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Second- generation immigrants

An arch between the past and the future of Albanian

immigrants in Greece

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In the memory of my beloved mother

Abstract

This paper addresses some of the hindering and encouraging factors which have been shaping Albanian migration in Greece since 1992. A set of migration drivers, such as political, economical, cultural and historical realities mediated and responded to the dynamics of both natives and migrants' rights. Though being massive and ongoing in its character, Albanian migration got a temporary treatment by the Greek policy makers. The successive adoptions of the Greek regularization programs contributed to the decrease of various forms of exclusion patterns relating to Albanian migrants' integration in the economy, education, housing and social security, but simultaneously, they prolonged Albanians' relative legal stability. Alongside the Albanian migrants' socio-economical accomplishments, achieved as the result of progressive regularizations, transformations in Greek ethnic culture and politics are introduced through new pluralist developments (the NGOs' and political elite) in the Greek society. The citizenship law on second- generation migrants, signals a long-term investment on Albanian immigrants' integration in Greek society as well as a lasting influence on future transnational developments.

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Introduction

Second- generation immigrants, an arch between the past and the future of Albanian immigrants in Greece

The topic of this paper is the changing dynamics of Albanian migrants' socio-political and economic status from 1991 to date. The hypothesis is an attempt to study the factors that have contributed to or have been an obstacle to the integration of first and second-generation Albanian immigrants in Greece. In this effort, I focus on presenting and analyzing a set of various political and socio-economical grounds/factors of both sending and receiving countries (Albania and Greece), which brought about and coped with the complex issues of Albanian migration management. The interpretation of the progress of Greek legislative framework during these two decades is used as the main background of new developments regarding first and second-generation immigrants' dynamics which gave rise to positive and negative aspects of their socio-economical integration in the Greek society. On top of this, the political and cultural context of the main migration policies was in the lead of transforming not only the status of Albanian migrants but also the cultural and political preferences of Greek people. Hence, citizenship law on second-generation migrants challenges not only the integration and transnational loyalties of Albanian migrant's communities, but also Grecian infusions of cultural diversities which under some political forces and NGOs' influence have become future targets of social cohesion and values of Greek democracy.

The structure of the thesis

In the first chapter, I present the deteriorating political and socio-economic situation of Albania during its democratic transition (1991-1997), under which three big immigrant flows towards Greece took place, and at the same time I try to explain how Albania was affected by immigration. Afterwards, I present statistical data on Albanian immigrants' profile relating to their group age, education, occupation and settlement in Greece.

The second chapter describes the evolution of the regularization programs from 1997 up to 2010. When, how and what those Greek migration policies changed in the status of undocumented immigrants. Evidence on their considerable advantages and drawbacks based on statistical data, are the focus of the following subchapters. I then interpret data on the formation of second generation immigrants, though the sources were rather limited.

In the third chapter, I analyze and comment on the restraining and contributing factors that have been shaping Albanian immigration since 1992. Apart from the state laws and policies, national culture and political approaches are given a special place as

another leading dimension concerning migration management. Besides the aforementioned constituents, the role of the media, the church, education, the Greek NGOs and the Albanian authorities are regarded as additional fundamental influential sources that designed the gates and patterns of Albanian migrants' social integration in Greek society.

The last chapter describes the dynamic changes of second Albanian generation during the passage of two decades. Different and similar experiences between two generations of Albanian immigrants are meeting points of their socio-economical and educational accomplishments. The last subchapter focuses on citizenship law benefits and the challenges of Greek society towards migrants' future integration as well as on the distinctiveness of transnational character of second-generation Albanian immigrants.

Finally, I conclude on each chapter's main points.

This paper also analyzes why and how socio-political and economic factors of both sending and especially receiving countries brought about and improved the regulation of Albanian immigration. I try to identify reasons, motives, causes and consequences of this ongoing Albanian migration concern in Greek society. In a similar way I intend to explain pragmatic conditions which determined the two migrant Albanian generations' socio-economical and educational achievements and their different experiences and expectations achieved so far. Also, I aim at finding the new perspectives of the citizenship law relating to challenges and benefits, in both Greece and Albania's national culture and politics.

The methodology is based on primary and secondary data collection sources. Books, articles, journals and internet sources are used as primary sources, while interviews and my personal experience belong to the secondary ones. During the period June-August 2010, I conducted interviews with 25 Albanian immigrants, in Greece and Albania (in the Albanian Embassy in Greece, at the customs of Kakavia and at the international bus stations of Albania and Greece). The interviews were realized based on two groups of ages between (14-25 and 25-55), who answered questions related to their socio-economical integration in the Greek society and plans to return for good. I raised questions which dealt mainly with their legalization, educational/economical successes, feelings of belonging, preferences of culture, stay (Greece or Albania) and citizenship. I kept notes on all answers, even during their open discussions with each other.

I also used data based on my own experience, knowledge and observations (interaction with family members, relatives, close friends), as I have been living as an immigrant in Greece nearly for a decade.

A. *Socio-political and economical background of Albanian emigration*

What immigrants have done is bring the borders which we had painfully agreed to set in Epirus, in the Aegean, in Thrace, and in the Ionian Sea, into the heart of our cities and our neighborhoods. The imaginary other – who is more threatening to us than the ‘real’ other – is now living next door, goes to school with our children and, not infrequently, works with and for us.

I. Roubanis.

A1. The Albanian ‘Odyssey’ of post communist era

- 1 million immigrants out of a population of 3.4 million
- 22-25% of the population
- 35% of active population
- 50% in Greece, 25% in Italy, 25% in other EU countries (UK, Germany, Switzerland), US and Canada.

Why, when and how did Albanians emigrate?

Since the beginning of time, the social condition of *Homo Sapiens* has been the prevailing migratory. Historically, people have moved since human inception because of a variety of causes such as natural disasters, warfare, colonialism, labor supply, political repression or economic recession¹. This holds true if we refer to the globalization phenomenon in which migration has been the ‘lubricant’ of the dynamics of socio-economic development especially of the least developed countries. There are now about 185 million people² living outside their place of birth, which is about three per cent of the world's population. Further, according to a recent international report, Europe has become a land of opportunity as it now hosts a population of 56.1 million immigrants.³

¹Goldberg D. Th., (1998), *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*, Introduction: Multicultural Conditions1, p 11.

²Papademetriu D. G. and Cavoundis J., (2006) *Managing Migration: The Greek, EU, and International Context*, IMEPO (Hellenic Migration Policy Institute) p 178.

³Roubanis I. (2008), Challenges for the social inclusion of the migrants’ population in Greece, *Ethnicity and Migration, a Greek story*, p 88.

Albania was one of the more isolated countries of Southeast Europe after the 1945 establishment of the communist regime. International migration was considered national treason. The so-called ‘Embassy Migrants’ (recognized officially by Albanian authorities on 2nd July in 1990⁴) was the first visible change in the attitude toward migration. Nearly 5,000 Albanians entered the Western embassies to seek refuge. This was the first wake-up call for all the Albanians, as a sign of a “...conscience act of defiance against the state”⁵ where “...after a half century of political isolation, Albanians instinctively identified the freedom and liberty of the Western world with free movement.”⁶

The first Albanian Odyssey started when the political and economic crisis reached its climax with the toppling of Hoxha’s statue and Alia’s victory (Hoxha’s loyalist) in the first democratic elections which radicalized the political atmosphere so much that it nearly resulted in civil war. The initial economic crisis included inflation at around 350%, GDP shrinking by 50%⁷ annually, a rapidly rising unemployment rate and swift urbanization. Twenty-four thousand Albanians composed the first immigration flow. The immigrants found their escape by boarding ships in the port of Durrës to sail to Italy, while Greece was preferred due to its cultural and geographical accessibility, as immigrants usually passed the border illegally on foot or by taxi. Thus, between the years 1991-92, an estimated 300,000 Albanians left the country⁸.

The second stream would be during 1992 to 1997, again with a similar number of immigrants fleeing the country due to poverty and a 27% unemployment rate⁹ (1992). Scarce resources and the implementation of ‘shock therapy’ in Albanian economy were responsible for the latter. The result of the collapse of the pyramid schemes were economic adversities combined with political instability, which only boosted further immigration flows from 1997 to 1998. The chaos in the Southern part of Albania was verging on civil war. In the largest cities of Albania like Tirana, Vlorë, Gjirokastër, during this period there was a climate of armed uprising, bombing and shooting. This was caused by the self-invoked arming of the vast majority of the male population, which unfortunately resulted in the injuries of 10,000 people and the loss of 2,000 lives¹⁰.

⁴Downloaded from <http://www.noa.al/index.php/noa-e-emigranteve/128-noa-e-emigranteve/25849-eksodi-i-korrikut-90-20-vjet-me-pare-shqiptaret-kapercyen-hekurat-e-ambasadave>

⁵ Laze L., Interview, *Koha Jone*, 19 June 2005.

⁶ Barjaba K, (2004), *Migration and ethnicity in Albania: Synergies and Interdependencies*, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XI, issue 1, p 232.

⁷ Ibid. p 232.

⁸ Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review, p 33.

⁹ Stubos G, (2002) Balkan Transition 1989-2002: Turbulent past, promising future. *The political economy of transition*.

¹⁰ Biberaj E, (1998) Albania in Transition, The rocky road to Democracy, Colorado: West View Press, p 331.

Economic survival, political harassment, personal liberation and self-expression¹¹ were the main motivators of Albanian migration. Undoubtedly migration was a benefit to the politics and economy of Albania, as it relieved political tensions that could have led to further anarchy, while remittances helped to facilitate recovery from the economic collapse by increasing the country's GDP and maintaining macro-economic stability. Remittances have exceeded many times the amount of foreign direct investments and aid received from international institutions and together they both amounted to more than twice the income from exports.¹²

Moreover, thanks to foreign exchange contribution, remittances have stabilized the trade deficit of more than 20% of GDP per year.¹³ The exact amount of remittances cannot be precisely estimated as they are often transferred in informal ways because of the "shaky" Albanian banking system and immigrants' lack of legal knowledge on banking rules, yet remittances "...for 1991 have been estimated at USD 548.5 million and at USD 365 million for 1992,...the majority of them came from Greece (82.2%) in both years..."¹⁴ According to IOM sources for the last 15 years migrant remittance has totaled 6.6 billion Euros¹⁵, placing Albania at number one in the list of top 20 immigration countries.

Unfortunately, remittances do not always ensure economic development, as they are overshadowed by the loss of human capital and "brain-drain." It is clear that migration brought demographic changes. The Southern region is most affected by depopulation¹⁶ because of the proximity with the Greek borders which facilitate to-and-fro movements of Albanians and especially ethnic Greeks to Greece. Another cost of migration is that nearly 50% of lecturers, academics and research workers¹⁷ of Albanian universities, have immigrated together with their families between the period from 1990 to 2005 and nearly 70% of them are not employed in their area of expertise in receiving countries, so Albania's 'brain drain' can be also characterized as 'brain waste'.

Finally, Albanian migration was characterized by a massive export of cheap labor and loss of human potential as the amount of flow was one million out of 3.4 million of its population, equaling 35% of its active population which thus caused a distinctive change in its own demography. Albanian migration is a unique case, as it actually continues to be an on-going phenomenon as even the voluntary returnees who have been transferring experience, skills and remittances, consider migration an unfinished

¹¹ Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review, p 41-42.

¹² Ibid. p 70-71.

¹³ Ibid. p 72.

¹⁴ Vidali M., (1999), Living in a policy vacuum, the plight of Albanian immigrants in Greece, vol. 1 no 21, 15 November.

¹⁵ Downloaded from <http://www.iomtirana.org.al/>

¹⁶ Lerch M, (2009) The impact of migration on fertility in post-communist Albania, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, volume 9, number 4, p 527.

¹⁷ Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review, p 41.

business. The on-going character of this phenomenon is unlikely to change as long as Albania fails to provide a stable country with a trustful economic and political system.

A2. Data collection on the profile of Albanian emigrants

Group age, gender, educational background, occupation and settlement of first generation of immigrants in Greece

On the nights of December 30 and 31, 1990 more than 800 Albanian citizens (including ethnic Greeks)¹⁸ crossed the borders of Greece. Ethnic Greeks and Vlachs were the first migrant pioneers among the Albanian emigrants.

According to data from the 2001 Greek census, there were 438,000 Albanian immigrants¹⁹, from which 54% came for work purposes while 15% came for family reunification²⁰. Additionally 70% of them cover the working age bracket of 16 to 64 years old, which is the youngest age of all other immigrants²¹.

Beginning in 1998, there is no official data on permits (Special Identity Card for Homogenes) granted to Albanians claiming Greek origin because it is considered an issue of 'national security' by the Ministry of Public Order, but this changed in 2006 when the Minister made it known to a Parliamentary Committee that the "...previously-leaked figure of 200,000 permits was correct."²² Though there is no official data on the total number of Albanians living in Greece--including those undocumented--it is assumed that the total is no more than 600,000 Albanians²³.

A2.a) Gender data

During the first years of immigration, males comprised the Albanian immigrant population, which changed with successive regularization programs that enabled the reunification of families during the years of 2003 and 2004. Greek authorities gave 80% of the total residence permits to Albanian immigrants.²⁴ Thanks to the regularization programs, the labor market has been characterized by the strong female presence during the most recent years of Albanian immigration in Greece.

¹⁸Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review, p 32.

¹⁹ Triandafyllidou A. & Gropas R. (ed) (2007), *European Immigration: A Sourcebook, Greece*, p 144.

²⁰Ibid, p 144.

²¹ Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review, p 49.

²² Athens News, 4 August, 2006.

²³ Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review, p 37.

²⁴ Baldwin-Edwards. M, (2004), Albanian Immigration and the Greek Labor Market: Economic Symbioses and Social Ambiguity, *South East Europe Review*, p 8.

Within the sphere of gender roles, it is assumed that because of the kind of jobs females are employed in (domestic services, 34.1% manufacturing, 11.9% restaurants and cafes) the female employment rate was 31% (even for natives) behind that of their male counterparts. Consequently, their social contribution was reduced to 22%, while men's contribution was 88.4%²⁵. Undoubtedly, that is related to the kind of employment.

A2.b) Albanian migrants' educational background

Due to the size of their presence in the total immigrant population, Albanians worked in all sectors, as 70% of the population had a primary-school education and higher (unskilled males). Comparative studies on the educational levels of different immigrant nationalities have shown that though Albanians have the lowest level of training, their degree level and secondary qualifications represent 30-50% of all²⁶ other immigrants.

According to the 2001 census conducted by the Mediterranean Migration Observatory, the educational breakdown of "self declared" immigrants' educational is as follows: 258 in postgraduate education, 21,753 with a first university degree, 5,154 qualifying for post-secondary education, 102,380 with a general secondary education, 10,926 with a vocational secondary degree, 86,550 with a compulsory education, 108,584 with a primary education, 41,894 with some primary school, 11,510 were basic literates, and 49,037 described themselves as illiterate.²⁷

Despite the fact that they remain the most untrained working force, Lambrianidis and Lyberaki note that this has changed now. They show that Albanian workers in Thessaloniki have managed to move from unskilled farm workers into semi-skilled ones as a result of their better Greek language skills and their adjustment to the labor market²⁸.

A2.c) Albanian migrants' occupation and settlement

This socioeconomic mobility is evident if we refer to data of their main occupations which are in: construction (42%), agriculture, (23%) and tourism (12%). Female employment is recorded as 19% in tourism, 15% in agriculture 9% in industry, while 52% are working in domestic services.²⁹ It is worth mentioning that 77% of Albanians usually find employment through their informal networks and their income data

²⁵ Lyberakki A. & Maroukis Th. (2004), *Albanian Immigrants in Athens, Some recent findings*, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Relations.

²⁶ Baldwin-Edwards M. (2005), *The integration of immigrants in Athens, Developing Indicators and Statistical Measures*, Pre-Final Version, p 29.

²⁷ Ibid. Table A7.

²⁸ Triandafyllidou A. & Gropas R.(ed)(2007) *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, Greece, p 145.

²⁹ Baldwin-Edwards M., (2004), Albanian Immigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbioses and Social Ambiguity, *South East Europe Review*, p 3.

shows a normal income of €900 per month, with 60% of the model earning extra of €900³⁰.

The spatial distribution of Albanians in Greece is determined by their occupation. According to official data, the majority of Albanians are concentrated in the regions of Athens and Thessaloniki because of the easy operation in informal economy. Referring to the 2001 Census, some 206,000 Albanians (444,000 throughout Greece) actually have Attiki as their recorded place of residence, which constitutes 55% of immigrants in the region³¹.

Meanwhile, rural areas are still preferred to the main islands (which may only offer temporary jobs) as the majority of immigrants themselves come from rural zones. Additionally, the geographic proximity and labor market have determined the way that the two kinds of migration patterns, the permanent and the temporary function. Azzarri and Carleto point out that "...the flow to the neighboring Greece, has traditionally been temporary in nature, whether seasonal or circular..."³² Thus Albanians mainly found employment in agriculture, especially in fields of Thessaly and olive groves of Corfu.

A2.d) The emergence of the "second generation"

First generation migrants are considered those who left their country to make their life better by immigrating to rich advanced countries. Second generation migrants are their children who were either young at the time of migration or were born in the host country. Actually, there is no official data on nationalities referring to the group age of second generation, as children who are born here or have come at an early age are registered as aliens.

Based on 2003 Baldwin-Edwards information, there were some 130,000 foreign children in state schools (of which, 32,000 were ethnic Greeks), constituting 11% of primary school registers and 8% of secondary³³.

Though there is yet to be developed the actual meaning of the 'second generation' for study purposes they are still "... identified as 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75 generation of foreign-born children arriving at the ages of >12, <12, and <6..."³⁴. Under this assumption there are some immigrants in Athens who have reached second generation and some who have reached the 1.5 generation. Though not referring to nationality, there are 127,000 immigrant children under the age of 15 and perhaps another 30,000 aged 15-

³⁰ Baldwin-Edwards M. (2005), *The integration of immigrants in Athens, Developing Indicators and Statistical Measures*, Pre-Final Version, p 23.

³¹ Ibid. p 3.

³² Azzarri C. & Carleto C., (2009), Modeling migration dynamic in Albania: a hazard function approach, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, volume 9, number 4, p 421.

³³ Baldwin-Edwards M., *The integration of immigrants in Athens, Developing Indicators and Statistical Measures*, Pre-Final Version 2005, p 3.

³⁴ Baldwin-Edwards M., (2004), Albanian Immigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbioses and Social ambiguity, *South East Europe Review*, p 14.

17 according to the 2001 census,³⁵ it can be assumed that the majority of them belong to the Albanian nationality.

B. Evolution of the Greek Legislative framework

B1. Evolution of the Greek legal procedures of regularization process (1997-2010)

If we refer to Roubanis' saying that, "...migration is neither desirable nor undesirable, it is like rain – sometimes revitalizing, sometimes devastating, yet definitely unavoidable..."³⁶ we can understand why and how Greece found itself unexpectedly from a sending country, into a host country especially after the fall of the Berlin wall and mainly after the Albanian political and socio-economic collapse. Thousands of Albanian illegal immigrants crossing the icy mountains challenged Greece's border security, especially in the regions of Ioannina, Kastoria, Florina and on the coast of Corfu.

In fact, Greece has not faced for the first time Albanian migration. The *Arvanites* were the historical legacy of Ottoman migration that fled massively to Greece and Italy. This was an old practice known as "*kurbet*", where southern populations traveled on foot across the Greek mountains in search of temporary work. The waves of Albanian migration continued during the Balkan Wars but as mentioned before they were prohibited after the Albanian post war regime.³⁷

The global economy, which increases the demand for cheap flexible immigrant workers in different sectors of labour has indicated that "...ultimately, states that attempt to restrict immigration, conflict with market forces".³⁸ Though many states have successfully limited legal immigration, the global migration network has sustained clandestine immigration resulting in weakening the potency of restrictive policies. So, Albanian migration, in this context, can be seen also as an inevitable consequence of the global economy.

³⁵ Baldwin-Edwards M., (2005) *The integration of immigrants in Athens, Developing Indicators and Statistical Measures*, Pre-Final Version, p 19.

³⁶ Roubanis I. (2008), Challenges for the social inclusion of the migrants' population in Greece, *Ethnicity and Migration, a Greek story*, p 88.

³⁷ Baldwin-Edwards M., (2004), Albanian Immigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbioses and Social ambiguity, *South East Europe Review*, p 1.

³⁸ Watts R. J. (2002) How globalization makes unlikely allies of business and labour, *Immigration policy and the challenge of globalization*, p 5.

The uncontrolled flows of illegal Albanians found the Greek government unprepared. As Edwards and Arango stressed, their response to immigration had been ‘complex and contradictory’ as its authoritative line “...has been –although it is unclear that it remains so–that ‘Greece is not a country of immigration.’”³⁹ Referring again to Edwards and Arango, the Greek pattern policy was characterized by ‘institutional/bureaucratic’, ‘external relation’ and ‘modernizing/technocratic’ patterns of behavior (1999).⁴⁰

At that time the only law in force was that of 4310/1929 which was replaced by the Act 1975/1991 titled “entry –exit, stay, employment, deportation of foreigners, recognition procedure of foreigners, refugees and other provisions”⁴¹, which according to Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas was not valid to ethnic Greek nationals, stateless persons or those under E.U. legislation. Furthermore, a special police force was created to check those who entered or left the country, as well as to expel illegal aliens devoid of any trial. From 1991 to 2001, Greek police carried out nearly 150,000 to 250,000 expulsions without any trial and of this amount, between 75 to 80 per cent were Albanian.⁴² Obviously, despite the law’s “...xenophobia and policing philosophy...”⁴³ it treated migration as a temporary phenomenon which in short time proved to be wrong. By 1994 the government estimated that the stock of illegal immigrants had reached between 500,000 to 600,000 people.⁴⁴

As aforementioned, regularization was a necessity after the long period of political lethargy, as the policy of mass expulsions led by the 1991 law failed to prevent large flows of illegal immigrants coming to Greece.⁴⁵

Thus Greece, like most of other E.U. countries, became a host country and “...she received the highest percentage of immigrants in relation to its labor force, where Albanians comprise 57.5% of the total number of them...”⁴⁶ It is assumed that foreign population comprises more than 10% of the national Greek population of 11,192,849

³⁹ Baldwin-Edwards M. & R. Fakiolas ,(1999), ‘Greece: The contours of a fragmented policy response’, in M. Baldwin-Edwards & J. Arango (eds.), *Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe*, p 188.

⁴⁰ Ibid. p 199.

⁴¹ Kasimis C. & Kassimi C., (2004) *Greece: A History of Immigration*, downloaded from: www.migration information.org/about cfm

⁴² Baldwin-Edwards M. & Kraler A., (2009) International Centre for Migration Policy Development, REGINE, *Regularizations in Europe*, p 41.

⁴³ Baldwin-Edwards, M. & R. Fakiolas, (1999), Greece: The contours of a fragmented policy response, in M. Baldwin-Edwards & J. Arango (eds.), *Immigrants and the Informal Economy in Southern Europe*, p 188-191.

⁴⁴ Baldwin-Edwards M. & Kraler A., (2009) International Centre for Migration Policy Development, REGINE, *Regularizations in Europe*, p 46.

⁴⁵ Ibid p 42.

⁴⁶ Kasimis C. & Kassimi C., (2004) *Greece: A History of Immigration*, downloaded from: www.migration information.org/about cfm

people ⁴⁷ according to the recent estimation of population by the National Statistical Service of Greece (ESYE) for 2007.

B2. The regularization program of 1997

The first regularization program was presented in 1997 with the Presidential Decrees 358/1997 and 359/1997. The target was to implement the Act 1975/1991 on the "entry-exit, residence, employment, expulsion of foreigners and procedure for the recognition of the status of refugee for foreigners,"⁴⁸ as well as to develop the human character of immigration under the influence of Western European countries.

These decrees facilitated a temporary residence permit (or 'white card') for undocumented immigrants who had lived in Greece for one year, were in good health, possessed clean court and police records and had 40 working days during 1998. It is estimated that the total number of applicants amounted to 371,641 with 65% of whom holding the Albanian nationality.⁴⁹ The Ministry of Labour policymakers expected that most holders of white cards would proceed to obtain a green card, but only 213,000 (or 57%) did. This represents a policy failure because of massive delays of both processes and the complexity of the requirements for both the state and the immigrants themselves.

The reducing number of applicants had its own reasons, as a great number of applicants were let down by their employers, who refused to pay their social insurance. This resulted in failure for the second phase of the green card application, because of lack of the most important precondition of proof of legal employment.⁵⁰

Another reason for the failure was the fact of giving political comforting to local commissions, which were appointed to evaluate Green Card applications [...their activity apparently unlawful... and completely misplaced...]⁵¹ brought insufficient public services.

B3. The 2001 Immigration Law 2910/2001

⁴⁷European Commission, (2009) Project no: CIS8-044103, CLANDESTINO Project, Final Report, Recent Host Countries in Southern Europe, Greece, ELIAMEP, p 63.

⁴⁸Kasimis C. & Kassimi C.,(2004) *Greece: A History of Immigration*, found in :www.migrationinformation.org/about_cfm

⁴⁹ Baldwin-Edwards M. &, Kraler A., (2009) International Centre for Migration Policy Development, REGINE, *Regularizations in Europe*, p 44.

⁵⁰ Triandafyllidou A. & Gropas R.(ed)(2007) *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, p 142.

⁵¹ Baldwin-Edwards M. &, Kraler A., (2009) International Centre for Migration Policy Development, REGINE, *Regularizations in Europe*, p 48.

The second regularization program was based on a new law (Act 2910/2001) of “admission and residence of foreigners in Greece and the acquisition of Greek nationality through naturalization.”⁵² It provided a second chance for all immigrants to legalize their status, but besides the new preconditions it required national social insurance to be paid for 200 working days and a registration fee of 147 Euro per person over the age of 14.

The Ministry of Public Order (MPO) shifted the competency of the 2001 Law immigration policy to the Ministry of Interior and the Greek municipalities. Thus O.A.E.D had to deal with all pending Green Card applications. It was recorded that only 35,000 residence permits had been given in Greece, while in Attica only 37,000 out of 180,000 immigrants had requested to renew their permits.⁵³ Nevertheless, the new law had an impact not only on the “old applicants” whose permits had expired at that time, but also on the new undocumented immigrants who either failed the first regularization program or had entered the country illegally.

The legal framework of the 2001 Act undoubtedly paved the way for national immigration policy, as from that point on it would be perceived and addressed on long term vectors not only for regular entry to Greece including employment, family reunion, studies or asylum, but also naturalization of foreigners living in Greece. Thus another 370,000 immigrants managed to submit their papers to obtain legal status from the new opportunities offered by the second regularization round⁵⁴.

This program was not successful for the immigrants themselves because irrespective of the extreme bureaucratic requirements, they had to pay 150 Euros per year of validity, along with 1,500 Euros for social insurance, which according to the parliamentary amendment of 2003 “...allowed immigrants to pay the social insurance debts of their employers, in order to renew permits...”⁵⁵ resulting in discrimination of foreigners by Greek employers.

B4. The 2005 Immigration Law (3386/2005)

The new law was influenced by the change of government, which assured reforms on migration policy after the PASOK administration’s failure in dealing with it. It was motivated “... to abolish the dual system of residence and work permits, substituting it with one procedure and a residence permit which embodied a specific authorization for employment ...”⁵⁶

⁵² Kasimis C. & Kassimi C., (2004) *Greece: A History of Immigration*, downloaded from: www.migrationinformation.org/about.cfm.

⁵³ Baldwin-Edwards M. & Kraler A, (2009) International Centre for Migration Policy Development, REGINE, *Regularizations in Europe*, p 51.

⁵⁴ Triandafyllidou A. & Gropas R. (ed) (2007) *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, p 142.

⁵⁵ Baldwin-Edwards M. & Kraler A., (2009) International Centre for Migration Policy Development, REGINE, *Regularizations in Europe* p 53.

⁵⁶ Baldwin –Edwards M. (2005) *The Integration of immigrants in Athens: Developing indicators and statistical measures*, p 53.

Additionally, the Greek Parliament approved a new immigration measure on ‘Entry, stay and integration of third –country nationals in Greece’ in August 2005, whose aims were “...to rationalize the coordination of Greece’s immigration policy, simplify procedures and cut red tape, and adopt the Greek legislation to the new E.U. directives...”⁵⁷ This law was different from the others, as it joined the residence and work permit into one paper and clearly addressed the process of family reunification strategies.

Despite these innovations, the law awarded regularization of irregular residents who had never held a residence permit only if they proved residence in Greece on or before December 31, 2004, along with some other requirements.⁵⁸ In previous regularizations Albanians were typically presented nearly 60 to 70%, while in this program they were only 37%.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, this program like the previous one was characterized by extreme requirements of legalization, as immigrants still remained ‘hostage’ of short term legalization.

B5. The 2007 Special Regulation 3536/2007 Law

Under pressure to adopt another program referring to the large number of TCN residents, in October 2006 the government passed the law 3536/2007. Article 18 of Law 3536/2007 gave possibility to apply for an ‘indefinite residence permit’ if a minimum of 10 years of legal residence could be shown along with some other requirements such as having a clear criminal record certificate, the applicant’s child attending school presently or before December 31, 2004, birth registration, legal residence of a spouse, etc.

According to Baldwin-Edwards, Albanians made up only 37% of the granted regularized permits in 2005, while now they make up 84%.⁶⁰ It was reported that the Athens municipalities were instructed to accept even ineligible applications for regularization, thus by August and September 2007 a sum of over two million Euros in fees were received from some 16,402 applicants whose contribution was significant for state incomes .

Based on recent data there were 678,268 immigrants with residence permits in 2008. Of those immigrants, nearly 363,700 still had a valid residence permit in March 2009 and another 314,568 were in the process of renewing their permits—the respective numbers in 2007 were 433,751 and 250,000,⁶¹ which indicate that in total the number of immigrants renovating their legal status remained nearly the same during these years.

⁵⁷ Triandafyllidou A. & Gropas R. (ed) (2007) *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*, p 143.

⁵⁸ Baldwin-Edwards M. & Kraler A., (2009) International Centre for Migration Policy Development, REGINE, *Regularizations in Europe*, p 54.

⁵⁹ Ibid. p 56.

⁶⁰ Ibid. p 60.

⁶¹ European Commission, (2009) Project no: *CIS8-044103*, CLANDESTINO Project, Final Report, Recent Host Countries in Southern Europe, Greece, ELIAMEP, p 63.

B6. The Law 3838/2010

The ground breaking legislative attainment made by the Greek government was warmly accepted by all second generation immigrants and the organizations/groups that fought for their rights. This law, categorizes second generation immigrants in these categories: a) those born in Greece and that are under the age of 18 when applying for citizenship, b) those born in Greece that are over 18 years old (this should be the minority of the applicants), c) those that have studied for at least six years in a Greek school and are either under or over 18 years old (with no discrimination of the category of institution ex. primary school, high school etc).

This law, despite its much tougher conditions than those originally proposed by the government, due to the firm resistance by the opposition parties, is expected to provide citizenship to some 250.000 second generation immigrants of which 100.000 may be of voting age⁶². Originally the law was more tolerant on the most important acquirement: only one parent being a legal resident, which changed to both parents being legal residents during the last five years..

To sum up, the Albanian migration got a temporary treatment at its first phase. The successive adoptions of all the regularizations revealed the preferences and policies' outcomes that resulted from Greek domestic political and socio-cultural approaches to migration management. They managed to reduce migrants' differences in treatment, payment, social security, public services, education and housing. Despite those improvements, migration management was not successful as it prolonged migrants' relative legal protection. Thus, short term work and residence permits were the main characteristic of all regularisation programs.

C. The shaping factors of Albanian migration

The hindering factors:

C1. Monocultures and political attitudes responding to Albanian migrants' integration

“We must search for ways to make the concept of
Hellenism a gift, an appeal to universality, not
merely a defensive shield”

I. Roubanis

⁶² Muir D. Greece: citizenship for the citizens of immigrants, Economics and Demography, posted on Monday, February 22nd, downloaded from <http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/economics-and-demography/greece-citizenship-for-children-of-immigrants/>

It is widely known that social scientists demonstrate that ethno nationalism is not a product of nature but of culture, often deliberately constructed, which Americans find awkward both intellectually and morally,⁶³ but in the E.U. it still holds a place. It is widely believed that Greek society perceived itself as a culturally homogeneous entity if compared with other E.U. countries. It is not surprising that now national culture in Greece is facing a real tsunami of change. Like all other European societies the Greek society has to face issues that arise from migration related diversities as well as its own cultural transformation.

In the modern European security story, threat definitions related to identity, created within a particular social construct defines itself as being threatened by the “others” who are taking “our jobs”, “they empty the public purse”, “watch out! Islamic fundamentalists will take over the West”, “a migrant is a criminal” etc, unfortunately indicate that this “disturbed harmony” signifies many concrete things⁶⁴.

In Europe, and elsewhere, immigrants being illegal, legal or citizens-are most of the time considered foreigners and “illegitimate” because of their origin or religion.⁶⁵ Ironically enough “Borderless Europe” (after the 1999 Schengen agreement) seems more like a “Fortress Europe⁶⁶” as bordering-settings and closures have taken place at various levels, such as access for migrants within the polity, national citizenship and international borders. Though EU integration speaks of “l’espace homogène” translated as border-free territory, but it also stands for “a space without foreign elements”. That is why in E.U. deportations and undocumented immigrants have escalated in our days.⁶⁷

To a considerable extent, this can be understood in Greeks’ reaction to immigrants. It is not the number of immigrants in Greece that is crucial, but rather their relationship to the political regime. Roubanis goes on by asking: If in 1920, though devastated by war, Greece managed to socially integrate the refugees of Asia Minor, who comprised 20% of its population, why is it so difficult to do the same in today’s world? He argues that illegal immigration is used as a means of instituting a specific social hierarchy, as immigration is mainly a byproduct of modernity and in the context of the Greek as a particular regime, a status-based hierarchy is thus made easier. According to Roubanis, it still remains a reality among Greeks that accession “to public goods, such as education, public office, political representation etc., is made conditional on the acceptance of a single cultural package or, in legal terms, a

⁶³ Muller J. Z., (2008) *Us and Them, The enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism, Foreign Affairs*, p 18.

⁶⁴ Huysmans J. (1995), Migrants as a security problem: Dangers of “securitizing” societal issues, in Thranhardt R. M. (ed) *Migration and European integration, The dynamics of inclusion and Exclusion*, p 59.

⁶⁵ Feldblum M. (1998) Reconfiguring citizenship in Western Europe in Joppke C. (ed) *Challenge to the Nation-State immigrants in Western Europe and the United States*, p 243.

⁶⁶ Bogdani M., Loughlin J. (2009) Clientelism, Corruption and Organized Crime: Serious Barriers to EU Membership, *Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous journey towards integration and accession*, p 148.

⁶⁷ Feldblum M. (1998) Reconfiguring citizenship in Western Europe in Joppke C. (ed) *Challenge to the Nation-State immigrants in Western Europe and the United States*, p 244.

unicultural regime,”⁶⁸ so the self perception of being ‘genuinely Greek’ gives the impression of people with special power.

Albanians are considered as Muslims and eventually allies of the Turks who have been Greeks’ historical enemies. This promoted nationalism and “a cultural division of labour based on genealogy, language and religion”⁶⁹.

Thus, the ideas of supremacy and skepticism have prevailed in the social exclusion of Albanian immigrants in nearly all the aspects of Grecian social life. They have experienced discrimination not only on the basis of ethnicity by locals and officials, especially during the first years of their immigration, but also, on the basis of social relations and labour availability⁷⁰. According to surveys conducted this phenomenon characterized as xenophobia/racism, is linked to low level of education, being of an elderly age and of “rightist” political beliefs⁷¹.

More to the point, it is widely known that discrimination against Albanian immigrants has created a variety of predictions which eventually have led to miscalculations as “even Greeks have been beaten or attacked for looking like “Albanians” by the Greek police.”⁷² Sadly enough, the racial discrimination becomes more disturbing by the fact that racial violence does not only belong to a few nationalist and fascist groups. This is why even in a football game between Greece and Albania racist tensions caused clashes among the groups and even the murder of Albanian immigrants.⁷³

C1.a) Greek perception of Albanian emigrants

Certainly Albanians share nearly the same history and culture with Greeks, but these similarities have not served for both countries as a common ground for co-operation but rather as a challenge for discrimination.

Greek mono-cultural attitude and state policies have produced endless contradictions and ambiguities in creating the “Albanian stereotype.” For example, as Baldwin-Edwards cites, a stereotypical Albanian “worker” is one who is employed on a daily basis, is transferred across different places, has ephemeral working relations, so basically an Albanian worker has no aims or plans, being deprived of public or personal life and disorientated from place and belonging. As a result this hard

⁶⁸ Roubanis I. (2008) *Ethnicity and Migration, a Greek story*, (chapter Challenges for the social inclusion of the migrants population in Greece), p 87.

⁶⁹ Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review, p 53.

⁷⁰ Michail D. (2009), Working here, investing here and there: present economic practices, strategies of social inclusion and future plans for return among the Albanian immigrants in a Greek-Albanian border town, p 547-548.

⁷¹ Γάβρογλου Σ.Π. (2003), κεφ. Μετανάστευση και ακροδεξιά αντίδραση στην Ευρώπη, *Μετανάστες και Μετανάστευση: Οικονομικές, Πολιτικές και Κοινωνικές Πτυχές*, p 103.

⁷² Vidali M., (1999) Living in a policy vacuum, the plight of Albanian immigrants in Greece, vol. 1 no 21, 15 November,

⁷³ Pavlou M., (2006), Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR) and Research Centre for Minority Groups (KEMO).

working reputation does not result in gaining social respect by the Greeks and instead, what they face are social disdain and contempt⁷⁴.

Another aspect of Albanian immigrants' disintegration is the area where they live. It was a common phenomenon among Albanian immigrants that new comers from Albania (being those relatives or just acquaintances) were sheltered and later rented a house close to other family members. Though practically, that has been beneficial for them in maintaining the network information of labor market, yet settling in particular neighborhoods remained the only chance of being allowed to stay somewhere.

On the other hand, areas where jobs and cheap housing are available according to Roubanis's predictions might be kept up by people originating from the same source country. He argues that suburbanization of people with different cultural characteristics may be found in certain areas because of a niche in the job market known in international jargon as the 'three D' market: Dirty, Difficult, and Dangerous, something typically done by illegal immigrants.⁷⁵ The categorization of areas in Athens has started to be affected by the presence of immigrant communities, still, Albanian immigrants though large in number "...have not and do not intend to concentrate in ethnic ghettos"⁷⁶ as the aspirations and targets of the majority of them remain their integration in Greek society.

C1.b) Political outlines on Albanian Migration

Migration continues to be a hot political issue among states as it is underlined "by challenging the receiving society's sense of identity and exposing the weaknesses of its social and economic model of governance—as well as its capacity to enforce its laws—quickly leads to political contentiousness"⁷⁷.

It is widely accepted that the immigration policy arena worldwide has become more complex than ever, as a variety of actors, transnational, sub national, quasi governmental and private, have influenced, if not actually *made* migration policy. But, despite this, the most distinctive element of migration policy in Europe is the persistent gap between the governmental political outline and the preferences of the society, which usually leads to difficulty not only in developing support from mass publics, but also in overcoming their direct opposition concerning the migration policy.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Baldwin-Edwards M., (2004), *Albanian Emigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbioses and Social Ambiguity*, South East Europe Review, p 8

⁷⁵ Roubanis I. (2008), Challenges for the social inclusion of the migrants' population in Greece, *Ethnicity and Migration, a Greek story*, p 90.

⁷⁶ Barjaba K., Albania Migration and Development, Exiting from vulnerability in global Migration system, downloaded from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/17/38528665>

⁷⁷ Papademitriou D.G. (2003) Reflections on Managing Rapid and Deep Change in the Newest Age of Migration, downloaded from <http://www.migrationinformation.org/> p 2.

⁷⁸ Freeman P. G. (1998) The decline of sovereignty? Politics and immigration restriction in liberal states, in Joppke C. (ed) *Challenge to the Nation-State immigrants in Western Europe and the United States*, p 88-89.

Beginning with the recent EU migration development, the Stockholm Program and the approval of the Treaty of Lisbon--which takes into account rights, irrespective of official status of all immigrants living in E.U. countries--immigration issues are prompted and promoted by some Greek political parties such as Pasok, Synaspismos, and the Communist Party (KKE), which are not only inviting immigrants in their parties but are also considering negotiations with them. Additionally, the Communist Party (KKE) issued a statement calling on the government to legalize all immigrants and to grant citizenship to all young immigrants under the age of 18, in spite of their parents' legal or illegal status.⁷⁹

Apart from these parties, there are other political forces such as the right-wing nationalist Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) which strongly objected the draft law for second-generation citizenship. Their political leader, notorious for his hostility to immigrants, said that "Greece is saying 'no' to this bill because it does not want Hellenism to be diluted. Greece belongs to its history: We were building the Parthenon when they were still living on trees."⁸⁰ Moreover, they claimed that the Greek Church supported their party.

Another influencing dimension of the contemporary political situation is that Albanian migration is affected by history, which according to Baldwin-Edwards is "...a concatenation of different histories-each with its own logic and set of values..." He argues that for Greece "...the contemporary history has produced a "fear of Albanians", in both a personal security sense and also in the sense of their possible role in the Greek polity"⁸¹.

Alongside the historical and political context, Greece like all other European states has linked immigration with national security, identity or territorial integrity. It is true that migrants have become "actors in a security drama"⁸², but we cannot ignore the fact that Greek border security issues go beyond the mere notion of Greek public safety, when Albania and Albanian migrants are concerned. That is because Albania is situated geographically within crossroads, which have facilitated "unprecedented influx of trafficking and organized crime to the EU",⁸³ additionally trafficking of people, smuggling of narcotics and weapons are issues of higher profile in Albania.⁸⁴

More to the point, in many areas traffickers collaborate with the police and customs officials, while they are protected by the political elite, who later on were found to be heads of the economic mafia, trafficking and organized crime in Albania. Eventually, organized crime in Albania has established connections with criminal networks all

⁷⁹ *Kathimerini*, January 25, 2010.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Baldwin-Edwards M., (2004), Albanian Emigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbioses and Social Ambiguity, *South East Europe Review*, p 1.

⁸² Huysmans J. (1995), Migrants as a security problem: Dangers of "securitizing" societal issues, in Thranhardt R. M. (ed) *Migration and European integration, The dynamics of inclusion and Exclusion*, p 59.

⁸³ Bogdani M., Loughlin J. (2009) Clientelism, Corruption and Organized Crime: Serious Barriers to EU Membership, *Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous journey towards integration and accession*, p 149

⁸⁴ *Ibid.* p 160-161.

over the world mainly with Russia, Former Yugoslav countries, Turkey, Bulgaria and Southern Italy involving even the Albanian Diaspora⁸⁵.

After the pyramid crisis, the violent and anarchic events in Albania alarmed Greece immensely as far as arms and population movement were concerned. Certainly, they were not irrational fears, as Greece and Italy were facing an arrival of illegal emigrants and escaped criminals rather more than economic refugees.⁸⁶

Additionally, Greece's primary political concern for Albania has been the political line that Albania will follow during and after its transition. According to Vidali, Greece was alarmed at Albania's tie with Turkey, as this was a potential threat in the formation of an "Islamic arch" near the border of Albania-Bosnia-Turkey.⁸⁷

In this context, the political priorities and schemes on executing state policies relating to migration management, have gained ground not only on dealing with the fear of loss of the "pure" national identity, political autonomy, threat to national security because of the immigration factor, but also on facing the challenge of overcoming direct opposition from voters in building a political will for future collective benefits regarding migration management.

Unfortunately, Greek regularization schemes have manifested political, social fears and threats towards the 'others'. Albanian immigrants still remain subject of a relative stability due to the short term regularizations, which can be deemed as a deliberate policy of Greek government exerting pressure on Albania whenever tensions have arisen in interstate relations. That is why the Greek government has often used the violent repatriation of Albanian illegal workers ("Broom" operations)⁸⁸.

These events had a great impact not only on Albania's internal and external affairs but also on Albanian immigrant communities who unexpectedly became 'hostage' in those disputes. Unsurprisingly, the majority of both first and second generation Albanian immigrants have experienced or witnessed the effect of 'broom operations' during their stay in Greece.⁸⁹

Undoubtedly, the Greek political terrain concerning immigration issues is undergoing changes day by day as global culture has signaled the shift towards cultural diversities and universal human rights.

⁸⁵ Ibid. p 162.

⁸⁶ Pettifer J., Vickers M. (2009), The crises in northern Albania, *The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans*, p 55-58.

⁸⁷ Vidali M., (1999) Living in a policy vacuum, the plight of Albanian immigrants in Greece, vol. 1 no 21.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Data based on personal interviews with Albanian migrants in Greece and Albania (June-August 2010 target group one), (June-August 2010 target group two).

C2. Migrants' image in Greek media

It is widely believed that media, which has been a reflection of Greek political and mono-cultural attitude, has encouraged deliberately racist and xenophobic practices among Greeks, specifically against Albanian immigrants. Obviously this behavior is motivated by abusive purposes which have targeted the freezing of any integration in any civic or political engagement. That is why media coverage on immigration issues has been much influenced by illegal immigrants and particularly by their criminal acts. Karydis and Pavlou showed that the press has time and again managed to 'recycle' criminal news, making it more frequent than in reality.

Based on Lianos's argument, the racist behavior within the Greek society is helped by media and police who tend to portray certain national groups, mainly Albanians, as the highest suspects of criminality and even when there is no evidence on who committed a crime, it is usually assumed that it was an Albanian immigrant.⁹⁰

Furthermore, the media did not only nurture the xenophobic intolerance of public opinion but also encouraged the police and '...the behavior of the judiciary in court, which reflect unfairness towards them (immigrants) resulting in great numbers of arrests and prison inmates'.⁹¹

It is worth mentioning that recently the Greek media has been challenging the acceptance of cultural and ethnic diversities, as well as being more moderate and sensitive in its 'language' when dealing with immigrants' issues.

In sum, in most cases mass media magnified racism, xenophobia and intolerance among Greeks by creating the image of 'immigrant criminality.' Under that 'culture of discretion' fear, distrust and contempt was created among the Greek population towards Albanian immigrants.

C3. The Greek national economic decline

As an answer to the perception that immigrants "contribute" to a receiving country's increase in the rates of unemployment, studies have proved that immigrants' labour does not affect these rates, as they are affected by the state economical policy, while immigrants contribute in a country's economical development, thus creating new job positions for natives⁹².

Despite this, it is believed that the present Greek economic situation would impact the social and economic integration of all immigrants who are "*last hired, first fired*",

⁹⁰ Lianos Th. P. in cooperation with Petralias A. and Boussoulas Chr., (2004) pilot study ,Report on immigration to Greece, p 19

⁹¹ Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review p 53.

⁹² Μαρβάκης Α., Παρσάνογλου Δ., Παύλου Μ., (2001), *Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα*, p 22.

resulting in losing their legal residence permits. Papadopoulos notes that the number of work permits and family reunifications issued has been steadily decreasing because of a meager formal labor market. This market makes it difficult to collect the necessary social security stamps and hard to prove the levels of income through tax declaration in order to receive a renewed permit.⁹³

These situations have brought difficult times for many Albanian families, including my own. Due to the fact of earning less than the official defined sum of money per year, my husband's renewable residence permit was refused last year. Eventually, he is an illegal migrant, though he has been legal since 1998.

Though, Kassimis foresees that Albanian immigrants will be survivors of the employment crises as they rely on their extended family structures for support and "...the crisis will de facto create *the regularization of irregularity*, meaning it will make irregular work, the normal work - at least for immigrants..."⁹⁴

There are claims that immigrants prolonged the flourishing of black economy, which was estimated as the highest in E.U. at 28 to 35%⁹⁵, and like other European countries, was a magnet for illegal immigrants who offered cheap and prohibited labour. It is to be seen in time of Greek crises, when the economical tendencies of the business world are to seek out non-risky means of profit and entrepreneurs are more cautious in hiring employees because of fear of fines, so time will tell if an informal economy would work in the most frequently occupied sectors of immigrants such as construction, agriculture, industry and tourism.

Finally, the recent immigration law 3386/2005 restricts the free movement of immigrants, compels them to keep the same occupation and insurance as well as the same place of residence..⁹⁶ Therefore, immigration policy even now tends to be more restrictive and inefficient.

The contributing factors

C4. Greek regularization programs

Baldwin considers that the multiple and complex dimensions of immigration include: labour, family reunification, security, immigrant rights, health and integration which if managed right would be profitable for both the individuals and society but international immigration needs an all-embracing and cooperative attitude by policy makers and practitioners, who should approach immigration and

⁹³ European Commission, (2009) Project no: *CIS8-044103, CLANDESTINO Project, Final Report, Recent Host Countries in Southern Europe, ELIAMEP*, p 147.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* p 147.

⁹⁵ Baldwin-Edwards M., (2004), Albanian Immigration and the Greek Labour Market: Economic Symbioses and Social Ambiguity, *South East Europe Review*, p 3.

⁹⁶ Roubanis I. (2008) Challenges for the social inclusion of the migrants population in Greece, *Ethnicity and Migration, a Greek story*, p 90.

development by facilitating and regulating. In order to be successful, its management cannot be undertaken by governments unilaterally.⁹⁷ Thus, global management on immigration development remains a priority not only for Greece but for all the E.U. states.

Under the influence of Western European countries Greek immigration policy became more productive than before. Because of the strong criticism from a well-known academic researcher, state authorities have instructed and ordered different state agencies such as OAED, IKA and the Greek Police as well “...to strengthen immigrants’ rights and prohibit police violence.”⁹⁸ Unquestionably, Albanian immigrants benefited more than others from all the regularization programs.

Firstly, they were no longer targets of ‘broom operations’ or deportation. Secondly, all the regularization schemes contributed to the occupational mobility of Albanian immigrants who initially sought low-skilled jobs for survival purposes, as they could not find jobs in their profession. Due to the legalizations, Albanian immigrants are integrated in the labour market and many very skilled immigrants occupy high-rank positions. Furthermore, they are provided legal protection from the abuse of employers from a temporary to a permanent basis, a social security system, compensation, etc. Regularizations made it possible for most Albanian immigrants, especially after family unification, to have access to all public services, hospitals, schools, universities and administrations.

As a matter of fact, regularizations not only normalized the life of Albanian immigrants, but also promoted their social and cultural integration. Thanks to these regularizations, Albanian immigrants enjoyed a better quality of living as now they could freely participate in many national cultural activities such as Albanian concerts, artistic and sport events without any fear of being caught by the police.

Apart from the Greek media’s attempt to include Albanian immigrants in their information, a TV station, Kanali 10, was created, along with Radio Skai which broadcasted news in the Albanian language. Progress was achieved even by immigrants themselves. They managed to publish their first newspaper, *The Immigrant*, which gave attention only on the problems and conditions of immigrants in Greece. Now there are four newspapers; *Tribunal News*, *The Express*, *Athens* and *The Immigrant*, which in the course of time have become sources of information not only for Albanian immigrants’ issues, but also of all main events taking place in Albania.

Also, it is fair enough to assume that due to their regularization, Albanian immigrants brought about the creation of trade networks especially on border regions. That mobility enhanced economic relations among small private businesses, which

⁹⁷ Baldwin -Edwards M. (2005) *The Integration of immigrants in Athens: Developing indicators and statistical measures*, p 6.

⁹⁸ *Athens News*, 26 September 2003.

continue to keep ties with their country of origin and later influenced political decisions of Greece to help Albanian people economically.

C5. Education attainments

C5.a) First generation Albanian emigrants' educational achievements

Aside from the Greek minority and Greek decedents, initially, all other Albanian immigrants lacked knowledge of the Greek language. It is worth mentioning that this lack of knowledge of the Greek language created an unfavorable position of immigrants in their integration in the labour market. At first they learned enough to get low-skilled jobs, because the academic and professional degrees many held, could not be ascertained.

However, many Albanians had acquired skills before they came to Greece. 63.8% of men and 65.2% of women had completed a 12-year school education and had been trained for specific professions in technical schools, while 15% of men and 13.4% of women were holders of a university degree from Albania or a vocational school degree. What's more interesting, they continue to learn skills and their attendance in the education scheme is higher when compared to Greeks, as attendance to educational courses over the last years was 6.7%.⁹⁹

According to the 2001 census of the Mediterranean Migration Observatory, the number of self declared Albanian immigrants' educational level: in postgraduate education consists of 258, first university degree 21.743, post-secondary qualification 5.154, general secondary 102.380, vocational secondary 10.926, compulsory education 86.550, primary education 108.584, some primary school 41.894, basic literate 11.510, illiterate 49.037¹⁰⁰. Due to lack of official sources, basic data from the Ministry of Education makes complex and unreal distinction between aliens/foreigners "allogenes" and foreigners with Greek ethnicity "homogenes" and in the case of Albanians this distinction is out of place.

Eventually, like in most E.U. countries, the regulated professions in Greece require Greek nationality or European nationality, so illegal and legal immigrants could not meet these requirements.¹⁰¹ However, this changed later as legalization offered them opportunities of acknowledging their academic titles through DOATAP (Hellenic Republic, Inter-University Centre for the Recognition of Foreign Academic Titles).

⁹⁹ Lyberakki A. & Maroukis Th.,(2004), *Albanian Immigrants in Athens, Some recent findings*, p 17.

¹⁰⁰ Baldwin –Edwards M. (2005) *The Integration of immigrants in Athens: Developing indicators and statistical measures*, Table A7.

¹⁰¹ Lianos Th. P. in cooperation with Petralias A. and Boussoulas Chr., *Report on immigration to Greece, (pilot study 2004)*.

C5.b) Second generation Albanian migrants' educational successes

Greece, obeying to the E.U. Convention on the Rights of the Child, permitted all immigrant children to attend school, regardless of their parents' legal status. Referring to the survey conducted by the Greek National Statistical Service in the year 2009, there are 219.913 immigrant children (54.0%) studying in primary school, 187.672 immigrant youngsters (34.7%) studying in secondary school and 60.760 immigrant students (11.2%) studying in universities¹⁰².

It is clear that there is significant participation of immigrant children studying in primary schools and if we consider that the majority of them belong to the Albanian nationality, we attribute that to the young group age of Albanian immigrants families varying between 35 to 45 years old, who after the regularization of 1998, reunified with their spouses and children.

Based on aggregate data on the educational performance of migrants and ethnic minorities, poorer academic achievements are revealed in comparison with majority populations in all EU Member States, as immigrants tend to get lower educational qualifications, finish schooling earlier, and have higher dropout rates.

There is a claim that 4.3% of non-native migrant pupils¹⁰³ did poor in comparison to Greek native pupils. That might be caused by lack of laws of punishment concerning racism and discrimination, of monitoring their protection,¹⁰⁴ the result being a subjection to poor grading, failing or expulsion.

Expressions of racism are carried out even in state schools. Even though educators support the most brilliant Albanian immigrant students, Greek students and their parents have prevented Albanian students from carrying the Greek flag on Greece's national day. In some cases even the chosen best Albanian students themselves have refused to carry the Greek flag in order to avoid clashes in the communities they live.

Education in Greece has been orientated by the ideals of "one Ethnos, one Religion, one Language" and its goal has not been the preparation of all children for life in a multicultural society, thus its educational policies have discouraged bilingualism in state schools¹⁰⁵. Obviously, Greek education furthered the Albanian language shift from Albanian to Greek language resulting into "the gradual abandonment of the mother tongue by second generation".¹⁰⁶ This is not the only reason. Investing in Greek education still remains an intentional family strategy of Albanians. They have

¹⁰² Downloaded from http://www.e-kyklades.gr/images/esye_metanastes_F31473.pdf

¹⁰³ Luciak M., (2004), Migrants, Minorities and Education, *Documenting Discrimination and Integration in 15 Member States of the European Union*, Report, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, p 55-56.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p 55.

¹⁰⁵ Michail D. 2009, Working here, investing here and there: present economic practices, strategies of social inclusion and future plans for return among the Albanian immigrants in a Greek-Albanian border town, p 547-548.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p 552.

also been targeting social mobility and integration through education, Orthodox baptism and name changing¹⁰⁷.

Apparently, in studies carried out by Luciak on the factors relating to immigrant and minority pupils' educational performance, importance is given to parental education and their aspirations for their children. For Albanian immigrants this factor holds a special place. Education has been given great importance and for some immigrant families it became the only target. That is explained by the fact that historically Albanians have considered knowledge a priority and a source of pride over economic, religious or cultural differences.

In this context, being immigrants in a European country, they aimed to achieve the best results out of possible chances in educational achievement. Though there is no data on the progress of the level of education of Albanian immigrants' children, or any official statistics about second generation Albanian students in Greek universities, there is an opinion that they do explicitly well and have a high participation rate in schools¹⁰⁸.

C6. NGOs and trade unions' contribution

Unquestionably, Greek NGOS, trade unions, institutes and the Greek Ombudsman, were and still are the first to sympathize with the difficult position of immigrants as well as to manage what the state could not accomplish for them.¹⁰⁹ Despite the fact that the regularization of 1998 provided the legislative framework and institutions for Albanian immigrants to create organizational life and activities through independent associations, the help, cooperation and contribution of NGOS on emigrants' rights, is undeniable.

Fortunately, now there are many NGOs led mainly by Greeks, which have voiced immigrants' rights. So, 'Diktyo', the Forum of Albanian Workers, and the Greek Helsinki Monitor and international NGOs (such as the UNHCR, the Greek Council of Refugees Caritas Hellas) are worth praising, not only for addressing the most critical immigrant needs mainly by working voluntarily, by providing help, information, medical aid, counseling, food and sheltering, but also for their activities in defending immigrants' rights.¹¹⁰

Furthermore, the national Co-ordination of ENARs' contribution against racism, exclusion and xenophobia, through a European network, promotes equality treatment between EU citizens and third country nationals¹¹¹. These organizations, have kept

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, p 551.

¹⁰⁸ Data based on my personal experience, knowledge and interaction with other Albanian migrants during these 10 years living as an immigrant in Greece.

¹⁰⁹ Downloaded from: [http:// www.enar-eu.org/en/puplication/national](http://www.enar-eu.org/en/puplication/national). Responding to racism in Greece

¹¹⁰ Gropas R. & Triandafyllidou A., (2005) *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Greece*, Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, Oldenburg, p 22-23.

¹¹¹ Downloaded from [http:// www.enar-eu.org/en/puplication/national](http://www.enar-eu.org/en/puplication/national). Responding to racism in Greece

informing emigrants on discussions among the officials about migrant policies, thus providing “a window of mediated access to Greek public and political life”¹¹².

In contrast with the NGOs, intellectuals and the Greek Ombudsman who have strived for the immigrants’ socio-political rights, trade unions of specific occupations such as the Builder’s Union have promoted only the legal employment of immigrants in an effort to prevent their illegitimate competition in the labour market.¹¹³ Referring to Gropas’ and Triandafyllidou’s studies on active civic participation of immigrants in Greece, it can be said that they do not take part in any formal political life, though recently they are invited unofficially by some parties and do participate in party conventions, but always as observers or “friends of the party.”¹¹⁴

Due to their large numbers, Albanians have formed more associations than the other national groups. The associations, forums or organizations such as ‘*Steki*’, the *FORUM of Albanian Immigrants of Greece*, the *Albanian Cultural Association ‘The Eagle’* *Albanian Immigrant Writers’ Club – ‘Drita’ League of Albanians of the Thessaloniki Region* *Albanian Forum (Rethymno – Crete)* *Association of Greek-Albanian Friendship Socrates*, *Greek-Albanian Association Proodos*, etc¹¹⁵, aim at fulfilling both personal and communal aspirations or practical ones such as improving their image in Greek society, being in touch with networks for employment or creating contacts with authorities.

However, Albanian immigrants inherited a shortage of rights’ culture—whether human, political or social, so their organization was weak and low, as most Albanians ignore the existence of Albanians’ unions and associations. Besides this, they tend to be rather apathetic as far as participation is concerned. This is attributed to their inferior economic and legal status in the receiving countries¹¹⁶ and to their aversion towards these unions, which only remind them of their communist experience. As a consequence, they feel distrust towards these forms of organization, even though these organizations can help their further integration in the Greek society¹¹⁷ and in finding solutions in their problems as immigrants.

C7.Social attitudes, internal welcome from local Greek communities

It goes without saying, that part of the Albanian integration into the Greek society remains the internal welcome from the local Greek communities. Though as complex and contradictory as it may seem, the common people were the first to help and support the Albanian immigrants as they [...gave us clothes, food, shelter, work....we

¹¹² Gropas R. & Triandafyllidou A., (2005) *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Greece*, Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, Oldenburg, p 34.

¹¹³ Ibid. p 18.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p17.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p29.

¹¹⁶ Barjaba K. and King R. 2005, Introducing and theorizing Albanian migration, *The new Albanian migration*, ed. R. King, N. Mai and S. Schwandner-Sievers, 1-28, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, p 19.

¹¹⁷ Ιωσηφίδης Θ. 2009, Κοινωνικό κεφάλαιο και μεταναστευτική ένταξη, *Ζητήματα κοινωνικής ένταξης μεταναστών*, p 333.

had nothing]¹¹⁸. The standard image of Albanians in Greece has for long been promoted by the media as that of ‘cunning, primitive, untrustworthy’, ‘dangerous people’ and ‘criminals’, but in reality, that half million of population has lived and worked in the most delicate sectors of the private Greek life.

Therefore, occupations such as babysitting, taking care of the elderly and cleaning houses may seem unimportant, but are yet related to trust and assurance. Greeks practically showed great confidence in leaving their dearest ones (either their children or parents) under the Albanian working force. Normally in summer time, Greeks would leave the keys of their houses to their housekeepers (mostly Albanian women) for different domestic services. Thus, this daily reality questioned a lot the ‘standard image’ of media and it seems, as common people of two nations live and work together ignoring political fuss or whatever hides behind those subjects. Nowadays, intermarriages of Greek with Albanians are becoming more and more accepted and welcome by both societies.

C8.The role of the Church

It is claimed that religion, as part of the Greek dominant culture, has been the ‘ticket’ to citizenship resulting into social inclusion. Roubanis supports this proof in the fact that [...it is no accident that in Greece there is a single Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs], reasoning that even in declaring ourselves to be Christian Orthodox [...we are in fact making a claim to a particular social status and, once again, we are making a particular claim to power.]¹¹⁹ He argues that the role of the Church regarding immigrants is as important as state policy.

The Greek Church’s approach towards immigrants and especially second generation immigrants has been mixed. As far as Albanian immigrants are concerned, the Greek Church has been either quiet or anti-Albanian immigrants as the majority of them are considered to be Muslims. Undoubtedly, that categorization has hindered their integration in Greek society and has influenced their marginalization in all spheres of Greek social life.

But it should be mentioned that the Greek Church runs many charities and does not make any discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. In programs such as human trafficking shelters or programs for the incarcerated, the numbers of Albanians who benefited were the highest compared to any other nationalities.

¹¹⁸ Michail D. 2009, Working here, investing here and there: present economic practices, strategies of social inclusion and future plans for return among the Albanian immigrants in a Greek-Albanian border town, p 547-548.

¹¹⁹ Roubanis I. (2008) Challenges for the social inclusion of the migrants’ population in Greece, *Ethnicity and Migration, a Greek story*, p 89.

Finally, the Greek Church with its representative Archbishop Ieronymos did silently support the second generation citizenship bill. This proved beneficial for second generation immigrants because of the influence of such a respectable figure on Greek society and because his support would not leave many possibilities to other bishops of opposing the bill.

C9.Role of the Albanian authorities

Among Albania's and Greece's bilateral affairs, the most prominent issues that stir dialogue are first [...the political, human, educational and cultural rights of the Greek community in Albania, secondly the economic and social rights of Albanian emigrants in Greece and the last the property rights of the Cham population, who after the Second World War moved from Greece to Albania...] ¹²⁰ from which I can say that the Albanian authorities have been very concentrated on Albanian immigrants' basic human rights, rather than political ones.

Though, the presence of the Albanian Embassy is not strongly felt among its compatriots in supporting their rights or demands towards both states, Greek and Albanian ¹²¹, still it has encouraged private initiatives on opening Albanian schools by providing books and other school material to them ¹²². Actually, in Athens there are two Albanian schools "Vatra Shqiptare" and "Porta" which receive text books as a benefit from that provision.

It is worth mentioning that the Albanian authorities have launched many initiatives and programs to turn 'brain drain' into 'brain gain', which have become a process [...that could help to accelerate the scientific and technical progress of Albania, and contribute to the globalization of scientific activities] ¹²³.

Due to the establishment of a National Steering Committee of Brain Gain ¹²⁴ and the recent initiative "*Brain Gain Program (2006-2008)*" ¹²⁵, which researches and tracks highly educated Albanians abroad, representatives of the Albanian Embassy have tried to encourage many highly skilled professionals such as MA and PhD holders who can either contribute by returning to Albania or offer their experience from Greece in service of their country.

¹²⁰ Barjaba K. (2004), Migration and ethnicity in Albania: Synergies and Interdependencies, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Volume XI, issue 1, p 234.

¹²¹ Data based on personal interviews with Albanian migrants in Greece and Albania (June-August 2010 target group one).

¹²² Personal interview with Bejko R. representative of sector of Education and Culture of the Albanian Embassy in Greece, July 2010.

¹²³ Gadeshi, I (2006) 'From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Mobilizing Albania's Skilled Diaspora' in Tamas, K and Palme, J (ed.), *How Migration Can Benefit Development*, Institute for Future Studies; Stockholm, Sweden, p 25.

¹²⁴ Ibid. p 29.

¹²⁵ Downloaded from <http://www.braingain.gov.al/>

To conclude, it is clear that there are a great number of Greek socio-political, historical, cultural and economical factors and realities involved in shaping and responding to Albanian migration policy. Undoubtedly, those determinants continue to introduce crucial political, cultural and economical interventions in order to satisfy collective preferences of both natives and Albanian immigrants. Alongside these policy targets, that variety of factors has also been contributing to Greek social cohesion as it deals with addressing and understanding the benefits of cultural diversities and human capital in a global world.

D. Second generation immigrants: Living in their parents déjà-vu

D1. Facing the duality of their identity (transnational character of Albanian migration)

That Europe has pioneered not only the nation-state and nationalism, but it has also been leading the way to formally develop transnationalism,¹²⁶ is already acknowledged by all. Referring to Linz and Stepan, many people in the modern world have identified themselves with more than one culture and history because of intermarriage, friendship of different nationalities and their movement back and forth.¹²⁷

Because of that, many western EU states have revised their policy towards nationality and citizenship and their character, consequences and directions are being greatly contested¹²⁸. Thus revisions of entry, creation of transnational closures and among others, the boosting of anti-immigrant politics, encouraged the expansion of dual nationality and enhanced citizenship rights for non-nationals¹²⁹. Though multiple nationality has always been discouraged and banned by most European states, dual nationality has continued to rise in EU as it is expected to be [...about transnational loyalties or multiple membership, rather than a singular citizenship].¹³⁰

Evidently, Albanian immigrants, and especially second generation immigrants because of their geographic proximity, historical and cultural bonds and long settlement in Greece are conscious of having a dual identity. They live in two

¹²⁶ Lahar G. (2004), *The European Factor: institutional and psychological constraints on immigration attitudes, Immigration and politics in the New Europe, Reinventing Borders*, p 149.

¹²⁷ Linz J.J & Stepan A., (1996) *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation, Southern Europe, South America and post communist Europe, Stateness, nationalism and democratization*, London, The John HOPKINS University Press Baltimore , p 33.

¹²⁸ Feldblum M. (1998) *Reconfiguring citizenship in Western Europe* in Joppke C. (ed) *Challenge to the Nation-State immigrants in Western Europe and the United States*, p 230-231.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p 260.

¹³⁰ Ibid p 237.

realities: Greece the land of the present and future dreams, and Albania, the only home of their past, with clearly neither of them being fully theirs. They perceive themselves different from Albanians in Albania, as they lead a different life in Greece but at the same time and for the same reason, they do not feel fully Greek.

Each young immigrant feels the need to belong to a national identity. It can be said that the ideology of a temporary form of migration has a central role in preserving or neglecting the cultural physiognomy of the country of origin. As happened in the case of Greek immigrants, when their immigration was considered “temporary” (Germany and other European countries), they were not assimilated in the receiving countries’ cultures, while when their immigration had a temporary character (when they immigrated in the U.S.A., Canada, Australia), they were completely assimilated in the receiving societies¹³¹. In the case of second generation Albanian immigrants, this is not proving to be the case, as based on the interviews I conducted, they would prefer a future in the country in which they were raised, and whose language they know best (Greece), which provides them with better working opportunities, than being integrated in their country of origin (Albania).¹³²

Based on some interviews I had with young Albanian immigrants¹³³, I concluded that two thirds of them would prefer the Greek citizenship as they plan their future in Greece, but their sense of belonging remains Albanian. The majority of them prefer the Greek culture to Albanian culture. Though most of them use the Greek language even when communicating with family members, they are aware of the necessity of practicing and enriching the Albanian language, as they lack not only communicative opportunities with their natives but also the sense of genuinely belonging somewhere.

Second-generation Albanian immigrants’ national identity formation is still in the making. This might have its roots both in the past and the present. During these twenty years of migration, second generation’s self perception/ID, leaving aside their own experiences here (Greece), is definitely influenced by their estimation of family relations, events, orientations, plus the stability of their parents’ legal status, which undoubtedly has affected directly not only the quality of their standard of living but also their psychological wellbeing, aspirations and expectations.¹³⁴

Evidently, such uncertainties have influenced that ambiguity but on the other side, we cannot ignore that historically, Albanians were the last to develop a feeling of national identity, which was not only because they were illiterate and living in a traditional underdeveloped agrarian economy, but because they also sought their national identity mainly in culture and its most important representative: the language, since religion and almost everything else in Albania was divisive rather than unifying.

The national identity perception was based on language, irrespective of religious faith or ethno—cultural division. Undoubtedly, Hoxha engineered the Albanian identity

¹³¹ Κασσιμάτη Κ. 1984, Μετανάστευση-Παλινοόστηση, Η προβληματική της δεύτερης γενιάς, p 86.

¹³² Data based on personal interviews with Albanian migrants in Greece and Albania (June-August 2010 target group two)

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Data based on my personal experience, knowledge and interaction with other Albanian migrants during these 10 years living as an immigrant in Greece.

into an ideological one, thus after his rule Albanians were [...convulsed by a violent rejection of everything associated with Hoxha...]¹³⁵

Obviously, democratic transition and immigration as a new phenomenon of Albanian reality, has affected the new transitional national identity formation, especially on the second generation living outside the Albanian territory.

The redefining of second-generation Albanian's identity is going to be influenced by the immigration factor, which has served as a generator of globalism more than any other reality of the immigrant Albanian community, as immigration is converted from a survival strategy to transnationalism. Geographic proximity, visa liberalization, trade and the large size of documented Albanian immigrants (bearers of two homelands: that of their origin and that of future destination or as Kuris said holders of blessing and curse of loving two motherlands¹³⁶) have created new transnational socio-political circumstances which have impacted the Albanian migration development. Evidence of that is not only the transnational movement of Albanians or their trade activities, but also immigrant's participation in the socio-political life of the country. The 2007 elections in Albania were characterized by a great number of immigrant participation, who traveled from Greece only for voting purpose, which was an indication of their political maturity as well as a moderated experience from the host country.¹³⁷

Hopefully, transnationalism will pave the way for transnational involvement, which practically would cater for all Albania's needs and especially back the formation of second generation identity.

But as migrants' identity is often politicized, it can be assumed that the Greek society would never make easy the creation of their identity. Jarvis argues about "what does it mean to be Greek." She explains that even PASOK Party supported giving second generation immigrant citizenship rights from birth, but when this campaign took legal form it became evident that the Greek society was not tolerant of diversity. In the name of preserving the "purity" of Greek bloodiness demonstrators expressed in chance of "you are born a Greek, not made a Greek". She concludes that [...Greece has to do a lot more to include "diversity" in its political vocabulary].¹³⁸

D2.Distinctions of second generation from the first one

¹³⁵ Fischer B. (2005) *The Development of Albanian Nationalism*, Staff-edited summary of the EES, downloaded from:

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=109

¹³⁶ Κουρής, Α. (1998), *Μετανάστες: Η Ευλογία και δυστυχία του να αγαπάς δύο πατρίδες*, p 94.

¹³⁷ Vullnetari J., (2007), IMISCOE Working Paper, Albanian Immigration and Development: State of the art review, p 83.

¹³⁸ Jarvis Y., May 10, 2010, A Fresh Voice in an Ancient Land: Take Five with Yvette, First Black Public Official in Greece downloaded from <http://inclusionparadox.com/a-fresh-voice-in-an-ancient-land>

It is widely believed that the first generation of immigrants from the very beginning of making their decision to leave their own land, took into account the great difficulties, costs and challenges they were going to face in host countries, so there is an ‘unwritten contract’ of agreement to accept and sacrifice a lot from their own life in exchange of a better future especially when their children were concerned.

From my empirical research, the first Albanian migration generation, irrespective of its economical achievements, has for survival reasons endured being silently treated as ‘second category’ citizens of the Greek society.¹³⁹

Initially, Albanians changed their names into Greek names, either on their free will, or as an effort to “ameliorate” their working relations with their employers. Either way, this meant their breach from their personal story as an Albanian immigrant. So, the Albanian immigrant, “...by denying his history/identity made an effort to correct their social status by adopting Greek names¹⁴⁰.” But those motives would be out of the question for the second generation, as they do feel equal with their Greek cohorts.

Another distinction between the two generations is that the first generation of Albanian immigrants maintained their bond with Albania, as is shown by the flows of remittances, especially at the first phase of their migration, while nowadays their capital investment strategies have taken a transnational character since many of them have created business activities in both countries¹⁴¹. On the other hand, second generation, is unwilling to build their permanent future in Albania, as they feel more a part of the Greek community¹⁴².

First generation immigrants prefer to be Albanian in private and they strive to breed national pride to their children not only by keeping the Albanian language alive, choosing Albania for vacations or going there for family occasions, but also by promoting to them the best national personalities of history, literature, art, science and politics. Many Albanian families have satellite TVs in order to be informed on everything new on Albania, as well as to keep the second generation in touch with Albanian media. Despite those efforts, linguistic assimilation has already begun, as second generation of Albanian immigrants are proficient in the Greek language (if compared to their knowledge of Albanian language).

Judging from my personal experience as well as my communication with other Albanian immigrants,¹⁴³ I believe that psychologically second generation immigrants have suffered more than the previous generation. I believe that they were more exposed to ‘exclusions’ in schools or playgrounds—as they spent many hours with

¹³⁹ Data based on my personal experience, knowledge and interaction with other Albanian migrants during these 10 years living as an immigrant in Greece.

¹⁴⁰ Ψημμένος Ι. 1995, *Μεταναστεύση από τα Βαλκάνια, Κοινωνικός αποκλεισμός στην Αθήνα*, p 186.

¹⁴¹ Michail D. 2009, Working here, investing here and there: present economic practices, strategies of social inclusion and future plans for return among the Albanian immigrants in a Greek-Albanian border town, p 547-548.

¹⁴² Data based on personal interviews with Albanian migrants in Greece and Albania (June-August 2010 target group two).

¹⁴³ Data based on personal interviews with Albanian migrants in Greece and Albania (June-August 2010 target group two).

Greek children in and after school—than their parents who were ‘prepared’ to cope with discrimination in their work.

Another aspect of their earlier psychological experience is that they were targets of expectations and goals of adjustment to the dominant national culture from both their parents and Greek society. Roubanis believes that from a young age the second generation of immigrants were taught [...to depreciate the cultural capital of their parents, to hide their origin...] and furthermore, 6.3% of those living in Attica, have changed their names to sound more ‘Greek’ all in exchange for acceptance in their peer groups].¹⁴⁴

Undoubtedly this situation has changed with the passage of time. Now according to Psaropoulos, there is great psychological difference between the first and the second generation that not only attends Greek schools and grows up with Greek culture, but also in their sameness, the right to vote and claim welfare. Furthermore, another difference from their parents is that if the “first generation” asked to leave Greece because there is no more economic need for them, their children must not suffer “...to be told that they were born into a mercenary arrangement.”¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, that has not prevented them in building their own niche. They seem more cosmopolitan as they are psychologically dealing with globalization more than their parents. Now this generation has become the arch that will bridge their parents’ earlier sacrifices with a promising future.

D3. Citizenship, a quest for the second generation

Muir raises the question that “if a child is born in Greece, speaks perfect Greek, wants to live in Greece and is willing to swear loyalty to the Greek State- should the child be allowed Greek citizenship? The Papandreou administration is saying yes.”¹⁴⁶ While Roubanis warns that [...if we do not create whole personalities, people with dreams and hopes, we should be preparing for a society dominated by fear]¹⁴⁷

If we notice the impact of the second generation immigrants (some estimated 250.000) position in the Greek society, and especially two-thirds of them that refer to Albanians, we can understand that citizenship by naturalization has come to a critical point for the whole Greek society. Second generation Albanian immigrants could be beneficial for the Greek society, as Roubanis emphasizes “they (immigrants) can be a danger, or they can be a revitalizing opportunity, a problem, or a source of wealth and rejuvenation, for a society that is ageing, both in ideas and in human resource.”¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Roubanis I. (2008) Challenges for the social inclusion of the migrants’ population in Greece *Ethnicity and Migration, a Greek story*, p 90.

¹⁴⁵ Psaropoulos J.,(ed),Editorial :*Successful Integration of Emigrants in Europe depends upon Work Opportunities* , Athens news, downloaded from <http://www.HellenicComServe.com>

¹⁴⁶ Muir D. Greece: citizenship for the citizens of immigrants, Economics and Demography, posted on Monday, February 22nd, downloaded from <http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoc/economics-and-demography/greece-citizenship-for-children-of-immigrants/>

¹⁴⁷ Roubanis I. (2008) Challenges for the social inclusion of the migrants’ population in Greece *Ethnicity and Migration, a Greek story*, p 94.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p 94.

According to Muir, citizenship by naturalization should be a reality, not only because of the passage of twenty years of immigrants' continual residence in Greece, but also because many of them have bought real estate, speak fluent Greek, are settled members of their community, and in some cases, their children outnumber native Greeks in some schools. If naturalized, in a country where 90% of the population is ethnic Greek, the new coming citizens being Albanian-Greeks or of other nationalities, will undoubtedly become an integral part of the Greek society.¹⁴⁹

This is going to be challenged as even now the new law 3838/2010 questioned the dimension of migrants' social integration. According to Maroukis, it is far from the target of social integration as "vesting it with the right not just to exist in the society but to change it, indeed, sounds surreal in the echo of this bill"¹⁵⁰ He emphasizes that the policy makers did not take into consideration the future labor force of second generation immigrants who will inevitably become Greek citizens.

As far as their integration is concerned, according to Gropas it [...involves access to the labour market, education, social goods and services..., it involves engaging in economic, cultural and political life] and is expected to deal not only with their identity but also with the social cohesion, social justice, social peace and the quality of Greek democracy¹⁵¹.

Nevertheless this citizenship law, in contrast with the previous citizenship law, is not based on nationality or religious criteria¹⁵² (which only served in maintaining the homogeneity of the Greek society). Immigrants will benefit from the citizenship in the long term, not only because their economical, legal and political status will become ameliorated, but they will also permanently avoid the bureaucratic procedures of their residence permits and they can plan their personal (education, occupation) and family life in the long run¹⁵³.

"In the modern, liberal-democratic tradition, conceptions of citizenship have been composed of three different elements: legal and political status, exercise of civic virtue and identification with the polity."¹⁵⁴ When granted citizenship, political engagement and civic participation of Albanian immigrants in the Greek society will become a reality.

¹⁴⁹ Muir D. Greece: citizenship for the citizens of immigrants, Economics and Demography, posted on Monday, February 22nd, downloaded from <http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoc/economics-and-demography/greece-citizenship-for-children-of-immigrants/>

¹⁵⁰ Maroukis, Th. December 23, (2008) downloaded from <http://blogs.eliamep.gr/en/maroukis/migrants-do-%e2%80%98we-%e2%80%99-want-them-or-not-a-pointless-question-that-often-appears-in-public-discourse-and-that-%e2%80%98we-%e2%80%99-can-no-longer-answer-by-ourselves/>

¹⁵¹ Gropas R. June 25 2008, Integrating immigrants: citizenship and civic activism downloaded from <http://blogs.eliamep.gr/en/gropas/integrating-immigrants-citizenship-and-civic-activism>

¹⁵² Κόντης Α. (2009), *Ιθαγένεια και ενσωμάτωση μεταναστών, Ζητήματα κοινωνικής ένταξης μεταναστών*, p 50.

¹⁵³ Ibid. p 37.

¹⁵⁴ Prospects for transitional citizenship and Democracy, downloaded from http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199/Prospects-for-transnational-citizenship-and.html

Those three dimensions of citizenship would enhance one crucial dimension of the citizenship law which is the civic participation of second generation emigrants, who would form [...a pool of citizens who may be civically as well as politically active, and who will be entitled to vote and stand for office in national, local and European and Parliamentary.]¹⁵⁵

Of course one of the main benefits except that of “complete” political rights, is the reinforcement of their economic rights (either employment in the private sector, or in the public sector, an alternative their parents did not have, so they will no longer face the instability and limited occupational options that their parents had)¹⁵⁶.

Thus, it is obvious that the citizenship law has encouraged changes in traditional culture and politics, as Greek society is going to face its own cultural transformation because of the integration of non-ethnic Greeks into its social life, while the ‘new’ Greek citizens will indisputably promote on long vectors the cultural fusion of the Greek and Albanian communities.

Conclusions

There is no denying that the Albanian migration transformations have been renovated profoundly by the dynamics of political, cultural and economical realities of Greek society. Due to Albania’s geographical proximity with Greece, Albanian migration remains an ongoing phenomenon, which has been challenging the migration policy of both countries, as even the returnees consider migration an unfinished business.

It is of the utmost importance that among the factors that affected the Albanian immigrants’ integration, such as the evolution of Greek regularizations, the mono-cultural approaches of Greek society, the role of mass media, the Greek NGOs, the church and education, a crucial influential factor remains the Greek political vision responding to both domestic and international sensitivities related to migration issues. We should always bear in mind that Albanian migration management has been politically complex and complicated as it has been challenging issues of national security, which go beyond the mere conception of Greek public safety or order, as the Greek borders represent European security, rather than the national one. Albania still remains a source among SEE countries of organized crime, trafficking, smuggling, narcotics, weapons, and connection with worldwide criminal networks

The advent of Greek migration legislation has brought with it a number of advantages and limitations. In this aspect since the beginning Albanian migration has got a temporary treatment which has created a relative legal stability for Albanian

¹⁵⁵ Gropas R., June 25, (2008) Integrating immigrants: citizenship and civic activism downloaded from <http://blogs.eliamep.gr/en/gropas/integrating-immigrants-citizenship-and-civic-activism>

¹⁵⁶ Κόντης Α. (2009), *Ιθαγένεια και ενσωμάτωση μεταναστών, Ζητήματα κοινωνικής ένταξης μεταναστών*, p 36.

immigrants as short term work and residence permits prevailed in all the regularization programs. Certainly, the successive adoptions of the Greek legislation managed to reduce the protectionist policy and the exclusionist patterns of Greek socio-economical inequalities for migrants' integration. Undoubtedly, favorable legislation contributed in providing equal opportunities in the labor market, education, social security and housing for Albanian immigrants.

The mono-cultural approaches and the "selective" role of the media, which have perceived illegal immigrants as criminals, or as threats to their cultural identity have been out shadowed by the Greek NGOs and some political forces who have been addressing and promoting migrants' rights and a 'multicultural' understanding of cultural diversity in the Greek society.

Living in the age of technology, transnational contacts have made possible for immigrants to 'keep one foot' in both Albania and Greece. It can be assumed that transnationalism is likely to be one of the main social bonds in negotiating migrants' integration, Greece's social cohesion and future challenges of globalization.

Consequently, the citizenship law will be the source of defusing xenophobia, racism and discrimination, as well as a life altering factor, for the redefinition of second-generation Albanian immigrants' identity. Furthermore, this law would be a fulfilling part of their parents' expectations, or whatever made them leave Albania twenty years ago as it will shape new future perspectives for them. Therefore, it is obvious that the new citizenship law demonstrates that the values of Democracy, 'filoxenia' and multiculturalism are on the rise and its vitality is going to be imperative for the social cohesion of the Greek society.

If the above mentioned expectations are fulfilled, it will lead to my question relating to second Albanian generation. What happens next? Would their integration in the Greek society spoil their fluid identity? Is it possible for both states not to put pressure on second- generation Albanian immigrants to give up any of the "bothness" of their national self-perception?

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First generation Albanian immigrants (target group one):

1. A.G. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (male, age 48, is running his own business for 10 years and has been living in Greece for 18 years).
2. A. P. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (female, age 45, is working as a housekeeper and has been living in Greece for 15 years).
3. B. H. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (male, age 48, is working as an electrician and has been living in Greece for 17 years).
4. G. S. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (male, age 35, is working in the agriculture sector and has been living in Greece for 9 years).
5. J. L. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (male, age 40, is currently unemployed and has been living in Greece for 17 years).
6. L. N. interview conducted on July 18 2010 (female, age 38, is working as a babysitter/ housekeeper) has been living in Greece for 14 years.
7. D. M. interview conducted on July 18 2010 (female, age 44, is working as an English teacher and has been living in Greece for 12 years).
8. S. H. interview conducted on August 22 2010 (male, age 52, is currently unemployed and has been living in Greece for 17 years).
9. F. O. interview conducted on August 22 2010 (female, is working in the tourism sector and has been living in Greece for 15 years).

Second generation Albanian immigrants (target group two):

1. A. K. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (male, age 21, Albanian student in Greece, has been living in Greece for 10 years).

2. D. F. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (female, age 15, is a pupil, was born in Greece).
 3. E. S. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (female, age 26, is an aesthetician, has been living in Greece for 14 years).
 4. I. S. interview conducted on June 12 2010 (male, age 22, is working in the tourism sector, has been living in Greece for 13 years).
 5. P. F. interview conducted on July 18 2010 (female, age 19, is working as a shop assistant, has been living in Greece for 9 years).
 6. S. D. interview conducted on July 18 2010 (male, age 16, is a pupil, was born in Greece).
 7. S. L. interview conducted on July 18 2010 (female, age 18, is a pupil, has been living in Greece for 14 years).
 8. I. J. interview conducted on July 18 2010 (female, age 24, is working in a bank, has been living in Greece for 13 years).
 9. F. I. interview conducted on August 22 2010 (male, age 21, is working as a carpenter, has been living in Greece for 10 years).
 10. M. P. interview conducted on August 22 2010 (female, age 20, is unemployed, has been living in Greece for 12 years).
 11. A. G. interview conducted on August 22 2010 (male, age 16, is a pupil, has been living in Greece for 14 years).
 12. P. L. interview conducted on August 22 2010 (female, age 19, is a student, has been living in Greece for 15 years).
 13. E. L. interview conducted on August 22 2010 (female, age 22, is a student, has been living in Greece for 13 years).
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1. Bejko R., (interview conducted on July 2010) representative of the sector of Education and Culture of the Albanian Embassy in Greece.
 2. Mandra J., (interview conducted on August 2010) member of the Albanian Youth and Students Union.
 3. Papa K., (interview conducted on June 2010) president of the Albanian Youth and Students Union.

Footnotes: Data based on personal interviews with Albanian migrants in Greece and Albania (June-August 2010 target group one), (June-August 2010 target group two)

Footnotes: Data based on my personal experience, knowledge and interaction with other Albanian migrants during these 10 years living as an immigrant in Greece.