

THE 2015 MIGRANT CRISIS: AN IMPACT TO GERMANY?

by

Irish Nicole Solinsky

Liberty University

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy: Economic Policy

Liberty University

2022

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2022

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ABSTRACT

The 2015 European Migrant Crisis emerged when an influx of refugees settled in Europe from 2015-2019. The asylum seekers fled their homelands to evade a myriad of crises such as violence and war, corruption and abuse, and poor socioeconomic conditions. Of the European states, Germany welcomed the largest number of migrants. This was in part due to Germany's existing immigration policies in a post-Second World War environment, but also due to Germany's resounding economic strength. Germany has significantly low unemployment rates and the highest gross domestic product (GDP) in Europe. As such, Germany's position is one of uncontested significance within the European Union (EU); however, there is controversy on whether the European Union's policies, and distribution of immigrants, is fair and reasonable and if the influx of migrants are beneficial or detrimental to German society as a result. This study seeks to use quantifiable economic data to outline the causal effects of the Migrant Crisis on Germany. This study concludes that the 2015 Migrant Crisis had a low but positive impact to the German economy and a mid to high-level impact on German political society in the short-term duration of the Crisis (2015-2019). A full and comprehensive determination of the long-term impacts requires a future study, but the results of this research indicate the effects of the Migrant Crisis have normalized resulting in no long-term impacts. Using statistical analysis of data and an ethnological and phenomenological research design to understand the impacts to Germany will aid policymakers navigating the complexities of, and policy recommendations for, the Crisis from both a data driven and local perspective. This will further aid in forecasting the economic strength, immigration policies, and public opinion of Germany and the European Union.

Keywords: 2015 Migrant Crisis, European Refugee Crisis, Germany, German economics, European migration

Dedication

This paper is dedicated to those in my life who never allowed me to quit. Thank you for all your love and support! I never would have accomplished this without you.

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List of Abbreviations

Definition	Abbreviation
Aid to Families with Dependent Children	AFDC
Alternative für Deutschland	AfD
Analysis of Similarities	ANOISM
Analysis of Variance	ANOVA
Austria's Freedom Party	FPÖ
Central and Eastern European	CEE
Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative	CITI
Common European Asylum System	CEAS
Consumer Price Index	CPI
Development Assistance Committee	DAC
European Economic Area	EEA
European Union	EU
Gross Domestic Product	GDP
Gross Domestic Product Based on Purchasing Power Parity	GDP (PPP)
Institutional Review Board	IRB
Integrated Political Crisis Response	IPCR
International Monetary Fund	IMF
International Organization for Migration	IMO
Interrupted Time Series	ITS
Multivariate Analysis of Variance	MANOVA
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
Official Development Assistance	ODA
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	OECD
Purchasing Power Parity	PPP
Robust Interrupted Time Series	RITS
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families	TANF

United Kingdom

UK

United Nations

UN

United Nations Refugee Agency

UNHCR

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Overview

The 2015 European Migrant Crisis commenced after a significant influx of refugees sought asylum simultaneously throughout Europe. The refugees hailed from a plethora of source countries throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe; however, they primarily derived from Syria, Iraq, Eritrea, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. They emigrated due to the emergence of numerous issues surrounding poverty and socioeconomic difficulties, war, violence, as well as social and political unrest in their source nations. As a result, Europe was faced with facilitating, integrating, and economically, politically, and physically supporting the onslaught of asylum seekers. Germany's economic success, existing immigration policies, and placement within the European Union (EU) set the stage for Germany to host more refugees than any other European state. Furthermore, Germany faced a multitude of economic gains and losses; a bipartisan societal outlook on the Crisis and the policy stance Germany should take moving forward; a division amongst the constituents and migrants; and an integration conundrum. Germany and the EU need to create a streamlined approach to forecast and contrive a mitigation for the ongoing crisis, especially for the impactful economic, infrastructure, political, and budgetary strains that emerged as a result.

Background

Immigration within the European Union

The flow of immigration throughout the European Union has been poorly conducted since its formation. There exists little to no coordination between EU members' immigration policies and stances (Huntoon 1998, 423). For example, Spain began to allow meaningful non-

European immigration in the late 1990's. By 1997, Spain went from an average of 30,000 immigrants to 958,000, or a 2% foreign population to a 12%, while Germany had been hosting non-European migrants since the Second World War (Izquierdo, Jimeno, & Lacuesta 2016). This has created an environment of uncertainty and confusion amongst EU members on the fluidity of immigration, particularly in light of the EU's constant migration due to the four foundational principles of free movement: labor, capital, goods, and services (Portes 2016, 14).

This is exemplified in diverging administrative control of entry – both legally and illegally, societal opinions on migrants, political relations with foreign nations, and control of the migrants once settled into the host nation (Huntoon 1998, 423). The creation of the Schengen border patrol laws became regularly established European law, but the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark implemented diverging and stricter policies (Thym 2016). To add to the complexity, these country-specific opt outs do not follow a uniform pattern, and the Schengen nations implement diverging laws within themselves for non-European immigration and asylum law (Ibid. 2016).

The vastly differing attitudes and perspectives across the European Union on immigration not only exists in a variance of policy but in immigration as a concept. Despite the commonly suggested link between socioeconomic characteristics and ideologies on immigration, attitudes toward the concept are largely shaped on the consequences of immigration (Malchow-Møller, Munch, Schroll, et al. 2008, 371, 387). The perceived consequences differ depending on the state; therefore, resulting in variances across the EU platform in attitude, which translated into policy agenda. The Maastricht Treaty – which was signed in 1992 – enabled a common migration policy referring to non-EU nationals, but it did not establish a common set of immigration regulations across the EU member states (Czaika & De Haas 2013, 499). To this day,

the migration policies of non-EU citizens are still regulated by each individual state, despite multiple harmonization efforts (Ibid. 499).

It was the EU's poor coordination and structure of immigration policy – and inability to properly integrate migrants as a result – that are partially responsible for the failed migration of the refugees during the 2015 Migrant Crisis (Maldini & Takahashi 2017, 54). The Migrant Crisis caused policymakers to increase the effectiveness of the irregular immigration policies employed by the European Union (Carrera & Allsopp 2017, 70). The EU immigration policies focus heavily on the inter-EU freedom movement, leaving little direction for those who are not deemed “useful” in the labor market, such as those in need of protection and labeled irregular immigrants (Ibid. 70). The EU began to control migrant flows and border control; simplified entry procedures; granted a high level of access to the labor market for foreign nationals; and, in October 2015, the president of Luxembourg activated the integrated political crisis response (IPCR) which provides tools and political coordination amongst EU members amidst a crisis (Council of the European Union 2021).

Integration

In addition to poor migration policies, the European Union has had a history of mixed success in relation to integration. European integration was most successful under the unification of a singular European ideology and not individual ideologies or nationhood (Marks, Wilson, & Ray 2002). This was exemplified in 2013 when the European Union understood it could not tackle ongoing conflict and crises without a joint and unified stance (Tardy 2017, 1). The result was a series of joint policies, strategies, commissions, and organizations to collectively respond to crises in the hope of preventing instances of instability.

The same approach can be said for the integration of immigrants into European society. The EU's stance, as stated in 2007 by the then affairs commissioner Franco Frattini, is that there can be no immigration without integration (Jackson 2011, 18). It is important to note that integration is not assimilation. The EU's stance is not for migrants to abandon culture and religion for the sake of the practices within the host nation, but to instead transform into the host nation's society by engaging in their rules, justice, and empathy – which may be characterized by diversity through culture (19).

Because of the intricacy of integration and its contingency upon each individual state's rules and perspectives of justice and societal behavior, the process of integration must be contextualized and cannot simply be standardized. This explains why the EU faced difficulties integrating the 2.6 million migrants into society. It is beneficial for migrants to maintain a European centric ideology when integrating for successful understanding of European society and its functionalities. For an overarching successful refugee integration, there should be a careful mix of EU-centric ideas and practices combined with individual state's rules and regulations all the while with the maintenance and understanding of the migrants' cultural practices and beliefs (Marks, Wilson, & Ray 2002; Jackson 2011).

2015 Migrant Crisis

The 2015 Migrant Crisis hit Europe when the Syrian Civil War, the violence in Afghanistan and Iraq, abuse and forced labor in Eritrea, and poverty in Kosovo – amongst others, such as the Wars in Darfur and Somalia, uprisings in Ukraine, and the Second Libyan Civil War – contributed to an increase in refugees seeking asylum in Europe (BBC 2016c). Racism and religious persecution also contributed to the Crisis, with Kurds making up 80-90% of all Turkish refugees in Germany in 2015-2016 (Jansen 2016). A culmination of the numerous crises resulted

in a global displacement of 65.3 million in 2015 alone – the largest number on record (Mavelli & Wilson 2016). For scaling purposes, it is important to note that of the 65.3 million, Western nations hosted an average of 14% while 86% were hosted in countries surrounding the conflict zone (Ibid.).

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Europe witnessed over a million migrant arrivals in 2015; 390,456 in 2016; 186,788 in 2017; and 144,282 in 2018 (Bierbach 2019). By the end of 2019, 2.6 million refugees immigrated into the European Union via land or sea, primarily through Greece, Turkey, or Italy (European Commission 2021d). This accounts for .6% of the European Union's total population of 447,706,209 (Ibid.). Of the 2.6 million, 928,890 asylum applications were still pending at the official end of the Crisis in December 2019; the EU asylum system is undermined due to the variance of recognition rates across EU member states (Ibid.).

Crossing the Mediterranean Sea is extremely dangerous and proved to be perilous for many migrants. The International Organization for Migration states that 4,041 migrant fatalities were estimated in the Mediterranean during 2015, with 5,141 in 2016; 3,139 in 2017; 2,299 in 2018; and 1,246 in 2019 (Bierbach 2019). This is in comparison to 105,425 migrants who arrived in Europe via the Mediterranean Sea in 2019 (Ibid.). Despite the dangers, there has been a steady increase in Central and Western Mediterranean crossings (European Commission 2021d).

Once in Europe, migrants were either processed and allowed into the country or put into camps until their paperwork arrived. An existing social and economic problem centered around the fact that many migrants either did not wish to wait for the arrival of their paperwork or could not attain the paperwork and rushed through the borders illegally. Upwards of 34,000 migrants died either in passage to Europe, from preexisting health conditions, in the crowded and

execrable conditions of the camps, or at the hands of violence and pirating (McIntyre, Nimah, Rice-Oxley, Kommenda, et al., 2018).

While immigration is not difficult to facilitate and accommodate in this modernized and globalized world, millions of asylum seekers fleeing tragedy simultaneously causes an issue for the nations they flee to. The sheer number of migrants at one time produce difficulties for the host nations as they must navigate housing, employment, health, social benefits, tax complexities, integration, and a plethora of social justice issues (including monitoring and recompense for increasing social justice movements) for both current constituents and refugees. The economic impact must then be further weighted against costs and investments to national security and border control.

Overarching Impact: EU Separatist Movements

After the commencement of the 2015 Migrant Crisis, numerous member states of the European Union had a downturn in favor of the EU's policies, most notably the United Kingdom. In a movement known as Brexit, Britain voted to leave the European Union in a display of English – opposed to British, which is exemplified in the results of the vote – nationalism in a move to gain political and economic advantages (Calhoun 2017, 57-58). The results of the referendum were favorable to leaving the EU, with 51.9% of the voters choosing to leave (17,410,742 votes) and 48.1% voting to remain (16,144,241 votes) at a 72.2% turnout (BBC 2016b). England voted 53.4% (15,188,406) leave and 46.6% (13,266,996) remain; Northern Ireland voted 44.2% (349,442) leave and 55.8% (440,707) remain; Scotland voted 35.80% (1,018,322) leave and 62.0% (1,661,191) remain; and Wales voted 52.5% (854,572) leave and 47.5% (772,347) remain (Ibid.).

A component of the United Kingdom's discontent with the EU – which played a role in the voters' decision to “exit” the Union – is the European Union's open border and pro-refugee immigration policies, with the national security and terrorism concerns as a result (Nugent, 2018). Those who believed Britain should have fewer migrants were 32 percentage points more likely to vote Brexit (Hobolt 2016, 17). Not only was the rise in migrants concerning for Britain, but the EU's open border policy – even amidst a series of terrorist attacks and migrant crisis – issued a sense of disquietude. It was this sense, coupled with the Brexit movement setting a precedent, that EU policymakers were concerned with; Brexit shed light on a larger underlying negative sentiment within the EU member states concerning immigration and refugees (Bickerton 2018, 132). As Simon Bulmer points out in his article, “Germany and the European Union: Post-Brexit Hegemon?” the sentiment to leave the EU is inciting for Germany as they contribute largely to the Union and may not be gaining the amount in benefits that they contribute (2018). It would be concerning if Germany left the EU as the European Union is unsustainable without Germany. Furthermore, other states such as France and Italy might choose to follow suit resulting in a razed international organization.

This came to partial fruition when levels of nationalism and nationalistic movements rose in Western Europe despite stagnant national identification (Hadler, Chin, & Tsutisui 2021). Germany, Austria, and Italy faced severe nationalistic movements, such as the rise in Austria's Freedom Party (FPÖ), Germany's right-winged Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), and Italy's populist election cycle (BBC 2019; Molkenbur & Cooper 2019; Tronconi & Valbruzzi 2020). Furthermore, Spain's right-winged Vox Party became the third largest in parliament, and France's Rassemblement National gained traction against Emmanuel Macron – the President of France since 2017, who is linked to the Renaissance liberal party – a trend which is recurring in

the 2021 elections (Lusher 2018; Sapin 2021). French justification circulated around opposition to the euro and the notion that the European Union's immigration policies, particularly pertaining to the Refugee Crisis was to blame for Europe's political, economic, and national security issues. However, because France and Germany were not hit as hard with the European Debt Crisis, their grief with the EU is primarily central to terrorism and national security whereas the harder hit states more heavily blame the Euro Crisis (Kriesi 2018). Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Greece all faced a similar rise in right wing nationalism and anti-immigration/ anti-refugee policies (BBC 2019).

Problem Statement

Germany hosted, supported, and granted citizenship to millions of refugees throughout 2015 – 2019 in what is known as the 2015 Migrant Crisis. These millions of asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants flooded to Europe to escape war, violence, poverty, and a myriad of other burdens in their source countries. Because of Germany's economic strength, low unemployment rates, pro-immigrant social policies, and positive word-of-mouth feedback from previous immigrants, Angela Merkel (the former Chancellor of Germany) and the European Union jointly decided that Germany would host the largest number of refugees within Europe.

In 2015 alone, Germany hosted 476,510 asylum seekers and 316,115 refugees. For context, Hungary – the next largest European hosting nation – hosted 177,135 asylum seekers and 4,393 refugees. This totals to 299,375 more asylum seekers and 311,722 more refugees in Germany than the second largest hosting nation (European Parliament 2021a). Between 2010 and 2019, Germany received 2.1 million asylum applications, with 619,000 submitted by Syrians, 232,000 from Afghans, and 204,000 accounted for Iraqis (UNHCR 2020a, 40). Germany is now faced with bearing the weight of that policy decision and navigating a bipartisan

population. Some German constituents feel the immigrants have caused an unnecessary political and economic burden on German society while others feel they are beneficial to the nation.

Contemporary research suggests Germany's economic strength is enough to support the onslaught of incoming refugees; however, Germany's shortcomings are highlighted through the actual immigration policies themselves – from both the German state and the European Union (Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East 2017, 12). General consensus is Germany was ill prepared for the influx in migrants, and a common research angle is elucidating it based upon on the poor structural framework and policy response by the European Union (Karolewski, Pawel, & Benedikter 2018, 98). These shortcomings clearly reflect a questionable European Union policy structure, often citing the United Kingdom's Brexit movement as an exemplified phenomenon of the current political climate and European distaste in the EU's liberal immigration stance (Quinn 2016). The inability to address the EU's failing immigration framework may lead to the rise of analogous movements throughout the EU, perhaps even eradicating the EU altogether.

There is little research covering the Crisis from an economic perspective, with even less focusing on Germany. The research outlined in this study will aid German policymakers in understanding what their constituents desire for their nation, what is politically and economically beneficial for their nation, and how to enact policies for the current sentiment accordingly. Second, it will aid in navigating the failures in current immigration policies as the Migrant Crisis set a precedent and an influx of migrants is likely to occur again. Third, it will provide a baseline forecast for economic strength, security, and public opinion within Germany. Last, by highlighting the cost-benefit analysis of hosting a wave of asylum seekers, this paper may be used as a comparative tool for policymakers to draw conclusions from.

Purpose Statement

The purpose of this phenomenological and ethnographic study is to discover the causal effects between the quantifiable economic data and perspectives of the 2015 Migrant Crisis in Germany to determine its impact to the nation. At this stage in the research, Germany's economic and political impacts as a part of the 2015 European Migrant Crisis will be generally defined as the impacts of the Migrant Crisis. To determine the relative economic impacts to Germany throughout the Migrant Crisis, the other European Union states' aggregate – with individual state comparisons outlined in Appendices (C)–(D) – will be used as a comparative case study. Germany's economic standing pre-2015 Migrant Crisis will be collated with the post-2015 Migrant Crisis to determine the impacts throughout the duration of the Crisis. To determine the variability of Germany's impacts for the 2015 Migrant Crisis specifically, Germany's 1940s Migration and Refugee Crisis will be used to juxtapose Germany's historical approach, impacts, and risks and opportunities with previous European migration crises. Furthermore, Sweden's approach to the Crisis will be used as a comparative case study. Sweden has similar historic and contemporary socioeconomic conditions as Germany and was equally impacted by the influx of migrants throughout the Crisis; however, Sweden took a divergent approach to mitigation. This offers a macro insight into the relative impacts of the 2015 Migrant Crisis.

Significance of Study

The 2015 Migrant Crisis was unprecedented and historic in its uniqueness, with severe lasting impacts on both the European Union and Germany. Germany hosted the largest number of refugees, nearing an approximate 2.1 million asylum applications by 2019 (Karolewski & Roland Benedikte 2018, 98). In 2017, there were 1.7 million refugees in Germany, with 1.2 million granted permission to stay, 84% of whom were under the age of 35 and 60% were male

(Trines 2019). Lichtenstein, Ritter, and Fahrnich explain that Germany hosted the largest number of refugees primarily due to the state's high gross domestic product (GDP), low unemployment rates, and favorable refugee policies that were adopted after the Second World War (107).

Having a full appreciation for the impacts of the Crisis on Germany will aid policymakers in navigating the complexities of German and EU immigration policies and national security measures, particularly how to be proactive when another migrant crisis emerges. Furthermore, understanding the native German sentiment and perspective on the influx of refugees aid in forecasting the future political climate for both Germany and the European Union. Because of this, Germany can serve as an example for other states to draw immigration and integration policy comparisons from.

To address the research question, this study seeks to use a mixed methods approach by using both quantifiable economic data and German perspectives to outline the causal effects of the 2015 Migrant Crisis on Germany. Quantitative data measures the initial economic impact while the data on the German perspective showcases the long-term decision-making economic impacts. Contemporary feel and everyday life impact the nation just as much, if not more, than the initial rub, which could easily sway policymakers. Using a mixed methods approach, particularly in the social sciences, enhances the accuracy of the research (Jick 1979, 602). Using statistical analysis of secondary data, through an ethnological and phenomenological research design through a modified time series approach, to understand the impacts to Germany will aid policymakers in navigating the complexities of and policy recommendations for the crisis from both a data driven and local perspective. This further aids in forecasting the economic strength, immigration policies, and public opinion of Germany and the European Union amidst an ongoing crisis. Furthermore, by drawing parallels between the crisis in Germany and the state's successes

and failures in its policy approach, other states can employ lessons learned in their own immigration policies.

Research Questions

How has the influx of asylum seekers throughout the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis impacted Germany politically and economically? From a German perspective, are these political and economic impacts beneficial or detrimental to German society? The research is significant as the 2015 Migrant Crisis was an unprecedented and uniquely historic refugee crisis with lasting impacts to the European Union and Germany (Karolewski & Roland Benedikte 2018, 98). While the Migrant Crisis affected the entirety of Europe, Germany's high GDP, low unemployment rates, and post-World War 11 refugee policies resulted in the country hosting the largest number of asylum seekers (Lichtenstein, Ritter, & Fahrnich 2017, 107). Understanding the extent of the effects the Crisis has had on Germany will aid policymakers in navigating the complexities of immigration policies, particularly in regard to their impacts on national security measures should another migrant crisis emerge. Analyzing the constituent opinions and sentiments surrounding the influx of refugees further aids in forecasting the political climate for both Germany and the European Union. Furthermore, Germany serves as an example to draw policy conclusions from for other states navigating similar immigration issues. Other European countries will be used to contrast Germany's approach, impacts, and risks and opportunities for the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis. Further comparing Germany's approach to 2015 Migrant Crisis with the 1940s Migration and Refugee Crisis, the notable differences, similarities, policy recommendations, and impacts can be highlighted.

Ensuring successful integration and immigration policies protects the safety of the host nation and its constituents as well as the asylum seekers and their rights. For the success of all

parties involved, as well as obeying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is imperative refugees are provided resources and basic needs (Abbas, Aloudat, Bartolomei, et al., 2018). It is in the best interest of the host nation – and the refugees migrating – to only intake the number of asylum seekers they can feasibly provide for.

Definitions

The 2015 Migrant Crisis is the official name used to describe the influx of asylum seekers to Europe throughout 2015-2019. However, while the Crisis was declared officially over in 2019, the effects are still presently seen. The term has also been used to describe the continuous flow of migrants and its domino effects past 2019. The Migrant Crisis is used interchangeably with the phrase Refugee Crisis.

There is a difference between the often-misused terms of nation, Nation-State, and state. According to Pennsylvania State University’s College of Earth and Mineral Sciences, *state* is defined as a sovereignty or territory with clear borders and is diplomatically recognized by other countries; a *nation* is a “group of people who see themselves as a...coherent unit on shared cultural or historic criteria”, usually shared language or cultural prices, and may change on circumstances (Rock 2016). A nation may include multiple states and not every state has a nation (Ibid. 2016). Last, a *Nation-State* is a homogenous nation governed by its own state; wherein each individual state has one singular nation (Ibid. 2016).

A *third country national* is defined by the European Commission as “any person who is not a citizen of the European Union within the meaning of Art. 20(1) of TFEU and who is not a person enjoying the European Union right to free movement (2021c). For further context, the phrase is commonly used as a term to describe individuals who are in transit or applying for visas to a country that is not their nation of origin in order to go to a destination that is likewise

not their nation of origin (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2021).

The European Commission's European Migration Glossary describes a *host nation* – also known as a host country, receiving country, host Member State, or nation of origin – as a nation where a third country national / non-national takes up residence (2021c). In contrast, a *source nation* is the nation that is the source of the migratory flows and where the migrants have citizenship (Ibid. 2021c).

According to Amnesty International, there is no internationally accepted legal definition of a *migrant*; however, according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the word *migrant* is generally used to describe those who settle in a new country temporarily, or a mass movement of people from one nation to another (United Nations 2021). In this research, the term migrant will be used as a description for those who are fleeing their source nations throughout 2015-2019 and/or amidst the Migrant Crisis. It is unknown how long they will be residing within Europe, and they are all part of a larger movement.

Opposed to migrants, *immigrants* are those who leave their source nation but stay within the host nation permanently (International Organization for Migration 2021). Often, migrants eventually evolve into immigrants as they choose to take up permanent residence within their host nation. This study determines immigrants to be those who are settling into their host nation due to violence or other unfavorable circumstances in their source nation.

According to Amnesty International, a *refugee* is a person “who has fled their own country because they are at risk of serious human rights violations and persecution there.” Refugees are granted international protection, as they felt the threat to their safety so severely

that they had no choice but to leave. *Asylum seekers* are simply refugees who have not been legally recognized as a refugee and are awaiting a decision on their asylum claim.

Refugee, asylum seeker, and migrant are used to describe those on the move; *Refugee, asylum seeker, immigrant, and migrant* are those who have left their countries and crossed borders (Amnesty International 2021). These four terms have miniscule yet legal and fundamental distinctions that are important to classify. As a reflection of the paramount distinction in the terminology, they will not be used synonymously throughout this essay. It is imperative to note that these terms have generally adopted an indistinguishable meaning within contemporary societal context, and because of their use interchangeably within society, there may be an instance where a term has been mislabeled resulting in a slight variance in the research.

Summary

Global violence, war, poverty, and civil unrest – amongst others – resulted in the displacement of millions of peoples throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Due to Europe's historic and contemporary geopolitical attractiveness for migrants and refugees, Europe faced an onslaught of simultaneous migration throughout 2015-2019. The resultant crisis accentuated Europe's poor immigration policies and limited ability to host, fund, integrate, and support the colossal number of refugees.

While the 2015 European Migrant Crisis introduced a plethora of complexities for the European continent, the impacts to Germany were fundamentally consequential from an interwoven economic, political, national security, and social lens. Germany hosted the largest number of refugees and faced a bipartisan political divide as a result. Germany's economic

impacts have yet to recover, and the state has faced terrorism and national security failures. However, the refugees and migrants have ensured Germany's liberal immigration, civil rights, social tolerance, and progressive reputation. They have also added a level of diversity to Germany's historic homogenous ethno-cultural identity. The pros and cons of these impacts will be outlined herein this dissertation; nonetheless, any impact – beneficial or detrimental – to Germany is globally prevalent as Germany is the economic stronghold of the European Union and the EU's stability is arguably contingent upon that of Germany's.

The 2015 Crisis is presently an ongoing migrant issue – despite the Crisis being declared officially over in 2019 – continuously exacerbated by the violence in the Middle East and Africa, and poor economic conditions in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the impacts from 2015 throughout 2019 are still being felt by Germany in 2021-2022. By defining a clear path forward and navigating the rights of the European citizens with the rights of the refugees, Germany, the EU, and Europe will have a clear directive to address and mitigate a future migrant crisis and any further complications that arise as a domino effect from the 2015 influx of refugees.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

EU member states have the opportunity to experience benefits from the European Union's ability to provide security, increased opportunity for budget and markets, integrated financial markets, employment, free trade and ease of travel, a tangible European identity, a face and high-ranking representation in the international global market, and a union of member states offering aid and policy integration to boost political cooperation. Unfortunately, member states could also face drawbacks from the EU's interconnectivity.

Germany is in a unique position within the European Union as it is the economic stronghold of the EU; it is the largest member state in landmass, population, and GDP (at €3.47 billion in 2019) (Trines 2019; O'Neill 2022). It also is the largest economic contributor, receiving €13 billion less than it put in, in 2017 (Ibid. 2019). The European Union relies heavily on Germany's economic, parliamentary, counsel, and political contributions. Furthermore, the EU relies on Germany's economic stability to counterbalance other states' shortcomings or as loan leverage. This was showcased during the Greek Debt Crisis; Greece was close to defaulting on its loans and in order to save the Eurozone, Germany and its banks lent Greece roughly €34 billion (Deutsche Welle 2018).

Germany's economic successes and large social welfare contributions are highlighted in arguments to support the welfare magnet theory. This hypothesis argues that migrants are drawn to countries where they are going to receive higher social welfare benefits. One could further argue, via the New Growth Theory, that once these migrants settle into the new nation, their human desire for economic success would outweigh any reliance on social welfare. The drive to

succeed would result in employment and limit labor market segmentation. Furthermore, while Germany's high social welfare contributions may have resulted in an increase in migrants, the Keynesian principles applied – via government investments in public services – were able to mitigate long term effects of the Crisis by increasing human capital.

Germany receives peace, freedom, and solidarity in return for EU membership (Borger and Stephanie Schoenwald 2019). The cooperation and peace across Europe have excelled, and non-member states such as Switzerland and Norway, adhere to the EU guidelines despite their non-member status. As a large export country, Germany greatly benefits from the free trade (Ibid. 2019). Furthermore, the EU offers its members capital flow and economic aid. As a member, Germany is subject to provide the aid; however, the distribution of wealth toward the EU budget is unequal. The contributions and budget allotment are tied to the size of the economy with Germany contributing the most, €25.82 billion in 2019, with Malta contributing the least at €110 million (Clark 2021a).

As such, Germany is faced with upholding the European Union's poor immigration and integration policies. The 2015 Migrant Crisis resulted, in part, due to the EU's poor immigration framework and interwoven policy reliance upon its member states. The interconnectivity of the Crisis and emanating policies resulted in a political and economic upheaval for the European Union and all its member states, including Germany. The integration failure relies largely on Germany's theoretical approach to multiculturalism via the salad bowl opposed to melting pot. In the melting pot theory, immigrants "melt together" losing their individual cultures for a conjoined new one. In the salad bowl theory, individuals are brought together in one place but retain their distinct cultures and individuality or "flavors".

Theoretical Framework

The European Union has had unquestionably poor immigration policies since its formation. This is not only because the EU has poor policies as an organization, but also because of poor coordination between the EU members' immigration policies and stances (Huntoon 1998, 423). This disparity is exemplified with Spain's and Germany's approaches to immigration; Spain began the process of immigration in the late 1990's while Germany has been hosting non-European migrants since the Second World War. These discrepancies have created uncertainty within the EU based off different directives in administrative control of entry – both legally and illegally, societal opinions on migrants, political relations with foreign nations, and control of the migrants once settled into the host nation (Ibid. 423). This dismal coordination and overarching structure of immigration policy led to partial responsibility for the failed migration and integration of the asylum seekers throughout the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis (Maldini & Takahashi 2017, 54).

Bauder argues that the Migrant Crisis throughout Germany outlines a dialectic methodology reflective of Friedrich Hegel (2016). The dialectic occurs between immigration and imagination; it is important to note that imagination in this context is the perception that a nation imagines its own identity on any topic or issue. Germany has historically *imagined* itself as a nation not of immigration but integration. This dialectic is tied to Germany's historical roots during the fall of the Holy Roman Empire. Pan-German nationalism began as the societal elite spread German identity as a concept of negation, specifically one that was opposed to French nationhood (Bauder 2011, 56). It was based upon existing ethno-culturalism, where non-ethnic Germans were excluded from this *imagined* community (Ibid. 57). This particular principle was applied to German identity throughout the post-Second World War period.

This Crisis in Germany stemmed from the millions of refugees, who were foreigners immigrating to Germany, that were failing to integrate successfully as Germans. Angela Merkel's policies under "*wir schaffen das*" (we can do it) began to shift the German *imagination* and the flow of immigration eased (Bauder 2016, 71). While it is not possible to alter the imagination of an entire nation in a limited timeframe, these minute changes validated the dialectic by showing that two opposing views, when working in tandem, can create a positive result. Merkel worked to solidify this by referencing human rights/dignity outlined in the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) in an October 2014 speech after Patriotic Europeans Against Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA: *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*) rallies in Dresden (Ibid. 70-71). Merkel reinforced "a dialectical negation that speaks out against anti-migrant protests while also welcoming and protecting refugees" (Ibid. 71).

Guiding Theories / Historic Solutions

Mass migration has occurred throughout history. One such crisis occurred after World War II, with Germany at the center (Wilhelm 2016, 32). The hundreds of thousands of Jews who survived the Holocaust were placed in Allied-occupied displaced persons centers in either France, Belgium, or Greece (Koren 2015). Germans were expelled or forced to flee from Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia expelled 500,000; Romania halved its population of 780,000 to less than 390,000; Czechoslovakia withdrew 2.2 million; and, by 1950, 11.5 million were forcibly removed from Eastern Europe (Ibid.). The European focus on the issue surrounding German refugees became so prevalent that the word *Flüchtlinge* (refugee) nearly became a synonym for *German* throughout the late 1940s and 1950s (Wilhelm 2016, 38).

Aside from the mass wave of Jewish and German migration, the Soviet Union expelled nearly 2 million Poles, and 500,000 Ukrainians. Allied nations exchanged 2 million Soviets in return for Western citizens (Koren 2015). By 1959, an estimated 900,000 European refugees ended up becoming absorbed by Western Europe, 461,000 by the United States, and 523,000 by other countries (Ibid.). Including forced migration, internal migration, and the movement of prisoners of war, approximately 30 million people were a part of the post-World War II migration flow (Fassmann & Munz 1994, 522).

Germany's successful solution to the post-Second World War migration issues centered around an equilibrium of economics and national security. Germany focused on forging alliances and improving immigration and border policies (Rudolph 2006, 87-88). Germany worked closely with the United States, eventually convincing the country that military and material were vital to U.S. interests (Ibid. 88-90). This rebuilt Germany and halted the spread of communism. The focus on alliances and treaties also secured \$1.7 billion in financial aid for West Germany through the Marshall Plan (Western Europe received a cumulative \$13 billion between 1948 and 1952) and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allowed for German rearmament (Ibid. 88-90; Stern 1997).

These German "solutions" centered around one overarching theme: augmenting the German national identity with liberalism, civil rights, and social tolerance while maintaining Germany's strong ethno-cultural identity (Rudolph 2006, 87, 91). The German ethno-cultural identity is fundamental to the German psyche. As a nation that was divided into various kingdoms, the Romantic Germans pushed for a German unification under *Volksgeist*. Literally translating to the "spirit of the people," the concept of *Volksgeist* means the traditions and national spirit of the people should construct the laws of a nation – it was believed that traditions

hold more wisdom than lofty politics (Kohn 1950, 454). This internal *Volksgeist* concept continued through the minds and hearts of the people in the early days of Germany's founding in 1871. German nationalism was rooted in cultural and ethnic roots opposed to territory and political affiliation (Tharsen 2005, 117). This ethnic founding shaped Germany's early immigration policies, law, and rooted identity (Ibid. 117).

The German language began to embody the sociolinguistic dogma of nationhood and German culture (Currie 1980, 409). As World War I approached, this resulted in the desire for *Alldeutsche Bewegung* or pan-Germanism, across Europe (P.J. Mode Collection of Persuasive Cartography 2017). At the close of WWI, many Germans unified under humiliation and defeat by pitting the blame on Jews and communists opposed to the German army and dissatisfaction with the Weimarer Republik (The Weiner Holocaust Library 2021). The German people further rallied under the concept of *dikat* (dictated peace) and hatred for the Treaty of Versailles' forced austerity measures, which included Germany to admit complete responsibility for the entirety of the war; pay large reparations, which further crushed the German economy after the war; give up significant land; and reduce the size of its army (The Weiner Holocaust Library 2021).

Adolf Hitler's pro-German nationalistic buildup led to his success throughout World War II. He not only leveraged the German distaste in a post-WWI world but upheld the ethnocultural principles of the nation. This included promoting community, Christianity, and German romanticism (Gurian 1945, 321). For Germans, a large cultural component is productivity and taking pride in your work and the work of your people. Hitler further reached Germans, who may not have liked him as a person or his political ideology, by upholding the civil duties of the people; producing work and rebuilding the economy; promoting industry; rebuilding the German army; and innovating with inventions such as the *Volkswagen* and the

autobahn (Gurian 1945). Simply put, Hitler brought pride back to Germans by building up ethnocultural principles.

The 1970s felt a rise in cultural identity as Germans worked to reinstate positive historic connotations to the terms *Reich*, *Nation*, and *Volk* (Whaley 2006). As time wore on, modern Germans moved to ethnocultural unification under pride opposed to nationalism, through the absorption of patriotic East Germans, an international European Union, and/or the desire for normalcy (Cohen 2001). Many modern Germans take pride focusing on Germany's advancements in industry and academia. A cultural sense of belonging radiates from the craftsmanship that Germany adds to the globalized world. For example, pride in Germany's leading economic and political principles across the EU, modern scholastic and philosophic achievements, and modernized advanced industry. In the early formation of the European Union, Germany faced a downturn in German identity and pro-European movements; however, recent dissatisfaction with EU policies resulted in an uptick in pro-German culture and German nationalism (Dogan 1994; Tzogopoulos 2017).

This ethno-cultural identity remained a dominant trait within ethnic Germans no matter where they migrated to (Rudolph 2006, 91). The ethno-cultural identity reaffirmation was accomplished under the Threat Hypothesis and the Rally Hypothesis. The Threat Hypothesis argues that as "geopolitical threats increase, policies regarding international labor mobility (migration) should become relatively more open in order to facilitate the production of wealth to support defense" (Ibid. 31). The Rally Hypothesis states that external threats result in domestic people rallying together under a common identity, turning toward nationalism (Bermejo 2007, 116). The myriad of postwar threats strengthened the grand strategy and resultant policies while any internal conflict was mitigated via the rally effect (Rudolph 2006, 93).

The *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) was established in 1949 based off the existing ethnocultural principles. The *Grundgesetz* granted jus sanguinis citizenship and paved the way for German nationals to return while creating a liberal citizenry for refugees and foreigners. This ensured a feeling of inclusivity in Germany's foreigners and an attractive incentive to identify as ethno-culturally German (Rudolph 2006, 93). This is further exemplified in the description of these ethnically German refugees. They described themselves as *Vertriebene* (expelled person) or *Heimatvertriebene* (persons expelled from home), both of which indicate migrants with ethnic and cultural belonging (Wengeler, 1995). This sentiment of belonging was also showcased in the post-war Germans who were escaping the East German regime and Stalinist oppression in Eastern Europe (Bauder 2011, 57-58). They were known as *Übersiedler* (migrant) and *Aussiedler* (emigrant) respectively and both contain an imagined automatic membership to the German community (Ibid. 58). Unfortunately, there was a clear division amongst non-ethnic Germans residing in Germany who were identified as *Ausländer* (foreigners) or *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers), with *Ausländer* evolving into the more common word of identification, often stigmatized and met with disapproval (Räthzel 2010; Bauder 2011, 58).

Multiculturalism

One of the largest recurring themes throughout the Migrant Crisis is one of multiculturalism. Ensuring a nation understands and applies the methodology of adopting multiculturalism within a national identity is a necessity for the successful implementation of immigration policies and navigating any migrant crises (Wayland 1997). Opposed to migration, which is about movement of people resulting in political issues circulating freedom, protection, and sovereignty, multiculturalism addresses the effects of migration centering on

accommodating diversity, equality, discrimination, recognition, and integration (Lægaard 2017, 245). Multiculturalism is beneficial when integrating migrants into the host nation and it supports the host nation's favorability from a global perspective – as contemporary society heavily supports the celebration of culture (Wayland 1997).

In a study conducted comparing cultural diversity in the European workforce, foreign born workers in Germany represented approximately 10% of the state's labor force in 2019 (Yong 2019, 13). The study showed a negative employment effect of approximately 3-4 incumbent migrant workers (>5 years) being replaced by 10 new immigrant workers (<5 years) (Ibid. 2019). Because this had no negative effects on the native employment wage rates, it is argued this is due to incumbent immigrant workers' familiarity with the cultural environment (Ibid. 13). Immigrants were able to help with entrepreneurship and creative thinking, resulting in Germany scoring a 0.903 (with 0.966 for skilled category) on international competition due to diversity of the state's immigrant workers (Ibid. 27). Furthering multiculturalism's benefits to creativity, a separate study was conducted analyzing multiculturalism in the classroom setting (Schwarzenthal, Schachner, Juang, et al., 2019). This resulted in favorable cognitive, metacognitive, and behavioral intercultural outcomes for those that were in diverse classrooms (Ibid. 2019). Europe's primary historic failure centers around cultural pluralism as a concept. In terms of Europe, multiculturalism – in a region where national identity has never been a linear or uncomplex notion – needs to make “sense of each country's distinct historical contexts, ideologies, and policies for dealing with diversity, on the one hand, and the fact that these efforts largely converged into a European-wide discourse on multiculturalism, on the other” (Chin 2017a, 5). Furthermore, in terms of Europe, the word multiculturalism now refers to the reality that European society houses a significant immigrant population (Lægaard 2017, 245).

As the Migrant Crisis evolved, this historic issue of multiculturalism throughout Europe came to a head. The European sentiment evolved into one that claimed the immigrants exploited Europe's tolerance and were unwilling to integrate into the liberal ideology of European nations by instead intentionally segregating themselves from society (Vermeulen 2019). Unfortunately, this narrative has resulted in an even bigger multicultural clash due to the increased stigmatization of immigrants and Muslims (Ibid.). In an effort to mitigate this clash, Europe pushed for equality, with Germany taking the lead on a stance focused on *multikulti* tolerance, coexistence and diversity celebration, and cultivation of liberal values (Scott 2017; Chin 2017b, 282). This diverged from Europe's historic secular push.

The Melting Pot Theory vs. The Salad Bowl Theory

The issue of multiculturalism in Europe adheres to both dominant theories of multiculturalism: the melting pot theory and the salad bowl theory. The melting pot theory first arose in 1782 by French immigrant J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur on American society (Thornton 2012). The theory is a metaphor used to describe heterogenous societies wherein immigrants come together and then "melt together" losing their individual cultures for a conjoined new one (Bachmann 2006; Thornton 2012). Alternatively, the salad bowl theory was first introduced in the 1960s as an alternative view on American pluralism (Thornton 2012). The theory argues that, like a salad, individuals are brought together in one place but – opposed to homogeneity – retain their distinct cultures and individuality or "flavors" (Longley 2020; Bachmann 2006).

The melting pot theory is successful in its effectiveness (Bettenhausen 1991). A key component to a successful society is a strong output (performance and satisfaction) through interaction and organization (communication and cooperation) (Bachmann 2006). The melting

pot creates cohesion through society's shared understanding and relatability. While it can be successful, the theory has been criticized for its loss of diversity and cultural traditions via governmental oversight and policy (Longley 2020). In contrast, the salad bowl enables the retention of individual cultural heritage but paves the way for discrimination, segregation, and prejudice (Ibid. 2020).

The European and German sentiment on immigration was largely focused on the melting pot theory. Many believed that if people were to seek refuge or emigrate to Europe, they would have to abandon their beliefs and traditions and adopt the beliefs and traditions of the host nation; the Migrant Crisis resulted in a stark loss of European identity and an uptick in European reported identity crises (Vermeulen 2019; Bolborici 2016). This follows Europe's push for a singular European identity and Germany's strong ethnocultural identity and *Volksgeist* (Tardy 2017; Rudolph 2006). However, as migrants held onto their source nations' individuality, beliefs, and traditions, this resulted in further clashes. Europe and Germany's mitigation strategy to coexist and celebrate diversity heavily clings to the salad bowl theory.

By subjecting Europe to the "the salad bowl," Europeans and their loss of identity were not the only ones who were negatively impacted. Migrants and people of color often face varying forms and degrees of racism when they enter and settle into a new nation (Virdee & McGeever 2018). This stems from individuals within society who are subjected to bias or when faced with a threat – such as increased racism toward Muslims correlated with the rising toll in terrorism – or from institutionalized racism when the collective organization fails to provide services to marginalized groups due to outright discrimination and/or thinly veiled discriminatory practices (Banton 2018, 81-82).

Fabian Georgi's article, "The Role of Racism in the European 'Migration Crisis': A Historical Materialist Perspective," highlights that racism in Europe became more "open, militant, and aggressive, resulting in stark political polarization" due to the increase in diversification and migrants (2019, 96). A series of anti-immigration protests and pro-nationalistic movements that encompass welfare chauvinism erupted throughout the 2010s (Ibid.). Muslims in Europe faced a ban of mosques and/or minarets in Austria, the ban of the hijab in France, and various surveillance programs and discriminatory laws (Hafez 2015). Aside from Islamophobia, migrants are likely to receive racial violence in the form of physical violence, labor exploitation, trafficking, sexual harassment and abuse, discrimination, and hate speech (Parliamentary Assembly 2016). There were nearly 30,868 victims of human trafficking throughout Europe from 2010-2012; migrants have received less than minimum wage in most countries, notably Italy where migrants receive an average of 40% below minimum wage; and 95 reported cases of physical violence from August to December in 2015 from Berlin and Brandenburg, including sexual attacks against migrants (Ibid.).

What is striking about the racist rhetoric throughout Europe is that it is not necessarily related to just a difference in skin-color or religion, but rather the concept of the migrants – or "other" – as a whole as there have been racially derived attacks on white Eastern European nationals (Virdee & McGeever 2018). Because people of all races and religions faced attacks, this closely mirrors the effects of forced multiculturalism through a "salad bowl" lens. Any new culture or tradition is subject to the negative impacts. Discrimination was experienced by approximately 24% of migrants who had been living in the EU for over year; it is unfortunate that crises stir up divisions within society, creating an "us versus them" rhetoric, often resulting in racism and racist themes (Hoffmann 2021).

In contrast, Europe did experience some benefits to its diversification. As with any society that is historically homogenous, creating a diverse population adds tremendous value. In opposition to the traditional benefits circulating raw materials or economic output, diversity brings long-term indirect economic benefits. Immigrants from variegated backgrounds offer a multitude of perspectives, ideas, traditions, and customs to society (McCarthy 2018). These translate to not only the benefits at face value, but the incorporation of cultural shops and businesses which bring in tourists, interested nationals, and those within the same ethnic group; essentially, dominating entrepreneurship with something new, garnering investors, shoppers, and visitors alike (Jones, Ram, & Villeras-Varela 2019, 3).

Adding diversity to the workforce and the education system has a plethora of benefits. Refugees bring the skills they learned and adopted in their source nation offering a different perspective with the added benefits of knowledge, applicability, and adaptability of the skills cultivated in the host nation (Beste 2015). Diversity has been proven to boost productivity and out-perform non-diverse groups (Kemeny 2017; Jones, Ram, & Villeras-Varela 2019). By adding a higher productivity to the workforce, migrants are able to bring about a better quality of life to the educated workforce and innovative entrepreneurs (Parkinson & Boddy 2004; Berliant & Fujita 2012).

According to a study conducted by the German organization Charta der Vielfalt e.V Germany – whose patron is Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel and Aydan Özouz, Minister of State for Migration, Refugees, and Integration, is a permanent Board Member – diversity showcased tangible positive impacts in nineteen major corporations (such as Adidas, Bayer, BMW, and T-Mobile) across Germany. 77% believed that a diverse workforce resulted in higher levels of innovation and creativity (Voß & Reimund 2016,17). 42% reported economic benefits

through increased cost efficiency, 40% reported greater access to niche markets, and 57% indicated they were able to instate better problem-solving capabilities (Ibid. 17). Because of these benefits and societal pressure, many German employers are facing increased diversity implementation requests and expectations (Bertelsmann & Mercer 2012; Wrede 2021).

Migration Patterns

Background: European Migration Trends

Due to a vast range in geographical and historical processes, the eradication of internal EU borders, and the perception of international mobility versus intra-European migration, common trends within migrant patterns across Europe are difficult to pinpoint (Bonifazi 2008, 121; Fassmann, Haller, & Lane 2009, 6). However, specific historic instances have created an insight into a migrant pattern – one of international mobility – throughout Europe’s history. To note, there is no standardized statistics between all the European countries and many of these historic movements are reflective of administrative priorities opposed to actual migration (Wallace & Stola 2001, 38). Europe saw a decreased movement of people once the “New World” was founded, a shift from the East to West after the Second World War, an increase during the European labor migration movement, a fall amidst the oil shocks of the 1970s, a skyrocket of immigrants from the East to West after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and a severe upswing because of the enlargement of the European migration system (Bonifazi 2008, 113-121).

Studies have found intra-European migration patterns were established by the relationships between the destination, origin countries, and the inauguration of institutions that supported ease of transportation, free-visa travel, open labor market, and mobility programs

(Baláz & Karasová 2017, 23), reiterating the notion that specific historic instances contribute to an overall European migration. Europe saw high naturalization trends from 2000-2013 correlating with minimized trust in political institutions and economic hardship following the Euro Crisis (Graeber 2016, 1670).

Since the 2000s, Europe has seen a deviation from the preexisting “traditional” migrant patterns in favor of “free mover” migration, which is characterized by individual moves that are independent from labor and chain migration (Braun & Glockner-Rist 2012, 404). The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 saw significant flows of migration – nearly 5 million citizens – from the influx of Central and Eastern European (CEE) labor migration; most of them Romanian and Polish emigrating to Italy and the UK respectively (Engbersen, Leerkes, Scholten, et al. 2017, 337-338). The increase in CEE migrants highlighted the freedom movement and politicization of intra-EU mobility (Ibid. 338).

International migration is primarily stimulated based upon the current labor market with small percentages resulting from an existing and detrimental political climate; however, this more traditional means of migration has shifted since the 1990s, with a majority of German and American immigration reflecting asylum seekers fleeing violence in their source nation (political climate) and a limited number seeking a favorable labor market (Van Mol & de Valk 1996; Johnson 1980). In 2001, 471,000 asylum applications were submitted to Western Europe, with the top-five countries of origin being Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (836,000); Romania (400,000); Turkey (356,000); Iraq (211,000); and Afghanistan (155,000) (Van Mol & de Valk 2016, 37). As a comparison, 1989 only saw a total of 320,000 asylum applications requesting to enter Western Europe (Ibid. 37).

Welfare Magnet Theory

A contemporary and predominantly relevant immigration hypothesis – which is arguably applicable to the 2015 Migrant Crisis – is the welfare magnet theory. The theory gained traction after U.S. Congress replaced the New Deal-era Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in 1996 (Congressional Research Service 2020). TANF was ultimately a block grant (which, per the structure of block grants, the state must pay 100% of the funds back to the government if exceeded the federal allotment) aimed at promoting work and limiting welfare, a mantra heavily pushed throughout the late-1970s under American President Ronald Regan (Ibid. 2020; Bruckner 2000, 506; Nadasen 2007, 53).

The theory states that migration flow is largely chosen by the existence of a welfare state and the amount of social welfare benefits that are likely to be received (Zavodny 1997, 2-3). In essence, the theory asseverates that the more generous the welfare benefits are, the more migrants the state will receive; furthermore, the more generous the provisions are, the more likely migrants who use such provisions will be attracted (generally this equates to low-skilled and low earning potential) (Kaushal 2005, 60). Tied to the welfare magnet theory is the impact via the fiscal burden theory. The fiscal burden theory states that migration imposes a net fiscal burden to the host country (Razin and Wahba 2015).

Corrado Giulietti disputes the theory's applicability in his claim that immigrant social welfare incentives mostly stem from differences in social and demographic characteristics between immigrants and non-immigrants alike opposed to migrants alone. He further argues that evidence suggests that in some states immigrants are less dependent on social welfare than natives (2014). Studies have indicated that newly arrived immigrants are far less likely to use the

social welfare system opposed to resident immigrants, who may have better knowledge of the welfare system and its respective laws; thus, disputing the hypothesis (Kaushal 2005, 79).

This is arguable depending on the migrant's need for social benefits, educational background, and work contributions. While there is a myriad of variables that indicate migrant successes or failures in the new host country, success is generally indicative of income and qualifications; therefore, those who are more successful tend to be migrant families opposed to singular migration and those seeking naturalization (Morse 1988; Rallu 2011). Within the EU and of the 2 million permanently settled immigrants in 2013, a quarter arrived for labor migration, a third for family reasons, and another quarter for free mobility; therefore, on average, most migrants in contemporary Europe emigrate to seek safety or a better life, economic success, or familial ties (OECD & European Union 2015). All of which may present the necessity for strong social benefits.

Within the EU, contemporary unemployment benefits have presented a moderate draw for immigrants but one that is statistically insignificant (Giulietti, Guzi, Kahanec, et al. 2013, 12). A limitation to this analysis is that the study was conducted specifically focusing on unemployment benefits opposed to social welfare and public spending. A similar recent study of the EU found that generous benefits increase unemployment when not part of the job-search-subsidy (Biegert 2017, 1058). As the job-search-subsidy lowers unemployment, it is then dependent upon the hosting nation and its capacity to meet the labor market demand, increasing benefits for both immigrants and non-immigrants alike (Ibid. 1058).

In contrast to Giulietti, Assaf Razin and Jackline Wahba (2015) outline strong empirical evidence that supports the welfare magnet theory and its pertinence to the Migrant Crisis. Razin and Wahba showcase that the European Union's free labor market – including Switzerland and Norway –

and the prime migrant social benefits have resulted in a consistent rise in immigrants. They further argue that the Migrant Crisis was partially driven by Europe's notorious social benefits and conclude that the fiscal burden to the host nation aligns with the fiscal burden hypothesis, even after accounting "for differences in educational quality and returns to skills in source and host countries" (369).

Soroka, Johnston, Kevins, Banting, and Kymlicka also indicate that increased immigration is associated with small increases in social welfare spending – primarily through the female labor force participation (2016, 173). They also argue that welfare and migration and impacted indirectly through an altered demographic and labor force (Ibid. 173). Last, nations that have higher social benefits have lower emigration rates. This was showcased with the decline in emigration in Central and Eastern Europe, only from countries that received higher social benefits following the EU's eastern expansion (Kureková 2013).

Being one of the first welfare states and with its continuous welfare generosity, Germany has historically shown low emigration rates (Kahnec & Guzi 2022). Studies have shown normal and stable increases in family benefits within Germany; however, there has also been a notable increase in Germany's rate of in-work-benefits, suggesting a challenge to the welfare state for lower wages (Martinsen & Werner 2019). Germany's top benefits are minimum income benefits, child allowances, and support for students (Ibid. 2019). While Germany had plans to limit non-German nationals to avoid the magnetization of Germany, German courts began to find the measures unlawful in accordance with the European Court of Justice and slowly began to allow EU nationals access to non-contributory benefits (Ibid. 2019). While there is no empirical evidence showcasing this hypothesis as a primary driver in the Migrant Crisis, there is substantial evidence that showcases nations with minimum restrictions on welfare are attractive to those seeking a host nation (Guzi, Kahanec, & Kureková 2018).

Economic Theories

A major component of this study focuses on the economic impact to Germany as a result of the Migrant Crisis. One of the largest recurring economic themes is whether the Crisis had a detrimental or positive impact to Germany's net economic growth and proving it through quantifiable economic datasets. The results of this study have indicated that while there is a myriad of varying positive and negative impacts to Germany's economic standing throughout the duration of the Migrant Crisis, there is no statistically significant negative impact to the overall economy. In contrast, Germany experienced a positive economic standing post-Migrant Crisis vis-à-vis GDP rate of change, inflationary rate of change, unemployment rates, and salary. The results indicate that the number of migrants Germany hosted were able to contribute back into society and balance the increase population and their subsequent social welfare needs. The results align with a few prominent economic theories.

Economic Equilibrium

Neoclassical economic theory showcases an international equilibrium between low-wage countries and high-wage countries (Oberg 1997). As those in the low-wage countries migrate to the high-wage countries and bring their low-skilled labor, the capital flow from the high-wage countries then flows into the low-wage countries (Ibid. 1997). While this theory highlights the equilibrium of international migration through real wage, the Keynesian theory is similar only in that it considers nominal wages. From that perspective, migrants are attracted to save or send remittances which may not result in the creation of a new international equilibrium (Jennissen 2007).

This paper argues that from this perspective, the German experience of the Migrant Crisis follows the Keynesian theory. In this theory, the economic determinants of net migration in Germany are shaped by net migration rates minus the natural population increase and divided by the midyear population (Jennissen 2003). Previous analysis argues that net international migration results in a positive GDP per capita and a negative unemployment rate, which is also showcased in the results of this study (Ibid. 2003).

Additionally, while the standard economists take on the successful integration of migrants throughout the Migrant Crisis can be accurately defined as the refugee net costs to the German economy, another aspect to Keynesian economic theory can also be attributed. Germany's large public sector investments into public services such as health care, housing programs, and active labor market programs are an increase to human capital (Rothstein 2017). Increased public spending is the launch pad for economic growth and is the Keynesian standard for riding economic downturns (Jahan, Mahmud, & Papageorgiou 2014).

Dual Labor Market Theory

In contrast to the neoclassical understanding of the labor market, the dual labor market theory does not follow the same understanding that those who the same abilities will be remunerated with the same wage (Brožová 2015). The theory divides the economy into two sectors: primary and secondary. The primary segment is production based on a capital-intensive approach while the secondary is production focused on a labor-intensive approach (Jennissen 2007). In this case, employees looking for work are the supply while employers are the demand.

The imbalance in the labor market occurs with the instability in the revolving labor shortages of the secondary sector, which tend to be filled by foreign workers for cheaper labor

(Piore 1979). Segmented markets generally tend to emerge amidst a large increase or decrease in migrant population as it ties to the demographic and social changes that the host country faces. A second cause is the host nation's demand for skilled and unskilled labor. However, it should be noted that this instability is usually a result of demand for foreign workers via a labor shortage, specifically within the secondary sector (Ibid. 1979). The increase in migration is a direct result of the need for labor opposed to the inverse.

A critique of the dual market theory is it generally disregards individual cost-benefit analysis, focusing heavily on macroeconomics. The theory argues that international immigration is more a consequence of economic globalization and market penetration opposed to individual decision making (Massey, Arango, Hugo, et al. 1993). This contrasts with the preponderance of the migrants Germany hosted during the Migrant Crisis. While some were directed by modern labor demands, a vast majority left their source nation due to violence and war. In this sense, the Migrant Crisis was dominated by microeconomics.

New Growth Theory

The New Growth Theory (NGT), which is a successor to neoclassical economics, states that human desires and wants to foster an increase in productivity and economic growth (Liberto 2021). The theory is guided by the notion that the most beneficial economic resource is human capital, and businesses and governments must focus on creating a modus operandi for individuals to maximize learning opportunities and development (CFI 2021). In this sense, NGT follows the theory of labor market segmentation (or the duality in labor is due to human capital via skills, experience, and education) (Reich, Gordon, & Edwards 1973).

This theory not only ties to the favorable results of the economic growth that Germany experienced (i.e., an increase in growth and an increase in population) but that those who sought refuge in Germany were motivated to succeed in their new life and were successful in their fiscal contributions. A comparison of Germany's GDP per capita to the increase in population showcases as correlating trend. The steep increase in population in 2015 is met with a steep increase in GDP per capita in 2015-2016 (Trading Economics 2022). As the population graph slowly plateaus through a slightly lessened increase in 2017-2019, the GDP curvature is reflected similarly. In 2020, where the population remained stagnant and even took a slight downturn, GDP per capita drastically fell. However, while the trend remains intricately woven with one another, it should be noted that 2020 is an outlier due to the global Coronavirus pandemic.

Related Literature

Refugee Law

The United Nations built upon Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights by defining the term *refugee*, outlining the rights granted to those individuals receiving asylum, and outlining the responsibilities of the nation's granting the asylum during the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention or the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 (UN General Assembly 1951). Asylum laws were then brought to the EU's institutional framework via the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 with the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam providing EU institutions with more power over legislation (European Parliament 2021b).

The Tampere Programme of 1999 implemented a two phased approach to establishing a common European system. The first phase established the Common European Asylum System

(CEAS) throughout 1999-2004, which determined the criteria for asylum applications and the minimum qualifications member nations must adhere to (European Commission 2020). The second phase began in 2004 under the Hague Programme – to be adopted by 2012 – establishing a singular asylum procedure throughout the European Union and uniform protection; however, this program was tabled in 2008-2009 with only the uniform protection status being incorporated under the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and reaffirmed under the Stockholm Programme of 2009 (European Parliament 2021b). Unfortunately, the tabling of the single asylum procedure and corroborating diverging policies would contribute heavily to the Migrant Crisis in 2015.

It is argued that illegal immigrants – either those who simply fail to comply with immigration policies and paperwork, or more dangerous illegal immigrants such as drug and sex traffickers or terrorists – are auspicious or precocious enough can enter into a nation under the guise of a refugee by means of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Nathwani 2004, 29). By moonlighting as a refugee, these illegal immigrants are able to enter the nation rendering the deterrence policy ineffective (Nathwani 2004, 29). This perceived notion resulted in a demand for restrictive asylum practice and limited interpretation of refugee law; it is this perception and failed practice which helped contribute to the crisis surrounding refugee law throughout Europe (Ibid. 29).

The success of a state's immigration is contingent upon the needs and demands that must be met under Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 23 of the Refugee Convention to ensure the safety of all the incoming migrants (Abbas, Aloudat, Bartolomei, et al. 2011). If these demands are not met, either through poor safety measures or limited resources, the host nation will not be able to create a successful platform to ensure the well-being of the migrants and their own constituents. Bubb, Kremer, and Levine outline

international refugee law and the obligated funds for the migrants (2011). They argue that these economic obligations of the host nations have been largely disregarded in contemporary times and the trend of disregard for the rules set forth in the 1951 Refugee Convention have made a statement that other nations could likewise take advantage (Ibid. 367). As such, it is fundamental that host nations recognize and understand the obligations established at the 1951 Refugee Convention in order to properly address the economic burdens to host the immigrants.

Because refugee immigration has occurred in multiple spikes at various times, refugee policy remains a rough and evolving concept that must be individualized and it certainly varies by each state. European migrant policies are not homogenous, as expected under the concept of Europeanization (Barnickel & Beichelt 2013, 466). As Jacobsen states, each country must weigh the cost-benefit analysis of providing international assistance. That includes not only the expenditures needed to provide social welfare, employment, and the necessary resources for the refugees, but also the political calculations on the local community's reactions and absorption capability, the relationship with the source nation, and national security concerns (655). Concerns also stem from bureaucratic politics, refugee representation in domestic policies and politics, power struggles between government and the people, voters' rights, and paucity of information (Ibid. 655-656).

Benefits of Immigration

In analyzing immigration policies and evaluating their subsequent successes and failures, weighing out the host nation's cost-benefit economic, political, and national security risks are predominantly at the forefront of the policy analysis. As summarized by Neeraj Kaushal, immigration comprises a necessary portion of the global economy and influences international travel and cash flow through global mobility (2019, 39-40). Without immigration, modern

society and globalization would crumble by upheaving every aspect of contemporary politics and economics as the world economy and political sphere are far too interdependent and reliant on cross border mobility (Ibid. 39-40).

Economics

The contributions immigrants pose to the labor market heavily depend upon the immigrants' productivity levels (Borjas 1994, 1667). Immigrants can bring economic benefits to the host nation as competitive labor increases income and GDP of the native nation (Borjas 2014, 149). Furthermore, immigrants can add tremendous global gains by moving to industrialized economies without bringing the poor institutions with them. In this context, institution is "existing capital stock but also the set of political, social, economic, and cultural institutions that regulate behavior and economic interactions" (Borjas 2014, 162 & 169). By noting the negative impact an influx of migrants would have on the host nation, a modest relaxation of immigrant restrictions – approximately 10% of the optimal number, or a little over half a billion people – the international economy would only benefit from immigration flow (Ibid. 169). Immigration waves, opposed to pulsed refugee flows, increase output and productivity in international macroeconomics (International Monetary Fund 2020, 79). This is due to the ability to focus on labor market policies and education, opposed to expenditures in financial support and policy coordination to integrate refugees (Ibid. 79).

One of the recurring themes throughout research is the benefits that refugees provide to the host nation's economy through fiscal expenditures. As cash flow increases and supplier demand rises, so does the economy (Fazzari, Ferri, & Greenberg 2008). The more people are investing in domestic products and services, the higher stimulation the economy receives. Studies showcasing the UK for the four years after the EU enlargement in 2004 have shown that

the fiscal impact is small but positive, typically +/- 1% of the state's GDP despite key assumptions of dependent children and/or mixed children (one foreign-born and one native parent) (Vargas-Silva 2014, 2; Hennessey & Hagen-Zanker 2020).

Once the migrants fully integrate into society and attain employment, they will also be able contribute back to society and social welfare programs through tax payments and other forms of fiscal revenue contributions (OECD 2013). It should be noted that fiscal costs are comprised of police protection, public education, transportation use, transfer payments, – welfare, social security, medical / health insurance, and unemployment insurance – and any activity where the government budget is indirectly or directly beneficial to the immigrant (Rothman & Espenshade 1992, 382). Fiscal revenues typically encompass tax payments, fees and licenses, public education tuition, donations to the government, or any activity where money is transferred from the immigrant to the government (Ibid. 382).

The fiscal impact is contingent upon the numbers of high-skilled versus low-skilled immigrants; however, taxes paid by the high-skilled immigrants must offset the cost of providing governmental services to the low-skilled (Orrenius & Zavodny 2011, 950). “Immigrants with less than a high school education cost \$89,000 more (based on 1996 estimates) than they contribute in taxes over their lifetimes, whereas immigrants with more than a high school education contribute \$105,000 more in taxes than they use in public services” (Ibid. 950). Today's refugees have an average of nine years of schooling, with an average lifetime fiscal cost of \$60,000 each for youths and \$133,000 each for adults (Richwine, Camarota, & Zeigler 2020). When taking into account cash welfare, SSI, Social Security, food, and healthcare, the cash flow is at a net negative opposed to positive (Ibid. 2020).

In relation to the Migrant Crisis, the cost of a single asylum seeker application and accommodation for the first year was approximately €10,000 (higher if integration support is needed), with a steady decline as the years go on; in 2015, Germany spent €16 billion (.5% GDP on migrants alone (OECD 2017). The IMF estimated that by 2017 the increase in migrants will boost Germany's GDP by .3% (Legrain 2016, 22). The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) estimates that the net benefit to Germany will increase by 2020-2021, with the average income per person increasing by .5% by 2030 (Ibid. 22).

Workforce

Immigrants tend to contribute to the workforce by undertaking labor that is more “blue collar” in nature. By taking employment that is not merely “white collar,” migrants are flowing to industries that have need for workers and are cultivating the backbone of a functional society (Bojas 1994; Citrin, Green, Muste, et al. 1997, 861). For example, when Ireland chose to not impose restrictions on the ten ascension states joining the European Union in the 2006 timeframe, more than 2 million Eastern Europeans (primarily Poles) took up labor that would otherwise not be filled (Sunday Times 2006). The increase in immigrants has had a direct correlation to the blue-collar labor shortage (Evmenkova 2019). Because immigrants tend to seek out blue-collar professions, as immigration rises, the demand for blue-collar jobs decreases (Ibid. 2019).

The steady flow of immigrants level out any age gap in population and averts any population decline. While this is clearly beneficial to the labor force merely by the addition of numbers, it also averts labor shortages and wage inflation (Coleman & Rowthorn 2004, 584). This steady flow further boosts productivity and expands the size of the domestic market (Ibid. 584). The size increase of the domestic market is not the only augmentation because of steady

immigration. A rise in immigration results in more job opportunities opposed to employment loss; New York City only lost 1% of private corporate jobs in 2011 due to its high levels of immigration as opposed to the country's aggregate of 6% (Kozlowski 2011).

Because of the drive to succeed in the new nation, high levels of innovation are correlated with migrant workers in a majority of occupations; predominantly found within high-tech jobs during the internet boom, bio-tech industries, and construction during the housing boom (West 2011, 437). For example, immigrant founded companies produced approximately \$52 billion in sales and employed 450,000 people in the U.S. in 2005 with a majority headquartered in Silicon Valley (Ibid. 437).

Politics and Civil Liberties

As refugees are displaced and forced to flee their home countries for shelter and safety, refugee crises are considered a civil liberties crisis (Ormsby 2017). Under international human rights law, the non-refoulement principle ensures refugees are welcomed, taken care of, and allowed to stay within their host nations (OHCHR 2018). Humanitarian policy has two defined criteria: protecting and strengthening global norms (such as human rights law) within the international system and adhering to these norms when conducting foreign policy (Riddervold 2018, 160). It becomes a humanitarian and non-refoulement question and concern if displaced people are forced back into their source country under dangerous circumstances. Unfortunately, the EU did not follow the humanitarian policy model in the anti-naval smuggling mission "Sophia" (Ibid. 158). Sophia was launched after the 2015 Libya migrant shipwrecks. Although presented as a humanitarian mission, it did not focus on the prevalent search and rescue component (Ibid. 158-159). The mission did, however, uphold the non-refoulement principle. While this is a singular

case study of an instance throughout the Migrant Crisis, it may potentially highlight the EU's humanitarian response to the Migrant Crisis in a broader context.

From an international perspective and in an era of progressivism, when the EU granted approximately 2 million migrants asylum and citizenship, the public persona of the EU was quite favorable. States such as Canada, under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, wanted to follow the EU's example and open borders to Syrian and refugees (Canadian Press 2015). The EU was seen as a stronghold of humanitarianism and strength in examples of peace and unity (Wike, Fetterolf, & Fagan, 2019).

Drawbacks of Immigration

While there is certainly a plethora of benefits to immigration, there are a myriad of drawbacks to consider. If navigated poorly, the predominant drawbacks are the negative impacts on wages, public services, unemployment, and bipartisanship within the host nation. It is imperative and exceedingly difficult to ensure policymakers properly navigate the complexities of immigration and globalization from both a constituent and migrant perspective. Understanding the negative and fatalistic components of the EU's attitude surrounding immigration is imperative to determine the drawbacks. Many in opposition, or who feel trepidation, to immigration feel that immigrants pose a threat to their welfare and security; social integrity of the nation; alter the job market and educational system; increase international and domestic security threats (organized crime, terrorism, and petty crimes); irreconcilable differences in religion and culture; and the perception of another as a "foreigner" or "other" (Attina 2016, 19).

Economics

Hosting refugees is a costly expenditure to the federal budget. Until employment can be found, refugees may benefit from a slew of social welfare programs. These programs typically encompass housing, food, healthcare, language training, integration, elderly and childcare, disability, criminal justice care and contributions, and education (Ruist 2015, 576-577). On average, the social welfare programs and contributions are made through high taxes on the host nation's constituents, with roughly only 3.4% contributed back by refugees (Ibid. 577). The OECD estimates the cost of a single refugee to be €10,000 for the host nation (2017). This equates to €20.8 billion in 2018, €21.2 billion in 2017, and €20.5 billion in 2016 in Germany alone (Trines 2019). From the costs of the Migrant Crisis alone, Germany was expected to spend approximately €93.6 billion by the end of 2020, with €25.7B in jobless payments and asylum applications, €5.7B in language courses, €4.6B to aid migrants in gaining employment (the 2020 expenditures are based upon previous budgetary estimations due to the unprecedented layered economic impacts of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus pandemic) (Reuters 2016).

While diversity offers macroeconomic benefits by incorporating new and distinctive customs and traditions while also boosting innovation and the market, it additionally creates a society that is not synergized. Having a variety of opinions and perspectives can equally create societal and political upheaval and discord. For example, the German workforce has faced difficulties maintaining organizational performance and productivity amidst conflicts from diverse attitudes and behaviors (Klaffke 2015, 3). Heterogenous societies have coordination problems, such as language barriers, increased distrust, religious opposition, increasing costs and collaboration efforts (Bove & Elia 2016). Furthermore, the economic benefit due to the innovation and technological boom that immigrants offer gets smaller the more developed the

host nation's economy is (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg 2013; Nelson & Phelps 1966). The adoption of new technologies and capitalistic innovation already exist in Western and developed economies, so the margin for growth is much smaller (Ibid.).

There is also a causal effect between immigration and wage disparity if immigration increases the consumer base more than it increases the workforce (Borjas 2014, 78). As immigrants from underdeveloped nations come into the developed state and are willing to accept a lower wage than a native, the wage gap increases (Gaille 2018). A study conducted surveying the wage disparity for Mexican immigrants within the United States was 17% for undocumented and documented men, and 9% for undocumented and documented women; this percentage does decline to 8% and 4% respectively when worker human capital and occupation are held consistent (Hall, Greenman, & Farkas 2010, 491). A wage gap, either from race or gender, lessens the state's overall GDP and economic success. For example, if the U.S. closed the average 18% wage gap in 2016, the economy would add \$512.6 billion, or 2.8% of GDP, in income (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser 2018; Milli 2017). As a comparison, Germany faced a 21% wage gap in 2016 (Ellis 2021). This not only helps the consumer but aids the economy by adding to the overall cash flow. The International Strategic Research Organization outlines how the Crisis resulted in an increase of illegal immigration and migrant smuggling (Çarmikli, Kader, Sen, et al. 2016). The illegal immigration not only resulted in an increase in bribes, illegal border rushing, false papers, and illegal trades, but also in increased gang violence, kidnapping, the creating of translational networks, and a series of expandable and flexible smuggling networks that created a platform for a well-formed and stable criminal enterprise (Çarmikli, Kader, Sen, et al. 2016; Angelos 2012). The crime rate, based off reported incidents per 100,000 people in Germany, rose 3.5% from 2014 to 2015 (Clark 2021b). By the end of the Crisis in 2019, there was a 16%

decrease in crime (Ibid.). This does not account for the percentages in Europe, which has faced an upward trend since 2014. From 2014-2019, Europe experienced an 11% increase in assaults and a 70.8% increase in “unlawful handling, possession, purchase, use, trafficking, cultivation or production of controlled drugs” (European Commission 2021a).

While these networks and crime syndicates were experienced throughout Europe, they were primarily formed in Turkey and used for illegal land crossing (Sarcinschi 2019). This creates two costly expenditures for the host nation; first, the upfront costs to police and mitigate conflict and crime. Second, without a means of tracking the migrants, the host nation does not have the data or knowledge to dedicate the necessary funds, social welfare, and resources toward the migrants; this can result in a governmental net loss in expenditures, illegal migrants not receiving benefits, or illegal migrants stealing the resources from legal migrants (Gerking & Mutti 1980). All of these actions skew the historical and forecast data needed for the host nation to properly budget and allot funds and resources moving forward.

Politics and Social Justice

Society at large has undertaken a sympathetic rhetoric toward minority and marginalized groups. The plethora of social justice movements show an outcry of public support for refugees while showcasing anger at the government, treatment of migrants, and systemic racism, and Europe is no exception to these movements (Deutsche Welle 2020; Euronews 2021; BBC 207; and BBC 2015). Humanitarian concerns and goodwill wished upon displaced persons was felt heavily throughout Europe, but what segregated Europe was the fact the sentiments were severely dampened in light of the rise in terrorist attacks – either from the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL) or lone wolf attacks (Quinn 2016, 275). The European Union faced 1,476 failed, foiled, or completed terrorist attacks from 2010-2020 and 488 fatalities from 2010-2019 (Statista 2021a). To further

compare, Europe faced 11 failed, foiled, or completed jihadist specific terrorist attacks from 2010-2014 (prior to the Crisis) and 122 failed, foiled, or completed jihadist terrorist attacks from 2015-2020 (amidst the Crisis) (Ibid.).

This civil war in Syria, amongst a multitude of other conflicts throughout the Middle East, have created a destabilized Levant region; however, the destruction wrought upon the destabilized nations follow the migrants as they emigrate. The host country becomes intertwined in the political, security, and economic complications of the source nation and its people (Lischer 2017, 85). The same humanitarian crisis which exists throughout the world – particularly in regions where nations that heavily contributed to the Migrant Crisis such as Eastern Europe and Africa – further add instability and emotional strife to both the host and source nations, creating an additional layer of intricacy policymakers and social justice movements must navigate (Ibid. 85). Many refugees flee because of an inability of the source state to meet their basic needs and human rights – an example of which is a lack of capacity – and, unfortunately, a mass migration results in a lack of capacity at the host nation, which may or may not result in an unintentional human rights violation of the migrants from the host nation (Betts 2013, 1).

The migration-nexus has created a bipartisan society across Europe. Societal polarization takes two primary forms: identity-based polarization, which increases favoritism of one's political group and dislike of the other, and issue-based polarization, which stems from the perception of threats and attitudes toward adversaries (Myrick 2019, 8). Europe has witnessed a severe increase in both right-winged extremism and nationalism – generally in opposition to the refugees and open borders – and an equal rise from the left – generally in support of increasing the number of allotted migrants in any given nation (Assoudeh & Weinberg 2021; Council of the European Union 2021). The response on the political spectrum in which a person takes is highly

dependent upon personal political beliefs, national policy response, terrorism, and the media coverage (Estevens 2018, 5).

National Security

There are a multitude of national security concerns that accompany open borders, free migration, and – certainly – a crisis resulting in millions of refugees entering Europe. The paramount concern is the threat of terrorism; as immigration increases, so does external threats, which often result in terrorist attacks (De Kerchove 2011, 86). Prior to the Migrant Crisis, in the EU in 2014, there were 82 terrorist attacks that were foiled, failed, or completed – 2 were jihadist, 67 were separatist, and 13 were left-wing (Statista 2021a). In 2015, at the start of the Crisis, that number rose to 104, with 17 jihadist, 65 separatist, 9 right-wing, and 13 left-wing attacks; in 2016, there were 140 attacks, 13 of them were jihadist, 99 separatist, 1 right-wing, and 27 left-wing; 2017 totaled 199 attacks, with 33 jihadist, 137 separatist, 5 right-wing, and 24 left-wing; 2018 totaled 127, 24 of them being jihadist, 83 separatist, 1 right-wing, and 19 left-wing; and 2019, with 21 jihadist, 57 separatist, 6 right-wing, and 26 left-wing, totaling 110 terrorist attacks (Ibid.).

Unfortunately, the rise in attacks correlates with a rise in fatalities. 2014 saw only 4 fatalities from terrorist attacks, while 2015 saw 151; 2016 faced 142; 2017 had 68; 2018 lost 13; and 2019 faced 10 (Statista 2021c). The rise in 2015-2016 is directly stemmed from ISIL's directed or inspired Islamic terrorist attacks (Ibid.). Europe surged not only in terrorism and fatalities, but in violence and crime with a direct correlation to the Migrant Crisis; countries with larger refugee populations – such as Germany with a migrant related 10.4% increase in violent crime from 2015-2016 – have seen an emergence in non-national drug, crime, gang, and violent offenses (Gehrsitz & Ungerer 2018, 3; Guarnieri 2018). This finding may be related to the larger alert police presence in these countries (Gehrsitz & Ungerer 2018, 3). Men indoctrinated in

Muslim extremism view women and women's rights poorly, resulting in an increase in sexual assault and rape related violence and crime. In 2019, 9.7% of all suspects in Germany related to rape, sexual coercion, and sexual assault (including those resulting in death) were from asylum seekers. A total of 1,200 women were sexually assaulted on New Year's Eve in Cologne in 2016, with 103 of 153 suspects foreign-born and 68 of them asylum seekers. Further, 59.2% of all rape and attempted rape cases (3,039) in Sweden from the years 2000-2015 (using the Swedish Crime Register) were due to foreign-born perpetrators (Ali 2021b; European Parliament 2015; Godet & Niveau 2021).

While immigration may result in an influx of terrorism, it also may result in establishing extremist communities and influence within the host nation resulting in internal terrorism and terrorist acts from natives (De Kerchove 2011, 86). The European hub for homegrown terrorism, or militant jihadism, is the United Kingdom. Research has shown that homegrown terrorism is generally linked to radicalization through socio-political alienation, religiosity and globalization, and reaction to foreign policy (Wilner & Dubouloz 2010). The EU's Internal Security Strategy states internal security is largely dependent on external security and while there is a clear link between immigration and terrorism, the EU faces challenges in balancing the ability to integrate and host refugees while maintaining national security. This is due to three factors: the EU uses the 2005 Counterterrorism Strategy which focuses on EU Strategy in Terrorism Financing, the EU Strategy on Combating Radicalization and Recruitment, the Media Communication Strategy (De Kerchove 2011, 90). However, the EU needs to invest more time and money in understanding terrorism prevention, better screen and monitor suspicious international travel, and respond to failing states by offering aid without using EU states as a haven for terrorists to blend in as asylum seekers (Ibid. 90-92).

The national security threat that mass migration poses is not just prominent in Europe, but a concern felt across the globe. Mirroring the influx of migrants throughout Europe, the United States faced a surge of illegal and legal migrants that brought immigration, integration, and border security to the forefront of the state's political agenda (Budiman 2020). The root cause of the U.S. crisis is nearly parallel to the one in Europe: a surge in migration resulting from violence, war, political corruption, and civil unrest from within Latin America and Asia (opposed to the Middle East and Africa) (Ibid.). Brown, Jones, and Becker contrast Europe's larger threat to national security through the high volume of correlated terrorist attacks with the rise in Mexican, Central, and South American criminal activities throughout the United States, including petty crimes, federal crimes, and cartel related incidents (2018, 118). The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported an increase in Hispanic related crimes since 2013, rising from 16.6% in 2013 to 19.1% in 2019 (FBI 2013 & 2019).

Health and Safety Concerns

Migration has historically been linked to the spread of a myriad of infectious diseases, notably smallpox, Spanish Influenza, measles, AIDS/HIV, SARS, meningitis, hepatitis A, and tuberculosis amongst others (Barnett & Walker 2008, 1447). Typically, disease amongst migrants is spread by prevalence in the country of origin, poor travel conditions, crowded and unsanitary detention centers, vulnerability to poverty related diseases, and traveling back to the country of origin for visitation (Castelli & Sulis 2017). This is disastrous for the migrants who are ill, the natives whom they may infect, and the health professionals who are unfamiliar with treating foreign diseases, such as leishmaniasis, Chagas disease, and malaria in North America (Barnett & Walker 2008, 1447; Pringle 2015).

SARS-CoV-2 – also known as the 2019 Novel Coronavirus, Coronavirus, or COVID-19 – emerged in late-2019 from Wuhan, China, and spread to nearly every state in the world causing an unprecedented global pandemic. This rapidly contagious and deadly disease existed for nearly 12 months before the creation and rollout of a controversial vaccine, with over half of the American population unvaccinated nearly 2 years later (Gavi 2021). The pandemic resulted in steep impacts at every mundane and paramount facet of life. The world faced unification in global quarantines, social distancing, mask mandates and lockdowns, and travel restrictions. Due to the inability to work, supply chain issues, and stay at home orders, global economies and employment plummeted. Governments were also left with navigating bipartisan societies as a divide erupted between those who were pro-vaccine and quarantine measures, and those who were against the mandated vaccine lockdowns. International migration was down nearly 2 million people by mid-2020 (United Nations 2021).

One of the largest economic, political, and societal impacts stems from the loss of migration and limitation of travel in any capacity. This impacts migrants, workers, and tourists alike as well as the national profit made from migration crossings. As of June 2020, 6% of airports, 25% land border crossing points, and 9% water crossing points were closed for entry and exits in the European Economic Area (EEA) (Migration Data Portal 2021). Within the first 10 months of 2020, the EU faced a 33% decrease in asylum applications at 390,000 and a 6-year low at a 10% decrease on irregular border crossings. This 10% accounts for the total decrease and does not account for regional variances. For example, the Central Mediterranean faced 154% increase in irregular border crossings (European Commission 2021b). However, the EU and Norway did take measures for migrants already within their territories by automatically

extending residence permits, tolerating lengthy stays and removing the obligation to leave, and extending numerous procedural deadlines (OECD 2021).

Refugees are in largely congested communities and areas, and an outbreak would wipe out an entire refugee camp (Monshipouri, Ellis, & Yip 2020, 179). In line with the international rhetoric of stopping the spread and flattening the curve, a non-politically driven solution of offering additional free health services and housing for refugees is required (Ibid. 179).

Additional food resources should also be provided in an effort to shelter in place as there is a link between food scarcity and both domestic and international migration amidst the pandemic (Smith 2020). The complication arises with finding the government resources to support legal constituents during the pandemic, let alone illegal migrants or an influx of refugees. A secondary, if not as pressing, complication arises in an increased hostility toward migrants amid the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in hesitation to host additional migrants (Del 2021).

“COVID-19: The Pandemic and Its Impact on Security Policy” by Matthias Rogg (2020) argues that the limited resources available during COVID-19 place a vulnerability on Europe. EU member states were forced to request policy aid and resources from Russia, the EU’s political rival (Ibid.). This was not abnormal during the pandemic; numerous international enemies unified throughout the global lockdowns and disparity. This offers the EU the opportunity to either gain an edge by collecting intelligence on their rivals or is the first step in a platform toward peace. Another rather large vulnerability the EU faced was the crash of the labor market, which drastically setback integration (Mariella, Uwe, Andreas, et al. 2021). The migrant workers within the labor market faced vulnerabilities in a more direct fashion. Migrant workers have a higher percentage of COVID cases due to three factors: they are more likely to be in

temporary employment, earn lower wages than natives, and have jobs that are less amenable to teleworking (Fassani & Mazza 2021).

The Migrant Crisis resulted in an influx of disease across Europe. Using data from 2010-2016, the refugee and asylum seeker population reported latent tuberculosis (9–45%); active tuberculosis (up to 11%); hepatitis B (up to 12%); malaria (7%); hepatitis C (up to 5%); HIV (up to 15%); and reports of cutaneous diphtheria, louse-borne relapsing fever, and shigella (Eiset & Wejse 2017). The spread of disease within the migrant community and to the constituents of the host nation depend on the severity of the disease, migrants' access to vaccination upon arrival (if applicable), and the host nation's knowledge by migrant reporting. A large part of the deadly and rapid spread of COVID-19 is due to migration, lack of reporting, and asymptomatic carrier spread. The same can be said for the aforementioned diseases. The prevalence of asymptomatic migrants reflects a high epidemiologic burden, up to 5.8%, 48.5%, and 56.1%, for schistosomiasis, Chagas disease, and strongyloidiasis respectively (Abbas, Aloudat, Bartolomei, et al. 2018).

The German Impact

Policy enforcement from the European Union; Germany's high GDP rate; low unemployment rates; existing positive refugee policies in the post-Second World War; positive "word of mouth" experiences; and an already existing community of migrants all contributed to Germany hosting the largest number of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe throughout the duration of the Migrant Crisis (Lichtenstein, Ritter, & Fahrnich 2017, 107). Furthermore, Kang-Soek Lee and Richard Werner showcase that Germany's high GDP results in low interest rates (2018, 26). Low interest rates have been used as a policy tool for ages, reflecting an incentive for emigration into the state (Ibid. 26). From a domestic perspective, lower interest rates encourage

investment spending, improve lending from the banks, and stimulate the economy. For foreigners, this results in securing better loans from a reputable bank (for mortgage, auto, etc.) (Paulson, Singer, Newberger, et al. 2016). Islamic tenets prohibit paying or receiving interest so lower rates and the option for a variety of financing alternatives are attractive to Muslims (Ibid.). Because of all these attractive justifications, Germany became a key player with the steepest impacts regardless of whether it was beneficial or detrimental to German society (Karolewski & Roland Benedikte 2018, 98).

Germany is the fifth largest migrant hosting nation in the world; Germany's population is at 83.02 million people, with 1.56 million of them being hosted immigrants – making up 2.4% of the state's population (UNHCR 2020b; Koptyug 2020). During the duration of the 2015-2019 Migrant Crisis, Germany hosted an approximate 1.7 million refugees with an estimated 1.2 million of those people eventually granted German citizenship (Trines 2019). Comparatively, as of 2019, Hungary, with the second largest immigration population in Europe, has a population of 9.7 million with upwards of 180,000 being hosted immigrants making up 1.6% of the country's population (European Commission 2021c).

As such, Germany faced tremendous economic and political impacts. Both the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East (2017) and Abbas Maysa Ayoub (2019) argue that the economic repercussions of the Migrant Crisis are beneficial to Germany. They both state that – in accordance with independent research, Deutsche Welle, the IMF, and the Financial Times – once migrants are properly integrated into German society, they will contribute back to the state via taxes, increased spending and cash flow, providing diversity and inclusion in the workforce which often results in better business opportunities, and integrating into the higher education system (Ibid). Once the students enrolled in the various universities find employment, they will

provide the benefit of a German education with the diverse cultural background. This is questionable. As of 2019 Germany has yet to break even in expenditures, let alone make a profit. The German government budgeted billions of euros – €20.8 billion in 2018 and €21.2 billion in 2017 – toward refugee social programs, which equated to over 6% of the federal budget for those respective years (Trines 2019). The social welfare programs provided all of the migrants with housing, medical and health benefits, and integration activities (Ibid.). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approximates that the public expenditures needed to fully and properly house the refugees by meeting their daily social welfare needs equates to .1% of the GDP of all the European Union countries (Poddar 2016, 2).

Angela Merkel's progressive "*wir schaffen das*" policies – welcoming 10,000 refugees daily – was guised in an epitaph of progressive welcoming; however, the native Germans began to face the personal negative impacts of the state choosing to host millions of legal and illegal asylum seekers (Pries 2019; Lemay 2019). Germany was faced with a severe population increase – upwards of 1.2 million in legal and granted citizenship alone – that put stress on the migrants for attaining employment and Germans for keeping their employment. Members of the German police force were brought out of retirement to manage the crisis and violence; government officials hunting for accommodations; and a surge in violence and racism from both Germans and refugees toward one another (Trines 2019; Connolly 2015). To distribute refugees equally and maintain a reasonable sub-central government taxation to account for the migrant needs, Germany established the Königsteiner Schlüssel system, which distributes the number of refugees based upon two-thirds the tax raising capacity and one-third the population (Die Welt 2015).

Comparative Analysis: A Swedish Case Study

James Traub argues that Sweden is known for being one of the best and most generous nations in the world for hosting immigrants in his 2016 article, “The Death of the Most Generous Nation on Earth.” Traub discusses that throughout the Migrant Crisis, Sweden accepted 160,000 asylum seekers, which was more than double the state had ever accepted and allocated 7% of its €100 billion budget on migrants (2016). The result was unfavorable responses from the Swedes on the migrants’ inability to integrate into Swedish society.

Sweden has been historically known for some of the most, if not the most, generous refugee policies within Europe (Christophersen 2022). Sweden shares this refugee approach, along with a similar GDP per capita and PPP, with Germany (Nation Master 2022). Unlike the German Case, the Swedish government listened to its people and enacted a temporary law limiting the number of refugees; furthermore, in conjunction with limited room, money, and patience, over 80,000 asylum seekers ended up being deported. These 80,000 displaced people were either forcibly sent back to their own country of origin or sent to another EU country, most of whom went to Germany (Crouch 2016). The difference in approach and similar background makes Sweden a fitting comparative analysis; the most about Germany’s successes and failures, as well as a culmination of lessons learned from the divergent approach, can be gleaned by using Sweden as the primary comparative focus.

The decision followed heightened tensions over migrant violence, with the catalyst being a 15-year-old migrant stabbing a 22-year-old asylum center employee to death (BBC 2016a). Sweden faced over 100 bombings in 2019; 300 shootings and 45 deaths in 2018; 320 shoots and 41 deaths in 2019; rise in gangs and organized crime groups; a 34% increase in rapes over the decade (with 58% of convicted rapists being foreign-born); violent riots; and a total 11%

increase in crime (Tomson 2020). Like Germany, Sweden faced an increase in crimes per capita, fraud, and assault in municipalities with her refugee populations (Uddfheldt 2021). In providing a fair assessment, these numbers reflect a high population of foreign-born people and therefore, reflect a higher statistic; a zeitgeist where an increase in riots and public discontent was displayed globally for a plethora of social concerns, a contribution to gang violence based on a severe increase in socioeconomic strain, and crime data that could be correlation opposed to causation (Tomson 2020).

Traub describes how a majority of the Somali and Afghan asylum seekers did not integrate and re-join the labor market because of the incentivized large social benefits. The Swedish phrase *asiktskorridor* (which translates to ‘opinion corridor’ – meaning the views and perspectives that one cannot relinquish) began to emerge in Swedish society in reference to the Muslim refugees who would not conform to Sweden’s secular national policies (Traub 2016). The word began to evolve as an umbrella term for *refugee*, albeit in a negative context. *Asiktskorridor* morphed into a broad concern of violence, the welfare state, and cultural clashing (Tomson 2020). While the overwhelming number of migrants could not be properly provided for by the Swedish government or civil organizations, and there is truth behind the concern, the media severely exacerbated the concept and poor connotation of *asiktskorridor* into an illumination of the welfare magnet (Ibid.).

Despite the economic concerns and in a similar fashion to Germany, the GDP of Sweden positively rose throughout the duration of the Migrant Crisis and stayed within the targeted (+/-) 2 % inflationary rate of change (The World Bank 2022b; The World Bank 2022c). Germany spent €16 billion (.5% GDP) and Sweden spent €6 billion (1.35% of GDP) on migrants (OECD

2017). One divergence to note is that Sweden did face higher unemployment rates and lower wages within municipalities that hosted refugees (Uddfheldt 2021).

Sweden was divergent from the other states despite the European Union's Schengen legal regime permitting free travel between its member states because Sweden instituted a temporary (and, therefore, Schengen-compliant) program to check the documents of everyone arriving by train and a percentage of those arriving by car (Traub 2016). While this did not diminish the number of asylum seekers fleeing to Sweden, it did grant the authority to monitor migrating refugees. The Swedish Migration Agency is responsible for determining the migrants who receive asylum. The Migration Agency made the decision to grant Syrians' asylum – as they are likely fleeing persecution and death – and most of the Afghani and Iraqi migrants; however, Sweden chose not to accept economic migrants and, therefore, denied almost all the Eastern European refugees in an effort to limit the migration flow.

Sweden and Germany are two European nations with historic welcoming refugee policies and high GDP (PPP). Throughout the duration of the Migrant Crisis, both states faced a degree of backlash from its constituents; an increase in crime and terrorism; a fiscal impact due to the large expenditure on migrants; and an impact to the preexisting labor market. Despite Sweden limiting the number of allotted refugees, the GDP in both Germany and Sweden saw a positive increase throughout the duration of the Migrant Crisis (see Appendix E). However, Sweden did face a negative impact to its unemployment rates and wages in municipalities where refugees were hosted.

Summary

The eruption of violence, terrorism, gangs, crime, poor socioeconomic conditions, poverty, and food scarcity throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe contributed to the large flow of migrants toward Western Europe; however, the ongoing civil war in Syria is primarily responsible for the existence of the 2015-2019 Migrant Crisis (Khallaf 2017). The Syrian civil war is multi-sided as the Syrian Arab Republic and its foreign and domestic allies, under President Bashar al-Assad, are fighting various foreign and domestic forces opposing the Syrian government. This fully fledged and violent war has displaced 6.2 million people within Syria, including 2.5 million children (UNHCR 2017).

The 2015 Migrant Crisis has a myriad of lasting international and domestic impacts stemming from the complex intricacies interwoven between politics, economics, and national security. The Migrant Crisis is unique amongst historic refugee crises due to three prominent and asymmetric aspects of the Crisis (Karolewski & Roland Benedikte 2018, 98). First, some EU member states are drastically more impacted than others, namely the uneven distribution of refugees and responsibilities amongst the 28 EU member nations (Sopariwalla 2017). Second, the uneven nature and differentiation of the EU has resulted in diverging responses from EU member states (Karolewski & Roland Benedikte 2018, 98). Third, Germany's position as the key player in the Crisis added to the uneven nature of the EU and has influenced how the EU responded to the Crisis (Ibid. 98). This raises questions surrounding power shifts within the European Union and Germany's key role regarding the increased responsibility. When the EU was established, there was apprehension that Germany's economic strength would upset the markets of the dependent member states and its influence would create an imbalance of power (Gruner 2017, 345). These concerns are still prevalent and have come to partial fruition with the EU's dependency on Germany,

Germany's role in the Migrant Crisis, and Germany's increasing "hegemonial" leadership (Schweiger 2018). If the EU does not navigate immigration policies proportionately, Germany could easily pull out of the EU and leave the dependent states – such as Greece – in a precarious position (Heinrich 2018).

The failures and successes of immigration throughout the European Union are commonly known and studied with various sources outlining avenues for policy improvement. There is a plethora of research and support for the stance that the European Union has poor immigration policies and was ill equipped to face the 2015 Migrant Crisis. The Crisis is a stark reminder to individual EU member states, and the organization itself, to revisit immigration policies particularly in light of a globalized world. The national security threat has only increased and policymakers need to address European constituent concerns over the continuous threat of terrorism.

While Germany is often noted as the state that hosted the largest number of asylum seekers, most of the literature fails to recognize and outline the impacts of the 2015 Migrant Crisis on Germany with even less evidence that showcases the impacts from the perspective of an economic lens. While this paper seeks to focus on the quantifiable data, it is also imperative to highlight the qualitative components of the Migrant Crisis as perspectives impact outcomes. In contemporary academia, there are writings that support the perspectives of asylum seekers but there is limited research that addresses the German perspective and the ramifications that are felt at the native constituent level.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODS

Overview

The 2015 Migrant Crisis was an unprecedented and historic crisis with lasting impacts to both Germany and the European Union. It emerged amidst various socioeconomic and war related crises throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Millions fled to Western Europe (2.6M), with Germany hosting the largest number of refugees of any state. From 2015-2019, Germany received 1.8M asylum applications and 1.7M refugees with 1.2M granted permission to stay (UNHCR 2020b, 40; Trines 2019). The influx of refugees caused a political and economic strain throughout the EU and Germany. This was a result of mass migration and poor immigration structural framework through divisive immigration policies across the EU (Huntoon 1998).

As a result, Europe's political and social composition became increasingly bilateral. Chancellor Merkel, with her "*Wir schaffen das*" ("we can do this") slogan, fought for a unified Germany under her inclusionary perspective; however, Thomas de Maiziere, the interior minister of the time, admitted there were "moments when control was lost" (Hasslebach 2020). The *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Social Democratic Party, or SPD) agreed with Merkel's position – although, SPD parliamentarian Lars Castellucci even admitted to some difficulties with Germany's approach (Ibid. 2020). On the other side of the political coin, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – the right-wing party – were very outspoken in their objections to Germany's position (Gedmin 2019). Members of the respective parties generally mirrored and exemplified the perspectives of their respective parties, often in extremes.

Furthermore, the economic integrity of Germany was severely compromised.

Understanding the nature of the Crisis – what it is, why it happened, and how to enact policies that aid in preventing a future crisis – will benefit policymakers in navigating any impacted or resultant German and EU policies. Ideally, this will shed light on the sentiment of the native people and provide a forecast for the future political climate of Germany and the European Union.

Design

The purpose of this ethnological and phenomenological quantitative research is to determine the causal effects between the economic standing of Germany and the 2015 Migrant Crisis. Germany's economic standing can be calculated by outlining the pre- and post-Crisis economic conditions. German fiscal and monetary growth and forecasting can be indicated through various economic output surveys and economic snapshots. Identifying impacts solely based upon a singular (and evolving) phenomenological event in a fluid and globalized world can be challenging. To capture the data, a modified time series approach will be used to analyze the sequence of data points within this study.

By using an isolated case study to Germany, the economic impacts to the nation can be showcased. Comparing the impacts that were experienced amongst other European nations amidst the Crisis provides the relative effects felt across the continent. Focusing on Sweden – with its similar socioeconomic conditions and influx of migrants but divergent approach to the Crisis – as a comparison will aid in isolating the statistic negative tipping point and identify triggers and correlations or causations. To further the comparative analysis, Germany's 1940 Refugee Crisis is used as a historic baseline for the determination of Germany's historic approach, risks and opportunities, and impacts.

Approach to Research

Phenomenology

One of the primary drivers to the research questions center on the German perspective of the Migrant Crisis and the resounding questions and answers – or simply stated, the German point of view of the Crisis and trying to understand the whys of that narration. The German perspective is imperative to understand the methodology of policy implementation, bias, and perceived notions on the Crisis itself. This is exemplified in phenomenological theory. The theory states that the existence of specific events turn into a *presence*, which is then analyzed into various *acts* or *meanings* (Welton 1982, 60). These acts and perceived meanings give the event significance, which – if used on an international scale – can have a sizable global impact.

In research, a phenomenological approach focuses on how a phenomenon was experienced at the time of occurrence opposed to the thought and meaning associated with the phenomenon subsequently (Nelson 2011). Phenomenology is often used in social sciences to aid in creating a comprehensive understanding of a social reality through momentary interactions, experiences, and communication (Srubar 2001).

This study outlines the 2015 Migrant Crisis as a phenomenon and its direct impacts to Germany. The analysis throughout the study is comprised of a mixed methods approach by aggregating secondary data and perspectives that existed at the time of the Crisis or shortly thereafter. This includes not only the phenomenon and economic consequences, but the perspectives of those directly involved. For example, the increased number of terrorist attacks as a result of the Migrant Crisis and the perceptions of the increased attacks at that moment in time.

By providing a comprehensive view of the Crisis, the direct political and economic impacts can be isolated and better understood.

A primary critique of phenomenology is that, opposed to being an exclusive research methodology, it is also used as a philosophy with multiple schools of thought (Norlyk & Harder 2010). Research on phenomenology has suggested that the failure to define the difference between scientific phenomenology and philosophical phenomenology may result complications for scientific procedures (Ibid. 2010). Scientific phenomenology studies the event at a given point in time while philosophical seeks to reflect on human beings as a structure, consciousness, and imagination of society and history (Armstrong 2005).

The convolution and complexity of this topic has resulted in multiple philosophical deviations from the classical European tradition of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty and derived a “less critical, less descriptive, and subjective” North American hybrid as well as a Cartesian split of experience and reality (Norlyk & Harder 2010; Paley 1998; Crotty 1996). This study uses scientific phenomenology as it analyzes the 2015 Migrant Crisis throughout its duration (and shortly after) and uses the assumptions and data as supplemental evidence to aid in drawing conclusions about the phenomenon opposed to absolute outcomes and facts about the contemporary human consciousness.

Ethnology

Ethnology is the study of people and cultural phenomena in their own environment and through their perspective (U.S. Department of the Interior 2004). Its purpose is to research behaviors in various social situations and societies and gaining the participants’ perspective of their society. It has been used, mostly by German ethnologists, to aid in drawing conclusions on

human evolution through knowledge gaps of migration and dissemination (Boas 1920; Westphal-Hellbusch 1959). While this study uses a phenomenological approach on analyzing the Crisis itself throughout its duration, that data is substantiated through a slight ethnological lens of the German perspective of the Crisis. This also leans on the historic approach to understanding migration patterns and its impact to society. While there is research on the 2015 Migrant Crisis that highlights the phenomenon from the migrant perspective, this study seeks to substantiate the existing data and provide a native German perspective of the Crisis. In this study, the German perspective is the well-being and status of the state or a set of collective perspectives. This will provide a more thorough view of the Crisis and better outline the impacts and the methodology behind policy.

While ethnology generally employs a qualitative method through observation and interviews, this study focuses on quantitative ethnology. Quantitative ethnology blends qualitative and quantitative solutions when analyzing data, specifically data about discourse of cultures (Shaffer, Hatfeld, Svarovsky, et al. 2009). Quantitative ethnography uses statistical techniques to link evidence and conclusions through the various collected data (Ibid. 2009). This often results in some form of a mixed methods approach but is unique to the study and the evidenced collected for the specific phenomena (Ibid. 2009).

Quantitative data will be used to capture the ethnological research design of the German perspective across the board. In this study, the ethnological components were derived from German approval and opinions through news articles, existing Pew Research (including polls and surveys) on the native interpretation of happiness and their perspective of the refugees, crime and terrorism, and economic standing because of the Crisis. Having been to Germany sporadically throughout the duration of the Crisis, a small component of this study reflects on what I

observed; however, because my time in Germany was not used for a research goal, the observations made in those years merely served as a guideline to the secondary research seen in this study.

One of the disadvantages to ethnological research is the necessity for an unbiased researcher on their observations (Baral, Uprety, & Lamichhane 2013). A second pitfall to ethnology is the need for a mid- to long-term study. Short-term studies may result in false assumptions, perspectives, and patterns from limited data; however, too much data may also result in false assumptions due to an inability to collect and interpret it effectively (Ibid. 2013). This study mitigates the first disadvantage through its use of multiple sources of secondary data. This study acknowledges the short-term duration of the study, but this is due to the phenomenological nature of the study. The ethnological component merely substantiates the phenomenological.

Time Series

Time series is used to analyze data points over a specific interval of time (Tableau Software 2022). The analysis showcases how variables are changed over time, specifically within that specific timeframe and projections for the future, opposed to intermittent or random datasets. This is ideal for dependencies and analysis of data points in some form of chronological order – such as increased or decreased GDP or interest rates and/or forecasting due to a specific phenomenon (Ibid. 2022). When analyzing data based upon an interrupted time series (ITS), it is crucial to “infer the effectiveness that accounts for data dependency” (Cruz, Bender & Ombao 2017, 4660). The ITS model does not account for any changes in variation and correlation.

Primarily, this study uses time series data throughout the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis to draw conclusions on the economic impact of the Crisis, namely in the interest rates and GDP rate of change. However, the underemployment, unemployment, and number of terrorist attacks were also calculated using a pre-/post-Crisis model. When accounting for a pre- and post-Crisis comparison, the data captured will be in a time series. For the data that is interrupted, this study seeks to use a robust-ITS (RITS) model to capture these limitations by identifying the change point and the variances in the post- and pre-Crisis correlation. For the most accurate results, time series requires a large set of data points. A limitation of this study is the restricted number of years that the Migrant Crisis occurred. A recommendation for future research includes revisiting the study after more time has passed and analyzing it without the heavier phenomenological component.

Research Questions

Historiographical analyses showcase human mobility is generally sedentary with the exception of extenuating socio-political circumstances (Koff & Giraldo 2014). It is also noted that generally those migrating face a negative connotation as foreigners no matter the time period or the society (Ibid. 2014; Taha 2019). Contemporary Europe is no different. It has been established in previous studies that the European Union has a poor history of immigration (Huntoon 1998). The 2015 Migrant Crisis exacerbated fissures in an already poor system and – coupled with the vast number of migrants in one specific timeframe – upended the economic and political stability of the EU and its hosting member states. Having the largest GDP, employment rate, and positive rapport with the migrants early in the Crisis, Germany undertook most of the political economic strain (Clark 2021a).

The 2015 Migrant Crisis was a global phenomenon that had major economic and political impacts to all in the European Union, particularly Germany. By quantifying and analyzing the political economic data of the Crisis and a comparative pre- and post-Crisis analysis, the results will better showcase what these impacts are and how severe. Furthermore, they will be able to identify if they are beneficial or detrimental to German society. As such, the purpose of this study is to answer two primary questions:

***RQ1:** How has the influx of asylum seekers throughout the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis impacted Germany politically and, namely, economically?*

***RQ2:** From a German perspective, are these political and economic impacts beneficial or detrimental to German society?*

Hypotheses

The 2015 Migrant Crisis has impacted the German political economy. While there are benefits to an increased flow of immigration, the sheer number of migrants in a limited time span, in comparison to that of the German population, seemingly outweigh the benefits. While Germany has gained great international humanitarian favor and social clout for its efforts, the domestic policies have seemingly not benefitted.

The alternative hypotheses for this study are:

***H_{a1}:** The 2015 Migrant Crisis will showcase a negative delta to Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis.*

***H_{a2}:** The Migrant Crisis has been detrimental to Germany's political-economic standing.*

***H_a3:** Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis will have a more significant impact than that of the other European Union states.*

The null hypotheses for this study are:

***H₀1:** The 2015 Migrant Crisis will not showcase a statistically significant difference in Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis.*

***H₀2:** The 2015 Migrant Crisis will have no impact to Germany's political and economic standing to its pre-Crisis levels.*

***H₀3:** Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis will not have a more significant impact than that of the other European Union states.*

Participants and Setting

Participants

There are no primary source participants in this study; however, secondary data was collected to encompass the perspectives and datasets for the German population, migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers throughout 2012-2022. The focus of this study is the 2015 Migrant Crisis, which encompasses 2015-2019. Using data prior to the Crisis allows for historic data to draw conclusions prior to the Crisis, throughout the duration of the Crisis, and after the Crisis.

Setting

The European Union

This research is centered on the European Union, with a specific emphasis on Germany. The 2015 Migrant Crisis occurred throughout the European Union with the majority of these migrants immigrating or fleeing to Germany. The European Union serves as the backdrop for the

Crisis due to its rich history in offering sanctuary to refugees (UNHCR 2021). In response to WWII, the 1951 Refugee Convention was established to aid those seeking asylum from conflict, war, and violence, human rights violations, and persecution (Ibid. 2021).

The EU is comprised of 27 sovereign member states with a singular market for free movement of goods, capital, and services (Gov.UK 2022; European Commission 2012). These member states have independent foreign, monetary, and domestic policies; however, their agenda is to create regulatory policies across the Union (Kelemen & Kelemen 2009). This also includes a shared delegation of decision-making to institutions at the European level (European Commission 2012). These decision-making bodies are the European Parliament, representing the citizens and are directly elected; the European Council, where the Heads of State of member states set the EU's policy agenda (but is not a legislative body); the Council, representing governments of the EU states; and the European Commission, which is comprised of one member from each of the 27 states and represents the interests of the EU as a whole (European Commission 2012; European Council 2022; Jones 2021). Legislation is enacted by the European Parliament and Council, but it is generally the European Commission that proposes them (European Commission 2012; Jones 2021).

Germany

As a member of the European Union, Germany is subject to the rules and regulations of the EU. Germany, as the largest economy within the EU, has the largest contribution, surpassing France (the second largest economy) by €4.4B in 2020 (Clark 2022). Despite the steep contribution, Germany benefits from membership through its free flow of goods within the market, being a leader in exports, and free flow of the labor market and travel (Borger & Schoenwald 2019). Germany is also able to receive the libertarian values of peace, liberty,

freedom, and solidarity (Ibid. 2019). Germany, like most of the European Union, has a relatively low average Gini Index and incites a quasi-egalitarian income distribution (The World Bank 2022d).

The German government is a Federal Republic parliamentary democracy centered around the constitution, the *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), typically known simply as the *Grundgesetz* (Buswell 2022). The Chancellor is elected by the public and is the executive power. The German government also elects a Federal President, who is mostly ceremonial in nature (Robbers 2006; Foster 2002). The legislature is comprised of the *Bundestag* (Federal Assembly) as the lower chamber and parliament and the *Bundesrat* (Federal Council), which represents the 16 German federal states (*Länder*) and operates as the upper chamber (Britannica 2022a). Legislation originates in the *Bundestag* and only requires the consent of the *Bundesrat* when the interests of the states (such as administration and finance) are directly impacted and/or there are *Grundgesetz* legislation questions (Ibid. 2022).

The judicial power is divided by three courts. The first, the federal courts, are courts of appeal and consist of five legal hierarchies: *Bundesgerichtshof* (Federal Court of Justice), *Bundesverwaltungsgericht* (Federal Administrative Court), *Bundesarbeitsgericht* (Federal Labor Court), *Bundessozialgericht* (Federal Social Court), and the *Bundesfinanzhof* (Federal Tax Court) (Robbers 2006; Reimann & Zekoll 2005; Foster 2002). The courts of the *Länder* (state courts) govern the individual state and address trial courts (Reimann & Zekoll 2005; Foster 2002). Last, the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* (*BverfG*) (the Federal Constitutional Court) is made of two Senates, each with eight justices (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2021). The first addresses human rights with the second focusing on constitutional disputes (Ibid. 2021).

At the beginning of the authorization of this paper, Angela Merkel was the Chancellor of Germany (serving from 2005 – 2021). She is a member of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Petrikowski 2022). Since 2021, Olaf Scholz has been the Chancellor. He is a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, having previously served as the Vice Chancellor under Merkel and the Federal Minister of Finance from 2018-2021 (Schmitz 2021). The current Vice Chancellor is Robert Habeck, a member of the Alliance 90/The Green Party (Thurau & Goldenberg 2021). Since March 2017, Frank-Walter Steinmeier has been serving as the President (Bundespräsidialamt 2022). Like the Chancellor, he is a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Ibid. 2022).

Instrumentation

The study will be conducted by segregating the 2015 Migrant Crisis in Germany as a case study. The economic data of Germany in a pre- and post-Crisis standing will be compared to outline the economic impact of the Crisis on Germany. Germany's economic standing pre- and post-Crisis will also be compared to the pre- and post-Crisis standing of other European Union states to further highlight the impact of the Crisis across Europe. This will enable the isolation of Germany's data to showcase how the country was detrimentally or positively impacted economically. Last, previous migrant crises in Germany will be used as a comparison to address Germany's response to this specific crisis and measure its impacts to a historical standard.

Data Collection

News Articles

News articles offer a plethora of information and benefits for research, namely because they state current events. They are informative throughout the globalized world on both a macro

and micro level. However, they can be severely politicized and biased providing a false narrative. With the understanding that news articles are rarely unbiased, the audience is able to use the tenor and content to interpret the general political climate and sentiment of the nation. If most of the articles have the same underlying tone, this is usually a good indicator of the overarching opinions, concerns, and desires through a social and cultural perspective.

Conversely, if various articles showcase two diverging perspectives of the same story, a politicized picture can be inferred. This indicates that a variety of opinions exist on a singular topic and are shaping the narrative. The tenor of the news emphasizes the experience and meaning of the event. International news articles from the *BBC* tend to offer a less biased and independent version of current events and facts, which can be used as a baseline. For example, Stian Reimers found the *BBC* replicated lab-based results in their publications in his study “The *BBC* Internet Study: General Methodology” (Reimers 2007). According to a 2020 AllSides community survey of over 50,000 random participants, conducted by the third-party Pew Research Center, the *BBC* is considered to have a Center Bias Rating (AllSides 2021).

Al Jazeera publishes numerous articles on the Migrant Crisis and a variety of international events. Because of this, the network is a good source for a comprehensive understanding of current events across the globe. However, of 9,791 community responses, 62% responded *Al Jazeera* as left leaning on AllSides’ scale of far left, left, center, right, and far right (AllSides 2019). *Al Jazeera* is a state (Qatar) funded media network that has been noted to lean pro-Sunni and anti-Israel (Ibid. 2019). Philip Meylan, using *The Factual’s* news rating algorithm based on site quality, author expertise, quality and diversity of sources, and article tone, rated *Al Jazeera* at an average of 54.3% factual (Meylan 2021). This score is based on a dataset of 245 news sources at 1,000 articles each. It should be noted this score was primarily due to a series of

unidentifiable authors and not the events and tone, which rated positively in the 68th percentile for neutrality (Ibid. 2021).

Bild.de is a popular German newspaper throughout the country that offers an exhaustive view of German opinion in popular culture. *Die Zeit* is a favored center-left leaning newspaper, rated high on factual reporting, while, in contrast, *Deutschland.de* provides an established center-right position, rating mostly factual (minor decrements to factuality due to instances of influential wording) (MBFC 2017; MBFC 2020). Pulling data from each news source provides perspectives from each end of the political spectrum. *Deutsche Welle* (DW) is a widely popular and independent tax-funded center reporting broadcaster (AllSides 2022). Lastly, offering a regional perspective, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* is an independent news source from Southern Germany (Munich) and can be used with *Die Taz*, which provides relevant information and opinionated columns from Northern Germany (Berlin).

Obtaining information from a wide range of perspectives and regions aid in the credibility of the data collected. Showcasing similar or dissimilar opinions and facts across numerous regions and political perspectives, provide a verification of information; a balanced and true data set of the German perspective and impact; and can be used as a credible baseline to conduct research with.

Academic Journals / Articles

Citing academic research aids in providing scholarly information, historical perspective, credible facts, and trends within the 2015 Migrant Crisis, other crises, governmental structures, and policies. Using historical and contemporary data adds an additional layer of intricacy and credibility to the research question and hypothesis.

Obtaining academic journals from sources such as *Journal Storage* (JSTOR), *Google Scholar*, and *ProQuest* provide digitalized and accessible academic journals, books, and primary sources (Genicot 2012). As of 2022, *JSTOR* offers more than 12 million academic journal articles, 100,000 books, and primary sources in over 75 disciplines (JSTOR 2022). *Google Scholar* combines books, peer-reviewed papers, articles, and abstracts in one scholarly literature web-based tool. *Google Scholar* has been used in countless research and utilized more often than subscription-based abstracting and indexing and is widely accepted amongst researchers (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, et al. 2010; Antell & Strothmann 2013; Dixon, Duncan, Fagan, et al. 2010). Not only does *ProQuest* have the same benefits of *Google Scholar* and *JSTOR*, but it is partnered with various city libraries (such as the Gold Coast City Council Library) to provide access to dissertations and theses, video and audio, and change databases (ProQuest 2022).

Institutional Websites

Economic data points and outputs, forecasts, and trends are pulled and analyzed from the provided official statistics of the European Union, Eurostat / European Commission, German Government, United Nations, the UN Refugee Agency, the World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the Asylum Information Database (AIDA), and the European Council of Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) amongst a variety of similar resources. These global institutional organizations provide current and historical data points to cross-reference while providing predominately impartial information from a variety of sub-databases. The data provides a standard for the economic trends and impacts on Germany, thus, validating or invalidating the hypotheses. According to the U.S. Department of State website, these sources are highly credible and accurate as they use multiple datasets and resources to conduct evidence-based policy analysis (2022). These websites are often cited in

academia, government, and various institutions because the analysis is based on inputs from a combination of states and sources, resulting in fact-based reporting.

Statista and Pew Research Center are sources of information that highlight a mixture of public opinions, polls, trends, and quantifiable data sets. From there, conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the specific polls and answers. Previous surveys and conducted research enable additional questions and research points to be explored; background information for additional questions; data points to follow up on and further question; and access to surveys on numerous perspectives and opinions, including German opinions on the Migrant Crisis.

Statista has been cited by more than 170,000 news media articles in 2020, with facts delivered across 170 industries and over 150 countries (Statista 2022c). Furthermore, Statista is widely used in political and economic academic research, amongst others, to track data, trends, and mobility (Gullen & Plungis 2013; Qaisrani 2020; Bozmoski & Sadurni 2021). Pew Research Center, as a D.C. based nonpartisan think tank, is widely credible and used in a variety of academic research (Pew Research Center 2022). Pew Research even has numerous archives within the electronic United States Library of Congress (Library of Congress 2021).

Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS)

The data compiled will be analyzed and output through Statistical Product and Service Solutions (SPSS). SPSS software has been used for data management, advanced analytics, business intelligence, and multivariate analysis for a plethora of research, criminal investigations, government entities, corporations, data miners, and educational facilities (Mills & Johnson 2004; Permaloff & Grafton 1988; Nie, Bent, & Hull 1970). While SPSS is a statistical software, one of

its primary end-uses is in social science due to its program abilities in conjunction with a wide variety of graphical user interfaces.

Procedures & Data Analysis

Approval for the Institutional Review Board (IRB) was sought from Liberty University (see Appendix A). To gain IRB approval, a certification for Social & Behavioral Researchers was required through Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) (see Appendix A2). Once approval was given, this study was conducted using quantitative research data collected from a multitude of secondary sources. The data was then normalized for consistency and testability. This included normalizing both the average annual salary of Germany to the 2020 euro value and the GDP for the 28 EU (inclusive of the UK) states to the 2010 chained euro value.

Once all the necessary material was collected and normalized, the data was analyzed and tested against the hypotheses using the statistical software SPSS. SPSS was used to create an error bar chart, two Independent Samples t Tests, and a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), which then required subsequent Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests. For all the tests conducted, the alpha (α) level was presumed to be 5% (.05) and the beta (β) 20%.

***H_{a1}**: The 2015 Migrant Crisis will showcase a negative delta to Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis.*

***H_{a3}**: Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis will have a more significant impact than that of the other European Union states.*

The first hypothesis (H_{a1}) was tested through the use of an error bar chart and an Independent Samples t Test. An error bar chart determines the amount of error (range of data)

and standard deviation (range of data in comparison to the mean) that is built into the chart (Glen 2019). The error bar chart informs the researcher on the likelihood of a statistically significant result.

An Independent Samples t Test is a parametric test that was chosen for H_{a1} and H_{a3} . The fairly robust test determines the statistical significance between the means of two groups (Kent State University 2022; Heeren & D'Agostino 1987). Simply stated, the null assumption for t Tests is $H_0: u_1 = u_2$, while the alternative assumption is $H_a: u_1 \neq u_2$ (Lærd Statistics 2018a). The two groups tested for H_{a1} were the impacts of the Migrant Crisis prior to the event and the impacts of the Migrant Crisis after the start of the event (post-2015). For H_{a3} , the two groups tested were the mean average of Germany's change in GDP and the mean average of all the European states' GDP. Appendix E showcases a country-by-country comparative analysis of the change in GDP to Germany. The years used were 2000-2014 and 2015-2019 to showcase the yearly impact of the Crisis.

***H_{a2}:** The Migrant Crisis has been detrimental to Germany's political-economic standing.*

The results for the second hypothesis (H_{a2}) were conducted through the use of a one-way MANOVA and subsequent ANOVA tests. A one-way ANOVA tests for statistical significance between one dependent variable and one independent variable, while a MANOVA tests for multiple dependent variables (Glen 2022; French, Macedo, Poulsen, et al. 2008; Weinfurt 2000). More specifically, a one-way MANOVA measures for any significance on independent groups against more than one continuous variable whereas the one-way ANOVA simply tests one dependent variable (Lærd Statistics 2018b). For the purpose of this research, the number of terrorist attacks; the number of crime offenses; asylum applications; GDP rate of change; consumer price index; inflation rate change; unemployment rate; and the average salary rate for

Germany were compared from pre-Crisis (2000-2014) levels to the post-Crisis levels, starting at the commencement (2015-2019).

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

Overview

The 2015 Migrant Crisis was a phenomenon that impacted the modern world; however, the European Union – and within the EU, Germany – undertook the lion’s share of the economic and political impacts. This study seeks to determine if these impacts were a burden or benefit to Germany. The IMO states that in 2015 there were over one million migrant arrivals in Europe with hundreds of thousands every year thereafter throughout the duration of the Crisis (Bierbach 2019). By the officially designated end of the Crisis in 2019, 2.6 million refugees immigrated into the European Union (European Commission 2021b). Between 2010 and 2019, Germany received 2.1 million asylum applications (UNHCR 2020a, 40). This has placed Germany in a unique economic and political position. Research has suggested that Germany’s economic strength is enough to support the onslaught of refugees with the true issue centering around the facilitation of the migrants and poor immigration policies (Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East 2017). This study seeks to determine the true political and economic impact of the Migrant Crisis on Germany and if the Crisis was problematic or beneficial to German society.

Research Questions

***RQ1:** How has the influx of asylum seekers throughout the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis impacted Germany politically and, namely, economically?*

***RQ2:** From a German perspective, are these political and economic impacts beneficial or detrimental to German society?*

Hypotheses

H_{a1}: The 2015 Migrant Crisis will showcase a negative delta to Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis.

H_{a2}: The Migrant Crisis has been detrimental to Germany's political-economic standing.

H_{a3}: Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis will have a more significant impact than that of the other European Union states.

Null Hypothesis

H₀₁: The 2015 Migrant Crisis will not showcase a statistically significant difference in Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis.

H₀₂: The 2015 Migrant Crisis will have no impact to Germany's political and economic standing to its pre-Crisis levels.

H₀₃: Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis will not have a more significant impact than that of the other European Union states.

Descriptive Statistics


Asylum Applications and Population

The 2015 Migrant Crisis severely impacted the European Union both politically and economically. As seen in Figure 1, EU asylum applications prior to the Crisis were relatively low at 335,290 in 2012, with a gradual incline to 431,100 in 2013 and 626,965 in 2014 (European Council: Council of the European Union 2021). At the crux of the Crisis in 2015, asylum applications skyrocketed to 1,322,850. The number of applications decreased slightly to 1,260,920 in 2016, further reducing to 712,250 in 2017. By 2020, due to the COVID-19

pandemic and travel bans, not lowered demand, asylum applications dwindled to 472,660 (Associated Press 2021).

Figure 1


Asylum Applications in the EU by Year



Note. Adapted from “Infographic – Asylum Applications in the EU, 1990-2021,” by the European Council: Council of the European Union. 2021. (<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/asylum-applications-since-1990/>).

Germany received the largest number of asylum applications by a considerable amount, at a total of 2,332,820 throughout 2012-2020 (Eurostat 2022a). France, second to Germany, only received 833,715 during the same timeframe; this equates to 1,499,105 less. Segregating the Migrant Crisis from 2015-2019, Germany received 1.8M applications. France’s applications were halved at 548.5K (for exact numbers by country, see Appendix C). It should be noted that there is no data accounted for Croatia in 2012 and the United Kingdom in 2020. Croatia joined the European Union on 1 July 2013 and the United Kingdom left the European Union, via Brexit, on 31 January 2020 (European Commission 2022; Government of the Netherlands 2022).

Figure 2
Asylum Applications by EU Country from 2012-2020



Note. The data for all of the European Union nations are pulled from “Asylum and First Time Asylum Applicants – Annual Aggregated Data (Rounded),” by Eurostat, 2022, *Eurostat*. (<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00191/default/bar?lang=en>).

Migrant Settlement Patterns

Using 2020 data – the year 2020 was chosen to encompass the culmination of migration throughout the Migrant Crisis – from the *Bundesagentur für Arbeit* (Federal Employment Agency), a large percentage of foreigners settled in the Bundesrepublik (Western Germany) (*Bundesagentur für Arbeit* 2022). Aside from the state’s capital of Berlin, there are little to no foreigners living in the East. Figure 3 outlines the percentage of foreigners compared to the total population throughout Germany.

Figure 3*Foreigners Compared to Total Population*

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Note. From “Migration. Integration. Regionen,” by Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2022, *Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Statistik*. (<https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Navigation/Statistiken/Interaktive-Statistiken/Migration-Arbeitsmarkt/Migration-und-Integration-Nav.html;jsessionid=68BA6A34E914661F0BFF6FAFC72733B7>).

This can be explained due to a history of significantly diverging socio-economic policies and public attitudes (Vertovec 2015; Kirschbaum 2018). Western Germany has been traditionally more welcoming to migrants than East Germany with a foreign population averaging 18-27.5% pre-Crisis (Vertovec 2015). To compare, Eastern Germany held an average of 3.4-4.6% pre-Crisis (Ibid. 2015). Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, East Germany had incredibly limited access to international culture, including television and radio broadcasts (Kirschbaum 2018). This led to the region being dubbed *Tal der Ahnungslosen* (Valley of the Clueless) due to lack of information, access to global resources, heterogeneity within society, and global socialization (Hirschman 1993). This mindset has transcended to contemporary times. Because of this and the

“normalization” of migrants in the West and Western media, they are less likely to be stigmatized than in the East.

East Germany remains largely impacted by an economic gap with West Germany. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, sought to privatize East German enterprises under the Trust Agency, or *Treuhandanstalt* (Britannica 2022b). Unfortunately, this operation became corroded with illegal corruption. Later dubbed the Handover Agency, over 85% of the businesses were sold to westerners, with only 5% to easterners, continuing Germany’s severe economic divide (Dale 2019). As the high-valued businesses boomed in West Germany, capital, immigration, and investment thrived (Ibid. 2019). Meanwhile, East Germany experienced declining populations, stagnation, and economic downturn (Ibid. 2019).

While the economic gap has lessened over time, East Germany contemporarily faces economic disparity. According to the Pew Research Center and the Federal Government of Germany, unemployment remains an average of 2.1% higher in East Germany than West Germany (Gramlich 2019; Federal Government Commissioner...2018). Furthermore, East German disposable income is an average of 86% of the level in West Germany, wherein the average East German salary is €19.9K a year versus the €23.2K in West Germany (Ibid. 2019; 2018). When adjusted for population differences, productivity in East Germany is 75% of that of West Germany (Ibid. 2019; 2018). This lapse in productivity is reflected in the GDP per capita by German states. In 2019, West German GDP per capita totaled €43.4K and East German GDP totaled €30K (Richter 2020). If refugees chose to migrate to East Germany, they faced the same issue as the local municipalities: pre-existing affordability and employment issues coupled with an increase in population (Katz, Noring & Garrelts 2016).

Historical Comparison: Germany's 1940s Migration and Refugee Crisis

The 2015 Migrant Crisis is not the first migration crisis that Germany has faced in recent history. In the 1940s (1944-1950), Germany similarly faced a migration migration and refugee crisis as a result of the Second World War, historically known as the Flight and Expulsion of Germans. WWII forced the mobility of refugees and expellees, fundamentally altering the preexisting German population and labor structure (DoMiD 2022). Using this Crisis as a historical guide to Germany's financial position and approach, the overarching impact and lessons learned and applied to the 2015 Migrant Crisis become apparent.

Background

Due to the horrors Germany partook in during the Second World War, many nations – in a coalition led by Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Harry S. Truman – expelled native Germans and those with German ancestry throughout 1944-1948 (Murphy 2004). The forced movement of “ethnic Germans” or *Volksdeutsche* to flee from Eastern and Central Europe resulted in 12-14 million people being expelled into Germany and Austria by 1950 (Taylor 2015). This includes an estimated 3 million people from Czechoslovakia; 2-3 million Polish; 2 million from the Soviet Union; 300,000 from the former Gdańsk; 300,000 from Yugoslavia; 400,000 Hungarians; and 300,000 from Romania (Magocsi & Matthews 1993; Murphy 2004). While the death toll is disputed, an approximate 500,000 – 2 million people were killed because of the post-war population transfer (Academic 2022).

These “displaced persons” shaped German refugee foreign policy, which is still in use today. Those who were forcedly exported to Germany, those who fled the Soviet Army, and Eastern Europeans and freed prisoners of war who voluntarily chose to reside in Germany were

considered displaced persons (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2020). These displaced persons were granted legal positions mirroring modern refugee status by the *Grundgesetz* under the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens in the Federal Territory (UNHCR 2022). Eventually, housing estates were erected around the state for the displaced persons (Koschmal 2014). In 1948-1949, the *Grundgesetz* added Article 16, which states that persecuted people have the right of asylum (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2020). This paved the way for the 1951 Geneva Convention, which followed shortly thereafter, enforcing the globally accepted minimum standards for refugees. This 1951 Geneva “Refugee” Convention played a colossal role in shaping Europe’s political stance throughout the 2015 Migrant Crisis.


Contemporary Germany not only provided the refugees with the bare minimum requirements outlined in the Geneva Convention, but equipped them with an abundance of housing, food, healthcare, language training, integration, elderly and childcare, disability, criminal justice care and contributions, and education (Ruist 2015, 576-577). Supplying various resources to refugees is not a new concept for Germany. In both circumstances, state provided welfare for refugees was met with mixed criticism and acceptance by the native Germans (Stokes 2019). Under the lens of the welfare magnet theory, German policymakers understood the draw of social welfare benefits. Historic refugees found themselves needing to be recognized under the United Nations as “genuine refugees” opposed to “economic refugees” (Ibid. 2019). Presently, this exact debate of discerning “economic refugees” (or *Wirtschaftsflüchtling*) from “genuine refugees” was seen in debates throughout *Der Spiegel* and weighted within the German Institute of Economics (Ibid. 2019).

German GDP

In the 1940s, the global economy was tied to the Bretton Woods system, which pegged global currencies to the USD and the USD to gold (Chen 2022). To aid in the mitigation of inconsistencies, Figure 4 analyzes German GDP per capita from 1944-1951 on normalized data for 1990 international dollars. There was a clear and significant drop immediately following the 1944 forced migration crisis. This was followed by a gradual incline throughout the duration of the crisis. Acknowledging the data was taken from the irregularity of wartime, this pattern mirrors contemporary crisis GDP data: an immediate drop and a slow incline thereafter.

Not only did the historic trends in GDP follow a similar pattern to the contemporary Crisis, but the German mitigation strategy was similarly analogous. In both instances, Germany leaned on the concept of the *Volksgeist* to bolster government intervention via Keynesian economic theory. In both crises, Germany's public sector investments and active labor market programs led to an increase in human capital (Rothstein 2017). The Keynesian standard for riding economic waves and netting positive is based upon increased public spending (Jahan, Mahmud, & Papageorgiou 2014). In both crises, the Keynesian economic theory proved to be successful.

One could also argue the New Growth Theory is applicable in both crises. The German government provided opportunities such as training, education, and employment. Those who were driven by success undertook the opportunities for growth which led to an increase in human capital. As the influx of refugees increased the German population and the GDP per capita rose in parallel, the classification question of "genuine refugee" or "economic refugee" becomes irrelevant. The result is the maximization of their opportunities to create a better life for themselves economically – and thus, the state – despite the initial migration intention.

Figure 4*German GDP 1930-1950*

Note. From “German GDP Per Capita 1930-1950”, by Niall Douglass, 2008, “Modeling the Costs of Climate Change and its Costs of Mitigation: A Scientific Approach. (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/24112542_Modelling_the_Costs_of_Climate_Change_and_its_Costs_of_Mitigation_A_Scientific_Approach).


Hypotheses

H₀₁: *The 2015 Migrant Crisis will not showcase a statistically significant difference in Germany’s economic standing post-Migrant Crisis.*

According to the Federal Reserve, a considerable macroeconomic indicator of a state’s economic stability, size, and health is through analyzing the state’s gross domestic product (Fagan 2022). Germany calculates GDP through the expenditure approach (Focus Economics 2019). This approach is commonly used throughout the world, including the United States. The expenditure approach measures GDP through the formula $C + I + G + (X-M) = GDP$, where C = Personal Consumption Expenditures; I = Gross Private Investment; G = Government Purchases; and X-M = Export minus Imports (Fagan 2022; Thakur & Vaidya 2018). Germany also utilizes the production method, which is value of goods and services (-) intermediate costs (Focus Economics 2019; Callen 2020).

The tracking of GDP trends is exceedingly relevant to determine not only the standing of a state's economy at any given point in time but the ability to segregate for years and events to determine the overall impact of a global phenomenon. Germany's GDP took a plunge throughout the majority of the Migrant Crisis. In 2014, pre-Crisis, Germany's GDP was \$3.884T USD (The World Bank 2022a). In 2015, amidst the Crisis, the GDP sank to \$3.356T USD (Ibid. 2022). Throughout the duration of the Crisis, the GDP slowly began to climb, rising to pre-Crisis levels in 2018 at \$3.975T USD.

Figure 5
Germany GDP by USD Trillion



Note. Adapted from “GDP (Current US\$),” by The World Bank, 2022, *The World Bank*. Copyright The World Bank Group 2022. (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2020&locations=DE&most_recent_year_desc=false&start=2012).

GDP is one of two primary macroeconomic components to evaluating the economic stability of a society, with the second component being inflation (European Central Bank 2022). Inflation is the rate of prices over a given period of time; it determines consumer's cost of living through the price of goods and services (Oner 2018). As inflation increases, so does economic instability, volatility to the market, and detrimental impacts to both the individual consumer and businesses (in both expenditures and investments). To calculate the most widely-used measure of

inflation, determine the consumer price index (CPI), and further measure the CPI against a period of time to assess the consumer price inflation (Ibid.). Germany fared exceedingly well throughout the Migrant Crisis, staying within the European Central Bank’s target inflation of 2% (Cecioni, Coenen, Gerke, et al. 2021).

Table 1
Consumer Price Index for Germany

CPI for Germany		
Year	Consumer Price Index	Change Over Previous Year
	2015=100	in (%)
2012	97.1	+2
2013	98.5	+1.4
2014	99.5	+1
2015	100	+0.5
2016	100.5	+0.5
2017	102	+1.5
2018	103.8	+1.8
2019	105.3	+1.4
2020	105.8	+0.5
2021	109.1	+3.1

Note. Adapted from “Verbraucherpreisindex,” by Statistisches Bundesamt, 2022, *Statistisches Bundesamt*.


States that utilize the euro are also subject to the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) (European Central Bank 2022). This syncs data for states within the EU to be compared because they follow the same methodology and are intertwined with one another (Ibid. 2022). Both the CPI and HICP are used to calculate inflation and are nearly indistinguishable from one another aside from the food and housing categories (Šolc & Tomanová 2021). One of the primary differences between the two is the HICP excludes the following eight item headings (totaling 626 item headings opposed to the 634 CPI item headings): mortgage interest, building materials, motor tax (motorcycle), motor tax (motor car), house insurance contents, house insurance dwelling, motor car insurance (non-Service), and union subscriptions (Central Statistics Office).

H₀2: *The 2015 Migrant Crisis will have no impact to Germany's political and economic standing to its pre-Crisis levels.*

Unemployment Rates

One of the largest indicators of the success of a state is through its employment rate. Unemployment rates are used as a gauge to the performance of that state's labor market; if unemployment rates are low, cash flow is generally high (Picardo 2022). Economic stability circulates around the ability to return to, or maintain, full time employment rates in supply and demand shocks; both businesses and individuals are impacted by the state's economy and cash flow (Wallace 1983). When businesses survive the economic shocks, they maintain their employees. As the individual employee survives and engages in societal expenditures, cash flow remains positive.

Figure 6
Germany: Unemployment Rate vs. Population



Note. This graph was created to compare the unemployment rate of Germany against the population throughout the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis. Copyright, Trading Economics. From “Germany Unemployment Rate,” by The World Bank, 2022, in *Trading Economics*. (<https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/gdp>).

Figure 6 outlines a nearly inverse graph depicting a steady decline of Germany's employment rate and an incline in population. The graph accounts for the seasonal adjustment unemployment rate in Germany, which is unchanged at 5% in March of 2022 (Trading Economics 2022). German unemployment rate is calculated by the registered unemployed as a percentage of the labor force. Unemployment is defined as persons out of work or working part-time at less than 15 hours a week, between the ages of 15 and 65, and are seeking compulsory insurance (Ibid. 2022). This correlates with a recent study, interviewing over 8,000 refugees between 2013 and 2018, showing that since 2013, approximately 49% of refugees have found steady employment in Germany within five years (Deutsche Welle 2020).

Alternatively, the unemployment rate of foreigners in Germany is still at an average high, coming in at 12.4% in 2019, 14.6% in 2020, and 13.7% in 2021 (Statista 2022d). While the overall unemployment rate is at an overarching decline, it is important to note that a vast majority of refugees are considered part of the underemployment category opposed to unemployed (Ott 2013). Underemployed are those unemployed and participating in Hartz IV measures, sick, over 58, or are considered difficult to place (Zimmermann 2021). Approximately 30% of the underemployed are beneficiaries to Social Security Code II (Hartz IV), which exempts those making €450 or less a month from income tax (IAB 2020). As of 2021, 65% of Syrian, 44% of Afghan, and 37% of Somali refugees are receiving Hartz IV benefits (MacGregor 2021).

The notion of the "silent" underemployed aligns with a starker division amongst the two dual labor market economic sectors than hypothesized (Figure 7). Taking the unemployed plus the addition of underemployed refugees into account, a clearer picture of instability within the secondary sector arises. It is still arguable that Germany is not facing instability within the dual

market considering nearly half of the country's refugees have been able to find steady employment and contribute back into society. However, there is clear evidence of a break in the market and opportunity for a large influx of foreign workers to enter the secondary sector. Future research is needed to pinpoint and identify if the unemployment rates will rise, showing an overturned secondary sector, or if the refugees were able to find long-term stable employment.

Figure 7

Germany's Labor Market: Unemployment vs. Underemployment

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Note. From "The Labour Market, Current Figures," by Bundesagentur für Deutschland, 2022, in *Bundesagentur für Deutschland: Statistik*. Copyright Bundesagentur für Deutschland.

(<https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Navigation/Service/English-Site/the-labour-market/the-labour-market-Nav.html>).

Crime and Unemployment

In addressing the second part of the research question, the German perspective, happiness levels are a good indication of public perception. There are few links to unhappiness and unemployment. Using scores from psychiatric evaluations and cross research by social scientists,

high unemployment was only linked to unhappiness for those who had immediately lost their job (opposed to those on long-term unemployment) and those middle aged (Clark & Oswald 1994). Unhappiness was also not linked in those who were actively seeking employment (Gielen & van Ours 2014). Berlin left-based news *Die Taz* noted that frustration has grown in Europeans regarding a plethora of topics, including immigrants and growing unemployment (Castellotti 2017). Unhappiness with the unemployment rates is similarly indicated in right-winged news source *Deutschland.de*; however, this sentiment seems to be felt primarily by those located in East Germany where they feel “shortchanged” and ignored (a 30-year-old sentiment left from their incorporation into the Federal Republic and the loss of their competitive industries) (Koepf 2019). Despite the sentiment throughout Europe, according to Pew Research Center, as of 2016, Germany had a relatively low percentage (compared to the rest of the European Union), at 31%, of people believing refugees were a burden on jobs and social benefits (Wike, Stokes, & Simmons 2016).

However, increased unemployment is linked to an increase in crime rates, which does constitute unhappiness (Raphael & Winter-Ebmer 2001). The rise in crime is seen for a variety of reasons. Individuals may feel that the economic and political benefits of crime outweigh legitimate work with crime being their form of economic employment or simply due to desperation and opportunity (Bushway & Reuter 2003). Research has found that unemployment is highly linked to property crime with little to no evidence supporting a correlation with violent crime (Edmark 2005; Steinhilper 1976). According to the U.S. Department of Justice, underemployment and crime, particularly in the youth, are similarly linked but are independent of unemployment rates and crime (Thompson 1981).

Germany does not showcase a correlation to refugee unemployment and an increase in refugee crime (Elbert 2016). However, Germany experienced an increase in crime with those who were unemployed (Falk, Kuhn, & Zweimüller 2011). Results showcased that the crime in East Germany was significantly higher than West Germany, almost correlating directly to unemployment within those regions; however, these statistics may not be an indication of direct correlation to unemployment. A majority of Germany's right-winged party members are located in East Germany and the rise in crime was predominantly right-wing extremism (Hasse & Somaskanda 2017; Steinhilper 1976). Figures 8 and 9 showcase a correlation between German party alignment and acts of right-wing extremism (Hasse & Somaskanda 2017; Antweiler 2021). This increase could, however, be related to right-winged frustration in the belief that the increase in migrants caused a burden domestic constituents' jobs and social benefits (Wike, Stokes, & Simmons 2016).

Figure 8

German Political Party Alignment

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with copyright*

Note. From "Germany's New Political Landscape in Maps," by Dr. Werner Antweiler, in *Werner's Blog- Opinions, Analysis, Commentary*. Copyright Werner Antweiler, University of British Columbia 2022. (<https://wernerantweiler.ca/blog.php?item=2021-10-02>).

Figure 9
Right-Wing Violence in Germany

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Note. From “Why Germany’s Far-Right Flourishes in Dresden,” by Nina Haase and Sumi Somaskanda, 2017, in *Deutsche Welle*. Copyright Deutsche Welle. (<https://www.dw.com/en/why-germanys-far-right-flourishes-in-dresden/a-39076094>).

Crime and Terrorism


Crime is a severe indication of a state’s socioeconomic standing. Generally, high crime rates are associated with poor socioeconomic conditions while lowered crime rates equate to higher income and thriving areas (Kitchen 2005). Terrorism is elevated crime and often the result of poor socioeconomic conditions and belief coupled with lax security and international threats (Klein 2021). One of the largest themes of the 2015 Migrant Crisis centered around refugee crime and terrorism.

Germany experienced a tangible increase in crime in the immediate aftermath of the Crisis; however, the crime dropped considerably in 2017 – 9.5% – from 2016 and continued the downward trend through 2020 (Statista 2022e). Terrorist attacks in Germany also spiked significantly after the commencement of the Migrant Crisis. The rise in terrorism remained relatively high throughout the majority of the Migrant Crisis. There was a 400% increase from

2014 to 2015, jumping from 13 to 65 attacks (Statista 2021b). The substantial quantity of attacks remained until 2018 where the number fell to pre-Crisis levels at only 2 attacks (Ibid. 2021).

Figure 10


Germany: Crime in Millions



Note. Adopted from “Number of Crime Offenses Recorded in Germany from 2000 to 2020”, by Statista Research Department, 2022, in *Statista*. (<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1039919/number-of-crimes-in-germany/>).

Figure 11


Terrorist Attacks in Germany: 2010 – 2020



Note. The data for the number of terrorist attacks are from “Number of Terrorist Attacks in Germany from 1970-2020”, by Statista Research Department, 2021, in *Statista*. (<https://www.statista.com/statistics/541198/incidences-of-terrorism-germany/>).

The European Union was not exempt from the spike in terrorist activities throughout the Migrant Crisis, facing 1,476 attacks and 522 deaths in a decade (Statista 2021a). The vast majority of attacks were executed by separatists in 2010 and 2011, followed by left-wing extremism and jihadism, with right-winged extremism as the lowest ranking category. This trend is the gradual decline of separatist activity against the gradual incline of activity amongst the other three terrorist categories. The highest death tolls were in 2015 and 2016 at 151 and 142 people respectively (Ibid. 2021).

Figure 12
Terrorist Attacks in the EU by Affiliation



Note. The data for the number of terrorist attacks are from “Number of Terrorist Attacks in the European Union (EU) 2010-2020”, by Statista Research Department, 2021, in. *Statista*. (<http://statista.com/statistics/746562/number-of-arrested-terror-suspects-in-the-european-union-eu/>).

Table 2
Terrorism in the European Union: 2010–2020

Year	Attacks	Jihadist	Separatist	Left-Wing	Right-Wing	Death Toll	Arrests
2010	208	3	160	45	0	7	249
2011	148	0	110	37	1	79	484
2012	193	6	167	18	2	17	537
2013	108	0	84	24	0	7	535
2014	82	2	67	13	0	4	774
2015	104	17	65	13	9	151	1077
2016	140	13	99	27	1	142	1002
2017	199	33	137	24	5	68	1219
2018	127	24	83	19	1	13	1056
2019	110	21	57	26	6	10	1004
2020	57	14	14	25	4	24	634
Total	1476	133	1043	271	29	522	8571

Note. The data for the number of terrorist attacks are from “Number of Terrorist Attacks in the European Union (EU) 2010-2020”, by Statista Research Department, 2021, in *Statista*. (<http://statista.com/statistics/746562/number-of-arrested-terror-suspects-in-the-european-union-eu/>). The data for the number of fatalities are from “Number of Terrorist Fatalities in the European Union (EU) 2010-2019”, by the Statista Research Department, 2021, in *Statista*. (<http://statista.com/statistics/1178596/number-of-fatalities-from-terrorism-eu/>). The data for the total arrests are from “Infographic – Terrorism in the EU: Facts and Figures. European Council of the European Union”, by the European Council and Council of the European Union, 2022, in *European Council and Council of the European Union*. (<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/terrorism-eu-facts-figures/>).

In a large-scale participant survey, comprising of 10 European states, conducted by the Pew Research Center, approximately 61% of Germans stated their belief that refugees will increase domestic terrorism, but only 30% believe refugees are more at fault for crime than any other group (Poushter 2016). Only 26% of Germans believed that diversity made their country a better place to live and 67% disapproved of the handling of the Migrant Crisis (Ibid. 2016). The disapproval has been correlated across the European Union based upon their perceptions of Muslims; Germany had a 19% favorable / 58% unfavorable view (Ibid. 2016). This low favorability to Muslims seemingly correlates to the drastic increase in terror attacks from 2014 to 2015 (Klein 2021).

Between 2018 and 2020, the German view on refugees faced a slight shift. As of 2019, 82% of Germans supported hosting refugees but 66% still disapprove of the EU’s handling of the

Crisis (Rasmussen & Poushter 2019; Connor 2018). There is a reciprocity to journalistic coverage of negative refugee stories and experiences (such as terrorist attacks and crime) opposed to humanitarian need, which increases public support (Dempster, Leach & Hargrave 2020; Duffy & Frere-Smith 2014). This mirrors the trend seen in the latter half of the Migrant Crisis where images of migrants were produced through an emphasized humanitarian lens (Dempster, Leach & Hargrave 2020). This was inclusive of migrants participating in common and local activities, which further increases support by humanizing them (Dempster, Leach & Hargrave 2020; Harrison 2018).

The perspectives on immigrants remain relatively negative. 58% of Germans did not want more immigration, with 41% remaining neutral or do not believe immigrants make Germany stronger (Dempster, Leach & Hargrave 2020; Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor 2019). This is perhaps connected to the fact that in 2018 only 33% of German immigrants wanted to adopt German customs and as of 2020, this number rose to 51% (Silver, Fagan, Connaughton & Mordecai 2021). The lack of adoption to German customs is in direct contrast to the German ethnocultural identity and fundamental concept of the *Volksgeist* (Rudolph 2006, 87, 91).

The increase in immigrant desire to participate in German customs is in direct contrast to the German government's multicultural mitigation strategy: to shift the acceptance within German society from the melting pot to the salad bowl. At the commencement of the Migrant Crisis, many Germans were of the belief refugees should adopt German customs and cultures, melting into one homogenous society; however, the government, in a push for unification and celebration of diversity, pushed for individuality and retention of cultural customs where refugees retain their individual "flavors" in a heterogenous society (Vermeulen 2019; Bolborici 2016). The forced shift in socially accepted multicultural theory may have resulted not only in a

contrasting increase to immigrant cultural participation in *Volksgeist* but also a decreased desire for immigration amongst German nationals.

Social Justice and Civil Liberties

Social scientists study mobility as a determination of societal stability and structure (Ornstein 2017). Social mobility typically indicates what modern society values. It can show how migrants and immigration are valued by how migrants are integrated in society and where they stand within society opposed to other demographics (Ibid. 2017). Social justice is the notion that all people should have equal rights and opportunity (2U Inc. 2022). What these equal rights and opportunities entail are an evolving definition but are arbitrarily defined by contemporary society and often revisited. Generally, they are rooted in the Christian morality of aiding the sick, weak, and oppressed in society with its formal conceptual origins in the Catholic Church as an extension of justice to the people from unjust rulers (Ornstein 2017; Burke 2014).


Social justice movements are movements and/or protests enacted by society to dispute a deemed injustice (Martinot 2004). Social justice movements have been increasingly popular in the age of the internet; nations are protesting on behalf of other nations and word is spread far quicker. The question should be posed if these injustices are an effect from the governmental institutions, and thereby reconcilable through policy shift, or the true opinions of the public. Is it an impact of citizen induced social mobility or governmental and institutional discrimination?

In relation to the 2015 Migrant Crisis, numerous protests emerged throughout Europe. Some on behalf of the migrants and others in opposition. Many of the Eastern European member states were particularly vocal about their hesitancy to share the refugee quotas of the EU with states such as Germany, Austria, and Sweden who felt a steep impact (Zaun 2017). In contrast, a

plethora of protests emerged throughout Western Europe (such as England and Germany) to support the influx of migrants (Samuels 2015).

Figure 13

Social Justice Movements: Trends in the EU



Note. Adopted from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 2022, in *ACLEDD* (<https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard>).


H₀₃: Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis will not have a more significant impact than that of the other European Union states.

Using Appendices C1-C3 to calculate the number of asylum applications the European Union states faced, the amount Germany received in comparison to the other EU member states is severe. During the years of listed data (2012-2020), Germany received an average of 259,202 applications per year. France was the second largest recipient of asylum applications averaging 92,635 per year. This places Germany at an average of 180% more than France.

Using 2010 as the baseline year for normalized chained euros, Figure 14 showcases the GDP for each of the 28 EU states over a 21-year period. The comparative analysis shows the economic prosperity of the various European states. Research suggests that increased migration, especially in high-income countries, creates social and economic success (Peterson 2017).

Weighting the number of asylum applications – and therefore, migration – to GDP, correlations may be drawn to the state’s overall economic success.

Figure 14
EU Nations GDP: Chained 2010 Euros (M)



Note. The information for all the European Union nations’ GDP, normalized for chained 2010 Euros in the millions, is adopted from “GDP and Main Components (Output, Expenditure, and Income)”, by Eurostat, 2022, in *FRED*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Mirroring the impacts for Germany, the inflationary rate of change across the European Union from 2015-2019 – wherein the CPI is 2010 = 100 – stayed within the targeted (+/-) 2% (The World Bank 2022b). Furthermore, the EU also experienced a steady decline in unemployment throughout the duration of the Crisis; however, levels did rise in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (Eurostat 2022d).

Results

H₀₁: *The 2015 Migrant Crisis will not showcase a statistically significant difference in Germany’s economic standing post-Migrant Crisis.*

The Independent Samples *t* Test was used to determine the impacts of Germany’s economic standing by comparing the difference between Germany’s GDP percentage change

pre-Migrant Crisis and post-Migrant Crisis. This null hypothesis assumes $p < .05$ and was calculated using normalized values for 2010 chained euros in the millions.

An Independent Samples t Test was used as it compares the means of two specific groups and aids in addressing statistical hypotheses through the resultant statistical significance (Frost 2020). When analyzing t Tests, the results indicate the probability of a statistical significance opposed to the strength. The test requires continuous and independent data, and generally assumes a normal distribution when the data studied has less than 15 observations (Ibid. 2021). The last assumption for the t Test is homogeneity of variance (Glen 2021). Using the Levene's Test, which can be included in the SPSS output, the variance of the dependent variable can be tested.

One of the strengths of the t Test is the robustness. Assuming the data tested is not normally distributed or does not have equal variance, a statistically valid output can still be drawn from the test (Flom 2018). Not only is the test robust from the first assumption and creates an output for unequal variance, but the input data required for an accurate result is small (i.e., tests are typically limited to less than 15 data points) (Frost 2020). The repeated measure design of the test, also known as the paired samples t -test, allows for control over individual differences and results in limited effects since the error from the samples is small (Admin 2019). The test is reasonably simple to conduct and, once computed, the interpretation of the results is straightforward. This aids in limiting user error and misinterpretation of results.

The Independent Samples t Test can result in variability or impacts to the data output due to environmental factors. Generally, random testing and grouping assignments can reduce systematic differences between groups, but subject specific responses and influences from outside environmental factors may exist (Frost 2020). The test computes both the t -value

(difference between the mean of the two samples and the variation within them) and the degrees of freedom, or the value within the study that can vary (Hayes 2022). When the degrees of freedom are lower, the tradeoff requires the t -value to be higher in order to reach the necessary significance level (Admin 2019). Furthermore, when conducting a paired t -test, because of the multiple comparisons, rejecting the null hypothesis becomes difficult and may result in Type I errors (Ibid. 2019).

Linear regression is similar to the Independent Samples t Test in that it is an inferential statistical test used to determine a relationship between variables (Bhandari, Yadav & Yadav 2022). However, the Linear regression is generally used with larger data sets and with comparative analysis between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables (predictability and forecasting) (Ibid. 2022). A Linear regression was considered for the purpose of H_01 , namely due to its ability to determine the extent of a relationship comparatively in a linear fashion and portray their relationship; however, the Linear regression output is more successfully associated with larger data sets. This study is limited by the number of years within the Migrant Crisis, so the regression output may not be an accurate assumption; furthermore, H_01 was used to determine the impacts between two sets of past data (years pre-Crisis and post-Crisis) opposed to predicting future GDP impacts and forecasts. A multiple regression may be applicable in a future study, particularly when analyzing trends and long-term impacts. Last, a t -Test is used to prove or disprove a hypothesis, which is more applicable than the Linear regression's analysis of correlations.

Figure 15
Error Bar Chart




Table 3
Group Statistics

	Event	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
% Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.281%	2.478%	0.640%
	Post-Crisis	5	1.712%	0.837%	0.374%

Table 4
Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance One-Sided p	Significance Two-Sided p	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
%	Equal variances assumed	2.053	.169	-.376	18	.356	.711	-0.431%	1.147%	-2.841%	1.978%
	Equal variances not assumed			-.582	17.890	.284	.568	-0.431%	0.741%	-1.989%	1.127%

The error bar chart in Figure 15 shows that there may not be a significant difference in mean GDP percentage change and variation between Germany's pre-Crisis and post-Crisis standing. The assumption for Levene's test for homogeneity of variance passes [$F(18)=2.053$, $p>.05$]. The null hypothesis is accepted [$t(18)=-.376$, $p>.05$]. The mean difference post-Migrant Crisis ($M= 1.712\%$, $SD = .8367\%$) is not statistically significant and greater than that for the pre-Migrant Crisis ($M= 1.281\%$, $SD = 2.4782\%$).

Analyzing the GDP – using GDP as the economic baseline – in Germany by segregating the pre-Crisis (2000 – 2014) and post-Crisis data (2015 – 2019), the 2015 Migrant Crisis did not show a significant change to the state's economic credibility and standing. Without accounting for a myriad of impacts due to external factors, from a macroeconomic perspective, the Migrant

Crisis was not detrimental to the economic standing of Germany. In contrast, the mean GDP percentage change of Germany improved after the Crisis. This hypothesis tested for the mean rate of change year over year in GDP for a more accurate comparative analysis. This differs from Figure 5, which outlines Germany's GDP in US \$T for each year.

H₀₂: The 2015 Migrant Crisis will have no impact to Germany's political and economic standing to its pre-Crisis levels.

A one-way MANOVA test was used to determine Germany's political and economic benefits. This analysis was conducted by comparing the number of terrorist attacks, the number of crime offenses, asylum applications, GDP rate of change, consumer price index, inflation rate change, unemployment rate, and the average salary rate (normalized to the 2020 euro). Because there was a significant difference, post hoc univariate ANOVAs were used to determine what the significant differences were.

The one-way MANOVA test is used to “determine whether there are any differences between independent groups on more than one continuous dependent variable” (Lærd Statistics 2018b). This differs from the one-way ANOVA, which determines statistical significance between one dependent and one independent variable (Glen 2022; French, Macedo, Poulsen, et al. 2008; Weinfurt 2000). A one-way MANOVA assumes that: there are more than one dependent variable and they have an interval measurement; the dependent variables are normally distributed; there exists an independence of observations and a larger sample size; there are no multivariate or univariate outliers; the independent variables are categorical; there is no multicollinearity; and the variance-covariance of each group are equal (the univariate ANOVA further requires homogeneity of variance) (Zaiontz 2020; Lærd Statistics 2018b; He, Mazumdar, Tang, et al. 2017).

There are four MANOVA tests: Pillai's Trace, Wilks' Lambda, Hotellings Trace, and Roy's Largest Root. The Wilks' lambda is generally recommended as the baseline because it tests for the overall significance and considers all the characteristic roots (Tabachnick, Fidell & Ullman 2007). Pillai's also considers all the characteristic roots and is more robust than Wilks' lambda but should be used with smaller sample sizes and/or unequal variances (Ibid. 2007). Multiple tests allow for more veracious results, using the method that best fits the scenario being tested, especially when similar results are seen across the board.

The one-way MANOVA is successful when testing for the mean of multiple groups and detecting patterns across multiple dependent variables (Frost 2020). This can be helpful when testing a hypothesis and the follow up ANOVAs are additionally beneficial when seeking solutions and explanations to tie to the MANOVA result. The MANOVA can find effects that are smaller than an ANOVA when the dependent variables are related. The MANOVA also decreases the probability of a Type II error that would occur if multiple ANOVAs were conducted (Keselman, Huberty, Lix, et al. 1998).

MANOVAs have a sizeable number of assumptions that need to be met and it can be difficult to assess the variables being tested meet the criteria. If they do meet the criteria, it may be also difficult to interpret the discriminant functions (the classification and their probability of being classified within that grouping) (Rencher 1992; Brunner & Giannini 2011). The best way to combat this error is by segregating the dependent variables and using follow up univariate ANOVAs to determine the analysis.

The one-way ANOVA test was considered for H_02 , but the MANOVA was chosen due to its ability to assess the relationship between the multiple dependent variables. It was also chosen because of the existence of a continuous dependent variable (the pre- and post-Migrant Crisis)

and multiple independent variables (Lærd Statistics 2018b). Additionally, post hoc univariate ANOVAs were used once the MANOVA significance was determine. A second test that was considered was the Analysis of Similarities (ANOISM), which tests for “significance between two or more groups based on any distance measure” (Clarke 1993). The issue with ANOISM, is that it tests for comparisons between groups as well as within groups and is based on a dissimilarity matrix opposed to raw data; it compares the dissimilarity against the similarity of the groups (Ibid. 1993).

Table 5
Multivariate Tests

Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared	Noncent. Parameter	Observed Power ^c
Intercept	Pilla's Trace	1.000	10451.25 ^b	8.000	11.000	<.001	1.000	83610.015	1.000
	Wilk' Lambda	.000	10451.25 ^b	8.000	11.000	<.001	1.000	83610.015	1.000
	Hotellin's Trace	7600.91	10451.25 ^b	8.000	11.000	<.001	1.000	83610.015	1.000
	Ro's Largest Root	7600.91	10451.25 ^b	8.000	11.000	<.001	1.000	83610.015	1.000
Event	Pilla's Trace	.978	62.41 ^b	8.000	11.000	<.001	.978	499.300	1.000
	Wilk' Lambda	.022	62.41 ^b	8.000	11.000	<.001	.978	499.300	1.000
	Hotellin's Trace	45.391	62.41 ^b	8.000	11.000	<.001	.978	499.300	1.000
	Ro's Largest Root	45.391	62.41 ^b	8.000	11.000	<.001	.978	499.300	1.000

a. Design: Intercept + Event

b. Exact statistic

c. Computed using alpha = .05

Table 6
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	Terrorist Attacks	2100.417 ^a	1	2100.417	12.249	.003
	Crime Offenses (M)	.428 ^b	1	.428	5.119	.036
	Asylum Applications (K)	306558.420 ^c	1	306558.420	19.732	<.001
	GDP Rate Change	.697 ^d	1	.697	.141	.711
	CPI	642.216 ^e	1	642.216	2.826	.110
	Inflation Rate Change	.662 ^f	1	.662	1.912	.184
	Unemployment Rate	62.771 ^g	1	62.771	19.669	<.001
	Average Annual Salary	70741308.502 ^h	1	70741308.502	72.238	<.001

The null hypothesis is rejected. A significant effect was found ($\Lambda(8,11) = .022$, $p < .001$). Follow up univariate ANOVAs indicated that terrorist attacks were significantly affected by the 2015 Migrant Crisis ($F(1,18) = 12.249$, $p = .003$). Crime offenses ($F(1,18) = 5.119$, $p = .036$); asylum applications ($F(1,18) = 19.732$, $p < .001$); unemployment rate ($F(1,18) = 19.669$, $p < .001$); and average annual salary ($F(1,18) = 72.238$, $p < .001$) were statistically significant. GDP rate of change ($F(1,18) = .141$, $p = .711$); CPI ($F(1,18) = 2.826$, $p = .110$); and inflation rate change ($F(1,18) = 1.912$, $p = .184$) were not statistically significant.

Based off of previous research and contemporary findings, the number of terrorist attacks; the number of crime offenses; number of asylum applications; GDP rate of change; consumer price index; inflation rate change; unemployment rate; and the average salary rate (normalized to the 2020 euro) were used as the variables to determine whether Germany faced an economic and political impact post-Migrant Crisis (2015 – 2019) comparative to pre-Migrant Crisis levels (2000 – 2014).

The statistical analysis tests indicated that there was no significant impact of the Migrant Crisis on Germany's inflation rate of change, CPI, and GDP; conversely, the GDP continued to rise. The results further indicated that the number of terrorist attacks and asylum applications significantly increased, negatively impacting the nation. Alternatively – while also showcasing a significant impact to Germany – the crime rate, unemployment rate, and average annual salary illustrated a positive impact to the nation.

***H₀₃:** Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis will not have a more significant impact than that of the other European Union states.*

In testing Germany's economic standing pre-Crisis (2000 – 2014) and post-Crisis (2015 – 2019) comparatively to other EU member states, an Independent Samples *t* Test was used. The variables analyzed to determine the differentiation was the mean average of Germany's change in GDP per year for both the pre- and post-Crisis in comparison to the mean average of all the European states' change in GDP for both the pre- and post-Crisis years. See Appendix E for an individual country-by-country comparison.

As with H₀₁, the Independent Samples *t* Test was conducted for H₀₃ due to the because it determines the statistical significance of two groups by comparing the means and, therefore, is able to test a hypothesis (Frost 2020). The main assumptions of *t* Tests are that there exists an equality of variance, normal distribution, and continuous or ordinal data scale (Glen 2021; Frost 2020; Maverick 2021). The *t* Test is suitable for testing multiple subjects where only one value is required (in the case of H₀₃, GDP percent of change) for each of the groups (Admin 2019). Once the values are acquired, the test is not only easy to conduct but the results are simple to interpret. When using a statistical software, the output (mean) of the independent samples are segregated with the t-score and average difference listed (Ibid. 2019). If the values of the two groups are not

normally distributed neither/nor do they showcase homogeneity of variance, the test is still fairly robust (Flom 2018).

While it is only a miniscule amount of noise, individual difference within the two group data sets, accounting for outside and environmental factors, may impact the output. To avoid the variability due to outside factors, researchers are urged to using not only random testing but avoid hypothesis testing if the assumption of independence has been violated to avoid errors (Frost 2020; Lissitz & Chardos 1975). Type I errors may also be the result of paired t-tests, due to the multiple comparisons (Admin 2019). The *t* Test computes for both the t-value and the degrees of freedom, and as the degrees of freedom lower, the t-value must be higher to reach the significance level (Hayes 2022; Admin 2019).

The non-parametric counterpart to the *t* Test is the Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) test; however, the Wilcoxon test, while comparing two distributions, often lead to Type I errors when dealing with non-normality and is less robust than the *t* Test (Rasch, Tuescher & Guiard 2007). In contrast, Mann-Whitney may be less likely to showcase errors due to outliers (Zimmerman 2010). Furthermore, the unequal variance *t* Test is just as reliable, perhaps even more robust, than the Mann-Whitney (Ruxton 2006). The *t* Test was used due to its combination of performance, ease, robustness, and the ability to segregate for the pre/post intervals and measurement.

Table 7
Group Statistics

	Event	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Germany % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.281%	2.478%	0.639%
	Post-Crisis	5	1.712%	0.837%	0.374%
Average % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	2.050%	2.560%	0.661%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.307%	0.442%	0.198%

Table 8
Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance One-Side	Significance Two-Sided	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Germany % Change	Equal variances assumed	2.053	.169	-.376	18	.356	.711	-0.431%	1.146%	-2.840%	1.978%
	Equal variances not assumed			-.582	17.890	.284	.568	-0.431%	0.741%	-1.989%	1.126%
Average % Change	Equal variances assumed	3.782	.068	-1.074	18	.149	.297	-1.257%	1.170%	-3.717%	1.202%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.822	16.165	.043	.087	-1.257%	0.689%	-2.718%	0.204%

Table 9
Independent Samples Effect Sizes

		Standardizer ^a	Point Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower	Upper
Germany % Change	Cohen's d	2.221%	-.194	-1.206	.823
	Hedges' correction	2.319%	-.186	-1.154	.788
	Glass's delta	0.837%	-.515	-1.557	.581
Average % Change	Cohen's d	2.267%	-.555	-1.575	.481
	Hedges' correction	2.368%	-.531	-1.508	.461
	Glass's delta	0.442%	-2.843	-4.965	-.681

The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes.

Cohen's d uses the pooled standard deviation.

Hedges' correction uses the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.

Glass's delta uses the sample standard deviation of the control group.

The assumption for Levene's test for homogeneity of variance passes for Germany [F(18)=2.053, $p>.05$] and the EU [F(18)=3.782, $p>.05$]. The null hypothesis is accepted; Germany has a lower mean increase post-Crisis [t(18)=-.376, $p>.05$] than the EU [t(18)=-1.074, $p>.05$]. The mean difference for Germany post-Migrant Crisis ($M= 1.712\%$, $SD = .8367\%$) is not statistically significant and less than that for the European Union post-Migrant Crisis ($M= 3.307\%$, $SD = .4421\%$).

Using the mean average rate of change in GDP as a baseline for economic standing and credibility, Germany did not face an impact to its economic standing as the results of *H01* also indicate; however, their mean GDP increase was less than that of other European Union states. The GDP for the EU was calculated on an average for all the member states (See Appendix E for an exact country-by-country comparison). Comparative to the analogous Sweden, both nations did not face a statistically significant or negative impact to its GDP, but a positive one, while remaining within its targeted (+/-) 2 % inflationary rate of change (The World Bank 2022b; The World Bank 2022c). Similar to Germany and Sweden, most of the EU member states faced an increase in GDP despite the increase in migrant population. Only 6 states (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, and Spain) did not see a statistically significant increase in GDP rate of change.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS

Overview

The 2015 Migrant Crisis was a major historic event that occurred throughout the European Union from 2015-2019. The colossal influx of refugees to the EU simultaneously – a result of civil unrest, violence, war, and poverty throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe – developed a Crisis that impacted multiple facets of European political economic culture. Of all the European states impacted by the Crisis, Germany hosted the largest number of refugees due to the nation's liberal social policies and strong economic standing. This chapter contains discussion and future research possibilities to help address the research questions posed in this paper:

***RQ1:** How has the influx of asylum seekers throughout the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis impacted Germany politically and, namely, economically?*

***RQ2:** From a German perspective, are these political and economic impacts beneficial or detrimental to German society?*

This study hypothesized that Germany would face negative political and economic impacts as a result. This study also hypothesized how these negative impacts would outweigh the impacts felt amongst the other EU states. While Germany did face significant political impacts, primarily resulting from increased terrorism and crime, there was not a significant economic impact to the nation. In opposition, Germany's GDP ended up increasing after the Migrant Crisis. Germany also did not face an economic and political change more significant than that of the other European states.

Discussion

The purpose of this study is to discover the causal effects of the 2015 Migrant Crisis in Germany to determine its impact to the nation. The statistical results garnered from the three hypotheses prove that the 2015 Migrant Crisis did have an impact to Germany's economy and political construct; however, the nature of the impact is mixed. While German society experienced a negative toll, namely due to the increase in terrorism, the German economy fared surprisingly well. In parallel, the EU fared equally well economically and poor politically. The results indicate that Germany faced near tantamount impacts to that of the EU as opposed to a concentrated negative one. Germany seems to have fared neutral to mildly positive amidst / post-Migrant Crisis.

Hypotheses

***H₀₁:** The 2015 Migrant Crisis will not showcase a statistically significant difference in Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis.*

Figure 15 indicated that there may not be a difference in mean GDP percentage change and variation between Germany's pre-Crisis and post-Crisis standing. The assumption for Levene's test for homogeneity of variance passes [$F(18)=2.053, p>.05$]. H_{01} fails to reject the null hypothesis [$t(18)=-.376, p>.05$]. The mean difference post-Migrant Crisis ($M= 1.712\%$, $SD = .8367\%$) is not statistically significant and greater than that for the pre-Migrant Crisis ($M= 1.281\%$, $SD = 2.4782\%$).

The results of the error bar chart and the Independent Samples t Test used to test H_{01} indicated there was not a significant change in Germany's economic standing (using GDP as the indicator) throughout the duration of the Migrant Crisis, nor post-Migrant Crisis. In contrast,

Germany's GDP rose. This mirrors George Borjas' claim that immigrants add to the labor market and bring economic benefits, such as increased GDP, to the host nation (1994; 2014). This would indicate that the refugees in Germany largely contributed back to the market through fiscal expenditures and cash flow, although their contribution to the labor market bolsters the fiscal aid (International Monetary Fund 2020; Fazzari, Ferri, & Greenberg 2008). Furthermore, this is corroborated through the Keynesian theory on economic equilibrium. The results of this study align with previous analysis showcasing that international migration results in a positive GDP per capita and a negative unemployment rate (Jennissen 2003).

Throughout the Migrant Crisis, Germany's social welfare expenditures were egregiously high to compensate for the mass influx in population. In 2015 alone, Germany spent €16 billion (or .5% GDP) on migrants (OECD 2017). For perspective, prior to the Crisis, the IMF projected the GDP-weighted average expenditures on migration to be .13% for the EU and .2% for Germany in 2015 (Aiyar, Barkbu, Batini, et al., 2016). This equates to Germany's expenditures being .3%, or approximately €6.4 billion, more than projected. Monetarily, it costs an estimated €10,000 – higher if integration support is needed – for a single asylum seeker application and accommodation (OECD 2017).


In addition to the domestic migrant expenditures of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members of the OECD, Germany has contributed the most Official Development Assistance (ODA) to those under category I.A.8.2 Refugees in Donor Countries throughout the duration of the Crisis (OECD 2019). ODA is defined as foreign governmental aid used to promote welfare and economic development for developing nations in need (Ibid. 2019). At the start of the Crisis in 2015, Germany contributed \$3,372.26 (in 2020 USD millions) (Ibid. 2019). Sweden, with the second highest amount, contributed \$2,424.18M. By the end, in 2019,

Germany contributed \$3,139.36M, with the United States following in second position at \$1,902.54M (or France at \$1,262.59M, for EU countries) (Ibid. 2019).

Despite the exorbitant expenditures in various refugee social welfare programs, independent analysis conducted by groups such as the International Monetary Fund, Financial Times, and Deutsche Welle claimed Germany would not only recover from the Crisis, but financially net positive once the refugees fully integrate into society (Rafik Hariri Center 2017; Ayoub 2019). According to a 2018 hypothetical study conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin wherein the Migrant Crisis did not happen, the German GDP would have a lower growth rate (DIW Berlin 2018). This would equate to .3 lower percentage points in 2015 and an average of .2 percentage points lower every year from 2011 – 2016 (Ibid. 2018). To fiscally net positive, Germany would have had to experience an increase in cash expenditures and economic output through the labor market (OECD 2013).

This would indicate that the asylum seekers and migrant population were able to properly integrate into the workforce and contribute back into German society. This coincides with the largest demographic of asylum seekers being of the working age group at 18-24 followed by those 25-29 and 35-39 (Juran 2017). This is further substantiated through Germany's rise in GDP and decline in unemployment despite the increase in migrant population, as seen in Figures 5-7. As of 2019, at the end of the Crisis, Germany's unemployment was 8 percentage points above the EU average for those aged 20-64 (Higgins & Klitgaard 2019).

Figure 16
Median Net Income (% Change)



Note. This graph was created to compare the percent change in median net income (based off of Euros) between Germany and the EU average. From “Mean and Median Income by Age and Sex,” by Eurostat, 2022, in *Eurostat*. (<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do>).

Furthermore, per Figure 16, for those aged 16-64, the percent change in median net income (based off euros) was higher every year in Germany over the EU average (Eurostat 2022e). This showcases Germany not only outperformed the average EU salary every year, but also saw a .96% higher difference in 2019 at the end of the Crisis. This trend is similar within the second component to economic stability: inflationary rate. Germany fared exceedingly well throughout the Migrant Crisis, staying within the European Central Bank’s target inflation of 2% (Cecioni, Coenen, Gerke, et al. 2021). At the start of the Crisis in 2015, Germany’s annual inflation was at .5% and by the end, in 2019, Germany’s inflation was much closer to the targeted 2% at 1.4% (The World Bank 2022b). The EU average was 0% (which is an indication of deflation) in 2015 and increased to 1.4% in 2019 (Ibid. 2022b).

H₀₂: *The 2015 Migrant Crisis will have no impact to Germany's political and economic standing to its pre-Crisis levels.*

Tables 5 and 6 test H₀₂, where the null hypothesis is rejected. A significant effect was found ($Lambda(8,11) = .022, p < .001$). A significant effect does not necessarily constitute a surprise, namely in relation to Germany's political standing, due to the European Union's poor historic immigration and integration policies (Huntoon 1998). The inability to initiate a European-wide multicultural and diverse approach to society, and the shift in Germany's multicultural mitigation strategy to the "salad bowl," is also a predictable indicator of an impact to Germany's political standing (Chin 2017a). This is further exemplified in the refugees' failure to integrate within European society, as seen outlined in Bauder's Hegelian reminiscent dialectic theory between imagination and immigration and the importance of identification and ethno-culturalism (Bauder 2011).

Follow up univariate ANOVAs indicated that terrorist attacks were significantly affected by the 2015 Migrant Crisis ($F(1,18) = 12.249, p = .003$). Crime offenses ($F(1,18) = 5.119, p = .036$); asylum applications ($F(1,18) = 19.732, p < .001$); unemployment rate ($F(1,18) = 19.669, p < .001$); and average annual salary ($F(1,18) = 72.238, p < .001$) were statistically significant. GDP rate of change ($F(1,18) = .141, p = .711$); CPI ($F(1,18) = 2.826, p = .110$); and inflation rate change ($F(1,18) = 1.912, p = .184$) were not statistically significant.

The MANOVA and subsequent ANOVAs testing for H₀₂ showcased Germany's economy and political sphere faced an impact post-Crisis. The ANOVAs indicated that terrorist attacks, crime offenses, asylum applications, unemployment rate, and average annual salary were significant post-Crisis commencement. Of the significant events, terrorist attacks and asylum applications negatively altered Germany while crime rate, unemployment rate, and average

annual salary positively impacted the nation. The results outlined that the GDP rate of change, CPI, and inflationary rate change were not significantly impacted.

Political Economy

Asylum applications negatively impacting Germany on a statically significant level is not a flummoxing realization; without the influx of asylum seekers, the Crisis would not exist. Germany received 1.8M applications throughout the duration the Crisis which was 228% more than France, the second largest total asylum application recipient in the EU (Eurostat 2022a). In relation to the commencement of the Crisis, Germany received a 135% increase in applications between 2014 and 2015. The migration follows the contemporary pattern of immigration reflecting asylum seekers fleeing violence in their source nation opposed to seeking employment in the host nation (Van Mol & de Valk 1996; Johnson 1980).

GDP rate of change, CPI, and inflationary rate failed to reach statistical significance. As the results of H₀₁ indicated, Germany's GDP was not negatively impacted by the Crisis, but, conversely, increased positively. This indicates most Germany's migrants joined the workforce and were able to contribute fiscally back into society. Immigration adds to both the economic stability and labor market of the host nation; it creates an economic equilibrium (Borjas 1994; Borjas 2014). Immigration benefits the labor market by maintaining employees, creating low unemployment rates, producing new employment opportunities through increased innovation, and averting labor shortages; however, the inflationary rate is also regulated and stabilized due to economic stability and the expansion of the domestic market performance and productivity (Coleman & Rowthorn 2004; Kozlowski 2011).

Unemployment and Salary

In part due to the symbiotic relationship to high GDP and stable inflation (positive cash flow), Germany showcased a positive significance with unemployment rates and salary (Picardo 2022). The inverse relationship between unemployment rate and population growth outlined in Figure 6 indicates that Germany was able to withstand supply and demand shocks and maintain positive cash flow throughout the Crisis (Wallace 1983). While the underemployment percentage remained higher than that of the unemployed, and a decent number of migrants fall under the underemployment category, the slope is in a paralleled decline (Figure 7) (Bundesagentur für Deutschland 2022; Ott 2013). As with the high GDP, this further showcases that Germany was able to successfully employ and integrate a majority its migrant population into German society, particularly when a large percentage of the migrants were of working age (Juran 2017). Those that are categorized as underemployed are still supported through social benefits, via the Hartz IV program; therefore, able to also contribute spending within German society (IAB 2020).

This directly ties to the successful utilization of the economic principals outlined in the New Growth Theory, which states that an increase in population will result in an increase in economic growth (i.e., GDP) and productivity (Liberto 2021). Because of Germany's large fiscal expenditure in social benefits that fostered learning opportunities and development (such as language training and education), the human capital of the refugees invested in the labor market increased. As their human capital and the desire for personal economic success increased, Germany was then able to bolster the labor market through a population that exhibited increased experience and skillsets (Reich, Gordon, & Edwards 1973).

Furthermore, Figure 16 outlines how the percent change in median net income was higher every year in Germany over the EU average (Eurostat 2022e). Germany pays well comparative

to its European Union counterparts and includes comprehensive social security and health insurance benefits. Germany is successfully economically in part due to Germany's overall economic performance, but primarily through its exceptionally high standard of living and purchasing power (Chamberlain 2016). Unlike most states, beneficiaries of the high living standards and purchasing power include the majority of the population, which are those that fall under the average wage-earning category (Ibid. 2016).

Crime and Terrorism

This paper is predicated upon the notion that the substantial increase of asylum seekers to Germany is significant. Proven statistically correct, the resultant analysis in this study fully realizes the impact of the influx of migrants and their interdependencies. Arguably, terrorist activity and crime had the largest impact on domestic and foreign policy adjustments as well as the overall wellbeing and mental health of the native people. Thus, terrorism and crime should be weighted accordingly when determining the impact to Germany's societal and political standing. Indicatively, crime and terrorism had the largest significance in the statistical analysis. Interestingly, Figures 10 and 11 show that the slope is nearly parallel for terrorist attacks and crime throughout 2014-2020.

Terrorism is a result of poor security policies and international threats (Klein 2021). Because immigration, particularly in mass waves, compromises both, it may result in increased terrorism, the formation or growth of extremist communities, and influence within those who already reside within host nation (De Kerchove 2011). This is particularly present in militant jihadism through radicalization, socio-political alienation, globalization, religiosity, and reaction to foreign policy (Wilner & Dubouloz 2010). When migrants stem from violent, war torn, and

corrupt societies, there is a parallel to the volume of crime and terrorist activities brought to the new host nation (Brown, Jones & Becker 2018).

It is estimated that for every casualty amidst a terrorist attack, there is between four and fifty times the number of victims of those who suffer from acute stress and psychological trauma (Bartholomew 2016). Using this logic, with the 384 casualties calculated for 2014-2019, Germany experienced upwards of 1,536-19,200 victims. Approximately 74% of Germans reported a heightened fear of terrorism throughout the Crisis – a dramatic increase from the pre-Crisis level of 49% (Ciechanowicz 2015). This significant increase in fear coincides with the astounding 400% increase in terrorism from 2014-2015 (Statista 2021a).

Unlike terrorism, Germany's overall crime rate averaged a statistically significant decline toward the end of the Crisis. This decline is regardless of a 3.5% increase in crime from 2014-2015 and an increase to non-German suspects of crime to 30% by 2018 from 2014's 24% (Clark 2021b; BBC 2018). Of the 30% foreign criminal suspects, 8.5% of those were asylum seekers (BBC 2018). While the overall crime levels decreased, Germany did see an uptick in sexual assault, rape, coercion, drug, gang, and violent offenses with high percentages of foreign perpetrators (Gehrsitz & Ungerer 2018, 3; Guarnieri 2018; Ali 2021b; European Parliament 2015; Godet & Niveau 2021). This aligns with the Muslim extremism and the correlating poor treatment of toward women and women's rights. Numerically, in 2015, 19% of asylum seekers were male minors (compared to 10% female minors), 42% were males aged 18-34 (compared to the 11% of females), and 12% of those 35 and older were male (compared to the 6% females) (Pew Research Center 2016).

An explanation for the overall decrease in crime – even with the population increase and sporadic upticks – is the alignment to the decline in unemployment. Many migrants faced

unemployment at the start of the Crisis in 2015; however, as they began to assimilate into society and gain employment, crime began to decline. Previous research argues that crime and unemployment/underemployment have a correlation; as one increases or decreases, so does the other (Borjas 2014; Raphael & Winter-Ebmer 2001; Thompson 1981). Furthermore, crime due to unemployment is typically linked to a mixture of desperation and opportunity (Bushway & Reuter 2003).

This justification stands to reason as unemployment has declined in wake of the Migrant Crisis. Not only has unemployment decreased, but underemployment, which has a large refugee population, faced a synchronist decline. At the end of the Crisis, underemployment (for those aged 25-74) had declined to a mere 2.7% from the Crisis' commencement of 4%; the curve maintained an entirely downward slope throughout the duration of the Crisis (Ycharts 2021). In addition, the average annual salary of Germans increased by an average of \$2.2K. As wages rise, desperation declines; as desperation declines, so does crime.

Historical Comparisons

The 1951 Refugee Convention established the asylum laws that were instated into the institutional framework of the EU's immigration stance throughout the Migrant Crisis (UN General Assembly 1951). This included Article 23 of the Convention and Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ensuring the refugees' safety and that all of their needs were met by the host country, including shelter and resources (Abbas, Aloudat, Bartolomei, et al. 2011; Bubb, Kremer, & Levine 2011). The precursor to the 1951 Refugee Convention, including the establishment of some of these fundamental laws, were first utilized by Germany during the migration crisis in the 1940s. Clearly, Germany's social and political stance on immigrants has not altered since the end of the Second World War.

Not only has Germany's acceptance of refugees and high social welfare remained in place throughout both migrant crises, but the economic impact mitigation strategy remains the same. Both crises followed a Keynesian influenced approach and buildup of human capital to mitigate the economic downturn because of the influx of refugees. Germany's economic growth and correlated rise in population mirrors the new growth theory ideals (CFI 2021).

***H₀₃:** Germany's economic standing post-Migrant Crisis will not have a more significant impact than that of the other European Union states.*

In Tables 7 – 9, the assumption for Levene's test for homogeneity of variance passes for Germany [F(18)=2.053, p>.05] and the EU [F(18)=3.782, p>.05]. The null hypothesis is accepted; Germany has a lower mean increase post-Crisis [t(18)=-.376, p>.05] than the EU [t(18)=-1.074, p>.05]. The mean difference for Germany post-Migrant Crisis ($M= 1.712\%$, $SD = .8367\%$) is not statistically significant and less than that for the European Union post-Migrant Crisis ($M= 3.307\%$, $SD = .4421\%$).

The Independent Samples t Test showcased that H₀₃ was accepted. Despite the larger number of asylum seekers hosted, Germany did not face an analogous impact to its economic standing comparative to the other EU states. The GDP percent change increased for both Germany and the mean average of the EU. The diverging approaches taken to address the Crisis by the varying EU states follows the guiding theoretical framework that the EU has contemporarily and historically failed in coordinating immigration policies and collaborating in integration efforts (Huntoon 1998, 423; Maldini & Takahashi 2017, 54). While there was no statistical impact to Germany's economic standing, Germany undertaking such a prominent role validated previous research stating that there are significantly uneven distribution of roles and

responsibilities amongst EU member states with Germany often undertaking key responsibilities (Karolewski & Roland Benedikte 2018).

Welfare Magnet Theory

The welfare magnet theory argues migration flow is contingent upon the existence of a welfare state and the amount of social welfare benefits that are likely to be received (Zavodny 1997; Kaushal 2005). Previous studies have argued that new immigrants are far less likely to use the social welfare system opposed to resident immigrants or natives (Kaushal 2005; Giuliatti 2014). When segregating H03 to Germany specifically, the results seem to substantiate that understanding of the migrant theory. While there is evidence throughout this paper to indicate the welfare magnet has merit, this paper does not find enough evidence to argue that theory is a primary driver of the 2015 Migrant Crisis.

The EU was an exceedingly popular regional choice for migrants throughout the duration of the Crisis, but Germany was not singled out due to its social welfare benefits. Tied to the welfare magnet, is the resultant fiscal burden theory; neither Germany nor the EU showcased a statistically significant fiscal burden at a mean average. According to the World Economic Forum and the OECD, the top six OECD states in terms of social welfare benefits and spending are France, Finland, Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Spain (Buchholz 2021). All of these states, sans Spain, experienced a statistically significant increase in GDP (see Appendix E) further proving that the migrants were not a fiscal burden.

However, the European Union faced a consequential increase in asylum population. Throughout the duration of the Crisis, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and Spain received the largest number of asylum applications respectively, with Belgium ranking tenth and Finland

fifteenth (Eurostat 2022). This which would indicate that these countries are exponentially desirable to migrants and the welfare magnet theory may be applicable. This data coincides with studies that argue that Europe was the backdrop for the Migrant Crisis due to Europe's generous social benefits and social welfare spending (Razin & Wahba 2015; Johnston, Banting, & Kymlicka 2016). Last, the various global crises of the time were the catalyst that began the Migrant Crisis in Germany. The refugees' subsequent inspiration to choose Germany and EU – as genuine refugees or for economic gain – is difficult to discern, especially without a correlating impact to the overall economy of the state.

Conclusion

The 2015 Migrant Crisis significantly altered the European Union and its member states. From 2015-2019, millions of refugees fled their source nations (throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe) to Western Europe due to an abundance of crime, war, violence, and poor socioeconomic conditions. This put the EU in a precarious position to facilitate, integrate, and economically, politically, and physically support the onslaught of asylum seekers. Germany, facing the largest influx of refugees, was hypothesized to face detrimental political and economic effects with the impact being larger to Germany than that of any other European Union member state.

This study argues that the 2015 Migrant Crisis had a low impact to the German economy and a mid to high-level impact to German political society in the short-term duration (from 2015-2019). Determining the true long-term impacts requires a future study, but the results found in this study argue that effects of the Migrant Crisis to Germany have normalized, resulting in little to no long-term impacts. Any future political and economic impacts are more likely to be related to the COVID-19 pandemic than the surge in 2015-2019 refugees.

The Migrant Crisis did not impact the German economy negatively, as hypothesized. Alternatively, the Migrant Crisis seemed to bolster and maintain the already stabilized German economy. GDP continued an upward trajectory; inflation did not stray past the targeted 2%; unemployment and underemployment both decreased; and the average annual salary increased despite stable inflation. Furthermore, the German economic standing was not an outlier and did not face egregious economic or political impacts comparative to the other EU states despite undertaking more than their fair share of asylum seekers and their respective economic burdens and expenditures.

However, the German political society did not burgeon. The steep increase in terrorism is a colossal negative impact and is directly related to the Migrant Crisis. The rise in attacks instilled considerable degrees of fear and outrage, both domestically and internationally. While the overarching crime rate did face a statistically significant decrease, the German political and societal response would indicate otherwise. This sentiment may be driven due to the nature of crimes committed by asylum seekers, the increased levels, and/or the existing disposition of the natives due to the rise in terrorism. For example, amidst the rise in crime and terrorism, the United Kingdom successfully voted to leave the EU, largely citing national security and safety concerns (Nugent 2018). While Germany did not exit the EU, many have reported similar concerns.

Policy Implications

Economic Policies

This study argues that from an overarching perspective, an influx of asylum seekers and migrants do not have a severe impact to its host nation economically. This position is predicated

upon the utilization of a state with high preexisting GDP. This would temporarily substantiate the costs associated with hosting an influx of migrants. Because the support provided is at the expense of the taxpayer, the aid provided should be focused on creating a temporary solution with the long-term solution focusing on successful integration into the host nation's workforce and market (including expenditures and investments).

Germany has been providing resources and basic necessities to refugees prior to the establishment of the 1951 Refugee Convention's law (Abbas, Aloudat, Bartolomei, et al., 2018; Koschmal 2014). The best way to meet the laws set forth in the Refugee Convention and maintain a positive outcome within society is by focusing heavily on providing education, housing, language courses, integration programs, and elder and childcare (Ruist 2015). By maintaining this strong humanitarian position contemporarily, refugees can receive basic necessities, such as an opportunity for education, and then bring productivity to the state's economy and society by adding valuable skillsets to the workforce. This approach not only aids the economic and political position of the nation but creates a state where refugees are fully integrated into society, the workforce, and educational systems. This level of integration is an essential component to successful immigration (Jackson 2011).

Integration not only encompasses inclusion within the local educational system and workforce but to the labor market and investment spending (Carrera & Allsopp 2017). European governments should focus on granting migrants high level access to the international labor market to incentivize fiscal expenditures and investments. Opposed to distributing stipends, this approach would provide the constituents tax relief while putting pressure on fiscal expenditures. There is no guarantee that federally distributed stipends would return to the market.

This study recommends German policymakers continue utilizing the Keynesian theory of economics in respect to government intervention. In respect to the 2015 Migrant Crisis, and historic migrant crises, government intervention was highly successful. Not only was the German economy able to last the initial influx of migrants and hit to the market, but the country was able to do so and end the Crisis with a higher GDP per capita while staying within the (+/-) 2% inflationary goal (The World Bank 2022b).

While the Keynesian approach impacts the native German taxpayer – Germany unlike America – is not used to the neo-liberalistic ideals of limited government intervention regarding social policies. Accounting for income taxes and social security, Germany leads the industrialized world in taxes (OECD 2022). Therefore, the taxes needed would not seem drastic to the average German. However, because German taxes are high, in an effort to balance social policies and aid the average German taxpayer, this research recommends German policymakers utilize the new growth theory and primarily invest in social programs that increase self-sufficiency and human capital.

This study showcased that the classical notion that human desires and self-interest results in increased productivity and economic stability. German policymakers should, therefore, increase educational and learning opportunities. As the German population – both native and migrant – increase their desire for economic growth, they will undertake social benefits that increase their human capital to become more marketable to the labor market. This would, ideally, create continuous integration into the primary labor sector opposed to adding to the instability of the secondary.

To aid the funding in beneficial social programs while also assisting the taxpayer, this research further recommends Germany limit their social funding in other areas deemed not as

crucial. An example would be the Unemployment Benefit I (unemployment insurance). Unlike the United States, unemployment is administered by the *Bundesagentur für Arbeit* (Federal Employment Agency) and funded by both the employee and employer (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2022). This could be limited to the employer contribution, so the benefit is not eradicated, but incentivizes the unemployed to seek employment while providing a tax break to the employee.

The dual labor market theory argues that the economy has two sectors: primary and secondary. The primary sector can be categorized as more “white collar” employment with the secondary sector as “blue collar”. It argues that a person’s position is largely determined by their human capital (education, skills, experience, etc.). It also argues that migration waves cause mass disruption to the secondary sector because immigrants and people of color largely fall into the secondary sector.

Figure 6 showcases the inverse graph of population and unemployment rates. As the population continued to increase throughout the duration of the Crisis, both unemployment and underemployment faced a continued decrease. As of 2019, at the end of the Crisis, Germany’s unemployment was 8 percentage points above the EU average for those aged 20-64 (Higgins & Klitgaard 2019). Within five years of the Crisis, half of the migrants were able to find steady work. Taking underemployment out (as they are not a component of the labor market), this would indicate Germany’s contributions to improve migrant human capital through education, language, and training resulted in an increase to their willingness to maximize opportunities and enter the primary sector. After the Migrant Crisis, Germany did not see a large disruption in the secondary sector, but, in contrast, the percentage of workers in the secondary sector decreased (Statista 2022). Because of the large increase in population and lack of disruption to the

secondary sector (but decrease), this would indicate that the migrants were able to successfully integrate into the primary workforce. Furthermore, Sweden faced a similar uptick in population and GDP as a result of the Crisis, but a dissimilar downturn in unemployment rates.

Social Policies

Converse to economic standing, an influx of asylum seekers creates a substantially negative impact to the host nation's social and political climate. The result of this study acknowledges the detrimental impact terrorism and crime have on a nation. These impacts include, and are not limited to, PTSD, death, injury, fear, and instability (Bartholomew 2016). Because of the colossal impact crime and terrorism have, policymakers must instate a better screening process into migration. This would include an increase in screening, monitoring of suspicious travelers, and an environment where reporting of suspicious persons or incidents is not only accessible but valued. Understanding that Germany is a member of the EU and has free travel and mobility between member states, this practice should be instated uniformly amongst all member states.

From an economic perspective, the "genuine refugee" versus the "economic refugee" becomes irrelevant as the differential impacts are minor. From a national security perspective, a distinction between "genuine refugee" and a "non-genuine refugee" becomes a question of public safety. The same question can easily be applied to those who are not just refugees fleeing danger, but merely immigrants seeking a new home. While Germany is required to aid those seeking asylum, Germany can instate stricter residency policies. Germany can also enact policies that are able to dive into why the person is seeking residency into the country.

This paper suggests something akin to the Canadian requirements. Canada has some of the strictest entry requirements in the world, even requiring biometrics if you are seeking residency due to a familial relationship (Government of Canada 2022). This paper suggests following the Canadian example and instate a background (with proof required) that ensures those seeking residency are either employed or have the capability to be, educated or seeking education, passes a language requirement (or has proof that they are enrolled in classes), and/or has a familial relationship.

Canada further selects their applicants based upon the ability to blend into social life of Canada (Government of Canada 2022). Arguably, a large component of migrant-related crime is due to cultural clashing. Using the 2015 Migrant Crisis as an example, Germany and the EU experienced an increase in assault, rape, sexual assault, and sexual coercion with many perpetrators foreign born – nearly 60% in Sweden from 2000-2015 and, in 2019 in Germany, 9.7% were asylum seekers (Ali 2021b; European Parliament 2015; Godet & Niveau 2021). This coincides with extremist Muslim views where women are viewed to have little to no rights. In a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center to Muslims, 20 of 23 countries reported over 50% that woman must always obey her husband and only 12 of 23 countries reported daughters have the same rights as sons (Pew Research Center 2013).

This also coincides with research indicating that host nations face instability and emotional strife as the host nation becomes intertwined in the complications brought from the migrants' source nation (Lischer 2017). This includes displays of violent crime and instability, perhaps further linking the European Union and Germany's upswing in violent crime. When screened asylum seekers enter the host nation, resources should be provided to educate them on the laws, legal systems, and cultural views of the host nation. While they should not be forced to

assimilate and change their beliefs, if they are unwilling or unable to comply with the local laws due to personal belief, then they should not be allowed to establish residency. Should migrants integrate into society and fully recognize they are residing in a host nation with different values, crime may decrease.

As a result of cultural clashing and violence, this research recommends German policymakers halt the push for the “salad bowl” approach to multiculturalism and focus more on the melting pot approach wherein refugees and migrants adopt the German ethnocultural way of life. To note, this should be an integration technique/policy, not an assimilation one. After 2019, 58% of Germans did not want more immigration, with 41% remaining neutral or not believing immigrants made Germany stronger (Dempster, Leach & Hargrave 2020; Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor 2019). There is a plausible connection the fact that in 2018 only 33% of German immigrants wanted to adopt German customs and the concept of the *Volksgeist* is too intricately woven into the native German psyche (Silver, Fagan, Connaughton & Mordecai 2021). The *Volk* is an ethnocultural concept that is still largely present in Germans, and German decision making, today; modern Germans still hold on to the notion that traditions and cultural values hold more wisdom than politics (Kohn 1950; Tzogopoulos 2017).

Recommendations also include a focus on the promotion of independent journalism and stricter media bias regulations. The perspectives of asylum seekers and terrorism are highly correlated to media coverage (Estevens 2018). For example, the public outrage under *Asiatskorridor* (public concern regarding the welfare state and cultural clashing due to the inability to integrate migrants) in Sweden could have been mitigated if the media had not severely exacerbated the connotation (Tomson 2020). The poor treatment toward migrants may be lessened if they are not seen as “the other” or more dangerous to society (Hoffmann 2021).

This may decrease right-wing crime and terrorism. The domino effect may even continue further. Discrimination often results in an increase in crime. If the discrimination lessens, so would the crime.

Furthermore, this study highlights the discrepancies in policies amongst the EU states. Although asylum seekers were unevenly distributed to Germany due to the state's high GDP, a majority of the responsibility to manage the Crisis fell upon Germany as a result (Karolewski & Roland Benedikte 2018). This highlights a fracture within the European Union system by placing increased power and positioning in one state opposed to the others (Gruner 2017). This power positioning is critical as it could increase pressure to existing fissures and either a) dissolve the EU system (this was already seen in the United Kingdom's Brexit) b) create an environment for animosity and/or c) dissolve the democratic integrity of the Union. Poor immigration and failed equal responsibility distribution are less likely to occur if the EU creates a uniform set of policies and procedures.

Limitations

2019 Novel Coronavirus

One of the most impactful, if not the largest, limitation faced within this study was the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic hindered the ability to travel. Loss of travel resulted in an inability to conduct on the ground field research. To mitigate the loss of field research, this study leans heavily on a quantitative approach with data retrieved from academic articles and institutions. The German perspectives on the political and economic environment were captured from a variety of available surveys and polls (such as Pew Research Center and Statista), and news media sources across a myriad of political parties, regions, and demographics. This was

used to bolster the existing quantitative data and, as a result, there may be perspectives and opinions that were not captured in this study.

Second, as global travel mandates were put in place, normalized data became skewed. When tracking migrant patterns, impacts, and domestic and foreign funds – including foreign and domestic aid – it can be exceedingly difficult to determine what is based on the outlying event versus what is considered the norm. In the case of the 2015 Migrant Crisis, data could become intertwined with the COVID pandemic and create difficulty isolating one global event from another. For example, numerous economic bills and stimulus programs (such as debt forgiveness and funding grants) were provided. This shifts the economic standing and migration data. Last, unemployment skyrocketed because of the pandemic, which may impact projections of migrant employment and stability of the host nation's employment rate.

The 2015 Migrant Crisis officially ended in 2019 before the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic were fully realized, aiding in the isolation of data. While the effects of the pandemic and the unofficial migrant crisis continued past 2019, using 2015-2019 as a baseline scope aids in determining the impacts of the Crisis alone.

Sample Size Limitation

The Migrant Crisis officially ended in 2019. This study was conducted in 2021-2022. Because of the limited sample size for post-Crisis data, the standard deviation for post-Crisis analysis was higher than that of the pre-Crisis. Using data post-2015 (2015 being the crux of the Crisis), only allotted approximately 5-7 years' worth of testable data. As time passes, more data points from subsequent years can be used in a future study to better calculate the true impacts of the Crisis and their lasting effects on Germany and the EU.

Access to Resources

Conducting this research from the United States of America amidst a global pandemic limits access to European and German resources. Using German newspaper articles and European institutional data provide credible data and perspective; however, the research is limited to the data accessible within the United States. Furthermore, research conducted from Europe provides researchers the ability to explore qualitative perspectives by questioning, documenting, observing, and analyzing data from their own experiences, interactions, and through the first-person perspective of those directly impacted by the Crisis. This research was conducted through secondary sources, previous research, and accessible data. Having been to Europe multiple times throughout the course of my life (including multiple instances throughout the duration of the 2015 Migrant Crisis) with family residing in Germany, I was able to enforce the tested results of this study and draw conclusions from my own experiences and knowledge.

Misinterpretation of Terms

Migrant, immigrant, refugee, and asylum seeker are terms that are often used synonymously in academic text, colloquial speech, and news articles; however, they have different meanings legally. While there is no current internationally accepted legal definition for *migrant*, it is generally accepted as someone who is settling into a new nation temporarily or a mass movement of people (Amnesty International 2021; United Nations 2021). In opposition, *immigrants* relocate to the host nation permanently (International Organization for Migration 2021). A *refugee* is a person actively fleeing their nation due to human rights violations or persecution (Amnesty International 2021). Finally, *asylum seekers* are refugees who have not been given legal asylum (Ibid. 2021).

Conducting independent research and using the available data, this study sought to provide accurate research in accordance with the legal definitions of migrant, immigrant, refugee, and asylum seeker. However, due to their normalized interchangeable use, this study cannot guarantee there was not a misrepresentation of terms used. To attenuate the possibility of misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the terms, multiple sources were used and cross-referenced when compiling and analyzing data. Additionally, this study leaned heavily on official statistics (such as UNHCR and the European Commission) opposed to journalistic and academic articles, where the terms are more likely to be used with their correct legal definition.

Recommendations for Future Research

As with all crises and global events, data continuously emerges and evolves and conclusions may transfigure because of new information. Because of this study's limitation to the utilization of secondary sources, the use of primary sources in future research is recommended. A better perspective of the impacted nations and states can be drawn – perhaps altering the conclusions of this study – through interviews, surveys, and field research. This would also outline the impact of the social welfare magnet and the subsequent cultural impacts of the Crisis. It would better showcase how the social welfare and local sentiments may have improved or remained over time. Furthermore, the true impacts of a situation are better tested years after the incident, after more data becomes available. This research's testable sample size was limited due to the rudimentary number of years since the start of the Crisis. Stronger conclusions may be drawn when utilizing the same tests for a larger sample of years' datapoints.

2021-2022 Russo-Ukrainian Crisis

The release of this study aligns with the contemporary and ongoing 2021-2022 Russo-Ukrainian Crisis. The Russo-Ukrainian Crisis presents an extremely interesting transition into future European migration research, particularly mirroring the study of refugees fleeing war. European economic and political standing parallels can be drawn and analyzed. Because of the event similarity and proximity in years, data will be easily accessible and comparable. In addition to adding to the research questions posed within this paper, the following questions can be further studied:

Are the population issues as a result of the Crisis faced by Europe all the same? How has Europe addressed another mass influx of refugees? Have the immigration policies been fixed and normalized across the various EU countries? Does the violence in Europe (opposed to the Middle East) impact the national people's perspectives? Did the refugees stemming from Muslim nations face increased levels of racism and decreased levels of Western support?

Addressing these questions create an interesting picture of migration patterns, racism, and policy issues. The proximity showcases the 2015 Migrant Crisis may not be entirely abnormal and part of a historical migration cycle, further highlighting the importance of creating uniform and successful immigration policies across the European Union.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Appendix A1*IRB Approval*

Date: 5-19-2022

IRB #: IRB-FY21-22-996

Title: The 2015 Migrant Crisis: Impacts to Germany

Creation Date: 4-21-2022

End Date:

Status: **Approved**

Principal Investigator: Irish Solinsky

Review Board: Research Ethics Office

Sponsor:

Study History

Submission Type	Initial	Review Type	Exempt	Decision	No Human Subjects Research
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Key Study Contacts

Member	Michael Langlois	Role	Co-Principal Investigator	Contact	[REDACTED]
Member	Irish Solinsky	Role	Principal Investigator	Contact	[REDACTED]
Member	Irish Solinsky	Role	Primary Contact	Contact	[REDACTED]

Appendix A2*CITI Certification*

Completion Date 21-Apr-2022
Expiration Date 20-Apr-2025
Record ID 48573574

This is to certify that:

Irish Solinsky

Has completed the following CITI Program course:

Social & Behavioral Research - Basic/Refresher

(Curriculum Group)

Social & Behavioral Researchers

(Course Learner Group)

1 - Basic Course

(Stage)

Not valid for renewal of certification
through CME.

Under requirements set by:

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Appendix B

Table B*CPI: Germany, Years, Indiv. Consumption by Purpose (COICOP 2-5-digit hierarchy)*

Consumer price index (2015=100)										
Individual consumption by purpose	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Food and non-alcoholic beverages	94.7	98.3	99.4	100	100.8	103.6	106	107.2	109.7	113.1
Food	94.2	98.3	99.3	100	100.9	103.9	106.3	107.8	110.4	113.9
Bread and cereals	95.3	97.5	98.8	100	100.6	101	102.3	104.7	105.8	109.3
Rice, including rice preparations	.	.	.	100	99.6	100.5	102.8	106.8	108.3	111.6
Flour and other cereals	.	.	.	100	101.8	100.1	101.9	106.5	106.4	110.5
Bread and bread rolls	.	.	.	100	101.5	102.5	103.8	106.8	108.5	112.7
Other bakery products	.	.	.	100	99.6	100.1	102.3	104.9	105.5	109.3
Pizza, quiche or the like	.	.	.	100	99.5	98.5	99.2	98.6	98	99.8
Pasta	.	.	.	100	100.6	98.4	99	99.7	101.2	103.4
Breakfast cereals	.	.	.	100	101.6	102.4	102.7	104.6	105	107.6
Other cereal products	.	.	.	100	99.1	97.6	95.9	95.5	96.5	96.2
Meat and meat products	96.2	100.6	100.6	100	100.3	102.5	104.3	107.5	114.1	117.5
Beef and veal	.	.	.	100	100.2	101.5	104.4	106.3	108.2	111.6
Pork	.	.	.	100	101	103.8	104.7	108.3	118.1	121.3
Lamb, goat meat	.	.	.	100	104.1	107.8	111.7	115.8	116.8	121.5
Poultry	.	.	.	100	100.8	101.2	102.5	105.3	107.1	112.9
Other meats	.	.	.	100	100.9	104.2	108.3	110.4	110.6	113.7
Edible offal, other edible parts of slaught. animals	.	.	.	100	101.7	104.7	108	109.6	111.1	113.3
Meat products and sausages	.	.	.	100	99.9	102.5	104.4	108	116.4	119.1
Other meat, processed and prepared	.	.	.	100	100.5	102.4	104	106.9	114.3	117.7
Fish, fish products and seafood	93.6	96.1	98.1	100	103.4	107.2	108.5	112	113.4	115.5
Fresh or chilled fish and fish filets	.	.	.	100	104.3	108	108.6	112.8	116.1	119.9
Frozen fish and fish filets	.	.	.	100	103.2	102.8	104.5	111.6	114.8	116.7
Fresh or chilled seafood	.	.	.	100	105.2	109.8	110.6	111.1	111	113.1
Frozen seafood	.	.	.	100	103.4	106.5	108.1	108.4	107.7	106.9
Dried, smoked or salted fish	.	.	.	100	101.8	111.9	114.6	112.3	111.9	110.4
Tinned fish and other fish preparations	.	.	.	100	103	105.1	106.5	111.9	112.5	115.6
Dairy products and eggs	93.7	98.5	104.7	100	97.1	105	110.6	110.3	111.3	115.7
Whole milk	.	.	.	100	94.6	110.6	116.7	115.6	120.1	124.9
Low fat milk	.	.	.	100	93.9	109.6	113.8	112.8	118.5	124.1
Preserved milk	.	.	.	100	95.4	107.2	113	113.4	115.4	119.5
Yoghurt	.	.	.	100	98.8	102.8	106	106.7	106.1	107.9
Cheese and curd	.	.	.	100	95.6	102.9	106.8	106.8	107.1	111.4
Other dairy products	.	.	.	100	95.7	106.6	119.2	119.5	118.8	121.9
Eggs	.	.	.	100	108.6	108.1	116.9	114	116.3	125.6
Edible fats and oils	99	107.3	105	100	102.5	127.4	137.5	129.3	124	130.6
Butter	.	.	.	100	103	149.3	167.8	151.2	141.1	148.1
Margarine and other vegetable fats	.	.	.	100	100.3	103.2	105.6	109.3	109.9	116.5
Olive oil	.	.	.	100	107.4	114.2	118.1	115.2	111.6	113.3
Other edible oils of vegetable origin	.	.	.	100	99.3	96.2	93.8	92.7	92.8	102.8
Other edible fats of animal origin	.	.	.	100	105.2	119.5	125	122.1	125.1	130.8
Fruit	88.9	95.5	95.3	100	103.8	106	109.9	106.3	113.8	115.7
Fresh or chilled fruit	.	.	.	100	103.5	107	111.3	106.5	115.4	117.3
Frozen fruit	.	.	.	100	104.8	103.7	106.4	106.9	108.4	112.4
Dried fruit, nuts or the like	.	.	.	100	105.2	99.4	100.2	102.5	104.8	105.1
Tinned fruit	.	.	.	100	104.9	110.4	117.3	114.6	116.8	122.8
Vegetables	92.3	97.9	94.6	100	103.6	103.9	104.4	111	110.7	115

Fresh or chilled vegetables (excluding potatoes)	.	.	.	100	103	105.8	106	110.1	111.8	115.9
Frozen vegetables (excluding potatoes)	.	.	.	100	99.5	100.8	102.2	103.9	106.7	112.3
Dried vegetables and preserved vegetables	.	.	.	100	102.1	98.9	99.5	102.5	105.1	113.6
Fresh, chilled and processed potatoes	.	.	.	100	112.5	106.9	107.9	129.4	118	118.4
Potato crisps and potato sticks	.	.	.	100	90.7	88.1	89.6	94.3	93.3	96.9
Sugar, jam, honey and other confectionery	93.6	95.9	97.6	100	100.8	101.1	101.5	101.1	102.2	105.5
Sugar	.	.	.	100	99.3	101.1	96.3	93	105.6	109.6
Jam, marmelade, honey or the like	.	.	.	100	101.8	102.3	103.2	102.4	102.3	104.1
Chocolate	.	.	.	100	102	102.6	103.4	103.6	104.5	108.8
Confectionery products	.	.	.	100	99.9	99.6	99.8	99.3	99.9	103.1
Ice cream	.	.	.	100	98.7	98.8	99.9	100	100.7	103.5
Sweeteners	.	.	.	100	100.2	100.2	100.3	100	97.2	92
Food products n.e.c.	97	98.4	99.4	100	100.9	101.3	102.3	103.4	103.8	106
Sauces and condiments	.	.	.	100	101.1	102.3	104.3	105.3	105.6	108.2
Table salt, culinary herbs and flavourings	.	.	.	100	100.8	101.5	102.2	102.4	101.8	102.2
Baby food	.	.	.	100	101.3	101.6	100.7	104.8	108.5	113.3
Convenience food n.e.c.	.	.	.	100	100.2	99.8	99.8	100.7	100.9	103.7
Soups and other food preparations	.	.	.	100	100.8	100.6	101.5	102.6	103.1	105
Non-alcoholic beverages	98.2	98.6	99.5	100	100.1	101.5	103.3	103.1	104.5	107.5
Coffee, tea and cocoa	96.2	93.1	94.9	100	97.3	99.6	99.6	98.3	97.5	100.4
Coffee or the like	.	.	.	100	96.3	99.2	98.7	96.8	95.7	99
Tea	.	.	.	100	100.3	100.2	101.8	102.5	102.5	104.3
Cocoa and cocoa powder	.	.	.	100	103.1	106.2	107.6	109	110.8	110.7
Mineral water, soft drinks and juices	99.2	101.3	101.8	100	101.6	102.4	105.1	105.6	108.1	111.2
Mineral water	.	.	.	100	100.3	101.2	102.2	104.4	105	107.6
Refreshments (excluding mineral water)	.	.	.	100	100.9	101.1	104.1	105.7	110.9	114.9
Fruit and vegetable juices	.	.	.	100	104	105.6	110	107	108.8	111.3

Note. From "Consumer Price Index: Germany, Years, Individual Consumption by Purpose," by Statistisches Bundesamt, 2022, *Statistisches Bundesamt*.

Appendix C

Table C1*Asylum Applications by EU Country from 2012-2020*

Asylum Applications by EU Country from 2012 - 2020										
Year	Austria	Belgium	Bulgaria	Croatia	Republic of Cyprus	Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia	Finland	France
2012	17,415	28,075	1,385	-	1,635	740	6,045	75	3,095	61,440
2013	17,500	21,030	7,145	1,080	1,255	695	7,170	95	3,210	66,265
2014	28,035	22,710	11,080	450	1,745	1,145	14,680	155	3,620	64,310
2015	88,160	44,665	20,390	210	2,265	1,515	20,935	230	32,345	76,165
2016	42,255	18,280	19,420	2,225	2,940	1,475	6,180	175	5,605	84,270
2017	24,715	18,340	3,695	975	4,600	1,445	3,220	190	4,995	99,330
2018	13,710	22,530	2,535	800	7,765	1,690	3,570	95	4,500	137,665
2019	12,860	27,460	2,150	1,400	13,650	1,915	2,700	105	4,520	151,070
2020	14,760	16,710	3,525	1,605	7,495	1,160	1,475	50	3,190	93,200

Note. The data for all of the European Union nations are pulled from “Asylum and Frist Time Asylum Applicants – Annual Aggregated Data (Rounded),” by Eurostat, 2022, *Eurostat*.

(<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00191/default/bar?lang=en>).

Table C2*Asylum Applications by EU Country from 2012-2020*

Asylum Applications by EU Country from 2012 - 2020											
Year	Germany	Greece	Hungary	Ireland	Italy	Latvia	Lithuania	Luxembourg	Malta	Netherlands	Poland
2012	77,485	9,575	2,155	955	17,335	205	2,050	2,050	2,080	13,095	10,750
2013	126,705	8,225	18,895	945	26,620	195	400	1,070	2,250	13,065	15,240
2014	202,645	9,430	42,775	1,450	64,625	375	440	1,150	1,350	24,495	8,020
2015	476,510	13,250	177,135	3,275	83,540	330	315	2,505	1,845	44,970	12,190
2016	745,160	51,110	29,430	2,245	122,960	350	430	2,160	1,930	20,945	12,305
2017	222,565	58,650	3,390	2,930	128,850	355	545	2,430	1,840	18,210	5,045
2018	194,180	66,965	670	3,670	59,950	185	405	2,335	2,130	24,025	4,110
2019	165,615	77,275	500	4,780	43,770	195	645	2,270	4,090	25,200	4,070
2020	121,955	40,560	115	1,565	26,940	180	315	1,345	2,480	15,255	2,785

Note. The data for all of the European Union nations are pulled from “Asylum and Frist Time Asylum Applicants – Annual Aggregated Data (Rounded),” by Eurostat, 2022, *Eurostat*.

(<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00191/default/bar?lang=en>).

Table C3*Asylum Applications by EU Country from 2012-2020*

Asylum Applications by EU Country from 2012 - 2020							
Year	Portugal	Romania	Slovakia	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
2012	295	2,510	730	295	2,565	43,855	28,800
2013	500	1,495	440	270	4,485	54,270	30,585
2014	440	1,545	330	385	5,615	81,185	32,785
2015	895	1,260	330	275	14,780	162,450	40,160
2016	1,460	1,880	145	1,310	15,755	28,795	39,735
2017	1,750	4,815	160	1,475	36,610	26,330	34,780
2018	1,285	2,135	175	2,875	54,050	21,560	38,840
2019	1,820	2,590	230	3,820	117,800	26,255	46,055
2020	1,000	6,155	280	3,550	88,530	16,225	-

Note. The data for all of the European Union nations are pulled from “Asylum and Frist Time Asylum Applicants – Annual Aggregated Data (Rounded),” by Eurostat, 2022, *Eurostat*.

(<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00191/default/bar?lang=en>).

Appendix D

Table D
Descriptive Statistics

	Event	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Terrorist Attacks	Pre-Crisis	4.53	3.378	15
	Post-Crisis	28.20	27.050	5
	Total	10.45	16.523	20
Crime Offenses (M)	Pre-Crisis	6.228	.231	15
	Post-Crisis	5.890	.436	5
	Total	6.144	.319	20
Asylum Applications (K)	Pre-Crisis	74.888	48.959	15
	Post-Crisis	360.806	248.037	5
	Total	146.368	175.650	20
GDP Rate Change	Pre-Crisis	1.281%	2.478%	15
	Post-Crisis	1.712%	0.837%	5
	Total	1.389%	2.170%	20
CPI	Pre-Crisis	86.208	16.999	15
	Post-Crisis	99.295	3.356	5
	Total	89.480	15.782	20
Inflation Rate Change	Pre-Crisis	1.560%	0.584%	15
	Post-Crisis	1.140%	0.603%	5
	Total	1.455%	0.602%	20
Unemployment Rate	Pre-Crisis	7.893%	2.001%	15
	Post-Crisis	3.802%	0.589%	5
	Total	6.871%	2.515%	20
Average Annual Salary	Pre-Crisis	37309.0197	1017.170	15
	Post-Crisis	41652.331	886.310	5
	Total	38394.847	2156.610	20

Appendix E

Table E1
Group Statistics

	Event	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Germany % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.281%	2.478%	0.639%
	Post-Crisis	5	1.712%	0.836%	0.374%
Austria % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.585%	1.873%	0.483%
	Post-Crisis	5	1.841%	0.630%	0.281%
Belgium % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.696%	1.526%	0.394%
	Post-Crisis	5	1.777%	0.343%	0.153%
Bulgaria % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	3.688%	3.256%	0.840%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.176%	0.590%	0.264%
Croatia % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.712%	3.607%	0.931%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.162%	0.489%	0.218%
Cyprus % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.878%	3.740%	0.965%
	Post-Crisis	5	5.333%	1.169%	0.522%
Czech Republic % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	2.656%	2.968%	0.766%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.884%	1.430%	0.639%
Denmark % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.055%	2.075%	0.535%
	Post-Crisis	5	2.503%	0.522%	0.233%
Estonia % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	4.166%	6.472%	1.671%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.794%	1.189%	0.532%
Finland % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.597%	3.401%	0.878%
	Post-Crisis	5	1.782%	1.152%	0.515%
France % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.386%	1.557%	0.402%
	Post-Crisis	5	1.638%	0.603%	0.269%
Greece % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	-0.064%	5.466%	1.411%
	Post-Crisis	5	0.713%	1.041%	0.465%
Hungary % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	2.202%	3.094%	0.799%
	Post-Crisis	5	4.015%	1.181%	0.528%
Ireland % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	3.306%	4.278%	1.104%
	Post-Crisis	5	10.021%	8.965%	4.009%
Italy % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	0.213%	2.270%	0.586%
	Post-Crisis	5	1.021%	0.526%	0.235%
Latvia % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	4.030%	6.990%	1.804%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.157%	0.859%	0.384%
Lithuania % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	4.457%	5.974%	1.542%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.476%	1.094%	0.489%

Luxembourg % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	3.023%	2.795%	0.721%
	Post-Crisis	5	2.780%	1.423%	0.636%
Malta % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	2.819%	2.639%	0.681%
	Post-Crisis	5	7.195%	3.085%	1.379%
Netherlands % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.327%	2.026%	0.523%
	Post-Crisis	5	2.268%	0.447%	0.200%
Poland % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	3.637%	1.735%	0.448%
	Post-Crisis	5	4.472%	0.834%	0.373%
Portugal % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	0.357%	2.143%	0.553%
	Post-Crisis	5	2.570%	0.684%	0.306%
Romania % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	-2.401%	24.595%	6.350%
	Post-Crisis	5	4.712%	1.463%	0.654%
Slovakia % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	3.980%	3.785%	0.977%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.215%	1.103%	0.493%
Slovenia % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	2.121%	3.625%	0.936%
	Post-Crisis	5	3.629%	1.230%	0.550%
Spain % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	1.554%	2.750%	0.710%
	Post-Crisis	5	2.703%	0.918%	0.410%
Sweden % Change	Pre-Crisis	15	2.082%	2.599%	0.671%
	Post-Crisis	5	2.738%	0.945%	0.422%

Table E2
Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Significance One- Sided p	Two- Sided p	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Germany % Change	Equal variances assumed	2.053	.169	-.376	18	.356	.711	-0.431%	1.146%	-2.840%	1.978%
	Equal variances not assumed			-.582	17.890	.284	.568	-0.431%	0.741%	-1.989%	1.126%
Austria % Change	Equal variances assumed	1.649	.215	-.295	18	.386	.771	-0.255%	0.866%	-2.077%	1.565%
	Equal variances not assumed			-.457	17.900	.327	.653	-0.255%	0.559%	-1.432%	0.920%
Belgium % Change	Equal variances assumed	3.860	.065	-.114	18	.455	.910	-0.080%	0.700%	-1.551%	1.391%
	Equal variances not assumed			-.189	17.186	.426	.852	-0.080%	0.423%	-0.972%	0.811%
Bulgaria % Change	Equal variances assumed	10.779	.004	.344	18	.368	.735	0.511%	1.489%	-2.618%	3.642%
	Equal variances not assumed			.581	16.341	.285	.569	0.511%	0.881%	-1.353%	2.376%

Croatia % Change	Equal variances assumed	7.422	.014	-.881	18	.195	.390	-1.450%	1.647%	-4.911%	2.010%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.516	15.425	.075	.150	-1.450%	0.956%	-3.484%	0.584%
Cyprus % Change	Equal variances assumed	5.757	.027	-2.001	18	.030	.061	-3.454%	1.726%	-7.082%	0.173%
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.146	17.998	.003	.006	-3.454%	1.098%	-5.761%	-1.147%
Czech Republic % Change	Equal variances assumed	1.088	.311	-.879	18	.195	.391	-1.227%	1.395%	-4.160%	1.705%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.230	14.938	.119	.238	-1.227%	0.998%	-3.356%	0.900%
Denmark % Change	Equal variances assumed	1.731	.205	-1.519	18	.073	.146	-1.448%	0.953%	-3.451%	0.555%
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.477	17.606	.012	.024	-1.448%	0.584%	-2.678%	-0.217%
Estonia % Change	Equal variances assumed	3.365	.083	.126	18	.451	.901	0.372%	2.961%	-5.850%	6.595%
	Equal variances not assumed			.212	16.393	.417	.834	0.372%	1.753%	-3.338%	4.083%
Finland % Change	Equal variances assumed	1.764	.201	-.118	18	.454	.908	-0.185%	1.574%	-3.492%	3.121%

	Equal variances not assumed			-0.182	17.881	.429	.858	-0.185%	1.018%	-2.325%	1.954%
France % Change	Equal variances assumed	1.830	.193	-0.348	18	.366	.732	-0.252%	0.724%	-1.773%	1.269%
	Equal variances not assumed			-0.521	17.224	.305	.609	-0.252%	0.484%	-1.272%	0.768%
Greece % Change	Equal variances assumed	7.236	.015	-0.310	18	.380	.760	-0.776%	2.502%	-6.034%	4.480%
	Equal variances not assumed			-0.523	16.528	.304	.608	-0.776%	1.486%	-3.919%	2.365%
Hungary % Change	Equal variances assumed	2.475	.133	-1.261	18	.112	.223	-1.813%	1.438%	-4.835%	1.208%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.894	17.325	.038	.075	-1.813%	0.957%	-3.831%	0.204%
Ireland % Change	Equal variances assumed	2.153	.160	-2.295	18	.017	.034	-6.715%	2.925%	-12.862%	-0.569%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.615	4.623	.086	.172	-6.715%	4.159%	-17.674%	4.243%
Italy % Change	Equal variances assumed	2.853	.108	-0.776	18	.224	.448	-0.808%	1.041%	-2.996%	1.380%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.279	17.304	.109	.218	-0.808%	0.631%	-2.139%	0.523%

Latvia % Change	Equal variances assumed	5.389	.032	.274	18	.394	.788	0.872%	3.190%	-5.829%	7.575%
	Equal variances not assumed			.473	15.189	.321	.643	0.872%	1.845%	-3.056%	4.801%
Lithuania % Change	Equal variances assumed	1.644	.216	.359	18	.362	.724	0.981%	2.733%	-4.762%	6.724%
	Equal variances not assumed			.607	16.378	.276	.552	0.981%	1.618%	-2.442%	4.405%
Luxembo urg % Change	Equal variances assumed	.815	.379	.184	18	.428	.856	0.243%	1.319%	-2.528%	3.014%
	Equal variances not assumed			.253	14.197	.402	.804	0.243%	0.962%	-1.818%	2.304%
Malta % Change	Equal variances assumed	.234	.635	-3.088	18	.003	.006	-4.376%	1.417%	-7.353%	-1.398%
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.844	6.086	.014	.029	-4.376%	1.538%	-8.128%	-0.623%
Netherla nds % Change	Equal variances assumed	3.518	.077	-1.013	18	.162	.325	-0.940%	0.929%	-2.892%	1.011%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.680	17.115	.056	.111	-0.940%	0.560%	-2.122%	0.240%
Poland % Change	Equal variances assumed	2.261	.150	-1.024	18	.160	.319	-0.835%	0.816%	-2.550%	0.878%

	Equal variances not assumed			-1.433	14.968	.086	.172	-0.835%	0.583%	-2.079%	0.407%
Portugal % Change	Equal variances assumed	3.866	.065	-2.235	18	.019	.038	-2.213%	0.990%	-4.293%	-0.132%
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.499	17.984	.001	.003	-2.213%	0.632%	-3.542%	-0.884%
Romania % Change	Equal variances assumed	1.375	.256	-.635	18	.267	.534	-7.112%	11.207%	-30.657%	16.432%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.114	14.293	.142	.284	-7.112%	6.384%	-20.779%	6.553%
Slovakia % Change	Equal variances assumed	2.891	.106	.438	18	.333	.666	0.764%	1.744%	-2.900%	4.429%
	Equal variances not assumed			.698	17.963	.247	.494	0.766%	1.094%	-1.536%	3.065%
Slovenia % Change	Equal variances assumed	2.084	.166	-.898	18	.190	.381	-1.507%	1.678%	-5.033%	2.017%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.388	17.875	.091	.182	-1.507%	1.085%	-3.790%	0.774%
Spain % Change	Equal variances assumed	6.307	.022	-.903	18	.189	.379	-1.149%	1.272%	-3.822%	1.524%
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.400	17.916	.089	.178	-1.149%	0.820%	-2.873%	0.575%

Sweden % Change	Equal variances assumed	3.333	.085	-.544	18	.297	.593	-0.655%	1.205%	-3.189%	1.877%
	Equal variances not assumed			-.827	17.611	.210	.420	-0.655%	0.793%	-2.324%	1.013%

Table E3
Independent Samples Effect Sizes

		Standardizer ^a	Point	95% Confidence Interval	
			Estimate	Lower	Upper
Germany % Change	Cohen's d	2.221%	-.194	-1.206	.823
	Hedges' correction	2.319%	-.186	-1.154	.788
	Glass's delta	0.837%	-.515	-1.557	.581
Austria % Change	Cohen's d	1.679%	-.152	-1.164	.863
	Hedges' correction	1.753%	-.146	-1.114	.826
	Glass's delta	0.630%	-.406	-1.432	.664
Belgium % Change	Cohen's d	1.356%	-.059	-1.071	.954
	Hedges' correction	1.416%	-.057	-1.025	.914
	Glass's delta	0.343%	-.233	-1.244	.804
Bulgaria % Change	Cohen's d	2.885%	.177	-.839	1.189
	Hedges' correction	3.013%	.170	-.803	1.138
	Glass's delta	0.590%	.867	-.337	1.996
Croatia % Change	Cohen's d	3.19%	-.455	-1.471	.574
	Hedges' correction	3.331%	-.435	-1.409	.550
	Glass's delta	0.49%	-2.963	-5.156	-.732
Cyprus % Change	Cohen's d	3.344%	-1.033	-2.086	.046
	Hedges' correction	3.492%	-.989	-1.998	.044
	Glass's delta	1.169%	-2.955	-5.144	-.729
	Cohen's d	2.703%	-.454	-1.471	.575

Czech Republic % Change	Hedges' correction	2.823%	-.435	-1.408	.550
	Glass's delta	1.430%	-.858	-1.984	.343
Denmark % Change	Cohen's d	1.847%	-.784	-1.818	.270
	Hedges' correction	1.928%	-.751	-1.741	.258
	Glass's delta	0.523%	-2.769	-4.847	-.648
Estonia % Change	Cohen's d	5.736%	.065	-.948	1.076
	Hedges' correction	5.989%	.062	-.908	1.031
	Glass's delta	1.19%	.313	-.738	1.329
Finland % Change	Cohen's d	3.048%	-.061	-1.072	.952
	Hedges' correction	3.183%	-.058	-1.027	.912
	Glass's delta	1.152%	-.161	-1.169	.867
France % Change	Cohen's d	1.403%	-.180	-1.191	.836
	Hedges' correction	1.465%	-.172	-1.141	.801
	Glass's delta	0.603%	-.418	-1.445	.655
Greece % Change	Cohen's d	4.846%	-.160	-1.172	.855
	Hedges' correction	5.061%	-.154	-1.122	.819
	Glass's delta	1.041%	-.746	-1.839	.417
Hungary % Change	Cohen's d	2.785%	-.651	-1.677	.391
	Hedges' correction	2.908%	-.624	-1.606	.375
	Glass's delta	1.182%	-1.535	-2.935	-.055
Ireland % Change	Cohen's d	5.666%	-1.185	-2.254	-.088
	Hedges' correction	5.916%	-1.135	-2.158	-.085
	Glass's delta	8.966%	-.749	-1.843	.415
Italy % Change	Cohen's d	2.018%	-.400	-1.415	.625
	Hedges' correction	2.107%	-.384	-1.356	.599
	Glass's delta	0.526%	-1.535	-2.935	-.055
Latvia % Change	Cohen's d	6.178%	.141	-.874	1.152
	Hedges' correction	6.451%	.135	-.837	1.104

	Glass's delta	0.859%	1.016	-.243	2.195
Lithuania % Change	Cohen's d	5.294%	.185	-.831	1.197
	Hedges' correction	5.528%	.178	-.796	1.146
	Glass's delta	1.094%	.897	-.318	2.035
Luxembourg % Change	Cohen's d	2.555%	.095	-.919	1.106
	Hedges' correction	2.668%	.091	-.880	1.060
	Glass's delta	1.423%	.171	-.858	1.179
Malta % Change	Cohen's d	2.745%	-1.595	-2.714	-.440
	Hedges' correction	2.866%	-1.527	-2.599	-.422
	Glass's delta	3.085%	-1.418	-2.763	.008
Netherlands % Change	Cohen's d	1.799%	-.523	-1.542	.510
	Hedges' correction	1.879%	-.501	-1.477	.489
	Glass's delta	0.448%	-2.102	-3.797	-.342
Poland % Change	Cohen's d	1.581%	-.529	-1.548	.505
	Hedges' correction	1.650%	-.506	-1.483	.483
	Glass's delta	0.834%	-1.002	-2.176	.252
Portugal % Change	Cohen's d	1.918%	-1.154	-2.219	-.061
	Hedges' correction	2.003%	-1.105	-2.125	-.058
	Glass's delta	0.685%	-3.232	-5.589	-.847
Romania % Change	Cohen's d	21.702%	-.328	-1.341	.694
	Hedges' correction	22.662%	-.314	-1.284	.665
	Glass's delta	1.464%	-4.860	-8.243	-1.499
Slovakia % Change	Cohen's d	3.378%	.226	-.792	1.238
	Hedges' correction	3.528%	.217	-.758	1.186
	Glass's delta	1.103%	.693	-.454	1.772
Slovenia % Change	Cohen's d	3.250%	-.464	-1.481	.566
	Hedges' correction	3.393%	-.444	-1.418	.542
	Glass's delta	1.231%	-1.225	-2.485	.118
Spain % Change	Cohen's d	2.464%	-.466	-1.483	.563

	Hedges' correction	2.573%	-.446	-1.420	.540
	Glass's delta	0.919%	-1.251	-2.522	.103
Sweden % Change	Cohen's d	2.335%	-.281	-1.293	.739
	Hedges' correction	2.438%	-.269	-1.238	.708
	Glass's delta	0.945%	-.694	-1.773	.453

a. The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes.

Cohen's d uses the pooled standard deviation.

Hedges' correction uses the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.

Glass's delta uses the sample standard deviation of the control group.