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
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We wish to thank the editors of Thinking, the Russian Journal of Philosophy for Children, *for permission to translate parts or all of their articles in Issue No. 1 (1995) of their periodical. This includes the articles by A.A. Margolis, E. A. Kondrat'ev, and M.V. Telegin.*

The article by Prof. Nina Yulina is published here with her permission, and the article by V.V. Davydov is published with his permission.

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THINKING IN STORIES

By Gareth B. Matthews



Gareth B. Matthews teaches philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Posy Simmonds, **Lulu and the Flying Babies,** London: Penguin Books, 1991.

Lulu, her baby brother, Willy, and her parents are getting dressed warmly to go out into the winter cold. Lulu is impatient. As it turns out, Lulu is *always* impatient. She already has her red jacket and red-and-white cap on. "**When** are we going to the **Park**?" she shouts. Eventually everyone is ready for the outing.

On the way to the park Lulu's parents stop to chat with friends, who want a chance to admire little Willy. Lulu tries to hurry her family along. "**When** are we going to the **park**?" she keeps asking.

By the time the little group finally arrives at the park, snow has started to fall. Lulu's father announces that they can't stay outside in the park but must go into the museum next door instead. Lulu protests: "Don't **want** to see the dinosaur. Don't **want** to see the pictures." Protest or not, Lulu has to go inside.

Once inside the museum, Lulu sulks. Her parents decide to leave her sitting uncomfortably on a couch. She starts up a monologue of protest that seems to be directed at no one in particular. A little winged cherub in a picture over Lulu's head hears Lulu's protests and comes down out of the picture to reprimand her. "Don't pick your nose," the cherub scolds her.

Then a second little angel flies down from an artwork and offers to fly off with Lulu into another gallery of the museum, where they can enter the winter scene of a Flemish painting that hangs there. and her new friends play together in the winter scene they have entered. When they have had enough of winter, they go into the summer seascape of a picture in another gallery, to splash in the sea. They enter yet another picture to growl at a tiger, another to ride a horse, and still another to fall off a cliff. When they finally enter a totally desolate landscape Lulu becomes scared and cries for her daddy.

It is the museum guard who manages to unite Lulu with her father and baby brother. Happily reunited with her family, Lulu recounts her wild adventures while the museum guard returns the flying angels to the works of art in which they belong.

Lewis Carroll made memorable for all of us the fantasy of crawling into the reverse space revealed by a mirror on the wall. Entering the winter scene of a Flemish landscape painter requires a little more imagination than making the imaginative step through the mirror, but perhaps not much—especially if one is as bored as Lulu was.

In Book X of the *Republic,* Plato has Socrates suggest that paintings and other works of art are something like mirrors, as if the artist's primary aim were simply to imitate the appearance of things. From what is said there, it might seem that, say, the mirrors on the wall of a restaurant that seem to double the size of the space should count as significant art. The artist would be, primarily, a trickster. But that can't be right.

We don't get the impression that Lulu was being fooled by the art she found in the museum. She seems to have entered those pictures willingly, imaginatively, much as one might enter the world depicted in a novel, or a movie.

What was her reward? What did she gain from the art in the museum? Art is sometimes said to offer us only substitute gratification—a Flemish painter's wintery scene when the real winter outside is what we want, but it is forbidden to us.

There is certainly something to the idea of substitute gratification. But, of course, the pictures Lulu was able to enter imaginatively didn't just replicate the world that was closed to her by the snowfall; they expanded it. Perhaps she had never seen a tiger before, or been able to ride a horse. Certainly she had never visited a 16th Century Flemish ice-skating scene.

So art and literature expand one's world. But it's not just that either. The artist doesn't just take us imaginatively to another place. The artist also gets us to see that other place in a certain way, perhaps in a way we wouldn't see it without the artist's help, even if we could travel there.

It is a theme of Tom Stoppard's new play, *The Invention of Love,* that it was the poets that invented romantic love. People had sex before they heard or read romantic poetry. But they had no experience of romantic love until the poets gave them a way of thinking about their sexual relationships in that way.

Artists, poets, and writers do give us ways of escaping our world. Certainly Lulu was glad for the chance to escape hers. But they also give us ways to understand and appreciate our world, and to give meaning to it. Perhaps when Lulu left the museum she was guided by her own art experience to see, for the first time, a winter landscape before her—not exactly like the Flemish landscape she had visited in the museum, but then not totally different either. Posy Simmonds's delightfully illustrated story doesn't exactly tell us that this is what happened. But it may make us wonder.

Dr. Arkady Margolis is Rector of the International College of Education and Psychology in Moscow. He is a key figure in the design of future Russian teacher education processes.

This introduction of Philosophy for Children to Russian educators contains much that is familiar to those who have already introduced the program to their own culture. It is instructive, nevertheless, to follow Dr. Margolis closely to see how he presents Philosophy for Children to a specifically Russian cultural context.

The Philosophy for Children Program

A. A. Margolis

One of the primary educational goals of the Russian Federation has become the formation of a reasonable and reflective individual who does not blindly accept declarative verbiage but is able to critically analyze both his own actions and those of other individuals as well as adapt his behavior to various situations and to new and complicated conditions.

How can these goals be achieved? The present educational system reveals that in spite of various innovations, it is still oriented toward traditional education and the delivery of ready-made knowledge.

This ready-made knowledge is more likely to be information about the surrounding world and less about the person and the way he or she thinks. It is fragmented and incomplete and spread over a number of disciplines, which keep growing in number and which threaten the well-being of children by preventing them from acquiring an integrated understanding of the world. The teacher is still regarded as the ultimate and all-knowing spokesperson for the learning process, occupying an authoritarian and disproportionate position even in those instances when he or she does not desire it.

Most often, knowledge is presented in the form of information to be assimilated and remembered and the educational focus is on "training" rather than on development.

What possible alternatives to traditional education would respond to contemporary needs and would help resolve the question posed earlier?

In answering this question, it is important to note in the first place, D.V. Elkonin's and V.V. Davidov's models of educational development which were later expanded by A.N. Leontiev and are based on D.S. Vygotsky's cultural and historical theory of activity.

The basic vector that determines the content and form of scholarship in this model is the formation of a basis of theoretical thinking in young school children about school subjects (primarily mathematics, Russian language and visual art). An education which is built on problem solving is presently one of the few, if not the only, sound alternative to traditional education systems as a long term and comprehensive system (with the availability of comprehensive materials, texts, teacher training systems and extensive testing).

The distinctive aspect of the developmental teaching mode is that the development of the child occurs as a result of the actual learning processes,—reconstructing conditions for solving problems, finding general genetic relationships, model construction, etc.—which are correlated to analytic and synthetic activities built upon a given subject and subject-related activities.

Many educators have been motivated to undertake the design of courses and programs based on the development of the child and not related to specific subjects. Despite the diversity in their approach, the common goal of these programs has been to form and develop independent thinking which is not related to subject matter.

We should note that the efforts by these educators also resulted in the creation of separate subjects aimed at developing thinking. The majority of these efforts occurred during the period when philosophy and logic were being introduced into school curriculums. It was generally assumed that the study of philosophy had a major developmental effect which does not depend on traditional pedagogy but on the simple fact of introducing the student to the accumulated knowledge found in philosophy and to provide him with a means of thinking.

Traditional philosophy courses are taught at lyceums, high schools and universities in the majority of European countries. However, as a rule, they are usually taught in the upper grades or university level. Initial attempts to introduce philosophy (logic) into high schools in the post-revolutionary period in Russia

occurred after the First World War but these attempts were short-lived. As a result of the changes in the social structure of the country, the original course in logic was changed to "social science." These courses which were widely taught in the 1970's and 1980's consisted of a series of declarations and unproven ideological clichés which only served to alienate students from the study of philosophy.

Recently, a number of lyceums and high schools have introduced philosophy into their classrooms. However, these are usually limited to simple introductions of philosophy as a cultural discipline (courses in history of philosophy) and to courses in logic which are often nothing more than exact copies of similar university-level courses. They use a traditional teaching approach and are not meant to teach philosophy as a means and instrument for developing thinking.

Detailed studies of the various undertakings to design a philosophy course primarily to develop thinking and to form reasonable and reflective behavior have been made by specialists at the Philosophy for Children Institute at Montclair State University (USA).

What are the main premises of the Philosophy for Children program developed under the direction of Professor Matthew Lipman?

First, one of its main educational premises is the formation of necessary skills for building logically correct reasoning and judgment, which facilitate reflective and critical behavior and which employ criteria in individual and collective performance.

Second, the creators of this program consider philosophy to be an effective tool and method for improving and developing thinking that provides the child with the ability to function and act on a qualitatively different level of reasonableness.

Third, in order for philosophy to be used in this manner, it should be taught not as a traditional (informtional) but as a specially designed subject.

We would also like to add several assumptions to these main premises:

1. The starting point for Lipman's theory concludes with the assumption of a rather trivial fact: the spontaneous development of a child which occurs during the process of growing up and native language acquisition is not sufficient for successful learning in school and forming the necessary skills for logical and correct reasoning and making judgments. In other words, a child's logical thinking should be designed as a separate school subject.
2. The attempt to form logical thinking at the high-school or college level is quite ineffective because elementary school children (ages 6–10) are more sensitive to philosophical problems and questions. Precisely at that age, children have not yet lost their ability to wonder about the world and this brings them closer to professional philosophers who are also interested in metaphysical questions.
3. Forming the ability to reason and make logical and correct judgments is impossible when philosophy is taught as a traditional school subject and even when it is taught as a special research subject. The logical development of a child becomes the means by which he reasons about the world and of his actual thinking process. This, in turn, brings us to the point of understanding that children do not need to study philosophy as such but, instead, to learn how to "philosophize" as a basic and genetic starting point.
4. In this manner, the object of learning is not the acquisition of individual mental skills and operations but the acquisition of an integrated process of thinking which is connected to such basic characteristics as:
   —self correction
   —sensitivity to context
   —criteria
   —ability to make judgments
   Consequently, there are two levels of performance in this program that enable the child to think about the world and objects (cognitive component) and, simultaneously, to think about the process of his own thinking (metacognitive component), by becoming aware of the methods and procedures that are used for thinking, i.e., the various points of view, conclusions and assumptions, etc. The combination of these components allows us to speak about the formation of a genuinely reflective and self-correcting thinking performance.
5. The development of thinking and the ability to reason are only possible when the philosophical content is presented not in the form of a scientific text or ready-made logical constructions, but in a form which is accessible and interesting to the child of elementary age.
   Children of that age are very eager to discuss a great number of problems and questions which interest them personally and which are philosophically profound ("What is good? Where does today disappear to? How does a car think? What is a name?") In not dismissing these questions (often done by parents who are tired of endless questions), in integrating them into the program and by basing the program on them the Philosophy for Children program is unique in terms of motivating students and in introducing them to a school subject in which they (perhaps for the first time) can discuss questions which interest them and not just the teacher.
   In summary, it is important to note that the content of the program is designed to meet the needs and the interests of children and is not simply based on purely philosophical material.
6. The basic method of teaching in the Philosophy for Children program is through discussion between students and teachers using topics which interest children and which have a philosophical content. The selection of this method is not accidental but is predetermined by the very fact that philosophy as a discipline of knowledge and culture originated in the form of dialogues within discussions among philosophers. This fact makes its reconstruction in the Philosophy for Children classroom very appropriate. On the other hand, by following the principle that philosophical problems and discoveries are not understood simply by reading about them (or through other forms of passive assimilation of knowledge) but through active attempts at solving these problems, the authors of this course assume that dialogue is an important tool for collectively discovering answers to various philosophical questions. This is why the teacher should organize a philosophical dialogue (a polylog) and not just a conversation or disconnected chatter and the children should be given the opportunity to carefully express their thoughts, listen to others, bring in arguments, weigh pros and cons, seek contradictions, etc.

* * *

Insofar as the students shift from a conversation and monologue to a philosophical dialogue and discussion structured by corresponding rules and methods for reasoning and logical principles, the class will gradually convert into what the authors of the program call a "community of inquiry". The community of inquiry should have the following characteristics:
—adherence to investigating philosophical problems;
—collective reasoning by using logical rules and procedures;
—various methods for discussion and reasoning;
—reflective thinking.
The conditions for creating such a community are:
—children's readiness to discuss philosophical questions;
—mutual respect of other participants;
—absence of indoctrination which imposes views and methods of discussion;
—diversity of opinion.

8. How do the philosophical questions which are taught in the classroom originate?

Taking into consideration that a large number of these questions can arise spontaneously, the most important source for discussion questions are found in specially written philosophical texts for children.

The rejection of classical philosophical textbooks and anthologies by the authors of the program does not necessarily indicate disapproval of the texts as such, but as a result of the need to remove a vocabulary barrier that not only prevents school children, but also many adults, from becoming acquainted with philosophy.

The need to design separate philosophical material for the program (corresponding to the various divisions of philosophy: metaphysics, logic, ethics, esthetics, etc.), in a form which is both accessible and interesting to children ages 6—10 resulted in the creation of a whole series of texts for children (each text targeted for a specific age group) consisting of short novels, which portray the lives of children of various ages with real problems related to their feelings and actions. The main difference between these texts and other literature is the presence of philosophical questions throughout the text, as well as the behavior of the protagonists, who incorporate these philosophical measurements into their discussions. In other words, the texts of the Philosophy for Children program are, to a large extent, multi-functional: on the one hand they are sources for discussion and on the other, they are models for this discussion.

Having departed from the traditional approach where the teacher is the only role model, the authors of the course created a much wider range of semantic possibilities in which one or another protagonist in the text is not only the carrier of a specific cognitive style, character and personality, but (which is more important) has the culturally determined characteristic ways of reflecting on and approaching one or more philosophical problems. Therefore, the model for creating a community of inquiry in the classroom becomes the community of inquiry of the protagonists in the text.

Just as it is in philosophy and its thousand year old tradition, there are no ready-made or one-dimensional answers provided in the texts. The texts merely systematize thinking while posing specific questions and showing models of how to reflect on them. In other words, the texts are not just philosophical but totally dialogical.

The texts for the whole program represent an integrated acquisition of its philosophical content, and vector its development from the formation of logical tools for thinking to using them for discussion and inquiry in problems of ethics, aesthetics and social phenomena.

7. In completing the analysis of the basic premises of the Philosophy for Children program, it is necessary to stop and discuss the role of the teacher.

The role of the teacher in the Philosophy for Children classroom is unusual and quite complicated. As opposed to other subjects, the teacher here is neither an expert in philosophy nor a judge. The teacher is, before anything else, an organizer of philosophical discussions which are not directed to the transfer of total knowledge from the field of philosophy. The teacher acts as a stimulator and catalyst for collective discussion and as a reflector on philosophical problems. The teacher cannot be a judge because as opposed to courses in mathematics, for example, (in any system) the teacher cannot provide finite answers since the problems discussed have neither one dimensional nor finite answers. The main responsibility of the teacher, therefore, consists in organizing discussions that interest children in such a way that it enables them to discover specific rules for discussing problems and various approaches to solving them.

From the above, it follows that traditional forms of teacher training are inadequate for this program which requires special training not only in philosophy, psychology and education, but primarily in those areas which enable the translation of philosophical ideas to presentation levels that are accessible to children and vice-versa.

It is also important to note that as a methodology, the structure of the program consists of seven parts targeted to children from grades 1 to 10. Each part has a specific text (named after the chief protagonist) and a specific philosophical content.

In addition to texts, the teaching material includes teacher manuals which contain plans for organizing a discussion (up to 5–6 one- to two-page plans for each episode), a series of games, exercises and other activities.

The program has undergone complex, psychological and educational testing in Russia since 1991. These tests were conducted jointly by various scholarly and educational organizations (The Psychological Institute, Association of Pedagogues and Psychologists, The Center for Innovative Systems and Methodologies, The Institute of Philosophy RAS, the International Educational and Psychological College) and resulted in the following accomplishments:

—translation of the educational material;
—cultural adaptation of the material;
—creation of experimental sites;
—design of a training program for teachers.

At the present time, there are about fifteen experimental sites in various regions of Russia. All of the above work was done privately without any government financing in cooperation with the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, USA. The program is widespread throughout Russia (Moscow, Moscow District, Toliatti, Western Siberia, Tataria). It includes regularly scheduled in-service training, seminars and conferences. Three international seminars were held (in Moscow, Surguta and Nizhnevartogovsk) with the participation of US and Canadian scholars. Three books for children with accompanying teacher manuals have been published. A bulletin is issued from the Center for Philosophy for Children, PI, RAO and College. Those wanting more information about the program can write to: 102009, Moscow, Bolshaia Nikitskaya St. No. 16, International Educational and Psychologic College, tel. 011-7-095-229-89-88, 229-07-16.

Furthermore, we are planning to highlight the program, and to introduce readers to its more interesting aspects in the journal, *Elementary Education.*

V. V. Davydov is vice-president of the Russian Institute of Education, Academy of Science, Moscow. He is the central figure in the reform of Russian education that has taken place since the collapse of the USSR.

The Renewal of Education and the Mental Development of Schoolchildren

V.V. Davydov

An analysis of the situation in our country over the last ten years shows that our educational system does not provide the necessary conditions for children's development. That is why one of the major theses of our conception of educational renewal is connected to our desire to create an educational system which develops the pupil's body, intellect and morals. In the course of the same analysis, it was also found out that it is not possible to solve such complicated problems without some radical changes in both the content and methods of education.

Many teachers are beginning to realize that the goal of school education nowadays is not only to provide pupils with more knowledge, but also to teach them to *find their own way* among scientific and other information. But that means that school education must teach one *to think*, that is, must help pupils to develop the foundations of modern thinking. In other words, what we should create is a *developmental* education.

But the possibility of such an education developing pupils' abilities is not accepted by everybody. There are some teachers and psychologists who think that children's mental development has laws of its own and does not depend either on upbringing or on education. The adherents of this theory are sure that the only thing we can do in purposeful education and upbringing is to use the results of spontaneous or "natural" development of children's mental capacities.

There are, to our mind, some reasons to think so. But we find these reasons too restricted and limited. We must proceed from wider suppositions genuinely corresponding to the process of human mental development. If these wider foundations are taken into account, we come to the conclusion that education can be considered a *necessary* factor in the mental development of a person. Back in the 1930's, an outstanding psychologist, L.S. Vygotsky, formulated the hypothesis that children's psychic development is *determined* by their upbringing and education.

In our research work we tried to obtain experimental proof of Vygotsky's ideas. This could be done by organizing elementary school education in a way favoring children's mental development. We think that the experience we have had in the Soviet Union of developing the elementary school's educational organization may be useful to foreign teachers.

The notion of thinking used by traditional psychology and pedagogy is founded on formal logic, which is also traditional. This is why the ordinary elementary school, which has its traditions as well, develops pupils' *empirical*

thinking, which is thoroughly studied by formal logic. Such thinking is characterized by an everyday, utilitarian attitude. It is aimed at object categorization and classification only. This helps people to solve *standard* problems when it is necessary to *recognize* some features and qualities of objects.

Empirical thinking is very important in life, but when we want pupils to understand fully some theoretical knowledge which is taught in modern school education, it is "in the way." This is so because, to understand theory, we use another type of thinking studied by dialectic logic. This is called *theoretical thinking.* Its aim is to find and to make evident the conditions of some objects' *origin and development.* Theoretical thinking enables a person to solve *new and unexpected* problems.

One of the objective reasons for the fact that education has little influence on pupils' general psychic development and on the development of their mental abilities is the domination of empirical thinking in the ordinary elementary school. Certainly, a number of elementary school pupils in some situations may show examples of theoretical thinking, but in most cases it was born and developed by some happy chance and in spite of existing content and methods of elementary school education.

Real elementary school education—if we take into account the needs of modern life—must in fact be oriented towards developing schoolchildren's theoretical thinking foundations. But of course, at the same time, empirical thinking must also be formed and developed. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to radically change the content and methods of traditional education, to make children search, reveal and formulate the conditions of the origin and development of knowledge.

Let us note that the term "theoretical thinking" must not be identified with so-called "abstract" thinking based on verbal reasoning. Let us repeat that the essence of theoretical thinking consists in the fact that it is a specific form of human approach, a way of understanding things and events *by analyzing the conditions of their origin and development.* The moment pupils begin to study things and events from the point of view of this approach, they begin to think theoretically.

An outstanding American psychologist and teacher, John Dewey, also stresses the essential difference between empirical and theoretical thinking (only his term for theoretical thinking is "*scientific*"). And he especially emphasizes, in his famous book, *How We Think* (Chapter XI), that what a person does in the process of scientific thinking is to *change, according to a plan* based on an idea (or a hypothesis), the conditions of some event's realization and, thanks to such an experiment, this person is then able to reveal the laws of its origin. According to Dewey, an important role in scientific thinking belongs to such thinking actions as reflection, induction (or analysis) and deduction (or synthesis). As these actions are not present in empirical thinking, it cannot distinguish true and false statements.

Is it possible to base learning programs in different disciplines (math, language, etc.) on theoretical thinking? From our research experience, we know that at present this possibility has *already,* to a certain degree, been *put into practice.*

In recent years, scientists from various countries (Soviet Union, [sic] Germany, Vietnam, USA, etc.) following a unified scientific approach and using the specific method of the formative experiment, have been doing extensive research on processes of pupils' education. A great deal of information has been collected, and on the basis of its analysis and generalization, an original *theory of learning activity* has been created. The experimental data forming the basis of this theory, together with its main theses, have been published in numerous scientific reviews and books in a number of countries. My last book, *Problems of Developmental Education,* where I give a

detailed description of the theory of learning activity, was published, in English, in the American magazine, *Soviet Education*, 1988, Vol.XXX, No. 8-10.

On the basis of this theory, many of the disciplines for elementary and secondary school have been constructed according to the requirements of learning activity (courses in math, native language, literature, labor, arts, physics, chemistry, geography, etc.). When we speak about the disciplines created, we mean complex teaching and methodological sets of materials including, first, original learning programs; second, detailed methodological directions for teachers to make it possible for them to teach according to our programs; third, detailed plans—summaries of all the lessons necessary to realize the programs; and fourth, corresponding textbooks.

These new sets of materials differ considerably in their contents from those used in ordinary schools. Methods of teaching according to these materials are also essentially different. In fact, our research group has begun to *renew* the content and methods of school education on the basis of activity theory—and we have made special progress in the field of elementary school education.

At present, learning disciplines created on the basis of learning activity theory are being used in certain schools in different countries. In the USSR, for example, they are used in Moscow school No. 91, Krasnoyarsk school No. 106, Ufa school No. 40, in many school districts in Volgagrad and Kharkov (Krasnodarsky Area). Many learning disciplines are used in a number of schools in Germany, Vietnam and Bulgaria. The methods of construction of the course of elementary mathematics which we have elaborated for a number of years *are being successfully used* by Drew Kravin, a teacher from Albany, California. In May, 1990, he reported the results of his work to the International Learning Activity Congress in Lahti, Finland. His report was entitled, "Algebra in the Elementary Grades. An Instructional Process Based on Davydov's Concept of Generalization."

Now it is necessary to say a few words about the main theses of the theory that is at the heart of our new learning discipline. First of all, the theory deals with a person acquiring some knowledge and mastering some skills in the form of specific *learning activity*. Human activity is connected to the *creative transformation* of an object. When pupils learn this or that piece of knowledge in the form of learning activity, they always begin with the *transformation* of the material to be mastered. Learning activity originality consists in the fact that in the process of its realization, pupils master *theoretical knowledge*. The contents of this kind are an object's *origin, formation* and *development*.

And if in the ordinary classroom, a child has to master some "ready" knowledge that had been formulated *beforehand* and thus is given by the teacher, if there is no hint of the origin and development of the object to study with respect to its contents, then we may be sure there is *no* learning activity in what the child is doing. In this case, what the pupil is doing is mastering with the help of the teacher's illustrations and explanations some *empirical knowledge*. We must sadly confess that this is exactly what happens in an ordinary classroom. That is why a comparatively small number of ordinary school pupils can accomplish a learning activity of full value.

Learning activity components are learning *needs, motives, problems, actions* and *operations*. Certainly small children beginning their school education do not yet possess its unified structure. To develop a full-fledged learning activity, elementary school pupils (and later secondary school ones) must constantly solve *learning problems*. The main peculiarity of a learning problem is that while solving it a pupil looks for, and finds, a *general way* (or a *principle*) to approach *many* specific and particular problems of a certain class. Later, similar problems are solved without much difficulty and in a correct way on the first attempt.

Learning problems are solved through a system of learning actions. The first learning action is to *transform* the situation of the learning problem. This action is aimed at the search for an *initial relation* of the situation's object conditions that forms the general basis from which the whole multitude of particular problems can be solved later. Other learning actions make it possible for pupils to model and to study this initial general relation, to single it out in particular conditions and to control and evaluate the process of learning problem solutions.

From all of this we can draw conclusions that are important for learning activity theory. *First,* schoolchildren master all theoretical knowledge and corresponding skills while solving learning problems. *Second,* the main method of such education is the *method of illustration and explanation:* it is a detailed description which can be found in virtually any textbook on pedagogy.

This method is based on association theory and behaviorism. According to these two theories, education is founded on associations, S-R connections, the use of visual method accompanied by verbal explanations, deduction of the general from the particular, and constant methods.

These are opposed to the *activity approach* in education, according to which education is based on object-transforming *actions* which reveal the *general* in these objects and *deduce* the particular from it, as well as *solve problems.*

Let us emphasize that John Dewey's and Jean Piaget's theories are also very close to the activity approach in education, because they are connected with the notion of *action* (though in their specific understanding of this notion).

Our long experience shows that if we teach different learning disciplines according to the requirements of learning activity, we achieve considerable positive results: children master various kinds of knowledge and skills and, more important, we are able to evoke essential effects in *their mental development.* That is what new learning disciplines were created for, and are now used for in the education of a considerable number of elementary and secondary school pupils....

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Teaching People How to Reason: The Philosophical Strategy of Philosophy for Children

Nina S. Yulina

1. Philosophy as a Paradigm of Reflective Education

In a philosophy class which I attended at an elementary school in Montclair, New Jersey, USA, 6- and 7-year-old children were discussing an episode from the story *Elfie,* in which the plot was organized around the concepts of "seeing" and "knowing." For some time, the discussion lingered around the idea that "in order to know, you have to see." (In order to know what a giraffe is, it's not sufficient to see the image on a picture, you have to go to a zoo.) Suddenly a girl who had kept silent to this point said, "I can't see my ears, but I know for sure that I have them. I can touch them and see them in a mirror." Latching onto this concept a boy gave another example, "My mother and I watched the sun rise at the seashore. I saw how the sun jumped out of the ocean though I know that it does not hide in the water, but appears in the sky." The other children, having recognized the key role words play, showered the boy with questions, such as, "How do you know this?" "Because my mother told me," he answered. "And how does your mother know?" "She was taught it in school." This last answer apparently satisfied the children and the discussion shifted to the differences between "feeling with your hands" and "seeing with your eyes."

In this classroom discussion, there were many recognizable signs of definite philosophical activity. The children were exposed to questions such as the relationship between cause and effect, the perceived and the rational, the tactile and the visual, reality and fantasy, criteria for confirming opinions, etc. We may conclude that children are apt to philosophize spontaneously and naturally when exposed to such questions. They reason rationally, logically, and critically. That is why a discussion such as the one described should be evaluated not as a stimulation but as original philosophizing. What took place was not senseless repetition of memorized information but "thinking for oneself," by relying on one's own experience, however limited.

The fact that children are able to ask philosophical questions at their level and to discuss them intelligently can be confirmed by every parent. How do people suddenly lose momentum in their ability to discuss, acquire lapses in their reasoning and become unreasonable? Why does increased information from schools, colleges, and surroundings cause some people to think in defiance of facts, logic, and sound thought, while their refusal to burden their minds with detailed, developed arguments causes them to become victims of self-delusion? Why do people refuse to think critically and so easily accept myths and dogmas and give in to social hypnosis?

During Stalin's time, the eyes saw terror while the head told us that everything is marching toward a universal Communist paradise. The victims of the "white brotherhood" epidemic in Russia and Ukraine in 1993 did not heed admonishments and prepared themselves for the "end of the world," which, according to their prognosis, should have come on November 14 or 24, 1993. And what about the Zhirinovsky phenomenon? People who did not even bother to take a look ahead after the elections and admit their error are enthralled by the fairy tales of this demagogue and prefer them to sane social and political programs.

Of course, the reasons for social pathology are outside the framework of philosophy and belong to disciplines that study society and social behavior. At the same time, there is a role here for philosophers—to teach reasonable, critical, and skillful thinking.

This practical aspect has thealways worried philosophers. Ancient philosophers acknowledged that qualities such as curiosity, inquiry, skepticism, criticism are innate and exist simultaneously with resistance to burdening one's mind with judgments and self-criticism and a wish to hide behind the opinion of others. The philosophers of Enlightenment understood that certain social conditions can stimulate reasonable thinking while other conditions can inhibit it. Stimulating thinking can be achieved through enlightened activity, the interaction of philosophers with culture, education, etc. At that time, the philosophers were speaking about an adult audience, more precisely, about the elite adults who were their students. In the 20th century, a number of European countries introduced philosophy into the classroom but it was only taught in

the upper grades and limited to the elite schools, such as lycées and high schools specializing in the humanities.

A new approach that proposes viewing philosophy in practical and educational terms was introduced by Professor Matthew Lipman, originator of the Philosophy for Children program, author of numerous studies on the theory of philosophy of education, and Director of the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children.

Lipman's basic premise is that in order for philosophy to have a practical and tangible effect in improving reasoning skills, it should be introduced into an ordinary school and be taught at an early age when one's intellect is still developing and thinking and behavior are not yet stereotyped. Lipman is deeply convinced that the enormous wealth found in the history of philosophy is undervalued and underused and not fully understood by society. Education only uses a tiny portion of philosophy's potential for teaching how to reason.

At the present time, everyone everywhere is talking about the crisis in world education. According to Lipman, this crisis is produced by the traditional model of education, based on the acquisition of information. He places this in juxtaposition with a new model of reflective education, or as he calls it, the education of inquiry, which aims at developing thinking skills and acquiring good judgment. "The goal of this educational method is to produce thinking, reasonable and creative individuals."[1] In order to reach this goal, new methodologies are needed.

Jumping ahead, we can say that by relying on a somewhat unusual use for philosophical texts—the teaching of thinking skills in the classroom—Lipman proposes a new model of rationality. If traditional education, which is based on a scientific model of rationality and a cumulative approach to knowledge, earned Francis Bacon's motto, "knowledge is strength," then Lipman's proposed model of rationality should be given the motto, "reason is strength." While this model does not, in any way, undervalue the acquisition of knowledge, its emphasis is placed on the thinking and humanitarian component of culture represented by philosophy, literature, etc.

One of Lipman's more radical proposals which is by no means indisputable among educators in the West is the reevaluation of philosophy's role in school education and its relocation from a third, or, sometimes, even last place to a central role. Moreover, he assumes that philosophy should be a disciplinary paradigm for school age children.

Lipman further argues that in comparison with other school subjects, philosophy is the finest instrument devised for developing and training intellectual skills and aptitudes. Philosophy has specific methods for simultaneously forming pliable, nondogmatic, rigorous and sound thinking. Its constantly problematic nature and sensitivity to riddles and paradox encourages wonder and an instinct for inquiry. Its acceptance of variant conclusions and the absence of arbitrary categorizing destroy dogmatic tendencies; use of reflective relationships to instruments of cognition and criteria and requirement for rigorous logic improve the critical potential of thinking; the richness of philosophical categories and problems train the mind to abstract and integrate diverse knowledge from school subjects. (It is interesting to note that within the reflective education model, those very same philosophical qualities which are currently the most valued were intensely criticized by scholars who once prided themselves in the exactness of their studies).

In the last few years, in the West, including the USA, many published studies propose to rehabilitate the ancient concept of "wisdom," and make philosophy relevant for everyone. (This is a reaction to the "dryness" of academic, especially analytical, philosophy.) The problem is how to do it. As an exception to the purely theoretical approaches to this problem, Lipman researched the "rational reconstruction" of philosophical knowledge and created a "special method of teaching" that takes children's potential, the content of school subjects and educational goals into consideration. As a result, the Philosophy for Children[2] program was created with accompanying teaching manuals, learning tools and much more, which made it possible to introduce philosophy into the school curriculum.[3]

In other words, one of Lipman's main contributions to modern philosophy is the creation of an original and unique technology for transmitting philosophical knowledge to children.[4] Later we will speak of this in more detail. At this point, we will define its main principles: (1) a problematizing presentation of the historical and philosophical content of the teaching of philosophizing, not information on philosophy; (2) organization of the lesson under the principal of "community of inquiry"; (3) providing children with philosophical texts in a fictional, story form.

While teaching an introductory course in Logic in 1969, Matthew Lipman, a professor at Columbia University at the time, wrote his first didactic philosophical story, *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery.* Later, he evaluated its intent as follows: "*Harry* gives children the means by which the secret content of adult learning can be decoded and translated to an everyday language. This gives them access to the world, which according to tradition, should be limited to a small number of adults."[5] Starting out as an experiment, this methodology was applied to teaching 11-year-olds and after seeing impressive results, Lipman decided to continue with the project. The experiment showed the necessity of accompanying the text with a teacher's manual to include exercises and other material which would help teachers with philosophical training. In 1973, Lipman co-authored a manual, *Philosophical Inquiry* with Ann Sharp and Frederick Oscanyan. By using Lipman's story and the co-authored manual, six new materials were developed for younger and older classrooms. Additional books clarifying and developing the concept and technology of the Philosophy for Children program were published.[6] In this way, a program designed for the entire school experience was developed. Comparatively recently, A. Sharp wrote a philosophical story for kindergartners, *The Doll Hospital.* While developing his philosophical concepts,

Lipman published results of his educational experiments in his book, *Thinking in Education.*

The success of Lipman's philosophical educational model is not only determined by its philosophical educational quality and carefully developed details. Its basic concepts anticipated many ideas that later became topical and are now widely popularized in "education for the future" projects. By the middle 1970's, within the framework of UNESCO, discussions on pedagogy in various European countries and the United States began to focus on the evidence of a crisis in the quality of world education. This crisis was acknowledge in USSR in the beginning of the 1980's, during discussions on educational reform. In essence, the crisis resulted from the ineffectiveness of measures already undertaken to improve the quality of education in middle and high schools and the inability to change the trend that showed that students know less and use their knowledge less effectively.

Reasons for the crisis were discussed in various countries and both conservative and radical solutions were proposed. In the United States, conservative activists from the educational establishment blamed lack of teacher training for the collapse of the educational level of adolescents. Teachers tended to blame social conditions—the pervasive pragmatism, the detrimental influence of television and mass culture, the collapse of educational values, etc.

The innovators attempted to probe deeper, citing inherent flaws in traditional ways of teaching thinking.[8] In the 1970's, under the catchword "critical thinking," a movement for reflective education was created.[9] Under the canopy of this generic phrase, innovative projects appeared, texts were reexamined and even special courses on "critical thinking" taught. It was assumed that academic disciplines should be taught in a "self-reflective spirit", *i.e.,* maintaining a critical analysis of their own premise, cognitive solutions, definition of criteria, etc. At the same time, far from all supporters of "critical thinking" related it to philosophy. Often the "critical" element was added to the content of the discipline like "vitamins to diet" (Lipman's expression). As a result, "critical thinking" in chemistry courses remained unconnected to "critical thinking" in physics courses, *i.e.,* each subject interpreted it differently. The thesis that philosophy possesses better instruments for the development of critical thinking is still not accepted by its proponents.

We take it as a given that education is one of the more conservative institutions, and has generally been slow to change. It's not only difficult to change the thinking of the people involved in education, but education itself is part of a long-established tradition, with a conservative administrative body. Presently, the most important issue is the amount of time necessary for educational reform to define its goals and methods and gain an understanding of people, thinking, values, theory of knowledge, etc. In other words, such a reform requires philosophical study and an appropriate evaluation of philosophical instruments for developing thinking. However, having defended "reflective education," educational activists are not in a hurry to acknowledge a new role for philosophy. They are held back by the doctrine and even an esoteric image of philosophy as something "non-serious," and by clannish conservatism of the teacher specialists.

The philosophical meaning of the concept of "reflective education," introduced by Lipman as an innovative idea for making philosophy into an (paradigmatic) ideal school subject is breaking ground very slowly. Despite the fact that the U.S. Department of Education has recognized the Philosophy for Children course to be an "outstanding program"—it is acknowledged as a model for the school curriculum in the Education Programs in the Year 2000 plans—in practice, it has only been incorporated into 5000 schools. A similar situation exists in Europe. The educational quality of the program received very high marks from the Commission on Education of the European Parliament which recommended its introduction into school education. However, the many traditions on the teaching of philosophy that exist in European countries and schools and lyceums hinder its wide dissemination. The introduction of the Philosophy for Children program was much more successful in the less conservative traditions with fewer competitive educational programs, such as Latin America, Australia, Asia, Canada, and the former Socialist countries (especially Bulgaria). Today, there are 25 Philosophy for Children Centers around the world and Lipman's course is translated into 15 languages.

Within the limits of this short work, we are unable to present a thorough analysis of Lipman's concept. Strictly speaking, this work requires analyzing three separate aspects: the purely philosophical, the theoretical, and the principles of transmitting philosophical knowledge and evaluating results. However, that approach imposes limitations on the critical analysis of Lipman's concepts. To criticize a concept that shows good results can only be done when it is supported by serious new results. Precisely, Lipman's concepts and methodology "rolled" through international associations in this manner.[10] (Of course, many of the topics, such as thinking, sound reasoning, judgment and criteria of judgment can be examined on a purely theoretical level).

In the first place, our analytical problem is to adequately describe, understand, and evaluate this concept which is new for Russia. Presently, many Russian educators have started to develop innovative programs on reflective education. It is our opinion that acquainting them with the theoretical and practical results of Lipman's work can be very useful and stimulating. In the second place, by concentrating our attention on the problems of teaching reason,[11] we will attempt to demonstrate the specifics of the Lipman model of rationality and its significance to the Russian sociocultural context.

Lipman's philosophical idea, is, generally speaking, a theory of reflective thinking for schools and also for "higher education" institutions. We are directing our attention to the aspect of his work which has to do with Philosophy for Children.

2. Reasonableness, "Good Judgment" and Critical Thinking

Most educational strategies, methodologies, and technologies are means and tools. Their nature depends on the educational goals of a given society which is largely determined by the prevailing ideas and the thinking of its people. In all these strategies, Lipman's point of view, presented as a comprehensive and well-developed concept, is that a "reasonable person" is someone who is "teachable" and "inquiring." It essentially differs from orthodox pedagogy, psychology and philosophy. Moreover, the examination of the person through the prism of teaching reason—a very important characteristic—places Lipman as a serious philosophical contender in the competing market of modern theories defining the thinking process, which is presently dominated by artificial intelligence, sociobiology, psychobiology, psycholinguistics, cognitive sciences, etc., *i.e.*, theories appealing to the scientific knowledge of the moment.[12]

What is a reasonable person? According to Lipman, he or she is not just an "informed person." The accumulation of knowledge, of course, is a very important component of education. However, in the modern and dynamically changing world, people are constantly faced with a succession of unusual problems at different levels and of different content where knowledge does not necessarily guarantee the ability to cope. Reasonableness is not identical to rationality. "Reasonableness," Lipman clarifies, "is not pure rationality; it is rationality tempered by judgment."[13] The most popular current model for rationality is science because of the exactness of its cognition, predictable hypothesis, and practical effectiveness, which to some degree, accomplishes a moral function in improving society. However, in the realm of human behavior, the principle of strict rationality does not always work. Ethical conflicts, unresolved by rational means, can be resolved with the help of reasonable compromises. Lipman thinks that rationality should be thought of as an organization principle related to an optimal combination of purpose and means. Any bureaucratic organization, be it government, military, or religious, is rational if it achieves the goal for which it is created. An educational system, for example, can be considered rational if it optimally achieves its goal and produces educated individuals, *i.e.*, those who are knowledgeable and reasonable thinkers.[14] Children in this kind of system have a greater chance of becoming reasonable individuals than in an irrational social milieu and a corresponding model of education. "Education can be seen as the great laboratory for rationality, but it is more realistic to see it as a context in which young people learn to be reasonable so that they can become reasonable citizens, reasonable companions, and reasonable parents in the future."

According to Lipman, reasonable people are those who are capable of working out "good judgments." Instead of the word "good," he uses other adjectives, "thought out," "substantiated," "skillful," and, more often, what ancient Greeks called "wisdom." A "reasonable person" is a person who can reason with substantiation, reasonableness, and weight. At the same time, this person respects the rights of others, presents his opinions in the form of arguments that are convincing to the other person and not at the expense of being self evident. That is why, according to Lipman, "wise judgments" in addition to being cognitive include communicative and ethical features. They, undoubtedly, have a specific intellectual identity, but the most important thing is that they can be a means or condition for wise behavior and coexistence and, ultimately, improve the quality of life.

Lipman considers that forming a judgment on the basis of factual observation is an axiomatic conclusion, equal to e=mc2 . Stating that "John is a good person," is an example of judgment. A judgment becomes a "good judgment" when it results from independent, reasoned and substantiated thinking or "higher order thinking."

Until recently, in both psychology and in cognitive sciences it was acceptable to characterize higher order thinking as "conceptually rich, coherent, investigative" thinking. Some people stress the creative and descriptive components of thinking. Lipman considers these characteristics to be important but they lack a process, a moving factor which forms the dynamic of movement. The causal mechanism is a problematic situation given in a specific context. It includes the mechanism of memory, comparing the context of past and present experiences, assessing the situation (indispensable for the creation of new meanings) and formulating one's own criteria, procedures and conclusions—a critical mechanism for self-evaluation. Good judgment results not from a one step action such as intuition, illumination or heavenly grace but from arduous and difficult work—a substantiated and critical reasoning activity. It is akin to a work of art. Yet it has a broader significance, be it decision making in a problematic situation or telling oneself what to believe in and what not to believe in.

The interaction between creative and critical thinking, the generation of new meanings, self reflection and self correlation are central to the development of good judgment.

"Critical thinking facilitates judgment because it relies on criteria, is self-correcting and is sensitive to context."[16] By appealing to criteria, it simultaneously subjects its activity to assessment with the help of new criteria. Creative thinking "is thinking conducive to judgment, guided by context, transcending, and sensitive to criteria (holistically)." [17] As a result, it creates an integrative picture.

When Lipman speaks about good judgment, he means everyday speech and common language for communication which, to a large degree, is descriptive and valuative. The problem of good judgment criteria appears to be much more complicated than the analyses of scientific language. The criteria which are used in everyday speech do not have the high level of social acceptance which the criteria used in science do. The criteria of everyday speech are products of experience, change together with it and depend on socially acceptable standards, etc.

Nevertheless, scholars such as R. Rorty who assume that a search for cri-

teria has to stop because it leads to endless regression are incorrect. Criteria exist and "work." People use them in their thinking; they are the strength of their rational apparatus. There are various forms of criteria: laws, natural laws, regulations, statutes, cannons, decrees, directives, instructions; testaments, needs, specifications, measurements, conditions, borders, limits, parameters; conventions, norms, regularity, uniformity, sweeping generalizations; principals, assumptions, suppositions, determinations; ideals, goals, problems, intuition; tests, proof of reality, factual evidence, experimental discoveries, observations; methods, procedures, politics and dimensions.

Of course, Lipman does not think that a person can be trained to think critically and criterially everywhere and all the time. It is neither possible nor necessary to transform a person into a "reasoning machine." In most of their lives, people think spontaneously and not reflectively. Nevertheless, knowing criteria and acquiring skills for using them are very important. Uncritical thinking is "flabby, amorphous, arbitrary, specious, haphazard and unstructured"[18] and vulnerable. Uncritical thinking is not indefensible in an argument, and is constantly in danger of being self-delusionary. Trained critical thinking helps people form strong defensible opinions and convictions and it strengthens the feeling of intellectual responsibility without which there cannot be moral responsibility.

And so, the concept of "critical and creative thinking," "good thinking," and "critical thinking" characterize thinking of a higher order. The question is whether all this can be taught to school children. Lipman responds that there is no situation when it would be inappropriate to ask any school child to produce "good" arguments defending his or her opinion, discussing these arguments and relying on criteria to do so.

The prevalent system of child psychology and education in Russia and abroad teaches children to think concretely, perceptively, and affectively up to ages 10 or 11; only after they are taught the basic or elementary skills needed for reading, writing, counting, drawing, speaking, etc., are they considered to be capable of abstract thinking, *i.e.*, higher order thinking. This system, developed as a result of J. Piaget's theories, was significantly strengthened by developmental psychology, which contends that a person goes through several qualitatively different stages of mental development, without being able to skip over any. It has produced theories of education based on an hierarchical appearance of different mental aptitudes (B. Blum).

In the 1970's Piaget's and Blum's ideas were subjected to intensive criticism. Even earlier, while developing his idea for his teacher's manual to accompany *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery,* Lipman took an opposing view which considers to appear, high order thinking not as a result of basic thinking training but simultaneous with it. The school which pays a great deal of attention to the development of basic skills without developing higher order skills shapes one-sided thinking. There is no notable qualitative difference between the thinking of a child and an adult. There are differences in experience, vocabulary, information, training in using concepts, but not in higher order thinking ability.

According to Lipman, two concepts, derived from psychology, significantly reinforce the misconception that there is a hierarchy of mental skills. The first concept is the ideal of "simplicity" in basic or elementary forms of thinking, the second is the idea of "extremely complicated" forms of higher-order thinking in comparison to the basic ones.

The basic skills necessary for reading, writing, counting, drawing, speaking, and hearing, are not simple skills. Each of them interacts with an extremely complicated spectrum of megaskills orchestrated by diversified mental acts. The critical, motivating skill is reasoning. It develops concurrently with all other skills but not on their foundation, or after an interruption, as an addition. Reasoning in relation to basic skills is fundamental. As Lipman says, "It is fundamental to their development. Yet even this foundation, it turns out, is multilevel. One of the major tasks for teacher and student is to discover and put in order the myriad of cognitive reasoning components that interact in every single act of reading, writing, speaking, listening, or computation."[19]

Lipman considers it a misconception that higher-order thinking is much more complicated than basic thinking. It is assumed that with growth and maturity there is a quantitative proliferation and a qualitative improvement in reasoning skills. There is, no doubt, some truth in this assumption, but throughout their lives, people depend, to a large degree, on the same nucleus of primary reasoning. The situation is somewhat analogous to language acquisition; the number of words learned by an individual during his or her lifetime grows but the letters for the new words are drawn from the same inventory, which is the alphabet. Even when complicated deductive chains are constructed and abstruse theoretical constructions are erected, they are based on a comparatively small number of mental acts and reasoning skills, upon which more elegant and complex thought are predicated. Lipman concludes that "without the ability to assume, suppose, compare, infer, contrast, or judge, to deduce or induce, to classify, describe, define, or explain, our very ability to read and write would be imperiled, to say nothing of our capacity to engage in classroom discussion, prepare experiments, and compose prose."[20]

III. The Methodology for Teaching Philosophizing

THE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH

Towards the end of the 20th Century, mankind has accepted the notion that without the study of their methodology, even the best ideas are just ideas. It is important to stress that Lipman's main contribution to philosophy consists in his development of an original and innovative methodology with corresponding tools, for teaching philosophy to the very special contingent that are school children.

Earlier, we noted that in European countries, philosophy has been taught in the older grades in lyceums and

gymnasiums. Curricula are usually constructed as follows: the dominant philosophy is chosen and arranged in anthologies together with supporting material from the classics. We will conditionally call this the cultural informative approach and the approach proposed by Lipman the problem solving.

The first principle of Lipman's problem solving approach involves acquainting students with philosophy, not from without, not with information about philosophy, but from within. It is assumed that once philosophical questions are recognized in everyday situations and discussed, the beginner will better understand the essence of philosophy and its practical relevance.

For learning materials, Lipman reconstructed the history of philosophy from ancient times to the present. The intent was to create a skeleton of problems (a) having universal meaning; (b) which children face in everyday life and which they can discuss in ordinary language; (c) which have a relationship to the content of school discipline. Without delving into the theoretical issues of such a reconstruction, we can say that the preference is really for traditional European thought represented by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell, Dewey, Wittgenstein, etc., *i.e.*, from the rational and critical philosophical tradition. To teach children, Lipman also uses contemporary philosophical theory, but only when it presents new problems which can be used for educational purposes.

Lipman sees specific advantages in programs built on the study of the history of philosophy but, in his opinion, they also contain serious dangers. This history is satiated with easily forgettable facts about the intellectual accomplishments of great people and through them it assumes an authority which inhibits children's own initiative. For students, the knowledge that great wise men have answers to problems has the same psychological effect as knowing that answers to math and physics problems can be found in the back of textbooks. It diminishes the spontaneity and freedom of the intellectual search.

When philosophy is presented as problem solving, it can play an active role in problem solving in other school subjects. In philosophizing, the higher order thinking skills necessary for assimilating the diversity of school subjects are practiced and perfected. Recognizing universal philosophical problems within the context of other problems helps children and teachers overcome the fragmentation in the content of school subjects, and creates an integrative picture of knowledge.[21]

Of course, as long as philosophy deals with language, the Philosophy for Children program will be oriented, before anything else, to verbal activity which is a basis for articulating feelings and emotions and for the development of personality. Here the problem of "coming down to earth" in verbal activity is resolved with the help of dialogue and adherence to a concrete context.

COMMUNITY OF INQUIRY

In order to start up that great human engine curiosity, the instincts for inquiry should be nourished by a socially beneficial environment and special surroundings that stimulate intellectual, emotional and linguistic free expression.

Lipman believes that a socially beneficial environment can be created in an ordinary classroom, if the role of the teacher and student change and a community of inquiry is established.[22] The term "community of inquiry" was first introduced by C.S. Pierce to define a group of scientists who share similar research goals and use similar procedures. Later the term was broadened to mean any collaborative research. J. Dewey, when accepting this term, emphasized the "inquiry" aspect, conceiving it as akin to scholarly research; for him, "the decision," the final result, was important.

Lipman suggests giving the community of inquiry a philosophical meaning and defines it as a collaborative search for truth or "attempt at truth" in the form of a "Socratic dialogue." Philosophical truth, as is known, has a tendency to slip away. However, the search for it, especially a collaborative search, is an investment in making a headway towards it. It is the best way to involve a school child in an activity with unpredictable results, and an invitation to a philosophical "dance" without end.

"Socratic dialogue" assumes a major functional change in teacher and student roles in the classroom. In an informal community of inquiry, everyone is equal in the search for truth. The teacher no longer assumes the role of encyclopedist or of an expert or judge with the answer in his or her pocket, nor does he or she have to aspire to be a charismatic leader. Because the teacher knows much more than the student, it is his or her task, as a co-participant in the discussion, to simultaneously stimulate, provoke and facilitate this search. It is like being the music and the orchestra conductor at the same time.

The community of inquiry is based on democratic principles where everyone has a right to express an opinion, no matter how absurd it may be. Since play is an inherent part of a community of inquiry, and play is built on positive emotions, children embrace philosophy like a "free conversation" and there is always a danger that the classroom discussion could evolve into chaotic chatter. To avoid this, fairly rigid rules based on cognitive and ethical structures should be adhered to. Freedom of expression should be well founded: A diversity of outlooks should be based on strong argument; the freedom to create with intellectual responsibility; the right to criticize with the ability to listen to opposing arguments and to compromise; the right of individuality with the ability to participate in a cooperative search for truth.

In other words, Lipman remains true to the old educational maxim that self-realization is reached through collectivism. "The reflective model is thoroughly social and communal. Its aim is to articulate the friction-causing differences in the community, develop arguments in support of the competing claims, and then, through deliberation achieve an understanding of the larger picture that will permit a more objective judgment."[23] The freedom and rules of limitation in a community of inquiry are directed not only at the formation of a specific type of cogni-

tive behavior but also at ethical behavior. By understanding the ethics of discussion, children learn the basic principals of democratic interaction. According to Lipman, the school is a basic societal institution that teaches democracy while the classroom, transformed into a community of inquiry can become a principal nucleus in which members of a democratic society are formed.

THE STORY AS A MODEL AND A MEANS OF "INCLUSION" OF THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUE

It is well known that when involving students in philosophy, Socrates used the genre of spoken language for teaching. Spoken language has priority in a community of inquiry. However, for regular school teaching, this is not enough. It is necessary to have a text which will organize, structure and systematize. But what kind of text? Lipman categorically rejected the idea of a *textbook*, since a textbook is always authoritative, and limits initiative. Problems are laid out in rows and overstructured, the language is unnecessarily professional requiring a long introduction; the textbook is designed for absorbing information, at a time when self-expression is needed.

Lipman's theory is based on the premise that people are more capable of learning what is understandable and interesting to them, what touches them personally and about which they can speak in a language that they are used to. The text should capture the imagination, arouse curiosity, provoke inquiry and entice one into an intellectual game. This can best be accomplished through a fictional story that has a philosophically saturated plot and denouement. Accordingly, Lipman wrote 7 stories, each named after its protagonist: *Elfie, Kio and Gus, Pixie, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, Lisa, Suki,* and *Mark*. The plots, which are directed at school children of various ages, depict common situations and typical conversations among children and between children and adults, such as a field trip to the zoo, a trip to the farm, an act of vandalism at school, etc.

The narratives (stories) that Lipman created have a very special quality. In the plot, the imaginary characters accidentally "bump into" philosophical questions which perplex them and create an intellectual anxiety, which, according to Lipman, should cause a similar reaction in the reader. As long as the questions appear under a literary guise, the students have to do some research (with the help of the teacher, of course) in order to see and recognize the philosophical meaning of these questions, to correctly formulate them and begin their own search for answers. The narrative is only a "lure" for this search.

Lipman's use of narrative permits the use of a didactic method which is rare in philosophical education.[24] Reflection by the imaginary characters acts as a model for philosophical discussion, and provides cues for continuing the philosophical dialogue. Without rejecting the value of fairy tales, allegories and moralistic parables, Lipman is categorically against using them as texts in philosophical education. In his opinion even young children would never seriously model their conversations on fairy tale characters.[25]

The narrative genre is meant to help children resolve a very important problem in philosophical education and that is to learn to think both universally and contextually. Philosophical questions in stories arise in concrete situations, and they migrate from one context to another, forcing one to recognize the universal in the contextual, to discover new facets in the same question in relation to contextual change, and to confront contexts. Even very young children are puzzled by questions such as: why isn't it okay to shoot squirrels in the park but it is okay to do so in the woods? Why can you eat killed cows, chickens, etc., while you can't torture pets? Why can't you do the same things at school that you do at home? etc.

Those who read Lipman's narratives for the first time might get the impression that problems that relate to the whole area of philosophical disciplines—epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and others are mixed up here like a layered salad, where the layers are repeated with different sauces. This impression is misleading. The texts are strictly structured and systematized. Lipman is convinced that only one discipline exists and that is philosophy. Distributing its problems over different levels is connected with a professional need for classification but in life they are all "interconnected." That is why the beginner can more easily understand the meaning of problems when they are presented as an epistemological, ethical and logical ensemble.

Lipman's program has a spiral structure. A problem may appear casually in one place and become central in another. By moving from one rung of the spiral to another, it can appear in different contexts, and can, sometimes, have a broader content or become more cognitively complicated. For example, a very difficult philosophical problem dealing with personality already appears at the beginning of *Elfie* which is meant for 6- or 7-year-olds. One of Lipman's main principles of cognition is that it is impossible to philosophize without having both spiritual and a physical self-awareness—that is, without exercising self-reflection. Elfie is a very bashful girl who, because of her constant silence, is called "unreal" by one of her classmates; this is hurtful to her so she attempts to convince herself that it is not so: "I think, that means (therefore) I exist," "I get surprised, that's why I'm a person." By using the Elfie example, Lipman shows how self-reflection can be neglected, and the spirit of Aristotle and Descartes is introduced. The problem of "I" frequently appears in other stories, in the most diverse settings. In the last story, *Mark*, which can only be mastered by older children since the discussion is about rights and responsibility, social justice, moral and ethical responsibilities, societal institutions, etc., the problem of "I" appears throughout.

The educational maxim "from the simple to the complicated" is realized in two ways in Philosophy for Children. The first is through an age-graded, gradual complication in the analysis of obvious problems. The second is by concentrating on the systematic teaching of reason through both easy and difficult problems in the stories, depending on grade level. Among the

"difficult" problems, Lipman includes those which have judgmental components and assume knowledge of certain skills of inquiry, and some life experience. These are ethical, aesthetical and social problems. The "easy" problems are thinking, language, logic, epistemology and metaphysics. Generally speaking, the structure of the program is outlined in the following illustration:

PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN COURSE

Grades 1-11

Grades	Children's Texts	Teacher's Aids
1	*Elfie*	How to organize thoughts
	Discussion about Thinking	
2-3	*Kio and Gus*	Puzzlement with the world
	Discussion about Nature	
3-4	*Pixie*	Search for meaning
	Discussion about Language	
5-6	*Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*	Philosophical inquiry
	Basic discussion skills	
7-8	*Lisa*	Ethical inquiry
	Discussion about Ethics	
9-10	*Suki*	The art of writing: how and why
	Discussion about Literature and Art	
10-11	*Mark*	Social Inquiry
	Discussion about Social Inquiry	

IV. Basic Discussion Skills and the Content of Philosophy

We have arrived at the most important question—what are the "hard" outcomes of Professor Lipman's educational strategy and methodology? It is understood that it is impossible to speak about "hard" outcomes in philosophical education in the same manner as we speak about them in teaching mathematics, chemistry or literature. At the same time, since it is a school program, the Philosophy for Children program should produce certain measurable results.

In general, one can say that the most important, positive result of the Philosophy for Children program is the acquisition (ability, creativity, facility) of basic, critical and correct reasoning skills, necessary for thinking and behaving reasonably. Conditionally, these skills can be divided into three groups: (1) skills for cooperative interaction within a community; (2) general inquiry skills; (3) cognitive skills for basic reasoning. We have already discussed the first group of skills when we examined the community of inquiry. We will, therefore, turn to the second and third groups.

General inquiry skills include the following: the ability to identify problematic situations, see the contradictions in received information, correctly formulate questions relevant to the situation, see mistakes in generalizing, avoid making conclusions on the basis of a single fact, using and applying facts to confirm, presenting hypotheses for coherent explanation of facts, recognizing the danger in hypothesizing, confronting contexts and analyzing differences between them, having a variety of explanatory instruments, analyzing hidden assumptions, etc.

The cognitive skills for basic reasoning are :the ability to work with beliefs and clarify their meanings, establish limits in relation to contexts, avoid multiple meanings, distinguish and establish connections and avoid over-generalizations, justify opinions, distinguish between strong and weak arguments, consciously use various criteria, produce examples and counter examples, use rules and regulations when producing facts, draw conclusions based on evidence, check for logic in conclusions, work with cause and effect relationships and logical formulas, know elementary logical rules for making deductions, recognize different types of relationships and their connections, work with analogies, alternatives, and metaphors, make balanced judgments, recognize pluses and minuses in evaluative, descriptive, comparative and analytical tools.

Listing inquiry and cognitive skills is obviously beyond the framework of formal logic.[26] They are sometimes called skills of "informal logic" or "logic of reasonable discussion," and creative argument.[27]

For the Russian reader, raised under a doctrinaire and propagandistic philosophy, these "hard" outcomes can produce some doubt. He or she might say that this belongs to theinstrumental side of philosophy and has no content. For the Russian, philosophy is supposed to teach the meaning of life, the difference between good and evil, paint a picture of the world, etc. Even a small child who is confronted with lies, injustice, violence, and national conflicts looks for meaning and a point of reference.

We can imagine Lipman's answer to be that both the stories and exercises in the texts are comprehensible to children and include moral and social situations. Of course, these models cannot attempt to embrace the entire wealth of life, since unusual and complicated problems constantly occur in people's lives and it is impossible to prevent them. At the same time, no system of indoctrination can provide answers to all situations. The use of moralistic polemics in teaching or remonstration in establishing authority is, as a rule, built on threats of punishment and is useless. It is difficult to relate its content to everyday "small" moral situations ("We won't play with him because he cheats.") A more effective method is to teach how to think independently and to provide instruments for reasoning. The best place for this is a community of inquiry. Here the discussion is diverted to interpreting facts and rules, clarifying ethical meanings, carefully examining contexts and drawing conclusions with the help of arguments, logic and proofs, not through the influence of emotion or casual public opinion. Results should not be limited to clarification of moral beliefs but to the acquisition of moral reasoning skills which can help one deal with other moral situations. "The larger and more important objective is to establish a regimen of sound thinking among children, a regimen that will not simply be remedial in function but will prevent unreasonableness."[28]

Lipman's philosophy is sometimes called "defensive" (as opposed to the "offensive" of the indoctrination and pontifical method). Its goal is to increase the defensive mechanism of reason with the help of philosophy, acquire immunity to unreasonableness, protect one from one's own mistakes, and provide tools that could be used as a defense against manipulation.

The instrumental interpretation of philosophy is unfamiliar to the Russian mind. It does not correspond to the stereotypes of philosophy which are judged on the basis of the negative "isms" in society and educational establishments. This negative reaction

is completely understandable. Russian philosophers and educators, who have formally rejected Marxism, still remain loyal to the image of philosophy that was formed under its influence. In philosophy, one can find a religion and ideology that will provide people with a world view. Many agree that after ridding the school curriculum of Marxism, it would not be so bad to replace it with philosophy, but what kind of philosophy is not clear to many. Still, everyone sees the value in helping students develop a world view, and instill a system of moral values in them (and even to form "a value consciousness as a new form of world view"[29]), make them spiritually rich individuals, provide them with points of reference, etc.[30] Presently, the candidates chosen to take over these tasks are the original doctrinaire philosophers. The ease with which some educators, who only yesterday were active proponents of a "Communist education for the young generation" are now enthusiastically introducing religious education into schools, confirms this thesis. In other words, shamanism has been introduced to the school curricula.[31]

After being hypnotized by the "offensive" ideology of Marxism, we are still unable to adapt to the educational projects found in UN and UNESCO documents on the rights of individuals. The world community of educators has quite a clear position on the rights of children, family, school, state, church, and the specific ways in which these rights are violated. The creators of the Philosophy for Children program do not believe that all types of philosophy are applicable in schools. Before anything else, they should meet certain moral and legal standards. In the first place, the inventions of adults can be harmful to children and should never be imposed on them, *i.e.*, the accepted maxim is "do no harm." In the second place, indoctrination in the form of conclusions, values, convictions and "world views" should not be permitted, *i.e.*, an obvious or hidden manipulation of children's consciousness. Philosophy for Children should be "open," and since it is ideologically and religiously neutral, it should adhere to universal humanistic values, nationalism and democracy. The family has a right to give a child the kind of upbringing it chooses; it should have the choice of placing a child in a religious or private school, etc. Indoctrinating a child by imposing a world view is unacceptable on both moral and legal grounds. One cannot propagate either atheism or religion since children can be from diverse nationalities, religious and cultural traditions. Preference should not be given to any one religion since children could belong to different religions.[32]

The moral of the above is as follows: Russia now finds itself in probably the most dynamic period of its history. Because of the social and economic breakdown, the tense political battles, shifts in ideology and values, the influx of new, unusual and contradictory information, Russians are confronted with new problematic situations requiring unusual solutions. Most Russians find themselves mentally unprepared for this situation. For seventy years, education and ideology taught people how to think and behave stereotypically, and oppressed their reasoning and critical abilities. Ideological myths clearly defined what was "good" and what was "bad," while doubting and the pursuit of truth was forbidden. Even during the Perestroika years, there was a strong attempt to suppress sensible thinking through mass information, especially through television. The Russian people, who were in the process of freeing themselves from the old mythologies were now confronted by a torrent of new myths. The "green street" offered by all sorts of shamans—fortunetellers, mystics, wizards and witches from medical and educational fields, persuaded people not to depend on their own intelligence but on a miracle. This kind of situation could confuse people even in the most stable and prosperous countries, and in our unstable country with its constantly worsening economy it is plainly destructive. Dealing with unpredictable situations and increasingly complicated problems can certainly cause social neurosis and its expected outcomes such as loss of points of reference, a collapse of fundamental values, a sense of betrayal, and, as a result of this, rejection. Some people might react by withdrawing into their own thinking and private lives while others in a zealous attempt to rid themselves of problems, invent their own "Hunchback Horse." The December 12, 1993 elections in which 47% of the adult population refused to participate, while 26% voted for the "story-teller," V.V. Zhirinovsky, is a clear sign that people do not want and cannot think sanely. They have still not freed themselves from inner slavery and are not ready to think independently. When ideas of freedom, initiative, and responsibility are thrown on unprepared minds they produce opposite results.

In light of all this, there is nothing more important to Russia than the preservation of the natural potential for reasonable and sensible thinking, and the creation of a socially favorable environment resistant to all forms of sorcery. To make thinking more flexible and trained in the face of the unusual problems occurring at the threshold of the 21st Century, is perhaps the most formidable task that faces Russia; but that is the most important long-term strategy for a democratic society, if it is ever to be attained.

Various countries, including developed ones who have found themselves facing critical situations, discovered that education has been the best solution so far for spanning the chasm between the old and the new, and in forestalling future problems. It is probably unrealistic to hope for a change in the thinking of the older population. All hope is directed to the classroom.

It is well known that Russia is in 43rd place in indicators for the intellectual development of children, and it scores even lower in the development of a democratic consciousness. In order to resolve the situation, schools need innovative programs including philosophy, which can develop the intellect, stimulate critical mechanisms, and instill morality and ethics. We can begin at zero and try to create such programs on our own. But that would probably take 15 to 20 years. On the other hand, we could take advantage of the research developed in the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children and its pro-

grams adapted in Europe (especially in the former Socialist states), North and Latin America, Asia and Australia. In other words, we might take a more sensible and productive direction by adapting these programs to Russian social and cultural conditions.

* * *

Professor Lipman's position, "critical rationalism," assumes an openness to criticism. But Lipman's concepts are much more complicated to criticize than say, K. Popper's critical rationalism. In contrast to Popper, who, in his early years, offered a rather "hard" model of rationality built on the logic of scholarly research, Lipman's model of rationality with its emphasis on reason is a "soft" one. It is based on the logic of natural language and functions within the context of everyday life. There is no universal touchstone for developing "wise" judgment, . For this, criteria must be used. Lipman's

relativistic system is stronger than Popper's critical rationalism.

One can, of course, criticize relativism or the differences in proofs between "weighted categories" of formal logic and informal criteria of good judgments. However, there is not much sense in this kind of criticism. It would be more interesting to analyze the accuracy of Lipman's epistemological innovation—a specific method of analyzing philosophical problems through the prism of thinking skills: reasonableness through education, reasonable and rational, critical and creative thinking, judgment and "good" judgment, critical thinking, universality and contextuality in the thinking process, dialogue and communication as a basis for creating a community of inquiry, the cognitive role of narrative texts, etc. When analyzing Lipman's concept within this context and in our own work with the Philosophy for Children program, some reservations did arise.

My first reservation concerns the principle of equality in expressing opinions in a community of inquiry, and the priority of a "strong argument." I will remind you that, according to Lipman, the community of inquiry is not just an arena for individual self-expression through "Socratic dialogue," but a basic societal nucleus where moral and ethical consciousness is formed. More, it is an optimal form for creating good judgment in democratic institutions, be it a parliament, business, etc. Our limited experience with Lipman's methodology (two weeks' worth of work at the Institute of Philosophy at the Russian Academy of Science) showed that to keep up the principle of equality and "strong argument" is extremely difficult in light of the "people factor." People are not equal in intelligence, interests, knowledge, activity, or their ability to listen and conduct discussion. Often, it is not the "strong argument" but the argument of a strong individual that is likely to become the decisive one in a discussion.

Secondly, the adaptation of the universal content of the Philosophy for Children course to the Russian social and cultural context. The originators of Lipman's course assume that a problematic reading of the history of Western European philosophy can be applied to any culture. Of course, numerous "Americanisms," in the stories—names, everyday details, etc., could be easily changed to fit specific cultures. But, in reality, the problem of adaptation is much more complicated.

Difficulties are already apparent when translating the philosophical exercises in the teachers' manuals into Russian into Russian. Many of these are built on English semantics, using cognitive and epistemological terminology that have no exact synonyms in Russian. In other words, the translator faces the type of difficulties which have to do with the "ontological relativity of language," and "inadequate translation" discussed by Quine at one time. Even more complicated are the many fundamental philosophical concepts. It is, of course, true that the problems of cause and effect relationships are universal; however, their interpretation within an historical context, say in the teachings of Hume or Kant, are indisputably Eurocentric.

There are other reservations that have to do with cultural logic. Can one consider the problematic skeleton of Lipman's program to be universal? From our point of view, it is a typical European product with a European system of values, and is foreign outside European boundaries. (The fact that the program "works" in Africa, Asia and Latin America does not prove anything). If Russia moves further towards European culture, there would be no problem. If it moves toward "originality" and "special spirituality," etc., and education takes that direction as well, then the adaptation of Lipman's program to the Russian context becomes problematic. Our limited experience with Lipman's program attests to the fact that its critical, rationalistic, activistic mood does not fare well with the typical Russian mentality and its idealism, its tendency to indoctrination, and its suspicion of Western intellectual traditions. The value of reasonableness, sensible thinking, creativity, intellectual responsibility is difficult to relate to indefinite passive notions of "spirituality" which have become slogans for the promotion of the rebirth of Russian self-consciousness.

NOTES

1. Matthew Lipman, *Thinking in Education* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
2. *Philosophy for Children.* Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, NJ 1973-1978.
3. Lipman warns against the displacement of Philosophy for Children with popular or applied philosophy. The aim of popular philosophy is the simplification of information, while the aim of applied philosophy whether in "business ethics" or "philosophy of science" is the clarification of concepts, problems and the methodology of non-philosophical disciplines. The purpose of Philosophy for Children is to teach straightforward philosophy, to do philosophy. *Thinking in Education,* p. 112.
4. The term "technology" (in Russian) is used here for convenience. Not wanting to associate his method with "technology," Lipman preferred to use other concepts, such as "special procedures," "methods," "examples," etc.
5. Matthew Lipman, "How Old is Harry Stottlemeier?" in *Studies in Philosophies for Children. Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery.* Ed. by A. Sharp and R.F. Reed. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1992.
6. Matthew Lipman, A.M. Sharp and F. Oscanyan. *Philosophy in the Classroom.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980, 231 pp.; M. Lipman and A.M. Sharp, *Growing up with Philosophy.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978; M. Lipman. *Philosophy Goes to School.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988; G.B. Matthews. *Philosophy and the Young Child.* Boston: Harvard University Press, 1980; G.B. Matthews. *Dialogues with Children.* Boston: Harvard University Press, 1983; M.S. Prichard. *Philosophical Adventures with Children.* University Press of America, 1985; *Children in Chaos: A "Philosophy for Children" Experience.* Ed. by L. Harris. Dubuque, In Kendall/Hunt, 1991.
7. *Thinking in Education.*
8. This has been one of the central topics systematically discussed since the 1980's in the International Conference on Thinking.
9. Lipman notes the roots of critical thinking in works of C. Peirce, J. Royce and J. Dewey. More contemporary sources are M. Black, *Critical Thinking,* 1952, S. Stebbing. *Thinking to Some Purpose,* 1939, M. Beardsley, *Practical Logic,* 1950, as well as works by P. Ennis, the analytic philosophers J. Ryle, M. Oakeshott and others. Lipman, particularly notes the work by B.O. Smith and R. Ennis, *Language and Concept of Education, 1961*; I. Scheffler, *Language and Education, 1978.* We assume that Lipman's list does not include all works of philosophers and methodologists who discuss models of self-reflection and philosophical criticism of science.
10. Extensive sources can be found in the journal, *Thinking.* Analytical articles are published in *Teaching Philosophy, American*

Journal of Psychology and others.

11. The first steps in this analysis were taken by the author from the following articles: N.S. Iulina. "Philosophy for Children," *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1993, No. 9; N.S. Iulina, "Introduction to Philosophy: Two Approaches," *Filosofskie Issledovania*, 1993, No. 2.
12. The approach to understanding the thinking process through the prism of education is, of course, not new. We may recall K. Popper whose approach is considered to be very productive in understanding the formation of language acquisition. "The ability to learn descriptive and argumentative language" he writes, "has a genetic base and is specific to man. It may be said that through language, the material genetic foundation transcends itself: it becomes the foundation for teaching culture, participating in civilization and in world traditions.: (K. Popper, J. Eccles. *The Self and its Brain*. London-New York, 1977, p. 46). Lipman is not involved in Popper's style of metaphysics. For him, the mind is a great secret, but the acquisition of knowledge by learning how to perfect the thinking process is not a great secret for him. The research on thinking in education, he points out, provides a vital clarification of its nature.
13. *Thinking in Education*, p. 8.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 16. It is necessary to make several semantic observations to better understand Lipman's concepts. From the point of view of content, logic, and style, Lipman's works are clear and transparent. Problems arise due to the absence of synonyms in Russian for English terms for "mental language." The English vocabulary is significantly richer and, as a result of a tradition stemming for Locke, Berkeley, Hume, legal meanings, penetrate into epistemology, since it is influenced by a well-developed legal tradition. Notions such as "reason," "reasoning," "reasonable," central to Lipman's ideas, are usually translated into Russian as *razumnyi. Razumnoe subhdenie, obladaiuzchii razumnost; iu.* All these words are rooted in the word *um* (intelligence), which the person either has or doesn't have and cannot be taught. In English, the word "reason" combines two meanings: reason *razum* and basis *oxnovanie* (cause). That is why "reasoning" can be more exactly be translated as "sound activity of reason," which can be taught to a "reasonable person"—"a person reasoning soundly, reasonably and thoughtfully." The term "judgment" we translate as *suzhdenie* which in Russian has a legal tone. However, in Russian, the verbs that have to be used with it, *vynosit, vykskasyyvat*, are monofunctional while Lipman's verbs, *vyrabatyvat* (to make, *delat* (to do) imply a process.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
21. We will clarify this with an example on the problem of relationships presented in the Philosophy for Children program. In one story, which centers around a sisters' quarrel, the question of what is a familial relationship arises. The plot also deals with other relationships, such as between "far and near," "yesterday and today," "warm and temperature," numbers in mathematics, words in grammar, name and named, etc. It is assumed that, as a result, children form an integrative picture of relationships learned in physics, mathematics, grammar, etc.—a picture of the world as a system of diverse relationships—that will prepare them to recognize new types of relationships.
22. We translated the English term, "community of inquiry" as *soobschesto issledovatelei.* A more precise meaning is probably, "community of people looking for truth."
23. *Thinking in Education*, p. 19.
24. " The idea of the text as model or portrait," writes Lipman, "strikes many educators as impertinent and bizarre. But how could there be anything more to the point? If we want children—or students of any age—to form a community of inquiry, surely it would help to show them a community of inquiry and let them examine how it works." (*Thinking in Education*, p. 216).
25. An assumption exists that Lewis Carol's *Alice in Wonderland* and Saint Exupery's *Little Prince* can be used in philosophical lessons. Lipman considers them inappropriate not only because of the story lines but because their hidden and complicated problems can only be mastered by adults.
26. Lipman believes that students should know and be able to use elementary rules of logic. At the same time, based on his own experience, he considers it inadvisable to teach logic in isolation. "Teaching logic in isolation in no way shows students how to *apply* that logic to the subject matters of the various disciplines," and how to work with contexts. (*Thinking in Education*, p. 188).
27. Lipman, apparently, takes a middle position between the preference for "informal logic" by English speakers and the continental theories of rational argument and rhetoric. The movement of "informal logic" began in the 1970's and is based on the concepts of analysis of natural language of L. Wittgenshtein, J. Austin and G. Ryle which were influential in the development of critical thinking principles (M. Scriven, P. Grice, S. Toulmin, R. Fogelin, C. Hamblin, R. Crawshay-Williams and others). Contributions by European thinkers include works on rhetoric and theories of argument by C. Perelman, P. Ricoeur, I. Richards, H. Blumenberg, H-G Gadamer, and J. Derrida.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
29. N.S. Rozov, *Philosophy of Humanitarian Education*, Moscow, 1993 and *Culture, Values and Development of Education*, Moscow, 1993. Rozov reflects on "values and world view" in sophisticated global societies. Yet, he does not have the necessary "know how" to teach sound thinking about values or how to use these skills in everyday life.
30. Even innovative thinkers who support substituting the informational model with the reflective one, use expressions such as, "meaningful picture of the world," "valuable pedagogy," as answers to the all important question, "why are we in this world?" (A. Asmolov. "Education in Russia: Shock from the Present," *Today*, No. 8, 1993, p. 10). The thinking of our educators is influenced by republished works of Russian Messianic and moral philosophers as well as by new publications of professional philosophers, who, despite their sincere hope for "rebuilding" are incapable of breaking away from old ideological, pontificating clichès and the "offensive" concept of education (see K.A. Shvartsman, L.V. Konovalova, O.N. Krutova. *Education: New Approaches in the Eternal Theme*. Moscow, 1993).
31. What can one say about the V.D. Stolbniak Experimental School 9, (see Iu. Riazhskii, "Paradise without Memory." *MK* December 30, 1993, p. 2) or the "clubs" directed by A. Garmaiev, "Scientific and Practical Laboratories for Moral Psychology and Pedagogy of the Academy of Science of the Russian Federation" (see D. Romanov, "The Apostle of Darkness: The Orthodox Experiment," *MK*, January 13, 1994, p.2).
32. It is sad but true that Russian school teachers, who are generally ignorant of people's rights, do not understand that their need to clarify their own confusion and the confusion in the minds of school children by infusing religion into schools, would be a violation of children's right to be free from indoctrination (see M.D. Geraschenko, "Tadpoles and Extrasensors," *MK*, December 22-24, 1993). It would be apt to note that Lipman does not make declarations on the rights of children. Instead, his texts for children and teacher's manuals are saturated with a conscious awareness of ones rights. The plots induce children to discuss topics such as the right to have a secret, the right of privacy, the right to be oneself, the right for one's own opinion, the rights of people and the rights of animals, the rights of children and the rights of teachers, games and observing the rules of the games, rights in face of rules and rights in face of judgment, etc.

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Philosophy and Philosophy for Children

Ie. A. Kodrat'ev

In the process of introducing and interpreting the Philosophy for Children program into the classroom, we were faced with the need to clarify the following questions:

1. What is the connection between everyday ideas and philosophical concepts? And more broadly, what is the relationship between philosophical thinking and the thinking of a child?
2. What is the nature of the teaching "material" (subjects, experimental data, language, thought)? What is dialogue and discussion?
3. What develops in the classroom: logic or creative thinking? What is creative thinking and its relationship to logic?
4. How does philosophy or philosophizing manifest itself within a "community of inquiry"?

We will begin with a slight departure and ask: What, after all, is philosophy? Philosophy can be defined as a science, as one of the sciences or as a thinking activity, directed by a scientific method and a logically stated system based on established concepts.

Such a rationalistic and pseudo-scientific definition of philosophy disputes the definition of philosophy as "knowledge of freedom" (Berdiaiev). Freedom is the possibility of asking cardinal questions about the meaning of existence beyond the limits of known facts. Freedom and necessity are, accordingly, attributes of philosophy and science. In attempting to establish a factual order, science is compelled to follow necessity. Philosophy does not posit order as its goal. It directs itself to truth and to the meaning of existence, which people discover through various phenomena. In questions that either deal with the world as a whole or its part, philosophy exists, before anything else, as a relationship—a means of transcending or clarifying a problem. The aim of philosophy is to always establish the whole truth, and not partial truths. It is not meant to regulate phenomena, or to dissect the world order. For philosophy it is important to understand that the world is a whole, that it exists and that identity cannot exist without differences. In some ways, one can say that the goals of philosophy and science are contradictory: Philosophy originates from the center to the periphery while science from the periphery to the center. The philosophical "is" and "isn't" indicate the point where reality and ideas coincide and what precedes the existence of the world. This is precisely why for philosophy and for its language, judgment is just as important as silence and existence is just as important as non-existence.

At the same time, philosophy is not poetry, although it is related to it through the power of language and it is through language that philosophy, like poetry, strives toward the discovery of truth. Philosophy is creativity by way of ideas. What role does logic play in philosophy? It is just a formal way of organizing ideas. Logic is a means of

bringing philosophical truth to the factual world. Plato assumed that ideas form a sort of hierarchy, but there is a also a point of view that understands philosophy to be governed by a different law. (M. Heidegger)

However, in philosophy, content—or rather, the question of meaning—is a more important question. The way to meaning is not found through a formal, simplistic order, but through a

free, philosophizing individual. Philosophy does not believe but seeks and it does this more intuitively than systematically: and it begins its search with the everyday sources of existence. For philosophy it is necessary to have the the entire experience of consciousness. "Philosophy should establish the primary truth in the mythology of a person's consciousness. Philosophy, itself, freely recognizes that the world can only be comprehended through mythology." (N.A. Berdiaiev. *The Meaning of Creativity,* Moscow, 1989).

In reality, isn't it surprising how easily consciousness can become an integrative whole in an esthetic experience and in reasoning directed at the general, and how poignantly it moves towards its goal through conceptual patterns?

In summary, we can note that philosophy cannot be characterized as an act of formal thinking. It is an integral phenomena which is an outcome not only of subjective activity but has roots in ontology.

The above, very general description of philosophy is necessary as a conceptual basis on which we can attempt to discover philosophical elements in children's discussions and dialogues.

Children often ask questions which adults would never think of asking or would consider irrelevant (Why is it dark at night? Why am I me?, etc.) What can be observed in these questions is naiveté and a lack of factual knowledge. On the other hand, doesn't this naiveté provide a basis for free discussion? An absence of a factual basis for establishing relationships may be considered undisciplined on one hand, but on the other, insubordination is a necessity and at the same time, questions such as these are clearly seeking answers and don't just simply appear. Questions that produce wonder also confirm that the search for answers is, after all, the search for the meaning of possible relationships.

That is why, by asking "clumsy" and metaphorical questions, a child unwittingly and through the use of language places himself in a significant thinking situation. Yet, one cannot say that a child is a philosopher and a metaphysician. On the contrary, the child is conservative and likely to obey authority, and is used to structure and to the logic of simple things. He cannot rise above his own thinking by reflecting and evaluating the degree to which his question is free. By not knowing the limits of necessity, he is incapable of discovering the limits of release. And still, the child's question is very important precisely because it uses the word as meaning.

This is the way that children's questions can be assessed by an adult. But what does the question mean to the child? We do not think that it would be justifiable to make logic a backbone of this program. In his practical life, the child is exposed to logic from early on. Moreover, logic can be taught in other subjects. What is more important are the substantive and imaginative components of thinking. What we have in mind is not the visual image level of thinking, but precisely the image as an integral part of the

thinking process. The image provides a wholeness when the child wonders. Without achieving this wholeness, the image disappears. We can accept that the child can think of whole images when generalizing the familiar. At that level of generalization, the child begins to think more intensively. Here, the thinking can become more creative and less formal and organized. Existing frameworks for problems do not allow the child to detach and look at the problem from a distance, as whole, as it appears. A problem, as a rule, requires strict behavior from the child, eliminating any excess and forcing him to use reason rather than the intellect. It is necessary to give the child the opportunity, before anything else, to activate his intellect.

This interpretation of the image in children's thinking allows us to examine the question of relating spontaneous thoughts to philosophical ideas. Without doubt introducing the ideas of "adult" philosophy early on is senseless. The adult does not think in images the way children do; for an adult, philosophical ideas are represented through abstractions which are foreign to the child, although these abstractions do possess a fair number of images. That is why abstractions should not be introduced to the child who should be given the opportunity to examine his questions, and his images of wonder in their pure and unobstructed form, from a removed position.

"It is necessary to clearly define philosophical problems as a special subject of instruction and present them to children."

There is a point of view that thinking originates from the need to reconstruct events. However, in order to form ideas, "borderline situations" are also significant. In this regard, the relationship between onto- and phylogenists of thinking is very important. Can we compare the thinking of a child to the thinking of a savage? Relying on test data, many psychologists think that ontogenesis does not correspond to phylogenesis. When they consider the thinking of a savage or primitive man it is assumed that they are speaking about an adult. However, an adult savage was able to adapt to his environment as well as a contemporary person does and his totems and mythologies, in many ways, were no less abstract than the generalizations of science and philosophy.

A child is apt to think about things related to himself. He is incapable of transferring his wonder to an intellectual perspective. He tries to give everything a simple, clear and immediate answer. Idealized generalizations and imagination intermingle, and he gives everything familiar and visual names. When generalizing, a child uses visual objects and not ideas. (To my question, "Can a lake be a toy?" children answered, "You have to be able to reduce the lake to the size of a wash basin," "We play in the lake," etc.)

Therefore, the question is: how philosophical should discussion topics that are given to children be? To what extent do children adequately interpret these questions? With the help of exercises, etc., we form scientific thinking in children, but how is philosophical thinking formulated?

In exercises directed to a specific goal, children develop not so much whole thinking as the ability to think within a framework of strongly motivating, assigned tasks (games, problems within a lesson, visual aids). In a philosophical discussion without a precisely defined topic or simple answer, children are apt to develop language as well as fanciful and symbolic layers of thinking much more rapidly.

What should be the subject of a philosophical discussion for children? What methods and principals of behavior can children discover without a goal or answer? In the final outcome, there may be no significant change in children's comprehension and experience. The presence of other points of view doesn't mean anything to him. How can a general solution to a philosophical problem be sustained from start to finish, and at the expense of what activity?

What is the *subject* in a children's philosophical discussion? Here, ideas and words are not symbols for objects but are ready-made abstractions and judgments, the origins of which the child may not understand. (Elfie: "I want to know my reasoning, soul and body.") Such judgments do not stem from any visual material. (That is why, when interpreting their reasoning, the children gave many visual examples such as semicircle, three brains, etc.)

To what degree does their level of ability at formulating abstractions allow children to philosophize? We can pose this question in another way: To what extent should games and visual experiences be introduced in the classroom and how should they be connected to philosophy? It is also necessary to clarify the role of aesthetic experience in the development of a child's thinking, that is, the experience of a whole image. It is necessary to clearly define philosophic problems as a special subject of instruction, and to present them to children.

M.V. Telegrin is an editor of Thinking, the Russian Journal of Philosophy for Children.

Fragment from a First-Grade Philosophy for Children Lesson

(Lesson Theme: "Foolish and Smart")

M.V. Telegin

Teacher: Imagine that some person thinks he is foolish. What gives him the right to think that way about himself?

Anton: That's because he is foolish, and that's all.

Kolia: He's just not smart.

Sveta: A person has the right to think of himself as foolish because he just does not know anything. He does not know how to answer any question. His head is empty, without any thoughts.

Vova: I agree, a foolish person doesn't know and doesn't want to know anything. He just likes to be the way he is.

Katia: Wait, but that man who just doesn't know anything and does not even have one little thought, he still thinks about himself as being foolish so he knows something even if it's knowing that he is foolish.

Camilla: So, what's-his-name does know that he knows something.

Liosha: What if this person is not really foolish but just wants to convince everyone else that he is that way so that it will be easier for him to accomplish what he wants to do. He just pretends and fools people. He's just very sly.

Teacher: So how do we decide if a person is really foolish or pretends to be foolish? What if his opinion about himself is an incorrect one?

Katia: There is no such person who doesn't know anything. He is not a piece of wood, is he?

Sasha: If there isn't such a person, then you think that there are no foolish people at all?

Vova: Of course a foolish person knows something, but not everything. He knows very little but a smart person knows everything and whatever he does, he does well.

Kolia: Do you really think there is such a person who knows everything about everything?

Vova: Yes there is! A scientist! Everyone asks him things and he always helps them. He is always walking around with a lot of books and reads them. He knows everything....

Katia: One person, even if he is a scientist, cannot know everything. He can know... for sure, less than half, because there are too many different things in the world.

Camilla: Even if his brain is large he cannot fit the whole world into it and he would need to live two lives to answer every question.

Anton: The brain alone is not enough. The back has to load the brain with thoughts (laughter, animation).

Teacher: Can it really be true that scientists can be foolish?

Sveta: There are different kinds of scientists—in chemistry, mathematics, biology, Russian language, physics. Now the one in mathematics is smart because of his subject but the one in biology is probably not very smart and could be completely foolish.

Kolia: For example, a scientist no longer wants to discover anything, so he becomes a builder. He builds a house with the wrong kind of bricks and the house falls apart, which is very foolish.

Sasha: So that means that when the scientist was making discoveries he was smart and when he became a builder he suddenly turned foolish?

Liosha: No, it's not like this. When



I started school, I wasn't foolish, I just didn't know how to do anything. I wrote my letters backwards and mixed up numbers but now I learned to do everything correctly. There's a lot I don't know out there, like physics and chemistry but that's okay, I'm not foolish, I'll just learn it all.

Anton: And the same is true about the scientist. He wasn't foolish, he just started doing something that wasn't his job, so the house fell apart.

Vitia: I understand. A smart person just knows his job. When he does what he knows, everything turns out. He knows where he wants to go and what he has to do to get there. A foolish person might know something but doesn't know how to use this knowledge. All these thoughts are mixed up.

Teacher: Does everyone agree with Vitia?

Katia: I agree. A foolish person's head is filled with porridge?

Vova: What kind of porridge, buckwheat or semolina?

Katia: Of thoughts.

Sasha: The foolish one doesn't know what he wants. Even if someone else tries to help him, he refuses that help.

Vitia: A smart person develops his thinking and intelligence and knows about it and this helps him get what he set out to do. He connects his thoughts to his work job and directs them to where they can be of use to him and to other people.

Kolia: While the foolish one's thoughts are a mish-mash—everything is mixed up. This limits him.

Sveta: The smart one wants to make a machine that would pour seeds into dirt but it's not turning out. So he will try to find out what is wrong. Maybe the seeds fall into the wrong place. He looks around, changes something and the machine starts to work.

Vitia: A smart person threads his ideas like little seeds or beads on to a thread. He is careful and does not hurry and everything turns out.

Anton: A smart person knows what he wants. First he connects his ideas, then he turns them into a project and then he yells, "It turned out!"

Teacher: And how does the smart person connect his ideas? What kind of magic thread does he use that always takes him where he's headed?

Katia: A smart person reads a lot and always studies. He knows all the rules, asks

about everything and is very curious....

Sasha: What if someone cheats him or there is a mistake in a book?

Kolia: Then he will check what he did. If he does something wrong once and makes a mistake or does something foolish he will realize that he was cheated and then will do everything right. He's smart, after all.

Vova: I think that the thread is his desire and will. If you want something very, very much, then you can get it.

Camilla: Yes, but a foolish person can also want something very much. He just doesn't know how to organize his thoughts in order to get it.

Katia: It seems that wishing alone is not enough. You should learn how to do things from people who know.

Sasha: But if a person does something for the first time, he doesn't have anyone to ask and no one can help him to do it properly. Or, for example, ancient people. No one taught them how to do things. They just learned on their own.

Vova: Maybe God helped them?

Teacher: I think I can now understand how a smart person can connect his thoughts.

Children: How?

Teacher: I'll give you a simple example, but you will have to guess yourselves.

Children: All right.

Teacher: Imagine that you never got caught in the rain. You walk out of the house, you look at the sky and see that it is filled with clouds and you see lightning flash.

Children: It'll start raining.

Teacher: But you still don't know that since you never got caught in the rain. You go out without an umbrella and get wet; it's really foolish.

Liosha: Next time, if the sky is cloudy, we won't go out without an umbrella or we would just stay home.

Teacher: So you see that clouds and rain are connected....

Katia: ... and our thoughts are connected. If we see clouds, that means we know that it will rain and we need to take an umbrella with us. That's why we can be smart and connect our thoughts.

Anton: I understood why thoughts are connected. Because a person observes, notes things down and learns from nature which can teach him.

Camilla: A foolish person saw clouds once and did not take an umbrella and got all soaked. When it happened for the second and third time, he got sick. A smart person got soaked in the rain and the next time, he knew that once there are clouds in the sky that it will rain, for sure. The thought about clouds and the thought about rain and umbrella got connected and he knows that in order to be smart he needs to take an umbrella with him.

Teacher: So how is the smart one different from the foolish one?

Sasha: The smart one learns from nature since everything is connected there. He observes nature and connects his thoughts in the same way.

Vova: The smart one knows what he wants. He doesn't begin his work until he thinks about it.

Kolia: A smart person learns from other people and is grateful for their help. He reads a lot and asks many questions.

Anton: A smart person goes forward a step at a time. If something does not turn our right, he re-does it.

Children: A foolish person does everything the wrong way.

Teacher: Children, you are all so smart!

The lesson was conducted and recorded by M.V. Telegin.



M.V. Telegin is an editor of Thinking, the Russian Journal of Philosophy for Children.

Philosophy for Children? Philosophy for Children... Philosophy for Children!

M.V. Telegin

Skeptic: The word combination itself is somewhat puzzling, provoking a whole series of questions.... Why don't you give me an illustration of this so-called Philosophy for Children and describe how it works? Let's have a topical and substantive conversation about this. So what is this Philosophy for Children? Is it a dream, a fancy, a myth?

Pragmatist: I can tell you, with good reason, that Philosophy for Children is a multi-faceted, polyphonic and dynamically developing reality—a reality which is embodied in a program under this name and directed at teaching philosophy to children from grades 1–10. The program has all the components of an integrated educational methodology: specialized student texts, teaching manuals (including several approaches to planning and organizing discussions, exercises, and video lessons), and a special methodology for teacher training.

The most important gauge of this reality is the unique method it uses for generating philosophical knowledge. This method is based on a child's spontaneous sense of wonder, the actualization and stimulation of the child's curiosity, and a genuine cooperation between children in solving philosophical problems.

The Philosophy for Children program was established in the mid 70's by scholars from the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (New Jersey, USA) under the direction of Professor of Philosophy, Matthew Lipman. What was once a small group of enthusiasts and "fans" of philosophy now has a strong following in more than 20 countries (USA, Canada, Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Australia, Russia, Romania, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Armenia, China, etc.) in more than one thousand schools. Important work in the field is being carried out by a large number of research groups and by entire institutes. In Russia, work in the field is conducted at the Psychological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences (V. V. Rubtsov, director), the International College of Education and Psychology (A. A. Margolis, director), and the Philosophy for Children Center (S. D. Kovalev, director).

Just as a river cannot be considered a calm phenomenon, the program produces an interaction between deep and shallow currents, and generates the most fanciful combinations of theory and practice. It is truly a living fabric for discussion that helps expose "breakthrough" zones which occur at the points of contact and produce a myriad of philosophical and psychological dialogues.

Whoever dips in the river once will want to return for more of its crystal clean waters and be nurtured by the springs of a child's naive ideas and puzzlement about the world and its truth, beauty and mystery. With our participation, these ideas transform before our eyes into the creative and discursive, the reflective and critical, sensitive to context and conclusive, accepting of and accommodating other points of view. At the same time, these naive questions are attempts to find appropriate answers to the demands of the 21st century.

Skeptic: You have painted a grandiose picture, sang a paean to your program, spoke grandiloquently and metaphorically. But what stands behind those words? There are countless new-fangled programs and courses that vanish as soon as they appear even before the teacher has time to realize their falsity.

Pragmatist: A real teacher will always feel it when something is false. Would you like to see a Philosophy for Children lesson with seven-year-olds?

Skeptic: Sure, of course. (Looks at a video of the lesson).

Pragmatist: What is your strongest impression?

Skeptic: I have worked in a school for thirty years but have never seen anything like this! The children are absolutely free and natural and they speak so convincingly, associatively and enthusiastically!

Pragmatist: One of the most important elements of this program is to create a favorable psychological climate which is an indispensible condition for any philosophical dialogue and for developing communication skills in children.

Skeptic: Only now do I understand what the children were talking about. They were really solving a philosophical problem!

Pragmatist: Designing this was a long and laborious process....

Skeptic: Just think about it! For two hours, seven-year-old children discussed what qualities determine a good or bad person and how these

influence his/her behavior. Step by step, remark after remark, they constructed symbols and images in their dialogue. Remember, "a person's soul resembles a circle, divided by a tube. In one half are the good qualities, in the other, the bad ones?" And later, another boy continued, "the tube is soft. That's why a person sometimes has more bad qualities and sometimes less of them." And five minutes later, he said, "I understand, the tube is a person's will!" There are so many examples and thoughts about nature! At the end of the lesson, the class was split since an opposing point of view was brought up by a quiet girl. "The position of the tube is not determined by the person or by his will, but by those people who surround the person and by the thing he or she does." And what a dialogue ensued among the children who had different points of view!

Pragmatist: And what can you say about the teacher's role, how did you see it?

Skeptic: Of course, it's nontraditional. The teacher did not appear as the bearer of truth. His style was not authoritative. Generally, he behaved as an equal participant in the dialogue. Although I did notice that he made sure that different points of view were voiced and he moderated the dialogue by shifting the context. By modifying the original context created by the children, he forced them to reconstruct a new context and improve their method of discussion. Another important point is that the teacher was always understood whether he based himself on assumptions and suppositions, or through images that the children, themselves created.

Pragmatist: These are very precise observations.

Skeptic: I could feel the heart of your program beat, but how does its brain work? On what theoretical, practical and philosophical assumptions is it based? What psychological premises do you use when you design the program as a school subject?

Pragmatist: These are complicated questions and to discuss them requires time. I'll try to give you a general overview of the program's theoretical premise: In psychology, we base ourselves on the cultural, historical (L.S. Vygotsky) and activity approaches (A.N. Leontiev), as well as on the views originated by the wonderful Swiss psychologist J. Piaget. We also rely on the educational environments oriented to communication and the creation of interactive forms of educational activity developed by V.V. Rubtsov and his colleagues. The essence of our approach consists of the following: in order to form logical and reflective thinking through the study of philosophy, children should be able to perform the activity which is generic to philosophy—and that is to philosophize (in the form of a dialogue and polyolog) the object of which is the content of learned philosophical concepts.

Skeptic: The concentric circles in your description tighten and I see a really good thing! But how does one "start up" this program?

Pragmatist: L.S. Vygotsky wrote that "interest precedes intellectual development, which it pulls behind itself." In wanting to know how things, ideas and thoughts relate to each other, the child is just as apt to pose and solve ideological, normative and axiological problems as he is to socialize and discover his place within a group.

On the other hand, the child has his own illusionary world which is filled with magic, spontaneous ideas, assumptions and ordinary language—a universal means for thought preservation and formation. All this allows the child to represent and interpret philosophical reality. This process can be actualized while reading specially designed, philosophically saturated stories which are comprehensible to children, philosophically measurable and have heroes who solve problems.

Philosophically, problematic situations stimulate children to generalize (summarize) their spontaneous philosophical ideas, to search for connections between them, to conceptualize and incorporate them into their discussion.

Skeptic: How is the spontaneous flow of philosophical thinking expressed?

Pragmatist: If we consider the visual nature of children's thinking and their ability to form symbols, we see that one of the ways philosophical thinking is expressed is through the use of metaphor. Metaphor when used in specific contexts will fixate what is singled out by the child during the process of generalization in order to convey the information not only to the other discussants but also to establish his relationship to this information.

Another important means of philosophical thinking is through various forms of interaction between children and through the use of educational dialogues to resolve philosophical problems. The way in which those dialogues are designed is an integral part of this new educational methodology.

Skeptic: This reminds me of Plato's *Socratic Dialogues*.It seems that they resemble your dialogues in the way various positions are taken.

* * *

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The Role of Stories in Doing Philosophy with Children

Paul Shrubshall

Many of those who subscribe to the Philosophy for Children (PFC) movement claim that philosophy is not just an addition to the curriculum but has a pressing claim on those responsible for the education of children.

In this paper I will explore the nature of this claim by first looking at two different ways of characterizing philosophy.

I will then argue that a leading theorist of the PFC movement, Matthew Lipman, presents an approach whose theory and method are at times at odds with one another because of a lack of clarity over which of these two ways should provide a model for a new curriculum. In doing this I will be elaborating on Karin Murris's argument in two recent articles (1993, 1994).

I will offer a perspective which moves towards resolving this tension by drawing attention to a theory of language teaching—Critical Language Awareness—which offers an alternative pedagogy by relating narrative analysis to philosophical questions.

I will then present an example of a PFC discussion which shows how philosophy and narrative are related.

Two perspectives: philosophy as meta-discourse and as critical practice

Philosophy can be regarded as an autonomous practice which provides a rational foundation for different areas of knowledge or intellectual disciplines. Although philosophy, according to this conception, is able to affect everyday life, it can operate in isolation from it: philosophy steps back from other practices to embark on a process of reasoning which aims to provide a more secure basis for knowledge and practice outside philosophy. This philosophical reasoning is based on its own principles. It can be understood through an attention to what is distinctively philosophical alone. According to this view, philosophy, although supremely important because of its ability to provide a foundation for other disciplines and practices, is not essentially connected to them. Philosophy makes it possible to understand, and rationalize, other aspects of thinking and understanding, but the reasoning principles of these other disciplines are left behind and not used. For example, to–understand what scientific evidence amounts to can take place without assuming that a particular scientific practice is paradigmatic.

An alternative view, or perhaps type, of philosophy views philosophy as internally connected with everyday practices and those practices associated with intellectual disciplines: philosophy explores the concepts that form part of these practices whilst at the same time being constituted by them. To continue my earlier example, philosophy of science, according to this picture, is bound up with what it is to provide evidence in a particular scientific community where these practices and disciplines provide the materials for philosophical reasoning itself: philosophy is an attempt to make sense of concepts underlying everyday life, not through a retreat to a purer form of reasoning but through the use of the practices from which these concepts came in the first place. Philosophy and non-philosophical disciplines and practices which it reflects upon are held essentially connected. This view depicts philosophy as contextualized in a social and intellectual practice.

What makes philosophy distinctive from other disciplines is its 'distance', or ability to abstract and analyse. According to this second view of philosophy this comes about, not through an occupation of a space which enables philosophy to be free from intellectual and ideological presuppositions–a notion belonging to the meta-discourse concept of philosophy outlined

above, but rather through an awareness of its own dependence on these. (This perspective is enlarged on by Derrida through his deconstruction of the notion of philosophy as a pure rational study (1983, 1984)).

When we open a text to a critical reading by situating it in a variety of contexts that problematize it with respect to its supposed univocal meaning, we are doing something very similar to what Derrida does when he shows us how philosophical texts can be read in ways that undermine their conventional meaning. Here philosophy, far from being a discourse that points beyond everyday discourse to a realm of understanding free from the 'faults' of everyday language, is a critical practice which explores how concepts are constructed from ideologies that are rooted in the everyday and in academic disciplines. Both critical reading and this type of philosophy involve a stepping back from our commonsense ease with the world to see an aspect of it as strange and problematic. Academic philosophy, to the extent that it has become conventionalized, can hinder this way of thinking.

I will briefly turn to some of the pedagogical outcomes of this notion of philosophy as critical practice when I look at Critical Language Awareness, a practice in part influenced by the literary theory of Derrida and others. However, before doing this I will turn specifically to Lipman's concept of philosophy.

Method and content in Lipman's Philosophy for Children

Matthew Lipman presents us with a pedagogy that propounds a philosophical practice that challenges the view of philosophy as autonomous and foundational: however, at times the content of his PFC program departs from the practice to set up a notion of philosophy as an autonomous practice: for Lipman, philosophy is a discipline which deals with matters that provide foundations for the more specific intellectual practices which are offered by the traditional curriculum (Lipman, 1977, 1988, 1991). Lipman writes:

> It is in the very nature of philosophy to transcend the points of view of individual disciplines, to be, as it were, transparochial. and yet to have an overall sense of proportion that would put it in a better position to formulate those aims than either the representatives of the disciplines or the specialists of education. (1988, p.36)

Lipman believes that questions become philosophical by arising out of a kind of innocent wonder, a search for non-scientific, non-narrative sense; philosophy arises from a desire to make sense of the world which is prior to any particular discipline or practice: "the PFC approach involves the view that ...to ask questions 'How did the world begin?', 'What is everything made of?', or 'What happens to a person when he dies?' is to raise issues of tremendous metaphysical import" (1977, p.9). For Lipman. these questions, when asked by children, are philosophical because of the children's "healthy disregard for artificial categories and barriers to understanding" *(Ibid)*.

However, it is the way that these questions engage with the lives of the questioners that make them philosophical and not scientific or religious. It is impossible for these questions to be completely dissociated from all aspects of intellectual disciplines and everyday practices, for the concepts that philosophy explores have meaning by virtue of their place within these social practices. For example, philosophical questions about death can only get off the ground through a process of discussion which reveals a questioner's feelings and attitudes to ways of life that indicate not only what might count as an answer but also what will not: an answer that gives a religious or scientific answer might have to be first dismissed before getting a sense of the meaning of the question. The meaning of the question as a philosophical question is related to our understanding of the questioner's own way of regarding his or her own life. (Of course, this might be an academic question, asked at a particular stage in an intellectual debate; in this case the meaning of the question is defined by this positioning.)

In order to "deliver" PFC, Lipman offers a range of philosophical novels. These are considered to present philosophical concepts and to model philosophical practice; Lipman believes that the narrative, while being an important device for delivering these concepts and providing these models, should not be allowed to become overly 'persuasive'. However, despite these professed aims, the practice of PFC engendered by the philosophical novels turns out to be firmly rooted in a communal endeavour to make sense of a narrative; rather than narrative being a mere means to the delivery of philosophical concepts, it is an essential part of them.

Karen Murris (1993) makes this point when she contrasts what she describes as the post-modern method of PFC with Lipman's modernist theory of meaning. The PFC programme has a postmodern method in that philosophical discussion is rooted in a communicative practice, and meaning is negotiated as part of this; concepts are not arrived at by a formal logical mental process but are constructed by interaction. However, for Murris the programme has a modernist theory of meaning in its suspicion of picture books and imagination; this literal/symbolic or rational/imaginative dichotomy is, she claims, a modernist trait which threatens to undermine the appeal of PFC to teachers. Instead, the argument goes, picture books should be exploited for their potential to situate children in an imaginative space within which thinking can take place which is both rational and imaginative at the same time.

I presented above two ways of looking at philosophy and have argued that the method of PFC favors the view of philosophy as critical practice. I have started to provide a philosophical argument for the favoring of this way. However, I believe there are strong educational reasons also. It is crucial, particularly in primary education, to connect concepts and academic practices to the lives and everyday experiences of young learners: for example, mathematical concepts cannot be taught effectively in isolation from the child's everyday world of playing and manipulating the objects around him/her (Hughes, 1986). A learner-centred curriculum is not only a way of

making abstract thinking easier to children, but it is a way of providing meaning to these abstract ways of talking about the world: for example, the mathematical concept of subtraction is what it is by virtue of the practice of physically taking away objects from other objects. By locating philosophy within a practice of reflecting on narrative, we enable children to reflect on other people's lives and their own: philosophical thinking becomes contextualized within a community reflecting on its own way of life.

Critical language awareness

If narrative is not to be regarded as a means to an independently defined philosophical end, we must have to construct at least a start to an alternative pedagogy. Unlike Lipman's philosophical exercises that draw out the philosophical topics introduced in specially written philosophical novels, this alternative must provide a direct link between reflection on the narrative and philosophical reflection on the concepts internal to the narrative. One way of doing this is through Critical Language Awareness (CLA).

CLA offers a fertile resource for both theoretical and practical teaching ideas. It is an approach to teaching language which is influenced by recent ideas in the field of linguistics and continental philosophy (*e.g.* Peim, 1993 and Hodge & Kress, 1988). Language is regarded from two perspectives: as formal structure and as situated use within a social context. A narrative is an instantiation of multiple social-semiotic systems (systems of signs which have social meaning). For example, the ways explanation sections of a narrative are sequenced can express narrator and listener expectations about what narrative components are or are not to be taken for granted. These expectations in turn are related to social norms and values. This approach situates the events of a narrative within a particular way of life in such a way that a particular perspective and practice is represented as part of a social practice which, when contrasted with other possible practices, is seen as contingent and changeable. So CLA is not only an academic practice but is a critical one: it is part of a way of talking and behaving which can bring about social change (Fairdough, 1992). In locating concepts which form an essential part of a narrative within a social context and in challenging their "givenness", one is practising a kind of philosophy.

Peim (1993) advocates a theorizing, and at times a 'philosophizing', of secondary school English by students being encouraged to ask questions about the nature of language, in particular reading and writing: according to Peim, English should be taught in such a way that distinctions between genres are questioned through a critical analysis of how they are constructed; this will then lead to a more eclectic and self-aware writing practice ("grammatology"). Conceptual boundaries between story and non-story are fixed by cultural practices in such a way that although we cannot give an account of all genres in one meta-language, or philosophy, strategies are open to us of self-consciously using a wider range of genres and discourses, to write in. These strategies involve ways of finding our way around existing discourses not through a Lipman-like "transparochialism", but through a practice of questioning which draws upon our own everyday ways of making sense of the world.

Narrative and philosophy: a practical example

I will describe a discussion which will illustrate some of the above points, although I have stated far more than I can show. This discussion took place between seven adults who had 'read' the picture book *Window* (Baker, 1991). The picture story illustrates a changing life, a child growing up in an environment which brings about differences in the possibilities open to the child and young person. It also illustrates a changing landscape, from natural wilderness to polluted city. One of the many strengths of this book is the way pictures 'tell a story': changes in the composition of the same space are part of changes in a life.

Before turning to the way that these themes were taken up by the participants, I will give a summary of the story (obviously a partial one), highlighting some of the details that are mentioned in the subsequent excerpts from the writing and the discussion that the story stimulated.

The story starts with a mother holding her new baby, Sam. She is looking out from her window on to a beautiful rainforest, a harmonious scene of trees, flowers, and birds. In the foreground there is a small shed with a path leading to it. This shed and a domestic cat are the sole signs of the presence of people. The clearing in which the family live opens on to a lake, beyond which the forest becomes more dense. So the forest itself, or an aspect of it, is open to our gaze: the clearing provides an opening into the heart of the forest. As the years go by, and Sam gets older, we see the view from this same window changing. (In fact, we see what the view is like on every second of Sam's birthdays.) By Sam's second birthday, the garden has been fenced in.

The family has appropriated its own space within which domestic tasks are performed. We see Sam's mother hanging out washing on a line (this is later replaced by a more elaborate mechanism). Some land outside is being cultivated, trees have been felled, and there are already fewer birds. When Sam is six, by the time he has started school, other houses have been built and there is a road. We see the forest receding behind new plots of domesticated land. It is raining on Sam's eighth birthday and he is drawing his own name in the condensation on the window.

The family now has its own car and the old shed, a remnant from an earlier way of life, is looking ever more dilapidated. The front garden is now separated from the outside world by a strong wooden fence, within which Sam builds his own private space. a tree-fort. As Sam's teenage years go by, we see Sam playing and living in an ever more cluttered and mechanized environment. Sam's toys of warfare, hanging in the window, seem especially problematic when framing the machines of developing urbanization. He now takes potshots at the birds, which are no longer colorful and exotic. Firewood is for sale across the street

as the forest recedes further. As Sam plays football on his fourteenth birthday, the window itself is broken as we look out onto a now barren hillside. From this time Sam lives in a city and as a young man he has all the experiences of life in a dirty and polluted urban environment. There are skyscrapers, smoking chimneys, McDonalds, and more and more cars (which he takes an interest in fixing). The only creatures to be seen are cats and dogs, but these are tied to their human owners. Planes now fly in the sky, the only bird being a paper one in the window. Sam moves out on his twenty-second birthday with his girlfriend and the final picture, a parallel of the first, shows him in his new house looking out on to rainforest, with his baby in his arms. This wilderness now, however, is compromised and threatened: the city looms on the horizon and the building work has already started opposite. We know that it will not be long before the city catches up with them.

After a short discussion on an elicited question, "Does beauty lie in the eye of the beholder?" the group was asked to write a story. Because of the limits of space, only extracts can be quoted. (Punctuation, and, as far as possible, the layout of the written texts is reproduced as in the originals. The spoken text is punctuated, and hesitations and false starts omitted to aid understanding. Names have been changed to preserve anonymity.)

The discussion starts with John elaborating on the question, "Is beauty defined by a feeling that we have or is it something outside the individual, within the world itself?"

> *John:* I'm wondering as we look through various windows over the years whether we can see some sort of beauty through every one of those windows. And if we can, then presumably that beauty, in a sense, lies in our own conceptions, or our own perceptions, of our own visual interests in what we are looking at. But if there isn't beauty in each of those pictures, we don't see beauty in each of those pictures, what is it that we are seeing? In other words, what makes it not beautiful if it isn't simply that we are not having some sort of beautiful perception?

This question is a loaded one in that it can be seen as emerging from a set of distinctions and ways of talking: for example, that the word can be thought about independently from our feelings about it and that it is possible to separate perceptions from their objects. Sue first develops John's distinction between perception and the world by locating beauty within form: "flowing shapes" and "flowing colors" which are "harmonious". She contrasts this judgment with her personal preferences as to where to live. Her "personal point of view" may involve her living in an ugly. but convenient place.

> *Sue:* I'm struck by the first pictures, particularly the first one of the mother holding the baby. It's very, to me, harmonious. Everything seems part of a whole and then she's still looking out of the window frame. But it's as though everything fits even though there's that man-made little shed in the garden, whose use we could possibly debate later. But I mean even that seems to fit: it's the wood, you know. Somehow it doesn't stand out as ugly, an eye-sore, whereas later on that harmony has disappeared. There is no sort of flowing shape, there are no flowing colors. I wouldn't want to live in the first house, miles away from anywhere I mean. But I still find that beautiful to look at and I can appreciate why it's lovely. I'm down the end and I'm feeling quite at home, really, by the time we've got a few houses around and a nice road. You know I could possibly live there.

Kate challenges this by taking up the notion of harmony and characterizing it in a way that relates it to a description of a life within a society: beauty is "the absence of conflict and competition" where this is both an aesthetic and potentially social notion. In doing this the perception/world opposition is indirectly challenged, although to what extent is unclear as the notion of "natural order" is also invoked.

> *Kate:* For me it's also about the absence of conflict and the absence of competition that makes something, which tunes into what you say about harmony because as soon as you create an environment where you have either a man or a house, you know even if you're turning over a stone, you come in some way in conflict with the natural order. And to me the real beauty is somewhere which is the natural order in its purest sense. Then my perception of beauty, the most beautiful place in the world to me, is the wilderness areas, be they the oceans or the deserts or whatever. Those to me are symbolic of ultimate beauty because they are completely at peace and are located within the natural order

It is hard to tell to what extent Kate's point is understood by John and Sue until we look at their written stories. In these they all develop this theme of the relationship between beauty and a type of life, and show that the development away from the assumptions underlying the question have been noted. Kate, perhaps predictably, tells a story of a people who make their world ugly through violent actions.

> At the beginning of time God created the trees, the butterflies and the goats, the rivers and the flowers. He soon got tired and frustrated with everything working so well and so he created
> PEOPLE
> who built fences and houses washing lines (and soap that poisoned rivers with fish in them)
> People became angry. They shouted at each other and threw things their children learned to
> HURT
> birds; to
> SMASH glass and trophies; to
> CUT DOWN trees to
> BUILD AND BUILD AND BUILD houses and more
> washing lines and ponds with sprinklers that cracked and
> split in the winter and never worked in the summer

John interestingly relates the breaking of the window itself to the direction of the view: "he preferred to look within"; the form of perception becomes a way of characterizing a life. This is a move away from the perception/world dichotomy which had started the discussion.

> 8 At eight more houses appeared and Sam looked through the window and drew his name upon it rather than looking through it.
> 10 At ten the garden became a junkyard of childish pursuits.
> 12 At twelve the birds were there to be shot at. Sam's world was changing and he was changing with it.
> 14 At fourteen Sam broke his window. He Preferred to look within

Sue relates a time of personal hope to a vision of beauty, and a loss of hope, and sense of being a stranger to the ugliness of the changed world.

Beauty is now far more than a "flowing shape":

> Holding her new born baby son, Sam, closely to her, she looked out of the window, thinking, for the hundredth time that day, would they survive in this beautiful, but untamed land. Birds sang and the air was sweet and no other person was in sight.
>
> They had moved from the city, trying to start a new life of their own, away from the bustle and rush of a rat-race that had come close to destroying themselves and their marriage.
>
> She thought of Jack, her husband, out there somewhere, trying to clear the patch of land that they called home. He had built this house and it really felt like home. "Content", she thought, "I'm home."
>
> Even now, looking back, twenty-four years later, she could remember how she had felt. Full of hope in that land of promise and beauty. Today, they were leaving and she was not sad. Sam, married and about to become a father himself would leave, too. Looking around at her home she hardly recognized it as the same place which had epitomized her optimism and trust all those years ago.
>
> Cracked paint, broken windows, graffiti on the fence—these were not the stuff of dreams. Where had it all gone wrong?
>
> Was it when Jack had died? When Sam no longer needed her? Her neighbors were strangers and did not fill the void left by the birds, animals and insects that were long since gone. She admitted, finally, as she shut the door for the last time, she was the stranger. She was glad to go...

Of course, the preceding gloss on the discussion and stories is an interpretation; the participants may well pull out different connections between the philosophical concepts and the written narratives; we can imagine a further discussion about these connections and a subsequent discussion about what it is to make these connections. What is important to note here is that the philosophical points, and the way these can be developed through a community of inquiry, are manifested in narrative. The story which concludes the session serves to develop the philosophy.

The session described involved a move that Lipman might think problematic: a return to narrative where narrative is more than a means to an end. However, in this instance we can see that this turn to narrative is intrinsic to the philosophy itself: it is a philosophical point that is made when a certain kind of story is told about the way a life changes. Philosophy is here a way of reflecting upon, retelling, and shaping a narrative. We can go a stage further here and use CLA ideas: we can imagine reflecting on some of the ways the pictures have been composed, or the ways the written stories have been put together; for example, the numbering convention or the way capital letters are used; these formal aspects of the narrative can be related to narrative/literary conventions which are part of a social practice. This literary discourse is in itself an important philosophical practice.

Conclusion

In order to teach philosophy, Lipman has used narrative as a vehicle, thinking of philosophy and story for much of the time as contingently related. I think this leaves Lipman failing to account for successful applications of his program. When the Lipman novels are at their most effective, inquiry is such that it involves a questioning that is both literary and philosophical at the same time: students ask questions that are rooted in their own concerns, the text, and what the Community of Inquiry is for. Perhaps partly because of this uncertain territory within which questions reside, discussions tend to be provisional in the sense that concepts used and what is being discussed are not fully understood, agreed upon, or shared. I think that it is at this point that PFC is at its most powerful: when thought is both private and public, philosophical and literary. It is at this point that participants cannot comfortably settle into a conventional practice or an easy understanding of key concepts.

Greg Ulmer sketches a path for a new form of academic discourse to take which involves "the dismantling of the dominant forms of narrative and argument" (1989, p.48). He models an anecdotal, aphoristic personal "storytelling" in which philosophy, narrative, "mysteries", and jokes are interwoven; his new style involves an "integrating of public and private dimensions of knowledge" (1989, p. 39). This approach offers an alternative to Lipman's more "transparochial" approach to knowledge. Ulmer uses the notion of "relevant mysteries" to construct his new pedagogy; quoting Sperber, he describes them as "evocative representations":

> The most evocative representations are those which, on the one hand are closely related to the subjects of other mental representations, and on the other hand, can never be given a final interpretation.(1989, p.37)

PFC discussions work when these relevant mysteries occur and are left unappropriated in any kind of philosophical ladder-climbing. In the discussion looked at above we can see how the three writers have appropriated the philosophical discussion on the relationship between an understanding of a life and beauty into their own stories. Instead of the philosophy moving away from the narrative starting point it has been developed through an extension of it. Beauty has not been defined, but tranformed into a relevant mystery through the telling of a story.

Acknowledgements

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Children's Preconceptions and Aristotle's Theory of Kinetics

By Boqin Liao

1. Introduction

In 1988, I was lucky to get involved with Philosophy for Children which really opened my eyes and helped me greatly in teaching physics. In 1989, I translated one of Matthew Lipman's papers and published it in the Chinese journal, *Jiaoyu Pinglun* (Educational Review). Later, I translated two books of his, *Philosophical Inquiry* and *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*. Since then, the ideas of Philosophy for Children have continued to affect my teaching.

In the process of teaching physics, teachers in China still use the method of Man Tang Guan (pouring out the physics contents from the jugs of their minds to the students' during the whole class). They hardly pay attention to the thinking of children, to the need to sensitize them to context, to self-correct, to learn to discuss with each other, etc. As a result, pupils feel less and less interested in physics. This represents a world-wide problem[1] in physics education. In this paper, I will address this problem through a discussion of the thinking of children with respect to Aristotle's theory of kinetics.

2. Preconceptions of Children in Kinetics

Student's preconceptions are deeply ingrained and cannot be altered by imposing "the truth" in a chalk-and-talk-lecture. Preconceptions survive our present physics courses and in our daily life. Thus, Prof. Nachtigall in Germany writes:[2]

> Preconceptions are developed from the self-centered standpoint of the child, appear as schema of explanation, common sense theories, naïve world views. They are based on experience, are derived from inadmissible analogies, but are sufficient to explain limited particular phenomena.... But first of all, they are one's own mental property, a valuable tool to make sense of particular events in the real life world, and they are extremely resistant to change when pitted against the common teaching of physics subject matter. Even adults show reasoning based on preconceptions, when they have to explain scientific phenomena, the science they were supposed to learn having been forgotten a long time ago!

Briefly, these preconceptions develop long before students get to physics classes, and are made up of:

- mental pictures,
- everyday theories
- common sense experiences
- rules of belief developed by personal interaction with the environment in order to make sense out of what is perceived
- developed before pupils get physics classes.[1]

In 1996 and 1997, I designed three interviews in order to determine student's preconceptions in kinetics. The subjects chosen were between 10 and 14 years old.

In the first interview, I asked five questions to the fifth-grade students in the Hua Xin Primary School in Chongqing, who have never had physics courses:

(1) In which directions should ripe apples fall from the tree?

(2) If the apple tree grew very high,

in which direction should the ripe apples fall from the tree?

(3) If the apple tree grew so high, even reaching the moon, in which directions should the ripe apples fall from the tree?

(4) Could the moon fall to the earth?

(5) Why do the things around the world fall to earth? Which thing falls faster, heavy ones or the light ones?

The pupils discussed the questions seriously and answered me warmly. Most of them thought that the ripe apples should fall to the earth if they did not grow so high as to reach the moon because of the earth's gravity.

They also told me that the moon would not fall to the earth because it could float due to the buoyant force of the air. In the daytime the moon hid at the bottom of the earth and in the night the moon would rise from the bottom to the top of the earth. The earth had gravity but the moon had buoyancy. Furthermore, they thought that heavy things would fall faster than light ones because they had greater gravity.

In the second interview, the following questions were posed to the first-grade pupils in one of the middle schools in Chengdu:

(1) Why does a stone not fall to your feet directly when you throw it horizontally?

(2) What impels the stone to move?

(3) Will the stone go farther if you throw it with greater velocity?

(4) Where would the stone reach if you could throw it with a velocity as great as you wanted?

The children thought that a stone thrown horizontally would not fall to earth directly because of the throwing force. When the stone separated from the hand, it would continue moving in the air. At this time, the air would fill up the vacuum behind the stone and push the stone to keep moving. The stone with greater velocity would go farther. If they could throw the stone with a speed as great as they wanted, the stone would fly in a circle and reach the back of the head of the person throwing the stone.

In the third interview, I asked the questions below to the third-grade pupils in the experimental middle school affiliated with Southwest China Normal University.

(1) Why can something move or not move?

(2) When an object slides from a frictional surface of an incline, why does the object keep moving on a horizontal surface?

(3) If you cannot move an object on an ordinary road, why can you make it move on an icy surface?

The pupils answered that forces could make a body move. For instance, a table could move due to people's pushing it and a cart could be made to move due to a horse's pulling it. The se inputs make the object keep going on a horizontal surface. Because of less friction on the icy surface, people could get the object moving.

There are some correct answers to the three kinds of questions, but other answers are the products of preconceptions in the children's minds.

3. Aristotle's Paradigm in Kinetics

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) discussed physics and metaphysics in a completely speculative way. I would like to compare his kinetic theory to children's preconceptions of physics.

Aristotle divided motion into natural motion and compulsive motion. He wrote:

> Now nothing is moved at random; there must be some moving cause. Thus, a thing moves in such and such a way by nature, in another way under compulsion. (P. 343).[3]

In natural motion, everything has its own position in nature. Aristotle thought that:

> It is in this sense too that the elements (singly or jointly) of natural objects are described as the 'nature' of those objects. According to some, these elements are fire; according to others, earth, air, water, or combinations of them. (P. 8).[3]

Because fire and air were thought to be light elements, their natural position was above, so that they must move upwards. On the other hand, Aristotle thought that water and earth were heavy elements so their natural position was below, which made them move downwards. He pointed out that the elements of water and earth made natural objects have weight. The more earth objects contained, the stronger the tendency of the objects to move to their natural position, the center of the earth. Thus he came to the conclusion that the velocity of objects is proportional to their mass[3] (the way pupils put this is "the heavy thing would fall faster than the light one because it would have greater gravity.")

If objects were in their natural position, they would not move at all and they would stay in that position forever. If we want objects to move, we must act on them. Furthermore, the acting force must be strong enough to make the objects move, which Aristotle called compulsive motion. He described it this way:

> Now if there is something which, though capable of moving and acting upon things, does not actually do so, there will not necessarily be movement;" "And even if it does act, this will not be enough if its essence is potentiality, for then motion will not be eternal, since that which is potentially may possibly not be. (P. 342)[3]

This meant that compulsive motion resulted from some kind of action. No action, no compulsive motion (the pupils' preconception is that "forces could let a body move, a table could move by people's pushing and a cart could get moving by a horse pulling.")

Aristotle thought that animals were controlled by soul, celestial bodies were driven by God, and objects on the earth were pushed by the action of other objects. For example, when a stone was thrown and moved forwards, the air would go around to the back of the stone and push it to keep it moving.[4,5] (Students' preconception: the air would fill up the vacuum behind the stone and push the stone to keep moving.)

From the comparison above, we can see that the preconceptions of children are similar to the thoughts of Aristotle in physics–at least in kinetics–to some extent.

4. Discussion

In the history of physics, there have been three paradigm shifts which have had epoch-making significance. Aristotle is thought to represent the first paradigm shift called ancient physics; Isaac Newton (1642-1727) who gave us what we call classical

physics, is the second revolutionary; and Albert Einstein (1879-1955) led the shift to modern physics.

In comparison, pupils will have preconceptions which are related to Aristotle's paradigm before they get formal physics education. They have similar explanations of some natural phenomena, especially those around them. Later, when students take physics classes, Newton's mechanics are arduously poured into them. During the courses, the students hesitate to give up their former Aristototelean preconceptions but then acquire other preconceptions related to Newton's paradigm, which they bring to the study of physics.

Thus we can see that as physics developed from a rudimentary to an advanced level, so do students when they study physics. Over the course of their study, they will recapitulate the whole development of the history of physics.

The similarity between students' preconceptions and Aristotle's theory of kinetics suggests that Aristotle's theory is a natural outcome of experience with motion. It is easy to see how experience could lead to the basic idea, but intuitive beliefs about motion do not always correspond with physics reality.

Jill H. Larkin has suggested that preconceptions in physics are based on a "naïve representation," and scientific physics conceptions have a "scientific representation".[6] According to her definition, Aristotle's paradigm of physics was based on naïve representation corresponding to what M. McCloskey has called "intuitive physics"[7].

Psychologists have devoted a great deal of attention to non-veridical perceptions and invalid reasoning processes.[8] However, in the development of models of knowledge it has usually been assumed that the information represented is correct. Our investigations lead us to the conclusion that educators in physics should not treat students as merely lacking the correct information. Instead, educators should take into account the fact that many students have strong preconceptions, and employ problem-solving strategies that are different from those used by experts.[9] When a student's naïve beliefs are not addressed, instruction may only serve to provide him with new terminology for expressing his erroneous beliefs.

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

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William James, Pragmatism and Philosophical Counseling

David O'Donaghue

Sometime between the turn of the century and the beginning of the First World War, a new spirit of optimism arose in America. The philosophical roots of this renewed appreciation for ingenuity, creativity and freedom came from two sources: Henri Bergson's vitalism and William James' pragmatism. Both men take issue with the predominant modes of philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century: the materialist determinism of Spencerian naturalism and the impersonal abstraction of neo-hegelian idealism, on the grounds that these completed systems leave experience out of consideration and thereby create artificial versions of reality that are not hospitable to human existence. Both James and Bergson find their solutions in focusing on experience rather than intellectual concepts. Both find that experience brings into question many of the tenets of rationality, as conceived in their time. My main interest is with the work of James and how it functions to bridge the philosophical world of conceptual thinking with the practical considerations of life. In this project I see James as an important precursor to philosophical counseling - the use of philosophy in examining the dilemmas that arise in everyday life. James was, perhaps, the leading psychologist of his time as well as a philosopher and I will show how his appreciation of the complexity of the human psyche stands in the center of his philosophical ideas, and then suggest how these ideas may be relevant to the practice of philosophical counseling.

In looking over the works of William James, one could justifiably claim that he was in a constant battle with the absolute. The neo-hegelians of Oxford were dominating the Anglo-American philosophic scene during James' formative years and he became acutely sensitive to their claims for a monistic version of reality that swept all individuality and difference under one cosmic rug. James finds this neither empirically sound nor particularly religious, since the Absolute, in its infinite abstractions, is anything but a personal God to whom one can relate. A monistic absolutism must constantly defend against novel human experience, since anomalies threaten the universality of the ideal. Also, since important empirical findings may be ignored in the interest of maintaining the purity of the system, a generalized universal that encompasses all experience would need to be so vague that it would lose any usefulness as a philosophical idea. We actually don't learn anything from such a construct; we learn, rather, through particular experiences.

James distinguishes his epistemological position from both the rationalist strategy of deducing parts from the whole, and from the empiricism of Hume and Mill, which arrives at experience through the aggregation of discrete units of sense data by means of association. He separates his position from other forms of empiricism by calling it "radical empiricism," by which he means the methodological approach that focuses on the relations that connect experiences, rather than the atomistic units of sense data themselves. "All that we really experience," writes James in 1884, "is the full body of thought between whose joints there is nowhere to pass your amputating knife."[1] In his later lectures, collected in the volume called *A Pluralistic Universe* (1908), James likens experience to two men carrying a large log. Each man can be replaced by another, but both cannot be replaced at the same time. Experience carries its past into its future through a continuous flow of consciousness. To separate out a part of the empirical field for examination, which is what the intellectualist concept does, produces an artificial slice of life that might be useful for some specific purpose but, which, has little relationship to the flow of life itself.

Although we can, by means of concepts cut out from the sensible flux of the past, re-descend upon the flux and, making another cut, say what particular thing is likely to be found there; and although in this sense concepts give us knowledge, and may be said to have some theoretic value...yet in a deeper sense of giving insight they have no theoretic value, for they quite fail to connect us to the inner life of the flux, or with the causes that govern its direction. Instead of being interpreters of reality, concepts negate the inwardness of reality altogether.

The flux of experience is initially a chaos of unrelated sensations. "We break the flux of *sensible reality into* things at our will."[2] We create the connections and relations between things, including some data and ignoring oth-

ers, as we judge what is relevant for our purposes. "The world stands really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Man engenders truths upon it."[3] This is one of the most important contributions pragmatism makes to philosophy. Pragmatism is committed to the statement that James made in his 1907 work on the subject, "The trail of the human serpent is over everything." We cannot escape the contributions of our motivations and conditionings in approaching any form of objective reality.

> Our nouns and adjectives are all humanized heirlooms, and in the theories we build them into, the inner order and arrangement is wholly dictated by human considerations...We plunge forward into the field of fresh experience with the beliefs our ancestors and we have made already; these determine what we notice; what we notice determines what we do; what we do again determines what we experience.[4]

James does not bemoan this subjective factor in the pursuit of knowledge but rather celebrates it. One way of dealing with the skeptic of the Humean variety is to simply admit she's right and then ask, "where do we go from here?" Skepticism alone leads to a critique of the presumptions of human knowledge, but the more important question is how this critique then mobilizes one to behave differently in the world. James examines the results of holding skeptical beliefs. If a Humean or Pyrrhonian skepticism leads to good things in one's life, then one should, by all means, hold to these beliefs; if they lead to despair, anomie, or paralysis, perhaps one should reconsider such beliefs. James is clear that, if skepticism leads to a vacant and thin existence, it should be dumped with no apologies.

One of the most important propositions of James (and this hurls him into the postmodernism of the nineties) is that truth is our creation; that we create it to serve particular purposes as a base from which our actions can rationally follow. James' position here, I believe, does not go as far as the pure contingency and irony of truth-making as in Richard Rorty's work, but rather maintains that truth is a central axis around which belief and action follow. I would like to look more closely at James' cognitive structure for truth and its establishment through action in order to bring out the particular rigor in his system.

As a good psychologist, James begins his inquiry about the nature of truth from a phenomenological standpoint. Reality, according to James, organizes itself from the core of personal interest and attention outward to a periphery which ignores anything that is not deemed significant to the individual.

> Reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life...whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real...What we need is practical reality, reality for ourselves; and, to have that, an object must appear both interesting and important. The worlds whose objects are neither interesting nor important we treat simply negatively, we brand them as unreal...Speaking generally, the more a conceived object excites us, the more reality it has.[5]

James describes the central axis of a person's beliefs as the 'hot spot," a group of ideas to which one devotes oneself and from which one acts in the world as a habitual center of personal energy. These hot spots may have varying consistencies throughout a person's life. Perhaps one has an overarching value system that maintains itself in the long run, but one may also shift axes of significance from moment to moment. James uses the notion of 'fields of consciousness' to describe this phenomena.

> As our mental fields succeed one another, each has its centre of interest, around which the objects of which we are less and less attentively conscious fade to a margin so faint that its limits are unassignable...[The field of consciousness] helps both to guide our behavior and to determine the next movement of our attention. It lies around us like a 'magnetic field,' inside of which our centre of energy turns like a compass-needle, as the present phase of consciousness alters into its successor. Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this margin, ready at a touch to come in.[7]

Consciousness, as James conceives it, is an *active* agent, always selecting and constructing webs of significant relationships with regard to its own interests. "As life goes on, there is a constant change of our interests, and a consequent change in place of our ideas, from more central to more peripheral, and from more peripheral to more central parts of consciousness."[8] The center works in one way the margins quite another. The center is determined by personal degrees of value and commitment whereas the margins are barely available to consciousness but, nevertheless, may take center stage as our priorities change. It is at the edges of consciousness that James sees the most possibilities of novelty, growth and deep transformation. James came to believe, along with Jung and Freud, that our personal consciousness is only a small part of a much vaster field of awareness that can profoundly influence the individual.[9]

James places a great deal of emphasis on the process of connecting ideas to one another in what he calls 'satisfactory relations.' Rational satisfaction, for James, means both inner consistency, whereby ideas of a similar nature cohere to one another without disruptive incompatibilities, and a congruence with the experience of the external world, so that anomalous experiences are not so frequent as to destabilize the working model imposed upon it. But it should be kept in mind that, since human motivations change and are highly complex, the shifting of structures of signification are quite mobile and fluid. When James defines 'the true' in his 1905 essay entitled *Humanism and Truth Once More*, as "that which gives the maximal combination of satisfactions," he is thinking of satisfactions in a multi-dimensional sense whereby truth needs to meet demands of the emotions, the activities of life and spiritual beliefs and experiences, as well as satisfying the demands of the intellect. This recognition of the demands of all aspects of the individual's life is a hallmark of James' philosophy and of pragmatism in general.

Once the individual meets the various demands for satisfaction which the adopted cognitive schema provides, there comes about a cessation of theoretic agitation and a stabilization of ideas, which characterizes belief. James writes in his 1879 article, *The Sentiment of Rationality:*

> Suppose this rational conception attained, how is the philosopher to recognize it for what it is, and not let it slip through ignorance? The only answer can be that he will recognize its rationality as he recognizes everything else, by certain subjective marks with which it affects him...What, then, are these marks? A strong sense of ease, peace, rest. The transition from a state of puzzle

> and perplexity to rational comprehension is full of lively relief and pleasure.[10]

The process of developing satisfactory relations of ideas is not primarily a reflective process but is intimately tied to action. James echoes Bergson's critique of intellectualism when he writes, "The return to life can't come about by talking. It is an act...the concepts we talk with are made for purposes of practice and not for purposes of insight...When conceptualism summons life to justify itself in conceptual terms, it is like a challenge addressed in a foreign language to someone who is absorbed in his own business; it is irrelevant to him altogether."[11] The importance and the difficulty of connecting action to idea is described in *The Principles of Psychology:*

> The problem of the will's education is the problem of how the idea of a movement can arouse the movement itself...framed as we are, we can have no a priori idea of the movement, no idea of a movement which we have not already performed...How is a fresh path ever formed? All paths are paths of discharge, and discharge always takes place in the direction of least resistance...The difficulty is mental; it is that of getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all.[12]

On the one hand, the problem of change in human behavior is concerned with sustaining "wise ideas" in consciousness, despite the natural tendencies to think as we have always thought, and, on the other hand, it is concerned with just acting, and thereby establishing new patterns of behavior. This latter strategy is central to James' conviction that through acting one can bring about new conditions of reality. This is based on the pragmatic principle that we are co-creators of the reality that we live in; it is not something solely 'given' to us. We, ourselves, are instrumental in its creation. "We need only in cold blood act as if the things in question were real, and keep acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing into such a connection with our life that it will become real."[13]

Actions provide their own verifications in the following way: Truth, as James conceives it, is created out of increasingly satisfying relations between the individual and the world. This provides a foundation for belief, which, in turn increases the likelihood that these new relations, with their associated actions, will follow more naturally in the individual's life. The world, in a sense, cooperates with our actions as aspects of it are developed through our agency. James judges this position as superior to abstract idealism or strict materialism on purely pragmatic grounds, that is, on examining the results of the belief that our actions can influence the universe. By so believing, we come to intimate terms with the universe and develop our own capacities to change our lives. "In the average man, the power to trust, to risk a little beyond the literal evidence, is an essential function [that] makes the man seem as if he were individually helping to create the actuality of the truth whose metaphysical reality he is willing to assume."[14]

Not only is "truth" a matter of expediency but it is also a matter of temperament. As I have mentioned earlier, James believes a certain feeling accompanies what we might deem to be the "true" for us. He calls this "the sentiment of rationality" and described it both as a sense of satisfaction and a sense of excitation. The parallels here with Freud's dual desires in mankind for excitation (eros) and the cessation of excitation (thanatos) is unmistakable. James' satisfaction is of an intellectual desire for truth rather than in any sense libidinal, as Freud would conceive it.[15] Instead of evaluating truth according to a correspondence with external facts, James offers a psychological understanding of our feeling of it. "The sentiment of reality can attach itself so strongly to our object of belief that our whole life is polarized through and through, so to speak, by its sense of the existence of the things believed in."[16]

James carries his interests in the emotional and the nonrational characteristics of human beings into an analysis of philosophical temperaments. He's quite emphatic in stressing that the beliefs that we assent to are, by and large, determined by their compatibility with our temperament. Our temperaments lead to the establishment of certain interests and pursuit of those interests lead to particular experiences that define our world.

> No philosophy can every be anything but a summary sketch, a picture of the world in abridgment...The only material we have at our disposal for making a picture of the whole world is supplied by the various portions of that world of which we have already had experience...All philosophers, accordingly, have conceived of the whole world after the analogy of some particular feature of it which has particularly captivated their attention...All follow one analogy or another; and all analogies are with some one or other of the universes subdivisions [and] at bottom, accidents more or less of personal vision.[17]

Philosophical stances, whether rationalist, idealist, or empirical, are often more a matter of personal taste and fit than a result of intellectual determination. We find a philosophy that makes us feel at home in the universe. People differ in their temperaments and experience and therefore find different modes of relating to the universe which are effective in bringing their personal experiences into harmony with more general concepts. These personal universes may differ remarkably from one another. James believes it is an injustice to the core reality of each of them to try to reduce them to one absolute system. Not only do individuals differ from one another, but, over time, individuals may shift their own allegiances, as their interests change. James would encourage this instead of a rigid maintenance of consistency, since richness and a certain "thickness" of experience implies a pluralistic universe.

James, above all, defends the priority, uniqueness and irreducibility of the individual. He fears that persons will be dissolved into systems and their experiences will be subsumed under categories that do not reflect their particularity. He writes, "Damn great Empires! including that of the absolute...Give me individuals and their spheres of activity...I am against bigness and greatness in all their forms... The bigger the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life displayed."[18] He sees the complexities of the feelings, motivations, and schemas of the individual to be primary over social institutions and philosophical systems. He defends the integrity of individual differences against the encroachments of grand umbrellas that are supposed to include all experience under them. It would be inter-

esting to know what he would think of some of psychology's hegemonic claims today.

His radical empiricism stresses "eaches" over "wholes" and this applies to the particularity of individuals as well as the particularity of experiences and conditions of individuals. He notes that we both differ from one another in spacial placement and we differ within ourselves over time. He writes, in *Varieties of Religious Experience:*

> Whatever of value, interest, or meaning our respective worlds may appear endued with are pure gifts of the spectator's mind...The same fact will inspire entirely different feelings in different persons, and at different times in the same person; and there is no rationally deducible connection between any outer fact and the sentiments it may happen to provoke.[19]

James describes each individual as having her own best conditions of efficiency and these practical considerations color all attempts at pure objectivity and vary in significant ways from individual to individual. "The axis of reality runs solely through the egotistic places."[20]

James not only contends that there is plurality between individuals and within the individual, he also claims that this reflects the plurality of the universe. The universe is so vast and we are so limited by our cognitive capacities, that it is quite conceivable that dimensions exist of which we are only faintly aware. Our knowledge is selective and partial and the universe is an open-ended system.

> Why, after all, may not the world be so complex as to consist of many interpenetrating spheres of reality, which we can thus approach in alternation by using different conceptions and assuming different attitudes...The world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and those other worlds must have meaning for our life also; and although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in.[21]

James speaks of these different realms in various ways throughout his writings, as "a multitude of personalities" or "different cycles of operation," but the point remains constant: we need to be open to the free play of diverse elements of experience in our philosophical systems and not close off some experience because it is deemed irrelevant to the overall picture we are trying to construct.

The results of this will be that we will have a far richer, thicker, more interesting world in which to live. This is inspirational enough, but James goes on to claim that this would be a moral world as well. In a world of diverse qualities, human beings have a moral imperative to chose options that support healthy integration and development through acts of will which will be judged by the fruits they bear. Another hallmark of pragmatism is the evaluation of any conceptualization by its subsequent effects in the world. Jamesian pluralism is not moral relativism but rather a recognition of options, some of which would be wrong to follow since they would lead to personal or social deterioration. James, after all, was trained as a physician; he called for humanity to strive toward health.

Pluralism requires that experiences are always in relationship to other experiences; that they interpenetrate one another, that to isolate and bracket one experience for an atomistic analysis is, by its very nature, artificial and at variance with life itself. In order to meet James' goal of unlocking human potential we must remain an open system ready to empirically receive new information in whatever form it presents itself. This approach will stay true to the inherent intellectual restlessness of the human spirit which, as soon as complete systems are posited, will look to the edges for what is not included in them: a sort of Whitmaneque eager friendliness toward the unbounded universe. Of course, James is projecting his own intellectual expansionism onto humanity which, I believe, is more of a mixed bag of a few explorers and a far greater number of settlers that seek security, safety and predictability over novelty. His optimism comes from his conviction that our efforts at philosophy are directed toward enabling us to feel more at home in the universe, envisioned not as a static given totality, but a cooperative and interactive organism that responds to us as much as we respond to it.

In keeping with the pragmatic method, I would like to link these ideas to their direct consequences in philosophical counseling. I will try to show how James' ideas can offer guidelines for effective philosophical counseling in a general way. James' major contribution in this field comes from his training as a psychologist which focused on the actual way human beings come to understand their inner and outer worlds, rather than squeezing human functioning into rational categories, logic, idealism, or other attempts of philosophy to create systems in which human beings are only adjunct. James is in the tradition of Locke (who was also a physician), of starting with human cognitive processes and examining the way reality is constructed out of them.

1. Philosophical counseling, according to James' commitments, should be based in experience, not in vague intellectual ideation that has no grounding in a person's life. It is a waste of time to ponder hypothetical propositions that have no relevance to the living of life. The counselee should be asked initially what experience has brought them into counseling at this time, not what ideas they have been having lately. The entire counseling process should be continually linked to the person's lived experience and ideas should be tested according to their efficacy in the person's life. The counselor needs to develop skills in unpacking individual experiences for their philosophical content. Say, for instance, a man comes to counseling and tells a story of rage felt toward a coworker who is a fundamentalist Christian. The counselor could explore the clients' concepts and values within this experience itself rather than abstracting them in a general discussion of Christianity. The value of staying with the experience is that it remains personal and more likely to expose particular anomalies that generalizations are likely to hide.
2. James would exhort all counselors to strongly respect the uniqueness of each client's particular way of understanding their universe and themselves within it. The Jamesian counselor would recognize that different temperaments will be drawn to different ideas which would make life more understandable given their experiences of it. She would inquiry into all the ways in which a person gathers information that forms his particular belief structure. This would include body sensations, intuitions, spiritual experiences, moods and intense emotions, and interpersonal contacts. James would want the client to leave a philosophical counseling session richer, more complex, more interesting, rather than "cured" with some reductionistic rational solution to their problem. Problems for James are only openings for wider experi-

ence. People have the choice to close off their options in the interest of simplicity but this may restrict particular aspects of themselves that may be useful in staying open to the plurality of the universe. Each person negotiates their own balance and this cannot be imposed by the counselor in some pat formula.

3. The counselor needs to be accepting and even welcoming of incongruities in the client's belief system. If the client feels that she must convey a consistent world view to the philosopher, she may be glossing over the crucial disparities that have brought her into counseling in the first place. She may need to be actively encouraged to bring up contrasts so the different networks of belief can be articulated and compared. Once a schemata can be developed, it can be looked at systemically as a sort of flow chart with a hierarchy of decision-making and sites of differing values. A personal analysis of cognitive decision-making to this degree could be a unique contribution of philosophical counseling, since I don't think this is done in any form of psychological counseling I know of. James' interest in what connects our ideas and beliefs together would be well served by such a mind-map, especially if it emphasizes the interlocking and interpenetration of schemas rather than the linear association of ideas as atomistic entities.
4. From this chart the counselor and client could determine what are the central values, ideas, images or beliefs that form the core of the network; what binds it together. This would be what James calls the hot spots or leading ideas that bring about conviction and commitment to action in the individual. There may be a number of core leading ideas that are in conflict with one another and this could be causing distress, paralysis, indecision, confusion, or mood swings in the client. In helping her get an overview of the various systems at work she may be able to discern the appropriate situations for each system of beliefs. She may also see gaps she wishes to fill with more reflection or incongruities that aren't serving any situation in her life that she would like to get rid of. By drawing them out of the chaotic assemblage in experience the counseling process can make the changing of a singular aspect of ones structure more feasible than attacking the whole. James sought to articulate the unique and singular 'each', both in empirical investigations, and in terms of human experience. He was not, however, atomistic in his method, and it is therefore important not to reify these elements of the system in a way that isolates them from the person's overall life which is an inseparable flow.
5. One way to bring the counseling process back into a person's life is to link the insights gained through the philosophical analysis to a specific action which will try out new behaviors that exemplify the inner change of perspective. This is a crucial part of pragmatism. One can only assess the truth of a point of view through its effects in the world. Distress is often caused when people are loyal to beliefs that don't work in their lives. When these are replaced by beliefs that are friendlier to the actual lived experience, one acts differently, if no other impediments are in the way. But it is important to remember that there may likely be forces both within and outside persons that compel them to return to the life-negating belief. Mere intellectual insight will not be enough of a bulwark against the systemic forces pulling the person back into the established patterns. A commitment to action and change of habit must accompany all insights. This action will then provide new information which can fine-tune the direction of change.

   An example is in order here. Suppose a client has come to see that she is living in partial truths in a number of social groups with which she is affiliated. This painfully splits hers into the various images she is projecting in order to be acceptable to the norms of each group. She has seen this though the counseling process, but then, what does she do? Continue to live part truths, part lies in her life? Or make a commitment to be fully herself in each group? By encouraging her to try out the new behavior of being more authentically herself, the counselor both encourages self-honesty and sets up an experiment out of which new data can help direct the change process. Both of the two other major figures of pragmatism in America, Charles Peirce and John Dewey, strongly advocated for experimentalism and environmental readaptation in their philosophies. This is the only way to evaluate the effects of changes in ideas. By themselves, ideas are free to recombine in infinite ways, but they remain impotent at that level. "Ideas only make a difference when they make a difference." So our client becomes more authentic with these groups and she finds that she is shunned and discounted as the group attempts to restore homeostasis. She recognizes the pull back, out of her new authenticity. This becomes rich fodder for the next counseling session.
6. The last point to which I am limiting myself as to James' contribution to philosophical counseling follows directly from the experimental changes encouraged in the client. The counselor, I believe, must believe in the possibility that when clients change major patterns in their life, they can actually bring about new realities for themselves. Personal truth and reality is an interactional process in which the individual is a co-creator with whatever extrinsic factors they are dealing with. These are much more malleable, in James' view, than many of our clients would like to admit. Why? Because its easier to play the victim of fate than to take the personal responsibility of freedom. Our role as counselors needs to be the facilitation of this transition from victim to freely determining agent.

To wrap up this brief introduction to the relevant ideas of William James for philosophical counseling, I will cite a passage in which he critiques philosophy itself:

> Philosophy lives in words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation. There is in the living act of perception always something that glimmers and twinkles and will not be caught, and for which reflection comes too late. No one knows this as well as the philosopher. He must fire his volley of new vocables out of his conceptual shotgun, for his profession condemns him to this industry, but he secretly knows the hollowness and irrelevancy. His formulas are like stereoscopic photos seen outside the instrument; they lack the depth, the motion, the vitality.

Philosophical counseling, as I see it is an attempt to bridge the gap between a static, stereoscopic philosophy and the glimmering and twinkling of the living reality of life. James, in his equal devotion to human psychology and human philosophy provides significant material for building such a bridge toward a living philosophy.[23]

NOTES

1. James W. "Phenomenalism," in Perry, Ralph, *The Thought and Character of William James.* Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1935.
2. Pragmatism (1907)
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*
5. *The Principles of Psychology,* (1890) vol. II, p. 296.
6. *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) p. 165.
7. *Ibid,* p. 191.
8. *Ibid,* p.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
10. *The Sentiment of Rationality* (1979) p. 3.
11. *The Pluralistic Universe* (1908) p. 763.
12. *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) p. 563.
13. *Ibid,* p. 321.
14. *The Sentiment of Rationality* (1879) p. 23.
15. It is interesting to consider the implications of rational desires. It seems that Kant had a sense of these when, in an effort to limit reason's desire for a satisfaction of the understanding beyond the chains of the conditions of experience, he drew a strict boundary around questions of metaphysics. Reason, in this context, does seem to have an intrinsic motivating impetus.
16. *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) p. 61.
17. *A Pluralistic Universe* (1908) p. 633-4.
18. Correspondence, in Perry (1935) p. 315.
19. *Varieties* (1902) p. 131.
20. *Ibid.* p. 387.
21. *Ibid.* p. 401.
22. *Varieties* (1902) p. 356.
23. *Ibid.* p. 356.

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Why Tamagatchis Are Not Pets

Deborah Barnbaum

I am thinking of four objects in my home. One is a rock. The second is a house of cards. The third is my cat. Finally, I am contemplating my most recent purchase - a Tamagotchi, a virtual pet. The Tamagotchi has a liquid-crystal display, which shows a small creature. My Tamagotchi has several functions, all controllable via three buttons. I can push buttons that allow the small creature appear to eat sandwiches and candy, play games, and give it medicine it if appears to be sick. The Tamagotchi beeps at me if it wants attention. If I fail to attend to the Tamagotchi in the proper fashion, the display will tell me that I have killed the small creature. I admit that I have grown attached to my Tamagotchi, and if the display tells me that I have killed it, I will feel sad, feel that I have failed it somehow.

But of the objects I am thinking of, only one of them is a pet.

What makes a pet a pet? Some may say that I only have one pet because only one of the objects I mentioned above is alive. Being a living thing is a necessary condition for being a pet. This may be correct, but I find it to be simplistic and question begging. Why can't I have a pet rock, or a pet Tamagotchi? "Because those objects are not alive" is a profoundly dissatisfying answer. But there is something to this, and I will return to it shortly.

If something is to be a pet, it must satisfy the following three criteria. These three criteria are necessary for any object to be a pet, and along with the "discontinuity" criterion, compose a jointly sufficient set of conditions for being a pet:

The affection criterion.

While a pet may not necessarily feel affection towards the one who has it as a pet, the one who has a pet feels affection towards it. Turtles and fish can be pets, even though they do not appear to demonstrate any affection towards the people who keep them as pets. But those who keep them as pets do feel affection towards these pets. Furthermore, those who keep the pets not only feel affection for their pets, but their actions are in keeping with this affection. The affection criteria is a teleological one—the ultimate purpose of this object has to do with feeling affection towards it, and acting in keeping with this affection. If I keep a tank of fish, but my object is to have a ready supply of fresh trout for dinner, then even if I occasionally feel affection for one of the trout, thereby naming it and giving it extra food, none of them is my pet. I feel affection for my cat. If I stopped doing so, and thereby stopped feeding her or giving her water, then one of two states of affairs would obtain. Either she would die, or she would go somewhere else, where food was more readily available. Either way, I would cease at that point to have a pet.

It may be observed that the affection criteria implies a power differential between pets and those who keep pets. Pets are chosen and maintained for a purpose, and that purpose is

determined solely by the owner of the pet[1].

The domicile criterion.

Imagine that I venture out every day and feed my favorite blue heron[2]. The majestic bird is nonetheless not my pet, because while I feel a great deal of affection for it, it does not live with me. If something is your pet, it must live with you. The domicile criterion implies that many pets live "unnatural lives", for they must live in our world. If they continue to live in their natural habitats, they fail to be pets. Again, if my cat runs away in an attempt to get food, she is no longer my pet.

The dependency criterion.

My pet depends on me. I feed her, I protect her. The dependency criterion is where the most significant distinctions between the pets and non-pets mentioned above are apparent.

What does my pet depend on me to do? If I merely say "to protect her" that is not enough. I might protect the rock—fearful that others might steal it. Or, I might protect the house of cards from destruction. It is true that my pet depends on me for her continued existence—but so does the house of cards.

What distinguishes the cat from the house of cards is that my pet has some interest in her continued existence. The house of cards does not. I fail my pet if I fail to help her maintain her continued existence, which is valuable not only to me, but valuable to my pet, herself. Note that the affection criterion has to do with my own internal states, my emotional attachment to my pet, regardless of my pet's state. I could have affection for a pet that isn't even aware of my existence. Similarly, I might even have affection for an "imaginary friend". But if I had a mere imaginary cat, such a cat would not be a pet. The dependency criterion requires that there is something external to me which depends on me, and which has an interest in its continued existence. Pets must be an "other" —there are no imaginary pets. Not only must they be an "other", but they must be a dependent other.

It should be observed that the dependency criteria implies that the relationship between those who have pets and the pets themselves is a paternalistic one; pets depend on us to provide them with those things that are are in the pets' best interests. Furthermore, insofar as (with only a very few exceptions) pets have not chosen to become pets, but have interests in their continued existence nonetheless, it is a strong paternalistic relationship.

Some may say that I have committed myself to a very strong thesis—have I implied that my cat has self-consciousness in saying that she has an interest in maintaining her continued existence? Not necessarily. All that I need is to say that my cat has a survival instinct. The survival instinct compels cat to try to survive by seeking food and a warm place to sleep. I provide these things for my cat. The survival instinct does not require a sense of self.

I can call the rock my pet. The rock is in my house, thereby satisfying the domicile criterion. I may even have some affection for the rock. I may protect it from those who wish to steal it, or force it into servitude as a paperweight. But the rock has no interest in its own continued existence. Thus, the rock is not a pet.

Similarly, I can call the Tamagotchi my pet. I can push buttons and the images on the screen will tell me that it has been fed or exercised, that it is fat and happy. If I fail to do this, the display will tell me that the Tamagotchi has died. But the Tamagotchi has no interest in its own existence. So, despite my affection for it, and the fact that it is here in my house, it is not my pet.

Returning to the claim that all pets must be alive, it may be said that all that I mean by "having an interest in one continued existence" is "being alive". If that is true, then what distinguishes my cat from my Tamagotchi, is that my cat is alive. I also have plants in my home—they are alive. They have an interest in their own continued existence. The reason that the plants that we see today exist on earth is that they survived the great battle of natural selection. It would probably be a mistake to say that my plants have a "will to survive", but they do "work" towards the "goal" of survival. Thus, they are pets, albeit rather dull ones. By my mind, plants and fish are equally dull pets. A Venus Flytrap is a slightly more interesting pet than a Ficus Tree, but not by much (but that is merely a personal bias). My Tamagotchi has no interest in its own survival. My cat does. Thus, she is able to be a pet.

This weekend my sister is visiting, along with my 4-year-old nephew. My sister has a great deal of affection for my nephew, and while it is not the case that she had a child merely so that she would have someone to feel affection towards, it is not inconceivable that she did so. In fact, for purposes of this essay, I will assume that she had a child for no other reason but to have someone to love. My nephew lives with her—he fulfills the domicile criterion. Finally, my nephew is entirely dependent on my sister for his continued existence. She feeds him and takes good care of him. Is my nephew her pet?

I don't believe so. My nephew fails to fulfill the following criteria:

The discontinuity criterion.

Pets lead dramatically different lives than we do. The differences are not merely differences in quantity—they are differences in kind. I could not have a pet that was capable of doing all the same kinds of things that I do—read philosophy, go to movies, order food in restaurants—but was merely smaller than me, or furrier than me, or had a shorter lifespan. Pets must somehow lead lives that are different in kind—my cat has experiences entirely different from my own. I have experiences unlike anything my cat experiences.

I do not want to fall into a gratuitous anthrocentrism by making the claim that the quality of experiences of those who have pets are always superior to the quality of experiences of the pets themselves. The point of the discontinuity criterion is that such comparisons cannot be made.

The discontinuity criterion rules out the possibility that my nephew is a pet. While he is younger and shorter than my sister, and fulfills the affection, domicile and dependency criteria, he is not her pet. My nephew is enough like my sister to make it the case than he cannot be her pet. He has the potential to experience the same kinds of things that she does. If he

fails to do so, this failure will be a failure in quantity, not a failure of quality.

There are two interesting implications of my views. First, I have not said anything that rules out the possibility that human beings could be pets. If some beings appeared that were wholly unlike humans, that found humans endearing in such a way that they wanted to take humans into their homes with the purpose of treating us with affection and taking care of all our needs, we would be their pets.

Second, there may be some animals that would be inappropriate to keep as pets. If there are animals that are so much like us that the differences between our species are closer to differences in quantity, and not differences in kind, then such animals ought not be kept as pets. I can imagine, for example, that chimpanzees are so much like humans that while we may bring them into our homes to show them affection and take care of them, that we ought not to treat them as pets.

To conclude, while my Tamagotchi does fulfill the affection criterion (I care about it), and the domicile criterion (it is here in my house), and the discontinuity criterion (it is very much unlike me), it *does not* fulfill the dependency criterion. It has no interest in its own continued existence. Thus, it cannot be a pet.

My cat doesn't seem to care. I don't believe that she thought that her status as the only pet I own was threatened, even for a moment[3].

NOTES

1. I have tried to avoid language that implies that people "own" their pets. Some people may claim that many pets are autonomous beings, and while we keep them as pets, we can never own them. Some of those who share the view that some pets are autonomous may claim that in virtue of their autonomy that it is morally wrong for us to keep these beings as pets. While this is an interesting question, it is beyond the purview of this paper.
2. Both the domicile criterion and the blue heron example are Timm Triplett's. I am very much in debt to Timm for a discussion of the metaphysical status of pets.
3. I wish to thank both Timm Triplett and Ulf Dunberger for conversations leading to the writing of this paper.

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P4C in Guatemala: A Report

Gumercindo Cabrera

Recently I received an invitation to attend a conference to review progress reports on three Latin American projects focusing on children's education. Philosophy for Children in Guatemala was one of the projects selected for review.

The conference, August 19-22, 1997, was held in Santafe de Bogota, Columbia. It was sponsored by Bureau International Catholique de l'Enfance in collaboration with Organismo Belga Para Apoyo de Proyectos de Desarrollo which supports projects designed to advance the rights of children.

In March of 1993, BICE launched PODER CRECER (power to grow), to facilitate the international exchange of ideas among persons and organizations committed to aiding children, adolescents, and their families to exercise the right to participate actively and effectively as members of society.

In attendance at this conference were 300 participants from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. The participants were divided into groups and subgroups to discuss the whys and wherefores of each of the three projects: "Listening to Children", "Children's Resiliency", and "Philosophy for Children". As the conference progressed one sensed a growing consensus among the participants that Philosophy for Children ISis an educational method able to help actualize the stated goals of PODER CRECER.

Dr A. G. Thompson, Professor Emeritus Marquette University, presented a paper to the conference which traced his 20 years of participation in P4C He related that in 1985, as a Fulbright Scholar, he attended a party given in his honor by the eminent Guatemalan educator, Dr Raul Osegueda. "At this party Dr. Cabrera asked me to tell him about my work in Mexico with Philosophy for Children. And thus began the long and laborious birthing of P4C in the land of eternal springtime. Marquette University financed my attendance at IAPC in 1987. And, in 1996, my P4C colleague, Saul Interiano, studied at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children."

Thompson's paper continues, "For a dozen years P4C bumped along in Guatemala. It wasn't easy for Gumercindo to accept the fact that teaching involved something significantly more than telling kids what they ought to learn. Once that lesson was learned P4Cs heart began beating strongly in Guatemala. Saul and Gumercindo are a new kind of missionary in Guatemala—certainly Guatemala has had more than its share the past 400 years! They bring good news for teachers and learners. And, the teachers are pleading for that 'good news'."

The atmosphere in the conference center was alive with a spirit for "revolution." The preferred type of revolution. Sitting in a chair. All of us in Central America have had our fill of the alternative. Perhaps it is because we have suffered so these past 30 years (or is it really the past 400 years?) with conquests, colonizings, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies that we are now not only ready for but pleading to catch up with what others in this world have been doing about the education of children. The ways of "ingestion, regurgitation and forgetting" are no longer useful, if ever they were. We need approaches to learning/teaching which will maximize the abilities of that pool of talent passing through the various stages of growth not only in Guatemala but in all of Central America. Maya blood still flows in our veins, and Spanish "intellectuals" marveled at what was wrought in this land before its "discovery." That "marvel" was such that its destruction was required because the mathematics, the science, the astronomy, the art, the religion in this piece did not conform to that of those "intellectuals."

A majority of the conference participants in Santafe de Bogota agreed that

education in Latin America is in need of a radical revolution. They also expressed a surprising level of agreement that the method inherent in P4C may well be the vehicle to carry water for that revolution.

On the final day and the final meeting of the conference a participant observed: "What has been shared with us during these days about Philosophy for Children cannot be read about in books. Guatemala has worked for over 12 years with P4C. Little by little. Making a variety of attempts in DOING Philosophy for Children. Involving over 2,000 educators. Of course, the children have been helped. But more importantly the teachers have gained as persons and as practitioners of their art. These teachers had not been satisfied with what was accepted as good practice, for which memory is the end all of education. They sensed that such teaching/ learning is of little benefit to children, let alone for Guatemala. These teachers sensed that the stuff of P4C can be the 'golden fleece', the 'good news', to be shared with teachers, learners, the community, and the nation."

1997 has been a good year for P4C in Guatemala. Not only did we enjoy the enthusiastic reception received in Colombia, but P4C now has legal status in Guatemala. This year the Guatemalan government officially approved the establishment of the, "Center of Philosophy for Children for Central America".

In June of this year we initiated P4C in Nicaragua, at the invitation of the Quincho Barrilete Association. For forty hours, thirty teachers and twenty children worked with P4C. Imagine the suffering endured by those teachers these past years. Perhaps it is because of that suffering that those teachers (as have those in Guatemala) grasped so quickly the soul, the spirit of P4C. For them P4C helps make one free, For them P4C demands that kids and teachers question, think, and doubt. Those teachers know better than most that thinking leads to questioning and that questioning leads to "dangerous" ideas. Those teachers know that democracy is nurtured by such "danger." Several of those teachers were visibly emotional during the demonstration lessons. "Imagine. Kids arguing with each other in my classroom! Imagine. Not needing to get the right answer before the end of the day! Imagine. Kids expect me to offer good reasons for saying what I say! I can't wait to get home to do this with my own three kids!" Yes. Just imagine!

During the past two years Saul and I have gone by chicken bus to where homes made of corn stalks and earthen floors are the norm. To where teachers travel for hours by bus or hike dust-blown paths for miles to reach their school. We sell nothing. We bring the "good news". Philosophy for Children. Twenty workshops. Five hundred teachers. Two hundred fifty kids. In these past two years.

The 300 participants in Santafe de Bogota, Colombia, thought Guatemala's work with children and with Philosophy for Children to be rather spectacular. You know, I think I just might agree.

Vera Waksman is Director of the Philosophy for Children Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

What We Talk About When We Talk About Tolerance

Vera Waksman

As the title of this paper points out, we propose to explore here the meaning of tolerance, particularly related with the dialogical practice that takes place in a philosophical community of inquiry (COI). Working as a philosophy teacher that tries to build communities of inquiry in her classrooms, I have found that tolerance is a problematic concept, both on a practical and theoretical basis. Thus, the first point I intend to make is that tolerance appears, for many reasons, as a fuzzy concept in our society; and then I wish to examine this concept. Is tolerance what we really need in a COI or can we think of another kind of relationship among its members?

I shall take as a starting point some of the usual claims made in philosophy for children (P4C) about the role that tolerance has to play in a community of inquiry. In the first place, tolerance is considered as a fundamental assumption of COI. Tolerance is a virtue or a disposition that the members of this kind of community must exercise.

> "The community will not function unless the participants can conform to the procedures of that community–logical and social. If one of the procedural principles is brought into question, other procedures must be adopted so that the discussion can proceed. Conformity is also manifest in a growing commitment to the underlying principles and practices that govern the entreprise itself: tolerance, consistency, comprehensiveness... (Sharp, "COI, Education for Democracy")

Here, tolerance refers to the capacity to listen to different points of view and to build one's ideas upon them. Tolerance means admitting the existence of others that don't think the same way I do. Tolerance here supports pluralism. That's why, even if we recognize that the procedural principles might be brought into question, it is difficult to figure out how anyone could bring tolerance into question, without being himself tolerant. That is, a discussion in a COI would not be a discussion unless it was regulated by the principle of tolerance; it is tolerance that allows us to play the game of discussion safely. We cannot even imagine a discussion where intolerance is the rule. In fact we can, we see that every day, but we would not call that a philosophical discussion in a COI. Tolerance is such a foundational assumption of COI that we can dare say respect, openmindness and care are grounded on this principle.

In the second place, we find tolerance at the end of the dialogue, as a closing principle for discussions, a disposition that must be called upon when people are unable to come to an agreement.

This is an interesting point: when an impasse has been reached, I must admit that I cannot make the other one change his or her mind, and he or she must admit that they cannot change mine, so we had better tolerate each other. And there is another point here: the views that we are to tolerate must be reasonable, and now we are back to the regulative principle mentioned before. Because, what does reasonable mean? Michael Pritchard says in "Education for Reasonableness": "It is only when rationality is combined with fairminded regard for the views and interests of others that reasonableness is present." So being reasonable means also being tolerant, and now the argument looks like a circle, because reasonableness and tolerance are in a relationship of mutual implication: we are reasonable, among other things, if we are willing to tolerate. In other words, intolerance is not reasonable.

So far, it is clear what a necessary principle of tolerance is: we must

assume this in order to create a COI and it is not easy to bring it into question. The purpose of this paper is not to propose that people become intolerant, but to look more closely at what we are assuming, and to ask ourselves if the only alternative to tolerance is intolerance.

The first problem I would like to mention is related to the classroom practice with middle-class teenagers of Buenos Aires, Argentina, where I work as a philosophy teacher. As the problem I am concerned with is tolerance and it belongs to the ethical and political dimensions of COI, and as I consider the choice of working in a COI a political choice, I would like to say something about the political context in which we live and educate in Argentina.

Argentina is a country that has lived for many years under military dictatorships. The last one, which took place between 1976 and 1983, was the bloodiest one and it left, besides a huge external debt, 30,000 missing people returned, murdered, tortured people whose bodies never reappeared. Democracy returned in 1983, and we hope it is here for good. But we have a young and weak democracy. Now, we have had three democratic elections, and the president we have now has been reelected in 1995 and will run the country until 1999. He is a democratic president because he has been democratically elected, but we could not say the same when we look at the way he governs: he makes decisions without consulting the Congress, the independence of the three powers of the state is constantly suspended, particularly the independence of the judges, the economic situation is terrible for a large part of the population and unemployment is becoming endemic. On the other hand, people don't trust politicians, corruption is common among people from the government and from the opposition, and for the president "liberalism" means just an economic option equivalent to savage capitalism. This economic model is something constantly preached: competition and efficiency are the big values, the ends before the means, economic index before social realities. In this context of generalized institutional devaluation, which includes politics, police, health and education, the mass media have assumed a prevailing role as the defenders of the democratic system. This role has two faces: on the one hand, it is true that many journalists take risks in denouncing serious problems that affect the government, but on the other hand, it is also true that the mass media must follow a logic that is close to the model they criticize. They depend on their audience index–they are not primarily concerned with the quality of the product they offer but with its popularity. The quality of the product is proportional to the degree of acceptance it gets among people. Marketing is the leading rule. And my feeling is that this logic has become "common sense," and it is with this sense that many of our students face reality. I remember a discussion I had with a class of 16-year-olds. We were discussing an advertising campaign for Nike shoes, where the slogans were taken from famous sportsmen who compared sport to the art of war. These slogans claim things like "The nails you can hammer on your enemy's coffin will never be enough," or "Respect your enemy: smash him up quickly," and so on. I didn't hide my shock at those advertisements, but teenagers didn't take it so seriously, it didn't mean anything to them: they knew this was just marketing, they told me: "the slogan must reach your mind; if it does, then it's good; if it doesn't, then it's bad." I am aware that this is a rich material for discussion in a COI, but I just want to show what are the leading values that are usually defended. I don't intend to judge this state of affairs, I'm only trying to make clear the assumptions teenagers bring to the discussion.

But efficiency is only a part of the problem. The media also attempt to make us believe that it is they who really take care of people, who denounce wrong things, who listen to people, who incarnate real democracy, because for the first time, people can really participate and have their opinion respected. This description may sound a bit ironic. Because we all know that it is not true, but, in this state of affairs, not being true doesn't matter, provided that it is effective. And because it is effective, I would like to explore how this influence affects three concepts that are crucial for building a COI. These three concepts are dialogue, communication, and opinion.

Let's consider dialogue: How is dialogue understood in the logic of mass media? Dialogue is basically debate, this is, exchange of opposing points of views, polarized in order to have a "hotter" debate. The kind of dialogue presented in television has nothing to do with the search of better understanding or with any kind of inquiry. At its best, the participants expose what they came to say and each one maintains the same position from beginning to end. Part of the interest television debates offer is that people defend the same idea all the time, they are not willing to change their minds, and there is no possible self-correction, because people never go there to really discuss anything but just to express an opinion. Therefore, "dialogue" in this case means people who speak one after another, people that declare, in a civilized way, that they disagree. And it is in the acceptance of such disagreement that people display tolerance: they are tolerant as long as they don't try to impose their views on others. But they don't display any of the features a conversation needs in order to be a real conversation–an authentic dialogue. They are just tolerant because they are not overtly intolerant. In Argentina, even the pro-dictatorship military and the torturers go on television to discuss. To discuss what? They don't really discuss anything, they just express their opinion.

Something similar happens with "communication": people phone the radio, the TV, they try to participate. Big word, "participation." But it has nothing to do with any kind of involvement, with any ideals. People phone the media to say hello to their aunt sitting just near them. Participating is, then, listening to yourself. But when someone says hello to his or her aunt on a radio, he and his aunt become "real". The media communicate with people because they put them on the air, or read their messages. No real communication takes place there, if we understand communication as some-

thing we have to construct as dialogue, as an encounter between two or more people.

The possibility of participating, of communicating, of dialogue, appears related to the fact that everyone can have an opinion. Talk shows, television debates, opinion polls: the only thing you need is a microphone before you and your opinion gets stronger, and you open your mouth and talk. For many years of dictatorship we could not say what we thought; now we are free, let's talk. After all, that's democracy, isn't it? Among another group of teenagers with whom we were talking about informal fallacies and good and bad reasons, we experienced the following situation. I had happened to watch a program on TV which I suspected my students had also seen, about the liberalization of marijuana, where they compared the situations in Argentina and Holland. A popular rock star was being interviewed, and he expressed his opinion, in favor of the liberalization of marijuana in these terms: "Smoking is good", he said, "and I have many friends, who are really nice guys, who smoke". I proposed this example and most of my students agreed that those were not good reasons and that they were not even convincing. But I had the feeling that it didn't really matter whether he was giving a good reason or not. Finally a girl said, "he doesn't need to give any reason, he is just saying his opinion, why should he defend an idea?" For most of my teenage students, it was clear that an opinion is not something we need to defend. What we need is to have them. Opinions are worthy because people who express them believe in them: my opinion is good because it's mine, and that's enough. If someone sees the question in a different way, never mind, that's democracy, we must tolerate the fact that different people think in different ways.

This long description is aimed to show how certain concepts have been trivialized–concepts and ideas that we claim as the necessary assumptions for our practice. Now, in this situation of a weak democracy with some key concepts of the practice in COI misunderstood, how can we understand the meaning of tolerance? I think that this sense of tolerance is close to that referred to by Lipovetsky in his book *Le crepuscule du devoir (The Twilight of Duty)* when he asks "What tolerance?". Lipovetsky says that we live in a "postmoralist" age, where the notion of duty or sacrifice, which has characterized ethics for centuries, is put aside. Instead of that, we live under a narcissistic imperative which defines self-interest and self care as primary. Nevertheless, a postmoralist society doesn't mean a society without values: even if personal sacrifices don't count anymore, tolerance has reached the level of a cardinal virtue. But what does tolerance mean here? According to Lipovetsky the popularity of tolerance accompanies the popularity of individualism: at the end of an age great common projects, of the universal values, the self takes priority, and each one may think and do as one pleases, provided he doesn't disturb his neighbor. Therefore, tolerance is also postmoralist, since it's more related to indifference and apathy than to some moral imperative. And, indeed, we observe this attitude among teenage students: anybody can say anything, not necessarily because we are in a safe place where we respect each other, but because nobody really cares about it. As TV demonstrates, the interesting thing about participation is that it allows me to hear myself, like those people who go to a disco to dance alone in front of a mirror or who go to a rock concert only if they know the songs, so that they can sing them. In this state of affairs, the other one is there as a limit, but not in the Sartrein way–I don't need the other but he is there, and I have to put up with him, and the best way, nowadays, is to tolerate him. Tolerance, says Lipovetsky, is a painless virtue that doesn't look for great sacrifices. In the classroom, that means to let the other talk: tolerance is, in the first place, patience, learning to wait for your turn to arrive: tolerance doesn't imply that you have to put your ego in perspective or that you have to value the other's ideas.

I am aware that this disappointing picture doesn't represent a community of inquiry, but I think it would be naive of me to simply assume a concept so poorly understood in my context, and maybe in many other contexts too, as if everybody knew what we we were talking about when we talk about tolerance. Tolerance is one of those words that nobody dares reject. Rejecting tolerance implies accepting intolerance, and in times where only few people believe in absolute truth, tolerance seems the only way to live in peace with others. But is it true that the only alternative to tolerance is intolerance? What should we do when we see that the terms we use to define our practice begin to change their meanings? Or maybe the real meaning of tolerance is the one that postmoralist society understand? Let's, finally, explore more closely the concept of tolerance and state its assumptions.

As has already been said, it is difficult to conceive of tolerance without its opposite, intolerance. In 1689, Locke in his *Letter Concerning Toleration*, proposes tolerance as the main characteristic of the true Church: no man can be absolutely sure that he possesses the truth, therefore, we must admit that different people can have different beliefs. Almost a century later, Voltaire described, in his *Treatise on Tolerance*, the misfortunes caused by religious intolerance, and claimed that tolerance is the only way for men to live together. In both cases, tolerance looks like a way out, some kind of negotiation that allows different people to be a part of the same society. But I don't see how this political virtue would create a relationship between these different people. On the other hand, I know that we do want to create a relationship among the different members of a community of inquiry.

Indeed, a community will only be one if its members knit together a net that embraces all of them; they are individuals, but they are with others. The products of a community of inquiry are not necessarily agreement, dialogue doesn't need agreement, we can also learn from disagreement. We need to value both agreement and disagreement, for a discussion in a community of inquiry never comes to a definite end–we can always discuss the issue again.

Disagreements are not something



we have to put up with, to tolerate: we are closing the possibility of dialogue when we decide to tolerate. And besides, once I decide to tolerate the other, to recognize him (which is another way to say the same thing) I put myself in a superior place, I do not consider him or her an equal, I make a decision "above" him or her, I make him or her the object of my appreciation. I value disagreements in a COI too much to make them lead me to tolerance: it is thanks to diversity that I can think for myself. Dialogue constitutes itself as a *critical tension*, as Eduardo Rubio claims in his article "Thinking about Dialogue" and thinking needs this dialectical tension. I cannot think without another. When I tolerate I close myself into my position and the other into his, I conceive, then, the subject as one and I miss considering the other as a dimension of myself. I remember a beautiful novel by Michel Tournier which retells Robinson Crusoe, and explores the concept of the other negatively, from the point of view of Robinson's solitude. Robinson goes through the island and realizes that his point of view is the only one on the island. When he first arrived, he says, he projected possible observers throughout the island who had different points of view that would make the island intelligible. But solitude destroyed this capacity of his little by little, and one day, he discovered that he had lost this dimension of the other, and that he was completely alone with his own point of view. "My vision of the island," says Robinson, "has been reduced to itself. What I do not see is absolutely unknown." No more possible worlds, no more virtuality. And then, the absence of another attacks the intelligibility of things: where he is not, there is absolute darkness. It also attacks the existence of things: how can he be sure of what is real, when he is completely alone? The other gives me the possibility to be myself, it is because of him or thanks to him that I can be me. So, if we understand the relationship with the others not as accidental but as structural; not as if the other just happened to be there but as if his being there is something I need to be myself–and I think this is the way we understand it in P4C–then the concept of tolerance impoverishes the kind of relationships we can entertain with others in a community of inquiry.

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