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Lessons from the Great War for a Small Country. The military debate in the Netherlands 1918-1923

By *Wim Klinkert**

Introduction

When the Great War ended in November 1918 the Dutch breathed a sigh of relief. The country had been spared the horrors of war, its armed neutrality having withstood the test of a major European conflict. However, during the years 1914-1918 the Dutch politicians and military leaders had constantly been preparing for war. The army had gone through a constant process of innovation – although any mass production of modern weaponry had been impossible – and it had remained on full strength constantly. The Dutch were the only small European neutral that did not demobilise during the war. The country was so close to the western front that political and military leadership deemed it to dangerous to decrease its military strength. The belligerent powers, with their attachés in The Hague constantly monitoring any Dutch military move, had to be constantly reminded of the Dutch will and capability to fight should the worst come to the worst. But in November 1918 a peaceful future seemed at last to be near.¹ For the military the central question was how to analyse the lessons of four years of war just across the borders. What were the implications of the Great War for a small neutral country? How did the ‘war experience’ influence future military planning both operationally and tactically? What public debates developed in which the military participated and how was the future of a small state perceived?

The period between 1918-1923 can be seen as a distinct one because the strong pacifism of the 1920’s and 1930’s had not manifested itself yet. Certainly, the defence budget had been reduced considerably and the Social Democrats demanded disarmament, but uncertainty about the near future was still such that a very strong broadly supported pacifism and anti-militarism had not surfaced yet. From 1924 onwards that would change considerably.

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Strategically, things seemed to change for the worse after the Armistice of November 1918. First, the Belgians demanded the annexation of parts of Dutch territory for both economic and military reasons. Skilful Dutch diplomacy in Versailles reduced that threat in 1919, but the relations with the small southern neighbour remained strained. Instead of a small neutral, like Holland itself, but with internationally guaranteed neutrality, the Belgians changed into an ally of France (1920) and took part in the occupation of the Rhineland. The unusual situation developed in which the Belgian army surrounded the southern Dutch province of Limburg on all sides, also in the east, the former German side. This situation seemed to escalate in January 1923 when Belgian and French troops occupied the Ruhr area. This was the tensest month for the Dutch General Staff since 1919.

Another major change was the disappearance of German military power. Since 1870 Germany had been the most dangerous potential enemy for the Netherlands, although the German army was highly admired by many Dutch officers. From 1918 onwards Germany seemed to have fallen prey to internal chaos, separatism and political extremism. The League of Nations, which the Netherlands joined in March 1920, did not seem to offer any solutions for the Dutch strategic position. For the Dutch General Staff this new institution had no relevancy for the time being, and it will be seen that it hardly played any part in its war planning.²

Internally, the Dutch General Staff had to cope with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, it knew radical budget cuts were unavoidable, while on the other, it realized that if the Dutch army wanted to implement the technical and tactical lessons of the war, it would have to invest heavily in expensive modern weaponry. But how to innovate when the financial means were scarce? The army had never been able to boast much sympathy from the Dutch society as a whole and after four years of mobilisation, it had even worn thinner. What choices were made in those first five years after the war? What ideas surfaced?

Internal changes: technical and tactical innovation

During the war the Dutch General Staff followed the tactical and technical innovations to the best of its ability. For this it had several means at its disposal. Dutch officers were regularly invited by the belligerents to visit

the front line or coastal defences. Many of them not only inspected the western but also the Alpine fronts. Secondly, the Dutch government appointed military attachés in Paris, Berlin and London, who from 1916 onwards sent information on many military matters and also paid regular visits to the front lines in West and East. Thirdly, all international belligerent publications were closely scrutinised in The Hague, and they were often even discussed with the military representatives of the belligerent powers residing in the Netherlands. Contacts between Dutch Staff officers and foreign military attachés were frequent and close during the war years. Fourthly, the Dutch army constantly experimented with the production of new weapons. Dutch factories tried to produce machine guns, chemical weapons, airplanes, radio equipment, hand grenades, flame throwers, concrete pill boxes, mortars, steel helmets, etc. In some they succeeded in others they did not. Success depended on the availability of raw materials and specialised knowledge and equipment. The army also trained its units in trench warfare and in modern mobile warfare. Field service regulations were constantly adapted. What was the result in 1918? Tactically, perhaps, the Dutch army had grasped the basic principles of modern warfare, but technically it lacked the equipment to fight a war for more than a very short period. To solve this gap in secret the Dutch army had made contact with the British for the supply of large quantities of modern (heavy) armament in case of a German attack.³

After the war the Dutch hunger for military information did not diminish in any way. All publications from the former warring states were analysed meticulously, and Dutch army officers kept on travelling, with France being the preferred destination. Not only were visits paid to the former battlefields, but officers were also sent to participate in French military courses on artillery, tank warfare and anti aircraft artillery. Specialised knowledge gathered in that way was used for updating the Dutch military manuals. The most important missions to France were those to the prestigious *Ecole supérieure de guerre* in Paris, to which one of the leading Dutch experts on trench warfare was dispatched for a year. The other countries with which the Dutch Staff had regular contact were the Scandinavian states. This was a follow-up of ties established during the war, when the Dutch army had bought machine guns in Denmark and airplanes and howitzers in Sweden. For financial reasons the military attachés abroad were abolished after the war, a move that only increased the value of foreign study trips. In the most prominent Dutch military journal, the *Militaire Spectator*⁴, many officers published their ideas, which

were partially based on foreign visits. This venerable periodical and several other military journals abounded with, mostly tactical and technical, articles on war-time developments and post-war foreign analysis. They testify to a theoretical military discussion on a high level, and as such they are in line with the Dutch tradition of high quality, internationally oriented military publication. Needless to say, realising all these ideas in practice was a totally different matter.

Who is the enemy?

Dutch military preparations had always been based on the fundamental idea of safeguarding neutrality, with the army having to deter potential enemies from crossing the Dutch border. Should that deterrence fail, the army had to be capable of putting up a resistance for a long enough period of time to enter into a coalition war with an opponent of the violator of Dutch territory. So, a mobile field army was to deter potential violators at the border and a Fortress system (Fortress Holland) was to defend the western part of the country where the main cities and ports were located. The fortress system intended to buy the country time to enter into a coalition and prevent a quick occupation of the entire territory. The exercises of the General Staff, both in the field and on maps, were more or less all based on these premises. The idea behind this operational concept was that Dutch territory was positioned in such a strategically important location in Western Europe that none of the Great Powers would acquiesce in the occupation of the Netherlands by any of their rival Great Powers. How relevant were these ideas after 1918?

The General Staff started with map exercises and staff exercise trips again in 1920, with field exercises on a larger scale in 1923 and resumed the traditional biannual divisional manoeuvres in 1924. The Staff focussed on possible attacks from the south and east. It considered German weakness a temporary situation and saw the Belgian army - much larger than the Dutch and with war experience, French backing and deployed in the Rhineland - as a potential opponent. Belgian animosity surely was a new phenomenon.

The winter map exercise of 1920-1921 started with an analysis of the main developments of the war years, conducted by expert Staff officers. This was followed by the scenario. It involved France and Germany that had freed itself from the limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty. Great

Britain remained neutral, while the League of Nations played no part. Russia took the side of Germany and Belgium that of France. Germany concentrated its army at its western border and asked the Dutch permission to cross their territory to attack France. The Dutch refusal meant war. The Dutch field army was concentrated in the south of the country to prevent any large-scale penetration of German troops into the Netherlands. It fought the Germans and was even helped by the Belgians, with Dutch and Belgian army headquarters cooperating.

The next winter map exercise in 1921-1922 involved a major German attack against the Netherlands and a coalition against this attack by several, unnamed, armies, of which the Dutch field army was one. In central Holland the Dutch field army attacked the German army. This exercise had a major logistical component and seemed to have as its main objective the analysis of all logistical aspects of the field army at full strength. The Dutch Staff used French and German statistical information on supply, transport, munitions, casualties etc.

The summer staff ride of 1920 involved the League of Nations insofar that the Dutch and Belgian army worked together as a League contingent against a German attack on the Netherlands. This exercise involved a thorough analysis of a trench war close to Amsterdam. The German army penetrated the Netherlands up to the Fortress Line that defended the capital. Using detailed data from France and Germany the Dutch officers simulated a trench war involving all the modern weapons: heavy and light mortars, flame throwers, hand grenades, complex trench systems, chemical weapons, aerial reconnaissance and the tactics of attack and defence. The following year they simulated a Belgian attack on the south of the Netherlands. The British and American armies had left Germany and the Rhine and Ruhr areas were occupied solely by France and Belgium. The Belgian attack on the Netherlands succeeded in pushing the Dutch army back, north of the great rivers that divide the country. Belgian-French attacks led to a major battle in central Holland, which formed the core of the exercise. The French even made use of tanks.

The summer staff ride of 1922 featured a Belgian attack directly targeted at western Holland, so the officers focused on the defence along the great rivers (Rhine, Meuse) to protect cities like Rotterdam. Again, much of the French data on casualties, transport capacity, munitions and even

specification on the types of wounds resulting from the different weapons were used.⁵

When these paper exercises were compared with the ones held in the period before 1914, the offensive role of the Dutch is striking. In almost all exercises the Dutch army was given the order to attack, instead of slowly retreating towards the Fortress Holland. Also, coalition warfare was given more attention and, of course, the trench warfare plans were completely new. What is also remarkable is the idea of German rearmament and aggression within a relatively short period of time and the Belgian hostility. The reason why so much emphasis was placed on the role of the Dutch field army will be discussed later.⁶

Belgium and the Netherlands showed a great interest in each other's armies after 1918. During the war the Dutch army, of course, had focused on a possible German attack. But it also considered the threat of coastal landings, especially in the south-western province of Zeeland, which controlled the entrance to the Belgian port of Antwerp and which lay close to the German U-boat harbours of Zeebrugge and Ostend. In this area the Dutch army seemed to have lost all interest. The real war danger came from the southern border. In October 1919 rumours of a possible Belgian raid on the Dutch city of Maastricht were rife. But war seemed even more imminent in January 1923 as a result of the Ruhr occupation by France and Belgium. The Dutch General Staff was informed by the French that war was a possibility and that Dutch neutrality would not be appreciated. The Dutch Staff prepared a war plan in case of a Belgian attack on the southern provinces. The plan envisaged that in case of a major attack, these provinces had to be abandoned. The fear was expressed that the Belgians might even be greeted as liberators in parts of the southern-most province of Limburg, so a quick retreat by the Dutch army had to be avoided. The General Staff officers also toyed with the idea of a blockade of Belgian ports. For a short while tension rose, but a real war threat did not materialize.⁷

How sensitive the relation with the Belgians was, from a military perspective, again became apparent in the fall of 1923 when the Minister of Defence made it clear he rejected exercise scenarios in which Belgium was portrayed as an aggressor. If such exercise ever fell in the wrong hands they could have undesirable political consequences.

In September 1923 the Dutch army held its first large field exercise. The so-called Light Brigade (the motorised reconnaissance unit of the field army) fought against an infantry regiment. Prior to the manoeuvres an impressive military parade was held in presence of the Queen, many dignitaries, and the foreign military attachés. A fly-past of the Netherlands army air service completed the show. It was the first time the Netherlands had shown all its military equipment in such a way since the war and in the presence of foreign military officials. It coincided with the 25th anniversary of the reign of the Queen.

The Belgian attaché commented on the field exercise. He was not impressed by the weapons he saw, or by the military fitness of the soldiers. He also warned that socialism and pacifism had found an easy breeding ground in the Dutch army. On the other hand, he praised the way the staffs operated, the aerial reconnaissance, the uniforms and the physique of the men. But as a military exercise he found these little of interest in these manoeuvres.

His French colleague thought the whole manoeuvre “*franchement médiocre*”. He was only positively impressed by the morale and, again, the aerial reconnaissance. The way the staffs worked and the cooperation between artillery and cavalry were, in his eyes, disappointing.⁸

In September 1924 the first traditional divisional manoeuvres took place again. They were the first since September 1916, when the only large field exercise of the mobilisation years had taken place.

New field service regulations

During the war the Dutch General Staff tried to keep up with the tactical development to the best of its abilities. In general, the pace and the depth of the changes struck the officers. War would, they believed, become much more technological and carried out at a faster pace. It was not the trenches that they saw as the most important legacy, but the speed of operations through airplanes and motorised units. These were frightening developments for a small country like the Netherlands, which lacked strategic depth. The answer had to be found in a modern field army, as was already seen in the exercises.

One perceived danger was that an aerial operation would strike so fast and so hard, that resistance would be futile. The answer was not only creation of an effective air defence, but also a field army that could be fielded quickly and would be modern and strong enough to be a partner in a coalition war with a great power. Many officers argued that the mobilisation period had proven their point: thanks to the field army the Germans had not attacked the Netherlands. When budgets were cut, it was all the more necessary to underline the need for such an expensive military organisation.

The most important tactical questions that needed to be answered involved the more complex role of the artillery, the introduction of modern weapons such as the machine gun and the airplane, and the coordination between the different branches of the army.

The artillery

The Dutch army had traditionally had field and fortress artillery. These were two completely separate branches, one mobile, and the other static. The war had changed that system completely. Even before the end of the World War the Dutch army wanted to integrate the artillery and add a new branch: anti-aircraft artillery. Also, the number of different types of guns increased dramatically. During the wartime mobilisation the artillery had experimented with mortars of different calibres, with machine guns – also against aerial targets – and with heavy howitzers. These needed to be fitted into a new organisation and choices had to be made as to the kinds of guns that would stay in the artillery and those that would be transferred to the infantry. From the end of the mobilisation onwards study groups were established to look into this matter. Information was also gathered from France, where Dutch artillery officers took courses.

In 1921 the first decisions were made. A separate branch was to be established for the anti-aircraft artillery, while the fortress artillery was almost completely abolished. The field army was to be fitted out with heavy artillery both at divisional and corps level. The guns were to be used both in mobile operations and static warfare.

The problem was that the officers wanted many more guns than the politicians were prepared to pay for. The mortar production – small it was – was completely stopped. The mortars would have gone to the infantry,

but they were no longer produced. Anti-tank artillery (also called infantry guns) were also to go to the infantry. But again, this proposal was axed. The only additions to the artillery were howitzers that had been bought in Great Britain and, in 1918, in Germany. Modernisation of the field guns had to wait until 1925, when it was done in the Netherlands itself. The number and diversity of pieces wished for by the artillery officers was not reached, but compared to the field army of 1914, the army of 1922 was considerably stronger in artillery.

There remained the problem of chemical artillery. During the war, the Dutch army had developed and produced gas masks and offensive chemical weapons. At first, in 1918-1919, all production of chemical weaponry was ended. But not long afterwards the General Staff and the Defence Minister agreed that Holland should also have the capacity to use chemical weapons in an offensive way to retaliate in case an invader should use them. Besides conducting research on gas masks and producing them, the army prepared, albeit on a very small scale, for the possible offensive use of chemical weapons.⁹

Infantry

Discussions on the future of the infantry centred on anti-tank combat, the introduction of the machine gun as the infantry's primary weapon, and trench warfare. The Netherlands never seriously thought of buying or producing tanks themselves, so all studies on tank warfare emphasised the strength of anti tank weapons and the unsuitability of the Dutch polder terrain for tank warfare. And, of course, tanks were much too expensive.

Trench warfare was taught in so-called storm schools. These schools had begun in 1916 with the establishment of a hand grenade school. In 1918 the Dutch army introduced a force of storm troops based on the German model, to be trained in storm schools. There would be one storm unit for each of the four divisions. These schools were closed after the Armistice, but reopened soon after, although of the original four only two schools remained. In theory, all conscript infantry soldiers had to be taught the basics of trench warfare and the best among them received extra training to become storm troopers. All infantry men had to handle digging equipment, saws, axes, hand grenades and had to be able to dig in during night time and handle sandbags and armoured shields. The main weapon of the infantry soldier was the machine gun, not the light Lewis machine

gun that many infantry officers preferred, but the older, heavier Austrian Schwarzlose machine gun, built under licence in the Artillery Works near Amsterdam. The production numbers were small, some one hundred per year, whereas the main advocates for a strong modern infantry thought the Dutch army needed at least 10,000 machine guns. The Staff abolished the flamethrower, but it did invest in new types of hand grenades.¹⁰

Engineers

Trench warfare was not only a job for the infantry, but also for the engineers. The engineers concentrated after the war on the preparation of field fortifications. Until the war, the engineers had mostly been concerned with the fortresses that protected the western part of the country. But the time of huge fortresses was past. Engineers now focused on small field works such as pill boxes. In 1921 a study group for the future of the engineers was established. It produced new regulations for field fortifications that emphasized small concrete pillboxes and temporary earthen field works. An extensive set of regulations was finished in 1926 that was based on building small fortifications and using reinforced concrete. The fortifications patterns were based on the German bunkers the Dutch engineers had visited in France and Flanders.

Military journals paid extensive attention to field works and fortified trenches, and many articles were written about them both during and after the war. Perhaps it was the fact that static warfare was not so unfamiliar to the Dutch, who had always relied in the last resort on their inundated fortified lines surrounding the western provinces. The war experience kindled interest in the topic of fortified lines. The fundamental change was that the forts no longer played a central role, but fortifying terrain related to the operations of the field army had become the order of the day. The traditional exercises in fortress warfare were abolished.¹¹

Cavalry

Traditionally the cavalry force in the Dutch army was small. The First World War accelerated the transformation of cavalry units into cyclist and motor units. Machine guns were also introduced. The field army retained its cavalry reconnaissance brigade but, as a whole, the cavalry was substantially reduced in size after 1918.

Science cooperates

More than ever before the changes in weaponry and tactics were attained through cooperation with university professors. During the mobilisation in 1915 the Minister of War established the Munitions Bureau. This bureau was assigned the task of coordinating and promoting weapons production and innovation, and it was relatively successful. The bureau brought military, entrepreneurs and scientists together and stimulated airplane and chemical weapons innovation and production and tried to tempt civilian industries into changing over to military production. This bureau was dissolved at the end of the mobilisation, but some of the military-scientific-entrepreneurial contacts remained intact. Its chairman, a former artillery officer, now professor of mechanics at the Technical University in Delft, remained a figure of importance in this field.

The work of coordination between the military and scientists was especially notable in the artillery, which had a long history of scientific research and relied more and more on civilian professors. The development of the anti aircraft artillery would not been possible without the strong support from the Leyden and Delft Universities. A big step ahead was made in 1924 with the establishment of the Commission for Physical Weaponry, which conducted fundamental research in the field of physics.

The development of chemical warfare and military aviation would have been impossible without help from the universities of Utrecht and Delft, respectively. The Signal Corps of the Dutch army also had strong ties with famous German firms such as Zeiss and Telefunken.¹²

New field service regulations

To bring cohesion to all the new ideas and changes the General Staff formed a committee in 1920 under the chairmanship of the director of the Staff College tasked to prepare new comprehensive field service regulations. The committee was to take into account all the developments in the fields of aviation, motorisation, chemical warfare, tanks, signals, trench warfare, etc. Its task was to redefine all general principles of warfare and apply them to the Dutch circumstances. It was important, for instance, that fortress warfare and mobile warfare were no longer seen as two separate kinds of warfare. Modern warfare had two, closely related,

dimensions: manoeuvre warfare in the field and static warfare in trenches. Both were different aspects of the same comprehensive concept. A first draft was already completed by 1921 so that the committees that were developing artillery and engineer doctrine knew the general principles on which they were to base their work.

In the committee's first findings the infantry remained the principle arm and offensive manoeuvre warfare demanded the most attention. The key words were high morale, quick action, and persistent action. That was what it took to prevent a static phase in the war. Should a trench war become inevitable, it had to be fought in a very active way, using all modern equipment and weaponry available.

These aspects were again laid down in the final version of the regulations, published in 1924. Exemplary leadership, faith in one's own strength, a just treatment of soldiers, and cooperation between the arms and services were essential. These behaviours were, in fact, considered timeless ingredients of warfare. The World War had shown how destructive modern weapons were and how their fire power could affect morale; how the emergence of aircraft speeded up the pace of operations, and how soldiers could become dispersed on the battlefield. Again, morale was the key to overcome these problems. Duty, and the will to fight, had to be stressed because the demands modern warfare posed on every individual were more exacting than ever before. Camouflage, preparation, and training had increased in significance. It was the role of the commanding officer to lead by example, to show courage, knowledge and will power, but also humanity and insight into character.

The emphasis on morale was not completely new, but it was stronger than before. Tactical manuals that were published in this period also show that morale was deemed more essential than weapons; that the psychological effect of fire, be it from the infantry or the artillery, always surpassed the physical effect. So it was moral fibre-- based both on the example of the commanding officer and the internalised strength and resilience received during training—that would make soldiers survive modern war.¹³

Not all officers agreed. In a critique on the new regulations published in the *Militaire Spectator* one officer stated that the Dutch were much too level-headed to make morale so important. He also pointed out that the Dutch army hardly had the weapons to fight such an all out modern war. Finally,

he pointed out that the Dutch army was based on conscripts and that most of the junior officers were also conscripts – so demands on that army could not be so high as set by the new regulations.

These critical notes were not unjustified. The Dutch Staff had placed all its bets on a modern field army, a more or less a small-scale copy of the large continental field armies. Why was that? Since the turn on the century the Dutch General Staff had striven for an army organisation based on the German model, and a field army in continental style was an essential part of this. The theory was that such a mobile force would deter an aggressor and safeguard neutrality. Yet, it was impossible for such an army to fight a major power on such terms without its certain defeat and destruction. Nevertheless, the Dutch professional officers had more and more identified themselves with ‘German model’, which was, in their eyes, the most fulfilling in a military sense. It made the Dutch army a fighting force that would be taken seriously by other European states, even though it was small. All alternatives for a different army organisation, no longer a copy of the German model but more like a defensive militia, were dismissed. In fact, the same attitude reappeared happened again after 1918. Alternatives based on a police army (related to the League of Nations) or on a militia system were never discussed seriously. Political support for alternative army organisations always found only minority support and most of the time the organizations were hopelessly divided on these issues.

In the early 1920s the General Staff again had its way. Even though money was lacking to properly arm the field army, and even though conscription was changed to make it difficult to field a properly trained field army quickly, the Staff and the Ministry of Defence held onto a field army organised in four corps, each consisting of two divisions.

Public debate

Defence issues, as long as they were related to the budget and the burden of conscription, were very much at the centre of attention during the years 1918-1922. In this period Parliament discussed ministerial proposals three times for a new defence organisation. Apart from these parliamentary discussions many politicians, commentators, and officers made their ideas on the ideal defence organisation public. These discussions ended in 1922 when a Defence Bill was passed, reducing the cost by lowering the yearly contingent of conscripts and the time those conscripts had to serve.

Moreover, budget cuts were implemented on army exercises, weapons procurement, and officer education. At the same time, Parliament rejected an expensive proposal to expand the Navy after vehement protests for many different sides of Dutch society. In 1924 the left-wing liberal party followed the Social Democrats in their advocacy of a one-sided national disarmament.

These debates on the new defence bills, on the Navy bill, and the political struggle for disarmament have been extensively discussed in Dutch historiography.¹⁴ Less attention has been paid, however, to the issues raised by officers in the uncertain years directly following the Armistice. Four themes can be distinguished: the army as guardian of neutrality, the social role of the officer, national strength, and national economic independence.

The army as a guardian of neutrality

The main argument put forward by officers and right-wing politicians against structural budget cuts on defence was the fact that the field army not only had saved Holland from a German invasion in 1914, but that it had also ensured Dutch independence during the war years. One only had to point to the sorry fate of Belgium to understand the important role of the Dutch army. The army as a deterrent against a potential aggressor was a theme already mentioned during the mobilisation. Only the Social Democrats rejected this view and they argued that the character of modern war and its enormous dimensions and industrial might involved rendered any efforts of a small country like the Netherlands totally meaningless. Warfare had outgrown the scope of small states, it was way beyond their means. The only thing the socialists were prepared to pay for was a police force within the framework of the League of Nations. The most extreme members of the Social Democratic party even called national defence a criminal illusion.¹⁵

The Protestants and right-wing liberals embraced the army most wholeheartedly. Their newspapers and the many officers from these circles, including the Ministers of Defence, constantly repeated that the army was a valuable asset for Dutch independence-- it had been so in the past and it would be so in the future.¹⁶ The most prominent was the former Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch Navy and Army, General C.J. Snijders (1852-1939). He regularly pleaded in newspapers and military

journals for a powerful army, based on a strong economy and a physically fit population convinced of the army's necessity. He did not show much faith in the League of Nations, as was probably the case for most officers.¹⁷

The year 1920 saw the publication of the first book on the Dutch war experience that based on expert opinion. Its editor was an historian – Hajo Brugmans (1868-1939) – a regular commentator on current affairs. Two staff officers wrote the military chapters. Even more controversial was the chapter written by historian Herman Colenbrander (1871-1945), who analysed the Dutch international position. He argued that the Germans had refrained from violating Dutch territory in 1914 because the Reich did not want an extra 200,000 enemy soldiers that would distract its armed forces from their main effort against France. What is more, neutral Holland could be a useful asset for German international trade.

The next publication dated from 1921. It was a well-researched history of the Dutch position during the Great War, written by historian Nicolas Japikse (1872-1944). Surprisingly, it did not touch much on military matters. In contrast, it was the military matters that formed the central theme of a war history published the same year by the inspector of the artillery, concurring completely with Colenbrander's arguments put forward the year before.

In 1922 a more thorough military analysis was published. Lieutenant-General W.G.F. Snijders (1847-1930), the former Commander-in-Chief's brother, published a book on the military history of the Western Front. His analysis was based on many international sources and memoirs and intended for a wider audience. Snijders concluded there was now no doubt: Helmut von Moltke had changed the German war plans, originally drawn up by Schlieffen, and banned the advance through the Dutch province of Limburg. Von Moltke's argument had been an economic one; he wanted to be able to use the port of Rotterdam for trade. But Snijders also concluded from his studies that Von Moltke had feared the military consequences had he attacked the Dutch army. A hostile Dutch army in the German flank formed a risk Von Moltke was not prepared to take.

The next year it was the other brother's turn to publish his views on Dutch neutrality. He used Von Moltke's memoirs, published in Germany in 1922. They confirmed Von Moltke's decision taken around 1906 not to cross

into Dutch territory. But did this have anything to do with the supposed strength of the Dutch army? Snijders thought it did because it was the gradual increase in strength of the Dutch army since 1900 that had inspired Von Moltke's decision. Both the Snijders brothers emphasised, moreover, that the timely Dutch reaction in 1914, a call for a general mobilisation on 31 July 1914, had settled the matter for the Germans.¹⁸

The Snijders' brothers both used a study written in 1919 by a Dutch officer that had been translated and was well known in international military circles. This officer had made a very detailed analysis of the German advance into Belgium in August 1914 and had concluded that the advance south of the Dutch province of Limburg had been extremely disadvantageous for the German army. The reason the Germans accepted the operational problems of a difficult advance via Liege had been the fear of a British attack via the Netherlands, in combination with an attack by the Dutch army itself. Had the province of Limburg been in Belgian hands – as annexationists demanded in 1919 – the defence of the Meuse River would have been very weak because the Belgians would never have been able to defend the Meuse in its entire length. So, from a military point of view, the Belgians were better off by a Dutch possession of Limburg.¹⁹

This study on the German advance was re-printed in 1923 when more sources were available. It made the case for the Dutch army relevance even stronger. Von Moltke was cited, saying, "*Ich war und bin noch heute der Überzeugung, dass der Feldzug im westen scheitern müsste, wenn wir Holland nicht geschont hätten.*" (Today I am more and more convinced that the campaign in the West would have been successful if we had not respected Dutch neutrality.) It was the Dutch Army that had tipped the German scale, and that is why the Germans offered to respect Dutch neutrality on 2 August 1914. The Dutch army had quickly mobilized, and their flank was secure.²⁰

Again, the Social Democrats dissented. They refused to believe the Dutch had played such an important role in German military planning. They also undermined the other set of 'evidence' for the crucial role of the Dutch field army. This evidence was based on the fact that Field Marshal Ludendorff had postponed the unrestricted U-boat war in 1916 out of fear for the Dutch and Danish armies. The Dutch minister of Defence mentioned this fact in 1919 for the first time. Only in 1921 did the relevant section from Ludendorff's *Kriegserinnerungen* appear in Dutch publications and Parliamentary debates. It read:

“Nur mit tiefsten Bedauern könnten wir uns nicht für die uneingeschränkte Führung des U-Bootkrieges aussprechen, da er nach Urteil des Reichskanzlers den Krieg mit Holland und Dänemark möglicherweise zur Folge haben würde; wir hatten zum Schutz gegen beide Staaten nicht einen Mann zur Verfügung. Sie waren in der Lage (...) in Deutschland einzurücken und uns den Todesstoß zu geben...”²¹ (It was very regrettable that we could not speak up for unrestricted U-Boat war because it was the view of Reich's chancellor that a war with the Netherlands and Denmark might follow. We had not a single man to defend Germany from an attack from those quarters and they were in the position to be the base for an invasion against Germany... that would have been our death blow.)

What Dutch politicians and officers did not mention was what Ludendorff had written a few pages later: “Nach unseren Siegen in Rumänien erwartete die Oberste Heeresleitung ein Eingreifen Hollands und Dänemarks in den Krieg zu unseren Ungunsten nicht mehr.” (After our victories in Romania the High Command no longer saw an attack from the Netherlands or Denmark as any real danger to our position.) And, of course, the U-boat war had been declared.

The discussion on the role of the Dutch field army during the war was relevant in the political and public debate because of the plans to cut back the defence budget. Protestants and right wing liberals were convinced that a continental-style field army was a vital security for Dutch independence, for Dutch international military relevance, and for a possible Dutch role in a future European war.²²

The social calling of the officer

In October 1918 a shockwave was felt throughout the Dutch army and society: mutiny! Barracks were burned down and officers had fled. Although peace and quiet was restored quickly, the shock was intense. Was the army still a reliable instrument? Who was to blame? Had the officers been too authoritarian and had soldiers been mistreated? All these questions still begged for an answer when in November 1918 the Social Democratic party attempted a revolution. Riots followed and law-abiding troops, conscripts and volunteers alike, restored law and order and organised a huge manifestation to show the country's loyalty to the Queen and the Orange dynasty.

Not only did these incidents influence the public debate on the role of the officer, the war had also changed the character of the army. Choosing conscripts by drawing lots had been abolished in 1915 as a measure to increase recruitment further. In 1918 the Netherlands had half a million trained military men in a population of 6 ½ million. Moreover, the officer corps consisted mostly of conscript reserve officers. This meant the army had become more 'civil' and in a future war this would be the case again. Professional officers and NCOs made up only a very small portion of the army. This, together with the call for a more humane treatment of soldiers and more democratic relations within the army, formed ingredients for a public debate that reached a peak in 1919.

As early as 1900 Dutch officers had published books and brochures pleading for a more respectful and humane treatment of conscript soldiers. In doing so they followed the famous French colonial officer Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) and at the same time contributed to the Dutch discussion on the introduction of personal conscription, which meant that the sons of well-to-do citizens had to serve in the army as well. Reformers wanted a healthier and more open relationship between army and society and the recognition of the army as a socially desirable institution that played a constructive role in society. The reformers also realised that the average Dutch male citizen did not like military discipline and did not respect authority easily. He was individualistic and loved his individual liberty and independence. But the right attitude by his commander could turn him into a good soldier and make him more valuable for society when his period of service was over.

The World War had caused these ideas to re-emerge. In November 1918 the Minister of Defence decided that the army had to reform towards more democratic ways. He had lectures held on this theme all over the country and had changes made in the curriculum of the military academy. Apart from these ministerial attempts to address the situation, many officers wrote pamphlets on this issue and it was discussed in Parliament. In fact, this discussion even became part of a much broader and older debate on juvenile education. The idea was that the young had become rebellious and somehow needed to be better understood and perhaps needed to be educated in a different way. Officers participated in this civilian debate and in conferences on the theme of juvenile education, stressing the need for more knowledge on army matters among schoolteachers and parents and an education with more emphasis on

physical aspects. They argued the army could be an important ally in comprehensive measures to 'discipline' young men. In this way the army could make a positive contribution towards reducing a social problem.

The effects of the heated discussions of 1919 are hard to measure. Within the military, the discussion seemed die down rather quickly. Certainly, from the 1920's officer cadets were instructed in sociological and psychological issues and were made aware of the need to treat soldiers with interest and respect. But what really happened? Were there any fundamental changes inside the barracks? These issues have not yet been thoroughly researched, but in all likelihood the changes in the Dutch army culture may have been slight.²³

National strength

In many publications Dutch officers observed that modern war was a national effort. Waging war meant involving the entire population, the industry and all the 'moral powers' a country could muster. Terms used most frequently in this debate were 'national strength' or 'national power', meaning the collective power a population could bring to bear. In this power military, economic, mental and physical elements were combined.

Two officers stand out in this debate: W.E. van Dam van Isselt (1870-1951) en P.W. Scharroo (1883-1963). Both were prominent officers, Van Dam van Isselt was a General Staff officer and director of the Staff College and Scharroo was a prominent engineer and one of the Dutch experts on concrete field fortifications. But both men had a 'second life' in the public domain and that makes them interesting examples of how military themes related to the war period were intertwined with the public debate.

Van Dam had published articles and books since 1895. He was a prominent member of the Society for National Strength (Volksweerbaarheid), established at the time of the second Boer War in South Africa, a war that had stirred Dutch society considerably. Not only did the Dutch population sympathise with the 'Dutch' Boers; that war also became the symbol of a major power crushing a small one simply for imperial and economic gains. It was a case of might over right. Basing themselves on these themes and on a growing Dutch nationalism and self-confidence, a number of politicians, entrepreneurs, and officers pleaded for a strengthening of the Dutch population in the light of a future war in

Europe. This was war generally seen in Social Darwinist terms. The society flourished for a short period, then declined. But it never disappeared. During the war its ideas regained a certain popularity. Van Dam remained an active member throughout this period. He regularly wrote articles in the Society's newspaper and published many leaflets and brochures. His themes were first to argue for an alternative organisation for the Dutch defence, less a copy of the German army and more a reflection of what he called "Dutch national characteristics." This meant, according to Van Dam, a 'people's army', a close merger between people and army based on general conscription and a conscripted officer corps. This army would find its strength in the fact it was rooted deeply within Dutch society. In a military sense its stance would be defensive, geared towards protecting the entire national territory, inch by inch as it were. It was, in fact, a combination of a Swiss-like militia system and a more traditional, professional army. According to Van Dam, the effect such an army organisation would have on society as a whole was that civilian values would permeate the army and military virtues would permeate society.

His second theme was the strengthening of the population, both physically and mentally. He predicted that the future of the state depended on the strength of its population and the willingness of the population to show enthusiasm for upholding and reinforcing that state. National unity of effort was important. How was this to be brought about? One of Van Dam's hobbyhorses was gymnastics. Dutch youths had to be physically trained from the time they first went to school until, in their adult life, they could be called upon to defend the fatherland. Physical training made young men more vigorous and energetic also in their civilian life, so strengthening both army and civil society. A Social Darwinist, Van Dam was a persistent advocate of physical training all through curriculum of every school.

Van Dam's opinions dated from the turn of the century. The World War had proven, in his eyes, the correctness of his opinion. The Belgians had shown, through their heroic fight at the Yser inundations in western Flanders, that a determined people could resist the best army in the world by using specific field conditions. Low-lying wet polder landscape was also a dominant feature of the Dutch terrain, so Van Dam argued the Dutch should have more faith in their own strength. Also, the years 1914-1918 had proven that waging modern war took a national effort, the very thing Van Dam had always propagated. His message for the future was that

army and people, still strangers to each other, should really merge, that they should show mutual interest and appreciation, both of which were completely lacking. A strong development of national unity and strengthening of the populace were the only remedies for the future. The Dutch would not survive a next war if this did not happen, and in this respect Van Dam remained very suspicious about Germany, which he still considered to be the major potential enemy.

Van Dam's views enjoyed a measure of popularity among liberals, but they were a small group. The Dutch society was anything but unified, and the war had made social divisions even greater. Van Dam's 'solutions' seem more in place in 1900 than in 1920. In the political debate on the future of the army they carried no weight.

Engineer Scharroo published regularly on trench warfare and field fortifications. He can be considered as one of the army's eminent experts in these fields. But from 1915 Scharroo showed an additional interest. Like van Dam, in sports. As the chairman of the National Athletics Union and a member of the National Olympic Committee, he became a prominent member among Dutch sports officials. The mobilisation had convinced Scharroo that the physical condition of the male population left much to be desired. He started to organise national sports meetings and tried to popularise sports among the conscripts, using the infrastructure of the National Olympic Committee. Both the Committee and Scharroo used military and Social Darwinist terminology to justify a more prominent place for sport. For Scharroo it went even further. Like Van Dam he was convinced of the need to strengthen the population and the economy on a national basis in order to be prepared for future war. He thought the Dutch population weak, undisciplined, and lacking a sense of community. 'National strength' had to be built up. Sports and physical training of the young in general were important first steps.²⁴

Van Dam and Scharroo were not the only ones who believed that the Dutch were missing the true lesson of the war. In the years 1918-1923, when uncertainty about the future was rife, there were more initiatives related to the theme of national strength. A good example is the national conferences on 'strengthening the Dutch nation' held in 1919, 1920 and 1921. Officers, politicians, women's rights activists (but only the more conservative ones), and scientists discussed many aspects of the central question of how to strengthen the Dutch nation to be prepared for the

future. The topics for discussion ranged from a stronger army, economic war preparations, sports and education, to the role of the colonies and the press. At first, the conferences attracted considerable attention, perhaps because the former Commander-in-Chief was involved and the Royal Family showed interest and approval. But interest dwindled rapidly. A fourth conference was never planned.²⁵

National economic independence

The last theme frequently discussed during the post-war years was economic independence. During the mobilisation the Dutch realized they lacked the means to produce weapons for modern war themselves, and huge quantities of weapons and other war equipment would be necessary should the country be involved in war. Scharroo also addressed this subject. He thought that only an economically stronger Holland could fight a modern war in the future. He joined the editorial board of the new *Militair Technisch Tijdschrift* that propagated, among others, national industrial war preparations.

It was the Social Democrats who opposed this policy most vehemently. Their conclusion was that modern war was impossible to conduct for a country the size of Holland. The left-wing liberals also rejected the option that the Netherlands should strive for an industrial base that could sustain war production. They preferred a different kind of defence organisation instead. A police army in case of international problems, and a kind of military police to suppress internal unrest could be acceptable options in their eyes.

The officers, politicians and entrepreneurs who had been involved in military production during the mobilisation were the primary supporters for national economic war preparations. These groups had experienced the grave difficulties in this area first hand. Former Munitions Bureau director Van Roijen is a good example, as well as the director of the Artillery Works, the Netherlands' main weapons factory. Some entrepreneurs working in the chemical, metal, and airplane industries also saw the advantages. But the economic reality was not helpful to their cause and the capabilities of the state to force this matter were limited. What remained was a network of military officials and entrepreneurs and a small Bureau within the General Staff to organise some very limited economic war preparations. In fact, this bureau could do no more than make an

inventory of factories that could contribute to the military side of the war effort should a crisis occur.²⁶

Conclusion

The Dutch General Staff was well informed on most technical and tactical innovations that had taken place during the war. It tried to implement as many of them as possible, as long as they fitted the Dutch circumstances. Mass production of modern weapons formed a bottleneck and during the war the Netherlands had to deal with serious problems related to acquiring raw materials, detailed technological knowledge, and procurement of arms in substantial quantities. On the other hand, to protect the neutral territory in a convincing way and to be a credible potential ally, the Dutch military leadership had to do its utmost to give the impression of a certain level of military strength. This 'war experience' affected military thinking after the war.

From 1918 onwards the military leadership tried to secure a modern field army for the Netherlands. It did not really consider any alternative form of defence organisation. The Dutch professional officers were, for the most part, deeply influenced by the idea that only a continental-style army could protect the Netherlands sufficiently, could lend the Netherlands international credibility and meet the cultural needs of a military elite, deeply influenced by the German military example. Exercises and new regulations were certainly influenced by thorough analysis of recent experiences of the warring great powers, but the widening gap between modern war and financial and economic capabilities was not truly addressed. The General Staff preferred a modern field army, allowing it to manoeuvre in the southern Dutch provinces, which were deemed to be of great importance in an inevitable next German-French conflict.

The public debate centred on different aspects of national unity. Its main theme was that war making in the future was a national effort on economic, industrial, personal, and moral levels. The people on the left wing of the political spectrum concluded that modern war was beyond the scope of a small nation. They propagated other forms of defence. But this was no new phenomenon. The left had for decades refused to support the classic German-style defence organisation. In fact, the arguments brought forward by officers as the primary lessons of the war were also nothing new. It was, in many respects, a debate that had already been held around

1900. The fear that ideologies would split the country apart, that the future of the country depended on vague, Social Darwinist- inspired notions of national strength, and that the army could be the national vehicle for unity and strength, were indeed rather conservative notions that dated from the late nineteenth century. It is remarkable to see those notions return after 1918 when both the European future and internal cohesion were rife with uncertainties.

But the fundamental questions raised by Van Dam and Scharroo, amongst others, were too comprehensive for the General Staff to solve. The only aspect raised in the public debate that was tackled by the military leadership was that of the treatment of soldiers. That subject was directly related to the reliability of the army and its standing within society. In other fields, like physical education and economic war preparations, efforts of the Staff were minimal.

Although publications and conferences were abundant, it cannot be said that Dutch society as a whole was very interested in military ideas on 'national power.' The political discussion on defence centred on costs and conscription, not on fundamental changes. The public debate touched military decision making only marginally. The Netherlands lacked veterans as an influential pressure group and had not been physically damaged by the war. When a kind of national consensus emerged it was on pacifism, anti militarism, and disgust of the horrors of modern industrial war. Ideas on economic and industrial war preparation were not realized until the late 1930's and physical education of the youth did expand. But these developments were not directly related to future war planning or Social Darwinist notions of national survival. In that sense, Van Dam and Scharroo were voices of the past. The public as whole never showed any interest in the field army as something prestigious or of national importance. In this sense many critics were right: the army and the people were strangers to each other and the mobilisation of 1914-1918 had not changed that.

¹ Maartje Abbenhuis, *The Art of Staying Neutral* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006) and James John Porter *Dutch neutrality in two world wars* (Boston: Boston University Graduate School, 1980). Forthcoming: Herman Amersfoort

and Wim Klinkert (eds.) *Small states in the age of total war 1900-1940* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

² Rolf Schuurmsma, *Jaren van opgang. Nederland 1900-1930* (Amsterdam: Balans, 2000) and Cornelis B. Wels, *Aloofness and neutrality: studies on Dutch foreign relations and policy making institutions* (Utrecht: H&S, 1982).

³ Wim Klinkert, "Om den oorlogstoestand zooveel mogelijk na te bootsen...". De grote legermanoeuvres van 1916 in Noord-Brabant," in *Wankel evenwicht. Neutraal Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog*, ed. Martin Kraaijestein and Paul Schulten (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2007), 85-116.

⁴ This very important journal can be consulted on: <http://www.kvbk-cultureelerfgoed.nl/kvbk.html>.

⁵ National Archives at The Hague (NA), archive General Staff (2.13.70) (GS), nrs.: 1511, 1512, 1513.

⁶ The Dutch army exercises before 1914 are dealt with in Wim Klinkert, *Het vaderland verdedigd. Plannen en opvattingen over de verdediging van Nederland 1874-1914* (Den Haag: SMG, 1992).

⁷ NA, GS, nr. 26.

⁸ Belgian Army Museum Brussels, Moscow archives, attaché reports from the Netherlands, box 12, nr. 185-2-58 and Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Vincennes, archive military attaché The Hague, nr. 7 N 2960.

⁹ J.C.C. Tonnet, "Artillerie in den bewegings- en in den stellingoorlog," *Militaire Spectator* (1921) 15-19.

NA, archive Ministry of War (2.13.01) (MW), nrs. 4959, 4966, 4979, 4988 and 4999.

¹⁰ P.C. Dekker, "Stormscholen," *Militaire Spectator* (1920) 336-345.

Ger de Vries and Bas Martens, *Nederlandse vuurwapens* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1993).

NA, MW, nrs. 4983, 4988 and 4998.

NA, archive headquarters field army (2.13.16) (HF), nrs. 889 and 947.

¹¹ NA, MW, nr. 4979.

A great number of technical and tactical aspects of field fortifications and trench warfare were dealt with in a number of lectures published in the *Orgaan van de vereniging ter beoefening van de krijgswetenschap 1922-1924*.

¹² NA, MW, nr. 4963, 4992 and 4994; NA, HF, nr. 960 and NA, GS, nr. 26 and 494.

¹³ NA, HF, nr. 25; NA, GS, nr. 25 and NA, MW, nr. 4980 and 4981.

J.N. Bruyn, *Beknopt handboek bij de studie der tactiek volgens de ervaringen uit den wereldoorlog 1914-1918* (Eibergen: Mavors, 1922). The Dutch field service regulations can be compared to the British *Field Service Regulations II, Operations* (1920) and the French *Instruction sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unités* (1921).

¹⁴ Henri Beunders, *Weg met de vlootwet* (Bergen: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984), and Rein Bijkerk, "Nederlands defensiebeleid in de jaren '20," *Militaire Spectator* 164 (1995) 90-96.

¹⁵ Handelingen Tweede Kamer (proceedings of Parliament, Second Chamber) 18 February 1919, 15 and 16 December 1919, 10 December 1920 and 8 June 1921.

The proceedings are published on the Internet: www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl.

¹⁶ Handelingen Tweede Kamer 27 February, 14 November and 17 December 1919.

¹⁷ Pauline Onderwater, *Vaderland, vorstenhuis en weerbaarheid* (MA thesis: university of Amsterdam, 2007).

¹⁸ Hajo Brugmans, *Nederland in den oorlogstijd* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1920), Nicolas Japikse, *Die Stellung Hollands im Weltkrieg* (Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1921), J.C.C. Tonnet, *Overzicht over het verloop van den Wereldoorlog 1914-1918* (Breda: KMA, 1921), W.F.G. Sniijders, *De wereldoorlog op het Duitse westfront* (Amsterdam: Mij. voor goede en goedkoope lectuur, 1923) en C.J. Sniijders "Nederlands militaire positie gedurende den wereldoorlog," *Militaire Spectator* (1923) 536-560.

¹⁹ Piet Blaas, "Nederlandse historici en de Eerste Wereldoorlog," in *Wankel evenwicht. Neutraal Nederland en de Eerste Wereldoorlog*, ed. Martin Kraaijestein and Paul Schulten (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2007), 14-31.

²⁰ J.J.G. van Voorst tot Voorst, *Over Roermond! Een strategische studie* (Den Haag: Swart, 1923).

²¹ Handelingen Eerste Kamer 10 March 1921.

²² Herman Amersfoort, *Een harmonisch leger voor Nederland* (Breda: NLDA, 2007).

²³ Wim Klinkert, "The salutary yoke of discipline," in *Images of the Nation. Different meanings of Dutchness 1870-1940* ed. A. Galema and B. Henkes (Amsterdam, Atlanta: Rodopi, 1993) 17-38; Ben Schoenmaker, *Burgerzin en soldatengeest* (Den Haag: Boom, 2009) 292 and 338-341; Lenny Hazelbag, "De invloed van de Harskamp-rellen op de positie van de officier", in *De Grote Oorlog. Kronieks 1914-1918* vol. 7, ed. Hans Andriessen and Martin Ros (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2005), 227-265; Petra Groen and Wim Klinkert, *Studeren in uniform* (Den Haag: SDU, 2003) 213-216; Gijsbertus van Everdingen, *De opleiding der officieren* (Amsterdam: Holkema & Warendorf, 1916); Gerardus Fabius, *De verhouding tusschen volk en weermacht* (Amsterdam: Holkema & Warendorf, 1916); Ron Blom and Teunis Stelling, *Niet voor God en niet voor het vaderland* (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2004) 862-863 and J.B. de Jongh, *De meerdere* (Den Haag: Van Cleef, 1919).

²⁴ Willem van Dam van Isselt, "De betekenis en de verdere ontwikkeling van onze weermacht na demobilisatie" *Onze Eeuw* 1918 and *Orgaan ter beoefening van de krijgswetenschap* 29 April 1919; Pieter Scharroo, *De betekenis van de lichamelijke opvoeding voor de economische weerkracht*, (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1919). On the relationship between sports, the World War and the defence organisation in Great Britain see E. Riedi and T. Mason, "Leather and the fighting spirit: sport in the British army in World War I," *Canadian Journal of History* 41 (2006) 485-516.

²⁵ The conferences, each year in September, were covered extensively in the daily press.

²⁶ Louis Anne van Roijen, "De mobilisatie en de economische hulpbronnen van het land," *Orgaan van de vereeniging ter beoefening van de krijgswetenschap* (1920-1921)

214-242; Wim Klinkert, “‘Het is een ingenieursoorlog’,” in *De Grote Oorlog. Kroniek 1914-1918* vol. 14, ed. Hans Andriessen and Perry Pierik (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2007), 250-290.

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