CIVIC AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN

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By

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To Ammi (my mother, Sajida Latif) whom I owe everything.

Acknowledgment

To Zahra, my daughter, you were born in the first year of my Ph.D., so practically, we have done it together. Because of you, my heart was full of joy and hope in this challenging and sometimes very doubtful journey. Thank you for your presence. I am forever indebted to my husband, Muhammad Umar Nawaz Babar, for coming to this country, for your hard work, and for being with me every step of the way. Thank you for being a loving, supportive, and protective husband, and father.

Abstract

In this thesis, Pakistan's experience with nationalism is studied by highlighting the interplay of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism. This study also focuses on understanding education's role in creating a shared nationalism. This thesis has employed Gellner's well-developed argument on nationalism, his zones of nationalism to examine civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism, and his emphasis on the role of education in creating shared high culture in nation-states.

The thesis has four hypotheses. The first hypothesis argues that since the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism have been in competition with each other. The second hypothesis posits that the elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that benefit their short term self-interests. The third hypothesis maintains that elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they promote. The final hypothesis argues that education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing shared nationalism or civic nationalism in Pakistan.

This study is conducted through a historical analysis of politics and national education policies in Pakistan. Interviews of bureaucrats, politicians, school principals and teachers, and academics were conducted for primary data collection. The research is broadly based on secondary data sources. Pakistan is examined as a deviant case that simultaneously falls in Gellner's zone one, three, and five of nationalism.

This thesis has found that during different historical phases, the political and military elites in power at the national level have promoted some form of high culture. However, the formation of shared high culture has been subject to shifting focuses, and competition from folk and religious cultures. This thesis concludes that the elites promote their proposed civic nationalism at the

national level and simultaneously promote ethnic nationalism at provincial levels to secure short term self-interests. The religious elites promote religious nationalism as a political narrative. The religious-political parties form alliances with ethnic-based political parties and support military regimes to secure short term political gains. Broadly, religious nationalism has not been able to gain popular support in Pakistan.

The study finds that political, military, and religious elites have subjected national education policies to shifting focuses, reflecting the form of nationalism they were promoting at the time of policy formation. Education in Pakistan lacks standardization. The public schools, private schools, and madrassas constitute different and parallel education systems in Pakistan. Therefore, in Pakistan, national education has been unable to address socio-economic, ethnic, and religious divisions. A shared civic nationalism has not been shaped through education.

The study illuminates that zone one style civic nationalism has not been formed in Pakistan. After the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan has not fully transitioned to zone three style ethnic nationalism. Pakistan has not adopted religious nationalism. There is an ongoing competition among civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism. The deviation from the discussed zones of nationalism might suggest a need to broaden the scope of Gellner's nationalism to include other post-colonial states, where it seems that due to ethnic and religious conflicts, and colonial imprints on the education system, a shared form of nationalism has not been formed.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

ABEP	Advisory Board of Education for Pakistan
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AEPM	Academic Education and Professional Management
AIML	All India Muslim League
ANP	Awami National Party
APS	Army Public School
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
DGRE	Directorate General of Religious Education
ESR	Education Sector Reforms
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
FSC	Federal Shariat Courts
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICS	Indian Civil Services
IJI	Islami Jamhoori Ittihad
IJM	Islami Jamhoori Mahaz
ILO	International Labor Organization
INC	Indian National Congress
IPEMC	Inter-Provincial Education Minister Conference
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ITMP	Ittihad Tanzeematul Madaris Pakistan
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat-Ulama-e-Islam
JUI-F	Jamiat-Ulama-e-Islam-Fazal
JUI-S	Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam- Sami-ul-Haq
JUP	Jamiat-Ulama-e-Pakistan

KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LAMEC	Literacy and Mass Education Commission
LFO	Legal Framework Order
LOC	Line of Control
MAO College	Muhammad Anglo Oriental College
MDM	Mutahida Dini Mahaz
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MQM	Mutahida Qaumi Mahaz
NAP	National Awami Party
NAP	National Action Plan
NCC	National Curriculum Council
NCDM	National Committee for Dini Madaris
NFC	National Finance Commission
NRO	National Reconciliation Order
NSC	National Security Council
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
OSD	Officer on Special Duty
PBUH	Peace Be Upon Him
PDA	Pakistan Democratic Alliance
PIF	Pakistan Islamic Front
PMEB	Pakistan Madrassa Education Board
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League- Quaid-e-Azam
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PONM	Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

SNC	Single National Curriculum
TV	Television
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1   Introduction

Pakistan was established as a new nation-state in 1947. Pakistan came into being as a result of a struggle against colonial rule, which began with an education movement, The Aligarh Movement. The education movement later paved the way for a political movement pursuing a separate state for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent based on their separate religious identity. Pakistan is among two states in the modern world that were founded based on the religion of its people. After its establishment, being a post-colonial state with an agrarian economy, Pakistan had yet to experience transformation to urbanization and a modern industrial economy. Pakistan's experience with nationalism was shaped by the presence of conflicting ethnic identities on provincial lines and the broader identity of a Muslim state.

Modernist scholars regard nationalism as a political phenomenon responsible for providing citizens with national identity in a modern nation-state. Kohn (1944) argued that nationalism could not have existed before French Revolution. Nationalism is a modern concept and could only be experienced by modern-nation states. A modern nation-state is characterized by a democratic government, industrialization, urbanization, and secularism. Modernists like Kohn and Gellner argued that nationalism moved from West to East and was experienced differently by the different regions of the world. The West experienced civic nationalism. Nationalism in other parts of the world came in late and was challenged by social and economic underdevelopment and deep-rooted older identities (Gellner, 1964; Kohn, 1944).

I will argue that Gellner's (1964, 1983, 1997) well-developed framework of nationalism, his argument on zones of nationalism in Europe, and his Muslim zone of nationalism can best explain

the dynamics of nationalism in Pakistan. There is perhaps, a little disagreement that a stable and strong modern nation-state needs to have a shared form of nationalism that is civic in its nature and characteristics. On the other hand, a modern nation-state with more than one form of contesting nationalism on civic, ethnic, linguistic, or religious lines is likely to face challenges. Gellner argued that in modern states, the national education system planned and provided by the nation-state plays a fundamental role in building a homogeneous national culture in heterogeneous societies (Gellner, 1964, 1983, 1997).

Other scholars on the subject view that governments can formulate national identity and citizenship by imposing prescribed curricula at the primary school level (Durrani, 2007; K. Kumar & Vickers, 2015; Lall, 2008). However, it is important to understand that if the elites promote competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism, they are less likely to agree upon formulating a uniform educational discourse leading to a shared nationalism. Over the years, education policy shifts in Pakistan reflect divided focuses leading to divided ideas on shared nationalism. The study of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan can provide an enhanced understanding of Pakistan's experience with nationalism. It can also help to understand some fundamental aspects responsible for the current situation in Pakistan.

The following section provides a detailed literature review regarding the topics discussed in this research. The literature review will situate this study in a broader theoretical framework and help set out the argument for this research. In further sections, research objectives, hypotheses, methodology, and scope of the study are mentioned.

1.2   Literature Review

To answer the research questions, the literature review here covers a range of topics like nationalism, the concepts of civic and ethnic nationalism, nationalism from west to east, state

education and nationalism, nationalism with respect to Pakistan, and finally, state education and nation-building in Pakistan. To undertake the intended research in the most nuanced way, discussing the existing literature on each concept is essential.

1.2.1 Nationalism

Nationalism and nationhood have been considered among the most ambiguous and incomprehensible concepts of the nineteenth century, down to the present day (Brubaker, 1999). In the pre-modern world, human beings used to associate themselves with various identities like gender, caste, clan, class, religion, family, ethnicity, territory, city-state, and empire, but no one identity ever achieved global political recognition (Smith, 2000). Smith argued that in the modern world, people still associate themselves with multiple identities; however, nationalism has acquired significance in terms of global political recognition. He further explained that the territorial states of the present are termed national states because nations and nationalism in them have become important political phenomena (Smith, 2000).

According to Kohn, nationalism was inconceivable in the system of royal courts and their civilizations, as it is associated with the concepts of popular sovereignty, democracy, industrialization, and modern economic activity. He marked the advent of the modern state from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century when there was a revision in the status of rulers and ruled, and the growth of nationalism integrated the masses into a common political form (Kohn, 1944, pp. 3-4). Kohn referred to the nation-state as an exemplary model of political organization. He argued that being a member of a nation-state provides people with nationality and that their supreme loyalty belongs to their nationality as their welfare is made possible by the state (Kohn, 1944, p. 16).

Gellner has emphasized in his writings that in modern times, nationalism has evolved from being a psychological state of citizens to a broader political identity of belonging to a state and sharing common aspirations. Nationalism, in his view, has acquired primary political legitimacy where political and national units are harmonious. Gellner explained the evolution of nationalism as an outcome of the industrial revolution. The beginning of modern times was characterized by processes of urbanization, bureaucratization, capitalism, and secularism. He described the process by mentioning that with urbanization, mobility becomes an inevitable feature of industrial society and results in the mass migration of people from villages to cities. This required immigrants to be literate in a shared culture and language, therefore, requiring a "high" culture for a state and its society.

He further elaborated that political and national units can only be harmonious because of a high culture prevalent over other local or folk cultures (Gellner, 1964, 1983, 1997). While explaining the means to achieve high culture, Gellner mentioned that it could only be made possible by a mass-oriented standardized public education system planned and provided by the state using its resources. To him, mass public education is the only effective tool that can bind all the masses into a literate high culture and consolidate their sense of citizenship (Gellner, 1964, 1983, 1997).

Gellner's theoretical description has explained how societies have transitioned to nationalism. The nationalism Kohn and Gellner talked about is civic. However, the transition may be incomplete, leaving older ethnic and newer national identities in conflict with each other. It is important to get insight into the difference between civic and ethnic nationalism and whether different world regions have experienced or can experience a similar path of transition to the age of nationalism.

1.2.2 Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

Brubaker explains that on the one hand, nationalism has been linked with a wide range of concepts like "militarism," "war," "irrationalism," "chauvinism," "intolerance," "homogenization," "forced assimilation," "authoritarianism," "parochialism," "xenophobia," "ethnocentrism," "ethnic cleansing" and "even genocide." On the other hand, nationalism has been closely associated with phenomena like "democracy," "self-determination," "political legitimacy," "social integration," "civil religion," "solidarity," "dignity," "identity," "cultural survival," "citizenship," "patriotism," and "liberation from the alien rule" (Brubaker, 1999, p. 55). People's evaluation of nationalism depends mainly on their understanding of it; however, the most popular differentiation lies between the civic and ethnic understandings of nationalism (Brubaker, 1999, pp. 55-56). The difference between civic and ethnic nationalism is perhaps best explained by Smith in a detailed definition,

> In the civic nation, members are related through territorial birth and residence; they possess citizenship in a territorial political community and are integrated by a unified legal system and a mass public culture (usually in an official language). In the ethnic nation, members are related through myths of common descent and are distinguished from outsiders by vernacular languages and customs, traditional religions and a strong sense of native history (Smith, 2000, p. 16).

He further explained,

> In the civic nation, barriers to entry are low: it is only necessary, at least in theory, to have resided in the national territory for a prescribed period and to speak the language and adopt the culture of the nation, to become a co-national through the application of *jus soli*. Whereas in the ethnic nation, again, in theory, the barriers to entry are correspondingly high: only those born of the same ethnic 'stock' and able to trace their genealogies back to the prescribed generations can share that particular ethnic nationalism (Smith, 2000, p. 16).

The definition by Smith provides an understanding that civic and ethnic nationalism are very different from each other. However, the most significant difference lies in the fact that civic nationalism can be shaped and adopted. Whereas ethnic nationalism is a given and cannot be shaped or adopted as people belong to an ethnic identity by birth.

The distinction and definitions laid down by Brubaker and Smith help to establish that in nature and characteristics, both civic and ethnic types of nationalism are quite different. Therefore, this might lead to a situation where it is challenging for both forms of nationalism to co-exist. Or to a situation where one form of nationalism is more likely to prevail over the other. The ambiguous nature of nationalism also allows every case study an opportunity to be unique.

1.2.3   Nationalism from West to East

There is a little disagreement among the modernist scholars that nationalism originated in Europe[1] or Western Europe in particular (Gellner, 1983; Kedourie, 1960; Kohn, 1944), in the eighteenth century (Kohn, 1944) or at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Kedourie, 1960). According to Kohn, nationalism in the West, like in England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United States, and the British dominions, occurred as a political phenomenon with the formation of future national states. While outside the Western world, in politically and socially less developed regions such as Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, nationalism arose in much later stages. Nationalism there did not coincide with the existing state ideals; rather, it conflicted with the existing patterns of the state. Other than in the West, nationalism in parts of the world was rich in problems and challenges (Kohn, 1944, pp. 329-330). From Western Europe, nationalism has reached the farthest corners of the world like a tidal wave, reshaping human thought and society. Therefore, each

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[1] Anderson is an exception, he argued that nationalism originated in Central America. (Anderson, 1983)

society has experienced it with different intensities and at different times (Gellner, 1983; Kohn, 1944).

Kohn's work is fundamental in this regard. He explained civic and ethnic understandings of nationalism by distinguishing nationalism in the West and nationalism in the rest of the world, like in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia (Jaskulowski, 2010). Although Kohn never used the terms Western nationalism or Eastern nationalism, his dichotomy was produced as a difference between Western (civic) and Eastern (ethnic) nationalism (Jaskulowski, 2010). In **Two Types of Nationalism**, the author maintained a clear distinction that nationalism in the West is civic and benign. In the East, it is dangerous, prone to violence, and even ethnic cleansing (Plamentaz, 1973, as cited in Gellner, 1997).

Kellas distinguished Western nationalism as inclusive, liberal, and democratic and Eastern nationalism as exclusive, illiberal, and susceptive to authoritarian regimes (Kellas, 1998, pp. 66-76). To understand the nature and origin of nationalism Pakistan has experienced, the research here will mainly focus on Gellner's more developed framework of nationalism and his discussion of zones of nationalism.

1.2.4 Zones of Nationalism

Gellner's explanation of zones also moves from West to East, with the zones of nationalism mainly discussing the variation in forms of state and cultural bonds (Sorge, 1997). Gellner mentioned four zones within Europe, using the metaphor of marriage of state and culture, where the state is referred to as a groom and culture as a bride. Zone one is commonly referred to as Western Europe or consists of states like Portugal, Spain, France, and England. There existed a common high culture shared by both rulers and common people long before the inception of nationalism; it was not contested by any lower or folk cultures bearing local languages or regional differences. The

transition to the 'Age of Nationalism' was without serious challenges in zone one. The literati and merchants in the society had shared high culture. Therefore, political and cultural centralization was nurtured in the modern states. People in zone one only needed to be educated about how to adapt the narrative in terms of modern society, as their membership in the modern state was never in doubt (Gellner, 1997, p. 51; Sorge, 1997).

While discussing the central European states of Italy and Germany as zone two, Gellner mentioned that the region had ready a bride, a shared high culture, long before the arrival of the age of nationalism but had no history of "state-culture congruity" (Sorge, 1997). Despite the existence of notables along with literati and merchants in central Europe, a suitable ruling class was needed to take the reins of the modern state structures or to become a proper groom in metaphorical terms. The ruling class that made a state for its nation had the backing of its people as there were no complex divisions on the ethnic lines that would cause seriously divided high and low (Gellner, 1997).

Eastern Europe is discussed as the third zone. It is important to understand that the dynamics of this zone are much more complex than the previous ones. Metaphorically both bride and groom were not available (Gellner, 1997). In East Europe, neither cultural homogeneity nor national states were present (Gellner, 1997; Sorge, 1997). Eastern European societies had linguistic and cultural differences across the region and within social structures. The social world comprised of multiple low cultures, with one folk culture assuming the state's power, putting people of its ethnic group in advantageous positions over the people of other folk cultures and ethnic groups. The dominant ethnic group in power imposing its own culture as the high culture of the state and nation was constantly opposed by other folk cultures, leading to ongoing conflict within the state (Gellner, 1997). Gellner concluded that nationalism based on one state and one culture in the third zone

could only be achieved by processes like ethnic cleansing, brutal expulsion, and violence (Gellner, 1997; Sorge, 1997; Stepan, 1999, p. 221).

Thus far then, Gellner has a zone similar to civic nationalism in Western Europe, one similar to ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe, and a zone in Central Europe that turned out badly though Gellner argue that need not have been the case. Gellner discussed another zone as zone four within Eastern Europe. The region which experienced communism under the Soviet Union is discussed in this zone. He argued that nationalism did not contribute to the demise of communism in the region. Rather, the end of the Cold War and the defeat of communism in the economic sphere benefited nationalism in this region. The nature of the communist regime and its decline shaped the form of nationalism that emerged in these regions of Europe (Gellner, 1997; Sorge, 1997). However, zone four will not be a part of the broader discussion in this research study as Pakistan does not have an experience with communism.

1.2.5 Gellner's Muslim Zone

Along with the analysis of different regions of Europe in terms of zones, Gellner mentioned zone five in his book **Nationalism**. The description of zone five and the previous description of zones one to three will help explain significant aspects of Pakistan's nationalism. He started his argument with the question of how a high culture can be separated from the faith, which frequently inspired the codification of that culture (Gellner, 1997, p. 79). Islam is then explained as a fifth zone. Gellner noted a difference between rural Islam of saints and urban Islam of scholars. He further mentioned that formally Islam does not have any system of saints and saints' descendants to conduct arbitration between man and God; rather, it mainly functions with the aid of a clerisy of urban Islam who consult the Koran, the direct word of God (Abashin, 2005; Gellner, 1997). According to Mabry, Gellner divided "Islam into an urban-based, bourgeois, scripturalist and

literate version, or high Islam, and a rustic, magical and illiterate version, or low Islam" (Mabry, 1998, p. 71). However, Gellner argued that in Muslim societies the difference between high and low Islam is often negligible and the followers of both variants of Islam can co-exist. This thesis is not focusing on distinction of high and low Islam because ultimately according to Gellner high Islam accommodates followers of low Islam (Gellner, 1992, 1997).

Gellner argued that one could not possibly rely on secularism adopted by Europe or the West in general and simply choose a convenient categorization of faith to aid in formulating high culture. Suppose the elites in eastern Europe ask a question about the underdevelopment of their societies compared to the West. The answer would be in a dilemma between idealizing the West or following the ideals of their people. However, in Islam, this question about the underdevelopment of their society is asked. The answer of the clerisy or religious scholars lies in opposition to all western ideals, like liberalism, nationalism, and Marxism. In Muslim societies, the religious scholars urge to go back to the roots practiced by the Prophet and his companions. In the case of Islam, the teachings of the Koran formulate the high culture or metaphorically the bride. Faith is pre-eminent over culture, or rather dictates culture, and there is no scope for any other interpretation. Otherwise, high culture in Muslim societies is prone to face powerful opposition from religious elites. For Gellner, Islam is unique among world religions; therefore, the dynamics of cases may change when it is involved as an element (Gellner, 1997, pp. 70-84).

In zone five of Islam, Gellner explained that the dynamics are different and much more complex than in the European zones. Islam is regarded as a complete code of life; it, therefore, provides followers with a high culture through the teachings of the Koran. In a Muslim society, the Koranic culture or religious culture is the bride. The attempt to introduce any culture other than religious cultures is likely to be challenged. Islam opposes all western ideals. In the zone of Islam, the

religious culture is mandatory; therefore, the transition to the age of nationalism is less likely. Rather, it would be a transition to fundamentalism (Gellner, 1997).

Juergensmeyer (1996, p. 5) explained religious nationalism by mentioning that in modern nation-states, religious nationalists oppose "western secular nationalism." The religious nationalists tend to shape a state system based on a religious ideology where state legislation is the manifestation of divine law. In religious nationalism, a state's political order is compliant with religion, as opposed to the situation where a political system accommodates religion (Juergensmeyer, 1993, 1996). Juergensmeyer's description of religious nationalism can be regarded as similar to Gellner's fundamentalism. This thesis uses the phrase 'religious nationalism' to discuss fundamentalism, as argued by Gellner in zone five.

Pakistan is a modern Muslim nation-state. Along with civic and ethnic nationalism, the phrase religious nationalism appears well suited to study Pakistan's experience with nationalism. Gellner has used 'high culture' to characterize conditions suitable for forming civic nationalism. He mentioned competing 'folk cultures' to indicate the presence of ethnic nationalism. In line with the phrases used by Gellner, this thesis uses the expression' religious culture' to discuss the contesting religious nationalism as explained in zone five of nationalism.

The above discussion notes that Gellner's zones of nationalism and his Muslim zone are different from each other. Zone one has the attributes of civic nationalism. Zone three, dominated by contestation among folk cultures, represents ethnic nationalism. Zone five describes fundamentalism or religious nationalism. Gellner also argued that a mass-level national education system could achieve high culture. It is important to note that each zone of nationalism is

experienced by different regions of the world, which suggests that each region's experience with nationalism does not overlap with more than one type of nationalism.

This study draws on the argument from Gellner's framework of nationalism and argues that as a new nation-state, Pakistan's experience with nationalism was yet to be shaped. As a post-colonial, agrarian state with high illiteracy, a shared form of nationalism predominantly civic in nature was yet to be formulated in Pakistan. From the beginning, due to distinct ethnic and linguistic identities on provincial lines, ethnic nationalism became strong in Pakistan. The demand for a separate state was based on the religious identity of Islam, which makes religious nationalism fundamental throughout the existence of Pakistan. Moreover, as established through the above literature review, these three forms of nationalism are different and are unlikely to coexist easily. Thus in Pakistan, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism are likely to compete with each other. Therefore, in the case of Pakistan, creating a shared form of civic nationalism through national education was going to be very difficult.

To undertake the study of civic and ethnic nationalism in Pakistan, Gellner's framework of nationalism, his further explanation of different zones of nationalism, and the Muslim zone will be fundamental. It is also important to point out that Gellner argued that the states of Western Europe experienced zone one. States of Eastern Europe experienced zone three, and zone five is only experienced in Muslim countries. He did not consider the possibility of a country or multiple countries falling in more than one zone at the same time. Thus a strength of this thesis as it attempts to study Pakistan as a state that fits multiple zones of nationalism that compete with each other.

1.3 Nature and Origin of Nationalism in Pakistan

The literature review will focus on Pakistan, which emerged from a region with a long colonial experience. In 1947, Pakistan gained independence after a history of colonial rule and struggle

against it. In pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial scenarios, the nationalist environment of Pakistan had to be shaped

1.3.1 Pre- Colonial Indian Sub-continent

The Indian subcontinent was a part of the world's oldest Indus valley civilization. The region had an autonomous civilization comprising of various religions, languages, and cultural practices (Thapar, 2012). However, Hinduism had been a dominating religion of the Indian sub-continent and had predominantly shaped the region's civilization. The history of the development of the high culture of the Indian sub-continent can be usefully traced back to 711 A.D. with the first Muslim invasion of the region. The Muslim invasion necessitated the development of a shared culture after centuries of cohabitation of people from different religions (Kureishi, 1969).

The region subsequently experienced different dynastic rulers like the Ghurid and Mumluk Dynasties (1170-1290 A.D.), the Dehli Sultanate under the Khaljis and Tughluqs (1290-1390 A.D.), up until the Mughal era (1526-1761 A.D.). The Mughal dynasty formally ended in 1857 as the natives lost first war of Indian independence to the British. The year 1857 marked the establishment of British colonial rule throughout the Indian sub-continent (Cohen, 2004; Kureishi, 1969). During the Mughal era, the region had a well-developed shared high culture involving literature, arts, sciences, philosophy, a strong dynastic rule, and a fairly prosperous economy (Kureishi, 1969). Applying the modernist explanation by Gellner, the region had a shared high culture and multiple folk cultures which were not in contest with the high culture. However, not yet the conditions for modern nationalism were met as the pre-colonial era was also a pre-industrial age.

1.3.2 Colonial Rule on the Indian Sub-continent

During the colonial era, the Indian subcontinent completely reformed its entire existing system. (Cohen, 2004, p. 23). The region was under the rule of powerful foreigners. The indigenous people from different religions and folk cultures had to reshape their loyalties and attitudes according to new realities (Stephens, 1964, pp. 83-84). The British Raj sought to establish its supremacy through cultural penetration by introducing and implementing the English language and western education. The measures resulted in advantages for one group in local society, which in this case were Hindus, who readily accustomed themselves to the new ways, resulting in the marginalization of Muslims who were left with no place in the administration, education, employment, and no political standing (Cohen, 2004, pp. 22-23; Stephens, 1964, pp. 83-84).

Jaffrelot argued that the theoretical framework by Gellner can explain the situation of Muslims in the pre-partition Indian sub-continent. The Muslims of northern India initiated the Muslim separatist movement in reaction to the marginalization of Muslims due to colonialism. The Hindu intelligentsia benefited from their assimilation to the English-medium education system and the anti-Muslim bias of the British up to the late 19th century. This scenario led the Muslim political elite to use identity markers like Islam and Urdu through political organizations like the All-India Muslim League (AIML) (Jaffrelot, 2002b).

The scenario can be analyzed by pointing out that the shared high culture lost its bearing because of factors like the successful execution of the divide and rule policy on the heterogeneity of folk cultures of the Indian sub-continent (Waseem, 2014). The situation placed British rulers at the top and enabled communities collaborating with British rule to access better education and civil and administrative jobs. On the other hand, communities not in close collaboration with British rule found themselves marginalized and disadvantaged in every aspect of social life, such as education,

economy, and employment. The penetration of foreign rule and foreign culture, the consequent undermining of the shared high culture and the disparities among local groups paved the way for highly divided folk cultures, creating a constant state of struggle both among the groups representing different cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic identities and against foreign rule. This led Muslims to use religion and language as differentiating marks to construct a nationalist Muslim identity mainly under the representation of the All-India Muslim League (AIML) established in 1906.

In anticipation of decolonization, Indian National Congress (INC) promoted Indian nationalism. According to INC, all natives of the Indian sub-continent, irrespective of religion, caste, colour, and ethnicity, form an Indian nation. The demand for a separate nation-state for Indian Muslims constituted the foundation of Muslim nationalism under colonial rule. All-India Muslim League opposed Indian nationalism in favour of Muslim nationalism. Gellner (1992) explained that Islam provided national identity to the Muslims, specially during the struggle against colonialism. Gellner elaborated, "the modern Muslim 'nation' is often simply the sum-total of Muslims on a given territory" (Gellner, 1992, p. 15). The demand for an independent Muslim nation-state under colonial rule and Gellner's distinction of the modern Muslim nation provide an understanding that Muslim nationalism is broadly associated with the notion of a sovereign nation-state of the Muslims.

In 1941, Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), along with like-minded religious scholars, founded a religious-political party by the name of the Jamaat -e- Islami (Islamic Party) (Bahadur, 1977; Kaul, 2002). Mawdudi was a religious scholar of Islam. After completing his education at a Madrasa (Islamic Seminary), he pursued a career in writing and journalism (S. V. R. Nasr, 1996). Beginning in 1918, Mawdudi wrote about religion and politics on the Indian sub-continent

opposing colonialism, and by 1930 his writings on Islam displayed an undoubted inclination towards finding sources of power in Islam manifested in the Koran to achieve Muslim revivalism in modern times (S. V. R. Nasr, 1996).

Bahadur (1977) argued that Mawdudi had always opposed the stance of the Muslim League and viewed the western-educated, modernist leadership of the Muslim League as incapable of serving Muslim interests in the true spirit of Islam. In the view of Mawdudi, Muslim nationalism propagated by the Muslim League was different from Islamic nationalism as only the latter serves the concept of the Muslim Ummah (nation) beyond territorial boundaries (Bahadur, 1977, pp. 36-41; Kaul, 2002). Alavi mentioned that,

> The Pakistan Movement was a movement of Muslims rather than of Islam; a movement in which diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions, representing different social strata and interests were allied in pursuit of quite material objectives (Alavi, 1988, p. 67).

Bajwa (2020) argued that the religious elite often misunderstood the demand of a state for Muslims with Islamic state. Since the establishment of Pakistan, the disagreement on whether Pakistan should be a modern Muslim or a religious nation-state has caused constant contestation between the religious and political elites. Thus, even before the establishment of Pakistan, Muslim nationalism promoted by the founding political elite was contested in favor of religious nationalism by the religious elite.

1.3.3 The Post-Colonial Indian Sub-continent

Hindus and Muslims of the Indian sub-continent had different experiences with colonial rule, which shaped their different political orientation during and after the struggle for independence. In 1929, the Indian National Congress demanded an independent state of India. Subsequently, the Muslim League stressed that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations. Therefore, they

emphasized that Muslims cannot survive in post-colonial Hindu-dominant India. By 1940, a historic Pakistan Resolution emerged as a full-fledged demand for a separate independent nation-state for Muslims (Cohen, 2004, p. 29; Khalid B. Sayeed, 1968, p. 101).

The western educated and modernist leadership of the Muslim League demanded a separate state based on their separate identity as Muslims. The high culture aspired to by the Muslim political elite was not purely Islamic but rather an amalgamation of modern political trends with complete freedom to practice religion without any fear or repercussions (Bahadur, 1977; Cohen, 2004). Jamaat -e- Islami did not support the demand for a separate nation-state for Muslims by the Muslim League (Bahadur, 1977; Kaul, 2002; S. V. R. Nasr, 1996). Mawdudi explained Jamaat's stance by arguing that the Muslim League intended to establish a state on the pattern of the western democratic system of government. However, the demand and establishment of any such state were unacceptable as it was not aimed at establishing an Islamic government based on Sharia law and the Koran (Bahadur, 1977, pp. 36-41). Another religious-political party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) (Party of Scholars of Islam), was established in 1945. This party supported the demand for Pakistan but emphasized that the new state of Pakistan must adopt an Islamic form of government. JUI continued its demand for an Islamic form of government after the establishment of Pakistan (Bahadur, 1977, p. 52).

Colonial rule ended on the Indian sub-continent with the establishment of two independent nation-states, India and Pakistan (Khalid B. Sayeed, 1968). The partition was marked by the greatest migration in modern human history, communal riots, and mass killings (Greenberg, 2004). Pakistan emerged on the world map with the serious challenge of state and nation-building from scratch (Jahan, 1972; Kureishi, 1969). Rupert Emerson argued that even after the establishment of Pakistan as an independent state, "there was no such thing as a Pakistani nation" (Emerson, 1967,

p. 92). While explaining the crisis in political development, Pye argued that for societies of Asia and Africa to become modern nation-states, identity crisis was embedded in their future, as in new states, the smaller identity of belonging to a tribe, ethnicity, or language competes with the newly acquired broader national identity (Pye, 1966, pp. 62-67).

Jahan argued that language, cultural and ethnic factors do not play a cohesive role in producing a singular nationalism; instead, they determine the differences among various groups within the same state. Therefore, the greatest challenge for the political leadership in the states of Asia and Africa is to forge stronger civic attachments to create a broader national identity superior to the other smaller identities (Jahan, 1972).

The situation in Pakistan was no different. Religiously the people were Muslims, but territorially they were Indians. Regionally they were Punjabis, Pathans, Balochis, Sindhis, and Bengalis with their own distinct folk cultures, languages, heritage, and outlook with the strong instinct of preserving their own identity and folk cultures against the domination of others (Kureishi, 1969, p. 27). Jahan highlighted that Pakistan had various subnational groups. At the same time, one or two sub-nations of Punjabis and Muhajir (the migrants) from northern and western India, with their early experience with modern trends, dominated the civil and military bureaucracies, political power, and the economic sphere. The situation left a relatively larger ethnocultural subgroup of Bengalis in Pakistan with little or no representation in these sectors (Jahan, 1972, pp. 5-6; Kabir, 1987).

The scenario in newly established Pakistan can be studied with the framework discussed by Gellner in zone three, where he discussed Eastern Europe. The experience with colonialism and the powerful presence of folk cultures undermined the possibility of high culture in Pakistan from

18

the very beginning. Powerful provincial political elites representing folk cultures across regional and social structures like Sindh, Bengal, Balochistan, and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), demanded maximum autonomy and even a separate state from the time of the establishment of Pakistan and through the years to come. The central government of the dominant folk culture of the province of Punjab, governing over others, further undermined the process of nation-building (Jaffrelot, 2002b, pp. 16-32).

Gellner mentioned that the intelligentsia in such circumstances, on both sides of the cultural divide, mobilize people over feelings of resentment and deprivation. The mobilization leads people to make demands for their nation-states, creating new nations seeking their own states (Gellner, 1964, 1983). Pakistan experienced the establishment of a sovereign state of Bangladesh in 1971 as the result of the disintegration of one of its provinces which was singled out based on its folk culture and linguistic identity and was denied its due role in the government after the 1970s elections (Jahan, 1972, pp. 185-205).

In newly established Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), under Mawdudi's leadership, emerged as a leading religious-political party. JI stated its vision that, as Pakistan had been established in Islam's name, the state should form a truly Islamic constitution in letter and spirit (Bahadur, 1977, pp. 78-87). Subsequently, Jamaat-e-Islami strongly opposed the ethnic nationalism propagated by Bengalis and supported military efforts to stop the disintegration of East Pakistan as a separate state in 1971 (I. Khalid, 2014). To this day, Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, and other religious-political parties play a significant role in Pakistan's politics by being part of coalition governments or staying on opposition benches in parliament. Active participation in national politics has enabled religious-political parties to influence and oppose government policymaking

(Cohen, 2004). However, they have never won a majority of seats to form a government of their own and establish an Islamic form of government based on religious culture and Sharia law.

The above discussion suggests that the Muslim political elite behind Pakistan Movement struggled for a modern Muslim nation-state. Religious elites opposed the demand for Pakistan as they claimed that Pakistan was not demanded with the purpose of making it a truly Islamic nation-state. The religious elite emphasizes religious culture as Pakistan's high culture. Soon after the establishment, politics in Pakistan was dominated by contestation on ethnic lines. Ethnic nationalism was consolidated as folk cultures opposed the domination of one folk culture in power. The situation has left Pakistan with no high culture or proper bride and three types of contesting nationalism on civic, ethnic, and religious lines.

1.4   Definition of Elite and Categorization in the Context of Pakistan

The study attempts to examine competition among civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism through the role of elites. Therefore, it is important to define elites and identify them in the context of Pakistan and the study. Higley and Burton defined *political elites* as "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 13). This definition is further clarified by drawing a comparison with Mills's description of a "Power Elite." He argued that power is concentrated among three types of elites, categorized as the political elite, military elite, and economic elite in a state (Domhoff, 2006; Mills, 1956). Higley and Burton further argued that power, or the ability to influence political outcomes, is not just limited to these three groups of elites. But also include "top position holders in parties, professional associations, trade unions, media, interest groups, religious groups, and other powerful and hierarchically structured organizations and socio-political movements" (Higley & Burton, 2006, p. 13). The definition of

political elite by Higley and Burton can be regarded as broad in scope. It can be of more utility in understanding where power lies in contemporary states rather than as a conceptual tool.

Asaf Hussain (1976) perhaps provided a comprehensive view of elites in Pakistan. He argued that factors like the colonial past, distinct ethnic identities, religious identity, and industrialization had constituted a set of elites in Pakistan who compete for political power and influence. Hussain argued that between 1947 to 1971, political power in Pakistan was exercised by six elite groups, "military elites, bureaucratic elites, religious elites, landowning elites, industrial elites, and professional elites" (Asaf Hussain, 1976, pp. 224-225).

Hussain explained that military and bureaucratic elites were the most powerful in the formative phase due to their colonial administrative experience and the establishment of direct military rule in 1958. The role of religious elites declined as the military elite of modernist orientation came to power at the national level through military coups, starting with General Ayub Khan in 1958. The landowning elite became career politicians with the emergence of Bhutto and his political party, joined by landowners turned politicians. He categorized industrial elites and professional elites as emergent elites and argued that the future power base would be concentrated in emergent elites (Asaf Hussain, 1976).

Hussain's prediction can be regarded as true as an industrialist turned politician, Nawaz Sharif, became the country's Prime Minister in the 1990s. Many businessmen actively participated in electoral politics by joining his political party (Lieven, 2011). Regarding the role of professional elites, Pakistan witnessed the Movement for the Restoration of Judiciary (2007-2008) by lawyers; the Movement was significant in ending General Musharraf's military regime (Z. S. Ahmed & Stephan, 2009; Phelps, 2009; Seher Shafqat, 2018). Moreover, the unprecedented role of media as

a political watchdog in the last two decades can also be regarded as an example of professional elites (Gul & Ali, 2017; N. Hussain, 2012).

Shoukat, Gomez, and Cheong (2017) built on the categorization of elites by (Asaf Hussain, 1976). They argued that, at least in the case of Pakistan, elites pursue self-interests rather than national interests. They both collude and contest with each other to protect their self-interest. They argued that in 1947 the self-interests of elites favoured the formation of an independent state. In 1971, the West Pakistan elite, which included the military elite, bureaucratic elite, and landowners turned politicians colluded with elite groups of similar nature in East Pakistan and sought the breakup of the nation-state as the best way to share power.

Aasim Sajjid Akhtar, Asha Amirali, and Muhammad Ali Raza (2006) argued that from 1979 onwards, with the initiation of General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, the religious elite restored their power by formulating coalitions with the military elite in power. Together, they have resorted to the instrumental use of Islam. Thus, there has been the development of an alliance between religious and military elites. Over the years the religious elites have aided the survival of military regimes in Pakistan.

For this thesis, I am drawing on the usage of the term elite from Higley and Burton. They argued that elites are those who can significantly affect political outcomes due to their position of influence. For types of elites, I draw on Domhoff's categorization of three fundamental elites, political elite, military elite, and economic elite. This research study will focus on political elites who exercise power by being in government or opposition at the national or the provincial level. Military elites command armed forces and intelligence agencies and have governed the country by declaring martial law. However, for this research study, economic elites are considered those who

also participate in politics as then they would be in the position to affect nationalism and national education policymaking in Pakistan. Therefore, the economic elite may not be mentioned separately but with political elites.

This thesis will use Akhtar, Amirali, and Raza's argument on the religious elite in Pakistan. The religious elite often becomes part of government coalitions and supports the continuation and consolidation of parliamentary and military forms of government. Then as discussed by Hussain and Shoukat, Gomez, & Cheong, in Pakistan, elites pursue self-interest over national interests. They compete for power and influence. The phrase 'short term' is used in view of Pakistan's sustained political instability and recurrent military coups. The political instability may lead the political, military, and religious elite to seek what benefits them personally and immediately. These short term benefits may include gaining or enhancing power before national and provincial elections, securing governments at least at the provincial level, and attempting to secure influential positions in the political or military regime. The pursuit of short term self-interests may mean long-term efforts focused on shaping a shared form of nationalism may not be prioritized. Rather shifting preferences toward promoting different forms of nationalism may evolve as common practice.

Thus, this research analyses three main elites: - political elites, military elites, and religious elites who primarily pursue short term self-interests. I argue that the elites, by virtue of their positions, are able to promote all three types of nationalism, civic, ethnic, and religious. However, as they primarily promote their short-term self-interest, they choose from civic, ethnic, or religious nationalism, whichever best serves them in their current circumstances.

1.5   State Education and Nationalism

Another important pillar in Gellner's theory of nationalism is the role of education. Literacy is the minimum requirement for full citizenship in modern society (Gellner, 1964, p. 159). The educational machinery coded with specific characteristics like language and values creates a greater possibility that its products will share a reasonable amount of resemblance to each other compared to the products of any other rival educational machinery embedding a different language or values (Gellner, 1964, pp. 159-160). Gellner argued that establishing a national education system by the state is an effective way to create mass nationalism in heterogeneous societies. Only state-planned and sponsored education on the national level has the resources and potential to be instrumental in creating shared language and culture. It enables the indoctrination of high culture among people with diverse linguistic, ethnic, and cultural associations (Gellner, 1964, 1983, 1997).

According to Benei, Gellner associates modernization with industrialization and secular nationalism, which makes the division of labour and shared culture essential for the working of this system. At the same time, schooling at the primary level plays a fundamental role in creating a homogenous culture for a state. (Benei, 2005) In accordance with this theoretical explanation, all nation-states have developed and implemented policies to promote mass-level elementary education to various extents (Le Thanh Khoi, 2001, as cited in Benei, 2005).

Lall (2008) asserted that governments can formulate identity discourse through their educational frameworks and imposed curricula at the primary school level. Durrani (2007) established that schools play a fundamental role in formulating national identity for a state. In most states, educational systems are considered a major tool in building national identity and citizenship (Kumar, 2001, as cited in Benei, 2005). K. Kumar and Vickers (2015) view that prescribed curricula in modern school textbooks are designed to fulfil the task of identity-building.

The National Education Policy of 2009, the current national education policy of Pakistan, mentioned that,

> The imperative of uniformity in Pakistan's educational system flows from the Constitution of Pakistan, which entrusts the State with the responsibility of organizing an equitable and effective education system, with an aim to enhance the overall well being of Pakistanis. The national educational systems in different countries have evolved with the State in such a way that they appear to flow from each other. That is the reason modern States have one educational system, customarily called the 'national educational system'. No other system in a State, except the national educational system, shares the ideals, objectives, and purposes of a State (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, p. 10).

The National Education Policy of 2009 further mentions that,

> As the national educational systems also evolve as a response to the particular demands of distinct ethnic, social, economic, religious, political groups and communities, there is always room for diversity. This diversity can lend strength to the educational outcomes, especially in a federation like Pakistan, if this does not work at cross purposes with the uniformities, which any national system would need to retain its uniformity and to be able to offer a national response to challenges,… (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, p. 10).

The National Education Policy of 2009 highlighted that "the new National Education Policy supports the reflection of local cultures through curricula" (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, p. 10). However, the National Education Policy of 2009 emphasizes that state-designed uniformity disseminated through national education must prevail over distinct ethnic, social, political, economic, and religious considerations (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009). The national education policy statements indicate that the government designates national education as fundamental for shaping shared civic nationalism. The statements in Pakistan's current national education policy document demonstrate similarities with Gellner's argument on the role of education in shaping shared civic nationalism. Therefore, this study focuses on the significance of

Gellner-style civic nationalism within the context of pluralism which is considered suitable for states with distinct ethnic, religious, social, and political orientations.

Keeping in view the above arguments, it is fair to tentatively conclude that the construction of modern society is incomplete without working educational machinery at the nation-state level. Education plays a fundamental role in building a national identity for a nation-state. Therefore, studying the role of state education is essential to determine the dynamics of nationalism in a nation-state. In the case of Pakistan, the role of education has been significant since before its establishment as an independent state.

1.5.1   State Education on the Indian Subcontinent

On the pre-colonial Indian subcontinent, the society had a well-established literary culture developed through Patshalas, Maktabs, and Madrassas under the administration and sponsorship of the Mughal Empire (Chandio, Jafri, & Ansari, 2015; K. Kumar & Vickers, 2015; Kureishi, 1969). Pre-colonial India's traditional education institutes were known as Patshalas, Maktabs, and Madrassas. During the colonial era, the British Raj systematically aimed to achieve cultural penetration through educational machinery (Cohen, 2004). In 1835, as the first Law Member in the Governor General's Council of India, Thomas Macaulay presented a Minute on Indian Education, where he highlighted the goals of the education system in the Indian subcontinent. He explained his agenda by stating, "We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect" (Macaulay, 1835).

Edmund King argued that Macaulay's minute had a great influence "throughout the British Empire, from Hong Kong to Gambia"(King, 1968, as cited in London, 2006, p. 45). Even before

26

Macaulay, Charles Grant, in 1796, had argued that competence in the English language could be a perfect resolve for the "disorders of Asiatic peoples" (Trautmann, 1997, as cited in London, 2006, p. 46). Macaulay's minute was convincing in its recommendations to policymakers that treating English as the cornerstone of the educational project would ensure the reinforcement of British "ideas relating to race, culture, politics, and economics" (London, 2006, p. 47). Hunter, in his book *The Indian Musalmans* (Muslims), explained that,

> The Muslims had a well-established educational system in Indian subcontinent although inferior than [sic] the system that we established later on but adequate enough to give them political, administrative and intellectual power in society. However, we continued to use their system for seventy-five years for producing officers to carry out administration for us. Meanwhile, we introduced a scheme of public instruction of our own; as soon as we trained up a generation of men on the new plan we flung aside the old Muhammadan system and the Musalman (Muslim) youth found every avenue of public life closed to their faces (Hunter, 1871, as cited in Haque, 1975, p. 274).

The statement indicates that an established educational system on the Indian subcontinent was replaced by the system of education introduced by the British which proved to be disadvantageous for the Muslims of that time.

The origin of Pakistan's nationalism can be traced to the Aligarh Movement, an educational movement that aimed to encourage Muslims to take part in modern education system under the colonial rule. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan laid down the foundation of this movement with the firm belief that the Muslims could only progress if they adopted a modern education system and cooperated with the British government (Haque, 1975). The Aligarh Movement started by establishing a primary school named Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875. The institute became a college in 1877 and was upgraded to Aligarh Muslim University in 1920 (Ruswan, 1997).

An All-India Muhammadan Educational Conference was founded in 1886 to impart modern education to Muslims, accompanied by religious education. The conference emphasized loyalty to British rule and abstention from politics until the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent acquired modern education (A. R. Khan, 2001). The 20th session of the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference laid down the foundation of a political party, the All India Muslim League, in 1906 (A. R. Khan, 2001; Usmani, 2018). In 1940, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, through the Muslim League's platform, widely emphasized that the Muslims of India are not just a religious community. Rather, they are a nation. His emphasis received greater recognition after the overwhelming victory of Muslim seats by the Muslim League in the 1946 Indian provincial elections, which eventually led to the establishment of an independent nation-state, Pakistan (Gilmartin, 1998).

Education has always played a significant role in shaping a society's outlook. The literary culture established by the Mughal Empire on the Indian subcontinent successfully manifested a high culture in the pre-industrial age. Subsequently, British rule reshaped the Indian subcontinent's culture favouring English values through their education policies. The resistance against British rule was also planned by formulating and executing a modern education system. The Aligarh Movement equipped a marginalized group from the local population with a modern education and political trends, which enabled them to strive for a separate identity as a nation and even a separate nation-state on the post-colonial Indian subcontinent.

1.5.2   State Education and Nation-Building in Pakistan

As a newly established state, the development and consolidation of the idea of Pakistani nationhood proved to be one of the most challenging tasks for the formative governments (Jahan, 1972; Kureishi, 1969). The Indian sub-continent had a well-established primary and secondary educational system under British rule (Cohen, 2004). However, Pakistan inherited relatively

backward regions in almost all respects. At the time of establishment, the illiteracy rate was 85%, and Pakistan had only two universities, one in Lahore and one in Dacca, with most of the primary and secondary education institutes situated in Lahore and a few in Karachi (Bengali, 1999b; Cohen, 2004; Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, 1975). It is also important to keep in mind that the functioning of existing schools, colleges, and universities at that time was largely dependent on Hindu teachers and was disrupted by the massive migration of Hindu staff members to India (Cohen, 2004, p. 236; Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, 1975, p. 37).

Pakistan's First Educational Conference, held in 1947, recommended universal and compulsory primary education and improvement in quality, though the state did not take any decisive steps in this direction. Rather education and health received low priority in the state's budget (Cohen, 2004, p. 236). To undertake the task of nation-building through education, Pakistan had multiple challenges like building infrastructure, training a workforce to inculcate knowledge, ensuring access to education in all parts of the country, and developing an inclusive educational narrative.

On March 21, 1948, while addressing a public gathering in Dacca, Jinnah highlighted provincialism as a curse and urged to give up provincialism. He explained that Pakistanis were all Muslims and now belonged to a nation, and no other identity should matter. Pakistan did not belong to a Punjabi, or a Pathan, or a Sindhi, or a Bengali; it belonged to the people of Pakistan (Jinnah, 1948).

Saigol (2015) focused on civic education and state nationalism in Pakistan and argued that, like most modern states, the government in Pakistan also relies upon schooling to create a shared sense of citizenship among its population. She discussed Pakistan's case by mentioning that the two-nation theory at the time of the establishment of Pakistan was perceived with the vision that

religion would be a sufficient binding force for the people of the state. However, the notion that the oneness of the Pakistani nation is ensured by religion is seriously challenged by the powerful existence of linguistic and ethnic nationalism. The disintegration of East Pakistan in 1971 was purely based on linguistic and ethnic differences, and the ongoing Baloch, Pakhtun, and Sindhi nationalisms are fundamentally based upon language and ethnic differences (Saigol, 2015).

Saigol argued that the controversial divisions in Pakistan's society have made the nation-building task of the education system extremely difficult. It requires simultaneous renunciation of local identities at linguistic, ethnic, and regional levels while shaping Pakistani identity at the national level evenly across Pakistan (Saigol, 2015). The military regime took measures in the initial years, as *"The Report of the Commission on National Education"* in 1959 highlighted the constant challenge of provincialism, linguistic, ethnic, and regional divisions. The report suggested that such challenges could be dealt with by formulating a national narrative by the state and inculcation through the school-level education system (S M Sharif, 1959).

The dilemma of post-colonial states lies in the thrust between a pluralistic society and a monolithic state; Pakistan is no different in this regard. Ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity makes it highly pluralistic, while the political elites in power at the national try to achieve a monist state, mainly emphasizing religion (Saeed Shafqat, 2017). According to Rashid and Shaheed, Pakistan came into being as religiously homogeneous while ethnically and culturally diverse (Rashid and Shaheed, 1993, as cited in Durrani, 2007). However, this argument about religious homogeneity can be regarded as overgeneralized. There existed deep divisions between modernist and religious interpretations of Islam even before the establishment of Pakistan. Powell argued that in post-colonial states like India and Pakistan, characterized by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and sectarian diversities, a historical narrative designed for the formulation of national cohesion can be

manipulated by the political leadership in favour of their own version of citizenship, which does not necessarily accommodate the internal diversity of the state (Powell, 1996).

The above literature review identifies that the formation of Pakistan's civic nationalism through education was challenged by the state's underdeveloped education infrastructure and the minimal priority given to national education in the budget during the formative years. During the formative years, provincialism was identified as a threat to Pakistani nationalism. Religious identity was regarded as fundamental in the civic nationalism of Pakistan. However, national education has been unable to address internal divisions along ethnic lines, and the emphasis on religious identity has not been effective enough in shaping civic nationalism in Pakistan. Drawing on Powell, it is important to note that in the post-colonial states with diverse ethnic and religious identities, the formation of shared civic nationalism can be manipulated by the political elites.

1.5.3   National Education Policy Formulation in Pakistan

It is helpful to understand how national education policies are formulated in Pakistan. Historically, the formal process for formulating a comprehensive national education policy starts with the prime minister's or the president's directive, depending on the parliamentary or military form of government. The order to form national education policy then goes to the Federal Ministry of Education, headed by the Federal Minister of Education, who can be a member of the political elite or military elite, depending on regime type. Each ministry is headed by an administrative head, a senior federal-level bureaucrat. With the approval of the prime minister or the president, the federal education ministry forms a national commission or a national council (T. Bashir & Shami, 2007; G. o. Pakistan, 2022).

The nature and composition of a national commission for education policy formulation have been largely similar over the years. The national commission for education policy contains civil servants from federal and provincial ministries of education, representation from the political, military, and religious elite, college and university professors, vice-chancellors of universities, and international and national experts on education, curriculum, and development (Aly, 2007; G. o. Pakistan, 2020; S M Sharif, 1959). During the preparation of the White Paper on Education in 2007, which led to the formation of the currently in place National Education Policy of 2009, suggestions were gathered from a wide range of stakeholders like parents, teachers, local bodies, private schools, journalists, and vocational education institutes (Aly, 2007; T. News, 21 December 2020). The composition of the national commission on education indicates that the process of national education policy formulation has sought participation and input from national, provincial, and religious stakeholders. However, it is unclear how or to what extent suggestions by stakeholders are incorporated into the national education policy.

After the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010, national education in Pakistan was devolved to the provinces. Before the 18th amendment, education was a federal subject. The amendment enables provincial governments to formulate and implement independent education policies through provincial education ministries, which means Pakistan could have different education policies for each province. However, more than a decade after the amendment, no province had undergone the formulation of an independent education policy. Pakistan still has one national education policy, last formulated in 2009. Given the discussion, it is understood that national education policies are formulated through national commissions, which are formed on the directive of prime ministers or presidents.

Pakistan has witnessed seven national education policies in seven decades since its establishment. The first formal education policy was formulated in 1959 during the military regime of General Ayub Khan. The second policy was announced in 1970 during a brief military regime of General Yahya Khan. The elected government of Bhutto announced the third education policy in 1972. After taking over the government in 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq announced the fourth education policy in 1979. The fifth education policy was announced during the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in 1992. During Nawaz Sharif's second term as Prime Minister, a sixth national education policy was announced in 1998. In the early 2000s, the policy guidelines for the seventh national education policy were formulated during the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf. His regime ended in 2008, and the policy was formally announced in 2009. The national education policy of 2009 is currently followed as a formal policy, but an up-gradation was announced in 2018 as the Single National Curriculum. It is important to note here that the formation of a national education policy has coincided with regime change in Pakistan over the years. This study will analyze the politics and formation of national education policies to understand the impact on the formation of civic nationalism through education in Pakistan.

It is also important to note here that the economic elite does not directly participate in national education policy formulation unless they are also political elite through joining politics. Therefore, the economic elite will not be included in the detailed discussion made in this thesis. It is essential to mention that education policymaking is a continuous process undertaken by the bureaucracy at the federal and provincial education ministries. However, this study is focused on the political, military, and religious elites' approach towards national education policymaking which is done primarily through national commissions. This study will analyze the national education policy documents, white papers, and pre-policy documents. With regime change in Pakistan, the

education policy focus at the bureaucratic level also shifts according to the prime minister or president's directive. Therefore, the role of federal and provincial-level bureaucrats in national education policy formation is not discussed in this thesis. Rather the policies reflecting the orders of the political, military, and religious elites will be discussed.

1.6   Research Objectives

The main objective of the research is to study the origin and unique nature of nationalism in Pakistan. The thesis aims to analyse the civic, ethnic, and religious dynamics of nationalism in Pakistan. The thesis attempts to examine the role of the political, military, and religious elites primarily driven by their short-term self-interest in promoting different types of nationalism. It also aims to study the role of education in shaping civic nationalism in Pakistan over the years.

1.7   Hypotheses

Hypotheses are statements the researcher makes at the beginning of a research study. The researcher's observation, preliminary research, and literature review form the basis of the hypotheses. Usually, a tentative phenomenon or sometimes conclusions about the study are explained through hypotheses (J. B. Johnson, Reynolds, & Mycoff, 2015; McNabb, 2010). In political science research, a single hypothesis may not be simply consisting of explicitly identifiable independent and dependent variable but rather, there often exist two or more variables because more than one phenomenon is usually needed to fully grasp a political behaviour (J. B. Johnson et al., 2015, pp. 106-109). Range of phenomenon discussed in this thesis are three forms of nationalism, role of elites in shaping and promoting civic, ethnic, or religious nationalism and elite behaviour primarily focused on securing short term self-interests, and national education policies.

Forms of hypothesis common in political science research are associated or correlational and directional. Associated or correlational hypotheses explain two or more variables but do not specify the nature of the relationship, like which variable produces what outcome. In the associated hypothesis, the nature of the relationship between variables is identified during the research. Directional or predictive hypotheses establish a proportional relationship between two variables that is if 'X increases so does Y and if X decreases so does Y' (J. B. Johnson et al., 2015, pp. 113-114; McNabb, 2010).

Multiple hypotheses of different characteristics as discussed above are used in this thesis.

Hypothesis 1: *Since 1947 civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan have been in competition with each other.*

Hypothesis one is drawn from Gellner's argument on nationalism. The literature review determines that civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism are different from each other. In the first hypothesis, three different types of nationalism are taken or presumed as the independent variable. This thesis intends to highlight an interplay of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan since 1947. The stated hypothesis has the potential to be falsified based on the analysis of the interplay of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism, which may reveal that different forms of nationalism do not necessarily compete. Therefore, competition or its absence is the presumed dependent variable.

Gellner discussed the process of transition to the age of nationalism and regarded high, low, or folk cultures as fundamental in shaping a state's experience with nationalism. The first hypothesis intends to assess the origin and nature of high, folk, and religious cultures or the origin of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan.

***Hypothesis 2:** Through different historical phases to this day, elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that benefit their short term self-interests.*

Hypothesis two can be taken as an example of associated or correlational hypotheses. Hypothesis two is derived from two different political phenomena. First is Gellner's framework on nationalism, where he argued that civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism are different, and different zones have experienced different forms of nationalism. The second political phenomenon is drawn through the literature on the role of elites who have the power to promote a preferred form of nationalism and elite behaviour, which has the potential to vary depending on the circumstances.

In principle, hypothesis two could have been two different hypotheses. One would be that elites in Pakistan promote three different forms of nationalism; the second would be that elites promote nationalism in ways that benefit their short term self-interests. However, this thesis studies Pakistan's experience with nationalism by combining Geller's argument on nationalism and the above-mentioned literature review on the elites. Therefore, this leads to one complex hypothesis with multiple variables: elites promoting different forms of nationalism (as set out in hypothesis one), and potentially varying elite behaviour, with the variation based on short and long term interests. The discussion in the following chapters will specify which variable produces which outcome.

***Hypothesis 3:** Elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting.*

Hypothesis three can be taken as an example of a directional hypothesis. Hypothesis three is derived by combining Gellner's argument that the national education system plays a fundamental role in shaping a shared form of nationalism in a nation-state and the literature review on the role of political, military, and religious elites who influence education policymaking in Pakistan. The promotion of preferred nationalism forms the first variable, whereas the respective influence on the national education policy forms the second variable in the third hypothesis.

The third hypothesis is linked to hypothesis two. Based on the analysis reached while examining questions related to hypotheses one and two, the discussion in each chapter will then attempt to discover whether elites promoting competing nationalisms promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism through national education policies.

Hypothesis 4: *Education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan.*

Hypothesis four is also a directional hypothesis. The above-discussed literature review maintains that Pakistan has experienced seven national education policies over seven decades of its establishment. Each national education policy has coincided with the change of government in Pakistan. Whereas Gellner argued that state-sponsored national education shapes shared nationalism. Perhaps, frequently changing national education policies may not produce the outcome, Gellner posited. Therefore, in view of frequently changing national education policies in Pakistan and Gellner's argument on the role of national education in shaping shared nationalism, hypothesis four of this thesis is drawn. The nature of national education policies, which have changed frequently, form a complex variable that must be assessed holistically. The outcome may be causing sustained internal diversities and non-formation of civic nationalism, which also must be assessed a complex variable.

In Pakistan, divided ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities constitute internal diversities. In the backdrop of politics dominated by the short term self-interests of elites, hypothesis four intends to assess the policy preferences adopted over the years. What has been the focus of the government's national education policies, and why have these policies been unable to formulate a shared civic nationalism.

1.8   Methodology

1.8.1   Research Methods

This research will use qualitative research methods to study Pakistan's experience with nationalism. As defined by Denzin and Lincoln (2011) "qualitative research involves an interpretive and naturalistic approach to the word." Denzin and Lincoln further explained that qualitative research is applied to understand and explain events, phenomena, or occurrences as they evolve in their natural setting and impact people as they experience them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Hennink, Hutter, and Bailey (2011) highlighted that qualitative research methods enable researchers to examine and explain how people's behaviours are shaped by their social, economic, cultural, and physical experiences. Qualitative research methods are advantageous where detailed descriptions regarding identifiable local contexts are needed. Qualitative data is also valuable for maintaining chronological flows, which help highlight cause and effect relationships and draw well-argued conclusions (Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar, & Newton, 2002).

1.8.2   Case Study Research

As mentioned above, this is a study of Pakistan's experience with nationalism. The study takes its theoretical framework from Gellner's argument on nationalism. Gellner used the nation-state as the unit of analysis. DeCarlo (2018) explained that the unit of analysis is the entity that researchers intend to comment on or analyse at the end of their study. In Gellner's theoretical framework, each

nation-state constitutes one case study. This thesis uses the case study method to analyse a nation-state, Pakistan. Yin (2014) defined the case study research method as,

> An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the "case") in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident (Yin, 2014, p. 16).

He further mentioned that case study research,

> Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interests than data points and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2014, p. 17).

This two-part definition explains the scope and utility of the case study research method. It provides a step-by-step guide to the researcher on how to design a research project, covers data collection techniques, and approaches to data analysis.

Hitchcock and Hughes explained case study research as "a study of key players, key situations, and critical incidents in life" (Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995, p. 319). According to Stake, a case study is "the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances" (Stake, 1995, p. xi).

The case study method is beneficial as it helps understand a "complex inter-relationship" and is significant in studying and understanding phenomena "grounded in lived reality," case studies may lead to the "exploration of unexpected and unusual" (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 2001, pp. 2-6) However, there is also criticism associated with the use of case study methods, such as it is difficult to differentiate between data collection and data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). It appears that in the case study method, the researcher lacks objectivity. Sometimes data at hand is too large that it becomes difficult not to be lost in detail and to keep the

analysis focused on research questions (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 2001; Hsieh). The criticism can be addressed by following the steps mentioned in Yin's definition of the case study method. He emphasized using multiple sources of evidence, systemizing, and consolidating data by triangulation (Hsieh; Yin, 2014).

1.8.2.1 Process Tracing Method

Collier (2011, p. 823) defined process tracing as "the systematic examination of evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator." Ulriksen and Dadalauri (2016, p. 224) elaborated that "in process tracing the ambition is not to identify values of specific variables and measure their covariation but rather to understand the processes linking the different relevant factors to the outcome." Process tracing is considered as an effective method in qualitative research and for theory testing in single case studies (Collier, 2011; Gerring, 2007; Hall, 2003; Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016). Process tracing is considered a useful methodology for this study as it involves examining Gellner's theoretical framework of nationalism in the case study of Pakistan over an extensive historical period. Process tracing enables collating a range of political occurrences along with identifying forms of nationalism promoted by the political, military, and religious elites in power and opposition during different historical phases, analysis of national education policies, and the subsequent impact on formation or non-formation of a shared form of nationalism in Pakistan.

1.8.2.2 Deviant Case Study

Pakistan's experience with nationalism is also examined as a deviant case study. The deviant case study is a case study that diverges from a well-established theory (Seha & Rommel, 2016, pp. 423-424). An in-depth study of a deviant case proves to be instrumental in highlighting problems in the existing theory, discovering new dynamics within the theory, and improving cross-case

analysis (Molner, 1967; Seawright, 2016; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). A deviant case examination does not necessarily contradict the theoretical framework's core prediction. Instead, a deviant case can be fundamental in rescuing the theory from "potentially damaging evidence" (Levy, 2008, p. 13).

This thesis is a case study of Pakistan's experience with three forms of nationalism. The study focuses on Gellner's theory of nationalism and views Pakistan as a deviant case in relation to Gellner's argument. This thesis makes an in-depth analysis of Pakistan's colonial experience and the establishment of a modern nation-state. It covers seventy-four years of Pakistan's political history in the context of political, military, and religious elites promoting competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism and the role of education in shaping nationalism in Pakistan. A qualitative case study approach using process tracing are considered appropriate because of the extensive scope of the study and the need to have an in-depth study over a long period of time for a complex phenomenon like nationalism. The focus is on examining Pakistan as a deviant case fitting multiple zones of nationalism simultaneously.

1.8.3   Sources of Data Collection

To conduct this research primary and secondary sources of data collection are applied.

1.8.3.1 Primary Data Sources – Semi-Structured Interviews

Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews conducted between January 2019 to May 2019 in Pakistan. Semi-structured interviews are considered effective because they are "flexible, accessible, and intelligible" and often lead to the disclosure of significant information (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Qu & Dumay, 2011, p. 246). Interviews were conducted with the

following categories of respondents as they remain closely involved in education policy formulation.

> Federal-level bureaucrats and politicians including former and current members responsible for policymaking and implementation in concerned ministries.

> Provincial-level bureaucrats and politicians including former and current members responsible for policymaking and implementation in concerned provincial ministries.

> School headmasters/headmistresses and schoolteachers who are responsible for inculcating educational narratives.

> Academics and researchers who specialize in nationalism and state education in Pakistan.

> Retired bureaucrats, politicians, school headmasters/headmistresses, and teachers with knowledge of Pakistan's history of policymaking, policy shifts, and educational focuses in formative years.

During interviews, the snowball technique was used to identify further potential participants (Hennink et al., 2011, pp. 100-101). All the participants were experts in their field; therefore, it proved to be an effective technique to reach out to participants who could give focused and productive input for the research study. A total of 50 invites were sent, of which 23 participants across various categories agreed to an interview. The following table details the number and categories of participants interviewed for this research study.

1.8.3.2 Details on Number and Categories of Interview Participants

No.	Categories	Number of Participants
1.	Federal Level Politicians and Bureaucrats	3
2.	Provincial Level Politicians and Bureaucrats in Punjab	2
3.	School Headmasters/Headmistress and Teachers	11 (Participants from three forms of education systems, Public schools, Private schools, and Madrasa)
4.	Academics and Researchers	5 (Experts on nationalism and state education in Pakistan)
5.	Retired Bureaucrats, Politicians, Headmasters/Headmistresses, and Teachers	2
	Total	**23**

Source: Author (2019)

Before the commencement of interviews, ethical approval for conducting interviews was sought from the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury. The ethical protocols were followed to ensure that interviewees could make a well-informed decision regarding their participation. Under the protocol, potential participants were approached with an invitation letter, an information sheet, and a consent form. Sample questions were also provided to enable potential participants to decide if they wanted to participate in the study. Final notes of the interview were shared with the participant to seek approval on the content they shared. The process allowed the interviewees to withdraw from participation before and after the interview. In the study, only two participants are named with their consent. The remaining interview responses are mentioned without revealing the identity of the participants.

Primary data collection through interviews has certain strengths and weaknesses. Interviews provide original and first-hand information regarding the topic. However, gathering valuable data through interviews takes a lot of time and financial resources. It is important to consider that interviews rely on interviewees' willingness to divulge information (Qu & Dumay, 2011). In the case of Pakistan, the interviews were conducted in a formal setting where the participants were limited to formal responses or official responses rather than giving more insightful responses. Moreover, extreme caution was needed to ask questions about religious and ethnic nationalism. This research study draws important evidence from official drafts of national education policies formulated in Pakistan. The official policy documents are also considered a primary source of data.

1.8.3.3 Secondary Data Sources

This research study is also broadly based on secondary data. Secondary sources include the use of data and information originally gathered and archived by others. They include but are not limited to government reports, surveys, reports published by independent agencies and think tanks, newspaper articles, government websites, views and information shared during television programs and webinars, journal articles, and books. Secondary sources help the researcher determine the existing knowledge about the case under study and identify gaps. Stewart argued that "it is often possible to combine the information from several different sources to reach conclusions that are not suggested by any one source" (Stewart, 1984, p. 12).

The study views nationalism in Pakistan through Gellner's multiple zones of nationalism. This is also regarded as a strength of this thesis that in the explanation of zones of nationalism, Gellner did not mention the possibility of a state or states that could fall in more than one zone of nationalism. However, in the case of Pakistan, the presence of powerful and multiple folk cultures, religious culture, and attempts to formulate shared high culture through education during different

governments makes it impossible to study Pakistan through a single zone of nationalism. Therefore, it is essential to consider zone one, three, and five simultaneously to study the dynamics of competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan.

To study Pakistan with the perspective that it fits multiple zones of nationalism, this thesis requires to cover a broad range of topics like the role of education during colonial rule, distinct folk cultures of provinces, the emergence, and consolidation of new and older ethnic identities in Pakistan, the breaking up of Pakistan in 1971, shifting role of the political, military and religious elites in power and when in opposition and the formation, discontinuation, and shifting focuses of national education policies. Secondary research is deemed necessary for this thesis to cover the above-mentioned broad range of subject matter.

There are strengths and weaknesses attached to the use of secondary data sources. The research based on secondary sources is considered efficient, cost-effective, quick, and offers extensive scope for comparative analysis. However, it is important to ensure the trustworthiness of all data sources. The researcher can lack objectivity and often present biased views regarding the topic. The weakness in using secondary data can be reduced by ensuring scrutiny of secondary sources. For example, the researcher must know when, how, by whom, and for what purpose data was collected. Stewart argued that it is important to use primary and secondary research sources "in a complementary fashion, rather than as substitutes for one another" (Stewart, 1984, p. 12). This research also intends to use both sources to check the validity of hypotheses.

1.8.4   Scope of Data Collection

Pakistan has four provinces Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and one Federal Capital Territory, Islamabad, also known as the capital city of Pakistan. There are two

autonomous territories, Azad Jammu Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, and one Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), which recently has become part of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Data collection and interviews are limited to visits within Punjab and Islamabad. Punjab is Pakistan's largest province by population and is home to almost half of Pakistan's population. Out of approximately 210 million total population, 110.02 million people live in Punjab. (2017 Census of Pakistan) According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics survey of 2014-2015, Punjab has a literacy rate of 63%, higher than other provinces.

Pakistan has three main types of education systems to provide education from elementary to higher secondary levels: Public Schools, Private Schools (low-cost private schooling and high-cost private schooling), and the Madrasa education system. All three types of education institutes were approached for data collection and interviews within Punjab. Punjab's Provincial Education Ministry was visited in the provincial capital, Lahore. Visits were made to Islamabad during field research to interview federal-level politicians and bureaucrats and access government policy documents. Limiting the scope of this study by confining data collection and interviews within Punjab was essential to complete this study in a reasonable timeframe compared to visiting each province of Pakistan. It is also important to mention that Punjab and Islamabad are safer than other parts of Pakistan. Therefore, conducting fieldwork in Punjab and Islamabad had no security risks.

1.8.5   Structure of the Thesis

This research study is divided into six chapters. Chapter one has mentioned the theoretical framework, hypotheses, research methodology, and scope of data collection. The discussion on Pakistan's experience with nationalism is divided into four historical phases, 1947-1971, 1971-1988, 1988-2008, and 2008-2022. Each historical phase is discussed in a separate chapter. Chapter two examines nationalism and education in Pakistan from its establishment in 1947 until its

disintegration in 1971. To fully grasp Pakistan's experience with nationalism in the formative years, it is helpful to discuss the first 24 years of united Pakistan in a single chapter.

Chapters three, four, and five discuss the time frames 1971-1988, 1988-2008, and 2008-2022, respectively. Dividing chapters along mentioned historical phases can better explain Pakistan's experience with nationalism and education. Each period indicates the transition to a new government and national education policy change in Pakistan. During the historical phase mentioned in each chapter, Pakistan experienced regime change, and national education policy change at least once. The rationale for dividing chapters along the mentioned timeframe is to make it easier to follow the transition from one government to another. Chapter six will draw conclusions of this thesis.

Map of Pakistan showing Political Provinces and Territories of Pakistan

Figure 1

Source: (Kanwal, 2014)

1.9   Conclusion

This study is an attempt to understand the dynamics of nationalism in Pakistan. The study is focused on understanding civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan. The role of education is fundamental as this thesis attempts to find the role of national education policies in shaping a shared form of nationalism in Pakistan. Pakistan is a post-colonial state, established in 1947 and had to undergo a transition to the 'Age of Nationalism' in the modern world. Gellner's well-developed argument on nationalism is applied as a theoretical framework for this study.

This chapter comprises a detailed literature review, hypotheses, and methodology, for the study. The literature review covered a broad range of topics like nationalism, the distinction between civic, ethnic, and religious forms of nationalism, the role of education in shaping nationalism in colonial and post-colonial contexts, identifying political, military, and religious elites, and the role of education in shaping nationalism in Pakistan. Based on the literature review, the chapter sets out the central argument of this study. It is argued that nationalism is a contested phenomenon between civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan. Competition is led by elites who primarily pursue their self-interest and, therefore, promote the type of nationalism that helps them protect or achieve their short term self-interest. The following chapters contain a detailed political analysis to examine civic, ethnic, and religious dynamics of nationalism in Pakistan, followed by an analysis of national education policy shifts in Pakistan.

Chapter 2:   Origin of Nationalism and Role of Education in Pakistan (1947-1971)

2.1   Introduction

Pakistan came into being as a result of the decolonization of the Indian sub-continent. Still, its foundation as a Muslim majority state was the outcome of the political struggle of Indian Muslims, which led to the partition of the Indian sub-continent into two independent nation-states, India and Pakistan, in August 1947. With the help of Gellner's theoretical framework on nationalism and the role of education in this regard, this chapter attempts to study Pakistan's experience with nationalism in its formative years until the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. Gellner's argument on the zones of nationalism in Europe and the Muslim zone will be fundamental in understanding the dynamics of nationalism in Pakistan.

This chapter has three main sections. The first section of the chapter discusses the role of colonial education in creating the political and military elite who governed Pakistan during its formative years. This section also discusses the heterogeneity of the Indian sub-continent and mentions the presence of historical divisions on ethnic and linguistic lines among all five provinces, Bengal, Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan, and North-West Frontier Province, which later became East and West Pakistan in 1947.

The second section of this chapter analyzes Pakistan's political history in the formative years. The discussion of political dynamics during the formative years in Pakistan is essential to relate Pakistan with Gellner's first, third, and fifth zone of nationalism. Gellner explained that in Eastern Europe, multiple low or folk cultures had linguistic and cultural differences. In this situation, one dominant ethnic group in power tends to put its people in advantageous positions and attempts to project their folk culture as the state's high culture. This situation often meets with severe

opposition from other folk cultures and leads to ongoing conflict and divided nationalism in a state. The political history of the first eleven years of the parliamentary government, followed by the martial law and presidential form of government until the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, may indicate the domination of the folk culture of Punjab, Pakhtun, and Muhajir (migrants), and rigorous opposition against it by Bengali, Sindhi, Baloch, and Pakhtun folk cultures.

The second section also focuses on Gellner's argument concerning the fifth zone of nationalism. Without incorporating the role of religion, Pakistan's experience with nationalism cannot be fully grasped. The demand of Pakistan was based on distinct Muslim nationalism. However, Muslim nationalism was differentiated from Islamic nationalism by the religious elite of the Indian sub-continent. This section explains the role of the religious elite and their interplay with the political and military elites in power at the national level in the formative years of Pakistan's political history. The discussion in the first two sections of this chapter aims to determine the validity of the first two hypotheses of this thesis. Hypothesis one explores that since establishment of Pakistan, the civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism are in competition with each other. Hypothesis two discusses that through different historical phases to this day, elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that benefits their short term self-interests.

The third section of this chapter highlights the role of education in shaping a shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. Gellner argued that the state-sponsored and planned education system could fundamentally create a high culture or shared form of nationalism in a state. The third section of this chapter is a detailed discussion on the role of the political, military, and religious elite in shaping shared nationalism through national education policies until 1971. The discussion in the third section of this chapter attempts to determine the validity of hypotheses three and four of this

thesis. Hypothesis three argues that elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting. Hypothesis four examines that education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan.

2.2 The Origin of Civic, Ethnic and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan

Gellner argued that nationalism is a political phenomenon that requires a state to have a shared high culture. Moreover, the shared high culture can only be achieved through a system of education universally designed and implemented by the state. He mentioned that "modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture" (Gellner, 1983, p. 36). The culture he talks about is a "school-transmitted culture," not a "folk-transmitted one" (Gellner, 1983, p. 36). Therefore, for a modern state, developing the state's high culture through school education can perhaps be the only effective way to formulate a shared national identity of the modern subjects.

The role of education can be regarded as fundamental in Pakistan's experience with nationalism. The educational policies during colonial rule and response to these policies shaped new nationalisms in the culturally, linguistically, and religiously heterogeneous Indian sub-continent. In pre-colonial India, Maktabs (schools and colleges), Madrassas (seminaries), and Gurukuls (traditional education institutes for Hindus) were responsible for imparting knowledge, functional for the economic and social requirements of the society, also for keeping the people associated with their respective religious identities. However, after the Macaulay Minute of 1835, the trend changed significantly with the introduction of British education policies focused on developing pro-British culture by introducing modern education inculcated in the English language.

2.2.1 History of Modern Education, Elite Formation, and Nationalism on Indian Sub-Continent

Before discussing Pakistan's experience with nationalism, it is vital to gain some insight into the role of modern education, the formation of the political, military, and religious elites, and nationalism during colonial rule on the Indian sub-continent. The following section also attempts to highlight the origin and nature of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism that became important after the establishment of Pakistan.

The British colonial government announced the "downward filtration theory" to execute modern education policy goals on the Indian sub-continent. On July 31, 1837, Macaulay stated,

> We do not at present aim at giving education directly to the people of lower classes of the country. We have not funds for such undertaking. We aim at raising an educated class who will hereafter, as we hope, be the means of diffusing among their countrymen some portion of the knowledge we have imparted to them (Macaulay 1837, as cited in Basak, 1965, p. 402).

On another occasion, Macaulay described "English schools as nurseries of schoolmasters for the next generation and educated youth as the conductors of knowledge to the people" (Macaulay, as cited in Basak, 1965, p. 402). The statements by Macaulay indicated the British mindset about the inculcation of modern education in the English language. The inculcation of modern education targeted local Indians of economically sound backgrounds. It was assumed that the well-off English educated Indians would play the role of educators of the less fortunate masses.

Al-Ahsan (1998) and Misra (2003) argued that the main purpose of introducing the English language education system in the 1830s was to turn Indians into loyal British civil servants and military men. Under this mindset, the proposed English education system was consciously made

accessible to well-off Indians. The purpose of educating wealthy Indians was to replace expensively maintained members of British administrative services with a cheap and willing bureaucracy for British rule. Moreover, local Indians were trained as armed forces with firm allegiance to the colonial rule.

This task of modernizing education in the Indian sub-continent and the prescribed way of achieving this goal through filtration had two significant implications. First, in 1835 it was stated by then Governor-General of India, Lord William Bentinck, that "all the funds appropriated for the purposes of education would be best employed on English education alone" (Lord Bentinck 1835, as cited in Basak, 1965, p. 405). The decision deprived the existing traditional system of education of any financial support from the government and ended the employment prospects for traditionally educated masses. Secondly, English medium schools, colleges, and universities were established in economically well-off regions of the Indian sub-continent like West Bengal, United Provinces, North-West Provinces, Bombay, Madras, Central Provinces, Berar, and Punjab (Chaudhary, 2009; Mondal, 2017). The situation left the rest of the sub-continent seriously disadvantaged regarding access to modern education and led to the subsequent lack of equal economic opportunities.

After Macaulay's minutes of 1835, the colonial government's national education policy document, Wood's Education Dispatch, was introduced in 1854 (Chaudhary, 2009). The Wood's Education Dispatch reviewed downward filtration theory and concluded that emphasis on English had not been an effective policy. The dispatch recognized the English language as fundamental for creating trusted civil servants for British rule. The dispatch recommended that the Indian masses be educated in vernacular and English languages be taught systematically from primary to higher secondary levels. Therefore, government funding for the traditional system of education was

resumed. However, to emphasize English language education, an additional financial incentive termed grant-in-aid was introduced for public and private schools that opted to teach modern education and the English language (Chaudhary, 2009; Moore, 1965).

Although Wood's Education Dispatch acknowledged the significance of educating in the vernacular to promote mass education, knowledge of the English language continued to be necessary for government employment. Therefore, employment opportunities for those who opted not to pursue the English language remained restricted. Subsequent documents on Indian education, like the Indian Education Commission Report of 1883 and Lord Curzon's Education Policy of 1904, conformed to the fundamental approach of Wood's Dispatch reviewed the progress of previous educational policies and emphasized ensuring the provision of mass education across the Indian sub-continent (Chaudhary, 2009).

The discussion regarding the evolution of British education policy on the Indian sub-continent demonstrates that the introduction of modern education aimed to create a trustworthy civil bureaucracy and only later achieve mass education in the Indian sub-continent. Despite extensive deliberations and policies on education, by 1911, every ten villages had three primary schools, and the literacy rate was less than 10 percent in the Indian sub-continent (Chaudhary, 2009). This situation demonstrates that British education policy did not achieve mass education in the Indian sub-continent. However, a substantial number of local Indians became civil administrators for the British. For example, in 1880, United Provinces had 54,000 civil servants, yet only 200 of them were British. Working directly under the British command, transferable to other regions of the sub-continent, responsible for the functioning of a wide range of departments like land, revenue, tax, irrigation, justice, law and order, civil servants formulated the most influential indigenous group of the 19th-century Indian sub-continent (Robinson, 1974, pp. 20-21).

The British colonial education system aimed to develop a high culture well-suited for the needs of colonial rulers. The colonial administration projected mass education as a fundamental objective of the education system. However, the British education system did not achieve mass education. Rather, Macaulay's original concept and strategy prevailed. British education policy served as the means to execute the policy of divide and rule. It created a divide in the society by creating a group of indigenous nobles, English in taste, loyal to and executors of British civic nationalism under colonial rule. On the other hand, the majority of the Indian masses could not or chose not to benefit from the modern education system and became unrepresented and disadvantaged subjects in all matters of social, political, and economic decision-making.

A brief overview of the formation of the military elite is significant for this study. The British Raj recruited indigenous people into the Indian armed forces to consolidate their rule. The British recruitment of armed forces in the Indian sub-continent was based on the "Martial Race" theory (Roy, 2013, p. 1311). Under the martial race theory, colonial leaders designated a "race" of people loyal to British rule and of strong physical build to undergo armed combat. Enloe described the martial race as "a race that occupies geographically distinct territory at the periphery of the state. And imperial elite used them against the dissident lowland population" (Cynthia Enloe, 1980, p 26, as cited in Roy, 2013, p. 1322). Recruitment in the military during colonial rule was dependent on the "political reliability" and "martial capabilities" of the people (Cynthia Enloe, 1980, as cited in Roy, 2013, p. 1322). The martial races in colonial India were Sikhs and Muslims from Punjab, Muslim Pakhtuns from the North-West Frontier Province, and Gurkhas from Nepal (Rand & Wagner, 2012; Roy, 2013).

From 1857 onward, military recruitment was based on martial race theory. Until 1913, Indian armed forces were around a quarter of a million. However, because of World War I and II, a huge

number of recruitments were made in a short period. In 1918, the strength of the armed forces was more than a million, forty percent of which came from Punjab, a province comprised of less than eight percent of the Indian sub-continent population (Eynde, 2014; Roy, 2013). The need for massive numbers of armed forces in a short time during the world wars paved the way for recruitment from other provinces like Bengal, United Province, Central Provinces, Bombay, Madras, Orissa, and Bihar of the Indian sub-continent (Roy, 2013). However, all this combined could not match the dominance of designated martial races in the British-led Indian armed forces.

Although colonial administration introduced the concept of modern education and stressed the goal for the masses to seek modern education, it was not a prerequisite for entering the military services. The people who volunteered for the armed forces were primarily illiterate or had basic traditional education from indigenous Maktabs, Madrassas, and Gurukuls (Eynde, 2014). Eynde maintained that through in-service training and informal learning opportunities like overseas deployment during the world wars, English as a medium of interaction and command was responsible for the literacy of Indian soldiers (Eynde, 2014).

From 1858 onwards, regimental schools were established to educate European and Indian soldiers in India. However, there were not enough places to ensure the literacy of thousands of soldiers in each regiment. In the early twentieth century, the issue of further education for the Indian army was addressed by the colonial government. As a result, a few institutes like the Staff College of Quetta in 1905, the Army Educational Corps in 1920, the Army School of Education in 1921, and the Armed Forces Academy at Dehradun in 1932 were established ("Army education corps: History and tradition," 2020). Indian soldiers who qualified at the officer level had the opportunity to go to the above-mentioned locally established military institutes for education and training, with a selected few sent to Britain to join command and staff colleges. Widespread formal education in

the army was not achieved until the end of colonial rule. However, the Indian soldiers' attitudes, particularly those who became officers, were shaped through professional experience under British command.

Thus British colonial education policies aimed to promote British civic nationalism on the Indian sub-continent. For this purpose, Indian civil services and armed forces were created, who began to comprise a new elite. They were Indians distinguishable due to their financial background, modern education, physical strength, military training, and political allegiance to the British Raj. The military training, their role as military men during colonial rule, and dedicated service during world wars exposed the Indian armed forces to and socialized them into British civic nationalism. The execution of martial race theory differentiated a certain group of people from the rest of the Indian masses. The recognition of being preferred recruits based on desired political consciousness and physical strength created a military elite dominated by Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs, Muslim Pakhtuns, and Nepalese of the Indian sub-continent.

2.2.2   Muslim Response to Modern Education on Indian Sub-continent

The two main communities of the Indian sub-continent, Hindu, and Muslim, responded differently towards the British education policies. Hindus were receptive to the modern education trends, which resulted in them being politically, socially, and economically advantaged in the colonial culture (Chandio et al., 2015). However, Muslims opposed modern education introduced by the colonial government. The British education policies were taken as a threat to distinctive Muslim culture and religion. Major opposition came from Muslim Ulama (clerics) or religious elite, associated with Maktabs and Madrassas. The English language was blocked as a medium of instruction and as a subject. The religious elite emphasized that Muslim glory can only be revived

by staying firmly in touch with religious knowledge and traditional education (Haque, 1975; Ruswan, 1997). However, the results were not what was expected.

Within three decades of introducing English-centric British education policies, the Muslims could be identified as socially, politically, and economically underdeveloped. The situation led to the realization among Muslims with a modernist mindset that rejecting modern education had caused their underdevelopment in the Indian sub-continent. Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan was an Indian civil servant. He began his career as an employee of East India Company in 1838 and retired as a judge under colonial rule in 1876. Sir Sayeed Ahmad Khan initiated an education movement, which offered modern education in a way that could be acceptable for Muslims who otherwise were rejecting the British education system. The education movement later became the platform to promote the Muslim nationalism on the Indian sub-continent.

The Aligarh Movement is significant in this regard. The Aligarh Movement was an education movement that called for the reformation of Muslim society on the Indian sub-continent through modern education. The first institute of the movement was a primary school named Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (M.A.O. College), founded in 1875, then upgraded to a college in 1877. About the institute, Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan mentioned,

> The aim of the college was to form a class of persons,
> Muhammadan in religion, Indian in blood and color,
> but English in tastes, opinion, and intellect (as cited
> in Lelyveld, 1978, p. 207).

The statement is a reference and redefinition of the statement made in the Macaulay Minute of 1835. The statement indicated the purpose to constitute a working education system for the Muslims incorporating religion, English, and oriental culture. The Aligarh Movement was carefully conceived as an alternative for Muslims who did not want to accept the British pattern of

education yet found that staying in touch with the traditional Muslim education system could not benefit them in colonial India. The educational movement aimed to find a middle ground where religion and modern education could co-exist and were not in conflict with each other.

The college was founded by Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan in a small town, Aligarh. The location of the college was finalized after careful deliberations. The town was secluded yet easily accessible from most major cities like Delhi, Agra, Lucknow, Allahabad, and Calcutta. Aligarh benefited from the modern rail network and was accessible from almost all parts of the sub-continent. Therefore, the college attracted students from Punjab, Sindh, United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bengal, and Madras. The well-managed boarding facility for students made it different from contemporary modern institutions. The college aspired to achieve the standard and reputation of Oxford and Cambridge (Lelyveld, 1978, pp. 147-185). The first headmaster was Oxford-educated Henry George Impey Siddons. Cambridge-educated Theodore Beck succeeded him in 1884. Both were accomplished educationists under British colonial rule. The college continued with the trend of hiring British principals and numerous British faculty members over the years (Minault & Lelyveld, 1974).

To realize the idea of modern education for Muslims, Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, and like-minded companions sought support from a wide range of individuals like members of the colonial bureaucracy, educationists, private and wealthy entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and even the rulers of princely states. The British government supported the idea as seventy-four acres were allocated by the government, while the college funds bought an additional twenty acres. The M.A.O. College secured financial support from the British government and later qualified for the government's grant-in-aid, a funding program to support institutes imparting modern education in the English language. The educational movement continued to receive funding from the indigenous Muslims

of good financial standing and the British in the sub-continent in the years to come (Lelyveld, 1978, pp. 134-142).

The students were trained to practice religion in their personal capacity. The college building plan had a grand mosque, although the building was completed in much later years due to a shortage of funds. The college promoted the culture of performing religious duties like praying five times a day, observing the fasting month of Ramadan, and reciting and translating of Koran. Separate religious clerics were hired for students' spiritual and social guidance from Sunni and Shia sects. Islamic education was compulsory with a strong emphasis on shaping Muslim identity on modernist lines (Belmekki, 2009; Lelyveld, 1978; Ruswan, 1997, pp. 36-38). The course on religion was taught in Urdu or English, not Arabic. Sir Sayyed was keen on developing Urdu as a vernacular language and a symbol of Muslim identity. The students were to learn Latin, Persian, or Arabic as optional subjects (Lelyveld, 1978, pp. 124-126). Later, a master's degree in Arabic was introduced for those who wanted to be an expert in the language and literature (Lelyveld, 1978).

It is important to mention that for Muslims, Arabic is not just a language; instead, it is a sacred language because the holy book of Muslims, the Koran, was revealed in the Arabic language. Therefore, Muslims worldwide accept Arabic as the language of their religion. Urdu is not a sacred language, but the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent attach an element of sacredness to Urdu. One of the reasons is that Urdu resembles the Arabic language in calligraphical style. Urdu takes many of its words from Arabic. Islam has been preached in Urdu on the Indian sub-continent for many centuries. For this purpose, holy scripts originally in Arabic were extensively translated into Urdu (King, 1994; T. Rehman, 2006). Therefore, from around 1780 A.D. onward, Urdu evolved as a "language of Islam in South Asia" (T. Rehman, 2006, p. 102).

Urdu was distinguishable compared to other folk languages of the Indian sub-continent. For example, Punjabi was spoken by Sikhs and Muslims of Punjab. Hindus and Muslims of Sindh spoke Sindhi. Bengali was the folk language of Hindus and Muslims of Bengal. Compared to folk languages spoken by people of diverse religious and ethnic identities, Urdu had the recognition as the language of Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, irrespective of their ethnic identities. Urdu was also different in script and pronunciation from Hindi, the dominant language of Hindus of the Indian sub-continent. Therefore, Urdu, and Islam, distinguished the Muslim identity in the Indian sub-continent.

In the beginning, education at M.A.O. College was accessible for the Muslims who could afford it; this trend continued until decolonization in 1947 (Belmekki, 2009). However, in later years, an extensive scholarship program gave numerous chances to Muslim students from less fortunate backgrounds to benefit from modern education and subsequent employment opportunities (Lelyveld, 1978; Robinson, 1974, pp. 60-72). The institute emphasized enabling Muslims to enter civil services under the British colonial administration. For this purpose, in 1881, a Civil Service Preparatory Class was introduced as a particular class to help Muslim students qualify for the Indian Civil Services Examination (Robinson, 1974).

A study was made in 1914 that documented the occupations of former Aligarh students. Although the study was unable to gather information on all the students that graduated from 1877 to 1900, based on information available, it stated that two-thirds of the students who graduated from Aligarh during this period became British government servants (Tufail Ahmad, 1914, as cited in Lelyveld, 1978, pp. 322-325). This data indicates that the M. A. O. College equipped students with modern education, which enabled them to become civil servants under colonial rule and disseminate British civic nationalism.

The spread of the Aligarh Movement was facilitated by establishing the Muhammadan Educational Conference, established in 1886. The conference aimed to identify challenges and solve the problems regarding modern education for Muslims across the Indian sub-continent. The conference was a platform for the nobles and leaders of the Muslim community and included members such as Raees and Nawabs (titles of wealthy landowners), businessmen, and lawyers. In later years, it was joined by M. A. O. College alumni who became successful professionals in different fields. The conference took pride in being the only platform where notable Muslim communities could meet annually (Robinson, 1974, pp. 73-75).

The educational conference aspired to be a representative body for the education of Muslims across the Indian sub-continent. For this purpose, starting from Aligarh, the conference held its annual sessions in different parts of the sub-continent like Punjab, Bengal, Madras, and Sindh. The conference pursued agendas like modern education, the English and Urdu language, strong emphasis on religious education, the establishment of small English medium schools, encouraging indigenous schools to introduce the English language, and encouraging Madrassas to include modern subjects along with religious teaching. Eight primary schools affiliated with M.A.O. College were established in the regions close to Aligarh (Robinson, 1974, pp. 78-85).

The discussion on the Muslim response to modern education indicates that Muslims were disadvantaged because of rejecting the British education system. Consequently, Muslims of a modernist mindset shaped an education system acceptable for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent that could uplift Muslims socially and economically. The education movement also created a class of modern educated Muslims who became part of colonial civil services. The Aligarh Education Movement shaped a modernist Muslim identity based on Islam, Urdu, the English language, and modern education.

2.2.3   From the Aligarh Movement to the Pakistan Movement

At the time of the establishment of M.A.O. College in 1875, Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan took a clear stance about the non-participation of Muslims in politics (Ruswan, 1997). Later, the way Muhammadan Educational Conference functioned created the ground for Muslim participation in Indian politics. The Indian National Congress (INC), a Hindu-dominated national-level political party, was established in 1885. INC called for Indian nationalism based on shared territory. The Aligarh Movement did not form any association with INC. Rather, INC. and Aligarh Movement competed for popularity among masses (Lelyveld, 1978; Robinson, 1974).

The Muhammadan Educational Conference proved to be significant in building a network of influential Muslims across the sub-continent and started a political discussion on issues related to the subcontinent's Muslim population. In 1906, during the annual session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference, the All-India Muslim League (AIML), a political party, was founded in Dacca. AIML was joined by Muslim educationists, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, lawyers, civil servants, and MAO alumni (Lelyveld, 1978, pp. 302-306; Ruswan, 1997). The Aligarh educational movement provided the foundation for AIML. The All-India Muslim League emerged as a leading political party that represented the interests of Muslims in colonial India. The Muslims who participated in politics through AIML made up the Muslim dominant political elite of the Indian sub-continent. This study primarily discusses the All-India Muslim League's political elite because they led the struggle for Pakistan based on Muslim nationalism and later formed the political elite of Pakistan in the formative years.

The political mobilization of AIML made it the second most popular political party after the Indian National Congress (INC). The INC was established more than two decades before AIML and had a well-established political base throughout the sub-continent. From the early 1920s onward, in

anticipation of a post-colonial Indian sub-continent, the INC acted as the "government in waiting" (Bose, 2004, p. 98). The INC's Hindu dominant political elite propagated Indian nationalism based on shared territory. The INC asserted that all Indian natives, irrespective of religion, caste, color, and race were Indian nationals. However, as opposed to the political stance of INC, the Muslim League called for the "Two Nation Theory" (Şahbaz, 2020).

Through the platform of AIML, the Muslim dominant political elite argued that Muslim nationalism is different from Indian nationalism. Muslim identity was separated from Hindu identity based on a distinct religion and language. Therefore, the post-colonial high culture aspired to by the Hindu dominant political elite was opposed by the AIML's political elite based on their religious and linguistic identity of Islam and Urdu. Modern education enabled the Muslim League's political elite of the Indian sub-continent to introduce Muslim nationalism, which was based on modernist Islam, Urdu, English language, and modern education.

In 1930, in the twenty-fifth session of the All-Indian Muslim League, a presidential address was made by Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), a modern and progressive poet and political thinker of the Indian sub-continent (Datta, 2002). In the address, popularly known as 'Khutbah Allahabad' (Allahabad address), while discussing the communal difference between Hindu and Muslim populations, Iqbal stated,

> I would like to see Punjab, North Province, Sind and Balochistan amalgamated into a single state. Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India (Allama Muhammad Iqbal, 1930, as cited in, Iqbal, Shafique, & Saaleh, 2011).

The idea of a separate political administration for the Muslim majority regions of the Indian sub-continent based on a separate Muslim identity comprised Muslim nationalism and was floated for the first time on the platform of AIML. Iqbal's statement articulated the political stance of AIML, later known as the "Two-Nation Theory," a response to the idea of Indian nationalism by the INC. According to the two-nation theory, Hindus and Muslims comprise two nations and require separate sovereign political regions.

The 1937 provincial elections were the first in which AIML competed. The Muslim League won less than 5 percent of the Muslim vote; it only managed to win a few seats in Bengal. The INC was able to form provincial governments in both Hindu and Muslim majority regions. The results showed that the idea of the two-nation theory did not initially win popular support among the Muslims (Qasmi & Robb, 2017). However, on March 23, 1940, the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution demanding geographically contiguous Muslim majority regions to be demarcated as independent states of sovereign status in the Indian sub-continent. The demand was strongly based on Islam and Urdu, determining the high culture of Muslims to be entirely different from the dominant Hindu culture; therefore, an autonomous political status was needed for Muslims. The resolution became famous as the Pakistan Resolution (Datta, 2000-2001). The political struggle for a separate Muslim state is known as the Pakistan Movement.

At the time of the 1940 resolution, the Muslim League had a precarious political position in the Indian subcontinent's politics. However, the following years were characterized by exceptional political mobilization. Some help came from the poor performance of INC ministries formed after the 1937 elections. Moreover, in some cases, the All-India Muslim League managed to gain the support of Muslim dominant small political parties, like Unionist Party of Punjab and Sind United Party, which were popular at the provincial level in Punjab, Sindh but did not initially support the

Pakistan Movement. These political parties were led by the political elite largely popular at the provincial levels and were supported by local masses of shared language, religion, and ethnicity. The results could be seen in the 1946 elections when the AIML won 453 out of 524 Muslim seats in the central and provincial legislatures. The All-India Muslim League promoted Muslim nationalism and contested the 1946 elections with the slogan that a vote for the All-India Muslim League would be a vote for a sovereign nation-state, Pakistan and won a sweeping victory (Chander, 1987; Qasmi & Robb, 2017; Talbot, 1988).

The 1946 election results determined the partition of the Indian sub-continent into two sovereign states, India and Pakistan. The Muslim League's political elite demanded a state of Pakistan based on Muslim nationalism. The Aligarh Education Movement helped Muslims evolve from a socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged minority on the Indian sub-continent to a well-educated and influential political elite who developed a vision of and struggled for an independent Muslim nation-state. The Muslim majority provinces of North-West India and East Bengal formed an independent state, Pakistan, on August 14, 1947.

The above discussion indicates that the political movement for a separate state based on Muslim nationalism had foundations in an education movement. The Muslim nationalism propagated by the All-India Muslim League's political elite was based on Muslim identity. The Muslim identity was shaped through the Aligarh Movement, comprising a modernist interpretation of Islam, the Urdu language, the English language, and modern education. The political elite behind the Pakistan Movement became the political elite in power at the national level after the establishment of Pakistan. Therefore, during the formative years, the shared Pakistani nationalism, or civic nationalism promoted by the political elite, would be closer to or perhaps similar to the Muslim nationalism they were promoting during the Pakistan Movement. Therefore, it is argued that in the

formative years, the political elite in power at the national level was inclined to promote civic nationalism.

2.2.4 Religious Elite Response to the Modernist Muslim Education

There was a visible modernist and religious divide over the education trends Muslims must follow under colonial rule. The religious elite regarded the Aligarh Movement as undermining the Muslims' commitment to the religion. Some ulama (clerics) went ahead and called the modernist Muslims "non-Muslims" or "irreligious" (Lelyveld, 1978; Metcalf, 1982). They were of the firm belief that institutions on the pattern of the Aligarh movement were disguised to impose a British way of thinking and could not serve the best interests of Islam and Muslims of the Indian sub-continent (McDonough, 1984).

The same modernist and religious divide continued to exist in the political thinking of the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. The political participation of the religious elite did not start as a response against the colonial rule or in response to the political stance of the INC propagating Hindu-dominated Indian nationalism. Rather, some religious schools of thought were in favor of Indian nationalism. The religious elite became politically active against the political stance of the political elite propagating modernist Muslim nationalism through the platform of AIML (Metcalf, 1982, pp. 315-347).

The religious elite's political activism against the AIML's political elite was perhaps due to the historical co-existence of Islam with the other religions of the sub-continent. Muslims ruled the Indian sub-continent before the colonial subjugation and later managed to survive with an exclusive fundamental religious identity throughout colonial rule. Non-Muslims and foreign rule did not challenge the fundamental religious identity of Muslims. However, the modernist Muslim mindset and the political stance of the AIML's political elite was taken as a threat to traditional

Islam. Therefore, in response to the Muslim nationalism demanding a Muslim nation-state, Gellner style fundamentalism or religious nationalism was asserted by the religious elite.

The reaction to the Pakistan Movement of 1940 was the political mobilization of the religious elite against the political stance of AIML. Religious-political parties like Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, Majlis-i-Ahrar, All-India Muslim Majlis, Jamiat Ahl-i Hadis, and Jamaat-e-Islami strongly opposed the All-India Muslim League's demand for a separate state based on Muslim nationalism (Qasmi & Robb, 2017). The religious elite promoted religious nationalism and stressed that the Muslim nationalism of the AIML is different from Islamic nationalism. Thus far, the discussion demonstrates that the modern education movement was contested by the religious elite in favor of a traditional education system, singularly focused on Islam and traditional subjects. Similarly, the religious elite opposed the political stance of the Muslim League's political elite in favor of fundamental interpretation of Islam designating the Koran and sharia as high culture of Muslims societies. The political stance of the religious elite outlined competing religious nationalism for the future state of Pakistan.

2.2.5   Historical Context of Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan

Historically, heterogeneity has been a dominant characteristic of the Indian sub-continent. For centuries, multi-lingual, multi-cultural, and multi-religious people have constituted the region's population. The proposed geographically congruent Muslim majority regions Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and geographically separate Bengal, had shared religion but distinct folk cultures and languages. It is important to point out that all regions directly benefited from modern education under colonial rule and later from the Aligarh Movement; only half of Punjab and Bengal, i.e., West Punjab and East Bengal, became part of Pakistan. West Bengal was the regional center of modern education developments compared to

East Bengal; therefore, the majority of the masses in Pakistan were uneducated or had traditional education.

Except for Bengal, the provincial political elite of other proposed provinces did not readily supported the All-India Muslim League's agenda of an independent state. One such example was Punjab's Unionist Party, formed in 1923. Unionist Party had a dominant Muslim representation because more than 50 percent of Punjab's population was Muslim, followed by approximately 31 percent Hindus and 11 percent Sikhs. The party was jointly formed by Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs of Punjab with the primary purpose of safeguarding landowners of Punjab from the unfavorable land reforms introduced by the Hindu political elite under colonial rule. (Oren, 1974) The Unionist Party could be regarded as a symbol of inter-religious harmony. Muslim political elite of the Unionist Party were wealthy landowners who were also Pirs and Sajjada Nashins (Saint Descendants); therefore, they had a mass following in Punjab (Mehta, 2014). The Unionist Party defeated All-India Muslim League in the general elections of 1937 and formed Punjab's provincial government. Punjab's provincial ministries were shared by the Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu political elite of the Unionist Party (Awan, 2020).

Throughout its establishment, the Unionist Party favoured post-British INC proposed Indian nationalism. However, the Unionist party experienced downfall due to factors; disagreements among the political elite and unpopular decisions by the party's provincial government between (1937-1942). The Muslim political elite of the weakened Unionist Party saw a better political opportunity to support the AIML's Pakistan Movement in the general elections of 1946 (Awan, 2020). The support for AIML came with the consideration of preserving political power and safeguarding their agricultural wealth, which was challenged by the Hindu political elite, and initially prompted the formation of the Unionist Party in 1923. Therefore, the support idea of

Pakistan came with the expectation of greater political and financial gains in the case of the establishment of the new nation-state (Jalal, 1985; Mehta, 2014; Oren, 1974; Talbot, 1988).

The political elite of Sindh was not as opposed to the AIML as the political elite of Punjab, but they retained the independent political status through Sind United Party. The Sind Unity Party had Muslim and Hindu representation and formed the 1937 provincial government in Sindh. Like Punjab, the Muslim political elite of the Sind Unity Party was dominated by landowners and Pirs. The Muslim political elite of Sindh supported the AIML's Pakistan Movement in the general elections of 1946. The support for AIML came with the anticipation in the new nation-state, after the expulsion of Hindu business competitors Muslims would have better economic opportunities (Kukreja, 2003, p. 138). The discussion indicates that the provincial political elite supported the All-India Muslim League's demand for an independent Pakistan. However, at the same time, the political elite of provincial political parties did not foresee that they could be required to merge their local power base and folk cultures into a shared high culture in an independent nation-state.

Thus, even before the establishment of Pakistan, the Pakistan Movement had a competition between the political elite promoting Muslim nationalism and the provincial political elite who supported Muslim nationalism but sought power from their own folk cultures. The contestation from ethnic nationalism has roots in the distinct folk cultures of Punjab, Sindh, Bengal, Balochistan, and NWFP. The religious elite opposed the Pakistan Movement and contested Muslim nationalism in favor of religious nationalism. This situation demonstrates that the newly established Pakistan tended to fit multiple zones of nationalism. With respect to the first hypothesis, the discussion thus far finds that even before the establishment of Pakistan, competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism were embedded in Pakistan's politics.

2.3   Competing Civic, Ethnic, and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan 1947-1971

Pakistan's experience with nationalism can be understood by analyzing political dynamics that evolved during the formative years. The political environment that shaped Pakistan during the initial years is to be examined in view of zone one, three, and five of Gellner's theory of nationalism. This section covers the period from 1947-to 1971 in Pakistan's political history. From 1947 to 1971, Pakistan experienced eleven years of unstable parliamentary governments (1947-1958), followed by martial law by General Ayub Khan (1958-1969) and General Yahaya Khan (1969-1971). After the establishment of Pakistan, politics in Pakistan was led by the political elite, military elite, and religious elite. This section intends to explore the validity of hypotheses one and two of this thesis. Hypothesis one states that since 1947, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan are in competition with each other. Hypothesis two argues that through different historical phases, elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism to benefit their self-interests; therefore, they promote the type of nationalism that suits them.

2.3.1   Competing Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan 1947-1958

Based on the 1946 elections, the first government in Pakistan was formed on August 14, 1947. The Muslim League won a majority in the regions that became Pakistan. Therefore, the Muslim League formed national and provincial governments in Pakistan. Pakistan's first constituent assembly had 80 members; 44 were Bengali members of the Muslim League (Park & Wheeler, 1954, p. 130). The majority of the members of the Muslim League were Punjabi and Muhajir (migrant) who benefited from modern education and joined politics in colonial Indian. Jahan (1972) argued that the political elite from Punjab and Muhajir (migrants) folk cultures were more influential in national politics than the Bengali political elite. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the first Governor-General of Pakistan until his death on September 11, 1948. Pakistan's first Prime

73

Minister was Liaqat Ali Khan, a founding leader of the Pakistan Movement. He was assassinated during a public rally on October 16, 1951. In the first decade of the parliamentary form of government, Pakistan experienced seven prime ministers and four heads of state (Dobell, 1969). Out of seven prime ministers, four were from Bengal.

At the provincial level, Punjab saw the dismissal of the chief minister, a member of a provincial political elite with a strong ethnic support base. The dismissal was followed by unrest from his ethnic support base in Punjab. Sindhi had six chief ministers changed during the first decade. In NWFP, the provincial government was dissolved in August 1947, days after its formation. In 1954, Bengal experienced governor rule imposed by the Muslim League government at the center (Q.-u.-A. Bashir, 2020). Death and assassination of founding leaders, frequent changes in leadership at the national level, and dissolution of provincial governments indicate that weak civilian governments were present during the formative years in Pakistan. Moreover, there was an atmosphere of serious mistrust and disagreement between the political elite at the national level and the provincial level.

The Muslim League's political elite led the political struggle for an independent state based on Muslim nationalism. The discussion demonstrates that in the newly established Pakistan, the Muslim Leagues' political elite was in power at the national level. The political elite in power at the national level proposed a modernist interpretation of Islam, Urdu, and English language and modern education as a shared high culture that would be suitable for shared civic nationalism of Pakistan.

According to the 1951 census, East Bengal had 41.9 million people compared to 33.7 million people in West Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2002a, 2015). One of the first instances that created a significant ethnic divide in Pakistan's national politics was the national government's decision regarding Urdu

as the only national language of Pakistan. Urdu was emphasized as a national language on two grounds first, its recognition as the language of Muslims, and second, Urdu was not associated with any provincial identity (Oldenburg, 1985). The decision triggered Bengali Language Movement in March 1948. The situation led to widespread opposition among the Bengali political elite, protests on the streets of East Bengal, and state use of force against Dacca university students (Islam, 1978; Jaffrelot, 2002a, pp. 20-21; Zaheer, 1995, pp. 24-27).

Pakistan's first constitution of 1956 recognized Urdu and Bengali as the national languages of the state, but the language controversy became the starting point for the rise of Bengali ethnic nationalism. Moreover, it also gave an effective political agenda of demanding maximum political autonomy to the provincial political elite in opposition to the political elite at the center and led to the formation of the Awami Muslim League in 1949. The Awami Muslim League was later popularly known as Awami League, as it dropped the word "Muslim" from its name and particularly used linguistic identity to define separate Bengali nationalism in the years to come (Kabir, 1987).

Another important decision was the formation of One-Unit, by the government of Pakistan on 14 October 1955. The idea was to merge all four provinces and princely states of West Pakistan into one big province to counterbalance East Bengal, making it East Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2015). Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra, a Bengali member of the Muslim League, supported One Unit. He stated that "there will be no Bengalis, no Punjabis, no Sindhis, no Pathans, no Balochis, no Bahawalpuris, and no Khairpuris. The disappearance of these groups will strengthen the integrity of Pakistan" (Muhammad Ali Bogra 1954, as cited in H. Ali, 2020). The statement shows that the Bengali political elite in power at the national level considered One-Unit essential for promoting shared civic nationalism and countering ethnic nationalism in Pakistan.

Under the One-Unit, the rule of equal representation was introduced in the 1956 constitution. According to the rule, 300 seats of the National Assembly were divided equally between East and West Pakistan. The equal division of seats impacted all folk cultures in Pakistan. For example, despite a larger population, East Pakistan had been given the same representation as West Pakistan. For West Pakistan, as all four provinces were merged into One-Unit, the representation from Sindh, Balochistan, and NWFP according to their population was not ensured. Rather, the policy strengthened the likelihood of the political elite of Punjabi folk culture winning the maximum number of seats in West Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 1998; 2015, pp. 111-117; Meher, 2015).

Effectively, the rule of equal representation gave maximum representation to the political elite from Punjabi folk culture. The policy marginalized the East Bengali political elite and the political elite from Sindhi, Balochi, and Pakhtun folk cultures. The policy steps like selecting Urdu as the national language and forming One-Unit can be seen as attempts to form civic nationalism by rejecting divisions based on linguistic and provincial identities. However, the provincial political elite opposed the One-Unit formula and Urdu as the national language and claimed that the political elite in the center intended to ensure their power at the national level by undermining the folk cultures of Pakistan.

The above discussion provides an understanding that during the first decade of Pakistan's establishment, the situation in Pakistan's politics resembled Gellner's third zone of nationalism. The domination of Punjabi and Muhajir folk culture in power at the national level was contested by the folk culture of Bengal, Sindh, Balochistan, and NWFP. The opposition by Bengali folk culture was strong compared to other folk cultures. The political elite in power at the national level promoted civic nationalism through the above-mentioned policy steps. However, the political elite in power at the provincial level and those who were out of power at the provincial level opposed

civic nationalism by claiming that those policies were designed to threaten their ethnic identities. With a support base from folk cultures, the political elite responded by formulating political parties based on ethnic nationalism, such as the Awami League. The discussion so far suggests the validity of the first hypothesis. During the first decade of Pakistan's establishment, civic nationalism promoted by the political elite in power at the national level was contested by the ethnic nationalism promoted by the political elite with a strong provincial support base.

2.3.2 Competing Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan 1958-1971

In Pakistan, democratic institutions struggled to run the state as most were in the formative phase. Compared to the elected representatives, the civil and military bureaucracy was much more accustomed to governing due to their experience in colonial administration (Ziring, 1977). The experience of running colonial administration gave civil services and the military a decisive role in Pakistan's state machinery from the beginning. In Pakistan's case, the failure of political leadership to develop strong parliamentary democracy and the failure of political parties to be well-organized at the national level shifted the balance of power in favor of civil servants and the military elite (Callard, 1957; Choudhury, 1974; Ziring, 1977).

On October 7, 1958, the parliamentary form of government ended in Pakistan with the first declaration of martial law. General Ayub Khan was a Pakhtun from North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Son of a junior commissioned officer in the Indian Army, Ayub Khan went to Aligarh Muslim University and was selected for British Royal Military College at Sandhurst. He was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1928, where he commanded a battalion and fought during World War II (Britanica, 2019). In 1947, he joined Pakistan Armed Forces as the tenth most senior officer. He was made Commander-in-Chief in 1951, became minister of defense in a civilian cabinet in 1954, and became President of Pakistan

as a result of Martial Law in 1958 (Britanica, 2019). With the declaration of martial law, a member of the British designated martial race, Aligarh educated, and Sandhurst trained military elite came into direct power at the national level. All political activities and political parties were banned until May 1962. Even when the ban was lifted, political activities could not be fully resumed due to strict regulations under the military regime (Gauhar, 1985).

General Ayub Khan's view of Pakistan's civic nationalism had modernist characteristics. He rejected traditional interpretations of Islam and called for the use of religious laws only in ways that could fulfill contemporary requirements. He proposed a presidential democracy for Pakistan and disapproved of provincial autonomy (Gauhar, 1985; Saleem M. M. Qureshi, 1966). Urdu and Bengali continued to be the national languages of Pakistan. The emphasis on modern education during the military regime will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

General Ayub's military regime focused on the economy and achieved unprecedented economic development. From 1959 to 1970, there was an increase in per capita incomes of both East and West Pakistan. However, there was unequal economic development between East and West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, per capita income rose by 17 percent compared to a 42 percent increase in West Pakistan (Rashiduzzaman, 1982). During the military regime, the proposed high culture suitable for the formation of civic nationalism involved recognizing Urdu and Bengali as national languages, promoting economic development, a modernist interpretation of Islam, and promoting modern education. Therefore, the military elite in power at the national level promoted civic nationalism which was predominantly similar to the civic nationalism promoted by the founding political elite in Pakistan.

Both civil and military governments were unable to ensure balanced representation of folk cultures in civil and military services. In 1947, owing to the 'martial race' theory of colonial rule, Punjabi

and Pakhtun had more than 96 percent representation in the military. Bengalis, Sindhis, and Balochis collectively had approximately 4 percent representation in the military. This situation prevailed during the twenty-four years of united Pakistan (Cohen, 1984). A study in 1955 determined that out of 741 officers of the Central Secretariat, only 51, or 6.9 percent were Bengali. (Goodnow, 1964, as cited in Baxter, 1997). In 1959, out of the 47 highest-ranking military officers, not one of them was a Bengali (T. Rehman, 1997, p. 121). In 1963-64, at the officer rank, Bengalis were 5 percent in the army, 5-10 percent in the navy, and 11-16 percent in the air force (Rizvi, 1974, as cited in Alqama, 1997, p. 192; A. Shah, 2014, p. 102). By 1968, out of 48 top military officers, 35.4 percent were Punjabi, 39.6 percent were Pakhtuns, 23 percent were Muhajir (migrants), and Bengalis rose from zero to 2 percent. There was not a single high-ranking military officer from Sindh or Balochistan (Sayeed, 1968, as cited in Jaffrelot, 1998).

The situation was no different in the civil bureaucracy. In 1959, out of 3,532 higher civil service officers, 349 or just 9.6 percent were Bengali. Sindh constituted 5 percent, and NWFP and Balochistan officers were 7 percent (Alqama, 1997, p. 190; T. Rehman, 1997, p. 121). The military elite of Punjabi and Pakhtun folk cultures were overrepresented in the military. There was an over-representation of Muhajir (migrant) and Punjabis in civil services. The domination of Punjabi, Pakhtun, and Muhajir folk cultures in national politics and civil and military services resulted from colonial education and martial race recruitment policies and not due to their place of birth. However, in Pakistan, this was seen and contested by the Bengali, Sindhi, NWFP, and Baloch political elite as the domination of one folk culture over the others.

2.3.2.1 Breaking up of the Nation

After a decade of rule, General Ayub Khan's grip on the government became weak due to his deteriorating health. He suffered a heart attack in early 1968 and took a long time to recover. As

promised by General Ayub Khan after announcing martial law that his "ultimate aim is to restore democracy" (Ayub Khan 1958, as cited in Choudhary, 1961, p. 161). The promise began to martialize after a decade. Political activity resumed in the country in late 1968. General Ayub Khan resigned in March 1969. As second martial law administrator, General Yahya Khan announced Pakistan's first general elections to transfer power to a democratic government. One-Unit was abolished in March 1970, which restored four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan of West Pakistan. Out of 313 members of the National Assembly, 169 were to be from East Pakistan. For the first time in Pakistan's history, East Pakistan; was given representation by the number of its population (Baxter, 1997, pp. 77-79; Jaffrelot, 2015, pp. 120-121).

The first and most free and fair elections in Pakistan were held in December 1970. Two popular political parties were Bengali-dominated Awami League and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). PPP was a relatively new party formed in 1967 in West Pakistan under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In Bengal's provincial assembly, the Awami League won 167 seats out of 169 seats. In the National Assembly, it won 167 of 313 seats. The Awami League did not win any seats in the provinces of West Pakistan. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) won the majority in West Pakistan's provinces by securing 81 of 138 seats, mainly from Punjab and Sindh. PPP did not win any seats from East Pakistan (A. Shah, 2014, p. 108). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a Sindhi leader, his party, PPP, secured 62 of 82 seats in Punjab's provincial election (Jaffrelot, 2015, pp. 120-121). According to the election results, Awami League could not win any seat outside East Pakistan. The PPP did not win any seats from East Pakistan.

The political elite of both political parties claimed to be committed to the national interests of Pakistan. To promote national interests, they needed to govern. However, both parties were unable to reach a power-sharing formula. Mujib-ur-Rehman preferred breaking up the nation if not being

able to make government on his terms, such as making Pakistan a federation. East and West Pakistan to have separate currencies and armed forces, autonomy in making tax, trade, and financial decisions, and a federal government to handle only defense and foreign policy. These demands were unacceptable to the military elite and West Pakistan's political elite (Ahmer, 2018; Barnds, 1971).

On March 1, 1971, General Yahya Khan indefinitely postponed the inaugural session of the national assembly, which was scheduled to be held on March 3, 1971 (Ahmer, 2018). The prolonged stand-off and indefinite postponement instigated civil unrest, followed by a military crackdown in East Pakistan. Civil unrest, violence, and intervention by India ultimately resulted in the breaking away of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh on December 16, 1971. On December 20, 1971, in West Pakistan, power was transferred to the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Baxter, 1997, pp. 78-79; A. Shah, 2014, pp. 109-112). The political and military elite in West Pakistan allowed the breaking up of Pakistan rather than letting the Awami League form a government.

In the absence of any political option from Punjab, the election results reflected that the people of Punjab preferred to vote for a Sindh-based political party instead of choosing the Bengali political elite. Bengalis utterly rejected political representation from the provinces of West Pakistan. People in East Pakistan were only comfortable with Bengali political elite on a provincial and national level. In West Pakistan, the political elite from the other provinces of West Pakistan was accepted, and any Bengali political elite was rejected. Just as the outcomes of the 1946 elections in the Indian sub-continent made Pakistan possible, the outcomes of the general elections of Pakistan in 1970 facilitated the disintegration of Pakistan on ethnic lines.

The disintegration of Pakistan demonstrates the prevalence of Bengali ethnic nationalism. Regarding Gellner's zone one, the discussion tells us that the political and military elite in power at the national level justified policy steps as an effort to create civic nationalism in Pakistan. Compared to weak and unstable civilian governments, the military regime was more committed to promoting civic nationalism. The emphasis on a modernist interpretation of Islam, rapid economic development, recognition of Urdu and Bengali as national languages, dissolution of One-Unit, and holding of free and fair general elections demonstrates the military regime's nationalistic orientation and commitment to promoting civic nationalism.

However, neither a weak civilian government nor strong military regimes could overcome ethnic nationalism in Pakistan. The ethnic divide triggered due to the Urdu-Bengali language controversy remained persistent even after Bengali was recognized as a national language in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions. The divide between East and West Pakistan remained unbridged due to constant contestation by Bengali folk culture against the domination of Punjab's, Pakhtun, and Muhajir folk culture in the economy, political power, and representation in the civil and military bureaucracy. The situation can be well related to Gellner's third zone of nationalism. Regarding hypothesis one, the discussion validates that until the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, civic and ethnic nationalism in Pakistan were in competition, and ethnic nationalism prevailed over civic nationalism.

Regarding the second hypothesis thus far, this thesis finds that the political and military elite in power at the national level promoted civic nationalism. However, the promotion of civic nationalism by the political and military elites in power at the national level cannot be regarded as the state's sole interest. Promoting civic nationalism also meant the sustained dominance of Punjabi, Pakhtun, and Muhajir folk culture. Nothing substantial was done to ensure equal

opportunities and power-sharing with Bengali, Sindhi, and Baloch folk cultures. Therefore, when in power at the national level, the political and military elite promoted civic nationalism as it also benefited their short term self-interests. It is seen through the discussion above that ethnic nationalism was promoted by the political elite, who also presented them as representatives of provincial folk cultures. They were out of power and were in opposition to the political elite in power at the national level. For the political elite in opposition, promoting ethnic nationalism created better political opportunities.

The decisive test of the political and military elites' commitment to civic nationalism of Pakistan came after the elections of 1970. After the general elections of 1970, the military elite and political elite of East and West Pakistan had the opportunity to show that their short term self-interest in securing power was not above Pakistan's national interests. However, the disintegration of the nation-state demonstrates that the political and military elites promoted competing civic and ethnic nationalism with the primary agenda of securing their short term self-interest of gaining and enhancing power. When the Bengali political elite could surrender Bengali ethnic nationalism by showing flexibility in their demands of absolute provincial autonomy, they refused. The military elite, otherwise committed to a democratic government transition, postponed the process indefinitely. The political elite of West Pakistan perhaps anticipated better political opportunities in disintegration as it meant being more powerful in post-disintegrated Pakistan. Therefore, as mentioned in hypothesis two, between 1947 to 1971, elites promoted competing civic and ethnic nationalism because promoting civic and ethnic nationalism also benefited their short term self-interests.

2.3.3 Competing Religious Nationalism in Pakistan 1947-1971

Religion and the religious elite have played an active and significant role in Pakistan's politics. After independence, the political stance of Pakistan's political elite was challenged by a religious elite. The All-India Muslim League's political elite of modernist mindset behind the Pakistan Movement did not conceive of an Islamic state but rather a state for Muslims. During the formative years, the political elite in power at the national level had a modernist political system in mind, based on electoral politics and the rule of law (Cohen, 2004, pp. 161-164). The religious elite considered this position of the political elite unacceptable and challenged in favor of a state governed by fundamental Islamic laws; therefore, religious nationalism had little chance of co-existing with the proposed civic nationalism. Jamaat-e-Islami adopted the agenda of pursuing Islamic constitutionalism through democracy and political process (S. V. R. Nasr, 1994, 1996). JI's participation in politics was also aimed at persuading the political elite in power at the national level to shape the constitution of Pakistan purely based on the Koran and sharia.

There was ongoing political opposition between the religious and political elite during the formative years. However, radical mobilization of the masses on the issues related to religion was strictly curtailed by the use of force. For example, in February 1953, three mainstream religious-political parties, Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis-ul-Ahrarul Islam, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, made three demands from the Prime Minister of Pakistan. They demanded the removal of Ahmadis from all important government positions, the removal of the then foreign minister from his position because he was an Ahmadi, and a declaration that Ahmadis were non-Muslims. Ahmadi is a faction that claims to be Muslim but does not believe that Muhammad (P.B.U.H) is the last Prophet in Islam. The religious elite sees this postulate as contradictory to the fundamentals of Islam. The first two demands were accepted. However, the government refused to declare Ahmadi as non-

Muslim. The situation instigated violent protests in Punjab. Violent protests were controlled by declaring martial law in Punjab in March 1953. Maulana Mawdudi of Jamaat-e-Islami was arrested for publishing the 'Qadiyani Problem.' Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi of Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam was arrested for his provocative speeches on the issue of Ahmadis. The military court gave them both the death sentence. The sentences were never executed (Aziz, February 23, 2013; Z. Hussain, 1986; S. V. R. Nasr, 1994). However, firm action by the military had the complete backing of the civilian government, which demonstrated intolerance for civil unrest created on issues related to religion.

The religious elite pursued a truly Islamic constitution; however, the religious provisions in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions can be regarded as a compromise between the political elite in power at the national level and the religious elite in opposition. Islamic provisions in both constitutions can be analyzed mainly as symbolic value, such as Pakistan being named the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the prime minister being a Muslim, the state would pass no such law inconsistent with the teachings of the Koran, and there would be Islamic advisory bodies, which could make non-mandatory recommendations to the government (Feldman, 1967, pp. 194-204; Mehdi, 1994).

During the first martial law period of 1958, the ban on political activities and political parties included religious-political parties. General Ayub Khan was staunchly committed to a modernist interpretation of Islam. In the second constitution of 1962, announced during his presidency, Pakistan's official name was changed from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the Republic of Pakistan. However, this was reversed through an amendment in 1963. General Ayub Khan, in his book, noted that "there was obviously no place for a supra-body of religious experts exercising a power of veto over the legislature and judiciary" (M. A. Khan, 1967, p. 194). Jaffrelot (2012) thus

convincingly argued that General Ayub Khan was committed to curtailing the political influence of the religious elite in Pakistan.

The discussion demonstrates that the religious elite promotes religious nationalism in Pakistan. The religious elite pushed the political elite in power to shape an Islamic constitution. However, civic nationalism prevailed over religious nationalism as civilian and military governments introduced Islamic provisions that were more symbolic in value and kept the military regime in line with a modernist interpretation of Islam rather than traditional Islam. Ayub Khan's military regime went ahead with more strict measures dealing with religious nationalism. The military elite ensured that religious nationalism was not being promoted through radical means. Regarding the first hypothesis, the discussion validates that from 1947 to 1971, civic and religious nationalism were in competition.

On the issue of ethnic nationalism, there was a convergence in civic and religious nationalism stances as both rejected ethnic nationalism. On the issue of Bengali ethnic nationalism, Jamaat-e-Islami, along with other religious-political parties like Jamiat-Ulama-e Islam (JUI) and Jamiat-Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP), denounced Bengali ethnic nationalism. They launched campaigns in East Pakistan to sensitize people that their loyalties belong to Islam and Pakistan. The religious elite emphasized that ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and provincial identities cannot be regarded as above the identity of being Muslim and Pakistani (Bahadur, 1977). Since the beginning, there was a continuous conventional political opposition between the religious elite and the political and military elites in power at the national level promoting civic nationalism. However, it cannot be regarded as severe as the contestation between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. In fact, against ethnic nationalism, religious nationalism and civic nationalism were in alliance with each other.

Regarding Gellner's zone five, this thesis finds that religious nationalism competed with civic and ethnic forms of nationalism in Pakistan during the formative years. Although religious nationalism was not as dominant as ethnic nationalism in Pakistan, the religious elite posed a significant challenge to proposed civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism by opposing folk cultures, pushing for an Islamic constitution, and attempting to impose the definition of a Muslim through radical means. The religious elite could not achieve desired results. However, it is difficult to ignore that if Pakistan had transitioned to a fundamental Islamic state as demanded by the religious elite, that would mean the religious elite would have unparalleled political power in Pakistan. The discussion in the following chapters may provide us with a better view of the role of the religious elite in promoting religious nationalism to secure their short term self-interests.

2.4   Education and Nationalism in Pakistan in Formative Years 1947-1971

2.4.1   Education and Nationalism 1947-1958

The following section intends to analyze the role of education in shaping nationalism in newly established Pakistan. Thus far, this thesis has highlighted that the education movement played a fundamental role in establishing Pakistan. The above discussion also highlights that political, military, and religious elites promoted competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan during the formative years. It will be significant to see how competition among the three nationalisms affected the formation of shared nationalism through education in Pakistan. The following discussion attempts to find the validity of hypothesis three and hypothesis four of this thesis.

Gellner, in his theory of nationalism, emphasized the role of education. He explained that different regions in the world are more likely to have different experiences with nationalism. His theory of nationalism implies that some regions in the world have experienced a smooth transition to a civic

form of nationalism. Some regions are perhaps a long way from transition to civic nationalism and are experiencing rather complex ethnic and religious nationalisms. However, he regarded education as a singular and powerful means of achieving a shared or civic form of nationalism in even the most heterogeneous societies. He further explained that only the state can build a massive educational infrastructure that can fulfill the requirements at the national level. Moreover, Gellner also explained that the task of quality control is also the state's responsibility, it is imperative to ensure that school transmitted culture is effectively designed and the educational product is not "shoddy or sub-standard"(Gellner, 1983, pp. 37-38).

At the time of establishment, the education system of Pakistan had serious disadvantages. The regions that became Pakistan had not benefited from the British education system and infrastructure. They did not experience the establishment of major Muslim modern educational institutes (Lall, 2009a; Talbot, 1998). Pakistan had a 15 to 16 percent population who could read and write and inherited around 10,500 primary, middle, and secondary level schools (Bengali, 1999b; ICG, 2004, p. 8). The madrassas, a traditional source of education, were in abundance (Lall, 2009a). Therefore, the political and military elite in power during the formative years had to build from a seriously disadvantaged education system.

The first decade of the parliamentary government in Pakistan was overshadowed by the efforts to achieve political stability and the issues of survival of the new state, including the stable economy, defense, rehabilitation of refugees, and building of governmental infrastructure. The unstable political environment kept the political elites focused on politics while developing an educational narrative to achieve shared nationalism remained in the preliminary phase. Fazal-ur-Rehman, a Bengali member of the Muslim League, became Pakistan's first federal education minister. He remained the education minister for the first five years, and along with education, Fazal-ur-

Rehman was also the minister for interior and information. (Noreen, 2014) Therefore, the education minister was not exclusively focused on education but had other important responsibilities. Each ministry had a Secretary, and a civil services officer, designated as the permanent head of administration of the concerned ministry (Khalid B. Sayeed, 1958).

The education policy is a government activity (Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard, & Henry, 1997). From 1947 to 1958, policy and decision-making on education were primarily conceived through educational conferences and goals to be achieved through five-year development plans. The First Educational Conference, held from November 27 to December 1, 1947, outlined the development of an educational system inspired by Islamic values, stressed free and compulsory education for all, and, most significantly, focused on scientific and technical education for economic development (Cohen, 2004; Jalil, 1998, p. 236).

An Advisory Board of Education for Pakistan (ABEP) was set up in June 1948 by the ministry of education to discuss education policy preferences and challenges to education. The ABEP was comprised of the minister of education as the Chairman, while civil bureaucrats held the positions of deputy and assistant education advisors. University vice-chancellors, political elites, and administrative heads of provincial education departments, schools, and colleges also had representation on the board. The ABEP functioned till 1958; throughout this time, the ministry of education did not prepare a national education policy for Pakistan; rather, the board largely remained a platform for discussions and suggestions on issues related to education (Noreen, 2014).

A National Education Conference was held in December 1951; the lack of trained teachers was identified as the biggest challenge of Pakistan's education system (A. H. Khan & Mahmood, 1997). Due to the extent of underdevelopment Pakistan inherited, education focused on achieving

economic development. The determined parameters of achievement were quantitative. For example, the conference of 1951 developed the Six-Year National Plan of Education from 1951- to 1957, which focused on increasing the number of schools, colleges, universities, and vocational institutes across Pakistan. Another focus was on increasing the number of people with higher education and vocational training to play a role in building Pakistan's economy. Increasing the number of students in schools was also the target (Hoodbhoy, 1998; Jalil, 1998).

Only 4 percent of the development budget was allocated to education from 1955-to 1960, making education second last priority, above only health. In the distribution within the education budget, the lowest priority was given to primary education by allocating only 18 percent of the total available funds. The highest amount was designated for higher, vocational, and scientific education (M. u. Haq, 1966, p. 90). The above discussion tells us that an education system capable of fulfilling the national education requirements of a state was yet to be formed in Pakistan. Moreover, the formation of a national education system aimed at shaping civic nationalism was challenged by political instability, underdevelopment, and the government's low priority, as demonstrated through budget allocation.

2.4.2   Education Caused National Divide

So far, the thesis has highlighted the visible divide between religious and modernist political mindsets before the existence of Pakistan. The ethnic divide in national politics emerged shortly after the establishment of Pakistan. The ethnic divide between East Pakistan and West Pakistan emerged during Pakistan's first Educational Conference in November 1947. In his address at the conference, the education minister, Fazal-ur-Rehman, stated that the education system must be reformed in accordance with Islamic ideology and Urdu as the medium of instruction for education

in Pakistan. At the same conference, the minister of education suggested that Islamic ideology can be consolidated by converting the writing script of all languages in Pakistan into Urdu or Arabic. These propositions were strongly opposed by Bengali political elites and were taken as an attempt to destroy distinct Bengali language and culture (Islam, 1978; I. H. Qureshi, 1975, pp. 133-135).

On February 7, 1949, the Advisory Board of Education for Pakistan under the education ministry recommended that Pakistan's languages be free of Sanskrit influence. The reason provided was that the Sanskrit script was taken as the symbolization of un-Islamic influence, while the Arabic script confirmed association with Islam. Pakistan's central government moved ahead with the policy suggestion and set up twenty adult education institutes across East Pakistan to teach basic Bengali in Arabic script. The policy step was regarded as a new form of colonization by Bengali intelligentsia and was met with vigorous opposition by the provincial political elite and massive student protest at Dacca University (Islam, 1978, pp. 145-146).

Although the policy recommendations by the political elite in power at the national level promoting civic nationalism to make Urdu the only national language and medium of instruction never materialized, the recommendations created language controversy at the national level. The controversy undermined the Muslim League's efforts in the first provincial elections of East Pakistan held in 1954. In opposition to the political elite in power at the national level, the Bengali political parties formed a coalition of three East Bengal political parties, the United Front, to oppose the Muslim League (Islam, 1978; Zaheer, 1995). The United Front fought the provincial elections over Bengali nationalism based on linguistic identity and won 223 seats (Keesing, 1973; Park & Wheeler, 1954). Muslim League secured nine seats (Park & Wheeler, 1954). The magnitude of defeat was enormous. The Muslim League, which secured the most significant number of seats from Bengal in the 1937 and 1946 elections, was completely wiped out from East

Bengal in 1954 by the opposition political parties fighting provincial elections based on Bengali ethnic nationalism.

The Education Reforms Commission for East Pakistan was created in January 1957 (Asadullah, 2010; S. M. M. Qureshi, 1973, p. 566). The commission was headed by the United Front's Chief Minister of East Pakistan, with all seven members from East Pakistan's bureaucracy and provincial political elite (Das, 2001). The commission gave suggestions about improving education conditions in East Pakistan from primary school to university level. The focus was on improving the quality of education to help economic development (Asadullah, 2010; S. M. M. Qureshi, 1973, p. 566).

On the issue of medium of instruction, which could have implications on the shared nationalism, the Education Reforms Commission for East Pakistan strongly recommended that primary school level students must be taught in vernacular. The students must not be overburdened by learning secondary languages like Urdu, Arabic, and English at the primary level (Das, 2001, pp. 154-158). With its emphasis on Bengali as a medium of instruction, the provincial political elite recommended an educational outlook that promoted Bengali ethnic nationalism and lacked the aspects of a shared form of nationalism. However, the 1957 reform commission provisions remained nothing more than recommendations. The political scenario of Pakistan changed with the declaration of Martial Law in October 1958 by General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who announced the formation of Pakistan's first National Education Policy.

The above discussion indicating political instability, underdevelopment, and budget allocation tell us that forming a national education system to shape a shared civic nationalism was not a priority in newly established Pakistan. The proposals by the political elite in power at the center, like

making Urdu a medium of instruction at the national level, and changing the script of the Bengali language from Sanskrit to Arabic, created a national divide on ethnic lines and developed a competition between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism in Pakistan. The counter-recommendations by the Bengali political elite in 1957 expressed their emphasis on Bengali ethnic nationalism through education. During the first decade, no national education policy was formulated.

The third hypothesis argues that elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting. The discussion finds that during the first decade, the political elite in power at the national level was promoting civic nationalism. Therefore, the national education outlook indicated that Urdu is essential for shaping shared national linguistic identity. However, in opposition to the political elite in the center, the Bengali provincial elite was promoting Bengali ethnic nationalism; therefore, they rejected proposals regarding Urdu as the only national language and medium of instruction. The counter-recommendation regarding emphasis on Bengali as the medium of instruction in education was made by the Bengali political elite as they aimed to strengthen Bengali ethnic nationalism. The fourth hypothesis argues that education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan. No national education policy was formed in eleven years of parliamentary governments. The contesting civic and ethnic nationalism dominated politics. The national conferences and reform commissions on education promoted contesting approaches and remained ineffective in addressing internal diversities and shaping civic nationalism.

2.4.3 Nationalism through National Education 1958 to 1971

On October 7, 1958, President Iskandar Mirza declared martial law and made General Ayub Khan the chief martial law administrator. President Mirza declared martial law as he knew if he did not act, the military would step up to seize power and make its announcement. Iskandar Mirza blamed the political elite for promoting political instability, provincialism, and corruption for political gains. He blamed the religious elite for promoting religious fundamentalism. He justified the declaration of martial law by mentioning that Pakistan as a state could not endure such disruptive forces (Feldman, 1967). The following section discusses the role of education and forms of nationalism that were shaped during the military regime that remained until the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.

After becoming President of Pakistan in October 1958, the civic nationalism of Pakistan was to be shaped by General Ayub Khan, and his cabinet comprised of civilian politicians who supported the coup, bureaucrats, and the military elite. The federal ministers for education in the cabinet of Ayub Khan were Habib-ur-Rehman from 1960 and Qazi Anwar ul Haq, who became minister for education in 1965. Both were from East Pakistan (Sharfuddin, 1978). Pakistan's education system remained formative during the first decade of its establishment. In 1958, for the first time, the formulation of a detailed national education policy was ordered by General Ayub Khan. On December 9, 1958, Ayub Khan stated that,

> Our present educational system is a legacy from the past. It was designed and devised to meet an entirely different set of conditions; it needs to be revised to meet the requirements of a free nation (Ayub Khan, 1958, as cited in Saigol, 2003, p. 15).

The statement indicates that unlike previous democratic governments, military regime led by General Ayub Khan took special interest in shaping an education which could fit the requirements of Pakistan as an independent nation-state.

2.4.3.1 Report of the Commission on National Education 1959

The Report of the Commission on National Education, famously known as the "Sharif Report," was released in 1959. The report has the status of perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed document about achieving national integration through education in Pakistan's history (S. M. M. Qureshi, 1973, pp. 564-566; Saigol, 2003). The commission was headed by S. M. Sharif, Chief Secretary, the highest officer in the civil bureaucracy. The other ten members were the officers in education departments of civil and military bureaucracy, college and university professors, and Vice-Chancellors of universities in East and West Pakistan (Raza; S. M. Sharif, 1959). General Ayub Khan appointed the commission to form a national education policy.

The formation of a national education policy was ordered by the military elite who came into power, claiming commitment to promoting civic nationalism in Pakistan. The Sharif Report of 1959 had the characteristic of an education policy aimed at shaping the civic nationalism of the state. The report highlighted challenges to shared Pakistani nationalism from folk cultures, language controversy, and traditional interpretation of Islam. The report emphasized that civic nationalism could be inculcated through schools and emphasis on modernist interpretation of Islam (S. M. Sharif, 1959).

The report began by acknowledging the failure of previous governments in building a sound education system. It mentioned that education in Pakistan does not articulate national needs and aspirations. It lacked the required standards to match the modern world (S. M. Sharif, 1959). The

report was aimed at providing a comprehensive national education system for Pakistan. The report stated,

> The disruptive forces of communalism, regionalism, and provincialism came to the fore in the sub-continent…progress and patriotism reflect, to a large degree, basic attitudes, and values.…After the first great surge that launched the nation, the magic was gone. Slowly the old attitudes that had been absorbed into the bloodstream of the nation during the last century returned to plague our national life and impede our progress. One by one we witnessed the reappearance of the old attitudes of passivity, indiscipline, opportunism, and regionalism. In a situation where the overriding objective is that of nation-building, and where there exist these centrifugal forces of regionalism, indiscipline, and non-cooperation, the immense tasks to be accomplished can only be carried out when a strong and responsible leadership emerges. Such leadership must come from the highest levels and it must be strong enough to overcome these forces and by its public behavior change the attitudes behind them This leadership failed to emerge in our country. Instead, we witnessed successive changes in administration and public service (S. M. Sharif, 1959, pp. 6-7).

The above statement indicates that multiple ethnic identities and continued association with folk cultures posed serious challenges to a shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The report emphasized the need for renouncing pre-modern trends of belonging to ethnic identities, folk cultures, and regional preferences. The report claimed that the political elite of previous years had been unable to subdue threats to national integration.

Regarding the association with the form of nationalism, the Sharif Report of 1959 mentioned that,

> But narrow nationalism in the modern world is not enough; and if we gave the child only this, we would be doing him a disservice (S. M. Sharif, 1959, p. 116).

The statement in the report provides the military elite's view on civic nationalism. By narrow nationalism, the report indicates that nationalism is only limited to folk and religious cultures and does not serve modern society. There is a need to shape a shared civic nationalism. The report explained that schools play a fundamental role in making good citizens.

It explains patriotism as the most significant quality of good citizens and mentions that,

> We have also said that the school has an important part to play in developing national consciousness…It is, therefore, most important that this sense of patriotism be cultivated throughout this stage of schooling (S. M. Sharif, 1959, p. 174).

The statement above indicates that inculcation of shared national culture was to be achieved through school education. The report also recommended that schools could promote a shared sense of nationalism by holding a daily assembly singing the national anthem, periodic hoisting of the national flag, and conducting inspirational talks on patriotism (S. M. M. Qureshi, 1973; Saigol, 2003).

The report highlighted the significance of economic progress and designated the creation of a modern workforce of universal technical expertise important for it.

> A modern technological society…, can only be built and function when there is available a large body of skilled and literate workers…The availability of such a body of manpower can only be ensured when some part of education is made compulsory and so universal (S. M. Sharif, 1959, p. 171).

The statement indicates that Pakistan's first national education policy emphasized that a modern workforce literate in a uniform technical education is essential for a state's economic development and can be achieved through the national education system. The emphasis a on modern workforce for economic development indicates that the military regime in Pakistan had already foreseen the same necessity later mentioned by Gellner in his framework on nationalism in 1964.

97

Regarding the language of instruction, the Sharif Report of 1959 continued by recognizing Urdu and Bengali as national languages of Pakistan and mediums of instruction. However, it promoted Urdu as the medium of instruction to achieve national cohesion in West Pakistan. From class 6, all the regions of West Pakistan using folk languages as a medium of instruction had to switch to Urdu. The provision regarding the medium of instruction affected the Sindhi language as, from 1963, schools in Sindh teaching in Sindhi had to switch to Urdu. In the Punjab regions of One-Unit, Urdu was the language of instruction. In NWFP and Balochistan regions of One-Unit, Urdu was the language of instruction after class 5 (T. Rehman, 2002a; S. M. Sharif, 1959). Over the issue of the Bengali language, the report attempted to avoid opposition over the medium of instruction as it did not contest the status of Bengali in East Pakistan.

2.4.3.2 Sharif Report View on the Role of Religion

The Sharif Report emphasized the role of religion as a unifying force for culturally, ethnically, and linguistically diverse populations. The report mentioned that religion is the only significantly effective means to foster national brotherhood and civic responsibilities. Therefore, religion should be an integral part of the modern education system (S. M. Sharif, 1959, pp. 209-212). The report strongly argued that the task of building nationhood is so significant that every difference needs to be set aside. It explained that strong and shared national culture could only be formed by discarding differences between Muslim sects and various religious communities inhabiting Pakistan (S. M. Sharif, 1959, p. 11). However, in practical terms, this proved to be wishful thinking.

The report mentioned that the traditional madrassas are widespread across East and West Pakistan as popular means of education. However, the madrassa education system is one-sided and focused only on producing experts on religion. To make students compatible with modern society and

economy, madrassas in Pakistan needed to integrate modern subjects and religious teachings. The report stated,

> Madrasas and Dar-ul-Ulums must present Islam as a dynamic and progressive movement which can endure through the changing times and changing values. The dynamic spirit of Islam can be imbibed only if Islam is presented in every age in the light of latest advances of science, philosophy, economics, and contemporary history (S. M. Sharif, 1959, p. 278).

Furthermore, it states,

> This is a move in right direction…the revision of the syllabuses of Madrasas and Dar-ul-Ulums from time to time, giving to subjects other than religion the importance that they deserve in practical life, and making full use of modern thought in the understanding and interpretation of Islam (S. M. Sharif, 1959, p. 278).

The above statements indicate that through the report on national education, the military elite in power at the national level emphasized Islamic modernism. The recommendations were made on how the traditional religious education institutes need to reform the teaching focus according to the modern world. The report rejected fundamentalist interpretations of Islam and stressed Islam's compatibility with the changing world.

Regarding religion, the report had an evident view that the traditional religion-centric education model cannot continue. There needed to be an immediate reformation in the religious education system by integrating modern subjects. In practical terms, this has been proven as a non-mandatory recommendation, as the parallel system of traditional madrassa education continued to exist and even grow in Pakistan. Instead, to make the madrassa education system more organized, four major madrassa boards representing madrassas of four leading religious schools of thought, Deobandi,

Brailvi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Shia, were established between 1955 to 1960 (Q. Khan, 2021; Shafiq, Azad, & Munir, 2019, p. 158).

Ayub Khan in an address to the nation on December 24, 1962, stated,

> Pakistan came into being on the basis of an ideology which does not believe in differences of color, race, or language. It is immaterial whether you are a Bengali or a Sindhi, a Balochi or a Pathan or a Punjabi – we are all knit together by the bond of Islam (Ayub Khan, 1962, as cited in, Saigol, 2003, p. 5).

The statement explains Ayub Khan's mindset, which was also reflected in the report. The military elite's vision of civic nationalism in Pakistan included renouncing ethnic identities on provincial lines and emphasizing Islam as the state's unifying force. The religion emphasized by the military elite was modern Islam.

2.4.4 Critical Analysis of National Education Policy 1959

According to Saigol, the two fundamental focuses of the Sharif Report were to achieve national integration and modernization of the economy and society through education (Saigol, 2003). The military elite in power at the national level wanted to build a modern Pakistan through uniform national education and a modernist interpretation of Islam. Notably, Pakistan's first national education policy of 1959 had a significant resemblance with the Aligarh Movement. Through Aligarh Movement, Muslims of the Indian sub-continent achieved their political objective.

However, it is important to consider whether Pakistan's first national education policy could create a shared high culture or a shared civic nationalism among the people. It is essential to keep Pakistan's political context in mind. When the first national education policy was announced in 1959, the state had profound ethnic divisions across social, political, and economic lines. The folk

cultures were contesting the domination of the folk culture in power at the center. To counter these challenges, the Sharif Report emphasized modern Islam as a unifying force, uniform technical education to prepare the modern workforce, and attempted to avoid language controversy.

It is essential to discuss what was missing in the report, comprised of twenty-seven detailed chapters. The topics in the report included primary, secondary, higher, vocational, religious, adult, and women education, textbooks, staff training, administration, and many more. The Sharif Report casually mentioned provincialism as a challenge to national integration in the introduction. The report did not discuss serious ethnic divisions along provincial lines, the powerful presence of diverse folk cultures in Pakistan, and how education can bridge deepening ethnic divisions and create a shared national high culture in Pakistan.

The Ministry of Education formulated the Education Commission's Reform Implementation Unit in 1960. Under the unit, a Curriculum Committee was formulated in the same year to formulate curricula for Pakistan that could be implemented evenly across the country. Furthermore, the National Textbook Board was established in 1962 (Qasmi, 2016). A committee to review the progress of the Reform Implementation Unit was formed in 1967. The committee considered that the progress of West Pakistan was better than East Pakistan and that formulating uniform curricula was an extensive and ongoing process and could take years to complete (Sharfuddin, 1978). Therefore, the task had to continue.

Moreover, the Sharif Report could not alleviate the challenge posed by Bengali ethnic nationalism. Asadullah noted that in terms of school infrastructure, from 1947-to 1971, there was negative growth in the number of schools in East Pakistan. In West Pakistan, the number of primary schools increased by 35,287 (Asadullah, 2010, p. 41). In terms of the literacy level, East Pakistan lagged

behind West Pakistan. Asadullah argued that he could not find any evidence that the central government in West Pakistan deliberately promoted educational underdevelopment in East Pakistan. Instead, he argued that the inadequate allocation of budget and resources and its impact on education were unintended consequences of an uneasy relationship between the center and the province (Asadullah, 2010). However, even if there was no evidence, it is almost impossible to consider that the provincial political elite would not blame the political and military elites in power at the national level for intentionally creating educational inequality between East and West Pakistan.

To collect data for this thesis, I conducted interviews in Pakistan between January 2019-May 2019. The participants included school principals and teachers and sought to find the impact of competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism on national education aimed at shaping civic nationalism. I interviewed a government girls' high school principal on April 15, 2019. On the ethnic divide between East and West Pakistan, the principal responded that before the disintegration, as a student in the 1960s, she remembered that there used to be a question in junior-level mathematics books taught in East Pakistan. 'Nine hundred tons of jute is produced and packed in Bengal. All were sent to West Pakistan. How much left for East Pakistan?' (Principal, 2019).

I was unable to verify if this question existed in the 1960s mathematics textbooks of East Pakistan. Still, it is embedded in the memory of the principal. If accurate, this question in school textbooks indicates that the textbooks taught in the 1960s contained material that reflected an opposite approach to what the Sharif Report and its subsequent implementation units were trying to achieve. The young citizens were being sensitized through school education about East Pakistan's distinct ethnic and cultural identity, as jute production was the specialty of East Bengal and about the economic manipulation of West Pakistan.

In terms of religion, the above discussion demonstrates that despite being clear about the role of religion in the education system, by proposing non-mandatory suggestions, the military elite in power at the national level did not ensure the reformation of the traditional education system in Pakistan. Rather, the madrassa education system evolved as a parallel education system in the years to come. It is argued that the lack of commitment was perhaps a strategy to avoid rigorous opposition by the religious elite. It eventually enabled the continued competition for religious nationalism, which fundamentally challenges civic nationalism in Pakistan.

The third hypothesis argues elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting. The discussion on the role of education and nationalism during General Ayub Khan's military regime tells us that after declaring martial law, the military elite formulated and implemented the Report on the Commission of National Education of 1959 as Pakistan's first national education policy. The Report was aimed at promoting civic nationalism in Pakistan. The Report was released in 1959, a year after the declaration of martial law. It was the same time when political activities and political parties were banned. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the Report did not receive explicit opposition from political elites promoting ethnic nationalism and from religious elites promoting religious nationalism.

The fourth hypothesis maintains that education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan. Thus far, the discussion tells us that the military regime claimed to be committed to civic nationalism and formed a national education policy strongly civic in nature. However, the national education policy and proposed national education system could not overcome Pakistan's competing ethnic and religious nationalism. In the case of ethnic nationalism, national education could not shape shared

nationalism between East and West Pakistan. The belief that the education policy coming from the center would cause Bengali folk culture to be dominated by the folk culture of Punjab and Pakhtun remained prevalent. The secession of East Pakistan along ethnic lines is considered partly due to the ineffectiveness of the national education policy.

Regarding religious nationalism, a parallel religious education system continued to exist and became systematized with the establishment of madrassa education boards. The discussion validates the fourth hypothesis that the national education policy could not develop civic nationalism in Pakistan. Instead, internal diversities featured as ethnic and religious nationalism were stronger than civic nationalism in Pakistan.

2.5   Conclusion

In 1947 Pakistan was established as an independent nation-state. This chapter has covered Pakistan's political and education history until 1971. The focus has been on analyzing Pakistan's experience with nationalism. Regarding Gellner's framework on nationalism, the thesis has established that zone one style civic nationalism could not be shaped in Pakistan. The discussion in this chapter indicates that during the first twenty-four years of undivided Pakistan, the divisions among folk cultures became very strong. The situation is regarded as similar to the zone three style ethnic nationalism. Pakistan had multiple folk cultures, and they contested the domination of folk culture in power. Politics in Pakistan were dominated by tensions between West and East Pakistan over the issues like unequal sharing of power, language controversy, minority folk cultures contesting the dominant folk cultures, and uneven economic development. Ethnic nationalism saw its peak with the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971.

Regarding Gellner's zone five nationalism, during the formative years, the role of religious parties was shaped as a political opposition calling for the implementation of Koranic culture as the state's high culture. The state governed by the political elite in power did not tolerate the radical use of Islam. Meanwhile, the political elite and the religious elite denounced Bengali ethnic nationalism. The discussion on the first historical phase from 1947 to 1971 demonstrates that with the breaking away of Pakistan, zone three nationalism prevailed over zone one and zone five nationalism.

Regarding hypotheses one and two, the chapter concludes that since the establishment of Pakistan, competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism dominated national politics. The chapter concludes that the political and military elites in power at the national level promoted civic nationalism. The political elite with a strong provincial support base promoted ethnic nationalism and opposed the proposed high culture, blaming it for dominating Bengali folk culture. The

religious elite promoted religious nationalism. For the political and military elite in power at the center, the promotion of civic nationalism also meant accumulation and consolidation of power. For the provincial political elite, opposing civic nationalism and promoting ethnic nationalism also meant securing a strong provincial support base and gaining and maintaining power at the provincial level. Promoting religious nationalism also meant a state system where the religious elite could exercise more influence. The political, military, and religious elites in Pakistan were competing for their short term self-interest. Therefore, they promoted competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism, leaving Pakistan with no shared form of nationalism.

Gellner argued that the national education system is the key to forming shared nationalism in modern nation-states. Through the Aligarh Movement, education played a fundamental role in establishing Pakistan. Education was not a priority for the political elite in power during the formative years, despite being fundamental for building a shared national narrative. It took over a decade to formulate Pakistan's first national education policy in 1959. By that time, the ethnic divide on linguistic and cultural grounds already had strong roots in the society.

Regarding hypotheses three and four, this chapter concludes that although the political elite in power promoted civic nationalism, the proposal and steps to emphasize Urdu as the national language and medium of instruction reflected their preferred way of promoting civic nationalism through education. The provincial political elite's proposed reforms of emphasizing the Bengali language promoting ethnic nationalism reflected their preferred approach towards promoting ethnic nationalism through education.

Except for General Ayub Khan, the political and military elite from East and West Pakistan throughout the parliamentary and military forms of government did not clearly state an objective of forming shared nationalism through national education. The Sharif Report of 1959 on national

education can be viewed as the expression of a preferred high culture of the military elite in power at the national level. The national education system shaped during the military regime allowed the traditional religious education system to continue and did not address the issue of ethnic divisions through education. Without effectively addressing the religious and folk cultures, forming a shared high culture through education could not be achieved. It is argued that the political and military elite's education policy preferences provided the basis for the continued existence of competing religious and ethnic nationalism in Pakistan.

Chapter 3:   Education and Nationalism in Pakistan 1971-1988

3.1   Introduction

Pakistan's experience with nationalism can be regarded as unique and challenging at the same time. As discussed in the previous chapter, the education movement played a significant role in Muslims becoming a part of British civic nationalism under colonial rule. The political movement led by the modern educated Muslim leaders demanded a separate state. They claimed that the identity of being a Muslim makes them a nation, which, therefore, needs a state. From 1947 onward, elites promoted three competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan. In 1971, Pakistan became the first post-colonial state to experience secession on ethnic and linguistic lines (Cohen, 2004, pp. 201-203).

After the separation of East Pakistan, Pakistan was left with four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) (now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KP). All four provinces in Pakistan had distinct cultural and linguistic identities (Cohen, 2004). Punjab is the largest province in population and has dominant civil and military bureaucracy representation. The challenge to create a shared nationalism was persistent, perhaps more significant after the failure of the state to protect itself from secession on ethnic and linguistic lines.

This chapter covers the historical phase from 1971 to 1988 to examine Pakistan's experience with nationalism. The historical phase discussed in this chapter starts from 1971 and ends in 1988. During this phase Pakistan witnessed the formation of two national education polices, first was announced in 1972, shortly after disintegration and the second was a formed in 1979, after declaration of martial by General Zia-ul-Haq. The chapter concludes with the end of martial law in 1988. Therefore, this historical phase covers an analysis on nationalism during two governments and two national education policies.

During this phase, Pakistan experienced an elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from 1971- to 1977. The parliamentary form of government ended with the declaration of third martial law by General Zia-ul-Haq 1977-1988. This chapter has three sections. The first section will highlight competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism shaped during the elected government between 1971 and 1977. The second section will highlight competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan during the military regime between 1977-1988. The first two sections of this chapter aim to determine the validity of first two hypotheses of this thesis. Hypothesis one argues that since 1947, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan have been in competition with each other. Hypothesis two maintains that, through different historical phases to this day, elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that benefit their short term self-interests.

The third section of this chapter focuses on the role of education in shaping shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The third section will cover national education policies shaped during Bhutto government (1971-1977) and General Zia's military regime (1977-1988). The discussion on national education and nationalism intends to investigate the validity of third and fourth hypotheses of this thesis. Hypothesis three posits that elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting. Hypothesis four contends that that education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan.

3.2   Competing Civic, Ethnic and Religious Nationalism during 1971-1977

The following section discusses the dynamics of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism shaped during the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. To establish the validity of hypotheses one

and two, outlining the nature of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism during the Bhutto government is helpful to determine the competition among them.

3.2.1   Civic Nationalism of Pakistan during 1971-1977

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the interim President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of a somewhat demoralized Pakistan on December 20, 1971 (Cohen, 2004, p. 136). The military remained committed to the transfer of government to civilian rule. Martial law ended after four months, and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto remained the President and then Prime Minister of Pakistan under the new constitution of 1973. According to the election results, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) formed the central government. PPP formed provincial governments in Punjab and Sindh, two large provinces of Pakistan. Two opposition parties, Pakhtun dominated National Awami Party (NAP) and a religious-political party, Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam (JUI), formed provincial governments in NWFP and Balochistan (Baxter, 1971; Breseeg, 2001; Burki, 1988).

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was a political elite from Sindh. He got his higher education from the University of California, then the University of Oxford, and later went to Lincoln's Inn to become a barrister (Wolpert, 1993). Bhutto started his political career in the late 1950s. From 1963 to 1966, he served as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in General Ayub Khan's cabinet. He formed the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in 1967 (Wolpert, 1993). At the time of the establishment of PPP and during the election campaign for the 1970 general elections, Bhutto raised the slogan of "Roti, Kapra Aur Makan" (Bread, Clothes, and Houses) for everyone (Sanghro & Chandio, 2019, p. 54). He expressed his party's ideology by stating, "socialism is our economy, democracy is our politics, and Islam is our religion" (Ishtiaq Ahmed, 1996, pp. 193-194; Chengappa, 2002, p. 29).

Bhutto used the term "Islamic Socialism" and argued that socialism has its root in Islam. (Sanghro & Chandio, 2019, p. 54) He stated that

> Islam is our faith, and it is the basis for Pakistan. Pakistan cannot last without the supremacy of Islam. A socialist government does not rival that supremacy. On the contrary, socialism will make the whole population the custodian of Islamic values (Chengappa, 2002; Mukherjee, 1972, p. 179).

The statement indicates that Bhutto emphasized that Islam and socialism do not contrast. Pakistan must have a socialist economy and a democratic political system. He further argued that the founders of Pakistan, Jinnah, and Liaqat Ali Khan, did not conceive of a theocratic state, but rather a state where people would be free to practice Islam, and there would be the rule of law and equal economic opportunities for all (Burki, 1988; Chengappa, 2002; Sanghro & Chandio, 2019).

Talbot observed that no political leader had enjoyed mass public support since Jinnah. With his charismatic personality, Bhutto had a national appeal among the masses. His liberal outlook resonated with public aspirations of social justice and a modernist Pakistan. His political processions became historical with the attendance of millions (Talbot, 2005, pp. 215-218; Wolpert, 1993). After becoming the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1972, Bhutto implemented his proposed Islamic socialism by announcing the nationalisation of industries, education, and health, and introduced land reform, and civil services reforms. Bhutto's foreign policy was focused on forging close ties with the Muslim states across the world. He took a staunch anti-India stance and highlighted the dynamics of relations with India as a national security threat to Pakistan (Bahadur, 1977, p. 121; Chengappa, 2002).

The current constitution of Pakistan, known as the 1973 constitution, was promulgated during Bhutto's elected government. Article 251 of the 1973 constitution declared Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. English was the official language. Appropriate measures were to be adopted to replace English with Urdu. Furthermore, in addition to the national language, provinces could teach, promote, and use folk languages at the provincial level (Jawad, Ali, Assad, & Sohail, 2021).

The above discussion demonstrates that Bhutto's view of socialist economy, democratic form of government, a modern Muslim state, Urdu as the national language, continued use of English as official language, shared external threat from India and emphasis on friendly relations with the Muslim states constituted his view of shared high culture which would be suitable for civic nationalism of Pakistan. Bhutto's electoral victory indicated that his idea of an Islamic socialist state was well-received among the people of West Pakistan. In line with Gellner's zone one nationalism, the above discussion indicates that the political elite who came into power at the center proposed and prompted a shared civic nationalism of the aforementioned characteristics.

3.2.2 Ethnic nationalism in Pakistan during 1971

To understand the extent of deep divisions among folk cultures in Pakistan, it is helpful to discuss situations in Balochistan and Sindh in some detail.

3.2.2.1 Baloch Ethnic Nationalism

Balochistan is situated in the southwest of Pakistan and shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Balochistan covers 42 percent of current Pakistan's geographical area and 5.94 percent of the country's total population (Cohen, 2004). To understand the dynamics of Baloch ethnic nationalism, it is necessary to outline the brief historical context. Historically the region has been very underdeveloped, highest in illiteracy, and had distinct tribal cultures and local languages like Balochi, Brahui, and Pashto (Breseeg, 2001; Siddiqi, 2012).

During the partition of the Indian sub-continent, Baloch tribal leadership was divided into pro-Pakistan and pro-independence stances. At the time of independence, the accession with Pakistan was discussed in negotiations between Jinnah and the Khan of Kalat, the ruler of British Balochistan of the Indian sub-continent, who aspired to be an independent neighbouring state of Pakistan (Harrison, 1981; Veena, 2015). However, 54 members of Shahi Jirga (council of tribal

chiefs) and members of Quetta[2] municipality decided in favour of accession with Pakistan on July 29, 1947 (Cheema & Riemer, 1990, p. 61; Talbot, 1988). M. Ahmed and Khan (2017) argued that the political mindset of the Baloch leadership has been divided into two categories, "federalist-nationalists" and "hard core-nationalists." The first one strongly favours maximum provincial autonomy and complete control over the economic resources of the province. In contrast, the other demands the right of self-determination and secession from the state of Pakistan.

The local Baloch tribal leaders, who also started to take part in Pakistan's mainstream politics, strongly opposed the central government's One-Unit scheme in 1955, criticized it as an attempt to dissolve the distinct Baloch identity and ensure the dominance of Punjab over Balochistan's resources (Sheikh, 2018, p. 142). The staunch nationalists took a more aggressive stance against One-Unit and started an armed insurgency. The situation led to an invasion by Pakistan's military on 6 October 1958, a day before the first declaration of martial law in Pakistan (Cohen, 2004, p. 220; Harrison, 1981, p. 27). Another insurgency was started in 1963. These insurgencies aimed to reduce the central government and army's role in the region. Both were considered as a means of non-Baloch domination or a means of Punjabi domination. However, in 1970, One-Unit was abolished, and Balochistan experienced its first general elections as a province (Sheikh, 2018, pp. 142-143).

The brief historical context indicates that Balochistan did not benefit from the British education system in colonial India. Balochistan did not want to be a part of Pakistan. The accession with Pakistan was decided in a Shahi Jirga and not through the general elections of 1946. During the formative years, the provincial political elite of Balochistan viewed the central government as a

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[2] The only urbanized and relatively developed city and the current provincial capital of Balochistan.

form of domination of Punjab's folk culture. There was strong opposition against the central government's control over Balochistan.

3.2.2.2 Baloch Nationalism in Post-Divided Pakistan from 1971 Onwards

According to the 1971 election results, the National Awami Party (NAP), a Pakhtun nationalist political party and a religious-political party historically in favour of the Pakistan Movement, Jamiat-e-Ulama-Islam (JUI), won 11 out of 20 seats and formed a coalition government in Balochistan (Majeed & Hashmi, 2014; Sheikh, 2018). The result indicated that at provincial level the political elite with strong ethnic and religious leanings won the first general elections of Balochistan. After having a due share in power, a coalition of NAP-JUI led by the provincial political elite and religious elite formed a government in Balochistan and NWFP. Martial law was lifted in April 1972. Sindhi and Punjabi dominant PPP government was at the center. PPP had provincial governments in Punjab and Sindh. Opposition parties led NAP-JUI coalition governments in Balochistan, and NWFP started working for the first time since the establishment of Pakistan. However, the relationship between the center and the provincial government of Balochistan and NWFP lacked cooperation and opposed each other's decisions. The policy steps taken by the Balochistan provincial government, and the central government led to even deeper ethnic divisions.

Like other parts of Pakistan, Balochistan was administered by Punjabi origin's civil and military bureaucracy. In 1972, Balochistan only had 5 percent of Baloch civil servants (T. Ali, 1983, p. 117). The development projects initiated by the central government were taken as a conspiracy to ensure Punjab dominated central control over Balochistan. As mentioned by a provincial political elite of Balochistan, Khair Bux Marri,

> Most of the roads in Balochistan are not for our benefit but to make it easier for the military to control us and for the Punjabis to rob us. The issue is not whether to develop but whether to develop with or without autonomy. Exploitation has now adopted the name of development (Harrison, 1981, p. 47).

The statement indicates that the provincial political elite of Balochistan had profound mistrust towards the development decisions of the political elite in power at the center.

After assuming the governance in the province, the provincial political elite took steps to contain the dominance of Punjabi bureaucrats in the Balochistan civil services. The provincial government actively pursued de-Punjabization of the province by the expulsion of Punjabi employees to the province of their birth and recruiting local Balochs. As a result, 2600 policemen from Punjab, some from Sindh and NWFP, were sent back to their respective provinces. Without approval from the central government, a local police force was formulated titled Baloch Dehi Mahaz (Baloch Rural Security Guards). Several hundred local Baloch men were recruited to Baloch Dehi Mahaz. Even with the policy of repatriation of low level employees, the dominance of Punjab could not have been reduced as almost all the secretaries and heads of departments were from Punjab, and the Balochistan government did not have replacements to match their seniority and experience (Breseeg, 2001, pp. 65-66; Siddiqi, 2012).

De-Punjabiztion of Balochistan by the provincial political elite can be viewed as promotion of ethnic nationalism. Reducing Punjabi dominance from the province meant limiting the central government's influence and ensuring more power for the provincial political elite at the provincial level. The de-Punjabization policy was viewed with great displeasure by the political elite in power at the centre and was perceived as a challenge to the state's authority. After the breakaway of East Pakistan, demands and measures leading to maximum provincial autonomy were susceptible to

being interpreted as secessionist designs. Subsequently, there was a tense working environment between the centre and the province.

On February 12, 1973, the ten-month-old Balochistan provincial government was dissolved by Prime Minister Bhutto. Bhutto replaced the provincial government with direct rule by the governor and a governor of his choice. The elected provincial political and religious elites were charged with several constitutional violations and with planning disintegration with foreign forces (India), a charge never proved (Jetly, 2014; Siddiqi, 2012). The dissolution of the provincial government was triggered by the confiscation of Russian arms from the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. There was no proof that the arms were destined for Balochistan to facilitate Baloch insurgents against the state (N. Alvi, 2016). However, the dismissal of the provincial government was justified by an alleged threat to the national integration of Pakistan. Bhutto claimed that in the greater interest of Pakistan to flourish as a strong democracy, he had facilitated the NAP-JUI coalition which formed a provincial government in Balochistan and NWFP. However, after looking at the ethnically driven governance of NAP-JUI in Balochistan and the threat to national security, he had to dissolve Balochistan's provincial government (N. Alvi, 2016).

The dismissal caused reactions like the resignation of the NAP-JUI coalition government in NWFP and instigated armed insurgency in Balochistan. Armed encounters between Baloch guerrillas and Pakistan's military started in April 1973, less than six weeks after the dissolution of the provincial government (Harrison, 1981, pp. 35-36; Majeed & Hashmi, 2014). The armed insurgency saw its peak in September 1974, when Pakistan's air force launched a major operation against Baloch guerrillas attacking from the mountains (Breseeg, 2001, pp. 253-254; Harrison, 1981, pp. 35-36). Estimates indicate that some 80,000 Pakistan soldiers and 50,000 Baloch guerrillas participated in this conflict. Over four years, the insurgency claimed the lives of 3,300 troops, 5,300 Baloch

guerrillas, and several hundred non-combat civilians were caught in the crossfire (Harrison, 1978, p. 139; 1981). At the same time, thousands of civilians were displaced due to continuous fighting (Janmahmad, as cited in, Breseeg, 2001, p. 254).

Long and violent insurgency in Balochistan ended after the military's overthrow of Bhutto government in July 1977. Although active confrontation was stopped, the insurgency, which started due to the central government's dismissal of the provincial government in Balochistan, ended with Punjab dominated military takeover of the government, permanently damaging any prospects of the shared form of nationalism in Pakistan, at least with regard to Balochistan, and perhaps more generally.

Khalid Bin Sayeed (1980) and N. Alvi (2016) argued that in Balochistan, the provincial political elite and the political elite in power at the national level had contesting approaches towards the power and influence they wanted to exercise. The situation in Balochistan can be viewed through Gellner's third zone of nationalism. The folk culture of the province contested the folk culture in power at the center. It is argued that the political elites could not form a democratic working relationship between the center and the province.

The provincial political elite promoted ethnic nationalism and were opposed to the center's policies towards the province. The political elite in power at the center emphasized promoting civic nationalism in Pakistan. However, the central government dissolved the democratically elected provincial government in Balochistan, and the situation led to the resignation of the provincial government of NWFP. The center justified the dissolution of the democratically elected provincial government over an alleged national security threat. However, it is difficult to ignore that the dissolution of provincial governments politically benefited the political elite in power at the center as they assumed the governance of all four provinces of Pakistan. The situation tells us that civic

117

nationalism promoted by the political elite in power at the center was contested by ethnic nationalism promoted by the provincial political elite of Balochistan. Moreover, when promoting civic nationalism, the political elites in power at the center sought short term self-interests to expand control to all four provinces. Similarly, the provincial political elites, promoting ethnic nationalism, were also seeking short-term self-interests of consolidating control within Balochistan.

3.2.3   Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan's Sindh

Historically the socio-economic structure of Sindh could be described as rural and Sindhi speaking people in a feudal system with a massive class difference between land owners and peasantry and almost no modern education, especially among the Muslim population (Ishtiaq Ahmed, 1996). The province comparatively had a very small urban population located in the port city of Karachi, the hub of modern economic activities, which became the first capital of Pakistan.

On August 14, 1947, Sindh experienced a mass migration of Muslims into the province. Although religiously Muslim, the people had different linguistic and cultural backgrounds and were called Muhajirs (migrants). The Muhajirs were Urdu speaking, urban-born, well-educated, and had exposure to businesses and administration. These factors contributed to far better socio-economic circumstances for them as compared to the local Sindhi population. Almost all the Muhajirs were settled in urban cities of Sindh, such as Karachi, Sukkar, and Hyderabad. Better education and administrative experience allowed Muhajirs to fill administrative posts left vacant by the Hindus (Ishtiaq Ahmed, 1996; Siddiqi, 2012).

Karachi is often regarded as the economic and industrial hub of Pakistan. Urbanization and industrialization of the city led people from all folk cultures to move to the city in search of economic opportunities. Punjabi and Pakhtun were the ethnic groups who migrated to Karachi

between 1960 to 1980, rural Sindhis moved to Karachi and surrounding urban-industrial regions later during 1970 to 1990s, and as a result of Soviet invasions, the city experienced massive migration of Afghan refugees during 1980-1990s (U. Javaid & Hashmi, 2012; Verkaaik, 2016). Over the years, Sindhi became the dominant ethnicity of rural Sindh. Urban Sindh became a multi-ethnic region of Pakistan, with Muhajir as the dominant ethnicity.

Until 1968, there was not a single Sindhi in Pakistan's military at general rank while, there were almost 23 percent of Muhajirs above or equivalent to Brigadier grade (Amin, 1988, p. 82; Kennedy, 1991). Moreover, by the 1970s, most of the large business corporations and prominent industrialists in Pakistan were Karachi-based Muhajirs (Ishtiaq Ahmed, 1996; Kennedy, 1991). The discussion demonstrates that soon after the establishment of Pakistan, the folk culture of Sindh was threatened by the Punjabi and Muhajir folk cultures.

3.2.3.1 Ethnic Nationalism in Sindh from 1971 Onward

After the disintegration of the nation in 1971, a Sindhi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. On July 7, 1972, the PPP dominated Sindh provincial assembly passed a Language Bill, which made Sindhi the sole official language of the province (Jaffrelot & Rais, 1999; S. V. R. Nasr, 1994). All non-Sindhi-speaking people were required to learn the language within three months if they wanted to keep their jobs and if they wanted to be recruited for new jobs (Ishtiaq Ahmed, 1996). The language bill triggered language riots between Urdu and Sindhi-speaking communities of Sindh. The situation became so serious that Bhutto had to intervene and extend the time to learn the Sindhi language to twelve years. However, when it expired in July 1984, the succeeding military regime ignored the twelve-year time limit (Siddiqi, 2012).

The PPP controlled the government at the center and in Sindh; therefore, the political elite in power at the center and in the province was the same political party, PPP, and had shared Sindhi ethnicity.

119

At national level, the PPP's political elite propagated Islamic socialism with the special emphasis on socialist economy to ensure equal economic opportunities to the people of Pakistan. However, in Sindh the political elite of PPP introduced policies that limited economic opportunities for non-Sindhi speaking people of Sindh. Moreover, the Language Bill of 1972 was also against the spirit of the 1973 constitution which mentioned that at the provincial level, provinces can teach, promote, and use provincial language in addition to the national language Urdu and not as its replacement. Bhutto relaxed the compulsion that learning Sindhi could be achieved in twelve years instead of three months. Bhutto's decision to extend the learning time of Sindhi up to twelve years demonstrates that he resolved to a temporary solution instead of solving it permanently according to the constitutional provision on national and provincial languages. Article 251 of the 1973 constitution declared Urdu as national language and allows provinces to teach and promote folk languages at the provincial level, however, the constitution did not allow to impose learning Sindhi on non-Sindhi speaking population of Sindh.

By 1973, combining federal and provincial level, Muhajirs held 33.5 percent of higher posts in civil services while Sindhis held 3.7 percent. To address this situation, PPP government introduced a new quota system to ensure rural Sindhi representation in provincial and federal civil services. Although the change in the quota system did not affect the over-representation of Muhajirs in bureaucracy, it gravely affected the possibility of future employment for middle and lower class Muhajirs (Kennedy, 1991; Siddiqi, 2012). From 1973 to 1983, there was a 10 percent fall in the recruitment of Muhajirs in Sindh while Sindh's share in the federal services rose from 3.1 to 5.1 percent (Kennedy, 1987a, p. 188). Wright explained this change in the status of Muhajirs as "peripheralization of the Muhajirs" (Theodore P. Wright, 1991).

Ahmar argued that the government policies led to the "Muhajir alienation and ethnic polarization," he also argued that such ethnic tendencies were not present in Muhajirs at the time of migration to Pakistan rather, they were developed afterward mostly from 1971 onwards (Ahmar, 1996). On the event of partition of the Indian sub-continent, many Muslims living in various regions of the Indian sub-continent decided to migrate to Pakistan, a Muslim majority independent nation-state, where they were called "Muhajir" (migrants). The Muhajirs were people of Muslim faith, in general they had benefited from the British education system, had a modern education, had often held administrative positions, or had a sound business background, had sometimes been active in national politics, spoke Urdu, and they chose to become the citizens of Pakistan in 1947. At the time of the establishment of Pakistan, Urdu-speaking migrants did not have any association with distinct folk cultures of Pakistan such as Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi, Pakhtun, or Bengali; rather they were associated with the broader civic identity of a Pakistani. In the formative years, Muhajir and Punjabi political elite were in power at the national level. Muhajir and Punjabis had significant representation in civil bureaucracy and the military. Therefore, Muhajirs had a closer association with the civic identity of Pakistan and promoted civic nationalism during the formative years. However, this changed over the succeeding years.

The discussion on the dynamics of ethnic nationalism in Sindh demonstrates that from 1971 onward, Pakistan witnessed the emergence of Muhajir (migrants) as a new ethnic group. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan because his political party, PPP won by strong mandate from Sindh and Punjab. He through his statements and the 1973 constitution claimed to be committed to the promotion of democracy, equal social and economic opportunities. He supported use of the Urdu language as the national language of Pakistan and provincial languages to be used in addition to the national language and not as a substitute. However, in the case of

Sindh, the political elite of PPP in power at the national and provincial level introduced policies like a quota system to reserve jobs for Sindhis, making it mandatory to learn the Sindhi language for non-Sindhi speakers if they wanted to keep government jobs or wanted to be recruited for future employment. These policies favoured people of Sindhi folk culture.

The policies meant limited economic opportunities for the Muhajir community in Sindh. Their disadvantageous position led to the emergence of Muhajir folk culture, which competed with Sindhi folk culture in power at the national and provincial level. At the national level, the political elite of PPP associated themselves with civic nationalism and claimed to ensure equal economic opportunities, preservation of national and provincial languages. But in Sindh, the same political elite of PPP introduced policies which promoted ethnic nationalism and initiated competition against Sindhi folk culture which was in power at national and provincial level. This shows that political elites were promoting different and competing forms of nationalism at national level and provincial level. At national level they promoted civic nationalism as it benefited them to gain mass public support. And at provincial level they promoted ethnic nationalism which benefited people of their own folk culture Sindh and proved to be disadvantageous to the Muhajir community of Sindh, forcing them to assert their own distinct folk culture. For the political elite in power at center and in Sindh, the promotion of Sindhi ethnic nationalism in Sindh was beneficial for securing a Sindhi ethnic support base.

3.2.4   An Analysis of Competing Civic and Ethnic Nationalism

The above discussion demonstrates that during the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, as opposed to the formulation of shared national identity, Pakistan experienced the creation of new folk cultures with deeper divisions on ethnic lines. Although the situations in Balochistan and Sindh were not without challenges, the role of the political elite in power at the center was aimed

more at promoting the domination of their own folk culture over other folk cultures. Decisions by Bhutto, like dismissing Balochistan's provincial government, introducing a quota system that favoured people of Sindh while limiting economic opportunities for Muhajirs, and the imposition of Sindhi language on non-Sindhi speaking population, all contributed to creating competition and rivalry among ethnicities.

The situation in Balochistan and Sindh can be viewed through Gellner's third zone of nationalism. During Bhutto's government, the domination of Punjabi and Sindhi folk culture in power at national level was contested by the folk culture of Balochistan. In Sindh, the domination of Sindhi folk culture in power at national and provincial level was contested by Muhajir folk culture.

The discussion indicates that from 1971 onward, in the case of Balochistan, the situation in Pakistan was dominated by competing civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The political elite in power at provincial level promoted ethnic nationalism. The political elite in power at the national level justified actions against the provincial government under the argument of preserving civic nationalism in Pakistan. In the case of Sindh, the policies of the Sindhi dominant central and provincial government promoted Sindhi ethnic nationalism that benefited Sindhi folk culture and proved to be disadvantageous for Muhajir folk culture. The situation in Sindh created competing ethnic nationalism. Visible competition among existing folk cultures of Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan and the emergence of competing Muhajir folk culture supports hypothesis one of this thesis that civic and ethnic nationalism competes in Pakistan.

Regarding hypothesis two, the discussion thus far finds that the political elite in power at national and provincial level were promoting different and competing civic and ethnic nationalism as it served their short term self-interests. During Bhutto's elected government the policies towards Sindh and Balochistan cannot be regarded as civic in nature. Rather the situation can be viewed as

123

Punjabi and Sindhi political elite in power at the national level were promoting civic nationalism at the national level and promoting ethnic nationalism at the provincial level as it was serving their short term self-interests to consolidate power at the center and the provincial level. The political elite in power at the center justified the dissolution of Balochistan provincial government by using the argument of civic nationalism. However, they were also politically benefited as PPP then controlled all four provinces of Pakistan. In Sindh, the political elite in power at the national and provincial levels promoted Sindhi ethnic nationalism to consolidate their Sindhi voter support base and created a contesting Muhajir folk culture in the process.

3.2.5   Competing Religious Nationalism in Pakistan from 1971 to 1977

Religion plays a significant role in Pakistan's politics. However, the political and religious elites promote different and contesting approaches towards the role of religion in shaping Pakistan's shared nationalism. The difference lies between modernist and traditionalist interpretations of Islam. In the previous chapter, we learned that religious nationalism contested the civic nationalism promoted by the political and military elites in power at the national level. Religious nationalism also competed with ethnic nationalism promoted by the Bengali provincial political elite. This contested approach towards the role of religion continued until the breakaway of the nation on ethnic lines in 1971.

At the time of Pakistan's first general elections in 1970, there were three major political forces in Pakistan. The Awami League ran its election campaign on Bengali ethnic nationalism. PPP's campaign slogan was Roti, Kapra aur Makan (Bread, Clothes and Houses) to be achieved through Islamic socialism with an emphasis on a socialist economy. Religious political parties ran active election campaigns over the need for a truly Islamic state. Three religious-political parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat-Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan, and Jamiat-Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) took active part in

the campaign. During the election campaign for the 1970 elections, religious political parties opposed Bengali ethnic nationalism and Islamic socialism. Staunch ideological opposition to Islamic socialism came from the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Maulana Mawdudi. Maulana Mawdudi was the same member of the religious elite who opposed Muslim nationalism in favour of Islamic nationalism and did not support the demand for an independent Pakistan (Chengappa, 2002). Mawdudi questioned why the PPP was using the term Islamic socialism, why not Islamic State? He designated Bhutto's Islamic socialism as dubious and ill-intentioned. The religious elites accused Bhutto of being irreligious and misleading to the actual spirit of Islam. Bhutto's idea of a socialist economy was declared un-Islamic by the religious elites (Chengappa, 2002; Sanghro & Chandio, 2019).

The proposed version of civic nationalism comprising socialist economy, democratic state, and a modern Muslim state by the political elite was contested by the religious elite in favour of religious nationalism during the election campaign. However, the outcome of the 1970 elections showed that the appeal for the formation of an Islamic state was not widely popular. JI won only 4 National Assembly seats and 4 out of 331 seats in all provincial assemblies of East and West Pakistan. JUI and JUP won 7 seats each in the National Assembly (Baxter, 1971; S. Kumar, 2001b).

After the general elections of 1971, Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. At the provincial level, only one religious political party, Jamiat-Ulama-Islam (JUI), was able to make a coalition government with National Awami Party (NAP) in Balochistan and NWFP. NAP was an ethnically oriented political party, only popular in Balochistan and NWFP. It is important to note here that the religious elite who otherwise contests ethnic nationalism did not give up the opportunity to form provincial governments through coalition with ethnically oriented provincial political elite. However, after only ten months of the coalition government, in 1972, the dissolution

of the Balochistan provincial assembly by Bhutto and, in protest to it, the resignation of the NWFP coalition government set forth the strong opposition of the political elite in the center by the religious elite who lost the provincial governments.

Despite opposition, Bhutto governed Pakistan for five years until 1977. He is given credit for the formation of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan. Pakistan still has the same constitution. The 1973 constitution passed under Bhutto's government is regarded as more Islamic as compared to the previous two constitutions of 1956 and 1962 (Wolf- Philip, 1989, as cited in Mehdi, 1994, pp. 97-102). Along with the provisions that all the laws are required to follow the guidance provided in the Koran and Shariah, the 1973 constitution declared Islam as the state's religion and required both President and Prime Minister to be Muslims.

Bhutto's government took credit for providing the definition of a Muslim in the constitution, a person who believes that Muhammad is the last prophet, something the previous two constitutions were unable to achieve. Another significant provision of the constitution was to pursue special relations with Muslim states across the world as the state's official policy (Mehdi, 1994; Wolpert, 1993). Although the PPP government took credit for providing the definition of a Muslim in the 1973 constitution, it is important to note that this fulfilled the longstanding demand of religious elites, initially made in 1953, to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims. According to the 1973 constitution, Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims.

When 1977 general elections were called there was no other mainstream political party that could match the popularity of PPP at national level. The strongest opposition to Bhutto's PPP came from an alliance of religious political parties. Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), an alliance of multiple religious-political parties and a few conventional political parties was formed in January 1977. The political agenda of PNA was to call for the implementation of Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of

the Prophet Mustafa or Islamic system). PNA mobilized people against Bhutto's regime based on a religious agenda (S. Kumar, 2001b; Ziring, 2003b, pp. 156-157).

PNA had put enough pressure that PPP had to include commitments in its 1977 election manifesto like making the teaching of the Koran a compulsory part of general education, the establishment of a Federal Ulama Academy, the strengthening of the Islamic Research Institute in Islamabad, and ensuring increased pilgrimage capacity for the Muslims of Pakistan (S. Kumar, 2001b; Mehdi, 1994). The word socialism was removed from PPP's official party literature and was replaced by Musawaat-e-Muhammadi (Islamic egalitarianism) (Chengappa, 2002; W. L. Richter, 1979b).

The discussion so far indicates that the religious elite promoting religious nationalism posed a strong opposition to the political elite in power at the center who were promoting civic nationalism. However, the political elite in power at the center only incorporated religion in politics to the extent they saw fit, and in line with the proposed civic nationalism characterised as Islamic socialism. The Islamic provisions of the 1973 constitution demonstrated that the political elite's view on the role of religion in shaping Pakistan's national identity and politics did not meet the religious elite aspirations of a truly Islamic state. Even though before 1977 elections, the PPP had to add a few religious commitments in its manifesto, but these provisions can be viewed as of a political nature and were not any closer to making Pakistan a truly Islamic state as aspired to by the religious elites.

Pakistan's second general elections were held in March 1977. PPP won 155 of 200 National Assembly seats. PNA won 36 seats. At the provincial level, Punjab remained a stronghold of the PPP. In Sindh, the PPP won a majority but the effect of PPP's ethnically oriented policies favouring Sindhi over Muhajirs was seen. PPP won Sindhi dominant rural constituencies and lost Muhajir dominant urban constituencies. PNA boycotted the elections in Balochistan because of the ongoing military operation against Baloch insurgents. In NWFP, PPP lost to PNA (Weinbaum, 1977). The

1977 election results demonstrated that other than in the NWFP, the alliance of religious-political parties promoting nationalism lost the national and provincial assemblies elections to the PPP.

PNA refused to accept election results and started a general strike and mass protest against Bhutto and PPP (M. Ali, 1977; Weinbaum, 1977). PNA continued to create powerful religious-political opposition, calling elections rigged and demanding new elections. The religious-political unrest resulted in the declaration of third martial law in Pakistan's history on July 5, 1977, by General Zia-ul-Haq (W. L. Richter, 1979b; Ziring, 2003b). Bhutto was jailed and found guilty of conspiracy to murder in March 1978, he was denied clemency by General Zia on the pretext that it would be against Islamic justice and was hanged on April 4, 1979 (Ziring, 2003b).

The attempts by the religious elite to create religious nationalism invokes Gellner's zone five of nationalism. Religious elites and religious-political parties played an active part in Pakistan's national politics. During the 1970 general elections campaign, religious elites opposed civic and ethnic nationalism promoted by the political elite of East and West Pakistan. Religious elites promoted religious nationalism in the 1970 election campaign. From 1971 onward, religious elites opposed the Bhutto central government for not being Islamic. The opposition between the political elite in power at the national level and the religious elites became intense after the religious and provincial political elite led provincial governments in Balochistan and NWFP were forced out of power by the central government in 1972. When NAP-JUI coalition formed the provincial government in Balochistan and NWFP it meant that religious elite were in coalition with the provincial political elites who were promoting ethnic nationalism. Therefore, even though ideologically religious nationalism contests against ethnic nationalism, for the short term political gain of forming provincial governments, religious elite did not mind being in coalition with the ethnically oriented provincial political elite.

In the next general elections of 1977, religious political parties emerged as opposition parties and contested elections based on the religious agenda of making Pakistan a truly Islamic state. Although the alliance of religious political parties was unable to win the majority, they strongly contested the political elite's view of civic nationalism in favour of religious nationalism. Therefore, the high culture of Islam competed with the proposed high culture by the political elite in power. By 1977, opposition from religious elites grew so strong that even after losing the elections to PPP, their protest and subsequent unrest made it impossible for the political elite to form a government according to the 1977 election mandate. The unrest eventually led to the declaration of third martial law in July 1977.

The above discussion validates the hypothesis one and two of this thesis that during 1971 to 1977, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan were in competition with each other. The political elite in power at the national level were promoting civic nationalism. Promoting civic nationalism served their short term self-interests of exercising strong control across four provinces. At the provincial level, the political elites promoted ethnic nationalism as it served their self-interests of securing their ethnic support bases. The religious elites promoted religious nationalism. Pakistan's political history demonstrates that religion is a strong political force in Pakistan. Despite the lack of electoral success promotion of religious nationalism provided religious elites with the power to mobilize masses in support of the religious agenda. Even though they were in no position to form the national government, their protest was so effective that Bhutto was unable to form a government the second time his party won an election. It was in the short term self-interests of religious elites to promote religious nationalism as it enabled them to stop the democratically elected political elite from forming a government.

3.3 Competing Civic, Ethnic, and Religious Nationalism during 1977-1988

General Zia-ul-Haq graduated from the University of Dehli and was among the last batch of officers commissioned before partition in 1945 from the Royal Indian Military Academy at Dehradun. He remained President of Pakistan until he died in an airplane explosion on August 17, 1988. With eleven years of rule, Zia's regime is the longest in Pakistan's political history. General Zia-ul-Haq was a Punjabi Muslim. He had modern educational and military background under colonial rule. At a personal level, he was a devout Muslim with firm religious leanings.

On July 5, 1977, in his first address to the people of Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq stated, "Pakistan which was created in the name of Islam will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of the Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country" (Zia-ul-haq 1977, as cited in H. Abbas, 2005, p. 92; W. L. Richter, 1979b, p. 555). The statement indicates that, with the declaration of martial law, a military elite of religious mindset with the purpose of building an Islamic state came into power in Pakistan. During the military elite's governance, Pakistan experienced unprecedented Islamization of state policies. In February 1978, A. K. Brohi, Legal Advisor of Zia-ul-Haq, mentioned that after the coup, Zia's primary concern was "to put the country on the Islamic system" (W. L. Richter, 1979b, p. 555).

Ziring argued that Zia was more interested in building an "Islamic State" than an "Islamic Republic" (Ziring, 1984, 1988). Ziring differentiated the Islamic republic as closer to the democratic and liberal form of government and the Islamic state as an authoritarian form of government with sole emphasis on Islam as a source of power and unity of nation (Ziring, 1984). General Zia-ul-Haq sought to create a presidential form of government to achieve an Islamic state. Zia was of view that parliamentary democracy does not serve the spirit of Islam (H. A. Rizvi, 1986). The 1973 constitution was not abrogated but was significantly changed by introducing over

sixty amendments which consolidated power at the hands of the President, who could also keep the designation of Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Political parties were banned in 1979 (W. L. Richter, 1979a; H. A. Rizvi, 1986). Weiss (1986) observed that Zia's Islamization was visible in the judicial system, Islamic penal system, economic system, and education system.

Zia introduced Hudood Ordinances, a combination of four ordinances, on February 10, 1979. The ordinance mainly discussed the transformation of Pakistan's legal and economic system on religious lines. The ordinances were aimed at evaluating the severity of crime according to Islam and granting punishment prescribed in Sharia. Under the ordinances Islamic punishments like lashing, stoning and amputation were introduced in Pakistan for the first time. Federal Shariat Courts (FSC) were established in 1980; they ran parallel to the conventional court system and were aimed at implementing a legal system based on Islam. FSC had the power to review existing laws if they were not in compliance with Islam (Kennedy, 1987b; Lau, 2007). While making a statement on the anniversary of Jinnah, General Zia-ul-Haq stated that, "the measures which are being initiated today to establish Islamic social order in Pakistan are the true manifestation of Jinnah's dreams" (General Zia-ul-Haq, 1980, as cited in Safi, 2021, p. 41).

Furthermore, Zia's martial law presented a unique opportunity for the religious-political parties, as they became part of the central government for the first time. Zia formulated a Majlis-i-Shura (advisory council), a body of around three hundred non-elected members, answerable to the President. The Majlis-i-Shura was constituted of ulama (clerics), religious elites from religious-political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, farmers, engineers, and industrial workers. It also included a few political elites from mainstream political parties, who left their parties to become part of the military government. The Majlis was a consultative body and did not have power over the President or to implement its recommendations (Ziring, 1988, 2003b).

The discussion on General Zia's martial law demonstrates that the dynamics of civic nationalism changed during the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. Zia in his first address to the nation showed his commitment to transform Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. The policies that followed conformed to his vision of Islamization according to the Koran and Shariah. I argue that this time the military elite in power at the center prescribed religious nationalism as the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. It was the first time in Pakistan's political history that religion was prescribed as the state's high culture by the military elite in power at the center. Under Zia, then, Gellner's zone one style of civic nationalism was not going to be contested by the zone five style of religious nationalism rather both would be considered as the same.

However, General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime is often criticized for instrumental use of Islam for political gains. On June 10, 1980, in a public meeting Zia-ul-Haq stated,

> Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam, and Islam alone could provide the basis to run the government of the country and sustain its integrity... The present government would provide opportunity to others to serve the country after it had achieved its objectives... [but] no un-Islamic government would be allowed to succeed the present regime (General Zia-ul-Haq, 1980, as cited in Ahmad, 1996, p. 383).

The statement indicates use of religion to create political legitimacy and as justification for an indefinite military regime. Ahmad argued that "the road to salvation became the road to power as well" (Ahmad, 1996, p. 383).

In December 1984, Zia held a referendum that confirmed his presidency for the next five years. What was most significant about the referendum was that it had only one question. The referendum asked if the people of Pakistan supported the process of Islamization of all laws of the state according to the Koran and sunnah, whether they supported the Islamic ideology of Pakistan. The yes answer to this question would be considered as a vote of confidence for Zia's next five years

of presidency. The referendum got 97.7% support in its favor. As the people supported the process of Islamization, they also guaranteed Zia's presidency. There was no other option (W. L. Richter, 1985; Ziring, 2003b).

During an interview I conducted in Pakistan on February 25, 2019, Yousaf Raza Gillani, former Prime Minister of Pakistan from the Pakistan People's Party, regarded General Zia's regime as the worst form of dictatorship. While commenting on the referendum held by Zia, the former prime minister mentioned that Zia blatantly made himself synonymous with Islam. Choosing Islam would also mean he was going to be President for the next five years. Who was going to say no to Islam? In Pakistan, Islam and Islamization cannot be criticized because they are prone to manipulation by people. That is what Zia did. He manipulated Islam to keep himself in power (Gillani, February 25, 2019). The interview response demonstrates that Zia's prescribed civic nationalism based on Islam was rejected by the political elite. The political elite, whose political party, the PPP was forced out of power by Zia in 1977, viewed use of Islam to justify undemocratic rule and as a means to pursue short term self-interests including keeping himself in power.

Even though the military elite in power at the center persisted on shared religion provides Pakistan with a shared civic nationalism, the contesting nature of ethnic nationalism remained persistent during the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. From officer to the soldier level, Pakistan military had dominant representation of Punjabis. Therefore, during Zia's military regime the governance of the center and provinces was dominated by the Punjabi folk culture.

As discussed previously, four-year (1973-1977) insurgency permanently damaged the prospects of shared form of nationalism at least with regard to Balochistan. After four years, with superior force, the state overcame active insurgency in the province. General Zia ul Haq reached a truce in November 1977, and tensions were reduced by releasing the imprisoned tribal chiefs (Siddiqi,

2012, pp. 69-70). After the declaration of martial law, military's focus was shifted to administrative control of the state. Active violence was stopped but Baloch grievances against Punjab dominant central control remained persistent (Ahmad, 1996).

By the time General Zia-ul-Haq became President of Pakistan in July 1977, the ethnically awaken Muhajir community competed with Sindhi and all other ethnicities, like Pakhtun and Punjabi, migrating to Karachi in search of economic opportunities from different parts of Pakistan (F. Haq, 1995). General Zia continued the federal quota system introduced by Bhutto, favouring rural Sindhi over urban Muhajirs. In 1982, Zia-ul-Haq allocated 10 percent of vacancies for retired military personnel at the federal secretariat and public enterprises across Pakistan to consolidate the military regime (Kennedy, 1991, p. 945). As the military was dominated by Punjabi and Pakhtun, Zia's 10 percent of vacancies allocation benefited Punjabi and Pakhtun retired officers. The policy meant the continuation of Muhajir grievances against Sindh folk culture and against Punjabi and Pakhtun dominated military elite and their influence at the provincial and federal level.

In March 1984, Muhajir ethnic nationalism found political expression by the establishment of Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (Migrant National Movement, MQM); the name was later changed to Mutahida Qaumi Mahaz (United National Movement, MQM) (Ahmar, 1996). The organization proved to be a platform to promote ethnic exclusivity, violence, and political participation and demanded that Muhajirs be declared the fifth nationality of Pakistan (F. Haq, 1995; K. M. Shah & Sareen, 2019; Theodore P. Wright, 1991). Muhajir mobilization under MQM soon resulted in the ethnic riots of 1985-86, the first and violent communal riots in Pakistan's history. The violence was triggered in May 1985 by a hit and run incident, killing a female Muhajir student by a bus driven by a Pakhtun driver. November and December 1986 saw riots spread between Muhajirs and

Pakhtun from Karachi to Hyderabad. The army had to intervene to stop mass murder, destruction of businesses and properties, and restore law and order (Kennedy, 1991; Verkaaik, 2016).

The discussion demonstrates that Gellner's zone three style of nationalism remained persistent between 1977-1988. The proposed high culture of Islam was contested by the distinct folk cultures of Pakistan. During the military regime of General Zia ul Haq, Sindh became the breeding ground of ethnic polarization where multiple ethnicities were contesting with each other for a share in the economy and to preserve their ethnic identities. With the instances of communal violence occurring during this period, Zia's military regime contributed to promoting ethnic nationalism in Pakistan.

Another division emerged when religious nationalism was promoted as shared civic nationalism of Pakistan by the military elite in power at the center. The division was along sectarian lines. Soon the policy changes reflecting one school of Islamic thought began to take effect, caused opposition from those of other sects. It came to light that different sects, Shia and Sunni, and schools of thought within the Sunni sect, including Deobandi and Barelvi, interpret Islamic laws differently. For example, the state sought compulsory deduction of Islamic wealth tax known as Zakat. The Shia sect contested the Sunni system of Zakat deduction. According to Shia religious elites, the state cannot make Zakat deduction compulsory (H. Abbas, 2005, pp. 112-113).

A controversy of a similar nature emerged over Islamic punishments where the extent of Islamic punishment is interpreted differently in various sects and schools of thought. General Zia-ul-Haq was a Sunni of the Deobandi school of thought. As the state policies dominated by the Deobandi school of thought started to take effect, Sunni of the Barelvis school of thought felt disadvantaged Government appointments of mosque Imams (prayer leaders) went to Deobandi Imams. The accusations that Deobandis were favoured over Barelvis in the distribution of Zakat funds were

floated by the Barelvis (Report, 2005). Soon it became clear that Zia's proposed Islamization drawing its interpretation from just one school of thought, could not be implemented on all (Baxter, 1991). The discussion thus far indicates that the religious nationalism as shared civic nationalism of Pakistan was contested by ethnic nationalism. Moreover, the prescribed religious nationalism as shared civic nationalism was contested by different interpretations of Islam on sectarian lines.

During General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism argued in hypothesis one continued to exist in Pakistan. The military elite in power at the center sought to use religious nationalism as shared civic nationalism to avoid contestation by other forms of nationalism. However, it did not produce the desired results. Rather the outcomes projected new and deeper divisions as the proposed religious nationalism by the military elite in power at the center did not satisfy the religious elites of all sects and school of thoughts. Furthermore, religious nationalism as shared civic nationalism of Pakistan was unable to overcome contestation among folk cultures. In terms of ethnic divisions, when Zia was pursuing Islamization throughout the 1980s, it was the same time when Sindh was undergoing the violent contestation among folk cultures, where people of shared religion were looting and murdering people of different ethnicity. Zia's prolonged presidency is often criticised by the political elite of PPP as pursuing his self-interest for staying in power rather than promoting a shared form of nationalism in Pakistan.

General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime ended with his assassination on August 17, 1988. A bomb was planted in the plane he was boarding. His assassination is unresolved to this date. New elections were scheduled to be held on November 16, 1988. The Pakistan People's Party (PPP), headed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter, Benazir Bhutto, won the elections. She became Pakistan's eleventh Prime Minister on December 4, 1988.

3.4   Education and Nationalism in Pakistan after Disintegration in 1971

The thesis thus far has determined that the dynamics of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism changed during the Bhutto and Zia governments, but the three forms of nationalism remained in competition with each other. Gellner argued that a national education system can shape a shared nationalism for a state. In view of competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism promoted by the elites, the following section discusses the national education policies adopted by Bhutto and Zia during their governments.

3.4.1   Education and Nationalism in Pakistan (1970-1977)

In the final years of united Pakistan, after the resignation of General Ayub Khan due to failing health, General Yahya Khan, became President on March 25, 1969. His main task was to conduct general elections and ensure a smooth transfer of power to civilian representatives. During his short presidency, second national education policy titled "The New Education Policy 1969-1970", was announced. The policy was not a deviation from the first national education policy known as Sharif Report 1959. Through the policy of 1970 Islam was emphasized as shared national identity through national education system. The education policy of 1969-1970 did not recommend curriculum changes and was rather focused on proposing a structural framework through which effective implementation of curriculum guidelines outlined in the Sharif Report of 1959 could be achieved (Choudhry, 1999; Kazi, 1987). However, amidst the general elections of 1970, following political unrest and the disintegration of Pakistan, The New Education Policy of 1969-1970 could not be implemented.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed the office of the President of Pakistan on December 20, 1971. Education was among the few areas that gained his immediate attention. Within days of assuming power Bhutto had a meeting with vice-chancellors of the universities where he asked for their

suggestions regarding a new national education policy. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, educated at Karachi University and trained as a barrister at Lincoln Inn, London, was nominated as education minister by Bhutto. Pirzada executed Bhutto's vision regarding Pakistan's national education system. As education minister, he conducted extensive meetings with teachers, students, and officials from provincial education departments, who were asked to provide input regarding the education system (Korson, 1974). Within three months of assuming power, on March 29, 1972, Pakistan's third national education policy titled "The Education Policy 1972-1980", was announced through the Minister of Education.

3.4.1.1 Competing Approach to Civic, Ethnic and Religious Nationalism in National Education Policy of 1972

During 1970 to 1977, the political elite in power at the national level promoted the above discussed Islamic Socialism as a shared civic nationalism for Pakistan. The following discussion on national education policy of 1972 aims to analyse the political elite's approach towards the form of nationalism they were promoting. To manage the new approach to the promotion of shared civic nationalism, the nationalization of education was announced. In 1972, the literacy rate in Pakistan was 21.7 percent (Bengali, 1999b). The education policy of 1972 focused on the eradication of illiteracy by universalization of free education, promotion of adult education, and special emphasis on agricultural and technical studies to develop a skilled workforce. To achieve mass literacy educational programs were proposed to run on television and radio (*The education policy 1972-1980*, 1972). Universal and free education to be achieved through nationalization was considered fundamental for shared civic nationalism of Pakistan.

A reformed and effective National Curriculum Bureau and Curriculum Centres in each of the provinces were proposed under the 1972 policy. The purpose of a national curriculum bureau is

seemingly to formulate uniform curricula to achieve a shared national narrative. However, under this policy, the role of the national curriculum bureau was to revise and update curricula of all stages with special emphasis on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics otherwise known as STEM subjects. At the school level, the curricula were to be designed to develop the capabilities of creative thinking and expression, experimentation, and exploration among the children (*The education policy 1972-1980*, 1972).

No recommendations were made to formulate a national narrative that could be central to the national curriculum. In fact, there was just one point mentioned in the objectives of the 1972 policy: "building up national cohesion by promoting social and cultural harmony compatible with our basic ideology through conscious use of educational process" (*The education policy 1972-1980*, 1972, p. 1). However, the remaining policy document does not further link to the mentioned objective nor explain what the basic ideology was or how social and cultural cohesion will be promoted through education.

The education policy of 1972 emphasized the role of religion as significant in shaping the social life of the citizen positively. For this purpose, Islamiyat (Islamic Studies) was made a compulsory subject throughout school education. Radio and television channels will devote substantial time for the recitation of the Koran and translation. However, the responsibility of creating a religious environment and imparting religious education was also designated to the parents, so that the children could be brought up with religious minds and attitudes (*The education policy 1972-1980*, 1972). The national education policy formulated by the political elite in power at the center defined the extent of religion that the national education system was going to incorporate such as teaching Islamic studies as a subject and recitation and translation of Koran to be aired on radio and television. But the policy document clearly stated that beyond the mentioned extent of inculcation

139

of religion, developing a religious mindset and attitudes was not the state's responsibility rather parents would do this from their homes.

Regarding religious education institutes, the policy of 1972 stated that the "status quo" will be maintained in their functioning (*The education policy 1972-1980*, 1972, p. 37). This meant that madrassas would continue to function independently as a parallel system of religious education and would not be affected by the government's policy. The national education policy of 1972 did not mention anything on the language of instruction. There was no mention of national or provincial languages. The 1972 policy failed to address perhaps the most significant issue of how and to what extent the national language, Urdu, the official language, English, and provincial languages would be incorporated in the national education system to shape the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan.

The national education policy of 1972 emphasized on nationalization of education as its most important characteristic. Phase wise nationalization of education was announced and was aimed at formulating uniform administrative structure for Pakistan's national education system. The policy gave a comprehensive framework for the nationalization of privately owned schools and colleges and announced that all the staff would become government employees. To achieve this, it was announced in the education policy that all private colleges to be nationalized on September 1, 1972, and private schools will be nationalized in two years, starting from October 1, 1972 (*The education policy 1972-1980*, 1972, p. 19).

In later years, the implementation of nationalization was critically viewed by academic scholars. For example, S. Richter (2018) and Ziring (1978) argued that in the formative years education and politics in Pakistan were separate from each other; however, from 1971 onwards, after Bhutto nationalized education, the politicization of educational institutes from schools to the universities

occurred. This meant that after the nationalization, education institutes' recruitment of administrative and teaching staff became government responsibility. Thousands of vacancies were advertised and filled by the government which increased Bhutto's political support base in Punjab and Sindh and specially among Sindhi population of Sindh (*Pakistan: Reforming the education sector*, 2004). People became state employees with a sense of obligation to the Bhutto government as their employment provider. Jones and Jones (1977-1978) argued that under the Bhutto government, the nature of the teacher's profession changed from non-political towards open and defined political leanings.

During field research in Pakistan, I interviewed a retired principal of Government Boys High School, on February 11, 2019. He shared his observation by saying that Bhutto's policy of nationalization impacted Pakistan's education system in a very negative way. The principal explained that once nationalization was completed it led to hundreds of thousands of political recruitments where merit was compromised. As a young teacher in the late 1970s, he witnessed that every other administrative staff and teaching colleague was a Jeeyala (famous term to refer to PPP and Bhutto's political supporters). Nationalization ensured job security for teachers at government schools. This resulted in a drastic decline in the quality of public education in Pakistan. The teachers had secure jobs until retirement and pension benefits after retirement; therefore, they had no reason to work hard, to inculcate a shared sense of nationalism among children from diverse backgrounds. They simply had no reason to even be at schools regularly (R. Principal, February 11, 2019). If the above-mentioned account on nationalization of education is considered as a closer description of what happened after the implementation of nationalization, I argue that the approach towards national education served the short term self-interest of enhancing the political support base of the political elite in power at the center.

The discussion on national education policy between 1969 to 1970 demonstrates that the policy of 1970 was short lived and did not impact on the nationalism of Pakistan. the discussion on the National Education Policy of 1972 strengthens the argument in hypothesis three of this thesis. The education policy of 1972 lacked the objective of creating civic shared nationalism in Pakistan through education; rather, it was more focused on promoting short term self-interests of the political elite in power at the center. The nationalization of education was about structural reforms in the education system, most importantly how recruitments in education departments were going to be done and managed.

In the 1972 policy document it was unclear how free and universal education without a defined national narrative was going to shape shared civic nationalism. On the issue of Pakistan's ethnic and linguistic diversity, the education policy of 1972 did not focus on the existence of folk cultures as a challenge for the formation of the high culture or how education could play a role in building a high culture in a recently disintegrated country. Gellner argued that "those who communicate must speak the same language in some sense or another" (Gellner, 1964, p. 155). A shared medium of instruction provides people of diverse languages a shared medium of communication, and therefore, a way to formulate a shared high culture. In Pakistan with serious divisions on linguistic lines, the national education policy of 1972 failed to mention what medium of instruction the education system in Pakistan was going to have.

Pakistan's 1972 national education policy failed to acknowledge that for a state to have shared civic nationalism, a shared medium of instruction plays a fundamental role. In Sindh, Bhutto's provincial government promoted Sindhi language over the Urdu language of Muhajirs, which resulted in serious contestation against the Sindhi folk culture in power. The situation demonstrates that the political elite behind the formulation of the 1972 national education policy promoted

nationalism in ways that served their short term political goals. At the national level they promoted nationalization of education which increased their political support base and at provincial level, by not addressing the medium of instruction, they let linguistic divisions among folk cultures thrive. Therefore, under the 1972 national education policy, competing ethnic nationalism continued to exist in Pakistan.

The education policy of 1972 did not emphasize Islam as a shared force among culturally, linguistically, and ethnically diverse populations. Rather, the aim of teaching Islamic studies as a subject in schools and Koran recitation on radio and television did not mention any link to how Islam can play a role in creating shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The policy of maintaining the status quo regarding religious education institutes had two implications. On the one hand, it neutralized any challenge to the national education policy of 1972 from the religious elites. On the other hand, the undisturbed functioning of religious educational institutes allowed the continuation of traditional religious education as a parallel system of education. This led to the existence of two types of education systems in Pakistan, public schools, and madrassas. Both had different learning objectives, and different approaches towards preferred nationalism. Therefore, the National Education Policy of 1972 promoted the continued existence of competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan. The discussion thus far validates the fourth hypothesis of this thesis, that the national education policy of 1972 was ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing a shared civic nationalism in Pakistan.

3.4.2 Education and Nationalism under Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988)

In the aftermath of the political instability that followed the general elections of 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq assumed power and called for the reformation of the national education system on Islamic lines. Reshaping the national education system with a central focus on Islam was an important

agenda of Zia's regime. As discussed above, during the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, religious nationalism was promoted as the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. The following section argues that Zia's national education policy also reflected his view of religious nationalism as the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. Under Zia-ul-Haq, Islam was the answer to the question of Pakistan's national identity, to the internal challenge of diverse folk cultures, and to external challenges like the impact of the cold war (Lall, 2009b). The National Education Policy during Zia's regime was announced in February 1979.

3.4.2.1 Approach to Shared Nationalism in the National Education Policy of 1979

During Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, shared national identity of a Pakistani was solely based on Islam. Therefore, the educational narrative was reformed with the aim promoting Islam as shared high culture of Pakistan. The vision on national education was explained by mentioning that,

> The highest priority would be given to the revision of the curricula with a view to reorganizing the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation so that Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of the younger generation and helps them with the necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenets (Zia-ul-Haq, as cited in, Azhar Hussain, Salim, & Naveed, 2011).

The statement indicates the mindset of the military elite in power at the center. National education was going to be reformed around the fundamental principles of Islam. It also indicates Zia's belief that before 1977, national education was not fully synchronized with the shared national ideology of Pakistan, which is Islamic ideology. Under his leadership, Zia-ul-Haq intended to formulate shared civic nationalism through education by making an educational narrative strictly Islamic in its orientation.

The National Education Policy of 1979, informally known as Islamic Education Policy had the following salient features. As a subject, Islamiyat (Islamic studies) was made compulsory for all

144

students starting from primary school up to university level of education. Therefore, students would remain in contact with religious education throughout their student life (Lall, 2009b). About the aim of education, the national education policy of 1979 mentioned that,

> To foster in the hearts and minds of the people of Pakistan in general and the students, in particular, a deep and abiding loyalty to Islam and Pakistan and a living consciousness of their spiritual and ideological identity thereby strengthening the unity of the outlook of the people of Pakistan on the basis of justice and fair play (Education Policy 1979, p. 1 , as cited in, T. Rehman, 2002b, p. 105).

The statement explains that the purpose of education is to make students and people in general loyal to the religion which will create loyalty to Pakistan.

Another important feature of the education policy of 1979 was the emphasis on Urdu as the medium of instruction. The purpose to use Urdu as a medium of instruction was "to strengthen ideological foundations of the nation, and to foster unity of thought, brotherhood, and patriotism" (Education Policy 1979, p. 2, as cited in, T. Rehman, 2002b, p. 106). Moreover, the emphasis on Urdu also included the restriction that from April 1979, students of class one of all English medium schools will adopt Urdu or an approved provincial language as a medium of instruction instead of English (Education Policy 1979, p. 72, as cited in, T. Rehman, 2002b, p. 106).

The education policy of 1979 mentioned the use of approved provincial languages but also clarified that a "switch over to national language as medium of instruction is the ultimate aim" (Education Policy 1979, p. 71, as cited in, T. Rehman, 2002b, p. 106). The purpose behind stressing on national language as medium of instruction over provincial or folk languages was to discourage ethnic divisions based on distinct languages and cultures. As mentioned about Urdu in the policy,

> Urdu became a great repository of Muslim culture and acquired the status of a lingua franca most extensively employed as a common link language by people speaking various languages and dialects

The policy emphasized Urdu as the medium of instruction and as a shared language from north to south in Pakistan which otherwise has diverse folk languages and cultures throughout the state. The statement demonstrates that the emphasis on Urdu in the national education policy of 1979 reflects the political elite's approach of religious nationalism as shared civic nationalism as it provides a shared medium of communication across Pakistan. Moreover, Urdu is associated with the Muslim identity; therefore, it fulfilled the purpose of shaping shared civic nationalism on religious lines.

Another important step to strengthen religious nationalism as shared civic nationalism of Pakistan through education was the opening of mosque schools. The concept of mosque schools for boys and mohalla (small community) schools for girls was introduced in the national education policy of 1979 (Bengali, 1999b; Lall, 2009b). To spread literacy especially in rural areas where the number of schools was highly inadequate, the mosque in every village was to perform the task of imparting religious as well as mainstream primary school subjects. For this purpose, each mosque would have one Imam and one primary school teacher. Along with studying the Koran, students in these schools were to take informal education in primary school subjects making them capable of admission to formal schools in higher classes such as from VI-grade and VIII grade onward (Bengali, 1999b; Lall, 2009b).

In 1981, the Literacy and Mass Education Commission (LAMEC) was established. From 1983 to 1988, many initiatives were taken to achieve mass literacy. The utilization of mosque schools remained part of the federal government's education policy under the military regime. For example, between 1984-86, Mosque Literacy Centres were to be established with the purpose of running Urdu-Arabic integrated courses by the mosque Imam. Funding of millions in rupees were

allocated for the execution of such programs. However, the initiatives taken under LAMEC were not a success rather, many of the programs were abandoned in initial phases due to "conceptual inadequacies and improper supervision system" (Bengali, 1999b).

The broad range of mass literacy programs and their individual failure is not the subject of this thesis; however, it is important to point out that the policy regarding mosque schools led to the establishment of numerous unsupervised mosque schools in Pakistan. Mosque schools lacked a standardized approach. The local members, like the Imam and primary school teachers, without any mechanism of national supervision, were in sole charge of imparting religious and other school subjects largely based on their level of competence, their own understanding and interpretation of religion, and according to their own religious school of thought within Islam. The military elite in power at the center promoted mosque schools to promote high culture based on Islam. However, unstandardized, and unsupervised mosque school education gave way to indoctrination of different religious interpretations, depending on each Imam's religious school of thought or sect. Thus, the possibility of formulating a uniform national education narrative based on Islam which could lead to the formulation of a shared high culture, or a shared civic nationalism, was contested by various interpretations of religion.

3.4.2.2 Competing Approaches to Shared Nationalism Promoted through National Education Policy of 1979

A significant policy step taken under Zia-ul-Haq's leadership was the initiative of bringing madrassas into the mainstream education system. This initiative is considered as important because the military elite in power at the center were promoting religious nationalism as a shared civic nationalism, therefore, the initiative reflected the military elite's approach to achieve some level

of integration between the parallel system of madrassa education and the mainstream national education system. In this regard a comprehensive effort was initiated during Zia's military regime.

Since the establishment of Pakistan, Madrassas came under the domain of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and were dealt with under its Auqaf (Endowment) Wing. When Zia-ul-Haq ordered the mainstreaming of madrassas education there were four madrassa boards in Pakistan. Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Deobandi) established in 1958, Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Barelvi) established in 1960, Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Shia) established in 1962, Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Salafia) established in 1978. The presence of these madrassas board demonstrates that Sunni and Shia sects, and school of thoughts within the Sunni sect, had independent boards for their madrassas which means the curricula of religious education was different under each board.

In September 1978, Zia-ul-Haq ordered the Ministry of Religious Affairs to prepare a report on the status of Madrassas of Sargodha Division, a district in Punjab. The report would be considered as a sample for state-wide implications on the matter of the madrassa education system. The report, known as the Sargodha Report, was prepared under the supervision of the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The report established that the madrassas were not dependent on funding from the government rather, they ran on public and private donations, Islamic tax on wealth called Zakat, income from shrines, and Madrassas owned property like shops, houses, agricultural land (J. Malik, 1996, pp. 132-135).

The report highlighted the following as shortcomings of the madrassa education system: lack of financial assistance from the government, lack of modern subjects in their curriculum, and lack of recognition of their degrees when considered for jobs in government or armed forces. The Sargodha Report led to the establishment of the National Committee for Dini Madaris (religious seminaries) (NCDM) on January 17, 1979. The committee aimed at proposing ways to integrate

madrassa education into Pakistan's formal education system. The report it produced was known as the Halepota Report, named after its chairman (J. Malik, 1996; S. J. Malik, 1989).

The twenty-seven-member committee had representatives from religious elites, bureaucrats from the ministries of education and religious affairs, vice-chancellors from the universities of each province, experts on education, and even a natural scientist (J. Malik, 1996). The composition of the committee indicates that Zia sought for modern educational trends to be introduced in madrassas and the madrassas compatible with modern subjects to be integrated into the mainstream education system, creating a religion dominant uniform education system at the national level.

The report prepared under NCDM was submitted in December 1979. It stated that "the Dini Madaris were not only worse in their quality of education than the formal education system but also their curricula were not meeting the needs of the nation" (J. Malik, 1996, p. 132). To address the weaknesses in the religious education system the report recommended,

> …concrete and feasible measures for improving and developing Deeni-Madrassahs along sound lines, in terms of physical facilities, curricula, and syllabi, staff, and equipment…so as to bring education and training at such Madrassahs in consonance with the requirement of the modern age and the basic tenets of Islam…to expand higher education and employment opportunities for students of the Madrassahs…integrating them with the overall educational system in the county… (J. Malik, 1996, p. 132).

The statement indicates the military elite approach to integrate madrassa education system into the mainstream national education system by introducing modern education trends like use of technology, and the introduction of modern subjects, with the purpose of making madrassa students employable in the modern age. It appears that to achieve an integrated and standardized national education system the military elite in power at the center reshaped mainstream education

system both by introducing Islamization and by the suggested introduction of modern subjects in traditional religious education institutes.

Once the report was submitted to President Zia-ul-Haq, NCDM received 39 telegrams addressed to the President by the religious elites of different schools of thought and heads of various madrassas. Those were the same religious elites who otherwise were in support of Zia's Islamization and were part of the government's Majlis-e-Shura (a consultative body) with no power of decision making or implementation. The religious elites refused to accept the proposals recommended by the committee by claiming the proposals undermined the sanctity of institutes imparting religious education. The government should not interfere in the affairs of the institutes and the way the state was suggesting madrassa's function was against the spirit of religious education. Imposing such recommendations would be against the national interest (J. Malik, 1996, pp. 131-140).

Even though the report did not recommend any change in religious curricula, firm resistance by the religious elites of different sects and schools of thought demonstrates that they did not want the government to interfere in their sect and specific school of thought centric religious education system. I argue that despite supporting the military regime, the religious elites were not prepared to lose their political power and influence rooted in support from people of shared sects and schools of thought. Therefore, the preferred religious nationalism of the military elite in power at the center was contested by the religious elites of different schools of thought and sects of Islam.

The report maintained that the state would not revoke the autonomous status of the madrassas. The state would provide financial assistance to the madrassas, and all the recommendations made by the report regarding the integration of the religious education system with the mainstream education system were non-mandatory (J. Malik, 1996; S. J. Malik, 1989). The two fundamental

developments that went in favour of the religious elites were the provision of providing financial

assistance to the madrassas by the state, and the religious degrees of madrassas graduates would

be recognized as equivalent to the undergraduate and master's degrees in Islamic studies awarded

by the universities, therefore, making them eligible to apply for mainstream private and

government jobs (J. Malik, 1996; S. J. Malik, 1989).

On April 19, 1981, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which sponsored the National Committee

for Dini Madaris (NCDM), wrote that,

> Since ulama themselves do not want that the Government should
> take any initiative in this behalf and since Government's intentions
> have been suspected quite unjustifiably, no further action will be
> taken in this behalf, at least for the time being (J. Malik, 1996, p.
> 139).

The statement indicates the conclusion of extensive attempts to integrate religious education

institutes into the state's mainstream education system. The non-implementation of most of the

recommendations made by the state regarding the reformation of madrassas education

demonstrates that the resistance to introducing reforms was powerful enough to lead to the

consolidation of the traditional system of religious education in Pakistan.

The discussion thus far demonstrates that during the military regime, the religious elite resistance

to mainstreaming madrassa education limited the promotion of religious nationalism as shared

civic nationalism of Pakistan by the military elite in power at the center. Gellner argued that

standardized literacy is fundamental in shaping high culture of a state (Gellner, 1983, pp. 55-56).

The military regime's inability to integrate madrassa education indicates that the government could

not achieve some level of standardization in education. The failure to mainstream the madrassa

education system consolidated the existence of madrassas as a parallel education system. In fact,

by the time Zia's regime was over in 1988, the number of madrassas in Pakistan had increased by 12000 (Jaffrelot, 2015).

The situation can be assessed in view of hypothesis three of this thesis. Elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting. The military elite in power at the center promoted religious nationalism as shared civic nationalism with one aspect of that being the integration of the madrassa education system with the mainstream national education system. However, this approach was contested by religious elites who did not accept the government proposal and kept the autonomous status of the madrassa education system, teaching different interpretations along sectarian lines. The policy steps proposed in the national education policy of 1979 reflected the military elite's approach towards the form of nationalism they were promoting. The religious elite resistance to the proposed policy steps demonstrates that they disagreed with the religious nationalism promoted by the military elite in power at the center.

Due to the nationalization of education during Bhutto's government, there was a ban on establishing private schools. In 1968, the number of private primary and secondary schools in Pakistan was 3,814, which declined to 927 private schools at the end of Bhutto government in 1977. The policy of nationalization ceased after the military takeover in 1977. The ban on establishing private education institutes was lifted in 1979 (Jimenez & Tan, 1987). The nationalization of education was reversed by encouraging private schools to help achieve mass literacy.

On August 12, 1984, the Punjab Private Educational Institutions (Promotion and Regulation) Ordinance of 1984 was announced. Private schools were to be regulated by the government. They had to fulfil criteria for facilities, infrastructure, rights of employees, and the range of fees they

could charge (Punjab Private Educational Institutions [Promotion and Regulation] Ordinance,1984 1984). The ordinance resulted in exponential growth of private schools in Punjab and other provinces. Along with public schools and madrassas, private schools emerged as a major and third parallel school education system in Pakistan.

The encouragement to establish private schools is viewed as a flaw in General Zia-ul-Haq's education policy of 1979. The prominent features of national education in Pakistan were Islamization, Urdu as a medium of instruction, mosque schools, and an effort to mainstream religious education institutes. However, in private schools, the government did not exercise strict control over curriculum choice or the medium of instruction. In addition to the national curriculum, most private schools also offered the Cambridge curriculum. English became the dominant medium of instruction across private schools. The private schools were popular as there was a realization that proficiency in English was needed for higher education and career progression in public and private sectors (Jimenez & Tan, 1987). This established private schools as a parallel and different source of school education in Pakistan. Their focus did not match religious nationalism promoted as shared civic nationalism by the military regime. Rather education in private schools was more modernist in nature.

Zia's propagation of religious nationalism employing Islam as a high culture through education was challenged by the growth of private schools. The education in private schools was modern and predominantly inculcated in English. They were not bound to implement the prescribed Islamization or employ Urdu as a medium of instruction. Moreover, those educated in private schools had better economic prospects. Therefore, the policy to promote private schools during Zia's regime created the outcome that the state proposed religious nationalism as shared civic

nationalism through the national education system was contested by a parallel system of education that did not follow the prescribed Islamization and medium of instruction.

I interviewed a retired Principal of Government Boys High School shared his observation from years of experience as an educationist and mentioned, that when Zia-ul-Haq assumed power, Bhutto's policy of nationalization was abandoned. Government schools once considered better than private schools in terms of quality education, lost their high standards. In reaction to Zia's extensive Islamization of education widely implemented in government schools, an unprecedented number of private schools were established as they offered modern English language subjects and were not bound to teach religious content extensively. The commercialization of education replaced nationalization. As of now, private education is one of the very successful businesses in Pakistan, only concerned with inculcating market-oriented content. Furthermore, the agenda of formulating shared nationalism among children across the state through the education system is far less discussed, far less cared for, and far less pursued (R. Principal, February 11, 2019).

Given the statement and above discussion, the government's decision to abandon English as a medium of instruction was not successfully implemented. The emphasis on Islamization and Urdu as the only medium of instruction consolidated a desire for the existence and propagation of a private school education system that could exercise considerable liberty regarding the form of education they could inculcate and the medium of instruction they prefer, undermining the use of Islam as high culture.

The discussion provides this thesis with an argument that the military elite's emphasis on the role of Islam in national education did not create shared civic nationalism through education in Pakistan. Rather it introduced multiple education systems with different focuses. The military elite's policy of Islamization of national education created public schools, private schools, and

154

madrassas as three parallel education systems with different focuses. As for public schools, the compulsion was to follow government directives and focus on achieving the Islamization of curricula. Private schools, not bound to the extent of Islamization prescribed by the government, focused on modern subjects and English as a medium of instruction. Madrassas remained focused on religious education and acquired substantial advantages like financial support and degree recognition without adopting any changes recommended by the government. Thus, the three parallel school education systems created varying nationalisms across different social groups depending on their public, private, and madrassa education backgrounds. The situation kept Pakistan away from forming shared high culture through education.

The discussion on nationalism and education during General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime validates hypothesis four of this thesis, that the education policies remain ineffective in addressing internal diversities and do not contribute in shaping shared civic nationalism. The education policy of 1979 introduced a different approach toward shared civic nationalism to be achieved through national education. The National Education Policy of 1979 was unable to address internal diversities based on folk cultures. The policy of 1979 employed Islam and Urdu as unifying forces to bridge ethnic divisions. However, the disintegration of Pakistan proved that Islam and Urdu were insufficient to provide shared civic nationalism among people of diverse ethnic associations. Pakistan had strict military rule from 1979 to 1988, political activities and political parties were banned; therefore, the scope for open opposition to the National Education Policy of 1979 from the political elite was minimal. However, as discussed above, political dynamics during Zia's regime escalated Sindhi ethnic nationalism, and there was a persistent contestation against the domination of Punjab folk culture.

The National Education Policy of 1979 promoting Islam as a shared high culture was contested by the religious elites of different sects and schools of thought. Madrassas continued to exist as a parallel and traditional system of religious education in Pakistan. Therefore, the internal divisions on sectarian lines became visible after the announcement of the education policy of 1979. The military regime led by General Zia-ul-Haq promoted the establishment of private schools that had the liberty to introduce curricula changes and different mediums of instruction. The fact that private schools did not follow the Islamization of education as prescribed by the government demonstrates that a parallel and different school education system was consolidated during Zia's regime. The situation demonstrates that the National Education Policy of 1979 was unable to address internal diversities; rather, it introduced other diversities on religious and socio-economic lines and did not provide Pakistan with a shared civic nationalism.

3.5   Conclusion

After its establishment in 1947, Pakistan experienced the secession of East Pakistan province on ethnic lines in 1971. This chapter has discussed two historical phases (1971-1977) and (1977-1988) of Pakistan's political and education history. The focus has been to examine Pakistan's experience with nationalism. Regarding Gellner's zone one style nationalism, this chapter finds that the political and military elite who came into power at the national level believed that Pakistan needed a shared civic nationalism. However, during the parliamentary government (1971-1977) and the military regime (1977-1988), the political and military elite had different views on the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. Bhutto promoted Islamic socialism as the state's civic nationalism. General Zia-ul-Haq promoted Islamization as the civic nationalism of Pakistan. This chapter concludes that zone one style nationalism promoted by the political and military elite in power had divergent focuses. Both forms of civic nationalism were contested by ethnic and religious nationalism in Pakistan. Pakistan was left with no shared civic nationalism.

Regarding zone three style nationalism, this chapter has established that the folk culture in power at the center was contested by the folk cultures in opposition and by the folk cultures who found them disadvantageous because of the center's policies favouring their own folk culture. During the Bhutto government, Baloch ethnic nationalism was asserted strongly by the provincial political elite of Balochistan. In Sindh, Muhajirs emerged as a distinct ethnic identity. The Muhajir political elite strongly opposed the political elites of Punjabi and Sindhi folk cultures in power at the center. The provincial political elites promoted ethnic nationalism. The trend to promote ethnic nationalism persisted throughout Bhutto's elected government and the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq.

Regarding Gellner's zone five nationalism, the religious elite strongly opposed the civic nationalism promoted by the political elite in power during Bhutto government. The most effective political opposition to Bhutto's Islamic socialism came from the religious elite pushing for religious nationalism as the state's shared nationalism. Zone five style nationalism dynamics changed during General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime. The military elite in power at the center promoted religious nationalism as the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. The promotion of religious nationalism as shared civic nationalism was a unique scenario where perhaps zone one and zone five style nationalism would not contest each other, and Pakistan would have a shared civic nationalism. However, the above-discussed political history tells us that religious nationalism promoted by the military elite in power at the center was contested by the religious elite by different sects and schools of thought in Islam. This chapter concludes that promoting religious nationalism as civic nationalism did not prove to be a simple matter. Rather the religious elite interpretation of a truly Islamic state was also required to be in line with the sect and schools of thought of Islam they follow. The situation made the military elite promoted religious nationalism prone to contestation by the religious elite who were not in power.

The discussion in this chapter supports hypotheses one and two of this thesis. This chapter concludes that after disintegration on ethnic lines, from 1971 onwards, competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism continued to dominate national politics in Pakistan. The chapter finds that the political and military elite in power at the national level promoted their own preferred and different forms of civic nationalism during their governments. During the Bhutto government, the promotion of the preferred civic nationalism served the political elite's short term self-interest of maintaining political power at the national and provincial levels and seeking re-election. The same

political elite also promoted ethnic nationalism in Sindh to strengthen their Sindhi political support base.

During the military regime, the promotion of religion-centric civic nationalism was used to justify prolonged military rule by General Zia-ul-Haq. The situation allowed the military elite to exercise uncontested power for over a decade. The provincial political elite promoted ethnic nationalism as the promotion of ethnic nationalism ensured political power, at least at the provincial level. The religious elite promoted religious nationalism. However, the promotion of religious nationalism also served short term self-interests of the religious elite. The political opposition by the religious elite based on the religious agenda disabled the democratic transition of government after the elections of 1977. Before the announcement of martial law, under the pressure created by the religious elite, Bhutto showed willingness to announce re-election or to achieve power-sharing formula with the religious-political parties. However, the military coup of1977 changed the political scenario. In the beginning, the religious elite supported Zia's Islamization; however, they ultimately contested Zia's version of religious nationalism on sectarian lines.

Pakistan witnessed two national education policies between 1971 to 1988. This chapter concludes that the national education policies of 1972 and 1979 were different from each other and reflected the political and military elite preferred form of civic nationalism. Gellner argued that if the educational machinery is coded with some specific characteristics like language and values, there is a greater possibility that its products will share a reasonable amount of resemblance to each other as compared to the products of any other rival educational machinery embedding a different language or values (Gellner, 1964, pp. 159-160). In the case of Pakistan, a fundamental formula that educational machinery must be coded with a single form of shared characteristics like language, values or even religion was missing. Rather, the educational machinery under every

regime has experienced a shift in focus, leaving the national education system with varying coding producing varying orientations towards shared civic nationalism.

Bhutto's nationalization of education called for structural reforms in the education system. Nationalization of education helped increase his political support base. Building a national educational narrative by formulating national curricula was not the focus of his national educational policy. His policy of not interfering with the religious education system imparted through madrassas consolidated state education and religious education as two parallel education systems, promoting varying and competing nationalisms. The nationalization of education policy was short-lived, as it was discontinued after the military takeover, but its effects persisted.

General Zia adopted Islamization of the national education system. He was of the firm belief that Islam could provide Pakistan with its high culture. Therefore, the education policy promoted more Islamic content in curricula, emphasized Urdu to forge a Pakistani Muslim identity, and discouraged the English language. The policy towards state education and madrassa education resulted in the emergence of three parallel education systems in Pakistan, public schools, private schools, and madrassas. However, the three parallel education systems with different educational focuses would promote difference in nationalism among different age cohorts and social groups. Therefore, the national education policy based on Islam pushed Pakistan away from any form of shared nationalism. This chapter concludes that the national education policies of 1972 and 1979 were unable to address internal diversities; rather, they created deeper divisions on civic, ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic lines.

Chapter 4:   Education and Nationalism in Pakistan 1988-2008

4.1   Introduction

The discussion in the previous two chapters tells us that Pakistan has faced the persistent challenge of shaping a shared nationalism. The last chapter demonstrated Pakistan's experience with a democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (December 1971-July 1977) and a military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq (July 1977-August 1988). The political and military elite during the previous two governments in Pakistan had different approaches towards the shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The shared civic nationalism promoted by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Zid-ul-Haq were different from each other and were contested by ethnic and religious nationalism in Pakistan.

The previous chapter concluded that the political and military elites promoted shared civic nationalism as it also served them to achieve short term self-interests of staying in power at the center. At the provincial level, ethnic nationalism was promoted by the political elite in power at the center and the provincial political elite in opposition. Promoting ethnic nationalism served the political elite in securing ethnic voter support base in the provinces. The religious elite promoted religious nationalism as the emphasis on religious nationalism also meant strong political influence in national politics. The national education policies under Bhutto (1972) and Zia (1979) differed and reflected the political and military elite's approach towards shared civic nationalism to be achieved through national education. The education policies of 1972 and 1979 promoted public schools, private schools, and madrassas as three parallel education systems with different focuses. The education policies of 1972 and 1979 were unable to address internal diversities on civic, ethnic, and religious lines. Rather, the national education policies created further divisions on sectarian and socio-economic lines.

This chapter covers the historical phase from 1988 to 2008 to examine Pakistan's experience with nationalism. From 1988 to 1999, four democratic governments were formed and dissolved, leading up to a military coup by General Pervez Musharraf 1999. The military rule of Musharraf ended in 2008. This chapter has three sections. The first section will cover the decade from 1988 to 1999. The discussion on the nature and orientation of political parties, leadership, and electoral trends during this decade is essential to determine competition among civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism. The second section will highlight the competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism during the military regime between 1999 to 2008. The first two sections of this chapter aim to determine the validity of hypothesis one, which argues that since 1947, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan have been in competition with each other. These sections also focus on hypothesis two of this thesis, which states that through different historical phases, elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that benefit their short term self-interests.

With the experience of unstable democratic governments followed by a fourth military coup and inconsistent education policies, the formation of shared nationalism through education during this period in Pakistan was going to be very difficult. The third section of this chapter will discuss nationalism and the role of national education policies shaped by the elected governments (1988-1999) and the military regime (1999-2008). The discussion on national education policies and nationalism intends to find the validity of hypothesis three, which mentions that elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting. The third section also investigates the validity of hypothesis four of this thesis, which argues that education

policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan.

4.2 Competing Civic, Ethnic, and Religious Nationalism from 1988 to 1999

In the first four decades after its establishment, Pakistan experienced two prolonged military regimes, General Ayub Khan (1958-1969) and General Zia-ul Haq (1977-1988). Therefore, a democratic political culture was not fully formed in Pakistan. After Zia's assassination in August 1988, Pakistan was again set on the path of democratic rule. However, the experience with democracy was not without serious challenges. Zia announced non-partisan elections in 1988, but after his death, the election plan was changed to party-based elections. With the return of party-based general elections, the following section discusses the nature and orientation of political parties, electoral trends, and voter support bases to find the forms of nationalism promoted by the political elites at national and provincial levels.

4.2.1 The 1988 General Elections and Dynamics of Nationalism in Pakistan

Elections were held in November 1988. Out of two prominent political parties, one was Sindhi dominant, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), whose government was toppled by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, now led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter Benazir Bhutto. The other was Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) (Islamic Democratic Alliance), established in September 1988. It is important to discuss IJI's formation and political orientation briefly to understand the forms of nationalism shaped in Pakistan. Islami Jamhoori Ittihad was a religious-political alliance formed just before the elections, consisting of political parties like the remnants of the Pakistan Muslim League, the National Peoples Party, and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI), and few smaller religious and political parties (Afzal, Imran, Ahmad, & Hussain, 2020). With the combination of

conventional and religious political parties, the coalition was aimed at attracting modernist and religion-oriented voter support (S. V. R. Nasr, 1992).

IJI had dominant representation from Punjabi and Pakhtun folk cultures and mainly comprised the religious and political elite who previously acted as General Zia's political allies throughout his regime. The most prominent figure who emerged from IJI was Punjab-based industrialist turned politician Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. Sharif is often considered Zia's protégé (A. Khan, 2006, p. 106). His political career started with his appointment as Punjab's minister of finance in 1981. Later, he became chief minister of Punjab in 1985. He owed both of his political appointments to General Zia-ul-Haq. H. A. Rizvi (1998) and Afzal et al. (2020) argued that the formal military regime of Zia was over. But still, the political and military elite of the time, represented by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Army Chief General Aslam Baig, and Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) General Hameed Gul, kept Zia's religion-centric policies in view and orchestrated the IJI. The IJI had dominant representation from the Punjabi and Pakhtun political elite and the religious elite. The IJI was established to counter the modernist, and relatively popular, Sindhi-led PPP. The formation of the military-engineered IJI demonstrates that even though the military regime was over, the military elite continued to be involved and influential in Pakistan's politics.

The PPP won the 1988 general elections. Benazir Bhutto became the eleventh prime minister of Pakistan on December 2, 1988. However, despite winning 94 seats in the National Assembly, more than any other party, the PPP needed 104 seats to form a government. The PPP had to seek a coalition of other winning candidates. IJI won 55 seats in the National Assembly. Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), the political party representing Muhajirs (migrants) of Sindh, emerged as the third-largest party in the National Assembly with 13 seats and the second-largest party in Sindh

provincial assembly after the PPP. Despite Sindhi and Muhajir ethnic differences, MQM and PPP entered a coalition in the national and provincial assemblies. The primary motivation behind the alliance was to counter the dominance of Punjab's folk culture in the military and National Assembly (Kennedy, 1991; Tambiah, 1996).

Unlike the time of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who won massive political support from Punjab in the elections of 1970 and 1977, the PPP was unable to form a provincial government in Pakistan's largest province, Punjab, in 1988. Nawaz Sharif once again became Chief Minister of Punjab after the elections. IJI did not win any seat in the PPP's home province of Sindh. In Balochistan, neither the PPP nor IJI were able to win a majority of seats. A Baloch nationalist political party and a religious political party formed a coalition government in the province (Rais, 1989). With control of the government in the largest province, Punjab, IJI acted as a powerful opposition to the Benazir-led government at the center. The PPP won a majority in Sindh provincial assembly. The IJI, dominated by the Punjabi-Pakhtun political and religious elites, had a majority in Punjab and NWFP provincial assemblies. With the Baloch nationalists' electoral victory in Balochistan and MQM's mandate in Muhajir majority parts of Sindh, it is argued that the 1988 general elections demonstrated that people from each folk culture in Pakistan voted for the political elite of their own folk culture.

As a prime minister from Sindhi folk culture, with different folk cultures dominating in provincial assemblies as opposition, Benazir Bhutto had the task of building shared nationalism in Pakistan. The resumption of democracy after eleven years of military dictatorship was not without serious challenges. In 1985, the eighth constitutional amendment was ratified by General Zia-ul-Haq. According to the 8th amendment, the president could unilaterally dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss the prime minister (Yasmeen, 1994; Ziring, 1991). After Zia's death in August 1988,

165

Gulam Ishaq Khan of Pakhtun ethnicity, a retired bureaucrat, was sworn in as President of Pakistan (Philip, 1996). In the presence of a powerful president who had the power to dismiss the prime minister, there was a limit to the power Benazir Bhutto could exercise.

Due to the military coup against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977 and the legacy of Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, there was an element of profound mistrust between the military and Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto was conscious of the military's role in politics. In the anticipation that Benazir Bhutto might pursue revenge against the military, she was kept under close observation by military intelligence. The rift between Benazir Bhutto and the military emerged when she removed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief, a retired General, and announced her preferred candidate for the position of Joint Chief of Staff, a move that bypassed the president's input (Yasmeen, 1994). Saeed Shafqat (1996) argued that from the beginning, it was apparent that the military intended to share power and not fully transfer it to the Sindhi elected political elite in power at the center.

The situation in Benazir Bhutto's home province of Sindh presented the biggest internal challenge. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the instances of communal violence between Sindhi and Muhajir folk cultures in Sindh started in the 1970s; the violent clashes in Sindh expanded among Pakhtun, Baloch, Punjabi, Sindhi, and Muhajir folk cultures during the mid-1980s. The violence in Sindh peaked during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Siddiqi, 2012). On December 2, 1988, the PPP and MQM signed Karachi Declaration. The declaration mentioned demands the PPP agreed to fulfill in return for MQM to become a coalition partner in national and provincial assemblies. The agreement had demands like establishing quotas to ensure recruitment of Muhajirs in civil services at the provincial and federal levels, a new census for the correct estimate of the Muhajir population, and the formation of subsequent policies to ensure Muhajir due share of political and

economic opportunities. However, the coalition between the PPP and MQM did not last long as the steps taken by both parties did not contribute to building a workable partnership (H. Alvi, 1991; Kennedy, 1991).

For example, in January 1989, Bhutto's government actively recruited Sindhis by establishing the Placement Bureau. The Placement Bureau could bypass the procedures of the Federal Public Service Commission, civil service recruiting body. Figures indicated that almost three-fourths of the total recruitments done by the Placement Bureau were Sindhis. The recruitment of Sindhis as civil servants could benefit the PPP as the latter owed political allegiance to the party. During the same period, some senior Muhajir bureaucrats were made Officers on Special Duty (OSD), a practice commonly done to remove officers from their designated postings by sending them on paid leave (Kennedy, 1991, pp. 951-952; J. Rehman, 1994). Communal violence in Sindh demonstrates the divisions on ethnic lines were strong during the democratic government. Moreover, the political elite in power at the center and in Sindh continued with the policy of benefiting Sindhi folk culture over Muhajir and other folk cultures in the province of Sindh.

By May 1989, MQM ministers in the Sindh cabinet were actively protesting the non-implementation of the Karachi Declaration. The situation worsened when a Muhajir student activist was shot dead at Karachi University in July 1989. MQM reacted by breaking the coalition with the PPP and partnered with IJI, a Punjabi and Pakhtun dominant opposition in the National Assembly (Tambiah, 1996, pp. 173-177). After MQM left and sided with IJI, the opposition against the Sindhi-dominated political elite in power at the center had representation from every other folk culture in Pakistan, including Punjabi, Pakhtun, Baloch, Muhajir political elite, and the religious elite. A motion of no confidence was moved against Benazir Bhutto in October 1989,

which she only won by a thin margin (Ziring, 1991). The situation demonstrates that all other folk cultures in opposition contested the Sindhi folk culture in power at the center.

The shooting of the student at Karachi university also triggered a wave of violence between Muhajir and Sindhi communities, which spread through two major cities of Sindh, Karachi, and Hyderabad; violence continued until May 1990 (Tambiah, 1996). Karachi was Pakistan's economic capital; the city's communal unrest had implications for the national economy and even national security. Therefore, the military was deployed in the province to restore law and order, a move criticized by opposition parties as the Bhutto government's use of force to crush Muhajir opposition in the province (Ziring, 1990). On August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan invoked his powers under the eighth amendment to dissolve the national and provincial assemblies and dismissed Benazir Bhutto as the country's prime minister over allegations of poor law and order, poor administration, corruption, and nepotism (Tambiah, 1996; Ziring, 1990, 1991).

The elected government of Benazir Bhutto could function for only eighteen months. The discussion on the first democratic experience after a prolonged military regime (1979-1988) shows that the civilian government was unstable and very weak. The political elite in power at the center and in the provinces did not provide any view on shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The political elite in power at the center was focused on consolidating their government by curtailing military influence and strengthening the voter support base of their own folk culture, Sindh. The electoral trend of the general elections of 1988 showed that the political parties won a mandate from their own folk cultures and performed poorly outside of their folk cultures. Therefore, the political parties lacked national appeal. The dependence on an ethnic voter support base made them prone to promote ethnic nationalism, such as done by the PPP by benefiting Sindhi folk culture.

Moreover, the folk culture in power at the center was contested by the folk cultures in the opposition.

4.2.2 The 1990 General Elections and Dynamics of Nationalism in Pakistan

The PPP government was dissolved in August 1990. The new general elections were held in October 1990. The main contestants of the 1990 elections were IJI and the PPP-led coalition named Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA). Pre-elections surveys indicated that no party or coalition was in a position to win enough seats to form a strong government (Afzal et al., 2020). However, the results concluded in a decisive victory for IJI with 105 seats in the National Assembly compared to 45 for PDA. IJI formed provincial governments in Punjab, Sindh, and NWFP. Balochistan again had a majority from the Baloch nationalist political party and a religious-political party. MQM became IJI's important partner in the Sindh provincial assembly and the National Assembly (Talbot, 2005, pp. 310-317). An alliance of Punjabi-Pakhtun political and religious elite, IJI, originally orchestrated by the military, formed the government in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif of the IJI became Prime Minister of Pakistan on November 7, 1990.

With a clear mandate from most of the folk cultures, Nawaz Sharif could be regarded as the face of the shared national leadership of Pakistan. However, Benazir Bhutto and her coalition parties claimed that the military-backed IJI stole the elections. The accusation was upheld years later when in 2012, the supreme court of Pakistan gave the verdict that the 1990 elections were rigged by ISI, the army chief, and the president. The court ruling mentioned that the military's intelligence agency, ISI, spent Rs 140 million to finance politicians, creating and strengthening IJI to prevent Benazir Bhutto or the PPP from coming into power ("1990 election was rigged, rules SC," 2012; Afzal et al., 2020). In 1990, the rigging was just an allegation; therefore, the government formed

by Nawaz Sharif continued with the assertion of winning a strong electoral mandate at national and provincial levels.

Despite popular electoral mandate and military backing, the Sharif government soon developed tensions with the military. When Sharif came into power, ethnic violence in Sindh was Pakistan's greatest internal challenge. The military was handling the matter, but the course of action taken by the armed forces created a rift between Nawaz Sharif and the military. Operation Clean-up was launched in 1992 by the military to restore law and order in Sindh. The operation reflected the significant divide between Nawaz Sharif and the military's approach. Sharif persuaded the military to focus on rural Sindh, with a majority Sindhi population and a strong political base of the PPP, to crush violence and anti-state activities. However, to obtain maximum outcomes, the military executed Operation Clean-up in rural and urban Sindh with a majority Muhajir population, a move politically damaging for Sharif as he was with MQM as a coalition partner (H. A. Rizvi, 1998). The situation demonstrates that the political elite in power at the center promoted ethnic divisions for the short term self-interest of consolidating their government.

Nawaz Sharif's confrontation with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan started over the issue of the appointment of the army chief in January 1993. After the sudden death of army chief General Asif Nawaz Janjua due to a heart attack, Nawaz Sharif's candidate for the post was overturned by the president, who appointed General Abdul Waheed Kakar using his discretionary powers. Nawaz Sharif retaliated by announcing he would pursue a constitutional amendment to remove discretionary power from the president. He also vowed to reverse the eighth constitutional amendment and remove the presidential power to dissolve the National Assembly unilaterally (H. A. Rizvi, 1998; Talbot, 2005).

Nawaz Sharif commenced governing in different, relatively better conditions than his predecessor Benazir Bhutto. However, Sharif had the same fate as Benazir Bhutto. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed his government on the charges of corruption, nepotism, and bad governance by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in April 1993. Nawaz Sharif challenged the dismissal in Supreme Court and launched a political mobilization against the president's decision (H. A. Rizvi, 1998; Talbot, 2005; Yasmeen, 1994).

In an address to the public, a senior politician of Sharif's party mentioned that "the people of Punjab had been genuinely hurt, and they have the reason to believe that this act has been against their province" (Talbot, 2005, p. 327). It is significant to note here that the dismissal of the state's prime minister was emphasized as an act against the folk culture of Punjab rather than an act against the nation's democratically elected leader. The court decided in Sharif's favor as he was restored as prime minister in May 1993. However, with the environment of open confrontation between the president and prime minister, it became impossible for both to resume their roles; therefore, after negotiations with the army chief, both resigned in July 1993, and new elections were held in October 1993 (Talbot, 2005; Ziring, 2003). During Nawaz Sharif's first tenure as prime minister, it appears that the political elite in the center promoted ethnic division between Sindhi and Muhajir in the province of Sindh, as the PML-N was in coalition with Muhajirs and the Sindhi PPP was in the opposition. Moreover, the political elite in power at the center also emphasized Punjabi folk identity in their protest when pushed out of power.

Nawaz Sharif's political career was started and advanced by Pakistan's military backing in the 1980s. By the time he became prime minister in 1990 and developed disagreements with the military elite, he had successfully built a significant political base, especially in Pakistan's largest province, Punjab, and other provinces. Therefore, when the military-engineered IJI was disbanded

in 1993, Nawaz Sharif launched his political party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and contested the October 1993 elections. The discussion on Pakistan's experience of democracy between November 1990 to July 1993 demonstrates that Pakistan had a weak civilian government and active military involvement in politics. The political elites in power at the center and in the provinces did not provide an approach to a shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. The political elite in power at the center promoted ethnic nationalism by preferring Muhajir over Sindhi and emphasizing Punjabi ethnic identity. The second elected government ended in 1993, with the emergence of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), a Punjabi-dominant national-level political party led by Nawaz Sharif. In short, with intense political party competition and uncertain election outcomes, the political elite turned to ethnic identity to shore up their political support, particularly at the provincial level, rather than take a national approach.

4.2.3 The 1993 General Elections and Dynamics of Nationalism in Pakistan

In October 1993 general elections, the Sindhi-led PPP and Punjabi-led PML-N emerged as the two leading political parties at the national and provincial levels. The PPP won more seats but, again, not decisively enough to form a government without the help of a coalition with independents and small parties. Benazir became Prime Minister of Pakistan for the second time with a far better position than her last term. The PPP had provincial governments in Punjab and Sindh. The PML-N formed a coalition government in NWFP, which the PPP replaced in 1994 (H. A. Rizvi, 1998; Yasmeen, 1994; Ziring, 1993). Balochistan remained dominated by the provincial political and religious elite, with a small representation from the PPP and PML-N. Moreover, for the presidential election held in November 1993, the PPP nominated Farooq Laghari won against the PML-N nominated candidate (Yasmeen, 1994; Ziring, 1993).

172

In the 1993 elections, both PPP and PML-N won national and provincial assembly representation from all four provinces of Pakistan, which indicated that these two parties and leadership were gaining significant popularity at the national level. Despite being in a better political position than her previous short tenure and having the president from her party, the National Assembly was dissolved. Benazir was dismissed as prime minister on November 5, 1996, by President Farooq Leghari under Article 58(2)(B) of the eighth amendment. The government was dismissed on charges of corruption, bad governance, a poor economy, and failure to maintain law and order (Robert LaPorte, 1997; Talbot, 2005).

An uneasy relationship with the military once again played a fundamental role in Benazir's dismissal. In appointing the new Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in January 1995, Benazir's recommended junior General was not approved by the president in favor of the military-preferred senior General Jahangir Karamat. She also confronted the judiciary over the transfer and appointment of Supreme Court judges. Moreover, in June-July 1995, the opposition leader Nawaz Sharif called a strike against the government in the province of Sindh. The call for a strike turned into a fourteen-party alliance against Benazir's government. The parties included large and small political and religious parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, MQM, and PML-N (Robert LaPorte, 1996, 1997).

The discussion demonstrates that a working relationship did not consolidate between the military elite, which previously had a history of confrontational relations with the PPP and its governments. Moreover, on the other hand, the political elite in opposition had representation from all folk cultures of Pakistan, including Punjabi, Muhajir, Pakhtun, and the religious culture, against the political elite of Sindhi folk culture in power at the center. Folk cultures in opposition contested the Sindhi folk culture in power at the center. The discussion also indicates that the political elite

in power at the center and in the provinces did not highlight a shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. Rather the focus was to achieve political stability and consolidation of the elected government.

4.2.4   The 1997 General Elections and Dynamics of Nationalism in Pakistan

In February 1997, the fourth general elections within a decade were held. Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) emerged victorious by winning a two-thirds majority. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was almost wiped out from the National Assembly with only 18 seats. PML-N was able to form a government in Punjab, NWFP, and Sindh. Religious and Baloch nationalist parties again dominated Balochistan. To consolidate power, Nawaz Sharif utilized his two-thirds majority in the National Assembly to achieve the thirteenth amendment in April 1997. The president's power to unilaterally dissolve the National Assembly and dismiss the prime minister was rescinded through the amendment. Moreover, the discretionary powers to appoint the service chiefs were also taken away (H. A. Rizvi, 1998). To further consolidate his power, the fourteenth amendment was passed in July 1997. The amendment made "floor-crossing" illegal, a practice that enabled National Assembly members to change parties during their five years in parliament. Moreover, members of parliament had to vote in favor of the party's legislation. In case of violation, they could be punished by canceling their national or provincial assembly seat (Lau, 1997; H. A. Rizvi, 1998).

Nawaz Sharif came in conflict with Supreme Court justice Sajjad Ali Shah, a Sindhi and Benazir appointee, over the issue of the fourteenth amendment, which gave decisive power to the prime minister. The tension rose to the level that when Sharif was summoned to court. He reacted by mobilizing his supporters, who broke into and vandalized Justice Sajjad Ali Shah's court during the proceeding. The confrontation resulted in the resignation of President Farooq Leghari, who had already lost his powers under the thirteenth amendment, and the removal of Justice Sajjad Ali Shah in December 1997 (Lau, 1997; Talbot, 2005). With the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments

in effect, there was no constitutional way to remove the prime minister from power or disrupt the governing party's majority in the national or provincial assemblies. After the amendments, Nawaz Sharif became the most powerful elected political elite in Pakistan's modern political history. While dominating Punjab's folk culture, Sharif was in a multi-ethnic coalition at the center and in the provinces. In this situation, he was in a better position to deliver on the task of creating shared civic nationalism in ethnically divided and politically unstable Pakistan.

However, after assuming power, the decisions by Nawaz Sharif indicated the consolidation of Punjabi folk culture in Pakistan's national politics. His policies were criticized as steps towards the Punjabization of Pakistan. In terms of privatization of the economy, state enterprises were sold to Punjab-based business groups during both tenures (1990-1993 & 1997-1999). In 1997, the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) was formed by twenty-eight small ethnic and regional organizations of Sindh, Balochistan, Pakhtun, and South Punjab (the less developed part of Punjab where Saraiki is the local language). PONM condemned the Punjab-dominated political elite in power at the center and demanded that the state must be structured as a loose federation with maximum autonomy for each ethnic group (Talbot, 2005; Ziring, 2003a).

After the appointment of Sharif's close associate, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, as President of Pakistan in January 1998, it was impossible to ignore that the President, Prime Minister, Chairman of the Senate, and Chief of Army Staff were all from Punjab. Furthermore, Sharif could not deliver on his promises with allied political parties of other provinces like the Awami National Party (ANP), a Pakhtun-dominated party of NWFP, and Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a Muhajir-dominated party of Sindh (Talbot, 2005). The situation disenchanted political parties of other folk cultures, with the political elite from Punjabi folk culture in power at the center. With maximum

powers ensured after the fourteenth amendment, Sharif did not need to deliver until at least the next elections.

Nawaz Sharif attempted to consolidate his rule through constitutional amendments, removal and resignation of the previous chief justice and president, appointing the president, chairman of the Senate, and chief of the army from his own folk culture, and placing loyal bureaucrats in key positions. However, his government was unable to complete its five-year term. He came into a confrontation with the military elite, ultimately resulting in the military coup of 1999. On October 5, 1998, Chief of Army Staff General (COAS) Jahangir Karamat criticized Nawaz Sharif's government for its vulnerable economy and political instability. General Karamat demanded the establishment of an executive body, the National Security Council (NSC), consisting of the president, prime minister, top army generals, and key ministers like defense, foreign affairs, and finance, a suggestion to enable the army to run the government under the constitution.

Consequently, General Karamat was forced to resign, and Nawaz Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharaf, a Sindhi from the Muhajir community, as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on October 8, 1998. General Musharaf was appointed after bypassing his senior officer in line. Nawaz Sharif chose an Urdu-speaking, Muhajir from Sindh with the anticipation of creating a divide in the Punjabi and Pakhtun dominated military elite (H.-A. Rizvi, 2000). However, the appointment of General Musharraf was followed by conflicts between the prime minister and COAS. Between May and July 1999, a military operation at Kargil, across the Line of Control (LOC) with India, caused a serious confrontation between the military and the elected government. Nawaz Sharif claimed that COAS had moved without his approval. General Musharraf claimed that Nawaz Sharif backed off from his support under international pressure. General Musharraf also dismissed

a Lt. General over a secret meeting with Nawaz Sharif where the removal of COAS was discussed (Hossain, 2000; H.-A. Rizvi, 2000).

Ultimately, Nawaz Sharif ordered General Musharraf's removal and appointed a new COAS. Sharif announced Musharraf's removal while the latter was on an official visit to Sri Lanka. Musharraf's plane was refused permission to land at Karachi airport. When eventually granted permission to land, General Musharraf was to be arrested. However, the military responded by arresting Nawaz Sharif and his new COAS. By the time General Musharraf's plane landed on October 12, 1999, the military was in control of Islamabad (Hossain, 2000; H.-A. Rizvi, 2000). In less than twelve hours after Nawaz Sharif announced the removal of COAS, General Musharraf appeared on national television at 2:50 am, announcing the dismissal of the Sharif government as a last resort to save Pakistan. He mentioned that Nawaz Sharif left him no choice and called for the military to take action (Dugger, 1999).

In 1988, after 41 years of existence, Pakistan experienced twenty-four years of military rule from General Ayub Khan to General Zia-ul-Haq. The experience with the parliamentary form of government was just seventeen years and was consistently interrupted by pre-mature transfer of power and military coups. Therefore, when Pakistan returned to a parliamentary form of government in 1988, forming a shared civic nationalism in Pakistan had serious challenges. A highly unstable parliamentary system of governments emerged. The military did not directly rule the state but constantly influenced the political process and elected governments or shaped them through indirect maneuvering. Thus civic nationalism could not be formed in Pakistan. The political elites were largely focused on saving their elected governments and completing their tenures.

Regarding Gellner's zone three style nationalism, the above discussion demonstrates that the decade of 1988-1999, with four general elections, was full of political turmoil. However, this decade can also be regarded as the most significant in Pakistan's political history. Strong political parties and leadership emerged. The electoral patterns based on ethnic considerations emerged, which consolidated the trend that folk cultures in opposition contested the folk culture in power. It is essential to highlight that political parties which became strong had a shared characteristic. The Pakistan Muslim League-N emerged in Punjab and had a strong voter support base among people of Punjabi ethnicity. The Pakistan Peoples Party had its origin in Sindh and enjoyed a strong voter support base from the Sindhi ethnicity. The Muhajir ethnic community within Sindh supported the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Awami National Party of NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), had voter support from ethnic Pakhtuns. Moreover, Baloch nationalist political parties in Balochistan were supported by the people of the Balochi ethnicity. The shared characteristic demonstrates that each national political party also represented a distinct folk culture.

The previous chapter noted that the eleven-year-long military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq left deeper divisions in Pakistani society on ethnic and religious lines. The following decade shaped politics in a way that each political party was strongly associated with distinct folk culture. Therefore, by keeping Gellner's third zone of nationalism in mind, it is argued that when a political party came into power, that essentially meant that the dominant folk culture of the ruling political party also came into power. The domination of one folk culture in power at the center was prone to contestation by all other political parties in opposition or in a coalition whose demands were not fulfilled by the political party in power at the center. Therefore, Pakistan stayed distant from the possibility of formulating a shared high culture or shared nationalism, and the contestation among folk cultures took deeper root in Pakistan's political culture. However, competition among folk

cultures did not solidify, in the manner of Gellner's zone three, as no ethnic group could maintain its dominance and was constantly replaced by another folk culture, leaving the ethnic competition in place.

The discussion of the decade (1988-1999) supports the first two hypotheses of this thesis. The thesis argues that civic and ethnic nationalism have been in competition with each other, and the political elites promote civic and ethnic nationalism to benefit their short term self-interests. The above discussion demonstrates that the political elites did not focus on promoting civic nationalism. The political elites promoted ethnic nationalism to secure an ethnic voter support base. The nature and orientation of political parties and electoral trends showed that the political parties were strong representatives of their own folk cultures. All leading parties like the PPP and PML-N sought to form the government at the center and promoted pro-Sindhi and pro-Punjabi policies at the provincial level. When in opposition, PPP and PML-N criticized each other for benefiting their own folk culture. During the unstable democratic governments, the political elite was not focused on promoting shared civic nationalism; rather, they promoted ethnic nationalism to serve their short term self-interests of saving the government and consolidating provincial voter support bases.

4.3   Competing Religious Nationalism from 1988 to 1999

During General Zia's military regime, religious nationalism was promoted as the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. Religious elites had unprecedented influence in various consultative bodies formed by President General Zia-ul-Haq. However, the religious elite did not have the power to make decisions and implement them, and they could not bypass the president's authority. By the end of General Zia's regime, the religious nationalism promoted by the military elite in

power at the center was contested by the religious elite who followed different interpretations of Islam under different sects and schools of thought. The return of parliamentary democracy and mainstream political parties meant religious-political parties were to participate in general elections. The promotion of religious nationalism was going to depend on the religious elite's electoral mandate.

Regarding performance in elections, as part of IJI in 1988, religious-political parties did not perform well. Rather, they won only a few seats, far less than other coalition partners. Only two percent of voters chose representatives from religious-political parties (Azhar & Muhammad, 2015). The same pattern continued even when IJI was able to form a government after winning the 1990 general elections. As each party in the coalition sought influence, the challenge of keeping the ruling coalition intact became imminent.

Nawaz Sharif being at the top, was less inclined to adopt the party line prescribed by leading alliance partner Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). For example, JI was a political rival of MQM in Sindh. Therefore, it opposed IJI's coalition with MQM. The JI also urged the government to take significant steps towards Islamization within Pakistan and take a religion-centric stance on foreign policy-related issues like the Gulf War, Kashmir issue, and Afghan War, which the government did not do. Over this combination of issues, JI left IJI on May 5, 1992 (S. V. R. Nasr, 1992). The separation from the ruling coalition had significant implications for the religious elite and their religious nationalism, as they already had little representation in national and provincial assemblies. Being separated from the ruling coalition left the agenda of religious nationalism quite weak.

During the 1993 elections, three electoral coalitions, Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM) (Islamic Democratic Front), Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF), and Mutahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM) (United

Religious Front), were formed by various religious-political parties. These electoral coalitions consisted of several small and large religious-political parties. Despite collective preparation for the 1993 general elections, the three coalitions collectively could not win more than twelve seats in the National Assembly. Not a single National Assembly seat came from Pakistan's largest province, Punjab. Most seats came from NWFP and Balochistan, limiting religious-political parties to Pakistan's smaller and less developed provinces (Azhar & Muhammad, 2015). The formation of three electoral coalitions containing several religious parties indicates that the religious-political parties differ not just on political views but also in their association with different schools of thought and sects of Islam. Therefore, the situation strengthens the argument that religious nationalism in Pakistan is challenged by different interpretations of Islam and does not enjoy electoral support.

The general elections of 1997 further reduced the representation of religious-political parties in mainstream politics. Jamaat-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP), two large religious-political parties, boycotted the elections. The religious-political party that contested the elections was Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F). JUI-F maintained its presence in the National Assembly, with only two seats won from NWFP. The representation of religious-political parties decreased significantly during the decade of the parliamentary form of government. S. Kumar (2001a) highlighted reasons for the lack of voter support towards religious-political parties. She argued that the sole emphasis of making Pakistan an Islamic state governed by the Koran and sharia law does not appeal to the nationwide voter base. Religious-political parties do not address issues of common interests, such as economic and social development (Kumar, 2001). Compared to the religious-political parties, PML-N and PPP gained support by offering a combined emphasis on

religion, promising economic development, and appealing to ethnic support by promising province job quotas (Karamat & Shah, 2021; S. Kumar, 2001a).

During the decade of the parliamentary form of government, the continuation of the religion-centric state system initiated by the previous military regime became dependent on mainstream political parties like PPP and PML-N. The political elite in power at the center did not continue with General Zia's style of religious culture but rather concentrated on their perceived role of Islam in politics. Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was associated with a modernist interpretation of Islam. Benazir Bhutto kept herself distant from religious-political parties, as she firmly believed that the religious elite played a significant role in her father, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's ouster, in 1977 (S. V. Nasr, 2004; S. V. R. Nasr, 1992). As for Benazir Bhutto, during her incomplete governments, 1988-1990 and 1993-1996, no legislation was moved on religious matters. However, she did not try to suspend Federal Shariat Courts or the Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court. Hudood Ordinance was kept in place but implementing punishments according to the ordinances was not actively pursued.

IJI had a membership of the mainstream political elite and religious elite who supported General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime. Therefore, they emphasized Islam to gain the popular support of the masses (S. V. Nasr, 2004; S. V. R. Nasr, 1992). However, as discussed above, the religious elite within IJI did not win electoral support, and they could not pursue religion-centric agendas under Nawaz Sharif as prime minister. In May 1991, a bill titled "The Enforcement of Shariat" was moved and passed by IJI in the Senate as they had a majority. The bill called for reforming the state system on the Koran and Sharia lines. However, the bill was unsuccessful in the PPP-dominant National Assembly.

Nawaz Sharif, in August 1998, pursued the fifteenth constitutional amendment under the title of "Shariat Bill." Under the Shariat Bill, Sharia Law would be the superior law of the state. The bill would give the prime minister the power to interpret and implement what is right and wrong. The bill had the power to bypass any constitution and court ruling on religious grounds. A two-thirds majority in October 1998 passed the Shariat Bill. However, it was unsuccessful in the Senate as PML-N did not have a majority there (Ziauddin, 5 March 2013). If the bill had passed, the prime minister and his handpicked religious advisors would have authority over all state institutions like the judiciary and military to see if they were functioning according to the Koran and Sunnah. If found non-compliant, the prime minister could take action against state institutions. The political and religious elites in opposition criticized the bill as Nawaz Sharif's way of using religion for political gains (Hossain, 2000; Ziauddin, 5 March 2013).

This discussion demonstrates that religious nationalism during the parliamentary governments between 1988 and 1999 was not as strong as in the preceding military regime (1979-1988). The electoral trends showed that the religious-political parties did not enjoy mass support. The PPP did not support a religion-centric state system; rather, the party voted against the bills calling for religion-oriented legislation. Even when in alliance with the religious elite, such as in IJI, the political elite had a different approach towards the role of religion in politics. The political elite in power at the center did not follow religion-centric foreign policy. In 1998, the political elite in power at the center proposed the fifteenth amendment. However, the amendment meant more power for the political elite in power at the center as they could interpret Islam and could act against the state institutions on religious grounds. The religious and political elites in opposition regarded the amendment as a way to serve the self-interest of enhancing political power. Religious

nationalism was weak. However, it was evident that the religious and political elites in power at the center and in opposition had different approaches towards the role of religion in politics.

Through the historical phase of 1988 to 1999, the politics in Pakistan was dominated by instability. The above discussion demonstrates that civic nationalism was not precisely defined and promoted. The political elites promoted ethnic nationalism to consolidate their voter support bases in the provinces. The political and religious elite had different approaches towards the role of religion in politics. The religious elite promoted religious nationalism emphasizing the formation of a state system solely based on the Koran and Shariah and religious identity. However, the agenda of religious nationalism remained very weak due to a weak electoral mandate. The political elite in power at the center initiated the fifteenth amendment, which meant they could use religion to exercise control over the state institutions. However, the amendment did not pass because the political and religious elites in opposition did not support it. The discussion supports the argument in hypothesis two that the elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that also help their short term self-interests.

4.4   Nationalism in Pakistan 1999-2008

After a decade of stumbling parliamentary democracy, the military regime was established in a swift and bloodless coup in Pakistan on October 12, 1999. General Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), took power but did not declare martial law. The 1973 constitution was suspended, and national and provincial assemblies were dismissed. General Musharraf chose the title of Chief Executive of Pakistan for himself. From October 12, 1999, General Musharraf retained two positions, COAS and Chief Executive of Pakistan. The judiciary could function as it

was, and provinces were ruled by governors, with governors chosen from military officers. Balochistan's governor was a retired high court chief justice (Talbot, 2002, 2005; Ziring, 2003a).

At the beginning of General Musharraf's rule, the priorities were restoring law and order, curtailing deep-rooted corruption, reviving the economy, and harmonizing inter-provincial relations. Transition to democracy was an immediate agenda. General Musharraf consolidated his control over the state machinery for the first three years and neutralized his political opposition. In 1996, after her government's dismissal and conviction on corruption charges, Benazir Bhutto went into self-exile. Considering the situation, she decided not to come back after the coup. Therefore, Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was headed by her remotely (Talbot, 2002, 2005; Ziring, 2003a).

After spending fourteen months in jail, Nawaz Sharif, with his entire family, left for Saudi Arabia under a secret deal mediated by the involvement of the Saudi regime. According to the agreement, Sharif agreed to stay out of Pakistan for at least ten years and would not participate in politics (Talbot, 2002, 2005). With both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in exile, the opposition from mainstream political parties became very weak. In July 2001, General Musharraf assumed the president's office and secured his presidency for five years through a referendum held in April 2002. By the third anniversary of the coup and after assuming the title of president, general elections were announced for October 2002 (Cushing, 2003).

With the popular political elite of Punjab and Sindh in exile, there was a vacuum of political leadership with national appeal, whereas smaller parties of Balochistan, NWFP, and Sindh did not enjoy mass support. The vacuum was filled by establishing the Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) in July 2002. The party became famous as the "King's Party." The majority membership of the party consisted of the Punjabi political elite who broke away from PML-N and sided with General Musharraf after the 1999 coup. (Ziring, 2003a) Therefore, the Punjabi political

elite dominated, a new national-level political party was formed. The party took center stage as it won general elections held under the military regime in October 2002. Another strong political force in the October 2002 elections was an alliance of six religious-political parties. The alliance was named Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). It included religious-political parties like Jamaat-e-Islami, both factions of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (S&F) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan, and Tehreef-e-Jafaria (Fair, 2010; Rakisits, 2005). Therefore, as opposed to the limited role of the religious elite during the previous decade, the political order shaped under General Musharraf allowed the religious elite to play a central role in Pakistan's national politics.

As a result of the October 2002 general elections, the military-backed PML-Q formed a government at the center. PML-Q formed governments in Punjab, Sindh, and Balochistan at the provincial level. PPP won the second largest number of seats in the National Assembly. MMA, with 60 seats, was the third-largest party in the National Assembly. MMA formed the provincial government in NWFP and became a coalition partner of PML-Q in Balochistan. Therefore, at the provincial level, the religious elite was a coalition partner of the political elite in power at the center. These national and provincial assemblies stayed in place until 2007. General Musharraf became President and COAS, while the pro-Musharraf political elite was in power at the center and in three provinces. In the National Assembly, the religious elite was in opposition, and they had the government in two provinces, NWFP and Balochistan. At the same time, PPP and PML-N under secondary leadership were not effective opposition (Rakisits, 2005).

The parliamentary political system shaped in the previous decade (1988-1999) was suspended after the military coup of 1999. This military regime was different from military regimes as it did not abrogate the constitution of 1973. After three years, in 2002, a parliamentary government was established through general elections. The political allies of General Musharraf's military regime

were the political elite from Punjab and the religious elite. A shared civic nationalism was to be promoted with the political and religious elite's participation under a military-led government.

4.4.1 Competing Civic, Ethnic, and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan 1999-2008

Pervez Musharraf belonged to a modern educated Muhajir (migrant) family in Pakistan. The family migrated to Pakistan and settled in Karachi in 1947. His father was a civil servant in the Indian Civil Services of the sub-continent, who became a civil servant in Pakistan's foreign service. As a result of his father's overseas posting, Musharraf spent time in Turkey. His mother worked with the International Labor Organization (ILO). He joined the army in 1961 and built a distinguished career (Rakisits, 2005; Talbot, 2005; Ziring, 2003a). General Musharraf had a modernist mindset and a strong leaning towards the modernist interpretation of Islam. On several occasions, General Musharraf expressed his fondness for Tukey's model of modernization under Kemal Ataturk and criticized the religious elite of Pakistan for their fundamentalist position (Rakisits, 2005).

The idea of shared civic nationalism promoted during the military regime of Musharraf was not only impacted by internal factors like tense relations among various folk cultures of the provinces, corruption, a weak economy, and bad governance but also the external factor like the global war on terrorism launched as the result of September 11 attacks in 2001. The war on terrorism made religious fundamentalism an issue of significant international concern. Therefore, religious nationalism promoted by the religious elite had internal and external implications for Pakistan. Musharraf's military regime emphasized modernist Muslim identity and vowed to make Pakistan a modern Muslim nation-state.

General Musharraf coined the term "enlightened moderation." In June 2004, Musharraf wrote an article published in various national and international newspapers explaining his idea of enlightened moderation. Although most of the article addressed the western world's perception of the Muslim world in the scenario that emerged after September 11, he also outlined the internal policy outlook for the Muslim world in general and Pakistan. General Musharraf emphasized that it is necessary to achieve "human resource development through poverty alleviation, education, health, and social justice" at the national level. He explained that modernization is different from westernization. The two must not be confused, and, as a Muslim state, Pakistan must adopt "modernization, democracy and secularism" (Musharraf, 1 June 2004).

In May 2004, Musharraf called for a convention to review and reverse the Hudood law and blasphemy laws, introduced initially during the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). Musharraf called Hudood laws man-made and asserted the need to undo them (Amir, May 28, 2004). On another occasion, Musharraf stated that "we must reject extremism and Westernization and develop a moderate culture of both extremes" (Musharraf, January 1, 2005). Musharraf, through enlightened moderation, focused on distancing Pakistan from a religion-centric identity. He opposed the fundamental interpretation of Islam and intended to detach Pakistan from the fundamental religious identity promoted during Zia's military regime, and was not effectively reversed during the parliamentary governments (1988-1999) of the PPP and PML-N. The military regime's emphasis on modernization, democracy, a modern economy, education, health, and social justice constituted Musharraf's proposed high culture of Pakistan.

In practical terms, the military regime's implementation of proposed enlightened moderation was flawed. The military regime was focused on Pakistan's participation in the US war on terrorism. Regarding the economy, no concrete steps were taken to modernize the economy; rather, Pakistan

saw an influx of money because of receiving aid from the USA, which did not result in economic development. In the name of strengthening democracy, a military-engineered democracy was installed where popular political parties like the PPP and PML-N did not have visible participation. A political alliance with religious-political parties was formed to consolidate the military regime. Musharraf opposed Hudood laws but could not reverse them (Kronstadt, 2005). Musharraf proposed enlightened moderation as the high culture of Pakistan, which might be suitable for shaping the country's civic nationalism. However, the military regime did not initiate any related policies to achieve its goals highlighted as enlightened moderation. The military elite's view of the modern Muslim nation-state was a response to the external political environment. The proposed modernist Muslim national identity did not provide a solution for competing nationalism on ethnic and religious lines.

The religious elite promoted religious nationalism in Pakistan. However, after staying out of power in the previous decade (1988-1999), the religious elite decided to be a part of General Musharraf's modernist military regime. In principle, the MMA's policy stance was opposed to Musharraf's modernist approach and the state's pro-American stance regarding the global war on terrorism. The MMA's first test as an opposition came over the matter of Musharraf's proposed Legal Framework Order (LFO). LFO was a set of constitutional amendments designed to consolidate Musharraf's and the military's role in Pakistan's politics. The amendment restored the power of the president to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve assemblies. It became legal for one person to hold two offices, like General Musharraf holding the office of the president and COAS. Moreover, LFO enabled the National Security Council (NSC) establishment under the constitution (K. A. Khan, 2008).

The NSC was the same institution that Sharif opposed vehemently, and Musharraf's predecessor had to resign for proposing it publicly. The government did not have a two-thirds majority to pass a constitutional amendment. Therefore, it needed the opposition's support (K. A. Khan, 2008). Despite being in opposition in the National Assembly, the MMA did not pose any opposition to LFO. Rather the MMA accepted LFO's inclusion in the constitution under the seventeenth amendment in December 2003. The MMA extended its support in exchange for the promise from General Musharraf that he would give up his uniform and would only continue as President of Pakistan in a civilian capacity by December 2004. General Musharraf later backed out on the argument that he kept both offices in Pakistan's interests (Grare, 2006; K. A. Khan, 2008). Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Asha Amirali, and Muhammad Ali Raza (2006) explained General Musharraf's regime as an alliance between the military and religious elite. They argued that the competition between the modernist military elite in power at the center and the religious elite was nothing more than a political narrative. The modernist military regime was consolidated with the support of the religious elite (Aasim Sajjad Akhtar et al., 2006).

The role of the religious elite declined between 1988 and 1999 because of the lack of voter support. The military regime provided them the opportunity of returning to power. General Musharraf had a modern mindset, and the regime under his leadership had a modernist orientation towards shared civic nationalism. Musharraf focused on distancing Pakistan from the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Despite knowing Musharraf's modernist orientation, the religious elite decided to be part of the military-designed elected government in the capacity of ineffective opposition at the center and in power in NWFP and Balochistan provincial assemblies. The attitude is viewed as political opportunism. The religious elite did not promote religious nationalism, and in return, it served their short term self-interest of being in power during the military regime. As

the military and religious elite were in alliance, religious nationalism did not pose serious competition to the proposed high culture promoted by the military elite.

Under General Musharraf's leadership, the situation remained unchanged regarding internal divisions on ethnic lines. In Sindh, violence among the Sindhi, Muhajir, Punjabi, and Pakhtun folk cultures was kept in check. However, the divisions among different folk cultures, evident in electoral results when Sindhis voted for Sindhi representatives and Muhajirs voted for Muhajir representatives, stayed in place. In NWFP, the religious elite of Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) controlled the provincial government, but it is also important to keep in mind that out of six parties forming the MMA, five were headed by the religious elite who were Pakhtuns by ethnicity (S. V. Nasr, 2004). The religious elite that governed the province had a shared folk culture. Therefore, the voter support for the religious elite in Pakhtun-dominated NWFP could not be regarded as free of ethnic considerations.

As discussed in the previous chapter, a four-year-long armed insurgency in Balochistan ended after General Zia-ul-Haq's military coup in 1977. Unlike Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's harsh policy line against Baloch insurgents, General Zia moved towards negotiated peace by releasing Baloch prisoners to call off violence and resistance against the state. The situation in Balochistan stayed peaceful until 2005. However, under General Musharraf's military regime, Baloch ethnic nationalism experienced a significant surge and was suppressed using brutal military force.

Bordered by Iran and Afghanistan, Balochistan became a primary area of interest during General Musharraf's regime due to its strategic significance and immense economic potential (Grare, 2013). Massive development projects were announced, investments were attracted from foreign countries, and the execution of the projects was overseen by bureaucracy dominated by Punjabi folk culture (Wani, 2016). The development projects were announced and executed without input

191

from Balochistan's provincial political elite. The projects were criticized for excluding the local population as an immediate beneficiary of the development projects launched by the military regime. The situation led to armed retaliation by the Baloch nationalists and led to a crushing response by the military elite in power at the center. The armed conflict started in 2003 and continued until February 2008. The situation remained tense, with occasional armed encounters until 2010.

The conflict resulted in several hundred deaths. According to an estimate, between 2006 to 2010, over 1600 people were killed in Balochistan. Over half of these people were civilians (Devasher, 2020, p. 149). The conflict caused the internal displacement of thousands of people and a missing person crisis due to extrajudicial killings and kidnappings (Aslam, 2011; Grare, 2013; Wani, 2016). The active conflict ended in 2008. The end of active conflict coincided with the end of the military regime and announcement of general elections. However, the situation had caused irreparable damage to center and province relations. The use of force against people of Baloch ethnicity permanently and seriously challenged the possibility of Baloch folk culture being a part of Pakistan's shared civic nationalism.

4.4.2 The Return of Parliamentary Democracy and Nationalism in Pakistan

General Musharraf's regime experienced a gradual turn of events that led to the return of parliamentary democracy and the end of the military's hold on the government. The year 2007 is considered significant in this regard. The uniformed president and civilian parliament completed their five-year term (2002-2007). The elections were announced according to the schedule. With the end of Zia's regime, the leadership vacuum in Pakistan was filled by a reformed Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) led

by Nawaz Sharif. Both parties were limited to a role of ineffective opposition led by second-tier leadership after the 1999 coup.

Although the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) was the ruling party between 2002 to 2007, it was overshadowed by the power exercised by the army chief as the president, and there was no scope for the emergence of popular political leadership. President General Musharraf was preparing for his reelection as a president for another five years. However, he intended to retire from the military and start a political career this time. After giving up the position of the army chief, Musharraf had to assume the role of a civilian president, with powers only coming from the constitution.

In exile, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif tried to work out a political partnership against the military regime. On May 15, 2006, the leadership of both parties met in London and signed the "Charter of Democracy" (CoD). Under the charter, both parties committed to working for the restoration of democracy, strengthening of parliamentary form of government, and consolidating power to elected representatives ("Text of the charter of democracy," 16 May 2006). The PPP and PML-N were more prepared to participate in the 2008 general elections. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto announced their return to contest the elections. Nawaz Sharif attempted to return to Pakistan on September 10, 2007. He was deported within four hours of landing at Islamabad airport (Walsh, 2007). Both parties were expecting to win large mandates compared to the previous military-managed elections of 2002.

On October 6, 2007, General Musharraf was re-elected for another five years by the PML-Q-dominated National Assembly. However, to continue as an effective president, Musharraf needed the support of opposition parties like the PPP and PML-N, which were expected to win a significant mandate in upcoming elections. The desire to stay in power led General Musharraf to

sign the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) on October 5, 2007, before his reelection as president. The NRO reversed all cases for corrupt practices of politicians, bureaucrats, and political workers from January 1, 1985, to October 12, 1999 ("National Reconciliation Ordinance," 5th October 2007). The NRO enabled the political elite like Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to re-enter active politics with a clean slate.

As a result of the NRO, Benazir ended her self-exile and returned to Pakistan on October 18, 2007. Hundreds of thousands of supporters gathered in the streets of Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh, to welcome her. In November 2007, Nawaz Sharif returned to Pakistan, welcomed by an equally large number of people on the streets of Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab. However, the election commission rejected Nawaz Sharif's registration papers, making him unable to contest the 2008 elections. On November 28, 2007, Musharraf resigned as COAS, and General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani assumed the command. On November 29, Musharraf took oath as a civilian president (Zaidi, 2017). At the peak of political activity in Pakistan, on December 27, 2007, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in a suicide attack at a political rally. The assassins and motives behind the assassination are still undetermined (Wilkinson, 2018).

Following Benazir Bhutto's assassination, elections in Pakistan were held after a month's delay on February 18, 2008. The PPP emerged as the majority party in the National Assembly, followed by PML-N in second and the Musharraf-backed PML-Q in third. The Muhajir dominant party, MQM, was fourth after winning 25 seats, all from urban Sindh's Muhajir community. The MMA, an alliance of religious-political parties, won only seven seats in the National Assembly. PML-N became the majority party in Punjab and PPP secured the majority of seats in Sindh. The result of the 2007 elections indicated the reemergence of the electoral trend where political parties won voter support mainly from the people of their ethnicity. General Musharraf's military regime ended

with the resumption of a democratic political order similar to that shaped between 1988 and 1999 in Pakistan.

The discussion on the fourth military regime (1999-2008) demonstrates that the military elite of the modernist mindset proposed a shared high culture of modernist orientation. The military elite proposed a shared civic nationalism comprising attributes of modernization, a modern economy, a modernist interpretation of Islam, and an eventual transition to democracy. However, emphasizing the mentioned attributes cannot be regarded as an actual promotion of shared civic nationalism but rather as a way to promote short term self-interests. In a practical sense, from 1999 to 2008, Pakistan had military-engineered democracy. The PML-Q formed the government in national and three provincial assemblies but had military backing. In the general elections of 2007, when the military regime was ending, and Pakistan was transitioning to a parliamentary government, the military-backed PML-Q did not win a strong mandate.

Further contrast in promoting shared civic nationalism can be noted in the military elite's partnership with the religious elite. On the one hand, General Musharraf emphasized distancing Pakistan from fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. On the other hand, he was in political alliance with the religious elite, who promoted religious nationalism in Pakistan. By the end of the military regime, to consolidate his career as a politician and extend his rule as president, General Musharraf signed the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), benefiting the same political elite ousted by him in the military coup of 1999. Therefore, promoting the proposed high culture was aimed at achieving political gains. Musharraf's reconciliation with the political elite whom he ousted in 1999 on bad governance, alleged corruption, and anti-state activities demonstrates that he was not committed to his proposed shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. Instead, General Musharraf used the narrative of a modernist Muslim nation-state, democracy, modern education,

and economy to justify his military coup and prolonged rule. The politics that included coalition with the religious elite and reconciliation with the rival political elite during the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf reflected the short term self-interests of the military elite in power at the center rather than the long-term national interest of Pakistan.

Regarding Gellner's zone three style nationalism, the discussion notes that the ethnic divisions stayed in place during the military regime. The folk culture of Balochistan contested the folk culture in power at the center. Due to the military regime's strict nature, the political elites' scope to promote ethnic nationalism was limited. However, the persistence of ethnic nationalism was demonstrated at the end of the military regime. The political elite of mainstream political parties won a strong electoral mandate from the people of shared ethnicity. The return of the parliamentary government, where the domination of a national political party also meant the domination of a folk culture it represents, left a strong possibility that the folk culture in power at the center was going to be contested by a different folk culture in power at the provincial level and in opposition.

Regarding Gellner's zone five style of nationalism, the discussion notes that, in principle, shared civic nationalism and religious nationalism had different and competing narratives. However, in practical terms, Pakistan did not experience religious nationalism competing with shared civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Rather, a political alliance between the military regime and religious-political parties benefited both by consolidating the military regime and ensuring the religious elite's share in power.

Hypothesis one of this thesis states that civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism have been in competition with each other in Pakistan. The discussion validates that competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalisms were promoted during the military regime. The competition among civic,

ethnic, and religious nationalism was dominated by the strong control of the military regime and by the alliance between the military and religious elite. Nevertheless, Pakistan did not get any closer to a shared form of nationalism. Hypothesis two argues that through different historical phases to this day, elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that benefit their short term self-interests. Throughout the historical phase from 1999 to 2008, the military, religious and political elites promoted civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism with the primary consideration of serving their short term self-interests of preserving and extending their power.

4.5   Education and Nationalism in Pakistan 1988 to 2008

In view of competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism promoted by the political, military, and religious elites from 1988 to 1999, followed by the military coup by General Musharraf in 1999, the following section discusses the role of education in promoting nationalism in Pakistan. This section has two sub-sections. The first sub-section discusses two national education policies announced during the elected governments (1988-1999) and their implications on nationalism. The second sub-section examines the role of national education in promoting nationalism during the military regime (1999-2008). The following discussion examines the validity of the third and fourth hypotheses of this thesis. The thesis argues that elites primarily promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism to serve their short-term self-interests. This thesis further argues that the national education policies demonstrate the promotion of the political, military, and religious elites' preferred form of nationalism. The situation makes national education policies ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan.

4.5.1 Education and Nationalism under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (1988-1999)

In 1988, the political system in Pakistan shifted from the religion-centric military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq to parliamentary democracy. Two strong political parties, PPP and IJI, later reformed as PML-N, alternately came into power and had the responsibility of promoting shared civic nationalism in Pakistan through education. General Zia's religion-centric education policy profoundly impacted national education in Pakistan. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Zia's national education policy could not shape shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. Rather, it introduced further divisions over the interpretation of Islam by different schools of thought and sects. The national education system also caused socio-economic divisions by strengthening the three parallel education systems: public schools, private schools, and madrassas. Ethnic divisions on provincial lines remained consistent and unaddressed.

During the parliamentary governments between 1988 to 1999, the first national education policy was announced in 1992. The National Education Policy of 1992 noted that the literacy rate in Pakistan was about 34 percent which was the lowest in the South Asian region (Bengali, 1999a). The policy of 1992 noted that the illiteracy rate in Pakistan had risen rapidly. The low literacy rate indicated the failure of previous policies to achieve mass literacy (Bengali, 1999a). Because of the backward trends in the nation's educational development, the education policy of 1992 was focused on achieving mass literacy and improving the quality of education according to modern trends so that human development could be achieved and disparities could be eliminated. To achieve mass literacy and improved quality of education, teacher training, an increased number of mosque schools, an increased number of schools, and madrassas' mainstreaming were suggested (S. Ali, 2013; Bengali, 1999a). The prescribed steps were no different from those already mentioned in previous policies.

The following education policy was titled The National Education Policy 1998-2010. The policy acknowledged education as the key to social, economic, cultural, and moral development. It also mentioned that Pakistan had produced some excellent policy documents on national education; however, none had been implemented. The 1998 National Education Policy was not significantly different from the previous policy of 1992. The salient feature was the involvement of international agencies, including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNESCO, UNICEF, and many others, as donors to promote literacy and educational development in Pakistan. The purpose of the new national education policy, not very different from the previous one, appeared to attract funding from international donors (Bengali, 1999a; Thachil, 2009).

From 1988 to 1999, two national education policies were announced, as both are often regarded as almost identical; a joint analysis of both policies follows. In the national education policies of 1992 and 1998, the idea of Pakistani nationalism promoted through education was based on Islam. As stated in the policy document of 1992, "No other worldview, certainly not of science and technology, would stand up to the social organization designed by the worldview of Islam" (National Education Policy 1998, as cited in Aly, 2007, p. 77). The 1998 policy document explained that the fundamental idea of Pakistani nationalism depends on the complete implementation of religion. As stated in the policy document, "Pakistan is not a secular country…[the] ideology of Islam forms the genesis of the State of Pakistan. The country cannot survive and advance without placing the entire system of education on a sound Islamic foundation" (National Education Policy 1998, as cited in Aly, 2007, p. 77). The policy further mentioned that "the only justification of our existence is our total commitment to **Islam as our sole identity**" (National Education Policy 1998, as cited in Aly, 2007, p. 77). The purpose of national education

199

is to "build a sound Islamic society" (National Education Policy 1998, as cited in Aly, 2007, p. 77). Moreover, "Islam and Islamic values should not be part of Islamic studies alone but also all other disciplines" (National Education Policy 1998, as cited in Aly, 2007, p. 77).

The above statements from the education policies of 1992 and 1998 demonstrate that the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan was based on Islam. The 1992 policy mentioned that Islam precedes the modern worldview based on science and technology. The national education policy statements did not deviate from the national education policy shaped under General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime, where religious nationalism was promoted as the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. Lall argued that the religion-centric approach initiated by Zia was not reversed during the governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (Lall, 2009b).

Over the matter of medium of instruction, both policies shifted from the 1979 policy towards a more flexible approach. The policy of 1992 acknowledged heterogeneous cultures and the significance of vernaculars in each culture. Therefore, provinces were given the liberty to choose among local languages, the national language, and the English language as a medium of instruction. The English language was acknowledged as an essential tool to meet global standards. The policy in 1998 mentioned that under the 1979 education policy, only Urdu was encouraged as a medium of instruction. However, it did not experience complete implementation and encouraged private schools' establishment (Aly, 2007). As for madrassas, the medium of instruction has always been Arabic and Urdu (T. Rehman, 2002a).

The policies of 1992 and 1998 did not prescribe a shared medium of instruction to be adopted across three parallel education systems. The liberty to choose the medium of instruction for the schools meant a lack of standardization. A visible divide became strong in the national education system as public schools largely carried on with Urdu and vernaculars as the dominant medium of

instruction. Private schools adopted a wide range of subjects to be taught in English and madrassas remained associated with Arabic and Urdu. The people educated in public schools, private schools, and madrassas had competence in different languages of instruction. Therefore, as Gellner argued, for the formation of shared civic nationalism, the state education system provides a common language to people of diverse linguistic identities; however, the education policies of 1992 and 1998 did not promote a shared language across Pakistan.

Privatization of national education was pursued to achieve mass literacy. Bhutto's nationalization of education was discontinued after a military coup by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Punjab Private Educational Institutes Ordinance of 1984 was announced to increase the number of private education institutes to cater educational needs of a large population. The policies of 1992 and 1998 continued to encourage the privatization of schools to achieve mass literacy. The policy of 1998 mentioned that public schools alone could not raise mass literacy; private sectors need to play an important role while working under government regulations (Aly, 2007). However, throughout these years, the establishment of private schools consolidated as a third option for the people who did not want to send their children to Urdu medium public schools and madrassas.

The policy to encourage the establishment of private schools could be regarded as a helpful strategy to achieve mass literacy in a state with more than 130 million population in 1998. However, the government failed to ensure a uniform standard of education throughout the public and private schools, whereas madrassas already stood different from the mainstream education system. Furthermore, those private schools were divided into upper, middle, and lower-middle-class standards, depending on what one could afford. The situation caused a further social and economic divide in the society as public school and madrassa-educated candidates competent only

in Urdu and folk language did not find much success in the job market (Ashraf, Turner, & Laar, 2021; Shamim & Rashid, 2019).

Most jobs, especially high-paying jobs, went to private school-educated candidates. Public school-educated candidates had considerably fewer chances of selection than private school-educated candidates. Alternatively, their best chance was limited to clerical jobs. At the same time, the chances for madrassa-educated students were even less than for public school-educated candidates. (Shamim & Rashid, 2019). After five decades of Pakistan's establishment, the education system that evolved could not be regarded as national but was subject to divisions at multiple levels. As a result of the state's failure to provide uniform national education to all, a system with multiple options and different focuses was firmly in place in Pakistan.

During field research in Pakistan between January 2019 to May 2019, I interviewed a Government Boys High School Principal on February 23, 2019. He provided old documents of the school, highlighting outstanding results of the students from the year 1959 to 1970. He believed that his school and most public schools were producing the best high school graduates. However, the situation is different now. There are not many outstanding results from public schools; rather, they hardly pass. Public schools stopped delivering quality education and failed to adopt modern education trends and the English language practiced by private schools. In the 1990s, English became a symbol of modernism, development, and success, and Urdu symbolized underdevelopment, poverty, and limited economic opportunities. Instead of moving forward, education in Pakistan has moved backward. The governments over the years have given national education a confused approach where every private institute is free to adopt almost everything they want to. At the same time, public school curricula are not as advanced and up to date. A shared sense of nationalism cannot be expected from children from different educational experiences.

(Principal, February 23, 2019). Given the statement, in the case of Pakistan, the national education system lacks standardization. To the degree the above statement is considered an accurate depiction of the state of education in Pakistan, it strengthens the argument that the three parallel education systems challenged the formation of shared nationalism in Pakistan.

I interviewed eight teachers at a Government Girls' High School on April 14 and 15, 2019. A piece of information came to light that the children of teachers at the public school do not go to the public schools. Rather all teachers send their children to private schools. The teachers expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of education, school infrastructure, and government textbooks. They believed public school education does not prepare children to meet job market competition (Teachers, April 14-15, 2019). This information demonstrates that public school teachers did not trust the public education system to be good for their children.

As discussed above, the religious elite lacked electoral success from 1988 to 1999. However, the religious elite sought significant support and influence in society by establishing new madrassas. Madrassas associated with the religious-political parties saw exponential growth during the decade of unstable parliamentary governments. According to estimates, between 1988 and 2002, madrassas associated with Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam- Sami-ul-Haq (JUI-S) increased from 1840 to 7000. Madrassas associated with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) increased from 96 to 500 (Osman, 2009; Riaz, 2005). These madrassas were from different schools of thought of Islam. Therefore, they had different orientations towards religious nationalism. The growth in religious education institutes indicated strengthening of a parallel and divided religious education system.

The discussion thus far demonstrates that the national education policies of 1992 and 1998, announced during the unstable parliamentary form of governments, were largely a continuation of

the 1979 National Education Policy. General Zia's religion-centric of national education was not effectively reversed. At the same time, sole emphasis on religious identity was not strictly pursued. The flexibility of using Urdu, English, and local languages as a medium of instruction was a deviation from the previous policy of 1979. However, the English language created a major divide between public and private schools. Ethnic divisions in Pakistan were not addressed through education. Moreover, in addition to the persistent ethnic divide, the strength of three parallel education systems further divided society by increasing social and economic inequality.

The above discussion supports hypotheses three and four that the political elite from 1988 to 1999 did not promote a clear view of the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. Despite introducing education policies in 1992 and 1998, the unstable parliamentary governments did not effectively reverse the previous education policy of 1979. The education system that evolved from 1988 to 1999 lacked standardization, strengthened the three parallel education systems, and did not address ethnic divisions on provincial lines. The national education policies did not address internal divisions. The formation of civic nationalism through education remained a remote possibility in Pakistan.

4.5.2 Education and Nationalism under General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008)

On October 12, 1999, General Pervez Musharraf became chief executive and later President of Pakistan for the next nine years. When General Musharraf came into power literacy rate in Pakistan was less than 50 percent. After over fifty years of establishment, Pakistan could not achieve any form of shared nationalism through education. As discussed previously, three parallel education systems, public and private schools, and madrassas, each with a different focus, were functioning in Pakistan. General Musharraf proposed enlightened moderation as a high culture of Pakistan. The formation of the national education policy reflected General Musharraf's attempt to shape his

proposed high culture. During Musharraf's regime, most policies were impacted by the global war on terror. The military elite focused on reversing the well-established impact of the fundamental interpretation of Islam in education. Musharraf's regime emphasized that a parallel madrassa education system must merge into the mainstream education system to achieve shared high culture through education. However, the regime did not address the divisions between public and private schools.

In 1999, the National Committee on Education, working under the Federal Ministry of Education, issued the National Curriculum 2000 – A Conceptual Framework. The document was prepared with the consultation of provincial education departments. The document highlighted that the education narrative needed to lead "away from ideological demagoguery and towards modern education" (*Pakistan: Reforming the education sector*, 2004, p. 18). In January 2002, under General Musharraf's rule, Education Sector Reforms (ESR) were announced. ESR focused on improving literacy, quality of education, performance assessment, curricula reform, and teacher training. Moreover, to shape education on the modernist interpretation of Islam, there was an emphasis on introducing modern education trends in madrassas (Kronstadt, 2004). In March 2002, Pakistan Education Minister Zubaida Jalal visited the USA, where she maintained that their government was going to focus on secularizing education and would take decisive steps to reform madrassa education in Pakistan (*Pakistan: Reforming the education sector*, 2004).

National Education Curriculum was designed in 2006. While highlighting curriculum guidelines for the subject of Pakistan Studies, the curriculum stated that,

> An understanding of the ideology of Pakistan, the Muslim struggle for independence, and endeavors for establishing a modern welfare, Islamic state as well as inculcating awareness about the multicultural heritage of Pakistan… to enable the students to better appreciate the socio-cultural diversity of Pakistani society and get

used to the unity in diversity in our national context (Lall & Saeed, 2019, pp. 99-100).

The statement indicates that the national curriculum designed during the military regime shifted to focus on modernist Muslim identity. The curriculum design also acknowledged the presence of various folk cultures and the need to shape shared high culture, accommodating diversity.

Between 2005 and 2006, the formation of a pre-policy document on national education was ordered. In February 2007, the Federal Ministry of Education issued a document titled "Education in Pakistan: A White Paper." The paper highlighted the military elite's vision towards national education in Pakistan and provided guidelines for future national education policy. The document started with the statement made at Pakistan's first educational conference held in 1947 by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He called for the absolute need to follow modern and advanced education trends to develop as a successful nation-state.

The White Paper acknowledged the role of religion in the formulation of Pakistan and mentioned conservative approach towards religions has caused significant damage to the state. It mentioned that "the lethal combination of autocracy, dogmatism, and misguided spirituality has destroyed the Muslim Ummah's capacity to enquire, acquire knowledge, and move forward into a new era of advancement" (Aly, 2007, p. 2). The paper recognized Islam as an ideological base for Pakistan, but in further elaboration, it mentioned that,

> We must recognize the value and importance of our ideological base while framing the education policy for the coming generations. However, Islam is not and cannot continue to be treated as a static religious dogma, thriving on ignorance and nostalgia (Aly, 2007, p. 3).

The statements indicate the military elite's attempt to distance from the fundamental interpretation of religion, overshadowing Pakistan's education policy since 1979 and a shift towards the modernist interpretation of Islam.

Furthermore, the White Paper ascertained that a child's religious education must be the responsibility of the family and not the state. The state can facilitate the family but cannot take full responsibility for the child's religious education. It necessitated that religious education must cater to the needs of a modern Muslim, which can only be achieved by sticking to a modernist interpretation of Islam (Aly, 2007, p. 56).

The military elite view on shared civic nationalism was reflected in the National Curriculum 2000 – A Conceptual Framework, Education Sector Reforms of 2002, National Education Curriculum of 2006, and Education in Pakistan: A White Paper of 2007. However, when it came to curricula reforms and making actual change, the resistance from the religious elite was strong and effective. For example, in 2003, the Koranic references to jihad (the Islamic concept of militancy over religious grounds) were proposed to be removed from Islamic Studies textbooks. The religious-political alliance of MMA reacted strongly and threatened to pull support for Legal Framework Order (LFO), a constitutional amendment to strengthen General Musharraf's regime. The MMA never pulled their support throughout the military regime. However, they continued to oppose the military regime over the issue of curtailing religious impact on education.

In December 2003, the federal Education Minister, Zubaida Jalal, had to come on the National Assembly floor to state, "I am a Muslim and fundamentalist and cannot think of deleting Islamic concepts from the textbooks" (*Pakistan: Reforming the education sector*, 2004, p. 18). The issue of reducing Koranic content from general subjects, as well as Islamic Studies, stayed under discussion throughout the year 2004. The political elite led by PML-Q, in coalition with the military elite in power at the center and in Punjab and Sindh, supported the recommendations. The religious elite opposed all recommendations (*Pakistan: Reforming the education sector*, 2004).

The influence of MMA in blocking any changes to liberalize educational content by removing extensive religious references remained persistent. At the provincial level, MMA, a religious-political alliance, was in power in NWFP and Balochistan., In January 2007, Provincial Education Minister Maulana Fazl-i-Ali Haqqani mentioned that his recommendation of adding 180 Koranic verses in the Islamic Studies textbook of classes 9 and 10 was accepted by the center (B. Report, 25 January 2007).The Federal Education Minister confirmed that NWFP's provincial government had asked to include more Islamic content in the Urdu and Islamic Studies textbooks, which the Federal Education Ministry had allowed within NWFP and Balochistan (S. M. Khalid, 2007, p. 149). The Punjab and Sindh were to follow a new scheme of study to be implemented in August 2007, designed under the National Education Curriculum of 2006.

During General Musharraf's military regime, the religious elite continued to oppose proposed education and curricula reforms by the modernist military elite in power at the center. In a press conference on January 24, 2007, the Provincial Education Minister of NWFP, Maulana Fazl-e-Ali Haqqani, mentioned that during the inter-provincial education ministers' meeting, he had conveyed reservations regarding the inclusion of the topic of 'Enlightened Moderation' in Pakistan Studies textbooks of class 9 and 10. He stated, "I asked federal government what was their idea of enlightened moderation, but even they did not know how to explain it" (B. Report, 25 January 2007). The Provincial Education Minister further mentioned, "if it was the enlightened moderation as propagated by President Musharraf, then certainly the NWFP did not agree to it" (B. Report, 25 January 2007). He further claimed that with the permission of the Federal Ministry of Education, the NWFP government was going to include a chapter on "enlightened moderation in the context of Islam as Islam is an enlightened religion" (B. Report, 25 January 2007).

The military elite in power at the center took a particular interest in addressing the unchecked religious education system imparted in madrassas in Pakistan. Therefore, in August 2001, Pakistan Madrassa Education Board (PMEB) was established. The board aimed to establish model madrassas and regulate existing madrassas through board registration. The registration with PMEB would imply that madrassas will also teach modern subjects and maintain their autonomous status (Kronstadt, 2004; Muhammad, Butt, Ahmed, & Omer, 2012).

In terms of targeted Madrassa reforms, aimed to be achieved through the formation of the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board (PMEB) in 2001, the same attitude adopted by previous regimes continued. All the proposed conditions by the PMEB were non-mandatory. Therefore, the success was little to none. As stated by Ahmed and Norris, "most madrassas remained unregistered, their finances unregulated, and the government has yet to remove the jihadist and sectarian content of their curricula" (S. Ahmed & Norris, 15 June 2004; Kronstadt, 2004, p. 5).

Regarding the role of Madrassas in society, the White Paper of 2007 states that,

> What we need is not to deride the Madrassahs, or require its so-called mainstreaming, but to ensure that providers of religious education are converted to the cause of true Islam with a purpose to unite and purify people, and not for the purpose of widening the gulf between various schools of religious thoughts and in producing an individual divorced from reality and living in a fantasy world (Aly, 2007, p. 57).

The statement on the role of madrassas in formulating shared nationalism in Pakistan shows the government's inability to play a decisive role and leaves much in the hands of madrassas. Contrary to the fact that under General Musharraf, the government was trying to bring madrassas into the mainstream education system through various initiatives. The statement mentions that we (the state) do not require so-called mainstreaming. Another important point in the statement is leaving it to the inculcators of religious education to serve 'true Islam.' The statement ignored the

fundamental dilemma that the religious elite of each school of thought and sect think of their interpretation of Islam as true Islam, which is contested by the different schools of thought and sects. Therefore, having a national agreement and implementation regarding religion is challenging.

In terms of practical implementation, General Musharraf's regime could not fully achieve the prescribed modernization of national education. However, it stayed on course to reverse religion-centric identity building through education, at least at the level of policy formation (Lall & Saeed, 2019). During the military regime, no new national education policy was announced. The focus remained on pre-policy documents to guide future national education policy. The discussion on national education during the military regime between 1999 to 2008 demonstrates that the military elite emphasized modern education. Distancing from religion-centric national education was considered fundamental for shaping the shared civic nationalism of Pakistan. The religious elite promoted religious nationalism by emphasizing the inclusion of religious content in the national education curriculum. The emphasis on addressing internal diversities on ethnic lines was mentioned in the National Education Curriculum but did not play any role in shaping shared high culture through education.

It is important to keep in mind that despite sitting on opposition benches, the religious elite supported the constitutional amendments that consolidated the military regime. Moreover, despite being committed to enlightened moderation, the military elite sought support from the religious elite to consolidate their power. The religious and military elite cooperated for short term political gains while simultaneously promoting competing civic and religious nationalism in national education. The military elite in power at the center could only implement national curriculum changes in the center, Punjab, and Sindh. The religious elite in power at the provincial level

retained religion-centric national education in NWFP and Balochistan. The situation led Pakistan towards divided and competing nationalism as the curricula with different focuses were introduced in some provinces, which led Pakistan away from any form of shared nationalism.

The discussion demonstrates that the military and religious elite promoted competing civic and religious nationalism in the national curriculum and education policymaking. The ethnic divisions stayed in place and were not addressed through national education. Public schools, private schools, and madrassas continued as three different and parallel education systems in Pakistan. The proposed revisions in national education were not fully implemented throughout the military regime. The opposition from the religious elite and emphasis on religious-centric national education at the provincial level provided Pakistan with a divided view on national education. The national education system did not address internal diversities on ethnic and religious lines and did not develop a shared civic nationalism in Pakistan.

4.6   Conclusion

This chapter has covered two historical phases (1988-1999) and (1999-2008) of Pakistan's political and education history. The purpose was to examine Pakistan's experience with nationalism. Regarding Gellner's zone one style nationalism, this chapter finds that from 1988 to 1999, Pakistan experienced the elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. In the previous military regime (1977-1988), religious nationalism had been promoted as the civic nationalism of Pakistan, which was contested by ethnic and religious nationalism under various schools of thought and sects of Islam. The successive political elite who came into power at the national level did not provide a clear view of shared civic nationalism. Neither did they strictly promote religious nationalism as civic nationalism. Political instability remained a dominant feature during the decade 1988 to 1999. The parliamentary government ended with a military coup.

General Pervez Musharraf focused on distancing Pakistan from a religion-centric national identity. He proposed a modernist Muslim identity and a modernist Muslim state under the phrase of enlightened moderation as a shared high culture of Pakistan. However, given the military-engineered democracy, political alliance with the religious elite, and persistent ethnic divisions, enlightened moderation can be regarded as a political narrative used to justify his military regime and cannot be regarded as an attempt to shape civic nationalism. Therefore, zone one style, civic nationalism, was not effectively shaped in Pakistan.

Regarding zone three style nationalism, this chapter finds that the electoral results showed voter support for the political parties of shared folk culture during the decade of unstable elected governments. The national-level political parties such as PPP, PML-N, ANP, and MQM all had a common characteristic: they were also the representatives of respective folk cultures of Sindh, Punjab, Pakhtun, and Muhajir. A political party in power at the center meant the domination of a

respective folk culture in power, which would be contested by the other folk cultures in opposition or dissatisfied coalition partners. Therefore, ethnic nationalism became embedded in the nature of the political parties of Pakistan. During the military regime, the political elites had limited scope for actively promoting ethnic nationalism. The military operation under Musharraf in Balochistan (2003-2008) weakened the prospects of cooperation among folk cultures. The situation demonstrates that zone three style ethnic nationalism became a permanent feature of Pakistan's experience with nationalism. However, no ethnic group could secure dominance at the center, leaving folk cultures continuously contesting.

Regarding Gellner's zone five nationalism, the religious elite did not win an electoral mandate during the parliamentary governments between 1988 and 1999. Therefore, the promotion of religious nationalism was not very strong. The situation changed after the military coup in 1999. In the 2002 general elections conducted by the military, the religious-political parties won a strong mandate. With 60 National Assembly seats, the religious-political parties had the third largest representation. The religious-political parties formed a provincial government in NWFP and a coalition government in Balochistan. During the military regime, the religious elite acted as opposition as well as a coalition partner of the military elite who was proposing shared high culture of modernist characteristics.

At the center, the religious elite did not push for religious nationalism and voted for the military-backed constitutional amendments in the National Assembly. At the provincial level, the religious elite emphasized religion-centric education. The religious elite played a role in consolidating the military regime. For the religious elite, consolidation of the military regime meant sustained provincial governments in NWFP and Balochistan and maintaining an influential presence in the National Assembly. Therefore, in Pakistan, zone five style religious nationalism was not promoted

nationwide. The promotion of religious nationalism was subject to the short term self-interests and political gains of the divided religious elite.

The discussion in this chapter validates hypothesis one of this thesis and concludes that competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism continued throughout the elected governments (1988-1999) to the military regime (1999-2008) in Pakistan. The discussion also supports hypothesis two that the political, military, and religious elite promoted competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism with the primary consideration of serving their short term self-interest of staying in power. The situation kept Pakistan distanced from the possibility of having a shared nationalism.

The discussion on national education validates hypotheses three and four of this thesis. This chapter establishes that promoting shared civic nationalism through education was not reflected in the national education policies of 1992 and 1998. The decade witnessed no efforts by the governments to analyze the failure of previous education policies in shaping shared civic nationalism through education or any attempt to design education in a manner that could play a decisive role in promoting shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The two education policies of 1992 and 1998 can be regarded as formalities fulfilled by the governments with no clear agendas.

The shared civic nationalism promoted by the political and military elite through previous national education policies such as emphasis on modern education by Ayub Khan, nationalization of education by Zulfiqar Bhutto, and General Zia-ul-Haq's religion-centric approach had divergent focuses and could not achieve desired results, but they were carefully conceived with the anticipation of actual success. However, education during the parliamentary governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif lacked a vision of using education to create shared civic nationalism. Ethnic divisions were not addressed through education. The education policy documents of 1992 and 1998 highlighted shared religious identity but did not emphasize religion-

centric national education. The education policies of 1992 and 1998 lacked standardization of national education. No uniform medium of instruction was promoted. Public schools were substandard and outdated. Private schools were following modern education trends and lacked emphasis on religion. Madrassas were solely focused on religious education.

Pakistan experienced a military coup in 1999. President General Pervez Musharraf stayed in power until 2008. Musharraf had a modernist mindset, whereas the international political scenario after September 11 also demanded modernization as the state's outlook. Musharraf's regime did little to change or overcome the situation of the existing competition among folk cultures. The proposed high culture under enlightened moderation was a modern and economically developed Pakistan. The vision to achieve it was through distancing from the fundamental interpretation of Islam without addressing internal divisions caused by contestation among various folk cultures. Pakistan had some success in distancing from the religion-centric identity, but the folk cultures remained in contestation with each other.

During the parliamentary governments and the military regime, the religious elite promoted religious nationalism in education. From 1988-to 1999, there was an increase in the number of madrassas in Pakistan. During the military regime (1999-2008), the promotion of religious nationalism was reflected in the emphasis on the religion-centric national education system at the provincial level. The discussion demonstrates that the political, military, and religious elites promoted nationalism through education as it suited them. The education policies did not address internal divisions and prevented the development of civic nationalism in Pakistan.

Chapter 5:   Education and Nationalism in Pakistan 2008 to 2022

5.1   Introduction

The formation of shared nationalism in Pakistan is a complex phenomenon. As discussed in the previous chapter, from 1988 to 1999, the state had challenging experiences with unstable elected governments. The formation of civic nationalism through education was not actively pursued throughout the decade. The politics during that decade shaped the nature of mainstream political parties. The political parties in Pakistan evolved as national-level political entities strongly dependent on the voter support from their distinct folk cultures.

During the military regime (1999-2008), reforming the educational narratives became an important agenda. The primary focus was to modernize the educational narrative and reverse the Islamization of education, a significant feature in Pakistan's national education system for the past two decades (1977-1999). Internal diversities on ethnic lines have always existed in Pakistan. However, they were not addressed through education during the unstable elected governments of the Pakistan Peoples Party PPP and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML- N) (1988-999) or during the military regime (1999-2008).

This chapter covers Pakistan's experience with nationalism in more recent times. This chapter has two sections. The first section will discuss the return of the parliamentary form of government in 2008 and the continued democratic transition of governments through subsequent general elections in 2013 and 2018. The discussion in the first section aims to find the validity of the first and second hypotheses of this thesis. Hypothesis one of this thesis argues that since 1947, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan have been in competition with each other. Hypothesis two argues

that through different historical phases to this day, elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that benefit their short term self-interests.

The second section of this chapter covers the role of national education in shaping nationalism in Pakistan from 2008 onward. The second section aims to determine the validity of hypotheses three and four of this thesis. Hypothesis three of this thesis maintains that elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting. Hypothesis four contends that, education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan.

5.2   The 2008 General Elections and Competing Civic, Ethnic and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan

In November 2007, General Musharraf took an oath as a civilian president. General elections were held on February 18, 2008. In the absence of military involvement, all political parties participated with an apparent belief that elections would be independent and, therefore, give them a better chance of winning. As Pakistan was transitioning to the parliamentary form of government in 2008, it is essential to mention the positioning of the civil and military elite. After Benazir Bhutto's assassination, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was led by her husband, Asif Ali Zardari. Zardari is a Sindhi political elite. Although he claimed to be educated from institutes in Pakistan and abroad, his foreign degrees are considered dubious. During Benazir Bhutto's two tenures as prime minister, from 1988-1990 and 1993-1996, Zardari became famous as "Mr. 10 Percent" due to receiving alleged commissions on government contracts (Bingham, 2010).

217

Nawaz Sharif was back from exile and exercised strong control over PML-N. He could not contest the general elections of 2008 because he was disqualified as a candidate by the election commission due to convictions related to the military coup in 1999. ("Court hands Sharif poll lifeline," 25 June 2008) Two political parties, the PPP and PML-N, with fundamental reliance on their respective ethnic voter bases in Sindh and Punjab, were strong contenders in 2008. The political elite of each party aspired to emerge as the national leadership and would then be in a position to shape shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. From 2001 onwards, in the wake of the global war on terrorism centered in Afghanistan, with which Pakistan shares its longest border, the state had been exposed to terrorism. As the military regime ended in Pakistan in 2008, the military elite did not seem to exercise a direct role in politics. It became more focused on countering terrorism within the country.

Due to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, it was anticipated that Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) would have a sympathy vote which would help them win a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. However, it is difficult to ignore that even after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, PPP did not win a simple majority in the National Assembly to form a government without a coalition. The PPP could not beat the Punjabi political elite dominant Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in Pakistan's largest province, Punjab. The PPP won 91 of 258 National Assembly seats. PML-N was the second-largest party in the National Assembly, securing 67 seats. Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), a split Punjabi political elite dominant political party, previously backed by the military in 2002 and supported by Musharraf in 2008, secured 41 seats. Muhajir political elite dominant Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) secured 19 seats, all from Muhajir dominant urban constituencies of Sindh. The alliance of religious-political parties

Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) was able to win only 6 of 258 National Assembly seats (Kanwal, 2017).

In the provincial elections, the PML-N won a majority in Punjab. PPP won the majority in Sindh, with MQM winning the second largest number of seats as those of the Muhajir folk culture in Sindh apparently did not vote for the Sindhi political elite of PPP. In NWFP, the Pakhtun nationalist party won the highest number of seats whereas, in Balochistan, a mixed trend of the religious-political parties, Baloch political elite as independents, PPP, and PML-Q won seats (Kanwal, 2017). The 2008 election results demonstrated that the political parties won from their folk culture strongholds. Therefore, the dilemma persisted that the folk culture in power at the center would be contested by other folk cultures in opposition or coalitions.

Starting from 1970, whenever Pakistan has experienced general elections, either from 1989 to 1997, in 2002, and from 2008 onwards, Balochistan provincial assemblies have demonstrated a consistent strong representation of religious-political parties. Akhtar (2011) argued that the electoral mandate in Balochistan is often divided among Baloch nationalist parties, religious-political parties, mainstream political parties like the PPP and PML-N, and independents. He highlighted that the national-level political parties like PPP and PML-N have not been able to establish a strong political support base in the province. The voter support of Baloch nationalist parties is often divided because of the tribal system and loyalty to tribal chiefs. The situation enables religious-political parties to mobilize people on religious grounds and gain broader support. Baloch (July 25, 2017) highlighted that Balochistan has more madrassas and mosques than schools which is an important factor behind sustained political support for religious-political parties. This thesis has also noted that Balochistan has the lowest literacy rate compared to other

provinces of Pakistan. A combination of the reasons mentioned above can explain religious-political parties' strong voter support base in Balochistan.

Despite the presidential powers acquired through the 17th amendment, after the formation of government in 2008, civilian president General (retired) Pervez Musharraf could not play any influential role. Rather the political elite of PML-N and PPP in power at the center and in provincial assemblies called for the impeachment of President Musharraf, which forced him to resign in August 2008. However, he was never impeached. Asif Ali Zardari, co-chairman of Pakistan People's Party (PPP), with the help of coalition parties except for PML-N, which suggested the president must be from any small party or province, got elected as president of Pakistan on August 26, 2008 (Kanwal, 2017). Zardari's election as president concluded the last traces of nine years of the military regime in Pakistan.

After the formation of government in 2008, the most significant development was passing the 18th constitutional amendment in April 2010. The amendment was a joint effort of an elected parliament dominated by PPP and PML-N. It was aimed at reviving the parliamentary character of the 1973 constitution, impacted by the military regimes of General Zia ul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. The 18th amendment was not limited to a particular article or any single issue; rather it was very extensive as it addressed 102 of 280 articles of the 1973 constitution (Imran Ahmed, 2020). The amendment is regarded as an up-gradation of the 1973 constitution and aimed to strengthen federalism in Pakistan. By rescinding Article 58 2(b) under the amendment, the power to dismiss elected government was taken away from the president. The president became a figurative head of the state. Some important themes of the constitutional reforms were restoring the parliamentary form of government, strengthening institutions, appointing judges, and

reshaping the relationship between center and provincial governments through decentralization (Imran Ahmed, 2020; Rana, 2020, p. 64).

Regarding the scope of this thesis, the decentralization through the 18th amendment could have significant implications on the form of nationalism political elites would promote. The amendment addressed the domination of Punjab's folk culture and aimed to reduce grievances among Sindhi, Balochi, Muhajir, and Pakhtun folk cultures in Pakistan. For the first time in Pakistan's political history, unprecedented decentralization was enacted through the amendment. According to the Concurrent List of 2010, there were some 40 areas where central and provincial governments could legislate. However, federal laws would have precedence over provincial laws. The amendment abolished the Concurrent List of 2010, which resulted in the devolution of 17 ministries to the provinces. The provinces became solely responsible for the legislation and implementation of matters regarding the environment, health, education, labor, and culture (Adeney, 2012; Cookman, 2010). It is important to keep in mind that until 2010 the formation and implementation of policies on national education had been under the central government's domain. After the amendment, provinces with distinct folk cultures and with significant autonomy were responsible for formulating and implementing education policies.

Another significant effort to address unequal inter-provincial and center-province relations was revising the formula for distribution of financial resources among the provinces titled the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) award, commonly known as the 7th NFC award. Previously, the distribution of financial resources was based on the province's population, making Punjab the largest beneficiary of the formula. With the announcement of the 7th NFC award in 2011, along with population factors like poverty and level of underdevelopment and wealth generation, inverse population density was added before allocating financial recourses. The 7th NFC award reduced

Punjab's share by 5.6 percent and increased Sindh, KP, and Balochistan shares by 1.3, 1.1, and 3.8 percent, respectively. Punjab remained the largest beneficiary of the financial resources, but the revision was well-received by all three provinces. Moreover, due to the decentralization under the 18th amendment, it was an important outcome that provinces were to have more financial resources than the center. Therefore, as opposed to the previous trend, which ensured 55 percent of the resources to the center, under the 7th NFC award, 57.5 percent of the state's total financial resources were distributed among the provinces, and 42.5 percent were allocated to the center (Adeney, 2012, pp. 548-549).

I interviewed Ex-Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani on February 25, 2019. He was prime minister of Pakistan from March 25, 2008, to April 26, 2012. He is a member of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and became prime minister of Pakistan after the general election of 2008. On the question of shaping civic nationalism in Pakistan, he responded that their government's fundamental effort to promote civic nationalism in Pakistan was the initiation and undertaking of the 18th constitutional amendment. He explained that the PPP believes that from General Zia to General Musharraf, the center was made strong, and provinces were kept weak by the military dictators to accumulate power in the hands of one individual. The ethnic and linguistic divisions on provincial lines are strong because of the unequal distribution of power and resources among provinces. Gillani mentioned that the PPP government revoked powers consolidated at the center and devolved policymaking, implementation, and resources to the provinces through the 18th amendment and NFC award. The PPP believes that if the sense of deprivation is addressed and curtailed and all provinces have equal opportunities to develop, this will give rise to shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. Ex-Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani also quoted Benazir Bhutto stating, "democracy is the best revenge" [This is a famous quote of Benazir Bhutto. She often used

it in response to the ouster of her father Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq, her two-time ouster in the 1990s, and the military regime of General Musharraf.] He mentioned that the PPP's commitment to democracy was evident in the smooth holding of the 2013 general elections. Yousaf Raza Gillani concluded that democracy and federalism are the only way to have civic nationalism in Pakistan, which PPP's government (2008-2013) have promoted (Interview, 25ᵗʰ February 2019, Ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan).

The discussion in previous chapters explains that the competition among folk cultures has been a dominant feature of politics in Pakistan. Gillani's response conforms to hypothesis one of this thesis as he recognized competition among folk cultures in Pakistan. The interview response provides a different and perhaps suitable approach towards forming shared high culture in Pakistan. Previously, the political and military elite in power at the center have recognized provincialism as a challenge in shaping shared civic nationalism and have resorted to a powerful center as a suitable solution. However, desirable results could not be achieved. Ex-Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani pointed out a different approach. He believed that devolution would ensure substantial political and financial powers at the provincial level which would be fundamental in eliminating competition among folk cultures. The removal of competition would provide a suitable environment for distinct folk cultures to co-exist and cooperate. The situation may eventually lead to the formation of civic nationalism with pluralism as a strong characteristic.

The interview response demonstrates that the political elite in power at the center regarded the 18th amendment and 7th NFC awards as their way of promoting shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. However, he emphasized the word **If,** that if the 18th amendment successfully creates equal opportunities among provinces, this will promote civic nationalism in Pakistan. The amendment was passed in 2010, and the interview I conducted was in February 2019. The response

indicates that in his mind the constitutional amendment had yet to create the desired result of shaping shared civic nationalism.

Following are a few examples that determine that immediately after the 18th amendment the contestation among folk cultures remained a persistent issue. A significant step taken under the 18th amendment was the renaming of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) (Musarrat, Ali, & Azhar, 2012). The names of Pakistan's provinces indicate the dominant folk culture that resides in them. For example, Punjab has people of Punjabi ethnicity, Sindh's dominant population is of Sindhi ethnicity and Balochistan has a dominant Baloch ethnic group. While naming NWFP, the government went against the popular demand to name the province Pakhtunistan or Pashtoonistan meaning the land of Pakhtuns. The word Khyber indicates that a famous mountain pass between Pakistan and Afghanistan was added to signify the location of the province. The name now means 'Khyber side of the land of Pashtuns' (Cookman, 2010; Musarrat et al., 2012). It is not a complete deviation from indicating the dominant folk culture of its people, but still an effort to not purely associate the province with the ethnicity. The decision incited violent protest by the Hazara ethnic community of KP. The protestors claimed that by naming the province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the state has failed to recognize the distinct linguistic and cultural identity of the Hazara community. (Cookman, 2010) Some raised the question of why the province was not named as 'Hazara-Pakhtunkhwa.' (Adeney, 2012, p. 551). The Hazara community of KP vocalized their demand to make a new province by splitting KP.

In the province of Sindh, the contestation between dominant and non-dominant folk cultures led to the demand for a new province. The demand for division of Sindh and the formation of Muhajir province surfaced in 2012. Initiated by smaller Muhajir groups, it was not backed by mainstream Muhajir political party MQM in the beginning but in 2019, they joined the demand (Siddiqi,

2020). The demands for separate provinces on ethnic lines have not received any support from the political elite in power at the center and in the provinces. However, the trend shows that even after decentralization under the 18th amendment, significant and persistent internal divisions exist among different folk cultures.

The proposition of dividing Punjab into two provinces has been discussed over the years. The division of Punjab cannot be examined on purely ethnic lines. There has been a consensus that by splitting the province into two, the fundamental issue of domination of Punjab's folk culture can be addressed. The proposed name of the province is South Punjab. The south of Punjab is relatively underdeveloped as compared to the central or northern regions of Punjab. The region is inhibited by a Seraiki speaking population, a different dialect of the Punjabi language (Mughal, 2020; Siddiqi, 2020). Regionally people are of Punjabi ethnicity, linguistically Seraiki and the dominant religion is Islam. The political elite from South of Punjab has been advocating for a separate province by the name of Seraikistan (land of Saraiki people). However, the political elite in power at the center emphasizes division on a regional basis and would call it South Punjab province.

The issue of dividing Punjab has incited demands for new provinces across Pakistan, purely based on ethnic differences (Siddiqi, 2020) Mainstream political parties like PPP, PML-N, are inclined towards creating a new provinces, but each party in power wants to take full credit for making the province and wants to maximize the political benefit out of it (Mughal, 2020). Within South Punjab, there is a disagreement between the political elite of the two main cities, Multan and Bahawalpur over becoming the new province's capital (A. S. Alvi, 2017; Mughal, 2020). If accomplished, establishment of a new province would be a first in Pakistan's political history. The issue is full of challenges and is prone to manipulation on ethnic lines.

The discussion thus far demonstrates that, after the election of 2008, coalition governments were formed at the national and provincial levels. After being forced out of power and with leadership in exile because of the military coup in 1999, political parties were determined to work for better prospects of staying in power. The intention to work together was reflected in the Charter of Democracy signed in May 2006 between PPP and PML-N. In Punjab, provincial ministries were shared between PPP and PML-N. The Chief Minister of Punjab was from PML-N, Shahbaz Sharif, the younger brother of Nawaz Sharif. In Sindh, the Chief Minister was from PPP. The PPP shared provincial ministries with its traditional rival, MQM, in Sindh. In NWFP, PPP and PML-N shared power with Pakhtun nationalist party, Awami National Party (ANP). The same pattern was followed in Balochistan, where all representatives were given a share in power.

The center and province relations dynamics changed significantly after the 18th amendment of 2010 and the 7th NFC award. Through decentralization and allocation of more financial resources, provinces became significantly powerful. The political elite in power at the center emphasized that removing inequality and the sense of deprivation among provinces would decrease competition and increase cooperation among provinces. The situation would provide Pakistan a better opportunity for shaping shared civic nationalism. From 2008 onward, the elected political elite proposed a high culture of a pluralistic nature that could bring Pakistan closer to Gellner's zone one style nationalism. The previous discussion on persistent ethnic divisions on provincial lines indicates that after the 18th amendment, the competing folk cultures remained strong, and zone three style ethnic nationalism remained dominant in Pakistan.

The 2008 election results demonstrate that the religious-political parties' appeal to religious culture as a dominant culture of Pakistan did not secure electoral success. The religious-political parties were limited to only a few seats in the National Assembly and could not form a government in any

province. Therefore, after the general election of 2008, Gellner's zone five style religious nationalism was very weak as the religious elite did not have a substantial presence in the national and provincial assemblies. The discussion on successive general elections in 2013 will provide us with a better understanding of the dynamics of competing nationalism in Pakistan.

5.3   The 2013 General Elections and Competing Civic, Ethnic and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan

In May 2013, after completing a five-year term of parliament, general elections were held in Pakistan. The elections of 2013 can be regarded as a landmark in Pakistan's political history as, for the first time, an elected government completed its term and transitioned to a successive elected regime. The elections of 2013 were significant as they were the first general elections after the 18th amendment. The PPP and PML-N jointly passed the 18th amendment, which devolved power and finances to the provinces to enable cooperation among distinct folk cultures to produce a suitable environment for the formation of shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. As a result of the general elections of 2013, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) came into power at the center. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif became prime minister of Pakistan for the third time. PML-N's support of the 18th amendment made Nawaz Sharif a direct beneficiary, as, after the amendment, prime ministers can serve for more than two terms. Before the constitutional amendment, there was a restriction on prime ministers serving more than two terms.

PML-N emerged as the dominant political party in the country. However, their domination came from winning a super majority of the national and provincial assembly seats from Punjab. Out of 272 National Assembly general seats, PML-N won 129 seats, 120 of which came from Punjab. The required majority to make the government in the center was then achieved by joining with

independents and including members of parliament from the reserved quota for women (Lashari & Mirza, 2013; E. C. o. Pakistan, 2013). PML-N's National Assembly win came from winning a majority in their ethnic stronghold, Punjab. The majority win from Punjab demonstrates that they did not have a national voter support base.

Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won the second largest number of seats in the National Assembly; however, with 42 seats, they were way behind PML-N. Apart from Sindh, PPP performed poorly throughout the country. The majority of the PPP's National Assembly seats came from Sindh which indicates that at national level PPP lost voter support outside Sindh. President Asif Ali Zardari admitted that PPP could not deliver on the issues of power shortages and inflation, which contributed to poor electoral results. Regarding religious-political parties, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-Fazal (JUL-F) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), managed to win 15 and 4 National Assembly seats, respectively (Lashari & Mirza, 2013; E. C. o. Pakistan, 2013).

PML-N won a decisive majority at the provincial level by winning 248 of 297 provincial assembly seats in Punjab. From 106 seats in the 2008 elections, the PPP was reduced to just 6 seats in the Punjab assembly. However, by winning 90 seats, the PPP maintained dominance in Sindh. The Muhajir dominant regions of Sindh were won by MQM, maintaining it as the second-largest party of the province. Balochistan had a mixed mandate where Baloch nationalist political parties, PML-N, and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam JUI-F won seats. In Balochistan, the winning parties prefer to be in coalition with the ruling party in the center, which in 2013 was PML-N. A coalition government with a formula of chief ministers from two main parties sharing the term was formed. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), PML-N did not form a government. Rather parties in opposition to PML-N in the National Assembly formed a government in the province (Lashari & Mirza, 2013; E. C. o.

Pakistan, 2013). The 2013 provincial election results demonstrate the political parties did not secure notable representation outside their ethnic strongholds.

Regarding the 2013 election results, the main difference compared to 2008 was PML-N's government at the center. Both PML-N and PPP stayed in power in their respective provincial strongholds, Punjab and Sindh. The 2013 general election results showed the persistent trend that folk cultures in Pakistan were inclined to vote for the political elite of their own folk cultures. Moreover in 2013, the political elite that came into power at the center was from Punjabi folk culture which had a history of being contested by other folk cultures. The election results showed that the idea of civic nationalism aspired to through the 18th amendment was overshadowed by ethnic considerations at the national, and provincial levels. Competition and not cooperation remained the pattern. Regarding the religious-political parties, with representation of only 19 seats in the National Assembly, the results of the elections indicate that religious nationalism could not present a powerful challenge to civic and ethnic nationalism in Pakistan.

The electoral results of two general elections of 2008 and 2013 demonstrates that when the parliamentary form of government resumed in 2008, the two strong political parties, the PPP, and PML-N, through decentralization, tried to shape a political system where folk cultures would be less likely to compete. However, competition among folk cultures remained persistent. Arguably, the decentralization served the short term self-interest of the political elite of staying in power at least at the provincial level. With increased provincial autonomy and financial resources allocated to the provinces, the political elite found a better opportunity to hold on to their ethnic voter support bases and may accept an alternative ruling regime at the center while retaining provincial governments in their respective provinces. The above discussion suggests that, especially after the 18th amendment, the political system in Pakistan remained prone to ethnic nationalism instead of

shared civic nationalism. However, the following discussion suggests that voter behavior on ethnic considerations changed in the general elections of 2018.

5.3.1 The Emergence of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) – A New Political Alternative

The decade (2008-2018) was the first time Pakistan experienced an uninterrupted parliamentary government where two mainstream political parties with strong ethnic support bases had the opportunity to govern. Therefore, their reelection was not only dependent on strong ethnic support bases, but their performance was also going to have an impact. The support base of PPP and PML-N changed and decreased after completing their respective tenures from 2008 to 2013 and 2013 to 2018. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice) (PTI) emerged as a new party of nationwide popularity during the elections of 2013. PTI is led by Imran Khan and was established in 1996 (Talbot, 2005; Wu & Ali, 2020).

Imran Khan is a former cricketer of international recognition; Pakistan won the cricket world cup in 1992 while he was the team's captain. His career as a sportsman established him as a national hero across Pakistan, where people cheered for him irrespective of ethnic considerations. Ethnically Imran Khan is a Pathan, and regionally he is from Punjab. His schooling was at Aitchison College, an elitist English medium school established under the British Raj in 1886. He went to Oxford for higher education. After retiring from cricket, he established a political party. Imran Khan rallied people against the economic underdevelopment and alleged corruption of the political elite in power in previous elected governments. PTI has a major support base from urbanites of all four provinces.

As discussed previously, throughout the 1990s, the politics in Pakistan was dominated by two ethnic-based political parties, PML-N and PPP. Imran Khan first contested elections in 1997,

where his party did not win any seat in the national or provincial assembly. In the general elections of 2002, held under the military regime of General Musharraf, PTI won only one National Assembly seat (Ziring, 2003a). The party boycotted the 2008 general elections and remained active in media and held public processions with mass attendance. In 2013, with 35 of 342 National Assembly seats, PTI emerged as the third-largest national-level political party after PML-N and PPP. The party had significant success in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), where they won 39 of 99 seats and were able to make a coalition government with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) with 13 seats (E. C. o. Pakistan, 2013; Wu & Ali, 2020). In 2013, the PTI was in government in one of the provinces in Pakistan and had an opportunity to perform. The gradual rise of the PTI demonstrates that the well-established political parties and their enacted decentralization did not bring Pakistan closer to a shared civic nationalism. The PTI emerged as a new nationally oriented political alternative as it appealed to voters from distinct folk cultures across Pakistan.

Imran Khan acted as a formidable opposition to the Nawaz Sharif-led PML-N's government in Pakistan. Throughout the five years from 2013 to 2018, PTI remained exceptionally active in mobilizing the masses against the corruption and alleged political agreement between PML-N and PPP. PTI criticizes PPP and PML-N that, in the name of the Charter of Democracy, they have created a formula of taking turns of being in power at the center and will retain power in their respective provincial strongholds. He criticized mainstream political parties for pursuing selfish political agendas and stealing the state's money (Wu & Ali, 2020).

After the general elections of 2013, Imran Khan claimed there were rigged elections in at least twenty-five National Assembly constituencies. He demanded a recount in at least four National Assembly constituencies of Punjab (M. Malik, May 16, 2013). In protest of not recounting four constituencies, the PTI called for Azadi March (Freedom March) on August 14, 2014. After

arriving at the capital Islamabad, the Azadi March became Dharna (a sit-in) for 126 days. It was only called off in response to the terrorist attack on Army Public School (APS) Peshawar on December 16, 2014. The attack was declared a national emergency. The military led the response against the attack and political backing was provided by the political elite in government as well as in opposition (Jaffrelot, 2015; Wu & Ali, 2020).

The 126-day Dharna can be regarded as unprecedented in Pakistan's political history. It received non-stop media coverage and was attended by thousands, mostly educated urbanites, who gathered at the designated location in Islamabad every evening and went home later at night after listening to Imran Khan's addresses (Mulla, 2017). Panama Papers leaks in April 2016 provided another opportunity for the Imran Khan-led opposition to run a successful political and legal campaign against PML-N. Imran Khan launched a case popularly known as Panama Papers Case against Nawaz Sharif in July 2016. The case ended with the verdict of Nawaz Sharif's disqualification in April 2017 (M. Abbas, 2 August 2017; K. Johnson, 2018).

Between 2013-and 2018, Imran Khan's popularity peaked due to extensive media coverage of his 126-day Dharna and then the Panama Papers Case. His processions were attended by hundreds of thousands across the country and watched by millions on television screens. It is significant to keep in mind that throughout this time, PPP did not condemn PML-N's government and political elite over their corruption cases as strongly as Imran Khan's PTI (Gethin, Mehmood, & Piketty, 2020). The PPP's weak opposition to the PML-N government of 2013 was criticized as collusion between the PPP and PML-N by Imran Khan.

The emergence of a new national level political party can be regarded as significant for Pakistan's experience with nationalism. The politics of two mainstream political parties, PML-N and PPP evolved as more focused on ethnic strongholds. From 2008 to 2013, both parties alternatively had

a chance to be in power at the center. PML-N uninterruptedly stayed in power in Punjab for ten years, and the same was the case with PPP in Sindh. Both parties, the PPP and PML-N, lost National Assembly representation outside their provinces in the general elections of 2008 and 2013, indicating the strengthening of folk cultures in Pakistan compared to the prospects for forming a state high culture. Under these two political parties, the possibility of forming high culture suitable for shared civic nationalism through decentralization in Pakistan became apparently slim. With a nationwide voter support base, popularity, and mass attendance at rallies across provinces, Imran Khan emerged as a powerful alternative with the potential to promote shared civic nationalism in Pakistan.

5.4   The 2018 General Elections and Competing Civic, Ethnic, and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan

PTI raised the slogans, Naya Pakistan (New Pakistan) and Tabdili (Change). Imran Khan rallied people over the need to build a new Pakistani nation. He stressed that the new Pakistan can be built by promoting social justice, economic development, reducing inflation, and accountability for the corruption of the political elite (Wu & Ali, 2020). Imran Khan highlighted corruption as a national issue of Pakistan and proposed a new Pakistan where there is across the board accountability. In the PTI's vision mentioned in the manifesto of 2018, Imran Khan aims to make Pakistan an **'Islamic Welfare State'** (I. Khan, 2018b, p. 7). Imran Khan emphasized that we need to build Pakistan on the lines of Riyasat-e-Medina (Medina State[3]). He explained Riyasat-e-Medina as an **"egalitarian society based on the rule of law and economic justice"** (I. Khan, 2018b, p. 6). He stressed that an Islamic welfare state cannot be achieved without breaking the status quo where

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[3] First welfare state in Islamic history.

institutions were corrupted and weakened by the political elite who have been in and out of power for last three decades, so that they do not face accountability (I. Khan, 2018b, pp. 6-7; Wu & Ali, 2020).

Another significant aspect of Naya Pakistan mentioned in PTI's manifesto and repeated by Imran Khan over the years is Pakistan to have an independent foreign policy. As mentioned in the manifesto of 2018, "A Naya Pakistan will not fight other's wars or act as surrogate for any power" (I. Khan, 2018b, p. 7). Imran Khan criticized the Musharraf led military regime's compromise on Pakistan's national interests by participating in the US War on Terrorism. He criticized the successive elected governments of PPP and PML-N for following suit and did not forming an independent foreign policy beneficial for people of Pakistan and not for some foreign country. Imran Khan emphasized that participating in a foreign war has caused Pakistan irreparable damage. At various occasions Imran Khan has referred to the official reports mentioning that in exchange of 20 billion dollars in US aid, Pakistan's economy has suffered loss of 123 to 150 billion dollars. 75,000 to 80,000 Pakistan's armed forces and civilians have lost lives (K. Ahmed, 2021; Singh & Agrawal, 2018). The discussion demonstrates that Imran Khan sought popular support by raising issues of national significance like economic welfare, accountability, and unity against an external enemy.

On August 19, 2018, in the inaugural address as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan stated that,

> If we want to uphold the dream of the welfare state that was given the great name of Pakistan, then we must follow the principles that formed the Medina State. In the Medina State, what did the Prophet (P.B.U.H) do? Did he ask the Roman or Persian empires for loans? Did he ask for assistance? He [Prophet] raised up his own people. He [Prophet] devoted all his attention to his people, providing them

education, delivering them justice, fulfilling their fundamental needs… (I. Khan, 2018a).

The vision in the PTI's manifesto and the inaugural address indicates that Imran Khan's interpretation of the Islamic welfare state was focused on egalitarian society, economic development, economic and social justice, accountability, and a state with an independent foreign policy.

Tareen (2022) rightfully pointed out that Pakistan's approach towards Muslim nation-building has been experimental over the years. She argued that Imran Khan's view on nationalism is based on "a modernist interpretation of the Medina state". She further explained that "the explicit link between religious history, national identity, and social welfare distinguishes Naya Pakistan from previous modernist programs" (Tareen, 2022, p. 155). However, Imran Khan's approach cannot be regarded as different from the previous political and military elites who promoted their own view regarding the role of religion and attempted to maintain the outlook of a modernist nation-state. Like Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and General Pervez Musharraf, Imran Khan has emphasized religion but has kept a distance from the fundamentalist interpretation Islam. Maqsood (2017) argued that Imran Khan's view on the role of religion is closer to General Ayub Khan's modernist interpretation of Islam. Imran Khan has not been as strict as Ayub Khan about curtailing religious influence in politics. Imran Khan's idea of an Islamic welfare state and egalitarian society can be regarded as closer to Bhutto's Islamic socialism.

The discussion thus far demonstrates that Imran Khan did not emphasize the traditional interpretation of Islam. Imran Khan's view of the Islamic welfare state, modernist interpretation of Islam, economic development, corruption as a national issue of concern, and a nationalist approach towards foreign policy constitute his attempt to shape a high culture. The above-mentioned characteristics of the high culture of strong national appeal can be regarded as helpful

in creating Gellner's zone one style of civic nationalism. However, Imran Khan's view of shared high culture did not address the significance of curtailing competition and promoting cooperation among folk cultures.

The most recent general elections in Pakistan were held in July 2018. The election results can be regarded as a mix of change and persistence. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, who campaigned on the agenda of Naya Pakistan (New Pakistan) and Tabdili (Change), emerged as the winning party in the center with 149 seats, followed by 82 seats by PML-N and 54 seats by PPP. (E. C. o. Pakistan, 2018; Wu & Ali, 2020). The PTI's National Assembly seats came from all four provinces of Pakistan which demonstrates that the party had been able to secure a national voter support base. However, there was still a difference between the total number of seats won and the seats needed to form the government in the center. PTI formed government at the center with help of independents and coalition partners and had a very thin majority in the National Assembly. The alliance of religious-political parties, Mutahida Majlis-e-Amla (MMA), was revived in 2017. An alliance of six mainstream religious-political parties won only 15 of 342 national assembly seats (Wu & Ali, 2020).

In 2013, PTI was able to make a coalition government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). After having a chance to perform from 2013 to 2018, PTI won a two-thirds majority in KP. Regarding other provinces, the most significant change was in Punjab, where PTI undermined the dominance of PML-N. Compared to winning 24 seats in 2013, PTI won 181 seats in Punjab, while PML-N's share of seats dropped from 214 to 166 in 2018. PTI formed the government in Pakistan's largest province, Punjab with the help of independents and other coalition partners. PML-N remained as second largest party of Punjab provincial assembly. PPP had just 7 seats in Punjab's provincial assembly (E. C. o. Pakistan, 2018; Wu & Ali, 2020). In Balochistan, the election mandate was

split among Baloch nationalist parties, MMA and PTI. However, no single party was in the position of forming a government independently; therefore, the political elite followed the previous trend of forming a coalition with the ruling party at the center. After having the opportunity to perform between 2013 to 2018, the PTI's two-thirds majority in KP's provincial assembly demonstrates that the party won a stronger mandate. Punjab has been the stronghold of the PML-N since its establishment in 1993. In Punjab's provincial election, the PTI undermined the dominance of PML-N by winning a majority and forming the provincial government with the help of coalition partners. The PTI's victory in Punjab's provincial assembly demonstrated that the voter support of people from Punjabi folk culture was shifting in favour of the PTI, which was seeking a nationwide voter support base.

In Sindh, PPP persisted for a third consecutive term, first from 2008-2013, from 2013-2018, and 2018-2023. The political career of Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, son of Benazir Bhutto and Ex-President Asif Ali Zardari, was launched before the general elections of 2018. After the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, Bilawal Zardari's name was changed to Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, a move criticized as seeking to capture Sindhi and Bhutto voter support. The significant change in Sindh's electoral patterns was the emergence of PTI as the second most popular party replacing Muhajir representative MQM. In the National Assembly and Sindh's provincial assembly the PTI was able to shift MQM's urban voter support in its favor. Within Sindh, PPP was confined to rural Sindh, characterized by the Sindhi population incorporated in the patron-client system, highly underdeveloped, and among the lowest literacy rates (Gethin et al., 2020; Wu & Ali, 2020). The rural constituencies of Sindh are often pointed out as the regions with a high possibility of vote rigging. PPP's presence in all other provinces of Pakistan shrunk significantly. Established by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1967 as the most popular national-level political party, the

party's electoral pattern the last three elections indicates that PPP has lost its limited national appeal, is increasingly dependent on Sindhi ethnic voter support, and is becoming more of a regional party of rural Sindh. The 2018 general election results showing PTI's increased representation in national and provincial assemblies demonstrate that PTI's emergence as a new alternative gained national support across Pakistan. Poor electoral performance and mandate limited to respective folk cultures demonstrated that the strong political parties like PPP and PML-N became largely dependent on ethnic voter support bases.

5.4.1 End of the PTI Government and Nationalism in Pakistan

In March 2022, joint opposition of 11 political parties named Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), tabled a no-confidence motion against Imran Khan in the National Assembly. PDM is an alliance of mainstream political parties like PML-N, PPP, religious-political party JUI-F, and a few Balochi and Pashtun nationalist political parties On April 9, 2022, the no-confidence motion against Imran Khan succeeded as his coalition partners MQM and Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) voted against him, and at least twenty of PTI's Members of National Assembly (MNA) announced support opposition parties against Imran Khan. Shahbaz Sharif of PML-N, brother of Nawaz Sharif, was the PDM's candidate for prime minister. Shahbaz Sharif became the Prime Minister of Pakistan on April 9, 2022. Imran Khan blamed the no-confidence motion on a United States-backed conspiracy for regime change in Pakistan. Imran claimed that the joint opposition, whom he referred to as the corrupt political elite, for their self-interests, had colluded with a foreign power to remove an elected prime minister of Pakistan (Aljazeera, 9 April 2022; I. Khan, 27 March 2022).

The validity of Imran Khan's claim of a foreign conspiracy and collusion of the political elite with a foreign power for his removal is not within the scope of this study. However, given the argument

of this thesis, it may be that all ethnic-based political parties allied to oust the PTI government as it threatened their long-standing dominance. Currently, ethnic-based political parties PML-N and PPP have power in Punjab and Sindh provinces and are sharing power at the center. The current coalition government of PDM demonstrates the return of the status quo, which otherwise was challenged by the PTI, a relatively new political party with a national voter support base. The PDM's political and religious elite have made it clear that they have formed a joint opposition against the PTI government and will compete each other in the next general elections of 2023. The removal of the PTI government through a vote of no confidence and not through new elections indicates that the political and religious elite in opposition continued the trend of disrupting the formation of a potential high culture in Pakistan.

The ouster of Imran Khan has been followed by unprecedented and ongoing mass protests by Pakistanis within the country and overseas. The situation indicates that his claim has some support from the people of Pakistan. Imran Khan gave a call for a peaceful protest the next day after losing a no-confidence vote. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered on the streets in more than 50 cities of Pakistan. Imran Khan declared that he did not recognize the imported government imposed on Pakistan through a foreign conspiracy and demanded an immediate announcement of general elections otherwise scheduled for August 2023.Within ten days after losing the vote of no-confidence, Imran Khan held general processions in the provincial capitals Peshawar, Karachi, Lahore of three provinces KP, Sindh and Punjab of Pakistan on 13th, 16th, and 21st April 2022 respectively. Imran Khan appealed to every Pakistani to attend his processions irrespective of political party affiliations as his ouster through foreign conspiracy made successful with the help of the political elite seeking self-interests, is threating to Pakistan's freedom. He encouraged

everyone to join him in the protest with the flag of Pakistan and not with PTI's flag (I. Khan, 14 April 2022, 17 April 2022, 22 April 2022).

Reaching out to all provinces and addressing Pakistanis irrespective of political party affiliation indicates that Imran Khan is trying to seek national support. This is the first time in Pakistan's political history that a prime minister has been ousted through a vote of no-confidence and the mass protest on the removal has followed. A twitter trend, hashtag Imported_Hakumat_Namanzur (Imported_Government_Unacceptable) was initiated after the PDM government was formed. It remained top trend on twitter for more than ten days. Tweet Binder is a 'twitter hashtag analytical tool', of international recognition. It tracks and counts twitter trends to prepare impact reports. On April 26, 2022, Tweet Binder tweeted that with over 100 million tweets, hashtag Imported_Hakumat_Namanzoor "maybe the biggest trend every analyzed in Tweet Binder" (Binder, 2022). However, the next general election results and the implementation of a proposed high culture will determine the support for Imran Khan's view of high culture in Pakistan and the prospects for the formation of shared civic nationalism. Currently, an alliance of 14 political parties strongly dependent on ethnic voter support bases are in power at the center in Pakistan.

The prevalence of PTI's proposed high culture with the potential to create shared civic nationalism cannot be determined with only three and half years to perform. The fact that PTI won the 2018 general elections with a thin majority and the return of political parties like PML-N, and PPP who seek support from competing folk cultures, demonstrates that zone three style nationalism is still strong in Pakistan. In the 2018 general elections, the alliance of religious-political parties MMA won 15 seats in the National Assembly. The religious-political parties joined opposition benches when the PTI government was formed in August 2018. Later, the MMA joined the opposition alliance of ethnic-based political parties including PPP, PML-N, and BAP and ended up with key

240

positions such as federal ministries and a deputy speakership in the current government of Pakistan formed in April 2022.

The religious elite contests elections to promote religious culture in Pakistan but does not win sufficient electoral mandate. Over the years, the religious elites have supported General Zia's Islamization and General Musharraf's modernization and formed coalitions and alliances with ethnically orientations political parties at the provincial and national levels. The discussion suggested that the religious elites, irrespective of political and military elite views on Pakistan's high culture, have supported and enabled governments and secured short term self-interests like provincial and federal ministries. Therefore, the religious elite does not promote zone five style religious nationalism in Pakistan. Rather the promotion of religious culture is subject to the short term self-interests of the religious elites.

Hypothesis one and two of this thesis argues that since 1947, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan have been in competition with each other and elites promote competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits their short term self-interests. The discussion of Pakistan's three consecutive general elections of 2008, 2013, and 2018 suggests that competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism remain a persistent feature in Pakistan's politics. The PPP and PML-N's political elite claimed equally powerful and autonomous provinces would eliminate competition among folk cultures and lead to better prospects for shaping civic nationalism in Pakistan. The politics and electoral results that followed the 18th constitutional amendment indicate that the mainstream political parties like PPP and PML-N gained politically by strengthening their ethnic voter support bases and made Pakistan more susceptible to competing folk cultures. Religious nationalism has been weak over the years as indicated by the lack of voter support in the general elections. Still, the religious culture is different from the proposed high

culture and distinct folk cultures of Pakistan. Therefore, by emphasizing religious culture, the religious elite keeps an influential presence in Pakistan's national politics.

The emergence of a new political party of national-level popularity can be regarded as promising for Pakistan's potential development of high culture. The political elite of PTI has proposed a high culture that may have national appeal. Imran Khan emerged as a ruler with a strong national appeal by winning national and provincial assembly seats across the country. His government may form a high culture that might be accepted by the folk cultures as the people from all folk cultures across the country voted for his party. However, it is too soon to determine if this might be the case.

The thin electoral mandate in the 2018 general elections and early dissolution of the PTI government demonstrates that the political parties with strong ethnic support bases are powerful and prevalent in Pakistan. The Sindhi-dominant PPP, Punjabi-dominant PML-N, Muhajir-dominant MQM, Baloch-dominant BAP, and religious-political party Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) have formed the current government and share federal ministries. The situation suggests that sticking to the competing ethnic and religious nationalism serves the short term self-interests of acquiring and consolidating power. It is also important to keep in mind that according to the above mentioned electoral results from 2008 onwards, religious-political parties led by the religious elite do not enjoy mass public support. Therefore, the potential of civic nationalism being contested by religious nationalism is significantly less than the contestation between civic and ethnic nationalism.

5.5   Education and Competing Civic, Ethnic, and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan

2008 onwards

The following section of this chapter will discuss the role of education in the competing nationalism in Pakistan in more recent times. The discussion in previous chapters highlighted that over the years, different political and military elites in power at the center had different approaches towards the high culture of Pakistan. Therefore, the national education in Pakistan had shifting focuses such as modernization, nationalization, Islamization, and a bid towards enlightened moderation. Furthermore, the emergence of three parallel education systems, including public schools, private schools, and madrassas with different focuses, created an outcome that the product coming out from these institutes do not share common values and do not encounter equal economic opportunities. Due to these factors, Pakistan has not been able to achieve any form of shared nationalism through education. The following section attempts to find the validity of hypothesis three and four of this thesis.

5.5.1   The National Education Policy of 2009

Gellner argued that establishing a national education system by the state is an effective way to create shared nationalism in heterogeneous societies. State planned and sponsored education on the national level has the resources and potential to create shared language and culture. It enables the spread of high culture among people with diverse linguistic, ethnic, and cultural associations. Gellner argued that nationalism is essential for the modern state. He further explained that a modern state is committed to economic growth through industrialization. At the same time, urbanization would be inevitable for an industrial society. Economic growth in an industrial society can best be achieved if people from diverse linguistic, ethnic, and cultural affiliations are

literate in a common language and culture through state-sponsored national education (Gellner, 1964, p. 160).

When the parliamentary form of government was resumed in Pakistan and PPP came into power after the general elections of 2008, the literacy rate in Pakistan was between 55 to 57 percent. With an average of 55 percent literacy rate, Pakistan is considered among the countries with the lowest literacy rates in the world (A. Rehman, Jingdong, & Hussain, 2015). The literacy rate of each province varies. As of 2014, the literacy rate in Punjab was 61 percent, Sindh was 56 percent, KP had a literacy rate of 53 percent, and Balochistan had 43 percent (A. Rehman et al., 2015). Moreover, Pakistan spends around 2 percent of its GDP on education which is also among the lowest in the world (A. Rehman et al., 2015). The data shows that challenges to national education in Pakistan are on many levels. Along with the lowest literacy rate in the world, the state has the lowest spending on education, which implies that Pakistan may not achieve a substantial standard in state-sponsored and planned education system in the near future. Moreover, the variable literacy rate among provinces indicates unequal access to educational opportunities among folk cultures and subsequent disparity in economic opportunities.

The formation of a new national education policy was already underway during General Musharraf's regime (1999-2008). The last curricula changes came into effect in 2006. The 2006 curriculum was followed by the 2007 "Education in Pakistan: A White Paper." The policy of 2009 came into effect a year after the transition to the parliamentary government. The guidelines for the education policy of 2009 were in the process of formation during the previous military regime. Therefore, the education policy of 2009 cannot be regarded as the political elite's approach towards nationalism, which came into power after the general elections of 2008. Rather, it demonstrates the vision of the military elite who ruled the country between 1999 to 2008. The Federal Ministry

of Education announced an education policy under the title of National Education Policy 2009 in

August 2009. The central theme of the national education was stated as follows,

> Our education system must provide quality education to our children and youth to enable them to realize their individual potential and contribute to the development of society and nation, creating a sense of Pakistani nationhood, the concepts of tolerance, social justice, democracy, their regional and local culture and history based on the basic ideology enunciated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, p. 17).

In the constitution of 1973, the ideology of Pakistan is Islam. The statement refers to religion by

using the word ideology. The emphasis on notions like tolerance, social justice, democracy, and,

most importantly, regional and local cultures to be addressed through education indicates that

ethnic and religious nationalism must be integrated into shared Pakistani nationalism and should

not be competing with each other.

Regarding the scope of this study, the following can be viewed as salient features of the 2009

national education policy. The policy document mentioned that a national education system is

fundamental for a modern state. It ascertained that only a state's national education system has the

potential and capacity to promote shared ideals, objectives, and aspirations among its people. It

also mentioned that for a state like Pakistan with distinct local cultures, a uniform sense of

nationalism could only be created through national curricula designed by the state (*National

Education Policy 2009*, 2009, pp. 10-11). It appears that at a theoretical level, perhaps the national

education policy of 2009 seek the same opportunities as Gellner did for the formation of shared

nationalism through education.

The aims and objectives of the education policy of 2009 mentioned that education must promote

national cohesion by integrating religion, diverse cultures, and ethnic identities into a shared

narrative. Therefore, the policy of 2009 aimed for an education system where religious culture,

245

folk cultures, and high culture do not compete with each other. The policy of 2009 also acknowledged that three parallel systems of education, public schools, private schools, and madrassas, have created a social and economic divide in Pakistan society and proved to be disadvantageous for national cohesion (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, pp. 16, 25).

Over the issue of the language of instruction, the National Education Policy 2009 regarded English as significant for meeting the requirement of a globalized world. Urdu is regarded as fundamental for promoting national cohesion, and local languages hold significance for respective ethnicities. However, the education system has not accommodated all languages of distinct significance in Pakistan's national education system (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009). The National Education Policy 2009 explained the cause-and-effect relationship between those educated in public schools, private schools, and madrassas, and differences in the language of instruction, and the economic divide in the society. Private schools use English as a medium of instruction, making students competent in English. The policy of 2009 acknowledged that proficiency in English plays a fundamental role in improving prospects for a candidate in the job market (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009). Public schools are primarily Urdu medium schools. In Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), a few public schools use folk languages such as Sindhi and Pashtu as the medium of instruction (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009; Shamim, 2008). The policy of 2009 emphasized that public schools need to achieve a reasonable level of proficiency in English in the shortest possible time by teaching science subjects and mathematics in English. Students educated in madrassas are currently not capable of any jobs outside those related to clerisy. Therefore, they need to adopt modern subjects and English as a medium of instruction at some level. Federal and provincial governments must prepare a strategy to facilitate madrassas to achieve this task. (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009).

Regarding the role of religion, the national education policy of 2009 mentions that education content cannot deviate from the fundamentals of Islam. It further elaborated on the role of education as, "developing Pakistani children as proud Pakistani citizens having strong faith in religion and religious teachings as well as cultural values and traditions of the Pakistan society" (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, p. 9). The policy emphasized that religious education needs to be integrated with modern trends with the purpose of creating a "just civil society that respects the diversity of views, beliefs, and faith" (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, p. 32). Religious education will be taught as a separate subject, and Islamic Studies will be compulsory for Muslim students. Advanced Islamic studies will be offered as an elective subject for secondary and higher secondary school students (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, pp. 31-34). The policy of 2009 emphasized a modernist interpretation of Islam. It proposed a role for religion that does not compete with civic and ethnic considerations in the society but instead integrates distinct cultures in a nation-state.

The National Education Policy of 2009 highlighted the issues with the national education system in Pakistan, indicated implementation gaps, and suggested policy steps to overcome shortcomings. The policy can be regarded as different from previous national education policies. It acknowledges that Pakistan is a state with diverse folk cultures, and education must play a fundamental role in integrating the folk cultures of Pakistan into a shared high culture. However, the policy was not followed by any curricula changes in the national education system (Rana, 2020). Moreover, the National Education Policy 2009 was introduced only eight months before the passing of the 18th amendment in April 2010. The 18th amendment decentralized education to the provinces. Therefore, implementing the National Education Policy of 2009 became non-mandatory for each

province. The decentralization empowered provinces to make their own education policy and curricula which could be distinct from each other.

5.5.2 The 18th Amendment on Education

When the 18th amendment came into effect in 2010, it had serious implications on the national education system and subsequently for the formation of shared nationalism in Pakistan. The Federal Ministry of Education was dissolved in 2011. However, it was soon replaced by the Ministry of Education and Professional Training (MoEPT). The new education ministry had a range of national matters like higher education, vocational training, the assessment system, and the federal board of intermediate and secondary education under its domain (Rana, 2020). According to the amendment, education policy and curricula formation and implementation became provincial subjects. The decentralization of education to the provinces leads to two questions. First, including one education policy for federal regions that come under the Ministry of Education and Professional Training, would Pakistan have five education policies, and five curricula that could be different from each other. Second, now that under the constitutional amendment, the center and provinces were free to make independent education policies and curricula which could be different from each other, how could a national education system with the potential to shape high culture or shared civic nationalism would be formulated.

To explore the answer to these questions, I interviewed the Director (Training and Research) of Academic Education and Professional Management (AEPM) on March 18, 2019. AEPM is a subordinate office of the Ministry of Education and Professional Training. The Director explained that there was a significant upheaval after the 18th amendment regarding how things will be handed over to the provinces and what would be the role of the Federal Ministry of Education and

associated offices. Gradually clarity on many matters started to occur. For example, article 25A of the constitution mentions that the state will provide education to all children aged 5 to 16. The Supreme Court of Pakistan interpreted that 'state' means federal and provincial governments, which means both federal and provincial governments will be responsible for providing education. Therefore, many federal-level institutes were retained, including AEPM, which otherwise would be dissolved. However, there has been a change in role. Before the amendment, AEPM policy suggestions and reports on education were applicable to the center and provinces. Today they are only applicable in federally administered areas. AEPM can provide services to the provinces based on their demand, and all suggestions and reports are non-mandatory for the provinces (Director, 18 March 2019).

Through this statement, the interviewee aimed to clarify two things. First by mentioning the Supreme Court decision, he explained that even after the decentralization of the provinces, providing education to all is a joint responsibility of the federal and provincial governments. Therefore, there needed to be a close working relationship. The federal institutes such as AEPM were retained to facilitate the close cooperation between the center and provinces. Secondly, he clarified that the training services and policy suggestions of AEPM have become non-mandatory for provinces.

I interviewed another senior bureaucrat designated as Joint Education Advisor, Ministry of Education and Professional Training, on April 4, 2019. A detailed account of how the national education system is working after the amendment was given. He explained that before the 18th amendment the Federal Ministry of Education was responsible for dealing with education at the national level which included,

> a) Coordination between the center and provinces.

b) Maintaining standards for education.

c) Developing and announcing National Education Policy in consultation with all provinces.

d) Developing the national curricula.

After the 18th amendment,

a) The federal ministry is still coordinating with all provinces. There is a forum to ensure effective coordination called Inter-Provincial Education Ministers' Conference (IPEMC). This forum meets once a month to discuss all issues and try to reach a consensus among all stakeholders.

b) Standard curricula design and policymaking have been devolved to the provinces. IPEMC has decided to formulate the National Curriculum Council (NCC) to provide coherent policy and curricula advice across provinces. NCC would formulate national curricula guidelines to be followed by all provinces, limiting the possibility of mutually exclusive policy and curricula by the provinces.

c) IPEMC agrees to formulate common standards mutually acceptable for all provinces (Advisor, 4 April 2019).

The above-mentioned information demonstrates that after the decentralization of education to the provinces, there was a realization that there is a need to avoid the formation of differing education policies in the provinces. Therefore, the Ministry of Education and Professional Training (MoEPT) formed forums like IPEMC and NCC to facilitate coordination between the center and provinces to develop a national education system. The discussion with interviewees provides an understanding that the constitution binds the state to provide education to its citizens. It becomes

mandatory for the center and provinces to work together to achieve compulsory education for all. However, the mere formation of these forums cannot guarantee better coordination between the center and provinces, particularly with competing high and folk cultures.

5.5.2.1 Devolution of Education and Competing Civic, Ethnic, and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan (2010-2018)

After the devolution of education through the 18th amendment in 2010, the formation of shared nationalism through education became more of the provinces' responsibility. Each province had the autonomy of formulating individual education policies, curricula, and mechanisms to implement them. However, shortly after devolution, it became clear even if education had become a provincial subject, not all provinces were prepared or had the capacity to formulate a new system of national education in Pakistan. Therefore, the existing curriculum of 2006 was agreed to be continued until the formation of alternative policies and curricula by the provinces (*Education reform in Pakistan* 2014).

Even though provinces agreed to keep following the 2006 curriculum, a few changes in the textbooks were introduced by the provincial governments of each province. It is significant to keep in mind that in 2010, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had the government in the center while political parties with the mandate from folk cultures were in power in their respective provinces. For example, Punjabi dominant Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) formed the government in Punjab. Pakhtun dominant Awami National Party (ANP) had power in KP, Sindhi dominant PPP had a mandate in Sindh, and a mix of Baloch provincial political elite and religious elite had a government in Balochistan. Therefore, the following examples of changes in textbooks reflect the political elite approach towards the form of nationalism they promoted at the provincial level.

For example, in KP, Pakhtun dominated ANP's provincial government introduced content on heroic figures of Pakhtun history who had a strong association with Pakhtun folk culture and were secular in orientation. They also authorized the regional language Pashtu to be used at the primary levels by the 2013 and 2014 academic years. In 2013, the ANP government was replaced by a coalition of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a religious-political party. As soon as the PTI-JI-led government came into power in KP, the authorized changes by the previous provincial government were discontinued. PTI emphasized the gradual introduction of English as a language of instruction whereas, coalition partner JI contested the ANP government's decision to teach about Pakhtun nationalist leaders of the secular mindset, undermining the religious culture of Pakistan (*Education reform in Pakistan* 2014).

In KP, the provincial political elite introduced curriculum changes to promote and strengthen Pakhtun folk culture. The successive coalition government of the political and religious elites discontinued changes authorized by ANP. The PTI-JI coalition government introduced English as a language of instruction and emphasized religious personalities as national heroes. This brief discussion strengthens the argument that the ANP's provincial political elite, with newly found authority through the 18th amendment, introduce provincial-level changes which promoted ethnic nationalism through education The succeeding coalition government of PTI-JI (2013-2018) introduced changes reflecting their preferred and competing folk and religious cultures. The shifting focuses of different political and religious elites in power at the provincial level demonstrates that competing high, folk, and religious cultures were promoted through education. KP, after decentralization, did not get any closer to formulating shared civic nationalism. Rather, the competition over nationalism was decentralized. Ex-Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani's view that more autonomous provinces would lead to better cooperation among provinces did not

turn out to be true. Rather the situation within the province became susceptible to shifting and competing nationalisms.

In Punjab, PML-N initiated extensive efforts to roll out English as a medium of instruction in public schools. I interviewed eight teachers at a Government Girls' High School in Multan, Punjab on April 14 and 15, 2019. The main subjects taught by the teachers were Pakistan Studies and Social Studies, and they had several years' experience teaching elementary to secondary level. A consensus view was found on the state of education under PML-N's government in Punjab between 2008 to 2018. As teachers of Pakistan and Social Studies, they have observed significant changes in syllabus and textbooks. There has been frequent publishing of new books with slight changes. The teachers described the topics of the Pakistan Movement such as the Aligarh Movement, Lucknow Pact 1916, Fourteen Points of Jinnah 1929, 1930-1932 Round Table Conferences, 1935 Government of India Act, 1944 Gandhi-Jinnah Talks are either cut short to bullet points or omitted. The interviewees further mentioned that the historical topics of national significance were replaced by politicized content like pictures of the prime minister and chief minister of Punjab and their developmental projects like Motorways, Metro Buses, powerplants, and the Orange Train (Teachers, 14 & 15 April 2019).

The topics highlighted by the interviewees explain the historical struggle of the Pakistan Movement. The inclusion of these topics plays a fundamental role in familiarizing Pakistan's citizens with the shared history of the struggle and ideology behind establishing a separate state, therefore, establishing grounds for shared civic nationalism of the state. Each topic in the Pakistan Movement mentions information about the founding political elite's struggle for Pakistan. This information includes the educational background of its leaders, their principled stance behind the struggle for a separate Muslim state, and their history with the Aligarh Movement. Together these

253

explain how modern education, English and Urdu languages and the modernist interpretation of Islam led to the foundation of Pakistan. Replacing or minimizing topics of national significance with the ruling provincial government's political achievements reflects the political elite's lack of commitment to forming shared nationalism through education. Instead, they seek to strengthen their Punjabi ethnic voter support base by highlighting development projects initiated in the province during their government.

In Sindh, most of the books taught, especially in public schools, are full of publishing errors, and therefore, contain factually wrong information about dates and events. There were also deliberations about attaining a balance between teaching the regional language, Sindhi, national language, Urdu, and international language, English (*Education reform in Pakistan* 2014). However, much less was achieved in practical terms. Sindh is often criticized for the highest alleged corruption and political recruitments (Naviwala, 2016). Statement of wrong facts and dates of the events of national significance by printing faulty textbooks indicate extreme negligence and incompetence on behalf of PPP's provincial government in Sindh. It also indicates that perhaps the Sindh government does not recognize the significance of the role of education in shaping shared nationalism. Political recruitments by compromising merit resulted in the abundance of incompetent teachers and other staff in the education system. The situation resulted in substandard education in public schools and increased reliance on private schools for a reasonable standard of education.

In Balochistan, a controversial Baloch tribal leader accused of anti-state activities was killed during a military operation in 2006. The Balochistan provincial government included him in the curriculum as a Baloch national hero (*Education reform in Pakistan* 2014). The inclusion of the alleged anti-state leader in the textbooks as a Baloch hero implies that the center and the province

254

do not share the same personalities as national heroes. Rather, the personalities regarded as heroes by the provincial political elite are considered an enemy of the state by the central government. This situation affirms that at the provincial level, the provincial political elite of Balochistan was promoting competing folk culture and strengthening ethnic nationalism through education.

For over six decades, provincial education ministries have been responsible for implementation national education policies, textbook printing, recruitment, infrastructure, and quality checks. Policy and curriculum development had been the domain of the Federal Ministry of Education. The provincial education ministries lacked the capacity to formulate independent education policies and perhaps needed comprehensive training for the task. Moreover, devolution of education was announced in 2010. Considering bureaucracy in Pakistan is a slow process, even if a province intends to form an individual education policy, it is unlikely that it would be complete in a decade. Therefore, the provinces chose to continue with the national curriculum of 2006 and the National Education Policy of 2009. The central government facilitated the non-mandatory coordination between the center and the provinces by forming the Inter-Provincial Education Ministers Conference (IPEMC) and National Curriculum Council (NCC).

The political elite who came into power at the center in 2008 did not provide a comprehensive view of their proposed high culture of Pakistan. The political elite of PPP and PMN-L, who voted for the 18th amendment, claimed that decentralizing power to the provinces would promote shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. However, the electoral results and politics that followed indicated the strengthening of ethnic nationalism. The ANP's provincial political elite in KP promoted ethnic nationalism by emphasizing regional language and discouraging Urdu and English and introducing Pakhtun personalities as heroes in textbooks. During the subsequent government of PTI-JI, the political and religious elites discontinued changes promoted by ANP and introduced their preferred

255

changes like emphasizing the English language and religious personalities. The situation made KP prone to shifting and competing folk and religious cultures.

In Punjab, the PML-N's political elite reduced or omitted topics on the Pakistan Movement and replaced them with development projects initiated in Punjab by their government. The changes in textbooks by PML-N's political elite indicate that they used education to consolidate the Punjabi ethnic voter support base. In Sindh, the printing of substandard and faulty textbooks and political recruitments in the education department support the argument that the PPP political elite was not focused on shaping shared national identity through education. Instead, the political elite of PPP in power at the provincial level used education to secure the Sindhi voter support base. Balochistan's Baloch provincial elite promoted ethnic nationalism by introducing controversial Baloch personalities in textbooks as heroes. The few changes introduced in education by the political elite at the provincial level promoted ethnic nationalism as it served their political agenda of consolidating provincial governments. Therefore, the changes introduced after decentralization of education, from 2010 to 2018, at the provincial level highlighted competing folk cultures. The discussion validates the argument made in hypothesis three that the elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they promote.

5.5.3   Nationalism and Education in Pakistan from 2018 onwards

The general elections of July 2018 showed a significant shift in Pakistan's electoral pattern when two old and established political parties, PML-N and PPP, were voted out of power by a relatively new political party PTI. PTI used the slogan of Naya (New) Pakistan and Tabdili (Change). Imran Khan's promoted the Islamic welfare state, socio-economic justice, economic development, and accountability as high culture of Pakistan. During the election campaigns, Imran Khan has been

vocal about the weakness of the national education system. He has pointed out that three parallel education systems, public schools, private schools, and madrassas, have created class differences instead of equality and unity within the nation. Imran Khan highlighted the issue of 22.8 million out-of-school children and emphasized the need for a uniform national education system (P. News, 2021; Unicef, 2017).

After coming into power in 2018, the PTI government announced the formation of the Single National Curriculum (SNC) to ensure a uniform education system throughout Pakistan. Three parallel education systems were highlighted as damaging to the formation of shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The PTI's Federal Minister of Education and Training, Shafqat Mehmood, stated on various occasions that "if you put students from public schools, elite and middle-class private schools, and madrassa students, they are not able to talk to each other as they don't have any shared experience that's how incompatible our national education system is" (H. News, 23 August 2020). The statement explains PTI led government's emphasis that the national education system has been unable to form shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. In addition, the existing education system has contributed towards a class divide among the citizens of Pakistan.

I interviewed the Joint Education Advisor, from the Ministry of Education and Professional Training, on April 4, 2019. He explained the difference between a national curriculum and a single national curriculum in a detailed answer. He mentioned that Pakistan has always had a national curriculum. However, it only found implementation in public schools. Low-cost private schools sometimes undergo partial implementation of the national curriculum. The elite private schools do not have to follow the national curriculum, as they aim to provide internationally compatible schooling. Moreover, madrassas are free not to opt for mainstream school subjects and stay focused on religious education. So, in this situation, the national curriculum had little or no impact

on shaping Pakistan's civic nationalism. Rather the non-implementation of the national curriculum across three parallel education systems caused divisions in society based on class, ethnicity, religious, and sectarian beliefs. With the Single National Curriculum (SNC), the PTI government aims to achieve uniform curriculum implementation across all forms of education systems (Advisor, 4 April 2019).

The Joint Education Advisor further mentioned that SNC formulation is promising as all stakeholders are involved in the process. The Ministry of Federal Education and Training is preparing the SNC with provincial ministries' active participation, holding a monthly meeting through IPMEC. Members from all leading private school chains, madrassa education board members, university vice-chancellors, and NGOs have given their input. If the PTI government achieves SNC implementation across provinces, in public and private schools and madrassas, it will be fundamental in shaping civic nationalism in Pakistan (Advisor, 4 April 2019). The interview response of the Joint Education Advisor is fundamental in explaining the difference between the previous and current concepts of the national curriculum in Pakistan. The SNC's uniform implementation across three parallel education systems is regarded as its strength. However, it is essential to keep in mind that even after the input from all stakeholders, the provinces are not bound to adopt or implement SNC. Therefore, there is a limited possibility that the SNC may achieve the desired results.

I interviewed Punjab's Minister for School Education, Dr. Murad Raas on February 28, 2019. In response to the question on the role of education in shaping shared civic nationalism, Dr. Murad Raas believed that Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf had given utmost significance to the state of education in Pakistan. In his view, the rampant commercialization of school education in the past three decades has been fundamental in shaping divided educational narratives in Pakistan. The

governments have failed to deliver quality education which led people to opt for private schools. There is a range of private schools available, and even a cheap private school is considered better than public schools in terms of quality of education. Each private school is free to introduce a range of books or topics different from books or topics prescribed by the government. Their main selling point is that they are offering something better than public schools. In this situation, one cannot expect a state to have a shared national identity primarily through education (Raas, 28 February 2019).

Regarding the PTI government's plan to promote shared national identity through education, Dr. Murad Raas responded that the government in Punjab had improved things on many levels. For example, the PTI government have introduced e-transfers, post-retirement processes, and leave applications to make administrative issues in the education department quick and corruption-free. Secondly, the government is in the process of making a Single National Curriculum with the help of the central Ministry of Education and Professional Training. Once formed, the SNC will be implemented in public and private schools uniformly. The PTI government aims to eliminate the quality and curricula differences between public and private schools, forming a shared national identity fundamental for shaping civic nationalism through education in Pakistan. Thirdly, the government is rigorously engaging representatives of all madrassa boards to integrate into the mainstream education system. If successful, madrassas will be registered with the Ministry of Education and Professional Training and will be bound to teach SNC along with religious education, which will be unprecedented (Raas, 28 February 2019).

While commenting on the impact of the 18th amendment on education, Dr. Murad Raas considered that the 18th amendment solves a lot of administrative issues. It is much easier and quicker to make decisions and implement them on an administrative level; otherwise, lengthy, and time-consuming

procedures were involved in getting things approved by the center. The 18th amendment gives every province immense scope for effective education policymaking and implementation according to the special requirements of individual provinces. Moreover, each provincial administration has only one province to deal with, which can produce very focused and quick results. National education did not get any better when education was a federal subject. However, under devolved powers and through coordination facilitated by the federal ministry, there is a strong possibility that better outcomes can be achieved (Raas, 28 February 2019).

The interview response of Punjab's Minister of School Education provides an understanding of the PTI government's (August 2018-April 2022) view on why education has not shaped shared civic nationalism in Pakistan and how they are planning to shape shared national identity through education. His views align with PTI policy regarding nationalism and education, where they blame the three parallel systems of public schools, private schools, and madrassa as fundamental in creating economic disparity and divided nationalism. PTI prescribed a uniform education system to provide a shared educational experience that would provide equal economic opportunities, which will help create a high culture. However, PTI's proposed SNC is targeting the three parallel education systems and cannot ensure uniform implementation across provinces. Therefore, the question remains how SNC will address competing folk cultures in Pakistan.

As pointed out by the Punjab provincial education minister, the education system in Pakistan lacks national character due to commercialization. However, it is important to keep in mind that Pakistan has been a capitalist state apart from a few years of partially implemented nationalization during Bhutto's government (1971-1977). The Punjab Private Educational Institutions Ordinance of 1984 was introduced during the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. It was the responsibility of subsequent governments to ensure the standardization of private education institutions. The

increase in private schools does not explain the substandard education in public schools. The governments in Pakistan have promoted private schools to achieve mass literacy. Punjab's education minister highlighted commercialization as a problem but did not explain how their government intends to address this issue.

Moreover, Dr. Murad Raas's response provided an optimistic view regarding the role of the 18th amendment in shaping shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. Regarding the formation and implementation of SNC by the provinces, Punjab or KP might not object to participating in formulating SNC and implementing it in their respective provinces as PTI controlled the government in the center and these two provinces. However, the same cannot be assumed for Sindh, where the opposition party, the PPP, was in government. Moreover, he did not address how and why private schools, whose main selling point is to offer different and better curricula, textbooks, and the English language, will introduce uniform curricula prescribed in the SNC. Nor did he explain how public schools will improve the quality of education.

5.5.4 Single National Curriculum and Competing Nationalism in Pakistan

This section explains the PTI government view of shared civic nationalism to be achieved through the Single National Curriculum. The following are the salient features of the SNC: English to be taught as a language; Urdu will be the medium of instruction from classes 1-5. Provinces can also adopt regional languages as a medium of instruction at the primary level; Islam and Seerat-e-Nabwi (Life of Prophet PBUH) to be taught with the focus on modern world concepts like "citizenship, cultural diversity, inter-faith harmony, tree planting, water conservation, etc." In addition, social studies will emphasize the significance of becoming national and global citizens of the modern world. This implies that social studies as a subject will highlight the importance of preparing citizens to compete for economic opportunities nationwide and overseas. Religious

261

education would not only mean Islamic studies; minorities from different faiths will also be able to study their respective religions like Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, Bhai, and Kalash (R. Javaid, 15 August 2021; "Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training," 2021b). The shared national identity to be formulated through the SNC includes Urdu, local languages, and gradual progression to English after class five. A modernist interpretation of Islam is stressed at each level. SNC proposes an inclusive approach to defining Pakistani nationalism where citizens can relate to folk, religious, high, and global cultures. The inclusive approach of the SNC reflects the political elite's view of shared civic nationalism to be achieved through the uniform implementation of the SNC across three parallel education systems.

The PTI political elite's initiative of the SNC has not been without serious challenges from folk cultures. As mentioned above, the PTI's electoral victory was an important shift from the pattern of two parties, the PPP and PML-N, winning alternatively or taking turns being in power at the center. As a result of a third consecutive general election, PTI came into power at the center. The PTI formed a provincial government in two provinces, Punjab and KP, and formed a coalition government in Balochistan. The opposition party, the PPP, formed the provincial government in Sindh. When education became a devolved responsibility in 2010 after the 18th amendment, provinces had the right to make independent education policies and curricula. However, they continued with the 2006 curricula and 2009 national education policy. The small changes each province introduced between 2010-2018 were more focused on promoting competing folk cultures. It served short-term self-interests of the political elite, such as securing power, at least in the provinces.

In this situation, forums like National Curriculum Council (NCC) and Inter-Provincial Educational Ministers Conference (IPEMC) were introduced by the Ministry of Education and Professional

Training. These forums were put into extensive use by the PTI government to formulate SNC. However, despite including all provincial ministers as members, the Sindh provincial government did not contribute to SNC formulation and always indicated that they did not intend to implement it in the province. Therefore, when Imran Khan launched SNC on August 16, 2021, the ceremony was attended by all provincial education ministers except for Sindh (R. Javaid, 15 August 2021; Munawer, 22 August 2021).

Regarding the implementation of SNC, Saeed Ghani, Sindh's Minister of Education stated that,

> We (the government of Sindh) will decide about the matter of SNC. We will review SNC, and we will implement it if it is better than the current curriculum. But it should be remembered that it will be the decision of the provincial government. The Constitution has provided us this right and we are not going to give it up (Saeed Ghani, as cited in, Omer, 7 September 2021).

The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) is a Sindhi dominant political party. The PPP controls the provincial government in Sindh. It is apparent from the statement that a political party dominated by Sindhi political elite, not in power at the center and within its rights after the 18th amendment, said that they would assess the suitability of the SNC for their province before considering its implementation in Sindh. The Sindh government has the authority to consider if the SNC is useful for Sindh, but the stance does not explain their non-participation in forums like IPEMC and NCC, which were forming the SNC. The central government of PTI could not ensure that all provinces would adopt the proposed national education system. The PTI launched SNC only in the provinces where it was in power, i.e., in the center, Punjab, KP, and Balochistan. The provincial government of Sindh, where the PTI was not in power, conditioned acceptance of SNC with the Sindh government's independent assessment of the policy. The Sindh provincial political elite's non-

participation in the SNC formation and unwillingness to implement it reflects competing high, and folk cultures overshadowed decisions regarding national education in Pakistan.

It is important to add that before the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010, the political and military elites proposed high cultures, and civic nationalism was promoted through the center. With the devolution of education, the dynamic of the relationship between the center and the provinces have changed. The enactment of the 18th amendment can be regarded as a bid towards pluralism where autonomous and resourceful provinces of distinct ethnicities would have a better opportunity to cooperate. However, the politics during the following decade of the amendment demonstrates that the competing folk cultures are strong and prevalent. The18th amendment provides an ongoing opportunity that the provinces may find a way to cooperate, and competition might become weak.

In the case of national education, the provinces have decided to follow the national curriculum of 2006 and the National Education Policy of 2009, which indicates their willingness to cooperate, and the possibility that pluralism might work. The National Education Policy of 2009 mentions that there is always room for diversity. However, diversity requires support for education outcomes, and the state must preserve the uniformity of national education (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009, p. 10). The role of national education, as mentioned in the National Education Policy of 2009, is closer to Gellner style zone one nationalism, emphasizing "pervasive high culture" to be achieved through "standardized, literacy- and education-based systems of communication" (Gellner, 1983, p. 54). Gellner argued that cultural pluralism becomes less feasible in societies experiencing a transition towards shared high culture through standardized national education (Gellner, 1983, p. 55).

It is important to point out that the SNC introduced by the PTI government does not directly address ethnic divisions on provincial lines. The main idea is that a single national curriculum will be implemented through the state across all education systems, which will be helpful in the formation of shared civic nationalism through education. SNC's approach can be regarded as closer to the National Education Policy of 2009 and Gellner's argument of shared high culture through state controlled national education. SNC addresses a significant issue of achieving a standardized national education system but does not provide a solution for competing folk cultures. SNC seeks a different and perhaps contradictory approach than what the 18th constitutional amendment allows. The amendment allows provinces to not follow center prescribed national education policy. After the amendment, the central government cannot preserve or ensure uniformity of national education without the will of the provinces.

The situation where the PTI government's recent effort of SNC and the 18th amendment provide a different approach towards achieving shared high culture demonstrates that national education is far from shaping civic nationalism in Pakistan. The 18th amendment enables pluralism, but pluralism might only work if competing folk cultures are not promoted to serve the short term self-interests of the political elite. Sindh's reluctance to adopt SNC demonstrates that the zone three style ethnic nationalism remains persistent in Pakistan.

5.5.5 Single National Curriculum and Religious Nationalism in Pakistan

The electoral results discussed in the previous section of this chapter showed that since the transition to a parliamentary government in 2008, the religious elite has not been able to secure strong representation in the National Assembly. In the recent elections of 2018, their representation in the provincial assemblies was also reduced. Recently, in April 2022, the religious elite has only come into power because of winning a no-confidence vote against the PTI government and not

through a fresh mandate. The reduced representation after the general elections and alliances with ethnically oriented political parties like PML-N and PPP to share power indicates that religious nationalism has become weaker over time and does not pose a significant challenge to civic nationalism in Pakistan.

Mainstreaming and regularization of madrassa education have been the agenda of almost all governments, especially military regimes in Pakistan, from General Ayub Khan (1958-1969) to General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). As discussed in the previous chapter, the last military regime from 1999 to 2008 was focused on reversing Islamization that overshadowed national education since General Zia's regime. By the end of General Musharraf's regime in 2008, regularization of madrassas was still to be achieved, but extensive engagement with all madrassa boards was put in place. After the transition to electoral governments of the PPP (2008-2013) and PML-N (2013-2018), engagement over the matter became dormant. However, it again was urgently pursued after the Army Public School (APS) attack in Peshawar on December 16, 2014 (Shafiq et al., 2019).

The Ministry of Education and Professional Training notes that there are 35,000 madrassas in Pakistan with around three million students, of which 26,160 are registered with the government ("Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training," 2021a). As the PTI government came into power in 2018 and announced the Single National Curriculum (SNC) to be uniformly implemented in public schools, private schools, and madrassas, mainstreaming and registration of madrassas with the government became a pre-requisite for the implementation of SNC. A landmark was achieved on August 29, 2019, when a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the Ministry of Education and Professional Training and Ittihad Tanzeemat-tul-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP) an organization that represents all madrassa education boards in

266

Pakistan. According to the MOU, a Directorate General of Religious Education (DGRE) will be formulated in the Ministry of Education and Professional Training. All madrassas will be registered with DGRE. Registration with DGRE would imply transparency in madrassas' financial matters, the state's involvement in international students' admission and visa policy, the introduction of technical and vocational education to make students compatible with the broader job market, and the implementation of the Single National Curriculum. In case of failure to register or follow agreed-upon conditions, the government would have the authority to shut down madrassas ("Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training," 2021a).

From September 2019 to December 2019, various developments occurred towards the mainstreaming of madrassa education in Pakistan. Some of the significant developments were allocating finances for setting up the DGRE, and the transfer of the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board (PMEB), previously under the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Inter-Faith Harmony, to the Ministry of Education and Professional Training. DGRE was inaugurated on December 19, 2019. Sixteen regional offices were to be established under DGRE, the first inaugurated in Lahore on January 17, 2020 ("Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training," 2021a). The formal process for integrating madrassas education into the mainstream national education system is underway for the first time in Pakistan's history.

I interviewed the Secretary-General of Wifaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia on February 27, 2019. With 23,000 registered madrassas, this Wifaq (board) is the largest in Pakistan. Regarding madrassas participation in the formation of SNC, the Secretary-General confirmed that they are collaborating with the government to form SNC. The Wifaq is working on the mechanism to register with the DGRE and implement SNC in madrassas. The Secretary-General of Wifaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia mentioned that religious education does not contest civic nationalism in Pakistan. Islam teaches

Muslims to love and be loyal to the state and denounce any divisions based on ethnicity; this is what madrassas are teaching. The Wifaq is willing to adopt the curriculum prescribed by the state. He claimed that private schools that follow Cambridge and Oxford curricula are opposing SNC. (Secretary, 27 February 2019).

The interview with the Secretary-General of Wifaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia, who was also part of SNC formulation, indicates that the religious elite was working closely with the PTI political elite towards the mainstreaming of madrassa education. Registering madrassa under DGRE would confirm their compliance with the government's regulations. Being involved in the formulation of SNC showed their willingness to be a part of a uniform national education system to provide equal economic opportunities. The participation in the formation and implementation of SNC indicates that religious nationalism did not contest the shared civic nationalism proposed by the political elite in power at the center. Rather the religious elite believed that the private schools would challenge SNC, not madrassas.

Three years after the formation of the PTI government in August 2018, the first phase of the Single National Curriculum (SNC) was launched by Prime Minister Imran Khan on August 16, 2021. While addressing the SNC launching ceremony, Imran Khan mentioned that twenty-five years ago he envisioned that education across Pakistan will have the same curriculum. Today children of private schools, public schools, and madrassas have different cultures because of their educational backgrounds. The Single National Curriculum is PTI's great achievement as it is a fundamental step towards eliminating different cultures developed due to different educational experiences and is going to shape a shared national culture through shared values outlined in SNC (P. News, 2021). It is also important to keep in mind that SNC is going to be implemented gradually. For example, phase one to be implemented from class 1 to 5 was inaugurated by Prime Minister Imran Khan on

August 16, 2021. Phase two from class 6 to 8 is scheduled to be launched in March 2022, whereas the third phase from class 9 to 10 will be implemented from March 2023 ("Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training," 2021b).

The uniformity of SNC was challenged by non-implementation in Sindh. The PTI government was unable able to implement SNC on elitist schools like Atchison College and others of similar status. (Desk, 14 September 2021). Moreover, as SNC was going to be implemented in phases, the PTI government gave even more time to madrassas for its complete adoption. Director (NCC), Dr Chughtai, mentioned that implementation in madrassas is going to take longer maybe five to six years as most of them do not have experience in teaching mainstream school subjects but they are well on their way to implementation (Desk, 14 September 2021). The discussion posits that the idea of a uniform national curriculum to be implemented across three parallel education systems and in every province was a lengthy and uncertain process. Therefore, the desired result of formulating shared civic nationalism was doubtful. Moreover, the early dissolution of the PTI government in April 2022 has cast uncertainty over the future of the SNC. The discussions in previous chapters demonstrate that through different historical phases to this day, as the governments change in Pakistan, the successive administrations do not continue with the national education policies of the preceding governments and often replace existing policies with a new education policy with shifted focuses. Therefore, with the end of the PTI government, SNC is unlikely to be continued.

The discussion on nationalism and education in Pakistan from 2018 onwards shows us that the National Education Policy of 2009 is still in effect. The PTI government proposed and launched a Single National Curriculum (SNC) aimed to achieve Imran's Khan proposed high culture, explained as Naya Pakistan and Tabdili (Change). PTI claimed that the uniform implementation

of SNC across Pakistan in public schools, private schools, and madrassas will fundamentally shape shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. However, SNC was contested by the provincial political elite of Sindhi folk culture. Moreover, the uniform implementation across three parallel education systems was contested by private schools. One of the largest madrassas boards has agreed to register with the government, follow prescribed regulations and implement SNC. However, the adoption of SNC by the madrassas and its outcomes will take years to be visible, even if it is successfully implemented.

The third hypothesis of this thesis argues that the elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, the national education policies are influenced by the form of nationalism they promote. The situation from 2018 onwards validates the third hypothesis as the PTI's political elite in power at the center and in Punjab and KP proposed a high culture for Pakistan. A Single National Curriculum was launched in line with the proposed high culture. The 18th amendment empowered the provincial political elite of competing folk cultures to decide if they wanted to adopt the center initiated SNC. In power at the provincial level and the opposition at the National Assembly, the provincial political elite did not follow the SNC. The process of integrating madrassas into the mainstream national education system has started. However, the process is preliminary, and the impact on shaping shared civic nationalism through education cannot be predicted.

With enhanced autonomy and financial resources, the 18th amendment has presented an unprecedented opportunity of eliminating competition among folk cultures and might lead to a situation where pluralism shapes a high culture in Pakistan. However, ongoing contestation among folk cultures manifested in national education in the decade after the 18th amendment demonstrates that zone three style ethnic nationalism is powerful. Constant competition among

folk cultures demonstrates a strong possibility that the 18th amendment may lead to entrenched ethnic nationalism and might not create an opportunity for shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The discussion on education and nationalism in Pakistan from 2008 onwards supports the fourth hypothesis of this thesis. The education policies have not been able to address internal diversities on ethnic, religious, and socio-economic lines and have not shaped shared civic nationalism in Pakistan.

5.6   Conclusion

This chapter has examined the most recent phase of Pakistan's parliamentary governments (2008-2013, 2013-2018, 2018-ongoing). This chapter focuses on the political and education systems to understand Pakistan's experience with nationalism. Regarding zone one style nationalism, this chapter finds that the elected government of the PPP (2008-2013) and PML-N (2013-2018) claimed decentralization through the 18th constitutional amendment of 2010 would provide a way of shaping shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. The politics that followed demonstrated that the political elite of PPP and PML-N were focused on consolidating their ethnic voter support base to preserve power at the provincial level. The competition among folk cultures remained strong and visible. The emergence of a relatively new political party of national-level popularity was important for developing Pakistan's nationalism. The political elite who came into power in 2018 proposed a high culture with strong national appeal. Imran Khan's national voter support base indicates that his view of the Islamic welfare state, socio-economic justice, accountability, and independent foreign policy gained visible support across all folk cultures of Pakistan. The removal of the PTI government through a vote of no confidence and the return of an alliance of ethnic-based political parties in power at the national and provincial levels strengthened the argument that the proposed high culture was contested and disrupted by the political and religious elites in opposition. Currently, zone one style of nationalism does not exist in Pakistan.

Regarding zone three style nationalism, the discussion in this chapter finds that the political elites of PPP and PML-N have utilized the 18th constitutional amendment to promote ethnic nationalism in Pakistan. The center's powers are limited, and provinces with more autonomy present better political opportunities for political elites focusing on strengthening their ethnic support bases compared to seeking national support. Pakistan has experienced a more sustained democracy over

the last decade. In the presence of political parties like PPP and PML-N, largely dependent on their respective folk cultures for coming into power, PTI emerged as a new political option. The results of the 2018 general election showed that there was a major shift from folk cultures voting for parties like PPP and PLM-N representing their own folk cultures to different folk cultures voting for the PTI. Despite his electoral success, Imran Khan's removal through a no-confidence vote and the formation of the PPP and PML-N dominant current government suggests that competing folk cultures are still strong. The situation also indicates that the provincial political elite are determined to defend their position against a new type of challenge that emerged as a relatively new and nationwide popular political party. Zone three style ethnic nationalism is prevalent in Pakistan.

The religious elite promotes religious nationalism. However, from 2008 onwards, consecutive poor electoral performances in three general elections (2008, 2013, and 2018) demonstrate that religious nationalism has not been strong in Pakistan. At best, the religious elite has been instrumental in the recent removal of the PTI government and secured political gains in the current government. This chapter concludes that Gellner's zone five style nationalism has not been visible in Pakistan. The religious elites promote religious nationalism to maintain political influence and use their political mandate to gain short-term self-interests. The discussion in this chapter validates hypothesis one of this thesis which contends that since 1947 to this day, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism have competed with each other. The discussion on the politics evolved after the transition to parliamentary governments in 2008 demonstrates that the political and religious elites' promotion of civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism is subject to consideration of their short term self-interests.

After the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010, education was decentralized to the provinces. However, a platform was devised for the center and provinces to work closely to formulate a

national education system. The discussion throughout the chapter highlights that in eleven years after the devolution of education, not a single province has come up with an independent or distinct education policy or curriculum. The provinces have decided to carry on with the existing national curriculum of 2006 and the National Education Policy of 2009. However, this cannot be taken as an indicator that pluralism is working in Pakistan. The small changes introduced in the textbook in each province suggested that the provincial political elite focused on promoting competing folk cultures and on short term political gains at the provincial level. In contrast, promoting shared civic nationalism through education remained unclear and perhaps unimportant to the political and religious elites as they remain focus on preserving political gains.

Historically, significant national education policies have been introduced during military regimes, whether General Ayub Khan's initiative titled Sharif Report of 1959, the Islamization of education by General Zia-ul-Haq, or General Musharraf's emphasis on modernization through education. The PTI government, led by Imran Khan, can be credited as the first elected government to highlight that three parallel education systems, public schools, private schools, and madrassas, with different focuses, cannot shape shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. To address this issue, the PTI government launched Single National Curriculum (SNC) in August 2021. This leads a to conclude that, although the education policies have failed in shaping shared civic nationalism, the military regimes with significant national education policies, and the PTI government's SNC, have been nationally oriented governments with a vision of civic nationalism.

The idea of SNC has fundamental weaknesses. First, the spirit of SNC is a uniform education system to be adopted at a national level. However, with education as a devolved subject, implementing a Single National Curriculum across all provinces cannot be ensured. Rather it is at the discretion of the provinces whether they want to adopt SNC. It is unclear how SNC will shape

shared nationalism in Pakistan if all provinces do not adopt it. Sindh is an important example as it has not implemented SNC. Sindh's reluctance indicates that even though the proposed national education system suits the formation of shared civic nationalism, the political elite have prioritized ethnic considerations that benefited them politically. Therefore, what SNC seeks to accomplish becomes ineffective under the powers designated to the provinces through the 18th amendment. Second, in Pakistan, where education has evolved as a money-making enterprise, it is unclear how the PTI government would ensure that private schools will adopt SNC.

Regarding hypothesis three of this thesis, promoting ethnically oriented content in the textbooks by the provincial political elite between 2008 to 2018 and Sindh's failure to adopt SNC indicates that the political, military, and religious elites, depending on who is in power, promote competing nationalism through education as it benefits their short term self-interests. Moreover, the 18th amendment has not produced the desired results of eliminating competition among folk cultures. Rather the political elite in power at the center cannot ensure the adoption of a uniform national education policy. The political elite in power at the provincial level promote competing folk cultures for political gains and are prone to not follow the center recommended national education system for political reasons. The discussion also validates hypothesis four, arguing that education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan in seventy-four years of establishment.

Chapter 6:   Conclusion

6.1   Introduction

This thesis is an attempt to study Pakistan's experience with nationalism. The study takes its theoretical framework from Gellner's well-developed argument on nationalism. Kohn (1944) and Gellner (1983) argued that modern nation-states have transitioned to the age of nationalism. Kohn argued that supreme loyalty of the people belongs to their nationality as the state makes their welfare possible. Gellner argued that in a modern nation-state, national and political units must be congruent. A shared high culture achieved through state-sponsored national education is fundamental for achieving nationalism in a nation-state. Gellner argued that nationalism, where a high culture enabled congruence between national and political units, was experienced by Western Europe and the West in general, including the United States. Kohn and Gellner argued that the nationalism the West experienced was civic. Kohn (1944, pp. 329-330) and Gellner (1983) argued that in Central and East Europe and Asia, nationalism came in late and was full of challenges from folk cultures. In these regions, high culture capable of shaping civic nationalism could be formed by undergoing many painful phases of expulsion and violence.

Brubaker (1999) and Smith (2000) have provided definitions of civic and ethnic nationalism. The definitions of Brubaker and Smith have helped us understand that civic and ethnic nationalism are quite different from each other and are unlikely to co-exist. The arguments of Plamenatz (1973), Kellas (1998), and Jaskulowski (2010) have demonstrated that civic nationalism primarily experienced by the West is characterized as liberal, inclusive, and democratic. Nationalism in the rest of the world, such as in Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, they argued, is ethnic. Ethnic nationalism is characterized as illiberal, exclusive, and prone to dictatorships, authoritarianism, violence, and ethnic cleansing.

This thesis has taken its theoretical framework from Gellner's well-developed argument on nationalism and his discussion on zones of nationalism. In zones of nationalism, Gellner (1997) elaborated on four zones of nationalism experienced in Western to Eastern Europe. Western Europe was discussed as zone one and had experienced civic nationalism. Central Europe experienced zone two, where it took some time to shape civic nationalism. Zone three discussed that Eastern Europe had experienced ethnic nationalism as the region had multiple folk cultures competing with the dominance of the folk culture in power. The communist states under the Soviet Union comprised zone four. Gellner argued that the Muslim zone is the fifth zone of nationalism. In zone five of nationalism, he explained that the Koranic culture is pre-eminent in Muslim societies over high and folk culture. Therefore, in Muslim societies, transition to nationalism is unlikely; rather, it would be a transition to fundamentalism or religious nationalism. For studying Pakistan's experience with nationalism, this thesis has focused on Gellner's zones one, three, and five, which set out civic nationalism, ethnic nationalism, and religious nationalism, respectively.

As a newly independent state established in 1947, Pakistan's experience with civic nationalism was yet to be shaped. On provincial lines, Pakistan had distinct ethnic identities, making it prone to ethnic nationalism. Under colonial rule, Pakistan was demanded as a separate and independent nation-state based on its religious identity, Islam. Therefore, a possible transition to religious nationalism is fundamental to studying nationalism in Pakistan. The literature review on nationalism helped determine that civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism are different from each other and are thought unlikely to co-exist. Instead, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism are likely to compete. In his argument on nationalism, Gellner maintained that different regions have a different experience with nationalism from West to East. He did not consider the possibility that a country or many countries might experience multiple zones of nationalism at the same time. This

thesis has studied Pakistan as a deviant case, a state that fits Gellner's zone one, zone three, and zone five style nationalism simultaneously.

Gellner highlighted the role of education as fundamental in shaping nationalism in heterogeneous societies. Gellner argued that a high culture of shared language and values must be dominant in a modern nation-state. He emphasized that only a state-planned and sponsored national education has the potential to shape shared high culture in diverse societies (Gellner, 1964, 1983, 1997). Pakistan's National Education Policy of 2009 explains the role of education similarly. The policy of 2009 mentions that state-designed standardization of national education precedes distinct ethnic, social, political, economic, and religious considerations (*National Education Policy 2009*, 2009). Therefore, Gellner's explanation of civic nationalism and Pakistan's National Education Policy of 2009 share a resemblance in the preferred form of nationalism to be achieved through education. Gellner and the National Education Policy of 2009 consider centralized and state-controlled national education fundamental for shaping shared nationalism.

This thesis has studied Pakistan's experience with nationalism by focusing on the role of elites in shaping civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism. This thesis has drawn its description of elites in Pakistan from the arguments of various scholars (Aasim Sajjid Akhtar et al., 2006; Domhoff, 2006; Higley & Burton, 2006; Asaf Hussain, 1976; Mills, 1956; Shoukat et al., 2017). Higley and Burton (2006, p. 13) defined political elites as "persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially." Mills (1956) and Domhoff (2006) highlighted the political elite, military elite, and economic elite as primary for concentrating power and influence in a state. Asaf Hussain (1976) pointed out that between 1947 to 1971, six elite groups, "military elites, bureaucratic elites, religious elites, landowning elites, industrial elites, and professional elites," exercised significant

power in Pakistan's politics. Over the years, some among the six elite groups became more powerful, and some experienced erosion in power. Aasim Sajjid Akhtar et al. (2006) argued that the religious elite in Pakistan became powerful after the military coup of 1979 by General Zia-ul-Haq. In general, they argued that religious elite are prone to instrumental use of Islam for political gains. Shoukat et al. (2017) argued that the elites in Pakistan focus on pursuing self-interest over national interests.

This research has focused on three types of elites: - the political elite, military elite, and religious elite. This study has argued that in Pakistan, political, military, and religious elites due to their influential positions in policymaking can promote three types of nationalism, civic, ethnic, and religious. However, they prioritize their short term self-interests; therefore, they choose from competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism, whichever best benefits them in the current circumstances, in acquiring or enhancing political power and influence.

Based on Gellner's argument on nationalism and definition of elites in Pakistan, the following are the hypotheses of this thesis.

Hypothesis 1: Since 1947, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan have been in competition.

Hypothesis 2: Through different historical phases to this day, elites in Pakistan promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that benefit their short term self-interests.

Hypothesis 3: Elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefits them; therefore, their approach towards national education policies also reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting.

Hypothesis 4: Education policies have been ineffective in addressing internal diversities and developing civic nationalism in Pakistan.

Chapters two to five examined Pakistan's political and education history in four historical phases, 1947-1971, 1971-1988, 1988-2008, 2008-2022, to determine the validity of the hypotheses. The discussion in each chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section covered the political scenario to highlight competition among high, folk, and religious cultures promoted by the political, military, and religious elites. The first section of each chapter thus focused on determining the validity of the first two hypotheses. The second section of chapter has examined the approach of political, military, and religious elites towards national education policies and the promotion of competing nationalism through education in Pakistan. The second section of each chapter aimed to determine the validity of hypotheses three and four of this thesis.

6.2 Zone One Style Civic Nationalism

Education played a fundamental role in establishing Pakistan as an independent nation-state. The Muslims of the Indian sub-continent initially declined to take part in the modern education introduced under British colonial rule. The Muslims remained committed to the traditional education system and perceived the British introduced modern education as a threat to their religious identity. The situation led to significant social, economic, and political underdevelopment of Muslims in the Indian sub-continent. Subsequently, Aligarh Movement of 1875 was initiated to make modern education acceptable for Muslims under colonial rule. The Aligarh Movement provided an integrated approach where religious identity and modern education could co-exist. Modern education uplifted Muslims' social, economic, and political status on the Indian sub-continent.

In 1906, the All-India Muslim League (AIML), a political party to represent the political interests of Muslims on the Indian sub-continent, was formed through the platform of the Muhammadan

Educational Conference. The All-India Muslim League successfully led the Pakistan Movement, a political struggle to achieve an independent state based on Muslim nationalism. Pakistan was established on August 14, 1947, as an independent nation-state. The educational movement thus paved the way for a political movement that demanded a separate nation-state for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. Since its establishment, Pakistan has experienced periods of unstable and weak parliamentary governments and prolonged military rule.

Regarding zone one style nationalism, this thesis has determined that since 1947, the political and military elite in power at the national level have all promoted shared civic nationalism in Pakistan. By analyzing different historical phases, this study found that different political and military elites have proposed high cultures of different characteristics during their governments. Shifting and varying interpretations of high culture with every regime change has undermined the development of shared high culture in Pakistan.

In the formative years (1947-1958), overshadowed by political instability, the political elite did not draw attention to a shared high culture. During the first martial law period (1958-1969), President General Ayub Khan proposed Urdu and Bengali as the national languages of Pakistan, emphasized modern economic development, modernist interpretation of Islam, and modern education as a shared high culture of Pakistan. General Ayub Khan conceived of Pakistan, based on a modern Muslim nation-state. In December 1971, the secession of East Pakistan on Bengali ethnic nationalism, demonstrated the failure of Ayub Khan's proposed high culture.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto formed a parliamentary government from 1971 to 1977. Bhutto proposed Islamic Socialism as Pakistan's high culture. He characterized Islamic Socialism with a socialist economy, democracy, modernist interpretation of Islam, Urdu as the national language and English as an official language, projecting India as shared national enemy, and close relations with the

Muslim countries worldwide, to strengthen shared Muslim identity. Islamic Socialism was implemented through nationalization of the economy, private enterprises, health, education, and land reforms. After completing his term in office, Bhutto won a majority in the general elections of 1977. However, he could not form a government because of the declaration of martial law by General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977.

During the military regime (1977-1988), General Zia-ul-Haq promoted a religion-centric identity and state system as Pakistan's high culture. Ziring (1984) noted that Zia attempted to transition Pakistan from an "Islamic Republic" to an "Islamic State." Ziring differentiated the Islamic republic as a democratic and liberal government and the Islamic state as an authoritarian system of government with Islam as the sole source of power and unity. From 1977 to 1988, the military elite in power at the center proposed religious nationalism as the civic nationalism of Pakistan. However, Pakistan never fully transitioned to an Islamic state. Zia's proposed religious nationalism was contested by different sects and schools of thought in Islam. Pakistan's transition to a religion-centric state ended with Zia's military regime; however, its effects persisted.

General Zia's-ul-Haq's military regime was followed by unstable parliamentary governments of the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990 & 1993-1996) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) led by Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993 & 1997-1999). The political elite in power at the center were overwhelmed by political instability and were focused on saving their governments from early dissolution. The elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif did not specify a shared high culture for Pakistan. The decade of parliamentary government from 1989 to 1999 ended with the military coup by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999.

During the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), "Enlightened Moderation" was proposed as the high culture of Pakistan. Musharraf proposed enlightened moderation in the

context of Pakistan's identity as a religion-centric state promoted during General Zia's military regime and the Global War on Terror. His main idea was to distance Pakistan from the traditional interpretation of Islam. The military elite in power at the center from 1999 to 2008 promoted modernization, economic development, a modernist interpretation of Islam, and promised transition to democracy as the high culture of Pakistan.

The successive elected governments of the PPP (2008-2013) and PML-N (2013-2018) emphasized the political mantra of the 18th constitutional amendment as fundamental for ending competition among political elites and ethnic groups. The political elite of rival political parties PPP and PML-N cooperated to pass the 18th amendment in 2010. Through the 18th amendment, 17 ministries, including health, education, police, labor, environment, and culture, were devolved to the provinces. In 2011, with the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) announcement, 57.5 percent of the state's total financial resources were distributed among the provinces, and 42.5 percent were allocated to the center (Adeney, 2012, pp. 548-549). The 18th amendment and 7th NFC award made provinces more powerful and better resourced than the center. The political elite believed the 18th amendment would promote cooperation and discourage competition among folk cultures. The political elite of the PPP and PML-N promoted pluralism as a high culture in Pakistan.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, emerged as a strong political alternative, and had a nationalist orientation. The elected government of PTI (2018-2022) won the electoral mandate in two provinces and at the center. Imran Khan became prime minister of Pakistan. He promoted an Islamic welfare state, a modernist interpretation of Islam, economic justice, and prioritizing shared national interests in foreign relations as the high culture of Pakistan. On April 29, 2022, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of 14 opposition parties including PPP, and PML-N, removed Imran Khan through a vote of no confidence. The current

coalition government of PDM demonstrates the discontinuation of the potential high culture proposed by the PTI's political elite in power at the center.

The above-mentioned brief description of the historical phases of parliamentary and military governments demonstrates that the political and military elites in power at the national level had not deviated from the emphasis that Pakistan needs a shared civic nationalism. Some even proposed high cultures with a strong national appeal that could shape a shared civic nationalism for Pakistan. General Ayub Khan's modern Muslim nation-state, Bhutto's Islamic socialism, General Zia's religion-centric state, and Imran Khan's 'Naya Pakistan' (New Pakistan) and 'Change' all proposed some form of shared high culture for Pakistan. However, with shifting interpretations towards shared high culture, zone one style civic nationalism has never been shaped in Pakistan. This study has concluded that the political and military elites all promoted high culture when in power at the national level.

6.3   Zone Three Style Ethnic Nationalism

At its establishment, Pakistan had five provinces East Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Pakistan has diverse folk cultures based on distinct ethnic and linguistic identities generally divided along provincial lines. Regarding Gellner's zone three style nationalism, this thesis has concluded that the divisions among distinct folk cultures became strong after the establishment of Pakistan. During the formative years, politics in Pakistan was dominated by the Bengali folk culture of East Pakistan, competing with the dominance of West Pakistan folk cultures, which were in power at the center. Under General Ayub Khan, the political and military elite in power at the center were promoting the modern Muslim nation-state as Pakistan's high culture. The political elite of East

Pakistan contested the military regime's proposed high culture and promoted Bengali folk culture. After the general elections of 1970, the political and military elite of West and East Pakistan prioritized their short term self-interests; they did not enable government formation according to the electoral mandate. The political and military elite did not reach a power-sharing formula and sought to break up the nation-state where everyone gained politically. In December 1971, the secession of East Pakistan on Bengali ethnic nationalism indicated the domination of zone three style ethnic nationalism in Pakistan during this period.

From 1971 to 1977, during the dominant Sindhi and Punjabi folk culture government of PPP led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan witnessed the emergence of new competing folk cultures. Muhajir (migrants) were the people who migrated to Pakistan at the time of the partition of the Indian sub-continent in August 1947. Muhajirs were predominantly Muslims, spoke the Urdu language, and were settled in the urban cities of Sindh. Bhutto promoted Islamic Socialism as Pakistan's high culture at the national level. However, at the provincial level, he promoted policies beneficial to Sindhi folk culture. Pro-Sindhi policies included an announcement of employment quotas for the Sindhi population in Sindh and making it mandatory for the non-Sindhi speaking population of Sindh to learn the language if they wanted to be employed in government jobs. At the provincial level, the Sindhi folk culture in power at the center and provincial level benefited people of their own culture. The pro-Sindhi policies were disadvantageous for the Muhajir population of Sindh. The situation led to the creation of the Muhajir folk culture, which competed with the folk culture of Sindh in power at the center and in the province.

In Balochistan, Bhutto replaced the provincial government of opposition parties with direct governor rule. This situation caused Baloch folk competition against the Sindhi and Punjabi folk cultures in power at the center. Political unrest subsequently enabled the Bhutto-led PPP

285

government to govern all provinces of Pakistan. The thesis has concluded that at the national level, the political elite of PPP promoted high culture as it served their short term self-interests of gaining and maintaining control of all provinces as they sought re-elections. At the provincial level, the political elite of PPP promoted its local folk culture. Promoting its folk culture in Sindh strengthened the ethnic voter support base of the PPP, while stimulating ethnic competition.

General Zia-ul-Haq promoted the traditional interpretation of Islam as high culture in Pakistan at the national level. However, he also sought the instrumental use of religion to prolong his rule. In December 1984, the referendum which ensured his presidency for the next five years had one question with the option to say yes or no. People were asked if they wanted Pakistan to be an Islamic state? Choosing 'Yes' meant General Zia-ul-Haq would be the president for the next five years and would carry on bringing Pakistan in conformity with the teachings of the Koran and Sharia. Choosing 'No' meant refusing Islam first and then General Zia-ul-Haq. The military elite's promotion of Islam as high culture in Pakistan was not free from short term-self-interests of achieving prolonged and strong rule.

Zia promoted competing folk cultures by allocating job quotas for retired military men at the federal secretariat. The thesis has pointed out that the Punjabi and Pakhtun are the dominant folk cultures in Pakistan's military. During the military regime, reserving a 10 percent job quota for retired military men meant the dominance of Punjabi and Pakhtun folk cultures at the national level. Muhajir ethnic competition initiated in Sindh during Bhutto's government was left unchecked during General Zia's military regime. During the military regime, pro-Sindhi policies introduced by Bhutto were not reversed. Ethnic unrest in Sindh meant ongoing competition among folk cultures during the military regime.

After experiencing several unstable parliamentary governments, the disintegration of East Pakistan in 1971, and two prolonged military regimes (1958-1969) and (1977-1988), parliamentary government returned to Pakistan in 1988. The PPP and PML-N alternatively formed governments during the decade. From 1988 to 1999, Pakistan experienced four general elections because no elected government could complete its term. The significant development during the decade was the emergence of strong political parties and leadership. The PML-N under Nawaz Sharif emerged from Punjab and had a strong voter support base in Punjabi folk culture. The PPP, under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto, had a strong voter support base in Sindh. The Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) emerged as the political representative of Muhajir folk culture. The Awami National Party (ANP) of NWFP, now KP, had voter support based on Pakhtun folk culture. In Balochistan, Baloch nationalist political parties gained support from Baloch folk culture.

Amidst political instability, the political elite of PPP and PML-N did not propose a high culture in Pakistan. The political parties sought short term self-interests as they pursued ethnic voter support to maximize the possibility of electoral success, at least at the provincial level. PPP and PML-N did not create a strong national appeal. The electoral success of one political party meant the domination of the folk culture it represented. The domination of one folk culture in power at the center was prone to contestation by the folk cultures in opposition or by the unhappy coalition partners. Zone three style ethnic nationalism was not consolidated in a way argued by Gellner as the folk cultures that came into power at the national level could not sustain it, leaving them under constant competition. The political elites promoted competition among folk cultures to ensure short term political gains like forming provincial governments and seeking a chance at forming a central government.

In 1999, the elected government of PML-N was removed through a military coup by General Pervez Musharraf. The top leadership of PPP and PML-N remained in exile during the military regime. At the national level, Musharraf promoted 'Enlightened Moderation' to distance Pakistan from the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. During the military regime, competition among folk cultures was not addressed. General Musharraf sought support from the religious-political parties to strengthen his military rule. Musharraf's military regime proceeded to its end with the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) signed on October 5, 2007, which facilitated PPP and PML-N to re-enter politics with a clean slate. In return for the NRO, General Musharraf would get support from the political parties for his role as civilian president of Pakistan. For General Pervez Musharraf, things did not turn out as planned, but his military regime (1999-2008) demonstrated that the military elite was not committed to its proposed high culture. The military elite partnered with the religious elite to introduce changes in the constitution. The military operation against Baloch insurgency damaged center and province relations and strengthened competing Baloch folk culture. The return of the PPP and PML-N as strong contenders in the general elections of 2008 demonstrated the return of parliamentary governments strongly dependent on the voter support from their folk cultures, leaving elected folk culture in power at the center opposed by folk cultures in opposition.

Between 2008 to 2018, PPP (2008-2013) and PML-N (2013-2018) formed the government at the center. From 2008 to 2018, PPP and PML-N retained provincial governments in their respective ethnic strongholds, Sindh, and Punjab. Both parties lost national and provincial representation outside Sindh and Punjab, making them predominantly regional political parties dependent on ethnic voter support bases. The enactment of the 18th constitutional amendment of 2010 can be regarded as a landmark development as it may provide a better environment for provinces to

cooperate. However, the politics that followed demonstrated that the political elite utilized decentralization to achieve their short term self-interests of preserving provincial governments. With increased provincial autonomy and financial resources, the political elite found it politically beneficial to strengthen ethnic voter support bases. The need to enhance the national support base became weak. This thesis has found that after the 18th amendment promoting ethnic nationalism for preserving provincial governments became stronger.

The emergence of PTI, a relatively new political party of strong national appeal, has been significant for Pakistan's experience with nationalism. In the recent general elections of 2018, PTI undermined the dominance of ethnic-based political parties PPP and PML-N. PTI won a mandate at national and provincial levels. However, the early removal of Imran Khan's government through an alliance of opposition parties and the installation of the current government of ethnic-based political parties suggests that the proposed high culture for Pakistan faces competition from the folk cultures in opposition. The situation has left Pakistan with competing high and folk cultures. In 74 years of its existence, a shared form of nationalism has not been shaped in Pakistan.

This study finds that the political and military elite tends to be flexible in promoting civic or ethnic nationalism and shift preferences when it serve their short term self-interests. The political and military elite in power at the national level have promoted their proposed high cultures, while, simultaneously, they have promoted ethnic nationalism for political gains. Creating or deepening ethnic divisions has been used as an effective strategy for retaining and consolidating power at the provincial level. The political elite are prone to manipulate civic and ethnic nationalism in their favor as they campaign. The military elite proclaims to promote civic nationalism, but they have dealt with ethnic divisions using force and sometimes left them unchecked. The thesis concludes

that the military elite has manipulated Bengali, Baloch, Sindhi, and Muhajir ethnic divisions to consolidate their rule, therefore, have contributed to consistent divisions on ethnic lines.

6.4   Zone Five Style Religious Nationalism

In zone five style nationalism, Gellner argued that Islam forms the high culture in Muslim societies. Therefore, any other form of nationalism is replaced by religious fundamentalism or religious nationalism. During the Pakistan Movement initiated in 1940, the Muslim nationalism promoted by the founding political elite of the modernist perspective was contested by the religious elite, who emphasized that Islamic nationalism is different from Muslim nationalism The religious elite opposed the establishment of an independent Muslim country. Later, the religious elite promoted Koranic culture as the state's high culture during the formative years. The religious elite contested the proposed high culture by the military elite and contested Bengali ethnic nationalism.

Religious nationalism was strongly discouraged by General Ayub Khan's military regime. In the 1970 general elections of Pakistan, religious-political parties contested with Bhutto's PPP and the Bengali nationalist party, Awami League. The religious-political parties won few seats compared to the PPP and the Awami League. During Bhutto's elected government, the religious elite opposed Islamic socialism. The religious elite accused Bhutto of deception by using Islam to make socialism acceptable. The pressure from religious-political parties was so strong that during the election campaign for the 1977 general elections, the PPP replaced the phrase Islamic Socialism with Islamic Egalitarianism. The religious-political parties proved to be a powerful opposition to Bhutto's proposed civic nationalism in favor of religious nationalism. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), an alliance of religious-political parties, contested the 1977 general elections. PNA won 36 of 200 National Assembly seats compared to 155 seats won by Bhutto's PPP. The

election mandate showed that religious nationalism did not have popular support. However, PNA strongly opposed and protested PPP's victory. The protests and unrest became so intense that even after winning the 1977 general elections, Bhutto could not form a government and the situation led to the declaration of martial by General Zia-ul-Haq. Throughout the formative years until 1977, the religious elite strongly contested the proposed high culture in favor of religious high culture.

The situation changed with General Zia-ul-Haq's martial law (1977-1988). General Zia-ul-Haq promoted Islam as the high culture of Pakistan. The religious-political parties supported the military regime. As a part of General Zia-ul-Haq's consultative council, the religious elite exercised significant influence during Zia's rule. Under Zia's martial law, it could be anticipated that religious nationalism would not compete with the civic nationalism of Pakistan as both would be the same. However, over the years, it became apparent that the military elite's promotion of Islam as the high culture of Pakistan was contested by the different interpretations of Islam by different schools of thought and on sectarian lines.

During the decade of unstable parliamentary governments (1988-1999), Pakistan had four general elections. The religious-political parties did not perform well in any of those elections. Parliaments were dominated by ethnically based political parties like the PPP, PML-N, ANP, and MQM. The weak performance in the general elections demonstrated that the agenda of religious nationalism did not have mass support in Pakistan. The declaration of martial law by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 created new opportunities for religious-political parties. When Musharraf announced general elections in 2002, the political elites who supported the coup and Muttahida Majlis-e-Amla (MMA), an alliance of religious-political parties, participated in military engineered democracy in Pakistan. During the Musharraf regime, MMA had a provincial government in KP. MMA had 60 National Assembly seats. For the first time, under Musharraf's military regime, with 60 National

Assembly seats, religious-political parties had the largest representation at the national level. By supporting the Legal Framework Order (LFO), which strengthened Musharraf's rule through constitutional amendments, the religious elite aided the consolidation of the modernist military regime. In principle, Musharraf's 'Enlightened Moderation,' an attempt to distance Pakistan from fundamentalist religious identity and the religious elite's emphasis on religious nationalism were different and competing approaches. However, practically religious nationalism did not compete with the military elite's proposed civic nationalism of Pakistan. Rather, there was a political alliance between the military and religious elites, which served their short term self-interests of maintaining and consolidating power at the national and provincial levels.

During the subsequent parliamentary governments (2008-2022), the religious-political parties secured a very weak electoral mandate. In the general elections of 2008, MMA won 6 of 258 National Assembly seats. (Kanwal, 2017) In the general elections of 2013, the religious-political parties won 19 National Assembly seats. (E. C. o. Pakistan, 2013) In the general elections of 2018, religious-political parties won 15 National Assembly seats. Religious-political parties have gained federal ministries and important positions in the current government after aligning with ethnic-based political parties to oust Imran Khan through a vote of no confidence. The limited voter support of religious-political parties demonstrates that religious nationalism has been very weak in Pakistan. The religious elite's promotion of religious nationalism has not been free from prioritizing their short term self-interests. The religious elite form alliances and coalitions with the political elite, who promote competition through folk cultures. However, the religious culture is different from the proposed high cultures and distinct folk cultures of Pakistan. By emphasizing religious nationalism, the religious elites maintain an influential presence in Pakistan's national politics.

The thesis has noted that religious-political parties have won weak electoral mandates throughout various historical phases. The lack of voter support indicates that religious nationalism does not strongly appeal to Pakistani society. Over the years, the religious-political parties have aligned with military and elected governments to secure a share in power. This thesis concludes that the religious elite's promotion of religious nationalism has not been without considering short term self-interests of gaining and maintaining political power. Even though religious culture competes with high and folk cultures, zone five style nationalism has never really been shaped in Pakistan. Instead, the religious elite has promoted a religious high culture as a tool for political gains. Therefore, this discussion validates the first two hypotheses of this thesis. Since 1947, civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism have been in competition with each other. The political, military, and religious elites have promoted civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in ways that have served their short term self-interests of staying in power at national or provincial levels.

6.5   Education and Competition among Civic, Ethnic, and Religious Nationalism

Gellner argued that national education is a prerequisite for forming a high culture or civic nationalism in modern societies. He argued that only state-planned and sponsored education has the potential to indoctrinate high culture among people with diverse linguistic, ethnic, and cultural associations (Gellner, 1964, 1983). Gellner further elaborated that the educational machinery coded with specific characteristics like language and values creates a greater possibility that its products will share a reasonable amount of resemblance to each other compared to the products of any other rival educational machinery embedding a different language or values (Gellner, 1964, pp. 159-160).

The origin of Pakistan's experience with nationalism can be traced back to the Aligarh Movement of 1874. The Aligarh Movement was an education movement initiated by Muslims of a modernist mindset. Under colonial rule, resistance to the British education system had resulted in the underdevelopment of Muslims on the Indian sub-continent. The Aligarh Movement set out to change that, beginning with the establishment of Muhammad Anglo-Oriental College in 1875. The institute was upgraded to a college in 1877 and became Aligarh Muslim University in 1920. The Aligarh Movement provided modern education to Muslims, which enabled them to participate in colonial civil services and uplifted them socially, economically, and politically. The Aligarh Movement integrated Islam, Urdu, the English language, and modern education into shaping a modernist Muslim identity.

The discussion in each chapter on national education and nationalism supports hypothesis three of this thesis which maintains that elites promote civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism as it benefit them, therefore their approach towards national education policies reflects the form of nationalism they are promoting. Throughout the establishment of Pakistan, the political, military, and religious elites have promoted competing high, folk, and religious cultures. This thesis has concluded that a similar trend has been reflected in the national education policies shaped by the various governments.

The national education policies in Pakistan have been subject to shifting focuses. Since 1947, national education in Pakistan has been challenged by underdeveloped infrastructure, lack of financial resources, a low literacy rate, and lack of a uniform education system. During the formative years, the discussion on national education created a language controversy in Pakistan. The political elite in power at the center emphasized Urdu as the only national language. Urdu, along with the English language, was emphasized as the medium of instruction. The proposal was

contested by the political elite of Bengal who proposed Bengali as a medium of instruction and discouraged teaching of the Urdu language in East Pakistan. Furthermore, during the first decade, political instability, underdevelopment, and a low budget allocation to education indicated that shaping shared civic nationalism through education was not prioritized by the governments.

Pakistan's first national education policy, in the Sharif Report, was formulated in 1959, after over a decade after its establishment. General Ayub Khan promoted a modern Muslim nation-state as a high culture of Pakistan. The national education policy formed during the military regime displayed the military elite's view of civic nationalism to be shaped through education. The Sharif Report of 1959 stressed the significance of shaping shared civic nationalism through education. The report mentioned that as a modern nation-state, Pakistan needed to disassociate itself from narrow nationalism limited to different folk and religious cultures. The report emphasized the necessity of creating a modern workforce through compulsory and universal education. The report of 1959 highlighted religion as a unifying force and stressed Islam's compatibility with the modern world. Madrassas had to integrate modern education to facilitate development, association with mere traditional religious education was deemed insufficient to achieve modern development.

The Sharif Report of 1959 remained in effect until 1971. During this period, there was uneven educational development in West and East Pakistan, where East Pakistan was behind West Pakistan in number of schools and literacy level. At the same time, the Bengali political elite emphasized Bengali ethnic nationalism through education. The disintegration of Pakistan confirms that the proposed high culture promoted through the Sharif Report of 1959 was contested on ethnic lines. Furthermore, Ayub Khan's military regime took no steps to introduce modern education in madrassas. Religious education through madrassas remained a distinct education system in Pakistan. Rather, the madrassa education system became organized by establishing madrassa

education boards. During this period, national education was ineffective in addressing internal diversities and shaping civic nationalism in Pakistan.

In 1971, Bhutto became prime minister of newly disintegrated Pakistan. He promoted Islamic Socialism as the high culture of Pakistan. To achieve his proposed high culture, the National Education Policy of 1972, introduced during the PPP government (1971-1977) focused on nationalization of education. The National Education Policy of 1972 lacked an emphasis on shaping shared civic nationalism. The policy of 1972 did not address the role of education in integrating distinct folk cultures into a shared high culture and how education could contribute to shaping a high culture in the recently disintegrated country. The nationalization of education empowered the state to manage recruitments in the education department. The PPP government gained politically through abundant political recruitments in the education departments across the country and especially in Sindh. The nationalization of education and subsequent political recruitments strengthened Bhutto's voter support base but compromised merit in the recruitment process and the quality of education in Pakistan.

The National Education Policy of 1972 did not specify a language to be employed as a shared medium of instruction nationwide. At the provincial level, the PPP government promoted the Sindhi language, which benefited the Sindhi speaking population and limited the employment opportunities for the non-Sindhi speaking population, predominantly Muhajirs. Regarding madrassa education, the National Education Policy of 1972 maintained the status quo. Maintaining the status quo meant that the government did not acknowledge the need to achieve some level of synchronization between the mainstream national education system and madrassa education. The policy of 1972 facilitated the continuation of two different and parallel education systems: public

schools and madrassas in Pakistan. The National Education Policy of 1972 did not form a shared high culture; rather, it enabled competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan.

In July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law in Pakistan. During Zia's military regime, religious nationalism was promoted as the civic nationalism of Pakistan. The National Education Policy of 1979 promoting shared religious identity as the national identity of a Pakistani. The promotion of religious nationalism through national education was not without serious shortcomings. For example, under the education policy of 1979, mosque schools were opened. The mosque schools aimed to achieve literacy in rural areas or in the regions with an inadequate number of schools. However, the policy initiative lacked standardization and state supervision which resulted in the inculcation of different interpretations of Islam depending on the Imam's sect or school of thought. The promotion of Islam as the high culture of Pakistan was contested by the different interpretations of Islam under different schools of thought and sects.

The National Education Policy of 1979 took the initiative to integrate madrassas into the national education system. The effort to mainstream madrassa education remained unsuccessful and was contested by the religious elites in favour of keeping madrassas free from the government's proposed standardization. Furthermore, the policy of 1979 reversed Bhutto's nationalization of education and encouraged the establishment of private schools to achieve mass literacy. On the one hand, the National Education Policy of 1979 promoted religious-centric national identity, Urdu as the language of instruction, mosque schools, and efforts to integrate madrassas into the national education system. On the other hand, the military regime promoted private schools, which were not bound to teach religion-centric curricula. Private schools adopted English as the dominant medium of instruction. Private school education further undermined the possibility of standardized

national education, which was already challenged by the religion-centric public-school education, mosque schools, and madrassas.

General Zia-ul-Haq did not achieve religion-centric high culture through national education. Islam as the high culture was contested by religious elites associated with the different schools of thought and sects of Islam. Competition among Sindhi and Muhajir folk cultures and contestation against domination of Punjabi folk culture remained unaddressed. During Zia's military regime, public schools, private schools, and madrassas emerged as three different and parallel education systems in Pakistan. Three parallel education systems demonstrated deepening internal divisions on varying religious interpretations and socio-economic lines. Under Zia's religion-centric military regime, civic nationalism could not be shaped through education.

From 1988 to 1999, during unstable parliamentary governments, two national education policies of 1992 and 1998 came into effect. The PPP and PML-N each formed a government twice during the decade. However, the political elite did not provide a clear view of the shared high culture of Pakistan. The elected governments of PML-N announced the national education policies of 1992 and 1998. Both policies were almost identical; therefore, they were subject to joint analysis in this thesis. The policies of 1992 and 1998 were not significantly different from the National Education Policy of 1979, announced during Zia's military regime. The policy of 1992 and 1998 committed to Islam as the sole source of national identity. The policies deviated from the 1979 education policy as they emphasized English as a medium of instruction along with Urdu. There was an exponential growth in the number of madrassas in Pakistan during the decade. The interview responses indicated that public schools became substandard over the years. The education policies of 1988 to 1999 did not emphasize standardization of national education. Public schools, private schools, and madrassas were consolidated as three different and parallel education systems in

Pakistan. The education policies of 1992 and 1999 did not address ethnic divisions on provincial lines. During the decade, Pakistan stayed distant from the possibility of shaping shared civic nationalism through education.

General Pervez Musharraf became president of Pakistan through a military coup in October 1999. The military regime under Musharraf had two focuses; the first was to reverse the religion-centric national identity building through national education. The second was vigorous efforts towards mainstreaming madrassa education. The military regime highlighted the urgent need to acquire modern and advanced education to shape modern Muslim identity for a modern nation-state. The national education policy remained under preparation and was announced in 2009, a year later after the end of the military regime (1999-2008). In February 2007, a pre-policy document titled "Education in Pakistan: A White Paper" reflected Musharraf's modernist approach towards education.

Regarding religion, the document mentioned that Islam provides the ideological foundation of Pakistan. However, Islam must not be treated as a static religion thriving on nostalgia. The paper claimed the conservative approach towards Islam had halted Pakistan's development in the modern world. Religious education had to cater to the needs of modern Muslims and a modern nation-state, Pakistan. Musharraf's promotion of modern education and a modernist interpretation of Islam was contested by the religious elite who otherwise aided his regime by supporting national assembly legislation. In NWFP and Balochistan, the religious-political alliance MMA controlled provincial government. At the provincial level, MMA refused to follow central recommendations of minimizing religious content and introducing topics on Musharraf's 'Enlightened Moderation' in the textbooks.

During Musharraf's military regime, the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board (PMEB) and model madrassas were formed to regulate madrassa education in Pakistan. However, all the provisions were non-mandatory. Therefore, the initiatives could not achieve the desired results. National education did not address divisions among folk cultures. Public schools, private schools, and madrassas continued to function as three different and parallel education systems; the military regime made no efforts to address difference in the education systems. The proposed high culture was mainly focused on distancing Pakistan from a religion-centric national identity. During Musharraf's military regime, the national education left competing folk cultures and the issue of three parallel education systems unaddressed. Therefore, at theoretical level through pre-policy documents, the military regime promoted its proposed high culture but practically they did not take effective and required initiatives to achieve proposed high culture.

Musharraf's initiatives to promote Pakistan as a modernist Muslim nation-state through education were contested by the religious elite. In principle, Musharraf proposed a competing approach to national education but practically sought support from the religious elite to consolidate his regime. Similarly, the religious elite promoted religious nationalism. Still, the religious-political parties secured provincial governments with the support of the modernist military regime, which they otherwise opposed. The military elite's promotion of shared high culture and the religious elite's promotion of religious culture were not free from prioritizing short term self-interests of acquiring and maintaining power at the national and provincial levels. Therefore, the military and religious elites cooperated for political gains but competed in shaping education policy in Pakistan. The situation seriously impaired the possibility of shaping shared civic nationalism through education.

In 2008, Musharraf's military regime ended with the return of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. From 2008 onwards, Pakistan has experienced three consecutive general elections for

the first time. The National Education Policy of 2009 was announced during the PPP government (2008-2013). The education policy formation was already underway during Musharraf's military regime. Therefore, the policy of 2009 reflected the military elite's view on shared civic nationalism rather than the political elite who came into power at the national level in 2008. The policy of 2009 emphasized that the state must ensure standardization of the national education system. The National Education Policy of 2009 acknowledged the distinct folk cultures of Pakistan, which require integrating into a shared high culture through national curricula and a standardized education system. The policy of 2009 mentioned that the three different and parallel education systems- public schools, private schools, and madrassas- hamper prospects of achieving national integration in Pakistan.

The National Education Policy of 2009 was soon followed by the 18th constitutional amendment of 2010 which decentralized education to the provinces. After the 18th amendment, the provinces were not bound to follow the education policy of 2009. The provinces had the power to make their own education policies, which could be different from each other. The political elite of PPP and PML-N, through the enactment of the 18th amendment, proposed pluralism in place of a high culture for Pakistan. The political elite who proposed the 18th amendment anticipated that autonomous and resourceful provinces were more likely to cooperate, and competition among folk cultures would become weak. Regarding national education, the provinces voluntarily chose to follow the National Education Policy of 2009. So far, no province has announced an independent education policy. However, between 2008 to 2013, small changes introduced in the textbooks at the provincial level demonstrated shifting focuses and strengthening of competing folk cultures through education.

A recent effort to achieve some form of shared high culture suitable to shape civic nationalism through national education was initiated through the Single National Curriculum (SNC) announcement by the PTI government (2018-2022). The PTI government targeted the three different and parallel education systems for causing divisions in Pakistan based on class, ethnicity, and religious and sectarian beliefs. The PTI government aimed to implement a uniform national curriculum across public schools, private schools, and madrassas. The PTI government announced the implementation of the first phase of SNC in August 2021.

After the 18th amendment, the dynamics of the relationship between the center and the provinces changed. Before the 18th amendment, forming a national education policy suitable for creating a shared high culture was the center's responsibility, and the provinces were bound to implement it. After the 18th amendment, the provinces have the authority to design independent education policies. Provinces can refuse to adopt the center's recommendations on national education. Until now, the provinces have chosen to follow the national curriculum of 2006 and the National Education Policy of 2009. Gellner argued that "standardized, literacy and education-based systems of communication" is fundamental for achieving high culture. SNC does not directly provide a way to promote cooperation among folk cultures to shape the high culture of Pakistan. SNC was focused on implementing uniform curricula across public schools, private schools, and madrassas. SNC's approach was closely related to the National Education Policy of 2009 and Gellner's argument of achieving high culture through a state-planned national education system. After the 18th amendment, the central government, through SNC, could not ensure uniformity of national education as the amendment allowed provinces not to follow the center's designed national education policy. Sindh, where the opposition party PPP was in government, avoided the implementation of SNC by putting it into a review.

The early dissolution of the PTI government through the vote of confidence and discontinuation of SNC by the current government of allied parties demonstrated that national education is subject to shifting focuses, and national education policies often face discontinuation after the change in government. The above brief discussion on the national education and competing civic, ethnic, and religious nationalism in Pakistan validate hypotheses three and four of this thesis. Through different historical phases, the political and military elites in power at the center proposed high cultures suitable to form civic nationalism in Pakistan. The national education policies during various parliamentary and elected governments reflected the political and military elites' approach towards shaping the proposed high culture. However, no national education policy continued long enough and was subject to full implementation to determine if it produced desired results. Different and shifting focuses in the national education policies have made them ineffective in addressing internal divisions. Shifting focuses and discontinuation of national education policies with regime change also reflects that national education has been subject to elites' preferences rather than aiming at shaping civic nationalism.

Gellner argued that the state needs to ensure that "the educational product is not shoddy and sub-standard" (Gellner, 1983, p. 38). He argued that in states where education is the responsibility of private or even religious organizations, the state controls standardization. (Gellner, 1983, p. 38) However, in Pakistan, standardization and reasonable standard national education has not been achieved. The growth of three different and parallel education systems demonstrated that the education system in Pakistan is not creating citizens literate in a shared language and culture. Public schools, private schools, and madrassas produce students with different experiences because they differ in quality and teach different content. Citizens educated in private schools are competent in English and Urdu and have a better grip on modern subjects. The public schools

instill limited or no English language expertise and limited competence in modern subjects. Madrassa-educated students do not have competence in English and are only literate in Urdu and religious subjects.

National education has become a contested subject between the center and the provinces since decentralization in 2010. The current National Education Policy of 2009 emphasizes uniformity and standardization in education to be imposed by the state. The 18th constitutional amendment of 2010 provides a conflicting approach by making the education policy of 2009 nonbinding for the provinces. National education in Pakistan can be characterized with frequently changing national education policies causing non-standardization and relatively substandard which undermines the possibility of shaping civic nationalism through education.

6.6   Pakistan as a Deviant Case

Pakistan is a post-colonial, multi-ethnic, and Muslim-majority state. Nationalism in Pakistan is examined through Gellner's framework on nationalism. This thesis has examined Pakistan as a deviant case. The breakaway of East Pakistan over Bengali ethnic nationalism indicated that zone three style nationalism was dominant in Pakistan until 1971. The simultaneous focus on zone one, three, and five style of nationalism demonstrated that there had been a continuous effort to shape a shared form of nationalism through education. However, zone one-style civic nationalism has not been formed in Pakistan. After the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, zone three style nationalism has also not been consummated in Pakistan. No folk culture has been able to maintain its dominance, and there has been ongoing competition among folk cultures. Pakistan was never conceived as a religion-centric state and has not experienced a transition to zone five style fundamentalism or religious nationalism. The study has demonstrated that Pakistan has been

associated with Islamic identity without adopting fundamentalism. In short, Pakistan was similar to zone three until 1971, but this thesis largely depicts an interplay of zone one, three, and five of nationalism both before and since that time. Pakistan has not seen a complete transition to any shared form of nationalism.

6.6.1 Pakistan as a Deviant case and a Post-Colonial State

The thesis concludes that with respect to Gellner's theoretical framework, Pakistan is a deviant case. However, it is important to consider whether Pakistan is a deviant case in the contemporary world. Several states, especially post-colonial states, appear to share similarities with Pakistan in their experience with nationalism but are missing from Gellner's zones of nationalism. Forrest (2006) argued that in most post-colonial states, a shared pro-independence aspiration was developed among diverse communities during independence movements. However, immediately after the establishment as independent nation-states, that shared pro-independence bond was challenged by some newer and some older ethnic identities. Therefore, a shared, unifying nationalism could not be shaped; rather it was challenged by distinct ethnic identities, giving way to prolonged conflicts, secession movements, and the breaking up of nation-states in some cases. Many post-colonial states have experienced some degree of instrumentalist use of ethnic nationalism aimed at consolidating power at the central level rather than shaping shared nationalism (Barrington, 2006; Forrest, 2006). The discussion posits that in post-colonial states a shared form of nationalism was challenged from the beginning and was subject to elite manipulation prioritizing political gains.

Much of post-colonial Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia did not fully and immediately transition to a shared form of nationalism after becoming independent. Some post-colonial states, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa, were relatively successful in shaping shared civic

nationalism; however, they had to undergo a prolonged struggle. Many post-colonial states are still a long way from having a shared nationalism (Forrest, 2006). Most of the post-colonial states did not completely transition to a zone three form of ethnic nationalism but are experiencing ongoing competition among folk cultures. Muslim majority states were not decisively challenged by religious nationalism and did not transition to fundamentalism. The detailed study of Pakistan as a deviant case and the loosely drawn similarities with most post-colonial states establish the need to indicate the missing category in Gellner's framework and justify the need to introduce a new zone of nationalism.

6.6.2   Identifying Missing Zone of Nationalism

The study of nationalism in Pakistan through zones of nationalism perhaps provide an opportunity to broaden Gellner's framework by including post-colonial states. From 1945 to the late 1960s, with the end of colonization, many Asian and African states were established as independent nation-states. Many scholars have discussed ethnic and religious conflicts in newly independent post-colonial societies of Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The degree of conflict varies from peaceful protests by disadvantaged folk cultures to violence, and some states saw separatist movements and disintegration. (Kingsbury, 2011; Wimmer, 1997) Thus it seems that a shared form of nationalism could not be shaped in many post-colonial states.

 There is perhaps a zone 6 that needs to be considered to understand nationalism in post-colonial states. Zone six of nationalism includes a group of post-colonial states that Gellner did not consider in his framework on nationalism. Gellner started to develop his argument on nationalism in his book *Thought and Change* (1964). His book *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) presented a well-developed argument on nationalism and the role of national education in shaping a shared nationalism. Gellner explained zones of nationalism and the form of nationalism experienced by

each zone in his book *Nationalism* (1997). The years (1964-1997) when Gellner was developing his argument on nationalism, coincided with the period when most of the post-colonial states were struggling to shape a shared nationalism and were experiencing multiple competing nationalisms. However, Gellner's argument lacked any explanation of the experience of nationalism in post-colonial states.

The post-colonial states that lacked a shared nationalism after independence and experienced prolonged and, in some cases, ongoing competition among different forms of nationalism constitutes zone six. Identifying Pakistan as a deviant case in theory and a common case in the post-colonial world that he should have been witnessing while developing his theory is underlined as a flaw in Gellner's theoretical framework on nationalism. This thesis pinpoints an entire category of post-colonial states, missing from Gellner's argument, as a contribution to knowledge in the literature on nationalism.

Applying Gellner's metaphor of marriage between state and culture on newly identified zone six, it is argued that the end of colonial rule meant that foreigners no longer controlled the state. Indigenous leaders, trained and educated under colonial rule, took control in the post-colonial states. The politics in the post-colonial states could be viewed through lingering attitudes of divide and rule. The groom (the post-colonial state) was not free from the impact of colonial rule deeply rooted in state structures and attitudes. The indigenous bride (high culture) in the colonial state was seeking an end to colonial rule so the bride can be characterized by pro-independence fledgling nationalism. The colonial state was replaced by a new groom (the post-colonial state) of colonial origins not acceptable for the bride who had an anti-colonial (pro-independence) spirit. The groom of largely colonial characteristics was not ready for marriage to an indigenous bride (high culture)

who embodied pro-independence anti-state attributes. This created a very uncomfortable conflictual relationship.

Before independence, under colonial rule, the post-colonial states had a colonial education system that fulfilled the requirements of the colonial state and its rulers. The colonial education system aimed to form a small group of locals, loyal to colonial government, that could undertake administration on behalf of the colonial government. Under colonial government, mass literacy was not a goal at and was never achieved. The indigenous education system was left to continue as a different and parallel education system which created a divide between the colonial-educated and traditional-educated and was disadvantageous for most indigenous people (Feldmann, 2016). The colonial education system helped shape a colonial high culture, among those elite who served the colonial power.

After independence, with different and parallel education systems, many post-colonial states saw a continuation of the colonial education system, which was inadequate for addressing social, economic, and ethnic divides, and limited the formation of shared high culture through education. Due to an ineffective or flawed education system, colonial attributes of the groom (the post-colonial states) could not be effectively reformed to make it acceptable for an indigenous bride. Therefore, in many post-colonial states, the marriage of state and culture did not happen, or a shared nationalism could not be formed.

Pakistan has a slightly different history due to the partition of the Indian sub-continent. Along with seeking independence from colonial rule, Indian nationalism was contested in favor of Muslim nationalism. However, Pakistan's experience with nationalism has not been very different from most post-colonial states after independence. The contestation in favor of the high culture of Islam has become weak over the years. Religious nationalism has not gained popular support in Pakistan.

Madrassa education exists as a parallel system of education in Pakistan. However, according to various reports, madrassa students only make up 1 to 14 percent of total enrolled students aged between 5 to 9 years across public schools, private schools, and madrassas in Pakistan (Abbasi, May 10, 2021; Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, & Zajonc, 2006; Nadeem, 2016). Up to 14 percent of total enrollment can help determine that the madrassa-educated students are significantly less than public and private school-educated children, which might explain why fundamentalism has not gained popular support in Pakistan.

Furthermore, the role of local Imams as local religious elites is important in local communities. People largely seek religious guidance from Imams who do not have any visible association with religious-political parties or who are not representatives of religious-political parties. Seeking religious guidance from local Imams perhaps offers liberty to choose what people want to follow compared to what would be imposed through state laws in case of supporting any religious-political party. Unlike the religious elites who participate in politics, local imams offer a religion disconnected from politics. Local Imam's lack of significant involvement in national and provincial politics and frequent contact with people at the local level may provide some answers on the dynamics of religious nationalism in Pakistan.

It is important to point out that at the time of establishment as independent states, the post-colonial states, including Pakistan had agrarian economies. Due to the agrarian economy, the formation of a shared high culture through education to fulfill the needs of an industrial economy was not an immediate requirement. According to a UN Population Division report, Pakistan is the fastest urbanizing country in South Asia (Artaza, June 5, 2019). With rapid urbanization and mass migration to cities, the need for standardized literacy is becoming strong and relevant compared to the formative years of the agrarian economy. Generally, urbanization is considered an indication

of modern economic activity that stimulates the mass movement of workers. In recent years, the need for standardized education to acquire a uniformly trained workforce is increasingly becoming essential in Pakistan.

Although there is political instability, federalism has largely shaped Pakistan's experience with nationalism. Despite prolonged military coups, the federal structure of government has not changed. In the recent decade, Pakistan has moved towards extensive decentralization, which has the potential to accommodate pluralism and provide better opportunities for folk cultures to cooperate. The formation of prospective education policies like the Single National Curriculum (SNC) indicates more focused efforts towards achieving an education system that might help create literate high culture. Federalism can perhaps pave the way for standardized education, which is increasingly becoming essential for economic development. The situation might help shape mutually compatible groom and bride in Pakistan to enable marriage between state and culture.

6.7   Limitations

This study is an extensive effort in terms of going through a broad literature review, data collection, and field research, but is not without considerable limitations. Pakistan is a very large country with a diverse and multilayered population. Classification of folk cultures is based on provinces and their dominant ethnicity. The study does not address sub-cultures and languages that exist within each province as the scope would have been difficult to handle. The interviews and data collection were conducted in Punjab and the capital city Islamabad. Traveling to all provinces was not possible due to the restricted timeframe and security risks of various levels in other provinces. Some additional limitations to this research were added as Covid-19 struck in 2020, the initial few

months of strict lockdowns around the world limited the access to data from American, European, and Pakistani libraries and relevant offices.

6.8   Directions for Future Research

This study offers a comprehensive account of political history and nationalism in Pakistan. Given the above-identified zone six of nationalism, this study can help initiate broader comparative studies on nationalism with other post-colonial states. The potential to draw comparative analysis among post-colonial states is a contribution to knowledge and a direction for future research. For example, a comparative study of Pakistan and Malaysia can be conceived. Malaysia is a post-colonial state; it initially struggled to form a shared Malay nationalism. The colonial education system was reviewed in the early 1950s to assimilate Malay and non-Malay folk cultures into a shared high culture of Malaysia. The role of Islam, accommodation of multiple religions, and federal state structure can help draw an illuminating comparative study of nationalism. Based on the above discussion, the study can also provide directions for future research on the role of education in shaping shared nationalism in many post-colonial states. The interplay of multiple zones of nationalism can help understand nationalism and the broader dynamics of political instability in the post-colonial states. The role of Imams as local religious elites can be considered significant for future research for understanding the aspects of religious nationalism in Muslim majority nation-states.

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