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Human Dignity in the Light of Humanism and the New Testament

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HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE LIGHT OF
HUMANISM AND THE NEW TESTAMENT



BY
WARREN LEWIS

HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE LIGHT OF
HUMANISM AND THE NEW TESTAMENT

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An Abstract of a Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Bible
Abilene Christian College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Warren Lewis
May, 1963

THESIS ABSTRACT

This study investigates the concept of human dignity in the light of the philosophy of humanism and of the New Testament. The thesis is aimed at examining, analyzing, and evaluating the humanistic views for their philosophical and practical worth; and comparing, contrasting, and harmonizing the good in them with those ideas in the New Testament which parallel them.

After a definition of terms, the study proceeds historically to treat the ancient Greeks, the Post-Apostolic Church, Pelagius and Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and the Renaissance-Reformation humanists in chronological order, showing their relation to a tradition of classical, "theistic" humanism. By this, there is established a background against which to contrast later humanism. After this, the process of change from a God-centred humanism of the earlier period to a man-centred humanism in the twentieth century is discussed, along with an evaluation of the effects caused in this modern world by a philosophy which claims to believe in man, but refuses to believe in God. John Dewey, Julian Huxley, and the secular neo-humanists of the 1933 Humanist Manifesto are suggested as normative of this way of thinking. On the other hand Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, F. R. Barry, and Jacques Maritain are discussed as having preserved the earlier tradition of classical, theistic humanism. The final chapter

is a discussion of the New Testament view of human dignity as emphasized mainly in three specific doctrines: grace, the Incarnation, and the optimum Christian life.

The investigation finds that whereas there was a tradition of theistic humanism that held to a view of human dignity based on the principle that man, possessed of the spiritual image of God, has dignity because he was created and so regarded by a heavenly Father, the followers of humanism in the modern period have departed from that classical basis and seek to find dignity in man as being alone, without God or a need for God. This secular, neo-humanism is based on the results of the Renaissance-Reformation, taken to the extremes of naturalism, scientism, and materialism. It is observed that because man is attempting to find dignity alone without reference to God that he actually loses his dignity and his ability to live the best life and thus, this form of humanism actually gives up its right to the name "humanism" in any historically or pragmatically real sense.

The investigation further finds that the New Testament holds to a high view of human dignity based on the concepts that man is a creation of God, that he has spirit as well as body, that he is the recipient of the grace of God (which includes having been created "good," with free will and not depraved, and having received God's commands, promises, and special gift in the form of His Son); that the Incarnation dignified the earthly estate of man; and that man has a right

to the optimum in life because he does possess dignity. The observation is made that those who have held to a classical, theistic humanism in most cases concur with the New Testament on these points.

It is finally observed that the view of theistic humanism and the New Testament, which might just as fairly be called Christian Humanism, but which is fully implied in the term "Christianity" without modification, is thus demonstrated as being the most valued attitude for maintaining human dignity.

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May, 1963.

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This thesis, directed and approved by the candidate's committee, has been accepted by the Graduate Council of Abilene Christian College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Purpose of this Study

This study attempts to show the attitude of philosophic Humanism toward the concept of Human Dignity. It also seeks to show the attitude of the New Testament toward this idea. By comparing these two points of view, the study demonstrates such harmony as may be found between the philosophy of Humanism and the religion of the New Testament. One purpose, therefore, of the study is to discover whether there be any form of Humanism that may be considered compatible with the teachings of the New Testament. If such a conclusion can be validly drawn, the harmony between New Testament Christianity and a compatible form of Humanism will then provide a sufficient apologetic basis for Christianity to make use of the elucidation that Humanism makes of such truths as are common to both systems. To the full extent of any such agreement in doctrines, these two systems may supply each other with valuable aid for upholding the effort to provide for man the good life which is worthy of the dignity which he should enjoy as a human being.

Methodology

As to methodology, first there is given a definition of the terms "Christianity" and "Humanism." Next, there is a

brief presentation of the development of the tradition of Humanism with short discussions of the views of the major humanists on the subject of human dignity. This section is presented chronologically and is divided into two parts. The first part treats of the early period of Humanism which may be called "classical" Humanism. It embraces the philosophical and theological humanists from the Greeks through the early Church to the Renaissance-Reformation. The second part sets forth the humanist view of human dignity after the Renaissance-Reformation, but with particular interest in the twentieth century. Next, there is a comment on the religious, philosophical, artistic, and literary conditions of the twentieth century as they affect views of human dignity. A lexical definition of "human dignity" is not offered since several views of it emerge throughout the study.

The last major division of the study comprises a discussion of the New Testament concept of human dignity. In this chapter, the theological aspects of the doctrine of grace are discussed; the Christian view of man as to his natural human condition is discussed; the boundaries of human ability set by the New Testament are discussed with the goals toward which Christianity purposes that human life should be lived and with the means which it suggests for that activity.

The final chapter is a summary statement attempting to coordinate in brief form the harmony that is found to exist

CHAPTER II

DEFINITION OF TERMS

"Christian"

In this study, the term "Christian" will be understood as pertaining directly to the teaching of the New Testament and not as referring to some particular religious system or sect. This definition is chosen since nothing is considered more central to Christian doctrine than the New Testament and no body of writings is held to be superior to it by Christians. This view emphasizes the New Testament itself as the final word in all matters pertaining to Christianity because the New Testament itself indicates that one should speak in conformity with the words of Scripture¹ since Scripture is considered to be inspired of God and complete for instruction in religious matters.²

This emphasis is the influence of the thinking of such men as Thomas Campbell, who formulated the statement of this dependence on the Original Source of Christianity to say: "Where the Scriptures speak, we speak; where these are silent, we are silent";³ and his son, Alexander, who reduced Christianity ultimately to belief in this simple formula: the divine

¹1 Pet. 4: 11. ²II Tim. 3: 16-17.

³R. Richardson, Memoirs of Alexander Campbell (Nashville: Gospel Advocate Company, 1956), I, 239.

Sonship of Jesus Christ with obedient trust as the active response to this belief.⁴ These men were instrumental in the Restoration Movement which, for the past century and a half has defended the New Testament as the only proper rule of faith and practice.

This sense of the term "Christian" is one with which even Adolf Harnack might agree since this is the sense which he attributes to the Reformers in that they "brought religion back again to itself" by discarding the accretions of centuries. Thus, for Harnack, Christianity was "reduced to its essential factors, to the Word of God and to faith."⁵ This sense of the word "Christian" is also appreciated by a contemporary, Georgia Harkness, since she considers a given man or system "Christian" according to the amount of "Gospel-content" present.⁶ In this study, therefore, "Christian" is to be understood as conforming with the views expressed in the New Testament, and the New Testament itself is to be understood as the very Word of God to man.

"Humanism"

The term "Humanism" cannot have such a singular meaning,

⁴ibid., p. 507.

⁵A. Harnack, What is Christianity? T. B. Saunders (trans.) (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), pp. 288-289.

⁶G. Harkness, The Modern Rival of Christian Faith (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952), pp. 21-28.

for it is a word used to express many ideas. Walter Lippmann asserts that Humanism is actually not the name of a school or sect, but rather a "human attitude" observable throughout history, and especially after 1300 in Europe.⁷ J. A. C. F. Auer, on the other hand, limits the term to the literary awakening of the Renaissance-Reformation, for it is of this period and movement that the term was coined.⁸ L. H. Hough accepts the wider definition and suggests a Humanism that would even include an "evangelical" turn of mind which would indicate a form of "Christian Humanism," or a system in which one is "haunted by a sense of ultimate, to whom 'logos' becomes a great word, and who investigates the New Testament and Greek fathers to come to see the Incarnation as the great goal and authentication of humanism."⁹

The above definitions suffice for the earlier period, but in the modern period "Humanism" has come to mean something much different. Humanism in the twentieth century in the main may more properly be described by the adjective "secular" or by the adjective "anthropocentric" which best describes the

⁷W. Lippmann, "Humanism as Dogma," The Saturday Review of Literature, VI (March 15, 1930), 818.

⁸J. A. C. F. Auer, Humanism States Its Case (Boston: Beacon Press, Inc., 1933), p. 4.

⁹L. H. Hough, "The Vicissitudes of a Noble Word," in Humanism: Another Battle Line, ed., W. P. King (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), pp. 15-17.

lack of the classical quality of a "God-consciousness."¹⁰

Dakin speaks of certain "optimistic" humanists as typified by Nicolai Hartmann, "pessimistic" humanists as typified by Bertrand Russell and J. W. Krutch, and "right-wing pragmatists" as typified by William James, F. C. S. Schiller and John Dewey, and those who subscribe to the 1933 Humanist Manifesto,¹¹ as well as by Julian Huxley and those of a more contemporary school. Dakin also speaks of the school of "literary" humanists which includes Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More.¹²

D. D. Runes gives the following breakdown of philosophical Humanism into its several forms:

- A. Any view in which interest in human welfare is central.
- B. Renaissance revival of classical learning as opposed to merely ecclesiastical studies.
- C. An ethical and religious movement culminating in Auguste Comte's "Worship of Humanity," better known as Humanitarianism.
- D. Philosophical movement represented by F. C. S. Schiller in England, better known as Pragmatism.
- E. Literary Humanism, movement led in America by Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, and Norman Foerster protesting against extreme emphasis on vocational education,

¹⁰One may observe a certain "humanistic" (in the "man-centred" sense) attitude in much of contemporary theology of the liberal variety since the presuppositions of this outlook cause it to be in many cases quite skeptical of the "obvious" supernatural. Hordern, e.g., lists four schools of liberal theology of which "Humanism" is one. The other three are: A. N. Wieman's "Empirical Philosophy of Religion" school, E. S. Brightman's "Personalist" school, and Leroy Waterman's re-vamped Hegelian-higher criticism notions. With these go the preachers--Coffin, Jones, Fosdick, etc. cf. Wm. Hordern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 91-94.

¹¹See "Appendix."

¹²A. H. Dakin, Man the Measure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 16-17.

- but for study of "the Humanities."
- F. Sociological term for tendency to extend ideals, such as love, loyalty, kindness, service, honesty, which normally prevail in primary or intimate groups to guide conduct in non-primary or impersonal groups.
- G. Religious Humanism is any view which does not consider belief in a deity vital to religion, though not necessarily denying its existence and not necessarily denying practical value to such belief. Represented by a group of left-wing Unitarian ministers and university professors. . . of the 1933 Manifesto.¹³

Runes' definition "C" may present somewhat of an unhappy image, for "Humanitarianism" has certain connotations of "charity" which should not be included in it as a definition of Humanism. Babbitt has suggested this word as a replacement for "Humanism" in speaking of the twentieth-century school of pragmatism and experimentalism.¹⁴ However, this particular school has elected to call itself "Religious Humanism" (see Runes' definition "G"). Here again is a somewhat misleading term, for one must understand John Dewey's definition of "Religion" as expressed in his A Common Faith before one can understand this re-defined use of the word.¹⁵

This pragmatic sense of "Religious Humanism," which perhaps may more accurately be called a materialistic and

¹³D. D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy (Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1960, p. 131.

¹⁴I. Babbitt, "An Essay at Definition," in Humanism and America, ed. Norman Foerster (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1930), p. 34; see also John Wright Buckham, "Humanitarianism and Personalism," in King, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁵John Dewey, A Common Faith (original publication: Oxford University Press, 1934; re-publication: New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), passim.

naturalistic scientism, is summarized by Titus as

the doctrine that men, through the use of intelligence, directing the institutions of democratic government, can create for themselves, without aid from "supernatural powers," a rational civilization in which each person enjoys security and finds cultural outlets for whatever normal human capacities and creative energies he possesses. . . science is viewed not as a transcript of reality, but as a human construct to secure control over the world. Humanistic naturalists recognize that the "laws" of nature are based on man-made hypotheses.¹⁶

This study will simply use the term "Humanism" when referring to the general tradition of philosophical Humanism that embraces all the major views. When referring to the Humanism of the more traditionally Christian sort, such terms as "theistic humanism," "traditional humanism" or "classical humanism" will be used. When referring to the more man-centered humanism of the twentieth century, such terms as "secular humanism," "anthropocentric humanism," or "neo-humanism" will be used.

¹⁶H. H. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy (New York: American Book Company, 1959), p. 9.

CHAPTER III

THE HUMANIST VIEW OF HUMAN DIGNITY

Theistic Humanism through the Renaissance-Reformation

Classical Humanism of Greek Thought. The discussion of classical humanism begins with ancient Greek thought since it first appears here among the classical philosophers. Plato returned philosophy to a "theistic" basis by re-establishing the "certainty of god" as the foundation for all human action.¹ This he sought to accomplish in order to offset the atheistic effects of the Sophists who had denied the ancient myths of Homer and Hesiod.² Through Plato's paideia (system of teaching),³ and his equation of righteousness with understanding, and identification of vice with ignorance,⁴ he maintained his "theological" basis in which he thought man could find his highest dignity. This dignity of man was to be found as man centered himself in God.⁵

Other early Greeks who expressed man's ability to

¹See W. Jaeger, Humanism and Theology (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1943), p. 43.

²Ibid., pp. 23-24.

³Ibid., p. 55.

⁴H. Miller, Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 89.

⁵Plato, "Theaetetus," 176b; in Great Books of the Western World, eds., Mortimer J. Adler and Robert M. Hutchins (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), XXII, 530. (This series hereinafter referred to as "Adler-Hutchins".)

attain dignity in his human station were Aristotle, who continued Plato's "theological" foundation for philosophy to hold that the Prime Mover provides the ultimate ground for human being,⁶ and Solon, one of the earliest spokesmen for the Western idea of freedom. He maintained human dignity through defending personal liberty so that "wherever democracy has since been tried in the West we find his spirit of measure, his community feeling, his denial of the individual will to power and of ambitious vanity."⁷

Indeed, it may be concluded that classical Greek humanism held a high view of human dignity. One author has said, "the Greeks humanized everything."⁸ Since they had forgotten the revealed nature of God, they created gods in their own image thus dignifying man by giving the gods human qualities, however perfected. To them, all life, religion, art, literature, everything was measured by the standard of man under the gods.⁹ This religious orientation of everything in life caused them to be not only one of the most intellectual of ancient peoples

⁶L. J. A. Mercier, The Challenge of Humanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 115-116.

⁷K. Jaspers, Existentialism and Humanism (New York: R. F. Moore and Company, 1952), p. 33.

⁸L. H. Hough, "The Vicissitudes of a Noble Word," in Humanism: Another Battle Line, ed., W. P. King (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), pp. 15-17.

⁹C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism (Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 1937), pp. 98-99.

but also caused them to feel the pull of a great chain of being that connected man to the gods and made the Greeks, as one has said, "the most religious of ancient peoples."¹⁰

Though this classical, theistic tradition of humanism was opposed by certain of the Sophists, Atomists, and others of their day, it prevailed and was later adopted by many of the early Christian apologists when Christianity later became the rightful heir of the Greek tradition.¹¹

Jaeger points out that the Roman Cicero taught the humanist view of human dignity since he coined the word humanitas to express the arts and letters of the Greeks insofar as they represent the Greek ideal of man, the humanizing influence by which the true self is discovered and the personality shaped.¹² This harking back to classical philosophy forms much of the spirit of the Renaissance-Reformation humanism, as Runes' definition "B" suggests. (See page 7)

The Post-Apostolic Church. The Fathers of the

¹⁰ See Miller, op. cit., p. 26. It is again to the Greeks--the Stoics--that the West owes the democratization of the originally Greek concept of Humanism. The Stoics taught that human dignity was every man's possession, not just that of an education aristocracy. Ibid., p. 89.

¹¹ A. H. Dakin, Man the Measure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 23, 26, 31, 36.

¹² Jaeger, op. cit., p. 21. Jaeger also points out a process of disintegration observable in the three principal Greek playwrights (god-centred Aeschylus, god-man balanced Sophocles, and man-centred, relativistic Euripides) in which faith in God is traded for faith in man. A similar process will be observed in the modern period. Ibid., p. 158f.

Post-Apostolic period express their views of human dignity in three main ways: in what they thought about natural theology, free will, and grace.

Certain of the Post-Apostolic philosopher-apologists adopted much of the philosophical language of the Greek tradition to which they fell heir. The "action-stories" of the Old Testament were thought by them to have been graced by the true paideia (Plato's word) of Christianity, for the New Religion was considered primarily the true way to understanding.¹³ Justin Martyr and Clement of Alexandria, while not necessarily normative for this period, are representative of this apologetic feeling.

Justin adapted Greek terms and frames of reference to Christian purposes. Christianity was for him the creation of the Logos who had enlightened the philosophers,¹⁴ making them "Christians before Christ,"¹⁵ To this way of thinking, Christianity was the perfecting of philosophy,¹⁶ as Clement

¹³ Ibid., pp. 58-64.

¹⁴ Justin Martyr, Apologia II, xiii in Ante-Nicene Fathers, eds., A. Roberts and J. Donaldson (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1956), II, 133-134. (Hereinafter referred to as "Roberts-Donaldson".)

¹⁵ Justin Martyr, op. cit., xivi, in Ibid., pp. 63-64.

¹⁶ T. E. Hulme, Speculations (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1936), p. 27.

said, the perfected end to which Hellenism had come through its schoolmaster--philosophy.¹⁷ These concessions to natural theology indicate that the Fathers held a high view of human dignity and felt that man could acquire the perfection of his likeness in the imitation of God "by the exercise of his own diligence."¹⁸ This dignity was obtainable through "growing knowledge,"¹⁹ but also through the perfected excellence of humanity which Christ had meritoriously gained in the all-important Incarnation.

The Incarnation provided not only the perfect example of humanity but it was also the efficacious hallowing and sanctifying of the human state by Christ's recapitulation of man's condition,²⁰ as Irenaeus said; or, as Athanasius later said, God's visit to man in human form deified humanity, renewed God's image in man, and made true the reality that "the Word was made man in order that we might be made divine."²¹

¹⁷Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, I, v, in Roberts-Donaldson, op. cit., p. 305.

¹⁸H. C. Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine (New York: Eaton and Mains, 1906), p. 100.

¹⁹Clement of Alexandria, Pedagogus, I, in Fathers of the Church, trans., Simon P. Wood (New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1948), V, 23.

²⁰Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, III, xvi; V, xxiv, in The Early Christian Fathers, ed., H. Bettenson (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 108, 111.

²¹Athanasius, Contra Arianos, I, 42 in ibid., p. 384; De Incarnatione, 54, in ibid., p. 404.

To this way of thinking, the Incarnation proved the dignity of man.

This view of human dignity included a strong belief in the freedom of the will. Origen,²² Clement of Alexandria,²³ John Chrysostom,²⁴ and even Tertullian,²⁵ all insisted that man is free to sin or not to sin and that since sin is due to ignorance and the following of a bad example, man is not responsible until he himself sins and destroys his "age of innocency."²⁶ Although another view would later build up and

²²G. P. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), pp. 110-111. Origen had his own view of "original sin" that involved not participation in the Adamic transgression, but in a pre-natal, free-will sin. In this way, he could justify the need of infant baptism. His firm belief in human free will and man's ability in his earthly estate, however, places him squarely in the Greek tradition. R. Seeburg, History of Doctrines (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1952), pp. 151, 155-157.

²³Sheldon, op. cit., p. 31; Clement of Alexandria, op. cit., (Stromateis) III, xvi; XII, iii, in Bettenson, op. cit., p. 239.

²⁴R. Seeburg, op. cit., p. 328.

²⁵W. G. T. Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), II, 3-10. Tertullian was a Western theologian and in the general tradition of which Augustine was heir; but, Tertullian was still influenced by an earlier view of free will and human dignity.

²⁶Tertullian, De Baptismo, 18, in Roberts-Donaldson, op. cit., III, 678.

be expressed in Augustine,²⁷ the Greek Fathers, to the extent that they are faithful to the Bible, cannot be accused of setting up "a conflict between body and soul, appetites and reason," for they saw the whole man as made by God and dignified in this condition.²⁸ Harnack discusses their Greek love for man that would not allow them to despise or vilify him in any way. He says they believed that

Man made in the image of God is a free self-determining being. He was endowed with reason by God, that he might decide for the good, and enjoy immortality. He has fallen short of this destiny by having voluntarily yielded and continuing to yield himself--under temptation, but not under compulsion--to sin, yet without having lost the possibility and power of a virtuous life, or the capacity for immortality. The possibility was strengthened and immortality restored and offered by the Christian revelation which came to the aid of the darkened reason with complete knowledge of God. Accordingly, knowledge decides between good and evil.²⁹

The Greek Fathers are similarly one in their view of grace. Grace to them was the observation through knowledge of the example of the Word-made-flesh and the appropriation of this knowledge through free will in the imitation of the Logos.³⁰

²⁷Ambrose and Augustine's ideas can be found incipient in Tertullian, Cyprian, Commodius, and partially in certain others, but this view is mainly a product of Western legality and is not the view of the Church of the classical humanist tradition. cf. Sheldon, *op. cit.*, p. 101f.; Shedd, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-25; and J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), p. 349.

²⁸D. R. G. Owen, Body and Soul (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), p. 56.

²⁹A. Harnack, History of Dogma (London, Edinburgh, Oxford: Williams and Norgate, 1897), III, 255.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 272-283; Shedd, *op. cit.*, p. 38f.

Harnack also sums up the Greek Fathers' view of grace:

This natural law [part of grace], when it had been obscured in the mind of man, was repeated in the Decalogue by an external legislation, and, on account of the hard-heartedness of the Jews, was supplemented with burdens, temporary commandments; and it was finally reduced by Jesus Christ to the simplest of formulas set in operation by the impressive preaching of rewards and punishments, and perfectly fulfilled by Jesus. He revealed the perfect knowledge of God and restored the natural moral law. . . the whole of religion could be looked at from the point of view of knowledge and law.³¹

From the above statements, it may be concluded that the Post-Apostolic Greek Fathers' view of the dignity of man was a view that attributed to him free will, the ability to seek after and find God, and a verbal and ethical grace which had been brought to him by the God-Man Jesus Christ.

Pelagius and Augustine. Augustine was heir to a tradition that held a much different view of human dignity than that outlined thus far in this study. His immediate predecessor and teacher was Ambrose, who

held to free will in his practical addresses, but his thought is dominated by the view, that through the fall of Adam we come into the world as sinners, that sin is an attribute which belongs to us from our conception and that we, therefore, being from the outstart sinful, must sin even when for the time being we do not desire to sin. . . .³²

Augustine accepted his confessor's ideas, but finally adopted his own terminology. From Augustine's epigram: "Da

³¹Harnack, op. cit., pp. 263, 267.

³²Seeburg, op. cit., pp. 239-330.

quod iubes et iubes quod vis,"³³ (Give what Thou commandest and command what Thou wilt), which later became Pelagius' point of departure, Seeburg points out that Augustine developed his whole system of man's complete inability and lack of human dignity. To Augustine, the entire human race is massa perditionis; no one, not even children, are free from original sin. Concupiscence and all sin come from a perverse will and nature which all men, who sinned in and with Adam, have received from their first father. Man's unregenerate will itself is carnal and animal. It follows then that man cannot will even to do or think one good thing, but that even the willing to do good must come from God's grace before anything else happens. It thus depends on the sovereign will of God as to who shall or shall not will to believe, and this results in the discrimination of two classes--the elect, those whom God chooses to save; and the non-elect, those whom God chooses to damn. This prevenient grace is irresistible and perseverance is sure for the elect; but, for the unpredestinated, they must fall with the mass of the perverted and be forever lost; they cannot do anything to alter this course. Man is thus free to fall, but not free to rise. Further,

No blame attaches to God; they are alone to blame, as they simply remain given over to their just fate; "He who falls,

³³Augustine, Confessions, X, 40, in Adler-Hutchins, op. cit., XVIII, 81.

falls by his own will; and he who stands, stands by the will of God." In such, God reveals his justice, as in the elect his mercy. To the question, Why he chooses some and leaves the others to their fate, the only answer is: "I so will," at which the creature must humbly bow before his Creator.³⁴

It may be seen that there is very little of the classical form of humanism in Augustine for he seems to set at naught any pre-grace idea of human dignity, for man is totally helpless in himself until God arbitrarily chooses to send some mystical power of the Holy Spirit to begin and finish the entire scheme of salvation.³⁵ This view, in one form or other, was also maintained by the semi-Augustinians, Gottschalk, Anselm, and finally found resting place as part of Luther's system, and mainly in the Brobdingnagian Calvinistic-Presbyterian edifice that Calvin constructed on Augustine's foundation.³⁶

Pelagius was the outstanding opponent of Augustine in this matter of human dignity, free will, and grace. One must understand what Pelagius meant by "grace" in order not to make

³⁴Seeburg, op. cit., pp. 329-352.

³⁵This attitude seems to contradict Augustine's appreciation for the pagan authors who might be considered to have risen to the knowledge of God on their own. He speaks highly of them, particularly of Cicero and of the Neo-Platonists, to the extent that "in regard even to the worship of the One God are found among them some truths." cf. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, II, 40, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed., P. Schaff (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1954), II, 554; Augustine, op. cit., (Confessions), III, 4, in Adler-Hutchins, op. cit., p. 14.

³⁶W. Walker, A History of the Christian Church (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 192; Shedd, op. cit., pp. 111-139.

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the mistake of some scholars who assert that he did not believe in it, or that to Pelagius, "the human was everything," or that "man was the centre of interest."³⁷

Pelagius, though born in Britain,³⁸ took the Greek view of the matter of man's natural human condition and found the increasingly popular doctrines of Augustine to be decidedly distasteful. He felt that the notion of moral inability had undermined the belief in human freedom, without which virtue was quite impossible. Also he opposed the emphasis on "direct divine control" throughout salvation, believing that man should depend more on his own efforts and less on some mysterious working of the Holy Spirit.³⁹

According to Coelestius' formulation of Pelagius' position, Pelagius opposed Augustine and taught:

- That Adam was created mortal and would have died even if he had not sinned.
- That the sin of Adam injured himself alone and not the human race.
- That infants at the moment of birth are in the same condition as Adam was before the Fall.
- That infants, even though they are not baptized, have eternal life.
- That the race of man as a whole does not die by the death or fall of Adam, nor does the race of man as a whole

³⁷A. C. McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 181.

³⁸P. Lehman, "The Anti-Pelagian Writings of Augustine," in A Companion to the Study of Augustine, ed., R. W. Battenhouse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 48.

³⁹McGiffert, op. cit., p. 125.

rise again by the resurrection of Christ.⁴⁰ Pelagius also held, at first, to a nation that the Law had exerted the same effect on men in introducing them to the Kingdom of Heaven as does the Gospel, but in the process of debate, this was given up. Similarly, a statement to the effect that before the coming of Christ there were men who lived without sin was modified to a less definite statement.⁴¹

These statements, however, are more indicative of the theological mind of Coelestius, as in the sixteen-point creed that he formulated in Sicily in which he undertook to show that "ought" implies "can" in the matter of the Biblical teaching of moral responsibility.⁴² Actually, in the thinking of Pelagius, the point of concentration lay more in the simple matter of the freedom of man's will and the practical effects of this idea than in these theological subtleties.

The doctrine of original sin he [Pelagius] wholly rejected, insisting that sin is purely voluntary and individual and cannot be transmitted. Adam's fall affected neither the souls, nor the bodies of his descendants. Their flesh comes from him but not their souls, and their flesh is good as everything made by God is good. So far as their nature and abilities go, all human beings are in the same condition as Adam was in the beginning. They suffer, however, from the bad example of the race as he did not. In spite of this, they are free, as he was free, and are able to choose either good or evil.⁴³

⁴⁰J. Ferguson, Pelagius (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd., 1956), p. 51.

⁴¹ibid. ⁴²ibid., p. 62. ⁴³McGiffert, op. cit., p. 126.

Pelagius simply could not accept Augustine's version of Romans 5: 12. Augustine's Bible read that all men sinned in Adam (in quo omnes peccaverunt); Pelagius' version read that all men sin like Adam (quia or propter quod).⁴⁴ Pelagius saw each man as newly created, upstanding, good--with all the potentialities for the perfection of his human dignity that Father Adam had. He saw no inner taint or bent; there was only the evil influence of the world that Adam had not had. He held that men could live righteous lives and taught that they should.⁴⁵

As proof of his position, Pelagius cited the example of the noble pagans, as well as that of Abraham, Enoch, and others of the Old Testament who had lived "righteous" lives relative to the standards to which they were obligated. Pelagius constantly affirmed that he was not trying to say that any one had lived a perfect life, but that a person could. He felt that any weaker statement would rob both God and man of moral responsibility.⁴⁶

Thus grace in Pelagius' view was something much different from Augustine's conception. Pelagius replied that even though

⁴⁴Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

⁴⁵Cf. Augustine's "On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin," II, 14, in which he quotes from Pelagius' "Defense of the Freedom of the Will," in Schaff, op. cit., V, 21.

⁴⁶Lehman, op. cit., p. 209.

all have the power to do right, they still need light not only to tell them what is right, but to show them the results of wrong and thus encourage them to the right. This was the function of the grace of Christ's life, death, and example. "He meant by grace, however, not some indwelling divine power or substance, but instruction and enlightenment, including the revelation of future rewards and punishments."⁴⁷

Regeneration meant, as Pelagius interpreted it, not the birth of a new nature, but the forgiveness of sins in baptism, the illumination of the mind by the truth, and the stimulation of the will by divine promises.⁴⁸

By divine grace Pelagius means primarily the endowment with reason and free will. Then, to check the ever-growing habit of sinning, God gave the law until in the preaching and example of Christ the gift of God's grace was completed. . . . In one place he says that grace is "necessary not only for every hour, and for every moment, but also for every act of our lives," in another he maintains that grace is given "in order that men may more easily accomplish that which they are commanded to do by free will". . . . This grace is intended for man, but man must make himself worthy of it by an honest striving after virtue.⁴⁹

Pelagius felt that Augustine's views were not only destructive of moral responsibility and human dignity, but also of the dignity of God; he said:

"It is hard," "It is difficult," "We are not able," "We are men"--Oh, blind madness! We accuse God of a twofold ignorance--that He does not seem to know what He has made nor what He has commanded. . . . I say that a man is able to

⁴⁷McGiffert, op. cit., p. 128. ⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹E. H. Klotsche and J. T. Mueller, The History of Christian Doctrine (Burlington, Iowa: The Lutheran Board, 1945), pp. 85-86.

be without sin, and that he is able to keep the commandments of God.⁵⁰

Without discussing further the theological ramifications of Pelagius' view, it may be observed that his beliefs place him squarely in the tradition of the theistic, classical humanists who recognized the ability and the dignity of man and attributed to him the power and necessity of cooperating with God in the matter of salvation. Pelagius held to a complete free-will, to the idea of no original sin or perverted nature, and to a belief in the ability of man to answer to a verbal and ethical form of grace without the need of any mysterious workings or supernatural power. In Pelagius' view, Christianity recognizes man's dignity and is not a notion that deprives him of it.

Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas is somewhat difficult to understand on the matter of human dignity and free will. He follows Augustine's ideas, but with his own interpretation; however, he also follows Aristotle's attitude which might show that he believed that those without "grace" had the ability to do something good.

In that he followed Augustine, Aquinas rejected the common understanding of free will and denied that man could will good or follow the right without a working of

⁵⁰ B. B. Warfield, "Introductory Essay on Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy," Schaff, op. cit., V, [sic] xiv-xv.

grace."⁵¹ He affirmed that man's nature is to possess free choice, but that this freedom is a formal, constructed thing which must be itself acted on by God.⁵²

Concerning other aspects of the question of human dignity Aquinas may be considered as in the tradition of classical humanism, for in that he follows Aristotle, he upholds the idea of the unity of body and spirit to form soul.⁵³ He says that soul and body are thus inseparable aspects of the same one substance and each requires the other in order to exist at all; the soul is nothing apart from the body of which it is the form, much as a pattern is nothing apart from that of which it is the pattern. His awareness of the use which thought makes of the senses caused him to conclude the "soul as a part of human nature has its natural perfection only as united to a body."⁵⁴

Aquinas' view of man thus comes to be a monism of form (in that the soul operates as an inseparable unity of body and

⁵¹Thomas Aquinas, "Treatise on Grace," CIX, II, in Adler-Hutchins, op. cit., XX, 340.

⁵²Ibid., CXIII, III; XX, 362-363. However, Mercier finds Aquinas in conflict with himself in his articles on the will, and says that Aquinas is "in conformity with voluntarism." cf. Conference Symposium, Freedom and Authority in Our Time (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 610.

⁵³Aristotle, De Anima, II, IV, 24, in Adler-Hutchins, op. cit., VIII, 429f.

⁵⁴Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, LXXV, IV; XC, IV, in Adler-Hutchins, op. cit., XIX, 381-382.

spirit), but a dualism of activity (in that there are separate psychical and physical functions that only meet at the union of the soul). He believed, of course, in immortality, and this doctrine could be supported only from a position of metaphysical dualism. Aquinas' distinctions of the soul as in the image of God, that is, apart from the animal creation, and his belief in the power of intellect and pure reason caused him to conclude that there is an essence in man other than matter. This spirit could exist apart from the body, but this would be an unnatural state. He therefore stoutly defended the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in order to give back to the spirit what it needs to make a soul in its composite nature.⁵⁵

He held also to other ideas that place him in the classical humanist tradition. His view of the end of the State as being the "vision of God"⁵⁶ demonstrates not only his awareness of his obligation to discuss such matters from the religious viewpoint, but also indicates his belief that religion must be brought into earthly life on all levels to sanctify it. Indeed, Jaeger finds in Aquinas the first hints of Renaissance humanism in that Aquinas went back to the original writings of Aristotle instead of depending upon the

⁵⁵Owen, op. cit., p. 63f.

⁵⁶Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, 1: 14-15 (written for the King of Cyprus), cf. Adler-Hutchins, op. cit., XIX, vi.

interpretations of the Arabian philosophers and also in that he followed Aristotle's first philosophy or metaphysics as a point of departure for his theology, finding theology and philosophy to compose a harmony and balance quite befitting a Greek humanist. Jaeger also claims humanism for Aquinas because of his exalted view of human nature, a view that sees man as the rational son of God, an ideal of human life that "includes the presence of the Divine."⁵⁷

Renaissance-Reformation Humanism. When one comes to the discussion of human dignity as it was conceived by the people of the Renaissance-Reformation, thought must of necessity turn from being strictly theological, as it has been thus far, to include also outstanding literary figures. Indeed, a thorough understanding of the views of this period should include the broadest comprehension possible of all fields; religion, literature, art, science, politics, philosophy, for the emphasis of the Renaissance Reformation is upon the uomo universale, or the universal man,⁵⁸ and is far from being one-sided.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 7, 10, 18, 32-35.

⁵⁸R. H. Bainton, Here I Stand (New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1950), p. 132.

⁵⁹J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1908), pp. 3-4, 22, 29; W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1952), pp. 548-634; Bainton, loc. cit.

For example, Jaeger includes Dante with Aquinas in his discussion of the latter's views of human dignity.⁶⁰ Petrarch, Boccaccio, Ficino, and the Popes Nicholas V and Julius II and many others⁶¹ were all extremely important in forming the patterns of thought on human dignity in the Renaissance-Reformation, but they were chiefly literary men. Pico della Mirandola, however, is normative of this period and well expresses the views of the literary men of the Renaissance on the subject of human dignity.

Thou [Adam, [man] restrained by no narrow bounds, according to thy own free will, in whose power I [God] have placed thee, shalt define thy nature for thyself. I have set thee midmost in the world, that thence thou mightest the more conveniently survey whatsoever is in the world. Nor have we made thee either heavenly or earthly, mortal or immortal, to the end that thou, being as it were, thy own free maker and moulder, shouldst fashion thyself in what form may like thee best. Thou shalt have power to decline unto the lower or brute creatures. Thou shalt have power to be reborn unto the higher, or divine, according to the sentence of thy intellect.⁶²

This literary Renaissance was the direct antecedent of the religious and philosophical revolutions that followed

⁶⁰Jaeger, loc. cit. cf. T. M. Lindsay, History of the Reformation (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), I, 47.

⁶¹F. A. Norwood, The Development of Modern Christianity (New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1956), p. 28; A. Hyma, Renaissance to Reformation (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1951), p. 141; Symonds, op. cit., p. 10.

⁶²Ibid., p. 35; Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, eds., Ernst Cassirer, et. al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 223-254.

and it provided such tools as classical MSS and also a spirit of resentment against authority which the religious Reformation and the Revolutions in government needed.⁶³ Representative of this school of literary humanists is Lorenzo Valla whose exposé of the Donations of Constantine forever shook the foundation of Papal claims to temporal authority.⁶⁴ Valla's spirit of independence permeated the whole of the Renaissance-Reformation with a desire for religious and intellectual liberty like his own:

I declare them [the popes] guilty of the grossest obscurantism, the most shameless greed, with which they serve the demons. . . . Of our own free will, oh, popes, we have come to you that you might rule over us. And now we are equally free to withdraw from your rule.⁶⁵

In philosophy, René Descartes felt the influence of the new science and recognized that some harmonization must be made to reconcile theology with science. He accomplished this with his "double-truth doctrine" which he inherited from the Aristotelian Averroists and William of Occam.⁶⁶ This Cartesian compromise would later lead to the wide divergence of religion and science, spirit and matter, God and man, and would contribute to the modern view of man as totally

⁶³H. S. Lucas, Renaissance and Reformation (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1934), p. 494.

⁶⁴Hyma, op. cit., p. 145. For other such literary humanists, see H. J. Grimm, The Reformation Era (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 65; Lucas, op. cit., pp. 367-403.

⁶⁵Ibid.,

⁶⁶Jones, op. cit., p. 548.

materialistic and naturalistic.⁶⁷

In government, Marsiglio made a similar use of the new "dualism" and divorced religion from the state, establishing a secular basis for law⁶⁸ and reducing the position of the priesthood to that of just another job in Renaissance society.⁶⁹ This gave place to the rise of Machiavellian naturalism,⁷⁰ and later caused Hobbes and Locke to feel called upon to set forth their philosophy of government.

Hobbes' view of man is contradictory, for his system calls the state an "artificial man"⁷¹ and a social contract into which men, who possess natural rights to freedom and a happy life, may enter of their free will.⁷² However, Hobbes does not believe that men are sufficiently enlightened to govern themselves, since they are only material, and therefore, they must have a sovereign over them to maintain restraint.⁷³ The contradiction obviously comes in that Hobbes trusts a sovereign, who is a human being, to do something that other men

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 676-677.

⁶⁸ Marsiglio, Defensor Minor, I, II, 4, in Jones, op. cit., pp. 548-550.

⁶⁹ Marsiglio, Defensor Pacis, I, IV, in Jones, loc. cit.

⁷⁰ Machiavelli, The Prince, chps. 8, 17-18, in Adler-Hutchins, op. cit., XIII, 3-37.

⁷¹ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, introduction, in Adler-Hutchins, Ibid., p. 47.

⁷² Ibid., I, 14-15, Ibid., pp. 86-96.

⁷³ Ibid., II, 17, Ibid., pp. 99-100; see also J. E. Bentley, Philosophy: An Outline-History (Paterson, New Jersey: Little-Field, Adams and Company, 1960), p. 51.

cannot do and in that men who have enough free will and knowledge to enter in to corporate government should also have enough enlightenment to maintain that condition.

John Locke was more democratic than Hobbes in that he taught that the state is a joint stock company whose members have entered into partnership for profit and who retain the ultimate control of the enterprise, rather than submitting to a sovereign. Though Locke did not believe in innate ideas, he attributed to man the power of gaining whatever he needs to govern himself through empiricism.⁷⁴ By these ideas, he taught a more democratic form of government and humanism than did Hobbes in that Lockes placed his trust in the people in general rather than only in a benevolent despot.⁷⁵ He expounded the doctrines of capitalism, God-given rights, majority rule, political equality, and the laissez-faire state--all ideas which imply a deep trust in man's personal ability.⁷⁶ These ideas of Locke permeated the fabric of European humanism and were a contributing source to the several types of revolutions felt in the centuries following.⁷⁷

⁷⁴John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I, 111, 24-25; II, xviii, 8, 12; IV, ix, 3; IV, xi, 1-3, 8-9, in Adler-Hutchins, op. cit., XXXV, 95f.

⁷⁵John Locke, Of Civil Government, 132, in Ibid., p. 55.

⁷⁶Ibid., 4-15, 26-47, 54, 95-99, in Ibid., pp. 25-47.

⁷⁷Bentley, op. cit., p. 71.

In the field of literary art, Shakespeare, an Elizabethan humanist,⁷⁸ poeticized about the dignity of man in many places, but representatively in Hamlet:

What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason!
how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express
and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension
how like a god! the beauty of the world! the
paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this
quintessence of dust?⁷⁹

Thomas More expressed his faith in man's integrity in his Utopia;⁸⁰ the Cambridge Platonists called man's intellect the "candle of the Lord";⁸¹ Richard Hooker defended the right of the English Church to use natural theology in deciding its governmental policies and customs;⁸² and John Milton, a product of John Colet's classical humanist St. Paul's School

⁷⁸Cf. H. Craig, The Complete Works of Shakespeare (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1951), pp. 11, 81, 770-771.

⁷⁹Wm. Shakespeare, Hamlet, II, II, 316-323, in Craig, op. cit., pp. 916-917.

⁸⁰Thomas More, Utopia (New York: The Classics Club, 1947), re-edition; see also F. Caspari, Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 50, 58.

⁸¹W. C. DePauley, The Candle of the Lord: Studies in the Cambridge Platonists (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 245; cf. M. M. Mahood, Poetry and Humanism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), passim.

⁸²Richard Hooker, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Books I-IV (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1888).

of London,⁸³ placed emphasis in his poetry on human dignity and salvation through the example of the human Christ,⁸⁴ and in his theological writings on natural religion and an aristocracy of Christian Humanists who have the enlightenment of regeneration and the restoration of any power lost through the fall of Adam.⁸⁵

Indeed, all art revelled in the new-found liberty of Renaissance humanism.⁸⁶ In summary, it may be concluded that the whole emphasis of the humanism of the Renaissance was

⁸³Hyma, op. cit., pp. 222, 246-247. Humanist action often took the form of education. The early wandering humanists of Germany were teachers, the Italians established schools to teach their New-Platonism, and no less than seventeen new universities sprang up under the humanist impetus in Germany from 1348 to 1527. The teaching Brethren at Deventer and other schools of the Common Life were the teachers of Erasmus, Luther, and others. This is in line, of course, with the humanist view that human dignity may be maintained through instruction and enlightenment. cf. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 50f. Erasmus partook of this spirit and emphasized education also. cf. L. H. Mough, Great Humanists (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952), p. 100; M. P. Gilmore, The World of Humanism (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1952), p. 204f.

⁸⁴R. M. Frye, God, Man and Satan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 42; B. O. Kurth, Milton and Christian Heroism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 127, 133.

⁸⁵John Milton, De Doctrina Christiana, in M. Y. Hughes, John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1957), p. 916f.

⁸⁶The plastic arts were affected cf. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 50. as were the musical arts. cf. H. D. McKinney and W. R. Anderson, Music in History (New York: American Book Company, 1957), p. 189f.; P. H. Lang, Music in Western Civilization (New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1941), pp. 199f., 314f.

upon the ability, worth, and dignity of man. It was these ideas that were later to cause the breach between Erasmus and Luther.

Erasmus and Luther. The Renaissance humanist spirit is observable in both Luther and Erasmus, but more strongly in the latter than in the former. Erasmus may be considered humanistic in his love for the original MSS of Christian literature⁸⁷ in that this desire to get back to the original sources of ancient religion and philosophy was the controlling spirit of the age, as has been previously discussed. Other aspects of his outlook which are considered humanistic are his attitude and literary productions,⁸⁸ his desire to appropriate the ancient philosophies to the good of religion⁸⁹ and the essence of religion to every day life.⁹⁰ He demonstrated not only the humanist spirit of seeking to educate and enlighten but also he possessed the attitudes of satiric cynicism as well as of moderation which have come to be synonymous

⁸⁷Hough, op. cit., p. 106; Bainton, op. cit., pp. 108, 125.

⁸⁸A. Hyma, New Light on Martin Luther (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Wahr Publishing Company, 1957), p. 49; Grimm, op. cit., p. 84.

⁸⁹Hough, op. cit., p. 129.

⁹⁰Hyma, op. cit. (New Light on Martin Luther), pp. 53-54; Lucas op. cit., p. 501; Caspari, op. cit., pp. 33, 36-38.

with this type of humanism.⁹¹

However, due to the influence of the humanistic Brethren of the Common Life, Erasmus was also possessed of a deep and vital piety.⁹² Luther was also influenced by this group of "reformed medievalists" who combined the via moderna with Christianity to form a devotio moderna.⁹³ Luther had other humanistic influences and attitudes,⁹⁴ but this modern spirit was not Luther's controlling humour. Luther's "Biblical Humanism" (his insistence upon the importance of the Bible itself as a source for religious truth of Scholasticism or papal pronouncement, in line with the devotion to the original MSS of literary humanism) provided him the tools he needed for his revolution,⁹⁵ but his personality and peasant background made him unable and unwilling to concur with Erasmus in certain other humanist implications, or as Luther summarized, he had always mistrusted that "damned heathen"

⁹¹D. Erasmus, Praise of Folly, trans., L. F. Dean (New York: Hendrick House, 1959), pp. 38-39; E. G. Schweibert, Luther and His Times (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), p. 684.

⁹²Hyma, op. cit. (Renaissance to Reformation), p. 124f.

⁹³Hyma, op. cit. (New Light on Martin Luther), pp. 44-47.

⁹⁴H. E. Jacobs, Martin Luther (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1898), p. 17; Grimm, op. cit., pp. 128-130; Schweibert, op. cit., pp. 292-302; Bainton, op. cit., p. 125.

⁹⁵M. Michelet, The Life of Martin Luther, trans., G. H. Smith (New York: A. A. Kelley, Publisher, 1856), p. 101; Schweibert, op. cit., pp. 280-291.

Aristotle anyway.⁹⁶

Whatever the personality and differences in background that Luther and Erasmus had, the difference which became the cause for their final break is most germane to this study, for it involved the doctrine of the freedom of the will and the dignity of man. Luther denied; Erasmus affirmed.

Said Luther:

I reject, and condemn as mere error, all doctrine which assumes the will to be free. . . Erasmus knows less about predestination than even the sophists of the school. Erasmus is not formidable on this any more than on any other Christian matter.⁹⁷

But Erasmus could not agree, for he believed in the perfectibility of man through his own efforts.⁹⁸

Erasmus wrote Discussion of Free Will in an attack upon Luther; Luther parried with The Bondage of the Will.⁹⁹ Erasmus returned with Hyperaspistes.¹⁰⁰ Henry VIII of England became involved in the squabble, penning Assertio Septem Sacramentorum adversus Martinum Lutherum, for which he was prematurely and ironically dubbed "defender of the

⁹⁶Hough, op. cit., p. 95f.; Hyma, op. cit., (New Light on Martin Luther), pp. 61, 72, 159; Schweibert, op. cit., pp. 685, 687.

⁹⁷Michelet, op. cit., p. 124f.

⁹⁸Caspari, op. cit., p. 38.

⁹⁹Michelet, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

¹⁰⁰Hyma, loc. cit. (New Light on Martin Luther).

faith" by the Pope. Luther replied, mainly with adjectives, in Contra Henricum Regem Angliae.¹⁰¹

In the debate, Luther followed the Augustinian tradition, Erasmus followed the classical humanistic position of Pelagius and the semi-Pelagians.

Luther spoke to the very heart of the Christian when he spoke of justification by faith. But when he tried to put it all into an intellectual frame, he was so afraid that he would be ministering to human pride if he admitted that man possessed freedom to accept the offered grace of God in Christ that he denied human freedom definitively and made the very act of accepting the divine grace the result of the act of God. This meant, if one followed it throughout, the emasculation of the very precious doctrine of justification by faith. And Erasmus saw that this would never do.¹⁰²

Luther was thus guilty of offending not only the central truth of humanism--the dignity of man--but he also defiled his own rich doctrine of salvation by faith, for he denied men the power to believe. In this way, he espoused an Augustinian view of mysterious grace, to say nothing of espousing ridiculous "and unintelligible mysteries about the sovereignty of a God that becomes immoral if the theory be true."¹⁰³ Erasmus asked;

Why does not God correct the viciousness of our will, since it is not in our power to control it? or why does he impute it to us, since this viciousness of will is inherent in man? . . . the vessel says to the potter:

¹⁰¹Ibid., pp. 154-158.

¹⁰²Hough, op. cit., p. 126.

¹⁰³Bainton, op. cit., p. 253f.

"Wherefore have you made me for the everlasting fire?"
 . . . If man be not free, what is the meaning of precept,
 action, reward, in short, of all language? Why speak
 of repentance, etc.?¹⁰⁴

Luther replied:

God speaks to us on this fashion solely to convict us
 of our powerlessness, if we do not implore his assistance.
 Satan said: "Thou art free to act." Moses said: "Act";
 in order to convict us before Satan of our inability to
 act.¹⁰⁵

In vain, Luther tried to out-wit, out-argue, or out-
 laugh Erasmus, but all Luther could do successfully was curse;
 his weak replies could not defeat Erasmus.¹⁰⁶

Summary. It may be said of the view of classical
 humanism relative to human dignity that man is possessed
 of a non-material part (as Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas
 Aquinas insisted) and that man may use this spiritual part
 to come to knowledge of God, both through revelation and
 through natural theology (as Hooker and Milton suggested).
 Classical humanism upholds that man is possessed of a com-
 pletely free will that is not impaired by a perverse nature,
 original sin, or any other "corruption" that might be con-
 strued as preventing him from making his own personal choice
 in matters of right and wrong (as Pelagius and Erasmus
 taught). Theistic humanism holds that man's dignity as a

¹⁰⁴Michelet, op. cit., p. 127.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 128.

human being has been enhanced by the visitation of God in human form--the Incarnation (as the early apologists and theologians held) and that this divine visitation in the event of the Incarnation is the highest expression of God's grace toward men, for Christ is His greatest gift to the world. This doctrine of grace is conceived by theistic humanism as being moral and ethical in that it involves response of the free will to commandments and the preaching of eternal rewards and punishment and verbal in that it is based on the appropriation by faith of the example of Christ's perfect life as this is presented to man's understanding through the preached Word. Included in this view of grace is also the creation of free will by God in man which gives him the power to utilize the other manifestations of grace (as Pelagius explained). Man, in such a dignified state, is thus considered as having a right to a pleasant and fruitful life on earth as well as the promise of heavenly existence (as also Locke philosophized).

Negatively, theistic humanism rejects any notions of restriction of man's free will or any deprecation of his human dignity, and thus disclaims any ideas that deny man his full rights as a son of God or any doctrines that imply the necessity of some sort of mysterious grace or operation of the Holy Spirit upon man to help him to do what God has commanded that he do by the use of his free will in attaining salvation.

With this summary, the study proceeds to a discussion of secular humanism's view of human dignity.

Secular Humanism of the Modern Period

Change from Theistic to Secular Humanism. Whereas the humanism of the Renaissance-Reformation and before has been demonstrated to have been centered in God, thus conceiving of man's dignity as a result of his being the creation of a heavenly Father, secular humanism lost this view. The neo-humanism of the modern period gave up two principal conceptions which came as gifts of Christianity: the belief that man is an autonomous self, which points to separate laws for persons and for things; and, the necessary humility that grants man his dignity when he submits even his reason and will to the law of God.¹⁰⁷

This change in outlook was the product of many causes: the constructed dualism of truth as begun by Renaissance-Reformation thinkers led to the wide divergence of man from God, led to human self-dependence, and gave place to the doctrines of the Deists.¹⁰⁸ Breathing this spirit, the English Deist Pope could say: "Know then thyself, presume

¹⁰⁷ Mercier, op. cit., pp. 34-35, 268.

¹⁰⁸ Dakin, op. cit., p. 34; J. H. Nichols, History of Christianity, 1650-1950 (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956), pp. 98-102.

not God to scan; the proper study of mankind is man";¹⁰⁹ the French Deists could discard all religious and political authority and establish a worship of reason;¹¹⁰ and the German Deist, Immanuel Kant, could express a view of Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone and teach a Christianity supported only by "pure reason," natural theology, and moral imperatives without the need of miracles, fulfilled prophecy, or a divine Messiah.¹¹¹

Under the influence of the Enlightenment, Hegel provided another source for the neo-humanism.¹¹² His views of progress and meliorism as the product of his Absolute (a redefined God) gave rise to secular humanistic optimism that was later to find place in the philosophies of many modern men.¹¹³

One of these men, F. C. Baur, became the founder of the "Tubingen School" of Biblical criticism that was later to seek religious support for the ideas of a society based

¹⁰⁹Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, pt. 1, in Eighteenth Century Prose and Poetry, eds., L. I. Bredvold, A. D. McKillop, and L. Whitney (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956), p. 343f.

¹¹⁰C. Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), pp. 34-40, 105; Bentley, op. cit., p. 71.

¹¹¹Nichols, op. cit., p. 105.

¹¹²Bentley, op. cit., pp. 87-93; J. Maritain, True Humanism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 26.

¹¹³Bentley, loc. cit.

on secular humanism.¹¹⁴ Another of these men was Charles Darwin, who combined Hegel's system with biology and developed a theory of biological evolution which became one of the principal philosophical bases for modern thought.¹¹⁵ Karl Marx interpreted Hegel economically to provide the basis for atheistic communism,¹¹⁶ and F. Nietzsche adopted Hegel's views of the "cosmic process," announcing that "God is dead" and man is alone to create of himself a superman through blood and iron and through the processes of nature, "red in tooth and claw."¹¹⁷

Effect of this Change on the View of Human Dignity.

As much as this new view praised and trusted man, it proved, however, not to be an adjunct to his dignity, but rather to lead to a process of decadence and disintegration.¹¹⁸ Hegel's system does not gain for each man his highest fulfillment of self-realization, for the totality of its scheme denies individual independence, defines away personal freedom, and sweeps man away to "impersonal oblivion in the depths of

¹¹⁴Nichols, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

¹¹⁵S. Cave, The Christian Estimate of Man (London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, Ltd. 1949), p. 182; Hulme, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

¹¹⁶Jones, W. T., or, et al. . A History of Western Philosophy, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1952), p. 916.

¹¹⁷L. H. Hough, Dignity of Man (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950), pp. 123-124.

¹¹⁸Hough, op. cit., (Dignity of Man), p. 97.

the stream,"¹¹⁹ while,

in the meantime truth became but the verification of relative and temporal values. An ice cake had value if it could hold up the swimmer or offer him a fairly comfortable seat. But why should the swimmer care to be held up anyway, since he is bound to sink presently?¹²⁰

Marx' system partakes of the same essence which Hegel's system possesses. There is no real God, and man is reduced to the totally material and natural. In such a system there is no true comradeship nor social interest, only impersonal formulae and relativistic standards.¹²¹ The society becomes a "Brave New World" in which "good" becomes relative to the state or party and a man is considered to be expendable if the state may be slightly bettered by his absence. Life is controlled birth, controlled mentality, and a controlled caste system¹²² in which man, like a medieval monk, gives up his private life in order to sacrifice his energy to the glory of the state or corporation or cause.¹²³ And if it is not a Russian Communist brand of totalitarianism, it could be any other Big Business or Big Government in which the

¹¹⁹Mercier, op. cit., pp. 50-54; Bertrand Russell asks the same question, but has no better answer. See Maritain, op. cit., p. 53.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Hough, op. cit., (Dignity of Man), pp. 123-124.

¹²²Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1932), passim.

¹²³Hartshorne, op. cit., p. 73; Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, Revisited (New York: Bantam Books, 1960), pp. 26-27.

small people try to find personal identification, but instead lose their personal identity through too much faith in "Man," and not enough faith in men.¹²⁴ These are T. S. Eliot's "J. Alfred Prufrocks."¹²⁵

Nietzsche's system is similar. He destroys both human dignity and humanity itself as well by seeking to create a super-humanity.¹²⁶ Nietzsche felt the force of the denial of the existence of God and the insistence on the materiality of man. Man to Nietzsche was cut off from cosmic surroundings with no sustenance from outside himself: thus,

Humanism ends in Nietzsche. . . Nietzsche, recognizing man's hopeless condition, advocates that man, as he now is, shall be annihilated. Man is either a laughing stock, or a sorrowful object of shame; we must do away with him. Nietzsche's teaching is not a gospel of heroism, it is on the contrary a most abject admission of defeat. Present man is good for nothing, let him be destroyed. Let us have in his place a Superman who shall be a law unto himself, a man wholly out of relation to his surroundings, except in the sense that he shall seek to dominate his surroundings.¹²⁷

With a combination of the Darwinian notion of the "Survival of the fittest" and a Hegelian notion of "cosmic

¹²⁴Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 66-67; Huxley, op. cit. (Brave New World, Revisited), p. 19, 22, 112.

¹²⁵From T. S. Eliot's poem, "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," in A College Book of Modern Verse, eds., J. K. Robinson and W. B. Rideout (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958), pp. 348-352. Prufrock is the world's classic futile man and a victim of the twentieth century.

¹²⁶J. A. C. F. Auer, Humanism States Its Case (Boston: Beacon Press, Inc., 1933), p. 124.

¹²⁷Ibid.

process," Nietzsche produced the philosophy that became one of the causes of the First World War,¹²⁸ and that would have attempted to create the race of supermen out of the Third Reich by "filling the spiritual void" that existed before Hitler's advent.¹²⁹ It may be observed that any view of human dignity is at a low ebb when the philosophy of a mighty government condones the extermination of millions of persons simply because they are of a different racial stock, as was the case of the Jews in Nazi Germany.

Finally, such also is the case with modern liberal theology. Based on scientism and the "assured results" of higher criticism,¹³⁰ modern Biblical studies sought to provide a human answer to religion out of the philosophical systems of post-Renaissance humanism.¹³¹ The end of the process has been a dilemma, however, much like that of the dilemmas that faced all those mentioned above who have followed secular humanism to its logical conclusions. Shall modern theologians continue

¹²⁸Cave, op. cit., p. 182.

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 206.

¹³⁰F. J. Rae, "How to Study the Bible," in Abingdon Bible Commentary, eds., F. C. Eiselen, et. al. (New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1929), p. 7, or others in the same work, e. g., E. W. Burch, "The Structure of the Synoptic Gospels," p. 867f., or R. W. Rogers, "Introduction to Isaiah," p. 638.

¹³¹Nichols, op. cit., pp. 171-172; Wm. Hordern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 91-92.

to believe in what they feel their criticism will not let them believe,¹³² or shall they accept their own conclusions and jettison the whole fabric of traditional religion and adopt a purely anthropocentric, humanistic view? The neo-orthodox thinkers attempt the former; the "religious humanists" accept the latter.¹³³

But this general admission of man's forlornness has certain definite effects on the modern view of human dignity. A similar process of change from theistic to secular emphasis in literature and art is observable in both Europe and America.¹³⁴ It has produced a twentieth century with an art of decadence, confusion, and dismay which pursues a meaningless course through life which, to such an author as Theodore Dreiser, had become "too much a welter and play of inscrutable forces to permit. . . any significant comment."¹³⁵ It is the aesthetic plight of

¹³²Renan felt the dilemma and gave up his belief. [cf. Mercier, op. cit., pp. 13, 19, 22, 47, 48.] Neo-Orthodoxy adopts the philosophy of existentialism as a way of escape, but without an historical foundation for religion, it cannot avoid the conclusion of "anguish, forlornness, and despair," and that "in the end, feeling is what counts." Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism, trans., B. Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), pp. 19, 21, 31; C. W. Reese, Humanism (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1926), p. 29.

¹³³Hordern, loc. cit.

¹³⁴L. Morain, Humanism as the Next Step (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), pp. 105-106; Bentley, op. cit., p. 108; Mercier, op. cit., p. 85f.

¹³⁵Robert Shafer, "An American Tragedy," in Humanism and America, ed., N. Foerster (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1930), p. 160.

the "Brave New World" wherein the chief delights are hyper-mechanized sports, "feelies," escapes into the blue by way of the sedationary panacea "soma," and little jingles of "orgy-porgy, pudding and pie."¹³⁶ In such a society, consciousness of the immutable elements of existence is taken away and the very sources of emotion are dried up. Great literature becomes impossible.¹³⁷ In such a man-centred view, rationalism without God and materialistic naturalism as the source of man become the pervading ideas, and this means the end of human dignity--the tragedy of man.¹³⁸

But the result is much more ultimate than art or economics, for it involves the denial of all standards, whether pertaining to God's existence, absolutes, or man's dignity. As Dostoevsky says, it involves more than socialism or the labour question. It is a question of atheism, "the question of the tower of Babel built without God, not to mount to Heaven from earth, but to set up Heaven on earth."¹³⁹ But there can be no heaven on earth if God be dead, for in denying God, all absolutes are denied; in denying absolutes, standards are denied; and in denying standards, ethical and moral conduct on both the personal

¹³⁶Huxley, op. cit. (Brave New World), passim.

¹³⁷Mercier, op. cit., p. 205.

¹³⁸Meritain, op. cit., p. 16f.

¹³⁹Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazev, trans., Constance Garnett (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 26.

and international levels is destroyed. With all traditional bounds destroyed, man surrenders to the moment and fails to transcend the pettiness of the evil of each day.¹⁴⁰ The outcome is that

Man bows to the technical law of a machine-universe and becomes the servant of mechanism, and thus dehumanizes himself. If things continue these lines the world it seems, in the words of Aristotle, will become habitable only by beasts or gods.¹⁴¹

Secular humanism denies the existence of God in the traditional sense and thus cuts itself off from the one thing which has traditionally given man his source of human dignity. Such a rootless, "cut-flower civilization" cannot last, for flowers fade.¹⁴²

Neo-humanism has thrust God far away, calling Him a "purblind doer," and a "Vast Imbecility, Mighty to build and blend, But impotent to tend,"¹⁴³ and thus rejected the only solid ground for human dignity, as theistic humanism pointed out. Contemporary man is thus left with the choice

¹⁴⁰Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 65-66, 80-81; Auer, op. cit., pp. 25-26; T. S. Elliot, "Religion without Humanism," Foerster op. cit., p. 107; G. K. Chesterton, "Is Humanism Religion?" Hockman, 69 (May, 1929), 236.

¹⁴¹Maritain, op. cit., p. 22f.

¹⁴²G. Harkness, The Modern Rival of Christian Faith (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952), pp. 84-85.

¹⁴³Thomas Hardy, "Hap," and "Nature's Questioning," in Robinson and Rideout, op. cit., pp. 3, 6.

of affirming his "new and terrible freedom" and kill himself to prove his liberty, subordinating his own existence to his own absolute independence,¹⁴⁴ or he may passively resign himself to the long wait as "the trampling march of unconscious power," "the slow, sure doom" which falls "on him and all his race. . . pitiless and dark"¹⁴⁵ descends upon him to bring the empty, eternal night. Neither of the horns of this dilemma provides man with sufficient grounds for a bouyant hope that will grace him with human dignity in the sense that theistic humanism believed. It may therefore be concluded that secular humanism holds a far lesser view of human dignity than does theistic humanism.

Religious Humanism¹⁴⁶ and Human Dignity. Religious Humanism is the "organized expression" of the general views of secular humanism as expressed in the preceding pages. It is the outcome of the aforementioned naturalism and materialism, a reduced form of Auguste Comte's "religion of humanity," the American secular philosophy of scientism and "know-how," and "Gospel of Wealth" idea that arose following the War of the

¹⁴⁴Maritain, op. cit., p. 53.

¹⁴⁵D. C. Mackintosh, "Contemporary Humanism," in Humanism: Another Battle Line, ed., W. P. King (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), p. 61.

¹⁴⁶The reader will be reminded that "religious" as used in this term is not to be understood in the traditional sense of that word, nor is the "humanism" of the sort of traditional humanism.

Rebellion during the last half of the optimistic and "progressive" nineteenth century.¹⁴⁷ It was also influenced by the tradition of religious liberalism, as demonstrated in the previous section. Other religious influences were the tradition of Emersonian Transcendentalism,¹⁴⁸ American Methodism with its strong Arminian prejudice towards the possibility of man's self-improvement and self-perfection,¹⁴⁹ and the quite liberal Unitarian-Universalist church which has always maintained its right to disagree with "orthodox" American religion and of which many ministers and members now openly avow themselves to be religious humanists.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷W. H. Werkmeister, Philosophical Ideas in America (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1949), p. 576.

¹⁴⁸Emerson's essay Self-reliance is perhaps the most significant single statement of American self-confidence and the Transcendental spirit. [cf. Leon Edel, et. al., Masters of American Literature (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 237f.]

¹⁴⁹Auer, op. cit., pp. 23, 96.

¹⁵⁰Stow Persons, Free Religion, An American Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947). To provide a frame of reference for discussion, the following chronological table outlines the progress of this organized religious humanism:

1927 professors and students at the University of Chicago began the publication of The New Humanist

1929 humanist club organized in Bangalore, India; Colonel Raja Jai Prithvi Bahadur Singh of Nepal first president, Rabindranath Tagore was a member of this indigenous Indian club

1933 the Humanist Manifesto published; preparation for this document had been a long time planning; before World War I, Unitarian and Universalist churches had been calling themselves "humanist," as well as had certain Ethical Culture Societies; backed philosophically by

Humanist Corless Lamont says that the general purpose of organized Religious Humanism is:

To assert the supreme importance of the ethical factor in all relations of life--personal, social, national and international--apart from any theological or metaphysical considerations. They are dedicated to . . . deed, not creed.¹⁵¹

Since the entire outlook of this philosophico-religious movement is centred solely in man, their views are important for a study such as this. The basic notions of religious humanism are expressed philosophically by John Dewey in his small book, A Common Faith, and practically in an anthology of humanism, The Humanist Frame, edited by Julian Huxley.

John Dewey and William James, and such "religious" leaders as C. W. Reese, M. M. Mangasarian, John Dietrich, E. H. Wilson, C. F. Potter, Percival Chubb, J. H. Mund, George O'Dell, Max Otto, Roy Wood Sellars, and O. L. Reiser (see "Appendix")

1934 the "New Humanist" group became officially the New Humanist Associates and organized the Humanist Press Association, expecting to pattern it on the order of the Rationalist Press Association of England; the name was finally changed to the American Humanist Association; it still operates under this name with headquarters in Yellow Springs, Ohio, with Vashti McCollum as president and E. H. Wilson as executive secretary at the time of this writing; functions include naming a "humanist of the year," starting study groups, and publishing such periodicals as The Free Mind and The Humanist as well as numerous books and tracts.

1952 First International Congress on Humanism and Ethical Culture held in Amsterdam; Julian Huxley, the brightest light in contemporary religious humanism, was chief speaker and called for the establishment of a humanist religion; the International Humanist and Ethical Union emerged from the meeting; the statement of the meeting resembles the 1933 Manifesto, but is not so complete. cf. Morain, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

¹⁵¹Lamont, op. cit., p. 20.

Dewey expresses a view of the "optimum in human life" that is understood as totally materialistic and defines "religion" as a quality possessed by all great persons and movements throughout history and innate in every moment of optimum living. Religion itself has evolved through a sort of Hegelian method, discarding its out-of-date manifestations as time demanded, but always seeking to express those elements common to all human interest. Those religious qualities once expressed in creedal or liturgical forms are now expressed in science. Dewey's definition of the faith of this religion is then "the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices."¹⁵² This "religious" faith is based on man, not God, since "dependence on an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor."¹⁵³ This faith is centred then in "the possibilities of continued and rigorous Inquiry. . . through directed cooperative human endeavor" and is thus more "religious in quality than is any faith in a complete revelation."¹⁵⁴ From the combination of this concept of faith and of religion, the term "religious humanism" is therefore coined to express a concept not to be understood in any traditional meaning of either word.

¹⁵²Dewey, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

¹⁵³ibid., p. 46.

¹⁵⁴ibid., p. 26f.

Religious humanism would not destroy the churches, says Dewey, but would rather offer the means of a recovery of vitality.

The fund of human values that are prized and that need to be cherished, values that are satisfied and rectified by all human concerns and arrangements, could be celebrated and reinforced, in different ways and with differing symbols, by the churches. In that way the churches would indeed become catholic. . . the surrender of claims to an exclusive and authoritative position is a sine qua non for doing away with the dilemma in which churches now find themselves in respect to their sphere of social action.¹⁵⁵

On such a pragmatic and experimental basis, Dewey would organize and establish "all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant."¹⁵⁶

It may be observed that these views seem to imply a high view of human dignity; however, it is evident that this human dignity is not predicated on the same beliefs that undergirded theistic humanism. Therefore, whatever merit there may be in the criticism of the departure from the foundations of classical humanism in the preceding section, the same will apply to Dewey's views in that they are a summary statement of materialistic naturalism.

Twenty-seven years after Dewey, Julian Huxley presented an anthology containing the practical views of several religious

¹⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 82-83. ¹⁵⁶Ibid., p. 87.

humanists who have more or less adopted Dewey's principles.¹⁵⁷ Huxley feels the disintegration of modern times to be the result of many wars and pestilences and a "purely materialistic outlook which cannot provide an adequate basis for human life." However, he offers an even more secular humanism as the antidote to this difficulty.¹⁵⁸ There are two main positive tenets of Huxley's religion of humanism: scientism¹⁵⁹ and evolution.¹⁶⁰

As for the other tenets of religious humanism, Huxley lists seven more: One is that "religion can be usefully regarded as applied spiritual ecology" finding man's true relations to the universe, external nature, man's own individual self, other men, and the community. Another proposed is the need for a re-semanticizing of traditional religious terminology (God, soul, salvation, etc.) so that, he continues, man can begin to understand anew his relation to the "divine law," and throw off any feelings of guilt,

not by destroying the inner authority of conscience, but to help the growing individual to escape from the shackles of an imposed authority-system into the supporting arms of one freely and consciously built up. And this will involve a thorough reformulation of the ethical aspects of religion.¹⁶¹

Another tenet is a re-examination of the religious experience to see if it is valuable; another is a study of man's potential spiritual resources; and a final tenet proposes a unitary view

¹⁵⁷ Julian Huxley, (ed.), The Humanist Frame (New York: Harper and Company, 1961), pp. 26, 47-48.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 13-14. ¹⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 36, 40f., 42f.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 18-19. ¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 42f.

of man, the universe, and everything based upon a unitary, monistic metaphysics in which man is an integrated and harmonious part of the pattern and must be kept in the "right direction of the whole process."¹⁶²

Huxley then lists twelve principal objections to traditional religion and Christianity in particular. His tenets of religious humanism and these objections parallel the sentiment of the Manifesto (see "Appendix") to a large extent. These objections deal mainly with the ordinary rationalistic and "enlightened" reactions to organized religion. Some of them demonstrate an obvious misunderstanding of New Testament principles; other appear to be valid criticisms of the extremes to which religion without a home-base of Gospel-content can go.¹⁶³ The thought that underlies most of the objections, for the purposes of this study, is that human dignity is in a real way lessened if man be considered to be dependent on any God-type force outside of man. Huxley wants all existence to be seen as a material unity with man and his intellect as the highest blossom on the tree. Since there is no higher, man is thus to rely on himself and not to become a beggar at the court of some non-existent deity.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶²Ibid.

¹⁶³Dakin, op. cit., pp. 41-42, 60-72, 190-191, 226.

¹⁶⁴Huxley, op. cit. (The Humanist Frame), pp. 39-40.

The majority of other religious humanists would agree with Huxley. The beliefs of this way of thinking with reference to human dignity may be briefly summarized as follows:

A doctrine of naturalistic evolution replaces the notion of theistic creation and the ideal of man's perfected totality replaces belief in God.¹⁶⁵

Human dignity is insulted by the impracticability of having to believe in such an authoritarian and undemocratic God as the God of Christianity.¹⁶⁶

Secular humanism rejects the traditional doctrine of special providence from God on the grounds that such a belief reduces man to passivity, denies his ability to make the best of the world, is inconsistent with a naturalistic view of the universe, and is philosophically untenable as well as empirically undemonstrable.¹⁶⁷

Religion in general is to be discarded in that it presents to man a false hope, is based on myth that is no longer

¹⁶⁵Auer, op. cit., p. 7; Lamont, op. cit., pp. 18, 103; Conference Symposium, op. cit., p. 619; H. J. Muller, "The Human Future," in Huxley, op. cit., p. 402; Mackintosh, in King, op. cit., p. 46f.

¹⁶⁶Hartshorne, op. cit., p. 42; Dakin, op. cit., p. 153.

¹⁶⁷Reese, op. cit., pp. 24, 31-33; Morain, op. cit., pp. 29, 53; Lamont, op. cit., p. 14; Sir Russell Brain, "Body, Brain, Mind and Soul," Huxley, op. cit., p. 51; Robert Platt, "The New Medicine and its Responsibilities," Huxley, ibid., p. 269; Auer, op. cit., p. 69; Bronowski, "Science is Human," Huxley, ibid., p. 87.

useful to modern man, and comes under the criticism of Sigmund Freud in being simply the projection upon the universe of human desires, the seeking of a great "father image" in which to trust rather than relying on man's abilities.¹⁶⁸

Science, more befitting of modern man, shall replace religion in the traditional sense. Old religion is considered as being un-humanistic and un-progressive; a new understanding of "religion" in John Dewey's sense is needed.¹⁶⁹

Christianity, based on self-interest (and often un-enlightened, at that), is unheroic. Humanism is based on altruism of the truest sort. Christianity's self-interest has produced its legalism, for by this it hopes to gain the control of men's mind and thus its own selfish ends.¹⁷⁰

To secular humanism, this legal aspect of Christianity only bespeaks its general authoritarian attitude, which it

¹⁶⁸Auer, op. cit., pp. 7, 94.

¹⁶⁹H. N. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy (New York: American Book Company, 1959), p. 216; Reese, op. cit., pp. 15-19; O. L. Reiser and B. Davies, "Religion and Science in Conflict: Postulates of a Scientific-religious Humanism," Annals of the American Academy, 256 (March, 1948), 137; Morris Ginsberg, "The Humanist View of Progress," Huxley, op. cit. (The Humanist Frame), p. 125; Morain, op. cit., p. 59. Such traditional religious terms as "original sin," "Total hereditary depravity," and "human nature" (which prevents man's self perfectability) are particularly distasteful to secular humanists.

¹⁷⁰Lamont, op. cit., pp. 12, 202-205; Barbara Wootton, "Humanism and Social Pathology," Huxley, op. cit. (The Humanist Frame), p. 348; Reese, op. cit., p. 42; Morain, op. cit., p. 96; Francis Williams, "The Democratic Challenge," Huxley, ibid., p. 101.

derives from its authoritarian God. This, secular humanism absolutely rejects. Authoritarian ethics are not to be considered ethics at all, but duty, and unbecoming of altruistic and free man. Morals in order to have moral content must be voluntary, not coerced.¹⁷¹

In the matter of anthropology, since man is an evolved species, a higher form of the natural existence, he is not considered to have a soul or any innate principle that sharply distinguishes him from the rest of nature; he is rather to be considered an expression of nature and in the great continuity of cosmic evolution. Man is possessed of a completely free will, except for certain obvious conditioning by heredity and environment.¹⁷²

Since there is no soul and no eternal, immortal part of man, secular humanism does not believe in any conscious after-life. "Heaven" is here, if man will make it so. Life is worthy to be lived for itself alone, without the idea

¹⁷¹Morain, op. cit., pp. 32, 46, 48, 51; D. J. Bronstein, Y. H. Krikorian, and P. P. Wiener, eds., Basic Problems of Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 537; Reese, op. cit., pp. 29, 34-38, 49-52; R. F. Davidson, Philosophies Men Live By (New York: The Dryden Press, 1952), p. 172, quoting Walter Lippmann; Auer, op. cit., pp. 74-77; Wootton, in Huxley, op. cit., p. 349.

¹⁷²Auer, op. cit., p. 7; Owen, op. cit., pp. 82f., 98-100; Morain, op. cit., p. 24; Lamont, op. cit., pp. 67-81; C. H. Waddington, "The Human Animal," Huxley, op. cit. (The Humanist Frame), pp. 78-79; Aldous Huxley, "Human Potentialities," Huxley, idid., p. 417; Werkmeister, op. cit., p. 583.

of future rewards or punishments to give it meaning and without any other authentication or absolute than life itself.

~~Life is its own centre of interest, its own orientation.~~

Progress of some sort is inevitable and will manifest itself in many forms; in government, for example, progress will be enjoyed through continued socialization of governments and the abolition of nationalism. Secular humanism believes in a socialistic One World.¹⁷³

No further comment concerning the effect of these summarized views of secular humanism on the matter of human dignity will be made at this point. There will be a certain criticism of the secular outlook given in the following section as the theistic humanists of the modern period are discussed.

The Theistic Humanist Tradition Maintained. Irving Babbitt, while not a member of a Christian church, was probably the most influential of literary humanists in the theistic humanist tradition of the first half of the twentieth

¹⁷³Dakin, op. cit., pp. 130-131, 174-176; Ginsberg, in Huxley, op. cit., pp. 113-114, 121, 125; Williams, in Huxley, op. cit., p. 101; Lamont, op. cit., pp. 15, 90-96; 202-205; Auer, op. cit., pp. 77-78, 149-150; Morain, op. cit., pp. 4-15, 69, 75-76, 79; I. L. Holt, "Will Humanism Suffice?" in King, op. cit., p. 115; Reese, op. cit., p. 56; Cave, op. cit., p. 180; Stephen Spender, "Social Purpose and the Integrity of the Artist," Huxley, op. cit. (The Humanist Frame), p. 223; Harry Kalven, "Law, Science and Humanism," Huxley, ibid., p. 331; Muller, op. cit., Huxley, ibid., p. 405.

century and a person whose life and work may be considered as a credit to theism. His voice in philosophy and literary criticism was one of the few to oppose John Dewey's "experimentalism" and the general trend of secular humanism.¹⁷⁴

In his Rousseau and Romanticism, he discusses the philosophy of the release of undisciplined emotion to its inevitable and tragic outcome in life. He gives particular interest to the school of French authors known as the Decadents as exemplary of this modern trend.¹⁷⁵ It was Babbitt who first pointed to the inconsistencies of secular humanism and suggested that the term "humanism" should not be applied to the American school of which Dewey was a leader¹⁷⁶ (see "Definition of Terms").

He criticized what he called "humanitarianism" (secular humanism) for over-confidently placing in man the idealized power of bettering himself "naturally," without a "conversion" of any type. This motive of natural desire Babbitt called the prevailing spirit of Machiavelli, Nietzsche, and H. L. Mencken, and attributed it as being one of the major causes of world disorder. He felt that only through a process of strict discipline could man improve his lot; he

¹⁷⁴Mercier, op. cit., p. 110.

¹⁷⁵Hough, in King, op. cit., p. 34.

¹⁷⁶John Wright Buckham, "Humanitarianism and Personalism," King, op. cit., p. 81.

taught that this was the view of classical humanism.¹⁷⁷

Babbitt felt that the only way of overcoming this secular view of man was through an emphasis on the eternal nature of man's soul as opposed to the monistic materialism of the secular humanists.¹⁷⁸ In proving the presence of a spiritual element in man, Babbitt pointed to the characteristic acts of intellect that only man possesses: abstraction or the capacity to attain universal concepts, generalization, comparison, discrimination, judgment, and reasoning. These are the abilities that man, has but that animals do not, which enables him to point to the unum in pluribus of Plato; these are proofs of the spiritual element in man.¹⁷⁹ Similarly, Babbitt pointed to the need of religion to answer to a will in man that constantly aspires to the ultimate good, and is thereby superior to the "natural will."¹⁸⁰

Mercier summarizes Babbitt's contribution fully:

We have in us what the Middle Ages called the *libido sentiendi*, the *libido dominandi*, and the *libido sciendi*. Our whole natural self ever reaches beyond itself. We come here to the crux of the question. If our natural

¹⁷⁷I. Babbitt, "Experience as Dogma," Saturday Review of Literature, VII (November 1, 1936), 287.

¹⁷⁸He sought to prove his point through experience and philosophy only, thus being even more "experimental" than the secular humanists. cf. Mercier, op. cit., pp. 171-175; I. Babbitt, "An Essay at Definition," in Foerster, op. cit., pp. 39, 44.

¹⁷⁹Mercier, op. cit., pp. 80-130.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., p. 135.

self is thus even tending to disorder, are we not also inevitably aware, is it not an immediate datum of consciousness, that these tendencies to disorder of our natural self may be checked and that we can actually achieve order? But if, Babbitt concludes, there is in us the power to check our natural self, then that power must be supernatural and hence ultimately divine. Not only is the Law, the Will of God, above us, but the Will of God within us. We have not only a natural self, not only a lower will tending to disorder but a higher will which enables us to achieve order, and which, like the cognitive glimpses of the Law reached by the higher imagination, is felt as a check upon the tendencies to excess of our natural selves. . . . Since man is evidently not self-disciplined, since on the contrary natural man tends to excess in his every activity, there must be something in him to oppose and check the excesses of his natural self, else he could never reach a harmonious life in conformity with the Law. If to be a rational animal is the natural estate of man, since his rationality is not sufficient to insure his right conduct, there must be in him more than rationality, if he would rise superior to his own weaknesses. Man, therefore, as Babbitt conceives him, is not only a rational animal endowed with natural reason and will, but a rational animal in whom is felt also the presence of a higher will ultimately divine. Such is the complete formula of Babbitt's humanism.¹⁸¹

Babbitt denounced the romanticists and hedonists and all who consider the cultivation of the sensual appetites as the highest good; he denounced the utilitarians who make material progress the final end of man; he denounced the sentimentalists who credit man with more natural fraternal sympathy or benevolence than he has; he denounced the naturalists who through their "experimentalism" disparage the findings of the experiences of the past.¹⁸² With all this, he did yeoman

¹⁸¹ibid., pp. 77-78.

¹⁸²Conference Symposium, op. cit., p. 612.

service for the classical humanist cause and provided a springboard for his friend, Paul Elmer More, into Christianity.

Paul Elmer More agrees with Babbitt that the neo-humanism is "definitely not humanism."¹⁸³ He accepted Babbitt's conclusions on the matter of the soul and used these ideas as the basis for his progress to faith which is outlined in his multi-volume literary criticism, Shelburne Essays, and his final expression of faith, Christ of the New Testament.¹⁸⁴ He too criticized scientism¹⁸⁵ and modern materialism,¹⁸⁶ upholding the ideas of freedom and responsibility, which he did not feel could be upheld from a naturalistic basis.¹⁸⁷

Besides Babbitt, he was influenced by Buddha, by the tradition of metaphysical dualism in general, and particularly by Plato. It was his notion of the "World of Ideas" that gave More a pointer to Christianity, for it was in the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos that More found the realization of Plato's ideal world. More developed a system of "steps of revelation," specifically the revelation of the Logos. Revelation, for More, was a thing present in the Hebrew and the Greeks, but forcefully present in Christ.

¹⁸³R. M. Davies, The Humanism of Paul Elmer More (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), pp. 20-23.

¹⁸⁴Mercier, op. cit., p. 228. ¹⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 214, 218.

¹⁸⁶P. E. More, "The Humility of Common Sense," Foerster, op. cit., pp. 173-174.

¹⁸⁷Davies, op. cit., pp. 14-16.

In the historical figure of Jesus Christ, More saw God making Himself intelligible in human language. For in the Incarnation God combined the world of His "ideas" with the earthly existence of men. Greek thought had been a noble attempt at delving into the ideal secrets of God by the limited mind of man, but Christianity was the very climax of this tradition; for in it, God used material and flesh as vehicles of His revelation.¹⁸⁸ To More,

the nature of the Kingdom of Heaven revealed by Jesus of Nazareth, the Incarnate Word, is precisely the same as the Otherworld of Plato, evolved out of that great philosopher's insight into the human heart and conscience. . . . In the assumption of his humanity, Christ the Word gave significance to that humanity, which, all too frequently in religion, has been treated as degraded and depraved. While the life lived on the simple human level will not possess the rich rewards of the spirit, it is not in and of itself a degraded thing. We do not become participants with the Logos to escape the world but to create within that world a place of beauty for the truly human spirit.¹⁸⁹

This is More's formulation of what he called the "sacramental life." This term he used, not in the ordinary Roman theological sense of transubstantiation, but rather to mean that

Natural things by their attributes and qualities should convey hints and lessons of higher realities, and should be capable of transmutation into instruments suitable for the spiritual life. . . . Something like this, an alchemy that would transmute the leaden materials of life into

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-12; Mercier, *op. cit.*, pp. 214, 218.

¹⁸⁹ Davies, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-141, 190.

a finer element is meant by the sacramental faith of Christianity.¹⁹⁰

More felt that his "sacramental" view of life provided the absolutes¹⁹¹ and true happiness¹⁹² that secular humanism could not provide. His formulation was to him the basis for the individual affirmation of life and the individual appropriation of God's created, natural world to spiritual ends.¹⁹³ This gave his humanism its classical, theistic flavour and provided his source of criticism for secular, anthropocentric humanism. His "sacramental" view of life is not only the "apex of his religious philosophy," but also supplies the unity between religion and life, making the leaven part of the lump, opening all of life to the influences of Christianity, and denying no part of existence a use to man in his place of dignity under God.¹⁹⁴

One of the corollaries of More's sacramental view of life was his political conservatism which caused him to criticize the "sentimental socialism" with which the clergy of the 1930's seemed to be toying.¹⁹⁵ But for the political and

¹⁹⁰Ibid., p. 185f. ¹⁹¹Hartshorne, op. cit., p. 63.

¹⁹²Mercier, op. cit., pp. 195-199; Dakin, op. cit., pp. 271-285.

¹⁹³Mercier, op. cit., p. 222.

¹⁹⁴Davies, op. cit., p. 175f.

¹⁹⁵Dakin, op. cit., p. 343.

economic understanding of modern theistic humanism, one must come to the philosophies of F. R. Barry and Jacques Maritain.

F. R. Barry, the Bishop of Southwell, Notts, Great Britain, sets forth the place of the modern Church in the modern world in his Recovery of Man. As a cure for man's contemporary tragic plight, he suggests a re-birth of Christianity, but a Christianity that is born from classical humanistic soil.¹⁹⁶

Barry says that it is the business of the Church to be "on the frontier" advocating her ancient position of the Fatherhood of God and the dignity of man. By doing this, the Church will save the world from the "lies" that now lie in the bosom of the modern world.

The Church is in the world--not in the sacristy or in a vacuum--and it is in the world to redeem it. History is the element in which it lives. God's redemptive purpose through the Church can never be apprehended or obeyed in isolation from his "strange work" in those secular historical movements by which, at any given period, the Church's task and its mission are defined.¹⁹⁷

The "lies" of which he speaks have to do with the nature of man. The most pressing problem of the day is a theological one with a religious answer: "a choice between the God of the Bible at the centre of it [the answer to the problem] , or a secular or Humanistic [answer] with

¹⁹⁶F. R. Barry, Recovery of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), pp. vi-vii.

¹⁹⁷Ibid., pp. 4-5.

man, or change, or nothing at all, at the centre of it."¹⁹⁸ One "lie," a product of the same process of disintegration outlined in previous sections,¹⁹⁹ is that the post-Renaissance state claims to be the source of its own law and its own moral justification, a turn that ignores divine as well as individual authority.²⁰⁰ The other "lie" is in the soul of a scientific age that believes that man can find salvation by increasing control of his environment without reference to the will of his Creator. This produces self-aggrandizement, power divorced from moral and ethical direction, and false aims which end in "contradiction and despair."²⁰¹ Both of these "lies" tend to the diminution of the personal; Humanism and Christianity are both built and thrive on the exaltation of the personal; these "lies" thus destroy not only faith in God but also in man--both Christianity and Humanism.²⁰²

Barry suggests that one way to recover faith in God is by recovering faith in man. The Church must recover Humanism for the West.²⁰³

If Christians are to be in the world like salt which preserves civilization from going bad, this surely applies to aesthetic and intellectual no less than to moral and religious values. If we want to stand out against triviality and to raise the standards of appreciation there must be a new, vital interpretation of beauty and

¹⁹⁸Ibid., p. 6.

²⁰⁰Ibid., p. 11.

²⁰²Ibid., pp. 78-79.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²⁰¹Ibid., pp. 40-45.

²⁰³Ibid., pp. 18-24.

dignity in Christian worship. . . the study of classical literature, permeated with the quality of Humanitas, was a true preparation for the Gospel. People who have never taken time, or have never been trained, to reflect on the splendour and tragedy of man or the mystery of human life and death, have never seriously asked the great questions to which Christianity offers them the answer. . . People who wish to predispose their minds towards understanding a religious world-view may well be advised to initiate themselves by pondering over the Shakespearian tragedies, which could have grown only out of Christian soil. . . The time has come when it must be recognized that we cannot teach politics or art or history or science or literature or anything else, if we have theology out of the reckoning. Theology is, and must be again admitted to be, the synthesis of education.²⁰⁴

He continues by suggesting that the Church should have "baptized" the new learning of the sixteenth century, the new biology of the seventeenth, and the new physics of the twentieth instead of leaving the halls of learning to the infidels. The Church's "otherworldliness," its refusal to take its rightful place as the saviour of the world now as well as in the next life, has caused the disintegration that now causes many to lose their present faith as well as their soul in the after-life. The Church should take her place, says Barry, as spokesman for God on all matters that touch man, for man is her interest and anything that interests man interests her. No truth, no art, no politics, no philosophy, nothing is beyond the pale of religion, of Christianity, for Jesus Christ is the summation of all truth. All truth is God's truth; His children should be teachers of it.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ibid., pp. 33-35.

²⁰⁵ibid., pp. 56-57.

In politics as well, says Barry, the Church must make up her mind on the issues and take her stand, for

The "sacredness of human personality," the respect for human dignities and decencies, which lie at the base of a Christian civilization, depend on nothing innate in man, nor upon any concession by the State, but upon a divine endowment and prerogative which no earthly power gave nor can take away.²⁰⁶

As the Church is often not particularly armed for political action, she must find her avenues of influence through other organizations that exist for those purposes in particular. Humanism alone trying to create a better world will break down, thinks Barry; but, where the theological partner is there to give support, such organizations as world peace clubs, national political clubs, state law clubs, and down-town men's clubs-- to say nothing of the myriad benevolent, medical, and charitable institutions--all become effective. The Church must influence, support and work through these organizations in an organized world in order to accomplish her ancient task.²⁰⁷

This process will not be one that will "dirty" the Church or reduce her to the level of the organizations through which she works any more than she is reduced to the level of the lives of the sinners which she comprises, Barry affirms. Instead, he continues, the Church must again produce aristocracy of divine, royal children, an aristocracy based on excellence, culture, creativity, and devotion. These children must affirm

²⁰⁶ ibid., p. 64.

²⁰⁷ ibid., pp. 40-51.

that the world is theirs as the creation of their heavenly Father and by right of conquest by their heavenly Brother.²⁰⁸ Barry replies to the criticism of Christians that they do not accept their share of responsibility for the betterment of the world to say that

the survival of freedom depends in the long run on there being enough men and women who will say, "We must obey God rather than men." Or why not, rather than the State? . . . The Church's power to transform this present order depends upon those other-worldly loyalties from which it draws its conviction and vitality. It is a fact that the most dynamic influences towards political and social changes have come from the most "otherworldly" people. It is a paradox of Christianity that many of those who have been most keenly aware that here on earth we are "sojourners and pilgrims" have been supremely the makers of history.²⁰⁹

Jacques Maritain also expresses a belief that men have a right to the optimum in human life, but he explains how he proposes this to be achieved. He begins his discussion of "true" or "integral" humanism by pointing out the same process of disintegration that has been noted by many such commentators.

As do the other evaluators of the twentieth century, Maritain points to the elements of post-Renaissance secular humanism which have caused the contemporary "tragedy of man." He lists, among other causes, the "purest pessimism" of the Reformers in their low view of man,²¹⁰ the "natural goodness"

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 33.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 88-95.

²¹⁰ Maritain, op. cit., pp. 1-9.

theology of Rousseau, the worship of deified mankind of Comte, the the godlike system of Hegel,²¹¹ He summarizes the contemporary "war against God" in the "evils of the totalitarianism" of communism itself," in which "the real man, the human person, is sacrificed to a devouring idol of the greatness of man."²¹² Any totalism, says Maritain, whether it be a Stalinist-Marxist exploitation of man or a caesaro-papism, is "equally an insult to human personality and to God."²¹³

Maritain does not only criticize secular humanism, however. He suggests as solution a "humanism of the Incarnation," "the taking up of the cross of redemptive suffering into the very heart of our existence."²¹⁴ This system he calls "integral humanism" because it is based on the principle established by the Incarnation that the spirit of God can dwell in uncorrupted flesh to save the world. Maritain would have the spirit of God that dwells in the flesh of the Church to continue this action of the Incarnation.

This "humanism of the Incarnation" would care for the masses, for their rights to a temporal condition worthy of man and to spiritual life, and for the movement which carries labor toward the social responsibility of its coming age. It would tend to substitute for materialistic-

²¹¹ibid., pp. 13, 14.

²¹²J. Maritain, "Theocentric Humanism," in Philosophy for a Time of Crises, ed., A. Koch (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 203; Maritain, op. cit. (True Humanism), pp. 77-78.

²¹³ibid., pp. 71-74.

²¹⁴ibid., p. 65.

individualistic civilization, and for an economic system based on the fecundity of money, not a collectivistic economy, but a "Christian-personalist" democracy.²¹⁵

In other words, Maritain is saying that what the world needs is New Testament Christianity brought into the reality of everyday life, brought to bear on the needs of political, social, and aesthetic living, and freed from the inactivity of creeds and theological strictures. Integral humanism would change the bourgeois man through a process of Christian conversion;²¹⁶ it would emphasize freedom and liberty;²¹⁷ it would be democratic, "a veritable socio-temporal realisation of the Gospels."²¹⁸

For Maritain, this is simply the Christianization of the world, the making of spiritual, theological Christianity into a social, realized Christianity. If this is to be, he thinks that it must be the work of Christian heroes who launch out from cloistered lives or theological towers and descend into the world of secular culture and labour in social and political affairs with a view to salting, lighting, and leavening the temporal order of mankind. It is called "integral" in that it refers to the Incarnation and the efficacious combination of flesh and spirit; it is called

²¹⁵Maritain, in Koch, op. cit., p. 203.

²¹⁶Maritain, op. cit. (True Humanism), p. 86.

²¹⁷Ibid., pp. 67-68.

²¹⁸Maritain, in Koch, op. cit., p. 205.

"humanism" because it recognizes the important part that man plays.²¹⁹

What is then described is a sort of christian diaspora, a Christendom not grouped and united in the body of a homo-geneous civilisation, but spread over the whole surface of the globe like a network of centres of Christian life disseminated among the nations. . . a full and temporal christian flowering. . . Man will remain what in himself he is, but under a temporal regime, a new historic heaven, destined also to come to an end, for all the things of time wear out in time; and it is only under that regime that there will begin the flowering-time of integral humanism, of that humanism of the Incarnation which has been in consideration in the preceding chapters, and which carries the sign of no theocracy other than the gentle dominion of God's love.²²⁰

Maritain discusses an important practical problem with his Christian world order: how it shall all work. He faces the problem of reconstituting the Middle Ages in which the Church ruled everything to such an extent that the Renaissance-Reformation rebelled for the sake of Humanism. This new "middle age" will not be a theocracy, however, but will be a secular state in which Christian influence is felt. Once again, Christ's kingdom is not of this world, but Christians who are ruled spiritually from another country are to affect their City of the Earth and govern it according to the rules from above.²²¹

²¹⁹Maritain, op. cit. (True Humanism), p. 112f.

²²⁰Ibid., pp. 238-239, 249-250.

²²¹Ibid., pp. 264-265.

He discusses the method of this action from three stand-
points: First, there is the plane of action of the Christian
acting as a member of the Mystical Body of Christ, the Church
as such. This is the plane of worship and the liturgical life
in which the Church acts as the Church in reference to her own
particular matters. The opposite of this plane is the plane
of the world in which the Christian acts as a citizen of an
earthly city. In this second plane are the Christian's trade,
his art, his daily living which he lives as a Christian, but
not as a Christian as such. The third and intermediate plane,
the plane on which the duality of the earthly city and the
heavenly city is synthesized, is the plane on which the spiritual
is inflected into the temporal. On this plane, "the Christian
acts and appears before men as a Christian as such and to this
extent commits the Church."²²²

This final plane is the plane of optimum human life,
where, as in the incarnation, flesh and spirit meet to create
a totally sanctifying experience. Actually, the two planes
of which the third is derived are not separate; they are
simply different. The essence of the two is the same, for
all that is done is done to the glory of the Lord Jesus. There
is, however, an expedient difference that is perceptible simply
through common sense. However, in the third plane, all the
second (secular plane that is expediently practicable comes

²²²Ibid., p. 288f.

under the rule of the first (spiritual) plane, and there is nothing in the first plane that cannot pertain to the second plane as the former sanctifies everything man does on the latter in the third plane through the balance of the optimum human life.²²³

Summary. The discussion of the last half of this chapter has shown that there has been a change in philosophic thinking on the matter of human dignity from the traditional theistic, classical view to a view of secular neo-humanism. Since there is now more than one form of humanism, it is no longer proper to speak of unmodified humanism.

The change from theistic to secular humanism has been demonstrated to be one of the major causes for the twentieth-century feeling of general disintegration and despair. The effects of neo-humanism on society have been several; but, as noted earlier, some suggest that the new brand of anthropocentric humanism has been the direct cause of world wars

²²³ibid., p. 292f. Maritain illustrates his ideas of the inter-relation of the planes by suggesting the effect on a Christian's views on foreign affairs or wheat policy. His views he holds as a Christian, but not as a Christian as such, and to this extent he does not commit the Church. But should some matter of feeding a starving foreign country become involved, the Christian would regulate his views (of the second, secular plane) according to "pure" Christian teaching (of the first, spiritual plane) and create a third plane of applied, incarnated Christianity. In this, the Christian implies and commits the Church and acts as a Christian as such involved in the affairs of the earthly city that bear directly on what shall be the Christian's state in the future heavenly city. Both cities, however, are a "City of God."

(see pp. 42-49). By the same tokens, it has also been shown (pp. 42-49) as destructive of the traditional standards in art, literature, philosophy, politics, and religion.

This change has also affected the humanist view of the dignity of man by changing the emphasis of man as a dignified individual under God to man attempting to maintain his dignity on his own. Secular humanism affirms that it believes in free will and human dignity, but at the same time, it affirms belief in the total natural materiality of man and creates totalitarian systems such as German Nazism and Russian Communism in which individuality is destroyed.

This philosophical feeling has taken an organized form, particularly in America, called "religious humanism." The beliefs of this group, all far-left liberal religionists, as summarized in the Humanist Manifesto of 1933 (see "Appendix"), include a denial of the existence of a personal God in heaven or a soul in man, a denial of the efficacy of traditional religion, and a denial of Christianity in general. Secular humanists affirm that traditional religious words should be re-defined, that "religion" itself should be conceived of as the eternal striving ahead of man toward his idealized full potentiality, and that a "humanist religion" should be founded on these principles. They believe that human dignity may be maintained only as man stands alone to himself without any "outside" help. They resent the doctrines of Christianity as an insult to self-sufficient human dignity. They seek to create

a religious humanist heaven on earth, an act which they feel they can accomplish as the inevitable result of social evolution assisted by scientism.

Against this secular humanism, certain philosophers (such as Ebbitt, More, Barry, and Maritain) have maintained the traditional, classical humanist views of human dignity. These have continued to assert that man does have a soul, that he does find his human dignity in his orientation to God, and that this God-centredness gives him the spiritual power and right to create for himself the optimum human life on earth. This school of thinking has often taken the form of a type of Christian humanism with a particular emphasis on the doctrine of the Incarnation as particularly supporting the classical, theistic views of human dignity. These modern classical humanists affirm that a belief in the supernatural, and particularly in Christianity, gives man the necessary social, political, and aesthetic impetus he needs to improve his lot on earth as well as the moral and ethical absolutes he needs to maintain both sanity and civilization.

With these two major systems thus compared, the next chapter will discuss such agreement as may be found between these humanist views of human dignity and that of the New Testament.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NEW TESTAMENT VIEW OF HUMAN DIGNITY

The New Testament conception of human dignity may be set forth, for practical purposes, through a consideration of three principal doctrines which contain the main teachings of Christianity on the dignity of man as previously discussed. In the theological concept of grace one finds the ideas of free will and man's cooperative part in his own salvation. In the Incarnation, a central idea of the Christian religion, one finds a certain "sanctification" of man's natural human condition in that God Himself assumes humanity in order to effect His purposes for man. As has been noted, such humanists as Maritain and More are quick to point to this teaching as indicative of a high view of human dignity. A third doctrine of the Christian's relation to the world demonstrates the values and attainments possible to the Christian in this life. In it, the aspects of man's earthly rights as a son of God are shown as well as his methods of obtaining what is his by God-given right.

Grace. The New Testament often speaks of grace, but in no place does it give a lexical definition of the term. Perhaps in the fifth chapter of Romans the Apostle Paul comes closest to explaining grace as he contrasts the action done for man by God which culminated in Christ to the transgression,

sin, and death that came through Adam's activity. What Christ did for man is a complete gratuity and costs man nothing. He accepts it through a faith which the grace itself creates in him. Consequently, one may say that grace is everything that God has done for man including the gift of His Son to become the effective agent of human salvation.¹

Concerning the idea of grace, however, certain other Biblical teachings should here be explored. For example, faith spoken of in relation to grace is an act which man himself must perform toward God as he trustfully and confidently accepts God's plan and stipulations.² If a man would be justified by faith, he must exercise his free will in believing or not believing. If Augustine's epigram ("Give what Thou commandest and command what Thou wilt;" see page 14) could be understood to have meaning in this way, it would uphold free will, for God has given grace through the Gospel to induce belief and He has also given man free will so that he has the inherent capacity to believe.

The New Testament view of man's inherent free will is seen in such passages as Rev. 22: 17 where the Church and the Holy Spirit invite anyone who hears the sermon to come. The

¹Eph. 2: 8-10; Gal 2: 19-21; see T. H. L. Parker, "Grace," in Baker's Dictionary of Theology, eds., E. F. Harrison, et. al. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1960), pp. 257-258.

²Jn. 3: 16, 36; 6: 28-29; Rom. 1: 16-17; etc. and Moses E. Lard, Commentary on Romans (Cincinnati: Standard Publishing Company, 1875), pp. 44-45.

drawing power of salvation is the Gospel;³ the saving belief is generated through the message heard;⁴ the power to hear or not to hear, to believe or not to believe belongs to man as he is.⁵ God of course desires the salvation of all men,⁶ but "this does not mean that his will to save some men is stronger than his will to save others, or that there is duality in God's antecedent will."⁷ Grace is God's inducement to man to have faith, but faith is the free-will act of man in response to grace.⁸

Much of the notion that man might not be capable of acting on his own choice out of free will without outside help stems from the Augustinian-Calvinistic interpretation of Rom. 5: 12, as has been noted in the discussion of Augustine and Pelagius. The New Testament, and the Bible in general, however, elaborates no doctrine of inherited "original sin" or depraved nature of man that would so mar his nature as created in the beginning that would preclude his exercising

³Rom. 1: 16-17.

⁴Rom. 10: 17.

⁵Jn. 5: 40; Mt. 23: 37.

⁶1 Tim. 2: 4; 11 Pet. 3: 9.

⁷R. C. H. Lenski, Interpretation (of 1 Tim. 4: 10) (Columbus, Ohio: The Wartburg Press, 1946), p. 639.

⁸See R. Milligan, Scheme of Redemption (St. Louis: Christian Board of Publication, 1868), p. 450, for a discussion of the relation of grace, faith, and free will. Also see John Wesley, Free Grace, in Classics of Protestantism, ed., V. Ferm (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1960), pp. 166-179.

of free will.⁹ Indeed, as Erasmus pointed out (see pp. 36-37), the abundance of moral injunction and preaching in the Bible indicates, on the face of it, that the Biblical concept of man is that he can choose or not choose to respond to moral and religious urgings of a verbal nature. It is unreasonable to think of a just or loving God who would command a thing for man to do, knowing that he could not keep it, and then damn him for his inability. Coelestius said that "ought" implies "can" in the clear moral and religious injunctions of the Bible, and this indicates a view of human nature that includes free will. (see p. 21).¹⁰

The ability of man to find out and do good by use of his own powers is indicated in many passages of the Scriptures and thus supports Pelagius' assertion that even though men may not have done so, they do have the power to live up to the Law that they may find in nature or that they received at Sinai (see pp. 21-22). For example, Paul teaches that through several avenues, man has the power to find out God and please Him, but that, due to sin, man generally gives himself up to hating, rather than loving, God.¹¹ It is not

⁹The Bible rather teaches free will; see Eze. 18: 1-24; Mt. 19: 13-15.

¹⁰There are, of course, persons in the Reformed tradition who still hold to Augustinian-Calvinistic ideas that would entirely disagree with these notions; e. g. C. Hodge, Systematic Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1885), II, 3-306.

¹¹Rom. 11: 8-21; Acts 14: 15-17; 17: 27-29; see also Psa. 19: 1-4.

to be concluded, however, that simply because most men choose not to honour God as God that men cannot do so if they choose, for Paul also suggests that some--noble pagans who lived by faith, as well as certain Jews themselves--had lived up to a relative righteousness so that they were acceptable to God.¹² Similarly, the Psalms also present the theme of man as a creature of dignity, second only to God in importance in existence:

Thou hast made him little less than God
And dost crown him with glory and honor
Thou has given him dominion over the
Works of Thy hands;
Thou has put all things under his feet.¹³

And Job was a man who, in all that he did, he did not sin against God.¹⁴

The very quality of manhood is that man is different from the animals by being "in God's image."¹⁵ Since God is spirit,¹⁶ it must be that the resemblance between God and man

¹²Rom. 2: 13-16; 4: 1-12. Such statements as Job 22: 2-3 should be considered in context and it should be remembered that, contrary to Eliphaz and Calvin, a man is capable of willing and doing a good thing without prompting by any special power. Mt. 26: 6-13 is one example of such human-originated action. Even Campbell, however, disagrees and says that man cannot really please God in an "unregenerate" state. See A. Campbell, Christian System, (Pittsburg: Forrester and Campbell, 1840), pp. 27-29.

¹³Psa. 8: 5-6.

¹⁴Job 1: 22.

¹⁵Gen. 1: 26-27.

¹⁶Jn. 4: 24.

is a spiritual resemblance.¹⁷ However, if this spiritual resemblance be in any wise denied, man would be less than man, for he would no longer be in the image of God. And this is the emphasis of certain of the modern theistic humanists, particularly of Babbitt (see pp. 60-62).

It is evident from the reading of the Genesis account that Adam was created with freedom of choice--to eat or not to eat, that was the question. His sin was simply a matter of wrong choice; he ate the forbidden fruit.¹⁸ But there is no passage anywhere in the Scriptures that indicates that men after Adam receive a nature different from that one given to their progenitor. Though Adam did not maintain his estate, there is no word that indicates that his or his sons' nature was changed.¹⁹

Similar to the idea of free will and its relation to

¹⁷An old and a recent commentator concur in this idea; see Adam Clarke, Commentary (on Gen. 1: 27) (New York: Lane and Scott, 1851), I, 36; and G. A. Buttrick, et. al., (eds.), Interpreter's Bible (New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1952), p. 485.

¹⁸Gen. 2: 15-17; 3: 1-24.

¹⁹Some suggest Rom. 5: 12 as an indication of inherited sin or a changed nature, but Pelagius stoutly denied this (see p. 21). Campbell, however, admits of a changed nature [cf. Campbell, loc. cit.], as does, of course, Hodge. [cf. C. Hodge, Commentary on Romans (5: 12) (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1951), pp. 142-155.] However, in the list of reactions caused by the fall, there is no mention of a changed nature. Indeed, Adam suffers a different penalty from Eve, not a common perversion of human nature. Any change in their "God-like image" is, in a sense, for the better since they are rationally even more like God "knowing good and evil" (Gen. 3: 22).

grace is the positive teaching of the New Testament on the operation of the Holy Spirit upon the alien sinner in the matter of conversion. While the Holy Spirit of God is conceived of as a sanctifying member of the Godhead that prepares the soul for heaven, the Spirit's work on the alien is done through the Word of God which is the Spirit's implement.²⁰ This is an idea significantly explored by many of the Restoration thinkers in opposition to the Augustinian-Calvinistic notion of a prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit in "direct operation" on the heart and mind of the alien sinner to prepare him and allow him to will and do good things.

Restoration thinkers, basing their views on many New Testament passages,²¹ have insisted that "the Holy Spirit can exert no greater influence upon the human mind, than is found in the arguments which are written in the New Testament."²² Alexander Campbell, for example, (with the aid of Lockean philosophy) explained that all spiritual light, like moral power is contained in and transmitted through words. Where there are no words, there is no light. "If, then, the Spirit of God can communicate new light to any mind, it must be by

²⁰Eph. 6: 17.

²¹Rom. 1: 16-17; 10: 13-17; Ga. 3: 1-5; James 1: 18; 1 Pet. 1: 22; 2: 3.

²²A. Campbell, Christianity Restored (Rosemead, California: Old Paths Book Club, 1959), pp. 343-379.

new words, or new verbal communications."²³

The Restorationists' conclusion is thus that the Holy Spirit works on the mind of the unconverted sinner, but only through the Word of God.²⁴ This is in agreement with their exalted view of human nature and human ability as expressed by Campbell in such a statement as that "sense" is man's guide in nature, "faith in religion, reason in both."²⁵ This attitude places the responsibility of choosing to believe upon the hearers of the preached message. Theirs also is the responsibility to act in accord with what they have heard. In the New Testament, with the miraculous exception at the house of Cornelius recorded in Acts 10, the Holy Spirit comes to abide in the Christian heart as a gift only after grace has been experienced through faith, and not before, in some mysterious, prevenient sense.²⁶ Finally, this fact thus indicates an aspect of how grace comes to man, in the New Testament view. Since grace is free to man, but must be appropriated by him through free will in response of faith to the preached

²³ *Ibid*; see also Z. T. Sweeny, The Spirit and the Word (Cincinnati: Standard Publishing Company, 1919), pp. 99, 132; and D. Lipscomb, Salvation from Sin, ed., J. W. Shepherd (Nashville: McQuiddy Publishing Company, 1913), pp. 93-95.

²⁴ Campbell-Rice Debate (Lexington, Kentucky: A. T. Skillman and Son, 1844), pp. 613f., 616.

²⁵ Campbell, *op. cit.*, (Christian System), p. 3 (11, 1).

²⁶ Acts 2: 38; 5: 32; 19: 1-7; Gal. 4: 6.

word, there becomes apparent a certain "cooperative function" which man performs in accomplishing his own salvation. As grace gave man the freedom to choose right from wrong and as grace has given Christ to be the Saviour, so also grace gives man the opportunity and expects him to respond to God in trusting obedience and good works. In this way, man completes the work of justification begun for him by grace.

Does this justification take place without the co-operation of man? Has man nothing to do to deserve grace? . . . Does he remain purely passive under its operation? . . . Protestantism thus adopted a one-sided doctrine of grace, losing sight of the fact that in St. Paul the doctrine of "justification through grace" is balanced by the doctrine of "justification through faith". . . it is true that grace is the free gift of God; but, on the other hand, the justice of God requires that He grant grace to the individual man as he stands in need of it and recognizes his need. Here we may see the reconciliation of the two aspects of the doctrine of St. Paul. Man is shown to be active, instead of being wholly passive, in the process of justification. . . Thus man collaborates with God by calling for the application to his individual self the merits of Christ; and God, in his justice, grants him the grace which his faith has yearned for, a faith which Christ constantly asked men to have.²⁷

This cooperative aspect of grace is illustrated not only by such things as the preaching of rewards and punishments which stir men up to good works, James' teaching that "Faith without works is dead," and the idea of Law itself; but also such statements as "work out your own salvation with

²⁷L. J. A. Mercier, The Challenge of Humanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 236-239.

fear and trembling,"²⁸ and "save yourselves from this crooked generation"²⁹ show man's cooperative function with God in salvation.

It may therefore be concluded concerning the New Testament idea of grace that it implies a view of human dignity that comprises free will--man's right to choose between good and evil, his ability to come to God on his own (whether he has historically done so or not), and his ability to cooperate with God in his own salvation. This view of human dignity, as has been demonstrated by constant references to the views of the theistic humanists discussed in previous sections, may be seen to agree in principle with the views of traditional, theistic humanism.

Since Christ is thought of as the highest demonstration of grace, a specific New Testament doctrine, important enough for a section to itself, and which further emphasizes human dignity, is the idea of the "Word made flesh."

The Incarnation. As has been suggested previously, the doctrine of the incarnation is considered (by More and Maritain especially, see pp. 63-65, 71-72) as definite

²⁸Phil. 2: 12; see also Lenski, op. cit. (on Phil. 2: 12), p. 798 for a concise discussion of the relation of synergism to grace.

²⁹Acts 2: 40; see also J. W. McGarvey, Commentary on Acts of the Apostles (Cincinnati: The Standard Publishing Foundation, 1892), I, 40-41.

testimony to the dignity of man in his natural human condition. This is based on the idea that Christ in becoming man³⁰ demonstrated His recognition of the human potential and showed that He does not consider human nature to be a depraved state, but rather one of dignity and one in which matter and flesh may be sanctified to a holy purpose. The New Testament, and the Bible in general, supports the idea that the natural human condition is a noble estate for many reasons.

Man is created in the image of God,³¹ that is to say, man has not only an animal, physical body, but is also given a spirit from God, which when united with the body, constitutes human nature.³² It is here that man derives his uniqueness as an individual, for he is the particular object of the creation of God and receives his individuality and personality in that he is like his Father.³³ Since the Christian view of God is that God is personal, loving, and eternal, the Christian view of man resembles this view in allowing man these same qualities.³⁴

³⁰Jn. 1: 1-5; 14, 16-18. ³¹Gen. 1: 26-27.

³²Gen. 2: 7; see I Thess. 5: 23; Heb. 4: 12.

³³Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), pp. 12-15.

³⁴For this reason, any view presented by materialistic evolution that deprives man of a spiritual element must be rejected for, as has been previously discussed, when man loses his sense of individual importance by being submerged in some materialistic process or any similar totality, he loses his personal dignity and ends in a despair much like that of the

It is just this spirit-flesh combination in man which indicates the bearing of the Incarnation on the matter of human dignity. That God Himself would deign to take on man's fleshly condition is proof positive that man's natural condition is not innately a perverted state, but rather one in which righteousness and grace may be attained. Matter and flesh are not unholy, staining elements in which a captive soul is incarcerated, as in Gnostic or Neo-Platonic theories,³⁵

twentieth century (see pp. 42-49). See Sir Russell Brain, "Body, Mind, Brain, and Soul," in The Humanist Frame, ed., Julian Huxley (New York: Harper and Company, 1961), p. 54; H. N. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy (New York: American Book Company, 1959), p. 221; A. N. Dakin, Man the Measure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 112; C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism (Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 1937), p. 129; Mercier, op. cit., p. 133. Campbell argues the Restoration position in "Life and Death," in Popular Lectures and Addresses (Nashville: Harbinger Book Company, reprinted after 1861), pp. 429-432.

³⁵D. R. G. Owen, Body and Soul (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), p. 165f; E. L. Mascall, The Importance of Being Human (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 25, 28-29. There is a semantic problem regarding the term "flesh." A medieval, ascetic view of the "flesh" as something to be despised and obliterated before man can rise mystically to Beatific Vision stems from a misunderstanding of Biblical language and Paul's use of the terms "flesh" and "spirit." "Flesh" does not refer to material substance or the body-matter in which man's spirit dwells; it is rather an objective correlative for all that is evil in the world as it affects both the body and the spirit of man-- "the old man" as opposed to "the new man in Christ Jesus." R. C. Bell makes the distinction between "flesh" and "sinful flesh," suggesting that "flesh" is not innately evil. cf. R. C. Bell, Commentary on Romans (Austin: Firm Foundation Publishing House, 1957), pp. 73-78.

but are rather the "good"³⁶ creations of God meant to complement the spirit of man in a paradisaical, edenic existence as described in the early chapters of Genesis; or now, after the fall, meant to be redeemed by Christ.³⁷

The emphasis on the Incarnation as a central theme of Christianity was a favourite of the Post-Apostolic Fathers, as has been suggested (see p. 13). A "humanism of the Incarnation" is a principal theme of certain of the modern theistic humanists (see pp. 64-65, 70-72). This last concept bases its view on Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, for it finds in Him not only promises of spiritual blessings, such as partaking the divine nature³⁸ or gaining back what is lost in sin,³⁹ but also gaining the optimum in human life on earth. To Jesus Christ, each man had human dignity that surpassed even the measure of the worth of the whole world just because he

³⁶Gen. 1: 31

³⁷Indeed, I Cor. 6: 13-20 affirms that "the body is . . . for the Lord, and the Lord for the body." Coupled with II Cor. 5: 10, this passage affirms an active spiritual use of the body in serving God. Not only the regenerated spirit, but also "your bodies are members of Christ." Here is a forceful indication of the worth of the natural human condition. As God once dwelt in flesh to redeem the world through the Incarnation, He now abides in flesh to continue and complete that redemption, for the Christian "body is a temple of the Holy Spirit." (see also Rom. 12: 1) Further, Paul suggests a future plan that God has when He will give men an indescribable resurrection body in which man will serve God eternally in the "new heaven and the new earth, and which in some way bears a likeness to the earthly body." (see I Cor. 15: 35-54; Rev. 21: 1f.)

³⁸II Pet. 1: 4.

³⁹Rom. 5: 12-20.

is a man, the child of a heavenly Father.⁴⁰ "Of how much more value is a man than a sheep;"⁴¹ said Jesus, dissociating man from the material-only creation. Man is worth infinitely more than the sparrows whose funerals even God attends; man's smallest parts are the particular concern of a heavenly Father.⁴² Jesus said that man's responsibility to his fellow man was "like unto" his responsibility to God.⁴³ Even religious laws and customs are subservient to man,⁴⁴ for man is set up as the "highest sanctity," when Jesus declares "the primacy of man over a hallowed religious institution and therefore, by inference, over every other institution and system whatsoever."⁴⁵

Jesus was no "pole-sitting" ascetic who was unaware of the everyday human needs of man. His moral teachings were for everyday living. He was dedicated to revolutionizing and dignifying the world by love. He promised an eternal reward to the man who gives a cup of cold water; He placed emphasis of feeding, clothing, healing, and providing an "abundant life" for men. His prayer was: ". . .Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. . .give us this day our daily bread." The fact of the Incarnation shows

⁴⁰Mk. 8: 35-37.

⁴¹Mt. 12: 9-14.

⁴²Mt. 10: 26-31.

⁴³Mk. 12: 28-34.

⁴⁴Mk. 2: 23-26.

⁴⁵R. Roberts, "Neo-Humanism and Human Need," in Humanism: Another Battle Line, ed., W. P. King (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), pp. 179-180.

God recognizing man in his human condition and assuring him that not only will the Father take care of all His children's needs; moreover, if they will respond in faith, He will open a way to multiplied earthly blessings "and inherit eternal life."⁴⁶

To a man who had lost his feeling of dignity as a human being, Jesus recommended returning to his pristine state as a pure human being--as a little child.⁴⁷ For those who needed an example of how to overcome the temptation to sell out cheaply, Jesus offered the truth by word and example that man can overcome through relying simply on the power of the Word of God and obeying its precepts.⁴⁸ For those who fail to live up to this expected excellence, Jesus offered forgiveness through His poured-out blood, once again showing His valuation of man's soul.

In summary on this point, it may be observed that the New Testament doctrine of the Incarnation provides a ground for the consideration of human dignity in that in this doctrine God is seen to have dignified human existence by His visit in the flesh. The meaning of God-becoming-man is that man became and may now become "like" God. In this way, the human condition is affirmed as dignified in two ways: as simply a

⁴⁶Mt. 6: 25-34; 7: 7-11; 19: 27-30.

⁴⁷Lk. 18: 16-17.

⁴⁸Mt. 4: 1-11.

potentially good and righteous condition with all the possibilities that God granted men in a world that counts and that can expect, with those men, a glory that human language cannot describe, and as having a promise of a higher, more abundant life both here and hereafter through the efficacy of the life and death and life of the Incarnation.

The Optimum Christian Life. The doctrine of the "optimum Christian life" is based primarily on the sentiment expressed in Col. 3: 17. In this passage, the Apostle Paul teaches the Church in the world to perform whatsoever is beautiful or noble or of any excellence and present this to her Lord. "Obedience to this command ennobles all life."⁴⁹ Man is to create out of the raw material of the world a life of beauty, grace, and righteousness, for he is to present both his body and spirit to God as his spiritual worship.⁵⁰ As each Christian thus attains to personal excellence, others are attracted to this way of life. This is the inward-moving influence that brings men to God through the lives of Christians. The outward-moving influence of the Church, the salting, lighting, and leavening, is God's way of redeeming the temporal world and making it a better place. By both

⁴⁹C. R. Erdman, Colossians (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1933), p. 92.

⁵⁰Rom. 12: 1.

processes the Church is glorified, and as the spiritual wife of her heavenly Husband, so glorifies Christ.⁵¹ It is through this kind of a life, a life that makes the most of everything the world offers, that the Church sanctifies and redeems the world and causes the kingdoms of this world to become the kingdoms of the Lord and of His Christ.⁵² This optimum in Christian living is what Dewey seems to feel after in his redefinition of "religion," (see pp. 52-53) but cannot find because he lacks the foundation of theism and divine love that gives men like Barry and Maritain a basis from which to attempt their humanist affirmation of life. (see pp. 66-74)

This doctrine of the optimum Christian life enhances the idea of human dignity since it allows for the principle of self-interest, and this is indeed the summation of the whole view of the New Testament on human dignity. It is a doctrine of both divine and human self-interest and is the motive for all action. It moved God to seek man; it moves man to seek God.⁵³ The all-consuming I AM⁵⁴ whose cosmic self-interest moved Him to create man for His glory has granted grace, including the incarnation, to man to encourage man to regard his own estate highly enough to come to God and thus preserve and improve upon the excellencies of that

⁵¹Eph. 3: 21; 5: 21-33; Rev. 19: 7-8.

⁵²Rev. 11: 15. ⁵³Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁴Exo. 3: 14.

estate. Man, moved by a desire to perfect his earthly condition, to attain his "full height," and to insure "the only possible ground of real individuality,"⁵⁵ responds to God's love and loves God. This love for God provides the worship that God seeks from the very beginning in creating man.⁵⁶

Since the Christian will be blessed in eternity according to his action in time, he must diligently work to attain all manner of excellence in every good thing while he is on earth. Man, son of the divine Ruler of the universe, has a divine birth-right to all the knowledge, science, art, philosophy, beauty, and world created by his Father. This is not only one of Barry's emphases (see p. 69) but also one of Erasmus':

All that was noble and sublime in antiquity should be gathered within the Church, "as when the Jews in their flight from Egypt took with them their gold and their silver utensils to adorn the temple they would build" . . . nothing that has ever been of great moral importance or of spiritual significance to mankind should be excluded from the Christian doctrine, inasmuch as there are neither specifically pagan nor exclusively Christian truths-- truth being always divine in everyone of its myriad human manifestations.⁵⁷

The Post-Apostolic Fathers recognized this truth in their willingness to borrow the philosophy and culture of the

⁵⁵E. J. Carnell, Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1960), p. 61.

⁵⁶Prov. 16: 4; Isa. 43: 7; Jn. 4: 23.

⁵⁷Antonio Iglesias, "Open Letter to Erasmus," Saturday Review of Literature, 35 (May 17, 1952), 24.

Greeks to the enrichment of the Church (see pp. 12-14). Or as even Columbus intended:

When I first undertook to start for the discovery of the Indies, I intended to beg the King and Queen to devote the whole of the money that might be drawn from these realms to Jerusalem.⁵⁸

So should the Christian claim continents and their wealth for the good of "Zion."

The Christian affirms life and finds in every aspect of life a truly religious quality. Whether he build an empire, farm his land, free a captive people, wash a car, make a million, or write a poem, the Christian does it as a matter of religion; he does it for the sake of the Church and to the glory of his Lord. This is the meaning of Col. 3: 17.

As John Eadie comments:

This is the highest Christian morality, a vivid and practical recognition of Christ in everything said or done. Not simply in religious service, but in the business of daily life; not merely in psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs, but in the language of friendship and of bargain, of the forum and the fireside; not simply in deeds which, in their very aspect, are a Christian compliance such as almsgiving or sacramental communion, but in every act, in solitude and in society, in daily toil, in the occupations of trade, or negotiations of commerce.⁵⁹

Nor need man to fear that this service is less than the "religious life," for "in earth's common things, He stands revealed." As Maritain points out, the proper balance of all

⁵⁸J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1908), p. 15.

⁵⁹John Eadie, Commentary on Colossians (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1957), p. 254.

the planes of life will bring the sacred over to the secular giving it a spiritual content (see pp. 73-75). Further, all this will be preserved for man so that the joy and contentment felt in this life will be retained and perfected in the New Earth and any failure and disappointment experienced will be wiped away with the tears in the New Heaven.⁶⁰ As Gerard Manley Hopkins said it, the

looks, locks, maiden gear, gallantry and gaiety and grace, winning ways, airs innocent, maiden manners, sweet looks, loose locks, long locks, levelocks, gaygear, going gallant, girlgrace, all will be given back by beauty's Giver. Not a hair is, not an eyelash, not the least lash lost; every hair is, hair of the head, numbered. And everything we freely forfeit is kept with fonder a care, fonder a care kept than we could have kept it, kept. . . Where kept? . . . Yonder, yonder, yonder.⁶¹

As Christ loved the primal and potential good of the world, so the Christian, living the optimum Christian life in preparation for its eternal fulfillment, may enjoy the world. Christianity, as it points men to heaven, has centred the interest of the universe on man in his natural human condition,

⁶⁰Rev. 21: 1-4.

⁶¹Gerard Manley Hopkins, from "The Leaden Echo and the Golden Echo," in A College Book of Modern Verse, eds., J. K. Robinson and W. B. Rideout (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958), pp. 36-37. Jesus' seeming world-denying statements should be understood much in the same way as Paul's "flesh," that is, as a warning against the evil in the world, not a rejection of the world itself. Actually, His tragic principle of "lost life to find it" (Lk. 9: 24) is the highest expression of world-affirmation, for Christ promises more in this world and the next to the man who will give up what little he has for the riches Christ has (Mk. 10: 29-31). cf. Job 42: 10f.

and has brought the City of God to earth, thus giving Christians the impetus to become conquerors of the world for the Prince of Peace. "Democracy is just Christian practice."⁶²

The vibrant hope of a home in heaven gives man not only the stamina to endure whatever ill the world might bring, but lends him a nimbus of blessedness that permits him to transcend the evils of life.⁶³ And the desire to inherit the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world is "a stimulant rather than a sedative. . .heaven, instead of conflicting with earth, encourages humanity in moments of weakness."⁶⁴ This is exactly Barry's point (see p. 70) and Maritain's point (see pp. 72-73).

This is a view of Christianity which impels Christians to perform social services and charities of all sorts that, while they lead men to a higher goal, make the world a better place to live in the meanwhile.

Even those who have most persistently thought of man as an heir to glory have often acted on the hypothesis that a person dignified by such expectations is entitled to decent living conditions during the days of his sojourn.⁶⁵

⁶²H. Miller, Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 157.

⁶³G. K. Chesterton, "Is Humanism Religion?" Bookman, 69 (May, 1929), 236-241.

⁶⁴A. H. Dakin, Man the Measure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 230-231.

⁶⁵W. E. Garrison, "Humanism: Reactionary Rather than Radical," in King, op. cit., pp. 156, 168, 172, 174.

It is an error for Christians to admit a difference between man's social acts and his individual acts. Man cannot do as a member of the earthly city anything that he cannot do as a citizen of the heavenly city; and, whatever he does he commits the Church.⁶⁶

A deep and abiding consciousness of "heavenly cities" to be received allowed many Biblical heroes to attain excellence on earth, for they realized the close relation between what they do on earth and what they expect in heaven. For example, Job could suffer patiently because he knew that he would see God. Moses lived for forty years as the son of the king, learning all that culture could offer--all this in preparation to lead God's people to Canaan. David built a great nation to the glory of God. His son built a great Temple of gold, and a great temple of wisdom and philosophy to the glory of God. Others ruled, conquered, led, and created--all to the glory of God.⁶⁷ Even Jesus Christ, who came to love man in his human condition; to teach, heal, and feed him, to set the enslaved free, was not an ascetic, but enjoyed living life just for itself.⁶⁸ Anyone who understands Christianity as any

⁶⁶N. Berdyaev, "Spiritual Dualism and Daily Bread," American Scholar, 7, no. 2 (1938), 223-229.

⁶⁷Heb. 11, esp. vs. 33-34.

⁶⁸Lk. 7: 34.

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less "worldly" in this wholesome sense, misunderstands it.⁶⁹

The practical applications of the optimum Christian life are many, but an obvious one is that the New Testament teaches a view of human dignity which can believe in progress; progress in personal righteousness, education, politics, freedom, and the amelioration of the world. Progress within God's moral order and God's world is just one more thing that belongs particularly to His children. The New Testament respect for the individual recognizes that "ultimately, genuine freedom is the freedom of the children of God and authority should only be a help to that freedom."⁷⁰ Thus the New Testament allows the Christian to take an active part in the social, economic, and political affairs of the world in order to bring about the kingdom of God on earth. Indeed, the moral standards of the New Testament impel Christians to seek actively the care

⁶⁹ Indeed, most secular humanist and other criticisms of Christianity stem either from a misunderstanding of the New Testament or is a criticism of Christianity that has departed from the teaching of the New Testament or is being poorly lived by those professing it. cf. Dakin, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42, 60-72. Edwin H. Wilson, in a letter to the author, complained that one reason he did not want to go to heaven was because he would be everlastingly bored "in a hypothetical state where one has no bodily instrument for the spirit to use in a living that would repel me." (Letter to Warren Lewis from Edwin H. Wilson, May 9, 1962) This objection is exemplary of a point of view that apparently does not understand the teaching of the New Testament concerning the perfected state which Christians will receive after death. It is of such criticisms as these that Dakin speaks, as mentioned above.

⁷⁰ Conference Symposium, Freedom and Authority in Our Time (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 621-622; see Rom. 13: 1-7.

of the sick, hungry, and dying; the release of slaves and oppressed peoples; and the processes of good government so that each man's personal and individual rights will be maintained.⁷¹

In summary, it may be said briefly that human dignity is the main focus of the Christian view of life which calls for optimum living, for it provides man an eternal promise of heaven which encourages him to perfect his earthly life so that he may gain the heavenly. Under the imperatives of this promise, Christians are moved to influence the world for good in any way that they may, for they realize that unconcern for the extremity of their fellow man is unconcern for their Lord.⁷² Thus, everything that the Christian may do or say is "in the name of the Lord Jesus."

⁷¹See C. H. Roberson, What Jesus Taught (Austin: Firm Foundation Publishing Company, 1930), p. 301; Lard, op. cit., p. 397. The Christian is taught to "be subject" to governing authorities, but he is also taught that when God's will contradicts that of man, God's will must be obeyed (Acts 4: 19-20). It is God's will that human dignity be upheld. In line with these sentiments, Linger criticizes Alexander Campbell for influencing the "restored" Church not to take part in the politico-moral struggle concerning slavery. He suggests that "with creative leadership, the church should be able to play a much more positive role in political and moral issues than Campbell advocated." cf. H. L. Linger, The Political Ethics of Alexander Campbell (St. Louis: The Bethany Press, 1954), p. 271. There are, of course, many noble and highly respected Christians who would entirely disagree with these sentiments, holding that Christians should entirely remove themselves from the affairs of the world and simply wait for heaven. See R. C. Bell, op. cit., pp. 146-148; David Lipscomb, Civil Government (Nashville: McQuiddy Publishing Company, 1913), passim.

⁷²Mt. 25: 31-46.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

From the preceding pages it may be observed that both theistic and secular humanism and the New Testament are all interested in the matter of human dignity and in one form or other support this idea. The two principal grounds for this belief are man's personal make-up or basic human nature, and man's cosmic relationship or his association with what may or may not exist above him. Based on these two thoughts, beliefs concerning man's rights, his standards, and his future on earth and in heaven are formulated. The value of the study is found mainly in the comparison of the several ways in which ideas of human dignity are derived from these views and in the historical and actual worth of the separate ideas.

Of the matter of human nature, theistic humanism and the New Testament concur in their view of human dignity in that they both conceive of man as a soul, a personal son of God, possessed of free will, composed of a body and spirit, and a noble and able individual created by the grace of God with dignity to make use of and accept further grace. This entire view, however, is grounded on the indispensable notion that man may retain his human dignity only insofar as he is oriented to God.

It is here that the principal criticism of secular humanism comes, for its anti-theistic orientation robs it of its grounds for belief in human dignity, as previously observed; and, if secular humanism be robbed of human dignity, it is no longer a real humanism, nor is it sufficient to provide for man in any age the outlook he needs for a meaningful and hopeful existence.

Thus, without a theocentrism, humanism loses its meaning and degenerates into a philosophy less than humanism. If there be no God, no end, no heaven, no teleology in the system, "what will it mean then that 'man had a good time in his day?' Nature will not know it, he will not know it; in what sense will it even be a fact?" Hartshorne continues:

Apart from the relation of love to knowledge, humanism is unable to integrate love itself. It cannot really solve the ethical and social problems. . . . To say nature is godless is to say that it is not basically intelligible. The only thing that fully explains itself to a purposive rational mind is a purposive rational mind. . . . What, if anything, does theistic morality add to humanistic? In a word, it adds infinity, the explicit recognition of the absolute in relation to which the relative is experienced as such, the whole of which all lesser values are parts. . . . as Reinhold Niebuhr says, it adds "depth."¹

Theistic humanism suggests, and Christianity agrees, that without God to give an absolute point of reference for

¹C. Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism (Chicago and New York: Willett, Clark and Company, 1937), pp. 12-25.

standards and love that man will mentally,² ethically,³ morally,⁴ and cosmically⁵ degenerate and lose all sense of direction, and thus will suffer the end of his humanity and his dignity in his only tenable answer--suicide; or, if not suicide, then a passive, hopeless waiting for relentless death, if he be too cowardly to take his own life (see pp. 47-50).

Life requires a faith; but, there is a certain amount of risk in faith. Secular humanists believe and are risking that there is no God. They thus lose whatever comfort there be in life from faith in God as well as any hope for life after death. Theistic humanists and believers in the New Testament believe and are risking that there is a God. They thus gain the comforts of faith in this life (though they may be deluded) and receive absolute impetus to live life to its ultimate. Furthermore, if they be right, they will receive an eternal reward for their troubles; whereas, the

² Ibid., p. 93; H. L. Hough, The Dignity of Man (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950), p. 15.

³ W. J. Sanders, "Some Catholic Objections to the New Humanism," School and Scholar, 50 (December 9, 1939), 763-765.

⁴ L. J. A. Mercier, The Challenge of Humanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp. 190-191; Jer. 10: 23.

⁵ H. H. Titus, Living Issues in Philosophy (New York: American Book Company, 1959), p. 221; A. H. Dakin, The Humanism of Paul Elmer More (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 353-355; William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan and Company, 1951), pp. 518-519.

unbelievers will receive eternal destruction for their unbelief. One may not actually be able to prove the existence of God, but certainly one can point to the necessity of there being One.

Secular humanists feel this lack of eternal security and absolute cosmic orientation; they realize that "there never was a theory of the universe that did not need a God to make it go."⁶ They thus attempt to fill their void with such obscure terms as "cosmic processes,"⁷ or sentimentality,⁸ or, as T. S. Elliot says:

Men have left God not for other gods, they say,
but for no god; and this has never happened
before
That men both deny gods and worship gods,
professing first Reason,
And then Money, and Power, and what they call
Life, or Race, or Dialectic.⁹

The secular humanists admit quite frankly that they would like to believe,¹⁰ and that Christianity works better than any

⁶W. P. King, "Humanism and Moral Motive," in Humanism: Another Battle Line, ed., W. P. King (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), pp. 254-255, 273, 287, quoting T. Huxley against A. Comte.

⁷C. W. Reese, Humanism (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1926), p. 92.

⁸Ibid., p. 91.

⁹A. H. Dakin, Man the Measure (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 170.

¹⁰C. Lamont, The Philosophy of Humanism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), pp. 82-89.

other system,¹¹ but they have not the insight of Emily Dickenson;

How excellent the heaven
When earth cannot be had;
How hospitable, then, the face
Of our old neighbor, God!¹²

They thus give up not only the basic ground for human dignity, the fact that man is made in the image of God, but practically, they forfeit the traditional beliefs which have proved productive of the best in religion, art, literature, politics, philosophy, and life. They thus lose the faith of Paul's statement of his own dignity of a man in Christ when he announced, in Phil. 4: 13, the unlimited power that he and God had together: "I can do all things through Christ who strengthens me."

It may therefore be said in conclusion that the views of human dignity held by theistic humanism and the New Testament are very similar in their emphases and results. They both find human dignity to be grounded in the belief of man's relation to God, and they both maintain that man as a son of God has a due right to the most dignified estate possible in this world. This view is contrasted to the view of human dignity of secular humanism which, although it claims to

¹¹Bertrand Russell, "Philosophic Rationality for a Changing World," in Philosophy for a Time of Crisis, ed., A. Koch (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 296.

¹²Dakin, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

hold a similar high view of man's estate, has proved historically and philosophically incapable of producing results that befit a high view of human dignity. The view of theistic humanism and the New Testament, which might fairly be called Christian Humanism, but which is fully implied in the term "Christianity" without modification, is thus demonstrated as being the most valid attitude for maintaining human dignity.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

The Humanist Manifesto of 1933.

Note: The Manifesto is a product of many minds. It was designed to represent a developing point of view, not a new creed. The individuals whose signatures appear, would, had they been writing individual statements, have stated the propositions in differing terms. The importance of the document is that more than thirty men have come to general agreement on matters of final concern and that these men are undoubtedly representative of a large number who are forging a new philosophy out of the materials of the modern world.*

The time has come for widespread recognition of the radical changes in religious beliefs throughout the modern world. The time is past for mere revision of traditional attitudes. Science and economic change have disrupted the old beliefs. Religions the world over are under the necessity of coming to terms with new conditions created by a vastly increased knowledge and experience. In every field of human activity, the vital movement is now in the direction of a candid and explicit humanism. In order that religious humanism may be better understood, we, the undersigned, desire to make certain affirmations which we believe the facts of our contemporary life demonstrate.

There is a great danger of a final, and we believe fatal, identification of the word "religion" with doctrines and methods which have lost their significance and which are powerless to solve the problem of human living in the Twentieth Century. Religions have always been means for realizing the highest values of life. Their end has been accomplished through the interpretation of the total environing situation (theology or world view), the sense of values resulting there from (goal or ideal), and the technique (cult), established for realizing the satisfactory life. A change in any of these factors results in alteration of the outward forms of religion. This fact explains the changefulness of religions through the centuries. But through all changes religion itself remains constant in its quest for abiding values, an inseparable feature of human life.

*A Note on a recently published edition of the Manifesto. Free copies in leaflet form, as well as other such material, may be obtained from The American Humanist Association, The Humanist House, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

Today man's larger understanding of the universe, his scientific achievements, and his deeper appreciation of brotherhood, have created a situation which requires a new statement of the means and purposes of religion. Such a vital, fearless, and frank religion capable of furnishing adequate social goals and personal satisfactions may appear to many people as a complete break with the past. While this age does owe a vast debt to the traditional religions, it is none the less obvious that any religion that can hope to be a synthesizing and dynamic force for today must be shaped for the needs of this age. To establish such a religion is a major necessity of the present. It is a responsibility which rests upon this generation. We therefore affirm the following:

- First: Religious humanists regard the universe as self-existing and not created.
- Second: Humanism believes that man is a part of nature and that he has emerged as the result of a continuous process.
- Third: Holding an organic view of life, humanists find that the traditional dualism of mind and body must be rejected.
- Fourth: Humanism recognizes that man's religious culture and civilization, as clearly depicted by anthropology and history, are the product of a gradual development due to his interaction with his natural environment and with his social heritage. The individual born into a particular culture is largely molded by that culture.
- Fifth: Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modern science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values. Obviously humanism does not deny the possibility of realities as yet undiscovered, but it does insist that the way to determine the existence and value of any and all realities is by means of intelligent inquiry and by the assessment of their relations to human needs. Religion must formulate its hopes and plans in the light of the scientific spirit and method.
- Sixth: We are convinced that the time has passed for theism, deism, modernism, and the several varieties of "new thought."
- Seventh: Religion consists of those actions, purposes, and experiences which are humanly significant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, science, philosophy, love, friendship, recreation--all that is in its degree expressive of intelligently satisfying human living. The distinction between the sacred and the secular

can no longer be maintained.

- Eighth:** Religious Humanism considers the complete realization of human personality to be the end of man's life and seeks its development and fulfillment in the here and now. This is the explanation of the humanist's social passion.
- Ninth:** In the place of the old attitudes involved in worship and prayer the humanist finds his religious emotions expressed in a heightened sense of personal life and in a co-operative effort to promote social well-being.
- Tenth:** It follows that there will be no uniquely religious emotions and attitudes of the kind hitherto associated with belief in the supernatural.
- Eleventh:** Man will learn to face the crises of life in terms of his knowledge of their naturalness and probability. Reasonable and manly attitudes will be fostered by education and supported by custom. We assume that humanism will take the path of social and mental hygiene and discourage sentimental and unreal hopes and wishful thinking.
- Twelfth:** Believing that religion must work increasingly for joy in living, religious humanists aim to foster the creative in man and to encourage achievements that add to the satisfactions of life.
- Thirteenth:** Religious humanism maintains that all associations and institutions exist for the fulfillment of human life. The intelligent evaluation, transformation, control, and direction of such associations and institutions with a view to the enhancement of human life is the purpose and program of humanism. Certainly religious institutions, their ritualistic forms, ecclesiastical methods, and communal activities must be reconstituted as rapidly as experience allows, in order to function effectively in the modern world.
- Fourteenth:** The humanists are firmly convinced that existing acquisitive and profit-motivated society has shown itself to be inadequate and that a radical change in methods, controls, and motives must be instituted. A socialized and co-operative economic order must be established to the end that the equitable distribution of the means of life be possible. The goal of humanism is a free and universal society in which people voluntarily and intelligently cooperate for the common good. Humanists demand a shared life in a shared world.

Fifteenth and last: We assert that humanism will: (a) affirm life rather than deny it; (b) seek to elicit the possibilities of life, not flee from it; and (c) endeavor to establish the conditions of a satisfactory life for all, not merely for a few. By this positive morale and intention humanism will be guided, and from the perspective and alignment the techniques and efforts of humanism will flow.

So stand the theses of religious humanism. Though we consider the religious forms and ideas of our fathers no longer adequate, the quest for the good life is still the central task for man-king. Man is at last becoming aware that he alone is responsible for the realization of the world of his dreams, that he has within himself the power for its achievement. He must set intelligence and will to the task.

(signed):

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Edwin Arthur Burtt--professor of philosophy, Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University.

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John Dewey--Columbia University.

Albert C. Dieffenbach--formerly editor of The Christian Register.

John H. Dietrich--minister, First Unitarian Society, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Bernard Fantus--professor of therapeutics, College of Medicine, University of Illinois.

- William Floyd--editor of The Arbitrator, New York City.
- F. H. Hankins--professor of economics and sociology, Smith College.
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- A. Eustace Haydon--professor of history of religions, University of Chicago.
- Llewellyn Jones--literary critic and author.
- Robert Morse Lovett--editor, The New Republic; professor of English, University of Chicago.
- Harold P. Marley--minister, the Fellowship of Liberal Religion, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
- R. Potter--leader and founder, The First Humanist Society of New York, Inc.
- John W. Reese--dean, Abraham Lincoln Centre, Chicago.
- Oliver L. Reiser--associate professor of philosophy, University of Pittsburg.
- Roy Wood Sellars--professor of philosophy, University of Michigan.
- Clinton Lee Scott--minister, Universalist Church, Peoria, Illinois.
- Maynard Shipley--president, The Science League of America.
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- W. Frank Swift--director, Boston Ethical Society.
- V. T. Thayer--education director, Ethical Culture Schools.
- Eldred C. Vanderlaan--leader of the Free Fellowship, Berkeley, California.
- Joseph Walker--attorney, Boston, Massachusetts.
- Jacob J. Weinstein--rabbi, advisor to Jewish students, Columbia University.
- Frank S. C. Wicks--All Souls Unitarian Church, Indianapolis, Indiana.
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- David Rhys Williams--minister, Unitarian Church, Rochester, New York.
- Edwin H. Wilson--managing editor, The New Humanist, Chicago, Illinois; minister, Third Unitarian Church, Chicago, Illinois.