

Social and/or national revolution? Ukrainian communisms in the revolution and civil war

Ukraine in the revolutionary period of 1917–1920 found itself in an ideological and political cauldron. Revolutionary parties and movements developed and attempted to implement various often contradictory and mutually exclusive projects of state-building and social transformation. These diverse visions often developed under the ideological umbrella of ‘socialism’ - since the revolutionary events of 1905-1907 most activist political currents in Ukraine had professed a socialist orientation. However, the socialist movement in Ukraine became significantly diversified after the February Revolution of 1917, a time when national aspirations and political separatist currents were gaining strength at the margins of the Russian Empire. In the new conditions of political freedom in Ukraine, parallel projects developed and canvassed, articulating different conceptions of Ukraine’s sovereignty and political autonomy, in which two different political horizons can be distinguished. In the all-Russia parties and movements operating in Ukraine, pan-imperial attitudes and horizons remained dominant even after the downfall of the Romanovs. The most important of these parties – the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP, both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) and the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries – all supported the idea of unchanged political borders and, as before, a centralist government. But there was another entire spectrum of nationally-oriented socialist organisations, consisting of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (USDRP) and the Ukrainian SRs in 1917, and later the Ukrainian communist parties of the *Borot’bysty* and the *Nezalezhnyky*, which adopted a separatist orientation and stressed the need for Ukraine’s autonomy in political, economic and cultural matters. In 1917, it was these parties, with their national Ukrainian horizons and concerns, which gained the greatest support among the population, as the massive votes for these parties in Ukraine in the elections to the all-Russia Constituent Assembly in November 1917 demonstrated.

Nonetheless, these nationally-oriented parties and their intelligentsia leaderships were unable to maintain power in the chaos of the post-revolutionary years. Ultimately, it was an all-Russia political power, the Bolsheviks and the Red Army, which proved to be the only force able to take control over most of Ukraine. However, as the Red forces' rapidly changing political fortunes in Ukraine during the civil war showed, military supremacy alone was not enough to take and exercise power in Ukraine. The Bolshevik leaders had to take on significant parts of the national aspirations which had been expressed in 1917-1918, and co-opt and absorb many of the diverse Ukraine-oriented left forces which had been articulating these aspirations. By embracing the popular nationalist discourse and making the national question an intrinsic part of their programme, the Bolsheviks were able to use the national factor to mobilise the population for reconstructing the country and help strengthen their position in the borderlands after the civil war was over. A policy known as *korenizatsiia*, or indigenisation, was introduced Union-wide in 1923. It was intended to head off local nationalism by recruiting natives to staff and lead local Soviet bodies, but in Ukraine the policy rapidly led to the emergence of new Soviet Ukrainian elites, who by the late 1920s had started challenging the central party leadership in Moscow. With the launch of the industrialisation campaign at the end of the 1920s, which required centralisation of political control Ukrainian 'national communism' became a political threat that Moscow could no longer tolerate.

Ukraine after February

The February Revolution initiated a complicated process of transforming the autocratic Russian Empire. Once Nicholas II abdicated, a Provisional Government was formed in Petrograd, which began to replace imperial bureaucrats with their own administrations throughout the empire.

The Provisional Government was intended as a caretaker administration until elections could be held for an all-Russia Constituent Assembly, which would decide the future of the empire. In its

early declarations, the Provisional Government condemned the restrictive tsarist regime, promised the equality to all citizens, and provided for cultural national autonomy. Despite those initiatives, it never enjoyed firm public support and rapidly lost authority due to its inability to tackle the problems of the Russian empire in conditions of wartime chaos, economic collapse and general social unrest.

At the same time, councils (soviets) of workers' and soldiers' deputies were spontaneously formed in the industrial centres and the garrisons of revolutionary soldiers at frontline. In Ukraine the first soviet was elected in Kharkiv on 2 March 1917, and a day later in Kyiv. By mid-1917, there were already 252 soviets on Ukraine's territory. Most of them were situated in the east of Ukraine (180 soviets or 71 per cent in the industrial Donbas area); big cities, such as Kharkiv, Kyiv, Katerynoslav, and Poltava, and in the frontline areas.¹ The soviets on Ukraine's territory were generally dominated by the all-Russia socialist parties – initially SRs and the Mensheviks, but as 1917 wore on they increasingly became Bolshevik strongholds in Ukraine.

Both the Provisional Government and the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies represented the all-Russia, pan-imperial political horizon in Ukraine. Neither of them could offer any feasible response to the separatist movements that started gaining strength after February 1917. Ukraine's nationally-conscious intelligentsia interpreted the revolutionary upheavals as the precursors for a national, Ukrainian, revolution, leading eventually to a full social and national emancipation of the country. But first of all, Ukraine itself needed to become a reality. 'Ukraine', as such, had not existed in the Tsarist empire; its territory consisted of three provinces (*gubernii*) populated predominantly by ethnic Ukrainians, but with no special political status within the empire. The fall of the monarchy created the opportunity for recently formed nationalist political parties to raise the question of Ukraine's autonomy and free cultural development.²

Representatives of pro-Ukraine political parties and nationalist activists gathered in Kyiv on 4 March 1917, where a future national legislative authority, the *Tsentral'na Rada* [Central Council] was founded. Its formation was initiated by the Society of Ukrainian Progressives [*Tovarystvo Ukraïns'kykh Postupovtsiv, TUP*], a nonpartisan political and civic organisation formed in 1908, and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party, a successor of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, the first mass party in Ukraine, established in 1899 in Kharkiv. The Rada consisted predominantly of left-wing political groups; beside the USDRP, most members belonged to the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR) and the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists (UPSF). They represented all the social groups on Ukraine's territory, for whom Kyiv was the main point of political reference and Ukraine was the main scope of their political objectives. The leaders of the *Tsentral'na Rada* included intellectuals, academics, writers, and public activists, many of whom had hurried back from Petrograd, inspired by the outbreak of the Ukrainian Revolution. Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, an historian and a public activist, one of the founders of the Ukrainian National-Democratic Party in Eastern Galicia and the Society of Ukrainian Progressives, was elected a president of the *Tsentral'na Rada*. Alongside the Provisional Government and the network of soviets, the Rada became the third competing authority on Ukrainian territory.

This nationally-oriented intelligentsia believed that Ukraine was oppressed both nationally and socially. Accordingly, the Rada tried to respond equally to the nationalist aspirations of the intelligentsia and the need for social and economic reforms. We should note that at this early stage, the Ukrainian intelligentsia did not even consider the possibility of Ukraine's independence. Immediate separation from Russia was entirely absent from Ukrainian public discourse - the initial demands of the nationalist leaders in the Rada did not go beyond national-territorial autonomy for Ukraine within a democratically transformed Russia. In a letter of greeting from the Rada to the head of the Provisional Government in Petrograd Prince L'vov and the Minister of Justice Alexander Kerensky on 7 March 1917, the Ukrainian leaders

expressed their hope that in a free Russia, equal rights for the Ukrainian people would be guaranteed.³ A month later, during the First Ukrainian National Congress held in Kyiv on 6-8 April 1917, it was reiterated that ‘only the national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine can guarantee the needs of the Ukrainian people and other people living on Ukraine’s land’.⁴

It was clear, however, that Ukraine’s autonomy could not be achieved without the support of the army. The Ukrainisation of the military units was controlled by Symon Petliura, at that time head of the Ukrainian front council in Minsk, and Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi, a founder of the Ukrainian independence movement. In early May 1917, the First All-Ukrainian Military Congress took place in Kyiv, representing those Ukrainianised military units which pledged support to the Central Rada. Altogether, around nine-hundred delegates, representing Ukrainian military units on all fronts, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, and military garrisons in Ukraine and Russia participated in the Congress. It passed a resolution ‘On Ukrainian Autonomy’, encouraging the Rada to declare the national-territorial autonomy for Ukraine immediately.⁵ Armed with this support from military units, a delegation from the Rada left for Petrograd on 13 May 1917 to present case for Ukraine’s autonomy to the Provisional Government. The Ukrainian demands were largely ignored in Petrograd, however.⁶

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Rada leaders proceeded with their agenda. Backed by the decision of the Second All-Ukrainian Military Congress (5 June 1917) and the First All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress (28 May – 2 June 1917) the Rada decided to declare Ukraine’s autonomy unilaterally. The First *Universal* [a legal act-declaration] of the Central Rada, issued on 10 June 1917, proclaimed that ‘without seceding from all of Russia [...] let the Ukrainian people have the right to manage its own life on its own soil’.⁷ The First Universal also envisaged the creation of a democratically elected all-Ukrainian people’s assembly with the sole right to draft laws for Ukraine, which, however, were to be confirmed by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

As the political crisis in Petrograd deepened in the summer of 1917, the position of the Ukrainian Rada became stronger. On 28 June 1917, a delegation headed by Kerensky arrived in Kyiv to negotiate the status of Ukraine.⁸ A compromise was reached, which laid the foundation for the Second Universal, issued on 3 July. This Universal reiterated that Ukraine had no aspirations to separate from Russia, ‘in order that we and all her peoples might jointly strive toward the development and welfare of all Russia and toward the unity of her democratic forces’.⁹ The principle of Ukraine’s autonomy was thus recognised by both the Provisional Government and the Central Rada - but without any precise delineation of the territory on which Ukrainian autonomy was to be applied.¹⁰

It was events in Petrograd which precipitated the shift from autonomism to separatism in Ukraine’s political discourse. On 25 October the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government and took power in Petrograd. In Ukraine, the local soviets of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies, by now dominated by Bolsheviks quickly declared their support to the new authorities. On the streets of Kyiv, Bolshevik activists revolted against the forces of the Provisional Government. The immediate response of the Central Rada was to create a Committee for the Rescue of the Revolution, in which representatives of all political forces in the capital, including the Bolsheviks, Russian SRs and the Bund leaders were invited to take part.¹¹ The Rada at first tried to remain neutral in the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the defenders of the Provisional Government in Kyiv. After three days of fighting, a truce was agreed, according to which the Rada assumed the powers of the Provisional Government in Ukraine and took over its military forces.¹²

Exploiting this prerogative further, on 7 November the Rada adopted its Third Universal. ‘Without separating ourselves from the Russian Republic and maintaining its unity’, the creation of a separate Ukrainian People’s Republic (*Ukrains’ka Narodna Respublika*, UNR) and its government – the General Secretariat, was proclaimed.¹³ The Universal also included a

number of important political and social decisions – abolishing existing private landownership, introducing an eight-hour working day and state control over production, and granting national minorities the right to national-personal autonomy. All these initiatives were to be legalised by a Ukrainian Constituent Assembly – not to be confused with the All-Russia Constituent Assembly – scheduled for 9 January 1918.¹⁴

The elections to the All-Russia Constituent Assembly, held on 25 November, showed that the project for Ukraine elaborated by the nationally-oriented parties had increased its support. Lenin's Council of People's Commissars in Petrograd had allowed the elections to the assembly to take place, despite the fact that they were based on universal suffrage rather than the class-based franchise of the soviets. Among other things, they hoped the results might legitimise their claims to power in the former imperial borderlands. The results of the elections in Ukraine, however, proved the opposite. The nationalist parties gained 75 per cent of the votes. The Bolshevik share of the poll in Ukraine was just ten per cent.¹⁵ After another attempted but unsuccessful uprising in Kyiv on 29-30 November, followed by their failure to secure control of the All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets held in Kyiv on 4-6 December, the defeated Bolsheviks retreated eastward to Kharkiv. Here they convened an alternative congress, at which they proclaimed an autonomous Ukrainian People's Republic of Soviets and its government – the People's Secretariat of Ukraine. At the same time, an ultimatum, signed by Lenin and Trotsky, was sent to the Rada. It demanded the legalisation of the Bolshevik military units, and threatened war if their demand was unmet.¹⁶

The UNR leaders rejected the ultimatum, and armed conflict began.¹⁷ On 11 January, under Bolshevik fire, the Rada with its Fourth Universal finally declared independence of Ukraine: 'From this day forth, the Ukrainian People's Republic becomes independent, subject to no one, a Free, Sovereign State of the Ukrainian People.'¹⁸ But by this time the declaration made little practical difference; the General Secretariat was too weak to defend its territory. On 26

January 1918, Bolshevik and pro-Soviet forces took Kyiv for the first time, and the UNR was forced to retreat westwards to Zhytomyr.

The war between Soviet and Ukrainian national forces continued, in various guises and with varying success, until November 1921, when the Soviet regime was established on almost the entire territory of Ukraine. This eventual outcome was not only the result of Bolshevik military supremacy. As the 'Russian' civil war developed, many Ukrainians were obliged to orient themselves to one or other of the belligerent sides. Besides the UNR and the Bolsheviks, foreign governments started looking for opportunities in war-torn Ukraine. In search for allies, the Ukrainian nationally-oriented political elites turned to the Central Powers, inviting those recent enemies into Ukraine. By the end of February 1918, there were almost half a million German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers on the territory of Ukraine, and by the end of April they had occupied its entire territory and returned the Ukrainian authorities to the capital.

In return, the Ukrainian government undertook to deliver substantial quantities of grain, food and raw materials to the occupying countries. The main burden fell on the peasants, who could not comprehend how or why the Germans had come to be in control. The UNR was losing the sympathy of its main social basis – the Ukrainian-speaking countryside. Numerous peasant leaders, *otamans*, took the advantage of the power vacuum on the ground to declare self-rule and take control over the land. Their mistrust towards the Ukrainian government, who had forced them under German control, was fatal for the nationalists' cause. When the UNR leader Petliura, this time backed by the Polish army as part of the Russo-Polish war, returned to Kyiv in May 1920, the general anti-Bolshevik uprising he had hoped for failed through lack of support. The peasant *otamans*, instead, sided with the Bolsheviks, whose promised system of *soviets* and *revkomy* appeared more in line with the popular slogans of self-government and desire to possess land.¹⁹

Soviet power in Ukraine

During the post-revolutionary decade, the Bolsheviks in Ukraine evolved from being a regional organisation of the RSDRP(b), representing the Russian-speaking industrial workers and soldiers in the border provinces, to becoming the only legal political organisation in Ukraine – the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (KP(b)U), consisting predominantly of ethnic Ukrainians. This monopoly was achieved equally through military supremacy, successful propaganda, tactical political alliances and revisions to their political programme.

The Bolsheviks started from a marginal position, however. In 1917, the regional organisations of the RSDRP(b) in Ukraine numbered some twenty-two thousand members, with two thirds of them being concentrated in the industrial and Russian-speaking Donbas area.²⁰ The course of the civil war changed matters. By mid-1918, the Bolsheviks had been ousted from power and driven underground in Ukraine by the German-Austrian occupying forces, the allies of the Ukrainian government. However, the terms of the Ukrainian-German alliance antagonised the countryside, which gave the Bolsheviks and other pro-Soviet forces an opportunity to compete for social support.

Regional party organisations needed resources to react more quickly to political and military reversals on the ground. The Russian Bolsheviks, bound by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, could not openly wage war against Germany, whereas a nominally independent Soviet government on Ukraine's territory could engage the German occupying armies in combat without breaching the treaty,²¹ and secure grassroots support by co-opting other leftist parties in Ukraine in the struggle against the common enemy. Consequently, on 7 March 1918 at the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets the creation of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic was proclaimed.²²

A separate soviet republic required a separate leadership. On 18-20 April 1918, communists from Ukraine met in Taganrog to discuss a possibility of a separate communist

party for Ukraine. At Taganrog, the Bolsheviks, whose party had by now been renamed the Russian Communist Party (RKP(b)) were joined by radicals from the Ukrainian SRs and the USDRP, who had retreated east together with the Red Army. This was not a sign of an ideological unanimity between the left parties, however. The primary goal of the left parties at this stage was to fight ‘the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie’,²³ the Ukrainian-German forces in Ukraine. There was little agreement beyond that. The main concerns of the Taganrog meeting were the status of the communist party in Ukraine – was it a separate organisation or a branch of the Russian Bolshevik party? - and its social support – should the peasants, who constituted the majority of Ukraine’s population, be seen as a revolutionary class?

Already at Taganrog, two different ideological camps within the Bolsheviks in Ukraine took shape. The so called Katerynoslav group, headed by Fedor Sergeev (Artem) and Emanuil Kvirring, represented the industrial south-eastern provinces. This group rejected the idea of a separate party outright, arguing that Ukraine’s revolutionary forces, weakened by the civil war and the German occupation, would not be able to restore soviet power without the help of the Russian Bolsheviks. Hence, Ukraine’s Bolshevik organisation should remain the part of the all-Russia Bolshevik party. In contrast, the Kyiv group headed by Georgii Piatakov promoted an idea of an autonomous Ukrainian Bolshevik party, which would become the vanguard of the oppressed people in Ukraine, especially the revolutionary peasantry. A similar position was articulated by Mykola Skrypnyk, an old communist and Lenin’s close ally, who was sent to Ukraine to mediate between the two groups. Skrypnyk, who headed the Soviet government in Ukraine between December 1917 and April 1918, sided with those supporting a separate communist party. Unlike Piatakov, who envisaged that the central committee of a Ukrainian Bolshevik party would act under the central committee of the Russian communist party, Skrypnyk advocated a Ukrainian party with its own independent central committee, which would cooperate with the RKP(b) only through an international organisation, the envisaged

Third International.²⁴ Of these three proposals, Skrypnyk's one gained the majority of votes at Taganrog.²⁵

Nonetheless, this separate status of Ukraine and its party was significantly undermined by the fact that the organisational bureau of the KP(b)U was situated in Moscow. The resolution of the Taganrog Conference was cancelled by the KP(b)U First Congress, held in Moscow on 5-12 July 1918. This congress resolved that the KP(b)U would be an integral, although autonomous, part of the RKP(b). The central committee of the KP(b)U acknowledged the authority of the central committee of the RKP(b). The party lost its status, but retained its name.²⁶ To make things unambiguous, the RKP(b) programme, adopted by the Eighth Party Congress in Moscow on 18-23 March 1919, stated that despite the separate status of the Soviet republics there was no intention to reorganise the Party as a federation of independent Communist parties: "There must exist a *single* centralised Communist Party with a *single* Central Committee leading all the Party work in all sections of the RSFSR. All decisions of the RKP(b) and its directing organs are un-conditionally binding on all branches of the party, regardless of their national composition. The Central Committees of the Ukrainian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Communists enjoy the rights of the regional committees of the party, and are entirely subordinated to the Central Committee of the RKP(b)."²⁷

Ukraine's subordinate position was also reflected in the status of its government. The first soviet government in Ukraine, the People's Secretariat, was formed in Kharkiv on 17 December 1917. It consisted mostly of RSDRP(b) members, as no specifically Ukrainian Bolshevik organisation had yet been established. This government, headed by Skrypnyk included a number of Ukraine-minded Bolsheviks, however, such as Vasyl' Shakhrai, Iurii Kotsiubyns'kyi, and Georgii Lapchyns'kyi, who would later champion the inner-party opposition to party centralisation. The second soviet government, the Provisional Workers-Peasants Government of Ukraine, was formed during the Second All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets in Kursk on 28

November 1918. It was later renamed the Council of People's Commissars (*Radnarkom*).

Khrystian Rakovskiy headed the government until July 1923.

The authorities of the Soviet government in Ukraine were significantly limited. Already in June 1919, a decree 'On the Unification of the Soviet republics of Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belarus for the Struggle against War Imperialism' deprived the enumerated republics of their own Commissariats of War, National Economy, Railroads, Finance and Labour.²⁸ The need to unify the above-mentioned commissariats with their Russian counterparts 'for defence purposes as well as in the interests of economic development' was further reiterated in a separate agreement between Russia and Ukraine, signed on 28 December 1920. In return for Russia's control over most important commissariats, Soviet Ukraine was recognised as an independent and sovereign state.²⁹

Ukrainian Communist Parties

In 1923, the first historian of the KP(b)U Moisei Ravich-Cherkasskii suggested that the history of the KP(b)U was "a sum of two histories: that of the Ukrainian proletariat and that of the Russian proletariat in Ukraine".³⁰ Accordingly, there were two distinct ideological roots in the KP(b)U, one extending from the Russian revolutionary movement and another from the Ukrainian socialist movement. The differences between these two ideological camps conditioned a certain level of plurality within the KP(b)U during the 1920s. Among the most frequent concerns were the status of Soviet Ukraine, its government and its Bolshevik party.

Perhaps the earliest attempt to voice national concerns inside the party belonged to the Ukrainian Bolshevik Shakhrai, Commissar for Military Affairs in Skrypnyk's government before January 1918. In his pamphlet *Revoliutsiia na Ukraine* [The Revolution in Ukraine], Shakhrai summarised the experience of Soviet state-building in Ukraine, highlighting the importance of the national component in the socialist revolution.³¹ In January 1919, Shakhrai in

co-authorship with another KP(b)U member Serhii Mazlakh published a pamphlet *Do Khvyli: Shcho Diyet'sia na Ukraïni i z Ukraïnoi?* [Concerning the Moment: What is Happening in and to Ukraine].³² This work highlighted the contradiction between Lenin's claims for nations' right to self-determination (realised, the authors believed, in the creation of Soviet Ukraine) and the subordinate position of the republic's Bolshevik party.

In *Do Khvyli*, Shakhrai and Mazlakh scrutinised the Russian position towards Ukraine. They supported the idea of an independent Soviet Ukraine with its own separate communist party, standing on an equal footing with the RKP(b). At the party meeting at Taganrog Shakhrai even suggested calling it the 'Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks – UKP(b)', modelled on the RKP(b), rather than KP(b)U (Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine). The idea was, however, rejected at the Congress in order to avoid ambiguity: "Ukrainian" could both mean 'of Ukraine' and 'of Ukrainians'; and the latter could hardly be used to characterise the Bolshevik party at the time.³³

For Shakhrai and Mazlakh, Ukraine's socialist orientation was beyond question. The question of who would be in the vanguard of this socialist construction remained, however, open. In *Do Khvyli*, a list of demands was put forward which challenged Russian dominance in Ukraine. This list, which can be seen as the foundation for Ukrainian national communism included:

- Ukraine and the Ukrainian people had defined themselves as a nation and proclaimed their independence;
- Ukraine will fight for its independence till the end. Sooner or later, whether in a hard and bloody way though armed struggle, or in a democratic way through compromise with neighbouring countries, Ukraine will be independent and sovereign;

- Ukrainian reunion with Russia is progressive only for Russian great power. In contrast, Ukraine's sovereignty is widely beneficial. The fewer national struggles we have, the better it is for the economic, political, social and cultural life of Ukraine; the bigger contribution it will be for the world revolution;

- Unless the independence of Ukraine is assured, unless the Ukrainian worker is not nationally discriminated against, to be "nationalist" and "chauvinist" for Ukrainians is not only a historical right, but an obligation. Our "chauvinism" depends on your [Russian] "internationalism", but you hide behind the words and we don't want to hide any more.³⁴

These statements by Shakhrai and Mazlakh gained support from other Ukraine-minded Bolsheviks. In summer 1919, an organising committee of the federalist group in the KP(b)U was formed. The faction's leader Lapchyn'skyi was a former member of the Skrypnyk government, where at different times he headed the Commissariats for Office Affairs, Social Security and Justice. Lapchyn'skyi gradually developed a critical stand towards the Russian Bolsheviks, condemning the RKP(b)'s centralisation drive towards Ukraine.³⁵ He continuously criticised Russian and centrally-minded Bolsheviks for their chauvinistic attempts to maintain Moscow's domination over Ukraine. He believed that since the two republics had different economic and social bases, and therefore different objectives and concerns, the communist party could not be the same in both Ukraine and Russia. He campaigned for a separate communist party in Ukraine, which, as he explained at the Fourth KP(b)U conference, should stand on an equal footing with the Russian communist party and become eventually a self-standing member of the Communist International.³⁶

While these Ukrainian Bolsheviks opposed Russia's domination of Ukrainian affairs and demanded equality in representation and decision-making, the members of other non-Bolshevik

left-wing parties in Ukraine rejected the Bolsheviks' right to represent the Ukrainian toiling masses outright. The left-wing section of nationally-conscious intelligentsia also regarded Ukraine as an oppressed nation, and the Ukrainian workers, and especially peasants, as doubly-oppressed: both as the toiling masses and as Ukrainians. To liberate Ukraine's toiling masses, a revolution which was simultaneously social and national was needed. For these parties, communism and nationalism were compatible. Each nation needed to find its own way to communism and to adapt the universal doctrine where necessary.

Ukraine's national communist camp during the civil war was represented by the *Borot'bysty* (former left-wing of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries); the *Nezalezhnyky* (left-wing of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Working Party); the *Bor'bisty* (Ukrainian Party of Left Socialist-Revolutionaries), and the *Ukapisty* (Ukrainian Communist Party, UKP).³⁷ These parties all supported the idea of 'soviet power' – that is, that Ukraine should be a republic of soviets, in which power was exercised by these workers' and peasants' councils. They did not equate this with rule by a single hierarchical party where all the important decisions were taken in Moscow. These Ukrainian communist parties all underwent major transformations during the civil war. Most of them originated from the Ukrainian SR movements, hence their attention to the Ukrainian countryside. They had been represented in the Central Rada and the Ukrainian government. But after the failure of the UNR and the German occupation they started gradually evolving towards accepting the soviet regime. Overall, the national communists supported the October Revolution, which they regarded as a necessary constituent of the world proletarian revolution. They rejected the idea of a messianic role of the Russian working class, however, whose example could not be copied blindly. As a *Borot'byst* paper put it in August 1919, the revolution needed to be translated 'into the language of local conditions',³⁸ taking into account the peculiarities of Ukraine's social situation. The socialist revolution in Ukraine had different social bases – semi-proletariat and poor peasantry that needed to be co-opted into the revolutionary struggle.

The national question was a cornerstone of national communism. As the *Borot'bysty* argued in February 1919, 'the best solution to the national question would be to reach socialism; thus, the primary goal of each and every revolutionary socialist party [in Ukraine], despite their national affiliation, should be strengthening the achievements of the socialist revolution, which will eventually result in national emancipation.'³⁹ Although social emancipation preceded a national one, Ukraine's independence was the primary goal of national communists. The *Nezalezhnyky*, for example, argued that national self-determination could be easily justified in class terms: 'only in a sovereign national state, the struggle with the bourgeoisie could not be overshadowed; under any other circumstances, this struggle automatically becomes the national struggle.'⁴⁰

A Bolshevik-led Soviet Ukraine did not represent an attractive alternative due to its pan-imperial horizon. The *Nezalezhnyk* social-democrat Myhailo Tkachenko charged that it united 'all sorts of Russian nationalist elements from the Black Hundreds to the revolutionary intelligentsia in Ukraine [...] joining forces with the Bolsheviks to help reconstruct a "united and indivisible Russia".'⁴¹ The Bolsheviks in Ukraine, who continued to disregard the national dimension of the revolution in, were dismissed by the national communists as subordinates of the RKP(b) and promoters of the imperialist Russian ideology.⁴² A *Nezalezhnyk* resolution charged that the Bolsheviks were 'a hypocritical party which continually violates its own principles',⁴³ while the *Borot'bysty* claimed that Bolshevik chauvinism was detrimental for the entire communist endeavour in Ukraine.⁴⁴

Despite these polemics, the Ukrainian national communists, aware of the danger of division among the communist forces during the civil war, sought for cooperation with the Bolsheviks. They continuously repeated their desire to take part in soviet institutions and share the responsibility for governing Ukraine. The Bolsheviks, however, were wary of their fellow revolutionaries. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks during the civil war were seeking political

allies, all the more so since the Ukrainian communists could offer a link with the resentful Ukrainian peasantry and intelligentsia. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks did not trust these parties. As the Bolshevik Larik (Ievgen Kasianenko) noted, Ukrainian national communism was ‘the worst enemy of the communist revolution in Ukraine.’⁴⁵ The KP(b)U Third Congress (1-6 March 1919) confirmed its stand against cooperation with the other, nationally-oriented, pro-soviet parties, and refused to allow their representatives into the soviet government in Ukraine.⁴⁶ Similarly, Lenin denounced the *Borot’bysty* in February 1920 as ‘a party that aims to split the military forces and supports banditism; it is violating the basic principles of communism and thereby plays directly into the hands of the Whites and of international imperialism.’⁴⁷ As we shall see, the Bolsheviks by 1920 were pursuing a twin-track policy towards the smaller soviet parties, including the Ukrainian national communists. On the one hand, some of these parties’ activists were being encouraged to go over to the Bolsheviks, singly or in groups, while the organisations themselves were being driven out of existence. Whilst encouraging this process of absorption, Bolshevik leaders in Ukraine were instructed to collect information on ‘the non-proletarian and most disloyal nature’ of *Borot’bysty* activity.⁴⁸

Soviet Ukraine: sovietising the national communist project

In order to attract the ‘best’ elements of the Ukrainian revolutionary intelligentsia – and their social constituencies – to the Bolshevik project, the Bolsheviks needed to offer a plausible alternative to the ‘bourgeois nationalism’ of the Ukrainian governments and national communists. Firstly, they had to be seen to avoid ‘chauvinistic’ behaviour in Ukraine. The language question was among the most urgent to tackle, since in their first attempts at ruling Ukraine the Bolsheviks had pursued Russification tactics reminiscent of the former tsarist government. The adverse consequences of ‘forced Russification’ of the republic were highlighted in the draft constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, adopted by the Third All-Ukrainian

Congress of Soviets in March 1919.⁴⁹ Further on, to encourage a free development of local commonly spoken languages, the official state language [Russian] was abolished. The preference, nonetheless, was clearly given to Ukrainian.⁵⁰

A turn in the national policy in Ukraine was marked by the RKP(b) central committee resolution of late 1919 'On Soviet Rule in Ukraine.' This resolution, adopted after the victory over Denikin's White forces, proclaimed that the RKP(b) was committed to 'removing all barriers to the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture.' The Bolsheviks in Ukraine were instructed to treat the existing nationalist tendencies 'with utmost patience and tact, countering them with a word of comradely explanation of the identity of interests of the toiling masses of Ukraine and Russia.' Ukrainian was declared 'a weapon of communist education of the toiling people' and a tool in establishing 'the closest contact between Soviet institutions and the native peasant population of the country.'⁵¹

Next, the Bolsheviks needed to disarm their ideological rivals, the Ukrainian communist parties. This was a process which developed over time. Firstly, the Bolsheviks had to show their interest in the Ukrainian affairs, to embrace the Ukrainian language and the latter separatist discourse. In his letter of 28 December 1919 'To the toiling masses of Ukraine after the defeat of Denikin', Lenin assured his readers that it was 'self-evident and generally recognised that only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can and will decide at their All-Ukraine Congress of Soviets whether Ukraine shall amalgamate with Russia, or whether she shall remain a separate and independent republic, and, in the latter case, what federal ties shall be established between that republic and Russia.'⁵²

Subsequently, the national communists were finally invited to join the government of Rakovs'kyi, where they were given posts in education, justice and communication. In addition, a merger of the national communist parties was initiated. For instance, following their self-liquidation in March 1920, around 4,000 former *Borot'bysty* members were admitted to the

KP(b)U on an individual basis.⁵³ The unification of the leading communist parties in the short run had proven to be mutually beneficial. The Bolsheviks had eliminated an important political rival, engaged those national communists in the Soviet bureaucracy and governmental institutions, and had been able to exploit their organisational structures and networks for Bolshevik party work.⁵⁴ In their turn, the Ukrainian communists gained a possibility to further promote Ukraine's autonomy and cultural development from within the ranks of the ruling party.

The influence of the former *Borot'bysty* was especially significant in the cultural sphere, which the Bolsheviks had neglected in the frenzy of the civil war. Following the merger, the former *Borot'bysty* Vasyl' Ellan-Blakytnyi and Oleksander Shums'kyi entered the KP(b)U Central Committee, and the former also acquired a seat in the Politburo. Arkadii Liubchenko became the Central Committee Secretary for Culture and the editor-in-chief of the party newspaper *Kommunist*. Already in May 1919, the *Borot'bysty* had taken control of Ukraine's Commissariat for Education (*Narkomos*) and the All-Ukrainian Literary Committee, *Vseukrlitkom*. In May 1919, the Commissariat was handed over to the *Borot'bysty* leader, the poet Hnat Mykhailychenko, who was succeeded by Mykhailo Panchenko, Shums'kyi and Hryhorii Hryn'ko. Under the auspices of the Narkomos, a State Publishing House of Ukraine (*Vsevydav*) was opened in Kyiv. At the same time, the *Borot'bysty* launched the first Soviet-sponsored Ukrainian-language literary journal *Mystetstvo* [Art]. In this way, former *Borot'bysty* had gradually taken control of much of the cultural and intellectual life in the republic, providing for the unprecedented cultural flowering of the 1920s.

In short, to win the civil war and re-unite the former imperial territories, the Bolsheviks were forced to make concessions to nationalist sentiments and form alliances with local political forces. In doing so they co-opted, absorbed and were themselves changed by diverse Ukraine-oriented left groups. However, this change of attitude in Ukraine also reflected a more general moderation of the nationalities policy within the Soviet Union. As the civil war had proven, the

national question in the peripheries could not be ignored. In Ukraine, this acquired even greater importance since the newly acquired western Soviet borderlands fell under the strategic plans of new Poland's head of state Józef Piłsudski. The possibility of losing Ukraine became especially apparent after the united UNR-Polish Army had driven the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine's capital in May 1920. As the Polish-Soviet war raged, Stalin, Russia's Commissar for Nationalities at the time, highlighted the urgent need to reassess the position of the Soviet government on the national question. In October 1920, he observed that the very success of the Russian Revolution depended heavily on redefining the centre-periphery relationship: 'Central Russia, that hearth of world revolution, cannot hold out long without the assistance of the border regions, which abound in raw materials, fuel and foodstuffs. The border regions of Russia in their turn would be inevitably doomed to imperialist bondage without the political, military and organisational support of more developed central Russia.'⁵⁵

This new approach to the national question was approved at the 1921 party congress. The political, social and economic modernisation of the former imperial lands was seen as the remedy for the alienation of the peripheries, their mistrust of the centre, as well as their search for foreign alliances. A comprehensive national program was envisaged, which included establishing local administration, promoting national languages and cultures, and recruiting indigenous intellectual forces into the party.

The success of the task, however, relied on the active participation of the indigenous population in creating these new Soviet elites. As Stalin explained in October 1920, in order to make Soviet power 'near and dear to the masses of the border regions of Russia,' it was necessary to engage 'all the best local people' into Soviet administration, since 'the masses should see that the Soviet power and its organs are the products of their own efforts, the embodiment of their aspirations.'⁵⁶ This process could not be spontaneous, however. Engaging indigenous cadres was the key priority of the new Soviet nationalities policy of *korenizatsiia*

introduced at the 1923 party congress. The resolutions of the Twelfth Party Congress of 1923 obliged regional leaders to engage locals into governmental and party work, use local languages in party bureaucracy and paperwork, and encourage the development of national cultures through book-publishing, cultural activities and promotion of local languages. *Ukrainizatsiia* became the local variant of *korenizatsiia*.

Despite being officially declared, the implementation of *korenizatsiia* did not start in earnest in 1923. This policy met with stubborn passive resistance at all levels. For party officials, such declarations did not seem important or obligatory. A number of initiatives, such as attending language courses or examinations in language proficiency for government employees, were prescribed, but never enforced. As a result, there was a certain level of cynicism on the ground, with the lower ranks not taking linguistic *korenizatsiia* at all seriously.

The low impact of *korenizatsiia* was discussed at the 1926 KP(b)U Plenum.⁵⁷ It was decided that more control over the implementation of the policy was necessary, especially in those historically Russian-speaking areas, where party members and the working class continued to oppose *Ukrainizatsiia*. The status of *korenizatsiia* was upgraded in 1926, when Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin's protégé, was appointed the First Secretary of the KP(b)U. Kaganovich was selected to implement *korenizatsiia* using the mechanisms of hard-line policies: direct leadership, constant control over the policy's implementation, use of pressure and force as its methods, and restricting disapproving public discussion around this project.⁵⁸

In 1926, the implementation of *korenizatsiia* was reinforced. In a short while, the party entrenchment and the indigenisation of the party apparatus achieved remarkable results. Ukrainians were given priority during party enrolments. The 1927 party census already attested that 69.7% of the party members and 99.5% of candidate-members had joined the party in or after 1922.⁵⁹ Within a couple of years, the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians in the party organs grew from 23.6% in 1922 to 47.0% in 1927 and 53.0% in 1930. The number of Ukrainian

bureaucrats increased from 35% in 1923 to 50% in 1925 and 54% in 1926 and the number of Ukrainians in the government amounted 56.5% in 1926.⁶⁰

The increased share of ethnic Ukrainian party members, however, led to growing demands for political, economic and cultural autonomy. By the end of the 1920s, an ethnic Ukrainian elite, which owed its status and position to the Soviet regime, had been created. As a result of the Soviet modernisation campaign, many more people gained access to higher education and promotion opportunities, whereas the new Soviet preferential nationalities policy created a demand for competence in local languages. The outcomes were, however, twofold. On the one hand, the central leadership managed to combat political manifestations of local nationalism outside the Bolshevik party, to undermine the position of the former nationalised elites and embrace the nationalist sentiment of the local population. On the other hand, as Francine Hirsch put it, Soviet ethnic particularism ‘activated national categories, showing that nationality, resources, and local political power were officially linked.’⁶¹ By the late 1920s, on the eve of the great industrialisation drive of 1929 onwards, these new, Soviet, nationalised elites in many places – not least Ukraine - were challenging the central leadership, attempting to gain control over the power structure and decision-making. More importantly, regional leaders started to question the internationalist [Russian] nature of the industrial proletariat, the political base of Bolshevik ideology, and demand a say in the industrialisation campaign. With Soviet institutions more firmly implanted across the USSR, and a whole new set of challenges facing the leadership in Moscow, the start of the 1930s saw a change of course in nationality policy. Although *korenizatsiia* was never suspended officially, its course was significantly redefined by the urgent need to address the growing – and potentially dangerous - influence of the nationalised regional Soviet elites, while encouraging a process of rapid industrialisation. Unsurprisingly, responses to both of these challenges coincided. The fastest possible industrial development was now the party’s top priority, and sensitivity in handling national, or any other,

sentiment could be readily sacrificed to this one goal. The Ukrainian famine of 1931-1933 provided a stark illustration of where these new priorities could lead. .

¹ Valerii Soldatenko, *Ukraïna v Revoliutsiinu Dobu* (Kyiv, 2010), vol.1, pp.151-152

² The creation and activity of political parties in Ukraine was banned under the restrictive tsarist regime. The ban was lifted after the Revolution of 1905.

³ ‘V ukrainskikh organizatsiakh’, *Kievskaiia Mysl’*, 1917. 5 March. Also in: V. Verstiuk (ed.) *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh. Berezen’-lystopad 1917 roku: Dokumenty i materialy* (Kyiv, 2003), pp.37-38

⁴ *Visti z Ukrains’koi Tsentral’noi Rady*, 1917, no 3, kviten’; *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, p.54

⁵ On The All-Ukrainian Military Congress see Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia Natsii* (Kyiv, [1920]), pp.139-145; *Visti z Ukrains’koi Tsentral’noi Rady*, 1917, no 7, traven’

⁶ ‘Povidomlenniatsentral’noi Rady pro khid perehovoriv z Tymchasovym Uriadom Rosii’, in *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp.92-93

⁷ ‘Persnyi Universal Ukrains’koi Tsentral’noi Rady’, in *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp.101-105; Excerpts in English in Taras Hunczak (ed.) *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolutio* (Cambridge, MA., 1977), p.382.

⁸ See: Vynnychenko, pp.275-78

⁹ ‘Druhyi Universal Ukrains’koi Tsentral’noi Rady’, in *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp.164-168; Hunczak, p.382

¹⁰ ‘Postanova Tymchasovoho uriadu pro zatverdzhennia heneral’noho sekretariatu’, *Visti z Ukrains’koi Tsentral’noi Rady*, 1917, no 10, cherven’; *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp.163-164

¹¹ ‘Vidozva Kraiovoho komitetu poriatunku revoliutsii v Ukraini vid 27.10.1917’, in *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp.364-365

¹² ‘Vidozva Heneral’noho Sekretariatu do hromadia, uriadovykh i hromads’kykh ustanov’, in *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp.390-91

¹³ ‘Tretii Universal Ukrains’koi Tsentral’noi Rady’, in Український національно-визвольний рух, *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp. 398-401; Hunczak, *Ukraine*, p.382.

¹⁴ ‘Postanova Ukrains’koi Tsentral’noi Rady shchodo zatverdzhennia zakonu pro vybory do Ukrains’kykh ustanovchykh Zboriv, 11, 16 lystopada 1917’, in *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, p. 412

¹⁵ Table 2.1. Votes for the Constituent Assembly, November 1917 (totals by region) in Jeremy Smith, *Red Nations. The Nationalities Experience in and after the USSR* (Cambridge, 2013), pp.23-24

¹⁶ *Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti* (Moscow, 1957), Vol. 1, pp.178-179

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- ¹⁷ The discussion on the Ultimatum from the radnarkom: ‘Materialy i dokumenty z’iizdu robitnychykh, selians’kykh i soldats’kykh deputativ Ukrainy, 4-6 grudnia 1917’, in *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp.502-512; The rejection of the Ultimatum: ‘Vidpovid’ Heneral’noho Sekretariatu na manifest radnarkomu. 5 grudnia 1917’, in *Ukrains’kyi natsional’no-vysvol’nyi rukh*, pp.512-514
- ¹⁸ The Fourth Universal, in Hunczak, pp.382-383
- ¹⁹ On this see: Arthur E. Adams, *The Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918–1919* (New Haven, 1963); “The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie.” In *The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution*, edited by Taras Hunczak (Cambridge, MA, 1977).
- ²⁰ *Shestoi s’ezd RSDRP (bol’shevikov) avgust 1917 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow, 1958) p.207
- ²¹ The resolution of the First KP(b)U meeting in Moisei Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoria Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bov) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1923), p.203
- ²² The name was changed to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1937. Vsevolod Holubnychy, “Outline History of the Communist Party of Ukraine,” in ed. Iwan S. Koropeckyj, *Soviet Regional Economics. Selected works of Vsevolod Holubnychy* (Toronto, 1982), p.70
- ²³ *Bol’shevistskie organizatsii Ukrainy v period ustanovleniia i ukrepleniia sovetskoï vlasti: noiabr’ 1917-aprel’ 1918 gg: sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Kyiv, 1962), p.86
- ²⁴ *Bol’shevistskie organizatsii Ukrainy*, pp.82-83
- ²⁵ Soldatenko, *Ukraina*, vol.2, p.132
- ²⁶ On these debates see: Ravich-Cherkasskii, pp.50-83
- ²⁷ *Vos’moi S’ezd RKP(b). Mart 1919 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow, 1959), p.160
- ²⁸ *Dekrety Sovetskoï Vlasti* (Moscow, 1971), Vol. V, pp.259-61
- ²⁹ ‘Soiuznyi dogovor’, in Mai Panchuk et al. *Natsional’ni Vidnosyny v Ukraïni v XX st.: Zbirnyk Dokumentiv i Materialiv* (Kyiv, 1994), pp.97-98
- ³⁰ Ravich-Cherkasskii, p.5
- ³¹ V. Skorovstans’kyi [Shakhrai] *Revoliutsiia na Ukraine* (Saratov, 1919)
- ³² Serhii Mazlakh, Vasyl Shakhrai, *Do Khvyli: Shcho Diïet’sia na Ukraïni i z Ukraïnoiu?* (New York, 1954); Mazlakh, Shakhrai, *On the Current Situation in the Ukraine*. (Michigan, 1970)
- ³³ Olena Liubovets’, *Ukrains’ki Partii i Politychni Al’ternatyvy, 1917-1920* (Kyiv, 2005), p.244
- ³⁴ Mazlakh, Shakhrai, *Do Khvyli*, p.105
- ³⁵ Soldatenko, *Ukraina*, Vol. III, pp.116-117
- ³⁶ *Chetverta Konferentsiia Komunistychnoi Partii (Bil’shovykiv) Ukraïny 17-23 bereznia 1920 r. Stenohrama*. (Kyiv, 2003), pp.173-177
- ³⁷ The majority of the national communist parties were dissolved by late 1920. The UKP existed, although marginal, until 1925. James Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation* (Cambridge, MA., 1983); Stephen Velychenko *Painting Imperialism and Nationalism Red: The Ukrainian Marxist Critique of Russian Communist Rule in Ukraine, 1918-1925* (Toronto, 2015); Ivan Majstrenko, *Borot’bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York, 1954)

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- ³⁸ ‘Do Nashoi Taktyky’, *Borot’ba* (Kyiv), 1919, 13 August
- ³⁹ ‘Iedyne Natsional’ne Vyzvolennia,’ *Borot’ba* (Kyiv), 1919, 20 February
- ⁴⁰ ‘Natsional’na Sprava i Sotsial’na Revol’itsiia,’ *Chervonyi Prapor*, Kyiv, 1919, 25 February
- ⁴¹ Mykhailo Tkachenko, *Borot’ba* (Vienna), 7-8 April 1920
- ⁴² *Deklaratsiia Fraktsii Nesalezhnykh*, in *Chervonyi Prapor*, Kyiv, 1919, 22 January
- ⁴³ ‘Resoliutsiia pro Vidnoshennia Fraktsii Nezalezhnykh do Rosiis’koi Komunistychnoi Partii i do Komunistychnoi Partii (bol’shevikiv)’, in Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i Materiialy do Istorii Ukraïns’koi Revoliutsii 1917–1920* (New York, 1969), Vol. IV, p.56
- ⁴⁴ “Memorandum Ukraïns’koi Komunistychnoi partii (borot’bystiv) Vykonavchomu Komitetovi II-ho Komunistychnogo Internatsionaly (serpen’ 1919 r.)” in *Ukraïns’ka Suspil’no-Politychna Dumka v 20 Stolitti*, 3 vols., ed. Taras Hunchak, Roman Sol’chanyk (Munich, 1983), Vol. 1, p.437
- ⁴⁵ Quoted from Velychenko, p.124
- ⁴⁶ The Resolution of the Third KP(b)U Congress, in Ravich-Cherkasskii, pp. 220-221.
- ⁴⁷ Vladimir Lenin, ‘Proekt rezoliutsii ob ukrainskoi partii Borot’bistov’, in Lenin, *Polnoie Sobraniie*, Vol. 40, p.122
- ⁴⁸ Lenin, *Proekt rezoliutsii*, p.122
- ⁴⁹ The draft of the Constitution of Soviet Ukraine in *III Vseukraïns’kyi z’izd Rad (6-10 bereznia 1919)*. *Stenohrafichnyi zvit* (Kyiv, 1932)
- ⁵⁰ ‘Do Istorii Mizhnatsional’nykh Protsesiv na Ukraïni’, *Ukraïns’kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, 6 (1990), p.110
- ⁵¹ ‘Rezoliutsiia TsK RKP(b) o Sovetskoi Vlasti na Ukraine’, in Lenin, *Polnoie Sobraniie*, Vol. 39, pp.334-337; Ravich-Cherkasskii, pp.226-2
- ⁵² Lenin, *Polnoe Sobraniie*, Vol. 40, p.42
- ⁵³ Ivan Maistrenko, *Istoriia Komunistychnoi Partii Ukraïny* (Munich, 1979), p.74; Mykola Popov, *Narys Istorii Komunistychnoi Partii (Bil’shovykiv) Ukraïny* (Kharkiv, 1928), p.219
- ⁵⁴ E.g., Stepan Velychenko, *State-Building in Revolutionary Ukraine: A Comparative Study of Governments and Bureaucrats, 1917-22* (Toronto, 2011)
- ⁵⁵ ‘Politika partii po natsional’nomu voprosu’ *Pravda*, October 10, 1920; J. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. 4, p.351
- ⁵⁶ ‘Politika partii’, p.358
- ⁵⁷ The results of Ukrainizatsiia were discussed at the KP(b)U CC Plenum in April, 1925. See: *Kul’turne Budivnytstvo v Ukraïns’kii RSR. Vazhlyvishi rishennia Komunistychnoi partiii Radians’koho uriadu 1917-1959 rr. Zbirnyk dokumentiv*, Vol. 1. (Kyiv, 1959), pp. 282-286
- ⁵⁸ Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca, 2001), p.87
- ⁵⁹ George Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923–1934* (Cambridge, 2002), p.88
- ⁶⁰ Liber, pp.87-103

⁶¹ Francine Hirsch *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union*
Empire of Nations (Ithaca,2005), p.146