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European Urban Policy Discourse

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Examples of politics of scale in 'Brussels' and the Netherlands

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Thea Dukes

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CHAPTER 1

1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In a brochure published by the European Commission in 2003, it is argued that: "European Union urban policy has been laid down in several documents" (EC 2003a, 50). While one could easily take this statement for granted and believe that there *is* an EU urban policy, a closer look at the European Union (EU) Treaties reveals that the European Union does not have a specific remit for urban policy (EC 1994b). Only two explicit (Atkinson 1999) urban programmes aimed at specific urban areas were initiated at the European level: the Urban Pilot Program (1990-1999) and the Community Initiative URBAN (1994-2006). Moreover, from a financial perspective these programmes are very modest.[1] Based on the small number of explicit urban programmes and the limited financial budget, one could therefore simply put it aside as a strong claim. However, that conclusion would be drawn too easily. Even if these European programmes as such would be rather insignificant, the European *discourse* on urban policy might still be very influential in the member states, especially since this discourse does not simply 'trickle through' from the European level, via the national governmental level but 'enters' subnational governmental levels directly. For, according to the partnership principle European urban programmes should involve actors at the subnational governmental levels. Moreover, Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer (2004) show that there is an increasing interaction between the European, national, regional and local levels in European Regional policy and in specific programmes such as URBAN.

Generally speaking, one can conceptualise the European Union as a multi-level polity, in which power is enacted in social relations between different governmental levels: the supranational, national and subnational levels. The process of European integration has increasingly been putting the territorial structures of public administration in the member states under pressure, implying a pressure to redirect domestic politics towards the European Union ('Europeanization'). Actors on these governmental levels will therefore actively try to reshape the spatial distribution of power within European political space. In this respect, Leitner (1997) points at a manipulation of relations of power and authority between them. European area-based urban programmes offer a good illustration, as various governmental levels are involved in this policy and as authority over a particular area is at stake. The involvement of local and regional actors in these programmes might be experienced as

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[1] While the total budget for the Structural Funds for 1994-1999 was about 154,5 billion euro at 1994 prices, for example, the CI URBAN budget for that period amounted to 900 million euros (EC 1997b).

a threat by the national governments of the member states, i.e. as European interference in their national administrative structures. Actors at the national governmental level might therefore be inclined to act as gatekeepers (Bache 1998; Tofarides 2003). But also at the local level, the programmes could be experienced as a threat. The local government system has control over a particular territory, but both the territory and the system itself are in flux. As Van der Wusten (1992, 2) argues: "The play of locality politics is played on a stage that is provisionally structured." In case of an area-based urban programme one could argue that a particular territorial sub-division within the territorial control of a local government system is constructed, based on European organizational requirements, such as local partnership and local participation.

One of the ways in which disaffection related to these European urban programmes might be expressed, is discursively, through contestation of European urban policy discourse. For that reason it is very interesting to examine this discourse in more detail. Based on a definition by Phillips and Hardy (2002, 3), 'discourse' can be understood as an 'interrelated set of texts and the practices of their production, dissemination and reception that brings an object into being.' The meaning assigned to the concepts in the discourse is not neutral, but politically laden and, for that reason, possibly contested. Introducing the idea of a discourse, in addition to text and context, provides the critical dimension that allows social construction to be understood.

What I basically argue in this dissertation is that, first of all, European policy makers employ an urban policy discourse that is disseminated through, among others, European urban programmes. This discourse implies a particular construction of social reality, in which European urban policy makers produce different meanings of 'place' and in which a politics of scale (a politics in which a particular construction of 'scale is involved) becomes visible in self positioning and the positioning of other actors, such as national and local governments or citizens. This positioning happens (among others) in a discursive way (parties do or do not figure in the discourse, they are referred to in a positive or in a negative way, they are depicted as important or not), in discursive practices: the acting of actors in speech and in writing. Actors in the member states might contest and negotiate that particular construction of social reality, especially the way in which they are positioned in the discourse.

How this process unfolds, depends to a large extent on the context and on contextual developments. An analytical distinction will thus be made between European Union urban policy discourse as the object of empirical analysis, and the contextual frameworks, policy debates, 'Euro-speak' as the background for this analysis: in relation with these frameworks European urban policy discourse comes about.

1.2 Research Goal

The ultimate research goal is twofold:

The first aim is to get a better and more general understanding of the 'negotiation' of European urban policy discourse and of the 'politics of scale' that might be implied. *How* does this process come about, as expressed in discursive practices and as embedded in and shaped by various contextual settings? This

particular focus is in keeping with Marston's, who argues that this kind of processes and 'micro-relations': "operate at a level that can be missed by research methods and forms of analysis that focus on large-scale structural and policy change" (Marston 2004, 18).

The second aim is to get a sense of the policy network around European area-based urban programmes. This policy network, of course, is also one of the contexts in which the discursive practices are embedded.

1.3 Research Questions

Focusing on the Netherlands, the following research questions will be addressed:
- *What is the extent of 'Europeanization' of the different governmental levels, involved in European area-based urban programmes?*
- *To what extent and how are actors at the different governmental levels involved in European area-based urban programmes, in particular in the European Community Initiative URBAN I?*
- *How is European urban policy discourse produced and 'negotiated' by governmental and non-governmental actors in discursive practices and what kind of examples of politics of scale can be found?*
- *How do the involvement of the actors in the policy network and their discursive practices come about, as related to the different contexts in which they are embedded?*

The primary time period covered in this research runs parallel to the European Community Initiative URBAN-I: 1994-1999. However, in order to do justice to contextual developments, the time period covered is actually roughly 1990-2005.

1.4 Methodology

In this research, case study research will be combined with a discourse analysis. Using a variety of data sources, the intention is to intensively *explore* and *understand* what happens within the cases. Discourse analysis will be used to investigate the processes of social construction, as expressed in discursive practices (research question 3).

In agreement with Phillips and Hardy (2002), the adoption of a discourse analytic methodology has been motivated by three reasons: an interest in the role of language and processes of social construction; an interest in (different views of) power and using the opportunity to make a case for the value of such a perspective in examining urban policy. These reasons overlay a general interest in the 'linguistic turn' in social sciences.

The most important contribution of discourse analysis is that it provides tools to unpack the 'production' of social reality: to empirically explore processes of social construction, processes that underlie individual, organizational and inter-organizational phenomena. At the same time, there is no standard discourse analytic method for researchers to follow: As it is largely 'data-driven,' it is difficult to formalize any standard approach to it (Tonkiss 1998; Phillips and Hardy, 2002). A researcher thus has to develop particular key themes and useful techniques for the analysis himself.

A second contribution of discourse analysis is that it forces researchers to think carefully about their own research practices. The linguistic turn has led to calls for increased reflexivity on the part of researchers, which means paying attention to "the interpretive, political and rhetorical nature of empirical research" (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 83).

Case study research and discourse analysis are both not undisputed in science, though. A choice for a combination of them is thus a major challenge, if not a dangerous undertaking. For, it means running possible methodological risks or facing criticism by other researchers. Elaborate attention will therefore be paid to the main methodological problems of and objections to these forms of research and to the efforts that have been made in this research to meet them.

1.5 Outline Dissertation

In this exploratory research, the empirical chapters follow the territorial structure of public administration: in principle, they are arranged according to governmental levels. Although the emphasis on the different research questions varies per chapter, basically their outline is similar, starting with an exploration of the contexts, continuing with an elaboration of the URBAN-I programme and ending with the discourse analysis.

In Chapter 2, first a framework will be developed that can be used as a basis for the empirical part of this research. Next, in Chapter 3 three issues will be addressed. It presents an empirical model, in which the research questions will be operationalized; a description of the methodology that is used to analyse them and a concrete research design, including a 'discourse analysis protocol'. The following six empirical chapters report the outcomes of the research for the European level (Chapter 4), the national level (Chapter 5), the regional level (Chapter 6), the City of The Hague (Chapter 8) and the City of Amsterdam (Chapter 9). In Chapter 10, the Cities of The Hague and Amsterdam will be compared. Chapter 7 deviates from the others in the sense that cities are described collectively; it serves as an introduction to Chapters 8 and 9. Finally, in Chapter 11, conclusions will be drawn and issues for reflection and discussion will be raised.

CHAPTER 2

2. Space of Governance

2.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to develop a framework, as a basis for the empirical part of this research. This implies, first of all, an exploration of scientific debates, with particular understandings of the European 'multi-level' polity, but, even more fundamentally, with particular understandings of core concepts of (political) geography, such as space, place, scale, power and territory. Secondly, it requires making conceptual choices, as a basis for the empirical model.

Within the European Union, conceptualized as a multi-level polity, power is enacted in social relations between actors at different (governmental) levels. This takes place in a context of change, in which territorial structures of public administration in recent years have increasingly come under pressure. Salet, Thornley and Kreukels (2002) refer to major institutional transformations in Europe, in terms of a reduction in the government's proactive role in the economy and society; the diversification of decision making throughout a wide range of organizations, and the restructuring of intergovernmental relationships. The first dimension refers to the increasing emphasis on privatisation, that has been dominant in the economic organization of European states, as well as in most sectors of public policy and that has implied the receding of government centrism. The second dimension implies the diversification of decision making. In the literature this is encapsulated in the broadly proclaimed shift from 'government' to 'governance' (see e.g. Geddes 2000; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Martin, McCann and Purcell 2003; Salet 2006). The third and final dimension concerns the restructuring of intergovernmental relationships. Peters and Pierre (2001, 133) emphasize the changed accessibility between governmental levels, arguing that: "decentralization and European integration have jointly reshuffled institutional relationships and created a system where institutions at one level can enter into exchanges with institutions at any other level...." Other authors point at a 'hollowing out of the state' (Rhodes 1994) or at processes of re-scaling or of transferring responsibilities and funding between governmental levels (Brenner 1999; Loughlin 2005).

In the following section, processes of European integration and Europeanization will be elaborated. Next, there will be a discussion of a variety of theoretical concepts and a number of bottlenecks and problems, related to them. The goal of this research is evidently not to try to solve these (conceptual) problems: one should, however, be aware of them when making (conceptual) choices. The last section of this chapter builds on the foregoing sections and extends them towards an empirical model, which will actually be further developed in Chapter 3.

2.2 European Integration and Europeanization

On March 25, 1957, the 'Treaty establishing the European Community' (or: 'EEC Treaty') was signed in Rome. It entered into force on January 1, 1958. The creation of the European Community, headed by Community institutions, added a new scale at the upper end of the European arena, marking an innovation in existing relations of power and authority, between the various governmental scales (Dukes 1999)[2].

The creation of a common market was of great political and economic significance (Pinder 1995). For that reason, from its early existence on, "the economic and political integration of nation-states into the EU (that is, the construction of this scale at the upper end) has been marked … with struggles over the location of power and authority. At the centre have been issues of whether, to what degree, and in which policy arenas member states should surrender national sovereignty to centralized EU institutions" (Leitner 1997, 125). This kind of contestation essentially consists of struggles over the transformation in the *vertical* order of the territorial structure of governance.

Since July 1, 1987, the date of commencement of the Single European Act, in an increasing number of policy areas, decisions are made in Brussels. Besides, these decisions are increasing in terms of scope. The Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1993, has enforced this process (Peters 1994). In Knill's opinion (2001), EU policies put pressure on national administrations because of the structural requirements they tend to imply. As an example he points at regulations that call for the centralization or decentralization of regulatory processes or that demand horizontal organizational change (e.g., by requiring the co-ordination of previously distinct administrative tasks).

This process of European integration is not a homogeneous process, because of variation in the member states. One could think of (at least) three forms of variation that are of importance.

First of all, there are a wide variety of territorial structures of public administration across member states. A basic distinction that is often made is one between federal and unitary systems (classic unitary states, devolving unitary states and regionalised unitary states) (Bullman 1997). These differences imply a wide variation in the relative power of the local and the subnational (regional) levels of government and in the degrees of political decentralization (Loughlin 1997; Börzel and Risse 2000), and thus in the relative political influence and autonomy of territorially based government actors (Hooghe 1996b; Marks 1996).

Secondly, there are important legal and administrative frameworks in the

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[2] In the sources in the research at hand, at times there seems to be confusion about the precise meaning of 'European Community' and 'European Union.' The establishment of the European Union in 1992 did not cause the European Economic Community to disappear; It remained a part of the EU as a 'pillar' under the designation "European Community" (www//europa.eu)

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Member states, that circumscribe to a large extent the position and formal options of the governmental levels. They do not only concern the constitution, but also the decision making system, formal agreements made between the different governmental levels in the member states, etc. These frameworks vary across member states.

Thirdly, regarding urban policy, there are also substantial differences between member states, in terms of the existence and (organizational) form of domestic higher-level policy frameworks. Tosics and Dukes (2005) give the example of frameworks for urban programmes, where the two extremes might be urban programmes designed as part of a national programme, versus urban programmes that are developed at the local level, not even resembling any higher-level programme.

The political administrative system and various frameworks in a member state will play a role in the way in which European integration comes about. In order to determine to what extent political-administrative institutions in a member state 'adapt' to the European Union, the concept of 'Europeanization' offers useful handles. This will be discussed next.

2.2.1 Defining Europeanization

Europeanization is a relatively new field of study and, as such, its definitions and approaches are disputed. Bache and Marshall (2004, 5) define Europeanization as: "the redirection or reshaping of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect the policies, practices or preferences of EU level actors/institutions." But there are also other definitions (see, for example, Harmsen and Wilson 2000; Radaelli 2000; De Rooij 2003).

In an effort to understand *what* is changing with Europeanization, Olsen (2002) distinguishes five different, but related phenomena, referred to by the term 'Europeanization': changes in external territorial boundaries; the development of institutions of governance at the European level; central penetration of national and subnational systems of governance; exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory and Europeanization as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe.

De Rooij (2003) seems to be right in arguing that Olsen's first, second and fifth interpretation of Europeanization could also be classified under European integration. In an effort to make a distinction between European integration and Europeanization, in De Rooij's opinion, generally speaking, European integration is primarily concerned with the question to what extent member states devolve authority to supranational bodies, while Europeanization focuses on the processes within these member states after authority has been devolved.

For a better understanding of the domestic impacts of European-level institutions, in this thesis, especially Olsen's third usage of the term, *Europeanization as central penetration of national and subnational systems of governance,* applies. De Rooij specifies Olsen's usage of the term, defining Europeanization as: "a series of processes that results in the European Union becoming a structural element in the political-administrative institutions in a nation state" (De Rooij 2003, 16). Finally, Olsen relates Europeanization to a multi-level governance approach: "Europeanization here involves the division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of governance. All

multi-level systems of governance need to work out a balance between unity and diversity, central co-ordination and local autonomy. Europeanization, then, implies adapting national and subnational systems of governance to a European political centre and European-wide norms" (Olsen, 2002).

2.2.2 Europeanization and Domestic Change

Studies reveal a considerable variation in the process of Europeanization across the member states (Harmsen 1999; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Bache and Marshall 2004). This uneven process is presently explained with reference to a neo-institutionalist framework, drawing in particular on the work of March and Olsen (1984; 1989)[3]. Institutionalism basically argues that 'institutions' (be they formal or informal organizational structures, procedures, norms, values or conventions) shape and constrain the behaviour of actors. Governments and administrative systems of the member states are stated to have *differentially* adapted to the pressures of European integration on their own terms: adaptation has reflected the pre-existing balance of domestic institutional structures and values. National administrations will, literally, seek to domesticate the integration process. Harmsen goes even further, arguing that: "…there will be a tendency for institutional forms to attempt to reproduce themselves in the face of new challenges. Alternatively, the pressures of integration may also be used in an attempt to shift existing balances of power.…" (Harmsen 1999, 85; Olsen 2002).

2.2.3 Dimensions of Europeanization

In trying to understand the impact of the EU on domestic politics, it is important to take into account that there are actually two-way pressures. Often domestic actors characterize these as 'downloading' from the EU level into the domestic arena and 'uploading' to the EU level. In the 'ascending' perspective, (sub)national authorities try, for example, to participate in European policy making, among other things, by lobbying at EU institutions (Bache and Marshall 2004).

Table 2.A Dimensions of Europeanization (De Rooij 2003)

Europeanization of:	Input towards the EU	Output from the EU
Functional Behaviour	Pro-active behaviour (lobby, for example)	Absorption and implementation (of EU-regulation and EU money)
Functional Structure	Policy preparing bodies	Implementing Bodies

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[3] See also Giersig and Beaumont (2006), who explore neostructuralist approaches or, ultimately, a selective integration of neostructuralist and neoliberal approaches for the analysis of governance in European cities.

For his examination of the extent in which subnational governments are 'Europeanized,' de Rooij (2003) uses different dimensions of Europeanization (see table 2.A). While he limits the dimensions of Europeanization within political-administrative institutions to 'functional behaviour' and 'functional structure', De Rooij also makes a distinction between an 'uploading' and a 'downloading' pressure. These different dimensions of Europeanization and the two-way perspective are useful within the theoretical framework of this thesis, in order to analyze Europeanization as a contextual element. At the same time, the way in which public administrative systems "work out a balance between unity and diversity, central co-ordination and local autonomy" (Olson 2002) being part of Olsen's (third) usage of the term 'Europeanization,' requires further elaboration. How do these dynamics play out? In the following, it will be explored what the 'multi-level governance' literature has to offer.

2.3 Governance and Multi-level Governance

Before turning to multi-level governance, it is important to briefly elaborate on the concept of 'governance' itself, as there is a wide variety of definitions and understandings of this particular concept.

2.3.1 Exploring the Concept of Governance

Over the last ten years, the term 'governance' has made a remarkable appearance in various disciplines (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2001), as reflected in divergent meanings, uses and versions. According to Kickert (1997), the term signifies a shift toward network-like relations beyond the formal structures of 'government'. Kooiman, on the other hand, focuses on its dynamics, arguing that governance includes: "all those activities of social, political and administrative actors that … guide, steer, control or manage society" (Kooiman 1993, 2; 2003). Peters and Pierre (2001, 131), in turn, point at changes in the balance of power accompanying the shift towards governance: "Political power and institutional capability is less and less derived from formal constitutional powers accorded to the state but more from a capacity to wield and co-ordinate resources from public and private actors and interests."
While the debate on governance is highly compartmentalized, Pierre (2000) argues that the overarching questions in the debate relate to new forms and shapes that the pursuit of the collective interest can and should take; the extent in which the traditional, liberal-democratic model of the state should be rethought and the steering instruments with which the state has to impose its will on society and on the economy.

Salet (2006) establishes the lack of one overarching discourse of governance that he attributes to the diversity of paradigms in which it is embedded, the variation of scientific disciplines and the different spaces of application. As an attempt to grasp the quintessence of 'governance,' he suggests to define it abstractly as a "framework for border crossing public action" (2006, 2). This relates to crossing the border of different systems of regulation; of 'familiar' relationships of the public and private sector and of 'place bounded experiences of space.' Regarding the latter, the author means that the effects of social interaction that require governance usually do not correspond with the territorial jurisdiction of administrative organization. As a result, more and more "in

between arrangements" will be needed that do not coincide with this territorial jurisdiction (Salet 2006, 2).

2.3.2 The Debate on Multi-Level Governance

The concept of 'multi-level governance' (MLG) was used for the first time by Gary Marks, in 1992, in a study of EC/EU regional policy. It was part of a new wave of thinking about the EU as a political system, following swiftly from the accelerated deepening of the European integration process in the late 1980s (Bache 2004; Bache and Flinders 2004). In its conceptualisation of the European Union as a single, multi-level polity, the MLG approach tried to capture changes in processes of decision making and control over territories in all their complexity. Its point of departure is that there is an interconnectedness of ('supranational' and national) policy arenas and that subnational actors operate in both arenas at the same time; that authoritative decision making competencies have become dispersed across multiple territorial levels and that (political) control over activities in the territories has become shared (Heinelt 1996; Hooghe 1996b; Marks 1996). Moreover, it is argued that processes of decentralization, in most European countries, have resulted in an increasing importance of the role of *local* governmental actors (Hooghe 1996b).

According to Peters and Pierre (2001, 132), multi-level governance refers to negotiated relationships between institutions at different institutional levels and also to a vertical 'layering' of governance processes at these levels. But, they add that: "although we tend to think of these institutional levels as vertically ordered, institutional relationships do not have to operate through intermediary levels but can take place directly … thus bypassing the state level." Additionally, Bache and Marshall (2004, 7) argue that multi-level governance does not imply that power is equally distributed among actors: "In most cases central government retains a nodal position within domestic policy networks and controls relatively greater resources than other domestic actors."

While one could wrongfully get the impression that multi-level governance merely deals with governmental levels, this is not the case. Multi-level governance actually has a wider cast of actors than traditional models of intergovernmental relations: both public and non-public actors can be involved. Moreover, as Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2001) state, MLG-theorists posit a set of policy networks, organized across policy areas and governmental levels, which connects the body of multi-level governance literature directly to the governance-as-network literature. Eising and Kohler-Koch (2000) speak of 'network governance' instead of multi-level governance.

2.3.3 A Critical Appraisal of Multi-level Governance

Although 'multi-level governance' is a useful tool to conceptualize and analyze the (ongoing processes in the) political-administrative structure of the European Union, at the same time, it has been seriously criticized. To give some examples of the criticism: The approach would be weak at explaining which 'levels' are the most important and why. Moreover, the role of subnational actors would neither be sufficiently elaborated, nor sufficiently differentiated for the different member states. This is important, for, as

mentioned earlier, the position of subnational authorities within the public-administrative system varies between EU member states (Tosics and Dukes 2005). Further, the approach would leave the question unanswered why subnational governments position themselves in the European arena. Finally, autonomy of subnational actors vis-à-vis the state would be overstated and the approach would not take into account the mechanisms of competition and hierarchy that might influence the interdependence in a negative way (Benz and Eberlein 1998; Jeffery 2000; Jordan 2001).

Other criticism relates to the lack of the role of institutions in the approach (Peters and Pierre 2004) or, more in general, in governance discourse (Salet 2006). In the opinion of Peters and Pierre (2004), the 'shift' towards multi-level governance should rather be conceived of as a gradual, incremental development in which institutions still play a defining role in governing. For, political action is still shaped and constrained by institutions. Their role should thus not be ignored. Moreover, "all actors have the option to resort to the constitutional definition of their institutional capability if … it is believed to be necessary to safeguard important institutional interests" (Peters and Pierre 2004, 89).

Salet criticizes governance studies in a wider sense. The author distinguishes two dimensions of public action: an institutional dimension (patterns of social norms that evolve over time) and an organizational dimension (goals, purposes, performance). In his opinion, the focus in governance studies is too much on the organizational dimension. Instead, Salet advocates more attention for an institutional analysis of political, legal or social legitimacy. For, considering the position of the state in the network society, as far as it is involved in social interaction, its power should rest on the actual legal, political and cultural institutions that condition its authority: "Negotiating or organizing consensus between direct involved actors of different background may be very useful, but cannot rest upon instant legitimacy which does not exceed the logic of the situation and its direct involved participants" (Salet 2006, 6).

Without completely ignoring this criticism on (multi-level) governance, also in this research, it is primarily the organizational dimension that is addressed in 'negotiating,' networking types of organization and regulation, within the context of the hierarchical framework of the state and 'conditioned by' territorial boundaries and various frameworks.

2.3.4 Multi-level Governance as a Negotiated Order
Multi-level governance is often depicted as a *negotiated* order. Marks (1993, 1996) refers to continuous negotiation among interconnected governments at several territorial tiers: supranational, national, regional and local. Boland (1999) tries to grasp the aspect of contestation by introducing the concept of '*contested* multi-level governance' and also Hooghe and Marks (2001) refer to the contested allocation of competencies between different levels. Peters and Pierre (2004, 75) emphasize that: "relationships among institutions at different tiers of government … are believed to be fluid, negotiated and contextually defined," the latter part referring to the regulatory framework in which, according to the authors, multi-level governance is embedded.

In case of the European Union, the authors also argue that these negotiations are based on the fact that the EU is still in the process of developing its jurisdiction and its agenda and thus tends to relate to actors and institutions through negotiations, instead of resorting to some formal, constitutional power base. This is actually questionable, as a substantial amount of acting between the EU level and other governmental levels is governed by strict legal regulations. However, in case of a policy such as urban policy, for which the EU does not have a specific remit, it seems plausible. Additionally, Peters and Pierre (2004) argue that EU institutions might conceive of this governance process as a means of enhancing their own powers vis-à-vis national governments, while subnational governments might use it to evade control from central government.

Finally, it is important to emphasize, that while negotiation might imply a negotiation of resources or competences, it might *also* imply a discursive 'negotiation' and relate to, for example, the construction of (new) levels of government and governance. This does not only hold for the European Union itself (Leitner 1997, 2004), but also, for example, for sub-state regions (Boyle 2000; Deas and Giordano 2003; Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde 2004).

Although multi-level governance is a useful conceptualization of the EU polity and offers some analytical handles for examining 'negotiations' within this polity, in two ways the model does not come up to the mark.

First of all, how should one understand the concept of 'scale' in multi-level governance? Interestingly, Cox (1998a, 1998b) disconnects two concepts of scale that are usually combined: scale as a level at which political action takes place and scale in terms of the levels that are marked by the territorial organization of the state. This issue requires more elaboration for the research at hand and will thus be discussed in the next section.

Secondly, how do the 'negotiations' within the EU polity exactly come about? These 'negotiations' might take the form of conflicts over power, resources and accountability, in view of the divergent interests of the actors involved. The Multi-Level Governance model, however, does not sufficiently problematize these dynamics. For that reason, additional handles are needed and these will be searched for in the debate on scale and politics of scale.

2.4 Scale and Scale Politics

Building on the concept of the EU as a multi-level polity with a negotiated order, in which territorial structures of public administration in the member states have increasingly come under pressure, Leitner (1997) points at a manipulation of relations of power and authority between different geographical scales: processes that do not pass off without any resistance, but will often be accompanied by struggle.

This struggle can be well represented as a 'politics of scale,' which will be discussed next. However, this requires a better understanding of the concept of 'scale'. For that reason, first, attention will be paid to the construction or production of *space* that is subsistent in the politics of scale and secondly, to the construction of scale.

2.4.1 The Production of Space

In his article on 'geography, difference and the politics of scale,' Neil Smith (1992b) refers to a 'geographical turn' in social theory: the rediscovery of space in critical social theory. While space was for a long time conceived as dead, fixed and immobile, inspired by Lefebvre (1991), it has been discovered as a social product: as produced and mutable, as an intrinsically complex expression of social relations. This view on space implies that social relations are not only expressed 'in' space, but also that the production of space has increasingly been looked at as the means by which social difference is constructed and reconstructed (Smith 1992b; Marston 2000).

Massey (1992, 80-81) points at the complex and political character of space, arguing that "space is by its nature full of power and symbolism, a complex web of relations of domination and subordination…." Staeheli (1994, 389) states in a similar vein that "the spaces and places in which we live and work are produced in and through contests between various social relations and forces. Through struggle, the power relations of society are inscribed in the landscape." Finally, Swyngedouw (1997) argues that these social relations also extend over a certain (material/social/ discursive) space and operate over a certain distance. "It is here that the issue of geographical scale emerges centrally. Scaled places, then, become the embodiment of social relations of empowerment and disempowerment and the arena through which they operate" (*ibid*. p. 169).

Based on the foregoing, one could thus also argue that European political space is a means by which power relations are constructed and reconstructed. Earlier it was mentioned that Leitner (1997) relates these power relations to different geographical scales. However, this implies an understanding of scale as a construction. What does this mean?

2.4.2 The Social Construction of Scale

For a long time, geographical scale, in terms of the nested hierarchies of bounded spaces, such as the local, regional, national, supranational and global, has been treated as a level of analysis and, as such, has been taken-for-granted. Only recently, this notion of geographic scale as a pre-given, fixed hierarchy of bounded spaces has been challenged (Delaney and Leitner 1997; Leitner 1997) and problematized. The common ground of this body of research is that geographical scale, rather than unreflected and pre-given, should be problematized as socially constructed: as produced and reproduced, in processes of social interaction. Scale is then considered as an expression of geographical scopes of particular structures of social relations that are continuously adapted and transformed (Cox 1996; Delaney and Leitner 1997; Arnoldus 2001). Instead of 'merely' considering scale as different levels of analysis for the examination of political processes, scale is thus captured in terms of political opportunities for various actors. This view has important consequences for inquiries into political action or decision making (Staeheli 1994; Arnoldus 2001). In this perspective, scales are not any longer seen as separate, unrelated levels, but they are seen within a relational context. This implies that actors who are involved in a particular political process have the opportunity to take action at different scales (or levels) or in co-operation with

actors who operate at other scales. At times, this kind of action is referred to as 'scale jumping' (Staeheli, 1994; Delaney and Leitner 1997; Arnoldus, 2001).

Interesting in this sense, is the model by Cox, who thinks about scale in terms of a network. He makes a distinction between 'spaces of dependence' and 'spaces of engagement.' 'Spaces of dependence' are defined by more-or-less localized social relations upon which people depend for the realization of essential interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere. These relations thus have a clear spatial dimension: they define place-specific conditions for people's material well-being and sense of significance. Through strategic action, actors with particular interests (citizens, firms, state agencies, etc) will try to safeguard their interests, or, in other words, their 'spaces of dependence'. However, in order to do so, they have to engage with other centres of social power (local government, the national press, etc.). In doing so, a new 'space' is created, that Cox refers to as the 'space of engagement': the space in which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds. This might take place in the form of 'jumping scale,' but that is not necessarily the case. In many cases actors of governmental levels will be implied in this 'space of engagement,' because of the interest of state territoriality. Cox therefore ascribes them an important role in politics of scale (Cox 1998a; Arnoldus 2001). This conceptualization applies perfectly to European area-based urban programmes, in which an area is at stake and in which various actors (but in particular actors representing different governmental levels) are involved.

Notions of Scale

There are different notions of scale and various authors have elaborated on them (see, for example, Taylor 1981, 1982; Smith 1984; Jonas 1994; Delaney and Leitner 1997; Howitt 1998, 2002, 2003; Marston 2000; Brenner 2001; Herod and Wright 2002; Sheppard and McMaster 2004; Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde 2004 and Paasi 2004).

The complexity of the notion of scale is expressed very well in Howitt's statement (2002, 306) that "scale … is simultaneously metaphor, experience, event, moment, relation and process." Howitt (1998, 2002) considers three interacting facets as constituting scale: scale as size, level and relation. None offers a fixed and undisputed sequence of scales, though (Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde 2004).

Scale as an areal concept, as *size or scope*, is the most common way of framing scale and a matter of central importance for geographers (Howitt 2002). Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde (2004) argue that if scale is a matter of size, 'global' can be considered as being larger than 'local.' Herod and Wright (2002), finally, use the metaphor of Russian Babushka dolls for scale as size.

Scale as a matter of *level* alludes to wider scales, encompassing greater amounts of complexity, such as organizational reach, the division of labour of the state, cultural diversity etc (Howitt 2002). Building on Howitt, Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde (2004) argue that if scale is a matter of level, differences between scales are a matter of complexity. Scales as levels imply a hierarchical ordering of scales, in which the local is the lowest scale and worldwide organizations are the highest scale –

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a "nested hierarchy of discrete enclosed jurisdictional spaces" (Cox 1998a, 1). In this hierarchy the scale of the nation state is well established, but intermediary scales (between state/municipality) can vary. As a metaphor for scale as level, Howitt (1998) uses the pyramid.

Comparing scale as size and scale as level, according to Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde (2004) the difference between the two is actually slim, as scale is seen in both cases as social organization in a bounded area. On the other hand, one could also argue that this is not necessarily the case: nation-states, for example, vary in terms of size, but in principle represent a similar level.

Finally, scale as *relation*, a dimension that has emerged in recent debates in social science (e.g. Swyngedouw 1997a; Marston 2000), implies an emphasis on the mutually constitutive character of scales. No scales exist without the others. No analysis can be limited to one scale: scales are constructed in relation to each other (Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde 2004). These cross-scale relations operate simultaneously, instead of hierarchically or unidirectionally (Howitt 2002). Scales as networks of interaction (Cox 1998a) seems to be in line with this notion of scale. Also Swyngedouw (1997) views scale as relational, when he refers to scaled places as the embodiment of social relations of empowerment and disempowerment. This also holds for Marston (2000) who sees scale as constituted around relations of capitalist production, social reproduction and consumption (Holm Nielsen and Simonsen 2003). Herod and Wright (2002) use the metaphor of a network. In case of the European Union, conceptualized as a multi-level polity, the most appropriate facets to scale seem to be scale as *level* and scale as *relation*. The relational character of scale is evident: the material and discursive production and reproduction of different scales are mutually constitutive.

Production of Scale

The view of scale as a social construction implies an element of action; actors socially construct scale in practices. Elaborating on this view, according to Marston (2000), currently there are three 'tenets' that constitute our understanding of scale 'production', as she calls it.

First of all, scale is a way of framing conceptions of reality (Delaney and Leitner 1997). Herod and Wright (2002) refer to it as 'rhetorics of scale'. Secondly, "the outcomes of these framings – the particular ways in which scales are constructed – are tangible and have material consequence" (Marston 2000, 221). Scale making is thus more than merely a rhetorical practice. As Uitermark (2002) argues, many social entities (neighbourhood groups, regional business associations, etc) have well-defined scales of operation. 'Scale organization' can then be considered as an attribute of these entities. Finally, Marston (2000) argues that the framings of scale that can thus have both rhetorical *and* material consequences, are often contradictory and contested and do not necessarily endure.

Smith (1993, 93) points at the framing of scale as a political process; as a site of political struggle. These struggles change the importance and role of certain geographical scales, reassert the importance of others, and sometimes even create entirely new significant scales. Most importantly, these scale redefinitions alter and

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express changes in the geometry of social power by strengthening power and control of some while disempowering others (Swyngedouw 1997; Uitermark 2002). Also Leitner (1997, 125) emphasizes the political and contested character of the production of scale: "A central aspect of the practice of the political construction of scale is the manipulation of relations of power and authority between overlapping or mutually inclusive political territories, by actors operating and situating themselves at different geographical scales. This process is highly contested, involving numerous negotiations, tensions and struggles among different actors as they attempt to reshape the spatiality of power and authority" (*ibid*. 125). As an example, the author points at various disputes surrounding the process of European integration: national sovereignty versus centralized EU institutions; the interpretation and application of 'subsidiarity' and issues of democratic accountability of 'supranational' policy and practice.

This process could be labeled as an example of a politics of scale, which will be addressed next.

2.4.3 Politics of Scale

Politics of scale (or 'scale politics') is the umbrella term for politics in which (a particular construction of) 'scale' is involved: scale strategies, scale frames, scale rhetorics, 'multi-scalar' practices etc. Various case studies have explored this issue, dealing with the role and scale strategies of political actors. Some contain explicit understandings of the importance of scale for negotiating power relations (Marston 2000). Like Smith (1993) and Leitner (1997), also Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde (2004, 458) refer to scale strategies, stating that: "In the process of formulating and enacting scale strategies, actors frame the problems they want to address, the solutions they propose, the actions of their opponents and their own at specific scales."

While scale construction is not necessarily purposive or deliberate (Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde 2004), regarding the process of European integration, Leitner (1997) does argue that the supranational scale of the EU has been purposefully constructed by political actors, in response to place- and time-specific contextual realities. In the disputes surrounding European integration, there has been contestation over three aspects of political construction of scale. Firstly, there was contestation over where power should be located and exercised (on which geographic scales and in which institutions on those scales). Since the late 1980s, the principle of subsidiarity has become central to discussions about the 'vertical' distribution of power and authority; affirming that, in principle, power and authority should be located at the lowest governmental levels possible. Secondly, disputes took place over the geographic scope of European integration, centring on the relative merits of deepening economic and political union among the member states (implying more power at the European level and thus referring back to the first aspect) versus widening of the geographic scope of the EU through enlargement. Thirdly and finally, disputes have transpired over the principles according to which political power should be exercised, such as democratic accountability and social justice. Finally, it is important to underline that politics of scale is not reserved for governmental actors, as has been shown by varies

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authors[4]. Staeheli (1994) focuses on spaces and scales of resistance and considers the empowering potential of scale identification for marginalized and oppressed groups. Empowerment has often been described as 'scale jumping' (Smith 1992a). This refers to the ability of actors to 'jump scale': to organize themselves at the scale with the most promising opportunities or, in terms of Cox, by constructing networks that are either smaller, larger or simply outside of the scales imposed by states, in order to realize their goals (Cox 1998a; Judd 1998; Mamadouh, Kramsch and Van der Velde 2004). Judd (1998) himself is less optimistic about their actual ability to do so: he argues that both, when the state constructs scale or fails doing so (the case of the 'missing scales'), it is very difficult for political agents to construct a scope of conflict more advantageous to them (what Cox calls a space of engagement). Also choosing the wrong scale might imply a weakening of actors' position: aiming at a 'world revolution' serves as an example.

2.5 Policy Networks in the Political Arena

The construction of scale is a social and political process that requires an apparent place (Arnoldus 2001). People assign different meanings to places. Places might therefore be fought over between different individuals or different (interest) groups. Phrased differently, places are necessarily bound up with the power relations that exist between different groups (Holloway and Hubbard 2001) or authorities for whom these places are meaningful.

In this thesis, European area-based urban programmes will be the focus of attention. In these programmes, the primary 'place' at stake is the target area on which the programme focuses. In terms of Cox (1998a), one could characterize this target area as a 'space of dependence,' for it will coincide with certain place specific social relations. This implies that particular actors might want to secure them, through creating a 'space of engagement'. This could be the case, for example, if policy measures would disrupt particular social networks in the area. Phrased differently, one could understand the function of area in terms of a political 'arena' and the involvement of actors in terms of a 'policy network'.

2.5.1 The Area as an Arena

An area can be seen as a political and social construction that constitutes a certain 'level' at which actors, groups and institutions are structured. Phrased differently, one can characterize the area as a political arena and as the frame of a policy arena.

Storey (2001, 1) refers to it as a territory, an area of 'bounded space' that might experience internal or external contestation. He argues that "territory refers to a portion of geographic space which is claimed or occupied by a person or group of persons or by an institution." The process whereby individuals or groups lay claim to such territory is denoted 'territoriality'. Inclusion or exclusion might be based on various differences, such as gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, age, etc

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[4] See for example Jonas 1994; Miller 1994; Staeheli 1994; Cox 1998a; McCann 2003; Mamadouh 2003; Martin 2003.

(Holloway and Hubbard 2001). Control over territory is, according to Storey, a key political motivating force.

In targeting a particular area, area-based urban programmes are thus, by their very nature, a form of territorial policy; Targeting an area also implies creating a political arena in which power over that particular area is at stake. In the arena, various political, social and economic actors meet, stimulated by policy initiatives and pursuing their own interests.

In area-based urban programmes often a wide variety of actors will participate: they might operate at divergent governmental levels, or, as we saw earlier, they might produce their own 'level'; they might be private or public; and they might be located inside or outside the area. Who will be involved in the planning and/or implementation of the programmes might be (partly) established in (overarching) policy programmes: these often imply conditions regarding (local) partnerships and (local) participation of non-governmental actors.

In case of European Structural Fund programmes, of which European area-based urban programmes are a part, the policy design even requires regional and local authorities to forge coalitions or partnerships with private businesses and their organizations. The Structural Funds are specifically used to enhance governance at the regional or local levels (Peters and Pierre 2004). However, involvement in these programmes as such of course does not necessarily mean equal involvement, as it does not say anything about the policy phase in which actors are involved or about the sort of involvement. Some actors will have advantages of legitimate status or they will have more resources than others. Moreover, there might be uncertainty over the use of such resources (Jordan 1990).

One could consider the actors who are involved in European area-based urban programmes as being part of a particular 'policy network'. In order to structure these actors and their interrelationships, some useful concepts can be found in the 'policy networks model.' This will be discussed next. At a later stage, attention will be paid to the relationship between policy networks and scale (section 2.5.3).

2.5.2 Policy Networks – a useful Tool for Analysis?

The network approach towards the analysis of public policy processes dates back to the mid 1970s and early 1980s. It is rooted in both inter-organizational theory (Scharpf 1978, among others) and the policy communities approach (Rhodes 1988, among others). The theoretical roots of policy networks can be found in policy science, organizational science and political science. For that reason, there are different approaches, and a univocal definition of the concept of 'policy network' is lacking (Klijn 1994).

In a rather general definition, Hanf (1978, 12) argues that "the term 'network' merely denotes … the fact that policy making includes a large number of public and private actors from different levels and functional areas of government and society." His definition, however, does not include any reference to interdependencies among the actors. In a definition of Benson it does. He defines networks as: "A cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource

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dependencies" (Benson 1982, 148). 'Resources' can be understood in various ways. They can be financial, organizational, constitutional-legal, political or informational (Bache and Marshall 2004), but they can also be discursive. More generally speaking, based on the literature, Klijn (1994) distinguishes three main characteristics of networks: (resource) dependency, variety of actors and goals, and relations.

Arnoldus (2001) points at a number of strong and weak points of the policy network approach, related to these main characteristics. First of all, what is meant by an 'actor'? In some studies an actor is an individual (personal goals), while in others it is an organization (organizational goals). Secondly, when exactly does an individual or an organization become an 'actor' in a network? For, involvement might be direct or indirect, active or passive. Thirdly, in terms of relations between actors, what kind of relationship is it? Some express it as a functional relationship (exchanging means for realizing particular goals); others put an emphasis on affective relations (based on trust, reciprocity) or co-operation in policy networks.

An additional shortcoming of policy network approaches seems to be that the dynamic aspect, the aspect of practices among actors in the network, is shed insufficient light on. A useful contribution in this sense is the book by Hajer and Wagenaar (2003), entitled '*Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society.*' The authors try to grasp the concept of practice: "It expresses the insight that knowledge, knowledge application and knowledge creation cannot be separated from action" (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, 20). Yet, the concept of practice is not merely a synonym for action, the authors argue:

> Practice theory integrates the actor, his or her beliefs and values, resources and external environment, in one 'activity system', in which social, individual, and material aspects are interdependent. The focus in such activity systems is on the way the different elements *relate* to each other rather than on the elements themselves. Practice theory … suggests that people negotiate the world (both social and physical) by *acting* upon it. Also, the concept of practice presupposes the social. It implies that in negotiating a particular situation the actor is always aware of his or her position in a larger network of relations and obligations. (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, 20)

At the same time, this leaves the question unanswered how actors in the policy network will act. For, in view of the divergent interests and resources among the actors, there might be friction between co-operation and competition in these networks.

Arnoldus (2001) points at the fact that policy networks have also been criticized for their lack of attention for change. In reaction to this criticism, there has been an increasing attention for the context or the 'environment' in which policy networks function: 'environment' does not only relate to the group of (potential) actors, but also to political, administrative and social institutional frameworks, or ideas, values and knowledge. At the same time, the author establishes that the context is not very often defined in spatial terms.

Policy network approaches thus offer handles for a more structured analysis of the actors involved in European area-based urban programmes, but at the same time,

they have some weaknesses that should be dealt with. Moreover, they are often conceptualized as 'horizontal' (based on a division of policy sectors), while in this thesis, there is also a 'vertical' aspect to the analysis. In this sense, Arnoldus (2001) points at the value of the network concept as used by Cox (1998a, 1998b), that implies possibilities for analyzing political action (for example policy development) in which actors of different spatial scales are involved. The link between policy networks and spatial scale requires some more elaboration, though. This will be done next.

2.5.3 Policy Networks and Spatial Scale

European area-based urban programmes are an example of policy that applies to a local level, while its development takes place at different, mutually connected scales. This implies a number of complications. Based on Arnoldus (2001), one could make the following, important observations.

First of all, if one considers the actors involved in European area-based urban programmes as a policy network, then the question that presents itself is: at what spatial scale does this policy network function? For, many actors involved operate on different spatial scales (or levels), while the scope of the policy (focusing on a particular target area in a neighbourhood) could be qualified as 'local.' Should one qualify the network, for example, as 'local,' 'national,' or possibly 'multi-level'? In view of the different spatial scales involved, a 'multi-level' qualification seems to best cover the overtones.

Secondly, in view of the important influence of the territorial structure of the state, Arnoldus considers the division in governmental levels the most obvious point of departure for the analysis of the network. But this entails a complication, as the different scales implied in policy development and –implementation, do not necessarily coincide with the territorial division of the state. One could thus be attentive to other spatial scales that might be constructed in the policy process.

Thirdly, how do actors in the policy network deal with the differences in spatial scales in their practices? Assuming, like Arnoldus (2001) does, that actors are aware of particular spatial interests as well as of the spatial scope of various institutional arrangements, in their strategic ways of acting, they might deal with them in divergent ways. For, they might use particular (European, national or local) institutional arrangements as a means for collective purposes, but also as a means for their own purposes. In both cases, one would expect to find examples of politics of scale, either in the form of 'scale jumping' or on different spatial scales at the same time.

2.6 Area-Based Urban Policy Discourse

In order to clarify the meaning of 'discourse', a basic distinction can be made between the material reality and the language used to represent it. Discourses include linguistic representation as well as social practices and might be quite powerful. As related to policy networks, one could conceptualize discourse as one of the resources, that actors, involved in the policy network, dispose of and might use to enact strategic intentions (Hardy, Palmer and Phillips 2000). In a similar way, Hajer expresses himself in terms of "formative power of utterances in policymaking" (2003, 104).

Applying these kinds of views to the politics of urban governance, Martin, McCann and Purcell (2003) point at the power to discursively represent the different (spatial, social, etc) 'bounds' of the city as an object to govern; to temporarily fix the limits of governable urban space for particular political purposes. An example relates to perceptions of particular neighbourhoods of cities as unsafe, with deviant residents. The authors consider it as a key aspect of the politics of urban governance.

One could also apply these views to the policy making practices of policy networks around European area-based urban programmes: actors in these networks might use 'discursive resources' to enact strategic intentions, either collectively or individually. For, in these programmes power over a particular area is at stake and the involvement of actors, in terms of resources, is usually not on an equal basis. They might therefore want to get, to maintain or to improve their position. This might be even more the case, if the policy implies new ways of governing and possibly threatens previously established forms of power relations.

2.6.1 Meaning and (Self)Positioning in Area-Based Urban Policy

The discourse around area-based urban policy concerns meanings assigned to particular concepts, ways of (self)positioning, and practices in which these are enacted. Generally speaking, policymakers fulfil a key role in this sense: they will construct, assemble and interpret terms and concepts that together might form a particular 'policy discourse.' In case of area-based urban programmes, the policy discourse will relate to areas, to problems connected to these areas, to ways of solving them, to organization, finances, time schedules etc. In assigning meaning to the policy concepts, the policy makers will produce a particular construction of social reality. This 'social reality' will be reflected in policy documents, in press releases, speeches, debates, etc. However, neither the social reality as a whole, nor the assigned meanings to the concepts on which it is based, will necessarily be shared by others. For that reason, in the interactive policy making practise to follow, when the policy domain is opened up to a wider variety of (governmental and non-governmental) actors, (particular) meanings in the policy discourse might be contested and therefore negotiated. Mindful of the quote of Martin, McCann and Purcell (2003) at the beginning of this section, both the construction of reality by the policy makers and its contestation by others, might be done for political reasons: to (re-) draw boundaries or to (re-)construct power relations. However, it is important to emphasize that neither the construction of a particular reality, nor the negotiation of parts of it are necessarily done with strategic intentions – it might be the case.

For a better understanding of the meanings assigned to concepts in a policy discourse and the (possible) negotiations of them by others, one thus has to examine *how* particular concepts in the discourse are constructed and reconstructed in policy and policymaking practises. Negotiation (if any) will probably relate to key concepts and story lines of the policy in question. In case of area-based urban policy, these would relate to (story lines regarding) place and scale.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the production of a discourse also implies allotting positions to the actors involved in the policy network. Besides, these processes of 'positioning' or 'othering' will be expressed in discursive practices.

One could think of seeking allies or, the opposite, claiming roles in the policy arena, as related to the place in question. Moreover, if processes of positioning are explicitly connected to place, they might be examples of a politics of scale.

Riggens (1997) expresses himself in terms of 'othering': emphasizing differences between Self and Other, that can take place along different fault-lines: 'Others' may be ethnic groups, women for men, the rich for the poor, the young for the old, the dominant majority for the subordinate minority, etc. Todorov (1982, 1985) points at three dimensions of the relationship between Self and Other: " value judgments (e.g., the Other may be deemed good or bad, equal or inferior to the Self), social distance (the physical and psychological distance the Self maintains from the Other), and knowledge (the extent to which the history and culture of the Other is known by the Self)."

Instead of 'othering,' the psychologists Harré and Van Langenhove (1999) use the term 'positioning'. They see positioning as a relational discursive practice that is both intentional and normatively constrained, that limits people's space, but on the other hand, as a resource, offers opportunities for negotiating new positions. Apparently not everybody shares their opinion that positioning is necessarily intentional. Bhabha (1994), for example, stresses the unconscious dimensions in representing others and Hajer (2003) points at the multiplicity of discursive strategies: "Positioning is not merely a matter of cornering one's opponents in concrete discursive exchanges. The power of policy discourse is also a matter of routinizing a particular 'parlance of governance,' of excluding or marginalizing alternative ways of seeing. Yet in other cases positioning might be an unintended side effect" (Hajer 2003, 107). Interestingly, Modan (2000), in her view on stance taking, argues that positioning can also be applied to entities other than humans. She emphasizes that positioning is relational, takes place along moral axes and is discursively interwoven with a geographical territory, creating alignments and oppositionings among people and places. A final, important contribution that should be mentioned is one by Neil Smith (1992b). This author suggests linking 'difference' and 'the subject' through a theory of scale where positionality is the product of contest and negotiation around socially demarcated boundaries: boundaries that are established at a particular scale and that may be permeable or not (Marston 2000).

2.6.2 Discursive Negotiations and the Understanding of Power

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that 'negotiations' are primarily understood here in a discursive sense: discursive power might be enacted in policymaking and practices. However, before proceeding with these negotiations, the concept of power requires some further elaboration.

The understanding of power in this thesis is basically in agreement with Foucault's, moving beyond more established views of power. At the same time, as will become clear later, it does not go that far, as the availability or lack of resources is considered to favour or hamper the ability to enact discursive power.

While the issue of power could be elaborated at length, below it will be limited to three key points that are of primary importance for the elaboration of this research.

First of all, following Foucault, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 13) argue that "power does not belong to particular agents and structures such as individuals or the state or groups with particular interests; rather, power is *spread across different social practices* (italics TD)." Such a view is at odds with more traditional views of power – as derived from resources or formal authority – in which, for example, in policy issues the government would be portrayed as the dominant stakeholder versus other, less powerful or powerless organizations.

Secondly, also based on Foucault (1980), is the view of power as productive instead of merely oppressive; constituting discourses, knowledge, bodies and subjectivities. As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 13-14) phrase it: "It is in power that our social world is produced and objects are separated from one another and thus attain their individual characteristics and relationships to one another…. Power is responsible both for creating our social world and for the particular ways in which the world is formed and can be talked about, ruling out alternative ways of being and talking. Power is thus both a productive and constraining force." Finally, discursive power does not exist by itself, but is enacted in social relations between actors.

Few summarizes these three key points of power and adds an element of negotiation: "Power is dispersed throughout society, rather than concentrated solely in the hands of the 'dominant'; power is entangled in social relations between agents that differ in their interests, identities and resources; and social power is articulated through complex mechanisms including tactics of negotiation" (Few 2002, 31).

However, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, the understanding of power in this thesis does not go as far as Foucault's. For, the availability or lack of resources is definitely of importance for the ability to enact discursive power. How do other authors understand this link?

2.6.3 Discursive Negotiations and Structural Conditions

Based on their study on collaboration and conflict in an inter-organizational domain, Hardy and Phillips (1998, 219) argue that "the ability to participate in social construction – the ability to create meaning – is differently distributed between actors…." In their opinion, actors with more power could be expected to use it and shape the political arena (they refer to it as 'inter-organizational domain') to their advantage. While this seems to imply that the authors have a somewhat more traditional view on power, this is only partly true. They highlight three aspects of power: formal authority (the legitimate right to make a decision), the control of critical resources (such as expertise, money, equipment, information) and discursive legitimacy (the ability to influence the process of social construction)[5].

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) point at structural conditions that might hamper (or benefit) the position of actors, in terms of class, ethnicity and gender. In case of policy networks around area-based urban programmes, this could imply that for poor, low educated neighbourhood residents in the policy target areas, these conditions might act as constraints, possibly putting them discursively at a disadvantage as compared to other actors.

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[5] As an example of the latter, the authors refer to environmental groups, such as Greenpeace.

Structural Conditions can also be understood in terms of resources. For, the division of resources also determines the position and the scope for policy making of the actors involved and thus also of the actors vis-à-vis each other. Depending on their division, resource dependencies might either act as a constraint or as an opportunity for actors to engage in discursive negotiations. Having more money makes it easier to disseminate a particular point in order to lobby for support, for example. Think, for example, of the presence or absence of funding for an expensive marketing campaign to announce a particular urban programme or for a grass roots campaign to object to it.

On the other hand, this does not mean that actors without any resources cannot engage in discursive negotiations at all. Phillips and Hardy (2002, 47) argue, for example, that "a discursive view … reveals that power can be exercised by creating meaning for social objects and that certain identities are able to have an influence – *even organizations that lack traditional power* (italics added by TD)." Moreover, this raises the question whether, in case of area-based urban programmes, this point only relates to actors who are formally involved in the programmes, or whether it also holds for actors who do not have a voice warranted to them in the initial, formal policy network[6].

Depending on their division, resources can thus both be limiting and enabling. While the impact of the division of resources on the position of the actors in area-based urban policy networks should not be overestimated, they should not be underestimated either: generally speaking, an actor with a favourable division of (formal/material) resources no doubt has a better point of departure for discursive negotiations than an actor with a less favourable division of resources.

2.7 Towards an Empirical Model

In this thesis, the EU will be conceptualized as a polity, with different governmental levels that are part of a multi-level governance system. The levels in this system – the supranational, national and subnational levels - are politically constructed and actors at these levels are actively trying to reshape the spatiality of power within the European Union, through manipulation of relations of power and authority. Ongoing processes of European integration and Europeanization increase the pressure and foster the struggle.

European area-based urban programmes, embedded in European Regional Policy and funded with money from the Structural Funds, offer a good illustration of struggles over power and authority, as various governmental levels are involved and as authority over a particular area is at stake. Moreover, involvement of actors will usually not be on an equal basis.

An important focus will be the struggles over power and authority, as expressed discursively in the policy networks. For that reason, there will be a substantial amount of attention for 'European urban policy discourse' as produced at

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[6] One would expect that voice should be warranted for an actor to be able to engage in discursive negotiations. As will become clear later, in the Amsterdam URBAN Bijlmermeer case study, this was not the case: a grassroots organization was able to obtain a formal position in the URBAN policy network, even though it originally did not have any formal resources or voice at all.

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the EU level and as (possibly) 'negotiated' in discursive practices, by other (governmental or non-governmental) actors most directly involved in some projects.

The conceptualisation of the EU as a multi-level polity, in which struggles are going on, implies a particular understanding of 'multi-level governance,' of 'scale' and of the 'manipulation of relations and power and authority'. They all require some further explanation.

First of all, multi-level governance hypothesizes the EU to be an organization in which central executives of states share and contest responsibility and authority with other actors, both supranational and subnational (George 2004). Governance, as described by Hubbard et al. (2002) matches well with this approach: a shift from centralized forms of decision making to a plurality of coexisting networks and partnerships that interact as overlapping webs of relationships at diverse spatial scales, from the neighbourhood to the globe (Hubbard et al. 2002; Martin, McCann and Purcell 2003). While it is not explicitly mentioned, governance might include both governmental and non-governmental actors.

Multi-level governance is seen as a negotiated order. In case of European urban policy, for which the EU does not have a mandate, the EU thus tends to relate to actors and institutions through negotiations, instead of resorting to some formal, constitutional power base. At the same time, these processes of negotiation take place within a 'regulatory framework,' in terms of a particular political administrative system (territorial structure, jurisdictions), formal and legal arrangements (between different governmental levels, for example), policy frameworks, etc. This regulatory framework thus dictates to a certain extent the formal positions of the actors at the 'levels' involved.

Secondly, it is important to emphasize that 'multi-level governance' will be used as an analytical tool and not as a normative concept. The different territorial levels of public administration will be used as levels of analysis. 'Scale' is thus viewed as a governmental level, linked to a particular territory and implying a hierarchical ordering. At the same time, however, scale will not be treated as a self-evident level, but as socially and politically constructed and potentially disputed: actors at a particular governmental level produce and reproduce their scale, in order to maintain or improve their position as related to other scales. For, the authority of the different governmental levels, as well as their mutual relationships in the EU polity, are no longer self-evident, but are under pressure. Moreover, scale should not be limited to governmental level. For, also non-governmental actors might organize at a particular scale, for example in order to get a position in a particular (policy) arena[7]. These scales do not necessarily coincide with the territorial levels of the state. Finally, each scale should be understood as relation, with respect to "its embeddedness or positionality within a broader scalar hierarchy" (Brenner 2001, 600). The analysis will therefore imply more understandings of scale. In case of the multi-level polity, this relates both to governmental levels, and to other politically constructed scales.

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[7] The latter is not the main focus of this research, though, but it will get some attention in the empirical chapters on the Dutch cities.

Thirdly, 'manipulations of relations of power and authority' within the EU political arena, might manifest themselves in highly divergent ways. In this research, however, especially their manifestation as 'politics of scale' will be the focus of attention. As mentioned earlier, this is a general term for politics in which (a particular construction of) 'scale' is involved: scale strategies, scale frames, scale rhetoric, 'multi-scalar' practices etc. In order to find out *whether* politics of scale takes place and in order to grasp *how* it comes about, the focus will be on ways of self positioning and positioning of others in policy and practices, as related to place and scale.

One can conceptualize the actors involved in European area-based urban programmes as being part of a policy network around these programmes. The governmental actors in this network, seen as representatives of organizations, operate at different spatial scales (mostly within the territorial structure of the European Union and the state). Policy network approaches turn out to offer useful concepts for mapping the actors, their practices, their mutual relations and resources in the design and implementation of European area-based urban programmes. However, the primary goal in this research is *not* to fully map the policy networks around all these programmes. The primary goal is to map the policy network in two concrete programmes (URBAN Bijlmermeer and URBAN Schilderswijk) and to examine the discursive struggles over power and authority between the various governmental levels within the context of, or even about, these programmes. In this examination the focus will be on scale and (self) positioning. Besides, the research mainly has an organizational focus instead of an institutional focus.

The element of action will be grasped by the concept of (discursive) practices. Regarding these practices of actors in the policy network of European area-based urban programmes, the main focus will be on the construction of place (cities in particular) and on the (self) positioning (often as related to place) by the actors involved.
Moreover, in order to 'contextualize' the policy network around European area-based urban programmes, various frameworks that dictate the position of the policy network or of (particular) actors within it, both at the EU level and within the member state, will be analyzed. These relate to territorial boundaries (jurisdiction) and to political-administrative-legal arrangements[8]. Policy frameworks will be described as a direct context of the policy network as well. Finally, also processes of European integration and Europeanization should be understood as a wider context of these policy networks. To be somewhat more specific, the focus will be on European area-based urban programmes (especially on the Community Initiative URBAN-I), as embedded in European Regional Policy, the Structural Funds and the EU Treaties, but also in different contexts in the member states.

In the following chapter, the research questions will be operationalized in an empirical model.

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8 Examples relate to agreements based on European primary- or secondary legislation, such as the Treaties or the Structural Fund regulations or (within the member states) to the division of authority between the national and subnational government, as laid down in the national constitution.

CHAPTER 3

3. Empirical Model and Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter consists of three parts: First, an empirical model will be presented in which the four research questions are operationalized. These questions will be answered per governmental level in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4-10) later. Second, a description will be given of the methodology that is used to analyse them, in particular paying attention to discourse analysis. In the third part, several items of the research design will be further discussed.

3.2 The Empirical Model

3.2.1 Question 1: The Extent of Europeanization

"*What is the extent of 'Europeanization' of the different governmental levels, involved in European area-based urban programmes?*"

The extent of Europeanization is an important issue, as we want to get a sense of the extent and the way in which 'Europe matters' for the different governmental levels, whose actors are involved in the European programmes. For, one could argue, in order to be motivated for action towards something, it basically has to matter. Or, as Hardy, Palmer and Phillips (2000, 1228) state: "Strategic actors … must locate their discursive activities within a meaningful context if they are to shape and construct action."

Earlier, a model by De Rooij (2003) was presented, in which he distinguished different dimensions of Europeanization. The author limited his dimensions of Europeanization in political-administrative institutions to 'functional behaviour' and 'functional structure'. As has become clear in the former chapter, however, one could also think of Europeanization in terms of 'discourse'. Moreover, just like 'behaviour' and 'structure,' this discourse could be both input towards the European Union (EU oriented discourse), as well as output from the EU (in terms of the absorption and implementation of European discourse, for example, of European urban policy discourse). Additionally, one could classify 'discourses' and 'behaviour' under the wider concept of 'practices.' Using De Rooij's model as a point of departure (De Rooij 2003), in table 3.A it has been extended.

Table 3.A Dimensions of Europeanization

Focus	Europeanization of:	Input towards the EU	Output from the EU
Practices	Discourse	EU oriented Discourse	Absorption and implementation of European (Policy) Discourse
	Behaviour	Pro-active behaviour (lobby, for example)	Absorption and implementation (of EU-regulation and EU money)
Organization	Structure	Policy preparing bodies	Implementing Bodies

In this research, not all of these dimensions will be examined to the same extent, as the main research focus is on discursive practices: the emphasis will thus be on discourse, especially as output from the EU. Additionally, some attention will be paid to behaviour, especially towards the European Union. In the discussion on Europeanization of the different governmental levels, structure will merely be addressed on an ad-hoc basis.

As related to the European URBAN programme itself, however, structure will be addressed elaborately, especially at the local level, in the stage of policy implementation (Chapters 8 and 9).

3.2.2 Question 2: Involvement in European Urban Policy

The space in which actors involved in European area-based urban programmes meet each other, can be characterized in different ways, for example: as an 'inter-organizational domain' (Hardy and Phillips 1998); as an 'arena' or as a 'space of engagement,' following Cox (1998a). These concepts are of a rather abstract nature and do not say anything about the place where, or about the 'scale' on which actors meet, for this might vary.

However, one can distinguish two elements that could be operationalized separately: the first component relates to the *organizational bodies* that are used or called into being for the urban policy under study and the actors involved in these bodies. The second components are the *practices* by the actors within these bodies. The following research question deals with the first component, the organizational bodies:

"*To what extent and how are actors at the different governmental levels involved in European area-based urban programmes, in particular in the European Community Initiative URBAN-I?*"

In order to operationalize this question, the concepts that require further elaboration are actors, involvement and levels. They will be discussed next.

Actors

Actors will be understood as representatives of particular organizations. In this capacity, they might have certain motives for negotiating, such as improving or even acquiring a position within the programme or within a wider context. A basic distinction that can be made among actors involved is whether they represent *governmental- or non-governmental* organizations. Examples of the latter are housing corporations, community organizations, private organizations, etc. Not all actors might meet this distinction, though. An example relates to 'Quangos'[9].

Basically, the primary focus will be on governmental- and non-governmental actors, involved in organizational bodies related to the European Community Initiative URBAN-I at the EU level and in the Netherlands. As will become clear later, non-governmental actors are mainly involved at the local level, during the stage of policy implementation.

Whereas this sounds rather simple, in terms of organization, area-based urban programmes can actually be quite complex, including a variety of organizational bodies with different actors, that vary for different localities and sectors.

Involvement: Opportunities and Constraints

Involvement can be expressed in terms of the use of resources. These resources will usually be unevenly divided among the actors in the inter-organizational domain. This implies opportunities for some actors (who can dispose of them), and constraints for others (who can not). Phrased differently, one could say that actors have a certain 'scope for policy making[10]' within the inter-organizational domain. Basically, the following aspects of involvement will be examined:

- The moment of involvement of the actor in the policy process (policy development and/or policy implementation);
- The position of the actor, in terms of different resources.

The following resources can be distinguished[11]:

1. Formal resources, in terms of formal position, formal authority and finances:
   a. Formal position: actors might (or might not) be formally involved in organizational bodies;
   b. Formal authority: actors might (or might not) have a recognized, legitimate right to make a decision (based on a law, on a regulation, etc). In an inter-

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[9] The acronym "Quango" is either spelt out as QUAsi Non Governmental Organization, Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organization, or Quasi-Autonomous National Government Organization. Quango's are non governmental organizations that perform governmental tasks, often with government funding.

[10] In the Van Dale dictionary (Groot Woordenboek Nederlands Engels) 'beleidsruimte' is translated as 'scope for policymaking.' However, this translation does not fully cover the overtones, as it merely refers to policy *making*, whereas policy *implementation* is not included.

[11] Inspired by Van der Laan (1998), Hardy and Phillips (1998) and Bache and Marshall (2004).

organizational domain, formal authority might rest with one particular actor (the government, for example), but it might also be shared by actors or be dispersed among them.

c. Finances: actors might (or might not) be able to influence other actors by means of financial distribution or withholding. Formal authorities anyway determine the possibilities for using provided resources and for withholding them.

2. Discursive resources, in terms of voice and command of the language.

a. Voice: actors might (or might not) hold subject positions that warrant sufficient voice, as recognized by others. One could think, for example, of a particular (good or bad) reputation that somebody has.

b. Command of the language employed: actors might have or lack sufficient command of the language that is employed. This can be a serious constraint, for example, for actors who represent ethnic organizations.

3. Information[12]
A final resource that could be of importance is information: information relates to knowledge, for example of the local situation. This knowledge is important for the interpretation and implementation of policy. In case of area-based urban programmes, one would expect that actors at the lower governmental levels and/or in the target areas have a knowledge advantage, as compared to actors at higher governmental levels.

Discursive power is determined by discursive resources. These, in turn, are partly determined by the division of formal resources and information. To be somewhat more specific: money, authority or information might all be of importance as related to having voice; having money for disseminating a particular message; having information in order to use valid arguments to convince (or 'manipulate') others, etc.

Notice that there might also be other sorts of constraints, related to, for example, age, class, education, ethnicity, gender etc. One would expect that these might be of particular importance for actors representing the local community in the target areas of urban programmes (often their inhabitants are poor, poorly educated and of foreign descent). As these are probably less important for actors representing the governmental levels, they are not implied in the model. But they should be kept in mind.

Resources are of course not isolated. They are related to the position of actors in a particular territorial structure of public administration; as laid down in legal

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[12] Van der Laan (1998) refers to information as a 'material resource.'

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frameworks, etc. These aspects will be discussed as 'contexts' in section 3.2.4 of this chapter.

Levels

Level will be, first of all, operationalized as governmental level, following the territorial structure of public administration (EU, national, regional, local). At the same time, however, level will be treated as socially and politically constructed: actors at a particular governmental level produce and reproduce their (scale) level, in order to maintain or improve their position as related to other (scale) levels. Moreover, also non-governmental actors might organize at particular (scale) levels, that do not necessarily coincide with the territorial levels of the state. Finally, each (scale) level will be understood as relation. The analysis, as reported in Chapters 4 to 10, will therefore imply more (scale) levels.

3.2.3 Question 3: Discursive Practices and Politics of Scale

An important focus in this research is on the production and 'negotiation' of meanings assigned and positions in European urban policy discourse. Earlier, it was argued that one can distinguish two components of an inter-organizational domain: organizational bodies and practices. The following research question concerns the second component, the practices:

"How is European urban policy discourse produced and 'negotiated' by governmental and non-governmental actors in discursive practices and what kind of examples of politics of scale can be found?"

For an operationalization of this question, the concepts that require further elaboration are discourse, discursive practices and politics of scale.

Discourse and Discursive Practices

As mentioned in the introduction, based on Phillips and Hardy (2002, 3), discourse is understood as "an interrelated set of texts and the practices of their production, dissemination and reception that brings an object into being." Discursive practices will be operationalized as the (discursive) acting of actors, involved in the European URBAN programme, in speech and in writing. It is impossible to examine *all* discursive practices of *all* actors involved, as related to *all* the aspects of European urban policy. For that reason, the primary focus of attention concerns discursive practices that relate to (assigning meaning to) cities and ways of (self) positioning:

- What kind of meaning is assigned to cities (or parts of cities)?
- How do actors position themselves and other actors a) in relation to cities (or parts of cities) and b) in relation to each other?
- What kind of politics of scale do these constructions of cities and ways of positioning express?

Moreover, after examining the discursive practices, it is interesting to look at the adapted table by De Rooij (see section 3.2.1) again. For, an interesting issue is whether actors turn out to 'absorb and implement' European urban policy discourse (this could then be seen as a dimension of Europeanization: output from the EU) or whether they do not and, instead, contest this European discourse or do have an EU oriented discourse, but based on their *own* framework and social reality.

Politics of Scale
In this research, politics of scale is understood as politics in which (a particular construction of) 'scale' is involved. It is viewed as a manifestation of a manipulation of relations of power and authority in the European multi-level polity, as related to particular territories. Politics of scale will be operationalized in terms of ways of (self) positioning by actors in policy and practices, as related to place and scale. As mentioned in the introduction, this might imply that particular actors do or do not figure in the discourse; that they are referred to in a positive or in a negative way; that they are portrayed as important or not, etc. Examples of politics of scale will be searched for in all the empirical chapters (Chapters 4-10).

3.2.4 Question 4: Contexts of Involvement and of Discursive Practices
Discursive practices take place in a dialectical relationship with various (more narrow and wider) contexts. The final research question thus relates to these contexts:

"How do the involvement of the actors in the policy network and their discursive practices come about, as related to the different contexts in which they are embedded?"

In order to answer this question, the following main contexts have been distinguished: policy contexts; political debates and discursive contexts; geographical, social-, economic- and physical contexts and the territorial structure of public administration. These will be operationalized next.

Policy Contexts
In a narrow sense the policy itself is the context in which the discursive practices take place. In the narrowest sense one could think of the organizational bodies (the URBAN Committees, for example, in which actors participate), whose organization is formally laid down in writing. But one could also think of it in terms of the wider policy and financial frameworks in which the policy is embedded. In case of European area-based urban programmes these would be the EU treaties or, more specifically, the policy framework of European Regional Policy and the European Structural Fund regulations. They define the 'scope for policymaking' and they also give directions – even though they are formulated broadly – for the utilization of this scope for policy making. Examples relate to the subsidiarity principle; to Structural Fund principles such as partnership, additionality, programming and concentration, or to specific requirements related to local participation.

However, one should not limit the policy context to the European policy context. Also the policy context in the member state in which the European programmes are implemented should be taken into account (see also Tosics and Dukes 2005). In case of the Netherlands, the framework of the Dutch area-based urban policy, 'Big Cities Policy,' but also other policy frameworks should be examined, as they might function as a context for the European URBAN programmes that are implemented.

Political Debates and Discursive Contexts
A final important contextual factor relates to, first of all, the discursive context. Actors who participate in the area-based urban 'inter-organizational domain' discursively exchange and 'negotiate' particular meanings of key concepts of area-based urban policy. However, as Hardy, Palmer and Phillips (2000, 1245) phrase it: "Discursive activity only provides a strategic resource when appropriately grounded in the prevailing discursive context." In order to explain how discourses operate, the broader discursive context should thus be examined, to ascertain the scope that it provides for action, as well as the limits that it places on action.
A second important context relates to ongoing political debates: the development of a particular policy and its discourse will reflect particular political debates in relation with which it has been produced. For a better understanding of the discourse, these debates require some attention as well. These debates will vary, for the EU, for member states, for different scales or places within these member states, etc.

Geographical, Social, Economic and Physical Contexts
Next, the European URBAN programmes are put into effect in a particular geographical, social, economic and physical context. In the narrowest sense, the geographical context relates to the target area of the programme: an area with particular social and physical characteristics (usually a deprived area), that is part of a wider geographical context. In order to understand the problems at issue in the target area and the aims of the URBAN programme (often: social-economic renewal), one should pay attention to these contexts: not only at the level of the area itself, but also at the level of the neighbourhood, the district, the city, etc.

The territorial structure of public administration as context
Another important contextual factor is the territorial structure of public administration and its legal foundation. The target area in a European URBAN programme is related to a wider public-administrative 'multi-level' context: the area is, for example, part of a city district, that together with other city districts is part of a city, a province, a country, the European Union, etc.
Moreover, even though it is not the object of study in the research at hand, some attention should be paid to developments that put pressure on these territorial structures of public administration, such as global economic transformation, regionalization tendencies and EU integration politics, as well as on the impact of these developments.

Territorial authority or formal relations between territorial authorities are laid down in legal frameworks and in various other agreements, with different legal or non-legal status. In case of the European Union, that has no constitution (yet), one could think of the Treaties (primary legislation). In the Netherlands, one could think of the constitution, or of laws, such as the Provincial act (*Provinciewet)* and the local government act (*Gemeentewet*), but also of agreements between local and sub-local governments (*Bestuursakkoorden*) or the Code intergovernmental relations (*Code Interbestuurlijke Verhoudingen)*.

Finally, under this heading also the formal division of resources should be mentioned, for example between the state and the provinces, or between the state and the municipalities. This formal division is usually (partly) laid down in legal frameworks as well.

The answer to this research question will be given in all the empirical chapters (4-10) and in the final conclusions.

3.3 Methodology

In this exploratory research the discursive practices of the actors involved in European area-based urban programmes are an important focus of interest. The aim is to get a better understanding of European urban policy discourse and the way in which it is discursively 'negotiated'. In view of the key concepts of area-based urban policy, the main focus is on meanings assigned to cities (or parts of cities) and on ways of (self) positioning. This particular focus requires a particular methodology, a so-called discourse analysis.

3.3.1 A Constructivist and Discursive Perspective

Generally speaking, discourse analysis is grounded in a constructionist epistemology that views language as constitutive and constructive instead of reflective and representative (Phillips and Hardy 2002). Constructivists' point of departure is the claim of (post-)structuralist linguistic philosophy that access to reality is always through language (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Social constructionism thus challenges the view that conventional knowledge is based upon objective, unbiased observation of the world. Instead, it claims that the ways in which we understand the world, the categories and concepts we use, are historically and culturally specific. Knowledge is constructed between people, through social interaction. These 'negotiated' understandings can take a wide variety of different forms. In other words, there are numerous possible 'social constructions' of the world. This does not mean that reality itself does not exist. As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) argue, physical objects exist, but they only gain meaning through discourse. The social constructionist approach has important implications, among others that the role of language becomes very important; People acquire the categories and concepts that they use in the process of learning a language. These are thus produced and reproduced by everyone who shares a certain culture and a certain language. In that sense, language has constructive power. The use of language can therefore be thought of as a form of action. Another important implication is a stronger focus on processes (such as interaction and social practices) than on structures. A final implication is that the historical and cultural

context of these processes becomes far more important, as all ways of understanding are historically and culturally relative (Burr 1995).

This implies that changes in discourse are a means by which the social world is changed. A keyword is therefore 'discursive struggle.' These take part in changing, as well as in reproducing social reality (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). For that reason, discourse analysts are interested in language and texts as sites in which social meanings are created, reproduced (Tonkiss 1998) and contested.

3.3.2 Discourse Theory and Discourse Analysis

Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) argue that discourse analysis as a method of analysis should not be used detached from its theoretical and methodological foundations, as each discourse analytical approach is a theoretical and methodological whole, a 'package' consisting of philosophical premises regarding the role of language in the social construction of the world; theoretical models; methodological guidelines for how to approach a research domain and, finally, specific techniques for analysis. In a similar vein, David Howarth[13] argues that discourse analysis can be understood both in a narrow sense (as a specific method) and in a wider sense. In the latter case, a discourse analysis (as a method) is understood as being rooted in a discourse theory.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as theorized and phrased by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), Fairclough (1992, 1995) and Marston (2004), offers some interesting theoretical points of departure for the research at hand. Drawing in particular on the work of Fairclough, this perspective focuses on the way in which discursive activity structures the social space within which actors act, through the construction of concepts, objects and subject positions. (Phillips and Hardy 2002). Marston (2004), for example, analyses micro relations of power, subjectivity and resistance and intends to highlight the voices of those that contest dominant discourses and subjectivities, to show that there are multiple organizational, policy and subjective realities.

While an explicit 'critical' discourse analysis is not followed, many of the more common features of CDA-approaches will be adhered to in this study, such as the point of departure that the character of social and cultural processes and structures is partly linguistic-discursive; that discourse is both constitutive and constituted; that language use should be empirically analyzed within its social context and even the critical attitude towards research[14]. Also Fairclough's distinction between discursive and non-discursive dimensions of social practises will be followed.

The approach in this study can be characterized as a pluralist one, with a 'package' containing both discourse analytical and non-discourse analytical elements, provided with a set of arguments to justify the adopted approach.

3.3.3 Methodological Guidelines and Specific Techniques

Discourse analysis aims at identifying (some of) the multiple meanings assigned to texts and at the same time provides a way of analyzing the dynamics of social

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[13] As expressed in his lecture at the NETHUR School 'Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences: Theories and Methods,' organized in Utrecht, May, 18-19 2004.

[14] For an elaborated overview see Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, page 60 and following).

construction that produce certain categories and hold the boundaries around them in place (Phillips and Hardy 2002). Because of the breadth of discourse analysis techniques and the wide diversity of the phenomena under investigation, the form and analysis will vary strongly from one study to another.

Regarding methodological guidelines and specific techniques, in the research at hand the writings of Maarten Hajer have been consulted. Hajer (2003) distinguishes three elements of a discourse analysis: the study of the *terms of policy discourse*, the analysis of the particular *institutional practices* in which discourses are produced and in which conflicts are played out and the formation of particular *discourse coalitions*.

The first element, the study of the *terms of policy discourse* relates to (new) vocabularies, story lines, generative metaphors, implicated division of labour and various 'positionings' for the actors/stakeholders involved. Drawing on Connolly, 'terms' are understood as "institutionalized structures of meaning that channel political thought and action in certain directions" (Connolly 1983, 1). Hajer reserves the concept of 'terms of discourse' to refer to the ways in which institutional biases are structured in textual utterances. He refines the analysis of the formative power of utterances in policymaking by introducing three layers that together make up the terms of policy discourse (Hajer 2003, 104):

- Analysis of *story lines, myths and metaphors*: (crisp) generative statements that bring together previously unrelated elements of reality and thus facilitate coalition formation.
- Analysis of *policy vocabularies*: sets of concepts structuring a particular policy, consciously developed by policymakers.
- Analysis of *epistemic figures*: certain rules of formation that underpin theories/policies.

The second element of a discourse analysis relates to *institutional practices* - the settings, in which the discoursing takes place and in which conflicts are played out.

The term 'institutional practices' might be somewhat confusing, as the main focus in this research relates to 'discursive practices'. For that reason, these institutional practices (or settings) will be referred to here as *contexts*.

The third element concerns the formation of particular *discourse coalitions*. Hajer argues that one should also examine the coalition of actors that supports the discourse. He defines a discourse coalition basically as a group of actors that, for a variety of reasons, adheres to a particular social construct.

In the discourse analysis protocol, developed for this research (see section 3.4.7), the first two elements of Hajer (the terms of policy discourse and the contexts) have been incorporated. The third element (the formation of particular discourse coalitions) will be addressed in the conclusions, though; for, then the empirical research allows to make a comparison between the social constructs that actors at the different governmental levels do (or do not) adhere to.

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3.3.4 The Challenges of Discourse Analysis

Basically, discourse analysis is not institutionalized, so doing it implies facing the ongoing struggle of convincing other researchers that discourse analytical studies have been conducted satisfactorily. Complicating in this sense, is that there are few established norms or standards that specify how to write up a study. One thus has to develop a convincing narrative to explain what was done and why in that way.

According to Phillips and Hardy (2002) issues of validity and reliability do not play out in the same way in a discourse analysis, as compared to other types of research: Validity, in their opinion, is irrelevant if the point of departure is that there is no 'real' world other than one constructed through discourse. Reliability, the idea that results are 'repeatable', is something they consider 'nonsensical' if one intends to generate and explore multiple (and different) readings of a situation.

However, I do not agree with these authors, as a discursive analytical study can be evaluated in terms of: how well the evidence is presented to demonstrate the arguments; how plausible the findings are and how profound the analytic scheme is in helping readers to make sense of discourse (Wood and Kroger 2000; Phillips and Hardy 2002). Phrased more specifically, Tonkiss (1998) argues that discourse analysis has a particular concern with issues of *internal validity*. Its reliance on close textual work means that it generates arguments on the basis of detailed interpretation of data: how coherent is the interpretive argument? Is it soundly based in a reading of the textual evidence? Does the researcher bring in arguments from outside the text, and if so, how well supported are the claims? Regarding *external validity*, the extent of generalizability of the findings to other research or social settings, the author argues that the critical interpretation of the research questions within discourse analysis makes it difficult to advance claims in this sense, as the analyst's own discourse is never wholly objective, factual or generally true.

Nevertheless, in section 3.4.7 efforts have been taken, to be as clear and systematic as possible in doing the discourse analysis.

3.4 Research Design

Following a so-called 'pluralist' approach, a 'multi-perspectival framework[15]' will be used that is based on an analytical distinction between discursive practices – the object of empirical analysis – and broader 'societal' developments – the background for analysis. In this framework, different discourse analytical approaches/techniques will be combined with imported social theories, related to multi-level governance, scale and scale politics, place and positioning.

3.4.1 Proposition

My basic proposition is, that in view of a) the wide variety of actors involved in European area-based urban programmes, b) the fact that a territory is at issue and c) the fact that these programmes take place in a wider European multi-level polity, in which political space is contested, there will be processes of contestation, both within the wider policy network and in the (more narrow) inter-organizational domain. While

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[15] This term is derived from Jørgensen and Phillips (2002).

these processes might take various forms, I argue that one of the ways in which they are expressed is discursively: as discursive contestation of meanings assigned. In case of European area-based urban programmes, this would relate especially to the meanings assigned to place and the ways of (self)positioning of the actors involved.

3.4.2 Research Strategy

In order to explore my proposition and to answer my research questions, my primary research strategy is case study research.

According to Yin (1984), in general, case studies are the preferred strategy when '*how*' or '*why*' research questions are being posed; when the researcher has little control over (behavioural) events, and when the focus is on contemporary events within some real-life context. Regarding the scope of a case study, Yin defines it as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (Yin 1984, 23). Covering contextual conditions, believed to be highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study, is thus a crucial element in case study research. The main question does not so much concern whether and to what extent there are connections between variables, but *how* these connections and processes go off in all their complexity. Case study research is an intensive form of research, in which, especially within the case study itself, various relations, connections and processes are examined over a particular period of time (Van Bueren, Jansen and Verbart 1999).

In a later edition of his book, Yin extends the definition, arguing that case study inquiry: "copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result; relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result; benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis" (Yin 2003, 13-14).

While cases studies can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence (Yin 2003), in this study, they will be based on qualitative evidence only. Using a variety of data sources, I primarily intend to intensively explore and understand what happens within the cases (instead of explaining). The case studies cover the issue being explored, the methods of exploration, the findings and conclusions for further research.

As mentioned in the introduction, the primary time period covered in this research runs parallel to the European Community Initiative URBAN-I: 1994-1999. However, in order to do justice to contextual developments, the time period covered is actually roughly 1990-2005.

3.4.3 Case Study Design

Regarding specific designs for case studies, Yin (2003) distinguishes four types, based on whether they are single- or multiple-case studies; and whether there is a unitary unit or multiple units of analysis. These four types are: single-case (holistic) designs; single-case (embedded) designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs and multiple-case

(embedded) designs. In all these designs, the boundary between the cases and their context is not sharp.

The research at hand could best be characterized as a multiple-case (embedded) design: Case studies have taken place at different governmental levels: at the European level; the national level; the regional level and (two cases at) the city level. Within these cases, there are multiple units of analysis (actors and discursive practices). Moreover, the unit of analysis varies depending on the research question under discussion: for question 1 and 2, the actors at the governmental levels are the unit of analysis; for question 3 it is the discursive practices of the actors involved in the wider policy network and in the inter-organizational domain. Finally, for question 4, it is both the actors and their discursive practices (see figure 3.B).

Figure 3.B Multiple-case design: Multiple cases and multiple (embedded) units of analysis (based on Yin 2003)

Based on Yin (2003), the logic underlying the use of this multiple-case study and the choice of the cases is based on a theoretical replication: each case predicts contrasting results, but for predictable reasons; it concerns a particular governmental level, with particular interests and particular contexts.

3.4.4 The Challenges of Case-Study Research

Case study research is often compared to quantitative research. Its evaluation is therefore often expressed in terms of the extent in which this form of research meets the requirements that are made on quantitative research (Van Bueren, Jansen and Verbart 1999) in terms of validity and reliability.

Yin (2003, 33-39) describes four tests to judge the quality of a research design: construct validity, external validity, internal validity and reliability. What these 'tests' imply and which tactics are available in designing and doing case studies, in order to meet their requirements is discussed next.

Construct validity implies establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. Tactics to increase construct validity when doing case studies relate to using multiple sources of evidence (referred to as 'triangulation'); establishing a chain of evidence in the phase of data collection and having key informants review the draft case study report.

External validity means establishing the domain to which the study's findings can be generalized (Yin 2003; Wolsink, 2003). Yin (2003) points at the fact that case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and *not* to populations or universes. The goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization). However, this generalization is not automatic. As a tactic for multiple-case studies, a replication logic should be part of the research design.

Internal validity concerns establishing a causal relationship, whereby particular conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious (*onlogische*) relationships (Yin 2003). As internal validity only applies to explanatory or causal studies and not to descriptive or exploratory studies (Yin 2003; Wolsink 2003), in the research at hand, in theory, this 'test' thus does not apply. However, Yin (2003) argues that for case study research the concern over internal validity may be extended to the broader problem of making inferences. As a tactic, one should therefore critically consider rival explanations and other possibilities in the phase of data analysis.

Reliability finally, means demonstrating that a study, such as the data collection procedures, can be repeated with similar results (Yin 2003). Using a study protocol and developing a case study database are useful case study tactics.

3.4.5 Data Sources

The four most important methods of data collection in case study research, have all been used in this research: research of documents (policy documents, letters and other communiqués; administrative documents, such as proposals, progress reports and other internal documents; formal studies and evaluations; incidentally media articles); an analysis of secondary sources (already existing research); interviews (semi-structured)

with key stakeholders who were directly involved in the policy networks around European urban programmes (Appendix C) and finally, observation (attending several conferences on European urban policy).

For the discourse analysis, the choice of the data that were used has been explicitly clarified. For, the selection of these sources was very sensitive and had to be dealt with in a precise way: it was, for example, crucial that a source could be ascribed to a particular actor. Documents that had been co-written by actors from various organizations or various policy levels were thus less suitable for this purpose. Moreover, as meanings assigned by 'insiders' (actors who were directly involved) were mapped instead of meanings assigned by 'outsiders,' generally speaking, articles in the mass media were less appropriate. Finally, interview data have not been used for the discourse analysis, as there are methodological drawbacks attached to it (see, for example Elwood and Martin 2000).

3.4.6 Research protocol

For every governmental level, the data have been structured in a similar way, starting with the contexts, continuing with the URBAN-I programme and ending with the discourse analysis. However, there are exceptions to this 'rule'. While this subdivision in three parts can basically be found in every chapter, and is most clear in the first two empirical chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), the emphasis varies for the different governmental levels. Moreover, in some cases the chapters have been organized slightly differently, for divergent reasons.

- Regional authorities, for example, did not participate in the European URBAN programmes in the Netherlands. Consequently, both a description of the URBAN programme as related to the regions and a discourse analysis are missing in this chapter (Chapter 6);
- Cities position themselves collectively vis-à-vis the European Union. While this is important to address as an aspect of Europeanization, at the same time, they do not collectively participate in the European URBAN programmes: the URBAN programme and the discourse analysis are therefore also missing in this chapter (Chapter 7);
- In Amsterdam and The Hague, a European URBAN-I programme was implemented. All three parts come explicitly to the fore. Moreover, as compared to the other chapters, in particular the URBAN programme itself is discussed elaborately (Chapters 8 and 9);
- In the comparison of the Cities of Amsterdam and The Hague, the focus is in particular on the URBAN programme, as related to the (local) contexts in which it is implemented. As opposed to the other chapters, this chapter also tries to explain the differences between the policy process in the two cities (Chapter 10).

3.4.7 Discourse Analysis Protocol

In this research, a separate protocol was developed and used for the discourse analysis, in order to be systematic in approaching the data and to clarify which steps were taken. The protocol consisted of the following four steps:

Step 1: Selection of the Data

    a. The first step was to make a well-founded, clearly marked selection of the data, based on unequivocal criteria that resulted in data that could be qualified as most relevant for the analysis of the subject under examination.

Step 2: Mapping the Policy Vocabulary

    b. One data source was used as a 'pilot': all the key words in this source were counted. This resulted in a first, 'pilot list' of key words.

    c. Next, the key words in this list were counted in other sources as well. Besides, if new words came up in these other sources, they were added to the 'pilot list' and additional counting took place of these words in sources that had been examined already.

    d. When all the key words had been counted in all the sources examined, their total frequency of appearance could be established (see Appendices A and B).

Step 3: Mapping the Meanings assigned and the 'Textual' Context

    e. For every separate data source, *all* the key words derived from step 1 were examined, to determine which meaning was assigned to them. Per key word the meanings assigned to it were checked (for example: for 'area,' meanings assigned could be: 'target area' or 'urban area,' but they could also be provided with a positive or negative connotation, such as 'wealthy area' or 'deprived area' etc). Moreover, key words often appeared in a recurring combination (for example: 'integrated approaches'). For that reason, also the frequency of appearance of particular combinations was mapped and the meanings assigned to these combinations.

    f. Then, an examination followed of the ways in which actors positioned themselves and other actors in the data source.

    g. Next, the source as a whole was examined once more, to get an idea of particular story lines and metaphors in which the key words (with their meanings assigned and their overtones) and the ways of (self) positioning were embedded.

    h. The results of e, f and h were then combined in one document.

    i. After this procedure had been followed for *all* the examined data sources, the results of the discourse analysis were then examined coherently, to get a sense of their similarities and their differences.

Step 4: Linking the data to their wider contexts

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j. Various 'wider contexts' were examined and described (in addition to the actual discourse analysis). Examples are policy contexts, territorial contexts, discursive contexts, etc.
k. The data sources and the outcomes of the discourse analysis, were considered in relation to these different, wider contexts.
l. Finally, also the 'overarching picture', based on the discourse analysis was considered in relation to these contexts.

At times, steps 2-4 were gone through again. This happened, for example, if information came up in the discourse analysis of data from a particular governmental level, that raised questions about (meanings assigned to) particular key words in the analysis of an earlier examined governmental level. To give an example: in EU level sources, the word 'motor' was used (European cities as 'motors of the economy'). In national level sources, however, the word 'engine' was used instead. This raised the question whether that word ('engine') had possibly been missed in the analysis of the EU level data. In that case all European data sources were checked once more.
Doing a discourse analysis is thus quite a labour intensive methodology.

3.4.8 Reporting the Results

In doing the discourse analysis, completeness of the analysis was the first matter of importance. In reporting the results, however, the emphasis has been on the *meanings assigned to cities* (or parts of cities) and on the *ways of (self)positioning* of the actors in question. For, in ways of (self)positioning a politics of scale could become visible. And the political construction of scale requires an apparent 'place' (Arnoldus, 2001). Moreover, as the sources were related to area-based urban programmes, 'place' has been limited to cities, or parts of cities.

Regarding the meanings assigned to cities (or parts of cities), in the discourse analysis of the EU level data, based on step 3, four main categories were derived:

1. City as a problem
2. City as a strategic potential
3. City as a balanced system
4. City as a governmental authority[16]

These four categories, derived from the EU level data, were then used to structure the constructions of cities in data at the other governmental levels.

Moreover, it turned out that the construction of cities as an entity of (formal) governmental responsibility, was often used by actors for (self)positioning in the discourse. For all the governmental levels, the different ways of (self) positioning by the actors were mapped as well (see table 3.C).

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[16] At a later stage, I have changed the name of this category into 'city as an entity of (formal) governmental responsibility'.

A final remark should be made about the way in which the results of the discourse analysis were reported in the different chapters.

In case of the European and the national governmental levels, the discourse analysis resulted in an overarching picture. This was reported in terms of meanings assigned to cities, following the main categories above (cities as a problem; as a strategic potential; as a balanced system and as a governmental authority) and in terms of the ways of (self)positioning: how did the actors at these two governmental levels position themselves and other actors?.

Table 3.C Actors examined at different levels (vertical) versus actors positioned (horizontal)

Actors at the level of the:	EU	MS	Region	City	City district	Population
EU	SP					
Member State		SP				
Region*	-	-	-	-	-	-
City				SP		
City district					SP	
Neighbourhood						

Note: SP = Self Positioning
* As regions were not involved in the European URBAN-I programme in the Netherlands, there has been no discourse analysis for this governmental level.

In case of the regions, as mentioned earlier, *no* discourse analysis has taken place, as the regions were not involved in the European URBAN programmes in the Netherlands. In this case, there were thus no discourse analysis results to report.

In case of the cities, the results of the discourse analysis were also reported based on the main categories of meanings assigned to cities (or parts of cities) and ways of (self)positioning. However, here they were reported *per data source* and not for the data sources as a whole. This was due to the lack of suitable data sources for a discourse analysis at these levels and due to the fact that the character of the data was highly divergent. This issue will be addressed once more in the chapters themselves.

The following seven chapters are the empirical chapters. The empirical part will start with an examination of European area-based urban policy, as (discursively) produced at the EU level.

CHAPTER 4

4. European Urban Policy and European Urban Policy Discourse

4.1 Introduction

In the introduction of this dissertation (Chapter 1), it was established that the European Union does not have a specific remit for urban policy, implying that the involvement of the European Commission in urban policy matters is actually 'a-constitutional' (Tofarides 2003). Moreover, its explicit 'urban programmes' (programmes targeted at specific urban areas) have been quite limited in terms of number and financial budget. For that reason, a claim of having an urban policy at the EU level, as argued in EU policy documents, was judged to be quite strong and considered to be a part of a European urban policy discourse. Nevertheless, at the same time, it was emphasized that this European discourse on urban policy could be influential in the member states, as the increasing interaction between governmental levels expedites its dissemination. Moreover, as European urban programmes require the involvement of local and regional actors, they might be experienced as European interference by the national governments of the member states. This, in turn, could imply a struggle that is discursively played out in the form of the contestation of European urban policy discourse.

In this chapter, European urban policy discourse, as produced by European policy makers and as disseminated through European urban programmes, will be the primary focus of attention. The main questions addressed are: how are 'cities' (or parts of cities) constructed in European urban policy discourse and how are various actors positioned in this discourse?

In the following, first attention will be paid to European area-based urban programmes. Then, in section 4.2, a brief description will be given of the European Union, its legal foundation and its decision making system. Next, various contexts that are important as related to the production of European area-based urban programmes and European urban policy discourse, will be addressed in section 4.3. In section 4.4, European urban policy discourse will be examined elaborately and finally, in section 4.5, conclusions will be drawn about this discourse as related to its contexts[17].

4.1.1 European Area-based Urban Programmes

From the 1990s on, in many European countries area-based Urban Development Programmes have been initiated. These programmes were developed in answer to major problems of poverty and social exclusion in European cities, and were

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[17] A large part of this chapter was published earlier in Dukes (2006b).

introduced to promote local development and urban regeneration. Their spatially focused approach was inspired by the idea that focusing on a well-defined area would improve the efficiency and would maximize the impact of the intervention. In several ways, these area-based urban programmes are radically different from preceding programmes.

First of all, they are area-based which means that they explicitly focus on a particular 'deprived' area. These areas are well defined and located in either inner-city areas or urban peripheral areas. Their area-based character distinguishes them from current thematically organized policy, dealing with for example (un)employment or education, but also from many preceding urban programmes.

Secondly, they imply new organizational forms and new ways of co-operation: they follow an integrated approach in the sense that different domains are targeted simultaneously and that different sectors are stimulated to work together in partnerships. In general, a wide variety of actors are involved; these concern public actors, from divergent political levels as well as private parties. Moreover, these area-based urban programmes lay considerable emphasis on local participation: community or volunteer groups should also be involved in these programmes.

Box 4.A The European Urban Pilot Program and the URBAN Community Initiative

The European *Urban Pilot Program* was launched in 1990 and aimed at supporting innovation in urban regeneration and planning. This concerned both the pursuit of new activities, as well as new ways of organizing urban regeneration, through a series of Urban Pilot Projects in a small number of localities in cities across the European Union. The scale of the projects, as compared to national and other European funding sources, was relatively small: between 1990 and 1999, 59 Urban Pilot Projects were implemented and received about 368 million euros, financed under the innovative actions scheme of the European Regional Development Fund (EC 1998b, 1998d, 2003).

The *URBAN Community Initiative,* started by the Commission in 1994, was a consolidation of the experience gained through the Urban Pilot Projects and intended to extend the European Union's contribution to the implementation of urban policies. Specific attention was called for the problem of spatial segregation in cities (EC 1997b, 1998d, 1999). As compared to the Urban Pilot Program, the scale of the URBAN CI was much larger: The first round of the URBAN Community Initiative ('Urban I') ran from 1994-1999', implied 118 programmess and received about 900 million euros in EU funding. In the second round ('Urban II') that ran from 2000-2006, about 70 programmes were included, receiving a ERDF contribution of about 730 million euros. Just like Innovative actions, of which the UPP was a part, Community Initiatives were proposed by the European Commission to the Member States on its own initiative (EC 1997b, 1998c, 2003).

Also at the EU level two area-based urban development programmes were initiated in the 1990s: the Urban Pilot Program (1990-1999) and the Community Initiative Urban (1994 - 2006)[18]. Both programmes were launched by the European Commission. URBAN targeted neighbourhoods in extreme deprivation. Although millions of EU money were involved in these programmes, their financial scale was relatively modest as compared to the amount of EU funding involved in other programmes: while the total budget for the Structural Funds for 1994-1999 was about 154,5 billion euro at 1994 prices, for example, the CI Urban budget for that period amounted to 900 million euro (EC 1997b, 2003a). Moreover, in a sense these two area-based urban development programmes were in an experimental phase, as they were not part of the so-called 'mainstream programs' yet.

While the European Commission thus initiated area-based urban programmes in the early 1990s already, a vision on urban policy was laid down much later, in two main Communications: '*Towards an Urban Agenda in the European Union*' (EC 1997b) and '*Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union: a Framework for Action*' (EC 1998a). Additionally, in November 1998, the European Commission organized the first 'Urban Forum' in Vienna, aimed at addressing the challenges faced by the European Union towns and cities.

After 2006, the policy framework of the urban programmes will be considerably broadened: instead of relatively small, area-based programmes, 'urban actions' will be then formulated within the wider framework of mainstream regional programmes.

4.2 The European Union

An important question to start with and an extensively debated issue is: "What exactly *is* the European Union?" (Mamadouh 2001). Bromley (2001) establishes that there are two difficulties in answering this question: first of all, the European Union (EU) is constantly changing. Any attempt to say what it is thus has to include some idea of what the process of European integration is about. A second difficulty relates to the fact that it is hard to tell where that process is heading or where it will end, or even stabilize.

There are basically three different visions of the European Union. The first vision is that of a strong Euro-state, that replicates nation-state authority at the supranational scale. This vision is based on a supranational model that states that the European Union is autonomous and makes supranational politics effective. It might also be normative, claiming that European institutions should have more influence on policy, at the expense of national institutions (Heinelt 1996; Leitner 1997; De Rooij 2003). The second vision portrays the EU as "a strategic supranational association expected to be capable of better representing respective national interests in European and global affairs" (Leitner 1997,125). This vision represents a state-centric model,

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[18] Besides, also within the regular 'Objective 2' programme (2000-2006), some money has been invested in a number of deprived urban neighbourhoods.

that argues that the member states set the pace: political processes are determined by intergovernmental arrangements (Heinelt 1996). In more recent years, such a vision has, for example, been substantiated and propagated by Andrew Moravcsik (1998). The third vision emphasizes the aspect of interdependence and does not make a distinction between 'supranational' authority and 'intergovernmental' arrangements. 'Multi-level governance' serves as an example of such a vision.

Whatever the vision of the European Union, Bromley (2001) argues that the EU already meets one of the criteria for political legitimacy – governing according to the rule of law. At the same time, this legal order is not (yet) part of a constitution for European citizens. For that reason, the EU cannot elicit the consent of the citizens, in the ways that member states can. The complexity of its character is also reflected in the EU decision making process. This will be discussed next.

4.2.1 EU Treaties

The European Union is based on the rule of law. That means that everything that it does is derived from treaties, which are agreed on by the member states (in the capacity of the Council). There are founding Treaties (original versions and later updatings), amending Treaties and Accession Treaties for each of the five enlargements (www. europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/index.htm;

www.europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm).

Whereas there have been substantial changes in the Treaty provisions over time, the main actors are still the same, though. At the same time, the changes in the Treaties have taken place in a context of debates between these main actors about the implications of European integration for the member states. For that reason, before turning to the actors themselves, two particular concepts in the treaties deserve some more attention, as they have often come to the fore in the debates: the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

The Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality

In the early 1990s, public anxiety increased about the implications of European integration for traditional forms of political organization – especially the nation state. This resulted in an extended discussion in the European Union of two related concepts: subsidiarity and proportionality. They both represented a concern; with the level at which decisions about particular policies were to be made (subsidiarity), and with the powers which were to be assumed by the agency entrusted with carrying out the policy (proportionality) (Taylor 1996). To be somewhat more specific about proportionality: based on this principle Community action should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the EU Treaties.

The discussion resulted in the 'principle of subsidiarity'. In 1992, this principle was introduced in the Treaty on European Union[19] into the EEC Treaty[20] (Article 3b),

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[19] The Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992 (Council of the European Union 1998). The formal title of the Treaty is 'Treaty on European Union,' but it is also often called 'Maastricht Treaty.'

[20] The 'Treaty establishing the European Community', signed in Rome on March 25, 1957 (Council of the European Union 1998).

along with the principle of proportionality (EC 1998c). Based on the subsidiarity principle, the EU institutions are allowed to take action in areas which do *not* fall within their exclusive competence "only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community" (Council of the European Union 1997a). The principle clearly sets boundaries in political space, providing for decision making at the lowest appropriate level. The discussion of subsidiarity decreased fears among member states, but the need for more clarification of the meaning and application of the principle remained.

For that reason, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999, the provisions concerning the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were extended: A new Treaty Protocol set out detailed legally-binding guidelines for applying the principles (Council of the European Union 1997b). The main aim of the new Protocol was to define more precisely the criteria for applying the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; to ensure their strict observance and to ensure their consistent implementation by all institutions involved (Council of the European Union 1997c)[21].

4.2.2 EU Decision making

There are three main institutional actors in the system of decision making in the European Union: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. Depending on the issue under consideration, the role of these actors and the balance of power and authority between them varies (George 1996). What is the role of these actors in legislative and budgetary processes within the EU decision making system?[22]

First, there is the European Commission, whose commissioners are nominated by the national governments for a five-year renewable term. The main function of the Commission is to initiate policy proposals and to submit them to the Council of Ministers for EU legislation. Most importantly, the Commission is the only institution with the right to propose legislation under the various EU Treaties. Its proposals can be amended by the Council of Ministers, or even be rejected. Further, the Commission sets the agenda for the multi-annual financial frameworks and draws up the draft annual budget of the EU, for discussion in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (George 1996). Especially the right of initiative is said to imply a powerful position for the Commission (Aggestam 1997).

Second, there is the Council of Ministers[23], consisting of ministers from the member states. It meets in nine different configurations depending on the subjects being examined. As opposed to the Commission, the Council does *not* have a permanent membership: which minister represents the state governments depends on the subject under discussion (George 1996). The Council of Ministers can be

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[21] For a more elaborate discussion, see Dukes (1999).

[22] A fourth important institutional actor is the Court of Justice, but in view of the focus of this research, this actor will not be further discussed.

[23] This title was officially transformed into the 'Council of the European Union' by the Maastricht Treaty, but is still very much in use (Aggestam 1997).

characterized as the European Union's actual legislature and focal point for decision making (Aggestam 1997). Depending on the issue involved, decisions on Commission proposals are made, either on the basis of unanimity or on the basis of qualified majority-vote. Above the Council of Ministers in the hierarchy of decision making stands the European Council (George 1996), which consists of the Heads of State and Government. It defines the general political guidelines of the European Union, among others the Financial Perspective for a period of six years. The number of votes that each member state can cast is set by the Treaties. The bigger the country's population, the more votes it has, but the numbers are weighted in favour of the less populous countries[24]. The work of the Council is prepared by COREPER. In Brussels, each EU member state has a permanent team that represents its national interest at the EU level. The head of this so-called 'representation' is, in effect, the country's ambassador to the EU. These ambassadors (known as 'permanent representatives') meet on a weekly basis within the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER)(www.ue.eu.int; www.europa.eu.int/institutions/council; www.eu2004.nl).

The third main player is the European Parliament (EP). The EP has been directly elected since 1979 and elections take place once every five years. The division of the EP members between the member states is approximately proportionate to their population size. Officially, the EP exercises control over the executive institutions, but its actual ability to do so is still considered to be limited, despite some expansion of its competences in the recent treaties (George 1996).

Regarding EU decision making, the treaties circumscribe the content of the Commission proposals, the constitutional position of the actors involved in the system of decision making, and the decision making procedures, used to decide on Commission proposals. Agreement on Commission proposals results in one of the legally binding instruments. In case of European Regional policy and the Structural Funds, the instrument used is the regulation.

The EU decision making stage is followed by the implementation stage that is determined by the content of the treaties as well. For many types of legislation, including the European Regional policy and Structural Fund regulations, the primary implementers are the governments and administrations of the member states (George 1996), actions of the actors at the various levels (including the EU level) are circumscribed by the earlier described principle of subsidiarity.

The foregoing points at the complexity of the EU decision making process. Strikingly, the European Commission does *not* have a formal relationship with subnational authorities, but only with the member states. Subnational authorities do not play a formal role in this process[25], only in the implementation stage. However, they do participate in the 'Committee of the Regions'.

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[24] Until EU enlargement in 2004, the Netherlands had 5 votes (out of 124) in the Council. Presently, it has 13 votes (of the total of 321).
[25] Based on the European Constitution, local and regional authorities would have become formally involved. Moreover, the subsidiarity principle would have been extended towards regions and municipalities (VNG 2005b).

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4.2.3 The Committee of the Regions

In 1994, the Committee of the Regions was established, based on agreements in the 'Maastricht Treaty,' to give local and regional representatives a say in the development of new EU laws and to meet concerns about the public being left behind as the EU steamed ahead (www.cor.eu.int). The Committee presently consists of 317 subnational representatives appointed for a four-year term, following submission of nominations by the member states. Both regional and local authorities can be a member of the Committee, provided that they are accountable to a chosen representative body in their region or municipality (Dukes 1999; De Rooij 2003).

However, the Committee of the Regions has merely an *advisory* status. According to the Treaty on European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty, the Committee of the Regions must be consulted by the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament on matters of mutual interest that directly affect the responsibilities of local and regional authorities, among others economic and social cohesion. Additionally, the Committee of the Regions can adopt opinions on its own initiative and send them to the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. This gives the Committee of the Regions an opportunity to exercise influence, also in the stage of discussion of the European commission proposals regarding European Regional policy and the Structural Funds (Dukes 1999; VNG 2001; De Rooij 2003).

Even though the Committee of the Regions originally seemed to be an enforcement of the formal position of subnational authorities within the European Union, over time its actual influence has been questioned.

In 1996 George argued that the Committee of the Regions had strong backing from political actors of considerable influence, making it quite influential. However, other authors were at that time far more critical of its influence. After its creation, the Committee was expected to develop regional loyalties within member states, and open channels for local authorities to by-pass national governments through Union-wide alliances (Story 1997). In practice, however, the Committee was said to be constrained by Treaty provisions (its status being consultative) and the fact that the designation of the subnational representatives was left to the national governments, instead of to the subnational authorities themselves. Moreover, the Committee was said to be troubled with internal dissension, based on the levels represented (local versus regional), on political and geographical groupings, and on the divergent capacity of the regions that are represented (Loughlin 1997). These divisions would undermine the development of a unified body with a unified opinion (Dukes 1999). Also more recent sources seem to be critical of the Committee; in recent years, it would have become divided among itself, both according to national delegations, as well as according to political groups, undermining its ability to act as one body. There would also be a dispute over areas of responsibility between the Committee of the Regions and the European Parliament, that both consist of directly elected representatives (De Rooij 2003).

In conclusion, the European Union is constantly changing, as is reflected in its legal basis (the Treaties) and, for example, in the Structural Fund reforms. This ongoing process of European integration, with a yet unknown 'outcome,' is accompanied by a complex EU decision making process. So far, subnational authorities only figure in an advisory role in this process.

4.3 European Contexts of Area-Based Urban Programmes

For a better understanding of European 'urban policy,' European 'urban policy' discourse, and the way in which they come about, attention should be paid to the contexts and debates that shape and impact their production.

4.3.1 Legal, Policy and Financial Frameworks

First of all, there are important legal, policy and financial frameworks: European area-based urban programmes take place under the heading of European Regional policy (a policy framework) and are financed by the Structural Funds (a secondary legislative and a financial framework), especially by the European Regional Development Fund (*Europees Fonds voor Regionale Ontwikkeling, EFRO*). These policy and financial frameworks, in turn, are framed by the earlier described EU Treaties (a primary legislative framework). Aside from important principles enshrined in the Treaties, like the subsidiarity principle, other important principles, such as the 'partnership principle' laid down in the Structural Fund regulations[26] also apply to European area-based urban programmes such as the Community Initiative URBAN.

European Regional Policy

The main goal of European Regional policy, as formulated in the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, is strengthening the economic and social cohesion within the Union, through a reduction of disparities (Council of the European Union 1997a). The European Structural Funds are the main instrument of European Regional policy.

The implementation of European Regional policy is characterized by a complex decision making process, as it consists of three different consecutive policy phases, each of them consisting of a particular combination of actors, and based on specific decision rules (Hooghe 1996a).

In the first phase, member state governments collectively negotiate with the Commission about the breakdown of the Structural Fund budget. This happens as part of a wider bargaining process about the financial package overall spending in the EU, which is drawn up by the Commission: the so-called 'multi-annual financial frameworks' (Marks 1996). In the second phase, spending priorities within the individual member states are determined. In the third phase, called 'structural programming,' member states can file an application for funding to the European Commission, for operational programmes that have been drawn up within particular European programme frameworks (regional development plans)[27]. Obtaining and diverting Structural Fund money is bound up by strict regulations, though. Financial assistance is in the form of non-reimbursable grants, subject to co-financing from the member states (EC 1998b).

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[26] Structural Fund Regulations are a form of secondary legislation, based on the Treaties. Regulations in general are directly applicable and binding in all EU Member States.

[27] This describes the situation until 2006. It will change in the next programming period (2007-2013).

Whereas the first two phases of regional policy involve the Commission and the member state governments in collective decision making, structural programming is country specific. Policy making at this phase of cohesion policy is territorial policymaking, formulated and implemented in the member states. For that reason, it reflects wide variations in territorial relations across the European Union (Marks 1996).

In terms of goals, European area-based urban programmes and regional policy are clearly related. Both are based on EU integration politics: what regional policy advocates 'EU wide', area-based urban programmes advocate 'city wide': reducing social, economic and territorial disparities. This interrelatedness between the area-based urban programmes and European Regional policy implies that changes in the policy framework also affect the area-based urban programmes[28].

European Structural Funds

The European Structural Funds support action that focuses on reducing inequalities between regions or social groups (EC 1998b). They are called 'structural,' as they address the economic and social factors which sustain imbalances in development (EC 1998e). In terms of financial resources, their size is quite impressive: in 2001 it was about 32 billion euro, one third of the total budget of the European Union.

Commission proposals for reform of the Structural Funds are always the subject of extensive discussion, both among actors involved as well as among social scientists. For, changes in these reforms might have a strong impact on the territorial power relations in European political space[29]. In this sense, the 1988 Structural Fund reform has often been called a 'milestone'. In that reform, four new principles were introduced, that still hold today: concentration of the resources by priority objectives, programme planning, partnership and additionality (Pollack 1998).

The Community sought to develop lasting partnerships among the Commission, the national governments, and regional authorities, in order to improve vertical co-ordination (Anderson 1995). Partnership was introduced throughout the policy implementation process. Thanks to the partnership principle, the Commission got a legitimate voice in the structural programming phase (George 1996). But also the subnational level benefited from the partnership principle, although in an uneven way. At the same time, the principle was criticized by the member states: it brought pressure to existing territorial structures of governance in the member states, as it connected the European, national, and subnational levels in an immediate fashion (Hooghe 1996a). This offered EU institutions the opportunity to by-pass member state authority.

For that reason, in the following Structural Fund reforms of 1993 and 1999, the partnership principle was reinforced ('broadened and deepened'), but with explicit provisions that the partners (local, regional or national, as well as economic and social partners) would be designated by the member states, and that only relevant institutional and other competencies would be involved in partnership. The member states thus got the role of a 'gatekeeper' (Wishlade, 1996; Dukes 1999).

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[28] See, for example, the recent discussion on European Cohesion Policy, described in chapter 7.
[29] See Dukes (1999) for an elaborate discussion.

The Urban Pilot Programmes (1990-1999) and the Community Initiative URBAN (URBAN-I from 1994-1999, URBAN-II from 2000-2006) have both been financed by the Structural Funds, primarily by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), under the headings of 'Innovative actions' and 'Community Initiative' respectively, alongside mainstream regional programmes. The ERDF, run by the Directorate General for Regional Policy[30], concentrates on promoting productive investments, improving infrastructure and furthering local development, including that of small businesses (EC 1998b). Funding from this fund is area-based.

4.3.2 Political Debates

A second important context relates to ongoing political debates. Two debates that have been of particular importance for European urban policy and its discourse are the debates on (the future of) European regional (or cohesion) policy and the debate on European governance (launched by the European Commission in 2001). It concerns all the rules, procedures and practices affecting the way in which powers are exercised within the European Union and aims at adopting new forms of governance (European Commission 2001a).

The debate on regional policy will be elaborated as an example, as European urban policy is a part of this policy.

Regional policy has been contested for years between the European Union and the member states; regionalisation versus re-nationalisation of the policy, being the issue at stake. The debate on regionalisation versus re-nationalisation concerns the interference of the supranational organization in member states' internal affairs. Scientists often discuss this in terms of an alleged 'hollowing out' of the state. According to Hooghe and Marks (2001, 117) this debate is fuelled by a: "deepening struggle about which type of society Europe should build: a neo-liberal Europe or regulated capitalism." Basic choices concerning the structure of political authority in Europe and the role of the state continue to shape the political debate. This issue was regenerated during recent debates on the reform of regional (or cohesion) policy for the period from 2007 until 2013.

In European area-based urban development programmes, the political authority issue is at stake as well: involvement of the European Commission in area-based urban development programmes is contested and the Commission has to negotiate its position, in particular with the member states, navigating between legally anchored concepts such as subsidiarity and partnership.

4.3.3 European Discourse

A final context of European urban policy discourse that should be mentioned, is the wider discursive context: The concepts in European urban policy discourse, such as 'regional policy,' 'partnership,' 'governance' etc, are all part of a wider discourse that

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[30] This Directorate-General (DG) is the department in the European Commission responsible for European measures to assist the economic and social development of the less favoured regions of the European Union. The Regional Policy DG is in charge of the administration of three major funds, including the ERDF.

one could describe as 'Euro-speak'. This is something that Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener (1999, 541) refer to as "the purpose-built vocabulary of terms to describe (and shape) the reality of the EU." According to these authors, treaties, directives and communications of European institutions all speak a specific and unique language which is normally only understood by a limited circle of insiders. However, they argue that because of the growing importance of EU policies in the 1990s, nowadays a far wider group shares Euro-speak.

Summarizing the foregoing, it has been argued that European urban policy and its discourse come into being in relation with various contexts, such as frameworks, political debates and wider discursive contexts. Keeping that in mind as a point of departure, the next issue to be addressed elaborately is: what does this European urban policy discourse look like?

4.4 Place and Positioning in European Urban Policy Discourse

The following analysis intends to map the vocabularies, story lines and generative metaphors in 'official' EU area-based urban policy discourse, as produced by EU policy makers (the European Commission and high EU officials, most of them working with the DG for Regional policy) in policy and practices. A selection of policy documents and speeches will be analysed and related to the contexts in which the discourse is produced.

4.4.1 Data Selection

The general criteria that were used for the selection of the data were the following: the policy documents and spoken statements had to be produced by either the initiator of the area-based urban programmes, the European Commission, or by the civil service that carried them out, the Directorate General (DG) Regional Policy. Whereas the documents were qualified as official publications by the EU, the selected spoken statements were the official views of the Commission or cases in which the authors explicitly identified themselves with these official statements. Another criterion was that only texts and practices produced by 'insiders,' that is, directly involved actors, were considered[31].

First, fourteen documents were examined that either related directly to the two European area-based urban programmes (Urban Pilot Projects and the Community Initiative URBAN-I and II), or to the general vision of the European Commission on urban policy (see table 4.B).

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[31] The data produced at the EU level could themselves also be considered as an outcome of negotiations within the institutes in/by which they are produced. Nevertheless, they were taken as the point of departure, all the more because of the primary research focus on the 'negotiations' of constructions in a vertical sense: between actors at the European level and actors operating at lower governmental levels.

Table 4.B European Commission documents by title, year of publication, author and Status

Title	Date	Author	Status
Notice to the member states, laying down guidelines for operational programs which member states are invited to establish in the framework of a community initiative concerning urban areas (URBAN)	1994	European Commission	Communication (94/C 180/6-9)
Communication to the member states laying down guidelines for operational programmes which member states are invited to establish in the framework of a Community Initiative concerning urban areas (URBAN)	1996	European Commission	Communication (96/C 200/4-6)
Towards an Urban Agenda in the European Union*	1997	European Commission	Communication
Europe's Cities	1997	European Commission	Brochure
Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union: a Framework for Action*	1998	European Commission	Communication
URBAN: Restoring hope in deprived neighbourhoods	1998	European Commission DG Regional Policy	Fact Sheet
Urban Pilot Projects*	1998/9	DG Regional Policy	Info on www
Urban Community Initiative 1994-1999*	1999	DG Regional Policy	Info on www
URBAN Success Stories: Building a better tomorrow in deprived neighbourhoods	2000	European Commission	Brochure
C.I. Urban: An Initial Evaluation*	2000	European Commission	Information paper
Inforegio: Panorama 5: 'Driving development in Europe's Cities' and 'Urban II (…)'	2001	DG Regional Policy	Magazine
Communication from the Commission concerning: the programming of the Structural Funds 2000-2006: an initial assessment of the Urban Initiative*	2002	European Commission	Communication (COM) (2002) 308 final, 14 June 2002
Partnership with the Cities: the Urban Community Initiative (Urban II)*	2003	European Commission	Brochure
Boosting depressed areas (info on Urban II)*	2004	DG Regional Policy	Info on www

* Used for counting terms in policy vocabulary.

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Secondly, three speeches were selected that represented settings in which the discursive practices took place (see table 4.C). The speeches were all presented by high EU officials at international conferences dealing with urban and/or regional affairs, and directed at an audience of primarily subnational authorities (administration and civil servants) and other stakeholders in urban policy.

*Table 4.C Speeches by date of delivery, lecturer, conference and title.**

Date of delivery	Lecturer	Position	Conference	Title of speech
May 26, 1998	Mr C. Trojan	Secretary General of the EC (from 1997 until 2000)	Eurocities seminar (Brussels)	Agenda 2000[32] and the role of cities
July 8, 2002	Mr M. Barnier	Member of the EC responsible for Regional Policy and institutional reform (from 1999 until 2004)	Cities for Cohesion (London)	Lessons of the Urban Community Initiative
May 27, 2004	Mr G. Meadows	Director General Regional Policy of the European Commission (Acting DG since March 2003, formally appointed in April 2004)	Europe empowers Cities (Maastricht)	Vision on 3rd Cohesion report

* All used for counting terms in policy vocabulary

Some comments should be made about the political debates that were going on when the speeches were delivered, as they are strongly reflected in the arguments and the line of reasoning of the lecturers. This will become clear later, in the actual data analysis. The speech of Mr Trojan took place on the threshold of the negotiations for the 2000-2006 Structural Fund reform, but this was not an issue any longer in 2002, as

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[32] '*Agenda 2000*' is an action programme that was adopted by the European Commission on July 15, 1997. It intended to strengthen European policies and to give the EU a new financial framework for the period 2000-2006, with a view to enlargement. Its priorities were fleshed out in twenty legislative texts, put forward by the Commission in 1998. They related among others to structural policy reform (SF's/ERDF).

by that time the SF-reform had been put into effect. The speech of Mr Barnier, instead, was delivered at a moment of heated debate on the future of Regional Policy in an enlarged European Union, after 2006 (launched by the Commission in 2001, with the Second report on economic and social cohesion) and during the ongoing debate on European governance (launched by the Commission as well). Mr Meadows held his speech at a moment in time when the debate on the future of Regional policy had reached a critical phase, just before the negotiations about the Structural Fund reforms were about to begin.

4.4.2 Data Analysis

Considering European area-based urban policy discourse, how are 'cities' constructed and how are various actors positioned? These questions form the basis for the organization of the outcomes of the following analysis of European urban policy discourse: the *construction of cities* and the *positions allotted* to the various actors involved.

An interesting question to start with, though, is: what kind of policy vocabulary is used in the discourse? To get an impression of the policy vocabulary, first, a sub-selection of the data, nine policy documents and the three speeches, was used for counting the most frequently occurring terms. As opposed to the other sources, these were all available in digital form and counting could thus be done very easily[33]. From this counting, it is clear that many terms in European urban policy relate to 'cities,' to problems and to ways of solving these problems (see Appendix A). While the overview as such is informative, at the same time, the frequency of occurrence of terms, does *not* give away the meaning of these concepts. The term 'motor,' for example, does not appear that often, but is used in a powerful metaphor, constructing European cities as: 'the motors of growth'. To get a sense of these connotations, one thus needs to have more information than merely an overview of the policy vocabulary. In the next part of the analysis, the meanings assigned to cities and the story lines in which they are embedded, are therefore explored in more detail.

Cities as a Problem

Various terms used in European urban policy relate to cities. They are simply referred to as 'cities' or 'cities and towns'. In other cases, a part of a city is meant: an 'area,' often an 'urban area,' and sometimes a 'neighbourhood'. Constructions of these parts of cities usually have negative connotations. They are problematic areas with particular problems, referred to as 'depressed urban area,' 'deprived (urban) neighbourhood,' 'old industrialised area,' and presented as the target area of European policy. Constructions of cities in terms of problems, for example, relate to "complex and interrelated problems" (EC 1998a, 4), the 'dysfunctional city' (EC 1997a), 'facing challenges' (EC 1997b, 1998 and 2003a), 'urban needs' (EC 1997b, 1998, 2003a), 'requiring help' (EC 2003a), etc. Problems lumped together in the 'dysfunctional city' concentrate on particular areas and groups of people in those areas. In this capacity,

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[33] During later stages of this research documents have been scanned and transformed to PDF files that could be digitally searched as well.

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cities are an important risk-factor for the EU: "Today, social dysfunction is the most painful in towns and cities and its crisis is becoming a crisis for the whole of Europe, affecting its mechanisms of integration and its identity" (EC 1997a, 10). In the analysed documents and speeches, the increase of social exclusion in urban areas is argued to be a 'threat' to social stability, to "the European model of society as well as to competitiveness and sustainability" (Trojan 1998). This not only expresses the gravity of the situation, but is also a good example of an argument that is used by the European Commission to legitimise action at the EU level: "That is why the European Union has a role to play in seeking new equilibriums" (EC 1997a, 10). The construction of cities in terms of a problematic area, city or town is usually combined with statements related to 'tackling' or 'combating' urban problems, with statements advocating an 'integrated approach' to solve these problems and, at times, with the explicit intention of 'sustainable (urban) development' (EC 1998a, 1997b, 2003a).

Cities as a Strategic Potential
Although cities in their problematic capacity make up a large part of European urban policy discourse, cities are also constructed in a neutral way ('the city as a whole'), or in terms of opportunities, with various positive meanings assigned to them. At times, the opposites of problem and opportunity in cities are characterised as a true paradox (EC 2001b, 2003a):

> Europe's towns and cities present a paradox. On the one hand they are the motors of growth in an increasingly global economy, concentrating wealth, knowledge and technical capacity…. At the same time however, many of the worst problems facing society today are concentrated in urban areas, including economic and social exclusion, degradation of the natural and built environment, congestion, crime, intolerance and racism, and the loss of local identity. (EC 2003a, 6)

Aside from the powerful story line of cities as a problem, an additional story line depicts cities as strategic potential, as "important strategic locations for pursuing shared European goals, such as promoting economic competitiveness, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and enhancing local culture and identity" (EC 2003a, 6). Highly positive qualifications that emphasise their privileged position can be found as well: "A sea of potential which has not yet been tapped" (EC 1997a, 3), just like an emphasis on their crucial importance for the EU as a whole: 'motors of growth' (EC 2002; Meadows 2004), 'growth poles' (EC 1997b; Barnier 2002) 'key locations' (EC 2002), 'centres of development' (EC 1997a). The reach of these 'motors of growth' varies from regional to global. Moreover, they threaten to be misfiring, to get stuck, and thus to endanger the economic position of the EU. This is a major risk factor for the EU that benefits from a well-run engine in order to safeguard its economic position world wide.

The European Commission thus constructs urban areas and cities both in terms of problems and opportunities. Especially in the case of cities, positive qualifications are mainly phrased in economic terms. The economic terms, used in European urban

policy discourse, seem to reflect a wider pattern of change in the way in which European Regional policy is positioned in relation to 'single market policies,' prompted by the Lisbon agenda[34]. While former European Commissioner Wulf-Mathies[35] referred to European Regional policy as: "the visible hand of European solidarity … designed to complement the unseen hand of the single market" (Wulf-Mathies 1997), in Meadows' speech (2004), cohesion policy seems to exist in the service of competition policy:

> Now then, … this search for competitiveness …, is a permanent state of life in any economy and what we say is that a proper cohesion policy, a proper regional policy will equip regions or cities to resist these changes in competitiveness to try to restore competitiveness. So that growth, which is what we are looking for, so the process towards Lisbon, which is what we are looking for, can actually continue and not be, as it were, slowed down. (Meadows 2004)

Here, cohesion policy aims at helping cities to maintain and improve their competitiveness and, in doing so, to improve the competitive position of the European Union as a whole.

Cities as a Balanced System

Both in terms of problems and opportunities, cities seem to be primarily discussed from a European Regional policy perspective, based on integration and cohesion, which shows that 'urban policy' formulated at the EU level basically stems from European Regional policy. An interesting illustration is the use of the concepts 'disparities' and 'balance'. The concept of 'disparities' is derived from European Regional policy that aims at "reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions" (Council of the European Union 1997a, article 158). In European urban policy discourse, however, 'disparities' do not only relate to regions, but also to disparities between cities and even within them (between neighbourhoods). Disparities within individual cities are even argued often to be bigger than disparities between the regions of the European Union (EC 2002).

The other concept that frequently comes to the fore in the discourse concerns 'balance': elements should be 'balanced' in relation to each other. This buzzword is usually applied to particular geographical entities within the EU, for example to cities vis-à-vis each other: the European Union is stated to aim at "a balanced European urban system" (Trojan 1998, 2), but it might also hold for cities themselves or for cities as related to their environment. Barnier (2002, 4) mentions "a well-balanced city and surrounding territory" and even refers to it in terms of a 'European model'. While the idea of balanced entities could be qualified as common sense, as something that probably everybody agrees on, it is not made explicit in the discourse in terms of *what* exactly these entities should be balanced.

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[34] The Lisbon Agenda, agreed on by the EU heads of state in 2000, aims at making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010.
[35] Euro-Commissioner for Regional Policy from 1995 until 1999.

Aside from being constructed in terms of problems, as strategic potential or as a balanced system, cities are also constructed as an entity of formal governmental responsibility. European policy makers often use this construction of cities for positioning themselves and others as political actors. 'Positioning' is thus understood here as the discursive representation of political actors in European urban policy discourse. How do European policy makers position themselves and others in this discourse? This will be discussed next.

The Position of European Authorities
A substantial part of European urban policy discourse relates to (self)positioning by the policymakers. The European Commission (EC), often shortened as 'the Commission,' is usually referred to both as author of various European publications, and as a governmental authority: an active body that 'intends,' 'will continue' etc. In the latter capacity, the Commission is almost always mentioned in a positive way. Aside from the European Commission, also the 'European Union' and the 'European Community' are often constructed as bodies that act.
An interesting way of self positioning by the European Union is through the qualifications that are used for the European urban programmes, especially for the Community Initiative URBAN. These qualifications of URBAN reflect on its initiator. Whereas these qualifications are at times 'neutral' of character, usually they are exclusively phrased in positive wordings, like: 'innovative,' 'supporting,' 'showing significant results,' 'particularly successful,' 'success story,' 'visible improvements,' etc. It is even argued that "URBAN … can act as a model for national policy" (EC 2002, 3). European Policy makers seem to aim at convincing the member states that the EU represents a body that feels strongly for urban areas. It is stated to be "at the heart of the Union's efforts" (EC 2003a, 5). Besides, in various wordings it is emphasized that the Commission opinion on this matter is widely shared by others. Barnier argues that: "so many are convinced of the need for the maintenance of a strong urban dimension" (EC 2003a, 5) without being more explicit as to whom these 'many' are and why or whether they truly have this conviction.

According to the European policy makers, the role of 'the Union' in urban policy seems beyond dispute: "Some urban challenges can only be tackled effectively if the European Union plays its part" (Trojan 1998, 8). For a number of reasons this is interesting. First of all, while the 'European Union' is sometimes constructed as an administrative entity ('stronger and weaker cities in the European Union'), it is mostly constructed as a governmental authority. Shortened as 'the EU,' it is presented as an acting body that takes or should take action, as an (important) player in the field. However, it leaves the question unanswered who this body precisely is. Secondly, involvement of EU actors has actually often been contested among others in European urban programmes witness the fact, for example, that there have been vast discussions during the past years about the subsidiarity principle. For that reason, the following statement does not come as a surprise: "For a number of reasons, European Union involvement is justified and has a clear added value" (Trojan 1998, 7). Besides, URBAN is also used to underline the crucial role of the European Union and to advocate the approach of the European Union, especially in terms of partnership. This

issue is contested as well: "The experience of the programme to date consolidates the apprehension that Community interventions in European cities should be integrated and based on local partnerships that ensure the involvement of all stakeholders" (EC 1998c, 4). Strikingly, the possible positions of the EU that are brought up do not address any aspects related to the formal authority of EU bodies in urban issues. They relate to, for example, the possible role of "catalyst of change in national urban policies and governance" (Trojan 1998, 3). While this might be a vital role of the European Union, its meaning is rather vague. Moreover, it contrasts sharply with its (presently lacking) formal authority in urban issues. Another capacity of the EU and its policy that often and in various forms comes to the fore, is the role of 'helper' or 'benefactor': "The EU can help to reinforce that local capacity" (Trojan 1998, 8), "URBAN's integrated approach is specifically designed to … helping the area towards…." (EC 2002, 19); "Urban areas are being enabled to help themselves" (EC 2003a, 6) etc. Involvement as catalyst or helper seems to be a well-chosen line of reasoning, as it does not discord with the subsidiarity principle.

The position of Member States
The frequency of appearance of the member states in European urban policy discourse is relatively modest. Cities appear far more often. While this does not come as a complete surprise in view of the focus of urban policy, it is surprising in the sense that the member states in general are an important formal partner of the European Commission, both in the negotiations of European Regional Policy and Structural Fund regulations and in the partnerships which are based on these frameworks. Whereas the positioning of the member states as administrative entities usually is relatively neutral, as governmental authorities they have different connotations attached to them. Although it is argued that "member states have primary responsibility in developing urban policy for the next century" (EC 1997b, 13) and that they are "free to define their own policies in this matter" (*ibid*.,15), at the same time, numerous examples depict member states as governmental authorities that have to obey European rules. For example: "Through new and revised directives member states are increasingly required to.…" (EC 1998a, 16), and "Directive 96/61/EC requires member states to ensure that…." (EC 1998a, 18). This is a regularly recurring division of roles. When it comes to issues of subsidiarity and the set-up of partnerships, the tone is often remarkably critical. The framework of subsidiarity, for example, is depicted as a constraining principle for the European Commission (EC), but at the same time as a principle that is not observed by the member states towards sub-governmental levels. The European Commission positions itself, claiming that it "should also encourage member states to apply subsidiarity at home" (Trojan 1998, 3). Also in relation to the widening of the definition of partnership, as proposed by the European Commission, member states are referred to in a very critical sense. Trojan, for example, argues: "This appears to be controversial for the member states. In view of the Commission, inclusion of local authorities in the partnership mechanisms is essential for tackling urban deprivation and for a successful mainstreaming of URBAN" (EC 1998a, 6). At the same time, the European Commission claims that the approach towards partnerships is widely shared by the cities, strongly confirming the alleged bond between EC and 'the' cities, while

excluding the member states. Marginalizing the position of the member states, Barnier argues that "the towns and cities themselves are in favour of direct partnership with the Commission, although with the member states being involved too" (Barnier 2002, 4).

The Position of Regions and Cities
Strikingly, while the approach of cities, towns or urban areas is embedded in a regional policy perspective and while (the debate on) European Regional policy now and then explicitly refers to regions, regions *as such* do not play a role of importance in European urban policy discourse: neither as an geographical or administrative unit, nor as a governmental authority or as an (important) partner of the European Commission in the implementation of urban policy. If regions are referred to at all, it is mostly in terms of problems, for example, as 'regions lagging behind' or 'disadvantaged regions'. Regional authorities are clearly not involved in the alleged alliance between the European Commission or the European Union and the cities. Only incidentally, one may find a reference to the 'Committee of the Regions' in the discourse. This is remarkable, especially in view of the fact that in European Regional Policy and the Structural Fund regulations regional authorities are explicitly mentioned as an authority that takes part in partnerships of SF-operations, together with actors at other policy levels.
Cities, on the other hand, frequently come to the fore in the discourse, among others in the capacity of governmental authority, as partner in partnerships or as part of a city network. Especially in the speeches of Barnier (2002) and Meadows (2004), cities are addressed as governmental authority. Both lecturers incite cities, in their own interest, to participate in the debate on the future of European Regional Policy. Usually, cities are explicitly positioned as an important actor in the urban policy field: as a partner of the European Commission that seems to be far more relevant than others. Several examples point at efforts to build alliances with cities. Trojan, for example, refers to the EU as "a natural ally of the European city" (1998, 8).
The presence of cities as governmental authorities and the absence of regions in this capacity might be explained by the fact that, in line with the subsidiarity principle, urban programmes require involvement of the lowest governmental authorities. Moreover, the Committee of the Regions, as an overarching governmental authority, has struggled for years to get recognition of the European Commission as a formal partner in the development of this policy, but so far this Committee was only allotted an advisory role. The limited position of regions as governmental authorities in urban policy discourse could also reflect the position they have within the wider context of European Regional policy discourse.

The Position of EU Inhabitants
EU inhabitants are positioned in very divergent ways in the discourse, such as victims for whom Europe is of the utmost importance, or as critical consumers of Europe.
Positioned as victims, they are described as people who are trapped in deprived neighbourhoods and belong to disadvantaged groups, whose 'quality of life' needs to be improved. 'Bringing Europe closer to its citizens' is an often used slogan that

matches very well with story lines like 'offering a helping hand' and 'restoring hope in deprived neighbourhoods'.

In line with the positioning of EU inhabitants as victims, urban projects are emotionally argued to be 'designed to give hope' (EC 2000a) or 'to build a better tomorrow' (EC 2000b). More generally speaking, the 'success stories' of URBAN are accompanied by a strikingly emotional tone, stated to "[have] succeeded in reversing the feeling of destitution and despair in some of Europe's most deprived neighbourhoods" (EC 2000b, 5). Moreover, in powerful metaphors, the innovative approach of the Urban Community Initiative is depicted as one that "tries to break this vicious circle by re-valorising the individual through his or her habitat and not in spite of it" (EC 1998c, 1), an idea that is put forward in a peremptory tone, the meaning of it being vague. This 'vicious circle' of poverty that needs to be breached, is opposed to a 'virtuous circle' of rising prosperity, presented as being offered by the internal market.

Other positions of EU inhabitants in European urban policy discourse are formulated in terms of 'population' or 'inhabitants' of a particular area, 'participants' in urban policy programmes and '(local) citizens'. In the last two capacities they are also positioned as critical consumers of EU policy. It is interesting to hear Trojan argue that, "there is a strong perception of citizens that the formulation of coherent urban policies suffers from the fragmentation of powers between various levels of government and overlapping actions" (Trojan 1998, 2). In a similar vein it is argued that if future European urban policy does not succeed in properly addressing the twin challenge that it faces (namely keeping cities competitive and solving urban deprivation), "Europe as a whole will pay trough disaffection of its citizens" (EC 1997b, 13).

Partnership and Governance

The subject-positions and the mutual positioning of actors involved in European urban policy are also often embedded in wider concepts, such as 'partnership' and 'governance.' These concepts relate to the collaboration of various sectors or actors and are constructions themselves as well. In the discourse governance is mainly constructed as partnership. In one of the sources, partnership is referred to as a "principle of action of the Structural funds that implies the closest consultation possible for the preparation of programmes, between the European Commission and the relevant authorities of the Member States at the national, regional and local level" (EC 2003a, 48). However, the principle is even more extended as it "also implies the co-operation of a wide range of public and private actors, including the social partners (trade unions and employers organizations) and bodies for environmental matters, in the implementation of programmes"(*ibid*. 48). The principle thus underlines a clear intention to co-operate, but at the same time it is suffused with an atmosphere free of engagement. For although it is mentioned who could be involved, it leaves open the question whether they are truly involved and to what extent.

In European urban policy discourse, partnership mostly refers to *local* partnerships. The European Commission is a fervent advocate of partnership and emphasizes in particular the importance of its local character, implying among others local authorities, local community groups, local citizens, social and economic bodies,

NGO's etc. Examples relate to: "Neighbourhood-based partnership between community groups, various authorities and the private sector" (EC 1997b, 10) and to "Partnership-building involving the private sector, communities and residents" (EC 1998a, 21). Together with citizen involvement it is even referred to as a "key factor in the success of all the Community Initiatives" (EC 2002, 22). In an emotional story line, it is argued that one should be "embracing local citizens in the development and implementation of the programmes" (EC 1998c, 1). Besides, the concept is often provided with particular qualifications, such as a 'new' or a 'strong' partnership. Qualifications like 'real' or 'genuine' partnership show that EU actors at times question the present status of these partnerships.

In addition, a lot of attention is paid to the composition of local partnerships, to widening it, to extending it, to partnership building.

Aside from being constructed at the local level, partnership is also constructed as a vertical form of co-operation between the European Commission and lower authorities, but it does not often appear in that form in European urban policy discourse. Barnier (2002, 5) for example, refers to "the framework of partnership … between the Commission, the Member States and the towns and cities or the regions" (2002, 5). While this illustrates the (probable) partners in the partnerships very well, the principle is actually not formally or legally elaborated in terms of a 'framework'.

While the partnership concept is very fashionable in European urban policy discourse, the concept of 'governance' appears far less frequent. If governance occurs at all, it is primarily referred to in terms of 'good governance', and it is constructed at one level only: as 'urban governance,' often bracketed together with 'local empowerment' or depicted as something that should be improved. "Contributing to good urban governance and local empowerment", for example, is formulated as an important goal of European urban policy (EC 2003a, 50). Moreover, it seems to be suggested that there is an implicit standard that governance should comply with 'the European model of governance' (EC 1997b, 2002; 2003a, 19). It is even argued that "the strong partnership with the local level promotes the European model of governance...." (EC 2002, 21). Interestingly, if one considers the Commission's White paper on Governance (EC 2001a), there is no explicit mentioning of a 'European model of governance'. The concept of 'model' is used, but it refers to a design for the Union's future political organization and only reflects a clarification of the division of power between institutes at the EU level and the sharing of competences between the European Union and the member states.

A final observation relates to the fact that the concept of 'multi-level governance,' often used by social scientists in their conceptualisation of the European Union, does not play any role of importance in European urban policy discourse at all – it never shows up in the sources.

4.5 Conclusion

European urban policy discourse, as produced by EU policy makers, represents a strong deviation from the traditional relations within the European polity , as it directly enters the (sub-)national governmental levels from the EU level. The policy vocabulary of this discourse is made up of a limited number of terms, that are constructed and used

in story lines in various, but constantly recurring ways. 'Cities' are constructed in an almost paradoxical way: they represent the problems connected to an (urban) area, but also the strategic potential that should be used and protected in order to safeguard the economic position of the European Union world wide. In reference to governmental responsibility, 'cities' connect directly to the question: who should be involved in dealing with particular issues in these cities. A politics of scale is reflected in the ways of (self)positioning by European (urban) policy makers. One finds recurring patterns regarding the extent of appearance of actors in the discourse, the undertone of the meaning assigned to them, and their positioning in relation to each other. For example, even though the member states are an important formal partner of the European Commission and even though their responsibility in developing urban policy does not seem to be contested by EU policy makers, in a recurring positioning of the member states by the EU, they are portrayed as governmental authorities that have to obey European rules. On the other hand, cities are positioned as an important partner of the European Commission: as governmental authorities with whom the Commission has a special alliance. At times, when this bond between the Commission and cities is emphasised, the role of the member states seems to be marginalized.

The presence of cities as governmental authorities and the absence of regions in this capacity might be explained by the fact that urban programmes focus on urban areas and, in line with the subsidiarity principle, require involvement of the lowest governmental levels. One could thus argue that this division of roles is reflected in European urban policy discourse. Following naturally from this line of argument, one would expect that regional authorities will get a more prominent position in the discourse after 2006, when urban programmes will be formulated within the wider framework of mainstream regional programmes.

Finally, EU inhabitants, who are clearly of great importance in the discourse, are depicted in highly divergent ways. As victims, trapped in circles of poverty, they seem to offer the ultimate justification for EU involvement in urban issues, in the capacity of helper, benefactor or catalyst of change. As critical consumers of Europe, they are used to endorse European viewpoints regarding fragmentation of powers between various levels of government and overlapping actors, "Europe as a whole will pay through disaffection of its citizens."

European urban policy discourse seems to be rooted in and reflect a wider process of politics of scale between various governmental levels in the European polity. The elaborate discussion on the subsidiarity principle; the contestation over the issue of partnership within European Regional policy and the Structural Fund operations (who is involved and who should be involved), but also within the particular case of urban policy (criticising the member states in their attitude towards local partnership), serve as an example. Interestingly, while the concept of 'multi-level governance' forms a useful tool to describe the European polity, it does not play any role of importance in European urban policy discourse.It never shows up in any of the sources. Finally, whether this 'Euro speak' on member states, cities, regions and citizens, as disseminated in European urban policy discourse, is shared or contested by others, such as actors at national or subnational governmental levels, is hard to tell. The following chapters might be able to answer that question.

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CHAPTER 5

5. The Dutch Member State in the European (Urban) Policy Arena

5.1 Introduction

European urban policy discourse, as produced by EU officials in policy documents and practices is disseminated in the Netherlands (among other countries) through European urban programmes (URBAN-I, URBAN-II, Objective 2- urban areas), at international seminars, in formal and informal meetings, in press releases, policy documents, etc. Basically everyone can take notice of European urban policy discourse, as it is expressed in sources that are accessible to the public at large.

The reach of European urban policy discourse goes far beyond the national governmental level, as the interaction between the European, national, regional (if existing) and local (urban) levels is increasing, among others in European Regional policy and specific programmes such as URBAN. Moreover, it does not simply 'trickle down' vertically but, because of the partnership principle that requires involvement of various governmental levels, it can also 'enter' these other levels directly.

In the former chapter, it was examined how European policy makers construct and disseminate terms related to (area-based) urban policy in policy documents and practices; how they position themselves and others in the discourse and how the discourse is related to the contexts in which it comes about.

Other actors involved in European urban policy programmes might share the construction of social reality that European urban policy discourse implies. For, with regard to European urban policy, over the years there have been many formal and informal contacts between the European, national and subnational governmental levels as well as among them, for example in the European Council, the Committee of the Regions, but also in city-networks (Eurocities, for example), at conferences (the Urban Forum in Vienna, for example), etc. At the same time, it is also possible that these other actors will contest this reality, particular meanings assigned, or subject positions allotted to them in the discourse. One of the main questions addressed in this chapter is therefore how Dutch *national* governmental actors who are involved in European area-based urban policy, 'receive' and 'negotiate' the meanings assigned and the positions allotted to them in European urban policy discourse.

First, however, attention will be paid to the public administrative structure of the Netherlands and to the extent of Europeanization at the Dutch national governmental level, in order to get an idea about 'whether Europe matters.' Next, the policy process of European area-based urban programmes will be examined, also as related to the Dutch policy framework of Big Cities Policy. Then, the actual discourse

analysis of various national sources will take place, to better understand the meanings assigned, the ways of (self)positioning and the possible discursive 'negotiation' of European urban policy discourse at this level. Finally, conclusions will be drawn.

5.2 Dutch National Contexts

First of all, to get the general picture, in what kind of economic and political climate have the European URBAN-I programmes (to be discussed later) been implemented in the Netherlands?

In an economic sense, the programmes have been implemented in a period when the Dutch economy was booming, although not without periods of crisis. These ups and downs were clearly related to the general economic restructuring process and mostly affected low-educated (foreign) workers in the largest cities. In the early 2000s, however, economic development hardly increased and in 2002, economic growth even showed the lowest increase of the past 20 years (0.2 percent) (Burgers et al. 2002; Aalbers et al. 2003).

Regarding the political climate in the Netherlands, as reflected in ongoing political debates, an important and ongoing debate related to administrative renewal: the government should operate more effectively and more efficiently and should pay more attention to what its citizens wanted. This theme is still high on the national policy agenda, only witness the presence of a 'Minister for Government Reform and Kingdom Relations.'

Generally speaking, important themes in the political debates are elaborated and incorporated in (national) policies. This has also been the case with Dutch Big Cities Policy (BCP), an area-based urban policy that served to enhance the administrative renewal goal of administrative de-fragmentation (*bestuurlijke ontkokering)* (Arnoldus 2002). Other important political debates have been incorporated in BCP as well. These have changed over time, from a focus on work (1994-1998), to a focus on the quality of the environment (1998-2004), to main objectives that presently (2004-2008) relate to safety, integration of ethnic minorities and immigration (Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer 2004).

The URBAN-I programmes were thus implemented in a political climate with a lot of attention for administrative renewal, among others incorporated in Dutch BCP.

As mentioned earlier, the European partnership principle requires (among other things) involvement of various governmental levels in programmes that are funded with Structural Fund money. Another important question therefore is: what kind of public administrative structure does the Netherlands have, and how has this structure developed over time, in relation to 'Europe'?

5.2.1 The Public Administrative Structure

The public administration of the Netherlands (a decentralized, unitary state) is based on a three-tier structure of national government, province and municipality. Davelaar, Swinnen and Ter Woerds (2004, 78) refer to the "strong, stable and fairly autonomous administration on both central and local levels." Needless to say that public administration is by definition tied to space and place: states, provinces and municipalities cannot exist without their territories (SCP 1998).

While many countries have a similar three-tier structure, according to Barlow (2000), the Dutch tiers are characterized by the fact that they are highly interdependent and closely interwoven by intergovernmental relations. The unity of the Dutch unitary state is derived from consensus-building and mutual adjustment, instead of hierarchy and central integration. Interestingly, Barlow differentiates between legislative power and implementation power and argues that in terms of the former, the Netherlands has features of a centralized state, whereas in terms of the latter, it resembles a decentralized state. He argues that Dutch municipalities are relatively strong, with their responsibility for a relatively high proportion of public spending, but this is partly because of the non-executant role of the national government.

In a 1998 report, the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (*Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP)* examines the last 25 years of public administration. Its overall conclusion is that the three-tier structure has basically remained intact during its 150 years of existence, but of course there have been processes of administrative renewal (or attempts to).

Focusing on examples of administrative renewal during the last decennia in the Netherlands itself, an important one is the decentralization of tasks, competences and resources from the national level to the municipalities. After the publication of the '*Decentralisatienota'* in 1980 (TK 1980/1981), decentralization was for the first time implemented in the early 1980s in a number of policy areas in which the role of the municipalities was substantial already, such as urban renewal (*stadsvernieuwing*) and social work. In addition, the financial independence of the municipalities was pursued through a reorganization of the existing system of specific payments: these were combined or transferred to the municipal fund (g*emeentefonds)*. Through this municipal fund, national payments are distributed among the municipalities. This fund gives them more authority than payments related to specific goals, the so-called *doeluitkeringen*. In the course of the years also the tax income of the municipalities increased somewhat from a very low level. Additionally, the decentralization process towards the municipalities received a new impulse thanks, to the social renewal (*sociale vernieuwing)*, from about 1989 to 1994 (SCP 1998).

Another example of administrative renewal related to the aim for an efficient and effective public administration: In 1983 the 'Geelhoed Commission' published a report on reduction and simplification of governmental regulations in the Netherlands (TK 1983/1984), which was used as a basis for a major operation of deregulation. Moreover, between 1985 and 1994, many divisions of the national government were privatized. Additionally, there were processes of functional decentralization, in which competences and tasks were transferred to (co-operations of) social institutions (SCP 1998).

A final example of administrative renewal concerns intra-municipal decentralization: the establishment of city districts in some big cities "ranging from a few municipal district officers, via well staffed district offices with citizens' advisory boards or councils, to elected district councils and aldermen" (Davelaar, Swinnen and Ter Woerds 2004, 84). The Hague is an example of the first, with merely civil servants at the city district level. Amsterdam is an example of the latter, including a

decentralized structure with elected councils, both at the level of the municipality and at the level of the city district.

Attempts to establish new forms of metropolitan government have been less successful, though. Presently, there is no strong government at the level of agglomerations or regions.

Summarizing the foregoing, during its 150 years of existence, the Dutch three-tier public administrative structure has basically remained in tact, but in the last 25 years, there are many examples of administrative renewal, related to decentralization, privatization and the establishment of city districts in some big cities.

5.2.2 The Netherlands and the European Union

Processes of European integration and 'Europeanization,' have had an increasing impact on the mutual relationships between the tiers of public administration in the member states, also in the Netherlands.

In the following, first the involvement of the Dutch government in EU decision making will be briefly examined. Next, the general influence of Europe on the Dutch public administration will be considered. Prompted by the focus of this chapter, in the analysis often explicit attention will be paid to urban policy issues.

The Dutch Presidency of the EU Council

The Netherlands is formally involved in EU decision making through the Council. The Presidency of the Council rotates every six months. In other words, each EU member state in turn takes charge of the Council agenda and chairs all the meetings, including those of the European Council, for a six-month period, promoting legislative and political decisions and brokering compromises between the member states.

Since 1958, the Netherlands has held the Presidency of the Council eleven times[36]. This chairmanship has been a good opportunity for the Netherlands to position itself in the European arena. Moreover, in recent years the Netherlands has also used it to position itself specifically in the European urban arena.

During the EU chairmanship in 1997, the then State Secretary for Big Cities Policy (Mr Kohnstamm) took the initiative to organize an informal meeting of EU ministers in Noordwijk (the Netherlands), in which urban policy was discussed. The aim of this initiative was to put European urban policy on the political agenda of the EU member states, in order to guarantee their involvement in this particular subject. The British chair (1st half of 1998) and also the following member state chairs (Austria, Germany, Finland and France) continued with the elaboration of a 'non binding European framework' for urban policy.

However, a month before the informal meeting of EU ministers in Noordwijk, the European Commission published a Communication, entitled: '*Towards an urban agenda in the European Union*' (EC 1997b). This communication related to the same subject, with a similar intention: to stimulate the debate about a possible European agenda for urban policy. The Communication was followed by another one:

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[36] This has been the case in 1960, 1963, 1966, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1997 and 2004 (www.eu2004.nl). The next Dutch Presidency is scheduled for 2016.

'*Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union: a Framework for Action*' (EC 1998a) and by the '*Agenda 2000*' (EC 1999), with proposals for the Structural Funds, including a more structural framework for urban policy. Moreover, in November 1998, the European Commission organized an Urban Forum in Vienna to further discuss the matter, including the realization of a 'non-binding European Framework for an Urban Policy'.

Initially, European urban policy was not broadly based among the member states, prompted by the fear of loosing competences (De Lange 1999). In response to the European Communications, the Dutch Member State sent a letter to the European Commission, in which it emphasized the primary responsibility of the member states in developing a framework for urban policy and suggested a 'facilitating' and possibly 'stimulating role' for the Commission (Leeuwestein and Bringmann 1999).

From the start, the member states and the European Commission have been competing with each other in relation to developing a European framework for an urban policy. Moreover, the lack of clear dividing lines in responsibilities of the European Commission and the member states, in relation to the subsidiarity principle, added to this complexity.

Also the most recent Dutch Presidency of the European Union, from July 1 to December 31, 2004, has been made the most of by the national government. An official website was established. It enlisted various activities and documents, planned and released during this period, such as seminars, formal and informal meetings, publications, press releases, etc (www.eu2004.nl/).

Once more, attention was paid to urban policy issues, for instance at the (third) 'European City Summit,' held in Noordwijk, in October 2004. Interestingly, this City Summit was a concerted action of the Dutch Presidency and the European Commission. The agenda for this meeting, joined by various governmental and non-governmental actors, included a discussion of the European Commission's proposals for future EU regional policy, and in particular of the role of the cities.

The Dutch Representation in the Committee of the Regions

As mentioned earlier, subnational authorities are not formally involved in the EU decision making process, but they do have a representation in an advisory committee, the Committee of the Regions (*Comité van de Regio's, CvdR*). The Dutch delegation consists of 12 members and an equal number of alternates. Six of them represent regional authorities (provinces), the other six represent municipalities. The selection of the Dutch CoR delegation is made by the Minister of the Interior, based on a proposal submitted by the Dutch Association of Provincial Authorities (*Interprovinciaal Overleg, IPO*) and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (*Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG*). The national government takes a decision on the basis of the proposed list of members and submits it to the Council of Ministers, which appoints the members of the Committee of the Regions. All Dutch members of the Committee of the Regions and their alternates are directly elected members of a provincial or City Council, or are politically accountable to a directly elected provincial or City Council (i.e. Queen's Commissioners for the Provinces and/or Mayors for the Municipalities)(VNG 2001; Committee of the Regions 2004).

As mentioned earlier, the position of the Committee of the Regions has been questioned in recent years. This also relates to the Dutch influence in the Committee, in view of the limited number of seats and because of the limited presence of Dutch members at meetings of the Committee (De Rooij 2003). Moreover, two years ago, the chair and vice-chair of the Dutch delegation in the Committee self-critically admitted that the Committee should become far more politically active, to increase its influence on the EU decision making process (Van Houten 2004).

Formal EU Co-ordination within the Netherlands
Finally, some attention should be paid to the formal EU co-ordination in the Netherlands.

The overall co-ordination structure of Dutch EU policy respects the comparatively diffuse, collegial policy making style which characterizes the national political-administrative system. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is in charge of the co-ordination of Dutch foreign policy, including, since the 1960s, policy related to the European Union. Since 1957, there has been a State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who was also in charge of European affairs. However, in 2002 the name was changed in 'State Secretary of European affairs'. At every stage, all ministries concerned are involved in trying to arrive at a mutually acceptable position. Ultimate decision making rests with the Dutch cabinet, acting collectively (Harmsen 1999).

The structure of the Dutch EU co-ordination consists of two parts: the central co-ordination by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the decentralized co-ordination by the different departments.

The outline of the co-ordination structure of Dutch EU policy, and its connection to Coreper[37], the Council in Brussels, but also to the interdepartmental working group BNC (*Werkgroep Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen*), is presented in box 5.A[38]. In the domestic co-ordination of European policy, inter-ministerial committees, such as the Co-ordination Committee for European Integration and Association Problems (*Coördinatie Commissie voor Europese Integratie- en Associatieproblemen, CoCo*) and the Council for European Affairs (*Raad voor Europese Zaken, REA*), assume a key role (Harmsen 1999).

While the figure as a whole presents the central co-ordination structure, in the rectangular box, the decentralized part of the co-ordination structure is shown.

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[37] Coreper is short for '*Comité des Représentants Permanents*' (the Permanent Representatives Committee). This body unites the permanent representatives (ambassadors) who act in the interests of their member states in Brussels.
[38] A more elaborate account can be found in the report '*Sturing EU aangelegenheden: rijksbrede Takenanalyse*' (Gemengde Commissie sturing EU-aangelegenheden 2005).

Box 5.A Co-ordination structure Dutch EU policy (Gemengde Commissie sturing EU-aangelegenheden 2005)

Consultations related to Europe

In recent years, various consultations have been established that relate to European affairs or, more specifically, to European urban affairs linked to the home administration. In 1998 a 'Task Force Europe' was set up. This was a consultation of the national government and the cities with the following mission: "to contribute to the development of (and discussion about) a European policy framework for urban policy, that is supplementary and supportive to the Dutch Big Cities Policy; that can count on broad support of the cities and that can contribute to the visibility of Europe for the citizen" (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 2002a, 26). In 2002, it consisted of administrative representatives of the 'G4[39]'; two representatives of the 'G21[40]', one representative of the VNG, the Minister of Big Cities Policy and Integration and national officials. Meanwhile, more consultations have come into existence. Since 2000 there is also a 'Euro G-9 consultation,' in which representatives of the nine Dutch

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[39] The four major Dutch cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht.
[40] The Dutch Cities of Almelo, Arnhem, Breda, Deventer, Dordrecht, Eindhoven, Enschede, Groningen, Haarlem, Heerlen, Helmond, Hengelo, Den Bosch, Leeuwarden, Leiden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Schiedam, Tilburg, Venlo, Zwolle.

cities participate, in which a European 'Objective 2 – urban areas' programme is being implemented. Finally, in the middle of 2005, a 'Europe consultation for the home administration' (*Europa Overleg Binnenlands Bestuur*, EOBB) was established. This consultation, chaired by the Ministry of the Interior[41], discusses all ongoing issues that touch on the linkage between Europe and the home administration. Its members consist of the ministries involved, the IPO, the VNG and the Association of Water Boards (*Unie van Waterschappen*) (interview).

European Integration and Europeanization

In a rather short period of time, the amount of EU law and regulation in the member states has strongly increased. Focusing on the Netherlands, in 1991, the SGBO[42] established that there was hardly any EU law yet that directly affected subnational authorities (VNG 1991). But only ten years later, the SGBO concluded that about *forty* percent of the national law and regulation was to a greater or lesser extent determined by the European Union. At the same time, the SGBO established that local authorities and their civil servants were often not aware of this fact and of its importance (VNG 2001)[43]. In any event, the influence of EU law on national law and legislation is strongly increasing and is of ever-greater practical importance (Prechal et al. 2005). As the process of Europeanization is often more or less hidden, the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research entitled one of its publications '*Unseen Europe*' (RPB 2004).

Since 1999, the Dutch cabinet publishes an annual report, entitled '*De Staat van de Europese Unie*', in which it presents an overview of the financial and policy implications of European decision making for the Netherlands. The report also includes a European agenda from a Dutch perspective, for the following year (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1999).

An interesting question is to what extent this process of Europeanization results in radical changes, for example in the national system of policy making or in the position of the national government, as related to other levels of government. Considering some Dutch case studies, this does not seem to be the case. First of all, De Beus and Pennings (2004) show that the Europeanization of Dutch political parties and newspapers is presently going on, but is still far weaker than is often assumed. Focusing on the making and implementation of European policy, Harmsen (1999) establishes that the pre-existing Dutch national model of policy making, in which power is diffused and that is based on broad consensus, continues to shape the European policy making process. Based on their study of the national implementation of EU cohesion policies in The Netherlands and Denmark, the overall finding of

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[41] Its full name is actually the 'Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations' (*Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, BZK*).

[42] Until 2001, the SGBO was the research bureau of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG). In 2001 it was privatized.

[43] This might still be the case, in view of recent publications such as the '*Handreiking Europaproof Gemeenten*' (Kenniscentrum Europa decentraal, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties and VNG 2006) and '*Grenze(n)loze gemeenten: Handreiking internationale samenwerking en activiteiten van gemeenten*' (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties and VNG 2005).

Yesilkagit and Blom-Hansen (2005), is that the implementation of Structural Funds has not led the Danish and Dutch national governments to transform the implementation structures within their existing national cohesion policy (regional development). For the Netherlands, they even establish that the partnership principle fits very well with the Dutch system of corporatism. According to De Rooij (2004), the position of the Dutch national government has not been eroded, neither in relation to subnational authorities, nor in relation to EU authorities. Considering the EU decision making process as related to the Structural Funds, it is the Dutch national government that, together with other national governments of EU member states, decides about their regulations.

Also in the allocation of European money to the provinces and municipalities, the Dutch cabinet fulfills a pivotal rule. In 1999, the national governments decided that EU funding would be transferred to the national governments first, and not any longer directly from Brussels to the subnational governments, as it used to be done. Moreover, the Dutch national government has increased the control of the spending of EU money in provinces and municipalities, among others with the Law supervision European Subsidies ('*Wet toezicht Europese subsidies*'), effective since 2002.

Finally, most applications of municipalities and provinces for EU money are collected by national departments and combined into a national programme. Also in that sense, in De Rooij's opinion (2004), the national government is thus in charge.

At the same time, however, the four EU Structural Fund principles, concentration, additionality, partnership and programme planning, do force the member states to work in a particular way. Based on the principle of additionality, for example, European SF money can only be obtained if co-financing is arranged by the member states and, as mentioned earlier, if the requirement of partnership is complied with, implying the involvement of various (governmental and non-governmental) actors in the operational programmes.

In conclusion, while the process of Europeanization does take place in the sense that intergovernmental relations and policy practices are affected, at the same time it does not seem to have resulted in radical changes in policy making procedures or in the position of the Dutch national government.

Intergovernmental Relations in a European Perspective

In recent years, there have been a number of publications related to the intergovernmental relations of the Dutch three tiers of government. Interestingly, in spite of references to the increasing influence of the EU on policy and regulation of the national government, the provinces and the municipalities, the amount of attention paid to intergovernmental relations *within* a European perspective is remarkably limited.

The '*Bestuursakkoord-Nieuwe-Stijl*' (BANS), signed by the prime minister and the chairs of the IPO and VNG on March 4, 1999 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, VNG and IPO 1999), serves as an example. It pays some attention to 'interaction (*omgangsregels*) in European perspective' between the different governmental levels, but its main focus relates to the development of the countryside and to regulations regarding public contracts (*aanbestedingsrichtlijnen*) of the European Commission. At the same time, the agreement pays attention to the interdepartmental Working Group

for the Assessment of New (European) Commission Proposals (*Werkgroep Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen, BNC*), that was established in 1989. In this working group, consisting of representatives from all the ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs puts forward new proposals of the European Commission. The working group examines their legislative and financial implications and prepares a first position of the Dutch Member State in the Council. While the BNC originally only consisted of national level representatives (all ministries involved, among others the Ministry of the Interior), since 2005 the intermediary organizations of the municipalities and the provinces are members as well.

Another document in which intergovernmental relations are discussed is the '*Code Interbestuurlijke Verhoudingen*,' that was laid down five years later (November 9, 2004), between the same partners: the national government, the IPO and the VNG (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, IPO and VNG 2005). Its point of departure, 'decentralize if possible, keep central if necessary' ('*decentraal wat kan, centraal wat moet*') is quite comparable with the European subsidiarity principle (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, IPO and VNG 2005, 7). Although it is stated at the beginning of the '*Code*' that special attention will be given to intergovernmental relations in a European perspective, this particular issue is merely addressed in an attachment of hardly two pages. Intentions concern timely consultation between the three governmental levels in judging new European policy plans, based on their governmental and financial consequences for the provinces and municipalities. Besides, detailed intergovernmental relations would be laid down later, in relation to the EU Constitution. But with the rejection of the Constitution, these detailed agreements have never been realized.

The foregoing has given an impression of the Dutch political and administrative context, as related to Europe, in which European area-based urban programmes are developed and implemented. Of course this has been essential for the formation of a policy network around European policy in the Netherlands. In the following, the urban programmes themselves will be the focus of study.

5.3 Area-based Urban Policy Frameworks in the Netherlands

In the 1990s and early 2000s, both European and Dutch area-based urban programmes have been implemented in the Netherlands. While the programmes have often been interconnected, there have also been frictions between them.

5.3.1 European Urban Programmes in the Netherlands

Over the years, the Netherlands has received a substantial amount of subsidy from the European Structural Funds. During the 1994-1999 period, this amounted to 2,6 billion euros. During the following period (2000-2006), it was even higher: 3,2 billion euros (ERAC et al. 2004). Altogether, about 260 million euros was allocated to the implementation of European urban programmes in the Netherlands, such as Urban Pilot Projects, URBAN-I, URBAN-II and Objective 2-urban areas. Over time, European urban programmes have been implemented in various Dutch cities (Dukes 2005).

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Table 5.B European area-based urban programmes in the Netherlands (round of in millions of euros) (www.urban-2.nl; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2004a;www.utrecht.nl; www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/urban2/urban/initiative/programmes

Programme	Financing period Structural Funds	City	Area	Money from ERDF*
Urban Pilot Programme	1989-1993 (phase I)	Groningen	Korreweg/Oosterpark	2
(Article 10 ERDF: innovative measures)		Rotterdam	Kop van Zuid	3
	1995-1999 (phase 2)	Utrecht	Museumkwartier	3
Community Initiative URBAN- I	1994-1999	Amsterdam	Bijlmermeer	5
		Den Haag	Schilderswijk	5
		Rotterdam	Delfshaven	7
		Utrecht	Kanaalstraat en omgeving	7
Community Initiative URBAN-II	2000-2006	Amsterdam	West binnen de ring	9
		Rotterdam	Noord aan de Rotte	9
		Heerlen	Heerlen Noord/Oost	12
Objective 2- urban areas programme	2000-2006	Amsterdam	Groot Oost	21
		Amsterdam	Amstel III & Bijlmer	15
		Arnhem	Kern	15
		Den Haag	Centrum Zuid	30
		Eindhoven	Focus	15
		Enschede	Stedelijk hart	15
		Maastricht	Noord	15
		Nijmegen	Kanaalgebied	15
		Rotterdam	Delfshaven	20
		Rotterdam	Feijenoord	16
		Utrecht	Westflank	21
Total				260

*The URBAN-I programmes in Amsterdam and Den Haag also received a small amount of money from the European Social Fund (ESF).

These urban programmes were all so-called 'subsidy programmes,' implying that the European means were distributed among projects via these subsidy programmes. Because of the co-financing requirement of the European Structural funds (additionality), Dutch BCP resources and European Structural Fund money have often been used complementarily in the implementation of urban programmes in Dutch cities. In practice, not only European and national money was involved, also the local government and even private parties have invested money in these programmes.

In case of the URBAN-I programmes (that will be discussed in the following chapters more elaborately), the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for the implementation of all the URBAN-I programmes in the Netherlands. In this capacity, the Ministry had to watch the financial implementation (administration and auditing) within the URBAN-I programmes, in accordance with European regulations in the field of co-ordination and auditing, and to give account in this sense to the European Commission. In order to be able to fulfill this task properly, the Ministry has developed a '*Controleprotocol Urban*,' to streamline the URBAN-I accountants reports from the different cities. Moreover, through the means that it had made available within the framework of Big Cities Policy, the Ministry of the Interior also acted as a co-financier of the URBAN-I programmes (ERAC 1998).

5.3.2 The Dutch Big Cities Policy

In 1994, in the Netherlands a national area-based urban policy was started. This so-called Big Cities Policy (*Grotestedenbeleid, GSB*) was initiated by the national '*Paars I*' government, in response to an urgent call for help by the four largest cities in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). These asked for a '*delta plan*' to counter the downward spiral of particular areas within their municipalities (Gemeente Amsterdam et al. 1994; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 2002b; Davelaar, Swinnen and Ter Woerds 2004). While originally only the four major cities were involved in Big Cities Policy, over time the number of cities has increased from four to thirty one, that are presently organized under the headings of 'G4' and 'G27' (www.grotestedenbeleid.nl).

In terms of administrative organization, the national government enters into covenants with the cities involved, in which mutual obligations for efforts and policy goals are laid down. While the cities have to give substance to the policy, the national government fulfills a co-ordinating, and in some areas a controlling role (Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer 2004). Big Cities Policy was a new form of policy, in the sense that it required an integrated way of working at the local governmental level.

Meanwhile, three phases of Big Cities Policy (BCP) can be distinguished: BCP-I (1994-1998/1999), BCP-II (1998-2002/2004 and the present phase, BCP-III (2005-2009). What were the first two phases like in terms of organization, covenants and funding?

Big Cities Policy - I
The first phase of Big Cities Policy is often referred to as a pioneering phase. In the 1994 coalition agreement, some important points of departure for Big Cities Policy

were laid down: reducing compartmentalization at the national government; furthering decentralization; enhancing the programme management role (*regierol*) of the municipal government, for the advancement of the connection between decentralized policy sectors; and increasing the financial elbowroom of the cities.

The agreements in the covenants that were entered into between the national government and the cities were on a thematic basis. Within these (five) themes separate projects were funded. An amount of about 1,5 billion euros was labeled as 'Big Cities Policy' money for the cities involved. A large share was meant work and economy, as can be seen in table 5.C.

Table 5.C Big Cities Policy-I (1994-1998): Finance by theme (round off in millions of euros) (Davelaar, Swinnen and Ter Woerds 2004)

Themes	Budget
Work and economy	1,194,1
Quality of the social and physical environment	196,7
Youth and safety	83,6
Education	7,5
Care	16,0
Total	1,498,0

During this period, a State Secretary (Mr Kohnstamm) was appointed at the Ministry of the Interior. He became responsible for Big Cities Policy, safety, social renewal and 'information provision policy'. At the end of 1998, within the Ministry, the Directorate 'Urban Policy and Intergovernmental Relations' (*Grotestedenbeleid en Interbestuurlijke Betrekkingen, DGSIB*) was established.

Big Cities Policy - II
In the second phase, Big Cities Policy was organized around three 'pillars': an employment and economy pillar; a physical development pillar and a social pillar. During this period, the budget and the number of cities involved increased, the number of policy instruments was expanded and the BCP accounting system was adjusted. Moreover, the emphasis of the programmes shifted to the district (*wijk*) level (Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer 2004; Davelaar, Swinnen and Ter Woerds 2004).

Covenants between the national government and the cities were now based on 'multi-year development programmes': the cities had to indicate their vision and strategies for becoming 'comprehensive cities,' as well as their policy priorities in the field of economics, social and physical infrastructure. In these programmes a number of measurable goals were incorporated (Arnoldus 2002; Davelaar, Swinnen and Ter Woerds 2004).

The national '*Paars II*' government reserved a substantial amount of money for Big Cities Policy (see table 5.D). Only a small part (50 million euros) came from

the Ministry of the Interior, the largest share came from various other departments (eight altogether)(Van Kempen and Bolt 2002). Once more, most of the money was invested in the economic pillar.

Table 5.D Big Cities Policy-II (1998-2004): Finance by pillar (round off in millions of euros) (Davelaar, Swinnen and Ter Woerds 2004)

Pillar	Budget
Economic pillar	951,3
Physical pillar	506,5
Social pillar	549,9

In 1998, the State Secretary, responsible for Big Cities Policy was succeeded by a minister without portfolio (Mr Van Boxtel). He became in charge of Big Cities Policy, Integration and Public Information Policy. Within the European Union, he was the first minister of urban policy.

In the present government, urban policies are the political responsibility of the Minister of Administrative reform and Kingdom Relations (Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer 2004), who is also responsible for the co-ordination of the European area-based urban programmes that are implemented in Dutch cities.

As an area-based urban programme, Big Cities Policy has a lot in common with European area-based urban programmes such as URBAN. An interesting question is therefore, how did these European urban programmes, implemented in the Netherlands, relate to the Dutch Big Cities Policy?

5.3.3 European Urban Programmes and Dutch Big Cities Policy

While various member states have considered the URBAN programme as an important innovation in policy making, because of its integrated, area-based approach of social and economic problems, in a Dutch report it is stated that URBAN could easily have been incorporated in existing long term area-based programmes (Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer 2004). This observation might be explained by the presence of Big Cities Policy in the Netherlands, whose development ran parallel to the European URBAN-I programme. Many other EU member states do not have a (national) urban policy.

In a special edition of '*Euromagazine*'[44], focusing on 'European urban policy,' it is argued: "What makes the Dutch model special, is the fact that European subsidies are linked to Big Cities Policy. This hardly happens in other member states. In Dutch cities, the subsidy programmes URBAN and Objective 2 (Objective 2-urban areas, TD) have all followed the structure of Big Cities Policy, with three pillars in which was

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[44] Euromagazine is a magazine that was published by the Economic Affairs department of the Amsterdam Municipality, until the end of 2005.

invested: economic reinforcement, physical infrastructure and social cohesion" (Euromagazine 2004c, 5). The view taken in the quote is quite clear: Big Cities Policy is the point of departure and European urban programmes are embedded in the Dutch policy framework. While this might be true in terms of the amount of money (10,25 billion euros for BCP, versus 257 million euros for European programmes in the Netherlands, albeit in slightly different time periods), in organizational terms, this is questionable. For, the European programmes were accompanied by financial and organizational requirements that had to be complied with and therefore were not fit in that easily. At the local level, where European and Big Cities Policy programmes were often implemented coherently (at least financially), one had to deal with (at least) two different policy frameworks, different goals, different money flows and different regulations, which often caused frictions.

But the shoe pinched in another way as well. While BCP was called the leading framework for area-based urban policy, the European area-based urban programmes resulted in an important direct connection between the EU and the municipalities and provinces (De Rooij 2004). This is quite clear if one considers the URBAN programmes, in which local and European governmental representatives participated in the same committees, directly connecting these two governmental levels. Moreover, in case of the URBAN-I programmes, money flows from the European Structural Funds were still sent directly from Brussels to the cities, without an intervening role for the Ministry of the Interior.

In conclusion, European area-based urban programmes and Dutch BCP serve as a context for each other: because of their common characteristics, they have often been financially combined in the stage of policy implementation. At the same time, as will become clear in the following discourse analysis, there has been some competition between the programmes.

5.4 Negotiating European Urban Policy Discourse

In the former chapter, European urban policy discourse was examined elaborately. The question raised now, is the following. In view of the different Dutch contexts in which European urban policy and its discourse are 'received,' how do Dutch actors at the national governmental level 'negotiate' these meanings and the allotted positions in European urban policy discourse?

5.4.1 Data selection

For the discourse analysis, various (policy) documents have been selected, that were produced by the Ministry of the Interior and speeches that were given by former Ministers of urban policy[45]. All the selected documents, that roughly covered the 1994-

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[45] Mr Kohnstamm, State Secretary of Internal Affairs (among others in charge of Big Cities Policy) from August 22, 1994 until Augustus 3, 1998; Mr Dijkstal, Minister of Internal Affairs and vice-minister-president, from August 22, 1994 until August 3, 1998; Mr Van Boxtel, Minister 'without portfolio,' in charge of Big Cities Policy and integration policy from August 3, 1998 until July 22, 2002; Mr De Graaf, Minister 'without Portfolio' for Administrative renewal and Kingdom Relations, from May 7, 2003 until March 23, 2005.

2004 time period, dealt with European urban programmes and often also, coherently, with Dutch Big Cities Policy.

The speeches were all given for an audience of a wide variety of actors. They were primarily chosen based on the extent in which they dealt with 'urban issues' at the national and at the European level and less based on an even spread within the time period examined. Some of the selected speeches and documents were derived from conferences in the Netherlands, most of which I have attended.[46] An overview of the sources is presented in table 5.E.

Table 5.E Speeches and documents selected for the discourse analysis of national policy level data

Speeches and Documents	
Speeches by Ministers responsible for urban policy	Speech Mr Kohnstamm, January 1997
	Speech Mr Dijkstal, October 1997
	Speech Mr Van Boxtel, February 2000
	Speech Mr De Graaf, May 2004
(Policy) Documents, produced by the Ministry of the Interior	C.I. Urban 1995-1999 (2nd edition)
	Urban II 2000-2006 brochure
	Urban Policy (2000)
	Citizen Participation: a source of inspiration to the EU (2003, pp. 1-16)
	Multi-level Governance brochure (2003)
	Europe Empowers Cities (2004)
	Introducing the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations during the EU presidency (2004)

Although all the sources were accessible to the public at large, in view of the themes and the audience that they address, they seemed to focus primarily on politicians and policy makers from various administrative levels.

As a discourse analysis is quite a labour intensive form of analysis, the selected data were limited to the ones mentioned in the table. However, after the analysis, some other sources were skimmed as well, to check whether they contained particular policy vocabulary, constructions or story lines that could possibly have been overlooked in the selected data. This held for some letters to the Lower House (*Tweede Kamer*), written by State Secretary Kohnstamm between 1996 and 1998, in which Big Cities Policy and European 'urban' policy were dealt with coherently, and for information on the website of the Ministry of the Interior, related to Big Cities Policy and 'European

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[46] '*De EU in de stad*' (December 18, 2002); European seminar: '*Multi-level governance and Democratic legitimacy*' (November 13-14, 2003) and '*Europe empowers cities*' (May 27-28, 2004).

Big Cities Policy'. Other Lower House documents (*Tweede Kamerstukken*), press releases from the Ministry of the Interior (that are often quite factual) and an interview with a civil servant working with the Ministry were used as contextual material, but not for the discourse analysis. Finally, while also other Dutch Ministries are involved in European policy, the Ministry of the Interior is the only one that deals with European *area-based* urban programmes. For that reason, only data from this Ministry were taken into account.

5.4.2 Complications in Data Selection and Analysis

After a first selection of data that qualified for the discourse analysis, the written data had to be limited, as they often contained both a general part (that was useful, as it dealt with general, coherent views on Big Cities Policy/Urban Policy/European urban programmes) and a specific part (that was not, as it focused, for example, on the implementation of a particular programme in a particular neighbourhood). For that reason, a compilation had to be made of merely the more general parts of the written data.

There was another complication. While some of the data at the national level were produced in English, other data sources were only available in Dutch. Examination would thus require double effort, as first the English data at the national level had to be examined, followed by an examination of the Dutch data at this level. Then the analysis of the English and Dutch data had to be compared to get a sense of the translation of English in Dutch terms and the other way round. And finally, the results from the analysis of national level data (both English and Dutch data) had to be compared to European urban policy discourse (in terms of policy vocabulary, constructions and story lines). For that reason the choice was made to merely analyze data sources at the national level that were written in English.

5.4.3 Data Analysis

To get an idea of the urban policy vocabulary used in sources produced by actors at the national level, first an inventory was made of the most frequently used terms in these sources. The results are presented in Appendix B. This thus concerned an overview of the frequency of key words derived from European urban policy discourse, as appearing in the *national* sources. Next, these results were compared with the urban policy vocabulary derived from the European sources, as earlier presented in Appendix A.

Considering the key words as units and their frequencies of appearance in European and national sources as variables, calculations point out that both variables have a strongly positively skewed distribution: 4.97 (European sources) and 4.02 (national sources) respectively.

An interesting question is whether key words that frequently appear in European sources, also show up frequently in national sources. In order to determine whether this is the case, the association between the two variables has been calculated:

the rank correlation coefficient (Spearman) turns out to be 0.46[47]. So there is indeed an overlap between key words used in the European and in the national sources. There is a clear tendency that if a key word occurs more frequently than another key word in European sources, it also appears more frequently than that word in the national sources.

Next, in order to determine what the relative frequency of appearance of the individual key words is, key words were categorized in one of the following four categories:

1. Key words that occurred more than average in both European and national sources[48].
2. Key words that occurred more than average in European sources, but less than average in national sources.
3. Key words that occurred more than average in national sources, but less than average in European sources.
4. Key words that occurred less than average in both European and national sources.

One should keep in mind, that these key words were *all* derived from European sources. Their frequency of appearance was determined both in the European and in the national sources (table 5.F).

The overlap in key words, expressed most clearly in category 1, points at the existence of a policy network around European urban policy, in which both European and national actors participate. Similar topics and similar concerns are phrased using similar words.

At the same time however, as is clear from the two categories in the middle (category 2 and 3), there are differences.

Considering category 2, especially in some cases it is remarkable that key words hardly appear in the national sources. This holds for example for 'partnership,' 'regions' or 'regional'. The key word 'partnership(s),' a Structural Fund principle, implied in the European urban programmes and often explicitly put to the fore in European (urban) sources, even never shows up in the national sources (see Appendix B). The relative absence of the regions in the Dutch sources could be explained by the fact that they are not involved in European urban policy in the Netherlands (see Chapter 6).

The key words more frequently used in the national sources (category 3) seem to express a concern with the European urban policy process and with competences, in view of key words such as 'co-operate,' 'exchange,' 'involve' and 'role'. It is also remarkable (but perhaps somewhat self-evident) that particular key words point at self positioning in this process, such as 'Dutch' and 'the Netherlands'.

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[47] As both variables show a strongly skewed distribution, this association has been calculated using the rank correlation coefficient of Spearman, instead of the product-moment correlation coefficient of Pearson.

[48] This was 'at least 101' (European sources) and 'at least 18' (national sources).

Generally speaking, these differences in key words seem to reflect the different contexts in which they were produced and embedded. In case of the national sources, key words could be derived from other discourses, such as Big Cities Policy discourse. Key words that were found in the national sources (but not derived from the European sources and thus not implied) point in this direction. Examples relate to terms such as: 'chain,' 'heart,' 'Major cities policy,' 'complete city,' 'engine,' etc.

Table 5.F Relative frequency of European urban policy vocabulary in European and national sources (in alphabetical order)(based on Appendix A and B)

More than average in both European and national Sources (N = 14)	More than average in European sources, less than average in national Sources (N = 9)	Less than average in European Sources, more than average in national sources (N = 13)	Less than average in both European and national Sources[49] (N = 52)
Approach(es)	Action(s)	Agenda(s)	Best Practice
Area(s)	Community/communities[50]	Citizen(s)	Cohesion
City/cities	European community/-ties	Co-operate/co-operation	Decentralise(d)
Development(s)	Measure(s)	Dutch	Democracy/-cies
European Commission	Partnership(s)	Europe	Governance
European Union	Policy	Example(s)	Grass roots
European[51]	Region(s)	Exchange(s)	Legitimate/legitimacy
Fund(s)/ERDF/ESF	Regional[52]	Government(s)	Neighbourhood(s)
Integrate(d), integration	Sustainable/sustainability	Involve/involvement	Participation
Local		National	Partner(s)
Member State(s)		Opportunity/-ies	Strategy/ies
New		Role(s)	Subsidiarity
Problem(s)		The Netherlands	Subsidy/subsidies
Urban			Territory/Territories

Interestingly, some words that one would expect to find in European and/or national sources were actually absent: 'multi-level governance,' for instance, never appeared in the European sources and hardly in the national ones; 'Europeanization' was even missing in both sources.

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[49] A selection has been made of 14 key words out of the full number of 52.
[50] Other than 'European community/-ties.'
[51] 'European' not being a part of 'European Commission' or 'European Union.'
[52] 'Regional' not including 'region(s).'

Finally, the fourth (and largest) category related to key words that hardly show up in any of the sources. Merely considering their frequency of appearance, one could argue that it is questionable whether they can be considered a part of European urban policy discourse at all. However, as has been argued before and as will become clear once more in the following, discourse does not only relate to the frequency of appearance of particular key words, but also to the connotations that these words are given.

The national sources were therefore examined in more detail, in terms of the meanings assigned to cities (or parts of cities) and in terms of ways of (self)positioning by national actors in the European urban policy arena. The constructions of cities were subdivided in the following categories: cities as a problem; as a strategic potential; as a balanced system and a governmental responsibility.

Cities as a Problem

First of all, cities, or parts of cities (urban areas, city districts, districts or neighbourhoods), are occasionally constructed in terms of problems ('considerable problems affecting the cities,' 'urban problems,' 'ageing of urban industrial areas,' 'problem areas,' etc), or as entities that are the focus of policy and/or that receive money. Usually, the focus of attention relates to the cities themselves. The terms 'neighbourhood' or 'district' are hardly ever mentioned. Incidentally, (urban) areas are constructed in a positive way.

Cities as Strategic Potential

Especially in the speeches, a lot of attention is paid to cities as a strategic potential. A recurring theme running through the speeches concerns the importance of cities, as reflected in the position of cities and urban policy on (national and European) policy agendas. Dijkstal (1997) refers to a recent "revolution in thinking" that has taken place "regarding the importance of cities for the vitality of Europe." Regarding their positive connotation, heedful of metaphors in European urban policy discourse, cities are never constructed as a 'motor' and only incidentally as an 'engine' ('engines of the European economy,' 'engines of our society'). De Graaf (2004) once constructs them as 'engines' in the context of the EU: "The power of the cities therefore partly determines the power of the European Union as a whole…. cities are sometimes called the engine of our society!" Aside from other comparable, positive constructions such as a 'driving force in society,' 'sources of energy' and 'dynamic places,' the preferred metaphor at the national level concerns the city as a beating heart.

Cities as a Balanced System

Cities are also constructed in terms of the mutual relationship, an equilibrium with the region that surrounds them. Kohnstamm (1997) and Dijkstal (1997) argue for a coherent approach in the interest of both. Kohnstamm, for example, refers to people who "retreat to walled-in havens of peace and happiness outside the cities," leaving cities behind that become increasingly poor, while their surroundings become richer. In a dramatic story line, he advocates co-operation between the two: "Cities are after all the places where everything comes together, but … without co-operation between the

cities and their surrounding regions we are doomed to failure. Cities often form the economic, social and cultural heart of a region. But just as with the human body, the heart cannot function without the body, nor the body without the heart." Strikingly, cities hardly come to the fore as people's home.

Next, as an introduction to the following, cities are also constructed as a *governmental responsibility*. This relates directly to the question who should govern these cities (or particular parts of them). Answers to this question can be found by examining the ways of (self)positioning. How do national policymakers position themselves and others in the discourse? In the following, this will be discussed per governmental level, ending with a reflection on (self)positioning through wider European urban policy discourse concepts, such as partnership and governance.

The Position of Dutch National Authorities

Dutch representatives are positioned in various ways, often rather general as 'Member State,' 'the Netherlands' or 'the Dutch presidency'. In the written sources they also occasionally occur as the 'national government,' the 'national level' or 'the Ministry of the Interior.' In the speeches one incidentally finds self positioning of the lecturers as 'the Minister' and as the 'State Secretary'. In the capacity of 'member state' and 'the Netherlands,' the meaning assigned is mainly one of an actor.

Self positioning as related to urban policy

In view of the subject, it does not come as a surprise that Dutch representatives are often positioned in relation to urban policy. If urban policy is referred to, it either concerns urban policy at the EU level (as discussed by ministers from the member states), national urban policy or urban policy initialized by the European Commission (at times specified as URBAN, Objective 2- urban areas programmes, etc).

From a Dutch perspective, there should be an urban policy at the EU level. Dijkstal (1997) in particular is very much involved with placing the issue of urban policy on the European agenda. Moreover, the capacity of 'the Dutch presidency' is often used in claiming a crucial role for the Netherlands in addressing urban policy at the EU level, although in somewhat different styles. While Kohnstamm (1997), for example, modestly argues that focusing on the problems and opportunities is not a new priority of the Dutch Presidency, as "we are simply taking up the sceptre from our Irish predecessors," Dijkstal, Van Boxtel and De Graaf claim a far more prominent role. According to Dijkstal (1997), "in the autumn of nineteen ninety-six (1996) the Netherlands … decided to place the question of urban development on the European agenda during the Dutch presidency of the EU." Using a football metaphor, he states that "the urban ball was introduced to the playing field' in the first half of 1997, when the Netherlands had assumed that Presidency. He then points at the 'successful' conference in Noordwijk (June 10, 1997), when the theme of urban development was informally discussed and the member states 'ultimately agreed unanimously' to place this item on the agenda in the years ahead. "The first point in this new 'league' had thus been scored," said Dijkstal. "The torch was subsequently handed on to other nations," according to De Graaf (2004), "with excellent results."

The exact interpretation of 'urban policy at the EU level,' among others in terms of responsibilities at the EU level, varies over time and per person: Van Boxtel (2000), for example, explicitly advocates a Euro-commissioner for urban matters, while De Graaf (2004), four years later, merely supports discussing urban policy at the EU level, leaving the initiative with the Ministers for urban policy in the member states.

As mentioned before, especially in these written sources (all produced by the Ministry of the Interior) one also finds self positioning of this Ministry: it is always depicted as a spider in various webs, as an active actor who takes various initiatives. Even an international role is claimed: "In addition to the national arena, the Ministry is also entering the European domain. BZK brings together public administration issues and organizations in the EU" (Ministry of the Interior 2004b, p.4).

Aside from self positioning based on the role of the Dutch government in the European 'urban policy' field, also a distinct profile for the Netherlands is created based on its 'Dutch urban policy' - the role of pioneer is claimed: the Netherlands has its own urban policy, it is well organized - it even has its own minister - and it is based on a '(large scale) integrated approach'. The 'Dutch approach' could even serve as an example for other member states or for the European Union: "The Netherlands envisages contributing its integrated policy to the European strategy …."(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 2001a, page number not indicated) and "even at the European level, urban policy aspires towards creating the comprehensive city" (*ibid*.). This is striking, as 'the comprehensive city' is something that never occurs in European sources, but merely in Dutch sources: a typically Dutch aspiration is thus suggested to be an aim at the European level. On the other hand, De Graaf (2004) presents Big Cities Policy as "a national structural urban policy that is being supplemented with the additional input from the Structural Funds." This is also remarkable, as 'structural' is a term derived from European urban policy vocabulary, in which it has a clear connotation (Structural Funds). Within a Dutch urban policy context, its connotation is not clear at all.

Also within the profiling of the Netherlands based on urban policy, the Ministry of the Interior claims a key role. In relation to European urban programmes implemented in the Netherlands, it is argued that "the experiences gained from the programmatic approach and the frequent contact between the cities themselves and with the Ministry of the Interior are seen as significant added value. In Europe this is a unique combination" (Ministry of the Interior 2004a, 40).

Constructions of urban policy

As urban policy is often used for (self)positioning, it is interesting to pay some more attention to the way in which it is constructed itself. As mentioned before, its connotation varies from urban policy, initialized by the European Commission (at times specified as URBAN, Urban Objective 2-programmes, etc) to urban policy at the EU level, or to national urban policy.

Moreover, urban policy is constructed at different administrative levels. A closer look at some of the constructions in box 5.G reveals their often ambiguous character.

While 'urban policy in Europe' seems to refer to urban policy in European countries (at whatever administrative level), 'European urban policy' in terms of urban policy at the EU level, does not exist in a formal sense, as was argued in the former chapter. There are merely urban programmes initiated at the EU level and urban accents in regional policy. The constructions related to Big Cities Policy are even more interesting. While 'Netherlands urban policy' might simply be a poor translation from Dutch to English, 'Dutch urban policy,' 'our national urban policy' and 'Dutch Big Cities Policy' all seem to be well translated. Considering 'Dutch Big Cities Policy,' its connotation is quite clear. But as Big Cities Policy is a *Dutch* national urban policy, references to '*European* Big Cities Policy,' in which Big Cities Policy is lifted to a higher scale level, as such do not seem to make any sense. They do, however, in terms of a politics of scale. Interestingly, 'European Big Cities Policy' is printed on the front page of all the brochures of the Ministry of the Interior, related to European urban programmes that are implemented in the Netherlands. The Big Cities Policy framework is clearly the point of departure, the primary context from which meaning is assigned to European urban programmes. The latter are either expressed as a European accent of Big Cities Policy (possibly implying European money for BCP) or as Big Cities Policy at the EU level. This point of departure is also clear in the story line 'placing Big Cities Policy on the agenda at the EU level'. Additionally, the perspective of 'urban policy and its European dimension' is interesting, as compared to 'European policy and its urban dimension,' as it is often phrased within European (regional) policy, at the EU level.

Box 5.G Constructions of urban policy (derived from the national sources)

> Urban policy and its European dimension
> Urban policy in Europe
> European urban policy
> Big Cities Policy in European context
> The Dutch Big Cities Policy
> European Big Cities Policy
> Placing Big Cities Policy on the agenda at the EU level
> Attuning European urban policy and national Big Cities Policy
> National Big Cities Policy   (versus European Big Cities Policy)
> Netherlands urban policy
> Dutch urban policy
> Our national urban policy

The Position of European Authorities
Considering the title of a 2004 conference organized in Maastricht (the Netherlands), '*Europe empowers cities,*' it seems to be beyond dispute that 'Europe,' through facilitating or supporting city programmes, acts in a positive way for the (Dutch) cities.

And also when the European Commission is indirectly positioned, based on these programmes, constructions are primarily positive as well: "The urban incentive policy developed by the European Commission is a very important initiative" (Kohnstamm 1997) and "The content of the URBAN programme acts in a positive way to compel those involved to combine policy at the local urban level" (Dijkstal 1997).

At the same time, the organization at the EU level and the programme procedures are criticized. While De Graaf (2004) merely suggests that "it would be very helpful if the EU regulations pertaining to the urban programmes were simplified," Van Boxtel (2000) openly criticizes 'Brussels': "On this point I would also permit myself a comment on Brussels as an administrative layer. Brussels too, will need to devote attention in the future to the co-ordination of policies." Even more explicit, he establishes that "there is a lot to improve, both within the Commission (fine-tuning between the various Directorates-General) and with the member states (so far Brussels does not even have a standard discussion forum on these issues)." On the other hand, Van Boxtel (2000) does not seem to concentrate too much on these critical points, as he also points at the 'chances, the creative opportunities and challenges' of 'Brussels' that outweigh particular disadvantages.

As related to urban policy, discursive claims point at the existence of competition between the national government(s) and the European Commission.

The European Commission is rather depicted as a follower than as an initiator of urban policy. Dijkstal (1997) positions the European Commission as "also increasingly advocating an integral approach" and according to Van Boxtel (2000), the Dutch Presidency in 1998 acted "prior to the ECs 1998 action plan." However, in view of the fact that the European Urban Pilot Program was launched in 1990 already, it is questionable whether this positioning of the European Commission as a follower is appropriate.

Moreover, it is frequently suggested that the European Commission has been and should be supportive to the member states. This view is most clear in the question raised by Dijkstal (1997): "How can the Commission provide support and incentives with respect to the national policy of the member states?"

Finally, remarkably, European influence is constructed in terms of fear. A written source argues that "the central question is how the EU member states deal with questions of governance, without the EU saying how it must be done" (Ministry of the Interior 2004b, 6). Van Boxtel explicitly warns for European influence, portraying the European administrative level as a serious danger in terms of its influence on the national administrative systems: "The various governmental strata, also at the regional and local levels … should be very alert to laws and regulations coming from the central authority in Brussels. Too often, these de-central authorities happily believe that they are largely safe until these Brussels regulations have been adopted into national law. The idea being that the central, national parliament acts as a sort of buffer." Adding a little extra, Van Boxtel (2000) states: "Not only is this incorrect, but it is dangerously incorrect."

In conclusion we can say that European authorities are positioned both as partners and as rivals: policy attention for the cities seems to be a concerted action of the national

and European authorities, participating in the same policy network. At the same time the authority as related to European urban policy initiatives is contested.

The Position of Regions
In the sources, 'regions' occur considerably less frequently than cities, member states, Europe and the (European) Union. Moreover, the connotation of 'regions' varies. But even though they do not occur very often, if they appear, it is mostly as authority. Kohnstamm (1997), for example, constructs 'urban regions' (an aimed at, but never realized administrative level in the Netherlands) as an administrative authority, when he argues that "member states and urban regions … can learn from others in this way, and can then put what they have learned into practice...." Van Boxtel (2000) advocates co-operation with (among others) the regional level: "At the very least the target for the French Presidency should include enhanced and intensified co-operation between the four layers of government: Europe, the member states, the regional and the city, local level." Also De Graaf (2004) implies the regional level, referring to "co-operation with local partners, with regional, national and European authorities" as vital, "if the cities are to be facilitated as much as possible with their policies." And finally, interestingly, in one of the written sources (Ministry of the Interior 2003, 13) a 'chain oriented approach' is referred to, in which all the administrative levels, including regional authorities, form a part.

The Position of Cities
In the national sources, cities are mentioned quite often and far more than the European Union or the regions. Connotations of cities relate to cities as actors or authorities, or to cities as part of a network in which information and experience are exchanged; the 'Eurocities' network, for example, being highlighted and highly praised by Dijkstal in his speech.

A number of times the relationship between member states and cities is emphasized. In his speech, Dijkstal (1997) does so several times, focusing on co-operation and exchanging information, arguing for example that "it is vital to exchange information between cities and member states." At the same time, he hints or points directly at problems regarding co-operation, referring to Kohnstamm's efforts "to break through the fragmentation and to restore better co-ordination in the policy in and for our cities." He even briefly addresses the subsidiarity principle. In view of the topic, he seems to criticize the cities when he argues that "in this way discussions about subsidiarity are turned into positive discussions about mutual learning and co-operation."

Finally, interestingly, the city district is never constructed as an administrative level in the sources, even though in some Dutch cities there is an administrative level below the municipal level (like in Amsterdam). In the examined sources, they evidently do not play any role in the capacity of an actor.

The Position of EU inhabitants
EU inhabitants never show up as 'inhabitants' in the sources, and in the speeches hardly ever as 'population' or 'citizens'. On the other hand, in the written sources, they

more often occur as 'citizens,' but that is hardly a surprise, in view of the fact that the document '*Citizen participation*' (2003) was one of the sources examined. In this capacity, they are mostly constructed from a European perspective ('European citizens') and only incidentally as national citizens or 'nationals'.

However, although EU inhabitants are completely missing as 'citizens' in the speeches, they are present in a far wider variety of connotations, all mentioned incidentally. Moreover, they are not only constructed at the individual level, but also at the group level: as households (family heads), or larger (sub)groups of society ('guest workers,' 'new immigrants,' 'local community'). Sometimes they are very broadly referred to as 'people,' 'generations,' 'cultures,' etc.

Additionally, EU inhabitants might be negatively constructed ('disadvantaged groups') or neutrally or positively constructed ('involving local residents'). When arguing that "eighty per cent of Europeans live in cities and towns," Kohstamm (1997) constructs EU inhabitants as 'Europeans' and reflects European urban policy vocabulary by referring to 'cities and towns'. Dijkstal (1997) uses the 'European citizen' as the linking pin between various parties involved: "For you and me, the European citizen is the key focus of everything we do."

Partnership, Governance and Co-operation

As opposed to European urban policy discourse, in which 'partnership' is frequently used and the concept of 'governance' is often used, these concepts are nearly absent in the national sources examined. 'Partnership' never occurs in the examined sources, 'partners' incidentally and 'governance' only a number of times in written sources that are related to one particular seminar: '*Multi-level Governance and Democratic Legitimacy*,' organized by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior, in 2003.

Governance and Government

In the sources related to the seminar, aside from 'Multi-level Governance,' 'governance' is also part of references to the '*White paper on European governance*' and to '*Governance and the European Union*'- the title of a formal meeting in The Hague, December 2004. More generally speaking, 'government' is used far more often than 'governance'. This holds mostly for the written sources, but also for the speeches. While De Graaf (2004) always means the national government when he mentions 'government,' Van Boxtel (2000) uses various connotations. This is also the case in the written sources, where it occurs as 'decentralized (levels of) government,' the 'national government' or as part of the 'chain of government'.

Partnership and Co-operation

Although the concept of 'partnership,' the European ideal form of co-operation, does not occur in any of the national sources, the importance of co-operation and the problems of co-operation in practice are discussed at length. This relates to both co-operation between actors at different policy levels and between various departments or policy sectors. Kohnstamm (1997) points at the importance of co-operation between cities and their surrounding regions. Van Boxtel (2000) bucks the European level up, by advocating that "Brussels too, will need to devote attention in the future to the co-

ordination of policies," particularly implying the co-ordination among the EU directorates-general. Dijkstal (1997) beats them all, by using various metaphors that relate to co-operation. He, first of all, denounces the tendency to work alone and argues (on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior, of the Dutch government, of himself?):

"We strongly believe that member states and cities can learn from each-other; it really isn't necessary to reinvent the wheel over and over again. Everyone, administrators included, has the tendency to want to produce the 'golden eggs' of a single, magical solution. But if there are already enough eggs in the European laying boxes, there's no point in laying even more." He emphasizes the necessity of teamwork in the 'playing field'. De Graaf (2004) even closely approaches story lines in European urban policy discourse, when he argues that cities and the national government "become partners, working together for strong, balanced cities." Of course, while in European urban policy discourse the story line would probably relate to cities working together with European actors (the European Commission in particular), in De Graaf's example the latter is replaced by the national government.

5.5 Conclusion

Although the Dutch public-administrative structure, consisting of a national, a provincial and a municipal level, has basically remained in tact during its 150 years of existence, over time there have been processes of administrative renewal, causing changes in their interrelationships. The creation of Europe, adding a fourth governmental level to this spectrum, has resulted in processes of so-called 'Europeanization,' that increasingly affect the intergovernmental relations in the Netherlands, although it seems not yet in a radical way. Moreover, the awareness among domestic officials and the amount of attention paid to intergovernmental relations in a European perspective has been remarkably modest. Only in the last decade consultations have been set up that concern European (urban) matters as related to the home administration.

Processes of Europeanization also work in the other direction and the rotating chairmanship of the EU Council offers member states opportunities to position themselves in the European arena. During its chairmanship in 1997, the Dutch national government has used this opportunity to put European urban policy on the agenda. However, this initiative coincided with a comparable initiative of the European Commission and the discourse analysis clearly reveals the competition that has been going on between the European Commission and the member states, as expressed in claims related to the initiative and in ways of positioning in relation to urban policy.

Strikingly, on the one hand there is a certain homogeneity in the urban policy discourse, reflecting a policy network between the European Commission, the Dutch Member State and probably also other member states and even other governmental levels. This homogeneity is for example expressed in the policy approach (area-based, integrated policy), as well as in the policy vocabulary, which partly overlaps. Differences in urban policy discourse, on the other hand, express the different (discursive) contexts in which it is produced. The policy vocabulary in the national sources, for instance, seems to indicate a concern with competences and self positioning within the European urban policy process.

At times, particular ways of (self)positioning and meanings assigned even express struggle. An example relates to the relation between European urban programmes in the Netherlands and Dutch Big Cities Policy: Big Cities Policy is explicitly put forward as the national policy framework in which European urban programmes are embedded, even though the national government is actually not able to get round the requirements related to Structural Fund programmes.

Urban policy as such (in various capacities) and also the division of roles within it are thus contested in the discourse. One finds many examples of a politics of scale by actors at the Dutch national level; 'European big cities policy' serves as an example. Claims from their part are either very abstract (reality claims), or concern more concrete issues like taking initiatives or allocating roles. Having an urban policy is contested as well: national policy makers claim having their own urban policy and position themselves indirectly, through positive qualifications of their policy. Through constructions of national urban policy at the European level ('European Big Cities Policy'), national policy makers even seem to exceed their own level of authority.

The main actors of interest, the main focus of attention in that sense, as expressed in the discourse, evidently relates to actors at the EU policy level. While the European Commission is often praised for its initiatives, at the same time, 'Brussels' is criticized. In a wider context, this struggle might reflect the fear for European interference in internal affairs, judging, for example, the construction of European regulations in terms of danger. Finally, the relationship between member states and cities also comes to the fore, but mostly in terms of learning from eachother, exchanging information, etc.

CHAPTER 6

6. Dutch Regions in the European (Urban) Policy Arena

6.1 Introduction

Dutch regional authorities are presently not involved in the design and implementation of Eureopan area-based urban programmes in the Netherlands, such as URBAN-I, URBAN-II and Objective 2-urban areas. For at least two reasons, this is remarkable.

First of all, in the Netherlands there has been a growing body of opinion that regions should be involved in urban issues. Both the 'regions' themselves and various advisory councils have fuelled this debate, among others in advisory reports to the national government[53]. Various social scientists have added to the debate as well (Gualini and Salet 2002; Frieling 2004; etc). An important argument that has often been put forward is the increase in scale (*schaalvergroting*) that implies a different dynamics and thus requires solving issues on a higher scale. Besides, this debate is embedded in a wider debate about regional government, in which the institutional position of the 'region' in relation to other governmental levels is the issue at stake.

Another reason why it is remarkable that Dutch regional authorities are not involved in European area-based urban programmes in the Netherlands, is that European legislation in principle offers opportunities for regional involvement in Structural Fund programmes, for instance through Treaty and Structural Fund principles such as subsidiarity and partnership.

While one could imagine that Dutch 'regions' would claim involvement in European area-based urban programmes in the Netherlands, this has not been the case; the discussion about regional involvement in urban issues has merely concentrated on involvement in the Dutch area-based urban programme, Big Cities Policy. An interesting question is therefore whether 'regions' position themselves at all in the European urban policy arena. As will become clear in the following, this diverges strongly between 'regions' and if they do so, they do so in a wider European policy arena.

In comparison with the former and the following chapters, the focus and the structure of this chapter are somewhat different, as regional authorities do not actively participate in the European area-based urban programmes in the Netherlands. One should, however, not totally ignore the 'regions' as they (possibly) represent an important level in the multi-level polity and as they might be a future player in the European urban policy arena. The research question addressed in this chapter,

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[53] See for example: Rob/Rfv (2001), VROM-raad (2001), RMO (2001) and SER (2002).

however, will merely concern the extent of Europeanization of the 'regions,' especially in terms of their organization structures and (pro-active) behaviour vis-à-vis Europe.

The outline of this chapter is as follows. In section 6.2, the debate on regional involvement in urban issues will be introduced. Next, in section 6.3, an effort will be made to delineate the (Dutch) regions. What qualifies as a 'region' and to what extent is this classification contested? Section 6.4 will briefly elaborate on the formal opportunities for regional involvement in Structural Fund programmes, based on EU legislation. In section 6.5, a number of Dutch 'regions' will be examined in more detail, particularly in terms of their extent of Europeanization. Section 6.6 will briefly elaborate on the future opportunities for regional involvement in urban issues, based on EU legislation. Finally, in section 6.7 conclusions will be drawn.

6.2 The Debate on Regional Involvement in Urban Issues

The public administration of the Netherlands, a decentralized, unitary state, is based on a three-tier structure of national government, province and municipality. The responsibilities and powers of these authorities are regulated in various acts, the foundation being the 1848 Constitution (IPO 2004). At the 'meso-'level, in between the national government and the municipalities, the Netherlands thus only has one elected tier of government.

In a large part of the Netherlands the process of urbanization has spread so fast that the traditional dividing line between urban and rural areas and between cities and villages has become blurred. In institutional terms, social developments and administrative boundaries do not seem to mesh with each other any longer. This issue of tension between the most suitable governmental level and the scale on which social problems occur, has dominated the debate on the organization of the home administration for a long time[54] (Rob/Rfv 2001).

Moreover, this argument has also often been put to the fore in the debate on regional involvement in urban issues: a debate that has mostly concentrated on involvement in Big Cities Policy (see Arnoldus 2002). In 2001 and 2002, on the eve of the new covenant period of Big Cities Policy, numerous reports were published in which advice was given on the future design and organization of Big Cities Policy and in which the role of the region was explicitly addressed[55]. The provinces joined the debate as well, presenting suggestions for a 'regional social agenda' (Davelaar, Duyvendak and Ter Woerds 2002; IPO 2002a) and discussing the future of regional government in the Netherlands (IPO 2002b)[56]. They argued that regions should not be considered as a competitor of the provinces and that the potential of the provinces for the regional government was utilized too little. It was suggested that the province could play a 'strong regional role' in the 'new social matter': the separation between winners of the new economic order and the subclass of underprivileged (Zouridis 2003).

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[54] See for example: Externe Commissie Grote Stedenbeleid 1989; SER 1998; IPO 1999 and CPB 2000.
[55] Rob/Rfv 2001; VROM-raad 2001; Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling 2001; Van der Wouden and De Bruijne 2001; SER 2002 and Van den Berg et al. (2002).
[56] IPO 2002b; Davelaar, Duyvendak and Ter Woerds 2002; IPO 2002a.

The involvement of regional government in urban issues has thus mainly concentrated on involvement in Big Cities Policy. However, in view of the foregoing, it is not only quite unclear what is meant exactly by the Dutch 'region,' but also which 'regional' authority would be the obvious authority to be involved in Big Cities Policy. Aside from the elected tier of meso-government (the provinces), one can distinguish various types of co-operation around the meso-level that one could qualify as 'regions' as well, diverging from informal forms, to forms that are regulated by law. Before proceeding, it is therefore important first to try to better delineate the (concept of the) Dutch 'region'.

6.3 Delineating the Dutch 'Region'

In essence, a region is a territorially determined entity, that is part of a bigger, territorial-geographic whole and that can vary strongly in terms of size.

Regarding regional classifications in the Netherlands, Davelaar, Duyvendak and Ter Woerds (2002) phrase it in terms of processes. They argue that these classifications are based on both administrative processes and dynamic-spatial, economic and social-cultural processes. In each region, other processes might form the dominant factor. Moreover, according to the authors, the size, nature and scale of the region is strongly determined by the level from which it is considered (city, nation, continent, etc); the perspective from which it is considered (city or surrounding area) and the thematic approach ('old regional identities', economic coherence, etc). Based on these different aspects, one can distinguish a wide variety of regional types in the Netherlands. Davelaar, Duyvendak and Ter Woerds (2002) mention the ones presented in table 6.A.

The Dutch 'region' as such thus does not exist. It is rather an umbrella term for a variety of types. Strikingly, in the original table, as developed by Davelaar, Duyvendak and Ter Woerds (2002), regions primarily come to the fore as networks instead of, for example, administrative entities. In a sense, this is in agreement with the statement of Gualini (2006). He argues that it is often rather the formation of a feeling of collective involvement in regional goals among public (and private) actors that confers an identity on a region, than the identification with a formal territorial jurisdiction. In the Netherlands, the '*Vereniging Deltametropool*' serves as an example. This highlights the fact that regions are not natural entities, but social and political constructions. At the same time, the lack of the Dutch provinces in the table, the only elected tier of government at the meso-level, is a serious shortcoming. This also holds for the missing COROP regions[57]. Both have therefore been added to the table.

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[57] A COROP area forms a part of the COROP-classification. This classification is used for analytical ends (statistical data). Altogether, there are forty COROP areas that consist of various municipalities. The boundaries of the COROP areas follow the provincial boundaries. As the COROP classification is merely used for analytical ends, it will not be discussed any further.

Table 6.A Different regional types in the Netherlands (Davelaar, Duyvendak and Ter Woerds 2002)

Type and characteristics	Examples
Countryside regions: Areas with a local form of co-operation; the basis is often a regional identity and a historical tradition of villages that are oriented towards each other	*Hart van Twente*, *Krimpenerwaard*
Smaller cities/big villages that form networks	G5 (5 Municipalities in East and South-East Groningen, one of the Dutch provinces)
City networks consisting of several cities of a rather similar size	KAN *Brabantstad*
City and (urbanizing) environment, the classic image of a region: one big city with its surroundings, consisting of villages and rural area.	Groningen Leeuwarden
City and (urbanizing) environment: polycentric metropolitan ('city regional') networks, grown from one or more cores. A metropolitan area with several centres	The Amsterdam region The Hague region
Administrative entity at the meso-level*	The Dutch Provinces
Statistical entity at the meso-level*	COROP regions
Urban networks at the supra-local level	*Randstad* or *Deltametropool* Ruhrarea Gent/Antwerp (Brussels)
Cross-border forms of co-operation ('Euroregions')	Triangle Luik, Aken, Maastricht

* Added by author.

6.3.1 The Debate on Regional Government

In 1950, the '*Wet Gemeenschappelijke Regelingen'* (WGR) was established; a law that offered a framework for inter-municipal co-operation (www.haaglanden.nl). Since then, there has been a political debate in the Netherlands on administrative organization and regional co-operation. This debate has primarily focused on the formation of new forms of metropolitan government, forms in between municipalities and provinces, often referred to as 'city provinces' or 'urban regions.'

Considering important developments during the past fifteen years, in 1988, the national legislature appointed the External Committee Big Cities Policy (*Externe Commissie Grote Stedenbeleid)*, also named the 'Montijn Committee' (*Commissie Montijn)* after its chair, to address continuing problems of metropolitan governance. Its advice was prompted by the economic structure of the Dutch four major cities that required reinforcement, in order to improve their competitive position within Europe. The Committee rejected options involving a new level of government between the provincial and municipal levels. It proposed the establishment of four 'agglomeration municipalities' around the four big cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). However, these would require massive annexations. The Committee's solution was therefore not regarded as politically feasible (Van der Veer 1997; Alexander 1998).

Also in several other European countries metropolitan government reforms were high on the political agenda in the 1990s (Brenner 1999; Lefèvre 2000, 2001). This upward pressure from the local to the 'metropolitan' scale was, according to Brenner (1999), related to economic globalization processes that create denser socio-economic interdependencies on urban-regional scales, that generally supersede the reach of both scales. Lefèvre (2000, 9) relates it to "the spatial extension of urban areas, the development of new information and communication technologies, the crisis of the welfare state …, European integration and 'globalisation'…." With a few exceptions, though, all these reforms have failed (Lefèvre 2001). Also in the Netherlands many plans for reform were put forward and as many did not make it.

Especially the efforts to create 'city provinces' have been of importance. Like the Montijn Committee, the national government wanted to avoid creating a fourth governmental level in the Netherlands. Unlike the Committee, it looked for solutions at the provincial level, rather than at the local level. In reaction to the report of the Montijn Committee, the national government published the policy document '*Bestuur op Niveau'* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1990; 1991; 1993a), followed by a Framework Law ('*Kaderwet bestuur in verandering')* (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 1993b; 1994), marking the pursuit to establish seven 'city provinces': metropolitan areas eventually headed by regional governments (Alexander 1998; Van der Wouden and De Bruijne 2001). However, the plan foundered on local referendums that were held in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 1995. What remained as 'metropolitan governments' were the forms of co-operation that had been established in 1994 as a result of the *Kaderwet bestuur in verandering*, the enabling legislation areas (*Kaderwetgebieden)*. Since January 1, 2006, these areas are called 'plusregions[58]' (*plusregio's)*.

Plusregio's
Altogether, there are seven plusregions in the Netherlands, four of them around the four major cities: the City of Amsterdam and its surrounding area (*Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam, ROA*), the City of The Hague and its surrounding area (*Stadsgewest*

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[58] Until the end of 2005, they were called 'enabling legislation areas' and they were based on the enabling legislation (*Kaderwet Bestuur in verandering*). Their new legal basis is the '*Wijzigingswet Wgr-plus*'.

Haaglanden), the City of Rotterdam and its surrounding area (*Stadsregio Rotterdam, SRR*) and the City of Utrecht and its surrounding area (*Bestuur Regio Utrecht, BRU*).

What is the status of these plusregions? Their institutional arrangement is, what Lefèvre (2001) calls 'inter-municipal': the municipalities are in charge of the decision making process in this co-operation (ROA, 2005). The regional co-operation, to which they are partly legally liable, focuses in particular on physical-spatial policy: regulations relate to spatial planning and regional zoning policy, housing, traffic and transportation, regional-economic policy and regional environmental policy (Lambriex, Schouten and Gerritsen 2000; Van der Wouden and De Bruijne 2001).

Map 6.B Seven plusregions in the Netherlands*
(http://nl.widipedia.org/wiki/Kaderwetgebied)

* The regions around The Hague and Rotterdam seem to be one plusregion, as they are connected to each other, but they actually represent two separate plusregions.

The national government is the main financier of the plusregions. The regional administrative bodies heading these plusregions do have particular responsibilities, but at the same time, they do not have direct democratic legitimacy and are seen as relatively weak (Alexander 1998; Davelaar, Swinnen and Ter Woerds 2004). Interestingly, recently, the plusregions have started a common website where they present themselves together as 'city regions' (see www.stadsregios.nl).

While the debate on regional government in the Netherlands has primarily focused on metropolitan government, it has not exclusively done so: also options at other 'regional' levels have been addressed in this debate, such as the *Deltametropool* and the provinces.

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The Deltametropool and the Provinces

In February 1998, the Aldermen responsible for planning in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht, issued a declaration called 'Deltametropolis' (Frieling 2000). They argued that a European perspective required thinking at the level of the *Deltametropool*,[59] "one of the world's many metropolitan regions" (Frieling 2003, 65) and "the world fourth largest 'hub' (traffic and transport intersection)" (*ibid.*, 66). The existing loose collection of villages, towns and cities, known as the Randstad should be transformed into an interconnected urban constellation, a 'Deltametropolis' (Frieling 2000, 2003). Without explicitly saying that this *Deltametropool* required its own governmental authority in the end, ideas seemed to point in that direction. In his article '*Op naar de Hollandwet na de Nota Ruimte,*' Frieling (2004), for example, reflected on creating a legally based 'Province of Holland,' a merger of (parts of) the Provinces of Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht.

A few years earlier (early 1990s), also the provinces, that had stayed in the background for a long time, suddenly joined the debate on regional involvement again, prompted by an increasing administrative doubt about their usefulness and necessity (www.provincies.nl). Their most striking publication in this sense was '*Op schaal gewogen: regionaal bestuur in Nederland in de 21ste eeuw*' (IPO 2002b) in which they advocated a strong regional government and positioned themselves as the obvious authority, in view of the fact that the new economic and social dynamics required an approach at a higher level. The urban agglomeration by itself, "could not any longer serve as the solution for metropolitan problems" (IPO 2002b, 31); it lacked the position, territory and democratic legitimacy to do so. Moreover, the Dutch influence in the European arena would benefit by less competition and more clarity about who represented the Dutch region in Europe (IPO 2002b). For the IPO itself it seemed to be an open-and-shut case. In its brochure, entitled '*The Dutch Provinces and Europe,*' the provinces were presented as "regional authorities: pivot of European policy" (IPO 2004, 2).

How strong is the position of the provinces within the administrative system of the Netherlands? In other words, how serious should one take their claims in this sense?

The provinces, situated between the national government and the municipalities, can best be qualified as 'intermediary meso-level government,' a form of government that usually does not have a powerful regulating, fiscal and steering position. This is also the case in the Netherlands. They are primarily tasked with the implementation of national policy and legislation. Their means are limited. Moreover, aside from the provincial taxes that they can levy, most of their means are derived from the national government: the fund for local financing at provincial level and specific payments. The latter cannot be freely appropriated (IPO 2005; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, IPO and VNG 2005). On the other hand, however, the provinces are the only democratically elected level of government between the national

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[59] The *Deltametropool* covers the area between the North Sea, North Sea Canal, Nieuwe Hollandse Waterlinie and the Merwede/Oude Maas/Nieuwe Waterweg waterways (Frieling 2003).

government and the municipalities. In that sense, as compared to other Dutch 'regions,' they have a strong (for, constitutional) position.

The originally proposed 'city provinces,' that were rejected in local referendums in the mid 1990s, could have become serious competitors for the provinces. They would probably have challenged them, as they would have been established by the amputation of provincial territory (Lefèvre 2001). However, so far the debate on regional government has not resulted in strong government at the level of urban agglomerations or regions.

At the same time, in view of the spatial dynamics in the metropolitan areas, a chance of frictions will remain and might even become stronger, especially if the provinces are close to the urban area. For, judged by European standards, the size of the Dutch provinces is relatively small (Gualini and Salet 2002). Moreover, the concept of 'region' is ambiguous and therefore contested. Claims about which 'region' qualifies best for, for example, involvement in (European) urban issues, will thus continue to come from different 'regions'.

6.4 Formal Opportunities for Structural Fund Involvement

Another interesting question within the context of this chapter is the following. Is there any formal 'elbowroom' in European area-based urban programmes for the regions that they (in theory) could make an appeal to?

In order to get an answer to this question, one has to turn to primary and secondary EU legislation[60]. For, European area-based urban programmes form a part of European Regional policy (or European Cohesion policy) and are financed with money from the Structural Funds, especially the ERDF. This implies that they are embedded in these wider policy and financial frameworks that, in turn, are framed by the EU Treaties. The formal position of the different governmental authorities involved, as laid down in these documents, is framed by two important principles: the principle of subsidiarity[61] and the partnership principle[62]. More specific guidelines, related to

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[60] While the European Treaties represent primary EU legislation, Structural Fund Regulations are a form of secondary legislation, based on the Treaties. Regulations are directly applicable and binding in all EU Member States.

[61] The 'principle of subsidiarity' was introduced in the Treaty on European Union (signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992) into the EEC Treaty (Article 3b)(signed in Rome on March 25, 1957), along with the principle of proportionality in 1992. A new Treaty Protocol (the 'Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality') in the Amsterdam Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on October 2, 1997 and entered into force on May 1, 1999), has set out detailed legally-binding guidelines for applying the principle.

[62] The partnership principle was introduced in the 1988 Structural Fund regulation, together with three other principles: concentration of resources by priority objectives, programme planning and additionality. Based on the partnership principle, various governmental levels should be involved in the implementation of programmes, funded with Structural Fund money. The principle has been adapted in the 1993 and 1999 Structural Fund reforms. Over time the composition of partnership has been broadened and the designating role of the Member States in choosing partners has become more explicit.

European urban programmes, are laid down in separate Communications to the member states.

What do these documents indicate if anything, about the formal involvement of regional authorities in European urban programmes?

Firstly, through the partnership principle in the general provisions on the Structural Funds, regions are allotted a formal position for involvement in Structural Fund programmes. This thus also applies to the area-based urban programmes. However, in practice their involvement depends on other factors as well, such as the choices made by the member states. For, the latter fulfil a 'gate-keeping role' in choosing partners in the partnerships related to programmes financed with European Structural Fund money.

Secondly, there are no distinctions made between regions, based on their constitutional position in the member state of which they are a part. The only distinction that is made is based on the 'Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units' (NUTS); a European classification system for dividing up the European Union's territory. The NUTS nomenclature serves as a reference for the collection, development and harmonisation of Community regional statistics; for the socio-economic analyses of the regions and for the framing of Community regional policies (www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts). A regulation, giving NUTS a legal status entered into force in July 2003[63].

The NUTS classification system subdivides each member state into a whole number of regions at the NUTS 1 level. Each of these is then subdivided into regions at the NUTS 2 level, and these in turn into regions at the NUTS 3 level. In the early 2000s two more levels ('Local Administrative Units', LAU) were defined in accordance with the NUTS principles. The lowest level (LAU level 2) usually corresponds to the municipality.

The first criterion used for the definition of territorial units relates to the existing administrative units in the member states (a normative criterion). An 'administrative unit' concerns a geographical area with an administrative authority "that has the power to take administrative or policy decisions for that area within the legal and institutional framework of the member state" (EC 2003b, 2-3). Additionally, the average size of this class of administrative units in the member states should lie within particular population thresholds.

The NUTS levels that are distinguished in the Netherlands are shown in table 6.C: *landsdelen* (literally 'country parts,' a co-operation of provinces), provinces and COROP regions (a classification used for analytical ends) are classified as NUTS regions and municipalities represent the LAU at the second level. A LAU at the first level has not been specified for the Netherlands. Of the Dutch 'NUTS' and 'LAU' levels, merely the provinces and the municipalities have an administrative authority, the others do not.

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[63] Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 26, 2003 on the establishment of a common classification of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) (Official Journal L 54, 21/06/2003).

Table 6.C NUTS levels in the Netherlands
(www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts/introannex_regions_en.html)

NUTS 1	NUTS 2	NUTS 3	LAU 1	LAU 2
Landsdelen (4)	Provinces (12)	COROP regions (40)	-	Municipalities (489)

In conclusion, through the subsidiarity and partnership principles, 'regions' are allotted a formal role for involvement in European Structural Fund programmes. In theory, 'regions' of divergent types could make an appeal to involvement, as no distinction is made between regions, based on their constitutional position in the member state of which they are a part; merely a 'NUTS' classification is used and presently only for statistical and analytical ends. Suppose that the NUTS and LAU levels would be used for political ends, in theory, it could play into the hands of the existing administrative levels (municipalities, provinces), as well as of the '*landsdelen'*. COROP regions do not seem to qualify in this sense. The question is whether the Dutch 'regions' seem to be inclined to do an appeal on the formal space offered to them and how they do so. This issue will be addressed next.

6.5 Dutch Regions in the European (Urban) Policy Arena

From the early 1980s on, the number of regional representations (with or without formal diplomatic status) in Brussels has strongly increased. In 2005, their number amounted to more than 200 (Van Criekingen and Kesteloot 2005). Especially the strong meso-governments in Europe, such as the Länder in Germany and the regions in Spain have paved the way for direct and intensive contacts between the meso-governments and Europe (Provincie Noord-Holland 2004). At the same time, the arena for urban policy has strongly changed during the past ten years, among others with the development of European 'urban policy.' According to Salet (2004) as a result, there are options for new coalitions between regions and Europe. To what extent do Dutch 'regions' focus on Europe and position themselves in the European (urban) policy arena? This will be addressed next.

In view of the focus of this research and of the two cities that will be studied later (see Chapters 8 and 9), only a limited number of 'regions' have been examined: the administrative regions around the Cities of Amsterdam and The Hague (the urban agglomerations) and their wider administrative embeddings (the provinces). Additionally, their wider regional networks, forms of co-operation and 'meso-' governmental levels were examined. Of course, this small selection of different types of regions has limitations in terms of generalizability of the results. An overview of the 'regions' examined is given in table 6.D.

Table 6.D 'Regions' examined, by foundation

Region	Foundation
Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (ROA)	'*Wijzigingswet WGR-plus*' (since January 1, 2006)
Stadsgewest Haaglanden	'*Wijzigingswet WGR-plus*' (since January 1, 2006)
Regionale Samenwerking Amsterdam (RSA)	No formal foundation (informal co-operation)
Province of *Noord-Holland*	1848 Constitution
Province of *Zuid-Holland*	1848 Constitution
Regio Randstad	'*Gemeentelijke Regeling Samenwerkingsverband Randstad*' (dd. September 1, 2002)
Landsdelen	Co-operations, at times formalized with a co-operation agreement

As the Dutch regions were not the main focus in this research, also the analysis of the data was relatively modest as compared to other chapters. It was limited to an examination of their websites and of (policy) documents in which they outlined their position as related to Europe. Interviews were not conducted, but at times, it has been checked (by telephone) whether a particular piece of information was correct.

What do these regions look like, and what is their extent of Europeanization, in view of their organizational changes and/or (pro-active) behaviour vis-à-vis Europe?

6.5.1 ROA and Stadsgewest Haaglanden

The Regional Body of Amsterdam (*Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam, ROA*) and the Regional Body of The Hague (*Stadsgewest Haaglanden*) are examples of plusregions, the inter-municipal form of co-operation between municipalities, that was described earlier.

Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (ROA)

Already since 1982, the City of Amsterdam has pursued the creation of a city province. As part of this ambition, in 1986 the Regional Consultation Amsterdam (*Regionaal Overleg Amsterdam, ROA)* was established.

In 1992, this consultation was succeeded by the Regional Body Amsterdam (*Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam,* called '*ROA*' as well). The participating municipalities were willing to sacrifice municipal tasks for the benefit of the ROA that should mark the development towards a regional government (Van der Veer 1997). However, in a referendum in 1995, more than 90 percent of the Amsterdam population rejected the idea of a city province[64].

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[64] For an elaborate discussion, see Van der Veer (1997).

The present ROA consists of sixteen municipalities that co-operate in the field of traffic and transportation, spatial development, public housing, economic issues and youth welfare work (see map 6.E).

Regarding its finances, nearly all ROA means are derived from the national government: in 2003 this was about 98 percent (408 million euros on the total of about 416 million euros). The other means come from the individual municipalities and 'third parties' (ROA 2004a).

To what extent does the ROA express an interest in Europe? In the ROA document '*Lijnen naar de toekomst: regionale agenda 2003-2006*' (ROA 2002), in which the ROA presents its future orientation, 'Europe' does not come to the fore. If 'Europe' appears in ROA sources, it is mainly related to economic issues or to transportation and mobility issues. This is, for example, the case in the 'OPERA programme' (*Ontwikkelings Plan Economie Regio Amsterdam)*, published in 2004. In this programme one does find a European perspective. Aside from a reference to 'other European regions' (ROA 2004b, III) for example, the 'yearly mutation economic growth' of 'Regio Amsterdam,' 'the Netherlands,' the 'EU 15' and 'global' are compared to each other in one graphic. The comparison turns out to be a pessimistic one: "The leading position that the Netherlands, and the Amsterdam region within it, was able to realize at the EU level through the 1990s, gave way at a great pace after the turn of the century. The decline in economic growth was stronger than in the European Union as a whole, while the expected recovery so far is less strong" (ROA 2004b, 6).

Map 6.E The ROA municipalities (ROA 2005b)

Aside from the fact that the ROA is said to employ someone who deals with European funds (RSA 2004), its European perspective and its individual positioning within the European (policy) arena seems to be quite limited. Positioning in the European urban

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policy arena is out of the question. Employees of the ROA communication department confirm this impression. Moreover, the ROA website is not even accessible in English. It should be mentioned, though, that formally ROA participates in 'Regio Randstad' (see section 6.5.5), which does position in the wider European arena..

Stadsgewest Haaglanden

The forerunners of Stadsgewest Haaglanden, surrounding the City of The Hague, date back to the late 1960s and have had divergent statuses. The present plusregion consists of nine municipalities, including The Hague itself. Co-operation relates to spatial planning, traffic and transportation, housing, environment, economic development, agriculture and youth care.

The administration consists of a general administration, an executive committee and a chair. More than half of its means (274 million euros of about 455 million euros for 2006) come from the national government (main financier), a substantial amount from a number of other sources[65] (176 million euros) and the rest from the participating municipalities (5 million euros). These resources are then divided among the different policy sectors of Stadsgewest Haaglanden (www.haaglanden.nl).

Map 6. F Stadsgewest Haaglanden (http://www.haaglanden.nl/)

The European perspective of Stadsgewest Haaglanden is even less than that of the ROA: neither at the website or in its general policy documents, nor in its magazine (Stadsgewest Haaglanden 2004a, 2004b), a European perspective can be found. Even

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[65] The 176 million euros from other sources consist of assets of railway infrastructure-projects (€ 62 million), withdrawals from various funds (€ 100 million) and 'other' resources (€ 8 million).

in the core tasks such as 'regional spatial policy' and 'economic development' (Stadsgewest Haaglanden 2004b), Europe does not come up. It is only pointed out that Stadsgewest Haaglanden (at times referred to as '*Regio Haaglanden*') participates in a Randstad co-operation (Stadsgewest Haaglanden 2004b, 44), but in these sources, this co-operation (Regio Randstad) is not related to a European context. Finally, its website is accessible in English, but only very limitedly.

In view of the website and the general policy documents in which it presents itself, Stadsgewest Haaglanden does not have a European perspective, let alone that it individually positions itself in the European urban policy arena. Just like the ROA, it is only represented in the wider European (policy) arena under other denominators, such as Regio Randstad.

6.5.2 Regional Co-operation Amsterdam (RSA)

The Regional Co-operation Amsterdam (*Regionale Samenwerking Amsterdam, RSA*) is an informal co-operation of municipalities and provinces that was established in 1998. The RSA aims at promoting co-operation in the region through bringing together administrators and civil servants situated in the region, to address regional questions, exchange information and promote the interests of the region (RSA 2005a; www.regionalesamenwerking.amsterdam.nl). The moving forces of the RSA are the City of Amsterdam, the Province of Noord-Holland and the ROA. It is sponsored by the City of Amsterdam and the Province of Noord-Holland. An overview of the RSA area is presented in map 6.G.

Map 6.G Regionale Samenwerking Amsterdam, RSA (O+S 2006)

An important RSA activity is the annual Northwing (*Noordvleugel)* conference: the *Noordvleugel* of the Randstad (see also section 6.5.3) is presented as

the 'economic motor of the Netherlands' (RSA 2005a, 2). Not surprisingly, co-operation in the *Noordvleugel* focuses primarily on economic and spatial issues, such as: spatial development, accessibility, the regional labourmarket and economy, the development of Schiphol airport and developments in the North Sea Canal area (RSA 2005a).

Comparing RSA and ROA, there are differences in focus, foundation, finances and area: the RSA primarily focuses on economic activities in the *Noordvleugel* of the Randstad, while the ROA focus seems to be much broader. While the RSA is an informal co-operation, the ROA has a legal foundation. The finances of the RSA are far less, as compared to the ROA: in 2004 the RSA spent about 67,800 euros. Finally, as is clear from a 2002 source (Gemeente Amsterdam 2002), in recent years the ROA and RSA have paid a lot of attention to positioning themselves vis-à-vis each other.

Generally speaking, in the RSA sources a European perspective seems to be missing. Besides, while the RSA website offers the possibility to connect to 'European links of interest for the region' and the RSA magazine (RSA 2004, 2005b) at times pays attention to European issues, they are both only accessible in Dutch.

Salet (2004) confirms this impression and sees it as a shortcoming. More generally speaking, he argues that from an international perspective, local and provincial administrations are still too much inward looking: a new 'policy attitude' is required.

One of the subjects discussed elaborately at the RSA website is the *Noordvleugel* programme. What does this imply?

6.5.3 The Noordvleugel and Zuidvleugel Programmes

In the National Spatial Strategy (*Nota Ruimte)* (Ministerie van VROM et al. 2004), both the *Noordvleugel* and the *Zuidvleugel* (Southwing) are characterized as economic core areas of *Randstad Holland*. Randstad Holland, whose importance is emphasized from an international perspective, is characterized in the following way:

> The Randstad Holland is the biggest national urban network in the Netherlands. A substantial amount of the Dutch population lives and works in this area. The Randstad is the political, administrative, social and cultural heart of the Netherlands and the most important engine of the economy, logistics, business and financial services and tourism. Also in the area of the knowledge industry and innovation, the Randstad is important. In view of this, the Randstad is of international importance and can compete with metropolitan areas in the world. (Ministerie van VROM et al. 2004, 66)

The *Noordvleugel* and the *Zuidvleugel*, thus the Northern part and the Southern part of Randstad Holland, could be called regions in a functional sense. With the *Noordvleugel* and *Zuidvleugel* programmes, related to these regions, the national government intends to implement a number of projects in these areas in a mutually coherent way, through realizing a co-ordinated and coherent decision making process. The national government, which has the final responsibility, co-operates with regional actors from

various governmental bodies in these programmes. However, as such they are national programmes. For that reason, they have not been examined in more detail in this chapter, as regions are the primary focus of interest.

6.5.4 The Provinces

The Netherlands can be subdivided in twelve provinces. Every province has its own government and is led by a Governor (Queen's Commissioner) and its provincial assemblies, elected in a direct vote every four years.

Based on his examination of a number of Dutch provinces[66], De Rooij (2003) concludes that they all focus on Europe and that there are many similarities in their EU engagement: they all receive EU money; they all have a lobby or information office in Brussels and they all employ officials who are exclusively involved in EU issues. Moreover, in all provinces EU-issues are on the agenda of the Provincial Executive (*College van Gedeputeerde Staten*). Finally, they all have a seat (or a deputy seat) in the Committee of the Regions.

Map 6.H The Dutch provinces (www.wikipedia.org)

Focusing on the Provinces of Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland in somewhat more detail, which observations can be made in terms of organization structure and behaviour vis-à-vis Europe?

The Province of Noord-Holland and Europe

The Province of Noord-Holland emphatically shows a European perspective in its document '*Grip op Europa: Agenda voor Europese Strategie 2003-2007*' (Provincie Noord-Holland 2004). In this document, the province expounds its views on European

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[66] The Provinces of Zuid-Holland, Friesland, Groningen, Zeeland and Flevoland.

developments as related to the Province of Noord-Holland. In answer to the processes related to European integration, the province formulates a number of goals in its attitude towards 'Europe'. It should be 'Europe proof,' implying that provincial policy and regulation should be in agreement with European law and regulation; it should have a strong lobby in Brussels (among others for attracting Structural Fund money); it should be clearly present in the Committee of the Regions; it should have clear priorities for applying for EU funding, etc. Moreover, as Europe means "thinking on a larger scale, in which boundaries of provinces and nation states become less relevant" (Provincie Noord-Holland 2004, 5), it argues that European thinking should become self-evident in various policy fields. In view of these aims, the province is clearly reflecting on its organization and behaviour, both in reaction to output from the European Union and as input towards it.

Moreover, the Province of Noord-Holland also positions itself vis-à-vis Brussels collectively, under the banners of both the IPO and Regio Randstad (see section 6.5.5).

The Province of Zuid-Holland and Europe

The first interactions between the Province of Zuid-Holland and 'Europe' date back to the 1980s, when the province got Structural Fund money within the context of the Renaval programme, a European programme that aimed at the revitalization of shipbuilding areas and at supporting former shipbuilding employees. Besides, in the late 1980s already, there were organizational changes related to the European Union: a 'Europedesk' was established and within the province there was a 'Project group Europe' a consultation in which all the departments of the Province of Zuid-Holland participated (De Rooij 2003).

The Province of Zuid-Holland intends to enforce its international position, especially in Europe. In its programme '*Vier jaar doen*,' covering the 2003-2007 period, the province points at the necessity to promote the provincial interests at the EU level (Provincie Zuid-Holland 2003). The booklet '*Achieving Ambitions: Europe and the Zuid-Holland experience*' (Provincie Zuid-Holland, 2004) provides an outline of European programmes in which the province presently participates.

A remarkable project is "'ReUrbA2,' Restructuring Urbanized Areas' for which the province as the lead applicant has received 883,756 euros. The main objective of this project, funded under the heading of the European INTERREG IIIB North West Europe Programme (2000-2006), is to find new ways of investing in urban areas. Interestingly, the five participating partners differ in terms of status: the Newcastle City Council; English heritage, London section; GIU Development Corporation, Saarbrucken, Germany; Development Corporation of the City of Rotterdam and the Dutch Province of Zuid-Holland.

The Province of Zuid-Holland thus focuses explicitly on Europe and is even the lead applicant of a project that focuses on urban areas and that is co-funded with Structural Fund money. Just like the Province of Noord-Holland, the Province of Zuid-Holland positions itself vis-à-vis Brussels collectively under the banners of IPO and Regio Randstad (see section 6.5.5).

The IPO

The Dutch provinces work together in the Association of Provincial Authorities (*Interprovinciaal Overleg, IPO*), whose main job is to promote the provinces' joint interests. European interests have been laid down in the '*Europese Agenda 2004-2007*' (www.ipo.nl). Among other issues, the IPO has dedicated itself to a strong position for the regions in the European Constitution and to a continuation of European Regional policy in the 2007 – 2013 budget period (IPO 2004).

The Committee of the Regions (CoR), the EU's official advisory body concerning the interests of local and regional authorities, is an important formal facility for the IPO, for exerting influence on the EU decision making process. The Dutch delegation in the CoR consists of both provincial and municipal administrators (IPO 2004). Additionally (some of) the provinces also participate in various networks, but these will not be discussed here[67].

Finally, the provinces and the IPO have an outpost in Brussels, the House of the Dutch Provinces (*Huis van de Nederlandse Provincies, HNP*) that will be discussed at the end of the chapter.

6.5.5 Regio Randstad

Regio Randstad is a joint venture of twelve public authorities of different governmental levels: the four Provinces of Zuid-Holland, Noord-Holland, Utrecht and Flevoland; the four Cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht; and what is referred to as the 'city regions' of these four cities (www.regio-randstad.nl) that uphold their separate responsibilities. According to Van Duinen (2004), by founding this new co-operative, the Randstad region has gained a stronger position. Its goal is twofold: it intends to enforce the competitive position of the Randstad as a region in an integrating and expanding Europe and it aims at improving the quality of life in the Randstad (Regio Randstad 2003b). Financing is based on a particular distribution code of the participating parties: municipalities (40 percent), provinces (40 percent) and 'city regions' (20 percent) (Regio Randstad 2003a).

Illustration 6.I Regio Randstad Logo (www.regio-randstad.nl)

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[67] An example relates to the Assembly of European Regions (AER), created in 1985. This is a political organization of regions in Europe. On its website, it characterizes itself as: "the political voice of the regions and the key partner for the European and international institutions on every issue of regional competence." Presently, there are three Dutch members: the provinces of Flevoland, Noord-Brabant and Limburg.

One could characterize Regio Randstad as a formal network around the meso-level. It was formally established on September 1, 2002[68] and is based on the Common Regulation Randstad Co-operation (*Gemeenschappelijke regeling Samenwerkingsverband Randstad)* (Regio Randstad 2003a). Regio Randstad has a board of twenty-four members and an Executive Committee of five (www.regio-randstad.nl; Storm 2004).

While Regio Randstad is connected to an area, often referred to as 'Randstad Holland,' at the same time it is not in charge of managing it. "Neither the Randstad board …, nor … the Randstad staff, can be considered to manage Randstad Holland" (Storm 2004, 19). Instead, Regio Randstad is presented as an 'intergovernmental body' (*ibid*. 15), "a platform for common attuning and general policy negotiations with [the] national government" (*ibid*. 28).

Regio Randstad and representatives from various national departments meet several times a year in the Administrative Committee Randstad (*Bestuurlijke Commissie Randstad*), to discuss new developments regarding plans for and investment in Randstad Holland. In a recent manifesto (October 12, 2005)[69], the '*Holland Acht'* (literally translated, the 'Dutch eight'), consisting of the G4 and the P4[70] advocated one democratically legitimate Randstad authority. Their primary motivation was prompted by the competitive position of the Randstad, as compared to other metropolitan regions in Europe. For, this position has strongly declined since the end of the 1990s, as measured by the gross regional product per head of the population. An important cause, in the opinion of the *Holland Acht*, was the absence of a decisive administrative structure. Interestingly, their motivation seems to echo the arguments of the earlier mentioned 'Montijn Committee' for the creation of agglomeration municipalities (*agglomeratiegemeenten)* in 1989. Now, however, they concerned a different level: the upper provincial level of Regio Randstad.

Regio Randstad has an explicit European perspective. The importance of Europe and the importance for Regio Randstad to position itself in the European (policy) arena, is expressed in many of its publications. To give an example: "In an enlarging Union and a growing economic competition between regions, it is important for the four Randstad provinces to present themselves as a region versus other regions, as well as versus the European bodies and the business community" (Regio Randstad 2003b, 4).

The strategy and implementation of the co-operation in Europe is laid down in the '*Strategic EU Randstad Agenda 2004-2006'* (Regio Randstad 2004), drawn up by the Administrative Consultation on Europe (*Bestuurlijk Overleg Europa*), in which the four Randstad Provinces participate, together with two Regio Randstad officials, ' to take advantage of European Union policy.' This agenda describes the five most

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[68] Its basis was actually laid already in the early 1990s, when co-operation started between the Provinces of Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht, later accompanied by Flevoland.

[69] 'Slagvaardig bestuur voor Randstad Holland noodzakelijk: Manifest van de commissarissen van de vier randstadprovincies en de burgemeesters van de vier grote steden over de modernisering van de Randstad, gericht tot regering en parlement' (Holland Acht 2005).

[70] The Provinces of Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Utrecht and Flevoland.

important common priorities for lobby activities in Brussels, among others European Regional Policy and the Lisbon agenda (Regio Randstad 2003b, 2004).

The Lisbon strategy is argued to be "the main criterion for the distribution of Structural Funds in the period 2007-2013. The strategy will therefore increasingly affect the policy of member states and their de-central administrations, and therefore also Randstad Holland as a European Region" (Regio Randstad 2004, 4). Regio Randstad aims at exploring the concrete role of regions in realizing the Lisbon goals and at realizing a structural report on the regions of Europe (NUTS 1 and 2, per *landsdeel* and per province), in addition to the annual country report of the European Commission, in order to measure the progress of Lisbon at the regional level and to compare progress between regions (Regio Randstad 2003b).

For European Structural Funds, the 'Randstad lobby' focuses both on Brussels and on The Hague to actually get funds channelled to Randstad Holland. For, member states are said to have much freedom in the distribution of the funds (Regio Randstad 2003b, 2004).

Explicit attention is also paid to the positioning of regions vis-à-vis Brussels. The Regio Randstad Agenda points at the fact that the regions that are represented in Brussels are of a certain scale from the economic point of view, even though the constitutional position differs per country. As mentioned before, this distinction, strikingly, is not made in Brussels. Moreover, now that Europe increasingly has a level playing field, there is a growing awareness that the importance of the role played at the European regional level is increasing (Regio Randstad 2004), for example in enforcing the European employment and knowledge economy (Regio Randstad 2003b).

In Brussels, Regio Randstad is represented as one of the *landsdelen* in the House of the Dutch Provinces (Storm 2004; Regio Randstad 2004).

6.5.6 The House of the Dutch Provinces (HNP)

While the four Randstad Provinces (Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland, Utrecht and Flevoland) have had a common representative in Brussels since 1993 (Regio Randstad 2003b), in 2000 all the Dutch provinces and the Association of Provincial Authorities (the IPO) established the House of the Dutch Provinces (*Huis van de Nederlandse Provincies, HNP*) in Brussels.

The HNP aims at creating synergy between the regional offices and the IPO for the purposes of: efficient representation of common Dutch regional interests; establishing and maintaining relations between the Dutch provinces and the EU institutions, the Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU and other regional offices in Brussels, in regard to representing the interests of the provinces; and contributing to greater knowledge in the Dutch provinces about the European integration process (www.nl-prov.be).

The board that administers the HNP is made up of representatives from the twelve provinces and a chair from the IPO (www.nl-prov.be).

Within the House, the provinces are grouped together and organized as *landsdelen* (literally, 'country parts'), referred to as 'regional provincial alliances'. Each *landsdeel* covers a number of provinces and is represented by a 'regional office' at the HNP. The IPO also has its own office in the HNP building (www.nl-prov.be).

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Interestingly, these *landsdelen,* that do not have any formal position or status in the Dutch administrative structure, are thus used as a basis for co-operation in the HNP. For the Netherlands, they even represent the NUTS-1 level, based on the European NUTS classification. In the last years, the *landsdelen* (the Randstad, North Netherlands, East Netherlands and South Netherlands) have all received money under the Objective 2 programme (RPB 2004).

Map 6.J Representation of Provinces in House of Provinces (by landsdelen)
(www.nl-prov.be)

The HNP building does not only house representatives of Dutch provinces and of the IPO: since March 2003, also the G4 office, the office of the Cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, is situated in its building.

While the term 'House' evokes an image of brotherly co-operation in Brussels, reality seems to be the opposite. According to the Province of Noord-Holland (2004), the organization of administrative and official consultation structures is far more complex than necessary. In terms of representation and co-operation between the Dutch representatives in the 'House' (Regio Randstad, the other *landsdelen*, IPO, G4, etc), the situation lacks transparency. In the European context, the G4 and the plusregions, for example, formally covered by the *Gemeenschappelijke regeling Regio Randstad* (Regio Randstad 2003a), do not come to the fore. Instead, in Brussels Regio Randstad merely seems to position itself as a co-operation of the Randstad Provinces. "Within the HNP the four Randstad Provinces co-operate on European files in which Regio Randstad has specific interests that cannot or can only partly be served at the

level of HNP/IPO" (Regio Randstad 2003b, 4), it is argued for example. Moreover, the priorities in the '*Strategic EU Randstadagenda*' are argued to be "especially complementary compared to the four major cities (G4) and the *Interprovinciale Overleg*" (Regio Randstad 2003b, 3) and a "supplement to the common lobby activities of the HNP/IPO" (*ibid*. 8). Additionally, from early 2004 on, there has been an informal consultation between the G4 and the Randstad Provinces about common interests.

The extent of Europeanization of the different Dutch regions examined, in terms of (pro-active) behaviour and organization vis-à-vis Europe, thus clearly diverges among them.

6.6 Future Opportunities for Regions

On July 14, 2004, the European Commission adopted its legislative proposals on cohesion policy reform for the 2007-2013 period.

One of the proposals was to fully integrate urban actions into regional programmes. These programmes, laid down in National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRF), should indicate how urban actions would be dealt with and how the sub-delegation of responsibilities to city authorities for these actions would be organized (EC 2004c). Moreover, it was proposed to abandon the current system of 'micro-zoning', in which a particular small area had been targeted, based on the argument that solving problems in an area require a coherent strategy for an entire region (EC 2004b).

The NSRF would then be presented by the member state and would include a list of urban areas requiring specific action, within the regional programmes (EC 2004a, 2004c, 2004d).

At the moment of writing this thesis, these proposals still have the status of 'proposal,' but as soon as they will be accepted, in theory, they might have implications for the involvement of regional authorities in Structural Fund programmes. To give some examples: in the proposals for new Council regulations, regional authorities come explicitly to the fore, especially in relation to the partnership principle: The Commission proposes "to introduce further decentralization of responsibilities to partnerships on the ground in the member states, regions and local authorities…." (EC 2004c, 8). Moreover, "in the context of the partnership, regions would have the responsibility in the first instance for concentrating financial resources on the themes necessary to address the economic, social and territorial disparities at regional level. The Commission would verify and confirm consistency at the moment of deciding the programmes" (EC 2004c, 11). Finally, "the partnership should be strengthened through arrangements for the participation of various types of partners, in particular the regions, with full regard to the institutional arrangements of the member states" (EC 2004c, 16). In the proposal for the ERDF-regulation (EC 2004d), regional authorities are emphasized in the reference to partnership as well.

On the other hand, as related to the 'urban dimension,' regional involvement seems limited: "The member states, regions and managing authorities should organize, within the operational programmes co-financed by the ERDF …, sub-delegation to the

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urban authorities for the priorities concerning the regeneration of towns and cities" (EC 2004c, 19). Regions thus have an organizing stake in the operational programmes, but their participation in the urban actions themselves is unclear.

In the Netherlands the reform of EU regional policy has been discussed elaborately (see Chapter 7). The Dutch government has advocated its discontinuation in the original fifteen member states, whereas the provinces and the municipalities supported the European Commission proposals and have plead for the continuation of European Regional policy in the Netherlands (IPO-VNG 2004, 2).

6.7 Conclusion

In general, the extent of Europeanization, in terms of organizations and pro-active behaviour attuned to Europe, strongly diverges among Dutch 'regions'. Moreover, EU engagement as found in this research, related to the wider European arena, and *not* to the European (urban) policy arena.

The plusregions (ROA and Stadsgewest Haaglanden) hardly show any interest in Europe, let alone that they actively position themselves in the European arena. The RSA shows a modest interest, through its involvement in the *Noordvleugel* programme.

The provinces, on the other hand, are quite active 'regions' in that sense. They do not only show an explicit European perspective, but they also position themselves explicitly in Brussels: individually, under the banner of the IPO, and as part of one of the *landsdelen* within the House of the Dutch Provinces. This is especially the case for Regio Randstad, that presents itself and the four Randstad Provinces that it represents explicitly in the European (policy) arena. Strikingly, the other actors that it officially represents based on the '*Gemeenschappelijke regeling'* (the G4 and their plusregions), hardly show up in the European context. Strikingly, the plusregions are conspicuous by their absence in Brussels. As will become clear in the following chapter, the four big cities follow their own course under the heading of the G4.

The focus of the Dutch 'regions' on Europe has often started or been intensified in the last decade. Also the Dutch provinces manifest themselves as part of the HNP only since 2000. However, the four Randstad Provinces (Zuid-Holland, Noord-Holland, Flevoland and Utrecht), now represented as Regio Randstad, form an exception in the sense that they have had a common representation in Brussels since 1993 already.

However, as mentioned before, the orientation of the provinces does not so much relate to European *urban* policy, but rather to its wider context (European Regional Policy, Structural Fund programmes), as well as to numerous other aspects. Regarding mutual co-operation as related to 'Europe,' the various 'regions' still seem to feel their way.

Future European Structural Fund regulations and the Lisbon Agenda seem to enforce the position of regional authorities. Some Dutch regions, such as Regio Randstad clearly anticipate what is coming. In the Netherlands, it could once more stimulate the debate on regional government. Regarding the 'city regions' or the 'urban regions,' so far this issue has not been discussed in relation to 'Europe'. However, in pleas for a governmental authority at a higher scale level (Randstad), the issue is

explicitly related to the European context. The timing of the recent *Holland Acht* manifesto, with the proposal for one democratically elected Randstad authority, is quite interesting in that sense.

Additionally, the proposal to mainstream urban actions and to abandon micro-zoning in future European Structural Fund programmes might stimulate approaching urban problems on a higher scale. Generally speaking, this could imply increasing opportunities for regional involvement, also in future European urban actions, either at the level of the 'urban region' or at a higher 'regional' level.

Considering the Dutch context, in future 'urban actions,' the national government, will get a stronger position as a gate-keeper. Moreover, the Netherlands will not any longer make use of Structural Fund money[71]. So, the question remains whether regional authorities will truly have serious opportunities for becoming involved in urban actions. Moreover, it would be questionable whether Dutch regions would use the 'opportunity' (if any). So far, their EU engagement has strongly varied and their interest in or claims on involvement in European area-based urban programmes seems to have been absent.

Finally, assuming that there would be opportunities for involvement in urban actions and that Dutch regions would be interested in using them, then what would be the most obvious Dutch 'region': The plusregions? The provinces? A co-operation of provinces? So far, in theory, the provinces seem to be the strongest candidate. They are the only democratically legitimate government at the meso-level. Moreover, of all the examined 'regions,' the provinces have had the longest and the best representation in Brussels. Besides, in the Netherlands they play a role within the NUTS-classification, even at two levels: as a province (NUTS 2 level) and as a *landsdeel* (NUTS 1 level). Still the question remains whether this would also apply to regional involvement in future European *urban* actions in the Netherlands.

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[71] This is actually not correct. The Netherlands will continue receiving Structural Fund money, but it will be far less than in the former budget period. Moreover, it will not be allocated to individual urban programmes any longer (see table below, derived from EC 2006).

Allocations 2000-2006¹ Million EUR, 2004 prices		Allocations 2007-2013¹ Million EUR, 2004 prices	
Cohesion Fund Objective 1		Cohesion Fund Convergence Statistical Phasing-out	
Phasing-out	123	Phasing-in	
Objective 2	878	Regional Competitiveness	
Objective 3	1.861	and Employment	1.473
Community Initiatives	676	European Territorial Cooperation	219
Total	**3.538**	**Total**	**1.692**

(1) - Comparisons need to be made with great caution given the change in regional eligibility, and the number and nature of the objectives in the two programming periods.
- The 2000-2006 amounts have been corrected to match the 2004 prices (as in the case of the financial perspectives 2007-2013).
- Figures are net of allocations for the rural development and fisheries instruments in both periods.

CHAPTER 7

7. Collective Positioning of Cities in the European Arena

7.1 Introduction

The next four empirical chapters (Chapters 7-10) all address the 'local' governmental level. Two of them (Chapter 8 and 9) focus on individual cities in which an URBAN-I programme was implemented: the Cities of The Hague and Amsterdam. In Chapter 10, these two cases will be compared.

The present chapter relates to *collective* positioning of cities in the European (urban) policy arena, but it has a narrow focus. It merely addresses the first research question (the extent of Europeanization) and serves as a context for the following two individual city chapters. As cities are not involved in European URBAN programmes as a 'collective,' the other three research questions are not applicable.

More specifically, the questions raised here are: What can we say about the extent of Europeanization of cities as a collective? What motivates (Dutch) cities to position themselves collectively in the European (urban) policy arena and through what kind of organizations do they do so?

Interestingly, as will become clear in the following, collective positioning of cities vis à-vis the European Union does not only imply operating behind the screens but also, and even explicitly, operating in all openness: with so-called 'position papers' collectivities position themselves explicitly in the European arena. The Eurocities network even literally defines them as papers "with the aim of influencing decisions that are being made at European level" (www.eurocities.org). In terms of De Rooij (2003)(see earlier Chapters 2 and 3), these are clear examples of Europeanization of behaviour, as input towards the European Union.

In the following section, first attention will be paid to the Europeanization of (Dutch) cities and their motivation for and ways of collective EU engagement. Then, collective organizations will be discussed in section 7.3. Next, the way in which these organizations position themselves in the European (urban) policy arena will be illustrated with the recent debate about the future of European Cohesion policy (section 7.4). Finally, conclusions about the extent of Europeanization, issues of motivation and forms of collective positioning will be drawn in section 7.5.

7.2 Europeanization of the (Dutch) Political Arena

In connection with an increasing Europeanization of the political arena (see Chapter 2), EU engagement of cities, both individually and collectively, has strongly increased in the past decennia. What has motivated this 'European turn'?

7.2.1 Europeanization of (Dutch) Cities

Especially the European Structural Fund programmes have resulted in a direct relationship of potential political importance between the European Union and subnational governments. European cities increasingly recognize the European Union as a new political arena, offering them opportunities as well as constraints. In a period that has been marked by internationalization, economic interdependence and intensifying competition, cities have therefore become more engaged in developing EU related activities. Wolffhardt et al. (2005) even refer to it as a 'European turn' of cities, that can be seen as a particular aspect of the Europeanization of domestic systems in EU member states. The extent of Europeanization does not only differ between member states[72], there are also differences within them, for example between municipalities and provinces, but also among municipalities and among provinces.

An interesting question is how exactly cities get involved with 'Europe,' and what explains the particular profiles of their EU engagement.

7.2.2 Motivation for EU Engagement

According to De Rooij (2004), the European Union has resulted in both opportunities and limitations for subnational authorities. In terms of opportunities, the author points in particular at European Structural Fund money. As a (possible) limitation, he refers to EU regulations that subnational authorities have to obey. However, even though money is important, at the same time it is a rather limited interpretation of European 'opportunities' for subnational governments. The establishment of the Committee of the Regions, in 1994, for example, definitely implied a consolidated position of the subnational governments. But there have also been other opportunities for subnational governments to improve their position in the European (urban) policy arena, such as the explicit attention paid to urban problems in European policy, from the late 1990s on[73]; the European '*Whitebook on European Governance*' (European Commission 2001a); the accentuation of the subsidiarity principle in the EU treaties; the emphasis on partnership in the implementation of (among others) European urban programmes, etc. Conversely, you could also argue that these opportunities have been the result of an increasing positioning of subnational authorities in the arena.

These opportunities and limitations have both been important driving forces behind EU engagement of subnational authorities.

The findings of Wolffhardt et al. (2005) are related to De Rooij's, but at the same time they are far more elaborated. Drawing from their empirical evidence, based on six case studies[74], the authors have derived two sets of factors that shape EU engagement of cities: motivational factors and intermediate factors.

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[72] See De Rooij, 2004.

[73] See, for example, '*Towards an urban agenda in the European Union*' (EC 1997b) and '*Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union: a Framework for Action*' (EC 1998a).

[74] Their six case studies all concerned studies of cities with a visible European engagement: Liverpool and Manchester (UK), Vienna and Graz (Austria) and Dortmund and Hamburg (Germany).

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The five *motivational* factors or driving forces behind all EU-related activities of cities connect to different views on Europe:
-   Europe as problem solver: support for socio-economic restructuring and a source of innovation;
-   Europe as stage: the EU as a means of profiling and identity building;
-   Europe as threat: EU norms challenging established urban policies;
-   Europe as alternative: EU engagement to overcome the domestic context;
-   Europe as duty: reactive, incremental involvement (Wolffhardt et al. 2005).

Although these factors are derived from case studies of individual cities, one could imagine that the driving forces behind cities' collective EU engagement will be very similar. Collective EU engagement could, for example, intend influencing EU policy in order to increase the budget allocated to urban problems (Europe as problem solver) or could intend collectively defending particular established models of delivering public policies (Europe as threat). Moreover, in case of the earlier mentioned collective positioning papers, the image of Europe as stage comes to the fore: the EU as a means of profiling as a collective; one could even argue as a stage for a politics of scale.

Aside from five motivational factors, based on their case studies, Wolffhardt et al. (2005) have also derived three *intermediate* factors or factors with a mediating effect on the primary motivational factors. These relate to:
-   Deliberate political choice and informed political actions. By this, the authors mean that conscious decisions 'for Europe' and a decisive influence on the part of individual actors play a major role in the shaping of EU activities in cities;
-   Quantitative aspects: the relationship between the size of potential gains (or constraints) and the size of a city. In case of a small city, an EU programme might have a major impact, thus motivating decision makers to put energy in getting it. In case of a large city, the EU means might be relatively minuscule, as related to an overall urban development agenda and thus not motivating decision makers to even seriously considering it;
-   Constitutional arrangements, domestic laws and domestic politics. The place of cities in a member state political system and their jurisdictional competences, as well as national policy frameworks in thematic areas that are important to cities, can strongly influence a city's pattern of involvement with the EU.

Just like the motivational factors, these intermediate factors could also hold for collective EU engagement of cities. A conscious decision 'for Europe,' followed by informed political action might have been the basis for the establishment of a G4 office in Brussels. Regarding size, although approached in a somewhat different way, one could think of small cities organizing collectively in order to create a stronger voice in the European arena. Finally, the last factor can obviously take the form of a motivational factor if cities collectively want to overcome perceived deficits in their own countries; this could be the case, for example, if urban policy (or particular aspects of it) does not have priority in their own countries.

Another important factor for collective EU engagement of cities relates to one particular constitutional arrangement, albeit on a different scale. As mentioned earlier, the European Commission does not have a formal relation with subnational authorities, but merely with the member states[75]. Subnational governments thus do not have an formal role in the EU policymaking process. This constitutional limitation takes the form of a genuine motivational factor, when cities (collectively) try to influence EU decision making processes.

7.2.3 Influencing EU Decision Making Processes

An important aspect of cities' EU engagement relates to trying to influence the EU-decision making process. This also holds for Dutch cities. It might take place on an individual or on a collective basis. The comparative assessment that is made (acting individually or collectively) is prompted by the type of interests that is at stake.

Van der Knaap and Hilterman (1997) point at the fact that there are both institutional and policy interests at issue. Seen from an administrative institutional perspective, subnational authorities in Europe have a (common) interest in being taken seriously as a governmental level: this 'emancipation' of subnational governmental levels is primarily pursued collectively.

Policy interests can be subdivided in interests that are linked with policy development on the one hand, and interests that are connected with policy implementation on the other. According to Van der Knaap and Hilterman (1997), regarding policy development subnational governments are primarily interested in aims of European policy as regards content, such as, for example, the realization of an urban policy at the EU level. However, if influencing policy implementation is under discussion, then usually short-term advantage prevails. This holds, for example, for the competition for EU Structural Fund money or for the competition for the domicile of a prestigious organization. In the last case, individual interests are often given preference to, instead of co-operation.

Generally speaking, the European Commission is very open to external contacts, partly prompted by its own need for information. Apart from lobby activities, directly focused on the European Commission, local and regional governments also influence the Commission via the European Council (Council working groups) or via the European Parliament (parliamentary committees). Besides, representatives of subnational authorities are in touch with the Permanent Representation (*Permanente Vertegenwoordiging, PV*) in Brussels (a sort of embassy with the EU), on a regular basis. Many local and regional governments even have an office in Brussels, with representatives who collect information, make contacts and promote their interests. As compared to other governments and organizations, Dutch cities have started relatively

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75 The European Constitution would have changed this situation. Based on the constitution, local and regional governments would have become formal partners in the EU polity. Additionally, the subsidiarity principle would have been extended towards regions and municipalities. Finally, the competences of the Committee of the Regions would have been extended (VNG 2005b). The committee would, for example, have become a supervisor, acting as a watchdog on the observance of the subsidiarity principle.

late with lobbying in the European context ('Euro-lobbying') (Peters 1994; VNG 2001). Since 1999, the City of Amsterdam, for example, has a lobbyist in Brussels, but Amsterdam was the first Dutch city with its own representation.

The Eurolobby of provinces and municipalities focuses primarily on four (sorts of) files: the Structural Funds and other subsidy programmes. For most subnational governments this is the most important issue that the EU has to offer; attracting EU and other international organizations, such as the European Central Bank; obtaining seats in EU-advisory bodies and in the boards of umbrella organizations for European subnational governments and finally, influencing EU policy making and EU issuing of rules in other policy areas than regional policy (Peters 1994).

Moreover, while promoting their interests in a European context, subnational governments also focus on their national government. For, European policy as the outcome of international negotiations gives national governments the role of policy maker. As will become clear later in this chapter, in practice this kind of contact often runs via collective advocates, such as the VNG or the G4 (VNG 2001).

How exactly do cities promote their interests collectively in the European policy arena? This will be discussed next.

7.3 Collective Organizations

To a considerable extent, cities enter the European (urban) policy arena collectively, from co-ordinating interest groups. As mentioned before, one of the most important motives is influencing policy proposals of the European Commission. Collective positioning is a fruitful way of influencing, as access to the European arena depends among others on the degree in which a particular (rank and file of the) party is represented. Cities position themselves both from intermediary organizations and city networks, at a national or at an international level.

7.3.1 National and International Intermediary Organizations

There is a variety of national and international intermediary organizations for subnational actors. What are the most important ones for the Dutch municipalities?

Association of Netherlands Muncipalities (VNG)
An important national representative of the Dutch municipalities is the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (*Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten*, *VNG*). In the 1990s, this association has started laying considerably more emphasis on European affairs. Besides, they have often taken initiatives in relation to Europe, together with the Dutch Association of Provincial Authorities (*Interprovinciaal Overleg*, *IPO*).
In 1990, for example, the VNG and the IPO established an information office (*Informatiepunt Europa*) that intended to inform their members about European law and regulation and options for subsidies and policy developments[76], among others through a bulletin ('*Europabulletin*'). On April 1, 2002, this information office was merged into a knowledge centre ('*Europa Decentraal*'), a common initiative of the

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[76] In 1995 the Association of Water Boards joined as well (De Rooij 2003).

Ministry of the Interior, the VNG, the IPO and the Association of Water Boards (*Unie van Waterschappen*).

Between 1991 and 1999, there has also been a VNG/IPO-Committee for European affairs, in which knowledge about European affairs was exchanged between municipal and provincial administrators twice a year. In 1999 this Committee was abolished, when 'Europe' became a part of the regular VNG-committees (De Rooij 2003).

Since 1991, the VNG has a co-ordinator European Affairs. In an interview, this co-ordinator (meanwhile called 'contact officer Europe') argues that VNG attention for Europe was still quite limited in the early 1990s. Because of the Maastricht Treaty, ratified in 1993, and the establishment of the Committee of the Regions, at the local level the attention for Europe increased considerably (Euromagazine 2002). At the same time, based on this Treaty the influence of the EU on municipal policy areas increased. Prompted by these developments, the VNG increased its EU activities. Moreover, it opened an office in Brussels in 1992, staffed by two VNG employees (VNG 2001; www.vng.nl). However, only quite recently, on January 1, 2005, the VNG has established a Directorate Europe/International (*Directie Europa/Internationaal, EUI*), in order to provide services and better look after local interests within the European Union.

The VNG does not play a formal role at the EU level, except for the fact that the association together with the IPO does the secretarial work of the Dutch delegation of the Committee of the Regions (Euromagazine 2002).

Within the Dutch context, the VNG participates in the following consultative bodies: the Europe Consultation for the Home Administration (*Europa Overleg Binnenlands Bestuur, EOBB*); Working Group for the Assessment of New [European] Commission Proposals (*Werkgroep Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen, BNC*), the Interdepartmental Committee European Law (*Interdepartementale Commissie Europees Recht, ICER*), ISO and the Interdepartmental Consultation European Tender regulations (*Interdepartementaal Overlegorgaan Europese Aanbestedingsvoorschriften, IOEA*).

Finally, the VNG is a member of a number of European and other international organizations, such as a European umbrella organization of municipalities and regions (CEMR) and an international umbrella organization (UCLG). Both will be discussed below.

Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR)

The most important European umbrella organization for Dutch municipalities is the *Council of European Municipalities and Regions*. In the Netherlands it is called the *Raad voor Europese Gemeenten en Regio's (REGR)*.

The Council of European Municipalities was founded in Geneva in 1951, by a group of European Mayors. At a later stage, it opened its ranks to the regions and became the Council of European Municipalities and Regions. It is now the largest umbrella organization of local and regional governments in Europe. Its members are national associations of towns, municipalities and regions from over 30 countries.

Together, these associations represent about 100,000 local and regional authorities (www.ccre.org).

On behalf of the Netherlands, the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (*VNG*), the Association of Provincial Authorities (*IPO*, member since 1995) and the CEMR Dutch section (*REGR-SN*)[77] are CEMR members (De Rooij 2003). Moreover, in 2004 Mr Wim Deetman, Mayor of the City of The Hague and chair of the VNG was appointed first vice-president of CEMR (Kennis Centrum Grote Steden 2004). The latter characterizes the CEMR as 'a sort of European VNG' (VNG-Magazine 2005, 12). However, actually a European version of the VNG that only represents European cities, like the Assembly of European Regions (AER) does for the regions, does not exist (De Lange 1999b).

The CEMR Dutch section (REGR-SN) was established in 1965 and has about 350 members. The section has a Service desk Europe for information and advice for its members concerning European funds, policy and regulations. Every two months, the organization publishes a journal, entitled '*De Europese Gemeente*' (the European Municipality), in which general developments concerning the EU and subnational governments are discussed (De Rooij 2003, 71-72; www.regr.nl).

The CEMR intends to promote a united Europe, based on local and regional self-government and democracy. To achieve this goal it endeavours to shape the future of Europe by enhancing the local and regional contribution; to influence European law and policy; to exchange experience at the local and regional level and to co-operate with partners in other parts of the world. Although the attention of the CEMR is generally focused more on institutional issues, such as subsidiarity and local self-government, during the Urban Forum in Vienna, in 1998, the CEMR has also taken up a position as related to urban policy (CEMR 1998; De Lange 1999b).

The organization has a budget of about 2,5 million euros, the main part of which comes from membership fees of its national associations. The rest (about 15 percent) consists of an annual grant from the European Commission (www.ccre.org; www.vng.nl; De Lange 1999b).

The Union of Capitals of the European Union (UCUE)
The 'Union of Capitals of the European Union' (UCUE) [78] is a network of the capitals of the (25) EU member states. It was created in 1961 to preserve continuous links between the European capitals and 'to encourage communication between the inhabitants in order to develop the living feeling of European solidarity' (www.ucue.org). The UCEU consists of a rotating chairmanship, appointed for one year and of a General Assembly which gets together once a year. There is also an annual official meeting. Amsterdam, the capital of the Netherlands, is an UCUE member as well. The UCUE aims at exchanging experience, information and

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[77] Before 1991, the VNG was a member of the IULA. The Dutch REGR section was a member of the REGR. But when the REGR became the European section of the IULA in 1991, both the VNG and the REGR-section have become a REGR member (De Rooij 2003).
[78] This network was established as the 'Union of Capitals of the European Community' on April 27, 1961. Its name was changed on November 12, 1993 into 'Union of Capitals of the European Union' (UCUE).

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documentation in all areas of the member cities' activities. Although their activities mostly seem to focus on the members of the network and although promoting their interests as such is not an aim (De Lange 1999b), the UCUE has also participated in the debate on the future of European Cohesion policy (see section 7.4).

A final organization that should be mentioned is the 'United Cities and Local Governments[79]' (UCLG). This worldwide umbrella organization of national associations of municipalities and regions positions itself on the global scale. For that reason, a more detailed description is outside the scope of this chapter[80].

Summarizing the foregoing, European municipalities unite at the national, European and global level. Within the European urban policy arena, for Dutch municipalities especially the VNG and the CEMR are of importance. Within the Netherlands, the VNG negotiates with the national government and in Brussels, the CEMR does so with the European Union (VNG-magazine 2005).

Other associations from which cities collectively operate in the European arena are city networks. These will be discussed next.

7.3.2 National and International City Networks

City networks might be organized both on a national or on an international basis. Below three important networks will be discussed: the G4 (a national city network), Eurocities and Urbact (international city networks)[81].

The G4 Co-operation

The G4 is the heading under which the Dutch Cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht co-operate[82]. In 2001, the administrations of these four cities decided to intensify their co-operation. The G4 consists of a regular consultation between the mayors and between the aldermen of the four cities, but it does not have a formal foundation.

Since a few years, the four cities, united as G4, position themselves as a collective in the European arena. In answer to the increasing influence of European integration on local administrations, in 2001, the boards of Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht and Rotterdam decided to enforce the act in their interest towards the Eureopean Union, in the form of G4 co-operation (Gemeente Den Haag 2002e).

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79 'United Cities and Local Governments' is the result of the unification of three organizations: the World Federation of United Cities (FMCU), the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and Metropolis, the international association of major metropolises.

80 For more information, see www.cities-localgovernments.org.

81 Another important network is Regio Randstad, in which both regions and cities participate. This network has been discussed in Chapter 6.

82The reason that G4 is presented here as a 'network,' is because of its form of cooperation. But the network is not accessible to other members than the G4 cities themselves.

Map 7.A Four Dutch cities united as G4 (www.nrc.nl)

Source: www.nrc.nl

On January 1, 2003, the four cities established a common G4 office in Brussels, located in the building of the House of the Dutch Provinces (HNP). The formal opening of the office took place on 23 April, in the presence of various Dutch national and European politicians. A new European G4 logo was presented as a symbol for the co-operation (see figure 7.B).

Figure 7.B European G4 Logo (G4 2005)

In a specific brochure, '*G-4 in Brussels: the city in Europe/Europe in the city'* (2003[83]), the G4 presented itself in this European context as "just one of many lobby groups in Brussels" (G4 2003, 6), but at the same time, being representatives of the largest cities in the Dutch Randstad, as "an influential discussion partner in the European circuit" (*ibid*., 7).

At the European level, G4 focuses on co-operation with three organizations in particular: the House of the Dutch Provinces, Eurocities and the Committee of the Regions. But it also co-operates intensively with the Dutch government, directly or via the Dutch Permanent Representation; with the European Parliament and with many European interest groups of local authorities. The Structural Funds, the Lisbon-Gothenburg Strategy and Governance were among the issues on which the G4 has focused its main attention in 2004-2005.

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[83] Exact date unknown. Probably about 2003.

A recently published document, entitled '*Meet the Challenge'* (G4 2005), could be characterized as the first G4 position paper in the European arena. It is written to present the G4 view of the Lisbon Strategy and offers suggestions for G4 involvement in its implementation, "The cities are ready to Meet the Challenge" (G4 2005, 11). Although it goes much further than European urban or regional policy, the themes that are addressed are clearly related to them.

Finally, at the end of 2005, the G4 also sealed their co-operation with a journal, '*G4 in Europa,'* to inform their rank and file about their activities (www.ez.amsterdam.nl).

Eurocities

The international Eurocities city network was founded in 1986, by the six Cities of Barcelona, Birmingham, Frankfurt, Lyon, Milan and Rotterdam. They intended to create a political platform for European cities. According to De Lange (1999b), from its early existence on, the lobby network has been a zealous advocate of European urban policy.

Already in March 1992, the Eurocities network opened a secretarial office in Brussels. Meanwhile it has a staff of about 30 persons. The network consists of more than 120 big cities (cities with a population of at least 25,000 inhabitants) from 30 countries, for whom it promotes the interests (Peters 1994; De Rooij 2003; www.eurocities.org). In 1999, five Dutch cities were full members[84] (Amsterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven, Rotterdam and Utrecht). Meanwhile also Parkstad Limburg[85] has become a full member.

Within Europe, Eurocities is regarded as an influential lobby-organization, partly because many prominent politicians have played an important role in this network. Regarding Dutch involvement, the former Mayor of Rotterdam (and later minister of the Ministry of the Interior), Mr Peper, was chair of the Executive Committee of Eurocities in 1997 and 1998 (De Rooij 2003). In 2004 the Mayor of The Hague, Mr Deetman, became a member of the Executive Committee.

Eurocities aims at: "Achieving a European context where cities can be inclusive, prosperous, creative, and sustainable, with democratic and effective governance, and where all citizens can be provided with opportunities for participation in all aspects of urban life, including political, cultural, social and economic aspects" (www.eurocities.org). In order to realize this goal, it 'gives cities a voice in Europe' by engaging in dialogue with the European institutions on all aspects of EU legislation, policies and programmes, that have an impact on cities and their citizens. Additionally, it provides a platform for its member cities to share knowledge and ideas, to exchange experiences, etc (www.eurocities.org).

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84 Full membership of the Association is open to major cities of the EU and the European Economic area (EEA) with a democratically elected city government. Criteria for admission of a city relate to the population (preferably over 250,000 inhabitants); the international and regional importance of the city and the urban structure of its country (Eurocities 2005b).
85 Parkstad Limburg actually consists of various Municipalities: Heerlen, Kerkrade, Landsgraaf, Brunssum, Voerendaal, Simpelveld and Onderbanken.

According to an employee of the Economic Affairs department of the City of Amsterdam, thanks to Eurocities, in co-operation with other organizations of subnational governmental authorities, cities have got a far better position in European Treaties, regulations and programmes. In the past, the word 'city' hardly appeared in European policy (Euromagazine 2004a).

Eurocities itself also seems to be pleased with its position: In a brochure entitled '*Giving Cities a voice in Europe*' (date unknown), on page 1, Eurocities presents itself as "a powerful voice for cities with the European Union institutions" that uses its "considerable influence to make sure that the interests of cities and citizens are taken into account whenever policies, legislation and programmes are developed and put into practice." For that purpose, in recent years, the network has published various *position papers* and *declarations*. In 1998, for example, during their annual conference, entitled '*Eurocities for an Urban Policy,*' Eurocities produced a political declaration that has become known as the '*Lille Declaration*' (Eurocities 1998). It called for urban issues to be addressed at the European level, and for a more integrated approach towards the urban dimension of European policies and their implementation in cities. During a more recent annual conference, in 2004, Eurocities adopted the '*Vienna Declaration,*' with proposals for improving European governance, especially in relation to urban issues. It was presented to the Council, the member states, the European Commission and to the European Parliament (Eurocities 2004; www.dutchuec.nl).

Interestingly, in 2004 Eurocities broadened its membership basis, by introducing the possibility for local authorities, businesses and other organizations to become permanent partners of the network and to take part in activities alongside Eurocities members. Local authorities and organizations that were not eligible for Eurocities membership, but wished to participate in one or more specific Eurocities Forums, could now apply to become 'Associated Partners'[86]. Meanwhile, private companies that wish to take part in the activities of one or more specific Forums can become 'Associated Business Partners'. In case of the Netherlands, Groningen and Leeuwarden have become associated partners (probably as their number of inhabitants did not meet the requirements of a full membership) and the business organization Oracle has become an associated business partner (www.eurocities.org).

Eurocities members and partners pay an annual fee. These fees diverge for the different types of membership. For 2006, they amounted to: 20,000 euros (full members, in Executive Committee); 14, 690 euros (EU 25 and EEA); 3,955 euros (associate members); 4,100 euros (associated partners, per Forum) and 10,250 euros (associated business partners, per Forum) (Eurocities 2005a, 9-10).

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86 Cities not eligible for EUROCITIES membership can become EUROCITIES associated partners in the frame of one or several Forums or Executive Committee Working Groups. Private businesses can become EUROCITIES associated business partners in the frame of one or several Forums or Executive Committee Working Groups (Eurocities 2005a, 2).

Figure 7.C Logo and quote Eurocities (www.eurocities.org)

EUROCITIES - THE NETWORK OF MAJOR EUROPEAN CITIES

NEWS RELEASE
**Europe's cities are crucial partners for
cohesion and competitiveness**

URBACT

Another interesting international city network is URBACT. This network actually has the status of an URBAN-II Community Initiative Programme and favours networking between URBAN-I, URBAN-II and Urban Pilot Project cities and their partners. Since May 1, 2004 also cities of the new member states can join. Its objectives are threefold: developing trans-national exchanges of experience between cities; capitalizing lessons learned from the analysis of those experiences and disseminating this knowledge to all actors in European cities.

The URBACT programme thus primarily intends exchanging knowledge and practices, instead of engaging in lobby activities. Its main focus is creating and managing thematic networks and working groups. These are built around particular themes and collect and analyze good practices in economic and social regeneration. The themes cover topics such as social exclusion; inclusion of populations of foreign origin; integration of young people; economic activity and employment; citizen participation; etc. Each network has to tackle its chosen theme from a specific angle and must establish a time-limited work programme.

The total programme budget is 28,33 million euros (18,03 million in community contributions and 10,30 million in national co-financing). The programme is managed by the French Ministry for Urban Policy, by agreement of the other member states (URBACT 2005).

Currently five Dutch cities participate in the URBACT network: Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, Enschede, Eindhoven and Heerlen (www.urbact.org).

Finally, it is interesting to mention that participating in European networks is not always reserved for cities. Also even lower administrative entities turn out to do so. The Amsterdam City District of Zuidoost, for example, participates with a number of others in a thematic network called 'UDIEX-UDIEX ALEP' (Urban Diversity and Inclusion Exchange). This network, established within the URBACT programme, focuses on fighting social exclusion. It is an action-learning programme for the transfer of experience and staff development.

In the last decades, various city networks have been established. They either have political intentions, such as influencing the European agenda, or they pursue exchanging knowledge, good practices, etc. Dutch cities increasingly act collectively as well, both through national or international city networks. The existence of these city networks has strongly increased the interaction between the cities and European institutions (De Lange 1999b). An example of the way in which cities collectively participate and position themselves in debates in the European arena is illustrated below, with the recent debate on European Cohesion policy.

7.4 The Debate on European Cohesion Policy

A recent debate that has caused a lot of commotion, especially among cities and city-networks, is the debate on European Cohesion policy (or European Regional policy). In the Commission proposals for future Cohesion policy, it was proposed to discontinue the individual European area-based urban programmes, such as the Community Initiative URBAN and to embed them as urban actions in wider programmes instead. However, this caused local authorities to become concerned about the future attention for urban issues.

How has this discussion gone off, both in general and in the Netherlands, and how have cities positioned themselves as related to this debate in the European urban (policy) arena?

7.4.1 The Commission Proposals

On July 14, 2004, the European Commission adopted its legislative proposals on cohesion policy reform for the 2007-2013 period.

In spite of the intention of the European Commission to give attention to the urban dimension in future European Cohesion policy, especially the cities in the prosperous member states feared that their position, as compared to the present situation, would deteriorate in terms of budget, responsibilities and as focus of policy. There were several issues at stake. The system of micro-zoning, policy focused on a relatively small area, a system that had been applied to urban programmes for years, would now be abandoned. The argument was that solving problems in a particular area required a coherent strategy for a wider region. However, the cities were worried about the consequences in terms of visibility and effectiveness of the urban interventions. Furthermore, the member states and the regions would get more responsibilities in the new cohesion policy: they would become authorized to draw up so-called 'National Strategic Reference Frameworks' (NSRFs), that co-ordinated the operational programmes in the different member states. Moreover, they would present these frameworks to the European Commission. In these frameworks, they could include a list of urban areas in which specific actions should be undertaken. The original individual area-based urban programmes would thus be replaced with 'urban actions' within a co-ordinating national framework. The cities feared this development as well: they would not only become more dependent on the priorities of the national and regional government, their involvement in urban policy would no longer be guaranteed either. In addition, in the more prosperous member states, the amount of money for urban policy would probably be far less than before.

Finally, it would vary between member states whether the 'urban dimension' would be addressed and to what extent and how municipal authorities would be involved. In the

Netherlands, for example, the continuation of an area-based urban policy as such was not at issue. For, within the framework of the Dutch Big Cities Policy, covenants were signed with thirty cities for the 2005-2009 time period.

7.4.2 Positioning in the European Urban Policy Arena

Against this background of an insecure future, during the past years many initiatives have been taken by (networks of) subnational authorities, to safeguard an urban focus in future European Cohesion policy. Especially urban networks such as Eurocities, the 'Cities for Cohesion,' UCUE, URBAN Germany-Austria etc., have been very active; bombarding Brussels with various declarations and memorandums. In these pieces, they have advocated a 'strong urban dimension' after 2006 (see table 7.D), based on arguments like "the real test for the Union in meeting both its cohesion and Lisbon objectives will be in large urban areas, where the majority of the EU's population lives" (Cities for Cohesion grouping 2003[87], 2) and "European added value can be maximized when its regional policy focuses on the problems and opportunities of urban areas, both of which have a European dimension" (Capital Cities/ Regions 2003, page unknown).

One of the most striking pieces of work in this sense was the '*Saarbrücken declaration*,' established during the Urban Future conference in Saarbrücken in June 2005 and presented to the Euro-commissioner for regional policy, Mrs Danita Hübner.

With this declaration, city authorities intended getting the European Commission at forcing member states and regions to continue paying attention to urban policy in the future. The experience acquired during the URBAN programmes, phrased as the '*Acquis URBAN,*' should not only be acknowledged, but should also be embedded in a separate urban chapter. This would primarily relate to the continuation of an integrated and cross-sectoral approach; to keeping the acquired experience in terms of new forms of governance (competences shared in partnership, more responsibilities assigned to the local level, participation of citizens, involvement of local players, etc); to a transparent selection procedure of cities and eligible areas; to the concentration of resources and competences on well defined urban areas and to the support of European and national networks.

The collective positioning of cities seems to have been effective; since the European Commission launched its proposals on future European Cohesion policy in 2004, the discussion on the urban dimension in this policy has been high on the political agenda as well.

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[87] Exact date unknown. Probably 2003.

Table 7.D Examples of position papers and other statements from cities and city networks, related to the future of European Cohesion policy, by title and year of publication (www.europa.eu.int; www.europadecentraal.nl)

Author	Title	Year
Eurocities	Eurocities response to the second cohesion report on economic and social cohesion	2001
Eurocities	The Future of Cohesion Policy in Europe: Establishing a strong Cohesion Policy in Europe	2003
Eurocities	Eurocities Vienna Declaration (final version): for an Integrated Approach towards Urban Issues and Reinforced Co-operation with Cities in the European Union. Vienna, November 12, 2004.	2004
Cities for Cohesion	10 Key principles for the Urban Dimension of a regional policy	2002
Cities for Cohesion	A stronger EU intervention in urban areas.	2003
Capital regions and Cities network	Memorandum of Capital Cities / Regions in the context of future European Regional Policy: For an urban dimension post 2006	2003
Capital Regions and Cities & Cities for Cohesion networks	The Commission's Draft Structural Fund Regulations: Comments from an urban perspective	2004
Capital Regions and Cities & Cities for Cohesion networks	Reaction to the Third Cohesion Report	2003
UCUE	Statement of the Capital Cities of the European Union on a stronger urban dimension of EU cohesion policy beyond 2006	2004
Varies partners, representing cities and city networks	The 'Acquis Urban': Using Cities' Best Practises for European Cohesion Policy. Common Declaration of URBAN cities and players at the European Conference 'URBAN Future' on 8 and 9 June 2005 in Saarbrücken, Germany ('Saarbrücken declaration')	2005
CEMR	The added value European Union Cohesion Policy: A Position Paper from CEMR	2002
Mayors and Leaders of Urban Areas	Declaration of Mayors and Leaders of Urban Areas ('Noordwijk declaration')	2004
IPO-VNG	Partnerschap voor structuurversterking: Decentrale overheden klaar voor Europees regionaal beleid 2007-2013	2004
City of Rotterdam	Contribution of Mr Ivo Opstelten, Mayor of Rotterdam *	2003

* Date unknown. Probably 2003.

7.4.3 Discussion in the Netherlands

Also within the Netherlands the Commission proposals have been discussed elaborately, but the discussion has mainly concentrated on the proposed EU budget and on the question whether European Cohesion policy should be continued in the original fifteen EU member states at all after 2006.

The Dutch government has advocated a fund that would only be meant for the poorest member states of the European Union (TK 2003/2004). The rich member states would continue paying their financial contribution to the Structural Funds, but they would no longer make an appeal to these funds themselves. The financial contribution to the total EU budget could then be reduced and the 'pumping around of money' would be finished.

Interestingly, the Dutch national government and the subnational governments were flatly opposed to each other in this discussion. At the urgent request of former Euro-commissioner Barnier, in 2004, the Dutch provinces and municipalities presented a common position paper in which they explicitly advocated the continuation of European Structural Fund programmes in the Netherlands and the continuation of and intensive co-operation between the three governmental levels in the European context (IPO-VNG 2004b). However, in 2005, the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) already made the best of a bad bargain, by anticipating the situation that the Netherlands would no longer make an appeal to the EU Structural Funds. They argued that the means that the Dutch national government would not any longer pay to the EU, should be added to the budgets that had been made available already to the different policy areas, such as Big Cities Policy (VNG 2005a; IPO-VNG 2005, 2006). This new course, set out by the subnational governments, now focusing primarily on the national government, could be viewed as a decreased extent of Europeanization. For, in terms of De Rooij (2003), they showed less pro-active behaviour towards the European Union. However, this is only true to a certain extent. For, at the same time, these Dutch subnational authorities continued lobbying with the European Commission through their city networks.

7.4.4 The Temporary End of the Story

For a long time, the outcome of the discussion about the future of European Cohesion policy was unclear. After the break-down of the financial summit in June 2005, the European Council finally adopted the EU budget in December 2005. The agreement seemed to pave the way for passing the Structural Fund regulations and for establishing the levels of the future expenses at the European level. However, on January 18, 2006 the European Parliament dismissed the agreement. Only on April 4, 2006, the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament finally reached an agreement about the EU budget. The contribution of the Netherlands to the European Union will be strongly reduced.

The pressure of the city networks on the European Commission, in order to put more emphasis on the urban dimension in future EU cohesion policy, has not passed unnoticed: in November 2005 Euro-commissioner Hübner presented a working paper, *'Cohesion Policy and Cities: the urban contribution to growth and jobs in the regions'* (EC 2005). This paper set out an agenda for the promotion of a more integrated and

strategic approach to urban development. The proposals were part of the Commission's reform of Cohesion policy for the 2007-2013 period.

Additionally, a public consultation on the Commission's paper was launched, whose results informed the final version of the '*Community Strategic Guidelines for Cohesion*,' the document which set the framework and future priorities for European funded programmes in the 2007-2013 period (www.europa.eu.int).

One of the interesting elements of the working paper was the proposed explicit responsibility of cities in Structural Fund Operational programmes. It was, for example, proposed that: "Member States should be encouraged to explicitly delegate to cities funds addressing urban issues within Structural Fund Operational Programmes. To get the full benefits of partnership, cities must be responsible throughout the process. This includes responsibility for the design and implementation of the subdelegated portion of the programme" (EC 2005, 20). It is unclear, though, whether and how this will work out in practice. On the one hand, according to Parkinson, this working paper "is a crucial statement of intent" (Parkinson 2006, 7) and "makes a critical contribution to this debate" (*ibid*., 10), on the other hand, the European Commission evidently cannot force the member states to explicitly include the urban dimension in their National Strategic Reference Frameworks.

7.5 Conclusion

In view of their collective behaviour in all openness vis-à-vis EU institutions, the extent of Europeanization of European cities as a collective seems to have increased. Dutch cities, positioning themselves collectively in the European (urban) policy arena through intermediary organizations and city networks, have started doing so relatively late, though.

The most important intermediary organization for Dutch municipalities, the VNG, for example, only started intensifying its EU activities in the early 1990s, inspired by the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the Committee of the Regions. The national G4 city network of the Dutch four major cities in the European (urban) policy arena, even started not until the early 2000s.

As a comparison: Eurocities, the international city network, was established already in 1986. It has meanwhile developed into an influential lobby organization vis-à-vis European institutions, for instance as related to European urban policy. But while the four major cities in the meantime have all become a member, only the City of Rotterdam was present from the start.

EU engagement of cities is prompted by various motivational factors. These connect to different views on Europe. In view of the variety of collective position papers and declarations that have been published by cities in recent years, especially the view of Europe as a stage comes to the fore. The collective positioning of cities in the debate on the future of European Cohesion policy, on the other hand, seems to be prompted by Europe as an alternative: as a way to overcome possible limitations of the domestic context.

Finally, considering their collective positioning in the debate on EU cohesion policy, the voice of the cities seems to be heard: the European Commission has put the 'urban dimension' high on their political agenda in the last two years. At the same

time, the Commission can certainly not warrant its continuation in future European Cohesion policy.

CHAPTER 8

8.The City of The Hague

8.1 Introduction

In the 1980s and 1990s, many companies based in the traditional economic sectors of the city moved out of The Hague, attracted by better, cheaper and more accessible alternatives outside the city borders. Along with the companies, many higher-income residents decided to move out as well. At the same time, the continuing influx of large numbers of mostly poor immigrants increased the pressure on the city's social departments, burdening its financial capacities.

In an effort to realize a process of economic uplifting, the city took far-reaching measures in the 1990s: in the city centre a new city hall was built, as well as several new national government offices. Despite such efforts, The Hague's economic growth stayed behind in comparison to the rest of the country, and the city's debts grew enormous. It was only in the late 1990s, after receiving financial support by the State, that The Hague managed to change its situation.

Fortunately, years earlier, a lot of money had been invested in urban renewal programmes, starting from the early 1980s. Several pre-war areas in the inner city, for instance, had undergone physical renewal. The Hague has often been characterized as the most strongly segregated city of the Netherlands, and the Municipality was eager to improve this image. Even though the urban renewal brought about perceptible improvements (in terms of housing and public space), the neighbourhoods stayed behind social-economically, as well as in terms of management (*beheer*). Many neighbourhoods dealt with a large number of low-income households, high unemployment figures, relatively cheap housing and a lack of social services.

One of these deeply troubled pre-war inner city areas was the Schilderswijk, presented in a subtitle as 'Europe's largest urban renewal district' (Gemeente Den Haag 1995b). During the early 1990s the Schilderswijk was one of the districts officially designated as an area where problems accumulate (*probleem accumulatie gebied*). This status formed part of the so-called 'deprivation area policy,' which was being formulated by the state at that moment (Boelhouwer et al. 1997; Kruythoff et al. 1997). It should be no surprise that this particular neighbourhood was selected for application for European funding within the framework of the Community Initiative URBAN, as the programme was primarily directed at social-economic problems.

Focusing on The Hague, on the Centrum City District and on the Schilderswijk in particular, the main goal of this chapter is primarily to come to a better understanding of the URBAN policy process, and the way in which it has developed in the course of time in relation to different contexts. These include the local, geographical context (the city istrict and the Schilderswijk); the institutional context

(The Hague and its subdivision in city districts), as well as the administrative initiatives and policy frameworks at the level of the Municipality and the city district (even though the latter does not have its own administration). Moreover, elaborate attention will be given to the way in which The Hague has been seeking its European and international context.

The European URBAN programme also implied the establishment of a European urban policy arena, in which various governmental and non-governmental 'players' were involved. A second goal of this chapter is, therefore, to get insight in processes of construction, positioning and politics of scale in this arena. The issues raised in this light are concerned with how these processes have taken shape and, to be more specific, which meanings governmental and non-governmental actors have assigned to the City of The Hague and the Schilderswijk in this European (urban) policy arena. The question is how these actors positioned themselves (and other actors) in this arena, and whether one could argue that, based on the data, there was a politics of scale from the side of The Hague, by governmental or non-governmental actors.

In the first of the following sections, an introduction will be given of the City of The Hague and the Schilderswijk in terms of the most important physical and social-economic developments of the past decades (sections 8.2 and 8.3). In the following section (8.4), the European URBAN Schilderswijk programme itself will be the focus of attention, particularly in terms of organization and policy process. Section 8.5 deals with the discourse analysis of meanings assigned to place and ways of (self) positioning by the actors in the European (urban) policy arena. Finally, conclusions will be drawn in section 8.6.

8.2 The Hague

The Hague is the third largest city of the Netherlands, after Amsterdam and Rotterdam, with a population of about 472,000 inhabitants (www.denhaag.buurtmonitor.nl). Although Amsterdam is the capital of the country, the national government of the Netherlands is located in The Hague. In addition, the city houses many embassies, consulates and a number of important international organizations, such as the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the headquarters of Europol, the International Criminal Court and the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (www.thehague.nl). Moreover, as a specialized judicial centre, the city has quite a strong international position (Van der Wusten 2006).

In a self-portrait from 1999, the city indicated that its power could be described best by the following catchwords (Gemeente Den Haag 1999b):

- The Netherlands' centre of control: The Hague houses the Head of State, the Parliament, the National Government, foreign representations, most governmental departments, etc. In 1999, about 40,000 of the 200,000 jobs in The Hague belonged to the section public administration;
- International centre of law, peace and safety: The Hague is stated to be the 4th UN city in the world (next to New York, Geneva and Vienna);

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- City of public service: many international forms and headquarters in The Hague are located in the field of business, financial and other services. About 45 percent of all jobs belong to the section 'various public services';
- ICT-city: The Hague's position as an ICT-city is increasing thanks to the many Information, Technology and Communication firms that have settled there;
- Brainport: in the wider region, there is a rich and varied infrastructure of knowledge;
- City of culture and tourists: there are several important tourist attractions, two seaside resorts close by, as well as an important congress centre;
- Green residential city by the sea: an attractive city to live in, with lots of green, the sea, and a wide and varied range of services.

At the same time, this picture was rather rosy: The Hague was suffering from a number of bottlenecks which reinforced each other, such as a shortage of space, a one-sided economic structure, and a weak social structure (Gemeente Den Haag 1994c). In the last two decades, the city had witnessed far-reaching economic and social changes: the departure of industry, along with a substantial loss of jobs; the departure of high- and middle-income households from the city, followed by a decrease in financial capabilities; a lack of space which made the city incapable of generating new building locations; and the increasing influx of large numbers of foreigners (mostly with low education).

In the 1990s, economy measures were a continuous point of focus for The Hague's City Council: in the early 1990s, The Hague was deeply in debt and forced to economize drastically. Part of this debt was caused by the urban renewal policy and, according to the Municipality, by the relatively high percentage of private property within the urban renewal areas, as well as by the high acquisition prices of this real estate (Gemeente Den Haag 1990b). Interviewees, however, saw the cause in the fact that The Hague started the process of expropriation only in the early 1990s. The building of The Hague's city hall has also often been mentioned as an important culprit.

At the end of 1997, de State government came to the rescue with a financial contribution of over 1 billion guilders (about 485 million euros). The city could now reorganize her deficit (Gemeente Den Haag 1998c), but the Municipality's financial situation kept being under pressure as the lack of space stood in the way of a proper financial basis. In the policy programme of 1998-2002, the municipal administration stated to be finally "on the road towards a new future" (Gemeente Den Haag 1998a, 5).

Besides these financial issues, the following items were also on The Hague's political agenda in the 1990s and early 2000s:

- *Local Administration and the Citizens of The Hague*
  A common theme in The Hague's political agenda in the early 1990s is the restoration of confidence of social organizations, and of The Hague's citizens in particular. The City Council elections of March 1990 had been a debacle: less than half (49.5 percent) of the population qualified to vote

had shown up (Boelhouwer et al. 1997)[88]. In 1994, the percentage was considerably higher (58 percent) (Boelhouwer et al. 1997)[89], but this time many votes went to extreme right parties.

The issue of citizen participation, particularly among foreigners in deprived neighbourhoods, was a point of care throughout the 1990s. This also concerned matters such as responsibility for one's residence and residential area. The debate on the future design of the City of The Hague's de-concentrated administration was held in close connection to this issue, prompted by the need to bridge the gap between citizens and the city hall.

- *The Hague: Vital and Undivided*
  The pursuit of a 'vital and undivided' The Hague appeared as a motto on the city's agenda during the second half of the 1990s. It reflected the Big Cities Policy's ideal of a 'complete city', "vital, undivided and balanced; lively, challenging, creative and safe; a place where every function of residing, working, learning, living, loving and recreating can blossom" (Van Boxtel 1999). A thriving economy would be essential to The Hague's vitality. Therefore, attracting new companies and creating employment were given high priority. The main line was based on co-operation between the local government and the private sector in public private partnerships. Moreover, an important aspect of the pursuit of an 'undivided' The Hague was the prevention of spatial segregation through urban restructuring as a continuation of traditional urban renewal.

- *Co-operation at a Regional Level*
  Prompted by the City of The Hague's lack of space - its need for (new) building locations inside as well as outside the Municipality and the need for a coherent regional economic development, there was an intensive debate on co-operation at the regional level in the 1990s.[90] Low point in this debate was the final cancellation of the City Province of Haaglanden, into which former Mayor Havermans had put many of his efforts. The emphasis on the region also came to the fore in the European context.

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[88] In the Schilderswijk the turnout of people qualified to vote was only 32 percent in 1990. This was the lowest turnout of all districts.

[89] For the Schilderswijk too, the turnout was slightly better: 43 percent.

[90] After the 1990 Derksen report, several reports came out, that presented (administrative) solutions for the Region of The Hague. Examples are the following: '*Een onderzoek naar de bestuurlijke problemen in de regio Den Haag*' (Derksen *et al*. 1990); '*Harmonie of dissonant: onderzoek naar de binnengrenzen van Haaglanden*' (Stadsgewest Haaglanden 1996); '*Het refrein: Evaluatie van het Stadsgewest Haaglanden*' (Stadsgewest Haaglanden 1996); '*Rapport Evaluatie ROL-bestuur Stadsgewest Haag*landen' (Berenschot 1996); '*Alternatieven voor de bestuurlijke ontwikkeling in Haaglanden*' (Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland 1996); '*Haaglanden op maat: onderzoek naar de buitengrenzen van Haaglanden*' (Stadsgewest Haaglanden 1996) and '*Nota 'De Instrumenten'*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1995).

Inspired by the expected increase in competitiveness between European regions/cities, The Hague wanted to position itself towards Brussels from within larger entities, such as the City Region Haaglanden (*Stadsgewest Haaglanden*); the functional co-operation in the field of knowledge infrastructure ('brainport') and as *Randstad* or *Deltametropool*[91].

- *European and International Positioning of The Hague*
  The positioning of The Hague in its European and international context was hardly a matter of concern in policy of the 1990s, but gradually it gradually became important on The Hague's political agenda. This was the case for, both, the positioning of the city towards Europe and positioning within a broader, international context. In a policy document from 1999, it is established that the discussion of European issues in the City Council had, up to that point, not caught up with the pace and size of European integration: "In the past few years, only the URBAN-programme and, recently, the introduction of the euro and the change of the European Structural Funds have been a matter of discussion in the Council" (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a, 20).

Hence, over the past years The Hague's City Council has been confronted with a number of complicated and quite diverse administrative tasks.

8.2.1 Physical Developments

Since the early 19th century, the spatial division that has characterized The Hague is related to a physical boundary that cuts through the city: it is a city built on peat (on the inland side) and on sand (on the side of the sea) (Kruythoff et al. 1997). In the urban areas that were built from the midst of the 19th century, the so-called '19th century belt,' the part built on sand housed the richer households, while the peat areas were for the poor (Schmal 1995).

To a certain extent, this spatial division in the City of The Hague still holds today, although one can also find disadvantaged neighbourhoods on sand and more well to do neighbourhoods on peat (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001). The spatial division corresponds to a high degree with a strong spatial concentration of the stock of public housing dwellings, on the one hand, and a slightly less strong concentration of owner-occupied dwellings, on the other. Generally speaking, the owner-occupied sector is not accessible to lower-income groups. These groups are mostly confined to the social renting sector (Kruythoff et al. 1997). Additionally, The Hague has a rather one-sided housing stock. Flats (multi-family dwellings) are over-represented, while single-family homes are under-represented. From the early 1960s on, many young families and families-to-be left the city, attracted by better housing alternatives in the wider region. In this way, The Hague lost many households to Zoetermeer, as well as to other bordering municipalities (Gemeente Den Haag 1997a).

[91] See for instance the introduction by Peter Noordanus, former Alderman of ROSV, held at the conference ' *The Randstad from international perspective*,' on November 17, 1999, entitled '*De deltametropool in Europees Perspectief*'.

The low interest of the local authorities for the development of the cheap peat areas has been of great consequence to the houses built in those areas from the second half of the 19th century. Planning or effective regulation for the building of houses was absent, so private entrepreneurs and speculators were free to build low-quality houses. Only with the introduction of the Housing Law in 1902, this situation came to an end. However, by that time a large part of the neighbourhoods on cheap peat grounds had already been built.

Because of the low quality of many houses, but also because of social-economic developments that increased the decline of a number of these district, several pre-war inner city areas were dealt with thoroughly in the 1980s and 1990s. During a long period of urban renewal, many parts of these districts were demolished and replaced with houses of a higher quality, most of them stacked residences (Gemeente Den Haag 1997a). In comparison to other cities, the urban renewal in The Hague came to a start relatively late (Gemeente Den Haag 1990b)

Map 8 A The traditional urban renewal districts (Kruythoff et al. 1997)

Based on the motto of urban renewal policy, 'build for the neighbourhood[92],' the new dwellings were built within the inexpensive public housing sector, as they should remain affordable for residents of these neighbourhoods, who generally had low incomes (Kruythoff et al. 1997). However, in doing so, the pre-existing differentiation remained in place, reproducing the existing spatial division. Only during the second half of the 1990s, an actual development to break this division was begun by creating a large share of moderate and expensive dwellings for the owner-occupancy sector in lagging districts (Kruythoff et al. 1997).

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[92] This goal was introduced in the mid-1970s by former Secretary of State, J. Schaefer (Gemeente Den Haag 1991).

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8.2.2 Social and Economic Developments

As mentioned before, The Hague suffers from a lack of space, a one-sided economic structure and a weak social structure. The social and economic developments at the basis of these problems will be discussed in the following.

Just like the other big cities in the Netherlands, The Hague has undergone radical social and economic changes in the last decades. These changes can be categorized under two broad headings.

Decline and Changes in Employment

First of all, the nature of employment has seriously changed. Due to a nationwide economic recession in the mid 1970s, many industries disappeared or moved out of the Dutch cities. This also happened in The Hague, resulting in a steep decline in employment (Kruythoff et al. 1997).

Table 8.B Change in the Number of Jobs in Industry and Services in The Hague, the Agglomeration of The Hague and The Netherlands, 1973-1993 (in percentages)(Van der Wouden 1996; Kruythoff et al. 1997)

	1973-1978 (%)	1978-1983 (%)	1983/84-1988 (%)	1988-1993 (%)
The Hague				
Industry	-14.5	-13.0	-14.1	-22.0
Services	-0.8	0.1	1.3	3.2
Total	-4.0	-2.1	-1.5	0.6
Agglomeration The Hague				
Industry	-10.8	-6.7	-6.8	-10.2
Services	7.1	3.8	8.6	6.9
Total	3.2	1.0	5.6	-4.6
Netherlands				
Industry	-5.9	-9.6	3.2	-2.8
Services	13.8	6.8	19.9	15.7
Total	4.8	-1.3	15.6	9.5

But also after the recession, due to an increasing competition, both within the Netherlands and with other countries, many companies belonging to the traditional economic sectors moved out of the city, taking advantage of cheaper, more accessible business accommodations elsewhere. Meanwhile, the economy changed from a manufacturing-based to a service-based economy. Many people lost their job. Especially for low-skilled workers, the loss of employment in the industrial sectors was disastrous. As is clear from table 8.B, over the years, some of the loss of jobs in

manufacturing has been compensated by an increase of employment in the service sector. However, this shift towards services did not benefit these low-skilled workers.

The Hague's economy is characterized as a monoculture. In 1994, 61 percent of all economically active citizens of The Hague worked in the service sector. A large number of jobs in this sector is (either national or local) government related (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001).

At the beginning of the 1980s, there were 10,000 unemployed people in The Hague. By the mid-1990s, their number amounted to 35,000 (Gemeente Den Haag 1995b). More than half of them had been unemployed for over a year. Furthermore, unemployment was concentrated in the so-called deprivation areas (Gemeente Den Haag 1994c).

The growth of employment, business activity and (working) population in The Hague lagged behind the Dutch average. As a consequence, The Hague held a relatively large number of inactive people (Gemeente Den Haag 1994c). Moreover, the service sector hardly offered any employment for the many low-skilled unemployed. In view of the policy document '*Den Haag op weg naar herstel, part 2*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1998c, 9-12), these problems stayed current throughout the 1990s.

A big obstacle for the city in its search for solutions, was its lack of space. While the Dutch economy, after years of recession, was improving in 1985 and while this upturn resulted in a substantial increase of employment in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht, in The Hague employment stagnated: the number of jobs was increasing only slightly, and mostly in the business service sector. An important cause was the shortage of space within The Hague's municipal borders (Gemeente Den Haag 1995b), making it impossible to offer enough office space. It was also a problem for the building of new houses. This brings us to a second important change to have occurred in The Hague.

Changes in Population Composition

The second radical change that The Hague has undergone relates to the composition of its population. As mentioned before, together with the companies, many middle- and high-income households that could afford to move, left the city as well, to find better alternatives in the suburbs. One of the consequences of suburbanization was a drop in income level in the city and a decrease in financial capabilities. Foreign migrants moved into the places that were left behind. The Hague was left with low-income households and received an influx of foreign migrants who had a low income as well (Kruythoff et al. 1997). Altogether, the city now had an over-representation of lower-income groups, ethnic minorities, singles and couples under 25 years of age and elderly persons, while families and prospective families were under-represented. The middle-income group was relatively underrepresented (Gemeente Den Haag 1995a, 1997e; Kruythoff et al. 1997). This social-economic proportion between the core city and its surrounding land originated in the 1960s, and has stayed relatively stable ever since (Musterd and Ostendorf 2005).

Table 8.C Immigrants in the Netherlands and in the City of The Hague, January 1,
1997 and January 1, 2005* (in numbers (round off) and percentages)
(Musterd and Smakman 2000; www.cbs.nl; www.os.amsterdam.nl)

	1997 (N)	1997 (%)	2005 (N)	2005 (%)
The Netherlands				
Surinamese	287,000	100	328,000	100
Turks	280,000	100	358,000	100
Moroccans	233,000	100	315,000	100
Antilleans	95,000	100	130,000	100
The Hague				
Surinamese	40,000	14	45,000	14
Turks	23,000	8	32,000	9
Moroccans	18,000	8	24,000	8
Antilleans	6,000	6	11,000	9

* For the Netherlands, the data are derived from Garssen, Nicolaas and Spranger (2005), via www.cbs.nl. For The Hague the data are derived from O+S.

Until 1960, the number of foreigners[93] living in the Hague had hardly grown. After that year, according to Kruythoff et al. (1997), their numbers rose sharply. The vigorous growth resulted mainly, but not exclusively, from an influx of people from Turkey, Morocco and southern European countries. In terms of nationality, the three largest groups of foreigners were Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese (Kruythoff et al. 1997). The Turkish and Moroccan guest workers in The Hague mainly settled in neighbourhoods with cheap dwellings, that could primarily be found in the traditional pre-war urban renewal areas, such as the Schilderswijk (Kruythoff et al. 1997; Metzemakers, Santokhi and Verkerk 2001; Van Kempen and Hoes 2001). The same goes for the Surinamese. The labour migration from Surinam started in the 1960s, when its economy lagged behind and the Dutch economy was growing stronger. Preceding Surinam's independence in 1975 and anticipating the obligation of visa in 1980, two large waves of migration have come out of Surinam (Van Niekerk 2000; Van Heelsum and Van Voorthuysen 2002). Many Surinamese ended up in 'concentration districts' like the Schilderswijk, where many houses were uninhabited as a consequence of the upcoming urban renewal, as well as in the bordering districts Transvaalkwartier and Regentessekwartier (Kruythoff et al. 1997; Van Niekerk 2000). Remarkably, many Hindu-Surinamese chose for The Hague, whereas Afro-Surinamese preferred to settle in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Tilburg (Mulder 2001). In 1997, The Hague housed approximately 14 percent of all Surinamese in The Netherlands (which,

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[93] The term 'foreigner' is used to denote nationals of another country. The term thus does not include people from the Netherlands Antilles and until 1975, Surinam (Kruythoff et al. 1997).

at the time, came down to 40.000 people) (see table 8.C). In The Hague, 80 percent of all Surinamese in the city had a Hindustani background (Van Niekerk 2000). Due to the large influx of labour immigrants, who ended up mostly in pre-war urban renewal areas, the existing spatial division between rich and poor in The Hague also became one between natives and foreigners.

Political and Policy Answers

To overcome the problems mentioned above, The Hague has invested a great deal in the reinforcement of its economic structure, the last decade. Key projects were *Nieuw Centrum*, the *Laakhavens*, the development of *Scheveningen*, the improvement of accessability and investments in the quality of public space (Den Haag 1994c). The *Nieuw Centrum* project, in which, among others, a new city hall and several new offices for national government departments were built, has initiated a process of economic uplifting.

However, in the early 1990s, just before the start of the URBAN programme, The Hague's urban economy was still facing problems: it had a one-sided economic structure (a disproportionately large employment within the service sector) and a large number of (mostly low-educated) unemployed. An increasing number of citizens appealed for the city's social services (Gemeente Den Haag 1994b). As mentioned before, the State offered financial support to the city to reorganize its negative means. At the time, the board of Mayor and Aldermen hoped to end the city's lack of space and declining income by the formation of a City Province of Haaglanden. This city province, however, never came into existence.

The URBAN programme thus took place during a period in which the City of The Hague was undergoing major physical and social-economic developments and in which it had to search for political and policy answers to cope with them. The next section discusses the local institutional context from within which this was done.

8.2.3 The Local Institutional Context

In the Netherlands, it is common practice to distinguish three levels in the spatial division of large cities: the city district, the district and the neighbourhood. A city district (*stadsdeel*) consists of several districts (*wijken*). These districts, in turn, comprise various neighbourhoods (*buurten*), that constitute the lowest level of scale (Kruythoff et al. 1997). In 1988 the decision was taken to subdivide The Hague in city districts (Gemeente Den Haag 1997a). The Municipality of The Hague is presently subdivided in eight city districts, thirty-two districts and ninety-nine neighbourhoods.

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Map 8.D The City Districts of The Hague (Kruythoff et al. 1997)

Map 8.E Subdivision of the Municipality of The Hague into 32 Districts (Kruythoff et al. 1997)

Map 8.F Subdivision of the Municipality of The Hague into 99 Neighbourhoods (Boelhouwer et al. 1997)

The next section deals with the administrative and official organization at the level of the Municipality and at the sub-municipal levels.

The Municipal Level

The administration of the City of The Hague is controlled by a City Council, which consists of 45 members and by a board of Mayor and Aldermen (the Executive Committee). In the mid-1990s, when the URBAN programme was implemented in the Schilderswijk, the Aldermen were members of the Council as well [94]. On the political front, there have been relatively little changes since the 1990s: for a long time, The Hague had had a coalition of Liberals (VVD) and Social-Democrats (Labour Party, PvdA) (Dekker, Beaumont and Van Kempen 2002). The local authorities were supported by a number of official departments. There were four 'core departments': the department of Urban Development (*Dienst Stedelijke Ontwikkeling, DSO*), focusing on physical and economic policy; the Social Affairs and Employment-projects department (*SZW*); the Education, Culture and Welfare department (*OCW*); and the City Management department (*DSB*) (interview). The SZW and OCW departments mostly focused on social policy, whereas the City Management department mostly focused on 'qualify of life'.

The URBAN programme was placed under DSO. Formally, the programme rested with the Alderman for Economy Mr van Laar, later succeeded by Mr Verkerk. However, in interviews, it was mentioned repeatedly that in practice, the 'Alderman for Urban Renewal,' Mr Noordanus, left a substantial footprint on the programme. The URBAN programme took place during two terms of administration: 1994-1998 and 1998-2002.

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[94] The law Wet Dualisering Gemeentebestuur did not yet exist. Since its installation on March 7, 2002, the Aldermen are not any longer a member of the City Council.

During the implementation of the URBAN programme, the Mayor, the board of Mayor and Aldermen, as well as the City Council changed. In 1996, the then Mayor Mr Havermans (CDA), was succeeded by Mr Deetman. The latter is a CDA member as well and, besides, a politician with a long career in national politics.

Judging by the Mayor's additional functions, The Hague appeared to be already well connected to networks of other administrative levels in the Netherlands, in the 1990s. However, in the municipal organization itself this was not experienced as such, according to the interviewees: the main impression was that The Hague was behind in comparison to other cities. The appointment of Mr Deetman in 1996 has improved this connection considerably, though. During his official term, Mayor Havermans had been, among other things, Chairman of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (*VNG*) (until July 1994) and a member of the presidium of Contact Region Administrations in the Netherlands. His successor, Mr Deetman, is also Chairman of the VNG, since June 2000. Moreover, he is chairman of the Big Cities Knowledge Centre (*Kennis Centrum Grote Steden, KCGS*) and he holds a number of other national and international additional functions. As we shall see later, in the course of the 1990s, The Hague has also become well connected to European networks.

The City Districts

The local administration of The Hague is characterized as a 'de-concentrated administration'. This implies that there is an administrative (elected) and an official organization at the municipal level and an official organization at the level of the city districts, with city district offices where citizens can get help for administrative matters (management, building permits, etc)[95]. It functions basically as an extension of the municipal organization. However, there is no elected administration at the city district level. Decision making takes place at the city hall. The municipal departments develop urban policy as well as policy focused on districts and neighbourhoods, and the means rest with the central city departments (Mulder 2001). With the decision to install city districts in 1988, the road was open to the eventual de-concentration of municipal tasks. The goal was to improve the accessibility of departments and to better involve organizations and neighbourhood residents in approaching neighbourhoods' problems (Projectbureau Sociale Vernieuwing 1992). This organizational operation was begun in the late 1980s, early 1990s, and a number of official departments got sub-departments in the city districts (interview).

In 1994, the Administrative Services (*Bestuursdienst*) became responsible for the functioning of city district offices and the attuning of de-concentrated activities to the city districts. In this way, the city district plan and the city district report were left to this department, and it received a 'de-concentration budget,' which was used in particular for matters concerning management. Every sector was managed by a City district co-ordinator, but the co-ordinator did not have a hierarchical relationship with his staff at the city district office. The staff consisted of delegates from various city

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[95] Since 2002, there is a new city district organization, with city district Aldermen, city district commissions and city district planning. However, this was not yet operative during the URBAN programme.

departments: the Administrative Services, the departments of Civil Matters, City Management, Urban Development, Municipal Tax Administration, Social councillors and Education, Culture and Welfare. They were controlled directly by their departments at the municipal level (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c, 1997a). The number of officials in the city districts was very limited. In 1996, about 350 of almost 9,000 employees at the Municipality worked at the city district offices, which was not even 4 percent (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c). Years later, these proportions had not yet changed. In 2001, a former city district co-ordinator of the Centrum City District (*Stadsdeel Centrum*) criticized the proportions between the large number of officials at the city hall and the small number of officials in the city district (Mulder 2001).

Even though the city district offices have often been characterized as an important link between the local authorities, the municipal departments and the city's inhabitants, in reality they were not much more than counters on location. According to the interviewees too, the power was held by the various departments at the city hall. The city district co-ordinator was a post of the city hall put forward; a functionary with limited competences and limited means.

In 1996, the local authorities observed several weak spots in the city district organization: there was no administratively fixed task and services package for the city district offices; the relationship between the departments and the city district co-ordinators was not committed enough; the substantial tasks and the essential preliminary conditions in terms of organization did not match and the support for the city district co-ordinators was insufficient, in terms of means and facilities (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c). The city district co-ordinator's tasks also needed readjustment. His network function from within the city district offices needed to be established more: "The city district co-ordinator co-ordinates city district wide consultation, functions as an agent between the many organizations, mediates actively in cases of conflict, and builds bridges between the Municipality and the private enterprise" (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c, 7). Also, the role of the city district co-ordinators within the implementation of municipal policy had to be laid down in a renewed function profile. Hence, in the policy document '*Werken aan de basis: het functioneren van stadsdeelkantoren*' (Gemeente Den Haag, 1996c), propositions were made for formal improvements of the city district organization. The city district co-ordinator was to become a 'process manager,' who, from within a co-ordinating role, would take care of a coherent implementation of municipal policy at the city district level. Yet, the (final) responsibility would still rest with the separate departments. Also, the city district co-ordinator, in consultation with the municipal departments and the Haaglanden police, was to make a coherent city district plan on a yearly basis. This was to be discussed at the city district level with residents' associations and, consequently, to be decreed by the board of Mayor and Aldermen.

In practice, however, the city district co-ordinator had a particularly difficult task to fulfil: he had to take care of the integral implementation of municipal tasks and activities at the neighbourhood level, but formally he had a weak position: no budget, hardly any competences, and no final responsibility. This issue will come back later in this chapter, in relation to the Centrum City District.

8.2.4 Administrative Initiatives and Policy Frameworks

Another important context of the URBAN programme is formed by the policy frameworks, as laid down in the municipal policy programmes, documents and the Big Cities Policy covenant. In some cases, these frameworks are local frameworks and in other cases, such as Big Cities Policy, these are local manifestations of a national framework. An administrative framework, parallel to the city district covenant in Amsterdam, agreed upon between the central city and the city districts, does not exist in The Hague. The following sections will deal with the emphasis in these frameworks and with the question whether there is a certain coherence with European (urban) policy in general, and with the URBAN-I programme in the Schilderswijk in particular.

Programme Agreements

The board of Mayor and Aldermen are the 'Executive Committee' of the city. They act on the basis of a collective policy programme for four years. In the 1990s, these were respectively: '*Beleidsprogramma 1990-1994 Gemeente Den Haag*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1990a); *'Nieuwe impulsen voor Den Haag: Beleidsprogramma 1994-1998'* (Gemeente Den Haag 1994b) and '*Beleidsprogramma 1998-2002: Hernieuwd Perspectief*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1998a). The following section deals with the themes in these programme agreements.

Policy Programme 1990-1994

The core policy issues in this programme were formulated from within three frames: administrative renewal, urban renewal and social renewal. These themes stayed important throughout the 1990s, even though the emphasis within them shifted. In this first period, administrative renewal meant mostly renewal of the relationship between the administration and the citizens. This concerned improving the involvement of migrants and the continuation of the de-concentration of the official organization by, for instance, the realization of city district offices. Urban renewal was continued in the old neighbourhoods and so was policy aimed at the prevention of decline of the post-World War-II neighbourhoods. Social renewal concerned, among other things, the activation of unemployed through 'job pools' and 'employment projects'; the improvement of liveability and the reorganization of welfare institutions. The financial shortage in these years called for major economizing, but it also stimulated co-operating in public private partnerships, for instance with the implementation of large infrastructural projects (Gemeente Den Haag 1990a).

Policy Programme 1994-1998

The basic ideas of the three frameworks mentioned earlier were maintained in this programme. The reinforcement of The Hague's economy and the fight against unemployment were the central issues. Other issues related to liveability, safety and the environment. As part of administrative renewal there was a strong focus on improving the dialogue between the administration and 'the city,' by involving citizens, social organizations and companies at an early stage in the policy process. Also in this period, the continuation of the process of de-concentration, in terms of a larger role for city districts and City district offices, was further elaborated (Gemeente Den Haag 1994b).

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Policy Programme 1998-2002
In this last programme, the term 'urban renewal' did no longer appear in the table of contents. The emphasis was now on urban restructuring: spatial segregation was to be pushed back through more mixed neighbourhoods and middle-income households should be kept for the city. In this programme, highest priority was given to social-economic restoration and to the creation of jobs in particular. The Hague focused mainly on sectors in which the city already created a distinct profile for itself. In addition, the city strove for new employment for the lower-educated and for the improvement of accessibility. A multitude of other topics remained as current as before, such as improving integration and social cohesion; investments in the environment (clean and safe); in welfare and in youth policy (Gemeente Den Haag 1998).

Even though the URBAN programme had common ground with the themes emerging from these policy programmes, no attention was paid to this European programme. Big Cities Policy did not come to the fore as a separate part of policy in any of the programmes either, merely under other headings. Moreover, in a wider sense it was quite remarkable that no or hardly any attention was paid to European or international matters in these programmes.

Another subject that one would expect to receive specific attention, was regional co-operation at the level of *Stadsgewest Haaglanden*, or at a higher level. This subject was mentioned only under different headings as well. Whereas co-operation at the regional level was already mentioned in the first policy programme, the 1994-1998 programme emphasized the priority to continue the formation of regional administration. Finally, in the third policy programme, by the time the formation of a city province had been cancelled, the city province was still called 'the best solution for the region's problems' (Gemeente Den Haag 1998a, 5).

Even though the subject did not get any particular attention in these programme agreements, EU and international involvement of the City of The Hague was an important subject, and it definitely received attention in practice. In the following section, the focus is on initiatives taken in relation to this matter, and on the extent to what they have been accompanied by changes in the municipal organization.

The Hague seeks its European Context
In the 1990s, the City of The Hague became increasingly interested in the European Union. Because of the Treaty of Maastricht (signed on February 7, 1992 and become effective on November 1, 1993), in 1993 the policy document '*De Europese Gemeenschap en de gemeente Den Haag: Een eerste verkenning*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1993) was laid down. In this policy document, for the first time, explicit attention was paid to the relationship between the City of The Hague and the European Union (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a). Not only was the expected, far-reaching impact of European integration extensively discussed, it was also described how The Hague intended to deal with it in terms of (future) organization and activities. The city expected that agreements concerning the EMU (Economic Monetary Union) and the

EPU (European Political Union) as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, would have far-reaching consequences for the assignment of duties and the position of subnational governments, because of the large transfer of sovereignty from member states to the European Union (Gemeente Den Haag 1993; 1999a). The disappearance of economic measures of control at the national level, for instance, would result in an increasing competition between European regions/cities. At the time however, practical consequences of those changes could not yet be assessed.

The goals, as formulated in The Hague's first policy document on Europe, are modest: improvement of structural contacts with the European Union; using European subsidies more often and becoming more conscious of the European dimension of municipal policy. By the way, at the time contacts already existed between the Administrative Services (*Bestuursdienst*) and the department for Spatial and Economic Development (*Dienst Ruimtelijke en Economische Ontwikkeling, REO*) with, among others, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA). Besides, the Education department had since 1990 already been actively acquiring finances from the ESF. The Spatial and Economic Development department (REO) had been employing a European fundraiser since the same year. However, these contacts were kept mainly from within the official departments. At the beginning of the 1990s, the City of The Hague took the first steps towards Brussels: a contract was made with a former member of the European Parliament who was to represent the Municipality in Brussels.

Only in 1999, the next policy document focusing on Europe appeared, entitled: '*De Europese Unie en de gemeente Den Haag*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a). It was established that, even though the Municipality had received large financial support from Brussels in the 1990s (among others, in relationship to URBAN, PESCA and KONVER, as well as to fight unemployment[96]), local policy had focused too much on the acquisition of subsidies. The emphasis should now shift from possibilities of subsidization to (influencing) EU policy. An important reason for this change was the fact that The Hague wanted to profile itself more explicitly as an 'international city' (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a, 16), among other things to become more attractive as a domicile for companies and institutions. The new direction was worked out in a 'strategic, integral and effective' plan of action. In essence, the starting points of this plan still appeared to be aimed, directly or indirectly, at increasing the chances of receiving subsidization, only now through a more directed approach. In addition, it was emphasized in the policy document that not just all departments (integrally), but also all the members of the board of Mayor and Aldermen had to take responsibility for the municipal European policy to be implemented (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a).

Only after the appearance of this policy document, adjustments of the administrative and official organization were made and money was allocated to the implementation of a European policy. In 1999, the Steering Committee Foreign Affairs (*Stuurgroep Buitenland*) was formed. This was presided by the Mayor, who was responsible for the co-ordination of international contacts and consisted furthermore of

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[96] In 1999, the City of The Hague estimated the support from European funds at 6,8 to 9 million euros a year.

three Aldermen[97]. The Steering Committee, which holds meetings 4 to 5 times a year, discusses all matters related to international contacts and co-operation, such as European matters, the co-ordination of The Hague's activities within larger co-ordinating European organizations and city networks, and the international aspects of the municipal contacts. Moreover, an important point of attention is the recruitment and acquisition of international organizations (Gemeente Den Haag 2000a). However, the agenda mostly concerns European matters (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a, 2000a, 2001a). In addition, a Co-ordination Group Foreign Affairs (*Co-ordinatiegroep Buitenland*) was formed, which holds meetings 6 to 8 times a year, with representatives of all core departments[98], in which the official attuning and co-ordination takes place. The director of the Administrative Services (*Bestuursdienst*) was assigned the overall co-ordination of the international policy (Gemeente Den Haag 2000a), European Policy being part of it. At the start of 2000, the municipal organization was further extended: a new permanent position was created for the elaboration of European policy at the Economy and Traffic Directorate of the department of Urban Development (*Dienst Stedelijke Ontwikkeling, directie Economie en Verkeer*) (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a, 2000d, 2001a). Additionally, a brainstorming group concerning European Matters[99] (*Klankbordgroep Europese Zaken*) was started, in which consultation with external specialists took place twice a year (Gemeente Den Haag 2001a). Besides, in 2001 a subsidy expertise office (*expertisepunt subsidies*) was established (4 FTE) that dealt with subsidies, among others European subsidies.

The increasing interest in Europe is also visible in the memberships that the City of The Hague took up during the 1990s: in March 1993, the city became a member of Eurocities. An important reason was that the City of The Hague, like other big cities in the Netherlands, did not belong to the prioritised areas in the European Union and, consequently, did not qualify for support from the ERDF. At the time, Eurocities pursued having large cities also be considered for ERDF resources (Gemeente Den Haag 1993). At the end of the 1990s, The Hague was deeply involved with Eurocities; first as chairman of the working group Telecities (1996-1998) and later as chairman of the working group Policy Forum on Technology (1998-2000). In addition, two congresses of this Forum were held in The Hague, in 1999 and 2000 (Verkerk 1998, 2000; Gemeente Den Haag 1999a). Also, The Hague joined eleven other cities in the three-year Interact programme, which was financed by the EU (2002-2004). This programme intended to bring about instruments with which European cities would be able to improve their urban development policy (Interact Network 2004). In this way, The Hague operated in the European arena mainly from within international and national collective bodies, and not as an individual actor. For instance, the influence on European policy took place through active participation in

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[97] The Aldermen of Economy and Personnel (EP); Education, Social Affairs, Employment promotion, Culture and Integration policy (OSWI); and Quality of Life, Environment, Promotion, Media and Information policy and co-ordination Scheveningen (LSPMS).
[98] With 'core services', the following services are meant: DSO, DSZW, OCW, DSB and BSD (Gemeente Den Haag 2001a).
[99] Aside from the Mayor and the Director of the Administrative Services (*bestuursdienst*), diverse experts from public and private organizations participated in this brainstorming group.

Eurocities, the Committee of the Regions and the G4 co-operation (Gemeente Den Haag 2001a). Besides, in reaction to the decision of the City of Amsterdam to open an office in Brussels in 1999, there were discussions among the Aldermen of Economic Matters of the G4, on the possibility of a joint basis in Brussels.

The course concerning European matters, as set throughout the 1990s, was strongly intensified in the early 2000s. The involvement of the board of Mayor and Aldermen in European connections, for instance, was intensified: in 2002, Bas Verkerk, the then Alderman for Economy and Staff, was appointed member of the Committee of the Regions[100]; in the same year, Mayor Deetman became a member of the Executive Committee of Eurocities[101] and was appointed First Vice-President of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR)[102](www.denhaag.com). On April 23, 2003 the City of The Hague, together with the three other large cities, opened an office in Brussels as G4. The Netherlands' EU chairmanship in the second half of 2004 inspired the City of The Hague to take initiatives as well: the city hosted official receptions for the leaders of the governments of the EU member states. In 2004, the policy document '*De Europese agenda van en voor Den Haag 2005-2006*' (Gemeente Den Haag 2004b) appeared as a follow-up of the earlier 'European' policy document from 1999. Next, the implemented policy was described in the "*Verslag inzake 'De Europese Agenda van en voor Den Haag 2005-2006'; het uitgevoerde beleid in hoofdlijnen in de eerste helft van 2005*" (Gemeente Den Haag 2005e). Even the recruitment and management of administrative functions in European/world-wide organizations was evaluated. The local authorities were very busy creating a distinct profile for themselves vis-à-vis Europe. "Being EU engaged will consequently contribute to The Hague's international image" (Gemeente Den Haag 2005e, 23). It was literally stated that a specially established 'The Hague Hospitality Centre' (HHC) should facilitate the international media, to "put The Hague in the limelight" (*ibid.*, 24). After all, the local authorites emphasised that, in the suggested agenda of The Hague, "The Hague's interest and policy priorities take central stage" (Gemeente Den Haag 2004a, 2). Hence the Account Commission of The Hague's City Council was pleased to notice in 2004 that the board of Mayor and Aldermen had a strong focus on the promotion of interests at European institutions. At the same time, the Commission called upon the Council to be directed more at 'Europe' as well (Gemeente Den Haag 2004e).

After the implementation of the URBAN programme, more European programmes in The Hague followed, like Objective 2 (2000-2006), Interreg (2004-2006) and ANSWER (2003-2005). In the early 2000s, the Municipality also received resources from the European Social Fund (ESF) (Gemeente Den Haag 2004e).

What is remarkable in documents and speeches from the early 2000s, is the emphasis on the region in relation to European developments. The Municipality

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[100] Verkerk was appointed on December 4, 2002, but he never completed his term of office. He was succeeded by The Hague's Alderman Mr Van Woensel.

[101] He was recently re-elected for the Executive Committee of EUROCITIES. His new term started on January 1, 2006 and runs for a year (www.denhaag.com).

[102] The Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) is called the '*Raad der Europese gemeenten en regio's*' (REGR) in Dutch.

wanted, for instance, to "reinforce The Hague's position in relation to the development of the *Deltametropool*" (Gemeente Den Haag 2002a, 19). In his 'Hofstad-lecture' on the future of big cities in the Netherlands, Deetman emphasised the importance of a strong *Deltametropool* within the European context (Deetman 2004). To realize this, there should be a reinforcement of the mutual connection between subregions, for instance between the members of the G4. In the same year, however, the Account Commission stated in its report that the *Deltametropool* concept was too underdeveloped to meet response from the European institutions; a missed opportunity, because European policy was strongly regionally oriented (Gemeente Den Haag 2004e). Hence the City Council expressed the intention of further developing the concept of the *Deltametropool* as a European regional concept, from within the G4 co-operation (Gemeente Den Haag 2004b).

The Hague seeks its International Context

In April 1989, the City of The Hague published '*Een structuurschets voor de Haagse agglomeratie*'. In this document, the Hague was already discussed as a centre with an internationally competing settlement climate. It was also emphasized that it was important to strengthen this position because of the increasing competition with other European cities (interview).

Seven years later, in 1996, as an elaboration of the policy document '*Weer 200.000 banen in 2000*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1995a), the City Council determined the Council proposition in '*Richting geven aan acquisitie en relatiebeheer*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1996b). The huge shortage of jobs, particularly at the lower side of the labour market, as well as worries about the economic position of the southwing (*zuidvleugel*) of the Randstad, caused The Hague's local authorities to put effort into the maintenance and creation of employment. One of the initiatives was to put more emphasis on account management and acquisition of, among others, international organizations, companies and events. Considering international organizations, The Hague had to operate from within a very competitive environment: there were, after all, other attractive cities for such organizations to settle, such as Brussels, Geneva, Luxembourg, Paris, etc. Hence, for its own positioning, The Hague chose for a specialization as 'city of justice/peace and safety'. In first instance, efforts were directed at this goal. The acquiring of international companies was more difficult, because basically every city in and outside of The Netherlands was a competitor of The Hague. That is why The Hague focused mostly on office-holding foreign companies and, in particular, on European head offices, call-centres and back-offices (Gemeente Den Haag 1998b).

At managerial (*bestuurlijk*) level, in 1997 agreements were made between the Mayor and the Alderman for Economic Structural policy, Marketing and Staff Matters (EMS), concerning their involvement in international matters. The Mayor was keeper of the portfolio for international contacts/co-operation and in was charge of the (municipal) programme management (*regie*). The Alderman for EMS was in charge of the municipal efforts as regards economic acquisition (Gemeente Den Haag 1998b).

At the end of the 1990s, a 'municipal-wide process' was started under direction of the Administrative Services, in which attention was given to 'The Hague

International City' in the broadest possible sense, with an emphasis on politics, sports, culture, Telecities, etc. (Gemeente Den Haag 1998b).

The local authorities were clearly very busy with marketing The Hague as an international city, as it stated: "It is of the highest importance to shape and elaborate the product The Hague International City" (Gemeente Den Haag 1998b, 13).

Apart from a focus on the international positioning of The Hague, there was also attention for international co-operation, among others with Surinam, as well as for the reinforcement of relationships with cities from former eastern bloc countries, like Warsaw (Gemeente Den Haag 2004b).

As it appeared earlier from a comparison of The Hague's policy programmes of the 1990s (1990-1994, 1994-1998, 1998-2002), European and international matters were almost entirely absent. This is completely different in the policy programme 2002-2006, '*Den Haag, dat zijn wij allemaal!*' (Gemeente Den Haag, 2002a). For the first time, reinforcement of the city's international position was explicitly formulated as a goal. The motivation behind this reinforcement was linked to European integration, which increased the importance of such positioning in the international context (Gemeente Den Haag 2002a). The emphasis was mainly on the reinforcement of The Hague's position as 'legal capital of the world.'

In correspondence with this goal, several initiatives and adjustments in the municipal organization appeared in the early 2000s, in order to support that administrative direction. For instance, the number of permanent positions at the Urban Development Department (Economy and Traffic directorate) was expanded with three , in order to intensify the efforts in the field of acquisition of (international) companies and institutions (Gemeente Den Haag 2000d). Also, international and European matters were brought closer to each other in terms of organization through the establishment of the Bureau of International Matters (*Bureau Internationale Zaken, BIZ*) in November 2003. This bureau, "the first point of communication for international matters" (Gemeente Den Haag 2003, 2) rested with the Directorate of Administrative Affairs within the Administrative Services and received, after a budgetary concentration, an annual budget of two million euros. It had three tasks: acquiring and hosting international organizations, realizing international co-operation and focusing on Europe (Gemeente Den Haag 2003; Gemeente Den Haag 2004d).

The tasks and responsibilities in relation to foreign policy were laid down in the '*Uitvoeringsbesluit Buitenlands Beleid*', effective since March 29, 2005 (Gemeente Den Haag 2005d): the responsibility for foreign policy rested with the director of Administrative Affairs of the Administrative Services, under the Alderman with the portfolio for International Affairs. In 2005, this was Pieter van Woensel, the Alderman for Economy. Under the Steering Committee Foreign Affairs, an Official Co-ordination Group Foreign Countries operated, in which the departments were represented. The head of BIZ was chairman (Gemeente Den Haag 2004c).

On March 30, 2005, the City of The Hague launched an international website, as an elaboration of the limited English offer at the Dutch website. The new site is accessible in several languages, with 'a new look and a wider message'. The city is presented in 'all its forms': "as a city of international organizations in the field of peace

and justice, as a European business centre, as a pleasant, liveable city and as world class tourist destination" (www.denhaag.nl).

The policy document '*Werken aan de Wereld in Den Haag*' (Gemeente Den Haag 2005f) seems to be the most recent policy crowning glory of the reinforcement of The Hague's international position. According to this policy document, it is of the greatest importance that, if the Randstad wants to stay in the international league economically, The Hague as an international city should be accessible, but it should also be distinguished by an eminent level of services. The goal is to present The Hague more strongly as an 'International City of Peace and Justice' (www.denhaag.com) or as an 'International City of Justice and Government' (Gemeente Den Haag 2005b). But The Hague wants more than just presenting itself. In order to develop "The Hague as international city of the Randstad Holland" (Gemeente Den Haag, 2005a: 7), it aims at setting up an investment programme, worth 900 million euros, together with the Province of Zuid-Holland, the Dutch State and Europe, in order to thoroughly reinforce the city's international working and living climate (Gemeente Den Haag 2005c).

The URBAN programme in de Schilderswijk took place in a period when the City of The Hague was raising its European and international profile, either collectively through (European) city networks and the G4 co-operation, or individually, with a focus on the product of 'The Hague International City'. At first, this positioning had a strong economic character, but gradually it was widened, albeit also for the benefit of the city's economic position. Also remarkable was the strong emphasis on the regional positioning of The Hague towards Europe, from within either the *Deltametropool*, or the *Randstad* (Holland). In the municipal organization, where 'European activities' had been an official matter until then, it now became an issue of administrative concern. The organization was attuned to the more focused direction as well. Gradually, European and international matters were mixed more and more, which appears from the establishment and tasks of BIZ. On the new international website of The Hague, extensive attention is given to the URBAN programme, under the headline 'The Hague and European programmes'. In combination with the intensified positioning of the city within the European and international arena and the organizational concentration of those positioning activities, also a discourse developed, which will be discussed in section 8.5.

Big Cities Policy

Another framework that formed a context of the European URBAN programme was the policy framework of Big Cities Policy (*Grotestedenbeleid, BCP*). Meanwhile, this Dutch area-based urban policy has entered its third stage (2005-2009). The URBAN programme took place during the first and second stage of Big Cities Policy.

Big Cities Policy - I

At the time of the cabinet formation in 1994, the Dutch four major cities (Amsterdam, the Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht) presented a collective programme, in which they asked the national government for special political and social attention for the accumulating problems in the cities. Their so-called 'Delta Plan' (the Big Cities Memorandum) became the starting point of BCP, an initiative taken by the national

government. The embedding of their mutual effort resulted in a covenant between the national government and the earlier mentioned four 'big cities,' signed on July 12, 1995, in order to underline the two-sidedness of the efforts and obligations (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1995). In this *Convenant* the outlines of BCP were laid down for the 1996-1999 period. Moreover, three key themes were formulated: employment and education, safety, and quality of life and care (Gemeente Amsterdam 1996a)[103].

In this first stage of Big Cities Policy (1995-1999), the total amount of investment within the BCP framework in The Hague was about 105 million euros (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001). In The Hague, Big Cities Policy formally covered the whole urban area. In practice, however, the BCP means were used for deprived areas in particular (Hulsker and Holt 1999), one of them being the Schilderswijk. In this first phase of BCP, structural co-operation on the long term and on a general level was not established yet: for The Hague, Big Cities Policy consisted of a number of programmes that each concentrated on a particular aspect of urban development. According to Van Kempen and Hoes (2001), the result was that BCP in The Hague lacked an overall co-ordination and fine tuning. An array of state budgets was concerned with BCP-I, which did not help in terms of clarity and applicability. Th city was still searching for an optimal form of programme management (*regie*) and organization at the municipal level.

Big Cities Policy-II

In December 1999, new city covenants were established between the national government and 25 cities, for another period of Big Cities Policy (1999-2003). The Hague was one of them. In this second stage, the BCP programme and its organizational structure crystallized out to a much larger extent. Cities were now required to develop an urban vision that formed the basis for the new covenant and was used as a basis for the amount of subsidy from the national government. The policy document that expressed the urban vision of The Hague was (translated) entitled: '*The Strength of The Hague: a city that actively invests in people, their work, housing, culture and well-being'* (Gemeente Den Haag 1999b). The main author of the document was the Department of Urban Development (*DSO*). Besides, this time, the Municipality chose for a clear co-ordination of the different projects (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001; Dekker, Beaumont and Van Kempen 2002).

At managerial level, a 'co-ordinating portfolio-alderman' was now appointed, who dealt with administrative and official responsibilities in relation to BCP. A Municipal Management Team functioned as an official Steering Committee for BCP. A BCP project organisation was subsumed under the Administrative Services, headed by a project director. The municipal secretary functioned as the official commission instructor, whereas the co-ordinating keeper of the BCP portfolio acted as the administrative commission instructor. Additionnally, for every three 'pillars' of BCP (physical, social and economic), there was a co-ordinator at the first responsible departments (Gemeente Den Haag 2001c).

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[103] Meanwhile, the number of cities included in Big Cities Policy is 31 (www.minbzk.nl, visited March 14, 2006).

For The Hague, the budget of Big Cities Policy-II, divided in 'pillars', amounted to 400 million euros a year on average (see table 8.G).

Table 8.G Budget Big Cities Policy – II The Hague, 1999-2003 (in millions of euros) (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 1999)

Pillar/Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Employment and Economy	160,659	194,479	164,642	186,610	201,616
Physical Renewal	151,634	137,733	101,728	75,007	107,058
Social Infrastructure	98,423	94,189	98,236	101,477	94,050
Total	410,716	426,401	364,605	363,094	402,724

Hence, the URBAN programme took place in the context of Big Cities Policy I and II. Strikingly, there were no organizational links between the URBAN programme and the Big Cities Policy programmes. However, as it will appear later on, there were financial links between the programmes.

Other Policy Frameworks
Aside from Big Cities Policy, there were various other, local policy frameworks, directed at urban renewal, urban restructuring, spatial-economic policy and social policy.

In the 1980s and 1990s, urban renewal policy stood high on the political agenda of The Hague, but in the course of the 1990s, the emphasis shifted towards urban restructuring. This was also a 'physical' policy instrument. The policy was aimed at the strongest possible positioning of inner-city districts and neighbourhoods on the regional housing market, in order to restore the city's financial capabilities, and to reduce the spatial-economic division within the city and between the city and the region (Gemeente Den Haag 1998c). As a further elaboration, city district plans (*stadsdeelplannen*) were developed, in collaboration with the housing associations.

Within spatial-economic policy, the creation of employment was given the highest priority. It took shape especially in the development of business areas and was done in different ways. On the one hand, (old) industrial areas were restructured and businesses were developed in the neigbourhoods again. This intended to strengthen the position of the small- and middle-sized companies and to improve employment at the bottom of the labour market. On the other hand, the settlement climate for the (international) top of the office market was strengthened (Gemeente Den Haag 1998a).

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Table 8.H Overview of plans and programmes produced by the City of The Hague, 1994/1999

Programme (title)	Year	Primary Focus
Van Den Haag aan Den Haag	1994	Integral Plan of Action of The Hague, related to Big Cities Policy (I), focusing on employment, safety and liveability.
Woekeren met Ruimte	1995	Safety, liveability and city economy at the neighbourhood level.
Weer 200.000 banen in het jaar 2000	1995	Spatial-economic policy (space for, among others, business activities).
Investeren in vernieuwing	1994	Municipal urban renewal policy for the second half of the 1990s
Naar een ongedeelde stad: Een herstructureringsplan voor de 21ste eeuw	1997	Policy frameworks from within which urban restructuring in The Hague is to take shape.
Startnotitie Wijkplannen	1997	Policy framework per neighbourhood for the development of the built environment over the coming 5 to 10 years. Focus: housing market position of neighbourhood concerned.
Den Haag op weg naar herstel 2	1998	City economy, urban restructuring and the *Hoog Haage* project. Main priority: creation of employment.
Masterplan Stadseconomie	1997	Improving employment opportunities for lower skilled and lower educated people through stimulating small businesses, particularly in deprived areas.
Masterplan Hoog Hage	1997	Large-scale, high quality offices in the city centre, close to the central station, combined with improved accessibility.
Masterplan 'Mensenwerk'	1999	Strengthening people's qualifications for The Hague's labour market and participation in The Hague's society, with a particular focus on youth, newcomers and (long-term) unemployed.
Stadsdeelplannen	Annually, since 1997	Liveability, safety, maintenance and surveillance.
De Kracht van Den Haag	1999	The Hague´s big city policy (GSB/ISV) period 2000-2003/ 2004. Focus on economic climate, living climate, social-educational climate, accessibility and mobility.

Additionally, policy attention was paid to reinforcing the qualification of the local population for the labour market and to improving participation in a more general sense, in particular of the youth, newcomers and the long-term unemployed (Gemeente Den Haag 1999b).

Finally, in the policy document '*Werken aan de basis*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c), it was proposed to create city district plans in order to be more precise in the implementation of de-concentrated municipal tasks and in order to reach a better attuning in terms of content, procedures and finances among municipal organizations as well as between municipal departments and residents (Gemeente Den Haag 1997d). In 1997, the first city district plan of a number of city districts came out, one of them being the plan for the Centrum City district. The range of these plans was limited. They mostly focused on management issues, such as liveability, safety, maintenance, surveillance and integration policy and were in force only for a year. In table 8.H, a number of (primarily area-based) policy frameworks and policy documents have been listed, to give an impression of the policy frameworks active during the URBAN programme.

      The costs of the implementation of the plans mentioned above were estimated in '*De Kracht van Den Haag*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1999b, 27) at 8 billion euros; an amount which had to come from both public and private investments. In interviews (in 2001), The Hague's financial limitations were emphasized: they would form an obstacle for the implementation of the physical policy. However, for the economic policy, there would be finances available, such as about a million euros from the European ERDF, within the framework of the Objective 2 programme in The Hague.

Finally, in the foregoing, various policy frameworks and programmes have been presented that were published and/or implemented in the second half of the 1990s, when the URBAN programme was implemented in the Schilderswijk. Strikingly, these policy frameworks and programmes hardly pay any attention to the URBAN programme.

      In the *Convenant Grote Steden* (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1996a), the European resources for the URBAN programme were classified under 'liveability/city economy, together with the national funding of city district plans. In the policy document '*Startnotitie Wijkplannen*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1997e), no link is made with the URBAN programme. In the city district plans (*stadsdeelplannen)* of 1997 and 1998, only a small reference is made. Only in the Centrum City District plan of 1999 (Gemeente Den Haag 1999e), there is some attention for the design and implementation of the URBAN programme. In a separate paragraph, it is stated that: "The URBAN programme connects to other municipal activities in the neighbourhood, such as urban renewal, the (beginning) restructuring and education" (Gemeente Den Haag 1998f, 20). It is, by the way, remarkable that the URBAN programme is described as a "part of the big cities policy" (*ibid*., 20) in this city district plan.

      The URBAN Schilderswijk programme thus seems to stand on its own, in terms of content and organization. In an interview with the former project manager of

the URBAN programme, this picture is affirmed, but the interviewee was unable to provide an explanation. Possibly the programmes have been established within separate departments (or parts of them) and are in fact far less 'integrated' than they pretend to be. For that reason, one could question whether these plans and programmes have been a context for the URBAN programme at all. Even so, many of the policy documents have been presented under the headline of BCP and, at the project level (co-financing), financial links have been made with the URBAN programme (see also section 8.4).

8.3 The Schilderswijk

The Schilderswijk, located in the Centrum City District, is a relatively large district in the Hague, adjacent to the inner city. Its surface amounts to 149 hectare. It takes up almost one third of the Centrum City district and houses about 33.000 people (www.denhaag.buurtmonitor.nl; Gemeente Den Haag 2002c). The area that is popularly called 'the Schilderswijk' is actually a district whose formal name is the 'Schildersbuurt.' The district consists of three neighbourhoods: Schildersbuurt-West, Schildersbuurt-Noord and Schildersbuurt-Oost (the western, northern and eastern parts, respectively). In the following, however, the 'Schildersbuurt' will be referred to as the 'Schilderswijk,' as it is termed in popular speech. The area will be described at the level of the district (*wijk*).

Map 8.I The Schilderswijk as located in the City of The Hague (Kruythoff et al. 1997)

What did the Schilderswijk look like in the 1990s, when it was appointed for application for European funding within the framework of the URBAN-I programme?

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What kind of physical and social-economic developments had taken place in the Schilderswijk, in the preceding decennia?

8.3.1 Physical Developments

The Schilderswijk was originally built in the second half of the 19th century and was completed in the early 1900s. The construction of this neighbourhood was instigated by the large demand for cheap houses around 1870, when many citizens from the countryside went to the cities to look for work, due to the agricultural crisis and the industrial revolution. The houses in the Schilderswijk were meant particularly for the working-class. There were hardly any building regulations, which meant that speculation building was possible and houses of very low quality were built on a large scale. Besides private building, a number of public housing building projects were realised, which were favourable in terms of quality and rental prices, as compared to the rest of the neighbourhood. However, generally speaking, the living climate in the Schilderswijk was bad (www.gemeentearchief.denhaag.nl).

The Schilderswijk not only developed itself into a residential area for workers, it also offered local employment. Because of its location, just outside the city centre, on cheap peat ground, adjacent to railway and water connections, the neighbourhood was able to develop into a small industrial area during the industrial revolution (Duivesteijn 1984). Besides metal factories, there was a furniture factory and a few large-scale bread and flower factories. In addition there were a number of small industries and official companies (Schmal 1995). The Schilderswijk industrial area did not exist for long, though; around 1900 already its importance decreased, due to liquidations and removals. On the other side of the railroad track, a new and larger industrial area emerged: the Laakhavens and surroundings. What was left were small companies, work places and warehouses in which a wide range of industrial activities and trades took place. These were primarily building and related companies. In a municipal investigation in 1969, still 764 small companies were counted (Duivesteijn 1984).

The poor quality of many houses, but also social-economic developments increased the neighbourhood's decline. For that reason, the Schilderswijk, together with a number of other inner city pre-war areas, was dealt with thoroughly in the 1980s and 1990s. At the end of the 1990s, after a long period of urban renewal, merely a quarter of the housing stock dated from before 1915. The new houses were built within the inexpensive public housing sector (Kruythoff *et al.* 1997). During the phase of urban renewal, the last two large factories in the Schilderswijk and most of the small office spaces were also demolished and replaced by houses; small-scale employment largely disappeared from the neighbourhood. Between 1972 and 1973, the estimated loss of jobs in the Schilderswijk was about 4,500. The numbers fell back from 7,400 to 2,900. Even the share of the construction industry, that had been relatively important for a long period of time, strongly declined during the 1990s (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001). This held even more for the retail sector. In the Schilderswijk there had always been many small shops, such as small supermarkets, butchers and bakeries. Partly due to urban renewal, partly due to the changing population structure of the city, the

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number of traditional Dutch shops declined, while the number of ethnic specific shops increased (Hulsker and Holt 1999; Van Kempen and Hoes 2001).

By the end of the 1990s, the Schilderswijk had become a residential area, but still one with a high housing density. The housing stock had largely been renewed and consisted mostly of houses in the inexpensive public housing sector; about 60 percent was owned by housing associations (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001). Economic activity and, along with it, employment had largely disappeared from the neighbourhood. Traditional Dutch shops had increasingly been replaced with ethnic specific shops.

8.3.2 Social and Economic Developments

Also in terms of population composition, the Schilderswijk has changed in a relatively short period of time from a working-class area into a multi-ethnic neighbourhood.

The Schilderswijk has always had a strong function in receiving newcomers to the city. In the late 1800s, these were country dwellers, the ancestors of the working-class living in the area later (*Haagse volkswijk*). In the 1960s, this image changed dramatically. The receiving function was now applied to 'guest workers'. Initially they came from Spain, Italy, Portugal and Yugoslavia and from the 1970s on, mostly from Morocco and Turkey (Duivesteijn 1984). Especially between the 1970s and 1990s, when many Dutch inhabitants left the Schilderswijk and moved to newer areas in the city and to the satellite town of Zoetermeer, an influx of people of foreign descent took place, resulting in a large number and a wide variety of ethnic groups (Van de Wetering 2000). But also many people from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles moved into the neighbourhood.

In the second half of the 1990s, the Surinamese formed the largest single ethnic group in The Hague. Turks and Moroccans also showed increasing percentages, but on the city scale, their shares were still significantly lower than those of the Surinamese (see table 8.J).

Table 8.J Population structure by ethnic group* in The Hague and the Schilderswijk, 1995-1999 (in percentages)(Van Kempen and Hoes 2001)

	Dutch	Turkish	Moroccan	Surinamese	Antillean	South European	Other-Industrial Countries	Non-Industrial Countries
The Hague								
1995	63.5	4.7	3.8	8.9	1.4	1.3	10.3	6.2
1999	59.9	5.7	4.4	9.4	1.7	1.4	9.7	7.9
Schilderswijk								
1995	22.7	23.7	16.1	23.8	1.8	0.9	2.0	9.1
1999	16.0	24.0	19.4	24.0	2.8	0.8	1.7	11.3

* Definition of a member of an ethnic group: place of birth of the person is in a foreign country or place of birth of one of the parents is in a foreign country.

However, as compared to the city as a whole, the Schilderswijk was a real concentration area of various ethnic groups. In view of the country of origin, the area was quite mixed. There were four main ethnic groups (in order of their shares in 1999): the Surinamese, the Turks, the Moroccans and the 'Dutch'. While in 1995 only 23 percent of the population could be counted among the Dutch population, in 1999 this percentage had further declined to merely 16 percent. In this period, especially the share of the Moroccan population and of people from non-industrialized countries increased. The latter consisted of a variety of smaller groups from Iraq, Armenia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Ghana and several other African countries (Hendriks 2003; Mulder 2001). The Schilderwijk thus still had its receiving function for newcomers to the city.

All in all, the social-economic position of the Schilderswijk residents was low. In terms of average disposable income, the Schilderswijk still belonged to the areas of with the lowest average income in the city (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001). In 1999, the average disposable income per year per receiver of income in the neighbourhood was ECU 10,292 ECU, as compared to 13,512 ECU[104] for the City of The Hague as a whole. The number of people receiving social benefits was large as well: in 1993, a random sample by NSS-Marktonderzoek BV showed that 35 percent received a social security benefit; 16 percent received a disabled benefit and 20 percent received an old-age benefit. Only 29 percent had income from labour (Gemeente Den Haag 1995b). From the same random sample it showed that over two third (68 percent) of the unemployed residents had only been in secondary school or had dropped out during secondary education. In 1990 as well as in 1995, the Schilderswijk ranked first in a calculation of the Problem Accumulation Average of all neighbourhoods. This was based on three deprivation indicators: unemployment, absence from school and no-show at elections (Boelhouwer et al. 1997). Moreover, the neighbourhood suffered from a number of maintenance problems. For instance, there was a lot of dirt in the streets and parks; houses were neglected and the crime rate was relatively high as compared to the rest of The Hague. Prostitution, in particular streetwalking among drug addicts, caused a lot of trouble and crime in the neighbourhood (Gemeente Den Haag 1995b).

In the second half of the 1990s, the number and the percentage of unemployed in the Schilderswijk declined, just like in The Hague as a whole. At the same time, however, the share of long-term unemployed increased during this period (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001).

Altogether, unemployment in this area stayed much higher than in the city as a whole. In addition, the level of education of the majority of jobseekers was very low: about two third had only been in primary school (Hulsker and Holt 1999). Altogether, it can be said that during the second half of the 1990s, the social-economic situation in the Schilderswijk was still quite bad as compared to the rest of the city.

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[104] Up until the introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999, the European Currency Unit (ECU) was the unit of account within the European Union (www.nrc.nl).

Table 8.K Unemployment rate, number of unemployed and percentage long-term unemployed* in The Hague and the Schilderswijk, 1995-1999 (Van Kempen and Hoes 2001)

	Unemployed (N)	Unemployed (%)	Long-term unemployed (%)
The Hague			
1990	35,896	13.3	26.6
1999	29,151	10.7	31.8
Schilderswijk			
1990	5,415	28.4	30.4
1999	4,704	25.7	35.6

* 'Long-term unemployed' is more than 3 years unemployed.

8.3.3 The Institutional Context: the Centrum City District

The Schilderswijk is part of the Centrum City District. This city district holds over 90,000 inhabitants and consists of the following neighbourhoods: Archipelbuurt / Willemspark, Zeeheldenkwartier, Stationsbuurt, Oude Centrum, Kortenbos, Rivierenbuurt, Voorhout, Schilderswijk and Transvaal (Gemeente Den Haag 2002c).

Map 8.L Centrum City District (Gemeente Den Haag 2002c)

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The Schilderswijk does not have a government of its own; neither does the Centrum City District. There is, however, an official organization at the city district level and an office. Yet, the Centrum City district office is accommodated in the city hall. The

details of the de-concentrated official organization and its internal bottlenecks have been described extensively in section 8.2.3. Hence, this subject will not be discussed here again. Instead, the organizational situation within the Schilderswijk will be discussed directly.

8.3.4 Local Governance in the Schilderswijk

In 1994, when The Hague applied for European funding for the URBAN Schilderswijk programme, urban renewal activities in this district were in a final stage. For years, and on a large scale, urban renewal programmes had been implemented in the neighbourhood. Due to this policy's radical character, as well as to the large sums of money involved, the urban renewal organization had been very decisive for the neighbourhood in this period. What did this organization look like, and to what extent and in what way were non-governmental organizations involved?

The Project Organization Urban renewal (POS)

In the municipal policy document '*De Haagse Stadsvernieuwing*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1981), the starting signal was given for a project-directed form of urban renewal. In the same year, the Project Organization Urban Renewal (*Projectorganisatie Stadsvernieuwing, POS*) was established (Gemeente Den Haag 1990b). In the '*Verordening Organisatie Stadsvernieuwing (VOS)*', laid down on February 7, 1983, the organization of the urban renewal was specified (Gemeente Den Haag 1983). The POS was in charge of the implementation of urban renewal policy in ten neighbourhoods, one of them being the Schilderswijk. In the mid-1990s, however, when the URBAN programme was about to be implemented, the POS, that up to that point had fulfilled a central function with the urban renewal neighbourhoods, no longer played a significant role.

The POS was created by the then Alderman for Urban Renewal, Adri Duijvestein, in order to realize urban renewal. It was an official organization that consisted of about 80 persons and fell directly under the Alderman. Apart from the central POS department, there were about 10 project groups in the city. Four of them were active in the central part of the Schilderswijk and one in Schilderswijk-West. One of the interviewees became project manager urban renewal in the central part of the Schilderswijk in 1986 and in this capacity responsible for two of the four project groups (in the beginning of the 1990s these four groups merged into one project group). He worked from a building inside the neighbourhood, located at the Hoefkade.

These project groups were decreed by regulation by the local authorities, in order to involve the neighbourhood in the plans of the POS. Not only did they prepare the urban renewal plans, they also accompanied and stimulated their implementation and advised the administration in related matters. The status of these project groups was thus an advisory one. They were presided by an (official) projectmanager (Gemeente Den Haag 1983). Apart from official members, the project groups held parties of varying nature, such as the police, education institutions, the Chamber of Commerce, housing corporations[105], the SME (*MKB*), residents' associations, etc.

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[105] According to the interviewees, during the period of urban renewal, three Housing

Accorcing to the former chairman of the residents' association HVS, the POS actively involved these parties in the design of the projects (interview). At the same time, in a policy document from 1990, it is stated that even though inhabitants could participate formally, in practice their involvement had decreased over the past years (Gemeente Den Haag 1990b).

Although the POS, which was directed from within the city hall, fulfilled a central function in the neighbourhood, there were also other organizations. One interviewee mentioned the Project group Social Neighbourhood Approach (*Projectgroep Sociale Wijkaanpak, SWA*), which was established at the beginning of the 1990s from within the OCW department. It operated in the Schilderswijk from within the same building as the POS. The SWA held responsibility towards the Consultation Platform Schilderswijk (*Overleg Platform Schilderswijk, OPS*), which, in design, was similar to the project groups existing within the POS. By the way, in a Council proposition from 1997, the OPS is not only linked to the SWA, but presented wider, as a platform for discussion and information exchange between departments, institutions, investors and residents' groups. The goal of this body was to realise discussion about various plans, directed at the Schilderswijk. This concerned the city district plan, the URBAN-programme, city renewal and restructuring activities by DSO, the maintenance plan of the DSB department, welfare and education activities by the OCW department, etc. The platform could offer 'qualified advice' to the board of Mayor and Aldermen. According to an interviewee, chairman of the OPS at the time, this competence was decreed in the urban renewal regulation, and, in reality, came down to the fact that the platform was allowed to pronounce a veto. Even though the word 'veto' does not appear in the regulation, the very fact that its participation was decreed by regulation does indicate that the OPS was taken seriously. The participants in the Platform were members of the Management Team Schilderswijk, just like representatives of residents' and migrant organizations, welfare work, health care, primary schools, secondary schools, housing corporations, business representatives and official departments (Gemeente Den Haag 1997c, 4).

The POS thus held a relatively important position in the neighbourhood for years. Apart from the organizations mentioned above, there were also a number of other organizational relations in the Schilderswijk; too many, according to a critical policy document from 1992 entitled '*Stop de plannen*' (Projectbureau Sociale Vernieuwing 1992).

From POS via PAS to Bureau URBAN programme Schilderswijk
Halfway through the 1990s the POS was abolished [106]. The former projectmanager urban renewal was now appointed project manager of the URBAN programme (for the Schilderswijk) and project manager 'Liveability' for the entire city. Because of these

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Associations were very active in the neighbourhood: *Patrimonium*, *Woningcorporatie VZOS* and *Woningbouwvereniging 's Gravenhage*. VZOS and 's Gravenhage later merged into *Haagwonen*. Patrimonium has also merged with other corporations under the name *Staedion*.
[106] Not until Oktober 14, 1999 the Regulation Organization Urban Renewal ('*Verordening Organisatie Stadsvernieuwing*') was revoked, 'by now having become a dead letter which can no longer be used' (Gemeente Den Haag 1999c, 1).

different job descriptions, the precise transition from POS to Bureau URBAN is rather unclear. The concerning project manager describes it as follows: "The URBAN event came, in fact, directly out of the urban renewal through me anyway." In a way, this appears to be the case. Together with an assistant, the project manager organized under a new headline, the *Projectorganisatie Aanpak Schilderswijk* (PAS), even though he says in relation to this that 'it never really existed.' For the URBAN programme, a Project Secretariat was established ('Bureau URBAN programme Schilderswijk' or 'Bureau URABN') from within which the project manager of the URBAN programme operated (Gemeente Den Haag 1998g). The PAS existed for a short while only and then merged into Bureau URBAN.

The earlier mentioned OPS was now also used as a platform by Bureau URBAN. This platform, which was to be presided by the city district co-ordinator (Gemeente Den Haag 1997c) was eventually presided by the then chairman of the residents' association HVS. From 1995 onwards, several times Bureau URBAN has submitted plans to the OPS. These plans had often been designed already before 1994, in consultation with the neighbourhood. Now, however, they were submitted as 'URBAN' projects. This 'feedback' was actually not official: unlike the former urban renewal arrangements, now there was no formal foundation. Yet, according to the interviewees, the parties that held a seat on the project groups that came under the POS and the OPS, strongly overlapped.

Management Team Schilderswijk

In 1997, it was stated that a coherent organization and discussion structure was needed in order to handle the problems in the Schilderswijk properly. The neighbourhood was in a transition phase from urban renewal to management, and a new form of organization was needed. Starting point for this new structure was the policy document laid down by the City Council, '*Werken aan de Basis*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c, 1997c).

A Management Team (MT) Schilderswijk was installed, in which agreements were made concerning management and development of the area (Gemeente Den Haag, 1998d)[107]. Under the MT a few theme-focused executive teams were subsumed, related to work and economy, liveability and social cohesion. The MT was presided by the city district co-ordinator and consisted furthermore of mandated representatives of the involved local authorities and a number of non-municipal partners. The latter concerned housing associations, the police, welfare work, construction work and, initially, also a residents' representative from the earlier mentioned OPS. The city district co-ordinated the MT in terms of proceedings. The mandated civil servants from the involved departments were responsible in terms of content and they were the 'trigger' for activities from within their department. The agreements made in the MT were reflected in the city district plan and in the plans of the departments involved

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[107] It is confusing that there is an MT City District Centre, an MT Schilderswijk as well as an MT Transvaal. Because of the big problems in these two neighbourhoods, City District Centre was split in two: both neighbourhood MTs rest with the same co-ordinator. The MT City District Centre, which does *not* co-ordinate the two MTs in the problematic neighbourhoods, falls under the city district co-ordinator (interview).

(Gemeente Den Haag 1997b, 1997c). Later on, representatives of residents' organizations no longer took part in the MT, but they did serve as a feedback group from within the OPS. One of the interviewees referred to it as a deterioration of the participation basis, which had been so wide during urban renewal. He blamed 'other forces' within the city hall and within construction work, for being reluctant to residents' associations participating in the MT. Also the neighbourhood management companies (*buurtbeheerbedrijven*) no longer took part in the MT later on. Housing associations, on the other hand, continued to participate in the MT. Another interviewee described this in different, but also critical words; she indicated that 'commission instructors' (*opdrachtgevers*) and 'commission receivers' (*opdrachtnemers*), which were initially seated together in the MT, were split up later. Executive organizations, such as BOOG[108] and the Welfare organisation in the Schilderswijk (*Stichting Welzijnsorganisatie Schilderswijk, SWOS*), were thrown out, according to her.

Asked about the exact position of the MT, one interviewee indicated that the MT mostly played a part in the management (*beheer*) of the neighbourhood, but not in the development of plans. In 2000 an external advisor wrote that, despite the establishment of the Management Team, there was still too little coherence in the approach towards problems in the Schilderswijk. Furthermore, the neighbourhood had a large concentration of professional help and service workers operating at the local level, but the circuits (neighbourhood welfare work, neighbourhood development work, self-organizations, education, housing, health care etc.) were mostly separated. The separated forms of work, organizations and financing flows did not contribute to the neighbourhood's synergy (Van de Wetering 2000). According to an interviewee, a truly integrated way of working at the neighbourhood level was made difficult by budgetary limitations, the lack of budgetary responsibilities (as not the MT, but the separate departments were in charge) and the MT's limited competences.

An interesting question within the framework of this research is of course to what extent the URBAN programme was embedded in this local governance structure in the Schilderswijk. The city district co-ordinator/organization played no role in the executive organization of the URBAN programme. This is remarkable: after all, in the policy document '*Werken aan de Basis*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c, 12), it was indicated that the city district offices fulfilled an essential role in a more coherent implementation of policy at the city district level, "because that is where city frameworks and sector/neighbourhood activities cross and where the most important actors meet each other and deal with ever more issues." Concerning Big Cities Policy, it is even specifically stated that "the city district co-ordinator's abilities will particularly be appealed to in order to realize the municipal tasks and activities in a coherent manner" (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c, 7).

It seems natural to explain the city district co-ordinator's absence in the URBAN organization by his weak formal position. A different explanation was put forward in an interview: the strong presence of the Urban Development department

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[108] The BOOG Foundation, established in 1994, is an independent organization that offers advice and support to residents' associations as well as to professional organizations, aimed at the improvement of social participation (www.boog.nl).

(DSO) in the area at the time, in the capacity of the POS. It held much more mandates and money[109] than the MT. Only when urban renewal had been finished and, along with it, DSO had withdrawn from the neighbourhood, the city district co-ordinator was allowed more space (interview). However, in the interview it was also stated that the city district co-ordinator does not play a role in the current European Objective 2 programme either.

What kind of picture emerges of local governance in the Schilderswijk, in the middle of the 1990s?

First of all, even though the de-concentration and the establishment of counters in the city districts may have made the municipal organization more accessible to citizens and institutions in terms of practical matters, authority still rests with the municipal departments. The city district co-ordinator has no money, hardly any competences and no final responsibility. Within the MT, presided by this co-ordinator, the issues addressed mainly relate to the co-ordination of a limited number of issues, especially concerning management (beheer). In the middle of the 1990s, one could not speak of a truly integrated policy at the city district level.

Secondly, the urban renewal organization, the POS, has left its footprints on the Schilderswijk. In officially managed project groups, ordained by regulation, a range of parties from the neighbourhood formulated plans together. Consequently, those plans were passed on to the 'higher level'. Along with the disappearance of the POS in the middle of the 1990s, the development of plans also disappeared from the neighbourhood and returned to the municipal level. In the neighbourhood, the emphasis shifted towards implementation and management.

Finally, the URBAN programme seemed to be strongly rooted in the plans, projects, organization and even functionaries involved with urban renewal in the Schilderswijk. However, at the same time there were no links between the organization structure of the URBAN programme and the co-ordinator and organization of the Centrum City District.

Local Participation of Ethnic Minorities
Before, during and after the 1990s, an issue that has got a lot of political attention was the issue of local participation of ethnic minorities.

In the foregoing, a number of times the involvement of residents' associations in the Schilderswijk has been discussed, for instance in project groups and in the OPS. In the course of the 1990s, the influence of residents' organizations declined. This was partly due to the way in which governance was organized in the neighbourhood and party due to the character of the residents' associations themselves.

During the period of urban renewal, there were three inhabitant organizations that played an important role in the Schilderswijk: HVS, Buurt-Zaam and Spoorgracht. These three accredited and subsidized organizations in the Schilderswijk focused on different parts of the district and received a combined annual subsidy of about 247,300

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[109] In 1990, it was noted that since 1980 the City of The Hague and the State had together spent about 2,4 billion guilders (about 1,08 billion euros) on urban renewal (Gemeente Den Haag 1990b).

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euros. However, they were mainly managed by elderly autochthonous Dutch people (Van de Wetering 2000). This last point has, over the course of time, become a problem; with the enormous influx of foreigners in the neighbourhoods, these organizations no longer represented their grassroots. Against this background, the subsidies granted for these organizations were ended on January 1, 2001 (Hendriks 2003).

It has often proved to be very difficult to stimulate local participation among the foreign population. This has also been the case in the Schilderswijk (see, for example Gemeente Den Haag 2000b, 2000e). Why is this the case and which initiatives have been taken to improve the participation of the foreign population in this district?

Searching for Explanations

In interviews with professionals working in the Schilderswijk within community work, neighbourhood maintenance, the municipal organization and the police, two explanations emerge.

First of all, these professionals explain the difficulty to connect to the organization structures coming from the residents themselves, in terms of their low level of organization and their little developed group and union life. If existent at all, they are mainly organized along lines of ethnicity, religion and family. Moreover, their focus is on the private and on the group domain, and far less on the public domain. There are, however, ethnic differences: Moroccans would be more prone to visit organizations with individual questions; Turks would be more inclined to collective action; Hindu-Surinamese would tend more to organize as private home owners in the context of an owners Union (*Vereniging van Eigenaren, VvE*), etc (Hendriks 2003).

Secondly, according to the professionals, social relationships are still directed more at 'bonding' (and with it, at developing and strengthening cohesion within their own group) than at 'bridging' (the creation and reinforcement of bridges between different groups in the neighbourhood). Forms of multicultural co-operation and co-productions of different ethnic or cultural groups are still very rare in the neighbourhood. Another point which could explain these problems is the fact that the turnover of the population in the Schilderswijk is substantial. This never has a positive effect on the social cohesion in an area or on the support for the formation of organizations.

Explanations from a scientific angle match the view of the Schilderswijk professionals. Van Heelsum and others (2002) have empirical indications for Amsterdam that there is a positive correlation between the existence of a high union density and a tight administrative network of these unions, and the political participation of ethnic groups. However, from studies directed at organization formation among separate ethnic groups, it appears that the level of organization is varied. Moreover, the focus of these organizations is often primarily on the maintenance or reinforcement of their own ethnic identity, and not so much on political participation. Considering the organization formation among Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans (the three largest ethnic groups in the Schilderswijk), the following emerges from these studies.

In Surinamese organization formation, it is mostly the ethnic-cultural variety that stands out. One could draw division lines between the three largest groups of Surinamese: Afro-Surinamese (38 percent of the Surinamese in the Netherlands), Hindu-Surinamese (53 percent) and Javanese-Surinamese (7 percent). Within the group of Hindu-Surinamese there are also clear religious fault lines noticeable, namely between Muslims and Hindus (Van Heelsum and Voorthuysen 2002). It was already mentioned earlier that the vast majority of Surinamese in The Hague (about 80 percent) is of Hindu-Surinamese descent. In comparison to organizations of Afro-Surinamese, organizations of Hindu-Surinamese have a more ethnic-exclusive foundation: their language, culture and religion form a more important basis for interest promotion and position improvement within the Dutch society than it does for Afro-Surinamese. The latter have, as a group, less cohesion. They are more open towards the Dutch society and more individualised (Van Niekerk 2000). Bloemberg (1994) establishes that Hindu-Surinamese strongly focus on their own culture. This holds in particular for people in a disadvantaged position in society. Furthermore, she states that the more or less similar disadvantaged position of Afro-Surinamese and Hindu-Surinamese has not resulted in a strengthening of the Surinamese identity as a basis for action. The Surinamese heritage of segmentation and ethnic barriers has continued to exist in the Netherlands. Afro-Surinamese and Hindu-Surinamese rarely establish joint organizations, and if it does happen, it is usually a sports organization. Even though the proper command of Dutch is what sets the Surinamese strongly apart from Moroccans and Turks (Martens and Verweij 1997), it seems that this language advantage has not been put to use enough in terms of political participation in the Dutch society by Hindu-Surinamese, due to the strong focus on their own culture. Moreover, this advantage is apparently set to gradually move to the background with the Moroccan and Turkish generations growing up here.

The Moroccan community is, from a political-organizational perspective, little homogenous and coherent. Buijs *et al.* (1994) view this as an important explanation for the fact that Moroccans are incapable of joining hands for the sake of promoting their interests at Dutch governments. The participation of Moroccans in general social organizations, such as trade unions and neighbourhood organizations, is also relatively low. This last point may be connected with the internal contradictions mentioned before, as well as with the lack of a cultural tradition in collective promotion of interests, and, possibly, with exclusion by natives (Buijs and Nelissen 1994). For Moroccan Dutch, Moroccan organizations are important for specific activities that they wish to develop in their own community. By far, in most of the cases it concerns religious organizations. In addition, albeit in smaller numbers, there are sports and cultural organizations. There are hardly any politically oriented organizations (Van Heelsum 2001).

Also the Turkish community has in many cities established its own social infrastructure, with various ethnic, political and religious division lines (Böckner 1994; Van Heelsum and Tillie 1999). Research into the number and nature of Turkish organizations has shown that these are primarily religious organizations (mostly Islamic, subdivided in various currents). The Turkish community seems to have the upper hand in Islamic organization formation (Böckner 1994). In contrast to the

Moroccan community, it seems that the second category is concerned with political organizations, though. In addition, there are organizations of Turkish minorities, and cultural or sports organizations. In this last category there are also some advisory bodies and discussion platforms. The most important conclusion drawn by Van Heelsum and others (1999) is that there is a network in the Netherlands, in which the most important currents of the Turkish community are represented. The organizations involved could, in theory, play an important integrating role for the Turkish community in the Netherlands. Whether this is the case in practice as well, and whether Turks show involvement at the level of the neighbourhood is, unfortunately, not mentioned.

The stimulation of local participation of ethnic minorities often proves to be difficult. This is also the case in the Schilderswijk. Explanations from professionals working in the Schilderswijk, as well as from scientific perspectives, point into the same direction: organizations are usually still formed in foundation along lines of ethnicity, religion and family, and they are usually hardly 'politically' oriented.

A following context for the URBAN programme is provided by the administrative initiatives and policy frameworks directed directly at the Schilderswijk. Without offering an exhausting overview, the following section goes into a number of initiatives and frameworks operative in the 1990s.

8.3.5 Administrative Initiatives and Policy frameworks at the City District level

The Centrum City District has no administration of its own and consequently no programme agreement. However, for decades there has been municipal policy, directed specifically at deprived neighbourhoods in the Centrum City district, in particular at the Schilderswijk. In 1954 already, before the big influx of guest workers, the City of The Hague declared the Schilderswijk to be an 'urgency area' because of overdue housing maintenance and large-scale decline.

Urban Renewal
In 1979, a plan was formulated for the Schilderswijk. It formed the foundation of the rigorous urban renewal mentioned earlier (Gemeente Den Haag 1997a) resulted in a physical metamorphosis of the neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the Schilderswijk saw its original population leave and later on its most successful foreigners too, while mostly underprivileged foreigners settled in the neighbourhood. Hence social-economic problems continued to exist.

In the early 1990s, the goal of urban renewal was somewhat broadened. Policy documents appearing around that time put more emphasis on social-economic aspects and suggested a more integrated approach to the neighbourhood's problems. This can be seen in the '*Beleidsplan Schilderswijk Centrum 1994-1998*[110],' summarized in the brochure '*Toekomst voor de Haagse Schilderswijk*' (Projectgroep Stadsvernieuwing Schilderswijk Centrum 1994). Four 'central issues' were brought up: public housing;

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[110] This plan was made in connection with the policy document '*Intensieve Integrale Aanpak Schilderswijk*', to which the board of Mayor and Aldermen agreed in September 1993 (Projectgroep Stadsvernieuwing Schilderswijk Centrum 1994).

work; management & maintenance and culture, sports and education. This plan was designed from within the central part of the Schilderswijk; urban renewal had started there and was by now finished for an important part (Gemeente Den Haag 1991). So, in fact, this plan was actually designed 'in conclusion' of the urban renewal. Yet, it had a wider focus. Furthermore, it was finally applied to all of the Schilderswijk. The plan was strongly directed at improvement of liveability. A survey was held among residents, in order to find out their ideas on the desirable direction. The outcomes served as a basis for the '*Beleidsplan Schilderswijk Centrum*' (Projectgroep Stadsvernieuwing Schilderswijk Centrum 1994), in which the SWA participated as well. However, according to the interviewees, there was initially no money for the implementation of the plan.

When it came out that European money would become available within the framework of the URBAN-I programme, the '*Beleidsplan Schilderswijk-Centrum 1994-1998*' was used as the basis for the operational programme URBAN Schilderswijk. Because of its width, the plan was very suitable for this goal. At about the same time, the four big cities received national money for, among others things, liveability. With those European and national resources, the financial possibilities for the realization of the aims and ideas in the policy plan came within reach.

Improving Local Participation

In the 1990s, many attempts were made to improve the local participation of the foreign population, In 1996, for instance, the *Integratieproject Schilderswijk* was started, with the aim of increasing the social participation of foreigners, for the sake of improving their social-economic and social position. Within this project, efforts were made to reinforce migrant organizations and to establish a Multicultural Platform Schilderswijk (*Multicultureel Platform Schilderswijk, MPS*) in 1998, in which the majority of migrant organizations held a seat (Gemeente Den Haag 1997b). Later on, the MPS was abolished, yet it is not clear exactly when and why. In 1999, the board of Mayor and Aldermen proposed to invest 10 million guilders (about 4,5 million euros) in the *Karavaan-project.* This project, developed by the Municipality, housing associations and residents' associations in the neighbourhood, intended to deal in particular with management problems (*beheer*) and to improve the quality of life and social cohesion in a number of former urban renewal areas, one of them being the Schilderswijk. Involvement of citizens in their residential environment took central place in the project. There was a project team for every location, supplemented with partners active in the neighbourhoods, such as welfare organizations, shopkeeper unions, housing associations, the BOOG foundation, maintenance teams, neighbourhood management companies, police and schools (www.denhaag.nl).

In 2000, an external advisor was appointed to investigate how the participation of Schilderswijk residents could be improved, and how sufficient support for participation in the Schilderswijk could be realised (see Van de Wetering 2000). Furthermore, in continuation of that investigation, a *Pilot Bewonersparticipatie Schilderswijk* took place between 2001 and 2003, which intended to increase the involvement of foreigners in their direct residential environment (Hendriks 2003).

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Project 'Tussen hard en zacht'

At the end of the 1990s, a project was started within the framework of Big Cities Policy (BCP). It was directed at the improvement of the administrative process and entitled: '*Tussen Hard en Zacht*'. The Hague's BCP-II plan, '*De kracht van Den Haag*', had hardly been translated to the city district or neighbourhood level and there was no collectively supported vision concerning the way in which this translation should take place. For that reason, in June 2000, the board of Mayor and Aldermen ordered to develop a new 'process architecture' for two pilot areas: the Schilderswijk and The Hague Zuid-West (Gemeente Den Haag 2001c).

An important goal was the improvement of integral, area-based co-operation (Gemeente Den Haag 1999b). Through the de-fragmentation (*ontkokering*) in the local approach and through more coherence at the district level, it was supposed to be possible to make large improvements in terms of administration. This was certainly no sinecure, as becomes clear in the comment of the (former) BCP director, who characterized the project as a 'struggle' (Gemeente Den Haag 2002d, 15).

For the improvement of area-based co-operation, the project intended a better attuning of activities between 'hard' sectors (like the departments DSO, DSZW and DSB) and 'soft' sectors (like the OCW department). However, this also implied the attuning of municipal and non-municipal activities directed at the area (municipal departments, housing associations, welfare institutions, etc.)

Furthermore, the project had to relieve the tension between the central control (the municipal departments) and the local, area-based implementation (the MT). This concerned the programmes (translating urban programmes to a city district perspective) as well as the control (central versus de-concentrated). The authorization of the de-concentrated officials within the MT turned out to vary strongly (Gemeente Den Haag 2002d).

District Plans Schilderswijk

Another part of the municipal policy was concerned with urban restructuring. In the '*Startnotitie Wijkplannen*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1997e), for four subdivisions of the (draft) Schilderswijk district plans were included. They all paid a lot of attention to management (*beheer*). Furthermore, there was attention for liveability, employment and reinforcement of the economic structure; the creation of office space for small-scale employment in the neighbourhood, etc. With regard to these plans, 'a tool of the DSO department', interviewees expressed critical views concerning the attitude of the municipal departments, in this case DSO. In their opinion, the opportunity to use these plans in combination with experiences acquired from the project '*Tussen Hard en Zacht*' as a basic tool for the development of the neighbourhood, was not seized.

Centrum City District Plan

There were also plans at the level of the city district, the 'city district plans' (*stadsdeelplannen*). Comparing these plans for 1997, 1998 and 1999 (Gemeente Den Haag 1997d, 1998e, 1999c), they appear to overlap strongly and to be hardly renewing. Furthermore, it is remarkable that the three mentioned plans were made by the

Administrative Services[111], while the city district co-ordinator had been appointed a leading role in relation to this plan (Gemeente Den Haag 1996c).

In the plan of the Centrum City District, the relation to other plans is also discussed. It shows that there are various plans within the city district and that it is not always clear how they are mutually related. Big Cities Policy appears incidentally: there are references to BCP budgets for the approach of unsafe places (Gemeente Den Haag 1997d), prevention of burglary and special projects (Gemeente Den Haag 1998e, 1998f). In the Centrum City District plan of 1999, the URBAN programme is mentioned for the first time, as a "part of the big cities policy" (Gemeente Den Haag 1998f, 20), which connects to 'other municipal activities' in the neighbourhood, such as urban renewal, the (beginning) restructuring and education.

The European URBAN programme thus took place in a neighbourhood in which a range of policy plans existed already and where the Municipality, in various ways, through failure and success, was looking for improvement in terms of control and local participation. The following section deals with the way in which the URBAN programme was set up within these local contexts.

8.4 The URBAN Schilderswijk Programme

In October 1994, the Municipality of The Hague applied for funding in the context of the European Community Initiative URBAN. The Ministry of the Interior handed over the application, along with applications from Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht, to the European Commission (Hulsker and Holt 1999). Approval of The Hague's plan was received in September 1995 (Gemeente Den Haag 1999d, 2000c). Consequently, on November 12, 1996 the City Council agreed with the Operational Programme '*De toekomst van de Schilderswijk*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1994a), which formed the basis of the implementation of the URBAN programme. The programme started in the middle of 1996 (Gemeente Den Haag 1997b). Although it lasted officially until 1999 (the projects had to be tendered before the end of 1999), the budget, that was sent directly from Brussels to the Municipality of The Hague, could be spent until the end of 2001 (Gemeente Den Haag 1999g). A map of the target area of the URBAN Schilderswijk programme is presented in Appendix D.

8.4.1 Goals and Priorities

In the URBAN Schilderswijk programme (Gemeente Den Haag 1998d) no main goal has been formulated. According to the former project manager of the URBAN programme, the main goal was "the improvement of employment in the widest sense possible" (Mulder 2001, 116). A lot of attention was paid to space for business activities. Within the URBAN Programme, six measures were distinguished and provided with various goals (Hulsker and Holt 1999; Gemeente Den Haag 2000c) The goals are presented in Appendix E, the measures and the estimated costs in table 8.M.

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111 To be more precise: by the department of De-concentration, part of the Directorate of Administrative affairs.

Even though this meant a considerable investment in the neighbourhood, the estimated costs were relatively modest in comparison to The Hague's policy plans mentioned earlier, in which costs were estimated at 8 billion euros.

Table 8.M Measures and total estimated costs based on the revised financial table, including indexation (in euros)(Gemeente Den Haag 2001b)

	Measures	Total Estimated Costs (€)
1	Space for Business Activities	18,733,095
2	Accompaniment to the Labour market/ Additional employment for the long-term unemployed	2,584,534
3	Training and Education Infrastructure	1,937,089
4	Management and Safety	1,996,256
5	Promotion and Community Structure	2,199,940
6	Technical Assistance	302,434
	Total	27,753,349

8.4.2 Measures and Funding

With regard to the measures, the URBAN Schilderswijk programme (financially) strongly emphasized physical infrastructural measures. Projects implemented from within measures 1, 3 and 4 consisted mainly of building, rebuilding and rearranging (old) business areas (measure 1), training centres and educational institutions (measure 3) and public spaces (measure 4). Because of the neighbourhood's physical limitations, the expansion of office housing (*bedrijfshuisvesting*) was planned on the edge of the neighbourhood (Hulsker and Holt 1999).

The choice for the strong emphasis on 'hardware' in the operational URBAN Schilderswijk programme was motivated in particular by the lack of office space, as the preceding urban renewal had focused mostly on housing. Hulsker and Holt (1999) state that the choice for hardware measures, and consequently for a stronger emphasis on financing with funds from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) rather than funds from the European Social Fund (ESF), was also motivated by the strict criteria surrounding the ESF finances: it was difficult to find proper projects that were able to meet those criteria. Another possible explanation for the 'hardware' character of the programme was the fact that the URBAN Schilderswijk programme and the included proposed projects, were strongly rooted in urban renewal, a 'physical' policy tool. Now, however, the concern related to office housing instead of residential housing.

Altogether, about 75 projects were implemented as part of the URBAN programme. However, in practice this number turned out to be 57, as about 18 projects

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were stated to be related to the implementation, administration and financial settlement of the programme (see also Appendix G).

In terms of funding, the European Commission made available about 4,8 million euros for the URBAN Schilderswijk programme. Only a small part came from the ESF, the majority concerned ERDF finances (see table 8.N). The larger part of the EU budget went to measure 1, space for business activity. On the basis of the European condition of co-financing, the Dutch government was obliged to add at least one Dutch euro for every 'European' euro. That finally turned out to be much more; national and local government have collectively made available over 20 million euros (see table 8. O). The Municipality was by far the largest investor in the neighbourhood (Hulsker and Holt 1999).

In the end, the State has offered two sorts of financial support: first, resources that have been applied within the framework of BCP, as co-financing of projects in which EU funding was involved (in The Hague, this is referred to as '*BIZA 2*' resources) and second, resources to finance projects that matched with the URBAN programme, but could not be implemented within the URBAN framework, due to EU regulations (referred to as '*BIZA* 3' resources) (Gemeente Den Haag 1998d).

Table 8.N Amount of money, made available by the European Commission and the Dutch national government for URBAN Schilderswijk (in euros)(Gemeente Den Haag 2002b; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1996).

European/National Resources	Amount of money (€)
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)	4,271,065
European Social Fund (ESF)	436,699
Contribution of the Dutch National Government, as co-financing for the European ERDF/ESF contributions (*BiZa 2*)*	4,325,668
Money from the Dutch National Government (not co-financing) (*BiZa 3*)**	3,341,524

* In Amsterdam, this was referred to as 'BCP-I' money.
** In Amsterdam, this was referred to as 'BCP-II' money. In The Hague, these finances were kept out of the final reporting of URBAN. The amount of money is derived from a source of the Ministry of the Interior (1996).

Private parties had initially promised to make available 30 million euros in the framework of measure 1. This concerned mostly money for the *Laakhavens* project. However, in May 1998, the URBAN Programme was changed, as the European Commission did not agree to this part of the programme, "without further notice of motivation"[112] (Gemeente Den Haag 1999f, 4). Because of this change, the financial

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[112] Although it did not become clear from interviews why this part of the programme was

share of private parties was reduced to about 3 million euros, of which roughly half was designated for measure 1, and the other half for measure 2 (accompaniment towards the labour market) and 5 (promotion and community structure) (Hulsker and Holt 1999).The planned government investments were also reduced, due to the change of the programme. Yet, the programme's focus was still on the 'hardware' activities. With the *Laakhavens* dropping out, only two locations were left for expansion of office housing: the GIT area (a former waste disposal burning site), and the Fruitweg and surroundings (see Appendix F).

The estimated finances (based on the original programme and on the adapted programme) and the final commitment are presented in table 8.O.

Table 8.O Financial scheme URBAN Schilderswijk (in thousands of ECU and euros)[113]
(Gemeente Den Haag 2002b)

Finances by	Estimated (1995)*	Estimated (1998) **	Committed per December 31, 1999
	(ECU)	(€)	(€)
European Commission	4,650	4,708	4,692
National Government	4,650	4,326	4,446
Local and Regional Government	28,198	15,836	18,193
Private Investors	30,732	2,323	3,086
Total	68,230	27,193	30,417

* Based on original financial scheme (September 1995). In ECU (1 Euro = 1,0250263 ECU)
** Based on adapted financial scheme (September 1998), including indexation.

8.4.3 The Organization Structure

The Ministry of the Interior (*BZK*) was appointed responsibility by the European Commission for the implementation of the Dutch URBAN-I programmes. The Ministry's most important task was the co-ordination of financial matters concerning the URBAN programme, which, according to the interviewees, amounted to very little effort. The Municipality was responsible for the financial control and management of the programme in the Schilderswijk. This was to be done along lines of action as laid down in the Control Regulation 2064/97 (*Controleverordening 2064/97*), dated October 15, 1997, and in the financial Control Protocol URBAN 1999

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rejected, it was possibly connected to the large size of the original target area.
[113] In case of URBAN Bijlmermeer (Chapter 9), another financier relates to 'public institutions'. In the case of URBAN Schilderswijk, this category is missing.

(*Controleprotocol URBAN 1999*) based on that regulation, developed by the Ministry of the Interior (Gemeente Den Haag 2000e; 2001b)[114].

The local organization structure basically followed the structure as dictated by the European Commission: the actual implementation of the URBAN programme was in the hands of a Steering Committee (in The Hague called the 'Technical Committee'), under the direction of the Supervisory Committee. The Technical Committee judged the individual project proposals and was also qualified to decide whether or not to make ERDF means available for suggested projects. The Regional Bureau of Employment Strategy (*Regionaal Bureau Arbeidsvoorziening, RBA*) took the decisions about the granting of ESF means. The implementation of the programme was done by a Programme Secretariat that rested with the municipal Urban Development department (DSO), at the Economy and Traffic Directorate (E&V) (Hulsker and Holt 1999). From within this Programme Secretariat, project propositions were made to the Technical Committee.

In The Hague, however, two consultation groups were added to this decision making structure: an Administrative Consultation (*Bestuurlijk overleg*) and a Commission Instructors Consultation (*Opdrachtgeversoverleg*), to warrant the responsibility of the local authorities concerning the application of municipal means, as it was stated. The Aldermen for Economy & Staff; Public Planning, Urban Renewal and Housing; and Education, Social Affairs, Employment and Integration held a seat on the Administrative Consultation.

The URBAN project propositions were passed on first from the Programme Secretariat to the Administrative Consultation. This consultation tested the project proposals along the lines of the programme of the board of Mayor and Aldermen. The Aldermen involved would judge whether or not the suggested URBAN projects matched municipal policy and their individual portfolios. The Aldermen also had to authorize the application of municipal co-financing means. Provided with an advice (positive or negative), the project propositions were then discussed in the Technical Committee, where they were tested along the lines of the criteria laid down by the Supervisory Committee (the European conditions). After that, the propositions were, with advice from the Technical Committee, passed on to the board of Mayor and Aldermen, and finally to the City Council (interview). The latter decided about the granting of municipal means (Hulsker and Holt 1999). When the Technical Committee started working, the Administrative Consultation had thus already taken important decisions. According to the interviewees, Alderman Noordanus in particular would have had a strong influence on the URBAN programme. This cannot, however, be verified on the basis of the available information.

The second consultation that was established, the Commission Instructors Consultation (*opdrachtgeversoverleg*), was an official consultation that consisted of representatives of municipal departments that commissioned projects within the framework of the URBAN programme (Hulsker and Holt 1999; Gemeente Den Haag

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[114] According to the interviewees, in the final stage of the URBAN programme, the Ministry did actually come to central stage. It fulfilled the role of mediator between the European Commission and the four big cities, when it appeared that they had not completely spent their URBAN I finances.

2000e). In this consultation the progress of the programme and the development of projects was discussed. In that sense, it supported the URBAN Programme Secretariat (Hulsker and Holt 1999). In terms of composition, six of its ten members represented various Directorates within the DSO department. Moreover, also the co-ordinator of the Centrum City District (at that time also heading the MT for the Schilderswijk) was a member as well.

Box 8 P The organization structure of URBAN Schilderswijk (Hulsker and Holt 1999)

Community Funding (ERDF/ESF)	Co-Financing City of The Hague	Tasks/Competences
Supervisory Committee		Supervision on implementation of URBAN programme
Technical Committee	City Council	Judging project proposals
	Administrative Consultation	Judging project proposals against programme of Board of Mayor and Aldermen
Programme Secretariat	Commission Instructors Consultation	Programme management

What did the URBAN organization structure look like exactly? How were the Committees composed, and how did they relate to each other? This will be discussed next.

Supervisory Committee
The Supervisory Committee, which held a meeting twice a year, was the Committee from which administrative representatives supervised the progress of the programme.

Moreover, the Committee was responsible for the general strategy (Hulsker and Holt 1999) and it had set up the implementation framework in which the criteria for testing ERDF/ESF applications were laid down (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Schilderswijk Den Haag 1996b; Gemeente Den Haag 2000e).

In terms of composition, it is interesting to read that according to the local authorities, "the key concept for the European Commission for the implementation of the programmes is partnership" (Gemeente Den Haag 2000c, 4). This concerned partnership between a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations. According to the local authorities, the municipalities were obliged to establish a Supervisory Committee in order to put this partnership into practice (Gemeente Den Haag 2000c). Strikingly, in practice, this Committee was not that mixed at all.

As is clear from table 8.Q, the Supervisory Committee of URBAN Schilderswijk consisted primarily of governmental representatives, from the Municipality of The Hague (mostly from DSO); the European Commission (the former Directorates General XVI and V) and from various ministries. The Chair of the Supervisory Committee was the Alderman for Economy & Staff, Mr Verkerk. Additionally, some non-governmental organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Regional Bureau of Employment Strategy (RBA) were represented. The latter was merely responsible for subsidizing based on the ESF in the URBAN programme (Gemeente Den Haag, 1998d). Only two positions on the board were reserved for residents (one of them even 'p.m.').

Table 8.Q URBAN Schilderswijk: Formal composition of the Supervisory Committee (Gemeente Den Haag 1999d)

Representation of	Number (N)
The Hague Municipality	6
European Commission	3
Ministry of the Interior	3
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	1
Ministry of Economic Affairs	1
Chamber of Commerce	1
Regional Bureau of Employment Strategy (RBA) Haaglanden	1
Residents' representatives	2
Total	18

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Officially, two seats were reserved for residents; one for a representative of the Consultation Platform Schilderswijk (*OPS*) and one for a representative of the Multicultural Platform Schilderswijk (*MPS*). In practice, only the then chairman of the OPS participated in the Supervisory Committee. However, when he left the Committee in 1998, because of supposedly conflicting interests (he went into politics), his position remained vacant. He attributes the fact that he was not succeeded to the changed conditions, in the sense that the participation (*inspraak*) at the central level was shifted towards 'dialogue' (*samenspraak*) at the level of the district. Interestingly, neither the then chairman of the OPS nor other interviewees think that the residents were put at a disadvantage, since (as mentioned before) residents' groups had been involved in most of the projects implemented in the name of URBAN at an earlier stage already. In that sense, there had actually been partnership at the project level.

It is remarkable that housing associations that had played an important role in The Hague's urban renewal, did not have a seat in the Supervisory Committee. Interviewees ascribed this to the URBAN programme's stronger economic focus. At the same time, housing associations had been involved in the URBAN programme through their participation in the OPS.

The Supervisory Committee was responsible for the supervision of contributions from within the ERDF, the ESF and co-finances linked to those, such as the '*BIZA 2*' resources. The '*BIZA 3*' resources, were officially kept outside of the decision making of the Supervisory Committee (Gemeente Den Haag 1996a, 1997c).

Technical Committee and Administrative Consultation

The Technical Committee (TC), which officially held a meeting every 2 months[115], was responsible for the judgement of individual project applications in terms of content and financing. The Supervisory Committee had given a mandate to the TC to approve individual project applications (Gemeente Den Haag 2000e). As stated earlier, for the judgement of applications, the TC used criteria laid down by the Supervisory Committee (Hulsker and Holt 1999). Moreover, the project applications that were submitted to the TC had already been tested by the earlier mentioned Administrative Consultation (*Bestuurlijk overleg*)(Gemeente Den Haag 2000c). Interestingly, the meetings of the Technical Committee were combined with the Commission Instructors Consultation (*opdrachtgeversoverleg*) (Gemeente Den Haag 1999d, 2000c, 2001b).

The Technical Committee consisted of twelve members and was presided by the Economy & Traffic Director (E&V) from the DSO department. In terms of composition, it was dominated by representatives from governmental bodies as well, as is clear from table 8.R.

The representatives from the municipal organization mostly came from the Urban Development Department (DSO) (four, altogether). Among them were the URBAN project manager and programme secretary. The other three members represented the departments of Social Affairs & Employment projects (one); Education, Welfare and Culture (one) and Maintenance (*beheer*) (one). In contrast to

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[115] In reality, this was less often: for instance, twice in 1998; four times in 1999 and twice in 2000 (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a, 2000b, 2001a).

the Supervisory Committee, residents' associations were not represented in the Technical Committee.

Table 8.R Formal composition of the Technical Committee (Gemeente Den Haag 1999d)

Representation of	Number (N)
The Hague Municipality	7
Ministry of the Interior	3
Chamber of Commerce Haaglanden Region	1
Regional Bureau of Employment Strategy (RBA) Haaglanden	1
Total	12

The Programme Secretariat

An important task of the Programme Secretariat was the co-development and management of current projects, in terms of content as well as financing. The Programme Secretariat initially rested with the Housing Directorate of the Urban Development Department (DSO) of the City of The Hague. In order to streamline the administrative process, later it was subsumed under the Economy & Traffic Directorate of the same department. The Economy & Traffic Director was officially responsible for the URBAN programme (ERAC 1998; Gemeente Den Haag 1998d; Hulsker and Holt 1999). Hulsker and Holt (1999) argue that the Programme Secretariat had a large formal and informal influence within the URBAN programme. It essentially functioned as a 'turn-table'(*draaischijf*) between the municipal departments that applied for project subsidies and the responsible bodies that had to judge the applications.

Some Critical Remarks

Considering the URBAN organization structure in The Hague, a number of things draw attention: the Supervisory and Technical Committee were both dominated by a governmental representation. This was especially the case for the Technical Committee, with a relatively strong municipal representation, supplemented with representatives of the Ministry of the Interior. There were merely two representatives from NGO's on the Committee, and no representatives of residents' associations. With the additional Administrative Consultation, the local authorities of The Hague had a strong say in the URBAN decision making structure.

ERAC (1998) also points at the large influence of Aldermen through their position in this consultation. Hulsker and Holt (1999) criticize the structure of the URBAN organization in The Hague. They state, for instance, that the 'linking pin' construction between the Administrative Consultation, the City Council and the

Technical Committee may have speeded up the decision making process, but that, as a process, it was hardly transparent at the same time.

Just like Big Cities Policy, the URBAN programme pursued an integrated approach in which, among others, different municipal departments were forced to co-operate. In practice, it did not run so smoothly: "The municipal organization was not well prepared for the department-surpassing nature of the URBAN programme" (Gemeente Den Haag 2004e, 5). There was a lack of communication between the different departments. In 1995 for example, after the URBAN and (first) BCP funds had been allocated to the Municipality, many problems arose because it was not clear who would divide the funds between the departments (Dekker, Beaumont and Van Kempen 2002). One of the former employees of the URBAN Bureau, referred to the municipal departments as separate kingdoms, which operated with their own resources. In order to break this situation, the earlier described project '*Tussen Hard en Zacht*' was initiated.

Finally, at the level of the projects, an extensive administration was required before, during and after every project that was funded with European funding within the URBAN framework. This procedure was highly criticized for being far too bureaucratic (Dekker, Beaumont and Van Kempen 2002).

Involvement of Other Parties

What was the involvement of other parties like, in the development of the separate projects?

According to Hulsker and Holt (1999), many URBAN projects were developed by or together with residents and institutions; the URBAN Programme Secretariat had built up a good relationship with the neighbourhood. At the same time, according to the authors, the URBAN Programme Secretariat was consciously aiming at a strong role for the responsible municipal departments in the implementation of URBAN-projects. This picture matches the picture that was painted in interviews: in the stage of the '*Beleidsplan Schilderswijk Centrum 1994-1998,*' residents' associations and other institutions had already actively participated in the development and application of projects.

By the way, this did not only concern urban renewal projects. Preceding the European finances, these were also supplemented with new projects; projects which, according to the interviewees, would not have existed if there had been no URBAN finances. The relatively short period of time in which the URBAN project applications had to be filed limited the possibility for renewed active participation by residents and institutions in developing and implementing plans. According to Hulsker and Holt (1999) more than 60 percent of the projects had been initiated by residents or local institutions. In first instance this might look difficult to match with the earlier mentioned strong emphasis within the URBAN programme on 'space for business activity'; one does not expect residents to feel enthusiasm for this. However, according to the interviewees, the residents were very much aware of the importance of the creation of employment, prompted by the high unemployment among ethnic minorities in the Schilderswijk. Moreover, attention was also paid to projects with a somewhat higher direct 'appeal' for the residents, such as projects related to the restoration of

squares and the Vermeerpark; neighbourhood focused ICT from within the library; neighbourhood management, etc.

Summarizing the foregoing, during the implementation of the URBAN programme itself, the participation of other parties was relatively limited, but it had certainly been present in the preceding period. During the URBAN period itself, project applications were submitted to the Consultation Platform Schilderswijk (*Overleg Platform Schilderswijk, OPS*) on a somewhat regular basis, but merely as feedback (Gemeente Den Haag 2000e).

8.4.4 Changes in the Programme

The URBAN Schilderswijk programme has undergone two important changes. Both changes have already been discussed, but here they are briefly described again.

First, the organization was revised. The original organization structure, as laid down in the 1996 *Reglement van Orde*, consisted of a Supervisory Committee, a Technical Committee and a Programme Secretariat (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Schilderswijk Den Haag 1996a, 1996b). The earlier mentioned Administrative Consultation and the Commission Instructors Committee were added to this, although it is unclear when exactly (probably late 1996, early 1997). Moreover, in the readjusted structure, the project applications were first submitted to the City Council, before the applicants received a decree on behalf of the Municipality.

A second change concerned a change in the programme area. As mentioned earlier, the European Commission did not agree with the inclusion of Laakhavens in the programme area, enforcing a revision of the financial plan for the URBAN Schilderswijk programme. This revision, which took place in May 1998, has somewhat delayed the progress of the programme. The planned *Laakhavens* project intended to realise a substantial amount of office space, in order to make a large contribution to the creation of employment (Hulsker and Holt 1999).

Table 8.S Revision of the URBAN Target Area (in number and square meters) (Gemeente Den Haag 1999d)

Quantitative Goal Operational Programme	Original Goal	Revised Goal
Structural working Places (N)	1,500	1,000
Temporary working Places (N)	500	200
Office Space/ Offices Laakhavens (M²)	16,000	0
Office Space/ Offices Schilderswijk/Fruitweg (M²)	30,000	30,000

The intended employment goals (structural and temporary jobs) were thus revised considerably. Apart from these changes there have also been other, smaller adjustments of the programme, but they will not be discussed in more detail.

In summary, the URBAN programme in The Hague strongly focused on the creation of employment in the widest possible sense; a large share of the money was designated for 'space for business activity'. The organization structure of the URBAN Schilderswijk programme was dominated strongly by governmental representatives. Particularly the local authorities of The Hague have left their mark on the decision making structure of the URBAN programme. This was not only expressed in the composition of the Steering Committee and the Technical Committee but also, particularly, in the Administrative Consultation that was added to the decision making structure. The modest position of non-governmental representatives and the absence of residents' organisations were not considered as obstacles for these parties.

8.5 Place and Positioning in the European Arena

In this section, the focus will be on the discourse related to URBAN Schilderswijk, by addressing three issues: First of all, attention will be paid to the meanings assigned to the City of the Hague and the Schilderswijk. Secondly, the ways in which local actors in The Hague position themselves and other actors in the European arena will be analysed. Finally, it will be examined whether one could argue, based on the data, that there is a politics of scale, either by governmental or non-governmental actors within the European (urban) policy arena.

In this analysis a distinction will be made between the municipal and the sub-municipal level (sections 8.5.1 and 8.5.2 respectively). At the municipal level, the only actors who were involved in the URBAN programme were governmental actors. As we have seen in the foregoing, at the sub-municipal level, both governmental and non-governmental actors were involved.

8.5.1 The Municipal Level

As stated earlier, the URBAN programme took place at a moment when The Hague was raising its European and international profile. This development is reflected in the available data: policy documents of The Hague, as well as speeches on Europe and European urban policy dating from the 1990s are relatively scarce. For the closer examination of the question described above, this was a limitation.

Data Selection

In order to be able to do a discourse analysis, first of all, data produced by the Municipality of The Hague that possibly qualified for such an analysis had to be found. These related primarily to data in which the Municipality explicitly focused on European urban policy issues. Data sources were acquired via employees of the former URBAN Programme Secretariat of The Hague Municipality; through the municipal search engine (*Zoeksysteem bestuurlijke stukken*), in the municipal library (*Dienstenbibliotheek)* of The Hague, as well as through the internet.

These data preferably had to focus on European *urban* policy issues. At this point another limitation emerged, because such documents were not only scarce but also often unsuitable for the discourse analysis. Often they would be progress reports, such as the URBAN annual reports, which noted in particular progress at the project level. Some parts of the Operational Programme URBAN Schilderswijk (1995) and of an URBAN brochure (1998), in which The Hague and the Schilderswijk were characterized, proved to be useful. Also a speech, held by (former) Alderman Verkerk at a conference in the Hague in 2000 qualified, as a part of it focused explicitly on European urban policy. Because of the limitations mentioned above, I have also looked at sources which did not specifically concern European *urban* policy issues, but European policy issues in a wider sense. For this, more documents qualified, such as '*De Europese Gemeenschap en de Gemeente Den Haag: Een eerste verkenning'* (Gemeente Den Haag 1993), a letter by (former) Alderman Verkerk on Eurocities (Verkerk 1998) and the policy document '*De Europese Unie en de gemeente Den Haag'* (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a).

Table 8.T Documents and speeches produced by governmental actors of the Municipality of The Hague, related to European (urban) issues, in particular to URBAN Schilderswijk.

Title	Date	Author	Status
De Europese Gemeenschap en de Gemeente Den Haag: een eerste verkenning	1993	City of The Hague	Memorandum
De toekomst van de Schilderswijk: een Europese bijdrage aan Europa's grootste stadsvernieuwingswijk	1995	City of The Hague (DSO)	Operational Programme URBAN Schilderswijk
URBAN brochure	1998	City of The Hague (URBAN Programme Secratariat)	Brochure
Proposal related to Eurocities	1998	Mr G.A..Verkerk (Alderman and Chair of a Eurocities committee)	Letter
De Europese Unie en de gemeente Den Haag	1999	City of The Hague	Memorandum
Speech at the occasion of the International congress New Technologies and the City, September 6, 2000, the Hague	2000	Mr G.A. Verkerk (Vice-Mayor for Economic Affairs of the City of the Hague)	Speech

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The downside of these three documents is that they were written in order to define the position of the city in the European arena and not so much as an actual self positioning in this arena. The selected data sources are presented in table 8.T.

With the exception of Verkerk's speech from 2000, all documents in the table above were written in Dutch, and therefore *not* primarily meant for positioning in the European or internation arena. Even the Operational programme URBAN Schilderswijk was not written in English[116].

For the discourse analysis of the data, first, attention was paid to The Hague in the European *urban* policy arena. Secondly, attention was paid to The Hague in the wider European (policy) arena. Moreover, the 'European urban policy discourse' categories (see Chapter 4) were used to structure the findings in the data. These related to cities (or parts of cities) as a *problem*; as *strategic potential*; as a *balanced system* or as an *entity of (formal) governmental responsibility*. As related to the last construction, the ways of (self)positioning by the actors were examined.

Data Analysis: The Hague in the European urban policy arena

First of all, what can be said about the meanings assigned to the City of the Hague and the Schilderswijk and about the ways of (self)positioning by municipal actors in the European *urban* policy arena? Three data sources were used to answer this question: two written documents and a speech. Of the written data sources, the following parts were examined: '*De toekomst van de Schilderswijk*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1995b, 17-26) and the '*URBAN Brochure*' (Gemeente Den Haag 1998g, 1-2). These concerned parts in which The Hague and the Schilderswijk were characterized. Additionally, a speech by Alderman Verkerk (2000) was analysed, in which he explicitly addressed European urban policy. As the character of the data varied, the results of the analysis will be presented per data source. Some concluding remarks will be given at the end.

De Toekomst van de Schilderswijk (1995, 17-26)

'*De Toekomst van de Schilderswijk*' is the Operational Programme of URBAN Schilderswijk. It is not much of a surprise that this document places a relatively strong emphasis on urban problems. Which meanings are assigned to The Hague and to the Schilderswijk?

Constructions of The Hague

The Hague is primarily constructed in terms of *problems*, with reference to the large unemployment (especially among low educated people), the stagnating employment, the one-sided economic structure and the one-sided housing stock. Also the positive image of The Hague as 'green city behind the dunes' is mostly worked out in terms of problems: apart from its attractiveness to tourists and congress visitors, the city has a limited territory and consequently a high population density. The city hardly comes to the fore as *a strategic potential*, although there is mention of investments that are supposed to 'make The Hague's (international) settlement climate more attractive'.

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[116] Documents and reports of the City of The Hague, directed primarily at the international context have not been used for this discourse analysis, because the focus in the research at hand was specifically on positioning within the *European* (policy) arena.

Approaching these threats has to improve the city's opportunities. The City of The Hague also comes to the fore as a *balanced system* with its region, Stadsgewest Haaglanden. The region is especially described in terms of its (poor) economic development, as compared to other Dutch regions and in the context of national developments. Finally, The Hague is also constructed as a *an entity of formal governmental responsibility*, but this construction is not elaborated. In a brief description, the city is positioned as a political/administrative centre ('centre of national administration', 'seat of the Dutch government') and as an international city, where important international institutions and many large international firms are located. The Hague as a 'European city' does not occur in the description.

Constructions of the Schilderswijk

The Schilderswijk, described in the subtitle of the document as 'Europe's largest urban renewal district', is almost entirely positioned in terms of *problems* and, in relation to this, as a target area of policy. The Schilderswijk is characterized as an old, densely populated and foreign residential neighbourhood; a 'classic urban renewal district' and the 'largest connected urban renewal area in the Netherlands.' The problems in the area on which subsequently most emphasis is put are: segregation, the decreased employment, the increased unemployment, the problem of management and, more generally, the weak social-economic position of the residents. It is remarkable that (on page 26) a connection is made with the use of discourse that is popular with area-based urban policy such as European URBAN or national BCP programmes. For instance, there is mention made of "a more integral approach," in the Schilderswijk, "an intensive and coherent approach". Apart from the gravity of the problems, this 'renewed approach' in the district has also been decisive for the selection of the neighbourhood as a target area. Finally, in the document neither constructions of the district as a *strategic potential*, a *balanced system* or an *entity of (formal) governmental responsibility*, nor (self)positioning of actors come to the fore.

URBAN Brochure

The second document, the URBAN brochure (Gemeente Den Haag 1998g) is primarily aimed at residents and entrepreneurs in the Schilderswijk, as it shows from Verkerk's appeal on page 1: "If you … see an opportunity for yourself in terms of work or work experience, or for the improvement of liveability in your environment, then do not hesitate to….." The brochure intends to inform residents and entrepreneurs on the European URBAN programme, and it does not primarily focus on the positioning of The Hague within the European arena. In this sense, the source may be less suitable for discourse analysis. Even so, it has some useful elements.

Constructions of The Hague

In the brochure, The Hague is constructed in terms of a city (*stad*) and a municipality (*gemeente*). As a city, it is constructed in terms of *problems*; as one of 'the big cities of Europe' in which 'the biggest social and economic problems' can be found and that, as a problem area, thus gets EU funding for solving these problems. As a municipality, it

is constructed as an *entity of (formal) governmental responsibility* (see further below). Constructions of the city as *strategic potential* or a *balanced system* do not appear.

Constructions of the Schilderswijk

In the brochure, the Schilderswijk is positioned in the brochure as a *problem area*: as a target area of European (URBAN) and Dutch (Big Cities Policy) policy, in which European and Dutch money is diverted; as a deprived area with high unemployment, 'the district with the largest number of unemployed,' where liveability is under pressure and the young cause trouble. It is remarkable that in the introduction of the URBAN brochure the district's foreign nature is not brought to the fore: there is no emphasis on ethnic differences. Only incidentally a reference is made to 'different population groups' (Gemeente Den Haag 1998g, 2).

It is noteworthy that there is hardly any positive connotation (the district as a *strategic potential*) given to the Schilderswijk. This comes back only in the long-term goals, according to which the Schilderswijk should become a 'worldly' district (*ibid.*, 1): "an attractive district to work and live … in which residents feel safe and comfortable" (*ibid.,* 2).

(Self)positioning of Actors

In the capacity of municipality, The Hague positions itself as an actor in its local context: as financier in the Schilderswijk as financially responsible for the URBAN programme and as an initiator who, from within municipal departments, plans projects and seeks consultation with neighbourhood organizations.

Regarding the positioning of other actors, especially the residents (and incidentally the entrepreneurs) are positioned. They appear as beneficiaries (unemployed who are (or should be) given help to find a job, residents who must receive proper education, etc.) and as citizens with their own responsibility. For instance, concerning the solution of problems, it is stated that: "Whether this succeeds, also depends on you as a resident or entrepreneur" (*ibid.* 1). Residents are also positioned as participants in organizations, for instance in the Consultation Platform Schilderswijk (*Overleg Platform Schilderswijk, OPS*). 'Neighbourhood organizations' are also positioned in a wider sense, for example as organizations that make an effort "for more work and the improvement of the liveability" (*ibid.* 1). The national government is mentioned in the brochure only in passing, as 'the Netherlands,' which 'has a special policy for big cities itself,' and as Ministry of the Interior, which invests in the Schilderswijk from within the BCP policy framework. The European Commission, finally, is mentioned in the capacity of initiator of URBAN, "the answer of Europe" (*ibid.* 1).

Speech Alderman Verkerk

In comparison to the two earlier documents, Verkerk's speech is of an entirely different nature (Verkerk, 2000): it is set in English and therefore accessible to a wider audience. Additionally, it is directed at a different audience, as it was held at the occasion of the International Congress New Technologies and the City in The Hague, on September 6, 2000. Cities, especially the development of the cities towards the 'new economy,' are

extensively discussed. The Hague itself often comes to the fore, which is not surprising in view of the theme and location. The Schilderswijk is not further discussed in the speech. Remarkable is Verkerk's call for the design of a 'European city policy' (Verkerk 2000, 4), 'a real city policy' (*ibid*.).

Constructions of Cities

In this speech, the meanings assigned to cities are very diverse. Far more often than as a problem, cities are constructed as *strategic potential.* An example relates to The Hague that "is now aiming at the more specific telecom and internet firms which want to open up here in The Hague because the largest Dutch telecom company is situated here" (*ibid*., 3). Cities as a *problem* appear for example in the description of de-industrialisation: "It is the cities that have to deal with the consequences…." (*ibid*., 1). Incidentally, cities are constructed as a *balanced system*. This is, first of all, the case for cities vis-à-vis each other: cities should get more freedom to formulate their own strategic plans, with their specific qualities, in order to prevent uniform plans to "cause cities unnecessarily to become rivals" (*ibid.,* 3). Verkerk also refers to The Hague, that "became a direct rival for other cities in the west of Holland" (*ibid.,* 3). A second interpretation of a *balanced system* concerns the mutual dependency of Europe and the cities, as expressed in the assumption that "the competitive position of Europe is partly dependent on the development of European cities" (*ibid.,* 1). However, considering all the meanings assigned to cities in the speech, they are mostly constructed as an *entity of (formal) governmental responsibility*, expressed in ways of (self)positioning. This will be discussed next.

(Self)positioning of Actors

In half of the cases in which cities are mentioned, it is in the capacity of *entity of (formal) governmental responsibility*: as actors who face similar problems for which policy needs to be formulated; but also as actors who want space for policy making (*beleidsruimte*) to formulate their own plan, particularly in relation to the new economy. In an individual sense, the city is often put forward as The Hague; positioned as an active, initiating, important administrative entity, which is oriented towards a future, using the new economy and information technology (Verkerk 2000).

It is remarkable that cities as actors are positioned in relation to each other (as network) only incidentally. Apart from the few times that the 'Eurocities' city network is mentioned, there are only a few references to mutual co-operation, concerning the G4: "These four cities are therefore conferring about this to reach a joint strategy…." (*ibid.,* 3). The positioning of cities as 'rivals' occurs only incidentally as well: it is mentioned only twice, and in both cases as an undesirable scenario. If cities are not constructed as actors, the meanings assigned strongly diverge. They concern, for instance, cities as a residential location, as focus of policy or as related to employment ('industrial cities', 'service cities', etc).

Regarding EU level actors, it is remarkable that 'Brussels' is never spoken about in the speech. On the other hand, they do occur as 'Europe,' positioned in about half of the cases as an actor, and in the other half as a location ('in Europe'). As an 'actor', Europe is called upon to lend support to the cities: "It is vital for Europe to take

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the initiative ... and to develop a real city policy .... I am therefore asking for a European city policy" (*ibid.,* 4). Verkerk uses the occasion to dictate the conditions: "I will give you the following outlines" (*ibid.,* 4).

The national government, constructed as an actor in every case, is usually brought forward as the one who designs the preconditions from within which cities operate. With an implicit reference to Big Cities Policy, it is stated that "the Dutch government ... has encouraged 25 of the largest Dutch cities to make strategic city plans for the coming years" (*ibid.,* 2). In passing, a claim of the cities is added: "Many cities were already doing this" (*ibid.,* 2). The national government is also put forward as an actor working on the same goal as the cities: "Cities, national governments and Europe ... all have policies which are aimed at getting rid of the legacy of the industrial city" (*ibid.,* 2).

Finally, the national government and 'Europe' are criticised collectively. The criticism concerns the limited freedom that cities have in formulating their own goals: "Europe, and the member countries should encourage the cities to develop their own policies and not to let themselves be dictated to by their own national governments or Europe" (*ibid.,* 4). "Too many cities still have to apply for permission from the financial and policy making levels of higher governments. This means that not only expensive energy is put into this, but this also leads to the wrong strategic actions of cities" (*ibid.,* 4).

In this speech the 'region' has no role; the term occurs only twice, and the Randstad and the city region (*Stadsgewest Haaglanden*) are not mentioned at all. There is in fact only one paragraph devoted to the region. From a discursive perspective, this paragraph is an interesting one, though: first of all, it is remarkable that the *Deltametropool* is defined in terms of the four big cities. Secondly, these four big cities are positioned as a 'city cluster' and as 'the fourth city region in Europe with regards to the service economy.' These are two clear examples of a politics of scale within the European urban and wider policy arena: the cities position themselves collectively on a higher scale. The contents of the total paragraph are quoted in box 8.U.

Box 8.U Excerpt from speech Alderman Verkerk (2000)

> The Hague, on a European and global level, is part of the so-called Delta Metropolis. This is made up of the four biggest cities in the west of the country: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. This city cluster qualifies as the fourth city region in Europe with regards to the service economy, according to research done by the Danish professor Mathiessen. These four cities are therefore conferring about this to reach a joint strategy so that they can continue to develop into a real Delta Metropolis on a European level. (Verkerk 2000, 3)

Finally, some other aspects of the speech are remarkable as well. For instance, cities are only incidentally positioned as partners, and other actors are never positioned as partners. The words 'partner' and 'partnership,' both commonly used terms in European urban policy discourse, do not occur. A modest exception is the mention of the organizers of the conference where the speech is held: The Hague, Eurocities and the Dutch Ministry of the Interior. It is hence even more remarkable that there is reference to 'close co-operation,' 'close contact' with non-governmental actors, for instance in relation to BCP: "The close co-operation with organizations from the social and economic side of society, such as civil organizations, housing co-operations, the Chamber of Commerce, businesses etc." (Verkerk 2000, 2) and in relatie tot IT: The Hague has "close contact with firms concerned with IT in and around the city" (*ibid.,* 3). As compared to the documents discussed earlier, the tone of the speech is far more emotional in nature. For instance, Verkerk calls upon national governments and the European Commission to give assistance to the cities: "Otherwise the city policy in Europe will be threatened to be suffocated in a 'quest for control' (*ibid.,* 4-5).

As has become clear in the foregoing, the three data sources that had to cast light on The Hague in the European urban policy arena, strongly diverge in character. The two documents have been written in order to position The Hague as an actor in the European context: the operational URBAN Schilderswijk programme aimed at acquiring money and the URBAN brochure intended to inform residents/entrepreneurs on European policy in the city. The documents strongly emphasize the problems in the city and in the neighbourhood. Other constructions, as well as forms of self positioning of The Hague, are hardly brought forward. In the operational programme, only very incidentally a connection was made with European urban policy discourse.

Verkerk's speech, held at a moment when The Hague was already active for years with positioning itself within the European arena, is of a completely different nature. In this speech, The Hague explicitly positions itself, individually or collectively, as an actor within the European arena. Its critical voice seems to echo the Eurocities network, which has taken a critical stance for years within the European urban policy arena. The city is also put forward strongly in terms of *strategic potential*. It is remarkable that no link is made with European urban policy discourse, as used by the European Commission. A commonly used term such as partnership, for instance 'exclusively' between cities and the European Commission, is not defined at all. It is also remarkable that The Hague, from within its co-operation in connection with G4, engages (albeit scantily) in a politics of scale in the European urban and wider policy arena.

Data Analysis: The Hague in the wider European (Policy) Arena
The second part of the discourse analysis relates to The Hague in the wider European (policy) arena. As described earlier, The Hague only started actually entering the wider European arena in the course of the 1990s and early 2000s. The municipal policy documents from 1993 and 1999 were primarily written for the (administrative and official) organization itself, and not as an 'outward' political statement. The emphasis is not so much on the image that The Hague projects of itself to the outside, but rather

on the way in which the city could or would like to position itself towards the outside. There is hardly any reference in these documents to European *urban* policy.

De Europese Gemeenschap en de Gemeente Den Haag: een eerste verkenning (1993)
This policy document discusses the (expected) far-reaching influence of the European unification, as a consequence of the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht. Light is shed particularly on the consequences for the municipalities, as well as on the role of money (financing of the EU, but also European subsidy schemes). Finally, it tries to formulate an answer to the question how to deal with these developments as a municipality, in terms of organization and activities. Remarkable is the soberness with which the document tries to create an overview of 'threats and opportunities' for The Hague as well as the purposive attitude in its efforts to formulate a strategy for the positioning of The Hague towards Europe and the pursuit of roles that The Hague could fulfil. The city has not quite got used to it, in view of references to Europe as 'the United Europe' (Gemeente Den Haag 1993, 9, 15) and the 'new Europe' (*ibid*., 15).

Constructions of The Hague and the Schilderswijk
While The Hague regularly appears in terms of applying for European finances or receiving them, the city is hardly positioned in terms of *problems*; only the high unemployment (as such the basis for receiving ESF resources) is mentioned. The city is, on the other hand, often positioned as a *strategic potential*, particularly when The Hague stresses its international character. The word 'international' appears frequently, for instance in relation to the available training facilities in the city (international studies, schools, programmes). The Hague positions itself not only as a city with an 'international character' (*ibid*., 23), but also as a 'centre of government' (*ibid*., 15) and as a "green seaside resort in proximity of Brussels" (*ibid*., 17). These are all opportunities for attracting (international) firms and institutions. Whereas The Hague itself is not positioned as *balanced system*, this does happen in a general sense regarding cities among each other. For instance, viewed from within a European perspective, it is stated that: "The competition between European regions/cities will grow in importance" (*ibid*., 8). Finally, neighbourhoods and districts are almost completely absent in this policy document. The Schilderswijk is never mentioned.

(Self)Positioning of Actors
In the widest possible sense The Hague frequently positions itself under the co-ordinating headline of 'municipalities,' or (sometimes) 'decentralized governments'. They are positioned mainly as entities which undergo the influence of Europe, and not the other way around, as entities that can influence Europe. The VNG and REGR, their intermediary organizations, are indeed positioned in that way; as actors in relation to Europe. There is also frequent reference to 'cities'. They are positioned primarily as actors, in terms of partners who co-operate, discuss and exchange knowledge, as well as in terms of competitors of other cities/regions. The City of The Hague also positions itself primarily as an actor, often in relation to requesting or receiving European subsidies. A few times the emphasis is on The Hague as a partner; for instance in

connection with Eurocities, in which it tries to influence European policy, together with other cities.

Regarding the positioning of European actors it is, mindful of the theme of the policy document, self-evident that the 'European Community' (*Europese gemeenschap, EG*) appears frequently; mostly as an actor, as an influential administrative authority: "More and more, the EG dictates the condition that …." (*ibid.*, 6); "Because of the expectation that the European Community will put further limitations on the member states….' (*ibid.*, 8). Incidentally the EC is constructed as a 'community of member states': "As a community of member states, the European Community only holds a direct legal relationship with those member states" (*ibid.*, 8). 'Europe' also appears frequently, both as an actor ("the influence of the united Europe," *ibid.*, 9) and as a location ("Affiliated organizations in Europe," *ibid.*, 12). The same goes for Brussels, which is primarily positioned as the governmental centre of Europe: "Brussels' decision making" (*ibid.*, 15), and as the 'capital' of a United Europe (*ibid.*, 15). The (European) Commission is mentioned less frequently.

Member states and national governments appear mostly as entities undergoing the consequences of Europe. For instance, there is a reference to the "transfer of sovereignty from member states to the EG" (*ibid.*, 7). Furthermore, remarkable is also the (once-only) reference to the capacity of the national government as a 'linking function' (*schakelfunctie*) towards Brussels and the future opportunities the The Hague sees for itself: "Among some the expectation is expressed that the national government will fulfil more of a linking function towards Brussels, a linking function that could be coupled with new and different forms of consultation and co-ordination. This could mean that The Hague's role will not become smaller, but different, in the sense of a regional centre of European contacts" (*ibid.*, 15). If such a role of The Hague would be disseminated within the European arena, one could speak of a politics of scale, but in this case it seems more like guessing what the future position of the city would be like as a consequence of European influence.

Regions appear under the headline of 'regions,' and sometimes also as provinces or, to a lesser degree, as *Randstad* or City Region (*Stadsgewest Haaglanden*). In all cases they are constructed primarily as actors. The term '*Deltametropool*' does not appear in the policy document. The meanings assigned to 'regions' are rather varied: modest highlights are regions as entities undergoing European influence or as entities from within which (as a consequence) competition is to be held. In all cases provinces appear as an actor. They are related particularly to activities towards Europe. The Randstad appears as one of the entities from within which The Hague would like to position itself towards Europe: "Co-operation should not be limited to Stadsgewest Haaglanden, but it should expand to the Randstad" (*ibid.*, 22); "In this competition, the Municipality should co-operate with relevant partners, in the first place within the connection of Stadsgewest Haaglanden, in the second place collectively with the Cities of Leiden and Delft and in the third place within the connection of the Randstad" (*ibid.*, 23). The level of the city region serves this purpose as well. The possibilities are not yet used to the full, in the view of The Hague: "Within the framework of Stadsgewest Haaglanden there is not yet enough anticipation to processes of internalization and increase in scale" (*ibid.*, 22).

Finally, whereas The Hague (or cities in a wider sense) as well as other actors are positioned within the European arena, European inhabitants hardly appear at all in this policy document.

Letter Alderman Verkerk (1998)

A source of a completely different nature, yet at least as interesting, is a letter from Alderman Verkerk to the members of the Economy & Staff Committee, dated December 4, 1998 (Verkerk 1998). Verkerk, himself chairman of the Committee, proposes to take up, on behalf of The Hague, the chairmanship of the Eurocities working group Policy Forum on Technology.

As the letter is primarily directed at Eurocities, the source has not been used for a complete discourse analysis. Yet a few parts will be discussed, because they present a good picture of the way in which The Hague wants to position itself in the wider European (policy) arena or in the international arena, and of the schematic ways in which that positioning is dealt with. Verkerk argues for instance, that the chairmanships of the Eurocities working groups Telecities and Technology, held by The Hague respectively from 1996 to 1998 and (at the time) to be held from 1998 to 2000, had changed The Hague's role in the European arena substantially: from "applying for subsidy" (Verkerk 1998, 2) towards "influencing the European policy agenda" (*ibid.*, 3). Regarding the working group Telecities, he also states that it has various meanings for The Hague in this perspective: "In the first place, it gives further meaning to The Hague as international city. The ambition that the Municipality has concerning this matter, 'The Hague as international city of peace and justice' can be further developed in the direction of 'European city." In other words, the chairmanship is a way to put The Hague on the European map as an 'international city' (*ibid.*, 3). It is not clarified what exactly is meant by a 'European city,' though. Finally, the approach of scale in the letter is remarkable. Operating from within a regional scale is seen as a means for positioning the city: "The presentation of the region in European connection as an important region for modern technology has an added value for promotion and acquisition. Because in this way there can be further elaboration of European image building of The Hague" (Verkerk 1998, 3). Elsewhere in the letter the reasoning is precisely the other way around. It is emphasized what the added value of co-operation between cities could be for the positioning of the region of The Hague towards Europe: "(We) will be looking for substantial collaboration with the cities in the region of The Hague, such as Delft, Zoetermeer and Leiden. These are the cities that can have an important added value for the presentation of the region of The Hague as an international high-standard technological settlement area" (Verkerk 1998, 3-4).

De Europese Unie en de Gemeente Den Haag (1999)

This policy document serves both as a retrospection on the policy of The Hague towards Europe and as an anticipating look in the form of a 'new municipal action plan.' Based on this plan, the city strives for a "strategic, integral and effective municipal European policy" (Gemeente Den Haag 1999a, 19). The action plan focuses on the realization of an 'offensive and positive attitude' towards Europe and on the development of the City of The Hague into a 'European player of stature' (*ibid.*, 33)

and 'a European city in words and action' (*ibid.*,34). The action plan is rather dry and factual, and therefore it has not been used for an extensive discourse analysis.

Even though the sources mentioned above vary somewhat, and even though they have not all been analysed in great detail (discursively), a few general concluding remarks can be made. First of all, in its ways of positioning in the wider European (policy) arena, The Hague appears mainly as *strategic potential* or as *entity of formal governmental responsibility* and not so much in terms of problems. Positioning at the level of the district does not occur. Secondly, The Hague, just like other (sub-)national actors, is constructed initially in particular as an entity undergoing the influence of Europe. Gradually it is positioned more as a player in the European policy arena: as a European player of stature; as an entity that influences the European agenda. Finally, it is remarkable that, in the European context, The Hague frequently positions itself in relation to its region, yet the definition of 'region' varies.

Sources after 2000

A general analysis of a few sources from after 2000, as a conclusion to this piece, directly shows how illustrative they are for the development that The Hague has gone through in terms of self positioning within the European (urban) policy arena and within the international arena.

Regarding its positioning in the European (urban) policy arena, the title of the brochure '*The Hague Impressions: The Hague in Europe, Europe in The Hague*' (Gemeente Den Haag 2004d) is telling. The same goes for the speech by Bas Verkerk (former Alderman in The Hague and present Mayor of Delft), held in September 2004 on the occasion of the Open Days workshop '*European Urban Projects*' at the House of the Dutch Provinces (HNP) in Brussels (Verkerk 2004). In this speech, he points for instance at the importance of the role played by The Hague in the European scene, as "one of the first members of Eurocities" (of which The Hague in reality became a member only relatively late, in comparison to, for instance, co-initiator Rotterdam), but also at the active role of Mayor Deetman and himself in Eurocities and Telecities. He also emphasizes the active involvement in the Committee of the Regions. In that context, The Hague positions itself again primarily as a collective within the European arena.

Box 8.V Excerpt from Building a Better World in The Hague (Gemeente Den Haag 2005a)

> The unique profile of The Hague as the international city of justice and governance lends particular weight to this national urban network. Alongside the economies of the two mainports Amsterdam and Rotterdam …, the wider region of The Hague offers an exceptional international environment were strategic agreements and decisions are reached which exert a great influence on economic development throughout the world. The knowledge, contacts and relevant networks are already present in the city. People build a better world in The Hague. This is a unique position, which can be put to even greater use. The climate for businesses and organizations to locate to The Hague is competitive and attractive. In the next few decades, the city aims to further strengthen its special identity as an international crossroads for justice and governance. (Gemeente Den Haag 2005a, 11)

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In a recent position paper of The Hague, entitled '*Building a Better World in The Hague*' (Gemeente Den Haag 2005a), there are various examples of an obvious international self positioning. In the profile of The Hague for example, as described on pages 11 and 12, the international position of the city is not only positioned as a natural point of departure, but it also holds various claims; both are characteristic for discourses. The position of The Hague as a city of international justice and governance (the latter being an interesting, new addition to the city brand) is characterized as 'inevitable', if the international appeal of the Randstad Holland agglomeration is considered important (Gemeente Den Haag 2005a, 7). Furthermore, the city is "one of the most important pillars within the urban network of the Randstad Holland agglomeration and the Zuidvleugel area…." (*ibid*., 11), etc. In the excerpt presented in Box 8.V, various other recurring examples can be found.

The statement by Van der Wusten (2006), that local government becomes an ever more important actor in this field, trying to pursue its own international profile among the other major Dutch cities, seems to have become true for The Hague. Particularly in the international context, The Hague has clearly chosen the way in which it wants to position itself. This way of self positioning is coupled with an international discourse, initiated and developed from within The Hague's municipal administration, which seems to go much further than a European (urban policy) discourse.

8.5.2 The City District, the District and the Neighbourhood Level

As stated before, in The Hague no policy is made at the city district level. Municipal policy is merely implemented at that level by 'de-concentrated' officials, whether or not in consultation with other parties. The closer examination of constructions of place and ways of (self)positioning as produced by policy makers in the European urban policy arena, is therefore not possible in The Hague at the city district level.

Also at the level of the district, closer examination is problematic: a document like the '*Beleidsplan Schilderswijk Centrum 1994-1998*' (Projectgroep Stadsvernieuwing Schilderswijk Centrum 1994), for instance, which was used as the basis for the URBAN programme, may have been made at the city district level, but the project group that developed the plan consisted of various representatives, such as municipal departments, residents' associations, housing corporations, etc. This makes it impossible to determine to whom certain constructions or ways of positioning can be ascribed. A similar problem goes for the Consultation Platform Schilderswijk (*OPS*), which was involved in the URBAN programme as a consultative body. Its composition was too diverse to take certain URBAN related sources into account (if they were there at all).

What remains, are certain individual parties within the URBAN target area (or parties concerned with that area from within a different location), such as housing corporations, welfare institutions, residents' associations and so forth, which in theory could have positioned in the European urban policy arena. If they had made their presence felt in relation to the URBAN programme or within the wider European (policy) arena, for instance through a speech or a written document, these could have been interesting sources for this discourse analysis. However, it looks like these parties

have not made any moves within the European (urban) policy arena during the URBAN programme. For that reason, a discourse analysis of sources produced by actors at the city district, district- or neighbourhood level has so far not taken place.

One initiative, of the National Collaboration of Districts for special attention (*Landelijk Samenwerkingsverband Aandachtswijken, LSA*), is particularly remarkable. It deserves some attention, although it is not exactly in its place under this headline. The LSA is a national platform of residents from problem areas in the 30 cities involved in Big Cities Policy in the Netherlands. It was established about 15 years ago and aims at stimulating and increasing the input and influence of residents on BCP. In 2004, the platform consisted of about 65 residents; all active volunteers representing neighbourhood organizations. Interestingly, both in 1997 and in 2004, when the Netherlands presided the European Council for half a year, the LSA organized a conference: in 1997, two days before the European summit (*Eurotop*) of the heads of the member states' governments in Amsterdam, the platform organized a conference in The Hague, together with the National Centre for Community work (*Landelijk Centrum Opbouwwerk, LCO*) entitled: '*No Europe without us*'. Residents of the Schilderswijk have also participated in this conference. During this 'European Summit of residents' ('*Eurotop van Bewoners*'), participants (active neighbourhood residents, politicians, community workers and scientists) could exchange experiences concerning social and physical renewal in their cities. These were primarily cities in which URBAN programmes were or had been implemented. Seven years later, this initiative was repeated by the LSA in Rotterdam, with the conference '*Making new connections*'. During this conference, again coinciding with the Dutch Chairmanship of the EU, participants could exchange experiences in the fields of safety, work & youth, housing, integration, and living standards, environment and social cohesion. Afterwards, Thom de Graaf, the then minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations, invited the LSA chairman to present the final act of the conference, the 'European Residents Agenda,' at the ongoing informal Council of Ministers for urban policy. It consisted of ten recommendations for the European Union (LSA 1997, 2004).

These LSA initiatives are interesting for a various reasons. First of all, it is exceptional that residents of deprived neighbourhoods organize themselves at the national level. In many other EU member states this proves not to be the case. Secondly, up to two times, the LSA has used the occasion to position itself within the *European* (urban) arena, in order to underline its interests in European urban policy. This is remarkable as the LSA positions itself as a platform that wants to influence the Dutch Big Cities Policy. It is a very clear example of a politics of scale that does not only occur within the national policy arena, but also within the European policy arena.

8.6 Conclusion

In the foregoing, three 'arenas' from within which The Hague operates have been discussed: the European urban policy arena, the wider European arena and the International arena. In the early 1990s, the attention for these arenas from The Hague's municipal organization was not only relatively modest, the initiatives related to them were also hardly connected to each other. European matters were almost completely

absent on the political agenda. Besides, European and international matters were not discussed coherently and rested with different departments, with their own budgets.

The Hague's administrators have developed a more manifest interest in Europe only after the Treaty of Maastricht. In 1993, the city became a member of Eurocities and, from within this European network, it started a more explicit positioning within the European urban policy arena. While The Hague still positioned itself in 1993 as an entity undergoing European influence and while it was still primarily occupied with acquiring European subsidies, this seems to be the basis for the development into a city that positions itself as an actor; as an entity that influences European policy within the European urban policy arena. In terms of dimensions of Europeanization, the pro-active attitude towards the European Union has increased. Only much later, around 2000, organizational readjustments to match this stronger focus on Europe followed.

The Eurocities membership was also a learning experience for determining the ways of positioning of the city in the wider European arena. In this arena, The Hague is gradually operating more explicitly towards Europe collectively, albeit now as G4. Appointments of administrators from The Hague in the boards of European city networks and of the Committee of the Regions have reinforced this development. At the end of the 1990s, one could observe not only a collective but also a more individual positioning of the city within the wider European arena. The Hague now positioned itself not so much in terms of problems, but in terms of opportunities; not so much as an entity undergoing European influence (passive), but as an entity that influenced European policy (active). Within the wider European arena, there was also a more clear politics of scale performed by administrators of The Hague, both at the level of the G4 as well as at the level of the region. The latter, however, has changing connotations (*Randstad, Randstad (Holland), Deltametropool, Haaglanden*, The Hague's agglomeration, etc), which makes positioning at this level less univocal and thus less powerful.

The URBAN programme was initiated at a moment in time when the interest for Europe of the administrators of The Hague was still in its infancy. It was therefore to a large degree an official, and not an administrative, matter. Besides, the programme was written by a project group concerned with urban renewal, in which, alongside 'authorized officials' also other parties were seated. Substantially and organizationally, it was a rather self-contained programme, without the presence of a political arena from within which The Hague explicitly positioned itself or others in any particular way. The local authorities only used the programme to acquire European funding. In other words, although 'place' and 'scale' were present, 'politics' were still absent at that moment; that would gain momentum only later.

The European urban policy discourse that accompanied the URBAN programme and that offered numerous helping hands to the cities ('partners of the European Commission') was not seized by the local authorities; there was simply not enough interest and the possible 'strategic' value for self positioning of the city (The Hague as an important partner of the European Commission) was not recognised. Up to that moment, the URBAN programme was positioned primarily in terms of money; as 'co-financing of BCP,' as a chance to implement the remaining urban renewal projects.

The increasing positioning of The Hague within the international arena is something that gained momentum relatively late. The motivation for stronger positioning within that arena was primarily inspired by the problematic economic position of The Hague in the early 1990s. Hence the self positioning was initially filled in from within an economic perspective. Only at the end of the 1990s, the local authorities started engaging 'municipality-wide' in 'The Hague International City' as a product, and to position itself univocally in this capacity. In the following years, the administration intensified its European and international positioning. Remarkable in this respect, was the passion that the entire board seemed to share. Around 2000, readjustments of the (administrative and official) municipal organization followed, which supported the new international direction taken. The official 'crown' on the reinforcement of The Hague's international position was the Bureau of International Matters (*BIZ*). It was established in 2003 and concentrated finances, competences, tasks and activities, for both international and European matters. Only with that conglomeration, room was created for an unambiguous 'European' or 'International' discourse, produced by policy makers of the City of The Hague. Sources from after 2000 seem, indeed, to point in this direction.

Finally, in this research, no examples have been found of a politics of scale in the European urban policy arena from within non-governmental parties at the level of the Schilderswijk. There has been no instance of a certain grouping or organization (housing corporations, residents' associations, entrepreneurs associations, etc) that, in the context of the URBAN programme and on the premise of a supposed involvement with the target area, has organized on a certain scale in order to claim administrative involvement. The positioning of the LSA is, by the way, a very good example of a politics of scale within the European urban policy arena, but this positioning took place on a much higher scale (not at the level of the City of The Hague or levels below). An explanation for the absence of a politics of scale of non-governmental actor at the district level could be that there was no reason for groupings and organizations to try to get a position in this European urban policy arena; they had, after all, from within their formal position in the urban renewal project group, stood at the foundation of the majority of the projects later implemented as part of the URBAN programme. Another explanation could be that the URBAN programme took place in an ethnically mixed, social-economic weak neighbourhood with a strong reception function for newcomers. Organizations of 'new' (read: foreign) residents in the district were, at that moment, possibly not organized enough yet to raise a critical mass and claim involvement.

CHAPTER 9

9. The City of Amsterdam

9.1 Introduction

In the 1990s, the Amsterdam economy grew and so did local employment; major infrastructural improvements were carried out and the capacity for industrial accommodation increased. The population was growing and so was the housing stock. Apart from that, prospects for the nearby future were good. At the same time this prosperous economy contrasted sharply with an unmanageable unemployment, especially among ethnic minorities; poverty; an increase of the homeless and (feelings of) insecurity. Middle-class residents left the city. There were discussions on an imminent social divide (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999a).

This social divide, feared for at the level of the city was in spatial sense already a reality in specific areas: in the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, for example, over time a visible spatial divide had developed between a highly problematic residential area to the east of the railroad and a successful business area to the west of the railroad. The residential area, known as 'the Bijlmermeer,' was a distressed neighbourhood, with a concentration of urban problems. In this area, home to a large share of ethnic minorities, the population was relatively poorly educated and many of them were unemployed and relying on welfare. Over time, the neighbourhood had degenerated and was now coping with problems such as criminality, vandalism, drug abuse, etc. It was even characterized as "the most problematic neighbourhood of the Netherlands" (Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1994, 3). At the same time, the business park at the other side of the railroad, usually referred to as 'Amsterdam Zuidoost', was developing into one of the centres of crucial importance for the economy of the City of Amsterdam, in terms of the provision of employment, housing industry and commerce, head offices of multinationals and many middle-sized and small businesses. However, a large part of the people employed in the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District did not live there, but commuted to and from this area. Thus at the same time, the city district was characterized by a large number of (office) jobs, mostly occupied by employees who resided elsewhere, and a large number of (often poorly educated) unemployed residents within the area.

Not surprisingly, it was this particular area, the Bijlmermeer, that was selected for an application for European funding in 1994, within the framework of the Community Initative URBAN. The URBAN Bijlmermer programme started in 1995 and was embedded in the major Bijlmermeer renewal operation that had started a few years earlier, in 1992. The URBAN programme was implemented under the heading of social-economic renewal, in (financial) coherence with the Dutch Big Cities Policy. However, as will become clear later in this chapter, from the outset, there was a public

outcry by the local population against the organization structure of the URBAN programme: under the collective identity of 'being black' an active group of people lodged a protest against the programme. The protest resulted in a heated discussion and caused a huge delay in the implementation of the programme. The latter had to undergo serious changes before it could be continued.

Focusing on Amsterdam, on the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and on the Bijlmermeer in particular, one of the main goals of this chapter is to get insight in the way in which the URBAN policy process has developed over time. How has this happened, as related to the various local contexts in which the programmes was embedded, such as the social-economic context; the decentralized institutional context of Amsterdam and the various policy frameworks, developed at the city and the city district level? A second goal of this chapter relates to getting a better understanding of the discourse at this level: of the meanings assigned to Amsterdam (or Amsterdam Zuidoost, or the Bijlmermeer); of the ways of (self)positioning and of a possible politics of scale that they reveal within the European *urban* policy arena and within the wider European arena.

In the following sections, first an introduction will be given of the City of Amsterdam and of the Bijlmermeer neighbourhood, in terms of the most important physical and social-economic developments of the last decennia, the local institutional context and administrative initiatives and policy frameworks (sections 9.2 and 9.3). As an important part of these contexts, attention will also be paid to the extent in which Amsterdam seeks its European and international context. In section 9.4, the European URBAN Bijlmermeer programme itself will be the focus of attention. Section 9.5 reports the discourse analysis of local meanings assigned to place and ways of (self) positioning of various actors in the European (urban) policy arena. Finally, conclusions will be drawn in section 9.6.

9.2 The City of Amsterdam[117]

Amsterdam is the largest city of the Netherlands. From an international point of view, however, it is a relatively small city, with merely about 743,000 inhabitants (www.os.amsterdam.nl).

Amsterdam has a long naval and trade history and for centuries the city has been a financial centre of a major economy. This situation had its peak in the years 1585-1672, the period that the city flourished to a large extent. During this 'Golden Century' (*Gouden Eeuw*) Amsterdam was the staplemarket of the world. Nearly all the goods that were traded in the world were stored in Amsterdam (www.bma.amsterdam.nl) in a large number of warehouses. These buildings are still to be seen, now often converted into luxurious residential apartments.

In the Amsterdam region the economic strength still lies, to this day, in the cluster of trade and transport (Schiphol airport, internethub, harbour activities), as well as in commercial and financial service industries at the international level. Nowadays,

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[117] Parts of this chapter were published earlier in: Dukes 2001, 2002a, 2002b; Musterd and Dukes 2002; Tosics and Dukes 2005.

the new international connections concerning information and telecommunication fulfill a crucial role.

In the competiton between municipal regions in Europe in the 21st century, the historically rich inner-city is often claimed to be a trump card: it is an important node of national and international culture and trade, with high concentrations of specialized professional skills and economic expertise. It has been the leading centre of culture and education and the cradle of multicultural cosmopolitanism in the Netherlands. Furthermore, it is an attractive area for small service-oriented firms and a very popular place for tourists, conferences and art exhibitions (Deben and Van der Vaart 2000).

At the same time, because of its 'monumental' qualities, the inner city is somewhat static in an urban sense, having very few possibilities for changing or extending. For that reason, over the past twenty years, many offices and specialized economic activities have moved to new functional centres on the urban periphery, such as Amsterdam Zuidoost and the *Zuidas* (Deben and Van der Vaart 2000; Gemeente Amsterdam 2001c) or even further.

From the mid 1990s on, the growth of the economy accelerated which resulted in an increasing prosperity in Amsterdam. The so-called Zuidas in the southern part of the city played an important role in this process. In that newly developed area, a lot of space was given to office buildings, to strengthen the economic capacity of the city. At the same time there were new developments in the northern part along the IJ-borders, meant to give a strong impulse to cultural life and to the stream of tourists (Passengers Terminal Amsterdam, a Music Centre, plans for a new Central Library). Employment increased tremendously; an increase that could be attributed to the growth of the business service sector in particular. Both unemployment and the number of people on welfare declined in the course of the 1990s. At the same time, however, the gap between the underprivileged and the privileged remained. There were also problems concerning the housing market; accessibility of the city; vacancies that were hard to fill and the quality of the public sector (Gemeente Amsterdam 2001c). Besides, more recently, due to the economic downturn the number of unemployed and people on welfare has increased (Aalbers et al. 2003).

Political debates and the political agenda of the 1990s reflect these issues. There were discussions, among other things, about the following subjects:

- *The regionalisation of Amsterdam*
  For decennia regionalisation had already been a subject of discussion, but in the 1990s it gained more and more attention, when the formation of a City Province of Amsterdam seemed to be at hand. That plan foundered as it became clear that there was hardly any public base for it among the population. From then the attention focused on co-operation of Amsterdam and the surrounding municipalities within the ROA, aimed at dealing with various items such as mobility, accessibility, housing etc. instead.

- *Renewal and the quality of Administration*
  In the 1980s and 1990s, city districts were introduced in connection with the regionalisation of Amsterdam. The attempt to find the best way to realize the

co-operation between the city and the city districts has been a recurring item on the agenda, especially since the result of the referendum about establishing a city province turned out to be negative. In the same way the quality of the Amsterdam institutional context got continual attention.

- *Prevention of a (spatial) divide in the city*
  For many years the administration has reflected on preventing (and fighting) a divide between the (underprivileged) poor and the (privileged) rich, and on the instruments that could be used in this respect, such as economic growth (by which employment, prosperity and welfare can be created). Improving participation in various forms was another item, together with a stronger emphasis on 'multi-cultural' policy, etc. In the early 2000s this debate put on a completely different aspect after the attack on the American 'Twin Towers', followed by the attack on the Dutchman Theo van Gogh three years later. The issues terrorism and safety got a much higher place on the agenda.

- *Harmonizing economic growth, labour and housing market*
  Attracting and retaining expertise in relation to employment and housing: in the process of urban restructuring (from the second half of the 'nineties), building for high-income groups was explicitly included.

- *Positioning of Amsterdam*
  Amsterdam had to optimize her competitive position in relation to other urban areas in Europe. For that reason there have been extensive debates on improving the city's image, with an emphasis on diversity, international orientation, culture and freedom; on creating a favourable situation for the location of international main offices (unique city centre, Amsterdam as a (creative) centre of knowledge, as a city providing a good ambience for innovation) and on offering tourists an attractive (clean and safe) city.

After this somewhat general impression of the state of affairs of the city in the present and recent past, in the following, attention will be paid to important developments that have shaped the City of Amsterdam. First, attention will be paid to physical and social-economic developments (sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 respectively). Then the institutional context of Amsterdam, with its subdivision in city districts, will be discussed (section 9.2.3). Next, administrative initiatives and policy frameworks will be addressed in section 9.2.4.

To start with, how has Amsterdam developed over time in terms of physical changes?

9.2.1 Physical Developments

Many of the buildings in the city centre of Amsterdam were built before 1870. Until about that time, the city stretched out no further than the Singelgracht; Amsterdam had no need for enlarging her territory (Bakker and Van de Poll 1992). This changed in the middle of the 19th century, due to the industrial revolution, which gave a tremendous

impulse to a great number of harbour and trade activities. This economic revival attracted many blue-collar workers, increasing the demand for cheap, (rented) houses. For that reason, from 1870, large working-class areas were built. After 1900 the population of Amsterdam kept growing in absolute sense. This lead to a number of large city extensions. Most of them were meant for the public housing sector, such as the *tweede Plan-Zuid* of H.P. Berlage (1917); the annexation of territory and the building of houses north of Amsterdam (from 1921); the *Ring '20-'40*; the *Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan* (*AUP*)(1935) and the *Structuurplan Noord* (1958) (Menzel 1989; Bakker and Van de Poll 1992; Van der Veer 1997; www.gemeentearchief.amsterdam.nl).

In spite of these large systematic extensions of the city, the housing shortage has constantly been an issue on the Amsterdam political agenda in the years after World War II. No wonder, that in the 1950s the Amsterdam Municipality came to the conclusion that expanding the city's territory was inevitable. Seeking a solution to this problem, the local authorities focused on annexation of surrounding territories, one of them being the Bijlmermeer. There were other arguments for these plans, apart from the shortage of houses. The city struggled with a 19th century housing stock that was not only insufficient but also dated. Urban renewal was therefore necessary and the inhabitants would (temporarily) have to move elsewhere. Over the years the arguments for annexation of the Bijlmermeer changed, but this did not effect the plans in any way. After a struggle that lasted many years[118] the Bijlmermeer was 'temporarily' added to Amsterdam in 1965. After a year the building of a new neighbourhood started; a neighbourhood that was meant for about 100,000 inhabitants. Only in 1974, when the building of the high-rise blocks was more or less finished, the temporary allocation of the Bijlmermeer to Amsterdam became a permanent one (Brakenhoff et al. 1991; Van der Veer 1997).

In the 1960s there was a strong growth of the disposable income. People got more time for leisure activities and their mobility increased. The result was that more space was used and that people preferred to live at a longer distance from work. This increase of scale had its effect on the housing market. Many families (especially young middle-class families) decided to make use of the expanded prosperity. Preferring a single family home, many left the city to settle in other municipalities in the Amsterdam region. After a peak in 1959 (870,000 inhabitants) the population of the City of Amsterdam decreased (Mentzel 1989; Brakenhoff et al. 1991; Van der Meer 1997).

For decades, Amsterdam had had an exceptionally high share of public housing. However, the housing stock became an ever-growing problem, due to an increasing discrepancy between what was offered and what was needed. No wonder that urban renewal policy, an issue on the Amsterdam agenda from about 1970, based on which vast areas in the city have been thoroughly renewed, had to make way for 'urban restructuring policy' in the course of the years. The latter aims at realizing a larger variety of dwellings; at building in a more compact way and at mixing functions (Musterd and Dukes 2002).

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[118] For an elaborate analysis, see Van der Veer (1997).

Summarizing, it can be stated that Amsterdam has had large-scale and systematic urban expansions since 1900. Up to about ten years ago the city produced an exceptionally high share of public housing, even when it seemed that the need for housing was changing. Only from the second half of the 1990s, the emphasis lies on more differentiated housing.

Next, how has Amsterdam developed over time in terms of physical, social and economic developments?

9.2.2 Social and Economic Developments

Since the 1960s, there have been some highly important social and economic developments, with far reaching consequences for the City of Amsterdam. These concern, first of all, a decrease in industrial activities and an increase in service activities and secondly, a process of large scale foreign immigration. What have been their consequences, in terms of jobs and the composition of the local population?

Table 9.A Share of employment (in jobs) by sector in the Amsterdam Municipality in 2001 (in percentages) (Aalbers et al. 2003)

Sector	%
Industry (and agriculture)	5
Construction	3
Publishing and press	2
Wholesale and distributive trade	3
Retail trade	7
Hotel and catering industry	6
Transportation and telecom	8
Banks and insurance	6
Business services	16
Government, public sector	7
Education, university	7
Health, welfare, environment	13
Social services, culture, sports, recreation	7
Other services	7
Others/unknown	3
Total (N=368,370)	100

In the 1970s and 1980s there has been a drastic restructuring of the industrial and harbour activities. This has resulted in a considerable reduction of labour force in Amsterdam in these sectors. At the same time, industrial activities spread out to other

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parts of the region or even further. The share of the industrial sector in the Amsterdam economy decreased from more than 20 percent in 1970 to merely 10 percent in 1999. While the industry is presently still important as a source of employment, its importance has thus strongly reduced, drastically changing the face of the Amsterdam economy. At the same time, there has been a strong increase in the importance of aviation and related sectors and in business and financial service industries. The rise of the information and communication sector and the unruly growth of the multimedia are the most conspicuous examples (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999a).

This decreasing employment in the industrial sector and an increasing employment in sectors such as services, information and communication and multimedia, have resulted in a substantial loss of jobs among the relatively low educated part of the labour force and in an increasing demand for a relatively high educated labour force.

These drastic economic changes together with a growing prosperity, also effected the housing market in the way of changes and/or problems. The housing stock (for a large part consisting of public housing) was no longer connected with the demand. As mentioned before, a growing number of middle and high-income families left the city (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999a).

As compared to other cities, Amsterdam has never had a uniform industrial profile. Instead, the Dutch capital has always been characterized by a relatively strong financial sector and by the presence of cultural industries, tourists and other consumption related sections of the economy (Aalbers *et al*. 2003). In view of table 9.A, employment in the Amsterdam Municipality is spread over a mixture of sectors; 'Business services' standing out in importance.

There were other developments that have had a strong influence on Amsterdam, namely the foreign migration, a process that started in 1960. In that year the first guest workers (*gastarbeiders*) came to live in the city. From the early 1960s on they were recruited in countries such as Morocco and Turkey. Also after the oil crisis of 1973, when labour recruitment was terminated, immigration continued, now based on family reunification and the immigration of marriage partners. As described earlier in the chapter on The Hague, in the 1960s also the labour migration from Surinam started . There were two peaks: preceding Surinam's independence (1975) and before a visa was required (1980). Between 1982 and 1992 non-Dutch immigration sharply increased, mainly caused by the arrival of asylum seekers (Musterd and Muus 1995). However, during the past years the admittance policy has been tightened up; not only for as related to asylum seeking, but also concerning requests for admittance of immigrants' family members. This has resulted in a drastic decrease of registered newcomers since 1993 (Gemeente Amsterdam 1996). In search of jobs or cheap housing, many of these non-Dutch immigrants settled in one of the four major cities. Often ended up in a neighbourhood with a concentration of immigrants.

The City of Amsterdam has the largest proportion of immigrants of all Dutch cities. By 1998 it was 44 percent, including immigrants from industrialized countries. About 34 percent of the population in Amsterdam belonged to so-called ethnic

minority groups[119] (Musterd and Smakman 2000). In 2005 this percentage had increased to almost 40 percent (www.os.amsterdam.nl).

Comparing the four main ethnic groups, the Surinamese formed the largest immigrant group, although especially the number of Moroccans has strongly increased in recent years (see table 9.B). The Surinamese and Antilleans have been concentrated in the southeastern part of the city (Musterd and Smakman 2000; see also O+S 2000).

Table 9 B Immigrants in the Netherlands and in Amsterdam, January 1, 1997 and January 1, 2005 (in numbers (round up) and percentages) (Musterd and Smakman 2000; www.cbs.nl; www.os.amsterdam.nl)

	1997 (N)	1997 (%)	2005 [120] (N)	2005 (%)
Amsterdam				
Surinamese	70,000	24	71,000	22
Turks	31,000	11	38,000	11
Moroccans	49,000	21	65,000	21
Antilleans	11,000	12	12,000	9
Netherlands				
Surinamese	287,000	100	328,300	100
Turks	280,000	100	357,900	100
Moroccans	233,000	100	314,700	100
Antilleans	95,000	100	129,700	100

The Surinamese population in Amsterdam consists predominantly of Afro-Surinamese, although the share of Hindu-Surinamese has grown since 1974: the shares of Afro-Surinamese and Hindu-Surinamese within the total Surinamese population in Amsterdam amounted to respectively 95 and 5 percent in 1970. In 1994 this was about 70 and 26 percent respectively[121] (Vermeulen 2005).

The thriving economy of the mid and late 1990s, did not affect the population in an even way. In the early 2000s, the Surinamese and Antilleans did relatively well as compared to other ethnic groups: at the level of the City of Amsterdam, the share of unemployed job-seekers among Surinamese, as a percentage of the potential labour force of this ethnic group, was even somewhat below the share of unemployed among

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[119] In the Netherlands, persons who are born themselves (or one of their parents) in Surinam, the Antilles, Turkey, Morocco, southern Europe or in other non-industrialized countries, are classified as 'ethnic minorities' (Musterd and Smakman 2000).

[120] For the Netherlands the data were derived from www.cbs.nl: Garssen, Nicolaas and Spranger 2005. For Amsterdam, the data were derived from O+S.

[121] The resulting shares concerned other ethnic Surinamese groups, mainly Javanese or Chinese-Surinamese (see Vermeulen 2005).

the 'indigenous' Dutch. Unemployment among Turks and Moroccans, on the other hand, had remained very high.

Table 9.C Unemployed in Amsterdam, per ethnic group, as a percentage of the
potential Labour force per ethnic group, January 1, 2003-2005
(www.os.amsterdam.nl)

Just like other European cities, Amsterdam has had serious concerns about the increasing social and spatial separation between rich and poor inhabitants. Moreover, this divide followed an ethnic pattern with a concentration in specific areas. To the opinion of the local authorities of Amsterdam it was their duty to create a 'complete' city; vital and at the same time strong in the social field (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999a). For that reason, over the past years many policy initiatives have taken place, consisting of a large variety of physical, social and economic measures, in order to enhance the vitality of the city and to counteract the spatial and social divide (Musterd and Dukes 2002). Nevertheless, this social divide is stated to have deepened and is thus still an issue of major concern (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004b).

Next, an important question is: what is the local institutional context like and what have been important developments as related to this particular context?

9.2.3 The Local Institutional Context
The City of Amsterdam has a layered administration, consisting of a central (municipal) level and a city district level. This structure, with an administration at two levels, is unique as compared to other Dutch cities. Moreover, as we will see later in this chapter, it has important consequences for the way in which policy is developed and implemented in Amsterdam.

The Municipal Level
The central city administration is headed by a City Council that consists of 45 members, who represent divergent political parties. This City Council, elected every four years, chooses the board of Mayor and Aldermen (the Executive Committee).

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Their task consists (among others) of shaping frameworks and of supervising. They also have duties in the field of representing the Amsterdam community. During the 1990s, the Aldermen were still members of the City Council, but since the introduction of the '*Wet Dualisering Gemeentebestuur*' in 2002, they are not any longer (Boelens and Geensen 2005).

The official organization of Amsterdam consists of 38 central departments. Additionally, the Administrative Services (*bestuursdienst*) functions as an intermediary between the central city administration and the municipal departments, organizations and city districts. In this capacity, Administrative Services is responsible for the implementation of administrative decision making processes. Another task consists of guiding and supporting the municipal organization (Boelens and Geensen 2005).

For decades, the administration of Amsterdam has been dominated by the Labour Party (PvdA). This is also reflected in the political origin of its Mayors. In the last two decades these have been: Mr Ed van Thijn (Mayor from 1983 until 1994), Mr Schelto Patijn (1994-2001) and Mr Job Cohen (2001-).

The City Districts

In 1982, an Amsterdam Alderman (Walter Etty) proposed to create a city province for the Amsterdam urban agglomeration. The idea was, first to subdivide Amsterdam into city districts and then to establish a new province, within which the Amsterdam city districts would become municipalities. Finally, the territory of the province would be extended to cover the urban region. While the subdivision of Amsterdam into city districts indeed began in 1982, the rest of the plan was not implemented. This was partly due to the fact that the Municipality had not consulted with neighbouring municipalities before announcing the plan, partly because many municipalities rejected Amsterdam's proposals in terms of power and responsibilities (Barlow 2000).

In the early 1980s, the first city districts were established in Amsterdam. It was expected that these city districts, with their own administration, would contribute to more efficient and effective decision making and would be less costly than the existing system. Their establishment was also a response to growing local pressure to bring government closer to the neighbourhoods (www.amsterdam.nl; Barlow 2000).

On July 13, 1994, the City Council decided to start establishing a city province, consisting of Amsterdam and 14 surrounding municipalities. This new entity would be operational from January 1, 1998. The city districts and also the city centre would be autonomous and the whole conglomeration would be headed by a new regional administration, a direct elected city province (Gemeente Amsterdam 1996c). However, a large majority rejected the plan via a referendum held on May 17, 1995. The city districts remained but they did not obtain the status of an autonomous municipality.

At present, the City of Amsterdam is subdivided in fifteen city districts. Fourteen of them are headed by their own administration, including an elected city district Council and an Executive Committee[122]. They are accomodated in city district

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[122] City District Westpoort, the western harbour area of Amsterdam, merely has about 400 inhabitants and does not have its own administration. It falls under the administrative authority of the central city instead.

offices (*stadsdeelkantoren*) in the city districts. These serve as an office window (*loket*) for the residents, for issues such as passports, driving licences, registration of birth or applications for licences.

Map 9 D Amsterdam in 15 city districts (Aalbers et al. 2003)

Every city district has its own administration and official organization. The administration functions in a similar way to the central city administration. The city cistrict Council members are elected every four years, by the residents in the city district who are entitled to vote. The number of seats in a city district Council depends on the number of inhabitants in the city district. The elections for the city district Council and City Council take place at the same time. The Executive Committees of the city districts, responsible for the daily implementation of the policy as agreed by the city district council, consist of four or five city district Aldermen and a chair. Just like the municipalities, the city districts now work in a dualistic way. This was thus not the case yet during the implementation of the URBAN programme. The Executive Committee is supported by an administrative organization of civil servants and by its head, the city district clerk.

Comparing the position of the mayor chair of a city and the chair of a city district, the latter is chosen by the City District Council, as opposed to the mayor, who is appointed by the Crown. Besides, the city district chair does not preside the City

District Council, while the mayor is the chair of the City Council. Finally, the city district chair has less authority than the mayor (www.amsterdam.nl).

While the City Council decides on the municipal budget and on the distribution of government revenues among the dity districts, it has decentralized a number of powers to the city districts: they are responsible for the supervision of public space; they decree zoning schemes and decide to a large extent on policy related to art, sport and social care. However, in some cases powers have not been delegated as they cannot be delegated for legal reasons (like the decision on the municipal budget); should not be delegated for practical reasons (like the water supply); or are necessary to keep at the municipal level in order to guard or enhance city cohesion (for example in case of metropolitan projects) (www.amsterdam.nl). The city districts receive an annual payment from the Municipality, emanating from the city district fund (*Stadsdeelfonds*) that was established in 1991. Additionally, they get 'specific payments' from the Municipality. Besides they have their own (modest) revenues, for instance by charging the collection of garbage (Boelens and Geensen 2005).

According to Barlow (2000), the city districts have quite a strong role in planning and, as opposed to decentralized structures in other Dutch cities, receive substantial financial resources from the Municipality. He therefore argues that the larger city districts are comparable to suburban municipalities, in terms of population size and financial resources. But there has also been criticism on the administrative system: in 1997, the 'Tops Committee' established that various parts of the system required improvement, such as the administrative fine-tuning between the city and the city districts and the representativeness of the system (Commissie Tops 1997). Barlow (2000) questions the actual authority of the city districts, by pointing at the fact that "their financial resources are part of Amsterdam's entitlement from the central government's municipal fund" (Barlow 2000, 278) and that their powers can be withdrawn by the city at any time[123].

Also the extent of decentralization from the Municipality towards the city districts has seriously been questioned. In an interview with a former Amsterdam Alderman, even he argued: "We get money from the [national – TD] government and (are) not free to spend it. So that generates the first set of rules. And we spend our own money, but we also develop policy and plans for the goals that we want to reach. So that generates the second set of rules. And the [city]district government, the Council is not free at all to choose what they can do for it and what not. So, as a matter of fact they have just limited freedom." Also a high-ranking official, formerly working with the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District organization, expressed his scepsis regarding the extent of intra municipal decentralisation and illustrated it with the decision making process around urban policy: "The City district chair cannot make big, big decisions. She has to go and get agreement from the Aldermen in the city hall, for urban renewal, for big cities policy, for Objective 2 programmes." The municipal administration is aware of the fact that financial decentralization still requires improvement. In the present (2002-2006) Programme Agreement of the Amsterdam Municipality, it has been formulated as one of the aims.

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[123] See also '*Verordening op de stadsdelen*,' art. 49, hfd XVII (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005).

The municipal administration takes various initiatives and disposes of many policy frameworks, that concern Amsterdam as a whole as well as specific areas. These will be discussed next.

9.2.4 Administrative Initiatives and Policy Frameworks

First, attention will be paid to the emphasis in the three programme agreements of the Amsterdam City Councils from 1990 until 2002. Then, because of the specific interest in the European URBAN programme, explicit attention will be paid to the initiatives that Amsterdam has taken in recent years, in relation to both its European and its International Context. As the European funding in the URBAN programme has been combined with Big Cities Policy money, next, the local elaboration of this Dutch area-based urban policy framework will be analysed. Finally, other policy documents related to local urban development programmes will be briefly discussed. First of all, what was the main focus in the programme agreements from about 1990 on?

Programme Agreements

A connecting thread in the programme agreements of het 1990s was the prevention of an (imminent) social divide, especially by stimulating and creating employment. Additionally, all the programmes pay attention to various other issues, such as: spatial development (infrastructure, public space and more differentiated housing); safety; transportation, mobility and parking issues; education; care; culture; environmental issues and the relationship between the central city and the city districts.

Programme Agreement 1990-1994

The programme agreement of 1990-1994 was concerned with two main issues: firstly, with the fight against severe unemployment, especially among low-income groups; secondly, with the regional economy of Amsterdam that required strengthening, by attracting new companies, by the growth of Schiphol airport, by an extension of the RAI conference centre, etc. The main policy instrument in this period, implemented in coherence with urban renewal, was labelled 'social renewal' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1990a).

Programme Agreement 1994-1998

Also between 1994-1998 the fight against unemployment was a spearhead of the city administration. The flourishing economy during this period, definitely proved profitable for improving the unemployment situation. Other issues that got much attention were the improvement of liveability and safety in the city, as well as seriously improving the level of education in Amsterdam. Not surprisingly, much attention was paid to the administrative impact of the transformation from the existing ROA organization into a city province, as was planned for 1998 (Gemeente Amsterdam 1994a).

Programme Agreement 1998-2002

The programme agreement of 1998-2002 seemed to be a continuation of the former programme agreement, with strong investments in the creation of employment and in improving the level of education, in order to fight unemployment. Besides, once more,

a lot of attention is paid to safety, among others at the level of the neighbourhoods. More explicit in this programme than in the preceding one, were the spearheads of improving the social infrastructure and fighting poverty. The region now came to the fore in relation to transportation and mobility issues only, and not any longer as an administrative issue. In terms of economic development, the emphasis was now more on the city economy than on the regional economy (Gemeente Amsterdam 1998b).

Comparing the three programme agreements, strikingly, none of them pays any explicit attention to 'Europe'. European affairs do not come to the fore in the portfolios of the political parties as proposed for the future aldermen. Also international contacts hardly get any attention. Depending on the programme agreement, they are either part of the portfolio of the mayor or of the portfolio of an alderman.

Even though the focus on European and international issues in the programme agreements of the 1990s is remarkably low, at the same time, the physical, social and economic developments in Amsterdam can not be viewed in isolation from the European and international context in which Amsterdam operates. In 1998, the then Alderman of Economic Affairs, Pauline Krikke, characterized the improvement of Amsterdam's international position in Europe as *essential* for the development of the city (Euromagazine 1998). Besides, during the 1990s, Amsterdam had a Mayor with a specific interest in European issues (Patijn). Therefore, even though these subjects were lacking in the programme agreements, it does not imply that no initiatives were taken at all. An interesting question is therefore: which initiatives have been taken in this sense, in the 1990s and 2000s?

Amsterdam seeks its European Context

In the first years of the 1990s, the Eurotop in Maastricht, to be held in 1992, and with it the planned European market without internal borders came in sight. This made clear that it was high time for Amsterdam to accentuate her profile in relation to Europe more explicitly.

In 1990 the City of Amsterdam produced her first 'European' policy document, entitled '*Nota Amsterdam in de Europese Gemeenschappen*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1990c). A version of this document was made especially for international use. On May 23, 1990, Mayor Ed van Thijn and Alderman Jonker presented the document to Bruce Millan, the then Euro-commissioner for Regional Policy, in the International Press Centre in Brussels. In this document Amsterdam positioned itself individually and directly in the European policy arena. Two years later the brochure '*Perspectief voor Amsterdam: Amsterdamse initiatieven in het tijdperk van de Europese eenwording*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1992) was published, a document containing a list of projects (in the field of industrial areas, housing stock, accessibility and the city centre) on the basis of which Amsterdam intended to develop the city into 'one of the European top locations.' In a discussion with the Euro-commissioner, preceding the presentation in 1990, concrete possibilities for co-operation of the EU and Amsterdam came up. This resulted in a financial contribution of 80,000 guilders (about 36,300 euros) for organizing the congress of the Union of Capitals of the European Community (the

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present UCUE), an event that took place in Amsterdam in 1990 (Eurolink bulletin 1990).

On that moment there was already a sum of 12 million guilders (about 5,4 million euros) coming to Amsterdam, emanating from the ERDF in connection with the European 'Renaval programme'. The northern part of Amsterdam was one of the places where the Renaval programma was carried out. These first ERDF-funds were appropriated to the shipbuilding industry that was to change over to other activities. Earlier, in 1989, an application for subsidizing this project had been submitted to the European Commission by the Province of Noord-Holland, the City of Amsterdam and the City District of Amsterdam Noord. Co-financing was required and so money from other contributors also came in; from the private sector and from the Dutch authorities collectively (Eurolink bulletin 1990). Apart from the ERDF-funds the City of Amsterdam was also receiving money from the European Social Fund (ESF), to be appropriated for education of the unemployed in the Amsterdam region. This subsidy amounted to about 2,3 million euros in 1989 and to about 5,4 million euros in 1990 (Eurolink bulletin 1990).

Since the Renaval programme Amsterdam has gradually obtained more experience with European programmes on which ERDF-funds were spent: the URBAN-I programme in the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer (1994-1996), the URBAN-II programme '*West Binnen de Ring*' (2000-2006) and the Objective 2 programmes '*Groot Oost*' and '*Bijlmer and Amstel III*' (2000-2006). Amsterdam has also once more received ESF-funds in connection with the ESF-3 programme.

On behalf of Amsterdam, the Alderman for Economic Affairs is in charge of European affairs. As a result of the earlier mentioned 1990 policy document on 'Europe' the local authorities established 'Bureau Eurolink,' a new organization that was incorporated in the Economic Affairs department of the Amsterdam Municipality. The task of this bureau consisted of intensifying the relation between Amsterdam and the European Union. Eurolink stimulates participation of Amsterdam in European programmes and networks, by way of providing information; by a lobbyist in Brussels and by professional support for drawing up project-proposals. Moreover, it gives advice concerning Europe and effects influence on European policy, for instance via networks (Gemeente Amsterdam 2003a). With these activities the bureau does not aim at obtaining European subsidies only; anticipating on European regulation and implementing these rules also belongs to its task. Bureau Eurolink aims at being an information-bureau for officials, administrators and, if it so happens, for outsiders. Until the mid 2000s, the staff was rather limited, as officials go: only 2,5 FTE. Therefore professional help from outside the bureau was chartered if necessary, such as ERAC[124]. Ten times a year Bureau Eurolink brings out the '*Eurolink Memo*' with actual information on new European programmes, projects and developments. Besides, until the end of 2005 another publication used to come out a few times a year, called '*Euromagazine.*' It contained thematic information on Europe and European projects in Amsterdam. Meanwhile the publication of this magazine has stopped. Its successor,

[124] ERAC (European Regional Affairs Consultants) advises and supports companies and governments in drawing up, implementing and managing programmes and projects, financed with (often European) subsidies (www.erac.nl).

published by the G4, is called '*G4 in Europa*' (www.ez.amsterdam.nl). On the website of the Amsterdam Municipality one can find Bureau Eurolink under Amsterdam and Europe, subsumed under the Economic Affairs department.

Illustration 9.E Logo Eurolink

Eurolink thus fulfills a crucial role for the City of Amsterdam; through this bureau the city positions itself as a party for the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Permanent Representative and the Committee of the Regions (Gemeente Amsterdam 2003b). Besides, since 1999 Eurolink has a lobbyist in Brussels; an official representative who is stationed there for three days a week. He was in fact the first person to represent a Dutch city in Brussels. As he himself puts it, according to European standards it was high time. During an interview he said: "From the Dutch point of view I was pioneering in Brussels, but from the European point of view I was very late indeed. I saw empty seats everywhere which Amsterdam could have taken." Initially he was housed in the building of the Dutch provinces (HNP), but later he got his own office. Since 2003 the G4 have a joint office in Brussels (see Chapter 6).

For years Amsterdam has also been active as regards European city networks. In this field too Eurolink has a key role but this does not hold for the network of European capital cities. Right from the start of the European Union, Amsterdam has had a regular contact with other European capitals. Since 1961 the city has these contacts also via the Union of Capitals of the European Union (UCUE) network (see also Chapter 7). This network, consisting now of the 25 capitals of the European Union as members, was created to preserve continuous links between the European capitals and to encourage communication between the inhabitants in order to develop the living feeling of European solidarity. The UCEU consists of a rotating chairmanship appointed for one year[125] and of a General Assembly that gets together once a year. In 1990 and in 2000 the UCUE conference took place in Amsterdam. Finally, there is also a meeting at the official level (*ambtelijk niveau*), once a year (www.ucue.org; Euromagazine 2005a).

Besides, since 1991 Amsterdam is a member of Eurocities. Within this network Amsterdam officials participate in thematic forums, working groups and committees. A Eurolink staff member, for instance, takes part in the Economic Development and Urban Regeneration Committee (EDURC), one of the largest working platforms of the network. EDURC is engaged in items like economic and

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[125] The present Mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, was chairman during 2005.

urban revitalization of big cities. It has actively participated in the debate on the future of European Cohesion policy and the Structural Funds. In September 1999, an EDURC Assembly was organized in Amsterdam. Apart from UCUE and Eurocities there are many other European networks (many of them thematic) of which Amsterdam municipal officials are members. The same holds for a number of projects (such as URBACT-projects) [126]. Besides, Amsterdam has had a member or a substitute member in the Committee of Regions as long as this committee exists; initially the Mayor, later the Alderman for Economic Affairs (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004a).

The Eurotop in Amsterdam in 1997 was, of course, a high point in the relation with Europe. After lobbying for years, starting at the beginning of the 1990s, the cabinet eventually appointed the capital as the location for the European summit of the leaders of the European member states. This conference was organized at the end of the Dutch chairmanship of the European Union. While the national government arranged this event, Amsterdam saw her chance to position the city internationally in a favourable way, as an 'inspiring and stable city', not to be associated with unsafety, drugs etc (Gemeente Amsterdam and Stichting Amsterdam Promotion 1995; Verdellen 2002). Nevertheless this event did not seem to lead to a breakthrough in EU engagement of the City of Amsterdam.

In the early 2000s it was established that in spite of the fact that several European activities had been undertaken, started off by the Department of Economic Affairs and by Eurolink in particular, for the rest of the local authorities Europe seemed to be hardly interesting.

Then, in 2003, two policy documents came out: '*Amsterdam in de Europese Unie*' and '*Inventarisatie Europese Activiteiten van Amsterdamse diensten*'. The first one contained a number of proposals on special subjects such as the intensification of participation of Amsterdam administrators in European networks in order to strengthen the European profile of Amsterdam (as had happened in Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). Another proposal concerned the further development of a 'European' and/or G4 Agenda, to be started by European Affairs/Eurolink (Gemeente Amsterdam 2003a). When the documents were discussed in the meeting of the City Council on February 25, 2004, the need for administrative guidance in the European policy file was expressed. Proposals to that purpose were listed in the memorandum '*Europa: nieuwe aandacht, nieuwe kansen*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004a). In this document the significance of Europe for Amsterdam was explained on the basis of three main topics: first, the need to make more use of European subsidies (*fondsenwerving*); second, the creation of a very strong lobby in Brussels for the policy files that were most important for Amsterdam (influence on European policy) and third, seeing to it that the city was 'Europe-proof,' in terms of being capable to adapt to European law and regulation (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004a). Much attention was also paid to establishing priorities in the European files and to the respective responsibilities within the board, regarding European affairs. As a result, the Alderman for Economic Affairs became 'co-ordinating Alderman for Europe', this being an extension of his task (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004a).

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[126] See, for example the overviews published by Bureau Eurolink (*Inventarisatie Europese projecten*).

The document also resulted in an extension of staff. An 'expertisepunt Europese subsidies' was established within Eurolink on September 1, 2005. This office employed two subsidy advisors who were specialized in European subsidies. At the same time the Administrative Services and the Directorate of Legal Affairs made part of their attention and expertise available for European affairs.

Other measures were taken to enlarge the support for Europe within the municipal organization, such as the formal establishment of a European Platform Amsterdam (*Europa Platform Amsterdam, EPA*), covering all sectors. Since January 2000, the EPA had functioned as an informal consultative body; an organization for gearing European affairs to one another. The EPA became an formal advisory body of the Amsterdam board of Mayor and Aldermen on October 10, 2004. A few times a year this advisory body has a meeting. Its members are representatives of all municipal departments and city districts that have connections with Europe in one way or the other. This platform supplied a strong need, as expressed, among others, by the head of the division for Economic Development (under which Eurolink falls) in an interview. She states: "Europe certainly has not, for a long time, been an important subject on the Amsterdam agenda .... We hope that this decision will induce city districts and departments too to participate in this platform" (Euromagazine 2005b). A similar remark had been made earlier in administrative circles. As was stated in the policy document '*Amsterdam in de Europese Unie*' by the then Alderman for Finance and Economic Affairs, Geert Dales: "If Amsterdam truly wishes to develop into an in European context active city, the individual members of the board of Mayor and Aldermen will have to consider themselves directly responsible. The same applies to several city district administrators." Apparently the situation had not much changed in 2005 as the then Alderman for Finance and Economic Affairs, Frits Huffnagel said in an interview that Europe should become a much more important and topical item for municipal administrators and officials (Euromagazine 2005c).

Also to the city districts the EPA offers a chance to enlarge their engagement with Europe. According to Tjeerd Heerema, in that period chair of the Zeeburg City District and chair of the Steering Committee of the European Objective-2 'Grootoost' programme, this is very essential, in the administrative and the official sense. As he put it: "At present, European affairs are not to be found in whatever portfolio of the city districts" (Euromagazine 2005d).

Summarizing the foregoing, for years Europe was high on the agenda of the Alderman for Economic Affairs. Moreover, Bureau Eurolink has been active for more than 15 years, intensifying the relation with the European Union and the co-operation between European cities (Euromagazine 2004b). Nevertheless, up to the early 2000s, the rest of the administrative organization showed hardly any interest in Europe. The Eurotop in 1997 was of course an exception, but this was actually a national matter, albeit taking place in Amsterdam. This municipal lack of interest for European matters was reflected, for instance, in the limited participation by administrators and officials in European committees. It seems that only from the beginning of the early 2000s, there is in fact more support for European affairs within the municipal organization of Amsterdam. This is expressed in the establishment of the EPA and in the extended participation in European activities.

Amsterdam seeks its International Context

Amsterdam regularly refers to the international character the city has had through the centuries, "The Amsterdam trademark is international" (Gemeente Amsterdam 1990c, 5).

In 1984, the Committee Development Co-operation Amsterdam (*Commissie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking Amsterdam, COA*) was established, for elaborating an Amsterdam development policy. The COA's task consisted of advising the local authorites on co-operation with developing countries and on connections with other cities in the framework of development co-operation[127]. For years the policy focused exclusively on the implementation of projects as part of the connections with Managua (Nicaragua) and Beira (Mozambique). But the budget was raised substantially, from only 10,000 guilders (about 4,540 euros) in 1985 to 598,020 guilders (about 271,370 euros) in 1997 (Gemeente Amsterdam 1998a). The portfolio rested with the Mayor. According to the head of the International Relations department, the policy was in that period still filled in in a rather ad hoc way. Striking too, was the fact that in the 1990s there were hardly any reports on COA policy and COA activities. As late as 1998 an overview of these matters came out. Municipal departments hardly participated in international co-operation. In the policy of most of them no structural place had been given yet to international co-operation. Only the department for Economic Affairs with Bureau Eurolink and the section Foreign Investments, and the Amsterdam Dock Industry that had its own acquisition section, were explicitly aimed at international affairs. This also held for the Water Board Company (*Waterleidingbedrijf*).

The situation changed when the '*Memorandum International Co-operation 2002-2006*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 2001a) was brought out, introducing a 'new style' in international co-operation. The main starting points as described in this document were the following: to try to join in with national and European policy; to exchange expertise and knowledge with local administrators elsewhere and to strengthen their administration. Another point regarded the policy in which international co-operation was to embedded, covering all departments, together with a thematic co-operation (with strict rules about the time involved) that would be evaluated on a regular basis. Amsterdam especially focused on co-operation with cities in the countries of origin of its population, located for instance in Surinam, the Antilles, Morocco, Turkey and Ghana. Furthermore, it focused on cities in the countries that had recently joined the European Union (Riga, Boedapest and Sofia) (Gemeente Amsterdam 2001a, 2003b, 2004c).

In the early 2000s, the organization structure as related to International Co-operation was changed. The COA was replaced with a municipal platform, in which municipal sectors and city districts interested in international co-operation participated. Moreover, a seminar on international co-operation covering all sectors was organized once a year. In 2001, the 'Bureau International Relations' (*Bureau Internationale Betrekkingen, BIB*) was established; an office that fell under the Administrative

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[127]The regulation regarding the Committee Development Cooperation Amsterdam has been Decreed in a decision of June 26, 1985, number 1158 of the City Council (Gemeente amsterdam 1988).

Services and by now has a staff of four (3 FTE). The Bureau is responsible for initiating, co-ordinating, implementing and evaluating international policy, as well as for its financial account. Besides, since 2003 the Bureau has its own website. The BIB budget, in 2003 and 2004 amounting to about 566,000 euros and 580,000 euros respectively, was used in particular for international projects (more than 80). For 2006, the budged has increased to about 745,000 euros. Gradually a growing number of municipal departments has started participating in these international projects; while only 8 of them did in 2002, their number had increased to 34 in 2004. The same holds for the number of participating city districts, whose has gradually increased as well (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004c; www.amsterdam.nl/internationaal). Within the framework of international co-operation the City of Amsterdam has connections not only with the cities concerned but also with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch embassies in the foreign countries involved, the Ministry of the Interior and VNG-International. The latter subsidizes some particular projects as well (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004c).

Quite another aspect of the city's international policy concerns the way in which Amsterdam positions itself in the international context. An important initiative in that respect was the city marketing project. The initiative came from Geert Dales, the then Alderman for Finance and Economic Affairs, in order to improve the city's competitive position in the international context[128]. It was found that the promotion of Amsterdam lacked a broad vision and that the way it was directed was very poor. As a result, Amsterdam's competitive position was inadequate, compared to the position of other European cities (www.amsterdam.nl).

In order to get all parties in Amsterdam working together on city marketing, on March 4, 2004, the 'Amsterdam Partners' foundation was set up: a public private platform for government, industry and organizations with marketing and promotional objectives[129]. The improvement and raising of Amsterdam's profile was guided by a single concept for the city's national and international positioning: Amsterdam is distinctive for its combination of creativity, innovation and commercial spirit. In order to promote Amsterdam, in September 2004 a new city motto was launched: '*I Amsterdam*'. The motto was meant to bring the city more strongly under international notice of firms, people coming for business purposes and tourists. In this way Amsterdam wished to position itself not exclusively as a 'canal city' and a 'city of culture.' It aimed at accentuating her enterprising, innovating and creative side more strongly. A website, especially started off for that reason, provides detailed information to these target groups (www.iamsterdam.com). The Amsterdam Partners foundation consists of a Supervisory Board, a Management Board, an Advisory Board and 'covenant partners'. Job Cohen, Mayor of Amsterdam is chair of the Supervisory Board. This emphasizes the significance of the foundation. Representatives of various business sectors are members of the Management Board (www.amsterdam.nl; www.amsterdampartners.nl).

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[128] See also Gehrels et al. (2003).
[129] Its predecessor, the Amsterdam Promotion foundation (AMPRO) was abolished in 2003 and has become a part of this new foundation.

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Although international co-operation and international positioning function in a common field, they are two completely different policy items. In regard of both items, however, Amsterdam has a special policy drawn up only as late as the early 2000s. The organization connected with this was set up in the same period. As far as international co-operation goes, this remains an item falling under competence of the Mayor and the Administrative Services. Regarding international positioning, the department of Economic Affairs is also involved, as well as a number of other governmental and non-governmental actors. Striking too is that the memorandum '*International Co-operation in Europe*' of 2003, made a real and obvious connection between International and European municipal policy (Gemeente Amsterdam 2003b).

In the preceeding pages wide attention has been given to the EU and international engagement of Amsterdam. In the following a quite different aspect of municipal policy will come to the fore: frameworks, programmes and plans that are specifically related to urban policy. First, Big City Policy will be discussed. Next, attention will be paid to other policy documents.

Big Cities Policy

As mentioned in the chapter on The Hague already, Big Cities Policy (BCP) is a policy that was initiated at the level of the national government. It has known different phases and has meanwhile reached its third phase (2005-2009). The URBAN programme took place during the first two phases of Big Cities Policy. What did they look like in Amsterdam?

Big Cities Policy I

In the first *G4 Covenant*, signed July 12, 1995, three key themes were formulated: employment and education; safety; and quality of life and care (Gemeente Amsterdam 1996a). Of these BCP-themes, employment, safety and 'quality of life,' were given high priority in the Amsterdam programme-agreement of 1994-1998. The themes were worked out in more detail in the municipal programmes '*Stad op eigen kracht*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1994b) and the '*Nota Gebiedsaanpak grote-stedenbeleid in Amsterdam*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1996b).

During the first phase of BCP the total amount of resources for the Amsterdam Municipality, mostly provided by the national government, amounted to about 432,5 million euros (Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer 1998). As the creation of jobs and putting long-term unemployed to work had top priority in the programme, it does not come as a surprise that by far the largest share of the BCP-resources (295 million euros) was used for improving the employment situation. Most resources were used for programmes developed at the central city level. Only a relatively small amount (19,8 million euros), called 'BCP-direct resources,' was directly allocated by the Amsterdam City Council to the city district administrations, in order to stimulate the implementation of neighbourhood supervision programmes (Gemeente Amsterdam 2000).

Because of its experimental character in this first phase, it is rather unclear what the organization structure of Big Cities Policy looked like in Amsterdam. In August 1999, a Big Cities Policy Bureau (*Bureau GSB*) was established at the central

city level. It had to fulfil the role of co-ordinator and programme manager. This modestly staffed bureau was originally categorized (and literally accommodated with) the former Amsterdam Municipal Housing Service (*Stedelijke Woning Dienst, SWD).*

Big Cities Policy – II
In December 1999, the Amsterdam Municipality signed a new covenant with the national government. In this second phase, the organization structure of Big Cities Policies certainly gave a better image regarding the organization, but the picture remained incomplete and with its various goals, approaches and pillars non-transparant, even then.

For Amsterdam the headlines of Big Cities Policy II were presented in the policy document '*Amsterdam Complete Stad, Stadsvisie tot 2010'* (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999a). The goals covered a wide area, such as: enhancing the position of the urban residential environments at the regional housing market; improving (physical) surroundings, the quality of life and public security; reducing (structural) unemployment and promoting jobs; enhancing the economic competitive position; increasing accessibility of economic activities; improving the connection between education and the labour market and enhancing the social infrastructure (Gemeente Amsterdam 2001c).

Three 'pillars' were distinguished, related to different fields of interest: a *social* pillar that mainly focused on the social domain, including for example participation and quality of life; an *economic* pillar that mostly directed employment and economic activity and a *physical* pillar (urban renewal) that mainly addressed the housing and living environment (Gemeente Amsterdam 2001c). The BCP budget, structured per pillar[130], is presented in table 9.F.

Table 9.F Budget Big Cities Policy – II Amsterdam, 1999-2003 (in millions of euros) (Ministry of the Interior 1999)

Pillar/Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Employment and Economy	131,497	163,422	143,071	166,106	179,601
Physical renewal	143,876	117,017	79,498	59,938	83,340
Social infrastructure	75,272	86,817	88,270	91,490	86,205
Total	350,644	367,256	310,839	317,534	349,146

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[130] The 'pillars' also received money within other policy frameworks. Urban renewal, for example, elaborated as the 'physical pillar' of Big Cities Policy, was also financed with the Investment budget Urban Renewal (*Investeringsbudget Stedelijke Vernieuwing, ISV*).

At the central city level, within every 'pillar', different sectors were involved. The co-ordinating sector was responsible for the development of instruments, monitoring systems and progress reports within the pillar. For the three pillars, the co-ordinating sectors were respectively the Municipal Housing Service (*Stedelijke Woning Dienst, SWD*)(physical pillar), Economic Affairs (*Economische Zaken Amsterdam, EZ*)(economic pillar) and the Sector Welfare Amsterdam (*Dienst Welzijn Amsterdam, DWA*)(social pillar) (Gemeente Amsterdam 2001c).

In 1999, Big Cities Policy was decentralized in Amsterdam, in the sense that the city districts from now on developed plans and lodged them with Bureau GSB. The bureau bore the responsibility for an integral assessment and a financial review of the plans. After they had been approved, the plans were implemented by the city districts. In these local policy documents related to both Big Cities Policy-I and II specific attention was paid to the renewal of the Bijlmermeer. This will be addressed later in this chapter. At times, there were even some (but mostly financial) links with the European URBAN programme (see for example Gemeente Amsterdam 1994b, 1996a).

Other Policy Documents
Another important urban policy that was developed in the second half of the 1990s was urban restructuring. While both urban renewal and urban restructuring were physical measures, the first focused on prewar neighbourhoods, whereas the latter primarily focused (and focuses) on postwar neighbourhoods.

The aim of this urban policy is to realize more differentiated neighbourhoods, with good quality dwellings; an improvement of the urban development quality and the social safety of public space and an optimal usage of the land (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999a). There are 27 urban renewal areas in Amsterdam, of which a number have been qualified as 'developmental area' (*ontwikkelingsgebied*) in this policy context, one of them being the Bijlmermeer. These areas are characterized by a large concentration of problems and require an intensive, integral approach (www.wonen.amsterdam.nl).

The foregoing has given an overview of the City of Amsterdam, presented at the level of the Municipality, in terms of physical, social and economic developments; local institutional context and policy frameworks of the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the following, a similar picture will be presented of the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer, the neighbourhood in which the European URBAN programme was implemented.

9.3 The Bijlmermeer

The Bijlmermeer (or the 'Bijlmer') is a vast peripheral new public housing estate, built between the 1960s and 1980s, which is located to the southeast of Amsterdam and which houses almost 50,000 people. The Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, of which the Bijlmer is a part, covers about ten percent of the total surface of Amsterdam and is presently home to about 80,550 people (www.os.amsterdam.nl). It does not border onto the city directly, as the Municipalities of Diemen and Duivendrecht are in between.

Based on the municipal statistical classification system[131], the Bijlmermeer actually consists of two combinations of neighbourhoods (*buurtcombinaties*): 'Bijlmer

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[131] See O+S, the Amsterdam Bureau for Research and Statistics.

Centrum' and 'Bijlmer Oost'. These two combinations can be subdivided into six and eight neighbourhoods respectively. While the population density in the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District is more or less similar to the population density in the City of Amsterdam, in both Bijlmer neighbourhoods, the population density is about twice as high[132].

Map 9.G Amsterdam: Bijlmer Centrum and Bijlmer Oost (Aalbers et al. 2003)

What did the Bijlmermeer look like in the 1990s? And what kind of physical and social-economic developments had taken place in the foregoing decennia?

9.3.1 Physical Developments

In 1965, the Amsterdam Municipality incorporated the Bijlmermeer area. In the same year the building plans were presented (Gemeente Amsterdam 1965) and on December 13, 1966, the foundation stone was laid. The Bijlmermeer, a unique urban planning experiment in the Netherlands, would become 'the city of the future'; the high point of modern town planning, inspired by the ideas of the Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) movement, led by the Swiss architect Le Corbusier. Originally, the Bijlmer consisted of 31 high-rise (10-floor) deck-access apartment

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[132] Meanwhile this might have changed, because of the large-scale physical renewal operation.

blocks that were built in a honeycomb pattern. About 13,000 of the total 18,000 units, surrendered between 1968 and 1975, were built in this way. These units were managed by about fifteen housing associations (Brakenhoff et al. 1991; Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1995; Helleman and Wassenberg 2001).

In this prestigious 'functional town,' living, working, traffic and recreation were separated. Between the large, high-rise apartment blocks, spacious green parks were developed, traversed by bicycle and pedestrian routes. Car traffic was led above ground level and metro lines crossed the roadways.

Illustration 9.H Apartment blocks in a honeycomb pattern in the Bijlmermeer (www.20eeuwennederland.nl) and drawing of high-rise building (Van Stralen 1998)

The spacious and comfortable high-rise apartments, mostly developed as public housing, were intended for (lower) middle-class families from the old inner city areas of Amsterdam, who needed to move because of urban renewal activities. Although most of the Bijlmer apartments had been developed as public housing, their rents were relatively high.

In the years after completion of the first homes in the Bijlmermeer, several developments affected the residential climate. First of all, at the national level, the policy of 'overspill towns' was launched: close to the City of Amsterdam, tens of thousands of low-rise dwellings were built in places such as Purmerend, Lelystad, Almere and Hoorn. To many people these low-rise dwellings were more appealing than the high-rise Bijlmer dwellings. Moreover, they were relatively cheap. Secondly, the infrastructure, services and shopping areas in the Bijlmer were either not created in time or never realized, due to retrenchments in expenditures. For that reason, as their expectations were not met, many new Bijlmer inhabitants left the area soon after having moved into it. In 1974 about 30 percent moved on an annual basis (Helleman and Wassenberg 2001). Moreover, in the early 1970s already, there was a significant lack of occupancy.

Instead of families, the vacant apartments attracted a relatively large number of

one-parent families, singles and people without children. The Bijlmer became an area where people mostly settled if they could not find a place to live elsewhere (Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1995). The lack of occupancy in the high-rise blocks remained high and the housing associations were weighed down by a heavy financial burden. In 1983 a new housing ssociation was established, called 'Nieuw Amsterdam[133]'; the management of the houses owned by the (14) housing corporations was surrendered to this new association, as an attempt to lighten the financial problems. The housing corporation thus became in charge of almost all the blocks of flats in the Bijlmer area. Many problems, such as vacancies and overdue accounts, related to managerial control (*beheer*). Homes were improved and major repairs were taken up. These measures brought some relief, at least temporarily; in the second half of the 1980s, the lack of occupancy decreased (Mentzel 1989). Nevertheless, the Nieuw Amsterdam Housing Association struggled with a deficit that continued to increase. Over time, there was a growing body of opinion to demolish a part of the Bijlmermeer (Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1995; Luijten 1997; Klijn 1998; Begeleidingsgroep Evaluatie Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1999a; Helleman and Wassenberg 2001).

Map 9.I Overview of the Bijlmermeer in 1990 (before the renewal operation)
(Helleman and Wassenberg 2001)

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
[133] In 1998 the staff of Housing Association *Nieuw Amsterdam* was transferred to Housing Association *Patrimonium*. Op January 1, 2004, the latter merged with Building Association Rochdale. The present name is *Woningstichting Rochdale* (www.rochdale.nl).

Interestingly, while the 'city of the future,' located to the east of the railroad between Amsterdam and Utrecht, was becoming one of the most disadvantaged residential neighbourhoods in the Netherlands, at the same time an important business park arose to the west of the railroad. Meanwhile, in terms of employment, this has become one of the most important locations in Amsterdam (Dukes et al. 2002).

9.3.2 Social and Economic Developments[134]

The composition of the Bijlmer population turned out different in another way as well. Between 1970 and 1975, preceding the independence of Surinam, many Surinamese left the country. In the years of 1974 and 1975 an exodus of more than fifty thousand took place. In 1975 alone, more than ten thousand settled in Amsterdam (Vermeulen 2005).

The steadily increasing numbers of Surinamese immigrants in the 1970s caused great concern among Dutch politicians. During the peak of Surinamese integration, authorities tried to disperse Surinamese (and Antillean) immigrants over the Netherlands, by means of a so-called five percent rule: every municipality was obliged to reserve five percent of the newly built state subsidized housing in the rented sector for Surinamese and Antillean households. This temporary measure was in force from January 1975 until January 1980. The orientation of Surinamese immigrants, however, was more urban than rural (Musterd and Muus 1995; Musterd and Smakman 2000).

Many Surinamese and Antilleans settled in the Bijlmermeer, as this was one of the only places where they could easily find a home. For, the period in which the honeycomb apartment blocks were completed covered the greater part of the period of the massive exodus from Surinam and the autochthonous Dutch were hardly interested in the Bijlmer apartments. Moreover, the appartments were freely accessible as a result of the high rents, while the City of Amsterdam had a strict distributive system for the rest of the housing-stock (Brakenhoff et al. 1991).

At the same time, the Surinamese and Antilleans who came in the 1970s were far more heterogeneous in terms of social class and ethnicity, than earlier immigrants had been. Besides, they came at a time when the unemployment rate was increasing. For many it was impossible to find a job and a certain 'sub-proletariat' developed, causing the Surinamese - wrongfully – to become stereotyped as a lower-class population (Musterd and Smakman 2000). The high level of unemployment, sparked by the worsening Dutch economic situation, was keenly felt in this group (Vermeulen 2005).

Their rapid increase in population caused serious social problems among the Surinamese immigrants. As rents were high, people shared dwellings, causing overpopulation in some blocks. In connection with high unemployment, increasing drug abuse and criminal lifestyles among unemployed youth, this resulted in major problems. Problems concentrated in the Bijlmermeer.

The Bijlmermeer, however, had more newcomers to absorbe. The

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[134] For a far more detailed description of the social-economic situation in the 1990s, see Burgers et al. (2002).

neighbourhood was not only host to many Surinamese and Antilleans, but in the years to follow also to many fringe groups with highly divergent nationalities.

While the proportion of ethnic minority groups in Amsterdam rose from about 25 percent of the total population in 1990 to 45 percent in 1999, in the Bijlmermeer the share of ethnic minority groups was already far above the city average in 1990. In 1999 it was even almost twice the share for Amsterdam as a whole (see table 9.J).

While the ethnic variety of the Bijlmer population was (and still is) enormous, two large groups stood out: the first one was the Surinamese and Antillean group that made up almost half of the Bijlmer population. The second group was far more mixed and consisted of 'others from non-industrialized countries', such as Africa, South America, Asia and eastern and southern Europe. A large share of this group consisted of (former) asylum seekers. While the categories Turkish, Moroccans, southern Europeans and 'Others from industrial countries' were remarkably low in the Bijlmermeer, the category of 'other people from non-industrialized countries' strongly increased during the 1990s. In 1999 it amounted to more than 25 percent of the total Bijlmer population. The Ghanese, the largest immigrant group in the category 'others from non-industrialized countries' is highly concentrated in the City District of Amsterdam Zuidoost (Aalbers et al. 2003).

Table 9.J Ethnic minority groups in Amsterdam and the Bijlmermeer, as a proportion of the total population in the areas concerned (in percentages) (O+S 1990, 1999a, 2005)

	Surinamese or Antillean	Turkish	Moroccan	Southern European	Others from non-industr. countries	Others from Industr. Countries *	Total
Amsterdam							
1990	9.2	3.2	4.9	1.6	3.4	2.3	24.6
1999	11.4	4.6	7.3	2.3	9.5	9.5	44.5
2005	11.2	5.1	8.7	2.4	12.0	9.8	49.2
Bijlmer C							
1990	43.1	1.1	1.0	0.9	7.2	4.4	57.5
1999	48.3	2.3	2.2	1.6	25.2	3.4	83.0
2005	47.4	2.0	2.8	1.5	30.2	2.9	86.8
Bijlmer O							
1990	35.8	0.7	1.1	1.4	8.0	5.2	52.2
1999	40.2	0.8	1.6	1.8	26.4	4.5	75.3
2005	40.9	0.6	1.9	1.5	28.6	4.2	77.7

* In the O+S statistics, this subgroup is actually not counted as an 'ethnic minority'.

In the 1990s, but also in 2005, the Surinamese and Antilleans together still formed the largest ethnic group in the Bijlmer neighbourhoods. At the same time, the share of 'others from non-industrialized countries' in the Bijlmer has strongly increased. Interestingly, at the level of the City of Amsterdam, the share of Surinamese is argued to be decreasing, because of a 'black flight': migration to Almere and to other municipalities in the wider region of Amsterdam (O+S 2005). Over the last six years, their share has merely dropped with 0.2 percent at the city level, though.

In the 1990s, there was a large share of unemployed jobseekers in the Bijlmer. The unemployment rate in the Bijlmer neighourhoods was far higher, both in 1990 and 1999, than the unemployment rate for the city as a whole. Moreover, while the share of unemployed slightly decreased at the level of the city, in the Bijlmer neighbourhoods it increased instead (see table 9.K).

Table 9.K Unemployed jobseekers, as a proportion of the potential labour force, in Amsterdam and in the Bijlmer (in numbers and percentages)(O+S 1990, 1999a, 1999b)

	Unemployed (N)*	Unemployed (%)*
Amsterdam		
1990	65,309	13.3
1999	66,485	12.8
Bijlmer Centrum		
1990	3,181	19.9
1999	3,533	23.2
Bijlmer Oost		
1990	3,833	18.9
1999	3,977	20.8

* The number of unemployed jobseekers as a proportion of the potential labour-force (the population in the age-groups '15-64 years old').

Additionally, regarding the Surinamese and Antilleans within the Bijlmermeer, in 1999 the share of unemployed jobseekers as a proportion of the potential labour force at the level of the Bijlmer neighbourhoods was about 23 percent (O+S 1999a).

Moreover, many of the unemployed jobseekers in the Bijlmermeer were relatively poorly educated and had often been unemployed for a long time. As compared to the City of Amsterdam, youth unemployment was slightly higher in the Bijlmer neighbourhoods in the 1990s as well.

A considerable proportion of the potential labour force in the Bijlmer relied on welfare in the 1990s. Moreover, the share of this group strongly increased between 1990 and 1999. Not surprisingly, the average disposable income in the Bijlmer neighbourhoods was far below the average disposable income for Amsterdam and a

large proportion of the total number of households received individual housing benefits. In 1999, home ownership was still quite low: about 72 percent of dwellings in Bijlmer Centrum and 80 percent of dwellings in Bijlmer Oost were owned by housing associations, as compared to 44 percent of the housing stock for the city as a whole (Musterd and Dukes 2002).

In conclusion, even though the Dutch economy had been flourishing in the mid and late 1990s, the social-economic situation of the Bijlmermeer at the end of the 1990s was still unfavourable.

9.3.3 The Institutional Context: Amsterdam Zuidoost City District

The area that is usually referred to as 'the Bijlmermeer' or 'the Bijlmer' is part of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District that came into existence in 1987 (www.zuidoost.amsterdam.nl). As compared to the other city districts in Amsterdam, in terms of population, it is the largest city district and in terms of area (km2) it ranks third, after Amsterdam Noord and the port area. The Amsterdam Zuidoost City District consists of seven 'neighbourhood combinations' (*buurtcombinaties*): Bijlmer-centrum, Bijlmer-Oost, Nellestein, Holendrecht/Reigersbos, Amstel III/Bullewijk, Gein and Driemond. Those, in turn, can be subdivided in various neighbourhoods.

As mentioned earlier, city district administrations consist of a City District Council, an Executive Committee and a chosen chairperson. The Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Council has 29 members and an Executive Committee that consists of three aldermen and a chair. The plans of the city district administration are laid down in a city district programme agreement (*bestuursakkoord*), covering a four year period.

Just like the municipal administration, the Executive Committee of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District has been chaired for a long time by a member of the Labour Party (PvdA). During most of the 1990s, this was Ronald Janssen. But also his successor, Hannah Belliot, and the present chair (Elvira Sweet) were members of the Labour Party.

9.3.4 Local Governance in the Bijlmermeer Renewal Operation

Aside from an administration at the level of the city district, there is no administration at the level of the 'combination of neighbourhoods' (Bijlmer Oost and Bijlmer Centrum) or at the level of the neighbourhoods that they comprise.

Due to the major social and economic problems that have been concentrated in this particular part of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, the Bijlmer area has often been chosen as target for policy measures. In the early 1990s, a large-scale renewal operation started that is presently still going on. Local governance in the Bijlmermeer can therefore best be viewed in the context of this renewal operation.

The large-scale renewal operation of the Bijlmermeer officially started in July 1992, based on a public-private partnership of the Amsterdam Municipality, the Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District. The operation consisted of three elements: spatial, social and managerial renewal (*vernieuwing van het beheer*). Spatial renewal was attended to first, followed later by social-economic renewal. As managerial renewal was for a long time a suppositious child, the focus below will be on spatial and social-economic renewal.

During the interviews with key stakeholders, in terms of governance, both aspects of the Bijlmer renewal operation were criticized: a former high-ranking official, working with the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District organization, criticized the central city, the city district and the housing association for being 'the three key players who tended to really keep everyone else out'. In his opinion, this was reflected in the formal decision making structure. In his research on decision making within the spatial renewal operation, also Klijn (1998) critically comments on the process and refers to a domination of municipal officials.

Critical comments could also be heard about the governance in the social-economic renewal process. The earlier mentioned high-ranking official, working with the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, characterized it as a top down renewal process in which connections with organizations on the ground were lacking. Various other interviewees criticized the city district organization for not being well connected to the neighbourhood.

Local Participation of Ethnic Minorities
Experiences with local participation in the spatial renewal operation in the Bijlmermeer, point at an inadequate participation of the residents. Klijn (1998) argued that their low degree of organization could be a possible explanation. On the other hand, one could also imagine, that ethnic groups chose a different basis for organizational activities, and not one intended for political engagement: Ghaneans in the Bijlmer, for example, are often said to organize on a religious basis. In an interview in 1996 with Grotendorst, the former Director of Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam, he established a decreased involvement of the Bijlmermeer population, putting it like this: "People do not dedicate themselves collectively to their neighbourhood" (Grünhagen 1996), which in his opinion applied to other areas as well. Aside from individualisation as an explanatory factor, in his opinion, the fact that the composition of the population had become far more diverse in an ethnic sense could be an important reason as well. Additionally, he referred to the 'real' newcomers, the various fringe groups in the Bijlmermeer, who had just arrived and who were merely involved in fulfilling their primary necessities of life.

But there might also be other explanations. Fennema and Tillie (1999) have examined the political participation of four different ethnic groups in Amsterdam (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans). Comparing the voting turn-out of the different groups at the municipal elections in Amsterdam in 1994 and 1998, they concluded, firstly, that there was an excessive drop in ethnic voting, affecting all the ethnic groups, and secondly, that the Surinamese/Antilleans (grouped together) had the lowest turn-out of all the ethnic groups:

As political participation is not limited to elections, the authors also measured the scores of the different groups on a 'political participation scale', consisting of the following five items: visiting meetings where matters concerning the neighbourhood one lives in are discussed; active lobbying with respect to issues which refer to the neighbourhood or the city; participation in a so-called 'neighbourhood Council'; the probability of voting at local elections 'if they were to be held now' and the likelyhood that one would attend a public meeting concerning the neighbourhood if one would be

invited. Based on these scores, they concluded that Antilleans showed the lowest degree of political participation, followed by the Surinamese, the Moroccans and the Turks. Based on the findings of Fennema and Tillie, one could thus conclude that Surinamese and Antilleans (the latter in particular) show far less political participation than other ethnic groups in Amsterdam.

Table 9.L Voting turn-out at municipal elections in Amsterdam, 1994 and 1998 (in percentages) (Fennema and Tillie 1999)

Ethnic Group	Municipal Elections	
	1994	1998
Turks	67	39
Moroccans	49	23
Surinamese/Antilleans	30	21
Municipal turn-out	57	46

Interestingly, Vermeulen (2005) establishes that, until the second half of the 1990s, Surinamese immigrants were the most actively organizing immigrant group in Amsterdam. At the same time, however, he notices that 'interest representation' and 'political activities,' categories that might represent organizations that participate in political or policy processes, are quite low among them. The two main ethnic groups among the Surinamese population in Amsterdam, the Afro- and Hindu-Surinamese, seldom establish organizations together. Moreover, comparing the activities of their organizations in Amsterdam, Hindu-Surinamese organizations are still overwhelmingly religious in nature (see for example Bloemberg 1995) and involved in socio-cultural activities. The distribution of Afro-Surinamese organizational activities, on the other hand, displays a more diverse picture, with a relatively high share of cultural and especially socio-cultural activities (Vermeulen 2005) (see table 9.M).

In conclusion, political participation of Surinamese and Antilleans in Amsterdam seems to be relatively low. Besides, the activities of Surinamese organizations are not primarily based on interest representation or politically driven. In view of the share of Surinamese living in the Bijlmermeer, these could be important explanations for low residents' participation in the spatial renewal operation in the Bijlmermeer. Other factors, like individualization and an increasing ethnic diversity could be important explanatory factors as well.

Strikingly, at the same time, as will be described later, this was quite different in the case of the social-economic renewal operation, where particular groups in the Bijlmermeer *claimed* a participatory role. However, before turning to the social-economic rewewal operation, first, important administrative initiatives and policy frameworks at the level of the city district will be described below. It is necessary to be familiar with these matters, in order to be able to understand the organization of the social-economic renewal operation.

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Table 9.M Percentage distributions of Afro- and Hindu Surinamese immigrant organizations in Amsterdam by the activities of the organizations, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Vermeulen 2005).

	Afro-Surinamese immigrant Organizations (%)				Hindu-Surinamese immigrant Organizations (%)			
	Total	1970s	1980s	1990s	Total	1970	1980s	1990s
Interest representation	15.8	22.7	16.4	13.7	13.1	3.6	13.2	13.8
Social welfare	14.8	20.5	19.0	13.7	14.0	10.7	11.8	12.5
Religious	8.2	4.5	5.2	9.8	57.9	67.9	65.8	62.5
Socio-cultural	31.6	31.8	31.0	34.6	19.6	32.1	18.4	18.8
Country of origin	14.3	25.0	13.8	10.5	2.8	-	-	2.5
Cultural	16.3	13.6	15.5	17.0	7.5	7.1	5.3	10.0
Sport	5.1	6.8	5.2	6.5	3.7	3.6	3.9	2.5
Youth	10.2	9.1	11.2	9.2	4.7	3.6	2.6	5.0
Women	4.1	4.5	5.2	3.9	1.9	-	2.6	2.5
Education	4.6	-	5.2	4.6	2.8	-	-	2.5
Media	1.5	2.3	1.7	2.0	1.9	-	2.6	2.5
Elderly	0.5	-	0.9	0.7	0.9	-	-	1.3
Political	0.5	-	-	0.7	0.9	-	-	1.3
Unkown	1.5	-	1.7	0.7	0.9	-	1.3	-
Total[135]	129.1	140.9	131.9	127.5	132.7	128.6	128.9	137.5
Number of associations (N)	196	44	116	153	107	28	76	80

9.3.5 Administrative Initiatives and Policy Frameworks at the City District Level

An important framework in the 1990s (and still) has been the framework of the Bijlmermeer renewal operation, that started in 1992. This was actually not developed by the administration at the city district level, but set up and signed by three partners: the Amsterdam Municipality, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam. As a framework, however, it was quite important, as

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[135] Most voluntary associations provide a variety of different activities. The Afro- and Hindu-organizations can have up to three different purposes. Some associations are classified under one type, and other organizations are classified under two or three different types. The total percentage of all types is therefore more than 100 percent. The classification is carried out using the name of the organization, its mission statement (if available), and the characterisation given by the Chamber of Commerce (if available) (Vermeulen 2005).

many policy initiaves has been embedded in it. After a short review this framework will be described extensively.

Instigating the Bijlmermeer Renewal Operation
On December 2, 1988, the board of Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam decided to establish a 'Working group Future Bijlmermeer' (*Werkgroep Toekomst Bijlmermeer*). In this working group, various local parties were represented, such as the Amsterdam Municipality, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam, the Amsterdams Federation of Housing Corporations and representatives of the business community in Amsterdam Zuidoost. Additionally, also several non-local parties participated: the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), the National Housing Council (*Nationale Woningraad*) and the Dutch Christian Institute for Public Housing. The working group proposed an integral approach towards the structural problems in the Bijlmermeer, starting from a project organization in which both public and private parties would participate (Gemeente Amsterdam 1990b; Brakenhoff et al. 1991). The plan mainly consisted of physical measures; demolition or improvement of houses, infrastructural changes, the connection of the Bijlmermeer and the Amstel III business park, etc. Additionally, the plan should result in a financially sound Housing Association.

On November 14, 1990, the Amsterdam City Council accepted the proposals of the working group (Stuurgroep Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1991a). Based on this decision, on January 22, 1991, the Amsterdam City Council, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Council and the member Council of the Nieuw Amsterdam Housing Association established a 'Steering Committee Bijlmermeer Renewal' (*Stuurgroep Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer*) to get the process started within a year and a half. The composition of the Committee is presented in table 9.N.

Table 9.N Composition Steering Committee Bijlmermeer Renewal (Stuurgroep Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1992)

Name	Position in Committee
D.H. Frieling	Independent chairman
Mrs T. van den Klinkenberg	Advisor Social renewal
R. Grotendorst	Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam
W. Nieuwenhuis	Amsterdam Zuidoost City District
A.J.J. Vos	Municipal Housing Service
G.A. Klandermans	Secretary (until November 1, 1991)
A.J.W.M. Brans	Secretary

In this limited period of time the Steering Committee produced a shopping list of memorandums[136]. Its final report, '*Werk met werk maken*' (Stuurgroep Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1992), approved in 1992 by the member Council of the Nieuw

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[136] See Stuurgroep Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992.

Amsterdam Housing Association, the Amsterdam City Council, and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Council, consisted of proposals for an integral approach towards the spatial, social and managerial renewal of the Bijlmermeer.

Another, related initiative that was taken in the early 1990s, was the 'Bijlmer table' (*Bijlmertafel*). This platform was formed by the national government (although opinions seem to vary as to *who* took the initiative), as a part of the Bijlmer problems exceeded the neighbourhood and could not be solved within the boundaries of the city district or the city. It was chaired by the Ministry of the Interior and funded to a large extent by the Ministry of VROM (interview). It met about four times a year and consisted of representatives from the Amsterdam Municipality, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam, but also of representatives from divergent ministries[137]. This platform was special in the sense that the Bijlmermeer now had become a subject on the national agenda and was discussed by high-ranking representatives from different administrative levels. Amsterdam Alderman Jaap van der Aa participated in the *Bijlmertafel* as well. The aim was to create a policy- and implementation framework for the renewal operation (Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1995). The policy document '*Speerpunt Bijlmermeer: de vernieuwing van de Bijlmermeer als uitwerking van het Grote Steden Beleid*' (1995), drawn up for other goals as well, was brought to the fore as being the 'condensed version of the *Bijlmertafel*-document' (Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1995, 13). It was to be a guide for the renewal process. Initially it was expected that the *Bijlmertafel* could play a role in the implementation of Big Cities Policy and in the realization of the URBAN-programme. It did not, though. It seems that bringing out the above mentioned document was in fact the last action of the platform functioning as a consultative structure.

The Bijlmermeer Renewal Operation

In July 1992, the large-scale integral renewal operation of the Bijlmermeer formally started. This operation took place in the form of a public private partnership between the Amsterdam Municipality, Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam[138] and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District administration. Their co-operation was formally settled with the 'Renewal Bijlmermeer Covenant' (*Convenant Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer*), entered into in 1995 for a period of ten years (Gemeente Amsterdam and Woningcorporatie Nieuw Amsterdam 1995).

The main purpose of the Bijlmermeer renewal operation, as phrased in the covenant, was 'a revaluation of the Bijlmermeer in order to create a neighbourhood with a favourable living climate' (Gemeente Amsterdam and Woningcorporatie Nieuw

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[137] The Ministry of the Interior; The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM); the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment; the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport; the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1995).

[138] In 1998 Housing Association Patrimonium took over the maintenance of the dwellings of Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam. In the course of 1998, both organizations were integrated. They continued under the name 'Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam-Patrimonium'.

Amsterdam 1995, 1). Frieling et al. (1992) took a more prosaic view and stated that the principal aim was the conversion of an annual operational deficit into an annual operational benefit. In view of the 'concrete results' in the covenant, both seemed to be main aims of the operation.

The Bijlmermeer renewal was approached as a project that was managed by the earlier mentioned three covenant parters. Its organisation consisted of different bodies.

The original Steering Committee Bijlmermeer Renewal was replaced with an administrative Steering Committee, a consultative and advisory body of the renewal partners (*Bestuurlijk Overleg*). This consisted of – once more – administrative representatives of the Amsterdam Municipality, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam. It was chaired by the co-ordinating Amsterdam Alderman for the high-rises[139]. The director and secretary of the PVB attended these meetings in the capacity of advisory members (Gemeente Amsterdam and Woningcorporatie Nieuw Amsterdam 1995).

Next, there was an Operational Committee (*Operationeel Overleg*). This Committee also consisted of representatives of the three contract partners. It supervised the implementation of the agreements that had been made. This Committee was in fact engaged in spatial renewal in particular, as was explained during interviews. A large sum of money was involved in this project: at the end of the 1990s the total investments in the physical renewal operation amounted to about 326 million euros (Begeleidingsgroep Evaluatie Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1999b) and in 2003 even to about 2,5 billion euros (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 2003).

A Bijlmermeer Renewal Project Bureau (*Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer, PVB*), paid and managed by the covenantpartners jointly, initiated and co-ordinated the complex renewal operation (Stuurgroep Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1992). One of the tasks of the PVB was managing three area-based project groups that implemented projects in Ganzenhoef, Kraaienest and Amsterdamse Poort. The director, the secretary and the other staff of the bureau were all employed by the Municipality of Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam and Woningcorporatie Nieuw Amsterdam 1995).

Although the renewal process was planned to consist of spatial renewal, social renewal and managerial renewal, due to the critical financial situation of the housing corporation, in practice *spatial* renewal got by far most attention. It was primarily funded by the Central Fund for Public Housing and by the Amsterdam Municipality (Gemeente Amsterdam and Woningcorporatie Nieuw Amsterdam 1995; Klijn 1998; Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1998).

A wide audience supported the understanding that social-economic renewal should be undertaken in connection with spatial renewal but the covenantpartners had not reserved any budget for social-economic renewal (Rijkschroeff and Vos 1996). Therefore, hardly anything happened in this field. Only when financing was found within the policy frameworks of the European Community Initiative URBAN and the Dutch Big Cities Policy, this could be started off.

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[139] In 2001, at the time of the interviews, this was Duco Stadig. According to the interviewees, however, also Alderman Jaap van der Aa participated in this consultation.

Originally, there was thus neither money, nor a separate organization structure for social-economic renewal. The organization structure as it was finally established, showed some resemblance with the organization structure, as presented in the covenant. At the same time, for two reasons, it was different: firstly, because of the way in which responsibilities had been defined. In case of the social-economic renewal operation, the Amsterdam Municipality was ultimately responsible for the spending of the European and Big Cities Policy money, while the city district administration was primarily responsible for the development of the social-economic programmes and projects (Gemeente Amsterdam and Woningcorporatie Nieuw Amsterdam 1995; Van der Aa 1996); secondly, because of the requirements of the European Commission with regard to the organizational set up of the URBAN programme. The organization structure had to take into account various requirements, based on the existing organization with its own social-economic programme (the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District); a project organization (Bijlmermeer renewal) and a covenant in which agreements had been made about social-economic renewal and two policy frameworks: the European Community Initiative URBAN and the Dutch Big Cities Policy framework. Not surprisingly, the final 'hybrid' social-economic renewal organization turned out to be somewhat confusing.

Social-Economic Renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost
The social-economic renewal activities in the Bijlmermeer were spread over various programmes and parties: there was a social-economic renewal (*SEV*) programme of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District. Secondly, there was the Big Cities Policy-I programme in the city district and thirdly, there was the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme. The relation between these three elements is complicated and often lacks clarity in the policy documents. Projects under these denominators have often been financed with different flows of money; the programmes and the budgets have often been practically combined in their implementation.

Already in the preparatory phase of the Bijlmermeer renewal operation, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District had laid down the approach of the social problems in a policy document '*Sociale Vernieuwing in Zuidoost*' (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1990). The outlines of the approach were, as such, written down in the policy document '*Van Wijk tot Voorstad*' (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1989) and also in the proposals of the Working group Future Bijlmermeer. The city district points out the significance of its role in the approach of social problems, putting it like this: "We take the view that … the city district, being the administrative level closest to the population, should get an important role when it comes to filling in social renewal" (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1990, 5). At the same time, the content of its role remained vague. The city district administration should have the task of 'directing,' and doing so, it should activate and stimulate social organizations and co-ordinate their activities. Concerning the approach of the problems in the Bijlmermeer, the document indicated little more than that spatial and social renewal should be taken up in connection with each other (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1990).

In 1991 the Zuidoost City District disposed of about 680,000 euros derived from a municipal fund for social renewal. In 1992, this sum was put in to the city

districts' fund (*stadsdeelfonds*). Moreover, national funds had been reserved for creating employment of which the city district also benefited (Stuurgroep Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1991a, 1991b). In the memorandum '*Sociale vernieuwing in Zuidoost: Strategie 1993-1994*' (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1993) driving back the high and long-term unemployment in Amsterdam Zuidoost and in the Bijlmermeer was the central theme. There were no European funds related to the URBAN programme yet.

However, at the same time the management and organization of social renewal at the city district level needed reinforcement. One of the reasons was the view taken by the Executive Committee that this was the main task of the city district. It lead to a proposal for a project organization social renewal, within the city district organization. This organization was to be more or less analogous to the project organization for spatial renewal, consisting of a management consultation, an official committee, a co-ordinator social renewal and furthermore of people who would be responsible for managing the projects (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1994).

Secondly, regarding Big Cities Policy-I, an important policy document was the '*Speerpunt Bijlmermeer*' (PVB 1995). The document is stated to be 'the elaboration of Big Cities Policy-I for the Bijlmermeer.' However, as mentioned earlier, it was also presented as the compact version of the *Bijlmertafel* memoranda. Strikingly, it is published by the PVB and officially signed (November 10, 1995) by the three Bijlmermeer renewal covenant partners. Even more striking is that the foreword is written and signed by the then State Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Kohnstamm. For, while it was already common for cities and the national government to sign a covenant for Big Cities Policy, at the level of the city district this was remarkable (it should be mentioned that the document did not have the status of a covenant, though). But this could probably be explained by the existence of the Bijlmertafel platform, in which representatives of various governmental levels were united. Finally, instead of Alderman Duco Stadig, who had signed the Covenant Renewal Bijlmermeer on behalf of the Amsterdam Municipality, in '*Speerpunt Bijlmermeer,*' it was Alderman Van der Aa who had signed on behalf of the Municipality (PVB 1995).

The document specifies a number of objectives and measures in the field of employment, education, living, safety, quality of life and social care, but it is done in a rather schematic way: a financial overview lacks, as insight in concrete financing sources was still missing at that time, and the report does not specify any projects yet. But in the back of the document a first move is presented for the organizational set-up of the social-economic renewal operation. This shows that by that time European money within the URBAN-I framework had been granted. Analogous to the spatial renewal organization, this organization would consist of several project groups: Work, Social Activation and Education, Quality of Life and Safety. These project groups would be headed by a Steering Committee Social-Economic Renewal (*Stuurgroep Sociaal-Economische Vernieuwing*) that at the same time would function as the Executive Committee of the Supervisory Committee of the URBAN programme.

Regarding social-economic renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost, there were thus various initiatives, in terms of plans, programmes and frameworks. The Amsterdam Zuidoost City District in particular was trying hard to position itself in the organization

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of this part of the renewal process. The European URBAN programme was a financial relief, but at the same time it added to the already existing organizational complexity of the social-economic renewal operation. In a wider sense the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme came down in a neighbourhood where at that moment an extremely complex and large-scale operation took place in which great interests and a substantial amount of money were involved.

Next, how did the preparatory phase towards the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme pass off and what did the programme look like in terms of goals, funding and organization?

9.4 The URBAN Bijlmermeer Programme

In the summer of 1994, the Amsterdam Municipality was informed by the national government that an application for funding for one particular area in the city could be submitted with the European Commission, within the framework of the Community Initiative URBAN. Because of its social-economic emphasis, this European programme would perfectly match with the needs in the Bijlmermeer. The Amsterdam Municipality decided to hand in a programme with the national government, as did the municipalities of the other three 'big' cities (The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht). Originally, the sum to be distributed was merely 20 million guilders (about 9,1 million euros). For that reason, in the end the Dutch government first submitted requests for funding of the Bijlmermeer (Amsterdam) and the Schilderswijk (The Hague) with the European Commission (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a). Later it also submitted requests for funding of URBAN programmes in Rotterdam and Utrecht. They were all accepted.

Drawing up the URBAN programme for the Bijlmermeer meant working under pressure of time. In interviews it was said that the Ministry of the Interior still had to get used to the procedure concerning European programmes. When the regulation arrived from Brussels there were only six weeks left to draw up the application and submit it. This application had to consist of a detailed programme together with financial schedules. The PVB had already made a rough scheme. Next, a consultant of Bureau P/A, a project organization within the Municipal Housing Service (*Stedelijke Woning Dienst, SWD*) of the Amsterdam Municipality, was hired to work it out in more detail. Based on interviews with the Nieuw Amsterdam Housing Association, the PVB and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, the consultant made a list of whatever was already there in terms of project ideas and projects. After classifying them he drew up measures to go with them. This resulted in the operational programme '*NO GHETTO: the URBAN Renewal of the Bijlmermeer*' (PVB 1994). There was no time at all for a public enquiry procedure. The programme even went directly via the board of Mayor and Aldermen to the Ministry, instead of via the City Council, what would have been the formal way. Drawing up the URBAN programme was, to the opinion of the then consultant, nothing more than a internal official procedure. Others too share the opinion that URBAN in its first phase was seen as an official item, nothing more than money; a motor for the social-economic renewal operation that could be managed in the same way as the spatial part of the renewal operation.

In September 1995, the European Commission approved the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme and funding was assigned. The target area would cover the Bijlmermeer area (see Appendix H). Financial support for the programme was received from the European Fund for Regional Development (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF), on the basis of co-financing. All URBAN projects had to be tendered before December 31, 1999. At about the same time that the European Commission approved the programme, the news got out that (partly based on the European condition of co-financing) the Dutch national government would financially support the social-economic renewal operation as well, within the framework of Big Cities Policy (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1998).

The then Alderman concerned with employment, Jaap van der Aa, who also had the Big Cities Policy portfolio, became administratively responsible for the implementation of the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme[140], on behalf of the City of Amsterdam. As this was realized, based on a proposal by the Alderman for Economic Affairs, one could assume that until that moment, the programme had fallen under the authority of the latter[141]. The daily management of the implementation of the URBAN Bijlmerprogramme was done by the then Municipal Housing Service.

9.4.1 Goals, Priorities and Project Criteria

The Bijlmer renewal operation clearly formed the framework of the URBAN programme and general goals for the URBAN programme itself were not formulated. The programme was embedded in the social part of the renewal operation and it was argued that "the financial contribution of URBAN can … play an important role" (PVB 1994, 22) in this operation. Originally, the specific aims and project criteria were formulated in a rather general way. However, during the implementation of the URBAN programme, they were elaborated and accentuated. In 2001, they were formulated as follows (see also Appendix I):

Projects should have a durable effect and should contribute to one of the following developments:
- Improving the living and working environment by reorganizing public space, the traffic infrastructure or buildings;
- New cultural and sports-facilities;
- Improving the quality of life, in particular by increasing the sense of safety;
- Creating new employment through facilities for the SME;
- Increasing the chance to get a job for local residents by means of education and government subsidized trainee posts;
- Improving education supply and facilities;
- Improving the connection between education and the wishes and capacities of the local population and the labour market;
- Improving the environment and stimulating recycling activities;

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[140] Excerpt from the '*Boek der Besluiten*' of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam, August 22, 1995.
[141] Surprisingly, neither present nor former employees of European Affairs (a subdivision of the Economic Affairs Department) have been able to confirm that this was indeed the case.

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- Improving the supervision and the involvement of the residents with their living environment (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2001).

Project proposals that were submitted for funding, were judged based on three priorities concerning content and on a number of quality criteria.

The priorities concerned, first of all, employment (permanent employment and an independent income); secondly, education (improving gearing and supply of the labourmarket, increasing vertical social mobility) and thirdly, 'fighting spirit' (creating a positive self-image, increasing knowledge, institutional participation).

Moreover, based on 'quality criteria,' projects should focus on co-operation between different parties; enlarge the involvement of ethnic groups and organizations; have a multi-cultural character and should thus enforce the multi-ethnic society; preferably be bottom-up; be innovative; be an example for other projects (preferably they should possibly be implemented in different contexts as well) and have a measurable and preferably lasting effect (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2001).

Later in this chapter, it will become clear why the setting of tasks (*taakstellingen*) and the project criteria were changed.

9.4.2 Measures and Funding

Within the framework of the Community Initiative URBAN, three measures were distinguished. Interestingly, under the heading of 'social-economic renewal', a large share of the expenses was reserved for physical infrastructural measures, such as 'facilities for the benefit of small-scale and new business' and 'improving the schooling infrastructure.'

Between 1995 and 1999 about hundred projects were submitted for funding by different organizations and institutions (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999b). More than 70 projects were honoured (see Appendix K). In all cases, financing of the projects concerned *co*-financing. A number of them (38) were labeled 'URBAN-projects': these were primarily funded with European money. Others were labeled 'extra projects' (41): those were mainly funded with other governmental funding and/or 'BCP-II' money.

The projects were classified according to the three measures mentioned above. Per measure projects could be remunerated and within measures projects could be rearranged. In principle the budgets of the measures were fixed. However, in 1999 the European Commission agreed with a proposal to change the distribution by measure, in the sense that the means for the safety measure (2.1) were shifted to the means for facilities for the benefit of small-scale and new business (2.2) (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2001). For every measure the European Commission had determined a certain percentage of co-financing (the obliged financial contribution by the (local) government to projects within these measures (Gemeente Amsterdam 1999b; Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2002). Appendix J shows the final balance of the investments made within the context of URBAN Bijlmermeer.

Table 9.O Estimated expenses by measures distinguished within the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, based on a revised financing table (in euros)(Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2002)

Measures	Expenses
I Spatial Renewal	*3,398,900*
1.1 Reorganization of public space and renovation for the benefit of social-economic renewal	2,578,000
1.2 Extension of facilities for cultural activities and sports	820,900
II Social-Economic Renewal	*15,265,200*
2.1 Upgrading safety, fighting drug related problems and improving the reception centres for drug addicts	3,750,600
2.2 Facilities for the benefit of small-scale and new business	848,700
2.3 Education and work experience projects	1,557,900
2.4 Improving the schooling infrastructure	7,359,800
2.5 Training programmes	1,748,200
III Supervision Improvement	*2,165,500*
3.1 Intensification of environmental protection	894,900
3.2 Improving (transitional) supervision and social participation	1,270,600
IV Technical Assistance	*465,000*
TOTAL	21,294,600

The promised financial support for the Bijlmermeer, derived from the European Structural Funds, consisted of about 4,8 million euros. This sum of money was transferred from Brussels directly to the local authorities of the City of Amsterdam, without intervention of the Ministry of the Interior. However, co-financing of the projects was necessary, as the European Commission did not reimburse more than about half of the project costs (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1998). Based on this condition, the Dutch national government made about 8 million euros available within the Dutch framework of Big Cities Policy. A large share of this money had to be used as co-financing (BCP-I), the other part (BCP-II) could be used 'freely': within the URBAN framework, "but without the accompanying and sometimes restrictive regulation" (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1998, 3). The total amount of money, made available by the European Commission and the Dutch national government is presented in table 9.P.

The total investments within the framework of URBAN Bijlmermeer were estimated to be about 21,294 million euros, but in the end, it turned out to be much higher: about 31,273 million euros. The final European financial support was, however, lower than the sum of money that basically had been made available. Of the available EU money, about 43 percent was not spent or not spent in time and had therefore to be returned to the European Union. This underspending was primarily

caused by a number of building projects that could not be finished in time. At a later stage, these projects have been finished, with the support of other funds.

Table 9.P Amount of money, made available by the European Commission and the Dutch National Government for URBAN Bijlmermeer (in euros) (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2002, 2001)

Financier	Amount of money
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)	3,828,000
European Social Fund (ESF)	976,000
Contribution of the Dutch national government, as co-financing for the European ERDF/ESF contributions (*BCP-I*)	4,686,448
Money from the Dutch national government (not co-financing) (*BCP-II*)	(about) 2,990,000

At the programme level (estimated financing), the European contribution amounted to 24 percent of all governmental contributions (Europe + national government + local government + public institutions). But, as shown in table 9.Q, in the end the actual European commitment only amounted to 16 percent of the total governmental contribution. The local and regional government invested a far larger share of money than had been estimated. Private investors surpassed all expectations, by investing about fourteen times more in the social-economic Bijlmermeer renewal operation than had been estimated.

Table 9.Q Financial scheme URBAN Bijlmermeer (x 1.000)(in euros) (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2002)

Finances by	Estimated	Realised
European Commission	4, 805	2, 727
National government	5, 108	4, 670
Local and regional government	7, 789	9, 441
Public institutions	2, 576	239
Private investors	1, 018	14, 495
Total	21, 296	31, 572

However, to put things into perspective, these total investments, related to the URBAN programme, were almost insignificant as compared to the total investments in the physical renewal operation, as mentioned earlier. URBAN was in a financial sense nothing more than a drop in the ocean.

While the national government (the Ministry of the Interior) was the primary contact of the European Commission as related to all URBAN-I programmes in the Netherlands, the local authorities were responsible for the implementation of the individual programmes (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a) and for their financial management.

In Amsterdam, the local authorities authorized the Municipal Housing Service (*SWD*) to take care of the implementation of the URBAN programme but this concerned *only* Big Cities Policy and the European ERDF funds. It is striking that the SWD was the treasurer, for that department was a part of the municipal organization that was not, in the first place, aimed at social-economic problems but at physical issues instead. Possibly, the fact that the SWD had a key role in the Bijlmermeer renewal operation also resulted in this arrangement. Moreover, this department was already familiar with the URBAN programme, because of its involvement via the PVB and/or Bureau P/A.

Coming at the end of the discussion, this is the moment to dwell upon the responsibilities regarding social-economic renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost on the whole. For, the URBAN programme was embedded in the renewal operation. The City of Amsterdam was ultimately responsible for spending the money derived from the ERDF and the Dutch Big Cities Policy funds. The Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, however, was the main party that was responsible for developing programmes and projects in the framework of social-economic renewal. For the implementation of the URBAN programme a separate organization structure was set up (Van der Aa 1996). Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam, the third partner in the renewal agreement, is not mentioned in the description of the way in which the responsibilities for social-economic renewal in the Bijlmer were subdivided, but it did participate in the organization, though.

9.4.3 The Organization Structure

According to European guidelines, an organization had to be set up, that would be responsible for the allocation of money to projects that were submitted for funding within the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme. On the other hand, it should be integrated in the ongoing renewal operation. The resulting organization structure, as set up in 1995, consisted of a Supervisory Committee (*Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer*), a Steering Committee (*Stuurgroep*), a Programme Secretariat and four project groups.

The Supervisory Committee superintended the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme. On behalf of the Amsterdam Municipality, Alderman Jaap van der Aa, who was responsible for the ethnic minorities, education, social affairs and employment portfolio, was appointed chairman of the Committee. Other seats were reserved for representatives from other governmental levels (the European Directorate-

Generals V and XVI, the Ministry of the Interior, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District), as well as for delegates from (semi-) public institutions (see table 9.R).

Aside from the administrative representatives in the Supervisory Committee (the so-called 'permanent members'), there were five official representatives, from the SWD and the Social and Cultural Affairs department of the Municipality of Amsterdam; from the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (city district clerk), the Projectbureau Renewal Bijlmermeer (*PVB*) and the URBAN Programme Secretariat (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1996, 1997a). These official representatives merely had an *advisory* status. Interestingly, the same five representatives participated in *both* the Supervisory Committee and the Steering Committee (Gemeente Amsterdam 1995b).

Table 9.R Composition of the Supervisory Committee in 1996, by number of seats (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1996; 1997a)

Supervisory Committee URBAN Bijlmermeer	N
Amsterdam Municipality (chair)	1
Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (vice-chair)	3
Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam	1
Chamber of Commerce Amsterdam	1
Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost	1
Regional Police Amsterdam – Amstelland	1
European Commission (DG XVI)	1
European Commission (DG V)	1
Ministry of the Interior	2
Total	12

The Steering Committee Social-Economic Renewal, established by the Supervisory Committee, was authorized to approve the individual project proposals that were submitted for European funding. This Committee was presided by a representative of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, but formerly mentioned Alderman Van der Aa participated as a member on behalf of the Amsterdam Municipality in the Steering Committee as well. Altogether, seats were reserved for the City District Amsterdam Zuidoost (2, including the chair), the Amsterdam Municipality, the Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam, the Chamber of Commerce, an educational consultative body and the police (see table 9.S).

A Programme Secretariat (the URBAN programme management) that supported the earlier mentioned Committees was established as well. This 'Programma Secretariaat URBAN Bijlmermeer' was responsible for the daily course of events, related to the implementation of the programme. Project proposals had to be submitted here and the Programme Secretariat then first tested the proposals for their compatibility with the implementation regulations, general conditions and testing

criteria, before sending it for discussion to the Steering Committee. Originally, it was subsumed under the Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a).

Finally, four project groups were established, related to employment, social development, quality of life and public security. This decision was based on the opinion that a specific approach was necessary for a succesful implementation of the social-economic renewal operation. The chairs and the secretaries of the project groups all came from the departments of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District. The most important tasks of these project groups were; translating the measures established in the '*Speerpunt Bijlmermeer*' and the URBAN programme into concrete projects; monitoring the progress of the objectives of the social-economic renewal operation; advising the Steering Committee on applications for URBAN subsidies; drawing up a work schedule for this part of the renewal operation and informing the Steering Committee by way of progress reports (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a, 25).

Table 9.S Composition of the Steering Committee in 1996, by number of seats (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a)

Steering Committee URBAN Bijlmermeer	N
City District Amsterdam Zuidoost (including chair)	2
Amsterdam Municipality	1
Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam	1
Chamber of Commerce Amsterdam	1
Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost	1
Regional Police Amsterdam - Amstelland	1
Total	7

These project groups were not an obligatory element in the European organizational requirements regarding the URBAN programme. Their existence makes clear that the above mentioned organization structure concerned not only URBAN. It regarded the whole social-economic renewal of the Bijlmermeer. Moreover, the project groups were obviously a matter of the Zuidoost City District organization.

Candidates for the Supervisory and Steering Committee were proposed by the Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmer, in which the three Bijlmer renewal contractpartners participated. The Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam appointed both the Steering Committee and the Supervisory Committee. These candidates were all representatives of organizations that were involved in the Bijlmermeer, especially in social-economic issues. Residents' associations were not represented. Moreover, according to one of the interviewees, this had never been part of the discussion, when the organization of the URBAN programme was set up. It became a discussion, a

political discussion, when particular local actors started claiming the European money and a position in the organization. This issue will be elaborated in the following.

9.4.4 The Headlines of the Black and White Conflict

Shortly after the start of the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, there turned out to be serious problems concerning public support among the local population. On February 2, 1996, a press report drawn up by the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District came out, presenting information about the start of the social-economic renewal. In this report the set up of the URBAN organization structure was included as well.

On February 6, 1996, four 'Alarmed Bijlmer residents' (*Verontruste Bijlmerbewoners*, at a later stage organized as *Allochtonen Breed Overleg, ABO*) organized a protest meeting, in which they criticized the organizational set up of the URBAN programme. This concerned in particular the composition of the four project groups, because of the (mostly white) representatives of organizations and because of the lack of representation of the (mainly black) neighbourhood residents. At this meeting, especially the 'black' City District Councilors were tackled about their neglected responsibility towards their electorate.

These 'black' Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Councilors did not submit to the criticism, but directly after united and became known under the honorary nickname (*geuzennaam*) of 'Zwart Beraad' (literally translated: 'Black Consideration'). However, shortly afterwards, *Zwart Beraad* came into conflict with the 'white' City District Councilors. For that reason, the conflict is often referred to as the 'Black and White conflict.' The conflict thus not merely concerned a crisis of confidence between the local population/social organizations and the local government; also within the local government itself severe conflicts broke out. The Council of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District made a request to the Steering Committee for a temporary time-out in the decision making process, in order to solve the conflict (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1998). The URBAN programme was brought to a stop in May 1996.

Next, based on the initiative of the Amsterdam Alderman Jaap van der Aa, the Steering Committee decided to have a quick-scan carried out, in order to overcome the deadlock. A research institute (the Verwey-Jonker Institute) was asked to do this quick-scan (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a). Their research focused on three aspects of social-economic renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost: the administrative management; the efficiency of the organization and enlarging public support, of ethnic minorities in particular. Solving the conflict was quite important for the Amsterdam Municipality, as it was ultimately responsible for the allocated European and national funding, and did not want to forfeit it. Van der Aa, administratively responsible for the implementation of the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, was therefore pushed forward as an interlocutor.

The analysis and recommendations of the Verwey-Jonker Institute were published in a report in September 1996. The quick-scan was supervised by a Committee, which was chaired by Van der Aa and composed of representatives of *Zwart Beraad*, political parties, religious organizations and the Ghanaian community. From October 1996

onwards, the Steering Committee elaborated the Verwey-Jonker recommendations, but did so together with this committee, under the name of 'extended Steering Committee'.

In October 1996, this extended Steering Committee organized a consultation among various governmental and non-governmental organizations that were asked to comment on the recommendations of the Verwey-Jonker institute[142]. Based on the advice of the Verwey-Jonker institute and on the outcomes of these consultations, the extended Steering Committee presented a proposal for an approach towards the social-economic Bijlmermeer renewal, published on November 29, 1996. It was entitled '*A New Start*' (Stuurgroep Sociaal-Economische Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1996).

Table 9.T Time Line Progress URBAN Bijlmermeer programme

Month/Year	Status Quo of the Programme
September 1995	Funding is assigned by the European Commission within the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme and by the Dutch government within Dutch Big Cities Policy. An organization structure is set up and the programme gets started.
February 1996	Protest meeting organized by four 'Alarmed Bijlmer residents'; 'Black' City District Councilors unite under the name of '*Zwart Beraad*'.
May 1996	The URBAN programme is put on hold.
June – September 1996	The Verwey Jonker institute does a quick-scan; The quick-scan is supervised by a Committee, chaired by Amsterdam Alderman Van der Aa and composed of representatives of *Zwart Beraad*, political parties, religious organizations and the Ghanaian community.
September 1996	The Verwey Jonker report, '*Sociaal-economische vernieuwing in de Bijlmermeer*' is published on September 19.
October – December 1996	The 'Extended Steering Committee' elaborates the recommendations of the Verwey-Jonker report in a policy document, published on November 19, named '*A New Start*.'
December 1996	The City District Council decrees '*A new start*', on December 17, 1996. The URBAN programme time-out is cancelled.

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[142] ABO, Vereniging Amsterdam Zuidoost, Kwakoe, BZO, BRAK, SSA, Sikaman/Recogin, SAAMGHA, Sociale Dienst ZO, Raad van Kerken ZO, Zwart Beraad, Arbeidsbureau ZO, Forsa/Wil di Bida, Nieuw Amsterdam, Residents' association Hakfort-Huigenbos.

April 1997	The URBAN programme restarts, based on a changed organization structure and based on new project criteria.
December 1999	URBAN projects have to be tendered before December 31, 1999.
December 2001	European funding has to be spent before December 31, 2001.

First of all, the proposal was to extend the Steering Committee with representatives of the local population. Additionally, in order to improve the labour participation of the local residents, the promotion of employment of this group was chosen as a spearhead. The Committee wanted to stimulate the local government and the local business community to put more effort in actively engaging people from (black) ethnic minority groups. Another proposal was the establishment of grassroots panels, in order to give the Bijlmer residents an opportunity to increase their influence on the social-economic renewal operation.

On December 17, 1996, the City District Council of Amsterdam Zuidoost decreed the outlines of '*A new start*' and enabled the progress of the URBAN programme (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a). In the same meeting, the decision was taken to ask *Zwart Beraad* and ABO to write a 'synthesis memorandum.' Besides, the Executive Committee would examine whether it was useful to establish a 'Multiculturalisation and Participation Bureau' (*MP Bureau*) that could monitor the process of social-economic renewal and stimulate participation among the local population in the renewal process (Zwart Beraad and Allochtonen Breed Overleg 1997).

9.4.5 A Closer Look at the Black and White Conflict

Although the organization of the European URBAN programme was the immediate cause for the Black and White conflict, there was a much stronger cause underneath. Apart from the implementation of the URBAN programme, there was also criticism on the lack of a participation structure for residents in the decision making processes in Amsterdam Zuidoost. The poor communication between the city district organization and migrant groups in the Bijlmermeer was another item. Finally, it was argued that the local authorities did not sufficiently deal with the social-economic problems of the Bijlmer population, such as unemployment, debts, rent arrears, criminality, drugs abuse and deterioration of the neighbourhood. Strikingly, according to a former municipal Alderman, but also according to other interviewees, at first, when the 'black' protest started, the Executive Committee of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District was not prepared to take the criticism serious. This, in turn, regenerated the protest.

Aside from the fact that the Black and White conflict hampered the continuation of the social-economic renewal operation and the URBAN programme in particular, and aside from the fact that Amsterdam was afraid of forfeiting the European money, there was more at stake. The conflict, discussed in the local and national media at great length, seemed to go beyond the borders of the city district. The Dutch authorities feared radicalization of the tensions and the Dutch National Security Service (*Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, BVD*) remained very alert on the

developments. There was a possibility of connections with radical separatist movements in the U.S. *Zwart Beraad* tried to fuel this fear by using a militant rhetoric. It suggested that there was 'fury' among the Bijlmer population and that the neighbourhood was explosive with a tapping time bomb underneath. Other suggestions were made, for instance about intensive contacts with black politicians in The Hague and Rotterdam, in order to lift the conflict to the national level; about establishing Black Power. Moreover, a war was to break out in the Bijlmer when the Netherlands would become chair of the European Union on January 1, 1997. In short, a black revolution was said to be in sight. To what extent was this picture correct?

The Parties Involved

In this conflict, three groups presented themselves as representatives of the black inhabitants of the Bijlmer. What did these parties stand for and to what extent did they dispose of funding and of grassroots support in the Bijlmermeer?

The first group, the *Verontruste Bijlmerbewoners*, afterwards united in the *Allochtonen Breed Overleg* (*ABO*), was a party in this conflict right from the beginning. Many Bijlmer residents knew members of this group, like Roel Luqman, Harald Axwijk, Just Maatrijk and Emile Esajas. Roel Luqman and Harald Axwijk had been active for some time, as early as the 1970s, in the categorical welfare work in the Bijlmermeer. Just Maatwijk had already been politically active for some time; he had been a member of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Council from 1990 to 1994, on behalf of his 'black' Progressive Minorities Party (*Progressieve Minderheden Partij, PMP*). Emile Jesajas had represented D66 in the City District Council in 1994; afterwards he went on as a one-man faction. Roel Luqman too had his own party called the 'Islamic Democratic Union' (*Islamitische Democratische Unie, IDU*) but he had never succeeded in reaching the electoral threshold. Except for Roel Luqman (Hindu-Surinamese) they were all Afro-Surinamese but their ambitions diverged sharply. Luqman was described as an activist on behalf of the neighbourhood, without national political aspirations. But regarding Axwijk it was said that he had established the ABO in order to 'conquer' the Bijlmer first and then to achieve a political position in Surinam. Rumours had it that all four were close friends with Desi Bouterse. In the media a lot of attention was given to conspiracy theories.

Zwart Beraad was the second group. Initially, all members of the City District Council joined this party, as far as they belonged to an ethnic minority group, except for the VVD. But its range was wider and among its members there were also politicians, officials and representatives of the social middle circuit (*maatschappelijk middenveld*) who defined themselves as 'black'. This political platform aimed at exerting optimal pressure on the Executive Committee of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District. For participation, it was obligatory that one worked in the city district. Besides, people took part as individuals, not as representatives of a political party. Members of the Executive Committee of Zuidoost could not join because of the oppositional character of *Zwart Beraad*. The members of *Zwart Beraad* were just like the ABO for the greater part Afro-Surinamese. There was only one woman. The core of this group existed of Swan Tjoa Tjheng, Clifton Codrington, R.A.H. Neslo, Krish Kanhai, R. Sanches and Eric Sinester. Henry Dors had formulated the ideological

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ideas. *Zwart Beraad* demanded, on paper, to be a shareholder in 'the BV Nederland' but the group actually primarily focused on the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District. They took the view that if the black community would participate (in proportion to their number) in the Executive Committee of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, in the City District Council as well as in subsidized institutes regarding education, industry and in all other relevant organizations, this would create a satisfactory 'multi-ethnic perspective.' A basis was laid for a politics of scale.

Relations between ABO and *Zwart Beraad* were usually difficult. ABO called *Zwart Beraad* 'Black betrayal' (*Zwart verraad*); its members were supposed to be place hunters. *Zwart Beraad*, for their part, called ABO 'old-fashioned' and 'become folklore'.

On a strategically crucial moment a third group, *Platform Bijlmer* joined them. On February 2, 1997, shortly before the URBAN programme started again and a year before the City Council elections, Wouter Gortzak, the then chair of the local Labour Party established this extra-parliamentary platform, together with a few others. The organization was strongly connected with the Labour Party. Its members came from divergent ethnic groups. Hannah Belliot (who later on became chair of the city district) became chair, Wouter Gortzak became secretary (interview; Van Roosmalen 1999). The platform, an organization in which 'black' and 'white' co-operated, wanted to put an end to the escalated Black and White conflict. Its members were, to use the same terms, seven 'blacks' and two 'whites'. There were six women and three men. The platform's ambitions went further than just calming down the political tensions; their aim was also to present a way to get out of the many social and economic problems that had to be solved. They brought out a plan called '*Flatproject Egeldonk: van idee tot grass root's panel'*. This plan aimed at activating the Bijlmer residents in one of the high-rises (Egeldonk) in a social sense. If it turned out to be a success, this pilot could be used for other high-rises as well (Platform Bijlmer 1997). The platform obtained a subsidy of about 160,000 guilders (about 72,605 euros), derived from the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and the URBAN budget.

There certainly was no unity in the sense of one 'black front'. Among the 'black groups' there were too many differences. Besides, there was too much criticism on one another.

The 1998 Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Elections

There may have been much criticism between the 'black' groups, but they did form a unity in the sense of using the same militant rhetoric. It was most impressive. In the local and national media it was suggested that a 'black' revolution was in sight; more dangerous and destructive than what had ever happened before. In fact there was just a relatively small group of people who were very active and politically engaged (see Appendix L). The picture of wide grassroots support was thus at least doubtful, but it was wiped out completely at the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Council elections in 1998. First of all, the turnout was relatively low: it was 39.5 percent, as compared to 45.2 percent in 1994. In the Bijlmer neighbourhoods it was even lower: 30.6 percent and 37.6 percent respectively, as compared to 36.5 percent and 41.9 percent in 1994. In

view of the Black and White conflict, one would have expected the turnout in the city district to be at least higher than in 1994.

But it should be added that the turnout at the municipal elections was much lower in 1998 as well, as compared to 1994 (47 percent and 57 percent, respectively). The turnout among Surinamese and Antilleans was even far below that percentage, though: 21 percent in 1998 and 30 percent in 1994 (Bestuurlijk Overleg Stadsdelen 1998; Tillie 2000).

Secondly, none of the smaller parties, characterizing themselves as 'black' and 'ethnic,' such as PMP, Toekomst 21, etc., reached the election threshold. Only 'Solidarity Southeast' (*Solidariteit Zuidoost)* of Mr Makdoembaks got one seat. Voters chose for the regular political parties, especially for the Labour Party.

Table 9.U City District Council elections in Amsterdam Zuidoost: turnout in Bijlmer Centre, Bijlmer East and the City District, by year of elections (in percentages) (O+S 1994, 1998, 2002).

Neighbourhood combination	1991 (%)	1994 (%)	1998 (%)	2002 (%)
Bijlmer Centrum	26.6	36.5	30.6	32.1
Bijlmer Oost	34.0	41.9	37.6	39.8
Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (total)	35.1	45.2	39.5	40.5

At the same time, the share of 'black' City District Council members increased from 30 percent in 1994 to 48 percent in 1998 (Bestuurlijk Overleg Stadsdelen 1998).Thanks to Ghanean preferential votes, three Ghaneans became members of the City District Council. Moreover, no doubt it has been (partly) a merit of the Black and White conflict that the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District got its first black 'City District Mayor', Hannah Belliot, a former member of the platform Bijlmer. Elvira Sweet was her successor; once more a 'black' candidate and also a former member of the platform.

The suggestion that the local population was fighting together, as one black community, for a black revolution in the Bijlmermeer, was thus a misrepresentation. There were several 'black' groups involved in the conflict with their own ideas and priorities. They attacked not only the local establishment but also each other and doing so could not count on wide public support from the local population (see also Dukes 2006a). At the same time, this does not mean that it was nothing more than a rhetoric politics of scale, without any material results. All the interviewees agree that the conflict has acted as a catalyst and has resulted in serious attention for 'black' issues. Stimulating participation and 'multiculturalisation' of the administrative organization became spearheads in the city district policy. Besides, other city districts learned a

lesson from the Bijlmer developments as well. In 1997, political participation of migrants was a main topic on the agenda of the consultation of chairs of the Amsterdam city districts (Bestuurlijk Overleg Stadsdelen 1998).

Table 9.V Seats in the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Council, in 1991, 1994 and 1998, by political party (in number)[143] (O+S 1994, 1998; www.zuidoost.amsterdam.nl)

Political parties	Abbreviation	1991	1994	1998	2002
Labour Party	PvdA	10	12	11	9
Democrats 66	D66	9	6	1	1
Green Party	Gr Links	5	5	4	1
Liberals	VVD	5	6	5	2
Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	5	4	2	2
Socialist Party	SP	-	1	2	1
Progressive Minority Party	PMP	1	-	-	-
The Greens	Groenen	1	1	1	-
Muslim Democratic Party	MDP	1	1	-	-
Bijlmer Interests	BB87	-	1	-	-
Solidarity Southeast	SOL ZO	-	-	1	1
Liveable Southeast	Leefb ZO	-	-	2	8
Christian Union		-	-	-	1
List Owusu Sekyere		-	-	-	1
Future 21	Toekomst 21	-	-	-	1
List Ampomah-Nketiah		-	-	-	1
TOTAL		37	37	29	29

Also regarding the social-economic renewal operation, and the URBAN programme in particular, the conflict has unarguably unchained a process of change. This will be discussed next.

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[143]When the city districts were established, their Councils had many members. Later on, the numbers were brought down. Shifts are now related to the number of residents in the city districts: on the last reference day, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District had a population of slightly more than 80,000 and thus it has 29 Council members. In smaller city districts the Council has less members.

9.4.6 The Changes

In the end, the URBAN programme started again in April 1997, after the organizational structure was changed and new project criteria had been established (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a). The new organization structure of the URBAN-Bijlmermeer programme is presented in figure 9.W.

Figure 9.W New Organization Structure URBAN Bijlmermeer programme (Hulsker and Koppert (2002)

* For the ESF resources, this was done by the Regional Bureau Employment Strategy (RBA).

What were the most important changes and to what extent were the requests by *Zwart Beraad* and ABO granted?

A New Organization Structure

The Steering Committee was replaced with the *Uitgebreid Bestuurlijk Overleg Bijlmermeer (UBO)*. The UBO, that met about once every six or eight weeks, was qualified to decide on *all* the projects related to social-economic renewal, funded with ERDF, BCP-I (co-financing for URBAN) and BCP-II money (no co-financing for URBAN, but to be invested within its framework)(Gemeente Amsterdam 1998c)[144]. While the UBO took the decisions in practice, the SWD screened the project proposals in advance. For this municipal department formally administered these funds in a financial and legal sense. The UBO decisions were taken over by the Municipality in

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[144] Originally, ESF-funding was involved as well. However, at the end of 1996, it was concluded that these resources should go via the Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment and the Regional Bureau Employment Strategy (RBA).

the quality of 'binding advice' (*bindend advies*) and the City Council decided about the municipal co-financing of the projects (interview). The Regional Bureau Employment Strategy (*RBA*), on the other hand, was responsible for the approval and the control of projects that were funded with ESF-resources. The RBA was also represented in the UBO (Hulsker and Koppert 2002).

Table 9.X Composition of the Steering Committee in 1996 and of the UBO (1997), by number of seats (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1996, 1997a, 1997b)

Steering Committee [145]	N	Uitgebreid Bestuurlijk Overleg (UBO)	N
		Independent chair	1
Amsterdam Zuidoost City District	2	Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (including vice-chair)	2
Amsterdam Municipality	1	Amsterdam Municipality	2
-		The Ministry of the Interior	1
-			
Housing Association	1	Housing Association	1
Chamber of Commerce	1	-	
-		RBA	1
-		Ethnic groups	4
-		Religious institutions	1
Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost	1	-	
Regional Police	1	-	
-		Amsterdam Zuidoost Association	1
TOTAL	7		14

First of all, the Committee doubled in size; the formal number of representatives (apart from the five advisory members) changed from seven to fourteen. Moreover, as compared to the original Steering Committee, the UBO was composed in a very different way. Some organizations were no longer represented. This concerned the Chamber of Commerce, the Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost and the Regional Police Amsterdam. At the same time, one seat was now available for a representative of the Amsterdam Zuidoost Association (*Vereniging Amsterdam*

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[145] As mentioned earlier, aside from the administrative representatives in the original Steering Committee there were also five official representatives (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a) with an advisory status, but they are not mentioned in the official '*Reglementen van Orde*' of 1995 and 1997 (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1995, 1997b).

Zuidoost), a local organization of employers, whereas four seats were reserved for representatives from ethnic minority groups and one for a religious institution. In the overview of the UBO members in the URBAN annual report of 1997, actually six ethnic/religious members are mentioned, representing the ABO/*Zwart Beraad* (1), the Surinamese community (1), the Antillean community (1), the Ghanian community (2) and the Bijlmerchurches (1) (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1998).

The Ministry of the Interior, that in the past had only been allowed to join the meetings of the Steering Committee, now became an official member. Just as in the former situation, EU-representatives in the Supervisory Committee would receive the UBO documents and were allowed to join the UBO meetings (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997b).

However, *Zwart Beraad* and ABO had actually advocated a UBO consisting of 19 seats; 'half plus one' of them held by (ten) 'black' and (two) religious organizations respectively (Zwart Beraad and Allochtonen Breed Overleg 1997). Although the UBO was extended, this request was thus not granted.

Table 9.Y Administrative members: old and new composition of the Supervisory Committee (1996 and 1997 respectively) (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1996, 1997a, 1997b).

Supervisory Committee (1996)	N	Supervisory Committee (1997)	N
Amsterdam Municipality (chair)	1	Amsterdam Municipality (chair)	1
Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (including vice-chair)	3	Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (including vice-chair)	2
Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam	1	Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam	1
Chamber of Commerce Amsterdam	1	Chamber of Commerce Amsterdam	1
Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost	1	Regional Bureau Employment strategy (RBA)	1
Regional Police Amsterdam – Amstelland	1	Ethnic groups	2
European Commission, DG XVI	1	European Commission, DG XVI	1
European Commission, DG V	1	European Commission, DG V	1
Ministry of the Interior	2	Ministry of the Interior	2
Total	12	Total	12

In case of the *Supervisory Committee URBAN Bijlmermeer*, the tasks and powers of the Committee did not change. This Committee, consisting of administrative representatives, monitored the progress of the URBAN programme. Besides, as the NEI states rather vaguely, the Committee was formally responsible for the general strategy and far-reaching policy decisions (Hulsker and Koppert 2002). The

responsibility of the Committee (*only* URBAN) was related to ERDF, ESF and BCP-I money (Gemeente Amsterdam 1998c). While the number of representatives (12) did not change, the composition of the Supervisory Committee did. Most importantly, two seats in the Committee were now assigned to ethnic minority groups. Moreover, representatives of the Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost and of the Police were no longer present in the new Supervisory Committee, while the RBA was added.

Aside from the administrative representatives as mentioned in table 9.Y, both in the 'old' and in the 'new' Supervisory Committee, there were official representatives, who only had an advisory role[146]. Also in the case of the composition of the Supervisory Committee, the 'half plus one' request by *Zwart Beraad* and ABO was not granted.

Finally, based on the foregoing, it was not very clear who was administratively responsible for the URBAN programme. The decision making around the URBAN programme rested with the UBO, but the final administrative responsibility rested with the Amsterdam board of Mayor and Aldermen (Hulsker and Koppert 2002).

Bureau SEV

Finally, the four project groups were abolished. Instead, within the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District organization, Bureau Social-Economic Renewal (*Bureau Sociaal Economische Vernieuwing, SEV*) was called into being, in order to put more emphasis on social-economic renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost. As compared to PVB, its position was quite different, though; instead of being managed by the three renewal partners, it was managed by the city district clerk.

The URBAN Programme Secretariat, until then subsumed under the PVB, was abolished as well; its tasks concerning content and policy were subsumed now under Bureau SEV. Within this bureau, thus *both* the social-economic renewal programme of the Zuidoost City District *and* the URBAN Programme Secretariat were centralized, in order to gear the activities to one another in an optimal way. At its establishment in 1997, Bureau SEV consisted of four project managers. Two of them were seconded employees of the URBAN Programme Secretariat.

Regarding the social-economic activities of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, Bureau SEV assisted other organizations and residents with developing and submitting projects. It also functioned as the project manager of a number of social-economic projects that were seen as strategically important for the development of the Bijlmer (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1998).

While Bureau SEV controlled the URBAN programme and was responsible for its content, the SWD stayed in charge of testing the project proposals in a financial and subsidy-technical sense (ERAC 1998; Gemeente Amsterdam 1998c).

Just like in The Hague, where the URBAN Programme Secretariat was embedded in the Urban Development Department (*Dienst Stedelijke Ontwikkeling,*

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[146] These were representatives of: the Municipal Housing Service (*SWD*) (1); the Social and Cultural Affairs department of the Amsterdam Municipality (1); the City District Amsterdam Zuidoost (1); the Projectbureau Renewal Bijlmermeer (*PVB*) (1) and the Programme Secretariat URBAN (1). Their presence is also mentioned in the official '*Reglement van Orde*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1995b; Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997b).

DSO), there was a field of tension at the project level. For, Bureau SEV not only supported others with their project proposals for the UBO, but also intended to have its own projects funded with 'URBAN' money.

Comparing the proposals for social-economic renewal, it turns out that Bureau SEV clearly was a compromise. For, opinions had strongly diverged on the extent of (organizational) integration of the spatial and social-economic renewal operation. In the Verwey Jonker research report (Rijksschroeff and Vos 1996), an integrated approach at the administrative and operational level was recommended. In '*Een nieuwe start*' (Stuurgroep Sociaal-Economische Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1996), however, the proposal was to keep these processes separate, with two project bureaus: the present PVB for spatial renewal and a Projectbureau Social-Economic Renewal (*SEV*) as its equivalent for social-economic renewal. *Zwart Beraad* and ABO (1997), in turn, had advocated an integration of the processes. They had suggested to set up *one* project bureau, based on a merger of PVB and SEV, that would become a 'co-ordination point'. Moreover, the city district clerk (*stadsdeelsecretaris*) should manage the total renewal process, gradually incorporating ('*inlijven*' it says in the document) this project bureau in the city district organization. However, the renewal processes were not combined in this way, nor did the city district clerk get the overall co-ordination; in the end he has 'merely' co-ordinated bureau SEV, that also had to be satisfied with a far less important position than many had pursued. To give an example: in 1997, Bureau SEV had a budget of about 872,197 guilders (about 395,785 euros) for its own city district projects (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1998). By way of comparison, the UBO could allocate millions of euros.

New Project Criteria

Another change concerned the project criteria that were used by the UBO in order to determine whether submitted projects qualified for funding. Major changes related to the fact that projects should now be 'multicultural' (a characteristic that had been absent in the original programme) and therefore help to reinforce the multi-ethnic community. Also, more generally speaking, multiculturalisation was a spearhead in all the documents with proposals for social-economic renewal. In addition, projects should be developed/created by residents' groups from the bottom-up, whereas originally projects only had to demonstrate that they were socially broadly based and assured enough involvement of the Bijlmermeer residents (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 1997a).

MP Bureau and 'Fonds voor Onderop'

Despite numerous efforts to stimulate and support the 'grassroots' to submit proposals, the European 'URBAN' money remained fairly inaccessible to the local community; it was difficult for them to meet the criteria. In order to help residents to formulate their initiatives and to submit these to the UBO, in the course of 1997 a Multiculturalisation and Participation Bureau (*MP Bureau*) was set up (UBO URBAN Bijlmermeer 1999). *Zwart Beraad* and ABO had made a strong plea for the establishment of an MP bureau; a request that has thus been granted. The bureau was positioned under the Executive

Committee of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1998) but it was located in the Bijlmer neighbourhood, as it intended to prime a dialogue between the city district organization and the local population. Moreover, it would also monitor the quality and the progress of the social-economic renewal programme of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, especially from the viewpoint of multiculturalisation (Goossens and Van der Zant 1999). However, the MP bureau got involved in a political discussion. While the full facts of this discussion are rather unclear, in view of the interviews that were conducted for this research, it seems that the MP bureau was regarded as a threat, both by particular people within the city district organization and by particular groups among the local population. For, how would the MP bureau, a continuation of the 'black resistence' in the Bijlmer, fulfill its monitoring role vis-à-vis the city district administration? Moreover, particular groups in the Bijlmermeer had initiated the MP bureau. What would this imply in terms of opportunities for other groups among the local population?

In order to get round the discussion, another organization was established, '*Bureau Onderop*,' that would support grassroots projects (Hulsker and Koppert (2002). In order to support bottom-up initiatives, the UBO had earmarked almost 1 million euros for projects for and by the community, by establishing the 'Bottom-up Fund' (*Fonds voor Onderop*), in September 1998 (UBO URBAN Bijlmermeer 1999). But, just like other project proposals that were submitted to the UBO, also these had to comply with the earlier mentioned three priorities that had been determined by the UBO (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2001). The MP bureau ended up trying to initiate different projects and to have them funded by the *Fonds voor Onderop*. Sometimes those efforts were successful, but in other cases they were not, which caused a certain tension as well (interview).

Overall there have thus been various changes in the URBAN programme, but merely some of the *Zwart Beraad* and ABO requests have been granted.

9.4.7 A Critical Reflection on the Organization Structure and the Changes

Finally, it is interesting to reflect once more on the organization structure and on the changes of the URBAN programme, as the above leaves some questions unanswered.

The Original and the Adapted Organizational Structure
Why, for example, had the original organizational structure of URBAN not incorporated any local groups or local organizations to start with? For, the European Commission had actively advocated local involvement in this Community Initiative. Various explanations are given. As mentioned earlier, according to some interviewees, designing the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme had been a purely internal official trajectory and its course had been very pragmatic. Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior and the Municipality had to get used to European programmes: people were not familiar with their regulations, organization, supervision, type of projects that qualified, etc. At the same time there was a time pressure to get ready. A complicating factor was that especially European governmental institutions were not familiar with city districts and thus did not incorporate them explicitly in their policy.

One of the interviewees said that initially neighbourhood organizations were not involved in the Committees, as it was not clear which organizations were truly representative. Either there weren't any clear ethnic representative organizations or they did not come to the fore. Another interviewee emphasized that the local government in Amsterdam Zuidoost did not have enough employees who disposed of connections with networks in the neighbourhood. Moreover, whereas the Community Initiative URBAN formally encouraged involving social organizations, the programme did not coerce to actually put it into practice. Local participation in the UBO has thus to a large extent been extorted by the Black and White conflict.

The UBO and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Organization

The UBO was part of a project organization and an interesting, but rather complicated question is what its position and authority was like, as related to the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District organization, in particular as related to the City District Council. In a formal sense, this was rather unclear, which seems to be caused by the fact that the final set up of the UBO was a compromise; the result of an extensive debate with a wide variety of opinions (see Rijkschroeff and Vos 1996; Stuurgroep Sociaal-Economische Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer 1996; Stadsdeel Zuidoost 1996; Zwart Beraad and Allochtonen Breed Overleg 1997). Comparing the proposals concerning the authority that would decide on and monitor the social-economic renewal programme, in '*A new Start*' (Stuurgroep Sociaal-Economische Vernieuwing 1996) this would be the UBO, while in the proposals discussed in the City District Council meeting of December 17, 1996, this would be the role of the City District Council. Finally, in practice, the UBO was the authority that did so. In the UBO also the Executive Committee of the Zuidoost City District participated. This implied decision making in situ that was basically binding within the bandwidth that the City District Council gave. As a decision making authority, the City District Council did not feel involved in the URBAN programme. This was bitter, for the City District Council representatives had been elected while the UBO- representatives had not (interview).

Sustainable Changes?

With the publication of the final report, the '*Eindrapportage URBAN Bijlmermeer 1995-1999*' (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2002), the URBAN programme has officially been finished. Actually the programme was already coming to an end in December 1999, when the money needed to be tendered. Anyway, the authorities of Amsterdam Zuidoost were by that time already thinking of the future (organizational) modelling of social-economic renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost, after the URBAN programme had been finished. Even though URBAN often got the stigma that it was 'only' a financial source in the process of the social-economic renewal of Zuidoost, it cannot be denied that the programme eventually has functioned as one 'window' (*loket*).

At the end of 1999, the Executive Committee of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District decided that Bureau SEV should truly become a part of the city district organization and should be better connected with the neighbourhood; until then the bureau had primarily been run by consultants and, according to one of the

interviewees, the relationship between SEV and the other parts of the organization was not very good. From now on, people employed by the city district should deal with social-economic projects.

In Amsterdam, the completion of the URBAN programme also implied the end of the URBAN organization structure. Efforts of the City District Council, to establish an Advisory Board (*Adviesraad*) for the Bijlmermeer renewal operation (see for example Stadsdeel Zuidoost 2000a, 2000b), in which (representatives of) local organizations would participate, have failed. Instead, in 2003 a Social-Economic Consultation (*Sociaal-Economisch Overleg*, *SEO*) has started. However, this is merely an advisory body, in which the city district administration confers with representatives of various organizations (www.seozuidoost.nl). It is thus not to be compared with the participation of representatives of ethnic and religious organizations in the URBAN organization structure. As one of the interviewees said, referring to the URBAN Steering Committee: "In the end they have participated in the UBO, with authority over an enormous amount of money. That was a unique situation."

Summarizing, it can be said that the URBAN programme has undergone a tremendous development in a rather short period of time: local 'black' groups, divided among themselves, used the (white) organization of the programme for bringing social-economic problems to the fore and for improving their own position in the local arena. This has resulted in drastic changes in the URBAN programme.

While sections 9.2 and 9.3 mainly related to the local contexts of the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme (research questions 1 and 4), this section has primarily addressed the programme itself and the involvement of local actors in its organization structure (research question number 2). The following section will thus concern the discursive practices of these local actors and examples of a politics of scale (research question 3).

9.5 Place and Positioning in the European Arena

Based on a discourse analysis, in this section, first of all, attention will be paid to the meanings assigned to the City of Amsterdam, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and the Bijlmermeer. Secondly, the ways in which local actors in Amsterdam position themselves and other actors in the European arena will be analysed. Finally, it will be examined whether one could argue, based on the data, that there is a politics of scale, either by governmental or non-governmental actors.

In this examination, an analytic distinction will be made between municipal and sub-municipal levels (sections 9.5.1 and 9.5.2 respectively). As has become clear in the foregoing, at the municipal level, only governmental actors were involved in the implementation of the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme (both administrative and official actors). At the sub-municipal levels, both governmental and non-governmental were involved. These levels could be subdivided in a city district level (an administrative level) and a neighbourhood level, the Bijlmermeer.

9.5.1 The Municipal Level

As mentioned earlier, the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme took place at a moment in time when Amsterdam was just raising its European and international profile. Like in

the case of The Hague, this is reflected in the available data: policy documents, but also speeches related to Europe or, more specifically, European urban policy, dating from the 1990s, were relatively scarce. This was a limitation for doing the examination.

Data Selection

First, municipal data had to be found that possibly qualified for a discourse analysis. These related primarily to data in which the Amsterdam Municipality explicitly focused on the URBAN programme itself or on European urban policy issues. Data sources were acquired via employees of Bureau Eurolink, the European contactpoint of the Amsterdam Municipality; through the municipal search engine (*Bestuursinformatie Amsterdam*); in the municipal library (*Stadshuisbibliotheek);* the Documentation centre Spatial Sector (*Documentatiecentrum Ruimtelijke Sector*); the municipal archives (*gemeentearchief*) as well as through the internet.

These data preferably thus had to focus on European *urban* policy issues. But there were two other limitations. First of all, these kinds of documents were scarce and often not suitable for a discourse analysis. Such was the case with progress reports like the URBAN annual reports that reflected in particular the progress at the project level. Secondly, very often the documents had been produced by different organizations. This implied that they could not be explicitly attributed to one particular actor. This was for instance the case with the URBAN Bijlmermeer application: '*NO GHETTO: The Urban Renewal of the Bijlmermeer*' (PVB 1994), published by the Projectbureau Vernieuwing Bijlmermeer, in which formally three renewal partners participated. Similar problems arose with the URBAN-II and Objective 2-programmes in Amsterdam. Some official documents that possibly contained useful information, were eventually left out of consideration because this research primarily focused on the URBAN-I programme.

Table 9.Z Documents produced by the Amsterdam Municipality, related to Europe

Title	Date	Status
Nota Amsterdam in de Europese Gemeenschap (EG)	1990	Memorandum
Perspectief voor Amsterdam: Amsterdamse initiatieven in het tijdperk van de Europese eenwording	1992	Brochure
Eurotop 1997 Amsterdam	1995	Brochure
Amsterdam in Europa: eerst profileren en dan profiteren	1998	Interview[147]

Due to these limitations, in the end I have not examined sources that focused on European *urban* policy issues, but merely sources that addressed European policy

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[147] The written account of this interview exists more or less only of quotations which makes it a useful source for this discourse analysis. For the analysis *only* these quotations have been used.

issues in a *wider* sense. In this case, more data qualified, such as the: '*Nota Amsterdam in de Europese Gemeenschap*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1990c); the policy documents '*Perspectief voor Amsterdam; Amsterdamse initiatieven in het tijdperk van de Europese eenwording*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1992) and '*Eurotop 1997 Amsterdam*' (Gemeente Amsterdam and Stichting Amsterdam Promotion 1995); as well as an interview with former Alderman Pauline Krikke (Euromagazine 1998). The final selection of data sources is presented in table 9.Z.

With the exception of the 1990 memorandum, these documents were all written in Dutch. This shows that they were indeed not primarily meant for self positioning in the European or international arena[148].

Data Analysis: Amsterdam in the European Urban Policy Arena

As mentioned earlier, the idea was, just like in the case of The Hague, to start the discourse analysis with an examination of Amsterdam in the European *urban* policy arena. For reasons mentioned above, as regards Amsterdam this subject has not been elaborated in detail.

Data Analysis: Amsterdam in the wider European (Policy) Arena

For Amsterdam, the discourse analysis thus related to Amsterdam in the wider European (policy) arena. In order to structure the findings in the data, the 'European urban policy discourse' categories, as described in Chapter 4, were used: cities (or parts of cities) as a *problem*; cities as a *strategic potential* and cities as a *balanced system*. Additionally, ways of (self)positioning by the actors, often based on the construction of cities as an entity of formal governmental responsibility, were examined as well. What could be found?

Nota Amsterdam in de Europese gemeenschap (1990)

The '*Nota Amsterdam in de Europese gemeenschap*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1990c) aims at making a inventory of the links between Amsterdam and the European Union, on the basis of three main themes: making use of chances for Amsterdam on the European market; taking the initiative to participate in European programmes and intensifying the relations between Amsterdam and the European Union as well as the co-operation between European cities.

This policy document is particularly interesting because of its timing and 'strategic character'. Earlier in this chapter it has already been indicated that the document, published in the period preceding '1992' and brought out in several languages, was submitted to the European Commission by the then Mayor of Amsterdam Van Thijn. This shows that the policy document was really meant as a strategic document. The signature of the then Mayor Van Thijn and his great interest in positioning Amsterdam in Europe, are obvious elements in this matter.

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[148]Documents and reports of the Municipality of Amsterdam that concerned the international context have not been used for this discourse analysis, because positioning in the *European* (policy) arena was the primary focus of interest.

The document has not been written as a 'position paper,' though. The content is rather dry, just presenting facts. For that reason, the document itself has not been analysed in detail for the discourse analysis.

Perspectief voor Amsterdam (1992)

The policy document '*Perspectief voor Amsterdam; Amsterdamse initiatieven in het tijdperk van de Europese eenwording*' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1992) bears the signature of Van Thijn as well. Its subtitle gives information on the context in which this document has been written, running: 'Amsterdam initiatives in the period of European unification'. The document provides an extensive overview of the spatial renewal in Amsterdam and the most important projects. Apart from this information, the 'perspective for the city' in the context of 'Europe after 1992' is the subject of interest. The picture that Amsterdam shows of itself is, in short: dynamic, anticipating, qualitatively renewing and a city with guts and class.

Constructions of Amsterdam and the Bijlmermeer

Strikingly, in this document Amsterdam is not described in terms of *problems*; the city is merely constructed as a *strategic potential*. Among other qualities the city's 'unique atmosphere' is mentioned, together with a reference to its 'vitality' and 'international style'. Broad attention is also given to the rich economic and cultural past, being the basis for the city to prepare for a 'new flourishing period' in order to become a 'European top location'. In terms of a *balanced system,* the description does not refer to other cities. It does, though, indicate the relation of the centre of the city with the periphery of Amsterdam: urban functions have gradually moved to the periphery, resulting in a city centre with an eccentric position. In that sense it is an unbalanced system.

The Bijlmermeer and Amsterdam Zuidoost have been left out, but the document does mention various other areas where spatial renewal projects are being carried out. They are described mostly in geographic terms, without adding a positive or negative connotation. The same applies more or less for the description of the plans and projects that go with the renewal: just the facts are presented.

There is one area that is explicitly described: the city centre. This 'heart of the city' with its 'unique character' is also again and again brought to the fore as *strategic potential* but its *problems* are not left out. The eccentric position of the centre, mentioned above, is in fact worrisome. Strengthening is needed, for instance by economic expansion in that very area, 'for, the centre of Amsterdam: that is Amsterdam. And that's how we will keep it.' This remark has two sides: first, that the identity of Amsterdan is strongly related to the character of the centre and second, that it seems to anticipate the fear of (possibley unforeseen) consequences of 'Europe after 1992.'

(Self)positioning as Actor

Regarding the positioning of Amsterdam itself and of other actors, the document actually brings only the city itself repeatedly to the fore; in many cases being a very dynamic actor. This is expressed for instance in the following way: 'Amsterdam wants

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to present itself as one of the European top locations now but especially in the future' and 'Amsterdam is working hard to obtain that position, by way of daring plans for a new future'.

The document does not mention European actors. Europe is described as context and furthermore only in relation to the European unification. National actors hardly appear: 'the State' is mentioned only twice, in both cases as actor in relation with agreements on accessibility. Regional actors are not mentioned at all; only the 'Amsterdam agglomeration' as a geographic unity, and in particular in terms of the accessibility within the agglomeration. Finally, in the document there are no actors at the city district level or neighbourhood level to be found; neither organizations nor residents. The document especially shows the city's intention to achieve a position as a top location among cities within the European arena, at the same time keeping its own identity (for an example, see box 9.A-1)/

Box 9.A-1 Excerpt from 'Perspectief voor Amsterdam ' (Gemeente Amsterdam 1992)

In this way Amsterdam presents a perspective for the future that on the basis of historic achievements anticipates important international developments that are very near. The new initiatives provide the opportunity to remain Amsterdam for the Amsterdam population and at the same time to develop into a European top location for the international business community.(Gemeente Amsterdam 1992)

Eurotop 1997 Amsterdam (1995, 4-5)
This proposal for the organization of the Eurotop 1997 in Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam and Stichting Amsterdam Promotion 1995) contains a global list of the subjects on the programme and hardly anything else; in that sense the document is too practical for a discourse analysis. Nevertheless, the introduction (pages 4-5) provides some clues, and so do the quotations on the cover.

Constructions of Amsterdam
The brochure's subject is not Europe but especially Amsterdam and sometimes the Netherlands. Both appear in particular as an actor and as a (positive) geographic location, sometimes coherently: "The historic picture of the Amsterdam townscape stands for a positive impression on the outside world: the Netherlands, a country that welcomes guests" (cover). Amsterdam is never constructed in terms of *problems* but exclusively as *strategic potential*. The city is put forward as 'the cultural centre of the Netherlands' (cover) and as 'one of the most prominent cultural cities in Europe' (cover). The fact that Amsterdam is a capital is also taken advantage of: "The city is

the Dutch capital and that's what it wants to show. It has various facilities and style" (Gemeente Amsterdam and Stichting Amsterdam Promotion 1995, 4). The motivation for hosting the Eurotop is presented as a matter that does not have to be explained: "Events like the Eurotop should take place in cities like Amsterdam" (*ibid.*, 4) and "Amsterdam and an event like the Eurotop are well matched" (*ibid.,* 4).

(Self)positioning of Actors

In the brochure, the city is often positioned as an actor: 'Amsterdam has much experience….' (*ibid.,* 4), 'Amsterdam proposes …..' (*ibid.,*.4), etc. Other actors are barely mentioned; The Netherlands, being the organizer of the Eurotop, only incidentally and Europe hardly, only as context: "Amsterdam is the cultural centre of the Netherlands and one of the most prominent cities of culture in Europe" (*ibid.,* cover).

Interview Pauline Krikke (1998)

The topic of this interview with Pauline Krikke, the then Alderman for Economic Affairs (1996-2001), concerns Amsterdam in the European context. One of the most important stands in the interview, is her conviction that Amsterdam needs to anticipate European developments but that local policy has to remain the point of departure.

Constructions of Amsterdam and the Bijlmermeer

Constructions of the city in terms of *problems* do not occur in the interview. *Strategic potential* seems to be the main point, expressed in qualifications like 'unique city,' capital and 'international work and trade city' (Euromagazine 1998, 17), a city with a 'European and global character' (*ibid.,* 17), a city of which the economic 'strength' is, among others, its position as 'staple market.' In logistic sense it has a 'key function' (*ibid.,*19). "Amsterdam is an international city and that's what it has to remain" (*ibid.,* 17). This statement holds at the same time a warning: as a *balanced system* in relation with other cities in the European context, Amsterdam has to be attentive to her position, for "because of the political developments in eastern and western Germany (fall of the Berlin Wall) Amsterdam has been shifted closer to the edge of the map of Europe…." (*ibid.,* 17). It is, therefore, "important to keep connections open with the rest of Europe" (*ibid.,* 17); to exchange knowledge with other cities on a 'European scale' (*ibid.,* 19) and, in the Netherlands, to co-operate with Rotterdam as a port.

During this interview the Bijlmermeer is mentioned once, in relation with the URBAN programme, as a 'good example' of the way in which Amsterdam approaches the 'suburbs' (*ibid.,* 17). These suburbs are constructed in a positive way, as target areas of 'renewal' (Mercatorplein, Bijlmermeer, Noord) or as 'development' (IJ-oevers and Zuid-as), all projects being a condition for Amsterdam to remain a 'vital international city' (*ibid.,* 17).

(Self)positioning of Actors

Amsterdam very often comes to the fore as an actor. This is not very surprising in an interview with an Amsterdam Alderman. The relation of the city (as an actor) with Europe (primarily in terms of policy, money and regulation) is the central point:

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"It is important for Amsterdam to position itself in Europe, now, to claim European support" (*ibid.,* 19). Strikingly, on this place too keeping the own authority/identity is emphasized: 'Amsterdam can just show what she is good in' (*ibid.,* 18). Incidentally Europe is mentioned as a context ('the European map') and as an actor, in a positive sense: "The experiences with 'Brussels' are good" (*ibid.,* 17). Finally, it is striking that the language and the terms that are used match with European urban policy discourse. Krikke puts it like this: "In Brussels officials realize more and more clearly that cities are the motors of the economy in Europe…." (*ibid.,* 19).

References to national actors are scarce. All references to the Netherlands, if they occur, are critical ones, for instance that national borders "still stand in the way of co-operation on European level" (*ibid.,* 19) and that it is essential "first to see to it that matters are put right satisfactorily in the Netherlands" (*ibid.,* 19). Regional actors or actors at the level of the city districts or the neighbourhoods are not mentioned in this interview, neither are residents. Private actors, on the other hand, are brought to the fore a number of times. This is not a surprise, considering the Alderman's portfolio. Constructions of these actors are positive, all of them, but there is a strong variety in references such as: the 'top of the business service' (*ibid.,* 17), 'European main-offices' (*ibid.,* 17), 'private funds' (*ibid.,* 17) and 'ethnic entrepreneurship' (*ibid.,* 18-19).

In conclusion, in all the sources examined, Amsterdam is the central point. Strikingly, all sources are written in Dutch, with the exception of the document of 1990. The city, as well as the respective areas within its borders, appears mainly as *strategic potential* and hardly in terms of problems. Regarding the city as a *balanced system,* it seems that there are some worries, although not expressed very explicitly. The balance with other cities and (within the City of Amsterdam) the balance between the city centre and the periphery need attention within European context, in order to strengthen the economic position of Amsterdam. It is also striking that the identity of the city and the local plans are called a guide in positioning Amsterdam in the European arena: on the one hand, because those are the main elements that make the city strong, on the other hand, so it appears, to protect its own identity; an identity that possibly might be threatened by European developments 'after 1992'. Other actors are hardly mentioned in the documents.

9.5.2 The City District and the Neighbourhood Level

As an administrative level, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District also formulates its own policy. However, as described earlier in this chapter, due to the complex way in which social-economic renewal, Big Cities Policy and the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme have been interwoven, both in terms of organization and projects, it was somewhat difficult to find data that could be specifically ascribed to the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District. Moreover, in this field too many documents that were produced turned out to be co-productions, for instance of the UBO or the Supervisory Committee URBAN Bijlmermeer. This made them unsuitable for the purpose, as the content of the documents did not make clear whose voice was heard.

The few interesting sources that have been produced by the city district organization date from the early 2000s, just after the URBAN programme was officially ended. But these cover a wider field than URBAN Bijlmermeer. They

concern either the social-economic renewal in the Bijlmermeer, or descriptions (in English) of the city district, aimed at an international audience.

As mentioned earlier, at the city district and neighbourhood level, not only governmental actors, but also non-governmental actors were involved in the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme. Regarding non-governmental actors, an important and powerful actor in Amsterdam Zuidoost was the Housing Association *Nieuw Amsterdam* (presently 'Rochdale'). In 2001, this housing corporation owned almost all (95 percent) of the Bijlmer dwellings. Interestingly, examining policy documents related to the renewal operation and to the URBAN programme, the housing association does not position itself in the European (urban) policy arena. The primary focus of attention of this housing corporation concerned the *spatial* renewal operation, but in that part of the renewal operation, there was no European money involved. For, as Alexander (1998) establishes, the EU was not involved in housing policy. And even though the renewal operation was officially an integrated operation, in practice, as mentioned earlier, the spatial and social-economic part of the Bijlmermeer renewal operation were organized in different ways and the link between them was not very strong. For that reason, as related to the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, the housing association did not qualify as an actor for a discourse analysis.

However, actors who *did* qualify for the analysis were *Zwart Beraad* and ABO, who initiated the Black and White conflict. They represented a clear voice in the European urban policy arena, organizing themselves under the overarching identity of being 'black' and linking it to (the high-rises of) the Bijlmermeer. In various protestmeetings and interviews with the media, they have expressed this construction of social reality (Dukes 2006a).

Data Selection

Based on the foregoing, the following sources have been selected for the discourse analysis (see table 9.B-1).

Table 9.B-1 Documents and speeches produced by governmental and non-governmental actors in the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, related to social-economic renewal or to the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District

Title	Date	Author	Status
Vertrekpunt van een zwart-etnisch politiek platform	1996	*Zwart Beraad* (Dors)	Manifesto
A different hunger: black resistance in a Dutch world	about 1996	*Zwart Beraad*	Pamphlet
'Zwart'- Wit' nader Beschouwd: een aanzet tot multiculturalisatie en aandeelhouderschap van de Bijlmer	1997	*Zwart Beraad* and ABO	Memorandum
Theme: 'Black and White' conflict	1996-1997	Various journalists	Articles (85) in newspapers and

			magazines
Empowering People and Communities	2002	Amsterdam Zuidoost City District	Brochure
Towards Zuidoost: the Colourful perspective of Amsterdam Zuidoost	2002	Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Council	Brochure
Speech Urbact Conference, November 26, 2004	2004	Elvira Sweet (Amsterdam Zuidoost, Executive Committee, chair)	Speech

They relate to data sources produced by the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (the last three in the table) and to data sources produced by *Zwart Beraad*/ABO (the first three in the table). Additionally, various articles (altogether about 85) in newspapers and magazines have been examined related to the Black and White conflict. The quotes in these articles have been used for a closer analysis of the 'black voice.'

Data Analysis: The City District in the European (Urban) Policy Arena
Three data sources (or parts of them) qualified for a discourse analysis of sources produced by the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District: '*Empowering People and Communities*' (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 2002a), '*Towards Zuidoost: The Colourful Perspective of Amsterdam Zuidoost*' (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 2002b) and a speech by the city district chair, held at the Urbact Conference in 2004 (Sweet 2004).

Empowering People and Communities (2002, pp. 3-5)
The brochure '*Empowering People and Communities*' (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 2002a) is written in Dutch, in spite of the English title. The content gives the impression that it is meant for a wide audience. It gives an overview of the economic renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost in the period 1994-2002, especially in terms of the results that have been achieved, the specific projects and the persons involved.

The foregoing discussion has made clear, that in the 1990s various parties have tried to find their position in the social-economic renewal operation in the Bijlmermeer. But in this brochure the role of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District is indeed emphasized to a large extent. It suggests that it was the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District that created a framework for social-economic renewal and also that this very City district has had a main role in the most important projects. As it is put: "The city district has, within the framework, used the available funds of BCP-I, URBAN, BCP-II, Objective 2, EQUAL and other financial sources for a number of very important projects" (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 2002a, 4). Additionally, it indicates that "the city district established the UBO, an organization in which apart from the city district several ethnic and social organizations took part" (*ibid.*, 5).

Towards Zuidoost: The Colourful Perspective of Amsterdam Zuidoost (2002)
This brochure, written in English, a typical product of 'City district marketing' seems to be a variant of the Amsterdam City marketing, be it that the City of Amsterdam itself is hardly mentioned at all. Creating a picture of Amsterdam Zuidoost has obviously been the main purpose and it has exclusively been done in a positive way. It is called 'a colourful and dynamic city district (Stadsdeel Zuidoost 2002b, 2), where one can live, work and relax. Receiving a 'fresh economic and cultural boost' (*ibid.,* 2), with a 'flourishing business community'(*ibid.,* 3), in which the ArenA forms a 'vital economic hub' (*ibid.,* 3) with other economically vital parts of Amsterdam, such as Schiphol airport, the Port of Amsterdam and the Zuidas. Less favourable elements (the fiasco of the Bijlmermeer) are mentioned in terms like 'Amsterdam Zuidoost is 'learning from the past' (*ibid.,* 5) and 'heading for a new future' (*ibid.,* 7). Once or twice the Bijlmermeer gets attention but always in a positive sense. The population in the city district is portrayed as multi-ethnic and young, with a 'strong feeling of togetherness' (*ibid.,* 11); a 'vibrant community' (p.15), thanks to an 'exceptional blend of people and cultures' (*ibid.,* 11). The strong emphasis on the diversity of Zuidoost as well as on its population, gives the impression that the brochure is, first of all, aimed at attracting new residents: "It is a great place to raise children and grow old. Welcome to Zuidoost!" (*ibid.,* 2).

Urbact Conference: Speech Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Chair (Sweet, 2004)
The European programmas in Amsterdam Zuidoost have brought Europe 'closer to the city district'. The city district has also become connected to networks with other cities in the European urban policy arena, such as the UDIEX-UDIEX.ALEP network within URBACT (see Chapter 7). In November 2004, the '*Fourth Topic Based Workshop on Enterprise development for socially excluded groups*' took place in Amsterdam/Rotterdam. During the first day of the workshop, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District was host. On this occation, the city district chair Elvira Sweet gave a speech in English.

What strikes one most in terms of 'place' and 'positioning' in this speech is that *problems* are mainly related to people ('excluded groups', 'target groups', 'local people') and to a lesser extent to geographic entities (neighbourhoods, cities). Only once, there is a reference to 'deprived neighbourhoods.' Only once, Amsterdam Zuidoost depicts itself in this way, in her effort towards realizing a *balance* between the city and the neighbourhood: 'narrowing the gap, between our neighbourhood and the rest of the city' (p.1). The city district does not appear as *strategic potential.* In view of the theme of the workshop, this does not come as a surprise.

Europa, Nederland and Amsterdam hardly come to the fore, neither as places, nor as actors. The Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, on the other hand, positions itself frequently, especially in relation to social-economic policy. It claims, for example, to have started 'the Urban and Socio-economic Renewal Program' (Sweet 2004, 1); to 'have installed the Socio-Economic Platform' (*ibid.,* 2) and to have 'initiated in 2000, the Entrepreneur's house project' (*ibid.,* 2). Regarding positioning towards other actors, the city district chair only (but merely once) explicity addresses other European cities, for, "there is the need … to strengthen co-operation between sister cities" (*ibid.,* 4).

To sum up, what strikes one most in the examined sources, are the claims of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District regarding initiatives in the field of social-economic renewal in the city district. Additionally, because of the European programmes (as a part of social-economic renewal) the city district seems to have got a stronger international orientation, witness, for example, the English brochures with a 'city district marketing' character and also the participation of the city district in the Urbact network. However, this orientation does not seem to be focused on Europe, but to have a far wider, international character. It should be noted though, that these data are somewhat too scanty for convincing arguments in this sense.

In the following, attention will be paid to the voice of non-governmental actors in the European urban policy arena, in case, the 'black' actors: *Zwart Beraad* and ABO.

Data Analysis: The Voice of 'Black' in the European Urban Policy Arena

While Musterd and Smakman (2000, 304) establish that: "Although many of the Dutch Caribbean immigrants are black, they are seldom referred to as the black population," the interesting fact in the Black and White conflict in the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer, was that they defined *themselves* as 'black'.

Considering various data sources in which this black 'voice' in the European urban policy arena expressed itself, an interesting question is which meanings were assigned to the City of Amsterdam, to the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and to the Bijlmermeer, and how these 'black' actors positioned themselves and other actors in this European arena. As place and positioning are often closely connected in these documents, they will be primarily discussed coherently.

'Zwart – Wit' nader beschouwd (1997)

This 'synthesis memorandum,' written by *Zwart Beraad* and ABO, has an explicit local focus, in which local actors and local themes are at stake. Europe, the Netherlands and even the City of Amsterdam do not appear; the European Commission, the Ministry of the Interior and the administration merely incidentally come to the fore, as actors/partners in the URBAN organization. Instead, the memorandum is about Amsterdam Zuidoost and about the Bijlmermeer. It focuses on the Bijlmer population and on the way in which the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme (UBO and Supervisory Committee) should be organized. A politics of scale becomes visible in the way in which the residents are positioned.

'Zuidoost' or the 'city district' are mainly depicted as a geographic context, whereas the Bijlmermeer is presented in terms of problems, as a target of policy, and as a (multi-ethnic) home to its inhabitants. The Bijlmerpopulation appears frequently and is constructed as a 'black' Bijlmerpopulation: either (and mostly) the focus is on the Bijlmer (Bijlmer society, Bijlmerpopulation, inhabitants from the Bijlmer, Bijlmer community) or the focus is on the 'blackness' of its population (Black ethnic (population) groups, black community, black people, blacks). Less frequently, the Bijlmerpopulation is constructed in somewhat vague terms such as 'basic groups', 'other' or 'different' ethnic groups. Incidentally, it is constructed as a social basis (*draagvlak*). Also 'white' comes to the fore, but not very often. Moreover, it is mostly related to the local administration or to the city district administration, like in: 'white

administrators, politicians and civil servants in Zuidoost' (Zwart Beraad and Allochtonen Breed Overleg 1997, 5) and not to the Bijlmer population.

Finally, aside from *Zwart Beraad* and ABO, who always appear as an (initiating) actor, other actors concern the city district administration (with various – positive, negative, but often neutral - connotations), the City District Council and the city district organization.

Also in other sources related to the Black and White conflict, the 'playing field' seems to be rather limited, in terms of the area concerned and the actors involved. One particular aspect that requires further elaboration is this 'black voice' itself; to what extent could it truly be characterized as one voice?

Newspapers, Magazines and the Zwart Beraad Manifesto

Parties presented themselves in the Black and White conflict as 'black'. However, 'Black and White' was of course a metaphor. As Prins (1997) argued, black represented something, but at the same time it involved a representation of a self; of the subjects who did the representing. An important question is therefore what the precise connotation of 'black' was in this conflict. As it turned out, there were many. In the following, an impression of these different connotations will be presented, based on an examination of 85 articles in newspapers, magazines and the *Zwart Beraad* manifesto. To start with, what was the connotation of 'black' as opposed to 'white'?

Black versus White

In this antithesis, black was, first of all, constructed as victim, as the oppressed, against 'white' being the exploiter. In the ideology of *Zwart Beraad*, the party referred to the period of colonization. Following that line, Surinamese, Antillean and Aruban Dutchmen should consider themselves as one co-ordinating ethnic category with 'a common history, characterized by colonial exploitation, 'dutchyfying' (*vernederlandsing*), and settling as 'colonial immigrant' (Dors 1996, 2). This collective history should instigate a process of emancipation. In the rhetoric of *Zwart Beraad* these terms were often heard. Wouter Gortzak, the then first chair of the local Labour Party, was once described as a 'white colonial farmer.'[149] Besides, this black and white opposition was also used, if it was appropriate, for legitimizing actions; a pamphlet issued by *Zwart Beraad* referred to 'a justified opposition of black against white rulers in politics'. In the words of Prins (1997), the issue of ethnicity got constructed within a discourse of racialization, in which the dominant opposition was one of 'black' versus 'white'.

Secondly, the antithesis stood for a difference in social status: black meant an unfavourable social status: underprivileged versus privileged, poor versus rich, lower-class against middle- or higher-class. Moreover, some added an element of racialism and discrimination with the result that in discussions 'whites' easily ran the risk of being called a racist.

A third and last aspect of the antithesis concerned the way one behaved in politics; the politics of black politicians was considered to be a matter of providing

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[149] *De Groene Amsterdammer* (Amsterdam), Oktober 30, 1996

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favours to one's friends and fellow party members, 'clientelism', a system quite different from the 'Randstad politics' of the (white) city district administration. Even 'clientelism' had a different meaning in relation with black and white. From the white point of view it meant gathering one's own (political) circle and then provide them with jobs and favours. But among the black population, 'clientelism' was seen as a personal political system of favours, which was characterizeds as 'the result of social networks in the neighbourhood. This point of view resulted in reproaching the Executive Committee of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District for their arrogant attitude.

Table 9. C-1 Examples of Quotes from Zwart Beraad Members, as presented in the media

Quotes	Source
'A justified opposition of black against white rulers in politics'	Zwart Beraad Pamphlet
'Blacks don't achieve anything in the Netherlands, no matter how hard they try'	*Parool*, January 18, 1996
'One is black by falling under the minorities policy, by not counting because of one's birth'	*De Volkskrant*, March 19, 1997
'I always tell people: don't forget that for all blacks the slavery is up to now an item that cannot be forgotten'	*Het Parool*, January 18, 1996
'There will always be a token'	*De Groene Amsterdammer*, October 30, 1996
'The right blacks'	*De Groene Amsterdammer*, October 30, 1996
'Listen to the words of a white colonial farmer''	*De Groene Amsterdammer*, October 30, 1996

Black versus Black
But also under the heading of 'black' there was a tremendous diversity; to such an extent, that it really could be called a faultline between black and black. What connotations did 'black' have here?

Firstly, the 'black' residents of the Bijlmer existed, in fact, of a diversity of ethnic groups. It is true that people from Suriname and the Antilles together formed the largest ethnic group (about 44 percent in 1995), but the Surinamese could be subdivided in Afro-Surinamese, Hindu-Surinamese, Javanese-Surinamese, etc. The same held for the Antilleans, who came from different isles (Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao). Additionally, there were 'blacks' living in the Bijlmer with a completely different origin. They came from Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan etc. 'Black' was thus highly diverse in view of ethnicity as well as in view of the different countries people came from. It was

doubtful, to say the least, whether a 'black voice' really existed. Besides, not everyone appreciated the fact that *Zwart Beraad* and ABO called themselves ' black'. A visitor of a public political discussion meeting of the ABO complained: "All persons behind the table are Surinamese. It is scandalous, the way they misuse the national exposure in order to claim the term 'black'. I am Antillean. I live and work in the Bijlmer too."[150]

Secondly, the 'blacks' constructed a normative separation between 'the right' blacks and 'the wrong blacks'; the 'tokens', the 'bounties: black on the outside but white on the inside'. With the latter, black people were meant who had been chartered only for electoral gain or just for show, and who subsequently joined in the established (meaning: white) ideas. Especially *Zwart Beraad* struggled against 'bounties', who were supposed to be used by whites as a weapon and who had to be exposed[151]. Every 'black' person who was active in politics ran that risk.

Black versus Red

In a meeting of the Labour Party (PvdA) in November 1996 one of its members Prem Radakishun called out (as the story goes): 'I am red first, then black'[152]. Saying this, he touched an important problem of many persons involved in the Black and White conflict: their political versus their ethnic loyalty. This loyalty problem caused faultlines within the political parties.

In 1994, the D66 representation in the City District Council was broken up along ethnic lines. The national party executive of D66 threatened with removal of the local branch as well as of the party members in the City District Council of Amsterdam Zuidoost. Eventually this did not happen, but the black members carried on under the flag of D66 while the white members eventually merged with *Leefbaar Zuidoost*.

Also within the Labour Party (PvdA) a rift was feared between the (black) *Zwart Beraad*/Labour Party members and the (mixed) group of Wouter Gortzak. The latter wanted to be seen as members of the PvdA in the first place. That also held for Prem Radakishun, the earlier mentioned PvdA member. It is said that he snarled at the *Zwart Beraad*/Labour Party members: "You'd better see to it first that people who live in the high-rises vote. That's the way to get black politicians."

Within the liberal party (VVD) the 'black' versus –'white' did not affect the discussion. Patricia Remak, the then chair of the liberal group on the City District Council, who herself had a dark skin colour, indicated that her work in politics was not aimed at a specific target group[153].

Summarizing, within the 'black voice' there turned out to be, in fact, several hidden antitheses and many connotations of 'black'. Nevertheless the 'black' actors used a similar rhetoric. They created one 'voice' in the European urban policy arena, at the level of the Bijlmermeer, by organizing under one overarching identity ('black') and by linking it to a clear place: the (high-rises of the) Bijlmermeer. In doing so, the actors constructed a scale, in order to get attention for their cause and in order to become a

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[150] *De Nieuwe Bijlmer* (Amsterdam), December 4, 1996.
[151] *De Groene Amsterdammer* (Amsterdam), Oktober 30, 1996.
[152] *Het Parool* (Amsterdam), November 9, 1996.
[153] *De Volkskrant*, November 2, 1996.

player in the arena. In this sense, their strategy was a clear example of a politics of scale. It is interesting at the same time that the aim was, not so much, positioning in the *European* arena (although that was incidentally referred to), but positioning in the *local* political arena of Amsterdam Zuidoost. The self positioning of 'black', and also the positioning of other parties took place not so much towards Europe, but especially towards each other in this local arena.

9.6 Conclusion

In the foregoing, three arenas on which Amsterdam embarked in the past years have been discussed: the European urban policy arena, the wider European arena and the international arena. Actually, there was another, local arena: the arena of Amsterdam Zuidoost, in which black parties committed a politics of scale, claiming European money.

Around 1990, European funds already poured into Amsterdam from the ERDF, in the framework of the Renewal project in Amsterdam Noord. Actually the city was at that moment already a party in the European urban policy arena. But it lasted till 1995, when the URBAN programme started off, that the City of Amsterdam became more visible in an administrative sense. In the next years more European programmes followed (URBAN-II, Objective 2). The Municipality remained active, as an actor.

When the European unification in 1992 came near, this stimulated the EU commitment of the city and some initiatives were taken: a first 'European' policy document was published in 1990, by which the local authorities positioned the city individually and directly in the wider European arena. This was a clear example of a politics of scale. Other initiatives in the early 1990s related to the establishment of Eurolink and the membership of Eurocities (1991). Then, for a period of about 15 years, very little happened: in the programme agreements of the 1990s Europe was not mentioned; no policy documents related to Europe came out and the city had a low profile regarding the administrative involvement with international city networks. At the administrative level there was little interest in Europe, except for the respective Aldermen for Economic Affairs. It even seems that the Eurotop in 1997, utilized for promotional objectives, did not have a lasting impact on the municipal organization. But in 1999, Amsterdam was the first Dutch city that sent an official to Brussels, to represent the city. Only in the course of the 2000s, the EU engagement of Amsterdam seemed to get an administrative and official character in a wider sense. It lead to formalizing the EPA and to an extension of attention and capacity aimed at Europe. At the end of 2005 the '*Euromagazine*,' published by Eurolink, was replaced with the '*G4 in Europa*'. This shows a conspicuous politics of scale of the four big cities, fitting the increased positioning towards Europe in G4 context (see Chapter 7). Striking though, is the fact that the discourse in the Amsterdam sources of the early 1990s has a strategic character, while the sources in the early 2000s are very official indeed. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, the municipal organization seemed to aim emphatically and individually at wider perspectives, while in the early 2000s she appeared to be particularly engaged in internally modelling its policy aimed at Europe. But anyway, the city became part of various city networks in the meantime.

Regarding the international arena, for years the local authorities had had the opinion that Amsterdam simply *is* international. However, prompted by the increasing international competition and the fact that an international profile of a city was not a self-evident proposition for companies looking for a business location, since the early 2000s, thus relatively late, the City of Amsterdam has a policy aimed at international co-operation and international positioning.

The participation of municipal departments and city districts in international projects has increased, which shows that within the municipal organization there is more and more interest in international projects. But the city also actively works on her international positioning. It is in this field too that the Alderman for Economic Affairs takes the lead, for instance with '*I Amsterdam*'. This slogan is meant to get more attention, internationally, from companies, from people who come for business reasons and from tourists. Additionally, in 2003, a policy link was established between international and European municipal activities. Finally, while the discourse concerning EU engagement was rather official in the early 2000s and inward oriented, the city marketing in the international arena, on the other hand, was explicitly outwardly focused.

Considering the position of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, as related to the earlier mentioned three arenas, the European programmes that have been implemented in this city district have been the entrance to the European urban policy arena; by that way, the city district started positioning itself in that arena. Besides, the city district positions itself also in a wider, international sense, possibly prompted by its large business park.

The degree in which the City of Amsterdam as well as the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District emphasize their own position and policy in the European (or wider) arena in the data they produce, is striking. Apart from that, they present themselves particularly in terms of *strategic potential*. At the same time, the city as well as the city district also construct themselves as an *(un-)balanced system*, in such a way that one gets a view on the context in which the explicit problems are seen. As for Amsterdam, it is the city centre versus the periphery, in relation with the economic developments; the city in comparison with other European cities in relation with international competition. As for the Bijlmer, it is the 'gap' between the Bijlmermeer and the City of Amsterdam, as related to their social-economic position.

As regards the operational URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, this was initially an official matter that has been drawn up in a very short time period and in an extremely pragmatic way. At the same time, from the beginning, it was surrounded with complexity at the levels of the central city and the city district, in an administrative and official sense. The European Commission requirements on organization and co-financing had to be taken into account, a matter still more or less unknown to the city and the city district. Besides, 'city districts' did not, as an administrative entity, play a role for the European Commission. Moreover, the URBAN programme had to be embedded in the policy framework of the ongoing Bijlmermeer renewal operation. Different authorities and different responsibilities often turned out to be complicating factors. The Amsterdam Zuidoost City District was, for instance, responsible for the content of social-economic renewal (being a part

of the Bijlmer renewal operation), while the local authorities of the City of Amsterdam were responsible for the financial control and management of the URBAN programme. Finally, the local institutional context also added to this complexity; the relation between the City District Council and the UBO was a sensitive one and in the 1990s, the relation between the city and the city district had not yet crystallized properly. No wonder that the outlines of the final URBAN organization were rather hybrid. In the discussion on the organization of the programme, the subject of local participation had been left out.

From a financial point of view the URBAN programme was just a drop in the ocean. Initially it appeared to be classified as 'money' under Big Cities Policy. The renewal operation in the Bijlmer was a context of much money and great interests. In this field of force several parties tried to optimize their position. The three renewal partners had already, in an early stage, worked out the organization of the physical part or the renewal operation in detail. This was not the case with social-economic renewal, that initially had not been elaborated and (in theory) thus offered opportunities for involvement. The City District Council used this opportunity to position itself in relation with the social-economic renewal part of the operation. Probably there would have been no other complications than the city and the city district having different ideas about money and organization, if not 'black' Bijlmermeer parties had considered this a chance to get a say in the matter.

In this context, complex and unclear in an organizational sense, 'black' parties used URBAN as a vehicle, and it proved to be a very effective one. Their politics of scale and the rhetoric they used, based on an alleged 'one voice' of a 'black' Bijlmermeer community, resulted in radical changes of the URBAN programme, concerning its content as well as in terms of organization. While these parties positioned themselves in the European urban policy arena, in fact they had other interests. They had no intention at all to obtain a position vis-à-vis Europe, judging from the discourse around the Black and White conflict. Besides, they did not make use of the chances on participation, as included in the URBAN programme ('local participation', 'local partnership', etc). They merely claimed the money that was meant for the poor, black Bijlmer population indeed, and in their opinion should thus be allocated by representatives of this population. These 'black' parties used the European URBAN programme in order to raise the question of discrimination of 'black' against 'white', and to profile themselves towards the city district authorities of Amsterdam Zuidoost. There could well have been another fuse to set fire.

This politics of scale was more than rhetoric; there certainly were substantive consequences. In 1998, the City District Council of Amsterdam Zuidoost got, for the first time, a 'black' chair. Moreover, 'participation' and 'multiculturalisation' became spearheads in the programmes of the city district.

Chapter 10

10. Comparing Amsterdam and The Hague

10.1 Introduction

The foregoing chapters on The Hague and Amsterdam presented an examination of the URBAN-I programmes in the Schilderswijk (The Hague) and the Bijlmermeer (Amsterdam), respectively. The focus was on the organization structure and the policy process of the URBAN-I programmes: how did these come about, as related to: physical, social and economic characteristics and developments of the two cities; their local institutional context; administrative and policy frameworks and as related to their exploration of the European and international context? These various contexts were described at the levels of the city, the city district and the neighbourhood (if relevant). Moreover, explicit attention was paid to discursive practices, in order to get a better understanding of the meanings assigned to cities (and parts of cities) and the ways in which urban governmental and non-governmental actors positioned themselves and others in the European (urban) policy arena. And finally, were there any politics in these constructions of place and scale?

At the beginning, the organization structures of the URBAN-I programmes in Amsterdam and The Hague were rather similar. This was not a surprise, as both cities had to set up an organization structure in accordance with EU-regulations. In practice, however, the policy process in these two cities turned out to be very different, resulting in radical changes in the original organization structures.

In the following, first of all, the URBAN programmes in Amsterdam and The Hague will be compared, addressing in particular their organization structure and the policy process (section 10.2). Next, in section 10.3, the local contexts of the two cities will be compared in terms of: institutional settings, policy frameworks in which the URBAN programme was embedded and characteristics of the neighourhoods in which the programme was implemented. Also, explicit attention will be paid to the extent in which these contexts might explain the differences between the URBAN programmes (section 10.4). Next, in section 10.5, the positioning of the cities in the European (and international) arena will be discussed, as related to the discourse that has developed over time. In the final section, conclusions will be drawn.

10.2 The URBAN programmes in Amsterdam and The Hague

In the 1990s, Amsterdam and The Hague were working on comparable themes. One of their main challenges was combating unemployment, especially among the foreign population. Realizing a 'complete' city, in the sense of a socially 'undivided city' was ranking high on the political agenda. Moreover, The Hague, more than Amsterdam, struggled with a high level of segregation of its population. Aside from these problems,

the cities were also involved in improving their local institutional structure (in terms of the quality of the public sector; bridging the distance between administration and citizens; improving co-operation between city and city districts, etc) and with working towards (never implemented) city provinces. Positioning in the European and international context started slowly in the 1990s, but in both cities it only really got off the ground in the early 2000s. In the 1990s, an important difference between the two cities concerned their economic growth: in the second half of the 1990s, Amsterdam benefited from the economic growth, while it lagged behind in The Hague. Besides, The Hague was almost going bankrupt and it would last until 1997, when the national government offered financial support, before the financial situation would actually improve.

When the Cities of Amsterdam and The Hague received European Structural Fund money in the middle of the 1990s within the framework of the URBAN programme, obviously both cities could use it very well. But at that moment the financial stringency was considerably higher in The Hague.

10.2.1 Designing the URBAN programmes

Comparing the URBAN-I programmes in Amsterdam and The Hague, a few similarities are obvious straight away: both cities did not have much experience with European programmes yet and the production of an operational programme was dealt with in a very practical way. For both cities, the Community Initiative URBAN was a first introduction to a European urban programme. Amsterdam had acquired some experience with European ERDF resources, through the Renaval programme, but the programme itself had had a somewhat different focus. European 'urban policy' was a relatively new phenomenon: something that even the Ministry of the Interior, which acted as an intermediary between the URBAN-I cities and the European Commission, was hardly familiar with yet.

A new experience thus for all people involved, who had to produce an operational programme under pressure of time, while having hardly or no experience with European programmes. One thus chose to be very practical about the matter: In Amsterdam the programme was written by an employee of the Project Bureau Renewal Bijlmermeer (*PVB*), an bureau which dealt with the spatial renewal of the Bijlmermeer. In The Hague an existing policy plan, made within the framework of urban renewal, was adapted and handed in. In Amsterdam the realisation of the plan was a very official affair, while in The Hague the policy plan was realised in consultation with other parties, albeit within the framework of urban renewal, that had been implemented primarily in the foregoing period. In both cases, a large number of already existing project proposals were included in the operational programmes.

Just like Big Cities Policy, the URBAN Community Initiative was an area-based urban programme. For that reason, it is not surprising that both programmes were combined in practice. Anyway, they have not been combined in terms of organization, but financially, to meet the European requirement of co-financing. Initially, URBAN was primarily viewed as 'money': as an addition to existing, national (Big Cities Policy) resources and not so much so as an independent programme. The overall picture that was disseminated, was that URBAN had been as it were embedded

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in the Big Cities Policy framework. This possibly explains why URBAN hardly appears as a programme in other policy programmes in the two cities and hardly has any connection with them concerning content. But URBAN had the status of a programme indeed: European Structural Fund money was not accessible just like that, but was accompanied by strict EU regulation. This concerned not only the required organization structure and the acquisition of the money (based on co-financing), but also the supervision over its spending (monitoring, reports). That could also explain the fact that the programme was isolated to a large extent.

There were more organizational similarities between the URBAN programmes in Amsterdam and The Hague. On behalf of the national government, the Ministry of the Interior was ultimate responsible for the implementation of the European URBAN-I programmes vis-à-vis the European Commission. In practice it merely co-ordinated financial matters. The local authorities were responsible for the financial control and management of the programme and had to give account to the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time, strikingly, the European resources were sent directly from Brussels to the cities, without intervention of the Ministry of the Interior.

In both cities, at managerial (*bestuurlijk*) level, the first contact about possible funding of local programmes within the framework of the European Community Initiative URBAN-I had taken place between the municipal Economic Affairs departments and the Ministry of the Interior. Formally, in both cities the URBAN-I programme was therefore the responsibility of the Alderman for Economic Affairs. In practice, these Aldermen for Economic Affairs did not do the implementation of the programme. In Amsterdam the responsibility for the implementation of the programme was transferred to the Alderman for Employment in 1995. In The Hague the URBAN-I programme formally remained the responsibility of the Alderman for Economic Affairs, but in practice the Alderman for Spatial Planning, Urban Renewal and Public Housing (*ROSV*) would have been influential in the implementation of the URBAN programme.

As regards official departments, in both cities especially the departments who were primarily involved in 'physical policy' (the Municipal Housing Department, *SWD,* in Amsterdam and the Urban Development Department, *DSO,* in The Hague, respectively) were closely involved in the implementation of the URBAN programme. This was remarkable, mindful of the social-economic character of the programme.

10.2.2 The operational URBAN programmes

The resulting operational programmes for URBAN Bijlmermeer and URBAN Schilderswijk themselves were also comparable, for example in terms of goals, measures and estimated costs (see table 10.A).

While the programmes in the two cities more or less ran parallel, they were embedded in different policy contexts: in Amsterdam, the URBAN programme was embedded in the large-scale Bijlmermeer renewal operation, whereas in The Hague, the URBAN programme was built on the foundation of urban renewal.

Table 10.A Comparison of URBAN Bijlmermeer and URBAN Schilderswijk

	URBAN Bijlmermeer	URBAN Schilderswijk
Time period	1995-1999	1996-1999
Relation to other policy	Embedded in Bijlmermeer Renewal Operation	Founded on urban renewal
Goals	Social-economic renewal	Employment
Measures (examples)	Upgrading safety, fighting drug related problems; Facilities for benefit of small scale/new business; Education- and work experience projects; Improving the schooling infrastructure; Training programmes; Reorganization of public space/ renovation for benefit of social-economic renewal; Extension of facilities for cultural activities and sports; Environmental protection; Improving supervision and social participation.	Business accommodation Employment Education infrastructure Maintenance and safety Social cohesion
Estimated costs	€ 21,294,600	€ 27,193,000
Total Investments	€ 31,572,000	€ 30,417,000

Both programmes aimed at social-economic renewal, but this was interpreted in the broadest sense: a large share of the expenses was actually reserved for physical infra-structural measures, such as constructing or converting business accommodation; creating for the benefit of small-scale and new business; improving the schooling infrastructure, etc.

In both neighbourhoods there was an urgent need for business accommodation: In the Bijlmermeer, built as a 'functional city' there were hardly any business locations in the neighbourhood itself (within the city district, there was a business park on the other side of the railroad). The aim was to mix functions to a larger extent. In the Schilderswijk this need resulted from the fact that business locations had been demolished on a large scale during the long period of urban renewal and had been replaced with houses.

The estimated costs of the URBAN programmes in Amsterdam and The Hague did not differ too much: in both cases they were over 21 million euros. However, the

actual investments in both Amsterdam and The Hague turned out to be higher and amounted to 30 million euros.

Table 10.B Financial scheme of URBAN Bijlmermeer and URBAN Schilderswijk (in thousands of euros)

Finances by	URBAN Bijlmermeer Realized (x 1.000 €)	URBAN Schilderswijk Realized (x 1.000 €)
EU (ERDF/ESF)	2,727	4,692
National Government (BCP)	4,670	4,446
Local and Regional Government	9,441	18,193
Public Institutions	239	-
Private Investors	14,495	3,086
TOTAL	31,572	30,417

In terms of finances, the European Commission had originally allocated about 4,7 million euros to both programmes. But, the final amount was much lower for Amsterdam than for The Hague. In Amsterdam, a substantial amount of the European money (43 percent) had not been spent in time and, for that reason, had to be returned to the EU. This underspending was primarily caused by a number of building projects that could not be finished in time. In both cities, the European contribution consisted mostly of money from the ERDF. Merely a small share was derived from the ESF. The money paid by the Dutch government within the framework of Big Cities Policy was more or less similar for both URBAN programmes, but the share of subnational governments was far higher in The Hague than in Amsterdam. Possibly in The Hague it contains the 'BiZa 3' resources. In Amsterdam, on the other hand, the share of private investors was relatively high, and far higher than in The Hague. However, in the original URBAN programme in The Hague this was also the case, but their estimated contribution had been strongly diminished when the *Laakhaven* project was dropped.

10.2.3 The Organization Structure

Basically, the URBAN Bijlmermeer and URBAN Schilderswijk programmes had a similar organizational structure. It consisted of a Steering committee (called '*UBO*' in Amsterdam and 'Technical Committee' in The Hague), a Supervisory Committee and a Programme Secretariat. Additionally, in Amsterdam, there were four project groups. At a later stage these were abolished, though. Generally speaking, these bodies had the following tasks and competences:

- The Supervisory Committee was responsible for the supervision of the implementation of the URBAN programme. The Supervisory Committee established a Steering Committee;

- The Steering Committee was responsible for the assessment (as regards content and financial) of the submitted project proposals, based on criteria that had been determined by the Supervisory Committee;
- The Programme Secretariat, consisting of public servants, was responsible for among others programme development (project development and supporting others with handing in project proposals) and programme management.

Aside from the fact that in The Hague two consultations had been added to this structure (the most important one being the administrative consultation (*bestuurlijk overleg*), there were more differences between the URBAN organization structures in the two cities, in terms of tasks, competences and location of the separate bodies.

The main differences related to the Steering Committee and the Programme Secretariat: in Amsterdam, the Steering Committee (*UBO*) judged all the project proposals related to socio-economic renewal in the Bijlmermeer, after the SWD had screened them first. In The Hague, on the other hand, the Steering Committee (Technical Committee) judged the 'URBAN' project proposals and only after the administrative consultation had first tested them.

Regarding the Programme Secretariat, in Amsterdam the tasks were allocated to different organizations. Project development and tasks concerning content and policy were originally subsumed under the PVB. After the programme time out, they were done from within Bureau SEV, established in the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District organization and managed the city district clerk. The SWD, on the other hand, was (and stayed) in charge of the financial and subsidy aspects of the Programme Secretariat. In The Hague, the Programme Secretariat was subsumed under the housing directorate of the Urban Development Department (*DSO*) and located in the city hall. This directorate was in charge of all the tasks of the Programme Secretariat. More generally speaking, DSO fulfilled a key role regarding the implementation of the URBAN programme.

What did the Steering Committee and the Supervisory Committee look like in the Cities of Amsterdam and The Hague?

The Steering Committee
The Steering Committee varied for both cities, in terms of number and composition: in Amsterdam there were seven members, supplemented with five official members, with merely an advisory status[154]. In The Hague, the Steering Committee consisted of 12 'full' members.

In both cities, the Steering Committee had quite a large share of governmental representatives, but this was twice as high in The Hague: in the original composition of Amsterdam, the governmental share was 43 percent (3 out of 7), while in The Hague it was even 83 percent (10 out of 12). In The Hague the representatives were all civil

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[154] These five representatives were derived from both the city and the city district: the SWD; the Social and Cultural Affairs department; the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (city district clerk); the PVB and the URBAN Programme Secretariat. These same five representatives participated in both the Supervisory Committee and the Steering Committee.

servants, one of them being the chairman. In Amsterdam, the three governmental members represented the municipality (1 out of 7) and the city district (2 out of 7); the city district was thus relatively strongly represented, as compared to the municipality. Moreover, on behalf of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, two Aldermen participated in the Steering Committee, one of them being the chair. In The Hague, most of the governmental representatives (7 out of 10) represented the Municipality; the other 3 (out of 10) represented the Ministry of the Interior. In Amsterdam, the Ministry of the Interior was not represented in the Steering Committee. In both cities, the Chamber of Commerce participated in the Steering Committee; proportionately, there were far more representatives of non-governmental organizations in the Steering Committee in Amsterdam than in The Hague. In both cities, residents' organizations were not represented in the Steering Committee.

Table 10.C The URBAN Steering Committees of Amsterdam and The Hague

Amsterdam	N	The Hague	N
Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (including the chair)	2		
Amsterdam Municipality	1	The Hague Municipality	7
-		Ministry of the Interior	3
Chamber of Commerce	1	Chamber of Commerce	1
Housing Association	1	-	
-		Regional Bureau Employment strategy (RBA)	1
Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost	1	-	
Regional Police	1	-	
TOTAL	7		12

In Amsterdam the five earlier mentioned official members of the Supervisory Committee also participated in de Steering Committee, once more with merely an advisory status.

The Supervisory Committee
The Supervisory Committee also differed for both cities: in Amsterdam, the Supervisory Committee consisted of 12 members, supplemented with the earlier mentioned five official members, who merely had an advisory status. In The Hague the Committee consisted of 18 members. The composition of the Supervisory Committees is presented in table 10.D.

In both cities, also the Supervisory Committee had a relatively large share of 'governmental' representatives (67 percent in the original composition in Amsterdam,

78 percent in The Hague), but this concerned representatives of various governmental levels. If one merely considers the share of local government in the Supervisory Committee, this was about one third in both cities (4 out of 12 in the original composition in Amsterdam; 6 out of 18 in The Hague). In Amsterdam, this share could once more be subdivided in municipality (1 out of 4) and city district (3 out of 4) representatives. They were all aldermen. Once more, the city district was relatively strongly represented in the Supervisory Committee, as compared to the municipality. Both Supervisory Committees were chaired by a municipal alderman. The share of the 'higher' governmental levels (national and European) was 33 percent (4 out of 12) for Amsterdam and 44 percent (8 out of 18) for The Hague. In The Hague the higher governmental levels were thus proportionately particularly well represented, but in neither city were they in the majority.

Table 10.D The URBAN Supervisory Committees of Amsterdam and The Hague

Amsterdam	N	The Hague	N
Municipality (chair)	1	Municipality	6
Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (including the Vice-chair)	3	-	
Ministry of the Interior	2	Ministry of the Interior	3
-		Ministry of Economic Affairs	1
-		Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment	1
European Commission	2	European Commission	3
Chamber of Commerce	1	Chamber of Commerce	1
-		Regional Bureau Employment strategy (RBA)	1
Housing Association	1		
-		Residents' Organizations	2
Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost	1	-	
Regional Police	1	-	
TOTAL	12	TOTAL	18

In both Committees the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) was relatively modest, but in the Supervisory Committee of Amsterdam their share was higher than in the equivalent Committee in The Hague (33 percent in Amsterdam, 22 percent in The Hague). The Chamber of Commerce was represented in both Supervisory Committees. Other NGO's diverged: in Amsterdam, the housing

association (one of the renewal partners) was represented, for example, but there were no residents' organizations. In The Hague it was the other way round, although the residents' seats stayed mostly empty in practice.

To sum up, if one compares the Steering Committee and the Supervisory Committee in the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme and the URBAN Schilderswijk programme, in both Committees in both cities there was quite a strong governmental representation. On the other hand, there were also clear differences in terms of the representation of the local government in proportion to other governmental partners, and in terms of the proportion of NGO-representatives.

10.2.4 The New Organization Structure

In Amsterdam the policy process took a totally different turn than in The Hague. In Amsterdam, the public outcry caused a huge delay in the implementation of the URBAN programme in the Bijlmermeer. The discussion that followed, resulted in significant changes in the organizational structure of the URBAN Steering Committee; these changes implied a strengthening of the governmental representatives of the municipal and national level and the addition of an independent chair, at the expense of the city district level.

But the most radical changes were realized in the composition of the NGO's, where representatives of ethnic groups and religious institutions were added, as well as an employers' organization that was located in the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District. Some other NGO's had to leave and also the five advisory members (civil servants) did not show up in the Steering Committee any longer.

There were also changes in the Supervisory Committee, but not as radical as the ones in the Steering Committee. The proportion between governmental and non-governmental representatives in the Committee was nearly left intact: only one representative of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District was laid off. Further, the changes primarily related to the representation of the NGOs: The Regional Bureau Employment Strategy (*RBA*) and two representatives of ethnic groups joined the Committee, whereas the representatives of the Educational body and the police left. The five advisory members stayed under the same conditions.

Finally as mentioned earlier, the Programme Secretariat, that originally had been subsumed with the PVB, was transferred to *Bureau SEV* which formed a part of the City District organization of Amsterdam Zuidoost.

In The Hague, the policy process, in terms of the formation of an organization structure and in terms of getting started, went far more 'smooth'. In 1997, two additional consultations were added: an Administrative Consultation and a civil consultation. The Administrative Consultation strongly enforced the position of the local authorities in the URBAN organization structure. There was no criticism.

Table 10.E URBAN Steering Committee in Amsterdam, original and new composition

Steering Committee [155]	N	*Uitgebreid Bestuurlijk Overleg* (*UBO*)	N
		Independent chair	1
Amsterdam Zuidoost City District	2	Amsterdam Zuidoost City District (including the vice-chair)	2
Amsterdam Municipality	1	Amsterdam Municipality	2
-		The Ministry of the Interior	1
-			
Housing Association	1	Housing Association	1
Chamber of Commerce	1	-	
-		Regional Bureau Employment Strategy (RBA)	1
-		Ethnic groups	4
-		Religious Institutions	1
Managerial Consultation Education Zuidoost	1	-	
Regional Police	1	-	
-		Amsterdam Zuidoost Association	1
TOTAL	7		14

Summarizing the foregoing, both the URBAN programmes in Amsterdam and in The Hague have undergone organizational changes, but dissimilar ones: In the Amsterdam URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, more space was created for local representatives of ethnic groups and religious institutions. The ratio between governmental and non-governmental representatives remained about the same. In The Hague, on the other hand, the municipal voice was enforced by the addition of the Administrative Consultation. While the Steering Committee in Amsterdam truly became a 'public-private partnership', in The Hague it remained a governmental and almost entirely official matter. The changes in the URBAN organizations thus resulted in increasing differences between the programmes in the two cities. At the same time, the programmes were implemented in quite different local contexts that also contributed their mite. These will be discussed next.

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[155] As mentioned earlier, aside from the administrative representatives in the original Steering Committee there were also five official representatives with an advisory status, but they are not mentioned in the official '*Reglementen van Orde*' of 1995 and 1997.

10.3 The Local Contexts

The different local contexts in the two cities seem to have been very decisive for the policy process and for the (original and adapted) organization structures of the two URBAN programmes. There were, first of all, local institutional differences between the cities; secondly, differences in the 'foundation' or 'framework' of the URBAN programmes and thirdly, differences between the neighbourhoods in which the programme was implemented.

10.3.1 The Local Institutional Context

While both cities are subdivided in city districts, in Amsterdam, there are two levels of administration: there is a municipal and a city district administration, to which various powers have been 'decentralized'. City district offices are located in the city districts. In The Hague, on the other hand, the local administration of The Hague is characterized as a 'de-concentrated' administrative system, with an administration and official organization at the municipal level and a small official organization of 'de-concentrated' civil servants at the city district level. Just like in Amsterdam, city district organizations are located in the city districts themselves. However, in the particular case of the Centrum City District of The Hague, the city district organization is not located in the city district, but in the city hall instead.

In both cities, these local institutional structures are relatively new and have not fully crystallized yet; during the 1990s and early 2000s both cities have therefore put efforts in furthering the processes of 'decentralization' and 'de-concentration'.

But the local institutional structures as such do function and have been the institutional framework of the URBAN programmes. In Amsterdam this implied the involvement of two different levels of government in the URBAN organization structure; in The Hague it meant the involvement of one governmental level, with 'concentrated' civil servants at the municipal level and 'de-concentrated' civil servants at the city district level.

10.3.2 The Policy Framework of the URBAN programmes

The policy framework of the URBAN-I programme was quite different for the two cities. In Amsterdam, the URBAN programme was embedded in the social-economic part of the ongoing Bijlmer renewal operation. In The Hague, on the other hand, urban renewal policy was the foundation of the URBAN programme, in the sense that the operational URBAN Schilderswijk programme had actually been developed as an urban renewal policy programme and had been modified, so that it could be used as an operational URBAN programme. Besides, a number of civil servants who had worked in the urban renewal organization (the *POS*), was now deployed in the URBAN organization, for instance in the Programme Secretariat.

But there was more at stake. In the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer, a big thing had been made out of the large-scale renewal operation that had started in 1992. In the ongoing operation millions of euros, later billions of euros were invested. Even though the money was initially allocated to physical renewal, the renewal operation as such brought enormous dynamics in the city district; there were large flows of money and thus major interests. In that field of force, public and private parties were searching for

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their optimal position. The position of the three partners in the renewal operation, the Amsterdam Municipality; the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and Housing Association Patrimonium, had been formalized in a covenant. Additionally, for the spatial part of the renewal operation, a solid and clear organization structure was established, in which the three renewal partners participated. For social-economic renewal, on the other hand, initially there had been no money, but when money became available, an organization structure had to be set up for that part of the renewal as well. In the resulting, somewhat hybrid form, once more the covenantspartners participated, this time supplemented with representatives from other organizations. In practice, social-economic renewal was a matter of the Amsterdam Municipality and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District; for, the Municipality was liable for diverting the European (URBAN) and national (BCP) funds and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District was primarily responsible for the content of social- economic renewal in the city district. Besides, the housing corporation was mainly interested in the physical part of the renewal operation.

Just like it had been in case of urban renewal in the Schilderswijk, the Bijlmermeer renewal operation had its own character in the neighbourhood; not only were its results (large scale demolition, new housing developments) directly visible, also two of the covenantspartners (the city district organization and the housing corporation) and the *PVB* were located nearby, in the city district itself. Moreover, as a covenant partner, the city district administration had a finger in the renewal pie. And although the city district organization was mainly white and operated somewhat isolated from neighbourhood, yet, this organization with its own local office was still much closer to the citizens than the Amsterdam municipal organization; the press release about the start of the social-economic renewal operation and the organization of the URBAN programme thus did indeed reach the local population.

In The Hague, the situation was totally different. For years, the city had invested in urban renewal programmes, but in the early 1990s, the city was hard pressed for money. In large parts of the Schilderswijk, urban renewal had more or less been finished, though. The urban renewal organization, the earlier mentioned POS, still existed, but it was working on shifting its field of activity, from plain urban renewal, to (social) management and even wider. With the completion of urban renewal in this neighbourhood, the regulation that had given a legal basis to formal participation by neighbourhood representatives in the urban renewal programmes, the '*Verordening Organisatie Stadsvernieuwing,*' had lost its reason for existence. This regulation did not have a successor. So, planning was withdrawn from the neighbourhood and now became concentrated more in the city hall.

Meanwhile, the city was struggling with the issue of government at the central city level versus area-based and de-concentrated governance. A Management Team was established in the Schilderswijk, in which both public and private parties participated, but this consultation strongly focused on maintenance and lacked money and authority.

The URBAN programme implied money and opportunities for the neighbourhood, but due to unfamiliarity with European programmes, one could not rate them at their true value at the level of the neighbourhood. Moreover, the millions

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from the EU Structural Funds ended up in the central, municipal purse. It is therefore questionable whether they were recognizable in the neighbourhood at all as a separate budget; for many, the URBAN programme was merely looked upon as a part of Big Cities Policy. The URBAN organization structure was primarily staffed by governmental (and in particular) municipal representatives. In the neighbourhood there was a platform, but that merely served to inform neighbourhood organizations. Actual participation was out of the question.

To sum up, in Amsterdam the URBAN programme was embedded in a dynamic and large-scale renewal operation, which was highly visible; for which a lot of money was available and in which the city district administration formally participated. This was completely different in The Hague: for decades, urban renewal had had its own, visible, character in the Schilderswijk, but the dynamics had stopped: urban renewal was completed in most parts of the neighbourhood, the money had run out and policy development was now mainly done in the city hall.

10.3.3 The Characteristics of the Neighourhoods

At first sight, the Bijlmermeer and the Schilderswijk look quite different: the Bijlmermeer is a peripheral, post World War II neighbourhood, originally built as a 'functional town' between 1966 and 1974. The Schilderswijk, on the other hand, is an inner-city neighbourhood, a former working-class area, that was originally built in the late 1800s, early 1900s.

There are similarities, though. Both neighbourhoods are part of a city district. In the case of the Bijlmermeer, this is the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, that has its own administrative level, official organization and a building located in the city district. The Schilderswijk is part of the Centrum City District; its official organization consists of 'de-concentrated' civil servants who are located in the city district office within the city hall.

Both neigbourhoods are home to a large share of ethnic minorities; a share that has strongly increased over time. For years, both neighbourhoods belonged to the most distressed and deprived neighbourhoods in the Cities of Amsterdam and The Hague respectively, housing a large share of (relatively poorly educated) unemployed jobseekers; having a considerable proportion of the potential labour force relying on welfare and a large proportion of households receiving individual housing benefits. Moreover, there were problems of drug abuse, criminality, etc. Both neighbourhoods functioned (and still function) as reception centres for newcomers and have a high turnover rate. Due to these major problems, in the last decades both neighbourhoods have been target areas of extensive physical- and social-economic programmes.

At the same time, however, there are some important differences between the neighourhoods. One of them relates to their ethnic composition. While they are both home to more than eighty percent of ethnic minority groups, the composition of these groups strongly diverges.

In the Bijlmermeer, the largest single group (more than 40 percent) consists of Surinamese (and Antilleans, but to a far lesser extent). As opposed to the Schilderswijk, Turks and Moroccans are hardly represented in this neighbourhood. The

influx of ethnic minorities in this neighbourhood started in the late 1960s, early 1970s - for, the construction of the Bijlmer only started in 1966 -; the many vacant apartments became home to Surinamese immigrants, who at that moment left their country on a large scale.

Although the Surinamese/Antillean share is still substantial, in the 1990s the number of 'ethnic minority groups from non-industrialized countries' has strongly increased in the Bijlmermeer. This group of newcomers is highly diverse and consists of people from Africa (Ghana, for example), South-America, Asia and southern and eastern Europe.

Table 10.F Characteristics of the Bijlmermeer and Schilderswijk neighbourhoods

Neighbourhood	Bijlmermeer (Amsterdam)	Schilderswijk (The Hague)
Location/Built	Peripheral Post-World War II (1966-1974)	Inner-city neighbourhood (1850-1920)
Inhabitants	50,000	33,000
Neighbourhood combination	2 neighbourhoods	3 neighbourhoods
City district (institutional/geographic characteristics)	Amsterdam Zuidoost	Centrum
	At this level: administration & official organization	No separate administration; 'De-concentrated' civil servants only
	Two parts separated by railroad (business/residential area)	In terms of functions: mixed
Ethnic minorities *	More than 80 percent ethnic minorities	More than 80 percent ethnic minorities
	Surinamese/Antillean (44%) 'Others from non-industrialized countries' (23%) Dutch (20%)	Surinamese/Antillean (24%) Turks (24% Moroccans (16%) Dutch (23%) 'Others from non-industrialized countries' (9%)

* Composition in 1995

In the Schilderswijk, on the other hand, there are four big single ethnic groups: Surinamese or Antillean, Turks, Moroccans and Dutch. The influx of ethnic minorities in the Schilderswijk started in the early sixties, with the arrival of the first guest

labourers. It strongly increased in the following decennia. The category 'others from non-industrialized countries' is represented in the neighbourhood as well. But in 1995, their share was still relatively low, as compared to the 'single' ethnic groups.

Regarding the Surinamese, interestingly, for years, Afro-Surinamese mainly took up their residence in Amsterdam (primarily in de Bijlmermeer), while Hindu-Surinamese preferred to settle in The Hague.

Both neighhourhoods have contended with a dwindling local participation among their inhabitants over time. This could partly be explained by the high turnover rate, but there were also other factors that played a role; factors that slightly differed for the two neigbourhoods.

In case of the Bijlmer, the declining involvement of Bijlmer inhabitants was on the one hand ascribed to the more general tendency towards individualisation in society, but on the other to the increased ethnic diversity in the Bijlmermeer and to the fact that many of these recent newcomers were primarily involved with their 'bare necessities'. At the same time, research shows that the political participation of Surinamese in Amsterdam is relatively low, as compared to other ethnic groups. As the Surinamese have been (and still are) the largest single group in the Bijlmermeer, in that sense it is questionable whether local participation has ever been high among this group.

In the Schilderswijk, the problems related to local participation were somewhat different in character. Residents' organizations had been very active in urban renewal, but their part was played out: they were managed by elderly autochthonous Dutch people and did no longer represent the 'new' residents of the neighbourhood. At the same time, it was very difficult to stimulate local participation among the foreign population and to find successors for these residents' (or equivalent) organizations. Explanations were sought in the low levels of organization, the moderately developed group- and social life and a focus on the private and the group domain instead of on the public domain. Of course there were variations between different ethnic groups.

To sum up, aside from differences related to their external characteristics, there were also other differences, such as the ethnic composition of the population in the neighbourhoods and – to a certain extent, and related - the issue of local participation.

10.4 Explaining Differences in the URBAN Policy Process

To what extent can the different local contexts in Amsterdam and The Hague, as presented in the foregoing sections, explain the differences in policy processes of the URBAN programmes in the two cities? A few crucial aspects of these local contexts seem to be the following.

First of all, in Amsterdam, the city district authorities were strongly involved in the URBAN programme. This becomes clear if one considers their extent of involvement in the two URBAN Bijlmermeer Committees. Besides, these authorities were a formal partner in the Bijlmermeer renewal operation and they were responsible with respect to content of the social-economic renewal in the city district. The Executive Committee and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Council were well informed about the URBAN programme. The programme thus came more into the

public eye in the city district and in the Bijlmer neighbourhood than in The Hague, where the URBAN programme was managed at the municipal level. The MT in the Schilderswijk, that, in principle, could have acted as an intermediary, was primarily oriented towards management in the neighbourhood and not towards the URBAN programme.

Secondly, there were a number of passionate and well-informed 'activists' in de Bijlmermeer, who have put the spark to the finder. Their demands on the European money for the Bijmermeer as 'black money' and 'thus our money' appealed to many people: for, in the eyes of outsiders, for years the Bijlmermeer had been a 'Surinamese neighbourhood' and involvement on that basis seemed justified. At the same time, also many of the Surinamese Bijlmer inhabitants themselves saw 'their' Bijlmer as a Surinamese neighbourhood. They agreed with the 'black' protests, even though the neighbourhood population had actually become far more mixed in the past two decennia. Moreover, in order to enforce their politics of scale, the 'black' parties availed themselves of a rhetoric that appealed to old feelings of guilt with many 'white' people, as well as to fear of racial tensions. Additionally, the media contributed their mite.

In the Schilderswijk in The Hague, on the other hand, the activists from the very beginning had mainly been the (meanwhile elderly) 'white' Schilderswijk inhabitants. United in residents' organizations, they had been formally involved in the urban renewal programmes and thus also in many of the projects that were continued under the heading of the URBAN programme. However, their part was played out and there were no successors yet. The Municipality was indeed working on establishing new organization structures in order to improve local participation, but in the mid 1990s, potential 'new' activists, united in these structures, had not been put together yet. Besides, a claim on the 'URBAN' money, on the basis of ethnic background (the Schilderswijk as a 'Surinamese,' 'Turkish,' or 'Moroccan' neighbourhood), would have been less self-evident in de Schilderswijk, in view of the fact that there were several 'single' ethnic groups.

Thirdly, while both cities struggled with the further elaboration of their institutional structure (decentralisation and de-concentration, respectively), in the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, the situation was extremely complex in terms of money and organizations: apart from an institutional structure, consisting of two administrations and two Councils (city and city district), additionally, the Bijlmermeer renewal operation involved three (covenant) partners, different flows of money and mutually divided responsibilities. Besides, structures had not fully crystallized out yet. However, at the same time, this lack of clarity gave a free rein: parties used it, demanded participation and their criticism and claims were taken seriously. For the relatively new 'city-city district organization', both the large-scale Bijlmermeer renewal operation, as well as the European URBAN programme were learning experiences.

Summarizing the foregoing, differences in the URBAN policy process in the two cities might be explained in terms of the 'political opportunity structure,' combined with the presence or absence of 'activists'. In Amsterdam, the URBAN programme was

implemented at a low administrative level. This was relatively close to the neighbourhood residents; people were better informed. Secondly, the local institutional structure in Amsterdam had not fully crystallized out yet. Combined with a major renewal operation in the city district, that had not fully crystallized either, the structure offered opportunities for participation. Thirdly and finally, there were activists, who grabbed the opportunity. The presence of the latter in the Bijlmermeer, and their absence in the Schilderswijk might be related to the transitional stage of participation in the Schilderswijk and to the different ethnic composition of the neighbourhoods.

10.5 Positioning and European Urban Policy Discourse

The URBAN-I programmes in The Hague and Amsterdam took place in a period that the local authorities were only still sparsely engaged in self positioning in the European and international arena of which they formed a part. The Municipalities were starting raising their European and international profiles and to a certain extent, the URBAN-I programmes have acted as 'fore-runners' for a more active EU engagement.

As a result of the approaching Treaty on European Union (signed in 1992), both in Amsterdam and The Hague 'European' policy documents were produced, in which the cities examined how they could fill in their policy related to 'Europe'. Although both cities already received money from the European Structural Funds in the early 1990s, 'Europe' was still a rather official matter, instead of a subject that ranked high on the political agenda of the cities. After these first policy documents, some changes in the official organization followed, to better facilitate EU activities. Memberships of international city networks were entered into; lobby contacts in Brussels were enforced (The Hague) and – although at a later stage – a city representative settled as lobbyist in Brussels (Amsterdam).

At the same time, only in the early 2000s, also the municipal governments started siding collectively with municipal European engagement. The Hague seemed to be at the forefront: not only could 'Europe' count on the support of the board of Mayor and Aldermen in The Hague in the early 2000s already, City Administrators also got a few important administrative functions in international city networks and in the Committee of the Regions. Official documents of the City of The Hague, produced in the early 2000s show a great and dynamic engagement. Also noticeable is the politics of scale at the level of the region, performed by administrators of the City of The Hague in the wider European arena.

In Amsterdam, on the other hand, the support for Europe only actually increased from 2004 on, when the 'Europa Platform Amsterdam' (EPA) was established: a platform in which municipal departments as well as city districts participated. At the time, the support among the Amsterdam administrators was not yet very convincing, though.

A milestone for both cities was the increasing G4 positioning as related to Europe; from 2003 on also supported by their own common office in Brussels. Moreover, the G4 positioning in Brussels is a very clear example of a politics of scale.

The international engagement of the two cities follows a somewhat different development. Based on the vision that Amsterdam 'is' international, in the 1990s, international affairs mainly consisted of international co-operation, with a focus on

maintaining connections with a few cities. At the time, in most municipal departments international co-operation was not yet a structural part of their policy, except for some departments, such as Economic Affairs. Because of the substantial shortage of jobs, already in the second half of the 1990s, The Hague focused more on account management and acquisition, among others of international organizations, firms and events. In the early 2000s, strengthening the international position of the City of The Hague was high on the political agenda.

Convinced that the increasing international competition between cities forces them to position themselves more explicitly vis-à-vis others, both cities now pursue a 'city marketing' policy. This policy is supported by separate bureaus in the municipal organizations, with an (international) website and a concentrated budget. Moreover, in organizational terms, activities related to European- and international policy become more and more integrated.

10.5.1 Place and Positioning at the Municipal Level

To what extent are the constructions of place and the ways of positioning in the European (urban) policy arena, as used at the municipal level in The Hague and Amsterdam similar?

Due to a lack of data, it is impossible to pronounce upon this issue for the City of Amsterdam. Regarding municipal data of the City of The Hague as related to the European urban policy arena, different constructions are found, depending on the aim with which or audience for which the source was produced. They vary from the city or the neighbourhood as a problem (in documents related to the URBAN programme), to constructions of the city as an actor or as a strategic potential (speeches).

In case of positioning of the cities in the 'wider European arena,' generally speaking, in the relatively limited data that are available, both cities construct themselves mostly in positive terms and not in terms of problems. The data of the two cities are further hard to compare in discursive terms, as they have been produced with different aims and for different audiences.

In the early 1990s, as a result of the (approaching) Maastricht Treaty (ratified in 1993), the interest for Europe was briefly high on the political agenda, but subsequently EU engagement started off relatively slow in both cities. That is also reflected in the discourse. European urban policy discourse can hardly be found at the local level. While one may find particular key words, generally speaking the URBAN-I programmes are embedded in other policy frameworks, whose discourse is rather taken as a point of departure (urban renewal in the Schilderswijk in The Hague and social-economic renewal in the Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam). Potentially interesting handles, offered discursively by the European Commission – depicting the cities as important partners of the European Commission, for example – are not seized. For, at that moment, the local authorities are neither ready, nor interested yet. Even though they are considering upon their positioning in the European arena, generally speaking, as individual cities they are not yet actively doing so.

Only in the course of the 1990s, the cities start to actively position themselves in the wider European arena: first mainly collectively, based on networks; later also on a more individual basis; finally, in the early 2000s also as G4. Concerning the 'wider

European arena,' EU related sources from the 1990s, are primarily official, substantive documents, that are inward oriented. In general, they are not formulated as 'statements' or 'position papers,' played to the gallery, except for exceptions. In the early 2000s, the increasing individual positioning of the cities is reflected in English brochures, city marketing campaigns (both at the city and city district level in Amsterdam), etc. But this positioning seems to be oriented towards the international arena, instead of merely towards the wider European political arena.

10.5.2 The City district, the District and the Neighbourhood Level

At the sub-municipal level, constructions of place and ways of positioning in the European (urban) policy arena, strongly diverge for The Hague and Amsterdam.

When closely examining the URBAN programme in The Hague, there have not been any particular 'single' parties, neither governmental, nor non-governmental, that have used the city district or the neighbourhood level to position themselves in the European urban policy arena. Quite remarkable in this sense is the politics of scale of the LSA platform which consists of representatives of residents' organizations in deprived neighbourhoods. The LSA is not only organized at the national level, but twice it has been able to get access to and position itself directly at the European level. Anyway, it actually does not truly fit in this context as their initiative merely took place in the City of The Hague.

Regarding Amsterdam, in the 1990s, the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District administration has primarily positioned itself within the local urban policy arena, especially in terms of its role within social-economic renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost. No doubt, partly inspired by the European programmes that have taken place in the city district, but probably especially because of the business area that is located in the city district, in the early 2000s, the city district administration has started casting its nest far wider: English brochures about the city district have a 'city district marketing' character and focus not as much on Europe, but on the wider, international arena.

In the Bijlmermeer, on the other hand, using a politics of scale, 'black' actors have got direct access to the European urban policy arena, in terms of involvement in the organizational bodies. Interestingly, as opposed to the LSA-platform, these actors were not interested in positioning in this arena, but merely in positioning in a local arena vis-a-vis the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District organization.

10.6 Conclusion

The organization structure of the URBAN programmes was, originally, rather similar for the two cities, despite the differences in local administration; still rather centrally managed in The Hague and with two administrative levels in Amsterdam. But, the programmes developed in quite different ways, resulting in organizational changes: in The Hague, governmental involvement in the organization structure was enforced, whereas in Amsterdam, under pressure of local parties, it was non-governmental involvement that increased. These differences can be explained by the different local contexts in which the URBAN programmes were embedded, especially by the different local institutional contexts that, in case of Amsterdam, offered an opportunity structure to non-governmental actors and had them interested in it.

Both cities have dived into the European and international arena relatively late. During the URBAN programme, the overall city administrative involvement in 'Europe' was still relatively low. In relation to the URBAN programme, it was remarkable that interesting handles, offered by the discourse, were not used, neither by governmental actors, nor by non-governmental actors. Perhaps the possible 'discursive' strategic value of the URBAN programme was overlooked at that moment. For, originally, it was not so much viewed as a programme, but 'merely' as money, embedded in the Big Cities Policy context.

Considering the discourse, actors were very much involved with their own agenda's. Strikingly, they did not always focus discursively on the European urban policy arena, the LSA-platform formed an exception to the rule in this sense. Other actors seemed to focus more on the international arena (Amsterdam, The Hague, and even Amsterdam Zuidoost), or just on the local arena (*Zwart Beraad* and ABO).

However, whatever the sort of arena they focused on, in both cities several examples of a politics of scale could be found in their discursive practices, such as the positioning at the level of the 'black Bijlmermeer' in the local arena of Amsterdam Zuidoost; the direct positioning of the LSA platform in the European urban policy arena, the positioning of The Hague at the level of the region and the recent positioning of the four big cities at the level of the G4, in the wider European arena.

Chapter 11

11. Conclusions and Reflection

11.1 Introduction

During the past 10-15 years, a policy network has developed around European urban policy. While urban issues had featured on the policy agendas of national and local governments for a long time, at the level of the EU this theme dates back to only the 1990s. Who, basically, got urban policy on the European political agenda is rather unclear, as various parties claim to have taken this initiative. It is certain, that the Eurocities network, established in 1986, has been a zealous advocate of European urban policy; that the European Commission itself started experimenting with Urban Pilot Projects in the late 1980s; that the Committee of the Regions (from its establishment in 1994 on) has paid attention to this subject; that the Dutch government, during her Council chairmanship in 1997 has taken initiatives with other member states and that also the European Parliament has been concerned with it. In conclusion, is it probable that several parties have contributed to it.

In this research, attention has been paid to one particular European urban programme and the policy network involved in it: the European Community Initiative URBAN-I. This programme can be looked upon in highly divergent ways: as an urban programme that intends solving social-economic problems in severely deprived neighbourhoods in European cities; as an inter-organizational domain in which different parties are involved (an opportunity); as an area-based urban programme that, through its focus on a target area, creates a temporary territory within the territorial control of the local government system (a possible threat); as a programme, launched by an authority that is actually not qualified for involvement in urban policy matters; as a carrier of European urban policy discourse, directly entering the (sub-) national governmental levels and disseminating this discourse (offering both discursive opportunities and threats) and finally, as a programme that will play out differently, because of the different contexts in which it is embedded.

In the foregoing, these qualities of the URBAN programme have all passed in revue, albeit in particular its political-geographic quality and its quality as a carrier of European urban policy discourse.

In the introduction, four research questions were presented. In the following, they will be addressed, one after another. Only the fourth research question, related to the different contexts in which the actors and their discursive practices are embedded, will not be answered separately, but will be answered in connection with the other questions.

11.2 The Extent of Europeanization

"*What is the extent of 'Europeanization' of the different governmental levels, involved in European area-based urban programmes?*"

One can distinguish different dimensions of Europeanization: first of all, as related to *which* aspect of the domestic public administration is 'Europeanized,' this might be behaviour, the organization structure or even the discourse. Secondly, Europeanization has two dimensions: it can happen in reaction to output from the European Union, or it consists of input towards the European Union. What can be concluded about the extent of Europeanization, in terms of aspect and 'direction', based on the outcomes in this study?

First of all, Europeanization is at issue at all Dutch governmental levels: developments have been found at all examined governmental levels: national, regional, local and, in Amsterdam, even at the city district level. Moreover, in the 1990s, early 2000s, in coherence with the increasing influence of Europe in the political arena, Europeanization seems to have increased. At the same time, this raises the question what will happen in this sense from now on, in view of the fact that Structural Fund money is no longer available[156].

Secondly, Europeanization is at issue, both at these governmental levels individually, but also in the collective bodies of which they form a part. Both the Dutch national intermediary (*VNG*) and the Dutch city network (*G4*), for example, are concerned with EU activities and have intensified them. The VNG started doing so in the early 1990s already, the G4 only in the early 2000s. In other cases, collective bodies have been established, like the Eurocities network and the House of the Dutch Provinces (*HNP*).

Often, but not exclusively, the focus in these collective bodies is a political one. In case of the Eurocities network, for example, the focus is on behaviour, as input towards the EU: 'euro-lobby' activities. They take place behind the screens or in all openness, through so-called 'position papers'. The debate on the future of European Cohesion policy serves as an illustration of how cities have operated collectively (and to a certain extent successfully) in the European (urban) policy arena.

Collective action of city and regional authorities is motivated by fact that the European Commission does not have a formal relationship with the subnational authorities. The establishment of the Committee of the Regions has improved the position of these authorities, but at the same time this body is not undisputed.

Thirdly, Europeanization gradually seems to switch from 'passive' (anticipating on what comes from Europe; becoming Europe-proof) into 'active' (Euro-lobbying, position papers, organizing conferences (Saarbrücken).

At the national level, for a long time already there has been a formal structure dealing with Europe (policy preparing and implementing bodies). However, consultations of the Ministry of the Interior related to European urban policy and the home administration were only established from the late 1990s, early 2000s on. Some

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[156] See earlier footnote on this issue, at the end of Chapter 6.

Dutch regions (especially the provinces) have shown a more active attitude towards Europe for a relatively long time now. As for cities, they have gradually intensified their EU engagement: Eurocities (1986) was, indeed, a pioneering (collective) initiative, but it lasted more than 10 years until Amsterdam (as the first Dutch city) sent an official to Brussels (1999) and as late as the early 2000s, until the G4 entered Brussels.

Fourthly, different dimensions of Europeanization (behaviour, structure and discourse) do not necessarily run parallel at the same governmental level, nor do they necessarily have the same direction (from or to the EU).

Moreover, Europeanization can vary among similar 'governmental levels'. This holds to a large extent for the Dutch regions. Actually, it is not correct to call this a 'governmental level' as only the provinces meet that qualification. Considering these 'regions' individually, in general the extent of Europeanization in terms of organizations and 'pro-active behaviour' attuned to Europe, strongly diverges.

Regarding the regions around Amsterdam and The Hague (needless to say that they were not formally involved in the URBAN programmes), the RSA shows a moderate interest in Europe, as related to the *Noordvleugel* programme. The plusregions around Amsterdam (*ROA*) and The Hague (*Stadsgewest Haaglanden*) however, do not show any signs of Europeanization in whatever form. They do participate collectively in the wider European arena, though, at least formally, under the banner of 'Regio Randstad'. But in view of the Regio Randstad sources, they are nearly invisible in Brussels.

The provinces, on the other hand, are quite active 'regions': they position themselves explicitly in Brussels: individually, under the banner of the IPO, and as part of one of the country parts (*landsdelen)* within the 'House of the Dutch Provinces' (*HNP*). These are all examples of Europeanization in terms of behaviour and organization structure. This also holds for the Provinces of Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland. Regional discourse as related to Europeanization has not been studied. It is thus not possible to pronounce upon Europeanization of the regions in this (discursive) sense.

The possibly different pace of the respective dimensions of Europeanization and the variety in 'direction' is also clear if we compare the extent and, in particular, the form of Europeanization in Amsterdam and The Hague: in both cities the approaching European Summit of Maastricht and the Maastricht Treaty generated EU activities. After that, in both cities EU engagement developed only gradually. At the same time there were also differences between the cities. In 1990, Amsterdam anticipated '1992' with a first European policy document and showed a remarkable initiative by presenting that document directly to the European Commission. Furthermore, in 1991, the city joined Eurocities and in the same period it set up Bureau Eurolink, to work on European activities exclusively. After that, for years, nothing happened; the Economic Affairs Department and Bureau Eurolink, that was a part of it, hardly met any interest in Europe in the rest of the municipal organization. On the other hand, in the course of the 1990s, Amsterdam became a member of various city networks and in 1999 the earlier mentioned official was sent to Brussels. But only in

the early 2000s 'Europe' became a topic of shared municipal interest, with the formalization of the EPA and the extension of staff for EU activities.

The Hague started later, but intensified its EU activities earlier than Amsterdam: in the 1990s, its individual behaviour gradually developed from passive (taking over what should be taken over from Brussels) into active (taking the initiative). The increasing EU engagement of The Hague can also be found in its collective activities and individual involvement in the *wider* European arena: aside from its Eurocities membership (since 1993) the city has shown a remarkable and increasing administrative involvement in international bodies (Committee of the Regions, CEMR, Eurocities). But also in The Hague, only in the early 2000s, there were organizational changes related to its increasing EU engagement.

Interestingly, in Amsterdam there has also been an increasing Europeanization at the level of the City district. For the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, but also for other city districts involved in European urban programmes, these programmes formed the entry to the European urban policy arena. The Amsterdam Zuidoost City District participates, for instance, in an URBACT network. At the same time, considering its discourse, the city district seems to focus more on the international arena instead of on the wider European arena, probably prompted by the large business area that it houses.

Finally, the process of European integration is stated to increasingly affect the member states, for example in terms of legislation but also in terms of intergovernmental relations. In the Netherlands, it does not seem in a radical way yet; the awareness among local officials and the amount of attention paid to intergovernmental relations in a European perspective, is still remarkably modest.

While the research question relates to the extent of Europeanization, it is also important to pay some attention to the extent of 'internationalisation.' For, it could be possible that the pro-active behaviour of actors at the governmental levels, for example, or the organization structures or discourses did not focus specifically on the EU, but on a wider, international arena. In other words, EU engagement could be part of wider, international engagement.

At the national level, I would argue, a focus on both the European and the international arena is self-evident. Therefore, international engagement has not been examined for that level separately. Mainly the Ministry of the Interior (as the primary national actor involved in European urban policy) has been examined. Also in case of the regions, this issue has not been studied. At the city level it has, though. What can be concluded for the two cities examined?

The international positioning of Amsterdam and The Hague has started relatively late: at the end of the 1990s, in the early 2000s. Once more, behaviour, organization structure and discourse had a different pace. In international engagement, the City of The Hague took the lead: its motivation to position itself more explicitly in the international arena was prompted primarily by the problematic economic situation of the city in the early 1990s. The cities had to attract and/or create employment. For that reason, originally the international positioning was tinged with an economic perspective.

The late start of Amsterdam was possibly connected with the self-image of the city: 'Amsterdam *is* international'. Because of the increasing international competition

and the knowledge that an international profile of a city is not a self-evident proposition for companies looking for a place to settle, the city started focusing more strongly on international co-operation and international positioning. However, the city started elaborating this policy rather late.

In the early 2000s an extensive city marketing campaign was set up in both cities (in Amsterdam, even Amsterdam Zuidoost engaged in 'city district marketing'). Only then, the (administrative and official) municipal organization was adapted to support the international course that the cities now followed. Moreover, for the first time the European and international arenas were connected. In both cities there were signs of a discourse that started developing as related to the international arena.

The European Community Initiative URBAN-I took place at a moment when the Cities of Amsterdam and The Hague were not ready for an active political attitude towards Europe yet. The programme was mainly dealt with by officials. The cities were raising their European profile, but EU engagement was by far not something that was widely supported by the local authorities yet. This would only be the case after the URBAN programme had come to an end, in the early 2000s.

11.3 Involvement in European Urban Policy

"*To what extent and how are actors at the different governmental levels involved in European area-based urban programmes, in particular in the European Community Initiative URBAN-I?*"

Within the frameworks of all European area-based urban programmes, the Netherlands has received EU funding (in particular from the ERDF) for its operational programmes. These concerned operational programmes, formulated within the Urban Pilot Program, the Community Initiatives URBAN-I and -II and Objective 2-urban areas. In the course of the years, the various governmental levels that have been involved in these programmes, got experience with these programmes, and with the European requirements related to funding and organization that accompanied them.

The Community Initiative URBAN-I was implemented in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. What did the policy network around these programmes look like in Amsterdam and The Hague?

The accountability structure of the URBAN-I programme was complex: the Ministry of the Interior was held formally responsible by the European Commission for the implementation of the URBAN-I programmes in the Dutch cities. At the same time, EU funding went from Brussels to these cities directly, without intervention of the Ministry of the Interior. The cities, for their part, had to give financial account to the Ministry. Next, while the Ministry was stated merely to 'co-ordinate' financial matters as related to the European funds, at the same time it acted as a co-financier in the programme with Big Cities Policy money, in order to meet the condition of co-financing. In that capacity, the Ministry had a formal position in the organizational bodies of the URBAN programmes in the cities.

Whereas Dutch regional authorities were not formally involved in the organizational bodies of the URBAN programme, the municipal authorities of the 'URBAN-I' cities of course, were. Moreover, in Amsterdam, with its decentralized administrative structure, also the authorities of the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District got a formal position in its organization structure. Generally speaking, in both Committees in both cities there was quite a strong governmental representation: in case of The Hague, this was prompted by the fact that this 'de-concentrated' city was actually centrally managed; in case of Amsterdam, it was prompted by the fact that there were two administrative levels that had to be involved.

In view of the basic organization structure of the URBAN programmes, originally, it was somewhat similar for the two cities, prompted by EU requirements. It consisted of a Supervisory Committee, a Steering Committee and a Programme Secretariat. Additionally, in Amsterdam there had been four project groups as well, but these were abolished at a later stage. Within the Committees the formal authority was shared: together, the members judged the project proposals and allocated money to them (Steering Committee) or supervised it (Supervisory Committee). However, in practice there were differences and these differences increased during the policy process.

In Amsterdam, the pressure of local (non-governmental) parties resulted in organizational changes, especially in the URBAN Steering Committee, in which seats were now reserved for local representatives of ethnic groups and religious institutions. By getting a formal position in the URBAN organizational structure, these parties got voice and formal authority. At the same time, through the screening of project proposals, the Municipal Housing Service (SWD) kept acting as a watchdog.

In The Hague the organization structure was modified in 1997, resulting in a strong enforcement of municipal (and in particular administrative) involvement in the URBAN organization structure.

In the two cities, the policy process ran off in a different way. An important aspect was that the URBAN programmes were 'rooted' differently.

In Amsterdam, the URBAN programme was, from an administrative and official point of view, right from the start surrounded by complexity. This applied to the municipal level as well as to the level of the city district. The programme was drawn up in the PVB and was therefore directly enclosed in the framework of the Bijlmer renewal operation. Formulating the programme was a rather pragmatic and official matter, but then followed the difficult task of drawing up an appropriate organization structure. The Bijlmer renewal operation formed a context of much money and great interests. In this field of force various parties looked for a way to optimise their position. The three renewal partners had already in an early stage worked out the organization structure of the physical part of the renewal operation, but that did not apply to the social-economic renewal part. So, basically, there were opportunities for getting involved the latter. Housing Association Nieuw Amsterdam (one of the formal renewal partners) was hardly interested in URBAN, as the programme formally merely concerned social-economic renewal instead of physical renewal. Besides, the money related to the URBAN programme was not more than a drop in the ocean, as compared to the money involved in the physical part of the

renewal operation. On top of that the Housing Association had other worries to deal with: its financial position. That left the other two renewal partners: the local authorities of Amsterdam and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District. But their responsibilities were mixed: the city district was responsible for the content of social-economic renewal in Amsterdam Zuidoost, whereas the City of Amsterdam was responsible for the European and BCP funds related to the URBAN programme. Moreover, the relations between the city and the city districts had by far not crystallized out yet and there was competition between the two, about authority and money; a problem also noticeable within urban policy.

Probably the animosity between the governmental levels would have become more visible, if there had not been developments in a different field that were brought to the fore: 'black' groups who claimed a formal position in the URBAN organizational bodies, based on a 'black Bijlmermeer' identity. For the city and the city district it now became far more important to jointly think of a solution (instead of struggling with each other), because of the risk of losing the European money. Amsterdam used her financial responsibility for the URBAN programme to put pressure on other actors to solve the conflict as soon as possible.

Originally, these black groups neither had a formal position in the organizational bodies of the URBAN programme, nor did they have any money. But they were well informed because of their participation in or connections with the City District Council of Amsterdam Zuidoost. Moreover, originating from a Dutch colony, these Surinamese had a language advantage. That was particularly opportune in their rhetoric (to be discussed below). In this way they managed to become a part of the European urban policy network or, more specifically, to obtain a formal position in the organizational bodies of URBAN.

In The Hague, the programme developed in a completely different way. In terms of policy and organization, the programme was founded on urban renewal. For years this policy had been implemented in the Schilderswijk according to a standing structure (POS + participatory body). However, in the URBAN organization structure, there were mainly municipal officials (among others: former POS staff-members) and an occasional resident (the former chair of OPS, who only took part temporarily and who was not succeeded). The former consultative committee (*OPS*) was no longer used for participation, but merely for feedback concerning the progress of the URBAN programme. Participation of residents was not taken into account in the URBAN projects. In many cases the residents had had a say in the matter, because these projects had been drawn up and discussed within the urban renewal framework, though. The residential voice had decreased; nearly all the residential organizations with white residents had disappeared. But perhaps there was no reason for the residents to use it. For, the neighbourhood was renovated, there were no large funds anymore and the urban renewal participation structure had done its job. In The Hague there were indeed tensions within the municipal 'de-concentrated' organization (between 'hard' and 'soft' policy sectors; between the city and the city districts), but they did not explicitly come to the fore in the European urban policy arena. The URBAN programme was a matter that was dealt with in the City Hall. The Management Team in the Schilderswijk was mainly engaged with management and could hardly be called a

participant in the policy network around the URBAN programme; the city district co-ordinator did not participate in the URBAN Committees, but he did in the Commission Instructors Consultation (*Opdrachtgeversoverleg*), though.

The question arises why particular groups came up in Amsterdam and got entrance to the European urban policy arena, while nothing happened in The Hague. The answer lies, possibly, in the local contexts of Amsterdam. Especially the local institutional context might have played an important role. It offered a favourable political opportunity structure, in terms of a low, accessible governmental level, combined with a (social-economic) organization structure that had not yet been worked out in detail. Naturally, as such this was not sufficient: there was a number of well-informed and eloquent actors who seized their chance by strong words and cheek (*op brutale wijze*). The Hague, on the other hand, missed a scale, a policy framework at the sub-local level and a residential (or other) collective voice.

Finally, regions were not involved in the organizational bodies of the URBAN programme, neither did they seem to be a part of the European urban policy network. Generally speaking, future European Structural Fund regulations and the Lisbon Agenda seem to enforce the position of regional authorities. In theory this could also be the case regarding their involvement in 'urban actions.' At the same time, in the Netherlands, this is questionable, for the Dutch Member State will call on the Structural Funds far less. Moreover, until now the examined Dutch regions have not expressed any interest in or claims on involvement in European area-based urban programmes.

11.4 Discursive Practices and Politics of Scale

"How is European urban policy discourse produced and 'negotiated' by governmental and non-governmental actors in discursive practices and what kind of examples of politics of scale can be found?"

European urban policy documents contain a policy vocabulary that is made up of a limited number of terms. These terms are constructed and used in story lines in various, but constantly recurring ways. For that reason, one can characterize this recurring, systematic way of constructing social reality, as a 'European urban policy discourse'. In this discourse, cities (or parts of them) are – not surprisingly - the most important issue. They are depicted in terms of problems; as strategic potential that should be used and protected in order to safeguard the economic position of the European Union worldwide; as a balanced system (the 'urban system' within Europe), but also as an entity of (formal) governmental responsibility, connecting directly to the issue who should be involved in dealing with particular issues in these cities. The overlap in key words used in European and national sources points at the existence of a policy network in which actors address similar topics and concerns, using similar words and – at times – similar constructions of cities. This does not come as a surprise. For years the European Commission, the member states, other governmental levels and several networks have been in touch with each other about European urban policy; formally and informally, through networks, at conferences, etc. However, the overlap implies

that there are also differences in key words used, in particular because of the various different (institutional, discursive, etc.) contexts in which they are produced and embedded. One of the most striking examples relates to 'partnership,' a key word that frequently appears in European sources, but never in the national sources.

At the same time, European urban policy discourse seems to be rooted in and reflect a wider process of politics of scale between various governmental levels in the European polity, prompted by processes of European integration and Europeanization. This is expressed in the ways of (self) positioning in the discourse. One finds recurring patterns regarding the extent of appearance of actors in the discourse; the undertone of the meaning assigned to them; and their positioning in relation to each other.

European urban policy makers position themselves in a subtle way in the discourse: in terms of roles that do not discord with the subsidiarity principle or with the formal authority of other (sub-)national actors. An example relates to the role as a helper for citizens in need. The European Commission clearly seeks a rapprochement with the cities as an ally within the urban policy network: cities are depicted as being in favour of partnership; as an important partner of the European Commission; as governmental authorities with whom the Commission has a special alliance. Regional authorities or the Committee of the Regions, on the other hand, are not involved in this alleged alliance. The formal position of the member states is not contested in the discourse but, at times, their attitude is. The elaborate discussion on the subsidiarity principle; the contestation over the issue of partnership within European Regional policy and the Structural Fund operations (who is involved and who should be involved), but also (within the particular case of urban policy) criticism on the member states because of their attitude towards local partnership, serve as examples.

The national actors, in turn, criticize 'Brussels' at times for dictating them and for producing EU regulations that are too complicated. In a wider context, this struggle reflects the fear for and resistance of European interference in the internal affairs of the member states, in particular in their national administrative structures, judging, for example, the construction of European regulations in terms of danger. Moreover, the construction of national urban policy at the European level ('European Big Cities Policy') is an interesting example of a politics of scale: national policy makers seem to exceed their own level of authority.

Although the discursive practices of Dutch regional authorities have not been examined, some examples derived from their involvement in the *wider* European arena are worth mentioning, as they are quite interesting. As mentioned before, it seems that regions might get a more favourable position within European Regional policy. Moreover, European individual urban programmes will be ended and will become an integral part of wider frameworks, drawn up by the member states. The 'city regions' or 'urban regions' that have been examined, so far do not seem to discuss the issue of a (new) governmental level in relation to 'Europe.' However, in pleas for a governmental authority at a higher level (Randstad), the issue is explicitly related to the European context – the timing of the recent 'Holland Acht' proposal for one democratically elected Randstad authority is a remarkable politics of scale in that sense.

Turning now to the two cities in which an URBAN-I programme was implemented, it is interesting that the European urban policy discourse carried by this programme appeared to find no connection in a political sense. The operational programmes of the URBAN programmes were embedded in particular local (policy) frameworks: urban renewal (The Hague) and the Bijlmermeer renewal operation (Amsterdam) respectively. They were clearly taken as the point of departure and the operational URBAN programmes were drawn up in an official and pragmatic way. No discursive approaches were made towards the European Commission in whatever way. Phrased differently, while place and scale were present, local politics was not yet focused on Europe; a European urban political arena was absent. Instead, in the mid 1990s, European urban policy discourse was confronted with a lack of interest in political matters vis-à-vis Europe at the municipal level of Amsterdam and The Hague. While Europe was on the local political agenda for a short while in the early 1990s, it did not last long. European matters were still mostly dealt with on an ad hoc basis.

This might also explain why the city governments did not seize the opportunities that the European Commission offered in its positioning of the cities ('partners of the European Commission'). The possible 'strategic value' for positioning themselves and/or the European Commission in the European urban policy arena was either overlooked or played down. URBAN was a relatively small programme that was mainly constructed in terms of money; as co-financing of Big Cities Policy. Phrased in terms of dimensions of Europeanization: the discursive output from the EU was not absorbed (in view of the local sources related to European (urban) policy), neither was it used for the production of an EU oriented discourse (that connected to EUPD, with story lines like 'partnership with the European Commission,' for example).

One could argue that in The Hague there was no politics in the European urban policy arena at all during the URBAN Schilderswijk programme. In Amsterdam this was different though: black groups claimed involvement in the URBAN organizational bodies, by using a rhetoric based on an alleged 'one voice' of a 'black' Bijlmermeer community. In doing so, they forced the local authorities of the Amsterdam Municipality and the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District to put the URBAN programme itself high on their political agendas and to co-operate in order to find a solution to the conflict. Only then the programme became indeed a political issue.

Although these black groups positioned themselves within the European urban policy arena, in fact they were not engaged with 'Europe' at all, nor did they have the intention to obtain a position vis-à-vis Europe. This is clear, first of all, if one examines the 'black and white' discourse about the conflict. Additionally, no appeal was made to the opportunities for participation that were included in the URBAN programme ('local participation', 'local partnership,' etc.). These ' black' parties merely used the European URBAN programme to bring the discrimination against 'black' to the fore and to profile themselves towards the city district authorities. There could also have been another fuse to light the fire.

The assigning of meaning, as done by these 'black' groups took place in a suitable discursive context: it appealed to the Bijlmer image that many people had, inside and outside the area, even though this was in fact incorrect or out of date. Opportunities for politics of scale depend largely on the extent in which actors are

capable to make other actors dependent of them or to make them enthusiastic for their objectives. Sometimes objectives or interests are explicitly 'framed,' for instance as being of local or national interest. This is exactly what happened in the Bijlmermeer. The (mainly) white administrators of Amsterdam Zuidoost could not gain an overview of the situation and chose, out of fear or out of caution, the safe side: they took the rhetoric seriously, eventually.

In the European urban policy arena in The Hague, no claims on involvement nor examples of politics of scale were found; neither at the level of the city, nor at the level of the Schilderswijk. The policy network around European urban programmes or, more specifically, the URBAN organizational structure was was concentrated in the city hall, making the URBAN organization relatively invisible in the neighbourhood. Besides, possibly there was no need for particular groups to pursue involvement as they had been at the basis of the greater part of the projects, originally developed within the urban renewal framework. Finally, there was not (yet) a new (foreign) residents' association in this ethnically mixed neighbourhood that had enough voice (or possibly even: sufficient command of the Dutch language) to recruit a critical mass. The cause remains a matter of conjecture.

However, there were some active Schilderswijk residents who participated in the National Collaboration of Districts for special attention (*Landelijk samenwerkingsverband Aandachtswijken, LSA*), a volunteer organization for active inhabitants from deprived neighbourhoods. The positioning of this national network in the European urban policy arena, was a very good example of a politics of scale. At the same time, it is difficult to situate the LSA network and its initiatives in the context of this research. For, it was actually an example of 'collective positioning of non-governmental actors', but this particular category has not been examined in this research.

Generally speaking, considering the sources and discursive practices at the local level, actors seemed to be very much involved with their own agenda's. Strikingly, they did not always focus discursively on the European urban policy arena; the LSA-platform formed an exception to the rule. Other actors seemed to focus more on the international arena (Amsterdam, The Hague, and even Amsterdam Zuidoost), or just on the local arena (*Zwart Beraad* and ABO). In both cities several examples of a politics of scale could be found in which actors politically constructed a scale, like in the case of the 'black Bijlmermeer'; the direct positioning of the LSA platform in the European urban policy arena, the self positioning of The Hague on the scale of the 'region' (with whatever connotation) and the recent self positioning of the four big cities on the scale of the G4.

Finally, to what extent do there seem to be 'discourse coalitions' (groups of actors that adhere to particular social constructions) within European urban policy discourse? In this research, they have not been found. In view of the policy network around European urban policy, it is self-evident that the discourse partly overlaps, but this does not necessarily imply that one could speak of 'discourse coalitions.' In its dissemination, European urban policy discourse meets so many different contexts that it seems to lose momentum. In theory, this could have been different, though, if

particular actors would have used the 'strategic handles' that the discourse offered, but they did not.

From the viewpoint of the earlier mentioned dimensions of Europeanization, this is interesting. For, it does not seem to be a matter of 'absorption' of (particular social constructions within) European urban policy discourse by actors at the governmental levels or by particular non-governmental actors. Neither does there seem to be a uniform EU oriented discourse of particular actors, as input towards the EU. In terms of discourse, the extent of Europeanization thus seems to be quite low. At the same time, instead, at least in the two cities examined, recently a more 'internationally oriented' discourse seems to have started developing in the international arena. This might be an expression of an increasing internationalisation.

To what extent do networks, such as Eurocities, connect to European urban policy discourse? For, in the capacity of member of a network, actors might be far less constrained by various domestic frameworks in which they are embedded. They have more freedom to spread their message and to strengthen it as a collective body. In case of European urban policy discourse, one could imagine that they would seek alliances with it in their 'position papers', and in doing so, contribute to the transformation of European urban policy discourse in a more widely shared 'trans-national discourse' This has not been examined in this study, but it could be an interesting question for future research.

This book started with the statement that there is a European urban policy discourse. While this seems to be the case indeed, at the same time, this statement needs to be amplified. For the original point of departure in this research, was that European policy makers are the ones who produce this discourse to start with. However, the foregoing has made clear that the discourse is actually connected to a European urban policy network that has come into existence in the last decades. While the discourse is partly shared by actors in the network, at the same time it reveals a politics of scale, as expressed in ways of (self)positioning towards each other. The claim of having a European urban policy at the EU level serves as an example.

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Appendices

APPENDIX
A. Key Words in European Urban Policy Discourse, derived from EU Level Sources

Key Words	Frequency
Urban	1401
(Urban Policy)	(23)
City/Cities	642
(Cities and Towns)	(20)
(Towns and Cities)	(61)
Area(s)	545
Development(s)	382
(European) Union / EU	377
Local	369
Action(s)	303
(European) Commission	250
Fund(s) (SF, ERDF, ESF)	226
European (NOT EC or EU!)	212
Integrate/integration/-ed	205
(European integration)	(3)
(integrated approach(es)	(60)
(European) Community, communities	184
New	153
Sustainable/sustainability	147
Problem(s)	143
Region(s)	137
Partnership(s)	130
Approach(es)	128
Measure(s)	125
Regional	121
(Regional Policy)	(23)
Policies	116
community/communities	107
Member State(s)	103
Town(s)	95
Cohesion	93
(Cohesion policy)	(25)
Population(s)	92

National	91
Challenge(s)	83
System(s)	79
Neighbourhood(s)	78
Example(s)	75
Involve/involvement	74
Innovative/innovation	74
(Innovative approach(es)	(8)
Exchange(s)	67
Opportunity/-ties	65
Europe	61
Help(-er)(-ing)	57
The need(s)	57
Role(s)	56
Inhabitant(s)	54
Target(s)/targeting	54
Priority/-ties	53
Strategy/-ies/strategic	67
Citizen(s)	49
Tackle/Tackling	49
Responsibility/-ties	45
Participation/participate	44
Network(s)	43
Capacity/-ties	41
Government(s)	39
Quality of Life	39
Territory/-ies/territorial	33
Brussels	32
Balance(d)	31
Governance	31
(Multi-level governance)	(0)
District(s)	31
Result(s)	30
Agenda(s)	28
Knowledge	27
Coord-/co-ord-	27
Model(s)	26

Disparities	26
Partner(s)	22
Central	21
Diverse/diversity	20
The Netherlands	19
Combat/Combating	18
International	17
Co-operat-	17
Empower/empowerment	17
Trans-national	14
Subsidiarity	13
Best practice(s)	12
Decentrali-	11
Democracy/-cies/-tic	11
Motor(s)	9
Dutch	8
(Dutch Presidency)	(2)
Critical	7
Grass-roots/grassroots	6
Imbalance(s)/imbalanced	6
Paradox/paradoxes	5
Threat(s)	5
Vital	5
Minister(s)	4
Legitimate/legitimacy	4
Collaborat-	3
Subsidy/subsidies	3
Nation(s)	2

Version 26 July 2006.

APPENDIX
B. Key Words derived from European Urban Policy Discourse, used in National Level Sources

Key Words Or (Combinations of Key words)	Total (indication)
City/Cities	185
(Cities and Towns)	(1)
Urban	145
(Urban policy)	(50)
European (not EC or EU)	105
Member State(s)	54
Urban policy	50
European Union/EU	50
The Netherlands	47
(European) Commission	42
Area(s)	36
(Urban Area(s))	(13)
Government(s)	37
Problem(s)	35
Development(s)	34
Approach(es)	34
(integral approach(es))	(3)
Citizen(s)	33
Fund(s), fund, SFs, ERDF, ESF	32
National	32
Co-operation/co-operate/co-operative	26
Dutch	25
(Dutch presidency)	(12)
New	25
Local	24
Opportunity/-ties	23
Exchange(s)	21
Agenda(s)	20
Example(s)	20
Role(s)	20
Involve/involvement	20
Europe	19
Integrated/integration/-ed	18
(integrated approach(es)	(6)

(European integration)	(4)
Knowledge	17
Need(s)	17
Region(s)	17
Regional	17
(Regional policy)	(3)
Best Practice(s)	14
Democracy/-cies/-tic	13
Participate/-ion	13
Brussels	12
Result(s)	12
Network(s)	11
Decentrali-	11
Responsible/responsibility	11
Cohesion	10
(Cohesion policy)	0)
Neighbourhood(s)	10
Priority/priorities	10
Tackle/Tackling	9
Minister(s)	9
Action(s)	8
Legitimate/legitimacy	8
Governance	7
Co-ordinate/co-ord-/coord-	7
District(s)	7
Vital	6
Target(s)/targeting	6
Strateg-/ies/-ic	6
Partner(s)	6
Measure(s)	5
Multi-level governance	5
Central	5
Collaborate/collabor-	5
Subsidy/subsidies	4
Challenge(s)	4

Community/community/ Communities/communities	4
Policies	4
Population(s)	4
Innovative/innovation	4
Subsidy/-ies	4
International	3
Help(-er)(-ing)	3
Subsidiarity	2
Diverse/diversity	2
Town(s)	2
Threat(s)	2
System(s)	2
Empower/empowerment	2
(European) Community/ties	2
Nation(s)	2
Model(s)	1
Balance(d)	1
Imbalance(s)/imbalanced/un-	1
Sustainable/sustainability	1
Quality of Life	1
Combat/Combating	1
Paradox/paradoxes	1
Territory/-ies/-ial	1
Capacity/-ties	0
Motor(s)	0
Disparities	0
Inhabitant(s)	0
Critical	0
Grass-roots	0
Partnership(s)	0
Trans-national	0
Europeanization/-sation	0

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APPENDIX
C. List of Interviewees[157]

The key-witnesses and stakeholders who were interviewed for this research held (at that time) the following positions:

European Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy
- Head of the Unit for Urban Actions
- Employee URBAN and urban policy department

The Ministry of the Interior, Department of Urban Policy and Intergovernmental relations (GSIB)
- Co-ordinator EU team within urban policy department
- Senior employee within urban policy department

The City of The Hague
- Project Manager URBAN programme
- Programme Secretary URBAN programme
- Chair of residents' association HVS / Chair of Overleg Platform Schilderswijk (OPS)
- City district co-ordinator of City District Centrum *
- Employee Projectbureau Big Cities Policy *
- Programme-manager URBAN/Liveability *
- Project Manager 'Tussen Hard en Zacht' *
- Housing Corporation Haagwonen Districtsmanager Schilderswijk *
- Manager Welfare organisation Schilderswijk *

    (* Data collected by a colleague from the Utrecht University in 2001)

City of Amsterdam

Amsterdam Municipality
- Alderman for Education, Young people's affairs, Diversity policy, Social Affairs, Social Structure plan, Big Cities Policy, Administrative system, concerned with the URBAN programme**
- Director MEC, Administrative service
- Director Bureau Big Cities Policy **
- Director Municipal Housing Service (SWD)**
- Project-managers bureau P/A (SWD)
- Co-ordinator Amsterdam EUROLINK Brussels

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[157] Many interviews were conducted between 2001-2003, as part of the UGIS project. Between 2003-2005 some additional interviews have been conducted.

Amsterdam Zuidoost City District Organization
- Head Bureau SEV (social-economic renewal)
- City district clerk
- Employees Bureau SEV

NGO's Amsterdam Zuidoost
- Director urban renewal, Housing Association Patrimonium
- Head Multiculturalisation and Participation bureau (MP bureau)

UBO and Steering Committee URBAN Bijlmermeer
Representatives of divergent organizations or ethnic groups, who had been members of these Committees

Zwart Beraad and Platform Bijlmer
Various people who have been actively involved in the Black and White conflict

** Group discussion.

APPENDIX
D. Map Target Area URBAN Schilderswijk Programme

GEBIED URBAN DEN HAAG SCHILDERSWIJK

APPENDIX
E. URBAN Schilderswijk Programme: Goals per Measure

In the Operational Programme URBAN Schilderswijk, the following goals have been specified for the separate measures (Gemeente Den Haag 1995b):

Measure 1: Space for Business Activities
- Creating opportunities for small-scale business activity in an existing urban area for (traditional) production companies, transport companies, (whole)sale companies and companies that are involved with small-scale business and personal service; companies that connect to the level of education and experience of the working population in the Schilderswijk.
- Preventing mono-functionality and social-spatial problems through mixing functions, which will reinforce the social structure of the Schilderswijk.
- Making available suitable office space and facilities for starting entrepreneurs against affordable prices. Furthermore, facilities are offered to companies that do well and want to expand on a different location.
- Stimulating employment for low educated people, particularly from the Schilderswijk, through encouraging substantial investments in the neighbourhood.
- Re-development of obsolete (old)business areas in order to offer affordable new buildings to companies from the Schilderswijk and other urban renewal areas.

Measure 2: Accompaniment to the labour market / extra work for long-term unemployed
- Goal of this measure is to realise employment for about 100 people, after a period of work experience. The aim is to offer as much work experience opportunities as possible to people who receive a particular benefit

Measure 3: Training and Education Infrastructure
- Accommodating organisations aimed at the accompaniment of unemployed people and starters on a location at the edge of the programme area.
- Realising education and training facilities for (foreign) students, to offer them better job perspectives. The aim is to expand the education facilities with a gross floor surface of 1,000 m².

Measure 4: Management and Safety
- Offering an environment where one can reside safely and comfortably.

<u>Measure 5: Promotion and Society Construction</u>
Within this measure no explicit goals have been formulated. The emphasis is on stimulating the involvement of residents in the Schilderswijk in their environment and on improving the neighbourhood's image towards the outside.

<u>Measure 6: Technical Assistance</u>
This concerns the implementation of a maintenance and management system (*beheer-en management systeem*).

APPENDIX
F. URBAN Schilderswijk The Hague: Revised Financial Overview including Indexation (in euros)

Measures	Total Costs (= TK)	Government Spending (total) (= TO)	Community contribution			ERDF	ESF	National Government	Local Government	Private Parties
			Total Community contribution							
			Absolute	% TK	% TO					
Space for Business Activities	18,733,095	17,643,962	3,034,761	16,2	17,2	3,034,761	0	3,050,424	11,558,776	1,089,133
Accompaniment to the labour market	2,584,534	2,003,616	445,710	17,2	22,2	0	445,710	33,231	1,524,676	580,918
Training and Education Infrastructure	1,937,089	1,937,089	619,183	31,5	31,5	610,183	0	613,332	713,574	0
Management and Safety	1,996,256	199,256	304,244	20,2	20,2	403,244	0	405,325	1,187,687	0
Promotion and Community Structure	2,199,940	1,499,322	235,394	10,7	15,7	235,394	0	236,609	1,027,320	700,618
Technical Assistence	302,434	392,434	75,608	25,0	25,0	75,608	0	75,999	150,827	0
TOTAL	27,753,349	25,382,679	4,804,900	17,3	18,9	4,359,190	445,710	4,414,919	16,162,860	2,370,669

Source: Gemeente Den Haag, 2001a.

G. Overview of URBAN projects (URBAN Schilderswijk)

Appendix G. Overzicht projecten URBAN-programma Schilderswijk

Overzicht van projecten en activiteiten die gelden ontvangen van het URBAN-programma Schilderswijk

Projecten en activiteiten op locatie

1 Bedrijfsgebouw Jacob Catsstraat
2 Bedrijfsruimten Miereven/Vennehont
3 Bedrijfsruimten Koningshof
4 Gezondheidscentrum Vaillant blok 8
5 Ventweg De Heemstraat
6 Bedrijfsverzamelgebouw AVO-gebouw
7 Bedrijfsverzamelgebouw 'De Schilde' en Compartimentering 'De Schilde'
8 AT&T-terrein
9 Bedrijfsverzamelgebouw HTM-remise
10 Bedrijvenkwadrant 'De Verademing'
11 Bedrijfsruimten Fruitweg/Parallelweg
12 Herinrichting Herman Costermarkt
13 Cursussen Vrouwen in Bedrijf / Oriënt
14 Winkelstraatmanagement Paletplein/Hobbemaplein
15 Winkelstraatmanagement Stationsweg
16 City Mondial
17 Volksbuurtmuseum - uitbreiding
18 Kringloopbedrijf Parade
19 Activerend Welzijnsbeleid / Matchwerk
20 E-team
21 Jongere Allochtonen Schakelen naar Arbeidsmarkt (JASA)
22 Werkgelegenheidsprojecten Schilderswijk o.a. De Gids
23 Scholing Stichting Wijkbeheer Schilderswijk
24 Johan de Witt College, vaklokalen Hoofdkade
25 Leer Werk Centrum Van Ostadestraat
26 Telematica Centrum Schilderswijk

27 Spelen, Leren en Werken met Chemie (HCO)
28 ITC Deskundigheidsbevordering onderwijzers
29 Campagne Promotie technisch beroepsonderwijs
30 Vermeerpark
31 Toezicht buitenterrein 'De Houtzagerij'
32 Verbetering winkelcentrum Hoefkade
33 Inrichting buitenterrein Volksbuurtmuseum
34 Inrichting 'Rode Plein'
35 Beheergebouw Oranjeplein
36 Nachtpreventie Schilderswijk-West
37 Prinses Ireneschool / documentaire 'Haagse Klasse'
38 Stichting Persbureau Schilderswijk / wijkkrant 'De Nieuwe Schilderswijker'
39 Huisvesting migrantengroepen Schilderswijk
40 Volksbuurtmuseum - cultuur
41 Volksbuurtmuseum - verbouwing
42 GVO / Kadercursus gezondheidsvoorlichting allochtone mannen

Algemene projecten en activiteiten (niet aangegeven)

43 Startersbegeleiding Schilderswijk door Stichting Stabij
44 Volwassenen-educatie/Basisonderwijs
45 Tyfoon
46 Den Haag Schoon en Heel
47 Schone Stad
48 Haalservice grofvuil

49 Integratieproject Schilderswijk
50 Ha-Schi-Ba
51 Pilot Gemeentelijke Radiovoorlichting Allochtone Groeperingen

Projecten en activiteiten die zijn afgerond (niet aangegeven)

52 PlanPraktijk Hoefkade
53 Hergebruik Centrum Parade
54 Pilot City Team
55 Film 'De Schilderswijk'
56 Elaine / wijkconferentie Schilderswijk
57 Uitwisseling / excursie Multicultureel Platform Schilderswijk (MCPS)

Het URBAN-programma Schilderswijk kent in totaal 75 projecten. De projectnummers 58 t/m 75 hebben te maken met de uitvoering administratie en financiële afwikkeling van het programma.

Informatie
URBAN-programma Schilderswijk   tel 070-353.4650
Stadhuis, Spui 70'   fax 070-353.4323
2511 BT Den Haag   e-mail somastj@dso.nl

APPENDIX
H. Map Target Area URBAN Bijlmermeer Programme

Source: Briene and Gielisse (1999)

APPENDIX
I. URBAN Bijlmermeer Programme: Goals per Measure

In the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme, the following goals were specified for the separate measures (Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer 2001; 2002):

Measure 1: Spatial Renewal
- Improving the living and working environment by reorganizing public space, the traffic infrastructure or buildings
- New cultural and sports-facilities

Measure 2: Social-Economic Renewal
- Improving the quality of life of the living environment, in particular by increasing the sense of safety
- Creating new employment through facilities for the SME
- Increasing the chance to get a job for local residents by means of education- and government-subsidized trainee posts
- Improving education supply and facilities
- Improving the connection between education, wishes and capacities of the local population and the labour market

Measure 3: Supervision Improvement
- Improving the environment and stimulating recycling activities
- Improving the supervision and the involvement of the residents with their living environment

Measure 4: Technical Assistance
This concerns the implementation of a maintenance and management system (*beheer-en management systeem*)

APPENDIX
J. URBAN Bijlmermeer Amsterdam: Revised Financial Overview

Measures	Total Costs (= TK)	Government spending (total) (= TO)	Community contribution			ERDF	ESF	National Government	Local Government/ Public institutions	Private Parties
			Total Community contribution							
			Absoluut	% TK	% TO					
1. Spatial Renewal	3,398,900	2,726,400	883,500	26.0	32.4	883,500		1,111,200	731,700	672,500
2. Social-Economic Renewal	15,265,200	15,251,500	3,130,900	20.5	20.5	2,154,400	976,500	2,925,300	9,195,300	13,700
3. Supervision improvement	2,165,500	1,833,800	558,000	25.8	30.4	558,000		838,800	437,000	331,700
4. Technical assistance	465,000	465,000	232,500	50.0	50.0	232,500		232,500		
TOTAL	**21,294,600**	**20,276,700**	**4,804,900**	**22.6**	**23.7**	**3,828,400**	**976,500**	**5,107,800**	**10,364,000***	**1,017,900**

Source: Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer (2002)

* As opposed to the overview of Urban Schilderswijk The Hague, in this overview there was also a column 'public institutions'. Of the total amount of money in the present column (local government/public institutions), about 25% was derived from public institutions that were involved in measures 2 and 3. These consisted, for example, of a welfare institution and a foundation for unemployed youth.

APPENDIX
K. Overview of URBAN Projects accepted by the UBO (URBAN Bijlmermeer)

	project	financiering	aanvrager/eindbegunstigde
1	speelweide Fort Kraaiennest	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost/stichting BZO
2	kinderboerderij Gliphoeve	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost
3	IMK-II: Een eigen bedrijf in ZO - beschikking ingetrokken	(ESF)	stadsdeel Zuidoost
4	dienstencentrum - beschikking ingetrokken	(EFRO)	stichting Centrum Ontwikkeling Projecten
5	geïntegreerde drugshulpverlening	EFRO	Dienst Welzijn Amsterdam
6	Niet-plaatsbaren tussen school en straat - beschikking ingetrokken	ESF	ROC van Amsterdam
7	uitbreiding Niet-plaatsbaren tussen school en straat	ESF	ROC van Amsterdam
8	veilige vindplaats Otrabanda	EFRO	stichting BZO
9	leefbaarheid Grunder	EFRO	Patrimonium/STIDA
10	IMK-III - beschikking ingetrokken	(ESF)	stadsdeel Zuidoost
11	lokale radio – ingetrokken/overgeheveld naar GSB-II	(EFRO)	stichting Audiovisuele Faciliteiten ZO
12	pilot grassrootpanels	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost/ Sikaman, Uma Lampe, Zuidoost Omroep Stichting
13	preventief camerasysteem Kraaiennest	EFRO	Patrimonium/Politie Amsterdam-Amstelland
14	verbetering beheer Gulden Kruis	EFRO	Patrimonium
15	sportopleiding werkloze jongeren	(ESF)	stichting Koryo
16	veilige schoolpleinen	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost
17	haalbaarheidsonderzoek kindercircus Elleboog	EFRO	stichting circustheater Elleboog
18	inrichting activiteitencentrum Ganzenhoef	EFRO	stichting BZO
19	haalbaarheidsonderzoek beeldverzamelgebouw	EFRO	stichting Beeldverzamelgebouw
20	vrouwenvakschool/vrouwenempowerment	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost
21	sociaal buurtbeheer en bewonersparticipatie E-buurt	EFRO	Patrimonium
22	integrale aanpak vernieuwing Gravestein	EFRO	Patrimonium
23	uitbreiding project leefbaarheid Grunder	EFRO	Patrimonium/STIDA
24	inrichting gemeenschapsruimte De Bron	EFRO	stichting De Bron
25	crea-gebouw K-buurt	EFRO	Bouwbedrijf De Nijs
26	sport- en spelvoorzieningen K-buurt	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost
27	sport- en spelvoorzieningen Gerenstein	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost
28	vestiging ROC Burgemeester Stramanweg – ingetrokken	(EFRO)	ROC Amsterdam e.o.
29	Huisvuilzaknummering	EFRO	STIDA
30	milieuwerkplaats/kringloopbedrijf	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost
31	Kringloop Mobiliteitsbureau Amsterdam-ZO - ingetrokken	(ESF)	stadsdeel Zuidoost
32	Veilig Beheer Kraaiennest	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost/Patrimonium
33	vestiging circustheater Elleboog ZO	EFRO	stichting circustheater Elleboog
34	bedrijvenstrook Daalwijkdreef (parkeergarages)	EFRO	Dienst Amsterdam Beheer-Parkeergebouwen
35	bedrijfsverzamelgebouw Daalwijkdreef (Gooi & Daal)	EFRO	stadsdeel Zuidoost
36	bedrijventerrein Kromwijkdreef – beschikking ingetrokken	(EFRO)	stadsdeel Zuidoost
37	cultureel & educatief centrum Ganzenhoef	EFRO	Stedelijke Woningdienst Amsterdam/ SFB Vastgoed
38	schuldhulpverlening	ESF	stichting Interculturele Dienstverlening

Source: Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer, 2002.

APPENDIX

K. Overview of Additional Projects accepted by UBO (funded with Dutch resources)

	project	aanvrager/eindbegunstigde
1	Nieuw Werk	stichting BZO
2	IMK-II: Een eigen bedrijf in ZO – beschikking (alsnog) ingetrokken	stadsdeel Zuidoost
3	verbetering schoolinfrastructuur	Openbare Scholengemeenschap Bijlmermeer
4	Roma-kinderen	stadsdeel Zuidoost
5	cultuureducatie Zuidoost	stadsdeel Zuidoost
6	lokale radio	stadsdeel Zuidoost/stichting Audiovisuele Faciliteiten Zuidoost
7	huisvesting kerken Zuidoost – projectleider	stadsdeel Zuidoost
8	Doe mee het is oké	stichting BZO/stichting Doe mee het is oké
9	sportopleiding werkloze jongeren	stichting Koryo
10	huisvesting kerken - haalbaarheidsonderzoek	Reliplan Adviesgroep BV
11	voorbereiding onderwijsvoorziening Ganzenhoef	stadsdeel Zuidoost
12	Stap Rond	stichting Mama
13	ondersteuning kansarme kinderen	stichting Eigen Initiatief
14	Five o' clock class	Hogeschool voor de Kunsten
15	uitbreiding bouw- en opleidingspool	stichting Bouw- en Opleidingspool
16	buurtserviceteams K-buurt	stichting BZO
17	Wereldse vrouwen	stichting Forsa
18	Brug naar de arbeidsmarkt	stichting Gate
19	Centrum Interculturele Gezondheidszorg - projectleider	stichting Centrum Interculturele Gezondheidszorg
20	Faya Lobi	stadsdeel Zuidoost
21	Kwakoe Festival	stichting Kwakoe Events
22	projectleider t.b.v. welzijnscentrum Antillianen en Arubanen	stichting Forsa/stichting Profor
23	barefootrecruitment – ingetrokken	Arbeidsbureau Zuidoost/Intrasupport
24	clustervorming huisvesting kerken Zuidoost	Reliplan Adviesgroep BV
25	Interieurfonds	47 maatschappelijke organisaties
26	Fonds voor Projecten van Onderop (Roel Luqman Fonds)	diverse bewoners- & maatschappelijke organisaties
27	gezondheidsvoorlichtingsproject AFAPAC	stichting AFAPAC
28	Jeugdtheaterschool	stichting Kunstweb
29	Sportclub extra	Van Houtenschool
30	MP-bureau	stadsdeel Zuidoost
31	onderzoek "Amsterdam als strategische locatie"	stadsdeel Zuidoost
32	vervolgonderzoek "Amsterdam als strategische locatie"	stadsdeel Zuidoost
33	Boekenfonds	stichting Verzeker je toekomst
34	nazorg Bijlmerramp	stadsdeel Zuidoost
35	onderzoek Infotech ESF-coördinatie	stadsdeel Zuidoost
36	Papa's Song	stichting Aves
37	aanvulling Brug naar de Arbeidsmarkt	Multisys Automation (stichting Gate)
38	aanvulling Buurtserviceteams K-buurt	stichting BZO
39	uitbreiding Huiswerkbegeleiding	STIDA
40	werving en promotie Five o'clock class	Hogeschool voor de Kunsten
41	vervolg Brug naar de Arbeidsmarkt	Multisys Automation (stichting Gate)

Source: Comité van Toezicht URBAN Bijlmermeer, 2002.

APPENDIX
L. Overview of People involved in Zwart Beraad, ABO and Platform Bijlmer

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">ZWART BERAAD:</td></tr>
<tr><td>Name</td><td>Professions (related to the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District and/or to the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme)</td><td>Time period (1990s/2000s)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Swan Tjoa Tjheng</td><td>Secretary of PVB, later Head of the MP Bureau</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Clifton Codrington</td><td>City District Council member (Labour Party)</td><td>1994-1998; 1998-2002</td></tr>
<tr><td>Henry Dors</td><td>City District Council member (Labour Party)</td><td>1991-1994; 1994-1998; 1998-2002; 2002-2006</td></tr>
<tr><td>R.A.H. Neslo</td><td>City District Council member (Green Party)</td><td>1994-1998; 1998-2002</td></tr>
<tr><td>Renate Hunsel</td><td>City District Council member (Green Party)</td><td>1994-1998; 1998-2002</td></tr>
<tr><td>Krish Kanhai</td><td>City District Council member (Labour Party) Passed away in 1997</td><td>1991-1994; 1994-1998</td></tr>
<tr><td>Eric Sinester</td><td>Lived in Zaandam
Originally Zwart Beraad, later ABO</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>R. Sanches</td><td>Member of Supervisory Committee URBAN Bijlmermeer</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Roy Mungra</td><td>City District Council member (Christian Democratic Appeal)
Leaves Zwart Beraad at a certain moment</td><td>1991-1994; 1994-1998</td></tr>
<tr><td>E.E.I. Rudge</td><td>City District Council member (Democrats 66)</td><td>1994-1998</td></tr>
<tr><td>Rob Groenhart</td><td>City District Council member (Democrats 66)</td><td>1991-1994; 1994-1998</td></tr>
<tr><td>Kwame Nimako</td><td>Teacher of International Relations at the University of Amsterdam, Director of research bureau OBEE consultancy</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Glenn Willemsen</td><td>Strategic policy development employee at the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District.
Later Director of NiNsee (Amsterdam)
Originally Zwart Beraad, later ABO</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

ABO:		
Name	**Professions (related to the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District) and/or to the URBAN Bijlmermeer programme)**	**Time Period (1990s/2000s)**
Roel Luqman	Islamic Democratic Union (IDU) *Member of Steering Committee URBAN Bijlmermeer (UBO)* Passed away	
Harald Axwijk	Later Director of the Foundation for Intercultural Services Amsterdam (StIDA)	
J.J. Maatrijk	Progressive Minorities Party (PMP) Passed away	1991-1994
E.P. Esajas	Democrats 66, at a later stage City District Council member as a one man party. New party: 'Future 21'	1994-1998

Board of PLATFORM BIJLMER		
Name	**Professions (related to the Amsterdam Zuidoost City District) and/or other**	**Time Period (1990s/2000s)**
Mrs. Hannah Belliot (chair)	Director of Psychological-Pedagogic Institute (PPI) in Amsterdam Zuidoost (member of Labour Party) Executive Committee (chair) Amsterdam Zuidoost City District 1998-2002	
Wouter Gortzak (secretary)	City District Council (Labour Party, chairman)	1994-1998
Andre Bhola (treasurer)	City District Council (Labour Party)	1998-2002
Mrs. E. Hermelijn	Director Primary School Bijlmer	
Jude Kehla	Social-scientific researcher at the University of Utrecht Amsterdam City Council member (Labour Party), 1998-	

	2002.
Mrs. A. Sastromedjo	Employee Ministry of the Interior
	Former employee of RBA Amsterdam Zuidoost
Mrs. Elvira Sweet	Member Management Team Welfare organization BZO (member of Labour Party)
	Executive Committee (chair) Amsterdam Zuidoost City District, 2002-2006
Kees Visser	Director Public School Bijlmermeer (OSB)
Mrs. Sonia Westerveld	Civil servant Amsterdam municipality;
	Former civil servant Amsterdam Zuidoost City District
Mrs. Joan Windzak	Psychologist
	Employee PPI Zuidoost

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)

Plaats, Positionering en het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid: Voorbeelden van schaalpolitiek in 'Brussel' en Nederland

Inleiding
In een publicatie van de Europese Commissie uit 2003, wordt gesteld: "Het stedelijk beleid van de Europese Unie is vastgelegd in diverse documenten." Terwijl men deze stelling gemakkelijk als vanzelfsprekend zou kunnen beschouwen en zou kunnen aannemen dat er op Europees niveau een stedelijk beleid ís, blijkt echter uit de Europese Verdragen, dat de Europese Unie daarvoor geen mandaat heeft. In de jaren negentig zijn er op Europees niveau bovendien maar twee programma's geïnitieerd, die specifiek gericht waren op bepaalde stedelijke gebieden: het Urban Pilot Programma (1990-1999) en het Communautair Initiatief URBAN (1994-2006). Vanuit financieel perspectief waren deze gebiedsgerichte stedelijke programma's relatief bescheiden.

Op basis van het kleine aantal specifieke stedelijke programma's en hun beperkte budget, zou je de stelling dat er een Europees stedelijk beleid ís dan ook simpelweg af kunnen doen als een sterke claim. Dat zou echter een overhaast getrokken conclusie zijn. Zelfs als deze Europese programma's als zodanig nogal onbetekenend zouden zijn, dan zou het Europese discours rondom stedelijk beleid nog altijd zeer invloedrijk kunnen zijn in de lidstaten, met name omdat dit discours niet simpelweg via het nationale bestuursniveau 'doorsijpelt' vanaf het Europese naar de lagere bestuursniveaus, maar daar tevens direct binnen komt. Immers, in lijn met het Europese 'partnerschap' beginsel, moeten bij de uitvoering van Europese stedelijke programma's ook vertegenwoordigers van lagere bestuurlijke niveaus worden betrokken. Bovendien is er sprake van een toenemende interactie tussen de verschillende bestuurslagen binnen Europees regionaal beleid (waaronder deze gebiedsgerichte stedelijke programma's vallen), alsook binnen de programma's zelf.

In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat Europese beleidsmakers een bepaald discours rondom stedelijk beleid aanwenden, dat onder andere wordt verspreid via Europese stedelijke programma's. 'Discours' wordt hierbij gedefinieerd als onderling met elkaar verbonden teksten en het in de praktijk brengen (*discursive practices*) van hun productie, verbreiding en ontvangst (Phillips en Hardy 2002). In een discours worden aan begrippen bepaalde betekenissen toegekend. Daarmee roept een discours een bepaalde constructie van de sociale werkelijkheid op

In het geval van het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid zijn deze betekenissen vaak politiek beladen en om die reden mogelijk betwist. In dit discours wordt bovendien een schaalpolitiek zichtbaar; een politiek, waarbij een bepaalde constructie van 'schaal' in het geding is. Deze uit zich in de wijze van zelfpositionering en positionering van anderen: zij komen wel of niet voor in het discours; er wordt op een positieve of negatieve manier naar ze verwezen; ze worden afgeschilderd als belangrijk of niet belangrijk, etc.

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In de lidstaten zullen betrokkenen deze 'Europese' constructie van de sociale werkelijkheid, de toegekende betekenissen of de vormen van (zelf-)positionering, mogelijk betwisten en tot 'inzet van onderhandeling' maken. De achtergrond van dit proces, alsook de wijze waarop het zich voltrekt, is gerelateerd aan verschillende contexten en contextuele ontwikkelingen.

Europese integratie, Europeanisatie en Europese stedelijke programma's
Het proces van Europese integratie vormt daarbij een belangrijke context. Sinds de oprichting van de EEG in 1957, is de politieke en economische integratie van de lidstaten in deze gemeenschap (en later, in de 'Europese Unie') gekenmerkt geweest door strijd, met name over de mate waarin en de beleidsterreinen waarop lidstaten hun soevereiniteit zouden moeten afstaan aan Europese instellingen. De Europese Akte (1987) en het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie (1992) hebben dit proces versterkt. Beslissingen worden op een toenemend aantal beleidsterreinen en met een toenemende reikwijdte genomen op Europees niveau. Daarmee wordt het openbaar bestuur in de lidstaten in toenemende mate onder druk gezet en geforceerd tot meer afstemming op de Europese Unie (Europeanisatie).

Aan Europeanisatie kunnen meerdere dimensies worden onderscheiden: ten eerste kunnen verschillende aspecten van een bestuurlijk niveau 'Europeaniseren'. Dit kan betrekking hebben op het gedrag, maar ook op de organisatiestructuur of op het discours. Ten tweede kan Europeanisatie zowel een reactie zijn op output van de Europese Unie, als input betreffen naar de Europese Unie (zie tabel 1).

Tabel 1. Dimensies van Europeanisatie

Focus	Europeanisatie van:	Input naar de EU	Output van de EU
Praktijken	Discours	Een op de EU gericht discours	Opname en aanwenden van het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid
	Gedrag	Pro-actief gedrag (lobbyen, bijvoorbeeld)	Opname en uitvoering (van Europese regelgeving en Europese gelden)
Organisatie	Structuur	Beleidsvoorbereidende organen	Uitvoerende organen

Naar verwachting zullen vertegenwoordigers van nationale en lagere bestuurlijke niveaus echter proberen om de ruimtelijke verdeling van macht binnen de EU naar hun hand te zetten, in een onderlinge manipulatie van machtsrelaties en autoriteit.

Europese gebiedsgerichte stedelijke programma's vormen een goede illustratie van dit proces, omdat er meerdere bestuurlijke niveaus bij zijn betrokken en omdat de autoriteit over een bepaald gebied in het geding is. In een dergelijk programma wordt

als het ware een bepaalde (territoriale) onderverdeling geconstrueerd binnen de territoriale structuur van het openbaar bestuur in een lidstaat. Deze Europese onderverdeling gaat gepaard met organisatorische vereisten, zoals lokaal partnerschap en lokale participatie. Vertegenwoordigers van bestuursniveaus in een lidstaat ervaren dit mogelijk als Europese inmenging in hun wijze van binnenlands bestuur. Een van de manieren waarop mogelijke onvrede tot uitdrukking kan worden gebracht is door het betwisten van (aspecten van) het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid. Daarom is het interessant om dit discours nader te onderzoeken.

Schaal, gebied en arena
De Europese Unie is te verbeelden als een bestuursvorm met meerdere lagen (een '*multi-level polity*'), waarin macht wordt uitgeoefend in sociale relaties tussen de verschillende bestuurslagen. 'Schaal' wordt daarin benaderd als een bestuurlijk niveau dat deel uitmaakt van de territoriale structuur van het openbaar bestuur (EU, nationaal, regionaal, lokaal). Daarnaast kan 'schaal' ook worden benaderd als een politieke en sociale constructie; betrokkenen op een bepaald bestuurlijk niveau zullen (het bestaan van) dat niveau steeds bekrachtigen, om hun positie in relatie tot andere niveaus te behouden of te verbeteren. Deze tweede interpretatie van schaal impliceert dat ook anderen zich op een bepaald niveau kunnen organiseren; een niveau dat niet noodzakelijkerwijs samenvalt met de bestuurlijke niveaus uit de territoriale structuur van het openbaar bestuur.

Europese gebiedsgerichte stedelijke programma's richten zich op een afgebakend gebied. De functie van dit gebied kan men zich voorstellen als een speelveld; als een politieke 'arena', waarin de zeggenschap over dat gebied in het geding is en waarin bepaalde 'spelers,' vanuit eigen (politieke, sociale, economische) belangen actief zijn. De onderlinge betrokkenheid van die 'spelers' is te verbeelden in de vorm van verschillende (beleids) netwerken. Omgekeerd heeft een 'arena' een bepaalde reikwijdte. Deze kan beperkt zijn tot een klein gebied, zoals in een Europees gebiedsgericht stedelijk programma, maar kan even goed veel groter zijn. In dit onderzoek wordt met enige regelmaat verwezen naar drie 'arena's,' die qua reikwijdte verschillen maar niet los van elkaar staan: de Europese stedelijke beleidsarena; de 'bredere' Europese arena en de internationale arena.

Onderzoeksdoel, onderzoeksvragen en methodologie
Het doel van dit onderzoek was tweeledig. Ten eerste was de intentie om een beter begrip te krijgen van de 'onderhandeling' van betekenissen van begrippen uit het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid, alsook van de schaalpolitiek die zich manifesteerde in manieren van (zelf)positionering. Hoe voltrok zich dit proces, in relatie tot de uiteenlopende contexten en contextuele ontwikkelingen? Het tweede doel, in samenhang daarmee, was om een beeld te krijgen van het beleidsnetwerk rondom Europese gebiedsgerichte stedelijke programma's, zonder dit volledig in kaart te willen brengen.

Het onderzoek richtte zich primair op Nederland en spitste zich toe op één Europees stedelijk programma: het Europese Communautair Initiatief URBAN-I. Dit programma vond plaats in de tweede helft van de jaren negentig en richtte zich op de

aanpak van sociaal-economische problemen in kleine, afgebakende gebieden in achterstandswijken in Europese steden. In Nederland zijn in alle vier grote steden (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag en Utrecht) URBAN-I programma's uitgevoerd. In dit onderzoek zijn Amsterdam (URBAN Bijlmermeer) en Den Haag (URBAN Schilderswijk) nader onderzocht.

De onderzoeksvragen waren de volgende:
1. Wat is de mate van 'Europeanisatie' van de verschillende bestuurlijke niveaus, die betrokken zijn bij Europese gebiedsgerichte stedelijke programma's?
2. In welke mate en hoe zijn vertegenwoordigers van die verschillende bestuurlijke niveaus betrokken bij deze programma's, met name bij het Europese Communautair Initiatief URBAN-I?
3. Hoe wordt het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid geproduceerd en 'onderhandeld' in *discursive practices,* door overheidsvertegenwoordigers en vertegenwoordigers van andere (betrokken) instanties? Welke voorbeelden van schaalpolitiek zijn er te vinden?
4. Hoe voltrekken de betrokkenheid van leden uit het beleidsnetwerk en hun *discursive practices* zich, in relatie tot de verschillende contexten waarvan zij deel uitmaken?

De primaire onderzoeksperiode liep parallel aan het Europese Communautair Initiatief URBAN-I (1994-1999), maar om recht te doen aan contextuele ontwikkelingen, was de feitelijk onderzochte tijdsperiode langer en liep ongeveer van 1990-2005.

In het onderzoek is een analytisch onderscheid gemaakt tussen het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid als onderwerp van empirische analyse en verschillende contextuele kaders als achtergrond van deze analyse. Hierbij is casestudie onderzoek gecombineerd met een discours analyse. De primaire intentie was om te verkennen en te begrijpen wat er binnen de cases precies gebeurde. Zowel casestudie onderzoek als discours analyse zijn binnen de wetenschap echter niet onomstreden. Een keuze voor een combinatie van beide was dus enigszins riskant. Om die reden is er uitgebreid stilgestaan bij de belangrijkste methodologische problemen van en bezwaren tegen deze onderzoeksmethoden, alsook bij de manier om eraan tegemoet te komen.

De empirische hoofdstukken in dit boek volgden de territoriale structuur van het openbaar bestuur in Nederland. De onderzoeksresultaten zijn achtereenvolgens weergegeven voor het Europese niveau; het nationale niveau, het regionale niveau en, voor Amsterdam (URBAN Bijlmermeer) en Den Haag (URBAN Schilderswijk), voor het niveau van stad, de stadsdelen en de buurten. Aanvullende constructies van schaal zijn binnen de kaders van deze hoofdstukken behandeld.

Conclusies van het onderzoek
In de afgelopen 10-15 jaar is er een beleidsnetwerk ontstaan rond Europees stedelijk beleid. Terwijl stedelijke vraagstukken al gedurende relatief lange tijd een belangrijke plaats innamen op de politieke agenda's van vele nationale en lokale overheden, bestaat dit thema op Europees niveau pas sinds de jaren negentig. Wie precies stedelijk

beleid op de Europese politieke agenda heeft weten te krijgen is onduidelijk, omdat dit initiatief door verschillende partijen wordt geclaimd. Wel is zeker dat het 'Eurocities' netwerk, opgericht in 1986, een gedreven pleitbezorger van Europees stedelijk beleid is geweest; dat de Europese Commissie zélf eind jaren tachtig is gaan experimenteren met 'Urban Pilot Projecten'; dat het Comité van de Regio's sinds haar oprichting in 1994 aandacht heeft besteed aan dit onderwerp; dat de Nederlandse regering, gedurende haar voorzitterschap van de Europese Raad in 1997 met andere lidstaten initiatieven op dit gebied heeft genomen en dat ook het Europees Parlement zich ervoor heeft ingezet. Samengevat lijkt het er dus op dat er uiteenlopende partijen aan hebben bijgedragen.

Wat is de mate van 'Europeanisatie' van de verschillende bestuurlijke niveaus, die betrokken zijn bij Europese gebiedsgerichte stedelijke beleidsprogramma's?

Wat betreft de verschillende aspecten en de richting van Europeanisatie kan op basis van de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek het volgende worden geconcludeerd.

Europeanisatie is op alle Nederlandse bestuursniveaus aan de orde: op nationaal, regionaal en lokaal niveau en in Amsterdam zelfs op stadsdeelniveau. Bovendien lijkt de mate van Europeanisatie in de jaren negentig en in de beginjaren van deze eeuw te zijn toegenomen, in samenhang met de groeiende politieke invloed van Europa.

Ten tweede is Europeanisatie zowel aan de orde op de individuele bestuurlijke niveaus als bij de gemeenschappelijke organen waarin zij zijn vertegenwoordigd. Zowel de Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG), als het Nederlandse stedennetwerk van Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag en Utrecht (de 'G4'), bijvoorbeeld, houden zich bezig met EU gerelateerde activiteiten en hebben deze bovendien gaandeweg geïntensiveerd: de VNG begon daar begin jaren negentig mee, de G4 volgde tien jaar later. Ook zijn er organen opgericht, voor een gezamenlijke belangenbehartiging richting de Europese Unie, zoals het internationale Eurocities netwerk (1986) en het Huis van de Nederlandse Provincies (2000).

Ten derde lijkt Europeanisatie geleidelijk te switchen van 'passief' (inspelen op wat er uit 'Brussel' komt; 'Europa *proof*' worden) naar 'actief' (Euro-lobbyen; '*position papers*', conferenties organiseren). Zo heeft het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (BZK) bijvoorbeeld rond de eeuwwisseling overlegorganen opgezet die betrekking hebben op Europees stedelijk beleid in relatie tot het binnenlands bestuur. Een ander voorbeeld geldt de steden: in 1999 stuurde Amsterdam, als eerste Nederlandse stad), een ambtelijk vertegenwoordiger naar Brussel en vier jaar later openden de 'G4' steden een gezamenlijk kantoor in Brussel.

Ten vierde blijkt dat de verschillende aspecten van Europeanisatie (gedrag, organisatiestructuur en discours) voor eenzelfde bestuursniveau niet noodzakelijkerwijs parallel lopen, noch dat zij noodzakelijkerwijs dezelfde richting volgen (van of naar de EU). Zo gaven zowel Amsterdam als Den Haag, begin jaren negentig, met de naderende Europese top en het Verdrag van Maastricht, blijk van tal van op de EU gerichte activiteiten. Het zou daarna echter nog meer dan tien jaar duren, alvorens de EU op brede belangstelling binnen de gemeentelijke organisaties kon

rekenen en alvorens ook de gemeentelijke organisaties daarop werden afgestemd. Den Haag startte daarbij later dan Amsterdam, maar intensiveerde haar EU activiteiten eerder.

Tenslotte kan de mate van Europeanisatie ook voor eenzelfde (bestuurlijk) niveau onderling uiteenlopen. Dit geldt bijvoorbeeld voor de Nederlandse 'regio's'. Zo zijn de provincies (individueel en collectief, onder andere als 'Regio Randstad') al jarenlang zeer actief bezig met Europa, terwijl de onderzochte plusregio's rondom Amsterdam (ROA) en Den Haag (Stadsgewest Haaglanden) in hun beleid nagenoeg geen blijk geven van een Europese focus -hun officiële deelname aan Regio Randstad, dat wel zeer actief in Brussel aanwezig is, daargelaten.

In welke mate en hoe zijn vertegenwoordigers van die verschillende bestuurlijke niveaus betrokken bij Europese gebiedsgerichte stedelijke beleidsprogramma's, met name bij het Europese Communautair Initiatief URBAN-I?

In termen van verantwoordelijkheden, zat het Communautair Initiatief URBAN-I in Nederland ingewikkeld in elkaar: de Europese Commissie hield het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (BZK) formeel verantwoordelijk voor de implementatie van de URBAN-I programma's in de Nederlandse steden. De steden, op hun beurt, waren financieel verantwoording verschuldigd aan het Ministerie. Tegelijkertijd gingen de gelden uit de Europese Structuurfondsen direct naar de vier steden, zonder tussenkomst van het Ministerie. Deze laatste leek de financiële zaken rondom deze Europese gelden in de praktijk dus slechts te coördineren. Om aan de Europese vereiste van additionaliteit te kunnen voldoen, trad het Ministerie echter ook op als co-financier met 'grotestedenbeleid' gelden. In die hoedanigheid bekleedde het Ministerie een formele positie in de organisatiestructuur van de URBAN-I programma's. Terwijl de Nederlandse regionale autoriteiten niet formeel betrokken waren bij de URBAN-I programma's, waren de lokale autoriteiten van de 'URBAN-I' steden dat uiteraard wel. In Amsterdam, met haar gedecentraliseerde bestuurlijke organisatie, bekleedden zowel de gemeentelijke autoriteiten als de autoriteiten van stadsdeel Amsterdam Zuidoost een formele positie in de URBAN organisatiestructuur. Zowel in Amsterdam als Den Haag was de overheid in het algemeen relatief zwaar vertegenwoordigd.

Bij een vergelijking van Amsterdam en Den Haag, blijkt dat het URBAN-I programma in de twee steden totaal verschillend 'geworteld' was en organisatorische gezien een heel ander verloop kende.

In Amsterdam was het URBAN-I programma bestuurlijk en ambtelijk gezien vanaf het begin met complexiteit omgeven. Het programma vond plaats binnen het kader van de Bijlmer vernieuwingsoperatie; een context van veel geld en grote belangen, waarin diverse partijen naar optimalisering van hun positie zochten. Woningcorporatie Nieuw Amsterdam, een van de drie formele Bijlmer vernieuwingspartners, was echter nauwelijks geïnteresseerd in het URBAN programma, vanwege de (sociaal-economische) focus en het relatief bescheiden budget dat ermee gemoeid was. De andere twee vernieuwingspartners, de gemeente Amsterdam en stadsdeel Amsterdam Zuidoost, waren dat wel. Hun

verantwoordelijkheden liepen echter door elkaar en hun onderlinge bestuurlijke verhouding was nog lang niet uitgekristalliseerd, met rivaliteit over autoriteit en geld als gevolg. Mogelijk was deze animositeit tussen beide bestuurslagen meer manifest geweest in het URBAN-I programma, als niet iets anders al hun aandacht had opgeëist: 'zwarte' groeperingen, die op grond van hun 'zwarte Bijlmermeer' identiteit een formele positie in the organisatiestructuur van het URBAN-I programma claimden. Deze groeperingen wisten die positie uiteindelijk te verwerven en aldus deel te worden van het Europese stedelijke beleidsnetwerk. Tegelijkertijd hield de gemeente Amsterdam, in de hoedanigheid van de toenmalige Stedelijke Woning Dienst (SWD), een duidelijke vinger aan de pols bij de verdere voortgang van het programma.

In Den Haag had het URBAN-I programma een totaal ander verloop. Daar werd het beleidsmatig en organisatorisch op de fundamenten van de stadsvernieuwing geplaatst. In dit beleid, in sterke mate ingezet vanuit de Dienst Stedelijke Ontwikkeling (DSO), was decennialang een enorme hoeveelheid geld gestoken. Bovendien was het volgens een vast organisatorisch stramien uitgevoerd, met formele inspraak voor de bewoners. Medio jaren negentig was het grote geld echter op en had het inspraakmodel rondom de stadsvernieuwing zijn functie gehad. De organisatie van het URBAN-I programma was eveneens sterk ingebed in DSO, maar bewonersinspraak was er niet of nauwelijks in verdisconteerd. De organisatie van het programma voltrok zich (in tegenstelling tot de stadsvernieuwing) nagenoeg geheel en al op het stadhuis. Een organisatiewijziging in 1997 leidde bovendien tot een aanzienlijke versterking van de gemeentelijke (met name bestuurlijke) betrokkenheid bij de URBAN organisatiestructuur. Tegelijkertijd hadden bewoners veelal wel inspraak in de 'URBAN-I' projecten gehad omdat deze feitelijk vaak al eerder, onder de noemer van de stadsvernieuwing, waren opgezet en besproken.

Een mogelijke verklaring voor het verschillende verloop van de URBAN-I programma's in beide steden ligt wellicht in de verschillende lokale institutionele contexten. Stadsdeel Amsterdam Zuidoost bood een laag en toegankelijk bestuursniveau. Daardoor waren bewoners mogelijk relatief goed geïnformeerd, vanwege hun deelname aan dan wel banden met de stadsdeelraad. Daarnaast was er een organisatiestructuur rondom de sociaal-economische vernieuwing van de Bijlmermeer die nog niet uitgekristalliseerd was en kansen voor betrokkenheid bood. Natuurlijk was dit gegeven op zichzelf niet voldoende: er waren ook een aantal goed ingevoerde, welbespraakte lokale activisten die, gebruik makend van een krachtige retoriek, hun kans grepen. In Den Haag, daarentegen, was er noch een laag, toegankelijk bestuurlijk niveau; noch een zwaar opgetuigd, overkoepelend beleidskader op stadsdeel- of wijkniveau; noch een collectieve stem van de bewoners. Het ontbreken van deze stem zou verklaard kunnen worden door de eerdergenoemde inspraak op projectbasis, alsook door de andere etnische samenstelling van de lokale bevolking.

Hoe wordt het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid geproduceerd en 'onderhandeld' in discursive practices, door overheidsvertegenwoordigers en vertegenwoordigers van andere (betrokken) instanties? Welke voorbeelden van schaalpolitiek zijn er te vinden?

Het vocabulaire dat gebruikt wordt in Europese stedelijke beleidsdocumenten beslaat slechts een beperkt aantal (vak)termen. Deze termen ('sleutelwoorden') krijgen op verschillende manieren betekenis en zijn op een steeds terugkerende wijze met elkaar verbonden. In dit discours vormen steden (of delen daarvan) – niet geheel verassend – het belangrijkste onderwerp. Ze worden afgeschilderd in termen van problemen; als strategisch potentieel dat aangewend en beschermd moet worden om de economische positie van de EU wereldwijd te waarborgen; als een (al dan niet) uitgebalanceerd systeem, maar ook als eenheid van (formele) bestuurlijke verantwoordelijkheid. Deze laatste constructie impliceert de vraag wie er betrokken is dan wel zou moeten zijn bij het aanpakken van bepaalde vraagstukken in de steden.

De overlap tussen sleutelwoorden in Europese en nationale bronnen met betrekking tot Europees stedelijk beleid wijst op het bestaan van een beleidsnetwerk. Daarin stellen betrokkenen soortgelijke kwesties en zorgen aan de orde; gebruiken zij overeenkomstige woorden en (soms) overeenkomstige constructies van steden. Dit komt niet als een verassing. Jarenlang hebben de Europese Commissie, de lidstaten, vertegenwoordigers van andere bestuurlijke niveaus en tal van netwerken op formele en informele wijze contact met elkaar onderhouden over Europees stedelijk beleid. Er zijn echter ook verschillen tussen gebruikte sleutelwoorden. Deze zijn met name terug te voeren op de uiteenlopende contexten waarin hun productie en gebruik is ingebed. Een van de meest opvallende voorbeelden is 'partnerschap'. Dit sleutelwoord komt herhaaldelijk voor in de Europese bronnen, maar nooit in de nationale bronnen.

Los van bovengenoemde overeenkomsten en verschillen in sleutelwoorden, blijkt het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid tegelijkertijd geworteld te zijn in en een weergave te zijn van een breder proces van schaalpolitiek tussen verschillende bestuurlijke niveaus in de EU, dat onder meer is ingegeven door processen van Europese integratie en Europeanisatie. Dit wordt uitgedrukt in manieren van (zelf-) positionering.

Zo wijzen Europese beleidsmakers op het belang van hun betrokkenheid bij stedelijke programma's. Tegelijkertijd positioneren zij zichzelf vaak op een subtiele wijze; in termen van rollen die niet in strijd zijn met het subsidiariteitsbeginsel of met de formele autoriteit van andere bestuurlijke niveaus. Een voorbeeld betreft de rol van de Europese Commissie als helper van hulpbehoevende burgers. De Europese Commissie zoekt bovendien duidelijk toenadering tot de steden als bondgenoot binnen het netwerk rondom Europees stedelijk beleid. Zij worden afgeschilderd als een belangrijke partner van de Europese Commissie; als een bestuurlijke autoriteit met wie de Commissie een speciale band heeft. Regionale autoriteiten of het Comité van de Regio's maken geen deel uit van dit vermeende bondgenootschap. De formele positie van de lidstaten wordt door hen niet betwist, maar hun houding jegens bepaalde aspecten van Europees (stedelijk) beleid wordt soms wel bekritiseerd.

Vertegenwoordigers van het nationale bestuursniveau, op hun beurt, bekritiseren 'Brussel' soms vanwege de neiging om de lakens uit de delen en vanwege het maken van te complexe Europese regelgeving. In een bredere context bezien, is deze strijd een weergave van de angst voor en het verzet tegen Europese inmenging in binnenlandse (bestuurlijke) aangelegenheden. Dit valt bijvoorbeeld af te leiden uit de

constructie van Europese regelgeving in termen van gevaar. Bovendien is de constructie van nationaal stedelijk beleid op Europees niveau ('Europees grotestedenbeleid') een interessant voorbeeld van schaalpolitiek; met die benaming lijken nationale beleidsmakers hun autoriteit te overstijgen.

Omdat regionale autoriteiten niet bij het URBAN-I programma betrokken waren, is er geen discours analyse van regionale bronnen uitgevoerd. Een paar interessante voorbeelden, ontleend aan regionale betrokkenheid in een bredere Europese context, behoeven echter vermelding. In pleidooien voor een bestuurlijke autoriteit op een hoger schaalniveau (Randstad), bijvoorbeeld, wordt de discussie expliciet aan de Europese context gerelateerd. Het recente 'Holland Acht' voorstel voor een democratisch gekozen Randstad autoriteit is in die zin een opmerkelijk voorbeeld van schaalpolitiek.

In de twee onderzochte URBAN-I steden zijn de Europese programma's geplaatst op dan wel ingebed in lokale beleidskaders. Opvallend was dat het programma plaatsvond op een moment dat de gemeentebesturen van Amsterdam en Den Haag nog niet open stonden voor een actieve houding jegens Europa. URBAN-I was een relatief klein programma dat met name in termen van geld werd uitgedrukt; als co-financiering van Grotestedenbeleid. Het waren voornamelijk ambtenaren die zich met dit programma bezighielden. Dit had ook zijn weerslag op het discours. Het Europese stedelijke beleidsdiscours, waarmee het URBAN-I programma vergezeld ging, vond politiek gezien geen enkele aansluiting. Er was wel sprake van 'plaats' en 'schaal', maar de lokale politiek was nog niet op Europa gericht. Dit zou ook kunnen verklaren waarom de gemeentelijke autoriteiten de kans niet grepen die de Europese Commissie hen bood door ze in het discours als 'partners van de Europese Commissie' te positioneren. De mogelijke 'strategische waarde' daarvan voor hun eigen positionering vis-à-vis de Europese Commissie werd ofwel over het hoofd gezien, ofwel gebagatelliseerd.

In Den Haag was er tijdens het URBAN-I programma feitelijk dus geen sprake van politiek in de Europese stedelijke beleidsarena. In Amsterdam lag dit anders: de eerder genoemde 'zwarte' groeperingen dwongen de lokale autoriteiten van de gemeente Amsterdam en stadsdeel Amsterdam Zuidoost het URBAN-I programma hoog op hun politieke agenda's te plaatsen. Saillant detail was dat deze groeperingen zelf helemaal niet met 'Europa' bezig waren en geenszins de intentie hadden om een positie in de Europese arena te verwerven. Het Europese URBAN-I programma was voor hen slechts een middel om de achterstelling van 'zwart' ten opzichte van 'wit' aan de orde te stellen, alsook om zichzelf te positioneren in relatie tot het stadsdeelbestuur.

De retoriek van deze 'zwarte' groeperingen, vond plaats in een geschikte context: het appelleerde aan een beeld dat veel mensen van de Bijlmer hadden, ook al was het beeld feitelijk onjuist dan wel achterhaald. Kansen voor schaalpolitiek hangen in belangrijke mate van af de mate waarin mensen in staat zijn om anderen van zich afhankelijk te maken of 'warm' te laten lopen voor hun doelstellingen. De gebeurtenissen in de Bijlmermeer golden in die zin als een geslaagd voorbeeld van schaalpolitiek.

In Den Haag zijn geen claims op betrokkenheid of voorbeelden van schaalpolitiek gevonden in relatie tot het URBAN programma, noch op het niveau van

de stad, noch op het niveau van stadsdeel Centrum of de Schilderswijk. Het beleidsnetwerk rond het URBAN programma concentreerde zich op het stadhuis. In de buurt was de organisatie van het programma relatief onzichtbaar. Actieve Schilderswijkbewoners die van zich lieten horen, deden dat vanuit een andere context (het Landelijk Samenwerkingsverband Aandachtswijken, LSA, een nationale vrijwilligersorganisatie voor actieve bewoners uit achterstandswijken) en op een ander niveau: tot twee maal toe positioneerde de LSA zich direct in de Europese stedelijke beleidsarena. Ook dit was een mooi voorbeeld van schaalpolitiek. De LSA vormde echter een uitzondering want op lokaal niveau leken veel organisaties (overheid en niet-overheid) ten tijde van het URBAN-I programma nog nauwelijks bezig met Europa. Men richtte zich discursief (nog) niet op de Europese stedelijke beleidsarena. In termen van het discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid, leek de mate van Europeanisatie (zowel van als naar de EU) in de onderzochte steden ten tijde van het URBAN-I programma dus nog relatief beperkt. Tegelijkertijd lijkt zich in die steden recentelijk een meer 'internationaal georiënteerd' discours te zijn gaan ontwikkelen.

Dit boek begon met de stelling dat er een discours rondom Europees stedelijk beleid is. Terwijl dit inderdaad het geval lijkt te zijn, behoeft deze stelling enige aanvulling. Het oorspronkelijke vertrekpunt was dat het in beginsel Europese beleidsmakers waren die dit discours vormgeven. Het voorgaande heeft echter duidelijk gemaakt dat het discours feitelijk verbonden is aan een Europees stedelijk beleidsnetwerk dat in de laatste decennia is ontstaan. Terwijl dit discours deels gedeeld wordt door betrokkenen in het netwerk, geeft het tegelijkertijd blijk van schaalpolitiek, uitgedrukt in manieren van (zelf-) positionering. De claim dat er op Europees niveau een Europees stedelijk beleid bestaat dient als voorbeeld.