

THE CONCEPTS OF RACE AND RACISM:

An Analysis of Classical and Contemporary
Theories of Race.

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Preface.

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Abstract.

Despite warnings to the contrary, sociological research projects in race relations have continued to develop a highly specific documentation of the 'facts' of race relations in particular settings. The substantive concepts operating at that level and the epistemological categories underlying their research techniques are generally assumed without question. The sub-field of 'race relations' has thereby been detached from problems of mainstream sociological theory and methodology.

This detachment has not been without its effects and one in particular has been to denegate the role of critique in substantive sociologies, in this case race relations. The project sets out to challenge the current status of critique operating here and to work towards an examination of the field of race relations in terms of a critical investigation of its conceptual underpinnings. Having introduced some of the major forms of critique prevalent in the field, and the shortcomings attached to each, the thesis proceeds to identify three apparently distinct conceptual frameworks within which the race concept has been worked: those of orthodox or classical race theory (where race is conceived as a physical object), sociological theory (race as a social object) and neo-Marxist theory.

The identification of these three fields permits the systematic posing of a number of problems, hitherto overlooked, or at least seriously neglected in conventional sociological race relations research. The first introduces the question of

the relationship between the concepts of race in orthodox and sociological theory. This itself involves initially an examination of the nature of the social scientific critique of orthodox race theory, which, it is claimed, in concerning itself predominantly with epistemological issues, avoids a critique of more substantive relations that obtain between the race concept and those that apparently lend it support. Furthermore the critique is seriously weakened, it is argued, to the extent that sociological race relations 'operationalises' the concept on identical epistemological grounds.

The sociological concept of race is introduced via an examination of Max Weber's sociology in general and his concept of ethnic group in particular. In keeping with the overall objective of the project (in part to make explicit a number of presuppositions taken from mainstream sociological theory and appearing as the 'facts' of race relations) Weber is considered particularly appropriate for this task. All the more so since many of the problems identified in contemporary sociological theories of race may be derived from certain problems inherent in Weber's sociological project. Such problems have been made explicit through a systematic reconstruction of sociological race theory on the basis of three central concepts, those of 'action', 'structure' and 'culture'. The relationships established between these and the implications for the possibility of a unified, coherent concept of race are raised in concluding this discussion.

The relationship between Marxism and sociology is particularly prominent in the social sciences at the present

time. The initial classification thus permits the reopening of this debate both in general terms and more particularly with reference to the possibility of a Marxist theory of race. What is suggested here is that the predominance of the sociological concept precludes at the present time a distinct conceptualisation of race within Marxist theory.

The conclusion points tentatively towards the conceptualisation of race and racism (the two concepts will be taken together for these purposes) that avoids the shortcomings of both sociological and neo-Marxist theory. In particular, as regards the latter, it seeks to avoid the reduction of social wholes to the economy in general and racist ideology to the production process in particular. On the contrary, it seeks to establish races as the product of distinct ideological practices that only subsequently intervene at other levels (i.e. the economy and politics). It is the systematic structure of these ideological/theoretical structures that this project seeks to elucidate.

INTRODUCTION

Race Relations: Theory and Research.

The thesis is concerned with an examination of the concepts of race and racism in sociological and neo-Marxist theory. These concepts have recently been developed in what has been granted a relatively autonomous status in sociology, a sub-discipline within the overarching mother discipline. This 'sociology of' that we refer to here concerns the field of 'race relations', 'minority group relations', or particularly in the United States 'ethnic group relations'.¹ This somewhat privileged status has encouraged a certain parochialism and with it a number of serious problems that, given the conventional parameters that define this particular sub-discipline, are rarely posed as such. To grasp fully the nature of these problems and their implications, it is necessary first to recognise that the sociological field of race relations, as any other, contains a number of propositions or statements that vary in terms of their level of theoretical abstraction. It is also necessary to recognise that race relations research, in the way it has traditionally been conceived, is a synthesis of two distinct sets of propositions. On the one hand it introduces a series of substantive statements and, within these statements, concepts that are traditionally associated with the field of race relations. One such set of categories, to take an illustration that we shall return to at various points throughout the thesis, is that of the integrative process,² that is to say, accommodation, acculturation, integration and

assimilation. The other set of propositions is essentially concerned with the operationalisation of these substantive categories: in other words they concern problems of method or technique in race relations research. The problem, for instance of measuring these indices of integration, is resolved around the relative merits and demerits of attitude surveys, community studies, comprising formal/informal interview schedules, and questionnaires etc.

In general terms the race relations researcher, on the basis of the substantive and methodological equipment at his disposal, produces or contributes to the production of knowledge of 'race relations' via new combinations and permutations of the existing theoretical propositions on the one hand and research techniques available on the other. Generally speaking, any new research undertaking in the field assumes the adequacy of both sets of existing propositions. This, it will be suggested, is an effect of the artificial divisions within sociology into various sub-disciplines on the one hand and sociological theory and methodology on the other. Effectively then, there exists a series of statements that remain presupposed in the substantive fields of investigation: in this case in sociological race relations. As it stands, the present division of labour in the social sciences effectively confines consideration of these presuppositions to the work of a minority. Their overriding acceptance, then, remains the point of departure for the vast majority of sociologists engaged in orthodox research projects. This thesis is in part an attempt to overcome the problem of compartmentalisation and to address itself to questions at a level of generality (the field of sociological theory) unfamiliar to most race relations practitioners.


This is not to suggest that sociological race relations is unaware of a range of theoretical problems and their implications for race relations research. Halsey, in a review of research in the field, refers to the 'modest' role of race theory in the 1960's and the importance of what he terms 'fundamental' research in the future.³ Others too, have recognised that the various conceptual levels of sociological analysis are by no means discrete fields of investigation. Van den Berghe for instance, refers to its 'low degree of theoretical integration with the rest of sociology'.⁴

Perhaps it is not so much a lack of integration, but, on the contrary, a lack of recognition that such relationships do exist and are important. What appears to be the case in sociological race relations, and this may be true of other substantive fields of investigation, is that there exists a certain point, in terms of theoretical abstraction, beyond which no problems may be posed or questions legitimately entertained. Consequently the field of race relations may be identified in the following way :

Fig. (i)

Concepts of variant forms of mainstream sociological and Marxist theory derived from distinct conceptual frameworks

Epistemological Concepts



--- 'Appearance' of concepts at level of 'Race Relations'
 ... Levels of theoretical abstraction.

The broken horizontal line marks the 'appearance' of concepts and research techniques available for the race relations practitioner. Each set of propositions and concepts that constitute quite distinct realms as far as sociological theory is concerned, become less clearly delineated for various reasons at the level of the sub-discipline. The general theoretical confusion, sometimes referred to as eclecticism, is a consequence of this artificial distinction that has been made between the pure and applied aspects of sociology.⁵ Sociological race relations has traditionally been associated with certain 'applied' objectives and these have remained ascendant in what Krausz refers to as the enormous "output of literature and reports of research in the area of minorities, and particularly race relations ... in recent years".⁶ Such studies have been encouraged under the auspices of educational trusts (e.g. the Runnymede Trust) and throughout the 1960's industry-backed bodies, such as the early Institute of Race Relations, Government-backed bodies (the Community Relations Commission) and the individual councils (established under the 1968 Race Relations Act), each with its own publishing facilities. Under such circumstances, the race relations industry, as it has been termed, has acquired its 'pragmatic quality', as Halsey refers to it, and its emphasis on practical policy recommendations, in the absence, it has been suggested, of any "satisfactory theoretical framework".⁷ The reluctance, however to tackle problems of a more general character has not been confined to non-academic publications. We have already suggested a hesitancy on the part of academic sociology to recognise the arbitrary divisions within sociology between its theoretical and substantive

components. Not only however is there the problem of transversing the horizontal division in Fig. 1. but, relatedly, there is the question of classifying and delineating the field of race relations as it appears to practitioners.

Where such attempts have been made, and these, it must be added, are few and far between, the results have been no more encouraging. Of Banton's project to found an applied social science in Race Relations, Pitt-Rivers writes,

One wonders what is to be its basis ... To be applied a science must have achieved a certain coherence and rigour. The theoretical relation binding together the explanations given in one chapter or another is missing. 8.

The question of the theoretical relationship binding together the explanations pertains closely to the theoretical confusion referred to above and hence to one of the central problems of this thesis. If we take a definition of theory from within the sociology of race, that is "theory, conceived as a set of logically interrelated propositions",⁹ then clearly the task of any analytical investigation is to assess the degree to which propositions pertaining to the concept of race and allied concepts are logically related. This, it will be argued, is notably absent in race theory, despite the fact that, defined in these terms, theory demands nothing short of this form of interrogation.

One very serious implication of this impasse, and this again relates to the problems raised with respect to Fig. 1., is the form or forms of critique developed in the field of sociological race relations. Given the constraints imposed by the divisions within sociology, there remains the question

of the basis on which we can assess the adequacy or usefulness of the various propositions that appear at the level of race relations research. In this respect we may distinguish four forms of critique currently in use in the field:-

(i) the 'empiricist' critique. Race theory is assessed in terms of the 'facts' of race relations situations and its usefulness in terms of the fit or discrepancy between them;

(ii) the 'conflict' critique. Here one explanation of order is rejected and countered by another on the ground that the one is more plausible or simply better than the other;

(iii) the 'radical' critique. Here sociological race relations are reduced to the values of the individual sociologist responsible for their production. With the denial of value-freedom, there emerges the necessity of stating 'whose side we are on' and the rejection, on ideological grounds, of race relations produced by those whose values conflict with our own; and

(iv) the 'epistemological' critique. Here adequacy is assessed in terms of the procedures invoked by sociologists to produce a knowledge of the race concept. Strictly speaking we must distinguish inadequacy, on the one hand, at the level of specific methodological or operational procedures and, on the other, at the level of the theory of the production of knowledge in general and race relations in particular that sometimes

preface work in the field.

The first may be seen for instance in the various critiques of cyclical theories or typologies of race relations situations. Here race relations are conceived in terms of some sequential pattern of development that reproduces itself in each case from the period of the initial stages of contact. "In so far as they (cyclical theories) posit assimilation as an inevitable conclusion, events of recent years have cast further doubt upon their validity".¹⁰ (Emphasis added) The second and third forms of critique referred to above are related in so far as what is often considered more 'plausible' or 'better' is judged to be so according to the values of the individual sociologist. This is not always the case however and certain attempts to counter one explanation by a 'better' one are not even qualified to this extent.¹¹ We shall illustrate fully one form this critique has taken below when we come to examine that part of sociological race theory whose object is the resolution of the 'race problem' and the various attempts to overcome certain limitations apparently inherent in this approach. The ascendancy of the sociologist himself, in terms of his value credentials, to play an important role in any critique has been advanced by Katznelson. Assuming, he argues, that value-neutrality is a 'chimerical posture', then certain consequences necessarily follow for Blacks in their relationships with Whites. In particular they should be encouraged, he argues, to ignore any 'blanched' advice on questions concerning such issues as the merits or demerits of cultural nationalism.¹² It is interesting to note Horton's distinction between normative and empirical theory in this respect.

As a sociologist I am not really interested in raising the question of whether a conflict definition of the race question is more correct than the more familiar order model. Each view is correct ... in so far as it conforms to a viable political and social experience. 13.

The onus thus rests on the sociologist to select one or the other of these models according to his own experiences (or values). Similarly Bridges, having rejected the possibility of a value-free sociology and hence a value-free critique, claims "It becomes imperative on us to say from the beginning whose side we are on". 14.

The epistemological critique, whilst enjoying some degree of favour elsewhere in sociology, has really yet to make its impact felt at the level of race relations research. The concepts of race and racism will not however be discussed at length in terms of their epistemological presuppositions for two reasons. The first relates to the question of ^{that} existing critiques ^{is} admittedly, rarely aimed specifically at race relations, ^{though its} ~~but~~ whose implications may be seen quite easily at this level. The generalised critique of methodological procedures in the social sciences by the Willers for instance clearly has implications for a substantive field, race relations, operating with identical or almost identical methods of investigation. In point of fact on several occasions in their book illustrations are taken directly from the field of race relations, an indication of the extent to which the field adequately reflects empiricism in the social sciences generally. 15. Under these circumstances there is little point in reproducing their arguments, with particular reference to surveys, questionnaires etc. constructed in the context of race relations research. There is, however, a second reason for not relying solely on this form of critique

and this relates to a distinction that has been made between epistemological and non-epistemological concepts and their respective discourses. A certain amount of controversy has arisen over this distinction that will not concern this thesis.^{16.}

One very important consequence of this distinction, however, is that having rejected the epistemological assumptions of sociological race relations, it is still possible to investigate the non-epistemological field of sociological race theory and attend to some very crucial questions of internal classification. A good illustration of these limitations of the epistemological critique taken on its own, appears in the distinction between sociological and Marxist theory, one central to this investigation of the race concept. If Marxism and sociology can be considered equivalent in so far as they both employ a 'hypothetico-deductive method',^{17.} is it sufficient to dismiss certain areas of both as 'empiricist' in so far as they attempt to produce knowledge on the basis of acquiring facts and making 'empirical generalisations'?. Clearly to do so leaves the question of the substantive concepts that distinguish the two fields unresolved (i.e. the difference between value-oriented action, etc. on the one hand and mode of production, labour process, etc. on the other.) The concepts of race and racism are not in this sense epistemological concepts and consequently they will not be dealt with in terms of an epistemological critique. Having said that, certain epistemological propositions do enter into the field of race relations and where they appear they will be dealt with by reference to the extremely succinct critiques that may be found elsewhere in sociology. Furthermore there is an area of

sociological race relations which does itself entertain a form of critique operating at this level: namely the sociological rejection of the biological concept of race to be found in what may be distinguished as orthodox race theory. We shall encounter this in Part One of the thesis.

Fig. 1. attempted diagrammatically to represent the arbitrary compartmentalisations of sociology into a number of discrete sub-disciplines and, consequently, the appearance, at the level of race relations and research of categories and concepts that are necessarily assumed and whose unproblematic nature is taken for granted. We have also suggested that the operationalisation of these concepts is an effect of certain methodological assumptions (on the right hand side of the diagram) that similarly remain taken for granted. Clearly the recent methodological critiques considerably assist in overcoming these divisions particularly once their implications for the operationalisation of sociological race theory is fully appreciated. If we conceive sociological race relations then as an effect of both these sets of propositions, and that a realm of theory beyond a certain level of conceptualisation remains out of reach of the individual practitioner, then it may also be possible to conceive the above forms of critique as effects of these internal impositions. We shall elaborate one form of critique in particular that has predominated sociological race relations recently. It is particularly pertinent to raise it here since it addresses itself in general terms to the traditional conception of race relations as a problem-solving discipline and thus serves as a useful introduction to the field as a whole.

The Status of Critique in Sociological Race Relations: an Illustration.

We shall introduce this debate via a reproduction of what has come to be referred to as the 'immigrant - host perspective' in current race relations.¹⁸ In turn attention will be focussed on those who have sought to challenge this perspective and the grounds on which this challenge has been made. Not only should this provide us with a valuable introduction in general terms to sociological race relations, but it should enable us to assess clearly the particular form of critique adopted.

The initial assumption of the 'immigrant - host' framework is, not surprisingly, that colour is one complicating factor amongst many other cultural variables that differentiate one group from another. Although Patterson fully expected to be concerned with a 'colour - problem' in her Brixton study,

Preliminary findings soon caused it to develop into a study of immigrant - host relations, with colour as one only of a number of major factors involved in the various processes of absorption. 19.

The subordination of the factor of colour in this way may be found in Handlin's study of Boston immigrants²⁰ and in Eisenstadt's analysis of the absorption of various waves of Jewish immigrants into Palestine and the State of Israel. "Immigration" the latter argues "does not breed any special types of such behaviour that do not exist otherwise"... so that "tensions ... do not differ from the types of disintegrative, anomic behaviour found in any society".²¹ West Indians, then, to return to Patterson's study, pass through the same kind of dynamic processes of interaction with local

populations as do all other working class migrants :

the same processes, for example, as the East European Jews and the Irish in London in the last century, the Italians in Canada, the Puerto Ricans in New York, or even the southern rural Negroes in the urban north of the United States. 22.

The immigrant perspective then, that Patterson finds suitable for West Indian immigrants in Brixton, leans heavily on studies concerned with previous waves of immigrants, Black or White. Consequently, in a slightly different context, Santon has argued that what is required to correct the tendency towards a 'race relations' approach is a historical perspective which examines the reception of all immigrants, regardless of origin, and their relationship to the indigenous culture. "The history of the Borough of Stepney could be written very largely in terms of the successive inflow and assimilation of widely different groups of immigrants".^{23.}

To find this broader historical perspective it is necessary to extend beyond the Borough of Stepney and contrast the treatment of the Huguenots in France, 'the offal of the earth', with the treatment of the Irish in England in the eighteenth century. The Gordon Riots of 1780 and the Spitalfields incident of 1836 occurred during a period when "the Irish in London were a police problem, a sanitary problem, a poor-law problem and an industrial problem".^{24.}

By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the first wave of Irish migrants had been absorbed in the general urban poor. It was then the turn of some 120,000 East European Jews who fled to Britain to form 'non-assimilating communities' based on an alien culture, language and religion. ^{25.} Likewise for coloured immigrants, emancipation in the long term promoted assimilation. By the end of the nineteenth century in Stepney, for instance,

coloured and White "were on very good terms and there was little or no colour consciousness".²⁶ While Banton still finds evidence of 'colour consciousness', "there are indications that the degree of social distance whites feel from coloured people has been declining in recent years".²⁷ In the course of initial contact of two groups, colour does present a complicating variable, however -

The suggestion that in Britain the coloured man is regarded as the stranger par excellence may cast light on the problem of national differences in the reception accorded to coloured people. 28.

The 'archetypal stranger' hypothesis assumes that society, comprising a complex network of relations, is maintained by a series of common understandings as to rights and obligations of persons who occupy positions in it. Britain, it is argued, is one of the countries where reliance is placed upon implicit norms, so that strangers are defined as people who do not or will not accept these norms and thus their behaviour cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. It is this sense of strangeness due to normative dislocation between two cultures that leads to conflict, particularly in the early phases of contact. Competition and conflict however inevitably give way to accommodation and assimilation²⁹ and this is true of all immigrant groups.

Where there are racial and cultural minorities, whether Jews, Negroes, Catholics or religious sects that do not intermarry, the conflicts ordinarily described as racial but which are mainly cultural, do everywhere tend to arise. 30.

Both Park and Eisenstadt conceive the conflict in terms of a clash between the universalistic values of a host group and the particularistic values of an immigrant group.

The process of absorption ... entails the learning of new roles, the transformation of primary group values, and the extension of participation beyond the primary group in the main spheres of the social system. 31.

and are comparable to the

ineluctable conflicts between the "little world" of the family in its struggle to preserve its sacred heritage against the disintegrating consequences of contact with an impersonal "great world" of business and politics. 32.

The categories of the 'integrative' process are conceived in terms of this relationship. Accommodation delineates an early phase of relations denoting a "minimum modus vivendi between newcomers and the receiving society"³³. where immigrants begin to establish themselves tolerably in contact situations. This is more likely, it is suggested, in more institutionalised settings where there is less chance of unpredictability in relations between groups.³⁴ The accommodation phase then marks the start of a resocialisation process, i.e. the reorientation of the particularistic values of the immigrant group in terms of the universalistic values of the host culture. Integration refers to an intermediary phase which leads to ultimate assimilation, or may itself refer to a final phase when a society withholds complete acceptance or a minority group continues to resist assimilation. In her more recent paper, Patterson refers to this as pluralistic integration or cultural pluralism in which a group adapts itself and is accepted in certain universal spheres of association and at the same time retains certain primary group ties (religious, linguistic etc.). Assimilation under such conditions is not always a "necessary or even a necessarily desirable sequel to integration".³⁵

Of her work, Patterson has suggested "It has arisen rather out of an 'integration' (or 'consensus') than a 'conflict' view of society".³⁶ It is this assumption which Patterson herself attributes to her middle-class background,³⁷ that constitutes

the point of departure for conflict theory's challenge to the 'immigrant - host' perspective.

It is virtually impossible to escape from the suggestion that these phases form part of a progression towards a non-conflictual generally acceptable state of inter-ethnic relations normatively oriented towards some system of common values. 38.

Furthermore, Patterson has discussed the categories of the 'integrative process' in terms of an "insular, conservative, homogeneous society"³⁹. and this too has been a source of some controversy in the debate that has ensued. In countering the first set of assumptions concerning the absorption process itself, Allen writes :

There is no inevitable progression, and processes of absorption are, as previous historical instances have shown, reversible. In fact, one can point to the situation in Britain in which long-established coloureds have during the past two decades become 'immigrants'. 40.

Similarly Rex and Moore argue in their Sparkbrook Study that the 'immigrant - host' perspective underestimates the internal conflicts and complexities in the host culture. There is, they suggest, no unitary concept of host society that can be taken as non-contradictory and static.

The relationship of a newcomer to the host-society can vary along several axes other than those which refer to the extent to which he has accepted the culture patterns of his host and gained acceptance as a 'role player' in the social system of his host. 41.

As far as the 'immigrant - host' perspective is concerned,

The frame of reference is a cultural one and culture is seen as an independent variable which may change regardless of a man's position in the structure of social action and relations and regardless of the degree to which he possesses property and power. 42.

For Rex and Moore then, culture is just one variable amongst others to be taken into consideration. Ianni, on the other

hand, relegates cultural phenomena to expressions of an underlying structure.

The dilemmas generated by the co-existence of these groups within nations cannot be resolved on the level of their purely cultural, social, political or demographic manifestations. They can only be understood when they are analysed in the context of the socio-economic structure. 43.

Similarly Allen has stressed the emphasis on attitudes, prejudice and culture rather than those aspects of the social structure within which these factors are located.⁴⁴ For these and other conflict theorists it is the structural context of economic, political and social institutions which becomes the key to social definitions of racial distinctions.

In the reproduction of the 'immigrant - host' perspective the colour factor was found to be one of a number of complicating variables. Its impact was assessed in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. It has already been suggested that its a-theoretical character has contributed to many of its deficiencies. Likewise, its inability to think historically has precluded the possibility of explaining the significance, in particular the permanent aspects of colour that derive in part, it is suggested, from a nineteenth century legacy of imperialist expansion bound up with the growth of racist thought and action.⁴⁵ Allen too regards the subsumption of race to ethnic differences as an oversimplification since it denies its potentially permanent features.⁴⁶

The concepts developed in the context of the 'immigrant - host' perspective in turn, have certain necessary consequences for the sort of race relations research undertaken and its problem-solving orientation.

The 'problem' in the 'immigrant - host' perspective is one of 'social control' and 'resocialisation'. Conflict is conceived in terms of temporary aberrations in the overall absorption process. Attention, according to their opponents, becomes focussed on those areas of contact where the process of adjustment may be assessed and problem areas identified. For instance :

In this study I have set out to describe and analyse the processes of accommodation (i.e. in terms of adaptation and acceptance) economic life and housing ... (and) ... social life. 47.

In adopting this approach, their opponents argue, they have steered perspectives towards ad hoc interpretations of specific situations without relating these to the wider social structure "a task that in sociology can best be performed with the aid of theory".⁴⁸ Similarly Allen has suggested that once the assumptions of the 'immigrant - host' framework are accepted

Students of race relations tend to deal with specific situations using ad hoc concepts and substantially neglect to relate these to propositions and theories about the macro-structures. 49.

The process of absorption and the society in which this takes place are far from homogenous. What grants them this apparent homogeneity is "their common definition as a social problem ... (and) ... the nature of the social problem, in turn, has been identified from 'liberal' and social-welfare perspectives".⁵⁰

Consequently the hallmarks of the conflict critique of orthodox race relations research embodied here in the 'immigrant - host' perspective may be said to entail :-

- (i) a rejection of the inevitability of the absorption process;
- (ii) a rejection of the assumption of a homogenous egalitarian

host society into which immigrants must necessarily adapt themselves and be accepted;

- (iii) a rejection of the normative orientation of 'immigrant - host' relations, in particular its emphasis on the internalisation of a universally-held value system by an immigrant group;
- (iv) a rejection of the 'culturalist' bias of the 'immigrant - host' framework.

Race relations are consequently invariably conceived in terms of a process of accommodation, acculturation and assimilation where each refers to a particular relationship between two cultures. The 'immigrant - host' framework hence entails consequences for race relations research and these are seen as follows :-

- (v) Race relations research is usually carried out in the context of community studies, attitude tests, surveys or questionnaires. Often these take the form of a detailed examination of certain areas of contact, e.g. at work, school, or home.
- (vi) In doing so it fails to accommodate a systematic historical approach with a necessary attempt to relate these community problems to wider structural and theoretical problems.

If we summarise conflict theory's response to these assumptions taking each in turn, we find :-

- (i) Allen has rejected the absorption process on the grounds that colour offers a degree of permanence that confers an 'immigrant' status on British-born Blacks. Colour, then, it is suggested, becomes a factor militating against this process.
- (ii) The homogenous culture argument has been rejected by Rex and Moore who argue that the perspective understates the internal

conflicts and complexities of the host culture.

(iii) Though the normative emphasis has not been dealt with specifically in the sociology of race, it has been dealt with at a general level elsewhere in conflict theory.⁵¹ The concepts of the absorption process, resocialisation, acculturation, adaptation and acceptance are seen as obscurantist in so far as they mask not only the nature of the legitimation process but also the nature of the roles into which immigrants adapt, resocialise and internalise.

(iv) Cultural forms are conceived by conflict theorists either as manifestations of some underlying structure (Ianni) or just one variable amongst many others (Rex and Moore).

The consequences of adopting this alternative set of assumptions involve, it is suggested, in the first place, a movement away from small scale ad hoc empirical pieces of research and detailed studies of institutionalised contact. In doing so, its new macro-approach readmits history and theory into race relations research.

As a critique of orthodox race relations research, it is not too difficult to demonstrate the serious limitations of conflict theory. In some respects the critique reflects serious weaknesses generally in the conflict versus consensus theory debate but we will only deal specifically with conflict theory in so far as it manifests itself at the level of sociological race relations. The a-historical and a-theoretical charges are particularly interesting in this respect. Both would suggest that history and theory are logically precluded from orthodox race relations research. In the case of history this may or may not be so,

but since no attempt is made beyond this assertion to demonstrate how historical analysis is beyond the scope of the 'immigrant - host' perspective, it would be premature to reach a definitive conclusion either way at this point. What is clear, and what does cast serious doubt on the usefulness of a straightforward assertion in this respect, is the fact that historical evidence does enter (legitimately or otherwise) into the 'immigrant - host' perspective. Banton, as we saw above, introduces his examination of the coloured quarter in Stepney with a historical review of previous waves of immigrants into the Borough. Both he and Patterson rely on evidence gained from studies from a wide range of historical sources: the Huguenots in eighteenth century France, the Jews in nineteenth century Europe and the Puerto Ricans in twentieth century New York. It may not be the 'history' of imperialism, or the legacy of the slave trade in the Americas, but it is a history nonetheless and it does appear in orthodox race relations research. The charge that such research is 'a-theoretical' is somewhat different. In the first place, it assumes a distinction between theory and the facts of race relations research that is widely regarded in sociology as untenable. (We shall return to this shortly). What is more surprising is to find such a challenge in the face of a set of theoretical presuppositions which, in the case of Eisenstadt, are developed in terms of the pattern variables scheme constructed theoretically in the work of Talcott Parsons.⁵² It seems ironic, to say the least, to find that orthodox race relations research, criticised as being a-theoretical, rests on certain presuppositions from one who, elsewhere in conflict theory, has been charged with being unable to admit facts to his 'grand theory'.⁵³

In terms of the methodological 'consequences' of both orthodox positions and conflict rejoinders, there appears much common ground between them, at least as far as it is from Sparkbrook and Bradford to Brixton and Stepney. That is to say, despite Zubaida's admonitions, they both appear tied to small-scale studies relying on survey evidence or questionnaire responses for the substantive material for their studies.^{54.}

In the absence of any internal critique of the 'immigrant - host' perspective, in terms of which it would be possible to demonstrate the logical inclusion of certain factors and the exclusion of others, the relative superiority of conflict positions becomes a matter of choice or personal preference. If one set of assertions is simply met by another set of counter assertions then clearly there is ^{no} rational basis for selecting one or another. Under such conditions, the third type of critique, the 'radical' critique, is a possible resolution to this problem. Here the values of the individual sociologist determine the superiority of one type of explanation over another. According to Horton, for instance, the decision is between the 'conflict' on the one hand, and 'normative' or 'order' explanations on the other. Neither one nor the other is logically preferable since both conform to 'viable experiences'. The main thing is that an individual selects the one that comes closest to his own.

In the above review of the 'immigrant - host' and 'conflict' perspectives, it has been suggested that theory and history both appear in orthodox race relations, despite Zubaida's suggestion that "sociological studies of race relations, with a few notable exceptions, have been a-theoretical and a-historical".^{55.} Had

they been so, however, that is, had they been devoid of history and theory, the problem still remains of establishing why they ought not to be. It is interesting here to note Zubaida's own acknowledgment of the inadequacy of such critiques.

The problem with most sociological critiques is that they are so easily countered. To show that sociology is conservative, anti-humanist, a-historical and ideological constitutes criticism from the point of view of someone who is radical, humanist, historical, has an opposing ideology. But why should sociology be radical any more than conservative? Why should it be of one ideology rather than another? The problem with discourses of this nature is that the force of the argument depends largely on shared ideological positions rather than any logical or theoretical necessity. 56. (Emphasis in original).

Race Theory and the Concept of Race.

If the 'conflict' critique is ill-equipped to provide a satisfactory basis for investigation of the field of race theory then what of the other forms of critique distinguished above? In the case of the 'empiricist' critique, it has already been suggested that the distinction made between theoretical propositions and factual statements is far from ascendant in sociology at the present time. Both anti-theorists and theorists alike have joined battle in this respect. In the case of the former, facts (e.g. crime statistics) may only be considered as indexical expressions of certain background expectancies each participant brings to the situation in question.⁵⁷ In the case of the latter, the integral role of theory has been established, even at the mundane level of fact-finding operations as those involved in measurement, thereby giving further credence to the abolitionist argument.⁵⁸ In the course of this discussion for instance, it will be suggested, that the

theoretical possibility for a sociology of race relations has been established primarily, though not entirely, in the work of Max Weber. In view of this it is surprising to find an almost complete absence of theoretical advance (some may even suggest the reverse has been the case) despite the numerous 'race relations situations' that have appeared since his death. Surprising, that is, only if the distinction between theoretical propositions and factual statements is maintained. If it is not, and a good case has been established elsewhere to abolish the distinction, then clearly there exists no possibility whatever of confirming or disproving various theoretical propositions (e.g. the race relations cycle) in terms of certain factual statements since the latter cannot be considered independently of the former. Any critique that attempts this can only do so via a form of reasoning whereby the facts themselves, only identifiable in some theoretical (conceptual) context, serve to vindicate the theoretical positions on which they themselves are contingent.

The 'conflict' and to some extent the 'radical' critiques have already been discussed. The problem with the latter, as Horton admits, is that strictly it is no critique at all. Any position 'conflict', 'consensus' or whatever is possible so long as it conforms with our experience. One general consequence of this position, and one in particular for race relations, may be mentioned here. In the first place it should be noted that once 'experience' becomes the only means to defend, or attack for that matter, a position in theory, then, as experiences undergo certain transformations, so too will the theories that correspond to them. All past theories are to this extent

irrefutable since they may or may not conform to an experience of which we, in the present, can have no knowledge.⁵⁹ As regards sociological race relations in particular it may be acceptable to some to permit both the 'immigrant - host' and 'conflict' theories as possible alternative explanations of race relations. But what of biologically-rooted theories of race, of Jensen and Eysenck's work in particular? Are these equally viable because they conform to the experience of the individual concerned? Do the numerous critiques of these positions, some of which we shall be discussing in Part One, serve no purpose whatever? Would it be sufficient to counter these apparently sophisticated arguments solely on the grounds that they bear no relationship to anything we have experienced or can experience? Whatever the political consequences of this position are, and clearly in the case of Jensen and Eysenck they could be quite serious, as theoretical critiques they have very little to offer.

In the light of what has been said with respect to these forms of critique and to the fourth type of critique, aimed specifically at the epistemological presuppositions of the discourse in question, it should be clear that the specific objectives of this investigation are confined to race theory itself. Any assessment will be made in terms of its internal propositions and not by means of some external referent: the 'facts' of race relations situations, other more 'plausible' theoretical positions, the inappropriateness of certain values held by particular individuals, the spirit of an age, or, even to some extent, the epistemological assumptions of those

responsible for the production of race theory itself.

If we recall our original conception of theory, taken from Barth and Noel, to consist of an interrelated body of propositions, then clearly an investigation aimed at this level demands that attention be paid above all to the nature of the relationship between the propositions found there. Likewise if we take Parson's conception of theory as a logically articulated conceptual scheme then any assessment first and foremost must entail an examination of a particular conceptual field in terms of the degree to which concepts there are indeed articulated and their mode of articulation with each other.⁶⁰ Race theory, the site of this particular investigation, is by no means a homogenous field. Its constituent elements comprise a number of widely divergent theoretical positions, whose common feature is the presence of the concept of race in each. For the purposes of this investigation, at the broadest level of classification, we have distinguished three such positions. Each corresponds to a particular type of 'explanation' associated with the concept of race. The first may be referred to as orthodox race theory and those attempts to produce a racial classification of man, homo sapiens, on the basis of a wide range of physiological, biogenetic and biochemical criteria. Such classifications in turn may or may not provide the basis for imputing certain differences at a behavioural level. The original biological classification provides a potential range of ability or mental capacity which is reflected in various ways ranging from the well-publicised differences in intelligence test scores to various levels of social political and economic organisation associated with these groups. It is principally this type of explanation which is

generally associated with race theory. It will be referred to as orthodox race theory to distinguish it from subsequent attempts to construct a set of propositions associated with race, yet outside the parameters of orthodox race theory.

Here we make two further classifications in an attempt to distinguish sociological from neo-Marxist race theory. Clearly the types of explanations will differ from those of orthodox race theory. By and large they are not even concerned to explain behavioural differences in terms other than biology, though this has been known as we shall see in Part One. To take an illustration from these introductory remarks, the object of the 'immigrant - host' perspective is clearly not to provide an explanation of behavioural differences in racial terms. Here racial classifications are rejected and, what differences there are, are due to cultural incompatibility. It is this incompatibility, as we saw, that was at the root of what is referred to as the 'race problem' and it is the resolution of this problem that constitutes the object of this particular aspect of sociological race theory.

The distinction within this second group of theoretical propositions (ostensibly non-biological) provides an opportunity to couch this investigation, in part, in terms of a particularly significant debate in the social sciences at the present time: the status of sociology vis a vis Marxism.

Within this three-fold classification, there are clearly sub-classifications and these will be elaborated in the case of each general division.

If we are to investigate theory as an interrelated body of

propositions, or an 'articulated conceptual scheme', then one of the central objectives will be to locate the concept of race in these respective fields, and to identify its properties through an examination of its relationship with various other forms of theoretical proposition in the conceptual context in which it is found. In terms of the foregoing classification then, the concept of race will be examined in terms of its relationship to Darwin's theory of natural selection, a number of propositions from population genetics and more recently biochemical anthropology, on the one hand, and in terms of certain concepts of social action, culture, values etc. on the other. In distinguishing the two fields in this way and locating the concept of race with respect to each, it will be possible to demonstrate the theoretical conditions for a sociological concept of race, or to be precise, the transition from a biological concept of race to a sociology of race relations. It will then be possible to examine the status of sociological race relations vis a vis the concepts of race and racism in neo-Marxist theory. The latter in turn will be seen to rely on a somewhat different set of concepts than those developed in the sociological context. In keeping with recent attempts to designate constituent elements of the Marxist totality,⁶¹ the concept of race will be examined in terms of its articulation with a certain conception of the economy, its relationship to a general theory of ideology (the concept of racism is crucial in this respect) and its role in the theoretical/ideological content of various forms of political organisation.

In each case the concepts of race and subsequently racism

will be examined in terms of their relationship to these concepts. Questions of dependency, e.g. the concept of racism in terms of a concept of ideology, consistency and coherence will be crucial in this respect. During the course of the investigation it will be necessary to readdress ourselves to conventional forms of classification before any attempt is made to reorganise a particular part of the field in terms of what may be considered its dominant concepts.

Clearly if these sorts of relationships are to be established, then it will be necessary to deliver race relations from the forms of compartmentalisation referred to diagrammatically in Fig.(i). It will certainly be necessary if van den Berghe's and Zubaida's demands for a theoretically integrated discipline are to be achieved. To make the point more explicitly, we shall make particular reference to the work of Max Weber. Not only does this provide ostensible evidence of our attempt here to address certain substantive questions in 'race relations' in terms of their theoretical presuppositions, it furthermore enables us to identify certain problems more readily in terms of the work of one of sociology's major theorists.

In this sense this is not a piece of orthodox race relations research in the way that it has come to be defined, at least in conventional terms. On the contrary, it is concerned to redress the imbalance between 'race relations' on the one hand and race theory on the other. Attempts to examine race theory in the past have rarely moved beyond an inventory of race theories and very few of these have ever seriously come to terms with neo-Marxist theory, even at this rudimentary level

of investigation. Their very scant documentation in this direction may be witnessed in some extremely glib dismissals of Marxist contributions to the field.⁶² The work of Cox and Baran and Sweezy are usually cited in this respect. Revealingly the work of Cox, in particular, probably bears the least resemblance of all neo-Marxist race theory to the work of Marx himself and in point of fact, has a much greater affinity, as we shall see, to aspects of Weber's work. Not only then have theoretical syntheses in the past been little more than mechanical reproductions of various positions but a whole corpus of work receives little more than cursory recognition. The following remarks by Westie leave no doubt as to where our priorities should lie :

In terms of volume of research material, the field of race and ethnic relations is one of the most developed in sociology. In terms of theoretical development, however, the field must be ranked among the least developed areas. 63.

If we accept that even the facts of race relations situations themselves are contingent on theoretical presuppositions then it is not simply a matter of developing the 'theoretical' aspects of race relations; what is a prerequisite of such development is an explicit statement on the theoretical presuppositions present in the field of contemporary race relations. In attempting to pose the theoretical conditions for a sociology of race relations it is hoped to make some contribution to the removal of the distinctions represented diagrammatically in fig.i.

Notes.

1. These refer to the courses in sociology departments within which these concepts have been discussed. For an extended discussion of course content etc. in the United States see P.I. Rose, The Subject is Race, chs. 7 and 8. See also B. St. Clair Drake 'Recent Trends in Research on the Negro in the United States' and for a general discussion of the

- historical development of the discipline see Graham C. Kinloch, The Dynamics of Race Relations: A Sociological Analysis, Sections One and Two.
2. S. Patterson has referred to these as the 'processes and phases of absorption'. Others have referred to them, as we shall see, in various ways. S. Patterson, 'Immigrants and Minority Groups in British Society' in The Prevention of Racial Discrimination ed. S. Abbott, p. 27.
 3. A.H. Halsey, 'Race Relations: The Lines to Think On.' Having said this in Halsey's favour, it must be said, this goes little beyond a recognition. In point of fact, it could be argued his 'fundamentalism' possesses that same pragmatic quality he argues has characterised sociological race theory in the past. Consider for instance the implications of the following: "Both theorists and policy makers are now forced to recognise that the assimilationist theory has gone with the end of the immigration or newcomer-period". p. 473.
 4. P. van den Berghe, Race and Racism, p. 6. Elsewhere van den Berghe recognises the extent to which this might be attributed to its 'specialist' character. Hence "If the subject has established itself as one of the standard specializations in sociology, it is mainly because of its immense practical consequences all over the world. Consequently, the speciality has been generally characterized by a level of theoretical sophistication, which is, if anything, lower than the altogether modest state of the discipline as a whole". Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Ethnicity: Essays in Comparative Sociology, p. 9. Not only do sociologists recognise a deficiency in this respect but some feel that progress in this direction is in keeping with the orthodox objectives of research. "The attempt to conceptualize these phenomena on a broader and more general level is not incompatible with an interest in problem solving and action research". N.R. Yetman and C.H. Steele, Majority and Minority: The Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Relations, p. xi.
 5. This distinction has been made with particular reference to race relations by M. Banton in Race Relations, ch. 1.
 6. E. Krausz, Sociology in Britain, a Survey of Research, p.143. He cites figures from A. Sivanandan, Coloured Immigrants in Britain: a Select Bibliography.
 7. H. Rose, 'Teaching Race Relations'. A report on the Institute of Race Relations Annual Conference September 1969, p. 160.
 8. J. Pitt-Rivers, 'Race Relations as a Science: A Review of Michael Banton's 'Race Relations'', pp. 337-338.
 9. E.A.T. Barth and D.L. Noel, 'Conceptual frameworks for the Analysis of Race Relations: An Evaluation', p. 334.
 10. M. Banton, op. cit., p. 76.

11. This has certainly been found to be the case outside the specific context of sociological race relations. See for instance, V.L. Allen, The Sociology of Industrial Relations, p. 11.
12. I. Katznelson, 'White Social Science and the Black Man's World: The Case of Urban Ethnography' (sic), pp. 47-48.
13. J. Horton, 'Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies', pp. 712-713. Related to this position is one which conceives the history of the concepts of race and racism in terms of the social and political conditions of the time. See for instance, L. Lieberman, 'The Debate over Race: A Study in the Sociology of Knowledge'.
14. L. Bridges, 'Race Relations Research: from Colonialism to Neo-Colonialism? Some Random Thoughts', p. 333.
15. D. and J. Willer, Systematic Empiricism: The Critique of a Pseudo-Science. See for instance their objections to the survey method in sociology using an illustration from Stouffer's survey of attitudes to racial mixing in the army, p. 73.
16. For an extended discussion of the limitations of and problems that pertain to this form of critique see B. Hindess, Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences, ch. 7.
17. This term was used in an unpublished paper given by D. Triesman at a conference on Marxism and Sociology.
18. We have confined ourselves in general to British sociology in this respect. For a reproduction of a similar debate in the United States see Paul Metzger, 'American Sociology and Black Assimilation: Conflicting Perspectives'.
19. S. Patterson, Dark Strangers, p. 7.
20. O. Handlin, Boston's Immigrants, 1790-1865.
21. S. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants, p. 20.
22. S. Patterson, Dark Strangers, op. cit., p. 18.
23. M. Banton, The Coloured Quarter, p. 18.
24. D. George, cited by M. Banton in The Coloured Quarter, op. cit., p. 21. See also S. Patterson in 'Immigrants and Minority Groups in British Society', op. cit., p. 44.
25. S. Patterson, *ibid*, p. 45.
26. M. Banton, The Coloured Quarter, op. cit., p. 27.
27. M. Banton, White and Coloured, p. 37.
28. M. Banton, *ibid*, p. 90.
29. E. Hughes, Preface to Race and Culture, by R.E. Park.
30. R.E. Park, Race and Culture, op. cit., p. 115.
31. S. Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 9.

32. R.E. Park, op. cit., p. 116.
33. S. Patterson, 'Immigrants and Minority Groups in British Society', op. cit., pp. 32-33.
34. S. Patterson, Immigrants in Industry, pp. 5-6.
35. S. Patterson, Dark Strangers, op. cit., p. 24.
36. S. Patterson, 'Immigrants and Minority Groups in British Society', op. cit., p. 27.
37. S. Patterson, Dark Strangers, op. cit., p. 41. "Partly modified" she adds "by such liberalizing influences as Oxford in the late 1930's" etc. etc.
38. S. Allen, 'Immigrants or Workers' in Race and Racialism, ed. S. Zubaida, p. 100.
39. S. Patterson, Dark Strangers, op. cit., p. 17.
40. S. Allen, op. cit., p. 100.
41. J. Rex and R. Moore, Race, Community and Conflict, p. 14.
42. Ibid, pp. 13-14.
43. O. Ianni, 'Race and Class in Latin America' in Readings in Race and Ethnic Relations, ed. A. Richmond, p. 237.
44. S. Allen, New Minorities, Old Conflicts, pp. 7-8, and in 'Immigrants or Workers', op. cit., p. 101.
45. See, for instance, P. Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, especially conclusions, p. 229 ff. We shall return to this question in Part Three.
46. S. Allen, New Minorities, Old Conflicts, op. cit., p. 23.
47. S. Patterson, Dark Strangers, op. cit., pp. 25-27.
48. S. Zubaida, Race and Racialism, p. 1.
49. S. Allen, 'Immigrants or Workers', op. cit., p. 101.
50. S. Zubaida, op. cit., p. 2.
51. R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, p. 241.
52. T. Parsons, The Social System, pp. 180-200. These constitute the basis for his elaboration of types of social structure.
53. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, ch. 2.
54. See in particular J.R. Lambert and N. Deakin's contributions to Race and Racialism, ed. S. Zubaida.
55. S. Zubaida, op. cit., p. 1.
56. S. Zubaida, 'What is Scientific Sociology', p. 69.
57. I am referring here in particular to the work of the ethnomethodologists. For an illustration of their work see H. Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, and A. Cicourel, The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice.

58. B. Hindess, The Use of Official Statistics in Sociology, Appendix, p. 51 ff.
59. See for an account of the relativistic implications of these positions in this particular case with reference to the work of A. Gouldner's project for a sociology of Sociology, see S. Savage, Sociological Theories of Talcott Parsons: Modes of Critique and the Analysis of Discourse.
60. T. Parsons, op. cit., p. 536.
61. L. Althusser, For Marx, especially p. 89 ff.
62. See for instance M. Banton, Race Relations, op. cit., pp. 167-169, and J. Rex, Race, Colonialism and the City, p. 172 ff.
63. F.R. Westie, 'Race and Ethnic Relations', in Handbook of Modern Sociology, ed. R.E.L. Faris, p. 576.

PART ONE.

THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC CHALLENGE TO ORTHODOX RACE THEORY.

Introduction.

The primary concern here in Part One is to investigate the sociological challenge to the concept of race as a non-social category, for it has been suggested that a refutation of 'biological and related theories' constitutes the correct starting point for a sociology of race relations.¹ Such a task, however, were it to include all possible areas where the concept may be found, would potentially embrace an enormously complex field of investigation and one that would certainly transcend the parameters of strictly biological arguments. One area in particular that does attempt such a task has become known as the field of the 'history of ideas'.² Here the concept of race is elaborated in terms of its historical development. Subsequent classification is primarily made in terms of convenient historical 'periods'. The unity of each of these fields of investigation, literature,³ anthropology, politics, etc. is possible, in this particular instance, in so far as the 'concept' of race is present in each. Taking one such period, early nineteenth century Britain for instance, Curtin writes -

Hundreds of variant theories were to appear in the mood of this new emphasis. Some would claim the rigor of historical law, conceived in detail and projected into the future. Others were content to use the fact of race as a key to understanding the present condition of man. In either case, the basic theories were followed in turn by countless specific applications, special formulations, calls to action, warnings of danger, and racio-political policies adopted by governments. 4.

These theories, taken together at any one time, in conjunction with all past theories, are somehow united by the common appearance in each of the concept of race. Consequently the development of the race concept is seen in linear terms, from early biblical references to Blacks through similar citations in Norse mythology and medieval poetry⁵ to some of the early attempts to classify homo sapiens on the basis of certain somatic criteria. The influence of Darwin's theory of natural selection, it has been suggested, marked an important stage in this development. Whilst it may, and has, been suggested that those attempts to extrapolate organic to superorganic evolutionary principles are a patent misrepresentation of Darwin's work (this will be developed below), social Darwinism is nonetheless considered a sequel to the work of Darwin and consequently inevitably succeeds it in the discussion of the race concept. Such 'histories' proceed toward the accumulation of evidence summarised in the UNESCO findings and the progressive attempts to redefine race, in some cases to appeal for its removal from anthropological literature. Despite the disreputable status of the concept in certain, though by no means all, academic quarters, almost as a postscript to this universal history of the concept there appears what has been referred to as the revival of the scientific concept of race in the field of psychometrics, in particular in the work of Jensen and Eysenck et al.

In this discussion of the concept of race in extra-sociological fields of investigation, a global documentation of the concept in all its multifarious forms will not be attempted,

for two reasons in particular. In so far as the thesis is primarily concerned with an investigation of the concepts of race and racism in sociological and neo-Marxist theory, the preliminary objective of this discussion will, of necessity, focus attention specifically on the sociological rejection of these rival concepts of race. Consequently the discussion is constrained by the limitations, to some extent, of the sociological critique itself. These have confronted two fields in particular: those of physical anthropology and psychometrics. The second reason concerns not so much constraints imposed by the thesis in terms of its overall objectives, as those limitations imposed by the field of the history of ideas itself. Above all the history of the idea of race can only strictly examine those fields where the concept of race may be found, i.e. all that is pertinent to a historical account of the idea of race are documents containing references to races.⁶ Two consequences follow from this. In the first place, ideas are conceived of as autonomous and strictly no relationship may obtain between discourse and the non-discursive.⁷ In the second place by constraining histories in this way (i.e. to only those areas 'apparently' pertaining to the race concept) discursive fields that may be found to possess considerable effectivity⁸ in terms of the traditional areas of race theory are considered non-pertinent. The history of the race concept not only then reduces time to an a priori continuism⁹ but in so doing denies the specificity of the various fields where the race concept may be found.¹⁰ In each, it may be said, the concept may appear but in conceptual terms, i.e. in terms of its location in the discourse, it may perform a role that

requires a distinct form of analysis in each case. For example in the above illustration taken from Curtin the race concept may 'appear' in both nineteenth century anthropology and political theory. Its role in both, however, must be considered in terms of the fields of anthropology and political theory. They cannot, as they have in the history of ideas, be reduced to a unitary discourse whose essential unity is vouchsafed by the appearance of the race concept in each. It is this form of reductionism that the thesis seeks to avoid.

The present discussion, it has been suggested, will focus attention on two fields in particular where the concept of race has been developed in terms of non-sociological categories: the fields of physical anthropology and psychometrics. These two areas in particular have come to be represented in sociological literature, at least, as the chief exponents of a biological concept of race. As such they constitute the basis of the supposed truths upon which, according to sociology, the fallacy of race rests. In so far as the biological concepts have been developed in accordance with the supposed epistemological protocols of the natural sciences, they have been considered as precursors of a 'scientific' concept of race; this has subsequently been held responsible for a whole range of misconceptions concerning the relationship of hereditary to behavioural characteristics. These find expression in a multiplicity of ideological contexts, from the relatively sophisticated statements elaborated in political theory down to the banal utterances assumed and delivered without question in literature and poetry and, in a less lyrical context, in

everyday conversation. If these misnomers rely for their support on developments in anthropology and subsequently in psychometrics, then sociology has as its first duty, according to Rex, the refutation of the concept developed in these fields. The object of this discussion then is not to investigate the 'origins' or 'genesis' of the race concept and trace its development through successive periods, but primarily to examine sociological attempts to refute these rival concepts and to thereby ensure a smooth entrance for the concept of 'social race'.

Consequently Section I will examine in general terms the status of the race concept in anthropology. This will entail firstly a reconsideration of attempts to provide an exhaustive classification of homo sapiens on the basis of somatic differentiation in physical anthropology. In particular, it will focus on Barzun's distinction between 'descriptive' and 'scientific' anthropology. In the second part of Section I we shall reproduce and elaborate recent anthropological objections to these attempts, some of which have been used as evidence in the case for a sociological concept of race. It will be suggested subsequently that there are two levels of critique operating here. The first concerns a direct challenge to the epistemological assumptions of the anthropological field of investigation. In other words if the scientificity of scientific race were a function of the methodological principles invoked to construct this concept, the critique is aimed at the canons of scientific anthropology. What tends to become relegated in this potentially quite devastating attack on one

form in particular of positivist epistemology, is a substantive attack on the concept of race itself which is now possible, given recent developments in population genetics and the assistance of certain principles taken from the Darwinian theory of natural selection. These will be developed in the latter part of Section II.

In Section II we shall examine the contribution of psychometrics to race theory and subsequently the rejection of this so-called revival of 'scientific' race in contemporary social science. In the first instance this will involve a reproduction of the work of two of psychometrics' renowned exponents; the relatively sophisticated work of Jensen in the United States and the popularised version in Great Britain prominent in Eysenck's contribution to the field. Here we shall attempt to locate the concept of race in their work and examine its function in psychometrics vis a vis its status in physical anthropology. In general terms this will enable us to establish the relationship between two fields that have been conveniently subsumed under some notion of 'scientific' or 'biological' race. The reproduction of these arguments should then enable us to reconsider fully the social or socio-psychological rejection of biological race and its implications for the production of a social concept of race in its place. As we shall see, the race concept in psychometrics, as in the case of anthropology, is somehow considered scientific at the outset, but, for reasons that should become clear, rendered unscientific in the course of both anthropological and socio-psychological objections to the 'biological' concept.

In elaborating the social challenge to the concepts of race developed in these arguments, the discussion will of necessity reproduce (in an extended form) a critique aimed at the 'scientificity' of scientific or biological race. To remain however at this level of analysis entails certain consequences for the possibility of a sociological concept of race. In particular it will be argued, that at this level the very undoing of a 'scientific' concept of race is accompanied by an acceptance of precisely those assumptions or protocols at the outset of sociological processes of racialisation.¹¹ In other words the set of methodological assumptions that constitutes the unscientific basis of scientific race at the same time constitutes much of the sociological field of race relations. In reply then to the question how do we establish a knowledge of this concept race, the response in both cases is essentially the same. The positivism invoked by physical anthropology is decried on the very basis of its positivistic assumptions, yet at the same time re-established within a sub-field of sociology that, in part at least, invokes precisely the same principles to guarantee its own scientificity. That part of sociological race theory that apparently remains distinct in this respect is embodied in a form of critique developed by Rex aimed in particular at the 'desensitising consequences of psychometrics': this will be elaborated in the concluding section. It provides the sole basis for a sociological concept of race which will be developed in the context of a discussion in Weber's sociology and his concept of ethnic group.

One final consequence of the form of critique developed by

sociology (with the assistance of anthropology) is seriously to neglect a refutation of the biological concept of race (in both physical anthropology and psychometrics) that develops its attack at the substantive conceptualisation of the race concept itself in the light of recent developments in population genetics. At this level of analysis, the field of psychometrics comes under pressure not through evidence supplied by the nurture side of the nature-nurture debate, nor for the 'desensitising effects of statistics' but through its retention of a concept of race that has been found elsewhere to be utterly incompatible with the body of scientific knowledge it appeals to for support.

Notes.

1. J. Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, p. 6. Strictly speaking we shall be reconstructing the 'Social Scientific' Challenge to orthodox race theory as the Section heading suggests. It will include arguments then from outside sociology (from psychology and anthropology in particular). For convenience however it will generally be referred to as the 'Sociological' Challenge.
2. An extended discussion of these positions from within a history of ideas problematic will be attempted in a subsequent discussion of the concept of racism in neo-Marxist theory in Part Three.
3. For a discussion of race in literature see for example, D.G. MacRae, Ideology and Society: Papers in Sociology and Politics, pp. 106 ff; P. Mason, Prospero's Magic: Some thoughts on Class and Race and M. Banton, Race Relations, op. cit., ch. two.
4. P. Curtin, The Image of Africa, p. 364.
5. See for example C.T. Jonassen, 'Some Historical and Theoretical Bases of Racism in North Western Europe', p. 157.
6. Or prior to the 'idea of race', reference to skin colour, blackness etc. See for example W. Jordan, White Over Black, Part One.
7. The distinctions between the realm of ideas and all that exists outside this realm i.e. the material world or the world of nature. Of course its logical preclusion from such histories has not prevented historians of race theory from including aspects of the extra-discursive in

their accounts. M. Banton's work is a case in point in this respect.

8. If discourse is considered in terms of a hierarchy of levels of conceptualisation, then it may be possible to demonstrate that certain concepts of a higher order of generality may be responsible for the theoretical content of those at other levels. This certainly has been found to be the case in relatively systematic social theory. See for example B. Hindess and S. Savage, 'Parsons and the Three Systems of Action'. It will also be suggested in our subsequent discussion of conceptual classifications in sociological and neo-Marxist race theory. The history of ideas, confined as it is to 'appearances', precludes this form of vertical analysis of discourse.
9. That is to say, the continuity of time is considered without argument. An a priori demonstration is one that by its very assertion is assumed to exist.
10. This question of the specificity of discourse is a point raised in particular in the context of a polemic against the History of Ideas by M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 171. The shortcomings of the archaeology itself have subsequently been developed by K. Williams. In particular there remains, it is suggested, the problem of delineating the specificity of each discourse which appears according to Williams to be an essentially arbitrary operation in Foucault's work. K. Williams 'Unproblematic Archaeology', p. 64.
11. Racialisation is a term borrowed from Montagu and used to refer to the process (genetic or environmental/cultural etc.) under which group differences are produced, A. Montagu, 'The Concept of Race' in The Concept of Race, ed. A. Montagu, p. 13.

I. Physical Anthropology and the Race Concept.

If Part One is concerned in general terms with exploring the sociological challenge to 'biological race', section I will be devoted to a reconstruction of the anthropological concept of race in so far as it provides the possibility, in the latter part of the section, of reviewing critically the anthro-genetic objections to this concept. Only then will an attempt be made to develop a form of critique implicit in recent anthropology and population genetics, but which remains subordinate to the general arguments presented there. Consequently attention will be drawn at the outset to that 'outmoded methodological approach'¹ invoked, it has been suggested, to provide an anthropological basis for race differences.

1. The Concept of Race in Descriptive and Scientific Anthropology.

To avoid the rather simplistic reduction of all non-sociological concepts of race to 'biological' categories, it may be useful to specify those disciplines in particular that have concerned themselves with an examination of race from a biological viewpoint. Montagu has distinguished zoology, genetics and anthropology in this respect.² This too obscures, to some extent, certain differences, not simply in terms of specialisms, but in terms of fundamental assumptions in the field of anthropology. Although race has been considered by some to be anthropology's main subject,³ there are areas, i.e. social and cultural anthropology, which, though potentially interested in race theory, only marginally concern themselves

with specifically physiological processes of raiation.⁴
 Consequently human somatic differentiation has become the object of physical anthropology, and, to some extent, more recently of population genetics and biochemical anthropology. This will subsequently be examined in terms of the concept of race found in psychometrics, and the work of Jensen and Eysenck. Hence -

What is common physically to all human beings has been the concern of human biology as a specialized branch of general biology, while the traditional task of physical anthropology has been the description and explanation of human physical variation. 5.

In general terms, then, we shall be concerned initially with that area which 'investigates' the laws regulating the distribution of mankind.⁶ Specifically it will attempt to reconstruct this field in so far as it pertains to subsequent attempts to challenge the race concept in recent anthropology and genetics. It is not to be seen as part of an attempt to explore the origins of ethnology and anthropology in terms of the influence of Hippocrates and the ancient Greeks, or to speculate the impact of mathematical physics in the seventeenth century and the rise of the biological sciences in the latter half of the eighteenth century on the growing interest in man and the nature of human differences.⁷ On the contrary, what concerns us here, is the location of the concept race in physical anthropology, with particular reference to the epistemological assumptions of a so-called 'science' concerned with the laws of human variation.

According to Barzun, the year 1859 saw the decline of 'descriptive' and the rise of 'scientific' anthropology.⁸ If recent work has been primarily concerned with the scientificity of scientific anthropology, it would be pertinent at this stage

to reconsider the relationship between the two.⁹ The space separating them, it will be suggested, is not quite the epistemological rupture the distinction implies.¹⁰ On the contrary it will be suggested, while the techniques of the former entailed observation and description of phenomena, the latter in addition to these involved counting, measurement and experimentation. Both, however, in terms of their methodological assumptions, remained two variant forms of positivist philosophy of science.¹¹

a) Racial classifications in early anthropology.

In terms of their theoretical assumptions descriptive anthropologists were divided in particular on the question of the origins of the human species. There were those monogenists on the one hand whose arguments appeared compatible with theological assumptions and who assumed man to be the product of a single stock (e.g. Adam and Eve). Subsequent differentiation then was explained in terms of variable ecological conditions. Polygenists, on the contrary, stressed the distinctiveness of human stocks at least in terms of their conception. Both polygenist and monogenist assumptions could then subsequently be developed in conjunction with the notion of either mutable or fixed and unchanging biological types.¹²

To some extent, the problem of how 'man' came to be divided i.e. whether he had always been or came to be so through ecological changes in the environment, appeared superfluous to those questions specifically concerned with racial classification. The concept of race was introduced as a taxonomic principle for the division of man along somatic lines by Bernier in 1684.

Races or species (the two were indistinguishable here) were developed according to a set of observable physical features, notably skin colour, hair and physiognomy, i.e. facial or bodily features. Consequently four or five races or species were distinguished which, it was suggested, provided the foundation for a new division of the earth.¹³ All these referred to above in connection with the monogenist - polygenist debate, shared a fundamental concern with classification and division according to a number of sets of physiological criteria. Linnaeus for example (1758) distinguished four varieties of mankind: *Europaeus Albus*, *Asiaticus Luridus*, *Americanus Rufus* and *Afer Niger*. Such classifications as these require no further explanation. Blumenbach (1781) elaborated Linnaeus' system by adding a fifth: these five human races (now considered sub-divisions of a single species) included the Malayan (Brown) in addition to the Caucasian (White), Mongolian (Yellow), Ethiopian (Black) and American (Red). Cuvier reduced this five-fold classification to three: Caucasian, Mongoloid and Negro.

Blumenbach, in addition to his colour based classification, made an extensive classification of skulls, a contribution underestimated by Barzun.¹⁴ Development in skull anthropology and phrenology (the latter was concerned with the relationship of man's faculties to certain areas of the brain and the size of these areas, and consequently to the shape of the outer skull) subsequently became a significant feature of nineteenth century anthropological theory, in particular that area which supposedly transcended descriptive anthropology with experimentation,

measurement and counting.^{15.}

The specific problems pertaining to these classifications will be elaborated below. In particular they will concern at one level the methodological assumptions invoked to produce these various taxonomies. At a more substantive level they will concern the possibility of transposing the concept of race for that of species, and subsequently of inferring super-organic principles of evolution from Darwin's theory of natural selection.

b) James Hunt and the 'new science' of anthropology.

In contradistinction to the apparently 'descriptive' nature of these early classifications, there appeared a 'scientific' anthropology whose claim to such status is principally what concerns us now. To do this we shall examine a paper written by J. Hunt presented to the Anthropological Society which draws particular attention to the scientific claims of the new anthropology.^{16.} Here he discloses the scope and object of the new science and lays down the protocols for its establishment. There can never be a science of Man, that is an anthropology, "until we take the trouble to use a scientific method of investigation".^{17.} (This is of particular significance since, as we have suggested, it is the character of this 'scientific method' that interests us here. As we shall see it is this pretension which has been challenged by recent anthropologists and geneticists (section I below) and later the sociological response (section II) to the concept of race in psychometrics. The onus then would seem to fall on sociology, if it is to remain at this level of critique, to provide a genuinely radical epistemology thereby transcending the limitations of an 'unscientific

concept' and reconstituting it on a truly scientific basis.) Hunt was convinced it seems, that hitherto "as a science, it hardly yet has any existence".¹⁸ (Emphasis in original). What is it that constitutes the basis of this transformation? The primacy of 'facts' it appears is crucial to Hunt's new science:

"The great problem of Anthropology can only be settled by facts, and not by abstract logic ... We should, therefore, take a lesson from the geologist, and found a science on facts".¹⁹

(Emphasis in original). And theory? "We must always be ready to change our theories to suit our facts ... (For) True science cares nothing for theories, unless they accord with the facts."²⁰

Hunt later modifies this argument, for there are, he claims, dangers invoked by considering facts independently of pre-suppositions: travellers only report according to certain preconceived notions. In point of fact, in concluding the lecture, factual content appears subordinate to theoretical presuppositions, for as he concludes "facts, too, we have in abundance, but they are not of the right sort".²¹ (Emphasis added). Certain

inferences may be drawn from these remarks with particular reference to the distinction made between this and earlier anthropology. The scientific method here proceeds by way of inductive and deductive reasoning to the formulation of general principles concerning the phenomena in question.²² Testability

(against a neutral observation language) is crucial in this respect, a principle refined by the application of statistical methods²³ and the use of advanced measuring devices for

discriminating somatic differences not outwardly observable.

Interesting in this respect is Broca's craniometer for measuring

the skull and cephalic index which was obtained by dividing the crosswise by lengthwise diameter of the skull and multiplying the result by 100. In doing so,

The race anthropologist must divide his scale into groups that he calls racial types. The most familiar are the dolicho (long-headed) with a small index, and the brachy (round-headed) with a larger index. 24.

Measurement was by no means restricted to the skull and others included measurements of limbs, organs and classifications on the basis of blood groups in addition to those already mentioned. In summarising scientific anthropology or anthropometry as this particular field of investigation became known, Deniker writes,

A science cannot remain content with a pure and simple description of unconnected facts, phenomena, and objects. It requires at least a classification, explanations, and, afterwards, the deduction of general laws. In the same way, it would be puerile to build up speculative systems without laying a solid foundation drawn from the study of facts. 25.

What distinguishes this new science in particular then, and presumably a scientific from a descriptive concept of race, is its application of a particular method. This method, to summarise the foregoing discussion, is characterised by an a priori distinction between the facts of anthropology on the one hand, and elaborate systems of racial classifications on the other. In each case the former are accorded a degree of primacy to the extent that racial categories are contingent on the presence of these 'facts' that lend them crucial support. The classifications, it is admitted, are relative: "In all sciences, classifications change in proportion as the facts or objects to be classed become better known."²⁶ The objects to be known, in this particular case races, are furthermore contingent on the development of

instrumentation enabling accurate measurement of internal and external bodily dimensions. Such instruments, the craniometer for instance, subsequently provide the data for statistical programming.

What apparently distinguishes scientific from descriptive anthropology is at best a transformation of method.²⁷ Both develop, however crudely, classification systems on the basis of the facts of physiology and physiognomy. The facts may have become more technical through the use of relatively sophisticated instruments and their programming more elaborate, but their assumptions concerning the possibility of an exhaustive system, and the means by which this was to be established, remained in principle the same. Consequently the problems at this level remain common to both. In particular there remains for both the question of selecting one set of classifications in logical preference to another, given "The great problem of anthropology can only be settled by facts, and not by abstract logic".²⁸ (Emphasis in original). Consequently there remains a problem that will be developed below of differentiating rigorously the concept of species from that of subspecies and consequently differences within species when, according to Barnicot the question of -

Whether two populations are sufficiently distinct to warrant recognition as a subspecies, a race, or some other conventional infraspecific category is an arbitrary matter to be settled by reference to some agreed rule. 29.

If sub-classifications such as these are made by differences of degree, whether by the establishment of statistical aggregates or crude taxonomic devices, the question of the pertinence of one set of

criteria and the resultant classification system over another remains unresolved. Both descriptive and scientific anthropology consider race a physical category known through observation and classification of somatic differences between individuals. What constitutes, by definition, the essence of descriptive anthropology, i.e. its 'factual' basis, remains central-it seems to scientific anthropology. The old colour based classifications are merely extended and refined by means of elaborate and sophisticated measurement and experimentation. Indeed as Hunt's observation at the outset suggests, a colour based classification remains very much at the heart of his new science :

Whatever may be the conclusion to which our scientific inquiries may lead us, we should always remember, that by whatever means the Negro, for instance, acquired his present physical, mental, and moral character, whether he has risen from an ape or descended from a perfect man (!), we still know that the Races of Europe have now much in their mental and moral nature which the races of Africa have not got. 30.

Scientific practice then cannot remove those obvious differences in the Negro's moral and mental character that are known to exist presumably without the assistance of Science ! Science may only substantiate those differences that are known prior to its existence, yet at the same time constitute the object of the scientific enterprise itself. If this is the case then, scientific anthropology was no more successful in its attempts to establish an exhaustive classification than earlier anthropology. Races numbered anything from four (St. Hilaire 1860), five (and fourteen secondary) (T. Huxley 1870), sixteen (Topinard 1878) and thirteen (Deniker 1900).

In considering Anthropology's attempt to produce an exhaustive system of racial classification, this section has

been concerned to reconstruct in particular those arguments that shall subsequently pertain to an examination of the anthro-genetic and sociological challenge to these attempts. In this respect it was thought productive to dwell on Barzun's distinction between descriptive and scientific anthropology. Not only then did this provide the basis of a review of several of these attempts, but it was also felt that the implicit non-science/science distinction conceals a fundamental similarity precisely at this (epistemological) level and that this will ultimately weaken the challenge taken up in particular by sociology to the scientificity of scientific race. In other words, though this discussion will ultimately develop a critique more directed toward the substantive implications of a concept race itself and limitations with respect to the level of critique entertained in recent anthro-genetics and more particularly in sociology, it will not hesitate to elaborate the epistemological arguments to their fullest extent.

2. Anthro-genetics and the concept of race.

Accordingly, this examination of the anthro-genetic challenge will fall into two parts. In the first place we shall be concerned to reconstruct and at times develop those arguments that have primarily sought to problematise the epistemological assumptions of physical anthropology. (The distinction between 'descriptive' and 'scientific' anthropology will be shown to be of no significance in this respect). This will also take into account those attempts to redefine race in the light of recent developments in population genetics. The second part will take these more recent attempts to incorporate race in the fields of

population genetics and biochemical anthropology, not so much in terms of those doubts concerning the epistemological status of physical anthropology, but more in terms of the current status of the concept race vis a vis the concepts of natural selection and subsequently those of population genetics. It becomes possible through these substantive questions to confront directly that other branch of orthodox race theory concerned not so much with straightforward physiological classification, as with inferring superorganic principles of evolution from certain principles of biological evolutionary theory.

a) The epistemological status of physical anthropology.

The paramount concern of physical anthropologists was it has been suggested in the reconstruction of their arguments, to provide an exhaustive system of classification along racial lines. What appears most questionable, at this level, is the possibility of demonstrating the rational superiority of one taxonomic system over another. If such a possibility is precluded the whole process of 'racial' classification becomes a purely arbitrary exercise on the part of the investigator, both with respect to the criteria selected and to the classification itself.

This remains the implicit suggestion of many recent misgivings concerning the race concept in anthropology and the methods invoked to produce this concept. Here, it has been suggested, "Nobody had tried to answer the questions why certain measurements were taken, (or) why they were considered significant ...".³¹

The selection then of one of an infinitude of possible physiological criteria on which each of the racial taxonomies

was based, became, as a result, a somewhat speculative process. Consequently the introduction of phrenological, and a multitude of other external and internal bodily dimensions were made, not through necessity, but through an almost random selection process on the part of the investigator. The extremes to which such operations might go have been suggested by Barzun: "Scientific anthropology might as well class together all human beings born with the ring finger longer than the little finger and call them a race".³² The essential arbitrariness is not only confined to the selection of those physiological criteria considered pertinent, but also to the question of what constitutes a 'suitable' degree of differentiation to warrant a semantic distinction at the various levels of sub-classification of the human species, and indeed of what these groups and sub-groups should be called. This, in point of fact, has been recognised by those who themselves have undertaken such attempts: "It is left to the personal taste of each investigator what name be given to these".³³ Both these problems, i.e. the problem of establishing what constitutes the basis for a hierarchical division within homo sapiens and what constitutes sufficient grounds for distinguishing nominally these groups (and what to call them), apply no less to anthropometrics assisted by relatively sophisticated measuring devices than it does to those crude taxonomies that preceded them. In terms of 'scientific' anthropology then, the problem of what constitutes a significant statistical aggregate remains:

There are differences of a statistical kind between the peoples of different regions but the geographical pattern of variation seems as a rule to be such that regional

groups can only be arbitrarily defined and no one in fact has yet suggested precise definitions. 34.

It is surprising in view of this that Barnicot suggests such precise definitions could emerge. Indeed it is hard to conceive of any classification, however precise, able to circumvent these problems. Consequently there are few grounds for supporting the relatively sophisticated taxonomy of Ehrlich and Holm based on multiple - character comparisons:

Numerical taxonomy consists of the quantifying of large numbers of characteristics (usually seventy-five or more) which vary in the group of organisms to be studied. 35.

This leads, they claim, to the production of some kind of coefficient of similarity among the units studied and the possibility of clusters comprising the most similar entities. The problems of selection however still remain, both with respect to the criteria for multivariate analysis and to which statistical aggregates merit semantic differentiation. 36.

The widely differing opinion has invoked racial classifications from three (Cuvier) to over one hundred as revealed at a number of anthropological congresses.³⁷ This is a necessary effect of the procedures outlined in ^{part 1 above} ~~the previous section of this paper~~. If such is the case, there is no basis for the supremacy of Cuvier's three-fold, Linnseus's four-fold, Blumenbach and Huxley's five-fold classification (both founded on independent sets of criteria) or Deniker's thirteen-fold classification.³⁸ What is more, by their own admission there is no possibility of resolving the problem: "The number (of races) increases as the physical characters of the populations of the earth become better known." 39.

In attempts to redefine the various concepts of race, principles of Mendelian Genetics have played a significant part.⁴⁰ Generally differentiation is now established on the basis of the degree to which 'populations' possess certain genes in common. The problem however of redefinition along these lines remains as before one of selection, in this case of pertinent and non-pertinent genes. "Since all human populations most likely differ in the frequency of some gene, this position implies that each population would be a separate race",⁴¹ and similarly Dobzhansky has commented: "If races have to be discrete units, then there are no races".⁴² This applies equally to attempts from within biochemistry, biochemical anthropology to be precise, to establish a division within mankind on the basis of biochemical criteria. The question of whether to select, for example, cholesterol or hemoglobin levels, or the concentration of various enzymes (e.g. amylose), remains as problematic for the biochemical anthropologist as for the early taxonomist.⁴³ Consequently it has been suggested,

In the face of such obvious discordance as, for instance, human skin pigmentation with blood type factors, or hair form with cephalic index ... the wildly varying opinions of anthropological schools on the racial classification of our species show up as irrelevant and unnecessary. 44.

If the classification schemes themselves appear as speculative and arbitrary, each attempt to develop certain principles for the purposes of investigating physiological processes of raiation is subject, in addition, to a necessary circularity with respect to the initial typologies suggested and those ultimately established. An illustration of this tendency common to all epistemological arguments, may be seen

in Hunt's inaugural lecture to the Anthropological Society. Here the science of anthropology, according to Hunt, is established on the assumption that races already exist and that colour provides the means of classification. Without this initial assumption there would be no basis for considering which of the multitude of physiological criteria subsequently invoked are to be considered pertinent or non-pertinent. The whole 'scientific' enterprise thus exists on the premise that homo sapiens, apparently a fixed entity itself, is divisible and that skin colour constitutes the basis of such a division. The object of physical anthropology (racial classification) is thus assumed, without foundation, at the outset; this alone grants legitimacy to further classificatory schemes, however advanced technically they may become.

b) Darwin, population genetics and the concept of race.

In so far as these arguments have aimed in particular at the epistemological status of physical anthropology (i.e. whether or not a knowledge of the concept race can be achieved via the procedural injunctions specified at the outset) they have to some extent ignored certain substantive problems with respect to the race concept that exist independently of epistemology and epistemological concepts.⁴⁵ There are several possibilities in this respect but, in the context of an examination of the concepts of race in sociological and neo-Marxist theory, to exhaust these substantive issues is out of the question. For these purposes, two areas have been taken to illustrate certain of these problems. The concepts of Darwin's theory of natural selection and those more recently of population genetics are

often assumed to accommodate a race concept without much difficulty. It may be possible to go as far as to say, particularly in the case of natural selection, that they demonstrate the necessity of some form of race concept. The status of the race concept in these fields then is of considerable significance for those who seek to retain and develop the concept and those who seek to defile it.

In this examination of what has been referred to as orthodox race theory, the race concept has only been investigated from within the field of physical anthropology. In so far as this has been the case, it has remained an object of physiological classification and no more. To move from physical anthropology to race theory proper, it is necessary to make two further assumptions. Once physiologically based groups have been identified, the task of physical anthropology, these may then be assumed to coincide with certain mental capacities. It is these biomental aggregates that may then be held responsible for various levels of political, economic as well as cultural advance (or, as some have referred to it, degree of civilisation). It is this shift from racial classification to racial determinism that marks a period in thought referred to as the tendency to "biologize" history.⁴⁶ Not only then was it assumed that an exhaustive system of somatic types was possible, but furthermore, "that the phenomena of social life could only be understood in terms of heredity and selection".⁴⁷ Orthodox race theory, in this sense, provided a biological basis for a whole range of theories of social, moral, economic and political behaviour. Change at this superorganic level could

be conceived as a function of the organic state of these racially based populations.⁴⁸ It was possible to suggest under these circumstances that 'race' was everything; "literature, science, art - in a word, civilisation depends on it".⁴⁹

The presence of concepts of selection and adaptation, for instance, in nineteenth century social theory⁵⁰ suggests a certain affinity with the concepts of Darwin's theory of natural selection⁵¹ and this has led Harris and others to comment on the influence of Darwin on Knott and other race theorists of this period. Consequently those problems introduced here concern orthodox race theory (i.e. the theories of racial determinism) as well as those concerned with the concept of race as a physiological category (i.e. physical anthropology). With respect to the former what will be suggested is that, contrary to the assumptions of social Darwinism, the concept of race is pre-empted by the theory of natural selection and the concepts contained therein. With regard to the assumptions of physical anthropology, Darwin himself, it will be shown, acknowledged the essential arbitrariness of intra-species classification.

Darwin's theory of natural selection concerns the relationship between an organism and its ecological environment and the delineation of the mechanism through which individual variation takes place. The mechanism referred to, natural selection, refers to the "preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations".⁵² Though Darwin believed hereditary factors to be significant, he was for obvious reasons unable to elaborate these here. Such 'favourable'

variations as were encouraged cannot however be considered independently of the environment (organic and inorganic conditions) to which they are constantly adapting. Transformations at this (ecological) level will through natural selection effect further changes in the organism thereby encouraging those best suited to the changes to survive and others to die out. He writes: "Can we doubt ... that individuals having any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating their kind?"⁵³

One very crucial implication of this theory is that there exists no necessary tendency toward the improvement of the species, for such 'improvement' or 'fitness' is obviously contingent on a given ecological environment which is itself subject to change, i.e. has its own determinate conditions of existence. Though many have read certain teleological assumptions into Darwin, that is they have suggested his biological theory implies some necessary tendency ^{toward} higher levels of organisation amongst organic beings, in point of fact, the concepts of mutation, adaptation and variation in relation to an ecological environment in fact reject such a possibility. In other words, these concepts can never be considered independently of determinate organic and inorganic conditions which, through changes at this level, encourage by procreation certain types of variation and discourage others. Consequently there is nothing in Darwin's basic concepts that suggests either some form of struggle as a necessary part of a progress toward higher forms, (e.g. the survival of the fittest racial stock) nor is there anything in this biological theory of evolution to suggest that superorganic

relations (e.g. political or economic) are somehow a function of some necessary stage in the evolutionary process of organic beings. The concepts of adaptation may only be considered in relation to organic and inorganic conditions. Natural selection thus pre-empts any notion of necessary advance either at an organic or superorganic level. On the contrary, according to Darwin,

Natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, does not necessarily include progressive development - it only takes advantage of such variations as arise and are beneficial to each creature under its complex relations of life. 54.

If there is no necessary progress at this level (i.e. in terms of organic complexity), there is no reason to suppose that forms of superorganic organisation will move in a similar direction, particularly, as is the case with race theory, when social and political development are held to be contingent on the necessary development of organic forms of organisation. Consequently the following remarks by Keith and numerous others like them will need to look elsewhere for support, for Darwin's work can offer them no means of defence whatever.

The human heart is an essential part of the great scheme of human evolution - the scheme whereby Nature, throughout the eons of the past, has sought to bring into the world ever better and higher races of mankind. 55.

The problems developed here with respect to the assumptions of race theory of course can only be posed as such if the existence of an exhaustive system of racial classification is conceded in the first place. Darwin himself admits the problems (in this case within botany) of distinguishing varieties, on the one hand, from what another botanist may refer to as species. 56. The essentially arbitrary character of such specifications,

however, has no effect whatever on the theory of natural selection, which may be seen, on the contrary, as part of a general attempt to specify the conditions under which intra-special variations are effected. The concept of race, on the other hand, attempts to delimit such processes to support an exhaustive classification of intra-special types. While Darwin's theory of natural selection is a theory of intra-special variation, physical anthropology, on the contrary, seeks to identify certain clusters of characteristics and correlate these with a pre-defined concept of race.

In so far as this may be said of Darwin's concepts, it is also true in the case of population genetics which develops certain Darwinian concepts in the light of recent developments in genetics. The object of population genetics may be conceived in terms of a general theory capable of explaining all gene frequencies in terms of a number of variant characteristics, the exact magnitudes of which are not known in advance: mutation, natural selection, genetic drift and gene flow. The implications of such a theory of intra-special variation of forms destroys the traditional concept of species as 'fixed types'. If 'man' is not fixed, then attempts to sub-divide it on the basis of further typological varieties or sub-species becomes absurd. What population genetics attempts to establish then is a set of categories that specify the conditions of variation of gene frequencies which in turn produce genotypical variations. The concept of race has no place in this analysis.⁵⁷ Its object is to provide a classification within 'man'. On the contrary, the theory of natural selection with the assistance of recent

developments in population genetics provides the possibility of theorising conditions of variation. Quite clearly race theory as outlined above and natural selection are working in opposite directions and their objects as such are quite distinct. Any attempt then to accommodate the concept of race in population genetics could only prove obstructive to further advance in the field.

Summary.

In conclusion then, this section has attempted to distinguish within orthodox race theory those attempts to provide an exhaustive classification of homo sapiens (physical anthropology), a classification which could then provide the basis of racially determined theories of social, political and economic organisation, such as those which predominated late nineteenth century social science. The concept of race in physical anthropology and subsequent attempts to construct social theories on the basis of this concept have been challenged, both in terms of the epistemological assumptions invoked to provide the possibility of such a classification and, in substantive terms, in relation to Darwin's theory of natural selection and more recently population genetics. As regards the substantive issues, those conceptual fields which have apparently accommodated and indeed sanctioned the concept of race have, on the contrary, been shown to pre-empt it in so far as it remains logically outside the scope of their basic concepts.

During the course of this investigation of the concept of race in physical anthropology and subsequently its place in theories

of social, as well as biological, evolution it has been necessary to reproduce and at times develop two levels of critique advanced in the fields of anthropology, genetics and (to some extent as we shall see later) sociology. On the one hand, the concept of race has been attacked on the basis of its scientific pretensions, in particular aimed at the positivistic assumptions of its protagonists. In so far as these were engaged in a successful confrontation at this level, certain substantive problems have been neglected. In particular, what has been overlooked is an examination of the relations that obtain between the concept of race and those concepts (in the theories of natural selection and population genetics) that apparently lend it support, and indeed, provided it at times with a much needed degree of scientific respectability. On the other hand, it has been necessary to demonstrate the concept's exclusive character with respect to the theory of natural selection and subsequently the concepts of population genetics. Where the concept appears in such fields, it remains conceptually detached from the concepts developed there. In biochemistry, for instance, cholesterol levels, metabolic activity and enzyme functions assume conditions of variation according to determinate external and internal chemical functions and reactions. The concept of race serves only to group in an arbitrary fashion (according to numerous classifications of physical or chemical properties) those variations considered pertinent by the investigator, so that, "despite all the permutations and combinations of these two elements, (skin and bone i.e. the object of early taxonomies) over 75% of the body mass was left out of the calculations."⁵⁸ In the light of

his attempts to make some contribution to racial classifications on the basis of biochemical criteria, Kuttner himself admits "The preliminary data in this speciality already indicate that biochemical criteria will cut across the lines of classical races".⁵⁹.

If the concept of race has been found to be deficient with respect to both the epistemological assumptions of scientific anthropology (which differ only in degree from their descriptive counterpart) and in terms of the logical relations that obtain between it and those concepts that apparently lend it support, then its recent reappearance in psychometrics, in particular in the work of Jensen and Eysenck, can only be met with some degree of scepticism. In the section that follows, its reappearance in this field will be reviewed and, following this, a reconstruction of sociological attempts to refute it once again. It is worth reiterating once more that it is crucial to examine those arguments that seek to refute this concept of race and theories of racial determinism, since sociology, it must be remembered, produces its own race concept and one that must ultimately be distinguished from the non-scientific, 'scientific' concept examined here in Part One. If the object of this investigation, in general terms, is an analysis of the concepts of race and racism in sociological and neo-Marxist theory, this should in no way detract from the groundlessness of those attempts to persist with exercises in racial taxonomy and of those who assume that such biological differences constitute the basis of differences at a behavioural level.

Notes.

1. A. Montagu, The Concept of Race, op. cit., p. XII.
2. A. Montagu, Race, Science, and Humanity, p. 11.
3. S.L. Washburn cited by P.I. Rose, The Subject is Race, op. cit., p. 31.
4. In fact one anthropologist, F. Boas, concerns himself with somatic differences only to refute certain assumptions of biological race. He suggests these differences on the contrary are not determinants of behaviour but are themselves contingent on the social and cultural environment. F. Boas, Race, Language, and Culture, pp. 76-85.
5. J.H. Greenberg, International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, p. 305. (Under 'Anthropology' heading).
6. J. Hunt, 'On the Study of Anthropology', p. 2.
7. For further examples see J. Barzun, Race: A Study in Superstition; T. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America and more recently, M. Banton and J. Harwood, The Race Concept, ch. 1.
8. J. Barzun, op. cit., p. 115.
9. It should be noted for most sociologists no such distinction within anthropology has been made. Biological race in whatever form it takes is both 'scientific' and paradoxically unscientific at the same time.
10. The concept of 'epistemological break' introduced into French philosophy by G. Bachelard has been significant in recent Marxist theory. L. Althusser refers to it as that which designates "the mutation in the theoretical problematic contemporary with the foundation of a scientific discipline". L. Althusser, For Marx, p.32 and ff.
11. For a general statement on positivist philosophy see L. Kolakowski, Positivist Philosophy, ch. one. In common with all philosophy of science, positivism "is a collection of rules and evaluative criteria referring to human knowledge: it tells us what kind of contents in our statements about the world deserve the name of knowledge and supplies us with norms that make it possible to distinguish between that which may and that which may not reasonably be asked", p. 11. He subsequently distinguishes four rules: phenomenalism, (only that which is experienced is admissible); nominalism, (all terms must have as their reference concrete, i.e. experienced, objects); the distinction between fact and value and the admissibility only of facts as legitimate material for science to work on; and finally the rule that these rules apply to all sciences. The methods invoked in each are consequently identical. Science then is confined to "those operations that are observable in the evolution of the modern sciences of nature". Ibid, p. 18.
12. M. Banton, Race Relations, op. cit., p. 18 ff.

13. Ibid.
14. "The usual division of races was into color-groups ... The first important shift of interest from the color-division to what might be called the shape-division came in 1829 at the hands of the British physician W.F. Edwards". J. Barzun, op. cit., p. 36. For an example of the development of skull analysis prior to this date, see J.C. Prichard, Researches into the Physical History of Mankind: Vol. I, the date of publication (1826) is significant in this respect.
15. J. Barzun, op. cit., p. 116.
16. J. Hunt, op. cit. The date of the lecture, 1863, is significant here if as Barzun suggests 1859 marked the end of 'descriptive' and the rise of 'scientific' anthropology.
17. Ibid, p. 6.
18. Ibid, p. 4.
19. Ibid, pp. 6-7.
20. Ibid, p. 9.
21. Ibid, p. 11.
22. While inductive reasoning infers general statements from individual isolated facts, deduction operates in the reverse direction from the universal to the particular. What is common and crucial to both is the rigorous distinction maintained between theoretical statements on the one hand and a neutral, independent observation language on the other.
23. "The object of statistical science is to discover methods of condensing information concerning large groups of allied facts into brief and compendious expressions suitable for discussion". F. Galton, Enquiries into Human Faculty and its Development, p. 33.
24. J. Barzun, op. cit., p. 118.
25. J. Deniker, The Races of Man, p. 10.
26. Ibid, p. 280.
27. It is necessary here to make a distinction between methodology, taken to designate the scientific study of the means of obtaining knowledge, and problems of method which refer to points of clarification and the modification of research techniques. The latter can and do, in the case of scientific and descriptive anthropology, assume identical methodological principles, only the methods are modified. For an elaboration of this distinction see D. and J. Willer, Systematic Empiricism, op. cit., p. 13 ff.
28. J. Hunt, op. cit., p. 6.

29. N.A. Barnicot, 'Taxonomy and Variation in Modern Man' in The Concept of Race, ed. A. Montagu, p. 203.
30. J. Hunt, op. cit., p. 3.
31. F. Boas cited by A. Montagu in 'The Concept of Race' op. cit., p. 16.
32. J. Barzun, Race: A Study in Superstition, op. cit., p. 126.
33. J. Deniker, The Races of Man, op. cit., p. 7.
34. N.A. Barnicot, 'Taxonomy and Variation in Modern Man', op. cit., p. 215.
35. P.R. Ehrlich and R.W. Holm, 'A Biological View of Race' in The Concept of Race, ed. A. Montagu, p. 156.
36. These problems are pertinent in those attempts to reclassify races. See for instance Garn's attempt to construct a concept of local race when again "our enumeration depends on the minimum size of the population units we wish to consider". With the result as Boyd writes "whatever races we choose to distinguish will be almost entirely arbitrary, and their distribution will depend on the particular characteristic on which we choose to base them". Cited by J. Hiernaux, 'The Concept of race and the Taxonomy of Mankind' in The Concept of Race, ed. A. Montagu, p. 39.
37. J. Barzun, op. cit., p. 203.
38. There is even confusion over the numbers. While Deniker claims to have identified thirteen races with thirty subdivisions (Deniker op. cit., p. 284), Barnicot attributes twenty-eight to him, Barnicot op. cit., p. 199.
39. J. Deniker, op. cit., p. 282.
40. See for example, C. Coon, The Origin of Races: Science and the Concept of Race, ed. M. Mead, T. Dobzhansky, E. Tobach, R.E. Light; and T. Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving: the Evolution of the Human Species.
A good example of progressive attempts to 'liberalise' the concept of race can be found in the UNESCO statements of 1950, 1951, 1964, 1967. Four statements on the Race Question 1950 "The term 'race' designates a group or population characterized by some concentrations, relative as to frequency and distribution, of hereditary particles (genes) or physical characters, which appear, fluctuate, and often disappear in the course of time by reason of geographic and/or cultural isolation", pp. 30-31.
1951 "Since race, as a word, has become coloured by its misuse in connexion with national, linguistic and religious differences, and by its deliberate abuse by racialists, we tried to find a new word to express the same meaning of a biologically differentiated group. On this we did not succeed, but agreed to reserve race as the word to be used for anthropological classification of groups showing definite combinations of physical (including physiological) traits in characteristic proportions", *ibid* pp. 37-38.

1964 "There is no national, religious, geographic, linguistic or cultural group which constitutes a race ipso facto; the concept of race is purely biological", p. 47, and, "Neither in the field of hereditary potentialities concerning the over all intelligence and the capacity for cultural development, nor in that of physical traits, is there any justification for the concept of 'inferior' and 'superior' races". p. 48.

The tendency to avoid defining race (1964 statement) is developed in the 1967 statement which is largely concerned with challenging the vilification of human groups on the basis of racist doctrines.

"The division of the human species into 'races' is partly conventional and partly arbitrary and does not imply any hierarchy whatsoever. Many anthropologists stress the importance of human variation, but believe that 'racial' divisions have limited scientific interest and may even carry the risk of inviting abusive generalization". p. 50. Thus "The human problems arising from so-called 'race' relations are social in origin rather than biological", Ibid p. 51.

41. F. Livingstone, 'On the Nonexistence of Human Races' in The Concept of Race, ed. A. Montagu, p. 49.
42. T. Dobzhansky cited by J. Hiernaux, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
43. R.E. Kuttner, 'Biochemical Anthropology' in Race and Modern Science, ed. R.E. Kuttner.

It is important here to note very definite differences present between the tasks of biochemistry and biochemical anthropology. The former is concerned with an analysis of organic tissue (skin, bone, organs for example) and in particular the constituent elements of the various types of cell. These latter comprise a number of compounds, the chief of which are proteins, lipids, carbohydrates, nucleic acids in addition to water and salts. It is the levels of each of these and their effects in general terms that concerns biochemistry. Clearly the task of identifying in a totally arbitrary manner any of these (e.g. serum, a soluble protein) as Kuttner does and attempting to locate them in terms of a predefined racial category can in no way assist the principle objectives of biochemistry. In point of fact in using animal tissue for a great part of their experimental work they seek to identify certain cell constituents and subsequently reactions common to all living organisms. In so far as this is the case their arguments run counter to the fundamental assumptions of all race theory.

44. W.L. Brown cited by P.R. Ehrlich and R.W. Holm, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
45. See note 16, p. 31 and p. 9 (in text).
46. M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, p. 99.
47. M. Banton, 'The Autonomy of Post-Darwinian Sociology' in Darwinism and the Study of Society, ed. M. Banton, p. 167.

48. See M. Ginsberg, 'Social Evolution' in Darwinism and the Study of Society, ed. M. Benton.
49. R. Knox, The Races of Men, p. v.
50. See for instance B. Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform, and R. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought.
51. C. Darwin, The Origin of Species.
52. Ibid, p. 131 (1968 edn.).
53. Ibid, pp. 130-131 (1968 edn.).
54. Ibid, p. 118 (1971 edn.). For a further discussion of the non-teleological character of Darwin's work in the context of a more general discussion of social evolutionary theory, see P.Q. Hirst, Social Evolution and Sociological Categories, ch. 2.
55. A. Keith, The Place of Prejudice in Modern Civilization, p. 26. The teleological character of race theory may be witnessed elsewhere in R. Hofstadter, op. cit. Consider for instance the following remarks by the Rev. J. Strong who talked of the "the final competition of races for which the Anglo-Saxon is being schooled ... this powerful race will move down upon Mexico ... South America ... and can anyone doubt that the result of this competition of races will be the "survival of the fittest"," cited by R. Hofstadter, ibid, p. 179. And Beveridge, who writes "God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-admiration. No ! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where chaos reigns", cited by R. Hofstadter, ibid, p. 180. Race theorists at this time did not all share Strong and Beveridge's optimism concerning the outcome of the struggle. (See for instance C.H. Pearson's National Life and Character). What they did share in common was the assumption of the inevitability of struggle, an assumption apparently borrowed from Darwin: "Since the theory of evolution has been promulgated they can cover their natural barbarism with the name of Darwin and proclaim the sanguinary instincts of their inmost hearts as the last word of science", M. Nordau, cited by R. Hofstadter, ibid, p. 171.
56. C. Darwin, op. cit., p. 101 ff.
57. F. Livingstone, op. cit., p. 54.
58. R.E. Kuttner, op. cit., p. 197.
59. Ibid, p. 216.

II. Psychometrics and the Socio-Psychological Rejection of the 'Revived' Concept of Race.

In this section we shall examine the recent so-called revival of the 'scientific' concept of race, in particular as it appears in the work of Jensen and Eysenck and related positions.¹ In view of the inexhaustible supply of rejoinders and counter-rejoinders, such a task may seem superfluous to some extent. Its inclusion however will ultimately enable us to establish two things. In the first place it will be possible to assess its relationship both with respect to the concept of race in physical anthropology and in the field of race theory proper (as distinguished in the previous section). Though certain developments in race theory² have taken place since nineteenth century social Darwinist theory which, if this were a 'history' of the concept, would constitute a gap in the discussion, the so-called 'revival' of scientific race generally refers to a revival of the nineteenth century concept of physical anthropology and the 'application' of scientific Darwinian principles to the theory of races. In the second place the examination will enable us in the latter part of this section to examine and develop (if it is found to be necessary) the social-scientific critique of the race concept as it has come to be found, and possibly modified, in the field of psychometrics. This will take us ultimately to the sociological concept of race itself and the foundation of such a concept in the abolition of a biological category in its various 'scientific' forms.

1. Jensen, Eysenck and the Concept of Race.

In the first instance we shall consider the epistemological

status of Jensen and Eysenck's work, in other words the means by which they hope to establish a knowledge of this concept race. We shall then reconsider specifically the concepts of intelligence and race and their attempts to infer differences in intelligence between races on the basis of hereditary differences between these groups (in turn inferred from heritability within different racial groups). In conjunction with these arguments we shall establish the relationship here between the concept of race and those produced in the previous section.

a) Epistemological categories in the work of Jensen and Eysenck.

Unlike some of their predecessors in physical anthropology, Jensen and Eysenck are not concerned with establishing universalistic relations between the phenomena in question.³

The relationship, for instance, between intra and intergroup heritability is, according to Jensen,

one of probability or likelihood, that is, the higher the heritability of a trait within each of two groups, the greater is the likelihood that a mean difference between the groups has a genetic component and the smaller is the likelihood that the group difference is attributable solely to environmental variation. 4. (Emphasis in original).

Similarly for Eysenck,

theories are never proved; if many different deductions are verified, the theory is provisionally accepted as useful, ... until ... a new theory is proposed, the old is the best we have. 5.

Forms of proof then are crucial if it is to be established rigorously at what point such theories do outlive their usefulness. According to Jensen,

I suggest instead that scientific knowledge is gained most efficiently through ... 'strong inference',

which means pitting against one another alternative hypotheses that lead to different predictions and then putting these predictions to empirical tests. 6.

Interesting in this respect is the similarity at this level with Galton and Pearson, referred to above in the context of their contribution to race theory, who were both active in the appropriation of statistical methods which they developed in pursuit of their objectives. Relations here were considered probabilistic: "No phenomena are causal; all phenomena are contingent, and the problem before us is to measure the degree of this contingency, which we have seen lies between the zero of independence and the unity of causation".⁷

It is somewhere between the two that strong inferences can be made on the basis of an analysis of variance (we shall return to this below). The possibility of establishing universalistic relations of causality is thus replaced by the more 'modest' claim that only relationships of correlation and contingency can be established.⁸

The problem then for Jensen and Eysenck becomes one of attempting to establish whether the appearance of two phenomena is the result of accident or chance, or whether some form of relationship does exist between them. For example, the initial problem may be to establish whether or not the appearance of a black skin and I.Q. test scores are related and if so to what extent, or whether the I.Q. test result and a black skin appear together by chance, the latter having no effect whatsoever on the former. If the concepts of race and intelligence are to be considered related (probabistically or otherwise) then there are a number of preliminary relations that, once established,

provide the possibility of establishing this final relationship via inferential reasoning. In the first instance they argue that educability in general is a product of both environmental and genetic factors. In his distinction between genotype and phenotype for example, Eysenck argues "different genotypes may give rise to the same phenotype (in different environments) and different phenotypes may be shown by the same genotypes".⁹ While the significance of environmental factors is acknowledged by both Jensen and Eysenck, they do not deny the possibility of isolating the relative significance of each for individual educability.

b) Heritability and I.Q. differences.

If the ultimate problem is to establish some form of connection between race and intelligence and race is conceived in terms of the relative frequency of gene distribution amongst different populations (we shall return to this later), then it is clear that this problem is posed initially to establish how far educability is due to genetic influence. To do this it is considered necessary to assume the null hypothesis, that is, that individual differences are the result solely of environmental factors. Consequently a sample survey is taken of persons whose genetic constitution is identical (i.e. Monozygotic twins) and who have been reared apart (i.e. reared under different sets of environmental conditions). The relative significance of each may now be established by contrasting the results of I.Q. tests administered to these twins (I.Q. test as a measurement of educability will be discussed shortly) with those test results of Monozygotic twins

reared together (that is with an identical genetic makeup and environment). As Jensen writes :

The conceptually simplest estimate of heritability is, of course, the correlation between identical twins reared apart, since, if their environments are uncorrelated, all they have in common are their genes. 10.

To illustrate the outcome of a significance test designed to estimate this, Jensen writes "the correlation between 53 pairs on the Stanford - Binet was 0.86 (0.91 corrected) in a study by Burt (1966)".^{11.}

The heritability factor (H^2), i.e. the "proportion of phenotypic variance due to variance in genotypes",^{12.} accounts for eighty percent of differences in I.Q. test performance.

Although the concept of intelligence presupposes a general heritability factor, it requires some degree of elaboration itself if we are to establish precisely what it is that is being genotypically determined. According to Jensen :

the most important fact about intelligence is that we can measure it ... There is no point in arguing the question ... of what intelligence really is. The best we can do is to obtain measurements of certain kinds of behaviour and look at their relationships to other phenomena and see if these relationships make any kind of sense and order. It is from these orderly relationships that we can gain some understanding of the phenomena. 13. (Emphasis in original).

Intelligence then is defined by what it measures, in the same way, according to Eysenck, as "gravitation, or heat, or any other physical concept"^{14.} may be defined. Consequently, "intelligence, like electricity, is easier to measure than to define".^{15.} What it is precisely that intelligence measures, is :

important intellectual qualities in children and adults;...

these qualities are very important both in education and in professions and jobs requiring abilities for abstract thinking and problem solving". 16.

It refers to a general brightness and adaptability which apparently remains independent of education and experience. In this way Jensen distinguished fluid from crystallised intelligence. The latter is not so much a function of abstract thinking or problem solving, but rather "a precipitate out of experience, consisting of acquired knowledge and developed intellectual skills". 17.

c) Race and I.Q. differences.

Having established however crudely what intelligence is and to what extent hereditary and environmental factors contribute to its measurement (however dubiously this has been achieved), it is now possible to attempt a variety of significance tests amongst sample populations e.g. 'social classes' or 'races'. If genetic differences are known already to exist between collectivities of individuals, it is then possible to correlate these with the I.Q. test results. One such collectivity is race: "the existence of ... (which) ... there can be little doubt; they are populations that differ genetically and may be distinguishable phenotypically (i.e. by appearance). 18. The racial classification however is not made on the basis of composite clusters of specified gene groupings each shared by different racial groups, but rather on the old skin colour classification which becomes the sole criterion for selecting and differentiating for intelligence testing purposes. 19.

A comparison of Negro and White I.Q. scores is thus a consequence of this position, the results of which "are well known; on the average, Negroes test about 1 standard deviation

(15 I.Q. points) below the average of the White population in I.Q."²⁰. These results are taken from evidence produced by Shuey whose survey of Negro intelligence testing covered more than fifty years, included 382 studies in which eightyone tests were administered and included the results of young children, high school children, college students, members of the armed forces, veterans and other civilians, gifted, mentally retarded, delinquents, criminals and 'racial' hybrids.²¹ On this evidence they make their final proposition: that between-group differences may be inferred on the basis of intra-group differences. As we suggested above, this relationship is one of probability, as indeed are all the relationships established in their arguments.²²

In summary then, the arrival at their final probabilistic relationship, i.e., that I.Q. differences between (in this case) racial groups are the result of hereditary factors (in the ratio 4:1), is a consequence of the following propositions:-

- i) that a concept of I.Q. is an operational concept "commonly interpreted as indicative of a more general kind of intellectual ability than is reflected by the acquisition of specific scholastic knowledge and skills";²³
- ii) that such differences within a group are a consequence of an interaction between hereditary and environmental factors where the former accounts for four-fifths of the differences;
- iii) race is a useful taxonomic concept. Jensen argues :

Races are said to be 'breeding populations', which is to say that matings within the group have a much higher probability than matings outside the group. Races are more technically viewed by geneticists as populations having different distributions of gene frequencies.²⁴

- iv) differences between the races in I.Q. performance average one standard deviation or fifteen points;²⁵ and finally,
- v) on the basis of this evidence I.Q. differences between racial groups can be attributed to genetic differences.

These propositions and the conclusions reached have certain consequences at a more practical level for education policy, in particular, the pertinence or non-pertinence of compensatory schemes of education.²⁶

Before we consider the sociological challenge to Jensen and Eysenck we shall conclude this section by examining the relationship between their revived concept of race and earlier anthropological concepts of race. In terms of the epistemological status of these arguments, we have already suggested that relations of uniformity and universality have been replaced by those of probability and contingency. The application of quantitative statistical techniques developed by Galton and Fisher have introduced the possibility of relationships between phenomena that are neither totally independent nor wholly causally connected but lie somewhere between zero and 100. Nevertheless certain fundamental similarities remain and we shall develop these fully in part 2. In particular the relationship between theory and facts (probabilistic or otherwise) remains unchallenged. The testability of the former solely in terms of the latter also remains unchallenged. In its general principles the 'scientific' method remains unchallenged. It is only with respect to its possibilities that differences exist. As the probability theorists become more sceptical, they replace their universalism for a conventionalism with respect to the

acceptance or non-acceptance of theoretical propositions,

As regards the concept of race in both its orthodox and revived forms, we must examine more closely the precise function each concept performs in their respective fields. What emerges in an examination of the concept of race in Jensen's work is ostensibly a revamping of the geneticist's definition (or redefinition) of the concept, that is, a differentiation of certain populations according to differences in gene frequencies. Precisely which genes are taken into account in their initial categorisation is far from clear, but what is clear is that the race concept is taken initially as given (as it was by Hunt) so that both assume them to exist prior to any establishment of their existence. However, the specific function of each of these concepts is peculiar to each field. In section I we established that infinite sets of criteria were possible for the classification of 'man' along 'racial' lines. Hence the number of races varied according to the criteria invoked by the investigator who selected freely from the infinitude of human physical characteristics. There was never any rational basis for classification, hence it was never possible to confer supremacy on any one set of criteria or to have only one taxonomic division. In this sense, what we have been examining in Jensen and Eysenck's work is not a straightforward resurrection of 'scientific racism' as Seyd amongst others suggests.²⁷ The concept of race plays a somewhat different role in the field of psychometrics from the role it was assigned in physical anthropology. The establishment of a concept of race in the latter was the objective of the field

itself and criteria were invoked to demonstrate the necessity of such classification. 'Race' in psychometrics plays a subordinate role, subordinate to the concepts of intelligence and the notion of heritability. Black - White differences, it is argued, contribute to differences in intelligence but the objective is to establish all possible sources of variation which lie outside the differences assigned to race (e.g. social class). Racial differences then are assumed prior to the discourse in both cases, but whilst the object of physical anthropology was to confirm this presupposition, the objective of psychometrics has been to confirm that differences in I.Q. are the result of hereditary differences, amongst which racial differences, defined as such, are particularly significant. Their results in this direction add weight to their fundamental objective that differences are due, for the most part, to hereditary factors. The notion of race in this respect becomes a convenient device in their argument. Where racial differences are the object of specific arguments, psychometrics clearly transcends the initial assumption of physical anthropology. In so far as it attempts to impute behavioural differences from physiological variation it may be said to constitute the realm of race theory proper as elaborated in the previous section.

2. Social Science and 'Biological Race'.

It is now necessary to turn our attention specifically to the sociological challenge to the arguments reproduced above. It is interesting to note at the outset the relative absence of attention paid to the concept of race in these counter-arguments, despite the fact that the concept

remains an integral component of this particular field of psychometrics. The sociological axe, on the other hand, has fallen heavily on the methodological procedures invoked to establish the race/intelligence relationship. There is, however, one further set of arguments which need to be distinguished and these concern the racist character of Jensen and Eysenck's work and the production of racist ideology. These arguments will be dealt with more fully in Part Three. What is necessary here is to distinguish these levels of critique. Again it will be suggested here that while the methodological problems are significant in themselves, they never really come to terms with the race concept itself. Consequently while the former are acknowledged and developed where possible, it remains necessary to examine at a more substantive level the concept of race and its role in the arguments of Jensen and Eysenck. This is particularly significant in view of the sociological reliance, to some extent, on precisely those procedures attacked here. This latter point will be developed ^{shortly.} ~~in the section that follows.~~ The ideological arguments, on the other hand, will be shown to be inadequate as critiques of the biological concept of race. An examination of their elaborated attempts to theorise the production of racist ideology will be reserved until later. Despite Nash's call to "Wed into one conceptual system the propositions on race and the interpretations of race differences",^{28.} for the most part sociologists have in fact, in confronting biological race, assumed them married already.^{29.} In fact, it

is necessary to make precisely this distinction, for there are quite clearly two separate theoretical operations extant in their critique. On the one hand, we have suggested there is an epistemological challenge concerned with the scientificity of scientific race and related concepts and the scientificity of the means of producing them. On the other hand, there is an attempt on the basis of its acclaimed unscientific status to establish the means by which ideologies are produced with reference to extra-theoretical forms, (e.g. political and/or economic interests). A likely outcome of blurring such a distinction without a fully developed critique (both methodological and substantive) on the one hand and a theory of ideological forms on the other, is to assume that the 'pseudo scientist' serves up his ideological fodder on a platter to the politician. Consequently it is presumed that a reflexive relation exists between the two, hence "The scientific evidence or the 'facts' of race only serve as ammunition in ideological warfare".³⁰ Science thus is reduced to an ideological battlefield where the protagonists of each school fight it out. Hence there is no possibility of rational consideration of theoretical work, for the "ideology of race is always normative"³¹ and "Like all ideologies, the ideology of race implies a call to action; it embodies a political and social program".³² Preference thus becomes not simply a matter of political taste, but more significantly a choice that rests on a normative acceptance of values which becomes the basis for a vindication or rejection of one theory over another. We

shall return to this shortly and throughout the thesis, for it is one of our central concerns to examine the status of critique in the sociological field of race.^{33.}

a) The epistemological status of psychometrics.

In common with the counterparts from anthro-genetics then, sociologists have been predominantly concerned with the status of the 'scientific' method invoked to establish, in this case, the race/I.Q. relationship. In particular they have been concerned with the essential arbitrariness and circularity in the construction, standardisation and validation of the I.Q. test. Some sociologists have drawn parallels with Galton's study of 'Hereditry Genius' to demonstrate their affinity, in principle, at least, with the Eugenics movement.^{34.} In this respect according to Rose et. al. :

Galton studied the relations of a variety of eminent men (one in 4000 of the population of Victorian England, he estimated, fall into this category) and showed conclusively that judges, statesmen, divines, literary men, scientists, tended to have amongst their relatives, often stretching back through several generations, other judges, statesmen, etc. Here, Galton concluded, was incontrovertible proof that genius was inherited.^{35.}

What is more he attempted to construct a test and correlate it with 'eminent' persons in society. Though the tests failed he was not deterred: "He simply went on trying to make up a test which would show the rich on top and the poor on the bottom".^{36.} In the same way Binet constructed his test :

The criteria used by Binet to judge whether a test item

should be included on his test, therefore, was not only whether the average child at a certain age level could pass it, but whether the score achieved on such a test correlated with other measures of "success", like class background and school performance. 37.

Furthermore the test results themselves are by no means fixed but rather "manipulated deliberately in order to provide a particular distribution of scores".³⁸ Hence the test may be "standardized on a population by adjusting the scores so as to make it come out with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15",³⁹ with two-thirds (68%) of the sample between eighty-five and 115. To illustrate the essential arbitrary nature of the standardisation procedure the P.L.P. cite the example of women which is worth quoting in full :

On the original Stanford - Binet test published by Terman in 1916, women were not treated as a separate population and standardized for, and their scores were about 10 points lower than men's until 1937. Then, for the new version of the test, the means of men and women were compared, and the test was standardized for sex. Questions were added on which women did better than men and some of the ones on which men did better than women were dropped. In this way the means for men and women were equalized. 40.

The implication here of course is that by a similarly arbitrary decision, Black - White differences may be standardised and that the fifteen point difference that now exists could be wiped out by selection and rejection of 'appropriate' test questions. It is interesting to note that the construction and validation of I.Q. tests have been challenged at one and the same time, underlining for its critics the circularity, and hence absurdity, of the whole test procedure. The construction and validation procedures rely on precisely the same information. The test is constructed according to school performance and validated in terms of school performance, previous I.Q. tests (validated themselves on school success) and factor analysis; hardly an

independent validating procedure by itself.⁴¹ The conclusion is that "tests can be designed to reflect anything the designer wants".⁴²

The 'nature - nurture' controversy, as it has become known, is not one confined to the race/intelligence debate though this is central to Jensen and Eysenck and the general response from education, sociology, and anthropology. We shall refer only to those arguments that have a direct bearing on this debate. As we have seen, the arguments presented above rest on the a priori probability that each will follow from the previous one. If physiological anatomy reveals genetic differences, then why not mental differences too? If mental differences are hereditary (I.Q. tests on identical twins), then is it not likely that differences between populations confirmed to differ in the distribution of certain genes will be reflected in mental differences too? To quote Eysenck, "Nearly every anatomical, physiological, and biochemical system investigated shows racial differences. Why should the brain be an exception?"⁴³ Results show in consequence a fifteen point difference in I.Q. test scores between Negroes and Whites. If heredity plays a predominant role within each group in accounting for intelligence, and there is a difference between two groups, is it not reasonable to suggest, they argue, that differences are genetic in origin?

The notion of heredity then is crucial, and the concepts of race and intelligence in these arguments necessitate it. Sociologists have generally concerned themselves, in the first instance, with the existence of I.Q. genes. These, they argue,

are quite distinct from general propositions of Mendelian genetics. If we summarise the latter here, a better understanding of the distinction will result. The combination of genetic material from both parents consists of several thousands of genes and some egg nutrient, each of which carry the information to enable the cell to produce a particular protein. Mutation causes several different kinds of gene or alleles, and each individual will vary in his/her particular genetic constitution. As the egg cell divides into other cells whose growth is influenced by the environment and type of nutriment available to them, the problem of isolating environmental from genetic factors becomes even more apparent in attempts to distinguish varying contributions of each to behaviour differences.

What is the relationship between such a gene and a "character" at the level of the organism? Sometimes it is relatively simple; eye or hair colour or blood group are determined by one or a few proteins. But how about behavioural characters like temperament or intelligence? ... The dichotomous approach of contrasting genetic and environmental causes is biologically naive because it fails to take into account the obvious reality that we have, at any point in time, an organism reacting with its environment - not just a gene. 44.

Likewise Seyd, citing Rose, writes "To attempt to parcel out hereditary and environmental influences during such developmental sequences is meaningless".⁴⁵ (We shall return to the concept of race and its relation to Mendelian genetics shortly).

It is clear that considerable attention is paid in sociology to those attempts to isolate environmental from genetic characteristics. The twin studies, referred to above, and constituting the most favourable setting yet discovered for isolating these components, has been challenged on the question

of the relative closeness of the environment of identical twins reared apart. In other words, if the environments are closer than they might have been, as sociology has suggested, then there is no reason to suppose that it was not this factor, rather than genetic influence, that prompted a similar I.Q. test score. Various problems with these studies have then been identified by sociologists. Age and sex differences have not been standardised, it is claimed, which often give the impression that similar I.Q. test scores are a consequence of genetic factors and not the effect of sex and age similarity. Both Jensen and Cyserck have leaned heavily on statistical evidence provided by Burt. This, it has been suggested, is less than reliable in this respect.⁴⁶ Similar problems have been identified in those studies that have been made not of identical twins but of other forms of parent - sibling relationship. For instance, those studies involving two children brought up in the same home, only one of whom lives with its natural parents, ignore the obvious environmental differences that will result from the two types of parent - child relationship involved here. (The object of these studies would be to show, in contradistinction to the identical twin studies, significant I.Q. test differences despite an identical environment. These could then be attributed to the absence of any necessary genetic similarity between the children). Similarly foster parent - child relations and natural parent - child comparisons fail to account for the unique circumstances of fostering and adopting children. When account is taken of the environmental differences that exist between the groups,

then results have supported the environmentalist position.^{47.}

Related to the nature - nurture problem is the question of the possibility of inferring genetic differences between groups from those apparently responsible for differences within each group. Of course this assumes that each preceding stage in the psychometric argument is acceptable, which, from the previous arguments, it clearly is not. Nevertheless to illustrate the specific problems involved in this final piece of inferential reasoning we shall use a paper by Tizard where he reproduces Jensen's argument as follows :

The higher the within-group heritability, the greater is the plausibility, or the a priori probability, that genetic differences exist between the groups. Plausibility is a subjective judgment of likelihood. (Emphasis in original). 48.

On the contrary, he argues, the heritability component is applicable only to the population from which the tested samples are drawn, since one of the factors that enters permanently is the variability of the environment encountered in a particular population. "It is meaningless to apply estimates of heritability gained from a study of White American twins to a comparison between Whites and Negroes in the USA"^{49.} since "the genetic basis of the difference between two populations bears no logical or empirical relation to the heritability within populations and cannot be inferred from it".^{50.} To illustrate the absurdity of even a probabilistic inference, Tizard takes an example of three sets of height differences taken in 1909, 1938 and 1959 and spanning an age range of $7\frac{1}{2}$ - $12\frac{1}{2}$ years. Both the mean height for the group and the standard deviation were recorded. The mean difference for the three

samples was 126.4, 133 and 136.6 respectively. The great difference Tizard argues between the heights can be seriously only taken to support the environmentalist argument (better food and living conditions were the factors cited as responsible for increases in height over the years). However, he argues, had the London sample not spanned several generations and not been confined to one city, but rather represented the heights of the Watusi (for the 1959 height) and the Pygmies (for the 1909 height) the argument would appear to support a genetic explanation for the differences.

Of course everyone believes, rightly or wrongly, on purely commonsensical grounds, that a genetic theory is needed to explain why Watusi are taller than Pygmies, just as everyone believes that an environmental hypothesis is needed to explain why London children were so much taller in 1959 than in 1909. 51.

By substituting Jensen's own categories for the London sample, the environmental hypothesis is now, through commonsense interpretation of inter-group variation, under pressure. The implication of this substitution is that Jensen's probabilistic inference is not supported and, if it were, would lead to false conclusions. What is more, Tizard argues that the illustration serves to demonstrate the questionable reasoning behind Jensen's argument. In this instance the heritability of height "may be assumed to be 0.95" and "even if ... (it) ... is less than 0.90, it is nonetheless almost certainly greater than the heritability coefficient of IQ".⁵² The inferential reasoning in Jensen's argument (i.e. the higher the heritability within the group, the higher it is between) can in point of fact be reversed in the illustration offered by Tizard, in spite of the fact that height offers a higher heritability coefficient

than I.Q. and consequently one where a higher heritability between groups is even more of a probability.

The development and culmination of Jensen's argument rests on a logical sequence of significance tests. The object of these is to establish probabilistic relations between phenomena that appear together. In the final instance, the relationship to be established is between differences in I.Q. test performances and Black - White genetic differences. Such a relationship has been established on the basis of inferential reasoning from a number of other probability relations, e.g. that intelligence test performance is a result of genetic endowment (at least in the ratio 4 : 1 with the environment).

In all cases probabilistic relations are established on the basis of tests administered to 'sample' populations. How can we be sure our 'population' is representative, given the impossibility of 'randomising the environment'?⁵³ The colour factor (for this, as we have seen, is the basis of Jensen's racial distinction) is just one factor amongst an infinitude of others, both environmental and hereditary, that may be associated with differences in intelligence. Any one of those factors could disprove the original hypothesis. A 'sample population' of Negroes and Whites and a fifteen point difference in I.Q. test performance between them can in no way establish a relationship between the two. No logical relations between them can be inferred on the basis of observation alone. The rejection of the null hypothesis, that is that differences between the two groups are randomly distributed, cannot establish any relationship other than non-random distribution of test scores. The more imaginative the sociologist, the more

likely he is to come across new variables for the psychometrician to control. Consequently there exists an infinite number of possible experiments before the race/I.Q. relationship can be affirmed with confidence. Jensen's and Eysenck's position here leads to a complete agnosticism with respect to a knowledge of I.Q. differences (leaving the concept itself aside) which cannot be attributed to any phenomenon whatsoever purely by experiencing them together.

b) The race concept in psychometrics.

The rejection of the revived concept of scientific race in psychometrics has been concerned less with the concept itself, than with certain general issues that would arise regardless of the appearance or non-appearance of the race concept. In particular, sociology has been concerned principally with problems of constructing and validating intelligence tests, with those of isolating hereditary from environmental components of behaviour and, finally, those associated with extrapolating differences within a particular group to differences between groups. While there is no reason to contest the issues raised, it is possible to show the precise form of this critique which has imposed certain limitations on a strictly 'sociological' explanation of racial difference. What is clear here, however, is that the challenge in general terms, could and would remain essentially the same on these three issues regardless of the precise nature of group differences (e.g. racial) under consideration. In point of fact, as we shall see in a moment, the concept of racial inferiority remains so unproblematic in sociology that it has almost become

the moral responsibility of sociologists to acknowledge this inferiority and account for it in environmental terms.

The entire race/intelligence edifice has been built to some extent on ground that has remained relatively undisturbed in the course of the sociological challenge. The race concept here is of the utmost significance to psychometrics. Without it, attempts to explain these behavioural differences in terms of it seem doomed from the start. It is interesting to note not only sociology's lack of concern in this respect, but rather more surprising to find how little attention is paid to it from within psychometrics itself. According to both Jensen and Eysenck every anatomical, physiological investigation shows racial differences. Although those investigations presenting some form of exhaustive classification are not identified, what is suggested, however, is that a knowledge of racial differentiation is now possible through recent evidence from Mendelian genetics. If the concept of race is not elaborated in either Jensen's or Eysenck's work, then it is necessary, given its fairly crucial import, to reconstruct the concept that appears to be operative here.

It was suggested above that the race concept in psychometrics has been specified in terms of the frequency of gene distribution on different populations. In doing so, psychometrics is apparently vouchsafed, through a reliance on work accorded a scientific status that extends beyond its presence in the race/intelligence controversy. What appears however, to confer some degree of immunity on psychometrics in

point of fact does no such thing. To demonstrate this it is necessary to distinguish two principles quite clearly. The first concerns that of Mendelian genetics, whose object, as we have suggested, concerns the process whereby an organism's egg cell divides into other cells, and the complex relationship that obtains between each cell and the type of nutriment available to them. The object of the race concept or the general principle of race theory, on the other hand, aims at delineating populations on the basis of the numbers of genes they possess in common. While genetics attempts to specify conditions under which physiological, biochemical variation takes place, race classification on the contrary is concerned, in the first place, at grouping these genes in an arbitrary fashion as they appear within populations, and only then to assume, and this is critical, the racial component or gene cluster itself may explain differences that exist. In other words, the gene concept, which itself remains a determinate product of complex biochemical reactions and functions in the nucleus of an organism's cell structure, has been substituted by a category which not only attempts to group these genes in a classification with no apparent basis whatever, but then assumes, again without foundation, that the emergent properties of this category can themselves elucidate patterns of behavioural difference. What appears then, at the outset, to vindicate the subsequent propositions of psychometrics, i.e. the principles of Mendelian genetics, in point of fact remains not only independent but exclusive of the concept of race in the race/I.Q. question. In this sense the problem of isolating the genetic component of

certain behavioural differences, or the problem of operationalising I.Q. testing, really is not the issue here. What psychometrics cannot do is to attribute these behavioural differences to a concept that, in every biological sense, has been shown to be vacuous.

3. Environmental explanations of racial differences.

It has been suggested above that one of the most contentious areas in the social sciences concerns the issue of 'biological determinism' and the role of hereditary factors in explanations of various behavioural forms. The substance of these arguments above has been to suggest there is no possibility of isolating nature from nurture, in this particular context isolating that part of 'intelligence' acquired innately from socially cultivated brainpower. "Estimates of the hereditary component within any given population are beset with great uncertainties".⁵⁴ (Emphasis added). It comes as somewhat of a surprise therefore to note that such assertions as Seyd's and Rose's have been made in conjunction with arguments which give credence to the environmentalist position alone, as if now, despite all doubts concerning these attempts, it were possible to isolate single environmental variables, while holding others, including genetic factors, constant. We must remember that the implication, in the above example of the foster and adoptive parent - child relations, was the very impossibility of randomising environmental variables in order to measure them. Without regard for their own critique of psychometrics in this respect, sociologists have made great efforts to establish the causal primacy of environmental

factors over hereditary considerations. Consequently numerous studies have appeared which attempt to distinguish not only environmental from genetic but, according to similar methodological principles found wanting in psychometrics, specify those aspects of the environment which are considered pertinent in this respect. Consider for example, the environmental factor of stress which, it has been suggested, is responsible for the relatively low scores of Blacks on the intelligence test. Similarly Mason isolates three more environmental variables, not, it should be added, on the basis of statistical variance but his own experience, and concludes "where incentive, numerical proportions and background are reversed (for Blacks) so are the (I.Q. test) results".⁵⁵

Other variables including socio-economic status, motivation, and a range of culturally specific factors make cross-cultural (and therefore inter-racial presumably) comparison of I.Q. tests (which are themselves culturally specific) a worthless exercise. Mead and Clinsberg have elaborated the problems of what have come to be referred to as culture-bound tests. The illustration taken above from the work of Katz and Mason suggest that sociologists have shifted from a complete agnosticism with respect to the possibility of randomising the environment, to a position where it becomes possible to assert, with some degree of certainty, not only that environmental factors are primarily responsible for I.Q. differences, but to specify those in particular that are significant in this respect. In doing so, furthermore, they accept the implicit assumption of psychometrics that I.Q.

test differences are significant between different racial groups, but attribute these differences to environmental variation. Hence the basis of their rejection of Jensen and Eysenck's position has moved quite clearly from an attack at one level on the methodological protocols of psychometrics, the circularity of the whole process, where "constructing and validating tests reinforces the concepts built in at the outset"⁵⁶, to a counter-assertion that an infinitude of cultural-class variables are now said to cause differences between racial groups. Racial differences then, do exist, be they all a result of manipulative 'pseudo-scientific' techniques of demonstration. This position is taken to its extreme by Rex who argues :

the empirical study which holds constant, size of income, type of neighbourhood and length of schooling in the United States of the present day, therefore, should in theory be supplemented for an experiment in which the peoples of Africa conquer, capture, enslave some millions of European and American whites under conditions in which a very large proportion of the white population dies and in which the white culture is systematically destroyed, 57, and in which finally a group of emancipated whites living in 'good neighbourhoods' are then compared to their Negro masters. 58.

And likewise similar arguments have been put forward :

instead of examining the problems of Africa in the light of past and continuing imperialist exploitation of these countries, racialists look at the individual and postulate a mysterious 'superiority' for the whites. 59.

The implication here then is that real differences do exist, Whites are indeed superior to Blacks on intelligence test scores, and that the past cultural experience of Blacks is responsible for their relative inferiority. It is interesting to consider what mechanism is being suggested here to account

for these contemporary differences that may be explained in terms of the nineteenth century historical experience of Black - White relations. Perhaps the inter-generational link is provided by some genetic component of alienation. The problem clearly remains one to be resolved in these arguments, this component not withstanding.

Summary.

This reconsideration of the sociological challenge to psychometrics and the work of Jensen and Eysenck has attempted to elaborate and develop once more the full implications of this critique. The three issues tackled here concerned the operationalisation of the intelligence test construct, the isolation of the genetic component of I.Q. differences given, according to Simon, the impossibility of 'randomising' the environment, and finally the question of inferring genetic differences between groups from differences within each group. This last problem of course is closely related to those environmental differences once more encountered by the groups in question. This critical reconsideration of the operational aspects of the race/intelligence arguments has been in keeping with the objectives here, being elaborated in terms of certain problems considered common to all statistical variance tests, including those developed in psychometrics.

The endorsement and the elaboration of these arguments has not, however, concealed certain limitations of this form of critique and has involved, as far as sociology is concerned, inevitable problems in its own attempts to explain those I.Q. test results as they appear differently between

racial groups. Consequently it seemed necessary to transcend this form of operational critique and examine in particular the race concept in psychometrics, since here, as much as at the level of methodological protocols, there appears some curious affinity in this case with the scientific principles of Mendelian genetics. The problems encountered in many ways reproduced those attempts, considered above, to redefine race according to the possession amongst populations of common gene clusters.

It may be said in conclusion, then, that while the concept of race appears to play a subordinate role in the field of psychometrics (i.e. subordinate to notions of heritability and intelligence) in so far as the group may or may not be racial (it could be sex or class-based, for instance), the specific question of the Black or White I.Q. test differentials presupposes in a very crucial way an elaborate concept of race; one that quite clearly it fails to deliver. Perhaps most misleading of all has been its ability to cloak itself in various 'scientific' guises and thereby shrug off opponents with contemptuous dismissal.⁶⁰ At the level of operational tactics it has employed a superficially complex analysis based on certain methodological protocols which fail wretchedly in their attempts to establish a race/intelligence relationship, and in so doing incur problems which have been shown elsewhere to confront all attempts to establish any form of relationship between observed phenomena in this way.⁶¹ Clearly what is at question here then, is the status of that realm of epistemology which apparently vouchsafes the empiricist knowledge process. At a substantive level, on the contrary, it is not the legitimacy

of the concepts of Mendelian genetics that are in question, but rather the incompatibility of these concepts with the concept of race which appears projected or superimposed on to a conceptual framework with which it bears no relation whatever.

If this section has expressed a degree of consternation over the sociological role played here, it has done so, not so much over the question of the critique it developed, but with the specifically sociological explanation of race differences which follows. If the form of critique aims, as we have suggested, at the operational level of Jensen and Eysenck's work, then clearly there seems little point in reproducing similar methodological assumptions (perhaps on a less refined scale) to guarantee the environmentalist position. In concluding Part One we shall develop this argument as well as reviewing others that have appeared here. In doing so, we shall point to one alternative form of critique, aimed not so much at establishing environmental explanations of racial differences, but on the contrary with questioning the worth of establishing any form of causal relationship without regard to their adequacy at the level of meaning; for this, it will be argued, constitutes the basis for a genuinely sociological concept of race that will be examined below in Part Two.

Notes.

1. We shall attempt this despite both Eysenck and Jensen's warning that only experts, that is those specialising in the fields of behavioural genetics, psychometrics and I.Q. testing, are qualified to comment on their work. H.J. Eysenck, Race, Intelligence and Education, p. 12.
2. For example, the growth of the Eugenics movement (see T. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America,) and for a more general review of these positions see F. Hertz, Race and Civilization, ch. 8; elsewhere the embodiment of

the race concept in national socialist theory, see for example, G. Kren 'Race and Ideology', and for background, H. Arendt 'Race-thinking before racism'. We shall discuss the question of Black racist ideology (e.g. negritude, cultural nationalism) in Part Three in our discussion of the race concept in neo-Marxist theory.

3. It is interesting to note here that Cuvier was greatly admired by none other than A. Comte, in particular for the former's attempt to establish lasting classifications on the basis of universal relations between observed phenomena. The degree to which anthropology and sociology are compatible at this level clearly poses problems for a sociological concept of race distinct from its biological counterpart. If the biological concept of race is rejected on the basis of its positivistic assumptions then clearly it becomes extremely difficult to justify a sociological concept established on identical epistemological grounds. We shall return to this later.
4. A.R. Jensen, Genetics and Education, p. 29.
5. H.J. Eysenck, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
6. A.R. Jensen, op. cit., p. 36.
7. K. Pearson cited by D. and J. Willer, Systematic Empiricism, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
8. In this respect the space separating Blumenbach and Cuvier from Jensen parallels J.S. Mills' relationship to Pearson. In both cases the possibility of universal relations is replaced by relations of probability and contingency.
9. H.J. Eysenck, op. cit., p. 73. Genotypic traits refer to those innately derived. The phenotype is conceived as the product of both innately and environmentally derived characteristics.
10. A.R. Jensen, op. cit., p. 127.
11. Ibid. Jensen in fact uses other parent and sibling relationships (e.g. foster/natural parents, Dizygotic twins, etc.). We shall examine these more fully below.
12. Ibid, p. 114.
13. Ibid, pp. 72-73.
14. H.J. Eysenck, op. cit., p. 51.
15. A.R. Jensen, op. cit., p. 72.
16. H.J. Eysenck, op. cit., p. 61.
17. A.R. Jensen, op. cit., p. 81.
18. H.J. Eysenck, op. cit., p. 36.
19. This is surprising in view of the fact that the concept of race was borrowed from Dobzhansky's attempt to re-define it. It appears here however that only colour is

- significant in this respect and this is sufficient, it is suggested, in conjunction with genetic material carrying I.Q. potential, to merit racial distinction.
20. A.R. Jensen, op. cit., p. 161.
21. A. Shuey, The Testing of Negro Intelligence, p. 491.
22. The precise relationship expressed here is :
- $$h_B^2 = h_w^2 \frac{(1-t)r}{(1-r)t}$$
- where h_B^2 = heritability between group means
 h_w^2 = average heritability within groups
 t = intraclass correlation among phenotypes within groups.
 r = intraclass correlation among genotypes within groups.
- A.R. Jensen, op. cit., p. 30. (Emphasis in original) (Supra p.72)
23. Ibid, p. 71.
24. Ibid, p. 159.
25. A. Shuey, op. cit. Though differences vary for the different groups studied, one standard deviation was considered the average approximation of these variations.
26. For further discussion of Jensen's view on compensatory education see 'Genetics and Education: a Second Look'.
27. T. Seyd, 'Scientific Racism Again'.
28. M. Nash, 'Race and the Ideology of Race', in Race and Social Difference, eds. P. Baxter and B. Sanson, p. 112.
29. See for example, J. Daniels and V. Houghton, 'Jensen, Eysenck and the Eclipse of the Galton Paradigm', in Race, Culture and Intelligence, eds. K. Richardson and D. Spears; and S. Rose, J. Hambley and J. Haywood, 'Science, Racism and Ideology'.
30. M. Nash, op. cit., p. 113.
31. Ibid, p. 112.
32. Ibid, p. 113.
33. It is important to reiterate here the possibility of establishing the essential arbitrariness at an operational level without offering an extra-theoretical (e.g. politico-ideological) explanation of the emergence of, in this case, 'scientific' race. The former involves a critique at the level of the discourse itself. The latter on the other hand seeks to establish the 'direction', in this case, in which I.Q. tests are manipulated i.e. in class interests. An analysis of the production of specific ideological forms entails a distinct theoretical operation. It cannot be

offered as a 'critique' however of the race concept in a theoretical context. That is, the usefulness of a particular concept cannot be established on the basis of the particular class credentials of the individual responsible for its production.

34. For an examination of the relationship between Jensen, Eysenck, Shockley and Herrnstein and the older Eugenics school, e.g. Terman, Yerkes, Brigham etc., see the Progressive Labour Party (henceforward P.L.P.) pamphlet Racism, I.Q. and the Class Society, Introduction.
35. S. Rose, et. al., op. cit., p. 237.
36. P.L.P., op. cit., p. 14.
37. Ibid, p. 16.
38. S. Rose et. al., op. cit., p. 250.
39. P.L.P., op. cit., p. 17.
40. Ibid, p. 17.
41. A similar argument is advanced by Seyd, "Validation of the tests has no scientific basis, since it is impossible to assess it by any objective criterion. Some tests are not validated at all, the test constructor relying on factor analysis. Other constructors correlate their tests with previous well-established ones, while the majority validate them against educational success (school or other academic performance",) op. cit., p. 6.
42. P.L.P., p. 18.
43. H.J. Eysenck, op. cit., p. 20. Adapted from A.R. Jensen, Genetics and Education, op. cit., pp. 159-160. What both fail to recognise is that each system taken on its own produces different racial classifications. This may or not coincide with their own, which is colour-based.
44. S. Rose, et. al., op. cit., p. 245.
45. S. Rose cited by T. Seyd, op. cit., p. 9.
46. The following illustration taken from Burt's work is cited by the P.L.P. as evidence of the suspicious character of his findings. Notice in particular the low size of the sample (when it is given) and at the same time the range of difference for each of the two groups, which appears almost too good to be true.

MZ twins	Reared apart	Reared together
1955	.771 (n = 21)	.944 (n = 83)
1958a	.771 (n = "over 30")	.944 (n = ?)
1958b	.778 (n = 42)	.936 (n = ?)
1966	.771 (n = 53)	.944 (n = 95)

n = number in sample.
Cited by P.L.P., p. 41.

47. Ibid, p. 45.
48. J. Tizard, 'Race and IQ: the Limits of Probability', p. 7.
49. C. Auerbach and G.H. Beale cited by T. Seyd, op. cit., p. 9.
50. S. Rose et al., op. cit., p. 248.
51. J. Tizard, op. cit., p. 8.
52. Ibid, p. 8.
53. B. Simon, Intelligence, Psychology and Education: a Marxist Critique, p. 248.
54. C. Auerbach and G.H. Beale cited by T. Seyd, op. cit., p. 9.
55. P. Mason, Race Relations, p. 48.
56. B. Simon, op. cit., p. 255.
57. For a fuller account on this point see F. Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, pp. 41-54.
58. J. Rex, 'Nature versus Nurture: The Significance of the Revised Debate' in Race, Culture and Intelligence, eds. K. Richardson and D. Spears, pp. 170-171.
59. 'The Politics of Intelligence', Partisan, No.1, p. 12.
60. In particular here is the joint warning given by both Jensen and Eysenck to discourage those not competent in psychometrics etc. to comment on their work (supra note 1, p.99) By restricting 'serious' criticism in this way, they effectively encourage criticism only from within psychometrics and in general will only be concerned with 'technical' problems and not the assumptions of the whole exercise which are likely to be taken for granted by those trained and engaged in testing itself.
61. D. and J. Willer, op. cit., especially chs. 3 and 4.

Concluding Remarks.

In Part One we have sought to examine the concept of race in physical anthropology and psychometrics, and the anthropological and sociological objections to these concepts. In physical anthropology the concept of race was predominantly a descriptive device designed to generalise individual physiological variations.

The innumerable groups of mankind, massed together or scattered, ... are far from presenting a homogeneous picture. Every country has its own variety of physical type, language, manners, and customs. Thus, in order to exhibit a systematic view of all the peoples of the earth, it is necessary to observe a certain order in the study of these varieties, and to define carefully what is meant by such and such a descriptive term, having reference either to the physical type or to the social life of men. (Emphasis added). 1.

In contrast, the concept of race in what has been distinguished as 'race theory' proper has been invoked as part of a more general attempt to explain and account for differences at a behavioural level. Hence, "the significant socio-cultural differences and similarities among human populations are the dependent variables of group-restricted hereditary drives and attitudes".²

In this respect psychometrics may be seen to transcend the limited assumptions of physical anthropology and assume certain behavioural differences, in this case intelligence test performance, to be the outcome of certain physiologically differentiated populations i.e. races. In other words it may be considered one variant form of orthodox race theory as defined by Harris above.

This is not to suggest that orthodox race theory has been confined more recently to the contributions of Jensen and Eysenck. In the more general field of anthropology, for instance, it has been suggested, "History demonstrates that the social commingling of members of advanced and retarded races results in illicit moral relations, with retrogressive effects on the higher race".³ Particularly disturbing in this respect is the fact that "Mulattos are very susceptible to Communist influence".⁴ Consequently it is thought,

Hopefulness ... for the Negro is scarcely justifiable over the distant future and with it intelligent participation in a democratic electorate, if irresponsibility is to be avoided. 5.

In a more recent contribution, whilst it is suggested that advanced and primitive races do exist, they cannot be considered in any hierarchial relationship, for there are imbeciles even amongst those nations that have a store of intellectual wealth !⁶

Here in Part One no attempt has been made at a universal history of the race concept in orthodox race theory, nor to trace its development in each of the various fields referred to above. On the contrary, we have confined this discussion of non-sociological concepts of race to the fields of physical anthropology and psychometrics. In the course of elaborating those problems pertaining to the construction of a theoretical concept of race, however, it is clear that each of these fields will face similar problems regardless of the nominal delineations that apparently distinguish one from another.

In the reappraisal of subsequent attempts to challenge these fields we have sought to distinguish and elaborate two

forms of critique present here. These have been reproduced with a view to endorsing and, at the same time, extending and elaborating the conceptual fallibility of the race concept.

At one level the critiques have been aimed at the epistemological assumptions and operational procedures of those engaged in race theory. In physical anthropology, for instance, the object was that of an ordered system of racial classification. The 'science' then moved towards an exhaustive set of racial categories. Such universalistic relations were assumed to be present between all types of phenomena. Scientists, regardless of their specific activity, were concerned with discovering these relations. The method employed in each case was fundamentally the same. Anthropology, in particular, set itself the task of elucidating the infinity of intra-species somatic variation. Toward this end it adopted certain assumptions from the then contemporary positivist philosophy of science. It is interesting to note their reliance here on A. Comte, whose Positive Philosophy provided not only a rationale for physical anthropology, but also an apparently scientific basis for the explanations of social phenomena.

If science, as positivism asserts, is to be defined in terms of its methods of operation, then the anthro-geneticists' objections to these attempts to provide an exhaustive classification were directed towards the 'scientificity' of both 'descriptive' and 'scientific' anthropology. In particular they sought to dispute the credibility of anthropology's attempts to establish rational relations between phenomena purely in terms of observation and arbitrary selection

from an infinitude of somatic differences. Science here had been reduced to the experience of the scientist who selected at random those categories considered pertinent for his classification. The complete absence of any logical connection whatever between these categories prevented any one set of criteria rationally asserting itself over others and consequently enabled taxonomists to reduce somatic diversity to literally any number of categories or 'races' from one to infinitude. The implications were clear to the taxonomists themselves. As Deniker suggested, the greater the knowledge of diversity the more races became possible.

This form of critique was developed here in Section I with particular reference to a paper given by J. Hunt to the first meeting of the Anthropological Society. The production of these racial classifications, it was argued, necessarily involved a circular reasoning whereby races were known to exist prior to establishing their existence (i.e. through the selection of criteria necessary to make the crucial initial distinction). If colour classification became the basis for this a priori assumption, then the existence of races, anthropology's objective, was not simply assumed at the outset but the very basis of the classification was known in advance. Further evidence confirmed or refuted the initial hypothesis. Those that appeared discordant in this respect could then be considered as non-pertinent for racial classification and consequently discarded.

Attempts to redefine race on the basis of recent genetic

evidence face similar problems. The gene simply provides the possibility of knowing the mechanism through which hereditary characteristics are transmitted. It cannot, contrary to popular belief, assist the anthropologist in his selection of those genes pertinent for racial differentiation, nor is it any more possible to establish any necessary relationship between genes than between minutiae of somatic differences. If the selection of pertinent genes is once more a matter of personal discretion, then it is not surprising that there appears to be as many problems over the precise distinctions between micro-geographical or local race, and breeding population, as between the manifold schemes of Cuvier, Blumenbach, Deniker, etc. Strictly speaking if we are to generalise on the basis of identical gene constitution, only monozygotic twins could accommodate an independent category. As one who has attempted to redefine race has admitted "if races have to be discrete units, then there are no races".⁷

While this may be seen as an attempt to reproduce and develop where possible these arguments, the opportunity was seen and taken in section I to examine certain substantive problems in physical anthropology and in orthodox race theory. In particular the status of Darwin's theory of natural selection was considered in terms of its relationship to orthodox race theory. Despite numerous appeals to Darwin's theory of natural selection, the latter can offer no assistance whatever to those fields that seek its support. Here we examined both attempts to infer certain superorganic evolutionary principles from Darwin's theory, and attempts

to classify intra-special types which may or may not be referred to as races.

With respect to the former, it has been suggested that Darwin's concepts of mutation, adaptation and variation may only be considered in relation to a given ecological environment. Consequently there can be no necessary tendency toward the 'improvement' of the species either at an organic level or, as some social Darwinists have suggested, in terms of the ever-increasing complexity of social forms of organisation. As regards the latter, Darwin's theory of natural selection was in no way affected by the problems Darwin himself admitted in the arbitrary classification of intra-special types. The theory of natural selection and the concept of race, far from complementing each other, work in opposite directions. While the one attempts to specify the conditions under which intra-special variations are effected, the other seeks to delimit such variations through the organisation of certain combinations of characteristics and by correlating these with a predefined concept of race.

In contradistinction to the race concept in physical anthropology, which appears as the object of those investigations discussed above, the concept of race in psychometrics appears to play a secondary role both with respect to a general concept of heritability and one of intelligence. Since these arguments have been reproduced in the context of other 'group' characteristics, (sex, social class),⁸ the general response from social science has been directed towards the question of intelligence testing and the operational problems involved here,

and the problem of distinguishing ascribed from achieved (both positive and negative) characteristics. These were developed in Section II following a reproduction of the case presented by Jensen and Eysenck.

Once again these problems encountered by social scientists have been endorsed and developed where possible. In particular this involved at a methodological level a general examination of statistical variance testing, and the problems of establishing relationships between two sets of phenomena (in this case 'race' and a low intelligence test score) experienced together. It was suggested here that no rational relationships may be established on the basis of observation alone, since there exists an infinitude of variables which have to be controlled, before in this case, the colour factor can be considered significant.

What the relationship between race and I.Q. presupposes and what is notably absent in psychometrics, and to some extent this is true also of those seeking to discredit these arguments, is an elaborated concept of race. Though it appears subordinate to other considerations, the whole race/I.Q. controversy presupposes it. What appeared more disarming was not so much the relative absence of attention paid to it by psychometrics, but the apparent ease with which it successfully appealed to the principles of Mendelian genetics to substantiate its claims. In so far as it did so, it incurred those problems, identified in previous attempts to provide a scientific gloss to their arguments, through a reliance on Darwin's theory of natural selection and recent developments in population genetics. The race concept was once more found to be entirely without

support in this respect. If the concepts of genetics aim specifically at the conditions under which biochemical variation take place, the concept of race on the other hand seeks to provide a broader basis of classification by grouping these genes in an arbitrary fashion. Of much greater significance, however, is the fact that these broader racial categories are then themselves assumed to be responsible for behavioural differences that appear to exist.

In both psychometrics and, to some extent, in the social sciences that have reacted to these arguments, a 'racial' category appears assumed. Consequently we examined in the latter part of Section II those attempts to account for real differences between Blacks and Whites in terms of environmental factors (motivation, stress, socio-economic status). The biological determinism is thus replaced by a form of cultural determinism which results in significant differences between groups (in this case defined according to colour).

The problems for environmentalists in this respect are in part a consequence of the objections raised over the question of isolating genetic from environmentally induced differences. To do so, it was argued, involves the problem of randomising or controlling environmental influences considered essential if any kind of relationship is to be established. However the problem works both ways and attempts to provide environmentalist explanations of behavioural differences are subject to precisely those charges in principle levelled at psychometrics. What was once assumed an impossible task according to Simon, i.e. that of controlling environmental variables, has now become a very

real possibility. Consequently the factors of stress and motivation used by Katz and Mason respectively seek to explain behavioural differences, in this case intelligence test performance, between groups defined according to colour. The Jensen/Eysenck position, which did in point of fact admit a degree of interactionism, has now been rejected on operational grounds, only to be replaced by similar (perhaps less refined) operational procedures to establish an alternative social explanation of behavioural differences. What appeared then at one level to be an extremely effective case against psychometrics and, by inference, the methodological assumptions of physical anthropology, appears in part to have been replaced by a series of research findings which seem to reproduce in principle an equally dubious set of empiricist assumptions.

There is, however, a form of anti-empiricism that does not simply attempt to substitute cultural for physiological variables. Consequently there is a sociological concept of race that is not confined to an environmental explanation of group differences. On the contrary, and, it might be said, in conjunction with the vast body of contemporary sociological theory, there appears an attack on orthodox race theory in its various forms which does not reproduce, at least in principle, the naturalist assumptions of positivist philosophy of science and it is here that we find the real clue to a sociological concept of race. This attack will be illustrated in two ways. The first concerns those attempts in orthodox race theory to infer superorganic forms of organisation from principles of natural evolution, and the second concerns the

use of statistical data in psychometrics.

Social Darwinism, it has been suggested, involved the assumption that Darwin's principles of natural selection may be appropriate for an analysis of social life. In a paper on this question, Stark identifies two social Darwinists in particular, Ammon and Lapouge, who were considered representative of both progressive and regressive evolutionist positions.⁹ Ammon consequently found, of the three sub-classifications of the Caucasian race, the Nordic race to be the most well-endowed genetically and hence the most likely strain to survive. Any attempt toward equality must be considered unnatural since, through the operation of the principles of natural selection in the social sphere, only the 'fittest' will survive.¹⁰ If Ammon's brand of social Darwinism was ultimately optimistic (in as much as he considered the fittest would naturally survive and the weakest go to the wall), Lapouge was, on the contrary, more sceptical.¹¹ Social selection was not the mechanism through which those most adapted to their (social) environment survived. Each of the aspects of social selection (Lapouge identified eight in this respect) tended to "weed out the good and make room for the bad".¹²

The relationship between race theory ('social Darwinism' here) and Darwin's theory of natural selection, it has already been suggested, rests on a misreading of Darwin's basic concepts which can offer no support whatever to theories of progressive or regressive evolution. In contrast to these more substantive distinctions, it is interesting to examine Stark's objections

to social Darwinism as represented here by Ammon and Lapouge.

The reasons for its (i.e. social Darwinism) failure are not far to seek. True, the human race is an animal species, and in so far as, or rather so long as, it is an animal species it must obey the same natural laws as all the lower creation. But man is not only an animal. There is, as Kant liked to express it, not only phenomenal man, man as science studies him, but also noumenal man, man as a moral agent. In other words, there is not only man in the grip of necessity, but also man with the privilege of freedom. 13.

This form of attack on naturalism, i.e. the view that the social world is subject to the same laws of determination as the world of natural objects, reproduces in general terms the sociological objections to various forms of positivist epistemology. "The laws of nature serve only to delimit an area of freedom, which we know as culture, and within which selection occurs on the basis of values."¹⁴.

In particular, in this respect it is reproduced in Rex's concern over the use of statistical data in establishing relations between phenomena.¹⁵ According to Rex :

It is a requirement of sensitive social science that the social scientist should be aware of the fundamental epistemological problem of the human studies, namely that, while natural science is an activity in which scientists have concepts about things, in the human sciences the scientist has concepts about things which themselves have concepts. 16.

In this respect quantification, according to Rex, has proved itself to be insensitive and "psychometric ... perhaps the least sensitive and the brashest of the empirical human studies."¹⁷ Consequently he attacks what he regards as the phenomenalism of psychometrics where the environment is reduced to "an index based upon the few quantitative variables".¹⁸ What these explanations lack is adequacy at the level of meaning, the essence in other words behind the phenomena. In view of

these prerequisites for an adequate sociological concept of race, it is necessary now to turn to Weber's concept of ethnic group and the various attempts to subsume the race concept to a number of sociologically defined categories.

The problems encountered here however should not detract from the general force of the arguments which at both an operational and substantive level have established the dubious status of the race concept in what in general terms may be referred to as orthodox race theory.¹⁹ Its scientific pretensions in both these respects have been found seriously wanting.

The inherent weaknesses of its methodological assumptions have been elaborated where possible and extended to include a more substantive attack on the race concept, in particular where it has sought refuge in the conceptual strongholds of the fields of Darwin's theory of natural selection and population genetics, and even biochemistry. The critical investigation of the sociological and neo-Marxist concepts of race and racism should in no way be taken to imply a return to the biological category. In point of fact where the concepts are found to be weakest in what follows, it will often be through a misplaced reliance on some real physiological distinction.

Notes.

1. J. Deniker, The Races of Man, op. cit., p. 1.
2. M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, p. 81.
3. C. Kephart, Races of Mankind, p. 89.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, p. 90.

6. J.R. Baker, Race, p. 534. For a useful review of Baker's overriding attempt to demonstrate the superiority of Europeans, see M. Dummett 'Prejudice Reinforced', The Guardian.
7. T. Dobzhansky cited by J. Hiernaux, 'The Concept of Race and the Taxonomy of Mankind', op. cit., p. 39.
8. For a discussion of Herrnstein's arguments and their relationship to Eysenck's work, see 'Does Intelligence really matter?', in the Sunday Times.
9. W. Stark 'Natural and Social Selection' in Darwinism and the Study of Society, ed. M. Banton.
10. Stark adds "We see here looming up behind Ammon, not only Herr Günther who provided the Nazi philosophy, not only Herr Himmler who put it into practice, but even the gas chambers of Buchenwald and Auschwitz which were meant, in the spirit of this whole philosophy, to help nature to do her 'wholesome' work". Ibid, p. 52.
11. See also Gobineau in Selected Political Writings, ed. M.D. Biddis, pp. 37-183, for a similarly pessimistic view of the decline of the aristocracy.
12. W. Stark, op. cit., p. 54.
13. Ibid, p. 56.
14. M. Banton, 'The Autonomy of Post-Darwinian Sociology', op. cit., p. 168.
15. J. Rex, 'Nature versus Nurture', op. cit.
16. Ibid, p. 167.
17. Ibid, p. 168.
18. Ibid, p. 170.
19. This is not to suggest that their work has not been particularly effective at other levels. The political implications of these positions (e.g. segregated educational programmes) are an obvious case in point.

PART TWO.

MAX WEBER AND THE CONCEPT OF RACE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY.

Introduction.

In keeping with the concluding remarks of Part One, we shall now turn away from what has been referred to as orthodox race theory to an examination of the race concept as a social category. This is not to suggest at this stage that sociology has settled accounts with its biological conscience. On the contrary, of particular interest here in Part Two will be the precise status of the biological category in sociological race theory. Principally, however, if sociology rejects the concept of race elaborated in Part One, then what 'appears' to be racial differentiation must be explained in terms of other sociological categories. Sociology has by no means presented a homogeneous case in this respect. Consequently a second principal objective of this investigation will be to review critically conventional conceptual differences in sociological race theory, in particular those attempts to subsume or incorporate the race concept to general and, at times, apparently exclusive sociological categories. These differences, however, will be shown to belie certain tendencies present throughout sociological race theory and a presentation of these will be the third principal objective in Part Two.

To these ends, it is considered crucial not merely to

subject contemporary race theory to careful scrutiny, but more fundamentally to locate the sociological concept of race in terms of categories generally examined in the context of mainstream sociological theory. In particular we will contribute in this direction via an examination of Weber's contribution to race theory, both with respect to certain of his general theoretical formulations and those that directly pertain to the concept of race and ethnic group.

Weber's work is particularly useful, illustratively, for two reasons. In the first place many of the very real problems confronting a sociological concept of race are particularly evident here. This will be shown to be the case particularly in Section III where conventional demarcations in race theory will be reorganised around the concepts of action, culture and structure. In the second place, it provides an invaluable opportunity for identifying certain problems in the context of what 'appears' as a substantive area of sociological research, race relations, and does so in terms of what appears to many as an autonomous region of sociological investigation: mainstream sociological theory and the work in this particular instance of one of its founding fathers, Max Weber.

Consequently to meet these objectives, there will be three sections devoted to an investigation of the properties of the sociological concept of race. Section I will be concerned with a general examination of those theoretical formulations developed by Weber, considered relevant to a subsequent examination of contemporary sociological race theory. This reproduction of certain selected arguments will rely solely

on Weber's texts themselves and not address itself generally to any one of several commentaries on his work. This is not borne of any aversion in principle to these secondary texts, but rather an attempt to redress a tendency common in specialist sociologies (of race for instance) to avoid primary texts when commentaries are available. In point of fact their shortcomings in this respect have often produced discrepancies not only in their own work in relation to their professed mentor, but at times, and this will be developed particularly with reference to neo-Marxist race theory in Part Three, a failure to identify correctly the mentor himself. Specifically then, we shall introduce this examination with the concept of 'social action' in sociology and causality in sociological investigation. This will be followed by a discussion of the role of 'values' both with respect to the sociologist himself and the subject-matter of his investigation, social action. Finally here we shall elaborate briefly Weber's principles of stratification with particular attention being paid to the role of the status category, for this is central to that of ethnic group, which may in fact be said to presuppose it.

Part 2 of this opening section will be concerned specifically with the concepts of race and ethnicity in Weber's sociology and their location in terms of his general formulations outlined in Part 1. In the first instance we shall examine the distinction made between the biological and sociological concepts of race. The concept of social action will be shown to provide the theoretical basis for this distinction. This will be

followed by a discussion of the concept of ethnic group which may be seen as an attempt to wed the biological and social aspects of race under a more inclusive category. Finally we shall examine the concepts of caste and nation in so far as they pertain to the concept of ethnic group. The status category outlined in Part 1 will be shown once more to be crucial in this respect. In the form of an appendix here we shall refer to Weber's own prescriptions for future work in sociological race theory on the basis of his professed rudimentary examination of the concept and those that directly relate to it.

Section II will be concerned exclusively with contemporary sociological race theory, a field which has been relatively undeveloped in American sociology but which has flourished there when compared to the British contribution to the field despite the recent profusion of race relations research projects. Attention will be paid here to conventional demarcations, initially developed by Rex, on the basis of various sociological categories invoked to explicate the concept of race as a social object. Part 1 will be devoted to those attempts to subsume race directly to orthodox stratification theory; in particular the concepts of ethnicity and caste will be confronted in this respect. The concept of class and those attempts to reduce 'race relations' to class relations will subsequently be examined in Part Three.

In part 2 we shall be concerned with those attempts to incorporate race within a more inclusive category; one that presupposes an extension or modification of stratification theory,

apparently designed to accommodate the specific characteristics and complexities of the race concept. In this respect minority group and plural society theory will be discussed in turn.

In conclusion the most recent developments in race theory will be reviewed, in particular those attempts, across the political spectrum, to elevate the concept of race to that of nation and race relations to international relations. In many ways this may be seen as a response to 'radical' race relations which, under several guises, has recently considered the concept of nation to be crucial to an understanding of the race concept, in particular those variants of Black nationalist and national liberation politics in the Third World, in addition to a number of recent academic contributions in this area. These radical developments again will be discussed subsequently in Part Three, in particular in an examination of the race concept in the content of national liberation and socialist programmes.

Section III will depart from conventional demarcations to reclassify the race concept in sociology on the basis of its relationship to three more general sociological categories: the concept of 'action', a particular conception of 'structure' and finally a very loosely defined realm of 'culture'. The concept of race, it will be suggested, has been conceived throughout sociological race theory, i.e. right across conventional demarcations, in terms of each of these categories. As a result, it may be suggested, there are three problematics of sociological race theory and to this extent three concepts of race. The reorganisation of sociological race theory in this

way will serve to draw attention to certain sources of confusion that may find expression at a more substantive level of investigation, i.e. orthodox sociological race relations research. Furthermore it will be possible for us to identify certain problems common to both contemporary sociological theory and Weber's concept of ethnic group in terms of his general sociological categories. Despite certain resemblances at this level, however, it will be shown in conclusion that, paradoxically, the most recent contributions in the field, have not, in point of fact, complied with Weber's rudimentary outlines for future research; but rather, if anything, moved in the reverse direction. The investigation as a whole should subsequently enable us to establish the relationship of the race concept in sociology to that developed in neo-Marxist theory.

I. Weber's Sociology and the Concept of Ethnic Group.

1. Theoretical Presuppositions of the Race Concept in Sociology.

a) Sociology and the Concept of Social Action.

The object of sociology for Weber is, "the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects".¹ Understanding or 'verstehen' includes both observation and interpretation of the 'subjective states of mind' of actors or of the logical and symbolic systems that are referable to these states of mind of the actor.² Action is taken to include "all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it",³ (Emphasis added) and social action is all action in so far as it "takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course".⁴ Consequently a social relationship refers to "the behaviour of a plurality of actors in so far as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms"⁵ (Emphasis added).

In terms of these general propositions concerning the status of sociology and its object, social action, it is particularly crucial for our purposes to elaborate the distinction Weber makes between subjective meanings and objectively valid or correct courses of action. In the case of the former, Weber distinguishes actually existing meaning attributable to an actor in a particular situation, and an average or approximate meaning attributable to a hypothetical actor or actors.⁶ In neither instance, however, does it refer to an objectively 'correct'

meaning. In the sciences of action,

processes or conditions, whether they are animate or inanimate, human or non-human, are in the present sense devoid of meaning in so far as they cannot be related to an intended purpose. 7.

Sociology then, in confining itself to purposeful action, is teleologically defined. The conditions of action thus are strictly non-pertinent in sociology unless they can be related to meaningful, i.e. purposeful action. A knowledge of these conditions, produced independently of the sciences of action, is thus treated as given data which may or may not be causally effective but in no way affects sociology's objective: the interpretation of action in terms of its subjective meaning. 8.

Put another way, the sociologist is only concerned with the conditions of action in so far as they relate to the means-end action schema, i.e. with freely chosen ends and appropriate means. Weber's typology of social action reflects variations on this means-end axis. Consequently, action is classified according to its mode of orientation. In the first place, zweckrational action refers to the expectation that external objects will perform in certain ways, and to the organisation of means on the basis of these for the achievement of an individual actor's freely chosen ends. Wertrational action refers to an orientation to an absolute value, regardless of whether or not it is ultimately realised. Affectual action refers to an orientation toward an object on the basis of the emotions of an individual actor. Finally traditional action designates an orientation toward an object on the basis of custom, habit etc.

'Understanding' or 'verstehen' is conceived in terms of either direct observational understanding of the subjective meaning of a given act or explanatory understanding. The former refers to an act that requires no more than its observation to grasp its meaning. For instance the act of shutting a door is grasped solely by observing the actor's movements towards the door, twisting the knob, closing it and releasing the knob.⁹ Explanatory understanding refers to an actor's motivation for acting in a particular way at a given time. In the above illustration, then, this level of understanding would seek to know why the door is shut at this particular moment; outside noise, to exclude a draught etc. For Weber this involves "placing the act in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning."¹⁰ The establishment of such motivational sequences cannot, Weber writes, "claim to be the causally valid interpretation. On this level it must remain only a peculiarly plausible hypothesis".¹¹ Weber thus distinguishes causally adequate interpretations "in so far as, according to established generalizations from experience, there is a probability that it will always actually occur in the same way"¹² and adequacy at the level of meaning which refers to the "subjective state of mind of the actor or actors".¹³ Causal interpretation thus includes reference to both overt (objective) action and subjective meaning structures. Nevertheless,

If adequacy in respect to meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the degree of uniformity and how precisely its probability can be numerically determined, it is still an incomprehensible statistical probability.¹⁴
(Emphasis added).

And later,

Statistical uniformities constitute understandable types

of action in the sense of this discussion, and thus constitute 'sociological generalizations', only when they can be regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning of a course of social action. 15.

Thus the sciences of action provide the possibility of transcending the demonstration of uniformities (such is the limited scope of the natural sciences) and grasping what is essentially beyond the realms of natural scientific knowledge: namely the subjective component of its object, action.

In summarising this section we shall refer back to the above illustration. In the act of closing a door,¹⁶ sociology is concerned only in so far as meaning is attached to the act by the person shutting it. Furthermore, meaning is present in so far as the act can be related to an intended purpose on the part of the person shutting the door. The purpose of shutting it may be to exclude a noise or draught (zweckrational action) or as part of an attempt to maintain orderliness and symmetry in the room (wertrational action) or it may be slammed in anger on entering the room (affectual action) or finally it may also be closed simply out of habit (traditional action). Through repeated observation of both the overt act of shutting the door and the purpose underlying the act, the observer arrives at some form of generalisation which enables him to state that in all probability when the wind is blowing X will shut the door, or that Y, as part of an orderly ritual, will invariably close the door behind him. In this sense, sociology is not concerned in the case of zweckrational action whether or not the actor has correctly identified the cause of the draught but only that he thinks he has and acts in order that he might exclude it. Hence sociology is restricted in two very crucial ways in this example. It cannot

seek to uncover what causes the draught, beyond what the subject actor thinks to be the correct cause. Secondly it cannot know why the person thinks that by shutting the door he will exclude the draught, even if he is wrong. Both are logically outside the scope of sociology in so far as both are devoid of purpose, hence subjective meaning. We shall return to this shortly.

b) The Role of Values: the Sociologist and his Sociology.

Implicit in Weber's concept of social action is some reference to values, for these, it has been suggested, provide the ends towards which action is directed (or 'oriented'). In other words, individual actors attribute differential cultural significance (meaning) to the multiplicity of possible meanings that comprise the social totality on the basis of their relatedness to certain values:

It is rather (i.e. rather than science) the task of the acting, willing person: he weighs and chooses from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world. (Emphasis added). 17.

What is more this applies as much to the sociologist as the acting individual, hence the selection of problems for scientific investigation is itself a function of values.

The very recognition of the existence of a scientific problem coincides, personally, with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values. 18.

The cultural sciences in particular are unique in this respect for, unlike the natural sciences, their objects (i.e. social actors) are constantly acting themselves according to values.

In the social sciences we are concerned with psychological and intellectual (geistig) phenomena the empathic understanding of which is naturally a problem of a specifically different type from those which the schemes of the exact natural sciences in general can or seek to solve. 19.

Such understanding is possible because both subject (sociologist) and object (social actor) are individuals who purposely orient action toward some freely selected ends or values i.e. both are endowed with a consciousness. Values thus constitute the basis of what is and what is not considered pertinent. "Perception of its (a cultural phenomenon's) meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation". (Emphasis in original). 20. However the sociologist and the social actor are separated in Weberian sociology in the distinction made between Werthung (value-judgement) and Wertbeziehung (value-reference). The sociologist's action, it is admitted, is directed on the basis of certain normative predispositions :

The significance of a configuration of cultural phenomena and the basis of this significance cannot however be derived and rendered intelligible by a system of analytical laws (Gesetzesbegriffen), however perfect it may be, since the significance of cultural events presupposes a value-orientation towards these events. (Emphasis in original) 21.

Hence sociology is culturally bound since "empirical reality becomes "culture" to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas". 22.

However this does not require sociology itself to pass judgement on the results of its interpretation of cultural events. The distinction can be illustrated with reference to Weber's concept of rational social action. This, if we recall, refers to the expectation that external objects will perform in certain ways, and to the organisation of means on the basis of these for the achievement of an individual actor's freely chosen ends. The sociologist is able to refer to

relations between various means for achieving certain ends without necessarily selecting the ends himself. Given the ends themselves, it is possible for him simply to examine to what extent the means are appropriate. In addition there may be two contradictory end values, in which case the price of one is the cost of the other. The sociologist is then able to refer to this contradiction without himself selecting one or the other.

Action then is necessarily value-oriented and selection from a multiplicity of phenomena is made on the basis of an orientation to certain values, freely chosen by the individual. It is the essentially free choice of values that determines the character of the overt action (or means) invoked to attain these ends. Though the sociologist necessarily refers to the means-end action schema (this, after all, being the basis of his investigation) and hence to values, value-judgements are themselves precluded from sociological investigation. Hence it is possible to identify the most appropriate means or rules for the achievement of specific ends/values and what is more it is possible for sociology to identify contradictory end values without itself making the selection of ends.

Hence, though the cultural sciences are unique in the sense that the subjects and objects of investigation are similarly endowed with consciousness (which makes all this value-oriented activity possible) they are nevertheless not altogether devoid of a limited objectivity through the *Werthung/Wertbeziehung* distinction. Two implications result from this discussion of the central role of values in Weber's sociology that will subsequently be elaborated here in Part Two. The first concerns the

problematic nature of the social totality, constructed on the basis of the sum total of all social action, which we have suggested constitutes the object of sociological investigation for Weber. If overt action is contingent on the subjective meanings attached to certain phenomena, which in turn are selected on the basis of an orientation toward certain values, what are the determinant elements of the social world? This problem will become particularly apparent in our subsequent attempts to reorganise contemporary sociological race theory around the concepts of action, culture and a notion of structure.

The second concerns the relationship between those values referred to above that are freely chosen by the individual and those cultural expressions (for instance, traditional values) which are imposed on a collective group and are not reducible to individual values.

This preliminary excursion through some of Weber's fundamental propositions, in particular the central role of values in the means-end action schema, will enable us, not only to locate the point at which sociology has sought to cut the umbilical cord and free itself from the biological concept of race, but will also ultimately facilitate the distinction between the sociological problematic and that of neo-Marxist theory that will follow in Part Three. 23.

c) Stratification Categories in Weber's Sociology.

In terms of the overall objectives here in Part Two, Weber's formulations on stratification provide a particularly crucial level of conceptualisation, presupposing as they do, on the one hand those general propositions with respect to the object of

sociology and the role of values elaborated briefly above, and, at the same time, having effects themselves at the level of the concept of ethnic group, where, it will be suggested shortly, Weber has attempted to locate the sociological concept of race. Furthermore, and this will be elaborated in Sections II and III, they provide, at least nominally, the rudimentary outlines for a wide range of 'race relations' frameworks that have been developed in sociology. In particular, they may be seen to contribute those 'structural' aspects of a race relations situation; or put another way, they constitute the 'structural' basis for differentiation in a given society. It is in terms of these general forms of differentiation that we shall seek to locate the race concept. Consequently they will be elaborated in the specific context of sociological race theory below but will be reviewed in general terms at this point in our discussion.

"'Classes', 'status groups', and 'parties'" Weber writes, "are phenomena of the distribution of power within a community"²⁴. where power (Macht) is conceived as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance"²⁵. If these three groups are phenomena of the distribution of power, then clearly the various aspects of power and their relationship to these three groups need to be specified. The concept of class, according to Weber, designates a group constituted on the basis of :-

- (i) common life chances
- (ii) in particular those concerned with the possession of goods and income opportunities
- (iii) under conditions of the commodity and labour markets. 26.

Consequently 'class situations' are "primarily determined by markets" (Emphasis in original),²⁷ or, put in stronger terms, "'class situation' is, ... ultimately 'market situation'".²⁸ Power in the market however is not the sole source of power and this distinction constitutes not only Weber's pluralistic assumptions concerning the separation of power but, relatedly, differentiation on the basis of class, status, and party affiliations.²⁹ The last two are by no means dependent variables for, according to Weber,

'Economically conditioned' power is not, of course, identical with 'power' as such. On the contrary, the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds. 30.

The other grounds refer to power derived from social honour and from within the political order. These respond respectively to the categories of status and party in Weber's typology of social stratification. Consequently,

We understand by 'status' situation the probability of certain social groups' receiving positive or negative social honor. The chances of attaining social honor are primarily determined by differences in the styles of life of these groups, hence chiefly by differences of education. (Emphasis in original). 31.

Consequently the economic and social orders refer to the organisation for the distribution and use of goods and services on the one hand and the distribution of social honour in a community on the other. The social order as we have suggested is by no means the dependent variable in this relationship. "Indeed, social honor, or prestige, may even be the basis of political or economic power".³² In other words, "a 'status situation' can be the cause as well as the result of a 'class situation', but it need be neither".³³ Although status

distinctions are related in various ways to class (for instance the acknowledgment of property as a status attribute) it is specifically the 'style of life' that defines a status group. It is this life-style, prescribed for each member and carried out through conventional modes of orientation, that provides the possibility of closure. It is the traditional aspects of life style that make status groups (in contrast to classes) communities.³⁴ In summarising the crucial features of status groups, Weber writes,

The primary practical manifestations of status with respect to social stratification are conubium, commensality, and often monopolistic appropriation of privileged economic opportunities and also prohibition of certain modes of acquisition. 35.

Closure may take various forms according to the cultivated life-style of the particular status group in question. "These restrictions may confine normal marriages to within the status circle and may lead to complete endogamous closure".³⁶

In terms of the effects of such conditions of status group closure outlined above,

only one consequence can be stated, but it is a very important one: the hindrance of the free development of the market occurs first for those goods which status groups directly withheld from free exchange by monopolization. 37. (Emphasis added).

It is not altogether surprising then to find that class and status categories do not always coincide. On the contrary, if class is a function of zweckrational action (see above) while status is a function of non-rational, i.e. affectual or traditional modes of orientation, then the two groups may well be oriented towards incompatible, if not contradictory, sets of values.³⁸

It is important to recognise the presence in Weber's work of a relatively well articulated (at least by sociological standards) conceptual scheme. Its relatively systematic character has been suggested here in particular with reference to Weber's attempts to conceive his classification of stratification categories on the basis of a more generalised action typology. If the group categories of class, status and party are considered products of variations on Weber's means-end action schema, then clearly the role of values must be seen as central once more. Indeed, this was found to be the case in attempts to distinguish the economic from the social order and the groups that correspond to these orders, class and status respectively.

In his classification of forms of differentiation, Weber distinguishes three relatively discrete orders, the economic, social and political within which power is distributed according to class, status and party. Each is conditioned by the other two, but no one on its own may be considered an independent variable. The class/status distinction has been addressed in particular here since it provides a clear indication of Weber's attempts to distinguish the economic and social orders and the distribution of a particular type of power within each. Both, it has been suggested, presuppose a specific mode of orientation: class groups in particular, contingent on the realisation of rational action, with status groups operating through affectual or traditional action.

These distinctions and the discussions in general should in the first place enable us to identify the concept of ethnic group in terms of these categories and subsequently to identify

their presence in recent sociological attempts to construct a social 'structural', as opposed to a biogenetic, basis for the race concept.

2. The Concepts of Race and Ethnic Group.

At this point we shall turn specifically to the concepts of race and ethnic group in Weber's sociology. In particular we shall be concerned to locate these concepts in terms of his general formulations reviewed in Part 1. To this extent we shall not reproduce Manasse's paper on this issue, which confines itself specifically to those "manifold utterances on specific race issues."³⁹ that have in turn been examined on the basis of a biographical sketch of Weber.⁴⁰ We shall attempt here to avoid a form of analysis that seeks to reduce sociological theory to the life-style of the individual sociologist, through an examination of the race concept in terms of the general theoretical fields in which the concept and that of ethnic group are worked.

Throughout this discussion of the race concept in sociological, and in point of fact neo-Marxist theory, it is crucial to take account of the following problems. In particular we must seek to uncover what precisely it is that the concept of race seeks to identify. Does its content for instance belie an attempt to specify the conditions of certain forms of social action? Or does it rather less ambitiously refer us to a seemingly significant form of social relationship, without attempting to specify its conditions of existence? In other words it is imperative constantly to readdress ourselves to the

specific content of the sociological concept of race; to uncover precisely what it claims to designate and thereby to determine those problems in particular that it seeks to elucidate. This is particularly important when we come to examine its formal relationship with sociological categories ('caste', 'ethnicity' and 'plural society' for instance) that have attempted to find a place for it.

a) Anthropological Types and the Sociology of Race Relations.

In his examination of ethnic groups, Weber clearly identifies his task as part of a broader project: the sources of social action, and in this particular case, antipathetical behaviour between groups on the basis of racial identity. It is the role of these 'racial' factors that concerns us here, for the elaboration of these and their role in inter-group behaviour constitutes the basis for distinguishing the biological and sociological concepts of race.

Racial factors per se are defined strictly in biological terms by Weber. Race identity then is referred to as "common inherited and inheritable traits that actually derive from common descent".⁴¹ The problem at one level, consequently, is one of elaborating the conditions under which antipathy between two racial groups takes place. In confronting this problem Weber distinguishes two types of condition. The first conceives antipathy to be the direct result of racial (i.e. biological) factors themselves: "There is not the slightest doubt that racial factors, that means, common descent, influence the incidence of sexual relations and of marriage, sometimes decisively".⁴² If racial factors themselves prompt some form of natural antipathy, there is, in addition, a set of social factors that are also

considered responsible themselves for 'racial' segregation (i.e. segregation of biological categories of individuals). Such factors include, for example, endogamous kinship relations which often result in, rather than from, the presence of pure anthropological types. Antipathy between these groups then is a consequence of a "tendency toward the monopolization of social power and honor, a tendency which in this case happens to be linked to race".^{43.}

In effect what Weber is suggesting here is that clearly there are anthropological or biological types and that relations between these types are generally antipathetic. On the one hand these antagonistic relations are the result of the existence of some form of 'natural antipathy' borne of racial distinctions, and on the other, that these real racial distinctions are themselves a secondary consequence of social (e.g. kinship) relations that are responsible for intergroup antipathy.^{44.}

We shall return to these questions shortly. In the meantime it has already been suggested here that this is only one level of analysis in Weber's elaboration of the race concept. Here Weber is intent on establishing conditions of group formation and group antipathy as part of a more general project: the sources of social action. Real biological differences are conceded at this level of analysis either as a 'natural' condition of intergroup hostility or as a consequence of social relations (e.g. kinship). There is, however, another level of analysis operative here in Weber's work and this may be seen to be contingent on certain general propositions that have

already been reviewed above on Part 1. There it was suggested that Weber's sociological project involved action, "in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it".⁴⁵ In this sense those external conditions of action referred to above are outside the scope of the sciences of action in so far as they are devoid of purpose, i.e. subjective meaning. Such conditions can only be introduced as given data.

Thus, for example, differences in hereditary biological constitution, as of 'races', would have to be treated by sociology as given data in the same way as the physiological facts of the need of nutrition or the effect of senescence on action. This would be the case if, and in so far as, we had statistically conclusive proof of their influence on sociologically relevant behaviour. The recognition of the causal significance of such factors would naturally not in the least alter the specific task of sociological analysis or of that of the other sciences of action, which is the interpretation of action in terms of its subjective meaning. The effect would be only to introduce certain non-understandable data ... into the complex of subjectively understandable motivation at certain points. 46.

If we recall Rex's misgivings concerning the efficacy of psychometrics in the explication of social relations elaborated in the concluding paragraphs of Part One, there is clearly a very strong resemblance to the formal rejection (that is to say, rejection in terms of relevance) of the biological category developed by Weber here. There Rex rejected the use of statistical (i.e. 'non-understandable') data in the elaboration of a sensitive (i.e. 'subjectively understandable') social science. At this level of analysis, it is not so much the types themselves as the meaning we attach to these differences that constitutes the basis of Weber's, and subsequently Rex's, project for a sociology of race relations. In both cases, they presuppose Weber's concept of social action and the sociological project in general outlined in Part 1. At one level, then, the

existence or non-existence of anthropological types is considered incidental to the sociological project. This constitutes not only a central assumption of Weber's position but, it will be suggested, remains a consistent feature of contemporary sociological theories of race.

We can conclude then that similarity and contrast of physical type and custom, regardless of whether they are biologically inherited or culturally transmitted, are subject to the same conditions of group life, in origin as well as effectiveness, and identical in their potential for group formation. 47.

So long as the object of sociology is to confine itself to meaningfully oriented action, then the degree to which racial (in Weber's case, biological) factors contribute to group formation is immaterial. In the above illustration, initially taken from Weber, of a man shutting a door, sociology is only concerned in so far as meaning (i.e. intention) is attached to the act. In this case if the door was shut to exclude a draught, sociology cannot know the causes of the draught beyond what the individual thinks to be the correct cause, nor can it know why the individual chose to shut the door for that purpose, even if he was wrong to do so. It may have been caused, for example, by a broken window, but sociology cannot legislate in this or in both areas in general since both are devoid of purpose, hence subjective meaning.

To return to the race concept in sociology, and the task of a sociology of race relations, physical differences are only relevant in so far as actors attach meaning to them. The external conditions known or unbeknown to the individual that prompt him to orient his action in this direction are what Weber refers to as given data, outside the scope of sociology

constituted in the first place as a science of action.

The more or less easy emergence of social circles in the broadest sense of the word (soziale Verkehrsgemeinschaft) may be linked to the most superficial features of historically accidental habits just as much as to inherited racial characteristics. 48.

Group formation may or may not be on the basis of racial typologies but this is of no concern to sociology. Clearly at this level the distinction between biological and other sources of group formation is irrelevant for Weber; it is precisely the 'belief in group affinity', the meaningful element in group action, that renders any further attempts to provide an objective basis for such action superfluous.

If at one level Weber correctly adheres to those general formulations elaborated in Part 1., at another he clearly contravenes his own legislative protocols and attempts to specify the conditions of group formation. This, it has been suggested, is part of a more general project to identify the sources of social action. At this level it becomes necessary to acknowledge the problems entailed in the isolation of 'racial' factors in group formation. In contrast to the above passage from Weber on the role of biological factors, elsewhere he writes, as if now they were pertinent,

It is understandably difficult to determine in general - and even in a concrete individual case - what influence specific ethnic factors (i.e., the belief in a blood relationship, ... or differences, of a person's ... style of life) have on the formation of a group. 49.

The ethnic group concept which will be discussed below is an attempt to overcome the problems inherent in accounting for group formation in 'racial' terms. What it cannot resolve is the tension surrounding the two levels of analysis encountered

here in Weber's work and, as we shall see, not only in Rex's but the bulk of sociological race theory. At this stage it is only necessary to reaffirm the contingency of the sociological concept of race elaborated here by Weber (and by Rex) on the general concept of action reviewed above.

b) The concept of ethnic group.

Weber's ambivalence over the question of the influence of physical factors in group formation is apparently resolved, it has been suggested, in the concept of ethnic group. Here the racial factor is located in terms of a range of cultural variables without specifying the extent to which each of these factors is responsible for its formation.

We shall call "ethnic groups" those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, ... this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. 50.

Attached to this belief which effectively delimits social circles to those possessing it, is a sense of 'ethnic honour', that is, the conviction of the excellence of one's own customs and/or inherited traits. Such customs, or cultural factors considered pertinent, include not only language and religion, but a multitude of differences providing possible indices of differentiation; "differences in clothes, in the style of housing, food and eating habits, the division of labor between the sexes and between the free and the unfree".⁵¹ It is these, in conjunction with biologically determined characteristics, that provide the possibility of ethnic group formation. A sense of ethnic honour or ethnocentrism assumes an integral

feature of these groups, in particular in terms of their relations with other similarly constituted groups. The possibilities as regards these factors are infinite:

Almost any kind of similarity or contrast of physical type and of habits can induce the belief that affinity or disaffinity exists between groups that attract or repel each other. 52.

The biological concept of race then is not abandoned outright in Weber's typology of social groups. At most it is considered superfluous, so that ethnic group identity is sustained "by what are perceived to be common customs (irrespective of actual differences)"⁵³. (Emphasis added). Rather than replacing it by a configuration of cultural variables, the race concept as a biological category simply assumes the role of one more possible index of differentiation. Hence there exists an infinite number of possible criteria for ethnic group formation, biological and/or cultural, and as yet no specification of the conditions under which some are invoked and not others. Race relations, if they are subsumed at all, are reduced to ethnic relations, but only on the condition that the latter may be said to accommodate both cultural and somatic variations. The transformation of the biological concept of race to the sociological concept of ethnic (and, within this, race) relationship is possible on the basis of Weber's general concept of social relationship. Consequently ethnic relationships may be seen as social relationships in which action takes into account the meaningful content of another (in this case in terms of actual or imputed, i.e. somatic/cultural, differences) and is oriented in these terms. An awareness of these differences

or similarities is sufficient to provide the possibility of group formation, of monopolisation and closure, and consequently of 'ethnic honour' for those within its ranks. This, in embryonic form, constitutes the transition from a biological concept of race elaborated in Part One to a sociology of race relations, here in Part Two.

The sense of ethnic honor is a specific honor of the masses (Massenehre), for it is accessible to anybody who belongs to the subjectively believed community of descent. The "poor white trash", i.e., the propertyless and, in the absence of job opportunities, very often destitute white inhabitants of the southern states of the United States of America in the period of slavery, were the actual bearers of racial antipathy, which was quite foreign to the planters. This was so because the social honor of the "poor whites" was dependent upon the social declassement of the Negroes". 54.

Closure thus provides the possibility of honour and the monopolisation of power, precisely the same conditions at a more general level that hold true for the existence of status groups. In point of fact, as regards both ethnic and endogamous connubial groups, "Their similarity rests on the belief in a specific "honor" of their members, not shared by outsiders, that is, the sense of "ethnic honor" (a phenomenon closely related to status honor...)" . And again,

The conviction of the excellence of one's own customs and the inferiority of alien ones, a conviction which sustains the sense of ethnic honor, is actually quite analogous to the sense of honor of distinctive status groups. 55.

The precise nature of the relationship between the two groups is here, and remains, ambiguous for Weber. It is possible to argue that Weber is concerned primarily with an examination of the conditions and characteristics of 'communities' and the concept of status provides the possibility of a general category

to designate, as we have suggested, "every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor".⁵⁶ (Emphasis in original). Honour, a condition of status, presupposes the monopolisation of those characteristics 'deemed significant' (i.e. attributed with meaning) by the group. Hence some form of 'closure' (e.g. endogamy) is a crucial feature of status development. In this sense ethnic groups may be seen as those status groups specifically concerned with a subjective belief in ethnic origins, and with a desire to preserve and monopolise their characteristics (hence endogamous closure), thus maintaining their particular brand of social (i.e. ethnic) honour.

Ethnicity thus appears in this context as one amongst a number of possible sets of conditions for the appearance of status groups. If this is the case, then, the class/status group relationship reviewed in Part 1. holds equally true for the concept of ethnic group. Consequently the lack of any apparent coincidence between the class and status categories above is likely to be reproduced with respect to ethnic groups. Their conditions of existence, as we have suggested, rest on two fundamentally different types of social action: class, in terms of market situation, is contingent on zweckrational action, and ethnic groups, as bearers of a multitude of customs and habits (and/or an allegiance to real or alleged physical differences) are contingent on non-rational action, sometimes affectually but predominantly traditionally oriented.

c) 'National' and 'Caste' differences.

By way of a preview to various attempts within sociological

and neo-Marxist race theory to associate 'race relations' with 'caste' or 'national' differentiation, we shall briefly review these notions as they appear in Weber's work. In this respect, it is necessary once more to distinguish these particular group categories from ethnic group and consequently in turn from the more inclusive category of status group.

(i) Nation.

In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept (nation) undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus, the concept belongs in the sphere of values. 57.

If the term is contained in this sphere, then the immediate problem becomes one of distinguishing in particular the focus of 'national' solidarity, since it has already been suggested both the general status group and the specific ethnic group categories presuppose a consciousness of kind or a subjective belief in identity. In general terms, there seems little basis for group differentiation since :

The significance of the 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group. 58. (Emphasis added).

If the group term is not identical with a linguistically autonomous community (though it is recognised in the formation of national sentiment "a common language takes first place")⁵⁹ perhaps it is in that sphere of cultural values set aside for a subjective belief in a community of descent, i.e. racial identity, where specifically national differences may be found. "Although a specific common anthropological type is not irrelevant to nationality, it is neither sufficient nor a prerequisite to found a nation".⁶⁰

National differences then are to be associated with a subjective belief in identity, one that may or may not incorporate a whole range of cultural variables, linguistic, religious, racial etc. Attached to these again there exists a sense of honour (e.g. national pride, chauvinism) that is maintained through closure of its ranks, endogamy etc. If this is the case, then without further specification of that particular province of meaning toward which national solidarity is oriented, the distinction between this and the ethnic group concept seems somewhat unrealistic. However, "in so far as there is at all a common object lying behind the obviously ambiguous term 'nation'", Weber writes, "it is apparently located in the field of politics".⁶¹ (Emphasis added).

Consequently,

If one believes that it is at all expedient to distinguish national sentiment as something homogeneous and specifically set apart, one can do so only by referring to a tendency toward an autonomous state.⁶²

In view of Weber's previous warning that 'nation' is first of all not identical with a people of a state, i.e. a given polity,⁶³ a distinction, implicit in Weber's work, may be drawn between a nation state on the one hand and the 'idea of a nation' on the other.⁶⁴ The one refers to the 'autonomous polity', the other to the subjective belief in national differences which may or may not coincide with a whole range of variables amongst which would be its correspondence with an autonomous nation state. A parallel distinction has already been suggested with respect to racial identity, i.e. between objective anthropological types on the one hand and a subjective belief in common descent (an 'idea of race') on the other. Both, furthermore, are contingent

on non-rational, traditional modes of orientation in terms of Weber's action typology. If these attempts by Weber may be described as an attempt (albeit half-hearted) to distinguish the two types of sentiment, we shall subsequently return in our examination of contemporary sociological and neo-Marxist theory to two attempts in particular to rewrite these group concepts: in some of the most recent sociological contributions to the field on the one hand, and in the various forms of Black nationalist theory and politics on the other.

(ii) Caste.

'Caste' is, and remains essentially, social rank, and the central position of the Brahmans in Hinduism rests more upon the fact that social rank is determined with reference to them than upon anything else. 65.

If caste primarily refers to a category of rank, then what must be considered in terms of the objectives of this examination is its relationship to other concepts designating an inequitable allocation of resources, prestige, honour, etc. In particular in this respect, we will be concerned with its standing vis a vis the status group concept. Once more it is interesting to note how Weber approaches it at a general level, in much the same way as he handles status, and subsequently, national differences. Indeed Weber writes,

a caste is doubtlessly a closed status group. For all the obligations and barriers that membership in a status group entails also exist in a caste, in which they are intensified to the utmost degree. 66.

Generally the social closure is specifically concerned with religious attachments with magic or taboo etc.. to the extent that "the caste order is oriented religiously and ritually, to a degree not even approximately attained elsewhere".⁶⁷ If its

religious orientation distinguishes it from status, what of its relations to the ethnic group concept? The latter have, after all, to be referred to as closed status groups. In some respects Weber too draws on this analogy,

In America these (status) barriers imply that marriage (between Whites and Blacks) is absolutely and legally inadmissible, quite apart from the fact that such inter-marriage would result in social boycott. 68.

Despite the analogy at this level, (i.e. both referred to in terms of a 'closed' status group) there are crucial differences, it is argued, in terms of the nature of the ranking system specific to each.

A 'status' segregation grown into a 'caste' differs in its structure from a mere 'ethnic' segregation: the caste structure transforms the horizontal and unconnected coexistences of ethnically segregated groups into a vertical social system of super- and subordination. Correctly formulated: a comprehensive societalization integrates the ethnically divided communities into specific political and communal action. In their consequences they differ precisely in this way: ethnic coexistences condition a mutual repulsion and disdain but allow each ethnic community to consider its own honor as the highest one; the caste structure brings about a social subordination and an acknowledgment of 'more honor' in favor of the privileged caste and status groups. 69.

The relationship between caste and the group concepts based on ethnic and status differences is by no means straightforwardly resolved in Weber's work. As regards its relationship to status, both are contingent on non-rational forms of action (primarily oriented towards traditional or ritualistically held values), both involve closure to a greater or lesser degree, and with it marriage rights, endogamy etc. Consequently Hinduist dietary rules for instance "belong in one and the same category of a far broader set of norms, all of which are 'status' characteristics of ritual caste rank."⁷⁰ However not only are caste differences

conceived as exaggerated status differences, they also may be distinguished in terms of the crucial role of the religious element in caste, in much the same way, it may be added, as the political factor marks the distinguishing feature of 'national' identity. Furthermore, from the extract on ethnic group/caste differences, it seems clear that both status and ethnicity involve prestige and honour that encourages closure and monopolisation. For caste, on the other hand, such honour and prestige is only conferred on the higher orders, and not only by their own members but those from lower orders as well. As regards the ethnic group/caste relationship, both at one level share extreme forms of closure and the rules required to bring this about. If the focus on religious factors characterises caste, then perhaps it may be said the concern with physical differences, real or assumed, is what distinguishes the ethnic group category. As with status, ethnic groups each possess their own honour which, with reference to caste, is reserved only for the higher orders.

Summary.

A review of these group categories based on ethnic, national and caste differentiation has revealed above all their integral relationship to the concept of status. This in turn, we have suggested, may be seen to be derived from the more general concepts of Weber's sociology reconstructed in Part 1 and in particular his four-fold action typology.⁷¹ Each of these group differences designates the communalisation of social groupings on the basis of a common attachment to what are believed culturally significant phenomena, and an orientation

towards these ends/values. Such phenomena are preserved through the monopolistic closure of their ranks, and the restriction of marriage within the boundaries of the group. The differences, it may be suggested, that distinguish these groups are by no means clearly specified by Weber. At most they may each be claimed to designate a particular aspect of cultural reality. Caste orders then may be said to represent a specific group in so far as their bearers select from the diversity of cultural reality and confer meaning on certain religious phenomena. Bearers of 'national' identity likewise confer meaning on certain 'political' phenomena (i.e. 'ideas of nationhood'). Accordingly ethnic group too may be conceived on the basis of an orientation towards cultural/racial (at least ideas about races, correctly held or not) phenomena, where 'differences' are preserved on the basis of endogamous relationships and associated with 'ethnic honour' and the corresponding prestige and rights that go with it.

The reconstruction of Weber's sociology of race has proved productive for two reasons. In the first place it has enabled us to preface our consideration of contemporary sociological 'race relations' with an examination of one of the discipline's most significant theoretical contributions. In this way it will be possible to consider the extent to which substantive 'race relations' research is an effect of some of these more general theoretical presuppositions. Secondly and related to this, it has enabled us to draw attention to the logical construction of these group categories, in particular caste and ethnic group, in terms of a more fundamental concept of stratification, i.e.

status, and the dependence of each on his social action typology.

The relatively systematic nature of Weber's overall sociological project should not divert attention from certain problems with respect to the construction of these group concepts. The tensions prevalent in the overall conceptualisation of race in sociology, the subject matter of Section III, will be seen to be analogous to a more general set of problems in Weber's sociological project as a whole. Weber himself was not unaware of the effects of these problems, but it does appear that he envisages them to be resolved independently of a more general level of analysis.

All in all, the notion of "ethnically" determined social action subsumes phenomena that a rigorous sociological analysis - as we do not attempt it here - would have to distinguish carefully: the actual subjective effect of those customs conditioned by heredity and those determined by traditions; the differential impact of the varying content of custom; the influence of common language, religion and political action, past and present, upon the formation of customs; the extent to which such factors create attraction and repulsion, and especially the belief in affinity or disaffinity of blood; the consequences of this belief for social action in general, and specifically for action on the basis of shared custom or blood relationship, for diverse sexual relations, etc. - all of this would have to be studied in detail. It is certain that in this process the collective term "ethnic" would be abandoned, for it is unsuitable for a really rigorous analysis. 72.

In the light of our subsequent examination of contemporary race theory in sociology, it will be interesting to note any advance made in this direction in terms of Weber's rudimentary guidelines for future research. Moreover it will be necessary to assess how far such possibilities are realisable either for Weber or contemporary sociology, given the existence of certain problems at a more general level of analysis in Weber's work.

Notes.

1. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. T. Parsons, p. 88.
2. Ibid, (Editors footnote).
3. Ibid, p. 88.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, p. 118.
6. Weber attempts to 'operationalise' both actually existing meaning and approximate measuring through his use of one ideal type construct. Epistemological problems have been raised, both with respect to the model-building exercise in general by B. Hindess in 'Models and Masks : empiricist conceptions of the conditions of scientific 'knowledge' and specifically on the particular form this model-building exercise has taken in Weber's work by P.Q. Hirst, Social Evolution and Sociological Categories, op. cit., p. 67. Here Hirst writes, "The ideal-type formalises the given and is then reapplied to it. Ideal-typical analysis is a variant of the epistemology of 'models'. It combines formalism, pragmatism and irrationality. Formalism is circular: reality is 'abstracted' into a model and the model reapplied to the real ... The criteria of abstraction, how models are formed, and of the 'fit' of the model with 'reality' are pragmatic, subject to no conditions of proof. The epistemology of models leads directly to conventionalism; those models which save the phenomena best are to be preferred and, where models have equal capacities in this respect subsidiary criteria of economy, elegance, etc., are to be introduced ... Irrationality ... enters into ideal - typical analysis in that the selection of elements to form the type and the problems to which the type is applied are both determined by unquestionable value-motivations." (Emphasis in original). It is important to recognise that this methodological process of abstraction constitutes the epistemological basis of a considerable amount of sociological race relations and, in point of fact, in neo-Marxist theory. For two of the most explicit attempts to invoke such procedures see P.L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism, op. cit., and from within neo-Marxist theory, P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, ch. 1.
7. M. Weber, op. cit., p. 93.
8. M. Weber, op. cit., p. 94.
9. This example is from Weber, *ibid* p. 95. It will be elaborated here to illustrate some of Weber's general sociological principles.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid, pp. 96-97.

12. Ibid, p. 99.
13. Ibid (Editors footnote).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid, p. 100.
16. The act of an essentially free individual.
17. M. Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, p. 53.
18. Ibid, p. 61.
19. Ibid, p. 74.
20. Ibid, p. 76.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. The term problematic here is borrowed in a very loose sense from L. Althusser. He uses it to designate a conceptual (theoretical or ideological) framework. The problematic, for instance, of the later Marx "was constituted by a coherent system of precise concepts tightly articulated together", For Marx, op. cit., p. 227, and L. Althusser and E. Balibar, Reading Capital, p. 316. Although we do not seek to differentiate theoretical from ideological problematics, from the point of view of this investigation, the general designation will be used as above.
24. M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, p. 181.
25. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., p. 152.
26. M. Weber, From Max Weber, op. cit., p. 181.
More precisely Weber distinguishes 'property' classes on the basis of differentiation of property holdings; 'acquisition' classes on the basis of differential access to goods and services in the market and finally the 'social class structure' refers to the plurality of 'class statuses' (including non-property owning and non-acquisitive (in relative terms) class statuses).
M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., p. 424 ff.
27. M. Weber, From Max Weber, op. cit., p. 301.
28. Ibid, p. 182.
29. Weber's formal differentiation of the distribution of power in this way constitutes the basis of contemporary pluralist theory in political sociology and political theory. Pluralism here is to be distinguished from plural society theory in sociological race theory in a way that will be elaborated in the section that follows.
30. M. Weber, From Max Weber, op. cit., p. 180.

31. Ibid, p. 300. Again, more precisely, he specifies three bases on which in this case social prestige rests: on 'mode of living', on 'education', and finally on 'the prestige of birth' or on 'occupation'. Ibid, p. 428.
32. Ibid, p. 180.
33. Ibid, p. 301.
34. 'Community' designates one type of social structure. It may be seen to correspond closely to the traditional mode of orientation in his action typology. Similarly 'society' has been said to correspond to zweckrational action. Marianne Weber cited in From Max Weber, op. cit. Editors' Introduction, p. 57.
35. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., p. 428.
36. M. Weber, From Max Weber, op. cit., pp. 187-188.
37. Ibid, pp. 192-193.
38. Clearly the concept of 'class situation' or 'market situation' presupposes a general concept of the economy. Since this does not directly pertain to Weber's concept of ethnic group it will not be developed fully here. However we may summarise Weber's concept of the economy and rational economic action in the following way.
- (i) The concept of economic in so far as it pertains to sociology presupposes a general concept of social action, so that economic action is considered relevant in so far as it is meaningfully oriented toward the satisfaction of utilities. The latter, (Nutzleistungen) are conceived in terms of "the specific and concrete, real or imagined, advantages (Chancen) or means for present or future use as they are estimated and made an object of specific provision by one or more economically acting individuals", M. Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., p. 164. Hence the concept of social action as means-end schema is reproduced with respect to one possible orientation, toward the satisfaction of utilities.
- (ii) Hence rational economic action as with social action is teleologically defined in as much as in both instances it is conceived as purposive toward some selected end-value.
- (iii) The concept of a capitalist system embodies the most rational elements of economic action; namely a well-developed money economy and the possibility of maximum marketability for goods and services. Hence the ideal type construct of capitalism, an abstraction and accentuation of its most rational elements, constitutes a free market economy where prices are determined by unregulated forces of supply and demand according to the principles of marginal utility.
- (iv) The construct of capitalism then, Weber suggests, provides the possibility of exploring those irrational elements, that regulate, inhibit or diminish market freedom. Such factors provide the possibility amongst

others of the exclusion of certain groups from market trade. Such restrictions may refer to the labour market which may or may not through monopolistic closure prevent certain groups from selling their labour power where and to whom they like.

The incursion of irrational elements into an otherwise rational economic system constitutes the basis of several attempts to locate race relations within capitalism. In particular it may be found in the work of P.L. van den Berghe, M. Banton and others on South Africa. See for instance, P.L. van den Berghe, South Africa, A Study in Conflict, ch. 8.

It also constitutes the assumptions underlying several attempts to examine racialist practices in employment in this country, particularly from a 'liberal-welfare' perspective. See for instance, R. Stokes, 'The Role of the Personnel Officer', M. Meth, Here to Stay, M. Stewart, A Stitch in Time.

39. E.M. Manasse, 'Max Weber on Race', p. 191.
40. For instance, in terms of his trip to the United States in 1904, see, *ibid*, p. 198 ff. See also P. Rose, The Subject is Race, p. 53. Rose at least does attempt, albeit schematically, to assess the influence of Weber's work on the sociological study of race in terms of his more general theoretical position.
41. Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. I, p. 385.
42. *Ibid*, pp. 385-386.
43. *Ibid*, p. 386.
44. The extent to which kinship has been the concern of contemporary sociology of race is strictly limited. The work of Talcott Parsons certainly offers the most systematic attempt to elaborate a concept of ethnic group along these lines. The latter here is considered one possible way of organising kinship units into larger clusterings. The kinship system itself is introduced as one aspect of the analysis of social structure elaborated in terms of its patterns of value-orientation. Kinship here illustrates the ascendance of ascriptive, over achievement, classifications: The ethnic group concept then, via the kinship system and the elaboration of the pattern variables, is ultimately derived from Parsons' action frame of reference. T. Parsons, The Social System, esp. p. 167 ff. and for the most explicit account of the location of the pattern variables in the action frame of reference, Toward a General Theory of Action, Part 2, ch. 1. With the possible exception of the work of Eisenstadt, the value-orientation dilemma developed specifically along these lines has not been fully developed in contemporary race relations research. What is more common in this respect is the elaboration of a concept of 'rational' economic action and 'irrational' systems of race relations. Hence the value-dilemma

remains, but bears a closer resemblance to Weber's action typology than Parsons' action frame of reference and the pattern variables.

45. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., p. 88.
46. Ibid, p. 94.
47. M. Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 388.
48. Ibid, p. 387.
49. Ibid, p. 392.
50. Ibid, p. 389.
51. Ibid, p. 391.
52. Ibid, p. 388.
53. Ibid, p. 397.
54. Ibid, p. 391.
55. Ibid, pp. 390 and 391.
56. M. Weber, From Max Weber, op. cit., p. 187.
57. Ibid, p. 172.
58. Ibid, p. 176.
59. Ibid, p. 172, and pp. 177-178.
60. Ibid, p. 173.
61. Ibid, p. 176.
62. Ibid, p. 179.
63. Ibid, p. 172.
64. See in particular, M. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit. p. 395.
65. M. Weber, From Max Weber, op. cit., p. 397.
66. Ibid, p. 405.
67. Ibid, p. 409.
68. Ibid, pp. 405-406.
69. Ibid, p. 189. It is interesting to note the use made of these arguments by contemporary sociologists, and for that matter Marxists, in their objections to the race/caste analogy. We shall return to this below.
70. Ibid, p. 408.
71. M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 115, ff. The systematic character of Weber's work can moreover be seen in his attempts to establish a classification of types of authority and imperative co-ordination on the basis of his action typology. This should not be taken in any sense as an endorsement of Weber's theoretical position. On the contrary there are some very serious problems at this level that, for

our purpose, will be shown to have substantive implications for sociological 'race relations'. In terms of contemporary sociological theories of race, however, Weber's work is, to all intents and purposes, refreshingly systematic. Related to the above illustration for instance of Weber's typology of authority, there has been a recent tendency to characterise race relations as dominant-subordinate relationships. As regards the latter, however, no attempt is made to elaborate this concept of domination, nor to establish its specific conditions of existence in terms of a general typology of social action. This is one of the particularly disturbing features of recent 'advances' since Weber's initial contribution to the field.

72. M. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit., pp. 394-395.

II. Conventional Conceptual Classifications in Contemporary Sociological Theories of Race.

In the previous section the transition from a biological concept of race to a sociology of race relations was made. It was achieved on the assumption that real biological categories may be distinguished from 'ideas' about biological differences between individuals. The sociological concept of race then is very firmly rooted for Weber in the realm of culture. Race relations assume a significance only when individuals orient their action towards that sphere of 'cultural reality' or those 'cultural values' that embody ideas, symbols, beliefs etc., concerned with physiological differences between men. Such ideas about race are independent of objective differences (if there are any) between races. Evidence, according to Weber, is superfluous in terms of the object of sociology in general and sociological race relations in particular.

It is now necessary to turn specifically to an investigation of those attempts in contemporary sociology to develop and/or modify the general conceptual characteristics of the field established in Weber's work. In doing so we shall distinguish three types of explanation, which, it will be seen, effectively exhaust both sociological and neo-Marxist theoretical accounts of the concepts of race and racism.

(i) The first, encountered in Part One, assumed that behavioural differences between races do exist, but attempted to account for them, not in biological terms, but in terms of environmental variation. The work of Mason, Katznelson etc.

illustrates this type of explanation.

If the concept of race in biology may be distinguished from the idea of race in sociology, then the latter will have to provide an independent account of the 'idea' of race, independent, that is to say, of any objective biological difference.

Sociology has approached this problem in the following way. If it is prepared at the outset to accept recent attempts to abolish the race concept as a biological construct, then the onus falls on sociology to account for what appears to be differences of a biological nature but which from recent evidence clearly are not. There have been two types of response to this from within both sociology and neo-Marxism. Together these constitute the second and third explanations.

(ii) The first assumes that what pass for 'race' relations (or what appears as 'racial' differentiation) are in reality not race relations at all but some form of sociologically defined relationship. Consequently there exists a range of specifically group concepts within which the concept of race is to be located. In Weber for instance it was subsumed under the broader category of 'ethnic group', which in turn bore a rather ambiguous relationship to the group concepts of caste and nation. This is also true of a good part of contemporary sociological theory which, in addition to these concepts, finds room for the race concept in terms of segmented (found in plural society theory) and minority groups. In neo-Marxist theory we shall see these group concepts are extended to include class or fractions of classes, (conceived as specifically economic

categories and their corresponding political forms of representation), 'nationalities' on an intra and international scale, and finally, again on a global scale, relations between metropolitan and colonial structures. Race relations here then are not race relations at all but relations between sociologically differentiated groups.

(iii) The second type of response to the fact of the non-existence of biologically conceived races, which constitutes the third type of explanation, attempts to develop a theory whose object is specifically the production of these falsely held beliefs about races. If the latter do not exist as biological categories, then these theories attempt to resolve the problem of why we think they do. Here we are entering the field of the sociology of knowledge on the one hand, and the theoretical account of the production of ideology (racism in this case) on the other. In so far as the latter has been predominantly the concern of neo-Marxist theory, it will not be dealt with here; nor indeed will those group concepts associated with Marxist theory (class etc.). These will be discussed in Part Three. This section in particular will be devoted to those attempts to articulate in some fashion a limited range of sociological group concepts with the concept of race. In other words, here we shall be dealing with those claims from within sociology which suggest that what pass for race relations are in effect relations between minorities, ethnic groups, etc. It is along these lines that sociological theories have, at least implicitly, been distinguished. Moreover, it is on the question of the specific sociological

group considered suitable for this task that differences have appeared within the field. Each group concept, in other words, is attempting to provide a sociological sojourn for the biological category and each, for various reasons that will be elaborated below, considers itself particularly suited to this task.

In reproducing conventional demarcations in this way three types of group concept will be distinguished.¹

- (i) The first attempts to reduce race relations to categories taken from orthodox stratification theory. Here no specialist field of race relations is required. Races are simply ethnic groups, caste orders etc. Consequently we shall be concerned with the reduction of racial to caste and ethnic stratification.
- (ii) The second set of group concepts, on the contrary, suggest that stratification theory cannot readily accommodate the race concept. Consequently 'races' may or may not fall into patterns that follow prescribed divisions distinguished in social stratification. Races, on the contrary, it is argued, may well cut across these divisions. Here we shall examine the concepts of minority group and segmented group (developed in plural society theory).
- (iii) The final group concept that will be reproduced here is the revived concept of ethnic group. If stratification theory attempts to provide a set of categories specific to a given social structure, the new ethnic group concept differentiates between social structures and locates the concept of race in terms of a global concept of ethnicity. This concept not only designates relations specific to a particular nation but also

refers to international relations. In view of this, the most recent contribution to race relations, it will be interesting to note the degree to which sociological race theory has developed along the rudimentary guidelines suggested by Weber above.

1. Race and Social stratification.

a) Ethnic.

An ethnic group, according to Shibutani and Kwan, consists of people who conceive of themselves as being of a kind. They are united by emotional bonds and concerned with the preservation of their type. With very few exceptions they speak the same language, or their speech is at least intelligible to each other, and they share a common cultural heritage. Since those who form such units are usually endogamous, they tend to look alike. Far more important, however, is their belief that they are of common descent, a belief usually supported by myths or a partly fictitious history. (Emphasis in original). 2.

The group that results from these specific cultural conditions form one possible component of a complex stratification system.

If the fullest spectrum of societies is considered, many criteria must be included. Usually, however, the most common criteria are such biologically grounded factors as: age, sex, race, and kinship; class characteristics such as occupation, wealth and power; and any number of idiosyncratic characteristics such as talent and personality. 3.

In this, Reissman's general review of the scope of stratification theory, the concept of race is introduced as one of a multiplicity of criteria that constitute possible indices of differentiation. Such criteria include an infinite range of dimensions including personality, cultural, and material (i.e. economic) interests. However, sociological theory, at least at the outset, locates the race factor, in

common with Weber, in the cultural sphere. Consequently it is not racial differences themselves, but an evaluation on the basis of assumed differences that constitute the crucial factor for Shibutani et al.

In studying the color line we are concerned with the manner in which human beings are classified and evaluated in a community; in short, we must focus upon the study of identification and social status. The study of the color line requires an investigation of various forms of social stratification, the ranking of people within a community. (Emphasis in original). 4.

Social stratification in turn will focus attention on the "unequal access to goods, services and pleasures".⁵ Once significance or meaning is attached to colour differences and a colour line is drawn, there emerges, on the basis of this differential evaluation, a pattern of rights and obligations where certain individuals are accorded differential treatment. These patterns are subsequently reinforced by institutional arrangements; the extent to which these are to the advantage of one of the parties on either side of the colour line relationship will depend on the relative power of each of the groups, "a relationship in which one party is able to enforce its demands on the other".⁶ Power that is institutionalised through legitimate means becomes authority. Hence ethnic differentiation provides the possibility of ranking on the basis of unequal access to goods, services, etc. via a set of conventional symbolic representations used to divide people into categories. Such symbols include colour, religion etc. Ethnic relations may be said to develop in the first place on the basis of a differential evaluation of individuals/parties in a relationship, that is, on the basis

of conceptions they form of one another. Such differentiation enables power relationships to coincide with ethnic divisions, assuming that one party in a relationship has comparatively greater access to resources and is able to enforce its demands on the other. To this extent relations between those groups who "conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious",⁷ (Emphasis in original) may be characterised as essentially relations between those who exercise authority and those who are subject to it i.e. dominant - subordinate relationships.

There are two problems that will be mentioned here but that will be elaborated in the section that follows. The first concerns the relationship between ethnic differentiation as one possible dimension of social structure and the infinite number of other possible indices of stratification. This is particularly crucial in view of those attempts reproduced above, to establish ethnic stratification in terms of another set of criteria, namely those 'class' characteristics referred to above by Reissman, 'such as occupation, wealth, and power'. If each is one possible dimension amongst an infinitude of others, then how is it that ethnic categories apparently coincide with the differential access to scarce resources, (wealth, power etc.) ? This issue poses particular problems for those who, with Weber, assume that ethnic classification rests on a traditionally value-oriented action (i.e. in terms of conventions, mores etc.), while class rests on rationally-oriented action, i.e. in terms of specific goals/values and the appropriate means for attaining them.

A second problem relates to the distinction made at the outset between real physical differences on the one hand and the 'idea' of physical differences on the other. It is these 'ideas' of physical differences that assume potentially the same significance as 'ideas' about dress, language, dietary habits and a whole range of cultural or symbolic variables. The question that arises from the initial distinction with respect to racial differences is as follows: if these are to be accorded the same status as those other factors, should a similar distinction be made between the 'idea of linguistic differences, eating habits etc.' and actual differences in language, food, etc. ? What will be suggested here and subsequently is that equal status is only granted to these cultural/physical variables, not by retaining this distinction, but by reintroducing a notion of physical differences that can be assumed to have an objective existence. Runciman, for instance, using Cross's fivefold classification of stratification dimensions, distinguishes ethnic and racial differentiation.⁸ Although this is qualified by the suggestion that physical differences usually only assume a significance in conjunction with cultural differences, the former nevertheless can be seen here to play a quasi-independent role in social differentiation. Likewise for Shibutani et al, the factor of objective differences is retained in the 'color line' which appears not so much a slice of cultural as material reality, albeit in a somewhat less sophisticated form here.⁹ Consequently racial groups, like caste groups, are distinguished from classes, deference groups (defined in terms of prestige)

and political groups (defined according to the distribution of power) in terms of their "zero, or near zero, rate of permeability".¹⁰. (Emphasis added).

Both the role of ethnic vis a vis other dimensions of stratification and the role of an objective set of physical differences will be developed below. For the present, it is only necessary to identify in conventional terms the specific category, in this case ethnic group, where the race concept may be found and elaborate it briefly in terms of a very loosely formulated set of theoretical presuppositions 'borrowed', though not always consistently, from Weberian stratification theory.

b) Caste.

It has been suggested that ethnicity is one possible criterion for differential ranking in a community. Another such index of differentiation is that of caste ranking, and this constitutes the basis for one further attempt to locate the race concept in terms of a sociologically-based group concept. In common with the ethnic group concept, caste differentiation has been articulated, after a fashion, with the race concept on the basis of a certain conception of the social structure. Hence for Berreman :

By definition, stratification is a common feature of systems of shared social inequality - of ranked social categories - whether birth-ascribed or not. Where membership in these categories is birth-ascribed, the ranking is based on traditional definitions of innate social equivalence and difference linked to a concept of differential intrinsic worth, rationalized by a myth of the origin, effect, and legitimacy of the 'system', perpetuated by differential power wielded by the high and the low, expressed in differential behaviour required and differential

rewards accorded them, and experienced by them as differential access to goods, services, livelihood, respect, self-determination, peace of mind, pleasure and other valued things including nourishment, shelter, health, independence, justice, security, and long life. 11.

If this designates in very general terms, according to Beireman, the 'conditions' of a stratified social system, then what is it specifically that constitutes a caste order? A caste system in particular may be referred to as


one in which a society is made up of birth-ascribed groups which are hierarchically ordered, interdependent, and culturally distinct, and wherein the hierarchy entails differential evaluation, rewards, and association. 12.

In so far as several of these conditions appear comparable to those discussed above with respect to the ethnic group concept (with the additional factor in the case of caste of impermeability), there have appeared a number of attempts from within sociology and anthropology to identify the race concept and hence racial stratification with that of caste or caste stratification.

One such attempt, Warner's 'color-caste hypothesis' (developed in the context of his Yankee City Studies), produces a concept of stratification contingent, on the one hand, on objective status criteria, income etc., and on the other, on subjective evaluation. In the course of immigrant-host relations, the objective and subjective status characteristics increasingly become matched. With Blacks however, though advance may have been made in terms of objective conditions, subjectively they have been denied esteem, honour etc. Hence, in subjective terms, they have


remained qualitatively inferior to Whites. On the basis of these suggestions Warner produced his model of colour caste relations where the stratification system, though nominally an open class - based system, nevertheless also produced tendencies toward vertical distinctions away from the horizontally stratified model.

Fig. (i)



is replaced by :

Fig. (ii)



In effect what Warner is suggesting is not so much that race relations really are caste relations, but, less ambitiously, that they are simply analogous phenomena. The specific symbols clearly differ in each case (bio-cultural as opposed to religio-cultural) but in terms of the overall structural conditions where each may be found and in terms of their effects on those structures, they may be said to be equivalent.¹³ Likewise, as Berreman suggests :

the further one probes into the nature and dynamics of race and caste, and into the experience of those who live them, the more it becomes apparent that they are similar, comparable, phenomena. 14.


No serious attempt then is made to subsume race relations

to caste orders, or to assume that if race relations are not relations between races, then what they really are are relations between caste orders. All that is suggested here and elsewhere is that the two appear sufficiently similar for comparison to be made.¹⁵ Far from abolishing the race concept in this instance, sociology and anthropology have simply sought to liken it to that of caste. Consequently differences of 'opinion' here only really seek to dispute the similarity/compatibility of the two concepts and, it might be added here, not always in a particularly 'radical' way. The first of two general complaints surrounds the possibility of transposing what is a peculiarly Indian phenomenon to race relationships in the United States. Both Leach and Dumont have addressed themselves to this problem.¹⁶ The second complaint suggests that an essential difference between the two systems rests on the degree to which both caste orders and (racial) 'minorities' accept by and large the stratification system as the natural order. In so far as caste orders do generally accept the present state of things while 'minorities' do not, the former, it has been suggested, are consensus-based, while 'race' relations are generally characterised by conflict.¹⁷


2. The Irreducibility of the Race Concept to Stratification Theory.

The concept of race for those whose position we have just reviewed may be identified in terms of a broader concept of ethnic group on the one hand and likened to a caste order on the other. What characterises both ethnic group and caste, and consequently the race concept itself, is their own

definition in terms of an order comprising various groups and ranked in terms of their access, very loosely, to 'scarce resources'. The ethnic group or caste concepts then presuppose a stratification system in which these resources are distributed according to membership of a specific ethnic group or caste order. Races as a strategic symbolic component of ethnicity in this sense come to define the stratification system.



In Fig. (iii), each layer, either distinguished by caste or race, constitutes a specific ranking in the overall stratification system. Race here is not so much subsumed to caste as likened to it. In both stratification systems caste and racial differentiation mark impermeable divisions in the overall structure.



In Fig. (iv) again ethnic differentiation constitutes the basis of the overall stratification system. Here however the race concept is not so much analogous to, but incorporated in, the broader ethnic group concept. Here at a 'symbolic level' it constitutes one possible component of the broader term.

In contradistinction to these positions there has emerged in very general terms a position which challenges the view that 'races', regardless of their relation to other group concepts, necessarily coincide with the stratification system. Racial differentiation, in other words, does not have to entail differential access to scarce resources. Here, the stratification system remains to some extent independent of differentiation on the basis of real or assumed physical differences. Two illustrations of this general position may be found in minority group theory,¹⁸ and the theory or theories of plural society.

a) Minority group theory.

The treatment of 'races' as minorities and race relations as part of a more general theory of minority group relations rests on a number of propositions developed by Wirth three decades ago.

We may define a minority as a group of people who, because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment and, who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination. 19.

The nature of the physical/cultural characteristics provides the clue to differing types of minority groups, and the racial minority in particular.

Minority groups are distinguished from other depressed groups within a society by the presence of special traits which are associated with low status, such as differences in physical appearance, religion, language, and custom. 20.

Race then, along with other cultural criteria, is considered one possible criterion for symbolic differentiation, the basis of minority group distinctions. More precisely the latter

are said to possess the following characteristics :-

- (i) as subordinate segments of complex social and cultural units, minorities suffer from prejudice, segregation and persecution.
- (ii) These discriminatory practices are related to special characteristics which the minority shares. These include language, religion and, amongst a variety of other cultural traits, physical appearance,
- (iii) Minorities are 'self-conscious' units which develop on the basis of an 'in-group feelings'.
- (iv) Membership of a minority is ascriptive and governed by a descent rule.
- (v) Closure is further secured by endogamy, that is to say, marriage takes place within the minority group itself and correspondingly within the majority group. 21.

The historical conditions for the emergence of majority - minority relationships are said to lie in the growth of the modern nation-state and the dominance over separate states.

Subsequent majority-minority relations are contingent on the policies developed by the dominant group. Such policies as may be followed include :

- (i) Assimilation, both forced (e.g. 'Russification') and permitted.
- (ii) Pluralism, (e.g. Switzerland, where a strong political and economic unity overrides cultural differences between German, Italian, and French Swiss.)
- (iii) Legal Pluralism, where cultural diversity is legally

sanctioned, sometimes referred to as 'official pluralism'.

(iv) Population Transfer (e.g. the Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, following the Turkish invasion.)

(v) Continued Subjugation of the minority where the latter and their low status are required. (We shall return to this in the section which follows).

(vi) Extermination, (e.g. the Indians in the Americas and the Hottentots in South Africa.) 22.

On the basis then, of what are considered policy options open to the majority group, Simpson and Yinger make the following contribution to social policy.

There is enough accumulated experience throughout the world to make it clear that heterogeneous populations do not have to be faced with the problems of prejudice and intergroup discrimination. Their effective development, however, requires the elimination of the concept of the national state, with its monocultural ideal. The majority must give up its claim to cultural dominance and superiority; the minorities must give up their hope of political and economic separation and "freedom". 23.

The concept of race then, or rather the sociological field of race relations, may be seen as one of a number of minority-majority situations, i.e. "groups that think of themselves as different ... (in terms of) ... culture, nationality, religion"²⁴.

In minority group theory race must be seen as one symbol amongst many that may be used to set people apart for differential treatment. It should be added here that while 'self-consciousness' of these differences is an essential prerequisite of minority situations, any differences that do exist can, it has been suggested, assist in their creation.²⁵

In this brief reconstruction of the parameters of minority

group theory we have also sketched the various historical conditions associated with the development of 'minority' situations (the rise of the nation state etc.) and the policies pursued by the majority once these differences are recognised by both parties to the relationship.

b) The Theory of Plural Society.

Against the thesis that no special sociological categories are necessary to explain the structure and dynamics of race relations, one very important critique has emerged: that which centres on the concept of 'plural society'. 26.

This critique, according to Lockwood, has been aimed at two levels. In the first place plural society theory has sought to challenge those attempts reviewed in part 1. above, to conceive the concept of ethnic group, and hence race, in terms of a general concept of stratification system. Each segment has its own stratified order with its own differential access to, and allocation of, 'scarce resources'. Taken individually these segments cannot be considered as one level of a general stratification system encompassing all segmentally differentiated groups in a given society, consequently Fig. (v) is replaced by Fig. (vi)

Fig. (v)





Fig. (vi)



In the second place, plural society theory, in so far as it presupposes a plurality of value systems (one per segment to be precise) challenges the view, prevalent in orthodox sociology that subscribes to a common value system. It replaces a notion of value - conflict then, for one of value - consensus.

In its inception, the concept of plural society was confined to tropical societies under colonial rule. Furnivall's objective in his examination of Burmese society was to examine, with reference to Dutch India, those "features of colonial rule ... that might suitably be adopted in Burma".²⁷ The latter was characterised as a medley of peoples who mix but do not combine.

Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. 28.

The distinguishing feature here of a plural society is the absence of a common cultural tradition. Where a society

has such a tradition, it may possess pluralistic features (the United States for example), but it need not constitute a plural society. We shall return to this distinction shortly. Only shared material interests and a common market situation provide an integrative basis for plural societies, hence the system can only be maintained by domination, regulation and force. In the absence of what Furnivall terms an "organic social will ... embodied in the social structure",²⁹ (a feature of Western democracies) the only idea common to all members of all sections is that of 'gain'. In point of fact it is suggested, there exists in the colonial structure a :

materialism, rationalism, individualism, and a concentration on economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous western lands; a total absorption in the exchange and market; a capitalist structure ... far more typical of capitalism than one can imagine in the so-called "capitalist" countries. 30.

Consequently Furnivall makes the distinction between what he considers to be pluralistic elements in an otherwise homogeneous society capable of effecting social demand through an 'organic social will', and a plural society where there is an absence of 'common citizenship' and the disintegration of will and social demand. Effective colonial policy, Furnivall writes, is only possible once these differences are acknowledged. Such policy then must aim at the reintegration of diverse and conflicting elements organised around a 'common social will'.³¹ The distinction here has been maintained in recent contributions to plural society theory. Kuper, for instance, makes it in terms of his 'Equilibrium' and 'Conflict'

models of society.³² In the case of the former, adjustment is maintained by cross-cutting loyalties and multiple affiliations where in Kuper's words: "a system of constitutional checks and balances is designed to effect a separation of powers among the legislature, the executive, the administrative sector, and the judiciary".³³ The 'conflict' model, on the contrary, associates domination through coercion and economic institutions with a despotic minority. The former may be seen to resemble the notion of pluralism developed in contemporary political theory.³⁴ The latter, in the absence of an underlying consensus (or 'organic social will'), may be seen to be Furnivall's concept of plural society.

M.G. Smith, too, conceives plural societies as ones characterised by, on the one hand, 'economic symbiosis', and on the other, cultural diversity and social cleavage. Having said that however, Smith has sought to overcome certain limitations in Furnivall's analysis and give the concept "a suitable theoretical form".³⁵ In particular, with regard to Furnivall's contribution, it is charged with being overly specific both spatially and temporally, i.e. both in terms of being restricted to the modern colonial situation, hence to tropical latitudes, and to the period of European expansion. In addition it suffers from its confinement to 'multi-racial' communities; a suggestion which would seem to imply that Smith's elaborated concept of plural society may accommodate the race concept, but cannot be considered identical to it. Far from constituting a precondition of plural society, as

Furnivall suggests, economic activity may be considered one of a number of precipitating factors. The basis of plural society, or segmented group formation, at least initially for Smith, is a 'culture clash' where one cultural minority dominates one or more other groups.^{36.}

Given the fundamental differences of belief, value, and organization that connote pluralism, the monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential precondition for the maintenance of the total society in its current form. 37.

The political control by a culturally differentiated group is an essential prerequisite of a plural society.

In the course of elaborating the concept, Smith distinguishes cultural from social pluralism, which, in terms of the above quotation, may be said to isolate differences in belief and value from those of organisation. Cultural pluralism, on the one hand, refers to the co-existence in a given society of several ethnic groups. It constitutes then, institutional diversity, i.e. linguistic, religious differentiation, and a range of traditions, customs generally associated with ethnicity that are not necessarily accompanied by 'structures of collective segregation'.^{38.} Social pluralism exists, on the other hand, in the words of van den Berghe, who has also adopted the distinction,

to the extent that a society is structurally compartmentalized into analogous and duplicatory but culturally alike sets of institutions and into corporate groups which are differentiated on a basis other than culture. 39.

De facto segregation in housing, education, work etc. provides the possibility of segmentation on the basis of distinctive

communities and systems of action. On the relationship between the two, that is to say, between cultural and social pluralism, there is, as Kuper writes :

The practice of different forms of compulsory institutions, such as kinship, education, religion, and economy, these different forms being incompatible in the sense that roles are not interchangeable. Since institutions combine social and cultural aspects, the culturally differentiated sections will also differ in their internal social organization. There is therefore a social pluralism corresponding to the cultural pluralism, but the boundaries of the culturally differentiated units and the structurally differentiated units may not fully coincide, since there may be a marginal association between adherents of different cultural traditions, and conversely there may be social division between adherents of the same cultural tradition. 40.

In addition to social and cultural pluralism, Smith distinguishes a third 'level' or 'mode': structural, which "consists in the differential incorporation of collectivities segregated as social sections and characterized by institutional divergencies".⁴¹ This, it has been suggested, implies a shift in emphasis away from cultural towards structural pluralism, perhaps a movement from Fig. (vii) to Fig. (viii) and hence a return, to some extent, to a position where ethnic boundaries and the stratification system coincide once more as they did in Shibutani and Kwan's model above.

Fig. (vii)





Fig. (viii)

Closed
upward
mobility.



The concepts of race and racism clearly play secondary roles in the analysis of plural or composite societies. The 'race' concept may be seen to constitute one possible 'basis' of pluralism (others may include religion, culture, language etc.).⁴² It cannot be considered, however, independent of culture for "racial differences derive social significance from cultural diversity".⁴³ 'Race relations' consequently become less significant as cultural uniformity increases. In some respects it would be hard to treat the race concept independently of culture, since it is clearly the meaning attributed to differences and not the actual differences themselves that is important here:

Indeed, "racial" coefficients of institutional and political division are often invoked as stereotypes despite their objective absence or their marginal biological significance. The social validity of these racialist classifications and interpretations of social cleavage is obviously unaffected by their scientific status. Where institutionalized, such racial categories are generally local developments of modes of thought that formed part of the traditional culture of the dominant ethnic group.⁴⁴

The concept of race assumes the role of one possible 'aspect' of cultural differentiation which is itself a precondition of plural society. It is interesting to note, in view of this, the role assigned to the concept of racism which, it is argued, serves to rationalise or legitimate a

composite social order. For plural society theorists, then, the concept of race on the one hand serves as a 'basis' or one possible basis for plural society, while racism on the other hand arises out of the need to justify it. According to M.G. Smith for instance, "As the Caribbean slave literature shows most clearly, the function of racism is merely to justify and perpetuate a pluralistic social order".⁴⁵ The reason for this, it may be suggested, is the tendency throughout sociological race theory to confer at one level a degree of objectivity or reality on the race concept itself in association with other group concepts, while the concept of racism is strictly confined to utterly false and spurious beliefs about the existence of races and the superiority of some over others. (We shall return to this later).

If plural society theory has sought to challenge consensus theory on the one hand and, to some extent, Marxism on the other,⁴⁶ it is from these two areas that most criticism of the concept has emanated. Consequently Morris writes :

In Uganda, for example, the imposition of colonial rule did not destroy the African kingdoms, not (sic) did the Indian immigrant traders live isolated commercial lives without well-integrated institutions. All sections of the society, too, shared ideas of correct and desirable behaviour more widely than always appeared. In addition to being included in a common imposed political and legal system, everybody also participated in a common economic system, and therefore shared many of the wants and values embodied in it. Agreement went further than that needed only for economic co-operation. Nobody seriously questioned the value of Western education and everybody who acquired it also took over a wide range of beliefs which were expressed in political, legal, commercial, educational and other social practices. 47.

The particular debate here concerns the presence or

relative absence of values that are universally held and extend beyond the market place. The emphasis on 'values', agreed or otherwise, is being increasingly replaced by an emphasis on 'structural' elements. It is the relative absence of any elaborated examination of this aspect that constitutes the second set of criticisms from within neo-Marxism. Here the institutional level, including the polity, are considered phenomenal expressions of some underlying structure. An understanding of race relations here does not 'presuppose an analysis based on pluralism' (Smith) but, on the contrary, both the race concept and the theory of plural society presuppose an analysis of the underlying content of which they are merely the expression. Consequently in Guyana,

Political conflicts have indeed lined up with racial differences and activated a sense of group identity in the major races, but that is not the cause and origin of political conflict. That must be sought in the social and economic structure and in the external political environment of these poor, small, and weak ex-colonial territories. 48.

To assume that differences in race relations are what is at stake, is to assume that :

Its explanation lay at the institutional level at which it was actually expressed, rather than this being secondary to some underlying common structure operating for specific reasons in different ways at the overt level. 49.

The problems entailed in these arguments will be addressed in Part Three. As far as plural society theory is concerned, if no summarising statement can do it justice, it has only itself to blame.⁵⁰ In the section which follows, an attempt will be made to rise above some of the more technical contradictions and, in attempting to re-chart the sociological

field of race relations, draw attention to similarities at a certain level with some of the other sociological theories of race reviewed here.

3. The 'Internationalisation of Race' and the revived concept of Ethnicity.

In concluding this review of conventional classifications in sociological theories of race we shall be concerned with one side of a convergence of apparently divergent theoretical positions around the concept of 'nation'. The identification of the race concept with nationality amongst numerous Black militant theoreticians and activists, and attempts to develop race relations in terms of a broader schema of metropolitan/colonial relations, will constitute in part the object of our investigation in Part Three. To the Right (politically)^{51.} of these arguments there has emerged a recent revival of the concept of ethnicity related, in general terms, to what has been referred to as the internationalisation of the race concept.^{52.} In some senses the debate at this level (i.e. between the radical nationalists and ethnicity theorists) may be considered analogous to the problem-solving/radical race relations debate reviewed in the Introduction.

In its 'revamped' form, ethnicity refers to the condition under which :

people in many countries and in many circumstances ... insist on the significance of their group distinctiveness and identity and on new rights that derive from this group character. 53.

If a consciousness of group distinctiveness alone is the precondition for 'ethnicity', then the term 'ethnic group'

is sufficiently broad, it is said, "to refer not only to subgroups, to minorities, but to all the groups of a society characterized by a distinct sense of difference owing to culture and descent".⁵⁴ The recent shift in this direction is the consequence, it is argued, of a number of factors :-

- (i) the relative decline of the colonial powers and the rise of the Third World in the international system;
- (ii) the growth of international organisations as mechanisms for concerted pressure;
- (iii) the increasing alarm at the prospect of international race conflict and the search for remedies; and
- (iv) the growth in nationalism, race and ethnicity as significant forces in self determination.⁵⁵

The new word, it is claimed, is ethnicity, and normative differentiation rather than class differentiation constitutes the source of potential conflict. In terms of orthodox Marxism ethnicity is now considered true, and class false, consciousness.

In any event, Communist nations (despite the fact that 'Marxists thought they would disappear') have shown a concern with ethnic matters far more pronounced than most others, possibly because ethnic reality is so at odds with Marxist-Leninist theory.⁵⁶

In attempting to distinguish ethnicity, "religion, language, and national origin all have something in common"⁵⁷ with it.

To be more specific :

It may be either a residual category, designating some common group tie not identified distinctively by language, color, or religion but rather by common history and coherence through common symbols, for example, the WASPs as ethnics; or it may be a generic term which allows one to identify loosely any minority group within a dominant pattern, even though the particular unit of identification may be national

origin ... , linguistic, racial, or religious. 58.
(Emphasis in original).

Of all these factors the most important category of group membership is communal, i.e. individuals who feel some 'consciousness of kind'.⁵⁹ The concept of ethnicity transcends in its revived context, it is suggested, the more restricted group categories with which race has been associated; minority group, class, corporate group, etc., to include 'national' differentiation. Ethnicity theory, then, provides the possibility of addressing inter as well as intranational conflicts.

In an examination of the basis of ethnic group identity, Isaacs assesses the relative significance of several factors, of which the "most decisive are the political conditions in which the group identity is held, the measure of power or powerlessness that is attached to it".⁶⁰ Group identity, however, is not only contingent on position vis a vis the dominant-subordinate structure, since "the degree of mobility between groups in most societies depends heavily on the degree of physical difference between them".⁶¹ The problem of the coincidence of these conditions of group formation, i.e. political and physical, will be discussed below. (It should be added that Isaacs, furthermore, considers group identity functionally imperative at the level of the personality structure since, he argues, groups satisfy not only the need for a 'sense of belongingness' but also the 'quality of self-esteem'.).

Hence the concept of race, which is conceived here to play an integral role in group formation, has thus taken on a

100.

'national/political' character through its extension to include international conflict on a global scale in addition to community conflict on a small scale. The politicisation of the race concept at an international level has not however discouraged a 'problem-solving orientation' that radical arguments suggested might result from a macro-analysis. Such factors in the alleviation of international or interacial tension include,

the ability to avoid stereotyping by noting distinctions among people in an outgroup, to discern connections between historico-cultural experience and group behaviour, ... to imagine the functional value of cultural diversity, to foresee the disfunctional consequences of unchecked and exacerbated conflict. 62.

We shall return to these and other of the more practical policy proposals in the section which follows, since these can only seriously be evaluated in the light of a critical reorganisation of certain of the theoretical propositions developed here.

Summary.

The first two sections in Part Two have been concerned with reproducing, at a certain level of discussion, the sociological field of 'race relations' as distinct from its conceptual counterpart in orthodox race theory. To fully grasp the principles entailed in this transition, it was felt necessary to preface this investigation with an examination of Weber's general sociological categories, in so far as they relate to his specific contribution to the field of race relations. These categories, it has been suggested, provide the theoretical basis of Weber's concept of ethnic group where

the race concept may be found. More significantly, however, much contemporary work in the field presupposes these general formulations. We have refrained in this section from any serious critique either of individual sociological 'explanations of race' or of Rex's general classification within which each explanation has been located. Where criticism from within sociology has been levelled at particular cases (e.g. in the case of Plural Society theory) then every effort has been made to document it. What this section seeks to do, in general, is to provide a material basis for a critical reconstruction of sociological race theory in the section that follows. The task there will be not only to challenge conventional demarcations in sociological theories of race, but also to identify certain problems with respect to the construction of a rigorous sociological concept of race that may be seen to be attributable to a number of presuppositions each of them shares. These presuppositions, it may be added, are in certain crucial ways dependent on the constituent elements of Weber's sociological problematic.

Notes.

1. To some extent conventionally - based group classifications are taken from J. Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, ch. 1. While this section will develop this classification to include some of the most recent contributions, it will nevertheless remain consistent, in principle, with Rex's formulations.
2. T. Shibutani and K.M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification, pp.40-41.
3. L. Reissman, 'Social Stratification' in Sociology: an Introduction, ed. N.J. Smelser, pp. 207-208.
4. T. Shibutani and K.M. Kwan, op. cit., p. 28.
5. Ibid, p. 29.

6. Ibid, p. 225.
7. Ibid, p. 47.
8. W.G. Runciman, 'Race and Social Stratification', p. 497.
9. Of course the differences alluded to here are not always the complex configuration of physiological/genetic aggregates reviewed in Part One. The crucial point is that they are real physical differences and, what is more, the colour-based classification remains the sole basis for differentiation in certain areas of orthodox race theory. Hunt's paper (see above pp. 47 ff.) and Jensen and Eysenck's concept of race rests on little more sophisticated evidence.
10. W. Runciman, op. cit., p. 500. A variation on the ethnic stratification model developed here may be found in N.F. Wiley 'The Ethnic Mobility Trap and Stratification Theory'. Here the traditional conception of the stratification system as a runged ladder is replaced by the metaphor of a tree where 'non-vertical' and 'dead-end' forms of ascent are possible.
11. G. Berreman, 'Race, Caste, and other Invidious Distinctions in Social Stratification', p. 387.
12. Ibid, p. 389.
13. L. Warner, 'American Class and Caste'.
14. G. Berreman, op. cit., p. 397.
15. See also J. Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town, and A. Davis, B. Gardner and M. Gardner, 'Intimidation of Labor', in Black Society in the New World, ed. R. Frucht.
16. E. Leach, 'Caste, Class and Slavery: the Taxonomic Problem', in Caste and Race, eds. A. de Reuck and J. Knight. "I myself consider that, as sociologists, we shall be well advised to restrict the use of the term caste to the Indian phenomenon only" (Emphasis in original), p. 9. See also L. Dumont, 'Caste: a Phenomenon of Social Structure or an aspect of Indian Culture' in Caste and Race, eds. A. de Reuck and J. Knight, p. 29.
17. M. Harris, 'Caste, Class and Minority', p. 248. E. Leach, op. cit., p. 16. It is interesting to note O.C. Cox's distinction in these terms, particularly in view of the fact that this argument is taken directly from Weber.
18. The relationship between minority group theory and social stratification is not really as well defined as Rex's distinction implies here. Minority groups on the one hand, it is suggested, are differentiated internally (occupationally for instance e.g. petty-bourgeois traders, professionals etc.). On the other hand they are defined in terms of some dominant-subordinate relationship. In so far as this theory and plural society theory attempts to accommodate some notion of internal differentiation

and hence the existence of Black bourgeoisies for example, and, at the same time, characterise race relationships as dominant-subordinate relationships, their positions entail a contradiction they have yet to fully resolve.

19. L. Wirth, 'The Problem of Minority Groups' in The Science of Man in the World Crisis, ed. R. Linton, p. 347.
20. C. Wagley and M. Harris, Minorities in the New World, p. 6.
21. Ibid, p. 10.
22. G. Simpson and J. Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities, pp. 20-25.
23. Ibid, p. 22.
24. Ibid, p. 26.
25. Ibid, p. 19.
26. D. Lockwood, 'Race, Conflict, and Plural Society' in Race and Racism, ed. S. Zubaida, p. 62.
27. J. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, p. 1X.
28. Ibid, p. 304.
29. Ibid, p. 310.
30. J.H. Boeke, cited by J. Furnivall, *ibid*, p. 312.
31. Ibid, pp. 545-546.
32. L. Kuper, 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems' in Pluralism in Africa, eds. L. Kuper and M.G. Smith, p. 8 ff.
33. Ibid.
34. See for instance the pluralism-imposition scale used by R. Dahrendorf in Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, p. 213 ff. Not all plural society theorists accept this distinction, however, even in principle. Van den Berghe for instance does not consider "that much is gained by distinguishing plural societies (characterized by political domination of a cultural minority) from societies with plural features and from heterogeneous societies". 'Pluralism and the Polity: A Theoretical Exploration' in Pluralism in Africa, eds. L. Kuper and M.G. Smith, p. 68.
35. M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, p. 75.
36. Ibid, p. 88. See also M.G. Smith, 'Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism' in Pluralism in Africa, eds. L. Kuper and M.G. Smith, p. 53 ff.
37. Ibid, p. 86.

38. It is important to note here that cultural pluralism of itself does not presuppose uniform patterns of institutional differentiation. The classification and elaboration of various types of institutions thus becomes a crucial feature of plural society theory. We shall return to this in Section III.
39. P.L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism, op. cit., p. 35.
40. L. Kuper, 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems', op. cit., p. 12.
41. M.G. Smith, 'Some Developments in the Analytic Framework of Pluralism' in Pluralism in Africa, eds. L. Kuper and M.G. Smith, p. 12. Other modes of incorporation include uniform or universalistic and equivalent. For an elaboration of these and their relation to the 'levels' or 'modes' of pluralism see M.G. Smith, *ibid.*
42. L. Kuper, 'Ethnic and Racial Pluralism: Some aspects of Polarization and Depluralization' in Pluralism in Africa, eds. L. Kuper and M.G. Smith, p. 472.
43. L. Kuper, 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems', op. cit., p. 13.
44. M.G. Smith, 'Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism', op. cit., p. 38.
45. M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op. cit., p. 89. It is interesting to note the relationship between sociology and neo-Marxist theory in this respect. In Smith's case racism is considered necessary to legitimate (political) domination. As we shall see, there are differences at this level but in principle both define racism in functional terms, i.e. in terms of a form of rationalisation required either by some aspect of the polity or the economy.
46. To be more precise, M.G. Smith not so much challenges Marx, as a certain reading of Marx. The latter's theory of revolution then "reveals his recognition of the primacy of political relations and action in determining the forms and degrees of social inequality and the conditions of social and economic organization". M.G. Smith, 'Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism', op. cit., p. 59. It is economism and economic interpretations of Marx that concern Smith. See also L. Kuper, Race, Class and Power, especially pp. 175-234. It is interesting to note here, through an equivalence of the racial structure and political forms of representation, how Kuper's latest contribution is almost indistinguishable in general terms from the 'race analysts' contribution to the race/class debate, which will be discussed fully in Part Three.
47. H.S. Morris, 'Some Aspects of the Concept of Plural Society', pp. 170-171. See also L. Braithwaite, 'Social Stratification and Cultural Pluralism'. Here he writes "The point of substance is that we must be careful not to stress the culturally pluralistic elements of the

- society without appreciating the fact that there must be a certain minimum of common, shared values if the unity of the society is to be maintained", p. 822.
48. R.T. Smith, 'Race and Political Conflict in Guyana', p. 427.
 49. C. Henfrey, 'Imperialism and Race Relations as a Dimension of Social Control', p. 263. See also S. Allen 'Plural Society and Conflict', and H. Wolpe 'The Theory of Internal Colonialism: The South African Case' in Beyond the Sociology of Development eds. I. Oxaal, T. Barnett and D. Booth.
 50. "The value of the term pluralism for the study of race relations is quite limited. It has been given no consistent meaning or interpretation. It has been applied to distinct or even opposite types of social organization and, in the process, frequently redefined ... It has been sometimes applied to Negroes as a 'national minority' and sometimes as an American group having only a definable subculture. Its difficulty, therefore, seems to remain that of conceptual definition". O.C. Cox, 'The Question of Pluralism', p. 398.
 51. The Left-Right distinction here is arbitrary to some extent. Glazer and Moynihan's conviction however that ethnicity theory is at odds with Marxist-Leninist theory, in conjunction with what may be described as their liberal/appeasement approach to international politics, would seem to support this distinction, at least with respect to their counterparts in the various nationalist/liberation movements which we shall consider in Part Three.
 52. L. Edmondson, 'Caribbean Nation-building and the Internationalization of Race: Issues and Perspectives' in Ethnicity and Nation-Building, eds. W. Bell and W. Freeman, p. 74.
 53. Editors' Introduction to Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, eds. N. Glazer and D.P. Moynihan, p. 3.
 54. Ibid, p. 4.
 55. L. Edmondson, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
 56. Editors' Introduction to Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, op. cit., p. 17.
 57. Ibid, p. 18.
 58. D. Bell, 'Ethnicity and Social Change' in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, eds. N. Glazer and D.P. Moynihan, p. 156.
 59. Ibid, p. 165.
 60. H.R. Isaacs, 'Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe' in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, eds. N. Glazer and D.P. Moynihan, p. 33.

61. Ibid, p. 42.
62. M. Gordon, 'Toward a General Theory of Racial and Ethnic Group Relations' in Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, eds. N. Glazer and D.P. Moynihan, p. 96.

III. Action, Culture and Social Structure in Sociological Race Theory.

In Part One, we were concerned in particular to reproduce the essential principles of orthodox race theory and the sociological arguments that sought to reject these principles. To illustrate the former, we referred, on the one hand, to attempts to produce a concept of race in terms of a classification scheme on the basis of somatic differentiation (physical anthropology), and, on the other, to account for behavioural differences in terms of these anthropological types (psychometrics). The critical reaction to these arguments in turn, it was suggested, focus specifically on the methodological assumptions of 'scientific' race theory. We also noted in passing that such critiques aimed at this level entailed certain problems for those attempting to establish environmental explanations of behavioural differences. In concluding Part One, it was suggested, there appears one other form of critique that rejects the 'biologism' or behaviourism of orthodox race theory on the basis of its naturalistic assumptions. While this particular form of critique was mentioned briefly with reference to papers by Stark and Rex in Part One, its ramifications could best be considered, it was felt, in the light of a detailed examination of Weber's sociological categories in general and those specifically concerned with the race concept.

This critique marks the introduction, at one level, of a central concept in sociological race relations: that of

action. The purpose of Section III as a whole is to reconstruct sociological 'race relations' around two other such concepts in addition to that of action: those of 'culture' and 'structure'. The race concept, it will become clear, has been developed in conjunction with each of these three concepts. The relationship established between each of these three general concepts and the implications such relations have for a unified concept of race will be raised in concluding the section.

1. The social meaning of race differences; the action concept in race theory.

The coincidence of Weber's sociological concept of race and contemporary sociological classifications, may be conceived in the first place as an effect of Weber's concept of social action, the object of the sociological enterprise. To demonstrate this, it is necessary to refer back to the distinction Weber makes between subjective meanings and objectively valid or correct courses of action. Sociology, if we recall, is concerned with action only in so far as actors attach subjective meaning to it. Anything external to this realm of action is only pertinent to sociology to the extent that individuals "choose from among the values involved according to his own conscience and his personal view of the world".¹ This position has one necessary consequence as far as a sociological concept of race is concerned. Anthropological types as such may only be considered pertinent for sociology in so far as they are immediately reduced to the sphere of values. Their objective existence cannot concern sociology

which must treat such evidence as 'given data'. Sociological race relations then concerns itself for Weber with the action of individuals in so far as they orient their behaviour towards others on the basis of an attachment to an 'idea' about racial differences, irrespective of whether these differences may be found to exist.

If this marks the transition for Weber from a biological concept of race to a sociological category, then it may also be seen to designate the contemporary sociological field of race relations. A predominant feature throughout the latter, one that transcends those conventional boundaries drawn up in the previous section, is a reliance on a concept of social action as distinguished in Section I. Schermerhorn for instance refers to an ethnic group "as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry".² (Emphasis added). Berreman, in his review of the analogous features of race and caste and other 'invidious' distinctions, isolates the race concept in terms of 'ascribed (real or alleged) physical differences'.³ (Emphasis added). Finally from the most recent contributions to the field, Glazer and Moynihan distinguish the concept of ethnicity on the basis of differences "or at least (those that) are seen as such".⁴ Physical differences may or may not have any objective basis. They may be putative, alleged or imputed, as well as actually being present. Sociological race relations concerns itself with relations between individuals who are conscious of some race identity, whether or not this is the case. In other words such differences are only subject to sociological interrogation

to the extent that individuals direct their behaviour (directed behaviour equals action) on the basis of a significance or meaning attached to these differences. Consequently, in his attempt to incorporate race relations within a general theory of plural society, van den Berghe writes, "Race must be clearly recognized as a subjective and social reality ... (it) has no objective reality independent of its social definition".⁵ (Emphasis in original). The concept of race in so far as it is considered in terms of a concept of action is thoroughly subjectivised and what objective content there is, is entirely superfluous. The sociology of race relations, then, restricted in this way, must necessarily focus attention on these possibly false designations and their consequences. Race, conceived in this way, is just one of a multiplicity of cultural phenomena from which an individual, according to Weber, chooses to attach significance. Race thus becomes reduced to the sphere of cultural values, and it is on the basis of an attachment to this particular value that the 'idea' of race becomes a feasible object of sociological investigation. The 'idea' of race is not altogether independent of cultural phenomena even here at the outset, however, since it presupposes a concrete individual with which the 'idea' of race may be associated. Sociological race relations entail, then, not only the reduction of the biological concept of race to the realm of cultural values; they furthermore entail the association of this 'idea of race' with the existence of concrete individuals between whom meaningful relationships may be established on this basis. Subsequent 'relations' proceed and develop on the basis of real or supposed physical

differences that are thought to exist between two 'acting' individuals. We can illustrate the nature and forms of this relationship more fully with reference to Shibutani and Kwan's attempts to locate a strictly sociological concept of race in terms of a general theory of ethnic stratification. "Attention will be centred", they write, "upon the kinds of distinctions men make on the basis of traits believed to be inherited".⁶ In other words, "how a person is treated does not depend so much upon what he is as upon the manner in which he is defined".⁷ (Emphasis in original). Behaviour then will rest on each individual's 'version of reality' since :

So long as people continue to believe that categories of human beings who occupy different positions in their status system are genetically different, however, they will continue to act as if this were the case. 8.

In some respects, in keeping with Weber, ethnic stratification is conceived primarily in terms of status differences, which, if we recall Weber, belongs to a discrete social order where power is distributed according to honour, esteem etc.⁹ Ethnic honour in particular is established on the basis of a conception that develops amongst individuals of themselves 'as being of a kind' and a 'belief that they are of common descent'.¹⁰ Individual and group action thus emerges as a direct result of individual conceptions of themselves and others and vice versa. Group classifications are possible on the basis of symbolic representations. Such symbols may be linguistic or religious, as well as physical. These become significant in and through interaction.¹¹ It is differences at this, the symbolic level, and not necessarily

actual differences, which constitute the basis of race relations.

Consequently it is suggested :

What is decisive about "race relations" is not that people are genetically different but that they approach one another with dissimilar perspectives. The basic differences between ethnic groups, if there are any at all, are in mentality. 12.

Symbolic distinctions, considered initially an emergent product of contact between individuals, may become routinised in customs and institutionalised in various forms. The concept of ethnic group thus appears, as it does in Weber's work, to presuppose a general status category, and in so far as it does so, remains attached to a specific type of social action, in particular, action oriented on the basis of traditionally held values.

If race relations rest on a mutual conception of self and other, then transformations at this level rely on changes in 'perspective'.

In the last analysis, then, the most important change is psychological - the manner in which people define their situation and their roles in it. Systems of ethnic stratification rest upon popular acceptance of classifications of people and of the assignment of rights and duties to each category. When a system is changing, the most significant transformation occurs in the self-conceptions of an increasing proportion of individuals in the minority group. 13. (Emphasis in original).

Both categories of change and integration, referred to by Shibutani as disjunctive and sustaining processes, are contingent on the initial presuppositions concerning the status of the race concept, which in turn is clearly reliant here on a concept of value-oriented action. "The course of events in each situation takes shape in the social interaction of the participants with each other".¹⁴. (Emphasis in original). Sustaining processes likewise are conceived in terms of the task of transforming

the perspectives of self and other. The categories of the 'integrative process', as they will be referred to here, bear this out.

'Assimilation' refers to the acquisition of the 'perspectives' of the ruling ethnic group by the subordinate group when the principle of assimilation is accepted by the former.

'Integration', it is suggested, refers to the acceptance by only one party in a relationship.

'Acculturation' refers to the "process of acquiring the culture of another ethnic group".^{15.}

'Cultural Pluralism' refers finally to separate but equal development of cultural groups.^{16.}

These categories then are a consequence of interethnic contact and contingent on an interaction process in which ego either accepts alter and vice versa (assimilation), where ego rejects the values of alter but is himself accepted by alter (integration), where ego seeks to accommodate his perspective to suit alter (acculturation) and finally the recognition of alter's perspective which is considered on equal terms with ego's (cultural pluralism).

The justification for selecting Shibutani and Kwan's work in this respect lies in the consistency with which they rely on the concept of action at the level of individually held values. This is not to suggest however that the concept of action is absent elsewhere in the field. In point of fact, to the extent that it is assumed that race can have no objective validity independent of its subjective definition, then it must necessarily remain an assumption common to all sociological

race theory. Each of the group categories then, developed in Sections I and II presuppose some form of 'consciousness of kind' or, as Weber referred to it, 'sentiment of solidarity'. If action is conceived in this way, i.e. in terms of the will and consciousness of the individual, then the categories of 'integration' and 'change' may be conceived in terms of the acceptance or rejection of alter's values. Consequently Harris' distinction between caste and minority is made on the basis solely of the former's acceptance and the latter's rejection of its minority status. Both then are a consequence of a conscious denial or acceptance of another's evaluations of them. In taking this position, it should be added, both Harris and Cox reproduce Weber's argument on the distinguishing features of the caste and ethnic group categories.¹⁷ Likewise Glazer and Moynihan's elevation of the ethnic group category to the societal level to include nationale as well as minorities and sub-groups is only possible on the basis of their generic similarity in this respect, i.e. all may be defined in terms of their 'distinct sense of difference'. Each constitutes a diffusely defined collectivity possessing the property of solidarity and identity amongst its members. It is precisely this sense of belonging or conscious identification of self with group that provides the possibility, not only of a sociological concept of race, but also the numerous other group categories that have, it has been suggested, pertained to it. Once the concepts of race, caste and ethnic group etc. are defined on the basis of a 'consciousness of kind', race relations becomes a subject for exploring the mental processes which sustain or reduce such differences.

At the centre of this process is the individual, for it is the sum total of individually held values that constitute the basis for those group categories identified above. Interethnic action is only possible on the basis of this sentiment of solidarity which is itself contingent on a consciousness of self or self-conception. If we remain entirely consistent with the assumption made at the outset, one that constituted an integral part of sociology's rejection of a biological concept, then these group categories, said to be associated in some way with the race concept, can only result from a positive orientation on the part of individuals towards the specific value in question.

The categories subsequently invoked to 'explain' integrative and disjunctive processes, or what Schermerhorn refers to as centripetal and centrifugal tendencies,¹⁸ are no more than alternative courses of action open to each group member and contingent on a conscious orientation towards certain ends/values. Hence the categories of assimilation, cultural pluralism, etc. become ends towards which individuals may or may not orient their action (there is of course no necessity for them to choose any). Categories of integration and change become 'open' policy alternatives. Consequently Kuper's objective is the transformation of plural society into pluralistic society where the latter is conceived as an ideal towards which, its advocates hope, race relations might move.¹⁹

This raises the question of the possibility, given these assumptions, of producing rational policy alternatives or for


that matter any form of explanation of 'race relations'. If a reality is conferred on the concept race in terms of its subjective meaning, then strictly speaking at no subsequent point in the discussion is it possible to introduce objectively valid categories outside of consciousness to 'account for' its existence. If we recall the illustration taken from Weber of the man closing the door, it will be remembered that sociology's concern only extended as far as meaning was attached to the act. The cause of the draught, beyond what the individual attributed it to be, was logically beyond the scope of sociology, in so far as it was devoid of purpose. Such evidence can only be treated as given data which may or may not become the object of an individual's attention (or 'orientation'). Once it does so, regardless of its objective validity, it is reduced to the level of 'cultural' phenomena or the realm of values. In other words the subjectivisation of the race concept prevents any rational explanations of its existence independent of the realm of consciousness, and in that sphere one 'explanation' is as good as another.^{20.}

In view of these remarks, it is not altogether surprising to find the group categories developed in Sections I, on the basis of Weber's distinctions, and II on the basis of Rex's mapping of the sociological field of race theory, show an extraordinary degree of 'flexibility' and appear interchangeable on an entirely arbitrary basis.^{21.} Under these conditions it is possible to notice the ease with which Furnivall exchanges pluralism for caste, Katznelson, ethnicity and colony for plural society and why Schermerhorn introduces his discussion of ethnic

relations with Wirth's definition of a minority group.²² This has been taken to its extreme in the revamped concept of 'ethnicity' which refers to minority groups (e.g. religious, racial, linguistic) and to nations themselves. This exchangeability is a function not only of their generic similarity (i.e. groups formed on the basis of a consciousness of 'kind' or 'sentiment of solidarity'), but, relatedly, the thoroughgoing subjectivism of these concepts which prevents the rational inclusion of one of these categories in preference to an infinitude of others we may choose from.

2. Non-purposive 'explanations' of race relations; a notion of structure.

The concept of race has so far been defined in terms of its relationship to a concept of action and individually held values. The action concept which, it has been suggested, is Weber's point of departure for his sociological project, attributes freedom to the individual who selects from the infinite range of cultural reality on the basis of those values to which he attaches significance or meaning, in this case the 'idea of physical differences'. In so far as it remains an effect of the action concept, as it is throughout sociological race theory, the race concept can have no 'objective reality independent of its subjective definition'. What is surprising then, is to find certain 'objective' factors are introduced including, in point of fact, actual (not imputed or alleged) physical differences as one of several 'natural', as opposed to 'ideal', conditions under which 'races' do appear. In other words there exists at a distinct level of analysis a range of



concepts that do not relate to the purposeful action of individuals. To this extent there appears a shift from a concept of race conceived as a process, a product of individual consciousness, to a concept conceived in terms of a realm of natural conditions, to 'structures' external to and possibly independent of the consciousness of the individual actor.

Accordingly, we shall distinguish two types of 'structure', in particular, that have been elaborated consistently in sociological race relations. These constitute an attempt, it will be suggested, to establish a set of factors external to the individual that predispose him to act in a specific way regardless of his intentions. The first concerns the question of a stratification system where differentiation to a greater or lesser extent is conceived in terms of some necessary ranking system, the nature of which we shall examine below. The second, in common with the action concept, remains at the level of individual, but not at the level of individually held, values. Here the race concept is conceived in terms of a personality (or 'socio-psychological') structure that again predisposes the individual to entertain certain prejudices and to engage in certain forms of discriminatory behaviour. Despite sociology's outward hostility to 'psychologistic' interpretations of race prejudice, it is interesting to note the extent to which such explanations remain, even within the context of a specifically sociological discussion. To conclude, we shall briefly mention a third, physiological structure which, it will be suggested, reaffirms the role of 'real physical differences'

as a primary condition of 'race relations'.

Social stratification theory and the categories developed therein have come to play an increasingly important role in sociological theories of race, regardless of their initial attempts to distinguish or accommodate the two sets of propositions associated with each. As far as Weber was concerned, the two quite definitely coincided. Ethnicity appeared there as one amongst several conditions of status group formation. In particular it constituted that status group 'with a subjective belief in ethnic origins, a desire to preserve and monopolise their characteristics' with a view to maintaining 'their particular brand of social (i.e. ethnic) honour'. 'Life style' that characterises status and consequently ethnic groups is prescribed for each member and acted upon on the basis of conventional modes of orientation, (i.e. traditional action). In so far as the social order comprising status groups is contingent on traditional action, it remains relatively distinct from the other two orders, comprising classes and political parties.

While recent sociological theory has retained, though hardly maintained consistently, this association of ethnic group and status identification,²³ it differs from Weber principally in terms of the latter's attempt to retain their relative independence vis a vis the other 'phenomena of the distribution of power' (i.e. classes and parties). In this sense sociological theories of race depart from Weber's relatively systematic attempt to derive these concepts, and subsequently the ethnic group concept, from his four-fold

action typology.

Nevertheless a particular conception of the stratification system remains a consistent feature of the more recent work in the field. Shibutani and Kwan, for instance, refer to stratification in terms of "unequal access to goods, services, and pleasures"²⁴ and, given the scarcity of such commodities, it is natural selection and competition that produce the relative inequalities between individuals and groups. (We shall return to the question of 'natural selection' shortly).²⁵ Similarly Berreman attempts to unite the concepts of colonialism, caste, race, ethnic group and plural society on the basis of a stratification system with its three dimensions: class, status and power. Even in the case of minority group and plural society theory where there is at least a nominal attempt to differentiate internally, according to principles of stratification, each minority, or, more particularly, segmented group, there is an increasing tendency to align these groups in terms of an overall concept of stratification. There is evidence of this for instance in Smith and Kuper's concern with structural pluralism and relatedly the notion of 'differential incorporation'. In his sympathetic review of plural society theory, Katznelson refers to the weaknesses of approaching the concept of race via prejudice and, to the extent that it has been guilty of this, "it has diverted attention from differential ethnic and racial distributions of wealth, status, and political power".²⁶

Similarly in his development of the concept of minority group, Yinger distinguishes groups with the same functions and

status (a peer group) from those characterised by differentiation, both unranked (an athletic team) and ranked. The latter in turn may be either temporary (teacher-student relationships) or permanent and here Yinger distinguishes caste, class and minority group situations. Ranking is contingent on the "unequal distribution of things that are prized and scarce".²⁷ Unequal access to scarce resources, power, prestige and wealth provides the possibility of domination by those to whom such resources are relatively accessible over those to whom they are not. The concept of relative distribution of power is crucial in this respect.

If groups in contact differ in their capacity to impose changes on the other group, then we may expect to find one group "superordinate" and the other population "subordinate" in maintaining or developing a suitable environment. 28.

Likewise Wilson writes:

Differential power is a marked feature of racial-group interaction in complex societies: the greater the power discrepancy is between subordinate and dominant racial groups, the greater are the extent and scope of racial domination. 29.

If a concept of 'power' in general appears an integral part of the definition of racial/ethnic stratification, then it seems necessary here to specify and elaborate its own conditions of existence. Given its significance, we shall look briefly at Wilson's attempt to provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept. Focussing attention on intergroup behaviour, he distinguishes 'power-ability' from 'active power'. While the latter refers to the actual exercise of power, the former refers to the "ability of Group A to control or influence the behaviour of Group B regardless of whether

A has actually influenced B's behaviour".³⁰ Under what conditions is such 'control' possible ?

Broadly defined, power resources have to do with the properties that determine the scope and degree of the group's ability to influence behaviour. These properties could include high social status, reputation for power, capability to bear arms, control of political office, control of mass media, wealth, and land ownership, to mention a few. 31.

Power resources that serve to induce or persuade groups to perform in particular ways are termed competitive resources, and accessibility to these provides the possibility of domination in general and racial domination in particular. With respect to the form of racial domination, conditions of control vary. In slave plantations for instance control is reinforced by "marked differences in culture and history".³² that create problems for Blacks adapting to the new situation. Control is less likely in 'colonial' situations, though it is effective in the early phases and situations of voluntary migration where at least the migrant has the chance of returning home or, if he works under a contract system, of renewing his contract.³³

In Wilson's account there is no attempt to distinguish what he refers to as power resources on the basis of three relatively autonomous orders, as there is in Weber, and certainly no attempt to elaborate them in terms of specific forms of social action. On the contrary, they appear almost as an inventory of properties, cultural, economic and political, that constitute the basis, not of one type of power, (e.g. social honour or 'prestige' in the social order) but 'power' in general. The confounding of these properties in this way

precludes the possibility of establishing specific conditions for the distribution of one of these properties, for instance, wealth or land ownership, in this case in economic terms. Unable to pose the problem in this way, i.e. in terms of determinate conditions of specific 'property' forms, there remains the question of the conditions of 'domination' in general. . In the case of Wilson's account, domination appears a function of the inevitable pursuit of 'interests' on the part of the individual or group concerned.³⁴ After a similar fashion, Kuper cites Gumplowicz's account of the inexorability of struggle on the part of interest-seeking groups.³⁵ Consequently it is power differentiation, according to the relative distribution of scarce resources borne of the universality of competitive struggle, that provides the possibility of 'racial' domination and racial control.

Wilson's account in this respect is fairly representative of positions elsewhere in sociology; Shibutani for instance, refers to 'natural selection' and competition as the basis of ethnic stratification. Consequently, as far as the categories of integration and change are concerned, acceptance or rejection of alter is generally conceived on the basis of relative access to scarce resources, i.e. in terms of position in dominant-subordinate relationship. It is this latter relationship which constitutes, at a further level, the basis of cyclical theories of race relations contacts, a predominant feature of the field.³⁶

Here we have moved within the same set of categories (those of 'integration' and 'change') from a position that conceived

the outcome in terms of individually held values, to one where race relations are a function of differential access to power resources and the necessary outcome of competitive struggles engaged in by interest-seeking parties. In contrast, there does appear some semblance of a structure, external to the individual who acts, not so much in the way he perceives the situation, but rather in terms of the conditions of the situation in question. Consequently there appears a reference, in the context of a general discussion of what seems to be policy options open to the dominant group, to the "continued subjugation of a minority where the latter and their low status are required".³⁷ (Emphasis added).

Some indication of the extent to which sociological theories of race have come to terms with a specific account of these 'requirements' or conditions appears in a paper by Blalock. Using mathematical models³⁸ predictably to depict (not to explain or account for) the relationship between mobilisation of resources and the percentage of Blacks under power equilibrium, he concludes :

The basic tasks that lie ahead ... are, first, to identify and measure the various factors that can be linked with either resources or degree of mobilization, and second, to develop theoretical notions as to how these variables are interrelated. It is perhaps premature and somewhat pretentious to make use of actual mathematical models, as has been done illustratively in the present paper. 39.

One can only endorse Blalock's judgement of his work and his recognition of the problems in general that confront race theory in this respect. The general concept of domination clearly does not assist attempts to pose the problem in terms

of the specific conditions under which the various power resources are distributed. As it is, domination in the broad sense in which it is used here is explained by the universal struggle of competing interest groups. The race concept, which was, in the first instance, conceived in terms of a concept of action, rests now on the necessary appearance of power differentials and dominant/subordinate relations; necessary in so far as they themselves rely on the inevitability of interest-seeking group struggle. Consequently there appears an explicitly behaviourist explanation of intergroup relations in contrast to one in terms of an action concept which, given its objectives, denies such factors, or at least considers them superfluous.

Despite the failure to pose conditions of specific forms of 'power relations' (e.g. property relations) and consequently the absence of any attempt to pose the conditions of racial domination in particular (in contrast to class or caste relations etc.), there nevertheless is evidence to suggest that factors external to the individual (and consequently independent of individually held values) are acknowledged in sociological race theory. Race relations do appear as determinate social relations, however poorly elaborated their conditions of existence.

If the concepts of neo-Weberian stratification theory have provided one set of conditions, a further set is provided by several attempts to produce a theory of race in terms of the requirements of the personality system. Prejudice for instance is considered in one such theory as the necessary outcome of a

frustrated individual seeking an outlet for his aggression, Another locates it in terms of the specific characteristics associated with an 'authoritarian personality'.⁴⁰ Similarly in an area marginal to psychology and sociology, there are those from within neo-Marxist theory who seek to explain the presence of a sub-proletariat in terms of socio-psychological pressures.⁴¹ Clearly while these 'explanations' appear subordinate to the general discussion, they do offer an explanation of race relations other than in terms of individually selected values. The concepts of prejudice and, to some extent, discrimination, are particularly pertinent in this respect. Here, at the level of the personality structure, certain predispositions on the part of the individual favour certain types of reaction in certain situations. Such reactions are considered necessary in terms of the maintenance and adaptation of individual personalities.

The abandonment of a biological concept of race provided, as we have suggested, the possibility of a sociological concept of race devoid of determinism in so far as it could only be conceived in terms of the purposeful behaviour of individual actors (i.e. in terms of meaningful social action). Once an attempt is made to elaborate the conditions of action, the reintroduction of real physical differences as one such condition again becomes a possibility. It becomes a particularly strong possibility moreover when attempts are made to move from domination in general to racial domination in particular, or from a generally prejudiced personality to a racially prejudiced individual. In these cases real physical differences,

not imputed or alleged, could play a crucial part in intergroup relations. Shibutani refers to ethnic groups in terms of common ancestry and distinguishes them on the basis of certain selected hereditary traits.⁴² Similarly Gordon argues ethnicity constitutes a complex configuration of racial, religious, or national origin which provide the possibility of identification.⁴³ According to Isaacs, even where all other conditions are or can be made equal, the physical characteristics themselves remain the barrier to status and belonging.⁴⁴ The 'reappearance' of a biological category is not confined to contemporary sociology. The problem beset Weber, if we recall, in the form of an ambiguous notion of anthropological types in his concept of ethnic group.⁴⁵ They arise both for Weber and contemporary sociological race theory, it must be said, as a result of attempting to elaborate the conditions of action in terms of a theory of action that considers them, at most, given data and certainly not a part of the sociological project.

3. Race and Culture.

We have already suggested the distinction between race differences and the 'idea of race differences' underlies the biological/sociological conceptual distinction. In terms of the action concept, 'race relations' exist in so far as individuals choose to orient their behaviour toward specific values, in this particular case on the basis of an attachment or meaning to race differences. This poses an immediate problem for attempts to move from a significance attached to differences at the level of the individual, to collectively held 'ideas about race'. We shall return to the coincidence of individually

and consciously selected values and collectively held beliefs shortly. For the moment we shall dwell specifically on those collective representations, for these constitute the realm of culture, a category of enormous significance throughout sociological theories of race and with very broad ramifications in terms of the concepts operative in substantive race relations research.

One sustaining feature of sociological race theory, that again transcends conventional demarcations, is some conception of 'cultural differentiation'.⁴⁶ The categories of the 'integration process' are apparently conceived at one level in terms of individually held values (i.e. individual acceptance or rejection) and, at another level, take the form of indices of group differentiation. The 'operationalisation' of these categories, in the context of specific methodological procedures, (surveys, questionnaires, attitude tests etc.) have constituted a formidable contribution to race relations research. Studies in this respect have ranged from the highly specific (an examination of dietary habits amongst West Indians in London)⁴⁷ to a more general assessment of such variation in an institutional context e.g. work,⁴⁸ and finally to a wide range of life style differences in a community context e.g. in Brixton,⁴⁹ Stepney,⁵⁰ Bristol.⁵¹ Very broadly, these attempt to assess the relationship between two cultures, with a view to measuring, via the indices of accommodation, acculturation, pluralism, assimilation, etc., their degree of compatibility. As such, they constitute the basis of the various cyclical models of

race relations, from the period of initial 'culture' contact, through phases of conflict accommodation, etc. and in some cases to assimilation.⁵² Without exception, each of the group categories referred to in the previous section, castes, ethnic, segments etc., are all distinguished in terms of a range of cultural criteria. Wagley and Harris, for instance, distinguish minorities in terms of certain characteristics (linguistic, religious etc.) which the minority is said to possess in common.⁵³ Similarly in an examination of possible bases of corporate group differentiation, Smith distinguishes a similar range of variables.⁵⁴ Each of these contemporary distinctions reproduces in part the range of cultural variables distinguished in Weber's concept of ethnic group where differences in 'clothes, style of life, housing, food and eating habits' as well as 'language, religion and political action' provided possible indices of variation.

The race concept, both with respect to Weber's concept of ethnic group and throughout the more recent classifications, appears as one additional basis of differentiation. It no longer appears however, in the sense used by orthodox race theorists. In its new context it constitutes a 'symbolic' component of group differences. The 'idea of racial differences' is not so much a concept as a representational category. With or without a whole range of other cultural symbols referred to above, it constitutes the basis of cultural formations referred to as ethnic groups, castes, minorities, nations etc. In so far as distinctions have been made at this level, they have generally associated each of the groups with specific

symbolic forms. Castes then are associated with certain religious 'meanings' and nations with a sense of political unity. Otherwise the symbolic category of race is associated in a very loose sense with any one of the other formations: ethnic group, minority, segment. In other words, each of these are delineated in terms of a very similar, if not identical, range of symbolic criteria amongst which the 'idea of race' invariably figures.

If certain collective representations exert a seemingly uniform impact on the individual, they too may be investigated from the point of view of their structural components. To this extent, the 'culture/' 'structure' distinctions for sociological race theory must appear a somewhat dubious morphological device. This is particularly true of plural society theory where the distinction is maintained in conjunction with an analysis of cultural forms in terms of their structural features. "The institutional system that forms the cultural core defines the social structure and value system of any given population."⁵⁵ Plural society theory, for the most part then, rests on an elaboration and classification of institutional forms :

Fig. (i)

Value-orientation	Universalism	Particularism	
Societal type	Equilibrium (Kuper) Homogeneous (van den Berghe) Pluralistic (Smith)	Conflict (Kuper) Pluralistic (van den Berghe) Plural (Smith)	
Levels of pluralism	Cultural	Social	Structural
Modes of incorporation	Universalistic	Equivalent	Differential
Types of structure	Unitary	parallel federated	separate colonial

This illustrates briefly the form this classification has taken. It is important to note that the levels of pluralism, and relatedly the mode of incorporation and subsequently the type of structure, all presuppose a specific value orientation.⁵⁶ Clearly there do exist differences within plural society theory itself and these appear in the diagram. (The distinction between plural society and pluralistic society is not maintained by van den Berghe for instance). Furthermore the levels of pluralism and modes of incorporation are by now clearly specified in terms of each other or in terms of the other dimensions, including the specific value-orientation attached to each.⁵⁷ Nevertheless the crucial point here is the elaboration of the societal types, structures and forms, in terms of institutional differentiation and hence in terms of specific value orientations. If the social structure is defined in these terms, as Figure (i) indicates, then there is no possibility whatever, as Smith suggests, of determining the 'internal/external connections' of each institutionalised system of social relations as 'sectors of a wider social system', since clearly the system is as wide as the institutional framework. To this extent, the apparent distinction between 'social stratification' and the composition of segmented or corporate groups (particularly prominent in Smith's earlier contributions) should not be taken to imply any quantitative difference between the two. Rather the alleged 'structural' aspect of stratification should be understood for what it is : a quasi-independent value-system, according to which honour and power (political power in particular in Smith's case) rest on different criteria, e.g. values placed on educational

achievement, income etc. In both cases the structure is defined in terms of a specific value orientation. The only distinction then which remains is the specific object of orientation which may differ from one 'cultural' system to another.

The concept of culture at a general level is by no means confined to Smith's early work or even to plural society theory. Shibutani and Kwan's contribution, in this respect, rests less at the institutional level than at the level of conventional understandings concerning, for example, the status of ego and alter.⁵⁸ These are established through the use of symbols which categorise groups on the basis of a multiplicity of cultural criteria. Amongst these are physical, linguistic and religious symbols that elicit common sense typifications of social groupings including for instance, the ethnic stereotype. "There is a constant reaffirmation of the world view of the group through trite expressions, shibboleths, clichés".⁵⁹ In point of fact, access to these cultural resources constitute the prime determinant of the outcome of competitive interethnic relations; "the group whose culture is best suited for the exploitation of the resources of a given environment tends to become dominant".⁶⁰ (Emphasis in original). Clearly there are variations in the terms in which the specific cultural forms have been elaborated. Nevertheless both presuppose an orientation towards traditionally held values, in very much the same way as Weber's concept of ethnic group pertained to status differences on this basis. 'Race' here appears as one tacit understanding, or common sense typification amongst many,

resting on traditionally held values and evoking certain forms of action (endogamy, closure, etc.).

Notes.

1. Supra note 17, p. 127.
2. R. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations, p. 12.
3. G. Berreman, op. cit., p. 390.
4. N. Glazer and D. Moynihan, op. cit., p. 15.
5. P.L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism, op. cit., p. 148.
6. T. Shibutani and K. Kwan, op. cit., p. 23.
7. Ibid, p. 27.
8. Ibid, pp. 40-41.
9. Supra p. 47 ff.
10. T. Shibutani and K. Kwan, op. cit., p. 40.
11. Ibid, p. 50.
12. Ibid, p. 110.
13. Ibid, p. 362. Notice the similarity with those arguments of M. Banton and S. Patterson reviewed in the Introduction (Supra p. 11 ff). Patterson for instance in Dark Strangers writes "Superficial first-hand observation by local people has on the whole supported the widely held preconceptions about both the strangeness and the low status of the coloured newcomers. These orientations undoubtedly condition the behaviour of Brixtonians to West Indians in many situations, particularly those which are intimate and uninstitutionalized, in which the relationship depends on acceptance by both sides of the same unwritten norms and values". p. 35.
14. T. Shibutani and K. Kwan, op. cit., p. 383.
15. Ibid, p. 470.
16. Ibid, p. 516 ff.
17. Supra note 69, p. 148.
18. R. Schermerhorn, op. cit., p. 81.
19. L. Kuper, 'Ethnic and Racial Pluralism', op. cit.
20. Strictly speaking of course no explanation is possible given the constraints imposed by the action concept.
21. This may also be found to be the case with Weber. At least there is sufficient ambiguity over the precise designation of ethnic group, caste and nation to allow interchangeability.

22. J. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, op. cit.; I. Katznelson, 'Comparative Studies of Race and Ethnicity'; R. Schermerhorn, op. cit. These, it should be added, by no means exhaust the possible permutations that are to be found in the field. The degree of interchangeability is in evidence even in the title of a number of Studies. Consider for instance William M. Newman, American Pluralism: A Study of Minority Groups and Social Theory.
23. "In studying the color line ... we must focus upon the study of identification and social status". (Emphasis in original). T. Shibutani and K. Kwan, op. cit., p. 28.
24. Ibid, p. 29.
25. Ibid, p. 139 ff.
26. I. Katznelson, 'Comparative Studies in Race and Ethnicity', op. cit., p. 137.
27. J. Yinger, A Minority Group in American Society, p. 19. Yinger's account here in point of fact offers a good illustration of the way contemporary sociology departs from Weber's relatively systematic approach to stratification. While income, prestige and power are 'present' here in Yinger's discussion, there is no attempt to relate them specifically to three relatively discrete orders nor to a specific type of social action. Consequently it is possible without much trouble to 'add' two more 'values' to Weber's three; 'dreams and hope'. Ibid, p. 12.
28. S. Lieberman, 'A Societal Theory of Race and Ethnic Relations', pp. 40-41. See also Majority and Minority: The Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. M. . Yetman and C. Steele. "Majority-minority relations do not appear until one group successfully imposes its will upon another. By definition minority groups are subordinate segments of the societies of which they are a part", p. 4.
29. W. Wilson, Power, Racism and Privilege, p. 18.
30. Ibid, pp. 15-16.
31. Ibid, p. 16.
32. Ibid, p. 19.
33. Ibid, p. 21.
34. "Conflict often emerges from cooperative activity because ... man's important decisions or actions are prompted by self-interests or partisan group interests, (and) that most of the many objects that man strives to control or possess are in short supply ... (consequently) ... "a struggle for rewards will be present in every human society"" (Emphasis in original), W. Wilson and G. Lenski cited by W. Wilson, ibid, pp. 22-23.

35. L. Kuper, Race, Class and Power, p. 164.
36. R.E. Park, Race and Culture, p. 150.
37. Supra note 22, p. 173.
38. H. Blalock, 'A Power Analysis of Racial Discrimination'. For an extremely effective methodological critique of the notion of causality found throughout Blalock's work see D. and J. Willer, Systematic Empiricism, op. cit., ch. 5, p. 88 ff. This would apply particularly to Blalock's major contribution to the field, Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations, op. cit.
39. H. Blalock 'A Power Analysis of Racial Discrimination', op. cit., pp. 58-59.
40. M. and C. Sherif, Groups in Harmony and Tension: J. Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town, op. cit. and T. Adorno et. al, The Authoritarian Personality. For a general exposition and review of these positions see A. Levine and T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behaviour, Part 3.
41. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, ch. 9. We shall return to other aspects of their work in Part Three.
42. T. Shibusani and K. Kwan, op. cit., p. 67 ff.
43. M. Gordon, 'Toward a General Theory of Racial and Ethnic Group Relations', op. cit., p. 92.
44. H. Isaacs, 'Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe', op. cit., p. 45.
45. Supra p. 35 ff.
46. One attempt to do so, hitherto unmentioned, may be found in C. Levi-Strauss' 'Race and History'. Despite its appearance in a UNESCO publication, it makes no attempt to confront directly the issues raised in the elaboration of a biological concept of race. Rather, it seeks to reduce what may appear attributable to biological differences to aspects of cultural diversity. The absence of any direct reference to the scientific concept in a collection entitled 'Race and Science' may or may not be considered unfortunate. What cannot be omitted, however, is an elaboration of the reconstituted concept of race in its cultural setting. That racial differences are not racial differences at all, but cultural variations, does not resolve the problem of the conditions under which cultural differences are thought to be racial. This reflects a general danger in all attempts to reduce race to broader sociological group concepts. Having reduced the concept per se to some other group concept there remains the question of the conditions under which the race concept is invoked as distinct from those when the group concept on its own is considered sufficient.
47. C.J. Jones, 'Immigration and Social Adjustment: a Case Study of West Indian Food Habits in London' (Ph.D. London School of Economics) in Index to Theses Accepted for

- Higher Degrees by the Universities of Great Britain and Ireland and the Council for National Academic Awards, eds. M. Geoffrey and J. Paterson, Vol. XXI, 1970-1.
48. S. Patterson, Immigrants in Industry, op. cit. and P.L. Wright, The Coloured Worker in British Industry.
 49. S. Patterson, Dark Strangers, op. cit.
 50. M. Banton, 'White and Coloured', op. cit. and M. Banton, The Coloured Quarter, op. cit.
 51. A. Richmond, Migration and Race Relations in an English City.
 52. It should be added, by no means all agree on the question of inevitability of assimilation even within sociology. See e.g. M. Banton, Race Relations, ch. 4., S. Patterson, Dark Strangers, op. cit. and V. Rubin 'Culture, Politics and Race Relations', p. 439. Indeed most plural society theorists seem prepared to settle for a degree of cultural heterogeneity.
 53. C. Wagley and M. Harris, op. cit., p. 6.
 54. M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies, op. cit., ch. 4.
 55. Ibid, p. 88.
 56. A typology of institutions is then undertaken on the basis of this classification. Various attempts have been made in this direction. See for instance M.G. Smith's distinction between broker and communal institutions. Others are referred to as core or compulsory units. The main point here is that each is defined ultimately in terms of some specific value-orientation.
 57. The clearest account in this respect is given by L. Kuper in Race, Class and Power, op. cit., p. 238 ff.
 58. Clearly the two forms of analysis have been taken together by most authors in so far as common understandings etc. developed in interaction precede their institutionalisation.
 59. T. Shibutani and K. Kwan, op. cit., p. 91.
 60. Ibid, p. 147.

Concluding Remarks.

In Part Two we have sought to investigate the properties of a sociological concept of race, via an examination of Weber's sociology in general and his handling of the race concept in particular. Clearly there are several levels of 'resemblance' at work as regards the content of Sections I and II and not all these have been dealt with. Certain of the more substantive arguments 'borrowed' from Weber have been noted in passing, but the object here has not been to dwell on these sorts of similarities. One of the most interesting in this respect which is worth noting, has been Weber's prognostications on the future role of the ethnic group concept in sociological race relations. In drawing up certain rudimentary guidelines for further research, Weber notes that "in this process the collective term "ethnic group" would be abandoned, for it is unsuitable for a really rigorous analysis".¹ In view of this general disapproval of the ethnic group concept and in view of the similarities that have been seen to exist between Weber's sociology and contemporary race relations, it is interesting to note recent developments in the field, in terms of Weber's admonitions. It may appear paradoxical, in consequence, to find the most recent of contemporary developments in sociological race theory, not so much burying the ethnic group concept, as resurrecting, and indeed, expanding and elaborating it.

The reason for this impasse, it may be suggested, is to be found in the presuppositions of certain basic concepts

that are common to both Weber and contemporary theories of race, and it is here that the relationship between the two has been explored. The investigation has raised a series of issues concerning the race concept.

(i) The first concerns the rejection of a biological concept on the grounds that the latter is devoid of 'meaning'. This, it has been suggested, is a common point of departure for all sociological theories of race. It constitutes the basis of a redefinition of race, not according to biology, but according to values. The concept of race became 'the idea of race' and developed on the basis of its symbolic representation.

(ii) If the race concept is not a biological category, then clearly the onus rests on sociology to elaborate the conditions of existence and properties of race in its reconstituted form. To this end sociology has sought to identify 'race' with a series of group categories. The form this association has taken has varied from a straightforward analogy in the case of caste, to attempts to subsume race relations, or what people think are race relations, to minority group relations, nationalities, corporate groups, etc. The incorporation, subsumption, or whatever form this association takes of race to various group-based classifications, constitutes the basis of orthodox divisions within sociology, and certainly of Rex's reproduction of them in Race Relations in Sociological Theory. They have not, however, consistently remained the basis for internal divisions. This is particularly true of those contributors to the field who have repeatedly flouted Rex's group-based classifications by conflating and interchanging

the group categories in their discussions of race relations.

(iii) Their ability to do so, it may be suggested, is a consequence of three distinct levels of conceptualisation operative throughout sociological theories of race, i.e. that transcend conventional demarcations.² In this sense three such levels are distinguished. (a) The concept of race at one level is conceived in terms of a general concept of action, that is meaningfully oriented behaviour on the part of the individual. Biological race is reconstituted here as sociological race relations in so far as individuals consciously select to orient their behaviour towards others on the basis of meaning attached to physical differences, i.e. ideas about race. (b) At another level it has been conceived in terms of a greater or lesser elaborated notion of structure. In the original illustration taken from Weber of a man shutting a door, the sociologist is not concerned with whether the actor has correctly identified the cause of the draught but only that he thinks he has and acts in order that he might exclude it. Sociology, in so far as its object is social action, cannot by itself know the causes of the draught beyond what the social actor thinks to be the correct cause, and secondly cannot know why the person thinks that by shutting the door he will exclude the draught, even if he has wrongly identified the cause. Both are outside the scope of sociology in so far as they are devoid of purpose and hence subjective meaning. What is being suggested here is that these conditions of action are explored in sociology and their presence, given its designation in terms of a science of action, is quite illegitimate. The conditions,

admittedly very loosely elaborated in sociology, reflect the needs of a personality system (e.g. prejudice conceived as an outlet for frustration-aggression), a social system which as we saw is reducible to a 'natural' propensity to promote group interests via competitive struggle, and finally a real physical component which 'if present' will certainly strengthen intergroup antipathy. The last of these, real physical differences, it should be added, remains distinct from any 'ideas about them'. On the contrary, real objective differences are now said to account in part for 'ideas about them'. In the case of the 'personality' and 'social systems', each have functional exigencies as systems which must be fulfilled if they are to survive. The concept of race in each case (or 'race prejudice', 'race struggle') is introduced to fulfil precisely such a role in the maintenance of each system.

(c) At a third level race is again conceived in terms of a supra - individually imposed set of categories but these are less concerned with the material as with ideal conditions, i.e. the realm of culture. Race here then remains a function of 'cultural differentiation', i.e. collective values, beliefs that are not reducible to the level of individually and consciously selected values. On the contrary, collective beliefs, embodied in traditional forms of representation, impose themselves from without on the individual in such a way that there exists a relatively coherent, consistent and uniform set of ideas about race. As one index amongst a multitude of others, these may or may not constitute the basis of institutional

differentiation, and levels of group segmentation.

These three levels of conceptualisation may be identified not only in terms of a distinct set of concepts associated with each. On the contrary, several concepts, including the race concept itself, possess properties from each. The categories of the 'integrative process' (assimilation, acculturation, etc.) are a case in point. In terms of individually held values, they refer to alternatives open to the individual, who is free to accept or reject alter through the association of a specific idea about race conferred on a particular individual developed in the context of a meaningful interpersonal relationship. Assimilation then refers to mutual acceptance. Conflict, at the other end of the scale, refers to mutual rejection. (It is important to note that 'conflict' here and throughout race theory refers to conflicting cultural systems, i.e. conflicting values individually or collectively conceived). In terms of some notion of structures they refer to functional exigencies of the system, independent of human will, which is relegated here to a subordinate role. Hence in Yinger's typology of minority group situations, the minority's subordinate status is not chosen by the dominant group but somehow required (admittedly the requirements are never fully explored here). Finally in terms of a generalised concept of culture they refer to indices of institutional differentiation, a function of the imposition of certain values and their mediation through action.

At a more practical level certain policy proposals necessarily follow from this. Furnivall's call for the restitution of an 'organic social will' and Kuper's 'depluralisation' slogan, are symptomatic of those 'culturalist' assumptions. Similarly the categories of the integrative process become in these terms, for the most part, policy options open to the dominant group as we suggested was the case in minority group theory. In so far as sociological race relations has been defined in this way, the numerous policy recommendations which have remained a consistent feature of the enterprise have invariably followed the somewhat speculative and Utopian demands of Furnivall and Kuper.

In terms of these three levels of conceptualisation, there remains the problem of reconciling individually held values with respect to ideas about racial difference, with the existence of 'races' in the realm of nature subject to the restraints of the particular system in question. Here we are referring to the tension present between the race concept conceived in terms of the concept of action, and its construction in terms of some notion of structure. There is also the problem of reconciling the conception of race as a representation imposed on the individual (through tradition, custom, etc.), and its conception in terms of an emergent product of meaningful relationships on the part of individuals who choose to orient their action on the basis of ideas about races.

Finally there remains the problem of reconciling some notion of race as a collective symbolic representation with its

role in the reproduction of various systems. At present the concept of race designates an object in the sphere of consciousness independent of the world of nature, and at the same time a functional prerequisite in several seemingly autonomous systems (social, cultural and personality) independent of whether the individual is conscious of them or not. The question arises, then, of how the race concept succeeds in emerging from these three seemingly autonomous levels of conceptualisation. Its coincidental appearance in each can only seriously be challenged by an a priori assumption that all systems are necessarily harmonious from the outset. This metaphysical explanation, however, can only hope to rescue the realms of culture and nature. Race relations, conceived in terms of individually selected values, are always unknowable and consequently may or may not coincide with the other realms. Ironically, in terms of the form the discipline has taken, race relations, conceived in terms of consciously chosen values on the part of an individual, leave no room whatever for rational policy recommendations.

This final point takes us to our last consideration of the race concept, that of conceiving it in terms of each of those levels taken separately: in other words the possibility of three independent concepts of race. If the three levels themselves are irreconcilible and, consequently, pose insurmountable tensions as regards the internal properties of the race concept, perhaps each on its own provides an adequate knowledge of the concept. The action concept, taken on its own, precludes any subsequent theorisation of the race concept,

in so far as the latter is conceived as an emergent product of interaction between essentially free individuals. The concept of culture and subsequently cultural differentiation (within which race relations assumes significance) taken alone, rests on an idealist conception of the social totality and with it a circularity with respect to the arguments developed at this level. At the most general level this has been expressed by Smith in attempts, on the one hand to elaborate some conception of institutional differentiation to define the social structure, while the latter is said to be exhausted by its cultural/institutional forms. Kuper too faces a similar problem in his attempts to explain the structure of plural society in terms of cultural pluralism which is said to be its chief determinant.³ And finally, the race concept, conceived as a necessary outcome of certain structural impositions, remains inconclusive, in so far as the nature of these are never really elaborated beyond a reference to unequal access to scarce resources, made necessary through the universality of group domination. 'Racial' domination is one form this may take. Nowhere however, are the conditions specified under which scarce resources are distributed. Similarly the concepts of unequal power and domination, beyond some reference to cultural superiority, remain largely unaccounted for. We are left to speculate the conditions under which certain forms of 'domination' are possible and relatedly how this pertains to unequal access to scarce resources. Its inability to do so of course rests on their elaboration in the context of a sociological project that denies their significance. The

conditions of action, biological, economic or whatever are 'given data' whose givenness is where curiosity, as far as sociology is concerned, begins and ends.

If the concept of race in neo-Marxist theory has anything to offer, it is hopefully to pose the race concept in terms other than those of values individually or collectively conceived and thereby explore its conditions of existence. The problem is, however, given the rejection of a biological concept in terms of values, whether this is feasible, or whether, despite its superimposition in terms of a new set of concepts: (mode of production, surplus population, ideology etc.), it still retains its logical allegiance to the sociological concepts of action, values and culture developed here in Part Two.

Notes.

1. Supra note 72, p. 151.
2. This is not to suggest that differences between and within these various classifications do not exist. Clearly there are several levels of similarity and difference between them. Here we have sought to reconstruct race theory at a certain level of generality that to some extent transcends these differences but by no means negates them.
3. L. Kuper, in, Pluralism in Africa, op. cit., p. 12. More often than not the concept of culture, in the form it has been elaborated in sociological race theory, designates a configuration of elements (institutional/non-institutional) that rarely move beyond an inventory of indices of differentiation. No attempt is made to examine particular institutional forms in terms of their specific conditions of existence; nor is any attempt made to specify the mechanism by which these various customs, symbolic representations etc. come to constitute the basis of an array of common understandings that underly interethnic contact.

PART THREE.

THE CONCEPTS OF RACE AND RACISM IN NEO-MARXIST THEORY.¹

Introduction.

The current investigation of the concepts of race and racism, in opposition to the forms of critique elaborated at the outset, has proceeded on the basis of an analysis of the concepts themselves and their properties, specified in terms of their relation to other concepts in the fields in which they are found. The general attempt to classify race theory on this assumption has entailed a distinction in the first instance between biological categories of race and the race concept in the social sciences. The immediate problem for the sociological concept of race, if it is to establish its own field of 'race relations', is to locate its object, not in biology but elsewhere. In Part Two, in our examination of the theoretical conditions for a sociology of race relations, the object was established, at least initially, in the realm of culture or culturally-expressed values. Race then becomes significant only to the extent that meaning is attached to it, and/or to related categories, by collectivities. If races then are cultural formations, what is subsequently required, given the terms of this designation, is an examination and specification of the conditions under which such formations exist, or rather 'appear' to exist. Sociology in general terms has deflected attention from this issue to pose a somewhat different problem, one moreover, that by itself still begs the question. If races

are not biological categories, the sociological argument continues, then the onus falls on the social sciences to establish precisely what they are. The several answers to this question are to be found in a series of group concepts which subsume, incorporate, or accommodate the concept of race in terms of their own properties. The race concept thus acquired a significance only in the context of an analysis of ethnic groups, religious/cultural groups (castes), or segmentally differentiated (plural) societies. In general then, the sociological project may be considered in terms of an attempt to reduce false biological categories to real sociological distinctions.

Those problems identified with respect to the race concept developed there were concerned, not so much with the specific group concept selected, as with certain presuppositions common to each of the sociological theories of race. In view of the interchangeability of the various group concepts found consistently throughout sociological race theory, there seemed little point in dwelling on the distinctions at this level. On the contrary, the ability to confound these concepts, to this extent, may be seen as a function of these shared presuppositions that were identified and elaborated in the final section of Part Two. As a result of this reorganisation of sociological race theory, the race concept was seen to exist as a determinate product of three mutually exclusive (at least, by no means necessarily coincidental) systems of concepts.

The race concept thus appeared on three distinct occasions,

a function of a concept of action, one of culturally-expressed values and variant conceptions of system or structure. The presence of all three entailed certain consequences for the sociological concept of race, including, amongst others, the reintroduction of biological aspects of the race concept elaborated in Part One.

Within sociological analysis then, race more often than not retains a biological character (real, not alleged) that constitutes, in conjunction with a series of specifically cultural criteria, one of an infinite number of possible forms of group differentiation. Part Two thus sought to establish the theoretical conditions for the appearance of these distinct conceptualisations of race. In doing so, it established their contingency on more general concepts that may be shown to possess mutually exclusive properties, thereby posing, in consequence, a fundamental problem of coherence for the field as a whole. Our examination of sociological race theory and the identification of these problems, all the more explicit through a reproduction of certain crucial aspects of Weber's sociology, does not however, exhaust the possibilities for a rigorous theory of race and racism. In this respect the overall project has sought to distinguish sociological from Marxist theory, the source of a particularly contentious debate in the social sciences at the present time. Whatever the implications of this debate, and we shall elaborate these with specific reference to the possibility of a neo-Marxist theory of race (as distinct from a 'Marxist sociology of race relations') below, there appear, at least initially, two ways

that neo-Marxism may be distinguished from sociological theory in this respect. (a) In the first place it may be seen to attempt to construct a race concept on the basis of its association with real economic categories. In some respects this parallels sociological attempts to reduce the race concept to real socially-based group concepts. If races do not exist as biological categories or variant forms of cultural collectivities, then they may be said to correspond to real economic categories: classes or fractions of classes. In doing so it attempts to develop, beyond the somewhat gestural formulations found in sociological race theory, a particular conception of structure and its constituent elements. (b) In the second place, neo-Marxist theory attempts to pose the problem of race in terms of the conditions under which falsely-held beliefs about biological categories are produced. In other words it confronts that problem referred to above whose resolution is demanded, given the non-biological assumptions of the race concept in its new setting, but which remain notably absent in sociological theory. This it does through the construction of a concept of racism, which it attempts by and large in the context of a historical examination of the 'origins' of racist thought: its preconditions in certain economic modes of production and exclusion in others.² Despite the presence of the economy in each of these two developments in neo-Marxist theory, they must at the outset, at least, be distinguished. In other words there are two quite separate theoretical exercises here: the reduction of races to real economic categories, and the analysis of the production of falsely-held beliefs about races.

If Marxism in general operates at the level of a concept of social formation, comprising a number of levels; ideology, politics and mode of production,³ it is over the precise nature of the relationship established between these levels that differences appear, at least superficially, most evident. In concurring with the identification of these levels regardless, for the moment, of their particular forms of correspondence, Part Three will be developed on the basis of the conceptualisation of race theory with respect to each of these levels.

Section I, then, will examine the concept of race as an economic category. In terms of the available material, it will be devoted to those attempts to construct a concept of race in terms of an analysis of contemporary capitalism. The theoretical basis of these arguments at the outset rests on Marx's concept of capital accumulation and the necessary production of a 'surplus population'. It is this conceptual context that provides the basis for the analysis of Blacks in the United States' economy and migrant labour in Western Europe. To some extent, certain analyses of the role of the reserves or Bantustans in South Africa may be seen to reproduce these arguments. The concepts of 'sub-proletariat' or 'underclass' and their association with the race concept will be seen to be derived from those more general positions elaborated at the outset.⁴

To some extent, the resolution of this first set of arguments rests on economic theory alone. They also, as we shall see, necessarily presuppose a certain formal relationship present

between, on the one hand, certain economic exigencies, and certain ideological and political forms on the other. Section II will be concerned specifically with those attempts to develop a concept of racism as the ideological component of neo-Marxist theory. Whilst the arguments in Section I are presented in general using contemporary illustrations, the concept of racism on the other hand may be seen to be part of a more general consideration of the historical bases of the doctrine of somatic and biogenetic differentiation. In common with sociological theories of race, often implicit in this historical dimension is the assumption that contemporary race relations may be understood more readily in terms of an analysis of their origins. The 'racism/slavery' debate (or, more precisely, slavery within capitalism) has been the subject of a good deal of controversy in the field and one that from within neo-Marxist theory itself has prompted disagreement. Dissension has in general terms focussed on the degree of autonomy present at the level of the ideological form, in this case, racism. Variant formulations in this respect may be said to constitute the theoretical conditions for the appearance of the race concept in the programmes of certain nationalist political movements. In particular these will be examined in Section III with reference to various organisations in the United States and South Africa, and, in a slightly different context, in two of the more overtly political journals, whose object amongst others is the analysis of Blacks/immigrants in the British class structure. In each case it will be possible to show how the programmes of these

groups have in part reproduced in essential terms variant positions in what has become known as the 'race/class debate'. In so far as they have reproduced the debate at this level they may be seen to coincide with certain forms of political practice that will be elaborated below.

In concluding Part Three, we shall return to the possibility of a Marxist theory of race in general and its relationship to sociological race relations. Given the initial social designation, the crucial problem remains of establishing a non-biological theory of race independent of those concepts elaborated in Part Two. If such a (non-biological) theory cannot be established, then the question of the relationship of Marxist theory to Marxist sociologies of race (we shall return to this distinction below) must be considered problematic. Furthermore, given those recent attempts to distinguish Marxist theory and sociology, the question remains whether we are not guilty once more of confounding two sets of mutually exclusive propositions. In concluding Part Three, we shall tentatively suggest a possible form of conceiving race that avoids both the particularism of a sociology of race relations and the variant forms of reductionism found in neo-Marxist theories of race. In general they may be seen as an attempt to reaffirm the concept of complex totality comprising a number of relatively autonomous levels. From the standpoint of the arguments presented here in Part Three this autonomy, though conceded formally, has effectively been denied. In contrast to these arguments, the concepts of race and racism will ultimately be conceived as the products of

determinate ideologies and ideological practices. Only then is it possible to establish their modes of intervention in politics and the economy. As far as the economy is concerned in particular, they may be conditioned by it, but are not in the first instance, contingent on it.

Notes.

1. The term 'neo-Marxist' has been adopted for two reasons. Firstly there is an absence of any attempt to develop a theory of race in classical Marxism. Consequently any 'Marxist' theory of race can only do so on the basis of an elaboration, rather than reproduction, of the concepts of Marxist theory. Secondly, given the considerable degree of controversy surrounding the status of Marxism and its status vis a vis sociology, the term neo-Marxism seems best suited to refer to variant forms of Marxist theory and Marxist sociology etc. as 'neo-Marxist' and leave a consideration of the possibility of a 'Marxist theory of Race Relations' until later.
2. It is interesting to note the extent to which non-Marxists rely on the neo-Marxian elaboration of the concept of racism in their own sociologies of race relations. See for instance, N. Banton, 'What do we mean by "Racism"?' and also M.G. Smith whose accommodation of the concept we reviewed in Part Two.
3. For an elaboration of these levels see L. Althusser, For Marx, esp. Part Three.
4. Clearly it is not possible to provide an exhaustive account of the illustrative material available in this field. Certain areas, e.g. the Caribbean, have been overlooked altogether. Furthermore within each area, and this is particularly true of Section III, there is by no means a full account as far as the areas selected themselves are concerned. There is clearly a case for these omissions, if they are considered in terms of their role in this investigation, as illustrations at a more substantive level of analysis of certain theoretical positions. It is really this attempt to locate a limited number of dominant theoretical positions (identified in terms of certain basic concepts) that lies at the heart of this investigation. Case study material is crucial here since it serves to illustrate the more substantive implications of these positions. To reproduce exhaustively these latter positions would not only prove physically out of the question, it would also serve to obscure the recognition of a quite distinct set of objectives.

I. Race and the Economy.

1. The Theoretical Basis of the Concept of Race as an Economic Category: Marx's General Law of Capitalist Accumulation and the Tendency toward the Production of a Relative Surplus Population or Industrial Reserve Army.

In the elaboration of the conditions of extended re-
production i.e. the conversion of surplus value into capital,^{1.}
Marx distinguishes two constituent elements in the latter's
composition whose internal relationships are transformed as a
result of capital accumulation. The value or technical
composition of capital comprising the value of the means of
production (constant capital) and the value of labour power
(variable capital)^{2.} and the material or organic composition
comprising the means of production and living labour power.
It is, to be precise, the relation between the mass of means
of production employed and the mass of labour necessary for
their employment that determines the organic composition of
capital. In the chapter on capitalist accumulation, Marx
elaborates two distinct phases of this process.^{3.} The first
presuppose a constant relation present in the elements in
the technical composition of capital. In this case the demand
for labour, as a result of the transformation of surplus
value into capital, will increase in proportion to the capital.
If the proportion of capital and consequently the demand for
labour increase the supply, then wages will rise. The
latter, that is, an increase in the labour price, will either

prompt the creation of more capital (a great stock with small profits will increase faster than a small stock with great profits) or it will reduce accumulation, thereby restoring equilibrium through a fall in wages.

The second phase involves an elaboration of the effects of a change in the technical composition of capital.⁴ The capitalist mode of production presupposes, in the first instance, accumulation by a handful of individual producers. Only then is co-operation on a large scale possible, as is the division and combination of labour, and economies of the means of production (instruments of labour e.g. machinery). The growing extent of the means of production is an expression of the growing productiveness of labour. Such, according to Marx, is the precondition of the diminution of the mass of labour in proportion to the mass of means of production moved by it.⁵ Hence a relative increase in constant capital in relation to its variable constituent increases the amount of capital required to effect an increase in the demand for labour.

So far, only the general effects of capital accumulation on the technical composition of capital have been discussed. The competition between individual capitals induces a tendency toward their centralisation.⁶ The cheapness of capital, that is to say how much may be extracted from the M - C - M process of the circulation of commodities,⁷ will depend on the scale of production which in turn will affect the productivity of labour. Under conditions of competition, big capitals beat smaller capitals, the latter consequently tending to concentrate

in areas where 'Modern Industry' has not developed. This process of centralisation effected through competition between capitals and the credit system (the mechanism for the movement of capital), accentuates and develops the effects of accumulation and concentration.

The absolute reduction in the demand for labour which necessarily follows from this is obviously so much greater the higher the degree in which the capitals undergoing this process of renewal are already massed together by virtue of the centralisation movement. 8.

The production of a surplus population is thus a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production;⁹.

It is capitalistic accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces in the direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a relatively redundant population of labourers, i.e., a population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus-population. 10.

Not only is the production of such a surplus a direct consequence of capital accumulation, but furthermore a relatively mobile population is required as some spheres maintain their technical composition of capital while others increase their constant in relation to their variable constituents.

There must be the possibility of throwing great masses of men suddenly on the decisive points without injury to the scale of production in other spheres ... the course characteristic of modern industry, viz. a decennial cycle, (interrupted by smaller oscillations), of periods of average activity, production at high pressure, crisis and stagnation, depends on the constant formation, the greater or less absorption, and the re-formation of the industrial reserve army or surplus-population. 11.

For each sphere of production the level of wages then

will be contingent on the technical composition of capital, affected by movements in capital accumulation, "Taking them as a whole", however, "the general movements of wages are exclusively regulated by the expansion and contraction of the industrial reserve army".^{12.}

Such transformations at the level of the technical composition of capital then are responsible not only for the production of a surplus population, but in addition, for the "badly paid strata of the British industrial class"^{15.} and the "best-paid, the aristocracy, of the working class",^{14.} hence for divisions within the proletariat.

In summarising Marx's theoretical account of the production of an industrial reserve army and for differentiation within the employed sector of labour, we may say :

- i) The capitalist mode of production presupposes some form of primitive accumulation. Only then is an organised division of labour and economies of the means of production possible.
- ii) Under conditions of extended reproduction transformations take place with respect to the internal constituent elements of the technical composition of capital, i.e. the value of the means of production and the value of labour power, and the organic composition, comprising the means of production and living labour power.
- iii) Where a constant relationship is present with respect to these elements, a point may be reached where the expansion of capital can no longer be met by a corresponding supply in labour, and wages will rise.

iv) As a consequence of accumulation and concentration on the one hand and centralisation on the other there is an inherent tendency towards the diminution of the means of labour in proportion to the mass of means of production moved by it.

v) A surplus population is both a consequence and a cause of capital accumulation, for the latter, according to the level of activity, will require relatively mobile, expendable section of the work-force.

vi) Wages, the price paid by capital for labour, are contingent on both the technical composition of capital in a particular sphere of production and, in overall terms, on the contraction and expansion of the industrial reserve army. Such differences as do exist in relative wage levels, find expression in the existence of a relatively low-paid stratum, on the one hand, and a labour aristocracy on the other.^{15.}

2. The conception of Blacks and/or immigrants as an industrial reserve army, sub-proletariat, or lumpenproletariat in social structures of advanced capitalism.^{16.}

a) Western Europe.

The recent tendency to consider immigrants or migrants, regardless of colour, in terms of certain functional prerequisites of the economy, contrasts sharply with orthodox sociological and certain socialist commentaries in the field. In so far as the former have directly concerned themselves with the economy, it has been through the adoption of a combination of assumptions borrowed from the 'human relations school' and 'organisation' theory in industrial sociology^{17.} and from the

orthodox 'immigrant-host' perspective in British race relations research.¹⁸ Consequently research in this field has been concerned with measuring 'indices of immigrant absorption into British industry'¹⁹ and in particular from an industrial relations standpoint, the role of the unions in restoring the equilibrium disturbed (temporarily) by the newcomers' arrival.²⁰ In as much as both migrant theory and the immigrant-host perspective subordinate the role of colour to a complicating factor, they may be distinguished from attempts in both sociology and neo-Marxism to emphasise the uniqueness of colour and Black-White divisions in British society. While on the one hand this has prompted analysis on the assumption of specifically racial discrimination²¹ and its resolution through legislation/education,²² in certain forms of neo-Marxism it has produced an analysis of the uniqueness of the colonial experience, its effects on the colonised and subsequently the strategic tasks of specific liberation movements.²³ (This latter distinction reproduces arguments with respect to the relation present between race and class which will be developed in Section III).

In general, attempts to locate and identify the role of migrants/immigrants in terms of the 'metropolitan'²⁴ structures of 'advanced' capitalism, have proceeded from within two related areas of Marx's economic theory. The first has been developed in concurrence with the latter's formulations on questions of the effects of movements in capital accumulation on the technical composition of capital, (i.e. those elaborated in 1. of this section). This, by and

large, is responsible for the greater part of work in this field both within the context of Western Europe and, as it will become clear, in the United States and South Africa. The second area takes up the question of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and certain of the counteracting influences that follow from this.²⁵

Migration then in the first case is conceived primarily as a direct function of capital accumulation. The latter with respect to Western Europe, was prompted by "technological progress, and characterized by an increasing replacement of labour by capital (automation, etc.)".²⁶

Accumulation presupposes an expanded market which was made possible through increased wages and the lowering of custom duties (the EEC). There resulted a corresponding shift of native workers to the service sector where higher incomes were obtained. This produced gaps in the labour market potentially available to migrant workers, which consequently constitute a structural requirement of the economies of Western Europe. Migration is a function not only of capital accumulation in the metropolises but a function of its relatively lower levels in the countries of emigration. This latter phenomenon, considered an effect of colonialism and dependency, sustains dependency ties through the migratory mechanism. In addition to these specifically economic functions there are both political (e.g. the 'buffer' function) and ideological effects that tend to maintain migration levels. These will be discussed below. As regards specifically economic exigencies, in the first instance, changes in the relationship

between constant and variable capital i.e. the relative replacement of the latter by the former, is deemed to have specific effects on the level and distribution of employment. The production of an industrial reserve army is seen as both a cause and a consequence of this accumulation. A surplus population however, taken from the ranks of the indigenous population is no longer a viable proposition, for political reasons.²⁷ Migration then is seen as both a direct result of "conditions historically related to the production of a lumpenproletariat"²⁸ and political expedience at home. The former may be arrived at via Marx's discussion of the production of a surplus population in general and a lumpenproletariat in particular²⁹. (Castles and Kosack, in point of fact, view immigrants in terms of a 'latent surplus-population'). The latter requires an examination of political conditions (embodying, in particular, levels of class struggle) specific to each social formation.

Once it has been established that migrants, or immigrants (the gasterbeiters in Western Germany or Black Commonwealth immigrants in Britain) are primarily economic categories for the reasons elaborated above, there yet remains the problem of explaining the apparent racial conflict that develops between indigenous and migrant or immigrant workers. Whilst arguments at this level focus on ideological and political factors as we shall see below, there has been one attempt, by Nikolinas, to develop a theory of racism on the basis of competition between the various fractions of capital and labour.³⁰ In the above reconstruction of Marx's arguments,

competition appeared as an integral aspect in the centralisation of capital. The tendency of big capital (through economies of the means of production and a greater labour productivity) is to appropriate a greater rate of surplus value and hence accumulate capital both at a cheaper cost and faster rate. According to Nikolinos it is precisely this competition between fractions of capital (indigenous and migrant) that provides the basis for racial conflict. In addition to intra-fractional conflict within capital there is also the question of racial conflict between the indigenous and the migrant proletariat. Again this may be conceived, it is argued, as a necessary outcome of competition between fractions of capital and the ability of certain groups to restrain attempts to diminish the cost of variable capital more effectively than others.

Capitalists try to increase m (surplus value)...by diminishing v (variable capital), although trade unions and to some extent legislation make this very difficult. This is important for that part of the working class which is not organized in trade unions as well as for minorities. The possibility of diminishing v in the case of these two latter groups is greater than in the case of organized labour. 31.

Racism, on the one hand, is a function of competition between native and migrant capital and in this situation "it is natural that the dominant (racial) group will be hated not only by the working class as its exploiter, but by the native capitalist class as well, as its competitor".³² On the other hand racism is a function of competition between the indigenous and migrant proletariat since the former is said to gain through the 'super-exploitation' of the latter.

It is evident that the higher the exploitation rate of the minority, the more the capitalists gain. On the other hand the national labour force gains as well since its average wage-rate is higher with the employment of the minority than it would be without it. 33.

In so far as these arguments rest on strictly economic contingencies, they have been developed as an effect of capitalist accumulation and subsequent changes in its technical composition. There is, however, one further area of Marxist economic theory that has been developed in this context. This concerns Castells' arguments with respect to the declining rate of profit and the need to counter such a tendency with such measures as a reinforcement of exploitation, state regulation, etc.

According to Castells the position of migrants and immigrants cannot as certain arguments suggest be seen as a necessary product of the need for a flexible, mobile surplus-population migrating and withdrawing in response to cyclical variations in the economy. On the contrary it is argued, there has been a long-term growth in immigration, regardless of such fluctuations.³⁴ Hence migrant labour is conceived not so much as a response to technical demands of production "but by the specific interests of capital in a particular phase of its development."³⁵ This phase, as with preceding arguments, is again prompted by the effects of accumulation and consequent changes in the organic composition of capital. The tendency of the rate of profit to fall is a direct result of the relatively smaller ratio of variable to constant capital as constituent elements in its organic composition,

As the sole creator of value, and hence profit, any decline in the proportion of labour to the other constituent elements will necessarily entail a relative decline in the rate of profit. The source of value thus appears smaller in relation to the mass of capital.³⁶ Hence at one level there appears a crisis of under-investment as it gradually becomes unprofitable. The cyclical character of such periods of activity balances such periods of under-investment with periods of over-accumulation. At one further level there appears, through an excess of capital and an ever-increasing growth rate, a tendency toward 'structural inflation'. Under such circumstances immigration plays an important role: "We advance the hypothesis that immigration has a specific role as a basic deflationary factor in controlling these critical effects of inflation".³⁷

In addition to various other counteracting tendencies, the rate of immigrant labour serves to reinforce the exploitation mechanism. The relative cheapness of immigrant labour derives from the legal-political status of immigrants.³⁸ Most are young, and yet at the same time, the cost of their education and training has been met by the country of emigration. Since many come without families, the cost of their reproduction is thus also avoided by the metropole. Furthermore the immigrants themselves in terms of 'social conditions' are inferior to the indigenous labour force. Hence their own cost of reproduction is reduced.³⁹

The legal restrictions accompanying migrant labour movements impose severe limitations on "their capacity for

cheap labour
immigrant
complex
active

organization and struggle",⁴⁰ a position which is advantageous to the various fractions of capital. Consequently, big capital seeks to maintain or regularise present controls, thereby limiting the possibility of class struggle. For small capital immigrant labour

is crucial to their day-to-day survival ... This is why in France, the most backward of the receiving countries, and the one with the highest proportion of small and medium-sized firms, tolerated without complaint up to 1972 a level of clandestine immigration which at that time represented almost 80% of all entries. 41. (Emphasis in original).

As far as indigenous labour is concerned, the ability to rely on this

veritable world reserve army ..., causes a relative lowering of wages thus contributing to the structural counter-tendency which helps delay the fall in the rate of profit. 42. (Emphasis in original).

Such a position, already objectively weakening migrant labour through various controls, is exacerbated by this source of fragmentation within the working class. 43.

In conclusion then this review of Marxian theoretical interpretations of the role of migrant labour in Western Europe suggests the crucial role of capital accumulation and the effects of transformations in the technical composition of capital on the demand for imported labour. The subsequent production of a surplus-population (whether latent or lumpen) is a condition of existence of this process of accumulation. The latter, however, is not without its contradictions, in particular, a tendency for the rate of profit to fall as a result of changes in the technical composition of capital. In the face of political pressure at home to preserve full

employment and the need to counter a declining rate of profit, the dependence on migrant labour becomes an indispensable feature of capitalist economies of Western Europe. Their position is both advantageous politically in particular to big capital and vital economically to small and medium-sized firms. As far as native labour is concerned their presence can only objectively weaken their own bargaining position, particularly in their role as an industrial reserve army. Such a position induces to some extent a fragmentation within the working class, an additional prerequisite of the system.

Before moving on to a review of the role of Blacks in terms of the exigencies of the American and South African economies and certain problems common to all theoretical analyses, it would be useful to demonstrate how these positions have served as the basis for illustrating the 'conditions' of migrants/immigrants in Western Europe.

An examination of these has focussed, in particular, on employment on the one hand, and housing conditions on the other.

Employment.

Evidence here has been collected on the patterns of industrial concentration, and within specific industries segregation at the level of plant or firm; patterns of unionisation, relative wage levels, unemployment rates and, related to the latter, legal restrictions with respect to conditions of residence. In Castles and Kosack's well documented survey, immigrants in all four countries considered

(Germany, Switzerland, France and Britain) appeared heavily concentrated in certain industries or occupations.⁴⁴ In Germany the overwhelming majority work in manufacturing industries and building. Those from recruitment countries are found predominantly in metal production and engineering. Great Britain has a far more varied pattern for immigrants than in other countries and the differences between indigenous and immigrants are less noticeable. However, migrants do follow certain patterns, for instance, the Irish are over-represented in construction, so too are the Jamaicans, but the latter are also found in metal and transport; Pakistanis in textiles and metal as are Indians who are also over-represented in engineering. Despite greater variation there is, then, a greater concentration of new Commonwealth immigrants in jobs requiring little skill and no status i.e. textile, clothing, engineering, foundry and the railways. Rex puts it thus :

So far as occupation is concerned, the colonial worker first finds acceptance as a replacement worker. He finds that there are certain jobs ... so arduous or unpleasant that they are not acceptable to the majority of the metropolitan working class. 45.

In Switzerland, Italians who are by far the biggest migrant group, are most heavily concentrated in building and engineering. It has been said in fact to underline Rex's point that the unwillingness of Swiss citizens to work in factories has resulted in a high proportion of foreign workers being employed in all sectors. In France 92.3% of migrants are employees and the majority are found in building and engineering yet again. Consequently it is argued migrants in all

four metropolitan centres are concentrated in certain industries and these are normally in the heaviest, dirtiest and most unpleasant conditions, jobs rejected by the indigenous workforce in favour of higher status occupations.

As regards patterns of employment, most studies confirm that "during times of recession, unemployment amongst Coloured workers has tended to rise more rapidly than amongst White workers and to go down again more slowly when trade recovers".⁴⁶ In Switzerland foreign workers are recruited for specific jobs by specific employers and if they lose their jobs they are not allowed to stay. Their position is almost as precarious in Germany where they are at least offered a small benefit if they are made redundant through no fault of their own. Furthermore migrants fare no better in terms of relative wage levels vis a vis their indigenous counterparts, having taken into consideration their patterns of industrial and occupational concentration and vulnerability to fluctuations in the trade cycle. According to Nikolinakos "research in Switzerland, England and France has revealed that foreign workers belong to the lowest paid groups".⁴⁷ This fact is not simply, it is suggested, a result of the aforementioned factors i.e. their patterns of industrial concentration, but several recent industrial disputes have revealed that pay rates differ for the same grade of work. At Harwood Cash Lawn Mill (a factory recently purchased by Courtaulds) the girls were paid twenty eight pounds for a forty eight hour week. The Pakistanis, to earn as much, were forced to work a sixty hour week minimum (in point of fact they risked dismissal for

anything less than between seventy two and eighty four hours a week) and, moreover, were not paid overtime rates, Saturday or Sunday rates, nor entitled to shift allowance.^{48.}

The relative 'backwardness' of migrants in the labour movement suggested and developed by Castells has been illustrated in the context of the unionisation of migrants. Allen, in a survey of Bradford's immigrants, found their low level of unionisation could only be understood with reference to poorer union organisation in the industries where immigrants predominated.^{49.} This would seem to be the logical outcome of the position discussed earlier i.e. that it will be in industries and occupations offering little in the way of pay, reasonable conditions of work, status and with a high risk of redundancy that union organisation is often weak and it is in these firms that immigrants predominantly find themselves.

The fragmentation of the working class, a problem raised by Castells, has been the subject of numerous studies and reports particularly in the context of industrial disputes.

In May 1972, for instance, at Crepe Size, Nottingham, White workers refused to join Asians in their bid to improve rates of pay and conditions of work. At the time of the dispute the Asians were paid thirty five to forty pounds for an eighty four hour week,^{50.} At Courtaulds, where Whites refused to participate in industrial action, the immigrants were used as bargaining counters by the firm which threatened its complete closure (including 2000 Whites) unless the interests of the overwhelmingly immigrant spinning department were sacrificed.

What is more, the Whites called for strike action in protest at the Company's action to reinstate Blacks with full rights and benefits (a suggestion which many Asians supported).⁵¹

At Birmid Qualcast, White workers campaigned for separate washing facilities and only outside campaigning prevented the company from adopting the proposal. It is significant to note at Birmid Qualcast the occupational distribution of Asians. In the foundries division, ninety five percent of the production line were non-Whites while Whites held 99.99% of staff and executive posts.⁵² It is worth considering not simply the industrial concentration of immigrants but further the occupational distribution within certain industries which may provide further evidence of a segregated immigrant work-force. Rimmer found evidence of segregation in his analysis of the effects of ethnic work on industrial relations in a small group of foundries. Fifteen out of the twenty eight occupational classifications were occupied by immigrants, twenty three out of twenty eight by Whites. But further evidence of work group classifications illustrated how an apparently integrated moulders' section consisted of immigrants working on one track while White workers worked on another. Rimmer concludes "in spite of first appearances, the reality revealed by the work-group distribution was that there were comparatively few immigrants who were well integrated in their working lives",⁵³ a conclusion that questions Patterson's belief that 'integration' ends outside the factory gates. According to Rimmer there is little evidence of it inside.

Housing.

In Britain, it is argued, there are areas of 'urban deprivation' around the city centre where immigrant members and poor Whites find themselves (such areas that have come under study include the Sparkbrook area by Rex and Moore⁵⁴ and the Handsworth area by John⁵⁵). This has been found to be the case elsewhere in Europe: "If ghettos are understood in a wider sense, to include all groups of immigrants living in virtual segregation from the rest of the population, then there are ghettos in all four countries".⁵⁶ Accommodation for immigrants in metropolitan centres varies from hostels for single workers, often close to the factory where no one else lives, to attic flats in Germany and Switzerland, transit centres in France and the old tenements found in twilight areas of the city centres in Britain.

The benefits that accrue to various sections of White capital and labour have been well documented in these studies. Such apparent benefits, it has been noted, have been sufficient to cut across traditional lines of industrial bargaining. The 'White elitism' that Pullé found in the Hosiery industry, notably a 'White alliance of workers and management' (and union in many cases) rendered the immigrant work force isolated and impotent. White strike-breakers kept production levels almost up to normal so the impact of immigrant action was hardly felt in many cases.⁵⁷ Employers benefit from such a situation, it is suggested, and by perpetuating it (German) society has "seen to it that they get the maximum economic advantage out of the employment of foreigners". Nikolinakos

goes on, "the whole mechanism of discrimination is profit-oriented. It is the ideology of maximising the profit".⁵⁸ What is more, this proposition applies no less to landlords than to employers. Discrimination operates to confine immigrants to certain areas. Daniel argues thus :

The accounts of both landlords and their agents show that two main justifications are put forward for discriminating against coloured people in private letting...The first is that coloured people are unacceptable as neighbours to many white people ... the second is ... coloured people in general are inferior as tenants to white people. 59.

Hence it becomes possible, through a greatly restricted supply of property available to would-be immigrant tenants, to force the latter to pay extortionate rents for the privilege of having a roof over their heads. (One must not forget that immigrant landlords too benefit from such a set-up and this is recognised as a complicating factor). The landlord is thus able to exploit this situation further by sub-letting to as many immigrants as possible and charging people on a per capita basis.⁶⁰ Nikolidakos offers one of the most explicit pieces of evidence of the apparent benefits which accrue to landlords as a direct result of immigration. He refers to a letter from the German Minister of Housing in August 1960 in which "he asks the Ministers of Housing ... to deny the approval of petitions on the part of employers who wanted to build sheds for foreign workers they intended to employ because this kind of living accommodation is cheaper !" ⁶¹. Not only is this evidence of the vested landowning interest in immigration, but more specifically, it is argued, it may be indicative of a conscious form of barter

on the part of ruling interests to divide the surplus value that accrues from immigration.

One attempt to demonstrate in general terms the positive effects on the economy of a subordinate migrant group is Cinanni's examination of the economic effects on the countries of origin of the migrant work-force.⁶² The remittance cannot be seen as compensation for training so long as no indemnity is given to the migrant worker. The daily work-rate consequently contributes a higher percentage of profit to the metropolitan economy which necessarily benefits from labour's surplus value. What is more,

by the very sale of goods to the country of origin of the immigrant worker, paid with that part of his salary that is used as 'remittance', the same country derives an ulterior benefit, which is in direct relation between the countries importing and exporting the same manpower and in reality counts for double. 63.

Consequently between 1954 - 60 for instance

'the activity of foreign manpower has led to an increase of the national Swiss revenue of 2,340 million Swiss francs'. The real salaries paid to the same workers having been about 800 million, the Swiss population has benefitted by the difference. 64.

Middle and upper income groups benefit from having at their disposal a large supply of cheap domestic labour. It has already been emphasised that Immigrants provided the possibility of a cheap source of labour. Generally it has only been necessary to pay a fraction more than a subsistence wage to attract Immigrants from their countries of origin. Wage differentials often increase as firms attempted to divide the workforce along national lines.⁶⁵ Thus all groups but those at the very bottom are given a stake in the system and at

least within the system improve their lots. It must be remembered, if we are to accept this argument, that a cheap labour supply is in capital's interest and the benefits of such a supply will only be redistributed in so far as capital's interests are again served. One other group that benefits is the marginal firms who, if they had had to pay normal prices for their labour, would have been forced out of existence. A cheap labour supply thus lowers their costs and prolongs their existence; what is more it is the marginal firms whose costs/revenue is higher than most and this has an effect on the conditions of work offered to employees. Thus the migrants are drawn to those firms who pay considerably less than the average price for labour; they also find themselves for similar reasons working in the most unpleasant conditions and facing the worst job opportunity prospects (promotion, security, etc.) that a firm can hope to offer and remain in existence. The 'contract' and 'rota' systems enable the countries involved to expand or contract the immigrant labour market with fluctuations in the trade cycle.

The technological trends referred to above explain, it is argued, the existence of a segregated sub-proletariat through the rota system, which establishes a high turnover of labour, produces what has been referred to as an industrial reserve army of labour and one that is denied, in consequence, any possibility of long term assimilation.

These illustrations, taken from numerous studies and reports have been developed in the context of certain theoretical

propositions discussed in the early part of this section. In general they serve to illustrate the relative cheapness of migrant labour over its indigenous counterpart. Furthermore they serve to illustrate the demands for a relatively mobile expendable work-force conceived as a direct consequence of economic imperatives and operative through an elaborate system of permit restrictions and rota systems. They describe the relative benefits available to the employers of migrant labour (concentrated in apparently backward sectors of the economy where profit margins are tight and 'reinforcement of exploitation' most expedient), to landlords and finally to the state which is spared certain costs that are borne by the country of emigration. The controversy over the 'applicability' or relevance of 'sub-proletariat', 'industrial reserve army', 'lumpenproletariat', or 'underclass' is on the basis of specific conditions of both migrant and indigenous labour differentiated above. Before commenting on this debate, the role of Blacks in the American and South African economies will briefly be discussed before returning to the general implications of these arguments.

b) United States.

In their analysis of the American 'race issue', Baran and Sweezy reproduce in general terms the arguments reviewed above. Essentially the present position of Blacks is a product of both the Southern slave system and recent developments in monopoly capitalism.⁶⁶ The migration from the South towards the expanding industrialised economy of the North is a product of both unemployment (a result of

agricultural mechanisation in the rural South) and the excess demand for labour once European immigration had been reduced after World War I. Hence Black migrant labour may be seen as an effect of both capital accumulation in the North and its relative absence (though mechanisation is clearly evidence of some) in the South. The Northern-Southern relationship parallels in this sense the relationship present in Western Europe between the metropolises and the countries of emigration.

In the United States the position of Blacks in the Northern industrial centres is quite unlike, at least in the long-term, the position of European immigrants there.⁶⁷ Whilst the latter were able to advance occupationally and educationally (and consequently disperse geographically)⁶⁸ there are, on the contrary, forces present, it is argued, reinforcing the 'sub-proletarian' condition of the negro. In the first place private interests benefit from its existence. Employers in general benefit from the fragmentation of the working class,⁶⁹ and the uneven development of the labour movement. Small capital not so much benefits as survives through the existence of cheap labour. Property owners too benefit from discrimination and hence geographical confinement, pushing up the price of accommodation through its relatively short supply. Finally white labour benefits from its almost exclusive hold on the more desirable and better paid occupations. In addition to the benefits⁷⁰ that accrue to individual groups, there exists as an integral feature of transformations in monopoly capitalism, a tendency toward the production of a surplus population. To be more precise, its existence is a

result of changes in the ratio of variable to constant capital effected through capital accumulation. Technology, it is argued, has effectively reduced the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour and in so far as it is these jobs that are reduced,⁷¹ Black labour fares worst of all. The unemployment figures bear witness to this fact.⁷²

Though the facts are specific to the American economy, they serve to illustrate certain tendencies that are common to the analyses of migrant labour in Western Europe. At this level problems for one will entail to some extent, as we shall see, problems for both. Before attempting to develop these there remains the analyses of Blacks in South Africa in terms of the particularities specific to the development of the South African economy.

c) South Africa.

photocopy *

South Africa possibly provides the most explicit illustration of all the current analyses of 'race situations' of the tensions surrounding the question of the contradictory or supportive status of Blacks in the economy. In so far as the elaborate and complex system of race laws contradicts certain rational exigencies of contemporary capitalism, the former, it is argued, will disappear through reform.⁷³ To be more precise certain integral features of contemporary capitalism include a flexible, mobile division of labour (occupationally and geographically) in addition to free movement of capital and resources. The geographical restriction of Blacks to the Bantustans, and their occupational confinement through certain forms of discriminatory legislation that favours White labour,

only serves to inhibit, it is argued, maximum economic growth potential.

Whereas the moral considerations and the socially disruptive effects of apartheid have rarely if ever hindered its implementation, economic cost has undoubtedly played an important delaying and mitigating role. There is no question that a rigid application of apartheid (in the sense of macro-segregation) would quickly bring the entire economy to a standstill. 74.

The 'liberal-reformists', or advocates of the industrialism argument, as it has become known,⁷⁵ are not alone in this respect, and certain (African) nationalist positions reproduce these arguments to the extent that apartheid is seen again to contradict economic development. Hence H. & J. Simons write :

South Africa's malaise stems from the impact of an advanced industrialism on an obsolete, degenerate colonial order. Stress and conflict are symptoms of an inner disharmony. (Contradictions)... between the dynamic potential of a multi-racial labour force and the strait-jacket of racially segregated institutions.76.

For both nationalists and liberals apartheid and the economy are out of step - they differ only over the location of the imminent cause. In an extremely convincing critique of both, Atmore and Westlake write :

For the liberal apologists, capitalism is the true determinant, and racialism - or a society stratified according to racial distinctions - the false; for the nationalists, the opposite is the case. 77.

They continue :

These determinants, dually active, are both anticipatory and teleological. The past directly anticipates the present ... And the future is latent in the past - the cause and course of apartheid/separate development is presented as the movement of the will of the Afrikaner Volk towards its inherent end of dominance over the other South African 'nations' or 'races' ... and capitalism is viewed as heading towards its inherent end of complete and beneficent integration. 78.

In challenging both liberals and nationalists, there has emerged a position that sees the role of Blacks in South Africa as not so much contradicting as complementing the needs of its economy. Such is the position of Wolpe,⁷⁹ Legassick,⁸⁰ Davies⁸¹ and Jordaan,⁸² though their conclusions differ in certain crucial respects.

Apartheid here is considered functional to and supportive of transformations in the capitalist mode of production or more specifically for Wolpe changes in the relationship between the reserve economy and the development of capitalism outside.

Whereas Segregation provided the political structure appropriate to the earlier period, Apartheid represents the attempt to maintain the rate of surplus value and accumulation in the face of the disintegration of the pre-capitalist economy, ... the mechanism specific to South Africa in the period of secondary industrialization, of maintaining a high rate of capitalist exploitation through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled labour-force, under circumstances in which the conditions of reproduction (the redistributive African economy in the Reserves) of that labour-force is rapidly disintegrating. (Emphasis in original).⁸³

The reserve economy formerly provided the partial means for the reproduction of Africans.⁸⁴ The remainder was paid to migrant African labour in the form of wages. As a result of this supplementary income on the reserves, the cost of wage-labour outside is effectively reduced, hence the possibility of a 'reinforced exploitation' mechanism. The decline in the reproductive potential of the reserves⁸⁵ may be contrasted with the level of accumulation in the capitalist sector. In particular the development of secondary industry has been largely responsible for consistently high growth rates in recent decades.⁸⁶ In summarising these developments Legassick writes :

The trend indeed has been towards greater centralisation of capital control, towards the interpenetration of the earlier defined sectors of mining, agricultural, state, commercial and industrial capital, and towards a partnership between foreign and local capital in all sectors. 87.

Once again as a result of capital accumulation in one sector and its absence on the reserves, it was suggested in the Report of the Native Laws Commission, 1946-8 that

Blacks should be allowed permanent residential rights in cities ... for secondary industry and commerce ... the migrant labour system should be gradually phased out. 88.

Another argument however proposed the tightening up of existing extra-economic coercive arrangements to accommodate Blacks under conditions of capital accumulation and an expanding secondary sector. Such 'arrangements' include the removal of political rights which effectively deny the possibility of organised opposition, of economic rights so that Black unions are not recognised and industrial action illegal and geographical rights curtailed by the pass laws which effectively remove militants back to their reserves and otherwise ensure cheap labour is available when and where it is required.⁸⁹ It is precisely these arrangements⁹⁰ that may be considered a direct response to transformations in the economy or more precisely in the 'reserve' and capitalist sectors of the economic system each with its own determinate mode of production.⁹¹

Under conditions of capital accumulation, the ratio of variable to constant capital is reduced, a factor not without its consequences.

There is increasingly evidence that, in contrast to earlier periods when the demand of capital for labour exceeded the supply ... the problem is now one of creating sufficient employment to meet the supply. 92.

In this context the migrant worker plays an increasingly important role.

Rightlessness, migrancy, and dispersion, reduce this concentration and this strength (which develops with a 'nominally free' proletariat). At the same time the structures of extra-economic coercion serve to control the industrial reserve army of the unemployed, disposing it in impoverished areas distant from the centres of power and wealth. Labour-reproduction costs need be met only to the extent that labour is needed: increasing pressures on the state for a birth-control programme for blacks are symptomatic. 93.

The present situation favours White labour as well as capital and both Jordaan and Davies have developed their arguments on the assumption of some conception of a labour aristocracy :

With the intervention of the state, part of the surplus extracted from the blacks is appropriated to provide super wages for the whites and increase the rate of black exploitation. The high living standards of the whites rest on the superexploitation of the blacks. 94.

Such measures to maintain wage and occupational differentials have included 'civilised labour' policies, minimum wage levels in selected occupations, the establishment of a Department of Employment to protect Whites from unfair competition from Blacks and the statutory colour bar which reserves categories of work exclusively for Whites.⁹⁵ Comparative wage rates and employment levels bear witness to the effectiveness of these measures.⁹⁶ It is through this control "that black labour is kept cheap, and that white labour is kept dear".⁹⁷

Far from antithetical to capitalist development, then, apartheid, operating through a combination of repressive and

ideological mechanisms has served to reproduce on an extended scale capitalist relations of production. The 'extent' of their development is taken as an index of the benefits directly associated with current legislation. These are seen as beneficial both to foreign capital (the extent of foreign investment has risen dramatically despite, some may say, the 'dysfunctions of racism')⁹⁸ and to the expansion of domestic markets to include White labour which, it is argued, is partner in, and beneficiary to, the 'reinforced exploitation' of the Black population.

Implicit in each of these accounts, i.e. with respect to Western Europe, the United States and South Africa, is a common set of theoretical assumptions borrowed from classical Marxist theory and variant formulations of the race concept (e.g. 'immigrants', 'indigenous workers', 'migrant workers' etc.) that coincide with the economic categories produced in Marx's texts. Each of these arguments pose two sets of problems. The first remains at the level of economic theory and concerns the necessity of a number of strictly economic categories prompted by certain exigencies within the economy itself. The second concerns the coincidence of these economic forms with certain 'ideological' relations. The race concept is a product of this second theoretical operation. It is now possible to confront these problems, thereby drawing out some of the implications of the more substantive illustrations of these economies in terms of their common theoretical presuppositions.



3. Economic Theory and the Race Concept.

a) Capital Accumulation and the Production of a Surplus Population.

The first of the strictly economic arguments concerns the production of a surplus population as an effect of transformations in the composition of capital. There are two propositions here that need to be distinguished. The first is that a given capitalist economy produces, through the effects of transformations in the composition of capital, a relative pool of unemployed conceived as a consequence of the reduction in the ratio of labour to capital. This argument is advanced in the chapter on capitalist accumulation in Capital and has been reproduced in several of the substantive analyses of the three economies above.

The second proposition is that capital accumulation on an extended scale attracts labour from outside. In each of the above illustrations, for instance, the presence of Blacks, immigrants or migrant workers is the result of migrations from economies with little or no accumulation (the reserves in South Africa, the backward economies of Western Europe, and the Southern agricultural belt of the United States) to areas with a rapidly expanding growth rate and consequently, it is argued, a relatively high demand for labour. These two propositions, evident in each of the arguments reviewed above, entail these two strangely contradictory consequences. On the one hand, capital accumulation effectively produces a pool of unemployed (Legassick and

Baran and Sweezy) through the diminishing ratio of variable to constant capital. On the other, an identical process of accumulation, far from wasting labour, attracts it from outside to supplement what is an apparently insatiable demand within its own boundaries. This paradox arises, it may be suggested, through the conflation of two quite separate problems.

The first concerns the constitutive makeup of capital's composition which, at any given time, may well reflect a decline in the ratio of variable to constant capital. The investment programme of a particular firm may well have this effect but it does not of necessity affect the ratio in favour of constant capital and furthermore, and this is what is important, it has no bearing whatever on the levels of employment in the economy as a whole.

The second problem is the determination of levels of employment. While the complexities of this problem will not be raised here, there is clearly nothing to suggest in the above argument that a decline in the variable component of capital's composition produces a corresponding fall in the demand for labour. As it stands, this is the sole basis for the surplus population argument. If unemployment in its variant forms is not a consequence of transformations at the level of the composition of capital, then clearly the specific form it takes (floating, latent, stagnant) cannot be posed in terms of determinate levels of capital accumulation. The discrepancy here has resulted in attempts to differentiate

racess as economic categories on the basis of the somewhat arbitrary designation of one of a range of concepts in some way associated with a surplus population. Much of the controversy has rested on the status of the term 'sub-proletariat' for use in this context.⁹⁹ The latter has come to embody the variant forms of surplus population referred to above, as well as lumpenproletariat and industrial reserve army with little attempt to delineate its precise form in each case. For Allen and Smith, for instance, the position of Blacks is tied up with the conditions of the production of a lumpenproletariat (a specific form of the surplus population, namely its 'lowest sediment'). Baran and Sweezy, on the other hand, subsume several specific forms of surplus population (latent, stagnant, lumpen) to the concept of sub-proletariat, while the notion of an industrial reserve army has been invoked with respect to each of the economies referred to above. The tendency with respect to Blacks or migrant workers has been to effectively subsume all these forms under a rather loose formulation designed to depict a position in general terms inferior to Whites. The concepts of sub-proletariat or underclass serve to fulfil precisely this role. Though contemporary neo-Marxist economic theory fails, to some extent, to make full use of Marx's classification in this respect, the inadequacy of the latter's formulations over the question of specific forms of surplus population must in part be held accountable. Marx's rudimentary observations with respect to these forms fail to specify the conditions under which any one or combination of them appear and prevail over the others. His failure to do so, it has been suggested, is the consequence

of posing a general theory of levels of employment in terms of the composition of capital and the corresponding ratio of its constant and variable components.

b) The Tendency of the Rate of Profit to fall; the Role of Migrant Labour as a Counteracting Influence.

According to Marx :

The gradual growth of constant capital in relation to variable capital must necessarily lead to a gradual fall of the general rate of profit, so long as the rate of surplus-value, or the intensity of exploitation of labour by capital, remain the same. (Emphasis in original). 100.

Profit then can only increase under two conditions :

The mass of profit cannot increase so long as the same amount of labour is employed, unless the unpaid surplus-labour increases, or, should intensity of exploitation remain the same, unless the number of labourers grows. 101.

The elaboration of this necessary tendency for the rate of profit to fall is developed in conjunction with certain counteracting tendencies (to increase the volume of unpaid surplus labour or increase the number of labourers) that are said to undermine the fundamental tendency. The migrant worker may be considered one such form of counterveiling pressure, providing the possibility of both a growth in the number of labourers and an intensification of the exploitation mechanism.

The general area of the theory of the declining rate of profit has been the subject of some considerable degree of controversy in Marxist economic theory recently. Some of these arguments would seem to support the 'migrant labour' arguments whilst others would appear to underline their

speculative character. In another respect still, which we will return to later, the rate of profit argument appears somewhat superfluous, as does the elaboration of the concept of race itself.

In so far as many of the critics of the rate of profit argument have taken the counteracting tendencies to denegate, in effect, the fundamental tendency in the first place, they may appear in principle to support the migrant labour arguments. Steedman for instance writes,

There is no obvious reason why any tendency to fall should be regarded as 'fundamental', while tendencies to rise should be dubbed 'counteracting'. 102.

The migrant labour arguments would apparently be vindicated if such a position were maintained, as one of a number of possible counteracting tendencies. It might well be considered, as economists above have suggested, a fundamental exigency of contemporary capitalism.

The counteracting influences argument, while it appears to support the theories of migrant labour against the falling rate of profit, nevertheless assumes that, in the absence of these tendencies, the law would apply. In point of fact, as Steedman goes on to suggest, taken on its own, there is considerable doubt as to whether this would be the case.

There is no reason at all why the methods of production and the real wage should not change through time in such a way that $S/(C + V)$ falls while the profit rate rises, or vice versa. 103.

If such is the case there is no reason to suggest that to increase the exploitation mechanism with respect to migrant

labour would, in point of fact, have the desired effect on the economy as a whole, and certainly not the most desirable to the point of being exigent to its needs. As we have already suggested, what may appear to be ostensibly beneficial to an individual employer may not have a similar effect on the economy as a whole. It may be, for instance, that the relative 'cheapness' of migrant labour deters a more efficient use of machinery and raw materials and consequently lowers the social product of labour. Such might well be the case in the so-called backwoods of industry where it has been suggested migrant workers more often than not find themselves.

If the viability of the economic arguments themselves are subject to a good deal of controversy within Marxist economics,¹⁰⁴ then there still remains the problem of identifying the race concept with that of migrant labour, that is to say, the coincidence of real racial with real economic categories. The consideration of races in this way presupposes their existence in objective terms. If the race concept is not intended to designate an economic but an ideological object, then the coincidence of real economic categories (classes or fractions of classes), political/legal categories (migrant labour) and ideological categories (false racial classifications) has yet to be resolved. In this sense the strictly economic arguments are somewhat superfluous. We shall return to this problem in Section II. As regards the role of profit arguments, it is worth noting Steedman's concluding remarks on the subject.

There is, at present, no respectable Marxist theory of a long-run tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Thus any existing Marxist analyses of capitalist development which are based on the existence of such a tendency are, as yet, without theoretical foundation. (Emphasis added). 105.

c) Race as an Economic Category: the Role of the State and Ideology.

It has already been suggested that attempts to concede 'races' as real economic categories have involved two distinct theoretical processes for their advocates. The first set of propositions suggest that transformations in the composition of capital effected through capital accumulations are responsible for certain changes in levels of employment. Differentiation is thus seen as a necessary outcome of these developments. These arguments, and those concerning the falling rate of profit, are clearly posed at the level of economic theory, and in their reproduction every attempt was made to extricate these from additional psychologicistic evidence, often submitted to lend them support.¹⁰⁶ The question of establishing certain exigencies in the economy is one problem which, it has been suggested, is not altogether satisfactorily resolved in Marxist and neo-Marxist theory.

2 There is a second problem however and this concerns the location of the concept of race in terms of these propositions. This second process entails the adoption of certain assumptions regarding the role of the economy that have necessary repercussions for the overall conceptualisation of the social formation. Within this second set of propositions there are two possible means of conceiving the race concept. The first

is to reduce race to real economic categories so that races do exist and race relations correspond to a variant form of the capital-labour relationship. Nikolinakos,¹⁰⁷ for instance, tackles racism in terms of competition between dominant and subordinate racial groups, and indigenous capital and labour. In terms of an economic theory of racism then, it presupposes the existence of races at the outset. Competition which gives rise to racism ('feelings of hate' etc.) is a necessary outcome of the initial differentiation of groups along racial lines. The second possibility admits the problems entailed in this position, in particular the assumption of real racial differences and their reduction to real economic categories. Here races are conceived as ideological categories whose appearance nevertheless is subject to the demands of the economy. Races then are not strictly economic categories, but false ideological representations. Clearly this second position transcends the confines of strictly economic theory and assumes a certain formal relationship between the economy and the extra-economic forms. This relationship will be elaborated fully in the section that follows. The presuppositions involved in this second argument conceive both racism as an ideological form, and subsequently races as political representations to be direct effects of economic transformations of the sort elaborated above. Furthermore in so far as they represent the basis of the dominant trend in the theoretical/ideological content of various nationalist/liberation programmes through their attempts to reduce the race concept in this way to economic effects, neo-Marxist theory of necessity

reduces the conceptualisation of other aspects of the social totality in the same way. The problem of moving from economic to racial categories however remains unresolved. In terms of the economic arguments referred to above the concentration of capital may well entail the competition between the various fractions but there is nothing in this argument to suggest how and why competition becomes racially based. To superimpose the race concept into this analysis serves only to introduce elements that clearly cannot be conceived solely in terms of the economy. One of the major tasks in this general examination of the concept of race in neo-Marxist theory is to draw out the implications of this problem both at a theoretical level and in terms of its political effects. In consequence it will assert the necessity of conceiving 'races' and 'racism' as essentially the product of ideological practices that may subsequently and only subsequently intervene at the level of political practice and the economy.

Notes.

1. K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 545.
2. Ibid, p. 202.
3. Ibid, pp. 574-666.
4. Ibid, p. 582.
5. Ibid, p. 583.
6. Ibid, p. 586.
7. Ibid, Part 2, ch. 4, pp. 145-153.
8. Ibid, p. 589.
9. Ibid, p. 592.
10. Ibid, p. 590.
11. Ibid, pp. 592-593.

12. Ibid, p. 596.
13. Ibid, p. 612.
14. Ibid, p. 625.
15. For further evidence of the existence of such categories see K. Marx and F. Engels, On Britain, and V. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in Selected Works, Vol. 1.
16. M. Legassick, in point of fact, refers to South Africa as 'intermediate' in terms of its gross national product in 'South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence', p. 253.
17. For a review of some of the material in these fields see for instance, D. Silverman, The Theory of Organisations, and N. Mouzelis, Organisation and Bureaucracy.
18. Supra, Introduction p. 11 ff.
19. P. Wright, The Coloured Worker in British Industry, op. cit. and S. Patterson, Immigrants in Industry, op. cit., ch. 1.
20. See for instance, J.A. Torode, 'Race Moves in on the Unions', M. Meth, Brothers to all Men? and B. Radin, 'Race and the Unions'.
21. See numerous reports of prejudice and discrimination in E.J.B. Rose, Colour and Citizenship, Part VII, pp. 551-604.
22. W.W. Daniel, Racial Discrimination in England.
23. For the psychological effects of colonisation see for instance, F. Fanon, Black skin White masks; A.G. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized and A. Césaire, Return to my Native Land.
24. The development of race relations within a general framework of metropolitan/colonial relationships has been developed by J. Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, see especially ch. 4.
25. K. Marx, Capital, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 211-240.
26. M. Nikolinakos, 'Notes towards a General Theory of Migration in late Capitalism', p. 7.
27. A. Ward, 'European Capitalism's Reserve Army', p. 18. The political events referred to or implied here are the Depression and the subsequent ascendance of National Socialism in the 1930's.
28. S. Allen and C. Smith, 'Race and Ethnicity in Class Formation: A Comparison of Asian and West Indian Workers' in Social Analysis of Class Structure, ed. F. Parkin, p. 46. It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that Allen and Smith's paper reduces the role of migrants to a lumpenproletariat per se. On the contrary, their contribution is at pains to point out the structural variation both within and between migrant groups.

29. K. Marx, Capital, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 602-603.
30. M. Nikolinakos, 'Notes on an Economic Theory of Racism', p. 371.
31. Ibid, p. 371.
32. Ibid, p. 374.
33. Ibid, p. 373.
34. M. Castells, 'Immigrant Workers and Class Struggles in Advanced Capitalism: the Western European Experience', p. 36.
35. Ibid, p. 44.
36. Ibid, p. 45.
37. Ibid, p. 46.
38. Ibid, p. 53.
39. Ibid, p. 47.
40. Ibid, p. 53.
41. Ibid, p. 58.
42. Ibid, p. 49.
43. Ibid, p. 59.
44. S. Castles and G. Kosack, Immigrant Workers in the Class Structure in Western Europe, p. 57 ff.
45. J. Rex, Race Relations in Sociological Theory, p. 108.
46. P. Wright, op. cit., p. 85.
47. M. Nikolinakos, 'Economic Foundations of Discrimination in Federal Germany' in Foreigners in our Community, ed. H. Van Houte and W. Melgert, p. 87, cites D. Maillet, Structures des Salaires et Immigration, p. 96, n. 30. Also cited by S. Castles and G. Kosack, op. cit., p. 381.
48. A. Razok, 'The Harwood Cash Lawn Mills Dispute'.
49. S. Allen, 'Immigrants or Workers' in Race and Racialism, ed. S. Zubaida, pp. 99-124.
50. 'Race and the Unions' in Race Today, August 1973.
51. P. Foot, 'Strike at Courtaulds, Preston'.
52. 'Struggles of Blacks at Birmid Qualcast', unpublished paper given at the Digbeth Conference on Trade Unions and Race Relations June 1973.
53. M. Rimmer, Race and Industrial Conflict, p. 38.
54. J. Rex and R. Moore, Race, Community and Conflict, op. cit.
55. A. John, Race in the Inner City.
56. S. Castles and G. Kosack, op. cit., p. 314.
57. S. Pullé, Employment Policies in the Hosiery Industry.
58. M. Nikolinakos, 'Economic Foundations of Discrimination in Federal Germany', op. cit., p. 93.

59. W.W. Daniel, op. cit., p. 162.
60. J. Rex and R. Moore, op. cit., p. 134.
61. Cited by M. Nikolinakos, 'Economic Foundations of Discrimination in Federal Germany', op. cit., p. 86.
62. P. Cinanni, 'The Backgrounds of Migration labour', in Foreigners in our Community, eds. H. Van Houste and W. Meigert, op. cit., p. 27.
63. Ibid, p. 33.
64. Cited by P. Cinanni, ibid p. 33 (study by Institut International d'Études Sociales).
65. The question of 'divide and rule' and its role as an ideological mechanism in the fragmentation of labour will be discussed below in Section II.
66. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, ch. 9. p. 249.
67. See M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life, N. Glazer and D. Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot, esp. Introduction.
68. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, op. cit., p. 257.
69. While the presence of a black sub-proletariat is considered necessary in terms of its fragmentary effects, a black bourgeoisie is also considered necessary to fragment black revolutionary potential. On the one hand then there appears a set of psychological pressures designed to dampen the black protest movement by ostensibly providing the possibility of upward movement; On the other there appears a set of socio-psychological pressures (pp. 158-159) designed to convince those whites higher up the status hierarchy that there is ostensibly a group below them incapable of competing, and fated to remain indefinitely below them. The contradictory character of these two sets of pressures and consequently these two groups (a black bourgeoisie and a black sub-proletariat) remains unresolved here (unless it were argued that whites were somehow "wise" to the gestural nature of tokenism while blacks were genuinely 'taken in' or 'duped' - an explanation it may be added, whose assumptions would embarrass the most conservative of their opponents). Ibid.
70. There are also psychological benefits from the existence of a black sub-proletariat - these will be discussed in a subsequent discussion of Race and Class.
71. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, op. cit., p. 267.
72. Ibid, p. 261.
73. P. van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict; M. Banton, Race Relations; L. Kuper and M.G. Smith, Pluralism in Africa and G. Hunter, Industrialisation and Race Relations.

74. P. van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict, op. cit., p. 215.
75. H. Wolpe, 'Industrialism and Race in South Africa' in Race and Racism, ed. S. Zubaida, p. 151.
76. H.J. and R.E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950, p. 610. See also A. Asheron 'South Africa, Race and Politics'.
77. A. Atmore and N. Westlake, 'A Liberal Dilemma: A Critique of the Oxford History of South Africa', p. 128.
78. Ibid. For a critique of these arguments, including an examination of the role of the state, see H. Wolpe, 'Industrialism and Race in South Africa', pp. 156-170, and H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid', pp. 428-429.
79. H. Wolpe, 'Industrialism and Race in South Africa', op. cit., pp. 151-179 and H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa', op. cit.
80. M. Legassick, 'South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence'.
81. R. Davies, 'The White Working Class in South Africa'.
82. K. Jordaan, 'Trade Unionism v. Revolution in South Africa'.
83. H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa', op. cit., pp. 432-433.
84. Distribution and allocation of the social product on the reserves was established through kinship ties, hence the distinction between this and the capitalist mode of production.
85. H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa', op. cit., pp. 440-444.
86. M. Legassick, op. cit., p. 269.
87. Ibid, p. 274.
88. Ibid, p. 275.
89. H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa', op. cit., pp. 446-447.
90. Ibid, pp. 429-430. The state then far from being a 'neutral' onlooker, plays a supportive role in the specific character of the South African economy through the enactment and implementation of this legislation.
91. This distinction between system and mode of production made by Wolpe is taken from E. Laclau, 'Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America'.
92. M. Legassick, op. cit., p. 280.
93. Ibid.
94. K. Jordaan, op. cit., p. 78.

95. R. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
96. *Ibid*, p. 52.
97. *Ibid*, p. 56.
98. M. Banton, Race Relations, p. 192.
99. See for instance, I. Macdonald, 'Immigration and Class' and a reply, S. Castles and G. Kosack, 'Immigration and Class: A Reply'!
100. K. Marx, Capital, Vol. III, p. 212.
101. *Ibid*, p. 229.
102. Ian Steedman, 'Value, Price and Profit', pp. 79-80.
103. *Ibid*, p. 80, where S = surplus value, C = constant capital and V = variable capital.
104. See also G. Hodgson, 'The Theory of the Falling Rate of Profit' and D. Yaffe, 'The Marxian Theory of Crisis, Capital and the State'. The debate between these two in particular illustrates two sides of the argument, particularly pertinent for our purposes; Yaffe on the one hand offers an elaborated defence of Marx's argument while Hodgson attacks it as part of more fundamental rejection of economistic readings of Marx. "'The last instance' (in which the economy is said to be determinant) is never announced by the sound of trumpets and the collapse of the citadel of profit". G. Hodgson, *op. cit.*, p. 767.
105. I. Steedman, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
106. I am thinking particularly here of Nikolinakos' 'Notes on an Economic Theory of Racism', *op. cit.* and aspects of Baran and Sweezy's discussion of race relations in Monopoly Capital, *op. cit.*
107. M. Nikolinakos, 'Notes on an Economic Theory of Racism', *op. cit.*

II. The Theory of Ideology and the Concept of Racism.

One debate which has received considerable attention in the social sciences and history over the last thirty years concerns attempts to specify the conditions under which racism and slavery arose and the bearing one has on the other. Implicit in much contemporary 'race relations' literature is the assumption that 'race problems' may be understood more readily and their resolution thereby facilitated by probing the question of the genesis of racist thought. Though the debate per se does not provide the subject-matter of this examination, certain of its participants will be raised in so far as their work pertains to an examination of the concept of racism in neo-Marxist theory. Furthermore certain implications may be drawn from this discussion that question the debate itself and the possibility of its resolution in the terms in which it has traditionally been formulated.

Though the precise status of the term racism has by no means been clearly formulated, it is necessary at the outset to give some brief indication of that area of knowledge in general to which it refers. Hence Benedict uses the term in a way that is generally approved by Marxists and non-Marxists alike: here it is referred to as : "the dogma that one ethnic group is condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to congenital superiority".¹

In attempting to introduce some measure of conceptual rigour into the area, Noel has specified that it is its ideological content that distinguishes racism from ethnocentrism

X and racialism,² and like Benedict and van den Berghe, distinguishes it from other ideologies by its racial focus, that is its root concern with biogenetic categories. Distinguished in this way, the object of neo-Marxist race theory has been concerned with locating racism, as one set of an infinitude of ideological forms, both in terms of some conception of the economic or mode of production and in terms of certain political practices referred to as racialist. Consequently this examination of the concept of racism will fall into three parts. Part 1. will examine the contributions of Cox³ and Genovese for the specific differences between them are broadly illustrative of predominant positions in this area. In the case of Cox attention will be focussed on the problem of reconciling a conception of "material social facts", the object of his analysis, with his conception of capitalism and subsequently racism. In the case of Genovese attention will be directed towards his critique of this particular conception of the racism/capitalism/slavery thesis⁴ and subsequently his attempt to replace Cox's 'mechanistic materialism' with an attempted synthesis of what he refers to as 'materialist' and 'idealist' analyses of New World race relations.

In the previous section the concept of race was elaborated on the assumption that it corresponded to real economic categories. It was suggested in this respect that once the problem of establishing the necessity of certain categories per se was overcome (this remains in doubt) there still remains the problem of locating the racial basis of

this economic categorisation. If races and the concept of race in general terms denote a spurious set of biogenetic criteria for human differentiation, then how does this patently absurd category come to correspond to a very real basis for economic differentiation? What the concept of racism attempts to identify is the false beliefs themselves and the means and conditions of their production. Under what conditions and by what means, in other words, has the human species come to be sub-divided on this basis? The economy in the previous section was invoked to explain the necessary appearance of economic categories (surplus population etc.). The economic level is introduced at this point in order to construct theoretically the necessary appearance of certain ideological categories. The appearance of racism then has, in the first instance, been developed historically, and in general is considered a determinate product of capitalism, or to be precise, a certain 'level' of capitalist 'development'.

Part 1. then will deal specifically with both Cox's and Genovese's attempts to develop an adequate concept of racism along these lines. In so far as racism denotes an ideological form both arguments, it will be suggested, presuppose a general concept of ideology. To some extent then the problems here appear regardless of the questions of the content of specific ideologies (e.g. racism) and their effects. Part 2. will deal specifically with the internal constituent forms of racist ideology, for the racism/capitalism thesis presupposes that racism may be distinguished rigorously from certain forms of thought that predated capitalism. Such a distinction, it

will be argued, poses problems for attempts to maintain a unitary structure in the light of what could be seen as internal transformations in the structure of the ideological form.

Part 3. will tackle the question of what it is precisely that racist ideology seeks to vindicate. At a substantive level, it is argued, the concept of racism seeks to justify a variety of economic and political practices. Their ambiguity, it will be suggested, is a consequence of the problematic relationship established between racism on the one hand and the corresponding forms of economic/political practice, referred to as racialist, on the other.

In summarising this section an attempt will be made to draw out certain implications of the arguments developed here. The racism/capitalism thesis appears uncompromising to the extent that it effectively denegates the role of politics on the one hand or reduces it to dubious forms of pragmatism/spontaneism on the other. The precise implications these have had for the content of specific political organisations will be discussed in the section that follows. What was suggested in concluding the previous section will be reiterated here; namely, that the concepts of race and racism may only be understood as the products of theoretical/ideological practices that subsequently intervene at the level of the economy. Clearly the scope of such intervention can only be determined via an adequate conceptualisation of the economy, since it will pose its own conditions for the intervention of this and other ideological forms. In this sense the economy may be said to

be determinant in the last instance.

Having posed the problem in these terms, it is necessary to distinguish within ideology, attempts to produce a global theory of ideology on the one hand and specific ideological forms on the other. In the context of this discussion, it may not be possible to contribute to a theory of the construction of ideology in general, one that incorporates, moreover, a concept of ideological effect through which ideology operates at other levels. It can, however, distinguish this general theory from the specification of particular ideological forms ('race' and 'racism') which may be confronted both at the level of their conceptualisation and which may be elaborated in terms of their specific effects at the level of political and economic practices. What this argument does not intend to suggest or imply is that on the contrary the opponents of the capitalism/racism thesis, Tannenbaum,⁵ Elkins,⁶ and others have anything more to contribute to its resolution. This will become clear as the implications of the arguments under consideration are fully developed.

1. The Racism/Capitalism Thesis in the Work of Cox and Genovese.

In his attempt to clarify certain terminological ambiguities in race theory, Cox distinguishes ethnocentrism, intolerance, racism and race relations. The first two will concern us later when the internal constituent forms of racist ideology as distinct from pre-capitalist forms of racist thought will be more fully examined. The term racism, according to Cox, refers to a philosophy of racial antipathy. Studies

however in the development of an ideology, or systems of rationalisations, are misplaced, he argues. The object of Cox's analysis is the world of material social facts, and, in this instance, relations between concrete individuals who are aware of each other's actual or imputed physical differences. The latter is a fairly widespread conception of race relations in Marxist and non-Marxist literature. To arrive at the material world of concrete race relations, it is necessary to establish: "The phenomenon of the capitalist exploitation of peoples and its complementary social attitudes".⁷

Though the object of Cox's analysis is race relations, it can only be reached via an examination of the concept of racism. "Our hypothesis" he argues "is that racial exploitation and race prejudice developed among Europeans with the rise of capitalism and nationalism".⁸

To establish the racism/capitalism link, certain well-known cases of slavery in antiquity are taken to demonstrate the non-existence of pre-capitalist race relations. In the Roman Empire, for instance, relations were not characterised by racial antagonism: "For the norm of superiority" he writes "in the Roman system remained a cultural-class attribute".⁹ What Cox wishes to establish however is more than a straightforward temporal relationship. That racism followed capitalism or that they both appeared around the same time is barely sufficient to establish a causal link. What is necessary then is not simply to show that racism did not predate capitalism, but why certain forms of exploitation required a social attitude while

others did not. Why it was for example that certain slave systems (e.g. slave labour in the Roman Empire) pre-empted this complementary social attitude while others did not. One explanation is put forward by Cox. It does not, however, deal with the period of classical antiquity as one might expect, but examines the pre-emption of racist thought in medieval Europe. What effectively prevented its growth here were the policies of the Roman Catholic Church. Hence the division was not along racial but Christian - non-Christian lines. "There was ..." he argues ... "an effective basis for the brotherhood of peoples". Hence "in the Middle Ages, then, we find no racial antagonism in Europe".¹⁰ In this sense then Cox in part seeks to explain the presence of one set of rationalisations, racism, in terms of the presence of another, religion.

If, as it appears, an attempt is made to explain the absence of pre-capitalist racism in terms of the presence of a further set of rationalisations, it is to be expected, given the charges of economism that have been levelled against him, that a concept of economic or mode of production would be developed at some stage. The charges of economism would imply, in other words, that it was the specific character of economic forms that presupposed a philosophy of racial antipathy and given the specificity of this relationship these economic forms would be spelt out in detail. The constituent elements then of the capitalist mode of production are decisive. These elements can be seen clearly from his account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism, "Gradually, under a commercial and religious impulse, Europe began to awaken and to journey

toward strange lands",¹¹ and following shortly :

The socioeconomic matrix of racial antagonism involved the commercialization of human labour ... and ... the intense competition amongst businessmen of different Western European cities for the capitalist exploitation of resources of this area, the development of nationalism and the consolidation of European nations, and the decline of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church with its mystical inhibitions to the free exploitation of economic resources. 12.

It is on the basis then of a competitive spirit that developed among businessmen that racist thought developed.

For immediately following this Cox writes :

Racial antagonism attained full maturity during the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the great nationalistic powers of Europe began to justify their economic designs upon weaker European peoples with subtle theories of racial superiority and masterhood. 13.

The form of correspondence in the racism/capitalism thesis thus appears as the articulation of a competitive spirit and the attitudinal facilitation of its application. To arrive at the object of his analysis, race relations, it has been necessary to introduce, not one set of rationalisations, (considered misplaced, at the outset) i.e. the philosophy of racial antipathy, but to introduce two more. Race relations thus appears as a function of the existence or non-existence of racial antipathy which in turn is contingent on the primacy of a competitive over a religious spirit. The problem is now one of arriving at the level of material social facts or concrete race relations from the presence or absence of these three spirits. This is only possible on the assumption that racism or the philosophy of racial antipathy necessarily expresses itself at the level of material social facts.

He writes :

Of course one should not be particularly disturbed about the fact that, although one never had the necessity or even the thought of exploiting colored people, yet an almost irresistible bitterness seems to well up as one finds himself in certain social situations with colored people. (i.e. material social fact/race relationship J.G.). It is this very reaction which derogatory racial propaganda (i.e. rationalisation/racist philosophy of antipathy J.G.) sets out to achieve. 14.

It is only possible in point of fact to refer to such collective spirits on the assumption that they find expression in concrete observable inter-personal relationships. Hence the production of racism is conceived thus :

When white scholars began their almost desperate search of the ancient archives for good reasons to explain the wonderful cultural accomplishments among the whites, European economic and military world dominance was already an actuality. 15.

And likewise the conflict between the three world spirits finds expression in the conflict between two individuals Les Casas and Sepulveda, the one an embodiment of the religious, the other the capitalist/racist world spirits. History thus appears for Cox as the unfolding relation of one idea and another and the contradictions between them. Racism thus becomes the resolution of one such contradiction involving the religious and competitive spirit of capitalism, the former precluding the development of a further set of ideas, racism, while the latter required them to flourish. Materialism thus presupposes the rooting of these contradictions in interpersonal relationships and one such conflict thus expresses itself at an individual level in the Valladolid debate. Cox's account, however, of the

conditions under which racism arose, reproduces, at a certain level of generality, the predominant positions within neo-Marxist theory in so far as they presuppose that ideological forms reflect mechanically transformations at base level (with the proviso that in the absence of any specification of these forms the latter are themselves in the case of Cox, contingent on transformations at an ideal level). Hence the essence/phenomenon or base/superstructure arguments may be found not only with respect to the production of racist thought during the slavery/capitalism period developed in particular in the work of Harris¹⁶ and Williams¹⁷, and during late nineteenth century capitalism or imperialism,¹⁸ but also in analyses of contemporary social structures. Wolpe, for instance, in his examination of racism in South Africa refers to the bending of racial prejudice to meet economic and political exigencies,¹⁹ and Nikolinakos²⁰ refers to racism as the mechanism produced by the capitalist system to serve specific needs.²¹ The concept of economic in each case may be developed to a lesser or greater extent but the fundamental relationship posed in each case with respect to the genesis of racist thought remains the same.²²

In so far as they reproduce this argument they not only effectively denegate the relative autonomy of political and ideological structures (these can only reflect something in the economy) but in attempting to reconstruct a social totality solely in terms of some aspect of the production process, they consistently fail to produce the mechanism through which specific economic forms have their necessary effects in

overcome
mechanistic

ideological and political structures. In the absence of such a mechanism, the individual is held responsible for translating economic form into political/ideological content. 'Conspiratorial' or 'clique' explanations of the production of racist ideology, as we saw in the case of Cox, have become a widespread feature of the field. This is particularly true of recent attempts to conceive racism as the product of a deliberate and consciously contrived effort on the part of capital to 'divide and rule' the working class.²³ The illustrations of industrial conflict in the previous section, in particular the attitude of trade unions and indigenous labour to discriminatory conditions of work, is taken as evidence of the successful effects of such a policy. Racism in this sense is identified in terms of its effects which are then assumed responsible for its production. The concept of race thus appears not as a necessary function of certain economic laws, which are consequently seen to be responsible for real economic categories, but rather a deliberate attempt to weaken and fragment the working class through the production of utterly false biological/genetic criteria for differentiation.²⁴

It is to certain of these problems that Genovese addresses himself and it is to his contribution to race theory that it is now necessary to turn.

In particular what is significant in this respect is his attempt to overcome the economism, or the 'mechanistic materialism' of Marxian interpretations of the development of race relations in the New World. In so far as his work

attempts to overcome these problems it may be seen, at least initially, as an advance in neo-Marxist race theory. Though his comments in this context are directed towards Harris' work they are equally applicable to Cox and other race theorists referred to above.

His point of departure is the holistic approach of Tannenbaum whose comparative analysis provided the possibility, he argues, of a more profound analysis of slavery and race relations and the dynamics of the transition from slavery to freedom.²⁵ Harris too, whose work is a political response to Tannenbaum, adopts such a position.²⁶ For Genovese:

the argument has been joined on two levels: on such specific questions as the ... degree of paternalism in the social system, and the daily treatment of slaves; and on such general questions of method and philosophy as reflect the age-old struggle between idealist and materialist viewpoints. 27.

The first set of questions and indeed its relation to the second, will be dealt with shortly. What is significant at present is Genovese's attempt to synthesise materialist and idealist viewpoints and in so doing construct a complex totality in the place of Cox's and Harris' mechanistic assumptions, since herein lies his popularity with Marxists and non-Marxists in history and sociology.

To recapitulate briefly the terms of the debate ^R Race relations²⁸ in the New World for materialists on the one hand like Cox, Williams, and Harris, are contingent on the level of capitalist development. Idealists, on the other hand, seek to distinguish the institutional background of the enslaving nations. † In this respect the paternalism/catholicism and slave tradition

of the Iberian colonists is distinguished from the liberal/secularised Anglo-Saxon experience without a slave tradition. It is the cumulative effects of these institutional features which, the idealists argue, are responsible for race relations in North and South America. These, the arguments run, are responsible for the savage and barbarous relations on the northern plantations by comparison with those in Latin America where the religious background of the Iberians enable them to take account of the moral personality of the slaves in their dealings with them. The institutional features, consequently, were also responsible ultimately for the relatively peaceful manumission period in the latter, in comparison with the North American experience.

Genovese attempts a synthesis of these viewpoints at a level of abstraction that will be reconstructed here. He writes :

Harris, by attempting to construct a materialism that bypasses the ideological and psychological elements in the formation of social classes, passes over into a variant of vulgar Marxism. In so doing, he ranges himself much further away from a consistent and useful materialism than do the idealists themselves. 29.

And to substantiate this he writes :

What Harris's materialism, in contradistinction to Marxian materialism, fails to realise is that once an ideology arises it alters profoundly the material reality and in fact becomes a partially autonomous feature of that reality. 30.

It is on the basis of this challenge to Harris which may be generalised to other similar positions as it has been suggested, that Genovese attempts to construct his conception of a complex social totality; in some respects in the way

Mintz,³¹ Finley³² and Noel³³ do elsewhere in the field.

Consequently, Genovese, in citing Prado's contribution to the field, writes :

the material basis of life and especially the class relationships provided room for it (racism) to breathe, but, given this room, it seriously affected that basis and those relationships. 34.

The concession then Genovese makes to idealists like Tannenbaum is that the past, in terms of its religious, legal and moral essence or spirit has some effectivity in the present. Classes have traditionally formed values and sentiments as well as particular interests, moral, aesthetic, religious as well as economic.

Such an analysis (of classes) must recognize the sociological uniqueness of every social class as the product of a configuration of economic interests, a semi-autonomous culture, and a particular world outlook; and it must recognize the historical uniqueness of these classes as the product of the evolution of that culture and world outlook in relation to, but not wholly subordinate to, these economic interests. 35.

It is, in terms of the debate, both the level of capitalist development and the complex historical experience of the enslaving colonists that are responsible for New World race relations. To be precise, it is the intervention of the institutional background of the enslavers which affects the level of capitalist development and subsequently race relations. At one level then, race relations appear as a complex determinate product of a multiplicity of forces. At another level however, they appear in a somewhat different form, and such a form is made possible on the basis of a certain reading of Gramsci for, as Genovese writes, it was he who recognised

that :

Lenin was the man who revitalized Marxism by purging it of determinism and economism, by restoring the element of will and by grasping the role of consciousness. 36.

In asserting the role of 'consciousness' and 'will' Genovese seemingly moves from a position wherein the totality is a product of complex determinations to one that rejects all forms of determinism including economism. The concept of class, at one level a product of complex determinations, is at another level, hardly worth the name until it has attained 'self consciousness'.³⁷ From a position which attempts to analyse race relations (i.e. the treatment of slaves, manumission etc.) as a complex synthesis of ideational (religious, legal, aesthetic, moral etc.) as well as material forces, we have effectively moved via an assault on economism to a rejection of all forms of determinism be they in the form of historically formed traditions or a complex articulation of forces and relations of production. This explicit form of reductionism produces a concept of totality where "every historical event", he writes, "necessarily embraces the totality of its components, each of which brings to that event the product of its total historical development",³⁸ a totality that confounds a multiplicity of extraneous determinations with an assertion of individual autonomy. The synthesis thus is made possible through a reduction of the concept of complex totality wherein each element in the structure is an expression of the will and consciousness of, in this case, master and slave. It is this relationship that remains consistently throughout his work the essence through

which all the elements express themselves. He writes :

In economic experience, as in the psychology of the leading strata, the relationship of master to slave proved decisive: it set limits to labor productivity, the flexibility of organization, the growth of the home market, and the accumulation of capital. It determined, in essential respects, the sensibilities of those who could and did place their imprint on society. 39.

From a position which attempted a complex synthesis of an analysis of the institutional background of the enslavers and the level of capitalist production, Genovese has effectively discarded both, a point no better exemplified than in Roll Jordan Roll, his latest contribution to the field. 40. He writes :

The task of those who would confront Freyre's idealism with a convincing materialism is to account for the complexity of societies in their historical uniqueness and for the special manifestations of the human spirit embodied in each such society. 41.

The concept of complex totality comprising a number of relatively autonomous levels each with its own degree of effectivity and its own conditions of existence, is ultimately abandoned in favour of an expressive/idealist totality where any autonomy once conferred is now reduced to the realm of consciousness expressed in the master/slave relationship.

2. Pre- and Post-Capitalist Forms of Racist Thought.

The task so far then has been to examine two attempts to conceptualise racism in neo-Marxist theory. Without as yet developing any substantive arguments with respect to the content of racism itself nor as yet developing its relationship to racialist political practice, the arguments have hitherto been concerned with reconstructing in general terms the status

of racism vis a vis a concept of economic on the one hand and a concept of complex totality on the other.

The arguments so far presented then, rest on certain pre-suppositions concerning the status of a general concept of ideology that may be elaborated to positions elsewhere in race theory. In other words the structure of Cox's and Genovese's argument could and would be reproduced regardless of the specific content of the ideological form under discussion. In some senses then, we have been concerned only with problems at that level, irrespective of substantive questions raised with respect to the concept of racism and racialist forms of political practice. These will now be considered.

The specificity of racism in capitalism, the essence of neo-Marxist theories of racism, presupposes that pre-capitalist forms of racist thought were not in point of fact racist and furthermore that the internal constituent elements of racist ideology have remained constant since their inception. What apparently distinguishes the racism associated with slavery/capitalism is its concern with human taxonomy on the basis of biomental characteristics that are said to be responsible for certain moral qualities.⁴² What then distinguished pre- from post-capitalist forms of racist thought? Very simply it was, according to Cox, the emphasis on the cultural/class attribute generally referred to as ethnocentrism which was responsible for the Greek and Roman contempt of barbarians, for instance, and in turn the Roman

contempt of Greeks.⁴³ Ethnocentrism here refers to the identification of oneself with one's own people (on the basis of cultural/national criteria) as against the rest of mankind. Similarly the period following the decline and fall of Rome, writes Puzzo :

... found Germans and Romano-Celts under the single rule of various Germanic kings and princelings, but living apart, each people abiding by its own laws and seeking to preserve its own customs ... However, the motivations which underlay these policies were not even remotely racist but ethnocentric. 44.

The special or unique characteristics of racism in the slavery/capitalism period and since appears to be its focus on fixed biomental types and not transitory cultural differentiation. What is interesting in view of this assumption with respect to the internal forms of racist thought is the use Sepulveda makes of congenital superiority or innate biomental inferiority in his apologia of slavery. This debate with Las Casas at Valladolid marked the destruction, according to Cox, of the religious and prompted the rise of the capitalist world spirit and its complementary social attitude. In view of this, it is surprising to find Sepulveda taking the view that the Indians

require, by their own nature and in their own interests, to be placed under the authority of civilized and virtuous princes or nations, so that they may learn, from the might, wisdom and law of their conquerors, to practise better morals, worthier customs and a more civilized way of life. 45.

To strengthen his pro-slavery argument, Sepulveda borrows terms from the ethnocentrists of classical antiquity and elsewhere the Aristotalian principle of natural slavery, and contrary to the implications of the thesis, does not refer to

any biogenetic rationale for their servitude. And if this were not sufficient to demonstrate the poignancy of pre-capitalist forms of thought in Sepulveda's arguments, he lends weight to it with the assistance of certain Augustinian principles.^{46.}

This is not to suggest that racism, in contradistinction to these arguments, prompted slavery, but rather to identify problems entailed in attempts to extricate a unitary concept of racism relevant only to the modern era. Noel himself has pointed out that there are several disputes within race theory on the question of racism's temporal specificity, even after the early period of the Conquistadors. (Puzzo locates its appearance around this early period, while Rose considers it appears post 1800 and van den Berghe locates it in post-Darwinian thought).^{47.}

Though attempts have been made to differentiate racism on the basis of its pseudo-scientific character and the relative intensity of its popular dissemination, its internal structure has since undergone transformations and the use of these biogenetic arguments have themselves, it has been argued by some, been displaced. Fanon writes for instance :

The vulgar, primitive, over-simple racism purported to find in biology, ... the material basis of the doctrine ... such affirmations ... give way to a more refined argument ... This racism that aspires to be rational, individual, genotypically and phenotypically determined, becomes transformed into cultural racism.^{48.}

Likewise, in a recent article on South African apartheid, Wolpe writes the rationale for Bantustan policy has shifted from biological arguments to a concentration on ethnic

differences. The Bantustans are there now to preserve the "cultural treasure of a people".⁴⁹ In terms of the internal content of racist thought not only would this appear to question the specificity of its biogenetic character but it would also create problems for attempting to isolate the ethnocentric or cultural racism of classical antiquity.⁵⁰

3. Racism and Racialism.

The arguments so far presented have sought to establish that some formal relationship may be established between capitalism or capitalism/slavery and racist thought. The arguments presuppose certain formal relationships are present with respect to all ideational structures and their corresponding mode(s) of production. Posing the problem in this way avoids, to some extent, the question of the necessity of particular ideational structures e.g. racist thought. When such problems are confronted they generally conceive racism in the form of a rationale or justification for certain forms of political/economic practice, which are then referred to as racialist. There is a tendency then in such arguments to presuppose that a multiplicity of political/economic practices termed racialist are necessary effects of a philosophy of racial antipathy. In view of this, the specific nature of the object of racist ideology, i.e. what it is precisely in capitalism that requires racism, merits attention.

In this respect there are two sets of arguments that need to be distinguished. The first asserts that capitalism requires stratification on racial lines (on the basis of certain economic/technological exigencies). In these arguments



races are reduced to classes or fractions of a class. Nikolinakos, for instance, attempts to argue along these lines. In this sense there are real race relations born of economic necessity. (These arguments were discussed in the previous section). Accompanying these real relations is an attitudinal facilitation of their application, racism.

The second set of arguments suggests that capitalism/ slavery requires racism to justify certain forms of political practice (the Jim Crow laws, laws affecting terms of residence of European migrants and those restricting access to certain facilities, for example). In the arguments presented and in others there appears a confounding of both economic forms and political practices. In the original debate, for instance, this derives in part from the precise status of slavery. Consequently it is not clear whether or not racism is intended to uphold the legal status of slaves, their daily treatment (the type of regime e.g. paternalistic) or the specific form of appropriation of a surplus product.⁵¹ Likewise in subsequent attempts to establish racism's specificity in various other forms of exploitation, it is unclear whether or not it is the specific form of appropriation or a multitude of political practices associated with it that it seeks to facilitate. Such diverse political practices range from the daily treatment of slaves in the New World, the attempted extermination of Jews and gypsies by the National Socialists, through the South African nationalist policy for Bantustan self-development, and the legal status of migrants in contemporary Western Europe. To depict these multifarious

forms of political practice as racialist is possible only on the assumption that each is a necessary function of a philosophy of racial antipathy. This antipathy is required, it is argued, to facilitate these acts of racialism. The problem involved in establishing such a relationship is evident when it comes to distinguishing racialist from non-racialist policies. Such a distinction is made on the basis of an accompanying philosophy of racial antipathy i.e. racism. Likewise, the presence of racism is established on the basis of its expression in certain forms of racialist practice. Attempts to establish much beyond a circular relationship are made harder for those like Noel who attempt to argue that the two, i.e. racism and racialism are independent of each other.^{52.}

There remains one further problem arising from the content of racist ideology itself and concerns the possibility, given its biogenetic content, of depicting what can only be regarded as classic racialist forms as racialist. Two such cases would be those of the Bantustan self-help ideology and the present legal status of the Gastarbeiters, both of which notably lack any reference whatever to biogenetic arguments. Its absence in these instances implies certain problems, both with respect to attempts to isolate the biogenetic aspects of racist ideology and to refer to the disparate political practices as racialist.

This is by no means to suggest that specific ideological forms, for instance those developed in psychometrics,^{53.} can and

do not have specific effects (i.e. policies for segregated education). Under certain conditions it may be felt politically necessary from the objectives of Marxist political practice to challenge such arguments. But this is a distinct problem which will be developed in the conclusion. It is not one to be confused with attempts to reduce specific political practices to the expressions of specific ideas and then, on the basis of identifying these ideas (racism) with their expression (racialism), attempt to establish the latter as a necessary function of the former.

Summary.

This discussion then, in conclusion, has addressed itself to three sets of problems in particular with respect to neo-Marxist theories of racism. In the first instance it dealt with certain presuppositions concerning the racism/capitalism (or slavery within capitalism) thesis that may be generalised to attempts to locate racism elsewhere (in late nineteenth century and contemporary capitalism). Such positions examined here presupposed a certain formal relationship present with respect to racism and a concept of economic or mode of production. It is the precise nature of this relationship that prompts differences within neo-Marxism. Cox and those briefly mentioned in connection with the general position formulated here, reproduce the relationship in terms of super-structural or phenomenal expressions of transformations at base level. What was suggested with respect to Cox was that the concept of the economy itself was reconstituted at an ideal level. Genovese, to his credit, attempted to replace

this mechanistic form of relationship by conferring a degree of autonomy on the ideological and political instances. What he confounds with respect to autonomous ideological and political structures is a notion of human autonomy. In point of fact it has been suggested a complex articulation of ideological and material structures is likely, if anything, to reduce such autonomy. As it transpires the assertion of autonomy at the level of the individual, on the contrary, reduces a concept of complex totality to a totality where such instances are autonomous in so far as they are lived and acted out in the consciousness of the individual, in Senovese's case the master and the slave.

In part 1. then the concept was examined in terms of the content of the specific arguments presented. In parts 2. and 3. it was developed in terms of certain substantive implications of the racism capitalism/slavery thesis. In part 2. the concept was developed in terms of the internal constituent elements of racist ideology. In particular it examined these in terms of the distinctions made between capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of racist thought and recent internal transformations at the level of the ideology itself. What was argued here was that these latter transformations not only appear to challenge the specificity of the biogenetic character of racist thought, but create difficulties in distinguishing these from certain forms of ethnocentric or cultural racism in classical antiquity.


The third set of problems raised concerns the ambiguous

nature of the object of racist ideology. Consequently we attempted to discern what it was in particular that requires racist ideology. Attempts were made to distinguish economic forms and certain forms of political practice both of which have presupposed a philosophy of racial antipathy. It has, however, been argued that the ambiguous content of the object of racist ideology is part of a more fundamental problem: namely, the assumption that whatever passes for racialist political practice is a direct expression of philosophies of racial antipathy. Not only then does the concept of racism, as was suggested in part 1, presuppose a certain concept of ideology, it furthermore presupposes a certain mechanism through which racism has had certain effects at a concrete political level. At present, the problem is resolved through identifying racism with its expression racialism. When confronted then, for instance, with the problem of assessing when racism is at its peak, the answer given is when its effects are most noticeable at a practical level. In so far as the concept of racism presupposes a general conceptualisation of ideology that has been found wanting in this discussion, an adequate formulation of this particular problem cannot hope to be reached via the concepts of race and racism themselves.

At this point it is necessary to reiterate a distinction made earlier and one that is likely to prove a possible source of confusion in the interpretation of this argument. In the first instance certain tendencies (e.g. the ratio of variable to constant capital, the fall in the rate of profit) have been held responsible for, amongst other things,

competition between the various fractions of capital, the necessity of reinforced exploitation and the production of a surplus population. These were examined in Section I. Regardless of their own effectiveness there remains the problem for race theory of establishing why racial categories necessarily constitute the basis of either fractional disputes between capital (Nikolinakos), the product of reinforced exploitation (Castells), or a surplus population (Baran and Sweezy, Allen, Legassick). There is nothing, it has been suggested, in the economy itself to establish the racial basis for differentiation. Hence the racial dimension may only be superimposed from without. This problem of shifting from one level to another has indeed proved a stumbling block for neo-Marxist theories of race. By starting with the economy however, as most do, there is only one possible form of relationship that can be established. It is precisely this form of expressivism that predominates attempts in this field to locate the concept of racism; and expressivism that must reduce ideologies and political structures to mere artifacts of the economy.


Fig. (i.) For Cox et al. The social totality would be conceived thus :



(With the proviso that in Cox's case the economic itself is constituted in the realm of consciousness. Consequently any


attempt to delineate precisely each of these levels is out of the question).

Fig. (iia). In the case of Genovese, at the outset, the relationship is conceived thus :



(ideology/politics remain consistently in this realm).

Fig.(ii b)). Ultimately this gives way to :



(Ideas, values, embodied in the master/slave relationship).

Consequently, as with Cox, the social totality is reduced here to the realm of ideas and values and its complexity thereby effectively denied.

Economic exigencies necessitate real economic categories. The production of myths about human classification i.e. racist ideology thus serve to rationalise any form of discrimination, be it economic or political. The problems raised with respect to this analysis so far concern :

i) The economic argument itself e.g. the necessary production of a surplus population.

ii) The transposition from economic to racial categories.

What the deficiencies of these arguments suggest is that if we are to achieve a satisfactory resolution of these concepts of race and racism, then clearly they must be seen as primarily the product of ideological practices that subsequently intervene at the level of political practice and the economy. The latter themselves impose limitations on the scope of racist ideology but can in no way be held responsible in the first instance for its production. In so far as the latter has been attempted, the effort of extricating a unique ideational structure (unique in terms of its specificity vis a vis a particular mode of production) has appeared a somewhat contrived theoretical operation, and contrived too, it has been suggested, with respect to the internal structure of ideas termed racist, where there appears no logical basis for differentiation, and to the multifarious forms of political/economic practice termed racialist that are considered necessary expressions of this philosophy of racial antipathy.

The effects of these theoretical positions will be developed in the next section when the theoretical/ideological content of specific political groups will be discussed.

Notes.

1. R. Benedict, Race and Racism, p. 97.
2. D.L. Noel 'Slavery and the Rise of Racism' in The Origins of American Slavery and Racism, ed. D.L. Noel, p. 155.
3. The work of O.C. Cox has been selected primarily because of its popularity and influence, often cited as the Marxist text in the field. Castles and Kosack, for instance, refer to it as "this superb work of Marxist

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scholarship ... recommended to anyone interested in racialism" in 'The function of labour immigration in Western European capitalism', p. 16, note 47.

4. This has been referred to by M. Freedman as 'the 1492 School of Race Relations', cited by M. Banton, 'Sociology and Race Relations', p. 5. Banton's use of this to depict all Marxists in this way is misleading for a number of reasons. In particular, as we shall see, it overlooks the differences between 'Marxists' over the role of capitalism in race relations, and indeed the controversy surrounding the precise date of its ascendancy.
5. F. Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen.
6. S. Elkins, Slavery.
7. O.C. Cox, Caste, Class and Race, p. 321.
8. Ibid, p. 322.
9. Ibid, p. 324.
10. Ibid, p. 326.
11. Ibid, p. 326.
12. Ibid, p. 330.
13. Ibid, p. 330.
14. Ibid, p. 336, note 25.
15. Ibid, p. 331.
16. M. Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas.
17. E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, ch. 1.
18. See for instance B. Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform, where he attempts to develop the origins of racism, and related to this, nationalism, in terms of the growing threat of proletarian Internationalism. The various social reform movements in the latter part of the nineteenth century may be seen as an outcome of the need to "draw all classes together in defence of the nation", p. 24. Improvements in the conditions of the working class demanded by certain leftist organisations must be seen in this light. Hence "Blatchford was a 'socialist' in that he wished to improve the condition of the working class but, it would seem, this so that England might be made stronger in struggling with foreign enemies". Ibid, p. 232. See also V.G. Kiernan, Marxism and Imperialism, pp. 102-103, and C. Vann Woodward's account of the northern capitulation to southern racism in view of her own adventurist policies in the Pacific and Carribean: "As America shouldered the White Man's Burden, she took up at the same time many southern attitudes on the subject of race", so that according to one senator "No Republican leader ... will now dare to wave the bloody shirt and preach a crusade against

the South's treatment of the negro. The North has a bloody shirt of its own". C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, pp. 72-73. The impetus of Darwin's "Origin of Species" in this context has been argued by R. Hofstadter in Social Darwinism in American Thought, although Darwin himself, it has been suggested elsewhere, cannot be held responsible for the consequences of his work; "It was not Darwin's fault that the extermination of "lower races" became part of the imperialist creed, the excuse being that on social Darwinist principles their disappearance from the face of the earth proved their unfitness to inhabit its fairer portions". G. Lichtheim, Imperialism, p. 85.

19. Wolpe here is attempting to locate the source of racial antipathy, not the role of Blacks, in the development of capitalist/pre-capitalist modes of production. H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa', op. cit.
20. M. Nikolinakos, 'Notes on an Economic Theory of Racism', op. cit.
21. These arguments may be seen to reproduce certain other attempts within neo-Marxism to conceive certain forms of academic race relations as the product of bourgeois ideology, see for instance, R. Jenkins, 'The production of knowledge at the Institute of Race Relations' and J. McGreal and P. Corrigan, 'Ideology in Colour and Citizenship'.
22. This is certainly true of the writers on imperialism. While these theories themselves have come increasingly under pressure from within Marxism, the appearance of racism in each remains essentially the same. The task is to examine, on the basis of a greater or lesser elaborated concept of the economy, the non-economic superstructure which grows up on the basis of finance capital - its politics and ideology stimulating the struggle for colonial conquest, V. Lenin, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism.
23. See P. Cinnani, 'The Backgrounds of Migration Labour', op. cit., p. 34. The 'divide and rule' thesis is by no means confined to Cinnani's paper, but constitutes a consistent feature of neo-Marxist interpretations of racist ideology.
24. In addition to racism, various nationalist and chauvinist ideologies have been treated in a similar way.
25. F. Tannenbaum, op. cit.
26. M. Harris, op. cit.
27. E. Genovese, In Red and Black, op. cit., p. 24.
28. 'Race Relations' viewed here as negro-white relations on the plantation (involving a consideration of such aspects as the degree of paternalism) are contingent on the extent of racist ideology. Hence materialists view

racist ideology (and subsequently race relations) as a function of the level of capitalist development. Idealists view racism and subsequently race relations as, in part, a function of certain institutional features in the enslaving nations.

29. E. Genovese, op. cit., p. 47.
30. Ibid, p. 32.
31. S. Mintz, 'Slavery and Emergent Capitalisms' in Slavery in the New World: A Reader in Comparative History, eds. L. Foner and E.D. Genovese. "Elkins ... like Tannenbaum, circumvents critical evidence on the interplay of economic and ideological forces. It is a historical mistake to treat slavery in Latin America as a single social phenomenon", p. 30.
32. M. Finley, 'The Idea of Slavery: Critique of D.B. Davis', in Slavery in the New World, eds. L. Foner and E.D. Genovese. "The connection between slavery and racism has been a dialectical one, in which each element reinforced the other", p. 261.
33. D.L. Noel, op. cit., p. 154. "Reciprocal causation is a common feature of the sociocultural world, but this does not mean that variables involved are necessarily, or even generally, of equal causal significance. The problem is to determine the primary direction of the causal linkage and the degree of onesidedness in the relationship".
34. E. Genovese, op. cit., p. 35.
35. Ibid, p. 324. For an analagous discussion of the relationship between class and race, see E.D. Genovese The World the Slaveholders Made, Part One, ch. 3.
36. Ibid, pp. 392-393.
37. To be precise, Genovese writes "one of his most striking ideas was that a class is hardly worth the name until it comes to self-consciousness - an idea that veers dangerously close to idealism and that nonetheless is hard to turn aside", *ibid*, p. 396.
38. Ibid, p. 43.
39. Ibid, p. 46.
40. E. Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll. Here he writes "If I have tried to present the slaveholders not as monsters but as human beings my intention has hardly been to spare them condemnation for their crimes. They commanded and profited from an evil social system" (Emphasis added), p. xvi, and from the point of view of the slaves "no theoretical advance suggested in their experience could ever deserve as much attention as that demanded by their demonstration of the beauty and power of the human spirit under conditions of extreme oppression".. *Ibid*.

41. E. Genovese, In Red and Black, op. cit., p. 43.
42. R. Benedict, op. cit., p. 97. See also C.T. Jonassen, 'Some Historical and Theoretical Bases of Racism in North Western Europe', op. cit., p. 155.
43. See A.N. Sherwin-White, Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome, chs. 1 and 3.
44. D.A. Puzzo, 'Racism and the Western Tradition', p. 581. For further evidence of early forms of racist thought, see W.D. Jordan, White over Black, Part One, and D.B. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture.
45. Cited by L. Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World, p. 47.
46. Ibid, p. 52.
47. D.L. Noel, op. cit., pp. 161-163.
48. F. Fanon, Towards the African Revolution, p. 42.
49. The Minister of Bantu Affairs and Development de Wet Wel, Hansard 1959, Col. 6018, cited by H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa', op. cit., p.451. He adds "what all this amounts to, as one writer has expressed it, is 'racialism without racism'".
50. On the general proposition, S. Allen writes "Earlier assumptions of psycho-genetic differences have been gradually replaced by beliefs in environmentally induced differences". S. Allen, 'The Institutionalisation of Racism', p. 100.
51. For an extended discussion of this distinction see B. Hindess and P.Q. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, pp. 109 ff.
52. "Racism, ethnocentrism, prejudice, and discrimination are not only analytically independent, they are often empirically independent also". D.L. Noel, op. cit., p. 160.
53. See above Part One Section II.

III. The Race/Class Question in Contemporary National Liberation and Socialist Programmes.

In this section we shall be concerned primarily with the appearance of the race concept in the programmes of specific political organisations in Western Europe, the United States, and South Africa. In doing so it will establish the theoretical conditions for the existence of what has come to be referred to as the 'race/class' debate in political analysis, for this has clearly dominated these programmes.

One of the most vexing problems, at both the theoretical and practical levels, with which persons involved in this struggle (for freedom from colonialism and race prejudice) have to deal, is the question of the relative weights which should be assigned to the rival factors of race and class. 1.

These conditions may be specified in terms of certain theoretical presuppositions developed in Sections I and II of this examination of the race concept in neo-Marxist theory. If the discussion appears to remain at a level of abstraction removed from any form of conjunctural analysis, this is often because the theoretical content of these selected programmes has been pitched at this level. Attempts to resolve the 'race/class' debate in principle, regardless of the practicalities of specific situations, remains an ubiquitous feature of these programmes. Both 'class' and 'race' analyses² which constitute the theoretical basis for the two contending parties in the debate entail certain political consequences. These, however, can only be investigated seriously in the light of a fuller investigation of each of the

various levels of what have been referred to as the 'relations of force' in a given situation.³ Nevertheless it may be tentatively suggested that the adherence to this debate in principle has coincided with a range of political consequences that can be seen to be at odds with the objectives of the organisations concerned and certainly at odds with the principles of Marxist and Leninist political theory to which many of these organisations express allegiance.⁴

The task of this section then is twofold. The first is to pose the theoretical conditions for the appearance of the race/class debate in political analysis. This is clearly part of the overall theoretical discussion of the race concept. The level of abstraction here however is not to be confused with that entertained by those (like James for instance) engaged in the 'race/class' debate. On the contrary in the context of a specifically political analysis, this level of abstraction will be seen to be quite misplaced without engaging in a full conjunctural analysis itself. The second objective will consequently be to raise some of the problems entailed in adhering rigidly to the theoretical axioms of the debate in question.

Illustrations will be taken from each of the three case studies referred to in section I. In the case of Western Europe the recent challenge from the editors of The Black Liberator discussion Journal to various factions (in particular the Race Today Collective) will introduce the general terms of the debate. In the case of the United States the 'separatist/

integrationist' division is crucial and the position of the Black Panther party is of particular interest in this respect. Finally in the South African case the 'race/class' question may be developed via an examination of the African National Congress and its relation to the Pan African Congress and other radical organisations.

1. Western Europe.

Clearly the politicisation of the race concept in Western Europe in all its variant forms requires an analysis that transcends the scope of this discussion. The objectives here are considerably more modest. In particular it will be concerned specifically to illustrate some of the theoretical tendencies elaborated in Sections I and II as they manifest themselves in the content of the various programmes and the principles of certain radical organisations. The two selected for these purposes are concerned specifically with the race issue in British politics, and serve to introduce the contributions of two Black organisations through the columns of their journals. We have selected for these purposes the Race Today Collective and The Black Liberator's political critique and proposals for a seemingly radical alternative programme.

In the opening editorial of the 'new' Race Today,⁵

Darcus Howe wrote :

Our task is to record and recognise the struggles of the emerging forces as manifestations of the revolutionary potential of the black population ... Race Today opens its pages to the tendency which seeks to give theoretical clarification to independent grass roots self-activity with a view to furthering its development. (Emphasis added). 6.

The Journal thus conceived itself from the outset as a recorder of the revolutionary potential amongst the 'Black' population, for this group alone can provide a 'knowledge' of its own position. The Journal cites Marx's 'A Worker's Enquiry',

We hope to meet in this work with the support of all workers in town and country who understand that they alone can describe with full knowledge the misfortunes from which they suffer and ... an exact and positive knowledge of the conditions in which the working class ... works and moves. (Emphasis in Race Today). 7.

The sort of 'grass-roots self-activity' the Journal has sought to clarify has covered a wide range of 'conflict' situations. Indeed any Black-White confrontation may be regarded as evidence of this potential. In the above issue, for instance, it was the

section of the working class ... involved in successive strike actions in the past five years which now threaten to develop into a cohesive and powerful mass movement of Asian workers. 8.

The elaboration of the role of Blacks in the economy, their struggles with management, unions and fellow White employees has been referred to above. The role of Asian workers has been characterised in a similar way in Race Today.

Employing a handful of workers herded together in filthy sweatshop conditions, set in motion by outdated machinery, workers are kept at heel by Dickensian management and a wage differential which encourages merciless competition between individual black workers ... To distinguish between these working conditions and those of larger factories with modern production process is to grasp the very complex relations between white and black workers... 9.

Each section or particularity in this struggle (at 'the point of production') is given individual coverage. In the case of Black women for instance, Burt and Hasson write :

Since January 1974 the editorial policy of Race Today has registered a complete break with those who seek to negate the particularity of the black women's position for some 'larger struggle'. 10.

The struggle, however, is not confined to 'sections' in the economy. The range of 'conflict situations' discussed in Race Today transcends the work setting. In the case of crime committed by unemployed Black youth, Race Today seeks to reproduce individual cases as integral features of the class struggle.

We in Race Today do not deny that there is an increase in street crime committed by young blacks. We will say why this is so, and in the process expose the sides in this crucial arena of class struggle and finally state what our position is. 11.

Crime however, cannot be understood independently of the work situation of Blacks. While juvenile delinquency then is a crucial 'arena' of class struggle,¹² it can only be understood in terms of the role of Blacks in the economy.

We in Race Today stand openly with the refusers of work ... we see the mugging activity as a manifestation of powerlessness; a consequence of being without a wage. 13.

The theoretical conditions that provide the possibility of this position will be elaborated below. As far as the Journal is concerned, one of the most explicit illustrations of its theoretical tendencies appears in the issue one year after the 'new' Race Today was first published :

for us, it is clear that the working class is mercilessly divided; divided by the capitalist division of labour ... In this hierarchy of labour each section is parcelled out according to race, sex, age and all other forms of ability and disability ... Each section is in conflict with capital, finding and discovering its own particularity, discovering differing modes of struggle, and organisation. (Emphasis added). 14.

Race Today, given these assumptions, can do no more than acknowledge sectional differences and, at the same time, their overall relationship to the capital/labour distinction

In situating ourselves in the particularity of the black struggle we cannot but recognise the different experiences within the black working class itself, the different levels and forms of struggle against capital ... 15.

The relationship between these particularities and labour as a whole is never explicitly developed in the Journal. Working class unity is both conceded and denied. In the same issue for instance,

Race Today seeks not to subsume one section to the other, not to pursue the hegemony of one over the other at the altar of working class or black unity, but in so far as we can in a journal, to socialise the information of each particularity for the enrichment of the whole. 16.

Clearly these remarks taken from Race Today do not suggest a well-formulated political programme. The role that it conceived for itself clearly prevents it from attempting such a task. What it does contain however are a number of presuppositions concerning the role of 'Blacks' in the capital/labour struggle that may be seen to be derived from certain positions developed in previous areas of the thesis' investigations. Furthermore these positions, which will be elaborated below, may be seen to have specific effects at the political level, or at least coincide with them. Again these 'effects' will be raised after each case study has been dealt with in turn. For the present however, we shall briefly examine one form of response to the politics of Race Today found in the Journal The Black Liberator. 17.

The reaction against Race Today may be seen as part of an elaborated attempt to assimilate "the range of responses to industrial action of the Black Masses in Britain"¹⁸, at both 'ascriptive' and 'prescriptive' levels. As regards the 'ascriptive' level of analysis, Race Today, it is claimed, effectively reduces class struggle to the capital/labour contradiction.¹⁹ The various sections of labour each possess a different relation to capital which in turn generates a different set of spontaneous responses. "This abstraction", (the modern capitalist production process) The Black Liberator writes "is then swiftly reduced to a concrete discussion about 'working conditions'".²⁰ It is precisely these latter conditions in the 'backwoods of British Industry' that, Race Today claims, generate racial strife. In 'prescriptive' terms, this manifests itself, so far as Race Today are concerned, in the "thesis of a bi-polar division of the conduct of the class struggle: 'point of production'/'community'".²¹ The joint demand for Black' caucuses at the point of production and Black political organisations in the community is a consequence,²² the editorial claims, of Race Today's economistic assumptions outlined above. The latter's economism takes three forms in practice: a struggle over wages,²³ the struggle over changes in the production process,²⁴ and a struggle to reduce the extended exploitation of Blacks.

According to The Black Liberator, Black groups including the Race Today Collective, may be considered expressions of

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'pure economism' in so far as they confuse 'radical reformism' with revolutionary politics: "The economic collapse of capitalism" will not on its own provoke the necessary overthrow of the ruling class, "The ruling class ... will fight militarily as well as politically and ideologically". (Emphasis in original).²⁵ In consequence their analysis of one strike in particular, the Standard Telephones and Cables, contrasts sharply with Race Today's coverage of similar disputes. Far from satisfying themselves with recording the struggle as one manifestation of revolutionary potential, The Black Liberator sought to point out its limitations, both in terms of its objectives and the breadth of its support.

Objectively, therefore, the position of the strikers was not strong! They were merely partially disrupting part of the production process of a large factory, (not in the backwoods, moreover, U.S.) while a racist trade union and management structure virtually sat tight and watched pressure mount on them to return to work. (Emphasis in original).²⁶

Rather than reducing the struggle to 'pure economism' and/or the restitution of democratic rights to workers, the alternative is found, according to The Black Liberator, in 'The Peoples' War' which can only be attained through a military capacity which will ensure the collapse of ideological/political as well as economic structures. Such a war can only be waged around antagonistic contradictions and on the resolution of certain concrete military problems.²⁷

Clearly the foregoing review of two Black political responses to the 'race issue' in Britain is not an attempt or even part of an attempt to provide a full conjunctural analysis of the situation in Britain/Western Europe. The

objectives here and throughout this section are limited to an examination of the effects of certain theoretical positions on the content of various political groups/organisations. In particular in this respect are the assumptions implicit in Sections I and II above. In political terms these have come to be referred to as economism on the one hand and variant forms of voluntarism and spontaneism on the other. Economism, which takes various forms at a practical level, may be seen to coincide with a reduction at a theoretical level of the social totality to an expression of the economy. 'Voluntarism', which again takes on a multitude of forms at a practical level, is an effect of a concept of action developed with reference to sociological theories of race but, as we shall see, a recurring feature of neo-Marxist theories of race. The implicit assumption here is that action through 'consciousness' is a necessary realisation of some 'revolutionary potential'.²⁸ on the part of the working class. We shall elaborate these effects with reference to Western European context below. Two points however will be raised here. The first concerns the role of economism in the columns of Race Today and the second concerns the question of a 'Peoples' War' in advanced Western democracies. The reduction of the race issue to an aspect of the capital/labour relationship does not, as The Black Liberator suggests, imply a total concentration of political resources at the point of production. On the contrary races offer one distinct particularity amongst several sections within the working class and the production process offers one possible arena amongst several for the class struggle.

Ironically then, what The Black Liberator refer to as economic assumptions at one level have been developed in conjunction with a set of prescriptive elements that retain a specific role for race analysis at a practical level. The political effects generally associated with economism have not however been reproduced in 'prescriptive' terms in the columns of Race Today. On the contrary, its assumptions concerning the role of consciousness and action appear to vindicate its 'tailist' role as an organ for Black revolutionaries.²⁹ It furthermore enables the Journal to sanction and condone all spontaneous outbursts on the assumption that each provides a very real source of revolutionary potential. In its present role as 'observer' and 'recorder' of such 'self-activity' there seems little chance of transforming what potential there is into an organisation capable of realising its objectives. This is particularly true, it may be added, if it is developed in conjunction with a somewhat contradictory set of propositions concerning the role of the economy and its implications for political practice.

Clearly then, The Black Liberator is not altogether accurate in its reproduction of the politics of Race Today. What is more significant however is not so much its political critique of various organisations concerned with the race issue, as the programme for action to take their place. It has already been suggested that specific programmes can only be discussed in the context of a fuller analysis which cannot be attempted here. Such an analysis is barely necessary

however to indicate the impracticabilities of the slogan 'Peoples' War' other than in the Chinese context for which it was intended. The abstraction of political slogans such as these at this level of analysis, i.e. at the level of specific conjunctures, may be seen at a theoretical level to be at odds with classical Marxist - Leninist theory,^{30.} and at a practical level, nothing less than Utopian, given the ideological and political conditions present in contemporary Britain and indeed in most advanced Western democracies.

2. United States.

The United States illustrates better than most, perhaps, the embodiment of the race/class debate in the theoretical content of Black political groups and certain radical White organisations. The advocates of separatism, on the one hand, (both internal separatism within the United States and external separatism entailing some form of repatriation) have vigorously, though not always consistently, opposed those who favour a straightforward incorporation within the indigenous White working class. There are differences too in the precise nature of the form of integration sought after. Hence in general terms again we see the appearance in radical politics of attempts to establish 'race' on the one hand as an integral component of organisation and programme and on the other an attempt to reduce it to class analysis.

The controversy surrounding this debate is by no means a recent phenomenon in the United States, indeed it extends back well into the last century to the American Civil War.^{31.}

Many of the assumptions contained in the work of recent separatist or quasi-separatist organisations are to be found in the work of Du Bois whose position is seen as a challenge to that developed in Booker T. Washington's Atlanta Compromise.^{32.} In a paper on the Conservation of Races he writes :

Nevertheless, in our calmer moments we must acknowledge that human beings are divided into races, that in this country the two most extreme types of the world's races have met, and the resulting problem as to the future relations of these types is not only of intense and living interest to us, but forms an epoch in the history of mankind 33.

and later :

the final word of science, so far, is that we have at least two, perhaps three, great families of human beings - the Whites and Negroes, possibly the yellow race. 34.

If the basis for differentiation in the first instance is biological there are associated characteristics that each of these families, types or races, possess.

(A race) is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses ... striving ... for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life. 35.

If these ideals, unique to each race that holds them, are to be realised then certain consequences necessarily follow.

As a race we must strive by race organization, by race solidarity, by race unity For the accomplishment of these ends we need race organizations: Negro colleges, Negro newspapers, Negro business organizations, a Negro school of literature and art (etc.). 36.

On the basis of certain hallowed assumptions taken from physical anthropology, Du Bois sought certain forms of internal separation with respect to the organisation of Black solidarity. These assumptions he shared in common with

Garvey. What he did not share were the latter's convictions with respect to external (i.e. outside the United States) organisation. "There were", Garvey surmises "different races, each having its own separate and distinct social life".³⁷ If the purity of races was conceded, ideals referred to by Du Bois could only be realised according to Garvey in "a country of their own where they should be given the fullest opportunity to develop politically, socially and industrially".³⁸ It is interesting to note in this respect not only Garvey's alliance with the Ku Klux Klan in his Back to Africa campaign, a consequence of a general assumption of Black nationalism that will be developed later, but in particular here, the challenge to the Back to Africa movement made by Randolph. In certain ways this resembles similar arguments used against more recent Black power organisations, in particular those aimed at the Utopianism of some of their objectives. Hence, according to Randolph, to conquer Africa would prove no less problematic than taking on Europe³⁹ and consequently he stressed the lack of capital and means of communication available to potential repatriates. "The issue" he wrote "is not race, color, or nationality, but economics ... Thus the problem consists in overthrowing capitalism". (Emphasis in original). 40.

Here then in embryonic form are the essential elements of the contemporary debate. Both race and class analysts⁴¹ have since elaborated their theoretical content and political objectives of their organisations. For instance :

The Black Muslims show how many different elements and influences can go into a single case-history of black nationalism - ethnological fantasy, theological credulity, internal statism, psychological emigrationism, economic separatism, political isolationism, and individual self-improvement. 42.

No individual biography illustrates the internal complexities and contradictions within the nationalist movement better than Malcolm X.⁴³ Having broken with the Muslims, his position oscillated around the internal statism, external emigrationist debate. A necessary feature of his politics was a demand for the rehabilitation of Black culture that would provide a necessary basis for the autonomous control of Black organisations and communities. He depicted the role of Blacks, vis a vis the White power structure in the United States, as 'domestic colonialism', and hence considered their position analogous to all colonial peoples.⁴⁴ The Black Power movement is referred to as "the latest swing in the pendulum which marks the perennial oscillation between integration on the one side and separatism-nationalism on the other".⁴⁵ The theoretical content of Black Power is above all nationalistic :

Here is the crux of the problem of race relations - the redefinition of the sense of group position so that the status advantage of the white man is no longer an advantage, so that an American may acknowledge his Negro ancestry without apologising for it. 46.

In this process of redefinition :

It is absolutely essential that black people know this history, that they know their roots, that they develop an awareness of their cultural heritage. (Emphasis added). 47.

Hence in a crucial policy statement Hamilton writes :

If we are to proceed toward true liberation, we must cut ourselves off from White people. We must form our own institutions, credit unions, co-ops, political parties, write our own histories. 48.

In remaining an exclusively Black organisation by expelling all Whites from its ranks⁴⁹. Black Power has conceived Black liberation as part of a colonial revolution and not essentially concerned with socialist objectives. The demand for five wholly Black states is seen as a consequence of their current colonial status. The notion of a 'domestic colony' suggested by Cruse⁵⁰ has been developed and distinguished in a paper by Blauner.⁵¹

It is this uncompromising exclusivism that distinguishes Black Power politics from the Black Panther party established in 1966 by Newton and Seale, later to be joined by Cleaver⁵² and Brown. The problem was not conceived by the Panthers in primarily colonial terms. There were "two evils to fight, capitalism and racism", and furthermore they "blamed capitalism for all that was wrong, and made socialism the precondition for freedom of any kind, including self-determination".⁵³ Hence there appeared a certain retraction from an exclusively nationalistic programme and the presence of White groups within the organization is evidence of their rejection of the exclusivism of the Black Power movement. It was for precisely this reason that Carmichael, who had joined the movement, split in 1969. It is symptomatic of certain underlying differences that persisted between individuals in these groups that the Panthers rejected the slogan of five or six Black states which, according to them, "would be

impossible to function in freedom side by side with a capitalistic imperialistic country." ⁵⁴. Since this time Carmichael himself has moved back towards a position more in sympathy with the Panthers than his own at the time of the split. In a recent paper to the African Liberation Support Committee, he writes :

The question before us is not a question of class struggle. Any serious revolutionary knows that class struggle is the motivating struggle, is the major struggle, that is not a question. ⁵⁵.

Specifically on the question of Black-White alliances, he writes "Although they (the White working class) have betrayed us, we are always willing to work with them". ⁵⁶. Furthermore though socialism will come to America "the white working class is the crucial element". ⁵⁷. Hence the nationalist objectives and exclusivist strategy have now been replaced by seemingly socialist objectives and the necessity of Black-White alliances to attain them.

The Black Left are not alone in their struggle to resolve these theoretical problems. "The Communist Party's policy had three basic parts: the nationality question, the Black belt, and the right of the Black man to self-determination". ⁵⁸. The self-determination slogan leaning heavily for support on papers by Lenin ⁵⁹ and Stalin ⁶⁰ was ultimately considered unrealistic and replaced by an 'equal rights' programme. ⁶¹. In concluding our review of this problem which appears central to struggles between Du Bois and Washington, Garvey and Randolph, and more recently Cruse, Malcolm X and the Muslims

and the Black Power advocates on the one hand and the Panthers and White Left on the other, Franklin and Resnik have this to say :

Marxist analysis posits the working class as the key component of the revolution, yet it fails to take into account the very obvious existence of racism within both the labor rank and file and the labor unions ... In the end, we have come full circle. While race and class analysts are in theory diametrically opposed, and while the proponents of each are in bitter disagreement, the black reality requires that they be combined. 62.

To concede that racism is present however amongst White labour is not quite to give credence to many of the assumptions and objectives of 'race analysis'. To admit that beliefs concerning the biogenetic basis of human classification do exist is not quite the same as holding the beliefs themselves. It is precisely this concession to physical anthropology that many of the early nationalists in particular appear to have made. In so far as they share certain of the assumptions of their political opponents in this respect, it is not surprising to find such bizarre alliances as Garvey with the Ku Klux Klan. The repatriation policy too is one that has won support on the political Right in particular in Britain over the last decade. 63.

In general terms however such explicit formulations as appear in the work of Du Bois and Garvey seem, at most, implicit in the recent nationalist/Black power programmes. In its place there has been an unqualified emphasis on a cultural basis for racial distinctions, though skin colour (i.e. biological criteria) makes differentiation possible in

the first place.⁶⁴ The evocation of 'black consciousness', 'negritude', 'Pan Africanism' etc., became an integral feature of Cruse's work in the early 1960's.⁶⁵ Black liberation consequently, in the first instance, presupposes seizure of the cultural apparatus. These assumptions were to remain a dominant feature of current 'radical political' strategies. "They (the SNCC) laid the basis for the cultural nationalism which has become characteristic of the Black Power movement".⁶⁶ To this extent Black Power politics have come under severe criticism from the Black and White Left. "It is characteristic of the cultural nationalist to exhibit a simplistic fixation on racism" writes Allen "and to be unable (or unwilling) to delve any deeper into the American social structure".⁶⁷ The reformism of much Black Power politics has been seen as a consequence of such dubious assumptions. Cruse's programme in Harlem contains nothing "that does not fall within familiar and traditional patterns".⁶⁸ Similarly, Black Power's position reproduces this reformism embodied in a programme which can, it has been argued, "be advocated by any traditional pluralist"⁶⁹ and the credit unions and co-operatives established by Black Power groups arguably differ minimally, if at all, from Operation Breadbasket and other Civil Rights programmes to which Black Power are in theory at least opposed.⁷⁰

Furthermore the pursuit of such objectives has been possible only with the assistance of White capital and personnel, a contradiction that strikes at the heart of the

separatist/exclusivist basis of the movement. The Utopianism of certain of their original objectives then has effectively reduced their strength to little more than a reformist lobby and one that can only survive (in terms of the realisation of its reformulated objectives) so long as their opponents are prepared to make funds available for that purpose.

In some way the shift in emphasis away from biological means of classification towards cultural nationalism, reflects a bias in the content of 'racist ideology', traditionally attributed to their opponents.⁷¹ It is interesting in passing to note how similar certain of their opponents' political objectives subsequently are. Contrast for instance the maintenance of the Bantustan states as all Black provinces 'to preserve the cultural treasure of a people' with Hamilton's five Black states slogan to preserve, or at least, re-establish the cultural identity of the American Black. This relates to a more general problem in race analysis. If "race has survived" as Adler suggests "and is clearly functional in perpetuating the capitalist industrial system",⁷² then does the maintenance, indeed the encouragement of such distinctions, biological or cultural, facilitate the exploitative system they were intended to rationalise ?

The ambivalence that resulted at the level of the theoretical and ideological content of its programme and subsequently the character of its political objectives has been reflected in the contradictions in its leaders. As such,

the Black Power movement in many ways epitomised the most uncharacteristic features of Marxist/Leninist politics.

The following extract from a paper on Black Power will serve to illustrate certain of these tendencies at the level of organisation and revolutionary tactics :

Revolutionary consciousness is, by definition, spontaneous - it is the sudden will of self-emancipation. Effective leadership cannot divorce itself from mass spontaneity, and when the masses are ready to move, leadership must accept its historical responsibility. It should therefore come as no surprise that Black Power leadership has moved from its original aloofness with regard to riots ... to Rap Brown's recent invocation to burn and shoot as the means by which black people will seize control of their own communities. 73.

Clearly under such conditions 'effective revolutionary strategy', conceived on the basis of the 'long run perspective of the struggle' with leaders taking initiative is quite out of the question.⁷⁴ It is the overriding presence of spontaneism as a political principle, and subsequently a 'tailist' attitude on the part of the leaders which creates "an impulse to action which quickly turns to nihilism".⁷⁵ What revolutionary strategy remains, it has been suggested, rests, to a considerable extent, on the theoretical and ideological content of their opponents.⁷⁶ Consequently one major problem is to reconcile, as Genovese unsuccessfully attempts to do, "Black nationalism (which) reflects, more accurately than integrationism, the historical uniqueness of the black experience in America",⁷⁷ and the fact that the movement cannot for long "sustain itself without an anti-capitalist ideology".⁷⁸ The problem then appears to be one of reconciling a culturally (occasionally biologically)

deterministic theoretical position with a progressive political programme. It is this sort of contradiction at the level of political practice that may be seen to have the 'tactical' effects that Adler, along with Carmichael and Rap Brown condone.⁷⁹ The theoretical content of both 'race' and 'class' analysis may be seen once more to reproduce variant theoretical positions reproduced throughout this discussion: in particular from Part One (in the case of Du Bois, Garvey etc.) and Part Two (variant forms of Black Power illustrated for instance in the work of Adler) and the two previous sections of Part Three (Randolph and other 'class analysts'). It is worth noting here the extent to which the similarity at this level of analysis to their opponents has often been reflected in a similarity at the level of political programmes. The confounding of a number of theoretical positions in the case of the Black Power movement has produced a bizarre combination of political sectarianism, (on the one hand,) the implications of which have been elaborated here, and on the other, a reliance on reform programmes initially attributed to their political opponents from the Civil Rights Movement.

3. South Africa.

In an analysis of the race concept in South African politics, what clearly emerges once more is the product of class analysis on the one hand, where race appears once more as functional to the means of reproducing capitalist relations of production, and race analysis whose first task is to assert the autonomy of the race concept.⁸⁰ In terms of the political

~~the political~~ effects of the first of these positions, there is a definite tendency to bypass politics altogether, for logically capitalism and racism can only fall together. Wolpe comes close to this in two of his recent papers. In one for instance he writes :

the analysis of the structural position of particular groups and the contradictory processes that tend to generate conflict between them does not of itself reveal how the political conflict will in fact develop. For this we need to examine other, additional, factors that are, however, beyond the scope of this paper. 81.

Similarly: "Whether capitalism still has space (or time) for reform in South Africa is an issue which must be left to another occasion".⁸² In both instances the role of the class struggle appears not simply outside the scope of the paper in terms of insufficient time or space etc. but logically outside the functionalist arguments presented by Wolpe in these essays. If the 'complex conjuncture' referred to at the outset serves only to reproduce capitalist relations of production, the political struggle, if it exists, is of necessity a reflex of the capital - labour contradiction. There appears in consequence no possibility for political intervention as such for the latter can only be considered as a particular index of the productive process.

The role of the South African economy and its relationship to the elaborate system of 'race' legislation has been discussed in a preceding section. What is significant in this context is the role of the economy and the relationship of Black Africans to White labour and capital therein which has come to be considered as crucial to an understanding of both nationalist and/or socialist movements in South Africa.

The concept of labour aristocracy, for instance, considered appropriate in this context has come to play a significant role in political alignments. Hence Jordaan writes "Accordingly, the struggle for the abolition of the colour bar and for democracy can be waged only by the black workers".⁸³ (Emphasis added). The assumption here is that certain political/economic conditions discussed above render Whites irrelevant as regards any programme for national liberation. Hence Davies writes "This development (economic/political) has, however, created a mass socio-economic base for reactionary white nationalism, of which the white working class unfortunately forms a part".⁸⁴ White nationalism or racism (the two are considered synonymous in this context), are considered pertinent not purely for nationalist programmes but also for long term socialist strategy. Indeed the one is often considered out of the question without the other.

Having abolished the colour bar, the black workers, guided by a leadership schooled in scientific socialism, will proceed to conquer the commanding heights of the economy and place the means of production under public ownership. The revolution can succeed only as a socialist revolution. 85.

The proposition that national liberation presupposes a socialist revolution has been a source of considerable contention in the revolutionary programmes of organisations in Southern Africa and to take Legassick as a case in point, a potential source of contradictions for these movements.

"It would seem" Legassick writes, on the one hand, "that such national liberation could be achieved only coterminously with the abolition of capitalism in South

Africa."⁸⁶. Yet at the same time :

It is doubtful if the struggle against capitalism in South Africa can proceed, through the unification of the interests and circumstances of black and white working class, without the leverage that might be achieved by a black proletariat using its 'national' institutions to their fullest extent. 87.

The question of Black - White alliances will be considered here, not only since political programmes devote a considerable amount of time to this question, but, more significantly it will be argued, because it has in consequence diverted attention from what, it will be suggested, are more serious problems. It is these which are responsible to a much greater extent for the current impasse prevailing amongst nationalist/socialist organisations. The illustration taken will be from Turok's analysis of political organisations, in particular the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress in the 1950's and 1960's.⁸⁸ Once more it is assumed "the national question must hold the centre of the analysis and of the solution",⁸⁹ since the Whites, as a labour aristocracy, have :

been incorporated into the political and social realm of the ruling capitalist class and have a stake in the status quo in a way that ensures their loyalty, for at least the foreseeable future. (Emphasis in original). 90.

Consequently as far as Blacks are concerned "the structure around them confirms that they are first black and second proletarians".⁹¹

The debate once more then in abstract terms is conceived at as a confrontation between those prepared, for reasons explored below, to commit themselves to a joint

(Black/White) campaign of political action on the basis of specific objectives; and those assuming the only effective political organisation must comprise an exclusively Black membership.

In view of the recent intensification of separatist organisations in South Africa, the South African Students Organisation (SASO) and the Black Peoples Convention,⁹² it is important to establish the conditions under which such movements have been felt necessary. In Turok's analysis, it is possible to identify certain critical junctures that have encouraged separatist demands and prompted splinter movements. The first may be seen as a direct consequence of the Treason Trial in 1956 where 156 leaders of all organisations were charged with conspiring to establish a communist state.⁹³ The trial which lasted for years had had serious effects in terms of the organisation and unity of the African National Congress and its co-operation with other groups (Indian Congress, Communist Party) in the Congress Alliance.

Turok writes of the trial period :

During this time, preoccupations with defence and sheer exhaustion of leaders by long days in court, led to a certain inertia. At the same time hundreds of leading cadres were banned and the Alliance was severely harrassed.

He continues :

Seizing this opportunity a group of Africans broke away from the ANC (African National Congress) and formed the Pan African Congress (PAC). The PAC made three claims for recognition: they claimed the mantle of genuine African nationalism, they adopted an overtly anti-white posture and they condemned communism and its influence in the Congress Alliance. 94.

The assumption here and one that Turok upheld was that the presence of Whites in key leadership roles above all precipitated a certain estrangement amongst Black masses, in so far as White domination, the object of their struggle, appeared to be challenged by an organisation with key leadership posts held by Whites.⁹⁵ Not only did such a situation appear paradoxical to Blacks but it appeared illogical and politically costly :

one must concede that a white intellectual whose life-style and daily experience is remote from that of the oppressed has some difficulty in formulating policies of struggle for the oppressed. ⁹⁶.

The recourse to separatist rhetoric may be witnessed once more during and since the sabotage campaign which began on a small scale in rural areas in the late 1950's and subsequently became part of the organisational programme of certain nationalist groups : Umkonto We Sizwe, linked to the Congress Alliance⁹⁷ and Paqo, the military wing of the PAC.⁹⁸ The latter consequently was critical of Umkonto "for diluting African nationalism by admitting non-Africans".⁹⁹ The rivalry between the two groups in this period serves once more to divert attention from the futility of the sabotage campaign which patently failed both as part of a nationalist and a socialist programme.

Looked at as a single phase of the struggle, it must be said that the sabotage campaign was abortive ... (though most considered violence necessary) the actual form of the campaign led down the road to disaster. ¹⁰⁰.

The Communist Party reacted to the campaign by urging

"No desperation; no adventurism, but firm, resolute and revolutionary action".¹⁰¹ Political activity in general and campaigns such as this met with increasing resistance by the Nationalist Government a factor which, Turok points out, the liberation movements rarely took into account in their forms of organisation and their plans of campaign :

The movement was carried along on a wave of euphoria and a refusal to recognize that the police state that was always referred to in speeches really existed. 102.

Its inability to come to terms with this problem constantly endangered the unity of the nationalist movement, removed its key figures, and succeeded in preventing any serious threat from emerging.¹⁰³ In point of fact, in terms of their objectives, the nationalist movements have never seriously come to terms with the slogan of national liberation, a point which Turok is correct to point out. "To talk of national liberation however, requires an answer to the question, which nation? And power for whom?",¹⁰⁴ and, on a practical level, which African groups are to be included? The Black civil servant, semi-professional and salaried groups? Is their life-style and daily experience too 'remote' from that of the oppressed?

What objectives and strategy have emerged (e.g. the sabotage campaign) seems to have taken their initiative from the spontaneous outbreaks of the masses. The absence of any organised revolutionary programme demanded by the Communist Party¹⁰⁵ ensured the 'spontaneist' character of these movements. Indeed the abdication of responsibility in

this direction, preferring instead to rely on a politics of experience for the formulation of their policies, has proved costly both in political and human terms. Events following the Sharpeville incident in 1960 which according to Fanon¹⁰⁶. was to be the catalyst for a successful liberation movement, have proved largely ineffective, and to the extent they have been met with tougher restrictions, counter-productive.

In view of these fundamental problems with respect to organisation, strategy and a certain ambivalence with respect to political objectives, it is curious to note the persistent recourse to the question of alliances.¹⁰⁷ In an otherwise extremely valuable documentation of these organisations, he suggests the question of Black solidarity is the prerequisite for a successful liberation movement even when the problem of who and what exactly is to be liberated remains unresolved.¹⁰⁸ The recurrent failure of such organisations to realise their objectives (assuming these have been fully articulated) has invariably prompted a return to this apparently fundamental question of separatism/unity. In so far as this has remained and remains the central question, it has and will effectively divert these organisations from confronting and resolving political questions that have remained, and will do so, their genuine stumbling block. In this respect it is interesting to reproduce the following :

It is not a crisis of growth, but mainly a crisis of knowledge. In too many cases the struggle for liberation and our plans for the future are not only without a theoretical base, but also more or less cut off from the concrete situation in which we are working. 109.

Summary.

In the consideration of the concept of race in politics, it is necessary to distinguish two areas to which neo-Marxist theory has addressed itself. On the one hand there are those attempts to conceive the 'race issue' in terms of its politicisation for party political advantage¹¹⁰, and the role of successive governments in its institutionalisation.¹¹¹ In Great Britain, for instance, the Race Relations and Immigration Acts of the 1960's and early 1970's were passed in conjunction with the establishment of an elaborate machinery designed to implement and administer them. The race bureaucracies then have been examined in their role as an integral feature of this institutionalisation process.¹¹² The 'race relations industry' comprises a number of official agencies with responsibility for the overall administration of official (i.e. Government) objectives. There also exists a number of groups/organisations that can be examined in terms of their 'unofficial' response to the race issue. The nature of these responses shift in accordance with the objectives of the group or body concerned.¹¹³ This constitutes the second area to which Marxists, amongst others, have concerned themselves and the one to which this section has addressed itself. In particular it has sought to examine that set of political responses to the race issue, not from liberal welfare perspectives, but from certain groups assuming to a greater or lesser extent certain principles from the works of Marx and Lenin.

In this context the discussion has attempted to locate the concept of race in terms of the theoretical content of certain contemporary political organisations and its coincidence with certain effects at a more practical level. In doing so it has sought to distinguish the positions developed here from those of classical Marxist - Leninist political theory.

At a certain level of abstraction the organisations discussed here may be said to reproduce a debate whose essential structure remains the same for each of the groups.

In reconstructing the debate in its variant forms at this level, i.e. in terms of the programmes of specific political organisations, it is clear that each reproduces certain theoretical presuppositions that constitute a good deal of this thesis' investigations. Consequently 'race analysts' are indebted to certain anthropological arguments discussed in Part One and certain sociological concepts in Part Two. The concept of race thus appears as a real biological category on the one hand and a collectively conceived cultural representation on the other. Their similarity at this level seems to have encouraged a degree of identity at the level of the programmes of their political opponents. Consequently a whole range of practical solutions: segregation, cultural nationalism, repatriation have been suggested by the political Left and Right alike. In addition to this set of arguments, the race concept in these programmes clearly possesses properties contingent on a general concept of action. Race consciousness then replaced biological race and in whatever

form it appeared at a practical level was considered a necessary and valuable manifestation of revolutionary potential.

If one side of the debate sought to confer a biological/cultural (individually and collectively conceived) reality on the concept of race, the other has sought to reduce it to a mystique of real social relations of production. The economy, or an advanced development of capitalist forces of production, has created certain exigencies with respect to the role of various categories of labour that Blacks/migrants have been compelled to satisfy. The production of 'racist ideology' (false facts about human differentiation) is a necessary outcome of these economic requirements. While this has not always coincided (in the groups under discussion) with an abstention from political activity altogether, the 'economists' have generally confined their practical proposals to the production process as the sole means whereby change may be effected at other levels.

The specific terms of the debate are by no means consistently reproduced in every case. The illustrative evidence from Race Today suggests the two sides of the debate itself may be confounded. A certain economism then, in terms of its theoretical assumptions, has been developed in conjunction with a number of concessions to race analysis at what has been referred to as the 'prescriptive' or practical level.

The theoretical adequacy of both class and race analysis has already been challenged elsewhere in the thesis and while

their political effects can only seriously be assessed in the light of an exhaustive analysis of specific political and ideological conditions, their presence in these programmes has coincided with some extremely dubious forms of revolutionary practice. In reproducing these arguments at a certain level of abstraction, both race and class analysis have ignored the ultimate object of Marxist theory: an analysis of the 'current situation' or 'relations of forces'. In doing so they appear so discrepant both theoretically and practically with respect to the principles of Marxist - Leninism as to render themselves almost unrecognisable as contemporary forms of Marxist political organisation.

Notes.

1. T. Martin, 'C.L.R. James and the Race/Class Question', p. 183.
2. The terms 'race' and 'class' analysis taken together in this way have been borrowed from R.S. Franklin and S. Resnik, The Political Economy of Racism. See especially Chapters 8 and 10 for an elaboration of variant forms of both and a proposed synthesis advocated by the authors.
3. The term 'relations of force' is borrowed from Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, p. 175 ff. and refers to elements of a current analysis. The problem for Gramsci, and clearly in this section, concerns the identification of what is 'organic' and what is 'conjunctural' (ibid, p. 178) i.e. those political principles universally applicable and those appropriate only in specific situations. Consequently the question of how far race and class may be legitimately abstracted from a conjunctural analysis is one to some extent that can only be resolved in the wake of the resolution of these general questions.
4. A number of references to classical Marxist-Leninist theory will be made throughout this section. Illustrations taken from Lenin will serve to illustrate certain 'organic' principles of party organisation and a number of deviations from Marxist-Leninist political practice. What is To be Done? for instance contains an excellent analysis of the political effects of economism and terrorism, pp.178-181.

Clearly a full account of these effects requires a fuller examination of specific conjunctures. Nevertheless it is possible to demonstrate, at least in principle, a certain identity with a number of deviations revealed in these classical texts and contemporary forms of political practice.

5. For a documented review of the old Institute of Race Relations up to the present time, see A. Sivanandan, Race and Resistance: The Story of the Institute of Race Relations.
6. Race Today, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1974, p. 3.
7. Race Today, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1974, p. 99.
8. Ibid.
9. Race Today, Vol. 6, No. 9, September 1974, p. 243.
10. Race Today, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 1974, p. 219. See also Vol. 7, No. 5, April 1975, pp. 108-113 and May 1975.
11. Race Today, February 1975, p. 27.
12. The 'Cricklewood 12', 'Stockwell 10', 'Mangrove 9', and other cases brought before the courts appear as manifestations of Black resistance to (White) police brutality. See for example Race Today, Vol. 7, No. 11, November 1975, p. 243.
13. Race Today, February 1975, p. 27.
14. Race Today, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1975, p. 3.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. The Black Liberator, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 1974-January 1975.
18. Ibid, p. 197.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid, p. 196.
21. Ibid, p. 198.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid, p. 207.
24. Ibid, p. 275.
25. Ibid, p. 276.
26. Ibid, p. 205.
27. Ibid, pp. 276-277.
28. For an elaboration of the theoretical basis of this conception of ideology, see N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, p. 195 ff. The effects of 'historicism' developed here resemble in some respects Genovese's concept of racist ideology reproduced in the preceding section.

29. The role of leadership as an 'organic' principle of party organisation has been developed by Lenin in What is To be Done ?, op. cit., Section II, in Selected Works, 1, pp. 141-161.
30. A good illustration of this in classical Marxist-Leninist theory would be the question of the 'violent overthrow of the State apparatus', considered unnecessary in the early summer months of 1917 when power may conceivably have passed peacefully from the Provisional Government to the Bolsheviks, to the situation elaborated in the text 'State and Revolution' written in August/September when any possibility of a peaceful transfer of power was by then out of the question. Lenin, Selected Works, 2, pp. 283-376.
31. See T. Draper, The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism, op. cit., and his discussion of the early separatists who were at the same time ostensibly liberal anti-slavery advocates (A. Lincoln and T. Jefferson), ch. 1.
32. W.E. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, ch. 3.
33. W.E. Du Bois, 'The Conservation of Races' in Black Power: the Radical Response to White America, ed. T. Wagstaff, p. 60.
34. Ibid, p. 61.
35. Ibid, p. 62.
36. Ibid, pp. 66-67.
37. M. Garvey, 'The Negro's Greatest Enemy' in Black Power, ed. T. Wagstaff, p. 77.
38. Ibid, p. 85.
39. A.P. Randolph, 'The Only Way to Redeem Africa' in Black Power, ed. T. Wagstaff, p. 87.
40. Ibid, pp. 96-97.
41. These terms are taken from The Political Economy of Racism, R.S. Franklin and S. Resnik.
42. T. Draper, The Rediscovery of Black Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
43. See for instance, Malcolm X Speaks, Selected Speeches and Statements and the Autobiography of Malcolm X.
44. R. Allen, A Guide to Black Power in America, p. 207-208.
45. R. Allen, 'The Dialectics of Black Power', p. 382.
46. S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, Black Power, p. 32.
47. Ibid, p. 38.
48. Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee, 'Who is the Real Villain - Uncle Tom or Simon Legree ?', in Black Power, ed. T. Wagstaff, p. 115.
49. S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 44.

50. H. Cruse, The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual, pp. 142-143. Cruse has developed the implications of this analysis for Marxist theory; in 'Marxism and the Negro'. (See also papers by G. Breitman and C. Deberry: all reproduced in Marxism and the Negro Struggle). A similar position is taken elsewhere by J. Rex in Race Colonialism and the City, where Fanon has become the "Third World's alternative to the Communist manifesto", p. 292. The idea of race war superseding the orthodox conception of class struggle has been developed by R. Segal, The Race War.
51. R. Blauner, 'Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt'.
52. For a documented history of the Panther Party, its organisation and programme, see B. Seale, Seize the Time.
53. T. Draper, op. cit., pp. 106-107.
54. Ibid, p. 114.
55. Race Today, Vol. 6, No.11, November 1974, p. 298.
56. Ibid, p. 299.
57. Ibid, p. 298.
58. R. S. Franklin and S. Resnik, op. cit., pp. 175-176.
59. V. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp. 432-437.
60. J. Stalim, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question.
61. R. S. Franklin and S. Resnik, op. cit., p. 177.
62. Ibid, pp. 177-178 and p. 183.
63. See for instance, P. Foot, The Rise of Enoch Powell.
64. E. Genovese, In Red and Black, op. cit., pp. 70-71. Indeed such distinctions appear at times complacently taken for granted.
65. H. Cruse, Rebellion or Revolution ?
66. R. Allen, 'The Dialectics of Black Power', op. cit., p.383.
67. R. Allen, A Guide to Black Power in America, op.cit., p. 211.
68. R.S. Franklin and S. Resnik, op. cit., p. 126.
69. Ibid, p. 116.
70. Ibid, p. 115.
71. F. Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, p. 42.
72. F. Adler, 'Black Power', pp. 96-97.
73. Ibid, p. 105.
74. Ibid.
75. R. Allen, 'Dialectics of Black Power', op. cit., p. 383.
76. E. Genovese, In Red and Black, op. cit., p. 65.

77. Ibid, p. '63.
78. S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 45.
79. The extent of these contradictions may be seen once more in their demands to close the ranks of their organisation to non-Blacks, a prerequisite they argue, for a strong bargaining position in a "pluralistic society". S. Carmichael and C. Hamilton, op. cit., p.45.
80. The politics of liberal reform will not feature in this section since neither its theoretical content nor its political practice suggests any approximation whatever to Marxism.
81. H. Wolpe, 'Industrialism and Race in South Africa', op. cit., p. 174.
82. H. Wolpe, 'Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power', op. cit., p. 454.
83. K. Jordaan, op. cit., p. 80.
84. R. Davies, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
85. K. Jordaan, op. cit., p. 80.
86. M. Legassick, op. cit., p. 286.
87. Ibid, p. 287. See also 'Nationalism and Revolution in sub-Saharan Africa', G. Arrighi and J.S. Saul, who on the one hand concede the mystifying role of nationalism, yet see a progressive role for it as part of an anti-imperialist struggle, p. 178.
88. B. Turok, 'South Africa: The Search for a Strategy', pp. 347-376.
89. Ibid, p. 345.
90. Ibid, pp. 344-345.
91. Ibid, p. 343.
92. Ibid, p. 368.
93. Ibid, p. 350.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid, p. 352.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid, p. 359.
98. Ibid, p. 360.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid, p. 361.
101. Cited by B. Turok, ibid, p. 363.
102. Ibid, p. 357.
103. For an interesting discussion of the apparent dilemmas facing an organisation that is of necessity clandestine and democratic, see Lenin's What is To be Done ? op. cit., pp. 225-232, Selected Works, 1. and Left Wing

- Communism - an Infantile Disorder, pp. 353-358, in Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp. 353-358.
104. Ibid, pp. 369-370.
105. Ibid, p. 363.
106. F. Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, ch. 1.
107. Alliances, however crucial to Marxist-Leninist theory can only be considered as crucial in terms of the objectives of the various organisations concerned. This is not however the basis for separatism or unity in the African case. The overriding problem is not one of objectives or programmes but alliances on the basis of ascribed physical or ideological differences (i.e. on a racial basis). It has already been suggested that in neo-Marxist theory differences are the result of counter-ideological forces. The extent of this preoccupation with one particular form of alliance which, it may be said, is integrally tied up with the status of the race concept, is clearly in evidence in Turok's analysis. The question of compromises and alliances can really only be satisfactorily dealt with, therefore, in the light of a much fuller conjunctural analysis. Their organic relationship to political objectives, however, may be clearly seen in a number of texts in classical Marxist - Leninist political theory. See in this respect, Lenin's Left Wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder, op. cit., Sections IV and VIII, and 'On Compromises' in Selected Works, Vol. 2.
108. B. Turok, op. cit., p. 370.
109. Cabral cited by G. Arrighi and J.S. Saul, op. cit. p. 179.
110. P. Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics.
111. A. and M. Dummett, 'The Role of Government in Britain's Racial Crisis' in L. Donnelly, Justice First.
112. See for instance, C. Mullard, Black Britain, Part III.
113. See for instance, G.K. Lewis, 'Protest among the Immigrants' in B. Crick and W. Robson, Protest and Discontent, D. Beetham, Transport and Turbans, and I. Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities, Part III.

Concluding Remarks.

Throughout this discussion there have appeared two parallel, yet contradictory, attempts to locate the concepts of race and racism in terms of a more inclusive set of concepts considered Marxist. These two attempts, each presupposing its own assumptions concerning what constitutes 'Marxism' may seemingly be distinguished in terms of the 'autonomy' conferred on the race concept. Autonomous in this sense generally refers to the concept's relationship to the economy. The precise status of any autonomy beyond this will be elaborated shortly. The problems entailed in both race and class analysis treated separately have been considered already. The seemingly excessive demands of each have, however, been tempered by a third set of arguments with increasing popularity.

What is demanded in this revised approach is a combination of certain 'authentic' Marxian assumptions of class analysis and an acknowledgment that some degree of 'autonomy' conferred in the context of race analysis is an essential complementary feature of this conceptual synthesis. Although it is correct to suggest that such attempts have become increasingly popular, it is also true to say that few have achieved more than an acknowledgment of the necessity for such a synthesis.¹ It is the purpose of this concluding section to explore reasons why this is the case.

To do so it is necessary, in the first instance, to

reconsider the question of an 'autonomous' concept of race (and racist ideology). This entails a recapitulation of certain arguments developed elsewhere in this thesis where the properties of these concepts have been elaborated. The implication here is that the autonomy of the race concept has been vouchsafed by recourse to the arguments of their opponents; that is to say, both at a theoretical level (in so far as Marxism is distinct from the problematics of sociology and physical anthropology), and at a more practical level (i.e. in terms of distinct political objectives). As regards the former, the concept of race here in neo-Marxist theory has been seen to presuppose some of the more questionable assumptions of physical anthropology on the one hand and the ethnicity theorists in sociology and anthropology on the other. The reintroduction of a biological concept into the realm of cultural representations in this sense remains as much a possibility in neo-Marxist theory as was found to be the case in sociological classifications. There is however a significant corpus of revised theory which does not presuppose any physical or culturally imposed distinctions. This additional form of autonomy presupposes a certain concept of action borrowed from Weber's sociology that remains a point of departure for a 'Marxist' concept of race.

We may think of race relations, therefore, as that behavior which develops among peoples who are aware of each other's actual or imputed physical differences. Moreover, by race relations we do not mean all social contacts between persons of different "races" but only those contacts the social characteristics of which are determined by a consciousness of "racial" difference. 2.

The concept of race then is 'autonomous', in this case only in so far as it presupposes a concept of action; the distinguishing feature of a sociological theory of race and a sociology of race relations. Both neo-Marxist theory and sociology share, to this extent, a conception of race relations at the outset that is confined to those physical differences to which individuals attach significance. The concept of race then, devoid of its biological properties is conceived in the sphere of values whether these are individually or culturally expressed. Race thus rests on a 'sentiment of solidarity' (Weber),³ a 'consciousness of kind' (Shibutani)⁴ or a 'self-consciousness' (Genovese).⁵ The concept of race in a variant form rests on an individual's definition of the situation regardless of the state of knowledge.⁶

The concept of class on the other hand, is conceived in terms of a determinate set of relations of production and productive forces. Classes, according to Castles and Kosack, exist in their objective state independently of whether each individual is aware of them or not.⁷ They exist, in other words, not through 'consciousness' (though they may) but through the elaboration of the theory (in Marx's case) of the capitalist mode of production. If classes may be shown to exist through a specification of their determinate conditions of existence then presumably concepts developed from within Marxism must satisfy similar criteria.

The concept of race in this respect appears the direct antithesis of such conceptualisation. It appears not through

a prior elaboration of its conditions of existence but solely in terms of the meaning individuals are seen to attach to it. On the one hand then, there appears a concept (class) that exists independently of whether men are conscious of it or not, (those that are not aware in this sense are often said to be falsely conscious). On the other hand, there is a concept of race that exists in the realm of consciousness: independent, apparently, of any real conditions of existence. Any attempt to produce such conditions necessarily invokes once more those real physical/cultural differences, precisely those abandoned to make room for a sociological concept in the first place. In so far as the two concepts presuppose two distinct forms of conceptualisation, the possibility of any form of correspondence appears logically out of the question. On the one hand, race is defined according to inter-subjectively derived meanings attached to actual or imputed physical differences. On the other hand, class is not defined according to imputed differences, but is present regardless of whether 'meaning' is attached to class differences or not. Where 'meaning' is not present, false consciousness mythology and the like are invoked to explain its absence. Consequently the paradoxical position appears in neo-Marxist theories of race where the 'reality' of race is defined both in terms of everyday perceptions of it 'regardless of the state of knowledge' (it may or may not exist) and at the same time explained with reference to some form of correspondence with a concept class, which is defined in objective terms regardless of subjective meaning, (i.e. in terms of positions in relation to the

production process). If the two concepts are derived by mutually exclusive means, then any attempt to synthesise them will necessarily be confronted with this problem of conceptual incompatibility. Since each concept rests on antithetical assumptions with respect to the ontological status of Marxist categories, their presence in the same conceptual context, it must be suggested, is quite illegitimate. Any attempted synthesis then is only possible on the basis of this unholy alliance.

What this discussion has attempted is the location and identification of the concepts of race and racism in the context of various arguments defended to a greater or lesser extent on the basis of their fidelity to Marxism. In the first section the concept of race was located in terms of its apparent relationship to certain economic categories. Consequently it was identified in terms of certain exigencies, or more precisely, certain necessary tendencies in the capitalist mode of production. Two levels of argument with respect to the concept of race must be reiterated here. In the first instance, there exists in purely economic terms the adequacy of the concepts of surplus population, industrial reserve army, and differentiation within fractions of the working class.

These specifically economic arguments which were challenged themselves in the discussion on the economy, still leave the problem of the coincidence of the racial and economic dimensions unresolved. In this sense the problem here reproduces

that identified in Part Two. There, attempts to account for certain necessary systems of domination and stratification according to an unequal distribution of power resources, nevertheless still failed to specify the conditions under which racial domination asserted itself over other possible forms. Hence in both cases the specifically racial character remains unaccounted for and indeed unaccountable for, either in terms of the use of Marxist concepts or in a less systematic context in terms of Weber's political categories. The concept of race developed here then presupposes precisely this convergence of real physical differences and economic exigencies. The former it has been suggested rest on dubious assumptions borrowed from anthropology, the other on dubious assumptions borrowed from Marx.

It has been suggested that the concept of race developed in the first instance in terms of certain economic concepts must be distinguished from attempts to develop a theory of the production of false knowledge concerning the possibility of a sub-classification of homo sapiens on the basis of fixed biogenetic criteria. The concept of the economy was again invoked, it is true, but the object had in the meantime been transformed from an attempt to confer on the concept of race a real economic status to one whose object had now become the production of ideology in general and racism in particular.

It was in this context that the racism/capitalism thesis was reviewed and once more the problem remained the conspicuous absence of a mechanism through which capitalism realises its

effects at an ideological level. Both attempts to reduce all elements of the totality to the economic (in the case of Cox et. al.) or to an expression of consciousness (Canovese et. al.) reproduced certain problems common to functionalism in general that were developed in the particular context in terms of the relationship posed, on the one hand, between racist ideology and racialist forms of political practice on the other. If the concepts of race and racism were found deficient in both these respects (i.e. as real economic categories or knowledge as an expression of the economy) the task of the final part of this discussion was to uncover the implications of these theoretical assumptions for the specific content of national liberation/socialist programmes.

In so far as they remained faithful to these assumptions it was not surprising to find the race/class debate reproduced with great consistency and regularity in the case studies reviewed. Nor was it surprising to find that the significance attached to these arguments and developed more or less as part of the theoretical/ideological content of their programmes, has necessarily entailed serious political consequences for these organisations. In particular, in terms of their forms of organisation and the content of specific political programmes, they bear a certain resemblance, it has been suggested, to two variant forms of deviation from which Lenin constantly sought to deliver Marxism. What has to be faced now, given the problems identified in this investigation, is to salvage what remains of the much tarnished concept of race through a reconsideration of the terms of the debate in

which it has been developed.

In so far as the concepts of race and racism have been developed, at least professedly, within Marxism they have always been assumed in general terms to possess some form of relationship to the economic or mode of production. These arguments, it has been suggested, take two forms, on the one hand, race and racism may be seen as direct consequences of transformations at the level of the productive process. The degree to which the production process is seriously considered even from this starting point varies considerably. Such variation may be noted by contrasting Castells' and Nikolinkos' relatively sophisticated development of Marx's economic concepts with Cox's rather tenuous affinity with Marx in this respect. The overriding assumption with respect to all these arguments however is that since Marxism treats 'society' 'holistically' each element can only be understood with reference to the other elements which are all in turn related to a common underlying economic structure. This holism is opposed to sociological atomism, and in particular in this respect, the micro-analyses of conventional race relations.⁸

The second form of analysis retains the primacy of economic forms and hold them in the first instance responsible for ideological representations. Only subsequently does it concede a degree of 'autonomy' with respect to the latter that may effect modifications at the level of the relations/forces of production. In so far as it reproduces the economists' arguments at the outset it remains faced with the problem in

the first instance of explaining certain forms of ideological representation in terms of economic content. Furthermore, given its modification of 'mechanical interpretations of Marxism' (to use its own phrase) it is required to specify under what conditions there is room for a degree of autonomy with respect to ideological/political practices and under what conditions they are capable of effecting transformations at the economic level. Without such a delineation in principle then, this concession to ideology and politics in effect remains no more than a somewhat gestural advance invoked to 'explain' differences at the level of 'empirical' manifestations.

The case of competing or contradictory ideologies is a very useful way of elaborating some of these problems. Orthodox race theory, it was suggested in Part One, is by no means a homogeneous, coherent enterprise. There exists numerous levels and forms, in terms of which the concepts of race and racist ideology are represented. In terms of levels of conceptualisation it is possible to contrast its representation in classical literature with its relatively sophisticated handling in the taxonomic exercises of twentieth century biochemical anthropology and finally its presence in the overtly political utterances of the social Darwinists. More significantly however the internal content of the ideologies themselves is by no means uniform. Within orthodox race theory itself there are numerous assumptions and consequently implications of a contradictory nature. De Gobineau's treatise is a case in point. The essay was not,

as it is popularly represented, a racist tract if the sense of the term generally accepted by Marxists and non-Marxists is to be retained. The innate differences alluded to here were neither inter-racial nor inter-national but concerned differences specific to each nation. If the essay ostensibly had little to do with racism or nationalism, it furthermore had very little time for capitalism either. On the contrary in terms of its specifically intra-national objectives, it sought to defend the feudal nobility and not the ascendent nineteenth century bourgeois class. The distinction between internal and external social Darwinists is again suggestive of certain contradictions within conventional race theory that defy a straightforward reduction to certain forms of production relations.⁹ Similarly there are equally numerous contradictions to be found within sociological race relations and Marxist race theory (the latter's own differences with respect to forms of organisation and political programmes) that remain equally inexplicable from the starting point of the productive process.

The consideration of the race concept in the first instance conceived as an effect of determinate ideological practices that subsequently intervene via the class struggle in the economy may be seen in outline in Legassick's paper on Capital Accumulation and Violence. It must be considered in this respect quite distinct from Wolpe's attempt to specify the scope of 'race relations' solely in terms of the reproduction of determinate forces and relations of production. In an extremely pertinent rhetorical question Legassick asks :

How was it, Marxists have often asked, that this white proletariat was not reduced to the condition of the

black proletariat in South Africa, if profit maximisation was the aim of capital ? ... the answer must be sought in terms of differing conditions of class struggle. 10.

Though he does attempt to show apartheid to be 'functional to capital' elsewhere, there is a definite attempt to differentiate its various fractions. Consequently he suggests that the strengthening of race laws after 1948 was a political decision by no means unanimously accepted by 'capital' en bloc and causing contention which persisted throughout the 1950's.

Though he does suggest all parties in this struggle sought to retain an extra-economically coerced labour force, the latter itself cannot be seen primarily in terms of the 'interests of capital' but in the specific conditions of the class struggle, which can only be analysed in terms of the African "resistance to mercantile colonial conquest" and the subsequent struggle for land which lasted over two centuries.¹¹

Apartheid is thus considered the consequence of a political decision that represented sections of Capital (by no means all) and was under continuous pressure throughout the 1950's by other sections who sought to revoke those forms of discriminatory legislative practices.

These very brief illustrations suggest, albeit schematically, the complex and contradictory nature of race ideologies that cannot be handled in terms of economic theory alone. This has been found to be the case both in terms of the ideologies themselves and their effectivity at the level of (South African) political practice. In terms of the wellworn dictum 'Marxism is holism' they serve to indicate that by treating totalities as 'wholes' in the sense above the arguments reviewed here have

effectively reduced the wholeness, i.e. the complex and contradictory nature of the parts themselves. In the context of this thesis, this very real danger is a necessary effect of an analysis of race and racism conceived in the first instance as determinate effects of economic categories. This applies in general terms to both parallel sets of arguments developed here. Each produces its own form of expressivism and, as the terms suggests, if the parts express something else, there is little room, to use Genovese's term, for the parts to 'breathe' themselves.¹² If some notion of the 'relative autonomy' of these practices is to be treated seriously, then there seems little to be gained from referring to a complex conjuncture at the outset as Wolpe does, and subsequently reducing its constituent elements to functions of transformations in the relations/forces of capitalist/pre-capitalist modes of production.¹³ If race and racism are to be treated as concepts whose objects are ideological, then they must be considered in the first instance as products of determinate ideological practices.¹⁴

In exploring the conceptual conditions of existence of the race concept, this is precisely what this thesis has set out to establish. The coherence/incoherence at this level may be established independently of the specific effects that the ideology in question possesses at the level of economic and political practices. One possible way to illustrate the possibilities emanating from these assumptions would be to consider the concept of race and distinguish it from that of 'migrant worker'. At present the two are somewhat

ambiguously defined, and where attempts have been made to demonstrate an equivalence in terms of 'conditions' (e.g. job concentration, mobility, discrimination in housing etc.) they have been confounded.¹⁵ If we start from a somewhat different set of assumptions, the concept of race on the one hand may be conceived as an ideological category, a product not of economic exigencies (Nikolinakos, Cox etc.) nor of purposive human activity (Genovese) but determinate ideological practices, the content of which this thesis has sought to investigate. 'Migrant worker' on the other hand in so far as it does not rest on anthropological/biogenetic assumptions clearly cannot in this sense be considered equivalent to the race concept. Where the latter attains a legal status however (i.e. it is now both an ideological and a political category) the two under certain conditions may be seen as commensurate. Such a coincidence may have occurred for instance in case of Black Commonwealth immigrants in Great Britain particularly after the 1971 Immigration Act and Italian migrants working in Switzerland for example. In the case of Great Britain however, immigration policy may well develop distinct forms as effects of the intervention of certain 'race' ideologies. Consequently specific legal clauses/restrictions may apply conveniently to Commonwealth immigrants (since most immigrants from the Commonwealth are Black the restriction thus introduces a 'racial' factor and the coincidence of 'races' with 'immigrants'). Clearly the precise nature of this intervention presupposes an adequate conceptualisation of political forms which has not

been attempted in this thesis.

The concept of race then is not 'autonomous' in the sense that it is contingent on a particular notion of human autonomy, or expression of consciousness as was the case with Genovese. Autonomy exists only in the sense that 'races' must be conceived first and foremost as the product of ideological and not the expression of extra-ideological practices. Once this is established it is necessary to specify as we have attempted the determinate theoretical/ideological conditions of existence of the race concept. To this extent it is quite misleading to refer to an 'autonomous' concept of race.

We have already suggested in terms of a specific 'legal status', 'races' and 'migrant workers' may well be reconcilable. If this is the case and specific ideologies are found to intervene at the level of legislative practices then it may also be possible to realise their effects in the economy. Under certain ideological/political conditions it may be possible for an employer to use a certain type of labour if it is relatively cheaper to buy.¹⁶ For this to be the case however certain discriminatory practices (often legally enforceable) would have to be present. What clearly defies the economists arguments is the presence of non-productive petty bourgeois and bourgeois categories that correspond to racial /ideological classifications. The position developed here concedes the possibility of a race/class discrepancy and consequently the possibility of a migrant/immigrant ('Black') professional category. Baran and Sweezy's contradictory

suggestion that Blacks are required as a sub-proletariat and as a bourgeoisie designed to mollify Black resistance is thus overcome.¹⁷.

The possibility of a complex totality is neither denied by recourse to 'sociological atomism' nor the variant forms of expressivism discussed in the context of our examination of neo-Marxist theory. The wholeness of the totality can only be established on the basis of distinct forms of conceptualisation: economic, political and ideological. Only then is it possible to establish the concept of race ideologies in terms of their effects at other levels. Clearly the theorisation of these effects can only seriously be undertaken with reference to an adequate conceptualisation of those other levels, a problem particularly evident in Section III when the effects of certain theoretical/ideological practices were suggested in the absence of a rigorous conjunctural analysis.

The extent to which ideologies intervene in the economy is clearly conditioned by the scope for such intervention: extended by the economy, i.e. in so far as the economy is permitted to reproduce its own conditions of existence. The possibility of intervention to the point of transition clearly enters the realm of the class struggle, an integral feature of Marxist theory and one to some extent glossed over in an attempt to produce a totality without recourse to an elaboration of its constituent parts.

Notes.

1. R.S. Franklin and S. Resnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-183.

2. O.C. Cox, Caste, Class and Race, op. cit., p. 320.
3. M. Weber, Economy and Society, op. cit.
4. T. Shibutani and M. Kwan, op. cit., p. 40.
5. E. Genovese, In Red and Black, op. cit., p. 396.
6. W.I. Thomas' dictum is quoted in full by S. Allen, New Minorities, Old Conflicts, p. 1. In developing this assumption she writes "In assessing the relations between races, however, what is important is not simply the state of our knowledge, as determined by the cautious investigations and tentative discussions of biologists, physical anthropologists, and psychologists but the ways in which those relations are defined in everyday life". (Emphasis added). Ibid, p. 7. The similarity with P. Berger and T. Luckman's social phenomenology may be seen in the following quotation: A sociology of knowledge "must concern itself" they argue, "with whatever passes for 'knowledge' in a society, regardless of the ultimate validity or invalidity of such 'knowledge'. And in so far as all human knowledge is developed, transmitted and maintained in social situations, the sociology of knowledge must seek to understand the processes by which this is done in such a way that a taken-for-granted reality congeals for the man in the street. In other words we contend that the Sociology of Knowledge is concerned with the social construction of reality". (Emphasis in original). P. Berger and T. Luckman, Social Construction of Reality, p. 15. For a similar approach to these problems from within Marxism see a paper by P. McNabb, I. Mellish and G. Ben-Tovim, 'Race and Educational Opportunity in Inner City Liverpool', "we are looking at the world as seen by the young black adult (to represent) ... some concrete realities and some comments on the processes that produce them". p. 2. (Emphasis added).
7. S. Castles and G. Kosack, op. cit., concluding chapter. The problems with respect to this form of critique have already been discussed.
8. See above p. 11 ff.
9. B. Semmel, op. cit., ch. II, p. 29ff.
10. M. Legassick, op. cit., p. 265.
11. Ibid, p. 277.
12. E. Genovese, In Red and Black, op. cit., p. 35.
13. It is interesting to note the extent to which Wolpe's essay in Economy and Society leans on Althusser's essay on 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. The analogous features of Althusser's essay to forms of sociological functionalism have been pointed out in Papers by J. Rancière, 'On the Theory of Ideology (The Politics of Althusser)' and P.Q. Hirst, 'Economic Practice and

Ideological Practice'. Wolpe's essay, which may be seen to reproduce this functionalism, differs little in principle however from his earlier contribution to S. Zubaida's collection, Race and Racialism, written apparently without the assistance of Althusser's essay.

14. The notion of practice attributed to Engels is developed in particular by L. Althusser in the essay 'On the Materialist Dialectic' in For Marx, pp. 161-218.
15. S. Castles and G. Kosack, Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe, op. cit. See also S. Allen, 'Race and the Economy: Some Aspects of the Position of non-Indigenous Labour'.
16. This is not to suggest the economy as a whole benefits; problems of extrapolation, in this sense, have been dealt with above in section I.
17. A particularly strange conception if the presence of cheap labour is also intended to fragment or 'divide and rule' the working class, see P. Baran and P. Sweezy, op. cit., p. 265 ff.

Conclusion.

The Problems of Critique in 'Applied' Sociological Research.

Conventional forms of classification both within and between each of the social sciences have from time to time been subject to certain forms of critical scrutiny.¹ The organisation of the social sciences into such disciplines as economic, politics, sociology and anthropology however provides a built-in tendency toward the reproduction of these distinctions. To some extent the same may be said of divisions within each of the above disciplines, though clearly the problem is not as acute. In sociology, for instance, there exist the potentially all-embracing areas of sociological theory and methodology which provide the possibility of confronting issues at a more general level of abstraction, and at the same time have implications for the more substantive areas of research. By and large however, the distinction between these two areas has been maintained, in common with divisions between the social sciences. To this extent this distinction has entailed similar consequences of a necessarily conservative nature.

The various 'sociologies of', what ever substantive form they take, operate according to a predefined set of methodological protocols and a limited range of conceptual variables. The race relations researcher 'operationalises'

notions of prejudice or discrimination via a limited range of procedural alternatives.

The case of discriminatory practices in employment, for instance, may involve a choice of two or three methods of investigation; the 'correspondence method' involving pairs of letters² (either of enquiry or in reply to advertisements), a questionnaire sent direct to employers³ or an assessment on the basis of interview results of a 'mixed' group of subjects and a number of prospective employees with a range of randomly selected employers.⁴ The race relations researcher would then collate his findings and assess in percentage terms the extent of discrimination in a particular firm, industry, area, etc. The contribution of the research itself is assessed in terms of the results and the particular method adopted. The latter may be justified on the basis of a critique of the alternative approaches referred to above. At this level of research, not only are the substantive concepts themselves assumed to be useful without question, but furthermore, given the technical differences that separate those alternative methods referred to above, there is also an assumption concerning the efficacy of empirical methods of investigation in general. The adoption of a limited range of concepts under a limited range of forms of operationalisation has produced a somewhat stereotyped pattern of research, not unlike that depicted by Allen and referred to in the Introduction. The problems, as we saw, were not confined to orthodox research in race relations, but appeared equally applicable to those

like Allen who recognised and attempted to transcend them. These are the consequences, it has been suggested, for forms of critique in a substantive discipline such as race relations where a significant corpus of knowledge remains conventionally (rather than logically) outside the scope of the researcher's or practitioner's terms of reference.

A critique, in the sense used here, involves a double-sided operation. The first involves the reconstruction of a specific position in terms of its flaws, inadequacies, incoherences etc. The nature of these inadequacies will depend on the criteria used themselves and may be seen to be the result of a determinate set of assumptions. The four types of critique elaborated in the Introduction each entail a specific set of assumptions concerning the nature of the knowledge process and, in some cases, the means by which it is possible to vouchsafe the results of that process. Such critiques may or may not be developed in a second operation, that is, the production of an alternative knowledge or knowledges on the basis of the foregoing critique. The 'empiricist' critique, for instance, addresses specific positions in terms of their match or fit with 'real' race relations situations. This particular critique then operates on the basis of a determinate set of assumptions concerning the fact/theory relationship. One theory is advanced in preference to another in terms of a fit with the facts, which are considered sole arbiters of the knowledge process.

The two-sided operation is by no means always fully elaborated in each of the other three forms of critique. The

conflict critique for instance, initially encountered in the Introduction and constituting in general terms a variant form of the neo-Marxist critique of orthodox race relations research,⁵ offers little in the way of a serious critique of existing positions but offers rather more in the way of an alternative, apparently more plausible, explanation of the 'phenomena' of race and racism. The 'critique' in this case, we suggested, barely moved beyond an elaboration of what was absent; history, theory (quite inaccurately as we discovered) without any attempt to elaborate why particular problems should be handled in this way and not in that. The alternative then was a historical/structural explanation of race, incorporating the essential dynamic elements of conflict into a hitherto 'static' analysis of race relations encountered in the 'immigrant-host' perspective and elsewhere.

The radical critique, strictly speaking and by its own admission, is not a critique as such. It does not attempt in the way the empiricist critique does, to establish a seemingly neutral arbiter that exists independently of theory and thereby able to exercise discretionary powers in terms of the comparative merits and demerits of particular theories. In the place of a realm of facts there does appear something external to, and independent of, the theory that is in some position to assess the relative adequacy of a particular theoretical statement. Here it is the individual who uses his own experience and values as a means of assessment in each case. If theory is conceived as a product of the values of the individual responsible for its production, then its

adequacy may be predicted in terms of the degree to which it coincides with the background experiences of those individuals it reaches.

The epistemological 'critique' addresses the usefulness or adequacy of a number of propositions in terms of their epistemological allegiance. We encountered two variant forms of this critique in Part One.

The one concentrates specifically on the empiricist assumptions of physical anthropology. These have laid bare the misconception that race as a taxonomic principle can be established on the basis of observation and random selection of criteria considered pertinent for classification. These were reproduced and elaborated there in conjunction with a form of critique aimed, not at the epistemological categories,⁶ but rather at the substantive relations that obtain between the race concept and those like species, natural selection, gene etc. with which it has generally been associated in orthodox race theory.

The second form of critique in this respect has formed the basis of an attempt to reconstitute the concept of race in sociological terms. This 'positive' contribution entailed the rejection of orthodox or classical race theory in terms of their behaviouristic assumptions. The biologisation of history was rejected as a universal principle of the elucidation of the state of man on the grounds that it lacked adequacy at the level of meaning. The contributions of Stark, Banton and Rex have reflected this position,

The problem common to all these critiques is that they have sought to establish the usefulness or adequacy of propositions in race theory, in its classical, sociological or neo-Marxist form, in terms of some referent external to and independent of the theory itself. Each form implies a number of assumptions concerning the production of race theory that cannot be explained with reference to race theory alone but nevertheless do rest, as we have seen, on certain theoretical assumptions. In the case of the empiricist critique it assumed a number of propositions concerning the relationship of theoretical to 'factual' statements. In the radical critique it assumed a number of propositions concerning the relationship of man, knowledge and society. In so far as epistemology is distinct from substantive relations in race theory, the final form of critique too has assumed some relationship of theory to some form of metatheory or theory of theories. The anti-empiricism of certain positions reproduced and elaborated in Part One can only address the operational procedures invoked to produce a concept of race. Substantive questions, i.e. those specific to race theory alone, involve the elaboration of certain propositions whose properties exist independently of those epistemological categories that constitute the operational context within which the race concept has been developed.

In contradistinction to these forms of critique, we have sought to establish in substantive terms the conceptual context within which race has been elaborated. Each of the above forms of critique has assumed a certain relationship

between theory and some external referent (facts, values/ experiences and, in the case of epistemology, some metatheory). In attempting to overcome these reductionist tendencies (i.e. the reduction of theory to something outside it) this thesis has attempted to establish the theoretical conditions of the existence of a race concept in sociology and neo-Marxist theory and their distinction from that produced in orthodox race theory.

This task presupposes an investigation that transcends the traditional parameters of orthodox sociological race relations research. In so doing it has subjected race theory in its broadest sense to a critique that has remained at the level of the concepts of race theory itself and not with reference to some external referent (whether these take the form of the facts of race relations situations, the experiences of an individual or epistemological categories).

The concepts of race and racism can only be fully grasped in terms of an analysis of the theoretical context in which they have been developed. Only then is it possible to establish relations of coherence, dependence or, in terms of the initial designation of theory, the necessity of relationships between concepts. In the course of this investigation it has been necessary to examine certain substantive issues in terms of their conceptual presuppositions. The thesis has thereby moved away from conventional research projects, viz. community studies, attitude tests, or studies of localised cultural variation (e.g. eating habits) to a series of problems and issues

conventionally reserved for mainstream sociological debate. One such area, particularly significant in the social sciences recently, is the distinction between Marxism and sociology and in this particular case, between sociological and neo-Marxist concepts of race and racism.

The Marxism/Sociology Debate in the Field of Race Relations.

The distinction between Marxism and sociology or conversely the possibility of a Marxist sociology, may be said to constitute one of the most contentious areas in the social sciences at the present time.⁷ The initial distinction made at the outset of this investigation between sociology and neo-Marxism is particularly apposite in this respect.

The debate for these purposes has clearly entailed a two-fold problem. The first concerns the justification for a distinction between the two fields at a general level of abstraction. The second clearly relatedly concerns the possibility of retaining the distinction in the field of race relations, assuming of course the general delineation is justified. In the first instance, then, it is necessary to distinguish the two problematics at a general level. This should be possible from this investigation given the extent to which it has addressed itself to concepts at this level of abstraction.

The investigation of social theories of race in the first instance reaffirmed the concept of social action as its basic concept. It was this concept that distinguished at the outset

the sociological from the non-sociological concept in classical or orthodox race theory. The concept of action, that is, behaviour directed on the basis of consciously or individually selected values, provided the possibility of reducing 'real biological' differences to 'ideas' about them. Any objective reality was now rendered superfluous. So long as individuals believed there to be differences, the sociologist of race was in business.

The problem for Weber, and for sociology in general, as we discovered in Part Two, concerns the subsequent inclusion of an account of the conditions of action in a theory that renders them superfluous or given data. Such 'conditions' have included both a realm of culturally-shared values (collectively shared, not individually chosen) and a number of quasi-autonomous systems, each of which required some concept of race or its derivatives (e.g. a prejudiced personality). The concept of social system, as we discovered, is ultimately reducible in Weber's work to the sphere of values. The concept of race in Weber's remarks on stratification appears as a variant form of status group, i.e. ultimately defined in a social order within which power is distributed according to prestige or honour. In so far as it appears confined to this relatively discrete category, it is also restricted to the sphere of values. These have either taken the form of values individually chosen on the basis of a significance or attachment to physical differences (in the case of Shibutani and Kwan, for instance), or imposed on the individual through cultural tradition and only then expressed through action.

The basic concepts of sociology are quite distinct from those of classical Marxist theory in this respect. The natural science/social science distinction (the epistemological basis, if we recall, of a social, as opposed to a natural, scientific, concept of race) and the subjective method is explicitly rejected here :

In what sense, then, does Marx speak of the economic law of motion of society, even referring to this law as a Naturgesetz - a law of nature ? How are we to understand this, when so many of our native sociologists have covered reams of paper to show that social phenomena are particularly distinct from the phenomena of natural history, and that therefore the investigation of the former requires the employment of an absolutely distinct "subjective method in sociology". 8.

Those propositions which Lenin seeks here to distinguish from Marxism in principle reproduce those designated as sociological throughout this investigation of the race concept. The role of values, if we recall the reproduction of certain of Weber's basic concepts, is central both as far as the sociologist is concerned and to the subject matter of his investigation, social action. This is equally true of Lenin's sociological contemporaries, as it is of more recent attempts to elaborate the basic concepts of the sociological problematic. The methods of investigation of one such group, the Narodniks, are clearly analogous to Weber's ideal-type form of investigation, procedures, it is important to note, that Lenin clearly sought to distinguish from Marxist theory.

The subjectivist sociologist, when he begins his argument supposedly with "Living individuals", actually begins by endowing these individuals with such "thoughts and feelings" as he considers rational ... And since, further, this sociologists's own ideas of what is rational reflect (without his realising it) the given social environment the final conclusions he draws from his argument, which

seem to him a "pure" product of "modern science and modern moral ideas" in fact only reflect the standpoint and interests ... of the petty-bourgeoisie. 9.

The role of consciousness, will or intention, which marks the point of departure, we have suggested throughout, of conventional classifications in sociological race theory remains a direct antithesis of classical Marxist theory as the following passage will indicate :

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, ... The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. 10.

The economic reading of the above passage has served in some ways to detract from the question of the role of determinate conditions 'in general' vis a vis any notion of consciousness.¹¹ In the case of the theory of the capitalist mode of production, for instance, (one set of determinate conditions) the role of consciousness embodied in the human subject is clearly subordinate to the role of individuals as economic categories.

To prevent misunderstanding, a word. I paint the capitalist and the landlord in no sense couleur de rose. But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as they are personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them. 12.

If the problematic of sociology reproduces the concepts of value-oriented action either individually conceived or a function of some cultural expression, the central concepts of

Marxist theory on the other hand (mode of production, determinate relations of production and productive forces) are in no way reducible to the sociological problematic. Consequently the transposition from one problematic to the other is only made at the cost of conceptual coherence.

Once the distinction is made at this level, i.e. in terms of the basic concepts of both Marxism and sociology, then the problem of superimposing a concept of race as it is at present constituted in the social sciences becomes more apparent. The difficulties, it has been suggested above in Part Three, derive, on the one hand, from the initial designation of a concept of race in terms of consciousness independent of any objective conditions (the point of transition from a biological to a social concept of race) and on the other, a theory of the capitalist mode of production resting on the specification and elaboration of its determinate conditions of existence. The tensions here, it has been suggested, preclude the realisation of a Marxist theory of race relations in the form in which both have traditionally been constituted. In the final paragraphs we shall attempt tentatively to reconstitute the race concept in a way that avoids these problems in addition to some of the major problems raised throughout the investigation.

So far we have reiterated some of the problems associated with the construction of a race concept in terms of the basic concepts of the sociological problematic. The concept of race has its own determinate conditions of existence, the specification of which has provoked a majority of neo-Marxists on the other hand to elaborate it in terms of a number of

seemingly economic exigencies. In other words, implicit in the arguments of the racism/capitalism thesis is the assumption that the conditions of existence of racist ideology lie specifically in the capitalist economy. Consequently, the argument goes, or at least should logically proceed, that once the conditions are removed, racism too disappears of its own volition. The problem of delineating the mechanism through which these economic exigencies have their effects at the ideological level was suggested in Part Three. The transition can only be made in terms of a conception of the social totality, wherein each part appears as an expression of the economic matrix. Not only is this theoretically unfeasible since the mechanism is clearly inaccessible to theory; it is also quite distinct, we have suggested, from Marxist theory.

The elaboration of determinate conditions does not necessarily entail the reproduction of some aspect of the economy or theory of the economy (e.g. the production of a surplus population, declining rate of profit, etc.). In other words, the speculative character of the sociological concept of race need not necessarily involve a recapitulation of the economist's position, nor for that matter, a return to some 'real' biological distinction which often seems to have been the case. The only possible way of conceiving race and racism, it has been suggested, (the two can now be 'married' as Nash somewhat prematurely demanded) is their initial designation in the realm of relatively autonomous theoretical or theoretical/ideological practices. Their conditions of existence can only be understood in terms of an analysis

specific to the particular ideological field in which they have been worked. In this sense, the field of sociological neo-Marxist theory is potentially as equally open to scrutiny as the seemingly 'obvious' ideologies of orthodox race theory.

This is precisely the assumption underlying this investigation of the field of race theory in so far as it has been examined predominantly in terms of its conceptual conditions of existence. In this sense the problem has continually been posed in terms of its solution. Internal differentiation at this theoretical/ideological level cannot hope to be extrapolated in terms of the capital-labour contradiction any more than it can be understood as an emergent product of will or intention. It can only be grasped at this level in terms of some distinguishing, and sometimes conceptually exclusive, characteristics which constitute the properties of the race concept in the fields of orthodox/sociological and neo-Marxist theory. In doing so, it becomes possible to confer a 'structure' on the race concept without recourse to the structureless field of the history of ideas,¹³ or to the structure of the economy which appears to certain misinformed Marxists to be the only structure worthy of the name. Consideration in this investigation has focussed in consequence on the structure of the ideological/theoretical form itself in an attempt to avoid reducing it to an effect of some all-determining force, either as a function of the capital-labour contradiction or as a function of the will and consciousness of the individual subject actor. It thereby becomes possible, as we suggested in Part Three, to reconstitute the ideological as an autonomous

zone within a complex totality. As a result, the concept of race is conceived in the first instance as an ideological form whose internal differences or contradictions may be understood as a function of determinate conceptual or notional¹⁴ conditions of existence. The elaboration of certain conceptual presuppositions lies at the heart of this exercise and consequently has played a central part in this investigation. The objective in this respect has been to elaborate those presuppositions without recourse to extra-ideological forms, in particular those that pertain to the forms of critique predominant in the field at the present time.

Once the problem is posed initially in these terms, it then becomes possible to theorise its effects, or rather the scope of its effects, at other levels without recourse to the variant forms of expressivism encountered above. The possibility of one such effect, for instance, has been realised in the area of legislative practices implemented in Great Britain and in the proposed areas of legislation embodied in the programmes of the major political parties. In Section III of Part Three its effects were witnessed at the level of certain of the current political programmes of a number of nationalist and/or socialist organisations. The political effects of the incorporation of the race concept into such programmes can only be fully elaborated in the context of a much fuller conjunctural analysis. At a certain level of abstraction, perhaps somewhat detached from such analysis, the content of such programmes as a whole appears, we have suggested, at odds with the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Similarly its effects at the level of the economy may be witnessed in certain selective employment practices¹⁵ and embodied in the programmes of certain trade union documents which may or may not be integrated into collective agreements with management.¹⁶ The scope of such intervention is clearly contingent on certain economic exigencies. It is not however these exigencies in the first instance that can be held accountable for the production of an ideological concept of race and the propagation of racist ideology. In this way not only is it possible to avoid the theoretical implications of the economists' position; it is also possible to avoid some of the practical problems that result from it. In particular there is the problem of reconciling some notion of an underclass regarded as synonymous with specific racial groups, with the existence of a large group of petty-bourgeois semi-professionals and professionals, again identified with a particular racial category that clearly contravenes the general principle. Furthermore it avoids the suggestion yet to be demonstrated theoretically that the ideology of race and racism will disappear of its own accord with the transition to an advanced communist mode of production.

This investigation has thus attempted one task and, in doing so, has posed a further set of problems; that is, the theorisation of the effects of specific ideologies at the levels of politics and the economy. A theory of the economy, in other words, that provides the conceptual possibility for the presence of specific ideologies, e.g. those connected with race, remains a problem. To reconstruct critically the

problematics of race theory in each of their variant forms, and to combat in the form of polemic or critique, the orthodox theorists (Jensen, Eysenck etc.) cannot hope to provide an adequate substitute for work in this direction.

Notes.

1. One of the most recent protests may be witnessed in the journal Economy and Society. In the first issue, for instance, the editors wrote, "Economy and Society rejects the view that it is sufficient to describe societies as aggregations of discrete institutions (whether political, economic, or social). Rather it is committed to a theoretical approach which is wholistic and which concentrates on systems of production and the division of labour, and on the related systems of domination and control, as the primary or core sectors of society". Editorial, Economy and Society, Vol. 1. No. 1. 1972.
2. See R. Jowell and P. Prescott-Clarke, 'Racial Discrimination and White-Collar Workers in Britain'.
3. See for instance S. Patterson, Immigrants in Industry, op. cit.
4. W.W. Daniel, Racial Discrimination in England, op. cit. p. 76 ff.
5. Clearly the similarity at the level of critique here reflects the analogous features of the 'immigrant-host' perspective reproduced in the Introduction and the terms of reference of sociological race relations. Both Patterson's and Benton's substantive studies serve as excellent illustrations of the more general position elaborated by Shibutani and Kwan concerning the interplay of distinct sets of cultural variables in the context of group interaction.
6. The use of 'categories' here as opposed to 'concepts' has been made by M. Castells and E. de Ipola, 'Epistemological Practice and the Social Sciences', p.114.
7. For some of the more important contributions in this debate, it is necessary to distinguish those who seek to reconcile sociology (or variants of the sociological problematic) and Marxism, from those who have sought to retain the distinction. Clearly the number of sociological readings of Marx are too numerous to list here. For a review of these positions, see B. Smart, Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis, ch. 2. The work of existential and phenomenological Marxism (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and the Frankfurt school) offer some of the more explicit attempts to reconcile the two on the basis of a specific reading of the sociological

and Marxist problematics. The two notable attempts to distinguish Marxism from sociology may be found in P.Q. Hirst, 'Marx and Engels on Law, Crime and Morality', where he attempts to demonstrate not only a distinction between Marxian and sociological theories of crime, but also between the work of the early and late Marx. (In this respect it may be considered analagous to Althusser's attempt in For Marx to distinguish the problematics of the early and late Marx.) See also M. Shaw, 'The Coming Crisis of Radical Sociology' in Ideology in Social Science: Readings in Critical Social Theory, ed. R. Blackburn.

8. V.I. Lenin, What the "Friends of the People" are and How They Fight the Social-Democrate, p. 10.
9. V.I. Lenin, 'The Economic Content of Narodism', in Collected Works, Vol. 1, p. 406, (and the criticism of it in Mr. Struve's book). Drawing an even closer analogy to the ideal-type construct, Lenin goes on: "but though you talk of "living individuals", you actually make your starting-point not the "living individuals", with the "thoughts and feelings" actually created by his conditions of life, by the given system of relations of production, but a marionette, and stuff its head with your own "thoughts and feelings"', pp. 408-409.
10. K. Marx, 'Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', p. 182, in Selected Works in One Volume, K. Marx and F. Engels.
11. See on this point B. Hindess and P.Q. Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
12. K. Marx, Preface to the First German Edition of Capital, Vol. 1, pp. 20-21.
13. The recurrent feature of the history of ideas, it was suggested in Part One, was the containment of discussion to the presences of the race concept depicted in linear fashion by historians/sociologists. The object of this discussion has been on the contrary to provide, in conceptual terms, the structural framework within which the race concept has been worked and the analysis of the concept has taken place primarily in terms of its structural (i.e. conceptual) conditions of existence.
14. 'Notions' in ideology are sometimes distinguished from scientific concepts. The distinction has not rigidly been enforced here since all propositions, scientific or ideological, have their own conditions of existence. Unless some form of a priori distinction is to be made, each must be subject to similar forms of discursive treatment.
15. See for example, G. Ben-Tovim, 'Discrimination by Post: A Study of racial discrimination in the response of Liverpool employers to written job-applications'.

16. The element of 'choice' then does enter into the argument here, but as far as the employer is concerned it is contingent on the nature and scope of determinate ideologies available to him. The purchase of cheap labour however, while it may 'appear' expedient for a particular employer, may not be a precondition for the reproduction of the economic system as a whole, (the 'economists'' position). Clearly the scope then of choice is limited both in terms of determinate ideologies and the adequate provision for the reproduction of economic conditions. The position taken here then to this extent is also quite distinct from positions (Genovese's for instance) that effectively denegate the role of autonomous ideological (and economic) practices by reducing them to the effects of self-consciousness.

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