The Netherlands

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INTEGRATED REPORT ON MEDIA CONTENT

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THE NETHERLANDS
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1. Introduction

– *The EURISLAM project*

This report is an outcome of the larger EURISLAM research project, executed by six national research teams and funded by the European Commission. The project is focussed on the following general **research question:**

> How have different traditions of national identity, citizenship, and church-state relations affected European immigration countries' incorporation of Islam, and what are the consequences of these approaches for patterns of cultural distance and interaction between Muslim immigrants and their descendants, and the receiving society?

We have elaborated our core research question into more specific questions and research methods. In this report we will deal with the first sub question, namely:

> What are the differences between European immigration countries in how they deal with cultural and religious differences of immigrant groups in general, and of Muslims in particular?

This again has two aspects. Firstly, the more formal aspect of legislation and jurisprudence, which we have addressed by way of gathering a systematic set of cross-national indicators using secondary sources in work package 1 of this study (Koopmans, forthcoming). And secondly, and now we come to the subject of this report on work package 2, cultural relations are also affected importantly by how conceptions of national identity, citizenship, church-state relations, and the position of Islam in relation to these, are framed and contested in the public sphere. These more informal understandings of national and European identity and ways of dealing with cultural differences will be investigated by way of a content analysis of debates in the mass media on Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants. In the future we will go ahead (work package 3) with a survey on the attitudes of Muslims and non-Muslims on relevant issues.

– *Location in time and place*

Content analysis of debates in the mass media on Islam and the integration of Muslims has been undertaken in the six European countries that participate in this project: the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France and Switzerland. In this country report we will show the results of the analysis on the debate in the newspapers in the Netherlands. We have chosen to analyse the debate in the period 1999 to 2008.

– *Country-specific aspects*

The Netherlands has a few specific characteristics that are relevant to this analysis. Firstly religious rights are laid down in national law long before the arrival of Muslims. Maussen describes four principles that the Netherlands traditionally applies in the spirit of these laws[4]:

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[4] For more information Maussen (2006: 17) 'Ruimte voor Islam'.

- Equal treatment, not only of citizens but also of religious and non religious organisations. This means that a faith based associations such as '*Leger des Heils*' (the Salvation Army) may not be rated lower when it sets up social work than a non-religious association. In line with this principle, already in 1977, a decree on meat inspection made Islamic slaughter possible, and the Islamic burial was made possible by a change in the law on burials in 1991.
- Religious freedom is not only a negative freedom (in the sense that it shouldn't be obstructed) but also positive: the government can sometimes actively help to provide for religious needs; this is called the social component of basic rights. Of course public space rules apply like safety of the building, and nuisance. Yet, since the constitutional revision of 1983 there is no direct financing of religion any longer.
- The public sphere is pluriform and there is no single state institution, so it's considered better to have several types of schools than one state-school. The Dutch school system makes it possible that public, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Hindu schools apply for the same subsides, as long as they follow the national curriculum and maintain the required quality standards. Also within the national broadcasting system a Muslim and a Hindu broadcasting organisation get subsidies, just like the many other broadcasting organisations.
- There is an emphasis on freedom of choice. This means that there has to be a choice, both on the religious terrain - protection against religious coercion - and on the social terrain. So if there is social work for youngsters, there have to be at least two institutions to give people a choice.

The history of church-state relations in the Netherlands has been strongly marked by pillarisation, though this is not the active system any longer (Maussen 2006).

Secondly the Netherlands had considerable immigration since the end of the nineteen sixties, and include from Muslim countries like Indonesia, Turkey and Morocco. So immigration is nothing new, contrary to for instance South and East European countries. There is already a considerable Dutch born second generation. According to data of the Central Bureau of Statistics there were 944,000 Muslims in the Netherlands in 2004 (5.8 % of the population), of which 582,000 of the first generation (62%) and 362,000 second generation (38%). The main countries of origin are: Turkey 238,000, Morocco 296,000, Afghanistan 36,000, Iraq 42,000, Surinam 32,000, Iran 28,000, Somalia 25,000 and 'other non Western countries' 116,000 and other Western countries 43,000.

Because this is not obvious to all, we have to be aware that only 67.3% of the Turks answer Muslim on the question to which religious denomination do you feel related, and 77.9% of Moroccans as a survey of the Statistical Bureau of the city of Amsterdam shows (O+S/Amsterdamse Burger Monitor 2006). This means that we have to be careful in assuming that all Turks and Moroccans are Muslims, a generalization that we often find in newspapers.

A third characteristic of the Netherlands relevant here, is that at first sight and without research information in this, there has been a relatively overheated debate on Muslims. This was particularly the case since the events of 9/11 (2001), the rise of the politician Pim Fortuyn since 2001, the murder on Fortuyn in 2002, and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. Pim Fortuyn is supposed to have put Islam as something questionable 'on the agenda', and politicians on the right like Rita Verdonk, Ayaan Hirshi Ali and Geert Wilders went on picturing Islam as dangerous. Besides terrorism and radicalisation, also issues like gay rights, women's rights, honour killings and troublesome Moroccan youngsters were part of this discussion. Right wing parties managed to get a considerable number of votes using anti immigrant views, once during the period of our study (2002 LPF) and after the period of our

study (2010 Wilders). Of course reactions and counter arguments were then put forward by both Muslims and non-Muslims. All this led to an ongoing stream of issues related to Islam in the newspapers in the period of this study and we will surely notice its effect when analyzing the claims on Islam.

  – *Criteria of selection of newspapers*

For the data analysis in the Netherlands we have selected five newspapers The size of the papers mattered (if possible the largest), the availability in the database of Nexus Lexus, and we looked for variation the political spectrum and reach, there fore the following five were selected: 'De Volkskrant', 'Trouw', 'NRC Handelsblad', 'De Telegraaf' and 'Het Parool'. 'De Volkskrant' and 'Trouw' are considered more to the left, actually Trouw is most to the left, even though 'Trouw' is the only newspaper that has Christian religious basis. 'NRC Handelsblad' is supposed to be read by the elite, while 'Telegraaf' and 'Parool' are read by lower educated people. 'Parool' is a national paper, but focussed on Amsterdam. The large 'Algemeen Dagblad' was considered but not available in Lexus Nexus for all years necessary. Free newspapers like 'Metro' also have a considerable readership, but are not available in Lexus Nexus. Table 1 shows the circulation strength of the selected papers.

Table 1: Selected Newspapers

Newspaper	Circulation strength (first quarter of 2008)
De Telegraaf	627.057
De Volkskrant	236.364
NRC Handelsblad	204.572
Trouw	93.524
Het Parool	64.251

  – *Selection of articles and claims for each newspaper* (total articles, article retrieved, articles coded, claims retrieved)

The number of articles that was selected per newspaper was 750. Articles were selected when one of the following keywords were found in the text: (Islam!) or (Moslim!) or (Moeslim!) or (Moskee) or (Imam) or (Koran) or (Qoer'ān) or (Qoer'an) or (Hoofddoek) or (Boerka) or (Burka) or (Burqa) or (Minaret).

Secondly articles with claims were used and articles without claims were not taken into account. To recognize a claim we used the following definition stated in the Eurislam Codebook 17.03.2010: "An instance of claim-making (shorthand: a claim) is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc. etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGO's, individuals, anonymous actors, etc. etc.). Note that decisions and policy implementation are defined as special forms of claim-making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim." (Eurislam Codebook 2010, p 2).

"To be included, a claim must either be made in one of our countries of coding or be addressed at an actor or institution in one of our countries of coding. Claims are also included

if they are made by or addressed at a supranational actor of which the country of coding is a member (e.g., the UN, the EU, the International Organisation for Migration), on the condition that the claim is substantively (also) relevant for the country of coding (e.g., a statement by the UNHCR criticising the Belgian government is not included in the British or German data, but a EU decision on common asylum rules is included because it affects all member states, including Germany and the UK). Claims reported in the issue consulted and which did not occur outside the two weeks before the date of appearance of that issue are also coded (but only if they have not already been coded; if they have already coded, additional information can be added to the first claim coded). We code all claims, unless we know that they occurred more than two weeks ago. The date of the claim is also coded, when the date is not mentioned (e.g. recently), the day prior to the newspaper issue is taken as the default." (Eurislam Codebook 2010, p 6).

Table 2 shows the number of articles per year per newspaper, the number articles retrieved and coded and the number of claims retrieved. In the final dataset 750 articles ended up in the sample, and a total of 890 claims were retrieved. Three coders, namely Sjef van Stiphout, Josine Jansen en Maarten Koomen managed to code the enormous number of articles. We report on the inter-coder reliability in a separate paper. Interestingly the total number of claims is highest in Volkskrant (196) and lowest for the religious Trouw (170).

Table 2 Selected articles and claims by newspaper:

Telegraaf

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	245	24	3	5
2000	326	32	3	6
2001	465	45	13	18
2002	675	67	8	11
2003	684	68	9	11
2004	1187	118	35	46
2005	1136	113	30	36
2006	957	95	16	19
2007	929	92	17	17
2008	967	96	15	18
Total	7571	750	149	187

Volkskrant

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1067	41	2	5
2000	1068	41	6	9
2001	1711	66	18	25
2002	1807	69	9	11
2003	1663	64	11	16
2004	2489	96	21	27
2005	2402	91	18	22
2006	2809	108	17	20
2007	2343	90	15	19
2008	2187	84	13	15
Total	19546	750	130	169

NRC

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1160	42	0	0
2000	1214	44	5	9
2001	1951	70	8	12
2002	1783	64	5	9
2003	2060	74	13	14
2004	2739	98	30	49
2005	2567	91	16	21
2006	2728	98	21	29
2007	2498	90	18	21
2008	2213	79	12	18
Total	20913	750	128	183

Trouw

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1253	43	5	7
2000	1264	44	10	10
2001	1984	69	20	30
2002	2051	71	17	24
2003	1935	67	16	20
2004	2781	96	20	28
2005	2640	91	16	18
2006	2840	98	12	13
2007	2680	93	6	8
2008	2267	78	9	12
Total	21695	750	131	170

Parool

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	634	38	4	6
2000	691	41	7	8
2001	1280	76	16	20
2002	1252	75	14	17
2003	1196	71	13	17
2004	1726	103	28	37
2005	1707	102	25	28
2006	1500	89	14	16
2007	1324	79	14	15
2008	1278	76	14	17
Total	12588	750	149	181

In figure 1 we show the total number of claims per year graphically. As becomes immediately visible, there are two peaks, on in 2001 (105 claims), that seems related to the events of 11 September and one in 2004 (187) - 2005 (125) that seems related to Theo van Gogh's murder.

Figure 1: Number of claims by year.

To see in more detail whether the claims in 2001 were related to the events on 11 September, we show the number of claims per month in 2001 in figure 2. There is indeed a sharp increase of claims in September and October, though the number drops back already in November.

Figure 2: Number of claims per month in 2001.

As the Eurislam Codebook mentions, generally one can distinguish the following elements, inspired by Franzosi's idea to use the structure of linguistic grammar to code contentious events. So we have broken down the structure of the summary codes into five claim elements, for each of which a number of summary variables has been constructed:

1. Claimants: the actor or actors making the claim (WHO makes the claim?)
2. Form of the claim (HOW, by which action is the claim inserted in the public sphere?)
3. The addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?)
4. The substantive content of the claim (WHAT action is to be undertaken?)
5. The object of the claim (TO WHOM is this action directed?)

6. Frame: The justification for the claim (WHY should this action be undertaken?)

In the following chapters we will distinguish these elements subsequently.

2. Actors

This chapter deals with the main claimants: the actor(s) making the claim. Who are these actors? We have categorized the actors into 21 categories + 1 category unknown. As table 3 shows, there are only a few categories of actors that make claims on Muslim issues. The most frequently observed actor (21%) were governments. The second largest groups are professional organizations and groups (16%) and Muslim organizations and groups (also 16%). Furthermore, legislative actors are responsible for 11% of the claims, police and security agencies 6%, political parties 6%, media and journalists 6%. The remaining claimants are involved with 4% or less of the total number of claims.

Table 3: Claims by actor (percentages)

State Actors (total 43%):	
Governments	21
Legislatives	11
Judiciary	3
Police and security agencies	6
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0
Other state executive agencies	1
Political parties	**6**
Civil society actors (total 35%):	
Unions	1
Workers and employees	0
Employers organisations and firms	1
Churches	1
Christians	0
Media and journalists	6
Professional organisations and groups	16
Muslim organisations and groups	16
Other minority organisations and groups	2
Antiracist organisations and groups	0
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	1
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	1
Unknown actors	**4**
Total	100%
N	890

Who are the Muslim actors? Concerning the Muslim actors, the next question is: how often are the organisations of the Muslim actors mentioned in the newspapers? Firstly only in 31% there was a Muslim actor. In total 69% no Muslim actor at all was mentioned. As table 4 shows, in 16% of the cases (so half of the Muslim actors) the name of the organisation he stands for is mentioned and in 15% of the cases a Muslim actor without an organisational name is mentioned.

Table 4: Claims by Muslim and non Muslim actors.

	%
Muslim actor, organization name mentioned	16
Muslim actor, no organization name mentioned	15
no Muslim actor	69
Total	100%
N	890

Out of the total of 890 claims, 31% of the actors are Muslim actors, while 43% of the actors are classified as migration/minority actors. There are not many cases in which we have clues about the nationality of these minority/migrant actors, but as table 5 shows, most of the know cases are nationals of one of the European countries (12%). After European background the next largest category is North Africa (mainly Morocco) with 7% and the Middle East (6%). Note that foreign policy issues are not part of this analysis, so conflicts in the Middle East itself are not considered. Only claims on issues in one of the countries of this study are considered, but of course actors from the Middle East, may claim.

Table 5:   Nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

	% overall	% when not specified is not included
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	12	
Country of residence nationality	2	
Europe: EU	12	14
Other Europe	0	0
Asia: middle east	6	6
Asia: south and east	1	2
Africa: North	7	8
Africa: other	2	2
Caribbean	0	1
North America	0	0
Not applicable: no minority or migrant actor	57	66
Total	100%	100%
N	890	759

What kind of groups do these minority actors represent? As table 6 shows, in 66% of the cases this question doesn't apply, because the actor is no minority actor or is not part of a group. In nearly two third of the other cases the actor represents a religious group, while in one third of the cases the actor represents a status group. When someone represents a status groups, the following types of people are represented: for instance 'foreigners', 'minorities', '(im)migrants', 'allochthonen' (a word often used for non Dutch'), 'asylum seekers', 'refugees' and similar types of people. Since we were searching for claims that have to do with Muslims and Islam, it is not very surprising that the actors from minority background, in this case often represent religious interests.

Table 6: Identity of the minority actor.

	%
Status groups	10
Racial groups	0
Religious groups	20
National and ethnic groups:	1
Unclassifiable actor	4
Not applicable	66
Total	100
N	890

In figure 3 we have looked at the number of claims that Muslim and non- Muslim actors made per year. The two peak are again visible, in 2001 (the 11 September peak) and in 2004 (the Theo van Gogh Peak). It the figure shows, Muslim actors are more responsible for the peaks, particularly the 2004 peak.

Figure 3 Claims per year by Muslim and non-Muslim actors

In the next table we go back to <u>all</u> actors, so including governments, legislative bodies, etceteras. The following questions deals with the scope of operation of the actors. As we saw earlier that largest categories of actors were government, professional organisations and groups and Muslim organisations and groups. As table 7 shows, all these types of actors may have a local, national or even supra- or transnational scope. As the bottom row of table 5 shows, most of the 890 claims are national (namely 374 claims), while 145 are local and 135 supra- or transnational (and 236 unclear). When we consider all national claims, the largest percentages are from governments (25%), or legislative bodies (21%), with less of them from Muslim groups (13%) and political parties (10%). When we consider the local claims, even more claims come from governments (38%) and professional organisations (16%), while less come from legislative bodies (8%) and political parties (6%). Compared to national claims, the supranational claims tend to come more often from Muslim organisations (19%) and from political parties and security agencies (13%). Governments make a considerable part of the claims, also here (28%).

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Table 7: Scope of the actor

	Supra or trans-national	National	Local	Unclear	Total
State Actors:					
Governments	28	25	38	1	21
Legislatives	7	21	8	0	11
Judiciary	4	3	1	2	3
Police and security agencies	13	6	7	1	6
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	1	0	0	0
Other state executive agencies	3	1	3	0	1
Political parties	3	10	6	2	6
Civil Society Actors:					
Unions	1	1	1	0	1
Workers and employees	0	0	0	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	2	1	1	0	1
Churches	1	1	2	0	1
Christians	0	1	0	0	0
Media and journalists	4	4	0	14	6
Professional organisations and groups	5	9	16	33	16
Muslim organisations and groups	19	13	12	22	16
Other minority organisations and groups	5	1	1	1	2
Antiracist organisations and groups	1	1	0	0	0
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	0	1	1	0	1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	2	1	0	0	1
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	1	0	4	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	0	4	1	1
Unknown actors	0	0	0	17	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	135	374	145	236	890

3. Forms of the claim

In chapter 2 we dealt with the question WHO is making the claim. As we explained in the introduction the second part of our analysis includes the form of the action. The form of the claim deals with the question HOW (by which action) is the claim inserted in the public sphere?
Table 8 shows the forms of the claims found in our study in the Netherland. As becomes clear from this table 75% of the claims were verbal statements, while only 8% took the form of conventional actions, 6% repressive measures, and only 4% were violent protests or political decisions and 1% on confrontational protest. In the second column, state interventions are excluded, and the percentage of verbal statements is even higher (83%).

Table 8: Form of the encountered claims (in percentages).

	Overall	State intervention excluded
State intervention:		
Repressive measures	6	
Political decisions	4	
Verbal statements	**75**	**83**
Conventional actions	**8**	**9**
Protest actions:		
Demonstrative protests	2	2
Confrontational protests	1	1
Violent protests	4	5
Total	100%	100%
N	890	804

The form of the claim differs per actor, as table 9 shows. The claims of Muslim organisation are 78% verbal claims, for 10% conventional actions, for 3% demonstrative protests and for 7% violent protest.

Table 9: Forms of action by type of actor (in percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
State intervention:				
Repressive measures	13	0	0	1
Political decisions	9	0	0	0
Verbal statements	**67**	**95**	**78**	**81**
Conventional actions	**11**	**4**	**10**	**5**
Protest actions:				
Demonstrative protests	0	2	3	3
Confrontational protests	0	0	1	3
Violent protests	0	0	7	8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N				

4. Addressees and criticized actors

After looking at the actor in chapter 2 (WHO), the form of the claim in chapter 3 (HOW), we will move on to the addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?) The claim can be neutrally simply addressed to someone – the addressee - but may also be criticizing or supporting an actor – whom we'll call the criticized actor or the supported actor. Note that it may happen that the addressee and the criticized or supported actor are the same persons, but this doesn't have to be the case.

Table 10: Number of claims by addressee (percentages)

	Addressee	'No addressee' not included
State actors:		
Governments	14	38
Legislatives	3	8
Judiciary	0	1
Police and security agencies	1	2
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	1
Other state executive agencies	0	1
Political parties	2	4
Civil society actors		
Workers and employees	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	1	2
Churches	0	1
Christians	0	0
Media and journalists	1	2
Professional organisations and groups	1	2
Muslim organisations and groups	10	23
Other minority organisations and groups	1	2
'pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups'	0	2
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	1	2
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	1	2
No adressee	64	-
Total	100%	100%
N	890	331

As table 10, 11 and 12 show, in most cases there is <u>no</u> addressee (64%), <u>no</u> criticised actor (56%) and <u>no</u> supported actor (73%). So actually the criticised actor is more common than any of the other addressees. Interesting is that Muslim organisations occur most as supported actor and criticised actor and less in a neutral role of addressee, while governments occur most in the role of addressee, less in the role of criticised actor and nearly never in the role of supported actor.

We mention a few striking facts on which actor addresses which addressee. As table 10 shows, the largest number of claims towards governments come from political parties as actors, and secondly from state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants, and general solidarity and human rights or welfare organisations.

The largest number of claims towards Muslim organisations come from racist and extreme right organisations and groups or judiciary actors, while less claims come from governments, police and security agencies, churches and pro minority rights and welfare organisations and

groups. These racist and extreme right groups focus mainly on Muslim organisations as actors, and to a lesser extent at governments, but to nobody else.

If we look at Christians and Churches as actors, Churches tend to address governments firstly, then Christians, Muslim organisations and other minority organisations, but Christians as such are not very often actors.

In the field of labour, unions tend to address governments, police and security agencies and employees organisations, while employers organisations tend to address only governments.

Table 11: Number of claims by criticised actor

	Criticised actor	'No criticised actor' not included
State actors:		
Governments	12	26
Legislatives	3	7
Judiciary	1	2
Police and security agencies	1	2
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	0
Other state executive agencies	0	1
Political parties	3	7
Civil society actors:		
Workers and employees	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	0	1
Churches	0	1
Christians	0	3
Media and journalists	1	3
Professional organisations and groups	2	2
Muslim organisations and groups	15	31
Other minority organisations and groups	0	1
'pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups'	0	1
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	2	1
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	0
No addressee	56	-
Total	100%	100%
N	890	401

As table 11 shows, governments and Muslim groups are most often criticized. Striking is that it are state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants stand out as highest followed by legislative actors (2), racist and extreme right organisations and groups (3), and antiracist organisations and groups (4) and political parties (5).

As table 12 shows, Muslim organisations are most often the supported object of the claims by all kinds of actors. The five largest percentages are support from anti-racist organisations and groups (1) employers organisations (2), churches and unions (3/4) and general solidarity and human rights organisations (5).

Table 12: Number of claims by addressee

	Supported actor	'No supported actor' not included
State actors:		
Governments	2	6
Legislatives	0	1
Judiciary	0	0
Police and security agencies	0	1
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	0
Other state executive agencies	0	1
Political parties	1	2
Civil society actors		
Workers and employees	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	0	0
Churches	0	0
Christians	0	1
Media and journalists	0	1
Professional organisations and groups	1	1
Muslim organisations and groups	20	69
Other minority organisations and groups	2	8
'pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups'	0	0
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	0
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	1	2
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	0
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	2
No adressee	73	-
Total	100%	100%
N	890	245

5. Issues and attitude towards Muslims

After looking at the actor(s) (WHO), the form of the claim (HOW), the addressee (AT WHOM is the claim directed?), we will now look at the substantive content of the claim: WHAT action is to be undertaken?

As table 13 shows, we have categorized the issues in 6 main categories, and these are again subdivided into fields.

Table 2: Types of issues encountered (in percentages).

	%
1. Immigration, asylum, and aliens' politics (4%)	
1. Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	4
2. Minority integration politics (77%)	
Minority integration general	8
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	2
Minority rights and participation social rights	4
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	3
Minority rights and participation religious rights	20
Minority rights and participation other rights	0
Discrimination and unequal treatment	2
Minority social problems	29
Interethnic, inter-, and intra-organizational relations	9
3. Anti-racism, islamophobia (11%)	
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	9
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme rights in society	2
4. Islamophobic claims (4%)	
Islamophobic claims	4
5. Actor claims Muslims (3%)	
Homeland politics	1
Transnational politics	2
6. Other (0%)	
Other	0
Total	100
N	890

As table 13 shows, most of the claims deal with issues that we have classified in category 2 'minority integration politics' (77%), while 11% fall in category 3 'anti-racism/islamophobia' category 4% in the category 'islamophobic claims', 4% with issues of 'immigration, asylum and aliens politics', 3% that we called 'actor claims Muslims' which includes for instance homeland politics and transnational politics.

The difference between category 3 and 4 needs some explanation; in category 3 (anti-racism/islamophobia) include issues like for instance racism/islamophobia and extreme right language in politics, police racism/islamophobia and violence against minorities, and stigmatization of minorities/Muslims/Islam in the public debate, while in category 4 (islamophobic claims) one finds: general islamophobic claims, claims against 'islamification' and other anti-Islam/Muslim claims.

Since most claims are on issues that we have labelled 'minority integration politics', more detail is possible on the sub field of these claims. Most of the claims within this category concern issues that deal with 'minority social problems' (29%), while a smaller section (20%)

concerns 'minority rights and participation: religious rights'. Smaller issue categories include: 'Interethnic, inter-, and intra-organizational relations' (9%) and 'minority integration general' (8%), while 'minority rights and participation social rights' cover only 4% and 'minority rights and participation cultural rights' covers 3% of the issues.

In figure 4 we have show how the issues fluctuate per year. The two peak that we saw earlier (2001, 11 September peak and 2004 Theo van Gogh peak) seem not to have a lot of consequences for the division of the types of issues. Minority integration policy issues are highest in 1999 and diminish towards 2003, they increase around the Theo van Gogh Peak, but again in 2006 (election year).
Clearly visible is that immigration/asylum/alien policy becomes less and less relevant after 2006, bu that anti-racism and islamophobia is on the rise (highest in 2008 – probably due to Wilders attracting attention in newspapers).

Figure 4: Number of claims by issue and year

Because Islamic religious rights seem more relevant in this context, we show in table 14 the types of claims we encountered dealing with religious rights. Out of 890 claims, 20% deals with Islamic religious rights (174 claims), and most of them concern religious rights and public institutions, like for instance wearing head scarves in public offices. Of these 174 claims only 5% percent dealt with rights and the religious practice itself, and 78% with religious rights and public institutions.

Table 3: Types of Islamic religious rights (RELRIGHT, one and main two-digit codes, not applicable not included).

	%
Rights and religious practice	5
Religious rights and public institutions	78
Other	18
Total	100
N	174

To what extent are claims positive or negative on the positions of Muslim's rights? To find out, we coded the claims either negative (-1) i.e. anti-Muslims/Islam/xenophobic/extreme right, neutral/ambivalent (0), or positive (+1) pro-Muslims/Islam/antiracist/anti-extreme right. This variable should provide a general indicator of the position of claims with regard to the rights, position and evaluation of migrants and minorities (and, conversely, of those who mobilise against them). All claims whose realisation implies deterioration of the rights or position of Muslims have received code -1, no matter if the reduction is minor or large. The -1 also went to claims which express a negative attitude with regard to Muslims (both verbal and physical) or a positive attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. All claims whose realisation implies an improvement in the rights and position of Muslims (minor or major) have received code +1. This code also went to claims expressing (verbally or physically) a positive attitude with regard to Muslims, or a negative attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. Neutral or ambivalent claims, which are not necessarily related to any deterioration or improvement in Muslims' position or rights and do not express a clear attitude with regard to migrants and minorities or their opponents, received code 0. To code a claim as +1 'pro-Muslim' it did not matter whether this referred to a demand that is shared by all Muslims. E.g., a claim granting Muslims the right to settle family disputes in sharia courts or to allow the burqa was coded as +1 even if many Muslims might disagree. Repressive measures without verbal claims were also categorised with this variable: -1 went to repressive measures directed against Muslims, +1 to repressive measures directed against xenophobic and extreme right individuals and groups.

Firstly figure 5 shows how the mean score developed over the years. As becomes clear the mean score was 1,20 at the start of the research period, and went down considerably after the events of 11 September. After this it remained for many years about 0.30/0.40. This means that more negative viewpoints were found in the articles beside positive ones, but that the mean never sank below zero. So the positive attitudes outnumbered the negative ones.

Figure 5: Development per year in the mean score expressing positive or negative attitude in the claim towards the position and rights of Muslims (means).

In table 15 we present the total mean score and the standard deviation per actor. It becomes visible whether a certain actor mainly put forward claims with a positive intention towards the rights of Muslims (+ scores), or mainly claims with negative intentions (- scores). Note that 807 of 890 claims could be coded. As the table shows, the actors that mainly put forward claims with positive intentions towards the rights of Muslims are more than those who put forwards claims with negative intentions. The positive ones include: governments, judiciary bodies, 'other state executive agencies', unions, workers and employees, employers organisations and firms, churches, media and journalists, professional organisations and group and – not very surprising - Muslim organisations and groups, other minority organisations and groups, anti-racist organisations and groups, pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups, general solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations and other civil society organisations and groups. The highest positive score for workers and employees is only about one claim.

The actors that mainly put forward negative claims are: legislative bodies, state executive agencies specially dealing with migrants, political parties (the score is not extreme), and 37 unknown actors. It is not suprising that racist and extreme right organisations and groups have the highest negative score: all there claims were negative so the mean was -1,00. It strikes us that governments in general tend to put forward positive claims and 'other state executive agencies' also, while 'state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants' put forward negative claims, but we have to remark that the last actor is only responsible for two claims, while governments are responsible for 167 claims.

Actors that were neutral or nearly neutral were: police and security agencies and Christians (the last one with only two claims).

Table 4: Mean score expressing positive or negative attitude in the claim towards the position and rights of Muslims per actor.

	Mean	N	Standard Deviation.
State actors:			
Governments	0,67	176	2,052
Legislatives	-.32	94	0,765
Judiciary	1,0	22	2,655
Police and security agencies	0,18	44	1,529
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	-,50	2	0,707
Other state executive agencies	1,36	11	2,580
Political parties	-0.09	56	0,837
Civil society actors:			
Unions	0,40	5	0,894
Workers and employees	1,00	1	
Employers organisations and firms	0,75	8	0,463
Churches	0,38	8	0,744
Christians	0,00	2	0,000
Media and journalists	0,54	52	1,863
Professional organisations and groups	0,68	128	2,008
Muslim organisations and groups	1,04	140	1,240
Other minority organisations and groups	1,08	12	2,610
Antiracist organisations and groups	0,50	4	1,000
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	0,40	5	0,548
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	0,40	5	0,548
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1.00	11	0,000
Other civil society organisations and groups	1,0	10	2,718
Unknown actors	0,13	38	1,758
Total	0,51	834	1,738

Table 16 shows the position taken in the claims per type of issue under discussion. We find the most positive opinions expressed on homeland politics (1,57) and discrimination and equal treatment (1,59), while islamophobic claims are obviously the most negative (-0,67). Claims on 'Racism/islamophobia' are most of the time positive, so defending the rights of Muslims both in institutional and non institutional contexts.

Table 16: Position of claims by issue

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	0,37	27	1,864
Minority integration politics:			
Minority integration general	0,75	68	2,181
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	0,31	13	0,751
Minority rights and participation social rights	0,87	39	1,436
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	0,46	24	0,658
Minority rights and participation religious rights	0,38	172	1,587
Minority rights and participation other rights	0,25	4	0,500
Discrimination and unequal treatment	1,59	17	2,852
Minority social problems	0,33	230	1,983
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganisational relations	0,72	75	1,521
Antiracism/islamophobia:			
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	0,95	77	1,450
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	0,90	21	0,301
Islamophobic claims	-0,67	39	0,737
Actor claims Muslims:			
Homeland politics	1,57	7	3,359
Transnational politics	0,89	19	0,315
Other	1,00	2	0,000
Total	0,51	834	1,738

In table 13 we have already shown how many claims we found on different issues, with a sub-classification into fields. Table 17 shows which actors formulate claims on these issues, now showing the percentage of claims on certain issues per type of actor. The most often encountered issue, minority integration policy, the state actors are the most active (85% of their claims), while Muslim organisation are relatively less active on this issue, though it still involves 67,4 % of their claims.

Table 17: Issues of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	4,5	7,1	2,1	3,9
Minority integration politics	85,2	73,2	67,4	71,4
Antiracism/islamophobia	7,1	14,3	20,1	11,9
Islamophobic claims	1,8	5,4	0,7	9,0
Actor claims Muslims	1,1	0	9.0	3,9
Other	0,3	0	0,7	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	379	56	144	311

Muslim organisation are relatively more active on antiracism/islamophobia claims, so fighting racism and islamophobia, since this is true for 20% of their claims. The percentage is much lower for state actors (7%).
Table 13 also shows that political parties and other civil society actors in the Netherlands are the ones who put forwards islamophobic claims (the most obvious one is 'racist and extreme right organisations and groups', (73% of their 11 claims are islamophobic), second

'employers organisations and firms' (13% of their 8 claims are islamophobic) and 'unknown actors', with 41% of the 39 claims islamophobic).

6. Object of the claim

After looking at the actor(s) (WHO), the form of the claim (HOW), the addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?), the content of the claim (WHAT) action, we now turn to the object of the claim (TO WHOM is this action directed?)

In our selection of claims in the Dutch newspapers, we selected claims on Muslims or Islam, but this doesn't mean that the claim is always directed towards Muslims or Islam. In 31% of the cases Muslims were not the object of the claim, while in 79% of the cases they were. In table 18 we show the the 631 cases where Muslims were an object. More than half of the claimants address either Muslims in general (46%), or Islam in general (10%), without distinction, so together 56%. In 18% of the cases a minority or a small particular group was addressed, and in 3% of the cases a minority current in Islam. This means that more than half of the cases actors in newspaper articles do not differentiate between for instance radical Muslims and mainstream Muslims: they are lumped together.

Table 5: Objects of the claims (percentages).

	%
Muslims as objects (85%)	
All Muslims in general	46
Majority most	3
Minority a small/particular group	18
Individual	16
Unclassifiable Muslims	2
Islam as religion (15%)	
Islam in general	10
Islam mainstream	0
minority currents within Islam	3
specific religious stream / movement within Islam	1
unclassifiable Islam	1
Total	100%
N	631

In table 19 we have looked at the nationality of the objects of the claim. In nearly half of the cases there was no specification of the nationality of the object of the claim. In the cases where a nationality was specified the object was mostly from Europe (35+23=58%), and in 25% of the cases from North Africa (Moroccans), and in 22% of the cases from the Middle East.

Table 19: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims (percentages)

	Overall	'Not specified/ applicable' excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	43	
Europe: EU	9	35
Europe: other	6	23
Asia: middle east	3	22
Asia: south and east	1	5
Africa: North	7	25
Africa: other	0	1
Not applicable: no object	30	
Total	100%	100%
N	890	237

Table 20 gets back to the issue of taking either the people (Muslims) or the religion (Islam) as an object. Political parties take more often Islam as their object (17%) than the other actors, whereas Muslim organisations and groups tend to focus more on Muslims as their object (94%) than the other actors.

Table 20: Objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Muslims as actors				
All Muslims in general	35	42	70	53
Majority/most Muslims	2	0	4	6
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	21	16	11	16
Individual Muslims	23	8	11	10
Unclassifiable Muslims	3	3	0	2
Islam as religion				
Islam in general	10	24	3	10
Islam mainstream	0	0	0	1
Minority currents within Islam	5	3	0	1
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	1	3	3	1
Unclassifiable Islam	1	3	0	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	297	38	75	221

Table 21 shows the nationality or ethnicity of objects per actor. The actors don't seem very different in their tendency to specify the nationality of the object, except maybe that state actors seem more explicit in naming the country of the object.

Table 21: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	58	71	60	64
Country of residence nationality	14	8	12	13
Europe: EU	9	8	9	7
Asia: middle east	5	3	4	3
Asia: south and east	1	0	5	2
Africa: North	10	8	8	9
Africa: other	1	0	1	0
Not applicable, no object	1	3	0	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N				

7. Scope of the claimant, the addressee of the claim and of the issues

In the chapters until now, we looked at the actor(s) making the claim in chapter 2 (WHO), the form of the claim in chapter 3 (HOW), the addressee of the claim in chapter 4 (AT WHOM), the substantive content of the claim in chapter 5 (WHAT), and the object of the claim in chapter 6 (TO WHOM?). In this last chapter we will treat the 'frame' of the claim that is the justification for the claim: WHY should this action be undertaken?

Firstly we look at the scope variable in terms of its relevance for the scale of the claim: the claim can have a local, national or supra national scope (or reach). In table 22 we have listed the scope of the actors. The scope of the actor is most often (42%) on national level, while 15% is on local level, and 15% is on supra national/foreign level (27% is unknown).

Table 22. Scope (or reach) of the actors.

	Actor
Supra or transnational: European	2
Supra or transnational: other	2
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0
Foreign national: other	10
Bilateral	1
National	42
Regional	1
Local	15
Unknown	27
Total	100%
N	890

For the addressee, the criticised and the supported actor, the scope is most of the time unknown (63%, 55% and 72%), but in the cases that it is clear, the national level dominates, just like among actors. Table 23 shows the scope of the criticised and the supported actor as far as it is known. As the table shows, the scope of the addressee is in 61% of the cases where it is know, national, for the criticised actor this is 63% and for the supported actor 62%.

Table 23. Scope (or reach) of the addressee, criticized actor and supported actor

	Addressee	Criticised actor	Supported actor
Supra or transnational: Europe	3	3	1
Supra or transnational: other	2	3	2
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0	1	2
Foreign national: other	14	13	12
Bilateral	2	1	1
National	61	63	62
Regional	1	1	20
Local	18	16	1
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	331	400	245

Table 24 shows the scope of the issue. In this case there are no unknown cases and all issues can be coded, though 4% of the cases were not verbal. Again we see that most issues are national (57%), while 25% is supranational/foreign and 17% is local.

Table 64: Scope (or reach) of the issue.

	Issue
no verbal claim	4
supra- or transnational: European	3
supra- or transnational: other	4
foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1
foreign national: other	10
bilateral	3
national	57
regional	1
local	17
no verbal claim	4
Total	100%
N	890

In table 25 we show more detail on the scope of the claim per actor. These data are similar to the ones in table 7, but in this case the percentages are calculated per row instead of per column. For all actors most of the claims have a national scope: for state actors 55%, for political parties 75%, for Muslim organisations 56%, for other civil society actors 57%. .

Table 25: Scope of issues by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
no verbal claim	3	0	5	6
supra- or transnational: European	3	0	5	4
supra- or transnational: other	4	2	3	4
foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1	0	3	0
foreign national: other	11	7	10	9
bilateral	3	0	1	2
national	55	75	56	57
regional	1	0	1	1
Local	18	16	15	18
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	379	56	144	311

8. Summary

In this report we presented the results of a content analysis of the debate in the newspaper on Islam and the integration of Muslims in the Netherlands. As we described in the introduction the context of the Netherlands can be characterised as: a) a country with an institutionalised system of equal rights of different religions, based on the earlier pillar system, b) a country with a considerable history of migration in the last 50 years and currently 5,8% Muslims, and c) a country with a rather heated debate on Muslims and Islam, and some political parties that openly criticize Muslims and Islam.
We have selected articles with Islam, Muslim and similar keyword, and 750 articles ended up in the sample, in five newspapers in the period from1999 up to 2008. We found 890 claims either by Muslims or about Muslims. There were two peaks in the number of claims, namely in 2001, after 11 September, and in 2004-2005 after the death on Theo van Gogh.

Generally the most observed actors that have been putting forwards claims in this period were firstly governments (21%), secondly professional organizations and groups (16%), and Muslim organizations and groups (also 16%) and thirdly legislative actors (11%). Smaller parties were: police and security agencies (6%), political parties (6%), media and journalists (6%).

The forms of the claim was dominantly verbal (in 75% of the cases), only 8% were conventional actions, 6% repressive measures, and only 4% were violent protests or political decisions and 1% confrontational protests.

In most cases there is no-one addressed by the claimants (64%), and also no-one criticised (56%) and no-one supported (73%). In the cases where someone is addressed, the criticised actors are more common than any of the other addressees. Interesting is that Muslim organisations occur most as supported actor and criticised actor and less in a neutral role of addressee, while governments occur most in the role of addressee, less in the role of criticised actor and nearly never in the role of supported actor. The largest number of claims towards governments come from political parties as actors followed by 'state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants', 'general solidarity-, human rights- and welfare organisations'.
The largest number of claims towards Muslim organisations comes from racist and extreme right organisations and groups or judiciary actors, while less claims come from governments, police and security agencies, churches and pro minority rights and welfare organisations and groups. These racist and extreme right groups focus mainly on Muslim organisations as actors, and to a lesser extent on governments, but on nobody else.

The content of most of the claims in the Netherlands deal with issues that we have classified in a category labelled 'minority integration politics' (77%), while 11% fall in category labelled 'anti-racism/islamophobia' category 4% in the category 'islamophobic claims', 4% with issues of 'immigration, asylum and aliens politics', 3% that we called 'actor claims Muslims' which includes for instance homeland politics and transnational politics. The major category minority integration politics drops in importance after 11 September 2001, but gets back to the attention soon after. Islamophobic claims increase in the research period (199-2008).

To what extent are claims positive or negative on the positions of Muslim's rights? We coded the claims either negative (-1) i.e. anti-Muslims/Islam/xenophobic/extreme right,

neutral/ambivalent (0), or positive (+1) pro-Muslims/Islam/antiracist/anti-extreme right. Results show that the actors that mainly put forward claims with positive intentions towards the rights of Muslims are more than those who put forwards claims with negative intentions. The positive ones include: governments, judiciary bodies, 'other state executive agencies', unions, workers and employees, employers organisations and firms, churches, media and journalists, professional organisations and group and – not very surprising - Muslim organisations and groups, other minority organisations and groups, anti-racist organisations and groups, pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups, general solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations and other civil society organisations and groups. The highest positive score for workers and employees is only about one claim.

The actors that mainly put forward negative claims are: legislative bodies, state executive agencies specially dealing with migrants, political parties (the score is not extreme), and 37 unknown actors. It is not surprising that racist and extreme right organisations and groups have the highest negative score: all there claims were negative so the mean was -1,00. It strikes us that governments in general tend to put forward positive claims and 'other state executive agencies' also, while 'state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants' put forward negative claims, but we have to remark that the last actor is only responsible for two claims, while governments are responsible for 167 claims.

Actors that were neutral or nearly neutral were: police and security agencies and Christians (the last one with only two claims).

In 31% of the cases Muslims were not the object of the claim, while in 79% of the cases they were (of course partly a consequence of looking for it). In the 631 cases where Muslims were an object, more than half of the claimants address either Muslims in general (46%), or Islam in general (10%), without distinction, so together 56%. In 18% of the cases a minority or a small particular group was addressed, and in 3% of the cases a minority current in Islam. This means that in more than half of the cases actors in newspaper articles do not differentiate between for instance radical Muslims and mainstream Muslims: they are lumped together.

The scope (reach) of the claimant (actor) is most often (42%) on national level, while 15% is on local level, and 15% is on supra national level, and 27% unknown. For the addressee, the criticised and the supported actor, the scope is most of the time unknown (63%, 55% and 72%), but in the cases that it is clear, the national level dominates, just like among actors. In the case of the issue, there are no unknown cases: all issues can be coded, though 4% of the cases are not verbal. Again we see that most issues are national (57%), and 20% supranational and 18% local.

Generally the picture that comes forward in this report is that the heated debate on Muslims has not lead to completely unbalanced claim making by either pro- or anti Muslim actors. Also the attitudes towards Muslims that we found in the claims were not totally pro- or anti Muslim, except for extreme right groups. Claim making in the debate on issues around Muslims and Islam in the newspapers seems to be a more open debate than the heated discussion sometimes suggests.