

University of Mississippi

eGrove

Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

1-1-2010

Challenging EU Solidarity? : German-Russian Relations

Jessica Ann Beck

The University of Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis

Recommended Citation

Beck, Jessica Ann, "Challenging EU Solidarity? : German-Russian Relations" (2010). *Honors Theses*. 2767.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2767

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.


CHALLENGING EU SOLIDARITY? : GERMAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

©2010
By Jessica Ann Beck


A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion
Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies at the
Croft Institute for International Studies and the
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
The University of Mississippi

University, Mississippi
Spring, 2010

Approved by:



Advisor: Dr. Matthew Loveless



Reader: Dr. Jacob Kathman



Reader: Dr. William Schenck

ABSTRACT

JESSICA ANN BECK: Challenging EU Solidarity? : German-Russian Relations
(Under the direction of Dr. Matthew Loveless)

The European Union and its ability to function as a unified actor in the international sphere will be analyzed in this thesis. When the 27 member states of the EU act as one, this institution clearly has tremendous power to adjust international politics in its favor. In addressing the EU's ability to act in a unified manner in the international environment, this thesis will analyze how bilateral relations affect unity in EU foreign policy. Often, the actions of individual nations are blamed for the EU's failure to achieve goals in foreign policy. Thus, this thesis will set out the case for the EU's performance in the context of German-Russian relations and EU-Russian energy policy, and demonstrate how this particular issue is instructive on the larger question of EU unity.

In analyzing EU foreign policy, a test measuring "actorness", or the ability of the EU to achieve actor status in foreign policy, will be constructed from criteria found in the literature. These criteria include authority, recognition, autonomy, cohesion, and capability. If the EU is not able to fulfill each of the criteria for actorness, then it will fail to achieve actor status.

Although the results of this research demonstrate a failure of the EU to achieve actor status, the test of actorness is helpful in that it highlights the strengths and weakness of the EU in international affairs. As the EU is an ever-developing institution, the findings of this research will be applied to new changes being made in the current EU, with particular consideration for the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	iv
1) Introduction: General Topic and Goals.....	1
2) Testing the Theory: Research Program and Assumptions.....	11
3) Literature Review.....	20
4) Hypothesis.....	34
5) Research Design: How to Measure Actorness.....	36
6) Analysis of Actorness.....	40
7) Conclusion.....	63
8) Bibliography.....	70

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Actorness Scoring.....62

1. Introduction: General Topic and Goals

The success of the European Union (EU) in uniting a large part of the European continent economically through a customs union and a single market is remarkable. Since the early nineties, there has been a stronger push to unite the member states of the EU in further areas of policy, such as security, defense, judicial affairs, and foreign policy. One must naturally wonder if unification can successfully be carried over into other policy fields, seeing as member states would need to yield further national competences to the supranational EU level in order to achieve deeper integration. Whether the EU will achieve such integration is a subject of current debate and much discussion exists over the future of this organization. Can the EU continue to power integration between its member states, or has it reached the point at which European integration can progress no further?

The European Union is not a state and therefore falls outside the traditional definition of an international actor. Much debate concerning the EU focuses on the organization's effectiveness, which differs on a case to case basis. The abilities as well as the limitations of the EU to act on the international stage and have an impact on world politics, or to demonstrate "actorness", is the general focus of this thesis. A definition of "actorness", which describes the necessary characteristics any political entity must possess in order to participate in the international system, will be constructed from the

literature and used to analyze the effectiveness of the European Union as an international actor.

A case-study involving German-Russian relations and their effects on overall EU-Russian relations will be used to highlight the power that member states and third parties have over the EU's ability to exhibit "actorness" in foreign policy. Alongside the case-study, testing "actorness" in the EU will determine the areas in which the EU behaves as a unified actor on the world stage in contrast to those areas in which the EU does not. The assumption of the thesis will be that the EU failed to exhibit "actorness" in the realm of foreign policy and an analysis will be conducted in order to understand why. The analysis from the case study and test of EU "actorness" will provide important information concerning the EU's current workings and offer implications on its future potential, as well discern possible limitations of the EU on a regional and international scale.

Foreign Policy in the EU: Future Potential and Limitations

The current European Union, which now boasts 27 member states, is often depicted by the image of an elephant in that it is a large, slow moving body which takes much time to act (see Emerson 2007). EU members states are slow to create, agree on, and implement most types of policy. Economic policies in the European Union are exceptionally successful due to the supranational nature of decision-making in this branch of the EU as well as the general advantages economic cooperation offers each country. In contrast, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which

composes the second pillar of the EU¹ and differs from the first pillar (EC) in that it is not a supranational but rather intergovernmental institution, requires that all member states achieve unanimity in making decisions concerning foreign policy.² Specifically in the formation of foreign policy, the results of intergovernmental decision making are said to be “inconsequential and weak” and represent the “lowest common denominator”, which even the most reluctant member state is willing to accept (Smith 2008, 10).

The success of foreign policy in the European Union directly affects its status as a viable international actor. Smith has stated that,

The inconsistencies of EU policies, the lack of agreement to devote more resources to the pursuit of particular policies (and to external relations in general)...do not give the impression of a unified international actor that can expect to be effective (2008, 238).

The focus of this thesis is to research EU foreign policy, as this particular policy area underpins the EU’s international profile and thus its international actor status. Whether the EU achieves the status of a fully capable international actor will ultimately determine the fate of the EU's effectiveness and relevance on the global stage.

The EU as an International Actor

The theoretical concept of “actorness” has been used by scholars to study the role of the European Union in world politics. Unlike nation-states, who are by nature actors on the international stage, the European Union’s ability to exhibit “actorness” by acting with unity varies between policies and circumstances, and mirrors nations’ inherently coherent organization to act with unity. Because the EU is made up of many individual

¹ The first pillar is the European Community (EC) which deals mainly with economic issues and the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), deals with domestic and inter-European security issues.

² As opposed to qualified *majority* voting (QMV) used in the first pillar

nations, each of which is considered to be an actor in its own right, EU “actress” depends on the willingness of its members to act with unity so that the union as a whole can be considered to be a unified actor. For this reason, it is useful to analyze the effects that traditional actors (i.e. nations) within as well as outside of the EU have on the actor status of the EU.

Important to consider is the binary nature of actorness used to describe the EU. In this analysis, the EU is either labeled as an actor or is considered to have failed to achieve actor status, although the multiple criteria and sub-criteria used to determine actorness will allow for speculation on the possibility of a multi-dimensional understanding of the term “international actor.” Simply stated, the EU may be considered to be an influential international actor in certain fields such as economics, but may only approach or exhibit partial actorness in other fields. In accepting the binary nature of actorness as a starting ground, this thesis will provide specific evidence on the areas of foreign policy in which the EU currently demonstrates actorness and those in which it does not, as well as consider defining “actorness” as a continuum and suggest ways in which the union could increase its actorness in the future.

Unity Defined by “Actorness”

Recently, accusations have been made that certain member nations are undermining EU solidarity in foreign policy through their bilateral relations with non-EU nations. Such an example can be seen in the present case of Germany’s relations with Russia, specifically in the field of energy, which some scholars and critics claim is detrimental to the EU as a whole. Due to the difficulty of quantifying and measuring

“solidarity”, a better approach is to instead measure the effects of Germany’s relations with Russia on the EU’s ability to act with unity in foreign policy. In hindering the EU’s viability as an international actor, a nation’s unilateral action could be said to be detrimental to EU solidarity. This thesis will investigate whether Germany’s actions have indeed prevented the EU from achieving “actorness” in foreign policy on Russia, or whether such accusations are groundless criticism. Other possible conclusions of this analysis may be that the EU cannot attain or possesses only limited actor status due to its structure, or that the actions of third parties (i.e. Russia) considerably influence EU “actorness.”

Specific Topic: European-Russian Relations

The history of European-Russian relations includes partnership as well as conflict. During the reign of Peter the Great, Russia aimed to model itself after a European ideal, and Russian art, literature, architecture and fashion all centered on European standards and trends. Beginning in the 1900’s, tensions began to rise between Russia’s revolutionary society and Europe. The end of World War II called in a long period of division on the European continent between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, with Russia imposing a form of communism on its people and those of Eastern Europe. The period following World War II also witnessed the beginning of European integration and the formation of organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community, which are considered the forerunners of the modern-day European Union.

The European Union was created after the collapse of the Soviet Union and soon experienced a rush of new applicants from the east. The historical tensions, dating back

from the Soviet times as well as the pre-World War II era are still visible in many eastern European nations and this mentality has obvious consequences for the EU's relations with Russia. Some nations, specifically Poland and the Baltic states, traditionally show opposition to anything but the toughest policies on Russia, warning that Russia is not to be trusted and must be forced to cooperate. Accusations primarily from Polish and Baltic, as well as other eastern European politicians against the highly economic and energy-oriented relations between Germany and Russia become more understandable when considering the stark contrast between the eastern member states' wishes for a value-oriented approach to Russia as opposed to the very business-oriented, pragmatic relations promoted by Germany. Eastern European member states desire a commitment from Russia to meet certain democratic, normative standards while Germany imposes no such demands on Russia.

Russia's Challenge to modern-day EU

In analyzing EU foreign policy, the Union's relations with Russia will be considered. The European Commissioner for trade, Peter Mandelson, admitted in 2007 that "No other country reveals our differences as does Russia. This is a failure of Europe as a whole, not any member state in particular." This view counters the opinion held by many that individual nations are responsible for the failure of the EU to achieve a successful, unitary foreign policy on Russia. In foreign relations, Russia has often demonstrated its ability to disregard the EU as an international actor by "dividing and conquering" EU member states through bilateral agreements or disputes in a variety of sectors (Baysch 2004). The most notable examples of such agreements and disputes

develop from Europe's undeniably high dependence on Russian energy supplies, an issue of great importance to Russia and to some EU members. Energy is a policy area which exemplifies how geopolitics, economics, history and geography all play a role in determining any one EU member state's relations with Russia. Stressing the pivotal role of individual EU member states in forming a secure foreign policy on Russia, Baysch states:

In the past, European leaders such as Gerhard Schröder, Silvio Berlusconi and Jacques Chirac happily discarded pre-agreed EU positions in their attempts to forge a special relationship with Russia. Such divisions have weakened the position of the EU, and allowed the Kremlin to assert that the EU cannot be taken seriously [as an international actor] (Baysch 2007, 2).

Also of great concern to the EU have been occurrences such as the recent gas crisis between Russia and the Ukraine in 2006, in which the flow of gas from Russia to Ukraine was temporarily restricted. Since the EU receives a large amount of its energy through transit pipes carrying supplies from Russia through the Ukraine, this type of crisis directly affects the energy security of many EU countries, specifically eastern and central member states. Largely due to this crisis, the EU now wishes to lower its dependence on Russian energy and is making efforts towards the formation of a stronger energy security policy.

Accusation that German-Russian Relations Undermine EU Solidarity

As the largest and most powerful nation in the EU, Germany has often been accused of betraying the EU and defying solidarity in foreign policy by playing a “two-level” game with Russia (Timmis 2006). For instance, Poland has compared Germany's Nord Stream Pipeline energy deal with Russia's energy giant, Gazprom, to the Molotov-

Ribbentrop pact of 1939 (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008). Through this two-level game Germany supposedly uses its powers in the EU to criticize Russia's lack of democratic reform and to push for a normative agenda on EU-Russian relations, while at the same time conducting bilateral relations with Russia for more pragmatic issues such as energy and economic collaboration.

In defense, German political and business representatives argue that Germany it is not throwing aside the interests of the EU, but rather promoting better relations between Russia and Europe through bilateral relations. Germany's approach to Russia has been called “Wandel durch Verflechtung”, or “change through interdependence”, an approach which originated in pre-EU policies between France and Germany so that the two countries were tied together through various European Communities to ensure that war was economically unfeasible (Leonard & Popescu 2007). Germany hopes that a similar approach of “binding” Russia to Europe will lead Russians to be “drawn into their way of thinking” (Leonard & Popescu 2007, 52).

Purpose, Aim, and Motivations

Taking the existing scholarly literature on EU “actorness” into consideration, this thesis will contribute to this academic discussion by demonstrating how individual member nations have helped or hindered the EU to act with unity in foreign policy. The analysis will also be used to speculate on the notion that limitations to achieving international actor status originate from the structure and organization of the EU itself, and whether or not this could be expected to change in the future.

Most of the literature on this topic is largely theoretical and, at worst, non-constructively critical. The consensus is that the EU does not act in a consistently unified

manner, undermining its global identity. Concrete solutions to this issue are notably vague and are thus particularly unhelpful. One missing component seems to be concrete evidence that the EU, in fact, does not act in a unified manner, and what this means for the EU and its constituent states. Thus, in order to better identify and address the issue of the EU's ability to act in a unified manner in the international environment, I will specifically analyze how the bilateral relations between Germany and Russia affect EU solidarity in foreign policy, specifically energy policy.

While many scholars agree that in order to achieve a unified international presence, the EU must change its approach towards Russia, some tend to blame individual nations instead of the structure of the EU itself for the EU's failure to achieve goals on Russia. Thus, this thesis will set out the case for the EU's performance in the context of the Russian and German relationship and demonstrate how this particular issue is instructive on the larger question of EU unity.

Contributions to Current Research

This thesis will take into consideration particularly the arguments concerning whether or not Germany's relations with Russia are threatening EU solidarity in foreign policy. Evidence for this research could be found by analyzing Germany's action within the EU in forming and implementing a policy on Russia and comparing these actions to those taken by Germany outside of the EU. In doing so, one may see how Germany has tried to form policy on Russia through the EU, but has simply failed. Whether the EU's failure to achieve actor status is due to Germany's bilateral relations with Russia, the structure and nature of the EU itself or perhaps to the actions of Russia is yet to be

concretely demonstrated. The research presented in this thesis will attempt to fill the vacuum of evidence on the subject of EU actorness by considering each of these three alternatives in the analysis.

This thesis will demonstrate that the EU faces many challenges in forming and implementing foreign policy due to its institutional nature and that member states' willingness to act with unity in the EU can be equated with solidarity. Simply because Germany has acted outside of the EU in policies on Russia, such as in energy relations, does not mean that Germany is opposed to the EU's success, but perhaps that the EU was not able to form or implement any acceptable policy on Russia. The EU's structure, the differing needs of the member states, tensions between some member states and Russia, Russia's view of the EU and preference to work with individual nations instead of the EU are all important factors in understanding the German-Russian case study, and I will address each in my analysis.

2. Testing the Theory: Research Program and Assumptions

In determining the ability of the European Union to implement an effective foreign policy, the theory of actorness will be applied to the EU's relations with Russia. The term "actorness" attempts to define the necessary requirements of state-like unity which a non-state body must display in order to have an impact on world politics. The characteristics of actorness are derived from nation-states, which are de facto actors on the international stage (see Bretherton and Volger, 2006), and are applied to non-state bodies. These characteristics include: authority to act, recognition by third-party actors, autonomy, cohesion, and capability. When a non-state institution meets the required characteristics of actorness, then it may be said to operate effectively as an international actor.

For the last 50 years, the dominant theory in international relations has been that statehood ultimately distinguishes actors (Rosamond 2000, 131). The classical, or Realist, approach is essentially "state-centric" and argues that the only actors worthy of consideration are powerful states (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 15-16). Other theories, including liberalism and constructivism, provide a somewhat less rigid definition of "actorness", but nevertheless maintain that nations play a very, if not the most important role in international relations. Accommodating the EU into these theories has been notably unsuccessful. "The EU's contribution...has been a function not only of

intentional decisions or purposive actions but also of its existence, or presence, as a new form of international actor which has defied categorization” (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 22). Because the EU is a “unique, non-traditional and relatively new contender for this status [actor], conceptualizing its international roles, or “actorness”, presents many challenges.” (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 13). However, analyzing the EU using the “EU-as-an-actor” approach is highly informative and has been said to have made a “major contribution to our understanding of the EU’s global role in both empirical and conceptual terms.” (Carlsnaes 2004, 17)

One important assumption associated with measuring actorness is that it can be measured on a case-by-case basis, or that actorness can be a variable characteristic of a non-state body. Bretherton and Vogler assert that

The ability, in principle, to identify policy priorities and formulate coherent policies is not in question. In question, rather, is the extent to which this ability is realized; and this varies considerably according to issue area and policy sector (2006, 31).

Research conducted on case studies is valuable in that they offer insight into and better understanding of the areas where the EU has, or is able to demonstrate effective actorness as distinguished from those areas in which it is unable to achieve an effective actor status on the world stage.

It is also assumed that the existence of a theory for measuring actorness suggests that those international bodies which portray effective actorness are distinguished from those which do not. The impact that non-state bodies who exhibit effective actorness have on world politics is therefore distinctly different from those entities which do not exhibit effective actorness. For example, although the United Nations is a very important non-state organization, it would fail to meet the criteria of effective actorness in many

cases, particularly in the realm of capability. Referring to the legal aspects of actorness, Bretherton and Vogler point out that “weak states may have full legal status but are insignificant as actors, while bodies such as the European Union can fulfill important functions without possessing legal personality” (2006, 25). This distinction gives the analysis of EU actorness meaning in that it attempts to discern the impact that the EU is capable of having on world politics by breaking down actorness into five sub-criteria: Authority, Recognition, Autonomy, Cohesion, and Capability.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this test is effective actorness. Providing a general approximation of the prevailing definitions in the literature, Groenleer and Van Schaik write that actorness is “the EU’s ability to function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (2007, 972). The question of actorness is a fundamental one and the term “actor” has been used as a synonym for the units that make up the international political system (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 15). Analyzing EU actorness therefore attempts to discern the extent to which the Union has made an impact on the international political stage and, if it has failed to make such an impact, which elements of actorness pose the largest challenges to the Union.

Elements of Actorness: Authority

The general authority enjoyed by the EU varies considerably between policy areas, and outside of economic policy, the formal authority of the EU is actually quite limited. In order to meet the criteria for authority, the EU must first possess some type of

formal authority, or legal mandate, to act on the international stage. This includes the ability to form policy and negotiate with third parties. In this case study, it will be analyzed whether the EU possessed the formal authority to form and implement an energy policy on behalf of its member-states, and whether the EU possessed the legal ability to negotiate and implement such a policy with Russia.

In measuring the EU's authority, it is also important to consider the informal authority that the EU possessed. This can be measured by analyzing the density of EU policies in any certain area of external relations, as well as assessing the EU's prior engagement with a third party or with a given issue (i.e. Russia and energy). It is important to consider informal authority alongside formal authority due to the fact that the EU is unlikely to be successful in engaging in foreign policy with a nation or on issues with which it has previously shown no interest or taken no action.

It is important to remember that the foreign policy of EU institutions sometimes contradicts that of its member-states', and that such contradictions can significantly affect (i.e. reduce) the authority of Brussels. Therefore, consideration will be taken in recognizing the initial preferences of the member states, and especially those of the larger, more influential member-states, on energy policy and relations with Russia. Whether the member-states' preferences have converged, diverged, or remained relatively the same over a time period will also be taken into consideration.

Elements of Actorness: Recognition

It is of essential importance that the EU receives recognition by third parties in meeting the criteria for actorness. Caporaso and Jupille label recognition of the EU by

third parties as “discretionary” in the area of mixed competences, since outside actors (i.e. third parties) often have the choice to approach either the EU or individual national governments in these areas (1998, 215). Bretherton and Vogler assert that recognition is important for the shared understandings that frame the policy environment, which ultimately shapes “practices of Member States governments, EU officials and third parties alike” (2006, 22). The pre-Lisbon Treaty system of a rotating presidency in the EU only complicated this issue, as at any time the top representatives of the EU were simultaneously national and supranational agents. In regards to the reforms set out by the Lisbon treaty, the hope is that by creating one European diplomat to deal with external relations will erase, or at least minimize, this problem. For this case study, the system of rotating presidencies prevailed and will therefore be analyzed, but the reforms of the Lisbon treaty will also be considered in the conclusion of this thesis in discussing the future potential of the EU.

The criteria of recognition is problematic for the EU in that it can lie outside of the EU’s boundaries (i.e., in the foreign policies and preferences of third parties). Therefore, the preference of an outside actor to deal mainly with individual nations rather than the EU’s institutions poses a serious threat to the Union’s ability to meet the prerequisite of recognition and therefore to function as an effective international actor. This thesis will analyze the extent to which Russia viewed the EU as a legitimate actor, specifically in the energy sector.

If Russia, or any other third party, prefers bilateral relations with individual nations, then the EU’s ability to achieve actor status could be weakened by the preferences of those third parties. In general, the EU enjoys sufficient recognition from

third parties and has partnerships with many nations. However, some analysts claim that, although the EU is determined to form a common policy on Russia, the “Russian government...has on the whole preferred to do business with individual nations” (Timmis 2007). This may, in turn, result in the conclusion that the EU was unable to meet the requirements of effective actorness due to the preferences of a third party, and not necessarily because of the member-states’ actions or the inter-workings of the EU itself.

Elements of Actorness: Autonomy

Many analysts consider the element of autonomy to be of central importance when determining actorness (see Bretherton and Volger 2006, 17). Autonomy in the EU depends on the member governments providing consent and support in the EU’s international actions, especially when implementing policies that require considerable member state agreement. Autonomy is problematic for the European Union due to the ability of its member states to continue to represent their national views and not solely the views of the EU. When member states do not agree on what is best for the EU as a whole, it is unlikely that the EU can function as an effective actor. The challenge of autonomy is best demonstrated through the EU’s previous system of rotating presidencies, which changed every six months. When a member nation holds the EU presidency, it can still remain an advocate of its nation’s own interest rather than the interest of the EU as a whole.

Indicators of autonomy can include analyzing whether the Presidency of the EU has acted as a representative of the EU and not as a representative of one member state. It is important that as representatives of the EU, the Presidents act in the interest of the

EU and not only for the good of one member-state; otherwise, it is impossible for the EU to meet the criteria of actorness. Autonomy can also be tested by considering whether member-states have channeled policy preferences and activities through the EU, even when no obligation to do so existed.

The inability of the EU to attain autonomy in its energy relations with Russia would mean a failure to achieve actor status. If autonomy posed a serious challenge to EU actorness, then energy policy could only be taken up through bilateral channels with Russia and not through the EU.

Elements of Actorness: Cohesion

Cohesion depends on member states taking actions which are compatible with EU policy. Because each member-state in the European Union has pre-existing national policies in each area in which the EU attempts to take action, it often occurs that member-states' policy preferences conflict with the policy preferences of the EU. Due to the likelihood that some member states will disagree on policy in the EU, the element of cohesion can be said to be the most difficult criteria of actorness to fulfill.

The support of large EU member states is essential in attaining cohesion on any EU policy. If large members do not agree, at least passively, to an EU policy, the Union cannot be said to act effectively. Because Germany is the largest member of the EU, it wields much power in its ability to affect cohesion in the EU on any type of policy. Analyzing the EU's ability to display coherency in foreign policy on Russia in the field of energy will specifically demonstrate whether the EU was unable to fulfill this

requirement due to Germany's lack of support for such a policy, or whether the challenge to cohesion lies elsewhere.

Also important to mention is the fact that the Council and Commission are not likely to take action known to be against the wishes of large member states. Cohesion can also be hindered when the Council and Commission do not agree, as these two institutions are the EU's main executive representatives. The European Parliament, although not as influential as the Council or Commission, can also undermine EU actorness if its actions are highly contradictory to that of the other EU institutions.

Elements of Actorness: Capability

The question of capability asks whether the EU has been successful in taking action on the world stage and whether this action has made a considerable impact on world affairs. Bretherton and Vogler define Capability as "the internal context of EU action or inaction- those aspects of the EU policy process which constrain or enable external action and hence govern the Union's ability to capitalize on presence or respond to opportunity" (2006, 29). This component of actorness is determined entirely by the EU's efforts in diplomacy, making or altering policies, and policy implementation. In measuring capability, it can be said that if the EU has made an impact on world politics, or in this case-study, on energy policy with Russia, then it has fulfilled the prerequisites for capability.

EU Actorness and Germany's Bilateral Relations with Russia

This thesis assumes that the EU has failed to attain actor status in foreign policy with Russia. Using the five elements of actorness described above, analyzing the failure of the EU to attain actorness will show the specific elements which it failed to meet. By showing the elements of actorness which the EU failed to fulfill, it can be derived whether it was unable to fulfill these elements because of Germany acting in its own interest in energy policy on Russia, or if the reason lies elsewhere

3. Literature Review

In studying the European Union, a central question concerning its most current form is whether or not it has the ability to function as a unified actor in the international sphere. Unlike nations or other supra-national actors, the ability of the EU to act as a single international unit, in representing the diverse interests of 27 European nations on issues including foreign policy and a common defense initiative, is integral to achieving its interests in the global community. Inasmuch as the EU can act as one, it clearly has tremendous power to adjust international politics in its favor.

In order to better identify and thus address the issue of the EU's ability to act in a unified manner in the international environment, this thesis will specifically analyze how the bilateral relations between Germany and Russia affect EU solidarity in foreign policy. While most authors agree that in order to achieve a unified international presence, the EU must change its approach towards Russia, some tend to blame individual nations instead of the structure of the EU itself for the EU's failure to achieve goals on Russia. Thus, this review will set out the case for the EU's performance in the context of the Russian and German relationship and demonstrate how this particular issue is instructive on the larger question of EU unity.

Central to this analysis is the problem faced by the EU in achieving unity among its 27 member nations. Addressing the EU's status as a viable international actor, Smith

acknowledges the existence of a rhetoric-practice gap, which she claims is damaging not only the EU's credibility, but ultimately its effectiveness (2006, 237). If the EU becomes ineffective or a failure in the eyes of the world, not only would its future potential be drained, but the member states who make up the Union itself would suffer. In concluding her book on EU foreign policy, Smith warns that the EU is now "flirting dangerously" with exactly this type of failure and irrelevance (2006, 240).

Bretherton and Vogler point out in their analysis of the EU as a global actor that due to a great variety of preexisting foreign policy priorities within the EU held by individual member states, impediments to EU policy-making are significantly more pronounced in foreign policy formation and implementation than in other areas and that this has been increased by successive enlargements of the EU (2006, 162). After the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), positive developments in the EU's ability to conduct relations with third countries and other international actors became noticeable, particularly in relation to Eastern Europe (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, 187). Despite these improvements, the EU still faces a problem in reaching consensus among its member states. Bretherton and Vogler explain, "the willingness of Member States to agree to institutional reforms...and their subsequent reluctance to use them effectively, or indeed at all" reflects one of the largest challenges facing EU unity in foreign policy (2006, 187). Fyodor Lukyanov is also extremely critical of EU foreign policy, stating that, "The association's foreign policy is made up of groundless ambitions that become lost in a chorus of internal dissent and an inability to adopt unanimous decisions" (2008, 1107).

In the literature addressing the issue of EU unity in foreign policy, the discussion often turns to the relationship between the EU and Russia. This is not unwarranted as Russia poses the largest challenge to EU solidarity in the international environment (Peter Mandelson, 2007). Anke Schmidt-Felzmann questions the utter feasibility of EU unity and argues that a lack of common identity and interest is the main problem for the EU's relations with third countries, and with Russia specifically (2008, 182). Schmidt-Felzmann gives two main reasons why the EU cannot agree on a policy for Russia in that 1) individual EU member nations lack consensus on the current state of Russian politics (i.e., the state of Russian democracy), and 2) that among the member nations there exist multiple approaches to Russia, any one of which is unlikely to gain support by all 27 members. Seeing as EU foreign policy is conducted through the CSFP, the difficult task of achieving unanimity is required before any action may be taken by the EU in foreign policy. More directly, Schmidt-Felzmann states that the expectation of EU unity in relation with Russia is "misplaced" and warns that solidarity within the EU should not be equated with policy convergence (2008, 181).

The Economist released an article on the state of EU-Russian relations which predicted that the summit called by French President Nikolaus Sarkozy after the escalation of conflict in Georgia was "not expected to...make big changes to the status quo, for the simple reason that the various leaders do not agree over whether that would be a good idea or counter-productive." (Rennie 2008, 54) This idea is precisely that expressed by Schmidt-Felzmann (2008), who has stated that the main problem of EU policy on Russia is the lack of consensus on even the basic approach which should be taken in dealing with Russia. Rennie, the author of the article, goes on to analyze a claim

made by the European Council on Foreign Relations (see below) that a united Europe would have more influence over Russia. Rennie states that although this claim is true, it is irrelevant because such thinking is very removed from the way that individual countries in the EU act. In order for this way of thinking and acting in the EU to change, any new policy must not only be able to prove that gains for the Union will be overall positive, but also that any European gains will be greater than any one nation's national interests. Simply restated, gains achieved by a united EU would have to be greater than the gains that any individual member state could have achieved on its own for its national interests. Rennie suggests that there is an even greater problem in that European nations do not even agree on what unity means (2008, 54).

The difficulty of attaining unanimity in foreign policy is an obstacle for the EU in functioning as a unitary international actor. To this point Schmidt-Felzmann (2008) argues that the credibility of the European Union as a viable international actor is not the concern of individual EU member nations, but that even on the EU level, nations are ultimately only seeking their national interests. Schmidt-Felzmann (2008) and Graham Timmins (2006, 2007) both point to a very significant difference between large EU member nations and smaller member nations in this strive towards national interest, which plainly says that the EU is a necessary institution for small nations wishing to have influence on the EU's policy on Russia, while it is only an optional avenue of foreign policy for larger EU member states such as France, the UK, and Germany. The option of using the EU held by the larger member nations means that when these larger member nations are not accomplishing their goals at the EU level, they are very capable of bypassing the EU and conducting bilateral relations with Russia directly.

A circumstance on which many experts in the field of EU foreign policy agree is that the bypassing of the EU by larger member nations is made easier by the other nation's (and in this instance Russia's) approach to large EU member nations (see Schmidt-Felzmann 2008; Lukyanov 2008; Timmins 2006, 2007). Plainly stated, Schmidt-Felzmann admits that "the fact that Russia prefers to engage with the largest states and tends to treat the smaller member states as second rank means that the respective states operate within, and respond to, distinctly different political conditions." (2008, 181) Timmins argues in a similar fashion that one reason Germany takes up bilateral relations with Russia is due to the fact that Russia itself seeks such relations with Germany (2006; 2007). Although the EU is determined to form a common policy on Russia, the "Russian government...has on the whole preferred to do business through bilateral channels" (Timmins, 2007, 170).

Timmins further explains that due to the dependence of some individual EU member nations on Russia for energy and the opportunity for economic investment gains provided by the developing Russian economy, the latter being seen by Germany as lucrative due to the nation's high unemployment during Schroeder's Chancellorship, larger EU member states are prompted to reciprocate this desire for bilateral relations (2006). Russia was naturally open to Germany's high level of investment, which accounted for 32 percent of Russia's accumulated foreign investment during the late 1990s (Timmins, 2007, 174).

In recent years, Germany has received massive criticism for playing what Timmins has named a "two-level game" in that it conducts independent, bilateral relations with Russia outside of the EU through economic investments as well as in

energy policy (2006; 2007). Although critics such as Polish politicians have claimed that Germany has purposely undermined the EU, Timmins argues that the two-level game was less of a conscious action of Germany to undermine the EU, but rather a logical and practical solution to fill the “vacuum” in foreign policy that has existed in Europe during the last two decades (2006, 307). Stressing Germany's commitment to multilateral organizations such as NATO, OSCE, and the EU, Timmins claims that multilateralism is the preferred choice of a nation burdened by its history³, but that it was the lack of substance and real results on the EU level that prompted Germany to seek bilateral relations with Russia (2006, 304). Despite these actions, Timmins claims that Germany's bilateral relations with Russia were not intended to undermine the EU and explains, “There was little if anything in the projection of Germany's agenda towards Russia that suggested a looser commitment to the EU as a vehicle for its eastern policy agenda” (2006, 305).

Timmins points out how Schröder's party, the SPD, promoted Germany's approach to Russia on the EU level and tried to push through their ideas during Germany's 1999 presidency of the EU (2006). The EU Common Strategy on Russia was formed in Cologne, but turned out later to the disappointment of many, and especially Germany, to be ineffective and actually quite offensive to Russia. The Common Strategy, in its final form, was too watered down for Germany's liking due to the injection of numerous normative and value-oriented aspects which had been added by various other EU members as well as by the Commission itself. Germany understood that such an approach would never work with Russia, seeing as a normative approach

³ After World War II, Germany tied itself to multilateral organizations, such as the European Community for Coal and Steel, in order to assure other nations that its nationalistic interests would not lead to a repeat of WWI or WWII.

was only effective in those nations who held prospects of one day becoming EU members (Timmins, 2007, 175; see also Haukkala 2008; Pursiainen 2008).

Timmins also claims that Germany's current relations with Russia over the past decade have been completely in line with previous Chancellor's policies on Russia and are not at all surprising considering not only their economic and energy ties, but also their historic and geopolitical backgrounds (2007, 172). For example, although Chancellor Schröder, who was in power from 1998 to 2005 during the SPD-Die Gruenen (or Red-Green) Coalition, has been criticized for focusing Germany's bilateral relations on Russia in order to attain economic gains, the same was true for the Chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt, during the 1960s as he aimed his relations with the Soviet Union towards economic growth for Germany. This continued relationship is due largely to Germany's dependence on Russian energy and Russia's dependence on the German economy; "This was true in the 1960s and is just as much the case in the contemporary period" (Timmins, 2006, 313).

Many authors agree that true criticism is deserved by Germany in that Schröder was unwilling to criticize Putin in public concerning human rights violations and the state of democracy in Russia (see Timmins 2006, 2007; Bayrsch 2004, 2007; Medvedev 2008). Despite the lucrative relations with Russia, the SPD-Green coalition's plan to decrease unemployment in Germany and to boost the nation's economy actually failed, and it was therefore easy to blame Schröder not only for seeking purely nationalistic interest in relations with Russia, but also personal gains. Directly after his Chancellorship in Germany, Schröder was appointed to the board of Gazprom and was allowed to lead the Nord-Stream pipeline project; a project which he had personally

brokered with Putin during his time in power. Criticism of Germany still remains, as Katinka Barysch claims that German-Russian bilateral relations demonstrate an “unusual amount of good will”, even after Chancellor Merkel has replaced Chancellor Schröder (2007, 2).

Taking a hard line on those nations who conduct extensive bilateral relations with Russia outside of the EU, Barysch repeatedly calls for the EU 27 to “reconcile internal differences” and achieve unity in its foreign policy on Russia (2007, 1). Barysch calls for the member nations to analyze the actual amount of power that they hold in the EU over Russia and to find a solution on EU-Russian policy which “all 27 EU countries feel comfortable with” (2007, 2). This pleasant sounding suggestion is not thoroughly explained in Barysch’s argument and the difficulty of finding a “comfortable” solution for all 27 EU members would be a greater task than the author seems to think.

Some authors also suggest that Germany’s relations with Russia could be beneficial to the EU’s policy on Russia, and point out that other EU members, notably Poland and the Baltic States, actually pose the greatest challenges to forging unity on Russia. Rennie specifies that Germany's relations with Russia actually come closest to considering the good of the union as a whole, in contrast to Poland's “taking hostage” of EU-Russian relations due to its problematic ties to Russia (2008, 54). Poland has also been criticized by Barysch for using the EU to solve its own nation’s problematic relations with Russia and she has said that such nations “need to realise that blocking a common EU position may ultimately play into the hands of the Russians” (2007, 3). Leonard and Popescu also discuss the “soft containment” approach, which is favored by Poland and the Baltic nations in that they attempt to form policy on Russia in calling for

isolation of Russia until it reforms itself to EU norms (2007, 51). In closing, the Rennie asks “Will the benefits of European unity ever trump the pursuit of national interests when it comes to Russia?”, and suggests that they will not until Russia itself becomes more aggressive and threatening towards the EU (2008, 54).

Clearly the question of EU-Russian relations highlights the unified actor imperative. Most authors agree that the EU must be more pragmatic in its relations with Russia if it wishes to have a productive and stable relationship with its largest eastern neighbor. In accordance with Lukyanov, Bayrsch admits that the EU should take a tougher stance towards Russia if it wishes to have any real influence at all over their eastern neighbor (Lukyanov 2008; Bayrsch 2004, 2007). Bayrsch states that it no longer makes sense to put common values “at the heart” of EU-Russian relations, alluding to unrealistic expectations and the consequential disappointments that arise for such an approach (2007, 4). Lukyanov describes the trend of post-Soviet development in Russia being mirrored by the development of the EU in Western Europe and how both initially agreed to better relations through negotiating agreements such as the PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement)⁴, but points out that there was a significant turning point in the last few years in which the EU began to prioritize their “value-led” approach on Russia and sacrificed a more interest-based partnership (2008, 1108). This new approach by the EU has had noticeable consequences in Russia's willingness to deal with the EU itself, and has actually prompted Russia to seek out bilateral relations with individual nations.

⁴ Signed in 1994, ratified by both sides in 1997

Lukyanov focuses on Russia's perception of the progress of a “value-led” approach within the EU and how it has affected Russia-EU relations overall: that because there is no likelihood of Russia attaining membership in the EU, then Russia has no incentive to necessarily adopt the values and norms which the EU is requiring of Russia (2008). Another problem that Lukyanov points out is that Russia does not “view the European Union as the final form of the political and economic order of Europe” (2008, 1117).

Germany is acknowledged for its pragmatism in its bilateral relations with Russia. Germany's approach to Russia has been called “change through interdependence” by Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu (2007). Focusing on Germany's hopes of “binding” Russia to Europe through pragmatic relations, Leonard and Popescu explain how Germany's approach could lead Russians to be “drawn into their [European's] way of thinking” (2007, 52). Bayrsch also acknowledges Germany's pragmatic strategy on Russia, explaining that Russian companies such as Gazprom's role within the EU are not problematic on their own, as long as they can be tied into the rules and regulations of the EU (2004; 2007). In contrast to other authors, Lukyanov claims that even an ultra-pragmatic approach based solely on interests will not work due to a lack of mutual understanding between Russia and the EU (2008, 1117; see also Medvedev 2008).

Writing for the Wall Street Journal, Fredrik Erixon stresses that the EU's only hope in binding Russia to a rule-based system must start with energy policy (2009). Erixon compares the effectiveness of the EU's economic single market approach, in which it opened up and liberalized itself internally and therefore had more outward leverage on other nations, to the potential for a single European energy market. The

multiple benefits of a single European energy market include more competition between firms, which translates to lower prices for consumers, new investment opportunities and the ability to better compensate for gas shortages within the EU. In relation to Russia, a single European energy market would give the EU greater strength to fight anti-competitive behaviors by Russia's energy firms such as Gazprom. Without such an energy market, Erixon warns that the EU "cannot act as a regional superpower when it does not have a common commercial policy on the issue that matters most to its Eastern neighbors" (2009).

Amelia Hadfield (2008), focuses on the EU's dependency on Russian gas and its affect on relations between the two. Hadfield makes note that this dependency will only grow in the future⁵. Arguing along the same lines as other authors, Hadfield admits that a pragmatic approach centering on common interests is likely to be far more successful in relations with Russia than any "artfully crafted" value-based approach (2008, 234). Hadfield is very critical of the EU in pointing out how the Union can dare to call the bilateral energy deals between EU member nations and non-EU nations increasingly vulnerable to the EU, while the EU itself currently has no internal regulatory system in the field of energy (2008, 242). The EU is not capable of conducting energy contracts for individual member nations with outside energy suppliers, and because the EU lacks this competence, the current goal of "speaking with one voice is overly ambitious at best and unattainable at worst" (Hadfield, 2008, 242). While the EU-Russian Energy Dialogue remains on hiatus, Hadfield stresses that the EU needs to "level the playing field" not

⁵ EU energy dependency on Russia expected to rise from 47% in 2000 to 67.5% in 2040 (see Hadfield, 2008, 239)

only in order to successfully engage Russia as a reliable partner, but also for the sake of the EU's international identity (2008, 245).

In his discussion paper, Dominic Heinz points out that until the CFSP, EU treaties had little to do with foreign policy (2007, 4). The groundwork for EU-Russian relations has been laid down by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and Common Strategy (CS), and Russia's own strategy towards the EU (Heinz, 2007, 7). Mentioning, as other authors have, that Russia prefers to seek out bilateral relationships instead of relying on legal agreements and institutions, Heinz claims that the bilateral relations between some European heads of state and the Russian president have "effectively constrained the institutions of the EU from implementing their policy" (2007, 13). Out of 18 areas of cooperation between Russia and the EU, Heinz chooses to focus on the energy dialogue, the situation in Chechnya and the status of Kosovo in order to analyze EU-Russian relations due to the author's assumption that these areas play a more prominent role than any other area of cooperation (2007, 14). Concluding that the EU's efforts toward Russia have "added value" to the EU-Russian relationship, Heinz ends his discussion with the hope that "despite its deficiencies, structured EU-Russian relations clearly display the potential to generate a more comprehensive and balanced relationship" (2007, 20).

In analyzing Russia's relation with the West, Alexander Rahr focuses on the effect of 9/11, which he claims boosted Europe's "search for its own foreign and security agenda" (2005, 223). Questioning whether Vladimir Putin was truly interested in European values, or whether he was just another Peter the Great looking to the west for support in modernization, Rahr admits that Germany's role in Russia's foreign policy

strategy is very significant (2005, 223-231). Rahr points out that Germany is Russia's single largest investor and frequently provides loans for the country, as had been the case for West Germany during the Soviet times (2005, 231-232), prompting Putin to view Europe, as Peter the Great had, as Russia's "main modernizing partner" (2005, 237).

At this point, the literature demonstrates a clear need for concrete action either within the EU itself or by individual member nations in their bilateral relations with outside nations. This thesis will take into consideration particularly the arguments concerning whether or not Germany is threatening EU solidarity in foreign policy. An important question is whether Germany would be willing to sacrifice its bilateral relations with Russia if it was proven that its actions are truly hindering the EU. What would provide us with the most instruction about this question would be to look at Germany's action on the EU in forming and implementing a policy on Russia and comparing these actions to those taken by Germany outside of the EU. In doing so, one may see how Germany has tried to form policy on Russia through the EU, but has simply failed. Whether this failure is due to the EU itself or to Germany, or perhaps even to Russia is yet to be understood.

Many of the authors, and particularly Timmins (2007, 2008), believe that Germany should be seen as a model for the EU to follow in its policy on Russia, but how the EU could model itself after any nation is not presently clear. The arguments all point to the fact that the EU should be more pragmatic in dealing with Russia and should not put too much weight on the "common values" and normative approach in hoping that Russia will one day suddenly decide to become like the EU. None of the authors have provided any specific suggestions on how the EU could actually follow Germany's

example in bilateral relations with Russia, although most agree that it may be a good idea. As a closing to this research, it would be worthwhile to look into the possible ways in which the EU could adapt to such a foreign policy approach as Germany's when approaching third countries, and it is a possibility that it simply cannot be done. Such an outcome would of course define the limits of the EU in its ability to form foreign policy.

Another argument which some authors touch upon is the fact that the EU is still developing, and its foreign policy skills are not quite matured. It will take a significant amount of time for the EU to assimilate its newer members, and once the Union of 27 is in full swing, then one can look to see how foreign policy might be formed in an appropriate fashion. In short, any speculation about the future of EU foreign policy is at this point just that: speculation. Despite this fact, it is still relevant to analyze and observe the current state of EU foreign policy formation so that changes can be made in the right direction for the future of the European Union.

4. Hypothesis

This thesis tests EU actorness by using the example of German-Russian contests over energy policy. That Germany has in fact taken up bilateral relations with Russia, particularly in the field of energy, demonstrates that the EU has indeed failed to implement an effective unitary foreign policy on Russia in the field of energy. Whether Germany was the cause, wholly or partially, of the EU's lack of success in its energy relations with Russia is the subject of this test.

One possible conclusion of this thesis could be to find that Germany did in fact act in its own national interests by taking up bilateral energy relations with Russia outside of the EU, and so purposely undermined the EU's ability to act effectively in foreign policy on Russia. A second possible conclusion could be that Germany took up bilateral energy relations with Russia due to the general inability of the EU to achieve unity on a single policy or successfully implement a satisfactory energy policy on Russia, therefore leaving a critical vacuum of policy in EU-Russian relations which Germany itself decided to fill.

My hypothesis is that the EU failed to achieve effective actor status in its energy relations with Russia in that it did not meet all of the criteria for actorness. My hypothesis assumes that Germany was a significant, although not solely independent cause in the

break-down of EU actorness. By testing the EU's failings to achieve actor status, it will be shown how the EU failed to act successfully on energy policy with Russia.

If it can be demonstrated that Germany purposely and single-handedly prevented the EU from meeting the criteria for effective actorness in its relations with Russia, then the claims against Germany will be confirmed. On the other hand, if it can be shown that the EU failed to implement an effective energy policy on Russia due to its inability to meet the criteria for effective actorness for reasons other than Germany's actions, then it can be argued that Germany was simply filling a policy-vacuum where the EU had failed and that Germany had therefore not intentionally undermined EU solidarity.

By testing the five characteristics of actorness, one will be able to see more clearly the specific areas where the EU failed to meet the criteria for effective actorness in energy policy on Russia. Such evidence will be of tremendous importance in determining whether the EU could "fix" its inability to meet the criteria for actorness in its future relations with Russia and in various areas of policy, or whether it is a functional flaw of the EU's nature and structure, and therefore cannot be expected to change.

5. Research Design: How to Measure Actorness

Testing EU actorness in foreign policy on Russia is essential to understanding why the EU has failed to form and implement a successful policy on Russia, especially in the field of energy. If it can be shown how the EU had not met certain actorness criteria due to the structure of the EU, Russia's unwillingness to recognize the EU, or other such factors, then it can be argued that Germany has not undermined EU unity in foreign policy on Russia. On the other hand, if this analysis proves that the criteria of actorness have not been achieved by the EU due to Germany acting in its self interest, then it can be said that it has undermined the EU's ability to act with unity in foreign policy on Russia.

Sub-Criterion: Authority

The Authority criterion for actorness is relevant in that it demonstrates whether the EU possessed the legal ability to act in foreign policy on Russia. In analyzing the EU's authority, consideration will also be given to whether the member-states' policies were compatible in dealings with Russia concerning energy policy. In analyzing whether the EU met the requirement of authority, some specific questions will be asked. They include:

- 1) Was the EU empowered to act legally? Evidence of this may be found in EU treaties and laws concerning Russia and energy policy.

2) Did the EU have an official policy towards the players (i.e. Russia) as well as informal linkages and interest (i.e. to energy policy)? Documentation of the various partnership initiatives, summits, and agreements between the EU and Russia will be reviewed, specifically those dealing with energy policy.

3) Did major member-states have roughly compatible values and interest? It is assumed that less compatible values and interests between the member states translates into less authority of the EU.

Sub-Criterion Indicators: Recognition

Testing Recognition will determine whether the EU was seen as legitimate by third parties, and in this case, by Russia in the energy sector. The questions that will be asked include:

- 1) Was the EU seen as a legitimate partner by Russia in energy policy? Russia's government documents will provide insight on whether or not Russia viewed the EU as a viable partner in energy matters.
- 2) Was EU co-operation in energy policy demanded by Russia? Alongside government documents, statements from political leaders as well as energy experts in Russia will be reviewed to determine whether Russia had called for EU cooperation in energy policy.

Sub Criterion: Autonomy

In assessing the EU's Autonomy, it will be shown to what extent EU member states holding the Presidency acted as representative of the EU rather than of their national

interests. Also of consideration in this test is the extent to which EU member states accepted being represented by the EU in energy policy on Russia. Autonomy will be tested in two ways. Firstly, this thesis will test whether Germany has acted in its national or in European interests in energy policy on Russia during the periods when it held EU's presidency. Secondly, it will test whether the member state holding EU Presidency during energy talks with Russia acted in their own interests or whether they acted in European interests. The questions that will be asked include:

- 1) Did major member-states accept that their position was represented by the EU, or channel their policy preference through EU institutions?
- 2) Did Council Presidency officials consider themselves "European" representatives?

Sub-Criterion: Cohesion

Measuring cohesion will show whether and to what extent the EU's and member-state's actions and communications were compatible in relations with Russia, and whether the EU institutions themselves behaved with co-ordination. The questions for this test include:

- 1) Did major member-states take actions contradictory to or incompatible with supranational ones on energy policy with Russia?
- 2) Were the Commission's, Council's, and Parliament's actions internally consistent? If these three bodies did not agree, then cohesion would be difficult or even impossible to achieve.

Sub-Criterion: Capability

This criterion is meant to show whether the EU's actions in relations to Russia on energy policy had any impact on the political situation at the time, and therefore if the EU acted effectively. The questions asked for this test include:

- 1) Did the EU take independent action?
- 2) Did the EU's actions have a significant impact?

6. Analysis of Actorness

This thesis will evaluate the EU's performance as an international actor according to the previously discussed criteria for effective actorness and their sub-criteria. If the EU demonstrates its ability to fulfill each of these criteria substantially, then the original hypothesis will be rejected. If the EU in turn fails to fulfill any of the criteria, then the original hypothesis will be confirmed.

In assessing the performance of the EU under each criterion, a successful fulfillment will be denoted as "Success", a partial fulfillment as "Moderate", and an unsuccessful fulfillment as "Failure." In order to achieve actor status, the EU must fulfill each of the main criteria. For the purpose of providing greater sensitivity in the analysis, partial fulfillment will be included in the assessment and will help to demonstrate the relative strengths and weaknesses which the EU has demonstrated in this case study.

Analysis: Authority

1) Was the EU empowered legally to act?

Energy and energy security have been identified as areas of special concern for the EU and the Commission maintains an explicit shared competence in external energy policy (Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, 2003). The EU's ability to act in matters of energy policy is therefore

rather liberal, and in the case of natural gas supply disruptions, the EU even has a specific legal competence (see Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004). However, the issue of climate change has been the main focus of the EU's energy edifice (see Hadfield, 2008). Security and competitiveness issues are often addressed in the context of climate change, and calls for reductions in the demand for energy and supply dependence assist the EU's goal of falling CO₂ emissions.

Assessment: The EU did possess the legal right to act in energy policy with Russia under certain circumstances, specifically in issues of supply security spelled out in Council Directive 2004/67/EC. Despite the fact that energy policy has been declared a mixed competence by the Commission, the EU does not possess the right to negotiate supply contracts on behalf of its member states or conclude contracts as a single importing entity. Without possessing the ability to bind member states to contracts, the EU is nevertheless able to act as an agent in the interest of member states (see Hadfield, 2008).

The absence of the specific competence to coordinated energy supply policies for member states severely restricts the authority of the EU in this area of policy. This is, however, not a complete failure of the EU to demonstrate authority in energy policy. Although existing EU documentation is careful to respect energy policy as a mixed competence, they do leave substantial room to for the EU to act in energy policy.

2) Did the EU have an official policy toward the players (i.e. Russia) as well as informal linkages and interest (i.e. energy)?

On the subject of energy, the EU's official policy linkages with Russia have been highly institutionalized. Since the negotiation on the Partnership and Co-operation

rather liberal, and in the case of natural gas supply disruptions, the EU even has a specific legal competence (see Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004). However, the issue of climate change has been the main focus of the EU's energy edifice (see Hadfield, 2008). Security and competitiveness issues are often addressed in the context of climate change, and calls for reductions in the demand for energy and supply dependence assist the EU's goal of falling CO2 emissions.

Assessment: The EU did possess the legal right to act in energy policy with Russia under certain circumstances, specifically in issues of supply security spelled out in Council Directive 2004/67/EC. Despite the fact that energy policy has been declared a mixed competence by the Commission, the EU does not possess the right to negotiate supply contracts on behalf of its member states or conclude contracts as a single importing entity. Without possessing the ability to bind member states to contracts, the EU is nevertheless able to act as an agent in the interest of member states (see Hadfield, 2008).

The absence of the specific competence to coordinated energy supply policies for member states severely restricts the authority of the EU in this area of policy. This is, however, not a complete failure of the EU to demonstrate authority in energy policy. Although existing EU documentation is careful to respect energy policy as a mixed competence, they do leave substantial room to for the EU to act in energy policy.

2) Did the EU have an official policy toward the players (i.e. Russia) as well as informal linkages and interest (i.e. energy)?

On the subject of energy, the EU's official policy linkages with Russia have been highly institutionalized. Since the negotiation on the Partnership and Co-operation

Agreement (PCA) between the new Russian Federation and the EU began in 1994, there has existed an abundance of complex formal policy interactions between the two parties. Due to controversies caused by Russian involvement in Chechnya, the PCA did not enter into force until 1997. Once established, it set up a tradition of biannual EU-Russian summits, which set a record for frequency of executive meetings unmatched in the EU's relations with any other party (Gomart 2008, 2). The PCA itself included calls for co-operation in the field of energy in areas such as improving the quality and security of energy supply, improvement in management and regulation of the energy sector, and the introduction of a "range of institutional, legal, fiscal and other conditions necessary to encourage increased energy trade and investment," as well as for the formulation of energy policy ("Agreement on partnership and co-operation and establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member-states, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part," Article 65, Brussels: European Union, 28th November 1997).

In 2003, the EU and Russia formed a new partnership through the creation of the Common Economic Space (CES), which, like the PCA, acknowledged energy cooperation as a critical platform of formal relations between the two nations. Plans in the CES roadmap included "convergence of EU and Russian energy strategies, policies, and regulatory measures", "cooperation on energy infrastructure projects of common interest," and even the implementation of a work program for the EU-Russia Energy Technology Centre for the development of new energy technologies (European Commission, "Road Map for the Common Economic Space – Building Blocks for Sustained Economic Growth," Brussels: European Union, 2005).

The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, which was launched at an EU-Russia Summit in Paris in October of 2000, has permitted “frank and constructive discussions” between the government of the Russian Federation, the European Commission, the EU member States and Russian and EU industry (European Commission, EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Sixth Progress Report, Brussels: European Union, 2005: 2). In the sixth report of the EU-Russian Energy Dialogue, both parties agree that this framework for discussion has helped to solve many important “misunderstandings and problems” between the two and that it is an important instrument in achieving the energy-oriented objectives of the CES (*Ibid*). The topics discussed in the most recent report include security of supply issues, improving the investment climate for energy, sustainable development, transportation issues, the EU-Russia Energy Technology Centre, cooperation in the area of nuclear energy, and even the establishment of a Pan-European energy market. Although Russia has of yet refused to ratify the European Energy Charter, the EU-Russian Energy Dialogue remains open and its proponents argue for its potential in bringing the EU and Russia together in all areas of energy cooperation.

Informal relations between the EU and Russia are expansive and issues of energy and trade dependency are of particular significance for both parties. Following the United States and China, Russia is the EU’s third-largest economic partner (Gomart 2008, 9). Since Russia is the world’s largest gas producer and the EU is the world’s largest gas market, the energy ties are (and will remain in the short- to medium-term) logical. In the oil and coal sectors, Russia provides almost a third of the EU’s oil needs and a quarter of its coal imports, while the European companies make up the biggest investors in the Russian energy sector (see Katina Baysch, October 2008, 1).

Assessment: The formal and informal links between the EU and Russia are extensive and very significant. Political activity in the form of the PCA, CES, and the EU-Russian Energy Dialogue, which include biannual summit meetings, have been highly conducive to cooperation in the field of energy. The economic ties between the EU and Russia are extensive, and the mutual dependence of the two is very significant.

3) Did major member-states have roughly compatible values and interests?

After the eastward expansion of the EU in 2004 and the inclusion of many former Warsaw Pact nations, the diversity of member states' preferences, values and interests also expanded. Germany's relations have been exceptionally warm, especially during the time of the Schröder Chancellorship. The most controversial element of this warm relationship was the Nord Stream Pipeline deal, which Chancellor Schröder personally developed with Putin. That Schröder was appointed to head the implementation of this energy supply project after leaving office in Germany has been seen as a huge embarrassment to German politicians and as confirmation of the former Chancellor's personal aims.

Once Angela Merkel replaced Chancellor Schröder in Germany, it was expected that Germany's views and attitude towards Russia would converge towards that of other EU nations in that Merkel promised to take a harder line and be tougher on Moscow.

France, alongside Germany, found itself in a very friendly relationship with Russia in standing up against America's invasion of Iraq in 2003. These three nations bonded together to try and counter American influence on world affairs (See Permanent Mission of France to the UN: "Iraq: Declaration Russia-Germany-France," 2003). France's attitude towards Russia dampened later during the Orange Revolution, when Paris openly

criticized Russia's actions in the Ukraine and their support for the anti-reformist Viktor Yanukovich (Gomart 2008, 152).

Russia found much favor with Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and the leaders' personal relationship with Russia was considered to be a warm one (Barysch, May 2007). On the business side of relations, Russia became Italy's number one non-EU export market in 2006.

Poland, on the other hand, had been very critical of Russia in general, and especially of its energy policies. Polish politicians from across all parties severely criticized the Nord Stream Pipeline plan and saw the deal as an attempt from Moscow to reclaim imperialistic control over Eastern Europe (Larsson 2007, 55).

The UK has had a varying relationship with Russia. While economic cooperations have been positive, specifically through BP's involvement in developing the Russian energy sector, these ties have been countered by high political tensions between the two nations. The UK has been criticized by Russia for granting asylum to various political opponents of the Kremlin, such as Boris Berezovsky as well as supports of Chechnya.

Assessment: The attitudes of individual EU nations towards Russia are diverse. The two extremes lay at Germany and Italy's very friendly relationship with Russia and Poland's, along with the Baltic nation's outright skepticism and criticism of Russia. Other large nations, such as the UK and France, were somewhere in between these two extremes.

At the time the German leadership shifted from Schröder to Merkel, it was expected that positions within the EU would converge, as Merkel highly criticized

Schröder's self-interest oriented involvement in the Nord Stream pipeline as well as his close relationship with Putin.

Scoring: Authority

Out of the three sub-criterion for authority, the EU successfully attained the second, while demonstrating partial fulfillment of the first and potential to achieve the third. Due to the high level of formal and informal policy networks between the EU and Russia, and the restricted, but significant legal mandate which the EU held to act in the field of energy, the EU can be said to have possessed a limited amount of authority in energy policy on Russia.

The critical competence to negotiate binding contracts for individual member states was not held by the EU. Nevertheless, the EU has been very active on behalf of its member states in issues concerning energy policy and does possess a limited amount of authority over member states. Although member-state attitudes towards Russia varied considerably over the time, they showed the potential to converge due largely to Germany's election of Merkel and the high importance of energy policy. Therefore, the criteria for Authority were moderately met.

MODERATE

Analysis: Recognition

1) Was the EU seen as a legitimate partner by Russia in energy policy?

It is evident through the founding foreign policy documents of the Putin presidency that Russia's perception of the EU as a legitimate partner was ambitious. In reaction to

lackluster and simply unsuccessful relations with the EU before 1999, the Putin administration was hopeful to create better relations with the Union. The Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation from 2000 criticized the integration process of the EU for “decrying the role of a sovereign state”, but also stated that the Russian Federation regarded the EU as “one of its main political and economic partners.” (Government of Russia, “Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation,” 92). The initiative was clear to strive towards more stability and cooperation between Russia and the EU, and not to have a relationship which was “susceptible to fluctuations” (*Ibid*). A clearer example of this desire for better relations with Brussels can also be found in Russia’s “Strategy for Development of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the European Union”, which was adopted in 2000. In this document, secretary of Russia’s Security Council in 2005-06 Igor Ivanov calls the EU “one of our key partners in world politics and the world economy”. (Ivanov 2002, 263).

Specifically in the field of energy, Russian officials have treated their EU counterparts as legitimate partners in energy policy matters. Evidence of this can be found in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, which was overseen at ministerial level in Moscow.

Assessment: The evidence suggests that Russia indeed viewed the EU as an important international partner in energy matters, as relations with Brussels were treated as a high priority in the foreign policy of Russia. Because Russia actively participated in EU policy networks and summitry, then it was indeed serious about the EU as an energy partner.

2) Was EU cooperation in energy policy demanded by Russia?

The EU is dependent on Russia for gas and oil, and Russia needs the demand of EU member states for its gas supply. Building infrastructure to sell to new Asian markets is not economically feasible for Russia currently, and without the EU's demand, Russia would be at a huge economic loss. Of concern to Russia is the fact that the EU is currently striving to diminish its reliance on Russian energy through projects like the Nabucco pipeline, which would transport supplies from Central Asian and Turkish energy markets to EU member states. Russian energy suppliers are threatened by this action and therefore have counteracted the EU's divergence away from their supplies by making exclusive energy deals with individual member states in order to secure future demand of their energy products. The Nord Stream pipeline agreement between Germany and Russia is a prime example of this type of agreement, but Russia is also striving towards a new project, South Stream, with Italy.

Assessment: Russia realizes it needs the EU's demand for energy and has tried to cooperate with the EU on energy policies, but all previous initiatives have proven unsatisfactory. Despite agreements such as the PCA, CES, and the Russian-Energy Dialogue, goals on energy policy cooperation between the two parties have not been reached. Due to the fact that the EU is now openly seeking non-Russian supplies of energy, Russia feels discarded by the EU as a worthy energy partner and has therefore taken up bilateral relations with Germany, as well as continues to maintain hold over the Ukraine pipelines. Russia has also recently signed a new energy deal with Italy called South Stream, which is rivaling the EU's Nabucco project. In the end, Russia did not demand EU cooperation, but it did seek the cooperation of European nations in energy

policy. Russia initially attempted to negotiate cooperation in energy policy with the EU, but because all efforts have proven unsatisfactory and are not progressing further, Russia has decided to approach individual nations.

Scoring Recognition:

Some researchers suggest that Russia often looked down on the EU as less than an international actor, and merely “tended to view the EU only as an economic alliance, never as a competitor for the role of one of the world’s future superpowers” (Rahr, 224). The nature of energy politics within the EU suggests that any preference on Russia’s part for taking up bilateral energy relations with individual EU nations must also have been reciprocated by these individual nations themselves. The EU otherwise had substantial legitimacy to deal with Russia in general, and specifically in energy politics. This is therefore a case of the EU not capitalizing on its power in relations with third parties, as it was not the case that Russia did not recognize the EU as a partner in energy matters. The criteria for recognition is considered to be moderately fulfilled in this case, since the EU did indeed receive recognition from Russia, but itself failed to realize and act successfully on this recognition.

MODERATE

Analysis: Autonomy

- 1) Did major member states accept that their position was represented by the EU, or channel their policy preference through EU institutions?

In the example of the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute, the member-states acceptance of the EU as their representative was extensive, but not complete. Some member states emphasized dealing with Russia (and Ukraine) bilaterally, while some called for the EU to act.

During the Russian-Ukrainian 2006 gas crisis, German, French, Italian and Austrian energy and economic ministers communicated with energy ministers in Russia (and Ukraine), asking for them to find a solution to the crisis. Although these letters stated the concern of each minister for gas supplies to EU member states and claimed to be acting in the EU's interest, they did not do so through EU representation, but rather approached Russia on an interstate basis, which can be seen in the frequent use of the concern about "relations between the states of the undersigned energy ministers and your country" (see "Gasstreit Russland-Ukraine," December 2005).

Leading up to the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, diplomacy on the state-to-state level was higher than when the gas crisis actually began. During and afterwards, many major EU member states such as the UK, France, and Italy began to call for coherent EU energy policy which would be appropriate for responding to this and future energy crises. For example, on January 2, 2006 Gianfranco Fini, the Italian foreign minister, asked the President of the EU Commission Barroso to take "diplomatic initiative" in finding a solution to the energy crisis and claimed that it was Europe's "duty" to intervene, since the EU possessed the "political strength to convince Moscow and Kiev" (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs of Italy, “Minister Fini writes to the Austrian President of the EU and to President of the Commission Barroso regarding the Russian-Ukraine crisis,” 2006).

Both during and after the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, German officials were directly in contact with Russian representatives, an example of which is the discussion held between Michael Glos, Germany’s economic minister, and the former Russian president Putin. Although these talks were direct between Germany and Russia, they did welcome the activities of the EU Commission (Federal Ministry for Economy and Technology, “Glos: “Gasversorgung in jedem Fall gewährleistet,” 2006).

During and after the 2006 Russian-Ukraine gas dispute, many EU member states began calling for a better EU energy policy, but Chancellor Merkel began to take interest in Germany’s national energy policy. In January 2006, Chancellor Merkel announced the drafting of a German national energy strategy, which would involve German energy producers (“Merkel to plot energy strategy for Germany,” Financial Times, 2006). This new strategy emerged out of “concern about the security of supplies after the recent dispute between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas shipments” and it was “aimed at securing future energy needs” (*Ibid*). These examples show a clear break from the pro-EU line in energy policy of Germany away from other major EU nations.

Similar to Germany’s break, Poland led its Visegrad neighbors, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic into issuing a joint statement at the EU Gas Coordination Group (GCG) on January 4th, 2006, calling for less reliance on Russian energy (“Central Europe seeks less reliance on Russian gas,” Reuters News, January 3rd 2008). This was similar to Germany’s call for less reliance on Russian energy, and also aided the effect of Germany’s actions by breaking down autonomy in the EU.

Assessment: The data demonstrates that most member states did indeed accept the EU as a representative in energy policy, with an increase in the desire for the EU to have a bigger role growing after the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis in 2006. Despite this trend, the acceptance of the EU as a representative was not complete.

German officials' statements and actions show a movement in the opposite direction in that they called for more nation-centered development of energy policy with Russia. Although Germany was in favor of the European Union taking action in the 2006 gas crisis and developing a more substantial energy policy of its own (see for example: Spiegel-Geprach: "Ich Habe Antworten," Der Spiegel, January 9, 2006), German officials were considerably less enthusiastic about moving energy policy too far in the supranational direction.

2) Did Council Presidency officials consider themselves to be "European" representatives?

In the 2006 Russian-Ukraine gas dispute, soon to be EU President Austria's communications with Russia, along with those communications of Germany, France, and Italy, initially called for bilateral relations, but after being appointed President of the EU in January, Austria took on the role of representing the EU in relations with Russia. Addressing the European Parliament on the 18th of January, Chancellor Schüssel claimed that the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis had "showed us that major work had to be done at European level to resolve a hitherto purely national issue such as energy supply. A greater European dimension is needed here...long-term solutions for Europe are the only possible answer" ("Speech by the President of the European Council, Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schlüssel," January 18, 2006).

Earlier, at the very beginning of Austria's EU Presidency, foreign minister Ursula Plassnik assured that the EU would "devote due attention to the political dimension of energy at various levels during Austria's Presidency," making energy issues a top focus of the Union's spring summit (Austrian Presidency of the European Union, "Gas dispute Russia-Ukraine: Foreign Minister welcomes agreement between Moscow and Kiev," Vienna: Government of Austria, January 4th, 2006).

Assessment: Despite the bilateral diplomacy demonstrated by the letters of the largest EU member states to Russia immediately preceding the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis, once Austria assumed the role of EU Presidency, its actions were in line with acting in the interest of the EU, and not simply its own nation. In this instance, the EU Presidency did consider itself to be foremost "European" and to concern itself with the good of the EU rather than acting firstly as a representation of one's member state.

Scoring: Autonomy

Sub-criterion for Autonomy was only partially filled. Some nations were willing to accept the EU as their representative in the example of the gas crisis. Others, particularly Germany, resorted to relying more heavily on national competences for energy security and energy policy. Merkel's outspoken desire to focus on a new German national energy strategy separate from the EU, while all other major EU member states were calling for more cooperation on energy policy at the EU level, essentially broke down the autonomy of the EU directly following the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis.

MODERATE

Analysis: Cohesion

- 1) Were major member-states taking actions contradictory to or incompatible with supranational ones on energy policy with Russia?

The official position of the EU during and after the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis in 2006 was that no party was to blame, but rather that, as minister Bartenstein claimed, “in the absence of sufficient information, we refrained from apportioning blame in any way” (European Parliament, “Debates: Tuesday, 17 January 2006,” Brussels: European Union). Many member states followed the EU in this stance, such as France, warning that such “commercial disputes” should not take on a political dimension (Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of France, Point de Presse: Declarations du Porte-Parole, January 3, 2007).

In contrast to the reactions of nations such as France, Germany used the crisis to reiterate its support for the Nord Stream pipeline. Although the Nord Stream project had approval of the Commission, the German leader’s stark reiteration of its superior importance contradicted EU policy action in that it opposed the Union’s efforts to focus on the Nabucco gas line project, which is unaffiliated with Gazprom, as a guarantor of energy security following the 2006 gas crises (President of Russia “Press Conference Following Talks with the Federal Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel”, 2006). Chancellor Merkel agreed with France and other EU nations in that she recognized the dispute as commercial, and claimed it had been politicized (see Der Spiegel, Spiegel Gespräch: “Ich Habe Antworten”), but ultimately contradicted the stance of the European Union’s efforts to make the Nabucco project the main guarantor of energy security for EU member states.

Poland, on the other hand, used this gas crisis to blame Russia and defined diversification of energy supplies as “access to non Russian gas and oil” (Ministry of Economic Affairs of Poland, “Stanowisko polskiego rządu na posiedzenie Grupy Koordynacyjnej ds. Gazu Komisji Europejskiej,” February 2009). Further, Poland openly accused Russia for the crisis and did not diplomatically comment on the EU’s position in the crisis, although it did praise the US’s efforts to support Ukraine’s stance (“Polish defense minister applauds US support for Ukraine in gas crisis,” Interfax Poland Business News Service, 3rd January 2006). The example of Poland shows that Germany was not the sole large member state contradicting the EU’s positions towards Russia following the 2006 gas crisis.

Assessment: Following the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute, both Germany and Poland contradicted the EU’s stance on dealing with the parties involved and the future of the EU’s energy policy. Germany failed to emphasize the Nabucco project and was instead more concerned with its own bilateral energy relations and energy security issues by way of the Nord Stream project, which indefinitely broke down cohesion within the Union on the issue at hand.

Poland also played an important role in undermining EU cohesion in that it declared itself leader of the Visegrad states and contradicted the EU’s efforts to appear impartial to both parties in the gas dispute by out rightly blaming Russia, demonstrating that not only Germany broke cohesion of the EU.

2) Were the Commission's, Council's, and Parliament's actions internally consistent?

Unlike the Council President and the Commission, which held the view that the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis was commercial and that no one was fully to blame, the EU Parliament was highly condemnatory of Russia's role as a trustworthy supplier of energy following the crisis. On January 17th, 2006 during a EU Parliamentary debate on the issue on the future of EU energy security, the EU's reliance on Russian gas was described as "dangerous" and "unacceptable" (European Parliament, "Debates," January 17, 2006). Konrad Szumański, the UEN representative, went so far as to claim that after the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis, "Russia has forfeited its status as a stable and reliable partner. The only question that remains is what conclusions will be drawn by the European Union and the individual Member States" (*Ibid*).

Assessment: Although the Parliament has no executive function in the Union and no specific role in crisis response, its disagreement with the Council Presidency and Commission severely undermined the EU's credibility following the Russian-Ukraine gas dispute in 2006 by contradicting the post-crisis stance of the Commission and Council on energy policy relations with Russia.

Scoring: Cohesion

The EU failed to meet the criterion for Cohesion due both to Germany and Poland's contradictory-to-the-EU rhetoric, and the EP's "mood" during and after the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute. The legislative branch, although un-influential, was not in step with the executive branch; this would not occur so severely in a nation state and

has severely hindered the EU's influence as a unitary international actor. The other member-states were much more in favor of the EU's supranational position and actions.

FAIL

Analysis: Capability

1) Did the EU take independent action?

In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute, it can be said that the EU did take considerable independent action. The Commission called for a convening of the Gas Coordination Group (GCG), which had recently been set up, although had never before convened. The Gas Coordination Group was established through Council Directive 2004/67/EC in November 2006 and it aims to facilitate the coordination of security of supply measures between EU Member States (European Commission, "Security of Supply: Gas Coordination Group", November 7, 2006). Since the GCG had never convened before, the Commission's initiative in convening it demonstrated how serious the EU's intentions were to deal with the gas dispute.

Javier Solana, High Representative for CSFP and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, external relations commissioner, were active on behalf of the EU during the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis and took action in that they communicated independently with Russia (as well as Ukraine) ("Russian gas returns to Europe; Ukraine talks start," Reuters News, January 2, 2006).

Assessment: In the instance of the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis of 2006, the fact the crisis quickly came to an end after a period of only four days did not allow the EU to prove the extent to which it may have acted independently if the crisis had continued.

What was shown, however, is that in the short time of the crisis, the EU did act independently and the data suggests that if the crisis would have continued, the EU would have continued actively and independently seeking a solution.

2) Did the EU have a significant impact?

In the instance of the Russian-Ukraine gas dispute in 2006, the fact that it ended as quickly as it did suggested that Russia wanted to find a solution before the EU meeting on energy in January 2006. This therefore suggests that the EU was indeed effective in bringing the energy crisis to an end as quickly as possible. Although the EU refrained from attempting to mediate between Russia and the Ukraine during the crisis, EU representatives were very active in resolving this conflict and it can be said that the Union had an impact on its outcome.

Assessment: In the instance of the gas crisis, the EU wanted a speedy solution – and that is what it received. The Union's refrain to mediate the crisis, but voicing of displeasure proved useful in bringing the crisis to an end.

Scoring: Capability

In the instance of the Russian-Ukraine gas crisis, no other nation, institution, or outside organization was as active as the European Union in actively pursuing a solution to the crisis. Some obstacles posed to the Union's overall effectiveness in this instance were the short time scale of the crisis and the Union's professed neutrality, but the EU nevertheless did have a definite impact on the outcome of the crisis.

SUCCESS

Review of Analysis

In this test of actorness, the European Union failed to achieve international actor status. Reviewing the criterion one by one and considering the specific areas in which the EU succeeded and in which it failed will be helpful in understanding the abilities and limits of EU foreign policy.

The European Union only moderately met the criterion for authority. This was due to the fact that the EU had demonstrated a limited legal ability to act in energy relations with Russia, but nevertheless possessed very dense and expansive preexisting formal as well as informal ties to Russia in the energy sector. Despite the diversity of member state values and interest towards Russia, these showed a potential to converge, especially after German Chancellor Schröder was replaced by Chancellor Merkel. However, until the EU is able to conclude binding contracts for member states, the authority of the EU will not be complete. Although there is much rhetoric calling for a single European energy market, the EU is still far away from achieving full authority over energy policy among its member states. The partial fulfillment of the criteria for authority in this test case therefore lies in the nature, structure, and legal system of the EU, and not in the actions of Germany or any other individual member state.

The criteria for recognition were only partially fulfilled in this study of EU foreign policy. Russia stated numerous times that it viewed the EU as a legitimate partner, not only an economic and business oriented one, but also in the field of energy. Russians demonstrated their willingness to work with the EU by attending more meetings with this institution than with any other, and gave EU summits priority at the ministerial level in Moscow. However, in engaging the EU as Russia did in energy policy, it did not

demand the EU's cooperation. The EU was largely at fault for not properly reciprocating Russia's efforts for cooperation, and therefore Russia turned to the individual member states (i.e. Germany and Italy), which were ready and willing to take up bilateral energy deals. This is therefore not a case of Germany purposely seeking out nationalistic gains and disregarding the EU, but rather a failure of the EU to take critical action in energy policy and the subsequent reaction of Germany to fill the vacuum of this type of policy.

The criterion for autonomy was also only partially met in this test case. Most member states accepted the EU as a representative in energy policy when dealing with Russia, especially following the 2006 Russian-Ukraine gas crisis. However, Germany's stark move in the opposite direction, in which it declared it would focus more heavily on its national energy supply and security through emphasizing the Nord Stream Pipeline, significantly reduced the EU's autonomy following the crisis. Alongside Germany's, Poland's stark comments condemning Russia as an extremely unreliable energy partner and sudden push to seek non-Russian energy supplies also hindered the EU from fulfilling the requirements for autonomy. Despite the fact that the EU presidency did act as a representative of the EU, Germany's and Poland's actions contradicted the EU and therefore broke autonomy in the Union. In this instance, it can be argued that Germany's independent actions led to a partial breakdown of unity, and therefore actorness, in EU-Russian relations. One must consider, however that Germany was not alone in this process; Poland's rhetoric and actions were also significantly damaging to EU autonomy.

The European Union failed to fulfill the criterion for cohesion. Germany's shift towards its own national energy sources and security issues hindered the EU from fulfilling the criterion for cohesion. Germany was not the sole breaker of cohesion in this

case study, as Poland's bold declaration as leader of the Visegrad nations and outright blaming of Russia for the gas crisis, despite the EU's claim neutrality in the matter, also prevented the EU from fulfilling the criterion for cohesion. Also, the European Parliament demonstrated a break from the Commission and Council in that, while the other two bodies maintained that the issue was a commercial one during and after the 2006 Russian-Ukraine gas crisis and maintained that neither party was to blame for the crisis, the EP spoke out directly against Russia and warned against further cooperation with Russia in the field of energy policy and security. Therefore Germany's actions, along with those of Poland and the EP, are to blame for the failure of the EU to meet the criteria of cohesion in this test case.

The European Union did successfully meet the criterion for capability. Considering the 2006 Russian-Ukraine gas crisis, the EU demonstrated that it could take independent action in areas of energy policy. The representatives were very active diplomats leading up to, throughout, and following the crisis. Due to the short time span during which this particular crisis took place, the EU was not given the opportunity to prove its full ability, but can nevertheless be said to have had a significant impact on the outcome of the crisis as Russia restored gas flows to the Ukraine and ended the crisis before the EU was able to hold a conference on the crisis itself.

The scoring of the analysis is summarized in Table 1 in order to review the outcome of each criteria.

Table 1: Actorness Scoring

CRITERIA	OUTCOME
Authority	Moderate
Recognition	Moderate
Autonomy	Moderate
Cohesion	Fail
Capability	Success

7. Conclusion

In this test case, the EU failed to fulfill the criteria for effective actorness. Although the Union was successful in the area of capability, it only showed partial fulfillment of the authority, recognition and autonomy criteria, while completely failing to meet the criteria for cohesion. This test analysis demonstrates that the initial assumption, which stated that the EU indeed failed to achieve unitary actor status in its energy relations with Russia, has been confirmed.

This analysis has also supported the original hypothesis that although Germany's bilateral relations with Russia did not promote EU actorness, they were not the sole cause of the breakdown of actorness in EU-Russian relations. Other nations have been equally active in bilateral relations with Russia, such as Italy under the terms of the new South Stream gas pipeline project, and some have been detrimentally hostile in their rhetoric towards Russia, such as Poland. However, most significant to this test case and to actorness in the EU is the considerably restricted legal mandate of the EU to bind member states to energy policies. Without this ability, the EU cannot be considered to demonstrate complete actorness. This brings up an important question, namely, regarding the definition and usefulness of actorness as a framework within which to evaluate the EU, and this question will be addressed later in this chapter.

Limitations to the Research

Although this test case has brought evidence to bear on the effects which bilateral relations between individual member states and third parties, specifically German-Russian relations, have on EU actorness, there were many limitations to the analysis. Firstly, the ever changing nature of the EU has posed a serious challenge in testing actorness. As mentioned previously in this thesis, the ability of the EU to achieve actor status on the world stage varies on a case-to-case basis, as well as between different types of policies. Foreign policy under the three pillar system is especially complex and remains intergovernmental in nature, unlike economic policy. Once the Lisbon Treaty is fully adopted and implemented, and foreign policy becomes more supranational, then testing the effect of bilateral relations on EU actorness may become somewhat easier in that the rules of decision making and legal mandate of the EU will be more obvious.

The nature of energy policy itself has posed challenges to this research in that it is an ever developing area of policy, but also one which touches on very sensitive issues of national security interests. Because the EU's goals for energy policy are not fully developed, it is difficult to rate the success of such an incomplete policy. It has also been a challenge to find the specific areas of authority which the EU does hold over member states in energy policy as opposed to those which member states retain. It is known that the EU is optimistic about its plans for a single energy market, but currently possess legal authority over member states only in areas of counteracting climate change and restricted activities in security of supplies. Because of the complex nature of this mixed competence, it is difficult to assess the EU's action in energy policy. However, judging

from its success in implementing a unitary economic policy, the EU has definite potential to become a noteworthy international actor in the realm of energy policy.

To further deepen this analysis, it would be helpful to look at the effects of bilateral relations between EU nations other than Germany and a variety of third parties. As Germany is the largest nation in the EU and one of the most influential member states, this thesis has demonstrated the significance effects which such a member state can have on EU foreign policy. However, it would be beneficial to compare the effects that bilateral relations between other member nations and Russia have on EU actorness in order to better understand whether or not Germany is truly a special case. Specifically of relevance to this point would be to analysis Italian-Russian relations, as their cooperation in business and energy seems to rival the cooperation between Germany and Russia. Further, this analysis would benefit with researching bilateral relations with EU member states and third parties other than Russia. The EU has multiple partnerships with many countries around the world, but whether the EU demonstrates actorness with certain countries and not with others is not clear. It would therefore be informative to the study of the EU as an international actor to evaluate EU actorness in relations to multiple third parties, also including its activities in international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).

This analysis has been restricted to energy policy, but there are many areas of policy outside of energy which the EU is now striving to implement on the international stage, an example of which is a European security and defense policy. Research on the EU's ability to demonstrate actorness in areas outside of energy policy would help to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of the EU in a variety of global affairs.

Alongside the benefits that expanding this analysis could provide, narrowing it down into more specific parameters could also allow this study to be more informative. For example, it would be of interest to this field of study to choose one issue as the main focus of the analysis, such as the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, and to evaluate EU actorness more thoroughly in this sole instance. Such research would provide a more specific picture of the EU's abilities in international affairs.

Actorness as a Framework for the EU

Although the EU failed to meet the criteria for actorness in this thesis, the results do not suggest that the EU's role has no significance. In fact, the opposite has been shown to be the case. The EU may have a complex role in international affairs, but it has a role nonetheless. Due to the evolving nature of EU institutions, the continuing expansion of the Union, the shifting constellations of member-state governments, and the role of third party actors, the task of acting with unity is still a considerable challenge to the members of the EU when forming and implementing foreign policy. This is especially the case in the sensitive field of energy. For this reason, it would be meaningful to consider viewing actorness as a continuum rather than a binary state.

The framework of measuring actorness used in this thesis has attempted to be consistent as well as sensitive in analyzing the EU's energy relations with Russia. However, the criteria are still considerably broad, which leads to a somewhat disjointed set of evidence with which to evaluate EU actorness. The most defining pieces of evidence come from the laws and legal documents of the EU and parties in question, and this type of evidence has been used as often as possible in this thesis. However, other

less pronounced, but still meaningful information, such as the informal ties between the EU and third parties, the compatibility of member states' attitudes towards certain policies, and the EU's intervention in specific crisis or events is also instructive of EU actorness.

Therefore, a non-binary definition of actorness would help to better gauge the EU's level of actorness in certain areas, making it easier to understand how or if the EU could increase actorness in needed areas. Rather than requiring that the EU either be an actor or deciding that it is not one, actorness should be assigned in the context of degrees. In doing so, one could better understand the areas in which the EU is approaching actorness and also be able to make suggestions on how it could reach a higher level of actorness. The EU is obviously functioning in the current system of international affairs, but simply does not meet the high standards of a binary understanding of actorness in each area of policy.

Future Outlook

This thesis has provided a reasonable test of actorness in the context of EU-Russian energy relations with regards to the bilateral relations between Germany and Russia. In reviewing the results of this test, one can see that the challenges facing the EU in achieving actor status are not few. What has been shown through this test is that Germany's bilateral relations with Russia have not been the sole cause of a breakdown in EU actorness, although they have contributed to the EU's failure to achieve actor status. More significant are the issues concerning the EU's legal mandate and ability to bind member states to policies. Without this ability, unitary action in EU foreign policy, and

therefore EU actorness, will be dependent on the voluntary cooperation of all EU member states.

Since this thesis only analyzes EU foreign policy under pre-Lisbon Treaty protocol, future analysis of EU actorness would benefit from taking into consideration the new organizational features brought in by the Lisbon Treaty. Because the changes will affect the method in which EU foreign policy is conducted, analyzing the EU's performance under the new system would further the understanding of the EU's abilities and roles in international affairs, as the Lisbon Treaty will attempt to streamline foreign policy into a less intergovernmental process. Considering the findings of this thesis, an improvement specifically in the cohesion of the member states and institutions within the EU through the Lisbon Treaty would aid the EU in coming closer to achieving actor status.

Also included in the plans of the Lisbon Treaty is the creation of a single diplomat for the EU in matters of foreign policy. As the EU only partially fulfilled the criteria for recognition in this test case, it could be expected that better representation to third parties could have great meaning for EU actorness in that it could boost the EU's recognition on the world stage. In this thesis, the EU failed to fulfill the requirement for recognition due to not capitalizing on the initiatives of Russia. If a single representative of the EU were given the task to engage in diplomacy and foreign policy with third parties, then the EU's ability to capitalize on the initiatives of other international actors would be increased inasmuch as it would concentrate the goals and efforts of the EU into a single channel rather than into a biannual rotating representative. A single diplomat for the EU would

also make it significantly easier for the EU to initiate actions of foreign policy with third parties on its own, as well as provide more distinct “face” of the EU to the world.

In any case, the study of the EU will remain a rich area of academic investigation in the future. Further developments and combinations of actor criteria applied to the EU in a variety of policy areas would benefit the study of the EU as an international actor. Due to being relatively new on the international stage and its ever developing institutions, the possible research and analysis topics concerning the EU are extensive. The research conducted in this thesis has added to the growing understanding of the European Union and its capabilities on the international stage.

8. Bibliography

- Austrian Presidency of the European Union, "Gas dispute Russia-Ukraine: Foreign Minister welcomes agreement between Moscow and Kiev," Vienna: Government of Austria. January 4th, 2006. Retrieved on February 10, 2010 from http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/Press_Releases/January/plassnik_0401.html?null
- Baysch, Katinka. (2004) "The EU and Russia: Strategic Partners or Squabbling Neighbors?" *Centre for European Reform*. Retrieved 2 January, 2010, from http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p564_russia_strat_squabb.pdf
- Baysch, Katinka. (May, 2007) "Three Questions That Europe Must Ask Russia." *Centre for European Reform*. Retrieved on January 5, 2010, from http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_russia_16may07_kb.pdf
- Baysch, Katinka. (July, 2007) "Russia, Realism, and EU Unity." *Centre for European Reform*. Retrieved on January 5, 2010, from http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_russia_FINAL_20july07.pdf
- Baysch, Katinka. (2008) "Pipelines, Politics and Power." *Centre for European Reform*. 1-14. Retrieved on January 5, 2010 from http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/rp_851.pdf
- Bretherton, Charlotte, and John Vogler. (2006). The European Union as a Global Actor. Routledge: London.
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit. (December 2005). "Gasstreit Russland-Ukraine: Gemeinsames Schreiben Der Energieminister Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Italiens, und Österreich an Ihre Russischen Und Ukrainischen Kollegen [Gas Dispute Russia-Ukraine: Collective Correspondence from the Energy Ministers of Germany, France, Italy, and Austria to their Russian and Ukrainian Colleagues]." Retrieved on February 21, 2010 from http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20051231_OTS0032
- Caporaso, James and Joseph Jupille. (1998) "States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics." The European Union in the World Community. Lynne Rienner: Boulder. 19-44
- Carlsnaes, Walter. (2004). "Foreign Policy Analysis and the New Europe." Contemporary European Foreign Policy. SAGE Publishers: London. 11-31

- Council of the European Union, "Speech by the President of the European Council, Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schäussel." Vienna: Government of Austria, January 18th 2006. Retrieved February 19, 2010, from http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/Speeches_Interviews/1801schuesselredeep.html
- Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004. Brussels: European Union, 2004. Retrieved on February 1, 2010 from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0067:EN:HTML>
- Council of the European Union, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy." Brussels: European Union, 2003. Retrieved on February 2, 2010 from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>
- Der Spiegel. (January 9, 2006). "Ich Habe Antworten [I Have Answers]." *SPIEGEL ONLINE*. Retrieved on January 20, 2010 from <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45280013.html>
- Emerson, Michael. (2007) "The Elephant and the Bear Try Again: Options for a New Agreement Between the EU and Russia." *Centre for European Studies*. (4): 1-120.
- Erixon, Fedrik. "Russia Divides and Rules Europe." *Business News & Financial News - The Wall Street Journal - WSJ.com*. 2 June 2009. Retrieved on August 10, 2009 from <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124389030958373823.html>
- European Commission, "Agreement on partnership and co-operation and establishing a partnership between the European Communities and their Member-states, of one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part," Article 65, Brussels: European Union, November 28, 1997.
- European Commission, "Road Map for the Common Economic Space- Building Blocks for Sustained Economic Growth." Brussels: European Union, 2005. Retrieved on February 11, 2010 from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/pdf/road_map_ces.pdf
- European Commission, "EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Sixth Progress Report," Brussels: European Union, 2005: 2
- European Commission, "Security of Supply: Gas Coordination Group", November 7, 2006. Retrieved on February 20, 2010 from http://ec.europa.eu/energy/security/gas/gas_coordination_group_en.htm

- European Parliament, "Debates: Tuesday, 17 January 2006," Brussels: European Union. Retrieved on 11 February 2010 from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20060117&secondRef=ITEM-011&format=XML&language=EN>
- Federal Ministry for Economy and Technology of Germany, "Gasversorgung in Jedem Fall Gewährleistet [Guarantees of Gas Supply in Any Case]," Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie. Berlin: January 2, 2006. Retrieved February 21, 2010 from <http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Presse/pressemitteilungen.did=90194.html?view=renderPrint>
- Gomart, Thomas. (July 2008). "EU-Russian Relations: Toward a Way Out of Depression." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*.
- Groenleer, Martijn, and Louise Van Shaik. (2008). "United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 31(3): 305-328.
- Government of Russia, "Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation," in Adrei Melville and Tatiana Shaklenia, eds., Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002) 165-180.
- Hadfield, Amelia. (2008). "EU-Russia Energy Relations: Aggregation and Aggravation," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. 16(2): 231-248.
- Haukkala, Hiski. (2008). "The Role of Norms and Values in the European Union's Russia Policy," Russia and Europe in the Twenty-First Century: An Uneasy Partnership. Anthem Press: London. 133-148.
- Heinz, Dominic. (2007). "A Review of EU-Russian Relations: Added Value or Structurally Deficient?" Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung: Bonn.
- Interfax Poland Business News Service, "Polish defense minister applauds US support for Ukraine in gas crisis," January 3, 2006.
- Ivanov, Igor (2002). "Russian Foreign Policy on the Eve of the 21st Century: Problems of Formation, Development, and Continuity," Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities. Central European University Press: Budapest. 235-268.
- Larsson, Robert (2007, October). "Tackling Dependency: The EU and its Energy Security Challenges." *Swedish Defense Research Agency Defense Analysis*.

- Leonard, Mark and Popescu, Nicu. (November 2007). "A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations," *European Council on Foreign Relations*.
< http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/eu_russia_relations/>
- Lukyanov, Fyodor. (2008, August). "Russia-EU: The Partnership That Went Astray," *Europe-Asia Studies*. 60(6): 1107-1119.
- Mandelson, Peter. (April 20, 2007) Speech: *The EU and Russia: Our Joint Political Challenge*, Bologna.
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/242>
- Medvedev, Sergei. (2008). "The Stalemate in EU-Russia Relations: Between "Sovereignty" and "Europeanization"," *Russia's European Choice*. Palgrave MacMillan: New York. 215-232.
- Financial Times. (January 6, 2006). "Merkel to plot energy strategy for Germany." Retrieved on February 21, 2010 from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b512fc6-7eef-11da-a6a2-0000779e2340.html?ncllick_check=1
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, "Minister Fini Writes to the Austrian President of the EU and to President of the Commission Barroso regarding the Russian-Ukraine Crisis." Rome: January 2, 2006. Retrieved on February 21, 2010 from http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Comunicati/2006/01/Comunicato_31.htm
- Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of France, "Point de Presse: Declarations du Porte-Parole," January 3, 2007.
- Ministry of Economic Affairs of Poland, "Stanowisko polskiego rządu na posiedzenie Grupy Koordynacyjnej ds. Gazu Komisji Europejskiej." January 4, 2006. Government of Poland: Warsaw.
<http://www.mg.gov.pl/Wiadomosci/Archiwum/Rok+2006/Stanowisko+polskiego++posiedzenie+Grupy+Koordynacyjnej+ds+gazu+Komisji+Europejskiej.htm>
- Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, "Iraq: Declaration Russia-Germany-France," March 5, 2003. Government of France: New York. 5th March 2003. Retrieved January 19, 2010 from http://www.un.int/france/documents_anglais/030305_mae_france_irak.htm
- President of Russia (January 16, 2006). "Press Conference Following Talks with the Federal Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel," Moscow: Government of Russia. Retrieved on 20 January, 2010 from http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/themes/2006/01/161734_100315.shtml

- Pursiainen, Christer. (2008). "Theories of Integration and the Limits of EU-Russian Relations," Russia's European Choice. Palgrave MacMillan: New York. 149-186.
- Rahr, Alexander. (2005) "Russia-European Union-Germany After September 11 and Iraq," Russia's Engagement with the West. ME Sharpe: New York. 223-237.
- Rennie, David. (August 30, 2008). "Charlemagne-The European Union and Russia," The Economist. 388(8595): 54
- Reuters News, "Central Europe seeks less reliance on Russian gas," January 3rd 2008
- Reuters News, "Russian gas returns to Europe; Ukraine talks start," January 2, 2006
- Rosamond, Ben. (2000). Theories of European Integration. St. Martin's Press: New York.
- Schmidt-Felzmann, Anke. (2008, August). "All for One? EU Member States and the Union's Common Policy Towards the Russian Federation," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. 16(2): 169-187.
- Smith, Karen. (2008). European Union Foreign Policy In a Changing World. Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Timmis, Graham. (December 2006). "German Ostpolitik Under the Red-Green Coalition and EU-Russian Relations". *Debatte*. 14(3): 301-314.
- Timmis, Graham. (2007). "German-Russian Bilateral Relations and EU Policy on Russia: Reconciling the Two Level Game?" Russia and Europe in the Twenty-First Century: An Uneasy Partnership. Anthem Press: London. 169-184.