The Politics of Developmentalism, Citizenship and Urban Youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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The Politics of Developmentalism, Citizenship and Urban Youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Abstract

This thesis explores the politics of developmentalism and citizenship in Ethiopia. The overarching question it seeks to answer is: *how does the politics of building a developmental state affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?* The thesis analyses primary qualitative data and reviews policy and legal frameworks to answer this question. The thesis argues that the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state has the tendency to use repression strategies against young citizens pursuing their civil and political rights within created spaces; whilst it facilitates the emergence of invited spaces of citizenship. The state primarily promotes social and economic rights within these invited spaces. The state adopts strategies of co-operation and co-optation when it offers social and economic rights. In response to the repressive strategies of the state, young citizens adopt resistance as a strategy of citizenship to continue pursuing and claiming civil and political rights.

The thesis adopts a relational and process-oriented approach to conceptualize citizenship and thereby critically examines the relations between the aspiring developmental state and the urban youth. Citizenship is defined as context-dependent dynamic processes that involve relations between the aspiring developmental state and urban young citizens where both actors are contesting for *rights* within *spaces* of citizenship by adopting different *strategies*. The key characters of the aspiring developmental state that influence its relations with the urban youth emanate from its intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives. Likewise, young citizens also exercise their citizenship rights to meet their priorities and interests that are affected by their age as well as their 'waithood' status.

The findings of the thesis explain the politics of citizenship by illustrating how the developmentalist aspirations of the state and the 'waithood' status of urban youth significantly shape the interplay between rights, spaces and strategies. The state combines its developmentalist ideology, policy and legal frameworks as well as its structures of mobilization to affect the processes of citizenship. By doing so, the state facilitates opportunities for young citizens to claim social and economic rights in invited spaces primarily through co-operation and co-optation strategies. Simultaneously, the state also restricts young citizens from claiming their civil and political rights within created spaces through its repressive strategies. This leads to young citizens adopting resistance as their main strategy of citizenship. From the youth side, their context-dependent relation with the aspiring developmental state varies depending on the type of citizenship rights they prioritise within the different spaces of citizenship. Some young citizens are willing to trade-off their civil and political rights within invited spaces in order to better claim social and economic rights; whereas other young citizens remain determined to reject co-optation and continue to claim their civil and political rights in spite of very severe repressive strategies pursued by the state.

Declaration

I have published two articles using part of the data and analysis I used for this dissertation. The first article combined the data I collected for my Master's thesis in 2009 with the data I collected for this dissertation. I co-authored the article with my MA thesis advisor Prof. Linda Herrera. The second paper was published during my engagement as a Matasa Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). I used the policy analysis sections of Chapter 5 to produce an article. Here is the full bibliographical information of both articles:

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Eyob Balcha Gebremariam., 2017. The Politics of Youth Employment and Policy Processes in Ethiopia. *IDS Bulletin*, *48*(3).

Eyob Balcha Gebremariam, August 2017

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List of Abbreviations

ADLI	Agriculture Development-led Industrialization
AAYA	Addis Ababa Youth Association
AAYF	Addis Ababa Youth Forum
AAYL	Addis Ababa Youth League
COYDOE	Coalition of Youth Development Organizations in Ethiopia
CSA	Central Statistics Agency
BR	*Bale-Raey* Youth Association
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GCAO	Government Communications Affairs Bureau
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan (I & II)
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoI	Ministry of Information
MoYSC	Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture
MSEs	Micro and Small-scale Enterprises
NYP	National Youth Policy
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty
PIS	Participant Information Sheet
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
VCP	Vagrancy Control Proclamation
WB	World Bank
YDP	Youth Development Package
YNGOs	Youth-led Non-Governmental Organizations

Dedication

To Billen Kebede Tesissa (Kiyaye) for your love, kindness and support during the ups and downs of writing this thesis.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

This thesis is about the politics of developmentalism and citizenship in Ethiopia. The main question it seeks to answer is *how does the politics of building a developmental state affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?* The evolving debate on the relationship between democracy and development serves as a broader framework for the thesis. Since the 1950s, development theories, policies and practices have been grappling with the debate on the democracy-development nexus. On the one hand, theories such as modernisation theory prioritise economic development over the fulfilment of the civil and political rights of citizens (Lipset 1959, Rostow 1960). On the other hand, post-Cold War development policies argue that good governance and democracy are pre-requisites for development (McAuslan 1996; Grindle 2004; Smith 2007; Kaufmann and Kraay 2008; Moore and Unsworth 2010). Whilst the debate on the democracy-development nexus remains unresolved, some scholars emphasise the 'institutional incompatibility' between democracy and development. For example, Leftwich (2005) and Khan (2005) contend that institutional frameworks and policies that promote transformational socio-economic growth and development do not necessarily coincide with the provision of civil and political rights of citizenship. The cases of East Asian developmental states demonstrate the 'institutional incompatibility' highlighted by Leftwich and Khan. In South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia, authoritarian regimes delivered rapid economic growth and socio-economic development (Vu 2007; Kim 2010). The thesis critically explores the debate on the democracy-development nexus by examining the politics of developmentalism in Ethiopia. More specifically, the thesis investigates the officially declared objective of the Ethiopian government to build a democratic developmental state (MoFED 2010; 2015). The primary line of inquiry in doing so is examining how this developmentalist orientation affects the citizenship of urban youth.

The thesis approaches the concept of citizenship by emphasising three different aspects of citizenship. The first aspect is the 'elements of citizenship'; these are civil, political, social and economic rights (Marshall [1950] 2009; Turner 1993). The second aspect focuses on spaces within which citizens can pursue and claim citizenship rights. The thesis identifies

invited, created and claimed spaces of citizenship (Cornwall 2002; Gaventa 2006). The third aspect focuses on strategies of state-youth relations that affect the processes of citizenship. These are co-operation (Ghandi and Przeworski 2006), co-optation (Gerschewski 2013), repression (Davenport 2007) and resistance (Bayat 2010). These three inter-related aspects of citizenship help the thesis to identify and examine how young citizens pursue and claim their citizenship rights within a context of developmental statism. Furthermore, the thesis also examines how developmentalism affects the nature, emergence and dynamics of spaces of citizenship, the kinds of rights that are pursued and claimed within these spaces and the strategies deployed both by the state and by urban youth.

Youth serve as a specific social group through which the thesis examines the implications of building a developmental state on citizenship. The thesis highlights two attributes of youth: youth as an age group (Mizen 2002) and youth as a transitional stage (Honwana 2012, 2014). Both attributes have specific implications in terms of shaping state-youth relations such as the age specific citizenship rights for voting and eligibility for minimum wage. This shows the vital role of age in pursuing and claiming citizenship rights. Furthermore, the thesis also explores how the political processes of pursuing developmental statism shape the processes of growing up and transitioning into adulthood. One inevitable feature of growing up is the capacity to pursue and claim citizenship rights. In the forthcoming sections, the chapter presents the aims, objectives and research questions of the thesis as well as rationale of the inquiry, followed by the structure of the thesis.

1.2 Research Aims and Objectives

1.2.1 Research Aims

The thesis specifically examines the ways in which developmental statism is shaping the citizenship of urban youth. The thesis identifies state strategies embedded within its developmentalist orientation that have direct implications on how young citizens pursue and claim citizenship rights. It also identifies strategies that young citizens adopt to pursue and claim citizenship rights within a context of developmental statism. At the end, the thesis explores how the identified state-youth relations influence the politics of building a developmental state.

1.2.2 Research Objectives

The thesis has the following research objectives:

- To explore what kinds of citizenship rights the urban youth are pursuing and claiming in the context of developmental statism
- To explain how and why young citizens are pursuing these identified citizenship rights
- To explain how the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state is affecting young citizens' efforts of pursuing citizenship rights
- To explore the implications of state-youth relations on the efforts of building a developmental state

1.3 Research Questions

The overarching research question the thesis seeks to address is: *how does the politics of building a developmental state affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?*

To answer this question, the thesis attempts to address the following more specific research questions:

1. How do state-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa?
2. How do youth-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa?
3. What are the implications of the identified state-youth relations on the politics of developmentalism in Ethiopia?

1.4 Rationale of the Study

This section explains the rationale of the thesis. It briefly presents the evolving debate on the democracy-development nexus. The section also discusses how the thesis intends to use the concept of citizenship to better analyse the democracy-development nexus. Furthermore, it explains why the current socio-economic and political context in Ethiopia presents an ideal empirical context to examine the complex relationship between democracy and development. Finally, it justifies why the thesis focuses on youth and the urban context.

1.4.1 The Democracy-Development Nexus

To start with, it is imperative to establish how the thesis approaches the concepts of 'democracy' and 'development'. The thesis conceptualises these two broad concepts by emphasising their impact on citizenship. With regard to democracy, Rueschemeyer *et al.* (1992) identified three key attributes of advanced democracies. These are: a division within branches of government (legislature, judiciary and executive), regular, free and fair elections and the fulfilment of the rights and freedoms of citizens. These three key attributes of a democracy are closely interrelated. However, without undermining the salient role of the institutions and processes of democracy mentioned in the first two attributes, the focus of this thesis is specifically on the third attribute – citizenship rights. In addition to these key attributes, it is also important to note the distinction between formal and substantive democracies. In formal democracies, we have the institutional apparatuses of democracy but with significant limitations on the processes and on the fulfilment of rights and freedoms (Sanderson 2007). By contrast, in substantive democracies, we have both the formal institutional machinery of democratic government and the effective implementation of democratic processes and the fulfilment of citizens' rights (ibid). Hence, the thesis defines democracy as a system of governance where the institutions and processes of democracy meaningfully promote and uphold citizens' rights and freedoms.

The thesis approaches development as a process of transformation within society that entails changes in the institutions of economic and political relations (Stiglitz 1998; Leftwich 2005). In the context of development, changes within the institutions of economic relations involve alterations in how different segments of society access economic resources. Actual manifestations include policies that shape the distribution and redistribution of resources, such as taxation policies, land reform, and the provision of welfare (Leftwich 2005). Hence, development can have a direct impact on the social and economic rights of citizens. Furthermore, development-induced changes in the institutions of economic relations also have direct impact on power relations among social groups. For example, changes in land tenure through redistribution will strip political power from the landowners and transfer it to new social groups (Barraclough 1999). New social groups, which were formerly without property and insignificant political power, can then become vital forces in the political process. In doing so, development can also shape how different social groups exercise their political rights. Hence, the thesis defines development as a set of processes that can change

economic and political relations among social groups with a positive outcome on peoples' lives as well as with direct implications on their citizenship rights.

The thesis also recognises that the state plays an indispensable role in the processes of development. Whilst earlier theories of development (1950s–70s) provided strong arguments for the leading role of the state in development, there were also alternative theories that advocated 'for a reduction in the role of the state' (Dearlove and White 2016 [1987]). In these competing theoretical orientations, the state is perceived either as an enabler of the changing relations among social forces toward development or an obstacle and a source of failure, especially to the proper functioning of markets (White 1998; Mkandawire 2001).

There has also been a continued debate in mainstream development theories about the relationship between democracy and development. The earliest theories of development, such as modernisation theory, argued that economic growth and development should precede democracy (Lipset 1959; Rostow 1960). Lipset, for example, argued that 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' (1959: 75). The central claim of this argument was that 'underdeveloped', 'backward' countries lacked the essential prerequisites for democratic institutions and practices (Lee 1967; Kitching 1983). A number of statistical studies using different sets of variables also demonstrated the significant impact of economic development on democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Lipset 1993; Diamond 1992).

However, this prioritisation was challenged more specifically in the post-Cold War period. Development theories and policies started to counter the earlier notion and began to highlight the positive role of democracy in economic growth and development (World Bank 1989; Fukuyama 1989; McAulson 1996). The triumph of liberalism in the post-Cold War period further emboldened the notion that 'good governance and democracy' were pre-requisites to end poverty and to achieve development. Hence, dominant development strategies started promoting market-oriented and entrepreneurial-focused policies. In these prescriptions, the role of the state was primarily that of a regulator of the efficient functioning of the market (White 1998).

Critics of the pro-democracy camp questioned the role of democracy in development. For example, Huntington famously argued that 'democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to anything else' (1993: 263). Leftwich further emphasised that it

is not the system of government or regime type – an autocracy, semi or full democracy – that matters (1996). Rather, the nature of the politics is the most essential factor in delivering particularly transformative economic growth and development (Leftwich 1996; Khan 2001, Levy 2014). Transformational development is a radical process that alters the production, control, use and distribution of resources among social groups (Leftwich 2005). The role of democracy in order to achieve transformational development is negligible because democracy entails a gradual, consensus-based process rather than a radical endeavour (ibid). Leftwich supported his argument by referring to cases of authoritarian developmental states in South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia (ibid). One can also refer to the economic success of China in the last two decades, which has achieved substantial economic growth and development under a markedly undemocratic political system.

The debate on the democracy-development nexus is important to the thesis for at least two reasons. First, the debate provides a broader theoretical puzzle to which the thesis can contribute with an empirically grounded analysis. The thesis examines to what extent the politics of building a developmental state prioritises economic growth or not and how this affects the citizenship of urban youth. Second, the democracy-development nexus also takes the central argument of the thesis beyond the particular case of Ethiopia and links it with current intellectual and policy debates about development. For example, the latest World Development Report underscored the vital role of governance for development (World Bank 2017). The report argues that the effectiveness of development institutions is more important than the forms they adopt (ibid: 3). In this report, the World Bank subtly argues in favour of the prioritisation of institutions that promote economic growth over the institutions that promote democratic governance. In doing so, the World Bank challenges the development orientations that prioritise democratic institutions.

Another way of examining the contending views on the relationship between democracy and development is through the concept of citizenship. For instance, states that prioritise economic growth before democratisation put various formal and informal restrictions on the civil and political rights of citizens. In this regard, the case of developmental states (such as South Korea, Taiwan and Botswana) and their economic success is a good example of putting restrictions on citizenship rights whilst pursuing a rapid economic growth agenda (Holm 1996; Leftwich 1996; Kim 2010). In these countries, despite remarkable growth, the capacity of citizens to exercise their rights and to influence political decisions was severely

constrained. Based on these countries' experiences, some scholars highlighted the developmental efficacy authoritarian regimes in pursuing economic growth and development (Haggard and Moon 1990; Wade 1990; Leftwich 1996; Hee-Yeon 2000).

To avoid the 'fallacy of sequentialism', analysing the democracy-development nexus needs to go beyond the simple prioritisation of one process over the other (Carothers 2007). One way of doing this is providing deeper analysis about the political dynamics that shapes the processes of state formation and the exercise of state power (Leftwich 1996; Carothers 2007; Kelsall 2014). In this thesis, the focus on the politics of building a developmental state seeks to go beyond the 'fallacy of sequentialism' by examining the democracy-development nexus with a specific focus on the citizenship of urban youth. The thesis takes the processes and politics of claiming citizenship rights by the urban youth as the analytical link through which the democracy-development nexus is examined. Such examination will adopt a historically informed analysis to understand how the politics of developmentalism emerged into the Ethiopian political scene and how it is affecting the citizenship of urban youth. The following section further explains how the thesis incorporates the concept of citizenship into its inquiry.

1.4.2 Citizenship

Citizenship is essentially about the relation between the individual and the state in the context of rights and obligations (Faulks 2000). As Faulks argues, the idea of citizenship is 'inherently contested and contingent, always reflecting the particular set of relationships and types of governance found within any given society' (ibid: 6). The relations between state and citizens exhibit complex features depending on the context (Clarke and Agyeman 2011). As argued earlier, development is inherently a political process (Leftwich 2005). Political priorities and decisions within states about socio-economic development have the capacity to shift the relations between states and citizens as well as the kinds of rights that citizens can pursue and claim (Staeheli 1994).

This thesis posits that citizenship is at the heart of the democracy-development nexus. Authoritarian developmental regimes have put in place legal frameworks and strategies that restricted civil and political rights of citizens. Scholars who studied these regimes argued about the instrumental role of authoritarianism in achieving economic growth (Hee-Yeon 2000; Vu 2007; Chang 2012). For example, Hee-Yeon (2000) argued that the authoritarian and state-led mobilisation against communism was one of the key features of state-citizen

relations in South Korean developmental statism in the 1960s and 70s. Likewise, Vu (2007) also noted the role of 'mass suppression' (ibid: 30) by South Korean and Indonesian states during the peak of their economic success. Haggard and In-Moon, similarly, argued about the effectiveness of developmental authoritarian regimes in keeping interest groups such as labour, civil society groups and students' movements at bay from challenging developmental policies (Haggard and In-Moon 1990: 212). These arguments attempted to establish a causal relationship between the restriction of civil and political rights and economic growth.

However, the restriction of citizenship rights through coercive and repressive state strategies does not always lead to successful economic growth. As the notion of taking democracy as a pre-requisite to development is critically questioned, authoritarianism and its developmental record also requires deep scrutiny. There have been authoritarian regimes in different parts of the world that have never achieved such economic growth as the East Asian states (Howard 1983; McFerson 1992). Such variance in developmental success between similar types of regimes in East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates that developmental success does not depend on the type of regime (Leftwich 2002; Kelsall 2014). Rather, the political processes that shape the production, use, distribution and control of resources significantly shape developmental effectiveness (Leftwich 2002).

The thesis builds on the above arguments to examine how the efforts of putting in place developmental policies and legal frameworks affect citizenship. It views the political and socio-economic context of developmentalism as the crucial factor that shapes state-citizen relations in general and state-youth relations in particular. The thesis further analyses the kinds of citizenship rights that the aspiring developmental state promotes or restricts and those which the youth pursue or claim. More specifically, the analytical framework of the thesis conceptualizes citizenship by adopting a relational and process oriented approach. Chapter 2 will elaborate the key components that constitute the processes of citizenship namely, rights, space and strategies. Such conceptualization will allow the thesis to examine the politics of citizenship by identifying the implications of the key attributes of a developmental state and the youth on the interplay between rights, spaces and strategies of citizenship. Hence, the thesis will go beyond the characterisation of the Ethiopian regime either as authoritarian or democratic. Rather, it will focus on how the politics of developmentalism is shaping the citizenship of the young. The following section explains why Ethiopia is a relevant case study to examine the politics of developmentalism.

1.4.3 Why Ethiopia

The current socioeconomic and political context in Ethiopia presents an ideal scenario to examine the democracy-development nexus. The Ethiopian government has declared its objective of building ‘democratic developmental state’ (MoFED 2010: 22). To this end, the government has been engaged in a large-scale development project aimed at transforming the country’s economy into a middle-income status by 2025 (MoFED 2010, 2015). Reports show that the government has achieved remarkable developmental success. For example, in terms of development, the latest World Bank report acknowledges that the country has registered an average of 10.9 per cent economic growth from 2004–2014 (World Bank 2016). Such sustained economic growth has also affected poor peoples’ lives in a meaningful way. For example, by 2014, with the exceptions of maternal mortality and gender equality goals, six of the remaining MDGs were achieved or on track to be achieved by the end of 2015 (Admit Wondifraw Zerihun *et.al* 2016).

Other reports also indicate positive development records of the incumbent regime in terms of improving human wellbeing, reducing poverty and increasing access to infrastructure and social services (Lenhardt *et al* 2015; UNDP 2014). Among sub-Saharan African countries, the rate of poverty reduction in Ethiopia is second to only Uganda (World Bank 2014). The poverty headcount ratio of those below the national poverty line decreased from 45.5% in 1995 to 29.6% in 2011, while the life expectancy at birth improved from 55 years in 2003 to 62 years in 2011 (World Bank 2016). Despite starting from a low base, the proportion of households that have improved access to electricity and water doubled from 2000 to 2011 (World Bank 2016: 12) Likewise, Ethiopia’s GDP, was 8.5 billion USD in 2003 and reached more than 61.5 billion USD in 2015 (ibid: 2016). The World Bank praised Ethiopia’s economic performance for the last decade as ‘remarkably stable and rapid’ (World Bank 2016: 22).

However, there is also another equally important fact about the incumbent Ethiopian regime. The government is heavily criticized for violating constitutionally guaranteed civil and political citizenship rights (Abbink 2007; Aalen and Tronvoll 2010). These violations include intimidation, the imprisonment and killing of political dissenters, opposition party members, journalists and political activists. Despite the establishment of formal democratic institutions, which marked the democratic transition in the 1990s, the possibilities of democratic

consolidation remain quite low. The formal institutions of democracy include a constitution which upholds all internationally recognised rights, three branches of government and regular elections. However, despite experiencing two decades of the political process under the new constitution, democratic consolidation is a far cry from reality. For example, the number of parliamentary seats won by opposition parties during the last three elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 diminished considerably from nearly 30 per cent to zero per cent. The World Bank, whilst praising the country's remarkable economic growth, also characterises the development path of the regime as an 'authoritarian developmental state model' (World Bank 2016: 31).

The current socio-economic and political context in Ethiopia is thus suitable for exploring the tension and trade-offs between democracy and development. The most recent violent protest that occurred from November 2015–October 2016 led to the loss of more than 900 lives, according to the government affiliated Human Rights Commission.[1] The violent protest forced the regime to declare a state of emergency, which critics say was a legal cover to further intensify political suppression.[2] One of the vocal civil societies in the country, the Human Rights Council, released a report claiming that 22,507 individuals were imprisoned with gross human rights violations after the state of emergency was declared. The official discourse by the regime about the protest is framed in terms of developmentalism. The ruling party argues that it was a development-induced protest which can be addressed only by pushing for more growth (EPRDF 2016). This shows the extent to which the incumbent regime is committed to keeping its meta-narrative of developmentalism intact whilst relying on repression to keep political dissent under control.

In present day Ethiopia, there is an inverse relationship between the trends of development and citizens' capacity to exercise their constitutionally guaranteed rights. This inverse relationship can be seen as one of the manifestations of the democracy-development nexus in Ethiopia. The late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who was the most influential person in shaping the country's developmental model, argued that 'development is a political

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[1] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/report-669-killed-ethiopia-violence-august-170418164259637.html (Accessed on 19 June 2017) ; http://thereporterethiopia.com/content/commission-names-responsible-parties-deadly-violence (Accessed on 19 June 2017)

[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37679165 (Accessed on 19 June 2017); http://addisstandard.com/news-human-rights-council-ethiopia-releases-report-on-rights-abuses-committed-under-current-state-of-emergency/ (Accessed on 19 June 2017)

process first and an economic and social process later' (Meles Zenawi 2012: 170). The thesis aims to examine how the political process of developmentalism can shape citizens' capacity to exercise and pursue their citizenship rights. Furthermore, the specific focus on the citizenship of urban youth allows the thesis to have a specific social group as a case study that can help to further understand state-citizen relations in the context of developmentalism. The thesis will also identify the strategies of the state whilst pursuing its developmental mission and also the strategies of young citizens in their efforts toward pursuing and claiming citizenship rights. The following section will further explain why the thesis focuses on youth.

1.4.4 Why Youth?

Two inter-related narratives dominate current debates around youth and development particularly in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, the 2011 popular uprisings and unrest in most Arab countries highlighted the impact of growing young population on stability. On the other hand, there is also a burgeoning debate about the prospects of successful 'demographic transitions' and 'demographic dividends' in sub-Saharan Africa (Drummond *et al.* 2014; Canning et.al 2015). For example, the World Bank estimates that there will be an additional half a million 15 years-olds every year in the sub-Saharan Africa region between 2015 and 2035 (WB 2014: 2). As the second most populous country in Africa with 100 million people, Ethiopia is one of the countries experiencing a youth bulge (UNDESA 2017). Furthermore, Ethiopia is a good example to examine both the concern for political stability and the potential for development within the context of a significantly growing young population. The thesis aims to critically examine the state-youth relations in Ethiopia by using the concept of citizenship and by understanding the politics of building a developmental state.

State-youth relations in Ethiopia have been changing along with the dynamic political processes the Ethiopian state went through, especially during the last four and a half decades. During the 1974 Ethiopian revolution, which was one of the defining moments of the current socio-economic and political context, Ethiopian students were the most vital political forces. The Ethiopian Students' Movement (ESM), with members both within Ethiopia and abroad, spearheaded the 1974 revolution (Bahru Zewde 2002; Gebru Tareke 2008). One can witness the influence of the revolutionary generation in shaping the socio-economic and political dynamics of the country to date (Eyob Gebremariam and Herrera 2016). Particularly in the

spheres of politics, the legacy of the revolution is maintained through former revolutionaries that are leading both the opposition and ruling political parties. More specifically, Marxist-Leninism inspired political organisation, mass mobilisation, discourse and practices which are still visible in the political practices of the current ruling party.

After 17 years of civil war, a segment of the revolutionary generation defeated the socialist military regime and established a new government in 1991. The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led the rebel movement, became victorious in 1991, and remained in power ever since. In the first decade of the EPRDF's reign, the youth remained at the margins of the socio-economic and political discourse of the government. The few moments that brought youth to the foreground include the Addis Ababa University student protest on the Eritrean referendum in 1993[3] and the Ethio-Eritrean war. In other spheres, the recovering post-war economy, the implementation of structural adjustment and failing social services all contributed to the high level of youth unemployment in the mid-1990s. For example, a 1994 socio-economic household sample survey revealed that the level of unemployment among urban young people below the age of 35 was 90 per cent (cited in Girma Kebbede 2004). Another similar study during the same period of time focusing on the under-30 male workforce in urban areas also found a 50 per cent unemployment rate of this demographic group (Serneels 2004).

However, in the second decade of the EPRDF's tenure, the growing population inevitably brought youth to the forefront of Ethiopian socio-economic and political dynamics. Another Addis Ababa University student protest in April 2001 spilled over to the city and resulted in an unprecedented level of ransacking, looting and chaos for the first time under the EPRDF's leadership. Whilst the initial cause of the protest was purely academic and administrative, the student protest quickly changed its tone into a political protest (Balsvik 2007). Perhaps, this was the first signal of the impact that a growing young population experiencing high unemployment has had on political stability. Security forces killed at least 40 people during the protest. Later on, Chapter 5 will discuss how the EPRDF used the April 2001 incident as a pre-text to initiate a legal framework that sought to address the problem of youth unemployment.

[3] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ethiopian-student-dies-in-un-protest-1476707.html - accessed 10 March 2017

The EPRDF-led government established the first youth-focused ministry in 2000. Furthermore, the government also launched the first National Youth Policy in 2004. After the 2005 national elections, there was deadly post-election political turmoil in which particularly urban youth were involved. As it will be further argued in Chapter 5, a quick political remedy by the EPRDF-led government streamlined the socio-economic and political programs to address the issues of youth unemployment and marginalisation. Examples of the government's efforts included a youth-focused micro and small-scale enterprise scheme and state-led youth political mobilisation.

However, youth-focused employment creation programs could not avert the most recent widespread and deadliest protests from November 2015 to October 2016. Young people were at the forefront of these prolonged protests. The government deployed both military and police to get the protests under control.[4] After successfully subduing the protest, the EPRDF-led government passed a bill to launch a 'new' youth-centred program focusing on job creation and self-employment. The bill called the Ethiopian Youth Revolving Fund (Proclamation No. 995/2017) targeted young people between the ages of 18–34 with a total amount of £330 million.[5] The empirical findings will allow better understanding behind the political and developmentalist rationale of such kinds of government budgets that specifically focus on youth employment. Furthermore, the empirical analysis also allows identifying the relations between different elements of citizenship rights and state-led development programs. In addition to using youth as a specific social group to understand the politics of developmentalism, the thesis also focuses on the urban setting as a specific location for the research inquiry. The next section will further explain the rationale for choosing this urban focus.

1.4.5 Why Urban?

In addition to the growing young population, rapid urbanisation is the other significant feature that is fundamentally changing Ethiopia's socio-economic and political dynamics. Currently, Ethiopia has 20 per cent of its population in urban areas, which is considerably below the sub-Saharan average of 37 per cent (Admit Wondifraw Zerihun *et.al* 2016). However, there has been a significant surge in urban population growth during the last

[4] http://addisstandard.com/news-rights-commission-say-security-measures-killed-hundreds-civilians-recent-protests-mostly-proportional-2/ (accessed on 25 May 2017)
[5] http://allafrica.com/stories/201704050732.html (accessed on 18 June 2017)

decade. In the two decades since 1994, the urban population has more than doubled (World Bank 2015). Furthermore, studies show that the urban population annual growth is 3.8 per cent, which is considerably higher than the national population growth rate of 2.5 per cent (ibid). If current trends continue, the annual urban population growth is expected to reach 5.4 per cent, bringing the total urban population to 30 per cent by 2028. With the current rate of urbanisation, the urban population is set to triple in the coming two decades (World Bank 2015).

The political and economic significance of urban centres is also boosted by another structural factor, which is the swelling young labour force both nationally, and in urban areas. According to the World Bank (2015), Ethiopia's labour force is expected to reach 82 million in 2030. As the current trend shows, a significantly huge proportion of the young labour force joining the labour market is expected to move to urban centres in search of employment, education and better opportunities (ibid: 105). Both urbanisation and population growth are important factors that will significantly shape Ethiopia's developmental prospects. One can argue that Ethiopia's prosperity and stability is inextricably linked to its capacity to harness the opportunities and address the challenges in these urban centres.

Another reason for the urban focus is the significant policy shift by the incumbent regime to prioritise urban development in the last 12 years. Chapter 4 of this thesis argues that the May 2005 election was one of the critical junctures leading to the present developmental statism in Ethiopia. The ruling party was heavily beaten in major cities and urban areas, and was totally defeated in the capital city. The EPRDF-led government reacted very strongly to the electoral defeats in urban areas. The government established the Ministry of Works and Urban Development (MoWUD) as the new ministerial portfolio in October 2005 (MoFED 2006: 161). Consequently, the first urban development policy and strategy was launched and became part of the five year development plan from 2005–2010. The prime focus was on job creation, housing, infrastructure and service delivery and also improved governance (ibid). In the following years, the government strengthened its political commitment to improve urban centres in line with its developmental orientation. The growing importance of urban centres also started to be manifested in their contribution to the national economy. Despite comprising one-fifth of the total population, Ethiopia's urban centres currently provided 38 per cent of the GDP and 60 per cent of all new jobs created in Ethiopia between 2005 and

2011 (Admit Wondifraw Zerihun *et.al* 2016). This makes the urban centres vital elements of both current and future socio-economic and political dynamics.

The above discussed sections provided the rationale of the thesis. Moreover, the current socio-economic and political dynamics of present day Ethiopia, with its growing young population and rapid urbanisation, also provide the empirical justifications for the thesis. The remainder of the thesis builds on these conceptual and empirical grounds to explain how the politics of building a developmental state affects the citizenship of urban youth in Ethiopia.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

The subsequent chapters of the thesis have the following structure. Chapter 2 presents the conceptual and analytical framework by exploring and linking key concepts of the thesis, namely, developmental state, citizenship and youth. Chapter 3 presents the research design and methodology of the thesis. Chapter 4 presents a socio-historical and political-economic analysis of the Ethiopian state. Chapter 5 and 6 present the empirical findings. Chapter 5 focuses on how state-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa; Chapter 6 follows with a specific focus on how youth-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa. Chapter 7 presents a summary of the key findings and explains the thesis's contribution to knowledge. It also examines the implications of the empirical findings on the Ethiopian state and the urban youth and presents recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER TWO
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE, CITIZENSHIP & YOUTH:
Conceptual and Analytical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conceptual and analytical framework of the thesis. It conceptualizes the developmental state, citizenship and youth. In the first section, the chapter argues that a relational approach offers a nuanced understanding of the developmental state. By adopting a relational approach, one can examine the politics of developmental statism and contestations among competing social forces that have different relations with the state. Likewise, the second section also adopts a relational approach to conceptualize citizenship. It identifies three aspects of the citizenship process, which are citizenship rights, spaces of citizenship and strategies of citizenship. In the third section, the chapter conceptualizes youth by defining them as an age group and a transitional stage. Finally, the chapter presents the analytical framework for examining the politics of citizenship within the context of developmentalism.

2.2 Conceptualising the State

This section explores how political processes shape the characteristics of the state. Political processes are relations among social forces that have vested interests in influencing state organisation and functions (Migdal 2001; Hagmann and Peclard 2010). A critical understanding of these political processes is important because it helps to go beyond the 'institutional features and functional roles' (Mann 1984: 187) of the state. The thesis conceptualises the state by focusing on the complex political processes and the social forces involved in shaping the dominant institutional features and functional roles of the state. The thesis does this first by juxtaposing 'statist' and 'relational' approaches to conceptualising the state. Then, it argues that the relational approach offers an analytically nuanced perspective to understanding the politics of building a developmental state.

2.2.1 Statist *vs.* Relational Approach

There are two dominant approaches of studying the state: the statist and relational approaches. A statist approach considers the state as an entity analytically and empirically

detached from society. It defines states in terms of their capacity to coerce and use legitimate force (Weber 1968 [1922]), and to govern and bring about social change (Huntington 1965, Skocpol 1985). The limitation of this approach is the inadequate room it allows for a critical examination of political processes that shape the characteristics of the state (Abrams 1988; Trouillot 2003; Sharma and Gupta 2006). One can hardly examine the different characteristics of the state (democratic/undemocratic, developmental, patrimonial etc) vis-à-vis the interests and the contested role of social forces if the state and society are conceptually separated.

In contrast, a relational approach goes beyond an imaginary and elusive borderline that separates the state and society. Migdal argues, 'the state is part of society … a sprawling organisation within society that coexists with many other formal and informal social organisations' (Migdal 2001: 63). A relational approach associates essential features of the state with socio-historical and political-economic processes within society that in turn shape the institutional features and functional roles of the state (Abrams 1988; Migdal 2001; Trouillot 2003; Sharma and Gupta 2006; Jessop 2008). This approach helps to explain why certain features of the state are dominant and identifies the crucial role of the relations among social forces to shape key attributes of the state (Migdal 1994; Leftwich 2010; Hudson and Leftwich 2013). Hence, one can expound on the democratic/undemocratic, developmental, or predatory character of the state by examining the relationship among social forces and the interests they promote. Bob Jessop (1990), for example, adopts a 'strategic-relational approach' to explain why and how the state acquires its character from its relations with different social forces.

In his strategic-relational approach, Jessop argues that the state is seldom 'neutral' in its role within society (Jessop 1990: 268). Instead, the state has a bias towards certain social forces that operate within the 'state system'. Social forces such as business and industrial elites within the state use their capacity to weave their priorities into the agendas of the state. Jessop underscores the instrumentality of the state to fulfil the interests of certain powerful social forces (ibid). He further argues that, 'the power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state' (ibid: 270). Jessop further underscores on the versatility of the state by arguing that the state:

> changes shape and appearance with the activities it undertakes, the scales on which it operates, the political forces acting toward it, the circumstances in which it and they act, and so forth (Jessop 2008: 3).

Jessop's argument emphasises that the state is hardly a unified entity with a predetermined character and rationalised position. Rather, the state's character and role is contingent on the motives of social forces that exist within society.

Similar to Jessop's argument, Hagmann and Peclard (2010) also claim that the state is hardly a unified entity. According to their 'negotiating statehood' argument, the state derives its shape and character 'through processes of negotiation, contestation and bricolage' (ibid: 544) among social forces. Such character of the state makes it deeply embedded within society rather than an entity that exists outside the realm of society (ibid: 524). Therefore, one can argue that, instead of being an autonomous actor within society, the state is highly influenced by continuous negotiations among social forces. The processes of negotiation and contestation involve social forces at the local, national and international levels (ibid).

Jessop's (2008) 'strategic-relational approach' as well as Hagmann and Peclard's (2010) 'negotiating statehood' perspectives contribute to an advanced understanding of the state beyond its institutional features and functional role. The examination of politics among social forces and their capacity to influence the state goes beyond the statist view, which examines the state as a distinct institution. In a statist approach, the emphasis is on the specific features of the state that make it different from society. A relational approach on the contrary explains why states have certain dominant features by exploring its relations with social forces. The focus is thus mainly on the politics of the relations between the state and social forces and the implications of these relations on the nature and dynamic features of the state. For example, whilst explaining India's sustained economic growth, Atul Kohli contends that 'the embrace of state and business [during India's economic growth period] continues to grow warmer, leaving many others in the cold' (Kohli 2004: 285). Kohli's expression shows how the state can become selectively oriented toward certain social forces within society. It further demonstrates how certain social forces can have more influence on the practices of the state.

Building on the above-discussed distinction between statist and relational approaches, the following section explores the concept of developmental state. It will also explain the

relevance of the relational approach to better understand the politics of building a developmental state.

2.2.2 The Developmental State

The concept of developmental state evolved through time since it first emerged into the academic debate in the mid-1980s (White and Wade 1984). In his reflection about 'the odyssey" of the concept of the developmental state, Chalmers Johnson emphasised three key aspects that characterise the Japanese developmental state (1999). These are the unrelenting commitment of prioritising economic development, a political system in which bureaucrats are autonomous, competent and empowered and a state with the capacity of implementing 'market confirming' intervention (Johnson 1999). Despite being a valid and influential observation, Johnson's definition was criticised mainly for failing to identify the vital role of informal relations influencing the effectiveness of the seemingly ideal-type bureaucracy (Evans 1989). Indeed, developmental states need to deliver economic growth and development more successfully than other states to merit their characterisation. However, the 'how' aspect has been debated for a long time, with a number of scholars offering different explanations. .

Other influential scholars also defined developmental states by focusing on some key attributes. For example, Mkandawire (2001) argues that an '*ideology-structure nexus'* is a defining character that makes developmental states different. Vu (2007) on the other hand focuses on "developmental structures and developmental roles" as the two most essential attributes of developmental states. For Mkandawire, a developmental state is a state 'whose ideological underpinning is "developmentalist" [with the] "mission" of ensuring economic development … [and the] *capacity* to implement economic policies sagaciously and effectively' (2001: 290) [emphasis in the original]. One can see that Mkandawire's definition goes one step further than Johnson's definition by underscoring the importance of 'developmentalist ideology' whose effectiveness is measured on its capacity to establish 'ideological hegemony'.

Similar to Mkandawire, Vu (2007) also gives recognition to the salient role of 'developmental structure'. However, his definition does not stop at identifying the importance of the 'developmental structure' but also identifies 'developmental roles' as an essential component of his definition. He argues 'the two components – roles and structures –

are interdependent factors that *together* explain successful developmentalism' (ibid: 28 emphasis original). A heuristic synthesis of the two definitions by Mkandawire (2001) and Vu (2007) can identify three vital attributes of a developmental state which are 'developmental ideology', 'developmental structure' and 'developmental roles'.

Perhaps, one of the most important elements that is missing, or at least is not explicitly mentioned in the above definitions of developmental states, is the role of politics or political processes in developmental statism. Johnson talked about a 'political system' whereas Mkandawire refers to the building 'ideological hegemony'. Vu also mentioned the important role of building 'an alliance with producer classes' at the expense of 'workers and peasants' (2007: 29) in his characterisation of developmental structure. This proves that the definitions are not merely technocratic or apolitical. Indeed, the analysis that followed especially in Mkandawire (2001) and Vu (2007) demonstrates the salient role of political processes in developmentalism. Nevertheless, the key role of *politics* and its direct link to developmentalism is emphasised far less than the structures and ideology. Hence, the thesis adopts a definition of a developmental state promoted by Adrian Leftwich (2008), who defines developmental states as:

> [states whose] successful economic and social development performance illustrates how their *political purposes* and institutional structures (bureaucracies) have been developmentally driven, while their *developmental objectives* have been politically-driven (2008:12 emphasis added)

In this definition, Leftwich accentuated the direct link between politics and development. His explanation underscores that the success of developmental states in socio-economic spheres goes hand-in-hand with the political processes within the states. This means the processes of achieving rapid and sustainable growth in developmental states is hardly separable from the political processes of favouring certain social groups over others. The straightforward focus on the relationship between political purposes and developmental objectives makes the definition relevant to the central focus of the thesis, i.e., the politics of building a developmental state.

The definition of 'developmental state' that the thesis adopts offers a synthesised view of both statist and relational approaches to developmental states. From a statist point of view, Leftwich's definition underlines the vital role of political and economic structures, state

institutions, and bureaucracies. At the same time, the definition has a relational element that examines the political processes that shape how institutions interact with social forces and their developmental implications. This shows how the developmental success of states can also be examined not only by studying the structures and institutions of the state but also by analysing the political processes that shape the relations of state structures and institutions with social forces.

Furthermore, Leftwich argues that development is essentially about political processes among social forces to alter the 'use, production and distribution of resources' (Leftwich 2008: 10). When access and control over resources is changing, economic, social and political relations among social forces as well as between states and citizens also change inevitably (ibid). Furthermore, Leftwich defines politics as 'the processes of conflict, co-operation and negotiation … in the use, production and distribution of resources' (1996:17). Hence, the politics of building a developmental state can be examined in terms of the processes of conflict, co-operation and negotiation embedded within developmental statism. This thesis aims to examine how these processes of 'conflict, co-operation and negotiation' affect spaces of citizenship, the kinds of rights pursued and claimed within them and the strategies adopted by the state and young citizens.

As discussed in the previous section, the thesis identified two approaches for studying the state, which can also inform the study of developmental states. From a statist point of view, a developmental state is 'a self-contained entity separable from society and economy on the one hand, and from the external (the global) on the other hand' (Song 2013: 1255). Starting from Chalmers Johnson's (1982) pioneering work, various scholars analysed the success of developmental states by considering 'the state as a rational and unitary actor' (Underhill and Zhang 2005: 2). For statist scholars, a developmental state is a prudent actor that shapes the way social, economic and political forces operate within society to achieve rapid industrialisation and sustained economic growth (Amsden 1989; Haggard 1990; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999; Mkandawire 2001). The unorthodox economic and industrial policy that the state adopted (Amsden 1989; Haggard 1990), the institutional strength and effectiveness of 'governing the market' (Wade 1990) and the far-sighted and insulated state bureaucracy (Johnson 1982) are among the dominant features of statist explanations of developmental states. In a statist approach, a developmental state is a 'market-rational' actor that has the capacity to launch 'market-confirming' interventions to achieve rapid economic growth

(Johnson 1999: 39). In general, the statist paradigm ascribes the economic success of East Asian countries to the dominant character of the state to tame the interests of market forces and pursue long-term developmental objectives.

At a later stage, an 'insulated state bureaucracy', which was one of the key arguments of the statist perspective, has been challenged by new concepts such as 'embedded autonomy' (Evans 1995). The notion of 'embedded autonomy' argues about how links between state bureaucracy and private market agents contribute to developmental statism (ibid). Evans's conceptualisation of 'embedded autonomy' moves beyond the assumption that state and society function in a silo. He emphasises the developmental efficacy of the relationship between state institutions and business elites. Hence, similar to the seemingly rational role of the state, the vital role of social forces in influencing the state has become equally important to developmentalism (Kim 1993; Moon and Prasad 1994; Weiss 2003; Underhill and Zhang 2005).

The statist approach to the developmental state primarily focuses on formal institutions, rules and regulations in order to examine developmental effectiveness. It also portrays state institutions as neutral actors that seek to meet the interests of the wider society without favouring any particular social group (Song 2013: 1255). In this approach, developmentalism is mainly about the presence and absence of 'insulated' state institutions and their effectiveness in achieving development. With a lopsided focus on state institutions, the statist approach fails to recognise the vital role of political processes in shaping the emergence and character of state institutions. However, critics of the statist approach argue that political processes that shape state institutions need deeper analysis.

A relational approach to the developmental state offers an alternative perspective to the statist approach. A relational approach considers political processes as primary variables that significantly influence 'the contours and directions of economic development' and the character of the state (Underhill and Zhang 2005: 11). In this approach, state institutions and structures shape the interests of social, economic and political forces within society as much as these forces shape and constrain state institutions and structures. A relational approach thus goes beyond the assumptions that the economic success of developmental states is derived from rational state interventions or insulated and effective state bureaucracy. Instead, economic success is explained in terms of the 'complicated interplay of state power and social forces that underpins the transformation of industrial structures and financial markets'

(ibid: 11). The relations between state power and social forces also play a vital role in shaping how resources are distributed, access and controlled. The relational approach underlines that states are 'parts of societies' (Migdal 1994: 2), and hence, cannot be autonomous. Hence, the analytical task is mainly to examine and analyse the intertwined nature of states and other institutions of society rather than their separation from one another. In this way, one can deepen the understanding the role of states either in facilitating or impeding development.

A critical reflection on East Asian developmental states demonstrates that the state was hardly autonomous. Rather, the state pursued its intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives in close collaboration with business elites and industrialists. In South Korea, the case of *Chaebols* is an excellent manifestation of 'state-capital relations' in developmental statism (Kim 1993: 32). It shows the vital role of market forces in shaping the policymaking processes of developmental states (Underhill and Zhang 2005). Similarly, in Taiwan and Malaysia, market forces significantly shaped developmental policies and legal frameworks to their advantage (Chu 1999; Weiss 2000; Zhang 2002). These cases demonstrate the pivotal role that socio-economic and political processes can play in shaping the developmental decisions of the state. Hence, economic growth in East Asian economies was not the outcome of autonomous state institutions and structures *per se*. Rather, the notable economic growth and development was the negotiated product of political processes among social forces within society, mainly between industrial and business elites and state officials.

The politics of building a developmental state is mainly about examining the political processes that promote state-led co-operation and negotiations with certain social forces at the expense of other social forces. The thesis will further examine these political processes by identifying and analysing their implications for the rights of young people. The developmental state in particular shapes political and economic institutions in favour of industrialists and capitalist social forces (Chang 2013). At the same time, it can also discourage social forces that promote civil and political rights through its legal and policy frameworks (Dong 1986; Fuller and Pitts 1990; Kim 1997; Lee 2001; Burket and Hart-Landsberg 2003; Hagen Koo 2005; Park 2008). The South Korean state, for example, used various legal instruments to restrict, punish and criminalise labour and student movements (Lee 2001: 168; Burket and Hart-Landsberg 2003: 167; Hagen Koo 2005: 132-140; Gray

2008: 55-68; Park 2008: 75-108). Hence, the politics of developmentalism facilitated co-operation and negotiation between the state and business elites. On the contrary, it also nurtured conflict between the state and civil society, labour and student movements.

Statist scholars argue that 'weak labour' (Johnson 1985: 75; Amsden 1989: 147) and 'weak civil society' (Weiss and Hobson 1995: 164; Leftwich 2000: 163) are key attributes of developmental states. They demonstrate the 'autonomy' of the state from the pressures of interest groups within civil society. If one approaches the politics of developmentalism in its totality, both organised labour and civil society emerge as competing social forces against the state-led capital accumulation process. The 'market governing and 'rational intervention' aspects of the state cannot remain disconnected from its repressive actions against civil and political rights advocating groups. For example, legal instruments and the use of physical violence are seen as political instruments that the state used to facilitate capital accumulation by industrialists that are justified by the economic growth. Hence, as the relational approach argues, the weakening of civil society does not entail the autonomy of the state. Rather it is a vital component of the state-led capital accumulation process where the state uses its policy and legal frameworks to favour some social forces at the expense of others (Chang 2013).

Here, it is also worth noting that East Asian developmental states had also a disciplining character toward capitalists. As is argued by Amsden (1989), Wade (1990) and Davis (2004), the rapid economic growth of East Asian states can also be attributed to the 'state's regulatory actions vis-à-vis industrial firms' (Davis 2004: 5). The developmental objectives of the state drove the regulatory schemes by setting performance standards for the industrialists. However, the role of the state in disciplining industrialists is different from its role against labour and civil society. In the earlier case, the state's relation with the industrialists is mainly toward boosting economic growth and accumulation. In the latter case, the state's role involves keeping civil and political rights advocates from disrupting the rapid economic growth process.

The thesis found the relational approach to understanding developmental states suitable for two reasons. First, it helps to identify vital relations among key actors within society that ultimately shape developmental pathways. Examining the relations among social forces is an essential step to analysing 'the complex world of politics and power relations' (Hickey 2013:

5) that shape how developmental states emerge and function.[6] A thorough investigation of power relations and interests among social forces thus leads to a more nuanced understanding of the democracy-development nexus. Second, a relational approach allows identifying whether the relations of a developmental state with young citizens that are contributing to its political purposes and developmental objectives vary from its relations with young citizens that are opposing it. The relational approach also enables one to trace which group of young citizens are willing to trade-off their rights or reject prioritisation of rights within the context of developmental statism. By doing so, the thesis will also examine how the corresponding spaces of citizenship, the elements of rights contested and the strategies deployed by the state and young citizens vary accordingly.

As argued in the previous chapter, the thesis uses the debate on the democracy-development nexus as the broader framework. The East Asian developmental states demonstrate the case for authoritarian developmental statism rather than democratic developmental statism (Leftwich 1996; Lee 2001; Burket and Hart-Landsberg 2003; Park 2008; Chang 2013). The following sub-section examines the possibilities of democratic developmentalism and the political processes that can accommodate both the purposes of democracy and development.

2.2.3 A Democratic Developmental State

As discussed earlier, the authoritarian nature of the state played a meaningful role in the East Asian developmental states. However, authoritarian developmentalism did not prevail without a challenge. There were sustained movements of resistance, particularly by organised labour movements, especially in South Korea, that persistently put pressure on the state for democratic reform (Kim 1997; Lee 2001; Burket and Hart-Landsberg 2003; Park 2008). The push for reform by civil society, student and labour movements amidst rapid economic growth shows the contradiction within the democracy-development nexus between such groups and the rapid economic growth benefiting the business and industrial elites. Leftwich further argued that citizens' initiatives to pursue civil and political rights were 'swiftly neutralised, penetrated or incorporated as part of the ruling party' (1996: 288). Such kinds of repressive actions by the authoritarian developmental regimes favoured the business and industrial elites. Particularly the industrialists benefited immensely from the actions of the authoritarian regimes because it crippled labour movements (Chang 2013).

[6]Concepts such as 'developmental patrimonialism' (Kelsall and Booth 2010; and 'political settlement' (Khan 2005, 2010; Park and Cole 2010; di John and Putzel 2010) also use relational approach.

Leftwich offered a model of the democratic developmental state that can accommodate the contradiction between democracy and development.[7] In his model, he underscored the salient role that both formal[8] and informal institutions play in democratic consolidation (Leftwich 1998: 57-60). He approached the processes of democratisation beyond setting up formal institutions that mark democratic transitions. Leftwich's approach also recognised the vital role of informal institutions that shape political processes in terms of facilitating intra elite negotiations and relations between elites and citizens (ibid). In the context of developmental statism, Leftwich's model attempts to give a solution to the contradiction between democracy and development. He suggested an institutional arrangement where the interests of industrial and business elite can be pursued without necessarily crushing the demands of civil society and labour movements.

Leftwich's model of democratic developmental state places more emphasis on the role of informal institutions. Informal institutions are 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels' (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). Informal institutions play an important role in either enabling or constraining the ways in which formal institutions function. Leftwich underscores that whilst democratic transition is primarily a function of putting in place formal institutions, democratic consolidation is mainly about making informal institutions work in favour of democratic ideals. Informal institutions contribute to democratic consolidation when they influence processes of democratic contestations where, '*the winner is not winning everything'*; '*the loser is not losing everything*' and the winner is committed to '*policy restraint*' (Leftwich 1998: 67-60; 2005: 696-697).

The democratic developmental state that Leftwich proposed aims to address the institutional incompatibility between the mainstream notion of democracy (liberal democracy) and transformational development. Liberal democracy is, in principle, 'consensual, conservative

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[7] Gordon White (1998) also promoted a model of the democratic developmental state from a different point of view. For White, substantive democracy is an essential component of democratic developmentalism, where both civil society and political society compete in a democratic space to shape the nature of the state. The study opts for adopting Leftwich's model because it is based on historical and empirical reflection rather than White's model, which sets more of a normative framework.

[8] The formal institutions of democracy according to Leftwich (2005) are: (1) a competitive (and multiparty) political system; (2) universal adult suffrage for all citizens; (3) regularly contested, free and fair elections with secret ballots; and (4) effective public access by political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning.

and incremental' in effecting change (Leftwich 2005: 699). It also involves putting in place formal institutions of democracy such as the three arms of government, credible electoral processes and an enabling environment for the media and civil society. This can lead to a political and legal context to pursue the civil and political rights of citizenship.

However, development that seeks to address structural inequalities requires radical political processes which might not give room for consensus and inclusiveness. Developmentalism that aims to address the deep-seated causes of poverty and inequality needs political intervention that alters the ownership, production, control and redistribution of resources. Such a kind of developmental endeavour can hardly be pursued through formal institutions that are designed for gradual consensus making. The demands of labour and civil society within East Asian authoritarian developmental states were a question of inclusiveness. By claiming civil and political rights, citizens were demanding their fair say in the development process. However, conceding to these demands could have compromised the rapid economic growth agenda and the process of state-led capital accumulation. As argued by scholars of democratisation, capitalists have a strong tendency to reject political processes that give more votes and power to labour (Rueschemeyer *et al*. 1992). Hence, the response from a developmentalist regime that favours capitalist accumulation at the expense of labour is inevitably that of repression.

Leftwich's model offers a solution to this contradiction by allowing the competing social forces to make a pact through informal institutions. His model advocates for a 'procedural democracy' under a 'dominant party' which will ensure minimum disruption to the capital accumulation processes (Leftwich 1996: 64-70 and 290-91). The case of Botswana, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore are examples where Leftwich's model of democratic developmentalism succeeded. He argued that the limitations on civil and political rights of citizens were the unavoidable price worth paying for the sake achieving developmentalism.

It is also worth noting the culture of organised civil and labour movement in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. The repressive and authoritarian regimes had been under continuous challenge by organised labour and civil society movements for decades (Lee 2001; 168; Burket and Hart-Landsberg 2003: 167; Hagen Koo 2005: 132-140). One needs to take into consideration the impact of these movements in influencing, either directly or indirectly, the way both formal and informal institutions function to accommodate competing purposes of liberal democracy and developmentalism.

In conclusion, examining the politics of developmentalism requires a thorough examination of the political processes and the way in which social forces interact with the state institutions as well as amongst themselves. This section on the developmental state demonstrated the relevance of the relational approach to providing an analytically nuanced understanding of the politics of developmental statism. In the following section, a focus on citizenship will further elaborate the focus of the research inquiry by linking how the state-led development process affects the ways in which citizens pursue and claim their rights.

2.3 Conceptualising Citizenship

This section conceptualizes the process of citizenship by focusing on three inter-related aspects of citizenship: citizenship rights, spaces of citizenship and strategies of citizenship. By using these three aspects of citizenship, the thesis attempts to identify the kinds of citizenship rights that urban youth are pursuing and claiming, the spaces in which these rights are pursued and claimed and the strategies that both the state and young citizens are adopting. Understanding the dynamics of citizenship through rights, spaces and strategies allows the study to examine the process through which the politics of developmental statism affects the citizenship of urban youth, the kinds of trade-offs involved in this process and ultimately the implications of the process on state-youth relations and the developmental objectives of the state. The thesis also aims to make a theoretical contribution to the conceptualization of citizenship by adopting a process-oriented and relational approach to citizenship with three key components namely, rights, spaces and strategies.

Broadly speaking, the concept of citizenship has been primarily examined within two philosophical perspectives. These are the liberal and republican perspectives. The conception of citizenship in liberalism emphasizes citizenship 'status' whereas republicanism is focused on 'practices' (Oldfield 1990: 177; Petit 1993: 162). These two philosophical views approach relations among citizens as well as between citizens and the polity from different perspectives. On the one hand, liberalism focuses on the importance of contract-based relations among individuals who are 'sovereign and morally autonomous beings' (Oldfield 1990: 178). On the other hand, republicanism underscores 'shared commitment [for citizenship] practices' among individuals, which is the basis for 'social solidarity and cohesion' (ibid). This thesis finds the notion of citizenship based on 'practices' relevant for two inter-related reasons.

Firstly, conceiving citizenship only as a status has profound analytical limitations. The social, economic and political contexts that contribute to the realisation of citizenship status can hardly remain invisible. As Oldfield argues, '"private citizen" is an oxymoron' (ibid: 181). The full meaning of citizenship is materialized only if individuals with rights are conceived within a broader context where they pursue and exercise rights. The broader context in turn includes duties and obligations, which means that an examination of practices is necessary to understand citizenship. Faulks further argues that citizenship is 'inherently relational idea' and 'always reciprocal and, therefore, social idea' (Faulks 2000).

Secondly, defining citizenship based on 'practices' allows giving sufficient attention to contexts and their role in shaping how citizens pursue and claim rights. The liberal notion of citizenship tends to over-emphasize individual autonomy to the extent of not recognising structural inequalities (Dietz 1987; Faulks 2000). Structural inequalities (based on gender, class, age, race, etc.) among citizens have direct impact on the capacity of individual citizens to exercise their rights. Unless the impact of contextual factors on citizenship rights is well-examined, one can hardly understand and analyse citizens' capacity to manoeuvre in order to claim their rights. It is by emphasising the capacity of citizens to negotiate for their rights in different contexts that the thesis builds its conceptualisation of the process of citizenship. The notion of citizenship as a 'passive status' (Turner 1993) hardly fits with a conceptualisation that involves joining invited or created spaces or the adoption of strategies to claim rights.

Furthermore, it is also imperative to recognise the role of social markers such as ethnicity and religion on citizenship. These socially constructed categories can be used as a basis for political mobilisation and organisation; for example to exercise or claim rights. Claude Ake for example underscored that African states are constituted of multiple 'nationalities, sub-nationalities, ethnic groups and communities' (Ake 1996: 132). Hence, any effort to study the dynamics of citizenship processes needs to recognise these diversities and their implications on state-society relations in general and on rights and obligations of specific ethic groups in particular.

The relational and process-oriented conceptualisation of citizenship the thesis proposes has three inter-related aspects. These are rights, spaces and strategies. The following sections elaborate on each aspects of citizenship.

2.3.1 Citizenship Rights

Whilst recognising the limitations of the liberal notion of citizenship, the study finds T.H Marshall's identification of the elements of citizenship relevant. Marshall conceived citizenship in terms of the evolutionary expansion of rights (1950). These are civil, political and social rights of citizenship. In his seminal work, *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950), Marshall delineated the progress from civil rights to political rights and, later on, to social rights with a particular focus on English society (ibid: 8). Civil rights constitute freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to justice and the right to own property (ibid). Political rights, on the other hand, include the right of citizens to exercise political power such as by voting and by establishing associations. Finally, Marshall associated social rights with the socioeconomic wellbeing of citizens (ibid).

Marshall's conceptualisation of citizenship received both endorsement and strong criticisms. On the one hand, based on his teleological approach to rights, some argued that civil and political rights are the means to social rights (Mishra 1981). Some also argued that institutionalisation of social citizenship is the final stage of citizenship (van Steenbergen 1996). On the other hand, Marshall's sequential order of realising citizenship rights is refuted substantially by empirical evidence (Turner 1990: 193-194; 1993: 7-9). For example, there are cases where citizens prioritise and successfully claim social and cultural rights without necessarily realising civil and political rights (Murphy and Fong 2006). Furthermore, Turner also argued for the inclusion of economic rights as additional elements of citizenship rights in addition to the three elements argued by Marshall (Turner 1993).

The thesis recognizes Marshall's contribution to the theory of citizenship by adopting the citizenship rights he identified. The thesis also takes into consideration the substantive criticisms of his theorisation. However, having clearly-identified elements of citizenship rights significantly contributes to understanding how the politics of developmental statism affects the citizenship of urban youth. This is because variations in citizenship rights are associated with differences in the specific processes of claiming the rights, the spaces in which rights are contested and the strategies deployed in claiming them. Furthermore, the thesis also agrees with the additional element of rights that Turner (1993) suggested. Hence, the focus of the thesis is on civil, political, social and economic rights.

In addition to identifying the four elements of rights, the thesis also underscores the role of context in shaping the process through which these rights are contested. The relations that citizens have with members of the community they belong to influence which kinds of rights they are pursuing or claiming. By adopting a relational approach, the thesis attempts to explore how different contexts influence the capacity of citizens to pursue, claim and realise their rights in various settings. Furthermore, a relational approach also provides the ability to discern dynamic social, economic and political processes within society and their impact on citizenship rights. In a relational approach, citizenship

> is conceptualised more than a set of political rights granted by the state; ….it encompasses the economic, social and political relationships between social groups and structures of power that mediate the standing of individuals in the polity (Staeheli 1994: 850).

Staeheli's definition underscores the salient role of socio-economic and political relations in influencing citizens' position within society in relation to the state. If citizens' 'standing' in relation to the state is shaped by socio-economic and political relations, their strategies of claiming rights can hardly remain unaffected. Such kind of relational understanding of citizenship implicitly recognises that citizenship practices are barely predetermined. Instead, as Dietz (1987:1) argued, 'context is all'. This means that citizenship is far more than contract-based relations among autonomous individuals, as liberals would have us believe. Citizenship is rather, heavily 'modified by context and social identity' (Staeheli 1994: 851). The relational understanding of citizenship recognizes the capacity of citizens to reposition themselves 'away from the state [whenever deemed necessary] ... toward capital and community' (ibid: 868). Citizens' capacity to manoeuvre on the contours of socio-economic and political relations to realise citizenship rights is heavily context dependent.

A relational approach to citizenship helps to examine citizenship beyond the formal institutionalisation of rights. This is because the capacity to pursue and claim citizenship is not only about the formal institutionalisation and codification of rights. Rather, citizenship is also about the context and the social position of citizens which may either facilitate or hinder the efforts of claiming formally recognised rights. For example, a constitution may serve as a social contract between a state and citizens to guarantee civil, political, social and economic rights. However, the context within which citizens actually live may require them to undertake self-consciously designed practices to realise these formally enshrined rights.

McEwan, for example, demonstrates the limitations of transforming constitutionally guaranteed gender rights into the spheres of community, workplace and family (McEwan 2000). This shows that the formal institutionalisation of citizenship rights does not necessarily guarantee the fulfilment of these rights. Hence, it is imperative to explore and understand citizens' capacity to claim and negotiate their institutionalized rights.

Whilst adopting the relational approach to the understanding of citizenship, the thesis also recognizes alternative approaches to citizenship that have different points of emphasis. Isin and Nielsen (2008), for example, focus on 'acts of citizenship' emphasizing the 'act' rather than the actor. In this conceptualisation of citizenship, the emphasis is on active citizenship and the 'acts of claim making' (Muller 2016: 50). Furthermore, Naila Kabeer (2005) also broadens the concept of citizenship to include the relations between citizens as well as between a citizen and a community. Such conceptualisation of citizenship allows one to make a distinction between 'vertical' and 'horizontal' views of citizenship (ibid: 23). On the one hand, the vertical view focuses on the relationship between states and citizens mediated through rights. On the other hand, the other equally important aspect of citizenship is the horizontal relationship among citizens demonstrated through 'collective acts of citizens' and 'solidarity' (ibid).

Both contributions, i.e. the conceptualisation of active citizenship as well as the distinction between horizontal/vertical citizenship; have further consolidated the inherently relational nature of citizenship. The 'acts of claim making' can hardly materialise without establishing the relational context within which these rights are claimed through active citizenship. Likewise, both horizontal and vertical views of citizenship offer an additional level of analysis that further stresses the relational nature of citizenship. Hence, the thesis found both conceptualisations of citizenship complementary to the adopted approach in this study.

This thesis concurs with the notion that citizenship is an outcome of dynamic processes of negotiation and contestation between the state and citizens. These dynamic features of citizenship are constructed and re-constructed based on the contexts or spaces within which citizenship rights are contested (Staeheli 1994; Stasiulis and Bakan 1997; McEwan 2000). Having adopted relational understanding of citizenship, the study aims to capture not only the dynamic features of citizenship, but also the 'complex and often contradictory experiences of citizenship' (Kurtz and Hankins 2005: 3). One way of capturing the complex experiences of citizenship is by locating and analysing the spatiotemporal spheres within which they are

occurring. As argued by Kurtz and Hankins, there are ‘multiple (and overlapping) geographical scales’ (ibid: 6) within which citizenship practices are taking place. The following sub-section will further elaborate this by introducing the second aspect of conceptualising citizenship as a process, i.e., spaces of citizenship.

2.3.2 Spaces of Citizenship

Citizenship as a process of contestation for rights has a spatio-temporal manifestation. The above-mentioned relational understanding of citizenship such as ‘restructuring of citizenship’ (Staeheli 1994), ‘negotiating citizenship’ (Stasiulis and Bakan 1997) or ‘constant contestations’ (McEwan 2000) are acts situated within spaces. French sociologist Henri Lefebvre defines ‘space’ as follows:

> Space is a social product … it is not simply “there”, a neutral container waiting to be filled, but is a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control and hence of domination, of power (Lefebvre 1991: 24).

Spaces are constituted by actors that have socio-economic and political interests and interact with each other both in a formal and informal manner. Spaces have both material and symbolic dimensions. It is imperative to note that spaces are hardly neutral grounds of relation. Access to spaces is inherently a political process, which involves power relations. Political element of spaces is inextricably linked with factors that contribute to their emergence (Cornwall 2002; Gaventa 2006; Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Hagmann and Peclard 2010).

A critical question about the emergence of spaces needs to include “*who* enters these spaces, on *whose* terms and with *what* ‘epistemic authority’” (Cornwall and Coelho 2007: 5). This allows transcending the normative assumption about spaces and their role in influencing citizenship rights. For example, the good governance discourse introduced ‘participatory development’ as an innovative way of ensuring citizens’ rights to effectively participate in development. The underlining assumption is that institutionalised spaces participation can ensure ‘inclusion’ and enhance citizens’ capacity to claim rights effectively. However, there are also possibilities where these spaces of participation limit or restrict citizens’ capacity of claiming rights. In some cases citizens are primarily considered as ‘users’, ‘beneficiaries’, ‘consumers’ and ‘customers’ especially in a context where the emergence of spaces is

associated with shrinking state (Chandoke 2003: Cornwal and Gaventa 2001; Dagnino 2005). Hence, the central role of rights become side-lined and citizens' relation with the duty bearers will become based on the availability of opportunities either for 'users' or 'beneficiaries'.

In this study context, two factors are considered relevant for the emergence of spaces. On the one hand, the political and developmental decisions of a developmental state can lay the foundation for the emergence of spaces. On the other hand, citizens' aspiration to rights can also become reasons for the emergence of spaces. After the emergence of spaces, how they are accessed, shaped or changed and their role in facilitating citizenship relations depends upon the power relations among those that are interacting within the spaces (ibid).

The study adopts categorisation of spaces conceptualized by Andrea Cornwall (2002) and John Gaventa (2006). These are *invited, created* and *claimed spaces.* This conceptualisation of spaces helps to critically examine origin of spaces, how the state and citizens contribute to their emergence, the relations between states and citizens within spaces, the kinds of rights contested within spaces and also the relationship between spaces. The thesis conceives 'inviting', 'creating' and 'claiming' spaces as acts of exercising power. Such conceptualisation of spaces of citizenship gives the thesis further analytical depth to explore the relational and process-oriented understanding of citizenship. By doing do, the thesis will examine how the politics of building a developmental state affects how spaces of citizenship emerge, how young citizens pursue and claim rights within them and the strategies that both the state and citizens deploy to pursue their interests within spaces. The thesis defines the three kinds of spaces of citizenship as follows:

- *Invited spaces* are spaces 'into which people (as users, as citizens, as beneficiaries) are invited to participate by various kinds of authorities [such as] the government' (Cornwall 2002: 17). The essential feature of invited spaces is their emergence, which is tied to an actor other than the citizens themselves. These invited spaces can be 'fleeting one-off consultative events; [or…] regularized institutions with a more durable presence on the governance landscape' (Cornwall and Coelho 2007: 1).
- *Created spaces* on the other hand, come into existence 'more organically out of sets of common concerns or identifications … [by] like-minded [citizens] in common pursuit. These may be "sites of radical possibility" where those who are excluded find a place and voice' (Cornwall 2002: 17). In Cornwall's definition, the key feature of

created spaces is that they are 'constituted by participants *themselves* rather than created for the participation of *others*' [emphasis in the original].

- *Claimed Spaces*: Gaventa defines claimed spaces as 'spaces which are claimed by less powerful actors from or against the power holders (Gaventa 2006: 27). The notion of claiming inherently involves an attempt to exercise power. Claimed spaces can serve as a buffer zone between invited spaces that are mainly dominated by authorities and created spaces that are primarily initiated by citizens. If seen from a citizen's perspective, claiming spaces means altering the purpose that an invited space is originally intending to serve toward the interest and priorities of citizens.

Spaces come into existence essentially as a manifestation of power relations among social forces. Gramsci's notion of power provides a helpful perspective here. Gramsci challenges the assumption of power as 'domination [or] … taking over an apparatus'. Instead, Gramsci defines power in terms of 'transforming social relations as a whole' [with the purpose of achieving] 'social, moral and intellectual' (Clarke et.al 2014: 31) dominance. Power is deeply embedded within social relations. Such a conception of power helps to identify multiple locations and forms of power relations among heterogeneous actors. Power is exercised when spaces are shaped and framed to meet the interests of those who initiated them as well as when access to the spaces of citizenship is either granted or denied (Cornwall and Coelho 2007). Citizens may also challenge existing power relations if they can see spaces as arenas of possibilities where they can potentially transform their role from passive to proactive actors (ibid). As Cornwall argues, the exercise of power plays a crucial role in defining purpose of spaces, rules of relations, accessibility and boundaries of the spaces (Cornwall 2002: 8-10).

Spaces may become spheres of contestation when they fail to serve the interest of their initiators. One example in this regard can be how authoritarian regimes in Hungary and Taiwan lured young people into their system to boost their legitimacy. At a later stage, the same young people become proponents of democratic reform from within in the respective regimes (O'Neil 1996: 585; Dickson 2001: 529). Spaces can emerge to achieve a certain purpose, but actors performing within these spaces can exercise their agency to pursue completely different, sometimes opposite agendas (Cornwall 2002: 9). Changed purposes may contribute to outcomes that are opposite to the original intentions of the spaces.

Whenever actors within a certain space act to change the purpose it is serving, they are exercising power within the boundaries of the space. The capacity of exercising power within spaces is equally important as creating the spaces in shaping the processes and outcomes of citizenship relations. As it will be illustrated in the empirical chapters, both invited and created spaces of citizenship initiated by the state and young citizens respectively may become spheres of contestation when the original agenda they sought to pursue is changed. Young citizens may attempt to alter the purposes of invited spaces. Likewise, the state may also deliberately attempt to control a created space to change the kinds of rights pursued in that particular created space.

Spaces of citizenship relations do not exist in a vacuum. They are, instead, involved in constant and dynamic relations. The dynamic relation between invited, claimed and created spaces may also give citizens the advantage to manoeuvre between spaces. Furthermore, the 'dynamic relationship' between spaces can also initiate continuous 'opening and closing through struggles for legitimacy and resistance, co-optation and transformation' (Gaventa 2006: 27). There can be relations between spaces of citizenship through transferable skills and experiences of claiming citizenship rights. As argued by Gaventa, 'power going in one space, through new skills, capacity and experiences, can be used to enter and affect other spaces' or create new spaces (ibid). In order to elaborate the functional role of spaces of citizenship, the following sub-section will explain possible practices and strategies that the study is focusing on to understand state-citizen relations.

2.3.3 Strategies of Citizenship

Context is one of the crucial factors that shape how citizens pursue citizenship rights, the emergence of spaces and the purpose they serve. As Faulks (2000) argued, citizenship is essentially context dependent and reflects the kind of relationship and governance between states and citizens. Context matters significantly because the social position of citizens is equally important, either in facilitating or constraining the fulfilment of rights as the formal codification of rights. Varying contexts require both the state and citizens to deploy different strategies so that they influence the processes through which rights are pursued and claimed. This section focuses on strategies that both the state and citizens adopt in order to pursue their interests within spaces of citizenship. As discussed earlier, the two crucial elements influencing the strategies of a developmental state are the intertwined political purposes and

developmental objectives. Furthermore, as it will be discussed in Section 2.4, the two attributes that influence young citizens' strategies are their position as an age group and their transitional status. The thesis identifies the following four strategies relevant to examine how the politics of building a developmental state affects the citizenship of urban youth. The primary purpose of these strategies is to enable either the state or citizens to pursue their interests whilst rights are contested. The strategies are *co-operation, co-optation, resistance and repression.*

a) Co-operation

States and citizens may both adopt co-operation as a strategy in order to pursue mutually overlapping interests. From the state's perspective, the driving factor for a co-operation strategy is winning the acquiescence of citizens toward its political purposes and developmental objectives. Particularly in a context of authoritarian developmental statism, co-operation strategy becomes vital because of the tendency to derive legitimacy from high rates of economic growth (Castells 1992; Mkandawire 2001). Hence, the state co-operates with citizens by creating economic opportunities and political platforms that correspond to its political purposes. One of the political purposes that authoritarian regimes pursue through co-operation is creating a new political base or reviving links with existing allies by meeting their socio-economic and political demands without necessarily compromising their political power (Dickson 2001).

From the citizens' perspective, co-operation is a strategy of pursuing citizenship rights within the socio-economic development programs initiated by the state. Hence, the citizens' interests may align with those of the state. Once can clearly identify an element of reciprocity within co-operation strategy. Citizens may even take their own initiative to join state initiatives and pursue their rights, which in turn contributes to the aim of the state to derive legitimacy and also inclusiveness from its programs. However, co-operation is not the only strategy that both states and citizens can adopt. There are also contexts where citizens might be pressured to prioritise rights and states have the capacity to influence citizens to trade-off their rights, thus leading to co-optation.

b) Co-optation

Co-optation is a citizenship strategy based on unequal relationships between the state and citizens where the state has relatively more power in shaping citizens' decisions to pursue their rights. The relation between citizens and the political elite primarily involves foregoing civil and political rights for the purpose of gaining better opportunities to claim social and economic rights as a reward (Gerschewski 2013). The state adopts co-optation strategies in order to reduce political challenges coming from citizens by rewarding citizens' acquiescence and consent. Furthermore, Shleifer and Treisman (2000: 8) argue that co-optation occurs when a social group or citizens are 'persuaded not to exercise [their] power to obstruct' the political purposes of the state and are rewarded with resources for their compliance. The terms of relations within co-optation mainly favours the political interests of the state. Barraclough (1985:308) similarly argues about the efficacy of co-optation for states in terms of thwarting potential danger.

In contrast to co-operation, co-optation is a strategy that essentially involves a trade-off. Depending on the context, citizens may consciously decide to be co-opted in order to pursue certain elements of citizenship rights. Particularly in authoritarian regimes, citizens may decide to forego civil and political rights in order to realise economic and social rights (Gold 1991; Cherrington 1997; Hooper 2007). In other contexts, getting closer to the corridors of power through co-optation may also create an opportunity to influence power at a later stage. Studies have shown that young people who were co-opted to join authoritarian regimes in Hungary and Taiwan became forces of reform from within at a later stage (O'Neil 1996; Dickson 2001).

Both strategies of co-operation and co-optation are not entirely dependent on transactional and material based relations between state and citizens. Ideas that communicate the essential attributes of 'a good citizen' also play an indispensable role in state-citizen relations. As argued by Schmidt (2011: 49), ideas have the power to influence both policy and practice by setting 'cognitive or normative' frameworks. Hence, states that seek to actively use strategies of co-operation and co-optation invest heavily in 'communicating' ideas that resonate with their developmental objectives and political purposes. The channels of communication can be policy documents where they frame the 'ideal type of citizen' through their discourses, framings and narratives as well as through media channels that influence the public sphere. Hence, whilst examining the material and economic benefits that are relatively more visible

in co-operation and co-optation strategies, the thesis will also highlight the ideational elements that lay the foundations for these strategies.

Furthermore, it is important to note the following two points whilst distinguishing co-operation from co-optation. First, in a co-operation strategy, there is a clearly demonstrated element of reciprocity. Citizens pursue their rights without foregoing their civil and political rights. However in a co-optation strategy, there is a clearly demonstrated element of trade-off: citizens' capacity to pursue and claim social and economic rights is conditional to the extent to which they surrender their civil and political rights. Second, the occurrence of co-operation and co-optation as strategies of citizenship is heavily influenced by context. Hence, as the context in which the state-citizen relations are occurring is changing, the strategies may also change. Instead of making a categorical distinction between co-operation and co-optation, the thesis approaches these two strategies as two ends of a continuum. However, state-citizen relations are not only of co-operation and co-optation but also repression and resistance, which can be distinguished categorically.

c) Repression

Repression is a strategy used by authoritarian regimes when co-operation and co-optation fail to deliver the required level of acquiescence legitimacy (Levitsky and Way 2002). Repression is:

> the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organisation … for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target [and] deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions (Davenport 2007: 2).

Repression is the use of state power to supress citizenship rights, particularly civil and political rights. State repression may target both individuals and organisations at different levels. Gerschewski (2013) identifies two kinds of repression, namely: 'high intensity' and 'low intensity' repression. High intensity repression, Gerschewski argues, may target 'well-known opposition leaders', a large group of people with 'concrete measures' including the '(violent) repression of mass demonstrations, (violent) campaigns against parties and … imprisonment of opposition leaders' (ibid: 21). Low intensity repression may target 'groups of minor importance' usually in a 'less visible' and subtle manner. Actual actions can include

'the use of (formal and informal) surveillance apparatus, low intensity physical harassment and intimidation' (ibid: 21). Gerschewski (2013) also includes the non-physical coercion of citizens such as the denial of jobs and education opportunities as well as restrictions on civil and political rights as elements of low intensity repression. One of the possible responses to repressive strategies of the state is resistance. The following section will further elaborate what constitutes a resistance strategy.

d) Resistance

Resistance is a vital element of state-citizen relations particularly in a context where state co-optation and repression are prevalent. The study defines resistance as an 'intentional act' (Scott 1986) by citizens who 'refuse to exit from the social and political stage' (Bayat 2010: ix) which is dominated by a repressive state. Resistance can be either violent or non-violent. The notion of resistance the thesis focuses on is a non-violent form of resistance.[9] Hence, any form of armed resistance that involves active violence against state officials or institutions is outside the scope of this study. Rather, the thesis focuses on individual and collective forms of resistance by citizens whilst claiming citizenship rights that have been curtailed or denied by the repressive strategies of the state.

The thesis builds a heuristic conceptualisation of citizenship that constitutes the three aspects discussed above. Hence, citizenship is a context-dependent process of contestation for rights by citizens against the state within spaces of citizenship. The varying contexts demand the adoption of different strategies both by the state and by citizens in order to influence the process of claiming rights. The thesis has already discussed how the state influences the context within which the process of citizenship is occurring through its developmentalist orientation. The following section will further elaborate on how young citizens enter into the context of contesting citizenship rights. In doing so, the following section identifies two key attributes, namely the social status of young people as an 'age group' and a 'transitional stage' of growing up.

[9] More specifically, the research focuses on young citizens in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia that are pursuing their rights either through legally registered organizations or informal groups that are dedicated to non-violent forms of citizenship engagement. This does not necessarily mean that violent forms of citizenship engagement (resistance) are non-existent either in Addis Ababa in particular or in Ethiopia in general.

2.4 Conceptualising Youth

This section conceptualises youth by defining their social status as an 'age group' and a 'transitional stage' into adulthood. Critical examination of these two attributes helps the thesis to have an empirically-grounded perspective toward understanding how the politics of building a developmental state affects citizenship in general and the citizenship of urban youth in particular.

2.4.1 Youth as an age group

Age is an essential feature that affects young people's citizenship (Allen 1968; Mizen 2002). Age is a natural phenomenon. However, social, cultural, economic and political contexts also have significant influence in shaping meanings attached to age. The state is one of the key players in defining 'age statuses' and categorising youth as a 'discrete and distinctive social category' (Mizen 2002: 6). Such categorisations justify the ways in which social institutions and practices construct the youth-hood that young people experience (Allen 1968; Wyn and White 1997; Mizen 2002). Mizen (2002: 6) further argues that:

> youth is most fundamentally a question of state and age … age [is] the primary basis on which the state relates to young people, rather than their gender, ethnicity or sexuality for instance, and that the value of age in youth to the activities of the state remains undiminished.

Some of the most common manifestations of the key role that age plays in shaping young people's citizenship include voting age, compulsory national service, eligibility for minimum age, running for office, accessing state loans, etc. These areas evidently show that the biological age of young people influences their access to citizenship rights. Implementation of socioeconomic policies that resonate with political and developmental objectives of the state can have impacts on young peoples' rights mainly because of their age. For example, policies that advocate free higher education and full employment directly affect young peoples' capacity to claim economic and social rights (Mizen 2002). This shows that age-based entitlements and rights are linked to dominant political and developmental orientations within the state.

A population that is significantly dominated by growing youth population can be both a developmental challenge and an opportunity. For example, developmental states shape the political processes, institutions, and policy frameworks that enable the effective utilisation of human resources that a youth bulge provides (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom et al. 1999; Letee and Alam 1999). Arguments around reaping the 'demographic dividend' revolve around generating economic growth by enhancing the productivity of a certain age group, i.e., youth.

East Asian developmental states have also restricted the civil and political rights of young people whilst pursuing their developmentalist agendas. These authoritarian regimes adopted repressive strategies against the organised activities of young people (Dong 1986; Fuller and Pitts 1990; Gold 1991; Cherrington 1997; Hooper 2007). Young people organised in student and labour movements experienced various forms of state-sponsored rights violations (Lee 2001; Park 2008). Hence it can be strongly argued that the developmental model of East Asian states promoted fulfilment of economic rights of young people at the expense of their civil and political rights.

However, being young does not only involve remaining within a particular age group. Rather, it is inevitably attached to growing up. Hence, in addition to age-based definitions of youth, the transitional status of becoming an adult also plays a role in shaping state-youth citizenship relations. The following section aims to explain this in further detail.

2.4.2 Youth as a transitional stage

The seemingly natural process of growing up occurs in a socio-economically and politically mediated context. This means how young citizens grow up into adulthood can affect how they claim and exercise their citizenship. Socially constructed categorisations of youth either as future potentials or as trouble makers (Abbink and Kessel 2005; Honwana and De Boek 2005) is inevitably attached with their processes of growing up. In these processes, the state plays a paramount role by setting up either enabling or constraining institutional and policy frameworks that affect young peoples' navigation into adulthood (Côté 2000; Sommers 2012). The signs and processes of reaching adulthood include school-to-work transition, economic independence, leaving the parental home, establishing a family and also exercising citizenship rights that are attached to a biological age. However, these processes are not

always easily achievable by many young people. There are plenty of contexts where the supposed transitions to adulthood are substantially compromised.

One way of explaining the processes of the youth-to-adulthood transition can be by examining its implications for the realisation of citizenship rights. For example, Lynne Chisolm noted a historical instance in Britain where segments of youth faced 'delayed, broken, highly fragmented and blocked transition' (1993: 30) because of high unemployment, educational failure and institutionalised discrimination. This was related to state policies and institutions that had a direct role in affecting youth transitions either positively or negatively.

Indeed, state policies do not only affect young peoples' transition but also their opportunities to pursue and access citizenship rights. For example, the implementation of structural adjustment programs by many African countries contributed to the precariousness of young peoples' processes of growing up (Caffentzis 2000; Abbink 2005; Konnings 2005). Significant manifestations of the negative impact included limited or no access to employment, education and health access, which are essential components of social and economic rights. In many cases, the failure and degeneration of the state system also led to civil war and protracted conflict that made young people both the victims and perpetrators of violence (Abbink and Kessel 2005; Honwana and De Boek 2005).

Such precarious socio-economic conditions, violent political crisis and institutional exclusions can also prolong the transitional period. This period of extended liminality makes young people vulnerable (Honwana 2012, 2013). Honwana adopts the concept of *waithood* to explain the extended processes of transition. Waithood is 'a prolonged period of suspension between childhood and adulthood' (Honwana 2013: 1). There is widely held perception that youth-hood is a short period of transition or a process of growing up; a transitional stage of becoming a full-fledged citizen and an independent member of a community. However, because of structural challenges, youth-hood can become a status in itself rather than a transitional stage (Honwana 2012, 2014; Sommers 2012).

The prolonged transitional status of young people or waithood has at least two implications on how young citizens pursue and claim rights. On the one hand, it can cause marginalisation and exclusion in the inter-related social, economic and political spheres. For example, Sommers (2012) explored how the waithood status of young people has affected social transition by constraining the opportunities of getting married and establishing a family. In

many contexts, leaving parental home and establishing a family is a significant threshold of social transition both for young men and women. One can also argue that the inability not to shorten ‘social waithood’ is related to marginalisation and exclusion in both economic and political spheres. However, on the other hand, the waithood position of young people can also trigger ingenuity among youth and the adoption of certain kinds of citizenship strategies to claim rights. Hence, waithood does not necessarily entail passiveness of completely constrained agency. Honwana argues that waithood induced marginalisation may create a fertile ground for ‘experimentation [and] improvisation’ (ibid: 24) of strategies of resistance. For example, young citizens who were politically marginalised used the opportunities of increased digital interconnectivity to launch popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (Herrera 2012; Honwana 2014).

Here, it is important to note that the experiences of waithood among youth are heavily influenced by gender relations. Both Honwana (2012) and Sommers (2012) highlighted that the experiences and challenges of both young male and young female as well as the remedies they apply vary considerably. For example, Honwana noted how the challenge of achieving socially acceptable status of adulthood altered and masculine and feminine identities. The economic vulnerability among young men precluded them from playing their perceived role as providers of material and financial support for their female partners (Honwana 2012; 102). Whilst as the same time, young females manoeuvred the contours of intimate relations with more than one person as a mechanism of securing material and financial benefit that could not be fulfilled by one man. In some cases, Honwana argues, female partners became sources of economic support in their relationship with men which entails the ‘reconfiguration’ of gender relations (ibid: 93-102).

Likewise, Sommers also elaborated on the gendered social markers for transitioning into adulthood in rural Rwanda (2012: 115-139). For young men, ‘building a house’ is unavoidable route of becoming a ‘full-fledged man’ whereas for young women, marriage is the socially acceptable and most respected marker of adulthood. Young men who are unable to build a house because of socio-economic difficulties face despair and lose recognition in their community. Such marginalised social position of young men also affects the transition of young women because the young men cannot marry without building their own houses. Such problem of transitioning into adulthood is further complicated by the legally and socially demarcated period of transition which is remarkably short for young women. Whilst

21 is the minimum age of marriage for both sexes, young women as young as 25 are considered as ‘old’ if they still remained single (ibid: 116). Sommers further expounded on the different routes that young men and women embark on to address their prolonged period of transition. He highlighted the key role of migration both to other rural areas (mainly by men) and to the city as a remedy to meet economic needs. For young men, low socio-economic status may remain the main sources of their marginalisation and exclusion. With regard to young women, the economic vulnerability may push them to socially ostracised life path such as prostitution or being ‘unwed mothers’ (ibid: 137). Furthermore, young citizens may also adopt different strategies that will help them address the uncertainties of waithood. These strategies may involve calculated decisions to be co-opted so that they trade-off civil and political rights to have better access to economic rights. For example, young people may forego civil and political rights in order to secure better access to social and economic opportunities. Particularly in a context where the state has a superior role in influencing access to resources and opportunities, prioritising rights can be a strategy of cutting short the waithood period (Gold 1991; Dickson 2001; Hopper 2007). Conversely, there can be also contexts where the inability of claiming and accessing citizenship rights prolongs the waithood period. A protracted period of waithood may change the meaning of youth from being a short period of transition to a permanent status. Sommers (2012) describes this prolonged period of waithood among youth in Rwanda youth as ‘stuck’, whereas Mains (2012) described the case of Ethiopian youth as ‘hope is cut’. These empirical cases challenge the normative understanding that youth is a brief transitional period to adulthood. Young people can, even in some cases, remain in a permanent status of deprivation, economic and political exclusion with severely restricted capacity to claim or practice citizenship rights.

In conclusion, both meanings attached to young people’s age and their transition to adulthood affect how they pursue and claim rights. The categorisation of youth based on age is the most common way through which states affect young people’s citizenship. Moreover, socio-economic and political processes also affect how young people grow up and become adult members of society. The socio-economic and political decisions within states also shape the transition into adulthood, which is directly related to youths’ capacity to pursue and claim rights.

After separately analysing the key concepts of the thesis, the following section presents the analytical framework. The main purpose of the framework is to serve as an analytical instrument for answering the overarching research question: *how does the politics of building a developmental state affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?* After presenting a description of the analytical framework which is followed by a diagram, the chapter concludes with a brief summary of the key arguments.

2.5 Analytical Framework

This section presents the analytical framework of the thesis based on the three key concepts: the developmental state, citizenship and youth. The purpose of the analytical framework is two-fold. First, it seeks to identify the gap in the literature and the contribution that the thesis seeks to make towards understanding the politics of building a developmental state and how it affects the citizenship of young people. Second, the analytical framework also seeks to answer the overarching question of the thesis: *how does the politics of building a developmental state affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?*

Certain themes and approaches appear quite frequently in the literature that analyses developmental states (Routley 2012). These include historical analysis on the emergence of developmental states (Johnson 1982; Amsden 2004; Doner *et.al.* 2005) state and business relations (Wade 1990; Underhill and Zhang 2005; Leftwich and Sen 2010; Nattrass and Seekings 2010), public policy and democracy within developmental state context (Mkandawire 2001; Randall 2007; Lim 2009; Poteete 2009) and also the relationship between patrimonialism, clientelism and patronage with developmental statism (Kelsall *et.al* 2010; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011; Kelsall 2011). There is a significant gap in the literature that makes a direct link between the concepts of citizenship and developmental state. Perhaps major exceptions include the works of Kyung sup Chang (2007, 2012) and the co-edited volume by Turner and Chang (2011). The thesis aims to make a contribution to the debates on the developmental states and citizenship with particular emphasis on the citizenship of urban youth. More specifically, the contribution of the thesis to these debates is anchored in the analytical framework that brings the literature on developmental state, citizenship and youth to construct a heuristic conceptualization of citizenship.

The analytical framework takes the developmental state and the youth as the two main actors to examine the effects of developmentalism on citizenship. The key attributes of the developmental state that shape its relations with the youth are its intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives. Likewise, the key features of the youth that influence their relations with the developmental state emanate from their role within society as a specific age group and from their transitional stage into adulthood.

The nucleus of the analytical framework lies in the process-oriented and relational approach to citizenship that the thesis has adopted. The processes of citizenship are relations between the developmental state and the youth through which *rights* are contested in different *spaces* and in which both actors deploy different *strategies* to influence these contestations of rights. Therefore, the processes of citizenship constitute the relations between the two actors (the developmental state and the youth) and involve three elements (rights, spaces and strategies).

The analytical framework underscores that the processes of citizenship are context dependent. The developmental state aims to shape the context in which citizenship rights are contested to fit its political purposes and achieve its developmental objectives. Similarly, young citizens also attempt to shape the context in which they pursue their rights to serve the interests and priorities emanating from their age and 'waithood' status. As a result, the context in which the processes of citizenship are occurring is inherently dynamic. The major implication of this dynamic context is in its influence on the kinds of rights contested, the nature of spaces and also the variation of strategies deployed both by the developmental state and the youth.

The framework explains the politics of citizenship by exploring these context-dependent processes of citizenship and demonstrating the dynamic interplay between rights, spaces and strategies. Developmentalism, which is shaped by the intertwined political purposes and the developmental objectives of the state, has an immense role in shaping this context. Likewise, age specific interests, social expectations as well as priorities attached to 'waithood' also affect the context in which rights are contested, spaces are created and strategies are pursued. Hence, the framework attempts to capture these complexities by analysing the politics of citizenship, as depicted in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The Politics of Developmentalism and Processes of Citizenship: Analytical Framework



2.6 Conclusions

This chapter constructed the conceptual and analytical framework of the thesis. This conclusion section briefly summarises the core arguments of the chapter.

First, the chapter defined developmental states by emphasising the mutually reinforcing political purposes and developmental objectives of states. By analysing the case of East Asian developmental states using a relational approach, the chapter illustrated that business elites and industrial capitalists were favoured at the expense of labour groups and rights-demanding civil societies. Such kind of understanding of developmental states needs to go beyond an emphasis on the functions and institutions of the state. That is why the thesis adopts a definition that specifically focuses on the inextricably linked political processes and developmental objectives of the state. On the one hand, the politics of pursuing development necessitate co-operation and negotiation with social forces that benefit economically from the development objectives. On the other hand, there are also political processes of conflict and contestations with social forces that challenge the state for the realisation of civil and political rights.

In examining the democratic potential of developmental states, the chapter highlighted the salient role of informal institutions. Formal institutions contribute to democratic transition. However, democratic developmentalism is primarily about the extent to which informal institutions shape the political processes of conflict, co-operation and negotiation among social forces within the state toward democratic consolidation.

Second, the chapter viewed citizenship as a process consisted of three aspects. These are citizenship rights, spaces of citizenship and strategies of citizenship. Elements of citizenship rights are civil, political, economic and social rights. Citizens pursue these citizenship rights within invited, created or claimed spaces. The chapter also made an analytical distinction between four types of citizenship strategies that are adopted by both the state and citizens. These are co-operation, co-optation, repression and resistance. Furthermore, the chapter underscored that a process-oriented relational approach to citizenship allows examining the salient role of context that shapes the interplay between rights, spaces and strategies.

Third, the chapter also presented the concept of youth. The thesis approaches youth from two perspectives. The first perspective focuses on youth as an age group where age-based categorisation plays a major role in shaping how young citizens pursue and claim rights. The second perspective focuses on youth as a transitional stage of growing up. The thesis uses the concept of waithood to demonstrate how the prolonged transition to adulthood is influenced by socio-economic and political context of society, which in turn has direct implications for the citizenship of young people.

Finally, the chapter constructed an analytical framework by synthesising the above-mentioned concepts. The nucleus of the analytical framework is the conceptualisation of citizenship as a relational and process-oriented concept. The processes of citizenship are relations between the developmental state and the youth through which *rights* are contested in different *spaces* and in which both actors deploy different *strategies* to influence these contestations of rights. The developmental state affects the context in which the processes of citizenship are occurring in order to achieve its intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives. Likewise, young citizens also contribute to the dynamics of the context by pursuing their priorities and interests that emanate from their age-specific experiences and waithood status. The inherently dynamic nature of the context affects the processes of citizenship. The analytical framework attempts to explain the politics of citizenship by critically examining the interplay between rights, spaces and strategies whilst the two actors are involved in the processes of citizenship. In the following chapter, the thesis presents the research methodology adopted to gather and analyse the empirical data for this study.

CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DESIGN AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research methodology and design of the thesis. The first section explains why I adopted qualitative methods, explains the case study approach and outlines the sampling strategies that were used. The second section discusses the research location and fieldwork site. The final section discusses the strategies I adopted to address potential bias and presents positionality, reflexivity and the ethics procedures I followed.

3.2 Methodological Approach

This thesis adopts a qualitative approach to answering the research questions. A qualitative approach is methodologically suitable here because it gives the researcher a deep and nuanced understanding about social *processes* and *contexts* (Snape and Spencer 2003). As presented in the analytical framework (Figure 2.1), this thesis attempts to answer the overarching research question by adopting a process-oriented and relational approach to citizenship. The processes of citizenship that the framework has identified take the developmental state and young citizens as its two main actors. The processes of citizenship involve relations between these two actors in the spaces of citizenship where rights are contested. Both actors use different strategies to shape the contestation of rights and to pursue their respective interests. Furthermore, the framework conceptualises citizenship not only as process-oriented but also as context dependent. The context in which processes of citizenship occur is affected by the developmentalist orientation of the state. Likewise, young citizens, whose role in society is influenced both by age-based expectations and the prolonged period of transition to adulthood, also contribute to the changing context. Hence, the use of a qualitative approach allows us to analyse both the processes of citizenship and the dynamic context that influences the contestation of rights, the emergence of spaces and the use of strategies.

Moreover, this thesis adopts a qualitative approach because it allows for the extraction of empirical data from a 'naturalistic inquiry in a real-world rather than [in an] experimental [or

controlled] setting' (Snape and Spencer 2003: 4). Qualitative approaches fall within the domain of interpretative ontology, which argues that the social world is 'not governed by law-like regularities but mediated through meaning and human agency' (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 17). Hence, the researcher is not positioned in an isolated sphere, but rather interacts with the social world, which inevitably influences both the processes and outcomes of knowledge acquisition (Preston 1996; Ritchie and Lewis 2003). From such an ontological position, the knowledge produced is neither objective nor value-free (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). However, the researcher is required to clarify prior assumptions and biases. In this approach, the researcher is mainly focused on 'meaning and interpretation' by primarily applying inductive reasoning and 'using evidence as the genesis of a conclusion' (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 14).

A focus on the meanings and interpretation of qualitative data gives the thesis a niche in 'understanding people's perspectives in the context of the conditions and circumstances of their lives' (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 21). Hence, instead of merely looking for quantifiable data, the focus is on obtaining a 'thick description' complete with detailed information on the context of the research and its subjects. Indeed, a thick description of circumstances recognizes the salient role of contexts. Furthermore, the thesis adopts the techniques of synthesis, the comparison of responses and inference as its key methods of drawing 'meanings and interpretations' (ibid). Moreover, the face-to-face encounters with the research participants, where they were encouraged to share their views, allow the thesis to build on the 'social and material circumstance, experiences, perspectives and histories' of these participants (ibid: 22). Such encounters lend the research inquiry a humane perspective in its explanation of the politics of developmentalism by 'providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding' of the study's context and its implications on the citizenship of young people (ibid: 22). One way of ensuring the efficacy of qualitative approach is to adopt the appropriate research strategy and design, as discussed in the following section.

3.3 Research Strategy & Design

Research strategies vary depending on the research questions and 'the control an investigator has over actual behaviour or events' (Yin 1994: 4). The temporal focus of a study (whether it addresses historical or contemporary issues) also affects research strategies. Furthermore, research strategies also need to reflect the methodological approach and the broad

epistemological orientation shaping the enquiry. By taking these key issues into consideration, I adopted a 'case study' approach as a research strategy. The following paragraphs explain in greater detail why such an approach was adopted.

3.3.1 A Case Study Approach

A case study helps to answer the explanatory questions of 'how' and 'why'. Yin argues that 'how' and 'why' questions 'deal with operational links needing to be traced over time' (Yin 1994: 6). In doing so, a study can explain why certain events occur by investigating scenarios across different time spans. Furthermore, a case study contributes to the temporal awareness of a given research project by 'examining contemporary events [where] relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated' (ibid: 8). Unlike for experiments, 'case study researchers construct cases out of naturally occurring social situations' (Hammersley and Gomm 2000: 3). The case studies discussed in the empirical chapters involve contemporary processes of citizenship and are identified during the data collection activities during the fieldwork period rather than being constructed prior to the data collection. As a result, the thesis will also examine the processes through which these case studies emerged. Such an examination of the identified case studies aligns with Yin's argument about the relevance of case studies by addressing 'a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control' (1994: 9).

The other important contribution of the case study approach lies in its ability to identify the influence of 'contextual conditions' on the theme of the research. Yin argues that when there is no clear boundary between 'phenomenon and context', case studies help to discern highly pertinent factors that might otherwise be overlooked (ibid). Whilst answering the question, the thesis will also explore four critical historical junctures that have direct implications for both the state and its relations with young citizens. At the same time, this analysis identifies the vital role of historical processes in shaping state-youth relations in present day Ethiopia.

The thesis has constructed two types of case studies: *state-led initiatives* and *youth-led initiatives*. State-led initiatives represent case studies that are directly linked with the political purposes and developmental objectives of the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state. These case studies are selected because they directly influence how young citizens pursue their civil, political, economic and social rights. Furthermore, they also represent either the socio-economic policies or political programs of the ruling party that justify the establishment of such state-led initiatives. The financial, technical, administrative and political support that the

aspiring developmental state provides to the groups that make up these selected case studies makes them state-led initiatives. Youth-led initiatives, on the other hand, are youth groups or associations that have emerged out of the enthusiasm of young citizens to pursue their rights in platforms outside of the state-led initiatives. The emergence of these youth-led initiatives manifests the presence of shared concern among young citizens and shows their determination to pursue and exercise their citizenship rights with a non-state platform. Building on these broad categories, the thesis has selected a total of eight case studies: three state-led initiatives and five youth-led initiatives. The following paragraphs introduce basic characters of each case study.

I. State-led Initiatives

a) The Micro and Small-scale Enterprises Scheme (MSEs)

The MSEs scheme is one of the major development programs that the Ethiopian state is running with the specific objective of creating employment opportunities for young people. In total, I interviewed eight young people involved in this program. Research participants from the MSEs pursue different income generating activities. These include cobble stone production, poultry and dairy product distribution, advertising, urban agriculture, and café and human resource management. I interviewed these young people in order to examine how a state-led development program addresses youth unemployment and affects the citizenship rights of young citizens.

b) The Addis Abba Youth Forum (AAYF)

The Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF) is the first state-initiated youth association, established after the highly contested 2005 elections. When it was formally established in July 2006, the AAYF reportedly had 55,000 members. At present, the AAYF operates in every sub-city and district of Addis Ababa[10] with direct support from the city government in the form of office space and financial support for its activities. In total, I interviewed seven AAYF leaders. Two of them were founding members and the remaining five currently hold leadership positions in their respective districts. The case of the AAYF helps the thesis examine how the EPRDF-led government reacted to the political setback of the 2005 elections and the implications of the government's approach to state-youth relations. The thesis captures how the AAYF has evolved since its establishment by interviewing both

[10] Addis Ababa has 10 sub-cities and 116 districts.

founding members and current leaders. This helps to identify and explain changes and continuities in the role the AAYF plays in shaping the citizenship of urban youth as the developmentalist orientation of the state become consolidated.

c) The Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League (AAYL)

The Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League (AAYL) is the youth structure of the ruling party in the capital city. The chairperson of the league claims they have 85,000 registered members in the city paying monthly contributions. Since the youth league is an extension of the ruling party, it was chosen to examine how the ruling party mobilises young people as part of its political agenda. In total, I interviewed five young people from the youth league, each with different responsibilities. In addition to the youth participants in state-initiatives, I also interviewed four government officials. Two of the interviewees are senior officials at what was then the Ministry of Women, Youth and Children with specific roles related to the encouragement of youth participation. Furthermore, I also interviewed a senior advisor to the head of the Addis Ababa City Bureau of Women, Children and Youth. The other government official I interviewed is a public participation officer at the Addis Ababa Micro and Small-scale Enterprise Bureau, job creation department.

II. Youth-led Initiatives

a) The *Bale-Raey* Youth Association

The *Bale-Raey* Youth Association (*Bale-Raey*) was established in January 2012 by 18 former members of the AAYF and AAYL. The youth leaders established *Bale-Raey* in order to run an independent youth association not directly controlled by the state. I found their experience relevant because it demonstrates how young citizens move from state-led initiatives to youth-led initiatives. The thesis uses the case of *Bale-Raey* to explain why such movement occurs and what the implications on the politics of citizenship i.e. the interplay between rights, spaces and strategies of citizenship. I interviewed four members of *Bale-Raey*.

b) The Zone Nine Bloggers

Zone Nine is a bloggers' group established by nine young bloggers in May 2012. At the time I was conducting the fieldwork, six bloggers and three of their journalist colleagues were imprisoned and charged under the country's anti-terrorism proclamation. I attended 12 court sessions where the case of these bloggers and journalists was heard. The experience of the Zone Nine bloggers is relevant as it helps us examine young citizens' effort of using social

media platforms to pursue and claim citizenship rights in the context of building a developmental state.

c) Youth Opposition Politicians

I interviewed young politicians from three opposition parties. This case study helps to examine how young citizens' use legally registered political parties to exercise their civil and political rights. The parties are: the Blue Party (2), the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP – 3) and Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ – 3). These opposition parties were chosen due to the relative visibility of their public mobilisation efforts compared to other opposition parties, particularly in Addis Ababa. These parties organise demonstrations and public meetings in Addis Ababa more frequently than other political parties. While two of the respondents from EDP were parliamentary candidates during the 2010 election, the other EDP member and one of the Blue Party members were candidates for parliament in the 2015 national election.

d) The Addis Ababa Youth Association (AAYA)

The Addis Ababa Youth Association (AAYA) is one of the pioneer youth initiatives established in 1998. The association has offices in every sub-city and district of the city. The chairperson during the data collection period claimed that the association has 79,200 registered members paying monthly contributions. Among the youth-led initiatives currently operating in Addis Ababa, the AAYA is the oldest youth association. The thesis found the AAYA to be a relevant case study because of its relatively long presence as a youth-led initiative. Furthermore, the relatively bigger size in terms of both membership and areas of engagement makes the AAYA an important case-study. In total, I interviewed five youth leaders, including a former chairperson.

e) Youth-led NGOs

I also interviewed six youth leaders who established and currently work in youth-led and youth-focused non-governmental organisations. These young leaders were selected because of their long experience in working in this sector. Their experience is particularly relevant because they continued to work in the sector after the government introduced a new legal framework called the Charities and Societies Proclamation, which significantly changed the working environment of NGOs and their relationship with the state. Chapter 4 will further elaborate on this particular legal framework.

III. Non-categorised Citizens

In addition to the respondents in the above categories, I also interviewed young citizens that are actively engaged in the political sphere either because of their personal interest or professional engagement. But they do not fall neatly into any of the above-mentioned categories. For example, I interviewed young citizens that developed public profiles by using social media platforms to write social, economic and political commentary. The essays, short stories or other commentaries these social media users post usually trigger long threads of discussion and debate which are sometimes covered by local newspapers. Illustrating their public influence, two of my interviewees had the highest number of Facebook followers, arguably among Ethiopian Facebook users at the time of data collection. One of them had more than 78,000 followers (and currently has more than 127,000) who stay up-to-date with his/her[11] posts and engages in active discussion and debate. This respondent also participated in one of the focus group discussions. The other respondent, who lost control of her/his first account with more than 125,000 followers, was currently in the process of regaining his/her followers on a second account. At the time of our interview, she/he already had more than 55,000 followers. The respondent also published three short essay books that are collections of Facebook blog posts and short stories. At the time of data collection, one of the short story books, comprised of Facebook posts, was published for the twelfth time in two years. Even though these famous and influential Facebook writers have defined numbers of followers, the actual number of unique readers of their posts can number in the hundreds of thousands. In a country with very low internet coverage, the influence of these young social media writers play a significant role in influencing debates on social and political issues. I also interviewed other young people who use social media platforms to actively support or oppose government policies.

The other group of respondents I interviewed include young government employees, business owners, poets, and journalists working for both private ruling party-affiliated and state-owned media institutions. These young people were interviewed because of their professional

[11] As part of the ethical procedure, I am concealing the gender identity of my respondents. However, there are some instances where my respondents, especially some young opposition politicians, explicitly emphasised that they preferred their identity to be revealed. For the sake of consistency, I will use the code I developed to refer to all my respondents. Nevertheless, no special effort will be made to conceal the gender identity of my respondents who preferred not to be anonymised.

engagements either as journalists or poets directly involved in the exercise of citizenship rights.

The empirical sections of the thesis in Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the state-led and youth-led initiatives. The main reason for focusing only on these two categories is because it allows the thesis to capture the implications of developmentalism on state-youth relations both at a collective and individual level. During the analysis stage, information that could be added from the data gathered from interviews with non-categorised young citizens was found to have already been covered by the experiences of the young citizens within the state-led and youth-led initiatives. There were also significant limitations related to time and word limit. The following table summarises the number of research participants (both interview and focus group discussion) and the categories in which they belong.

Table 3.1: Categories and number of research participants interviewed

State-led Initiatives	**No. of Participants**	**Youth-led Initiatives**	**No. of Participants**	**Non-categorised**	**No. of Participants**
MSEs	8	*Bale-Raey*	4	Social media activists	9
AAYF	7	Zone Nine*	-	Art (poets/writers)	4
AAYL	5	Opposition Politicians	8	Business owners	3
State officials	4	AAYA	5	Government employees	2
		Youth-led NGOs	6	Journalists	4
Sub-total	**24**		**23**		**22**
Total No. interviewees = 69					

*Zone Nine bloggers were not interviewed directly. Rather, I followed their case by attending court hearings and used secondary sources in the analysis. I then used email communication to fact check my analysis with each member of the group.

In addition to choosing the appropriate research strategy (a case study approach being most fitting here), a qualitative study also requires a rigorous research design to collect relevant data. Essential components of the qualitative research design include sampling procedures, research questions, data collection methods and an understanding of the research context (Yin 1994; Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The following section provides further information about the sampling techniques the study adopted.

3.3.2 Sampling Techniques and Criteria

The research adopted purposive sampling to select research participants. Purposive sampling enables a qualitative study to identify 'sample units [that] have particular features and characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding' on the topic of the study (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 78). Purposive sampling is common in qualitative study because it enables a research enquiry to focus on subjects that yield particularly profound insight into the study's area of interest (Patton 2007; Coyne 1997; Devers and Frankel 2000). Patton argues "information rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry, thus...*purposive* sampling" (emphasis original) (Patton 2007: 4006). In purposive sampling, the researcher can ensure reliability and validity by ensuring the sample units cover the relevant subject matter of the study as well as in guaranteeing diverse views are included (Ritchie and Lewis 2003).

In this research process, I attempted to include diverse views of young citizens that are claiming their citizenship rights either within state-led or youth-led initiatives. Furthermore, as I am aware of the political nature of the research, I interviewed young citizens with political opinions both supporting and opposing the ruling party. Gender can help to ensure a diversity of views. From the onset, the research I did not intend to achieve perfectly equal gender representativeness in my research sample. However, a conscious effort was made to include numerous female participants. As result, out of the total of 69 research participants either interviewed or involved in the focus group discussions, 16 were female. Future research on a similar topic might consider adopting a strictly gender-conscious approach through the entire research process.

Purposive sampling in qualitative study relies heavily on prior knowledge about the research context. An informed understanding of the research context helps to identify appropriate sampling categories and relevant variations in experiences and traits. Furthermore, the research question and the kind of answers that the study seeks to find from the empirical enquiry also play an indispensable role in getting reliable data through purposive sampling. Another key feature of purposive sampling is the use of 'snowballing'. Snowballing allows the researcher to select other research participants that can contribute to the study through the recommendation of either other research participants or acquaintances. During the data collection stage, I heavily benefited from the recommendations of my informants to identify and meet other potential research participants.

In total, I used three sampling criterion to select the research participants. The first criterion is age. All my research participants except for the state officials were within the age limits of 18-35. Ethiopian national youth policy defines young people as those between 15 and 29 years old. The African Youth Charter, which is also ratified by Ethiopia, defines young people as those between 15 to 35 years old. I chose 18 years of age because Ethiopian law defines 18 as the age of majority and opted for age 35 as the highest boundary to adopt the regional legal framework.

The second criterion is citizenship engagement. All my young respondents are actively involved in contestation of rights either individually or collectively. The citizenship engagement of the young respondents may also be related with their professional engagement or occupation for example as entrepreneurs, journalists, poets and writers or their interests such as social media activism, volunteerism or political engagement. The third key criterion is residence in Addis Ababa. As it will be argued in section 3.4, the thesis took Addis Ababa as fieldwork site to examine how the politics of building a developmental state affects the citizenship of urban youth.

As argued earlier, social markers such as ethnicity are important factors in affecting citizenship. As it will be further highlighted in Chapter 4, the post-1991 Ethiopian political dynamics further emboldened the role of ethnicity through a federal system based on ethno-linguistic identity. However, this study has not considered ethnicity of the research participants as a sampling criterion for two reasons. The first reason is the sensitivity of the topic. The politicisation of ethnicity makes it one of the most contentious topics in present day Ethiopia. Hence, it requires extra effort and longer period of building trust between the researcher and the participants to openly talk about the implications of ethnic identity on citizenship rights. Furthermore, since the data collection occurred closer to the May 2015 election, the intensity of the political dynamics increased the sensitivity of the topic. With the time constraint and the unfavourable political environment considering ethnicity as a sampling criterion was not possible. The second reason is related to Addis Ababa's formal status within the federal system. The political and administrative structures of the city are not established along ethno-linguistic identities. This makes Addis Ababa different from other regions in the country where ethno-linguistic identity is an essential factor for the

establishment of political and administrative structures.[12] Hence, unlike other regional states, there is no ethno-linguistic requirement for dwellers of Addis Ababa to exercise some of their citizenship rights such as running for office.

3.3.3 Data Collection Methods

The study uses four types of data collection methods. Each method helped to collect different kinds of data that contributed to the richness and depth of the information required to answer the research questions. During both data collection and analysis, I used triangulation to corroborate the data I collected, using different methods to ensure the reliability and credibility of the data. For example, respondents were asked for further evidence about the information they provided, such as events and activities that involved more than one individual. I have also looked for additional evidence by interviewing other respondents and whenever possible by gathering secondary materials (including electronic, print or audio materials) to validate the primary data. I also used available legal and policy documentation as well as secondary source materials to validate the credibility of the data I gathered. The following sections further explain the data collection methods.

a) In-depth interviews

I used in-depth interviews because they generally provide more informative, context-sensitive data than structured interviews. I used guiding questions to conduct the in-depth interviews. Guiding questions help to keep the interview focused on the research topic whilst their flexibility allows the researcher to probe the participant with follow up questions for further clarification (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). In-depth interviews can also generate deep and nuanced data that is framed by the interviewee's own language.

Furthermore, in-depth interviews helped to produce individually specific data from the participating young citizens. The data relates to their experiences joining a government initiated youth group, establishing a business within the MSEs scheme or starting their own youth association. I asked about their motives, the rationale behind their decisions, the challenges they faced and the opportunities they capitalised on. For the government officials, the in-depth interviews helped me get detailed information about government policies and programs regarding young people that the respondents were involved in. Out of the 69

[12] Dire Dawa is the other region where the political and administrative structures are not established based on ethno-linguistic boundaries.

research participants, I conducted in-depth interviews with 63 of them. The remaining six participants participated only in the focus group discussion.

b) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Two FGDs were organised. The theme of the first FGD focused on the role of social media as a platform of exercising citizenship. The discussion covered key issues related with the challenges and opportunities that active young social media users face particularly in relation to exercising their civil and political rights. Seven social media activists (include two females) from diverse socio-economic, professional and political backgrounds participated. The theme of the second FGD was on young citizens' engagement in political parties. Six young politicians (including one female) representing the EPRDF, EDP, UDJ and Blue Party participated in the second FGD. Furthermore, the second FGD had two purposes. The first purpose was to understand why the participants had decided to join their respective political parties. The second and perhaps most important reason was to observe the interaction between the young politicians, especially when they disagreed on key issues such as the status of democracy in Ethiopia.

c) Observation

In addition to in-depth interviews and FGDs, the data collection also involved the active observation of events as well as activities of young citizens at the research locations. The purpose of this observation technique was to gather relevant and detailed information about the relations between young citizens and the state without necessarily setting a data gathering context. I took field notes both during and after my observations. In some of my observations I was a nonparticipant, though when the situation allowed it, I interacted with other participants to get more information. The events I attended included meetings and trainings organised by youth-led NGOs, poetry nights organised by young writers and a two-day long national conference organised by the Ministry of Youth and Sports under the theme 'Youth Development'. In one instance, I attended a strategic plan development meeting of one of the youth-led NGOs I studied. I also attended twelve court sessions related to the case of the Zone Nine bloggers. Oftentimes, the court sessions also included other cases of journalists, politicians and individuals faced with terrorism charges. In addition to specifically attending and participating in these specific events, I had various discussions and informal conversations with ruling party officials and members, opposition party leaders and members, youth activists, young government employees, youth entrepreneurs, and other academic

researchers. These informal discussions helped me to reflect on my research from different perspectives, to get new information and to find research participants.

d) Document Analysis

In addition to generating primary data using the above-mentioned methods, I have also analysed various relevant documents that contributed to the richness of my data. Most of the documents analysed are produced by the state and the youth and they have added further depth to the query by supporting the primary data with additional substantiated evidence. I used critical discourse analysis to analyse the perspectives of both the state and the youth through the texts (proclamation, and policies for the state and opinion piece and articles for the youth) they produce. Discourse analysis helps the thesis identify the meanings of the documents by analytically connecting them with the social and political context they were produced in (Gasper and Apthorpe 1996; Van Dijk 2009). Hence, the document and text analysis enables the research to give close attention to language and the words of the producers of the documents in light of the broader context.

I collected the documents from government offices, youth organisations, official government websites, the website of the ruling party and media outlets. The documents include official government policies and legal documents (national development plans, proclamations, policy documents and reports), official and internal documents from the ruling party, reports published by youth organisations and online sources such as newspaper articles. With regard to the ruling party documents I used, the ideological magazine of the ruling party (*Addis Raey*) and other internal party documents disseminated by the ruling party were also examined.

One of the key features of the qualitative approach that generates primary data is its occurrence in a particular location. After presenting the above discussed research design and strategy, the following section explains the rationale for choosing Addis Ababa as a fieldwork site.

3.4 Fieldwork Site

The research is conducted in Addis Ababa, the capital city of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa has more than 3.5 million in habitants, constituting nearly 25% of the country's total urban population (CSA, 2012). As the centre of all major socio-

economic and political events, programs and institutions, Addis Ababa has unique features within the Ethiopian context. These include a higher human development index, as well as the presence of various CSOs (both national and international), research institutions, and the head offices of almost all national political parties (UNDP 2014). Addis Ababa is also the primary home of a now-weakened private press (newspapers and magazines) that tries to counterbalance the one-sided view of a public media that is under the total domination of the ruling party. The presence of multiple actors with diversified views gives Addis Ababa a relatively conducive environment for the exercise and pursuit of citizenship rights.

According to Article 49 the Ethiopian constitution, Addis Ababa has a self-government status where the city administration is accountable to the Federal government. This means, Addis Ababa's administrative and political structure is not established based on the ethno-linguistic identity of its dwellers. However, this does not mean the city dwellers have homogenous ethno-linguistic or cultural identity. In terms of ethnic composition, the 2007 census confirms that the Amhara ethnic group constitutes around 44 per cent of the city dwellers whereas the Oromo ethnic group constitutes around 20 per cent of the total population in the city (CSA 2008). The remaining population of the city is composed of almost every ethno-linguistic group with Gurage and Tigire having more members around 16 and 1.6 per cent respectively. Furthermore, there is also a provision within the constitution (Article 49 (5) that recognizes 'administrative' links between Addis Ababa and Oromia region mainly because the city is geographically located within the Oromia region.

Furthermore, as the seat of the federal government, the incumbent Ethiopian government uses Addis Ababa as a showcase of its modernist orientation. Compared to other urban centres in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa receives a high proportion of infrastructure investment. In recent years alone, the city has received funding multiple major infrastructure projects including the construction of condominium housing, road complexes, light train systems (GCAO 2016). These investments are seen as signs of the government's unrelenting effort to transform Ethiopia into a middle-income country by 2025. Addis Ababa is placed at the centre of this 'hyper-modernist' and developmentalist government project. It thus provides the ideal empirical context in which to investigate how young citizens are pursuing and claiming their rights within the context of developmental statism.

Another vital element of qualitative research involves examining the relationship between the researcher and the social world in which the research is being conducted. To this end, the

following section discusses research bias and measures taken to address it, positionality and reflexivity aspects of the researcher and research ethics.

3.5 Bias, Positionality, Reflexivity and Ethical Considerations

3.5.1 Sources of Potential Bias

Every researcher has presuppositions based on their academic interests and personal experiences which can become sources of potential bias. Hence, the credibility of research findings can be significantly enhanced by being aware of such assumptions and taking measures to address them. In this thesis, I have identified the following interrelated sources of potential bias. I also discussed the measures I have taken to off-set the bias and ensure the credibility of the thesis findings.

a) Research Interest

As mentioned above, the topic and focus of a study can hardly remain isolated from the researcher's personal experiences and values. When I chose to study the politics of developmentalism and citizenship, I was influenced by my previous academic training in sociology, development studies and African studies. The concepts I have chosen, the philosophical approach I have followed and the references I have used in this thesis are all influenced by my academic training and interest. In order to expand the breadth of the thesis beyond the limits of my previous training, I used academic materials from fields such history and politics. Furthermore, to ensure the credibility of the findings, I also used official government documents and research reports produced by international organisations such as the World Bank and the UN.

With regard to the focus of the research, the decision to look at youth as a specific social group was heavily influenced by my previous experience. I was actively involved in youth activism since my undergraduate years at Addis Ababa University in the mid-2000s. My experiences as a youth activist became part of my academic engagement when I wrote my master's thesis in 2009 on the theme youth and politics. I argued about the rationale of focusing on youth in Chapter 1. Despite the research's specific focus on youth, I intend for my examination of this group's relations with the state to reveal insights credible enough to be generalised to the wider Ethiopian population. Furthermore, in order strengthen the

plausibility and relevance of my argument, I analysed legal and policy frameworks of the government as well as the political program of the ruling party, sources that have broader implications for citizenship in Ethiopia. I identified the particular implications of these policies and legal documents on young citizens in order to draw broader conclusions about the politics of citizenship in the context of developmentalism

b) Urban Bias

The research is specifically focused on state-youth relations in urban context and it uses the capital city Addis Ababa as a research location. Research applying the same analytical framework to rural agricultural or pastoralist areas of Ethiopia may find additional elements that are shaping state-youth relations in different ways than for urban youth. In order to minimize the effects of the urban bias, I examined socio-economic and legal frameworks such as national development plans and national youth policy and political programs based on the ruling party's ideology. In my analysis, I attempted to demonstrate that the implications of these documents go beyond the rural-urban divide. I have also demonstrated that the ideological orientation of the ruling party is immensely important in shaping state-youth relations irrespective of the geographic and socio-economic specificities among young citizen.

c) Selection Bias

As discussed earlier, my experience as a youth activist and the previous research I conducted are potential sources of bias. Both experiences facilitated my fieldwork and data collection, giving me easier access to information and research participants because I was knowledgeable and trusted. However, I am also aware that both experiences can act as sources of bias, particularly when selecting research participants for interviews and focus groups. Hence, in order to address this potential selection bias, I have strictly followed the three selection criteria discussed in Section 3.3.2.

Furthermore I have used my previous contacts and research participants primarily as informants to gather information and documents, and also as links to potential research participants. However, on two occasions, I re-interviewed one opposition party member and a female youth-NGO leader for this research. The reason for re-interviewing the young politician was that he was the youngest candidate of his party participating in the 2015 national elections. Hence, his experience at the time of data collection was highly relevant. Regarding the female youth-led NGO leader, her organisation was one of the two youth-led

NGOs that have been actively involved in facilitating economic opportunities for young citizens. While most youth-led NGOs have programs focused on sexual reproductive health, her organisation prioritised the agenda of youth economic empowerment. Hence, her input regarding the research was very relevant and provided information that I could not find through my communication with other youth-led NGOs.

d) Gender Bias

The total number of research participants that were either interviewed or have participated in the focus group discussions is 81. Out of these, 19 are female. In order to address this gender bias, the thesis has given more focus to include the voices of female respondents in the analysis. Moreover, the thesis also highlighted in the conclusion chapter that one of the possible areas of further research in understanding the relationship between developmentalism and the citizenship of urban youth can be using a fairly gender conscious methodological approach. Such approach may enable to discern gender specific challenges and opportunities that young female citizens experience in the efforts of exercising their citizenship rights.

In addition to the above discussed measures for addressing potential sources of bias, I also used triangulation as a key technique to ensure reliability of the data I collected.

3.5.2 Triangulation

Triangulation serves the purpose of checking the integrity of the collected data by verifying the ‘convergence’ of data with the conclusion (Lewis 2003). Triangulation can also serve as a way of addressing potential biases that can affect the validity and credibility of both the data and research findings. As a result, I have used multiple methods of data collection, analysis and corroboration in order to enhance the credibility and plausibility of the findings. Each of the data collection methods I used allow for the extraction of different kinds of data that cumulatively contributed towards answering the research questions.

Triangulation also contributed to the verification of the data during both data collection and analysis. For example, by using the in-depth interview method, I gathered detailed information from young politicians about how they are using their political parties as platforms to exercise their citizenship rights. This was followed by a focus group discussion

among six young politicians (four of them who I had already interviewed) for further information. With the focus group discussion, I attempted to achieve two purposes. I attempted to explore why young citizens are joining political parties (how they are exercising their rights) and the relationships among young politicians from competing political parties. The encounters between the young politicians' generated additional data that could not have been identified individual in-depth interviews alone. I also used the same technique to verify the information I gathered with social media activists by organizing a focus group discussion.

I also used various secondary data sources in order to ensure the credibility of the collected data through corroboration and cross-checking. I used official and internal party documents primarily from the ruling party, government policies and reports, autobiographies of individuals involved in the political processes, online sources and reports from international institutions. The data from secondary sources served as additional documentation and evidence to the information gathered through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and observation.

3.5.3 Positionality

As mentioned earlier, I have a background as a youth activist. This made me less stranger to the research context. Activities during my days of activism include participation in various youth-focused policy advocacy and dialogue platforms, academic research projects and training activities both at individual level, within informal groups and formal organisations. I have also been using different media platforms to express my views and perspectives about the general context of youth, politics and development in Ethiopia. My media exposure also includes participation on radio debates, writing magazine/newspaper articles and using my personal blog (including Facebook and Twitter) to express my political and personal views.

Previous experience and position as a youth activist has both positive and negative impacts on my research activity. On the positive side, I was not completely a newcomer to the topic and the field context. It was relatively easy to re-establish old contacts, and finding new contacts was not a difficult task. This includes re-integrating myself into youth activists' informal networks, which helped me to interact with them at ease without necessarily introducing myself as a researcher. Furthermore, my experience also helped me during the data collection process to probe interviewees with informed questions and follow-up questions for greater clarity.

However, not being completely new to the context also had its own drawbacks. Potential research participants who know my previous engagement both as a researcher and as an activist could have easily made prior assumptions about me. In order to reduce the negative impact of prior assumptions, I explained that the purpose of the research was purely academic, both verbally and by giving them the Participant Information Sheet (PIS). Furthermore, I attempted to address potential biases that could have arisen from my positionality by using the techniques discussed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.5.1.

Whilst being aware of one's positionality is an important element of ensuring the credibility of qualitative research, reflexivity, which addresses the subjective experience of the researcher, is also a vital component of the qualitative approach. The following section will further elaborate on the reflexivity process I went through as a researcher.

3.4.4 Reflexivity

Reflexivity is one of the ways through which the 'objectivity' and reliability of a qualitative study can be investigated (Snape and Spencer 2003). Creswell (2014) argues that reflexivity enables the researcher to be aware of the 'biases and values' that are attached to the personal background of the researcher and their potential and actual implications on the research. Reflexivity hardly stops at addressing potential biases but necessitates an awareness of the meanings drawn from the research and how biases are shape the direction of the study (ibid). Reflexivity thus allows me to be aware of my position within the research context both in relation to the research participants and the research environment. I recognise that I was not completely detached from the social world that I was researching.

My primary reason for embarking on this research journey was my earlier 'subjective experience' as a youth activist (Studer 2017). I have first-hand experience of both the challenges and opportunities for the pursuit of citizenship rights within the context of developmentalism in present day Ethiopia. Hence, one can argue that whilst there is a valid reason to initiate this research project by identifying a gap in the literature that links youth, citizenship and developmentalism, I have additional justification that emanates from my own experience. There are both positive and negative implications of having such strong subjective experience within a qualitative research project.

There were instances where my ‘subjective experience’ as a youth activist gave me a unique position to become ‘part of the researched and share the [research] participants’ experience’ (Berger 2013: 219). Such a position, which allowed me to be considered as an ‘insider,’ helped me to pass some barriers easily. One advantage of being considered as ‘part of the researched’ (ibid: 219) by the participants is the relatively easy start and better access to information that this provides. For some of the respondents, I was a fellow youth activist; hence they were ‘receptive and co-operative’. One example of this was when I was allowed to attend a strategic plan development meeting of a particular youth-led NGO.

In another context, being considered as ‘part of the researched’ can include having first-hand exposure to the very difficult emotional and psychological challenges that young citizens are facing. For example, following the case of the Zone Nine bloggers at the high court allowed me to experience the different forms of repression and resistance that I have conceptualised in this thesis. I went to the Lideta High Court more than a dozen times during my fieldwork. I was easily accepted as a new member by a group of concerned young citizens, close friends and family members who were closely following the case of the Zone Nine bloggers. Whilst observing the trial process, I witnessed the intimidating environment of the court room. There was always a heavy presence of armed military police both in the compound and within the court room. Most of my trial observation days usually started by queuing outside the tiny court room before 9 a.m. to find a seat when the courtroom opened. Sometimes, I spent at least half a day waiting for a hearing that might barely last 20 minutes. This routine almost always entailed harsh treatment by the young military-police officers staffing the compound. I observed that most of the military-police officers were in their mid-twenties and were armed with guns. The encounter between frustrated, desperate, yet at times defiant friends and family members of the bloggers and journalists and the military-police officers was often tense and full of tearful emotions.

Such moments made me think about the value of my research. As an academic, I am trained to give theoretical explanation about the politics of developmentalism and its impact on citizens’ rights. However, none of the theories and concepts of development or citizenship can insulate the researcher from having an emotional attachment to the lives and struggles of the research participants. I was directly witnessing and experiencing how the developmentally-justified politico-legal processes affected the lives of young citizens’ and their families. I was as intimidated as any ordinary citizen would have been by what I saw

and experienced. The tense environment in the courtroom, where young bloggers were brought in chained to each other, guarded by heavily-armed young military-police officers, calls for a response that goes beyond any academic exercise.

Another similar emotionally challenging experience occurred when some of the young politicians shared their ordeals of torture and gross physical assault at the hands of security officials. I never assumed that I would be put in a position where I had to try to offer solutions to the horrendous experiences these young citizens had faced. However, there were moments where I questioned the morality of recording and analysing their experiences as part of my academic qualifications. Most of the research participants who shared their experiences of torture and other gross violations of human rights were willing to give recorded interviews. They considered it part of their struggle to expose the ruling party.

During my fieldwork, I learned how to engage with different research participants, and heard stories and experiences that are completely opposite from each other. On the one hand, the stories of young citizens that explicitly opposed the government and other young citizens within youth-led initiatives were often times filled of intimidation and fear. On the other hand, stories from young politicians within the ruling party focused on promoting a very ‘positive’ image of Ethiopia by emphasising the ‘fruits’ of development. As I continued to interview more respondents, I developed skills to handle interview sessions involving the completely different experiences of various young citizens.

Furthermore, in the early stages of my fieldwork, I had the assumption that there were just two groups of young citizens: those who supported the government and those who opposed it. However, as I started to meet more young citizens, especially those participating in state-led initiatives, I started to realize the diversity within these groups and the reasons for these differences. Whilst there are young citizens who have expressed their strong support for every political decision that the government has taken, there are also other young citizens that are very opportunistic in their relations with the government. For young politicians within the ruling party, the country is on the right path for achieving its developmental objectives. Hence, they defend every aspect of the government’s actions and decisions with full confidence. Young citizens that have joined the ruling party for the sake of accessing social and economic rights were very reserved in expressing their full support for the actions of the ruling party, particularly against members of opposition parties.

My academic preparation for the fieldwork and previous personal experience as a youth activist gave me sufficient reason to approach youth as a diversified social group. Despite all the preparations, the level of diversity that I observed among my young respondents in terms of their beliefs, political opinions, experiences, shared fears and hopes, admirations and frustrations, opportunism and determination was very illuminating. My conceptualisation of youth as a diversified social group was open enough to accommodate this diversity. However, the fieldwork experience was nonetheless very enlightening. I approached these diverse young citizens every single day and listened to their kaleidoscope of experiences, helping me deepen my understanding of youth as a diversified social group. Such deepened understanding of diversity among youth helped me to approach the different kinds of citizenship experiences among young citizens.

In addition to being aware of my positionality within the research context, the other important element of the fieldwork and data collection is observing strict ethical procedures. The following section briefly discusses the ethical steps I followed.

3.4.3 Ethical Procedures

I followed all the standard ethical procedures of the University of Manchester in the entire process of conducting fieldwork for this research. The School Research and Ethics Committee granted me permission to conduct the research in Addis Ababa. During fieldwork, after every initial contact, I presented the Participant Information Sheet (PIS) to my potential research participants to give them sufficient information about the type and the purpose of my research. The PIS, which was prepared both in Amharic and in English, was presented to the participants prior to every interview and FGD. Most of the research participants took at least a day or two on average to get back to me before they accepted or rejected my request. The PIS contains all the necessary information about the purpose, aim and objective of the research and all other relevant information as approved by the School Research and Ethics Committee (Annex III). Most of the research participants also filled a Consent Form (Annex IV). On a few occasions, some research participants were either not willing to give a recorded interview or to sign the consent form, while a small number were unwilling to do either. The main reason for this was because of the sensitivity of the research topic. Some of my respondents were understandably hesitant to share their political opinions on record. I understood and respected their decisions and wrote their responses in my field

notes. Further data protection procedures I used include using password protected data storage and disguising the identity of the respondents with a code. I have also guaranteed my respondents that what they said would not be identified with them.

Before analysing the empirical data of the thesis, the following chapter will set the context by analysing the historical, socio-economic and political attributes that have shaped the contemporary Ethiopian state.

CHAPTER FOUR
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEMPORARY ETHIOPIAN STATE
Historical, Political and Socio-Economic Analysis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to understand historical, political and socio-economic factors that contributed to the current developmentalist orientation of the Ethiopian state. Examining these factors will allow the thesis to explain both the enabling and constraining features of the Ethiopian state toward developmentalism. This chapter has three main purposes. First, it briefly examines the evolution of the Ethiopian state and the critical junctures that have shaped its current nature. Second, it examines the ideological orientations of the incumbent ruling party that has dominated the Ethiopian state system for the last quarter century. Third, it explores how the incumbent regime is pursuing developmentalism through its politico-legal frameworks and socio-economic policies. By doing so, the chapter aims to set the scene for answering the research questions in the subsequent empirical chapters.

The chapter puts forward the following three interrelated arguments for understanding the contemporary Ethiopian state. First, historically embedded structural and institutional factors play a significant role in shaping the developmentalist orientation of the state. The Ethiopian ruling party (EPRDF) capitalised on widely shared worldviews about state power and a historically dominant centralised state structure with coercive power and authority in order to maintain its power. To this end, the ruling party's revolutionary democratic ideology has been very instrumental for controlling the state system and kick-starting the mission of developmental statism.

Second, the EPRDF controlled the Ethiopian state by fusing the party structure with state institutions. Later on, particularly after the 2010 election, a Party-state became the *de facto* feature of the government, where the institutional distinction between the ruling party, the government and the state was deliberately eliminated. Because of this, the thesis refers to the 'EPRDF-led government' or the 'ruling party' for incidents prior to the 2010 election and the 'Party-state' for the post-2010 election period. Both the politics of building the Party-state and its official developmentalist orientation post 2010 clearly prioritises the economic rights at the expense of the civil and political rights of citizens.

Third, the Party-State uses mutually reinforcing politico-legal frameworks and socio-economic policies to pursue its developmental aspirations. Both the frameworks and the policies correspond to the definition of developmental state the thesis adopted. One the one hand, the politico-legal frameworks contribute to the political purposes of the state in terms of ensuring dominance and authority. On the other hand, the socio-economic policies advance the developmental objectives of enhancing state legitimacy based on economic growth. It is through these intertwined politico-legal frameworks and socio-economic policies that the Party-state is influencing the process of citizenship.

The remaining sections of the chapter present the above-mentioned core arguments. Section 4.2 provides a brief historical background by identifying critical junctures that helped to shape the contemporary Ethiopian state. Section 4.3 critically analyses the ideological foundations of the aspiring developmental state. Then follows Section 4.4, which presents the politico-legal and socio-economic policy frameworks that influences how citizens pursue and claim their rights. Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the key findings and arguments of the chapter.

4.2 The Emergence of The Modern Ethiopian State

Historical accounts indicate that present day Ethiopian state has evolved over a history of some 2,000 years of state formation (Harbeson 1988; Schwab 1985; Clapham 2006). However, the modern and centralised features of Ethiopian state started to emerge in the second half of the nineteenth century (Bahru Zewde 2001; Clapham 2006; Shiferaw Bekele 2015). Particularly, the accession of Emperor Tewodros II (1855–1868) to power was a watershed moment in shaping the modern Ethiopian state for at least two reasons. First, Emperor Tewodros ended the period known as *Zemene Mesafint* (Era of Princes) in Ethiopian history. During the *Zemene Mesafint*, the monarchy was at its weakest and warlords were fighting with each other for regional power. Emperor Tewodros defeated the competing warlords one after the other before being crowned king. He played a major role in restoring a strong and centralised monarchy to Ethiopia (Shiferaw Bekele 2015).

Second, Emperor Tewodros was also the first king who aspired to use centralised monarchy as an instrument of pursuing ‘civilisation’, ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ (Bahru Zewde 2001, 2008; Clapham 200; Bekele 2015). He set a solid foundation for subsequent regimes to

pursue modern state building. These include: establishing a modern army, limiting the role of the church in political administration, redistributing land, launching development-oriented diplomatic relations with Europe, and pushing for 'ordered governance' (Bahru Zewde 2008; Shiferaw Bekele 2015). Emperor Tewodros's initial steps helped the succeeding polities both maintain the integrity of the Ethiopian state – successfully resisting colonialism, and also pursue modernisation and development (Clapham 2006; Bahru Zewde 2008). In this regard, two of the longest serving monarchs after Emperor Tewodros, Emperor Menelik II (1889–1913) and Emperor Haile Selassie (1930–1974) played their respective roles in shaping modern Ethiopian state.

Emperor Menelik not only defended the country from Italian colonisers; he also oversaw territorial expansion of the empire which gave Ethiopia the geographic shape it has today (Shiferaw Bekele 2015). Furthermore, Emperor Menelik had successful diplomatic relations with Europeans, which helped him to establish the first railway line, telecommunications systems, ministerial offices, western-style schools and hospitals. Ethiopia's political and economic elites, who aspired to replicate the socio-economic and political systems of governance they observed in the West, also supported such a modernising vision (Bahru Zewde 2002).

Emperor Haile Selassie further continued the effort of modernising the country after he ascended to the throne in 1930. Foreign-educated Ethiopian intelligentsia played an important role in the Emperor's effort to modernise the state bureaucracy (Bahru Zewde 2002). Most members of the Ethiopian intelligentsia were in favour of reforming the Ethiopian state. They aspired to establish a constitutional monarch, achieve economic development and improve the lives of the poor peasants (ibid). However, Emperor Haile Selassie's response was not sufficient. Later on, the failure to reform fomented resistance and protest movements, which finally culminated in the ousting of the feudal monarchy through revolution.

The above-discussed historical accounts of the Ethiopian state have had a lingering impact on the nature of the modern Ethiopian state. The thesis identified at least two major attributes. These are widely-shared views about state power and the continuous effort state elites searching for a 'model' to achieve modernity and development. These two attributes have significant implications in shaping state-citizen relations. After some brief reflection in the following paragraphs, the remaining sections of the chapter will further elaborate them.

First, the hierarchical nature of modern Ethiopian state since its inception has been very influential in shaping shared worldviews and attitudes within Ethiopian society. The notions of ‘power’, ‘authority’, ‘state’ and ‘government’ are perceived by the peoples of Ethiopia in the most hierarchical sense. Ethiopian society, particularly that of the central and northern highland areas which has dominated Ethiopian politics for the last century and half, is ‘deeply hierarchical’ (Clapham 2006: 139) and ‘vertically stratified’ (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003: 11). Social relations both at the family and community level give significant value to hierarchical power and authority, which also transfers into sphere of politics. Clapham further argued about the ‘enormous emphasis for hierarchy and obedience’ in different parts of Ethiopian society (Clapham 2004: 75). It is important to recognise the role of such kinds of shared values because they constitute informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). As argued by Leftwich (1998, 2005), democratic consolidation is heavily influenced by informal institutions and their role to accommodate democratic values into shared values and norms.

There is also a widely held conception that associates state power with divine power. Lefort mentioned how his respondents equated political power with divine power, whose authority ‘cannot be contested’ (Lefort 2007: 258). The aristocracy ruled the country for centuries with a claim of being the ‘elect of God’ until the 1974 revolution. Nearly four and half decades after the revolution, such conception of equating state-power with divine appointment is quite common, especially in rural areas. Hence, total submission to the state is by implication part of expressing respect the divine will of God (ibid). As Clapham argued; during elections ‘voting against the government … especially in rural areas, is a strange and disturbing [concept]’ (Clapham 2004: 75).

These shared values and norms sustained by informal institutions have been shaping state-citizen relations in a context where formal institutions are also serving the same purpose. Hence, one can argue that state-citizen relations are mediated not only by written and codified laws that make clear the rights and obligations of the state and citizens, but ancient shared values equally influence whether citizens establish rights-based relations with the state or remain submissive by giving divine justifications for the authority of the state. In terms of developmentalism, such informal institutions have a role to play in ensuring authority and dominance of the state. However, in a context where the formal institutions of democracy are also being promoted, the effect of informal institutions can hardly remain unrestrained.

Especially in urban areas, informal institutions might have relatively weaker influence in shaping state-citizen relations than in rural areas.

Second, modern Ethiopian elites have also been very keen to 'emulate' development models from the outside world. Western Europe, Russia and Japan inspired Ethiopian elites in different periods of the 19th century. During Emperor Haile Selassie's regime, an 'amalgamations of models' (Clapham 2006: 142), mainly from Western countries, was pursued to achieve 'modernity'. After the 1974 revolution, 'Soviet communism' and 'Maoist' rural development strategies were the two most dominant models among Ethiopian revolutionaries (ibid: 144). This demonstrates that Ethiopian rulers were keen to use state power toward the aim of advancing 'modernity' and development. While the state acted as leading actor in development, the developmental models and priorities continued to change, depending on the era. Not surprisingly, the incumbent regime also seeks to emulate the footpath of China's state-led capitalism and South Korea and Taiwan's developmental statism (EPRDF 2006). The following sub-section briefly explores the political processes that led to the current developmentalist orientation of the incumbent Ethiopian state.

4.3 The Four Critical Junctures for the Present Day Ethiopian State

Historically embedded structures and institutions of society have a crucial role to play in shaping developmental statism (Vu 2007). For example, the highly centralised and coercive South Korean state, which was one of the legacies of Japanese colonisation, was immensely influential in shaping of the developmental structure of the country. Vu's analysis is a vital reminder to be aware of historical antecedents and political processes that lay the foundation for the emergence of developmental states. Similarly, historical institutionalism also recognises the salient role of 'concrete temporal processes' and 'legacies [of] historical processes' on the socio-economic and political dynamics of society (Thelen 1999: 371-382).

In the same vein, this thesis attempts to provide a historical context to the politics of developmentalism that one can observe in present day Ethiopia. To this end, the thesis identifies four critical junctures that have occurred during the last four decades. There are two reasons for choosing the following four critical junctures. In the first two critical junctures (1974 and 1991), the Ethiopian state passed through a radical change in terms of the dominant social forces the controlled that state and in its formal institutions of governance.

During the latter two critical junctures (2001 and 2005), the ruling party adopted remarkably new ideas and forms of political organisation that ultimately affected state-citizen relations. It is important to note that critical junctures are not only about change but also ensuring continuity. For example, the dominance of the Ethiopian state as a key player has remained intact during the last four decades whilst the ideological orientation has kept on evolving. The thesis aims to link both the politics of developmentalism and its influence on how citizens pursue their rights to these critical turning points during the last four decades. The subsequent sections will give further elaboration.

4.3.1 The 1974 Revolution

Chronologically, the first critical juncture was the 1974 Ethiopian revolution. Under the spearheading role of Ethiopian Students' Movement (ESM), the revolution ousted the feudal monarchy (Andargachew Tiruneh 1993; Markakis and Nega Ayele 2006; Bahru Zewde 2008; Gebru Tareke 2009). The two fundamental questions of the revolutionaries were 'the land question' and 'the national question' (Merera Gudina 2003; Bahru Zewde 2007). Both questions remain central pillars of state-citizen relations to the present day in Ethiopia. At least three major elements can be considered as the continuing legacies of the revolution that shaped the present developmental statism.

The first enduring legacy is the radical change in the land tenure system. The revolution ended the landlord-tenant based tenure system with a land reform dubbed 'land to the tiller' in February 1975. The land reform removed the rentier landlord class and granted user rights for every tenant cultivating the land (Abera Yemane-ab 2016). The socialist military regime, which oversaw the land reform, prohibited the private ownership of rural land. As a result, despite the elimination of the rentier landlord class, the state became the new landlord (Abera Yemane-ab 2016; Admasie 2016). Admasie further argued that the land reform had far-reaching impacts in terms of setting the ground for capitalist development and current rapid economic growth (2016: 80–81). Some of the fundamental changes include: the emergence of the petit bourgeois as a key social force within the state, the expansion of the internal market from the relatively freed peasantry, the 'relative autonomy' of the state emanating from the monopoly of land and the key role that the state played in capital accumulation by supressing labour (ibid).

The second enduring legacy is the inclusion of socialist/leftist political ideals and practices into Ethiopian politics. Marxist-Leninist ideological orientation and organisational structure

was embraced by the revolutionaries, the military and the rebel groups alike (Merera Gudina 2003; Gebru Tareke 2009). The military which controlled state power from 1976–1991 established a centralised socialist state. The socialist state mainly used mass organisations as primary channels of state-citizen relations. The Urban Dwellers Association, the Farmers' Association, the Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth Association (REYA) and the Revolutionary Ethiopian Women's Association (REWA) were the main state initiatives of citizenship relations (Clapham 1988). For example, young people were expected to present credentials from local branches of the REYA to 'get a job, secure an entrance to the university' (ibid: 141). Similarly, the current regime also maintained its leftist inclination in its relations with social groups such as the youth. As will be discussed in the empirical chapters, the EPRDF-led government established a youth forum in order to shape its relations with young citizens.

Similar to the military regime, the insurgent group, the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), which has later become a key player in Ethiopian politics, also adhered strictly to Marxism-Leninism (Aregawi Berhe 2008; Vaughan 2011). The legacy of Marxism and Leninism is still evident particularly in the way the ruling party is organised. Key manifestations of the legacy such as revolutionary democratic ideology and the principle of democratic centralism will be discussed in the subsequent sections. The legacy is also witnessed in the ways the ruling party organised young people in its structure under a youth league. In Chapter 5, the thesis will further analyse the youth league and its role in shaping state-youth relations whilst subscribing to revolutionary democratic ideology. Furthermore, the radical political rivalry – 'binary opposition/exclusion' (Melakou Tegegne 2008: 279–285) particularly among political leaders from the revolutionary generation, remain one of the legacies of the leftist politics (Eyob Balcha Gebremariam and Herrera 2016).

The third enduring legacy is the use of the state apparatus for repression. Particularly the period from mid–1976 to late 1978 was known as the period of 'Red Terror'. Clandestine political movements, mass arrest, torture, mass executions and other grave violations of rights were common during the 'Red Terror' period (Andargachew Tiruneh 1993; Babile Tolla 1997; Bahru Zewde 2008, 2009). The horrific experience of the 'Red Terror' remains a scar in the collective memory of Ethiopian society. More specifically, experiences drawn from the 'Red Terror' have sway in shaping state-youth citizenship relations in today's Ethiopia. Experiences of the 'Red Terror' still inform political socialisation of the post-revolution generation. A good example of this is illustrated by a widely-used expression '*poletika ena*

korentinen beruku' ('avoid politics as you would avoid electric shock') which is the most common advice for politically active youth (Tronvoll 2002: 160; Eyob Balcha Gebremariam and Herrera 2016: 143). As discussed in Chapter 2, repression is one of the strategies that states adopt to shape state-citizen relations. Furthermore, the empirical data analysed in Chapter 6 also demonstrate how repression is still a vital component of state-citizen relations.

The above-discussed enduring legacies of the 1974 revolution have had a considerable impact on state-citizen relations. The revolution fundamentally altered the economic, political, social and ideological structures and institutions of the Ethiopian state. The state leadership radically changed from feudal aristocrats based on a claim of divine status to socialist revolutionaries. Likewise, new institutions of land tenure, mass organisations and political movements based on class and ethnicity were also introduced. Furthermore, the struggle among competing political forces to control state power also highlighted the role of the repressive state apparatus and repression as key components of state-citizen relations (Abbink 1993). These legacies remained influential despite a regime change in May 1991 after 17 years of civil war. The following sub-section discusses both new and continuing features of the Ethiopian state after 1991.

4.3.2 From a Centralised Socialist State to a Federal State (1991)

The 1991 regime change, which was spearheaded by the victorious rebel groups under the umbrella of the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF),[13] heralded a new set of state-citizen relations. The thesis identifies 1991 as a critical juncture because it marked the beginning of the democratic transition process, the dismantling of the centralised state and establishment of a federal state and also the introduction of ethno-linguistic identity as main factor of state-citizen relations. The following sections will further elaborate these features.

The first key feature is the beginning of formal processes of democratic transition. After centuries of aristocratic rule and 17 years of socialist military dictatorship, Ethiopia formally entered the world scene of democracy (Kinfe Abraham 1994: Vestal 1999). A new

[13]EPRDF is a coalition of three ethno-linguistic parties, namely the Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO) as well as one regional party called the Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The TPLF is the core party which has also overseen the establishment of the other parties.

constitution was adopted in August 1995 and the establishment of the three branches of a government signified the transition to democracy. The political sphere has also become legally open for contestation by political parties. Since 1995, Ethiopia conducted five regular elections including the most recent election in May 2015. However, the democratic transition through the establishment of formal democratic institutions and the occurrence of democratic processes such as regular elections has failed to ensure realisation of citizenship rights (Abbink 2006; Lefort 2010; Merera Gudina 2011; Arriola and Lyons 2016). As will be further explored in the remaining sections of this chapter, the democratic transition remained feeble and unconsolidated.

One of the key manifestations of the democratic transition is the institutionalisation of citizenship rights in the August 1995 Ethiopian constitution. Some argue that, Ethiopian constitution 'enshrines robust provisions on civil and political rights' (Sisay Alemayehu Yeshanew 2008: 276). Similarly, another observer argues, the constitution 'embodies fundamental freedoms that need to in any liberal polity' (Gedion Timotios Hassebon 2013: 227). Indeed, the constitution covers broad range of rights that can be categorised within the definitions of rights identified by T.H. Marshall (1950).

For example, constitutionally guaranteed civil and political rights include the right to life, the right to protection from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the rights of arrested, accused and convicted persons, the right to equality, freedom of religion and belief, freedom of thought, opinion and expression, the right to assembly, demonstration and petition, freedom of association, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to property (FDRE 1995 – Arts 13-40). Furthermore, the constitution also broadly categorised economic, social and cultural rights in Article 41 of the constitution. These rights include the right to freely engage in economic activity and pursue a livelihood as well as 'the right to equal access to publicly funded social services' (ibid: 15). Some of the 'obligations' of the state stipulated in Article 41 include 'to pursue policies which aim to expand job opportunities for the unemployed' and 'to increase opportunities for citizens to find gainful employment' (ibid). Hence, it is fair to argue that the Ethiopian constitution has sufficient institutional framework that recognises the civil, political, social and economic rights of citizens.

The second key feature of post-1991 Ethiopia is the establishment of regional states that constitute the federal state. The EPRDF used ethno-linguistic identity as the principal criteria for establishing the regional states. The August 1995 constitution introduced two city

administrations and nine autonomous regional states to establish the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Young 1996, Abbink 1997). By doing so, the EPRDF transformed the political structures of the state by making ethnicity, a social structure, the most fundamental element of the federal state. Furthermore, the constitution also considers 'nations, nationalities and peoples' as the founding members of the federation (FDRE 1995). Hence, according to the EPRDF's logic, individuals' citizenship rights are subsumed under the collective rights of 'nations, nationalities and peoples'. The new constitution sought to 'rectify historically unjust relations' among ethno-linguistic groups (ibid). In the early 1990s, according to the EPRDF, democratisation was nothing but ensuring 'ethnic representation' (Abbink 1997: 162).

The relevance of ethnicity in shaping state-society relations and particularly the fulfilment of collective rights cannot be overemphasised. Some argue that EPRDF's effort of 'constitutionalising ethnicity as nationality' (Young 2007: 253) is a 'unique pathway' compared to other African countries experiences. The historical trajectories of state formation in Ethiopia during the late 19th and early 20th century contributed to this exceptional political project. As articulated by the young Ethiopian revolutionaries of the 1960s and 70s, the centralised Ethiopian state adopted a 'policy of cultural suppression' (Young 1996: 534). Key manifestations of the 'cultural suppression' include the imposition of northern and central highland socio-cultural practices, Amharic language and orthodox Christianity onto the lately integrated societies of southern Ethiopia. Some scholars even characterised the socio-economic and political relations between the central Ethiopian state and the peripheries as 'internal colonialism' (Holcomb and Ibssa Sisai 1990; Asafa Jalata 1993). Confiscation of land, forced labour and surplus extraction facilitated by political domination are identified as key parameters of such characterisation. These historical and political dynamics served as a rational ground to institutionalise ethno-linguistic based federalism. Hence, as a political remedy, the constitution guaranteed ethnic groups, perhaps, the ultimate form of political right for self-administration and 'self-determination up to and including secession' (FDRE 1995).

The third key feature of the post-1991 Ethiopian state is the formal devolution of power to regional states. The decentralisation process has affected processes of resource extraction and distribution, political representation and cultural identity (Eshetu Chole 1994; Young 1996; Paulos Chane 2007; Merera Gudina 2007). However, there are critics that question the

efficacy of the decentralisation process, particularly in ensuring democracy, self-rule, responsiveness and accountability (Paulos Chane 2007; Merera Gudina 2007). Critics evidently argued that the ruling party relentlessly disrupted the constitutionally guaranteed decentralisation through political practices based on ‘democratic centralism’ (Merera Gudina 2007). Moreover, some observers also argue that, the flawed decentralisation process institutionalised neo-patrimonialism rather than democracy and self-rule (Paulos Chane 2007).

The post-1991 EPRDF-led government claimed to have addressed one of the key questions of the revolution, i.e., the national question. The EPRDF argues that a constitutionally guaranteed right to self-determination including secession is the ultimate answer to the national question. With regard to the other key question of the revolution, i.e., land, the EPRDF retained the land tenure system introduced by the post-revolution military regime. Hence, state ownership of land has remained intact and even elevated to be included into the constitution (Art. 40(3)). Both the questions of land and nationalism were key questions that the left-leaning revolutionaries promoted. However, after rising to power in 1991, some of the EPRDF’s elites started to shift their ideological orientation. The thesis considers the ideological change which has created a rupture particularly among the core leadership of TPLF as the third critical juncture relevant to present day developmentalism.

4.3.3 From Socialism to State-led Capitalism (2001)

The third critical juncture was the 2001 rupture within the TPLF. Most observers note that the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998–2000) served as a catalyst to aggravate the power struggle within the core leadership of the TPLF (Paulos Milkias 2003; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003; Medhane Tadesse and Young 2003; Medhane Tadesse 2015). During the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict, the late Prime Minister was accused ‘gambling with Ethiopian sovereignty’ by giving in to Western pressure (Medhane Tadesse and Young 2003: 396). After a convincing military victory over Eritrea, the rift among the TPLF leadership escalated to the extent of shaking both the ruling party and the Ethiopian state.

At least three major impacts resulted from the 2001 internal power struggle in the TPLF. The first impact was the resurgence of Pan-Ethiopian sentiments in the national political discourse (Medhane Tadesse and Young 2003; Bach 2014). The war can be considered a direct cause

for the re-emergence of Pan-Ethiopianism. This sentiment was considered an anti-thesis of the ethno-linguistic based federalism that the EPRDF championed. Some also argue that the late Prime Minister, who lost a critical power base in his home region because of the party split, used Pan-Ethiopian sentiment to garner support at the national level (Tadesse and Young 2003).

Second, the internal power struggle in the TPLF (which constitutes the core leadership of the EPRDF) made the federal government an important power base. The embattled late Prime Minister, who faced a strong challenge within his party, used his power in the federal government to mobilise sufficient support. In doing so, the he shifted his power base from the Tigray region to the central government (Vaughan 2011; Medhane Tadesse 2015). This was followed by large scale state restructuring. The restructuring resulted in a step-by-step merger of the ruling party with the Ethiopian state and the rise of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi as the unchallenged leader of the ruling party (Medhane Tadesse and Young 2003; Medhane Tadesse 2015).

The third and perhaps most important impact of the rupture was ideological revision. The TPLF/EPRDF ideology of revolutionary democracy which claimed to be vanguard of poor peasants and the proletariat officially recognised the crucial role of the 'national bourgeoisie' (Tadesse and Young 2003: 392). Despite being accused by his adversaries of denying the success of the revolution, the late Prime Minister insisted that revolutionary democracy was clearly about building a capitalist state (de Waal 2012). Hence, after the rupture (dubbed '*renewal*'), the Prime Minister quickly shifted his attention to reinvigorate the state structure toward achieving capitalist development. In actual and political terms, the 'renewal' process involved purging the rivals of the Prime Minister from the Party and imprisoning some of them for corruption (Paulos Milkias 2003; Medhane Tadesse 2015).

The ideological revision that occurred in 2001 has become a vital component of the EPRDF's developmentalist endeavour and its effort of shaping citizenship rights. The government streamlined its development policies of social protection, agriculture, rural development, and industrialisation with new ministerial portfolios (Lavers 2016). Such rationalisation of government policies and structure were also accompanied by a step-by-step strengthening of the executive arm of the government (Vaughan and Rafanell 2012). By recognising the role of the 'national bourgeoisie', the ruling party also officially opened the path to capitalist development (Medhane Tadesse 2015). With such kind of reinvigorated institutional and

political capacity, the EPRDF was building the foundation for a developmentalist state that could deliver rapid economic growth. However, both the long-term developmentalist vision of the ruling party and its record of reconciling Pan-Ethiopian sentiments with ethno-nationalist politics had to be tested at the ballot box. The results of the 2005 election were not pleasing for the EPRDF, but it capitalised on the results to further consolidate its developmentalist project.

4.3.4 The 2005 National Elections

The fourth critical juncture that shaped the developmentalist nature of the current Ethiopian state was the 2005 national election. As it is the most recent event, the 2005 national election has had the most pronounced impact on current state-citizen relations. The study identifies three closely related impacts. These are: the re-emergence of Pan-Ethiopianism as a political force, the increasing focus on urban centres and a growing tendency toward authoritarianism. The subsequent paragraphs will briefly reflect on these four elements.

First, opposition parties that criticised the EPRDF's ethno-linguistic based federalism used Pan-Ethiopian sentiment during the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998–2000) as a stepping stone to challenge the regime. As the 2005 election was a major national political event after the war, its impact could still be felt in the political discourse. Especially, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), which was the main contender of the EPRDF, was the main proponent of the Pan-Ethiopian agenda (Bach 2014). The party advocated for state-citizen relations based on rights instead of the ascribed status of ethnicity. The CUD managed to win 109 seats mainly in major towns and urban centres, including a clean sweep in Addis Ababa.

After surviving the electoral challenge, the EPRDF responded to the widely held Pan-Ethiopian sentiment strategically. The government dedicated a specific day every year to celebrate the national flag (Bach 2014: 106). Compared to the early 1990s discourse by the EPRDF where the Prime Minster called the flag just a 'piece of cloth', this was considered a big change (ibid: 105). The EPRDF used Flag Day as part of its strategy to promote Pan-Ethiopian nationalism in its favour and as a vital element of its developmentalist orientation. It can be argued that the Pan-Ethiopian sentiment became a potent political discourse in both camps. The opposition uses it to mobilize dissenting voices. On the contrary, the EPRDF used the Pan-Ethiopian sentiment to galvanize support for its developmentalist narrative.

Second, the 2005 elections also elevated the political significance of the urban centres. The EPRDF started to give additional focus to urban centres after the 2001 ideological revision. The urban-based national bourgeoisie was targeted by the EPRDF as a potential partner in the economic growth agenda after 2001. However, it was the 2005 election that put more pressure on the streamlining of urban focused institutional and policy frameworks as well as political mobilisation. The significant electoral defeat in major cities and urban centres played a major role. After 2005, urban focused policies were prioritised and highlighted in the national development plan – the Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (MOFED 2007; Asnake Kefale 2011). A Ministry of Urban Works and Development was also established in the new government in October 2005. New urban development programmes included large scale urban upgrading and renewal projects, condominium house construction, infrastructure development programmes (such as schools, roads and health facilities), and the provision of micro finance for small scale businesses for the urban poor (Duroyaume 2015). In this process, the private sector became a key player in the expansion of the service sector and in the huge construction projects through the provision of state contracts. As briefly mentioned in the rationale section in Chapter 1, the above discussed political dynamics is one of the reasons why the study focuses on urban youth.

Third, perhaps the most important impact of the 2005 election was its role in paving the road to authoritarianism. In many aspects, the 2005 national election was the most openly contested election in the country's entire history. Opposition parties managed to increase their seats from 12 to 170 in the official results of the election. A number of observers agree that particularly the pre-election period was relatively democratic by many standards (Abbink 2006; Tronvoll 2009; Merera Gudina 2011). However, the outcome and consequences of the election contributed to a setback to the processes of democratisation and inadvertently ended up strengthening authoritarianism (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Lefort 2010; Abbink 2006). Opposition parties accused the government of election rigging and called for street protests. Violent post-election protests occurred and based on the official reports of an Independent Commission, 193 protesters were killed by government security forces. Furthermore, around 17,000 protestors were imprisoned, including opposition party and civil society leaders (Melakou Tegegne 2008). The post-election period resulted in attacks on opposition parties and dissenting voices, and the promulgation of restrictive laws on civil society organisations (CSOs), the media and political parties.

One can argue that the 2005 elections intensified the use of repression by the EPRDF-led government as a key strategy in its relations with citizens. The intensity of the repression varied, including the closing down of offices, harassment and the imprisonment of opposition party members, the restriction of services such as fertilisers and special seeds for farmers in constituencies that voted for opposition parties during the 2005 elections, and so on (Lefort 2010; Tronvoll 2010). Tronvoll summarised the scale of political intimidation by the regime between the 2005 and 2010 election as follows:

> Four years of active state repression against democratic voices of dissent and legislative and institutional infringement on the freedom of organisation and expression did not bode well for a level playing field in the 2010 electoral process (Tronvoll 2010: 125).

These post-election scenarios forced a number of observers to categorise the 2005 election as a democratic practice with a long-term authoritarian impact (Abbink 2006; Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Lefort 2010; Merera Gudina 2011). In a normative sense, elections were supposed to ensure the upholding of democratic values and processes. However, in post-2005 Ethiopia, the reverse was true. One can mention at least two key reasons to support such a conclusion. First, the post-election violence marked the return of the full-scale repressive state apparatus in crushing dissent after the 'Red Terror' period of late 1970s. Second, repressive legal frameworks enacted by the regime in the wake of the 2005 election eventually contributed to a single party-controlled parliament. The 170 opposition seats won in 2005 were drastically reduced to only one seat in 2010. Moreover, the May 2015 election completely swept the opposition from Parliament, with 100 per cent control for the EPRDF. The virtual elimination of opposition parties from Parliament can be directly attributed to the post-2005 authoritarian politico-legal decisions implemented by the EPRDF.

Building on the above-discussed critical junctures, the subsequent sections of the chapter delve into the details of politics of building a developmental state. While doing so, the chapter will also explain how the politics of developmentalism has affected citizens' rights.

4.4 Ideological Foundations of the Aspiring Ethiopian Developmental State

Shared ideas and worldviews play an indispensable role in influencing both structures and institutions of society. Some argue that 'ideas are embedded in institutions' (Beland and Cox

2011: 9). This gives ideas the power to influence 'people's actions' that can become 'routines' and later on the basis for 'social institutions' (ibid). One of the ways through which ideas shape socio-economic and political processes is through ideologies. Ideologies allow actors to have a systematic line of thinking that can be pursued or translated into actions (Henning 2007). Hence, the effort of pursuing developmentalism necessarily requires a set of ideas that can shape people's action in way that they contribute to the developmentalist goals.

Mkandawire (2001), for example, argued about the salient role of 'developmentalist ideologies'. In his term, developmentalist ideology is committed to a 'mission' of economic development pursued through 'high rates of accumulation and industrialisation' (ibid: 290). This shows that the politics of building a developmental state has both material and ideational features. Hence, it is important to further deepen the understanding of developmentalism in Ethiopia beyond the above discussed critical junctures. The subsequent sub-sections elucidate on EPRDF's ideological orientations and explain how the ruling party's ideological orientation contributes to the prevalence of developmentalism within the Ethiopian state.

4.4.1 Revolutionary Democratic Ideology

Revolutionary democratic ideology was pioneered by V.I. Lenin to establish a proletarian dictatorship, which is an anti-thesis to a bourgeois (parliamentary) democracy (Aregawi Berhe 2008; Bach 2011). Revolutionary democracy calls for a 'vanguard party' that is committed to the principles of 'democratic centralism'. Democratic Centralism has its roots in Marxism-Leninism promoting the principle of 'complete freedom to discuss and criticise' any idea within the party before a decision is reached. After a decision is reached, 'everyone must implement the decision of the [party] no matter what their view' (Angle 2005: 525). With its Marxist-Leninist orientation, the EPRDF's revolutionary democracy ideology embodies one of the enduring legacies of the 1974 revolution. Furthermore, the EPRDF had a fertile ground within the shared worldviews and attitudes among the central and northern highland society to effectively integrate the principles of democratic centralism. The shared values and norms promote secrecy, obedience and total submission to authority, which resembles the discipline the EPRDF promotes, i.e., strict adherence to hierarchy and upward accountability.

In the early days, the EPRDF adopted revolutionary democracy as an ideology to build a socialist state. The party claimed that it aimed to liberate the oppressed people from the

shackles of Western imperialism and from the local ‘oppressive classes’ (EPRDF 1993: 1). Economically, the EPRDF sought to establish ‘complementary and regionally balanced economy’ and rapid economic growth. Revolutionary democracy bestowed a key role on the state to ‘co-ordinate, shape and guide’ economic forces with fiscal and monitory policies (ibid: 43-44). The ultimate outcomes of these economic objectives, the EPRDF argued, would be ‘self-reliance and the prevalence of economic justice’ (ibid: 14–19).

Revolutionary democracy discredits ‘liberal democracy’ for being overly representative of the upper classes with little room for majority to participate meaningfully. Hence, the party advocated ‘popular democracy’ based on collective and organised participation of the people. As discussed in the empirical chapters, the EPRDF organises young people to guide and control their collective citizenship engagement while at the same time it represses organised movements outside of its control. Through popular democracy, the EPRDF favours the use of persuasion to achieve consensus among everyone rather than representativeness (Vaughan and Tronvoll 2003; Lefort 2010). However, it is important to note that the intended ‘popular democracy’ is pursed under the auspices of a vanguard party. Hence, the EPRDF’s notion of democracy is pursued only in invited spaces which serve the party’s political purposes. Furthermore, the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ has a restraining impact in the exercise of both civil and political rights within the framework of ‘popular democracy’. One can argue that ‘democratic centralism’ is an oxymoron. It is a principle where centralism overrides genuinely democratic deliberations.

The EPRDF’s revolutionary democratic ideology promotes the use of mass organisations to restrict the bourgeoisie and comprador class from manipulating the democratic process in the name of ‘free and multiparty democracy’ (EPRDF 1993: 6). Such an ideological orientation has direct implications for citizenship rights. Contrary to the constitution, which guarantees rights for all Ethiopians, the EPRDF’s revolutionary democracy aligns itself to the protection of the rights and interests of ‘the oppressed majority’. The party argues that:

> When we say that all citizens’ democratic rights will be respected in the future socio-political system, it does not mean that Revolutionary Democracy will stand equally for the rights of the masses and the ruling classes. Our support is always for the rights of the masses only (EPRDF 1993: 1)

Furthermore, based on the Marxist ideological orientation, the EPRDF categorised Ethiopian society into four social forces: the peasantry, the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the comprador class. Of these social forces, the party vowed to protect the 'political and human rights' of 'the oppressed majority' (*ye sefiw chiqun hizb).* These are mainly the peasantry and the proletariat whose relations with the state are mainly through mass associations, which are essentially, invited spaces since they are under the direct control of the vanguard party. The mass organisations are meant to restrict the bourgeoisie and comprador class from manipulating the 'democratic process' in the name of 'free and multiparty democracy' (EPRDF 1993: 6).

In the 1990s, the EPRDF's leftism was so dominant that it categorised social forces in terms of their position within the production system. Hence, it is hardly surprising that the EPRDF did not identify the youth as a specific social force that has a specific role in itself in the production system. However, as the demographic structure changed and had direct implications for political and socio-economic dynamics, the EPRDF realised the importance of organising the youth. The new dynamics include a high rate of unemployment and political crisis that brought the youth to the streets. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the EPRDF officially recognised youth as a key political force after the 2005 election and passed a decision to establish a youth league. This demonstrates how the social position of youth and the rights they can claim are shaped by socio-economic and political processes.

It is imperative to note that, from the onset, EPRDF never conceived of the state as a detached entity from society. As argued in the relational approach to state in Chapter 2, the EPRDF's conception of the state favours particular social forces at the expense of others. Particularly, the EPRDF aimed to establish a state that advances the interests of the peasantry and the proletariat. This demonstrates that the politics of state formation is not only about putting in place institutions. It is also essentially about the processes of political alliances between ruling elites and certain social forces.

The EPRDF's revolutionary democracy has a strong antagonism to the principles and values of liberal democracy it was overseeing being institutionalised in Ethiopia in early 1990s. The EPRDF argued in its strategy document that

> Ethiopia has *one and only one opportunity* to continue its existence as a state – that is the realisation of our revolutionary democracy objectives. Without our revolutionary

> democracy objectives, not only the improvement of peoples' living standard is in jeopardy but also the very existence of Ethiopia as a state (EPRDF 1993: 22 emphasis added).

As the victorious group after the civil war, the EPRDF considered itself as the only option for the country's 'existence' and closed the door for any constructive engagement with other competing political forces. Indeed, what the EPRDF aspired to was building hegemony. It argued that:

> our revolutionary democracy forces need to have a sustained support that ensures legitimate superiority by winning all regular elections through continuous popular support to govern the country. *Losing even for a single election can create a serious danger. Hence, the road to a hegemonic dominance must be paved by winning the first election* (EPRDF 1993: 49 emphasis added).

The EPRDF attempted to ensure the dominance of its ideology in at least three interrelated spheres. First, the EPRDF dismantled the bureaucracy it inherited from the Dergue regime. Such state restructuring had two purposes. It helped the EPRDF to diffuse potential sources of resistance among remnants of the previous regime in the state bureaucracy. At the same time, it also helped the EPRDF to formally deliver on a self-administration and decentralisation programme that it had championed in the name of ethno-nationalist forces (EPRDF 1993; Young 1996; Henze 1998; Vaughan 2011). By doing so, the EPRDF installed a state structure that fit its political agenda and purpose.

Second, the EPRDF also pursued the dominance of revolutionary democracy by significantly controlling how citizens exercise civil and political rights. These include influencing how political parties, and religious, educational, and community organisations are established and operate. For example, the party directly or indirectly organised 'Peoples' Democratic Organisations (PDOs)' to serve as 'satellite representatives' of the EPRDF in newly established regional states (Henze 1998: 44; Merera Gudina2011: 667; Vaughan 2011: 627). For this purpose, the party targeted farmers, workers, 'educated but economically disadvantaged' individuals and teachers to establish new ethnically-organised PDOs (EPRDF 1993: 51-55). It also used the same members of society to co-opt and take control of already established organisations. Hence, co-optation and the establishment of invited spaces to shape

citizens' efforts of claiming civil and political rights were part of the EPRDF's strategy since the early stages.

Third, the aspiration of building the hegemony of revolutionary democracy has also been extended toward influencing the social and economic rights of citizens. The period of liberalising the socialist command economy in the 1990s offered the EPRDF a golden opportunity to establish party-affiliated business entities that benefited from the economic restructuring. The EPRDF member parties, particularly the TPLF, established 'economic development organisations' and 'charity foundations' that had extra advantages during the period of peak privatisation (Paulos Milkias 2001: 16-19; Gebru Asrat 2014: 156-158). A good example in this case is the TPLF-led business organisation the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT), which was established in mid-1995. With all its current and previous board members coming from only the TPLF, EFFORT is currently one of the largest business empires in Ethiopia, with investments in every lucrative sector. These include mining, banking and insurance, heavy industry such as metal, chemical and cement industries, the retail sector, the import and export sectors, engineering and construction, mechanised agriculture (Vaughan and Mesfin Gebremichael 2011).

To sum up, the 1990s witnessed the EPRDF's aspiration to ensure the dominance of its revolutionary democratic ideology by shaping the state structure and state-citizen relations. The EPRDF clearly stated that it stood for the peasants and the proletariat and proclaimed itself as vanguard of the oppressed. However, such kind of partisanship of the 'oppressed' did not last long and was not found promising to launch a developmentalist project. Hence a '*renewal*' happened.

4.3.2 Ideological Revision – the '*Renewal*'

In the wake of the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998–2000), an ideological rift occurred within the TPL. The elites of the party had opposing views on the political approach that the party should adopt. Some remained loyal to their Marxist background and wanted to keep 'class struggle' as an undisputed political mobilisation strategy whilst others were favouring 'class reconciliation' with economic elite as a viable strategy (Medhane Tadesse and Young 2003: 390). The Prime Minister led a faction, which later became victorious, promoting reconciliation with the economic and business elites and pursuing rapid economic growth. After the rift, the EPRDF reformed its ideological orientation and adopted a revised

programme at the Fourth Congress in September 2001. In the revised programme, revolutionary democracy recognised the crucial role of the 'national bourgeoisie'. In its 1993 strategy document, the comprador and petit bourgeoisie were categorised as 'enemies' of revolutionary democracy forces. In the revised programme, the former enemies have become vital 'social forces that play indispensable role to development' (EPRDF 2001: 11). Since then, the 2001 split was dubbed the '*Renewal*'.

In the revised programme, the EPRDF embraced 'building a free market economy' (EPRDF 2001: 8) as a basic objective of the party. The party underscored the increasing impact of the interconnected and globalised world. Hence, the party aimed not only for 'rapid economic growth' but also an improved economy that could 'end dependency on aid' and 'guarantee economic independence' (ibid). The revised programme states that:

> Our effort to build a free market economy cannot be conceived without creating a private wealth owner that can massively engage in developmental activity … We need to adopt a strategy that enables the role of the private wealth owner in our developmental activities and diminishes the rent seeker (the dependent). (EPRDF 2001: 9)

The EPRDF clearly shifted its alliance with social forces – from the poor peasants and proletariat to the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the EPRDF also aimed to establish international alliance with forces in favour of 'free market and democracy'. The party identified 'national interest' as the core principle of international alliance and co-operation. In the earlier internal document, the party framed revolutionary democracy as a strategy of manoeuvring in the international scene dominated by 'imperialists'. On the contrary, in the post-renewal programme, the EPRDF sought to establish an 'alliance and co-operation' with global forces to pursue its agenda of rapid growth under the free market and democratic system.

Nevertheless, despite the ideological revision, the EPRDF's position on the role of state toward socio-economic development hardly changed. The state remained the main actor, not a 'night watchman' state recommended by the World Bank and the IMF. Hence, the kind of free market the EPRDF is promoting is 'a state-led or controlled free market'. However, the ideological reform allowed the introduction of dominant discourses of democracy and good governance into state policy documents. In one post-renewal policy document, the EPRDF-led government claimed that 'democracy and good governance are existential questions'

(MoI: 11). However, such very liberal leaning views were kept hand in hand with the revolutionary democracy ideology. In one of the strategic documents entitled '*Issues about Democratic System Building in Ethiopia'*, the EPRDF stated the following:

> A country needs to have democratic order to realise good governance. However, a democratic system does not necessarily lead to good governance. Democracy is not a guarantee for effective state bureaucracy, for corruption free governance, nor to inclusive and rapid development. Good governance can prevail only in a state that is committed to effectiveness, controlling corruption and enabling rapid growth. We need both in our country. Unless we have both, democracy hardly saves our country from crisis and demise. (MoI: 82)

It seems that the EPRDF recognised the challenge of the democracy-development nexus. It specifically argued that democracy cannot be a solution for every problem. However, the remedy that the EPRDF is providing sounds more technocratic than political because of its focus on an effective state that ensures good governance. Therefore, one can argue that, at least at discursive level, the EPRDF started to show a commitment to build a state that effectively delivers inclusive and rapid development rather than democratic state. By implication, the rights of citizens have become a secondary priority compared the need to have an effective state that is committed to good governance.

The EPRDF also aspired to impose its own version of democracy on the post-renewal period. In another internal document, the EPRDF argued:

> The only democracy that is possible in Ethiopia is 'revolutionary democracy'… When revolutionary democracy permeates the entire Ethiopian society, individuals will start to think alike and all persons will cease having their independent outlook. In this order, individual thinking becomes simply part of collective thinking because the individual will not be in a position to reflect on concepts that have not been prescribed by revolutionary democracy (EPRDF 2001; cited in Aregawi Berhe 2008: 234).

From the onset, the kind of democracy that the EPRDF aspired to impose negates the civil and political rights of citizens enshrined in the Ethiopian constitution. In its human rights section, the constitution states that 'everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion' (Article 27 (1) FDRE 1995). Moreover, the democratic rights section of the

constitution emphasised that 'everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference' (article 29 (1)). The political strategy that the EPRDF adopted to ensure the hegemony of revolutionary democracy violates the rights of citizens guaranteed in the constitution. Furthermore, the EPRDF's intention of controlling both 'individual and collective thinking' and its hostile approach toward 'independent outlook' demonstrates its intolerance to citizens' efforts to pursue civil and political rights. The first challenge that the EPRDF faced in operationalising this political strategy was during the regular national elections in 2005.

In the May 2005 elections, the EPRDF faced a real power-threatening political challenge. The hastily organised opposition groups were able to mobilise significant numbers of voters to win around 30 per cent of the parliamentary seats. However, this unprecedented election was also filled with irregularities, which later led to post-election violence and a violent crackdown against the opposition[14] (EU-EOM Report 2005; Carter Centre Report 2009). The ruling party's aim to build a developmental state would have been compromised considerably if it had failed to keep its power at the federal level in 2005. Afterwards, the EPRDF learned a lesson from the 2005 election and implemented a series of politico-legal measures to prevent similar political upsets from the opposition. As will be demonstrated in the following section, the EPRDF's effort to strengthen its grip on power is inextricably linked with its aspiration of building a democratic developmental state.

4.4.3 Developmental Alliance Creation with an Urban Focus

After the 2005 election, the EPRDF adopted a new strategy for mobilising different segments of the public. Farmers, women, youth, teachers, traders, business leaders, trade union and community leaders were invited to meet with senior officials. The electoral loss gave the party a lesson that mass mobilisation was equally important as the restructuring of the state from a central to a federal state (Paulos Chane 2007; Merera Gudina 2011). As a result, the EPRDF held a series of meetings all over the country in rural and urban areas in late 2005 and 2006. The EPRDF unofficially stated that the purpose of the meetings was 'asking forgiveness' (Vaughan 2011: 632). While participants were using the meetings to express

[14]Election observation reports by European Union and the Carter Centre published in 2005 and 2009 respectively covered a considerable number of irregularities, particularly during the vote counting and tabulation. Both reports also noted that the relatively peaceful pre-election period which deteriorated significantly after Election Day. The reports also mentioned that hundreds of citizens were killed and thousands were imprisoned because of their protest against the actions of the government.

their grievances, the EPRDF claimed the meetings demonstrated the party's determination to establish a 'coalition with the people' (ibid: 620).

The EPRDF aligned its new political strategy of mass mobilisation with the revised ideological orientation of reaching out to business and economic elites. In the rural areas, the meetings primarily targeted 'rich and successful farmers' who were latterly identified as 'model' farmers and celebrated as 'development patriots' (Lefort 2010). Such kind of targeted mobilisation was informed by the new alliance that the EPRDF sought to create in its pursuit of economic growth. An internal party document stated that:

> The organisational and political manifestation of the pre-renewal ideology relied on the destitute and impoverished peasants. This force can be a reliable base for socialist change. However, it can hardly be a leader and promoter for a change within a free market framework (EPRDF 2008: 5).

The revised ideological orientation of building a capitalist state required the EPRDF to shift its alliance from social forces that it claimed were 'poor' and 'oppressed' to productive and wealthy ones. In the rural areas, the EPRDF identified 'rich farmers' as its key targets. The newly created alliance was politically justified because it coincided with the economic growth the country was registering since 2004. Hence, the meeting with different segments of the public was an alliance creation which also included the mass recruitment of new members. In most cases, individuals attending the meetings were 'informed' that they had become members of the party (Lefort 2010; Vaughan 2011).

The EPRDF particularly targeted the urban centres in its post-2005 endeavour of alliance creation. By recruiting new members from different segments of society, the party aimed at creating a social force with whome the party could establish an alliance for its economic and political agenda. As will be further explained in Chapter 5, the micro and small scale schemes, for instance, served the purpose of mobilising the economically disadvantaged urban poor to create a political base by providing economic opportunities. Furthermore, the party also recruited young citizens primarily through a co-optation strategy to make them a viable political force during elections. The political mission of mobilising the urban population is further highlighted in the EPRDF's strategy. The party argued:

> *It is necessary to prioritise the creation of political and economic force in urban centres that resembles the rich farmers force in rural areas. Bringing this force to leadership should be a top priority*. Our urban leadership and mission can improve in quality and skill only by creating such kind of social force. [At the moment] Unnecessary focus on quality and skill is a waste of time. We should rather grab whatever available and focus on our work [of creating a political and economic force]. Quality and breadth can be achieved through the process of creating the force (EPRDF 2008: 54 emphasis added).

The emphasis the EPRDF gave to 'prioritise political and economic force in urban centres' demonstrated the new urban focus in the EPRDF's post-2005 political strategy and justifies the focus of this thesis. The mission of establishing a 'coalition with the people' was literally building a political and economic base for the party's goals. This explains why the massive recruitment of new members both in rural and urban areas was carried out. As a result of this mission of expanding membership, the party's membership increased exponentially from roughly 760,000 during the 2005 elections to more than 4 million in 2008 (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008: 117). Clearly, the expansion of membership contributed to better electoral results at least numerically in the subsequent elections.

Furthermore, in addition to recruiting new members EPRDF also introduced restructuring of the local government. The restructuring of local government was a carefully designed political strategy of ensuring nearly a totalitarian presence of the ruling party. The newly recruited members from different segments of society were very instrumental in realising this strategy of dominance. For example, local council seats in each *kebele* grew significantly from 15 to 300. As a result, during the 2008 local elections, there were more than 3.5 million seats to be contested for (ibid: 116). Establishing a council of 300 members to the lowest tier of governance structure, which governs between 1000–3000 inhabitants was nothing but an act of expanding the controlling arm of the government (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008: 116-117).

The EPRDF's effort to regain political legitimacy and to ensure total control and dominance in the post-2005 political context contributed to the emergence of mass based associations as invited spaces of citizenship. The ruling party established different mass associations especially in urban areas as part of its political project of building a 'coalition with the people'. The mass associations were given the name of 'forums'. The forums established include the Youth Forum, the Women's Forum, the Inhabitants' Forum, the Traders' Forum,

and the Women Trader's Forum (EPRDF 2006). The Youth Forum established in Addis Ababa will be further discussed in the following empirical chapter. These mass associations served as mediums of mobilising citizens. After a huge membership expansion project and the establishment of mass associations, the EPRDF was in a better political standing during the 2008 local elections. Furthermore, with the expansion of local government structures, the ruling party was the only party who could register as many candidates as required. Logically, the party used both its new members and the members of the forums it established to field candidates for the millions of local council seats. Inevitably, the ruling party 'won' the local councils election with a landslide victory.

Two implications can be drawn from the results of the 2008 elections. First, the results gave the EPRDF political legitimacy after losing significant number of parliamentary seats in 2005. Most importantly, gaining political legitimacy in the urban areas was a huge success. Especially in Addis Ababa, the party reversed the clean sweep result of the 2005 election. Hence, the EPRDF controlled the city council, which was boycotted by the main opposition party, the CUD. Second, the victory in the local elections gave the EPRDF a huge political momentum to use its political power and dominance for the following national election in 2010. The mass based associations, significantly large size membership and the closely tied party-state structures were used during the local elections for the first time. After controlling local councils with a resounding 'victory', the EPRDF could aim for the 2010 national elections with better confidence.

As expected, the EPRDF 'won' the 2010 national election. The result was both unexpected for the EPRDF itself. The Party won 99.6 per cent of the parliamentary seats. The election victory in 2010 also consolidated the EPRDF's efforts of fusing the ruling party with the state structure, leading to the establishment of a Party-state. Furthermore, such unprecedented control of the legislature and their nearly absolute dominance in the political sphere encouraged the EPRDF to take its developmentalist mission to another level. The following section will further elaborate the new elements of the developmentalist orientation in the wake of the May 2010 election victory.

4.4.4 From Revolutionary Democracy to Democratic Developmentalism

The Party-state used its dominance within the formal structures of government to officially launch its mission of achieving democratic developmentalism (MoFED 2010). As early as

2006, the late Prime Minister mentioned the EPRDF's efforts to find an 'alternative development paradigm' to neoliberalism through 'democratic developmentalism' (Zenawi 2006). The Prime Minister linked the 2001 split within the TPLF as a part of the 'slow and painful processes' (ibid) of articulating a development paradigm that fit the Ethiopian context. However, there was no official mention of this paradigm until the enormous electoral victory of May 2010. The Party-state then argued that democratic developmentalism would be a remedy to Ethiopia's primarily 'rent-seeking political economy' and 'zero-sum game politics' (EPRDF 2010: 45).

The Party-state argued the Ethiopian developmental state has two mission objectives. The mission objectives were: 'rectifying a rent-seeking political economy' and 'ensuring selective and effective government intervention to address market failures' (ibid: 45). Furthermore, the Party-state also identified three 'basic characters' of the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state. These were: 'taking development as an existential question', 'political and economic autonomy from the economic elite' and 'creating the hegemony of developmentalist thinking' (ibid). The Party-state referred to the experiences of Taiwan and South Korea whilst identifying these 'mission objectives' and 'basic characters' of the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state. Furthermore, it also attempted to contextualise both the need for a developmental state and the aspiration to the Ethiopian setting particularly to its previous ideological orientation.

The Party-state argues that revolutionary democracy and democratic developmentalism can be used interchangeably. In doing so, the Party-state appeared to achieve a dual goal. First, it sought to gain credit for its original ideology in achieving economic growth and enabling the party to be a dominant political force. Second, the Party-state also claimed legitimacy because its positive track record of both political and economic success. An internal strategy document argues:

> There is only one way that revolutionary democracy can happen now both at national and international context. ... *developmental democracy can be seen as the only timely manifestation of revolutionary democracy*. Revolutionary democracy epitomises our historical root, the revolutionary and democratic behaviour of our organisation; hence it is our correct name. Likewise, developmental democracy is also our correct name, because it describes the present day essence of revolutionary democracy as well as the true face of its emergence and realisation (EPRDF 2010: 57 emphasis added).

Based on the internal strategy document reviewed earlier, this thesis argues that revolutionary democracy is a leftist ideology aimed at building a socialist state. Later on, when the EPRDF changed its goal to 'statist capitalism' similar to China, the ideology remained the same. If the EPRDF used the same ideology to achieve opposite objectives, it can be argued that it is more of a discursive instrument and strategy that help the party to be flexible and adaptive in its approach to control state power (Bach 2011). The dramatic shift that occurred in 2001 demonstrates that revolutionary democracy is more of a pragmatic strategy than a thoroughly developed ideological orientation.

After presenting democratic developmentalism as a new version of revolutionary democracy, the EPRDF followed the same strategy for achieving hegemony. The party document reads that:

> There is one and only one way that can ensure the continuity of the developmentalist direction. It is only by ascertaining a hegemonic position so that developmentalism can penetrate into the public domain and become the dominant thinking and cultural orientation. In order to do so, we have learned that a massive public relation and indoctrination task is essential (EPRDF 2010: 69).

In its mission of building hegemony of democratic developmentalism, the Party-state adopted strategies similar to those used to make revolutionary democracy dominant. This makes the politics of building a democratic developmental state a continuation of the political processes that started since the early 1990s. The identified practices included dominating universities, research institutions, CSOs and religious institutions. These venues were considered as battlegrounds to fight the neoliberal thinking which usually has, according to the Party-state, a foreign origin and operates with strong financial power (EPRDF 2010: 68-72)

EPRDF's effort to achieve ideological dominance demonstrates that its political strategy has both material and ideational manifestations. This can also be linked with Mkandawire's argument about the salience of developmentalist ideology in building a developmental state (Mkandawire 2001). Furthermore, as argued earlier, the ideas have a vital role in shaping state-led strategies of both co-operation and co-optation by portraying the 'ideal' or 'normative' attributes of a citizen. In Chapter 5, the thesis will further investigate how legal and policy frameworks particularly focusing on youth portray the ideal young citizen in their discourses.

The Party-state further argued that the hegemony of developmental democracy is achieved only if it can transcend the life span of the EPRDF either as a ruling party or as an organisation. Hence, the primary focus has been to ensure the prevalence of ‘developmental and democratic thinking’ among the entire population. Furthermore, without explicitly mentioning the notion of ‘dominant party’, the Party-state has made itself ready to remain in power by winning consecutive elections and by scaling up its developmental achievements (ibid: 73–75).

One can also observe the continuity of the ideals of revolutionary democracy under a new brand of democratic developmentalism. Perhaps the major difference is the context in which democratic developmentalism is currently pursued. When the EPRDF-led government pursued its political mission of under the revolutionary democracy ideology, Ethiopia was recovering from a 17 years long civil war. There was also a direct influence from the international financial institutions to implement structural adjustment programs. However, when the Party-state officially launched its mission of democratic developmentalism in 2010, it has already achieved successive economic growth nearly for five years and heavily dominated the formal political institutions. As it will be further elaborated in the subsequent section, the Party-state pursued its developmentalist agenda through an effective combination of politico-legal frameworks and socio-economic policies. This has helped the Party-state to have a relatively conducive context to pursue its developmentalist mission.

In conclusion, the above sections presented the ideological roots that have been shaping the politics of building the developmental state in Ethiopia. As discussed earlier, the EPRDF pursued the revolutionary democracy ideology to pursue its political project. The ideology initially sought to create an alliance with poor peasants and the proletariat which later changed to ‘rich farmers’ and ‘the business and economic elites’. This shift in allegiance demonstrates that the state can hardly remain a neutral actor within state-society relations. Rather, the political priorities of the state are inclined toward the interest of certain social forces.

Furthermore, this section also discussed how the fusion of the ruling party with state structure was pursued. The above-discussed section also examined how the EPRDF responded to the most significant political challenge it has faced, the 2005 elections. The EPRDF used the electoral defeat in major urban areas to re-organise itself with more power within the state structures and among other social forces by recruiting as many new members as possible.

This effort of creating a political and social base in the urban areas paid off with a victory both in local and national elections. Finally, after successfully cementing its developmentalist ideology into the historically embedded, dominant and centralised structures and institutions of the Ethiopian state, the EPRDF officially declared its developmental objective of building a democratic developmental state in 2010. The subsequent sections of the chapter will further elaborate how the party-state pursued its developmentalist agenda through politically inspired legal frameworks and socio-economic policies.

4.5 Developmentalism in Practice: *legal and policy frameworks*

The previous sections sought to examine the politics of building a developmental state by scrutinising the evolution of the Ethiopian state and the ideological orientations of the ruling party. This section builds on the arguments presented thus far to examine the actual pursuit of developmentalism. As argued in Chapter 2, the essential elements of developmental statism the thesis focuses on are the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives. In doing so, this section will specifically examine politico-legal frameworks that have been used by the EPRDF (later, the Party-state) to ensure the hegemony of its ideology. At the same time, the section will also examine the socio-economic policies that delivered both economic growth and development over the last decade. The central argument is that developmentalism is operationalised through politico-legal frameworks and socio-economic policies that are strongly linked with the mutually reinforcing political purposes and the developmental objectives of the aspiring developmental state.

The crucial factors of pursuing developmentalism are found in the restriction of civil and political rights to ensure political dominance and the robust commitment to rapid economic growth to make it a principal source of legitimacy. It appears that the Party-state clearly understood the essential role of politics and political power in operationalising its developmentalist orientation. The late Prime Minister, in many ways the architect of the aspiring developmental state, argues that:

> Development is a political process first and economic and social process later. It is the creation of a political set-up that is conducive to accelerated development that sets the ball of development rolling (Meles Zenawi 2011: 170).

The subsequent sections critically examine how the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state created the 'political set-up', as argued by Meles Zenawi, through politically inspired legal frameworks and socio-economic policies that aimed to generate legitimacy. In doing so, the thesis will specifically examine how the 'political set-up' through which developmentalism is operationalised shapes state-citizens relations and the contestation for citizenship rights.

4.5.1 The Securitisation of Development

The Ethiopian Party-State pursues its developmentalist mission through discursive notions of the 'securitisation of development' (Dereje Feyissa 2011: 794; Gagliardone 2014: 283; Fana Gebresenbet 2014: S67). The securitisation of development occurs when development is framed as a mission to resolve a problem that is 'posing an existential threat'. Hence, 'the special nature of security threats' is used as a justification to 'the use of extraordinary measures to handle them' (Buzan *et.al*. 1998: 21). The securitisation of development is used in terms of 'systemic vulnerability' (Doner *et.al* 2005) to explain the success of East Asian developmental states. Threats of internal strife, external threats of national insecurity and resource constraints were used as necessary and sufficient conditions to frame development as a survival strategy (ibid).

The securitisation of development serves the political purposes of the Party-State in two ways. First, it gives the Party-State political justification to categorise and attack perceived and actual competing political actors. The securitisation of development sets the tone for the Party-state to enact politico-legal instruments to repress organised social forces that challenge its discourses of developmentalism. The main target groups are CSOs, political parties and private media. Second, the securitisation of development also gives the Party-state the impetus to establish multiple structures of mobilising citizens toward its political purposes and developmental objectives. These structures serve as invited spaces of state-citizen relations (mass associations), channels of propaganda and indoctrination (monopolised public media institutions) or channels of execution (expanded state structures).

The securitisation of development has a direct impact on the public space where citizens exercise their citizenship rights. It provides a politically justified ground to close down spaces of exercising civil and political rights. For example, the Ethiopian Party-State identified poverty as an 'existential threat' and declared 'war on poverty' to avoid national calamity. It argued the fight against poverty was a battle against the 'signs of Armageddon' (Bereket

Simon 2011: 37). Hence, extraordinarily rapid development is required to reverse the looming danger caused by poverty. As quoted in de Waal (2012: 154), Meles Zenawi argued that 'I am convinced that we will cease to exist as a nation unless we grow fast and share our growth'.

Likewise, another senior EPRDF official quoted a report by the late Prime Minister at one of the EPRDF's executive council meetings in November 2002 in his book. The late Prime Minister compared the need to adopt rapid development policies and practices with a person running for a refuge against a speeding avalanche:

> A person in this run must know the short cut to get to the refuge not to be smashed by the avalanche heading his way at a high and increasing speed. However, knowing the shortcut is not enough. Unless the run is quicker than the avalanche, the person can be smashed where he is standing or a step away from the refuge. Slowness is as deadly as the avalanche and speed is as equally vital as taking the right direction the refuge; both are essential elements of survival … Our situation is that we have taken the right path but unless we have the necessary speed to escape the danger, we will inevitably give way to the danger (Bereket Simon 2011: 38)

Furthermore, the securitisation of development helps the Party-State to present development as 'a matter of utmost urgency deserving extraordinary measures' (Fana Gebresenbet 2014: S66). Such urgency in turn used as a justification of relegating citizenship rights, particularly civil and political rights, as subordinate concerns. Within the securitisation of development, the 'war on poverty' is constructed as 'securitising act' (ibid: S70) which requires military-like mobilisation toward defeating the perceived enemy. The securitisation of development also introduced discourses of war and army-like structures of mobilisation. Examples of such structures that are very common in the pursuit of developmentalism include '*ye-limat serawit*' (development army), command post, '*tsere-dehenet tigil*' (anti-poverty struggle), '*ye-lemat arbegna'* (development patriots), '*ye-lemat jegina'* (development heroes), and '*tsere-limat*' (anti-development) (ibid). These structures of mobilisation serve the purpose of securitising development by narrowing the public space and closing down spheres of pursuing civil and political rights. At the same time, the economic opportunities attached to these structures also make co-optation a viable strategy of citizenship, where social and economic rights are offered at the expense of civil and political rights. The discursive power of these structures of mobilisation can also be linked with the ideational attributes of pursuing

developmentalism. Hence, securitisation of development is not only the physical restriction civil and political rights of citizens. Securitisation is also manifested in the explicit and implicit message that is conveyed through the naming and framing of the structures of mobilisation.

The Party-state used at least three specific legal frameworks to pursue its developmentalist orientation through the securitisation of development. These legal frameworks are the Freedom of Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation (Proclamation 590/2008), the Civil Society and Charities Proclamation (Proclamation 621/2009), and the Anti-terrorism Proclamation (Proclamation 652/2009). All the three proclamations came into force in the wake of the highly contested 2005 elections. The ruling party used these legal instruments effectively to pursue its political purpose of dominating the political sphere before and after the 2010 elections. These legal frameworks have had direct implications in restricting individual and collective efforts of pursuing civil and political rights by citizens.

For example, the EPRDF categorised foreign NGOs as 'Trojan horses' of instilling neoliberalism and rent-seeking political economy (EPRDF 2008: 5-23). As a result, the new proclamation restricted the role of civil society organisations' work on advocacy and rights related issues based on the amount of foreign funding in their annual income. Any civil society with more than 10 per cent of its annual income coming from foreign sources is banned from political activities. The proclamation forced thousands of civil society organisations to vanish, significantly reduce their operations or shift their focus to 'non-political' activities (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009, Debebe Hailegebraeil 2010, Sisay Alemahu Yeshanew 2012, Dupuy*et.al.* 2015). As will be further discussed in Chapter 6, the proclamation has placed severe restrictions on young citizens pursuing civil and political rights by establishing youth-led NGOs. When accused of 'clamping down' on CSOs, the late Prime Minister argued that the new law is 'empowering, because civil society has to be expression of the membership' rather than funding from the outside (Tronvoll 2012: 275).

The political purposes embedded within the civil society proclamation can be understood if one examines the activities of the ruling party toward controlling the public space. Whilst legally restricting and diminishing the role of independently organised citizens' platforms, the ruling party dominated the public sphere with its own public mobilisation structures. In the wake of the 2005 election, the ruling party aggressively mobilised and recruited youth, teachers, students, farmers, government employees and traders. These were gathered into the

Women's, Youth and Inhabitants Forums, the Youth and Women's Leagues in urban areas, and village and household level structures in rural areas (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008: 115; Lefort 2010; 436-449; Nunzio 2014; 11). The EPRDF argues,

> it is essential to involve all societal initiatives in the state building struggle in an organised and effective manner so that the hegemony of developmental and democratic thinking is ensured both in the practical and ideational struggle (EPRDF 2010: 70).

To this end, the EPRDF established its Youth League (180,000 founding members) in May 2009 and reached more than two million registered members in 2013 (EPRDF 2013: 32-33). These mass based associations also played an immense role in exponentially increasing the EPRDF's registered membership from roughly 700,000 members in 2005 to more than 6.5 million in 2013 (ibid: 3). The Party-state also used these newly recruited members to fill up the newly created council seats in thousands of local constituencies. The expanded local state structures (district and *kebele*) needed approximately four million candidates across the country. Through such mobilisation, only the ruling party could provide these candidates (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009: 203).

The securitisation of development is playing a positive role towards ensuring the dominance of developmentalist thinking. The Party-state aimed to establish the dominance of developmentalism by restricting actors who could provide alternative views and perspectives. To this end, the Party-state enacted politico-legal frameworks that deterred private media institutions and opposition political parties. In this regard, legal frameworks focusing on the media (Proclamation 590/2008) and anti-terrorism (652/2009) served the political purposes of the Party-state. Private media institutions and journalists were targeted by both laws to put administrative and legal barriers to their professional engagement and by the criminalisation of dissenting views against the Party-state.

Since the Party-state pursues developmentalism as a mission of saving the nation from 'existential threat', it does not tolerate any dissenting and critical views on its record of economic growth. For example, in January 2014, the Party-state controlled public media institutions the Ethiopian Press Agency and the Ethiopian News Agency published a report targeting private media institutions and magazines. The objective of this study was to 'assess the role of [selected] magazines in the nation's peace, democracy and development' (Addis

Zemen 2014 Vo.73, No.120). The study focused on seven magazines and their content over a two month period from September–November 2013. The study measured the content of the magazines on six broadly defined themes. The themes were: 'belittling the constitution', 'blackening the political system', 'denying the economic growth', 'promoting terrorism' and 'calling for unrest'. The study epitomises how the securitisation of development shapes the relation between the Party-state and private media. As a result, in 2014 alone, six privately owned publications were closed, 22 journalists, bloggers, publishers were criminally charged, and 30 journalists fled the country in fear of persecution (Human Rights Watch 2015). In Chapter 6, the thesis will further examine the case of young bloggers in line with the securitisation of development and the use of repressive strategies.

There are indications that demonstrate the success of the Party-state in building the 'hegemony of developmentalism' by influencing the individual and collective thinking of citizens. For example, an Afro-Barometer survey in 2013 produced a surprising result compared to many other African countries and different from what was observed. The survey found that more than 81 per cent of Ethiopians 'consider[ed] their country as either a complete democracy or a democracy with only minor problems' (Mattes and Mulu Teka 2016: 6). The researchers associated these exceptional survey results by examining the data collection process and responses of the participants to other questions. Among the different explanations given by the authors included factors related with the understanding of democracy by the respondents and their perception of the data collection process. The authors argued that most of the respondents have an instrumentalist understanding of democracy where the provision of economic and social rights through service delivery is highly regarded. Hence, rather than focusing on the fulfilment of civil and political rights and the effective functioning of institutions, the respondents measured democracy in terms of the material welfare it provided for the citizens (ibid). Second, 'two-thirds of the respondents' thought that they believed the enumerators were sent by the state (ibid: 2). Hence, a 'fear' of any repercussion from the government also played a vital role in the highly positive data generated. Other crucial factors included the fact that only two per cent of rural dwellers read a newspaper every week and only three per cent of the rural population owns television. Such factors made the authors too cautious about the overall survey results about democracy in Ethiopia.

In a context where the Party-state has unprecedented control and dominance over citizens' lives, it is hardly surprising for a nationally representative survey to return these findings. The results of the survey demonstrate the level of restriction that citizens feel from the perceived and actual presence of the Party-state. Furthermore, the kind of state-citizen relations that the Party-state seeks to promote are also having a tangible impact. It will be a remarkable achievement from the Party-state's perspective if citizens measure democracy by the level of economic opportunities that they are able to access. As developmental states seek to derive legitimacy based on their performance, such an observation would be a tremendous success for the Party-state.

It is also important to understand recent uprisings and the remedies that the Party-state took to address the protests in the context of the securitisation of development. Core causes of the protests that lingered from November 2015–October 2016 included the political marginalisation of ethnolinguistic groups, the expulsion of farmers from their lands without proper compensation, political suppression and corruption.[15] The Party-state accused opposition parties and their efforts to disrupt its developmentalist orientation as the core reason behind the protests.[16] The protests occurred in different parts of the country, mainly in the Oromia and Amhara regions. When the protests reached a culmination point in early October 2016, the Party-state declared a state of emergency and established a Command Post led by the Minister of Defence.[17] After the state of emergency, the Party-state mobilised its repressive arm with full force and imprisoned thousands of individuals who participated in the protests and who were also known for their vocal opposition. In April 2017, the government-affiliated Ethiopian Human Rights Commission reported that around 900 people were killed in the protests since end of 2015.[18] The Human Rights Council, a local civil society organisation, also published a report in May 2017 stating that 22,507 individuals were

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[15] http://addisstandard.com/editorial-ethiopia-should-stop-killing-maiming-and-incarcerating-its-peoples-question/ (Acceded on 19 June 2017) ; https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren-lefort/ethiopia-s-crisis (Accessed on 19 June 2017) ; https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren-lefort/ethiopian-spring-killing-is-not-answer-to-our-grievances (Accessed on 19 June 2017)

[16] http://hornaffairs.com/am/2016/08/22/eprdf-executive-committee-statement/ (Accessed 19 June 2017)

[17] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37679165 (Accessed on 19 June 2017)

[18] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/report-669-killed-ethiopia-violence-august-170418164259637.html (Accessed on 19 June 2017) ; http://thereporterethiopia.com/content/commission-names-responsible-parties-deadly-violence (Accessed on 19 June 2017)

imprisoned after the declaration of the state of emergency.[19] This shows to what extent the Party-state relies on the repressive arm of the government and the use of violence whenever its political dominance is challenged.

To sum up, the above section argued how the Party-state pursues developmentalism through the securitisation of development. The key aspects discussed were the closing down of public spaces, the large scale mobilisation of different segments of society to dominate the controlled public spaces and the use of legal frameworks to criminalise citizens' initiatives. The securitisation of development helps the Party-state to pursue its political purposes of dominance where civil and political rights are extremely restricted. However, operationalising developmentalism is not only about pursuing the political purposes of dominance. It is also equally about ensuring the other aspect of the dual agenda, i.e., achieving the developmental objectives. To this end, the following section will discuss socio-economic policies that helped the Party-state to achieve economic growth and the remarkable development which have become sources of legitimising its political dominance.

4.5.2 Developmentalist Socio-economic Policy Frameworks

As argued in Chapter 2, developmental statism requires the fulfilment of both political purposes and developmentalist objectives. Whilst the politico-legal frameworks discussed earlier achieved the political purpose of the Party-state, the following socio-economic policies serve its developmental objectives. The most essential goal of developmentalist socio-economic policies is to facilitate state-led capitalist accumulation, which is also the source of legitimacy (Castels 1992; Mkandwire 2001; Mattes and Mulu Teka 2016). The subsequent sections present how the EPRDF's socio-economic policies since the early 1990s have evolved to become developmentalist and successful in achieving economic growth, especially for the last 12 years. For the sake of deeper analysis and coherence, the following sub-sections are divided into two where the evolution of policies is examined in relation to the revision of the EPRDF's revolutionary democratic ideology in 2001.

[19] http://addisstandard.com/news-human-rights-council-ethiopia-releases-report-on-rights-abuses-committed-under-current-state-of-emergency/ (Accessed on 19 June 2017)

4.5.2.1 Pre-Renewal State-led Development (1991–2001)

As Ethiopia was coming out of 17 years of civil war, the EPRDF had to deal with a number of internal and external challenges during the first decade of its reign. The internal challenges include the peace and stability concerns during the Transitional Government period, the recovery from the war economy, the demobilisation of rebel fighters, the adoption of the constitution, elections, and the establishment of the federal and regional governments (De Waal 2012; Vaughan 2015). Major external challenges include the pressure from the IMF and WB to liberalise the economy and the 1998–2000 Ethio-Eritrean border war (Stiglitz 2002; Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll 2001). By the end of the first decade, the EPRDF came out of all the challenges and consolidated its dominance in the newly established federal republic.

During the first decade in power, the EPRDF garnered remarkable political and economic capacity to remain the most dominant force in Ethiopia. One way of achieving this dominance was linking the state-led development objectives to the economic gains of the ruling party. For example, one of the EPRDF's flagship development strategies, Agricultural Development led Industrialisation (ADLI), was a dominant development endeavour during the 1990s. The EPRDF sought to improve the productivity of small-scale farmers and to use agricultural development as a springboard to launch an industrial economy. The EPRDF rightfully judged that Ethiopia's economic growth should primarily focus on the majority of its population, which is the rural population, constituting 85 per cent of the total in the 1990s (EPRDF 1995). Hence, ADLI was a labour-intensive agriculture development strategy in a context where there was acute shortage of capital and advanced technology. Donor support and particularly the use of agricultural extension workers contributed to the positive record of the ADLI policy (Dercon *et al.* 2008). While pursuing its agricultural development policy, the EPRDF also benefited economically as a service provider. Studies indicate that party-affiliated business organisation took advantage of the opening up of the agriculture sector and their political affiliation with the party to collectively monopolise the distribution of fertiliser, specialised seeds and other vital agricultural inputs (Berhanu Abegaz 2013; Kassahun Berhanu and Poulton 2014).

Likewise, the EPRDF also took advantage of the liberalisation of the economy mainly to local investors and the privatisation of state enterprises to strengthen its economic muscle. The EPRDF-established 'endowment owned-funds' (Altenburg 2010) under each member party served as economic arms of the party. Among these business organisations, the

Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) was the most prominent. Established in the 1995, currently EFFORT has direct involvement in the mining, manufacturing, service, merchandise, construction and agricultural sectors.[20] Furthermore, EFFORT also has a share in the finance sector, media and publishing sector (Vaughan and Mesfin Gebremichael 2011; Berhanu Abegaz 2013). When Western institutions such as the IMF put pressure on the EPRDF to liberalise the economy in the 1990s,[21] companies such as EFFORT were introduced by the EPRDF as endowments and charity organisations (Stiglitz 2002: 26-27; Gebru Asrat 2014). However, the primary purpose was to keep the government in general and the EPRDF in particular a major economic player in the economy. The EPRDF also remained defiant in keeping state ownership of land and other strategic sectors such as banking and finance, power, airlines, telecommunications and shipping lines. Nevertheless, the modest level of liberalisation was strong enough in creating socio-economic problems such as unemployment. There were significant fall in public spending and privatisation, which occurred without any viable private sector or effective market institutions in place. As a result, the impact was strong enough to cause massive layoffs and reduce state capacity (Fassil Demissie 2008).

One of the negative impacts of structural adjustment was the restriction of young citizens' capacity to pursue and claim their social and economic rights. A key manifestation of this was the high level of youth unemployment especially in urban areas from the mid-90s until the mid-2000s (Krishnan e*t al*. 1998; Fassil Demissie 2008). Since the government was the main employer, young people considered public sector employment as the most 'desirable' way of ensuring their transition into adulthood (Mains 2011). However, a significantly reduced public sector through privatisation and considerable cuts in public expenditure contributed to high youth unemployment between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s (Krishnan e*t al*. 1998; MYSC 2004; Fassil Demissie 2008). An anthropological study by Mains in the mid-2000s about young men in Jimma town, south western Ethiopia, explored the level of impact that unemployment had in creating desperation and boredom (Mains 2007). Mains further argued that young men considered the failure to get job either in government offices or in the nascent private sector as a loss of hope. This has severely compromised young men's transition of achieving socially acceptable status of adulthood

[20] http://effortinvestments.com/new/index.php/about-effort-investments - (Accessed on 04 March 2017)
[21] https://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/eth/etp.htm – (Accessed on 22 October 2016)

through economic independence. This contributed to socio-economic marginality and exclusion. Similarly, Du Nunzio (2012; 2016) also discussed about how socio-economically marginalised urban youth with limited opportunities eke out a living through 'hustling' and illegal activities in the informal sector.

However, after resisting extensive structural adjustment programmes and effectively ending the border war with Eritrea, the EPRDF attempted to get a full grasp on the socio-economic development trajectory of the country. As discussed earlier, 2001 was a turning point for the ruling party in shaping its ideological orientation, called a period of '*renewal*'.

4.4.2.2 Post-Renewal State-led Development (2001–2015)

The 2001 ideological revision helped the EPRDF to pursue a state-led capital accumulation process where the control, usage and distribution of resources followed its political purposes. The new political economy strategy kick-started a steady economic growth that the country never experienced in its recent past. Particularly after surviving a drought-induced food crisis in 2002/2003, the EPRDF vowed to build resilient economy through accelerated growth (Bereket Simon 2011; Lefort 2015; Lavers 2016). The EPRDF pursued the accelerated growth agenda by putting the state at the driver's seat of capital accumulation whereby the business and industrial elites became the primary actors. Major productive sectors of the economy became the primary spheres of resource ownership, control and distribution under the direct control of the EPRDF. For example, with regard to agriculture, the EPRDF switched its focus from small-scale agricultural development to large-scale mechanised farming, and both local and international investors became the main beneficiaries of the 'state sponsored land-grabbing' (Lavers 2012; Dessalegn Rahmato 2014). Similarly, the industrial policy was also pursued in a context where party-endowment organisations such as EFFORT and few other dominant business conglomerates became the leading actors (Altenburg 2010; Arkebe Oqubay 2014; Berhanu Abegaz 2014).

After the 2001 ideological revision by the EPRDF, Ethiopian urban centres became the focus of state-led development. In the early 2000s, the level of youth unemployment especially in urban areas was more than 50 per cent (MYSC 2004; Fassil Demissie 2008). Furthermore, there was a significant infrastructural deficit in urban areas because of long years of neglect by the regime, which favoured the rural over the urban (Dyroyaume 2015). Restructured urban governance, urban development policy, the Integrated Housing Development

Programme (IHDP) and government investment in urban roads, health and education facilities were signs of the shift. The electoral defeat during the 2005 election further accentuated the political importance of urban centres.

Despite disagreements on the actual figures, particularly between the IMF and the Party-state, the rapid growth is well acknowledged by observers. The World Bank (2016), for example, confirms 10.9 per cent average economic growth between 2004 and 2014. Furthermore, there was a considerable increase in GDP from 7.8 billion in 2002 to 61.5 billion in 2015. Other recent success stories, including achieving all but two MDG targets (Goal 2, gender equality and Goal 5, maternal health), keeping inequality low at a national level and reducing poverty at the same level both in rural and urban areas, were recognised by the latest World Bank report (2016).

The economic growth has significantly contributed to tangible social development manifested in the spheres of education, health and agriculture and overall improvement in the human development index. The positive record also demonstrates the prioritisation of the aspiring developmental state and its commitment to 'developmentalist ideology' (Mkandawire 2001). For example, in the education sector, the expansion of education centres at every level contributed to a significant increase in enrolment and completion rates. For example, in 2012/13 the grade 1–8 enrolment rate increased to 85 per cent from 68 per cent in 2004/05. The number of universities increased to 34 in 2012/13 from just three in 2004/05. In the same period, the share of education budget in total public expenditure increased from 16 per cent to 25 per cent (UNDP 2014: 34-41). In the health sector, the country has boosted its capacity to reach a significant number of rural households with extension health workers. According to the Ministry of Health, a total of 15,000 health posts and 30,000 health extension workers all over rural Ethiopia ensured universal health coverage since 2012/13 (UNDP 2014). The success of achieving the MDG–4 on child mortality three years before the target date is one sign of the country's success. Likewise, public investment toward improving agricultural productivity contributed to the deployment of more than 50,000 agricultural extension workers in rural areas and the establishment of 9,000 Farmers' Training Centres, one in every two *kebeles* (Lenhardt *et al* 2015).

The developmentalist orientation of the Party-state led to huge government spending in what was called 'pro-poor expenditures' with a share of 73 per cent in 2014/15 (Admit Wondifraw Zeriuhn *et.al* 2016). These expenditures cover education, health, water and sanitation, roads

and agriculture and food security (UNDP 2014). Furthermore, Ethiopia's sustained economic growth for more than a decade is also credited to the 'public-sector led development strategy' which has been witnessing huge investment in infrastructure (ibid). As a result, extreme poverty fell from 55 per cent in 2000 to 33 per cent in 2011 (World Bank 2016). The decrease in extreme poverty is also reflected in a significant increase in life expectancy from 57 in 2004/05 to 62 in 2012/13. The inequality adjusted human development index also shows major improvement from 0.349 in 2004/05 to 0.459 in 2012/13 (UNDP 2014).

The aspiring Ethiopian developmental state has also shown a remarkable level of effectiveness in using foreign aid for pro-poor development programmes. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and bilateral donors such as the DFID identified Ethiopia as a role model where aid money has more value in terms of changing poor peoples' lives (Whitefield and Fraser 2010; Barneet*et.al.* 2009). One possible reason for the effective use of aid money was the commitment from the government to put in place socio-economic policies that complement each other. For example, the widely acknowledged social protection programme, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is closely coordinated along with policies of rural development, food security policies (Lavers 2016). Elite commitment and policy synergy combined with financial and technical support from donors resulted in a model social protection programme that supports nearly 10 per cent of the total population (Hansen and Borchgrevink 2006; UNDP 2014; Cochrane and Tamiru 2016; Lavers: 2016).

The successful implementation of the above mentioned socio-economic policies contributed to the EPRDF's developmentalist discourse and efforts of claiming legitimacy through its success. The literature argues that developmental states seek to derive their legitimacy from the improvement in the livelihood standards of the broad sections of society (Routley 2014). Likewise, the Ethiopian Party-state also justifies its prolonged political dominance with its socio-economic achievements. However, it is imperative to note that the success in the socio-economic spheres can hardly be disentangled from the repressive politico-legal environment discussed in the previous section.

To sum up, the pursuit of developmentalism has two mutually intertwined features. These are the securitisation of development and the developmentalist socio-economic policies. Whilst both aspects correspond to the political purposes and developmental objectives of the aspiring developmental state, they also linked to the democracy-development nexus observed in present day Ethiopia. As the following figure taken from Arriola and Lyons (2016) clearly

depicts, there is an inversely proportional relation between the fulfilment of citizens' civil and political rights and the increasing economic growth during the last decade.



Figure. 4.1 'Ethiopia's receding democracy and rising development, 1995–2012' (Source: Arriola and Lyons 2016: 81)

Compared to the average measure of political freedom in the Africa region, Ethiopia's record has been low and significantly declining especially after 2005. On the contrary, with regard to economic growth, Ethiopia is performing significantly higher than the average economic growth record of the Africa region. The graph also reveals that the significant surge in economic growth occurred in the period immediately after 2005. This illustrates the mutually reinforcing relationship between the political purposes and developmental objectives of the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state. According to the argument presented above and the following graph, the Party-state has been successful in using authoritarianism as an instrument of achieving sustained economic growth which can ultimately lead to realising a developmental state.

4.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, four points help us understand the historical, socio-economic and political dynamics of contemporary Ethiopian state and its aspiration of developmental statism.

First, the historical legacy of the dominant Ethiopian state has a major impact on the current character and effectiveness of the aspiring developmental state. The historical legacy is

strongly associated with the way state power has been used and exercised both through the formal and informal institutions of state and society. The EPRDF has been very keen in keeping the informal institutions central to its political dominance whilst pursuing its modernist agenda of developmentalism.

Second, the EPRDF's revolutionary democratic ideology has been instrumental in shaping the contemporary Ethiopian state. The EPRDF used revolutionary democracy to keep external powers at bay, to consolidate its political power, to silence competing forces, to establish alliances with new social forces, and more recently, to promote democratic developmentalism. The EPRDF used its ideology and principle of democratic centralism to set up a *de facto* centralised system of governance with a formal federal structure. The centralised nature of its governance contributed to effectively deliver socio-economic growth and development mainly in urban areas and 'advanced' rural areas. In this process, the EPRDF also merged the Party with the state structure; hence the Party-state is now in place. The political power the Party-state was able to garner has been very instrumental in achieving socio-economic development.

Third, the fusion of the party with the state structure was consolidated by politically inspired legal frameworks. These legal instruments helped the EPRDF to defeat internal competing political forces by framing them as threats to the country's stability. The Party-state pursues its aspiration of building a developmental state through securitisation of development where every competing view is defined as a security threat.

Fourth, the last 12 years have witnessed remarkable economic growth and social development in Ethiopia. The success is credited to the EPRDF's political determination of deriving its legitimacy from its development record. The economic growth agenda is also recognised for its pro-poor focus and redistributive approach through public investment and welfare programmes. But there are also indications of patronage and clientelism between EPRDF-affiliated businesses and the Party-state. However, since the positive record of development is improving millions of lives, EPRDF's success is more significant than these side-effects.

The next chapter presents the first empirical findings of the thesis. The chapter focuses on state-led initiatives and their role in shaping the processes of citizenship in the efforts of

building a developmental state. It explains how the politics of building a developmental state affects the citizenship of urban youth.

CHAPTER FIVE
STATE-LED INITIATIVES & CITIZENSHIP

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the role of state-led initiatives in the processes of citizenship and how they affect the interplay between citizenship rights, spaces and strategies. It explains how developmentalism has influenced the emergence of state-led initiatives. Furthermore, it also illuminates how the age-specific categorisation of young people and their 'waithood' status shape their engagement within state-led initiatives. The primary purpose of the chapter is to answer the first sub-question: *how do state-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?* It adopts the analytical framework illustrated in Figure 2.1 to examine the processes of citizenship within the context of developmentalism. This empirical chapter analyses youth-specific and related policy and legal frameworks as well as three case studies of state-led initiatives. In doing so, it explains the processes of citizenship between the aspiring developmental state and the urban young citizens by focusing on the interplay between the three components of the process: rights, spaces and strategies.

The chapter has three inter-related arguments. First, since the emergence of the first legal framework that focused on youth unemployment and crime in 2004, the Ethiopian state has transformed and streamlined its discourse about youth in line with its developmentalist orientation. As a result, the categorisation of young people as 'threats' to societal stability has evolved into seeing them as 'seeds of democracy and development' (MoFED 2015: 86). Second, state-led initiatives serve as invited spaces of citizenship. In these invited spaces, the Party-state offers opportunities for young citizens to pursue their social and economic rights. At the same time, the invited spaces also advance the political purposes of the Party-state, particularly by allowing urban young citizens to exercise civil and political rights under its direct control. Third, key manifestations of these invited spaces include the prevalence of co-operation and co-optation strategies. Through co-operation, the Party-state and the urban youth pursue mutually overlapping interests involving reciprocal relations. By contrast, where co-optation prevails, young citizens are forced to trade off civil and political rights to access social and economic rights.

The chapter has five sections. The next section provides a concise overview of the legal and policy frameworks concerning young people. The three sections following this examine three case studies of state-led initiatives, and the final section presents a conclusion.

5.2 Youth Focused Legal and Policy Frameworks

The EPRDF-led government established the first ministerial portfolio focusing on youth during the second parliament (2000–2005). However, none of the youth-focused ministerial offices kept their organisational structure and portfolio for more than five years. It appears that the ministerial portfolio responsible for youth changes after every election. So far, the ministerial portfolios have included the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture (2000–2005), the Ministry of Youth and Sports (2005–2010), the Ministry of Women, Children and Youth (2010–2015) and the current Ministry of Youth and Sports (2015–present).

The repeated changes of the organisational structure and mandate of the ministry have been a disruption to its youth-focused programs. According to a youth expert who worked in the ministry since its inception, the absence of long-term and sustained administrative and programmatic structures causes internal organisational problems.[22] One of the problems he referred to include the frequent reshuffling and restructuring of staff members, directorates and their respective responsibilities. For example, when the interview was conducted in April 2015, staff members did not receive any information as to whether they would continue in their present positions after the establishment of a new government following the May 2015 elections. After these elections, the portfolio of the ministry became Youth and Sports in October 2015. Hence, restructuring occurred for the fourth time. Another key implication of such organisational discontinuity is the side-lining of youth-focused programs as the main agenda of the ministry. For example, another senior official at the ministry indicated that from 2010–2015, the agenda for gender and children's issues was highly prioritised by donors; hence, most of the ministry's resources were inclined toward these two themes.[23] As a result, the youth agenda remained on the margins of the ministry's major activities.

In addition to setting up a youth-focused ministry, the EPRDF-led government has been using different legal and policy frameworks that influenced its relations with young citizens. The

[22]SO-1 MYS-04/15
[23]SO-2 MYS-04/15

following sub-sections examine and trace the evolution of state discourse about youth by focusing on a proclamation, two youth-focused policies and three national development plans. These documents are the Vagrancy Control Proclamation (No.384/2004), the National Youth Policy (2004), the Youth Development Package (2006); and, the consecutive five-year development plans from 2005–2020.

5.2.1 Vagrancy Control Proclamation

The Vagrancy Control Proclamation (VCP) (384/2004) came into force on 27 January, 2004 with the objective of 'bringing criminals to justice, imposing punishment proportionate to their crimes and to create conditions for their transformation into law-abiding and productive citizenry'.[24] The proclamation categorised particularly unemployed youth as a 'threat' to the 'tranquillity and order' of society. Activities referred to in the proclamation include 'betting and gambling in a public place without no visible means of subsistence, substance abuse, disturbing the peace on streets or around schools, participating in organised gang' (Proclamation 384/2004: 2534-36). Furthermore, the proclamation ruled that individuals found guilty of vagrancy would be punished and sent to rehabilitation centres.

Prior to the emergence of the VCP, urban young citizens in Ethiopia were facing mounting challenges in pursuing mainly social and economic rights. The main reason was the limited prospect for job and employment opportunities. Contributing factors of unemployment include, rural-urban migration, surging population and incompatibility between the expanding education opportunities and the available job opportunities (Krishnan *et.al.* 1998; Broussard and Tekleselassie 2012). Furthermore, despite its continued resistance, the EPRDF-led government was forced to implement some elements of the structural adjustment programs. Privatisation, the reduction of public expenditure and the restructuring of the public sector contributed to a significant decline of government employment opportunities (Krishnan *et.al.* 1998, Fassil Demissie 2008). As a result, young peoples' 'desirable' (Mains 2011: 115) employment opportunities in government offices were vanishing. The situation

[24]The Vagrancy Control Proclamation defined a vagrant as an individual who: 'is found loitering or prowling at a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for a law-abiding citizen . . . betting, gambling and playing other unlawful similar games involving money'; 'intentionally alarms the public or people in the vicinity by intoxicating with alcohol or psychotropic or narcotic substance'; 'disturbs the tranquillity of residents in vicinity by participating in organised gang brawls'; 'directly or indirectly receives or lets himself to be given money or other similar benefits by using his reputation for violent behaviour or brutality in his community or taking advantage of the fear he has caused to the community in vicinity due to such reputation.'

was further exacerbated by the increasing number of young high school graduates. Hence, there was an increasing gap between the number of unemployed youth and available opportunities. The difficulties to realise social and economic rights compromised the transition of young people into adulthood.

A prolonged period of transition into adulthood, i.e., 'waithood' particularly among young men was against the normative notion of being a youth. For example, Mains (2012) observed in the mid-2000s that in Jimma town, members of the wider society interpreted the presence of young idle men on the streets as a threat to their personal security. Such a kind of discursive link between unemployment and delinquency within societal discourse served as a basis for the VCP. Hence, the VCP can be seen as a state intervention to discipline young people who deviate from the socially acceptable trajectory of becoming an adult. The transition to adulthood has a predetermined destination of becoming an economically independent and productive citizen. Hence, failure of expected social mobility and a troubled 'waithood' period among the youth is perceived as an anomaly. As a result, the VCP can be seen as an instrument of rectifying the perceived and actual deviance of young people from becoming socially and economically productive citizens in the future (Mains 2012: 120-124). Mains further argued that the VCP characterised youth, particularly young men, 'as both social threats and emasculated idlers' (ibid: p. 123). One of the major implications of such a paradoxical characterisation is the criminalisation of unemployed young men. Particularly 'street youth' who depend on economic activities and exchanges on the street to make a living were the prime targets (Mains 2012; Nunzio 2014a).

During the 2005 election, a significant number of young people that were engaged in the informal 'street economy'[25] (Nunzio 2012: 435) became involved in political activities supporting opposition parties. At this point, the VCP, which was initially formulated from a crime controlling perspective, evolved into a political tool to suppress dissent. As Di Nunzio (2014a: 450) argues, the ruling party labelled those who participated *en masse* in pre- and post-election protests as 'dangerous vagrants', jobless, and unruly young people. Such labelling by the ruling party against young citizens was used by the opposition to mobilise the majority of unemployed urban youth against the government.

[25] Marco Di Nunzio defines the 'street economy' as 'the material, moral and symbolic economy of exchanges, social relations, identities and meanings [that young people] participate in to get by and, at the same time, define their aspirations for a better future'(2012: 435).

A few weeks after the EPRDF-led government launched the VCP, it introduced the National Youth Policy (NYP) which had a completely different framing of young citizens. Rather than focusing on the illegal and criminal activities that unemployed young people are engaged in, the NYP attempted to address the broader causes of the problem. The following section will further elaborate the NYP and its framing of young citizens.

5.2.2 National Youth Policy

Enacted on 12 March 2004, the National Youth Policy (NYP) is one of Ethiopia's most significant youth-specific state documents. The Council of Ministers ratified the NYP roughly 45 days after the Vagrancy Control Proclamation. The NYP envisioned 'creating [an] empowered young generation' with values incorporating a democratic outlook, knowledge, professional skills, organised engagement and ethical integrity (MoYSC: 19). Furthermore, the objectives of the policy included to 'bring about active participation of youth' in socioeconomic, political and cultural activities and to 'enable [the youth] to fairly benefit from the results' (ibid). In this way, the policy approached youth issues from a broader socioeconomic and political perspective. The policy also underscored the pervasiveness of extreme poverty (44 per cent in 2004), high youth unemployment (67 per cent in 1999), the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and low enrolment in secondary and higher education as major challenges for the youth. Furthermore, it blamed the country's long history of undemocratic political systems as a hindrance to meaningful youth participation.[26]

Compared to the VCP, the NYP presented a different discourse about youth. The NYP frames young people primarily as 'potential resources' and discursively constructs their contribution to society in the future. This framing is evident in the narrative that considers youth as 'nation builders' and 'agents of change' (Anyidoho *et al*, 2012:7). The responsibility of the state is also stipulated in the policy in terms of helping the youth to fulfil their potential. Furthermore, the policy also depicted young people as 'marginalised resources' who have the potential capacity to contribute to the country's development and democracy. Contrary to the VCP, state discourse about youth shifted in the NYP from criminalizing the activities of

[26]The NYP identified four major principles. These are ensuring that youth are actively participating and benefiting from democratization and economic development activities, promoting unity by recognizing diversity, the benefits of getting organised and 'youth capacity building'.

young people, to addressing ‘economic and social problems’ (MoYSC 2004:6) causing youth marginalisation.

The NYP approach is significantly different from the disciplining intention of the VCP. Instead of ‘imposing punishment’, the policy aimed at ensuring the youth become active participants in the socioeconomic, political and cultural activities of the country. The policy narrative provides responsibility both to the state and the youth. On one hand, the state is given predominantly administrative and technical responsibilities such as ‘to direct, coordinate, integrate and build capacity’ for implementation of the policy. The responsibilities of the youth, on the other hand, are presented more in terms of ‘loyalty to the constitution’, active participation in the development and democratisation process, nurturing democratic thinking, building their capacity to shoulder responsibilities and becoming ethical citizens dedicated to work (ibid: 50).

The VCP and the NYP manifest a carrot and stick approach that EPRDF-led government adopted in shaping the processes of citizenship. On one hand, the VCP approached youth as social forces that needed to be contained and controlled for the benefit of wider society. On the other, the NYP intended to harness the progressive potential of this social force toward development and democracy. As argued by Honwana and De Boeck (2005), the youth are approached as both ‘makers and breakers’ of society. The purpose of the policy framework was to enhance the positive contributions of the youth by addressing the structural impediments they were facing. The proclamation aimed to contain perceived and actual harm that the youth could inflict on society.

The ruling party effectively used these competing narratives in the VCP and the NYP to promote its developmentalist orientation. On the one hand, the VCP equips the state with a necessary legal instrument to ‘discipline’ young people in line with its goal of achieving rapid growth and development. On the other hand, the NYP and the responsible ministry portray an image of capable state bureaucracy which has the capacity to identify problems and plan interventions. This ‘carrot and stick’ approach was evidently seen in the way the EPRDF-led government handled the post-2005 election crisis. During the climax of post-election violence, the state invoked the criminalizing discourse from the VCP to justify its crackdown on dissenting youth (Mains 2012; Nunzio 2014b; Bitania Tadesse 2014). Later on, once the EPRDF-led government took full control of the crisis, the state discourse returned to its ‘youth are marginalised’ mantra. Furthermore, the EPRDF-led government also expanded

this discourse of youth marginalisation and exclusion to produce another youth-focused policy document after the election. The following section will briefly analyse this new document called the Youth Development Package (YDP).

5.2.3 Youth Development Package

The Youth Development Package (YDP) was launched in September 2006. The YDP contains three volumes that specifically focus on urban, rural and pastoralist youth. In the urban YDP, three 'burning issues' are identified. These are unemployment, the 'lack of capable and youth-focused social services and recreational centres' and the 'lack of [a] participation platform' for the youth. The YDP also set 'strategic directions' to address the identified 'burning issues' of urban youth in Ethiopia. The key element of the strategic directions is endorsing the youth as 'front-leaders' to solve the problems they are facing. Additional strategic directions include: 'enabling the youth to understand its leading role', 'facilitating youth participation forums', 'enhancing young peoples' educational, vocational and leadership skills for improved participation', and 'organising the youth depending on their interests' (FDRE 2006a). The package assigns a 'key supporter' role to the state in the efforts of addressing youth problems.

The YDP was formulated by the Prime Minister office and came into the youth-focused policy sphere in a strict top-down approach.[27] As argued in Chapter 4, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had a major role in shaping the legal and policy frameworks of the aspiring developmental state. The emergence of the YDP from his office also shows how influential he has been in shaping state-youth relations. The case also illustrates the political commitment of the government in addressing youth marginalisation in the wake of the 2005 elections. When the YDP appeared on the scene, the NYP was in the early stages of implementation after participatory consultative processes of preparing the strategic plan. A 10-year multi-sectoral youth development strategic plan was prepared by the ministry to implement the NYP through extensive consultation with concerned stakeholders. Accordingly, the national development plan also mentioned both the NYP and the strategic plan (MoFED 2006: 197). When the YDP was introduced, it immediately kicked the NYP and the corresponding strategic plan out of the scene.[28] This demonstrates the political limitations of a technocratic policy process and the overriding power of a politically driven

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[27] SO-1 MYS-04/15
[28] SO-1 MYS-04/15

policy document. However, *Addis Raey*, the ideological magazine of the ruling party, claimed that the YDP was developed by the Ministry of Youth and Sports in collaboration with other federal ministries (EPRDF 2006).

The YDP is a youth-focused political intervention by the EPRDF in the wake of the post-2005 election crisis. It demonstrated the commitment by the EPRDF-led government to heal the wounds that resulted from the deadly protests. The direct involvement of the prime minister's office in producing the YDP further validates the urgency of addressing youth issues and the level of commitment by the government. Perhaps, addressing state-youth relations was part of the political project to regain legitimacy after the EPRDF lost a huge number of votes for the first time. It can also be argued that the formalised and step-by-step processes of implementing the NYP were found to be inept at generating politically feasible immediate outcomes. As a result, the YDP was introduced with particular a focus of addressing youth employment issues in urban areas. In addition to the above discussed youth-focused policy frameworks, the EPRDF-led government have also been addressing youth in its national development plans since the mid-2000s. The following section will critically review the national development plans to explore their role in shaping the processes of citizenship.

5.2.4 National Development Plans

The first two national development plans were either very broad or weak in their approach to incorporate youth-focused issues. For example, the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) from 2005–2010 has a broad focus on economic citizenship. 'Youth and employment' is the only topic it mentioned about youth. The identified aim was to integrate micro and small-scale enterprise programs with a technical and vocational training program in order to enhance job creation efforts. Perhaps this indicates how the EPRDF-led government has been prioritizing economic rights as the most defining elements of its relations with young citizens. PASDEP made very little attempt to further elaborate the government program than referring to the National Youth Policy and the 10 year multi-sectoral youth development strategic plan (MoFED 2006: 197-199). As discussed earlier, both the policy and the strategic plan were displaced by the Youth Development Package since the last quarter of 2006.

Likewise, the first Growth and Transformation Plan (hereafter GTP-I) spent barely a page in addressing youth-focused ‘strategic directions’, ‘objectives’, ‘targets’ and ‘implementing strategies’ (MoFED 2010: 111-112). The Party-state declared its objective of building a democratic developmental state for the first time in GTP-I (ibid: 22). The GTP-I also mentioned youth issues as one of ‘cross cutting schemes’ under the section ‘youth and sports development’. However, the section has just two sentences that make a general reference to the government’s commitment to enhance youth participation in democratic governance and economic development. The three identified ‘GTP targets for youth development’ were: increasing youth centres at a district level, ‘youth mainstreaming in development programs’ and an increasing the number of youth volunteers (ibid: 111–112).

Both the PASDEP and the GTP-I were very shallow in their approach to shaping state-youth relations. The PASDEP, for example, highlighted ‘youth and employment’ as the only aspect of its focus. It also slightly touched youth-related elements of health (HIV/AIDS especially) and education in other sections of the document. The plan made no effort to harmonise its focus on youth other than simply echoing the topics highlighted in the NYP. Likewise, the GTP-I set unspecified number of youth centres at district level as ‘a development target’. Furthermore, the GTP-I adopted the most commonly used terms in the youth development sector without any explanation or qualification within the Ethiopian context. These are ‘participation’, ‘youth mainstreaming’ and ‘youth centres’. The above mentioned reasons make both the PASDEP and the GTP-I very weak national development plans in their approaches to youth.

Compared to the previous national development plans, the current national development plan, the GTP-II (2015–2020) has a better articulation of youth-focused developmental objectives. Similar to the previous national development plans, it addresses youth issues as a cross-cutting sector under ‘women, children and youth affairs’. The GTP-II establishes the objective of enhancing meaningful youth participation in various socioeconomic and political areas. The GTP-II also has a number of youth-focused milestones in the socio-economic and political spheres. For example, it aims to have young people occupy 35 per cent of legislative bodies and 40 per cent of both the executive and the judiciary (MoFED 2015: 182). Furthermore, the total number of youth centres is also expected to reach 3000 by the end of the GTP-II. Youth-specific economic plans include organising 7.43 million young people in MSEs and 1.35 million young people in co-operative unions. A total of 10.99 billion birr

(approximately £366 million) will be made available for loan to 2.19 million young entrepreneurs. The plan also includes increasing the proportion of young people participating in the MSE scheme, from the current 59 per cent to 90 per cent. Whilst its effective implementation is yet to be seen, the GTP-II has presented the first costed socio-economic development program aimed at addressing youth unemployment.

To summarise, Table 5.1 presents how youth-focused legal and policy frameworks have evolved in the period from 2004 to 2015. The table focuses on the framing of the policy and legal documents in identifying youth as a social group, the policy recommendations and the state institutions identified as key actors. By framing youth as 'vagrants', 'threats' and 'criminals', the VCP adopted a disciplinary approach toward youth. Since, the VCP approached youth as a problem, the policy recommendations were 'punishment', 'incarceration' and 'rehabilitation'. The actors that the VCP identified to implement its policy proposals and recommendations were also police, courts and prison administrations. The NYP, on the other hand, framed youth as 'nation builders', 'agents of change' and 'potential resources'. As a very technocratic document, the policy recommendations and proposals focus on 'capacity building', 'youth mainstreaming' and the establishment of 'councils' among key government bodies. In terms of actors, the NYP identified the government, youth, family and civil society as responsible actors to realise its policy objectives. Among the three national development plans, the PASDEP was produced mainly in line with the global poverty-reduction and millennium development goals agenda. Hence, the Ethiopian government had a relatively narrower policy space compared to the two national development plans that followed. In the PASDEP, the youth were framed was as 'unemployed and unproductive citizens'. With policy recommendations including increasing the number of youth involved in MSEs and youth human capital development through education and technical and vocational training, the PASDEP simply endorsed all the proposals and identified actors mentioned in the NYP.

In other words, the change in the framing of youth in these legal and policy documents shows the dominant ideas within the EPRDF led government have evolved. As argued in Chapter 2, ideas that set both 'normative and cognitive' framework can be inculcated through policy discourses and narratives. As demonstrated in the above document analysis, different youth focused legal and policy frameworks portrayed various ideas about youth as framed by the EPRDF-led government. The 'ideal young citizen' as perceived by the government has also

evolved from a law abiding citizen to a potential resource, from unproductive and marginalised citizen to seeds of democracy and development.

Having analysed the youth-focused legal and policy frameworks, the subsequent sections of the chapter discuss two case studies that are directly linked with the YDP. These are: Micro and Small Scale Enterprises (MSEs) and the Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF). Furthermore, the chapter will also discuss the Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League (AAYL) as an additional state-led initiative that emerged after the 2005 elections.

Table 5.1 Youth Focused Legal and Policy Frameworks in Ethiopia (2004-2015)

	Vagrancy Control Proclamation (January 2004)	**National Youth Policy (March 2004)**	**Plan for Accelerated Sustainable Development to End Poverty (2005)**	**Youth Development Package (2006)**	**Growth and Transformation Plan – I & II (2010-2015; 2015–2020)**
Framing	Youth as: vagrants, a threat, criminals	Youth as: 'nation builders', 'agents of change', 'potential resources'	Youth as: unemployed and unproductive citizens	Youth as: 'victims of economic problems', 'marginalised social forces'	Youth as: 'seeds of today's democratic and developmental forces and tomorrow's leaders'
Recommended Action	Punishment, incarceration, rehabilitation	Provision of comprehensive capacity building support for youth and youth organisations, conducting further research and studies on youth issues, mainstreaming youth issues and coordinating policies and programs focused on youth	Micro and Small-scale Enterprise (MSE) development, job creation, building human capital through education and technical & vocational training	Economic empowerment through MSEs, social empowerment through education, training, health and the establishment of youth-focused sport and entertainment facilities Political empowerment through enhanced youth participation in democracy and good governance programs,	Economic empowerment through MSEs & co-operatives Social empowerment through education, training, health and the establishment of youth-focused sport and entertainment facilities Political empowerment through enhanced youth participation in democracy and good governance programs

Policy Proposals	Rehabilitation through basic education, civic education, vocational training, labour work	Organising the youth; capacity building programs; information, awareness and advocacy; database of youth initiatives, research and studies on youth issues	(endorses the National Youth Policy)	Micro and Small-scale Enterprise (MSE) development; the provision of finance and youth-focused financial services; building human capital through education and technical & vocational training; facilitating the establishment of youth organisations and the National Council	Micro and Small-scale Enterprise (MSE) development; the provision of finance and youth-focused financial services; building human capital through education and technical & vocational training; establishing youth-focused databases all over the country
Recommended New Institutions or Actors	The establishment of 'a centre for vagrants' under the institution of the Federal Prison Commission	The establishment of a Youth Council, an Inter-Federal Government Offices Committee, an Inter-Regional Bureau Committee, and a Consortium of Non-Governmental Bodies	The establishment of a Youth Council, an Inter-Federal Government Offices Committee, an Inter-Regional Bureau Committee, and a Consortium of Non-Governmental Bodies	The establishment of Youth Centres, Youth organisations and associations	The establishment of Youth Centres, youth mobilisation platforms, production and selling sites of youth entrepreneurs, and Youth Development Teams
Responsible Actors	Police, courts, prison administration	Government, youth, family and civil society	Government, youth, family and civil society	Government, youth, MSE Agency	Government, youth, MSE Agency, universities

In the subsequent sections of the chapter, the thesis will discuss three case studies of state-led initiatives. The case studies explain how state-led initiatives serve as spaces of citizenship where rights are contested and the strategies that both the urban youth and the aspiring developmental are adopting. The case studies are the Micro and Small-scale Enterprises Scheme (MSEs scheme), the Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF) and the Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League (AAYL). Before discussing each case study, the following table presents an overview of these case studies and the labels the thesis uses to identify them.

Table 5.2 Overview of State-led Initiatives

Case study	Label/ Abbreviation	Associated policy framework
Micro and Small-scale Enterprises Scheme	MSEs scheme	MSEs Development Strategy revised in 2011
Addis Ababa Youth Forum	AAYF	Youth Development Package (YDP) launched in 2006
Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League	AAYL	Decision of the 6th EPRDF Congress in September 2006

5.3 Micro and Small-scale Enterprises Scheme

The thesis selects the Micro and Small-scale Enterprises (hereafter MSEs) scheme as a case study because national development plans since 2005 have included the MSEs scheme as a key component of the government's effort to shape its relations with urban youth. The main purpose of the MSEs scheme has been creating employment opportunities for young people. This section adopts the analytical framework to explore the dynamic processes of citizenship within the MSEs scheme. In doing so, it seeks to explain how the context in which the MSEs scheme operates has been shaped by both developmentalism, young citizens' age or their 'waithood' status. Furthermore, the section also illuminates on the kinds of rights that are contested within the MSEs scheme, the nature of the scheme as a space of citizenship and the prevalence of different strategies deployed by the state or the youth.

This section develops three inter-related arguments. First, the MSEs scheme is an invited space of citizenship where the Party-state primarily facilitates opportunities for young citizens to pursue and claim economic and social rights. Second, co-operation becomes a prevalent strategy of citizenship when the Party-state focuses on the legitimacy it generates from young citizens' engagement within the MSEs scheme. Young citizens also co-operate with the Party-state by fulfilling administrative and legal requirements whilst joining the MSEs scheme. The primary aim of young citizens in joining the SMEs scheme is to improve their economic status and address the uncertainties attached with 'waithood'. Third, because the Party-state uses its control over resources within the MSEs scheme to primarily pursue its political purposes, it forces young citizens to trade-off their rights. In such a context, co-optation becomes a dominant strategy. For the urban young citizens, both strategies of co-operation and co-optation help them to access economic opportunities that eventually contribute to their efforts of shortening their 'waithood' period.

The following three sub-sections will further elaborate the above arguments. The first sub-section briefly and critically analyses the MSEs scheme's development strategy and examine how the Party-state is using the MSEs scheme to pursue its political purposes. Then the subsequent sub-sections provide empirical analysis on the politics of citizenship within the MSEs scheme. The analysis examines how context shapes the kinds of citizenship rights contested within the MSEs scheme, the features of the scheme as a space of citizenship and the strategies adopted by both the Party-state and the urban youth.

5.3.1 The MSEs Development Strategy

The first MSEs development strategy was launched in 1997. However, the strategy was given limited attention, mainly because the EPRDF was primarily focusing on agriculture and rural areas rather than urban areas until 2005. It was only after the post-2005 election crisis that urban development became the vital component of the national development (MoFED 2006). As a result, MSEs and job creation started to feature in national development strategies. The increasing urban youth population and widespread youth unemployment were equally important factors that justified the emergence of the MSEs scheme. After controlling 99.6 per cent of the parliament seats in 2010, the Party-State decided to revise the MSEs development strategy. The revised strategy had three objectives. First, it sought to create 'job opportunities for the majority', 'reduce income poverty' and ensure the 'fair distribution of

wealth' (FDRE 2011). The second objective is to create 'a foundation for competitive, sustainable and rapid development by contributing to rural and industrial development'. The third objective is to create 'a wider base for developmental investors in urban areas' (ibid: 13).

The Party-state also channelled financial resources both directly into the MSEs scheme and indirectly by linking it with other development programs. Particularly, the infrastructure development programs such as the construction of roads, hospitals, schools and condominium houses are closely linked with the MSEs scheme. This shows how the Party-state considers the MSEs scheme as an integral part of its developmentalist orientation. Furthermore, the MSEs scheme is also one of the channels through which the Party-state distributes financial resources to different actors involved in the scheme. During the first GTP (2010–2015), the Party-state dedicated approximately 1.6 per cent of the national budget to the MSEs scheme. The total budget allocated to the scheme also increased from £366 million in the GTP-I to £700 million in the GTP-II (MoFED 2015: 181–182). With a target population of 8.78 million young people, the GTP-II set out an extensive policy co-ordination, with universities, industrial clusters, research centres and the export market (ibid).

The MSEs scheme is one manifestation of the politically driven development objectives of the Party-state. As mentioned in the strategy document, the MSEs scheme is intended to serve as one way of building 'a reliable [political] base' for developmental statism. The document mentions that:

> In the rural areas, farmers are the base of our developmental state. In urban areas, a segment of society striving by uniting its labour and property, like farmers, is a potential actor that will join micro and small enterprises. This segment of society is compelled to rely not only on its property but also on its labour; hence it gets only the leftover of the rent-seeking activities. This segment of society will never become a principal beneficiary [of a rent-seeking economy]. Furthermore, this segment covers the majority of the urban population … *hence it can become a reliable base for our developmental state.* (FDRE 2011: 4, emphasis added)

The Party-state has embedded its political purposes of controlling citizens' access to economic rights. This is demonstrated in the Party-state's intention of using the MSEs

scheme as one channel of expanding its membership. As the above quotation shows, the Party-state considers the MSEs scheme as a crucial aspect of its developmentalist orientation. Hence, it solely controls the entire institutions of the MSEs scheme from the federal to the *kebele* level. Any decision making relating to resource utilisation and distribution is under the total control of the Party-state.

The Party-state also pursues its political purposes through the MSEs scheme by recruiting MSEs operators into the ruling party structure. The strategy document further states that:

> So long as they are carefully selected, we need to give recognition and incentive to successful role models. We need to create a positive influence on others by promoting and encouraging role models. [Furthermore] In order to attract these vanguards into our party, we need to empower them to lead and mobilise others with their success. (FDRE 2011:6)

By planning to recruit successful MSE operators into the party structure, the Party-state is paving the way for co-optation. Since the Party-state has absolute control over the distribution of resources, there is a strong possibility of linking access to resources with ruling party membership. It also reveals that the MSEs scheme is embedded within the Party-state's political purpose of expanding membership and strengthening its legitimacy. As mentioned earlier, the primary purpose of the MSEs scheme is creating job opportunities and addressing income poverty. The Party-state pursues this noble developmental objective hand-in-hand with its efforts to recruit new members. This political strategy inevitably affects citizens' efforts of pursuing and claiming economic and social rights within the MSEs scheme. Particularly, it affects citizens who disagree with the ruling party who might face either exclusion or co-optation.

Moreover, it is important to underscore that the MSEs scheme serves as a crucial channel of acquiring legitimacy for the aspiring developmental state. As argued in Chapter 2, the legitimacy of authoritarian developmental states emanates from their economic performance and improvements in living standards (Wade 1990; Fritz and Menocal 2007; Routley 2012). In Ethiopia, particularly the 2010 and 2015 election results nullified the Party-state's rhetoric of 'strengthening multiparty democracy'. The ruling party controlled 99.6 and 100 per cent of the parliamentary seats after the last two elections, respectively. The parliament is a manifestation of the unprecedented and almost absolute dominance of the ruling party within

the state system. This leaves the Party-state virtually no ground to claim democratic legitimacy from the political processes through which it gained power. This also explains why the MSEs scheme strategy is revised after 14 years and became one of the key instruments of pursuing developmentalism, particularly in urban areas. It is intended to address the legitimacy deficit that the Party-state has been facing, especially after the 2010 elections.

For further empirical reflections, the following sub-sections examine the role of the MSEs scheme in two ways. The first section focuses how the MSEs scheme serves as a state-led initiative in which the urban youth can pursue their economic rights. Then, the subsequent section explains how the MSEs scheme serves as a means for political mobilisation by the Party-state.

5.3.2 Pursuing Economic Rights through the MSEs Scheme

In Addis Ababa, the Party-state uses multiple, often times overlapping, governance and mobilisation structures to run the MSEs scheme. The apex of these structures of governance and mobilisation is a 'command post' overseen by vice mayor of the city.[29] The other structures of governance and mobilisation include 'village committees', 'zone committees', 'development teams' and the 'development army'. These structures co-exist along with the formal layers of governance in Addis Ababa.[30] The informal character of these structures, on the one hand, contributes to inconsistency in their role and level of effectiveness in addressing youth unemployment issues. On the other hand, putting in place these structures helped the Party-state to reach youth in every neighbourhood. A special advisor at the Addis Ababa Children and Women's and Youth mentioned that the government went door to door to register unemployed young people and facilitate opportunities of joining the MSEs scheme.[31] This has both a symbolic and material significance. It symbolically demonstrates the capacity of the Party-state to reach every urban citizen's doorstep. Furthermore, it also

[29]SO-03-AAMSEDA-03/15, SO-04-AABCWY-02/15
[30]At present, the city government of Addis Ababa has two levels of governance structure: districts and sub-cities. The governance structure is divided into 10 sub-cities and 116 districts. The structure of governance in the city changes very frequently. Most recently, there were three levels of structures. These were *kebele*, district and sub-city in ascending order. As the new structure that scrapped *kebeles* as formal structures is introduced recently, some of the respondents refer to *kebele* structures, which have now been consolidated into districts.
[31]SO-04-AABCWY-02/15

actually reveals the real commitment of the regime to address the challenge of youth employment.

There were many responsive young citizens in the city that reacted positively to the Party-state's plan of addressing youth unemployment through MSEs. Indeed many of them saw the initiative as a great opportunity. Young citizens participating in the MSEs scheme who were interviewed for this research expressed that they joined the scheme with a strong ambition to improve their economic and social well-being. For example, one of the respondents, a university graduate himself, mobilised his friends to establish an urban farm in their neighbourhood as a way out from their poverty-ridden life.[32] All of his friends have low educational backgrounds, with the highest achiever reaching only grade 10. Young people also join the MSEs scheme with the expectation that it will provide them better opportunities to earn more money compared to jobs both in the formal and the informal sectors. One of the respondents joined the MSEs scheme as a cobblestone cutter, quitting his previous job as a street vendor.[33] Other young respondents joined the MSEs scheme expecting better earnings than the low-paying government jobs they used to have.[34]

Since the MSEs scheme is a state-led initiative, the Party-state has more power in dictating how young citizens can claim rights within the scheme. The controlling position of the Party-state is demonstrated in its capacity to set legal and administrative requirements for MSEs scheme participants. Depending on the areas of their engagement, the youth are required to fulfil certain criteria. For example, for some, the requirement was to have at least 25 founding members to be registered.[35] Whereas for others the requirement was to attend compulsory skills development training, political sensitisation training organised by the ruling party, to open a saving bank account at Addis Saving and Credit Bank, saving 30 per cent of the required capital for their business, or providing a guarantor before receiving a loan.[36] The topics covered in the political sensitisation trainings include the ruling party's political ideology and the socio-economic policies derived from the ideology. These political sensitisation trainings that all MSEs scheme participants are required to attend[37] can be linked

[32]MSE-01-12/14
[33]MSE-02-01/15
[34]MSE-03-01/15, MSE-04-04/15
[35]MSE-01-12/14
[36]MSE-02-01/15,MSE-03-01/15, MSE-04-04/15
[37] MSE-01-12/14, MSE-02-01/15,MSE-03-01/15, MSE-04-04/15

with the Party-state's commitment to inculcate certain ideas of citizenship into the minds of young citizens.

The absolute control of the Party-state over the political, legal, administrative requirements of joining the MSEs scheme has direct implications on the citizenship of urban youth. It enables the Party-state to target a specific group of young citizens and exclude others. Those who agree to take the political indoctrination training and fulfil all the requirements will be included. By implication, other young citizens who do not want to be indoctrinated in order to pursue and claim citizenship rights and fulfil the other legal and administrative criterion are excluded.

As one particular case demonstrates, sometimes it is not enough to fulfil all the formally stated legal and administrative requirements. Young citizens may also be required to take additional steps to challenge widely held prejudices against them. For example, a group of young people needed to take their complaint to the highest political office in the city, the Mayor's office, to get their certificate of registration.[38] Local officials in their district refused to register them because some members of the group have a bad record. These young people grew up in an impoverished neighbourhood, which has had an impact on the kinds of activities they were engaged in. Some members of the group were involved in petty crime activities in the past. This required the group members to hold a face-to-face meeting with the mayor to claim their right and get their business registered at the district MSEs office. Furthermore, the group members also volunteered to the Community Policing unit in their district to change the prejudice that local officials hold against them. The Party-state established Community Policing units for the explicit purpose of preventing crime and the implicit mechanism of repressing dissent and protest following the 2005 election (Di Nunzio 2014b). This particular group of young people were involved only in the crime prevention aspect of Community Policing. In this particular context, the acts of assertively claiming rights by the youth were as equally essential as fulfilling legal and administrative requirements of participating in the MSEs.

The Party-state uses co-operation as one of its strategies of affecting the citizenship of urban youth participating in the MSEs scheme. By offering economic and social rights that the young citizens need to fulfil their aspirations of growing up, the Party-state is attempting to

[38]MSE-01-12/14

win their acquiescence. The revision of the MSEs development strategy, the provision of financial, administrative and technical support are actual manifestations seeking acquiescence from citizens. Furthermore, by setting political, legal and administrative requirements, the Party-state is also demanding meaningful action from the young citizens to join the MSEs scheme. The political requirements come in different form. This include subtle or open pressure to be member of the ruling party, attending trainings the ruling patry's ideology and the socio-economic policies derived from it, attending the ruling party organised demonstrations and also making financial contributions to such kinds of events.[39] Moreover, both the MSEs development strategy and the associated supports also constitute the distribution of resources to young citizens that are fulfilling or co-operating with the requirements set by the Party-state.

In addition to the legal and policy frameworks, the multiple layers of formal and informal structures also facilitate the Party-state's co-operation strategy with the urban youth. As discussed earlier, the Party-state seeks to build 'a reliable base' in the urban areas for its political project of building a developmental state. The MSEs scheme serves as a vital component of this reliable base by becoming a source of legitimacy. Particularly in a context where the Party-state suffered a major electoral challenge during the 2005 elections, the presence of multiple layers of structures facilitating resource distribution and recruitment to the ruling party contributes to regaining legitimacy. This shows how the Party-state is concurrently pursuing both its political purposes and developmental objectives within the MSEs scheme.

The young citizens' also adopted a co-operation strategy within the MSEs scheme by joining the scheme and fulfilling its administrative and legal requirements. The young people recognised the economic opportunities that the Party-state is providing. As discussed in Chapter 4, contemporary Ethiopian political economy is heavily dominated by the state. Hence, there are very limited opportunities for young citizens to pursue economic rights outside spaces that are under the control of the Party-state.[40] As discussed earlier, the MSEs scheme offers the youth economic opportunities to earn better incomes and perhaps facilitate

[39] MSE-01-12/14, MSE-02-01/15, MSE—04-04/15, MSE-08-03/15

[40] Compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, the proportion of the private sector in the economy is significantly low. The latest World Bank data argues that Ethiopian private sector access to credit is only 9 per cent of the GDP compared to more than 20 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2016).

their economic independence, which is one of the socially acceptable statuses of adulthood. Thus, one can consider that establishing a business or joining a government-initiated employment program within the MSEs scheme in order to claim social and economic rights are crucial components of the processes of citizenship. These processes can contribute to young citizens' smoother transition into adulthood. As a result, the youth responded positively and co-operated with the Party-state for the reinvigoration of the MSEs scheme. When the youth are co-operating, they are also contributing to the realisation of the political purposes and developmental objectives of the Party-state whilst achieving their own goal of pursuing economic rights. This shows how overlapping interests are crucial components of a co-operation strategy.

Furthermore, the MSEs scheme is an example of an invited space of citizenship engagement in which the Party-state invites young people to pursue their economic rights. By controlling the way this invited space is structured and functioning, the Party-state shapes how the youth pursue economic rights. However, pursuing economic rights within an invited space does not necessarily make the youth passive invitees. The example of the young people who went to the mayor's office demanding their rights demonstrates that the youth are also proactive in claiming their citizenship rights in invited spaces. As the case demonstrated, decision makers' perceptions about youth can also be a significant factor in influencing the rights of young citizens. The age-based prejudice against young citizens as trouble makers which informed the VCP in the mid-2000s can still influence how state officials perceive young citizens.

The process of citizenship within the MSEs scheme does not only provide opportunities for economic rights for the youth. They also provide the Party-state a means for political mobilisation. In doing so, the MSEs scheme also affects the civil and political rights of young citizens. The following sub-section further explores how citizenship processes within the MSEs scheme affect the way young citizens exercise their civil and political rights.

5.3.3 MSEs as Means for Political Mobilisation

The Party-state's decision to pursue its political purposes through the MSEs scheme has direct implications for how the urban youth are exercising their civil and political rights. As argued earlier, the responsiveness of young citizens to the Party-state's initiative and their proactive engagement has been found to be very crucial. Furthermore, there are at least four

ways through which the citizenship processes within the MSEs scheme affect the civil and political rights of young citizens.

First, there are contexts in which young citizens already pursuing social and economic rights within the MSEs scheme are implicitly required to become members of the ruling party. In such a situation, some young citizens may prefer to trade their civil and political rights so that they continue accessing the economic opportunities in the MSEs scheme. For example, when one of the respondents joined the MSEs scheme to become a cobblestone producer, he never considered becoming a ruling party member.[41] He mentioned that he never had an interest in politics. When asked how he joined the ruling party, he said 'a membership form was being circulated and everyone filled out the form. Only a few refused'.[42] From his point of view, his ability to access economic opportunities as a participant of the MSEs scheme is tied with his membership to the ruling party. Now, he belongs to a party cell at his workplace where he is required to attend meetings every two weeks. He further mentioned that the ruling party mobilised thousands of young people in his production site to get registered for the 2015 election using the cell structure.

Second, some young citizens may also make a calculative decision to use their membership to the ruling party as a means to access opportunities of claiming economic rights. These young citizens join the ruling party expecting job opportunities in return. For example, a group of three young people joined the ruling party just before they graduated from the university.[43] Their main purpose of joining the party was to get a job. As planned, they all got a job in different government offices three months after graduation. A year later, these young people resigned from their respective low paying and less promising government jobs to establish a poultry and dairy product distribution business by joining the MSEs scheme. While endeavouring to succeed in their business, they found themselves in the same position again. Through their encounters with district officials, they found out that ruling party youth league members were favoured to get additional services that the government provides for MSEs operators. As will be discussed in Section 5.5, there are reportedly 25,000 Addis Ababa EPRDF youth league members in the MSEs scheme.[44] One member of the group said:

[41]MSE-04-04/15
[42] MSE-04-04/15
[43]MSE-02-01/15
[44]AAYL-02-02/15

> In one of our several visits to the district MSEs Office, we asked why we are not allocated a place in the subsidised selling hall. One of the officials replied 'you guys are not actively participating.' We told them that we participated in every training they organise and also made financial contributions whenever we are asked. Every time the district organises demonstrations and political rallies, they request MSE operators to contribute to the event financially. Finally, we understood what they mean when they say 'you don't participate'. So we went to the district EPRDF office and filled out a membership form.[45]

After three months, the young people achieved their objective of getting access to the subsidised shop in the selling hall. The district MSEs Office offered them a subsided shop which they had been formally requesting for more than a year and a half. The rent for the subsidised shop is just £5.00 per month, which is significantly low compared to the £116.00 they used to pay to a private landlord. One member of the group said he was happy that they managed to get the subsidised shop. However, he also stressed that he was very frustrated. He regretfully mentioned that their business could have thrived had they invested the money in their business rather than paying to private landlords. He summed up by his feeling by saying: 'I felt that we were betrayed'.

Third, there are also contexts where a co-optation strategy of the Party-state creates uneasy relationships among members of a group that are collectively running a business within the MSEs scheme. A member of another group of young MSEs scheme participants mentioned about multiple incidents where his group was approached by local cadres to join the ruling party youth league.[46] Leader of the group specifically said 'our district administrator called me to his office three times to convince me to join the ruling party. But I refused.'[47] Both the leader and other members of the group had to deal with several rounds of pressure from local cadres and district officials to join the ruling party youth league. They were promised individual benefits and also better access to services such as a speedy process of their requests to use adjacent land for their urban agriculture project. Most of the group members were determined not to join the ruling party hence the potential progress of their urban farm was compromised. But the group members' refusal to be co-opted lasted only until three of

[45] MSE-02-01/15
[46] MSE-01-12/14
[47] MSE-01-12/14

them were recruited at later a stage. This created a tense relationship among the group members, because youth league members are believed to work as spies for the Party-state.

Fourth, for young citizens who are already members of the ruling party, the process of accessing the available opportunities within the MSEs scheme is relatively smooth. One young MSE operator who is also an active member of the EPRDF youth league shared his experience of setting up his print and advertising business.[48] He highlighted the effectiveness of local government officials in helping him to establish his business in a short period of time. He started running his printing and advertising business at full scale within a six month period of time. Registration, renting a subsidised shop and getting a loan within six months was an extremely speedy process compared to the experiences of the other respondents.

The above mentioned four cases demonstrated how the dynamic processes of citizenship within the MSEs scheme force young citizens to trade-off their rights in different ways. Sometimes, young citizens are expected to demonstrate compliance to the political interests of the Party-state whilst pursuing their economic rights. In other contexts, young citizens may become opportunistic with a clear goal of getting economic opportunities by joining the ruling party. As noted earlier, in a context where the MSE business is run by a group of young people, a decision by some of them to join the ruling party has implications for youth-to youth relations. As will be further elaborated in Section 5.5, young citizens who join the ruling party youth league are tasked with specific responsibilities. These include spying and information gathering. In a context where the political context is dominated by hierarchical relations and the ruling party adopts repressive strategies, relationships between members and non-members become strained and full of suspicion.

It is imperative to consider the role of context in affecting the processes of citizenship. If one adopts the liberal definition of citizenship, joining a political party can be seen as a sign of exercising civil rights, i.e., the right to association. However, civic virtue is compromised if citizens consider civic rights as a means to achieving economic gains. The above cases reveals how the Party-state uses the MSEs scheme to promote civil and political rights in line with its political purposes as a means to get access to economic rights. This is a strategy of co-optation. Co-optation prevails when ruling elites use the distribution of resources as a political strategy of buying legitimacy, thwarting threats or pursued actors not to go against

[48] MSE-03-01/15

their interest (Barraclough 1985; Shleifer and Treisman 2000; Dickson 2001; Gerschewski 2013). Co-opted youth exercise very limited agency. By pursuing co-optation as a strategy of citizenship, the Party-state is promoting citizenship that is built on a trade-off of elements of citizenship rights.

In conclusion, the MSEs scheme has demonstrated the critical role of context in shaping the dynamic processes of citizenship. The EPRDF's electoral 'victory' during the 2010 election presented an ideal context for the revision of the MSEs development strategy and the expansion of the MSEs scheme. Developmentalism significantly shaped the revision of the strategy, in which the Party-state clearly embedded the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives of developmental statism. The case study analysed the implications of developmentalism through its impact on the kinds of rights the MSEs scheme has promoted, the nature of space it provided and the different strategies that both the state and urban youth adopted. As argued above, some young citizens have responded positively to the Party-state's expansion of the invited space within the MSEs scheme. The case study has found that the primary driving factor for their responsiveness is the effort to address the challenges that emanate from their 'waithood' status. Hence, they pursued and claimed social and economic rights.

Co-operation strategy prevailed with the MSEs scheme when the aims of addressing the uncertainties of 'waithood' facing responsive urban youth overlapped with the drive to generate legitimacy by the Party-state. Such a relationship between the aspiring developmental state and the urban youth was reciprocal and led to co-operation. However, the inherently dynamic context has been found to be very influential in affecting state-youth relations and their strategies. In a context where the Party-state primarily seeks to ensure its political purposes of dominance, it co-opts young urban citizens. As demonstrated above, both responsive and opportunistic young citizens can become willing to trade-off their civil and political rights. One can conclude that the urge to meet the economic demands of transitioning into adulthood remains the most crucial factor for the prevalence of co-optation strategy. However, it is important to note that there is hardly a clear cut-off point between the ending of co-operation and the commencement of co-optation strategies. What remains crucial is to understand the vital role of context in shaping the politics of citizenship, i.e., the interplay between the economic and social rights contested, the emergence of the MSEs scheme as an invited space and the move between co-operation and co-optation strategies.

Hence, young citizens who enter into the invited spaces of citizenship on reciprocal relations may find themselves forced to trade-off their civil and political rights. For young citizens, the willingness to be co-opted is one way of ensuring their access to economic opportunities to shorten their ‘waithood’ period.

The MSEs scheme is a state-led initiative that has an explicit focus on affecting young citizens’ social and economic rights. In the politics of building a developmental state, there are also state-led initiatives that have an explicit focus on affecting young citizens’ civil and political rights. The following two sections present such kinds of case studies.

5.4 The Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF)

This sub-section presents a case study of a state-led youth mobilisation platform. This youth mobilisation platform is called the Addis Ababa Youth Forum (hereafter AAYF). The AAYF emerged after the political crisis following the 2005 elections. Examining the AAYF is imperative to understanding how the ruling party sought to regain its legitimacy after the most highly contested election. As discussed in Chapter 4, the EPRDF survived the strongest electoral challenge, especially in urban areas, during the 2005 elections. The analysis adopts the analytical framework of the politics of citizenship to explain the interplay between the three aspects of the processes of citizenship: the kinds of rights contested, the nature of the space that the AAYF presents and the rationale behind the prevalence of different kinds of strategies.

This case study aims to develop three inter-related arguments. First, the ruling party initiated the AAYF as an invited space of citizenship to offer economic and political rights for young citizens. Second, the Party-state aspired to achieve a dual purpose through the AAYF: i.e., legitimacy restoration and political mobilisation. The deal is was to recruit young citizens into the ruling party structure through co-operation and co-optation. In return, young citizens were provided with a political space to exercise their rights. Third, many young citizens were responsive to the initiative of the ruling party, hence they co-operated. Some of the young people took the AAYF as a remedy to address the political marginalisation they faced in the pre-2005 period. However, at the later stage, when the political purposes of the Party-state started to become dominant, the Party-state demanded the youth to trade-off their rights.

Some of the youth leaders resisted the co-optation while others were forced to accept the deal.

5.4.1 The AAYF as a Response to the Post-2005 Election Crisis

The AAYF came into existence after the government opened public meetings targeting young people in Addis Ababa in July 2006.[49] The emergence of the AAYF goes hand in hand with the recommendations on the YDP about enhancing youth participation. The YDP sought to alter causes that made young people ‘marginalised social forces’ (FDRE 2006a: 23). When the EPRDF-led government organised citywide meetings, it already had the plan to establish the Youth Forum. A youth leader who actively participated in one of the meetings and continued to have an active role in AAYF was interviewed.[50] He recalled that, at the end of the meeting, government officials came up with the name of the initiative, the structures and the areas of focus it would be working on. Accordingly, the Youth Forum in his *kebele* was established with 31 committee members.[51]

The primary purpose of the Addis Ababa Youth Forum was to restore EPRDF’s lost political legitimacy in the city after the 2005 election. By losing almost every seat in the city council, the EPRDF lost formal and direct control over the political and administrative matters of the city. Mass killings and imprisonment during the post-election crisis contributed to a huge legitimacy deficit. However, the opposition party that won the city administration boycotted the entire election result at the national level and hence created a political and administrative

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[49]The Youth Forum was established before the government introduced the discourse of developmental state in its policies and practices. In the early periods of the post-2005 election, youth issues revolved around democratic participation, unemployment and poverty. In addition, the National Youth Policy (MoYS 2004: 21–24), the Youth Development Package (Youth Development Package: 4-11) and the national development plan (PASDEP) (MOFED 2006: 197–198) also identify youth related problems along the above mentioned areas.

[50]AAYF-01-11/14

[51]The 31 members were divided into four sub-committees of i) micro and small enterprises ii) youth focused development iii) environment and housing development, and iv) good governance. Each sub-committee had seven members. The remaining three were assigned as chairperson, vice-chairperson and secretary. Because of his active participation at the meeting, my respondent (AAYF-01-11/14) was elected as a chairperson of the Youth Forum in his *kebele*. The name, the structure and the areas of focus were all proposed by the government and accepted by the youth. This activity of establishing a Youth Forum was replicated in the 99 *kebeles* in Addis Ababa. Each *kebele* Youth Forum was expected to have a minimum of 500 young people in its structure. Shortly after, the Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF) was established at the city level with a total membership of 55,000 youth.

vacuum in Addis Ababa.[52] As a response, the federal government, which was under the EPRDF's control, established a caretaker administration. The EPRDF established the AAYF while Addis Ababa was being administered by the caretaker administration.

The establishment of the AAYF was one of the EPRDF's political measures to redress one of the possible causes of the post-election crisis through youth mobilisation. Di Nunzio (2014) argues that the EPRDF had learned its lessons from the pre-2005 period where it had minimum relations with youth groups in the city. Part of the lesson, Di Nunzio claims, was establishing 'the leagues and Forum' and to make them key players in addressing 'socio-economic and political problems of the youth' (ibid: 11). Once the AAYF was established, the government provided all the necessary financial, material, administrative and, most importantly, political support. The AAYF's activities included: proactive engagement in local level decisions, the mobilisation and recruitment of youth to join MSEs, and identifying and reporting maladministration and 'bad governance', etc.[53]

The culmination point of the AAYF's role, which also shows its significance, was when it organised national youth conferences. The AAYF played a pivotal role in organising two national youth conferences in August 2007 and February 2009, where the late prime minister spent half a day answering questions raised by young participants. This was the first time that the prime minister had such a kind of meeting with young people since he came to power in May 1991. The political support the EPRDF rendered to the organisation of the two national conferences demonstrated how the party was keen on mobilising youth at the national level. This shows the salient political role that EPRDF started to play by focusing on youth and by mobilising them in large numbers. This helped the EPRDF to send a strong propaganda message about its capacity to mobilise young people in the city.

According to one of the founding members of the AAYF, young people took the establishment of AAYF as a positive response from the government to their demand for spaces of political participation.[54] He recalled the heated debate between the government

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[52]The opposition party which won the almost all city council seats boycotted, taking over the city administration after accusing the government of gross vote rigging at a national level. As a result, the EPRDF, which controlled the federal government, established a caretaker administration constituted by technical professionals until a by-election in 2008. Similar to the Youth Forum, the government also established a Women's Forum (AAWF) and an Inhabitants' Forum (AAIF) to facilitate relations with the wider public whose representatives boycotted the city council.

[53] AAYF-01-11/14, AAYF-02-11/14, AAYF-03-02/15

[54] AAYF-02-11/14

officials and participating youth where the youth were expressing their grievances and accusing the government of being too late to talk to them. Nevertheless, by the end of the daylong meeting, the EPRDF convinced them to play their part in addressing youth exclusion.[55] Hence, the ruling party responded to the request of spaces of political participation by inviting the youth to join its new initiative. Responsive young people who were enthusiastic about the government's initiative filled the committees and sub-committees suggested by the EPRDF in establishing the youth forum. This confirms the overlapping interest between the youth and the EPRDF at the onset of establishing the AAYF. The EPRDF was keen to learn a lesson from its mistake of distancing itself from the youth in the pre-2005 period. The youth were also willing to take part in addressing their own economic and political exclusion by joining the government initiative.

By establishing the AAYF and supporting its operations, the EPRDF-led government adopted a strategy of co-operation. As argued in Chapter 2, the state co-operates with citizens in order to win their acquiescence to its political purposes and developmental objectives. Furthermore, one of the key elements of the co-operation strategy is the element of reciprocity, where citizens pursue social, economic, civil and political rights whilst the state is meets its political and developmental goals. Manifestations of the co-operation strategy include the administrative, political and financial support that the government provided to the AAYF. For example, the government made the AAYF a key player within the tripartite relationship between the caretaker Administration, the federal government and the youth. Furthermore, as indicated by one of the founding members and leaders, Youth Forum leaders both at the sub-city and city level were given a nominal allowance of 120.00 birr (£6.00) to cover their transport and communication costs.[56] Here, it is important to note that the co-operation strategy the government adopted in the AAYF came to fruition with the active role of the youth.

During the early years of the AAYF, there was a significant number of young citizens who were responsive to the government's initiative. Both the founding members and the EPRDF claimed that there were 55,000 young people who joined the youth forum in their respective *kebele*.[57] The emergence of the AAYF allowed young citizens who joined the forum to pursue economic, civil and political rights. Young citizens were able to claim economic

[55] AAYF-01-11/14, AAYF-02-11/14, AAYF-03-02/15
[56] AAYF-01-11/14
[57] AAYF-01-11/14, AAYF-02-11/14, AAYF-03-02/15

rights by joining the MSEs scheme using the AAYF as a channel of mobilisation. Furthermore, young people were also actively involved in pursuing and claiming civil and political rights by organising themselves within the Youth Forum and actively participating in the decision making processes.[58]

Young citizens' active role within the AAYF contributed positively to the EPRDF's efforts of building a developmental state. The EPRDF-led government achieved at least three major political purposes that laid the foundation to its developmental state making project. First, the ruling party boosted its membership significantly by recruiting more young people from the AAYF into its structure.[59] This contributed to the party's legitimacy and popularity. The increased youth membership was evidently seen when the Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League was established in May 2007. Within less than two years after the deadliest post-election crisis, the ruling party recruited thousands of young people from the AAYF to establish its first youth league. These young people contributed significantly to the increased membership of the ruling party in general, 'from 760,000 in 2005 to 4 million in 2008' (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008: 115).

The EPRDF achieved a second political purpose when it utilised the AAYF to win local elections and by-elections in 2008. The AAYF members who joined the EPRDF as young cadres boosted the electoral competitiveness of the ruling party. During the 2008 by-elections and local elections, many young people from the Youth Forum ran for local council seats representing the EPRDF. One of the leaders of the AAFY recalled that there were at least 500 young people from the Youth Forum who represented the EPRDF during the 2008 local elections.[60] The 2008 local elections were the first elections after the EPRDF-led government considerably changed the structures of local governance by increasing the number of elected officials in the local councils from 15 to 300. There were at least 3.6 million local council seats available throughout the country (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008). The EPRDF relied on structures such as the Youth Forum to fill these seats, which made doing so practically impossible for any opposition party. Hence, the AAYF was a key player in the EPRDF's first electoral victory after the 2005 election.

[58] AAYF-01-11/14
[59] AAYF-01-11/14, AAYF-02-11/14
[60]AAYF-01-11/14

The third fundamental political purpose that EPRDF achieved was power consolidation. The Youth Forum was one of the key political players that set the foundation for winning the 2010 national election. The Youth Forum campaigned for the EPRDF both during the 2008 local elections and the 2010 national election. Several of its members also ran, representing the EPRDF. The ruling party 'won' all but two of the 547 parliamentary seats during the 2010 election. It was after this massive electoral 'victory' that the EPRDF openly declared its objective to build a democratic developmental state (MoFED 2010).

One can argue that the AAYF's emergence, structure and the purpose it served made it an invited space of citizenship engagement. The EPRDF used the AAYF as an invited space where it adopted co-operation as a strategy of offering young citizens opportunities to pursue civil, political and economic rights. By doing so, the EPRDF succeeded in regaining at least electoral and administrative legitimacy by winning every local and national election after a huge loss in 2005. The government took the political initiative to establish the AAYF, provide office space, financial support and also political recognition to the AAYF in its post-2005 political endeavours. The material, administrative, financial and mainly political support that the EPRDF put into the AAYF are credible manifestations that the AAYF is indeed an invited space.

There are some elements convergence and divergence between the MSEs scheme and the AAYF. In terms of spaces of citizenship, both the AAYF and the MSEs scheme can be identified as invited spaces. But the MSEs scheme is guided by a government strategy revised after 14 years in 2010 to offer job opportunities to youth. The MSEs scheme is also implemented by government offices established from the federal to the local level of administration. With regard to AAYF, the YDP has played a significant role in setting the rationale for the emergence of AAYF. The AAYF, as has been shown, emerged as an invited space as part of a political strategy to regain legitimacy in the aftermath of post-election crisis in 2005. It seems that in the aftermath of the 2005 election, the EPRDF decided to have a direct role in mobilising young people in Addis Ababa. Hence, one can conclude that invited spaces of citizenship can emerge both as an outcome of government strategy and as a response to a political crisis.

Young citizens who were responsive to the government's initiative found an ideal opportunity to exercise their civil and political rights. The responsiveness of the youth can be explained in terms of their eagerness to shorten their period of 'waithood' and become

meaningfully involved citizens. Oftentimes young citizens' participation is meant to be entirely cosmetic. When the AAYF emerged, it offered them an actual platform of exercising citizenship. The AAYF facilitated the opportunity to get involved actively in local administration, in elections, and in mobilising fellow young people to join MSEs. Compared to the pre-2005 context, where young people were marginalised and had limited opportunities for participation, the AAYF was an opportunity to be embraced. The eagerness to actively exercise their political rights was one of the core elements of the co-operation observed between the youth and the government. Moreover, the opportunity to pursue economic rights was also another key aspect of the co-operation between the youth and the EPRDF-led government. The following sub-section will further elaborate how the processes of citizenship within the AAYF allow young citizens to pursue economic rights.

5.4.2. The AAYF and Economic Opportunities

The AAYF has also been serving as a space of citizenship through which young citizens are pursuing economic rights. As mentioned earlier, one of the sub-committees of the AAYF established in each *kebele* is specifically dedicated to the MSEs scheme.[61] Hence, members of AAYF have been tasked with the responsibility of mobilising their respective communities and encouraging their fellow young citizens to join the MSEs scheme. Current youth leaders of AAYF also have repeatedly expressed that their primary responsibility is 'benefiting young people'.[62] Their definition of benefiting young people is ensuring that young people have established a business within the MSEs scheme and can exercise their economic rights. 'Benefiting young people' is one of the most widely used expressions not only among current leaders of the AAYF but also among every government official interviewed from the Youth Ministry, the Addis Ababa Youth Bureau and the MSEs office. As it will be discussed later, young citizens closely relate to the Party-state (youth league and youth association) also use the phrase 'benefiting young people' (*wetatochin metiqem/masteqem)* to describe their core purposes. It is interesting to hear exactly the same kind of expression from more than a dozen people interviewed in different times and contexts. It appears that the aspiration of the Party-state to build developmental hegemony by controlling collective thinking is taking shape in a common expression toward youth.

[61] AAYF-01-11/14, AAYF-02-11/14, AAYF06-03/15, AAYF07-03/15
[62]AAYF02-11/14; AAYF03-02/15; AAYF04-02/15; AAYF05-02/15; AAYF06-03/15; AAYF07-03/15

Through time, in addition to benefiting the young citizens it is targeting, the AAYF has also become a space of claiming economic rights for the youth playing leadership roles within the forum. During the first couple of years, the EPRDF was relatively open to the active engagement of the AAYF leaders claiming civil and political rights. As discussed earlier, the ruling party even recruited a significant number of AAYF members into its structure and established a youth league in Addis Ababa. However, after some time, critical voices started to emerge from the youth leaders and members of the AAYF demanding the independence of the Youth Forum from the direct control of the ruling party. Such kind of political demand from the youth leaders alerted the EPRDF that co-operation may not always deliver the political purpose it sought through the AAYF. As a result, the party started to adopt co-optation as an additional strategy.

The demand for independence by the some of the AAYF leaders started to change the dynamics of the citizenship processes involving the EPRDF and the youth. Despite being an invited space of citizenship where the ruling party had more authority, some youth leaders in the AAYF started to demand certain level of autonomy. These youth leaders wanted to transform the AAYF into an independent youth platform.[63] The main reason for demanding autonomy was to get more credibility in the eyes of the wider youth and to prove that they were not dependent on the EPRDF.[64] This demand can also be explained as an effort to push the frontiers of an invited space so that rights could be exercised without necessarily being restricted by EPRDF's political purposes. The push for an independent Youth Forum gathered momentum, especially when the ruling party become reluctant to support some of their initiatives. As one of the leaders recalled, plans of the AAYF started to be shelved and the government started to refuse financing for their activities.[65] Furthermore, the youth leaders started to voice their disagreements about receiving orders from the EPRDF in their works. The youth leaders also started challenging the dominance of the EPRDF over the operations of the AAYF by using its political cadres both within and outside the AAYF.

The government adopted a co-optation strategy to defuse the growing level of discontent among the leaders of the AAYF. The co-optation strategy aimed to 'persuade [members of AAYF] not to use their power to obstruct' (Shleifer and Treisman 2000: 8) the way the AAYF has been functioning by rewarding them with salaried positions in government

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[63] AAYF-01-11/14, AAYF-02-11/14
[64] AAYF-01-11/14, AAYF-02-11/14
[65] AAYF-02-11/14

offices. Some youth leaders considered this offer too good to be ignored. One respondent said:

> For more than two years, we were working voluntarily with just a token allowance of 120 birr (£6.00). When we started to challenge the government, the EPRDF started to lure our members into government offices with a salary of 3,000 birr (£300.00). This practice becomes so common, especially after the EPRDF won the 2008 local elections in Addis Ababa. Many young people changed their critical position once the party offered them a job or a condominium house.

To get a job in government offices or to own a house was an ideal opportunity for many of the youth leaders. These opportunities can meaningfully contribute to the shortening 'waithood' period for many young people before they could become economically independent. For most ordinary young people, such kinds of opportunities are difficult to realise in the near future. Low socio-economic status, low educational level, and unemployment are some of the reasons why the opportunities of getting a government job or owning a house are difficult aspirations to fulfil for many young people. Hence, the Party-state used this vulnerable status of some of the youth leaders in the AAYF to convince them to change their opinions.

The demand for autonomy by the youth leaders of the AAYF was a sufficient reason to shift the state's strategy from co-operation into co-optation. Through co-optation, the ruling party managed to thwart the danger of losing the youth structure it initiated. The ruling party attempted to silence dissent by rewarding those who agreed to trade-off their citizenship rights. The youth who expressed their disagreement with the ruling party were made to trade-off their idea for an independent youth forum against a controlled youth forum by receiving material rewards. The EPRDF simply offered more opportunities of economic rights for AAYF leaders at the expense of sacrificing their civil and political rights to get their loyalty. However, not every youth leader was willing to be co-opted.

Some AAYF leaders continued voicing their disagreement with the EPRDF's control over the youth forum. These youth leaders resisted co-optation by the EPRDF and remained consistent in their call for autonomy from the EPRDF's control. However, the dominance of the EPRDF and other loyal members of the AAYF forced them to quit the AAYF and continue their

resistance outside of the invited space. The decision by these youth leaders to reject the material rewards demonstrates the limits of co-optation. It shows that invited spaces of citizenship have a limitation in providing a political space for young citizens who are not willing to prioritise or trade-off their citizenship rights. The youth leaders who rejected the material benefits and persisted in pursuing civil and political rights later on defected from the AAYF. In Chapter 6, this thesis discusses how these young people who defected from the AAYF adopted resistance as a strategy by organising themselves into a group called the *Bale-Raey* Youth Association.

In conclusion, the AAYF is another example of how the dynamic processes of citizenship contribute to the understanding of the politics of building a developmental state. The case study revealed the immense role of context in shaping relations between the EPRDF-led government (later on the Party-state) and the urban youth. From the onset, the AAYF emerged as an invited space of citizenship in the wake of the 2005 political crisis. Restoring political and administrative legitimacy after the sudden electoral loss was a key political strategy before the EPRDF officially launched its developmentalist mission. The political purposes and developmental objectives which later consolidated within the developmentalist project immensely benefited from the huge political mobilisation the AAYF provided during local and national elections in 2008 and 2010 respectively.

Moreover, understanding the dynamism of the context also helps to explain why certain citizenship rights have been prioritised either by the young citizens or the Party-state. For example, immediately after the 2005 post-election violence, the ruling party offered a space for exercising political rights that helped to ease the lingering political tension. The post-election violence exacerbated the shared feeling of marginalisation and exclusion among the urban youth. Hence, they grabbed the opportunity that the ruling party offered. During the honeymoon period of the AAYF, both the ruling party and the youth adopted strategies of co-operation to guide their relations. The defining feature of a co-operation strategy was the existence of an overlapping agenda that both the ruling party and the youth honour. From the youth side, it mainly involved getting a space to exercise their political rights. For the EPRDF, it was involved regaining legitimacy. Both the ruling party and the youth sought to address their respective prior concerns through a reciprocal relation.

The case of the AAYF also demonstrated the implications of a changed political context on the kinds of rights contested and the strategies adopted. After consolidating its political power

through the electoral victories in 2008 and 2010 and boosting its membership base with recruits from the AAYF, the Party-state become more dominant in its relations with the AAYF. The Party-state's dominance is demonstrated through its capacity to curb the concerted effort of AAYF leaders who demanded autonomy of the youth forum. The Party-state used a co-optation strategy to restrain potential resistance by providing more economic opportunities that potentially addressed the challenges of 'waithood' among the youth. By doing so, the Party-state kept the AAYF under its control and has continued to use it to fulfil its political purposes to date. Young citizens who refused to be co-opted left the invited space to pursue their civil and political rights in a created space rather than a space controlled by the Party-state

The case of the AAYF demonstrates how a state-led initiative that emerged after a political crisis affects the citizenship of urban youth. The invitation within the AAYF was offered to any young person who wanted to join. In addition to the AAYF, which was open to every young person, the EPRDF also established its first youth league after the 2005 elections. The youth league strictly demands political party membership to become a member. The following section will further examine the processes of citizenship within the ruling party structure.

5.5 The Ruling Party's Youth League in Addis Ababa

This sub-section is about the ruling party youth league in the city: the EPRDF Addis Ababa Youth League (hereafter the AAYL). Whilst answering the question of how state-led initiatives are affecting the citizenship of urban youth, the thesis finds it extremely important to examine the ruling party's youth-focused structure. This is vital because the EPRDF is the most powerful and dominant political force in today's Ethiopia. The ruling party utilises its dominance over the entire state and government structure to pursue socio-economic policies and political programs that affect the citizenship of urban youth in general.

The previous case studies of the MSEs scheme and AAYF are examples of how the EPRDF-led government influences the citizenship of urban youth in general. However, as the findings in each of the case studies demonstrated, membership in the ruling party youth league appeared to be an essential aspect of the process of citizenship. As discussed above, this is particularly true in the aspect of gaining access to more resources within the MSEs scheme or

to get job opportunities. Hence, understanding how this youth league functions in relation to other state-led initiatives will shed more light on understanding the politics of citizenship in the context of developmentalism.

5.5.1 Political Mobilisation

There was no youth-focused structure (such as youth caucus or youth wing) within the EPRDF party until 2007. The founders of TPLF, which later played a leading role in establishing the EPRDF, were young revolutionaries in the mid-1970s, when they abandoned a university education to establish a rebel movement. They led a rebel movement against the Derg regime for 17 years before coming to power in 1991. Afterwards, it took them a further 17 solid years before they established a youth league. The EPRDF passed the decision to establish a youth league during its sixth congress in September 2006. Historically, the 2006 congress was the first assembly after the momentous May 2005 election and the deadly political crisis that followed.

As argued in the party's ideological magazine, the establishment of the Youth League was part of the EPRDF's effort to strengthen the party 'by producing a new, capable and strong force' that could replace the current leadership (EPRDF 2006b: 72). The party argues that a political program that is detached from the youth is an unrealistic program (EPRDF 2006b: 42). The EPRDF claims that it is moving from being a 'vanguard' of youth issues to a 'key supporter', i.e., facilitating opportunities for young people through socio-economic policies. The EPRDF argues that this will improve ownership and leadership among young people.

By establishing the AAYL, EPRDF is offering a political space for young citizens within its party structure to pursue and claim primarily civil and political rights. What makes the AAYL different is the fact that it is a structure within the ruling party. Members of the AAYL are, in principle, expected to subscribe to the revolutionary ideology principles and abide to party principles such as democratic centralism and organisational discipline. The AAYL had more than 85,000 registered members who pay monthly contributions at the time of data collection.[66] These young members are divided into four divisions: micro and small

[66] AAYL02-02/15

enterprises (MSEs), schools and universities, non-governmental youth initiatives and neighbourhoods.[67]

It is important to recall that EPRDF is a coalition of four parties. Three of the four parties have membership only from specific ethnic groups namely Amhara (Amhara National Democratic Movement), Oromo (Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organisation) and Tigire (Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front). Whereas the fourth EPRDF member party, Southern Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement (SEPDM) was initially established as a front of 20 ethnically organised political parties and later evolved into a movement (EPRDF 2013). Despite such strong political commitment of ethnic based mobilisation, EPRDF established its youth league in Addis Ababa without strictly adhering to the ethnic based mobilisation. Hence, EPRDF member parties do not have their own youth league in Addis Ababa. The majority of the Addis Ababa youth league members still use their respective ethnic based political party as their 'mother organisation'. However, young people from other ethno-linguistic groups are also members of the EPRDF Addis Ababa youth league without necessarily becoming members of an ethnic based political party that belong to EPRDF. In this case, being a resident of Addis Ababa and accepting the political program and ideology of EPRDF were the key criteria for membership in the Addis Ababa EPRDF youth league.[68]

However, this does not mean that there are no ethnically organised youth structures in Addis Ababa. There are liaison offices of regional (hence ethno-linguistically organised) youth associations specifically for Amhara, Oromia, Southern and Tigray regions in Addis Ababa. These liaison offices serve as representatives of their mother organisation in Addis Ababa and mobilise young people that belong to their ethno-linguistic group. However, the activities of these liaison offices is hardly visible compared to the two Addis Ababa specific state-led initiatives namely Addis Ababa Youth Forum and Addis Ababa EPRDF youth league as well as the city's youth association i.e. Addis Ababa Youth Association (AAYA).

[67]Out of the total members, the chairperson claimed that nearly 25,000 are in the MSEs scheme. Within the schools and universities division, the youth league recruits teenagers between 15 and 17 years of age into the youth league and those above 18 into the main party structure. The youth league claims that it has membership structures in 104 out of 113 high schools in Addis Ababa. The 'non-government youth initiatives', according to the chairperson, are the Addis Ababa Youth Association (AAYA), the Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF) and other youth led clubs and organizations. Additionally, the youth league also targets young people that are neither in educational institutions nor in youth initiatives using its neighbourhood structures. The youth league has structures of mobilization in all the 116 districts of Addis Ababa.

[68] AAYL-01-12/14; AAYL-02-02/15

Similar to the Soviet-era youth structure *Komsomol* and the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL), the youth league adopts the structures and principles of a Marxist-Leninist organisation. The AAYL has 1920 cells in the city which are considered 'essential components of the league'.[69] With a maximum number of 20 members, the chairperson of AAYL describes the cells as 'the most basic unit of the party where every mission is carried out'.[70] The mission includes mobilising the public and gathering intelligence about opposition parties' plans and activities. As the chairperson noted, it took only three days for all AAYL members to get registered for the 2015 national election. Plus, every member is also given a responsibility to influence and mobilise five individuals in the 'one-to-five' structure. The 'one-to-five' structure serves the dual purpose of both public mobilisation and control. The role of cells is also demonstrated in mobilising members for election registration and voting. For example, one of the respondents who works within the MSEs scheme as a cobblestone cutter mentioned that despite his reluctance to vote during the 2015 election, he was forced to register for voting through the cell structure he belongs to.[71]

One of the distinct roles that the AAYL plays in the processes of citizenship is making young citizens as agents of the state. Their role can be either to mobilise other young citizens or to contribute to the repressive strategies of the Party-state. As one of the youth league leaders mentioned, the responsibilities of members of the AAYL might include, spying over the opposition party members and passing intelligence to officials. One of the AAYL leaders mentioned that:

> In January 2015, the Blue Party members organised a demonstration. The government did not give them permission but they defied the decision. Finally when they started their demonstration they were only 79 and their demonstration was quickly disbanded by the police. From our side, nearly 10,000 members were mobilised through the cell structure. The main task was gathering intelligence about the demonstration and to remain alert to take any orders if deemed necessary.[72]

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[69] AAYL-02-02/15
[70] AAYL-02-02/15
[71] MSE-04-04/15
[72] AAYL-01-12/14

This shows how the ruling party, in addition to offering young citizens a space for political engagement, uses young citizens to meet its purposes of political dominance. On another occasion, one of the AAYL members who also headed a Yeka sub-city AAYF was at the court where the case of Zone Nine bloggers (a youth initiative case study in the following chapter) was being held. This young leader was one of the procedural witnesses of the Federal Prosecutor. This is another indication of how the ruling party using its young members in its repressive strategies.

The EPRDF's tactics of using young people as foot soldiers of its repressive strategies have had a significant impact on youth-to-youth relations. This strategy of the Party-state further strengthens the widely shared normative view of absolute respect to authority and submission to hierarchy. It also creates mistrust and suspicion among young people. As one of the MSE cases discussed earlier, it created tension within youth groups when some of them were recruited into the Youth League.[73] It also created uneasy relations and a loss of trust among youth, which can be a hindrance for youth-to-youth relations, especially among those who have opposing views.

One can observe a strategy of co-operation between the ruling party and young citizens in their relations within the AAYL. Young citizens that have strong conviction for civic engagement and public service found a favourable environment within the AAYL. Most members of the AAYL expressed their strong commitment to serve their community. The spirit of volunteerism or willingness to work for the cause they believe in with very minimum material or financial reward at the time of their service is also quite visible. The youth leaders in the AAYL have also shown a good awareness and understanding about the socio-economic and political issues of the country and are zealous to play a positive role.[74] Volunteering activities within the local community are the primary means of engagement that most members of the AAYL refer to in terms of their citizenship engagement. For example, a female youth league member who is also executive committee member of the AAYA (sub-city chairperson) argued that her engagement in the AAYL gave her the opportunity to be an actively engaged and responsible citizen.[75] Another youth league leader argued that 'youth

[73] MSE-01-12/14
[74] AAYL-03-02/15; AAYL-04-11/14; AAYL-05-11/14; AAYL-06-03/15; AAYL-07-04/15
[75] AAYL-04-11/14

league leaders are not like other civil servants. We commit ourselves to the benefit of the mass youth by always asking what is my role is for the country's development'.[76]

Ideological orientation is another key aspect that makes the processes of citizenship within the AAYL unique. Revolutionary democracy is the ideological banner under which young citizens within the AAYL exercise their political rights. The EPRDF argues that revolutionary democracy is an antithesis of liberal (bourgeoisie) democracy (Lefort 2007; Bach 2011; EPRDF 2010). And it is within this ideology that young citizens are exercising political rights by becoming elected members of local government, promoting community engagement through volunteerism and also contributing to the repressive strategies of the regime. As discussed in Chapter 4, the EPRDF's notion of 'democratic developmentalism' emanates from its ideology of revolutionary democracy (EPRDF 2010: 57). By doing so, the Party-state conflates the ideological and developmental goals it is pursuing.

The thesis identifies at least three inter-related elements that demonstrate how the overlapping ideological and developmental orientations of the ruling party affect the processes of citizenship between the Party-state and urban youth. First, the EPRDF's left-leaning ideological orientation has a significant sway in shaping how its young members are politically involved within the party. The ruling party's background in Marxism-Leninism is visibly seen as a very powerful organisational structure and principle among AAYL members. AAYL members use terminology such as 'struggle', 'sacrifice' and 'martyrdom' to express their citizenship engagement. In addition to the strictly hierarchical and secretive organisational structure and system they operate in, their ideas of citizenship are tuned in to the terminology of the revolution period of the 1970s (Gebremariam and Herrera 2016). Such terminology is part of the 'binary opposition' (Melakou Tegegne 2008: 284) political discourse which 'vindictively negates' rival political groups. This terminology of radical political rivalry dominated the revolution period. The 'Red Terror' which caused large scale bloodshed, was the final outcome of such extreme rivalry buttressed by such vindictive language (Melakou Tegegne 2008; Bahru Zewde 2009).

In addition to the terminology and discourse of the revolution period, young politicians within the youth league also incorporated ideological expressions in their political discourse. AAYL members express their citizenship engagement as 'a struggle against rent-seeking and

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[76]AAYL-03-02/15

dependent mentality', 'a struggle against neo-liberal forces' and 'a struggle for democracy to the extent of paying a life sacrifice'.[77] These phrases are the most widely used propaganda messages by the Party-state in its effort of building a developmental hegemony. Such kinds of expressions also play a vital role in making members of the AAYL active players in the repressive strategies of the Party-state. Both during individual interviews and focus group discussion among political party member young people, AAYL members expressed strong support for all the actions and objectives of the Party-state. According to AAYL members, the imprisonment of journalists, bloggers and opposition party members are justifiable actions in the struggle against actors of neo-liberal forces.[78]

In addition to endorsing the detention of dissenting voices and serving as spies for the Party-state, a member of the youth league is found playing an active role in the repressive strategies of the Party-state.[79] As it will be further elaborated in the case studies of Chapter 6, one of the implications of politically inspired legal frameworks is the pervasiveness of 'show trials' in the court rooms particularly of citizens that demand their civil and political rights (Awol Allo 2012; Awol Allo and Beza Tesfaye 2015). In these 'show trials' there are grotesque procedural irregularities and also presentation of witnesses that are believed to be 'coached or coerced' by the prosecutor (Awol Allo and Beza Tesfaye 2015: 290-292). In such cases, the witnesses failed to substantiate their claim against defendants, and were sometimes unable to identify the person they are testifying against (ibid). In the case of Zone Nine bloggers, the prosecutor presented only procedural witnesses to support the terrorism charge against the defendants who were detained for more than 500 days. Like many other 'show trials', there were witnesses that do not know the name of the defendant they were testifying against, or were unable to identify the person in the courtroom. It is in this trial that one of the youth league members, who is also leader of a Youth Forum in his district, testified against one of the bloggers.

Second, the AAYL is plays an indispensable role as an agent of the Party-state to control either state-led or youth-led initiatives that are shaping state-youth relations. For example, out of 12 former and current leaders of the Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF) and the Addis Ababa Youth Association (AAYA) interviewed for this study, only one of them described

[77]AAYL-01-12/14; AAYL-02-02/15; AAYL-07-04/15
[78]AAYL-01-12/14; AAYL-02-02/15; FGD-02-04/15; FGD-05-04/15
[79] Field notes (30 March 2015): one of the interviewee (AAYL-04-02/15) testified against one of the Zone Nine bloggers.

herself as a non-member of the ruling party. Rather, she said she is strong supporter.[80] Through members of the AAYL, the Party-state managed to dominate the two largest youth structures in the country. It is not by accident that these youth leaders are members of the ruling party. It is one of the strategies of the EPRDF to control mass-based associations (EPRDF 1993; 2010). The chairperson of the AAYL argues:

> Our members have the right join any association. But the youth league also requires its members *to play a leadership role wherever they are*. Hence, if they are in the Youth Association or the Youth Forum we expect them to be leaders and they will be given a mission to carry out as leaders of the youth group they lead.[81] (emphasis added)

Both the observation of the dominance of youth league members in the AAYA and AAYF as well as the response from the chairperson of the AAYL show how the EPRDF is using its youth league to make sure that state-youth relations serve its developmentalist orientation.

Third, the youth league also plays both implicit and explicit roles in encouraging young citizens to be co-opted in the processes of citizenship. All members and leaders of the AAYL agree that there is a widely held belief among young people that the youth league is a path to getting a job or access to economic opportunities. The chairperson of the AAYL shared his experience of receiving in his office a number of recent graduates from university who wanted to drop their CVs in search of job opportunities.[82] Leaders of the AAYL blame 'immature youth league leaders'[83] who promise job opportunities for recruiting new members. During a focus group discussion, both participants from the EPRDF emphasised that individual cadres may offer job opportunities to recruit new members, which in their opinion is wrong.[84] They insist that allegations must remain at the individual cadres' level. In their defence, the EPRDF has no such policy, hence, it should not be held responsible. It seems that all the respondents from the youth league do not want to blame their party but the faulty individual members. However, contrary to their defence, the MSEs development strategy clearly states the intention of the ruling party to recruit participants of the MSEs scheme into the ruling party (FDRE 2011). Indeed, none of the AAYL members denied the

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[80]AAYA-03-01/15
[81]AAYL-02-02/15
[82]AAYL-02-02/15
[83] AAYL-01-12/14; AAYL-02-02/15; FGD-02-04/15; FGD-05-04/15
[84] 2FGD-02-04/15; 2FGD-05-04/15

increasing tendency among young people in joining the Youth League only for the sake of gaining economic opportunities. This confirms that the youth league is fertile ground for a co-optation strategy. It also shows how opportunistic young people are willing enough to join the Youth League as a means of pursuing economic rights. Similarly, the ruling party cadres are also using the provision of economic opportunities as a strategy of recruiting new young members.

In comparison with the previously discussed state initiatives, the AAYL has some similarities and differences. Similar to the AAYF, the emergence of the AAYL as an invited space was significantly influenced by the political crisis after the 2005 election. It appears that the ruling party was determined to have an additional youth mobilisation platform directly attached to its party structure. Perhaps, the reason to have an additional youth mobilisation channel through the youth league is to have a youth group that is capable of carrying out political missions. The political missions include spying opposition parties, gathering intelligence, and also serving the interests of the ruling party whilst leading youth groups. The AAYF is open to every young person, at least in principle. The AAYL, on the other hand, is mainly for those who subscribe to the ruling party's ideological orientations and principles. Hence, one can argue that invited spaces can also emerge as part of the political party structure where ideological orientation plays a major role.

Moreover, it is important to note that the role of the AAYL in shaping the citizenship of young citizens has two interrelated features. The first feature involves processes of citizenship within the AAYL i.e. between young members of the EPRDF and the Party-state. In this context, the ruling party affects the citizenship of young citizens by imposing its revolutionary democracy ideology, principles of democratic centralism, its hierarchical cell structures, and also discursive categorisations. The second feature involves AAYL's role in relation to other young citizens outside of ruling party. The AAYL is an interface between the ruling party and other state-led or youth-led initiatives. The Party-state uses the AAYL when it co-opts young citizens into its structure as well in its strategies of repression against young citizens that prioritise their civil and political rights.

In conclusion, the one can identify the following three points about the processes of citizenship occurring within the AAYL. First, the AAYL emerged as an invited space of citizenship within the ruling party structure as a result of the EPRDF's effort to establish close links with young people in the wake of the 2005 elections. As an invited space, the

AAYL primarily provided young citizens a space to claim civil and political rights. Second, the way the AAYL operates reveals one of the continuing legacies of the 1974 revolution, i.e., the introduction of leftist ideology as well as political mobilisation. The revolutionary democratic ideology, democratic centralism, expressions of struggle and martyrdom, mobilisation and organisation within cells are manifestations of this legacy. Hence, the AAYL demonstrates how spaces and strategies of citizenship can be influenced by socio-historical processes and ideological orientations. Third, unlike other state-led initiatives, the AAYL has a dual purpose. It serves both as a channel of mobilisation among the youth as well as an instrument of control of other state-led and youth-led initiatives. Hence, the findings on the AAYL reveal that the Party-state mobilises young citizens as key players of its repressive strategies. Therefore, it is imperative to note that the processes of citizenship between the Party-state and the urban youth have direct implications on youth-to-youth relations as well.

5.6 Conclusion

The chapter has attempted to answer the first sub-question: *how do state-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?* The following concluding points summarise the key findings and arguments of the chapter.

First, the chapter argued that one of the main ways through which state-led initiatives affect young citizens' rights, spaces and strategies of citizenship is through legal and policy frameworks. Over a period of 12 years, the dominant policy narratives evolved from categorizing youth as 'threats' to societal tranquillity to approaching them as potential actors of democracy and development. This change of narrative and discourse affects young citizens' capacity to pursue and claim rights in invited or created spaces as well as the strategies they adopt. When young citizens were categorised as 'threats' and 'criminals to be contained', their civil and political rights were compromised by the criminalizing approach the state adopted. Whereas at later stages, as the policy frameworks evolved and streamlined with the developmentalist orientation of the Party-state, the narratives started to favour the economic rights of young citizens and addressing their economic and political marginalisation. A key element of the developmentalist policy framework is the way the government has embedded its political purposes within its developmental policies as demonstrated in the MSEs scheme strategy.

Second, the three case studies discussed in this chapter demonstrated that state-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth by serving as invited spaces. Furthermore, the above discussed sections also demonstrated that these invited spaces primarily facilitate the realisation of social and economic rights. From the Party-state's side, facilitating opportunities for social and economic rights allows it to derive legitimacy. From the urban youth side, the provision of social and economic rights allows them to address the challenges of the prolonged period of 'waithood' which oftentimes makes them economically insecure. Civil and political rights are also offered within the invited spaces. However, the Party-state has the upper hand in dictating how young citizens exercise civil and political rights within invited spaces to make sure that they serve its developmentalist orientation.

Third, the context in which the processes of citizenship are occurring shapes the way both the Party-state and the urban youth adopt different strategies. In a situation where the Party-state is strongly seeking to regain legitimacy, it adopts co-operation as a strategy. Regaining political legitimacy, ensuring popularity, strengthening the ruling party with expanded membership base, and securing electoral victory were the motivations that drove the Party-state to adopt a co-operation strategy. Young citizens who have seen opportunities of exercising civil and political rights as well as claiming economic rights within the state initiatives also co-operated with the state. Hence, the overlapping agenda among both actors is a fertile ground for a co-operation strategy based on reciprocity.

However, the dynamism of the political context requires both the Party-state and the urban youth also to adopt a co-optation strategy. The co-optation strategy allows the Party-state to persuade or pressure young citizens to exercise their civil and political rights in ways that support its political purposes. The Party-state provides better economic opportunities for young citizens who are willing to trade-off their civil and political rights. From the young citizens' perspective, prioritizing social and economic rights at the expense of civil and political rights is one way of cutting short the prolonged period of 'waithood'.

The citizenship of urban youth within the context of developmentalism is shaped by both state-led and youth-led initiatives. In addition to the case studies that examined state-led initiatives, this thesis also examines the role of youth-led initiatives in shaping the citizenship of urban youth. In the following chapter, five cases of youth-led initiatives will give further insights about the processes of citizenship in the context of developmentalism.

CHAPTER SIX
YOUTH-LED INITIATIVES & CITIZENSHIP

6.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to answer the second sub-question: *how do youth-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?* The chapter adopts the analytical framework presented in Figure 2.1 to examine the role of youth-led initiatives in the processes of citizenship. It covers five case studies of youth-led initiatives. In each case study, the thesis examines the interplay between the citizenship rights contested in the specific youth-led initiative, the kind of space the youth-led initiative is providing and the dominant strategies that both the urban youth and the Party-state are adopting.

The chapter advances three inter-related arguments. First, youth-led initiatives are created spaces of citizenship that emerge out of the 'common concern' of young citizens to exercise their rights. In these created spaces, young citizens primarily pursue civil and political rights. Second, of the five case studies of youth-led initiatives, the Party-state adopts repressive strategies in its relations with four of them. These four youth-led initiatives primarily focus on claiming civil and political rights through resistance. The Party-state adopts a co-optation strategy with the remaining youth-led initiative and forced it to become a 'capture created space' where social and economic rights are prioritised. Third, the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state has extensive power and dominance over the youth-led initiatives and their roles in the dynamic processes of citizenship. The dominance of the Party-state is realised through administrative, legal and political frameworks that operationalise its developmentalist aspiration. The Party-state utilises a combination of these frameworks in its strategies of co-optation and repression.

The case studies discussed in the following section include a youth association established by former AAYF and AAYL members, social media activists, young politicians in opposition parties, the relatively largest and youth association in Addis Ababa and leaders of youth-led NGOs. Before presenting each case study of the youth-led initiatives, the following Table 6.1 briefly summarises the main features of each case study.

<u>Table 6.1 Overview of Youth-led Initiatives</u>

Name of Youth-led Initiative	Abbreviation	Specific Feature of the case study
Bale-Raey Youth Association	*Bale-Raey*	Established in January 2012 by youth leaders that defected from invited spaces (AAYF and AAYL)
Zone Nine Bloggers and Activists	Zone Nine	Established in May 2012 as a collective group of independent young bloggers
Young Opposition Politicians	Young politicians	Young citizens who joined opposition political parties
Addis Ababa Youth Association	AAYA	A pioneer youth association established in February 1998 by youth leaders
Youth-led NGOs	Youth-led NGOs	NGOs re-registered after the adoption of the new Charities and Societies Proclamation (621/2009)

6.2 Contesting for Civil and Political Rights

6.2.1 The *Bale-Raey* Youth Association

Bale-Raey means 'visionary' in Amharic. The association was established in January 2012 by 18 youths who were formerly leaders of the Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF). The founding members include the former chairperson of AAYF, sub-city level leaders, former members of the EPRDF Youth League and local council members who represented the EPRDF in the 2008 local elections. As one of the founding members mentioned, he stepped down from his role as head of the Bole sub-city AAYF before co-founding *Bale-Raey*.[85]

[85] BR-01-02/15 (AAYF-01-11/14)

Establishing an independent youth association was the main reason that brought the founding members of *Bale-Raey* together.[86]

Bale-Raey was established by youth leaders who defected from the AAYF and aspired to have an independent youth association to pursue civil, political and economic rights. The founders of *Bale-Raey* attempted to make the association a platform that allows them to implement activities they were unable to execute within the AAYF. For example, unlike the AAYF, *Bale-Raey*'s objectives, structures and activities were set by the youth themselves.[87] Furthermore, membership fees and voluntary contributions by members were the only sources of finance for *Bale-Raey*. In order to realise their objectives, *Bale-Raey* leaders carried out two major activities. The first major activity was organising a weekly dialogue forum for young people. One of *Bale-Raey's* leaders in Yeka sub-city mentioned that the weekly dialogue forum aimed to promote a culture of debate and dialogue among members.[88] The second activity was facilitating job opportunities for unemployed young people. *Bale-Raey* leaders worked in collaboration with the government and private businesses to address issues of youth unemployment. For example, the association negotiated with a soft-drink production company for its members to work as wholesale distributors. *Bale-Raey* leaders created a sense of ownership amongst themselves because their objectives, activities and financing were no longer under the direct control of the Party-state.

Bale-Raey is a platform for young citizens to exercise their civil and political rights. Examples of *Bale-Raey*'s activities include organising weekly dialogue forums in their offices and organising a demonstration. Their weekly dialogue forums are focused on debating issues of democracy, governance, human rights, and civic participation of young people. One of *Bale-Raey's* leaders mentioned that they hosted weekly dialogue forums in

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[86] Off-the record informal discussions were held at *Kilinto* prison with the former chairperson of the AAYF, who was also one of the founding members of *Bale-Raey.* He stressed that one of the main reasons for establishing *Bale-Raey* was the frustration of the youth leaders in receiving orders from the EPRDF headquarters. He later joined one of the opposition parties and ended up in jail after being accused of 'terrorism' in July 2014 and was later acquitted in August 2016.

[87] The objectives of *Bale-Raey* include: promoting active youth participation, particularly focused towards achieving the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-I), creating job opportunities for young people and promoting Ethiopian national unity. The founder also planned to have branch offices in each sub-city of the city, led by an executive committee and a city level council constituted by executive committee members from each sub-city. The initial plan was to have a minimum of 50 members in each sub-city branch.

[88] BR-02-02/15

their offices for more than a year.[89] The youth leaders claimed that there were at least 40 young people, on average, who actively participated in each weekly dialogue forum[90]. In addition to the dialogue forum, *Bale-Raey* leaders also tried to organise a demonstration. When news about the construction of a monument for Marshal Rodolfo Graziani in a small Italian village appeared,[91] *Bale-Raey* leaders acted immediately to express their protest. Marshal Graziani was one of the Italian generals during the Italian Occupation period (1936–1941). Graziani reportedly ordered the massacre of thousands of Ethiopians (Bahru Zewde 1993). Leaders of *Bale-Raey* took the initiative and collaborated with one opposition party and an ad-hoc group of citizens to organise a protest demonstration in front of the Italian Embassy. Both the organisation of a weekly dialogue forum and the organisation of a rally reveal the commitment of *Bale-Raey* leaders to pursue and claim civil and political rights. One can also argue that *Bale-Raey* leaders have attempted to shape the processes of citizenship by actively claiming civil rights that ultimately challenged the political purposes of the Party-state. They challenge the political purposes of the Party-state primarily because they are pursuing their civil and political rights outside the spaces directly controlled by the ruling party.

The response of the Party-state toward the exercise of rights by *Bale-Raey* leaders is an indication that the organisation poses a political challenge. The Party-state adopted both low and high intensity repression strategies to restrict *Bale-Raey* leaders from carrying out their activities. For example, the Party-state used its administrative and political power in every neighbourhood to deny *Bale-Raey* rights for peaceful assembly. Leaders of *Bale-Raey* reported that a person from whom they rented an office was under extreme pressure from local cadres to increase the rent in order to stop them from using the venue.[92] Their monthly rent increased by 300 per cent, from 1,500 birr to 6,000 birr (£50 to £200). As an association funded by voluntary contributions from its members, it was impossible to pay this amount. Similarly, the Party-state used a high intensity repression strategy to disband the peaceful rally that *Bale-Raey* leaders organised. Despite fulfilling all of the required legal procedures to hold a rally, the demonstration was dispersed violently by the police before it even

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[89] BR-02-02/15

[90] BR-01-02/15, BR-02-02/15, BR-03-02/15

[91] BBC reported the controversy of honouring Marshal Graziani in August 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19267099 - accessed 22 August 2016

[92] BR-01-02/15, BR-02-02/15

started.[93] In total, 43 participants of the demonstration, including many *Bale-Raey* leaders and members, were detained in a police station for up to two days before being released on bail.

The Party-state's repressive strategies aimed at 'deterring specific activities' (Davenport 2007: 2) of *Bale-Raey*. Specific examples of repression include the violent disbanding of a peaceful and legally permitted rally, the denial of access to meeting places and the infiltration of the association by ruling party-affiliated members. For example, respondents shared the challenges they faced in convening a general assembly for their association. The respondents said that hotels, youth centres, cultural centres, cinema halls and NGOs refused to rent them a meeting hall. The reason for refusal was pressure by government spies who threatened either the business owners or employees not to rent a venue to them.[94]

> We were even denied access to a meeting hall in a youth centre that was built specifically to serve young people. When we asked the reason, the district officials told us we are opposition party [and] hence [have] no right to use government facilities. On three occasions, government cadres who claim to be security officials but neither [was] wearing a uniform nor willing to show their identity cards disbanded our meetings.[95]

Bale-Raey members were also denied the right to access facilities constructed by the state as part of its youth-focused development endeavours, as mentioned in its national development plans (MoFED 2010). The restriction of the organisation from using youth centres because of the political opinions of the youth leaders is an example of repression of rights as well as the denial of services. *Bale-Raey* leaders did not give in to the repressive measures easily; rather, they pushed defiantly for the fulfilment of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. As part of their resistance, *Bale-Raey* leaders issued a press release requesting the government to respect their right to a peaceful assembly.[96] However, their official request did not bear any fruit.

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[93] Awramba Times reported 43 politicians and activists were arrested http://www.awrambatimes.com/?p=6788 – accessed on 22 August 2016; whereas a reporter of Global Voice summarises the reaction of social media users to the arrests of the protesters https://globalvoices.org/2013/03/23/ethiopians-jailed-for-protesting-italys-butcher-of-ethiopia-memorial/ - accessed on 22 August 2016

[94] BR-01-02/15, BR-02-02/15, BR-03-02/15

[95] BR-01-02/15

[96] On October 7, 2012, members of the youth association gave a press release under the theme 'Actors Restricting Constitutional Rights Must Stop Their Actions' - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uq_WXyvSwU– accessed on 30 July 2016

In addition to restricting some activities of the association, the Party-state also carried out targeted repressive acts against individual members of *Bale-Raey*. The kinds of repression include intimidation, physical assault by security agents and expulsion from work. The respondents shared experiences of two of their members who were expelled from their jobs in local government offices and their membership in an "opposition-leaning association" was mentioned as the reason by local government officials[97]. All three respondents also shared their respective experiences of being followed by security agents, witnessing the expulsion of their fellow members from government jobs, and receiving threats from security officials to stop their involvement in *Bale-Raey*. One of the respondents reported:

> I usually receive calls from people who appear to be new members seeking information but, in fact, they are sent from the government. I usually sit down with them and openly describe our objectives. Some of them tried to threaten me, saying that the association is engaged in unlawful activities and I should resign before it is too late. On two occasions, I did not meet the guys who called me in person at our venue of appointment. Rather, they called me again, mentioning the kind of clothes I [was] wearing so that I know that they are watching me and threatened me to stop my involvement in *Bale-Raey.*[98]

Both restrictions of the association's activities and the intimidation of *Bale-Raey* leaders are examples of 'low intensity repression' (Gerschewski 2013:21) by the Party-state.

Bale-Raey illustrates how young citizens can shape the processes of citizenship by creating their own spaces to exercise their rights. The founders of *Bale-Raey* refused to be co-opted and made a deliberate decision to change their relations with the aspiring developmental state. When they were members of the AAYF and AAYL, they were in invited spaces which prioritised social and economic rights through strategies of co-operation and co-optation. The invited spaces also allowed them to pursue civil and political rights that serve the political agenda of the Party-state. By the time the *Bale-Raey* leaders left the invited spaces of citizenship, co-optation was the most dominant strategy. As argued in the previous chapter, young citizens were implicitly or explicitly forced to trade-off civil and political rights in order to access their social and economic rights. Since the ruling party had the upper hand, particularly in rewarding loyalty and punishing dissent, the room for co-operation was getting

[97] BR-01-02/15, BR-02-02/15, BR-03-02/15
[98] BR-03-02/15

narrower as co-optation became dominant. This ultimately was the reason that caused some of the youth leaders to defect and quit the invited space.

The founders of *Bale-Raey* defected from the invited spaces (AAYF and AAYL) because they were committed to exercising their civil and political rights outside of the direct control of the Party-state. A shared interest in pursuing and claiming these rights in an independent platform was the reason behind their rejection of the deal offered by the Party-state. One can also argue that this explains why *Bale-Raey* emerged as a created space. *Bale-Raey* is an example of a created space in which young citizens set their own objectives, structures and activities in order to pursue and claim their citizenship rights. The leaders of *Bale-Raey* demonstrated their commitment to exercising civil and political rights by establishing a self-financed association, organising regular dialogue forums and through political mobilisation. Compared to their experience as leaders of the AAYF, *Bale-Raey* leaders partially achieved their objectives of pursuing and exercising their rights outside the state-initiated youth-focused platforms. However, claiming and exercising civil and political rights in an independent platform was not welcomed by the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state.

The Party-state did not welcome the establishment of *Bale-Raey.* Most observers argue that the Party-state barely tolerates organised dissent (Asnake Kefale 2011; Merera Gudina 2011; Nunzio 2014b). Nunzio, for example, discussed how young people in Addis Ababa carefully navigate the repressive political environment by not crossing the 'red line' (Nunzio 2014b: 22). *Bale-Raey* not only crossed the red line, but also posed a direct challenge to the political purposes of the Party-state. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Party-state aspires to control all community and civil society organisations as well as political organisations (Tronvoll 2010). Examples of the authoritarian tendencies of the Party-state include the establishment of nominal political parties (Merera Gudina 2011), its dominance in the economy through Party-affiliated business organisations and media outlets (Vaughan and Mesfin Gebremichael 2011), and its plan to control and dominate religious and educational institutions and community organisations (EPRDF 2010). Hence, the independently organised youth platform is contrary to the political purposes of the Party-state.

Furthermore, the defection of the youth leaders from the invited spaces also signifies how they rejected the spaces of citizenship that are dominated by the Party-state. As the cases studies in Chapter 5 demonstrated, the Party-state attempts to shape the processes of citizenship by organising young citizens in invited spaces and facilitating opportunities for

social and economic rights. Since *Bale-Raey* is an independently funded and organised youth platform, it can hardly contribute to the political dominance of the Party-state and its aspiration to pursue developmental hegemony.

Some *Bale-Raey* leaders decided *to move within* created spaces as part of their resistance strategy against the repressive acts of the Party-state. As a result, some *Bale-Raey* members joined opposition political parties. Two different reasons were given to explain why members decided to join opposition parties. On the one hand, this is seen as a strategy to put more pressure on the Party-state. The young people aimed to push for reform or removal of the Party-state from power through their actions in legally registered and operating opposition parties.[99] It appears that some of the young people thought they would have more power to influence the Party-state by engaging as opposition party members. As a result, most members of *Bale-Raey* joined the Blue Party and the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ). On the other hand, joining opposition parties is also considered as a strategy for exposing the repressive actions of the Party-state on dissenting voices. One of the respondents mentioned that:

> We paid a lot of sacrifices [as leaders of Bale-Raey]. However, our ordeals were not given enough attention, especially by the media, because we were just a youth association. If the intimidations were happening to opposition party members, the media would highlight them and the government would be held responsible. Hence, for some of us, joining the opposition parties was a strategy we took to increase the visibility of the repression that the government is putting on us.[100]

When Bale-Raey leaders decided to join opposition parties, they moved within created spaces of citizenship, i.e., from civil society to political parties. As argued in Chapter 4, the repressive political environment for opposition parties is no better than for civil societies. Furthermore, as is further discussed in this chapter, in Section 6.2.3, young opposition politicians also face high intensity repression from the Party-state. Hence, the strategy to move within created spaces – from a civic organisation to opposition political parties – barely reduces the amount of repression.

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[99] BR-01-02/15
[100] BR-02-02/15

The strategy adopted by *Bale-Raey* youth leaders can be better explained by Asef Bayat's (2010) argument about resistance. Bayat argues that the act of resistance by 'ordinary people' can appear 'by refusing to exit from social and political stages controlled by authoritarian states' (Bayat 2010: ix). In the case of *Bale-Raey*, the young citizens showed their 'non-conformity' to the strategies of co-operation and co-optation by the Party-state when they defected. They also rejected a state-youth relationship based on a trade-off. Bayat's notion of 'refusing to exit' represents the determination of the young citizens to continue pursuing civil and political rights despite the mounting level of repression. *Bale-Raey* leaders attempted to change the processes of citizenship, from relations based on co-operation and co-optation in invited spaces to relations based on resistance, by challenging the political dominance of the Party-state. As a result, they continued claiming their rights by creating their own spaces of citizenship. When they found that their efforts were heavily repressed by the Party-state, they moved into another created space – opposition political parties – to further intensify their resistance. Hence, the thesis understands 'to refuse to exit' mainly as an act of defiance and resistance.

In conclusion, the case of *Bale-Raey* can help us to understand that youth-led initiatives have a major role in shaping the processes of citizenship. *Bale-Raey* leaders took a vital step toward influencing the processes of citizenship within developmentalism by creating their own spaces of citizenship. *Bale-Raey* leaders defected from invited spaces that serve the developmentalist orientation of the Party-state to pursue and claim their citizenship rights within a space whose objectives; structure and funding are outside the control of the Party-state. Their defections provide strong evidence to claim that young citizens' demands can hardly be addressed through invited spaces that only prioritise opportunities for social and economic rights. The efforts of *Bale-Raey* leaders to simultaneously pursue economic rights as well as civil and political rights demonstrate that they are not willing to trade-off their rights.

As argued in the analytical framework, the processes of citizenship are heavily dependent on the interplay between rights, spaces and strategies. Hence, *Bale-Raey* leaders' decisions to create their own spaces and to start pursuing rights that are restricted within invited spaces automatically changed the strategies adopted by both the Party-state and the youth. By rejecting the processes of citizenship in invited spaces, *Bale-Raey* leaders also refused to co-operate or to be co-opted. The Party-state adopted a strategy of repression toward the

activities of *Bale-Raey* to pursue civil and political rights outside invited spaces. From the Party-state's perspective, the strategy of repression serves to ensure its political dominance. The youth leaders responded by adopting strategies of resistance. As discussed above, the youth leaders attempted to further intensify their resistance by joining opposition political parties.

The decision by *Bale-Raey* leaders to join opposition political parties further illustrates how dynamic the processes of citizenship are within the context of developmentalism. The young citizens who joined state-led initiatives by being responsive to the government's invitation in the wake of the 2005 election helped the ruling party to consolidate power during the 2008 and 2010 local and national elections. Later on, when their reciprocal relations shifted to a trade-off based relation, some young citizens defected and started to challenge the political purposes of developmentalism. As the Party-state further intensified its repressive strategy, the young citizens, who helped the EPRDF to 'win' the elections a few years before, became opposition party members with the aim of dethroning the ruling party.

In addition to the case of a youth-led initiative constituted by defectors from invited spaces, the subsequent sections focus on youth initiatives that emerged out of the shared conviction among young citizens who are already operating outside of state-led initiatives. To begin with, the following case study examines a social media-based youth-led initiative and its role in shaping state-youth relations in the context of developmentalism.

6.2.2 Youth Social Media Activists: the Case of the Zone Nine Bloggers

This case study specifically focuses on the social media-based youth activist group called Zone Nine. The case study allows for the examination of how a social media-based youth-led initiative affects the process of citizenship within the context of developmentalism. This case study also allows for the examination of how the increasing role of new technologies, particularly social media, is shaping state-youth relations in the Ethiopian context.

Zone Nine was established in May 2012 by nine young bloggers and activists (two female). Zone Nine members describe themselves as an 'informal group of activists and bloggers' (Zone Nine 2013). The founders were between the ages of 22 and 32 when they established their collective blogging group. The Zone Nine founding members were drawn from different professional backgrounds and all of them made a living through their professional

engagement.[101] The young activists used the internet as a primary platform for their acts of pursuing and claiming rights, despite the fact that Ethiopia has one of the lowest internet penetration rates. When the Zone Nine bloggers established their group in May 2012, hardly 3 per cent of Ethiopians were using the internet.[102] According to African Economic Outlook (2016), the total number of internet users in Ethiopia in 2014 was significantly low, at 2.9 per cent, compared to the world average of 40.7 per cent.

Despite significantly low internet penetration in Ethiopia, there has been a steady increase in the use of social media for political conversation, debate and mobilisation. Previous studies have argued that most Ethiopians use the internet mainly for personal communication and entertainment purposes (Abiye Teklemariam Megenta 2011). However, in the last five years, the use of the internet, particularly social media (such as Facebook and Twitter), as a source of information and political communication has increased significantly (Human Rights Watch 2014; Emnet Assefa Degafe 2015). One can mention at least two reasons for the growing role of social media. The first reason is related to increased access and availability. Ethio-telecom, a state-owned company, which has a total monopoly in the telecom sector, has been massively improving their service and standards since 2003 (Human Rights Watch 2014; GCAO 2015). Contrary to the report by African Economic Outlook, the annual government report for the year 2014–15 claims that there were more than 38.8 million mobile phone users, including 9.4 million data and internet customers (GCAO 2015). However, infrastructure development does not stop at improving the capacity of the aspiring developmental state to provide telecom services. The Party-state also acquired the technical capabilities to maintain strict control over 'the type of information that is being communicated and accessed' over the internet and mobile technologies (Human Rights Watch 2014).

The second reason for the increased role of social media is closely related to the 'securitisation of development', as argued in Chapter 4. The Party-state is remarkably dominant and controls almost every mainstream print and electronic media platform. Furthermore, there is an increasing amount of intimidation of private media journalists and

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[101] The professional background of the Zone Nine bloggers includes two lawyers (one of them a university lecturer), two ICT specialists, a statistician, an economist, a university lecturer in journalism, a mechanical engineer and a computer scientist.

[102] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2 - Accessed on 15 September 2016

self-censorship as well as low professional and ethical standards in the state-owned media (Skjerdal 2008, 2010, 2011; Human Rights Watch 2015). These features necessitated the nascent social media to become an alternative source of information for many. It is against this backdrop that the thesis examines how a social media-based youth-led initiative affects the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa.

The young bloggers conveyed a strong political message by calling their group 'Zone Nine'. The name Zone Nine is chosen to symbolically describe the nature of state-citizen relations in Ethiopia. One of the main prisons in the city, Addis Ababa Maximum Security Prison, commonly known as *Kality* prison, has eight zones. When the young bloggers picked the name 'Zone Nine', they were referring to the country outside of the prison, which has become a continuation of the eight zones of *Kality* prison. Hence, Zone Nine metaphorically represents Ethiopia as 'a bigger prison with a relative freedom'.[103] Through their metaphorically powerful name, the young social media activists send a clear message about their priorities. The young activists particularly focused on civil and political rights that the majority of the 'Zone Nine dwellers' are denied.

The bloggers and activists explicitly declared that claiming civil rights, particularly 'freedom of expression', is their primary engagement. As their motto 'We blog because we care!' illustrates, they consider their blogging as an aspect of their civic duty. Furthermore, one of their objectives reads, 'constructing alternative narratives' about socio-economic and political dynamics in Ethiopia. To this end, the activities they carried out include organising virtual campaigns, writing opinion pieces and articles on constitutionalism, socio-economic, cultural and political issues, compiling documentation of human rights abuses and regular visiting of political prisoners[104].

Compared to the other youth-led initiatives, Zone Nine bloggers introduced new ways of claiming citizenship rights. They are arguably pioneers in introducing a virtually organised blogger group that uses social media as a primary platform of pursuing and claiming citizenship rights. The bloggers demonstrated that it is not only through traditional forms of organisational and associational movements that collective activism can be pursued. They

[103] https://www.ethiotube.net/video/35836/ethiopia-zone-9-bloggers-the-aftermath-of-prison-april-2016 (Accessed 21 August 2016)
[104] https://www.ethiotube.net/video/35836/ethiopia-zone-9-bloggers-the-aftermath-of-prison-april-2016 (Accessed 21 August 2016)

demonstrated this by seizing the objective context of increased digital connectivity and the advent of 'wired citizenship' (Herrera 2014), albeit nascent, to challenge the developmentalist narratives of the Party-state. The Party-state took swift action to repress the activities of Zone Nine bloggers. The government quickly blocked the blog's web-address and hence, the bloggers had to change their web-address six times until they settled on their current address.[105]Later on, the bloggers decided to use their Facebook page as their primary platform of engagement in order to more easily reach their Ethiopian audience.[106]

The Zone Nine bloggers started their social media-based activism in a very critical historical context. 2011 was a year in which social media platforms became key instruments for political mobilisation. The use of social media during the popular uprisings that swept Northern Africa and Middle Eastern countries was unprecedented. Nevertheless, the level of internet access in 2011 between the Arab countries and Ethiopia was incomparable. For example, the internet penetration in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 was 33.9% and 24.5%, respectively (Laremont 2014: 27). On the contrary, Ethiopia's internet penetration rate in 2011 was just 1.1% (World Bank 2014).[107] Nevertheless, despite infrastructural limitations, the global context had a significant influence in making the internet an important platform for processes of citizenship to occur in Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian Party-state set the limits of citizens' engagement within the parameters of its developmentalist political purposes before the advent of social media as a key instrument of political mobilisation. As argued in Chapter 4, the politico-legal instruments introduced after the 2005 election set these limits. For example, the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (652/2009) gave the Party-state the legal jurisdiction to categorise political dissent as an act of terrorism through its broad definition of terrorism (Human Rights Watch 2014; Wondwossen Demissie Kassa 2014). The proclamation defines 'encouragement of terrorism'[108] so broadly that any form of publication would qualify as an act of instigating terrorism. As a result, scores of

[105] ZN01-08/15; http://www.zoneniners.com/ - accessed on 08 August 2016
[106] ZN01-08/15
[107]https://www.google.co.uk/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=it_net_user_p2&idim=country:ETH:DJI&hl=en&dl=en – accessed on 16 April 2017
[108] Whosoever publishes or causes the publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission or preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism stipulated under Article 3 of this Proclamation is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 10 to 20 years.

journalists, columnists and politicians have been targeted by this proclamation (Human Rights Watch 2014, 2015).

Every activity that Zone Nine bloggers carried out to challenge the limits of the Party-state and pursue their activism was internet-based. These activities included online campaigns[109] and blogging. In the first year of their activism, the Zone Nine blog hosted more than 150 articles and opinion pieces on a range of issues. An electronic compendium of articles published in May 2013 with the title 'Constitutionalism and Freedom of Expression in Ethiopia' included opinion articles written by the founding bloggers and contributing writers. The 366-page compendium is divided into 15 chapters,[110] where each chapter has between 5 and 20 opinion pieces and articles, which cover a wide range of issues.[111] As an example, the following section briefly examines the first chapter of the compendium, which includes 10 articles under the theme: '*The Rule of Law'*.

The Zone Nine bloggers' contestation for citizenship rights stemmed from their understanding of citizenship as a contractual relationship between the state and citizens through a constitution. Thus, the bloggers used the Constitution as their yardstick to evaluate and criticize the aspiring developmental state and its efforts to respect citizens' rights. Similar to *Bale-Raey* youth leaders, the bloggers hold the role of formal institutions of democracy in high regard. The bloggers critically questioned the implementation of the constitution, the legal processes in the courts and the functions of government offices by using the constitution as the standard. For example, in an open letter addressed to the prime minister, the bloggers juxtaposed rights enshrined in the constitution with actual practices of the aspiring developmental state. For example, the bloggers contrasted Article 20 (3), which refers to rights of persons accused 'to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and not to be compelled to testify against themselves', with the criminalisation of political prisoners on state-owned media before the court decision. Likewise, the bloggers also contrasted Article

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[109] The themes of their online campaigns were: 'Respect the Constitution!', 'Respect Freedom of Expression!' and 'Respect the Right to Demonstration!'

[110] Chapter headings of the compendium are: The rule of law, Meles's regime, Opposition parties, Ethnic politics, Economy, Education, Social life, Religion, Travel diaries, Book review, Politics in neighbouring countries, Football, Freedom of expression and media, Change and other issues

[111] Some of the issues covered include: questioning whether EPRDF can step down in the next election to address the need for gradual change or revolution, the quality of education to government interference in religious institutions, from questioning the democracy-development nexus to ethnic based violence in universities, from the death of the late Prime Minister to the rule of his successor, and from book reviews to adopted translations of book sections such as 'If Wael Ghonim were Ethiopian'.

40 (2), which guarantees Ethiopian peasants 'protection against eviction from their possession', with large- scale land lease allowed for foreign investors by evicting farmers.[112] Another article, which perhaps summed up the views of the bloggers, questioned whether Ethiopian government is practicing 'rule by law' rather than the rule of law (Zone Nine 2013).

As indicated in Chapter 4, the Ethiopian Party-state has completely dominated formal institutions of the state to serve its political purposes. Hence, formal institutions and processes of democracy have major limitations in guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens as stipulated in the Constitution (Sanderson 2007). On the contrary, the Party-state manipulates the formal institutions and processes of democracy to tighten its grip on the power regime than to enforce democracy. In practical terms, the Party-state uses formal institutions of democracy (the legislature, courts) and processes (elections) either as smoke screens to its democratic claims or as instruments to punish rival political forces (Awol Allo and Beza Tesfaye 2015). In this context, pursuing the fulfilment of civil and political rights within formal institutions and processes of democracy is futile. However, the bloggers never stopped demanding that the Party-state respect the Constitution. In another open letter addressed to two ministers, the Minister of Communications and the Minister of Information and Government Communication Affairs, the bloggers questioned the government's commitment to the fulfilment of Article 29 of the constitution, which covers the rights of 'thought, opinion and expression'. By enumerating the intimidation and imprisonment that journalists are facing, and the closure and blocking of newspapers and websites, the bloggers criticised the Party-State for violating the Constitution (Zone Nine 2013).

The claim for the fulfilment of citizenship rights by taking the constitution as the only departure point has limited the effectiveness of Zone Nine bloggers in challenging the Party-

[112]In this particular open letter to the Prime Minister, the bloggers contrasted other constitutional rights with the actual situation in present day Ethiopia. These include: Article 10 (2) – the human and democratic rights of citizens vis-à-vis the violation of rights by security officials and police against people with opposing political opinions; Article 12 (1) – transparency of government affairs vis-à-vis the refusal by different government offices to respond to the requests of private media; Article 20 (3) – 'the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law' vis-à-vis the allegation of accused opposition leaders and journalists as 'terrorists' by state owned media and government officials; article 21 (2) – the rights of persons held in custody to communicate with and to be visited by spouses, closer relatives, friends, etc. vis-à-vis the restrictions imposed by prison administration to limit the number and kind of people visiting political prisoners; article 29 (5) – 'any media financed by or under the control of the State shall …entertain diversity in the expression of opinion' vis-à-vis the partiality of State-owned media to the ruling party, etc.

state. As argued in Chapter 2, the consolidation of democracy is not limited to the role of formal institutions only but also applies to informal institutions (Leftwich 2008). The unwritten rules and procedures that are embedded within shared worldviews, norms and values of society have an equally important role as formal institutions of democracy (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). The aspiring developmental state is breaching the rights of citizens and is ultimately making formal institutions obsolete through its politico-legal frameworks. However, its dominance does not only depend on its capacity to manipulate formal institutions. The Party-state also manipulates shared views toward authority, the state and hierarchy to galvanise support and loyalty from citizens. The Party-state rewards citizens with social and economic rights when they co-operate and get willingly co-opted. This contributed to its effort of generating legitimacy through what it delivers, rather than through its adherence to the formal institutions of democracy.

At the early stage of Zone Nine bloggers' activism, the Party-state adopted 'low-intensity repression' as a strategy. The first action of repression by the Party-state occurred two weeks after the bloggers launched their online activism; the state blocked the Zone Nine website. The blog has remained blocked in Ethiopia since its inception. As a result, the bloggers have been using their Facebook page to post their articles. As an act of resistance, every article they post on their Facebook page starts and ends with the message 'this piece was originally posted on the Zone Nine blog, which is blocked in Ethiopia'.[113] The bloggers also reported constant intimidation, temporary detention, physical assault and spying by state security officials throughout their period of activism.[114]

As the pressure from the Party-state started to increase, the bloggers and activists shifted their strategy of active resistance to passive resistance. They were resilient enough to continue their activism despite the intimidation, temporary detention and spying by security officials. However, when the repression persisted, the bloggers decided to temporarily stop their activism after continued period of social media-based collective activism that lasted for more than a year and a half. They specifically stopped their collective activism on social media for nearly six months in late 2013 whilst keeping their individual engagement at a modest level.

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[113] Email conversation with one of the bloggers.

[114] https://www.ethiotube.net/video/35836/ethiopia-zone-9-bloggers-the-aftermath-of-prison-april-2016 (Accessed 21 August 2016)

The main reason for the cessation of their active resistance was the increasing intensity of repression from the Party-state.[115]

The decision by the bloggers to temporarily stop their collective activism shows the effectiveness of the Party-state's repression strategy. The bloggers remained in the space of citizenship they created without actively pursuing and claiming rights. By stopping their collective activism, they attempted to ease the repression of the Party-state. Later on, despite the imminent danger, the bloggers decided to resume their online engagement on 23 April 2014 and made an announcement on their Facebook page. However, two days after their announcement, the Party-state took their repressive actions to a new level by detaining six Zone Nine bloggers[116] and three of their young journalist colleagues. The decision by the bloggers to resume their activity while knowing the level of repression they might face shows their perseverance in asserting their citizenship rights.

As argued earlier, the anti-terrorism proclamation is one of the most potent politico-legal instruments in the repression strategy of the Party- state. The bloggers and journalists spent 85 days in the Federal Police Crime Investigation Centre, commonly known as *Maekelawi* detention centre, before being formally charged with terrorism.[117] The charge includes, 'establishing a clandestine organisation to carry out an act of terrorism and to incite public unrest, dismantling the constitution and constitutional order through organised acts of terrorism and rebellious activities, working with and promoting the objectives of outlawed political organisations',[118] etc. When they appeared in court, the bloggers repeatedly appealed to the court about the torture and inhumane treatment they underwent, such as beating, hard physical exercise, and solitary confinement in a dark house. The Party-state adopted high-intensity repression, i.e., detention and corruption, as a response to the young citizens' demands for the fulfilment of their civil and political rights. However, one of the key formal institutions of the state that is supposed to ensure the fulfilment of citizenship rights, the court, did not accept or was not willing to consider any of their appeals.

[115] https://www.ethiotube.net/video/35836/ethiopia-zone-9-bloggers-the-aftermath-of-prison-april-2016 (Accessed 21 August 2016)

[116] Among the nine founding members, three of them were not detained for different reasons. One of them, who was in Ethiopia at the date of detention, quickly left the country the following day. The remaining two were already outside of Ethiopia for work and education purposes.

[117] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/08/ethiopia-persecuted-bloggers-zone-nine-twitter-q-and-a (accessed 28 June 2017)

[118] Author's translation of the official charges presented by the federal prosecutor to the Federal High Court, Lideta Bench on 15 July 2014.

The detention of the bloggers and journalists at *Maekelawi* (The Centre) is a strong manifestation of the enduring legacies of the 1974 revolution. This particular detention centre was used as a primary site of mass detention, gross violations of human rights and was also a de facto 'concentration camp' during the 'Red Terror' period. Hundreds and thousands of young revolutionaries, whose exact number is still unknown, were massacred or vanished after being imprisoned and tortured at *Maekelawi* (Andargachew Tiruneh 1993; Babile Tolla 1997; Bahru Zewde 2009). The Zone Nine bloggers and their journalist colleagues are members of the young generation that came of age listening to the appalling experiences of young revolutionaries at *Maekelawi* under the repressive military regime (Eyob Balcha Gebremariam and Linda 2016). During their detention, the young bloggers and journalists had similar experiences to those of Ethiopian revolutionaries four decades ago. In the 1970s, the detention of young revolutionaries in *Maekelawi* was justified as a 'revolutionary action' by the military regime (Bahru Zewde 2009). Four decades later, the detention of social media activists in *Maekelawi* is justified on the grounds of 'fighting terrorism', 'fighting extreme neoliberal forces' and 'pursuing developmentalism'.

One of the manifestations of procedural democracy is the presence of formal institutions and processes that are extremely weak in promoting and protecting rights and freedom of citizens. The judicial branch of the Ethiopian Party-state exhibits this particular feature. The Party-state uses its political power through politico-legal frameworks to manipulate formal procedures in the court of justice to criminalise and punish political dissenters. Politically motivated trials are common, where opposition leaders, political activists, journalists and bloggers must defend themselves against charges of 'treason', 'dismantling the constitutional order' or 'inciting terrorism' (Salisbury 2011; Awol Allo and Beza Tesfaye 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015; Washington Post 2015). Awol Allo further argues that the Ethiopian Party-state has put in place 'show trials' where the 'courtroom has been used to intimidate, harass, silence, exile and eliminate political foes'.[119] The anti-terrorism proclamation is a vital discursive and legal instrument in this regard. It is in light of this flawed justice system that curtails the civil and political rights of citizens that the Zone Nine bloggers is examined.

The Zone Nine bloggers and journalists remained defiant and continued their resistance against the repressive Party-state in the court room. One significant moment was when the

[119] https://www.opendemocracy.net/awol-allo/politics-in-ethiopias-political-trials (Accessed on 24 March 2016)

bloggers and journalist were asked to plead guilty or not guilty. The young bloggers and journalists seized the normative courtroom procedure to loudly convey their message of defiance and resistance. The defendants went beyond a formal response of ‘not guilty’. In their responses, the bloggers underscored the politically instigated prosecution and questioned the legality of the trial. By doing so, they challenged the Party-state in its own political space, which has been used to repress dissenting voices. Subsequently, the case of the two bloggers and three journalists was ‘withdrawn’ without any explanation in July 2015. Likewise, the remaining bloggers were also acquitted of their terrorism charges in October 2015.

In conclusion, the case of the Zone Nine bloggers adds further insight about the role of youth-led initiatives within the processes of citizenship. Zone Nine is an example of a created space established by young citizens that have effectively utilised social media platforms in order to shape their relations with the Party-state. The collective effort of Zone Nine bloggers contributed to the transformation of social media platforms in Ethiopia, from being a place to spending leisure time to a space for pursuing and claiming civil and political rights (Eyob Balcha Gebremariam and Herrera 2016). The global context within which the Zone Nine bloggers initiated their activism witnessed an unprecedented role of increased internet connectivity as a means of mobilisation. As a result, despite significantly low internet penetration in Ethiopia, the Party-state reacted swiftly to repress the activities of the Zone Nine bloggers. The response from the Party-state included both low and high intensity repression. The culmination point of the state’s repression was later in April 2014 when the bloggers/activists were detained and accused of terrorism.

The case of the Zone Nine bloggers has highlighted at least two major points. First, the case demonstrates the dynamism of the context in which the processes of citizenship occur by linking vital attributes from the revolutionary period to current political processes. Whilst the young citizens are using current and up-to-date technological platforms to pursue their citizenship rights, the Party-state adopted age old strategies, actors and venues of repression. The young citizens use a combination of blogging, Twitter and Facebook, whereas the Party-state uses detention and torture executed by its security agents in *Maekelawi.* As mentioned earlier, *Maekelawi* was the centre of gross violations of rights, including torture and execution during the ‘Red Terror’ period, in the early days of post-revolution Ethiopia.

Second, the case of Zone Nine demonstrates how developmentalism is pursued through politically motivated legal frameworks as well as through manipulated formal institutions of democracy. The anti-terrorism proclamation criminalises the citizenship engagement of the bloggers whilst the court of law has given the repressive strategies of the Party-state a legal disguise. The implications of such a strategy are the dominance of the Party-state within the processes of citizenship. Such a commanding position allows the Party-state to keep its developmentalist aspirations intact from organised citizens' engagement at every level.

After a critical examination of a youth-led initiative that uses new technology, such as social media, the following section will focus on a more traditional platform. The following case study examines how opposition political parties affect the citizenship of urban youth. Even though the young citizens have not established opposition parties *per se*, the thesis took their decision to join opposition parties as an act of joining created spaces.

6.2.3 Young Opposition Party Members

This case study focuses on young people in opposition political parties. By focusing on these young politicians, the case study examines how the decision by young citizens to become opposition politicians, within the context of developmental statism is affecting the processes of citizenship. Opposition parties started to operate legally in Ethiopia after the military regime was ousted in May 1991 and the declaration of multiparty democracy was included in the 1995 Constitution (Vestal 1996; Tronvoll and Haggman 2012). As a result, according to the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia, as of December 2012, there were 75 registered political parties in Ethiopia.[120] Out of this huge number of parties, 23 have 'country-wide' operations, whereas the remaining parties are registered as 'regional'.

After a quarter of a century of democratisation, Ethiopian opposition political parties are very ineffective spheres of political mobilisation. Broadly speaking, this is for two reasons. One reason is weak internal capacity. Contributing factors include: the establishment of unstable alliances among political parties that have contradictory ideologies, a 'lack of internal democracy and a culture of consensus building' (Asnake Kefale 2012: 695), a lack of trust among leaders and calamitous internal power struggles (ibid). The other reason for the weak performance of opposition parties can be attributed to the widely shared views about state,

[120] http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/political-parties/active-political-parties.html – accessed on 18 August 2016

authority and power. Opposition parties are operating within a society that gives high regard to submission to authority (Clapham 2004; Vaughan and Tronvoll 2004). As argued in Chapter 4, there is a widely shared view in Ethiopia that voting for opposition parties is considered as an anomaly (Lefort 2007, 2010). The Party-state manipulates such kinds of shared beliefs within society in order to justify and sustain its political dominance. This historically embedded factor combined with the increasingly narrowing political sphere in the past decade to sustain superiority of the ruling party, the EPRDF (Abbink 2006, 2009; Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Bach 2012; Lefort 2007, 2010; Merera Gudina 2011).

The joint effort of these two inter-related external factors resulted in a disorganised and extremely weakened opposition, on the one hand, and the advent of a *de facto* 'one-party state', on the other hand (Tronvoll 2010). Manifestations of a *de facto* 'one-party state'/Party-state include the 'little distinction between the state and the ruling party' (Bach 2011: 648; Gudina 2011: 664; Kefale 2012: 692;), the use of state resources by the incumbent against opposition parties, as well as changes in electoral processes and constituencies that favour the ruling party (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008; Gudina 2011). A major example includes the significant expansion of local council members at the lowest tier of governance, i.e., the *kebele* level, 'from 15 to 300' (Aalen and Tronvoll 2008: 116-117). Bearing in mind the fact that opposition parties are severely restricted in their operations and that the EPRDF has the upper hand in mobilising every segment of society, it is practically impossible for any opposition group to be remotely competitive in local elections. Effective control of local governance structures is also clearly reflected in the EPRDF's unparalleled dominance in the entire state structure.

In total, eight young politicians (two female) were interviewed from three opposition parties.[121] The analysis aims to explain how young politicians in opposition parties pursue their citizenship rights and the implications these actions have on the processes of citizenship. The following sections will briefly identify the reasons among young citizens for joining political parties in opposition to the Party-state.

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[121] The Parties are the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), the Blue Party (BP) and the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ). As argued in section 3.2.3.1, these three opposition parties are selected mainly because of their visibility in the political sphere, particularly in Addis Ababa, in political mobilization and election participation.

6.2.3.1 Reasons for Joining Opposition Parties

A decision to join a political party is an act of claiming political rights. Furthermore, political participation through political parties can also be an act of executing one's civic duty. Every young politician interviewed stressed that taking part in the political processes of the country was their primary reason for joining opposition parties.[122] One of the young politicians was only 21 when he represented his party in his hometown during the May 2010 general election. He explained why he wanted to be a young parliamentarian by saying:

> As a citizen, I aspired to play a role in my country's political affairs. Regardless of the imminent risks, I wanted to contribute. Everyone was playing their corresponding role and I wanted to play mine too. There is no one who can do it on my behalf.[123]

Another young politician who heads the public relations division of his party and was a candidate for parliament during the 2015 elections said:

> After the 2005 election, most opposition parties were disorganised. But there were also efforts of reviving the opposition group. I wanted to contribute my part. I believe in the saying 'if you want to see a change, be that change'. Change also happens only when you work with people who have the same concern like you. That is why I joined the Blue Party.[124]

By joining opposition political parties, these young politicians demonstrated their enthusiasm to play a role in the country's politics. Inevitably, the decision involves pursuing and claiming civil and political rights, both as young citizens as well as young politicians.

In another case, one young opposition politician mentioned that government restrictions that prevented him from pursuing his profession of journalism were a reason for him to join an opposition party.[125] Consequently, the government closed down the two newspapers,

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[122] EDP-01-11/14; EDP-02-12/14; EDP-03-03/15; BP-01-12/14; BP-02-12/14; UDJ-01-12/14; UDJ-02-12/14; UDJ-03-12/14
[123] EDP01-11/14
[124] BP01-12/14
[125] UDJ-01-12/14

Awramba Times[126] and *Fitih*[127] that the journalist used to work for. He also tried to establish a newspaper with his friend. However, since he worked on newspapers that were critical of the government, his name was 'blacklisted'. He used his wife's and his friend's names to apply for a licence to hide his identity from the authorities. He managed to get the licence but could not publish the newspaper more than once. He said, 'all printing houses in town were ordered by the government not to publish political newspapers, hence we could not continue our work'.[128] The decisions by the Party-state to deter alternative views and restrict the civil right to express opinions are manifestations of repression. By doing so, the Party-state controls the public sphere in which created spaces can emerge. The journalist, later on, decided to join an opposition political party. He was convinced that standing against the regime as a politician is politically more effective than working as a journalist.

It appears that opposition political parties are offering an alternative space in which the youth can claim their civil and political rights, rather than in other spaces that are easily controlled or dominated by the Party-state. Similar to members of *Bale-Raey*, this former journalist is using an opposition party as a space for contesting his political rights. His decision seems to indicate that he can pursue his rights more effectively in his relation with the Party-state as an opposition politician, rather than as a journalist. As a journalist, he has been exercising his civil and political rights albeit within a controlled environment. As argued in Chapter 2, 'the standing of individuals in the polity' (Staeheli 1994: 850) shapes their relations with the structures of power. For this young journalist, joining an opposition political party provides better leverage with which to continue claiming his rights. By repositioning himself, he is escaping a space that is under direct control of the Party-state.

Both the decisions of *Bale-Raey* members and this young journalist indicate that young citizens perceive opposition parties as effective spheres for claiming civil and political rights. Perhaps, such an assumption can be associated with the ultimate goal that opposition parties seek to achieve, which is assuming state power. However, as argued in Chapter 4, opposition political parties are targets of systematic repression by the Party-state (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; Abbink 2009; Merera Gudina 2011; Bach 2011; Awol Allo and Beza Tesfaye 2015).

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[126] http://hornaffairs.com/2011/11/24/ethiopia-awramba-times-editor-to-seek-political-asylum-in-us/ - accessed 05 June 2017

[127] https://rsf.org/en/news/ethiopian-governments-witchhunt-against-privately-owned-media -accessed 05 June 2017

[128] UDJ-01-12/14

Using the same logic about the complementary roles of formal and informal institutions in the process of consolidating democracy, opposition political parties alone can hardly become effective channels for challenging authoritarianism without a vibrant civil society (White 1998).

Furthermore, it is also important to underscore the distinctive platform that opposition parties offer to young citizens, compared to the cases of *Bale-Raey* and the Zone Nine bloggers. First, opposition parties are not originally created by the youth themselves. Instead, opposition parties are created spaces that young citizens join in order to pursue civil and political rights, presumably to a higher degree. Second, the ultimate objective of opposition political parties, i.e., winning an election and controlling state power, is another key feature. When young citizens become politicians, they are also implicitly aiming to become government officials at some stage. Hence, in some sense, opposition parties provide a unique form of created space for young citizens that are focused on their civil and political rights and most importantly, provide the space within the constitutionally guaranteed legal context. As discussed above, both the former journalist and *Bale Raey* leaders followed basically the same logic to consider opposition parties as effective spaces to pursue and claim civil and political rights while the repression from the government mounted. The increasing level of repression also triggered *a movement within created spaces,* i.e., from civil society to opposition parties. However, the movement within created spaces hardly reduced the level of repression. Nonetheless, it can still be considered as a strategy of active resistance.

6.2.3.2 Contesting for Civil and Political Rights as a Young Opposition Politician

It is imperative to note that there is a stark ideological difference between the majority of Ethiopian opposition parties and the ruling party. On the one side, in the three opposition parties the respondents belong to, members identify themselves as liberal democrats (Asnake Kefale 2011). On the other side, the ruling party's revolutionary democracy ideology proclaimed itself as the anti-thesis of liberal (bourgeoisie) democracy (Bach 2011). Furthermore, the ruling party categorises opposition parties that subscribe to liberal ideology as 'anti-development forces', 'agents of imperialism', 'agents of neo-liberalism', 'forces of destruction' and 'enemies' of the aspiring developmental state (Tronvoll 2010: 124; Bach 2011: 655; Merera Gudina 2011: 674; Gebru Asrat 2014: 161). Such a contradiction between main opposition parties and EPRDF plays a significant role in the way young opposition politicians are interacting with the Party-state.

While the ruling party categorises opposition parties as 'forces of destruction' and 'advocates of colour revolution' in its political strategy (EPRDF 2010: 6-18), young politicians view the regime as a 'dictatorship'. For example, respondents from the Blue Party and the UDJ define their political engagement as 'a struggle from dictatorship to freedom'.[129] They characterise the regime as a repressive authoritarian state (Tronvoll 2010) in which political engagement is filled with sacrifices. The kinds of repression that opposition members experience range from expulsion from work and intimidation to imprisonment, torture and even killings.[130]

One of the direct implications of claiming citizenship rights as young opposition politician is the pressure to trade-off economic rights in order to pursue civil and political rights. For example, one of the respondents mentioned his experience of being forced to resign from his job as an English language teacher at a private school.[131] The other young politician who aspired to be a parliamentarian at the age of 21 also mentioned his expulsion from a government job after his office found out that he was running for parliament and representing an opposition party.[132] Another young female politician also complained about the business opportunities she is missing in her privately owned business since people are afraid to hire her service. She said people are afraid of repercussions from the government if they hire a service from a former opposition party candidate during the 2010 election.[133] These denials and restrictions of economic and social rights occur in tandem with a continued repression of young political engagement by the Party-state.

As discussed in Chapter 2, there can be both 'high' and 'low intensity' repression (Gerschewski 2013: 21). Most young opposition politicians face both forms of state repression. These include losing jobs or education opportunities (social rights) and also facing imprisonment and torture. When the intensity of the repression of young opposition members increased, they become subjected to torture and inhumane treatment at the hands of state security officials. For example, one of the young female politicians shared her ordeal after being caught at the margins of a public protest. She was beaten heavily, which caused serious physical injuries. Despite a fractured head and a strained arm, she was refused medical treatment for more than nine hours and was interrogated by security officials. Later

[129] BP-01-12/14; BP-02-12/14; UDJ-01-12/14
[130] BP-01-12/14; BP-02-12/14; UDJ-01-12/14
[131] BP-01-12/14
[132] BP-01-12/14
[133] EDP-03-03/15

on, she was detained for 29 days and released on bail. Despite the high probability of facing the same level of high intensity repression, she remains resistant and 'refuses to exit' (Bayat 2010) the political scene which is causing her physical and psychological damage. Like her counterparts, she said being imprisoned and released is 'part of the struggle'.[134]

Election times are crucial moments for relations between young opposition politicians and the Party-state. Indeed, since 2005, elections are considered by observers as key moments of strengthening the authoritarian nature of the Party-state, rather than opportunities for exercising democracy. Aalen and Tronvoll (2009: 203) characterise the Party-state as 'an authoritarian state draped in democratic window-dressing in which multiparty elections are a means to sustain power'. In other words, the Party-state uses formal institutions and procedures of democracy (such as elections) to produce a political system that stifles plural views and compromises civil and political rights. Citizenship relations between young people that run as candidates of opposition parties and the Party-state clearly demonstrate this observation. After being a candidate for his party during the 2010 election, one of the young politicians was expelled from his government job and he, along with his friends and family, was intimidated.[135] The other female politician also shared similar experiences of intimidation by security officials and an extended impact that jeopardised her economic opportunities. Among the two young politicians who represented their parties during the May 2015 election, one of them has been recently sentenced to six years in prison for encouraging 'terrorism' through his Facebook posts during the recent protest from November 2015 to October 2016.[136]

In conclusion, one can argue that opposition political parties provide young citizens with created spaces through which they can affect the processes of citizenship. The young citizens who join opposition parties prioritise civil and political rights. The processes of claiming these citizenship rights involve a strategy of repression by the Party-state and resistance by the young politicians. Since developmentalism requires political dominance, young citizens' engagement through opposition parties is considered as a threat to the developmentalist hegemony of the Party-state. The analysis further revealed that there are at least two reasons

[134] BP-02-12/14
[135] EDP-01-11/14
[136] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/ethiopian-court-jails-politician-6-years-170525141848655.html ; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-39933874 (Accessed on 28 June 2017)

why young citizens join opposition parties. The first reason, shared by most young politicians, is their enthusiasm to exercise their civic duty. The second reason is that young citizens apparently share the belief that opposition parties give them a better edge to effectively pursue their civil and political rights than other spaces, such as civil society.

The analysis found that the Party-state shapes the processes of citizenship that involve young opposition politicians by adopting both high and low intensity repression. The low intensity repression includes denying or obstructing young politicians from claiming social and economic rights. Such repression has a direct impact on the opportunities of young politicians to achieve the socially expected status of economically independent adulthood. Young politicians that are self-employed or employees of government and private institutions share the restrictions imposed by the Party-state on their economic and social rights. The high intensity repression involves severe physical assault by security officials, detention, torture and imprisonment. Through these strategies, the Party-state attempts to discourage both current and future aspiring young citizens from pursuing civil and political rights as opposition members.

As argued in the three case studies so far, the Party-state adopts a repression strategy against different forms of organised young citizens' engagement in claiming civil and political rights. As the following case study demonstrates, in a context where the Party-state can control and dominate a youth-led initiative, co-operation and co-optation can become more prevalent than repression.

6.2.4 The Addis Ababa Youth Association (AAYA)

This section presents the case of the Addis Ababa Youth Association (AAYA). Established in February 1998 by young volunteers, the association is one of the oldest and perhaps the largest youth initiative in terms of membership, structure and activities.[137] The president of the association, who was interviewed for this study, claimed that the association has 79,200 registered members.[138] In answering how youth-led initiatives are affecting the citizenship of

[137] AAYA has youth-led and youth-focused programs on social issues, such as HIV/AIDS, the environment and gender, economic issues, such as youth unemployment, and political issues, such as civic participation of young people in democracy and governance. The association has parallel structures to the city government, with a head office and branch offices in the 10 sub-cities and 116 districts.

[138] AAYA-03-01/15

urban youth, examining the AAYA adds value at least on two levels. First, it is, arguably, the only youth-led initiative established by young people and currently operating in every sub-city and district of the city. Only the AAYF, which was established by the government in 2006, has a similar structure and presence in the city. Second, the AAYA has a long history of youth mobilisation compared to any other youth-led initiative, both in the city and across the country. Hence, it is relevant to examine the dynamics of its role in shaping the processes of citizenship during its existence for more than a decade and half.

In the early days of its inception, the AAYA strongly advocated for youth inclusion in socio-economic policies and political decision-making processes that affect young people. The editorial of the association's magazine, published in September 2003, stated that 'the state needs to ensure that youth are participating and practically engaged in policy formulation processes that are meant to address their issues' (AAYA 2003: 3). At the same issue, the then president of the association underscored the challenges of exclusion and marginalisation that young people are facing. He said:

> [Currently] we [young people] cannot put our vision, interests, beliefs and dreams in the development and democratic process…if we are not contributing, we cannot become key development actors. (ibid: 35)

Since its establishment, the AAYA has had a well-recognised reputation for mobilising young people through its youth volunteerism program. The volunteering programs include summer campaign activities on HIV/AIDS, environmental protection, gender based violence, youth civic engagement and also include tutorial programs for high school students. All interviewees from the AAYA, six former and current members, mentioned that participating in the youth volunteering program was their first encounter with AAYA.[139] Through these activities, the AAYA established a close relationship with Addis Ababa city administration and the government. Particularly in the pre-2005 election period, the AAYA was perhaps the most visible youth association given recognition by the government.

The city administration recognised the role that the AAYA is playing in youth volunteering and started to provide both technical and material support. Evidence of this vital support can be seen in how the AAYA became a de facto heir of the Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth

[139] AAYA-01-12/14;AAYA-02-12/14; AAYA-03-01/15; AAYA-04-02/15; AAYA-05-02/15; AAYA-06-02/15

Association (REYA) of the military regime (Ezana Amdework and Ayalew Gebre 2012). Residential and business properties that used to be owned by the previous regime's state-initiated youth association were transferred to the AAYA. By taking the close ties with the government as evidence, many questioned the independence of the AAYA. For example, during the 2005 election period, the association was accused by one of the key opposition parties, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), of being a government sponsored association. As a result, CUD boycotted an election debate session organised by the AAYA, claiming that the association is not neutral. In return, the AAYA issued a statement claiming it is an independent association (AAYA 2005).

The founders of the AAYA were youth volunteers. They exercised their political rights effectively to establish the association to pursue 'sets of common concerns' (Cornwall 2002: 17). Hence, it can be considered a created space. As a created space, the AAYA also facilitated multiple platforms that enabled young citizens to claim civil, political, social and economic rights. These include organising civic education programs, art events, environmental campaigns and community volunteering activities (AAYA 2005). As the AAYA's influence on mobilising young people increased, the government provided material, administrative and technical support for its activities. In addition to taking over offices and properties of REYA, the current city administration also offers office spaces for the youth association in its sub-city and district offices. The chairperson of the association claimed that they convinced the city administration to do this after a long process of negotiation. Compared to the *Bale-Raey* youth association, which was unable to hold a meeting in a public or private venue, both the AAYA and the AAYF have been provided office spaces in district and *kebele* offices. This demonstrates how the AAYA's operation has been well-received and is complementary to the developmentalist agenda of the ruling party.

At present, the AAYA works very closely with the Party-state in promoting its developmental objectives. The association uses its proximity to the Party-state to run youth-focused programs in almost every sphere. Hence, the AAYA creates venues for young citizens' to pursue and claim their civil, political, economic and social rights. The city government offers the necessary technical support for their programs. This support includes the use of public schools for tutorial programs, allocation of city buses for environmental campaign programs and government-owned premises and venues for their events. According to one of the former presidents of AAYA, the Party-state always wants to capitalize on the AAYA's popularity

among youth in Addis Ababa[140]. Since the association has well-established youth volunteerism programs that run throughout the year, it reaches huge numbers of youth. Hence, the Party-state is very keen to use these channels for its political purposes and developmental objectives. Indeed, the AAYA has better acceptance than both the AAYF and the AAYL, which joined the scene after the 2005 election.

One of the major ways through which the AAYA affects the citizenship of urban youth in the city is by recruiting unemployed young people to join the MSEs scheme. The AAYA works very closely with local government in promoting the MSEs scheme. According to the AAYA's 2013/14 annual report, the association organised 15,309 members to join the MSE sector. A female executive committee member who is heading a sub-city branch emphasised that linking unemployed young people with their respective district MSEs office is one of the AAYA's primary activities.[141] In the first six months of her tenure as a chairperson, from July–December 2014, her office registered 775 unemployed young people. She outlined her branch office's plan to facilitate job opportunities for 600 of these young people in the MSEs scheme before the year's end.

One can argue that the AAYA is playing a brokering role between urban youth and the state. Whilst the AAYA's volunteerism programs create opportunities for active citizenship amongst young people, the city government also gets the opportunity to be involved in youth initiatives through its technical and administrative support. The city government provides transportation facilities during campaign activities, allows the AAYA to use classrooms in public schools for its tutorial programs and also offers office spaces in its sub-city and district administration offices. This shows how the AAYA benefits from its brokering role through access to resources to implement its programs. At the same time, the AAYA also recruits unemployed young people to join the MSEs scheme, which eventually contributes to the success of the state-led initiative. In return, the Party-state has an army of volunteers who can disseminate its message within society.

This brokering role involves a co-operation strategy between the AAYA and the Party-state. As argued in Chapter 2, co-operation exists when there are overlapping interests between young citizens and the state. It appears that the co-operation between the AAYA and the Party-state is benefiting both actors in meeting their respective objectives. The AAYA is

[140] AAYA-05-12/14
[141] AAYA-01-12/14

enjoying a privilege that no other youth-led initiative was ever offered. The Party-state has found a key youth-led partner on the ground that can reach out to young people and mobilise them to join the state's MSEs scheme.

The co-operation between the AAYA and the Party-state is not limited to recruiting young citizens into the MSEs scheme. It also involves mobilising young citizens to exercise their civic and political rights within the parameters of the Party-state. As a youth-led association, the AAYA has programs that aim to enhance young citizens' civic engagement. The main activities are usually organised during election times, for example, youth-focused civic education, voter registration campaigns, election debates among political parties and the sending of young election observers.[142] However, a closer look into the terms of co-operation reveals that the Party-state has the upper hand in the activities of the AAYA.

For example, one of the striking observations made during the fieldwork for this study is that almost all former and current leaders of the AAYA interviewed are members of the EPRDF Addis Ababa Youth League (AAYL). Except for one of the former presidents of the AAYA, all current leaders of the association insist that their membership to the party has no effect at all on their work. The chair and vice chair of one of the sub-city branches of the AAYA further confirmed that all nine executive committee members of their branch are members of the AAYL. But, they argued that it was 'just a coincidence'.[143] When the secretary general of the association was asked about the dominance of the AAYL members in the entire leadership of the AAYA, he also replied: 'it's just a coincidence'.[144]

However, responses from the former president of the AAYA and the current chairperson of the AAYL confirm that members of the youth league are given a mission to control youth initiatives.[145] This illustrates one of the political purposes of the aspiring developmental state, i.e., dominating every socio-economic and political sphere of society. As argued in Chapter 4, the EPRDF's ideological orientation aspires to build the hegemony of revolutionary and developmental democracy by controlling the leadership of civil society and religious, community and educational institutions (EPRDF 1993; 2010). The former president of the AAYA stressed that the ruling party has significant power in deciding who will be the leader

[142] AAYA-03- 01/15; AAYA-04-02/15; AAYA-05-02/15
[143] AAYA-01-12/14;AAYA-02-12/14
[144] AAYA-04-02/15
[145] AAYA-05-02/15; AYL-02-02/15

of the association, as well as in the activities and every decision of the association.[146] He underscored that such influences happen 'behind the curtain'.

The dominance of the AAYL in the leadership of the AAYA is an indication that co-optation is another key strategy shaping the relationship between the AAYA and the Party-state. The co-optation is manifested through restraining the potential capacity of the association to challenge the Party-state's political and developmental agenda (Barraclough 1985; Shleifer and Treisman 2000). As a pioneer and the largest youth association, the AAYA has a strong youth mobilisation capacity. After witnessing the 2005 post-election political crisis, where young people were leading the street violence, it was only logical for the EPRDF to try and control this youth initiative. As argued by Leftwich (1996), East Asian developmental states have a record of co-opting civil society movements with the potential to challenge the developmental purposes of the state. Such kinds of civil society activities were 'swiftly neutralised, penetrated or incorporated as part of the ruling party' (ibid: 288).

By putting youth league members in leadership positions, the Party-state clearly penetrated and neutralised the AAYA. By doing so, the Party-state only allows the youth leaders to implement activities in line with its political purposes and developmental objectives. At present, the relatively critical position of the AAYA in its early days is significantly compromised by the provision of material and technical support from the Party-state. Both the chairperson and the secretary general emphasised that their primary purpose is ensuring that young people are 'benefiting'.[147] When they say 'benefiting', similar to the AAYF and AAYL leaders, as well as government officials, they are specifically emphasizing social and economic benefits. This demonstrates that co-operation and co-optation can also occur in youth-led initiatives when they appear within state-led initiatives.

One can identify a stark difference between the roles that leaders of the AAYA and *Bale-Raey* are playing in shaping the processes of citizenship. *Bale-Raey* leaders were initially invited into a state-initiated space to exercise their citizenship rights. However, when they found out that that space was heavily dominated by the Party-state, they rejected the economic opportunities that is linked to their involvement in the invited space and created their own youth initiative. In contrast, the AAYA came into existence as a created space of citizenship. The youth association has been co-operating with the government to achieve a

[146] AAYA-05-02/15
[147] AAYA-03- 01/15; AAYA-04-02/15

commonly shared agenda. It has been playing a vital role in mobilising young people to actively pursue and claim citizenship rights. By the time the AAYA started organising and mobilising youth, the EPRDF-led government was far from producing a youth-focused policy framework. In practical terms, it was only after the 2005 post-election violence that the EPRDF become conscious about mobilising youth and approaching their initiatives. One can also argue that, perhaps, it is the relative independence of the AAYA during the 2005 election period that forced the EPRDF to establish the AAYF after the election. Once the AAYF came into existence, the EPRDF continued to use it as a primary channel to mobilise youth in the city. However, through time, the Party-state started to have significant sway in shaping the decision-making processes of the AAYA as well. As a result, the AAYA is currently one of the three state-affiliated youth structures in the city, next to the Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF) and the Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League (AAYL).

One can argue that the AAYA was probably the only youth-led initiative that had strong co-operation with the EPRDF-led government before the 2005 elections. However, after the election, the EPRDF completely transformed its political and developmentalist orientation, which has had a direct impact on the processes of citizenship. This means that the kinds of rights contested started to change, along with the emergence of new invited spaces of citizenship, such as the AAYF and AAYL. Inevitably, the strategies of citizenship can hardly remain intact hence, co-optation started to prevail along with co-operation. The rationale behind the change in strategies of citizenship is because the EPRDF needed to regain legitimacy in the wake of the strongest electoral challenge in 2005 . The EPRDF also learned a strong lesson about the political significance of youth in its post-2005 political endeavour. Hence, one of the approaches it adopted to redeem its political and administrative dominance was establishing invited spaces for young citizens. Through these invited spaces (the MSEs scheme, the AAYF and AAYL), the EPRDF pursued its developmentalist agenda. The distribution of resources in terms of administrative, technical and material support, which were primarily channelled to the AAYA in the pre-2005 period, started to be diverted to, particularly, the AAYF and AAYL. As discussed in Chapter 5, the EPRDF reaped the fruits of its new political strategy of mobilising young citizens within invited spaces during the 2008 and 2010 local and national elections.

In order to remain significant in the eyes of the EPRDF-led government, which now has its own channels of youth mobilisation, the AAYA was forced to adjust to the post-2005

context. The Party-state has become more powerful, particularly after the 2010 election, with three strong youth-focused channels of mobilisation and resource distribution (the MSEs scheme, the AAYF and AAYL). These state-led initiatives were driven by the EPRDF's developmentalist strategies which sought to control and dominate community organisations to build hegemony of developmentalism (EPRDF 2010). The AAYA managed to remain significant in the dynamic processes of citizenship by embracing the developmentalist orientation of the Party-state and playing a brokering role.

The AAYA is well-suited to play a brokering role because of its origin as a created space. The AAYF and AAYL can hardly assume such a role since they were initiated by the ruling party after the 2005 election. For the AAYA, this brokering role gives a bargaining power in its relations with the Party-state hence, allows the organisation to continue its co-operation strategy. The well-established volunteerism programs and the structures of mobilisation in every sub-city and district of the city are also strong negotiating edges for the AAYA. However, the Party-state also interacts with the AAYA from a position of power, with direct control over the distribution of resources. Furthermore, having alternative channels of youth mobilisation also emboldened the Party-state. The upper hand that the Party-state has in its relations with the AAYA is manifested in the current composition of the AAYA's leadership. Ultimately, the Party-state co-opted the AAYA.

Because of the co-optation, one can argue that the AAYA is now a 'captured created space'. The Party-state succeeds in co-opting the AAYA for two interdependent reasons. First, the Party-state has absolute command over the resources that the AAYA needs for its operation. The resources include technical, administrative and political support, for example, the provision of office space, venues and transportation for large scale volunteering programs and political support in administering businesses inherited from the previous regime's youth association. In order to continue enjoying this crucial support, the AAYA surrendered its relative autonomy that existed in the pre-2005 period. As a result, members of the AAYL now dominate the AAYA and ensure its operations fit with developmentalism.

The other related reason that led to co-optation of the AAYA is the aspect of being relevant in shaping state-youth relations in the context of developmental statism. The AAYA currently faces competition from the other two state-initiated youth-focused structures, namely the AAYF and AAYL. Accessing relevant support from the Party-state can hardly be guaranteed if the AAYA is less relevant to the project of developmental statism.

In conclusion, the case of the AAYA illustrates how the dynamic context of developmentalism shapes the politics of citizenship. The case study reveals that a youth-led initiative, which initially emerged as a created space, can be turned into a 'captured created space'. The AAYA was allowing young citizens to pursue their citizenship rights primarily through co-operation. However, the dynamic context of developmentalism in the wake of the 2005 elections forced the AAYA to be a space of citizenship that complements developmentalism. As a result, the AAYA currently plays a brokering role in the processes of citizenship, as it promotes citizenship rights that complement the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives of the Party-state. The Party-state pursued the strategy of co-optation particularly by using members of the AAYL as agents of the state. Hence, it is imperative to note that the AAYA is another case study that shows youth-to youth relations in the context of developmentalism. One of the ways in which AAYL members execute their mission and serve the developmentalist agenda is by assuming leadership positions within youth-led initiatives, as seen in the AAYA. The case study also shows how the Party-state used its administrative and political power to take control of the AAYA. The following section examines how the administrative and legal power of the Party-state affects youth-led initiatives and their roles in the processes of citizenship.

6.2.5 Youth-led NGOs

This section discusses the role of youth-led NGOs in the processes of citizenship in the context of developmentalism. Youth-led NGOs belong to the wider civil society in Ethiopia, which has been significantly affected by the Charities and Societies Proclamation of 2009 (Proclamation 621/2009). As discussed in Chapter 4, the Charities proclamation is one of the politico-legal instruments enacted after the 2005 election. The proclamation severely restricts the role of citizens' initiatives in civil and political rights-related issues to be based on the amount of funds they mobilise from local and foreign sources.[148]

The decision to establish an NGO emanates from young citizens' conviction to contribute to their community. One of the commonalities between youth-NGO leaders is their enthusiasm toward playing a positive role by sensitizing their fellow young citizens regarding issues of

[148] The Charities and Societies Proclamation (621/2009) categorises Charites and Societies into three groups based on the laws under which the Charity/Society is established, the membership of Ethiopian residents, and the amount of funds received from local or foreign sources. This categorization also impacts the types of activities that the Charity/Society is allowed to carry out. The categories are 'Ethiopian Charities/Societies', 'Ethiopian Resident Charities/Societies' and 'Foreign Charities'.

the environment, sexual reproductive health (SRH), economic empowerment and ICT.[149] They initiate and implement projects in their areas of focus usually by soliciting funding from donors and often, by hiring young professionals to implement their projects. Hence, one can argue that youth-led NGO leaders exercise their rights to establish associations to execute their civic duty of serving their community.

However, the widely-shared enthusiasm to exercise civic duties among these young citizens is heavily affected by the developmentalist orientation of the Party-state. The context within which the youth-led NGOs operate is strictly monitored by the Charities and Societies Agency and local government officials. Currently, there are two youth coalitions that operate as umbrella organisations for youth-led NGOs in Addis Ababa. These are: the Youth Network for Sustainable Development (YNSD) and the Coalition of Youth Development Organisations in Ethiopia (COYDOE). Leaders of both of these coalitions mentioned that the biggest challenge they faced was to adapt to the new legal context.[150] A number of youth organisations opted for the Ethiopian Residents' Charities status and were forced to change their focus to issues of environmental protection, sexual and reproductive health (SRH) and youth economic empowerment. Because of their status, youth-led NGOs are legally restricted from working on issues of youth civic participation, governance-related rights or policy advocacy issues.

Because of Proclamation 621/2009, the youth leaders are heavily constrained from freely deciding the areas they want to focus on. The youth leaders established their respective organisations within the category of Ethiopian Residents' Charities to actively engage in the areas in which they are legally allowed to operate. Despite having real interests to work on issues of civic engagement focused on different social groups, including youth, the youth are restricted to work in very limited areas. One youth-NGO leader argues that the decision that youth-led NGOs took, both on their status and area of focus, is 'a strategy of survival not a strategy of interest'.[151] In his opinion, the Party-state used Proclamation 621/2009 as a legal instrument to impose new categorisations, which youth-led NGOs are forced to adapt. The organisation he leads re-registered in the category Ethiopian Residents' Societies because they did not see any possibility of mobilising enough funding from local sources, had they

[149] YNGO-01 – 12/14; YNGO-02 – 01/15; YNGO-03 – 02/15
[150] YNGO-01 – 12/14; YNGO-02 – 01/15
[151] YNGO-03 – 02/15

opted for Ethiopian Societies status.[152] However, their decision also came at a cost. As a result of their decision, they had to abandon their previous work on issues of youth civic engagement, policy advocacy and gender issues. Now, for both youth coalitions and their member youth-NGOs, sexual and reproductive health programs cover more than 90 per cent of their work.[153]

Proclamation 621/2009 is the most effective instrument with which the Party-state is influencing the dynamic processes of citizenship and the context in which youth-led NGOs are operating. There are two major ways that the Party-state is utilizing the Proclamation. First, the law allows the Party-state to impose new characterisations and definitions of NGOs and civil society organisations in general and youth-led NGOs in particular. The most important element of the new definition is sources of funding. According to the current governing law, the youth-led NGOs fall into the category of 'societies' and their role within society is constrained by their sources of funding. Under the new law, the Party-state limited youth-led NGOs focuses on only 'non-political' areas, such as SRH, environment and economic empowerment. Even in these areas, youth-led NGOs are allowed to provide only technical intervention and they are restricted from adopting a rights-based approach and advocacy-oriented programs. One can argue that the Party-state has partially fulfilled the civil rights of these young citizens to organise and establish associations. However, at the same time, it has also restricted their engagement within society and has forced them to become service providers. One can argue that the Party-state is using the Proclamation to keep civil society organizations in general and youth-led NGOs in particular to prohibit them from challenging its aspirations of building a developmental state.

Second, the Proclamation enabled the Party-state to establish stringent procedures for controlling the activities of 'Charities and Societies'. More specifically, the Party-state controls the activities of youth-led NGOs through the politically-motivated, rigorous processes of appraisal by local government officials and sector offices. For example, SRH projects of youth-led NGOs need approval from the government finance, youth and health offices. The officers check two basic things. First, they check budget proportions and whether at least 70 per cent of the project's budget is allocated to program cost. Second, they review the objectives and strategies of the project and whether it has any right or advocacy-related

[152] YNGO-01 – 12/14; YNGO-02 – 01/15; YNGO-03 – 02/15; YNGO-04 – 02/15;YNGO-05 – 03/15
[153] YNGO-01 – 12/14; YNGO-04 – 02/15

elements. After approval, these government offices are also actively involved in monitoring, evaluating and reporting processes. This demonstrates how the Party-state uses both its administrative and legislative capacity to influence the context in which the processes of citizenship are occurring.

Whilst abiding to the imposed legal categorisations, youth-led NGO leaders also attempt to manoeuvre some of the administrative hurdles. Three different youth-led NGO leaders mentioned that one way of quickly passing the project appraisal process by government officials is to prepare a report that the officials will easily accept.[154] The youth leaders said they make sure that both proposals and reports get cleaned of terms referring to 'rights' and any objective or strategy that may portray that the project has an advocacy element. But, the influence of the Party-state is not only in appraising project documents. There are also contexts in which youth-led NGOs are restricted from directly identifying project/program beneficiaries. Local government officials have a significant influence in determining who will be project beneficiaries and participants. As one of the respondents mentioned,

> not having full control of the project participants compromises the quality of the project outcome. … Most of the time, the local officials recruit participants from the ruling party structures, both to benefit them as well as a mechanism of control against the NGOs.[155]

It appears that the Party-state deploys legal and administrative mechanisms in order to restrict active citizenship engagement by young citizens. The primary purpose of these restrictions is curtailing young citizens' organised and collective engagement in the civic and political spheres of society. Such a constraining environment makes the youth-led NGO leaders quite vigilant in their activities. The youth leaders are very cautious in checking that they are not crossing any boundaries and use manoeuvring techniques such as reframing project documents in legally and politically acceptable tones. The youth leaders also underscored that the existence of their organisations and their continued citizenship engagement depends on the political decisions of the Party-state. This is primarily because of the hostile discourse that the Party-state directs toward the role of NGOs. The Party-state categorises NGOs as promoters of neo-liberalism, which is, according to the EPRDF, a system that breeds 'rent-seeking behaviour' (Meles Zenawi 2011). The Party-state accuses NGOs of rent-seeking

[154] YNGO-03 – 02/15; YNGO-04 – 03/15
[155] YNGO-04 – 03/15

because most of them rely on foreign donors that promote their own agenda. The Party-state uses its local cadres and the Proclamation to control NGOs that it accuses as promoters of this 'rent-seeking' and anti-developmental behaviour (EPRDF: 2008b). Hence, the day-to-day activities of youth-led NGOs are a matter of navigating the contours of a very restrictive environment. As one of the respondents mentioned, 'we spend most of our time contemplating how to avoid being blacklisted by government officials'.[156]

Resistance describes the strategy that youth-led NGOs adopt within the processes of citizenship. Their form of resistance is another example of refusing to exit the spaces of citizenship and the capacity of resilience to operate within a created space limited by repressive strategies of the Party-state. They are trying to cope with the very unpredictable and politically tense environment by adhering to formal legal requirements whilst, at the same time, smartly avoiding faults to avoid being trapped by the repressive Party-state. However, sometimes, local government cadres abuse their power and intervene in the activities of youth-led NGOs. As mentioned above, local cadres sometimes choose the project participants for youth-NGOs. This demonstrates how the Party-state is determined to pursue its developmental agenda within the activities of the youth-led NGOs. Despite such challenges, youth-led NGOs are functioning within the narrow space offered by the Party-state to pursue their political rights in a partial way.

In conclusion, the case of youth-led NGOs demonstrates that youth-led initiatives provide a created space within the processes of citizenship where political rights are partially fulfilled. This case further illustrates that the Party-state adopts low-intensity repression to control and restrict young citizens' efforts to claim their political rights. The response from youth-led NGOs is resistance through which they fulfil the legal requirements and, oftentimes, manoeuvre the legal and administrative barriers to continue claiming their rights. The youth-led NGOs currently in operation remained resilient and survived the fate of being totally crushed by the newly introduced proclamation. The Party-state uses its legislative and administrative power to pursue its repressive strategy against youth-led NGOs. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Charities and Societies proclamation is one of the instruments that facilitated the consolidation of developmental statism in post-2005 Ethiopia. By restricting youth-led NGOs to 'non-political' areas and by forcing them not to adopt rights-based approaches, the Party-state is forcing them to serve its developmentalist agenda.

[156] YNGO-03 – 02/15

6.3 Conclusions

This chapter sought to answer the second sub-question of the thesis: *how do youth-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia*? Whilst answering this question, the chapter adopted an analytical framework which presented the dynamic processes of citizenship involving the relations between the developmental state and urban youth, as well as the three components: rights, spaces and strategies. The following three concluding points summarise the main findings of the chapter.

First, the identified youth-led initiatives serve as created spaces for claiming and pursuing citizenship rights. However, whilst the contexts in which these created spaces were established vary significantly, most of the initiatives prioritised civil and political rights, at least initially. For example, *Bale-Raey* came into existence when defiant young citizens defected from the invited spaces of the AAYF and AAYL. The defection had a clear implication on the citizenship rights of *Bale-Raey* leaders. The youth leaders sacrificed their opportunities for accessing social and economic rights through co-optation in order to pursue and claim their civil and political rights. In addition to defecting from invited spaces, created spaces can also be established by effectively using social media platforms (Zone Nine) and by establishing either a city-wide association (the AAYA) or an NGO (youth-led NGOs). The chapter also examined how young citizens join opposition political parties, which are, by default, created spaces of citizenship.

Second, the vital role of context within the processes of citizenship is also demonstrated by how the created spaces allowed young citizens to exercise their rights. Since *Bale-Raey* emerged after the Party-state consolidated its power and dominance through the AAYF and AAYL, there was hardly any room for co-operation. Rather, the Party-state adopted repression as its main strategy towards *Bale-Raey*. Similarly, the ruling party swiftly adopted a repression strategy against the Zone Nine bloggers whose emergence coincided with a historical period in which social media platforms were being used internationally for popular uprisings in unprecedented ways. The Party-state's repression of young opposition politicians and youth-led NGO leaders can also be seen as part of its developmentalist aspiration, which has been aggressively pursued in the wake of the 2005 elections.

The thesis defined the responses of young citizens within the four case studies of created spaces as resistance. The young citizens remained defiant to the low and high intensity

repression strategies of the Party-state by continuing to demand the fulfilment of their civil and political rights and hardly compromising. They issued statements of defiance, continued their activities despite imminent dangers of high intensity repression and manoeuvred administrative hurdles to continue claiming their rights. Another aspect of resistance identified by the thesis is moving within created spaces, particularly from civil society to opposition parties.

The case of the AAYA demonstrates how dominant the aspiring developmental state is in its relations with the identified created spaces. The Party-state controls the context in which the processes of citizenship are occurring, which allows it to penetrate and neutralise some created spaces of citizenship. For example, the AAYA, which initially emerged as a created space of citizenship, became a 'captured created space'. Hence, at present, the AAYA plays a brokering role within the processes of citizenship, where its role is inclined toward serving the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives of the Party-state.

Third, the chapter has clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of the aspiring developmental state in combining administrative, political and legal frameworks to operationalise its developmentalism. The repression and co-optation strategies of the Party-state are pursued through local government structures, state-led initiatives inspired by the ruling party's ideology (the AAYL), politically motivated legal frameworks (anti-terrorism and CSO proclamations) and formal institutions of democracy (the courts). Furthermore, the Party-state has also utilised institutions of repression, such as state security forces and venues that forces young citizens to undergo horrific experiences of torture and inhumane treatment, to keep the legacy of the revolution period intact.

The findings of this chapter, focusing on youth-led initiatives, combined with the previous chapter on state-led initiatives, constitute the empirical sections of the thesis. The findings are also an original contribution to knowledge in terms of understanding the politics of building a developmental state and its implications on the citizenship of urban youth. In the final chapter, the thesis brings together the conceptual framework and the empirical findings to highlight the contributions of the study, to summarise the research findings and revisiting the analytical framework. In addition, the final chapter also identifies areas for further research.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENTALISM & CITIZENSHIP

7.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to achieve three objectives. First, it seeks to highlight the contributions of the thesis to the study of the politics of development and citizenship by summarising the findings. The summary of findings revisits both the research questions and the analytical framework. Second, the chapter discusses the implications of the findings on the developmentalist orientation of the Ethiopian state and the citizenship of urban youth. The final section identifies three priority areas for further research.

7.2 Contribution and Summary of Findings

The thesis set off by asking the question: *how do the politics of building a developmental state affects the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia*? The evolving debate on the democracy-development nexus served as a broader framework for investigating the politics of building a developmental state. Ethiopia's case was chosen as an ideal example to examine the complex relationship between democracy and development. Over the last 12 years, Ethiopia has achieved remarkable economic growth and development under an authoritarian regime. Furthermore, the incumbent regime has also declared that building a 'democratic developmental state' is its overarching goal. Both the empirical context of achieving economic growth under authoritarianism and the policy commitment of the regime serve as a rationale for the study.

Furthermore, the thesis has argued that examining citizens' efforts to pursue and claim their rights is one way of analysing the democracy-development nexus. To this end, the thesis built an analytical framework aimed at understanding the processes of citizenship within the context of building a developmental state. Since citizenship is conceptualized in terms of three key aspects – rights, spaces and citizenship – the politics of developmentalism is examined by identifying its implications on the interplay between these three aspects of citizenship.

Since the concepts of democracy, development and citizenship are broad concepts and further contextualisation was needed for a meaningful intellectual inquiry. The thesis achieved this by focusing on youth as a specific social group. Hence, the thesis analysed state-youth relations in the context of building a developmental state in order to examine how citizenship rights are pursued and claimed. Furthermore, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa, with slightly more than 100 million people out of which around 72 per cent are below the age of 34 (UNDESA 2017). Hence, the demographic significance of youth is another reason for focusing on young people.

Moreover, the thesis also justified its focus on the urban context by emphasizing two points. First, recent socio-economic and political dynamics in Ethiopia have highlighted the vital role of urban centres. For example, during the highly contested 2005 elections, the ruling party lost in major urban centres, including a clean sweep in the capital Addis Ababa. Second, despite the fact that Ethiopia is one of the least urbanised countries in the world, the current rate of urbanisation (3.8 per cent per annum) is more than the annual national population growth rate of 2.5 per cent (World Bank 2015; Admit Wondifraw Zerihun *et.al* 2016). Plus the economic significance of the urban centres has also increased significantly. For example, whilst employing only 15 per cent of the total work force, urban centres produce 38 per cent of total GDP (World Bank 2015)

The key contribution of the thesis is found in its conceptualisation of citizenship. The thesis has adopted a relational and process-oriented approach to conceptualising citizenship. Hence, citizenship is thus defined as a context-dependent and dynamic process that constitutes the relations between the state and citizens. In this process, both actors are contesting for *rights* within *spaces* of citizenship by adopting different *strategies*. The thesis has adopted this conceptualisation to answer how the politics of building a developmental state affects the citizenship of urban youth. The thesis has conceptualized both the developmental state and youth to identify the key attributes of each actor that affect the dynamic contexts in which the processes of citizenship are occurring. The thesis also contributes to the gap in the literature of studying developmental states by using citizenship as the key analytical tool. As argued in Chapter 2, unlike themes on state-business relations, public policy and developmental states' relations with elites, the concept of citizenship and more specifically state-youth relations are given limited attention.

The thesis defined the concept of developmental state by focusing on three key aspects. First, the thesis emphasised the relational aspect of developmental states by adopting a relational approach. Hence, instead of focusing on the autonomy of the state, its institutional features and functional roles (Mann 1987), the thesis emphasised the relationship between the state and different social forces within society (Migdal 2001; Jessop 2008). This relational approach allows examining which social forces are favoured within the developmentalist aspirations of the state and which social forces are excluded. Historically, East Asian developmental states favoured the industrial and business elites at the expense of civil society and labour movements. Such character of a developmental state is relevant to understanding how developmentalism affects citizenship. Based on the kinds of social forces a developmental state is favouring, one can argue that economic rights are prioritised at the expense of civil and political rights.

Second, the thesis has found Leftwich's (2008) definition of a developmental state highly relevant. He defined developmental states as states whose political purposes are intricately intertwined with their developmental objectives. The thesis also recognized other key aspects of developmentalism such as 'developmentalist ideology' (Mkandawire 2001) and 'developmental structures [and] roles' (Vu 2007) identified by other scholars. However, such key aspects of developmentalism can become effective within a context where there are mutually reinforcing political purposes and developmental objectives of the state. Third, democratic developmentalism is affected not only by formal but also informal institutions. Whilst democratic transition focuses on setting up formal institutions, democratic consolidation depends upon the positive contribution of embedded informal institutions that shape shared values and norms to uphold the principles and practices of democracy that formal institutions promote.

In conceptualizing the other key actors of citizenship process, specifically youth, the thesis focused on two features. The first feature approached youth as an age group. Age is the most basic feature that mediates state-youth relations. Legal frameworks and development policies that focused on youth primarily categorize young people as a social group that belong to the same age cohort before considering any other important factors (Mizen 2002). The second feature takes youth as a transitional stage of growing up. Growing up is mediated by socio-economic and political factors that affect both the actual experiences and future opportunities of youth. The thesis focuses on 'waithood' which is a prolonged period of growing toward a

socially acceptable status of adulthood (Honwana 2014). Young citizens' capacity to exercise their rights can hardly remain insulated from the enabling or constraining socio-economic and political factors that shape their 'waithood' status.

The key attributes of both the developmental state and the youth discussed in the above definitions have direct implications on the processes of citizenship. As mentioned above, the processes of citizenship have three essential components: rights, spaces and strategies. Citizenship rights are further disaggregated into civil, political, economic and social rights, which are being contested by both the aspiring developmental state and the youth. As argued above, the developmentalist orientation and its relational position in favour of industrialists and the business elites gives the state the impetus to favour primarily economic and social rights at the expense of civil and political rights. From the perspective of the youth, the urge to shorten the 'waithood' period can also become a reason to prioritise social and economic rights.

The thesis has also identified invited, created and claimed spaces of citizenship within which the contestation for rights is occurring. The emergence and purposes of spaces of citizenship is also affected by the attributes of both the developmental state and the youth. On the one hand, the developmental state uses its political power as well as legal, policy and administrative frameworks to facilitate the emergence of invited spaces. Therefore, invited spaces can become key aspects of developmentalism to realise the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives of the developmental state. Furthermore, one of the ways through which a developmental state relates with the youth is by setting up invited spaces that specifically target young people that belong to a specific age group. Young citizens may join these invited spaces to pursue and claim their citizenship rights. On the other hand, young citizens can also create spaces of citizenship out of their shared concerns to pursue and claim citizenship rights. Young citizens' efforts of creating spaces of citizenship can be seen as a vital element of their efforts to influence the context in which the processes of citizenship are occurring.

The thesis also identified four kinds of strategies adopted by states and citizens during the contestation for rights within spaces of citizenship. The identified strategies are co-operation, co-optation, repression and resistance. In co-operation, both the aspiring developmental state and the urban youth pursue overlapping agenda and their relations become reciprocal. While the state provides economic opportunities to win the acquiescence of the youth and improve

its legitimacy, young citizens use the economic opportunities to shorten their 'waithood' period. On the contrary, co-optation is when young citizens are forced to trade-off their citizenship rights, particularly when social and economic rights are prioritised over civil and political rights. Repression is a strategy of the aspiring developmental state particularly against young citizens whose claim for civil and political rights is considered as a threat to its political purposes. On the contrary, resistance is a strategy of young citizens who are determined to continue to pursue civil and political rights regardless of the aspiring developmental state's repression.

A synthesis of the above discussed concepts of developmental state, youth and citizenship allows the thesis to construct an analytical framework of studying the processes of citizenship. The processes of citizenship are relations between the developmental state and the youth through which *rights* are contested in different *spaces* and in which both actors deploy different *strategies* to influence the contestation of rights in their respective interests. The analytical framework emphasises the vital role of context in shaping the processes of citizenship. As argued above, the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives of the state have their own impact on the context. Likewise, priorities and interests of young citizens based on their age and 'waithood' status also shape the context in which the processes of citizenship occur. The analytical framework further explains the politics of citizenship by exploring how the context-dependent processes of citizenship influence the interplay between rights, spaces and strategies.

In Chapter 4, the thesis analysed Ethiopia's socio-historical and political economic context that strongly shapes the current context of developmentalism. The chapter presented three core interrelated arguments. First, the incumbent Ethiopian regime inherited a centralized and dominant state with strong and repressive structures and institutions. The ruling party, the EPRDF, enhanced the existing state structure through its revolutionary democracy ideology in such a way that it became a fertile ground for developmental statism. For example, despite the establishment of a federal government structure in 1995, the EPRDF kept the central government dominant by controlling regional parties either directly or indirectly (Paulos Chanie 2007; Merera Gudina 2011). Second, the revolutionary democracy ideology of the EPRDF contributed to the dominance of the ruling party within the state system. This has led to the fusion of the party structure with the state leading to the establishment of the Party-state. Third, the Party-state operationalises its ideological orientation through legal and policy

frameworks. The legal frameworks allowed the Party-state to dominate the public sphere and silence dissenting views using securitisation of development as its main discourse. Simultaneously, the Party-state launched developmentalist socio-economic policies that contributed to increased agricultural production, massive expansion of infrastructure and large scale social welfare programmes to mention a few. The cumulative effect of these socio-economic policies in turn improved the human development indices of the country, improvement in social indicators and welfare as well as infrastructure (UNDP 2014, Lenhardt 2015; World Bank 2016; Admit Wondifraw Zerihun *et.al* 2016). The success in the socio-economic spheres of Ethiopian society has also become a key source of legitimacy to the aspiring developmental state.

In Chapter 5 and 6, the thesis presented eight case studies that are broadly categorized into state-led initiatives and youth-led initiatives. The following sections analytically summarize the case studies by revisiting the sub-questions, linking the findings with the analytical framework and identifying lessons learned. Revisiting the sub-questions allows the making of a direct link between the case studies discussed in each chapter with the overarching question. Furthermore, re-examining the analytical framework will also allow questioning as to what extent the framework contributed to understand the politics of developmentalism and citizenship.

7.2.1 Case Studies of State-led Initiatives

Chapter 5 sought to answer the first sub-question; how *do state-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?* The thesis has argued that state-led initiatives serve as invited spaces through which developmentalism shapes the processes of citizenship through *ideology, policy frameworks* and *structures of political mobilisation*. The political context in the wake of the post-election crisis in 2005 played an indispensible role both for the emergence and expansion of the state-led initiatives. As argued by Mizen (2002), the categorisation of youth based on their shared age group was one of the primary fact when the Party-state mobilises them within state-led initiatives. For example, after the 2005 election induced crisis, young citizens were separately targeted and organized within the AAYF. The other similar mobilisation forums were Women's Forum and Inhabitants' Forum. The young citizens in their turn attempted to influence the citizenship processes within state-

led initiatives mainly by prioritising their economic rights with the aim of cutting short their 'waithood' period.

EPRDF's pragmatic ideological orientation has played a vital role in the emergence and expansion of state-led initiatives in urban areas. The 2001 ideological revision in particular brought the urban centres to the forefront of developmental statism. EPRDF set a political objective of establishing an alliance with urban based business elites and to make them a 'reliable political base' (EPRDF 2001). This strategy was further accentuated after a political shock following the electoral defeat in 2005 mainly in urban areas. In order to rectify the political loss, EPRDF endeavoured to ensure hegemony of its ideology in the urban areas. Hence, in addition to expanding the local governance structure that it has easily dominated, the ideology also inspired policy decisions that set up state-led initiatives of mass mobilisation. As the evidence revealed, state-led channels of mobilisation served a dual purpose of distributing economic opportunities as well as ensuring political control.

For example, the establishment of Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF) and Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League (AAYL) came as an immediate response to the electoral loss. Both youth focused initiatives also served as crucial channels for the state to regain legitimacy by increasing youth membership in the party. From an ideological point of view, the establishment of AAYL and AAYF is part of the strategic effort to control 'individual and collective thinking' (EPRDF 2001: 13), in this context among young citizens. AAYL in particular demonstrates how the Marxist-Leninist tradition of the ruling party is still an influential element in shaping the processes of citizenship four decades after the 1974 revolution. Moreover, the ideological commitment of establishing a new political base in the urban centres also justified the revision of the MSEs development strategy after 14 years and the expansion of the scheme.

Developmentalist policy frameworks operationalised the ideological orientation of the aspiring developmental state by facilitating the emergence and expansion of invited spaces. Particularly over the last 12 years, policy frameworks that have direct implications on young citizens have become more effective in addressing the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives of developmentalism. For example, the Micro and Small-scale Enterprises Development Strategy has explicitly mentioned the dual objective of recruiting new party members as well as creating economic opportunities. Likewise, the Youth Development Package (YDP) also addressed the limitations of the Vagrancy Control

Proclamation (VCP) and the National Youth Policy (NYP). The YDP watered down the criminalizing discourse of the VCP which framed unemployed young citizens as 'threats'. Furthermore, the political ineptness of the NYP is also addressed by the clear political actions included within the YDP. The YDP identified institutional causes of economic and political marginalisation of young citizens and proposed specific solutions to address youth marginalisation. As a result, Addis Ababa Youth Forum (AAYF) emerged as part of the political remedies recommended by the YDP. The Addis Ababa EPRDF Youth League (AAYL) also emerged as an invited space after a political decision passed by the sixth general assembly of EPRDF in September 2006. The most fundamental feature of the three invited spaces is the key role they have been playing to meet the interlinked political purposes and developmental objectives of the Party-state. One of the ways in which the invited spaces are serving the interlinked political and developmental objectives of the Party-state is by being structures of political mobilisation.

As structures of political mobilisation, the invited spaces contribute to the political purposes of control and dominance as well as developmental objectives of distributing economic opportunities. For example, within the MSEs scheme there are multiple and overlapping layers of informal structures that are chained hierarchically. These layers are channels of political control as well as avenues for job and employment opportunities. The AAYF also serve as a structure of political mobilisation as witnessed since the 2008 local elections. With its structures spread in every district and *kebele* of the city, AAYF recruited members to the ruling party and also mobilized young citizens to join the MSEs scheme. For the AAYL, the political mobilisation is further enhanced by adherence to EPRDF's Leninist principle and structures such as 'democratic centralism' and cell structures. Furthermore, AAYL members also have additional role in implementing the repressive strategy of the Party-state by spying on fellow young citizens, dissenting citizens as well as serving as witnesses in political trials.

Developmentalism not only shapes the emergence or expansion of invited spaces but also has a significant influence on the kinds of rights contested and the strategies adopted. In every invited space of citizenship, the Party-state prioritises social and economic rights of young citizens. The strategies of co-operation and co-optation tend to dominate these invited spaces. When the invited spaces emerged in the wake of the 2005 election, both EPRDF and the urban youth had overlapping interests. The government aimed to regain legitimacy by inviting young citizens to participate within invited spaces. Young citizens also aspired to

address their marginalisation from decision making processes. When the young citizens pursued their interests within invited spaces, they also helped the government to recover from its electoral loss. Hence, the overlapping interests become grounds for co-operation where both actors pursued overlapping agendas and act reciprocally. However, as the ruling party garnered more political power and consolidated its dominance, the room for co-operation became narrower. A trade-off between citizenship rights has become more prevalent where economic rights are prioritised at the expense of civil and political rights, thus leading to co-optation. In both cases of co-operation and co-optation, the developmentalist orientation of the state remained intact as political purposes have been pursued hand-in-hand with developmental objectives.

Whilst the categorisation of youth as an age group remained key factor of state-youth relations within invited spaces, the youth were hardly passive actors. They entered into these invited spaces with their own priorities that were influenced by their 'waithood' status. For example, the aspiration to get better income and eventually achieve economic independence was the primary goal for youth to join the MSEs scheme. Some young citizens even resigned from low paying government jobs to pursue their economic rights within the MSEs scheme. Likewise, other respondents aimed to get better income by shifting from more precarious jobs such as street vending and hawking.

However, some young citizens who joined invited spaces with the aim of claiming their economic rights later realised that they need to forego some of their rights. Through time, the ruling party started to demand political loyalty and membership to access further resources within the MSEs scheme. As a result, a strategy of co-operation that involved reciprocal relation was replaced by a co-optation strategy that required a trade-off of rights. Similar processes also occurred within the AAYF. Founding members joined the AAYF with the enthusiastic intention of addressing youth political marginalisation. Such enthusiastic engagement of young citizens helped the EPRDF to quickly recover from the 2005 setback. However, once the political power of the ruling party became consolidated, it started to dictate how young citizens need to pursue their civil and political rights. Hence, young citizens were forced to make a choice; either to remain within the AAYF and trade-off their rights or to reject the deal. As discussed in the empirical chapter, some young citizens accepted the deal while other decided to leave the invited spaces.

The key lessons learned from the cases studies on state-led initiatives are twofold. First, developmentalism achieves its mutually reinforcing political purposes and developmental objectives through a combination of multiple factors. The cases demonstrated the salient role of ideology, structures, context as well as political mobilisation. Second, as is highlighted in the analytical framework, context plays a significant role in shaping the processes of citizenship. When the EPRDF-led government was facing a legitimacy crisis, it primarily adopted a co-operation strategy in its relations with the urban youth. Later on, after the EPRDF fully controlled formal institutions of the state in the 2010 elections, it became more assertive and powerful to impose state-youth relations based on trade-offs. This explains the politics of citizenship where the interplay between rights, spaces and strategies are influenced by the context. Another indicator of the salient role context plays in the politics of citizenship is the starkly different results of the 2005 and 2010 elections. The EPRDF was forced to co-operate with young citizens in the wake of the 2005 elections. On the contrary, after the 2010 elections, it controlled the processes of citizenship and pursued its developmentalist orientation with more power and dominance.

7.2.2 Case Studies of Youth-led Initiatives

Chapter 6 sought to answer the second sub-question: *how do youth-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia?* To answer this question, the thesis analysed five different types of youth initiatives. The thesis found that youth-led initiatives affect the citizenship of urban youth by serving as created spaces in the processes of citizenship where young citizens pursue their civil and political rights. In the context of developmentalism, young citizens' efforts of pursuing and claiming their civil and political rights outside state-led initiatives is a direct challenge to the political purposes of the Party-state. As a result, the Party-state adopts two kinds of strategies to influence the citizenship processes within youth-led initiatives. The dominant strategy in these youth-created spaces is repression where the Party-state uses politico-legal frameworks to restrict civil and political rights. Young citizens in return adopt resistance as their main strategy of citizenship. The other strategy is co-optation, where the Party-state penetrates and neutralises youth-led initiatives to make them instruments of developmentalism

Youth-led initiatives emerge as created spaces of citizenship primarily because of young citizens' common pursuit of exercising their citizenship rights in spaces independent of the

state. Whilst the context of developmentalism remains the same, the ways young citizens establish created spaces vary depending on the context. For example, the thesis identified some young citizens that have rejected the deal that the developmental state offered within state-led initiatives. These young citizens defected from the invited spaces and pursed the civil and political rights they were denied within the invited spaces. Created spaces also emerged out of young citizens' ingenuity of using internet-based social media sites as platforms of exercising citizenship. Hence, social media based activism and blogging became another way of exercising rights within created spaces. Establishing mass-based youth association as well as theme-based non-governmental organisation are the other examples through which created spaces come into being. Another unique way through which young citizens exercise their civil and political rights in created spaces is by joining opposition political parties.

Developmentalism shapes the context in which the youth-led initiatives serve as created spaces of citizenship. The ideologically inspired politico-legal frameworks further strengthened the repressive state structure, which remained intact during the reign of the last three regimes over four decades. The Anti-terrorism proclamation and the Charities and Societies proclamation are the two most important politico-legal frameworks of repression. These legal instruments give the Party-state the legal power to criminalise and severely restrict young citizens' efforts of claiming civil and political rights. Furthermore, high intensity repressive measures such as torture, physical assault and imprisonment are also committed, especially against members of *Bale-Raey,* the Zone Nine bloggers and opposition party members. In addition to legal instruments, the expanded local governance structures also set administrative hurdles to restrict young citizens from exercising their civil and political rights within the created spaces. The examples include the restrictions on *Bale-Raey* from using both state-owned and private facilities to organize their general assembly. The stringent control over the operations of youth-led NGOs is also part of the administrative hurdles. For example, local government officials use their political leverage to impose restrictions on the kind of participants that youth-led NGOs are recruiting to participate in their programs.

Among the youth-led initiatives, the Addis Ababa Youth Association (AAYA) stood out as unique. The AAYA initially emerged as a created space of citizenship. As an independent youth association, it negotiated for technical and administrative assistance from the

government to implement its programs. However, the political context in the wake of the 2005 elections completely changed the relations between the AAYA and the EPRDF-led government. The EPRDF established its own city wide youth structures which gave the ruling party more political power in youth mobilisation. Furthermore, the EPRDF also used its youth league members to control the AAYA. Leftwich (1996: 287) argued that developmental states have the tendency to 'neutralize, penetrate or incorporate' citizens' initiatives outside the ruling party structure. Likewise, the EPRDF used its youth league members to penetrate the leadership of the AAYA and then turn the youth-led initiative into another platform of developmentalist mobilisation. In this process, the continued reliance of the AAYA for technical and administrative support from the city government played a major role for the youth-led initiative to be easily controlled. As a result, the AAYA became a 'captured created space'. Based on the evidence from current and former leaders of the AAYA, the youth league leaders and the EPRDF's ideological strategy documents, one can argue that the AAYA is a co-opted youth-led initiative. Further evidence of its co-optation is the role it currently plays in the processes of citizenship. The AAYA is primarily playing a brokering role between young citizens and the Party-state in that it has prioritised the social and economic rights of young citizens.

There are two key lessons to be learned from the case studies on youth-led initiatives. The first lesson is that the strategy of the Party-state in its relations with youth-led initiatives is primarily shaped by its political purposes. The political purpose of the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state is ensuring dominance and authority through repression. This thesis identified three sources from which the Party-state draws its repression strategies. These are the institutions of repression the Party-state inherited from previous regimes, the ideologically inspired legal frameworks and the overlapping formal and informal structures of local governance. A good example of inherited institution of repression is the infamous detention centre known as *Maekelawi.* This centre has been used as a site of torture against dissenters, especially since the revolution period. The Zone Nine bloggers and the young politicians were detained in at this centre because of their efforts toward demanding civil and political rights. Furthermore, revolutionary democracy which characterises social forces promoting liberal views as 'enemies' and 'anti-development' is informs the Party-state's repression strategies. Finally, the multiple layers of formal and informal structures of governance that are filled with ruling party members operationalise the repressive strategies of the Party-state. The activities of EPRDF members in these structures include intimidating,

threatening, and physical assaulting dissenting young citizens as well as spying on them and bearing witness against them in political trials. One example in this regard is the case of one of the AAYF leaders who is also an AAYL member. He was one of the prosecutor's procedural witnesses in the case of Zone Nine bloggers. Another example is the experience of *Bale Raey* leaders when trying to hold their general assembly. Their attempt to rent meeting halls and venues was checkmated even after paying down payments because of the work of these informal networks of governance and control.

The second lesson is that context plays an indispensable role in shaping the politics of citizenship as demonstrated in the case of youth-led initiatives. For example, the Party-state has significantly shaped the context in which the AAYA and youth-led NGOs are operating. The mission to penetrate and neutralize the AAYA appears to have been successful in that now it is incorporated into the developmentalist orientation of the Party-state as a co-opted youth initiative. On the contrary, the Party-state influenced the context in which youth-led NGOs are operating by enacting a legal framework that immensely restricts their operation. As a result the youth-led NGOs decided to survive by running programs that fit into the developmentalist objectives of the state.

For further succinct summary of the empirical chapters, the following table 7.1 presents the three components of the processes of citizenship with respective examples. The strategy of co-operation prevails within every invited spaces of citizenship studied (MSEs scheme, AAYF and AAYL) in this thesis where economic and political rights are offered by the Party-state. Likewise, the Party-state adopts the strategy co-optation within invited spaces by facilitating the fulfilment of economic rights as well as restricted opportunities to exercise political rights particularly within AAYF and AAYL. As discussed in Chapter 6, the only created space where the Party-state's co-operation and co-optation strategy is found effective in affecting the civil and political rights of young citizens is the AAYA. With regard to the remaining cases of created spaces (*Bale-Raey*, Zone Nine, opposition party members, and youth-led NGOs), the relations between the Party-state and the urban youth is primarily dominated by the strategies of repression and resistance.

Table 7.1 The Processes of Citizenship: Rights, Spaces and Strategies.

Strategies of Citizenship	Spaces of Citizenship	Citizenship Rights Focus	Empirical Examples
Co-operation	Invited spaces	Economic rights	MSEs scheme, AAYF, AAYL
		Political rights	AAYF, AAYL, AAYA
Co-optation	Invited spaces	Economic rights	MSEs scheme, AAYF, AAYL
		Political rights	AAYF, AAYL
	Created spaces	Civil & Political rights	AAYA
Repression by the Party-state	Created spaces	Civil and Political rights	*Bale-Raey*, Zone Nine Bloggers, Opposition Party members, Youth-led NGOs
Resistance by the urban youth	Created Spaces	Civil and Political rights	*Bale-Raey*, Zone Nine Bloggers, Opposition Party members, Youth-led NGOs

Furthermore, based on the above summarised findings, the analytical framework can be redrawn to reflect the findings about the dynamics of citizenship processes within the Ethiopian context (Figure 7.1). One of the major elements of the revised analytical framework is the expansion of invited spaces and contraction of created spaces. The analysis has shown how the aspiring developmental state in Ethiopia has forcefully limited the opportunity for young citizens to create their own spaces of citizenship. As a result, state-youth relations are dominated by state-led initiatives which are serving as invited spaces where young citizens often have to trade-off their political rights in exchange for economic opportunities. By doing so, the young citizens aspire to shorten their 'waithood' period whilst the aspiring developmental state bolsters its legitimacy. The other key aspect of the revised analytical framework is the influence of the repression strategy on the created spaces of citizenship. The relative contraction of the created spaces is because of the low and high intensity repressive measures that the Party-state has adopted against young citizens within these created spaces.

Figure 7.1 The Politics of Developmentalism and Dynamics of Citizenship among urban youth in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.



7.3 Synthesis, Contributions and Implications of Findings

This section seeks to synthesize the thesis findings and highlight its theoretical and conceptual contributions. Furthermore, it will also examine the implications of these findings both on the developmentalist aspirations of the state and on the citizenship rights of urban youth.

7.3.1 Synthesised Summary of the Thesis

The overarching argument of the thesis contends that the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives of the Ethiopian state have a considerable role in shaping the citizenship of urban youth. The thesis demonstrated this by illustrating how the politics of building a developmental state influenced the processes of citizenship i.e. how spaces have emerged, rights are prioritised and strategies are adopted. As argued by the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, development is 'a political process first' (2012; 170). The thesis synthesised this inherently political process by examining the combined role of historically embedded state structures and institutions as well as ideology in driving developmental statism. The thesis also analysed the politico-legal frameworks and socio-economic policies through which the structures, institutions and ideology of the state affect the processes of citizenship. Furthermore, the empirical chapters that examined state-led and youth-led initiatives demonstrated the implications of developmentalism on the citizenship of urban youth.

The thesis argued about the link between the key attributes of the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state and its role in shaping the citizenship of urban youth. For example, the influence of the historically dominant and centralised features of the Ethiopian state can be seen in the emergence and operation of both state-led and youth led-initiatives. State-led initiatives such as the MSEs scheme, AAYF and AAYL manifested various aspects of dominant state structures and their centralised nature. The MSEs scheme, for example, shows how the EPRDF utilises its policies and state resources to sustain its political dominance by recruiting new members into its structures. The thesis demonstrated how the MSEs development strategy and the way it is being executed are clear examples of the intertwined political purposes and development objectives of the Party-state. The MSEs scheme also illustrated the dominant and centralised features of the Ethiopian state through the

overlapping formal and informal structures of mobilisation and resource distribution. Whilst these structures ensure the pervasive nature of the state, they also show the capacity of the state to influence the processes of citizenship. These structures of mobilisation play an indispensable role in controlling the invited space (i.e. the MSEs scheme), the citizenship rights contested within the space (mainly economic rights) as well as the dominant strategies (co-operation and co-optation).

Likewise, AAYF and AAYL also demonstrated how the aspiring developmental state negotiates with the urban youth from the position of domination. The aspiring developmental state capitalised on its position as the most viable, if not the only, source of economic benefits for the urban youth. As demonstrated in the empirical chapter, the ruling party could co-opt potential dissenting voices within AAYF into its structures by providing economic opportunities. Similarly, leaders of AAYL also repeatedly reiterated that they receive considerable number of new membership applications with a clearly demonstrated expectation of getting job opportunities in return.

Furthermore, the findings of the thesis also identified the vital role of ideas as equally relevant aspects of developmentalism as the structural and institutional dominance of the aspiring developmental state. Since the early 90s, EPRDF's revolutionary democracy ideology served as a primary source for political mobilisation. The last decade also witnessed the transformation of the revolutionary democracy ideology as a source of political discourses towards democratic developmentalism. As for the citizenship of youth, youth focused policy and legal frameworks also evolved towards depicting ideal attributes of young citizens in their discourses. This contributed to the EPRDF-led government's effort to keep consistency within its developmentalist orientation and narratives. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, the criminalising discourse on young people is now replaced by a framing that characterises ideal young citizens as 'seeds of democracy and development'. Moreover, state-led initiatives also serve as channels of inculcating both the developmentalist ideas and the ruling party's ideology through indoctrination trainings.

Likewise, youth-led initiatives hardly remained intact from the dominant features of the Ethiopian state and its developmentalist orientation. For example, *Bale-Raey* emerged as a created space in response to the dominating characters of the ruling party within AAYF. Similarly, Zone Nine bloggers also attempted to address the unparalleled dominance of the Party-state as the sole source of information by controlling the print and electronic media. As

a result, Zone Nine bloggers capitalised on the nascent digital sphere to challenge both the authoritarian nature of the Party-state and its dominance as a source of socio-economic and political narratives. The case of AAYA further reveals the authoritarian nature of the Party-state and its effectiveness in taking full control of a created space. The case of both young opposition politicians and youth-NGO leaders also exemplifies how the ruling party is strategically using its legislative power to restrict their activities using politically inspired legal frameworks.

The core arguments of the empirical chapters generate nuanced perspectives to revisit the key arguments presented as the central puzzle and conceptual framework of the thesis. With regard to the democracy-development nexus, the Ethiopian case illustrates that there is a clear sequencing of development over democracy. A deeper look into the policy and legal frameworks of the Party-state reveals that there is a clear prioritisation of economic objectives, such as growth and developmentalism; at the expense of ensuring substantive democracy. The analysis in Chapter 4 presented both the manifestations and implications of the current state of the democracy-development nexus in Ethiopia. On the one hand, the establishment of formal institutions of democracy and regular occurrence of elections are barely accompanied by the fulfilment of civil and political rights. On the other hand, the EPRDF-led government has demonstrated considerable determination to achieving economic growth, social development, welfare for the vulnerable and infrastructure development with tangible results in improving peoples' wellbeing.

Based on the observed political processes that shape the democracy-development nexus, the thesis claims that Leftwich's conceptualisation of developmental statism explains the Ethiopian case very well. The core arguments put forward in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 revealed how the EPRDF's political purposes are developmentally driven and its developmental objectives are politically oriented. The political purposes are developmentally driven because the ruling party effectively utilises its political dominance to sustain rapid economic growth and ensure redistribution of resources which in turn serve as sources of legitimacy. Likewise, the developmental objectives of economic growth and redistribution are politically oriented because the Party-state has embedded its aspiration of ensuring its political dominance in the development policies and strategies.

Despite the remarkable success in tackling poverty and achieving economic growth, the Party-state's prospect of building a democratic developmental state is less promising. The

main reason for the derailment of the democratisation process is the inherent contradiction between the ideological orientation of EPRDF and the democratic transition process that started in the early 1990s. As argued by Leftwich (2008), democratic developmentalism is achieved after a successful democratic transition followed by a democratic consolidation. Ethiopia's democratic transition has been severely compromised because EPRDF agreed to the instalment of liberal democratic institutions out of a survival strategy during its early years in power than out of a conviction to liberal democracy. The review of internal party documents in the early 1990s revealed EPRDF's state building project that defied the logic liberal democracy (EPRDF 1993). An autobiographical account of formerly key player within EPRDF and the political dynamics and contestation during the third critical juncture (TPLF's *renewal*) also confirms EPRDF's half-hearted commitment to democratic transition. As a result, there has only been procedural democracy in Ethiopia where the formal institutions are functioning under sever political pressure from the ruling party.

The core arguments in Chapter 4 and the empirical findings in Chapters 5 and 6 illustrated the authoritarian nature of the EPRDF-led government than its democratic credentials. Hence, the thesis concludes that Adrian Leftwich's notion democratic developmentalism can hardly occur in Ethiopia because of the failed democratic transition and unrealised consolidation. The thesis argued that the Ethiopian case presents an example of authoritarian developmentalism. Examples of authoritarian nature of the state include the establishment of a Party-state and the effective use of politico-legal frameworks that severely restricted civil and political right as illustrated in the empirical chapters.

Authoritarian developmentalism has a direct impact on the processes of citizenship. As argued by Faulks (2000), citizenship is a direct reflection of the nature of governance within society. Hence, the emergence of spaces of citizenship, the kinds of rights contested with the spaces and the types of strategies utilised by both the state and young citizens can hardly remain insulated from the influence of authoritarianism. As noted by Leftwich (1996), East Asian authoritarian states penetrated, co-opted and restricted citizens' initiatives that promoted civil and political rights. Likewise, the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state also adopted strategies of repression to control and dominate created spaces of citizenship initiated by young citizens. The key attribute that make authoritarian developmentalism different from other kinds of authoritarianism is the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives of the state. As demonstrated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 mutually reinforcing politico-

legal frameworks and socio-economic policies contribute to the prevalence of the developmentalist orientation whilst repressing citizens' civil and political rights.

Lastly, the thesis argued that the contestation for citizenship rights is one of the three essential components of the process oriented conceptualisation of citizenship. As briefly presented in Chapter 4, the Ethiopian constitution has clearly stipulated civil, political, social and economic rights. One set of rights, for example, is the right to 'equal access to publicly funded social services' (FDRE 1995 (Art.41 (3)). Despite the formal institutionalisation of this right in the constitution, the politically driven developmentalist strategy of the Party-state reduces this right into an 'opportunity' or a 'reward' offered in return for loyalty. This demonstrates the salient role of context and the inherently relational nature of citizenship. As discussed in Chapter 2, the institutionalisation of citizenship hardly ensures the contract-based relation between states and citizens. Rather, as argued by Staeheli (1994: 850), '…the standing of individuals [or citizens] in the polity' plays a vital role in the fulfilment of codified rights. As demonstrated in empirical chapters, the politics of developmentalismin Ethiopia reduced these rights into 'opportunities' and offer them as 'rewards' through transactional relations with citizens.

7.3.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Contributions

The existing literature recognises that most East Asian developmental states achieved the remarkable economic growth under authoritarianism. The legal instruments that restricted and criminalised labour, civil society and student movements were key manifestations of the repressive attributes of East Asian Developmental states (Weiss and Hobson 1995; Leftwich 2000; Chang 2013). The findings of the thesis extended this debate by tracing the structural, institutional and ideological foundations of authoritarian developmentalism in Ethiopia.

One of the contributions of the thesis is the identification of the crucial factors that enabled the emergence of authoritarian developmentalism by tracing continuity and change at the core of the Ethiopian state. In Ethiopia, authoritarian developmentalism is consolidated through the historically embedded nature of the state, its manipulation of formal democratic institutions and the vital role of informal institutions in constraining citizenship rights. Moreover, the relatively successful socio-economic policies and effective politico-legal frameworks also played an indispensable role. In addition to identifying these crucial factors

that help shape authoritarian developmentalism in Ethiopia, the thesis also analysed how this type of developmentalism has influenced citizenship processes, especially among urban youth. By doing so, the thesis examined how key attributes of a specific social group can affect the processes of citizenship within authoritarian developmentalism.

Analysing the key features of authoritarian developmentalism and the specific social group also allows the thesis to examine the different strategies that shape state-citizen relations. Hence, instead of a uniform type of repression that resonates with authoritarian attributes of the Party-state, the thesis identified various forms of strategies adopted by both the state and the youth. These are strategies of co-operation, co-optation, repression and resistance. Examining these strategies of citizenship in tandem with spaces of citizenship and citizenship rights enables the thesis to discuss the different aspects of state-citizen relations under authoritarian developmentalism. Hence, it is argued that, while authoritarian developmentalism is the dominant character of the Ethiopian Party-state, there are a range of strategies that mediate state-youth relations. For the Party-state its intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives dictate its role within the processes of citizenship. For the urban youth, their status within society as an age group and as people in transition of becoming adults influence their relations within the politics of developmentalism in Ethiopia.

The thesis also contributes to the literature on spaces of citizenship. It has shown how the ‘captured created space’ can be a manifestation of the impact of authoritarian developmentalism on citizenship. The literature on spaces of citizenship is predominantly focused on democratic or semi-democratic political systems. Hence, applying this concept in an authoritarian developmental state context required a nuanced perspective. Whilst applying the concept of spaces of citizenship, the thesis recognized that power relations as key aspects of this analytical concept. Hence, in the case of authoritarian developmental statism, the power of the state is manifested in its capacity to ‘capture’ created spaces and make them subservient to the developmentalist orientation.

7.3.3 Implications on the Developmental Aspirations of the Ethiopian State

The EPRDF commenced its political project of dominating the Ethiopian state by aspiring to achieve hegemony of its revolutionary democracy ideology. In 2001, the aspiration to build a socialist state was replaced by a pragmatic plan of building a capitalist state. Hence,

developmentalism became primary goal of the regime. The EPRDF's ideological revision was inevitably accompanied by a change in alliance, i.e., from 'the poor farmers and the proletariat' (EPRDF 1993) to rich farmers and the urban bourgeoisie (EPRDF 2001, 2008; Lefort 2007). However, the political processes of pursuing developmentalism remained intact. Accordingly, the EPRDF declared the aspiration to build hegemony of revolutionary democracy is now transformed into pursuing the hegemony of 'democratic developmentalism' (EPRDF 2010).

Mkandawire (2001) argues that 'developmentalist ideology' is an essential component of developmental statism. Vu (2007) also underscored the vital role of 'developmental structures and roles'. As argued by Leftwich (2005; 2008) and later echoed by Meles Zenawi (2011), how politics is driven ultimately influences the realisation of a developmentalist ideology or the effectiveness of development structures and roles. The inherently political nature of developmentalism is manifested in the ideologically inspired decisions that the EPRDF has been implementing to realise the intertwined political purposes and developmental objectives. These include the political decisions, legal and policies frameworks aimed to shape citizens' 'collective thinking' as well as practices in line with the developmentalist orientation of the state. Examples include the expansion of the local governance structures, the efforts of controlling the public sphere with party-affiliated mass organisations and draconian laws that severely restrict media, political parties and civil society organisations. The successful fusion of the ruling party with the state institutions has further consolidated the power of the aspiring developmental state.

Over the last 12 years, developmentalism has been relatively successful in achieving the agenda of rapid economic growth. There is evidence of positive change with tangible impacts on peoples' lives. Observers agree that developmentalism has delivered positive outcomes in education, health, infrastructure, agricultural production and social welfare in present day Ethiopia (UNDP 2014; World Bank 2016). Pro-poor spending of the national budget increased from 28 per cent in 2000 to 73 per cent in 2013 (UNDP 2014). The success in meeting five of the eight MDG targets before 2015 (UNDP 2014), achieving 10 per cent average economic growth for a decade (World Bank 2016), the inclusion of nearly 10 per cent of vulnerable population into coordinated social protection schemes (Lavers 2016, Sennoga *et al.* 2017), and the expansion of education and health facilities as well as

agricultural productivity enhancing programs (Lenhardt *et al.* 2015) are some of the key manifestations of the success developmentalism.

However, the success in the social and economic spheres can hardly be disentangled from the severe restrictions on the civil and political rights of citizens. There has been an inverse relationship between the records of citizens' social and economic well-being and civic and political freedom over the last 12 years (Arriola and Lyons 2016). The recent political unrest which lingered nearly for a year (from November 2015 to October 2016) is a good indication of the challenges that the aspiring development state is facing. There were, indeed, historically embedded and structural causes that exacerbated the recent protests. The two critical questions that the 1974 revolutionaries sought to answer are yet to be resolved to the extent of satisfying major political forces in Ethiopia. These are the land question and the question of nationalism and ethnolinguistic identity (Merera Gudina 2007; Abera Yemane-Ab 2016). For example, the expulsion of poorly compensated farmers from their land to give way for developmentalist projects of industrial expansion, large scale-mechanised agriculture or infrastructure developments was one of the key issues of the protests in 2015–2016. In most cases, such kinds of demands for social justice and inclusion are pursued hand-in-hand with questions of the 'self-determination' of nations and the autonomy of regions as enshrined in the 1995 constitution.

The central element of contention arises from the inherently incompatible institutions and processes of development and democracy (Khan 2005; Leftwich 2005). As argued in Chapter 2, the developmentalist orientation that aspires to achieve rapid economic growth hardly follows consensual and inclusive processes of decision making (Leftwich 2005). Furthermore, as developmentalism is a capitalist state-building process, it favours the industrial and business elites. Hence, developmentalism thrives on rapid economic growth which occurs simultaneously with the suppression of demands for inclusion by competing social forces (Underhill and Zhang 2005; Chang 2013; Song 2013). Hence, one can argue that the recent protests in Ethiopia are unsurprising aspects of developmentalism. The inevitability of such kinds of protests and contestations demonstrate both the challenges and the limitations of the political processes that drive the developmentalist orientation in present day Ethiopia.

Moreover, the recently occurred violent protests in Ethiopia also provide strong evidence that improvements in the socio-economic spheres, repressive laws and co-optation may hardly

keep authoritarian developmentalism immune from popular uprisings. Citizens were demanding more representation in the decision making processes beyond their nominal presence in the invited spaces. Whilst repressive laws led to a restrained public sphere dominated by the Party-state, platforms such as social media provided alternative channels of communication and mobilisation. This is perhaps an indication of the fragility of the deal that the aspiring developmental state is offering and the unsustainability of the trade-off. Furthermore, it is also important to note that the Party-state's co-optation strategy promotes mass recruitment of new members to the ruling party. The presence of these citizens within invited spaces can boost the image of the Party-state as a legitimate regime. However, such an image of legitimacy built of opportunistic relations can quickly vanish and may hardly become a reliable source of support during widespread popular uprisings.

The continuity of the developmentalist aspiration of the Ethiopian state is tied to its resilience to similar political uprisings recently occurred. Similar to the post-2005 election crisis, the Party-state quickly decided to address young citizens' economic and political rights as part of its coping strategy. As a result, the Party-state established a Revolving Youth Fund worth £340 million specifically to create more employment opportunities for young citizens by expanding the MSEs scheme. This is another effort of keeping the citizenship processes running with well-resourced and expanded invited spaces where social and economic rights are prioritised. Since the Party-state has suffered a huge legitimacy deficit during the recent protests, co-operation might become more dominant. Within such a strategy, the Party-state will find the opportunity to ease the pressure, regain its legitimacy and keep its developmentalist aspiration intact. In return, participating young citizens may get more opportunities to shorten their 'waithood' period

The aspiring developmental state needs to be prudent in order to ensure the sustainability of its developmentalist mission. Politically, responding to legitimate political demands through repressive strategies can be successful in the short term. However, unless the core problems of political exclusion and the tendency to control every aspect of the public sphere are addressed, similar popular uprisings are likely to reappear, perhaps on a larger scale. The scale and magnitude of recurring protests may, then, discredit and threaten the developmentalist meta-narrative of consecutive economic growth and improved social wellbeing.

Economically, since Ethiopia's economy is heavily dependent on primary commodity exports, rain-dependent agriculture and foreign aid, there is an urgent need for the structural transformation of the economy. The current capacity of the Ethiopian economy might not be strong enough to generate sufficient economic opportunities that can be distributed to reoccurring dissenting voices. In a nutshell, the cake might not be big enough to be shared as part of the regime's efforts of co-optation. Hence, a gradual and realistic process of ensuring economically and politically inclusive developmentalism needs to be considered. Such kinds of decisions can be taken into consideration only if the Party-state and the supporting social forces are willing to concede political power. However, compromising political dominance might also mean aiming for a modest growth rather than rapid growth. Because, giving room for competing political forces will also have a direct impact on economic and political decisions that contribute the rapid growth agenda. This, in turn, might have negative consequences for the capacity of the Party-state to distribute economic opportunities to sustain its legitimacy. However, it is worth paying this price in order to off-set the danger of heading toward a full-scale political and economic crisis.

Similar to the implications for the developmentalist aspiration of the Ethiopian state, the identified state-youth relations also have direct impact on the urban youth. The following section draws on the findings to identify different groups of urban youth and their relations with the aspiring Ethiopian developmental state.

7.3.4 Implications on the citizenship of urban youth

The state-youth relations examined in Chapter 5 and 6 identified multiple groups of young citizens involved in the processes of citizenship. The features of developmentalism, the attributes of youth as well as the dynamic context in which the processes of citizenship are occurring can help us identify at least four types of youth groups. These groups of young citizens are heavily influenced by the context in which they are pursuing their rights, which may require them to move from one group to another to better claim their rights. Hence, the thesis identifies them as loose analytical groups rather than categorically defined closed groups.

The first group includes urban young citizens that are potentially willing to join state-led initiatives. The fact that the Party-state is the most dominant actor within the economic sphere provides a rational ground for young citizens who aspire to join invited spaces. The

uncertain and prolonged period of ‘waithood’ is perhaps the most difficult experience for most urban young citizens. Hence, young citizens that are witnessing the dominance of the Party-state in economic spheres may base their decision accordingly. When entering into the invited spaces, these young citizens are potentially playing their part to consolidate the legitimacy of the Party-state. As social and economic rights are the primary focuses of invited spaces, the dominant strategies will certainly be co-operation and co-optation. There will also be opportunities of pursuing civil and political rights. However, these rights will be pursued under the direct control of the Party-state in such a way that its political purposes of dominance and authority are ensured.

The second group includes young citizens that are positively contributing to the developmentalist orientations of the Party-state. These young citizens act within the invited spaces of citizenship (the MSEs scheme, the AAYF and the AAYL) or in ‘captured created spaces’ such as the AAYA. The visibility and presence of these young citizens in the public sphere is a very crucial source of legitimacy for the aspiring developmental state. Furthermore, they also serve as agents of the state to extend its control over fellow citizens and for political mobilisation. These young citizens enjoy social and economic rights due to their relations with the Party-state. They exercise their civil and political rights within the parameters set by the Party-state.

The third group includes young citizens who were once part of the state-led initiatives but currently defected and created their own spaces of citizenship. These young citizens exemplify the limitations of the co-operation and co-optation strategies that the Party-state has adopted. These young citizens defected because they refused to compromise their political rights. By implication, these young citizens also have sacrificed the economic opportunities that the Party-state would have provided them if they consented to be co-opted. The decision of these young citizens to reject the deal that the Party-state was providing can have a profound negative impact on their ‘waithood’ status. However, their defection also demonstrates the high value these young citizens place on civil and political rights, unlike other groups of young citizens within the invited spaces.

The fourth group includes young urban citizens that appear to be committed to pursue civil and political rights regardless of the repression from the Party-state. These young citizens appear determined not to trade-off or prioritise their citizenship rights, but rather aspire to claim their rights in full. The cases of the Zone Nine bloggers, opposition politicians and

youth-led NGOs demonstrate the authoritarian nature of the aspiring developmental state in Ethiopia. These young citizens exercise their rights within an extremely repressive context where the Party-state utilises administrative, political and legal means to restrain them. Their resistance strategy is primarily refusing to exit the spaces of citizenship they created or joined, despite the heavy price to be paid.

It is imperative to note that the above discussed groups are basically analytical distinctions that allow us to examine the interplay among rights, spaces and strategies of citizenship. Contextual factors can significantly affect young citizens in any of the four groups, hence young citizens can move between groups. For example, the recent political protest might become a triggering factor for more young citizens to join the invited spaces to pursue social and economic rights by accessing opportunities from the revolving fund that the Party-state has launched. At the same time, other young citizens may decide to defect from invited spaces to join created spaces to demonstrate their disagreement with the way the Party-state has handled the protests. This shows that a particular context can have different impacts on young citizens belonging to the different groups.

Before concluding the thesis, the following section will highlight at least three points that can be considered for future research on issues of developmentalism, citizenship and youth in Ethiopia and other similar contexts.

7.5 Recommendations for Future Research

There are at least three areas for which the findings of this thesis can serve as a starting point. First, for further understanding of the politics of building a developmental state and its effect on the citizenship of youth, future research may focus on rural youth. With the different socio-economic and political context associated with rural livelihoods, one may reveal additional insights for understanding the processes of citizenship within a developmental state context. Especially in a country like Ethiopia, where the rural population constitutes nearly 80 per cent of the population, examining the dynamics of state-youth relations in a rural context can potentially reveal more insights.

Second, youth is a heterogeneous social category. The thesis has recognized the diversity of youth in the entire stage of the research. More specifically, the findings of the research also demonstrated the diversity of young citizens based on value orientations toward different

elements of citizenship rights. However, there are also other elements of diversity among youth. These include gender, socio-economic status, ethnolinguistic background and religion. Future research can take these categories as starting points in order to study how young citizens that belong to different gender, religious, ethnolinguistic or socio-economic groups pursue and claim their citizenship rights within the context of developmental statism.

Third, the relational and process-oriented conceptualisation of citizenship the thesis adopted can be used as an analytical framework for further research at least in two ways. One way can be to conduct a cross-national comparison between different types of regimes in order examine the implications of different regime types on the interplay between rights, spaces, and strategies. For example, a comparison could be made between a democratic and an authoritarian regime in order to identify and explain differences and similarities within these processes of citizenship. Likewise, the framework can also be used to compare state-youth relations in authoritarian regimes. Second, the framework can also be adapted to study other social groups within Ethiopia or other countries apart from youth. For example, the framework can be used to study relations between the state and women's groups, peasants or labour in order to examine how these groups are pursuing their rights within the context of developmentalism.

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Note: Names of Ethiopian authors are conventionally cited in full on first name.

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Annex I – Complete List of Research Participants

Guide

- The first letters/abbreviation or words describe the category Eg. MSE- Micro and Small Enterprise, ZN – Zone Nine, SO- State Official
- 1FGD and 2FGD represents the first and second focus group discussions
- Research participants with more than one code participated twice such as ; AAYL-04-02/15 (AAYF-03-02/15), BR-01-02/15 (AAYF-01-11/14)

	Code	**Case Study/Category**	**Age**	**Sex**	**Description of respondent**	**Date**	**Remark**
1.	MSE-01-12/14	MSEs Scheme	28	M	University graduate who leads a group of 18 young people organized in the MSEs scheme to establish an urban farm.	December 2014	
2.	MSE-02-01/15	MSEs Scheme	27	M	High school graduate. He joined the MSEs scheme as a cobble stone cutter after migrating from a rural town in southern Ethiopia.	January 2015	
3.	MSE-03-01/15	MSEs Scheme	29	M	With diploma in law, joined the MSEs scheme after resigning from working as a registrar in a social court.	January 2015	
4.	MSE-04-04/15	MSEs Scheme	25	M	University graduate co-founded dairy products distributing business with his two friends who are also university graduates.	April 2015	
5.	MSE-05-01/15	MSEs Scheme	33	M	Entrepreneur	January 2015	
6.	MSE-06-02/15	MSEs Scheme	26	M	Leader of a youth group running a human resource management company	February 2015	

7.	MSE-07-02/15	MSEs Scheme	29	M	Leader of a youth group running an advertising and promotion company	February 2015	
8.	MSE-08-03/15	MSEs Scheme	33	M	Leader of a youth group who runs a small cafe	March 2015	
9.	AAYF-01-11/14	AAYF	29	M	Youth activist who was founding member of AAYF and later on *Bale-Raey* Youth Association	November 2014	
10.	AAYF-02-11/14	AAYF	24	M	Yeka Sub-city District 6 AAYF chairperson and chairperson of EPRDF Basic Organization	November 2014	
11.	AAYF-03-02/15	AAYF	22	M	Kirkos Sub-city District 2 AAYF Chairperson and AAYL member	February 2015	
12.	AAYF-04-02/15	AAYF	20	F	Kirkos Sub-city District 2 AAYF Environment & Housing committee chairperson	February 2015	
13.	AAYF-05-02/15	AAYF	19	F	Kirkos Sub-city District 2 AAYF Environment & Housing committee vice-chairperson	February 2015	
14.	AAYF-06-03/15	AAYF	26	F	Yeka Sub-city District 13 AAYF member	March 2015	
15.	AAYF-07-03/15	AAYF	27	M	Yeka Sub-city District 13 AAYF member	March 2015	
16.	AAYL-01-02/15	AAYL	30	M	Former chairperson of AAYL	February 2015	
17.	AAYL-02-12/14	AAYL	27	M	Chairperson of AAYL	December 2014	
18.	AAYL-03-02/15	AAYL	29	M	Social Media Co-ordinator	February 2015	
19.	AAYL-04-02/15 (AAYF-03-02/15)	AAYL	22	M	Member and Chairperson on Kirkos Sub-city District 2 AAYF	February 2015	
20.	AAYL-05-04/15	AAYL	28	M	Yeka-Sub-city District 6 Chairperson	April 2015	
21.	BR-01-02/15 (AAYF-01-11/14)	*Bale-Raey*	29	M	Youth activist founding member of and vice-president of *Bale-Raey* who was also previously founding member of AAYF and Bole Sub-city branch	February 2015	

22.	BR-02-02/15	*Bale-Raey*	30	M	Youth activist chairperson of Yeka Sub-city *Bale-Raey* branch and also member of UDJ	February 2015	
23.	BR-03-02/15	*Bale-Raey*	28	M	Youth activist and member of Yeka Sub-city *Bale-Raey* branch executive committee	February 2015	
24.	BR-04-02/15	*Bale-Raey*	27	M	Member of *Bale-Raey*	February 2015	
25.	ZN-01-08/14	Zone Nine	29	F	Founding member of Zone Nine	August 2015	Email exchange
26.	EDP-01-11/14	Young Opposition Politicians	25	M	Opposition politician who was a candidate of his party during the 2010 national election at the age of 21	November 2014	
27.	EDP-02-12/14	Young Opposition Politicians	30	M	Opposition politician Head of Party Affairs at Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP) and MP for the 2015 election		
28.	EDP-03-03/15	Young Opposition Politicians	32	F	Opposition politician who MP candidate of her party during the 2010 national election	March 2015	
29.	UDJ-01-12/14	Young Opposition Politicians	31	M	Opposition politician formerly worked as a journalist	December 2015	He was detained for four month from Nov.2016-March 2017 for violating the State of Emergency. He never appeared before the court of law during his detention.
30.	UDJ-02-12/14	Young Opposition Politicians	27	M	Opposition politician	December 2015	
31.	UDJ-03-01/15	Young Opposition Politicians	29	M	Opposition politician and deputy public relations officer of Unity for Democracy & Justice (UDJ)	January 2015	

32.	BP-01-12/14	Young Opposition Politicians	27	M	Head of Public Relations at Blue Party and MP candidate during the 2015 election	December 2014	Resigned from his position and left the party after the election, detained during the recent protest because of Facebook posts, accused of terrorism and convicted for inciting violence using Facebook and currently serving a six years long prison sentence
33.	BP-02-12/14	Young Opposition Politicians	24	F	Head of Party Affairs at Blue Party	December 2014	She was detained for a total of 73 days during the state of emergency at a Police station (for a month) in Addis Ababa and in a military camp and released without any charge.
34.	AAYA-01-11/14	AAYA	25	F	Youth leader, chairperson of Gulelle Sub-city AAYA branch and AAYL member	November 2014	
35.	AAYA-02-11/14	AAYA	24	M	Youth leader, executive committee member of Gulelle Sub-city AAYA branch and member of AAYL	November 2014	
36.	AAYA-03-01/15	AAYA	29	F	Youth leader and President of AAYA	January 2015	
37.	AAYA-04-02/12	AAYA	26	M	Youth leader, General Secretary of AAYA and member of AAYL	February 2015	
39.	AAYA-05-02/15	AAYA	31	M	Youth leader, former President of AAYA and also former member of AAYL	February 2015	
40.	YNGO-01-12/14	Youth-led NGO	33	M	Executive Director of Youth-led NGOs' and Associations' Network	December 2014	
41.	YNGO-02-01/15	Youth-led NGO	30	M	Youth activist and program officer in a youth-led NGO	January 2015	

42.	YNGO-03-02/15	Youth-led NGO	24	F	Executive Director of Youth-led Organizations' Consortium	February 2015	
43.	YNGO-04-03/15	Youth-led NGO	30	F	Youth activist and program officer in a Youth-led NGO	March 2015	
44.	YNGO-05-03/15	Youth-led NGO	28	F	Program officer in a Youth-led NGO	March 2015	
45.	YNGO-06-03/15	Youth-led NGO	31	F	Executive Director of a Youth-led NGO	March 2015	
46.	1FGD-01-03/15	Social Media	26	M	Pro-government active social media user	March 2015	
48.	1FGD-02-03/15	Social Media	28	M	Pro-government active social media user	March 2015	
49.	1FGD-03-03/15	Social Media	33	F	Very prominent commenter on Facebook	March 2015	
50.	1FGD-04-03/15	Social Media	34	M	Neutral active social media user	March 2015	
51.	1FGD-05-03/15	Social Media	30	M	Critical to the government and active social media users	March 2015	
52.	1FGD-06-03/15	Social Media	28	F	Critical to the government and active social media users	March 2015	
53.	1FGD-07-03/15	Social Media	26	M	Pro-government active social media user	March 2015	
54.	2FGD-01-04/15	Youth politician	27	M	Blue Party	April 2015	
55.	2FGD-02-04/15	Youth politician	25	M	EDP	April 2015	
56.	2FGD-03-04/15	Youth politician	31	M	UDJ	April 2015	
57.	2FGD-04-04/15	Youth politician	33	M	EPRDF	April 2015	
59.	2FGD-05-04/15 (AAYL-04-02/15)	Youth politician	22	M	EPRDF	April 2015	
60.	2FGD-06-04/15	Youth politician	24	F	UDJ	April 2015	
61.	SO-01-MoYS-04/15	State official		M	Youth Expert at Ministry of Youth & Sports	April 2015	
62.	SO-02-MoYS-04/15	State official		M	Senior official at Ministry of Youth & Sports	April 2015	

63.	SO-03-AAMSEDA-03/15	State official		M	Public Participation officer at Addis Ababa Micro and Small-scale Enterprises Development Agency	March 2015	
64.	SO-04-AABCWYA-02/15	State official		M	Senior Advisor at Addis Ababa Bureau for Children, Women and Youth Affairs	February 2015	
65.	SM-01-11/14	Social Media	32	M	Business Consultant active social media user	November 2014	
66.	SM-02-12/14	Social Media	30	M	Activist and active social media user	December 2014	
67.	SM-03-12/14	Social Media	28	M	Law Consultant active social media user	December 2014	
68.	SM-04-02/15	Social Media	33		Social Development Consultant and prominent commentary writer on Facebook	February 2015	
69.	SM-05-02/15	Social Media	31	M	Civil Engineer and active social media user	February 2015	
70.	SM-06-02/15	Social Media	30	M	Prominent short story writer on Facebook	February 2015	
71.	SM-07-02/15	Social Media	31	M	EPRDF social media editor	February 2015	
72.	SM-08-02/15 (1FGD-06-03/15)	Social Media	28	F	Gender Activist Active social media user and	February 2015	
73.	SM-09-03/15 (1FGD-03-03/15)	Social Media	33	F	Prominent commentary and short story writer on Facebook	March 2015	
74.	Poet-01-02/15	Poet	33	M	Very Prominent author of poetry and short story books	February 2015	
75.	Poet-02-02/15	Poet	32	M	Published poet	February 2015	
76.	Poet-03-03/15	Poet	30	M	Writer, journalist and poet	March 2015	
77.	Poet-04-03/15	Poet	30	F	Published poet and leading organizer of poetry nights	March 2015	
78.	Business-01-01/15	Business owner	28	M	Software developer	January 2015	
79.	Business-02-02/15	Business owner	29	M	Café owner	February 2015	
80.	Business-03-02/15	Business owner	31	M	Carpenter	February 2015	

81.	Govt-01-02/15	Government Employee	27	F	Junior Diplomat	February 2015	
82.	Govt-02-03/15 (1FGD-07-03/15)	Government Employee	28	M	Banker and EPRDF member	March 2015	
83.	Journalist-01-01/15	Journalist	32	M	Journalist at Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation	January 2015	
84.	Journalist-02-01/15	Journalist	31	M	Journalist at Ethiopian Reporter Newspaper (Private)	January 2015	
85.	Journalist-03-02/15	Journalist	27	M	Journalist at Fana Broadcasting Corporation (Ruling party affiliated)	February 2015	
86.	Journalist-04-03/15	Journalist	32	M	Freelance Journalist for private media	March 2015	Detained during the state of emergency from November 2016 until July 2017

Appendix – II Interview Guide [Sample]

Introductory statements and instructions

- Introduction
- Indicate how long the interview will take (45mins to 1hr)
- Provide statement of confidentiality
- Confirmation of informed consent
- Check if the interviewee is happy to be recorded

A. Youth Participants

1. **Youth in MSEs**
    - 1.1 What is the main reason for your participation in the MSEs?
    - 1.2 Can you describe the process you went through to establish your business in the MSEs scheme?
    - 1.3 What were the requirements that you were expected to meet?
    - 1.4 What were your expectations from the MSEs scheme?
    - 1.5 In your opinion, do you think your expectations from the program are fulfilled?
    - 1.6 Do you think you there are benefits in participating in the MSEs scheme?
        - 1.6.1 If yes, can you mention some of the benefits?
        - 1.6.2 Are you getting these benefits?
        - 1.6.3 If yes, how they helping you achieve your personal goal?
        - 1.6.4 If no, why?
    - 1.7 Do you think there are challenges in participating in the MSEs scheme?
        - 1.7.1 If yes, can you mention some of the challenges?
        - 1.7.2 Are you facing these challenges?
        - 1.7.3 How are you dealing with these challenges?
    - 1.8 How do you describe your political engagement?
        - 1.8.1 Are you member of any political party?
        - 1.8.2 If yes, can you tell me which party?
        - 1.8.3 Can you tell me the reason for joining this political party?
        - 1.8.4 If no, do you have any plan to be a member of any political party?
    - 1.9 In your opinion, is there any relationship between political party membership and participating in the MSEs scheme?
        - 1.9.1 If yes, which party membership gets more benefits?
        - 1.9.2 If yes, which party membership gets less benefit?
2. **Youth Politicians**
    1. When did you join this political party?
    2. What is your reason for joining this political party?
    3. Do you have any specific role/responsibility in your party?

    2.1 Ruling Party Youth Politicians

    - 2.1.1 How do you describe your experience as young politician?

2.1.2 What are the opportunities of being a young politician within the ruling party?

2.1.3 What are the challenges of being a young politician within the ruling party?

2.1.4 How do you deal with the challenges?

2.1.5 Do you aspire to become a career a politician?

2.2. Opposition Youth Politicians

2.2.1 Can you share me your experience as an opposition politician?

2.2.2 What are the opportunities of being an opposition politician?

2.2.3 What are the challenges?

2.2.4 Have you experienced any of major challenge as opposition member lately?

2.2.5 How do you deal with the challenges?

2.2.6 Do you aspire to become a career politican?

3. Youth social media activists

6.1 Can you tell your reasons for being an active social media user?

6.2 Which social media platforms do you use often?

6.3 What kinds of issues do you usually post on social media?

6.3.1 Do you have specific target audience/followers when you use social media?

6.3.2 Do you have a specific purpose when you use social media?

6.4 What kinds of issues do you usually follow on social media?

6.5 In your opinion, what role do social media platforms play in Ethiopia?

6.5.1 Can you mention any positive role?

6.5.2 Can you mention any negative role?

6.6 In your opinion, do you think social medial has any political importance in Ethiopia?

6.6.1 If yes, how do you explain this political importance?

6.6.2 What is your opinion about youth social media users who use it for political purpose?

6.7 In your opinion, what are the opportunities of being an active social media user?

6.7.1 Do you see yourself benefiting from these opportunities?

6.8 In your opinion, what are the challenges of being an active social media user?

6.8.1 Do you face these challenges?

6.8.2 How do you deal with them?

4. Youth organization/association leaders

7.1 Can you tell me the objectives of your organization?

7.1.1 Do you work on socio-economic issues?

7.1.1.1 If yes, what kinds of programs do you run on socio-economic issues?

7.1.1.2 If no, can you tell the reasons?

7.1.2 Do you work on political issues?

7.1.2.1 If yes, what kinds of programs do you run on civil-political issues?

7.1.2.2 If no, can you tell the reasons?

7.2 In your opinion, what are the reasons that lead to the establishment of youth organizations?

7.3 Which reasons are behind the establishment of your organization?

7.4 In achieving your objectives, how do you work with the government?

7.4.1 In your opinion, does the government support the establishment of youth organizations?

7.4.2 If yes, what kind of supports are you aware of?

7.4.3 What are the requirements to receive support from the government?

7.4.4 Does your organization qualify?

7.4.5 Does your organization ever applied?

7.4.5.1 If successful, what was the support?

7.4.5.2 If failed, what do you think is the reason?

7.5 Where do you get most of your support (financial, technical)?

7.6 In your opinion, how do you describe the work of youth organizations in Addis Ababa?

7.6.1 What are the main opportunities for youth organizations in Addis Ababa?

7.6.1.1 How does your organization use these opportunities?

7.6.2 What are the main challenges for your organizations in Addis Ababa?

7.6.2.1 How does your organization deal with these challenges?

7.7 Are you member of any political party?

7.7.1 If yes, can you tell me which political party?

7.7.1.1 Can you tell me your reason for being member of this party?

7.7.1.2 Is there any impact on your organization's performance related to your party membership?

7.7.1.3 If yes, can you tell me what kind of impact does it have?

5. Youth journalists

8.1 Can you tell me the reasons why you become a journalist?

8.2 What are the main areas that you write about?

8.2.1 Socio-economic issues

8.2.2 Political issues

8.3 What factors influence your decision to write on these topics?

8.3.1 Is there any kind of legal/policy or institutional framework that gives you support for your journalistic work?

8.3.1.1 Was there any instance where you use them for your work?

8.3.1.2 Can you share me your experience?

8.3.2 Is there any kind of legal/policy frameworks give you a problem for your journalistic work?

8.3.2.1 Was there any instance where you were affected by them?

8.3.2.2 Can you share me your experience?

8.4 From your experience, which area is more difficult to write about as journalist?

8.4.1 Can you tell me why?
8.4.2 Do you have any experience to share with this regard?
8.5 What measure do you take if you face any challenge because of what you write?
8.5.1 Can you tell me more from your experience?
8.6 Are you member of any political party?
8.6.1 If yes, can you tell me which political party?
8.6.2 What is the reason for you to join this party?
8.6.3 How does your party membership affect your work?