

The Europeanization of the British Media Narrative: Understanding the Growth of Eurosceptic Discourse

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities

2020

I declare that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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Textual content of chapters: 79, 199

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Acknowledgement

The work that follows has been the most testing undertaking of my life, both emotionally and practically, I gave this piece of work, all that I have. I am certain others can produce a better thesis, but this is reflection of years of my best work on a subject that has left me fundamentally changed, in light of recent breaks with what I once assumed were long established and universal democratic practices. I want to thank all who helped me in this demanding, and at times draining, venture. Without the names that follow, I would not have succeeded. My debt is eternal.

Dimitris Papadimitriou, Nick Turnbull, Gabriel Siles-Brügge, Paul Tobin, Kevin Featherstone, Ann Cronley, Val Lenferna De La Motte, Stephen May, Jane Munro, Richard May, Amie Kanneh, Patrick Michael, Luke and Jo Stretton.

Abstract

Brexit has fundamentally changed the European landscape. A change of this significance raises a plethora of questions concerning both cause and consequence that will continue to drive popular debate and academic enquiry. The following research helps us better understand an element of context that contributed to the cause and growth of British Euroscepticism. European integration drives change in member states, the development of Euroscepticism represents one such change. This process of change, known as Europeanization, occurs across member states in different domains extending from formal political and economic structures to social, cultural and media responses. The following thesis is concerned with the latter. The aim is to make an original contribution to our understanding of the language via which European integration becomes present in the national context. This work adds to the existing research concerned with the development of Euroscepticism.

This following research evaluates how the process of Europeanization has affected British media discourse regarding the process of European integration. More specifically, it focuses upon the shifts in tabloid media output over the five decades of British membership. The tabloids, *The Sun*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Express*, *The Daily Mirror*, have been selected on the basis of their popular influence as they are the most widely read over the decades in question.

The research will draw on the strengths of both quantitative methods, in the form of content analysis, and qualitative methods, in the form of critical discourse analysis, to provide both a holistic overview of change premised upon case studies, as well as engaging specifically with the form and content of Europeanized media discourses. The case studies, which reflect critical junctures in the development of Anglo-European relations, are the British referendum in 1975, the passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and Cameron's pledge to hold a second referendum in 2013. With the use of these case studies the thesis will map the Europeanization of British tabloid media discourse, providing an in-depth analysis of this process of change.

Discourse has an important role in affecting national responses to the pressures of integration. Given the absence of established direct communicative links between the supranational structures of governance and popular opinion, regional governance is dependent on national discourse for presence in the domestic public sphere. While media only represent one component of the national public sphere, their role is central to public understandings and popular perceptions.

The research finds that British Europeanized tabloid media output begins in positive, but fundamentally under-engaged terms. The data sets indicate a dearth of focus on supranational aims, actors and institutions, and defence of integration in limited terms primarily framed in relation to material or economic implications. This creates a degree of path dependency as, when the true scope of integration becomes apparent, these shortcomings of Europeanized discourse create scope for future popular resistance. The final case study outlines a coherently Eurosceptic public sphere, one that is incompatible with supranational legitimacy in the domestic context. However, this is not the consequence of exceptionalism in British discourse, but rather the degree of focus upon discursive frames that are present in other member states. As such, the British public sphere evident in this research serves as a warning to the risks of limited engagement and perspectives, to popular perceptions of legitimacy and effective democracy more broadly.

1. Introduction: The Europeanization of the British Media Narrative - Seeking to Understanding the Growth of Eurosceptic Discourse

1.1 Why does the History of British Media Coverage on European Integration Merit Mapping?

The aim of the following research is to contribute to our understanding of the effects of European integration upon national discourse. Integration drives change across member states in a plethora of domains, but the specific focus of this thesis is on how this change has shifted the form and focus of media output on European affairs since British accession. The research will evaluate change in the normative frameworks for coverage of European affairs, emanating from the process of Europeanization, consider if and how the ideas of 'separation' and 'conflict' have grown since the first case study, whether any evident growth is likely to impact popular notions of legitimacy, and assess if the findings of the data sets are reflective of British exceptionalism in terms of Europeanized discourse or are comparable to discourse evident in other member states? Via these research considerations the thesis will make a substantive contribution to the literature on the causes of Euroscepticism, and by extension the causes of Brexit.

The referendum in June of 2016, and the subsequent commitment to leave the European Union marked a break with decades of established political consensus, and raises a range of wide-reaching questions. Both the causes of this break, and its long-term consequences will go on being the subject of popular debate and academic contention for the foreseeable future. No single thesis is capable of addressing the plethora of challenges this shift in the European landscape raises. Nor is it the aim of this thesis to speculate on the future, but the following research will contribute to a better understanding what factors may have influenced the growth of populist Eurosceptic sentiment in the national context.

Many factors affected, and continue to affect domestic perceptions of the process of integration. The European Union is a highly complex, and unprecedented structure in terms

of regional integration, and as such, both its perception and popularity are subject to variant national pressures and idiosyncrasies. The Union grew from 6 to 28-member states over its 7 decades to date; each of these nations has distinct histories, interests, discourses, politics, and electorates – all with their own unique qualities and characteristics. However, throughout the history of the European Project, and despite such evident variation, unity and continued integration have broadly been maintained. Brexit marks the end of this continuity.

Integration began with rudimentary aims and was comprised of a limited number of member states. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in 1951, was premised on the ideas of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman - that incremental and technocratic steps could pave the way for lasting peace and reverse centuries of European conflict. It sought to create a framework that would foster a Union of member states aligned by both interests and values. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 marked a significant step toward Monnet and Schuman's vision, which "determined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe...[creating] closer relations between the states belonging to it" (Treaty of Rome, 1957). Since the signing of this Treaty, the European Community has grown, in form, subscription, and scope, to become the most advanced regime for regional integration in political history.

The following thesis will assess a key component of the British public sphere over the duration of British membership, and seek to map how the growth in size and scope of European integration has changed British discourses on European affairs and British membership. The component of the public sphere under consideration is print media, specifically tabloid media. Via the analysis of British tabloid output at critical junctures in the development of Anglo-European relations, the following research will provide a clear map of the change in the discursive landscape in which integration becomes present in the national context; the thesis will assess the Europeanization of British tabloid media discourse. However, before any such contribution can be made, this introduction will need to provide an overview of the background to this discipline and research, the structure of the thesis, and the objectives of the research.

Research Questions:

Overarching Research Question:

- How has the process of Europeanization affected British media discourse on European integration?

The thesis will assess how European integration has driven change in media content, regarding that process of integration.

Supplementary Research Questions:

- Have the normative frameworks, in which the British media frame European integration, shifted substantively since British accession?

Considering this change, the research will record and analyse alteration in the value structures through which the process of integration becomes present in this component of the British public sphere.

- To what extent have the ideas of *separation* and *conflict* become evident in the linguistic and normative frameworks in which Britain's tabloid press convey the pressures and challenges deriving from the process of European integration?

In this analysis of value structures, the research design will assess if these concepts become important to the discursive framework in which integration is relayed to the domestic population.

- Does the output of the British tabloid media allow for the EU to acquire legitimacy in the national context?

The thesis will not directly evaluate how Europeanized discourse interacts with popular notions of legitimacy, but it will critically consider the discursive content with regard to normative and ideational constructs, to evaluate if discourse can help explain the growth of Euroscepticism and the process of legitimisation in the national context.

- Does tabloid coverage support an assertion of British-exceptionalism in regard to the process of European integration?

Finally, the thesis will assess whether the empirical findings of this research supports the notion of British exceptionalism in terms of discursive Europeanization, or if it is more reflective of divergence in terms of aggregate form and focus.

1.2 Background to the Discipline and Research

The thesis will contribute to our understanding of, and map the change in, the language via which European integration becomes present in the national context. A comprehensive overview and critique of the salient literature and disciplines will be presented in the subsequent chapter, but the relevant fields require brief introduction here before any critical engagement is possible.

The aim of this work is to better understand how integration has altered domestic discourse. As such, the first body of literature this thesis must engage with is that of Europeanization. Europeanization sought to overcome the shortcomings of the traditional macro-theories of integration through the adjustment of perspective for analysis. It helped move literature away from an exclusive focus on the “high politics” (Hoffman, 1964) and the widely accepted “permissive consensus” (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970) to facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the consequences of integration. This adjustment in perspective recognised national variation and the interactive nature of change driven by the European project; Europeanization sought to recognise and better understand “domestic change caused by integration” (Vink, 2003: 63).

Initially this redirection of focus remained primarily concerned with the implications for formal structures of governance; the new research agenda was concerned with the “Europeanization of the domestic institutional set up” (Radaelli, 2000: 23). This research helped to illuminate the interactive character of integration, such as Börzel’s recognition of “a ‘bottom-up’ and a ‘top-down’ dimension” to the process of integration (Börzel, 2002: 193). It also furthered our understanding of the variation in ways that change can be driven by integration, Olsen identified change as a consequence of “experimental learning or competitive selection, contact and diffusion, or turnover and regeneration” (Olsen, 2002: 924). The research agenda of Europeanization has permitted a far more holistic understanding of both the complexity and divergence of pressures emanating from European integration. This marks an essential prerequisite to the aims of this thesis. However, the contributions of this discipline to the aims of this research do not cease there.

Europeanization has moved on to address the normative implications of regional governance. As Radaelli notes the literature has also sought to engage with the consequences of integration for “shared beliefs and norms” (Radaelli, 2000: 23). This engagement remains framed within the interactive understanding consistent throughout the agenda; integration facilitates both an uploading of normative structures as well as having domestic implications. Marcussen evaluated the effect of Europeanization on French, German, and British notions of identity, finding evidence of both change and divergence (Marcussen, 1999). Banchoff mapped the growth of the European dimension to German identity throughout the history of the European Union (and its predecessors), that was evidence of a clear normative adjustment (Banchoff, 1999). The growing research agenda has provided recurring evidence of the adaption of national norms and values as a direct result of the process of integration. This recognition of normative adaptations represents a major contribution from the Europeanization literature. This is essential to the aims of this thesis, as the research will analyse and map change in the linguistic frameworks via which European integration becomes present in the national context

The theoretical underwriting of Europeanization, which will be substantively addressed in the next chapter, has been heavily informed by the contributions of New Institutionalism (Bulmer, 2008). The combination of this literature will support the theoretical aims of this research and allow the thesis to assess the salient consequences of integration at a domestic level. The unifying theoretical premise behind New Institutionalism is that the institutions matter, that the consequence or outcome cannot be adequately understood with reference to context or environment; institutions are not confined to the formal structures of power or governance, but extend to the “norms, cognitive frames, scripts and meaning systems” (Schmidt, 2010: 13). Such a nuanced framework permits research to consider any shift in values or normative responses emanating from the pressures of integration. Furthermore, institutionalism provides a theoretical structure capable of evaluating change over a given period, as it recognises how structures affect and constrain potential future responses and reactions (Thelmo & Steinmo, 1992). Through this prism we are able to recognise how ‘critical junctures’ lead to the “recalibration of interests and social norms” over an extended period (Papadimitriou *et al*, 2019:, 437). With the support of this literature, this thesis will be able to evaluate change in the patterns and forms of discourse over the history of British

membership of the European Union. This research will analyse and map the language and discourse evident in British tabloids since the accession of the UK, and with use of part of the theoretical tool kit provided by New Institutionalism, it will be able to evaluate change in the normative frameworks via which European integration becomes present in British media discourse.

Discourse refers to language, and the ideas that develop via the language. Language is central to both public comprehension and response. Language permits understandings of, and preferences toward, the world around us. It serves as a framework via which mankind is able to process and engage with environment in which we reside. Language entails value structures and normative judgements. With analysis of media discourse, the thesis will allow us to better understand these structures and judgements.

“A language is not just words. It is a culture, a tradition, a unification of a community, a whole history that creates what a community is. It is all embodied in a language.”

(Chomsky, 2011: from *We Still Live Here*)

As Chomsky notes, in this telling quote from a powerful documentary following the revival of native American language with no living native speakers, language is much more than a means for communication. It defines culture, heritage, and community. Language serves to construct how we understand the world, and adjusts to reflect what is acceptable, desirable or important in a given context.

Language or discourse extends beyond structure, grammar or syntax; it is more than words on a page. The following research will evaluate the language via which European integration becomes present in national discourse, and how that discourse has shifted since British accession. Following on from the work of Schmidt (see next chapter) it is understood that discourse explicitly addresses “the representation of ideas and the discursive interactions” evident in a given public sphere (Schmidt, 2008: 306). As such, this thesis will map the change and growth in ideas relating to Europe that are present in a component of this sphere. It will evaluate how pertinent the ideas of ‘separation’ and ‘conflict’ are to the Europeanization of British media discourse.

Habermas defined the public sphere as that “realm of social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1964: 49). This clearly offers a broad understanding of the channels capable of significant public influence, Habermas did, however, recognise the importance of the media as one such channel. The significance of the media has only grown since British accession and Habermas’ analysis.

The Sun had a significant impact on John Major’s unexpected electoral victory in 1992, with a front page claiming “it’s The Sun wot won it” (Sun, 11.04.1992), and his successor, Tony Blair, clearly recognised this. In 1995 Blair flew to Australia to secure the support of media mogul Rupert Murdoch, with a close relationship developing and contributing to Labour’s return to power and sustained electoral success. Since Major, no candidate has won the Premiership without the support of Murdoch and his flagship tabloid. Evidently there are numerous other salient factors in both securing the keys to No. 10 and in directing public opinion, but the role of the media has clearly been significant in the outcome of domestic British politics in recent decades. It is not the aims of the research to consider the relationship between media discourse and popular preferences. However, any contribution to our understanding media discourse and its relationship to the process of Europeanization, can only help us to better understand the environment in which popular responses to the European Union develop. Furthermore, analysis of this discourse will indicate whether it is conducive to the development of supranational legitimacy in the national context. The specific focus and structure of how this research seeks to make that contribution will be outlined next, but the primary concern of this research will be mapping the Europeanization of media discourse in the most influential British tabloids throughout the period under consideration.

1.3 The Objectives of the Research

This thesis aims to contribute to intellectual discussions taking place in the three sets of literature mentioned above; to the development of Euroscepticism; that is to say the research will add to existing Europeanization literature focused on how the process of integration affects national ideas and preference structures (see for examples, Banchoff, 1999, Börzel & Risse, 2000, Copsey & Haughton, 2014) as well as Media and Discursive literature (see for examples, Anderson & Weymouth, 2014, Carrey & Burton, 2004, Schmidt, 2007) that engages with the role of ideas, language, communication, and media in affecting political and popular understandings of phenomenon. It is not the aim to consider any shifts in popular preferences, but rather to map the discursive environment in which such shifts can occur.

The research does not seek to make any predictions premised upon the history of how integration becomes present in the public sphere, but analyse change in coverage of European affairs and the ideas that develop around the process. To permit the research to comprehensively map a key component of the public sphere, four publications have been selected on the basis on national readership (figures detailed in the methodology chapter). The four tabloid titles select for analysis are The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, and The Daily Mirror. These four titles represent the most widely read titles throughout the period, and as such represent a significant component of the British public sphere. Given that these publications represent the most widely read British print media publications, throughout the period in question, these texts and the data sets they generate will provide a vehicle for the inspection of this process of Europeanization. Furthermore, the data generated will indicate how salient the ideas of 'separation' or 'conflict' are to the discursive landscape that develops, how the normative structures shift over the decades, and whether it is conducive to supranational legitimacy in the national context.

As the aim of this research is to make an original contribution to our understanding of how Europeanization affects national discourse, tabloid newspapers have been selected for the dearth of existing research focused exclusively upon them. Existing literature on media output will receive assessment in the subsequent chapter, but the majority of research to

date has focused on broad sheet coverage (Machill et al, 2006). The following research will help to rectify this imbalance by providing a holistic overview of tabloid coverage of European integration spanning four decades of British membership.

The primary aim of this thesis is to map, and analyse the Europeanization of British tabloid discourse. To these ends the research will combine both content analysis, to review the history of tabloid output, and critical discourse analysis, allowing substantive critical engagement with the content and ideas contained within tabloid discourse. For each case study six months of tabloid output will be coded and analysed, meaning that the research model will map 1.5 years' worth of media engagement. This model, combined with the theoretical frameworks introduced above (see 2nd Chapter for extensive discussion), and the specific research methodologies detailed below (see 3rd Chapter), will ensure the following thesis meets the aims and objectives of the research. Furthermore, the structure and literature outlined in the next two chapters will allow the work to make valid theoretical contribution to the discipline. However, neither this nor any model is capable of conclusively explaining the popular shifts against integration at a domestic level. It will inherently raise more questions as the thesis develops, but the findings will offer a novel contribution and help us better understand the discursive environment that contributed to the critical juncture that Brexit represents. More research will be required to understand the complete picture that led to the vote in June of 2016, but this research will provide a unique analysis of the process of the Europeanization of British media discourse.

As the introduction indicated, the supplementary research questions will focus on how the normative frameworks, in which the British media frame European integration, have shifted since accession. Only with use of the domestic perspective intrinsic to the Europeanization agenda, can we adequately understand change driven by integration. The literature outlined in the next chapter marks an essential prerequisite to the research that will follow. Each empirical chapter will map media output, and code value structures that are present within the output. As such, the thesis will record and map normative shifts with regard to European integration, in the national context. The conclusion will provide a summary of this change, and conclude that under engagement and a dearth of perspectives in early media coverage, contribute to points of resistance and the expansion of normative Euroscepticism in the final case study. Combined with the emergence of increasingly normative critique post-

Maastricht, the following thesis will indicate that growth of Euroscepticism is closely related to the form of Europeanized discourse that developed in response to the process of integration. These findings will represent a contribution to our understanding of the causes of Brexit, and the relationship between populist politics and discourse more broadly.

1.4 The Structure of the Thesis

The following thesis will be framed around a number of “critical junctures” that “reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 6), in the development of Anglo-European relations and the process of European integration. It is understood that key moments, or critical junctures, in the historical development of any given political structure or phenomenon will go on to condition both future understandings and popularly viable courses of action. In a process as complex as that of integration, which has developed over decades, time becomes an increasing salient factor as previous actions go on to affect future interactions and outcomes. To address this temporal challenge the thesis will draw on the established literature of Historical Institutionalism (see subsequent chapter) which recognises “that political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time” (Pierson, 1998: 29). This theoretical framework is central to the structure of the thesis.

To evaluate changes over an extended period, the research will be structured around “seismic events that trigger a critical juncture or ‘punctuate’ the existing equilibrium” (Bulmer, 2008: 50). To operationalise this structure a series of such events, that mark either critical junctures or a punctuation of the equilibrium, have been selected as case studies for the focus of this research. The research will be structured around three case studies analysing the public sphere throughout such junctures or punctuations.

Britain joined the European Economic Community under Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath in 1973. This clearly marked a critical juncture, and despite this being an evident seismic punctuation this has not been chosen as the first case study. As the aim of this thesis is to map the construction of integration in the public sphere, the referendum that follows accession is the first case study. Following an electoral pledge in the in 1974 General Election,

Harold Wilson committed Labour to a national plebiscite on membership. The referendum that followed in 1975, is the first case study as it leads to a major spike in media coverage regarding the EEC and the referendum itself. The extent of this spike will be detailed in the first empirical chapter, but it is sufficient to indicate during this introduction that this referendum marked a highwater mark in media coverage of European politics in the first decades of British membership. As such, the national vote in 1975, and its coverage in the public sphere represent an ideal first case study from which to undertake the following research.

The second case study is open to greater contention, as there are multiple critical junctures or punctuations in the following decades that could merit consideration. However, the Maastricht Treaty has been selected for analysis in the second case study. Maastricht marked a comprehensive overhaul of the supranational structures for governance and the long-term aims of the European project. As such, it clearly marks a critical juncture in the process of integration, and one with salient implications for popular understandings and preferences. Furthermore, the negotiations surrounding the passage of the treaty drove another substantive spike in the coverage of European affairs. In light of both the importance of Maastricht and its presence in the public sphere, this juncture marks a highly suitable period for the second case study.

The last case study has been selected on the premise that it marks an equally critical juncture and is well suited to follow from the first two, as well as providing an appropriate final period for analysis. In January 2013, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron committed to a second referendum on British membership of the European Union. This marked a break with four decades of established mainstream political equilibrium and consensus regarding membership, and the juncture at which British Euroscepticism has acquired sufficient popular support to drive change in government policy. Given the gravity of this break with established and cross-party consensus, this juncture marks a perfect period of analysis for the final case study. With the use of these three case studies, the research will evaluate the long-term effects of the process of Europeanization upon British media discourse.

2. Literature Review

God is opposed to Britain joining EU's Single Currency.

(Daily Telegraph, 14th May, 2001)

2.1 Introduction

The following thesis is focused on changes in British media discourse regarding the process of European integration. The media represent a one of the “most important” sources of “public knowledge” on foreign policy issues (DiMaggio, 2009: 210). As indicated by Trenz’s analysis of ‘*Media Coverage on European Governance*’, media output on European integration is widely framed and publicly understood as “foreign news” (Trenz, 2004: 305). This indicates that public opinion on European issues is highly suited domestic direction, and media discourse feeds into this process of opinion formation. The research will not engage with this process directly, but analyse the discourse that feeds into it. European integration brings to bear pressure on member states, that drives domestic change. National discourse is subject to this pressure, and the change that follows from it will be mapped over the following chapters.

Furthermore, the UK is subject to comparable pressures stemming from the process of European integration as her continental counterparts (see for examples Hawkins, 2012; Meyer, 2005; Carey & Burton, 2004; Machil et al, 2006; Hay & Rosamond, 2011; Kriesi et al, 2006; Hooghe & Marks, 2008; McLaren 2004), however, in 2016, Britain uniquely voted to leave the European Union. No single factor can explain this vote, but with a more complete picture of the context that led to the growth of Euroscepticism, we can better understand its causes. Media discourse constitutes a significant part of this context. The following research will record how this context has changed in response to the pressures of integration, to evaluate how this might affect popular perceptions and assess whether British Europeanized discourse is unique, or reflective of discursive Europeanization evident in equivalent public spheres.

The process of European Integration is widely recognised to have begun with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in April of 1951. The Treaty that created The European Coal and Steel Community was signed by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux states (Belgium,

Netherlands and Luxembourg) and the process of integration that it instigated has continued without contraction or major deviation until very recently. The speed, depth and commitment to the process has fluctuated throughout the decades, and encountered national challenges and popular objections. However, such challenges and objections had never resulted in the loss of a member state – until June 2016.

On the 23rd of June 2016, 17.4 million British voters, voted to leave the European Union. This accounted for over 51% of those that voted; since this vote both the British government and the opposition have committed to take the UK out of the process of integration. This commitment marks a major break with decades of established British political consensus, and marks a precedent with regard to integration itself. This raises a number of questions given the break with consensus and the precedent set. As the UK is subject to the same pressures deriving from the process of integration, what distinguishes Britain from her continental neighbours? Is there something exceptional about the UK? Either in regard to domestic context or popular engagement and support? What factors are salient in understanding the road toward Brexit? How can we best understand and theorise the path the UK took to arrive at the vote of June 2016?

These are major questions, set against a volatile and increasingly dynamic national political context; post-referendum domestic cleavages have altered significantly and the conduct of parliamentary and representative democracy itself also appears to be in flux. In such a context, with the consequences, meaning and form of Brexit all still in contention – it is evident that the questions above, will continue to be contested. However, this thesis will make a contribution to our understanding of the path that lead the UK to vote as it did in 2016.

The following research will be focused on an important dimension of the public sphere, that of media output. The specific focus will be tabloid print publications of greatest readership since the date of British accession (this will receive justification and explanation below). This focus alone cannot explain Brexit, but it can contribute to an explanation of it.

The following chapters will intersect a range of research agendas but the primary focus and contribution will be to three fields. The first will be to the established agenda of Europeanization, which has sought to redirect research regarding the consequences of

integration to better understand the process from a national perspective. The section below on Europeanization, will detail the shift in perspective, and growth in understanding, this agenda has facilitated. This will allow the thesis to engage with the questions above regarding the domestic consequences of integration, and allow the research to better understand the validity and significance of the notion of British exceptionalism.

This chapter will provide an overview of the theoretical justifications for, and contributions of, this thesis. This overview will be focused on the literature of New Institutionalism, which in simple terms asserts that institutions matter when seeking to understand outcomes. The specific composition and importance of the said institutions will be outlined below, with specific focus on the contributions of Historical Institutionalism and Discursive Institutionalism.

Finally, the chapter will outline its focus on media output. Given that this is the focus of the primary research conducted for the following thesis, this chapter will need to justify this focus, outline the relative importance of media discourse with regard to public understandings and popular responses, and indicate how salient this discourse is to understanding complex political phenomenon. The discussion of these three literatures will situate the thesis within existing Europeanization literature focused on domestic change driven by integration, indicate the importance of context as evident in New Institutionalist literature, and support the value of a better understanding of media output, and national discourse more broadly, in understanding popular perceptions of integration. This will make for a suitable point of departure from which the thesis can proceed to outline a suitable research design, to address how the process of Europeanization has affected British media discourse on European integration.

2.2 Understanding Europeanization

2.21 Elite Directed Integration and the History of Macro-Theory

The EU as we know it today is the consequence of incremental compromise between sovereign states producing a regime of regional integration unique both in scope and substance. What needs to receive brief attention is the relationship between elite direction and public involvement, and the implications of this for early theoretical conceptions of the process of integration. Following the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, there followed four decades widely referred to as the “permissive consensus” within European studies (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970). The industrial union morphed into an economic union, exponentially expanding in terms of both depth and scope. This progress toward the economic and political union evident today, was driven by mainstream political elites across Europe, and across the European political spectrum. There were clearly variations contingent upon national context such as France prior to, and post De Gaul or the shift from British policy under John Major and Margaret Thatcher, to that under Tony Blair, however, the overarching trajectory of policy was pro-integration.

If more extensive critical national debates had taken place across Europe, or with regard to this research, specifically in the UK, they may have tempered progress toward a functioning economic and political Union. However, it could have pre-empted developments in popular discourses that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s that are tied to the “elite-public gap”.

Hooghe and Marks cite the Danish and French public reactions to Maastricht as evidence of the salience of this gap (Hooghe & Marks, 2008: 21).

Conceived as an elite project, and directed as such – the focus of early research agendas, or the ‘grand theories’ of European integration followed suit; “Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism conceived of Europe as an elite-driven affair” (Hooghe & Marks, 2006: 247). This may have been a reflective of the agency behind integration at the outset, but it would limit the theoretical value of the ‘grand theories’ as the process of the integration developed.

Neofunctionalism followed on from the work of David Mitrany and Jean Monnet, it rejected realism, claiming that the concept of the state is more complex than previously recognised and that interaction and 'spill-over' at the supranational level is paramount to any understanding (Haas, 1958). The premise was "the international activities of states were the outcome of a pluralistic political process in which governments were influenced by pressures...these pressures constituted the complete explanation for government decisions" (Bache et al, 2015: 10-11). While this framework rejected the absolute supremacy of the nation state placing importance on supranational institutions, and transnational collaboration and interests; it primarily provided a high-level prism for the analysis of integration.

A theoretical counter to the work by Haas was provided by Hoffman, who reasserted realist understandings of the nation state, or rather the government of the nation state. He recognised the value of collaboration where the interests of nation states intersected, but Hoffman's Intergovernmentalism asserted the primacy of the nation state was greater than Neofunctionalism recognised, and integration would never truly permeate issues of *high politics* (Hoffman, 1964).

Initially the growth of supranational collaboration might have suggested Neofunctionalism had won the battle in the 'grand debate'. However, political shifts in the 1960s and 1970s made evident Neofunctionalism's limitations; Haas himself went on to reject the theory. Equally Intergovernmentalist predictions regarding the reassertion of the nation state following the end of the cold war, have not been born out. It is not the aim of this section to critique the merits and failings of the grand theories of European integration, simply to highlight a high-level focus in terms of analysis that limits our ability to understand the pressures that derive from the process. Just as integration was itself directed at an elite level from the outset, analytical theory was reflectively limited in its consideration of the process; the Europeanization agenda would help rectify this shortcoming.

Before assessing how exactly, it is worth briefly noting the cause of these limits within process of integration. The risks associated with 'politicising' the 'European question' are evident in the national context; Hooghe and Marks cite the political party's relative standing vis-à-vis their counterparts, and the risks to ideological coherence, as well as the potential divisive consequences of engagement with the 'European question' in the public sphere (Hooghe and Marks, 2009: 20). As such, one can understand why the political classes were

found to be “missing in action” (Ladrech, 2007: 945), however, this aversion meant that when leadership was required – it was circumscribed, and when explanation was needed – it was limited and under-engaged. This has had an impact on the ‘construction’ of Europe, as those who drove the process of integration were limited in their engagement with this ‘construction’, leaving scope for actors opposed to integration. As such the implications of the ‘permissive consensus’ for levels of public understanding, legitimacy and support are significant.

With the passage of Maastricht, there was a public awakening. No longer did European issues remain technocratic and inconspicuous in the eye of the public. European integration was now “increasingly salient” to popular politics, and responses to it were both structured and contested in the national context (Marks et al, 2002: 586). However, as the literature indicates, it was not the mainstream political elite that were active in this shift, they were reactive (see for examples De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993 & 2007). It is the assertion of this chapter that this “missed chance” (Denman, 1995: 10) has left the mainstream as limited actors in the UK in driving popular responses. Popular understandings of European integration have been conditioned by those at the extremities of the political spectrum, and the European ‘discourses’ that have developed in the national public sphere as a result, present an obstacle to the prospects for EU legitimacy at the nation level.

The “consequences of this permissive consensus have been to free national parties from the need to coherently address and articulate European policy concerns...Instead of defending their participation in European regulatory decision-making on the grounds of fulfilling an electoral mandate, ruling parties have consistently defended such actions on the grounds that they have done their best to protect national interests”.

(Franklin, 2006: 242).

This insightful assessment by Franklin, begins to support the assessment of the political class as reactive. As with the grand theories of integration, a limited perspective regarding the pressures emanating from the process of integration served to limit understanding. A perspective that recognised national variation, the complexity of the process, and the interactive nature of integration was required.

2.22 Europeanization as a Research Agenda to Shift Perspective

The narrow perspectives of the early literature on integration, and the 'elites public-gap' limited a more holistic understanding of the pressures emanating from the process of integration. The growth of efforts to understand the interaction between the national and the supranational has given birth to a research agenda under the broad umbrella of Europeanization, which in the broadest sense seeks to understand the "important processes of change in contemporary Europe" (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003: preface).

This body of research is focused on "changes in national political systems that can be attributed to the development of European regional integration and brings together scholars from the fields of international relations, EU studies and comparative politics" (Vink & Graziano, 2007: 3-4). While the 'grand theories', 'the first debate' and much of the development of European studies has focused on the "creation of a European political arena and on the addition of new governance structures more generally (see for examples Moravcsik 1993; Haas 1958; Stone Sweet & Sandholtz, 1997; Hooghe & Marks 2001) ...the Europeanization approach goes beyond this European level orientation...by shifting attention principally to the domestic level" (Vink & Paolo, 2007: 3-4). This shift in focus permitted a growth in the understanding of policy adaptations, normative adjustments and public responses at a national level in response to the EU legislative and regulatory framework (See for examples Ladrech, 1994 & 2002; Bach & Jones, 2000; Börzel, 2002; Falkner et al, 2005). Börzel has contributed to this growth in understanding, recognising Europeanization as a "two-way process" (Börzel, 2002: 193) that affects both the structure of European-wide governance as well as domestic concerns. It is this movement toward a more pluralistic conception of the process of integration that marks an essential prerequisite to the aims of this thesis. The process is not unidirectional, it is not confined to traditional realist conceptions of the nation state, nor is it only of salience to the political class. European integration is unprecedented in terms of any structure of supranational governance, and as such any framework for analysis must move beyond the limitations of traditional theory and an exclusive focus on elite level politics. Europeanization provides a "well-established menu of theoretical approaches" (Bulmer, 2008: 48) that recognises "national institutions and

actors matter” (Goetz & Hix, 2001: 20). The importance and composition of these institutions will be addressed in depth in the final section.

However, the salient insights (with regard to this thesis) provided by the growth of this research agenda relate to its re-conception of the study of national politics through a European prism. This sits within broader regional integration literature (see for examples Anderson & Blackhurst, 1993; Mattli, 1999; Sapir, 1992) that is focused on the domestic consequences of regional structures of governance. That is to say for the purposes of this thesis Europeanization is understood as “domestic change caused by integration” (Vink, 2003: 63).

While much initial research within the growth of this new agenda was concerned with the more formal impact of integration such as the “Europeanization of the domestic institutional set-up...[or] the creation of coordination mechanisms for uploading or downloading European policies”, it swiftly moved to address the broader challenges emanating for the process. As noted by Radaelli, Europeanization must be understood as:

“Processes of a) construction b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”

(Radaelli, 2000: 23)

As such, it is evident that Europeanization impacts both formal and informal considerations; on both the normative and the structural qualities of a given social order. In a salient paper by Knill and Lehmkuhl entitled *‘How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization’*, three distinct mechanisms of Europeanization are outlined. The first relates to the “concrete institutional” change that derives from integration, the second relates to the “altering of domestic opportunity structures”, and the final mechanism entails shifts in “beliefs and expectations” that emanate from the process (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999: 1-2). With regard to the aims of this thesis, it is the latter two mechanisms that are relevant to how we must re-conceive the nature and form of the impact of the European project on its constituent member states.

This redirection of academic inquiry has allowed European studies to engage with the “new opportunities for national social or political actors, new analytical tools and simply a broader empirical knowledge that goes beyond the traditional units of analysis...(permitting substantive developments in our understanding of) national political dynamics in an integrating Europe” (Vink & Paolo, 2007: 4). As such, we must be aware of the opportunities it provides for novel actors and discourses at the national level and utilise appropriate conceptual tools to address this shift in the dynamics of domestic political interaction, which will be outlined below.

The premise of this thesis is the understanding that discursive practices and the rhetoric surrounding Europe have a significant, sustained and substantive impact on the legitimacy and perception of the EU within the national context. As such the epistemological and ontological shift produced by the growth of Europeanization research agenda constitute an essential pre-requisite to the aims, focus and framework of this thesis.

Writing in 1958 the founding father of modern European studies, Ernst B. Haas foresaw a time when populations “shift[ed] their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of (which would be)... a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones” (Haas, 1958: 16). Despite the degree to which the Functionalism Haas espoused has been discredited (including by himself), if we remove the normative notions (loyalty, expectation, and community) from this sentence, much of his foresight has been born out. Supranational competence has reached unprecedented levels, the EU has a swathe of mechanisms to ensure or motivate compliance affording jurisdiction over ‘sovereign states’, furthermore the EU represents itself as a single political community in matters of trade and continues in efforts to strengthen its voice in the harder domains of foreign policy. While Haas was equally correct to foresee an impact upon normative notions, such as loyalty or identity, it was neither as simple, nor as uni-directional as he envisaged. The nature of the pressure European integration has brought to bear on its member states is complex, multifaceted and divergent. In the “traditional integration theories, the focus is on the creation of the European political arena...[rather than] the diffusion of EU policies and institutional practices at the national or subnational level” (Vink & Paolo, 2007: 3-4).

This evident limitation contributed to growth of this new research agenda, seeking to understand in what manner this unique experiment in regional integration would come to affect domestic patterns of competition, political dynamics, policy output and normative adjustment; that of Europeanization. The growing shift in the European political landscape emanating from the progress of integration, drove an equally significant shift in the theoretical landscape. It became apparent that Europeanization did not equate to convergence despite comparable pressures.

The development of the Europeanization research agenda has enabled a much more holistic understanding of the pressures emanating from integration. Jordan and Liefferink identify two “generations” in the development of Europeanization literature. The first emerged in the mid-1990s as a movement “away from looking at European integration as exclusively EU-level activity, to analyse its ‘rebound-effect’ on states” (Jordan & Liefferink, 2004: 4).

Rometsch and Wessels wrote of the increasing importance of Europeanization in 1996, indicating “that the interaction and exchanges between national and European institutions have become increasingly intensive” and that the sustained distinction between the domestic and supranational was no longer valid for analysis. Rather both levels were now better understood as an increasingly interwoven structure that is now “mutually dependent”. Rometsch and Wessels recognised the necessity for a novel theoretical approach to address the change in the structure of, and pressures emanating from the process of integration. Such an approach must recognise the dynamic and interactive nature of integration and move beyond the precepts of traditional theory.

“The institutional struggle for influence and efforts to adapt to the European decision-making process will go on and might even intensify, irrespective of member states differences as regards their specific historical, constitutional and political backgrounds...[This] dynamic political development had an impact on science and research”

(Rometsch & Wessels, 1996: xiv)

The now unprecedented supranational structure for governance had altered established political interactions and norms and would continue to do so. Any theoretical framework for research in this dynamic context must adjust accordingly, as well as recognise national

variation. While early Europeanization literature adjusted perspective from the traditional theories on integration, it did remain “principally centred on the executive branch of government” (Vink & Paolo, 2007: 4). Moravcsik argued integration of Europe actually “strengthens the state”, enabling more national government rather than less (Moravcsik, 1994: 1). Raadschelders and Toonen indicated that integration drove administrative adaptation in national governance (Raadschelders and Toonen, 1992). While such research provides a novel perspective, it does not move past the limitations of a primarily executive focus.

The next “generation” of Europeanization research developed a far more nuanced theoretical framework for understanding the pressures emanating from integration. In the first generation, integration “was the independent variable explaining domestic outcomes... [the following generation] in which reality was not as discrete...has been rather more fine-grained...and has been characterised by a new institutionalist agenda” (Bulmer, 2008: 49). New Institutionalism will be returned to in the subsequent section, but before that can be addressed a brief review of the value of this generation shift, and its meaning for our understanding of integration at a national level is required.

2.23 The Europeanization of EU Member States

As outlined above Europeanization has facilitated a research agenda more suited to understanding how integration drives change within and across member states of the European Union; “conceptually, the term ‘Europeanization’ has come to be used to explain the impact of the EU upon individual states, and to identify the comparative impact across member states” (Bulmer & Burch, 1998: 602). The aim of this research is not to contribute to comparative literature; however, this thesis must draw on existing comparative work throughout to best understand Europeanization in the British context.

As Börzel correctly identified, Europeanization is a “two-way process...in which member states both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to them” (Börzel, 2002: 192). This process is neither uniform, nor without deviation. The ‘permissive consensus’ outlined above ended with the passage of Maastricht if not before (see next chapter for discussion) as

integration encountered increasing points of resistance. However, it is evident that Europeanization had driven divergence in member state responses, prior to the emergence of Europeanization as a research agenda. The question of if, and how any notion of British exceptionalism might help explain the culmination of British membership was raised above, but it would be naïve to think that Britain alone might be absolutely exceptional, or that member states respond to the process of integration in equivalent terms.

Marcussen *et al* produced insightful research comparing British, French and German responses to Europeanization in a paper on '*Constructing Europe*' (Marcussen *et al*, 1999). The paper explores the difficulty in establishing consensus regarding state identity following the trauma of the Second World War, highlighting De Gaulle's "Europeanization of French exceptionalism...[through the] successful reconstruction of French nation state identity...[as] a prime example of the instrumental selection of particular discourse". While this was by no means consensual at the outset, De Gaulle had sufficient political and national capital to redefine the notion of identity in the integrated context. He maintained a sustained vision of the unique "Frenchness" of the nation, and the importance of its sovereignty, but within the novel context of a "French mission *civilisatrice* for the world destined to spread the universal values of enlightenment and the French revolution" (Marcussen *et al*, 1999: 619-20). This was a process that would be repeated and redefined at other 'critical junctures' (see next section) for France.

Marcussen *et al* recognised that while Germany has equally Europeanized notions of national identity, it would be misguided not to recognise the unique nature of the German response to integration. This derives from Germany's history as "Europe's other", which resulted in an expedited consensus regarding the nation's place at the heart of integration; "since the 1950s, a fundamental consensus has emerged among political elites, and has been generally shared by public opinion, that European integration is in Germany's vital interest" (Marcussen *et al*, 1999: 622).

Britain's response to the process of integration, however, was "in sharp contrast to both France and Germany", while all must be recognised as individual, British attitudes actually reflected a continuation of pre-war attitudes in a post-war context. "British attitudes toward integration have remained essentially the same since the end of the Second World War",

decades after British accession, the nation continues to perceive itself as “of rather than in Europe”. (Marcussen *et al*, 1999: 625)

This is not to suggest that the notion of British exceptionalism is not without value in terms of explaining Anglo-European relations and British Europeanization. While many nations and constructs of national identity may reflect unique qualities or experiences, it is possible that greater emphasis, perception and value are attached to these qualities in certain national contexts.

Ash offers a telling summary of the perception of British exceptionalism in a paper considering ‘*Is Britain European?*’ (Ash, 2001) It offers an overview of historiography, literature and political discourse that details, constructs and reproduces this notion of exceptionalism; detailing Victorian “exceptionalist vision” still evident in “schoolbooks and children’s books”, “prose by G. M. Trevelyan, Arthur Bryant, Winston Churchill and H. A. L. Fisher”, Gaitskell’s assertion of a “thousand years of history” at risk in the face of integration, through to Blair’s description, at Warsaw in 2000, of the British as a “proud and independent minded island race”. Ash notes, as recognised above, that an inspection of the “historiography of any other nation in Europe...[makes it clear] that exceptionalism is the norm”. However, “the belief in British or English exceptionalism is very deep and very wide” (Ash, 2001: 6-7). It is evident that exceptionalism is far from exceptional, it is not inherently Eurosceptic and can be compatible with sustained Europeanization. However, to better understand the form it takes and the function it performs we must better understand the national context in which it resides. To develop a theoretical framework suited to understand this context, the chapter will return to the institutionalism of the second “generation” of Europeanization.

2.3 The Value of Institutionalism in Understanding Political Contexts and Outcomes

This section will seek to make evident the value of an analytical framework which understands outcomes as contingent to, constructed in, and to a degree, constricted by the

institutions in which they reside. Bulmer explains it is “necessary to explore the relationship between Europeanization and New Institutionalism in order to understand how the latter informs theorizing Europeanization” (Bulmer, 2008: 50). Bulmer indicates this is best done with an overview of the theoretical contributions of New Institutionalism (NI), to those ends this section will review these with particular focus on the Historical and Discursive forms. NI in all three of its ‘classic’ forms has made substantive contributions to the field of comparative politics. The premise, in its most rudimentary form, is that institutions matter; political interaction and causal relationships can only be understood with regard to the context in which they occur. It is “focused on the mechanisms through which social and economic action occurred...[and] the enduring interconnections between the polity, the economy and the society” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 2).

It is interesting to note that despite simultaneous development in chronological terms, Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) developed in isolation in response to distinct empirical challenges, and as such produced divergent understandings of ‘institutions. The emergence of RCI stemmed from the paradox of a stable legislature in the US, when considered in terms of competing interests and ‘self-evident’ utility maximisation. RCI views ‘institutions’ as the formal mechanisms that “lower the transaction costs...[and] solve many of the collective action problems that legislatures habitually confront” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 943).

In contrast to the narrow frame of RCI, that holds that “action is assumed to be an optimal adaptation to institutional environment” (Tsebelis, 1990: 40), HI is premised on a much broader ontology. HI is “concerned with the role of time in the integration process” (Bulmer, 2008: 51). This is particularly relevant to the aims of this research given its aim to map the Europeanization of British discourse since accession. To develop a suitable concept of “institutions” for the purposes of this thesis, the following section will draw on HI, Sociological Institutionalism (SI), and Discursive Institutionalisms (DI). Within HI “Institutions are understood less as the functional means of reducing uncertainty, so much as structures whose functionality or dis-functionality is an open – empirical and historical – question” (Hay & Wincott, 1998, 954). Following in the footsteps of the Haas and the ‘First debate’ in European politics, HI has sought to engage with consequence and context, rather than the ‘perfect intent’ that frames RCI and (formal) state-centric prisms for analysis (See Moravcsik,

1993). With this heritage, HI sought to move beyond the limitations of “spill over” (Haas, 1958) and engage with the wider normative considerations when considering the pressure derived from the process of European integration.

2.31 Historical Institutionalism

As noted by Thelen and Steinmo, HI “allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as objects, and as agents, of history. The institutions that are at the centre of institutional analysis can shape and constrain political strategies in important ways, but they are themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political strategies of conflict and choice” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 10). As such the institutions that HI recognises are not formal and legally framed but dynamic, cumulative, and must reside within and adhere to the context in which they develop. It is in this contingent, cumulative process in which previous actions contribute to, or circumscribe the options for future political interactions and outcomes, that one can begin to understand legitimacy, popular response, and the complexity of Europeanization.

HI has taken this broader ontology and sought to engage with the gaps that “emerge in member-state control over the evolution of European institutions and public policies” (Pierson, 1996: 126), and the divergence between intent and outcome. With recognition of the structural qualities of modern Western democracy, such a theoretical framework has helped to draw attention to the electoral concerns and discount rates in operation that effect member state interaction at the highest level of the EU – “long-term institutional consequences are often the bi-products of actions taken for short term political reasons” (Pierson, 1998: 38).

The crux of the insight that HI can offer is in the notion that ‘institutions’ (in both their formal and informal sense) often develop beyond the aspirations of their architects, and can have a substantive impact upon the scope for, and acceptability of, future action. HI allows us to recognise the role of previous action, in affecting flawed and unintentional forms or outcomes that such processes may produce.

Western democratic administrations are more concerned with maintaining electoral support, than an abstract notion of sovereignty (however, once sovereignty bears a relationship to electoral returns – this concern would be expected to shift). As such, the short-term nature of electoral cycles has two substantive implications for the course and consequences of European integration. The first is concerned with the immediate political cost of any given action, on which great weight is applied, to the detriment of medium to long term ramifications. This is referred to as the ‘discount rate’ within HI. The mainstream aversion to politicize the ‘European debate’, noted above, is an example of such a discount rate. This example draws attention to the limitations of synchronic analysis when addressing an entity as complex and multi-faceted as the EU; short term preferences often bear a limited relationship to long term interests. HI provides a framework that recognises “the ‘stickiness’ of both institutional and policy arrangements, observing broad patterns of incremental change that may be interrupted occasionally by seismic events that trigger a critical juncture or ‘punctuate’ the existing equilibrium” (Bulmer, 2008: 50).

Furthermore, short-term preferences circumscribe the viability of future actions, creating ‘path dependence’ (Pierson, 2000: 252). While Pierson was writing in reference to formal institutions, this framework for analysis is of clear value in furthering constructivist contributions to our understanding of Europeanization. Historical Institutionalism allows us to recognise the “importance of ‘critical junctures’ as moments where path-dependencies or established equilibria are disrupted, giving rise to institutional reconfiguration or the recalibration of interests and social norms” (Papadimitriou *et al*, 2019: 437). As such HI, when combined with the insights of Discursive Institutionalism (see below), will allow us to understand both critical junctures and the role of discourse in the reconfiguration or the recalibration of interests at these junctures.

Beyond the clear importance of ‘discount rates’ in producing unforeseen consequences, the partisan structure of electoral politics can produce preferences toward what would be best termed as ‘locking in’. Moe asserts this structure has a fundamental impact on the form and condition of any given administration’s policy preferences, which again can bear a strong relationship to the institutions that develop. An administration will be only too aware of the limited temporal window in which they will be able to direct policy, once again faced with this short-term horizon, they will seek to curtail or circumscribe the options available when their

partisan counterparts take office. However, it is often only possible to “shut out their opponents by shutting themselves out to. In many cases...they purposely create structures they cannot control” (Moe, 1990: 125).

While this brief overview of the merits of HI does not engage directly with the public sphere that is the focus of this thesis, it does do much to highlight the value of a theoretical framework that is not limited by narrow conception of ‘institutions’, and displays an awareness of the importance of a temporal dimension when analysing the impact of European integration. HI has been able to incorporate the insights first provided by NI and empirically demonstrate the weakness of synchronic analysis. It does not aspire to the claims of the two ‘grand theories’ of European studies. However, it does offer useful tools to advance our understanding of the nature of European institutions, their relationship to member states, and the degree of complexity and interdependence at play when considering Europeanization.

2.32 Sociological Institutionalism

Given its academic heritage, it is of no surprise that Sociological Institutionalism (SI) views meanings and preferences as contextually contingent. SI holds ‘institutions’ as “the forms and procedures of organisational life stemming from culturally specific practices, with institutions cast as the norms, cognitive frames, scripts and meaning systems” (Schmidt, 2010: 13).

Political and social action, and interaction, are framed by a “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen 1995: 30). This logic has both a normative and a cognitive dimension.

SI has offered significant contributions to the Europeanization research agenda and done much to advance our knowledge of the significance of identity to political outcomes. The pressure that derives from the process of Europeanization stimulates change “through a socialization and collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development of new identities” (Börzel & Risse, 2000: 2).

SI emphasises the importance of engaging with novel and informal structures that impact on political interaction, along with a sensitivity to the terms under which reality is framed. This emphasis has drawn into sharp focus the parsimony and limitations of frameworks that

operate exclusively at the macro level, or those the confine themselves to analysis of the formal and narrowly confined constructions of power. The research undertaken by SI has significantly broadened the scope, and collective understanding, of political science and comparative politics. Börzel and Risse, at the forefront of SI, have developed notions including 'cognitive short-cuts', 'political entrepreneurs' and 'change-agents' (Börzel & Risse, 2000: 12) in an effort to understand the drivers of change. Such concepts are useful tools and will be incorporated into the theoretical framework of this thesis. Given the complexity of the European structure for governance, the public is rarely able or equipped with sufficient cognitive ability to undertake the analysis required to establish a preference. As such the public will seek 'cognitive short-cuts' to allow them to reach a judgement. While Börzel and Risse focus on political elites in providing these cuts, and acting as 'political entrepreneurs' or 'change-agents' (Börzel & Risse, 2000), this concept is entirely suited to engagement with the public sphere and the importance mass media in conditioning popular understandings.

The major weakness of this framework rests in the way it conceives this "logic of appropriateness" (March & Olsen 1995: 30). Ideational factors are considered as "static structures" (Schmidt, 2008: 320) that serve to produce collectively constructed constraints, and frame the possible. The challenge here is how to address shifts in normative contexts, as it is theoretically un-equipped to "engage with the construction of ideas and discourse" (Schmidt, 2008: 320). This brings us neatly to the most recent addition to the NI family.

2.33 The Ideational Turn and Discursive Institutionalism

As the previous sections have sought to review, the development of the New Institutionalism(s) has done much to highlight the limits of any theoretical framework that fails to adequately appreciate context and time. However, within the traditional schools of NI there have emerged short comings regarding ideational concerns (Schmidt, 2014). This does not detract from their value, but requires addressing for a complete framework suited to mapping British discourse since accession.

As Blyth indicates "genuine theoretical advances are achieved neither through declarations of hegemony nor through the blanket rejection of alternatives" (Blyth, 1997: 223). The

chapter will now argue for the incorporation of the valuable conceptual tools provided by HI and SI into political science's recent critical engagement; *'The ideational turn'* (Blyth, 1997). That is to say, in the context of the complex and divergent processes of Europeanization, a nuanced tool kit is required, one that recognises the temporal dimension and 'discount rates' identified by HI, the weight and role of 'political entrepreneurship' and 'cognitive shortcuts' in affecting popular perception is provided by SI. Furthermore, it must understand the increasingly evident significance of 'ideas' in affecting political outcomes.

The first forays into ideational factors emerged as a response to the theoretical shortcomings of the existing institutional research agenda. However, these first efforts viewed "ideas instrumentally and functionally, rather than as progressive extensions of their research programmes. They reduce[d] ideas to 'filler' to shore up these already existing research programs rather than treat them as objects of investigation in their own right." (Blyth, 1997: 229). Since Blyth offered this telling criticism of the use of ideas in understanding political dynamics and outcomes, there has been a notable growth in ideational literature, refining its tool kit and seeking to engage more critically with their influence.

Any well considered overview of the 'turn to ideas' within political science must proceed to pay credit to the "Moravcsik" of constructivist research (Luedtke, 2004: 1107). Craig Parsons' *A Certain Idea of Europe* is a seminal text in modern political terms, and the most comprehensive engagement with ideas to date. It sought to move European Studies beyond the confines of the first debate, that had framed the expansion of the discipline. To do so it sought to ascertain the relative causal weight of federal ideals in directing French policy preferences toward European politics (integration) following the end of the Second World War. It structured the research around the critical junctures in French (and European) politics and demonstrated the viability of alternative policy solutions and normative frameworks for engagement with the major challenges of the time. Via the use of these alternatives it demonstrated how the proponents of a community focused, ideational matrix managed to redefine national interests and "how these ideas ruled out others as active options, making their victory permanent... (it was through the achievement of ideational hegemony that) 'pro-community' leaders left a legacy of new institutional constraints to their successors" (Parsons, 2003: 1). Despite the achievements of this transformative piece of research, it did raise notable challenges to any researcher seeking to engage with the causal significance of

ideas. It is not always possible or operable to evaluate the relative significance of certain ideas.

Among the most prolific researchers within this agenda, it is Vivien Schmidt (see for examples Schmidt 2008, 2010, 2002, 2006 etc.), who has taken issue with the static bias of the traditional schools of NI in which “institutions serve primarily as constraints” (Schmidt, 2010: 2).

The focus on discourse, however, aims to overcome this challenge, as such it requires clarity. Schmidt indicates that analysis of “discourse (serves to) address explicitly the representation of ideas (how agents say what they are thinking of doing) and the discursive interactions through which actors generate and communicate ideas (to whom they say it) within given institutional context” (Schmidt, 2008: 306); this will be taken as the working definition of discourse for use throughout the thesis. She further distinguished between two salient forms of discourse, that come to affect political outcomes; coordinative discourse among policy makers and stakeholders, and communicative discourse which is directed at the public. (Schmidt, 2008). This research will primarily focus on the later, as this is the discourse most evident in media output.

This thesis is aimed at understanding the ideas of separation (between the national and the supranational) and conflict (with our fellow member states). Such ideas are best understood as the popular decedents of the ideas of nationalism, imperialism, and racism, but they are redefined by the nature of European integration and as such must be recognised as dynamic. Furthermore, the growth in the electoral returns of ‘political entrepreneurs’ advocating this ideational matrix, such as UKIP and subsequently The Brexit Party, Golden Dawn or National Front (now National Rally) highlights their popular expansion. This indicates that any theoretical framework suited to critical engagement with their increasing significance in populist politics – must be able to understand and appreciate ideas as fluid and dynamic. This is not, however, to say that ideas cannot also serve to constrain; while an idea may expand and gain greater currency in popular terms, it may correspondingly serve to incrementally limit viable political options and re-orient normative frameworks and popular value structures.

To understand this complex and interactive process between ideas and politics the research will incorporate the tools provided by what Schmidt terms “Discursive Institutionalism” (DI). DI has four guiding principles around which to structure its research. First one must recognise the significance of ideas and discourse in conditioning political outcomes; secondly ideas and discourse must be recognised to reside in their institutional context in line with one or more of their institutional predecessors; third one must seek to frame ideas within their ‘meaning context’ following a ‘logic of communication’ to appreciate how these ideas are constructed in the public sphere and how they become re-affirmed over a given period; finally “and most importantly...(one must) take a more dynamic view of change, in which ideas and discourse overcome obstacles that the three more equilibrium-focused and static older institutionalisms posit as insurmountable” (Schmidt, 2008: 304).

The European Union, and her member states have been through periods of continuity and stasis, as have popular perceptions of her institutions, but this is neither the rule nor the norm. Data from Eurobarometer shows a clear fall in levels of support and trust in EU institutions since the passage of Maastricht (note); it is the aim of this thesis to contribute to our understanding of the causes of the shifts in public opinion, by demonstrating the growth in the ideas of ‘separation’ and ‘conflict’ over the corresponding period. With regard to the UK, preferences regarding the EU have often set her aside from her continental counterparts, however, they have not been static. One can briefly draw attention to the movement in British preferences following the election of Blair in 1997. New Labour entered government and drove a notable change in British European policy; one can recognise this as a critical juncture that initiated substantive change.

As such change can be identified, how best can we seek to understand it? It is through engagement with ideas as causally significant factors that our understanding of political outcomes can be furthered. Parsons defines ideas as “subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions” (Parsons, 2002: 48). Both the descriptive and normative context in which ideas emerge affects their reception, proliferation and consequential relation to political outcomes. This understanding is central to both the contribution of DI and the aims of this thesis.

Eurobarometer data has further shown that European citizens lack sufficient understanding of the workings and institutions of the EU and feel disconnected from its decision-making

processes (Commission, 2008). However, what is equally apparent is that efforts to increase the powers of the EU's directly elected body (the European Parliament - EP) have done little to counteract this trend, rather voter turn-out has dropped by approximately one third since the first European election in 1979, and European elections are increasingly dominated by nationally framed debates (Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley, 2008). That is to say, Europe suffers from "an imbalance between the increasing transfer of political power from European nation-states to the EU on the one hand and the still-national orientation of political debate and opinion formation on the other hand" (Sifft et al, 2007: 128). This has led commentators such as Open Europe to talk about the European Parliament as "failed experiment" in European democracy. This thesis will seek over the subsequent chapters, to provide evidence supporting the claim that it is this disjuncture between the idea of national and the supranational, that threatens the long-term prospects for popular support of the 'European project'. Equally this separation has a relationship to the perception of legitimacy in the national context. However, before we can move to substantive assessment of the importance of ideas in the British context, it is essential to provide an overview of the contribution this 'turn to ideas' has so far made, and as such situate this research within the wider literature.

Returning briefly to Schmidt, her creation of the fourth NI – Discursive Institutionalism has offered insight into a range of compelling issues that are salient to the aims of this thesis. Schmidt undertook a comparative review of efforts at welfare reform in the UK and New Zealand and demonstrated that the success of British reform and the failure in NZ was closely tied to the discursive practices and rhetorical strategies at play in the two national contexts (Schmidt, 2002). In an earlier paper written in collaboration with Radaelli, an insightful case was made for the significance of discourse as a crucial "factor in the explanation of change...in Europe". (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004: 207).

DI provides "not only an analytical framework but also a commitment to go beyond 'politics as usual' to explain the politics of change, whether this means the role of ideas in constituting political action, the power of persuasion in political debate, the centrality of deliberation for democratic legitimation, the (re) construction of political interests and values, or the dynamics of change in history and culture".

(Schmidt, 2010: 2)

It is with regard to the (re)construction of political interests and the centrality of discourse to legitimation, that the introduction of ideas has made a substantive contribution to the discipline. Rosamond has engaged with one of the most widely used ideas of our time – that of Globalization. However, Rosamond has sought to move beyond engaging with this ‘phenomenon’ as an exogenous structural and material reality and address its value as a political tool. In his paper, *Discourses of Globalization and Social Construction of European Identities*, he considers the function and construction of ‘globalization’ and the ‘hyper-Globalization thesis’ in the context of the European Union relating it to the recent growth in (second wave) regionalism. Again, the merits of SI’s conceptual toolkit relating to ‘political entrepreneurship’ are apparent as Rosamond highlights the ability of discourse to “open strategic opportunities for certain types of policy actor” (Rosamond, 2011: 653). Any given actor is able to call on this rhetoric concerning ‘external threats’ to legitimise reform or policy output by defining collective interests against such externalities.

However, “the role of Globalization in actually constituting those interests and identities is largely ignored” (Rosamond, 2011: 656). That an idea (globalization) that is so widely considered a *fait accompli* in policy circles, may also be the product of the social construction of interests has profound ramifications for direction and focus of political research. In a subsequent paper written in collaboration with Hay, Rosamond expands upon the importance of ideas and their environment; “it is the ideas that actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs the way in which actors behave” (Hay & Rosamond, 2011: 148). If this can be said at a policy level, in which actors are presumed to be better informed (than the wider public) in their relative policy domains, the consequences for the relationship between public understandings, popular perception, normative context and Europeanization are significant.

2.4 The Importance of the Public Sphere

The public sphere is a concept first advanced by Habermas and remains best defined as “as a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1964: 49). This will be taken as the working definition of the public sphere throughout the research, recognising that public opinion is not formed in a vacuum, but

rather develops as a result of complex interaction between a number of social actors, both private and public. The work noted the significance of media, and this recognition is central to this thesis. Habermas argued autonomy is a fiction (Habermas, 1989), and as such we must recognise and seek to understand the collective and interactive process of opinion formation. Mass media is only one dimension of the sphere, however, it is a central one, and one that has only grown in significance over the period of integration, as such the media are understood to be a defining component of the public sphere.

The Commission has identified that the mass media are the primary mechanism for informing European citizens with regard to the EU (Commission, 2004). While knowledge of the constituent supranational institutional framework of the European Union is high, with awareness of the EP, the EC and ECB ranging from 82-89%, understanding and trust in these institutions is a different matter. Less than half of the Union's population understand the function of, and interplay between these bodies (47%). Eurobarometer indicates that trust in these institutions is at an all-time low, with just 39%, 35% and 34% trusting in these institutions respectively. Furthermore, Eurobarometer data clearly highlights a strong relationship between levels of education and trust.

When one considers these challenges in light of research within the public sphere literature that has called for greater inspection of the "agenda-setting role of newspapers" (Firmstone, 2008: 225) and concluded that output from government actors (in the British context) is "only neutral or ambivalent regarding the merits of European integration" (Statham & Gray, 2006: 72) one can begin to make the case for the re-conception of the media in the terms Börzel and Risse developed (see above).

No longer should research be confined to conceiving of the role of media in narrow reflective terms, but rather it appears increasingly evident they perform an active normative role. Whether one wishes to cite the Daily Express' ongoing "crusade for Britain to quit" (Express, 23.01.2013) or the Daily Mail's discussion on the "undermining of sovereignty...[and the need] to stand up for British voters" (Mail, 24.01.2013), it takes very little to identify normative output that could serve toward a "reconfiguration or the recalibration of interests" (Papadimitriou *et al*, 2019: 437) . Consequentially, the notions that SI has developed for the analysis of political elites appear increasingly salient to the analysis of the political functions of the mass media.

The question follows, if the media are now performing an active normative role, of the sort conceptualised by Börzel and Risse (Börzel & Risse, 2000), how significant are they in terms of shaping public opinion and affecting political participation? Evidently there are a range of mediums and actors that contribute toward a complete political sphere, and new forms of media have had a substantive impact on the relative importance of traditional media. However, the above discussion regarding agenda setting remains highly salient.

Furthermore, existing research has shown a direct relationship between newspaper readership and political participation. McLeod *et al.* demonstrated “significant effects... [of newspapers upon] political participation”, indicating that exposure to issues and “attention to public affairs” was positively related to newspaper readership (McLeod *et al.*, 1995: 318). In comparison to news on television, research by Viswanath *et al.* found that newspaper readership bore strong relationship to voting preferences and political involvement that was not evident in television (Viswanath *et al.*, 1990). This would support the significance this research model (see next chapter) places upon newspapers.

Salient to the aims of this thesis is the US discussion in the 1990s regarding the role of news in motivating participation or mobilisation:

“Newspapers have more recently claimed an important role for themselves as providers of mobilizing information...News media in general and newspapers in particular can serve as important agents of conveying information necessary for individuals to participate in politics”.

(Eveland & Scheufele, 2000: 220)

This suggests not only are print media capable of mobilizing popular responses via the proliferation of perspectives regarding any given political phenomenon, but equally they have assumed the role in line with the above conceptual tools provided by SI. That is to say, newspapers are increasingly aware of their own role in driving specific agendas and constructing given phenomenon in the public sphere. “These findings, of course, have important normative implications for democratic systems, in general, and mass media, in particular...[Furthermore,] newspapers have consistently been found to increase overall levels of participation” (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000: 231). This is not to say that other factors do not have significant implications for levels of participation and popular understanding, but

a better understanding of the discourse evident in print media can only further our understanding of the Europeanization of public attitudes.

2.41 Public Sphere Literature

The existing literature identifies a qualitative deficit in media coverage of the EU (See for example Carey & Burton, 2004; Machill et al, 2006; Meyer, 2005; Firmstone, 2008). An empirical review with regard to a pan-European public sphere is not required here; suffice it to that such a public sphere “independent of individual states does not exist” (Machil et al, 2006: 61).

An overview of the importance of the mass media in with regard to the context of European member states is offered by Meyer in his paper on *‘The Europeanization of Media Discourse’*. First it is crucial to note the significance of the media, both functionally and normatively; “citizens’ ability to follow and take part in public discourse about political issues is rightly seen as an essential part of a legitimate political system by mediating social demands and fostering political accountability as well as sustaining social cohesion and trust” (Meyer, 2005: 123). National media operate as a primary vehicle for this mediation. The Commission figures above regarding trust illuminate a failure to develop trust, which one can only presume is tied to a functional failing to offer explanation and provide essential accountability. In a previous paper *Exploring the EU’s Communication Deficit*, Meyer’s draws attention to “national bias” in media coverage and the tendency to utilise the Commission “as a scape goat for Member States’ failings” (Meyer, 1999: 634). If the data sets in the subsequent chapters indicate this outsourcing of responsibility for failure is an evident feature of the Europeanization of media discourse, this will contribute to an explanation of low trust, and by extension the growth of Euroscepticism.

In a research project seeking to understand *‘Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere’*, Koopmans undertook a review of the relative Europeanization of varying themes (monetary politics, agriculture, immigration, troop deployment, pensions & education) in the national media. The paper offered a succinct overview of the “four crucial functions” performed by the media at the national level. First “in the absence of direct communicative links” issues, challenges and policies must be made visible via media platforms, “it is in this public forum

that they must gain public legitimacy” (legitimation function). Second, due to the perennial challenge posed by the evident separation, “European policy makers depend on mass media for information about the concerns of the citizenry” (responsiveness function). Third, and tied to the notion of *separation*, as citizens have little to no direct contact with the institutions of (supranational) governance, they “must therefore rely on how Europe becomes visible in the mass media” (accountability function). Finally, public participation and influence over policy makers is only possible if the public are able to “achieve visibility in the mass media” (participation function) (Koopmans, 2007: 184). In sum, while the Commission is guilty of failings in terms of public relations and media output, national media play a central role in the development of popular preferences regarding the process of integration. Koopmans proceeds to identify the selective nature of the new winners and losers of the Europeanization national public sphere, the sustained prevalence of national frames for European issues, and most concerningly a major qualitative deficit in the coverage of European politics (Koopmans, 2007).

These are challenges that have empirical support in the public sphere literature. Sift et al, highlight the increasing importance of the gulf between the expansion in European competencies and sustained “national orientation of political debate and opinion formation” (Sift et al, 2007: 128). Despite the focus of that research being on broadsheets, it again uncovers an alarming qualitative deficit in which “EU policies are mostly referred to as intervening factors for domestic matters” and as such, little is done to reduce the lack of public understanding of supranational dynamics (Sift et al, 2007: 128). This separation is detrimental to the prospects for understanding, and resultant support for, and legitimacy of, the EU in the national context as such domestic discourse does little to counter “the lack of public information about political decision making at the European level” (Sift et al, 2007: 137). Returning briefly to Meyer’s key features of legitimacy; authorization, responsiveness, and accountability, are all contingent on the belief of relative proximity to, and faith in, the cooperative and collective efforts of any given structure of governance (Meyer, 2005). However, if the media are repeatedly placing emphasis on the degree of separation, and framing discourse in terms of conflict as is evident from the literature (see for examples Machill et al, 2006; Meyer, 2005; Firmstone, 2008), the prospects for the development of Meyer’s key features are very limited and the consequences for the perception of the EU in

national context are concerning. Again, it is the impact such media output has for collective understanding (a clear and evident pre-requisite to support and legitimacy) that draws into sharp focus the risks of such framing of the European project. If the Europeanization of British media output displays a dearth in substantive or informed coverage, has led to the dominant framing of the process of integration or supranational structures of governance as distant and separate from national governance, or framed interactions in terms of defence or conflict, this would contribute to any explanation of the ascendancy of British Euroscepticism.

In research into the Editorial Values of the British Press, Firmstone identified a (relative) lack of knowledge with regard to European affairs (in comparison to her continental counterparts) that is likely to have a detrimental “qualitative impact” on media coverage (Firmstone, 2008: 215). Again, this has substantive implications for collective understanding and popular responses. When there is rudimentary knowledge deficit within the British media – how can we expect the institution of national media to adequately inform the public? Firmstone proceeded to assert such findings “support the need for researchers to look more closely at the actions of the media as independent political actors” (Firmstone, 2008: 216). This assessment offers encouragement to my belief that the policy options and broader actions, available to the political ruling class, are circumscribed by the discursive frameworks and public sphere in which such actions and policies reside.

Returning to Meyer’s review of the ‘*EU’s legitimacy deficit*’, and in light the literature reviewed above, it is increasingly evident that the role of the media is central to modern and legitimate governance (Meyer, 1999). As the paper notes “both the political and media systems are caught in highly interdependent and tense relationship, which means the prospects for legitimating public debate depend on the performance of both systems” (Meyer, 1999: 621). As this chapter has sought to make clear, this performance is questionable, and as such merits further critical research.

The final justification that is required, is that concerning the exclusive focus on tabloid media within the UK. Above and beyond the already mentioned qualitative deficit, that is evidently greater among the tabloids than the broadsheets, it would appear there may be what can best be termed as a knowledge and resource gap in the tabloid media, that is to say “none of the tabloids has a dedicated Brussels correspondent” (Firmstone, 2008: 217). This can only

serve to compound what Hay and Rosamond termed the “crude ‘us’ versus them dialectic...(that) infect[s] the public and media imagery of the European debate in British Politics” (Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 159). Furthermore, the most pressing motivation behind the tabloid focus (beyond the arguments relating to market share) is to rectify a knowledge gap within the discipline, that would contribute to our understanding of the media as cognitive political agency and provide a (currently absent) coherent overview of the Europeanization of the British tabloid media dating back to accession. As Machill et al, conclude in their *‘Meta-Analysis of (European) Media Content Analyses’*, “future media content analyses on the European public sphere should pay more attention to the media as a whole, avoiding the existing emphasis on newspapers with a relatively elite readership” (Machill et al, 2006: 79). As has been outlined in the thesis so far, the aim of this research is to make a contribution to the understanding of the context in which public opinion formation occurs. While “elite” newspapers may widely reflect the readership of the academic community, they are significantly less influential in terms of public opinion than their tabloid counterparts as they are read by a much smaller proportion of the public. The specific focus and justification in terms of tabloid output will follow in Chapter 3, but the relationship between the media, and popular support requires brief consideration before the thesis can move out to outlining the methodology.

2.42 Legitimacy in the Public Sphere

Data from Eurobarometer indicates that trust in European institutions has fallen, the trajectory as detailed in Eurobarometer (EB 80) suggests it is in continual decline (Commission, 2013). Equally, there is a clear relationship between levels of education and support for the EU detailed in the EB. While Eurobarometer fails to directly address the issue of *legitimacy*, the following section will seek to argue it is tied to a failure to adequately promote collective learning and understanding of European politics, along with a recognition of the divergence between national and supranational legitimacy, that bears a direct relationship to this decline and without redress poses a threat to the legitimacy of the EU in the national context.

The clearest theory regarding the importance of *collective learning* in regard to social outcomes is articulated by Kilgore. This argues for an increased recognition of the importance of interaction in establishing, developing and changing *norms* and *values* within a political space. The importance of collective learning, Kilgore indicates, is increased in times of change; collective learning is the process whereby people “understand and become involved with...dealing with societal change” (Kilgore, 1999, 200). As such, for the purposes of this thesis collective learning is understood as the process of social interaction that affects and constructs responses to change. This is an expanded definition of this process to account for the macro scale on which Europeanization drives change. Learning feeds into popular understanding, affecting the norms and value via which change becomes present in a public sphere, and in term serves to construct and define *legitimacy* or *illegitimacy* in a given context.

Weber conceived legitimacy in descriptive terms arguing it is dependent upon *tradition*, *charisma*, and *legality* (Weber, 1964, 124), while this is an older conception it presents challenges to a novel, distant, and complex structure such as the European Union.

Legitimacy entails both an empirical (popular support) and a normative (compatible with existing value structures) dimensions.

One of the most coherent and insightful engagements with this challenge in the European context is offered by Meyer in his paper on ‘*Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union’s Communication Deficit*’. Meyer’s draws attention to the narrow conception of legitimacy in the modern western context, as essentially a bi-product of democratic input (Meyer, 1999). The perceived validity of this input, he argues, is contingent on three key features; the *authorization of power*, *responsiveness in the exercise of power*, and the *accountability of power holders* (Meyer, 1999, 619). These three criteria are paramount to the development of supranational legitimacy in a national context. In essence a demos (people), needs to believe any given authority has been endorsed (authorised) by those it governs, they need to be aware of reaction by an institution of governance (responsiveness), and they need to believe any abuse of power will not go unpunished (accountability) (Meyer, 1999). Given the evident *separation* between national populations, and supranational institutions of governance – Meyer’s criteria present a substantive challenge to legitimacy in this context.

As Lodge recognises, the debate concerning legitimacy in the context of European integration has been widely conducted in “limited terms”, focused upon “securing the election of the European parliament by direct, universal...suffrage”; however, “the issue is more complex and multifaceted” (Lodge, 20007; 1595). Lodge continues to argue that legitimacy is conditional upon wider considerations, evolves over time, and subject to contention and division between national and supranational government (Lodge, 2007).

It is the clear divergence between established nation states, and the novel framework for regional integration compounds the challenge for supranational legitimacy. History, normative affinity, and precedent underwrite national legitimacy; “domestically, policy making is grounded in the first instance in the legitimacy of public institutions...(and is) historically and culturally embedded in the polity” (Verdun & Christiansen, 1999: 162). European institutions lack this history, affinity and precedent in comparable terms. Only with greater appreciation of the divergence between national and supranational contexts, can we better understand this process of legitimisation in the context of regional integration. As Verdun and Christiansen conclude, advanced integration and the associated policies and competences must be recognised as fundamentally distinct and analysed in light of this reality; the “process of legitimation...runs counter to the entire experience of domestic systems” (Verdun & Christiansen, 1999: 174). As such, while the focus on democratic input may be valid for discussions of legitimacy in the national context, it is likely we need to reconceive legitimacy in the supranational context.

In contrast to Lodge’s analysis much of the debate over European legitimacy has been dominated by focus on the ‘democratic deficit’ (see for examples Bogdanor, 1989, Blonde *et al*, 1998, Sharpf, 1999, Rohrschneider, 2002). This thesis does not aim to argue that institutional reform is not required, nor that direct representation does not play a significant role, but rather that an exclusive focus on direct democratic input is to omit the wider normative considerations that affect the process of legitimisation. MacCormick indicates we need to have a broader appreciation of popular democratic values, to understand the difference between instrumental and intrinsic value attached to democracy (MacCormick, 1997). With a greater appreciation of the intrinsic values of democracy we can recognise that material improvement may not improve popular legitimacy. MacCormick concludes there is “no absolute democratic deficit” in the EU, but we need to better understand the

relationship between the composition of, and affinity to, a *demos* (or people) and the prospects for legitimate democracy (MacCormick, 1997: 1). It is clear that legitimacy, in the context of regional integration, is a complex and multifaceted challenge; it is a challenge that has not been addressed by the increase in powers and electoral accountability of the European Parliament.

Furthermore, the increased returns of nationalist parties to the European Parliament indicates the evident national orientation of European elections. This assessment has been supported by the findings of Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley, who indicated the importance of national considerations in *supranational* elections (Hobolt, Spoon and Tilley, 2009). If a stronger legislative does not prompt greater democratic involvement in European governance, or drive a shift away from national considerations, then it is misguided to presume such reform would address the issue of the EU's *legitimacy deficit*. The process of legitimisation is something more nuanced and complex than a debate concerning direct democratic input. Legitimisation as a process includes a plethora of normative and empirical dimensions that affect it. The public sphere, must be recognised as an important dimension in this process, and the media as important in directing the orientation of this sphere.

The importance of the media as conduit between supranational challenges and representation in the national context is widely acknowledged; “the media is citizen’s principal source of information on EU affairs” (Hawkins, 2012, 563). As such, while *authorization* may depend on electoral input (in some form), European citizens are almost entirely dependent on the media to represent *responsiveness* and *accountability*. The complexity of European integration creates further difficulty in this regard, as does the distance between national publics and supranational institutions of governance. In light of these difficulties, new research must pay greater attention to the construction and leadership of collective national responses. McNamara highlights the value of more nuance in this regard in her paper on *Constructing Europe* (McNamara, 2010). The paper “investigates the role of symbols and practices in providing the underpinnings for the construction of legitimate authority” (McNamara, 2010: 131). McNamara concludes that the EU is fundamentally distinct from the nation state, and the development of legitimacy attached to it – must be recognised as equally distinct. It has never sought to coerce loyalty,

as the nation state has, which “naturally limits what the EU can command in terms of its loyalties” (McNamara, 2010; 139). In terms of the symbols to which the public attach loyalty and ascribe legitimacy, the nation state also retains superiority, evident in the “very overt borrowings of state symbols” (McNamara, 2010: 139).

If supranational legitimacy is to be acquired in the national context, and support developed, the media will play a central role in terms of the promotion of novel symbols and the growth of public comprehension. That is to say that in the context of European integration, due to the separation between government and those being governed (that does not occur in the context of a national democracy); the media must perform an *education function* both in terms of empirical and normative understanding of European integration (to contribute to any process of *collective learning*), if the trajectory noted at the start of this section is to be reversed. However, if Eurosceptic discourses are as dominant in the British media as existing literature suggests (see for example Koopmans, 2007, Meyers, 1999, Sifft *et al.* 2007) and they promote the ideas of *conflict* and *separation* (as is the aim of this thesis to demonstrate) – the implications are significant and can contribute to our understanding of the causes of *Brexit* .

2.5 Conclusion

The primary research aim underwriting the following thesis is to understand how the process of Europeanization has affected British discourse since accession. The above chapter has outlined a review of salient literature that will allow the research in the subsequent chapters to ensure this is done with reference to the existing research, developing our understanding of the process of Europeanization, and the value of institutions and the importance of media in terms of popular preferences.

This chapter has sought to frame the challenge that populist responses to the pressures of European integration present to political research. It has done so first by highlighting the importance of the ‘elite-public gap’ and the era of ‘permissive consensus’ and its implications for early theory on integration. It then sought to place this phenomenon within the broader Europeanization literature that has facilitated a far more nuanced appreciation of the pressures emanating from integration. While the first generation of Europeanization

literature remained primarily focused on the consequences for the state, and formal structures of governance, the second generation has overseen significant development into the wider reaching implications of integration. It is in this second generation that this thesis will contribute to the literature, by offering a novel overview of the Europeanization of British tabloid discourse.

This chapter has advocated a combination of the conceptual tools suited to doing this, that are now provided by the growing body of constructivist research, much emanating from the second “generation” of Europeanization. The growth in New Institutional theory and research marks a vital prerequisite to the aims of this thesis. The notions of ‘path dependency’ and ‘critical junctures’ produced by HI allow us to develop a temporal sensitivity that is essential to understanding the construction of ‘Europe’. With the use of these conceptual tools the research model (see next chapter) will map the construction, growth and shift in tabloid discourse regarding integration. The thesis will record the importance of the ideas of ‘conflict’ and ‘separation’, and across the empirical chapters demonstrate a tangible growth in these notions, that undermines the prospects for supranational legitimacy in the national context. These concepts will be outlined in detail in the Method Statement that follows, as will a coherent and operable structure for their application across the case studies.

To further the theoretical contribution of this work, the chapter proceeded to draw on the work of SI, this will permit this research to better engage with the role of the media as proactive agency driving normative change in the public sphere. Such a model will be of value in analysing increasingly dynamic media platforms, functions and actors in the modern discursive landscape. The value of the conceptual tools of SI such as ‘cognitive short cuts’ and ‘change-agents’ are evident and will continue to be so in assessing ongoing changes in media and public discourse.

The final and most important dimension the framework constructed in this chapter was the introduction of ideas as causally significant variables. That is to say, the chapter argued for the recognition of discourse as an increasingly valuable dimension in political interaction when seeking to understand shifts in both popular understanding and political outcomes. This argument drew on the growing work of DI and the broader ideational literature which has demonstrated the relationship between discursive practices, rhetorical strategies,

popular reception and political outcomes. The use of the concepts of 'conflict' and 'separation' will allow the research map the growth of salient ideas, in the discursive structures present, since British accession and throughout subsequent Europeanization

The final section of the literature review sought to both justify the focus on tabloid media, and review the importance of the public sphere. The chapter recognised and supported recent calls from the 'public sphere' literature to critically engage with the media as normatively active agency. Which reaffirmed the value of another SI notion, that of 'political entrepreneurship' (or agenda setting). The following research will contribute to the literature engaged with the role of media discourse as factor in conditioning popular understandings, and by extension affecting conceptions of legitimacy and political outcomes more broadly. In analysis of the role of media discourse the empirical chapters will map a range of value structures, these will include ideational constructs or appeals as referred to in the final supplementary research question; does tabloid coverage support the assertion of British-exceptionalism in regard to the process of European integration? Exceptionalism will be of notable value in understanding the normative shifts recorded in the final chapter.

Throughout this chapter, the literature review has sought to develop a framework that can contribute to the understanding of how Europe has been constructed in the national context, and aid in our broader understanding of the relationship between discourse and, popular preferences, and democracy in the wider sense.

3. Methodology Chapter:

How will the Thesis Map and Analyse British Tabloid Output Since Accession?

Research Questions:

Overarching Research Question:

- How has the process of Europeanization affected British media discourse on European integration?

Supplementary Research Questions:

- Have the normative frameworks, in which the British media frame European integration, shifted substantively since British accession?
- To what extent have the ideas of *separation* and *conflict* become evident in the linguistic and normative frameworks in which Britain's tabloid press convey the pressures and challenges deriving from the process of European integration?
- Does the output of the British tabloid media allow for the EU to acquire legitimacy in the national context?
- Does tabloid coverage support an assertion of British-exceptionalism in regard to the process of European integration?

3.1 Research Design

The following research design has been constructed to analyse how the process of Europeanization, domestic change emanating from the process of integration, has affected British media discourse on European integration. The supplementary considerations relate to the form and focus of Europeanized media discourse. The research will assess any evident shift in the normative frameworks present in media coverage of European affairs, how salient the ideas of *separation* and *conflict* are to Europeanized discourse, considering is the discourse evident conducive to popular understanding and legitimacy in the national context, and finally evaluating if this discourse unique or exceptional, or is it comparable to other

national public spheres? These research concerns will make the findings valuable to our understanding of the process of Europeanization, the relationship between discursive environment and the growth of Euroscepticism, and challenge populist discourse creates for regional integration and legitimate governance more broadly.

This research seeks to contribute to the growing Europeanization literature focused on understanding the nature and form of the pressures that integration brings to bear upon the member state; specifically addressing the impact this pressure has upon the dynamics of the public sphere. The aim is to make an original contribution to the corpus of knowledge on the significance of ideas and discourse in conditioning political dynamics and public understanding. This thesis, however will not seek to prove causality to policy outcomes or popular preferences, but map the history of the Europeanization of tabloid coverage of integration. This will entail the most comprehensive analysis to date of British tabloid coverage of European politics spanning the four decades of British membership of the 'European project'. As such this research aspires to offer a unique and original contribution to the discipline and expand our understanding of the causes of populist Euroscepticism.

To ensure the following research makes this contribution, an appropriate research design is needed. The following chapter will lay out the structure for this design. This will begin with justification of the case study method, selection, and associated data collection, before moving on to an explanation of the composition of the data sets, the conceptual framework and the associated scales. The chapter will then move on to outline the analytical framework, with reference to the value of the both quantitative and qualitative methods used to analyse the data sets, before concluding with an assessment of the limitations of this research design.

3.11 Case Study Method

The European Union, as it is today, is the culmination of seven decades of incremental integration, moving from limited technical aspirations to becoming the most advanced exercise in regional integration, in political history. The history of these decades is defined by key moments, spanning from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community

in 1951, to the sovereign debt crisis in 2010, and beyond. Such moments have diverse consequences, some immediate, some extended, some unforeseen. It is with the aim of making a contribution to our understanding of these moments and their implications for the Europeanization of media discourse, that the following research model has been developed.

In the previous chapter, the thesis drew on the literature of historical institutionalism (HI), this literature is central to justifying the focus on these key moments; “the concept of ‘critical junctures’ is an essential building block of historical institutionalism” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 341). The theory outlines extended periods of “path-dependent institutional stability” intermittently broken by ‘critical junctures’ – “during in which more dramatic change is possible...emphasis[ing] the lasting impact of choices made during those critical junctures in history” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007: 341). These junctures represent epoch defining points around which we can build a better understanding of that which follows, as they limit the scope for future action creating varying degrees of path dependency. From the HI premise of these ‘critical junctures’ we can develop a methodology suited to understanding change over an extending period, via the inspection and analysis of said junctures.

To consider ‘critical junctures’ the research design must provide a framework suited to the analysis of specific units of interest and evaluate how they might help us better understand a broader trend or phenomenon. The framework most suited to aims of such research is that of the case study; a case study is “best defined as an intensive study of a single unit with the aim to generalize across a larger set of units” (Gerring, 2004: 341). The units will be outlined and justified in the subsequent section, but the aim is to take a series of *critical junctures* as the basis for a series of case studies, from which the thesis will be able to provide a more general understanding of the development of the a given phenomenon over an extended period.

While the aim here is not to prove a causal relationship to public opinion, the research will provide a contribution to our understanding of the environment in which opinion develops. The environment in question is the ‘public sphere’ as outlined in the previous chapter, and the contribution will be made through the mapping and analysis of tabloid media output over a number of case studies selected and defined by their importance as *critical junctures*. The case study method is recognised to provide a “holistic approach... (permitting) a researcher empirical and theoretical gains in understanding larger social complexes of actors, actions

and motives” (Feagin et al, 1991: 8). The aims of this research are well suited to the case study method as it represents a specific “way of defining cases, not a way of analysing cases or a way of modelling casual relations” (Gerring, 2004: 341). The method for analysis of the cases will be outlined below, but the case studies provide the framework for the focus of the research design.

As with any method, there are both merits and weaknesses. The case study method has merits in terms of selection, definition and holistic understanding, but does not provide for a universal or standard research design. As such, this constitutes a method absent of “hard and fast rules... (rather it is) best understood as an ideal-type” (Gerring, 2004: 346). This absence of universal rules, can be considered a weakness in terms of consistency. However, if the rest of the research design provides a rigorous framework for data collection and analysis, and the design is clearly explained and justified these weaknesses can be minimised.

Furthermore, as the case study method is “most often used” with qualitative methods is open to criticism regarding reliability (Feagin et al, 1991: 17). That is to say the method may not lend itself to replicability, as it may be difficult to “replicate the original study using the same research instrument...get[ting] the same results” (Feagin et al, 1991: 17). The limitations of this research design will be addressed in the final section of this chapter, but the research design that follows which combine both quantitative as well as qualitative methods, and include third party sample reliability checking to account for these acknowledged weaknesses.

3.12 Case Study Selection

- 1) The First Case Study: Wilson’s Referendum – 1975.
- 2) The Second Case Study: The Maastricht Treaty – 1992.
- 3) The Third Case Study: Cameron’s Pledge to a Second Referendum – 2013.

The focus on these three ‘critical junctures’ in Britain’s integration and will serve to offer a unique inspection of the construction of Europe in the domestic public sphere. British accession to the EEC took place in 1973, however, the aim of the following research design is to map and analyse ‘critical junctures’ in terms of media discourse regarding European

integration. While British accession clearly represents a ‘critical juncture’ in the history of Anglo-European, the plebiscite in 1975 represents a major event in the public sphere, and as such is highly suited to the aims of this research design. The referendum on membership in 1975 sees a major spike in coverage of European affairs and will also represent a high water-mark in terms of positive coverage (see Chapter 4). Consequentially, it will provide the base line against which the subsequent case studies can be assessed. This will allow the research design to map change from 1975 onwards, and analyse the Europeanization of media discourse over the last five decades.

The Referendum returned the largest ever proportional mandate in the history of British democracy, with 67% of those polled voting in favour of continued membership of the European Economic Community. This provides the perfect case study for analysis of the start Britain’s relationship with Europe as present in media discourse. As over two thirds of those who voted, supported European integration, it must be anticipated that the public sphere was broadly positive regarding integration.

There numerous ‘critical junctures’ in the development of European integration and Anglo-European relations, and certainly the Maastricht Treaty would not have been possible without previous junctures such as the Single European Act in 1986. However, and as noted in the literature review, the passage of the Maastricht Treaty drew to an end the era of permissive consensus, marking the start of a public awakening regarding the process of integration. It increased supranational competence in number of key domains, created a new pillar structure, and represented a fundamental step toward the European Union as we know it today (see Chapter 5). At this juncture, there was proliferation of ‘new actors’ and an expansion in the pressures of Europeanization, which made European integration increasingly salient in the public sphere. As a result, one can anticipate a notable shift in the discourse that constructs the idea of Europe between these two case studies. The second case study will also record another anticipated spike in coverage in European affairs. As Maastricht makes a significant change to the European *acquis communautaire*, and framework for regional integration, it marks a perfect ‘critical juncture’ around which to structure the second case study. This will allow the research design to map and analyse change since 1975, and to evaluate, how accurately and in what terms, the changes inherent to Maastricht become present in a defining component of the public sphere.

The final case study is open to more debate. This growth in Euroscepticism has been an ongoing and extended development. The expansion of new actors has resulted in the rise of novel agency in British politics such as UKIP, Vote Leave and The Brexit Party. Eurosceptic discourse will be evident in the first case study, but in 1975 this language and the ideology it reflects is anomalous. Over subsequent decades this discourse transforms from exceptional to common. This transformation is an extended process, and is subject to various ‘critical junctures’ However, Cameron’s speech in 2013 marks the juncture at which Eurosceptic discourse acquired such currency as to prompt the party of government to make an unequivocal commitment to a referendum once again. In 2013 David Cameron committed the Conservative party to a national plebiscite on British membership of the European Union. The speech in 2013 represents the ‘critical juncture’ at which Eurosceptic discourse, which began at the extremities of the political spectrum, has moved into the centre of British politics. As such this has been selected as it marks the acceptance of this discourse by mainstream political actors. In 2013 The ‘European question’, was once again committed to a referendum.

3.13 Data Collection

As outlined in the previous chapter the aim of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of why Britain has broken with decades of policy consensus regarding European integration: why was the UK such a *reluctant European* (Gowland & Turner, 2014) despite being subject to comparable pressures (as other member states)? Is this a question of British exceptionalism in the European context or a combination of pressures and processes evident in other member states? Assessing the shift in public opinion regarding such a complex structure “is not a straightforward task”, as such this research takes as its point of departure that “public discourses play a significant role in shaping the attitudes of the British to European integration” (Fairclough, 2013: 112). The aim is not to analyse the substance or shift of public opinion, that is taken as a given from wider literature (see for examples Hawkins, 2012; Meyer, 2005; Carey & Burton, 2004; Machil et al, 2006; Hay & Rosamond, 2011; Kriesi *et al*, 2006) but to increase our understanding of the qualities of the public discourse that contributed to this shift, and the ideas that they are premised on.

To these ends the thesis aims to use a mixed-methods approach. The quantitative component (detailed below) will provide for an overview of the trends in the newspaper output. This component will come in the form of Content Analysis which permits the “systematic examination of communicative material” (Mayring, 2004: 266), that will allow the research to produce a “description and an explanation of the social phenomena [being] investigated” (Bohm, 2004: 270). This quantitative contribution will be made using two ordinal scales (see below) that permit the categorization of all output coded across the research design. However, as this research is underwritten by constructivist theory it cannot substantiate its claims with a positivist model that views “time and context-free generalizations...[as] desirable and possible” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 14). The first level of data will be collected via the use of content analysis, providing a holistic overview and map of change in Europeanized discourse in tabloid output.

While quantitative methods, specifically content analysis, are highly suited to engagement with large scale data, analysis of trends, or provision of an overview – it faces significant challenges when seeking micro-analysis of the semiotic and linguistic features that construct the ‘meaning’ of a text. To address these challenges, once the quantitative research is complete, the research will utilise a qualitative framework to permit in-depth analysis of the most salient texts as indicated by the content analysis.

The framework proposed is that of Critical Discourse Analysis (detailed below) which is aimed at understanding the “constructive effects of discourse...upon social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and belief” (Fairclough, 2013: 12). This will be done by breaking down the findings of the broader categorizations mentioned above, to understand the framing and rhetorical devices that emerge across the case studies. The second level of data collection will take the quantitative overview as its point of departure, from which key articles are selected for their representation of salient discursive frames and rhetorical devices. For each case study, and each coding matrix across both the scales (see below) data will be evaluated using CDA to ensure a more nuanced analysis of the discourse evident in media output.

The research anticipates a growth in normative objection to integration, that has a positive relationship to the expansion of supranational competence. It is these normative notions (constructions), that bear a significant negative relationship to legitimacy and collective

learning. As such, it is the shift in the discursive environment that is understood to be central to improving our understanding the growth of British Euroscepticism.

With the combination of these methods the thesis aims to provide not only an assessment of the shift in British discourse on European integration, but also contribute to greater understanding of the specific qualities of this discourse, and their potential relationship to legitimacy, understanding and support. Given the aims of the thesis, the combination of quantitative and qualitative are not viewed as epistemologically incompatible, rather this spectrum of methods is conceived as a “continuum” and the aim of this mixed methods approach is to “draw from the strengths and minimise the weaknesses of both in [a] single research [design]” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 14-15). The combination of the quantitative and qualitative data collection will make the basis for the for the empirical section of the thesis in the next 3 chapters. However, the data collected throughout the following research is extensive, and as such each chapter will present and substantiate the most telling findings with regard to the aims of the research.

3.2 Datasets

As outlined above, the research will be structured around case studies that reflect critical junctures in the development of Anglo-European history. The data will be collected via the use of mixed-methods approach providing both a holistic overview, and in-depth analysis of the specifics of the discourse in question. Now the chapter must detail and justify the specific focus and framework of the datasets in the subsequent chapters. This will begin with an explanation of the component of the public sphere that the thesis is focused upon, before moving onto outlining the key concepts and associated scales used to analyse the datasets.

3.21 Newspaper Selection

To make a valuable contribution to our understanding of the Europeanization of the public sphere, the dataset must reflect a salient component of that sphere. To ensure this contribution is original, the dataset will avoid “the existing emphasis on newspapers with a relatively elite readership” (Machill *et al*, 2006: 79). The selection of the resource for the dataset reflects these considerations, as well as the need to ensure the research was reflective of media with a wide public subscription. The table beneath is data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) on the readership of national newspapers, over the decades across which the case studies are situated. With the focus on tabloid newspapers established, or newspapers with a less “elite” readership, newspapers were chosen on the basis of the ONS data. The tabloid papers read by the largest populations over the period were The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, and the Daily Mirror. The archives of these publications will be the basis for the dataset.

The Sun, Mail and Express are right-wing publications, which have been central to the promotion of Eurosceptic discourse into the build up to, and since, the referendum in 2016. The Mirror represents a left-wing dataset to offer a comparative framework, that will permit a clearer understanding of change over the case studies and their relationship to political cleavage and ideational considerations. The three case studies provide a structure that ensure the dataset captures salient change, or Europeanization, over the period since British accession.

Table showing Readership of National Newspapers:

Newspaper	1971	1981	1991	2001	2010
The Sun	17	26	22	20	16
Daily Mail	12	12	10	12	10
Daily Mirror	34	25	22	12	7
Daily Telegraph	9	8	6	5	4
The Times	3	2	2	3	3
Daily Express	24	14	8	4	3
Daily Star	-	9	6	3	3
The Guardian	3	3	3	2	2
The Independent	-	-	2	1	1
FT	2	2	2	1	1
Any Daily	-	72	62	53	41

Fig 3.a: This table shows the percentage of the British population that reads given newspapers at 10-year intervals. The data was recorded by the Office for National Statistics (ONS report on Social Trends No. 41) and published in the National Readership Survey (2010)

3.22 Conceptual Framework

As noted at the start of this chapter, the engagement with British Euroscepticism will require a conceptual framework. Two concepts have been chosen and developed to underwrite the Likert Scales that follow in the subsequent section; “a concept is a single idea, or ideational kernel, regardless of whether it is represented by a single word or a phrase” (Carley, 1993: 82). The concepts that will frame the research design are those of ‘separation’ and ‘conflict’,

each of which will apply to one of two levels of analysis required to adequately understand the form of Europeanization evident in the dataset. 'Separation' refers to the national level of analysis, reflecting coverage of, and preferences toward, the domestic impact of integration. 'Conflict' refers to the supranational level of analysis, reflecting coverage of, and preferences toward supranational actors, aims and institutions.

These concepts have been selected for two reasons. The first being the evident support for their prevalence across existing literature on the British public sphere (for examples see Hawkins, 2012; Meyer, 2005; Carey & Burton, 2004; Hay & Rosamond, 2011) As Hawkins notes in his insightful paper *Nation, Separation & Threat: An Analysis of British Media Discourses on the EU Treaty Reform Process* there are "two principle frames evident Eurosceptic discourse: the EU as a foreign power and the EU as bargaining forum". The notion of a foreign power presents a high degree of separation, something that is distant and by extension inherently lacks legitimacy. Conflict is evident in context which the "EU is seen as a hostile, quasi-imperial power which poses an existential threat to the United Kingdom". The frame of discourse that construes the EU as a bargaining forum, does so in manner that implies it is a forum from which the UK "is excluded and with which it engages in a bilateral relationship...[under which] the policies and the institutions of the EU are seen to work against the United Kingdom's interests" (Hawkins, 2012: 565). As such while Hawkins defines the relationship in terms of threat, I prefer the concept of 'conflict' as I believe it more closely reflects the terms in which this competitive bilateral relationship is presented.

The second reason for the selection of these two concepts relates to the thesis' aim to engage with the notions of legitimacy, support and understanding. Returning briefly to Locke's understanding of legitimate governance, it was his assertion that an institution of governance can only acquire legitimacy (and the support that follows) via consent and continued assessment of said institution (Locke, 1980: 52). If an actor is to consent to any given power structure, it is evident that the actor must believe that they are part of it; not simply subject to its control mechanisms. If assessment is to be undertaken, this can only be a valid assessment if the information upon which the assessment is taken, is itself valid. As such, if the concepts that I propose for the purposes of this research are evident throughout the British tabloid press output regarding the EU, it substantially undermines the prospects for public collective learning (and understanding) of the British relationship with the EU, and

subsequent support for and legitimacy of supranational institutions. For these reasons, I believed the concepts of 'separation' and 'conflict' provide a highly suitable prism for understanding the form media Europeanization takes, and how it contributes to the growth of British Euroscepticism.

These concepts or kernels constitute the 'level of analysis'. To understand the use, growth, and significance of these concepts they will be placed on a scale using their antonyms to ensure an acceptable level of validity with regard to the concept under question. The scales proposed are derived from the Likert scale, initially developed to engage with developments in public attitudes toward social phenomena, however, their structure and value is easily transferable to attitudes in other domains (such as the public sphere). As Likert noted "there are no family of differences between attitudes, there is simply one infinite series of attitudes" (Likert, 1932: 8). However, if we are to consider the spectrum of attitudes evident in the media, we must conceive of this spectrum in a fashion that permits valid and reliable research. Oppenheim asserts that when analysing subjective notions within a continuum, analysis can be made "easier and more powerful" with the use of an ordinal scale (Oppenheim, 1992: 158); constructing a scale that will permit an acceptable level of reliability (consistency) and validity (suitability of measurement to object of research). With this aim, and in recognition of the design of Likert's scale to "permit a judgement of value rather than a judgement of fact" (Likert, 1932: 12); two scales are laid out below to structure measurement of the two concepts under consideration.

3.23 Ordinal Scales

3.23a Conflict:

‘Conflict’ does not simply include overt or outright belligerence, but rather extends to include a range of objection, and its antithesis in the form of support. The ‘conflict scale’ has been developed to code the construction and coverage of supranational aims, actors and institutions as presented within the texts under consideration, across a range of ‘conflict’ value structures as laid out in the following table:

Ordinal Scale:	Definition:	Example Words:	Examples
-2	<p>‘overt objection’ : Frames the ‘risk’ posed by the EU in highly normative terms. Is highly suspicious of integration and of all EU aims/frameworks. Likely not only to frame objection to the European project in normative terms, but also level visceral/personal attacks/slants at European actors/institutions; questioning their integrity/honesty/decency etc. May extend to framing the aims of integration in conspiratorial terms, that pose a fundamental challenge to the freedom and sovereignty of member states/possibly</p>	<p>Crusade, ruled, nation, attack, freedom, victory, prisoners, dictator, emperor.</p>	<p>“ democratic history is on trial ... we cannot let a Common Market Commission we do not elect and cannot remove assume powers over our future.”</p> <p>“ the very soul of our democracy’s at stake”</p> <p>“ THE TIDE HAS TURNED AGAINST EUROPE'S DICTATORIAL ARROGANCE”</p> <p>“No surrender”</p> <p>“Delors goes on attack to create a superstate”</p> <p>“The tide has turned against the Europe’s dictatorial arrogance”</p>

	<p>drawing comparisons with non-democratic structures (USSR, Third Reich, Roman Empire etc.). May imply or state that European integration/EU/European migrants pose a threat; possibly evoking emotive anecdotal evidence (i.e. rape/crime/ethnic or cultural 'danger' etc.). Linguistic frames may allude to, or directly promote/reference 'conflict'/violence and imply or indicate the end of the EU is either likely or desirable.</p>		<p>"Brussels Empire"</p> <p>"European superstate"</p> <p>"The Battle of Brussels"</p>
-1	<p>'suspicion'; Frames the 'risk' posed by the EU in 'rational' terms, views the project as a financial drain and a regulatory burden. Is inherently suspicious, but does not engage in more normative concerns, rather curtails its critique to the tangible. However, may contain pejorative/mockling references to European actors/institutions and/or references to federalism/f-word or seek to mock/ridicule the EU and associated policy output.</p>	<p>Hostility, technocrats, outfox, threat, anti-European. Eurocrats, drain, demise.</p>	<p>"On food, he protested about the increasing taxes the Market will force member nations to impose."</p> <p>"The EU is on its way out" "Fury at threat to jobs from new EU financial transaction tax"</p> <p>"EU BUDGET HIKE!"</p> <p>"Euro fat cats"</p> <p>"EU dim-wits"</p>

0	<p>'neutrality'; expresses/entails no clear/unequivocal normative judgement/assessment. Offers a holistic assessment of the project, offering pros and cons in a 'relatively balanced' manner.</p>	<p>Impartial, unbiased, even-handed, dispassionate, disinterested.</p>	
+1	<p>'passive support'; Expresses conditional 'support' for the European project/EU tied to performance. Likely to include support for reform, however does not promote any normative arguments for integration or the 'European project' in the broader sense, rather its assessment remains narrowly framed and focused on the material benefits that integration offers and the benefits of a collective framework in terms of leverage or realpolitik.</p>	<p>Compare, discuss, pressures, challenges, cooperate, options.</p>	<p>"Making a great deal better". "It's true, the EU is good for you." "EU exit jeopardy"</p>
+2	<p>'active support'; expresses ideological/normative support for the processes of integration. Views the ideals/aims of the 'European project' as highly positive.</p>	<p>Hope, aspire, dream, collaborate, teamwork, help, vision.</p>	<p>"An end to all war" "Peace, power and prosperity." "Yes! It's joy all around in Europe."</p>

3.23b Separation:

Separation does not simply include severance such a Brexit, but rather extends to include a range of association or attachment. The ‘separation scale’ has been developed to code the construction and coverage of relations (between the UK and the EU), and preferences toward British membership of the EU, as present within the texts under consideration across a range of ‘separation’ value structures as laid out in the following table:

Ordinal Scale:	Definition	Example Words:	Examples:
-2	<p>‘divorce’; Primary indicator is the promotion of ‘Brexit’/separation/’No’. Likely to conceive of Europe as the ‘other’/’alien’, with little to no shared identity/history/culture. Considers such ideational motivations as superseding all other concerns, but may frame the need for immediate withdrawal in material terms or seek to imply public opinion or economic rationale is against British membership as a fait accompli. Does not consider uploading possible as ‘they’ are ‘alien’; downloading only ever negative both normatively and empirically. May contain references to risk posed to sovereignty/identity/nationality etc. Or the use of the EU as mechanism to outsource blame for policy or phenomenon at a national level. Also codes all</p>	<p>Exit, break-up, split, isolated, separate, referendum, Brexit, leave, risk.</p>	<p>“Joining the Common Market is more like being pounded to pieces on the rocks than entering the safe anchorage which the advocates of entry promised us three years ago.”</p> <p>“Now it's time for Britain to make an exit from the EU””</p> <p>“EU 'like corpse'”</p>

	visceral/personal attacks on domestic pro-European actors, dismissing their claims as lies, if not conspiracy.		
-1	<p>'detachment'; Does not consider Britain within 'continental Europe', but recognises some interdependence. May advocate a rolling back of integration to a 'single market project'. Does not allow for any deepening of integration. Does recognise some potential for the uploading of British preferences, but this is highly circumscribed. Downloading considered negative on balance, and primarily attacked in terms of material impact.</p>	Unconnected, disjointed, over-reached, revert, burden, meddle, enough.	<p>"ANTI-MARKET Minister Peter Shore lashed out yesterday at the new deal his Government had arranged with the Market. He told a London rally that it had failed " massively " on almost all the major issues"</p> <p>""Mr. McCartney came straight to the point: "The Common Market is like the Beatles partnership," he said.</p> <p>"When I wrote a hit, the money was shared around all the group and no one ended up getting anything. "Now that the partnership has been dissolved, I'm much better off in every way."</p> <p>"HAGUE: UK DISILLUSIONED WITH EU"</p>
0	'neutrality' ; expresses/entails no normative	Detached, nonpartisan, nonaligned, equal,	

	judgement/assessment. Does not engage with the prospects for uploading to the European level. Largely agnostic/ambivalent regarding the consequences of downloading. Also may include a measured/balanced review of the relations that unequivocally does not favour either side of the argument.	noncommittal, acceptable.	
+1	'conditional unity' ; views relations in functional terms. Supports sustained British membership but only argued for in material/realpolitik terms. May advocate reform of the EU, and would not be adverse to a greater British role and deeper relations – if certain conditions were met. Does not make much reference to the mutually constituting nature of relations with regard to uploading of UK preferences. Views downloading in broadly positive terms on balance	Improvement, reform, change, negotiate, assent, agree, compromise, benefit.	<p>“A MAJORITY of voters prepared to commit themselves wants Britain to stay in the Common Market. But the minority against remains strong. And many people have reserved their judgment until they see the full details of Harold Wilson's renegotiated terms.”</p> <p>“Britain will be 'lonely' outside EU”</p> <p>“We're 3rd rate if we leave EU, says Blair”</p>
+2	'absolute unity' ; Offers unconditional support, possibly views a 'common destiny'	Together, unified, common, unison,	“The overwhelming pro-European vote

	<p>predicated on shared heritage and values. May simply focus on such shared heritage and cultural affinity or advocate a deepening of integration, and sees cooperation as ideologically justified. Views uploading of UK preferences as highly viable and desirable. Considers the downloading as positive. May engage/explain the use of the EU as scape goat for the failure of domestic actors or decry/mock/deride anti-European UK actors as extreme or fanatical.</p>	<p>leadership, values, vision, peace.</p>	<p>marked a day of triumph".</p> <p>"We are really part of Europe."</p> <p>"Our European friends."</p>
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These scales provide a starting point from which to undertake content analysis but does not constitute the finished research design. The research will meticulously place all articles on both scales based upon the dominant content in any given text, before moving on to undertake qualitative analysis of complete texts to provide a clearer map of the specific form and focus of Europeanized tabloid discourse.

For each case study, three months either side of the date in question will be subject to content analysis. To ensure analysis is focused on the most salient texts during the windows under consideration, articles will be selected on the basis of a reference to either European Integration (i.e. 'EU', 'EEC', 'European Union', 'European Economic Community') or the specific case study (i.e. 'referendum', 'Maastricht Treaty', 'TEU', returning to 'referendum') in question.

This will allow the research to understand the overarching trend in the form and scope of 'Euro-sceptic discourse' from the British referendum though to the modern day, as well as mapping the specific discourse that constitutes media output.

3.3 Analytical Framework

As detailed above the thesis will be taking a mixed-methods approach to make the most of the datasets. This will determine the sequencing of the analytical framework. The quantitative Content Analysis (CA) based upon the scales in the previous section will classify the data to provide an overview of salient change, the qualitative Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) undertaken on the data to provide an in-depth map of media discourse. This combination ensures an analytical framework well suited to assessing how Europeanization has affected British media discourse on European integration, with CA providing the quantitative overview of change, and CDA facilitating a nuanced appreciation of the specific form and focus of discourse evident in the data sets. This combination constitutes the analytical framework of this research design, and these two methods require elaboration.

3.31 Content Analysis

Content analysis permits research to make “inferences from a symbolic medium such as text...(and facilitates) the generation of cultural indicators which point to the state of beliefs, values, ideologies and other cultural systems” (Weber, 1984: 126). Weber proceeds to highlight the value of these macro-level indicators in “assessing empirically the relationships among economic, social, political and cultural changes” (Weber, 1984: 127). So, while CA may not be able to facilitate in-depth understanding of complex ideas and discourse; it does offer a suitable method for the first engagement with tabloid output. The CA based upon the ordinal scales will classify all articles across all data sets.

The CA design is constructed in a way that facilitates the broadest understanding of the concepts under examination, provides an oversight of their growth in significance, and ensures that the subsequent CDA is undertaken with an understanding of the overarching trends or changes evident in the data. This is in recognition of the fact there is “no simple right way to do content analysis...(rather) investigators must judge what methods are most appropriate for their substantive problems” (Weber, 1990: 13). The ‘substantive problems’ under consideration in this research are the multifaceted development of British Eurosceptic discourse, CA will allow a suitable overview of this development.

CA allows the research to apply meaning to textual data to within a cultural context; “it seeks to analyse data within a specific context in view of the meanings someone – a group or a culture – attributes to them” (Krippendorff, 1989: 403). The scales above provide a specific mechanism via which one can consistently classify comparable output or value structures as present in the text. However, complex discourse and the Europeanization of media output require more detailed analysis to supplement this overview.

3.32 Critical Discourse Analysis

To ensure a more detailed picture of the development of Eurosceptic discourse, the quantitative overview will be followed by in depth qualitative critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA is a “label for a broad...movement within discourse analysis” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 58), it has five unifying features as identified by Jorgensen & Phillips that indicate its suitability to the focus of this thesis:

1. An understanding that discursive practices constitute an important form of social practice, from which the wider social world is built: discourse affects cultural and social reproduction and change.
2. Discourse is, at the same time, both constitutive and constituted: discourse is contingent to context and constitutes (part of) social practice that affects change.
3. Discourse must be empirically studied within (and with reference to) the social context in which it resides.
4. Discourse has a tangible ideological dimension. Discursive practice contributes to the production and re-production of unequal power relationships and social structures. It calls for the systematic enquiry of language with regard to its normative implications. It is consequently ‘critical’ in that it seeks to make evident the complex discursive practice that underwrites the social order, seeking to contribute to both social and structural change.
5. CDA therefore does not “understand itself as politically neutral, but as a critical approach which is politically committed to social change” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 58)

Given the focus on media output, and the concepts of 'separation' and 'conflict' outlined above, CDA provides a highly suitable framework for substantive engagement with the complexity of the discursive construction of British Euroscepticism from a critical perspective. This critical perspective will allow the following empirical chapters to relate the findings of the data sets to the role of media discourse in driving normative shifts and changes in popular preferences. The model that will be used is that of Fairclough which "represents, within the critical discourse analytical movement, the most developed theory and method for research in communication, culture and society" (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 60).

Fairclough indicates that discourse contributes to the construction of:

1. Social Identities.
2. Social Relations.
3. Systems of knowledge and meaning.

(Fairclough, 2013)

As such it performs three social functions in terms of; identity, relations and ideational structure. In regard to the concepts (and scales) outlined above, the second falls entirely within the scale of separation, the third within the scale of conflict, and as identity entails both an internal and exogenous dimension, it must be understood in terms of both. As Fairclough indicates every instance of language use is conceived as a communicative event that occurs at three separate dimensions (Fairclough, 2013):

- It is a text.
- It is a discursive practice which involves both the production and consumption of texts.
- It is a social practice.

Analysis of the text is focused on the features of language that serve to realise the discourse in linguistic terms. Through engagement with the linguistic characteristics of any given text it is possible not only to highlight how discourses are constructed, but how the form of the text presents a specific interpretation of the social world. Fairclough specifies a selection of semantic tools to unpack the text:

- Interactional Control – entails assessment of the relationships between participants within the discourse. This permits understanding of both, the simple linguistic features such as pronouns, or the more complex qualities related to the form and framing of questions, as well as the conversational agenda (that will not fall within the remit of CA due to their contingent quality).
- Ethos – this is the use of linguistic tools to construe and condition notions of identity.
- Metaphors, Similes and other rhetorical devices – this entails focus on such devices to understand how they promote or re-affirm a specific perspective or ideological frame.
- Wording & Grammar – as this suggests, this is in-depth analysis of the most basic of linguistic components and structure to understand how the form of a text frames any given event or social dynamic and constructs certain ‘realities’.

Fairclough asserts that with the use of these semantic tools research can contribute to our knowledge on the transitivity and modality of a given text; with this understanding we can begin to relate the text to the other dimensions noted above (Fairclough, 2013).

Transitivity is the relationship between events and processes, seeking to address given connections (or the absence thereof) between objects and subjects within a broader discourse. The potential insight “lies in investigating the ideological consequences that different forms can have” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 83). This is central to understanding normative implications and how discourse contributes to the normalisation of a given social practice, serving to re-affirm or re-align normative and ideological structures.

Modality refers to the writer’s level of affinity with the substance of the text, and the conviction with which particular readings of events is presented. This is crucial when engaging with public sphere, or more specifically media output – as opinion and value assessment is widely and regularly presented in ‘factual’ terms; the degree to which value judgements are presented as ‘truths’ is central to the discursive construction of ‘reality’. That is to the modality and transitivity evident in the data will help in the evaluation of the potential implications such discourse has for public understanding and popular preferences.

This analytical framework will allow the empirical chapters that follow to engage with ‘reality’ as it is constructed in media output. With use of Fairclough’s CDA model the research will evaluate the authority of claims and actors, the growth and normative coherence of

recurrent themes and narratives, and the potential implications such discourse has for supranational legitimacy and popular preferences in the domestic context.

3.4 Limitations of the Research Design

The thesis will not seek to prove a correlation between the discourse identified, and policy outcomes or popular preferences. Consequentially it remains liable to the ‘how much’ critique. That is to say, as with Fairclough’s assertion regarding the dialectic nature of social relations, the relative causal weight of a given ‘idea’ is equally challenging in empirical terms (Fairclough, 2013). As Blyth indicates “attributing change in behaviour to a change in ideas is tenable, only if it is counterfactually demonstrated that the change could not have occurred without the ideas” (Blyth, 1997: 230). This is a challenge to any ideationally framed analysis. The research will be susceptible to criticism that contests the relationship between political outcomes and discourse or ideas. However, as Parsons notes, this can be said of any effort to engage with the significance of ideas and ideational considerations over the material pressures (Parsons, 2003). Rather, this research design accepts that quantifying the specific causal importance may not be possible, but that does not detract from the value of mapping and analysing the Europeanization of British media output.

With regard to CDA, it does have some inherent weaknesses, most notable in its assertion of a dialectic relationship between all three dimensions. It is empirically impossible to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, while Fairclough advocates analysis of the production and consumption of communicative events there is a “dearth of empirical research” in this regard within the work of Fairclough (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 90). While the framework provided by Fairclough calls for such analysis, it does not have a rigorous structure for this, nor provide evidence of it. Neither does this research design, as it is not operable within the logistical restraints of this research. This however, did not negate the value of Fairclough’s work, and neither should it do with this research. Furthermore, as an inherently subjective framework, CDA is subject to accusations of subjectivity. While these cannot be refuted, as a critical research endeavour this subjectivity is central to its critical nature and will be supported through out with reference to wider literature. To address the issue of subjectivity

two checks will be operationalised, I have personally reviewed all coding following a six-month break to ensure consistency. Secondly, a peer of mine has reviewed a random selection of 100 articles to ensure objectivity of the scales; the results are included in the appendix. However, both these checks have supported the validity of the research design and replicability of the findings.

The other major substantive criticism this model is open to, relates to the selection of the case studies. First as this model is framed around 'critical junctures', these can be anticipated to distort the findings or produce a bias as all of these events brought the 'European question' to the forefront of the public sphere, as well as possibly serving to polarise discourse. Machil *et al* note the risks that such an event-based framework may pose but argue that to reject such a model would be counterproductive as such events lead to "considerable" increase in media reporting on the EU and as such provide an invaluable pool of data (Machil *et al*, 2006: 76). It is also salient to note that "media coverage...focuses on the 'big issues' of Europe", such as the case studies selected, while in-depth coverage regarding the daily interactions at a European level "remains ephemeral" (Trenz, 2004: 305). This would suggest that to understand the nature of media output on European affairs, one must structure research around the issues that receive media coverage – i.e. critical junctures.

As the model proposed selects three events around which to structure the research it can also be accused of simply offering three synchronic windows for analysis. These are legitimate criticisms. The research may be subject to a bias as a result; however, the importance of these events in conditioning the terrain that developed from them, justifies their selection and supports the necessity for such research. Furthermore, the construction of Europe in the public sphere is widely structured around major events and to dismiss them as suitable vehicles for the inspection of discourse and political interaction – would be to highly circumscribe our scope for understanding. To address the second challenge noted, I will undertake three months of analysis either side of the 'critical junctures' serving in to redress the critique of a synchronic analysis. This translates into the analysis of 18 months of media output across four publications, entailing the coding of thousands of articles, anything more ambitious would pose major demands on time required to undertake such analysis.

Finally, there are the minor technical challenges that emerged during the process of the research. While the Daily Mail and The Daily Express have excellent online archives entirely

suited to both CA and CDA, the same cannot be said of the other two papers chosen. The Daily Mirror has complete archives, but a highly flawed search mechanism, which required far more manual searching. It was also surprising to discover The Sun has no online archive facility, although the final case study will be able to use Factiva for both the Mirror and the Sun (Factiva's online archive only includes publications post-Maastricht). Given that the Sun is the most read tabloid in this country I am not willing to permit their failure to make records accessible as impediment to an analysis of their media output. To overcome these issues, the research model had to undertake extensive (and time consuming) manual searching and evaluation, using micro film for the Sun, and unsearched articles for the Mirror – this translated in the manual reading of all articles for these publications. This was slow but permitted the research design outlined above.

4. The First Case Study: Wilson's Referendum

I want to start by disposing of some myths about my country, Britain, and its relationship with Europe.

Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome. Nor is the European idea the property of any group or institution.

Over the centuries we have fought to prevent Europe from falling under the dominance of a single power.

And it was from our island fortress that the liberation of Europe itself was mounted.

The Community is not an end in itself.

Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of some abstract intellectual concept.

Nor must it be ossified by endless regulation.

To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging...but working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels.

Thatcher, Bruges, 1988.

4.1 Introduction

As was addressed in the previous chapters, this thesis will make an original contribution to our understanding of the growth of Euroscepticism. This contribution will be specifically focused upon change in British tabloid media discourse, driven by the process of European integration. The data set in the following chapter will outline the normative frameworks, in which the EEC and the process of integration becomes present in the domestic public sphere. At this juncture, the concepts of 'separation' and 'conflict' are not yet anticipated to be central to Europeanized discourse. However, as outlined in the previous methodology chapter, the scales these concepts have underwritten have been extended to include a

spectrum and include their antonyms to ensure this research catalogues change. In terms of the potential and long-term implications for supranational legitimacy in the national context, this chapter will consider the specific focus and depth of media content with use of CDA. Furthermore, the chapter will compare the findings to key discursive frames evident in France and Germany, to establish whether it is valid to talk of British exceptionalism? However, before the chapter can move on to address these research questions, the salient considerations, and background, must be outlined.

In the British context, Forster indicates that the Euroscepticism “first galvanized by Prime Minister Thatcher’s Bruges speech in September 1988...came to prominence in the ratification of Maastricht Treaty” (Forster, 2002: 2). This is a national reaction driven by the process of integration. In this defining speech, Forster identifies a number of critical perspectives regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions, an aversion to shared competence, and a rejection in any reduction in sovereignty. As evident in the extract from Thatcher’s speech above, there is an implicit primacy attached the nation state via the rhetoric and framing of the Treaty of Rome or European institutions. There is a rejection of increased centralisation or supranational competence, as well as Europeanized regulation. There are also evident rhetorical devices drawing on recent continental conflict, and an implied claim of British superiority; as the “island fortress” that saved the continent. This discourse is indicative of many of the defining features of British Euroscepticism, and it essential to understand this, to establish if such discourse has any presence in this case study, or if there is adequate engagement with these dimensions of integration.

The critical perspectives evident in the speech above have now permeated the political mainstream in the UK, both in terms of discourse and policy, following the vote for Brexit in 2016. However, writing in 2007, Crum indicated that favourable perspectives toward integration remained the norm among the majority of mainstream political parties (Crum, 2007). De Vries and Edwards, indicated two years later that “so far, Euroscepticism constitutes...strong opposition towards the integration process...often only found on the fringes of the left-right spectrum – the anti-EU position of the British Conservatives being the notable exception” (De Vries & Edwards, 2009: 6). While ‘conditional unity’, support premised upon a material rationale or economic interest, remained official Conservative policy until the result of the referendum in 2016, there has been a consistent and

increasingly coherent Eurosceptic component to British political discourse that dates back to before Thatcher's speech. The aim of this research is to further our understanding of how this discourse has developed, and if the UK presents a notable exception, or is better understood as culmination of processes, that are individually far from unique.

Understanding these processes of change is central to the aim of this research, as such this is a contribution to our understanding of Europeanization. Europeanization is best defined as "domestic change caused by European integration", an emerging literature engaged with this form of change has been evident "since the mid-1990s" (Vink, 2003: 63). It has permitted a refocusing of academic study on the process of integration by seeking to shift "attention principally to the domestic level" (Vink & Paolo, 2007: 3-4).

As such the development of Euroscepticism, a direct reaction to the process of integration itself, is in itself, Europeanization. However, the emergence of Euroscepticism predates the literature mentioned above. To ensure a more complete picture of the process of this change, and understand how it has affected a defining component of the public sphere (as laid out in the previous chapter), this research will first go back to the first major public engagement with the process of integration – The First Referendum (1975). The following chapter will code and map early tabloid output with a European focus, including and distinguishing between national and supranational issues. This case study will provide a basis for the mapping of future tabloid output, as well as beginning to provide an understanding how the process of Europeanization has affected this component of the public sphere.

This chapter will represent the first coordinates, as the following research maps out change in the domestic public sphere driven by the process of integration. The following chapter will code and analyse the coverage of European affairs, both in terms of national and supranational focus, that develops around the referendum of 1975. National and supranational focus is structured around the two scales outlined in the previous chapter, and explained in depth with specific examples below. However, before the chapter can start to analyse media output, it is important to offer an overview of the background against which the referendum occurs and highlight salient issues in relation to both media and elite discourse on Europe.

4.2 Understanding Context: The Emergence of the 'Awkward Partner'

4.21 Coming to terms with a changing World

On the 19th of September, 1946, at Zurich University, the Tory opposition leader and war time Prime Minister made a historic speech that entails something of a lasting contradiction, evident in British discourse on European integration. In response to the shifting geo-political context and emerging Soviet threat, Churchill called for the re-creation of the “European family...with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom...[working toward a]...United States of Europe.”. This was one of a number of speeches from Churchill that clearly indicate a vision of a highly integrated Europe, going as far as to call for the creation of a European army (1950). This is a construct clearly at odds with many of the tenets of traditional nationhood and sovereignty. If one was selective in one’s readings of Churchill’s post war rhetoric, it would not be difficult to find adequate evidence to present the man as the complete Europhile; however, a holistic reading of his speeches highlights an inherent inconsistency and confusion that is a fitting mirror, for Britain’s testing and laboured relations with the process of European integration.

“We have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, but not comprised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed.”

(Churchill, 1953)

These words draw into sharp focus the dichotomy of the British engagement with the ‘European project’; it is this telling separation, that will be a key component of what the following three empirical chapters seek to explore. When Monnet developed his incremental vision of the first steps toward European integration, Attlee declined the invitation to participate in negotiations regarding the European Coal and Steel Community. British focus remained divided between the questionable ‘special relationship’ (US), and the financially

draining demise of the Empire and Commonwealth, with European concerns given limited priority at this juncture.

In the decades that followed there was a growing realisation of the success of European integration, and a resultant shift in British preferences toward the process. British power was in irrevocable demise, mirroring an economic decline; the UK was experiencing “declining overseas stature...(and) increasing humiliation” upon the international stage. “Never before had British subservience been so explicit...(and) the fact the French had been cheerful witnesses of the British humiliation...made the wounds more painful” (Morgan, 1990: 215-16). There were a series of British diplomatic failures that crystallised the changing geo-political realities. In 1950, British Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee declined an invitation to join the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), however, the success of the ECSC and the Treaty of Rome (1957) drove a marked improvement in the economies of the 6 founding member states; France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. In 1960, despite this evident success, the Conservative Prime Minister rejected another opportunity to participate in what had become the European Economic Community (EEC). While British policy discourse at this juncture was framed in terms of “rational arguments. In fact, it had much more to do with inchoate feelings about where Britain belonged in the world” (Young, 1998: 99-100). Instead Britain signed the Stockholm Treaty with Austria, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and Portugal, creating the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), which sought to promote a more liberal vision for European cooperation. Despite these efforts, the economic performance of the EEC members continued to improve relative to the EFTA and the UK.

By 1961, the growing success of the EEC had become apparent to British policy makers, as the UK opened negotiations for accession. For the next two years the British sought membership, however, in 1963 Charles De Gaulle vetoed the application. With Labour assuming power in 1964, Harold Wilson attempted to contest emerging British subservience asserting the UK did not want accession, as it would entail some reduction in relations with the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth, Wilson claimed, was the priority in regard to the future of British foreign policy; “there has to be a choice, we are not entitled to sell our friends and kinsmen (Commonwealth nations) down the river for a problematic and marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf” (Wilson, 1964). Wilson’s claim was

short lived, as were efforts to establish a Commonwealth Union; this might best be understood as a failed final attempt at a national reassertion of former geo-political dynamics. However, economic and structural realities were changing, and with them British interests. It was during this realisation of shifting interests and preferences that opinion regarding the commercial value of the Commonwealth altered (Crafts, 2012). Furthermore, the economic performance of the EFTA continued to be surpassed by that of the EEC (Aitken, 1973). This motivated a further application to the inner six (EEC), as the founding members were known (as opposed to the outer seven – the EFTA) by Wilson in 1967. The economic benefits of integration were increasingly clear to the UK, but that did little to alter De Gaulle's position or perspective, and once again the British were subject to a French veto.

A change in French leadership had an immediate effect. Jacques-Maurice Couve de Murville, the French diplomat would later claim the new Prime Minister, Georges Pompidou, only offered the British membership to indicate "he wasn't like De Gaulle" (Young, 1998: 234). Whatever the motivations, Pompidou encouraged the UK to apply again in 1968, the British sought to resume negotiations for the third time in 1969. This is already emerging evidence of the Europeanization of British policy, preferences and interests. These forms of Europeanization are not the focus of the research but help highlight the length of the process and value of long-term framework for analysis.

4.22 British Accession and Partisan Response

Edward Heath oversaw the subsequent negotiations, following Conservative electoral victory in 1970. However, it is clear that the UK was the weaker party in the negotiations that followed. Heath accepted both the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and a system of funding that centralised payments for food imports from outside the EEC to fund Community programmes, both of which would cost the UK notably more (due to its sustained higher levels of imports of food stuffs from the US and the Commonwealth) than other member states. The UK lacked leverage, Heath himself published an article in *Foreign Affairs* calling for '*Realism in British Foreign Policy*' warning that "each British attempt to associate Britain with the movement for European unity has failed, and that each attempt has taken place in less favourable circumstances than its predecessor". Heath proceeded to recognise the cost of

CAP, the missed opportunities in the previous decade, and the growing *acquis communautaire* that has developed “without taking account of the needs and interests of Britain” (Heath, 1969: 41). However, the article concludes “this analysis, rather than nostalgia for imperial grandeur, has led the British Conservative Party to the firm conclusion that if a Conservative government is returned to power it will consult with our friends to see, in the conditions (for accession) then obtaining, what kind of British effort is required” (Heath, 1969: 49).

Heath and the Conservative party won the election in 1970 and sought to enact this shift in policy. Roy Denman, one of the senior civil servants at the heart of the negotiations over British accession, would later support Heath’s assessment of wasted opportunities, calling Britain’s relations with Europe in the Twentieth Century (post 1945), a history of “missed chances” (Denman, 1995). Heath was committed, able, but ultimately in no position to make significant demands; the terms of accession would be defined by the inner six. Heath’s perspective on the necessity of accession was addressed by Anthony Meyer MP in 1971 a Commons debate; “I do not think it depends on the terms at all. I believe it would be in the interests of the country to join the EEC whatever the terms” (from Young, 1998: 239).

The UK entered the EEC in 1973. This was followed by a brief spike in public support for the ‘European project’ in the UK, however, this was very short lived and within a matter of months a majority of British citizens viewed EEC membership as major contributing factor to the UK’s economic distress (Jowell & Hoinville, 1977). The terms of accession would go on to become a point of increasing partisan contention, working against Heath, but change emanating from integration is already evident. The political landscape was shifting. Lord Crowther speaking in the House of Lords said “You do not haggle over the subscription when you are invited to climb aboard a lifeboat. You scramble aboard while there is still a seat for you” (from Young, 1998: 239). British accession may have been delayed, but when it did occur it is clear that Britain was not driving the process, but rather subject to changing context.

Support for integration continued to decline throughout Heath’s government, while “economic problems and the Community’s low standing in the polls fuelled the call for a popular referendum on...membership” (Jowell & Hoinville, 1977: 55-56). Mounting pressure regarding the terms of accession and the sustained poor economic performance of the

British economy, were becoming a growing domestic problem for the Conservative government. Heath had related accession to an economic recovery during his electoral campaign, consistent with his claims in the Foreign Affairs article above – as such he had invested notable political capital in this process. Heath called an election in 1974.

This election would open up Europe as an issue for partisan exploitation in British political discourse; this is a feature of Europeanized discourse that will continue to have a structuring effect throughout the research. Heath misread the national public opinion, but Wilson initially failed to capitalise. In the general election of 1974 Heath and the Conservative party anticipated they would be returned to government. However, with neither Labour nor the Conservative party having particularly successful recent records on the economy, and Europe not yet adequately salient, the election saw something of a surge in support for the Liberals along with Nationalist parties. Despite the Conservative party securing the most votes, Labour won four more seats, however, this did not secure an overall majority. Had Heath's negotiations with Liberal leader Thorpe taken a different course, so may the course of British membership of the EEC. However, these talks collapsed and Labour took the reins of government over Britain's first hung parliament since 1929, as the UK headed toward its first referendum.

When Wilson took control of No. 10, he was at the helm of a weak government and a divided party. The Labour party had voted against accession to the EEC in 1972 and Union opinion was "overwhelming hostile" toward European integration (Morgan, 1992: 363). This division was as evident as it had been two years before, the opponents of British membership in the party were both vocal and influential in the Party's membership, parliamentary party, and Union support. The most vocal of these opponents was Anthony Wedgwood Benn, who backed a referendum. With the evident cleavage in his own party regarding integration and the absence of any parliamentary majority, it is of little surprise Wilson was willing to do all he could to maintain some level of party unity. What must be stressed, is that the dynamics] ~ that led to the referendum were not driven by the 'European project' itself, but were closely tied to a combination of domestic pressures. Domestic pressures have done much to condition both the path of integration, as well as its emergence and construction in the public sphere.

Given the orientation of public opinion alongside the dis-unity of the Labour party, Wilson's commitment during the election was arguably the only viable domestic option. There was a "promise by Labour in the election that there would be an attempt at a renegotiation (of the terms of membership), and that the people would be allowed to vote on it" (Broad & Geiger, 1996: 88). This is a defining moment in the development of British-European relations, and one that would do much to condition the trajectory of this relationship. At the national level this afforded Wilson to construct conflict for the purposes of domestic consumption. This conflict is evident at two levels, first it permitted the Wilson administration to assert that the previous government had failed to take Britain into the EEC on acceptable terms; such use of Europe as an externality to frame partisan conflict helped to contribute to the surprise of the Conservative electoral demise in 1974. This construction would go on to remain central a feature of cross-party and internal party relations in regard to the national engagement with European politics, and condition future public discourse.

The more conventional construction of conflict is evident in Wilson's conduct upon the European stage; "the very notion of 'renegotiation'...was something of a misnomer since, as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt observed to Wilson in December 1974, the discussions never implied revision of the Treaty of Rome" (Morgan, 1992: 364). Parallels are not challenging to identify with the nature of Cameron's commitment to "negotiate a new settlement with our European partners in the next parliament" (Cameron, 2013), however, this will be returned to in depth in the final case study.

What must be noted is that in the 5 domains that Labour promised to "immediately seek a fundamental re-negotiation of the terms of entry" (Labour Party General Election Manifesto, 1974); Common Agricultural Policy, UK contributions, the goal of Economic and Monetary Union, harmonisation of VAT and Parliamentary Sovereignty, it would be incredibly difficult to classify any of the compromises Wilson and Callaghan secured at the Dublin summit as fundamental. The British administration also sought to ensure there was adequate conflict for the purposes of domestic consumption; one can highlight the excessive emphasis placed upon the issue of New Zealand's dairy exports as one such an example of this. This discursive construction of Europe as an external foe, provided domestic benefits in terms of political capital and populist discourse.

“For the Government, membership of the EC was an issue on which it was useful to focus attention because it cut across the class lines along which the country was divided. It also allowed the Prime Minister to promote national unity in the pursuing of national interest. There is no surer way of uniting a divided nation than for its leaders to wrap themselves in a national flag and conduct a campaign against an external foe. It was just unfortunate that the foe in this case consisted of Britain’s partners in the Community”.

(George, 1998: 76)

This marks the emergence of the reluctant European. The passage by George clearly indicates the importance of national pressures and domestic discourse in affecting the course of Anglo-European relations. While Britain’s partners did afford some concessions in the final re-negotiation, these were not in line with the rhetoric of the Labour Party manifesto noted above and contained numerous and substantive qualifications. Returning briefly to George’s telling analysis it is “[n]eedless to say, Wilson did not dwell on the qualifications and exceptions when he outlined these agreements to the British press. They were presented as an unequivocal acceptance of the British demands, a capitulation of the foreign dragons to the courage of the British champion.” (George, 1998: 88)

This represents a defining moment in the development of discourse toward supranational aims, actors and institutions, as well as the framework in which cooperation and British membership are defined in the public sphere. Wilson had framed this interaction as conflict, and defined himself as an agent defending the nation from abuse at the hands of Europe. The media output analysed in the following section will not yet assume the discourse mentioned above, rather it follows Wilson’s changed narrative following his claim of “capitulation of the foreign dragons to the courage of the British champion.” (George, 1998: 88). However, the value of Europe as an exogenous rhetorical device in domestic political discourse is already evident. The use of conflict to construct unsubstantiated risk, and the function of discourse in

constructing a dichotomy are already emerging. Separation structured around two “categories ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ and their inherent analogy to ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’, ‘Right’ and ‘Wrong’” (Rabinowitz, 2010: 75) are both changes already present in the public sphere emanating from the early stages of Europeanization.

4.3 Empirical Analysis

The referendum in 1975 returned the largest ever proportional mandate of any British electoral exercise, with 67.2 % of the electorate voting to remain a member of the European Economic Community. Media output cannot offer a complete explanation of why this was the case; however, the findings beneath will map a data set that would certainly contribute. The first case study codes a public sphere that was positive, but under-engaged. This helps to explain such levels of public support, but also starts to highlight a pattern of selective or limited Europeanization, that contributes to the future development of discursive engagement. Media output does not reflect accurately the degree of integration at this juncture, presenting an imbalanced perspective regarding the process of integration and as such is limited in its contribution to ‘collective learning’ (Kilgore, 1999).

The following empirical section will map tabloid coverage across the six-month period in which the referendum was situated. As with all the three empirical chapters, the focus is specifically upon change in media output driven directly by the process of integration. This change will be mapped across the empirical chapters with the use of the two Likert scales outlined in the previous chapter. The ‘separation scale’ will code and map coverage of Anglo-European relations, as well as perspectives and preferences toward British membership of the European Community; the ‘separation scale’ is focused upon national considerations. The ‘conflict scale’ will code and map coverage of supranational aims, actors and institutions, evaluating how this new dimension to governance becomes present in national tabloid output; the ‘conflict scale’ is focused upon supranational considerations. The findings of these scales will provide the quantitative analysis that will allow the following research to map change over the period of British membership, the research will combine this overarching analysis with in-depth critical discourse analysis. The qualitative methodology of CDA will ensure a holistic analysis of the following data set, as it will become evident in the

following chapters that the quantitative analysis alone cannot adequately map the Europeanization present in the data. However, before the thesis moves on to this analysis, the chapter will begin with an overview of Europeanization in terms of the volume and distribution of Europeanized output across the first case study.


4.31 Evaluating Europeanization in terms of volume of salient articles identified in the data set

With Europeanization recognised as domestic change driven by the process of integration, the first indicators all case studies will assess is the volume and distribution over time of articles with Europeanized output. Articles are identified on the basis of a textual search of key terms in the periods under consideration, these have been run automatically using a number of online archives for all publications, excluding The Sun. The Sun had no online record available for either of the first two case studies. As such it was necessary to simply read all output across both these case studies, this entailed reading 365 newspapers via microfilm archives at the British Library cover to cover. This does open up the research to the risk of human error, however, I was meticulous in my reading and am confident this has had a limited effect on the data set. The key terms are adjusted to reflect the context of any given case study, in 1975 articles were selected on the presence of three key terms within either the title, or the textual body; the terms were, European Economic Community, EEC, or referendum. The referendum took place on the 5th of June, 1975, therefore the window of analysis extended three months either side of this vote. Europeanization at this juncture, in terms of volume and distribution of output, is limited.

On the basis of the key terms 565 articles were identified across the four publications; The Daily Mirror, The Daily Mail, The Daily Express and The Sun. As was addressed in the methodology section of the previous chapter, the case study framework underwriting this research model is situated around 'critical junctures' (Pierson, 2000) in the development of British relations with Europe. This must lead to us to anticipate considerable spikes in coverage of European affairs at these junctures. As such the data sets will inherently produce more focus on European issues than if the model had simply selected random periods. However, media output and European focus in the broader public sphere has a history of being both defined by and structured around "formative moments" (Pierson and Skocpol,

2002). As such, despite any change from the conventional public sphere these moments may drive, their value as data for analysis is clear (Machil et al, 2006: 75-76).

Graph showing volume, and distribution over time, of articles coded in 1975:



Graph 4.a (author's own data): this graph shows the complete number of articles caught in 1975 using the key search terms, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of the referendum on the Thursday 5th of June 1975 (i.e. 05.03.1975-05.09.1975). As such the months of March and September are not complete months, however, this does provide a data set of the complete 6-month period in which the referendum occurs.

The data in Graph 4.a captures the volume of articles with Europeanized content three months either side of the referendum in 1975; it identifies a spike in Europeanized coverage, in line with the expectations laid out above. Once the date for the referendum is set, there is a progressive building of focus in this component of the public sphere. This is mirrored in a comparable growth of interventions and interactions in the public sphere, by the political class. While this is not the focus of the thesis, it is important to recognise (as will be evident in the remainder of the chapter) that media output at this juncture broadly takes its direction, focus and framework for analysis directly from the political class.

While the peak of 170 articles in the month of June, is to be anticipated in light of the referendum driving increased coverage; the more telling feature of this data set is speed and degree to which coverage of European affairs disappears from the public sphere within a week after the referendum. In the three months prior to the referendum until one week after

it (06.03.1975 to 12.06.1975) the data set identified 509 salient articles. In the subsequent three months this falls to just 54 articles, a drop of 89.4%. Substantive Europeanization, at this juncture, is only evident in the build up to the referendum. Once the vote has been had, and the mandate secured, there is no sustained European focus. The Media do not reflect the increasing salience of integration. However, as has been addressed, output broadly follows the discourse of the political class, and thus must be understood in terms of the “elites-public gap” (Herranz-Surralles, 2012) and the aversion to politicize the European question. This will be returned to later in the thesis.

Graph 4.a clearly supports Trenz’s assertion, as discussed in the literature review, that substantive coverage of European issues is “ephemeral” (Trenz, 2004: 305). What is evident from this data, is that whatever the substance of European coverage, it is not being integrated into the existing framework of domestic political output; it remains event based and outside existing national political cleavages.

4.32 Understanding the findings of the Separation Scale

The separation scale was constructed to code and map media output of Anglo-European relations and British membership of the European project. It is a scale specifically to map and measure the construction of, and engagement with relations and interactions (between the UK and the EU) as presented within the texts under consideration’ (see appendix for full scale). The ‘separation scale’ is focused solely on Anglo-European relations, and British membership of the European Economic Community (latterly the EU), as they are covered in British tabloid output. This scale does **not** engage with supranational aims, values and institutions directly, only coding national concerns, perspectives and preferences.

It is this scale that identifies a high-watermark in positive tabloid output on British membership; the ‘separation scale’ for the first cast study codes the highest level of positive coverage, across all data sets.


The ‘separation scale’ provides for the coding of a range of values, focused on how British membership of the European project, and Anglo-European relations are relayed in tabloid output. The value structures identified in the data are classified into five categories ranging

from normative support to normative rejection: 'absolute unity' (2) offers unconditional support for British membership, and views Anglo-European relations as premised on common heritage and values; 'conditional unity' (1) offers conditional support contingent upon material benefits tied to the process of integration, and views Anglo-European relations in broadly positive, but functional terms; 'neutrality' (0) codes articles that entail no normative or material judgement on British membership; 'detachment' (-1) does not view the UK as part of continental Europe, however, it recognises limited interdependence, but does not accept membership or Anglo-European relations extending beyond material or economic terms; 'divorce' (-2) is highly critical of British membership and the status of Anglo-European relations, seeks to promote a break with current terms irrelevant of form, conceiving of Europe as 'alien' or 'other', promoting visceral normative attacks on British participation and those that promote it, concluding 'divorce' (Brexit) is the only tenable solution. (See Methodology Chapter for complete breakdown)

As noted, it is the 'separation scale' that identifies a high-watermark in 1975 in terms of positive tabloid out on British membership. No other data set identifies media output displaying this level of support for the process of integration, but what form does this take? And does this enable collective learning regarding this process?

4.33 Positive and Neutral Coverage of British Membership

Graph showing the findings of the 'separation scale' of all articles for all publications in 1975:



Graph 4.b (author's own data): this graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications combined, along the 'separation scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1975. The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding European integration from a domestic perspective indicating preferences toward British membership.

This graph shows distribution across the separation scale for the 565 articles coded in 1975, indicating a clear and coherent value structure is evident in tabloid output regarding British membership and Anglo-European relations. As Graph 4.b indicates, 43% of all output coded for this case study meets the criteria for positive coverage, this represents the most positive public sphere recorded throughout the research. This is a significant finding, and helps us to understand the degree of public support for British membership evident in the 1975 referendum. However, we need to understand the form this coverage takes as this will actually serve to limit engagement in the public sphere – rather than open debate regarding the process of integration. This will entail discussion of the coding itself, as well as critical discourse analysis of representative discourse and recurrent themes or narratives.

4.41 'Absolute Unity':

'Absolute Unity' (2) codes unconditional support regarding British membership of the European project. This is premised upon shared heritage, values, inherent interests and a possible perception of a common destiny. Articles may include output that crosses coding

criteria, in this case the dominant, or most recurrent framing of output is coded. 'Absolute Unity' may refer to tangible implications, but the overarching frame will entail normative or emotive language, and imply or explicitly state opponents of British membership are wholly misguided, if not malign or conspiratorial (this ensures symmetry of the scales that will be essential in later case studies). Eight percent of the 565 articles in this data set met these criteria and were coded for 'absolute unity'.

The first case study also coded the least variation between publications, which will be addressed below, but indicates further the degree to which mainstream discourse from the political class defines the terms of engagement evident in tabloid output. The Daily Mirror, which will present something of an anomaly throughout the research (as the only left-wing tabloid) offers more coverage (in relative terms) meeting the criteria for 'complete unity' than its right-wing counter parts, with 13% of its output in 1975 framing integration in these terms.

Heath was ardently pro-European at this juncture, defending the need for integration in both material and normative terms. His emotive and impassioned defence of European integration, or more specifically the need for Britain to assume its role in it, in the Foreign Affairs piece and his Premiership, continues throughout the referendum campaign. Despite its partisan affiliation (to Labour), which will go on structure future output regarding Europe, The Daily Mirror covers Heath in favourable terms, accepting all he claims and critiquing any detractors.

It would be an "act of madness" to pull out of the Common Market, the Mirror agrees; Britain still has a "high reputation for honest dealing, but anti-Marketeers [are] asking us to throw that all away", if the anti-Marketeers succeed "it will not be a day of national independence, but a day of national disaster" (Mirror, 26.04.1975).

The Mirror's coverage is equally deferential to Harold Wilson, praising him for indicating his and Britain's commitment to the community is now "total" (Mirror, 17.07.1975). If there was any equivocation, the Mirror addresses this in a series of editorials; "The Mirror agrees with Harold Wilson...in the world of 1975 it makes no sense for Britain to go it alone" (Mirror, 28.04.1975). As indicated, the Mirror coverage codes more 'absolute unity' (2) than its right-wing counter parts at this juncture (in relative terms), and will remain the most consistently

positive publication in its coverage of integration across the 40 years under consideration. However, it is also the least likely to provide coverage of European issues, 19.1% of the data set comes from the Mirror, with all other publications capturing more data. The right-wing publications are inherently more likely to cover Europe. This is only the first example of this phenomenon, that will be recurrently evident throughout the case studies. As such, it merits explicit statement being the earliest evidence of this structural feature of the Europeanization of tabloid media output – publications most likely cover European integration in the most positive terms, are at the same time those least likely to cover integration at all.

‘Absolute Unity’ (2) is also evident in all other publications across the data set. This is the only time the data recorded such positive coverage across all publications, in the data set. The Daily Express, which will, in the final case study, launch a crusade against the EU, is at this juncture not remotely critical of the scope and depth of integration. An editorial offers support for “Wilson’s date with destiny” (Express, 10.03.1975), however, we do see the emergence of partisan framing in the right-wing publications despite their positive coverage of integration itself. Partisan engagement will go on to be a defining structure of the Europeanization of the public sphere in later case studies, so it is of value to note its emergence at juncture.

Structures that define Europeanized discourse in the future, are already evident (if limited). The Express backs Wilson but derides the “sham of the renegotiations by Labour” (Express, 12.03.1975). This is an inherent recognition that negotiations are primarily a face-saving exercise, for the purposes of domestic consumption, most notably among Labour party members. Such comment is insightful, however, there is no further engagement with this. This contributes to the notion of ‘missed chances’ addressed in the literature review (Denman, 1995); had coverage of domestic political actors been subject to further critique, it could have contributed to popular understanding. However, this output from the Express was an outlier and did not reflect wider discourse evident in 1975.

As noted in the methodology chapter, ‘absolute unity’ also codes for the dismissal (in highly pejorative terms) of opponents and their claims. This is another emerging structural feature, evident in this case study, that will continue throughout the research; derogatory dismissal of opponents and alternative perspectives is widespread. Callaghan is “jeered” for his criticism

of the EEC (Sun, 10.04.1975), Powell is the subject of “heavy scorn” (Express, 11.04.1975), while Benn is the subject of the most sustained personal attacks and critiques. It is interesting to offer a direct comparison to show the already emerging dichotomy between anti-Marketeers and the political mainstream as they are presented in the public sphere. ‘Absolute Unity’ (2) codes a number of highly normative, emotive and impassioned defences of Britain’s place in Europe, which while not prolific within the data set (as unity accounts for 8% of the first case study) are neither mocked, nor substantively questioned:

“Thirty years ago, today we celebrate V.E. day. The lessons of that war, as of the previous one, was the sheer impossibility of opting out of events across the channel...Tens of millions of people paid for that mistake for their lives...Thirty years of peace are too valuable to be thrown away on the basis of false statistics about jobs and food prices ”(Express, 05.06 1975).

While claims such as this by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in The Daily Express are not the discursive norm (evident only in ‘absolute unity’), this brief passage does much to highlight the authority given to actors supportive of integration. The significance of the personal authority and status of the advocates, and detractors, in the debate over Britain’s place in Europe was central to the public sphere that develops in 1975. Personalities including Wilson, Heath and Jenkins were able to make powerful personal appeals via the media, without adequate scrutiny from journalists, while those on the other side of the argument did not receive such benign coverage within the media. A fine example of the importance of personality (and authority), and the variation in which the various actors are framed, is evident in the in The Sun’s editorial on Why the Sun believes you should Vote Yes, the paper asserts:

“We are not alone in this verdict. It is supported by:

- ***The Prime Minister, And EVERY living ex-Prime Minister.***
- ***The Chancellor of the Exchequer, and EVERY living ex-Chancellor.***
- ***The Foreign Secretary. And EVERY living ex-Home Secretary.”***

(emphasis in the original)

This clearly indicates that those making the case for integration are presented as respected and knowledgeable figures of authority; figures whom the public can trust and who it would be advisable to base one’s own ideas upon. However, it is the conception and framing of the

anti-Marketeers that is most telling in regard to this analysis and its ramifications for an open debate:

“No one runs Britain, but the British. So why listen to the desperate men who want us to be afraid of the rest of Europe?”

What is their angle anyway?

What have Citizen Benn and Brigadier Enoch and the Communist Party and the racist National Front got in common?

The answer is simple. And sad. They are frustrated. They are bitter. They are demagogues. They rant and rave while better men reason.”

(emphasis in the original)

(Sun, 04.06.1975)


Aside from the only Left-wing tabloid under consideration (The Daily Mirror), such pejorative presentation of the Market’s detractors is consistent across publications. Those who support integration are relayed as respectable, informed and reasoned, in short, they are constructed as actors with authority. Benn, who raised a range of valid critiques of the process of integration, and recognised the negative relationship between this process and national competence and the traditional notions of sovereignty, is mocked. He is categorized alongside the Communists and Nationalist, he is derided as a populist, and dismissed as irrational. While such coverage is evidently pro-European and is conducted in normative terms meeting the criteria for ‘absolute unity, it does little to facilitate deliberation or drive collective learning regarding integration. Concerns that will become staple in the emergence of later Eurosceptic discourse, are at this juncture, in essence laughed out of the public sphere. This will contribute to the development of rallying points around which objection to integration develop.

4.42 ‘Conditional unity’:

‘conditional unity’ (1) avoids the concepts of destiny or emotive attacks highlighted above, rather it presents the relationship between the UK and the EEC in functional terms. It

supports sustained British membership but justifies it on a material basis. As such, the subsequent discussion of data and critical discourse analysis will be focused on economic or realpolitik frames and discourse. ‘conditional unity’ represents the most prolific value-based perspective (inherently excluding ‘neutrality’) coding criteria for this case study. However, the thesis needs to unpack this data set, to assess variation, framing and recurrent discourse.

Graph showing the findings of the ‘conflict scale’ for all articles for all publications in 1975:



Graph 4.c (author’s own data): this graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications, along the ‘separation scale’ as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1975. The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding European integration from a domestic perspective indicating preferences toward British membership. This data remains divided by publication indicating the degree of variation or consistency between tabloids.

Graph 4.c indicates the degree of consistency across publications in 1975, there is mild variation. However, irrelevant of right-wing or left-wing preferences tabloid output is widely positive and broadly consistent, with the vast majority coding for ‘conditional unity’ (1) or ‘neutrality’ (0).

In regard to ‘conditional unity’ (1), the importance of authority remains as evident as it was in the discussion of ‘absolute unity’ (2). The majority of output continues to follow the leadership and narrative of the political class. In practice this translates into the case for British membership being conducted in very limited terms. With regard to Britain’s place in

Europe this equates to a primary focus upon arguments framed in terms of the risks of departure, rather than the benefits of membership. The Express' coverage of the anti-Marketeers plan for a British exit published in April 1975 is a telling example, this not only highlights all that has been addressed above regarding personality but draws into sharp focus these narrow terms. The published plan for an exit is initially decried as "misleading propaganda" before the article moves address the risk of the unknown:

"Leaving Europe could not be done with speed, ease and comfort, Mr. Jenkins said. To pretend it could be anything other than a messy and damaging process was a dangerous illusion. 'At a most critical period for our economy we would enter a long tunnel of trading chaos and confusion'"

(*'Shambles to pull out, says Jenkins'*, 23.04.1975, Express)

As this passage indicates, the focus is clearly placed on what Britain may lose in the case of a 'No' vote, rather than the benefits that derive from membership. In essence such negative arguments in favour of membership are not surprising at a time of such domestic economic difficulty (see above), but fail to defend membership outside the context of current externalities or offer a more rounded defence of integration.

This was not unique to the press, nor one side of the argument, however, it served to undermine a more complete engagement with the complex issues at stake when considering British membership; "prices, income levels and economic security dominated" (Steed, 1977: 131). This framing of the case for integration, and the construction of arguments and actors in favour of a 'yes' vote was consistent across publications. The Sun relayed an assessment by Which magazine in favour of sustained membership premised on economic rationale, without any critique; "we are giving you the facts you can use to make up your own mind". The article uses the assessment of Which to "[urge] people to vote 'yes' in the referendum (The Sun, 08.05.1975), without offering any balance or critique from an alternate perspective. The Daily Mail lauds "our £35 million market profit" offering a notable warning against the risks of losing further capital gains, or jeopardising economic recovery (Mail, 06.05.1975). Furthermore, in the reporting of negative economic news, such as the sterling falling to "new lows", the Mail is careful to avoid speculation regarding any relationship between the increased relative inflation and accession (Mail, 12.06.75). There is a

consistency in terms of narrative, and discourse across publications that is telling, entailing a limited narrative, a primacy of economic concerns, and omission of alternative perspectives or critiques.

It is apparent that the political dimensions to integration, and the substantive ideational considerations that emerge as salient by the time of second case study are widely avoided; in essence the campaign is conducted in the form of lowest common denominator. As George insightfully indicates “the media also played their part in trivialising the campaign, they focused primarily... ‘the familiar bread and butter issues’ ...(as the other issues noted above were) complex, and difficult to deal with in a manner deemed appropriate to the readership of the more popular newspapers” (George, 1990: 93).

This trivialisation and negative coverage may have galvanized support for integration in the short term, but as was noted in the previous discussion of Historical institutionalism there is often a limited relationship between short term aims and long terms consequences; “long term institutional consequences are often a bi-product of actions taken for short term political reasons” (Pierson, 1998: 38). As Denman wrote in 1995, the history of UK-EU relations, is a history of “missed chances” (Denman, 1995). Had the longer-term implications, and the arguments for integration been framed in more positive terms a precedent would have been established; instead debate was stifled, and alternative perspectives mocked.

The Daily Mail offers a number of expansive editorials “warning” against isolation of the anti-Marketeers, asserting anti-integration perspectives are “nothing more than a farce” (Mail, 14.03.1975). The paper supports all government warnings in a “direct challenge to the anti-Marketeers and their protests”, accepting it will be a “disaster to quit the market” (Mail, 29.03.1975), and revels in the collapse of alternative perspectives; as “Benn’s anti-market coup is crushed” (Mail, 01.05.1975). This mocking dismissal of anti-Marketeers is closely related to the issues of authority and personality addressed above. The Sun claims “we must stay in” in a piece that paints Wilson in terms of reverence, while dismissing valid concerns from Benn (Sun, 08.04.1975). Benn along with other critics of integration are mocked even in name, referred to as “Wedgie” (example see Sun 21.05.1975, but evident in all publications); such framing undermines authority even before any substantive argument can be made. This rhetorical dismissal of counter arguments, and almost blind acceptance of material claims in

favour of integration offers compelling parallels to the structure of the public sphere that developed around the referendum in 2016, simply reversing the orientation of media output.

A telling example is the claim by Deputy Prime Minister Edward Short who claimed that a 'no' vote would return Britain to "war-time type rationing" (Mail, 05.06.1975), instead of challenging this hyperbolic claim the Mail accepts it without question. This claim was made the day before the referendum, it clearly served a political function exaggerating the material risk of a 'no' vote. This claim went unchallenged across tabloid coverage. While 'project fear' served as a rhetorical device to shut down critical debate in 2016, the combination of authority, uncritical acceptance, and outright dismissal of critique served a comparable function in 1975.

4.44 'Neutrality':

'Neutral' (0) output is understood as expressing no clear preference regarding British membership of the European Economic Community. This accounts for 44% of output, and while that might appear to contribute to a balanced public sphere, qualitative analysis of this data indicated that was not the case. While this coding matrix can record highly-engaged coverage that presents a plurality of perspectives, without giving one, or the other preference; it also codes limited-engagement, that is agnostic or ambivalent regarding the process of integration such as referendum may lead to (General) "election soon" (Sun, 15.04.1975), or statements and coverage that display no preference such as "choice of dates set for market date" (Express, 07.03.1975) or "no vote for exiles" (British migrants living abroad) (Mail, 23.04.1975).

This coding scheme also highlighted the use of European issues in framing domestic preferences and partisan perspectives. Given that this research is primarily considering right-wing tabloids, a critical perspective toward the Labour party is to be anticipated. While Wilson is covered in favourable terms, a majority of the 'neutrality' coded in output from the right-wing publications is actually negative coverage of the Labour party, the Labour movement and actors or issues associated with it. As such these articles contain at least one of the key terms indicated above, however, integration is not the primary focus of the piece,

and a clear preference cannot be defined. This includes attacks on Unions and the Left of the Labour party such as demand to “get tough on pay” (Mail, 09.06.1975), or a “dressing down for the anti-market men” (Sun, 03.06.75). Equally this critical coverage of Labour is primarily framed around domestic (non-European) concerns, with the key search terms only raising integration as a peripheral consideration within these articles - as such it does not meet the criteria for any of the other coding schemes. This explains, why the Mirror codes as the least neutral at this juncture. As such ‘neutrality’ does not, in this data set, serve to promote collective learning, rather it promotes partisan perspectives and indicates the actual degree of substantive Europeanization of the public sphere in 1975, was far less pronounced than the data set above initially suggested.

4.45 Negative Coverage of British Membership

As displayed in the Graph 4.c, just 13% of the 565 articles coded for this data set were critical regarding the British membership. It is worth noting at the outset that a quarter of negative output coded is anti-integration adverts placed by anti-marketeers, this was not addressed in the last section as it was so insignificant in relation to the volume of positive output, it was not considered salient; that is no longer the case. Negative output is clearly dwarfed by the positive coverage analysed above and supports the assessment of this case study as a high water-mark in terms of positive coverage. Given these criteria coded just 76 articles this section will offer a more succinct analysis of these findings, this will be sufficient to support the assessment of under-engagement and an imbalanced tabloid component to the public sphere.

4.46 ‘Detachment’:

‘Detachment’ (-1) codes output that again views the relationship in functional terms, however it is critical of these terms as they stand. It distinguishes Britain from Europe, and notions of mainland unity, however, it may recognise a degree of interdependence or the potential benefits of liberalisation but only on specific, often preferential, at times unrealistic terms. ‘detachment’ coded 7% of the output for this case study.

These criteria code a limited number of articles where claims from anti-Marketeters are given space within the public sphere without being mocked or dismissed in the same piece (although they are often critiqued in another piece within the same publication). “Joblessness will rise if we stay in the EEC” sees the Mail cover a “warning” from 4 (anti-Marketeer) cabinet ministers. The claims of the four ministers, Peter Shore, Barbara Castle, Anthony Benn and John Silken are accurately relayed; “We warn the British people will be faced with mass unemployment, worsening inflation, de-industrialisation, and working people will have to leave Britain to find jobs” (Mail, 05.05.1975). However, it is salient to note that while actors and claims that are pro-integration are widely presented in terms of authority, or with comment from the publications serving to support their perspectives, this is not the case for negative output.

There are also articles that do present the claims of anti-marketeters as their primary focus, and as such meet the criteria for ‘detachment’, however, they undermine the claims in the same piece. The Sun covers a series of critical claims by Anthony Benn, which address a range of tangible negative implications for the UK, however it is presented as “Wedgie launches one-man war” and dismisses him as a lone radical in the summary (Sun, 16.05.1975). Leading anti-marketeer, Douglas Jay’s claim that Wilson’s renegotiation “had changed nothing” (Mirror, 09.04.1975) is a valid and now recognised analysis (see above), however, the Mirror dismisses his analysis in final sentence of the article claiming he would “have continued to oppose the Market membership whatever the terms”. This analysis makes clear, not only are critical claims a minority perspective, they are never afforded authority comparable to those promoting a ‘yes’ vote.

Materially framed negative output when it does appear without counter critique, or attacks on the authority of those making the claims, is limited to less salient concerns. This is coverage that is unlikely to have a significant or substantive implication for public opinion; “sugar levy” may put the British jam “manufacturers at a disadvantage against their Common Market competitors” (Mail, 05.05.1975); “anger over (cheap) French eggs...was the dominant issue yesterday among poultry farmers” (Mail, 08.05.1975); or the “fishing issues” (Express, 07.06.1975). This output can be widely categorised as low salience and as such does not have comparable impact with the positive coverage analysed above. With each level of analysis, tabloid output reveals less balance and a greater dearth of perspectives.

4.47 'Divorce':

'Divorce' (-2) is the final criteria for the 'separation scale' and codes negative emotive or normative coverage and claims. 'divorce' explicitly advocates a complete separation of relations with European integration, viewing the process as entirely incompatible with notions of sovereignty and democracy. 'divorce' codes 6% of data set.


These criteria code a number of highly pejorative claims regarding the "the 'capitalist' Common Market" (Express, 01.04.1975). This discourse must be placed within the 'socialist' ideology of the Labour party and movement, which views capitalism as a major threat to state itself. As such, there are a number of emotive claims regarding the risk integration presents. Benn claims the "Market (is a) threat to socialist Britain" (Mail, 11.04.1975) in a scathing attack on what integration would mean for Labour policy competence and ability the legislate its ideals. The validity of this claim is not salient in terms of analysis here, Benn's claims constitute the dominant framing of the article, and as such it meets the criteria for 'divorce'. However, as is to be anticipated all the right-wing publications are unreserved in their support of capitalism, as was the case with some detached coverage, claims are undermined within the articles. Benn's claims, while broadly covered are succinctly dismissed as "startling" and representative of the "rebellious left-wing" (Mail, 11.04.1975).

'Socialism' itself is relayed as something of dirty word. In one of the few pieces authored by Benn himself asserts, "We have lost our national independence and the European dream has turned into a nightmare" (Express 04.06.1975), going onto argue integration is simply a vehicle for the interests of big business, wholly incompatible with the socialist ideals of the Labour party. That this article is presented without commentary, is a positive regarding a plurality of perspectives. However, in a satirical cartoon of Benn sat directly above the article, equivalent in size to the article itself, socialism is derided for its inability to provide meaningful choice. Once again, negative coverage of European integration is undermined, balance does not exist in this data set.

4.5 Understanding the findings of the Conflict Scale

The conflict scale was constructed to analyse the other dimension of the integration process, while 'separation' assessed coverage of the consequences of integration for the UK, 'conflict' will assess coverage of the supranational dimension. The 'conflict scale' codes supranational aims, actors, and institutions as they are constructed in tabloid coverage. As such, its exclusive focus is on supranational considerations, and output focused on the EEC itself, its aspirations, ideals and agency. This division of scales allows the research to identify, map and analyse divergence in the construction and coverage of, national and supranational, phenomenon as evident in tabloid output.

Graph showing the findings of the 'conflict scale' for all articles for all publications in 1975:



Graph 4.d (author's own data): this graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications combined, along the 'conflict scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1975. The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions perspective indicating preferences toward the supranational dimension of integration.

As this scale is focused exclusively on supranational issues, we can anticipate divergence from the findings of the 'separation scale'. Graph 4.d immediately indicates less preference regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions. 'neutrality' appears, at first inspection, to have assumed the dominant frame. However, upon greater inspection and critical

discourse analysis it is evident this is not the case. It is also equally clear that positive coverage once again outweighs negative. Nevertheless, divergence between positive and negative coverage has reduced significantly (in comparison to the previous scale), with positive output now accounting for less than a fifth of the data set. As with the previous scale, we need to understand what this means in practice and how reflective these findings are of Europeanization of British tabloid media output.

4.51 Positive and Neutral Coverage of Supranational Aims, Actors and Institutions

The following section will outline the findings of the 'conflict scale', with regard to the positive and neutral output in the data set. This section draws into focus the narrow engagement with, and limited focus on, the supranational dimensions to the process of regional integration, in British tabloid output at this juncture. This data reveals a further dearth of engagement, and limitations in terms of perspectives. These findings will contribute to the mapping of a structural pattern of Europeanized discourse, that would have negative implications for public understandings.

4.52 'Active support':

'Active support' (2) codes ideological or normative support for the aims, actors and institutions of European integration. Throughout the case study this will prove the least prolific coding scheme. Even at this high water-mark in terms of positive coverage, just 12 articles code for 'active support'. This is indicative of a clear pattern of divergence evident between the two scales. All 'active support' records emotive, impassioned or historically framed defences or promotions of integration and how Europe should relate given its history of conflict and violence, but such framing is anomalous.

William Hamilton offers the most telling example of a perspective defined by this history of conflict, and how Europe ought to ensure such conflict is never again possible at a continental level in an article entitled 'An end to all war':

“The last two wars were caused by fears, hatred, and ‘suspicion’ s, and Europe has moved to prevent future conflicts by merging their differences and suppressing their fears. It is far more important than butter and mutton prices...I believe we can transform the Market and Western Europe”.

(Sun, 27.05.1975)


This brief passage encapsulates ‘active support’ and reflects the discourse evident in the other 11 articles coded as such. It draws into sharp focus the pain of European conflict and the need to work toward common values. However, this accounts for such a small proportion of the data coded in 1975, it cannot be considered to have a substantive effect on the public sphere in any broader sense. This highly emotive and impassioned discourse represents a clear anomaly in 1975.

While every publication contains at least one article meeting these criteria, as ‘active support’ accounts for just 2% of the of the data set – such a perspective must be recognised as a minority position, and such limited output will not have a sustained or lasting impact on the public sphere. ‘active support’ does not really exist as an explanation of, or belief in a supranational level of governance. Rather this rhetoric must be recognised as relatively unique, and cannot be expected to having long-term implications for the Europeanization of British discourse.

4.53 ‘Passive support’:

‘Passive support’ (1), runs parallel to ‘conditional unity’, it frames support for supranational aims, actors and institutions in functional terms. As such support is tied to performance and material improvement, while it avoids all discussion of the beliefs Hamilton outlined above. What requires highlighting with regard to the scale, comparable to negative coverage on the previous scale – paid adverts account for 20% of all output coded on for ‘passive support’, indicating again lower levels of Europeanization than the data might initially suggest.

Graph showing the findings of the ‘conflict scale’ of all articles for all individual publications in 1975:



Graph 4.e (author’s own data) this graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications, along the ‘separation scale’ as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1975. The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions perspective indicating preferences toward the supranational dimension of integration. This data remains divided by publication indicating the degree of variation or consistency between tabloids.

Graph 4.e highlights the sustained consistency across publications along the ‘conflict scale’, with the left-wing tabloid, the Daily Mirror, showing limited divergence with its right-wing counterparts. This divergence is not entirely out of sync with the other publications, but it does reflect a higher degree of ‘passive support’ from The Mirror, in relative terms. This is broadly reflective of more coverage of Wilson and pro-Market cabinet members offering public comment on supranational aims, actors and concerns. Once again, it is clear that coverage of supranational issues is broadly contingent on domestic actors for a presence in the national public sphere. Furthermore, the significance of the political class in defining the focus of the sphere in 1975 is evident.

The data set codes a number of claims regarding the consequences of interactions at a supranational level; the majority of these engagements are again rejections of negative claims. “Premier Harold Wilson set out to explode the myth of cheap food outside the Common Market” attacking claims by anti-Marketeers and asserting rejection of integration

means “accepting risk” (Mirror, 11.03.1975). This is coded on the conflict scale as it frames the issues at a supranational level, as opposed to an exclusive focus on national impact. Again, however, we see the same structural impediment to positive coverage as identified on the last scale. While the Mirror is most likely to offer positive output, it is least likely to offer coverage. This remains a feature of tabloid output throughout the research.

Coverage from right-wing tabloids follows the broad structure for engagement identified above. It is defined by output from the political class. The majority of output codes a rejection of negative claims, either following the lead of pro-Market actors, or provides dismissal of anti-Marketees. The outlier to this structure is positive coverage of the achievements of Wilsons negotiation, and its future impact on supranational aims, actors and institutions; Wilson has ensured “better Market” after “days of bargaining” (Sun, 12.03.1975). However, as evident throughout this scale, while this may be positive, it lacks substantive engagement with what ‘better’ means. As such we see the emergence of a pattern that defines this scale, coverage remains under-engaged, it may display a preference, but lacks substantive discussion – as such it cannot contribute to collective learning.

The Daily Mail dismisses a series of “myths” by anti-Marketees regarding the trade within the Market (Mail, 21.04.1975). The Express rejects negative claims regarding what market membership means for food security; “The EEC is self-sufficient (in terms of food)” (Express, 29.04.1975). The Sun dismisses a series of pejorative claims from anti-Marketees regarding the costs of integration, asserting it provides “benefits for us all” (all member states) (Sun, 28.05.1975). As such this scale indicates any Europeanization of the public sphere is limited, under-engaged and broadly dependent on the national political class.

4.54 ‘Neutrality’:

The most telling findings produced by the ‘conflict scale’ emerge in the coding of ‘neutrality’ – which initially sought to code for balanced coverage. However, in the process of coding it became apparent that a complete mirror of the previous scale would not be suited to coding of the supranational dimension. If articles could not be placed on the ‘separation scale’ they were omitted from the data set, but it quickly became apparent that while a national focus was to be expected, the majority of tabloid output offered no engagement with

supranational aims, actors and institutions. As such 'neutrality' (0) was divided into sub-categories, neutral engagement, under-engagement and non-engagement (coverage with no mention of supranational concerns). Non-engagement accounted for 60% of the data set. As such it is not possible to talk of 'neutrality' as a defining trait of the public sphere, in terms of coverage of supranational aims, actors and institutions. Rather, the data set reflects a substantive supranational deficit.

The data evident from CDA indicates a defining absence of the supranational issues in the national public sphere. A clear majority of media coverage has no coverage of the EEC directly, its aims, or those who represent it. This indicates both that tabloid media have not recognised this dimension as salient, and the political class have not driven adequate focus on this dimension. This evident deficit has direct implications for Meyer's conditions for legitimate governance, it will not foster perceptions of accountability or responsiveness, understood as prerequisites to popular legitimacy (Meyer, 2009). As supranational structures, agency or aspirations are widely absent from this component of the public sphere in 1975, no accountability can develop, nor can any substantive evidence of responsiveness be found, finally we can anticipate very little contribution to collective learning in light of such a deficit.

4.55 Negative Coverage of Supranational Aims, Actors and Institutions

At this juncture, negative coverage on the 'conflict scale' accounts for 10% of coverage. It broadly follows the structures identified in the negative output on the previous scale, distinguished by a supranational rather than a national focus. It is primarily defined by claims from anti-marketers; however, these claims are again broadly presented in manner that serves to limit their authority.

We see an increase in coverage of more peripheral actors, Enoch Powell emerges as something of a figure of ridicule, attacking the Market as the first step in the creation of "European superstate" (Sun, 04. 05.1975) which makes member states "passive prisoners" however, he is widely dismissed as a "renegade" (Mirror, 03.06.1975), or some variant on extreme. Powell and Benn's concerns regarding federal aspirations and the loss of

sovereignty are briefly touched upon in the Sun, such concerns should be recognised as genuine and afforded appropriate column inches. However, the coverage of their concerns amounts to two small paragraphs, after a separate article on the same page approximately eight times the length addressing “Will Harold be the first to vote yes?”. The article on Benn and Powell concludes they are “fearmongers” (Sun, 10.03.1975). These are the prime examples of **‘overt objection’ (-2)**, raising larger ideational concerns with regard to supranational aims, actors and institutions.

‘Overt objection’ codes output that frames the supranational institutions and aims of European integration, as a direct threat to sovereignty and independence of member states. This coding matrix identified the first use of the term ‘Eurocrat’, in an article relaying a claim from Benn; “Eurocrats are ‘lying in wait’ warns Benn” (Mail, 14.04.1975). The warning from Benn claims supranational actors are planning to “ambush” members states. The use of the rhetorical device ‘Eurocrats’ is unique at this juncture, but will go on to become prolific. This rhetoric is at odds with Meyer’s concepts of responsiveness, accountability and authorization (Meyer, 1999). The framing of European actors and bureaucrats in these terms, constructs a foreign threat to ideational and normative concepts of the nation state. While ‘overt objection’ codes just 2% of data set in 1975, we can see the emergence of rhetoric that will go on to become central Eurosceptic to objections in the future.

‘Conflict’ is very limited in 1975, but its emergence in 1975 precludes a gradual and progressive normalisation over subsequent decades. As Wilson had sought to construct ‘conflict’ to accrue domestic political capital, anti-Marketees follow suit. Benn viewed the Market as a direct “threat” (Mail, 11.04.1975) to the independence of member states. Enoch Powell asserts he will never “give up the fight” (Sun, 04.05.1975), and integration will be the “death” of the nation state (Mirror, 03.06.1975). Douglas Jay attacked the European institutions, asserting their aim was undermine the nation state, warning that member states will “lose our power” (Sun, 28.05.1975). Peter Shore claims that the malign European actors have “tricked” (Mirror, 02.06.1975) the British government. These examples of ‘overt objection’ illuminate a more normative, ideational and emotive dimension to the integration debate that was broadly absent from the findings above. If the public debate around the referendum had been widely opened to engage with these Eurosceptic but salient concerns, the debate may have taken a different path, and made a more substantive contribution to

collective learning. However, 'overt objection' accounts for just 12 articles in the whole data set and as such the aggregate effect on the public sphere is negligible.

'**Suspicion**' (-1) frames the risk of supranational aims, actors and institutions in less polemic terms, focused instead on the material costs and economic implications. 'suspicion' coded 43 articles or 8% of the data set. Benn remains central to these critical perspectives, with a number of materially frame critiques of supranational actors and institutions such as claims the "ECC can grab our oil" (Sun, 14.04.1975) and "joblessness will rise...in the EEC" (Mail, 05.05.1975). However, Benn and other marker detractors are again subject to recurrent dismissal in the same articles their claims are relayed and elsewhere. Claims of his regarding the implications of supranational integration for trade, employment standards and remuneration, and policy competence are dismissed as an "outburst" (Express, 04.06.1975). There is limited negative discussion of "how much" integration will cost member states, and "how to" maintain trade relations with the wider world inside the Common Market (Sun, 12.03.1975). Critical perspectives (or that of those advocating such perspectives) again suffer from limited authority as a consequence of framing. A series of valid material criticisms of the EEC by Benn is succinctly dismissed by the Sun; "Wedgie launches one-man war" (Sun, 16.05.1975). Shirley Williams criticism of EEC market tariffs on food imports is equally dismissed as "Shirley talking nonsense on prices" (Sun, 31.05.1975). Such framing of critique is not surprising at this juncture, as media output broadly follows and supports the government narrative and rejects overtly critical perspectives, however, with regard to Meyer's criteria for the development of legitimacy: responsiveness, accountability, and authorization (Meyer, 1999), it fails to provide a meaningful or lasting contribution.

The only article in the set that did not, in the same piece, challenge the authority of the claimant was a piece covering Benn's critical claims regarding the centralised Commission control of energy production and resources, and its implications for member states. The Sun relays Benn's critical claims regarding the "Common Market's Brussels Commission" (Sun, 14.04.1975) concerned with the centralisation of competence without comment. This is a positive in terms of a plurality of perspectives. However, the whole piece is less than 100 words, and was printed in such small text, that the micro film was difficult to read. 'suspicion' does provide critical perspectives on supranational actors, aims and institutions, however,

these are limited in terms of volume and authority. With each further level of analysis, the tabloid component of the public sphere becomes less balanced.

4.6 Europeanized Public Spheres

Having addressed the empirical findings of this case study, the chapter will offer a brief overview of comparable public spheres in Germany and France, in the same period, to assess if these findings represent a fundamental difference either in terms of degree or substance. This research did not have the resources to undertake comparable coding of other European public spheres, however, it can briefly assess some key components of comparable salient spheres. As the chapter above has identified, the British public sphere primarily followed the substance and focus of elite political discourse for its framing and construction of Europe and European integration at this juncture. It is equally evident that Europeanized discourse in other national public spheres was heavily conditioned by elite political direction; the spheres of Germany and France have some defining characteristics that highlight a degree of divergence from their British equivalent.

In the previous chapter there was a brief discussion of the priority of European reconciliation among Germany policy makers, and the use of discourse among the political class to develop a supranational component to national identity (Banchoff, 1999). There is a clear and evident gulf between post-war discourses emanating from British political elites, and their German counter parts, both of which feed into respective public spheres and subsequent ideational developments.

Haas identified Europeanized discourse in Christian Democratic Union rhetoric that is distinct from the findings of the 'conflict scale' laid out above; identifying a "dedication to European unity as a means of redemption for past German sins... (as playing) ...a crucial ideological role" (Haas, 1958: 127). This highlights not only the importance of a historical perspective in understanding ideational developments and national responses to the European project, but the importance of elite discourse in providing leadership in a Europeanized context. Haas' assessment precedes the first data set by 17 years; however, it remains valid.

This elite perspective and consequential discourse remained a defining feature of the German public sphere, “from the 1960s on, a federalist consensus prevailed among German political elites” (Risse, 2002: 10). Post-war ideology was heavily coloured by the horrors of the Two World Wars, “the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the Treaty of Rome (1957) marked a decisive break with the destructive balance of power politics of the past” (Banchoff, 1997: 63). The consensus “outlasted” various changes in government, from the 1960s way past the passage of Maastricht (Risse, 2002: 10). This dominant ideology framed the German public sphere for decades, and represents a notable divergence with the elite discourse as evident in post-war Britain though to accession and beyond.

While elite political discourse, and the public sphere that develops from it, in the UK was pro-integration it broadly avoided identity and history. There are clearly examples (as identified above) where this is not the case, so it would be premature to talk of absolute British exceptionalism. However, there is a gulf in the degree and scope of such framing. It is not possible to talk of historical, normative or ideational frames as dominant in the UK, while in Germany such discourse has assumed a primacy that distinguishes it from the empirical findings of this chapter. Normative or ideational discourse would go on to affect notions of identity and bears a strong relationship to exclusive versus inclusive notions of identity. While the UK will see the growth of exclusive ideational framing in subsequent data sets and discourse, Germany developed an inclusive, or multi-dimensional notion of identity in the same period; directly tied to leadership in terms of elite political discourse (Banchoff, 1999). This is closely related to the issue of legitimacy opened up in the first chapter; authority is a subjective and constructed notion. Meyer indicated that the development of legitimacy is unlikely without the sustained perceived authorization of structures or agents of governance (Meyer, 1999). While supranational authority is repeatedly constructed and re-enforced in German political discourse, such discourse is exceptional and an anomaly in the British public sphere in 1975.

In France, rhetoric, discourse and ideational developments are distinct from Germany, but do share some crucial similarities. French discourse must also be understood with reference to a historical perspective. The degree of French loss and destruction of French cities and defences, twice within three decades, heavily coloured post-war policy preferences and

political discourse. The cost of the World Wars had been evident to all European nations, but the speed and scope of French collapse had drawn into sharp focus the risk European conflict posed to French sovereignty and security. The implications this has for the aims and aspirations of the French political elite are evident in the decades that followed.

Charles De Gaulle founded and led the Fifth Republic of France, following a public plebiscite, and would define the “foundational paradigm for French discourse about Europe” (Schmidt, 2007: 998). In light of the assault on French sovereignty and identity that had occurred during previous conflicts, the above noted German incorporation of a supranational component to national identity was not suited to the French context. Rather, de Gaulle asserted, integration would permit the extension of French identity and preferences at a supranational level. Schmidt shows how De Gaulle’s discourse constructed and re-affirmed a belief that integration “would serve to promote not only French national interest but also French identity, by bringing back French grandeur as it projected France’s universalist values to the rest of Europe” (Schmidt, 2007: 998). The German discursive construction of Europe by the political elite internalised identity concerns, while their French counterparts externalised identity and extended sovereignty. Such discursive strategies are clearly best understood with reference to a historical perspective and despite their evident divergence, they both recognise and address the importance of identity in integrated Europe.

The French perspective which saw Europe as a vehicle for the extension of French identity and sovereignty, drove general support for the strengthening of supranational institutions and extension of supranational competence. This support may have been more limited, at certain junctures, than support emanating from Germany, and reflected continued post-war insecurities, but it did contribute to an ideational coherence and construction that wasn’t evident in the data set above. The ‘Empty Chair crisis’ did represent a temporary deviation from this support, however, if understood as a response to risks to sustained relative French authority in this process, this does not actually represent a major change in ideational concerns, but rather the sustained importance of historical framed insecurities that underwrote such preferences. De Gaulle had some clear reservations regarding the form of integration, evident in his initial efforts to drive change in the institutional framework for integration, but he realised that the EEC was the best opportunity for “creating a French led ‘third way’ for Europe between the superpowers” (Parsons, 2003: 18).

This realisation of changing geo-political dynamics and the need to ensure history wasn't repeated drove a re-appraisal of French preferences, and by extension elite political discourse. While De Gaulle was initially concerned with the importance of foreign policy coordination, placing little value on supranational institutions; preferences and discourse shifted quickly; "the Gaullists defended the EEC as the foundation of French interests in Europe" (Parsons, 2003: 18). By the 1970s, the decade of the first case study, the "French increasingly championed delegations of monetary sovereignty over German and British reticence" (Parsons, 2003: 2). As integration now represents an extension of French sovereignty in ideational terms, this movement toward increased pooled sovereignty is ideologically coherent. This may lead to ideational concerns for France in later years, as divergence between French politics and the "excessive Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism" of Europe becomes starker, but at this juncture extending French sovereignty through integration is effective both as policy and discourse (Schmidt, 2007: 993).

While it is clear that there is national variation between French and German elites' political discourse, there are salient similarities. Both must be understood in light of recent conflict and competition. Both entail an ideational adjustment to account for the process of integration. Both recognise the importance of sovereignty. The response to these commonalities is distinct, but the pressures and realisations behind them are consistent. Elite political discourse and the public sphere that emanates from it in the UK, lacks these commonalities as coherent and consistent components of Europeanized discourse. It is not appropriate to talk about genuine British exceptionalism, as the pressures from the process of integration are equal for all member states, but the broad absence of these ideational and normative dimensions would imply a belief in British exceptionalism. That these commonalities are recognised, and are consequently evident in defining German and French discourse, but are only peripheral and non-defining within the British context indicates either a belief in exceptionalism or a failure to recognise the importance of the changing European landscape.

Parsons identifies a "particular set of ideas that appear in Western Europe after the Second World War" (Parsons, 2007: 1). These are evident and contribute to the legitimisation of change in French and German discourse, but such ideational considerations remain limited in British discourse. The UK would remain 'with Europe, but not of it' (Churchill, 1953).

4.7 Conclusion

As outlined in the introduction and the previous chapters, the aim of this research is to better understand the effect Europeanization has upon British media discourse. The thesis will map discursive change driven by the process of European integration. This chapter reflects the first step in that aim. It has outlined the form and focus of media discourse from which the latter case studies can evaluate change.

This case study represents a high water-mark in positive terms of tabloid discourse regarding the process of integration from a British perspective. The 'separation scale' recorded positive coverage regarding sustained UK membership and Anglo-European relations that will prove distinct from later case studies. The data identified a degree of pro-European coverage that is unique within this research.

Critical coverage, where it did exist was widely dismissed and the authority of critics was undermined. This contributes to our understanding of the referendum result in 1975, that returned the largest ever proportional mandate in the history of British democracy. The question that follows is, given the degree of pro-European bias, how has the public sphere and public opinion shifted so dramatically in the decades that followed. Clearly there will be subsequent developments that affect the process of this shift, but there are some salient findings that are tied to the issues of legitimacy outlined above.

The public sphere that develops around the referendum lacks an adequate plurality of perspectives. Valid claims regarding the reduction of policy competence and sovereignty, are dismissed, this creates the opportunity for future points of resistance. Claims of deceit and conspiracy will emerge in later data, would have been difficult to make if there had been a more diverse and critical debate regarding integration at this early juncture. The risks of politicization were outlined in the previous chapter, but this *missed chance* (Denman, 1995), to seize, define and construct the terms of discourse by the political class, had a clear effect the public sphere and subsequent understandings of, and objections to integration. This opportunity to construct a substantive and nuanced engagement with the process of integration was missed, this construction, when it does happen will be defined by those opposed to the process.

Partisan affiliation of the publications does have a limited structuring effect in the form and focus of coverage, but it does not alter preference regarding integration at this juncture. This structure will continue in later media output, beginning to also affect preferences on integration by Maastricht, but partisan affiliation and European preferences are not yet related.

The case study also found that nearly two thirds of all coverage had no substantive engagement with supranational aims, actors and institutions. This is distinct from continental discourses at this juncture, and highlights a degree of divergence in terms of national public spheres that will prove important. This represents a significant deficit, and a further missed opportunity to construct and define the terms of discourse. This is distinct from political discourse in Germany and France, where identity, sovereignty and their relationship to supranational developments are addressed. These normative concerns are widely absent from British Europeanized discourse, they are unusual and lack the importance attached to them in the French and German public spheres. These findings will help explain the discursive shift in later case studies and Eurosceptic frames that develop in subsequent decades.

The first case study has coded and mapped broadly positive tabloid output and discourse in 1975. All the publications are supportive of British membership. However, this support and the debate that develops around the referendum is limited. It is primarily focused on the material or economic dimensions of integration. The ideational and normative concerns that are central to the French and German public spheres, are exceptional in the data set for this case study. The data set indicates a discursive framework that is defined by material or economic considerations and avoids the more salient concerns in regard to public opinion. Issues of identity, sovereignty and values are widely absent. Equally, engagement with the supranational aims, actors and institutions as recorded by the 'conflict scale' is highly circumscribed. As such, it is possible to talk about substantive divergence from the German and French public spheres both in terms of ideational and supranational considerations. However, to make claims regarding British exceptionalism in terms of discourse would be misguided. These findings are not unique, but rather have divergence in terms of degree of focus or importance attached to normative concerns.

Negative claims regarding, and coverage of, integration are present, but they are limited. This limitation extends to both volume, and authority. Not only does positive coverage dominate, but critique of integration, where it is evident, is undermined with pejorative framing and mockery of the EEC's detractors.

The ideas of 'separation' and 'conflict' are not consistent in media discourse at this juncture. However, given the limited engagement evident in this data set this is not a surprise. These concepts are critical by their nature, and the first case study indicates a public sphere broadly absent of substantive criticism. In light of this absence, we can assume there will be little effect on public understanding and this has negative longer-term implications for the development of supranational legitimacy in the national context.

The public sphere that this chapter has mapped and subsequently analysed is pro-European, but uncritical. It fails to provide adequate scrutiny of the implications of integration, or pro-European claims from the British political elite; at the same time as it limits the public presence and authority of Eurosceptics. It lacks depth, or defining engagement with the salient normative and ideational dimensions of integration. Consequently the findings above help to explain the referendum result in 1975, but make very little contribution to collective learning, and can be expected to have limited positive impact upon Meyer's conceptions of authorization, responsiveness and accountability (Meyer, 1999). Furthermore, the dismissal of Eurosceptic claims and actors creates scope for future points of popular objection, once the true extent and ambition of European integration becomes widely apparent.

5. The Second Case Study: The Maastricht Treaty

“Game, set and match for Britain”

(John Major, 1991)

5.1 Introduction

The following chapter will evaluate the Europeanization of British media discourse in light of the findings of the previous chapter. It will assess change evident in the normative frameworks via which European integration becomes present in the national public sphere with regard to both the supranational and domestic dimensions. The CA will establish if either of the concepts of ‘separation’ or ‘conflict’ have become significant to the discourse present in this data set and provide an overview of change. CDA will ensure the chapter engages with the specific form and focus of media output, to appreciate the implications of the discourse surrounding Maastricht for public understanding and popular legitimacy, and assess whether the British public sphere is exceptional, or indicative of discourse evident in other member states.

The Maastricht Treaty saw a significant expansion in the competence and aims of the European framework for regional governance, entrenching the now infamous “ever closer Union” within the introduction to the revised *acquis communautaire*. This vague aspiration would go on to become a rallying point for British populist objection and media output. The Maastricht treaty was one of a number “critical junctures [that] constitute the starting point for many path dependent processes” (Capoccia & Keleman, 2007: 342). These junctures serve to confine the boundaries of what may be likely in the future; that is to say that the Treaty, in part, set the UK on a trajectory which culminated in the Brexit vote of 23rd June 2016.

The significance of Maastricht will be addressed below, but the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is widely regarded as an epoch-defining event. Despite its significance, its complexity inhibits both understanding and appreciation of this significance. It did serve to raise some notable popular concerns, including but not limited to the issue of the democratic deficit and the elite-public gap, which will be discussed below; however, the Europeanization of the

public sphere following epochal moments in Anglo-European relations is an enduring process. As such the debates that have become synonymous with Maastricht in hindsight were not inherently the principal concerns of the day, as will be evident in the analysis later in the chapter.

As outlined in the previous chapters, the aim of this thesis is not to assess or engage with changes in public opinion, but rather code and map a defining component of the public sphere in which it is formed. The following chapter will map notable shifts in the substance and focus of coverage from the first study; there is a clear shift away from the high-watermark of positive coverage identified in the last chapter. Britain's place in Europe (coded via the separation scale) records what is best described as a shift to balanced coverage. Supranational aims, actors and institutions (coded via the conflict scale) see a notable spike in coverage. However, this data set records growing Eurosceptic discourse along this scale. Aside from the Daily Mirror (the only left-wing publication in the set), supranational focus emerges in broadly negative terms. So, while this case study codes an increasingly Europeanized perspective in this component of the public sphere, it is already evident that there is a dearth of perspectives.

This case study again records a spike in European focus, but it lacks an adequate plurality of perspectives and remains under-engaged given the extent of competence shift entailed in the TEU. The value of a temporal perspective, as outlined in the discussion of historical institutionalism in the literature review, is increasingly apparent in this case study. That is to say, that just as "historic institutionalists stress the unintended consequences and inefficiencies generated by existing institutions" (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 942), the media as an institution itself is a major contributor to the public sphere, and discourse can equally have unintended consequences. Especially so with regard to European integration, in which it is subject to extended temporal pressures, and coverage is affected by complexity, and limited understanding. These factors limit the scope of engagement with, and coverage of, Maastricht in the public sphere.

Volume (number of articles captured via the use of key terms) remains at equivalent levels to the media output throughout the referendum (First Case Study). This move towards

increasingly Eurosceptic frames in terms of supranational focus, absence of expansion in volume (indicative of sustained under-engagement), and under-appreciation of the significance of Maastricht, highlight that integration remains a peripheral concern in the public sphere. European concerns remain widely framed as a foreign policy issue, rather than integrated into domestic cleavages. While this data set will show a widespread framing of integration in terms of material or economic concerns, coverage does not integrate integration into existing domestic cleavages or discursive frameworks. European politics remains disjoined from national politics in a way that has implications for popular preferences. Engagement is framed in such a way to structure public opinion “in ‘for’ and ‘against’ positions vis-à-vis European integration” (Ladrech, 2007: 957). This was beneficial in terms of support in 1975, but contributes to the scope for future polarisation in light of changing context ushered in with Maastricht.

The key concern here is how, and if, a defining component of the public sphere is performing any function in terms of collective learning. This was addressed in the literature review but requires brief reconsideration at this juncture. Kilgore offered the most comprehensive theory of collective learning which recognised the process as contingent on the number of interactions and pressures on any given collective. This theory inherently recognises economic pressures, political processes and importantly “mass media messages,” arguing that only with an awareness of these factors can we “understand...societal change” (Kilgore, 1999: 200). Europeanization constitutes the change in question, and integration arguably represents the most significant change in governance and statehood since the establishment of a universal franchise. If the media are to contribute to this process, which as Kilgore indicates is central to collective learning, sustained, diverse, and engaged coverage is required. However, as this case will show, no such contribution is evident, and as such media output conversely contributes to the construction of future points of resistance to the process of integration, and accusations of conspiracy and deceit that emerge in the final case study.

The following chapter will follow the format laid out in the previous one; providing the key findings of the second case study and seeking to understand the shift in the discursive landscape from the first case study. As such, it maps the Europeanization of the public sphere and media output since 1975, before briefly comparing these findings to key components of

French and German discourse in the same period. As was noted in the previous chapter, during the first referendum British tabloid media coverage of integration was broadly 'positive', with 87% of media output either neutral or in favour of British membership of the (then) EEC. This positive coverage was identified by the 'separation scale' (see Appendix), constructed to map media engagement with Britain's place within the European project. The second ordinal scale, the 'conflict scale', was designed to map the discursive engagement with the supranational aims, values, institutions and actors independent of British membership. While the findings of this scale do not merit the classification of negative coverage during the first case study, there was a telling gulf between positive coverage of the nationally derived benefits of European integration and the engagement with supranational dimensions.

During analysis of the second scale it was evident that there was a sustained and telling pattern of under-engagement with supranational concerns, with 64% of all tabloid coverage of European issues only engaging with Europe in reference to the UK. The second case study shows a major spike in supranational focus vis-à-vis the first case study. However, it is the form of this spike that may produce scope for future points of resistance. While this may not be unique to the UK, the combination of under-engagement in both the media, and political class, regarding the longer term aims and implications of integration generate scope for future populist objection when they become apparent. In terms of Kilgore's theory of learning, this case study identifies emerging shortcomings.

As such we can already identify the clear structural impact of media coverage from the outset; that is to say, "UK newspapers have exerted manifest structuring effects over Britain's national debates about 'Europe'" (Daddow, 2016: 151). In terms of the emerging Europeanization of the public sphere, this data set records an increasingly evident structure to discourse on supranational concerns; a structure that is not conducive to public understanding or popular legitimacy.

5.2 Understanding Context: 'At the Heart of Europe'

The quotation at the start of the chapter from John Major, Prime Minister at the time of the

Maastricht negotiations, highlights his claim that he had 'won' the negotiation upon his return from the Netherlands. The opt out, he asserted meant it was "game, set and match for Britain". As has been discussed in depth in the previous chapters, Britain's relationship with the European project has been a perennially confused one; from Churchill to Cameron it is not difficult, for Europhiles and Eurosceptics alike, to select passages from a Prime Minister to support their own positions or attack those of their opponents.

Speaking to a Central Council meeting in Southport on the 23rd of March 1991, Major gave a notable speech that encapsulated the inherent conflict within Britain's European position:

'It is because we care for lasting principles that I want to place Britain at the heart of Europe. But partnership in Europe will never mean passive acceptance of all that is put to us. No-one should fear we will lose our national identity. We will fight for Britain's interest as hard as any Government that has gone before. I want Britain to inspire and to shape Europe as decisively as we have over the Single Market programme. Then we will fight for Europe's interests, too. But not from the outside where we would lose. From the inside where we will win.'

(John Major, 1991)

As with the majority of executive speeches intended for domestic consumption, discourse remains cautious regarding integration. Despite the extent of competence exchange entailed in the TEU, the European Union remains a peripheral focus in an expansive speech. The words above fall 4972 words into a 5292-word speech, barely a footnote. This follows Major's acceptance speech after expansive commentary on every aspect of British life and politics from national unity, to energy choice and a citizens' charter. While Major claims to want to place Britain at the 'heart of Europe', it is evident Europe is little more than a capillary to this opening address. This is a fitting metaphor for domestic engagement with integration in the public sphere. Furthermore, this telling quote from Major highlights the domestic necessity to perennially frame European engagements in terms of conflict; this discursive need to always 'fight' for Britain's interests even when it is not evident that they are under attack. This will be returned to in the final empirical section of the chapter.

What is essential to stress here is the ongoing under-engagement with substantive change in terms of the framework of European governance. As such we briefly need to assess the changes contained within Maastricht along with an overview of their implications.

5.21 The Treaty on European Union

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) brought into existence the EU in its current form, representing a 'new stage in European integration...open[ing] the way to political integration' (Eurlex, TEU review, 15.10.2010). It did so with the creation of a three-pillar structure advancing the framework established under the Single European Act (1986). The first pillar, under the title of The European Communities incorporated customs and single market regulation, economic and monetary union (EMU), and environmental and social policy, among a range of other significant areas of coordination. This first pillar was to be governed by the Community Method, which afforded the Commission powers to initiate legislation. The power of co-decision rested between the Council (of ministers) and the European Parliament, as well as the introduction of QMV (Qualified Majority Voting) in the Council. This is a substantive change and ensures genuine advances in terms of supranational governance, competence and power. The second pillar accounted for the new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with the third falling under the nomenclature Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), serving to coordinate policing and judicial policy. These two pillars were managed via an intergovernmental framework. While the latter has achieved some notable success in terms of collaborative law enforcement and intelligence sharing, the CFSP has been the object of sustained and substantive criticism (see for examples, Kavanagh, 1997, Larsen, 2002, Smith, 2004).

Above and beyond the pillar structure the TEU provided for major reform in terms of the competencies of the European Parliament, established European citizenship and laid out a timetable and convergence criteria for further political and economic integration.

While it has been argued that the Single European Act was a more “fundamental step” in the evolution of European integration (George, 1998: 244), the scope, aims and ambition

contained with the TEU are beyond contention. The summary of the Treaty above is very succinct, as this thesis does not aim to offer a descriptive overview of the development of the European *acquis communautaire*. However, it does need to critically engage with the ramifications of this treaty to anticipate what media output should be focused on if it is to perform the ‘public learning’ functions outlined above. To do so, the chapter must briefly summarise what these reforms meant for traditional notions of national governance, statehood, sovereignty and identity.

As detailed above, the first pillar institutionalises a wide-reaching expansion in the degree of supranational competence; the Commission assumed far greater power and importance under the stewardship of Jacques Delors. The challenge this domain of competence posed to public understanding, rests in the complexity and multifaceted nature of the first pillar. This complexity, along with the future timetable for further integration laid out within the Treaty, allowed Major to defer public engagement. Not only did the Commission assume far greater competence, the European parliament was overhauled to promote the democratic component of the European framework; a noble intention but as with much of the reform contained within Maastricht, this would have unforeseen consequences contributing to the growth in perceptions of a “lack of direct accountability between the governing and the governed” (Schmidt, 2011: 129). That is to say, the TEU took major steps toward establishing what many now see as distant, unaccountable and increasingly illegitimate institutions of European governance; this led to the emergence of the now clichéd ‘democratic deficit’ debate, to which we must return later. However, it was evident that by the 1990s there was “widespread concern about the democratic deficit of European integration” (Majone, 1998: 12)

In terms of the other pillars, the significance of these domains relates to public perceptions of ideational concepts. Foreign policy, security, and defence apparatus are closely entwined with conceptions of sovereignty, identity and nationality.

For the purpose of this thesis, national identity is understood “not as an objective fixed entity but as the subjective representation of allegiance toward one’s country” (Macdonald, 1993: 121); this means it is both dynamic and normative. Associated with national identity are a

range of symbols or 'ideational kernels' (Nida & Taber, 1969) that assume varying degrees of popular importance dependent upon context; as context shifts, so can the degree of attachment or importance ascribed to symbols or kernels. Within the context of the UK clear examples of these would include the Monarch, the Parliament and the Union Flag. Security and foreign policy have long been both entwined with the establishment of the nation state and its subsequent defence, and evolved to become clear and evident symbols of the type described above. As such, whatever the relative successes of the second two pillars, it is evident that they made clear and significant incursions in the traditional domain of the nation state in highly sensitive fields. The challenge inherent here is major one, and one that for reasons addressed under the next two sections was often avoided.

To summarise this brief critical engagement with the problem of sovereignty in the European context:

'The absolute power of the Sovereign State has been the foundational doctrine for political theory and practice...It seems to me, as it seems to others that we may be witnessing its demise in Europe, through the development of a new and not-yet-well-theorised legal and political order in the form of the European Union' .

(MacCormic in Schiemann, 2008: 488).

MacCormic was premature to talk of the absolute demise of sovereignty and misguided to conceive of it as a unidirectional process. However, the TEU certainly legislated for major incursions into many of the key symbols of sovereignty and national identity. This was not acknowledged in the national public sphere adequately, as will be shown below, and would go on to have major implications evident in the data produced for the final case study and the subsequent chapter.

Franklin would later write, of further changes in the *acquis communautaire*, that the political elite, "by failing to take the opportunit[ies] to present voters with meaningful choices... [would] also miss the chance to educate them about European affairs' (Franklin, 2006: 241-2). This is an ongoing failure of the political elite that requires a brief re-appraisal, before we are able to assess its ramifications for the wider public sphere and media output specifically

within this case study.

5.22 Top down integration and Popular Involvement

From the inception of the 'European project' its architects sought to minimise resistance; this led to actions such as Monnet's self-confessed 'conspiracy' to keep the British involvement in the European Coal and Steel Community absent until the 11th hour (Young, 1998: 51).

However, this has had substantive, lasting and arguably negative consequences for popular involvement in European integration. The complexity of the European political infrastructure is unique for an institution as salient as the EU and bears a strong relationship to the growth in populist Eurosceptic sentiment. This will be returned to, but what requires note at this point is the crucial role of political and media elites in providing "cognitive short cuts" (De Vries & Edwards, 2009: 8) to permit accountability, affinity and crucially, *explanation*. In the national context these functions are evident and paramount in Meyer's key features of legitimacy; authority, responsiveness and accountability (Meyer, 1999). However, the roles political and media elites have performed in the European context are fundamentally distinct from their national equivalents, if not at times dysfunctional; this will be addressed in the empirical sections in the following chapter.

It is not difficult to understand the aversion, among the political class, to politicizing the 'European debate' in the national context. Hooghe and Marks drew attention to the risks to party unity, relative standing, and ideological coherence in the national context (Hooghe & Marks, 2009); Ladrech cited the structural challenges that were evident in integrating European politics into existing national cleavages, discourses and institutions (Landrech, 2007); while Hay & Rosamond highlighted the political value of Europe as an externality in managing domestic challenges (Hay & Rosamond, 2002). These brief examples of the motivation behind the sustained aversion to integrate the supranational and the national are by no means exhaustive, but permit a succinct understanding of the preferences of components of the European political elite. If one considers these factors, it becomes evident why politicization was so ardently avoided. Little could be gained in domestic terms, and

much would be risked. However, this aversion to risk would contribute to a growth in the risk of populist objection, once the extent of integration began to emerge in the public sphere. As such, an ideological commitment to integration grew across the mainstream political class without any genuine focus on public collective learning and popular engagement. This sustained under-engagement may have its origins in the political class, but as this chapter will show it has notable effect upon media engagement in the UK, as the relegation of substantive issues in the political class translated, at least for a period, into their relegation in terms of media attention. Both of these have proved over time to have major implications for popular understanding of European integration in the national context; a path dependency is emerging.

Proactive debates and efforts at such politicization across the member states may have tempered progress towards a functioning economic and political union. However, they could have pre-empted developments in public discourse that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s that may come to fundamentally undermine the European Union's ability to act as a legitimate and coherent actor in national contexts. The watershed moment came with the passage of Maastricht. This treaty, combined with the Single European Act, created the basis of economic and monetary union, and supranational institutions of governance that encroached on the traditional sovereignty of the nation state. While much of the discourse evident in the first two case studies frames integration as a material or economic exercise, the expansion of aims and competences inherent to the TEU exceed the ambitions of such an exercise. When this gulf between the framing of integration, and the increasing ambition of the project, become apparent in the public sphere – we can anticipate the growth of populist objection and Eurosceptic discourse.

European integration was to become 'increasingly salient' in public perception and political contestation (Marks et al, 2002: 586). However, and this remains a major failing of the political and media elites, rather than framing the European debate within existing cleavages and integrating its challenges into the national political discourse, it remains external and disjointed from 'normal' politics. Whether this was truly possible, given that integration has a track record indicating it cuts across existing cleavages, is a different question. However, this has produced, "almost by default, public opinion to structure in 'for' and 'against' positions vis-à-vis European integration" (Ladrech, 2007: 957), thereby failing to advance popular

understanding of the structure, aims of, and challenges that face the EU. Perhaps the structure and complexity of the European Union make popular understanding unattainable; but in hindsight this would have been an ideal opportunity to attempt such public conversation on the future of integration. By the time the degree of integration entailed in the TEU was evident, the opportunity for such a conversation in the UK had passed and scope for future accusations of conspiracy and deceit were established.

The Europeanization of the national political space created a spectrum of opportunity for new “winners” and “losers” (Koopmans, 2002: 183), and it is in this regard that we have witnessed a substantive shift in the orientation of discourse toward Europe and the role of agency in driving this shift. As noted above, the risks to those associated with government were great. However, to the growing number of political actors with little or no chance of direct power, there was “little to lose in formulating an extreme position” to seek political gain (Marks et al, 2002: 588). This opportunity included not only actors that were currently at the extremities of the political spectrum, but also applied to narratives regarding the process, and increasingly Europeanized discourse. The failure to proactively engage with these sensitive debates in the national public sphere would ensure their emergence in Eurosceptic terms, and against a background of wide-reaching mis-information.

5.23 The ‘Democratic Deficit’

The ‘democratic deficit’ debate has become prolific in the years that followed Maastricht (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007), with the term gaining popular currency and being widely utilised by opponents of integration at both extremities of the political spectrum. Popular engagement in the European democratic process has fallen, despite concrete steps taken to bolster the democratic credentials of the EU that started with the European Parliamentary reforms within the TEU.

The question follows is that if democratic endorsement is a prerequisite for legitimate governance, and yet popular involvement in the European democratic process is in decline, if not increasingly dominated by anti-European sentiment, (Hobolt et al, 2008), can the European Union be an effective and legitimate institution for governance? The answer, it will

be evident when we move on to the final case study and concluding discussions of Brexit, is that without major changes in the performance of the mass media the EU faces structural challenges in assuming sufficient legitimacy in certain national contexts. But such a conclusion is premature at this juncture.

As noted in the opening chapters, the focus of discussion regarding legitimacy and popular engagement in the European context has been primarily concerned with framing the debate in terms of direct representation and the relationship this has to popular support (see for examples, Blondel et al, 1998; Bogdanor 1989; Rohrschneider, 2002; Sharpf, 1999).

Numerous analysts concluding in some variant form that the “EU’s democracy deficit constitute[s] a serious liability to Europe’s political integration” (Rohrschneider, 2002: 472). This thesis does not seek to claim that calls for further democratic reform are invalid, nor that the EU does not have clear democratic shortcomings, but with regard to the broader normative themes of legitimacy, engagement and accountability, the challenges the EU faces are more complex and ingrained than just a failure of electoral politics. As Majone indicates this focus on democratic input can be misleading: “arguments about the democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature, functions and goals” of European integration (Majone, 1998: 6). This understanding supports the empirical section that follows and the next chapter as well. Avoidance of substantive focus on the nature, functions and goals of integration in this case study, feeds into objection to those goals premised upon notions of popular or democratic legitimacy in the final case study.

It is in no small part, tied to the failure to adequately understand and address Meyer’s three key features of legitimacy that the growth in anti-European sentiment must be understood. Paramount to these features is the role of the mass media in promoting collective learning regarding the increasingly complex structure of regional governance, along with facilitating accountability. As the chapter now moves on to analyse the empirical findings of the case study, we must maintain an awareness of the descriptive overview laid out above and the critical engagement with the key issues that stem from Maastricht in order to understand and map tabloid output. This will allow us to establish the coverage these key issues received within the British public sphere.

5.3 Empirical Findings


The passage of the Maastricht Treaty represents a clear ‘critical juncture’ in the development of European integration. The expansion in structure and competence at the supranational level is a major step toward the European Union as we know it today. While the Single European Act (1986) began the process, the importance of the TEU is beyond contention. The following section will evaluate how European integration is constructed in tabloid output at this critical juncture, the degree of Europeanization evident by this time, and map the shift from the previous case study. While the importance of the TEU is self-evident, and the following section will outline a greater degree of Europeanization to that seen in 1975, it will also indicate a failure to fully appreciate the scope and importance of change entailed within the Treaty. Once again this is closely tied to elite political discourse. The data set that follows further supports and justifies the use of a temporal perspective afforded by HI, as both complexity and short-termism have a substantive influence on the Europeanization of discourse. The failure to recognise, or politicize, the degree of integration Maastricht facilitated, will limit both the extent of Europeanization and engagement with supranational considerations. The change mapped since the previous case study is significant, but falls short of representing change inherent to the revised *acquis communautaire*. The ‘separation scale’ will show a far less positive, but not yet widely opposed, public sphere with regard to British membership of the EU. The ‘conflict scale’ will demonstrate greater Europeanization of supranational aims, actors, and institutions, than in 1975, however, this occurs in increasingly negative terms and remains under-engaged.

5.31 Evaluating Europeanization in terms of volume of salient articles identified in the data set

The previous section served to frame the context and background against which this case study must be understood. The chapter will now move to address the empirical findings of the research. As was mentioned at the start of the chapter, the Maastricht Treaty legislated for a major expansion in the competence of the European Union. It was widely held that

public opinion was “favourable towards European integration but did not see the issue as salient (to domestic political concerns)” (Franklin et al, 1995: 102). This understanding led Linberg & Scheingold to coin the term “permissive consensus” to describe the orientation of public opinion toward European integration, however, they warned this status quo may not be able to sustain a “major increase in the scope or capacity of the community” (Linberg & Scheingold, 1970: 277). Maastricht ensured this major increase. The clear challenge here is that since British accession to the community, European integration had been widely considered, presented as, and framed within the remit of foreign policy concerns, although this is not unique to the UK. This representation of the aims, values and institutions of the expanding supranational structure for governance, was mutually reinforced at varying levels of the British public sphere, serving to limit engagement with the genuine structural upheaval contained within Maastricht. This understanding is crucial to an accurate reading of the data below.

Graph showing volume, and distribution over time, of articles coded in 1991-92:



Graph 5.a (author’s own data) this graph shows the complete number of articles caught in 1991-92 using the key search terms, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of the signing of the TEU on the 7th of February 1992 (i.e. 07.11.1991-07.05.1992). As such the months of November and May are not complete months, however, this does provide a data set of the complete 6-month period in which the TEU is signed.

Graph 5.a indicates the degree to which European focus in media output remains highly event-based. November and December are the months in which negotiations reach their peak. There are numerous interactions at a supranational level, intergovernmental debates, and recurrent Europeanized output from national political actors, all of which contribute to this period of uncharacteristically high European coverage. However, the more telling findings are in the months that follow. The drop-off in coverage of European affairs indicates that much engagement remains tied to major events, output, or leadership from the national political class. While the second data set indicates a continuation in focus not evident in the first case study, which recorded a collapse to just 24 articles in the final three months, analysis below will indicate that this is not yet adequate evidence of an adequately Europeanized public sphere and is, in fact, tied to other developments in international relations.

A brief inspection of this data might at this juncture suggest that the Europeanization of the British public sphere had forced, in part at least, an internalisation of supranational political aims, values and institutions into national political cleavages. This would be an interesting finding and one that might challenge the overarching analysis of this chapter. As such, this finding requires some discussion and evidence to indicate why this is not the case.

The first point to note here is the distinct nature of the two case studies. Inherently, with the referendum campaign in the first case study, there was a gradual increase in output as polling day approached. This culminated with the largest proportional mandate any British electoral exercise has ever produced, with 67% of the vote backing continued membership of the EEC. This offers a very neat narrative structure around which to structure a case study, with Wilson's commitment to a referendum on his election as an introduction, the public debate serving as the narrative centre, and the vote providing the denouement or conclusion. Furthermore, the very premise of a referendum on European membership offers a simple binary engagement with the question of integration; the value of simplicity is an entirely separate debate, but what it does ensure is clarity in terms of a closed question. The electorate chooses to support membership, or it does not, and certainly debate can be opened in the build-up to the referendum, but in its conclusion such a framework for securing a public mandate offers only two choices. Once made, there is finality to such a binary

process that does little to foster any further deliberation or challenge existing political values and structures. This was evident from the collapse in coverage after the referendum.

While Maastricht was clearly a significant event, both in terms in European integration and in terms of Anglo-European relations, its significance and its consequences were both complex and open-ended; a product of previous actions and an event that would shape future European integration and the UK's place within it.

"In some ways the Maastricht agreement was a less fundamental step in the evolution of the European Community than the Single European Act which...Thatcher had signed in 1986. Nevertheless, in some respects it could be interpreted as a big step toward closer European unity, and perhaps a bigger step than many members of the Conservative Party initially realised. As time passed perceptions began to change".

(George, 1998: 244).

This insightful passage from George's work in *'An Awkward Partner'* draws into sharp focus the complexity of any change in the *acquis communautaire*, but also alludes to the qualities of path dependency and unintended consequences (see Literature Review for full discussion). Like many members of the ruling party that accepted Maastricht and ensured its transfer into legislation, the mainstream political class failed in the short term to grasp the degree of change and the shift of competencies inherent with the Treaty. Eurosceptic Conservatives who did appear to appreciate, more fully, the consequences of Maastricht, were dismissed as "those bastards" (Guardian, 25.07.1993) As with the first case study, opponents of integration were mocked and maligned, the tabloid media followed elite political discourse in this regard.

Alongside the issues accounted for by the incorporation of historical institutionalism within the conceptual framework for this thesis and addressed briefly in the last few paragraphs, there are the simpler to quantify, and more tangible issues associated with complex treaty change. By its very nature, any alteration in the *acquis communautaire* required the involvement of all member states; as such it is an extended process with multiple focus points

distinct from a referendum. As a result, it is inevitably more complex to understand, cover and relay, all of which contribute to an absence of collective learning.

The structural divergence noted between the two case studies contributes to the variation, in terms of volume of output. In this case the data clearly identifies a peak of European coverage in the months of November and December. This accurately reflects focus on Major's negotiations in the build-up to the Treaty concluding with the summit on the 14th and 15th of December. However, it is the continued fluctuation around the 60 articles per month figure that requires specific explanation, if this is not to be understood as reflective of the development of a supranational or adequately Europeanized component to the national public sphere. This is done with further critical discourse analysis of the leading content within these months to ascertain if this is reflective of a substantive shift, or if it is better explained by reference to other intervening factors.

When we make a direct comparison between the first two case studies, we can identify a shift in the focus of Europeanized coverage. Closer analysis of January of 1992 indicates a four-fold increase on the 'equivalent' month in 1975 (July), however, as detailed above it is difficult to make a valid claim of equivalence. In January 1992, 33% of the output engages with the TEU, while in July 1975 (the equivalent month), 93% of the output leads with issues deriving from the referendum. In absolute terms we do see a small increase of all Europeanized output in the second case study, however, as indicated above the complexity and implications of Maastricht merit a major proportional increase if the media is to serve public learning functions within a framework of supranational governance; this is clearly not evident. What is equally telling is that 25% of the output for January 1992 engages with Europe only as an intervening factor in the issues associated with changing political dynamics in either the Former Yugoslavian Republics (FYRs) or the collapsing USSR. The Daily Mail's coverage of a European emergency aid programme to Russia is framed in terms of outrage at "Russian demands" as "Hungry Russia blocks 'mad cow beef'" (Daily Mail, 03.01.1992). The Mirror's coverage of a significant coordinated foreign policy statement from the European Union regarding the collapse of Yugoslavia only offers one reference to this European "recognition" (Daily Mirror, 16.01.1992), while the same story in the Sun does not even mention this joint statement, framing it as Britain recognising the newly formed republics, who "border" the

European Community (Sun, 16.01.1992). These examples help highlight that despite substantive collaborative actions and supranational collaboration, where it does receive coverage it is highly circumscribed and dependent on other factors. Furthermore, this indicates the degree of preference toward an intergovernmental perspective may inhibit more engaged, possibly nuanced discourse.

With Maastricht's creation of the Three Pillars, the European project has reached unprecedented levels of regional integration with 'ever closer union' enshrined as an underwriting value and aim of the respective member states. The marginal increase in coverage does not reflect this shifting reality, and the 7% variation between direct focus on Maastricht lead issues and those of the FYR and USSR would support the assessment that despite these changes in competence, European political concerns remain framed within the sphere of Foreign Policy (Trenz, 2004). It is not the aim of this thesis to assess editorial guidelines underwriting such levels of coverage, suffice to say it fails to meet Meyer's criteria for an effective conduit for the transmission of supranational aims, actions and interests (Meyer, 2005).

February witnesses the ratification of Maastricht, for which one should anticipate a noteworthy increase in European output. If we briefly return to the first case study, 42% of the 170 articles in June are published after the vote, indicating a sustained if short-lived focus, engaging with the implications of the referendum. This is not the case for February 1992, for which critical discourse analysis shows very limited focus on ratification and implications of Maastricht with just 23% of the content in the month of February leading with these issues. The FYR and the USSR remain a constant undercurrent of coverage at comparable levels to integration and the Treaty. However, this may be reflective of limited space in media output, so the data may actually suggest European integration suffers from contingent as well as structural under-engagement.

March sees a continuation of broader foreign policy concerns, with food problems in Russia, migration and security fears relating to the collapse of the USSR and FYR remaining conduits for limited engagement with European institutions. Interestingly, we see the emergence in

response to these growing security and migratory concerns of the discursive frameworks that will underwrite some of the narratives evident in the final case study. All the tabloids aside from The Mirror (the only 'left wing' publication under consideration) offer some sustained pejorative engagement with the imminent risk posed by "the flood of bogus refugees"; "the vast majority of which are merely economic migrants hoping to slip through the existing net to take [advantage] of Britain...[as] Eastern Europe and the former Soviet States threatened to bring about a stampede of new refugees to add to those from the third world" (Daily Mail, 26.03.92) This frame is by no means novel, and has clear parallels with elements of negative media output and public discourse on migration in the build-up to the Second World War. While this does not directly relate to the process of integration, this frame of risk tied to migration and the pejorative fanning of other peoples as inferior will become central to the findings of the final case study. As such it is worth recognising the (re)emergence of this discourse of risk.

This analysis of the Europeanization of media output in terms of volume supports the conclusion reached in the previous case study and again supports Trenz in his assertion that substantive Europeanization is limited; "In-depth coverage...remains ephemeral...European issues are not included in their own context of relevance and are transformed into 'foreign news'" (Trenz, 2004: 305). It is clear from the analysis in this chapter that where Europeanization is evident, it is transitory and neither positive nor accurately reflective of the change to the European framework for governance. This inherently raises questions regarding the form this Europeanization takes; this will be engaged with in more depth in the next two sections.

5.4 Understanding the findings of the Separation Scale


In the previous chapter and case study it was the Separation Scale that identified the most positive engagements with European integration. However, it must be re-iterated that the scale constructed to do this was designed exclusively to code the media output on British membership of the European project; 'A scale to measure the construction of, and

engagement with relations (between the UK and the EU) as presented within the texts under consideration' (see Appendix for full scale). As with both 'separation' and 'conflict', the aim of these Likert scales is to code a range of value expressions in tabloid media output. These scales provide the basis for a quantitative overview of the data, allowing the research to map discursive shifts emanating from the process of Europeanization. The scales range from normative support to normative objection, with materially framed support and objection, along with 'neutrality', coding between the normative criteria. The 'separation scale' codes output specifically concerned with British membership of the European Union and Anglo-European relations. This scale does **not** engage with supranational aims, values and institutions. The scale is then used as the basis for further qualitative analysis, in the form of critical discourse analysis, to provide a more holistic picture of this component of the public sphere at the critical juncture under consideration.

5.41 Positive and Neutral Coverage of British Membership

The separation scale coded and mapped a significant shift between the two case studies. In 1975 positive coverage on this scale accounted for 43% of all output, with 8% meeting the criteria for 'absolute unity' (2) premised upon a perception of shared heritage, values or destiny. As graph 5.b indicates below, by 1992, all positive coverage has fallen to 20% and 'absolute unity' has disappeared in tabloid output. Negative output now exceeds positive output, indicating substantive change recorded via the 'separation scale'. This data indicates the Europeanization of media discourse is driving change. The question follows what is the form and focus of this Europeanized discourse?

Graph showing the findings of the 'separation scale' for all articles for all publications in 1991-92:



Graph 5.b (author's own data): this graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications combined, along the 'separation scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1991-92, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of the signing of the TEU on the 7th of February 1992 (i.e. 07.11.1991-07.05.1992). The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding European integration from a domestic perspective indicating preferences toward British membership.

5.42 'Absolute unity':


As the previous chapter detailed, media output in the build-up to the referendum represented a high watermark in terms of 'positive' engagement with regard to Britain's place in the European framework. So, the question follows, what is the level of positive coverage by the time of Maastricht and how has it changed since the previous case study? Graph 5.b shows the complete disappearance of '**absolute unity**' (2), this is a telling finding, when compared to discussion of political discourse in France and Germany at the end of the last chapter. While other comparable public spheres saw the development of normative and ideational discourse (as will be shown to be present in France and Germany later in the chapter) to account for the changing context of integration emanating from the political class, this has almost entirely disappeared from the British public sphere. Once again, UK media discourse is closely tied to output from the political elite, as will be shown below. The

political elite offer very little in the way of normative or ideational leadership with regard to integration; ‘absolute unity’ has disappeared from the British public sphere.

5.43 ‘Conditional unity’:

‘Conditional unity’ (1) promotes or defends British membership in terms of material benefits derived from the process of integration. It relays interactions in functional terms, omitting any explicit or overt normative or ideational discourse. As evident in the graph below, by the time of the 2nd case study the data identifies notable variation in the publications. The extent of this variation indicates a notable change from the data in the previous case study, that will show that while elite political discourse still bears a strong relationship to tabloid output, it is no longer ubiquitous. There is substantive growth in critical perspectives (which will be returned to below), as well as a growth in the importance of partisan affiliation of publications, specifically evident in the Daily Mirror data set (the only left-wing publication).

Graph showing the findings of ‘separation scale’ for all articles for all individual publications in 1991-92:



Graph 5.c (author’s own data): this graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications, along the ‘separation scale’ as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1975. The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding European integration from a domestic perspective indicating preferences toward British membership. This data remains divided by publication indicating the degree of variation or consistency between tabloids.

Graphs 5.b and 5.c both show the exclusive coding of positive coverage under the criteria of 'conditional unity' reflecting the broader ascendancy of discourse focused on the development of the single market. This focus on material concerns, combined with a clear partisan structure framing engagement with integration explains the anomaly the Daily Mirror presents in this case study. In the first case study 48% of all Mirror articles coded as positive. In the final case study, the Mirror will code as the most positive (or least Eurosceptic) publication regarding British membership. The Mirror's negative coverage will be explained in the next section, but the collapse in its 'conditional unity' in this case study reflects a critical perspective on market-driven integration, as well as the Conservative administration.

At this juncture, as evidenced in Graph 5.c, the leading publications in terms of 'conditional unity' are the Express and the Mail, with them accounting for a quarter of output from both. The most surprising finding from this data set, given the nature of tabloid output in the modern era, was the level of deference to, and trust in, the political elite. Prime Minister John Major is depicted in terms of authority that is alien to modern media output. Returning to the issue of competence exchange, and the establishment of the pillars, editorials in the Express assure readers that the changes inherent to the TEU, regarding this competence exchange will never happen. Assertions of genuine implications regarding both sovereignty, and associated 'ideational kernels' (Nida & Taber, 2013) tied to the traditional conceptions of the nation state from Eurosceptic MPs are dismissed and the Prime Minister praised:

"No one can seriously believe Mr Major will sign anything that would rob us of control over vital matters of social, foreign and security policy... (no one should) doubt the Prime Ministers' determination to protect the long-term interests of the British people at Maastricht".

(Daily Express, 21.11.1991).

This succinct extract highlights a range of the shortcomings in terms of media content and an under appreciation of the importance and implications of the TEU. Firstly, Maastricht has implications for all policy domains, so this editorial is misguided in asserting that there is no competence exchange entailed. The pillar structure does provide for intergovernmental

cooperation in terms of new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Although this remains the primary competence of the nation state, there is change and as noted above any degree of change in domains such as this is both sensitive and salient. Furthermore, this reference to the 'long term interests' relays a notion that Maastricht does not itself entail provision for the future deepening of integration, when the Treaty explicitly contains such commitments.

The Mail praised "Masterly Major" for his "victory" at Maastricht (Daily Mail 12.12.1991) while dismissing the prospect of further integration and decrying those suggesting such a possibility as "irresponsible" (Daily Mail, 25.02.1992). In one of a series of articles dismissing the Eurosceptic claims of Thatcher, Major is painted as something of a national hero for putting the "nation before the party over Europe" (Daily Mail, 02.12.91). 'conditional unity' (1) across the right-wing tabloids reflects a reverence that would be alien in the current public sphere and the degree of dismissive denial that is arguably comparable to current right-wing media output regarding the potential implications of Brexit.

While coverage in the first case study played up the significance of the 1975 referendum, and the importance of obtaining a democratic mandate, this is not the case for Maastricht. This, as noted in the opening section of the chapter, does not reflect the substantive change contained with the TEU, and the dismissal of the need for more public debate regarding such change. This coverage must be considered with reference to the HI perspective addressed in earlier chapters. Had the scope of change been widely recognised, critiqued and opened up for public contestation at this juncture, it would have limited the scope for future claims of deceit and conspiracy, claims that will go on to become prolific in the final case study. Editorials across the right-wing tabloids actually go as far as to attack Thatcher and others who seek to open up public debate regarding the genuine degree of change entailed in the TEU, while maintaining an unquestioning deference to Major's authority:

"Referendum? Just a red, white and blue herring.

Wrapping herself in the mantra of Britannia, Margaret Thatcher continues to call for a referendum on the issue of single European currency. 'Let the people speak' she thunders imperiously in the commons.

*The Prime Minister remains unmoved. Mr Major sees no reason to hold a referendum on the result of the Maastricht Summit. He is against **plebiscites** in general. He is for **parliamentary democracy**.*

Rightly he refuses to be browbeaten by his predecessor...

***No chord of patriotic emotion remains unstruck** as she scorns John Major's government for its 'arrogance' in declining to contemplate a referendum.*

Coming from a lady with not only a towering faith in her own rectitude but also a previous record of opposition to the use of referendum, that is ripe indeed".

(Daily Mail, 25.11.1991)

The editorial goes on to dismiss what it presents as sensationalist claims from Thatcher and other Eurosceptics. While such output regarding British membership of the EU could not be classified as unequivocal in its support, but rather offers 'conditional unity'; it is, however, most definitely deferential and not to the once revered Iron Lady.

The treatment of Thatcher here is recurrent throughout the tabloid media during the build-up to Maastricht, but more telling is what she appears to represent within this narrative. Thatcher is constructed as a symbol of regression, irrationality, and mockery. By association, so are the ideational kernels or symbols she attempts to draw upon; "**No chord of patriotic emotion remains unstruck**", yet this does nothing to persuade the reader that she has legitimacy or reason on her side. It is the calm and measured nature of the 'unmoved' Major that commands respect. In comparison to the findings of the next chapter this output is evidently far less polemical, which could be mistaken for balanced journalism. However, returning to the issues of sovereignty and identity, Thatcher is not misguided to suggest the people should be included in a national debate, nor do her warnings merit the scorn they receive here and throughout the case study.

It would be comparable to apply the populist narrative of 'project fear', in as much as anything that fails to conform to an existing world view is immediately dismissed, derided and mocked. Such coverage makes any notion of collective learning in the public sphere regarding both the immediate and the longer-term consequences of Maastricht very unlikely and lays

the foundations for future accusations of conspiracy and deceit. The Europeanization of media discourse is starting to indicate a relationship to sustained substantive under-engagement, and dismissal or avoidance of a plurality of perspectives.

5.44 'Neutrality':

'Neutral' (0) output regarding British membership had become the discursive norm by 1992, a notable shift from the first case study. No longer can we talk of a positive public sphere regarding membership, but rather a balanced, if partisan contingent sphere. As is self-evident, neutral coverage expresses or infers no preference regarding British membership. This ought to contribute to public understanding, but this output remains widely under-engaged in the substantive implications of integration. 'neutrality' sees further discussion of broader foreign policy issues in which British membership or Anglo-European relations are secondary considerations. In the Mirror data, 10% of articles coded as 'neutral' (0), are primarily concerned with developments on the FYR and collapsing USSR. This rises to closer to 20% for the right-wing publications. As such, while this output meets the criteria for 'neutrality' on the 'separation scale', as it does not express a value judgement regarding British membership, integration itself is not the primary focus and output frames it as foreign policy concern. 'neutrality' records an expansion of articles with a primary domestic focus, in which, again, Maastricht or integration are secondary concerns.

Partisan affiliation retains a strong relationship to the orientation of domestically framed output. The Mail consistently constructs Major as a figure of authority, praising his "frank answers and no passes" (Mail, 09.04.92) in response to Labour's critique of his management of Maastricht, and attacks Kinnock for his failure to adequately respond to the "risk" that "refugees" may pose to the UK (Mail, 26.03.92). The Express is equally critical of Kinnock, indicating the Labour leader "ducks TV questions on Europe" and he is running "out of puff for Major challenge" (27.11.91). The Sun asserts that the "PM won't be bullied" by Labour opposition in the build-up to the TEU (Sun, 30.11.91). Labour's policy toward integration is decried as "nightmare on Kinnock street" (Sun, 08.04.92), while the Express views Labour policy on integration as a "road to ruin" (Express, 20.03.92).

Understandably the Mirror offers something of a distinct perspective given its partisan affiliation. As was noted above, it offers the least positive output on the 'separation scale'. This is tied to partisan preferences, and again neutral output offers a vehicle for an expression of these preferences. The Mirror asks Major if there is "summit wrong?" (10.12.91) in a critique of the Prime Minister's handling of the negotiations. The Mirror is consistently critical of Conservative aims regarding the social opt-out. However, this narrative is not critical of British membership, but rather the government's management of negotiations and membership. It seeks to outline the "painful truth" (Mirror, 13.03.92) of the lost opportunity to participate in a social Europe. While these perspectives are critical, they do not object to the UK's place within an integrated framework, as such critical discourse analysis supports the classification of such output as neutral.

Internal party dynamics are also recurrent throughout 'neutrality'; however, this is only evident in the right-wing press. The Mirror is critical of the government, while its right-wing counterparts are critical of Conservatives who question or challenge Major. The Mail supports Major as he "ruled out a referendum" (Mail, 20.11.91) and recognises his understandable "fury at Maggie and co." (Mail, 25.11.91), dismissing calls from Eurosceptics to open up a national public debate. It goes on to praise his management of the rebels, asserting his composure and moderation ensured "Major (was) left unmarked by Tory Euro clashes" (Mail, 27.11.91). The Express is equally one-sided in its coverage of Tory party dynamics, decrying the rebellion as a "Euro ambush" (Express, 15.11.91) in a piece entitled "Irony Lady v Quiet Man", wholly dismissing Thatcher and her actions as a "distraction" (Express, 26.11.91), while Major is not questioned. Rather, Major's conduct throughout the period is held in high regard; the Express claims it is "time to trumpet Tory triumphs" (Express, 01.04.92). The narrative evident in the Sun is consistent with that in the Mail and Express. With regard to the Tory rebels, The Sun calls for Major to get "up and at 'em" (Sun, 15.02.92) and supports "Major's mission" (Sun, 16.12.91) to quell the dissent.

Over a quarter of neutral articles utilise integration as a vehicle to express a perspective on primarily domestic (non-European) concerns. As shown, these perspectives are closely tied to partisan preferences. Equally, while such output is critical in the broader sense, it is not critical of British membership. It utilises integration as a frame to re-affirm existing domestic

preferences. Consequently, this output cannot be considered as indicative of substantive Europeanization, but rather under-engagement.

The majority of the remaining neutral output is framed around what are best understood as peripheral or low-salience issues. These include payment structures and times (for examples see Sun, 09.12.91, Mail 27.11.91, Express, 14.04.92), food regulations (for examples see Sun, 27.11.91, Express, 14.02.92, Mail, 11.12.91), working regulations (for examples see Express, 27.04.92, Mail, 29.11.91 Sun, 06.03.92) and transport and environmental regulations (for examples see Express, 20.04.92, Sun, 24.03.92, Mail 13.11.91). This does represent a degree of Europeanization as British media are engaged with the domestic implications of European legal and regulatory structures. However, these issues are technocratic, low in terms of salience and lack substantive critical engagement. As such, while the quantitative analysis initially suggested a major growth in neutral, and consequently balanced, Europeanized media output, further qualitative analysis indicates the Europeanization of tabloid coverage is far less pronounced than the Likert scales would imply. Furthermore, it lacks substantive or critical engagement with the most salient issues entailed in the shift of competence legislated for in the TEU.

5.45 Negative coverage of British Membership

Maastricht sees a collapse in both normative objection and normative support coded via the 'separation scale', with tabloid coverage no longer engaging in the more abstract dimensions of integration with regard to British membership. Interestingly we actually see a reversal of the assertions evident in the first case study, supporting the conclusion that party affiliation has a strong relationship to output throughout both case studies assessed so far. However, this further highlights the limitations of Europeanized discourse, and the emerging gulf between engagement and the substantive implications of change entailed in the TEU.

5.46 'Detachment':

As was evident in the previous case study, the Mirror differed from the from the other three tabloids; once again it offers a degree of divergence from its right-wing counterparts. As

displayed in the combined separation scale bar chart above, the Mirror codes the greatest divergence between 'conditional unity' (1) and 'detachment' (-1). However, and as remains a consistent feature across the case studies, it also publishes far less European output. While nearly a third (29%) of the articles coded for the Mirror meet the criteria for 'detachment', this amounts to only 15 articles across a 6-month window. All of these are framed in partisan terms, which returning to the coding matrix includes dismissal of those promoting integration (as long as it does not become visceral or personal, as this is coded via the normative criteria, i.e. -2). This accounts for the divergence evident here. The Prime Minister is a "Euro flop", as the paper dismisses "Mr Major's claims of a triumph" (Mirror, 16.12.1991). The paper, as one would anticipate, covers divisions in the Conservative Party in critical terms, "Tories in Euro split" (Mirror, 19.11.1991). Furthermore, while criticism of the Conservatives frames all of the Mirror's negative engagement, it is critical of British membership under Conservative stewardship, and as such meets the criteria for 'detachment'. This is very much framed around what British membership means under a Conservative administration, and as such only objects to integration on the basis of Conservative terms. The Mirror views form and function of integration under these terms as a risk to the value and influence afforded by integration; 'Euro deal leaves us out in the cold' (Mirror, 11.12.91).

"Mr Major's refusal to sign the single currency was also formally confirmed. It means that on the two most important sections, Britain is condemned to the second tier of a two-tier Europe".

(Daily Mirror, 11.12.1991)

The Mirror does not, at this juncture, offer positive discourse on the single market, which it will do in the final case study, but counters Conservative claims regarding monetary and social union. As such one could argue that such output does serve something of collective learning function. However, the Mirror accounts for just 9% of the complete data set, and as such its impact on the wider public sphere, as well as its focus on Europe, must be recognised as marginal.

The right-wing publications meeting 'detached' (-1) criteria are equally partisan, warning of what European integration could be under Labour. The Sun warns that under Labour's direction we would risk entering a social Europe, within which "we can't spend our own cash"

(Sun, 27.01.1992). The Daily Mail claims that Labour and Kinnock don't even know their own position vis-à-vis Europe; their "credibility was blown apart" (Mail, 09.12.1991), so how can the public trust their leadership on the matter? The Express warns of a taxation burden that would be bought to bear on British business, if Labour oversee integration, after Kinnock agreed with the idea of tax harmonisation; such an admission by Labour is decried as a "spectacular own goal" (Express, 21.11.1991). All publications, via their overt partisan claims, demonstrate that European issues are more salient when they reinforce, or permit partisan attacks.

While output regarding monetary union and financial concerns is both limited in volume and under-engaged, the right-wing tabloids do offer coverage of this in detached terms, this broadly relates to whether the UK can secure its opt-outs as this concern remains "unresolved" (Mail, 06.12.1991). The Mail does briefly comment on the scope for excessive economic regulation, again very limited, but worth noting as this is the first discourse framed around "European red-tape" and the limits it may place on "economic freedom" (Mail 23.11.1991). The Express relays claims by the Eurosceptic Bruges Group, warning of the risks of Europeanized taxation "which Brussels would impose" on the UK (Express, 21.11.1991). The Sun provides the starkest warning in material terms; "Euro threat to British" (Sun, 18.11.1991), and rather predictably this is tied to where Labour may seek to take integration.

There is a range of valid critique coded across these criteria, and some evidence of more Europeanized perspectives on British membership. However, this remains a minority within the data set, accounting for 22% of all articles examined. Europeanization, at this juncture, is in transition and it is premature to talk of coherent narratives or consistent output regarding membership. It is clear that the growth in the martially framed critique represented by 'detachment' (-1) does partially increase the plurality of perspectives on British membership and Anglo-European relations. However, critical discourse analysis indicates this is more as bi-product of partisan preferences and concerns, than direct evidence of substantive and sustained Europeanization.


5.5 Understanding the findings of the Conflict Scale

The conflict scale was designed to understand the construction of supranational aims, actors and institutions in the British public sphere. Whereas the 'separation scale' focuses exclusively on national considerations, the 'conflict scale' moves to a wider frame for analysis, coding only coverage regarding the supranational dimensions to integration. To code and map this dimension of Europeanization this scale focuses on if, how, and in what terms these supranational dimensions to the process of integration become present in tabloid output. As was shown in the previous chapter, 60% of all tabloid output had no engagement at this level at all, which is to say, nearly two thirds of all the articles coded in 1975 were coded exclusively for content on British membership. The first case study identified a substantive structural deficit regarding supranational issues. The question that follows whether this is going to remain a feature of tabloid coverage, or has the process of integration contributed to change in this regard?

5.51 Positive, neutral and non-engagement in Coverage of Supranational Aims, Actors and Institutions


Of the 565 articles coded in 1991-92, less than 10% offered any form of positive engagement with supranational aims, actors and institutions. It is increasingly evident that this component of the public sphere may have a structural imbalance with regard to non-domestic considerations. However, the Mirror provides something of a contradiction within this data set, and in reference to this imbalance. This merits a brief return to the separation scale, and a direct comparison to the findings of the conflict scale for this publication. Graph's 5.d and 5.e highlight a feature of Mirror discourse that is unique to this publication and this data set, which requires explanation.

Graph showing the 'separation scale' for Mirror articles in 1991-92:



Graph 5.d (author's own data): This graph shows the coding of Mirror data, along the 'separation scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1991-92, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of the signing of the TEU on the 7th of February 1992 (i.e. 07.11.1991-07.05.1992). The data represents a quantitative overview of Mirror discourse regarding European integration from a domestic perspective indicating preferences toward British membership.

Graph showing the 'conflict scale' for Mirror articles in 1991-92:



Graph 5.e (Author's own data) this graph shows the coding of Mirror data, along the 'conflict scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1991-92, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of the signing of the TEU on the 7th of February 1992 (i.e. 07.11.1991-07.05.1992). The data represents a quantitative overview of Mirror discourse regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions perspective indicating preferences toward the supranational dimension of integration.

As has been outlined in the previous section on the 'separation scale', and is evident in Graph 5.d, the Mirror was far more critical of the British membership than it was supportive; 29.4% of Mirror output was critical, while just 3.9% was supportive. As detailed in Graph 5.e, it is also negative regarding supranational coverage. However, this is the only such example throughout the entirety of the research in which a publication is more positive in its coverage of non-domestic aims and agency than it is regarding the British membership. This anomaly is tied directly to the partisan nature of European media output in the domestic public sphere and will receive consideration in the following sections.


5.52 'Passive support':

'Passive support' (1) avoids normative and ideational considerations, those that are most salient in affecting popular support and public opinion. It is restricted to the coding of material concerns, or frames for the coverage of supranational actors, aims and institutions. Despite the focus of the 'conflict scale' being the supranational dimension of integration, again critical discourse analysis highlights the sustained dominance of nationally framed perspectives. Positive coverage at a supranational level in the Mirror provides a structural vehicle for critical perspectives regarding the national administration and the Conservative party. One of the most engaged articles throughout the entire case study was published by Alistair Campbell for the Mirror under the title "Fighting for the future" (Mirror, 09.12.1991). Although one might anticipate a normative, possibly even emotive, defence of integration and its aims, the content broadly restricts itself to a tangible and material discussion. As such, and as with vast majority of the limited positive coverage identified by this scale, it is confined to 'passive support' (1); support premised on tangible benefits and positive outcomes (see scale for full definition).

The piece asks 22 questions covering both national and supranational dimensions. It discusses supranational aims to "improve the standard of living for all Community citizens". The Q & A structure follows this claim with positive reinforcement; "Sounds good. What are the chances of agreement?" Campbell outlines the challenges cooperation between multiple

nation states entails and the possibility of the need for future negotiation to reach consensus. The article then presents a series of claims regarding the aims of European Union (as it would become) including; “forc[ing] the UK to improve working and social conditions”, “more EC aid”, and developing the “economic muscle to compete with the US and Japan.” Such nuanced and comprehensive discussion is unique to the Mirror, but the framing draws into question the primary focus of such a piece. The article is accompanied by a mocking satirical cartoon of Major, deriding his ability to negotiate, while the article asserts the only “real opposition comes from the UK”, “Major fears if he signs the pact it will split the Tories”, failure could prove a “disaster for the UK economy”, but Major will probably “present a climbdown...as a triumph”. As such, once again coverage is as much framed in terms of domestic preferences as it is in terms of supranational aims and institutions. There is an emerging divergence between the right-wing publications as evident in 5.f.

Graph showing the findings of the ‘conflict scale’ for all articles, across all individual publications in 1991-92:



Graph 5.f (author’s own data): this graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications combined, along the ‘conflict scale’ as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1991-92, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of the signing of the TEU on the 7th of February 1992 (i.e. 07.11.1991-07.05.1992).. The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions perspective indicating preferences toward the supranational dimension of integration. This data is categorized by publication indicating consistency and variation between tabloids.

As evident in Graph 5.f the Mirror is the most positive in relative terms (i.e. as a proportion of Mirror output). However, the right-wing publications offer more 'passive support' in absolute terms (i.e. number of articles) for supranational aims, actors and institutions than the Mirror. This is because the Mirror accounts for just 8.5% of all the articles coded for this case study. The majority of these articles would meet Kilgore's criteria for 'collective learning' (Kilgore, 1999), and as such would equally contribute to Meyer's conception of the prerequisites for legitimacy, accountability, responsiveness and authorisation (Meyer, 1999). However, Europeanized output in this publication, is evidently less common than in right wing publications.

The Mail proclaimed the treaty negotiated by Major will be "good for Europe, [and] great for Britain" (Mail, 12.12.91), arguing that the Conservative Prime Minister has skilfully avoided excesses of integration, in the form of the 'Social Charter', while making the most of the growing single market. The Express is equally supportive of economic integration and the framework for undertaking it; in an editorial the paper lays out the case as to "Why we must go forward" with European integration (Express, 04.12.91). Once again, we see praise of Major for avoidance of the social dimension, but this is juxtaposed with support for the aims, aspirations and institutions that drive the single market. The Sun doesn't deviate from this narrative in the articles coded for 'passive support' (1), the supranational market remaining the focus. It argues that the British and Germans are now "uber allies" in terms of economic aims for an effective single market (Sun, 23.01.92), and highlights business are seeking an appropriate structure to oversee such a market as "bosses want European link-up" (Sun, 09.12.91). This coverage from the right-wing publications does represent noteworthy Europeanization; it entails more substantive engagement with the supranational aims and institutions of integration.

However, all articles meeting the criteria for 'passive support' account for just 8.9% of the data set. As such, while this is indicative of positive Europeanization in terms of potential implications for 'collective learning' and supranational legitimacy in the domestic context, the volume of 'passive support' (1) limits the degree of potential influence it wields over the

public sphere. The Mirror, which is most predisposed toward positive coverage of supranational aims, actors and institutions, as evident in Graph 5.f, is also the least likely to publish on European affairs. Furthermore, as will become evident below, it is dwarfed by negative and non-engaged tabloid output with regard to supranational aims, actors and institutions.

This is indicative of emerging patterns that will repeat in the final case study, and supports the use of a path dependent theoretical framework. There is growing evidence of structures that will prove consistent across the final two case studies, and that has precedent in the first relating to the depth of coverage, the form and focus of engagement with the supranational dimension to integration, and the propensity to publish Europeanized output. This supports the assertion of “dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 6), but this will be returned to below.

5.53 ‘Active support’:

‘Active support’ (2) entails appeal to normative or ideational values. As such, it is more salient in terms of influence upon popular support. However, the articles that meet these criteria account for less than 1% of output in 1991-92. Just four articles, all from the Mail, offer positive coverage in these terms, as they entail discussions of a vision for Europe, and as such meet the normative criteria to count in the scale’s definition of ‘active support’ (2). However, it is presented as “Major’s vision of creating a true community” (Mail, 09.12.1991). An editorial argues for moving “forward together” as a “community” and is juxtaposed with the violence and suffering in the “bloody Balkans” and the “wreckage of what was the Soviet Union” but again frames this as partisan contingent because “John Major is the right man” (Mail, 08.12.1991).

This outlines the heights of both engaged and positive coverage. However, it is evident that national partisan perspectives are a driving consideration behind both forms of engagement. The Mirror produces more positive coverage in proportional terms than any other publication, with 15.7% out output from this publication meeting the criteria for positive

support. Nonetheless, negative output from this publication still exceeds positive, as shown in the data below. Furthermore, given that the Mirror accounts for just 8.5% of all articles coded, it is evident that the publication most disposed to positive coverage of integration is least likely to publish. This trend will continue throughout the final case study, but it is worth noting at this juncture that there is an emerging structural resistance to positive and engaged coverage on this scale and, where it does exist, it is tied to partisan preferences.

5.54 'Neutrality':


'Neutrality' (0) on the 'conflict scale' codes articles that do not entail a particular value judgement regarding supranational aims, actors or institutions. As was noted in the previous chapters, this can occur in different ways: engaged coverage entails a plurality of perspectives in its output, but does not assume or express a particular preference toward them; under-engagement entails narrow framing of an issue; and non-engagement, only existent along this scale, refers to a complete avoidance of supranational considerations or perspectives. The First Case Study coded for a non-engagement rate of 60%, with under-engagement accounting for 38% of the remaining 40%. This case study codes a significant fall in non-engagement to 23%, which contributes to an explanation of 'neutrality' (0) indicated in the data above. The most significant finding, however, is that engaged coverage climbs only to 5%, with under-engagement now the norm. Under-engagement entails coverage of supranational aims, actors and actors, without a clear and evident value judgement, but omits adequate perspectives or consideration of highly salient factors. For example, the Mail reports Kohl will ensure the EU "drop the F-word" (Mail, 27.11.91), however, there is no consideration of the expansion of competences entailed in the TEU, which Eurosceptic critics would argue serve as a precursor to an increasingly Federalist structure. The Express offers a comparable omission when it reports the "F-word scrapped" (Express, 04.12.91). Returning to the overview of the Maastricht Treaty outlined above, the increased supranational competence in the first pillar, as well as the aspirations for further integration in the ideationally sensitive second and third pillar, all entail significant reductions in the traditional notions of national sovereignty; these substantive changes could easily be critiqued for their federalist tendencies. Neither paper did so.

The Express reports on mounting concerns over “trade war fears” (Express, 23.12.91) that could develop with other trade blocks and nations following the passage of Maastricht. This represents a recognition of the potential competition and economic conflict that may arise from the TEU, however, there is no consideration of the negative relationship between supranational trading competence and former national pre-eminence in the domain of trade. The establishment of a single market effectively ends member state competence in matters of trade. Such a seismic shift in the authority of the nation state certainly merits consideration in the context of coverage of the changing dynamics of international trade. Nonetheless, the Express has either failed to appreciate the evident change or deemed it superfluous to this discussion on trade.

The Sun is equally limited in its neutral assessment of supranational developments and aims. For example, reporting on (trade) “union’s Euro link-up” (Sun, 07.02.92), it provides coverage of the increased potential for unions to collaborate via a European framework. However, it omits any engagement with shifting competencies in terms of labour or work place regulation. In coverage of the “EC food deal” (Sun, 27.11.91) there is a limited discussion of the harmonisation of standards required for the single market, however, there is no discussion of CAP, the cost associated, or divergence in terms of agriculture and import patterns between member states.

While this limited growth in engagement may be a marked improvement from the previous data set, it still falls short of making a substantive contribution to collective learning. Simply put, the growth in neutral coverage on this scale does not equate to a significant growth of engaged coverage; as such it does little to alter levels of public understanding regarding the process of integration. Once again, qualitative assessment in the form of critical discourse analysis highlights a far less Europeanized, and engaged, public sphere than an exclusively quantitative analysis would suggest.

5.55 Negative Coverage of Supranational Aims, Actors and Institutions



Graph 5.g (Author's own data): This graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications combined, along the 'conflict scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 1991-92, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of the signing of the TEU on the 7th of February 1992 (i.e. 07.11.1991-07.05.1992). The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions perspective indicating preferences toward the supranational dimension of integration.

Europeanization is understood as change emanating from the process of integration. Graph 5.g draws into focus significant change from the previous case study. Negative coverage on this scale accounted for 9.7% of output in 1975, but has jumped to 48.8% by 1991-92: the change emanating from this process is clear. While the findings of the 'separation scale' focused on British membership coded for balanced coverage, the conflict scale indicates a stark difference in the coverage of supranational aims, actors and institutions.

Europeanization is developing a relationship to Eurosceptic output.

As noted by Machil et al, in their review of media output, citizens are "essentially dependent" upon the media to serve as an information conduit within modern society (Machil et al, 2006: 62). Recognising this dependency alongside an understanding of legitimacy is contingent upon an "informed and enlightened citizenry" (Dahl, 1994: 31). The data above serves to anticipate a negative change in public opinion toward supranational aims, actors and institutions. Media output may have a proclivity toward being negative, as this serves commercial ends, but it is the increasing singularity of perspectives and the absence of adequate engagement that support this assessment.

5.56 'Suspicion':

'Suspicion' (-1) codes output that frames the risk to member states in primarily material, regulatory or economic terms, viewing supranational actors, aims and institutions as a financial drain and regulatory burden; it is inherently suspicious of the supranational level of governance. However, it does avoid the overtly normative or ideational concerns that will become prolific by the final case study. That said, it also codes for pejorative and satirical coverage of European actors, institutions and aims.

As has been the case throughout the analysis so far, negative output focuses heavily on actors and differing degrees of Eurosceptic discourse towards them. 'Suspicion' (-1) records the largest growth in output, viewing supranational aims, actors and institutions as a drain, or impediment. The, now established, mocking nomenclature 'Eurocrats' becomes a rhetorical device for deriding European civil servants, as well as constructing an image of an unaccountable, and by extension illegitimate, institution. The Mail calls for "Eurocrats (to be) unmasked" (Mail, 18.11.1991), The Express warns Major to guard against the "ever ambitious Eurocrats in Brussels" (Express, 19.11.1991), and The Sun decries the "Eurocrats...(as) meddling politicians" (Sun, 25.11.1991). Despite its substantive divergence, the Mirror has also accepted this rhetorical device as it mocks "half-baked Eurocrats" (Mirror, 16.11.91) in claims regarding regulation affecting the name of Eccles Cakes. This term has already assumed universal coverage across publications; all are consistent regarding their 'suspicion' of supranational bureaucrats.

Conversely, national actors are presented in terms of reverence for their resistance to the growing risk posed by such 'Eurocrats'. The Conservative negotiation team at Maastricht are considered "heroes" (Mail, 29.11.91) for their "valiant" resistance and the Mail praises Major for throwing down the "gauntlet" (Mail, 07.12.91), declaring he has won "by a knock-out" (Mail, 11.12.91) in his fight with these supranational bureaucrats. 'Conflict' is an increasingly salient concept for the coding of this coverage and supported by the use of critical discourse analysis. The 'gauntlet' draws on the figure of an old-fashioned military glove; throwing it down preceded a violent duel. The concept of a 'knock-out' reinforces this notion of physical combat between national and supranational actors.

Whilst we have not moved onto consider the final coding matrix on this scale, 'conflict' has already assumed the role of a recurrent and dominant theme across negative coverage. The Express asserts Major must not "surrender" to these "Eurocrats" (Express, 11.11.91) and supports "Major's vow" (Express, 12.12.91) to defend national interests, from supranational incursions, at all costs. Major, himself, as noted in the outset of the chapter, contributed to this dichotomy.

The construction of a foreign (supranational) enemy serves domestic political ends effectively, allowing national actors to, in effect, outsource points of resistance and objection. The value of such framing is evident as the Conservatives claim success in their conflict with supranational actors over the framework for integration established in the TEU; "Tories claim victory in war with Delors" (Express, 06.01.92). The Sun supports this framing of conflict between supranational and national actors, proclaiming "Major is in battle" (Sun, 07.11.91) with supranational institutions. Furthermore, there is a clear gulf in terms of authority, and by extension legitimacy, afforded to national actors in comparison to their supranational counterparts. In a piece entitled "Cometh the hour, cometh the man", Major is constructed in terms of reverence, while the same piece mocks Delors and "Eurocrats", painting them as wasteful if not corrupt.

This assault on the authority and legitimacy of supranational actors assumes the role of coherent and consistent narrative by 1991-92, across both 'suspicion' (-1) and 'over objection' (-2), to differing degrees. While Major is widely praised for his fortitude, temperament and authority, European actors are presented as weak, farcical, and emotional. It is claimed "Delors to resign if Major is EC winner" (Sun, 06.12.91) and that Delors cannot handle the fortitude and courage of his British counterparts. In a piece entitled "Delors and Farce" (Sun, 29.02.92), he is widely mocked in terms of authority and ability, while the paper goes on to celebrate as "Delors' hopes ruined" (Sun, 11.04.92). The Mail calls for the necessity of capitalising upon the weakness of supranational actors; "don't beat the retreat, sound the advance" (Mail, 08.01.92). Although this growth in coverage of the supranational dimension to output on European affairs marks clear and evident Europeanization of British media coverage, there is an emerging gulf between national and supranational narratives. While the former serves to generate and re-affirm legitimacy, the latter constitutes an increasing discursive assault, premised upon rationale concerns (in the 'suspicion' data set) regarding

integrity, authority and ability. However, not only does such discourse raise notable concerns in terms of authority and legitimacy, it goes further than that. The alarming finding regarding these narratives that frame the negotiations, is that 'conflict' is generated and, by extension, a need for national defence established, despite this being a fallacy. Such frames were clearly salient in the context of global and European wars; the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty is not a war.

5.57 'Overt objection':

'Overt objection' (-2) codes explicit appeals to normative or ideational concerns. It is overtly hostile to the aims of integration, and supranational actors and institutions. This discourse is fundamentally at odds with the development of any notion of legitimacy as it attacks integrity at the supranational level. This coding scheme maps output that has a zero-sum relationship with Meyer's (1999) criteria for legitimacy, authorisation, responsiveness and accountability.

Just as Tony Benn and Michael Foot were figures of visceral ridicule in the first case study, Jacques Delors finds himself the most recurrent target for the emergence of pejorative Eurosceptic frames that code the growing 'overt objection' (-2). 'Overt objection' frames the risk that supranational aims, actors and institutions pose in highly normative and emotive terms. Such discourse is entirely incompatible with popular perceptions of legitimacy, as it constructs the 'other' as an overt threat producing an unsustainable dichotomy.

"Delors want to be Emperor of all Europe

Power mad EC chief Jaques Delors wants to become Emperor of Europe.

Delors claims he turned down the chance to become Prime Minister of France to rule the whole of Europe...when he revealed his Napoleon Bonaparte-style plan.

...But Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd rejects the empire building scheme.

And Tory Euro MP Bryan Cassidy said "Delors already has too much power".

One Euro Chief warned: Instead of Delors become the servant of Europe, he would become the 20th Century European Emperor"

(The Sun, 04.05.1992)

Again, this article has been selected for its value in highlighting not only the structure of these emerging frames, but also the emergence of what will become recognised as ‘post-truth’ politics, prevalent in the referendum campaign in 2016 and other current populist political movements. Key to the Eurosceptic frame present here are linguistic references to conflict and use of associated symbols or ideational kernels. Alongside the article sits an image designed to evoke a cognitive short cut to a time when Europe posed a military threat to the UK; Delors’ face is super-imposed on a painting of Bonaparte. The recurrent references to Empire and Emperor serve to reinforce the severity of the threat this implied tyrant poses. The reference to ‘a Napoleon Bonaparte-style plan’ serves to reinforce this notion of a European dictator.

Delors’ proposal sought to improve the performance of the Commission and reform the rotating presidency to account for post-Maastricht changes in the polity. Certainly, as with all efforts at reform at a European level, there is always objection, but it is the absence of any quotation from Hurd and the inability to provide a source for the quote that claims Delors aspires to an empire that is most revealing. Editorial judgements are being made that accept the promotion of misinformation or fallacies. These are more measured, as there is a genuine proposal underwriting output, than the myths that develop in the next data set, but we can identify the start of a tendency. The set codes an increased relative prevalence of personal attacks with over 10% of the output in February attacking Delors directly; “It’s time for Jacques to take a jump” (The Sun, 13.02.92), “No, Jacques, it is not all right” (Daily Mail, 13.02.92), or recycling “Up yours Delors (Part 2)” (The Sun, 03.02.92).

Media output at this juncture is not yet dominated by such fantastical claims, however, increasingly pejorative Eurosceptic frames account for the growth of ‘overt objection’. This divisive and conflictual discourse is already present in all the right-wing tabloids.

“Kraut Bid to ban us

German Euro MPs yesterday called for Britain to be kicked out the EC in revenge for John Major’s Maastricht Triumph!”

(The Sun, 13.12.1991)

The recurrent references to conflict are present across publications. It is disconcerting that such divisive if not offensive language is normalized. It is clearly designed to provoke associations with previous and brutal conflicts. The emotive association with the term 'Kraut' is beyond question, the Sun seeking to imply an association with horrors such as the Battle of the Somme or Nazism. However, what they are actually talking about are dissident MPs within the European Parliament; the contexts are stark in their difference.

However, the Sun is far from unique in the expansion of this discourse of conflict. In another hyperbolic claim on Jaques Delors, he is claimed to have launched a "vitriolic attack on Britain" (Mail, 09.12.1991), with the Mail, in a series of articles, urging there can be "No surrender" (Mail, 15.11.1991) or some variation on this theme. The Express also accepted such frames; Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd won a "Battle of Waterloo to smash Jaques Delors" (Express, 14.11.1991). While these frames remain a minority, accounting for 8.7% of output as indicated in the graph above, they have been accepted as normalised by all but the Daily Mirror. Europeanization is evident, but it is the change driven by integration that has produced an increasingly Eurosceptic engagement.

What is apparent from this data set is that Maastricht does mark a major point of departure from the first case study. A scale to measure the construction of conflict in media output may have looked extreme or even hyperbolic in the context of the first referendum; the second data set supports this scale. Only via a sensitivity to the emergence of such discourse can we better understand later developments in Europeanized discourse in the national context.

5.6 Europeanized Public Spheres

The chapter will now briefly compare the findings of this case study with the comparable public spheres in Germany and France, to evaluate if we can identify fundamental differences with their British counterpart. As was evident in the previous case study, the political class remain paramount in terms of defining how 'Europe' is constructed in the national public sphere. In Britain, France and Germany discursive leadership continues to come from the political elite. As was evident above, Major is widely relayed in terms of authority, and his administration strongly conditions media coverage of British-Anglo relations and the merits

of British membership of the EU. With regard to supranational actors, aims and institutions, media coverage is dramatically more critical, however, this does not yet represent substantive divergence from the political class, as Major contributes to this dichotomy. While British tabloid media discourse may differ in terms of degree, Major does construct conflict for the purposes of domestic consumption.

As was also shown in the previous chapter, there is political capital to be acquired in the domestic British context by presenting oneself as an agent seeking to defend national interests, irrelevant to whether they are under attack, or not. Furthermore, and as was reflected in the data obtained via the 'separation scale', integration and British membership are widely constructed in material or functional terms. Major and his government advocate the benefits in terms of a growing single market, and the economic value of membership. As a result, this is how integration and membership become presented in the media. Normative defences of integration have all but disappeared, while normative critiques, focused upon supranational concerns, are in the ascendancy.

This is distinct from the public sphere in Germany. Speaking just after the passage of the TEU, Helmut Kohl outlined two possible futures for Europe; continued and increasing unity or a reversion to "national divisions and rivalries" (from Banchoff, 1997: 63). Kohl defended the European Union as the "the most effective insurance against a re-emergence of nationalism, chauvinism and racism" (from Banchoff, 1997: 63). In discussion of the need to support and promote the restructuring and expansion of supranational institutions, the Chancellor of Germany called on Germans to "empathise with the ideas of our partners" (from Banchoff, 1997: 63). Such discourse must evidently be understood in the light of German history. However, it does represent a direct appeal to ideational and normative concerns, as well as explicitly supporting the institutions and partners central to integration, that is absent in the case study above. Despite the changing geo-political context that the end of the Cold War ushered in, German preferences regarding integration did not dramatically shift.

The unification of Germany could have driven a major re-appraisal of normative attitudes towards, and discourse regarding, the European Union. However, if anything, support and associated discourse grew apace; "the German government accelerated rather than slowed down its support for further progress in European integration" (Risse, 2010: 10). What is noteworthy is that, despite major change in terms of both global and national context,

German discourse and identity has contributed to consensus and continuity regarding European integration until Maastricht and beyond. This highlights the value and importance of ideational and discursive construction. Realist analysis at the time predicted a substantive shift, however, “Germany’s commitment to European integration...long outlive[d] the context in which it had originally emerged” (Risse, 2010: 10). Ideas, and the identity that they constitute, matter.

As Banchoff acknowledges “historical memory played a central role” in conditioning German preferences towards, and discourse regarding, the process of integration; contributing to the development of a supranational component to national identity (Banchoff, 1997: 73). This is not confined to the public sphere that develops around Maastricht, but remains central to understanding German Europeanization and national discursive variation in the response to the pressures of integration. Equally, any valid analysis of the British public sphere must recognise and appreciate the value of a historical perspective. The distinction of the British historical perspective helps to construct a substantively distinct idea of ‘Europe’ from that of both France and Germany. While features of the German and French public spheres are present in the UK, it is scope, degree and priorities that underwrite this substantive variation.

France inherently has a distinct historical perspective compared with their German counterparts. This colours the public sphere and discourse that develops around Maastricht. France lacks the level of consensus evident in Germany, and there is contention regarding French identity, discourse and preferences at this time, evident in the need for a referendum. However, the focus and manner of this contest highlights substantive difference from the findings of this case study. That being said, until the debate was opened up in the referendum, Mitterrand’s “discourse about France in Europe predominated, [going] largely unchallenged politically” (Schmidt 2007: 1000). This did shift in the debate preceding the French referendum, however, as has become only too apparent since the British referendum in 2016, a plebiscite is capable of opening major discursive and ideational cleavages and fuelling corresponding division. The ideational and normative considerations, wholly absent from the findings of the ‘separation scale’ above, are present in French discourse, as they are in Germany. Schmidt identified “moments of negative communicative discourse...[that] decried [integration] as a loss of national sovereignty”, as well as detailed objection to the

domestic implications of European policy and competence such as Aerospatiale's proposed take-over of De Havilland and the remit of the Competition Commission (Schmidt 2007: 1000).

French political elites, and by extension French discourse, retain an insecurity and concern regarding resurgent German power in the post-Cold War context. Risse outlines that the "political debates surrounding the referendum on Maastricht...represented identity-related discourses about the new role of France in Europe and the world after the end of the Cold War" (Risse, 2010: 13). In his paper on Nationalism and National Identities, Risse goes on to indicate that, as had been the case following the Second World War, fear of "German power" remained paramount in the ensuing French discourse (Risse, 2010: 13).

In the debate that developed around the referendum, multiple critical perspectives emerged. The discourse that ensued was more critical than that evident in Germany, but it did retain the normative and ideational dimension with regard to national perspectives and implications present in Germany, which was widely absent from British elite political discourse and media coverage. While the French far left did include a focus on the shift in economic competence, debate extended into the more wide-reaching implications of the TEU. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, co-founder of the French Socialist Party, critiqued European integration as the cause of the "loss of (French) sovereignty" (Schmidt, 2007: 1001). On the right, there was even greater concern with the normative and ideational consequences of Maastricht; "La Pen's National Front was obsessed with issues related to immigration and sovereignty", while Phillipe Séguin, who would go on to be the President of the National Assembly, claimed in a national televised debate that to ratify Maastricht "was to give up on national sovereignty and democracy" (Schmidt, 2007: 1001). This brief overview of French discourse highlights a more deliberative and diverse public sphere than was evident in this case study. This certainly shifted, to a degree, after the referendum, but is indicative of greater contestation than was present in the British public sphere surrounding Maastricht. While there were opponents of integration who advocated a return to "traditional balance of power politics", it was the advocates of integration and a continued 'binding' strategy that assumed control of the narrative; "the majority of the French political elite gradually incorporated Europe in notions of French distinctiveness and started identifying the future of France as a nation-state with European order" (Risse, 2010: 13).

Both France and Germany display recurrent normative and ideational engagements in their respective public spheres directly addressing the national implications of integration. In the UK, such framing is exclusive to the supranational aims, actors and institutions, it compromises less than 10% of media output in the data set, and is only conducted in negative terms. As such, the case study has identified substantive omissions vis-a-vis our Franco-German counterparts. These findings are by no means exhaustive as an explanation of further variation that develops in later years, and which will be addressed in the final case study, however, they can certainly contribute to our understanding of national variation and the causes of the break with decades of policy consensus that occurred in 2016.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to map the shift in a defining component of the British public sphere from the first British referendum on Membership of the EEC in 1975, through coding and mapping of tabloid output. This allowed a comparative analysis with the first case study, as well as discussion and analysis of the shift in the discursive landscape. The chapter had to address the significance in both the short and long term, of the institutional reform within the Maastricht Treaty to highlight the value of the TEU as epochal moment and one worth analysing given its association with change from 'permissive consensus' (Linberg & Scheingold, 1970) to 'constraining dissensus' (Hooge & Marks, 2004).

The Treaty on European Union brought into effect the pillar structure, extending the supranational competence over a range of domains, along with the introduction of a closer intergovernmental framework in the sensitive fields of CFSP and JHA. These wide sweeping reforms have been held responsible for the triggering of a change in public opinion, however, this chapter has sought to argue that such a conclusion is incomplete as it fails to fully understand the complexity of the relationship between European integration and its perception within member states. Essential to increasing our understanding of this relationship, this thesis argues, is how these critical junctures are constructed within the public sphere.

To analyse how this critical juncture was constructed in media output, the chapter briefly addressed the substantive changes, before moving to critically engage with debates relating to public engagement, accountability and legitimacy that became prolific in the post-Maastricht era. This was essential to identify the presence or absence of these concerns in the public sphere at the critical juncture in question.

Despite the ramifications of the TEU for traditional notions of statehood, nationality, sovereignty and identity, the case study found such concerns to be broadly absent from the public sphere; both the political and media elites avoided the politicisation of these sensitive issues. This, it has been argued, and will be developed in the next chapter, has been significant in the development of Eurosceptic discourse as it fundamentally limited the scope for public learning, an essential prerequisite to a legitimate framework for regional integration.

The empirical analysis began with a review of frequency to establish if there had been a major change since the last case study. The data initially suggested an increased internalisation of European politics with existing national cleavages and discursive frameworks. However, a closer inspection showed media output on regional politics was still highly event driven and remained closely framed within the domain of foreign policy, which no longer reflected the degree of regional integration Maastricht was bringing into effect.

The data found a balanced public sphere in regard to British membership, although all normative and ideational frames on this scale have all but disappeared by 1992. Rather the 'separation scale' is now limited to coding output framed in material or economic terms. However, there is an increasingly critical perspective in coverage of supranational aims, actors and institutions. This constitutes the first evidence of consistently Eurosceptic discourse in tabloid output. While this discourse was broadly negative in its construction of supranational considerations, it remained substantively under-engaged. The wide-reaching implications of Maastricht were broadly absent from tabloid coverage, and actors who made claims regarding the extent of integration entailed in the TEU were dismissed or mocked. As such this case study recorded evidence that the public sphere suffers from the same short-term outlook that is evident in elite British political discourse. Furthermore, and as was

evident in the previous case study, tabloid media output follows elite discourse in terms of substance and has a growing relationship to partisan affiliation.

At a supranational level, the conflict scale identifies not only an expansion of Eurosceptic coverage but a clear growth of the negative framing and construction of supranational actors. That is to say, the chapter identifies the first instances of hyperbolic pejorative claims, and discourse regarding supranational actors. While the data set remains balanced in its engagement with British membership, the conflict scale identifies a number of the key features of Eurosceptic discourse that will come to define the final case study.

Furthermore, the case study identified structural divergence between the Europeanization of the British public sphere and that of the German and French counterparts. Ideational and normative concerns such as identity and sovereignty are present in French and German discourse with regard to the national effects of regional integration. Equally, there is a recognition of the importance of the change, and its potential implications; while in the British public sphere, the degree of change is broadly limited to material consequences avoiding the more salient implications addressed in France and Germany. This does not constitute exceptionalism, given the increase in 'overt objection' identified above and evident in Graph 5.g, but it does reflect divergence.

The aim of this research is to better understand the Europeanization of media discourse, and the findings of the chapter are starting to map clear change and coherent qualities or features to tabloid output. This case study identifies a number of structural quantities regarding Europeanized media output that are of significance in terms of mapping the process of Europeanization. British media discourse on the national effects of integration avoids normative or ideational considerations at this juncture. It fails to adequately appreciate the importance and implications of the TEU. It omits substantive engagement with the most salient implications in terms of affecting public opinion. Focus on supranational aims, actors and institutions increases significantly, but it does so in negative terms. Furthermore, it lacks depth. The only left-wing publication, *The Mirror*, is the most likely to publish in positive terms regarding supranational concerns, but it is also the least likely to publish any form of Europeanized output. Maastricht is a 'critical juncture', and the tabloid

media discourse via which it becomes present in this component of the public sphere is increasingly structured. In light of the consistency between these findings and those in the next chapter, Europeanization is feeding into a degree of *path dependency*; “events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney, 2000: 507). The event being the signing of TEU, and patterns being those outlined above, the final case study will look to evaluate the deterministic properties of the discourse evident in this data set.

6. The Final Case Study: Cameron's Pledge to a Referendum

*"If we left the EU, we'd have to recognise that most of
our problems aren't caused by Brussels"*

(Boris Johnson, 2013)

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have sought to record and map shifts in British Europeanized tabloid discourse; showing the notable change from what has been termed "permissive consensus to destructive dissent" (Daddow, 2012: 1219). The previous chapter identified structural qualities to tabloid output that are of interest in understanding the development of Euroscepticism. The emergence of an increased focus on supranational actors and institutions occurred in primarily negative terms, and indicated an expansion of normative critique and narratives. The 'separation scale' recorded a complete collapse in normative engagement with the national consequences and implications of integration. The former case study also recorded a lack of substantive depth in tabloid media output. This chapter will assess Europeanized media discourse, at the 'critical juncture' of Cameron's pledge to hold a second referendum, in light of the findings of the last case study.

Following the format of the previous chapters, this chapter will seek to frame the context that developed in the build-up to Cameron's commitment to a second referendum in 2013, drawing attention to the salient pressures and factors that will come to affect British political considerations and media output.

The chapter will provide an overview of context by assessing change in a range of telling domains. Changes in governance will offer an insight into changing political dynamics, partisan concerns, and electoral pressures. Next the chapter will move to address salient phenomenon, and exogenous factors, driving populist nationalism; all of which are essential to understanding the role the media played in Brexit and the preceding debates and discourse.

Following an assessment of context, the chapter will consider the empirical findings of the case study; outlining them in light of the aforementioned considerations to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between populist politics, media output and Europeanization.

As has been addressed in previous chapters, but merits a brief re-emphasis, the research has sought to offer an original contribution to our understanding of the effects of *Europeanization* upon national public spheres. The specific focus being tabloid media output, addressing a previous gap in the literature and mapping the discourse via which integration is presented, constructed and perceived in the national context.

Anderson and Weymouth offered a detailed analysis of both tabloid and broad sheet Eurosceptic press output, in the 1997 General Election, identifying “imaginary threats to the British way of life” (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 136) and a tabloid “Eurosceptic discourse...[both] emotional and ferocious in its opposition to current and future levels of British integration with Europe” (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999: 92). So, any identification of Euroscepticism is far from original, however, the holistic overview this thesis has sought to offer on tabloid output over this period is. Furthermore, with the incorporation of the temporal awareness offered by Historical Institutionalism we can better understand its causes. The recognition of the limited engagement in European affairs identified in the previous empirical chapters, provides a basis for understanding later media output and the growth of Eurosceptic discourse.

6.2 Understanding Context: The Ascendancy of Euroscepticism

The process of European integration has brought to bear notable pressure upon both the major domestic parties, and the British legislative itself; causing division within both parties and parliament. While the previous case study identified levels of deference toward the political class, along partisan lines, in media output that would be alien today, most notably toward Major, this was never reflective of party unity. As the deference dissipates, we can identify the ascendancy of increasingly Eurosceptic discourse.

6.21 The Politics of Division - Europeanization of the national polity

The first case study identified divisions within the Labour party as a key factor in Harold Wilson's electoral commitment to a plebiscite (Crowson, 2010). This has been a characteristic quality of partisan politics, that underwrites much of Britain's history as the 'awkward partner' (George, 1990) and remains an essential factor in understanding the trajectory of Anglo-European relations. Wilson claimed to have renegotiated improved and acceptable terms for his party in 1975, versus those of Heath's entrance in 1973, however, it is now widely accepted that such claims were hyperbolic and primarily for the purposes of domestic consumption (George, 1990; Crowson, 2010). Domestic context changes significantly by the juncture of Maastricht, but this understanding of political method and purpose serves us well in seeking to understand political action.

Labour Party scepticism of the EEC and subsequent single market had been a long-standing feature of the Party's politics, best understood as the product of conflict between an increasingly market, latterly neo-liberal, driven venture and the Party's socialist ideals. The challenge of this long running conflict, contributed to the "longest suicide note in history" (Childs, 2013: 220) in which Foot's manifesto committed to, among other radical policies, the complete withdrawal from the EEC, resulting in party disunity, factionalism, and arguably 14 years in the political wilderness. Certainly, other factors contributed toward Labour's demise, but Europe was both divisive and dangerous for the party.

The relationship of the Conservative Party with Europe is somewhat more complex. Edward Heath was appointed Lord Privy Seal in 1960, and from 1961 was responsible for overseeing efforts to join the EEC. Despite sustained resistance and rejection from de Gaulle, Heath sought to make the Conservatives 'the party of Europe' asserting:

"We are part of Europe by geography, tradition, history, culture and civilisation. We shall continue to work with our friends in Europe for the true unity and strength of this continent".

(Heath from Watts & Pilkington, 2005: 30).

Heath's sustained efforts were finally successful, aided in no small part by the death of de Gaulle, and in 1973 he took Britain into the EEC, cementing his and his Party's status as

supporters of economic integration and the European project in its current form. Thatcher, despite her support of accession in 1973, has a key role in shifting elements of Conservative opinion on Europe. Division was evident in the conflict between Thatcher and two of her Chancellors, Nigel Lawson and John Major, over the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and this division has cast a lasting legacy over subsequent Party dynamics. By 1990 “Thatcher’s increasingly strident Euroscepticism had made her seem out of touch with voters, the mainstream Conservative Party and perhaps even something of an embarrassment”, however, the seeds of future division were sown, and Thatcher’s legacy would be remoulded by future Conservatives as that of a national champion (Copsey & Haughton, 2014: 78). The ‘ideational kernels’ that would go on to form later Conservative Euroscepticism were in place; the Iron Lady had helped sow the seeds of ideational separation that would grow over the coming decades, and will be returned to below.

As the thesis laid out in the last chapter, while Major oversaw the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), this was not without domestic difficulty. It must be stressed, however, that mounting domestic challenges stemming from the process of European Integration, were far from unique to the UK. As Hooghe and Marks note in their insightful *Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration*, with the passage of the TEU “partisan conflict intensified as market integration was extended to monetary union, and as political union once again came on the agenda...party leaders in positions of authority, must look over their shoulders when negotiating European issues. *What they see does not reassure them*” (Hooghe & Marks, 2008: 5, emphasis added). This is not to diminish the importance of partisan divisions, or the emergence of populist discourse, but to indicate that these do not account for any British exceptionalism, if it exists, and we must consider other factors when seeking to understand the growth of Euroscepticism.

Major managed the difficult task of finding terms that would be both acceptable to his European counterparts, while framing his achievements in terms that would be acceptable for domestic consumption and the growing Eurosceptic component of his own party; no small feat, and one that has only grown in difficulty over time. Parallels are easy to draw with reports in October 2017 that Theresa May “pleaded with EU leaders over dinner in Brussels to help her strike a Brexit deal that she can defend to voters back home” (Guardian, 20.10.2017), this challenge ultimately contributed to Cameron’s and May’s demise.

Despite Major's juggling act, his balancing of growing domestic discontent and operable European relations would not be adequate to save his own political future. Division within the Conservative party would continue to grow. As the chapter will show there are further parallels between Major's demise, and that of Cameron. Financial pressures were kind to neither; however, Black Friday, 16th Sept 1992, saw the collapse of sterling, Chancellor Norman Lamont attempted three major interest hikes reaching 15%, the release of billions to counter runs on the pound in international markets, finally culminating in the withdrawal from the monetary system as a last resort. This crisis was just after the last case study, but its effects on the Conservative party have been lasting and profound in terms of its relationship with Europe, and as such it merits brief consideration at this juncture. As Copsey and Haughton demonstrate in their discussion of *'Issue Capture' and the Politics of David Cameron's 2013 EU Referendum Pledge*; "conservative policy on Europe since the 1990s has been heavily influenced by the intertwined themes of the ERM debacle of 1992 and Margaret Thatcher's legacy" (Copsey & Haughton, 2014: 78). Thatcher's demise and the loss of the Conservative's long held status as the party of economic responsibility left a very bitter taste in the mouth of many in the party that casts a shadow to this day.

The loss of the mantle of their status as the party of sound economic and monetary responsibility arguably contributed to their longest absence from government, and contributed to a shift in the ideological ownership of the party. In the two decades that followed, the right wing of the party grew in subscription and confidence; more importantly "no new ideologues emerged to challenge, or even rethink the Thatcher Legacy" (Copsey & Haughton, 2014: 78). This growing singularity of narrative would come to permeate much of the political class as well as the public sphere. While Copsey and Haughton frame this development in terms of a legacy of Thatcher, it may be more complex than that. This development highlights the emergence of some of the key features of modern *Euroscepticism*, such political tremors provide opportunity for *issue capture* (Copsey & Haughton, 2014). In the literature review this issue was addressed, and we must return briefly to these concepts to understand adequately this juncture in the process of British Europeanization. Sociological institutionalism provides the concept of a "logic of appropriateness", which March and Olsen assert allows to understand the internalisation of dynamic or novel norms (March & Olsen, 1998). This assertion was made just after the

signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, and must be understood in the context of an emerging *third way* in European politics. While the internalisation of European norms certainly seemed a valid conclusion at that juncture; March and Olsen were both premature to suggest that a “logic of appropriateness” was uniformly pro-European.

While the Blair administration marked something of a high-water mark in Anglo-European relations, right wing narratives both inside the Conservative party and among a growing number of new actors were running counter to the assertions of March and Olsen. Börzel and Risse moved from the concept of this logic, to highlight the value of ‘cognitive short-cuts’, ‘political entrepreneurs’ and ‘change-agents’ (Börzel & Risse, 2000: 12) in driving normative shifts. In the context of multi-level structures of governance that are not conducive to widespread public comprehension, popular legitimacy is more open to manipulation due to inherent complexity and structural separation. However, it appears evident from developments in the political class, that a failure to adequately understand the process of regional integration was far from exclusive to the public.

As Hix and Goetz note a “new institutional arena at the European level impacts on domestic political systems by providing ‘new structures of opportunities’ for domestic actors” (Hix and Goetz, 2000: 12). This holds for actors of all political persuasion, and the combination of Maastricht and Amsterdam offered a range of such new structures. These novel structures and the renewal of political and monetary integration that they facilitated provided the perfect opportunity to rewrite the past, and redefine the terms of the present.

A vocal but concerted minority within, but not confined to, the Conservative party sought to reappraise their own economic failings, outsourcing blame while seeking to nationalise achievement. Simply put, the economic maladies of the UK were said to be the product of European integration or policy, and patriots must resist this assault on our economic health and sovereign status. Any nuanced understanding of economics or regional integration would dismantle such a singular narrative; but this form of Euroscepticism followed from its populist and nationalist predecessors, with nuanced understanding to be decried, dismissed, and in time to be attacked as national treachery. It is key here to note the development of normative objection masquerading as material critique, by no means unique or novel, but powerful and lasting once in the public sphere. The quality of dressing normative objection as

economic critique is a well-established practice, closely related to nationalism; and long used to attack migrants, and undermine politics that actors object to.

As Rustenbach highlights a “Economic competition is another commonly used explanation for discrimination toward immigrants... However, people’s perceptions may be very different from reality. That is, rumours or specific cases can provoke a general feeling that immigrants are to blame for economic hardships. An alternative explanation for the link between economy and attitudes toward immigrants is that in times of recession, natives are simply looking for someone to blame”

(in Koopmans, 2007: 10).

Euroscepticism has fostered a comparable relationship between regressive aims and material justifications. Matthias Matthijs, writing in *Foreign Affairs* warned of the ‘folly of flirting with an EU exit’ shortly after Cameron’s commitment to a plebiscite, drawing attention to this relationship between the Conservative party, visceral normative objections, mounting nationalism and a dearth of adequate understanding.

“If London does ultimately cut the rope, it will not be the result of rational political or economic calculations. British Euroscepticism boils down to a visceral dislike of Brussels...on the part of an ill-informed conservative minority that clings to an antiquated notion of national sovereignty”.

(Matthijs, 2013: 10)

Cameron was inevitably subject to a series of political developments beyond his control: the growth of a post-Thatcher fallacy on European responsibility for domestic economic failings; the corresponding resurgence in conservative Eurosceptic confidence; the rise of UKIP and their notable electoral success; and, partially, exogenous economic pressures. The difficulty these factors present to any defence of European integration cannot be overstated. As has been identified in the last two case studies, from the highwater mark of positive coverage of European affairs in 1975, though to the deferential coverage of Major’s negotiations, defence of Europe was primarily, if not at times exclusively, made in economic or materially framed

terms. This necessitates a brief return to the conceptual tools outlined at the start of the thesis.

This primary focus on material justifications for the process of European integration has created a degree of path dependency; *“the order in which things happen affects how they happen...the trajectory of change up to a certain point itself constrains the trajectory after that point; and the strategic choices made at a particular moment eliminate whole ranges of possibilities from later choices while serving as the very condition of existence for others”*.

(Hay & Wincott, 1998: 955)

The aversion of the political class to politicize the issue of European integration during the era of *permissive consensus* (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970) has been well catalogued in previous chapters; with the political cost inevitably great and the potential reward very limited. However, it is at this juncture that the costs of previous actions begin to emerge. Sustained framing and defending of integration in limited terms, make its support highly contingent on continued economic success, and furthermore this limited framing of Europe makes the extensions of competence entailed in Maastricht and Amsterdam obvious rallying points for populist objection.

Cameron was in essence trapped; if he were to adequately defend Europe his options were highly circumscribed before he ever began. To advocate the political and social dimensions of integration would go against decades of elite and media discourse on the European issue. To defend Europe in economic terms would run counter to internal party demands for a reduction in spending, and would require an admission of hypocrisy, a politically impossible feat.

Cameron may only have been following well established precedent in outsourcing responsibility for domestic difficulties, but he further circumscribed his already limited options with his administration’s discourse on Europe. His chancellor, George Osborne, offered one in a long list of such ill-considered interventions. In June 2012, he asserted that it was Eurozone debt that “killed off” British growth, claiming his government was powerless when faced with European “headwinds” (Telegraph, 09.06.2012). This fallacy may have been attacked by moderate conservatives, with even Eurosceptics, such as Douglas Carswell,

dismissing these claims. However, when such claims emanate from the national government, we must recognise their effect on national discourse and understanding. Such claims fitted into a much broader narrative of responsibility avoidance, Cameron broadly sought to “portray the country’s economic woes as result of the Eurozone crisis rather than of his own government’s biting austerity measures” (Matthijs, 2013: 11).

If integration is primarily defended in economic terms, and one ascribes the root cause of economic difficulty to that very process of integration, then only one conclusion can be drawn. The “logic of appropriateness” that developed within the political class, was one of circumscribed explanation, recurrent blame re-allocation and repossession of achievement.

6.22 Populism, identity and Europeanization

The previous section sought to provide an overview of the challenges the pressures of European integration bought to bear upon the major political parties and government, and the implicit challenges these posed to the development of legitimacy for the EU within the national context. Defence of European aims was always conducted in limited terms, limiting the scope of British popular affinity and preference toward the European project. However, this limited explanation of the European project is not unique to the UK, and as such can only be considered a contributory factor in any explanation of the British departure from the EU. The thesis will go on to argue that the case to be made of any notion of British exceptionalism is very limited, but there is a combination of factors that contribute, and it is a question of degree rather than presence of these factors that culminated in Brexit. As such, Brexit serves as warning of the risks to integration, and democracy more broadly, among remaining member states. Among these clear risks, are the issues of identity, populism, and the growth of a resurgent nationalism.

“There are no such animals as ‘Europe Citizens. There are only French, German, or Italian Citizens...For the nation state was the final act in the drama of political history”

(Aron & Hofstadter, 1974: 653-54).

The French philosopher, most renowned for his critique of Marx, *The Opium of Intellectuals*, may be correct in his claims of sustained cultural primacy of nation state, but he was misguided in his assertion that the nation state is in a zero-sum relationship *vis-à-vis* other identities or attachments.

Meehan offers an insightful critique of Aron & Hofsadter, in her 1993 assessment of *Citizenship and the European Community*:

“My conclusion is that a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national, nor cosmopolitan but which is multiple in enabling the various identities that we all possess to be expressed, and our rights and duties exercised, through an increasingly complex configuration of common institutions, states, national and transnational interest groups and voluntary associations, local or provincial authorities, regions and alliances of regions.

(Meehan, 1993: 185)

This issue will be returned to, following the empirical section, in the discussion of French and German public spheres. However, it is clear that notions of identity are closely entwined with national discourse, and the public sphere it feeds in to. France and Germany develop more multifaceted concepts of national identity, tied to more ideational and normative discursive engagements with European integration. While the increasingly ideational and normative discourse that the following chapter will outline in the British public sphere, is overwhelming negative and lacks depth in coverage. As the discussion of France and Germany toward the end of this chapter will highlight, the form of discourse feeds into the process of construction and ongoing reaffirmation of national identity. In the case of France and Germany this permits more inclusive notions of identity. While this thesis does not aim to evaluate the relationship between discourse and identity, or the Europeanization of identity itself, the limited and polemic nature of British discourse evident in the subsequent empirical section is likely to impact upon notions of British identity. This impact is anticipated to result in a less inclusive construction of identity.

6.3 Empirical Findings

As in previous chapters, the data set comes from a key word search, covering six months of tabloid output across four publications (The Mirror, Daily Mail, The Express, and The Sun). To undertake analysis, all articles were coded against two ordinal scales. The first being termed the '*separation scale*', which seeks to record the construction of British relations with the European Union, in all forms, measuring how Anglo-European interactions, relationships, negotiations and debates are presented in tabloid output. The '*conflict scale*' was constructed to record the other vital dimension across the data set; this scale measures the presentation of European actors, aims and institutions, independent of their relationship to the UK, within the tabloid press. The full scales are available in the appendix, but both follow a 5-point structure ranging from normative objection, to normative support, with materially framed objection or support sandwiching 'neutrality'. These scales were constructed to provide an effective overview of four decades of *Europeanization*, allowing us to understand more fully the context in which such *Euroscepticism* develops. Alongside these scales, articles were subject to critical discourse analysis, recording and analysing not only the orientation of tabloid output, but in what terms European integration was either defended or attacked.

The first case study demonstrated what this thesis has termed a high-water mark in terms of 'positive' coverage. This entailed a dominant focus on the materially framed benefits derived from the process of integration, with all publications supporting British membership of the EEC to varying degrees. However, it was the omissions evident in this case study that provided the most telling insights. The tangible consequences for sovereignty were clearly avoided in both political and media discourse, and those who warned against the potential risks to the nation state were widely mocked and decried as extremists. The actors, aims and institutions of European integration were almost entirely absent in 1975; this was a major omission, and one that has had a lasting effect on the British process of *Europeanization*.

The second case study provided evidence of a notable shift from the output of the first referendum. Coverage was still widely supportive of British membership, but this support was far more conditional. The right-wing tabloids, all except The Mirror, all offered highly

deferential coverage of Major's administration, but there was coverage of the risk Europe may pose under Labour direction. Equally, coverage of John Major's interactions with his European counterparts emerged in far more conflictual terms than that of Harold Wilson two decades earlier; Major's task was widely covered as that of defending British interests, and optimising benefits from the growing single market, with some very limited engagement with curtailing the excesses of political and economic integration, albeit these were largely supplementary to the primary frames. The telling finding of both these case studies is that the *European project* was widely presented, constructed and framed as an exercise in market expansion and liberalisation. The risks of politicisation have been adequately covered in previous chapters, but it is worth noting at this juncture, that European integration was never limited to these aims. The Treaty of Rome (1957) indicated integration was “determined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”. However, this was never relayed by the British political class, nor for decades did the tabloid press engage with these founding principles. It is this lasting omission that we must understand if we are to adequately explain the shift that is about to be outlined below.

The following section will outline the empirical findings of the final case study, addressing the notable break with the last two, and explain why previous defence of Europe in almost exclusively material terms has left British preferences on European integration highly susceptible to exogenous shocks, as well as providing the foundations for multiple points of resistance in the expansion of European competencies post-Maastricht.

As was addressed in earlier chapters, research has questioned the form of *Europeanization* of the public sphere as “if one looks for a genuinely transnational European public sphere there is not much to be found” (Koopmans & Erbe, 2007: 99); that is to say a pan-European public sphere “independent of nation states does not exist” (Machil et al, 2006: 61). However, this does not imply that the process of *Europeanization* is not evident. Gerhards actually argued that while we would be misguided to anticipate a truly supranational public sphere, we should expect the development and expansion of an increasingly *European perspective* from member state's national spheres (In Meyer, 2005). Given previous discussions on the incorporation of a supranational component to German national identity (See previous chapters or Banchoff), this may be a valid analysis of the trajectory of Germany's public sphere, but it is not for the UK. However, the prediction of collective, sustained and coherent

response from the public sphere, to the increasing pressures of European integration does hold valid.

Trenz identified the distinction between these two responses, and it is of value to refer to this definition briefly:

“When discussed from the perspectives of a participant and an observer at once, European issues are included in their own context of relevance and treated as ‘home news’. From a perspective that does not consider their own role as a participant, but rather that of only an observer, European issues are not included in their own context of relevance and are transformed into ‘foreign news’”.

(Trenz, 2004: 308)

As such, the later understanding of the process of *Europeanization* offers a valid framework for analysis of this data set. While the former framework may hold true for some other member states, this chapter will proceed to demonstrate it is the latter that best accounts for the British process of Europeanization; European affairs are broadly constructed as issues of foreign news.

We must briefly recognise the implications this understanding brings to bear on the development of supranational legitimacy within the national context. The excessive emphasis on the direct structural electoral relationship and the oft cited democratic deficit has been addressed above (see Chapter 2); but returning to Meyer’s key components of legitimacy, accountability and responsiveness (Meyer, 1999; Trenz, 2004) these will be negatively affected by such a form of Europeanization. Furthermore, it is interesting to note how this form of Europeanization affects the opportunity for agenda setting in line with the conceptual tools offered by Sociological Institutionalism (see above). In the absence of a truly interactive and responsive public sphere, the construction and definition of Europeanized national spheres becomes “predominantly the domain of political and economic elites, not that of a wider European public” (Schlesinger, 2002: 36).

To summarise, legitimacy is deeply entwined with, if not contingent upon *responsiveness* and *accountability*, however, *Europeanization* does not preclude transnational transmission or collective discourse; rather it filters European issues through national prisms. Given the

dynamic and novel nature of European integration, these national prisms are highly susceptible to assumption of control. If political and media elites promote a positive European prism, one can anticipate a positive reaction from the public. However, correspondingly in the absence of a positive prism, one can anticipate a divergent prism, with an equally significant relationship to public understanding, perception and legitimacy. The question follows, what evidence is there of an attempt to assume control of the national perspective within the data set? And is there a change in the pattern of engagement with *European issues* that might be better explained with reference to ‘political entrepreneurs’ or ‘change-agents’ (Börzel & Risse, 2000: 12) as mentioned above?

6.31 Evaluating Europeanization in terms of volume of salient articles identified in the data set

As the last two empirical chapters demonstrated, there was very limited variation in terms of focus upon *European Issues*; during the first referendum the key search terms identified 564 salient articles, with Maastricht providing a data set of 598. As was explained throughout those chapters, the expansion in coverage of European affairs did not correspond to the expansion in European competences; simply put, both case studies identified a clear and sustained deficit in coverage of European concerns. The first question to address when mapping the changes in media output is, whether there is evidence of change capable of having an effect on the narrative on Europe? Is the final data set indicative of a significant aggregate shift in the focus on European Issues? The data in fig 6.a below maps the volume of Europeanized output across all the case studies, and highlights a substantive, and consequently significant, growth in in such output by the final case study.

Table showing output across complete months in all Case Studies:


Case Study:	Month	Output (Articles)	Mean		
1975 Referendum	April	146	95.4		
	May	139			
	June	170			
	July	15			
	August	7			
1992 Maastricht Treaty	November	167	96.6		
	December	168			
	January	60			
	February	69			
	March	63			
	April	53			
	2013 Cameron's Referendum Pledge	November		195	192
		December		151	
January		263			
February		143			
March		208			

Fig. 6.a (author's own data), the table shows the number of articles caught on the basis of key search terms across case studies. Incomplete months, due to the location of the date/event upon which the case study, have been omitted, excluding the November 1991. The 2nd Case Study recorded data from 07.11.1991, but to omit the data for November given the volume of output would be counterproductive.

As evident in fig 6.a, across the first two case studies there is an average output of 581 articles, this leaps to 1131 for the final case study covering the same length of time. This shows a 94.7% increase in Europeanized output from the previous two data sets. The two

previous chapters indicated coverage was highly events-based; in the first case study we see virtually a complete collapse of coverage of European affairs immediately after the referendum. The two complete months of July and August of 1975 identified only 22 articles across all four publications, clearly indicative of the sustained deficit mentioned above. The 1991-92 case study, upon initial inspection, seems to suggest a much greater level of Europeanization reflected in greater sustained coverage of European affairs, following the events-based surge in November and December. However, the incorporation of European issues into domestic cleavages is significantly over-stated if one takes output alone as an indicator. Rather, via critical discourse analysis of this data set it was demonstrated that this coverage was more accurately analysed as contingent upon broader concerns in the domain of foreign affairs. Europe served as a supplementary concern or framework for addressing wider geo-political challenges, such as the consequences of the collapse of the USSR or events in the FYR. What the first two data sets did not identify was a consistent focus on Europe, irrelevant of exogenous considerations. Neither given that finding, is it possible to talk of political entrepreneurship or coherent and sustained discourse serving strategic ends. What the previous chapters did identify was limited defence of the benefits of European integration, conducted primarily in material terms, with the form of support bearing a relationship to partisan affiliation. As the data in Graph 6.a below shows, by the final case study there is a major and sustained increase in Europeanized output. While this output does still fluctuate across months, the drop off in Europeanized coverage evident in the previous case studies is no longer evident.

Graph showing volume, and distribution over time, of articles coded in 2012-2013:



Graph 6.a (author's own data): this graph shows the number of articles caught in 2012-2013 using the key search terms, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of Cameron's pledge on the 23rd January 2013 (23.10.2012-23.04.2013). As such the months of October and April are not complete months, however, this does provide a data set of the complete 6-month period in which Cameron's pledge referendum occurs.

As Graph 6.a indicates, the final data set displays a significant departure from the previous case studies. Ideational frames present will support this assertion, and will be addressed below. The data above demonstrates a consistency of coverage absent in the previous data sets. The first and last months in the table above are not complete months in line with the structuring of case studies around key events, the data reflects this. The data still shows a notable spike around the key event of this case study; Cameron's commitment to a referendum in January 2013 with output peaking at 263 articles. However, Europeanized output is now evidently established in terms of media focus. The previous case studies identified output peaking at 168 (2nd case study) to 170 (1st case study) salient articles in a month and falling as low as 7 (1st case study) and 53 (2nd case study), but by the final case study output for complete months never falls beneath 143 and peaks at 263.

This is the first indicator that the process of Europeanization has brought fundamental change to this component of the public sphere. Radaelli foresaw the process facilitating the development of "shared beliefs and norms", the data in Graph 6.a does show that integration

has now increasingly been “incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse” (Radaelli, 2000). The question remains, what effect this incorporation has had? The answer will focus on Knill & Lehmkuhl’s outlining of Europeanization as a process altering “beliefs and expectations” (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999: 4); a process that might be better understood, in the British context, as *anti*-Europeanization.

As was addressed in the last chapter, the Maastricht Treaty extended the competence of supranational cooperation, moving toward much greater economic and political cooperation; however, assertions of an immediate public awakening were premature. The complexity and time frame for realising the aims of the TEU created scope for new actors, narratives and responses but these would take time emerge. That is to say, “many of the implications of political decisions – especially complex policy interventions or major institutional reforms – only play out in the long run...[as] political decision makers are frequently more interested in the short-term consequences of their actions; long term effects are often heavily discounted” (Pierson, 1996: 135). Simply put, political elites remain more concerned with short-term electoral concerns, than explaining, or engaging with sensitive or controversial developments or commitments, but this will be returned to in the conclusion.

This is a point that has been made earlier in the thesis, but merits repetition here; had the genuine extent of integration entailed within the TEU been adequately explained and subsequently defended in terms of changing global pressures and national interest, it is unlikely that the British path would have been so dependent upon such a singular narrative. However, the absence of a concerted effort by the political class to assume control of the debate on *Europe* post-Maastricht, created what is best understood as a discursive or ideational vacuum. Major institutional change occurred without established cleavages into which such change could easily be defined, creating scope for novel approaches and responses. The promotion of new discursive responses to the pressures of Europeanization in between the two later case studies is outside the remit of this thesis, but to the growing number of political actors with little or no chance of direct power, there was “little to lose in formulating an extreme position” to seek political gain (Marks et al, 2002: 588).

It is in this context that the major increase in the coverage of European affairs must be considered. The final case study identifies nearly a doubling of coverage, the substance of this focus will be addressed below, but such an increase is in itself a finding of note, and one

that could support the assertion of increased agenda setting by the tabloid media with reference to European integration. The role of mass media as a conduit between structures of governance and public understanding has been well covered in previous chapters; as McCombs and Shaw demonstrate in their work on agenda setting:

“the information in the mass media becomes the only contact many have with politics. The pledges, promises and rhetoric encapsulated in news stories, columns and editorials constitute much of the information upon which a voting decision has to be made”.

(McCombs & Shaw, 1972: 176)

In the context of supranational frameworks for governance, where a direct link between any given electorate and policy output is challenged by further degrees of separation, this ability to affect voting preferences must be recognised as more pronounced. Equally, in the absence of clear or consistent output from the mainstream domestic political class, the scope for actors within the public sphere, as well as those at the extremities of the political class, to frame change in regressive or binary terms is equally pronounced. While Lang and Lang’s research was inconclusive regarding the relationship between media output and public sentiment, it was clear regarding the role of media in terms of agenda setting:

“The mass media force attention to certain issues. They build up public images...they are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, have feelings about”.

(Lang & Lang, 1966: 468).

While this assessment may be five decades old, this understanding of the role of media has only grown in salience. Select actors and institutions within the public sphere are increasingly able not only to force attention on certain issues, but affect the terms and normative frameworks via which issues are relayed to the wider public, with substantive implications for democratic legitimacy and understanding. More research would be required to identify at what juncture between the 2nd and 3rd case study a shift can be identified. However, members of the political class identified these concerns way ahead of suggestions of a

plebiscite, or the now evident acceptance of Eurosceptic terms among the mainstream political class:

"...although he did not deny the right of the press to take positions on Europe...the British people and the democratic debate are starting to lose out from the nature of the coverage."


(Peter Mandelson, in the Guardian 10.07.2000).

This is starting to move into the broader debates regarding democracy, quality governance and the public sphere; these will be returned to in the conclusion as they are beyond the remit of the empirical aims of this thesis. However, it is in light of these concerns that the spike in coverage of European issues must be considered. The chapter will now move to support the argument that such coverage poses a challenge to legitimacy, via deconstruction of the findings of the ordinal scales and meta-analysis.

6.4 Understanding the findings of the Separation Scale:

First the chapter will consider the findings of the separation scale. To recap, this was constructed to map the shift in the presentation and construction of the relationship between the UK and her European partners since accession. The scale codes all articles ranging from normative support to normative objection to Britain's role within the EU, with material framed support and objection sandwiching 'neutrality'. As detailed in the findings of previous chapters, it was this scale that identified both the high-water mark of 'positive' coverage of European integration in the first case study and conditionally positive support for Major's efforts at Maastricht. However, the data set for the final case study is virtually unrecognisable when compared to the previous chapters. It is the extent of this shift that supports the assertions in the last section that we may be looking at a concerted and coherent effort to assume control of, or at least effect the narrative on *Europe*. The data as shown in Graph 6.b below, shows an almost complete collapse in positive engagements with the UK's position within the process of European integration.

Graph showing the findings of the ‘separation scale’ for all articles for all individual publications in 2012-2013:



Graph 6.b (author’s own data): This graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications, along the ‘separation scale’ as caught on the basis of key search terms in 2012-2013, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of Cameron’s pledge on the 23rd January 2013 (23.10.2012-23.04.2013). The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding European integration from a domestic perspective indicating preferences toward British membership. This data remains divided by publication indicating the degree of variation or consistency between tabloids.

6.41 Positive and Neutral Coverage of British Membership

This section will provide an overview of the findings of the ‘separation scale’, considering the positive and neutral output in the final case study. The data indicates a collapse in positive engagement with British membership of the European Union in all but one publication, and substantive shift toward an increasingly narrow framing of perspectives. Furthermore, the case study details discourse that would contribute to the growth and proliferation of Eurosceptic sentiment in the public sphere. These findings all have notable implications for public understanding, and begin to indicate that this final case study maps a public sphere incompatible with popular legitimacy.

6.42 'Absolute unity':

'Absolute unity' (2) seeks to code unconditional support for the UK's place in the European Union premised upon normative or ideational considerations. The outlier immediately apparent in this data set is evidently the 'left-wing' tabloid, *The Mirror*, with 38.2% of the 157 articles identified from this publication containing positive engagement with the UK's place in the European Union. However, as has been repeatedly raised throughout the previous chapters this positive engagement is highly circumscribed. From the 1131 articles coded for this case study, only 2 display the criteria required for 'absolute unity'. While the 'absolute unity' criteria were constructed to code any normative or ideational defence of the UK's position within the EU, these two articles offer a very limited, and highly partisan rejection of anti-European actors. On the 23rd of January a brief editorial in the *Mirror* offers a discussion of Cameron's commitment to a referendum, focused on the internal dynamics of the Conservative party; decrying Cameron's actions as capitulating to "his party's extremists" and handing power over to "swivel-eyed Euronutters". Evidently such output does not offer any value-based defence of Britain's place in Europe, however, it does constitute a normative attack on anti-European actors in the national context. To ensure consistency in the scales, non-material and personal attacks on Eurosceptics were included in coding criteria for 'absolute unity'; as 'divorce' [-2] includes and codes a significant number of such attacks going the other way.

The only other article meeting the criteria for 'absolute unity' was a whimsical piece on "sex symbol Ed Miliband", Labour leader at the time. Miliband uses the opportunity to again attack his opponents. The language is nowhere near as polemic as the last article, but it dismisses Cameron's claim that due to European Law that the UK government is unable to raise working conditions. It is a theme that has actually been addressed in previous chapters, and in the discussion of the Europeanization of national public spheres as Miliband critiques the "Government trying to hide behind the skirts of Europe to hide their failure". It is notable, that while this does implicitly amount to a defence of British membership, Miliband only goes as far as to imply benefit as it supports a claim of national failure of governance. However, this is the most unconditionally positive claim regarding the UK's place in the European project. Notably, that being said, Miliband's language still does not suggest an equality of

status with the use of 'skirts' implying a traditional domestic status upon the EU. This outsourcing of blame is a recurrent phenomenon evident across this case study, however, this is the only explicit reference to it, and marks the height of 'positive' output regarding the UK-EU relations; that is to say the most positive tabloid output on UK-EU relations across the entire case study, is a partisan rejection of a negative claim regarding EU interference.

6.43 'Conditional unity':


As has been outlined in the thesis in previous chapters, '**conditional unity**' (1) criteria code engagements with the benefits of British membership framed in functional or material terms, claims that detail or infer a positive exchange ensuring material or tangible benefits. Out of the complete data set 'conditional unity' accounts for just 5.8% of the articles coded, which begins to support the above assertion of limited Europeanization, occurring primarily in negative terms. Before addressing the Mirror, which as shown in the data in Graph 6.b constitutes the overwhelming majority of positive output, it is insightful to assess the claims contained in the three, now evidently, Eurosceptic publications. All of the claims come from two forms of actor, and while they do convey a material benefit the framing of the claims serves to detach the paper from the claims and limit its authority.

Claims come from pro-European domestic actors warning of the risk or cost associated with anti-EU activity or policy. These claims come from Cameron, Clarke, Major and Blair and are presented in terms that undermine the authority of the claims or claimants: "Cameron *snubs* 'lesser' EU plan" is the Sun's engagement with the PM rejecting a back bench Eurosceptic proposal to leave the EU but remain in the single market (Sun, 05.01.2013); "We're third rate if we leave EU says Blair," shows the same paper condense a comprehensive speech into a few hyperbolic claims, "as he (Blair) branded Euroscepticism a 'virus'" (Sun, 29.11.2012); "EU Veto 'Ludicrous' says Clarke" shows the Mail cover the former cabinet minister taking a "swipe at the Prime Minister's stated negotiating stance"(Mail, 03.11.2012). Major warns of the major economic and political "gamble" involved in any plebiscite, the Mail also quotes Major's 20-year-old dismissal of Conservative Eurosceptics as "bastards" (Mail, 15.02.2013).

While all articles coded for these criteria do defend the material value of EU membership to the UK, the fanning of these claims serves to limit their authority.

The other actors evident in the Sun's and the Daily Mail's 'conditional unity' articles are claims or preferences by foreign nationals. The French favour British membership (Sun, 28.01.2013), while both the German President (Sun, 23.02.2013) and "Germany's No1 Paper" (Mail, 25.01.2013) are reported to be *pleading*, or some variant of the verb, for the British to stay. Once again, such output meets the coding criteria, but both limits the authority via framing and also serves to imply the UK is the dominant actor within this relationship. Suffice it to say, that the right-wing tabloid media contain no pro-European output that does not implicitly challenge the authority of said claims or claimants.

Graph showing coding along the 'separation scale' of Mirror articles in 2012-2013:



Graph 6.c (author's own data): This graph shows the coding of Mirror data, along the 'separation scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 2012-2013, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of Cameron's pledge on the 23rd January 2013 (23.10.2012-23.04.2013). The data represents a quantitative overview of Mirror discourse regarding European integration from a domestic perspective indicating preferences toward British membership.

The Mirror does again offer an outlier to this trend as the data above shows, with 36.9% of its output defending or promoting the material benefits of British membership. Again, this subset of the data does offer a range of engagements regarding the nature of said benefits. As

has been the case throughout the previous case studies, the Mirror's output on interactions between the UK government and supranational actors is consistently critical of the Conservative government. Furthermore, this case study records Mirror articles critiquing the aims of renegotiation of the terms of British membership, and the value of a referendum. The Mirror's partisan affiliation may bear a relationship to this divergence from the other publications, although a review of editorial process would be required to establish if correlation bore any relation to causation. What is evident from the data set, positive output on Europe permits a more critical prism via which to cover the domestic, Conservative government. "Osborne in EU ridicule" (Mirror, 06.03.2013) is one of number of engagements with EU banking reform that sees the government widely ridiculed for "defending the indefensible". Conservative efforts to extricate the UK from the European Convention on human rights receives comparable coverage as "May [is] blasted over human rights plans" as it is claimed that justice is being threatened by "battles in Westminster" (Mirror, 05.03.2013). This is not to assert that support of EU policy might not be genuine, but it raises questions. Is this Europeanization in the sense of an internalisation of European policy into British discursive cleavages, or is Europeanization simply offering a mechanism to critically scrutinize domestic governance in line with partisan affiliation?

There is a recognition that this perspective is divergent from mainstream narratives in the public sphere; "It's true, the EU is good for you" (Mirror, 23.10.2012) offers the most positive engagement with the impact of EU membership upon the British worker, via an interview with Laszlo Andor, EU Employment Commissioner at the time of publication. But as the data in Graph 6.c shows even within the most pro-European publication, such articles are a minority accounting for 36.9% of Mirror output. This presents a further challenge to the development of a balanced public sphere; the dearth of engaged and positive coverage represents a clear emerging imbalance in the discourse via which European integration becomes present in the national context.

6.44 'Neutrality':

'Neutrality' (0) codes for all articles that express no clear preference regarding British membership. However, these findings present a further challenge to the development of a balanced public sphere. The Mirror may offer a counter balance to some of the Eurosceptic output in subsequent sections, and while it provides far more in the way of neutral coverage of Anglo-European relations and interactions, it remains dwarfed in terms of focus. Despite a majority of the output from the Mirror meeting the criteria for '*neutrality*', this does little to alter the overall imbalance of output. It is evident that European issues rank lower in terms of editorial priorities for the Mirror, than they do for their Eurosceptic counterparts. While engaging with editorial priorities was never an aim in this thesis, the gap between self-proclaimed pro-Brexit publications and others is significant. The Express, with the Sun and the Mail did not explicitly state their support for Brexit at this juncture, however, output and later editorials will make this clear, if there was any doubt. In this case study the Mirror accounts for 13.9% of the 1131 articles coded across the four publications, but 27.4% of the *neutral* output.


This phenomenon complicates the difficulty in ensuring a balanced public sphere; publications that are most likely to offer neutral or positive coverage, are the same publications that are least likely to offer coverage at all. This is not unique to this research but supports the findings of Hawkins in his work on newspaper discourse regarding Lisbon Treaty reform to the *acquis communautaire*. Hawkins considered the same papers as this thesis (excluding the Express) along with two broad sheets (The Guardian, and The Telegraph), and the two *left wing* publications accounted for just over a quarter of the output. As was recognised earlier in this thesis, selection of these publications may bias the data set to the right, but this only "reflects the skewed nature of the British press in terms of both the number of titles published and their circulation...therefore reflect[ing] the political biases to which the British public are exposed" (Hawkins, 2012: 564)

6.45 Negative Coverage of British Membership:

The following section reviews the findings of the 'separation scale' in light of the substantive shift toward the negative coding criteria for British membership of the European Union. The data will outline an increasingly Eurosceptic public sphere, with increasingly coherent Europeanized discourse. This dimension of the public sphere is now displaying sustained and evident normative agency, and this is a salient finding in seeking to better understand the causes of Brexit, and the growth of associated populist discourses more broadly.

6.46 'Detachment':

Graph showing the findings of the 'separation scale' for all articles for all publications in 2012-2013:



Graph 6.d (author's own data) This graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications, along the 'separation scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 2012-2013, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of Cameron's pledge on the 23rd January 2013 (23.10.2012-23.04.2013). The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding European integration from a domestic perspective indicating preferences toward British membership.

The data in Graph 6.d begins to demonstrate the genuine degree of bias in favour of Eurosceptic perspectives. 54.2 % of all articles coded displayed *detached* criteria viewing

membership as a material or tangible burden on British resources, or integration as over extended and an infringement. **'detachment' (-1)** does not entail the promotion of Brexit but does view the status quo as unfair if not unjust upon the UK. As was mentioned earlier in the chapter it is essential to establish if there is a coherent or consistent narrative within this element of the British public sphere. This data shows a major shift has occurred from previous case studies, the majority of tabloid output now meets these criteria and the data maps a clear trajectory. The first case study recorded just 7.6% of output meeting the criteria for 'detachment', by 1992 this had risen to 21.9% and by 2013 it has become the discursive norm. An analysis of post-referendum discourse would certainly highlight that discursive shift has continued, and all likelihood gathered pace, but this is beyond the remit of this research.

'Burden' is the growth concept within this data set, previously case studies showed that where the British public sphere viewed integration as positive, this was primarily as a mechanism to maximise British interests. European integration was positive, so long as it served the UK's material concerns. The previous case studies found 'conditional unity' defending British membership as a vehicle to improved market access and economic opportunity. This limited engagement with the implications of regional integration creates a degree of 'path dependence' (Pierson, 2000), as it presents the process as narrower than the founding principles addressed earlier in the thesis, as well as creating evident points of resistance in the context of an economic downturn.

The final case study follows major recession and the Eurozone crisis; this change in economic context is essential to understanding the form of discourse that has developed in the years leading to the final case study. The economic climate has transformed into one where austerity has become a norm within UK political discourse and policy output. George Osborne presented his 2012 budget as tackling "difficult choices", including £10 billion cut from welfare spending, already cut by £24 bn under the 2012 Welfare Reform Act, as well as a range of other major reductions in government expenditure. While this does not relate directly to the shift in tabloid output, it is essential to understand the political context in which the concept of *burden* finds such ripe ground. Cameron had framed his leadership bid and electoral campaigns as his responsibility to fight "Britain's culture of irresponsibility", developed under "Labour's big government bureaucracy". His speech to the party conference in 2009 related fiscal irresponsibility to this growth of governance and loss of accountability;

“But if there is one political institution that needs decentralisation, transparency, and accountability, it is the EU.” Cameron’s discourse seeks to make austerity a national necessity, and one in which “we’re all in this together” (Cameron, 2009). This discourse is by no means novel, charging partisan opposition and foreign actors with responsibility for national failure. But it is salient in a context where the executive is committed to “cutbacks in public spending...that will be painful” (Cameron, 2009).

This data set shows a defining degree of focus on the material *burden* of others, both individual or collectives perceived not to be ‘us.’ ‘Detachment’ catalogues the expansion in victimization evident in this case study; given the focus on migration throughout the referendum and the discourse that has developed in its wake, there are clear risks to a balanced public sphere from the emerging shift. The Mirror does not provide an outlier in terms of this proliferation of ‘burden’ articles. In October half the *detached* Mirror output focuses on the issues financial burden, such as “Benefits for kids abroad” (Mirror, 24.10.2012) with claims regarding the use of “crazy EU laws to abuse our benefits system”, although the discourse and degree of focus is far more pronounced in the right-wing publications there is an alarming consistency in the relationship between welfare or financial abuse, migration, and European culpability. The Sun offers an editorial proclaiming it is “Time for the truth on migration” (Sun, 17.12.2012) in a series of hyperbolic articles attacking a range of foreign as well as domestic actors, but it is the polemic language that must raise most concern. “Mass immigration was no error...an act of calculated deceit imposed by a bullying regime”; Labour support for freedom of movement is then compared to the treatment prisoners of war by the Japanese in the second world war; before the Polish “illegals” (migrants), the EU, Gordon Brown, and Ed Miliband are singled out and charged with responsibility for “Britain’s crippling debt”.

After benefits, the most prominent focus for this discourse of *burden* is the National Health Service (NHS). The Mail suggests the use of health care by “jobless migrants from Bulgaria and Romania” merits legislation in line with the Californian 1994 bill that excluded undocumented illegals from access to welfare services, arguing equally discriminatory legislation would be a just response to the *burden* of ‘health tourism’; claimed to now cost

the UK £40 Million (Mail, 12.12.2012). As has been shown throughout the thesis, the public sphere operates on the basis of interplay between a range of political actors and media output, with complex issues often reduced to invalid direct relationships. The importance of such interactions was outlined in the literature review, which made clear the importance of both 'cognitive shortcuts' (Börzel & Risse, 2000) and the 'importance of ideas' (Schmidt, 2004) in terms of public understanding, accountability and legitimacy. Without adequate understanding, legitimacy will remain circumscribed if not unattainable, and while it is not within the remit of this research to falsify claims within the public sphere; simplistic relational claims do little to facilitate a growth in public understanding.

This article offers one of endless examples of such simplistic engagements with complex political issues. Research has shown that European migrants had very limited awareness of the welfare structure available in the UK (Ponce, 2018). However, the Daily Mail article relays, and then exaggerates claims by Theresa May that British welfare provisions are "pull factors" in "drawing thousands of jobless migrants to the UK", and require "restrictions on migration from the EU" to prevent this 'abuse' (Mail, 12.11.2012). Claims such as this are prolific across the '*detachment*' data set. Unpacking these cognitive shortcuts immediately raises a range of questions regarding validity of such a framework, and the inherent omissions. Healthcare funding would certainly be the most obvious omission following welfare cuts in excess of £40 billion overseen by this administration (Conservative-Liberal Coalition), and whether in the scheme of such reductions, £40 million over the same period merits such relative scrutiny. Furthermore, the intentional confusion of figures, and implication of European responsibility actively links distinct pressures. In this article the £40 million claim equates to the cost of all foreign nationals using the NHS premised upon freedom of information requests, the data on cost does not relate only to European citizens, however, it is European migration that is singled out in the piece.

The Express is the most prolific offender in this regard, both in terms of hyperbole and invalid cognitive shortcuts. Both in absolute and relative terms, it offers more Eurosceptic output than any of its counterparts. In its discussion of Romanian and Bulgarian migration it repeatedly indicates the UK is at risk of a "flood of migrants" from "29 million Bulgarian and Romanians" as a result of "European 'freedom of movement'", and this will "snatch jobs from UK workers" while reducing "British living standards" (Express, 29.10.2012). While it holds

true that this figure does accurately represent the total combined populations of these two countries once again the output is implying both a link, and a risk that is way beyond any measured engagement with reality.

While these pieces meet the criteria for 'detachment' as they engage with material or tangible costs to the UK, the discourse drives deeper fears and serves to undermine perceptions of accountability. The Express writes of "anger at cover up over new surge in migrants" (Express, 10.04.2013), claiming ministers are "keeping the British people in the dark" regarding the consequences of changes in freedom of movement. The article implies conspiracy between domestic and supranational actors against the British public. It is alarming that the data set catalogued a number of claims of conspiracy under these criteria. European proposals regarding tables on legal standards are relayed by the Express as *Eurocrats* trying to "seize control of Britain's law courts" (Express, 27.03.2013). The Express claims "the data is being compiled as a step towards imposing a single criminal justice system across the EU that will be controlled by unelected European judges". Unpacking the claims within these articles, one quickly recognises that judges are never elected and that the UK would have a veto over any reform to the *acquis communautaire*, however, these claims demonstrate discourse capable of both scaring and misleading populations.

6.47 'Divorce':

'Divorce' (-2) codes output promoting a British exit from European regional integration. As with all the criteria the set contains a range of engagements, but the focus is upon a fundamental, and lasting, separation from the process of European integration. The European Union is broadly relayed as *alien* or *inferior*, with material and cultural commonalties both downplayed if not entirely dismissed. The concept of *burden* remains evident throughout this set, but it is superseded under the final criteria by the more emotive idea of *risk*.

In regards to *burden* as the criteria set out, we see the recurrent conclusion that the drain of integration is such that the only reasoned course of action is to separate, the European Union is portrayed as irresponsible and unaccountable. This discourse is coherent with the comments of Cameron and Osborne but reaches a different conclusion. The Express

develops criticism of a “wasteful EU” into its *crusade* to leave the EU across its coverage. The discourse presents the European actors as direct competitors in an interaction for limited resources, this follows and supports the *austerity* ideational framework highlighted above. New contributions to the supranational budget may exceed child benefit expenditure, which bears as much relation to the reduction in the latter, if Cameron does not show adequate “fiscal leadership” in “next month's budget showdown with European leaders...The massive budget demands add further weight to the Daily Express Crusade for Britain to quit the EU” (Express, 30.10.2012). The “arrogant EU will never moderate its demands”, it is claimed that “Eurocrats are plotting” major increases for themselves in complete disregard to the sacrifices being made at a national level; “the expense account culture of the EU has been untouched by austerity” (Express, 06.11.2012). This discourse is coherent across publications, with thrift and accountability ever present.

However, these themes are not exclusively presented as a *burden* to the UK and its population but are developed into *risk* to both democracy and sovereignty. The language fuels fear and frames this risk in terms that undermine legitimacy. The Daily Mail urges, “We need a blood bath to tame these arrogant officials” in an alarmist editorial on bureaucracy at both national and supranational level. The Mail claims the nation is witnessing the “defeat of democracy”, and although responsibility is also partially placed in Whitehall, it is clear where the greater threat emanates from:

“Our departure from the EU...would start to resolve the problem of this *coup d'etat* by bureaucrats and hand it back to our elected representatives. It requires will power and, quite possibly, a bloodbath of officials.” (Mail, 14.01.2013)

The tone here is clear and leaves no room for ambiguity. European integration poses a *risk* to the UK, its sovereignty and democracy, and it is the British people who have been the victims of this great deception. The Sun, a clear advocate of the value of British membership in 1973, recasts history to again imply concerted conspiracy.

*“We joined on January 1, 1973... We have been lied to pretty much ever since.
Every treaty has undermined Westminster democracy and given away power to*

unelected and unaccountable Brussels officials. The EU goal was to seize command of economic, defence and foreign policy...

David Cameron, who once said he would never lead Britain out of Europe, is having to think again.

This month he will make a major speech about our place in Europe, spelling out the powers Britain wants back from Brussels. That prospect has enraged pompous EU presidents Jose Manuel Barroso and Herman Van Rompuy.

"You cannot cherry-pick," spluttered Rumpy-Pumpy. Oh yes we can...Other EU leaders know Europe will unravel without Britain".

(Sun, 31.12.2012)

This discourse is both divisive and misleading, as such it relates directly to Knill & Lehmkuhl's discussion of Europeanization as process capable of shifting beliefs and expectations (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999). The beliefs or ideas evident in this output frame the EU as not simply alien, but a normative threat to the UK. The European Union is not a cooperative framework but more akin to an invading power engaged in conspiracy against the British people, despite being at the very same time entirely dependent upon them. Such cognitive dissonance is recurrent throughout 'divorce' and will be evident in the following analysis of Eurosceptic discourse across the conflict scale.

However, before moving to the next scale we need to briefly access the shift in discourse on national public actors. As the case study was constructed around Cameron's commitment to a referendum, the Prime Minister remains a central actor across output, however, the relative significance and authority attached to public figures supporting British membership has diminished from the previous data. Major was broadly relayed in positive and deferential terms in the last case study (see last chapter), Cameron is subject to far less positive coverage. The Prime Minister is accused of "lying over an EU referendum" and reneging on a "'cast iron guarantee' he made to Sun readers in 2007 to hold a poll" (Sun, 19.11.2012). This will be related to wider changes in political discourse and the relationship between the political class and the electorate since the last case studies, but feeds into broader fears regarding accountability and legitimacy. Whereas the last case study saw Major's opposition to a referendum applauded across the right-wing tabloid output, the very same caution

regarding a plebiscite is a “betrayal”, and is now the “rebels, not the PM, who speak for us on Europe” (Sun, 04.11.2012). It is evident that the treatment of public figures in right wing media output is no longer clearly structured along partisan lines, but European lines.

Nigel Farage is portrayed as a “conviction politician” (Sun 08.01.2013), Cameron does receive praise upon his pledge to a referendum, but the Express makes clear its preferences regarding future actors’ perspectives on Europe:

“This is a great moment in our crusade. But much remains to be achieved. We need to force the other party leaders to match David Cameron's commitment. And of course, we need to make sure that when the referendum is held it is won by those who would restore Britain's status as an independent nation”.

(Express, 23.01.2013).

All of the right-wing tabloids provide a direct voice for anti-European actors across the data set including Nigel Farage, William Hague, Chris Grayling, Boris Johnson, and David Davis. Authority and legitimacy are continually ascribed to these actors, while their opponents are presented as a moral hazard. Boris Johnson attacks the PM as “morally wrong and...intellectually dishonest” in his collaboration with “Eurozone countries” over banking union and claims the UK must “withdraw from all political Union” (Mail, 05.12.2012). Grayling asserts the Eurozone crisis, and the response to it indicate just where the European Union is headed. Miliband and Brown put us on a “ever faster conveyor belt towards "more Europe". Only Conservatives can get us off it” (Express, 27.03.2013).

Correspondingly actors on the other side of the European cleavage are guilty of “monumental deceit” (Mail on Blair and Brown, 01.01.2013); Clegg, “whose wife is *Spanish*, and who for years was himself a Eurocrat” is charged with “contempt for democracy” (Mail, 28.12.2012); Ken Clarke is so arrogant and committed to “revenge... in the face of damning and dangerous evidence, to admit [he was] wrong from the start” (Sun, 05.11.2012). Farage publicly “declared war” on Cameron, following comment on the risk of departure but is relayed as the leader of “sensible UKIP” (Express, 27.11.2012). Peter Mandelson is the “the long-time Europhile Moriarty to our Eurosceptic Holmes” (Express 12.01.2013), equating this

pro-European actor to the fictional murderous criminal master mind, referred to as the *Napoleon of Crime*.

This analysis is not exhaustive as one could write an entire chapter on the discourse that surround pro-European actors across this data set alone, but what it does show is that tabloid output has shifted from partisan affiliation to exclusively anti-Europeanized terms. Any actor critical of integration receives positive coverage, any defence of integration merits both personal, substantive and moral assault, leaving very little opportunity for meaningful dialogue in this component of the public sphere.

6.5 Understanding the findings of the Conflict Scale:

Recapping, the second scale was constructed to map and code output on supranational aims, institutions and actors. The previous case studies have shown this component of the public sphere to be suffering from a dearth of engagement. As fully outlined in the full scales (see appendix), the ‘conflict scale;’ follows the same structure as above, coding for different degrees of positive to negative output on the process of European integration itself; this scale codes from what is understood as ‘active support’ to ‘overt objection’.

6.51 Positive, neutral and non-engagement in Coverage of *Supranational Aims, Actors and Institutions*

The following section will consider the findings of the ‘conflict scale’, with regard to positive, neutral, and non-engaged output. Due the bias now evident in Europeanized media discourse, the number of articles coded against these criteria is limited. However, the data will highlight a further narrowing of perspectives, and sustained absence of substantive engagement. These findings contribute to the mapping of an increasingly Eurosceptic dimension to the public sphere, and one that requires further research to better understand its relationship to shifts in public opinion that culminated in Brexit.


6.52 'Active support':

'Active support' (2) codes articles on one of two essential criteria, a normative or value-based defence of European integration, or personal, normative or value-based critique of *Eurosceptics* when engaging directly with the European Union, its aims, or agents, external to debates regarding how integration effects the UK. This is an almost redundant coding matrix by 2012, as such discourse simply does not exist within British tabloid output at this juncture. Out of the entire data set, not one article offers a value-based defence of integration, just one article offers a salient critique of *Eurosceptics*, although it is very limited. The claim within the Mirror is that the Tory-UKIP alliance is engaged in a "hate-campaign against Europe" (Mirror, 15.02.2012). This claim will receive support in the sections that follow and requires little in the way of unpacking here. Suffice it to say, that as with the *separation* scale, the height of positive engagement with the idea of Europe, is once again a rejection of negative output.

6.53 'Passive support':

'Passive support' (1) as with 'conditional unity' focuses on the material or tangible benefits, however, these emanate directly from *supranational* processes, institutions and actors and do not exclusively focus on their effect upon the UK, but rather frames these issues at a European level, or considers their benefit to member states collectively.

Graph showing coding along the 'conflict scale' of Mirror articles in 2012-2013:



Graph 6.e (author's own data): This graph shows the coding of Mirror data, along the 'conflict scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 2012-2013, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of Cameron's pledge on the 23rd January 2013 (23.10.2012-23.04.2013). The data represents a quantitative overview of Mirror discourse regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions.

The Mirror again offers a partial of an outlier to the right-wing tabloids, although it must be stressed that this is only in relative terms. As Graph 6.e indicates, it represents an anomaly within the data set as it has sustained positive coverage of supranational considerations. Nevertheless, the Mirror is more *negative* than it is *positive* regarding the European Union itself. 'passive support' focuses upon economic, regulatory, and social benefits to integration. The status of the European Union as the world's "biggest business market in the world" (Mirror 24.01.2013) is the most recurrent defence of integration. However, as has been noted above, against the background of austerity, the Eurozone crisis and relative economic decline, the impact of these claims within the wider public sphere were limited.


Work place regulations are recognised as having improved working conditions and combating the scope for "bad bosses to turn the clock back and exploit workers" as every "employee should enjoy decent job standards in common with 500 million workers in the world's biggest market" (Mirror, 23.10.2012). Human rights and cross border policing also receive positive engagement, with the European Convention on Human Rights claimed to be of clear benefit, especially in "countries in the former Soviet Union" and the European Arrest Warrant ending cross border "safe haven[s] for Europe's criminals" (Mirror, 05.03.2013).

While this suggests a shift from previous case studies, offering more balanced engagement with the implications of European integration at a continental level, this is unfortunately misleading. Only 2.7% of all output across the data set meets the criteria for 'passive support', furthermore 76.3% of these articles come from the Mirror. In total less than 3% of all articles code any form of *positive* engagement with European integration, its aims, institutions and actors.

6.54 'Neutrality':

As explained in the previous chapters these '**neutrality**' (0) records both neutral or balanced output (expressing no preference or judgement regarding the process of integration), and non-engagement (entails no engagement at all with supranational institutions, aims or actors); articles that have been coded exclusively of the basis of claims regarding implications for the UK on the separation scale. This is the first set of criteria to code a significant number of articles on the conflict scale, with 34.7% of all output being coded for 'neutrality'. In the first case study, 84.3% of articles coded for 'neutrality', but actually had no engagement at a supranational level. Analysis showed a significant change by the time of Maastricht, with 46.3% of the output coded under these criteria actually neutrally engaging with the supranational implications and interactions. This did demonstrate tabloid output had offered more nuanced coverage than in 1975 suggesting a notable shift had occurred between the first two case studies. The question that inherently follows, is has this shift had a lasting effect on tabloid media output. Can we view this as Europeanization in terms of lasting change going some way to counteract the "lack of public information about political decision making at the European level" (Sift et al, 2007: 137)?

Graph showing the gap between 'neutrality' and *non-engagement* in 2012-2013



Graph 6.f (author's own data): This graph shows the level of 'neutrality' vs *non-engagement* as recorded by the 'conflict scale' in 2012-2013

As Graph 6.f indicates 81.1% of the 392 articles coded for 'neutrality' offered no engagement with supranational concerns. This means that *engaged* neutral output accounts for just 6.5% of the complete data set. While the cumulative *positive* and *engaged* neutral output on the 'conflict scale' accounts for just 9.3% of the 1131 articles coded for this case study. It is evident from Graph 6.a, along with the findings in the previous two sections, that Europeanized British media discourse is not counteracting the "lack of public information" regarding supranational governance (Sift et al, 2007: 137).


This tabloid component of the national public sphere is evidently failing in terms of a range of functions essential to the legitimacy in the context of a supranational framework for governance; "citizens' ability to follow and take part in public discourse about political issues is rightly seen as an essential part of a legitimate political system" (Meyer, 2005: 123). Public discourse that lacks balance will never permit citizens to follow, understand and engage with the issues at hand.

6.55 Negative Coverage of Supranational Aims, Actors and Institutions

The following section will explore the data that reveals the major growth in negative Europeanised media output. This growth is evident both in terms of frequency, and the substance of the discourse now present. The data will outline the expansion and normalisation of Eurosceptic perspectives now apparent and recurrent in media discourse. These findings raise further questions regarding the implications for legitimacy, public understandings, and democracy more broadly.

6.56 'Suspicion':

Graph showing the findings of the 'conflict scale' for all articles for all publications in 2012-2013:



Graph 6.g (author's own data): This graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications combined, along the 'conflict scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 2012-2013, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of Cameron's pledge on the 23rd January 2013 (23.10.2012-23.04.2013). . The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions perspective indicating preferences toward the supranational dimension of integration.

Graph 6.g shows the degree of bias in tabloid output evident by 2013, with regard to supranational aims, actors and institutions. In comparison to the evident limited coding under the previous scales, 62.6% of the complete data set coded negative output regarding the European Union, its aims, institutions and actors. Nearly two thirds of the articles coded were critical of the EU, while less than 10% were positive or neutrally engaged.

'Suspicion' (-1) views European integration as an economic, social and regulatory burden; an impediment to member states. It focuses on the impact of integration in tangible terms, but perceives them to be negative. These articles may contain pejorative or mocking references to aims, actors and institutions, but do not extend to emotionally charged, visceral or irreconcilable terms.

The Express continues its "crusade" to leave the EU, with a series of articles focused on 'excessive' economic regulation, wasteful expenditure, and financial crisis or mismanagement ranging from the comical to the alarmist. The former serves to create 'pantomime' villains or fools; not worthy of public service:

"A TOP Eurocrat who once ordered ordinary people to take the bus to save the planet travels in a taxpayer-funded limousine...racking up huge bills being ferried across the continent at public expense. As usual, it's one rule for them, another for the rest of us"

(Express, 03.11.2012)

While such output may not initially appear substantive, it feeds into a discourse of farcical, distant, and reckless governance; language that can never permit adequate authority. At the other end of the spectrum, the criteria coded further conspiratorial framing of supranational action. A reform package with the specified primary aim to "complete the banking union" following the series banking failures since 2008, is relayed as an effort to centralise budgetary competence:

"BRUSSELS will be able to overrule national governments to enforce budget decisions under plans for the eurozone unveiled by chief Eurocrat Herman van Rompuy last night"

(Express, 07.12.2012)


The extract above helps highlight the varying negative claims coded, the Eurocratic villain is recurrently re-enforced, broadly engaged in some scheme against member states and their populations. While 'detachment', did not entail a promotion or implication of member state departure or an unsustainable Union, 'suspicion' bears a strong relationship to such conclusions.

Supranational institutions and output are relayed as interfering, ill advised, and at times destructive. Legislation on gender equality in terms of consumer rights, is mocked as “the European Union issues another crazy ‘directive’” (Sun, 23.12.2012). While the Mail charges the EU with the creation of a “lost generation” (Mail, 03.04.2013) in its management of the Eurozone crisis, a term associated with the millions who lost their lives in the First World War. Unpacking this discourse, we can see that while the critique focuses on material implications, the inferred risk is more malign than a 12% unemployment rate across the Eurozone.

This output broadly views the Eurozone itself as a destructive framework responsible for the “uncertainty plaguing Europe” (Mail, 22.03.2013), and the single currency may lead to a much more lasting break down, it is claimed: “economic problems will spill over into social breakdown in many areas of Europe as unemployment soars and governments run out of money” (Mail, 05.11.2012). Anecdotal horror stories of people resorting to crime and prostitution are relayed in this article, not to suggest, dismiss or diminish social hardship, but directly relating this to the monetary union, and concluding it is adequate evidence that the “best thing for Europe's struggling economies might be a break-up of the single currency” (Mail, 05.11.2012). It might be suggested that sincerity in terms of concern for Europe’s struggling economies is less than genuine, such nations may simply serve as vehicle in this discourse to attack the single market; however, this would need insight from an editorial perspective, and clarity regarding editorial preferences, which are beyond the aims of this research.

6.57 'Overt objection':

Graph showing the findings of the 'conflict scale' for all articles for all individual publications in 2012-2013:



Graph 6.h (author's own data): This graph shows the coding of all data, for all publications combined, along the 'conflict scale' as caught on the basis of key search terms in 2012-2013, extending exactly 3 calendar months either side of Cameron's pledge on the 23rd January 2013 (23.10.2012-23.04.2013). The data represents a quantitative overview of British media discourse regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions perspective indicating preferences toward the supranational dimension of integration. This data remains divided by publication indicating the degree of variation or consistency between tabloids.

Graph 6.h details the complete degree of imbalance in output on EU institutions, aims and actors across all publications, the Mirror representing the only evident limited divergence from the coherent Eurosceptic discourse that now constitutes Europeanized tabloid output. The shift from the previous case studies supports the assessment of the tabloid component of the public sphere as relaying an increasingly narrow narrative on European concerns. The significance of 'suspicion' (-1) was outlined above, but 'overt objection' (-2) represents 20.2% of the data set, and as such is a coherent and sustained component of tabloid discourse.

'Overt objection' (-2) frames the risk of European integration in normative terms, demonstrating a high-level of animosity and anxiety regarding the aims, actors, and institutions of the European Union. As the graph above indicates, again the Express leads in terms of highly negative output, as it did on the previous scale. The discourse now reaches levels of visceral or belligerent engagement that are entirely incompatible with cooperative interaction. The Express' "crusade" makes recurrent astonishing normative and conspiratorial claims. The European Union is engaged in a "sinister" plan, and "EURO MPS want to brainwash children" with "Soviet-style propaganda" the continent over (Express, 12.03.2013); according to a hyperbolic critique of a website on working methods and democratic principles. Such a claim, even if it were not a recurrent theme in the discourse requires unpacking. A website focused on citizenship and rights, is not only compared to a regime responsible for the deaths of millions but equates it to mental abuse of minors. Such ideational inferences again serve to present horrific *risk* as inherent to integration. The *risk* implied in such discourse frames the European Union as a direct threat to security, freedom, democracy, and established norms and values. The EU itself is a "corrupt" institution, "fraud is endemic", and any actors who defend integration are "Eurofanatics" (Express, 02.11.2012). Claims such as these regarding corruption and fraud serve to present an institution devoid of accountability and incapable of legitimacy.

While the proclaimed *crusade* from the Express would be anticipated to entail such hyperbole, it is not extreme in relative terms, this discourse is both consistent and coherent across all right-wing tabloids accounting for a fifth of the entire data set. The sharing of policy competence, or supranational legal oversight are widely relayed as authoritarian rather than collaborative, and again European 'villains' are driving a malign and conspiratorial agenda against the people. The above reference to 'fanatics' raises a range of highly emotive, and violent connotations, such ideas and imagery do not allow room for deliberation or cooperation.

"The tide has turned against Europe's dictatorial arrogance. In Brussels, the Eurocrats would have settled back in their taxpayer-funded limousines, happy in the knowledge that the summit had turned the ratchet of EU expansion one notch further.... the arrogant, anti-democratic, vastly wasteful EU, which appears to

believe it should be immune from the austerity being inflicted on the peoples of Europe”.

(Mail 02.11.2012).

The above extract from the Mail decries European integration as a dictatorship, again such terminology is emotively charged. Negotiation regarding the supranational budget is relayed as EU expansion. Unpacking this language, we can identify not only extreme hyperbole, but integration is now a vehicle for conquest. Exogenous expansion into sovereign states legitimises the idea of resistance and frames the relationship between states and supranational actors as one of conflict. The European Union is now “a gross abuse of...power, [and] an attack on the most basic principle of democracy” (Mail, 25.10. 2012). The Sun refers to negotiations regarding the Common Agricultural Policy as the “The Battle of Brussels” (Sun, 23.11.2012); a clear reference to the Battle of Britain, the last defence against the *risk* of Nazi invasion. Agreement on a budget reduction is “Victory in Europe” (Sun, 09.02.2013), again a clear reference to the Second World War (VE Day). The European Union is no longer a partner, but now a “Brussels Empire” (Express, 16.11.2012) – *conflict* now seems almost inevitable.

6.6 Europeanized Public Spheres

With the empirical findings of the third case outlined, we can begin to fully recognise the extended process of discursive Europeanization. British discursive Europeanization begins framed in limited, material or economic, terms. It broadly follows output from political elites and reveals a dearth in terms of normative or ideational dimensions. This changes with Maastricht, but change is neither immediate nor reflective of the complexity of European integration. The third case study presents an increasingly normative and ideational public sphere, but one that dominated by limited narratives and hyper-critical or conspiratorial perspectives.

Does this reflect a British exceptionalism? Or rather a difference in the focus of Europeanized discourse in the national context. The relationship between discourse and identity is beyond the remit of this research, but the data sets in the thesis raise interesting questions for

further research in this regard. Can we better understand the British Euroscepticism via closer inspection of the interplay between Europeanized discourse and national constructions and conceptions of identity? Once again it is insightful to compare British discourse to its French and German counterparts. Theresa May's address to the Conservative Party conference in October 2016, months after the referendum, helps to draw into focus ideational and normative divergence that is now evident.

"If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what the word citizenship means... But this is our generation's moment. To write a new future upon the page. To bring power home and make decisions... here in Britain. To take back control and shape our future... here in Britain".

(Theresa May, 2016)

This rhetoric is an explicit rejection of identity as multi-faceted concept, re-assuming the exclusive primacy of the nation state as the object of loyalty. The Prime Minister claims to be re-writing the future, a re-construction defined by the primacy of 'home' and 'control' above all other concerns or attachments. Such discourse is better understood, in part, as a product of the ideational and normative findings of this case study, and the limitations of Europeanized British discourse as shown throughout this research. May's speech indicates mainstream Eurosceptic discourse is now directly appealing to notions of British citizenship and identity.

Identity is present in French and German Europeanized discourse, but is constructed in distinct terms. The telling work of Banchoff offers a fine point of departure to understand this complex, but crucial, puzzle to the Europeanization of national identity. As the term implies, we must inevitably anticipate national variation in response to pressures integration brings to bear upon identity, and the internal and external dynamics that affect this ongoing process of social and cultural reconstruction; "for states, like other social groups, identity has both an internal and an external dimension – it is what binds the group together and what situates it with respect to others...[promoting and redefining] the set of shared norms and narratives that sustain 'we-ness' through time" (Banchoff, 1999: 268).

To operationalise his analysis of the salience and impact of ideational factors within the German context, Banchoff focuses on public discourse among national political elites. Banchoff identifies some interesting qualities and telling junctures in the development of modern German identity that merit brief consideration. Ingrid Matthaus-Maier (SPD spokesperson) is one of a number of actors identified as making public claims largely absent in the British public sphere. She indicates that the fact that conflict between Britain, France and Germany has become “unimaginable” is the “most important” achievement of European integration. However, as Banchoff demonstrates “supranational identity did not emerge suddenly after 1990, it has deeper roots” (Banchoff, 1999: 274). The first ratification debate in 1951 prioritised the political significance of union over economic concerns, Chancellor Adenauer argued the willingness to share sovereignty marked “the end of nationalism” (Banchoff, 1999: 274). By the end of the 1950s there was cross-party consensus on European integration as “the foundation of German policy”; “the enduring strength of the pro-European consensus was evident over subsequent decades...a supranational identity remained an object of broad domestic consensus” (Banchoff, 1999: 275). Banchoff proceeded to demonstrate that the German political class did not cede their own national identity, rather they promoted the multi-faceted conceptions of identity. Furthermore, via their discourse and public communication the German political elite defined Germany both at home, and upon the national stage; “they engage in Foreign policy. Their words are deeds” (Banchoff, 1999: 276).

As such, we can see in Germany, how the public socialisation emanated from the political class. The Europeanization of any given member state provides a range of opportunities for actors, agendas and responses. Börzel and Risse framed these opportunities in terms of ‘cognitive short-cuts’, ‘political entrepreneurs’ and ‘change-agents’ (Börzel & Risse, 2000: 12) and these concepts offer a useful inroad into understanding the promotion of these cultural revisions; “collective understandings of appropriate behaviour (logic of appropriateness)...strongly influence the way in which domestic actors respond to European pressures” (Börzel & Risse, 2000: 9). Within Germany such collective understandings and consensual politics facilitated the expedient transmission of Europeanized *cognitive shorts cuts*.

However, as was outlined in the 2nd Chapter, such concepts do not permit a holistic understanding of the cultural or ideational shift. To further our understanding in that regard, we must draw in the additional tools offered by Discursive Institutionalism, incorporating ideas; “more important[ly], their role in the redefinition of existing interest and the creation of new ones...they can build bridges...[serving] both as facilitators of radical policy change and a prerequisite of it” (Blyth, 1997: 246).

As will be shown in the subsequent discussion of France, in both these public spheres there is a constituent focus on the ideational and normative dimension to European integration that is not present in this research. The idea of identity matters, it is tied to the scope for supranational legitimacy in the national context, and its form is contingent upon discursive context. German elite political discourse retains this recognition of the importance of identity, this recognition began with early integration but continues into the present as evident in this extract from a 2018 speech from Angela Merkel:

“Today’s generation will play a crucial role. It is their historic responsibility to actively defend and strengthen European democracy, the European value system, the European social model and the dignity of each and every individual – in a nutshell, everything that constitutes European identity”.

(Angela Merkel, 2018)

Germany offers clear evidence of political entrepreneurship, from the political mainstream actively addressing identity via their discourse. This discourse seeks to lead and define the terms of the debate. This is not limited to Germany.

France also displays an extended history of incorporating ideational and normative dimensions to national Europeanized discourse. This is distinct from that of Germany. However, it does not have the deficit of this dimension evident in Britain; “Gaullist discourse underplayed the loss of sovereignty by emphasising the gains to interests and identity through French leadership” (Schmidt, 2007: 992). While in Britain, the implications for sovereignty were broadly underplayed via their omission from political discourse and, by extension, media output. In France, there is an acknowledged interplay and defence in terms of aggregate effect.

Inherently over time national context shifts, and with it the value and form of discourse. However, these normative and ideational dimensions remain present and discursive leadership continues to emanate from the political class. Mitterrand was initially faced with difficulty in reconciling his socialist vision with the changing national and European context. However, via the discursive reframing of himself as 'social democrat' Mitterrand managed to overcome the normative challenge; "French socialists started highlighting the common European historical and cultural heritage" (Risse, 2002: 88). National political aims were not going to be curtailed as result of European integration, rather the European framework would permit the extension of these aims to a supranational level and this would be consistent with a revised construction of French identity.

"The PS's (Socialist Party) move toward Europe included an effort to reconstruct French nation-state identity...They increasingly argued that the French future was to be found in Europe. The French left started embracing the notion of a 'European France'...In sum, the majority of the French political elite incorporated...notions of French distinctiveness".

(Risse, 2002: 88-89)

As such, across political cleavages, distinct periods and national contexts, there is a consistent engagement with these normative and ideational concerns associated with European integration. Clearly one cannot claim this engagement ensures consensus, and certainly publicly salient concerns are open to contention, as is evident in the popular rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. However, the terms of Europeanized discourse are actively constructed by the political elite and seek to promote inclusive notions of national identity that are compatible with the process of integration.

The change in economic context and growing, and increasingly evident, impact of integration upon the French economy and polity raised challenges. The response of the French political elite to these challenges is comparable to the findings of the research; "French leaders have emphasised the EU's economic benefits for France in their general discourse, invoking Europeanization as a shield against globalization, at the same time that they have shifted the blame to the EU for unpopular policies while taking credit popular policies without even mentioning the EU's role" (Schmidt, 2007: 993). As such, it would be naïve to talk about

substantive British exceptionalism. These are qualities present in British discourse. However, it is the proactive effort to incorporate the ideational dimension to integration in the France and Germany by the political elite that is distinct. This active effort to address identity via public and communicative discourse continues in France. President Macron has made direct appeals to multifaceted conceptions of citizenship and identity in a Europeanized context.

“Citizens of Europe, if I am taking the liberty of addressing directly, it is not only in the name of the history and values that unite us, but because time is of the essence...Never, since the second world war has Europe been so essential...Retreating into nationalism offers nothing; it is rejection without alternative...Nationalists are misguided when they claim to defend our identity by withdrawing us from the EU, because it European civilisation that unites, frees and protects us”.

(Emmanuel Macron, 2019)

This succinct overview of the interplay between Europeanized discourse and identity in France and Germany highlights substantive divergence with the findings of this research. Ideational and normative dimensions to the process of integration are present in all public spheres, but emerge at different junctures and in significantly distinct terms. While French and German political elites seek to initiate this discursive Europeanization, their British counterparts broadly avoid such discourse, surrendering the opportunity to define the terms of it. As Nicolaidis and Howse indicate “Europeaness ought not to mean a shared identity but rather the sharing of identities” (Nicolaidis & Howse, 2002: 773). Normative adjustment to the pressures of integration requires inclusive not exclusive ideational responses. The normative and ideational dimensions present in this final case study indicate that they become present in Eurosceptic terms. Furthermore, appeals to identity, when they do emerge, are primarily in exclusive terms, not in the pluralistic terms evident in France and Germany. This will contribute to the growth of Euroscepticism in the British context as it fails to promote normative or ideational adjustment compatible with European integration. As such, “the formation of the identity or associative basis of...(European) community...(is necessary) in order to achieve adequate democratic legitimacy (Nicolaidis & Howse, 2002: 780

Outside the domain of political science, but useful to draw briefly on here, are the contributions of sociological psychology in understanding divergence in the national psyche. Müller-Peters offered an insightful assessment of the factors and forms of identity that contribute to collective attachment and unity within social groups. She identifies two distinct forms of national identity: “national identity is a multi-dimensional construct under which nationalism, the discrimination dimension, is distinguishable from patriotism, the categorization dimension” (Müller-Peters, 1998: 704). That is to say that nationalism operates as an exclusive ideological framework, circumscribed in geographical terms, entailing a belief in the superiority of one’s own collective over that of others. This is distinct as an ideational matrix from patriotism, which can operate at multiple levels premised upon non-exclusive self-categorization; that is to say Müller-Peters identifies concordant national and European patriotism evident across a range of European nations in the run up to the establishment of a single European currency. However, the UK is distinct to the nation states that have adopted the Euro in this regard, indicating that even British patriotism stands aside from its European counterparts. While the British form of patriotism inherently rejects the superiority of its nationalistic counterpart, it is not predisposed toward the loss of symbolic national ideational kernels. It remains highly attached to notable symbols of sovereignty.

“In Great Britain the hypothesis of a zero-correlation between attitude toward the Euro and national patriotism is falsified, because it turns out there, even those who exhibit only purely patriotic feelings toward their country reject the introduction of the Euro. This supports the thesis that, fundamentally, the introduction of a single European currency cannot be reconciled with the British self-image, no matter how this self-image is framed in concrete terms”.

(Müller-Peters, 1998: 713)

German and French discourses have integrated the normative and ideational dimensions to European integration since the start of European integration as shown in this section throughout the last three chapters. This incorporation has widely been directed by political elites in these nations, and allowed adequate time for, and explanation of, this process of adjustment. The discourse contributes to an inclusive form of patriotism of the form Müller-Peters outlines above. This is distinct to the process in the UK. When identity does emerge in British Europeanized discourse, it is primarily constructed as a counter referential against

Europe. British identity is distinct, it is exclusive, and it is not constructed in multifaceted terms. While normative and ideational discourse in Germany and France is compatible with supranational legitimacy, in Britain there appears to be emerging zero-sum relationship between identity and integration. This will be returned to the final chapter, but these comparative findings would contribute to any explanation of the causes of Brexit. As Hobolt and De Vries indicate, there is benefit in terms of rallying “opposition by highlighting national identity considerations and feelings of cultural threats” (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016: 422. They were referring to the use of these normative risks by right-wing political parties. However, as this case study has shown, this discourse is equally evident in right-wing media output. The construction and promotion of such risk is incompatible with inclusive notions of identity and will undermine the prospects for supranational legitimacy in the domestic British context. This does not reflect British exceptionalism in terms of discourse, as the right-wing parties in France, Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands propagated comparable normative risk (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016), but the absence of a substantive counter narrative, as evident in this case study, indicates divergence in the aggregate form and focus of the normative discursive construction of the process of integration.

6.8 Conclusion

The aim of this research has been to record the change in Europeanized media discourse since the first referendum in 1975. The chapter above sought to map and detail tabloid output surrounding Cameron’s commitment to a referendum to establish whether there was clear evidence of coherent and consistent Europeanization, and establish the form and focus of the change evident by this juncture.

The empirical section above has presented clear evidence of change emanating from the process of European integration. The data sets have mapped the tangible Europeanization of British tabloid output. This case study recorded a major and sustained increase in Europeanized tabloid media coverage; the volume of such tabloid output for the final case study is nearly equal to that of both the previous case studies combined. European concerns are now consistently present in national discourse.

However, this presence has developed in fundamentally negative and limited terms. Positive coverage of British membership as recorded by the 'separation scale' has dropped to 6%, and positive coverage of the supranational dimension to integration is below 3% of the complete final data set. This represents a complete collapse in balance. The only publication indicative of divergence from this clear trend is The Mirror. The only left-wing tabloid, does represent an anomaly in this data set as over 38% of all Mirror articles coded were positive regarding British membership or Anglo-European relations, and over 15% were positive *vis-à-vis* supranational considerations. Left-wing publications are more likely to published positive Europeanized content. However, left-wing outlets are also conversely the least likely to publish any form of Europeanized content. This element of the public sphere, and Europeanized media discourse, is overwhelming defined by the Eurosceptic right-wing press. This supports the findings of Hawkins, who in an analysis of British media coverage of the Lisbon Treaty, found that left-wing publications were more pro-European, but significantly less likely to publish on European affairs (Hawkins, 2012).

Right-wing tabloids are consistently and coherently Eurosceptic in this data set, displaying a complete collapse in any substantive sense of balance. British membership is widely constructed as a burden, without benefit. Furthermore, there has been a major ascendancy in highly normative, ideational, and emotive critique. The Express is engaged in a 'crusade' to 'liberate' Britain (see for example, the Express, 24.11.2012), The Sun is at 'war' for the "Battle of Brussels" (Sun, 23.11.2012), The Mail is equally polemic in its framing of *conflict* as constructs the "Fourth Reich" (Mail, 30.03.2013) and "Kaiser Merkel" (Mail, 20.04.2013). All three publications are consistent and coherent in promoting Brexit or a *separation* from the framework for European integration, with over a fifth of all output explicitly favouring 'divorce'. This supports the findings of Marks *et al* that the process of the popular politicisation of European integration has been heavily influenced by those that oppose it (Marks *et al*, 2002). The Europeanization of British media discourse is contributing to the growth and increased primacy of Eurosceptic narratives in tabloid output.

The media represent a defining component of any given public sphere. As with previous chapters the data set was coded against the two ordinal scales, as well as a substantive analysis of the specific form and focus of Europeanized output with CDA. While the previous case studies coded structure and shift between 'critical junctures', neither were as coherent

as this data set; in the final case study output is both coherent and consistently anti-European as shown in this data.

This case study recorded a 97.4% increase in terms of the volume of output, it also demonstrated that this increase is not tied to events-based output, or European integration as a conduit into the domain of other foreign policy concerns, as evident in previous case studies. The case study identifies evidence of *Europeanization* as now ensuring consistent focus upon European affairs, in fundamentally negative terms. However, this has not incorporated European interactions and concerns into “the logic of domestic discourse” (Radaelli, 2000), but constructed a “logic” of discourse that operates almost entirely against all aspects of integration.

As such it is valid to talk of *anti-Europeanization* as an evident and continual process in British tabloid output. The data set broadly views integration as *burden* on either the UK or the member states, with nearly a quarter of articles going as far as to claim this process poses a fundamental threat to the UK or the member states. Nearly two thirds of the discourse views the EU as nothing other than a continual, and illegitimate drain, while a quarter frames it as an exogenous *risk* to liberty, security and democracy. While the research framework anticipated a *Eurosceptic* press, the extent to which this output lacks balance is an alarming finding. The implications of such an imbalance raises warnings for other member states, the future of European integration, and the quality of national democracy, which will be considered in the following conclusion. However, such a public sphere cannot be conducive to an informed and deliberative public sphere, and must be expected to contribute to a negative shift in public opinion.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

The aim of this research was to make a contribution to understanding the interplay between European integration and domestic change. The specific focus was upon how the pressures emanating from the process of integration, affected national patterns of discourse and the ideas present in the public sphere. A research design was constructed to evaluate the Europeanization of British tabloid media discourse over the period since the referendum in 1975.

To these ends, the thesis was structured around a series of case studies selected on the basis of their importance as ‘critical junctures’ or punctuations in the established equilibrium (Bulmer, 2008). The vehicle for inspection of a defining component of the public sphere was the coding and analysis of the most widely read tabloid newspapers throughout the period in question; The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, and The Daily Mirror. The three cases selected spanned the majority of the duration of British membership of the European Union and its predecessors; starting with the first critical juncture in Anglo-European relations, that was prolific in the public sphere, the 1975 referendum. The second case study evaluated the construction of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) across the publications under consideration, this Treaty represented both a landmark in the expansion of the remit, and framework, for European governance, as well as another notable spike in media coverage of European affairs. The final case study was selected on the basis that it marked the acceptance of Eurosceptic discourse by the mainstream political class, as the Conservative party committed to a second referendum on British membership of the European Union; that critical juncture was David Cameron’s speech indicating this was now formal Conservative policy in 2013.

This framework for analysis permitted the research to map and assess growth of Europeanized coverage in the public sphere, as well as providing a better understanding of the substantive shift in this coverage and the ideas present within it. As anticipated, the idea

of *separation* and *conflict* (defined throughout) grew both in presence and depth by the final case study. However, the degree to which these concepts have assumed a discursive primacy in media output is a telling finding and one that is likely to contribute toward the growth of populist Euroscepticism. This is indicative of a major change in the normative frameworks in which integration becomes present in the national public sphere. What began as a project framed as material and economic cooperation, is now widely constructed as an illegitimate risk.

The relationship between such ideas and popular perception were never the focus of the research. Further research is required to develop a more concrete understanding of this relationship; however, this identification of growth represents a substantive and significant finding offering a novel contribution to the literature on consequences of integration for domestic discourse. The empirical contribution of the research as detailed throughout the previous chapters will be summarised below, but this final chapter will begin with outlining the theoretical contribution this thesis has made to the existing literature addressed in the introduction and literature review.

Following a discussion of the theoretical contribution of this thesis, the conclusion will move on to review the Europeanization of British tabloid media discourse. It will assess the evident normative shifts emanating from this process of Europeanization, the growth in importance of the concepts of *separation* and *conflict*, and review the comparisons between British Europeanized discourse, to that of her continental counterparts

7.2 Theoretical Contribution

This thesis has sought to make an original contribution to our understanding of the way that European integration has driven change in the UK. The empirical findings have been outlined in the previous three chapters, and will be reviewed below, but the theoretical contribution of this work needs to be outlined specifically. To ensure this contribution is clear the three key pieces of literature to which this work has added will each be addressed. This overview will begin with a discussion of Europeanization, before moving on to New Institutionalism, finishing with a brief assessment of the theoretical implications for media and public sphere literature.

7.2.1 Europeanization

The growth of the Europeanization research agenda was designed to counteract the shortcomings of the “grand theories” of integration (Stead *et al*, 2016: 101). Via the redirection of academic focus, it has sought to develop a more nuanced framework for understanding how the growth of the European Union has fuelled “domestic change caused by integration” (Vink, 2003: 63). The agenda began with a primary concern for the implications of integration upon formal domestic structures of governance (Radaelli, 2000), and helped to highlight integration was a far more interactive process than had been initially understood. Europeanization has furthered our understanding of the implications of regional integration for the nation state, and domestic political outcomes. As correctly identified by Knill and Lehmkuhl there has been a long-standing failure to adequately consider the domestic dimension of integration:

“While much has been written about the European Union in recent years, most of the scholarly work is concerned with the developments at the European level, and focuses on the extent to which domestic conditions affect the outcome of supranational institution-building and policy-making. As a result, the impact of European integration at the national level remains poorly understood”.

(Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999: 1)

This lack of understanding must be recognised as both salient and significant in the growth of populist Eurosceptic sentiment. Europeanization has contributed to recent efforts at redressing this shortcoming in the literature by providing a focus on the domestic implications. As such the research above, and the theoretical framework underwriting this thesis, mark a contribution to the “attempts to address this research deficit” (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999: 1). The growth of the Europeanization agenda was initially focused on the implications of integration for the more formal structures of politics (see for examples Börzel, 2002; Laegreid et al, 2004; Jordan, 2003). This represented a major step forward and has advanced the understanding of Europeanization as a “two-way process” (Börzel, 2002: 193), however, the theoretical framework that Europeanization has advanced remains to be fully exploited with regard to the informal consequences the European Union brings to bear at a domestic level.

It is in regard to these implications that the thesis has made a substantive theoretical contribution to the Europeanization research agenda. This is by no means the first such contribution, a growing literature is serving to improve our understanding of the pressure integration places upon a wide range of domestic considerations (See Chapter 2). However, the significance of Brexit, marking a break with decades of consensus and the first contraction in the membership of the European Union, indicates that an adequate and holistic understanding of this form of Europeanization is yet to be developed. It is increasingly evident that integration has some effect on virtually all aspects of national social and political concerns; covering, but not limited to the formal structures of power, social cleavages, opportunity structures, voter priorities and preferences, and ideational and normative constructs. To address both the theoretical and empirical dearth evident in these dimensions, much more research is required. This thesis offers both a theoretical and empirical contribution to redress this dearth. The empirical contribution will be summarised below, but in terms of theory the research has shown the value of national perspective in understanding ideational and normative implications of integration.

Europeanization as a theoretical framework has advanced the re-conceptualisation of the process of integration. These revised “conceptualisations of Europeanization” are allowing us to better understand “direct and indirect impacts, diversity and uniformity and fit and misfit” at the national level (Howell, 2002: 2). It is this nuance in theory that has permitted a far

more balanced appreciation of the change that is both increasingly evident and influential. While Europeanization as a process places comparable pressures on all member states, divergence in its consequences needs to be better understood.

As mentioned in the empirical chapters above, the justification for any belief in the notion of British exceptionalism may be no more valid than it is in any other member state; however, the perception, reconstruction, and proliferation of this notion has gained greater currency in British media, than in its counterparts. Furthermore, the discourse that developed post-referendum among both politicians and across media outlets (see below), indicated that a belief in exceptionalism had permeated multiple dimensions of British discourse. The separation scale (see methodological chapter) identified repeated and increased construction of divergence, and exceptionalism, as narrative and discursive concepts, these findings mark a theoretical and empirical contribution.

With regard to the coverage of supranational aims, institutions and values (as addressed in the 'conflict scale' - see Chapter 3), the research also identified a degree of divergence with other public spheres in terms of focus and framing of supranational considerations. Distinct from the consistent presence and voice national actors, institutions, and aims have in national public spheres; their supranational counterparts rely on a domestic conduit. This reliance is uniform across member states, but the performance of domestic conduits is not. This thesis offers an original theoretical contribution to the research agenda that seeks to recognise such variation. Europeanization developed to understand the complexity of change in national contexts driven by the process of integration, and provides a theoretical framework capable of identifying and accounting for a range of diverse consequences. This research has ensured a contribution with its extension of such theory to an holistic and extended analysis of the tabloid dimension of the public sphere.

With the use of tools provided by the Europeanization research agenda we are better able to assess the domestic implications and consequences of the highly complex process of integration. However, with the growth of populist political narratives and discourses, we must anticipate the possibility for further dynamic shifts in public responses to the process of integration. While the UK remains unique in its response at this juncture, comparable narratives and discourses are not confined to Britain. Europeanization provides a highly suitable framework for improving our understanding of both the development of these, and

their potential implications for integration and democratic preferences more broadly. This work marks an addition to that understanding and highlights the importance in adopting a national perspective to adequately understand change driven by integration, but political science needs further work in this area to better understand the dynamic context of the 21st century.

7.22 New Institutionalism (NI)

As recognised in the opening chapters, the growth of the Europeanization research agenda has been heavily informed by the contributions of New Institutionalism (Bulmer, 2008). This thesis follows in an established tradition of combing the theoretical tools provided by this literature. While Europeanization provides for a focus on the consequences of integration at the domestic level, New Institutionalism offers a range of tools well suited to engaging with and understanding context. The fundamental premise underwriting Institutionalism is that institutions matter. This thesis has drawn on a range of theoretical tools capable of contributing to our understanding of context and conditions that affect political and social outcomes. Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) is focused on the formal structures that structure political interaction, so it is not salient to the concerns of this research. However, the other schools of NI all have theory pertinent to the aims and contributions of the thesis.

The first school of NI that this thesis has both called upon, and contributed to is that of Historical Institutionalism (HI), which recognises that institutions are not limited to the formal structures and intensions of governance and government. Rather, institutions are the cumulative consequence of interaction, they extend to include both formal and informal structures, and serve to constrain future viable action. This literature began with consideration of the gaps that develop in terms of “member state control over the evolution of European institutions and public policies” (Pierson, 1996: 126); and demonstrated that prior action can often lead to unforeseen consequences. As such HI is a theoretical structure that “allows us to examine the relationship between political actors as objects and agents of history” (Thelan & Steinmo, 1992: 10). This research, has extended the scope of such theory to contribute to a better understanding of how the public sphere, and the language present within it can be analysed in the same way. The cumulative build-up of media coverage serves to structure normative engagement with political or social phenomenon over an extended

period. As with existing HI literature such development cannot be adequately understood with limited inspection of media coverage, but requires the extended temporal window provided by the theory of HI. Furthermore, at critical junctures or punctuations in the existing political or social equilibrium (Bulmer, 2008), there is a greater consequence for the future of coverage or output on issues salient at the time of these critical junctures or punctuations. These findings represent a notable contribution to the existing theory of HI and support the value of their extension into further social and political domains. Such an awareness of time as an independent variable in the consideration of relevant phenomenon can only further our understanding of how today's outcomes are better understood with an awareness of yesterday's actions.

Sociological Institutionalism comes from a strong heritage of constructivist theory, as such it is inevitably going to place great value on context. This is well suited to both the theoretical and empirical aims of this research, given its focus on the development of coverage and language in the public sphere. SI recognises institutions as the product of "norms, cognitive frames, scripts and meaning systems" (Schmidt, 2010: 13). This theoretical recognition of normative context is of great value in understanding the structures that develop around given political and social phenomena. The consideration of ideational shift and the importance of identity in political outcomes merits the use of a range of theoretical tools established in SI literature. Börzel and Risse highlighted how misfit between supranational and national institutions can drive domestic change via "socialization and collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development of new identities" (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 2). Their research considered the role and need for norm entrepreneurs in facilitating collective responses to substantive misfit. This theoretical framework allows Europeanization literature to better understand populist responses to the complex pressures of European integration. Such theory has been adapted in this thesis to develop a more expansive understanding of how populist narratives can be constructed and directed. Political agency clearly has a significant role in this process, but the extension of this theory to recognise the role of the media in this process represents a contribution and merits further research. As Europeanization alters "domestic opportunity structures" (Knill & Lehmkuhl), we need to be sensitive to institutions capable of capitalising on this change. The media represent one such institution. March and Olsen developed the concept of misfit driving

adaptation via the development of a “logic of appropriateness”, lead by “change agents” or norm entrepreneurs to understand change and continuity in international political orders (March & Olsen, 1998). These tools represent a major contribution, and this thesis has sought to extend their application to less formal institutions, namely those involved in the public sphere. This understanding allows us to better consider the role of discourse as a broadly defined ‘institution’, capable of driving change and redefining identities and interests.

The final school of institutionalism that the thesis has both drawn on, and contributed to, is that of Discursive Institutionalism (DI). This has grown out of the recent “ideational turn” (Blyth, 1997) in political science, which has sought to engage with and assess the importance of ideas as independent variables in research. Via the use of this theory we can consider the construction and growth of salient ideas. Schmidt has been at the forefront of developing this framework in which analysis of “discourse (is able to) address explicitly the representation of ideas...within (a) given institutional context” (Schmidt, 2008: 306). Schmidt went on to distinguish between coordinative discourse, evident among policy makers, and communicative discourse that feeds into public opinion formation. The aim of this research was not to consider the link between such discourse and opinion formation, but evaluate how ideas capable of doing so could develop and grow in media output. The empirical findings will be reviewed below, however, this research has contributed to DI by highlighting the repetition of limited narratives, singular perspectives, and hyperbolic use of ideational frames. This supports the value of a discursive theoretical framework in research feeding into our understanding of popular responses to increasingly complex political and social phenomenon. Ideational concerns are far from the sole factor we must consider in trying to understand shifts in public opinion, but their influence in the public sphere is evident throughout the thesis and the growing literature detailed in the review. Furthermore, as political cleavages become more polarised, as has been evident in the UK post-referendum, their value in explanation of political outcomes can only be anticipated to grow. The value of such a theoretical understanding is not limited to modern British politics, but extends to a growing number of populist and polarising political ideologies and successful campaigns and discourses. Once again, further research is required to better understand this relationship and apply this salient theory to increasingly dynamic and internally interactive public spheres that continue to evolve.

7.23 The Public Sphere and the Media

The final area this research has sought to contribute to, pertains to the public sphere. As outlined in the early chapters, the working definition taken for the basis of this thesis was that “realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1964: 49). As such, the public sphere is recognised as paramount to the development of public understanding and popular preferences. The focus was never on the outcome for understanding and preferences, but upon a component of the sphere central to affecting them.

The component selected for analysis, was that of tabloid newspaper coverage. Evidently the nature and composition of the public sphere is far more dynamic now, than it was at the outset of the case studies. The changing nature of this forum requires much more research to understand how such change has affected and will go onto to affect public opinion. However, the theoretical basis for such research remains relatively consistent. Opinion does not develop in a vacuum, especially with regard to the increasingly complex social and political phenomenon that constitute the world in the 21st century. The European Union is a leading example of this increasingly complexity and as was outlined in Chapter 2, understanding of the structures and aims of integration in alarmingly low. This leaves public opinion subject to considerable influence. Structures, narratives and institutions capable of such influence merit further theoretical and empirical consideration; mass media is one such institution.

There has been a substantial growth in the literature on newspaper coverage aimed at better understanding the form, and preferences such coverage adopts (see Chapter 2). This analysis has resulted in serious “accusations [being] levelled at the press and [raised concern with] the potential implications for democracy” (Firmstone, 2008: 213). With the vote in 2016, it is increasingly evident that these accusations and implications are more salient than ever. The unambiguous normative output on integration identified in this research supports existing literature and will be reviewed below, but the role of theory is essential to an improved understanding of media. To develop and contribute to the existing literature, the thesis drew on, and applied theory from the other disciplines to facilitate a more holistic understanding

of media's contribution to the public sphere. The incorporation of an historical perspective allowed the research more fully to appreciate both shifts in, and lock in of, certain ideas in publications over an extended period. With a recognition of the importance temporal considerations we can see how certain ideas acquire increased significance over time, serving to limit or eliminate the possibility for other ideas or discourses. Furthermore, the identification of increasingly normative or polemic discourse has highlighted the value of constructivist theory to the field of public sphere research. The use of key conceptual tools from SI has proved valuable in understanding the increased ideational role the media play in agenda setting and framing the terms via which the European Union is constructed in the national public sphere. However, this thesis was limited both in terms of scope, and resources, and as such can only mark a partial contribution to the discipline that is certainly going to continue to prove influential to our understanding of democratic outcomes. Equally, given the growth in other forms of media, with less accountability, alongside the wave of modern populism; the theoretical combination and contribution outlined here could prove very valuable in understanding the increasingly dynamic and diverse public sphere that continues to develop.

7.3 Empirical Contribution

This thesis sought to contribute to our understanding of change in national discourse, and ideational shift in the public sphere, emanating from the process of European integration. As such the findings of this research constitute an addition to the growing Europeanization literature. To ensure a substantive and original contribution in this regard, a historical perspective was important. Furthermore, as existing research has placed a wide reaching "emphasis on newspapers with a relatively elite readership" (Machill et al, 2006: 79), the dearth of literature on more popular media institutions required redress. To account for these challenges a research framework, premised on HI, was adopted that would allow empirical consideration across the history of British membership of the European Union and its predecessors. To these ends, the research was structured around a series of key events or case studies that represent critical junctures or punctuations (Bulmer, 2008) in the existing equilibrium of Anglo-European relations. The case studies were selected on the basis of their

importance in terms of the process of British membership of the European project, as well as their effect on the coverage of European affairs in domestic media output. This resulted in the selection of the First Referendum in 1975, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and the commitment to a second referendum by Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, in 2013. To redress the existing bias toward research of broadsheet coverage, and ensure analysis of discourse that was highly salient to public opinion formation, four tabloid titles were selected on the premise of their readership figures across the period under consideration. The four titles with the highest readership figures, as identified by the National Readership Survey 2010 (see Methodology Chapter for full figures), were The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, and The Daily Mirror. Appropriate key search terms were used for each case study to guarantee consistency across case studies, and each case study would also cover a 6-month period allowing adequate context and analysis of change around the critical events or punctuations under consideration.

This research design has ensured this thesis made an original contribution to the literature outlined above, as well as making a novel empirical contribution to the discipline. No previous research has sought to code and map tabloid media output across the history of British participation in European integration; as such this represents a major empirical contribution. The analysis of thousands of newspaper articles, across multiple publications, over three case studies, spanning decades represents a substantive undertaking and provides a holistic understanding of change driven by the process of integration. The research design has ensured a historical perspective to the Europeanization of British media output, that was absent from existing literature. This has required years of primary research, both digital and manual, to compile a major archive to use as the basis for the three data sets. The data sets submitted alongside the thesis, and the empirical chapters written from analysis of them, are a valuable tool for further research of the Europeanization of British media. As noted by Machill et al, existing research on media output is dominated by analysis of broad sheet publications (Machill et al, 2006); this thesis has done much to redress the imbalance in focus of existing public sphere literature.

Furthermore, the research design has ensured a methodological contribution to the discipline. The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is by no means original.

However, the adaptation of Likert scales to represent value structures via which European integration is constructed in the national public sphere represents a novel and valuable contribution, and one that could be utilised in the analysis of other public spheres, or with references to other forms of change in the public sphere. The application of the concepts of *separation* and *conflict* to better understand the two dimensions to European integration, national and supranational, have proved to be useful mechanisms and scales for the holistic analysis of change, and are valuable concepts in further developing our understanding of both populist understandings and the national implications of the process of Europeanization. These represent a significant methodological contribution, above and beyond the theoretical contributions outlined above, the chapter will now move on to review the empirical contribution to the discipline.

The first case study began with positive, but both limited and under engaged coverage. The 'separation scale' recorded widespread support of British membership, but also identified dismissal of valid critiques of the implications of integration. The 'conflict scale' identified widespread omission of supranational institutions, aims and actors. As such the first data set identified a positive public sphere, but one that lacks depth and substantive engagement, serving to limit public debate and contribute toward future points of Eurosceptic resistance.

The analysis of Maastricht records a notable shift in the form and focus of tabloid output. This represents clear evidence of Europeanization and the initial emergence of a negative "logic of appropriateness", with coverage continuing to bear a link to partisan affiliation as in 1975. The 'separation scale' is far less positive than it had been, with criticism growing closely related to partisan concerns. The expansion of a supranational focus is further indication of Europeanization; however, this occurs in predominately negative terms, contributing in part to a path dependency that helps explain the later coverage.

This growth in focus at a supranational level continues into the final case study, both in terms of volume and degree. Negative coverage now represents a clear majority, across both scales constituting a coherent narrative and clear "logic of appropriateness". Separation and conflict are now widely recurrent discursive frames, indicating clear change over an extended period. Change has occurred in the national public sphere emanating from the process of integration. As was laid out in the literature review, discourse itself is recognised to "constitute political action (and reconstruct) ...political values and interests" (Schmidt, 2010: 2). Discursive

practices and the rhetoric surrounding Europe have a significant, sustained and substantive negative impact on the legitimacy and perception of the EU within the national context.

7.31 The First Referendum (1975)

This case study was the first engagement with tabloid output in the context of European integration. As with all the case studies, articles were identified on the basis of key terms adjusted for each case study; the key terms in 1975 were 'European Economic Community', 'EEC' and 'referendum'. The framework captured 565 salient articles across a 6-month window extending three months either side of the referendum itself. This case study marks what is best understood as a high-watermark in terms of positive tabloid output regarding the UK's position within a process of regional integration, with positive output dwarfing negative in absolute terms. As the first empirical chapter outlined 43% of the data set was positive regarding the Britain's position in the process. The data found 8% of coverage framed the defence of British membership of the EEC in terms 'absolute unity' (2), this means it promoted a perception of shared heritage, values and destiny. As such, 'absolute unity' represents the most positive classification on the 'separation scale'. This scale measured the construction and coverage of relations between the UK and Europe. With this specific coding matrix capturing coverage offering unconditional support of British membership, relaying this support in normative terms concerned with shared ideals, history, and destiny to create a lasting framework for peace and cooperation.

'Conditional unity' (1), next on the 'separation scale', coded coverage that constructed the benefits of British membership in functional terms. It supports a 'yes' vote in the context of the first referendum, but omits the normative arguments seen in the previous category. Instead its focus is on the material benefits the UK can accrue as a member. Given the economic plight of Britain at this juncture, and its status as the "sick man of Europe" (Economist, writing of British economic history, 19.07.2017) the relative importance of this category of media output during in the first referendum is of little surprise. Of all articles analysed in 1975, over a third coded for 'conditional unity', accounting for 35% of output. These articles also supported a 'yes' vote, but avoided any discussion of history, values or destiny. Rather they promoted or defended British membership in terms of material benefits derived from the process of integration. They sought present membership as beneficial, but in

limited terms. Furthermore, and of note, coverage widely dismissed the claims of Eurosceptic actors who correctly identified and attacked the implications for sovereignty and independence.

As such we can identify discourse that would in time contradict future integration, and contribute toward the later development of points of Eurosceptic resistance and objection. Had the wide-reaching implications for sovereignty and absolute independence been adequately recognised and critiqued at this juncture, it would have made claims of integration beyond public mandate harder to articulate or assert in more recent discourse. These findings represent a high-water mark in terms of positive output, that is to say, the separation scale identified 43% of output as supportive of British membership – no subsequent case study would code such support. Despite this, positive coverage was marginally superseded by output that displayed no preference regarding the outcome of the referendum. In the first case study, 44% of all articles displayed no clear or evident preference regarding British membership, or the outcome of the referendum.

Of the 565 articles coded in 1975, 13% expressed negative sentiment regarding British membership; negative in this context entails directly advocating, or indirectly supporting, a ‘no’ vote. ‘Detachment’ (-1) accounted for 7% of the articles in the first case study, this category coded output that did not consider the UK as part of continental Europe, it does recognise limited interdependence, but views relations only in functional terms as sees no justification for a deepening of relations. However, ‘divorce’ (-2) is far more absolute in both its perception and ideology, in 1975 this accounted for 6% of articles across all publications. This coding scheme broadly views European integration as the other, or alien, dismissing claims of shared identity, culture or history; considering the EEC as a direct threat to British sovereignty, democracy and identity. As such this output is highly normative and pejorative. While the coding of the ‘separation scale’ was broadly consistent across publications, there were a few points of interest that merit recap. The Daily Mail was both the least likely to code for positive output or negative output, and inherently more likely to cover European relations in neutral terms expressing no preference regarding British membership. This is interesting given the later findings for this publication, which will begin to shift with the deepening of the depth of integration at Maastricht, and completely change by the time of Cameron’s speech in 2013. This supports the use of HI in allowing us to assess an extended period, but also adds weight

to Firmstone's call for "further investigation of the editorial values applied by newspapers" (Firmstone, 2008: 226). While this specific focus was beyond the remit, or scope, of this research it highlights major change is evident, and requires better explanation. The other point of note, was that the Daily Mirror coded for more normative objection, and more normative support than any other publication. This represented a combination of a positive editorial position expressed in editorials, as well as its position as the publication that, in terms of partisan affiliation, was most favourable to the Labour administration. This entailed both substantive support of Wilson and his defence of integration, as well as coverage of the significant objection to integration from the likes of Benn, Shore, Castle, and Silken. Partisan affiliation already represents a notable factor in determining output, this finding will continue across later studies.

The most significant findings of the first case study however, do not relate to perspectives on British membership, but rather to the absence of supranational engagement. As was identified in the literature review, with regard to supranational institutions, national media are essential if there is to be adequate exposure of their aims and actions in the national public sphere. Such exposure marks an essential prerequisite to domestic legitimacy (Meyer, 1999). While the above findings are telling and contribute to our understanding of the referendum returning the largest relative mandate in British electoral history, they only offer a partial picture regarding the form and arguable failures of the media at this crucial juncture in the development of Anglo-European relations. The second ordinal scale was constructed to consider the direct exposure of the supranational issues; it identified a substantial omission.

The 'conflict scale' sought to code and map media discourse on the aims, actors and institutions behind the European project. As has been repeated throughout this thesis, the media functions as a vital conduit between supranational governance and national opinion formation, affecting perceptions of authority, responsiveness and accountability, all of which preclude the development of legitimacy (Meyer, 1999). Without exposure to, information regarding, and scrutiny of supranational interactions, the development of national legitimacy for the European Economic Community and its subsequent forms faces major, if not insurmountable hurdles.

The conflict scale identified a notable deficit in this regard, with only 39.8% of all output offering any engagement regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions. As integration

marks a substantive change in the structure of governance, and highly complex one at that, widespread, recurrent and in-depth discourse from the political class and media outlets would be required to promote a genuine change in public understanding, but this was not evident. Furthermore, where engagement was evident it was limited, virtually avoiding all discussion around the pooling of sovereignty, the transfer of competence, or the political aspirations evident in the Treaty of Rome. This is distinct from other member states, such as Germany, with an established tradition of integrating supranational concerns into national discourse and cleavages (Banchoff, 1999). In contrast, discourse in the UK “whether among the political elites or in the mass media strongly emphasizes intergovernmentalism” (Risse, 2006: 300). This created an inherent contradiction in the public sphere, recognition of the degree of supranational competence required to operationalise effective integration was not compatible with the dominant perception of the venture as exclusively driven by member states. As such this recognition where it did emerge in the public sphere, was widely dismissed as sensationalist; project fear, while not yet a concept in the public sphere – would be an equivalent framework for dismissal.

Actors who recognised and warned against the inevitable pooling of sovereignty were widely decried and dismissed. The likes of Tony Benn and Enoch Powell, who campaigned against a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum and indicated the reduction in sovereignty inherent to regional integration, were mocked for making such claims. The Sun, The Express, and The Mail, all of which would, in later output, attack the European Union for its assumption of national competence in exactly those terms, at this juncture dismissed such claims as farcical. Communist, Nationalist, and Labour resistance to the single market, and the trajectory of integration, were all painted as equally radical if not entirely ridiculous.

These findings regarding output on supranational concerns represent both a systematic under engagement with, and widespread misrepresentation of, the aims of European integration. While the first case study codes and maps this component of a public sphere as positive regarding the process of integration, it is neither adequately transparent nor engaged to function as a conduit for the promotion of public understanding. Tabloid output is broadly limited to the material benefits derived from the European Economic Community, omitting the longer-term consequences of such a process. The risks of politicising integration have been well catalogued throughout the thesis, but the elite-public ‘gap’ presents a substantive hurdle

to understanding and consequently perception (Hooghe, 2003: 283). The referendum and the public sphere that developed around it represented an ideal opportunity to pre-emptively overcome what would become a defining failure, but it was not taken.

This creates a degree of 'path dependency' (Pierson, 2000) that would go on to create points of resistance around which Euroscepticism would develop and inhibit scope for the growth of supranational legitimacy in the national context. The outright dismissal of discussions regarding sovereignty would fuel later media accusations of deceit and conspiracy by political elites, as well as attacks framing the European Union as an actor in direct competition in a zero-sum interaction for national sovereignty. Had the public sphere broached the concept of pooled sovereignty at this juncture it is likely that subsequent engagements would have followed a more nuanced narrative on the process. Furthermore, the immediate collapse in European output following the referendum indicated national media, a defining component of the national public sphere, was yet to recognise and represent the increasing significance of European integration. Of all the 565 articles coded in in 1975, 96% of output was published up to and including the month of the referendum, just 4% in the months that followed. This represents a drop-in coverage that does not reflect the shift in competence entailed in membership, and contributes to the concerns expressed above regarding the development of supranational legitimacy in the national context.

What is evident from the first data set is that positive coverage in itself does not benefit public understanding in the long term. What is essential to a functional public sphere is a plurality of perspectives, and a recognition that any given political interaction balances costs against benefits. This statement holds true across the case studies and will become particularly salient during the final data set.

7.32 The Maastricht Treaty (1992)

The second case study was focused upon the Treaty on European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), widely recognised as an epoch defining event in the process of European integration; economic integration spilled into political, social and monetary union. Once again time plays a major factor in the process of integration here. The complexity and scope of the

TEU limit substantive engagement with it in the public sphere, change begins to emerge in public opinion, but neither the extent of this, nor the causes are yet evident. Research prior to Maastricht had suggested that “that macroeconomic performance had a strong positive influence on support for the EU up to 1990. However, public opinion then tracked dramatically downward despite the generally positive economic conditions of the 1990s” (Eichberg & Dalton, 2007: 42). The rejection of the TEU in Denmark, and nearly in France, marked a notable shift in public response to the process of integration, but if this did not relate to economic pressures then other factors must have affected the public sphere in regards to Europeanization.

By the time of Maastricht, tabloid output has shifted significantly, while it is definitively possible to talk of more critical coverage, it is difficult to assert there is yet evidence of a coherent or consistent Eurosceptic press in regard to British membership. The data outlined in the second empirical chapter indicated, regarding British membership, the variation between positive and negative coverage is very limited. The ‘separation’ scale, concerned with British membership of the European Union and Anglo-European relations, was far less positive than it had been in 1975. Nearly all focus on UK-European interactions is now framed in material terms. That is to say output on this scale is limited to tangible pressures, and costs or benefits, derived from the process of integration and widely omits substantive engagement with broader normative concerns regarding sovereignty, political integration, or ideational concerns.

The positive discourse on British membership is framed around the functional benefits of ‘conditional unity’ (1), this accounted for 20.4% of the 598 articles coded, while no articles defended membership in normative terms. The negative output is also primarily limited to material terms, focused on the potential costs of integration, rather than wide reaching normative objection and calls for ‘divorce’ that will be evident in the final case study. Material objection on this scale, or ‘detachment’ (-1) accounts for 21.9% of the output. It is evident from this data set that the public sphere still considers integration primarily an economic exercise, with little to no coverage given the wide-reaching other shifts in competence inherent to the TEU. It is interesting to note that in terms of this material defence of integration it is The Daily Express and Daily Mail that are most prolific. However, across the data set the preferences evident in output are closely tied to domestic concerns and partisan affiliation. Both the Mail and Express offer positive coverage, widely tied to the Conservative administration under

Major. The Mail, however, also publishes marginally more articles meeting the criteria for 'detachment'; of the 59 articles meeting these criteria, the majority are actually critical of the implications and costs of integration were Labour to assume power. As such Europe is an issue through which frames for domestic preferences are articulated, the same is evident, if to a lesser degree in the critical output from The Sun. Partisan affiliation and domestic concerns are equally influential with regard to coverage from the other side of the political cleavage. The Daily Mirror, the only left-wing tabloid under consideration, is critical of integration; 29.4% of its articles coded for 'detachment', however 85.2% of this output was critical in so much as they rejected Major's negotiating tactics, aims and preferences. This data set indicates that a "logic of appropriateness" was developing that was both domestically framed and tied to partisan affiliation. This is evident as it derived from a limited misfit, sought to promote a degree of critical collective understanding, and redefine interests, however, these were closely tied to partisan political culture and identities (March and Olsen, 1998). This logic will shift by the time of the final case study, but it has begun to emerge. Furthermore, these findings support the research of Sift et al, that found "EU policies mostly referred to as intervening factors for domestic matters" (Sift et al, 2007: 137). Negotiations and Anglo-European relations are becoming closely related domestic preferences and often serve as intervening factors to restate or reinforce such preferences.

This case study also identified a notable spike in neutral engagement, which initially suggested evidence of greater integration of European concerns into a more functional and diverse public sphere. However, upon greater inspection this spike still omitted debate regarding the longer-term consequences of integration, and the political or normative implications of the TEU. The chapter on Maastricht suggested that while the politicisation and proactive debate regarding the genuine extent of competence exchange and its implications for sovereignty, may have tempered further integration, it would have limited the scope for futures claims of deceit, conspiracy, and manipulation. It is unlikely that such leadership could have begun in the media, without more proactive leadership from the domestic political class. However, as noted by Hooghe and Marks, the domestic costs to the politicisation of the 'European question' are great, and the potential rewards very limited (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Such leadership was, was again evident from a limited number of increasingly Eurosceptic actors; most vocal among these was Thatcher, who did articulate concerns regarding the implications for British

sovereignty and democracy. This, unfortunately, was given limited coverage across the data set, and where it was present it was relayed in mocking or condescending terms, undermining the credibility of valid critique. This does represent another missed chance to politicize what would develop into controversial shifts in competence, and would contribute to future claims of deceit. The data further supports the use of 'critical junctures' having significant future implications. The short-term focus of the public sphere both in terms of political class and media discourse serves as a structural impediment, to franker public discourse on the process of integration, and consequently to both public understanding and the perceptions of legitimacy. While output on British membership was broadly balanced, it was not adequately engaged as a result of these factors.

With regard to output on supranational aims, actors and institutions as coded by the 'conflict' scale, the case study recorded change in terms of focus. There is a spike in direct focus on supranational concerns, 19.7% of this data set offers neutrally engaged coverage at this level, a major increase since 1975. The Daily Mirror is most prolific, in relative terms, regarding neutral and positive coverage regarding supranational aims, actors and institutions, however, both neutral and positive output are closely tied to the social dimension to integration, or the Social Charter of Maastricht as it was known. This was the component of Maastricht, and the supranational aims, to which Major had secured an opt out; even with articles containing direct coverage of supranational issues, once again Europe served as an intervening factor in domestic preferences. Furthermore, the Mirror is the least likely to publish, as such the publication that is most likely to present a favourable or neutral perspective has the lowest probability of actually writing about European affairs. There was limited relative growth of positive coverage of supranational aims, actors and institutions among the right-wing tabloids. However, all positive coverage on this scale accounts for less than 10% of all articles coded, with positive and neutral coverage accounting for less than a third, and as such reflects the limited perspectives evident in this component of the public sphere.

Data from the right-wing publications painted a different picture, while coverage regarding membership was broadly balanced, discourse with a supranational focus was now increasingly suspicious. 39.1% of the data set met the criteria for 'suspicion' (-1), viewing supranational institutions and aims as a financial or regulatory burden or risk. This equally records a growth of pejorative and mocking references to European actors. This is the first substantive expansion

of such coverage, and while it is not as absolute or as polemic as it will become, such a perspective creates a degree of path dependence as figures established as targets to be inherently viewed with 'suspicion' will struggle to assume legitimacy at a later date. Furthermore, 8.7% of all articles coded for 'overt objection' fanning the risk posed by supranational aims, actors and institutions in highly normative terms, attacking their integrity and honesty, with the emergence of limited conspiratorial claims that would later go on to become the staple narrative among a number of right-wing publications. Such framing portrays supranational aims at fundamental odds with democracy and liberty. While this constitutes a minority of coverage at this juncture, the origins and heritage of subsequent discourse are emerging. These findings indicated that while media output now offers more focus on European concerns, an essential function of national media in the context of European integration (Meyer, 2005), it is already evident this focus is significantly negative, with such output accounting for nearly half of all output. 'suspicion' in this case study is broadly framed around potential burden, while 'overt objection' is dominated by personal, at times visceral comment on European actors and aims. What is evident is that despite a shift in focus to incorporate a more Europeanized perspective, it lacks an adequate plurality of perspectives and does not contribute to a functional public sphere, or counter a dearth of public understanding. Following the final negotiations, and prolific coverage of Major, there is another drop-in coverage of European affairs. However, this is far less pronounced than in 1975, with the article count stabilising at approximately 60 per month, and is tied broader foreign policy concerns, as integration remains framed as a foreign rather than a domestic consideration. This represents a degree of lasting Europeanization not evident in the first case study, but not yet reflective of the shift in competence entailed in the TEU. Furthermore, it lacks substantive discussion on the increasingly political dimensions of integration, or the emerging implications for the traditional notions of sovereignty, or wider ideational concerns. Furthermore, Major is already evidently presented as agent seeking to defend the nation from European risk. These findings serve to place limits on the form and content of future discourse.

7.33 Cameron's Referendum Pledge (2013)

The final case study sought to analyse tabloid output around the Prime Minister's commitment to a referendum in 2013, to establish if this component of the public sphere demonstrated a degree of change adequate to be considered evidence of significant Europeanization above and beyond previous findings, and if this was evident, what form did it take? The data set recorded a major shift in output relative to the previous case studies, there is nearly a doubling of output returned by the key search terms (EU, European Union, referendum) for this window. European Integration has reached a degree of consistent focus in tabloid output that previous data sets did not show, but it is the narrow nature of this focus that is the most significant finding of the final case study.

By 2013 the only publication offering sustained positive coverage of British membership is the Daily Mirror, broadly framed around the benefits of the world's largest single market. However, even in the Mirror data set positive output is now a minority, and it serves to provide a critical perspective on the Conservative Party, in line with the paper's partisan affiliation. As with all the data, it would require further research into editorial processes to accurately represent priorities, but this output suggests Europe often remained a vehicle for framing national concerns or preferences, rather than direct engagement with the European Union itself. Positive coverage accounts for just 6% of the whole data set. 'neutrality', again most recurrent in the Mirror, accounts for 27.4%.

The remaining 66.6% of the 1131 articles in this data set coded negative output on the 'separation scale', indicating a degree of shift that is both significant and substantive. The UK is now widely constructed and relayed as separate from the European Union, and Anglo-European relations are dominated by the discourse of division. The narrative that emerged in the final case study across this defining component of the public sphere is consistent, and coherent.

'Detachment' (-1) now frames European integration as increasing burden on the UK, integration is framed as a primary cause of a range of growing problems at the national level, including austerity, social breakdown, welfare abuse, health care and housing shortages, and falling working conditions. National competence in these fields bears no relation to critical coverage of membership. Migration is a recurrent burden across the discourse on these issues,

and while this is widely presented as a focus upon material costs, framing and tone appeal to, and propagate a deeper fear, or prejudice. Such output widely contributed to a narrative that integration has gone too far, and requires reversal at a minimum. While such coverage does not yet actively promote Brexit, it did relay the status quo as unfair, if not unjust upon the UK. This perspective on the 'costs' of membership accounts for 54.2%, and as such has now become the discursive norm within the final data set. In the context of nationally driven austerity, long-standing wage stagnation and inflation, materially framed critiques are able to drive more polarised responses. An overarching narrative develops; national resources are increasingly limited, but the burdens of integration, and mass migration are ever growing. While this narrative remains framed in functional costs, it implies a growing injustice; this one-sided perspective on integration, as a burden without benefit is not sustainable in the public sphere. It is not compatible with notions of legitimacy or valid authority. This discourse is also in flux, and the data would suggest it is only moving in one direction. Tabloid output is increasingly evidence of anti-Europeanization (or negative Europeanization) in the public sphere. A fundamentally negative "logic of appropriateness" resulting from an increasingly evident discursive misfit is now evident (March & Olsen, 1998), national interests are increasingly defined in zero-sum competition with Anglo-European relations, this logic will extend into more ideational concerns in the normative coding criteria.

As indicated in the data in the final empirical chapter, while the majority views integration as a burden, 12.4% of output has already concluded that the only appropriate response is a complete separation of current terms. 'Divorce' (-2) is most evident in the Express' 'crusade to leave the EU', but it still accounts for a fifth of Mail and Sun output. This is no longer a fringe perspective, and eclipses comparable positive output. There is notable expansion in the polemic nature of this discourse. Historical references, imagery, and metaphors are common place in 'divorce' articles, that both frame Europe as separate and at times alien, lacking any shared heritage, culture or values. The UK is constructed as superior, referred to as a saviour in former conflicts, and as a nation to which Europe should simply offer uncritical gratitude. Visceral attacks on domestic pro-European actors are now evident, which question their patriotism and loyalty to the nation. Such discourse represents a precursor to media assaults on these actors post-referendum, which will receive brief discussion below.

The final case study also identified a major expansion in focus on European actors, aims and institutions. 71.9% of the data set does now directly offer a Europeanized perspective, however 87.4% of this, is negative. 'Suspicion' (-1) is now the most prolific coding scheme across the 'conflict scale', representing the European Union as an illegitimate burden on member states. Furthermore, over a fifth of all output is now framed in terms of 'overt objection' (-2), presenting a recurrent and coherent normative narrative on European aims, actors and institutions. European actors are wasteful, unaccountable, corrupt, malign and at times conspiratorial. Europe's aims are incompatible with freedom, democracy and sovereignty. The European Union risks the nation state as we know it, discourse on its institutions is increasingly framed in terms of conflict, with comparisons with authoritarian regimes becoming recurrent, and the EU now relayed as an actor in 'expansion'. 'Conflict' has assumed a defining role in the discourse via which Europe is constructed in this component of the national sphere.

The first case study began with positive, but both limited and under engaged coverage. The 'separation scale' recorded widespread support of British membership, but also identified dismissal of valid critiques of the implications of integration. The 'conflict scale' identified widespread omission of supranational institutions, aims and actors. As such the first data set identifies a positive public sphere, but one that lacks depth and substantive engagement, serving to limit public debate and contribute toward future points of Eurosceptic resistance.

The analysis of Maastricht records a notable shift in the form and focus of tabloid output. This represents clear evidence of Europeanization and the initial emergence of a negative "logic of appropriateness", with coverage continuing to bear a link to partisan affiliation as in 1975. The 'separation scale' is far less positive than it had been, with criticism growing closely related to partisan concerns. The expansion of a supranational focus is further indication of Europeanization; however, this occurs in predominately negative terms, contributing in part to a path dependency that helps explain the later coverage.

This growth in focus at a supranational level continues into the final case study, both in term of volume and degree. Negative coverage now represents a clear majority, across both scales constituting a coherent narrative and clear "logic of appropriateness". 'Separation' and 'conflict' are now widely recurrent discursive frames, indicating clear change over an extended

period. Change has occurred in the national public sphere emanating from the process of integration. As was laid out in the literature review, discourse itself is recognised to “constitute political action (and reconstruct) ...political values and interests” (Schmidt, 2010: 2). Discursive practices and the rhetoric surrounding Europe have a significant, sustained and substantive negative impact on the legitimacy and perception of the EU within the national context.

While this research did not engage with the degree to which this component of the public sphere, has contributed to change; change is evident, it is coherent and it is incompatible with the development of supranational legitimacy in the domestic context. Further research is required to develop a better relationship between the discourse that developed over the period since accession, and the effect this brought to bear on the process of public opinion formation.

7.34 Empirical Summary

This research has mapped the Europeanization of British media discourse across four decades, structured around three ‘critical junctures’ in the development of Anglo-European relations since British accession to the EEC. Tabloid media output began as broadly positive regarding British membership, but discourse revealed a lack of depth. Integration was widely constructed as a material or economic venture, justifying the membership on the premise of benefit in these terms. This limited focus creates the potential for future objection in the context of changing economic pressures, or discursive frames (i.e. austerity). This is despite the commitments to comprehensive political aims evident in the Treaty of Rome (1957), that predates British accession by 16 years. The first case study recorded widespread avoidance of the ideational and normative dimensions to political integration, as well as the supranational aims, actors, and institutions, that are present in French and German discourse.

The second case study provided evidence of substantive Europeanization. Positive coverage of British membership has shifted to balanced coverage. Focus on supranational considerations has grown substantially, but it has done so in increasingly negative terms. The second data set also records a spike in normative engagement along the ‘conflict scale’, again in negative terms. This indicates that the emergence and construction of supranational aims, actors and

institutions in British public discourse occurs without substantive balance or notable plurality of perspectives. This fails to contribute toward public understanding and cannot facilitate the development of supranational legitimacy in the national context as it fails meet Meyer's prerequisite criteria for such a development; responsiveness, accountability, and authorisation (Meyer, 1999). The Mirror indicates divergence from its right-wing counterparts, it is more critical of British membership (due to partisan preferences) than it is of supranational aims, actors, and institutions. However, it is also fundamentally less likely to publish Europeanized output. Equally right-wing press is supportive of membership, but guarded against what it might mean under a Labour government. Partisan preferences now have a structuring effect on the form and focus of British tabloid media discourse.

The final case study follows the trajectory established in the second. The Mirror remains the most supportive, but its Europeanized output is very limited in terms of volume in comparison to the right-wing publications. The Sun, The Mail, and The Express record a major and sustained increase in focus that produces a data set equivalent to both of the previous combined, in terms of volume. There has been a complete collapse in balance from these publications, with Euroscepticism now the evident effect of the Europeanization of tabloid media discourse. Integration is widely constructed as a burden, with a significant minority now framing the European Union as a normative risk. There is no comparable defence of integration, and as such we can now talk about the primacy of limited and critical narratives, without any substantive counter discourse.

These findings indicate clear Europeanization over an extended period, this Europeanization is not unique as it does entail normative and supranational considerations. However, as these are primarily developed and constructed in negative terms, it does reflect divergence in the form and focus of Europeanized discourse to that evident in France. Certain defining structures relating to lack of depth, limited perspectives, negative normative construction, and the increased Eurosceptic proclivity to publish, that emerge in the first two case studies demonstrate coherence and growth in later case studies. Ladrech indicated that the absence of a plurality of critical national discourses on European integration contributed to "default" structuring of the public opinion "as 'for' or 'against'...European integration" (Ladrech, 2007: 957). The final data set presents a discursive framework that would be better understood as 'against' or 'against'.

This research has demonstrated the Europeanization of media discourse occurs over an extended period, but previous patterns and structures contribute to the form and focus of future output. ‘Critical junctures’ offer a valuable tool for the inspection of Europeanized discourse, but they cannot be understood in isolation, rather one needs to appreciate context and wider patterns to recognise the trajectory and shift in this process. This is a process that would be expected to continue, increasing the primacy of dominant narratives and discourses over time; “Outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 6). This feedback mechanism is expected to increase importance and influence of Eurosceptic narratives and discourse in the years that follow the final case study. These implications will receive brief discussion in the *post-script* that follows.

7.4 PostScript: The Public Sphere Post-Brexit

‘Damn the unpatriotic Remoaners and their plot to subvert the will of the British people’

(Daily Mail, 12.12.2016)

‘Time to silence EU exit whingers’

(Daily Express, 12.12.2016)

‘Enemies of the people: Fury over ‘out of touch’ judges who defied 17.4m Brexit Voters’

(Daily Mail, 4.11.2016)

“Volksverräter ausgestoßen aus der Deutschen Volksgemeinschaft [Traitors of the people, pushed out of the German people’s community]”

(Illustrierter Beobachter, July 1933)

7.41 The People and Post Truth Politics

The aim of this thesis has been to understand one of the processes of Europeanization, mapping the effects of European integration upon British tabloid discourse. As Hajer & Versteeg indicate, 'discourses shape what can and cannot be thought, delimit the range of policy options and thereby serve as precursors to policy outcomes' (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005: 178). The aim of this research was not to understand the relationship between discourse and policy outcomes; this is considered a *fait accompli* for the purposes of this thesis. However, understanding the importance of the relationship between the language and limiting what is normatively and politically viable, is central to the value of this research. Hajer & Versteeg demonstrate that while environmental discourse is not only focused on addressing a 'real world problem', it serves as a linguistic battlefield; 'as a critical struggle where conflicts between discourses may be exacerbated, sidestepped or resolved' (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005: 181). The same is evident in the European discourse that develops in member states in response to the pressures of European integration. The previous chapters and case studies have shown a contested battlefield, limited in engagement, but far from uniform. The first case study recorded a positive public sphere, but under engaged and entirely dismissive of critical recognition of the salience of integration for established structures of governance. The second case study begins to highlight the development of discursive dichotomy, and the emergence of the counter-referential 'other'. By the final data set, conflict and separation are established in discourse, what was once a minority perspective is increasingly winning the battle.

By the time of the referendum (2016), the discourse of Euroscepticism has assumed both political control, and an increasing normative monopoly. The final case study did not engage with the referendum itself (due to logistical concerns, see Methodology Chapter), rather Cameron's commitment to one in 2013. However, the discourse that emerged, during in and following the vote, offers an insightful vehicle to draw attention to what this thesis considers as the path dependent conclusion of decades of unmanaged Europeanization; a discursive Brexit ground zero.

Returning to the central themes of the early chapters, legitimacy is of major concern here. October 2016 saw two of the right-wing populist tabloids argue for, and assert the 'patriotic'

necessity of dis-enfranchising of 16,141,241 British citizens, or 48.11% of those that voted in June. This is a major departure from the substance, focus or aims of media output analysed in the previous chapters. As such it requires brief consideration to highlight how far the paradigm has shifted, how divisive the discourse has become, and the extent of conflict now evident in post-Brexit tabloid media output.

The expansion of conflictual discourse is notable, no longer is the agency that poses a threat exclusively foreign. Actually, it now includes arguably the largest electoral minority in British history, and any and all who defend the preferences of those that voted remain. The issue here, and throughout research is whether the data indicates a degree of bias that is to be considered a risk in its own right; as with 'extensive media coverage of an issue that displays a consistent directional bias, the media are likely to have an impact sufficient enough to change public attitudes at an aggregate level' (Norris 2000)

What is evident from the coverage in 2016, was that the acceptable and expected focus of Eurosceptic media commentary was no longer primarily concerned with the institutions, aims and values of the European Union itself, nor the process of European integration or the UK's place within it. In response to legal challenges, and calls from 'pro-remain' actors for democratic parliamentary oversight, the Express called to silence the whingers, with the editorial in the same publication going much further:

"You can sum up in one sentence the disgusting opinions of the rabble of MPs who are demanding a Commons vote on Brexit: "The people have spoken, we don't like what they said because they aren't as clever as us so let's ignore them and try and reverse the referendum result". Such snake like treachery cannot go unpunished. Here's what I would do with them: clap them in the Tower of London. They want to prison us against our will in the EU should we should give them 28 days against their will to reflect on the true meaning of democracy. We're in the midst of an exhilarating people's revolution and those who stand in the way of the popular will must take what's coming to them".

(Express, 12.10.2017)

The extent of a normative dichotomy could not be much clearer. On one side there is snake like treachery, it appears democratic oversight is such as abuse at this juncture that it merits

incarceration. The ascendancy of the rhetorical device of 'the people' has risen in popular currency since the vote in June 2016, relaying the benevolent common man in a struggle for justice, and serving as a means to delegitimise counter-inspection and critique. As such discourse is clearly in its infancy it would be naïve to suggest one can predict the conclusion of this novel phenomenon. But there are some observations we can draw, with reference to its emergence at other junctures in history; which do raise questions of concern.

We must first recognise its linguistic and normative function. It is closely tied to issues of membership, legitimacy and authority within a community or collective; as such to be part of 'the people' affords members rights, privileges and a degree of normative power. Chipkin argued that 'the people' entailed underwriting and discriminatory characteristics, that affected and affects the development of South African democracy, perception of these characteristics was related to membership, authority and normative legitimacy with a national or community space (Chipkin, 2007). As such it is of value to recognise that 'the people' does not simply afford membership and rights, but inherently restricts them too; if one resides within a political space, but is no longer considered part of this collective, one correspondingly loses legitimacy, authority and by extension equality. The above passage from the Express seeks to frame two clear groups, one as benevolent, decent and patriotic; while the other group are collectively responsible for 'treachery', and are clearly malevolent, subversive and perfidious. While 'the people' have nothing but 'popular will' driving their glorious revolution; the turncoats, however, have no valid normative cause or political legitimacy in their aims or actions, and discrimination is consequently justified. The discursive separation of these respective groups is far from unique to the Express. It offers democratic validation to one, while intrinsically withdrawing it from another; this is a pattern and trajectory of discursive construction that can only cause concern.

Regarding episodes of European history where national community has been used against previously accepted and formerly legitimate members, Fascism of the 1930s offers salient comparative discourse. The *Illustrierter Beobachter* headline sat above an image of 33 'traitors', including academics, politicians, journalists and lawyers, decrying them as "Traitors of the people, pushed out of the German people's community". There is an inherent risk in any comparison to Nazism, and as the *Beobachter* was a state directed publication, it must be clarified here that the thesis is not seeking to compare pro-Brexit media output with Nazis.

However, there is much in the use of discourse as a mechanism of power and normative suppression that hold as a valid comparison. The article from 1933 went onto offer a series of identity-based attacks on these 'traitors', before declaring all of their citizenships 'revoked'. Evidently the degree of punitive consequence varies greatly, but the use of 'Die Volk' appears to serve comparable functions. The language, ideology and membership of 'Die Volk' served as an "enforcement mechanism... [and] demonstrated most graphically how a totalitarian ideology can occupy the vacuous notion of Volk consciousness whose attributes are of course wholly non-verifiable" (Dubber, 1995: 266). That is to say the discursive promotion of an entirely subjective community allows one to construct selective 'non-members' as a threat to selective or misleading constructions of national interest; via such a discourse one is able attack the rights and authority of the constructed 'non-members'.

Discourse has a track record of constructing and exaggerating threat, far from unique to Nazi Germany. The role of discourse in constructing the Soviet Union as 'the other' in emphasising risk to sustain power and funding was crucial (Dalby, 1988; Tuathail & Agnew, 1992).

Heydemann & Leenders demonstrated the role of discourse, following the Arab Spring in quelling popular demand for democratic reform by claiming such demands emanated from foreign agency (Heydemann & Leenders, 2011). Yegen highlighted the use of discourse throughout the history of modern Turkey to undermine claims of Kurdish identity and statehood (Yegen, 1996). Rabinowitz wrote of the role of discourse in constructing a dichotomy that creates a normative risk, again structured around two "categories 'Us' and 'Them' and their inherent analogy to 'Good' and 'Bad', 'Right' and 'Wrong'" (Rabinowitz, 2010: 75). This research covers a range of contexts and political conflicts, but constructing the risk as alien to 'us' is consistent and serves to fundamentally undermine the legitimacy of the 'other'. This form of discourse is now increasingly evident in the British public sphere.

As indicated in the extract from the Mail above, in efforts to ensure judicial and potentially parliamentary scrutiny of the process of Brexit, discourse has transformed legitimate actors and concerns into national betrayal. Brexit has driven discursive change at speed not evident in the previous case studies, however, it follows the established trajectory of circumscribed engagement, growing discursive separation and conflict, and sustained attacks on the legitimacy of divergent perspectives. This change is best understood as discursive or ideological paradigm shift; discourse and perspectives that were once the norm, are

increasingly under discursive assault. All of these developments, not only delegitimise European integration, and those that defend it, but correspondingly limit what is normatively acceptable in the public sphere. Anti-Europeanization is an evident, ongoing process, with increasingly tangible implications for national discourse.

Eurosceptic discourse, and rhetorical conflict and separation have now assumed normative dominance across a major section of media output. The Sun published output during the referendum claiming that opponents of Brexit cannot 'be-leave' in the nation, asserting all opposition and discussion on the consequences of departure was nothing more than concerted conspiracy by 'project fear' ; "We must free ourselves from dictatorial Brussels...the remain campaign made up of the corporate establishment, arrogant Europhiles, and foreign banks have all set out to terrify us!" (Sun, 14.06.2016) While this must always be done with great caution, again parallels with the dark ideologies of Europe's history again emerge. Wodak and Richardson highlighted the function of language within Fascism serving as a "form of anti-memory, revising, reformulating, and reclassifying" the normatively acceptable. This function is comparable with what has been termed the "toxic nostalgia of Brexit"; "Brexit is intricately connected to Britain's under-addressed and unredressed imperial past" (El-Enany, 2017: LSE European Institute Blog). This must be viewed in the context of Britain's long standing 'historical amnesia' (Tharoor, 2007); the public sphere begins to recast the nation's past following the referendum. The term Empire 2.0 emanates from Eurosceptic ministers; Leave.EU are one of a number of actors to talk of "retaking our place on the global stage" (Leave.eu PR release, 2016); UKIP claimed in the aftermath "Outside the E.U., the world is our oyster, and the Commonwealth the pearl within" (UKIP, 2016); Liam Fox makes the claim that "'The United Kingdom, is one of the few countries in the European Union that does not need to bury its 20th century history'" (Fox, 2017). Such narratives are clearly tied to the singular Anglo-centric perspective addressed in the introduction. This discourse feeds into the emerging challenge of post-truth politics, already evident in the final case study in a range of conspiratorial claims.

In the most recent developments of the post-truth public sphere, the value of absolute claims over nuanced engagement has become apparent in manipulating public opinion. The telling undercover journalism of Channel 4 drew into sharp focus the role of this form of manipulation in driving discursive change and conditioning electorates. Cambridge Analytica

(CA), a private company with the professed aim of “data driven behaviour change”, has emerged as significant actor in a number of populist electoral campaigns. CA’s CEO Alexander Nix was filmed on camera by Channel 4 claiming of electioneering; “it doesn’t have to be true; it just has to be believed”. The role of CA in the shifting the focus and normative structure of the public sphere remains a point of legal contention at the time of writing. However, in February 2016 an article was published in Nix’s name, claiming:

Cambridge Analytica has teamed up with Leave.EU, the UK’s largest group advocating for a British exit (or ‘Brexit’) from the European Union, to help them better understand and communicate with UK voters. We have already helped supercharge Leave.EU’s social media campaign by ensuring the right messages are getting to the right voters online, and the campaign’s Facebook page is growing in support to the tune of about 3,000 people per day.

On the 3rd of March Aron Banks, key actor and funder of the Leave Campaign, tweeted; “We made no secret of working with Cambridge. We created a huge machine that took the message to voters.” In light of, now recognised, criminal misconduct both have claimed such a relationship was misrepresented. However, this indicates we are witnessing a changing discursive battlefield, one in which evidence carries little weight, but both targeted and coherent messages are able to produce aggregate effects upon public opinion.

7.42 Post Truth Discourse in the Political Class

As the final case study demonstrated, positive coverage of national political actors in tabloid output, was directly related to critical perspectives on the European Union. In light of that, the research would anticipate an ascendancy of critical perspectives following the referendum. This is borne out by the composition, coverage of, and output of a number of cabinet members and anti-European actors.

While it would require further research to establish the specific relationship between media output, elite political discourse and policy, what is increasingly evident is that the engagement identified in the final case study is now increasingly the norm among the ‘Brexiters’. Detail is tiresome, if not irrelevant, superiority is assumed, and abstract notions of sovereignty increasingly supersede all tangible concerns. Boris Johnson, a former advocate

of European integration, assumed a central role in the expansion of post-truth politics, now no longer confined to tabloid output but permeating the institutions of British governance.

There are number of the developments in regard to Brexit negotiations that one can cite to support this assessment, but the ‘divorce’ bill offers a clear first example. The European Union always indicated existing financial commitments would have to be honoured, Johnson’s rather astounding response was to tell the EU to “go whistle” (Johnson, 2017) in a parliamentary debate, claiming no payment was required and the UK had the leverage in this regard. These assertions were well received by pro-Brexit actors and platforms. However, this must be recognised as a notable shift from the established discourse of a cabinet members, mocking allies is increasingly acceptable in the context of anti-Europeanization, condescension and dismissal of claims and actors that challenge the anti-European narrative is increasingly normal among ‘Brexiters’. Furthermore, we see the recurrent critique of integration, without substantive engagement with alternatives or consequences, comparable to tabloid output in the final case study.

This returns us to the functions of the public sphere as addressed in Chapter 2, Koopmans outlined the role of the media in affecting publicly viable political action and response; “it is in this public forum that they must gain public legitimacy” (Koopmans, 2007: 184). The final case study detailed the growth of this selective engagement in media output, that is to say such discourse was already assuming a degree of legitimacy in the public sphere. Following the referendum, this discourse assumes a primary role in the discourse of the national government itself. Claims and rhetoric carry more value in the public sphere than nuanced substantive engagement. Despite Johnson asserting in parliament that no ‘divorce’ bill would ever be paid in July 2017, by November the UK has accepted the EU’s terms. This draws into sharper focus the assertion “it doesn’t have to be true; it just has to be believed”.

The discourse painting European actors as dictatorial agents has migrated into output from the political elite, Johnson labels Jean-Claude Juncker “Caesar Augustus in Brussels” (December, 2017) following the recognition of British financial obligations. We are no longer engaged exclusively in media output; this pejorative and visceral discourse has become mainstream among the British political elite. It is difficult to see how nuanced and effective policy can exist in this context. The framework continues to relay European Union as an

opponent, one with whom we are increasingly engaged in conflict to retrieve national freedom and sovereignty.

This rejection of balanced engagement and nuanced debate emerged as a recurrent theme throughout the referendum. Michael Gove, anti-European cabinet minister, offers one of the clearest examples of the establishment of 'post-truth' politics in the mainstream public sphere. In an interview with Sky News in June of 2016, days before the vote, Gove repeated the now widely rebuked 350 Million a week claim; the UK statistics authority released a statement making clear this figure was "misleading and undermines trust in official statistics" (Dilnot, 2016: UK Statistics Authority Release). Sky's Political Editor, Faisal Islam, indicated this figure was wrong and challenged Gove of importing the "post truth politics of Donald Trump," a damning criticism of a cabinet member it would appear (Islam, 2016: Sky Broadcast). However, it is evident this is no longer the case. Gove did not provide substantive engagement to justify the figure, it appears this is no longer a necessity in government, he simply asserted that "the people in this country have had enough of experts". The use of 'the people' as a rhetorical device to undermine substantive engagement was evident in media output above, it is now evident in output from the political elite. It appears that change in the national public sphere, evident in as a long-standing process throughout this thesis, has been expediated by the referendum, and so has the growth the discourse that developed around it.

7.43 Europeanization, Populism and the Public Sphere

This thesis sought to further our understanding of Europeanization; change bought about in the national context as a consequence of the pressures of integration. My belief, when I began this research was that the UK, and the Euroscepticism I recognised in my formative years was somehow unique; a British exceptionalism of sorts tied to our communication on Europe. The thesis has shown examples of national variation, in response to the pressures of integration, but it has shown how the process of Europeanization has contributed to the

growth of Eurosceptic discourse in the British public sphere. However, there is nothing in this research to indicate any exceptionalism.

In the context of European Integration, the growth of Eurosceptic discourse is widely evident. Elections in Italy, followed much of the discourse of burden and risk evident in this research. Anti-migration rhetoric and by extension Islamophobia, a significant component of the Leave Campaign in the UK and media output in the final case study, is growing in appeal and presence in other European public spheres. The AfD, who have framed this risk in terms of an 'invasion of foreigners' (Gauland, 2017), entered the Bundestag for the first time in 2017 taking 12.6% of the national vote and 90 seats. Comparable to the shift between the two latter case studies, what began as critical discourse regarding European institutions and aims (AfD initially focused on the Euro and monetary Union) developed into evidently more electorally effective polemic discourse. In Italy, the 5 Star Movement, developed its Eurosceptic discourse around opposing the establishment and corruption, however, again more emotive framing of risk around migration and Islam are evident before it won the largest share of the vote in 2018. Mr Grillo, the party's founder responded to Sadiq Khan's election as London Mayor by suggesting he would "blow up London" (Grillo, 2016). This discourse fuels fear, and is again intrinsically linked with Europeanization, initially blaming the single currency and supranational actors for a number of domestic maladies – however, this has been adjusted retrospectively following electoral success. Europeanization is affecting discourse the continent over, and process is far from finished.

However, as this research has made clear this is not producing novel discursive engagement with the process of integration, of the sort that might contribute to collective learning. But rather reframing national ideational responses and ideologies into a European framework. Reungoat identified comparable developments in France; "national discourse patterns adapt...to a European context and a phenomenon of Europeanization of certain populist themes." (Reungoat, 2010: 292). Limited engagement, identity and radical response underwrites populism, just as this research has shown British tabloid media to have a track record of bias, hyperbole and circumscribed discourse on Europe, similar patterns are evident in a range of national contexts.

The resurgent wave on modern populism structures its political engagement in terms evident in the data of the final case study, again supporting assessment of a coherent pattern of

response to the pressures of European integration. That is to say there is a coherent narrative of “anti-elitism”, it is the elite who are the villainous authoritarians subjugating the “‘the people’ whose interests, it is argued, are being systematically ignored by the self-interested and insulated elite”. This discourse serves to “cast an appeal to interests and wisdom of ‘the common man’” (Harmsen, 2010: 334). Just as the data in the thesis identified recurrent, unaccountable, malign elites, such output is growing in appeal and prevalence across national public spheres. It is evident in the increasing electoral successes of populists. Furthermore, in line with Nix’s telling assessment above, it need not bare any relation to reality.

Nigel Farage provides multiple shining examples of such discursive engagement, despite coming from a wealthy background, attending elite private schools, and working ‘in the city’, he repeatedly decries ‘EU elites’ of crimes against ‘the people’. Again, as with media output there is a coherence of accusations “collusion”, “dictatorship” and “fanaticism” (Farage, 2017: EP Speech). This rhetoric is increasingly mainstream, and coherently anti-European. Boris Johnson, again from a privileged background and former Mayor for the Conservative Party, not qualities of the ‘everyday man’, attacked the “elite of Europe” for their “narcotic tyranny” and conspiracy to build a “federal super-state”. Michael Gove, Oxbridge graduate, offered a clichéd call to “take back control...from (Europe’s) unelected, unaccountable elites”, and when challenged by a correspondent at Sky News, Gove accused the broadcaster of being part of the same “elite” conspiring against the people.

This shows just how clearly such rhetoric is a device to limit engagement. By moving debate from substance to personal pejorative slant this discursive framework is able to circumnavigate genuine criticism and cloak itself with the manta of anti-elitism. However, in the context of Europeanization, it seems increasingly evident that elite has become something of a synonym for European. Anti-elitism looks increasingly like a framework for anti-Europeanization. As Harmsen details; “opposition to European integration has unquestionably been shaped by wider anti-elite discourses, Euroscepticism (is now) at the shifting boundary between ‘mainstream’ and ‘protest’ politics” (Harmsen, 2010: 335). Clearly national discourse is context based and demonstrates degrees of divergence that reflect this, however, there are growing commonalities, and Europeanized public spheres seem to be sharing in the growth of populist discursive responses. Reungoat noted the use of ‘the people’ in France to create a “pointedly exclusionary conception of community in which the

culturally defined nation also becomes the basis for legitimate political participation” (Reungoat, 2010, 294), Harmsen identified in Poland the “construction of a mythical or idealized ‘heartland’, whose ‘people’ had to be protected against both predatory foreign interests and a complicit metropolitan elite.” (Harmsen, 2010: 335-336).

This all supports the findings of the final case study, and the above discussion of the public sphere that develops around and subsequent to the British referendum. Integration is not only a burden to the demos, but now poses a substantive risk to the people and the nation. Elites, are a danger, if they subscribe to European aims or represent European institutions. We are witnessing the establishment, and proliferation of a normative and highly emotive dichotomy as addressed above. This dichotomy has already contributed to political change, the most telling example of this being Brexit. Further research is needed to better understand the nature and extent of this contribution, and the potential scope and impact of anti-Europeanized populist discourse, but this dimension of Europeanization is very much an ongoing process.

7.5 Concluding Remarks

This research was motivated by a belief that the history of the United Kingdom as the “awkward partner” (George, 1990) was best explained by British exceptionalism, emanating from a combination of cultural, ideational and historical contexts, and the process of Europeanization had driven a regression toward a British form of novel populism, something borne of Britain herself. The history of Empire, this ‘Sceptered Isle’ and our continual ideational re-affirmation of the continental ‘other’, the arrogance attached to Britain’s status as the only undefeated European power (20th Century), and maybe even a relatively unique degree of military reverence and mythology. I anticipated this exceptionalism to emerge in the public sphere, and so constructed a framework to code and map the most polemic and wide-reaching form of traditional media. The data sets did not indicate or support the assessment of British exceptionalism in any abstract sense, or anything specifically unique regarding the form of British Europeanization. However, there is evidence that the degree of

‘separation’ and ‘conflict’ evident in the most recent data does distinguish the British public sphere from its European counterparts. Normative and ideational concerns are evident in British media discourse post-Maastricht, but develop in exclusively negative terms, this indicates divergence in form from French and German discourse.

Over four decades, the research assessed a process of discursive change tied to European integration; the Europeanization of the public sphere. The pressures of integration did by the final case study produce a clearly Europeanized public sphere. However, it is Europeanized only in as much as now entailed a consistent perspective on integration, but it never meaningfully integrated European concerns into existing domestic cleavages. By the juncture substantive Europeanization is evident, populist engagement is also evident. The central ideas of ‘separation’ and ‘conflict’ are evident in this populist discourse and contribute to fundamentally Eurosceptic frameworks for media output. It is populist in as much as it offers limited engagement, it constructs ideational narratives, it is limited in terms of perspectives and has fostered the growth of post-truth discourse. Rhetoric is increasingly of more political value than material realities. Such a national public sphere is fundamentally incompatible with supranational legitimacy, as such these findings bear a relationship with the referendum result. However, given the abuse of social media and rulings regarding illegal electioneering and foreign interference, there is much about Brexit, Eurosceptic discourse and public policy still to be understood regarding both cause and consequence.

These findings are not unique in terms of content or narratives, but rather indicate the notable degree of primacy such discourse has assumed in the British context, to the detriment of wider or more holistic deliberation. It is a combination of pressures that have resulted in Brexit, of which discourse is just one. Anything in this data set, could be identified in EU27 public spheres, degrees may vary, but Europeanization is driving comparable change across member states. Furthermore, the composition of the public sphere itself is in a state of flux, technology has afforded a far greater role to new, and less accountable actors, to drive discursive agendas. More research is required to understand how both technology and discourse relate to political outcomes in a European context, but this research supports the ‘turn to ideas’ (Blythe, 1997) and indicates we must recognise the growing value of discourse in understanding political change and reaction. The European Union was built on ideals masquerading as material aspirations, if integration is to remain the underwriting European

political structure, maybe it needs to move away from its material discourse and return to defend the ideals that drove Monnet and Schuman. It is clear that if democracy is to remain the primary and preferable structure for legitimate governance, discourse and ideational concerns require better understanding, and the scope for their abuse needs to be better regulated against.

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Appendix

Online Archives and Resources:

- Bundesregierung Online, available at <https://www.bundesregierung.de>
- Daily Mail Online, available at www.dailymail.co.uk
- Dow Jones Factiva Archive, available at www.global.factiva.com
- Economist Online, www.economist.com
- Eurobarometer EB61, EB63, EB80, available at www.ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion
- Express Online, available at www.express.co.uk
- Gale Group Archive, available at www.cengage.com
- Guardian Online, available at www.theguardian.com
- Hansard Online, available at www.hansard.parliament.uk
- Leave.eu Online, available at <http://www.leave.eu>
- LSE European Institute Blog, available at www.blogs.lse.ac.uk
- News Minute Online, available at www.thenewsminute.com
- Sun Online, available at www.thesun.co.uk
- Telegraph Online, available at www.telegraph.co.uk
- Times Online, available at www.thetimes.co.uk
- UK Press Online Archive, available at www.ukpressonline.co.uk
- White Paper on European Communication Policy, 2006, available at http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com2006_35_en.pdf

Reliability Testing:

25 Articles were randomly selected for each publication across data sets, and coded by a third party to assess the reliability and replicability of this research design. The table below indicates the accuracy of coding for each scale, for each publication.

Publication	Accuracy on Separation Scale	Accuracy on Conflict Scale
The Sun	96%	88%
The Express	92%	88%
The Mail	92%	92%
The Mirror	96%	84%

This indicates a robust coding matrix that could be re-applied and re-coded for a limited margin for error. The 'conflict scale' assessed the more complex supranational dimension to integration and the limited decrease in accuracy reflects this. However, this does not invalidate the research design or the findings of the thesis. In future research it would interesting to record and reproduce the application of this coding structure to other influential dimensions of the public sphere, including TV and Online News media, Social Media, and Elite Political output. There is an emerging relationship between discourse and political output, evident in Brexit, Trump, and increasing populism; this is something that needs better understanding to sustain effective democracy.