

Wine's belated globalization, 1845 to 2025

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Abstract

In the latest wave of globalization, the share of global wine production crossing national borders has trebled since the mid-1980s, to more than 40%. Prior to then, wine was confined mostly to southern Europe with very little trade outside that region. Why was wine globalization so belated? Why did it take so long for wine exports to take off even in the New World regions of European settlement? This article addresses these questions and also seeks to explain the bilateral patterns of wine trade. It concludes by speculating briefly on how wine markets might develop in the foreseeable future.

Key words: Wine trade; New World wine exporters; Changes in beverage tastes; Premiumization of wine consumption; Beverage market projections.

JEL codes: F14, F17, L66, N50, Q11, Q17

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“Winemaking is really quite a simple business; only the first 200 years are difficult.”

The late Baroness Philippine de Rothschild,
(vigneron in France, California and Chile)

INTRODUCTION

For millennia, wine was produced and consumed almost exclusively in the Mediterranean region and the nearby Levant. Western Europe's key wine-producing countries plus Britain (often the world's most important wine-importing country in recent centuries) include imperial powers that colonized New World countries with winegrape-growing potential. Winegrowing knowledge and vine cuttings accompanied Europeans settling in those colonies (Meloni and Swinnen, 2021), but none of them became significant wine exporters during the first globalization wave (the seven decades to World War I). A further seven decades elapsed before the second wave of globalization intensified from the mid-1980s. Only then did wine exports from those former colonies in the New World take off. Since that take off the share of global wine production crossing national borders has trebled, to more than 40%. It led to more and better wine being enjoyed by consumers in a much broader range of countries. Yet despite that export take-off, the total volume of wine consumed globally is very similar today to what it was in the 1960s, thanks to exploding demand in Northern Europe, North America and then East Asia being more than offset by shrinkage in demand in traditional wine-producing countries.

Why was wine globalization so belated? More specifically, why did it take so long for wine exports to take off in most New World regions of European settlement, including many with ideal conditions for growing winegrapes and whose domestic wine markets were

expanding?¹ What explains the bilateral patterns of wine trade in the first globalization wave, and those that emerged from the 1980s? In particular, how did colonial connections, and trade policies and alcohol consumer taxes, impact national and global wine production, consumption and the volume, unit value and direction of international wine trade flows?

This article addresses these questions with the help of a new global database covering wine and, at least with respect to consumption, other alcoholic beverages (Anderson and Pinilla 2020). By way of background, it begins with a brief history of winegrowing from its beginnings in the South Caucasus eight millennia ago to its spread through the Roman Empire and eventually to colonies of European imperial powers. It then lays out the numerous demand, supply and policy/regulatory factors that standard trade theory suggests contribute to this evolving pattern of international competitiveness and altered wine production, consumption and trade of different countries. That theory provides a framework for assessing developments over the past two centuries. The focus initially is on the quantity of wine, but subsequently the paper looks also at factors contributing to the gradual and uneven rise in wine quality. The article concludes by speculating briefly on how wine markets might develop in the foreseeable future, bearing in mind the premiumization of other beverage markets that began late last century.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF WINE GLOBALIZATION

The cultivation of *Vitis vinifera* grapes (by far the most suitable species for winemaking) began around 6000BCE in or near the South Caucasus region (McGovern 2003, 2009;

¹ Most notably in Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa, Uruguay and the United States.

McGovern et al. 2017). It spread west to the eastern Mediterranean from 2500BCE, and spread north into much of Europe by 400CE.² It then took another 1100 years before spreading to Latin America from the 1520s, South Africa by 1655, Australia by 1788, New Zealand by 1820 and California (as a US State) from 1850 (Johnson 1989; Unwin 1991). But this gradual spreading involved mostly the transfer of vine cuttings and grape and wine production knowhow, and only to temperate climate regions in the 30° to 50° latitude band north and south of the equator (plus a very few higher elevations in lower latitudes). Long-distance international trade in anything but the most expensive wines was rare: ordinary wine deteriorated quickly prior to the use of standardized corked glass bottles and sulphur as a preservative, which began to be used only from the 1700s (Johnson 1989, pp. 195-98). Even in those New World countries with the potential to grow winegrapes and with growing domestic wine markets, export expansion was slow until late in the twentieth century (Anderson and Pinilla 2018).

In the 1860s the top three countries (France, Italy and Spain), accounted for more than three-quarters of the global wine market. That is, the rest of the world – which accounted for almost 90% of the world's population and included numerous nearby countries of northern

² Wine cultivation and consumption also spread south to the Middle East (subsequently curtailed in the 8th century by Mohammed who frowned on alcohol consumption by Muslims), and also east along the Silk Road to China but where per capita consumption (and even more so production) pre-21st century was always tiny because grape-based wine was affordable only for the elite (Kupfer 2018). Russia, a major wine importer like Britain, also influenced its colonies' wine production, most notably in Georgia but also, especially during the Soviet Union period (sometimes positively, sometimes very negatively), in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine and several Central Asian republics.

Europe – produced and consumed just one-quarter of the world’s wine. Despite massive per capita income growth and a huge reduction in international trade costs, the share of global wine production that was exported was no higher at the end of the first globalization wave (1913) than it was in 1860, at just 5%. Even more remarkably, nor was it any higher in the 1960s: the majority of the world’s wine was still produced and consumed in just a few European countries.

True, that apparent stability hides numerous changes in domestic wine markets, including the hugely disruptive effect of a phylloxera outbreak in Europe in the last three decades of the 19th century. We seek also to explain them, plus the spectacular growth of new wine markets since 1990. Recent export-led production growth in a handful of New World countries has been accompanied by wine import growth in many countries whose alcohol consumption was previously beer- or spirits-focused, and most recently there has been the dramatic rise (from a low base) of East Asia as a wine-importing region. However, coinciding with these developments has been a two-thirds reduction since 1960 in wine consumption per capita in the world’s key traditional wine-producing countries.

Together these trends mean that (a) the volume of wine consumed globally is very similar today to what it was in the 1960s, and (b) the share of global wine production that is traded internationally trebled from 5% to 15% during 1960-90, and then trebled again, to 45%, by 2017. As a consequence, wine’s share of rapidly expanding global exports of all merchandise has not fallen but rather just fluctuated around a flat trend value of 0.2% since 1980, thereby keeping up with the rapid global growth in other product trade. That is, in less

than half a century, wine has switched from being one of the world's least-traded agricultural products to one of the most traded.³

Simultaneously, and largely because of increased competition from the New World, there have been huge improvements in the average quality and the diversity of wines available to consumers. This premiumization has occurred despite fears by some wine consumers that the accompanying emergence of multinational wine brands, and the convergence of winegrape varieties grown to a few key 'international' ones (Anderson and Nelgen 2020), would lead to the homogenization of wine styles.

Thus this recent globalization of wine has been an unprecedented boom for almost all consumers in an ever-expanding number of countries, at very affordable prices. The only consumers who may be worse off are the less-prosperous of those who consumed the most iconic of wines, particularly from Bordeaux and Burgundy, the prices of which have risen to stratospheric levels. Those price rises of course are a great financial benefit to owners of the best wine assets in, and finest wines from, those iconic regions. Furthermore, those who store the finest wines as an investment have found that not only do they tend to enjoy capital gains as the wine matures in bottle, but also those values tend to move counter to the business cycle, making such wine a convenient alternative store of wealth (Masset and Henderson 2010).

³ The global share of production exported in 2010-13 averaged 17% for grains and around 25% for tropical products and for oilseeds (based on FAOSTAT data), and has always been less than 10% for livestock products. Between 1910 and 1929, about 20% of wheat production, 50% of sugar, 65% of coffee and 25% of tobacco were exported (Aparicio et al., 2009).

THE 1ST AND 2ND WINE GLOBALIZATION WAVES: EVIDENCE

The basic theory of comparative advantage as it applies to wine, and the impact market-distorting policies can have on international wine trade, are laid out in Appendix 1, available online. In drawing on it to explain national market and trade developments, it is helpful to focus first on production and exports, and then on consumption and imports.

Wine production and exports

The first globalization wave (the 1830s to 1913) seemed to affect global markets for wine less than for many other products – except for the transfer of the tiny phylloxera insect from the United States to Europe. That insect devastated the majority of Europe’s vineyards, starting in France in the mid-1860s (Campbell 2004). It led to French vigneron initially importing raw material from other European countries to supplement their diminishing supplies while they invested hugely in nearby North Africa. The latter led to Algeria’s share of global wine production rising from 0.1% in 1870 to 8% by 1910, by which time it accounted for more than 40% of the world’s exports. However, almost all Algerian exports went to France (Meloni and Swinnen 2014), so if colonial Algeria is thought of as part of France (as claimed by the French Government until Algeria’s independence in 1962), then global wine exports averaged no more than 5% of the volume of global wine production before the 1960s, apart from the 1880s when phylloxera caused France to temporarily import wine from its neighbours (Figure 1).

[insert Figure 1 about here]

The number of countries producing and exporting the world’s wine has been increasing, but only recently. Through the first globalization wave both the top two and the

top ten wine-producing countries retained their combined shares of world wine production: the top two (France and Italy) accounted for almost 60%, and the next-highest eight countries accounted for a further 30% of global wine output. There was very little diversification in winegrape growing beyond the traditional European base (plus the Mediterranean edge of France's North African colonies) during the last four decades of the 19th century. By the early 1960s the production share of the top four countries had fallen from three-quarters to two-thirds as production for local markets expanded in the New World, but the top ten's share was no different than during the first globalization wave at almost 90%. It is only since the end of the 20th century that significant production shares have been accounted for by additional countries (Appendix Figure 1(a)).

Similarly, global wine exports were almost fully accounted for by the top ten exporters (all European) at both the start and end of the first globalization wave, and their share was still 92% by the early 1960s; but it has declined since then, especially since the late 1980s (Appendix Figure 1(b)). Even so, the volume of exports of France, Italy and especially Spain have continued to grow on a per capita basis since 1980, albeit not as fast as for New World countries (Figure 2). Their moderate rise in exports per capita was mainly a by-product of a faster decline in wine consumption than in their production: their combined annual consumption fell by four billion litres (from a little over 12 billion) over 1970-89 while their annual exports rose by two billion litres (from a little over one billion).

[insert Figure 2 about here]

Values of wine exports expanded at different rates to volumes in these various countries, however. This was because of quality differences. That matters when generating value-based indicators of international competitiveness in product markets. If wine's export value alters at a different rate to the value of a country's other exports, it could indicate a change in that economy's comparative advantage in wine, depending on how that ratio alters

in the rest of the world. One way to capture that is to estimate the Balassa (1965) index of comparative advantage, defined as the share of wine in national merchandise exports divided by wine's share of global exports. Those indexes, shown in Table 1, reveal that France, Italy and Spain have been able to retain their strong comparative advantage in wine despite the dramatic strengthening of comparative advantage in key wine-exporting countries of the southern hemisphere. However, New Zealand and Chile have now surpassed them by this measure, as did Australia in the 2000s.

[insert Table 1 about here]

The emergence of strong comparative advantages in wine in New World countries during the current globalization wave begs the question as to why those countries did not emerge as exporters in the first globalization wave. This is all the more puzzling when wine production per capita was expanding, at least in the southern cone of Latin America and in Australia (Appendix Figure A2). Part of the answer has to do with trade costs: in all those settler economies, only two products (both primary) accounted for the vast majority of their exports prior to 1914, both having high value-to-weight ratios sufficient to make them tradable (Anderson and Pinilla 2018, Figure 2.17). For example, they were [wool and initially hides](#) and then grain for Argentina (Pinilla and Rayes 2019), gold and wool for Australia, copper and salt for Chile, and cotton and wheat for the United States. Apparently the perceived quality of those countries' wines was not high enough pre-1990s for them to attract prices that could cover production plus trade costs. Indeed in Argentina even internal trade costs were important: until the railway line was built from Mendoza to Buenos Aires in the 1880s the capital relied on wine imports from the Mediterranean (Stein and Matau 2018).

To get a sense of the importance of the wine industry in the overall economy of each country at any point in time, it is helpful to consider wine production per dollar of real GDP. During the first globalization wave, at least five countries produced more than 50 litres of

wine per real US\$ '000 of GDP: Spain, Portugal, Italy, France and Algeria (Table 2). Those same five exceeded 30 litres in the interwar years, when five others produced between 12 and 24 litres: Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Greece and Romania. Hungary was next with 9 litres, and Moldova and Georgia probably would have been above 10 litres had they been separate countries then. During 1960-89 there were still no other countries in those ranges, and Greece and Hungary had fallen below 8 litres. Then by 1990-2016, when real GDPs of all countries were much higher, the range had shrunk to no more than 5 litres except for Moldova and Romania. But note that those same 13 countries just mentioned are still the highest ranked in 1990-2016, together with South Africa and Uruguay.

[insert Table 2 about here]

The acceleration since the 1980s in the volume of wine that crosses national borders is due mostly to the emergence of New World wine exporters. That surge began in Australia from the late 1980s, helped by a very low value of the country's currency at that time (Anderson 2018). Similarly, New Zealand's currency was very depressed in the early 2000s, while a large real devaluation in late 2001 triggered the export take-off of Argentina, aided by declining domestic consumption just as in Spain (Anderson and Pinilla 2018, Chs. 11 and 12). Australian wineries' international competitiveness over the decade to 2012 declined because of the real exchange rate appreciation associated with Australia's massive mining investment boom (Anderson 2018). That appreciation relative to the currencies of other wine-exporting countries enabled the latter to expand their sales in third countries at Australia's expense (Anderson and Wittwer 2013). This is a clear example of how, in a globalized world, temporary misfortune to the industry in one country – including from economic forces outside the industry – can be a boon to the industry in other countries.

To put the growing extent of international wine trade in perspective, it is instructive to compare it with that for other products. Having been never more than 15% before 1990, and

no more than 5% before the phylloxera outbreak in the final quarter of the 19th century, the share of global production exported for wine was much lower than the share for other farm products, the average of which has been estimated to be 10-15% during 1900-38 and 15-30% during 1950-90 (Aparicio, Pinilla and Serrano 2009, p. 57). The five-fold increase in wine's share since the late 1960s to around 40% (Figure 1) now puts it at the higher end of the spectrum – as it should be for a heterogeneous, highly differentiated product group whose primary ingredient (winegrapes) can be grown profitably in a very small share of the world's cropping land (currently less than 0.5%, see Anderson and Pinilla 2020).

Wine consumption and imports

The top seven wine-consuming countries, which accounted for almost 90% of global wine consumption in 1909-13, still accounted for 70% a half-century later. The share of France alone peaked in the early 1950s at 30%.⁴ That was helped by the fact that from 1931 the French government explicitly campaigned on behalf of its wine industry to encourage greater wine consumption in France (Phillips 2014, pp. 286-89) – despite the fact France already had at that time the highest national per capita wine consumption in the world, at more than 150 litres per year. However, in the half-century to 2010-18, the combined share of those top seven countries' fell to just 32%. Italy and Spain saw the largest falls, but the shares of France, Argentina and Portugal also fell, by about half. Meanwhile, the combined share of Germany, the UK, the US and China rose to 33% in the 2010s.

⁴ Wine consumption grew in North Africa in the French colonial period, but mainly because of immigration from Southern Europe: legislation was enacted to limit the sale of alcohol to Muslim natives, ostensibly to respect their cultural and religious views (Znaïen 2020).

Bear in mind that while Britain was important for centuries as a consumer of fine wines from Bordeaux, accounting for a substantial share of the value of global wine imports, it accounted for well under 1% of the volume of global wine consumption prior to the early 1970s (Anderson, Nelgen and Pinilla 2017, Table 137). Also, per capita wine consumption grew rapidly in a number of smaller countries that had previously focused only on beer or spirits (Figure 3). That is, beverage consumption mixes have been converging across countries, with wine markets emerging in countries where beer or spirits previously dominated – and vice versa (Table 3). As part of that, East Asia’s share of global wine imports grew from 2% in the mid-1980s to 21% in 2016-18 (Anderson 2020b).

[insert Figure 3 and Table 3 about here]

Of course wine is not the only beverage that is becoming more globalized. Beer traditionally was produced and sold only locally. However, with technological advances and exploitation of economies of scale through mergers and acquisitions of what have become multinational companies, beer brands are becoming nearly as global and concentrated as carbonated soft drinks (Swinnen and Briski 2017; Garavaglia and Swinnen 2018). As part of that, beer is increasingly being traded across national borders: in the early 1960s only 1.6% of the world’s recorded beer production volume was exported, but by 2016-18 that share had increased five-fold to 8.7% (Anderson and Pinilla 2020). Much of the world’s spirits too is produced by a small number of multinational firms and are now very highly traded globally: the value of that annual trade has grown from less than US\$2 billion prior to 1975 to \$30 billion by 2016-18 – very closely matching that of wine, which grew from \$2 billion in 1973 to \$35 billion in 2016-18. However, the share of production exported was always higher and grew faster for wine than spirits, especially after the early 1990s (Appendix Figure A3).

In the 1960s, all three beverages had a similar share of the global recorded alcohol market (measured in litres of alcohol or LAL). In the subsequent three decades, the share of

wine in that overall market halved, and is now just one-third of the shares of beer and spirits which are each a little over 40%. Total alcohol consumption per capita in the world has traced a flat trend since 1960 (at around three LAL per year), but annual wine consumption has fallen from 0.9 LAL in 1960 to 0.4 LAL in 2015 while beer has risen from 0.7 to 1.2 LAL and spirits consumption per capita has grown from 1.1 to 1.6 LAL. In total terms, wine consumption has changed little while beer and spirits have nearly trebled, at least as recorded by governments (Appendix Figure A4). This overstates the situation somewhat for beer and spirits though, because some of that growth in their consumption is to replace what was previously produced illicitly and so not recorded, especially in developing countries (Holmes and Anderson 2017).

PREMIUMIZATION: THE DEMISE OF NON-PREMIUM WINE AND EMERGENCE OF COMMERCIAL PREMIUM WINE

The lack of growth in the volume of wine consumed globally hides not only the net effect of the decline in consumption in traditional wine countries coinciding with rapid rises in wine consumption in traditionally beer- or spirits-drinking countries. It also hides the fact that the quality of wine consumed since the late 20th century is spread over a far broader spectrum than previously, and the average quality is now very substantially above that of the past.

Earlier, the majority of wine consumed in wine-producing countries of Europe was sold in bulk, was unbranded, and was simple in style and meant for immediate local

consumption rather than for cellaring or branded export marketing.⁵ The rapidly expanding exports from New World countries did not replace such non-premium wines. Instead the New World effectively created a new category of branded, varietal-labelled bottled wines in such large volumes that the rapidly agglomerating supermarkets in Britain and elsewhere could advertise nationally as being approachable, consistent, without obvious faults and yet affordable for those on an average income. Many of those brands have since added a super-premium range to their commercial premium range by separating out their best as the average quality improved with experience. Thus supermarketing of such brands not only ‘democratised’ wine but also assisted the more curious of the new wine consumers to gradually explore better-quality wines. That simultaneously slowed the decline in wine’s share of global alcohol consumption and raised its share in numerous countries that had previously been beer- or spirits-focused. It has also meant that there is now a far broader spectrum of branded wine qualities available to consumers over a wide range of prices, instead of the simple caricature of just two qualities: an abundance of cheap commodity wine (most of which was not exported) and a small range of expensive fine wines enjoyed mostly by the elite in a slightly larger number of countries.

Ironically, this ‘thickening’ of the spectrum of prices, varieties, brands and styles of wine for consumers has coincided with greater concentration on the part of winegrowers on the key ‘international’ (i.e. French) grape varieties, and an increasing use – initiated by the New World – of grape varietal labelling on bottles. The latter may be a consequence of the boom in supermarketing and, more recently, in the use of social media as an additional and

⁵ France was exceptional, thanks to Champagne, in that during 1910-38 the value of its exports in bottles exceeded that in casks for the first time (Ayuda, Ferrer-Pérez and Pinilla 2020b).

more-readily searchable source of information for wine consumers. As Appendix Figure A5 shows, in 2000 the top ten varieties accounted for 36% of the global winegrape bearing area but by 2016 the top 10 contributed 42% -- six of which are French varieties.⁶ The rapid up-take of online purchasing of wine during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 will have added to the ease of shopping by variety.

A proxy for the average quality of the world's wines that enter international trade is the average price in real terms of global wine exports. This is reported in Figure 4, using the US CPI to bring those prices into 2015 US dollars. The average price rose substantially over the second half of the 20th century – and even then would not have flattened out except that the share of exports in bulk containers rose from around 30% to 40% (which meant that the value of bottling, capping and labelling was not included in the export price for that rising share of bulk wines). Also shown in Figure 4 is the average price of exported wine relative to that of spirits: that ratio has risen even more steeply than the real price of wine. Both trends suggest steady improvements in the average quality of (at least exported) wine over time. Needless to say, qualities differ across countries, but average export prices of New World wines are converging on those of Western Europe even though a much larger proportion of the former is shipped in bulk: as of 2010-16, the New World average was just one-fifth below that for Western Europe (as was New Zealand's relative to that of France), and 73% above that for Eastern Europe (Anderson and Pinilla 2020).

[insert Figure 4 about here]

Meanwhile, with the wealthy consumers of China (including Hong Kong) becoming major players in the ultra-premium and iconic fine wine buying segment, the UK-based Liv-

⁶ This increase in concentration of winegrape varieties globally contrasts with an apparently increasing genetic diversity of food crop varieties. See, e.g., Khoury et al. (2016).

Ex index of prices of the top 100 wines has risen more than 350% over the past 15 years (Phillips 2018). So while most of the world's wine consumers have never had it so good, the exceptions are those addicted to rare iconic wines, particularly reds from Bordeaux and Burgundy: their prices have risen to stratospheric levels, to the immense financial benefit of owners of the best wine assets in, and finest wines from, those iconic regions.

BILATERAL TRADE IN THE WORLD'S WINE MARKETS

Since the globalization of wine was not a continuous process but one interrupted by the period book-ended by the two world wars, we consider the two waves separately in focusing on the way bilateral wine trades have developed.

Leading up to and including the first wave of globalization (1830s to 1913)

During much of the second half of the previous millennium, Britain was the major importer of wine in value terms and France and Spain were the world's biggest wine exporters. All three had colonies that played significant roles in those wine trades at various times (Meloni and Swinnen, 2021). Hence in this section we examine the bilateral wine trades of all three countries, as key case studies, in addition to that of their neighbours (particularly Italy and Portugal).

British bilateral trade in wine has been well documented back to at least the 17th century. Its imports came from a diverse set of countries, whose shares fluctuated substantially according to changes in trade restrictions, taxes, and wars and related crises in foreign affairs (Nye 2007). This can be seen from Appendix Figure A6. France was Britain's main trading partner in the 17th century but, when war broke out as that century closed, Portugal and Spain became the dominant suppliers to the British wine market for more than

150 years, assisted in the case of Portugal by the Methuen Treaty of 1703. Germany and Italy were minor and sporadic suppliers, and were replaced by South Africa after the Cape became a British colony in 1814. Cape exporters enjoyed preferential tariff access to the British market from then until tariffs on other exporters' wines were lowered in 1825 and then lowered further in subsequent decades.

The emergence and formation of more-complex patterns of international wine trade occurred mainly during the second half of the 19th century (Simpson 2011). As we have already seen, from 1850 the wine trade grew significantly, and by the early 1890s it peaked at just over 15% of world wine production, which had also increased considerably. In this first globalization, there was an expansion of production in European colonies or ex-colonies of the two main exporters, France and Spain, and also of the main importer, Britain. Thus vineyards expanded in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), South America (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), North America, and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand).

Growth in international wine trade in the second half of the 19th century was boosted by five factors: the increase in demand for high-quality wines by high-income groups in the most advanced economies; the massive transatlantic migration of Europeans from traditional wine-producing countries; some of the French metropolitan population moving to new colonies; the liberalization of trade policies (triggered by the French-British Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860); and the reduction in trade costs (Ayuda, Ferrer-Pérez and Pinilla 2020a).

A sixth factor was even more important in adding complexity to the bilateral pattern of international wine trade: the phylloxera plague. That plague devastated European vineyards, beginning in France in the 1860s where import tariffs were lowered to encourage top-up supplies of wine from neighbors. Italy, Greece, and especially Spain took advantage of the reduction of French tariffs by exporting huge volumes of wine (or raisins in the case of

Greece) to France so as to make it possible for France to maintain its exports of finer wine (Pinilla and Ayuda 2002; Meloni and Swinnen, 2017). In this way, intra-industry trade in wine emerged for the first time, and until the Second World War France continued to be the world's main importer of wine. It needed these imports to blend with the wines it obtained from the vineyards replanted with French-American hybrids, in order to improve their alcohol content and color. France thus played a key role in the world wine market as the leading importer of low-quality wine while simultaneously continuing to be the leading exporter of high-quality wine (Appendix Table A1). Italy engaged in intra-industry trade to a much smaller degree than France, while Spain and Portugal so engaged hardly at all (Appendix Table A2).

Studies that have used gravity models with bilateral trade flows to explain the determinants of the directions of wine exports in the first globalization wave have verified the importance of French harvest cut-backs (mainly due to the impact of phylloxera), together with the changes in French tariffs, the fall in transport costs, and colonial links (especially for France) in explaining changes in bilateral trade patterns (Ayuda, Ferrer-Pérez and Pinilla 2020a, 2020b).

However, from the end of the 19th century, world trade in wine stagnated. A key reason was the very limited degree of globalization of wine's consumption. A strong preference for wine remained limited to populations in the European Mediterranean region plus the economic elite in their colonies and a few other Western countries. Studies have shown that the increase in income outside that small set of countries did not translate into increases in wine consumption (Pinilla and Ayuda 2008; Ayuda, Ferrer-Pérez and Pinilla 2020a, 2020b). Wine trade was also restrained by policies of new wine-producing countries in the Americas and in Oceania, which protected nascent national production. For example, the strong increases in tariffs in Argentina from 1890 and in Uruguay from 1902 caused a

collapse of Spanish exports to its former colonies (Pinilla and Serrano 2008). The Australian federation and New Zealand imposed non-trivial tariffs on wine imports from the early 1900s too. As well, in 1930 Australia added an excise tax on imported but not locally produced wines, while in 1935 New Zealand increased its wine tariffs and halved the volume of import licenses (Anderson 2018; Cooper 1996).

Econometric evidence reveals that the wine trade was sensitive to a series of external shocks that severely damaged exports (Ayuda, Ferrer-Pérez and Pinilla 2020a, 2020b). World War I, the rise of the Soviet Union, temperance movements that discouraged alcohol consumption in numerous countries, and Prohibition in the United States (1920-33) all dealt severe blows to that trade in the 1920s. The 1930s' Great Depression was even more pernicious. Only the enormous expansion of Algerian exports to France maintained the level of world exports. If we consider Algeria as part of France, world exports as a share of production more than halved in the interwar period (Figure 1).

Colonial ties were a major contributor to the globalization of wine in the first globalization period. From the point of view of production, the migration of metropolitan winemakers to the colonies was fundamental. The most outstanding case is Algeria: in the midst of the phylloxera plague that devastated the French wine industry and caused the ruin of many producers, French colonization policy favored migrants who cultivated vines in North Africa (White, 2021; in Morocco and Tunisia in addition to Algeria, see Meloni and Swinnen 2018). Once North African production expanded sufficiently in the 1890s, a large increase in tariffs on France's non-colonial wine imports (which were coming mainly from Spain) caused the latter to fall dramatically (Appendix Table A3). Every one per cent increase in the French tariff reduced the market share of imports from foreign countries by 0.7 per cent in the short-term, or by 1.8 per cent in the long-term (Pinilla and Ayuda 2002).

Also, wine production increased in the former Spanish colonies in the South American cone, especially following the arrival of immigrants from southern Europe at the end of the 19th century. Spanish and Italian immigrants played an important role in the development of vineyards in Mendoza, the main wine-producing region of South America, particularly after the railroad between it and Buenos Aires was constructed in the 1880s (Stein and Mateu 2018).

Imperial preferences also boosted the wine trade between countries with colonial ties. Australia began exporting still wines from the mid-19th century, but volumes grew far more for fortified wines during the interwar period. Australia's share of British imports was boosted by two trade policy changes: in 1919 and again in 1927, Britain lowered tariffs on 'Empire' wines; and the Australian government provided a substantial bounty on fortified wine exports that lasted from 1924 to 1947. When Britain then raised its tariff on fortified wine five-fold in 1947, that trade all but disappeared (Anderson 2018).

A helpful way of summarizing bilateral trade patterns is to estimate their index of intensity. Appendix Table A4 shows that Australia had by far the most intense relationship with Britain during 1880-1940, where intensity is defined as the share of Britain's wine import volume or value from country *i* divided by country *i*'s share of the global volume or value of wine exports. South Africa's trade too was intense during the interwar period. Portugal was the only other country with intense wine trade with Britain.

The destinations of exports from France, Spain, Algeria and Italy, the principal wine exporters of the first globalization wave (they always accounted collectively for more than three-quarters of world exports), varied greatly. Patterns were largely conditioned by each country's specialization in different wine quality and price segments, in addition to colonial ties.

France was the only country with a significant and growing specialization in the fine wine segment, where it held between 75% and 90% of the high-quality wine sales of the four main exporters (Appendix Table A1). Initially France exported ordinary wine sold in casks but, as the wine trade grew strongly in the decades from 1850, the volume of bottled high-quality French wine increased more than cask wine. Those fine wines came mainly from Bordeaux, Burgundy and especially Champagne. Phylloxera intensified France's reorientation towards wines with a higher quality and price, which exceeded the country's exports of ordinary wine late in the 19th century as producers in those three premium regions improved the quality of their products and developed brands and modern marketing strategies (Ayuda, Ferrer-Pérez and Pinilla 2020b). As this type of wine was purchased by high-income earners in many countries, France had the most diversified sales abroad. European countries were the principal destination, representing between 50% and 70% of France's foreign wine sales. Even though Britain was the principal non-colonial customer, the neighbouring countries of Germany, Belgium and Switzerland also received considerable percentages of French wine exports (Appendix Table A5).

The principal markets of the other three large exporters were much more highly concentrated geographically. This was also conditioned by their specializations. Spain expanded its production and sales principally due to a high French demand as a result of the phylloxera plague. The French market was, by far, Spain's main destination, accounting for around 75% of its exports at the end of the nineteenth century. Subsequently these levels dropped, but they still accounted for 60% of its export sales of table wine casks in the interwar period. Latin America was also a principal market, due to the high presence of immigrants from Mediterranean Europe, until the protectionism in the southern cone of South America enormously limited imports from the end of the nineteenth century. The British market was important due to sherry sales (Appendix Table A6).

Algeria was an extreme case of the concentration of sales, with Metropolitan France representing more than 95% of them. Not subject to tariffs and with preferential access to the French market, Algerian wine was used as a raw material to enhance the strength or colour of French wine, which fostered a specialization based on this complementarity. However, this ended in the 1930s when Algerian wine began to compete in the French market as a final product (Meloni and Swinnen 2018).

Finally, wine exports from Italy were principally sold to neighbouring countries plus Britain up to the 1870s. Except during the phylloxera plague in France, Switzerland was the principal destination of Italian wine in the 1880-1940 period. Other neighbouring countries, such as Austria and Germany, were the next-most important. Throughout the period, these four countries accounted for more than 60% of Italian wine exports. Most of the rest went to Argentina or the United States, where many immigrants from Italy continued to consume wine from their native country (Appendix Table A7).

The second globalization wave

After reconstruction following the Second World War, the Atlantic economy quickly reintegrated with new governance based on institutions such as the GATT and the IMF. Some years later, the creation of the European Common Market and its gradual membership expansion generated a strong process of integration within Europe between its members. International trade grew quickly, particularly that of manufactured goods. Agro-food trade also grew, but at a considerably slower pace than that of manufactured goods (Serrano and Pinilla 2012). Within this context, international trade in wine, which had experienced a spectacular fall during World War II, recovered and in the mid-1950s reached the levels of the inter-war period. It then stagnated until the beginning of the 1970s before growing

steadily through to 1990 – when the international wine market began to experience some far more significant changes.

In terms of exporters, the most significant change was the disappearance of exports from Algeria, which had been the leading trader due to the volume that it exported to mainland France. Independence, the expulsion of European owners, the nationalisation of its land and other policy changes led Algeria – which represented around half of global wine exports in the 1950s – to disappear from the international market (Meloni and Swinnen 2014). After it became independent and with the gradual loss of the French market, Algeria redirected its exports to Soviet bloc countries. However, Algeria's problem resided not only in its disintegration with France but also with its economic policies. All of this, together with the creation of the European Common Market, resulted in Italy replacing Algeria as the principal supplier of low-quality bulk wine to France. Meanwhile, European integration excluded Spain until 1986, preventing it from recovering its prior position in the French market. It was only after Spain and Portugal joined the European Community and thus lowered their barriers to wine imports that they began to catch up with France and Italy in terms of their index of intra-industry trade in wine (Appendix Table A2).

An important change, which began in the 1960s, was the gradual increase in the consumption of wine in numerous English-speaking, Germanic and Scandinavian countries where beer or spirits had been the principal alcoholic drink. At the same time there was a decrease in the consumption of wine in the wine-exporting Mediterranean countries (Holmes and Anderson 2017). The exported surpluses of France and Italy became overwhelmingly concentrated in those destinations, which also took advantage of the opportunities arising from the liberalisation of intra-European trade. The exclusion of Spain and Portugal from the European Community until 1986 hindered the growth of their wine exports to that bloc, so they had to find other markets in which to sell part of their production. In the case of

Portugal, until its independence after the revolution of 1973, its African colonies (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Cabo Verde) represented up to 50% of its exports. Spain, specialised in the bulk and low-quality wine segment, found new opportunities in the African continent and the Soviet Union (Table 4). Meanwhile some exporters in the Soviet sphere, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, took advantage of their situation to significantly increase their exports to their COMECON allies.

[insert Table 4 about here]

Since the mid-1980s, further far-reaching changes have taken place in both the demand and supply sides of the global market for wine, which have had an impact on the geography of its international trade. The strong growth in consumption from 1985 in developed countries and some emerging nations, the significant drop in the consumption in countries where it was the principal alcoholic drink, and the strong entry of New World countries as wine exporters have been crucial. The New World countries currently constitute the origin of around 20% of global wine exports, while in the 1980s they represented just 2%. The traditional exporters of Mediterranean Europe have thus lost considerable market share, although as trade has more than doubled over this period their exports still increased in absolute terms, almost doubling. Of the traditional exporters, France is the country whose weight in the global wine trade has decreased the most in terms of both volume and value. The volume exported by Italy fell significantly too although the value of its exports has remained stable, while Spain has had strong growth in its share of exports in terms of volume with only a small increase in terms of value.

With respect to imports, the share of Asian countries in world wine imports has increased extraordinarily, particularly in value terms, rising from just 2% of the total in the early 1980s to 21% by 2018 and overwhelmingly led by China in the 2010s (Anderson 2020b). In bilateral trade terms, there are considerable differences between exporters

supplying that region. For traditional European exporters, the East Asian market has grown significantly but unequally. It has played a growing role for French exporters, representing more than 20% of their sales. While China initially preferred French wines (Muhammad et al. 2014; Anderson and Wittwer 2015), by 2019 Australia had surpassed France's share of China's imports in both volume and value terms. Asia represents much less of the exports of Spain and Italy. For New World countries, the Asian market is now an important destination, particularly for Australia and Chile. However, most New World countries are fairly diversified in their destinations, with Europe or North America also accounting for very high shares of their exports.

Australia is exceptional in its growth of wine exports to China since 2015 though: the intensity of its trade doubled by 2019, when the share of its exports going to China was 5.5 times China's share of the value of global wine imports – an index value more than twice Chile's and six times that of France (Appendix Figure A7). It was therefore a huge and unexpected shock when China decided, for petty political reasons, to place a prohibitive tariff on bottled still wine imports from Australia from November 2020.

By contrast to the New World, the countries in Eastern Europe have not been very dynamic. Their share of world wine exports has halved since their transition to market economies began in the early 1990s, to less than 3%. Much of their exports continue to be destined to Russia and Europe's other former socialist countries.

As previously mentioned, a contrast to the first globalisation wave is the geographical extension of wine consumption as incomes of wine-importing countries grew rapidly from the 1980s (Dascal et al. 2002; Castillo et al. 2016; Candau et al. 2017; Dal Bianco et al. 2017; Bargain 2020; Macedo et al. 2020; Ayuda et al. 2020a). However, other determining factors of wine trade patterns have had similar effects in the two globalisation waves. Transport costs or tariffs continue to constitute a major obstacle for the expansion of trade (Dal Bianco et al.

2016; Castillo et al. 2016; Macedo et al. 2020). Price increases reduce trade, although they tend to affect medium- and low-quality segments more than high-quality wines (Bargain 2020; Muhammad et al. 2014). And, as one would expect, exports have been hindered when there have been increases in real exchange rates of the exporters, and they have been favoured by Regional Trade Agreements such as the EU or Mercosur (Dascal et al. 2002; Anderson and Wittwer 2013, 2018a; Dal Bianco et al. 2017; Cardebat and Figuet 2019). Real exchange rate appreciation encouraged imports at the same time as discouraging exports of wine, causing the index of intra-industry wine trade to grow less than it otherwise would have for Australia and New Zealand so far this century (Appendix Table A8). Meanwhile, that intra-industry trade index has fallen to close to zero in Argentina, Chile and South Africa.

LOOKING FORWARD

The dramatic changes in national and global wine production, consumption and trade over the past two centuries, including in the drinking of wine versus other alcohols during the current globalization wave, raise lots of questions as to how the situation might change in coming decades.

In terms of wine production potential, it is instructive to look at national vine bearing areas as a share of total area under crop. This share is above 4% in the main wine-exporting countries of Europe, and 2-4% in numerous other European countries. Among the new exporters, by contrast, it is only in Chile where a high share of the cropping area is under vines. In Argentina, Australia and China barely 0.5% of cropped land is under vine, in the United States only 0.25% is, and that share is even smaller in emerging cool-climate areas such as Canada, southern England, elsewhere in northwest Europe, and Tasmania (Anderson and Pinilla 2020). Should the world's climate continue to warm up, those cooler areas with

still-low vine intensities of cropping may develop a stronger comparative advantage in wine production in the decades ahead, as has New Zealand this century (Anderson 2017). The dramatic rise in the New World's shares of global wine production and exports over the past three decades, at the expense of Europe's shares, may have plateaued, with limits on irrigation water possibly being a more-binding constraint in future thanks to climate changes. It seems unlikely the Islamic countries of North Africa or the Middle East will play a more-significant role in global wine markets, but it is less clear whether some former East European socialist economies might re-emerge as wine exporters. As for wine imports, East Asia may well continue to become more significant in value terms as its economies continue to grow and its consumers embrace more western habits (Anderson and Wittwer 2015, 2018b).

Whether total global consumption of wine or wine's share in global recorded alcohol consumption will continue to fall is unclear, but there is still plenty of scope for further convergence across countries in wine consumption per capita and in its share of national alcohol consumption. In particular, recorded alcohol consumption is still low per capita in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa where incomes are growing fastest – and wine's share of that is extremely low in Asia (Table 3). Contributing factors will include various developments in institutions and policies affecting consumption (Anderson, Meloni and Swinnen 2018; Meloni et al. 2019). For example, will health lobbies succeed in their lobbying for higher taxes and other curbs on alcohol consumption? Will there be further deregulation of retailing liquor laws and super-marketing or online sales of wine at all hours? Will consumers continue indefinitely to upgrade the quality of the wine they consume at the expense of quantity as their incomes grow? Will governments of wine-exporting countries lower barriers to imports so their consumers get access to a wider range of wines? Bilateral and regional trading agreements – or their undoing in the case of Brexit – also will continue occasionally

to impact on both production and consumption of affected nations and thereby on bilateral and global wine trade flows (Anderson and Wittwer 2018a).

Formally projecting into the future is always risky, since myriad assumptions need to be made. Wittwer and Anderson (2020) nonetheless draw on their new model of global beverage markets to project how those markets might change by 2025. In their baseline scenario, the real value of wine consumption is projected to rise slightly for most key countries. However, the composition is projected to continue the move to higher-quality wine. In Western Europe, Russia and southern hemisphere New World countries, for example, the volume of commercial wine consumed is projected to fall more than the volume of fine wine consumption rises, whereas in Asia and Africa the former is expected to rise more than the latter. Overall, the volume of consumption of both fine wines and commercial premium wines is projected to be about one-sixth higher, and the volume of non-premium wine to be slightly lower, in 2025 than in 2016-18. That is, according to that modelling, premiumization of wine drinking in the world is to continue for some time to come, and Asia – especially China – will increasingly become a major importer of wine, even if China's income growth were to be only two-thirds as fast as in the baseline scenario (Figure 5).⁷ Further into the future one could expect Sub-Saharan Africa to add to Asia's import demand.

⁷ This also depends on how promptly other wine exporters fill the vacuum created by the near-cessation of imports into China from Australia, following the 200+% tariff imposed on that bilateral trade from late 2020. See Wittwer and Anderson (2021) for one projection of its impact, along with projections of the short-term effects of COVID-19 on global beverage consumption. Wine trade has been disrupted in recent years also by several bilateral free trade agreements, by US tariffs on some EU wines, and by the UK exiting the EU. Estimates of their effects on wine trade are presented in Anderson and Wittwer (2018a, 2019). The

[insert Figure 5 about here]

A final point: not made explicit in the modelling just described is the assumption that policies toward marijuana (and other stimulants) do not change. Yet governments on both sides of the North Atlantic are gradually liberalizing their stances first on medicinal and then on recreational use of marijuana. How that will disrupt consumption of wine and other beverages has been the subject of much speculation in recent years, with wildly differing perspectives being put forward. No serious empirical analysis has yet been undertaken on this issue to date, other than to make guesses as to the possible value of national sales of marijuana in a few years' time. Only time will tell whose guesses came closest to what eventuates – which itself will depend heavily on the extent of consumer taxation and other regulations of the various forms in which the drug will be allowed to be marketed.

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influences of lobbying by health and environmental groups for stronger curbs on alcohol consumption and on pollution by vignerons also will affect wine markets, and is already being reflected in the growth of lower-alcohol, organic and biodynamic wine production.

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Table 1: Index of ‘revealed’ comparative advantage in wine,^a key exporting countries,^b 1900 to 2017

	France	Italy	Portugal	Spain	Greece	Bulgaria	Hungary	Argen- tina	Chile	Australia	New Zealand	South Africa	United States
1900-09	5.8	3.3	41.9	6.9	20.4	1.7	n.a.	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1
1910-19	4.2	5.7	52.5	10.6	11.0	0.9	n.a.	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1
1920-29	3.8	3.9	58.1	18.6	11.5	1.2	7.2	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.3	0.0
1930-39	3.5	3.2	22.6	3.6	4.3	0.3	3.2	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.9	0.0
1950-59	4.3	3.6	23.8	1.8	5.9	4.6	2.8	0.0	0.9	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.0
1960-69	5.3	3.0	23.7	12.4	4.1	11.8	4.9	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.0
1970-79	5.9	4.2	25.1	9.8	4.1	8.6	7.5	0.4	1.1	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0
1980-89	8.1	4.3	17.3	6.4	2.4	6.2	6.2	0.5	1.4	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1
1990-99	7.8	3.9	10.7	5.1	3.0	10.2	3.1	1.5	7.8	2.7	1.2	1.8	0.2
2000-09	7.8	5.3	8.5	4.9	2.0	4.2	0.7	3.7	12.6	8.4	7.2	4.9	0.4
2010-17	9.4	6.8	8.0	5.5	1.3	1.1	0.5	6.4	13.4	4.4	14.8	4.4	0.5

^a The Balassa (1965) ‘revealed’ comparative advantage index is defined as the share of wine in a nation’s merchandise export earnings divided by that share for the world as a whole.

^b Three other countries with high wine RCAs are Georgia, Montenegro and Moldova, whose annual RCAs during 1992-2017 averaged 28, 23 (since 2006) and 63, respectively. During 1900-69, Algeria’s and Tunisia’s RCAs averaged 67 and 14, respectively, but both had fallen to below 1 by 1990.

Source: Anderson and Pinilla (2020).

Table 2: Volume of wine production per \$m of real GDP, 1860 to 2016 (KL)

	1860- 1909	1910- 1959	1960- 1989	1990- 2016
<i>New World</i>				
Argentina	5.4	13.9	11.9	4.5
Australia	1.2	1.8	1.6	2.0
Chile	6.8	15.5	9.5	3.3
New Zealand	0.0	0.1	0.7	1.6
South Africa	4.9	5.7	5.7	4.7
United States	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3
Uruguay	1.3	6.8	5.2	3.0
<i>Old World</i>				
Algeria	>50	>50	23.7	0.5
Austria	6.9	3.7	2.9	1.4
Bulgaria	18.7	12.0	9.5	3.9
France	50.9	31.4	10.6	4.1
Georgia				5.0
Germany	1.8	0.8	0.8	0.6
Greece	26.5	24.9	7.2	2.8
Hungary	16.7	8.9	7.9	5.0
Italy	54.4	32.4	12.4	4.9
Moldova				14.8
Portugal	61.1	58.7	19.7	5.0
Romania	16.0	16.2	10.6	6.2
Spain	71.5	34.5	12.7	5.5
Switzerland	7.0	1.8	1.0	0.7

Source: Anderson and Pinilla (2020).

Table 3: Shares of beer, wine and spirits in total recorded alcohol consumption, key countries and the world, 1961-64 and 2010-14 (%)

	1961-64 ^a			2010-14 ^a		
	Wine	Beer	Spirits	Wine	Beer	Spirits
Argentina	84	3	13	50	44	5
Australia	12	75	13	40	46	14
Austria	30	55	15	35	51	14
Belgium-Lux	13	77	11	35	51	14
Brazil	22	37	41	5	61	34
Bulgaria	48	17	35	18	37	44
Canada	6	60	34	24	50	26
Chile	85	7	8	35	37	28
China	1	1	98	4	44	52
Denmark	8	77	15	47	38	16
Finland	13	21	66	21	53	26
France	78	10	13	59	19	23
Germany	18	57	24	28	53	19
Greece	46	23	31	53	27	20
Hong Kong	2	37	62	29	53	17
Hungary	48	28	24	30	36	34
India	0	2	98	0	15	85
Ireland	5	76	19	28	52	21
Italy	87	3	10	65	23	11
Japan	0	20	78	5	21	77
Korea	0	26	74	2	2	96
Malaysia	2	65	33	5	74	21
Mexico	4	67	29	3	75	22
Netherlands	9	47	43	35	48	17
New Zealand	4	78	18	38	43	19
Norway	3	27	69	29	35	36
Portugal	96	2	2	65	27	8
Romania	64	13	23	31	53	16
Russia	16	15	69	11	39	49
Singapore	2	70	28	15	71	14
South Africa	43	13	44	21	68	11
Spain	71	9	21	22	48	29
Sweden	9	39	52	49	37	15
Switzerland	42	38	20	47	34	19
Turkey	39	26	35	9	58	34
United Kingdom	4	81	15	41	37	22
United States	8	48	44	18	49	34
Uruguay	69	25	9	56	33	11
WORLD	34	29	37	15	43	42

^a Bold numbers indicate which beverage has the highest share in the period shown.

Source: Holmes and Anderson (2017).

Table 4: Shares of the world's five top wine exporters' wine exports going to key destinations, 1962-74 and 1975-85 (%)

(a) % of volume of wine exports by destination

1962-74	WEM	ECA	NA+ANZ	ROW	World	BEN	G	F	CH	UK	USA	exC
Algeria	53	41	0	5	100	2	3	45	1	0	0	
France	77	1	13	9	100	14	35	0	7	11	10	6
Italy	84	0	7	9	100	3	30	33	10	4	6	
Portugal	38	0	8	53	100	5	6	6	6	6	7	50
Spain	79	6	6	9	100	12	10	3	17	20	5	
1975-85												
Algeria	22	68	0	9	100	10	0	7	3	0	0	
France	74	1	18	6	100	21	25	0	6	13	13	3
Italy	81	4	13	3	100	3	26	40	4	6	11	
Portugal	60	9	17	14	100	10	5	17	8	9	13	5
Spain	54	23	7	16	100	10	8	2	9	15	5	

(b) % of value of wine exports by destination

1962-74	WEM	ECA	NA+ANZ	ROW	World	BEN	G	F	CH	UK	USA	exC
Algeria	56	40	0	4	100	1	1	49	1	0	0	
France	70	1	20	9	100	16	19	0	8	16	16	4
Italy	77	1	17	6	100	4	26	24	10	8	14	
Portugal	53	0	16	31	100	6	6	14	3	12	13	27
Spain	80	2	11	7	100	16	6	2	6	38	9	
1975-85												
Algeria	15	77	1	8	100	1	0	10	3	0	0	
France	69	0	22	9	100	20	16	0	8	15	16	3
Italy	67	1	29	3	100	3	23	24	5	8	25	
Portugal	71	3	18	9	100	13	6	23	2	13	14	2
Spain	70	6	13	11	100	18	11	2	5	24	10	

WEM: Western European wine-importing countries

ECA: Central and eastern European countries plus former Soviet Union


NA+ANZ: Canada plus the United States, and Australia plus New Zealand

ROW: rest of world

BEN: Belgium, Luxembourg and The Netherlands, G: Germany, F: France, CH: Switzerland, exC: former colonies


Source: Authors' computations based on UN COMTRADE

Figure 1: Share of volume of global wine production exported, 1860 to 2019 (%)




Source: Compiled from data in Anderson and Pinilla (2020).

Figure 2: Volume of wine exports per capita, key Old World and New World countries, 1955 to 2019 (litres, five-year averages to year shown)




Source: Compiled from data in Anderson and Pinilla (2020).

Figure 3: Wine consumption per capita, 1900 to 2018 (litres/year)




Source: Compiled from data in Anderson and Pinilla (2020).

Figure 4: Average price of global wine exports, 1950 to 2019 (% in real 2015 US\$ based on the US CPI, and relative to the price of spirits exports)



Source: Compiled from data in Anderson and Pinilla (2020).

Figure 5: Projected changes in regional shares of the real value of global wine imports, 2016-18 to 2025 (percentage points)^a



^a The slower growth scenario assumes Asia's aggregate household incomes grow only two-thirds as fast as in the baseline rates.

Source: Wittwer and Anderson (2020).

Online Appendices

APPENDIX 1: TRADE THEORY AND POLICY IMPACTS ON WINE'S INTERSECTORAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

A price-taking small open economy's export specialization, according to standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, is determined by supply factors (relative factor endowments, and the relative factor intensities of production) assuming technologies and tastes are the same across countries and markets are undistorted by governments. Leamer (1987) developed that model for many goods and three factors of production: natural resource capital, produced physical and human capital, and labor. Immigration and foreign investment can gradually redistribute national produced capital stocks per worker. If the stocks of natural resources (used exclusively in primary production) are unchanged, rapid growth by one or more countries relative to others in their availability of produced capital per unit of available labor

time would cause those economies to strengthen their comparative advantage in non-primary products. By contrast, a discovery of minerals or energy raw materials or a rise in their real international price would strengthen that country's comparative advantage in mining and weaken its comparative advantage in agricultural and other tradable products. It would also boost national income and hence the demand for nontradables, which would cause mobile resources to move into the production of nontradable goods and services (Corden 1984, Freebairn 2015). As domestic transport infrastructure is developed, more of the country's products would move from the nontradable to the tradable category, and a fall in ocean transport costs would widen the range of products traded internationally (Venables 2004). Such trade cost changes are especially helpful for those regions and countries most distant from key markets, but the benefit is not shared equally across the product range.

An important part of natural resource capital pertinent to the production of winegrapes and thus wine is *terroir*, which refers to various aspects of such attributes as climate, topography, soils and geology that determine the quality of the vine's growing environment. Experience has determined the best sites and most-suitable grape varieties in long-established wine regions (along with land reclamation technology in the case of the Médoc), while in new regions and where the climate is changing rapidly, science is being used to speed the varietal selection and re-selection processes (Gergaud and Ginsburgh 2008). The conventional wisdom is that winegrapes grow best between the 30° and 50° temperate latitude bands (or lower at higher elevations) where rain is concentrated in the winter and where summer harvest times are dry. However, as with other crops (Olmstead and Rhode 2008, 2011), investments in R&D can gradually expand the range of climates in which winegrapes can be profitably grown.

Technologies are certainly transferable across countries, and for wine that transferability process has accelerated over the past three decades via both fly-in/fly-out

vignerons and foreign direct investments. However, new technologies in agriculture tend to be developed to save the scarcest factor of production, as reflected in relative factor prices (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Thus new labour-saving technologies can help high-wage countries remain competitive in winegrape growing.

Greater openness to foreign investment encourages mergers and acquisitions of wine firms and the emergence of multinational companies able to spread their technological and marketing knowledge capital over numerous countries' wine industries. That helps spread those firms' risks arising from exchange rate fluctuations, weather volatility, policy changes, etc., but it passes those risks up the value chain. In particular, this aspect of globalization means independent grapegrowers, whose product is perishable and difficult to trade internationally, are becoming increasingly – albeit indirectly – exposed to the vagaries of international markets. Similarly exposed are producers of specific inputs into the wine industry such as bottles, labels and capsules – although they can potentially export their products.

Historically, countries have differed greatly in the aggregate volume and mix of alcoholic beverages consumed, even controlling for income differences (Holmes and Anderson 2017). That may be due to differing consumer preferences, which religion or immigration can influence (Bernheim et al. 2021). Such differences across countries can affect both trade patterns (Markusen 2013) and the consequences of changes in trade-related policies (Atkin 2013). But Stigler and Becker (1994) caution against assuming differences in tastes to be the sole explanation for long-term consumption differences. High trade costs can be part of the reason for those differences in consumption patterns, as they can generate differences in relative domestic consumer price. High trade costs also can help explain why historically wines were internationally traded between only a few nearby countries. In such

settings, local/nearby demand determines the level of local wine production, and local production costs influence the alcohol consumption mix.

Local demand is also relevant today for smaller wineries unable to cover the fixed cost of entering export (or distant national) markets (Melitz 2003, Melitz and Ottaviano 2008), and even for a complete national industry if it is too small to be able to afford generic promotion abroad. For all these reasons the size of the domestic market can be a contributor to an industry's productivity and competitiveness (Linder 1961, Krugman 1980). It can also help explain a home-country bias in wine demand (Friberg et al. 2011).

In addition to these standard determinants of industry competitiveness, production and trade specialization are affected also by market-distorting policies at home and abroad. Excise taxes on alcoholic beverage sales are common. Many countries also impose import taxes or other restrictions on imports of beverages, especially those they do not produce so as to serve the additional political purpose of protecting a local industry. Hence those taxes vary greatly across countries (Anderson 2020a) and, together with other regulations, can alter beverage consumption levels and mixes (Meloni et al. 2019). A dramatic example is the anti-alcohol program in the Soviet Union in the 1980s: it led younger consumers to switch from vodka to beer and reduced overall alcohol consumption to the extent of significantly reducing male mortality in Russia decades later (Kueng and Yakovlev 2021). Tariff preferences and occasional export subsidies also have dramatically affected wine trade patterns at various times. As well, tariff protection from imports for a country's other manufacturers – a common policy in many countries until late in the 20th century (Irwin 2020) – weakens the international competitiveness of that country's wineries. Where those tariffs extend to beverage imports to reduce that negative impact on the local wine industry, as was the case in numerous New World countries (Anderson and Pinilla 2018), such protection tends to slow the speed with which quality of the domestic product is raised to that at the global frontier.

The most common empirical indicator of a national industry's comparative advantage in international trade is Balassa's (1965) 'revealed' comparative advantage (RCA) index: the share of wine in a nation's merchandise export earnings divided by that share for the world as a whole. The more that ratio is above (below) unity, the stronger is the country's comparative advantage (disadvantage) in wine as revealed by actual trade data – bearing in mind that those actual trade data may be affected by governmental interventions in markets. Also helpful as indicators of competitiveness are national volume indicators such as the share of wine production exported relative to those of other countries or the world, and wine production divided by wine consumption (the self-sufficiency indicator). The share of consumption imported also is worth referring to, but it needs to be kept in mind that intra-industry trade (that is, simultaneous exporting and importing of a differentiable product) is to be expected the more heterogeneous is that product in terms of quality, variety, or style – attributes that are demanded increasingly as incomes rise, including for wine (Krugman 1980).

As for the bilateral patterns of each country's trade, distance as defined in the gravity model (Armington 1969; Anderson 1979, 2011) has become the main explanation of them post-World War II. The basic gravity model also was able to explain well Britain's trade pattern in the 18th century. However, the trade-enhancing effects of the British Empire then dominated the trade-diminishing effects of distance on Britain's bilateral trades. The former effect gradually diminished but it was only after 1950 that distance again exerted the same influence that it does today, according to Jacks, O'Rourke and Taylor (2020). Such transformations were helped by the replacement of imperial trade preferences with regional ones (Anderson **and** Norheim 1993; Schiff **and** Winters 2003). Below we summarize studies that explore the capacity of the gravity model, as distinct from colonial influences, to explain bilateral trade patterns in wine pre- and post-World War II.

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