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POLITICS OF THE HUNTLY

POWER PROJECT

A Thesis
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of the requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Social Science in Sociology
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ABSTRACT

The political activity associated with the Huntly Power Project was examined in relation to a number of case studies using a Symbolic Interactionist approach to illustrate processes of power.

A broad view of the politics of energy use in New Zealand provided the setting to understand why there was continued Government support for the project.

An analysis of the case studies and their relationship to the Huntly Power Project Planning Forum permitted an appraisal of the influence of the Forum on political interaction.

It was confirmed that political activity was characterised by negotiation through the processes of symbolic manipulation and control of information.

The influence of the Forum for discussion primarily benefitted Government Departments for in conflict situations it promoted compromises which supported the overall goal to complete the project. It provided an opportunity to accommodate local interest group concerns and problems. The Forum was largely successful as a device for the amelioration and mediation of conflict among groups which voiced reservation, about the effects of the project on the local area, when it was proposed and in its initial stages of development.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONIST APPROACH

INTRODUCTION

Political scientists have used a number of theoretical perspectives to analyse politics. Use is made of Systems Analysis (Easton, 1965), Marxist Theory (Avineri, 1971), Structural Functionalism (Merton, 1949; Durkheim, 1938) but there has been little application of the Symbolic Interactionist perspective.

"The term "symbolic interaction" refers, of course to the peculiar and distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human beings. The peculiarity consists in the fact that human beings interpret or 'define' each others actions instead of merely reacting to each others actions. Their response is not made directly to the actions of the other but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such actions. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another's actions. This mediation is equivalent to inserting a process of interpretation between stimulus and response in the case of Human behavior."

(Blumer, 1969: 78,79)

Symbolic Interaction is a perspective that asks how selves emerge out of social situations. It presupposes a link between the person and social interaction (the process of interpretation) that rests on common meaning and the use of symbols. It offers a much needed view of how individuals shape and reflect upon social interaction (Denzin, 1969).

Aspects of Symbolic Interaction have been used to analyse politics particularly in respect to the role of symbols (Whitehead, 1927; Sapir, 1930; Lasswell, 1952; Edelman, 1971) and images (Boulding, 1956; Ehrlich, 1969; Nimmo, 1974). However in a criticism of the perspective, Huber (1973) notes that Symbolic Interactionists have failed to examine aspects of power. Schmitt (1974) supports this view and suggests that developing a method within the perspective might be difficult, Stone et al (1974) on the other hand while agreeing with Huber (1973) and Schmitt (1974) contend that some advances have been made in Edelman (1964) and Hall's (1972) research on the subject.

Symbolic Interactionism focuses on the individual action within a social situation. In a political application the unit of analysis remains the same and the focal questions to be explained are how the

interaction is controlled and maintained, for what purposes and for what length of time. The process of creating an interpretation of action and the ability to influence definitions of a situation needs to be explained in order to render intelligible the process of power and the outcome of events.

Symbolic Interactionism provides both a theoretical perspective and a methodological orientation. It is a particular school of thought proposing an image of man using a number of fundamental ideas and applying them "to make modern society intelligible". (Marrs and Meltzer, 1972:46).

PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION

The perspective derives from the pragmatic philosophy of James (1907), Dewey (1903), and Mead (1934). Mead (1864-1931) developed the viewpoint as 'Social Behaviourism' but it was redefined as 'Symbolic Interaction' by Blumer (1969).

Pragmatic philosophy was an attempt to understand the actual crisis of life so that some guidance to action could be offered which made a difference to the event. It was a practical philosophy which emphasised that every-day life should be discussed in relation to the things that constituted it and taken in the context, as they occurred. It held that the individual actively created the social world and that the subject of experience i.e. 'self' was part of the course of events and was knowledgeable about them.

"The individual is designating different objects to himself, giving them meaning judging their suitability to his action, and making decisions on the basis of the judgement. This is what is meant by interpretation or acting on the basis of symbols. Whatever the action in which he is engaged, the human individual proceeds by pointing out to himself the divergent things which have to be taken into account in the course of the action." (Blumer, 1969:80)

James (1907) outlined his philosophy of what 'truth' was by stating that it was what the individual said it was. "The idea is true when the mental representation corresponds accurately to the object represented".¹ The object is attained by thinking of it, an interior process which creates the object.

Dewey (1903) applied this idea to the examination of language and the social world. The symbolic meaning of language enabled regular patterns of behaviour to develop once the individual could reflect on his experience and acquire new meaning of situations.

James (1907) and Dewey (1903) mark an important beginning, the development of two central ideas which are essential to an understanding of Symbolic Interaction. The concept that the individual defined and controlled his own environment and acted upon the social world remains a basic theme. Dewey (1903) recognised that language was the controlling factor in the development of complete social behaviour allowing communication and order and dealing with the total perceptual experience.

MEAD, G.H. (1863-1931)

Mead (1934) explored the relationship between mind, self and society. He wanted to account for the emergent properties of man, thinking in abstractions, self consciousness, purposive and moral conduct. The evolution of man into a social being Mead saw as a process of meeting and solving problems. Although Mead did not define this concept as a political one his philosophy may be seen as an essential beginning to the understanding of the Political act within social behavior. Mead saw scientific method as the evolutionary process grown self consciousness. This too is a concept central to Symbolic Interaction for it provided a basis for the study of social behavior and processes. The evolutionary processes are ongoing and defined by the social situation, we reflect and understand because we are part of that process and because we have an intellectual reflective capacity which divides us from it. Symbolic Interaction seeks to analyse the individuals interpretation of the world and his social interaction.

The fullest exposition of Meads work is found in *Mind, Self and Society* (1934). Mead postulates that the creation of these concepts is dependent upon the development of language, a form of symbolic interaction in which people respond to one another on the basis of the interpretation of the consequences of others actions for them. The expressiveness of the individual involves both the expression he gives, a verbal symbol, and the manner in which he projects a wide range of gestures and actions creating impressions and broad social information. (Goffman, 1958). The gesture becomes a symbol to be interpreted and responded to on the basis of common understanding of the social world. Mead says co-operation characterises human life and social structures are developed by this process of interaction since each individual

ascertains the interactions of the acts of others and makes his action on the basis of that intention, reviewing his understanding of the collective (societal) symbolic world that will limit both his understanding and his response. This mechanism ensures orderly social behavior based on shared values and perceptions.

The impulse to act autonomously (in contrast to heteronomous conduct determined by external control) was referred to as the 'I' by Mead. Each person forms an object of himself through role taking and definitions made by others. The concept of the 'I', the impulsive spontaneous, biological drives, and unconventional motives, the undirected tendencies and reactions of an individual to a situation as he perceives it and the concept of the 'me' the imagined effect of an action of others, the perceptual object one forms of oneself, comprises the set of attitudes, understandings and expectations of how the individual thinks others see him. Mead proposed these concepts in order to study the process whereby the self is both object and subject.² The 'I' and the 'me' constitute the self, the individual sitting in judgement of his own impulse to act. These concepts are phases of activity in which individual action constitutes a sequence of adjustments whereby the person reflects to himself as well as on the rest of his perceptual field.

"With the mechanism of self-interaction the human being ceases to be a responding organism whose behavior is a product of what plays upon him from the outside, the inside or both. Instead, he acts towards his world interpreting what confronts him and organising his action on the basis of the interpretation".

(Blumer, 1969:63)

The social act characterises society, it is a ongoing and flexible process in which participants build up social acts by an adjustment to individuals and situations by taking the role of others or the role of a group. Co-operative action occurs because all share a common perspective that guides them. The act is initiated by some desire and occurs through a communication process at a symbolic level. Between the terminal points of the act the individual perceives and manipulates.³ The individual is continually interacting with the environment but through perception he selects only those objects which may be important in any given situation. The objects are given meaning through the processes of symbolic interaction and by utilising the objects as tools, through

manipulation, as a means to the end action occurring within a situation. Thus the individual apprehends objects which have symbolic meaning to him which may be shared with others and through symbolic manipulation endeavours to carry out the intended act. If the objects have shared meaning they can be manipulated by individuals outside the context they developed and can be applied to some other situation e.g. a group might accept that a country's energy demand has to be met and will use that symbol to account for building power stations and ensuring they continue to be built.

The objects are human constructs not self existing entities. Their nature depends on how people act towards them, they give objects meaning and it is through this that objects have meaning for the person and thus achieve a symbolic nature. Clearly objects vary in their meaning for people but because an object is something that is apprehended and in a sense apart from the individual he can inspect the object, think about it, decide to act towards it or not. The individual is freed from a stimulus response and can live in a world of socially produced meaningful objects varying his action towards them if desired. The meanings that are created which we collectively act towards occur through a process of social interaction.

Mead identified two levels of social interaction. The 'conversation of gestures' and 'use of significant symbols'. In the 'conversation of gestures' individuals responded directly to another's action without interpreting that action but in use of 'significant symbols' individuals interpret each other's gestures and act on the basis of the perceptual meaning yielded by their interpretation.

Symbolic Interaction involves a dual process of interpretation and definition. Interpretation occurs when the individual ascertains the meaning of the object or the actions of the other person and definition conveys the indications to the recipient as to how he is expected to act. Through this process individuals fit their acts to the acts of others and in doing so guide others. The potential to control or symbolically manipulate the definition can be seen as an attempt to alter the interpretations of others and get them to behave in a prescribed manner. This is the essential point relevant to examining processes of power.

Mead (1934) makes a number of conclusions about this interdependent relationship of symbolic interaction. It is a formative (shaping) process as each individual builds up his line of conduct constantly intergrating other's actions. The continual nature of the relationship suggests it is an ongoing process sustaining established patterns of behaviour or transforming them. Order is created and maintained by reaffirmation of the action but there are innumerable points at which participants redefine each others acts. Such redefinition or confirmation is intrinsic in problematic situations so that Symbolic Interaction is able to account for a range of general forms of human association such as co-operation, conflict, consensus, domination, exploitation.

BLUMER, HERBERT.

Herbert Blumer has stated that the nature of social organisation is implicit in the thought of G.H. Mead and has sought in his work to make it explicit (Blumer, 1969:1). In actuality Symbolic Interaction does contain within it a distinctive view of man, interaction and society. The image of man as represented by Blumer is that of a creator of his social world. Not only is he capable of learning cultural elements but he also discovers, invents, innovates and initiates new forms.

The nature of Symbolic Interaction is based on three premises according to Blumer (1969). First, individuals act towards things on the basis of the meaning that the things have for them. Second, the meaning is derived through a process of social interaction. Third, these meanings are handled in and modified through an interpretive process used by the individual as he encounters action of others. He restates the Meadian concept that meanings grow from the way individuals act towards things (objects) through a 'reflective process' to interpret and define a situation or actions of others.

The individual can also act towards himself by regarding the self as an object. The self emerges in a process of interaction as the individual internalises definitions of himself by others and in this way the individual can bring to situations and learn from situations sets of meanings (experience) which may guide future action. The individual is able to be subject and object and act towards situations noting symbols through this reflective process

to arrive at an action. In this way the individual can take a number of roles depending on the situation he acts towards. The meaning of symbols is not fixed for all time, it will vary with the situation and the people acting towards it so that an intended planned action may have to be abandoned, suspended or revised to fit ones own activity to the actions of others. The participants' ability to act effectively will be dependent on each individual's ability to judge the others actions in terms of their significance for the individual and his course of action. Thus in order to deal with the other individual one must endeavour to establish his meaning for us and our meaning for him, however, persons seldom act exactly as we would like and may choose to break off or continue the encounter. The interpretive process occurs by making indications not only to oneself but others. To obtain collective action (co-operation) the things relevant to the event must be transformed into a symbol so that to name it is not only to know it but to deal with it. A symbol is the components of experience, the combination of sign and meaning (a sign is a sensation we interpret on the basis of our images which in turn affect those images). The process of giving meaning to those signs creates symbols. The creation of consciousness, emotion and belief constitutes the meaning given to symbols. (Whitehead, 1927: Nimmo, 1974).

In viewing this interaction between individuals in a collective sense Blumer extends Meads (1934) 'social act' to a concept of 'joint action'.

Joint action is constituted by the articulation of individual's lines of action in a collective whole.

"A joint action, while made up of diverse component acts that enter into its formation is different from anyone of them and from their mere aggregation. The joint action has a distinctive character in its own right, a character that lies in the articulation or linkage as apart from what may be articulated or linked".

(Blumer, 1969:17)

Joint action is a putting together of individual acts, it is not a commonly held consenses but rather a coalescing of intersubjective views. Participants fit their acts together by identifying the social act in which they are about to engage (through this the participant is able to orient himself He has a key to the interpretation of the acts of others and a guide for

directing his action with regard to them). Participants also fit their acts together by interpreting and defining each other's acts in order to form the joint whole. Even though social identification is made the participant in joint action must continue to interpret and define one another's ongoing acts. Participation in joint action is not a static relationship. Joint action provides several important keys in the practical understanding of social behaviour. First, the essence of society lies in an ongoing process of action. To be fully understood a society must be seen as a dynamic for ever-changing process. It is essential in social science research to remember this concept. Any interpretation which posits human relationships and social behaviour as unchanging has failed to grasp the essential reality of the human evolutionary condition. Action and society must be seen in terms of the joint action into which the separate (individualised) lines of action fit and merge this inter-linkage of the many separate parts is a concept Blumer believes few scientists have fully grasped. (Blumer, 1969:71). The concept that human behaviour is made up of many intersubjective views coalescing along a continuum (joint action) remains largely unexplored among social scientists. Second, Joint action is not fixed in time or place, it is built up over time, and many places and under a variety of circumstances, thus the social scientist must see joint action in context of past present and future, each of these is in itself dynamic rather than static and interacts on the other. Third joint action is a fixed and orderly approach. It attains this state by virtue of the common definition held by the participants in any given interaction. It is this common definition (often but not always transmitted through the symbolic tool of language) which accounts for the regularity and stability of social interaction over time. It is the common definition which supplies each individual with the necessary guidance ensuring that his action fits in and becomes a part of the acts of others. There are however, many possibilities of uncertainty in the concept of joint action, each joint action must be initiated and once started they may be interrupted, abandoned or transformed. We do not yet have any clear indication of these initial processes constituting joint action, Moreover participants may not hold a common definition of the joint action which they are entering into and may orientate their acts on

different premises. Even when a common definition is held individuals may diverge into many separate lines of action and thus alter or confuse the course of interaction. Individuals may be led to rely on others' considerations in interpreting and defining each others' lines of action. We cannot assume that individuals in a common situation will apprehend the situation in like manner nor can we be assured that each individual begins with a similar (unified) concept. Finally new and dramatically varied situations may arise which demand types of joint action never before perceived for which there is no common definition. Again we have no clear understanding of the processes which would ensue. We can expect confused exploratory efforts attempting to bring about some sort of joint action.

Blumer (1969) in redefining and building upon the pioneering work of G.H. Mead (1934) has provided an important and practical concept. Joint action is a way of observing the dynamic processes of human interaction that is readily applicable to politics and other social sciences. It provides an acceptable view focusing on the dynamic yet stable society. The emphasis on the relationship between the individual and the wider group and the value of commonly held definitions to encourage co-operation are essential in any study of social processes.

ANSELM STRAUSS

Blumer (1969) has left a number of questions for further resolution and Strauss (1964) provides a practical understanding and in some cases solutions to these questions. First, Blumer (1969) and others have long talked about situations and their definition but have failed to specify or indeed adequately discuss the processes to be taken into account in defining and understanding situations. Strauss (1964) begins to define situations by breaking society down into smaller units and these units into component parts i.e. the psychiatric hospital and utilising these for analysis he is able to form a basic understanding of and indeed redefine the many processes in social situation⁵ Second, Blumer has a tendency in describing the general situation, to treat all men as if they were alike. This lack of understanding of the individuality of people does not allow the social scientist to understand the complexity of human interaction. If we are to observe and analyse the human

condition we must begin with the individuals. Strauss by breaking men into role groupings often based on commonly held ideological and conceptual stands has begun the important process of viewing the individualised social situation. Strauss uses the individuality of men to study human interaction e.g. with a psychiatric institution the different roles (nurses, doctors, aids, patients) can be isolated to provide a cohesive analysis of the underlying nature of situations.

Joint action and co-operation is the basis of the thought of both Blumer (1969) and Mead (1934) who see co-operation as the desired outcome in any social situation. We are, however, left without any clear understanding of the actual process of joint action nor any real explanation of why it should fail. Again Strauss (1964) with 'negotiated order' provides an analysis not only of the nature of the process of joint action but he begins to provide an explanation of why joint action fails. He discusses the things which are likely to be problematic and the common way people (and society) go about accommodating these problems (a process of bargaining and negotiation). Strauss looks at the importance of differing ideological back-grounds which provide individuals with various and diverse perceptions of any given situation. Therefore the success of co-operation of joint action is dependent upon ideological perspectives that coalesce or at least do not clash in any given perceived situation. Strauss has attempted to look at joint action as ongoing and to provide some verification of the process at work. He has called it 'negotiated order' to stress his belief that we solve problematic situations through bargaining and negotiating and the social scientist will be able to perceive order and stability in any given ongoing situation.

The concept of negotiated order provides a concept with which to look at conflicting situations that give rise to political (social) activity.⁶

Negotiated order is a concept of viewing social situations under condition of change and the way in which change is made orderly. It must be noted that this has immense practical use in any study involving political activity since political activity is always

chaotic yet orderly. Order or stability does not occur automatically but because of the reaffirmed, reconstituted acts of the participants. This is in essence the ongoing, forever changing social milieu which is repeated, reconstituted by a process of shared agreements, tacit understandings and contracts that evolve from the social process of diplomacy and bargaining in which the individual is involved. This concept, the negotiated order, contains a number of important points which Strauss (1964) has developed from the Meadian (Blumer) approach. These are the evolutionary processes of society, the development of order amongst constant change.

Strauss (1964) develops a number of important practical methods through which to observe the processes of negotiated order. First there are the societal values. These are often vague and ambiguous and may in fact be the only shared element of common definition held by participants. The value system Strauss labels the symbolic cement

"Never questioned, always assumed, because it does constitute the generalised mandate for the organisation."

(Strauss, 1964:43)

Values are often abstract and distant. They may not be clearly meaningful nor of direct relevance to individuals engaged in interaction. They are rarely organised into an internally consistent belief system and may contradict each other. As such the value system can lead to disagreement, discrepant purpose and a lack of co-operation (Joint Action⁷). While most individuals might agree with any particular abstract value (goal) they are often sufficiently removed from the reality to ensure interpretation and redefinition by both individuals and sub groups which develop different perceptual understandings of any particular situation. In a study of any organisation or institution or situation the social scientist is soon aware of the constraints, ambiguities, conflicts and negotiations which arise from trying to fulfil all goals with equity. It is the attempt to do so which leads directly to what we term political behaviour, a situation where priorities are set, decisions are made, actions are chartered, all on the basis of a shared ideology or belief among a generally small and relatively cohesive social grouping.

Groups develop their goals and attempt to present their interests

in such a way as to assume their collective goals. An excellent example occurs with relation to the Natural Gas Corporation and the NZED both of whom have the same goal, to satisfy energy demands but operate under different value systems and in competition with one another. Strauss (1964) has noted that aside from broad acceptance of a generalised value the individuals participating in any social situation are predisposed to a divergent set of values, interests, perspectives and action, these are characterised by such things as profession, reference group, training, stage of career, communications network etc. This variety of expectations must be somehow joined together by processes of negotiation and co-operation in order to promote order and stability.

Strauss (1964) notes that the ongoing and complex transactions among individuals relate to the wider problems of consensus, communication and co-operation. Here we might return to some of the points raised by Blumer (1969) and his concept of joint action. The perception we have of the required social act, our interpretation and definition of the other's act which create the joint action are developed out of our cultural and societal learning processes. We behave because we understand the rules (often symbolic) which control any given situation and the role we play complete with ideological perspective and symbolic communication is a major part of this learning process. This is often called socialization. Socialization, the establishment of goals, is part of the solution to the problem of developing consensus.

Strauss (1964) stresses that rules (specification of norms, the means to goals) are a further solution and perhaps the most practically evident. Although they require interpretation and definition in order to be applied to a specific situation they are usually stated at least in abstraction and their application can be observed. However there are a number of problems in studying rules. There may not always be rules for particular and problematic situations. Nobody can ever know all the rules and precisely because rules are set down they are quickly outdated by the rapidly changing social reality.⁸ In addition rules can be ignored, misused and adapted, usually this occurs in response to each individual and with regard to particular situations. Strauss (1964) therefore proposes the observation of day

to day agreements running the continuum from firm verbal to tacit understandings, negotiated by participants in order to deal with the everyday situations. It is these agreements which encourage co-operation in potentially conflicting situations and which in the practical setting become more important than the rules, ideologies or value systems since they are applied as a consequence of external and internal change. It is precisely these day to day agreements of long or short duration which indicate the orderly and stable processes within society or organisations. As Strauss (1964) pointed out agreements are influenced by such things as a hierarchical position ideological commitments, variable demands and by the more practical aspects such as the need for specific terms, the time factor, the necessity for answerability. At any moment these processes of negotiation and agreement are constantly in change but stability is ensured in the basic social structure. Joint action is now a complex process dealing with the problematic values, goals, rules, situations and courses of action through processes of negotiation and bargaining. Thus Negotiated order is characterised by the complex network of groups and individuals acting to control or maintain or improve their social conditions as defined by their self interests. The temporal aspects of negotiated order allows for the development of shifting coalitions and alliances. Their success or failure allows them to impose or have imposed upon them limitations on their ability and the ability of others to compete or negotiate. This is a directly political aspect of negotiated order since groups can organise the institutions of society⁹ for their own purposes and values, can control skills and resources and promote their ideological viewpoint.

Although Symbolic Interaction as a perspective cannot account for what people bring to situations in terms of differentiation, stratification or other variables it can be used to analyse the processes of interaction that result from social conditions and to explain the maintenance or change in those dimensions. Strauss (1964) has pointed out that the effectiveness of the negotiative effort and the means used to bring about an outcome may be limited. Thus people in dominant positions indoctrinate the rest of society with the values they claim gave them power.¹⁰

The concept of power maybe used to explain participation in,

and effectiveness of bargaining, to explain how a given bargain is made, why a group or individual, or norm or ideology emerges. The concept is largely absent in much interactionist writing. This may in part be due to its typical definition in non symbolic terms. It has often been defined in terms of authority. Buckley (1967) however provides a definition which allows us to merge Symbolic Interaction and negotiated order with power. This requires a differentiation between power and authority. Authority has often been defined in terms of power and they have been used together because both are forms of control. In the discussion of negotiated order the distinction is vital. Authority and power exist or emerge in quite different kinds of social situations with different antecedents and results. They involve on the part of individuals or groups observably different behaviours. Buckley sees power as control or influence over the actions of others to promote ones goals.... the mechanisms involved may range from naked force through manipulation of symbols, information and other environmental conditions to the dispensing of conditional rewards. (Buckley, 1967:186)

In Buckley's discussion of power the important factor is the lack of consent. The individual or group promote its ideology or goals against the will or without the conscious knowledge or understanding of others. Power is achieved by the control and manipulation of the total societal environment¹¹. Authority on the other hand implies the promotion of a collective goal wherein the control is exercised with consent (this relates to the concept of legitimized power as discussed by Weber¹²) An important distinction between the two is that authority is characterised by collective goals, consensus and co-operation. Its ideology is that of commitment to the activities and commands of those in control. Power is characterised by private goals, competition and disagreement, compliance is enacted through fear or ignorance. This close relationship between power and the individual is emphasised in Weber's Politics as a Vocation (1918). Politics comprises any kind of independent leadership. "Politics grants a feeling of power, the knowledge of influencing men, of participating in power over them."¹³ However Weber notes, as does Buckley, that individuals and groups maintain and sometimes

achieve power by use of legitimated authority. The multiple processes of power ensure that successful participants will use those resources likely to be most effective (they may differ with ideological perspective). Individuals and groups in their use of discensus, competition and private goals, the emphasis placed on force, the encouragement of ignorance and a sense of powerlessness are in fact using the negotiated order and here it is linked to power. Power without some sort of stability, without continuing interaction because of power is valueless. Thus self-interest ensures that negotiation and co-operation form an important part of the processes of power within a group or society. Negotiation makes it likely that resources and perspectives will differ with participants and thus negotiation, in order to strengthen a weak (or strong) position, commonly takes place.

In the process of negotiation, politics is the area of social concern which reflect the undefined, unresolved, problematic issues which are deemed by participants (those in power) to necessitate the creation and application of a norm. The negotiating processes in this and other areas are based on our understanding and analysis of past events where we have perceived problems and we act on the basis of our experience (and our perceived future goal) to deal with the situation. Action in this setting will be through authority if we feel consensus among all individuals party to the decision exists (e.g. the use of law and a judicial system) but power will be used if experience suggests that consensus does not exist (e.g. government decree in the "national interest"). The use of power as opposed to authority characterised all areas of human life where no obvious legitimated and consensual authority exists or where authority is a distant and little exercised state. In these situations the negotiated order is dealing with power and negotiations are orientated to mediation and compromises on behalf of those over whom power is held or on behalf of those who hold power. Strauss (1964) has emphasised throughout his analysis the forever changing nature of any situation. This has direct relevance in a discussion of power since because of this power is itself a commodity of change. Power can only be assessed in relation to a specific situation and the individuals who perceive an altered

situation may 'opt out'.

Another important contribution in Strauss' (1964) work is the explanation called the "crisis situation" which analyses situations in which co-operation and negotiation break down. It is an important explanation because it focuses on a situation which can radically change an institution or society causing great disturbance but leaving little quantifiable and discernible traces. Strauss (1964) sees them as arising where ideological differences (goal objectives) are increasingly prominent, creating a conflict situation where ambiguous jurisdiction occurs (the interpretation of the rules) leading to a situation where the fundamental goals are questioned. Strauss notes that the ordinary processes of negotiation are inadequate. In such a situation structural channels (central administration etc) can be used to exert authority accepted by all participants who fear a descent into chaos. The process is particularly important in politics where crisis situations are often resolved by the application of power latter legitimated as authority and agreed to by a majority of participants.

Strauss (1964) focuses on an "arena" of activity from where the investigator can view and analyse the interaction between the outside world and the specific situation. He notes that a specific situation occurs when multiple careers temporarily converge bringing with them ideas, concepts and ideologies to contribute to the negotiation and discussion. The arena enables the investigator to attend to change and stability and to observe the processes and efforts by which stability is preserved. The concept encourages a view of the individual developing a shared expectation for a variable time span employing strategies on the basis of his apprehension of the present situation and his analysis of past experience of success or failure.

The political system can be viewed as a loosely interlocking set of arenas and we investigate it by viewing each arena and its relation to the others.

The concept of negotiated order may be applied to politics as attempts are made to implement goals (e.g. build a power station to meet demand for electricity), political behaviour occurs as priorities are set, decisions are made and alternatives discussed.

Differentiated interest groups with their own particular goals or ideological values try to effectively promote their collective or individual lines of action. The ability to successfully project images, the interpretation and definition of which are accepted by others will give an initiative for action or an ability to exercise power. As all situations are problematic and permit power to be exercised strategies are employed to gain advantages and benefits from others by using ones resources to achieve goals or plans. The resources that may be used range from force to establishing a legitimate committee where people act with authority to carry out plans and achieve goals but the essential direction to which these resources are put is the manipulation of others to alter their definition and interpretation of a situation or event. While the aim is to get others to act in a prescribed way this is not always achieved because of the differing resources, demands, perceptions and ideologies of the others and their goals in relation to you. However Hall (1972) has proposed that we examine the range of mechanisms for symbolic manipulation which he calls processes of power. Hall (1972) breaks power into component parts (processes) for analytic and practical purposes so that while they are occurring together at different times in different sequences, in different situations or some not at all, they reveal the Symbolic Interactionist nature of politics.

PROCESSES OF POWER

Hall (1972) notes that a great deal of politics primarily involves symbolic exchange and manipulation of this exchange to gain advantages so that goals can be achieved. Symbolic manipulation regulates the conflict and maintains a sufficient level of concensus to make collective action possible. The symbols are tools to assist in defining and redefining the situation. They provide standards to evaluate the environment and serve as a means of expression by those using them. One can propose that others follow a course of action because of the "symbolic" or remote objectives of the need to meet energy demand or one can propose for oneself a role to achieve a goal of "getting a fair share". In either case the symbolic aspect derives from the significance placed upon it by the individual and by others acting towards it.

Thus for example not everyone would strive to meet energy demand, they may disagree with the goal, have other goals or not even perceive the symbol. The use of symbols by the individual can be used as standards to judge right or wrong (Bailey, (1970) develops this point in normative/pragmatic rules) or in his personal expression to create and define a particular political character.

The correct presentation of the political self (or role taking in a political situation) is essentially symbolic in nature as the individual seeks to gain support or draw attention to himself. It can of course be used in the opposite direction by others to malign a character and deny him status in the range of objects to be considered while exercising power. His importance may be downgraded, but never abandoned. In situations where one may wish to compete for support or initiative in the political arena the ability to control a definition of a situation can in part depend on the character one presents. Thus a politician may be generally regarded as a 'sly one' or 'untrustworthy' and his impact downgraded not by the individual himself although he may become aware of it but by the others he acts towards. A reputation for 'sorting things out', 'trouble-shooter' can permit one to gain control with the consent of some for a time. By building up an identity one can carve out a character which will lead others to regard the individual in a particular light but at the same time one is competing for support (or control) and countering others characters. In the wider context one may act out not so much against the other individual but in relation to a general audience of public spectators. One may try to cast opponents in unfavourable lights by imputing socially undesirable motives to him (e.g. 'he's interested in gaining power') or by judging his standards according to normative rules¹⁴. The creation of political character is problematic in itself and must be worked at if it is to be continued. The image must not be allowed to fall away (he has lost his touch). The individual must be seen to be responsible and his ability to cope must not come into question unless there is a generally acceptable situation where the ability to manipulate individuals is ineffective and requires joint effort (e.g. war). In such situations the credibility of some characters will remain the same, (those who could be unaware that a war is imminent) others will

lose (responsibility is accredited to them for starting the war or mismanagement), while others will gain (a strong and successful leader). At an intimate face to face level political characters will be threatened and built up but for an indeterminate length of time. Other techniques will be used e.g. one individual will try to attack the 'mana' of another while on other occasions it may be a long standing feud or a once only 'point scoring' endeavour.

An aspect of political character which may be used on occasions to enhance support is the definition of an issue. Hall (1972) notes that quite often politicians simply define the problem for others while suggesting no solution. They act as an intermediatory interpreting the problem for others but promoting neither side of a conflict. At a subsequent time they may act to support or control the situation as they see it through negotiation and bargaining. The spheres in which they act with regard to one stance and then another may be quantitatively different, a person might be able to control certain resources but may choose not to do so in one sphere when challenged to reserving the right to exercise his power in another sphere. In this way one can see an administrator living up to his 'impartial' role for others but when he gets back to Wellington he acts politically and makes recommendations in regard to the situation that faced himⁱⁿ the other sphere of activity.

One can view politics and symbolic manipulation as an overlap between the purely controlling aspect of symbols as tools to control others and the emphasis of symbols as elements of subjective play where there is a negotiation occurring and individuals can choose to undertake a particular action - a 'covergant selectivity'.¹⁵ In this sense the actions of an individual or group are seen as endeavouring to control but others are acting to control them so that in any situation the outcome is problematic but involves a joint process of negotiation and symbolic manipulation backed by the perceptions and resources available to the group or individual to resist, review, revoke, attack or advance depending on how they see the situation, how others see it and what variables they can retain to ensure initiative and exercise power.

Holzner (1968) argues that in constructing a reality frames

of reference influence our perception but even more influence our interpretation of what we see and the formulation of plans of action. A frame of reference directs attention to a range of possible experiences and equips one with methods to deal with the situation. By altering the frame of reference for individuals the action in any negotiative political situation can be controlled by getting opponents to accept a particular definition (view) of any situation. If one can explain why a deed was done, who performed it and what the circumstances in which the deed occurred people will act in relation to the meaning they have accepted and in so doing their alternative courses of action will be limited. Ichheiser (1949) postulated that to convince people to take an action or behave the individual had to express himself so that others would be impressed by him. Goffman (1958) used the notion of impression and coined the term 'impression management' to include 'scenes of a performance' which were required to successfully present the individual in everyday life. Balsi (1972) used this notion to refer to how an individual built up a controlled interaction situation and Hall (1972) applied this 'impression management', 'frames of reference' or 'definition of situation' to political situations where others could be controlled in the way the initiator prescribed. The actor expresses himself in such a way as to lead others to act voluntarily or in ignorance in accordance with his plan. He conveys to others an impression which is in his interest to convey. Edelman's (1964) use of the term 'symbolic manipulation' would encompass these ideas and reinforces the role of symbols as tools to an end but since these symbolic (object) contents can be set aside from the individuals in their mind, and considered, the manipulator is forced into a negotiative situation where a number of actions or strategies are employed to get others to act in the prescribed manner.

".... political beliefs, demands and attitudes, far from being fixed and stable are frequently sporadic in appearance fluctuating in intensity, ambivalent in composition and therefore logically inconsistent in pattern and structure."

(Edelman, 1971:33)

Edelman's (1971) treatment of symbols is in terms of this broad

acknowledgement of negotiated order - a patterned variability of inconsistency but he prefers to develop the symbolising ability and examine the mechanisms of this (talk, myth, ritualism) which permit one to redefine a situation and promote an interpretation for others.

"This emphasis places at the center of attention the symbolising ability with which man adapts his world to his behaviour. (he) reconstructs his past, perceives his present condition, and anticipates his future through symbols that abstract, screen, condense, displace and even create what the senses bring to his attention. The ability to manipulate sense perceptions symbolically permits complex reasoning and planning and consequent efficacious action."
(Edelman, 1971:2)

Edelman (1971) uses the concept of myth as a symbolic mechanism to shape others' action. The myth is an unquestioned belief held in common by a large group of people that gives events a particular meaning. It is a device for supplying and giving meaning to complex sets of observation that evoke concern. Edelman (1971) notes that not all accept myth and it is here that we can relate the concept back to competing interest groups and individuals. One section may try to promote a particular myth but it may not be accepted by others. The Myth is promoted as an attempt to define a situation for others but the ongoing nature of action suggests it can be modified or abandoned from time to time. An excellent example would be the maintenance of the myth that things have to be done urgently, deadlines to meet and so on, so that other achievements can^{be} justified in relation to that myth.

In common with Hall (1972) and Nimmo (1974), Edelman (1971) notes that in the communication of the symbolic the essential aspect which permits communication is language or talk. Shared meanings are created through the language which triggers some symbolic perception. The effective use of language can depend on the rhetorical style adopted by an individual in a variety of situations. Thus he might use an exhortive style in a dramatic issue urging people to accept his view or in a technical committee use a bureaucratic style of technical jargon, or in a bargaining situation use a style indicating feelings and promoting compromises.¹⁶ The imparting of information is important in reinforcing meaning already held or to change or destroy existing meanings as perceived by those to whom the message

is directed. Information promotes signals to others and as such is utilized to manipulate and control the situation. Hence the preoccupation of some individuals or groups to get the 'correct' information to 'leak' certain information for political advantage.

Hall (1972) sees the control of information flow of vital importance as a process of power. Political actors need to limit destructive information which could destroy a definition of a situation. However the individual needs to perceive opponents' lines of action so that plans can be made or in a collective situation directed to achieving a goal, information must be imparted to link together the action and understanding of the individual parts. The promotion of coordination is often stressed to achieve a goal through collective imparting of information which enables decisions to be made and situations defined. Hall (1972) states that secrecy about ones strengths and weakness or internal dissent or plans are important in the ability to manipulate situations. Matters for concealment are those which would be inconsistent with the position of the individual or group. It may be prudent to conceal errors, mistakes, bribes and so on. The possession of information and the control of it allows insulation, independence and flexibility on the part of the possessor, either because others are kept in the dark or actions can be anticipated.

Organisations employ techniques to maintain secrecy such as 'confidentiality', 'censorship', classify documents while individuals may simply not tell others what they know. The over communication and under communication of some information can be used to foster a particular view so that others may accept it. Nimmo (1974) extends the concept to suggest that information can be used to promote a degree of predictability and certainty about a situation and by communication and interaction uncertainty is dispelled. Both Nimmo (1974) and Hall (1972) suggest what can be achieved by imparting information and communication but do not consider adequately what is achieved by the lack of communication. By deliberately keeping things at a vague level a group or organisation can retain the initiative for action since others do not know what is planned and cannot therefore act in relation to it. Through a deliberate lack of co-ordination with other groups

one group can avoid having to commit resources or manipulate situations until they decide that the time is right. While it can be a delaying tactic lack of co-ordinating plans also promotes a symbolic message of uncertainty while in actual fact the plans may be being devised, research undertaken, decisions made, but the initiative for action and control is retained by the group controlling the information and the imparting of that information to others.

Hall (1972) and Nimmo (1974) explain the use of 'creating issues' or 'dramatic action'. The ability to handle issues effectively or cope with a dramatic action permits one a measure of control in directing the situation redefining it or defending a position. The emergence of an issue has both antagonists and protagonists who actively strive to gain from the interaction. Hall (1972) notes issues are seen as 'battles' or major conflicts in which positions are taken principles upheld and strategies mapped out. This relates to Strauss' (1964) idea of a 'crisis situation' in which people can gain power when negotiation breaks down. However Hall (1972) sees the issue as limited by rules but with the potential to develop into a crisis situation as Strauss envisages it. Hall (1972) notes that the individual can provide a reference point and give a concreteness which may be lacking in a situation. People can suggest alternatives and hope to gain support by offering these solutions. As issues are seen to involve sides (battles) the outcome will be derived initially (outcome can continue long after an 'initial solution') by the ability to manipulate sufficient resources of a symbolic nature to exercise power over others. While the solution reached (agreement, tacit understanding, contract) may be accepted it can be broken or changed or brought into play at subsequent times. Its return becomes part of the experience which can guide future action, for example, we learn from our experience of the outcome of a fight, we may not fight a person again using guns, but swords instead, because the opponent may be less proficient at using a sword.

Nimmo (1974) provides a practical explanation of the things that go into 'creating an issue' or as he says a 'dramatic action'.

While the issue can arise because of fundamental ideological differences or perceptions the converting of the issue into action to act upon others is crucial. It requires staging, the settings are important. The performance (action) is directed to achieve some decisions and establish rules which may be broken (dirty play concept). Dramatic performances permit maximum room for actors to manoeuvre outside the restraints of formal rules and regulations. Appeals to the mass audience through using the media can be made when established procedures normally require a committee decision. Extreme positions may be taken to emphasise a point and they may be voiced by an individual or groups of concerned citizens. The staging of an issue highlights the negotiative process since one can easily see what each individual or side is doing and how they handle the issue at a public 'surface' level. However, like the 'iceberg' nine tenths of the action remains obscured at first glance. The history and context of the issue is linked to the complex goals and ideologies of the participants which will determine their handling of issues. It is the study of goals, values and ideologies and their effect on negotiation, co-operation and communication which must be studied to provide insight into the real depths of the issue.

A procedure to handle issues and provide a context for negotiation can be seen in 'administrative procedure'. Hall (1972) notes that the administrative ideology seeks to create situations which have a recognised purpose where individuals can be 'forced' together to resolve their problems. A structure, such as a committee is established to promote communications and attempts to resolve problems within it. Like Strauss' organisation there is an overall goal which provides the symbolic content, the directions towards which ones effort is directed and symbolic manipulation related to. Hall (1972) sees the concept arising from an attitude which views problems, not as basic conflicts of interests, but as a breakdown in the communicative processes because others do not know what is happening, they are misinformed. Through 'rational discussion' they will change their attitudes to the desired outcome. Information is imparted to promote co-operation and co-ordination of purpose. Administrative

procedure is imposed by individuals and interest groups through a process of power (as opposed to authority) on a wide network of participants in any situation. It is generally an attempt to encourage co-operation (consensus) or in the least an attempt to prevent harmful conflict in the overriding purpose. It is generally unsuccessful because the negotiating processes are at work long before the procedure is established. The very situation of its establishment over the heads or against the knowledge of some or all of the participants ensures that where conflict and disagreement occurs within the procedure the previous negotiating processes will be redeveloped by the interest groups. Once the administrative process is established interest groups may perceive it as a method (conceivably in some cases the most relevant) of obtaining goals and for dealing with conflict among interest groups through symbolic manipulation.

The value of Halls' concept is that administrative procedure is characterised by its importance as a buffer between competing individuals and interest groups and between outside administration and inside (local) interests. Its ongoing nature is both helpful and hindering to the ideology that established it. In a situation of rapid change it may be of enormous value to have an organisation or structure which mediates between the existing and the changing social situations. However it is the very ongoing evolutionary nature of any procedure which may create a potentially conflicting situation out of the control of those who established them. Thus an administrative procedure may work both for change and stability, both for those who established it and for those it was established upon. As Mead correctly foresaw one of the essential variables in this process is change and adaptability.

Administrative processes may be seen as a focus for bargaining over resources and for the establishment of ritualized behaviour. Resources, those variables controlled by participants such as material goods, power, or productivity, or social skills, may be manipulated to the best advantage by any participants ~~and are an~~ essential element in negotiation. They are used to enhance power and authority and provide a method where by all interest groups come into the negotiating process with something to share, with

something to offer and with prospects of gain. The compensation, loss and reconciliation of resource variables is often brought about through ritualized, commonly accepted observances or practices. Ritualization in the political sense is a method for dealing with the conflict to ensure that conflict itself does not get out of hand. Ritualization, rights or forms connected with political activity, influences both the individuals who participate and the wider social group who view it looking in. It encourages co-operation through social interaction, mutual role taking and a sharing of perspectives, it is an acting out of conflict and a legitimatization of the negotiation process. It provides readily assimilated rights or ideologies which can transpose power into authority.

The evolution of man into a social being through meeting and negotiation is the development of potential action in the social sphere. The examination of how this action is controlled and maintained by whom, for what purposes, and for what length of time is the scientific method grown self conscious, (Mead, 1934). The social scientist studies political action by viewing social process and the variables that effect them among the small and large participants (Strauss, 1964). He uses a variety of variables, symbols, ideologies, situations, rituals, power, joint actions, definitions and individuals and the use, misuse or abuse of information and their consequent co-operation, consensus and conflict. In practically developing the approaches Mead (1934), Blumer (1969) Strauss (1964) and Hall (1972) emphasise processes rather than theory, and the changing and dynamic and are an important step forward if we are to understand social situations.

AIMS OF THE STUDY

The development of Huntly and surrounding area to provide the support facilities associated with the Huntly Power Project is a recent occurrence. Without these facilities the Project could not be completed. If houses are not built to cater for the demand, manpower problems could result. Land must be made available for schools, coal conveyors, and a pipeline route. Compensation has to be payed. Roads and new mines need to be constructed. Fire station, telephone and medical services must be improved and extended. Water rights negotiated. As potential sources of conflict and controversy the

facilities assume a special significance in light of the overriding objective to get the power station built. In dealing with these requirements some overt political activity has occurred in that objections have been raised to the granting of water rights, alternative methods of transporting coal have been advocated, assurances to prevent air pollution have been accepted, and disagreements over land boundaries have arisen.

A two tier structure was established to deal with the many problems which would occur. A Liaison Committee dealt with the day to day detailed problems of the Project. A Huntly Power Project Planning Forum considered the wider planning issues, associated with the Project, in an attempt to mediate in conflicts and problems which might arise among Government Departments, Local Authorities and interest groups.

This study aims to examine (i) why the station was necessary and what political factors exist to motivate continued Government support for the project and (ii) how did the creation of the Power Project Planning Forum influence political interaction with regard to the Project. By analysing political activity (politics is the exercise of power) and focusing on the processes of power the aims of this study may be achieved.

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted in Wolff, K.H. (ed) Essays on Sociology and Philosophy. 1961:399.
 2. For a detailed discussion on the concept of Self, See Strauss, A. George Herbert Mead. On Social Psychology. 1969:199-246.
 3. The term act is used in this thesis as a form of academic shorthand. It is seen as a particular part of action used for study. It represents a breakdown within any given situation under Observation. Strauss (1964) uses this technique particularly with reference to the study of crisis situations.
 4. Blumer, H. 1969:67.
 5. For analytical purposes Strauss artificially separates the processes that are occurring, then recombines them to gain an impression and explain the organisation. He says that this idea can be extended to a general analysis of society but what one could find is that society is only fiction, the reality is the complex negotiative process.
 6. The concept of negotiation has been applied by Newman, D.J. The Negotiated Plea, in "The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial, 1966:76-130 Boston, Little Brown. Also been applied by Balint, M. "The Doctor, His Patient and the Illness." N.Y. International University Press. 1957:18. Application of this concept to Social Science research has been advocated by Scheff, T.J. Negotiating reality: notes on power in the assessment of responsibility, 1966 in Faberman H.A., Goode, E., (eds) "Social Reality" 1973, Prentice-Hall Inc N.J.
 7. Values (goals) are the covert functions ascribed to an institution or organisation or individual. Goals are part of the general category of values which are vague and ambiguous. They are covert, often unspoken and undiscussed which encourage a collective viewpoint, they are important because they contribute to the actual development of an institution, organisation or group. The individual perceives a goal (value) by ascribing meaning to the outcome of an act and its relationship to the wider action. A collectivity may act in a similar way, assessing the situation, noting situations to be dealt with and mapping out action, all with regard to a required (but not always clearly perceived) end (goal) and the acceptable methods to be used to achieve it. (Strauss, A. 1964: Hall, 1972)
- The concept is dealt with at length in group dynamic theory see particularly Bales, B.F. Scientific American. March 1955 "How people interact in Conferences."
8. Rules derive from the commonly held goals or values of a group, they are the concensual agreement to behave or believe thus. They are developed from the needs of groups (organisations and institutions) to define and control situations and behaviour and impose order (collectively) on conflict and confusion. Rules are a method of

regulating thought and action. (Berger and Luckman, 1966). They are the most structured forms of social control, spoken and applied wherever the general control exercised (through socialization etc.) breaks down.

9. For example, institutions such as the police, judiciary, education system, armed services.
10. They promote their values and goals through socialization education and other institution within society.
11. Power is used here as an analytical tool to represent the manipulation of variables (resources, communications etc.) to achieve an end without the agreement or consensus of those it is imposed upon. The important point is this lack of choice exercised by people. After the event people are forced, encouraged to accept the result (the status quo) thus legitimating the situation. Berger and Luckman (1966) The Social Construction of Reality, Doubleday Books briefly discuss the role of power at a societal level. "The success of particular conceptual machineries is related to the power possessed by those who operate them. The confrontation of alternative symbolic universes implies a problem of power which to the conflicting definitions of reality will be 'made to stick' in the society!" (P.108-109)
12. Weber, See Gerth and Mills (Eds) 1974. Max Weber:294.
13. Ibid, 1974:115
14. See Bailey, F.G. "Stratagems and Spoils." 1970:5
15. See Nimmo, D.D. "Popular Images of Politics." 1974:145
16. Ibid. 1974:37

CHAPTER TWO

THE STUDY: METHODOLOGY

A significant amount of sociological literature is taken up with discussing the methodological advantages or disadvantages used to verify and understand theory. There exist a number of major theoretical orientations each promoting particular methodologies.¹ Many theorists have suggested models to understand the essential features of politics. They include class conflict, manipulation, elitism, co-operation and competition. It was this diversity of perspectives that posed the initial problem of which model to choose. One could use Marx's approach and find evidence of alienation and conflict² or Edelman and examine symbolic manipulation³ But does political reality consist of either feature or is there a mixture? and if so how much? What other features characterise the nature of politics? Dunham (1970) notes that because there are these various images of man, different models of society, problems with concepts, locus and orientation research scholars make one type of intellectual commitment or another. They take a position with respect to this issue and this position governs the kind of Sociology they develop and the kind of research they pursue. The constant concern for methodology in sociology arises from the fact that these issues have not been resolved satisfactorily and criticism of perspectives and procedures continually occurs.⁴

In contemporary literature there exists a considerable emphasis to operationalise empirical research and develop objective indices. Kuhn (1964) stressed the need to make universal predictions of social conduct and sought to "empiricise" Meads (1934) ideas by developing techniques for a "standard objection and dependable process of measurement of significant variables."⁵ This view emphasised that the individual responded to variables which could be manipulated and reproduced for verification and stands in contrast to the Symbolic Interaction view of social conduct as an emergent process.

The Symbolic Interaction assumption is not that situational characteristics explain all behaviour but that knowing the individuals

own interpretation of those situational characteristics is indispensable for understanding the behaviour since individuals act on the basis of the meaning that things have for them. But how does one know the meaning individuals give to things? Since meaning has relevance only in a social context, Blumer (1969), asserts that to understand the social reality it is necessary to go directly to it and examine everyday life through 'sympathetic inspection' and 'exploration'.⁶ For Weber (1946) there was a need to verify 'facts' on a level of cause and at the level of meaning. He considered it essential to reconstruct the state of the subjects' mind using verstehen (intuition, insight) to empathise with the subjects and see the world from their viewpoint.⁷

Huber (1973) has recently argued that the methodology of Pragmatism and Symbolic Interaction permits the perspectives of the researcher and the people in the interaction situation to bias the research. Huber (1973) continues debate on what Hutcheon (1970) calls the 'objectivity problem' in the social sciences.⁸ Huber (1973) maintains that in carrying out research there is no assurance that the ideas and beliefs of the researcher will not carry over into the analysis since there is no theoretical backing and no hypothesis put forward. Equal weight cannot be given to informants since motives for aiding the researcher shape the character of the information and if informants present divergent views on what grounds does the researcher choose a view. She concludes by claiming that with no structured propositions the researcher wins all bets and power and personalities intrude.⁹ In replying to Huber (1973), Blumer (1973), Schmitt (1974), and Stone et al (1974), consider that all methods involve bias particularly when one constructs an hypothesis and looks for evidence to support it. Stone et al (1974) quote Deutsch's (1969) studies which indicated that the observer will observe what he wishes to find.¹⁰ By not using a set of preordained hypotheses one can approach the problem with an 'open mind'. They agree that researchers bring beliefs and concepts to a problem but that through a process of continually testing these images throughout the research one is in a better position to produce valid findings. The views of informants can be checked by subsequent statements, written evidence, or confronting

other informants with the view. Blumer (1973) notes that a theoretical base emerges from the study guided by a broad set of interrelated concepts, findings and assumptions about man and the social world. The researcher poses problems, identifies an area of inquiry, gets relevant methods and in the effort to clarify problems has to develop premises and impute connections between objects, these ideas are tested through study thus Symbolic Interaction provides both a theoretical perspective and a methodological position.

The Symbolic Interaction perspective as refined by Strauss (1964) and Hall (1972) provided me with the 'glasses' through which to view the politics of the Huntly Power Project. Although its application to a political analysis has not been fully developed it provides a 'theory of relevance'¹¹ to understand the situation and provide answers to the problems posed.

It is precisely because, in my opinion, politics exists in the here and now is continually recast, negotiated, and changing that a flexible naturalistic approach is necessary. It provides a framework which deals with the vitality and reality of political life. My methodological position flows from the need to see political activity from the viewpoint of the actor in his social situation. Douglas (1970) notes that

"the only valid and reliable (or hard scientific) evidence concerning socially meaningful phenomena we can possibly have is that based ultimately on systematic observations and analysis of everyday life."

(Douglas, 1970:12)

These sentiments are echoed by many¹² who see a need to develop a closeness and familiarity with the social world to capture the essential features of the on going process. By using naturalistic methods of observation and analysis the integrity and meaning of the phenomena under study can be retained. Among those who have outlined the naturalistic approach Kluckholm (1940), Foote Whyte (1955) Becker and Geer (1957), Glaser and Strauss (1967), Blumer (1969), Douglas (1970) and Denzin (1970a, 1971) have provided valuable, extensive, and critical analysis of the approach adopted in this study.

The naturalistic methodological approach consists not of one but of a number of associated methods. It reflects the more general

strategy of methodological triangulation¹³ the merits of which are now being emphasised¹⁴. Traditionally Participant Observation, however loosely defined has been the major method of naturalistic studies. For want of a better label my approach will be called Participant Observation¹⁵.

PROCEDURE

Taking Denzin (1970) and Blumers (1969) advice to use a variety of techniques since no single method will ever meet the requirements for the validation of interaction theory¹⁶, and to improve the capacity of discovery of what is taking place in actual life¹⁷ the following field work procedures were used.

The periods in which they were used are indicated in brackets.

1. Direct observation of local government and Forum meetings (May 1974 - Oct 1975).
2. Use of Government files, reports, court proceedings, letters minutes and newspaper reports. (May 1974 - 1975)
3. Participant observation at ad hoc meetings, private parties (June 1975 - Nov 1975).
4. Informal interviewing (July 1975 - Nov 1975)
5. Questionnaire responses (Sept 1975 - Dec 1975)

The field work was divided into three interrelated and ongoing aspects and covered the period from May 1974 to Dec 1975. The first aspect involved reading relevant background texts and journals relating to the energy situation in New Zealand. Considerable literature is available as energy has become a topical matter. Little written work is available on Huntly as a community. The Huntly Report (1972) by Jones and Arnold provides insights of the community before the project began. The collection of newspaper cuttings and the follow up collection of speeches and reports provided a valuable introduction to the subject, identified lines of inquiry and informants. Using data from NZED files and minutes of meetings provided evidence and enabled the action of participants to be pinpointed and checked. The second aspect involved observation of Forum meetings (one per month) and recording the type of action, language styles, symbolism and the context of individuals as they engaged in activity. Observation at other meetings in Huntly was necessary from time to time to follow up particular events, for example, attending - Federated Farmers meeting, Town and Country

Planning Appeal Board, Liaison Committee. Associated with these meetings I recorded information from a number of 'informal chats' with participants. Observing meetings over a period of time provided an opportunity to evaluate responses of participants and check conflicting information. The final aspect involved interviewing Forum members and relevant individuals on a wide range of aspects related to the project e.g. questioning their views of the Forum, Government Departments, energy in general, what they hoped to gain, why they did certain things and so on and was included in a programme of informal interviewing. Interviewing Government Department heads provided information on energy use in New Zealand much of which is contained in the proceedings of the Second Energy Conference May 1975. Administering a general attitude questionnaire developed by Anton, Linde, Mellbourn (1973) polled the wider attitudes of the individual Forum members. The information gained provided a background and filled out the character of the Forum members. e.g. whether a civil servant should limit his activity to carry out policy, whether they thought conflict brought about progress. It is not proposed to include the questionnaire, as the questionnaire itself was not essential to the data collected but rather served to orientate the author to the type of individuals being dealt with and check on interpretations without the necessity for repeated interviews. Indeed the questionnaire was a way of analysing the individuals views in order to understand the collective being expressed in the setting of the Forum since it is understood that the individual viewpoint will affect the presentation of a collective viewpoint (on behalf of particular interest groups). As I was in the field for a considerable time I was able to build up a network of informants and assess their credibility. Much of the written material (documents, reports, etc.) provided further checks. The confidential basis on which I received some information would preclude the reader from verifying some of the comments used to illustrate examples.

Blumer (1969) suggested that in examining a given social situation, such as Huntly, it must be approached in a variety of different ways and viewed from different angles. He likened the analysis to handling a physical object

"We may pick it up, look at it closely, turn it over as we view it, look at it from this or that angle, raise questions as to what it might be go back and handle it again in the light of our questions, try it out and test it in one way or another." (Blumer, 1969:44)

Bearing in mind Blumer's advice I have approached the politics of the Huntly Power Project from two different but interrelated views. By examining the politics of energy use in New Zealand, the broad angle serves as the context and provides a background for a closer indepth analysis. I believe this joint approach is essential to an understanding of the situation and has in fact been advocated by Blumer when he said that in the formulation of principles and research it is necessary to pay attention to the historical linkage of what is being studied, to examine the background out of which it grew because to ignore this carry over leads to a genuine risk of misinterpretation for the scholar. (Blumer, 1969:60) Accordingly chapter three contains an analysis of the politics of energy use in N.Z. and its relevance to the Huntly Power Project.

The results of the field work conducted at Huntly are presented in the form of case studies which build up a composite picture of the situation and illustrate negotiated order and symbolic manipulation. Chapters four, five and six provide discussion of the case studies in respect to the theoretical perspective. The emphasis is on the processes of power, the development of consensus and the amelioration of conflict. It must be understood that the widest variety of political action is taking place within this small setting and the use of the case study method is an attempt to break down the complex situation for convenient analysis. The conclusion, Chapter seven, incorporates a general discussion developed from the perspectives of the case studies seen in relation to general energy planning. The attempt is to provide a general understanding of the processes at work, the function and development of methods to encourage co-operation within specific and general situations.

In the previous two chapters the author has presented some of the perspectives that guided this study. They are in the nature of general assumptions that directed the research along certain courses (using a certain methodology) and were unquestionably critical to the conclusion finally reached. The research ends were not predetermined but the researcher's initial perspectives do affect profoundly the direction of his activity and some of what he sees. The discussion of the theory and methodology should have therefore provided an introduction to the case work and a check upon the approach of the author.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Wagner, H.R. American Sociological Review Vol. 28 1963:735-42. Types of Sociological Theory Towards a System of Classification.
2. See Tucker, R.C., 1969. The Marxian Revolutionary Idea. Particularly relevant is Chapter 3.
3. See Edelman, M. 1964. The Symbolic Uses of Politics.
4. See Wrong, D. American Sociological Review. Vol. 26 1961:183-93. The Over Socialised Concept of Man in Modern Society.
5. See Hickman, C.A. Kuhn, M.H. 1956. Individuals Groups and Economic Behaviour. Dryden Press New York. Particularly pages 224-25.
6. Blumer provides an indepth treatment of these processes in Symbolic Interactionism Perspective and Method. 1969:40-47.
7. For a comprehensive discussion of Verstehen see Abel, T. 1948. The operation called Verstehen. American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 54, 211-18.
8. Hutcheon outlines three dimensions of the objectivity problem
 1. the researchers approach to his subject matter, methods used.
 2. Interaction between researcher and subject of study.
 3. Effect of researchers knowledge on the social relations under study.
9. Huber op cit, 281-282.
10. Stone et al, 1974. Deutscher analysed three studies of the correspondence between verbalised attitudes and actual behaviour as it pertained to ethnic discrimination.
11. Edeman, N. opcit: 43.
12. In addition to the Symbolic Interactionists such as Blumer (1964) Stone and Faberman (1970) Shibutani (1970) Ethnomethodologists such as Garfinkel (1967) Stebbins (1967, 1969) and Cicourel (1964, 1972) emphasise the need to investigate in great detail, the settings and components of acts to discover how people typically define situations and the procedures they employ in coping with them. Garfinkel's (1967) research on a Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Centre was an attempt to discover who made decisions on what basis, and for what reasons definitions were made.

13. For a more comprehensive account of this procedure see Denzin, N.K. The Logic of Naturalist Inquiry in Social Forces Vol 50 Dec 1971:177.
14. See Denzin (1971) Ibid and Stone Faberman et al (1974)
15. Other terms used include 'Symbolic Interaction', 'Naturalistic Inquiry', 'Naturalistic Behaviourism', 'Open-ended Approach'.
16. Denzin, 1970(b):26
17. Blumer, 1969:50

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICS OF ENERGY USE

The use of energy resources has been to be forefront of public attention in recent years. The interest in energy problems was sparked off in 1973-74 by a decision of OPEC members to raise the price of oil from \$2.59 to \$11.65 (U.S.) per barrel.¹ The price increases had a tremendous impact on countries which relied heavily on imported oil. In New Zealand as oil accounts for 62% of the energy market the oil bill rose from \$100M in 1973 to \$440M in 1975.² The price rises made other forms of energy considerably cheaper in comparison and provided an impetus to research, plan, and develop alternative resources. It speeded up a trend to reduce dependence on imported oil and develop indigenous fuel resources which New Zealand had by necessity been moving towards.³

To this end two Energy Conferences were held in 1974 and 1975 and an Energy Research and Development Committee was established in April 1974. The high level conferences have dealt with issues such as nuclear power, environment, transport, policy and planning while the Research and Development Committee has provided \$900,000 in research funds.⁴

The creation of the Ministry of Energy Resources in 1972 to provide for the development, promotion and co-ordination of effective policies in respect of energy marked the beginning of attempts to bring together government departments concerned with energy policies. A co-ordinated overall energy plan has been advocated by politicians, industrialists environmentalists and administrators however the lack of co-ordination is a noticeable feature of the energy sector.⁵ The idea of superimposing a ministry on departments to co-ordinate overall activities involved a significant problem with no short term solution. The continuation of an existing administrative system and attempted co-ordination through a committee system produced some advances as well as conflicts. Mr Hogg Commissioner for Energy Resources acknowledged that 'previous practices' were occurring and much work was still to be done on co-ordination.⁶

There are a number of government departments concerned with energy but the most immediately effected - NZED, Mines, Energy Resources, Natural Gas Corporation - are the ones which have traditionally been noted for co-operation and conflict. The General Manager of the Natural Gas Corporation summed up a general feeling among these departments when he stated that

"I have been content to leave co-ordination to Energy Resources, having first made quite sure that they know what my views are. If necessary, we might have to carry that a little further but I have a great deal of confidence that Mr Hogg and his Department will, in the long run see the light and produce the right answers for us." ⁷

These comments were followed by the Under-Secretary for Mines who stated that

"I do not take much notice of the Minister of Energy Resources or anybody else." ⁸

The conflict of interest between these groups was particularly evident in the Committee Review Power Requirements (1975) where the Ministry of Energy Resources disagreed with NZED's growth demand predictions. (NZG.D6A) The comments of the Fuel and Power Council of the 1968 National Development Council remain substantially true today, they concluded that

"Investigation, planning and co-ordination suffer serious limitation in our opinion because it lacks objective guidelines and criteria to determine the optimum use of capital and other resources which are needed in large quantities for this sector.....We are entirely convinced that effective planning and co-ordination will be achieved only if the separate industries have confidence in the process of planning and in the body responsible for this work." ⁹

A conflict of interest among the 'Energy departments' stems from a concern to alter the balance and type of energy used by different sectors in the society. At present of the energy consumed the Transport sector uses 47%, Industrial-Commercial 38% and Domestic 15%. ¹⁰ Some policies have been directed to reduce consumption in the transport sector ¹¹ but as the motor vehicle runs efficiently and economically on oil and petrol alternative fuel resources are difficult to encourage (not withstanding some successes in LPG car conversion programme because of the cheaper fuel). The rugged topography and linear nature of the country with low density and numerous population clusters results in a high degree of inter-regional traffic and greater distances to travel encouraging high

fuel consumption which is difficult to control. The other two sectors are areas in which much concern and some policy¹² has been directed particularly in respect to the use of electricity, coal and gas. While many figures¹³ have been quoted to indicate that projected growth rates in the demand for the respective forms of energy will deplete natural resources Kibblewhite's (1974) figures indicate the magnitude of the problems that the country faces in the energy field.

N.Z. fossil fuel resources are estimated at ¹⁴			
Coal	1000×10^6 tons	or equivalent electric power	9×10^{12} kwh
Mauí Gas	5×10^{12} ft ³	" " "	8×10^{12} kwh
(Proven Mauí gas)	5×10^6 ft ³	" " "	7.6×10^{11} kwh

Based on present rates of power demand (7%-8%p.a.) the total non renewable fuels, if used exclusively for electricity, are estimated to run out by the year 2500 (continuing the present growth rates into the long term, present generating capacity (4000MW) would have to be increased to 8,000MW in 1980, 32,000MW in 2000, 64,000MW in 2010 to satisfy projected demand. Power planners are currently planning for 10,708MW in 1990 which represents an estimated population of 4,100,000 consuming twice as much electricity per head as we now use. (Kibblewhite 1974) Recent government policies have been aimed at reducing the demand for electricity and encouraging the efficient use of indigenous resources. The Maui gas field development programme is good illustration of the problem facing the country. The stated proven reserves in the Maui Gas field could be exhausted by three 1000MW stations in 30 years (Kibblewhite 1974:31). It is well known that the thermal efficiency of using gas to produce electricity rather than as a premium fuel is extremely low and inefficient yet to recover the development costs of the field in the short term converting gas to electricity provides the only viable market.¹⁵ While recent announcements by the Minister of Energy resources (9.10.75 and 9.2.76) indicate that larger quantities of gas will be diverted into the premium gas fuel form they come at a time when subsequent seismic surveys have revealed considerable bigger quantities of gas than previously thought existed.¹⁶ An indication that larger quantities of gas are proved when the wells begin operation can be seen in the Kapuni field when in 1972 it was announced that the recoverable gas reserves were redetermined at a level 84% higher than the level originally fixed.¹⁷

It is not clear at this stage what proportion of the Maui gas field will be used for electricity, but it is known that the NZED is committed to using gas at the New Plymouth, Huntly and Auckland No.1 thermal power stations. An acceptable source of fuel enables NZED to fulfil its projected demand curves, but considerable pressure, from wide interests, stress the desirability of using gas as a premium fuel and conserving some of the resource. The Natural Gas Corporation and environmental groups¹⁸ have stressed the need to expand the gas industry and reduce the electricity demand which inevitability challenges the interests of the electricity industry.¹⁹ The Ministry of Energy Resources currently alines itself on the side of efficient use and expansion of the gas industry.²⁰

The NZED, which believes in the accuracy of its projections (despite overestimating demand in 1973, 1974, 1975), and faced with political technical and environmental pressure has endeavoured to find suitable alternative fuels. A major coal exploration programme in the Waikato region has revealed sufficient coal for a second thermal station (possibly Auckland No.2). Other revaluations have also provided proven fuel resources for power planning. However NZED contends that the contribution of gas and coal to meet the total electricity requirements will be minimal and the gap between supply and demand can only be met by nuclear energy. An established nuclear training programme (overseas) by NZED was augmented by a Joint US/NZ Agreement of Scientific Co-operation (signed 27 February 1974) which aimed to foster alternative energy sources, greater self sufficiency, and a free interchange of expertise and technology between the countries. The introduction of nuclear power is to be the subject of a public inquiry²¹ but while the political decision is still to be made many of the technical considerations have been reached. The Atomic Energy Committee

"has expended considerable effort in assessing seismic effects on various sites".²²

NZED sees the introduction of nuclear power as inevitable in 1988, because proven indigenous resources are insufficient and if further quantities were discovered there would be no guarantee that they could be developed within ten years to cope with the demand then. The Chief Engineer (Development) NZED sums up the official attitude

"We have no reason to believe that any substantial deferment will be possible."²³

Other alternative fuels have been researched by a number of organisations with the Ministry of Energy Resources and the Energy Research and Development Committee co-ordinating and overseeing the results. The use of natural gas reticulated throughout New Zealand has been suggested,²⁴ harnessing up to 2,000MW of geothermal steam is a possibility, New Zealand is ideally suited to wind power and solar heating which have been extensively researched with units in commercial production. The researching of alternatives does pose something of a threat to the electricity industry which has favoured the use of nuclear power and lately the use of coal which could lead to a deferment to the introduction of nuclear power. Ministry of Energy Resources has encroached on the traditional responsibility of NZED in other ways beside examining alternative resources. It is currently fostering a project to develop a quantitative energy projection model and has on a number of occasions suggested that NZED reduce its growth rate curves and encourage restraint.²⁵

A close association between NZED and Mines Department is a logical outcome of their mutual interest in fuel resources for electricity generation. They stand apart from the Natural Gas Corporation which seeks to expand its industry in a market (industrial and domestic) predominantly reliant on electricity. The Ministry of Energy Resources, a young but expanding ministry, has encountered difficulty in promoting co-ordination and is increasingly taking over some important activities of both NZED and Mines Department while promoting its own research and becoming the focus of decision making effecting other departments in the energy field.²⁶ A more detailed examination of the departments concerned reveals some of the processes of conflict, cooperation and negotiation.

NEW ZEALAND ELECTRICITY DEPARTMENT (NZED)

The Electricity Act 1968 set-out the aims which guide the activities of NZED. In general the NZED is required to satisfy the need for electricity and to promote a continuous programme of work to provide adequate supplies of electricity at the lowest practical cost. It supplies electricity in bulk to supply

authorities who in turn retail it to the public. NZED has borne the brunt of much criticism directed at energy planners, particularly in relation to growth demand curves and environmental issues associated with a planned programme of power stations. The criticism should not be unexpected with a growing concern for environmental conservation and efficient energy use in society. It is not surprising therefore that when faced with mounting criticism people will act to counter such feeling. Political activity is involved in respect to electricity and energy. The actions and solutions proposed by those in Government Departments and their respective industries are inherently political and this is acknowledged by all involved. The Electrical Supply Authority Engineers' Institute Conference in 1973 recognised the intrusion of politics into the industry.

"We should ask for much more control through our Association to ensure much closer adherence to the (power Planning) report and elimination of subsequent political manipulating ...what starts out as a realistic report eventually becomes unrealistic thanks to politics. Electricity must be taken away from political control, it is a political issue and we in N.Z. are in control of such a political issue."

(Conference Transactions 1973:83)

At the Second New Zealand Energy Conference in 1975 the Prime Minister acknowledged the political control over energy matters.

"Government policy will continue to ensure that energy resources are used in the most appropriate way....what we have developed is a raft of policies framed within the context of the Government's broader policy and as such maintaining a high standard of living, full employment, economic growth, and so on."

(Preceedings, 1975:5;8)

Political intervention in the electricity industry has been evident by such actions as government subsidies on large electricity uses (Comalco, Tasman Pulp and Paper, N.Z. Steel Co.), bulk supply electricity contract freeze 1972-1976, decision not to raise Lake Manapouri for extra power generation.²⁷

The NZED is essentially acting politically in its overt and covert attempts to influence action and planning in energy use. It was established to promote electricity and the supply authorities recognise that the activities of NZED which are directed to providing the electricity will effect the industry as a whole. An important person in the electricity industry is the General

Manager of NZED whose views can affect the direction of the industry and NZED. The differing views expressed by two general managers in regard to electricity and wider energy utilisation are briefly examined to illustrate the somewhat changed stance of the industry in the face of considerable pressure exerted to limit the industries traditionally dominant position in energy planning.

NZED GENERAL MANAGERS - TWO PERSPECTIVES

Mr E.B. Mackenzie became General Manager of NZED in 1963 and retired in 1972. The public outlook of the Department during that period and the relationship to the electrical supply industry was in part governed by the policy directives and attitudes of its General Manager. Mr Mackenzie was a strong supporter of using fossil fuels as premium fuels instead of converting them to electricity. His views were taken up and supported at a Ministerial level as both Minister and Department began to sound warnings of the need to re-examine and curb electricity demand.²⁸ In 1966 he recommended using Kapuni Gas as a premium fuel rather than for electricity generation much against the pressure of the Electrical Supply Authorities Association (ESAA) and the consortium of Shell, B.P. Todd who owned the gas and wanted it used for electricity production.²⁹ Mackenzie supported this decision by claiming that its use as a premium fuel had a greater thermal efficiency than converting it to electricity, it would reduce the demand for electricity saving generating capacity by 8%, and it would save on capital investment and electrical plant. At a time when the Power Planning Committee recommendations were being ignored by Government and limited finance was available for electricity development such attitudes did not meet with much favour by representatives of the supply industry or members of his own Department who wanted to expand the industry.³⁰ He agreed that in the national interest guidelines for control and direction of energy were necessary but not particularly palatable for the people involved. To this end he actively supported the establishment of the Ministry of Energy Resources. Mr Mackenzie was pleased by the discovery of Maui Gas in 1970 since in his opinion, it allowed a delay in nuclear power generation and allowed the possibility of using quantities of the gas as a premium fuel.³¹ These attitudes are in sharp contrast to the current General Manager who succeeded Mr Mackenzie in 1972.

Mr Blakeley although acknowledging the need to consider alternative energy sources has maintained an approach to actively promote electricity. He sees circumstances outside the control of NZED encouraging electricity demand for example in discussing the of electrical appliances he stated that

"....There is a measure of choice within the personal economic restriction of each consumer. The development of these energy resources required to meet the demand can to some extent be freely set by a competing market."

(Blakeley and Lough, 1975:20)

Although with a similar background as his predecessor (Engineering)³² Mr Blakeley contends that in domestic use there is not much difference in thermal efficiency between use of gas as a premium fuel or converted to electricity for use in the home.³³ As a government representative in the Maui Gas negotiations (1971-74) he stated that the studies carried out by NZED confirmed that the gas should be used for electricity generation.³⁴ Mr Blakeley sees the projected electricity demand curves increasingly because of the effects of home heating and believes there is no evidence to indicate demand levelling off despite the effects of conservation measures, oil price increases, inaccurate demand forecasts of electricity in the past three years.³⁵

The arrival of a new General Manager promoting the interests of electricity as opposed to a person considering other interests instilled a measure of confidence in the Electricity supply industry than was previously the case. The change in personnel enabled "a closing of the ranks" and a common agreement on the development and direction of the industry which would be of benefit to both the industry as a whole and the NZED.³⁶

NZED AND POWER PLANNING

There are three committees responsible for planning electricity in N.Z. They were established in 1958 as a result of the white paper on Electric Power Development. The committees involved are the Electric Power and Finance Utilization Committee, Committee to Review Power Requirements, Planning Committee on Electric Power.

The Electric Power and Finance Utilization Committee is a sub-committee of the Electrical Supply Authorities Association and consists of seven members (one from NZED). It arranges for the preparation of estimates of future consumption for five years from the sixty-five independent supply authorities in New Zealand. It

collates these estimates, amends them if necessary, and then forms a composite estimate of the electricity energy consumption. This organisational arrangement is thought to provide the best framework for bringing together the maximum amount of knowledge and experience that can be applied to this task. (NZG.D6A,1975:4). The estimates are then submitted to the Committee to Review Power Requirements.

The Committee to Review Power Requirements is a Government appointed committee consisting of seven members (chairman NZED, one member from Treasury, Statistics, Energy Resources, Electricity and two members from the Supply Authorities). It reviews the consumption estimates, amends them if necessary, converts the results into generating ~~fore~~cast for the first 5 years. Then by considering other relevant matters (economic development, energy conservation etc.) extends the estimates to a long term forecast of 10 years. The Department of Statistics using a different procedure, provides an independent projection which gives the committee a basis for comparison. This committee reports its estimates to Parliament and the Power Planning Committee.

The Power Planning Committee is a government appointed committee consisting of ten members (Chairman NZED, two other members from NZED, two from MWD, three from Supply Authorities, one from Energy Resources and one from Treasury). This committee is required to present to Parliament an annual review of a practical and economic programme of power station construction to meet the estimated load demand forecast.

"It must leave the desirability of concepts such as 'zero growth', and the wide-ranging social and philosophical requirements which would have to be adopted by the community to achieve such a target, to be debated in other forums."

(NZG.D4B.1975:3)

This committee is serviced by the power development section of NZED which plans the Power Stations.

The Electric Power and Finance Utilisation Committee bases its estimates on the assumptions of unrestricted consumption, normal average weather conditions and normal economic conditions, while the Committee to Review Power Requirements bases its estimates on unrestricted consumption, normal weather and long term economic trends (Both these committees recognise that it is difficult to predict normal conditions and future economic situations).

The structure for planning electricity demand allows the industry

considerable opportunity through its representation, to promote its own interests. The objectives of the Supply Authorities Association include promoting the economic use of electricity and showing the public how to use it for greater productivity.³⁷ Despite this objective they stress that they are not pursuing policies of growth for growth's sake,³⁸ but see their role as providing much needed public amenities. In the past five years the Supply Authorities have faced considerable difficulties pursuing their policies. They believe they have been continually hampered by government pressure resisting their legitimate demands for increased power generation. In 1971 the President of the Electrical Supply Authorities Association stated that

"The supply authorities representatives consider that the Treasury representatives dissenting opinion on energy deficiencies is incorrect and should not be allowed to bias government consideration...the Government is receiving advice from Treasury which, in our opinion, is incorrect, if not irresponsible."³⁹

These sentiments were reinforced in 1975 when the Treasury, Statistics and Energy Resources representations on the Committee to Review Power Requirements considered the estimates too high, but the NZED and Supply Authority representatives stood by their estimates which had been increased in the lower committee over the estimates supplied by the independent supply authorities throughout the country. The NZED Supply Authority representatives were opposed to altering the established methods of production and were reluctant to condone the effect of the Government's energy policy. (Electricity consumption was lowered by 260MW in 1974, predicted demands were over estimated by 7.3% in 1973, 14.1% in 1974, 8.8% in 1975)⁴⁰ The members opposing the estimates contended that the effect of conservation policies should be taken into account and it was time to change the traditional basis on which forecasts were made. These attitudes were expressed by the Prime Minister when he stated that

"Other pessimists have extended the growth line of electricity demand and have reached some awesome conclusions regarding expenditure on electricity production in relation to GNP. Of course, if you extend any trend line over a long enough period without changing the basis assumptions you are bound to get odd results."

(Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975:5)

The Supply Authority and NZED in 1974 and 1975 chose to increase the estimates of the individual supply authorities and they can be

seen to want to maintain the continued growth position of electricity demand (which would serve their interests) in the face of government policies to foster reduction in electricity demand and use of alternative fuels.⁴¹

NZED AND ENGINEERING RESOURCES

Traditionally Ministry of Works and Development has been responsible for the design and construction of power stations. It carries out site investigations and town planning associated with the stations and then hands over the project for operation and maintenance to NZED. With the trend towards thermal stations the Ministry of Works and Development has complained of the heavy demands imposed on its servicing resources in development, design and construction and has to rely increasingly on overseas consultants. Experience from job to job has not been sufficient to allow independence from consultants and has forced the MWD to rely on NZED engineering staff⁴² for example at the Huntly Power Project there is a joint office of NZED and MWD technical and engineering staff. With the build up of Nuclear Engineers by the NZED through an overseas training programme and a greater reliance on its own Engineering abilities the control exercised by MWD is passing to the NZED.⁴³ The control of technical resources by NZED poses a direct threat to the role of MWD and strengthens the position of NZED.

NZED ENVIRONMENT AND CO-ORDINATION

The proposed raising of Lake Manapouri for Hydro-Electric Power and the controversy surrounding it brought the conservation movement into public focus. It was only when a Commission of Inquiry was called after much public pressure to 'Save Manapouri' that the NZED began to officially take an interest in environmental matters and public relations.⁴⁴

"Consequent public scrutiny is causing public relations problems to become more and more complex and to require increasing attention by departmental officers.... public relations must be regarded as a inevitable component of the job."

(NZED, 1970: D4)

Despite comments by NZED in its annual reports to Parliament that it has an active concern for the environment it has faced considerable criticism from the Commission for the Environment and

and at the Energy Conferences held in 1974 and 1975. In its audit of the Environmental Impact Report on Auckland No 1 thermal Power Station the Commission for the Environment stated that too little attention had been given to many environmental aspects, and not enough information was available to evaluate the proposed alternative sites.⁴⁵ NZED has recently been directed to rewrite its Environmental Impact Report on the Huntly Power Station so that the public could understand it.

"What we got from NZED was a very loose sort of draft which was an enormous collection of paper and appendages which we sent back to the department as incomprehensible for the public to receive as an impact report.....the report has been under preparation since October 1972."

(Spokesman for Environment Commission, Times, 16 Feb.1976)

Success by environmental groups in recent years has promoted a cautious approach to the environment by NZED.⁴⁶ The Electrical Supply Authorities voiced concern at the environmental lobby and suggested that "when environmental groups come in the door sanity flies out the window."⁴⁷ While official NZED attitude is not as strong it never-the-less stresses the effect of delaying power stations because of environmental concerns.⁴⁸

Closely associated with the environmental issue and inherent in the demand issue is pressure for conservation and alternative uses of energy. NZED and the supply authorities have played a dominant role in forming policies which provided the community with power. Those who represent the electrical industry suggest that

"....measures are necessary to ensure a priority for electricity against other demands and a well programmed expenditure on power development which provides for necessary margins and consumers needs".

(Transactions of Electric Supply Authority Engineers' Institute, 1973:82)

Such sentiments are not shared by the Natural Gas Corporation and Ministry of Energy Resources which pose threats to the electricity industry because of their views. As part of its function to co-ordinate overall energy planning the Ministry of Energy Resources became a member of the Power Planning Committee and Committee to Review Power Requirements in 1973. It was also involved with NZED over Maui Gas negotiations. Increasingly the Ministry of Energy Resources developed activities which incorporated some of the

traditional practices of the electricity industry e.g. developing a quantitative model for energy planning including an electricity sector.

In an address to the Second Energy Conference in 1975 the Commissioner of Energy Resources stressed the need for greater co-ordination and overall planning to be done by his Department. The need to conserve and develop alternative fuels has been continually stressed by Ministry of Energy Resources spokesman since 1972. Disagreements over electricity consumption estimates in the Committee to Review Power Requirements and comments made by the Minister of Energy Resources and NZED General Manager indicate that there is a lack of co-ordination of all Departments concerned with energy planning and a rivalry among the interests concerned.⁴⁹

ELECTRICITY AND COAL

Fifty years ago coal provided 93% of New Zealand's primary energy demands but today supplies only 17% of the market.⁵⁰ The decline in coal corresponded to an increase in use of electricity in the domestic sector and oil in the industrial sector. With increased oil prices some industries are reverting to coal use encouraged by Government through a rationalisation scheme announced in 1975.⁵¹ Control in the coal industry is vested in the state and the decline in importance has occurred as a matter of policy over successive years. Many mines have been closed and Government subsidy to the industry has averaged \$1.9M per year since 1962.⁵² In 1974 the State operated fourteen underground and ten opencast mines. There are three major coal areas - Waikato, Buller, Southland, with the greatest producer of coal and the highest reserves being the Waikato coalfield. Early investigations in the Waikato area proved coal for electricity generation. As a result the MereMere power station was commissioned in 1958. In 1964 further quantities of coal capable of supporting a 500MW powerstation were proved in the Waikato, however the Power Planning Committee decided that the coal should be used for local industrial requirements.⁵³ With a change in Government in 1972 and their policies of promoting regional development and greater encouragement for the industry new mines

were opened, mechanisation encouraged and extensive geological surveys begun.⁵⁴ An extensive development programme to bring the 'inferred' and 'indicated' coal into the measured category so that thermal power stations could be planned was begun in 1974. The 1975 Power Plan indicated that a 480MW station in the Buller area using coal from the Denniston - Stockton area was feasible while coal was considered a possibility for Auckland No. 2 and Marsden B Power Stations.⁵⁵ A \$2M drilling programme in the Waikato coalfield has proved some extra 150M tonnes of sub-bituminous coal which could support a further coal fired power station based on a 50% coal recovery rate.⁵⁶ At present a \$27M expansion programme is underway to provide coal for the Huntly Power Station and industrial consumers of the area.⁵⁷

Until 1973 it was Government policy to let the coal industry run down although its importance as a source of energy to reduce demand for electricity (in industry) was acknowledged but no programme to actively encourage the industry was made.⁵⁸ With the planned increase in production both for industrial purposes and power generation the Mines Department hopes to begin a new era. At head office level a considerable degree of co-operation based on personal feelings, between NZED and Mines Department is apparent⁵⁹ (although a competitive stance is maintained on price negotiations for coal). The NZED is the one market which promises to bring the Mines Department from a situation of debt, decline and stagnation to a profitable, viable and expanding industry.⁶⁰

ELECTRICITY VERSUS GAS

The development of gas as an alternative energy source has been advocated by many and is the subject of considerable debate at present. With the discovery of Maui Gas old debates associated with Kapuni Gas reemerged on the merits of possible alternative gas uses.⁶¹ The Electricity industry and the Gas Industry have historically maintained attitudes of business competitors with each side accusing the other of take overs and unfair competition practises.⁶² The Electrical Supply Authorities see the Natural Gas industry as a threat to their share of the energy market and are reluctant to agree that greater development of this alternative energy resource is in the national interest claiming instead that their industry has the

ability, reticulation system and efficiency necessary to immediately meet the growing energy demand.⁶³

The gas industry has had a varied history of expansion and decline. Manufactured Gas was used extensively in the early 1900's gaining a peak in 1916 with 56 undertakings in operation. Over the last sixty years manufactured gas undertakings have received subsidies to prevent complete decline, under financial hardship on local authorities, and additional demand for electricity. In August 1971 the Gas Council retained W.S. Atkins and Partners to study the industry. The consultants proposals to increase subsidies and rationalise were unacceptable to the government.⁶⁴ Subsequently the Ministry of Energy Resources was directed to undertake detailed economic studies and make further recommendations on the industry's future. In December 1975 the Ministry of Energy Resources announced it would pay to the country's twelve manufactured gas undertakings increased subsidies (150% more than in 1974/75) to promote gas sales (help reduce electricity consumption) and to pay compensation for closure of undertakings which were financial liabilities on local authorities.⁶⁵ The output of the Manufactures Gas industry accounts for about 1% of the total energy market (mainly in South Island) and can be strategically improved for the national benefit.

Natural Gas was discovered at Kapuni in 1959 but it was not until 1967 that the Natural Gas Corporation began its work of promoting, selling and distributing gas to nine utilities in the North Island. Its use as a premium fuel followed recommendations to Parliament on the Utilisation of Kapuni Natural Gas in August 1964 and August 1965. Despite problems of very high leakages (caused by condition of coal gas reticulation systems) and conversion of appliances taking longer than expected the gas market continued to expand. The discovery of the large Maui gas field in 1969-70 lead to discussion on its use culminating in an agreement to establish a joint venture for the development of the field in 1973 between the Government and a consortium of Shell, BP and Todd.⁶⁶ A white paper produced in late 1973 confirmed that a large proportion of the gas would be used to generate electricity while quantities would be made available to meet the increased premium fuel demands of the domestic, industrial and commercial markets.⁶⁷ It is planned that gas production from the

field will begin in 1978 to be used by New Plymouth and Huntly Power Stations.

Production of Natural Gas cannot keep pace with present demand. In 1974 the NGC supplied 30% more gas than previously planned and in 1975 estimated demand was up by 66%.⁶⁸ This upsurge in demand promoted action to increase the capacity of Kapuni's treated gas output. A third processing train (unit to remove high CO₂ content in gas) capable of increasing output by 50% was commissioned recently. In addition Liquified Petroleum Gas facilities are to be increased to cater for production of 20,000tonnes p.a. instead of the 2,500 tonnes p.a. current capacity.⁶⁹ In 1974 Natural Gas accounted for 3% of the energy consumed and its share of the energy market is expected to rise to 10% by 1985 based on present use but excluding the proportion used for electricity generation.⁷⁰

THERMAL EFFICIENCY OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY

The White Paper on Development of the Maui Gas Field stated that

"burning the gas to fire boilers at power stations is a relatively inefficient use of natural gas."

(NZG.D5A 1973:15)

The relative thermal efficiency of using gas for electricity generation or as a premium fuel has been the subject of continued debate between representatives of the electricity industry and advocates for a more efficient use of the resource. When uses of the Kapuni Gas were being debated in 1964-1966 the government consultants which undertook feasibility studies stated in their report

"The useful energy available to the consumers in the form of gas can be expected to be three times as much as if it is delivered as electricity. Briefly stated the difference in useful energy delivered as gas or electricity lies in the different efficiency of handling and utilisation of the two energy forms. When utilised as electricity it is estimated that 20%-27% of the original gross heat is useful energy. When utilised as gas the range of useful energy is estimated to be from 55%-62% of the original gross heat."

(NZG D7.1964)

The New Zealand Institute of Engineers recognised that by using gas converted to electricity at a thermal efficiency of 30% twice as much is used as is necessary if gas was used directly at a thermal

efficiency of 60%. In a paper at the Energy Conference in 1974⁷¹ it was estimated that if gas was used directly in homes instead of through power stations over the next ten years (target 54,000 homes or equivalent converted to gas) at least one 1000MW. station would not have to be built and the nominal 30 year life Maui Gas would be extended by about 10%.

Despite this technical evidence electricity interests continue to debate the efficiencies and use a study referred to by Boswell (1973) to back up counter claims. The study by the Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co revealed that under field conditions a gas system operated at about 40% efficiency. The NZED General Manager has argued in a similar vein when discussing domestic use of the fuels. He accepts that in using gas for electricity two thirds of energy loss occurs in the generation process and about 8% loss in transmission and distribution but when the energy gets to the house its efficiency is 100%. In an all gas system he contends, that large losses occur in the treatment and transmission stages and when it gets to the house losses occur so that all things considered the efficiency of the two fuels is about the same.⁷² The Energy Resources Commissioner sums up the arguments

"This agreement is debated just about where ever you go in the world. We have done our own studies on this. The best you could say is that there is a positive advantage in distributing Natural gas for use as a premium fuel. When distributing it for domestic, commercial, and industrial purposes you do get a quantitative advantage over burning the gas for electricity generation."

(Supplement to the Proceedings of the Second Energy Conference 1975:41)

The competitive spirit between gas and electricity has led to many conflicts in past years.⁷³ Attempts at gaining control over the gas industry have been a feature of the Electrical Supply Authorities Association annual meetings. In 1957 the government established an Electricity and Gas co-ordination Committee which receives strong representation from the supply authorities suggesting that large numbers of gas undertakings be declared unessential and closed down. Despite those submissions only two gas undertakings were declared unessential. These were subsequently taken over by the Hutt Valley Electric Power Board and Ashburton Electric Power Board. When Kapuni Gas was discovered the Supply Authorities made

strong representations to allow the gas to be used for electricity, however, with the pressure from Gas interests supported by the Power Planning Committee the gas was not used in this manner. In 1969 the official journal of the Electric Supply Authority Engineers Institute suggested combining gas and electricity under one authority.⁷⁴ This suggestion was taken up in Dec 1973 when the Power Boards Association voted to nationalise private and public gas companies. Throughout 1974 the Supply Authorities maintained that amalgamating the two interests into an energy authority was a viable alternative to the governments local body legislation⁷⁵ which would amalgamate electricity authorities into Regional Councils and thus disband the ad hoc authorities.

Pricing policies of these two forms of energy have received much attention with gas interests claiming that the electricity tariffs were set to maintain a price edge over gas and ensure a larger market for the product.⁷⁶ (Pricing policies are a method to regulate and satisfy demand but the extent to which they are effective is an area of uncertainty). An election promise not to increase the bulk rate of electricity in 1972 led to a freeze until 1975 but with rising costs of electricity production (expensive capital outlay in thermal stations) the price of electricity was increased by 60% to Supply Authorities, effective from April 1976. The increased price gave natural gas a price advantage compared to electricity but the effect of that price structure is not known.

The desire to develop indigenous resources and to reduce the countrys dependence on imported fuels was a platform of the Labour Party in 1972.⁷⁷ After becoming the government a deal was completed to develop the Maui Gas Field. The gas contract assured NZED a supply of gas sufficient for them to plan for thermal power stations.⁷⁸ The development of the field proceeded on an "understanding" between the developers and the Minister of Electricity at the time that should gas be found it would be used for electricity generation.⁷⁹ Thus the Government was privately committed to using a large portion of the gas for electricity. However the contract allowed for the sale of gas to other parties at a specified price terms and conditions to be determined when it was used. The Natural Gas Corporation continued to claim that the commitment to use gas in electricity generation was wasteful, inefficient and better used through its

In 1975 the National Gas Corporation recommended to government that not all gas should be consumed but that a proportion should be made available for the domestic, commercial and industrial

A report by the Corporations General Manager in 1974 provided evidence that greater amounts should be available to the gas industry.⁸⁰ He claimed that an extended gas reticulation scheme to cover New Zealand would cost about \$262.5M or about one-quarter the cost of NZED proposed power station programme using gas.⁸¹ In Oct 1975 the Minister of Energy Resources announced that gas would be provided to the Natural Gas Corporation with significant quantities being diverted from electricity generation. He stated that

".....it can now be confirmed that the unlimited use of gas for electricity generation could not be justified when the opportunity exists to develop markets where it could be used more effectively.....the emphasis will be placed on sales which directly replace demand for electricity."
(Times, Oct 9 1975)

With its environmental and thermal advantages, increased sales and political support natural gas poses a serious challenge to the dominant position enjoyed by the electricity industry in policy formulation and sales of the product.

SUMMARY

My account of the use of energy portrays a system in change. I have attempted to explain the directions of the change by focusing on the processes of agreements and conflicts which occur on a pragmatic basis and may be reviewed or revoked at any time depending on their effect to the groups involved in this process. The absence of any overall governing structure steadily controlling energy policy is acknowledged by those who advocate it from politicians to academics.⁸² Energy use is characterised by an area in which a complex set of groups temporarily converge, make contact to pursue their respective aims and in so doing foster co-operation or ~~conflict~~ as a method of obtaining their goals. What becomes problematic and political is the degree of attainment of those goals and strategies used.

The electrical industry faces a time of crisis as its position in the supply of energy is being challenged. A shadow is cast across the supply Authorities intentions in determining power demand.⁸³ The basis

of their forecasts are not revealed⁸⁴ for information control allows greater flexibility to function effectively and defend themselves from ridicule should destructive information be exposed. However this sets limits on the direction of conflict with environmental groups and provides ~~sustenance~~ to maintain attacks.

NZED acts in regard to other groups taking account of past successes and failures. Environmental interests have caused the Department to take greater concern which necessitates modifying its traditional Engineering outlook in order for projects to be accepted.⁸⁵ The Development section of NZED has been concerned to justify demand and develop well researched technique for planning but has not tackled the underlying assumption on which their work rests. Their powerful position is being challenged as other specialist knowledge as well as their own is required for public debate.⁸⁶ Preparation of the Environmental Impact Report for Huntly and Auckland No. 1 indicate that there is a lack of trained staff capable of undertaking such studies and recommend policy alternatives.⁸⁷ The Engineers are used to counter misrepresentation and justify a nuclear programme ~~in the~~ face of controversy and use by ~~the~~ opposition of advocate Engineers/experts.⁸⁸

Informal alliances between Supply Authorities and NZED have been re-established following a change in General Managers. Such "agreements" between the Executive of Supply Authorities Association and NZED to maintain high projections in the face of considerable pressures indicate a strategy to achieve their goals which would include.

<u>Electrical Supply Authorities</u>	<u>NZED</u>
1. Maintenance of present competitive position in energy market.	1. Continued power construction programme ensured.
2. Increased supply available for consumption.	2. Demand for electricity met.
3. Increased revenue from sales.	3. Decreased dependence on government subsidy.
4. Continued growth expansion of industry.	4. Continued growth/expansion of dept "empire building"
5. Aims of association fulfilled.	5. Aims of Electrical Act 1968 fulfilled.
6. Needs of consumers met efficiently.	6. Personal satisfaction and importance as policy makers for electricity and in energy planning maintained.
7. Present independent ad hoc structure necessary.	
8. Political position retained	

Other alliances are formed e.g. an alliance between NZED and Mines Department ensures an alternative supply of fuel for the former and the prospect of recovery and expansion for the latter department.

Strategies designed to maintain lack of co-ordination are pursued to all groups' advantage in that initiative for action manoeuvrability and strength are retained since structures and programmes are not formulated to threaten these essential qualities. If mistakes occur the "buck" can be passed to other people or groups and if a major breakdown occurs lack of co-ordination provides a neat solution to such problems.⁸⁹

The ideology of individuals within the process should not be undervalued since they can choose to reflect their own industry's attitudes or they can move in other directions. The jockeying for favour in deliberations of Ministry of Energy Resources indicates more a desire to take up a position to influence policy than to cast aside the interests of an industry, but compromises are necessary. Government policies are increasingly exercised per medium of the Ministry of Energy Resources as it is required to make trade-offs in competing objectives and mediate between Government Departments. For example, Initial support to use Gas for Electricity has changed to favour greater use of Gas as a premium fuel thus ensuring continued expansion of that industry.⁹⁰ Mobilising support from groups advocating efficient use of gas the National Gas Corporation was provided with ethical reasons to support the co-ordination policies advocated by the Ministry of Energy Resources.

While the Ministry of Energy Resources lacks effective co-ordination it receives co-operation since it is seen as the Department to consult and the place where policy decisions effecting all energy industries are made to an increasing degree. NZED maintained its leadership position in the '60's for Electricity and Energy but is steadily losing the initiative. With the introduction of the Ministry of Energy Resources a number of clashes have resulted, but working co-operation continues when necessary.

The occurrence of any unexpected events can cause plans to be abandoned or modified and once noticed, must be interpreted, for example, the explosion of a commercial nuclear power station overseas would undoubtedly effect the timing of a decision to introduce Nuclear Power

in New Zealand. The decision of OPEC to raise the price of oil and impose embargos in 1973 proved the impetus to speed up energy plans.

If change is anticipated reappraisal will occur but the initiative for action is with those who perceive trends or accurately predict outcomes.

The change in government in 1975 resulted in combining the Ministries of Energy Resources, Electricity and Mines under one administration. The Minister for these Departments has indicated that the Ministry of Energy Resources will be reinforced to administer the total energy policy.⁹¹ An Energy Resources Planning Commission is to be established to overcome the lack of co-ordination that exists

"It is possible the new Commission will take over the existing Power Planning Committee whose operations are restricted to the narrower field of electricity."

(Times 10 January 1978)

Such a proposal would involve NZED in a choice either to resist and oppose or join and support a Commission. Any choice is problematic since it inevitably involves a down grading of Electrical Supply Authorities influence and greater uncertainty in the outcome of manoeuvres to achieve the purposes of NZED.⁹²

Circumstances between 1971/73 are of great importance to development of energy in NZ and demonstrate the culmination of facets in the political process. It was a time when the country through the principle efforts of NZED, was committed to an expenditure of \$1500M for thermal development over the next 10 years.⁹³ A new General Manager with different policies to his predecessor, was appointed in NZED. A fledgling Ministry of Energy Resources was established in 1972 without experience or resources comparable to NZED. A new Labour Minister took office from a Government which maintained financial restrictions on NZED and was reassessing energy planning but particularly the demand for electricity. With technical and political experience in energy planning, forecasts of demand (accurate over last 40 years) and leadership promoting electricity in competition to other fuels, the NZED took the initiative and was successful in committing the countrys economic manpower, and indigenous fuel resources to ensure a programme designed to meet the organisations aims. Whether or not such resources will remain committed in this direction is open to doubt but it can be assumed that NZED will

require strategies and negotiation to maintain its view of energy planning on N.Z.

POWER PLANNING AND HUNTLY POWER STATION

Huntly is important as the beginning of the thermal programme but to appreciate the decision to build it one should remember the proper context of bargaining and negotiation occurring at the time. In 1964 the need for a 1000MW thermal station to cater for Auckland's demand was established.⁹⁴ It had to be built by 1977 to meet the demand and Nuclear Power was seen as the answer since other indigenous fuels were considered insufficient by NZED. Site investigations by NZED were undertaken in subsequent years and in 1968 consultants were engaged to report on the Economics of Nuclear Generation in relation to other forms to determine the best way to meet the load growth in Auckland.⁹⁵

When Maui Gas was discovered in 1969 Preece, Cardew and Rider were asked to examine using gas for the station. Early in 1970 after preliminary results indicated that it was feasible to use gas the NZED tentatively planned the power station using gas.⁹⁶ This demonstrated the government's good faith in honouring a pledge to use gas for electricity should substantial quantities be discovered.⁹⁷ The 1970 power plan indicated that the gas should be used in this way but negotiation would need to be undertaken. However before the power plan was produced the Consortium developing Maui Gas felt it necessary to publically remind the Government that unless Gas was used for electricity it was not worth them developing the field.⁹⁸ Negotiations proceeded but were not concluded by May 1971 when the power plan needed to be 'firmed up'. Because the demand curves showed power was needed by 1977, and the long lead times involved in construction and design it was becoming imperative to have a definite decision on the fuel so that equipment could be ordered by late 1972. With no likelihood of an agreement over development of the gas NZED was placed in an invidious position. It needed a power station and quickly. A solution that would take the pressure off NZED and give the Government a greater time to negotiate price and conditions with the consortium was necessary. Uplifting Huntly from its 'pigeon hole' provided the solution.⁹⁹ Huntly had long

been considered a site for a medium sized coal fired thermal station. Preliminary studies to prove coal for a 'Steam Electric Generating Plant adjacent to Auckland' had indicated at least 12 million tons of open castable coal and 29 million tons of underground coal in the Waikato coalfields, 86 foot coal seams were discovered and thick coal was reported from boreholes to the north of Huntly.¹⁰⁰ 'The London Report' (1952) showed that a medium coal fired power station was feasible in the area. In 1955 Preece Cardew and Rider's feasibility study of a coal fired power station in the Waikato favoured Huntly as the site for a station. This was supported by Mines Department but in 1956 after considerable controversy the Government decided on the Mercer site using ^{one}third Maramaura coal and two-thirds Huntly coal. Interest in coal fired stations continued after MereMere was commissioned and the Mines Department undertook further studies to prove coal. A survey completed in 1963 concluded that at least half the proven reserves were capable of supporting a 500MW power station.¹⁰¹ In 1969 Mines Department surveys proved 'recoverable' coal reserves of 94 million tones in Huntly and 123 million tons in the general Waikato Coal field.¹⁰²

The 1964 Power Plan shows that NZED was aware of the coal reserves but decided not to use them. Latter surveys simply brought coal from the inferred and indicated category to the measured recoverable state. Considering that when fully operational the 1000MW Huntly Power Station will use 1.65 million tons per annum¹⁰³ the reserves proved by 1963 were adequate for the twenty-five year economic life of any thermal station that was required to be built.

Once the NZED decided that the Huntly project in 'cold storage' was possible Preece Cardew and Rider were instructed to prepare a Feasibility Report on the Station in November 1971.¹⁰⁴ This was completed in April 1972 and as there was no agreement over Maui Gas the Power Planning Committee recommended in May, to proceed with Huntly Power Station and delete Auckland No 1. Cabinet decided on 4 September 1972 to authorise NZED to proceed with design, planning and construction of the station so that projected demand would be met by the earliest possible date.¹⁰⁵ A change of Government in November 1972 delayed final approval until August 1973 however by

this time an agreement was reached over Maui Gas. It was decided that Huntly would initially burn gas then coal. The programme would correspond to Auckland No. 1 taking over gas supply as it became fully operational, while Huntly would become fuelled by coal.¹⁰⁶

Huntly plays a small part in the politics of energy use but it cannot be examined in isolation to the broader view since some of the issues effect the local scene. The Huntly Power Project has passed from being a pawn in the national game to a reality in a construction programme effecting local interests. There are distinct objectives to be obtained but the course is problematic. Local politicians and residents demand concessions which may set precedence for future projects, environmentalists may cause delay and extra expense. The intrusion of the Project into the established community of Huntly caused conflicts that required political action to smooth the process. This political action centred on the project is the subject of further analysis.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Coal Industry of New Zealand D9 1974:8
2. Energy Conservation. The Auckland Star, August 30 1975
3. Use of fossil fuels for thermal power production was advocated in 1966 by E.B. Mackenzie General Manager NZED in Forecasting and Meeting Demands for Electric Power in New Zealand. N.Z. Engineering Vol. 21,11 pp 478-484 1966. Also the rise in electricity demand and exhaustive use of hydro sites meant that fewer hydro sites available and necessity for thermal stations.
4. NZN Energy Research and Development Committee established April 1974 estimates \$400,000 to 31 March 1975 see Kennedy, R.J. Introductory Lecture Proceedings Second Energy Conference 1975 P.10, estimate of \$500,000 to 31 March 1976 see Labour Leads, Policies of Work 1975 P.44, and The N.Z. Energy Journal, 25 May 1975 for confirmation of above estimates.
5. Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975: 68-86.
6. ibid 1975: 68,69
7. ibid 1975: 69
8. ibid 1975: 69
9. ibid 1975: 37
10. See Hogg, R.J. 1974 Use of Petroleum and Coal in N.Z., Proceedings First Energy Conference 1974.
11. Government Policies for transport include car pooling permitted, speed limit, subsidised coastal shipping, increased price of petrol, preferential tax on diesel fuel, increased sales tax on motor vehicles. For further elaboration see Polaschek, R.J. Chairman of panel discussion in Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975: 16
12. Policy announced 1973-75 includes: Petroleum Amendment (No 2) Act 1975, White Paper on The Coal Industry of New Zealand 1974 Interest free loans for home insulation, loan finance for conversion of oil fired to coal fired industrial plant, increased bulk electricity tariff by 60% effective 1 April 1976.
13. See Bauer, H.E. Projections of Electrical Demand and Capacity. N.Z. Engineering Vol 29, 12, 1974: 340-345
14. See Kibblewhite A.C., Non Renewable Energy Resources Global and N.Z. Prospects, Proceedings of the N.Z. Energy Conference 1974.

15. See White Paper Development of the Maui Gas Field D5A 1973: 14,15.
16. See Maui Field Gas Reserves and Composition, Shell, B.P. and Todd Oil Services Ltd. Maui Development Ltd, September 1975. Maui Gas Reserves: (thousand million cubic feet)
- | | <u>Low</u> | <u>Middle</u> | <u>High</u> |
|-------------|------------|---------------|-------------|
| In Place | 7330 | 9150 | 11110 |
| Recoverable | 4870 | 6230 | 8000 |
- The middle range figures have a 50% chance of being exceeded. In the above estimates the middle figure can be compared with the estimates totals of 8428 (in place) and 5324 (Recoverable) in the white paper on Maui Gas 1975.
17. Development of the Maui Field D5A 1973:46
18. For example, Environmental Defence Society open letter to Prime Minister on Energy Policies April 1975.
19. See Bush gas challenges electricity's power. Times September 1975
20. See Mr R.J. Hogg comments Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975:41
21. See National Party Manifesto 1975
22. New Zealand Listener November 22 1975:16. Sites investigated include Firth of Thames, Kaipara Harbour, Barring Heads.
23. ibid 1975: 16
24. O'Callahan, R.M. The impact of National Gas on the NZN Scene. 1974 in Proceedings of the N.Z. Energy Conference.
25. See Committee to Review Power Requirements D6A 1975 and Proceedings of the N.Z. Energy Conference 1974 and Supplement to the Proceedings of the Second Energy Conference 1975. A research fellowship at Victoria University development of quantitative model ibid 1975:39.
26. Ministry of Energy Resources responsible for white papers Development of the Maui Gas Field (1973) and The Coal Industry of New Zealand. (1974) See ibid 1975:71
27. See Boswell, D.J. The Economic use of electrical energy resources 1973.
28. ibid 1973: 22,23
29. ibid 1973: 23,24
30. See A.W. Gooder, president, Electrical Supply Authorities Association 1971 quoted in Boswell 1973:24.

31. Mackenzie, E.B. Anatomy of electricity supply in New Zealand, N.Z. Engineering Vol 28, 4 1973
32. Mr Blakeley was formally assistant General Manager and before that Chief Engineer Development Section. Mr Mackenzie was Chief Engineer Planning and Development, then assistant General Manager, then General Manager 1963-72.
33. Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975: 27,28
34. ibid 1975; 27
35. ibid 1975: 68-73
36. Transactions of the 44th Annual Conference of the Electric Supply Authority Engineers' Institute, September 1973:82-84 (Discussion on power planning)
37. Boswell 1973:25
38. See Report of the Committee to Review Power Requirements D6A 1974:14
39. Quoted in Boswell 1973:24
40. Compiled by examining Report of the Committee to Review Power Requirements D6A 1975, 1974, 1973, D4A1972
41. See D6A 1974, 1975, Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975: 68,69
42. See Annual Report of the New Zealand Electricity Department 1973, D6, and Annual Report of the Ministry of Works and Development 1974, D1
43. See N.Z. Listener 29 November 1975
44. For a good discussion of the Lake Manapouri issue and the link with NZED See Boswell 1973:19
45. See Preliminary Environmental Impact Report on Auckland Thermal No 1 Power Station. August 1974. Commission for the Environment Audit January 1975.
46. For example Lake Manapouri and Change in site of Auckland Thermal No. 1 from proposed Te Atatu.
47. Boswell, 1973:25
48. See Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development, D4B 1971:10, D6B 1973:17.

49. See Minister of Energy Resources comments in Proceedings of N.Z. Energy Conference 1974:226 and Supplement to Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975:68-74
50. Hogg, R.J. Use of Petroleum and Coal in N.Z., Proceedings of the Energy Conference 1974:91.
51. See The Coal Industry of New Zealand, D9, 1974:59 for details of scheme.
52. ibid 1974: 17
53. See Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand D4B 1964:11,12
54. See Labour Leeds 1975:44 (statement of policy and progress)
55. Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand D6B 1975:10,11
56. New Zealand Coal Vol. 18, (4) 1974: 3
57. ibid 1974
58. The Coal Industry of New Zealand D9 1974:15-20
59. Comments of Under Secretary Miners Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975:69
60. The Coal Industry of New Zealand 1974: 48-51
61. Electrical Supply Authorities had argued that Kapuni Gas should be used to provide electricity as it was the only market big enough to give capital returns in minimum time period. Other alternative examined included a petro-chemical industry.
62. See Electricity and Gas at the Cross Roads 1974. Seminar
63. ibid 1974
64. ibid 1974
65. N.Z. Local Government Vo. 11, (12) Dec 1975 "Help For Gas Suppliers
66. See White Paper Development of the Maui Gas Field 1973:16-24
67. ibid 1973:250,251
68. See the N.Z. Energy Journal 25 January 1975:12
69. See Prime Ministers Address to Second Energy Conference 1975:6
70. The Demand and Supply of energy in N.Z., The N.Z. Energy Journal 25 May 1975

71. Stephenson, The Thermodynamics of Energy Conservation and Utilisation Proceedings of NZ Energy Conference 1974:64
72. Supplement to the Proceedings of the Second Energy Conference 1975:27
73. For an historical account see Worley R. in Gas and Electricity at the Cross Roads, Seminar 1974
74. New Zealand Electrical Journal Vol. 42, 9, 1969 Editorial
75. See N.Z. Local Government Vol. 11, 11 Nov 1975:57 and Vol. 11 12 Dec 1975: 3,5
76. In 1971 Prof Cowan undertook cost comparison study of electricity prices, his study and results quoted in Worley, R. Electricity and Gas in the Fuel and Energy Crises'. Prices for fuels as at 1974.
- | Auckland Gas | | Electricity (cents per therm) | |
|--------------------|-------|-------------------------------|-------|
| (cent per therm) | | | |
| Domestic | 31.7c | Domestic | 31.2c |
| Av.Industrial | 17.8c | Industrial | 34.0c |
| Special Industrial | 12.8c | Commercial | 49.8c |
77. Labour Party Manifesto 1972
78. Development of the Maui Gas Field D5A 1973:23
79. A private agreement between the Consortium Shell BP and Todd and Government in light of use of Kapuni stipulated that Government would use gas for electricity generation. See Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975: 42 "Speaker from the floor" was retired General Manager, Mr E.B. Mackenzie.
80. See O'Callahan R.M. The impact of Natural Gas on the N.Z. Scene, Proceedings of N.Z. Energy Conference 1974
81. Cost derived from ibid 1974 and estimate of costs based on programmed station development outlined in Footnote 78.
82. Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975:68-84
83. See Committee to Review Power Requirements D6A 1974, 1975
84. Environmental Groups have constantly asked NZED for the basis or criterion of electricity demand curves but have not been supplied with them. See Times October 1975:1 "Government" asked to reveal basis for power forecasts."

85. NZED has acknowledged, throughout its reports to parliament 1972-75 that there is a need to consider other aspects than Engineering technical matters.
86. This is particularly evident at the Water Rights hearings for Huntly Power Project, September 1973, and increasingly in the Nuclear Power issue experts from both sides of the fence are being used to demonstrate each view, particularly the use of overseas experts.
87. The Huntly Environmental Impact Report 1975 (un published) was compiled by Mr D.H. Jones. Power Project Co-ordination Engineer. The Commission for the Environments Audit on the Auckland thermal No.1 Power station stated there was need for greater interdisciplinary study. A time bar chart used for this project indicated a number of studies to be undertaken outside NZED because of lack of staff in those fields e.g. sociological town planning, atmospheric pollution, marine life.
88. See footnote 86. The First Energy Conference 1974 was notable in that an anti nuclear expert provided a key note address while in the second Energy Conference 1975 a pro nuclear expert provided the key note address.
89. This was the implication of comments made at the Second Energy Conference 1975. See Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975: 68-74
90. Compare statements made in Development of the Maui Gas Field D5A 1973:15 and Public Statement by Minister of Energy Resources. Times 9th February 1976 "Use more gas, not oil Holland asks New Zealanders".
91. See Public Statement by Minister of Energy Resources Electricity and Mines. Times 10 January 1976:3.
92. See NZG Electricity Act 1968: 5,6. Also the Supply Authorities faced further pressure at a regional level with the introduction of the Local Government Act 1974 which in time would dismantle the individual Supply Authorities and combine them under a Regional Council. The Supply Authorities presented submissions vigorously opposing the legislation claiming that their interests were challenged (Times 24 February 1974) in that electricity would be moved out of the direct area of supply becoming just another division under a Regional Council like transport, drainage roads etc. The revenue gained would be channelled away from the industry and used instead for the Council purposes. See N.Z. Local Government Vol 11, 11 Nov 1975:57 and Vol 11,12 December 1975:5.
93. This cost is based on present cost Huntly Power Station and 1975 values for half offshore gas development, total onshore estimates and capital cost of New Plymouth, Auckland No 1 and No 2 outlined in White Paper on Maui Gas Development 1973

(adjusted by inflation rate to 1975 values) and cost of Huntly coal expansion programme figure does not include devaluation in 1975.

94. Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand 1964:10
95. Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand D4B 1971:23-26.
96. ibid 1971:2A and D4B 1972:17-19
97. See footnote 79
98. See Development of the Maui Gas Field 1973:16-20
99. Reports. Annual Reports from Mines Department in 1971, 1969, 1964 C2 indicated results of coal surveys. Also D4B 1964 clearly showed that the Planning Committee were aware that Huntly was a good possibility the London Report 1952 proved that. Personal communication with NZED officials confirm that they were aware of the coal reserves and site contrary to officially published reports D4B. 1972:17.
100. See Kear, D. Potential Coal Sources for Steam-Electric Generating Plant Adjacent to Auckland, Coal Report 278, July 1951. Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. Wellington.
101. See footnote 94.
102. Annual Report of the Mines Department for year ended 31 December 1969. C2, 1970
103. New Zealand Coal Vol.18,4,1974. Also The Coal Industry of New Zealand 1974:50.
104. Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand. D4B 1972:17-19
105. Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 20th March 1974
106. Development of the Maui Gas Field D5A 1973:23

CHAPTER FOUR
HUNTLY POWER PROJECT
PLANNING FORUM

THE SETTING

Huntly is situated 60 miles South of Auckland and straddles the banks of the Waikato River. It is a small well established town of 5,310 (1971) people. It serves an adjacent rural farming community but owes its origin and early growth to coal mining - the largest single industry in the area. Commercial production began in the 1870's but it was not until after 1918 that most mines were opened. The period of expansion continued until the mid 1960's but began to decline thereafter. The population of Huntly and surrounding small mining towns followed the pattern of growth and stagnation. A sociological study conducted by Jones and Arnold in 1972 found that Huntly was in the process of an industrial decline due to a running down of the coal industry. A number of mines were closed - Pukemiro (1967), Glen Afton (1969), McDonald (1971), Renown (1972) - forcing people to leave the town.

In the early 1970's Huntly proved to be a neat solution to the country's energy problems of meeting electricity demand and buying time in Maui Gas price negotiations, and once again become poised for growth and expansion. Studies in 1955 had suggested that Huntly was a good site for the then proposed thermal power station. Considerable controversy was ended in 1956 when the Government decided on the Mercer site for the MereMere Coal fired power station much against the recommendation of the Mines Department and community leaders in Huntly. However events of the '50's were not repeated and in 1973 official approval was given to construct a 1000MW coal and gas fired power station in Huntly. An election promise to develop indigenous energy resources and ensure full utilisation of coal reversed previous policies of retirement and non-replacement of miners. Operation of Huntly's existing mines were extended and a \$27M programmed development to provide coal for the power station, industrial and domestic consumers was approved in 1974. As a result 200 extra miners

will be required to develop three new mechanised underground coal mines and one opencast mine. The decision to use Huntly coal is expected to boost consumption by 70% by 1985 to meet the station coal demand of 1,600,000 tons per annum. At present the Huntly coal fields provide one-third of N.Z. coal requirements.

Huntly Borough will have its population increased the estimated influx of 5,000 people related to project construction. The 'new' community, based on past industrial boom towns, will be multi cultural, skilled, young and mobile. Because of the transient nature of such construction workers it is unlikely to settle or 'put roots down' in Huntly for any length of time. The 'new' community will stand in marked contrast to the 'old' and stable community. Jones and Arnold (1972) found that 'old' Huntly was predominantly lower middle class with a high proportion of British immigrants. The close knit community was inward looking and had a good knowledge of local affairs and politics.

To the North West of Huntly in Raglan County adjacent to the project site is the Waahi Marae and related settlements of Te Kauri and Rakaumanga. This area has tremendous cultural and historical significance to the Maori people and particularly the Waikato tribes. Under the 1863 N.Z. Settlements Act, 1,202,172 acres of Maori land in the Waikato was confiscated. After the land war of 1863-64 Waahi Marae became the central focus of the Maori King Movement and remains the ancestral home of the Maori Queen. Today about 200 acres remain as the remnants of Government confiscation policies (Mahuta 1974) and approximately 300 Maoris reside near Waahi although it is estimated that about 2,000 people have kin and tribal ties which regularly bring them back to family and tribal rituals during the year.

It is in this setting that the project is currently being developed to meet a commissioning deadline of April 1978, for the first of Huntly's four generating units. The problematic courses of action needed to complete the project in the 'national interest' and solve attendant problems, such as water rights, housing, pipeline route and roading, illustrate the processes of power which are examined in specific cases subsequent to an analysis of the Huntly Power Project Planning Forum.

HUNTLY POWER PROJECT PLANNING FORUM

Planning implies co-ordination and fitting together collective lines of action directed to achieving a goal. The general goal, to complete the power station, is necessarily interrelated and dependent upon the successful achievement of solving problems which could threaten the general goal. The degree of co-ordination, the direction it took could be achieved in a variety of ways but the creation of the Huntly Power Project Planning Forum (hereafter called the Forum) illustrates a particular process of power derived from an administrative ideology to provide a context in which problematic situations could be directed or solved.

The Forum is not a statutory body and has no legal authority to make decisions. Its terms of reference specifically exclude any decision making function.¹ A communication link is provided to the Minister of Works and Development, Minister of Electricity, and Government caucus through two Forum members, the Member of Parliament for Western Maori and Member of Parliament for Raglan. In addition, the Departmental representatives provide a communication link to their respective department heads. The Forum's membership can fluctuate from time to time if people are co-opted but there is a core group consisting of twelve members. These are District Commissioner of Works, Ministry of Works and Development (chairman), Member of Parliament for Raglan, Member of Parliament for Western Maori, Mayor of Huntly Borough Council, Chairman of Raglan County Council, Project Engineer (MOWD) Huntly Power Project, Project Engineer (NZED) Huntly Power Project, Power Project Co-ordination Engineer (NZED) District Manager of Mines Department, Maori Community Representative, Federated Farmers Representative (co-opted) Chairman Waikato County Council (co-opted).² There is a fringe group which attends the meetings and often speaks at them although they are not formally members. This fringe group consists of Waikato County Council - Huntly Borough Council Engineer, Assistant District Manager Mines Department Huntly, District Manager NZED Hamilton, Pukemiro Riding Member of Raglan County Council. From time to time representatives of an organisation are co-opted for a meeting or attend at the invitation of the Forum. Such representatives have included, South Auckland Education Board Architect, Maui Project Pipeline Engineer, Consultant Architects, Huntly Borough Councillors and

Lower Waikato Rugby Union Representative.

The membership (both formal and informal) of the Forum is predominantly appointed Government Officials who occupy senior positions in their Department organisation. The local interest representatives form a minority and are elected representatives of interest groups.

Forum meetings are held about once per month in the Huntly Borough Council Chambers and last for about four hours. The Forum members sit around a large semi-circular table with the Chairman and Members of Parliament sitting at a raised desk overlooking the other members. To one side is a Press bench and dotted around the room are a number of chairs and usually one or two map or photograph displays of the Power Project. The meetings follow a formal agenda including minutes and matters of the previous meeting, individual Departmental reports and general discussion. Meetings are semi public in that the Press can attend but by convention the public do not attend. On occasions the Forum can move into 'in committee' and the Press are asked to respect the confidential nature of the discussion. While confidential Forum discussion was quite frequent in the early stages of the Forum it was rarely used in 1975.³ Services such as typing circulating minutes, town and country planning, graphic displays etc are supplied by the Ministry of Works and Development in Hamilton. There is one subcommittee of the Forum called the Technical Advisory Committee⁴ which dealt such matters as the proposed Marae redevelopment and the extended planning study of Huntly.

The first meeting of the Forum was held on 21 December 1973. Establishing the Forum was motivated by a genuine desire on the part of the District Commissioner of Works to rectify a problem he saw developing at Huntly and as a result of a deputation made to him by Local Authority Representatives in mid 1973. He suggested the idea to the Minister of Works and Development who together with the Minister of Electricity gave their support for the Forum to be set up.⁵

"Word got to me that there was concern about what was going to happen at Huntly. They told me the problems, the questions that were asked and couldn't be answered.....there was only a certain amount of information available on matters of concern such as Rakaumanga School, Temporary Bridge, Water Rights, Coal conveyor route etc. Some felt that there was a lack of commitment, ignorance and misunderstandings developing over the effects of

the Project so we decided to set up the Forum to co-ordinate and explain these things to the people in an effort to make the situation better."

(District Commissioner of Works
1975)⁶

The Raglan County Council chairman who was a party to the initial decision to establish a Forum maintained similar views as to why the Forum was established

"It provided an answer to channel complaints and to hold things at a reasonable level so nothing got out of hand. It was to provide a buffer against public opinion and the Government itself and finally it was a genuine attempt to answer questions that various groups had and could raise and to provide an opportunity for them to contribute."

(R.C.C. Chairman 1975)⁷

The concept of a Forum was a new one in New Zealand. A Power Station Liaison Committee was established in 1969-71 related to the Auckland Thermal No. 1 scheme to assure local organisations that there was nothing to worry about the siting of it at Te Atatu. It was an NZED organised structure and did extend membership to other Departments.⁸ The suggestion of a Forum much wider in membership and scope than anything ever before experienced met with some opposition from the Maori Community and NZED.⁹ The NZED was in favour of its normal mode of working through the appropriate Local Authority but recognised that the Project Engineer assisted by an Information - Public Relations Officer and possibly a Maori Liaison officer could operate an effective local liaison between Government Departments and the local community.¹⁰ The Maori community was unsure as to what could be achieved by the Forum and suggested that a public relations meeting would not solve their problems and the proposed Forum could be a place to 'bury' difficult or embarrassing issues.¹¹ Despite this initial opposition to become involved all parties agreed to co-operate and establish the Forum. While some regarded it with suspicion and doubted its usefulness and function the Local Authority representatives initially saw the Forum as a formal channel to obtain information and discuss issues.¹² In the planning stage of the Forum it was envisaged that the Maoris would be represented because the Maori community would be immediately and significantly affected by the Project.¹³ However when the Federated Farmers became aware that the Forum was to be established they wanted representation.¹⁴ The District Commissioner of Works argued that they were represented by the

Raglan County Council (RCC) but agreed that if their interests were being discussed they would be invited. He argued that a precedent could not be set which permitted 'every Tom Dick and Harry' to be represented at the Forum.¹⁵ At the first Forum meeting the Farmers were not present and the Member of Parliament for Raglan urged that they be co-opted for future meetings.¹⁶ At the second Forum meeting it was resolved that the Farmers could attend the Forum as co-opted members with their representation to be affirmed at each meeting. After three successive meetings it became automatic for the Farmers to be represented and the formal co-opting agreement was dispensed with, but they still remained co-opted members.

Since the Forum was established there has been relatively few changes in membership. The Mines Department changed its representative in November 1974 as did the Huntly Borough Council as a result of a new Mayor in the Local Body Elections in October 1974. The Farmers changed their representative in May 1975 and NZED changed its representative two months later in July 1975. While both the Mines Department and Farmers representatives knew the history and reasons for establishing the Forum the new NZED representative and Mayor were not initially aware of the Forum's history, how it was established or by whom.¹⁷

The essential nature of the Forum is inherently political as hazardous situations occur and the Forum attempts to encourage negotiation agreements and understandings among its members.¹⁸ Although its terms of reference exclude decision making functions it never the less is involved in decision making and groups try to exert power. Situations are discussed, courses of action are decided, members commit themselves to certain agreements and specific recommendations are put to the meeting, debated and endorsed.¹⁹ Thus power is exercised through a negotiative interaction relationship among the individuals representing collective interests.

Any project such as Huntly requires for its smooth progress a planning atmosphere where obstruction delay and conflict can be minimised. The Forum provides for negotiation by bringing together diverse interest groups involved with and in the project. Conflict occurs among the Forum members because of different demands, ideologies and perceptions they bring to the situation and their attempts to promote action according

to their self interest.²⁰ The ability to influence any situation will in part depend on the range of resources any member can muster or what attributes others ascribe to him. For example, the NZED can counter environmental groups scientific evidence at water rights hearings by impressing upon all those people relevant to the case²¹ the extensive biological investigations undertaken and the overseas trips undertaken by Departmental Officials to establish the facts and investigate alternatives. The dramatic staging of a deputation and use of the Media by the Farmers highlighted their concern over roads in the area of the project and served as an endeavour to get Forum members attention focused on the problem and reach some agreement.²² The Maori community perceived that a course of action open to them to voice their concern about possible effects of the station on them was to use legal channels to obtain concession from NZED over water rights.²³ Reinforcing a message to the effect that time was of the utmost importance, the Maui Pipeline Project representatives impressed upon the Forum and landowners that a route for the pipeline had to be finalised quickly to get gas to the station by the target date. A particular route was suggested and it was hoped the landowners (Maori, RCC, Farmers) would readily agree and accept the situation.²⁴

The interests represented at the Forum make different demands which limits the thrust of the Forum from one issue to another to another in an indeterminate pattern. For example, The Maoris seek improvements to their Marae.²⁵ The Huntly Borough Council (HBC) seek financial relief from the Project because of the pressure placed on town facilities.²⁶ The Farmers seek to upgrade roads in the area to protect their livelihood. The Ministry of Works and Development (MWD) needs manpower, housing and borough facilities for the Project. These demands permit the groups to coalesce and form alliances on issues for specified lengths of time. For example, the Raglan County Council (RCC) (a rural electorate) supported the Farmers to obtain a satisfactory solution to the roading issue. The MWD and NZED formed a mutual alliance to complete the construction of the Project. The HBC and Maori community gave reciprocal support for their respective claims for finance under the Electricity Act 1968.

The ideological positions held by Forum members allows them to justify actions and manoeuvre in difficult situations so as to retain

some control over the action. The RCC representative adopts an attitude not to 'milk the state cow' and 'justice should be done' which is often utilised to gain public support, appear reasonable in dealing with Government Departments or explain failures.²⁷ The bureaucratic emphasis on due process and proper channels to follow, permitted the Chairman not to make an agreement with the Farmers on the Roding issue.²⁸ The NZED member of the Forum by evoking a civil servant ethic that he personally could not make a decision (acting irresponsible in terms of the Forum and Department) permitted him not to make a commitment at the Forum in respect of the Maori's Marae re-development proposals²⁹ but at other times, for example, at Minister of Works and Developments suggestion that the Forum act as a 'clearing house' for the Technical Advisory Report,³⁰ he participated in endorsing recommendations. The Forum provides an example of the administrative bureaucratic view where behaviour is guided by rules (e.g. one does not interrupt when others are speaking, or disagree with the ruling of the chair, or call people insulting names, or wear beach shorts to the meeting or sit in the chairmans seat, or smoke and so on) and rational reasoned discussion takes place³¹ (however there are exceptions). The members maintain the procedure of the meeting by continually reinforcing, reaffirming and participating in the Forum. Thus the administrative view has meaning which is continued at each successive meeting. The Forum provides a buffer between the Government Department and the Local interest groups since they agree to act towards the situation by reaffirming the purpose of the Forum. As all members of the Forum are involved in administrative bureaucratic procedures to a greater or lesser degree and are committed to using it themselves they support the ritual ceremony of the Forum because they are aware of its usefulness and limitations³² in trying to achieve their aims. One of the main purposes of the Forum was to promote liaison and co-operation. When Departmental reports are presented from the Project Engineers and NZED co-ordination Engineer they impart a considerable amount of information e.g. no. of houses planned, intentions in town planning, nos of workers on site, design and progress of look-out, Environmental Impact Report and so on. It is usually of a technical nature but ~~at~~ ^{they} respond to questioning and discussion regarding policy matters, future intentions of aspects of the Project if they are raised by the local interest representatives when they are giving

their report or in general discussion, however as a general rule if a policy matter has not been discussed at the Forum previously the Departmental representatives tend to be evasive and non committal. e.g. Mines Department assurances on water levels, or method and type of compensation to farmers paid by NZED for transmission lines.³³ By imparting such information NZED representatives particularly feel that the aims of the Forum are being fulfilled. The NZED District Manager often claims that "The Forum is a perfect example of co-operation!"³⁴ The continued emphasis on this symbol and the giving of information has been successful in relation to some groups in the town who view the Forum at a distance. The Local Progressive Association saw it as a "highly successful exercise in democracy where information and ideas are freely exchanged."³⁵

Actions of the interest groups are related to their perception of any situation and their ability to get others to accept their particular interpretation of that situation. This process is occurring by all groups concerned but not all the 'impressions' are perceived as intended (as the case studies show) for example The Farmers continually stress that many activities e.g. Coal mining, coal cartage, transmission lines and gas pipeline routes, will seriously effect them and try to get other Forum members to accept their viewpoint. However most Forum members do not accept that the Farmers will be seriously effected.³⁶ The negotiation (including conflict and consensus) is created by the individuals attempting to define a situation in terms that others will accept and vice versa. As issues evolve and circumstances change the order created is an ongoing flexible one as new conflicts emerge, alliances formed broken and reformed.

The Forum's success may be judged on the ability to achieve a negotiated settlement. The establishment of dialogue and rational discussion among interest groups has encouraged some to alter goals or change opinions.³⁷ This attempt to 'win them over' can be seen as a major function of the Forum.

"The Forum provides a necessary conclave for dialogue of all interested parties, the flow through of information is quite good....its achieving its purpose."

(Mayor of Huntly 1975)

The attempt to create communication by establishing a ritualised discussion place allows for the transformation of power to interest

groups and Local Authorities providing they abide by the rules in a negotiative situation where each individual is attempting to put forward certain points.

"It provides a steadying effect, the Government Departments can't do too much otherwise it will be brought up at the Forum....it stops them running away on private hobby horses (and they have a few)."

(Farmers Representative 1975)

The Forum in itself has been successful in by-passing legal procedures yet forstalling conflict on a large scale. The best use is its ability to by-pass the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 regulations, a problematic situation in which the Forum achieved considerable success in negotiating acceptable settlements among interest groups, for example the Baker Block issue.³⁸

"The Town and Country Planning procedures were not followed and the Forum provided an opportunity to consider the issues that could have been raised under the Act but without the delay that would have been incurred if the full procedures were followed, however we have made provision for considering the things which were raised at the time."³⁹

(Project Engineer 1975)

The Forum has further been successful in providing a forum for interest groups to present their positions, concerns etc, and allowing other members to understand the problems and impart important information to the Government.

"Any recommendations made by the Forum must be listened to by the Minister concerned....it would be an unwise Minister who disregarded the Forum's advice."

(Farmers representative 1974)

In this sense the Forum allows individuals to apportion responsibility and encourages the acceptance of negotiated settlements.

"The Maoris are more immediately, clearly and directly effected by the station. People are necessarily careful to ensure that the Maori people are given proper consideration..."

(Project Engineer 1975)

"A lot of notice is taken of the things brought up at the Forum and things are followed up."

(NZED Project Co-ordination Engineer 1975)

It is perhaps for the Government Departments that the success of the Forum is most evident.

"The Forum as a structure should be more balanced with community groups. At present it's weighted in favour of Government Departments."

(Maori Representative 1975)

The Government Departments provide the greatest amount of information given at the Forum and they can easily influence the demands and perceptions of the situation by the other interest groups.⁴⁰

"The Chairman should be changed to be more impartial, he has a vested interest and can steer you away from certain discussions."

(Farmers Representative 1974)

The Government Departments can easily point to the consequences of delay in discussing issues for example, the oft imagined bogey that the project will not be finished on time, and they are able to emphasis their own activity individually and collectively (e.g. through reports at Forum) in a situation where the smaller interest groups (usually without parallel in their experience and lacking the large resources of Government Departments) are necessarily fragmented by their competing interests at a local level. The Government Departments are also able to use confidential information to justify their position without fear of public recrimination. This use of confidential information sometimes imparted by experts brought to the Forum e.g. Maui Pipeline Routes, helps Government Departments to 'convince' members to accept their impressions of the situation as the members become 'co-conspirators in the plot'. The Government Departments particularly the MWD, are able to act in relation to outside bodies and interest groups developing a pay back system for help and support given for the Project, for example, the Forum Chairman is also Chairman of No.2B District Roads Council and lobbied in support of a \$30,000 National Roads Board contribution to Huntly Borough Councils town planning scheme.⁴¹ This is both an actual and perceived impression that local groups have which acts to effectively stall open opposition to the Projects development at important times.⁴² The local groups are aware that the Government Departments control financial resources and particularly the MWD at a local level (roading, townplanning, services, zoning etc) and are reluctant to antagonise them at the Forum or on a person to person basis although outside the Forum and using different people the interest groups may attack the Departments.⁴³

Two examples provide evidence of the successful achievement of negotiated settlements by interest groups.⁴⁴ A dispute over boundaries associated with the Baker block housing development between Raglan County Council and Huntly Borough Council saw the active participation

of project officials, representing the MWD and NZED, to bring about a settlement. In this instance the symbol of the need to complete the time and minimise delay was used as a lever to obtain agreement.

"It is important that we get agreement as soon as possible because its the projects future needs we have to plan for now."⁴⁵

(Project Official 25 March 1974)

The Waahi Marae redevelopment scheme⁴⁶ provides an example of a smaller interest group supported by the larger and more powerful Raglan County Council to achieve a desired end. The RCC representative believed that the Maoris would be the most effected by the station and should receive support so that they could gain some benefits and not be 'worse off' or detrimentally effected. He believed they should have a 'fair deal'.⁴⁷ In proposing their redevelopment scheme the Maoris used architectural consultant experts to present and explain the scheme in an attempt to impress upon the Forum members and particularly the NZED, that it was worthy of support and should receive some financial backing from NZED. While not achieving all their demands the Maoris successfully negotiated and obtained some assistance from NZED in landscaping the environs and raising the level of the Marae.⁴⁸

The Forum has been unsuccessful in other aspects. Some members of the Forum see it as providing few tangible benefits serving to inform rather than make decisions.

"Basically the Forum is a public relations exercise to give a veneer or facade of consultation. It is not benefiting us in terms of the concerns we expressed....change will only come through litigation."

(Maori Representative 1975)

"It has no executive powers, but it must have some powers otherwise we are wasting our time. Everyone blithely talks and does nothing about things."

(Farmers Representative 1975)

A problem associated with the Forum was the fact that many issues arose and were solved before the Forum was established.

"The Forum should have been set up two years earlier when roading, housing, sewage and water supply problems etc could have been overcome, now we are presented with a 'fait accompli' which revolve around the short term aims of the project."

(Farmers Representative 1974)

The development of these problems in the absence of a Forum encouraged alternative meetings on specific issues to resolve discontent.⁴⁹ They took the form of face to face meetings between the interest groups concerned. The lack of direct success in the Forum itself to achieve solutions can be seen in the fact that small intimate face to face meetings outside or associated (before or after) with the Forum still continue and are seen by most members of the Forum to be of greater value in negotiation, for example,

"Yes small private discussions achieve more. One can discuss details at a practical level whereas at the Forum, things remain at policy level which are continually expounded....they need to be translated into action, its the detailed discussion that can do this."

(Maori Representative 1975)

"Yes discussions outside the Forum achieve more, when it first started off. I made more arrangements with Departmental Officials over the lounge bar of the Huntly Hotel than the Forum to get things done."

(Raglan County Council Representative
1975)

"The informal meetings are a part of the total process, much of decision making is through direct personal contact, people talking at head office, or people coming here to talk to us, we get a ring and the problem is solved, usually there is no need for formal meetings."

(Project Engineer 1975)

The acknowledgement that other meetings are more useful in reaching agreements than the Forum could be seen as a failure of the Forum in that it is not always providing the buffer between Government Departments and local interests but because of its very nature, the public view the ritual that is performed by all members, necessitates and forces members into private informal meetings to achieve agreements which if one party is unwilling or unable to undertake such meetings could result in lack of co-operation and conflict.⁵⁰

The visit of the Minister of Electricity in May 1975⁵¹ provides an example of the changing perceptions and uses of the Forum by the various interests. When the Minister arrived at the Forum direct appeals to him on matters of concern to the Borough were raised by the Mayor which he had not been prepared to raise through the Government representatives on the Forum.⁵² The Minister's appearance allowed him to use another channel of communication to voice concerns however subsequent attempts on another occasion to use the Minister directly met with

considerable opposition from the Chairman of the Forum.⁵³ In his report the NZED co-ordination Engineer stressed the value and benefit of the Forum in helping to solve some local problems and ensuring the project interests were not unduly hindered. He also stressed the great concern NZED had for the local people especially the Maoris, and the way NZED tried to co-operate with everyone.⁵⁴ The Maoris and Farmers raised a possible problem concerned with siting and surveying transmission lines and asked for assurances that there would be no adverse effects. While they did not receive a definite assurance the Minister expressed his belief that the Forum was 'doing its Job' and could solve any problems that might arise. The Minister's speech was weighted heavily on the importance to achieve the construction deadline so that a national demand for electricity could be met. He stressed the need to safeguard the environment and people of the area against possible harmful effects of the Project and the Forum was doing a good job to provide feedback and maintain co-operation and liaison with Government and the local interests.⁵⁵

The Ministers visit provided an extra 'boost' to the value of the work the Forum was to achieve. Clearly both the Minister and his Departmental representative perceived the Forum to be of great value and was achieving its aims.⁵⁶ The local interests groups raised a few matters of concern but did not attempt to list a host of problems or seek firm agreements and solutions.⁵⁷ They demonstrated that consultation, discussion and negotiation were taking place within the confines of the Forum and the Minister acted to assure all concerned that the Forum had value and his support.⁵⁸

The Forum was established for many reasons and its historical context is important when examining why it was established. A situation was prevailing where the local interests were not able to obtain information about the project. Concerned groups of Maoris and Farmers had publicly voiced their fear of the effects of the Project on their interests.⁵⁹ A general concern that people should be involved with and in major projects such as the power station was beginning to emerge and was strengthened by the Labour Government.⁶⁰ The Forum provided an opportunity to involve local groups and particularly the Maoris who had pushed their grievances further than any other group.⁶¹ As all groups accepted the role of the Forum and agreed to give it

their support the Forum achieved a balancing effect in which the participants felt obliged to at least inform the Forum of their intentions rather than to act without regard to the co-operative aim of the Forum.⁶² While Forum members were not compelled to clear everything through the Forum the fact that it was a procedure to avert possible problems meant that in some instances at least (e.g.

Block, Sports complex) members brought things for resolution by amicable agreement and discussion, although that usually involved bargaining for resources held by the Government Departments.⁶³ The Government Departments committed to the Forum as they attempted to co-operate by imparting detailed information (e.g. contract price, No.'s of houses, how many employed on site etc) but reveal little of their forward planning or their intentions.⁶⁴ At times however agreements are made to meet outside the Forum and discuss things in detail and perhaps resolve an issue.⁶⁵ The fact that the Forum is used in this way, is a point from which to begin detailed discussion and bring people together to do this, leads some members to express scepticism of the value of such a device as the Forum for consultative purposes and co-operation. It is clear that co-operation if it is to occur, although I prefer to use the term negotiation, occurs both in an intimate face to face situation, where many of the 'deals' or agreements are made, and in a public Forum meeting which ratifies the agreement. In the former case some members of the Forum will be excluded as others perceive them as not intimately affected or their presence relevant to the issue under discussion.⁶⁶ Thus when things are presented to the Forum some members may feel left out, not consulted and therefore unable to co-operate.⁶⁷

When asked to judge the success of the Forum the chairman replied that it could only be judged by thinking of the possible adverse publicity that might have arisen if the Forum was not established.⁶⁸ In this respect the Forum has been successful and publicity prejudicial to the Project has been minimal. However this does not mean that problems are not occurring or have ceased, as the initial (basic) decisions have been made. The negotiation concept is one which stresses the ongoing and continual nature of social interaction. A press report can only be the end point in one particular moment of an ongoing and complex process. Problems are occurring in Huntly regardless of the

Forum or the effort made by its members. Outside directives by Government have inevitably caused conflicts and negotiation at a local level.⁶⁹ Internal organisational structures of Government Departments ensure that planned activities are kept within the organisation at planning stages and day to day discussions and work on future activities traditionally takes place within the organisation.

of splitting up interests and activities is reinforced by the goals of the Departments to examine and concern themselves with things relevant to the Department. Hence the situation where a problem is a Mines Department problem or a Ministry of Works and Development problem and so on. The Forum permits co-ordination between Government Departments to occur but the Departments' representatives may feel that problems are not their particular responsibility and they should not try to make them their responsibility.⁷⁰ This can be seen as an influence militating against co-operation and liaison at the public level of interaction.

Many problems have been discussed at the Forum and action taken to solve them which has emanated from the Forum members at or adjacent to Forum meetings, but in some circumstances e.g. Water Rights, Tavern Licence, political action has been outside and maintained outside the Forum itself with little attempt to focus the Forum's attention on the Issue. The granting of Water Rights before the Forum was established and subsequent discussions and conflict over water Rights when the Forum was operating illustrate a reluctance to involve the Forum by the parties concerned. Its usefulness is non-existent as the appropriate channel to resolve the dispute is a legal judgement. The informal meetings and prior negotiation took place but the Forum as a collective was not involved. Thus while the Forum could deal with many problems associated with the project there were some that remained outside its influence by mutual agreement among the participants for indeterminate lengths of time.⁷¹

The value of a Forum is determined by the members who contribute and act towards it on the basis of their understanding of its symbolic meaning (co-operation, compromise) for them and the interests they represent. Members will criticise it in one breath and praise it in the next. The Forum is both successful and unsuccessful yet to determine its influence on the political activity associated with

the Project, analysis must consider not only the Forum, but also the events and activities, the problems, the subject of negotiation which characterise and constitute political action.

FOOTNOTES

1. Terms of Reference
1. To discuss forward planning associated with Huntly Power Station including site development, single and married accommodation, mining operations, services reticulation, town planning etc.
 2. To advise government agencies through their representatives on the forum on the effect of the various aspects of developmental work associated with the station on the physical and sociological environment of the area and make recommendations where deemed warranted.
 3. To discuss matters brought forward on behalf of the local community and act appropriately on these matters through the recognised channels.
 4. To keep local authorities and the Maori community informed of forward planning proposals as and when they may be affected.
 5. To co-opt the advice of specialists or representatives of ad hoc organisations as deemed necessary to assist the Forum in its deliberations.
 6. The Forum will not be a decision making body nor will it deal with day to day problems arising from construction activities on the site or associated there with (the latter will be handled directly by the Departmental controlling officers on the site or the liaison committee).
 7. To act as the role of 'clearing house' for recommendations made by the Technical Advisory Committee.
2. The names of the persons as listed are: Mr R. Hermans, Ms M. Waring (Mr Carter) M.P., Mr K. Wetere M.P., Mr R. Wright (Mr T. Gavin), Mr R. Kellow, Mr B. Denton, Mr T. Levett, Mr J.W. Malcolmson (Mr D.H. Jones), Mr J.E. Holm, Mr R.T. Mahuta, Mr J. Chadwick (Mr T. Pask), Mr T.C. Henderson.
 3. A review of the minutes will show that in 1974 the Forum used the 'in committee' provision five times and in 1975 nil times, e.g. Maui Pipeline Route, Baker housing Block.
 4. This sub-committee was initially established to examine a Marae redevelopment proposal in November 1974 but reconstituted into a broader committee examining Huntly Town Planning at the direction of the Minister of Works and Development in March 1975.
 5. Comment in private conversation but in public statement issued at First meeting 21 December 1973.
 6. Private conversation with author 1975.
 7. Private conversation with author 1975.
 8. See Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand D4B 1971:11

9. See Letter from Mr R.B.Mahuta to Minister of Electricity dated 13 November 1973. Re NZED attitude see internal memorandum to Chief Engineer from D.H. Jones dated 11 October 1973. Comments on Submissions made Public meetings 30 September and 1 October 1973. File 21/90/1 PLE and private conversation with RCC Chairman.
10. Internal Memorandum to Chief Engineer from D.H. Jones, 11 October 1973 P1,5 File 21/90/1 PLE. Huntly Power Station Comments on Submissions made public meetings 30 September and 1 October 1973.
11. Letter from Mr. R.B. Mahuta to Minister of Electricity 13 November 1973.
12. See minutes of Forum 21 December 1973. Mr Carter MP address in which he said, ^{times} channel for communication to protect the project. Raglan County Council and Huntly Borough Council similar comments. Private conversations with author 1975 also confirm these attitudes.
13. Private conversation with District Commissioner of Works and Project Engineer 1975 see case study on siting the Power Project for issues affecting them. e.g. Rakaumanga School.
14. Comments and resolutions of Meeting on 1 October 1973 at Ruawaro Hall. See also letter to Minister of Electricity from Mr J.W. Peek, Hon. Sec Rotongaro Branch Federated Farmers dated 10 October 1973 and D.H. Jones comments on the meeting 1 October 1973 in internal memorandum to Chief Engineer referred to above.
15. Private conversation with author 1975.
16. See Forum minutes 21 December 1973: 2
17. Private conversation with Mr Malcolmson NZED 1975 and Mayor of Huntly Mr R.A. Wright 1975. The Author was able to inform these persons of the origins of the Forum.
18. For example Baker Housing Block, Huntly Planning Studies, Roading issue.
19. For example Sports Complex resolutions September 1975 Forum meeting, Marae Town Planning proposals November 1974. Mines Department agreement to consult MWD 29 July 1974. Forum Meeting, possible lowering of water table to farmers by Mines Department 7 July 1975. Forum meeting.
20. Self interest includes both the interests the members represent and their personal self interest.
21. This would include the Appeal Board, opposition and the Press and other news media.
22. Further details of this case are examined in the next Chapter.

23. Further details of this case are examined in the next Chapter.
24. See Forum minutes 2nd September 1974
25. The Maori community suggested a redevelopment proposal for Waahi Marae involving new buildings raising the ground level, landscaping, flood protection and a number of other modifications dealt with in more detail later.
26. See comments by Mr R.A. Wright at Forum meeting 1 September 1975 page 8 regarding facilities in the Borough.
27. Private conversation with Author; however such attitude can be seen at Forum meetings on 21 December 1973, 2 September 1974; 21 May 1975, 1 December 1975 see minutes of these meetings when Mr Kellow spoke.
28. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975:9 regarding the Farmers request for an assurance of liability on the roads.
29. See Forum minutes 7 October 1974:12 comments by Mr D.H. Jones Project Liaison Engineer.
30. For a brief summary of this committee see Forum minutes 3 March 1975.
31. Opinions and reports are put forward without interruption and talking is in a polite style however in closed session on occasions a haggling, bickering style developed and when the Farmers Deputation was received at the Forum in December 1975 tempers were flared a little and emotion (exhortive style language) added to that dramatic event.
32. From private conversations with the Forum members they readily agree with the procedure and structure of establishing committees, set procedures, the Forum, they know what the rules are both 'normative' and 'pragmatic' (Bailey F.G. Stratagems and Spoils 1970).
33. See Forum minutes 7 July 1975:6, 21 May 1975:9, 1 September 1975:5
34. Comments made at the Forum meeting 7 July 1975.
35. Report of Progressive Association of the Years Activities Huntly 1974. Further report contained in Huntly Press 19 June 1974.
36. Based on comments during private conversations with Author e.g. Mahuta "No! farmers not seriously effected.....who can yell loudest and pressure the hardest will win" (Maori Representative 1975), "you can't make a broad statement that they will be seriously effected since those effected can range from those that have a complete farm taken to those where the activity is next door to their farm." (Denton, Project Engineer 1975).
37. Examples of this can be seen in the Baker Housing Block issue, Mines Department re-evaluation on site of East side Mine Site,

Air Pollution solved by dust arrestors, Maui pipeline route needed to be finalised in short space of time to meet contract deadlines.

38. Land was needed for housing adjacent to Huntly Borough and in Raglan County. If traditional procedures of objections over the necessary boundary changes was carried out delay would have resulted as each side attempted to gain concessions or prevent the change. In any event negotiaion occurred and at the First and Second Forum meetings in December 1973 and February 1974 the town planning procedures and possible delays were raised and debated.
39. This statement is backed up by another from NZED Co-ordination Engineer, Mr Malcolmson "NZED didn't have to abide by the Town and Country Planning Appeal/Objection procedures etc, but felt that interested groups should be approached and could have their say and opportunity to discuss the issues at the Forum" (conversation with Author 1975).
40. For example Baker Housing Block, Maui Pipeline in which symbols of delay and need to meet deadlines were used with effect. "The Department can inform people of whats happening and can tell them their fears are ill founded.....we keep the people informed." (NZED Project Co-ordination Engineer 1975).
41. Conversation with District Commissioner of Works who felt that it was a good opportunity to help out the Huntly Borough Council and solve an issue of the Huntly By-Pass Motorway which had been controversial in Huntly for many years.
42. While the Mayor of Huntly was a little reserved on this point the Chairman of Raglan County Council, Farmers Representative and Maori Representative all acknowledged the powerful position of the Chairman in Local Government affairs as a representative of the powerful Government Department. Particularly the RCC Chairman was reluctant to offend the Chairman as this could sour relations in another field (District Roads Council). The Ministry of Works and Development influence is directly represented on a number of local body authorities e.g. Hamilton Regional Planning Authority District Roads Council No.2B, Waikato Valley Authority, Loans Board and vets all planning changes and proposed developments under the Town and Country Planning Act 1953.
43. For example the cuts in National Roads Board grants to Raglan County Council were criticised by the RCC Engineer rather than the Chairman. See The New Zealand Herald 12 January 1976. "Roads will Suffer."
44. These are discussed in depth later in Chapter six.
45. See The Times 25 March 1974. "Row may cause delay".
46. See Forum minutes October 1974 and November 1974
47. Private conversation with Author 1975.

48. See correspondence between Mr Mahuta and Mr Jones NZED 13 August 1974, General Manager NZED to Commissioner of Works 28 August 1974, Commissioner of Works to General Manager NZED 5 September 1974, and Mr Mahuta's submission read to Forum meeting November 1974 untitled but discussing the interpretation and application of the Town and Country Planning Act, and the proposals. See Forum Minutes March 1975.
49. For example 1975 Water Rights see The Times 30 October 1975 "Meeting Set for discharge Talk". Farmers - NZED meeting on coal conveyor 8 October 1974. Marae Redevelopment Committee and Raglan County Council Forum Minutes 3 March 1975.
50. For example the representatives of MWD and NZED at the Forum have little to do with each other while the NZED and RCC representatives enjoy a co-operative pleasant relationship. Mines Department Representative and Chairman have strained personal relationship.
51. Minister of Electricity Mr Bailey was officially on a familiarisation tour. The Forum meeting was originally scheduled for 5 May 1975 but delayed to suit the Ministers timetable.
52. See Forum minutes May 1975. Mayor raised the issues of the temporary bridge and general funding of Borough facilities such as expanded library, recreation etc.
53. In December 1975 the Mayor HBC decided that the report of the Technical Advisory Committee should be sent to the Minister directly and by-passing the Forum. This caused sharp action by the Chairman who disagreed with this action. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975:12,13.
54. See Forum minutes May 21, 1975:4,5
55. See Forum minutes May 21, 1975:5,6
56. See terms of reference footnote 1.
57. In relation to footnote 52 the concerns expressed by the Mayor were of a general nature but some specific areas were mentioned. The speech was more an indication that the local interests were working on a principle that they should receive some 'extra' benefit by the project's presence in the town.
58. The Rakaumanga School issue was mentioned by the MP for Western Maori as an example of settlements achieved through the Forum. There are others as further chapters illustrate.
59. The case study on the siting of the Station explains the issues at the time, some were concern for roads, Rakaumanga School, coal conveyor, need for information, water rights.
60. Specifically the 1972-75 Labour Government had promised environmental reports on major projects. These would include

social effects of projects. The Environment Commission was begun in 1972. A major platform of the Labour Party was that People were first before machines, projects and procedures. Thus there was a general national trend to involve people and concern for environmental issues (physical and social impact).

61. See Water Rights case. Maoris believed that litigation would bring results more so than Forum.
62. One particular event provides a good example of this. In May 1974 Mr Mahuta read a paper to the Labour Party Maori Affairs Policy Convention at Huntly entitled "Industrial Relations and the Huntly Power Station." It was critical of the Government Departments attitude and lack of co-ordination, procrastination etc evident in the Planning of the Project. At the May 1974 Forum meeting the Mayor of Huntly considered the Press Reports of this paper to be unfair and asked that the claims be discussed at the Forum. They were discussed in the Forum Meeting 28 May 1974:6,7,8. The NZED representative felt that he had been put in the "hot seat" to answer the questions raised by Mr Mahuta and the eventual outcome of the discussion was an agreement to bring things to the Forum before being "publically" discussed. This agreement was not adhered to at other times however. The debate concerning whether a trust Tavern or private brewery interest should provide drinking facilities on the West side of the River was raised outside the Forum (see Herald 10 February 1976, and Times 9 February 1976) after being initially raised at a Forum meeting in 7 July 1975.
63. For example Marae re-development plans, Sports Complex, Rooding issue.
64. The exception is of course the proposed Maui Pipeline Route, which was discussed behind closed doors at the July and September 1975 Forum meetings and 'surfaced' publically in January, February and March 1976 in local newspapers.
65. See footnote 49. This is particularly true in regard to the Compensation of land taken for the coal conveyor. See minutes of meeting 8 October 1974 NZED files.
66. *ibid* and the discussions between RCC and Maori Community over change of zoning of Marae see Forum minutes November 1974:11 and March 1975:7.
67. This sentiment was publicly expressed by the Farmers representative in the December 1975 Forum meeting when he questioned the credibility of the Forum see P.12 in relation to the Technical Advisory Committee where the Farmers are not represented. See The Times 2 December 1975 "Damaged roads bring criticism of Huntly Forum."
68. Private interview with the Author 1975.
69. For example compensation over transmission lines crossing Farmers property usually given by way of "lump sum" agreement - a policy

directive, however Farmers are now asking for an annual rental fee which required a change in policy for NZED. The Huntly Tavern licence was opposed by the Project Officials upon Government directive see The Times 7 February 1975 "Minister Orders Department to block trust tavern bid" and 9 February 1975 "Waring Opposes Young on Tavern."

70. See Memorandum from Jones to Chief Engineer 11 October 1973 regarding Maoris Submissions 30 September 1973 where a number of points raised in the Submission are answered by "not appropriate for NZED to comment upon." (costs of water right appeal.
71. For example Water Rights, Roding, Mine Site East Side, Tavern Licence.

CHAPTER FIVE
HUNTLY POWER PROJECT
WATER RIGHTS AND ROADS

WATER RIGHTS

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

A thermal power station requires large flows of water to transfer the waste heat from its condensers. Three basic cooling water systems can be used - cooling ponds, cooling towers and direct cooling.

In the cooling pond method water is drawn from a natural or artificial closed pond of water. The heat is transferred from the water to the atmosphere by convection, radiation and evaporation. The temperature of the entire pond is raised above normal water temperatures. A large area of about 400ha is required for a 1000MW station.

The waste heat can also be rejected into the atmosphere in a cooling tower system which transfers heat by evaporation (wet tower) or by convection and radiation (dry tower). In a wet tower water is brought into direct contact with the air whereas in a dry tower water flows in a closed water-to-air exchange.

In both these systems extra water is needed to 'top up' the system but they are basically closed systems.

If the station is sited close to a large body of water it is possible to draw the water continuously and return it so that mixing between intake and discharge does not occur. In this open ended system heat is transferred and diluted in the flowing water. A large volume of water is raised in temperature by a small amount and heat is transferred into the atmosphere. It is this method which will provide the cooling water for the Huntly Power Station. Water will be drawn from the Waikato River and returned at a slightly higher temperature to mix with the main flow of the river. A consideration in the initial siting was the ability to use the river for cooling purposes. Although other water cooling alternatives were possible they were discounted for a number of reasons.¹

LEGAL PROCEDURE

The NZED according to the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 was bound to apply for authority to use river water to the Minister of Works and Development (in charge of the Act). The application for use of the water could proceed in two ways. Either the Department (NZED) could request a normal application in which case it would be referred to the Water and Soil Conservation Authority, for a decision or NZED could request a designation of any part of the river as of 'national importance', in which case it would be referred to the Authority for a recommendation and then to the Governor General-in-Council for a decision. The designation of national importance (Section 23(7)) allows the Crown to by-pass appeal procedures. Whatever course of action was taken the Authority² was required to refer the application to the regional water board concerned, in this case The Waikato Valley Authority (WVA) for its recommendations since most of the Authorities functions were delegated to the WVA pursuant to section 16 of the Act. In a normal case not involving the Crown the WVA has the authority to grant a water right or authorisation but in cases where the Crown is the applicant authority to make a decision is specifically denied without the prior consent of the Authority. In the case of the Huntly Power Project the NZED (Crown) applied to the Minister of Works and Development in February 1973 to have three miles of the Waikato River declared of 'National importance'. This application was referred to the Authority who in turn referred it to the Waikato Valley Authority for recommendation. The Waikato Valley Authority (WVA) recommended that the 'national importance' designation be replaced by a normal application to take and discharge water.³ This recommendation was communicated to the Minister through the Authority with the result that NZED dropped its application under section 23(7) and applied for rights to take and discharge water under section 23(1) of the Act. This new application was referred to the Authority for a decision but before they made their decision the application was referred to the WVA for its recommendations. The result was that the Authority granted the Right subject to twenty-six conditions. The Right granted was thus subject to public objection. Three Appeals objecting to the Right were made and a case was heard before the No.1 Town and Country Planning Appeal Board in compliance

with section 23(4) of the Water and Soil Conservation Act.⁴ The result of this action was that of the appellants' appeals two were dismissed and one withdrawn but an extra nine conditions were attached to the original decision of the respondent i.e. National Water and Soil Conservation Authority. The above series of events led to a number of consequences in later applications by NZED to use water and the case illustrates when examined in detail, the political negotiative process.

POLITICS OF THE WATER RIGHTS TO TAKE AND DISCHARGE COOLING WATER FOR THE HUNTLY POWER STATION.

Early research into the effects of discharging heated water into the river was carried out for the MereMere station. This was used as the basis for NZED Engineers claims at a July 1972 meeting in Huntly that there would be no adverse effects on the Rivers ecology.⁵ This local environmental (biological) information (collected in 1953 and 1955) and use of research results from Castle Donington (600MW thermal power station) in Britian formed the basis of Preece Cadrew and Riders recommendations that the Huntly Power Station would have no 'measurable ecological effects on the river.'⁶ The consultants report (available in April 1972) was used as justification by both NZED Engineers and Ministers from time to time throughout 1972 to assure people that there was little to worry about environmentally. When the initial cabinet approval to proceed with Huntly was given on 4 September 1972, the decision was subject to an environmental impact assessment.⁷ The basis of this assessment was research carried out by Professor Chapman Auckland University, into the effect of discharging heated water. Towards the end of 1972 and early 1973 national environmental groups⁸ had been vocal in criticising the Governments intentions to use the river for cooling purposes. At this time the new Labour Government with a policy to institute environmental impact reporting decided to ask the Water and Soil division of MWD for a report on alternative means of providing cooling water. The report recommended the open ended system.⁹ This, together with Prof. Chapmans research formed the basis for the Minister of Electricity's assurance that there would be no adverse effects on the river, when he visited Huntly in connection with the Maori Communities problems.¹⁰ Early in 1973, NZED aware of the MWD report on cooling systems and 'armed' with Prof.

Chapman's research decided to apply for authority to use water using the 'national importance' clause. The application was referred to the WVA in February 1973 and considered at its meeting on 28 February. It decided to defer consideration with the object of making enquiries as to the reason for this particular type of application and received a reply from the Director of the Water and Soil Division of MWD on 12 March outlining the reasons for the application. The application for 'national importance' was considered by the WVA at its 28 March meeting. A report prepared by the WVA Chief Engineer and circulated with the agenda was strongly critical of NZED's technical information, which he considered was open to too many unknown factors for the WVA to risk its approval.¹¹ Contained in the report was an admission on behalf of NZED that

"The use of the ordinary provisions of obtaining a water right would subject the Huntly application to possible appeals and delays to the power development programme."¹²

Mr Jones (WVA Chief Engineer) had had meetings with NZED and MWD Engineers in Wellington who tried to convince him of the necessity and applicability of the research already undertaken, however Mr Jones stuck to his belief that

"there were a number of features which on final sight gave cause for concern."¹³

He further believed that there was a very compelling reason for NZED wishing to by-pass the appeal procedures in that

"as a result of the change in Manapouri development plans and the consequent loss of some 300,000,000 units per annum in generating capacity, the deficiency must be made up in a hurry.....the natural deduction from this is that WVA is now receiving part of the backwash from the Manapouri decisions."¹⁴

Mr Jones also pointed out that local government agencies and the public would have no opportunity to appeal against the terms of the application if the procedure of 'national importance' was accepted.

The District Manager of NZED and Mr Shanks, had tabled a letter in which he made strong criticism against Mr Jones whom he thought should have greater faith in NZED Engineering ability. He thought that the interests of individual objectors would be adequately represented by WVA members of whom Messrs Kellow, Henderson and Minogue were the elected representatives of the people effected.

"Informal discussion with anyone who objected would dispell any fears"¹⁵
Mr Shanks said that

"we regard national importance as a formality only and everything would be conscientiously studied."

Because the Environmental Statement had not been made available to the WVA Mr Shanks considered that the Authority should defer the matter and ask Government for it before making a decision.

Mr Kellow (RCC) wanted the classification of 'national importance' since he accepted that the power was needed for the country. He thought it rather small minded that the WVA should hold up the Project and it should not get into a confrontation with Government.¹⁷ These sentiments were not shared by a majority of the Authority¹⁸ and Messrs Minogue and Page moved that the designation of 'national importance' could not be recommended, once-through cooling be limited to two machines, or minimum discharge be set, all information including the Environmental Statement be made available, and a written undertaking from NZED accepting full financial responsibility for remedial works due to the Station be obtained. Mr Shanks expressed his opposition to the motion.

At the following monthly meeting on 30 April 1973 the matter was again discussed, but the meeting was held 'in committee'. The WVA had agreed to keep the Environmental Impact Statement confidential and it felt it necessary to discuss the matter in confidence. A deal was made whereby NZED application for 'national importance' would be dropped and replaced with one to take and discharge water rights. WVA also recommended a number of conditions¹⁹ to accompany the right to take and discharge all necessary water. A few days later the Minister of Electricity announced that the application for 'national importance' would be dropped and the Authority members would visit the WVA and site to discuss the proposed conditions of the right to be considered at the Authorities 5th June meeting. On 19th May the Associate Minister of Works visited Huntly to discuss the issue and achieve agreement 'over the steps to be taken' in recommending conditions to the Authority. About one week before the Minister's visit the Report of the Officials Committee for the Environment (7 May 1973) had recommended that the station proceed but that NZED should undertake to reduce environmental damage to a minimum. The Committee wanted Cabinet to direct NZED to arrange for studies of river stability, effects of discharge

water, biological and wildlife matter and monitoring water to effectively keep within the rights proposed by WVA. If these conditions were met

"then this committee considers that in balance the risks are acceptable and recommends that clearance be given for the proposal to proceed."²⁰

(Report of Officials Committee
1973)

Considerable adverse publicity was generated by this issue particularly concerning the findings of the Environmental Statement which had been completed, seen by the relevant Ministers but not submitted to Cabinet for approval because of the new requirements to obtain an Environmental Impact Report on the effect of mining operations associated with the Project. However the Press in a number of Editorials strongly criticised the Government's stance and Opposition leaders claimed that the Government's Environmental Reporting was negated if environmentalists and concerned citizens could not discuss the contents of these reports. Typical of the Editorials criticising the secrecy surrounding the Environmental Impact report was The Times. Just what does the Environmental Impact Report dealing with proposals to use the Waikato River water for cooling purposes at the proposed Huntly coal fired power station contain?

Last month the WVA Chief Engineer and several individual members expressed serious reservation about the proposal but were given assurance that the environmental report would allay their fears

"....Within the confines of a virtual cone of silence imposed by cabinet the report was considered by the Authority. No details of what it contained or what action the authority now plans to take were released....nor was any reason given why the report or the authority's conclusions should be treated with such secrecy. The course of action which was adopted at the insistence of cabinet can only create suspicion... about the contents of the report and cabinet's motives..."

(The Times 1 May 1973)

The Prime Minister announced that the Environmental Impact Report²¹ was of a technical nature and of limited value to the public but that it would be released after the Water and Soil Conservation Authority had commented upon it. The Environmental Impact Report was released on the same day that the Authority announced that the

Water Right to take and discharge water was approved. Government announced (on 5 June 1973) that in future all documents where appropriate would be referred to the Commission for the Environment for comment and later public release.²²

Within days of the Authority's approval the Environmental Defence Society, the Maori Community and Hamilton City Council announced they were considering objecting to the Rights. On June 8th the WVA Chairman issued a disclaimer to statements made by Mr Minogue and others.²³ He said that under the conditions of the Water Right the WVA was allowed to view any or all conditions at any time "the whole future of the river is protected."²⁴ The figures that were being quoted in connection with the power plant were quite incorrect and were confusing the public. Despite these comments Mayor Minogue continued to claim that the "cooling plans would put the city's sewage bill up,"²⁵ and the Environmental Defence Society claimed that there were not enough safeguards and possible damage could result as insufficient studies had been carried out. The Maori Community felt that traditional fishing waters would be effected but more importantly felt that by objecting to the rights it was the only way to present their objection to the Town and Country Planning Board about the Station in general. Although they agreed that the Station should proceed they felt their interests were not being considered and involving themselves in litigation although expensive was the only way to show the NZED they would stand up for their rights.²⁶

The WVA moved to soften the decision and explain their part in the granting of the Right by calling a public meeting in Huntly (28 June 1973) to discuss the issue. The Chief Engineer, Mr Jones indicated he was satisfied with the conditions while Mr Shanks asked people if they wanted the station to go ahead saying that the new Tongariro Project would increase river flows by about 10% but the station would use about 10% making things equal. He repeated earlier assurances that NZED would make sure there was little likelihood of pollution of the river.

The meeting did little to dissuade the objectors who were at the stage of preparing their objection.²⁷ Correspondence between the Minister of Electricity and Hamilton City Council did much to allay the initial fears expressed by Mr Minogue. In a letter on 27 August 1973

to Hamilton City Council the Minister of Electricity gave an assurance that should the City have to advance its commissioning date of the second stage of the water pollution plant because of the operation of the station the NZED

"would meet any reasonable additional costs for loan charges and plant operation incurred over the period of advancement."²⁸

The minister also assured the Council that should any upgrading of river quality be required to improve water conditions downstream along with other uses of the river suitable methods to compensate the Council could be assured although no firm assurance on this matter could be given at the time. In considering these assurances the Hamilton City Council decided to accept an informal ruling of the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board (an address in chambers) that the Council was 'without status' in the hearing²⁸ and withdrew its objection.

WATER RIGHTS APPEAL

The appeal conducted at Hamilton between 10-13 September 1973 proved an interesting example of negotiation of conditions, the success or failure of which can be seen to have been considered in subsequent cases.

The evidence presented by both sides was mainly specific and of a technical nature. The cultural ground of objection by Mr Mahuta (Maori community) was regarded as irrelevant to the proceedings but the specific technical Objections to pinpointing the intake and discharge structure and quality of water were ruled as relevant. The cultural objections raised by the Maoris were that they were effected by the station's effect on the river. The river was regarded as their ancestor and they should protect it. The river embodied the sense of community and was therefore central to the protection preservation and improvement of community life. The Maoris raised a number of other objections:

1. Water standards of purity and oxygen content.
2. Effect of heated water on the quality of the river was not sufficiently investigated.
3. Not sufficient system for monitoring the quality of water.
4. The discharge and intake structure could effect the river bank and use of the river for transport and their access to it.

5. The intake and discharge structures should be fixed at a location.

6. Not all information available to the Authority had been made public so that to grant the Right was not just and equitable in all the circumstances.

The Maori community sought the cancelling of the Rights or as alternatives

i the Rights be not granted until all information had been made public

ii amendment to the Rights to include standards of water flow and water quality.

The second appellant, The Environmental Defence Society (EDS) did not seek the revocation of the Rights but it sought the amendment of some conditions and the addition of others

"To ensure that the best practicable means are adopted to reduce or eliminate any adverse environmental impact which will flow from the granting of the rights."³⁰

It specifically claimed that a number of amendments to the original conditions granted by the Authority should be made so that

1. Intake/discharge structure should be designed to minimise entrapment of fish.

2. Anti fouling of cooling structure by toxic chemicals

3. A definite limit on the mixing zone of heated water to normal river water should be made

4. A biological survey should be carried out, sufficiently advanced before the Station came to operation to compare the effect of discharge on the river.

5. Results of biological monitoring programme be available for public inspection.

6. The Authority should be able to vary the rights from time to time.

The evidence given in support of these appeals was largely of a scientific nature. Some of the experts for EDS conflicted with the experts for NZED but upon closer examination the theoretical grounds were agreed but not the degree of effect. Thus while the scientific evidence did not disagree on fundamentals there was disagreement over questions of degree and significance. The EDS claimed that effects of raising the temperature were largely imponderable but the potential harm

could be great while the NZED indicated that they could keep within the conditions of the Rights as layed down by the Authority. Both sides recognised that because the river is an ever draining thing it would be impossible to say catergorically that a particular discharge would never cause the river to fall below minimum standards and the conditions laid down by the Authority were designed to set limits to maintain the quality of the water and as far as reasonably possible the biota and ecology of the receiving waters.³¹ Thus the broad issues raised were firstly to what extent could the river accept heat, and secondly within the limit defined by answering the first issue, to what extent and on what conditions should the application be granted having regard for the objects of the Act and all the interests which may be effected.³²

The NZED presented evidence from expert witnesses in biology, engineering and freshwater fisheries while the EDS presented evidence from similiarly qualified witness. The Maori Community presented mainly cultural evidence as well as some scientific evidence.³³

In challenging the objectors NZED asked the Appeal Board to rule on the status of the EDS (This was a legal point and it could be considered NZED policy to undermine the credentials of the Society or a maneuver to try and make the evidence inadmissable³⁴). The result of this challenge was that the Society's status to appeal could not be shown and their appeal was dismissed, however, since they had given their evidence and the Maoris were able to call the EDS as witnesses to their appeal a relationship was established whereby the evidence given was accepted but 'officially' they did not have right to appeal.

As the proceedings continued NZED agreed to incorporate many of the objections raised by the appellants and add one more. Specifically it agreed to

1. Pinpoint the intake and discharge structures and design it to minimise entrapment of fish.
2. Undertake a biological survey to enable comparisons to be made.
3. Make results public.
4. Allow the Authority to withdraw water rights and issue new ones upon 12 months notice, with new rights subject to appeals.
5. Antifouling of cooling structure by toxic chemicals.

6. Install and maintain such instrumentation as necessary for WVA to independently monitor a biological programme and water quality.

Thus while the appeals were dismissed the Water Rights were strengthened from the conditions originally granted by the Authority. The Maori Community regarded the hearing as successful in that it showed it was prepared to 'stand up for its rights and not be bulldozed' into things. It was able to establish a relationship with the EDS whereby they provided the technical evidence and the Maori objectors enabled the EDS to have its evidence considered on its merit. The intake structures were able to be pinpointed and most of the conditions of EDS were included in the Water Right. Mr Jones (NZED) summed up his impression of the hearing thus:

"Mr Mahuta presented statements which were inaccurate and irrelevant to the hearing....All appellants agreed the station should go ahead....the Department made a number of concessions and agreed to the following conditions.....the conditions and promises made to Hamilton City Council are not likely to embarrass NZED. Despite inadequate time to prepare the case and strategy-it was conducted in an orderly manner...there was no need for people in headoffice to worry on this aspect.

In future NZED will have to fight its own battles...from the EDS submissions it is obvious that a spirit of mistrust of Government Departments is evident.....It is important that the Water and Soil Conservation Authority and NZED are seen as independent bodies.

It is important to NZED that in future it discuss with appellants its views to....discuss concessions.....and assess the weight of their evidence.

In the present case the Authority had discussions with the appellants but did not advise us as to what was said or what evidence to expect...

The showing made by NZED was good public relations wise... this was confirmed by three of the four members of the Appeal Board..NZED gained valuable experience in respect of presentation quality and quantity of evidence...

NZED will gain in Public Relations by being seen to willingly adhere to conditions as set out in water rights."³⁵

(NZED Jones 1973)

BIOLOGICAL MONITORING PROGRAMME - CONDITIONS OF THE WATER RIGHT.

The decisions of the Planning Appeal Board regarding the water Right was delivered on 12 October 1973 and contained among other things the following two conditions.

1. "9A. As soon as practicable after the granting of these rights the New Zealand Electricity Department shall have a biological survey of the river carried out to the satisfaction of the National Authority to determine the biological conditions obtaining in the river prior to the right being first exercised and after full commissioning of the power station. Results of the surveys shall be transmitted to the Waikato Valley Authority which shall make such results available for public inspection."³⁶
2. "27. The New Zealand Electricity Department shall have installed and maintained all the necessary instrumentation to enable the Waikato Valley Authority to itself monitor the results of the continuous monitoring required in Conditions 8 and 9."³⁷

The biological study was carried out by a joint NZED, - Department Agriculture/Fisheries - University of Waikato team between July 1974 and February 1975. This represented an interim report and formed part of larger studies being carried out on the river.³⁸

The report was presented to a Liaison Committee meeting in February 1975. Huntly Power Planning Forum members had been invited to attend as well as officials from the Commission for the Environment. The lengthy and scientific paper was preceded by an introduction from NZED District Manager. He emphasised the expertise, care and methodology of the scientists and the willingness of his Department to undertake such studies. The present report was to form part of a continuing programme of studies which NZED was proud to be involved in.³⁹ Few questions were asked and most present were impressed with the depth and range of the scientific evidence ensuring that NZED was actively living up to the conditions imposed by the Water Right.

As the WVA is responsible for the management of the Waikato River and involvement with NZED had been considerable in the past, due to hydro dams, and would continue because of the biological studies and monitoring instrumentation required the WVA decided, upon the suggestion of MWD (Water and Soil Division), to establish a joint scientific technical sub-committee of WVA. The Scientific Technical Committee consisted of scientists from NZED, MWD, University of Waikato, Health Department, Meat Research Institute and WVA. It was divided into four sub-committees - wastes, turbidity, biology and a working group.

The committee presented some suggestions and findings to the March 1974 WVA meeting. It had conducted a biological reconnaissance survey of stretches of the river and none of the species normally

characteristic of pollution were found however it recommended that an intensive study between Hamilton and Huntly be carried out and that a biological unit to carry out routine sampling be established. A research contract between the University of Waikato and WVA to undertake four separate studies of the river was established. This would form part of wider studies the MWD was conducting for WVA. The committee also recommended the best sites for the monitoring stations, seven in all, which NZED had agreed to provide pursuant to the Water Rights.

As a result of these continuing studies the informal technical links between the WVA, NZED and MWD became increasingly blurred and the studies became part of an overall river management scheme which can be seen to be of mutual benefit for NZED and WVA. The NZED was able to use much of the research related to the Huntly section of the River and interrelated for the River as a whole for its purposes of demonstrating its willingness to do more than was required by the Water Rights and thus achieve good 'public relations'. On a number of occasions at the Huntly Planning Forum, NZED's representative has indicated that its wide ranging research will show that the station could not pollute the river. For example

"It was not really required that such extensive research be carried out but NZED wanted to produce facts, so that sensible and logical answers could be evaluated."⁴⁰

(NZED Representative 1974)

In addition to these continuing scientific studies other areas of liaison and co-operation are promoted. A flood management scheme was developed in 1975 to protect the interests of NZED and WVA, in the event of flooding. A number of management rules were adopted and the Department undertook to 'smooth out' daily variation of water flow. (While this may not appear significant at present the engendering of co-operation to increase water flows in summer months passed the Huntly Station could prevent or cover up serious biological damage caused by heated water discharges in times of low river flow.)

BOILER CHEMICAL CLEANING AGENTS, WATER RIGHTS.

The water used to generate steam in a thermal power station is clean treated water of very high purity so that corrosion of boiler tubes and other parts will not occur. Before filling boilers with the clean water it is necessary to clean all surfaces of grease, rust

etc by a chemical cleaning method. The chemicals are then flushed out into the river. The chemicals used to filter and clean the water are also flushed out with the sludge from the water treatment. Thus it is necessary to obtain water rights for the initial cleaning operation and routine cleaning operations throughout the life of the station. It is known that some of the chemicals are toxic to water life, in particular iron and amonia.

Two water rights were issued by the Water and Soil Conservation Authority in June 1975. One to clean the boilers during part of the plant's commissioning, the other for regular cleaning of the boilers and discharge of water treatment plant back wash. Among the chemicals to be discharged are hydrochloric acid, citric acid, sodium hydroxide, ammoniz, hydrozine, trisodium, phosphate, tergitol PX, ironsales, armohib 28, and trisodium phosphate.⁴¹

A number of objections were lodged against the Rights from WVA EDS, Auckland Regional Authority and the Tainui Maori Trust Board. The Appeal case was heard before the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board on 28 October 1975 but adjourned sine die. The negotiation and bargaining of the case has not been concluded but the current discussions are relevant to consider. The appellants appeals are based on a number of factors. First, the environmental effect of discharging chemicals into the river, second, the open-ended nature of the Right which did not adequately specify limits or times or durations of the chemical discharges. Thirdly, the requirements of the Act were not observed in that Authority did not ask WVA as the regional water board concerned, for its recommendations on the application of NZED.

An adjournment was sought by the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority when the third question of procedure was brought up by the ARA early in the hearing, however, other reasons were given by the NZED whose Counsel stated that the Department was evaluating new information on the chemicals used, and the results of inquiries made during a senior Engineers visit to Canada were being assessed.

A five hour meeting between all parties was held in Auckland a week later to discuss the Right. Alternative chemicals for cleaning the Stations boilers were suggested. Before this meeting the WVA and the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority had discussions on the appropriate procedures and the objections the WVA lodged concerning

limiting the discharge and the wording of the Right itself.⁴² The result of the meeting was that the NZED would seek new water rights and withdraw the ones objected to, however, these new rights may be the subject of further appeals but from which parties is not clear at present.

The EDS evidence is to be presented as evidence of the Tauni Maori Trust Board because the Appeal Board previously ruled that the Society was 'without status'.

Official comment from NZED following the meeting was made by their legal counsel who said

"If anything in the Rights can be improved we will try to meet the suggestions. At this stage we have had a very helpful and friendly meeting with all parties and have shared a great deal of information."⁴³

It would be expected that the WVA would not object to any new Rights provided the application was considered by them in the first instance, however the original objections of the EDS may still be relevant since the advice received from the visit to Canada by NZED staff and the stage Environmental Report prepared in June 1975⁴⁴ contained all the necessary documentation and intentions of NZED to continue using the chemicals originally envisaged (however, if one chemical is changed the Rights as originally prepared are void since legally the Rights applies only to the named chemicals listed in the application),

The failure to refer the application to the WVA and the general nature of the wording of the Right as approved by the Authority has occurred in other Water Rights⁴⁵ and can be explained by the lack of experience or incompetence of the new personnel currently dealing with preparation of Rights in the MWD Water and Soil division which provides the necessary services for the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority.⁴⁶

IMPLICATION OF THE WATER RIGHTS

The symbolic belief that the Huntly Project should be completed with minimum delay was accepted by the Engineering staff of NZED as a legitimate term of reference. This belief was considered when the NZED chose to apply for the 'national importance' designation of the river. It was seen as the quickest way to get on with the job⁴⁷ NZED carried out scientific studies to ensure that there would be no

detrimental effects on the river's ecology thus reinforcing their action as justifiable in the public interest.⁴⁸ The studies proved no detrimental effects of discharging cooling water and were in turn used as symbols to influence other's interpretation and definition. The use of Preece Cadrew and Riders Report (biological aspect, twenty years old) and Prof. Chapman's update studies provided the 'unbiased' symbolic evidence for NZED as these sources were independent of NZED and each other. They were used to assure the public at meetings in 1972 and early 1973 (but not in any detailed form) that there was nothing to worry about in respect of thermal pollution of the river. However the Prime Minister's statement that he would not release the Environmental statement because it was too technical for the public to understand broke the credibility of the scientific symbol for some of the public as groups with technical expert knowledge and political weight expressed the view that the Environmental Statement should be made available to vindicate past statements about the effect of the cooling water. The retaining of this information led to a questioning of the substantive scientific contents of the documents. When the Environmental Statement was eventually released some months later it was again used as the scientific symbol but it was not enough to limit objections by groups of individuals either before or after it was released. In the initial phase of its use the scientific symbol was not accepted by Mr Jones, Chief Engineer WVA a person with adequate scientific and technical knowledge to challenge the validity and ask for evidence of NZED's claims. As an individual his other ideological beliefs and perceptions of the situation (e.g. Manapouri backlash, no public objection) together with his Engineering knowledge promoted a crisis situation which was deepened by political support from WVA members who perceived that they could possibly lose some material resources (Mr Minogue - sewage treatment). However the scientific symbolism was accepted by some members of the WVA (e.g. Mr Kellow RCC Chairman) together with other symbols (e.g. country needs the power, NZED are responsible organisation, extra cost to taxpayer of alternative cooling systems, the WVA was smallminded in getting into a conflict with the Government, the Project was in the national interest and local interest) which combined into a problematic situation resolved for a time by the passing

of a motion against some opposition and a plea that more information could alter the view expressed i.e. to reject the 'national importance designation'. The collective perception and meaning apprehended by the WVA of NZED's intentions was perceived by NZED as a threat and opposition to its plans.⁴⁹ A further negotiative situation in secret enabled an arrangement or understanding to be made whereby the WVA recommended a series of conditions for a right to take and discharge water and NZED agreed to withdraw its national importance request. The releasing of information (Environmental Statement) to the WVA provided the WVA with the scientific material to evaluate the NZED's scientific symbolism about effects of cooling water. There is no suggestion that the release of that document caused a decision to be made, many other factors were relevant, but it did focus public attention towards questioning the contents of it and a Government policy as well, the eventual outcome of which was a release of the information and a set of guidelines for future reports of this nature. The Government's insistence on secrecy provided a cover for private negotiation.

After the negotiation of a settlement between the NZED and WVA the WVA embarked on a programme to assure the public everything was under control and their interests would be protected. A broader scientific symbolism was used by WVA's Mr Jones when he addressed a public meeting at Huntly on 28 June 1973. In addition to the type of symbol NZED had been using he explained the safeguards WVA had insisted upon and obtained (e.g. monitoring stations, biological survey, public right to object) and assured the public he was satisfied with the situation as it was then.

One can interpret the action of NZED as manipulating legal channels to obtain a goal but this action was perceived as an attempt to stifle legitimate objection and rush the Project through. The WVA objections and other modifying influences (Government's Environmental policy, claims by Maoris they were being 'brushed aside' which was receiving public attention in the newspapers) provided a situation where the NZED chose to discontinue a line of action and embark upon another problematic course of action. The intervening action between these alternative courses was one of negotiation in which agreements with the WVA and needless to say with the appropriate

Ministers⁵⁰ were arranged.

The new course of action to apply for water rights enabled competing interest groups to object and challenge the NZED. The scientific symbolism was countered by the Environmental Defence Societys technical scientific evidence and the Maoris cultural evidence.⁵¹ Although the Appeal Board ruled that the cultural evidence was irrelevant it accepted the purely scientific. The Maoris saw this action as cultural oppression⁵¹ but were satisfied that an achievement had been made by the number of changes that were agreed to as a result of the court hearing. The hearing provides a good example of a negotiation process where manipulation of the scientific symbol was used to influence the outcome of an action by opposing interest groups. The release and retention of information by the Government to the public and the specific interest group (Environmental Defence Society) enabled alternative courses of action to be followed at different times. The retention and control of environmental information initially provided an opposition from the WVA but later its release to them helped achieve a negotiated settlement. Its non release to the public but release to the WVA created a situation where in the public and interest groups openly criticised and challenged the contents of a report and the scientific symbolism. The release of the document accompanied by the release of another document detailing the environmental criticisms of the project provided the information on which specific groups could challenge the NZED. While the release of information may have been accepted by some it was not accepted by others⁵² which changed the pattern of negotiation and brought the achievement of NZED goal (i.e. obtain clearance for using cooling water) into another problematic dimension.

At the Appeal hearing a private agreement⁵³ between the Maoris and NZED that the Maoris would withdraw their case if NZED pinpointed the intake/discharge structure was revoked when NZED questioned the status of EDS right to appeal. The Maoris and EDS formed an alliance of necessity to negotiate with the NZED. Recommendations of the Officials Committee for the Environment were incorporation in the EDS submissions as presented as Government preferences. The ritual court setting permitted NZED officials not to 'face' but to offer concessions and be seen in a position to willingly accept environmental requirements

- good public relations. The Maoris and EDS were able to claim they forced NZED into accepting the new conditions they were prepared to fight and they were successful. The Hamilton City Council achieved assurances by behind the scenes bargaining. Its Council chose to withdraw at the Hearing on a technical point (after an address in chambers) rather than before, its honour satisfied publically and agreement achieved privately.

The exchange between experts illustrates the attempt by both sides to define for the other a situation using symbolic scientific information for adjudication. The possible outcome was considerably more unsure for NZED than if it had been out of a Court situation and it was aware that there was a possibility of a judgement which could impede the Projects viability. Subsequent mobilisation of scientific information (biological survey) was used by NZED to gain support from the Public, local Huntly groups statutory boards (WVA) and demonstrate that a great deal of extra research was being undertaken. A working agreement between NZED and WVA provided mutual benefits. NZED interests in flood management and water quality control were protected and technical financial assistance from NZED helped WVA to undertake a river survey programme to establish scientific data about the river.

The boiler chemical cleaning water rights were granted without consultation to the WVA a legal move similar to the earlier water rights case, however the lack of co-operation and ability to follow legal requirements stemmed from an error outside the NZED. Never the less the same type of symbols were used in an attempt to define a situation, namely that any discharge of chemicals would be minimal and of little significance. The same groups were involved in a negotiating situation and challenging technical information was available to counter NZEDs claims. The Appeal was never fully heard and the informal meetings which were held among the parties concerned after the adjournment are a clear indication of some parties wishing to achieve a settlement in respect to the Right. The past experience of NZED was considered in that the meetings enabled NZED to gain information about the appellants evidence strengths and weakness. The outcome of NZED apprehension of the appellants position was that they chose to try an alternative course

of action by revoking their current application for Water Rights and applying for new ones. As the EDS was still without status and a previous agreement with the Maoris, the mutual alliance between the Maoris and EDS was maintained and reaffirmed by their initial willingness to object together and carry this to an Appeal Hearing. The Auckland Regional Authority's grounds for objection were not released at the Hearing as the procedural points were considered before their evidence but negotiation with a territorial authority (similar to Hamilton City Council in first case) and NZED may proceed on a similar level to the Hamilton City in the first case but the outcome or acceptance of assurances is not certain. The new application for water rights to discharge chemicals will involve a negotiative situation and illustrates the ongoing and enduring nature of the process.

The Huntly Power Planning Forum was not established when the first water rights case was decided but Forum members were well aware of the case and subsequently believed the Maoris achieved something but were not quite sure what. The Mayor of Huntly believed the Maori's objections were responsible for NZED sending an Engineer to Canada to evaluate effects of chemicals on the river but my research has been unable to establish such a casual relationship.⁵⁴

The second water right application (later withdrawn) occurred when the Forum had been established, but it was not discussed at any time before the Court hearing. The NZED did not mention it as a matter of forward planning and the Maoris did not inquire. There was a mutual agreement or tacit understanding that the Forum was not the place to discuss the issue as the more formal judicial decision making channel was the appropriate arena to achieve a settlement.

These Water Rights cases illustrate the patterned variability of negotiation. The agreements or understandings run for specific to nonspecific terms and are subject to review, alteration or termination. e.g. the Appeal Board placed limits (conditions) on the water right, specified its duration, but made provision for cancellation before the specified time. The entered into a shifting coalition with NZED to support a water right after initially opposing the NZED, then at another Water Right (chemical cleaning wasters) hearing opposed the NZED. One can see the kinds of things that are problematic - values,

situations, resource constraints, collective versus group versus individual interests, and courses of action. Action is now seen as a complex process of power characterised by negotiating, bargaining, strategy, manoeuvring, persuasion, threat and exchange.

Two recurring symbols used throughout the Water Rights were

1. The scientific symbolic myth that there was little for the public to worry about as scientific studies and research had proved this or the problem was identified and being coped with by employing a variety of resources, e.g. monitoring programme, and
2. The time myth that things had to be carried out to minimise or avoid delay and consequently people should not hold up the activity in question as they would be challenging the viability of the Project to meet the commissioning deadline and provide power to meet the demand.

These two symbols are examined in two further examples (each emphasising one particular symbol) with the Maui Gas pipeline route illustrating the latter and the Air Pollution Control the former.

MAUI GAS PIPELINE ROUTE - HUNTLY SECTION

TECHNICAL ASPECTS

The Huntly Power station is designed to initially burn large quantities of gas so that the development cost of the Maui Gas Project can be recouped in a minimum time. The construction of a pipeline to the Huntly station has to be completed in time to meet the commissioning deadline of 1978. The gas pipeline from Oaonui to Huntly was divided into a number of sections for construction and administrative purposes. The section between Ngaruawahia and Huntly was of particular concern because of the engineering difficulties in locating the route through the rugged terrain of the Hakarimata Ranges.⁵⁵

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES

A number of alternative routes⁵⁶ were proposed and these were eventually narrowed down to two routes for intensive investigation. One route continued along the base of the Hakarimata Ranges beside the Waikato River northwards to the Station, while the second route crossed a saddle in the middle of the Hakarimata Ranges and then

northwards to the Station. The former route was longer but much easier terrain while the latter was more direct, slightly more difficult terrain and impinged on native bush and ran close to a ~~seric~~ reserve. As both routes involved those interests represented on the Forum the chairman invited the Maui Pipeline Project to send a representative to the Forum and explain the forward planning proposals.

DISCUSSION OF THE PIPELINE ROUTES AND THE TIME MYTH

Discussions with the Pipeline Project representatives initially occurred between July 1974 and November 1974⁵⁷ and were characterised by a theme of the limited time available to decide on a route and the consequences of this constraint.

At the July 1974 Forum meeting the Project Engineer announced that a meeting had been held between Project Officials and the Maui Gas Pipeline Project over the routes of the line to the Station. The Chairman indicated that there might be difficulties in regard to the routes. The Farmers representative asked for assurances that farmers in the area be consulted before a final decision on the route was made. The NZED representative indicated that close liaison would be achieved if a representative from the Pipeline Project could attend the next Forum meeting. At the subsequent Forum meeting in September the Pipeline Project Manager attended. He emphasised that pipe had already been ordered and a contract for the Oaonui to Huntly section was to be advertised in November 1974 and let in March 1975 with ~~construction~~ starting by October 1975 to meet the 1978 deadline. He outlined the alternative routes indicating that it was necessary to finalise the route so the contract could be let. The precise route had not been finalised at that stage but Mr Shadwell⁵⁸ indicated that discussions would be held in two weeks to inform landowners. The Landowners⁵⁹ involved included the Maoris, RCC, Farmers, Lands and Survey Department.

At the October 1974 Forum meeting an Engineer for the Pipeline Project attended the meeting. The deadline targets were again emphasised and it was revealed that of the alternative routes the one across the Hakarimata saddle was the preferred one. Discussions had yet to be held with the owners of land of this route (Maori Trustees, RCC) but one owner the Department of Lands and Survey (Director of

National Parks) had indicated that it should be the subject of a feasibility study. The Maori representative asked why the promised discussions had not taken place and was told that pressure of work had not permitted these to be arranged. It was indicated to the Forum that a considerable amount of research had to be completed before the November deadline to advertise the contract. The Maori representative felt that in view of the time factor discussions should be held as soon as possible to avoid any delay and the land owners being placed in a situation where they were presented with a fait accompli.⁶⁰

The discussions with the landowners were held and it was emphasised that the route could not be held up because of the time factor. These discussions concerned the route through the Hakarimata Ranges. This message was again emphasised at the November Forum meeting. The Pipeline Project Engineer⁶¹ restated that the contract would be let in March 1975 and he expected no problems with the landowners of the proposed route.

Nine months later at a Liaison Committee Meeting⁶² in August 1975 a Federated Farmers representative complained to the Project Engineer that farmers had received notices of the proposed pipeline route north of the Hakarimata Ranges but did not know what was happening. They were informed that an Environmental Impact Report had been prepared at Government request and it was open to public objection. The report concentrated on the alternative routes between Ngaruawahia and Huntly.

At the September 1975 Forum meeting the situation was explained in greater detail by the Project Engineer. The Environmental Impact Report for this section of the Pipeline had taken longer to complete than originally envisaged in November 1974. The extended nature of the studies involved more research. The Lands and Survey Department had still not agreed to the preferred route and reserved the right to make objections along with the public. At the December 1975 Forum meeting the Project Engineer reported the comments of interested parties had been received and were being processed. The Forum had received no information of the pipeline from November 1974 to September 1975 while the planning was continuing.

Stressing that limited time was available to plan the pipeline

route the Project representatives projected a myth which the RCC and Maori landowners initially accepted. The Farmers supported the proposed route across the saddle as it considerably reduced the effect on farming operations and initially accepted the time myth (symbolic meaning) as it related to land north of the Range. In the collective setting of the Forum the time symbolism was repeated and this was within a context that Forum members were experiencing in relation to other aspects of the Project.⁶³ There was a collective feeling that the Pipeline was an urgent matter requiring a quick decision.⁶⁴ The Department of Lands and Survey not a member of the Forum was not prepared to give any assurances over using the saddle for the pipeline route until public reaction was known.⁶⁵ When it became apparent that contracts would not be let for the area private inquiries by the RCC Chairman revealed that the Environmental Impact Report was taking considerable time to prepare. This information was not relayed to the Forum officially but all parties were aware of the reasons for the delay and were not prepared to act until the proposed route had been announced publicly⁶⁷ and favoured by the Commission for the Environment. The early agreement negotiated with the RCC and Maori Trustee was used by the Pipeline Project as evidence to indicate that the local landowners did not object to the route.⁶⁸ However when the route was officially announced the Chairman RCC supported environmental groups⁶⁹ who opposed the route but neither the Maori Trustee or RCC chose to either support or object to the pipeline in an official manner by writing letters to the Commission for the Environment when it was carrying out its Audit.⁷⁰

The initial symbolism permitted the Pipeline Project interests to manage individual support by convincing the Forum members that the matter was urgent and contracts had to be let, deadlines kept. A comment by the Federated Farmers representative illustrates a general feeling among the local interests⁷¹ on the Forum

"They said that the route was the only practical one but they have since realigned it five times. We dont know whether we are coming or going, you cant get any guarantees out of them and what do you when they say things are urgent and contracts are going to be let... we dont want to stop the power station."⁷²
(Federated Representative 1974)

The emphasis and importance placed on this symbolic myth enabled two parties to reach an agreement quickly and not object to the route.

(Maori Trustee, RCC). The Farmers also accepted the definition of the situation but their land was not immediately effected in reaching a decision over the route around or through the Hakarimata Range. When the Farmers received official notification of their land being involved in the route they raised the matter publically which had previously been 'under wraps' and in the discussion-planning stage.⁷³ Despite the intial acceptance of the urgency the delay in actually pinpointing a route varied the circumstances and introduced new factors into the situation thus permitting new positions to be taken⁷⁴ and old ones changed. In the face of a public outcry from the people of Ngaruawahia and environmental groups⁷⁵ the Farmers stressed that their land should not be used and supported the Pipeline Project in the preferred route through the saddle.⁷⁶ The Commission for the Environment has not produced its Audit at the time of writing and the issues is by no means concluded. The delay in the letting of the Contract for the Ngaruawahia to Huntly section of the pipeline because of the Environmental procedures⁷⁷ has been used by the Pipeline Project⁷⁸ to add extra impact to their claim that the situation is more urgent and deadlines have to be met so the station can be commissioned in time to use the gas. Thus even though the situation developed and changed considerably the recurring theme of the symbolic time myth was used in an attempt to create an impression and pressure others to accept a definition of the situation. As the issue is ongoing and not settled the success of the symbol cannot be judged in respect of the latest events but it is evident that the symbol has been used successfully on the pipeline route in the initial stages and continues to be emphasised so as to keep the pressure up on one aspect which is interrelated to the viability of the Huntly Power Project.

AIR POLLUTION - HUNTLY POWER STATION

When Huntly residents became aware that Huntly was a possible site for a Thermal Power Station and considerable interest was shown in the area by NZED officials⁷⁹ a question that was consistently raised not only by the locals but also by others⁸⁰ outside the region was "what about air pollution?" The Meremere coal fired thermal station just 30km north of Huntly was renown for its smoke and ash discharges. The Health Department, responsible for administering the Clear Air Act 1972 acknowledged that the discharges were well above the permissable

limits of the Act but upgrading facilities would be too expensive to justify expenditure on the sixteen year old plant.⁸¹

At Public meetings throughout 1972 and 1973⁸² held in Huntly the question of air pollution was always raised and discussed with the general public. There was no scientific debate but a considerable amount of scientific information was given to the people by the NZED Engineers⁸³ and they impressed upon the people by detailing costs and technical information the effort made to solve this problem.

For example

"We feel ashamed of 'MereMere but it was built before there was pollution control. There will be no hazard to health or crops. NZED say they can achieve a 90.5% collection of dust. If this is achieved the emission from the stack will be barely visible... and because the gases rise much higher the chimney emissions should not effect the fog in the area."

(Douglas, Chief Chemical Inspector
Health Department. July 1972)

"Gaseous effluents would be stripped of almost all their particulate matter by electrostatic precipitators... the installation of efficient precipitators and higher chimneys than necessary should ensure that any deposition of ash will be well below regulation requirements. The latest calculations show this to be only one fifteenth of the amount allowable. It can confidently be expected that there will be no smoke nuisance."

(Jones Project Co-ordination Engineer
August 1973)

The scientific symbolism was continued throughout 1974 at some Forum meetings⁸⁴ and in particular the 29 July 1974 Forum meeting in which a paper was presented on 'Pulverised Fuel Ash' by NZED Project Co-ordination Engineer. The emphasis on technical scientific information was strong and followed the previous patterns of public statements. He emphasised the fact the station when fully operational would burn 1,650,000tons of coal annually producing 90,000tons of 'fly ash' and 23,000tons of bottom ash.⁸⁵ The estimated cost of the necessary electrostatic precipitators equipment would exceed fourteen million dollars. The use of these electrostatic precipitators show

"that satisfactory precipitation (in the order of 98%) should be obtainable from Huntly coals under normal operating conditions."⁸⁶

In publicity material⁸⁷ about the Project these facts are given and emphasised the air pollution will have been solved. The official stage Environmental Impact Report on the Huntly Power Station 1975 (Draft)⁸⁸ contained a lengthy Appendix dealing with the topic of air pollution. In the Introduction of this document the symbolism is

reinforced for example

"Electrostatic precipitator type dust collection equipment is being installed to prevent air pollution occurring when coal fuel is being burnt."

(EIR Huntly Power Station 1975:xii)

Continued emphasis of this scientific symbolism that research has been undertaken, equipment is the latest expensive and most efficient, air pollution is thus prevented by stopping the dust and eliminating the smoke has been deliberately fostered on many occasions to reassure people that there will be no problems. Whenever air pollution has been discussed it has always been dealt with by NZED Engineers on the visual ash and smoke. It is the visual impressions, that people have concerned themselves about and there is a recognised feeling among the general public of Huntly that equates visual discharge of smoke and ash with pollution. Once that is reduced or eliminated pollution is solved.⁸⁹

The invisible gas pollutants which pose a considerable danger have not been discussed in any detail at the Public meetings or in public relations material.⁹⁰ The Environmental Impact Report 1973 and the Stage Environmental Impact Report 1975 briefly discuss this aspect but weight the reports towards elimination of ash. While the public discussion has centered on the visual aspect of air pollution and legislative provisions⁹¹ encourage this the NZED has been successful in maintaining and reinforcing this symbol. The Engineers have not promoted a debate over the invisible gases in the public sphere either in relation to Huntly or other thermal projects,⁹² however if they are questioned some will privately reveal that the gaseous pollutants pose considerable and significant problems⁹³ which have been to the fore in discussion of thermal power station in scientific literature for many years and recently in New Zealand scientific literature with the International Clear Air Conference in 1975 sponsored and promoted by the Health Department.⁹⁴

To further indicate the significance of the symbolic manipulation and impression management to influence others' perception and definition of a situation by officials concerned with the Power Project it is necessary to briefly examine the alternative scientific symbolism which challenges the position that by spending large amounts of money on equipment, doing certain types of research and reducing ash discharge,

solves air pollution per- se .

"Because of the largely invisible nature of many of the constituents of air pollution and their role in photo chemical reactions there is a real need to control the present and projected discharges of these gases to prevent an increase in the formation of serious air pollution conditions."

(Freeman 1968)

Freeman (1968) notes that when fuels are burnt chemical oxidation occurs as combustible elements of the fuels are converted to gaseous products and non combustible elements to ash. Ninety-five percent of gaseous combustion products are not presently known to be harmful (e.g. O_2 , N, CO_2 , water vapour) however the noxious gases of oxides of sulphur and oxides of nitrogen and organic compounds (including polynuclear hydrocarbons) are harmful to humans, animals and plants. The results of fuel tested controls of oxides of Sulphur and oxides of nitrogen are reviewed by Durie and Smith (1975) but they note that there is comparatively little work done on it to date. It is known that nitrogen oxide contributes to photo chemical smog.⁹⁵ Nitric oxide oxidises to nitrogen dioxide a lung irritant, however under sunlight nitrogen dioxide disassociates into nitric oxide and atomic oxygen. Some atomic oxygen combines with molecular oxygen to form ozone, a highly irritating gas. O'Connor, Parberg and Strauss (1975) have demonstrated the effect of ozone on Australian tree and shrub species but note that the effect of sulphur dioxide causes considerably acute injury to trees and shrubs. Daly (1975) provides the New Zealand evidence of sulphur dioxides effect on crop vegetation, vegetable plants and trees and notes that the cumulative effect is extremely harmful. When the sulphur is combusted⁹⁶ it forms a sulphur dioxide gas which may convert to sulphur trioxide and that to sulphuric acid mist. In combination with other pollutants (e.g. particulates of sulphur dioxide) are shown to exhibit 'synergistic' effects which are several times more harmful than exposure to any single pollutant. In addition to these pollutants radioactive gases are also released and in larger quantities than would be released from a conventional nuclear power station under normal operation.⁹⁷

The intention at Huntly is to have two 150 metre high chimneys to disperse the invisible gases but although they may be effective in lowering the ground level concentrations they do not in themselves

reduce the amount of pollutants released into the atmosphere. The often quoted efficiency of electrostatic precipitators has been overestimated according to Potter and Paulson (1975) who refer to recent Australian examples. Lamb (1975) also notes that variations in efficiency are considerable⁹⁸ when reviewing Australian coal fired plant performance. Mills and Tassicker (1975) found that in pilot tests for Huntly Power Station there was a variability in efficiency of extraction in part function of the range of chemical content of the coal around the Power Station's coalfields.

Although the gaseous pollutants may be comparatively small it must be realised that health risks to humans, animals and plants are increased when levels of toxic gases are increased substantially above the normal levels for the area and this must occur at Huntly. As many Scientists note with regard to nuclear levels (the same is true for thermal gas levels) it is impossible to specify safe levels of air pollution for all the community and by raising the levels the cumulative effects are intensified.

"The public has heard a lot about air pollution from the scientists and technologists and has been led to expect improvements. The actual improvement effected has been quite small and there is strong evidence to show that air pollution will get worse, not better, in any growing industrial state, even with the best abatement practice."

(Martin 1975:634)

A question related to the radioactive wastes of Huntly Power Station at the First Energy Conference 1974 was answered by NZED General Manager with a "don't know what you're talking about."⁹⁹ Throughout discussions on air pollution of the Huntly Power Station and written material one aspect has been emphasised and an aspect which is likely to pose serious environmental problems to the surrounding area has been under emphasised. The process is an ongoing one so that when the stage Environmental Impact Report is released in 1976 and environmental groups have access¹⁰⁰ to specific technical information from which to calculate emissions of toxic gases¹⁰¹ they could be in a position to challenge the scientific symbol with the alternative scientific symbols if they choose to. One cannot predict with accuracy whether a group or individual will initiate the debate or when it will arise but one can legitimately speculate that there is a possibility of this particular scientific symbol being challenged but when, is for the reader to decide.

THE POLITICS OF ROADS

GEOGRAPHIC SIGNIFICANCE

The Huntly Power Project is situated at the corner of two main roads which serve the rural community surrounding the Project. These roads provide efficient access to and from farms for the transport of agricultural products, farm machinery services, education social and recreational amenities. These crucial links between the farm and Huntly township of considerable social and economic benefit to the rural and urban sectors of the district. With the advent of the power project considerable strain was placed on the physical conditions of the surrounding roads. Built initially as rural farmland roads they were not designed to take the intensive construction traffic carrying heavy loads (some in excess of 90 tons) of materials and equipment to and from the site. The old, narrow, unsealed roads were unable to cope and the rapid deterioration posed a direct threat to the farming community.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

The possibility of roading problems occurring were discussed Huntly in July 1972, August 1973 and a Federated Farmers meeting at Ruawaro in October 1973.¹⁰² The Rotongaro Branch of the Federated Farmers had sought assurances from the Raglan County Council (RCC) - the local authority responsible for the roads - and Government Departments associated with the Project¹⁰³ that the Farmers of the area would not suffer because of the Project. These assurances were given to the Farmers and Huntly community in general by the Ministers of Electricity and Works.¹⁰⁴ When construction of the station began in 1973/74 it became apparent that the roads would be effected. The Federated Farmers again sought assurances from the local authority that the roads should not be allowed to deteriorate.¹⁰⁵ The roads had received little maintenance for many years because they were considered a low priority in Raglan County's road expenditure programme.¹⁰⁶ The road problem was first raised at the October 1974 Forum meeting when the RCC representative asked for assistance from the Project to meet these additional requirements placed on the roads for which were County responsibility.¹⁰⁷ Discussions between the Project and County were already taking place at this time about an unsealed road from the Project site North to the temporary bridge. This

section of the road needed to be upgraded and reformed to cope with large equipment loads expected on site in late 1975 and 1976. Project Officials had given a verbal assurance that the County would not be required to meet the cost of reforming and sealing.¹⁰⁸ Two other roads were causing concern, the road running parallel to the river and Waikokowai from the river to farms in the West. The river road was called Huntly West Road until it reached the residential area where it was renamed Harris Street after which it became Te Ohaki Road.¹⁰⁹ In November 1974 at the Liaison Committee meeting¹¹⁰ the Federated Farmers representative reiterated their concern and drew attention to the condition of Huntly West Road which was breaking up due to trucks carting metal from two quarries south of Huntly and general construction traffic. A press report¹¹¹ that RCC was asking for assistance was used to raise the problem at a Liaison Committee meeting in April 1975.¹¹² The NZED representative¹¹³ announced that NZED would pay "its fair share" where such traffic increase and road wear could be substantially attributed to Project activities. The matter was next discussed at a Forum meeting in July 1975.¹¹⁴ The Chairman assured RCC that the Project would cover the cost of upgrading Te Ohaki Road to the temporary Bridge and offer an annual financial contribution to maintain the road North from the temporary bridge to Rangiriri Bridge. As regards Harris Street an annual sum would be given to the Huntly Borough Council for maintenance from the Tainui Bridge to the Borough boundary and eventually it would be regraded and sealed as had been done with the section from the boundary to the Project site (part of Te Ohaki Road). The Mines Department had given a written assurance that should Waikokowai Road be used to cart coal from the minehead to the station it would pay for upgrading. The concern of RCC and the Farmers with this road was that a large number of trucks were carting metal to the site of the No.1 underground mine. In August 1975¹¹⁵ the Mines Department admitted it would be necessary to carry metal for four to five months due to site conditions at the mine head but as it had no intention to cart coal (this would be done by conveyor) their early assurance regarding coal could not be applied to the metal carting situation. The increased use of Waikokowai, Te Ohaki and Huntly West Roads caused further deterioration to the extent that normal car speeds were reduced, large pot holes and sub-

sidences occurred and flying rocks were damaging cars. With this situation the Federated Farmers placed notices in the local Huntly Press to call a public meeting on 6 November 1975 which was attended by about 100 people. At the liaison Committee meeting in November and the Forum meeting in December 1975¹¹⁶ the issue was discussed and it was resolved that some action to solve the problem be taken.

THE PUBLIC MEETING

The public meeting on 6 November 1975 was a dramatic event lasting about two hours. Mr Carey a local resident farmer and former County Councillor¹¹⁷ explained that the cost of upgrading the roads concerned was \$500,000. This could not be met by Raglan County and it was unreasonable to expect them to do so. A number of speakers from the floor addressed the meeting, most of them planted in the audience to give support to the main aim of the meeting which was to show concern for the state of the roads and criticise the inaction to date in achieving any solution. People called on the Project to provide the necessary finance as they believed it was a project in the national interest and the local ratepayers should not be required to bear the financial burden. Comparisons were drawn with other areas which had received assistance from power projects to support the case that the Project should contribute to the roading for example

"If we are to enjoy the situation that other centres have e.g. New Plymouth, and not have the assets of the area reduced to rubble then we have to do something NOW!"¹¹⁸

(Speaker at Meeting 6 November 1975)

"NZED must earn thousands of dollars each year and should accept responsibility for the roading."¹¹⁹

(Mr Carey, November 1975)

Early in the meeting one of the main speakers Mr Carey, stated that the District Commissioner of Works and Project Officials had been invited to the meeting but were not present.

"There are gaps between the loudly acclaimed liaison between Government and the local people in whose area the station operates."¹²⁰

(Mr Carey, November 1975)

Speakers from the floor suggested it was a matter of principle and it was necessary to fight because if they could not get something "heaven help the Clutha people."¹²¹ They asked what would happen

to the people at the Auckland No.1 thermal station site and said that they should learn from the experiences of Huntly. They should obtain written agreements with Government Departments before construction began.

"We just want to be protected not left to grin and bear it."¹²²
(anon. November 1975)

After considerable discussion the M.P. for Raglan addressed the meeting saying that it was inevitable that the meeting should occur from the time the station began.¹²³ He outlined the procedures to be followed when presenting submissions and asked the Farmers to ensure they received the support of the local authority. The RCC Chairman then addressed the meeting stating that his Council would support the claim of the Farmers in the area. He explained that RCC was in a strong position over the matter since a verbal assurance by the Mines Department had been given, that they would restore Waikokowai Road. In regard to Te Ohaki Road he felt NZED was trying to back out of a written agreement to provide the maintaince.

"They said we could have \$10,000 if we could prove that excess traffic was related to the station, however, the criterion they set makes it a gimmick."¹²⁴
(Mr Kellow, November 1975)

The Chairman RCC continued his speech noting that the County was in a difficult position because it was legally liable for roads under its control and did not want a repeat of a situation two years before when the County was sued as a result of a bus accident.¹²⁵ Thus although it could not afford the money to fix the road it was obliged to maintain the roads to a safe standard. He thought the Government Departmental Officers were ethical men and had always regarded them as such and he would accept their assurances on this basis, but he was attempting to obtain written guarantees on the matters before the meeting.

A number of motions were proposed by a selected group of Farmers who read from typewritten sheets at prearranged times so that it appeared as though the motions came from the floor spontaneously.¹²⁶ The Press who attended (by invitation) were presented with copies of the motions after the meeting. Support for the motions was unanimous and the meeting resolved to

1. form a deputation to approach the Minister of Electricity and Minister of Works and Development and the Project Planning Forum.

2. To enlist the support of RCC.
3. To ask the RCC to impose restrictions on the weight and type of vehicle which could use the roads.

The following day the local newspaper gave the Meeting front page headlines.¹²⁷ The issue was kept alive until the Forum meeting on 1 December 1975 by coverage of the Farmers deputation to the RCC monthly meeting and the visit to the Ministers in Wellington.¹²⁸

At the RCC meeting¹²⁹ the Farmers claimed that the finance should be met by the Project and not the County.

"This is not a charge to be met by the County in any form but a power project cost to be met by them no matter how the various Departments prevaricate and change their minds."¹³⁰
(Carey, November 1975)

The Farmers said the conditions of the roads were such that it was impossible to drive continuously on the right side of the road and people had taken to driving along the stopbank on Te Ohaki Road. The non appearance of Project Officials was described as

"A far cry from what they said in past Public Relations exercises."¹³¹

(Mr Carey, November 1975)

DEPUTATION TO THE PROJECT PLANNING FORUM

The sentiments expressed at the Public meeting and the RCC meeting were restated at the Planning Forum meeting on 1 December 1975 when a deputation of Farmers¹³² (including the Federated Farmers co-opted member of the Forum) addressed the Forum. They presented three speeches (type written notes) in a ritualistic and formal manner. In addition to the main points made at the other meetings¹³³ they attacked the credibility of the Forum to achieve its aims of co-operation and co-ordination. The Chairman explained that he had not attended the public meeting because as it was not an official RCC meeting he could not be seen to be interfering with a matter that was RCC responsibility. The other Government representatives explained they were in a similar position and had not been invited. The Farmers called for an assurance by the Forum that it accept responsibility should an accident occur on the roads but the Chairman explained that as the Forum was not a statutory body it had no executive power, was not set up to make decisions and could not give the assurances asked of it.¹³⁴ The RCC representative sympathised with the deputation and

and restated the efforts made by himself but he said the Farmers should realise it was a slow and lengthy business. The Chairman moved the discussion from the general principles involved to a specific consideration of each particular road concerned. The Chairman reassured the Farmers that Te Ohaki Road would be reconstructed at the cost of the Project to the turnoff of the temporary bridge. Although the standards of reconstruction were agreed with the RCC due to a Government directive to reduce spending the Project had to revise the roading expenditure. As sealing Te Ohaki Road was not necessary to carry the heavy loads it would be deferred. Sealing the road had been viewed as the 'gilding on the lily'¹³⁵ - an extra benefit which could not be offered in the short term. The NZED representative confirmed that \$10,000 had been offered for the maintaince of Te Ohaki Road on the condition that the money was used on that road.¹³⁶ The Mines Department representative outlined the circumstances surrounding the carting of metal to the minehead and assured RCC that discussions would be held with a view to repairing the extraordinary damage attributable to the carting programme. If upgrading was necessary it would be carried out when the carting had finished as the programme could not be delayed. A decision to advance the RCC finance (cost of maintaince) would be made when the extent of the problem could be gauged and costs fixed.¹³⁷

The Project Engineer provided a list of quantities of metal carted from the quarries over the Huntly West Road but stated it was a problem to identify the amount of traffic generated by the Project and the extent it was damaging the road. The Huntly Borough Council Mayor supported the Farmers case and stated that a number of complaints from residents along the Huntly West - Harris Street route had been received by him particularly about the noise and dust. He urged the Project to take some action about the situation in general and the particular complaints of dust and noise. The Project Engineer agreed a problem existed and thought it was the contractors responsibility to reduce the dust level and speed of vehicles. He undertook to inform the contractors concerned.

The M.P. for Raglan, Mr Carter, expressed his concern that Farmers were being effected when ministerial assurances¹³⁸ had indicated that

the people of the area would not suffer. The Forum minutes recorded his definition of the situation.

"Mr Carter said there was now this question as to who was suffering and to what extent they were suffering. He felt that it was unfortunate that certain confidential negotiations were taking place between various parties which could not be readily or quickly communicated to the ratepayers of the area and this question of communication could be one of the main problems being faced. The question which has to be resolved was - did the Farmer have to suffer and if so, for how much longer."¹³⁹

(Carter, November 1975)

After the deputation presented its case it thanked the Forum and the Chairman indicated that they could stay and observe proceedings if they wanted to.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ROADING ISSUE

The roading issue illustrates a negotiative situation which extended for a considerable length of time and eventually presented as a dramatic issue both at a public meeting and a Forum meeting.¹⁴⁰ People at the public meeting were placed strategically so as to give the appearance of spontaneity.¹⁴¹ While some of the public made comments from the floor the majority of criticism voiced was by the Farmers who called the meeting.¹⁴² A typed list of recommendations was prepared and the deputation members were selected before the meeting began.¹⁴³ A justification for the staging of the meeting was that

"Its better this way, more efficient, meetings can drag on for hours and get nowhere."¹⁴⁴

(Carey, November 1975)

The exhortive language style used to convey the Farmers concerns and mobilize peoples' support was presented as an 'angry' meeting in the Press.¹⁴⁵ The Farmers used the media to convey their message, gain wider support and pressure the Government Departments into making a decision.¹⁴⁶ Some individuals at the Public meeting (general agreement) saw the conflict situation as part of a symbolic conflict to help other people where power projects threatened their interests while others accepted a general ideological belief that since the Project was in the national interest, the national interest should pay the cost of hardship on the local area.

"If people want the power they should pay for it."

(Speaker, Public Meeting, November 1975)

The Raglan County Chairman and the M.P. for Raglan gave the meeting some credibility and respectability and were themselves placed in a position to follow the matter to a conclusion.¹⁴⁷

The Raglan County Chairman felt that the meeting allowed him flexibility (reinforcement) to press Government Departments for more definite assurances and since he had a 'just' claim justice would be done.¹⁴⁸

"Although we don't believe in milking the State cow all the time we should be properly and fairly treated....we have not been."¹⁴⁹

(Mr Kellow, November 1975)

This attitude is reflective of a general attitude operating in the district among the farmers, politicians, and interest groups.¹⁵⁰ The emphasis is not so much being detrimentally effected but rather what 'spinoffs' and benefits will be brought to the district. While the Chairman of Raglan County expresses this as justice and fair treatment, initial statements by Ministry of Works spokesman indicated the people should expect economic payoffs and a boom period.¹⁵¹

Reaction to the public meeting and the subsequent newspaper reports by Project officials¹⁵² indicated that they retained a fixed image of the Farmers and would not be persuaded into accepting the Farmers claims by them using the public meeting - media influences. The problem that existed would not be solved by coercive tactics. For example

"The Federated Farmers outfit used the media to push their own ideas. We are always open here or at Head Office for representations however they dont appear to like to work that way. They like to have it out on a big stage with headlines in the paper. They make all this noise about having submissions considered but they dont come along and see us. They are seeking status for their own organisation rather than getting to the crux of the problem. They are wanting to get into a position where they can have an effect, but this is available to them without having to go to the Forum."¹⁵³
(Project Engineer 1975)

The Farmers considered the roading issue one of many things or aspects of the Project which required some action to improve or change.

"We have found more and more things which should have been planned but are only beginning to be considered after construction has begun. Government Departments give no consideration until we bring things up to their attention but by the time we persuade them to upgrade the road the major traffic will be finished. They should have built a road to cope with the situation."¹⁵⁴
(Federated Farmers Representative
1975)

The deputation to the Forum meeting made a considerable dramatic impact.¹⁵⁵ The deputation was used as a form of stage and where long speeches were given, facts established and questions posed. The formality of the Forum and involvement of respectable people¹⁵⁶ produced a situation of significance and a test of the Forum's ability to actively reach a solution. A negotiative situation was apparent as the Farmers and Government Departments put forward their views and what the solution should be. The alliances with the local interest against the Project and Head Office representatives was clearly defined.¹⁵⁷ The Farmers used a variety of symbolic images in an effort to define a situation in their terms. They saw the matter as urgent, cars were damaged and communications were reduced. The earlier experiences of success or failures were brought into the situation. The Raglan County representative explained the legal liability, the reduction in road funding,¹⁵⁸ the assurances given and broken, the criterion for obtaining money which was impossible to achieve. The Farmers recalled their experiences with other actions such as the Liaison Committee,¹⁵⁹ representation on the Forum¹⁶⁰ and assurances over water levels.¹⁶¹ They attempted to show up the Project's inconsistencies such as providing finance for sealed car parks on the site, while the road outside was falling apart.¹⁶²

The Project¹⁶³ breached an agreement with RCC over sealing Te Ohaki Road which was an action they chose as a result of an external directive to cut non essential expenditure - an unanticipated consequence of the national economic decline.

When the Farmers questioned the credibility of the Forum to make decisions they challenged a basic ground rule¹⁶⁴ they initially accepted. The Chairman defended this attack on the Forum and expressed complete surprise that anyone should think of it as anything but a place for discussion.¹⁶⁵ In carrying out this action the Farmers deputation entered a world of illusion or fantasy - their act had been carried too far and the effectiveness of the exercise faltered¹⁶⁶ but was rescued for a while by the intrusion of the M.P. into the situation. Later in the Forum meeting the credibility and what the Farmers meant by it was discussed in detail with the Farmers maintaining a view that little was achieved since everyone talked but made no decisions.¹⁶⁷

The M.P. maintained a flexible position in the situation but gained support from both sides by stating the obvious. His clear announcement that a problem existed and it should be solved while not suggesting the solution brought support from the Farmers who considered he was backing them against the Departmental Officials and support from the Departmental office who were relieved of pressure¹⁶⁸ from the Farmers to make a decision and resolve the lack of co-operation which they could not do at the Forum because of its rules but which they could choose to do outside the Forum. The chairman expressed their position as follows

"I think it fair to say that those on the Forum are responsible people and they have taken any problems to the right people in an effort to get results." 169

(Chairman, Forum, 1975)

The Farmers' use of dramatic action to voice their concern arose from a twin belief that the situation was bad and getting worse and staging a dramatic event ensured action and brought pressure¹⁷⁰ on the decision makers.¹⁷¹ It served to clarify the issues, obtain an assurance¹⁷² and a promise to hold further discussions with the local Authority¹⁷³ (RCC) as the appropriate legitimate authority responsible for the roads. As the chairman explained about the Farmers

"They're quite wrong in divorcing themselves from their local Authority. They have elected representatives to an authority which has statutory control over the roading system. They should go through their local Authority to have matters righted since it is the local Authority which knows the financial system by which funds are allocated."174

(Chairman Forum 1975)

The Farmers did achieve a clear statement regarding the funds that were already made available for Road maintenance and enabled the Raglan County to 'sort that one out',¹⁷⁵ but the Farmers received little indication of future intentions except a promise that discussions would be held not with them but with the appropriate body and within their respective Departments. The issue was not resolved,¹⁷⁶ it remained ongoing requiring further negotiation to reach a settlement. A phase in this political process was concluded, but by mutual agreement the problem of roads was to be continued at a future time.

FOOTNOTES

WATER RIGHTS

1. For a full discussion of the scientific reasons see Bayer H.E. The Environmental Impact of Thermal Power Station Siting, N.Z. Engineering, Vol 29, 9, 1974. Briefly the cost of closed cooling systems is about \$30M, cooling towers (wet) involve climatic changes, cooling ponds involve large areas of land use and environmental disturbance if lakes are used.
2. Throughout this study Authority is taken to mean the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority.
3. For reasons see details in next section.
4. Grounds for objection outlined in next section.
5. See minutes of Meeting in Huntly Borough Council Chambers
6. See Preece Cadrew Rider. Feasibility Study on Huntly. April 1972
7. See Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 21 March 1974
8. For example the Environmental Defence Society.
9. This report was a cost comparison, 1. once through system using river water \$9.6M, 2. closed cooling towers \$27.2M, 3. Combination of both \$15.7M.
10. See The Times, 21 March 1973
11. See Report by Mr HCC Jones, Engineers Report for the period ending 23 March 1973. Supplementary Report No. 1. Waikato Valley Authority.
12. See letter of 12 March 1973 from Director of Soil and Water Division of Ministry of Works to Waikato Valley Authority.
13. See footnote 11 for source.
14. *ibid* 1973
15. See letter District Manager NZED Hamilton 28 March 1973 to Waikato Valley Authority.
16. *ibid* 1973
17. Private conversation with Author 1975
18. As a majority voted in favour of the motion put by Minogue and Page one could assume they voted for the motion and against the NZEDs arguments. The reasons for doing so were varied but subsequent correspondence between the Hamilton City Council and Minister of Electricity showed a concern for advancing the second stage sewage treatment project by Hamilton City and disruption to loan schedule.

19. For a list of these conditions see Water Right No. 220,221 file No 75/2/2/11 National Water and Soil Conservation Organisation, Wellington N.Z.
20. See Report of the Inter Departmental Officials Committee on Environment 1973. Huntly Power Station.
21. The Environmental Impact Statement on the Huntly Power Station was subsequently termed a Report according to procedures announced by Government in June 1973.
22. See public statement made by Minister for the Environment, Mr Walding, 8 June 1973.
23. See The Times 6 July 1973, 8 June 1973
24. The Times, 8 June 1973
25. *ibid* 1973
26. Private conversation with Mr Mahuta, the Maori Community Representative and see also Mahuta, R.T. Some Implications of Industrial Development for Maori Communities ANZAAS Congress Canberra 1974:12.
27. The Town and Country Planning Act 1953 allows 28 days to lodge an Appeal from the date a Right is granted by the Authority.
28. See letter to Town Clerk, Hamilton City Council, 27 August 1973 from Minister of Electricity. Proposed Huntly Power Station.
29. The Appeal Board applied the decision of the Supreme Court in Evans v Town and Country Planning Appeal Board 1963 NZLR 244. Holds that appellant must demonstrate that the detrimental affect upon him will be appreciable. It is not sufficient that an appellant demonstrate that he will be affected in the same manner as the general public will be affected.
30. See Decision of Town and Country Planning Appeal Board No. 1. Case Nos. 272, 273, 280, 286/73, PA581. 12 October 1973
31. *ibid* 1973:581
32. *ibid* 1973:578
33. By cultural evidence I mean evidence relating to Maori customs life style, rituals, beliefs, whereas scientific evidence refers to the technical aspects of say number and type of fish species, conditions of river bottom, temperature difference.
34. This could have been interpreted as a deliberate tactic to discredit or prevent the evidence of the EDS but my discussions with NZED Legal Officer in charge of this case have satisfied me that it was challenged as a purely legal technicality and there was no malice involved.

35. File No. 34/9. NZED Report by Mr D.H. Jones Project Liaison Engineer to Head Office. Files on Water Rights 10-13 September 1973.
36. No 1 Town and Country Planning Appeal Board Decision No 272, 273 280, 286/73 A 596 1973.
37. *ibid* 1973:596
38. The final copy of the Biological Survey was completed in November 1975 and transmitted to the WVA for public inspection.
39. See Liaison Committee Minutes 24 February 1975. Huntly Power Project and record of speech and Liaison Committee Minutes 21 April 1975.
40. Mr D.H. Jones NZED Representative at Forum see Huntly Power Planning Forum minutes 24 July 1974.
41. Draft. Stage Environmental Impact Report Huntly Power Station. 1975 Appendix G NZED
42. See The Times 29 October 1975 "Planners Objectors to meet informally on Huntly discharge."
43. See The Times 7 November 1975 "Water rights may be sought".
44. Draft State Environmental Impact Report, Huntly Power Station 1975.
45. For example Water Right application by Maui Gas Pipeline Project considered by WVA 9 December 1975.
46. Private conversation with Author and Secretary WVA 1975
47. See letter referred to in footnote 12.
48. See letter referred to in footnote 15.
49. See comments by Jones (refer footnote 35) in which he said there was no need for head office to worry about the case, the fears expressed were unfounded.
50. Although my evidence does not establish the Minister actually viewed the reports it is I believe a reasonable assumption since the Minister for the Environment issued a statement on 8 June 1973 about these reports and indicated that the Minister of Electricity and Minister of Works were aware of the Reports. See The Times 8 June 1973.
51. See footnote 26, Mahuta R.T. 1974 *Loc cit.*
52. For example Mayor Hamilton City Council, Maori Community, Environmental Defence Society however it was accepted by the Chairman of WVA and Chairman Raglan County Council. See WVA minutes 27 March 1973.

53. See footnote 35 in this report Mr Jones outlines the nature of the agreement.
54. The Mayors comments were based on what he had been told by the NZED representative to the Forum in 1975, however it would be unlikely for NZED to send a person specifically to examine this aspect but rather it could have been done in conjunction with supervision of the boiler contracts which are let to a Canadian Firm.

MAUI GAS PIPELINE ROUTE - HUNTLY SECTION

55. As the pipeline is 30" in diameter the degree of bend to follow contours of hills, valleys etc is considerably less than with the Kapuni 6" diameter gas pipeline. The project has attempted to run the Kapuni and Maui Gas Pipelines side by side.
56. Four alternatives were considered for discussion at these see Forum minutes 7 October 1974:6,7
57. The discussions at the Forum level were held 'in committee' although some discussion was undertaken in open meeting.
58. Mr T.G. Shadwell, Project Manager Maui Pipeline Project.
59. The landowners listed include owners for both routes.
60. Conversation with Mr Mahuta and Author also see Forum minutes 7 October 1974:8
61. Mr C.E. Bartholomeusz, Pipeline Project Engineer.
62. Liaison Committee Meeting Huntly Power Project minutes 18 August 1975.
63. For example Baker Housing Block, temporary bridge, and onsite wage agreements (site allowance and conditions) were all aspects which needed a quick decision.
64. Replies to questions from the Author in informal conversation among all Forum members 1974.
65. See letter from Director General, Department of Lands and Survey to Project Manager Maui Pipeline Project 25 July 1975 Maui Pipeline Route - Ngaruawahia/Huntly.
66. Conversation with chairman RCC Mc Kellow and Author 1975.
67. Conversation with Forum members substantiated this fact. They had heard through official channels in the case of Government Departments and the local interests through informal network and newspaper reports of the day, e.g. Herald 10 September 1975. "Gas fears Allayed."

68. The Pipeline Project specifically stated in the environmental report that the RCC and Maori Trustee raised no objection to the route and were favourably disposed as a result of discussions with them. See Oaonui - Auckland Pipeline, New Plymouth - Huntly Section, May 1975. And Addendum to the Environmental Impact Report January 1976.
69. See The Times 30 October 1975, and 20 November 1975.
70. The Maui Pipeline project was required to submit an impact report to the Commission for the Environment, which would be released for public comment and then Audited by the Commission and recommendations made. In this case the Project decided to undertake a general report New Plymouth to Huntly and then a second more specific Ngaruawahia - Huntly report. Thus many of the groups and comments relating to the second report were originally made and are contained in the first report. The second report has not been Audited at the time of writing. The first report was Audited in 1975.
71. Other local interests were the Maoris and Huntly Borough.
72. Conversation with Author 1975.
73. This raised another symbol which I do not propose to deal with at present i.e. the symbol that discussion and tentative planning is never confirmed until an official announcement. This lack of commitment can enable groups to change the action, it does not preempt a situation or decision but can be interpreted as procrastination, lack of co-ordination or co-operation.
74. For example the modified stance taken by Chairman RCC in supporting the environmentalists.
75. See The Times 30 October 1975, 20 November 1975, 17 February 1976 4 March 1976. The environmental groups include Nature Conservation Council, Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society (Waikato Branch), Environmental Defence Society, Lower Waikato Conservation Society.
76. See letter to Maui Pipeline Project from Waikato Federated Farmers Mr B.C. Smith, 11 December 1975.
77. It should be remembered that when the pipeline route was first suggested the Project was unsure as to whether it had to undertake an environmental Impact Report. Procedures were still being developed as it was a relatively new concept.
78. See The Times 17 February 1976, 26 February 1976, and The N.Z. Herald 4 March 1976.

AIR POLLUTION HUNTLY POWER STATION

79. Huntly residents were aware of the possibility of the station in late 1971. See The Times 30 September 1971, 13 October 1973 5 November 1971. Huntly Press 24 November 1971.

80. For example Environmental Defence Society.
81. Electrostatic precipitators would cost more than \$3 million to bring the plant with the 500mg/cm level (milligrams of dust per cubic metre of chimney emission). MereMere usually operates at output of 900mg/cm but exceeds 1200mg/cm during regular boiler cleaning. Statement by Health Department in The Times 26 February 1976:30 says it is unlikely to reduce the level of pollution to an acceptable level.
82. See minutes of meeting in Huntly Borough Council Chambers with Government Departmental Representatives 12 July 1972, copies of speech by Mr M.J. Williams and Mr D.H. Jones to Progressive Association in Huntly on 1 August 1973 and The Times 2 August 1973 "Likely Effect of Thermal Station Probed", Speech of Mr D.H. Jones and minutes of Public meeting in Huntly on 4 August 1973 and The Times 5 August 1973, minutes of meeting in Ruawaro Hall on 1 October 1973, with Farmers and NZED Engineers.
83. In one case on 12 July 1972 the Chief Chemical Inspector for the Health Department Wellington gave supporting evidence.
84. For example Forum meetings of 29 July 1974, 7 October 1974 4 November 1974 and 3 March 1975:6.
85. See Jones, D.H. Huntly Power Station Pulverised Fuel Ash Generation and Disposal 1974:2
86. *ibid*, 1974:3
87. General publicity handouts available from the Project Office distributed at Forum Meeting 3 March 1975:6
88. This EIR was compiled and written in 1975 and was due for release at the end of 1975 but due to production difficulties and its length (600 pages) it was not completed by the target date. In February 1976 the report had still not been produced as problems had arisen in its submission to the Commission for the Environment. The Commission told NZED to rewrite the study in a more presentable form so the public could understand it. See the Times 16 February 1976.
89. I believe this is a fair inference as the minutes of the meetings listed in footnote 82 and the questions asked at these meetings indicate a general belief that smoke and ash were air pollution.
90. A review of the minutes of these meetings and the written material shows that the only time gaseous pollutants were discussed was in the 12 July 1972 meeting refer to footnote 82.
91. The provisions of the Clean Air Act 1972 reinforce permissible limits by specify dust emission levels, licencing the emissions see Section 3, however the Act under Section 2 does define any air pollutant in terms of gases, fumes, mists or dusts and in the first schedule list a comprehensive list of chemical pollutants.
92. For example Auckland No.1 Thermal Power Station.

93. Conversation with Author by Mr Malcolmoon, Project Co-ordination Engineer Wellington and Mr Nixon Chief Engineer, Development NZED Wellington.
94. This conference contained papers on Electrostatic Recipitators and specific reference to Huntly. See Mills and Tassicker (1975).
95. Durie and Smith (1975) note that as the boiler size increases so does the amount of nitrogen oxide released into the atmosphere. By weight a substance such as coal nitrogen composes 2%.
96. Compared to other types of coal the coal used in the Huntly Power Station will be low content sulphur, about 3%. If the Station was operated for 360 days per annum on the stated load factor using the annual coal requirement, about 9000 tons of sulphur wouldbe produced. See Freeman 1964, for equation.
97. See Prof. Kendall address in New Zealand Energy Conference 1974 and Mann, L.R.B. 1975. New Zealand's Nuclear Power Decision, Town Planning Quarterly No 39 March 1975. Also contained in Proceedings of International, Clear Air Conference 1975.
98. Lamb (1975) notes variations in efficiency due to variations in composition of fuel, combustion conditions, pulverising mill wear, atmospheric conditions, percipitator performance, thickness of the residual dust layer after rapping.
99. See Proceedings of New Zealand Energy Conference 1974.
100. Until the document is released by the Commission for the Environment it remains a classified document for Departmental use only.
101. Until the actual time limits, loadfactors, rate of coal use, coal to gas use etc the toxic gases emitted can not be accurately assessed.

THE POLITICS OF ROADS

102. Meetings referred to in footnote 82. 12 July 1972, 4 August 1973 1 October 1973.
103. Departments are Ministry of Works and Development, NZED, Mines Department.
104. See Mr Carter M.P. Raglan address to Forum meeting 21 December 1973 and 1 December 1975.
105. See The Times 26 March 1974 and then recalled in The Times 7 November 1975.
106. Local Authorities were under strain for roading finance. This attitude was expressed at RCC meeting 25 March 1974. See The Times 26 March 1974.

107. See Forum minutes 7 October 1974:10
108. Conversation with Author and Project Engineer, however later announced in Liaison Committee meeting 17 November 1975 and Forum meeting 1 December 1975.
109. The Project site is situated at the intersection of Te Ohaki and Waikokowai Roads.
110. See Liaison Committee minutes 18 November 1974:4
111. See Huntly Press 26 March 1975
112. Liaison Committee meeting 21 April 1975:4
113. The NZED representative at the Forum also attends Liaison Committee meetings. This procedure is generally true for other Government Departments.
114. See Forum minutes 7 July 1975:7
115. See Liaison Committee minutes 18 August 1975:3
116. Liaison Committee meeting 17 November 1975, Forum meeting 1 December 1975.
117. Mr Carey fits the 'gentleman farmer' image. He was a former Raglan County Councillor and Waikato Hospital Board member for many years. Retired.
118. The Author attended the Public meeting at Ruawaro Hall on 6 November 1975. The statements made were recorded on tape Public meeting 6 November 1975.
119. Public meeting 6 November 1975
120. *ibid*, 1975
121. comment at meeting 6 November 1975
122. *ibid*, 1975
123. Mr Carter M.P. felt that at some time the local residents would formally raise objections to an aspect of the Project effecting their interests.
124. Public meeting 6 November 1975
125. About 2 years before a bus load of people plunged off a bank because the road was in an unsafe conditions. Legal suits for compensation by the passengers and relatives of one victim were awarded damages against the Raglan County Council.
126. As a result of conversations with the chairman, Mr Kimpton, my impressions were confirmed and another organiser made similar comments which are quoted below.

127. See The Times 7 November 1975 "Residents upset at road damage."
128. For example The Times 25 November 1975 "Farmers call for upgrading of Roads", The NZ Herald 25 November 1975 "Farmers: don't use ratepayers money for roads."
129. Raglan County Council meeting 24 November 1975.
130. *ibid* 1975
131. *ibid* 1975
132. Deputation consisted of Mr Pask, Mr Kimpton and Mr Chadwick.
133. Refer to Public meeting 6 November 1975 and Raglan County Council meeting 24 November 1975.
134. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975:9
135. Comment from Project Engineer at Forum meeting 1 December 1975.
136. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975:11
137. *ibid*, 1975:11
138. He referred to both a National and Labour Government.
139. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975:11
140. One can justifiably call these meetings dramatic both in the emotional sense and as a drama. The scene was set, actors played roles, scripts were prepared and read, an audience received the messages.
141. See footnote 144.
142. My impression
143. Confirmed by fact that the names also appeared on typewritten notes with the motions.
144. Comment to Author after Public meeting 6 November 1975.
145. See The Times 7 November 1975
146. Conversation between Federated Farmers members Mr Pask, Mr Chadwick and Author 1975.
147. The fact that both the political leaders attended the meeting was given publicity and emphasised at the Forum on occasions.
148. Conversation with Raglan County Chairman Mr R. Kellow and Author 1975.
149. Conversation *ibid* 1975.

150. A fair interpretation - judging by numerous comments received from community individuals and Forum members in conversation with Author.
151. See Forum minutes 21 December 1973 and comments by Minister of Works and Development, Mr H. Watt, on 30 January 1974 in Huntly Borough Council Chambers.
152. An unofficial "Official" attitude expressed by Project Engineers Public Relations Officer, Administrative Officer.
153. Interview with Author 1975.
154. Interview with Author 1975.
155. Judging by comments made after Forum among members and subsequent discussion with them individually by Author.
156. Refer to political leaders
157. Clearly observable and see Forum minutes 1. December 1975:9,10,11
158. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975:11 and The NZ Herald 12 January 1976 "Roads will suffer".
159. Farmers suggested establishing a Liaison Committee in 1973.
160. Farmers were not originally invited to be a Forum member but after considerable pressure they were allowed to attend as co-opted members.
161. See Forum minutes 7 July 1975:6
162. This was literally true as a drive along the roads at that time would show.
163. While individuals made the agreements reference to the 'Project' is used as a shorthand to encompass both the individuals and the organisation.
164. i.e. see terms of reference in Chapter four footnote 1. Forum not a decision making body.
165. The Chairman believed it to be an attack, he said so at Forum and in conversation with Author 1975.
166. My impression judging by comments received from Departmental Officials to the effect that there was a set of rules and procedures which guide the Forum's deliberations.
167. Comments made at Forum meeting 1 December 1973 by Farmers Representative see minutes 1975:12
168. Conversation with Departmental officials (NZED) after Forum meeting.
169. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975:10
170. Conversation with Farmers after public meeting 6 November 1975.

171. The decision makers would be Government cabinet in first instance but the Project Engineer and Department have considerable discretion and make recommendations to their superiors.
172. Refer to NZED representative saying that as far as he was concerned there was no tag on the money. The Ministry of Works and Development had established the criterion without NZED knowledge. The misunderstanding was clarified that RCC would receive the money. The RCC Chairman explained the reasons for the misunderstanding as "a Fair bit of personality clash! the Chairman was a little red in the face."
173. Not with the Farmers as it would be an inappropriate procedure according to the Chairman.
174. Conversation with District Commissioner of Works who is the Forum Chairman November 1975.
175. Conversation with Chairman RCC and Author 1975.
176. The ongoing nature was clearly evident in comments by Raglan County Council reported in the Times 24 February 1975 "Huntly project roads payment teases county."

CHAPTER SIX

HUNTLY POWER PROJECT

A COMPENDIUM OF CASES.

SITING THE HUNTLY POWER STATION

PLANNING THE POWER STATION

Plans were well advanced by 30 September 1971 when the Central Waikato Electric Power Board announced that a new mine would be needed to service a power station in Huntly,¹ however it was to be two years before the public were officially informed of the actual power station in Huntly.

The need for a 1000MW thermal station was shown in the 1969 power plan² as a nuclear plant situated at Auckland. A year later after the discovery of Maui Gas and a feasibility study by Preece Cardew and Rider,³ nuclear fuel was replaced with Maui Gas.⁴ The first public indication that an alternative site to Auckland was under consideration came when the 1971 (May) Report of the Power Planning Committee recommended that Auckland No. 1 be set back a year because of difficulties in negotiating a suitable price for Maui Gas. As the fuel supply was not assured the Report stated alternative sources of power production could necessitate a changed site.⁵ Official statements⁶ indicated that NZED did not realise there was sufficient coal at Huntly to fire the proposed station until they received a report from the Mines Department in September 1971. An Electricity Department spokesman described the advice from the Mines Department of huge coal reserves as

"It was like a bolt from the blue."⁷

(Chapman November 1971)

But was it? Elsewhere I have indicated that the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand 1964 was aware that sufficient coal existed. In the 1970 Annual Report of the Mines Department coal reserves matched the September 1971 Report on New Zealand Coal fields. The 1970 annual report notes that

"As a result of drilling North of Huntly township over the last few years the Huntly coalfield reserves have been increased considerably in the measured and inferred categories to reduce the indicated."

(Annual Report Mines Department 1970)

It would seem that NZED planners were aware that Huntly was a viable concern by the time it prepared the Planning Committee's Report in May 1971 if not at least a year before. The viability of the station needed to be confirmed from other aspects and on 2 November 1971⁹ the Minister of Electricity announced that money was to be voted for overseas consultants to examine the feasibility of Huntly and Marsden B power stations. As a result of discussions between representatives of Preece Cardew and Rider and NZED in November 1971 the terms of reference were clarified in a letter from NZED to Preece Cardew and Rider dated 10 January 1972.¹⁰ The consultants noted that

"Our present terms of reference do not include the consideration of alternative sites in the area."

(Preece Cardew and Rider Feasibility Study 1972:17)

The Feasibility study was completed in April 1972 and recommended proceeding with Huntly Power Station, however some six months before their recommendation the District Manager of NZED (Hamilton) had announced on 12 October 1971¹¹ that the power plant was a 'fait accompli' and would be built on the West side of the river. Despite these early indications throughout 1972 and much of 1973 Government officials would not confirm that the station would be built. In a speech to the Huntly Progressive Association on 1 August 1973 Mr D.H. Jones a NZED representative maintained a noncommittal stance when he stated that

"You will have noticed that I have said 'proposed' power station. This is because the Government has not yet approved a station to be constructed in this area. Until the Government is satisfied that all people affected, and that all ecological aspects have been considered and assessed the go-ahead will not be given."¹²

(Jones, August 1973)

Two weeks later on 13 August 1973 official approval to construct the station was given. The Minister of Electricity stated that

"Further aspects of the scheme will be the subject of discussion with interested parties and subsequent releases of information will be made from time to time."¹³

(Official Statement August 1973)

The reluctance to provide information prior to an official announcement can perhaps be explained by some of the reactions of the local people to the news that the station would proceed.

"A study is needed into the effects on Huntly of a large population increase and the traffic problems."¹⁴

"As yet there has been no comprehensive study of possible sociological problems."¹⁵

"There is a need for comprehensive town planning we dont want Huntly-West to be put together in bits and pieces."¹⁶

"The Station was hastily prepared and far from all embracing in examining matters."¹⁷

These typical comments showed some reservation about the background planning associated with the Project, but the political leaders were openly welcoming the station for its economic impact to provide an industrial boost for the district.¹⁸

The control of information by Government Departments produced an air of uncertainty about the Project. The Maoris were attempting to obtain information about the station's design for their water right case.¹⁹ The Farmers were asking for assurances that social and physical impacts be investigated but could not see any evidence of research. The HBC and RCC²⁰ wanted to know what plans were being made and what they would have to provide by way of amenities.

The failure of Government departments (NZED, MWD) to provide information must also be seen in context of civil service procedure. It would be rare for a Department to make a public decision without it being referred to the Minister for approval or a Cabinet decision. Policy matters such as authorising expenditure are legitimately a Cabinet decision and Departments would have to wait for such approval. They would be reluctant to place the Government of the day in an invidious position by releasing detailed research information which may show several alternatives for a plan all politically sensitive. The Departments may be unwilling to bear the responsibility for decisions which are entirely political and not of the Department's own suggestion. The final aspect is that Departments are established to deal with specific areas of concern and while issues are raised at a local level and directed to the 'obvious' Department concerned with the Project (NZED) it may not be in their jurisdiction to answer.²¹

SITING THE POWER STATION

Information control, manipulation of symbols and interaction with the local residents has been described as 'public relations' by NZED officials. The public relations programme or communication

activities²² can be analysed in terms of information control and symbolic manipulation.

In the last few months of 1971 when it became generally known that Huntly was likely to proceed²³ little technical information was publically released ostensibly because the Consultants were continuing their studies. This attitude was contained in the Draft Stage Environmental Impact Report 1975.

"One objective is to avoid creating unnecessary concern about future possibilities when the project is only in the conceptual phases. Normally so many changes occur at this atage that the final proposal may bear little resemblance in some respects to the original. Aspects of the plant are only known in broad outline and the details cannot be made known until suitable work on the design has been carried out."

(Draft Stage Environmental Impact Report 1975, A5:1)

Independent studies²⁴ by the Ministry of Works in October 1971 set forth the 'pros and cons' of the site for the station. The report stated.

"Cooling water from Lake Waahi and Waikato River could be used as MereMere is over 20 miles down stream the extra heat should be dissapated without effecting that station, undue river temperature will not be caused. Foundation conditions along both banks of the Waikato River north from Huntly and beyond to Mercer are commonly difficult. This is confirmed by drilling these soft layers which generally extend for 1000' back from the river bank. It is expected that areas can be found near the river having conditions suited to the foundations of a major power station but they will have to be searched for and an extensive drilling and material testing programme will be needed. On present evidence it is considered that a power station could be sited to the North of the Waahi Stream but much more data and site information is needed before a site for a coal fired station can be selected and the station designed."²⁵

(District Commissioner of Works Hamilton 1971)

The Preece Cardew and Rider study emphasised the foundation problems

"The site is less attractive than Marsden. There is a high ground water level at the proposed site which could be flooded to several feet if the river rises. There is risk of subsidence ...differential settlement could occur and tilting....100' piles would be necessary. The intake and outflow structure should be on piled foundations to guard against undermining. More extensive piling than recommended by Ministry of Works is needed."²⁶

(Preece Cardew Rider 1972:165)

None of this technical information warning against possible foundations problems was made public but when construction began the

piling pattern had to be increased considerably and settlement in the intake and discharge ~~pipes~~ ^{pipes} resulted in some delay as the structures had to be replaced and piles driven.²⁷

As these negotiations were progressing the Minister of Electricity made comments that alternative sources of generation must be sought in view of the Maui Gas negotiations and to enable the demand for energy to be met.²⁸ The comments were made in relation to an attempt to pressure better gas negotiations and reaffirm Governments intention to use the coal alternative in thermal production.²⁹

During the first four months of 1972 little was heard about the Huntly Power Station until in May 1972 the Minister of Electricity announced that a decision on siting would be made in three to four months.³⁰ Details released at this time were that it would be designed to burn either coal or gas and to meet the deadline of 1978 construction would have to begin by late 1973 or early 1974.³¹ It was about this time that the 1972 power plan was being prepared and in late June the General Manager of NZED stated that a decision to build the station had been made.³² Shortly after this announcement the District Manager NZED (Hamilton) called a meeting in Huntly on 12 July 1972 to discuss the station.³³ The day after this meeting the District Manager NZED cabled Head Office to indicate that in his opinion the only contentious issue was Maori Land but he felt sure the Maoris were for the scheme.³⁴ Discussion at the 12 July 1972 meeting covered many topics - water and air pollution, coal mining, use of gas, relocation of Rakaumanga School, housing. Departmental Offices provided technical information on how the water and air pollution problems would be solved but they did not give any indemnities over possible failures or adverse effects of the plans and solutions they offered. A Maori representative criticised the lack of 'real information' given to the meeting. The Officials would not say where the station was going to be sited or if official approval to proceed had been given.

"The NZED representative knows more than he is saying. People in your position can make recommendations."³⁵

(Mr Tukiri, July 1972)

The weight of opinion at this meeting was in favour of the station and the Mayor expressed enthusiastic support.

"Huntly hopes to procure the Station. Please don't keep us in suspense too long."³⁶

(Mr Gavin July 1972)

The power plan showing a 1000MW station at Huntly was tabled in Parliament on 1 August 1972.³⁷ Huntly was to fill the breach for as the General Manager of NZED said

"It was now necessary to take positive steps leading to construction of a station which was not dependent on gas."³⁸
(General Manager NZED)

Confirmation that the NZED had decided to go ahead with the Project came when letters were circulated to other Government Departments (Education, Maori and Island Affairs, Mines, Nature Conservation Council) advising them of the site and asking for any comments.³⁹ A month later Cabinet decided to approve in principle the station subject to an Environmental Impact statement and call tenders by the end of the Year.⁴⁰ Reaction from Huntly's Mayor was favourable⁴¹ and he believed his efforts in leading a deputation from HBC to the Minister to assure him the Huntly community was in favour of the project played a definite part in the decision.⁴² A local newspaper summed up many peoples feelings in an editorial

"There must be spring air in Huntly today. What other town of its size is contemplating a complete rebuild for its main street and is at the same time able to contemplate the existing proposal of a rebirth of the industry which gave the place its heritage."

(The Times 19 September 1972)

NZED had still not publically indicated the site and a month was to pass before a spokesman announced that a decision was expected within the week.⁴³ This announcement was used by a Maori representative to voice concern that the Rakaumanga School might have to close⁴⁴ because at that stage the Maori people did not know what was planned and no discussions had been held with them despite assurances at the 12 July 1972 meeting that discussions would be held.⁴⁵

The expected announcement of the site did not eventuate and about one month later it was announced that the station had been delayed pending an Environmental Statement. Throughout the year the Minister of Electricity made a number of statements indicating that sufficient coal was available but if gas negotiations were successful, the station may be dual fired.⁴⁶

Negotiations were broken off before the election in November 1972

and the subsequent change in Government before final approval to construct the Station was given resulted in further delay.

A Labour Government was elected on a number of policies which included a system of Environmental Impact Reporting on major Government projects, and a deep concern for the Maori people and their problems, especially land.⁴⁷ These two aspects of policy were important to the Huntly situation since an environmental assessment was being prepared⁴⁸ and the Maori community was becoming increasingly 'dissatisfied at the evasiveness of officialdom' concerning the school and related matters.⁴⁹ Little was heard about the station for the first two months of 1973 but two visits to the area, one by an Engineering Firm conducting drilling tests,⁵⁰ and another by the Water Resources Council⁵¹ for water rights, indicated to the locals that the Station was still proceeding. The Maori community 'enlisted the help of the media' and voiced their concern regarding the school and their reservations that social impacts had not been considered.⁵² Widespread newspaper⁵³ and television coverage brought action from the local Huntly Community in the form of public abuse, threatening phone calls and a strongly worded editorial in the local Huntly Press

"It would be thought that the Maori Community would be right behind the establishment of the power project - what with employment that will be provided, a large portion of the labour force required would be Maoris and they stand to gain immensely it is hoped that the protests now being voiced from Huntly West will not spell doom to a project that could give Huntly district a badly needed 'shot in the arm' economically."

(Huntly Press 14 March 1973)

Telegrams sent to the Prime Minister and Minister of Electricity concerning the school by the Maori Community resulted in a top level visit by NZED - MOW officials and the Minister of Electricity to talk with the Maori community. This meeting on 21 March 1973 resolved that the Maoris would be kept informed thenceforth and every effort taken to prevent any detrimental effects. Discussions about noise, dust problems and water pollution were also included with this meeting, clarification of the proposed site and Government's intentions to continue the Project were confirmed but despite these indications various statements continued to be made from NZED indicating that the Project was not certain to proceed.

The Maui Gas negotiations were restarted when the Labour Government took office and in April 1973 agreement in principle to develop the gas

field was achieved.⁵⁵ However the Minister of Electricity reassured the public that Huntly was to go ahead since

"as the negotiations lengthened it was realised that stop gap measures were needed."⁵⁶

These sentiments were reinforced by further Ministerial statements throughout the year,⁵⁷ but most particularly when it was announced that Huntly would use Maui gas and coal.⁵⁸ The Minister of Electricity announced that

"Huntly will be dual fired to achieve greater security of fuel supply. Continued growth in the demand for electricity seems inevitable and makes the construction of large thermal station such as those proposed for Huntly and else where in the Auckland area essential."⁵⁹

(Minister of Electricity July 1973)

This message continued to be reiterated at a number of public meetings in Huntly.

PUBLIC MEETINGS - SYMBOLIC MANIPULATION

Throughout a series of meetings in Huntly in August, September and October 1973⁶⁰ a number of symbols were emphasised. The national need to satisfy demand for electricity was used extensively. Environmental problems (air and water pollution) would be solved through research and equipment. The economic spin off to the area would be significant (e.g. employment, temporary bridge to relieve traffic problems, increased population, larger commercial market). However not all groups and individuals shared these beliefs particularly the Farmers and the Maori Community. They argued that increased population would bring increased strain on the Borough's ability to provide amenities, county roads would deteriorate, coal conveyor routes were disruptive, noise could effect the Marae and so on.

The Federated Farmers aided and abetted by the Maoris asked for greater consultation between the Government Departments and themselves. The Maoris suggested greater communications in submissions to NZED⁶¹ and the local Federated Farmers suggested a Liaison Committee be formed. After some negotiation among the Farmers, Maoris and Government Departments the Forum and Liaison Committee structure was established.⁶²

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITING PROCEDURE

The events which predated the Power Planning Forum illustrate a political process. Continued symbolism that a coal fired station would

be built provided the Government with a lever to break the time bind over the use of Maui Gas. To be effective the pressure had to be maintained for a specific time. The symbol that electricity was needed in the national interest also helped keep the pressure up so that the station could be given approval. The economic boom to Huntly symbol was emphasised and appealed to many who actively resented any threat to the Project from within their community. By ensuring that the actual site and viability of the Project were expressed in vague terms and never confirmed until official approval was given, the illusion that alternative sites could be considered was possible. Adverse criticism could be deflected as the Departments claimed their research was not completed and the local groups were placed in an uncertain and less flexible position. Faced with this situation the Maoris and Farmers sought more and more clarification and information. Things were happening in which they felt they could not participate in or exercise some control.

The aim of the Farmers and Maoris was to obtain information and point out the effects of the plans thus attempting to alter the Departments view of the situation. They felt access to information would improve the situation where gossip and uncertainty was common place.

The aim of the Farmers and Maoris was to obtain information point out effects of proposals thereby participating in decision making which were going to effect them. They felt that this would improve the situation compared to that which existed, where things were presented to them as a 'fait accompli' with little interaction before the decisions were made and little hope of changing the decisions once they were made.

The Public relations campaign carried out by NZED promoted more questions than it answered for these groups particularly in not providing the tangible evidence to back up their verbal assurances or giving written assurances to specific submissions. The administrative procedure not to proceed in town planning, feasibility studies, housing allocation of money and so on until after the official approval had been given meant that much of the information and assurances these groups were seeking could not be given since the basic studies had not been carried out and more over the responsibility for these

secondary problems was traditionally not the responsibility of NZED but rather the Departments concerned. For example the Coal conveyor - Mines Department, Housing and Town Planning - Ministry of Works and Development, Rakaumanga School - Education Department.

The Minister of Electricity's assurances that the people would be kept informed and counter claims that they were not, together with strong lobbying by Ministry of Works officials⁶³ provided support for the establishment of the Planning Forum. Although the Forum could not decide on the Maori's and Farmers' problems it permitted the issues to be raised and information imparted. The length of time it took to establish a channel of communication from the point at which the Project had a good chance of proceeding and upon the instigation of another Department, belies the New Zealand Electricity Department to involve itself in an effective public relations campaign but illustrates a process to manipulate information and symbols to achieve control in the problematic action of locating a power station close to a town and on the 'doorstep' of Maori lands steeped in spiritual and historic importance. The retention of information to itself allowed NZED a flexibility to vary its plans and courses of action with regard to the local people, however the lack of information intensified the negotiative process with the local interest groups by their actions to obtain Ministerial visits and bring pressure through the media to their plight. On the one hand NZED officials attempted to impress upon the locals with a variety of symbols their interpretation of what was going to happen, but NZED inability to provide either adequate answers of the substantive information lessened the effectiveness of their symbolism and focused attention on the control of information. Out of this situation and a negotiative process the Planning Forum developed which would move the entire political situation into another dimension yet the control of information as a process of power could occur in this situation as it did in the siting of the station, if one chose to academically abstract the process as was done with this example.

BAKER HOUSING BLOCK

BARGAINING OF RESOURCES

In order to provide housing accommodation for the Power Project it was necessary to subdivide suitable land. A large block of land

owned by Mr Baker (Farmer) was found to be suitable by Project Officials. It was on the outskirts of Huntly West near the Project in Raglan County land zoned 'Rural'. According to the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 it was necessary to rezone the land to permit residential development. Servicing the block would normally have been the responsibility of the Local Authority which would receive the rating revenue from the Development. The Block would accommodate about 250-300 sections and it was viewed as a matter of urgency by Project Officials to get on to develop the land. Three alternatives existed, either the land could be rezoned Residential and remain Raglan County land or it could be ceded to Huntly Borough or it could be made a Project housing development and rezoned later.

The Raglan County Council (RCC) stood to gain rating revenue which it might otherwise lose because of the depressing effect of the power station on the land values surrounding the Project if the land was used for Residential purposes. It would lose the revenue and land if it was taken over by the Borough. Servicing the Block would have been difficult as the County was essentially a rural one with few concentrations of people and services.

The Project was not prepared to make the Block a Project housing development because of the cost of supplying parallel services available if the existing services of Huntly Borough were extended.

The Huntly Borough stood to gain revenue and an increase in its urban territory but would incur the extra expense of upgrading and extending its services to the Block imposing a financial burden necessitating raising loan moneys.

COMPROMISE AT THE PLANNING FORUM

The matter was first considered at the 21 December 1973 Forum meeting. The RCC representative stated that while he did not wish to hinder the Project his council's policy was not to cede territory to urban authorities. He was in favour of the housing proposal provided it remain within the County.⁶⁴ The Huntly Borough representative stated that he would require assurances that a financial burden would not be placed on the council if Huntly Borough Council was to service the Block.⁶⁵ The Project Engineer said that as the Block was close to existing services these should be extended rather than duplicate facilities and a decision was needed urgently on what the two local

Authorities planned to do.

Subsequent discussion⁶⁶ with Project staff before the second Forum meeting convinced the local Authorities that the Project was not willing to consider the development a project one and bear the full costs associated with that option. Discussions⁶⁷ among the respective Local Authorities proceeded apace with two Forum meetings in February and March 1974 with little progress. The RCC would not cede the land and HBC would not provide the services until the land became part of the Borough. A meeting with the District Supervisor of Housing and Town and Country Planning resolved that the development proceed on the assumption that the Block would be serviced by extending the Boroughs facilities.⁶⁸ At the March Forum⁶⁹ meeting the Chairman stressed the need to resolve the matter urgently but it was two months later at the May 1974 Forum meeting, that the matter was resolved. The HBC would initiate the Boundary changes and a case would be presented to the Local Government Commission with Project and Ministry of Works support.⁷⁰

IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAKER BLOCK

Considerable effort was expended in negotiation by all parties concerned both at the Forum meetings and the respective council meetings. The attitudes expressed by the Huntly interests were that they would like the territory but not with the financial burden attached. They felt compelled that they had to accept a decision imposed upon them. For example

"The ordinary ratepayer will derive nothing from this extension except more debt. I can't see we will gain anything."⁷¹

"This matter is not one of regional co-operation....its a terrific price to pay and who pays for it - we do. The Borough would have to expand its services to provide for a population of 8,000. Upgrading water supply would cost \$320,000, flood protection \$250,000, sewage treatment \$140,000."⁷²

The Raglan County Council wanted to gain some economic spin-off as they had been promised⁷³ ("Huntly cannot prosper at our expense"⁷⁴) but were eventually forced to a situation where they backed down saying it was not their intention to 'milk the state cow' or be aggressive but seek co-operation.⁷⁵ A counter offer to develop the Baker⁷⁶ Block together with the Huntly Borough was not accepted. Discussion at the Forum was 'in committee' with the language used consisting of bickering over aspects of the development.⁷⁷ The changed stance by RCC

representative promoted a coalition between him and the Project Engineer to pressure the Huntly Borough Mayor into accepting the negotiated deal. In the Public arena all the parties attempted to influence the situation by appealing to certain symbols. The Project Engineer made a number of statements in the Press about the urgency and problems delay would cause the Project.⁷⁸ The Huntly Borough Council collectively emphasised the huge cost and burden on the ratepayers of the development. A bargaining situation developed which was characterised by the process of negotiation. Counter offers were made and a compromise solution was reached where the Raglan County Council agreed to hand over the land to the Crown, the Borough would service the entire development and extend its boundaries to include half the Block. The Local Authorities compromised but there was little concession from the Project itself. The agreement enabled the process of objection under the Public Works Act 1968 and the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 not to be used by any party⁷⁹ and a speedy solution was reached. Material resources were at stake in this situation and through a process of negotiation bargaining and symbolic manipulation a settlement was achieved.⁸⁰ A similar process over bargaining of resources occurred in many other cases. Two further examples of the Sports Complex and Marae Redevelopment Plan are discussed below.

WAAHI MARAE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN AND HUNTLY SPORTS COMPLEX

The Electricity Act 1968 clause 11, 2(g) states that

"The Minister may from time to time provide public amenities in connection with any projected works at a cost not exceeding one percent of the estimated capital cost of these works, or in connection with existing works within lines determined from time to time in conjunction with the Minister of Finance."
(Electricity Act 1968)

There have been two attempts using this clause, to gain material resources for the community in Huntly. The first was a contention by the Maori people for assistance to refurbish the Waahi Marae as the Centre for the Maori King Movement and enhance the environs by improved educational and recreational facilities in a domain type setting. The second was a request for finance to support a Sports complex from the Huntly Borough Council. In both these cases the bargaining and resources can be exposed which led to the successful outcome of one request and undecided outcome for the other.

WAAHI MARAE REDEVELOPMENT PLAN

In October 1974 the Maori representative at the Forum put forward a redevelopment plan for the Waahi Marae. It involved landscaping a buffer zone in conjunction with proposed flood stopbanks, raising areas, constructing amenities buildings, housing development. The representative had the plans prepared at his community's expense and were in the nature of sketch plans. He believed that the legal provisions and recommendations of the Clutha Valley Impact Report regarding social hardship compensation suggested finance could be made available by NZED.⁸¹ At a subsequent Forum meeting⁸² after the plans had been evaluated and considered by NZED - MWD a full discussion ensued which illustrated a bargaining for material resources.

The NZED representative repeated an earlier interpretation of the clause in question to the effect that since the Marae was private land not open to the public no finance could be provided. He agreed that the Department should be responsible for landscaping the buffer zone and contribute part costs towards stop bank facilities. He thought that should the clause be challenged in court the interpretation would back up his view (previously checked with NZED legal staff and Crown Law Office). He agreed that the Minister did have discretionary power, but if he accepted this many other requests would follow from service groups within the community.⁸³ The Chairman supported the NZED interpretation and noted that in other projects the people who lived in the local community were extremely hard working and contributed much voluntary work as well as a source of extra revenue for clubs and so on.⁸⁴ The wider implications of the Maori submission were discussed at length with considerable support from the Local Authorities who were of the opinion that facilities were strained by the Project then it should pay. The Maoris plans were a constructive attempt to cope with the effect of the Project on their community. Experts⁸⁵ from both sides were called to discuss the plans and together agreed that the proposal had merit and was a well intergrated concept which complied with Government design philosophy for community environments. The MOW experts suggested a committee be established to carry the plan to a reality.⁸⁶

As the Marae was zoned in a rural area and non rateable the RCC representative suggested that if redevelopment was to occur agreement

would have to be reached on this point. The proposed stopbank development by Waikato Valley Authority involved taking Maori land and this needed to be discussed further. Subsequently discussion resolved the zone issue by redesignating the area for Maori Community purposes.⁸⁷ During negotiations the NZED agreed to have the stop banks and buffer zone landscaped according to local design, but continued its insistence that finance could not be given to the project even though the intention was modified to allow the Marae to be opened to the public. The issue remained unresolved despite numerous Forum meetings, letters and threats.⁸⁸

The Maori request raised the general issue of facilities in the Borough and during discussions at Forum level NZED stated that each request would be considered on its merits.⁸⁹

HUNTLY SPORTS COMPLEX

In March 1975⁹⁰ the Huntly Mayor asked NZED representative to clarify his Department's position with regard to the Act. The NZED representative stated that if Huntly had a just case fair and proper consideration would be given to it. He said the Department usually advised the Minister on these matters so any cases should be presented by the Local Authority directly to the Department.⁹¹ Forum Chairman advised that any case could be brought to the Forum for consideration. In September 1975, the Mayor of Huntly presented a case requesting \$450,000 to assist in providing amenities for recreation to cater for the growth of population in Huntly due to the Power Station. Considerable work had been done on the proposal as a result of a Lower Waikato Rugby Football Union proposal in June 1975 to develop a 15acre site in Huntly. The Rugby club was prepared to cede the land to the Council and loan \$30,000 for the project. Sketch plans had been prepared and a cash grant of \$15,000 from the Recreation and Youth Activities Distribution Committee had been obtained.⁹² The project was explained in detail to the Forum and discussed at some length. The NZED representative felt that a comprehensive package should be provided and that individual organisations should channel applications through the Borough Council to be relayed to the Department. Both the RCC and HBC representatives felt this was a change in position from statements made in relation to Marae development proposals earlier in the year. They pointed out that it was NZED policy to establish similar facilities at hydro projects

in undeveloped areas and NZED should provide assistance to sporting and cultural activities when the Power Project imposed on the existing community. The Forum decided to endorse⁹³ the application for assistance of a sporting cultural and recreational complex. A month after HBC application the Minister of Electricity announced that NZED would contribute \$459,000 in accordance with the Acts provisions for the facilities required.⁹⁴

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARAE DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND SPORTS COMPLEX

In both these cases the proposals were presented in open Forum meetings with advance knowledge⁹⁵ by the parties effected. Experts⁹⁶ were used to put forward the salient points of each proposal. The discussions at the Forum on both proposals were courteous and formal.⁹⁷ The NZED representative changed his opinion when discussing the philosophy of the Act. When the Maoris presented their proposals, he suggested that if they received finance it would lead to a proliferation of requests but when the Sports Complex proposal was discussed he indicated that the individual clubs should apply in preference to the complex proposed.

In the case of the Marae development although substantial agreement on technical matters was achieved finance was not provided for redevelopment however the Huntly Borough Council's submissions were successful in a bid to receive finance. NZED files⁹⁸ indicate that both proposals were to be given sympathetic consideration but the degree of financial assistance was not specified. A principle to give assistance to the public body and not the private group could have been applied but the evidence to support this interpretation could not be found.⁹⁹ Both situations are similar in that all the local interests (Local Authorities, Maoris, Farmers) represented on the Forum supported the suggestions and actively lobbied through informal meetings¹⁰⁰ and did not use the Press to bring pressure or publicise the requests.¹⁰¹ The Maori's representations established that it was possible to obtain assistance but they were only marginally successful despite lobbying on their behalf while the Marae proposal involved considerable concessions and continued discussion the sports complex involved little concessions by either party and in comparison with the Marae proposal less lobbying. However the Sports Complex involved

strings attached in the loan monies afforded by the Rugby interests. In return for perpetual lease of the grounds the Rugby Club has unfettered use of the grounds and the playing fields in winter months and a new clubroom.¹⁰²

The Sports complex proposal was decided in a very short space of time while the Marae Development was considered over three to four months and by a subcommittee of the Forum, the Sports Complex case was rapidly considered, but the proposal was not examined by a subcommittee although it was at a similar 'sketch' stage as the Marae proposal when it was presented. Full discussions among the Maori Community had resolved what they wanted but similar discussion with interested groups in Huntly over the Sports Complex were not held. This led to considerable criticism of the HBC for not consulting with the interested parties and lead to considerable conflict over administration of facilities on what facilities to include within the Complex. Letters to the Editor of Huntly Press indicate some of the feeling that existed over the Council's action.

"Sir, there is no justification for the Sports Complex. It duplicates existing facilities which are presently underused. Huntly Domain is the home for soccer, tennis, netball, outdoor bowls, squash, badminton, swimming, yachting and provides club rooms for many others. I would have thought the complex was a low priority, what about the Library and swimming baths."¹⁰³

"I say Huntly is a good town, it deserves a hand out such as this one, but one thing I am certain of it will not remain a happy town if by devious means a small section of our community gets all this cherry pie."¹⁰⁴

Clearly then both proposals involve considerably more discussion and bargaining for a successful outcome to be reached. The Maoris were not happy with offers by NZED, the sports bodies were not happy with the sports complex despite assurances that consultations would continue.¹⁰⁵ In different dimensions negotiative action occurred as a proposal proceeded to different stages and developed. Plans were firmed up and made public and public reaction to them varied. The Marae proposal received little local press coverage while considerable space was given to the concerns of the local Huntly sports club. When unsatisfactory results¹⁰⁶ of the interaction between the Maoris and NZED were apparent, the level of interaction initiated by the Maori and supporters¹⁰⁷ increased. There was a similar action with the sports clubs and Huntly Borough Council. A basic aspect of both cases was

the bargaining over resources of land, money, design and control over the proposals. The local interests were applying for assistance from the NZED and as such attempted to influence the representatives towards a favourable consideration of their requests.¹⁰⁸ The technical symbolic messages of architectural experts were perceived as necessary and important to 'sell' the proposals of the Marae and Sports Complex. The 'moral' symbol that the Project was causing pressure on Borough facilities and should contribute was used as one justification in support of the request for a sports complex. As with other examples e.g. Roads no final solution was actually achieved. Sports clubs objected to the Minister of Electricity¹⁰⁹ with the result that final approval to issue the finance for the Sports Complex was delayed and by March 1976 the Mayor was complaining that little had been heard from the NZED about the promised finance.¹¹⁰ The Marae plans were being drawn up while negotiations continued¹¹¹ and by March 1976 a solution was still not achieved which satisfied the parties concerned.

HUNTLY TOWN PLANNING STUDIES

PROJECT PLANNING FORUM AND THE TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The terms of reference of the Huntly Power Project Planning Forum include a provision to discuss forward planning associated with the Huntly Power Station and the community and to ensure these matters are referred to through the appropriate channels for action.

The first proposal to come before the Forum which was of a Town planning nature was a suggestion from the Maori community to redevelop and plan the existing Waahi Marae. The Maori representative, Mr Mahuta contended that finance for the development should be made available from the Minister of Electricity, under the Electricity Act 1968 clause 11,2.(g) which provided for up to 1% of the cost of the project to be made available for public amenities. The Chairman of RCC felt that no one should be worse off as a result of the Project and offered his support to Mr Mahuta. As the proposal would have implications for Raglan County¹¹² and because of the problems of finance design, technical assistance the Forum was decided to establish a Technical Advisory Committee convened by the NZED with representatives from Raglan County Council, Huntly Borough Council, Ministry of Works

and Development and the Maori Community.¹¹³ This Committee met on occasions between November 1974 and March 1975¹¹⁴ and by this time most of the problems regarding design and rezoning were decided.

As a result of the Project's impact on the town the Huntly Borough Council had decided to engage town planning consultants to undertake a planning study of the Borough. In March 1975 the Minister of Works and Development asked the Borough to extend its studies.¹¹⁵ The Minister wanted the wider implications of the effects of the Power Station on the Huntly Community to be studied in conjunction with planned roadways, CBD expansion, recreational facilities, residential areas and so on. The estimated cost of the expanded study was \$35,000 which would be paid for by MWD (\$20,000), National Roads Board (\$12,000) and Huntly Borough Council (\$13,000). A part of the suggestion was that the Planning study be supervised by the Forum through the Technical Advisory Committee with the Forum acting as a 'clearing house' to direct the recommendations to the appropriate bodies. The HBC agreed to this suggestion and together with the Chairman asked the Forum to accept the role outlined by the Minister.¹¹⁶ The technical Advisory Committee was reconstituted with additional members being co-opted when their advice was necessary. The new members included NZED, Mines Department, Hamilton Regional Planning Authority, Department of Transport and National Roads Board.¹¹⁷ The Forum agreed that the Huntly Borough Council should remain the contractual agents so far as the consultant firm (JASMAD) was concerned.¹¹⁸

DISCUSSION OF PLANNING STUDY AT THE FORUM

The studies proceeded throughout 1975 with brief progress reports given at Forum meetings by the Huntly Borough Council's Engineer.¹¹⁹ A fact finding survey was completed and in June some initial alternative traffic routes around the Borough were proposed. In September 1975 alternative development plans were suggested the cheapest estimated at \$22M the dearest at \$37M.¹²⁰ The Technical Advisory Committee agreed that existing Urban development on both sides of the River, including the Central Business District, should continue and that an arterial or motorway through the Taupiri Ranges would be required in the near future in view of current traffic trends in the area.¹²¹ The third phase of the study involved suggestions for planned Borough Development and was considered by a special meeting of Huntly Borough Council in

November 1975.¹²² At the December Forum meeting it was learned that the HBC had decided to send the consultants/^{report}directly to Government for approval and keep the contents confidential.

The HBC had decided on its preferences¹²³ for development and sought Government approval to proceed to implement the preferred alternative. Once approval was received Phrase IV which involved detail planning and public participation could begin.

There was considerable debate at this Forum meeting¹²⁴ because the HBC had decided to by-pass the established procedure which was designed to co-ordinate the exercise and achieve an efficient and speedy consideration of the matters contained in the report so that appropriate action could be taken.¹²⁵ The Chairman was concerned that the channels of communication to facilitate efficient but detailed consideration would lead to considerable delay since the Minister¹²⁶ had charged the Forum with the responsibility of discussing and recommending appropriate courses of action.¹²⁷ He was supported by the MP for Raglan who felt that in view of the responsibility placed on the Forum it should be discussed. The Mayor asserted that both the Technical Advisory Committee and Huntly Borough Council agreed that the Report should remain confidential in an effort to minimise land speculation. To bring it to the Forum would not be appropriate.¹²⁸ After considerable discussion it was agreed to prepare a 'broad' report for the next meeting in March 1976.

IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION TO BY PASS ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES

The reluctance of Huntly Borough Council to co-operate and provide information in a procedure designed to promote co-ordination and an efficient process for distribution of information illustrates a deliberate attempt at lack of co-ordination.

The Huntly Borough Council regarded themselves as in control of the studies since they were legally the contractual agent.¹²⁹ The initiative to decide on the alternatives in the planning studies was mainly with them since they were the statutory body responsible for planned development and planning procedures under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953. It was established procedure to keep planning reports confidential until official Council or in this Government approval was received. The Mayor under an impression that the Forum was a public meeting and unaware of the provisions to go

'in committee',¹³⁰ saw the Chairmans move as an attempt to make public the contents and take the initiative for deciding on what would happen to the Report from him which he regarded as his and Huntly Borough Council's right to decide.¹³¹

By failing to co-operate according to the established procedure the Mayor was able for a time to control the information contained in the planning report and prevent it being released to the public. He had on some occasions¹³² indicated the general nature of the studies as they progressed and general summaries had been made at Forum meetings which could be publicised. The concern expressed by the Chairman and MP for Raglan was one of the need for the Mayor to recognise that if the procedures were not followed delay could occur while the appropriate group (Forum) was examining the Report. The retention of information and thus implied control by such lack of co-ordination can be seen in two further examples, one before the Forum was established and one while the Forum operated.

RAKAUMANGA PRIMARY SCHOOL

A LACK OF CO-ORDINATION AND MAORI APPREHENSION

The Rakaumanga Primary School was situated adjacent to the Project site and between the two main Maori communities of Rakaumanga and Waahi. The School traditionally^{had} been considered a Maori school, there were few Europeans attending and practically all the children were from the local Maori communities. When it was learned that the Project site was close to the school the Maori community became increasingly anxious about what would happen to the school.¹³³ There had been early assurances that the school would not be effected and no Maori land would be taken,¹³⁴ however as project plans proceeded it became evident that the school would be effected.¹³⁵ The Maori community dubiously expressed their fears about the school on many occasions¹³⁶ and on the 21 March 1973 the Minister of Electricity visited the Maoris to discuss the problem.¹³⁷

He gave the Maori assurances that they would be kept fully informed. Earlier in mid 1972 the District Manager of NZED had given the same assurances regarding the school¹³⁸ but in the intervening period various plans were floated and no one was prepared to state what the outcome of the discussion between NZED and Education Department would be or indeed if any were occurring. Discussion between NZED and

Education Department in late 1972¹³⁹ had revealed that there were long term plans for a second primary school in the area and eventual closing down of the Rakauimanga School. It had been vaguely suggested at the July 1972 meeting in Huntly that the school might be shifted from its site.¹⁴⁰ When the Huntly Power Project Environmental Impact Statement was released in June 1973 it contained little information on social effects and no mention of the school had been made.¹⁴¹ By August 1973 when the official decision to construct the station was given little further information was to hand. The Maori's protests and letters were met with indecision and vague replies.¹⁴² The liaison between NZED and Education Department of August 1972¹⁴³ had not proceeded any further or got beyond the stage of preliminary discussion about the Departments general long term intentions, for the area.¹⁴⁴ Throughout 1973 Maori activity was increasingly focused on the effects the siting proposals would have on their established way of life. The Water Rights case was proceeding and numerous meetings of the local school committee reaffirmed they want the school to remain where it was and the identity and close association between the school, community and marae to be maintained.¹⁴⁵

At a meeting of the South Auckland Education Board (SAEB) in September 1973¹⁴⁶ they reaffirmed that they were unable to deal with the issues since it hadn't been consulted by NZED. They considered the educational facilities could be overloaded in Huntly but no discussion had taken place or any approaches made by NZED. At the water rights hearing two days before the NZED had said the school would be closed in 1976¹⁴⁷ even if the station didnt proceed, but neither the Board or Education Department had received any information on which to plan the education facilities in Huntly. A spokesman for the SAEB stated

"I hope the NZED doesn't make the decision fait accompli."¹⁴⁸

It was not until two weeks later before a scheduled meeting with Federated Farmers on 1 August and the Maori Community on 30 September (in attendance M.P.s for area) that NZED had discussions with the General Manager of SAEB.¹⁴⁹ Broad proposals were discussed centred around alternative accommodation for the Rakaumanga School pupils. The SAEB favoured relocating the children at the Marae during construction and indicated they could provide transportable classrooms with costs

around \$75,000.¹⁵⁰ The Maoris presented their submissions to NZED at the September 30 Meeting and basically asked that should the school be relocated, (which was inevitable by this stage) all existing amenities be provided (e.g. swimming pool, sports fields, basketball, tennis courts) and a mutually agreed site be found with the former site being offered back to the community in Trust.¹⁵¹ In considering the submissions NZED thought they could make a contribution towards some of the cost of temporary classroom, paths, and recreational facilities.¹⁵²

When the Planning Forum and Liaison Committee structure were established in December 1973 and February 1974 considerable discussion on the Rakaumanga School had taken place in the form of letters and private meetings.¹⁵³ The membership of a Maori representative on the Forum allowed all the parties to consider the issue but it was not until April 1974 that Mr Mahuta felt discussions had dragged on and decisions were necessary.¹⁵⁴ At this point he suggested a representative of SAEB attend the next meeting of the Forum to indicate plans for the area. Discussions at a local level between Project Staff and the Maoris had switched to considering relocating the school in the Baker housing block close to the Marae but floundered on who was going to pay the cost of \$80,000 for relocation.¹⁵⁵ The following Forum meeting¹⁵⁶ reported on the agreement to relocate the school in the Baker Block and at the July¹⁵⁷ Forum meeting the NZED representative confirmed that a request had been made for the \$80,000 to relocate the school.¹⁵⁸ Two days after the July Forum meeting the NZED announced¹⁵⁹ the Minister of Electricity had approved the spending of \$80,000 to relocate the Rakaumanga school. It was eventually shifted to its new site in the Baker Block on 23 February 1975.¹⁶⁰

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROCESS

The essential points illustrated by this example are (i) the lack of early co-ordination between SAEB (the statutory body responsible for the school) and NZED causing considerable anxiety to the Maori community. (ii) The Forum was used as a means of 'hurrying up' a decision and pinpointing the responsibility for decision making. It permitted a situation to occur where the parties concerned had to achieve a co-ordinated settlement which involved concessions and benefits to all parties. Initially by keeping the situation vague and not attempting co-ordination the NZED was able to keep open a number of

options concerning finance and the school,¹⁶¹ and it was not forced to make a decision from a position of having little or no information about alternative courses of action.¹⁶² As co-ordination heightened information was imparted allowing alternatives to be considered and bargaining occurred on the alternatives available since all parties were aware of the basic choices available and the developing positions of each respective party. The SAEB considered the settlement a 'windfall'¹⁶³ it would not otherwise have got. The NZED could not be seen to deliver a verdict without consultation since the purpose of the Forum would have been undermined and the earlier claims that people were being presented with a 'fait accompli' would have been borne out. The public statement by the SAEB put pressure on the NZED to undertake discussions about the future of the school.¹⁶⁴ The decision to relocate the school was purely a result of the Project and although the schools welfare was outside the jurisdiction of the NZED it was to chose to become involved and used the contribution of finance as evidence of its good intentions to honour its pledge to pay for activities which detrimentally effected the local area.¹⁶⁵

SITING THE EAST SIDE MINE HEAD

Background planning by the Mines Department to provide the necessary coal for the station had been proceeding since they initially announced that sufficient coal was available for a power station.¹⁶⁶ A grant of \$2M to prove the extent of coal for the power station and future reserves was announced in September 1972. Approval for the station was held up by the necessity of Mines Department to produce an Environmental Impact Report on the effect of coal mining in the area. The report was completed in July 1973 and outlined their plans to develop three underground and one opencast mines for coal production. One underground mine would be on the East side of Huntly to supply industry and domestic consumer demands while the other ones would be used to produce coal for the Power Station. At the time the Environmental Report was released it indicated that because of the preliminary nature of the Report, detailed individual reports would be produced for each separate proposal. A Report for the East Side Coal Mine was received by the Commission for the Environment in May 1974 and it proceeded to ask for comment from effected parties so that its Audit could be produced.

The Audit was finally produced in August 1974 but not released until a year later. Despite unfavourable comments about the Mines Department report approval to undertake a \$27M expansion programme was given on the understanding that the details would be worked out as development proceeded.¹⁶⁷

At the July 1974 Forum meeting the Chairman asked for detail of the proposed development on the Eastern side of the River. The Mines Department representative was not familiar with the proposed development but agreed to convey the Chairmans concern that other community services should be consulted before any decision on location of the mine head was made. The Chairman was furious with what he considered an evasive answer but could do little to improve the situation since the Mines Department representative was 'stepping in' for the usual Mines representative.¹⁶⁸ The chairman demanded a report for the next meeting (September) but this did not eventuate as another representative side stepped the issue.¹⁶⁹ It was not until the October Forum meeting that the usual Mines Department representative announced that the original site was being reconsidered.

The Environmental Impact Report produced by the Mines Department had located the mine head virtually underneath a proposed Ministry of Works motorway by-pass which had been planned for the area for sometime and was the subject of considerable publicity for a number of years. In addition the Mine head was close to residential areas, large oxidation ponds, and a lake which was surrounded by water bearing gravels. Any discharge of material from the mine (spoil, water, tailings) required a water right from WVA, but no negotiations had been conducted. At the March 1975 Forum meeting the Mines Department advised that the June 1974 Water Right had been mislaid and another would be applied for.¹⁷⁰

As announced in October 1974¹⁷¹ Mines Department were reconsidering the site. This reconsideration was completed in September 1975 after extensive drilling to determine geological structures for the proposed drives. The drilling programme had taken considerable time because of Mines Department activity and priority accorded to a exploratory programme to the North aimed at providing coal availability for future power stations.¹⁷² An alternative site in the North West corner of existing Kimihia opencast mine was decided upon and preliminary

planning began in December 1975. A new Environmental Impact Report was required.

Throughout the reconsideration of the mine site (October 1974 - September 1975) formal discussions with local bodies effected by the proposals did not take place¹⁷³ until the new site was fixed in October 1975. After the site was fixed the Mines Department undertook preliminary discussions with the Local Authorities concerned.¹⁷⁴ i.e. Huntly Borough Council, Waikato County Council, Raglan County Council, Waikato Valley Authority.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MINES DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES

The Commission for the Environment, considered the Environmental Impact Report on the East Side coal mine insufficiently detailed and well below the standards required. In their comments they outlined the areas which should be covered in any future report. They noted the Report failed to supply information on traffic generated by the mine, the frequency of rail movements, reasons for abandoning alternatives sites, no provisions for housing workers and no indication of ways in which the operation would be controlled or restricted by such things as Clean Air Act, Town and Country Planning Act, Local Authority By-Laws.

The Commission noted that they saw little attempt to co-ordinate planning

"A Major omission from the report was any reference to attempts made to co-ordinate the proposal with the plans and wishes of the Huntly Borough Council, WCC, WVA, NZED, MWD. No reference was made to the fact that the proposed location mine portal lies within the line of a planned motorway...The EIR indicated a lack of co-ordination and understanding between agencies of central and local government with responsibilities in the Huntly area."¹⁷⁵

A major recommendation of the Commission for the Environment was that some means to facilitate communication among the effected parties should be found.¹⁷⁶

A comment by the Commission that there was a lack of close rapport has been emphasised by a number of Forum members but in stronger terms. For example

"I deplore the fact that some Government Departments go gaily ahead without so much as a thought for what others might be doing....it staggers me. Its the sort of thing we dont do ourselves - the first thing we do is see what other departments are doing in the area."¹⁷⁷

(District Commissioner of Works 1975)

"It is our intention to co-operate, we are aware that people have Departmental allegiances and regard us as an ogre. They always handle things in a set way since its the safest. If you haven't seen a person from another Department for three months and ring up to discuss a point, he's likely to react by saying to himself what the hells he up to.

I don't think Government Departments are as bad as private contractors. I've seen many examples of this sort of thing between major contractors and their clients."¹⁷⁸

(Project Engineer, 1975)

"Some Departments seem to change their minds at various times."¹⁷⁹

(Maori Representative 1975)

"You can see the jealousy between Departments at Forum meetings."¹⁸⁰

(Federated Farmers Representative
1975)

While the Commission for the Environment suggested that closer liaison take place there was no guarantee that it would. Most Forum members recognised that this situation occurred and can point to many examples of similar situations still occurring. For example

"In deciding on housing sites in April 1974 the Mines Department complained that it had not been consulted. Ministry of Works announced agreement in principle on available sites had been reached with the District Supervisor of Housing."¹⁸¹

(Mines Department Representative
1975)

"A brand new no. 7 wire fence about quarter mile long was put up at the no.1 minehead. No stock was fenced in then two months later it was ripped by a Departmental bulldozer."¹⁸²

(Federated Farmers Representative
1975)

"NZED wanted a permanent bridge to the site but MWD said this wasnt feasible but still NZED Engineers kept saying a permanent one would be built."¹⁸³

(Huntly Mayor 1975)

The Forum could have been used by Mines Department to discuss the issue, but when they learned that other Departments were involved in the area of the proposed East Side Minehead they decided not to discuss the matter publically. When they learned that the issue was to be discussed at Forum level¹⁸⁴ the usual representative, the Development Engineer, was absent from the relevant meeting and replaced by another representative not concerned with the project in any way.¹⁸⁵

At subsequent Forum meetings the Development Engineer was in attendance but was subsequently replaced in May 1975 by the District Manager.¹⁸⁶ In this case lack of continuity allowed flexibly to decide when to enter the issue publically and it was done at a time when the

Mines Department understood that the Environmental Impact Report Audit by the Commissioner for the Environment was to be publically released.¹⁸⁷

Mines Department officials remain 'tight lipped'¹⁸⁸ about their reasons for lack of co-ordination over their proposal when they were participating in the Forum and attempts to initiate discussion of the proposal were made by the chairman of the Forum. A decision to replace the Mines Department representative with a more authoritative person was generally believed to have been as a result of a direction for the Mines Department to take a greater interest in the Forum. While the Mines Department's action in not discussing its proposals could have been excused by an often used claim¹⁸⁹ that research was proceeding and proposals were still being firmed up they did not make any attempt to obtain even the most basic clearances to use water before they prepared the Environmental Impact Report in May 1974.¹⁹⁰ The Huntly Borough Council had on a number of occasions opposed the first site and recorded this opposition in letters to the Mines Department in 1974 and 1975.¹⁹¹ The inability of Mines Department to undertake even basic liaison with effected interests before producing its report in May 1974 could be accounted for by incompetence or personal animosity¹⁹² since there would be little to gain by not releasing the information of intentions to other agencies. The Commission for the Environment's Audit was not released until the Mines Department was in a position to know the alternative site of the mine head and thus be spared some embrrassment and public criticism. In defending the Mines Department actions at the time the Audit was released the Mines Department representative stated that

"We are very conscious of our responsibility and are prepared to meet any requirements imposed."¹⁹³

(Mines Department Representative
1975)

This example is an extremely clear one in which one Government Department deliberately chose not to co-ordinate its activities in a project which depended on co-ordination to achieve the goal of building a Power Station. Other Government Departments involved in the area were clearly unaware of Mines Department intentions and were strongly critical of its action. The case illustrated that even with a procedure established to promote co-ordination such as the Forum, the effectiveness

of it depends largely on the members initiative to liaise with other members. In this case the Mines Department chose to control important information by a lack of co-ordination providing evidence that another Government Department was involved in the regulation or control of information.

CREATING A POLITICAL CHARACTER

Any political action is characterised not only by ideologies and interest groups but also by individuals and their manipulation of issues. In this setting of the creation of political characters is important to an understanding of the political process. The ability to control the presentation of images of oneself or ascribe to others a particular character is a process of power.

The effective use of language and the language style is the essence of how a character is created.

There are a range of language styles available to individuals involved in the negotiative situation including exhortive, legal, bureaucratic, bargaining and emotional styles. The bureaucratic style is often used at Forum meetings to impart information by using technic jargon.¹⁹⁴ The exhortive style was used frequently by Farmers urging Forum members to accept their plight over the roading issue. A bargaining 'haggling', 'pinpricking' style was common in negotiating a deal over the Baker Block land. These styles which are artificially isolated occur in different combinations but are used by all Forum members at times both inside and outside the formal meeting. The direction of the language has an important consequence for the image an individual wishes to create. By continually attacking individuals representing organisations and not the organisations themselves the person is often seen as personally threatening to the representative. He is 'put on the spot' as it were and may retaliate by counter individual comments. In all such actions the individual's ego is at stake but his need¹⁹⁵ to respond in a particular way can vary depending on the strength of the attack against the individual. Thus if an individual is continually seen as a threatening person others may make every attempt to put him down. The intensity of communication by an individual or conversely his reluctance to communicate is an aspect which permits an image to be created. An individual can become regarded as a leader, a hostile plotter or a neutral approachable individual by the image he promotes and others

ascribe to him.

The creation of a political character also depends on identification with an issue and interest groups and an ability to manipulate information and individuals and as such the successful political character is characterised by an ability to clearly perceive end goals and sufficient knowledge of the process to compromise where necessary to achieve those goals.

The Forum provides examples of both successful and unsuccessful characters. Individuals representing Government Departments are clearly successful in manipulating information and symbols to achieve a stated end goal. Unsuccessful individuals are clearly characterised at the Forum by lack of clear goals and a corresponding inability to manipulate situations through information and symbols.

MR KIMPTON - POLITICAL CHARACTER

The creation of a political character regarded by some as unsuccessful and by others as successful¹⁹⁶ is seen in Mr Kimpton.

Mr Kimpton was elected to Raglan County Council by the Pukemiro Riding ratepayers at the 1974 local body elections. He had little previous experience of local body affairs but stood on a platform of protecting farmers' interests with respect to the Power Station in whose area the Station was situated. He was not officially a Forum member as the Raglan County was represented by its chairman Mr Kellow. Mr Kimpton's relationship with the Forum began in November 1974 when he attended Liaison Committee meetings. Throughout 1975 he attended these meetings¹⁹⁷ and in the latter half of 1975 attended Forum meetings as an observer with speaking rights.

Mr Kimpton actually strove to demonstrate his concern for Farming interests by raising many issues of concern and seeking assurances on them. The questions he asked at meetings covered roading, runoff, transmission towers, opencast mining operations, smoke emission but he was particularly concerned with roading and the effect of underground mining on Farming operations.¹⁹⁸ He often attacked individual representatives¹⁹⁹ of Government Departments for their lack of concern and indecision and was commonly regarded as a threatening character by the Departmental representatives. His emotive bargaining and exhortive style of language was continually used

in an attempt to get discussions from the Departmental representatives who regarded him as an individual out for private gain. A Forum member considered Mr Kimpton as "pushing his barrow" fairly vigorously as a new member.²⁰⁰

His attendance at Forum meetings was not regarded as appropriate since the Raglan County Council Chairman was the official representative of the ratepayers of the area.²⁰¹ Opinion was that he had rather pushed his way in.²⁰²

With an emphasis on appropriate procedures Departmental representatives regarded him as a 'stirrer' and did not see him as acting with any legitimate authority but recognised that because he felt strongly on issues (e.g. roading) and was prepared to take part in dramatic action he posed a threat.²⁰³ Mr Kimpton aligned himself with Farmers and was elected a deputation member to approach the Forum on the roading issue.²⁰⁴

Mr Kimpton tended to use a piece-meal approach to problems, fighting each and every issue in a public situation but lacking a clear perspective of his intended final goal and reluctant to embark upon private arrangements.²⁰⁵ This stance aroused antagonism and hostility from Government Departments representatives since he did not follow the due process of negotiation characteristic of the Forum.²⁰⁶

A conflict with the Raglan County Chairman was heightened by Mr Kimpton's action in calling and chairing the public meeting on 6 November 1975 over roading²⁰⁷ and at Raglan County Council meetings he is known for his attacks and dislike for the Chairman.²⁰⁸

Support for his actions came from the Farmers in the Pukemiro Riding who saw public action by any individual and the impact of them on the political scene the standard by which to judge his effectiveness.²⁰⁹ For example

"He does a bit more than Mr Kellow who says nothing at Forum meetings. He's prepared to work and represent our interests and that what we want." 210

(Federated Farmers Representative
1975)

Mr Kimpton's continued presence at Forum meetings and great use of speech making encouraged their view that he was actively representing

their interests. Members of the Forum on the other hand believed his effectiveness in negotiating solutions and agreements was minimal and see his expansive rhetorical style as potentially damaging (conflict producing) to the good relations that existed between the local community, the Project and Government, however they were not prepared to interfere in a domestic argument over who was the most appropriate to sit at Forum meetings.

REVIEW

These eight case studies illustrate slightly different dimensions of the processes of power. There is a predominant theme of negotiation and control of information through lack of co-ordination or delay in giving information to groups and individuals. The process of symbolic manipulation by using experts, emphasising a personal characteristic or alluding to a goal to achieve, helps individuals to define situations for others, hopefully according to the users definition, and as such portray a process of power the many facets of which are described in this compendium of cases.

FOOTNOTES

SITING THE HUNTLY POWER STATION

1. The Times 30 September 1971
2. See Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand D4B 1969
3. See Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand D4B 1970
4. *ibid*, 1970
5. See Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand D4B 1971
6. See Huntly Power Station Environmental Impact Statement, Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement 1973:22
7. Huntly Press 24 November 1971
8. Mines Department Annual Report, C2 1970 for year ended 31 December 1969
9. Hansard Parliamentary Debates 2 November 1971
10. See Preece, Cardew and Rider, Feasibility Study of Huntly and Marsden Thermal Power Stations 1972
11. See The Times 13 October 1971
12. Speech by D.H. Jones to Progressive Association Huntly August 1973:1
13. Official statement Minister of Electricity 13 August 1973
14. See The Times 15 August 1973
15. *ibid*, 1973
16. *ibid*, 1973
17. *ibid*, 1973
18. The Times, 14 August 1973
19. See Chapter Five
20. The Chairman RCC claims that NZED treatment of both Local Authorities was as though they did not exist. There was little communication formal or otherwise until the official decision to proceed. Conversation with Author 1975.
21. These reasons are generally recognised while there is no evidence to substantiate that anyone in fact operated I am simply providing a general comment.

22. See Draft Stage Environmental Impact Report, Huntly Power Station 1975 Section A5:1
23. See The Times 30 September 1971
24. Independent of NZED and Preece Cardew and Rider studies.
25. Letter to NZED General Manager from Commissioner of Works, 15 October 1971 File TP 148/8/5
26. Preece Cardew and Rider, Feasibility Study of Huntly and Marsden Thermal Power Stations 1972, Section 3:11
27. See Report of Project Engineer in Forum minutes 21 May 1975:2
28. The Times 5 November 1971
29. See Chapter Three for background
30. See The Times 4 May 1972, Huntly Press 10 May 1972
31. Huntly Press 31 May 1972
32. Huntly Press 28 June 1972
33. Meeting held in Huntly Borough Council Chambers, Minutes available. Representatives from NZED, MOW, Mines Department, Lands and Survey Department, Huntly Borough Council, Waikato County Council, Raglan County Council, Maori Elder, Progressive Association, Landowners.
34. See memorandum from Mr Shanks District Manager to Head Office File no. 32/7/11/1
35. Meeting 12 July 1972:8
36. ibid, 1972:7
37. Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power in New Zealand D4B 1972
38. The Times 2 August 1972
39. See letter from Commissioner of Works to other Departments. 7 August 1972
40. Cabinet decided on 4 September 1972 to approve the station. The decision was forwarded to NZED on 5 September 1972 (see Hansard Parliamentary Debates 20 March 1974) however the decision was not publically released until 18 September 1972 and was widely reported the following day. (See The Times 19 September 1972)
41. See The Times 19 September 1972
42. Huntly Press 9 August 1972

43. The Times 11 October 1972
44. *ibid*, 1972
45. This is discussed in a brief case example. The Department of Education could not hold discussions with the Maoris as it had not received any information from NZED.
46. See Huntly Press 31 May 1972, The Times 6 November 1972
47. See Labour Party Election Manifesto 1972
48. Reasons for the delay was preparation for Environmental Statement. See Huntly Press 15 November 1972
49. This was the Maoris opinion. See Mahuta, R.T. Industrial Relations and the Huntly Power Station presented at Maori Policy Convention Labour Party 1974 at Waahi Marae.
50. Engineering firm Tonkin and Taylor. See Huntly Press 31 January 1973
51. At the request of the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority See Huntly Press 28 February 1973
52. See footnote 49.
53. For example The Times 8 March 1973, Huntly Press 14 March 1973 The Auckland Star 19 March 1973, The Times 10 March 1973, 14 March 1973, 22 March 1973.
54. Mahuta 1974 See footnote 49.
55. White Paper on Development of Maui Gas in New Zealand D5A 1973
56. The Times 5 April 1973
57. For example Huntly Press 11 April 1973, 23 May 1973
58. See The Times 3 July 1973, 10 July 1973
59. The Times 10 July 1973
60. 1 August 1973 Progressive Association 4 August 1973 Public Meeting Huntly, 30 September 1973, Waahi Marae, 1 October 1973, Ruawaro Hall.
61. See submission to NZED by Maoris delivered at 30 September 1973 meeting at Waahi Marae and Federated Farmers submission delivered at 1 October 1973. Meeting in Ruawaro Hall. Comments on those by Mr D.H. Jones NZED in Memorandum to Chief Engineer (Design and Construction) 11 October 1973 File 21/90/1 PLE.
62. The history of the Forum is outlined in Chapter Four, however a brief summary could be beneficial to the reader. The NZED was evaluating the suggestions of the Maoris and Farmers independently of the idea to establish a Forum. Traditional

practice with NZED was to work through the appropriate Local Authority and establish a Liaison committee to deal with day to day matters. After considering the Maori's submissions the Maori Liaison Officer together with a Public Relation Officer and Project Engineer was suggested as a group to provide a rapid acting channel of communication. Such a group would be controlled by NZED and in addition to a Liaison Committee. The idea of a Planning Forum suggested by the Minister of Works met with some initial disfavour from within the ranks of NZED but the proposal was accepted and the Minister of Electricity suggested to the Maori community that they could nominate a representative. He suggested to the Farmers that they could form part of a Liaison Committee which would be the appropriate place to make their view known. The Maoris replied to the suggestion of a Forum by expressing scepticism that such a structure would alleviate their pressing problem contained in the submission. They considered the proposed Forum merely a public relations exercise and a delaying tactic in answering the specific submissions made. The Farmers considered that they had just as much right to sit at a planning forum as the Maori community since the project would have an effect on their economic livelihood viz-a-vis coal conveyance, transmission lines, gas pipeline, roading. However MOW and NZED countered this claim by stating that since the Maoris were immediately effected by virtue of the station being close by, relocation of the school, taking of Maori land for construction purposes they should have their interest considered as a special case. If the Farmers were allowed on to the Forum other groups could claim to be represented but as the Forum was not intended to be comprised of various ad hoc local interest groups the Liaison Committee was the appropriate channel of communication. The Farmers would be represented by their local authority representative. After agreement with the Maori community and support from the Local Authorities the District Commissioner of Works announced that the Forum would be established to help resolve problems arising from the station and ensure co-operation and co-ordination.

63. In particular the Hamilton District Commissioner of Works.

BAKER HOUSING BLOCK

- 64. See Forum minutes 21 December 1973:5
- 65. See Forum minutes 4 February 1974:6
- 66. See Forum minutes 4 February 1974:2
- 67. For example Raglan County Council meeting See The Times 30 January 1974, The Times 25 March 1974, Huntly Borough Council meeting see The Times 13 March 1974.
- 68. See Forum minutes 4 February 1974:6
- 69. See Forum minutes 4 March 1974:5

70. See Forum minutes, 6 May 1974:6, also as a result of conversation with Mayor of Huntly at the time he indicated MWD would contribute financially to the Borough however documentary evidence or details were not able to be obtained.
71. The Times 10 April 1974. Borough Councillor Mr F.G. Tregoweth
72. The Times 10 April 1974. Borough Councillor Mr B.T. Gill
73. Conversation between Mr Kellow Chairman RCC and Author. See Forum minutes 21 December 1973
74. The Times 10 April 1974
75. *ibid*, 1974
76. *ibid*, 1974
77. See minutes of Forum meetings February to May 1974
78. For example see The Times 25 March 1974 "Row may cause delay"
79. Under provisions of these Acts effected parties could object either to the acquisition of land by Crown or extension of boundaries.
80. The Settlement was a compromise and had still be be ratified by the Local Government Commission.

WAAHI MARAE RE-DEVELOPMENT PLAN AND HUNTLY SPORTS COMPLEX

81. See Forum minutes 7 October 1974:12
82. Forum minutes 4 November 1974:7,8,9
83. *ibid*, 1974
84. *ibid*, 1974
85. Architect consultants Angus Flood Griffin, Hamilton, were responsible to Maori community. Town and Country Planner Mr L. Gow, Hamilton, Ministry of Works and Development.
86. See Forum minutes 4 November 1974:10
87. See Forum minutes 3 March 1975:2
88. For example Forum meetings in March, May, July, correspondence between Mr Mahuta, Maori representative and Mr D.H. Jones NZED 13 August 1974. Letter from General Manager NZED to Commissioner of Works 28 August 1974.
89. See Forum minutes 4 November 1974 and 3 March 1975
90. Forum minutes 3 March 1975:9

91. ibid, 1975:9
92. See Forum minutes 1 September 1975:7
- At 1 September 1975 Forum meeting a formal recommendation was put to the meeting "that the Forum supports Huntly Borough Council's application to the NZED for assistance in the establishment of a sporting, cultural and recreational complex. Wright/Kellow carried."
94. See The Times 27 October 1975 and 29 October 1975
95. Refer to footnote 88 for letters in respect of the Marae and in March 1975 Forum meeting the Mayor indicated he would seek assistance from NZED for many aspects including recreation.
96. See Footnote 85 for Ministry of Works representative and Huntly Borough Council used same firm of architectural consultants. In addition Mr Wallace from the Rugby Union attended.
97. My impression through observance of these meetings differed from bargaining over Baker Block.
98. See Mr D.H. Jones memorandum to Chief Engineer regarding Maori's submissions made to him on 30 September 1973. His comments on these dated 11 October 1973. See page 3 which relates to page 6 of Maori's submission and page 4 (b) provision of recreation facilities.
99. However Mr Jones (NZED) in Forum 7 October 1974:12 noted that in his opinion finance would not be available as the Marae was not for public use.
100. For example Mr Kellow Chairman RCC saw the Minister of Works and Development in November 1975 and believed he had achieved a concession in which the costs of raising the Marae level would be Government funded. Conversations with Author.
101. Press covered both events after announcements had been made public and a decision made, no coverage during the bargaining stages.
102. It should be noted that Huntly is characteristically a Rugby League town which has large grass roots support but few financial or physical resources such as grounds, clubrooms, while the Rugby union has vast financial backing from its national body and considerable land reserves, but few players. For example in 1973 the Rugby Club had to abandon its grade structure for under 20 year old competition for lack of any young Rugby players.
103. See Huntly Press 19 November 1975
104. See Huntly Press 26 November 1975
105. See The Times 17 November 1975 "Views to be heard"
106. From the point of view of Maoris

107. See footnote 100.
108. A difference between the two requests was that the Marae redevelopment plan did not come to the Forum for formal approval as a total package. An aspect was considered and agreed upon at different times whereas the Sports Complex was presented as a package.
109. Deputation from clubs head by Rugby League Chairman Mr W.L. O'Claghan (including swimming, soccer, tennis, bowling, yachting) met Minister of Electricity in Huntly on 14 November 1975.
110. See The Times 2 March 1976, 3 March 1976 and Forum minutes 1 March 1976.
111. See Forum minutes 1 March 1976

HUNTLY TOWN PLANNING STUDIES

112. Rural zone restriction on housing possible loss in revenue if more houses build as suggested in plan.
113. See Forum minutes 4 November 1974
114. See Forum minutes 3 March 1975
115. See Forum minutes 3 March 1975:7
116. *ibid*, 1975:8
117. A motorway by-pass scheme had been suggested for Huntly taking traffic away from the commercial area for many years. The representation on this committee protected the interests of those who were in favour of the motorway namely the Ministry of Works, District Roads Council, Transport Department.
118. See Forum minutes 3 March 1975:8
119. See Forum minutes 21 May 1975:8, 7 July 1975:7
120. See Forum minutes 6 October 1975
121. *ibid*, 1975:7
122. On 22 November 1975. See The Times 22 November 1975, The N.Z. Herald 23 November 1975
123. See The Times 22 November 1975 and Forum minutes 1 December 1975:13
124. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975
125. *ibid* 1975
126. Minister of Works and Development
127. Conversation with Chairman of Forum and Author 1975.

128. See Forum minutes 1 December 1975:13
129. Conversation with Mayor of Huntly and Author 1975
130. The Mayor joined the Forum in November 1974 as a result of local body elections. He had little knowledge of Forum procedures and the Forum had not used this procedure since the Mayor had taken office. Statements by the Chairman that the Forum was open to everyone reinforced the Mayors belief that the Forum was a public meeting.
131. While I was not able to find the detailed evidence to support possible reasons one could speculate in view of activities generally undertaken by authorities in the area in this regard. By keeping the Report confidential the Huntly Borough Council retained initiative to make any decisions on land purchase or investment before the public was aware of intended plans. Keeping the report confidential for a time would enable the Council to negotiate agreements with commercial and industrial interests which they might seek to attract. Ability to control land use designations would be an important control and power to encourage facilities and directions of industrial or commercial development. Encouragement could be given to intensify the existing CBD or develop a new one on Huntly West. The Planning Report recommends expansion and consolidation of the existing central shopping - commercial area and a by-pass route originally planned for the area. Two somewhat contradictory aims as the by-pass could reduce the business in the shopping area. The present highway passes through the main street.
132. See The Times 22 November 1975

RAKAUMANGA PRIMARY SCHOOL

133. See Mahuta R.T. Industrial Relations and the Huntly Power Station paper presented to Maori Policy Convention of Labour Party Waahi Marae 1974.
134. Assurances given at 12 July 1972 meeting in Huntly with Government Departments.
135. See submission to NZED and Ministry of Works concerning the Huntly Coal and Gas Fired Thermal Power Station by Maori community made on 30 September 1973 at Waahi Marare.
136. See footnote 53.
137. For report of Ministers visit see The Times 22 March 1973
138. See minutes of meeting 12 July 1972 in Huntly Borough Council Chambers with Government Departments representatives.
139. See letter to Director General, Department Education from Commissioner of Works dated 7 August 1972 refers to discussions with Mr O'Byrne 31 July 1972.

140. See minutes of meeting 12 July 1972:5
141. See Huntly Power Station Environmental Impact Statement 1973.
142. According to Mahuta see footnote 133
143. See footnote 139.
144. See The Times 15 September 1973
145. See submissions referred to in footnote 135 30 September 1973:6,7
146. See The Times 15 September 1973
147. *ibid*, 1973
148. *ibid*, 1973
149. See D.H. Jones comments on meeting with South Auckland Education Board General Manager and Land Purchase Officer in Report to Chief Engineer 11 October 1973 file 27/90/1 PLE NZED
150. *ibid*, 1973
151. See submission referred to in footnote 135, 1973:7
152. See footnote 149 for source
153. For example letter to Minister of Electricity from Mr R.T. Mahuta 13 November 1973, letter to Mr R.T. Mahuta from Minister of Electricity 23 November 1973. See Forum minutes 21 December 1973 4 February 1974:4
154. See Forum minutes 1 April 1974:6
155. *ibid*, 1974
156. See Forum minutes 6 May 1974: 5
157. See Forum minutes 29 July 1974:8
158. The request had been made by the SAEB through the Department of Education to NZED.
159. See Huntly Press 31 July 1974
160. See Huntly Press 26 February 1975
161. For example what level of financing, close the school or relocate.
162. In the placing of a Project there are many problems which have to be dealt with and it takes time to attend to all of them. When early requests had been received by NZED it took some time before they could devote attention to the problem. As it involved finance it needed some investigation.

163. Conversation with SAEB Architect and Author 1974.
164. Conversation with SAEB architect and Author 1974.
165. See Draft Stage Environmental Impact Report 1975. A3:2

SITING THE EAST SIDE MINE HEAD

166. Report on NZ coal Resources September 1971 Mines Department
167. See Forum minutes 29 July 1974:9
168. Mines Department representative Mr Brazil said so at Forum meeting 29 July 1974.
169. See Forum minutes 2 September 1974
170. See Forum minutes 3 March 1975:6
171. At the Forum meeting 7 October 1974
172. See Forum minutes 1 September 1975
173. See Forum minutes 6 October 1975:7
174. *ibid*, 1975
175. NZ Commission for the Environment Audit of EIR: Huntly East Side Coal mine Wellington 1974:5
176. During the period the Mines Department produced the Report the Forum was operating. The Commission for the Environments Audit did not spell out whether another structure should be established or even if it was aware of the Forums existence. However liaison of Government activities was one aim of the Forum.
177. Conversation with Author 1975.
178. Conversation with Author 1975.
179. Conversation with Author 1975.
180. Conversation with Author 1975.
181. Conversation with Author 1975.
182. Conversation with Author 1975.
183. Conversation with Author 1975.
184. Conversation with Mines Department Representative and Author 1975.
185. See Forum minutes 29 July 1974
186. Mines Department have previously been represented by a Development

Engineer, Assistant District Manager and then District Manager. There was some feeling that the Mines Department were not actively supporting the Forum (conversation with Chairman 1975) they gave very brief reports of their activities compared to the NZED or Project and did not take part in discussion at the Forum to any extent.

187. The issue was not raised at the July or September 1974 meetings and under normal circumstances the Commission for the Environment would have released its Audit about five to six months later in October or November 1974.
188. When approached to explain their actions and reasons by the Author 1975.
189. Used by many Government Departments commonly used by Ministry of Works and Development.
190. See Mines Department Environmental Impact Report. East side Coal Mine Huntly 1974.
191. See Commission for the Environments Audit 1974 see footnote 175.
192. Mines Department in common with other Government Departments lacked the skilled personal to produce reports particularly at local level. The Author understands from conversation among Forum members that there is considerable personal animosity between the Mines Department Representative and Chairman.
193. See Forum minutes 6 October 1975:6

CREATING A POLITICAL CHARACTER

194. The Reports of Government Departments are a good example.
195. The individual's desires are fulfilled by a choice on his part to attain the goal. It is not a stimulus response situation.
196. Government Department representatives, RCC Chairman, Huntly Mayor and Waikato County Council Chairman regard him as unsuccessful. Federated Farmers and Maori Representative regard him as successful.
197. Liaison Committee meetings April, June, August, November 1975
Forum meetings September, October, December 1975.
198. At the following Liaison Committee meetings and Forum Meetings he raised the following issues. Liaison Committee: November 1974, roading, settlement ponds, runoff facilities in Huntly for clubs. April 1975, transmission lines, traffic control, roading, water-table, open cast mine run off, police strength. June 1975, test bore holes, roading, traffic flow, transmission lines, safety at Tainui bridge underload. August 1975, new mines, opencasts, water supply, twin pipeline, smoke emission, annual compensation rentals. November 1975, housing, mine roading proposal, compensation, roading. Forum meetings September 1975, transmission

lines. October 1975, EIR on coal mine, water loss big underground mines. December 1975, deputation member on roading.

199. See minutes of above meetings.
200. Conversation with Author 1975.
201. Conversation with Author between Maori representative, Chairman, and RCC Chairman 1975.
202. Conversation with Author 1975.
203. Opinion among the Government Representatives and other Forum members in conversation with Author 1975.
204. Mr Kimpton was chairman of the Public meeting on 6 November 1975.
205. My conclusion based on comments about Mr Kimpton's ~~willingness~~ to meet and discussion of issues with other Forum members.
206. Conversation with Forum member and Author 1975.
207. Normal convention from the Raglan County Chairman to Chair meetings in his territory on such an issue related to the Project.
208. General comment by Press reporters and other County councillors observed behaviour at Raglan County Council meetings by Author 1975.
209. Conversation with Federated Farmers Mr T. Pask and Mr J. Chadwick and Author 1975.
210. Forum member Mr J. Chadwick. Conversation with Author 1975.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

Politics in relation to the Huntly Power Project is diverse, simultaneously occurring in many different dimensions and seemingly chaotic. Yet there is an inherent order and patterned variability in the activity that exists. Individuals representing interest groups initiate action through the processes of power to achieve goals only limited by their self interest. The political situation is changing and on going as new issues and situations occur and people collectively involve themselves in a number of relationships from consensus to conflict. The meanings attached by interacting individuals to a variety of situations goals and actions of others become symbolic through an interpretative and definition process peculiar to each individual. The fitting together of these symbolic meanings not always in co-operation or conflict through a negotiative process interrupted by processes of power (engaged in by all participants to a greater or lesser degree) produces an uncertain outcome but which has a degree of stability dependent upon the actions of the participants who may reaffirm or revoke established procedures of interaction or create new ones.

SIGNIFICANT TRENDS

At both a national and local level individuals representing well defined interests are engaged in a negotiative process. NZED representatives have vested interests in maintaining a continuous programme of power stations. The Huntly Power Station is one part of this programme to produce electricity for the national energy demand. The national scene has not been examined to the same detail as the Huntly situation however there are parallels which can be considered jointly and aspects which typify the interaction at Huntly as a microcosm of the national scene.

The links between Government departments (the national level) and the local community are significant to Huntlys development. Historically, Huntly has been heavily dominated by the Mines Department and Railways Department which mined and exported coal

from the district. With the power project the Electricity Department and Ministry of Works and Development took an increasing interest in the community itself affecting decisions in a wide number of areas from roading to employment. The project would have an impact on the community and impose strains on it but with the solution to the problems created the initiative to control Huntly development became increasingly arrested from the community itself to its defacto Government Department partner. Government Department involvement in Huntly through the power project was somewhat of a two edged sword. On one hand it imposed limitations on the direction of town development and strains on the amenities, for example, siting housing blocks on the West side intensified residential development in that area with the need to increase water and sewage reticulation across the River. On the other hand the Project offered an economic boom in the form of employment, commercial and industrial expansion and a source of funds for new amenities such as a sports complex. Closely associated with this differing interpretation of the Projects relationship to the community were the views of Forum members, the political leaders and Government officials, to the presence of the Project. The Government officials and ministers viewed the power project as having a beneficial effect and strove to make sure the locals were not adversely effected or 'out of pocket' by the impact of the power project. The locals tended to view the project with mixed reaction but as a source to obtain extra benefits and improve the general life of the community compared to what existed before the power project. However they found (e.g. Marae plan and roads) that the Government Departments, mainly NZED, were not as free with their resources as the locals expected. They had to fight for what they wanted and to obtain solutions to problems caused by the Project. In so doing the groups were prepared to use a variety of manoeuvres in addition to the Forum such as highlighting their case in the newspapers and direct appeals to the Ministers of Electricity and Works and Development. The very thing which concerned the local community but which the Government Departments were reluctant or slow to solve were the things that would effect the community on a long term basis and the community groups were justly claiming to be protected. For example, it was the Maori community that had to live beside (less than 100m) the country's largest thermal power

station complex and suffer the noise and traffic during construction as well as the bulk and operation of the completed station. The NZED was not prepared to meet the total cost of lessening the impact but content to offer small piecemeal concessions. A similar situation existed with the roads where the local farmers and Raglan County were entitled to think that the roads should not deteriorate and disadvantage them. Instead they found that no forward planning was done on the use of roads in the area, promises to upgrade some roads were modified to defer improvement indefinitely and they were left with a worsening situation effecting them in the short term with the potential to create permanent difficulties for the rural population.

The power project itself represents the successful outcome of a negotiative situation in another dimension for the NZED. By maintaining a continuous programme of works influence and control over energy planning is maintained. NZED is a large department with wide ranging administrative, technical scientific and planning resources which are geared to providing the information and research to justify expansion of electricity generation. There has been an official Departmental policy to promote a continuous supply of electricity rather ^{than} to balance this against the restriction and control aims laid down in the Electricity Act 1968 to guide the conduct of the Department. The control and manipulation of these resources allows officials to exercise considerable power in many different dimensions. A new and naive Minister of Electricity in 1972-1973 was provided with the appropriate information to commit the country to a massive industrial expenditure in electric power generation for years to come. But after the committment was made the Ministers concerned (through experience and necessity of oil price rises) began reiterating the sentiments expressed by their predecessors in the late sixties such that the continued expansion of electricity is neither acceptable financially or environmentally.

In similar respects NZED officials were able to manipulate a range of skilled Engineer and scientists for a 'public relations' campaign to get the power station accepted in Huntly.

Of special importance in this process was the idealogical or philosophical belief of being individuals. This was particularly evident in the changed attitude of the two General Managers of NZED

toward the use of gas. At a local level the genuine concern and support, by the District Commissioner of Works, led to the establishment of the Power Planning Forum. The tenacity and righteousness of the Chairman of Raglan County ensured some benefits for the Maoris and farmers.

Challenges to the stance projected by electricity interests came from the competing fuel resource of natural gas which posed threats to the influence of electricity as a major supplier of energy. The Ministry of Energy Resources was established in 1972 out of a general desire by the politician and administrator to co-ordinate and plan an energy policy in the national interest rather than the interests of any one industry. The Ministry of Energy Resources increasingly became the channel through which policies were ~~announced~~ ^{announced}. Although its Act established it as an independent unit, Energy Resources was forced to rely on the information and resources of other Departments in the field of energy. The increasing ability to undertake independent surveys and research to gain information corresponded to its rising importance as a major ministry in the field of Energy. It began to encompass and oversee the activities of coal, natural gas, and electricity interests but the co-ordination role came under increasing strain as its activities grew and other interests were challenged. Energy Resources, energy saving measures, criticism of ^{the} Committee to Review Power Requirements demand curve and a decision to divert gas from the electricity generation programme presented a significant attack on electricity interests. The Energy Resources Minister and Commissioner noted that it was difficult to achieve co-ordination under these circumstances. The co-ordination of a common policy involved 'trade-offs' or compromises among the conflicting goals as perceived by the respective interests. In this situation the degree of commitment and support given by the interested parties to co-ordination was the 'corner stone to a successful Ministry of Energy Resources. It is clear (from statements at Second Energy Conference) that the energy interested groups will actively seek involvement in deliberation of Energy Resources, to a certain degree, to ensure their interests are protected but that real conflicts of purpose exist. A further attempt in 1975 - 1976 to co-ordinate the Ministry of Energy Resources Department of Mines and

Department of Electricity under one political administration must be seen as a further move to promote a goal of co-ordination.²

A similar situation as the Ministry of Energy Resources can be seen in the Huntly Power Project Planning Forum, with its parallel philosophy to encourage co-ordination the Forum mirrors a negotiative process and a number of trends occurring at a national level. There are a number of well defined interest groups not always in conflict but supporting each other for indeterminate periods of time in different situations. Coalitions and alliances among the interest groups (represented at one level by individual representatives) develop as some perceive a situation in one light and others in another. For example, the support given NZED by the Mines Department and the Electrical Supply Authorities Association stands against the support given the Natural Gas Corporation by the environmental groups and Ministry of Energy Resources. These are shifting alliances in that at times the Supply Authorities Association actively challenged the views of NZED leaders and the Ministry of Energy Resources chose to disregard environmental and Natural Gas Corporation arguments against using Maui Gas for electricity generation. Similarly in Huntly, Raglan County representatives supported the Maori communities claims for assistance from NZED. The Local Authority representatives (RCC and HBC) presented a united front in requests for a sports complex yet were in considerable conflict over the Baker housing block issue. The Waikato Valley Authority Engineer vigorously opposed initial NZED plans for water use but later campaigned and supported the settlement in the Electricity Departments interest. The nature and extent of alliances indicate consensus and conflict aspects of interaction but do not in themselves reveal the nature of the Symbolic Interactionist perspective of negotiation.

The Huntly Power Project Planning Forum was established at a time of conflict and dissention by some^{of} the local people, spearheaded by the Maoris, directed towards the NZED and Government in general. The Maoris' claims brought Ministerial assurances that they as well as the local community would be kept informed. A general attitude from within NZED favoured the established procedures of liaison through the local Authority but recognised the need for 'public relations' to explain the situation to the people and Local Authority. The allied

department in construction of the Project, the Ministry of Works and Development through the District Commissioner of Works suggested the idea of a Forum as a means to impart information, promote co-ordination and smooth the conflict. The Forum represented a new mechanism in the history of New Zealand power project development although some tentative steps had been made in 1969 with the Auckland Thermal No.1 Power Station Liaison Committee.³ The Forum was an experimental procedure and as such engendered an enthusiasm for it to succeed as an administrative procedure and political device from those who were a part of its membership and from those observing its progress at a national political level.⁴ The Forum was an attempt to involve the local community in decisions effecting their lives and as such was an important step in citizen participation in planned projects. A national environmental lobby, election of a party to Government with strong principles about the social welfare of people and a growing criticism⁵ about the effect of large power projects situated close to urban areas were of underlying importance in the birth of the Forum. It was recognised by all concerned that the project would have an impact on the local district by attempting to 'graft on' a new community to an established close knit mining community. Whether the impact would be beneficial or harmful was uncertain but objections were occurring immediately prior to the Forum and in a manner which NZED officials perceived as a serious threat to the viability of the Project (water rights). Two groups, at least, had reservations about establishing the Forum (Maoris and NZED) but eventually decided to support the concept. When the official decision to proceed with the station was made prior to a resolution of Maori and Environmental Defence Society objections the decision of the Planning Appeal Board was in a sense preempted. The Maoris had perceived the Appeal as the most appropriate way some binding agreement could be made over their interests but in terms of their cultural concerns they were largely unsuccessful. They were then prepared to use the Forum as an avenue to voice their concerns and attempt a better deal. On the NZED's part the logical extension of Mr Jones recommendations to informally meet with adversaries to appraise their strengths and weaknesses and achieve negotiated agreements, was a commitment to the proposed Forum where

the local problems and objections could be considered and acted upon in an appropriate manner. In a similar process to the Ministry of Energy Resources the success of the Forum depended upon the willingness of the parties to contribute and support the concept of co-operation and co-ordination and in this sense the Forums participants actively initiated action in the situation to achieve goals for themselves.

The goals Forum members could achieve were limited in one main respect. The overriding goal, the symbolic cement, was to complete the project with minimum delay to meet the deadlines. This goal served as a reference point on many occasions to remind members of what was at stake and needed to be achieved. There was a general commitment to this goal by all Forum members but for different purposes and the degree of commitment varied at certain times in the negotiative process. For the Government interests concerned (i.e. NZED, Project, MWD) the Forum provided a setting where compromises could be reached and conflict threatening the Project could be accommodated and dealt with without recourse to outside authorities. It also provided an avenue to maintain continued pressure about the time and financial constraints and as an important agent through which the departments could influence the local community's view of the Project as a whole. Reinforcing and re-establishing the projected view of time, economic restraints but economic benefits to the community reaffirmed the viability of the Project and its contribution to the national electricity demand. For the local community the Forum provided an opportunity to obtain information raise problems and attempt to obtain some community amenities and benefits. From both these points of view and the fact that the Forum has continued to exist it has by and large been successful.

The NZED controlled the financial resources⁶ reserved the right to make policy decisions and jointly controlled the flow of information about the Project with the Ministry of Works and Development. The Ministry of Works and Development controlled technical services, finance and policy matters in town planning associated with the power project and as such both Departments were able to exercise significant power because of the range of resources at their disposal compared to the local community. The Departments provided finance, defined the issues and retained for themselves the direction of action, however the local community groups recognised they could also define the issues

and had the potential to mobilise support against the project and disrupt aspects of it. Such local conflict would ensure ministerial intervention into the situation and the procedures of the Departments concerned. The past success of this manoeuvre was apparent in Huntly vis - a - vis the Maoris and in Te Atatu vis - a - vis siting of Auckland Thermal No.1 power station.

The ability of all participants to relate their particular circumstance to national issues or other power projects constantly reoccurred in public meetings and Forum meetings and illustrates a process of continued reflection of past successes and failures. (experience) which are brought to bear to help define a situation. For example, in the public meeting on roads people constantly referred to the plight of other people facing similar projects in Auckland and Clutha Valley. In presenting the Marae plan proposal the Maori representative recalled decisions of the Clutha Valley Development Commission on social compensation.⁷ In asking for clarification of the Electricity Act the Mayor of Huntly indicated that it was his intention to ask for similar benefits to those received by Turangi and New Plymouth. In defining the status of the Environmental Defence Society in the Water Rights case the planning appeal board considered previous legal precedent. On the national scene for example, the General Manager and NZED Engineers defended the Departments record in environmental issues by recalling environmental awards the Department had received for various projects around the country while the opposing critics pointed to the lack of forward planning in Huntly and the lack of environmental research for Auckland No.1 Thermal Power Station.⁹

As the project was to supply electricity it was viewed by the local community as an Electricity Department responsibility and demands tended to be in relation to that Department. This was further reinforced by provisions in the Electricity Act 1968 to provide up to one percent of the total project cost for community facilities and the responsibility of NZED to undertake a degree of forward planning before official approval was granted. Initial demands from the Maoris over the Rakaumanga school and environmentalists over river pollution were seen as outside the jurisdiction of the NZED; but they became increasingly drawn into considering the wider aspects of the project other than design, construction and management.

This trend was part of an emerging national one brought about by the environmental impact assessment procedures and the need for NZED to become involved in the practical solution of problems in the community because of its range of resources especially the financial aspect. It became increasingly necessary to build up a pool of skilled researchers to investigate the social and environmental problems and make recommendations about them outside the purely engineering field and subject to the scrutiny of other Departments. The Huntly experience was a rather rushed affair in the midst of experimenting with these new requirements but it was never the less a discernable trend which occurred initially and was carried on as a result of the decision of the water rights appeal and the demands of the local community for more and more amenities.

Political activity at the Forum was primarily in terms of negotiation through symbolic manipulation and information control to influence Forum members' definition of a situation to achieve a desired outcome. The range of symbols and kind of information controlled varied considerably depending on what was at stake at any one time. The process was a continuing one so that certain action had to be repeated or new directions of action taken. The Maui pipeline case illustrated the ability of the Pipeline Project Officials to repeat the symbolic time constraint after it had been discredited, but with a new sense of urgency, at a later stage, because of the delay and greater need to meet contract deadlines. In siting the East-side coal mine a reappraisal and new site was necessary through an initial lack of co-ordination and desire to retain certain information. The choice of the Mayor of Huntly not to present to the Forum a report on town planning, a desire to retain information, was later reversed at a subsequent Forum meeting.¹⁰

The ability to control information was common to all Forum members and their organisations. At a face to face situation Government officials would refuse to make a decision at the Forum but later suggest recommendations and decisions in their reports to superiors. The East side coal mine was a clear example of controlling information through lack of co-ordination but it did so at the risk of undermining the credibility of the Forum to achieve co-ordination.

Similarly the Huntly Borough Mayor chose to retain a document with high informational content against the procedures of the Forum and against the aim to achieve co-ordination. In these situations a choice not to support the Forum was made and carried on for a moment in time to obtain the initiative to carry on some action or retain the 'edge' over another interest group to assure political advantage. This process also occurred before the Forum was established in the Rakaumanga School and siting of the station cases. The control of information allowed NZED to gain time and complete discussions with interested parties before deciding to enter the political scene. A report by Mr Jones on his impressions of the water rights Appeal demonstrated, by implication, that the retention of information by the appellants from NZED, was a move to discredit and or counter the NZED arguments. The control of information must not be viewed in isolation to the process of negotiation as this would surely lead to little co-operative action and perpetual conflict. The collective commitment to complete the project ensured that information was being imparted to influence consensus and co-operation and in a sense the overall goal can be seen to provide for the manipulative process and consequently how people should act. The selective release of certain types of information within this setting serves to support the goal and in itself has symbolic meaning. The manipulation of information in this way was evident throughout all the activity at Huntly and an inherent part of this was the particular significance of symbols and the way they were used.

The use of symbols is a basic ingredient of communication and language but has political significance when groups of symbols are deliberately manipulated to achieve some goal. They become a means to an end. For example, the use of the time symbol was reinforced by the NZED in its procedure to apply for water rights. The Project used it in pressuring for a solution to the Baker housing block and the Maui Pipeline Project achieved a quick agreement over the pipeline route. The Farmers stressed the need for urgent action in solving the roading problems. The national interest symbol was used by NZED in applying for water rights, in the siting of the station and to some extent in the Baker block dispute. The Farmers attempted to use the symbol over roads with the reinterpretation that the national

interest should bear the cost of improving the roads. The Mayor of Huntly and Maoris acted in a similar respect to achieve support for their claims for assistance for the Marae and sports complex. A further pervasive symbol in use by all parties ~~was~~ the scientific-technical-research and expert opinion. In the case of the air pollution issue a great deal of scientific and expert opinion concentrating on visual smoke abatement was brought to bear to assure the public the problem was solved. A similar manoeuvre by NZED in regard to the water rights was countered by scientific and expert testimony from the Maori and Environmental Defence Society coalition in the first water right hearing and continued at that hearing on boiler cleaning wastes. The use of technical experts by the Maui Pipeline Project to outline the preferred route and the alternatives was used effectively not only on the Forum members but through official publications.¹¹ The Maoris use of architectural experts to present their Marae plan received support from the architectural and planning experts of the Ministry of Works and helped to create an impression that the Marae project was a worthwhile, well researched and planned proposal. The use of engineers and top NZED officials involved in planning the project were used in a public relations campaign to reassure the locals that any problems would be solved and to convince them of the economic benefits of the project. The creation of a political character and the staging of a dramatic event represent further variations in the use of symbols. The Farmers dramatic staging of a public meeting followed by many press reports and deputations focused attention on an issue and the need for some kind of action to solve the problem. Imputing an unfavourable unlikable character to a politician the Government Department representatives could endeavour to discredit the arguments of the person and lessen his effectiveness and in so doing get others to see the faults and share the perspective created. The impressions of the character varied such that not all shared the unfavourable view. The Farmers viewed the aggressive action as effective and admirable by actively publically trying to reach a solution. In each of these examples there is the implicit assumption to influence others views of a situation, their frame of reference, to attain a particular goal and this process is undertaken by all in an interactive situation.

The concept of negotiation unifies these processes and can be seen to characterise political activity in Huntly. Symbolic manipulation and information control are used by all concerned. Some of the groups support each other on occasions or over long periods but conflicts between them develop. The difference between the Waikato Valley Authority and the NZED over water rights and RCC versus Huntly Borough over the Baker block illustrate this. The situation cannot be analysed in purely consensus-co-operation or conflict terms as a negotiative bargaining compromise process, as revealed in this research, is the essential characteristic. The legal court hearing over the water rights is an excellent illustration of the pattern of alliances, conflicts, agreements, mutually agreed and abided by outcome. The experiences gained and judgements given were clearly used and related to further actions over water rights. The pattern of negotiation through meetings, agreements, alliances and conflicts was evident in the roading issue and showed the influence of unforeseen circumstances changing the situation. A decline in the national economy and a directive from Government to the Project to reduce unnecessary expenditure was viewed as a broken promise by the Farmers and as grounds for renewed pressure to reach a solution. The change in Government and new policies altered the speed and requirements necessary for a decision to approve the station. Other unexpected factors such as a delay in boiler design and construction, outside the control of those associated with the project, could jeopardise the project and necessitate a rescheduling of activity, ensuring political action to deal with the problems, likely to occur in the labour field for example. The negotiative aspect is evident in the Marae plan and Sports complex where there was a bargaining over resources between NZED and the local community groups. The process was observed in the offer and counter off bargaining between Raglan County and Huntly Borough over the Baker block.

The fact that certain cases examined before the Forum was established i.e. water rights (negotiation), air pollution (symbolic) and siting (information control) indicate a similar process of political activity occurring similar to those processes occurring while the Forum was in operation illustrate the pervasive type of interaction regardless of a set procedure established with certain aims. This

does not mean however, that the Forum made no difference to the situation, on the contrary it was used successfully by those involved. In the case of the water rights however, the issue continued to be dealt with outside the Forum with the Forum's relevance minimal. This was also true for the East side coal mine. When issues developed within the Forum or were raised after it to achieve a desired goal the problem remained within the Forum for further discussion and resolution (e.g. Marae Plan, Sports complex) although quite often informal meetings were where the details and agreements were thrashed out. To resolve and manage the issues within the confines of the Forum depended on what was brought to the Forum and the members' perceptions of the Forum for this type of interaction. From the issues dealt with at the Forum it is evident that the local community interest groups represented viewed the Forum as an avenue to present their case and for the local authorities as an alternative way to gain amenities. The main advantage gained from the Forum was by the Government Departments who were able to manipulate a wide range of resources (skilled experts, technical skill, finance research), define situations in their interest and achieve compromises where possible, supporting the continuation of the smooth construction of the project and they were aided in this by a general community commitment to this goal.

The project gathered a momentum through progressive construction development and influence in the community which would be difficult to stop should either the local community or Government choose to do so. While the project had not achieved its half way point contracts for equipment and plant were signed and design underway. A delay in completion time increasingly put costs up so in the country's economic interest a slow down in construction or delay would involve increased costs. The relationship record between the project and the community has been good in that extreme action and prolonged conflict situations to threaten the viability of the project have not occurred and the creation of the Forum can in part, be credited with this. The Government's austerity programme in 1976 could be expected to influence the project by economic cutbacks and consequent delay.¹²

Throughout my discussions associated with the project by Government

officials and local politicians Engineers as a particular occupational group were a party or influenced the limitation of discussion in terms of physical or technical problems. Many of the planning problems dealt with by the Forum were defined in terms of an Engineers viewpoint and left to others (usually the politicians) to reinterpret. From the local Huntly Borough Engineer giving his report on the Technical Advisory Committee to the General Manager (an Engineer) of NZED making policy decisions the Engineer played a crucial part in deliberations and defining situations. This pervasiveness of this group in positions to exercise power by manipulating resources and naturally 'seeing the problems from a particular perspective is not only common to power situation development but seems to be characteristic of the general New Zealand way of life. The decision to site the power station was initially in terms of the physical engineering difficulties. The decision to site a temporary bridge some miles North of Huntly was based on the technical reasons of access and convenience of approaches. The original East-side mine site was technically the most efficient for Mines Department and access to coal seams. It would seem that until there was sufficient political action from those likely to be effected by a proposal that the socio-political perspectives were considered and in some situations (e.g. water rights and siting) the decisions were largely preempted by a concentrated engineering effort on one possible alternative.

An inherent aspect in the negotiative concept is that the political action is an ongoing process. For example, new boiler cleaning water rights were to be negotiated, roading finance was not solved to all parties' satisfaction and nor was the Marae plan. Local reaction that the sports complex delayed the finance, development work on the East-side mine was subsequently curtailed and a final route for the Maui pipeline across Hakarimata Ranges had not been approved. The situations change and develop and new problems are created by people as the station rises from the ground. The political representatives change and bring varying degrees of experience to the Forum's deliberations. New situations are perceived as a threat by one group (or individual) and local groups goals' are modified, revoked and created. The political situation is thus continually redefined and ongoing.

LIMITATIONS AND USEFULNESS

In undertaking social science research problems inevitably occur in gathering data particularly if it involves studying the actions of politicians and administrators. Their perceptions and images of the researcher are important in the kind and amount of information they will be prepared to give. To some extent the credibility and respectability of the researcher is questioned particularly if the researcher is a student rather than a lecturer or consultant with a reputation or organisations to back him up. There seems to be a natural suspicion among people discussing political matters which in my case was overcome to some extent by being in the field for a considerable time before asking questions and probing motives for actions. Associated with this suspicion seemed to be a general belief amongst the local community that social science research consisted of questionnaires and interviews and to some extent one felt obliged to carry out a questionnaire or at least formally interview a subject. The more informal 'chat' taking notes about what people said and did and later discussing these with them was inevitably viewed with some surprise and could have even been regarded as 'snooping' but after a time this attitude became less pronounced as familiarity with the researcher developed. The need to spend a considerable length of time gathering data of this type is a drawback in that the pace of the research varies to a large extent because of the variation of the actions of subjects themselves from undertaking intense activity to protracted slow disputes. People are often difficult to interview because of their job commitments, meeting take longer than expected disrupting schedules etc.

The aspect of bias is a thorny problem and much has been written by anti and pro symbolic interactionists and humanist researchers. I would align myself with those that believe bias is a naturally occurring phenomenon. While I accept that different interpretations could be placed on my results, and no doubt they will, one develops an intuition and becomes aware when people are giving false information for a certain purpose. It is apparent when interest groups actively strive to manipulate the symbolic world so that the researcher might portray them in a favourable light and their opponents less generously.

The degree of co-operation given by the subjects, their

organisations and in relation to what issues provides a further constraint. By and large the co-operation received from most Forum members was good but the Mines Department and Waikato County were reluctant to contribute to the research effort to any great degree. A common attitude seemed to be the questioning of the value of the research and the use to which it would be put. On hearing of the social economic impact project¹³ and its initial funding of \$40,000 the chairman of Waikato County Council remarked that it was a waste of time and money and he could not see why funds should be given to an academic project when finance was not available for the airport proposal he had suggested which would be of immediate and long term benefit to the people in the Huntly district.¹⁴

The limited availability of funds for social science research is well known and this study was no exception. To undertake the research a considerable private contribution was necessary in travelling expenses to attend meetings, interview people in the district and examine Government files in Wellington. The cost of transport became such that one had to critically weight the benefits of academic pursuit versus the personal economic costs involved.

Any researcher is naturally sensitive to criticism of his works and will usually be the first to admit that aspects of the work could be improved given different constraints. In this respect improvement could have been made in examining the interrelationships between local ad hoc authorities such as the District Roads Council or National Loans Board, and their interrelationship with the Power project and influence on the Forum. This could have been accompanied by a detailed character analysis and background of Forum members. A greater examination of the relationships between local authorities ad hoc authorities and Government Departments could have been made but such limitations if they are infact that could perhaps be left to an extended research programme.

The study provided data about a new political concept (the Forum) which had developed in New Zealand and hitherto unresearched. Involvement in the power project early on in its development permitted a rare opportunity to understand the initial phases of activity which is often not apparent and unavailable to researchers at a later stage in the growth and development of a power project. As such this research

could be of historical importance and introductory value to subsequent research by others interested in the same or different aspects of the Huntly power project.

The practical application of a perspective, available to researchers for many years but rarely used in a political context has, I believe, indicated that the perspective of Symbolic Interaction can be applied to advantage to abstract essential processes and dimensions which characterise politics. While there are disadvantages in generalising to the national situation from the local activity in Huntly, the indications and principle concepts can be applied to these different dimensions of activity. Utilising a twin approach to include an analysis of the general energy situation throws a useful perspective on the Forum and the power projects' relevance in the wider context and ensures a more comprehensive examination of the subject under study.

In a society moving in the direction of involving people in planning decisions through varying degrees of citizen participation the study can perhaps be useful in that the interaction consequences and degree of power exercised by interest groups in one community in relation to a major power project have been analysed and may be helpful in the establishment of similar Forums for discussion where major projects are planned to have an effect on an existing community.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The Huntly Power Project is situated close to two university centers and is the first major thermal power station complex close to significant concentrations of people. It marks the beginning of a trend towards the provision of energy by this method. This situation provides a good opportunity to undertake research projects from the social impact to the physical effect on the environment. Recently a major socioeconomic monitoring study was begun with financial, technical and personal resources from the University of Waikato and Ministry of Works and Development, to examine the effect of the power station from one point of view but in monitoring the impact the academic is observing an action or effect after it has occurred. This may be of use for future power projects but it does little to actively solve the problems occurring or prevent them from happening and could in fact be used to stall political pressure about problems of real concern

to the individuals who have to live with the project. It may be useful in refining and developing techniques for prediction to be used at a later stage but that will depend on sufficient finance being made available.

A potential area for greater indepth research exists in the field of local government affairs generally. A political science approach could focus on the intrusion of Government into this area with reference to Huntly and the surrounding district which provides the resources of labour, materials, housing, recreation, and social amenities for the power station, using the perspective (or another if one chooses) developed in this thesis. A good aid would be a computerised system to collate public statements and newspaper reports about the subject area. Associated with a political analysis would be the need to examine patterns of financial investment and the influence of national policy trends among the organisations concerned and their implications for the local area.

CONCLUSION

Using the symbolic interaction perspective the interpretation of politics as characterised by the essential processes of power (negotiation, information control and symbolic manipulation) was observed in the political activity and provides empirical evidence for the theoretical prognostications.

Continued Government support and involvement, through the Government Departments, for the Huntly Power Project resulted from a desire to achieve a satisfactory level of electricity production to meet a national demand for this form of energy. The financial and manpower investment in the project and the lack of significant local disruption or conflict provided further impetus to complete the project. A considerable effort was expended by all those involved (the local community and government officials) to achieve the goal to complete the project for this resulted in mutual advantages both to the local community and the electricity interests.

The Huntly Power Project Planning Forum influenced the political activity in that it provided a focus for action in relation to the project. It was successful in its aims and its usefulness was acknowledged by all members. It provided a channel for communication and co-operation by those involved and co-ordination when the parties

chose to support the Forum in this respect. It was primarily of benefit to the Government Departments involved, by achieving compromises which did not prejudice their interests and by minimising conflict where possible. The local community was committed to using the Forum as an avenue to achieve their goals namely, continued project development, protection of self interests and to gain extra amenities for the community.

I hope this thesis can provide some substantive information which may increase our social and self awareness and contribute to our understanding of our relationship and place in society. It may prove useful to our social planning and in guiding social policies irrespective of existing theory.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the Electricity Act 1968, section 7(e)
2. See Ministerial statement reported in The Times 10 January 1976
3. For details of this see Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand 1971:11,12.
4. In particular the Minister of Electricity see comments made at Forum meeting 21 May 1975, and Minister of Works and Development remarks made on his 30 January 1974 visit to Huntly.
5. Mainly in connection with Auckland Thermal No.1 and the proposed site at Te Atatu. Early in 1973 the Prime Minister announced that as it would have an effect on people and they didnot want it a change in site would be made.
6. Provisions of the Electricity Act 1968 Part Two, Section 11 (g)
7. See Forum minutes 4 November 1974
8. See Forum minutes 3 March 1975
9. See Supplement to the Proceedings of Second Energy Conference 1975.
10. See Forum minutes 1 March 1976
11. For example the Environmental Impact Statement on the Maui Pipeline section from Ngaruawahia to Huntly 1975.
12. See Ministerial statement reported in The Times 11 March 1976
13. The University of Waikato School of Social Science established a project to monitor social and economic impacts of the Huntly power station in December 1975.
14. See Forum minutes 7 July 1975, 1 September 1975, 1 December 1975.

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