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# An exploration of within-herd dynamics of a transboundary livestock disease: a foot and mouth disease case study

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## Abstract

Transboundary livestock diseases are a high priority for policy makers because of the serious economic burdens associated with infection. In order to make well informed preparedness and response plans, policy makers often utilize mathematical models to understand possible outcomes of different control strategies and outbreak scenarios. Many of these models focus on the transmission between herds and the overall trajectory of the outbreak. While the course of infection within herds has not been the focus of the majority of models, a thorough understanding of within-herd dynamics can provide valuable insight into a disease system by providing information on herd-level biological properties of the infection, which can be used to inform decision making in both endemic and outbreak settings and to inform larger between-herd models. In this study, we develop three stochastic simulation models to study within-herd foot and mouth disease dynamics and the implications of different empirical data-based assumptions about the timing of the onset of infectiousness and clinical signs. We also study the influence of herd size and the proportion of the herd that is initially infected on the outcome of the infection. We find that increasing herd size increases the duration of infectiousness and that the size of the herd plays a more significant role in deter-

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
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mining this duration than the number of initially infected cattle in that herd. We also find that the assumptions made regarding the onset of infectiousness and clinical signs, which are based on contradictory empirical findings, can result in the predictions about when infection would be detectable differing by several days. Therefore, the disease progression used to characterize the course of infection in a single bovine host could have significant implications for determining when herds can be detected and subsequently controlled; the timing of which could influence the overall predicted trajectory of outbreaks.

*Keywords:* transboundary livestock disease, foot and mouth disease, within-herd dynamics, herd size

## 1 Graphical Abstract



## 2 Highlights

- Within-herd dynamics of transboundary livestock diseases affect outbreak outcomes.

- 4 • In the FMD system, empirical studies show differing disease progressions in cattle.
- 5 • Herd detectability differs by several days depending on assumed disease progression.
- 6 • Herd size impacts infectious duration more than number of cattle initially infected.

## 7 **Introduction**

8 Mathematical models, including agent-based and hybrid models, are part of the tool-  
9 set that policy makers deploy to inform decisions regarding the potential for outbreaks of  
10 transboundary livestock diseases, such as foot and mouth disease (FMD), highly pathogenic  
11 avian influenza (HPAI), and African swine fever (ASF) (Webb et al., 2017; Schoenbaum and  
12 Terry Disney, 2003; Probert et al., 2016; Keeling et al., 2001; Tildesley et al., 2006; Yoon  
13 et al., 2006; Willeberg et al., 2011; Buhnerkempe et al., 2014; Tsao et al., 2014; Savill et al.,  
14 2006; O’Neill et al., 2020; Hill et al., 2017; Retkute et al., 2018; Lange et al., 2018; EFSA  
15 et al., 2018; Hill et al., 2018). These diseases have the potential to spread rapidly across  
16 international borders and cause serious, sometimes catastrophic, economic and agricultural  
17 losses in non-endemic countries (Paarlberg et al., 2008; Thompson et al., 2002). Often these  
18 models focus on transmission between herds (Keeling et al., 2001; Tildesley et al., 2006;  
19 Buhnerkempe et al., 2014; Tildesley et al., 2008; Keeling, 2005; Pomeroy et al., 2015a; Tsao  
20 et al., 2019). However, models of between herd spread often make a simplifying assumption  
21 that herds are either susceptible or infected. The reality is more subtle as within-herd  
22 dynamics impact the force of infection from a herd (Keeling, 2005). Thus, understanding  
23 the outbreak trajectory within a herd can provide important information for understanding  
24 the biology of transboundary disease systems, including the transmission behavior and the  
25 potential for disease detection. This information can also be used to inform decision making  
26 and developing policy, and in parameterizing larger between-herd models.

27 A primary focus of policy intended to mitigate transboundary livestock diseases in non-  
28 endemic countries has been to reduce the potential for fast spreading infections. Due to their

29 fast spread rates, models often make the assumption that once infection is introduced the  
30 entire herd or flock, functioning as a single unit, can be considered infected and subsequently  
31 infectious. This is a justifiable assumption in large-scale outbreak models because inference  
32 is often on large-scale control policies whose implementation occurs over months or weeks  
33 compared to the smaller timescale of within-herd dynamics. Additionally, there is often  
34 limited data on infection dynamics at this scale (Keeling, 2005). The assumption is also  
35 more tractable because it allows herds, flocks or premises to be treated as a single entity.  
36 Assuming the entire herd or flock is a single unit is a simplifying assumption but it provides  
37 policy makers with metrics of interest about potential outbreaks, including the number of  
38 potential herds or flocks infected and the spatial extent. However, some outbreak metrics  
39 of interest to policy makers are influenced by within-herd dynamics, particularly overall  
40 outbreak duration (Chis Ster et al., 2012; Gilbertson et al., 2022), which is important for  
41 understanding potential economic impacts and can be underestimated by models that do  
42 not include within-herd dynamics.

43 Studies exploring the potential impact of within-herd dynamics on outbreak disease pro-  
44 gressions are often done using information from data collected in outbreaks, which often  
45 includes the day of reporting, the location, control actions taken and, if available, an in-  
46 ferred infection date. These data are invaluable and have been used effectively for numerous  
47 studies (Keeling et al., 2001; Keeling, 2005; Tildesley et al., 2006, 2008, 2009; Keeling et al.,  
48 2003; Hayama et al., 2012, 2013; Perez et al., 2004b,a; Ward and Perez, 2004; Ferguson, 2001;  
49 Ferguson et al., 2001). However, it can be difficult to parameterize within-herd models using  
50 outbreak data. One reason for this is there is uncertainty in the estimated date of infection  
51 for herds and these data are not always collected during outbreak situations (Keeling et al.,  
52 2001; Perez et al., 2004b; Muroga et al., 2012). Additionally during an outbreak, premises  
53 that are identified as being infected or at higher risk from infection are often controlled as  
54 quickly as possible (Anderson, 2002; Muroga et al., 2012; Perez et al., 2004b), which means  
55 that the full progression of infection within a herd or flock is not realized. For instance at

56 the end of March in the U.K. 2001 FMD outbreak, herds that were identified as infected  
57 were supposed to be culled within 24 hours, and those that were identified to be at higher  
58 risk (dangerous contacts) were culled within 48 hours (Anderson, 2002), meaning that in-  
59 fected herds were removed from the population before the infection fully progressed through  
60 the herd. In endemic settings, serological data are available (Pomeroy et al., 2015b); how-  
61 ever, the complex interactions between immunology and the different circulating serotypes  
62 can make it difficult to understand the progression of a single strain in an immunologically  
63 naive population. Parameterization through serological data also requires repeated sampling  
64 through time, which is not always available or feasible.

65 Another difficulty is that outbreak data available to researchers usually report the entire  
66 herd or flock as infected rather than reporting the number of animals that are infected.  
67 This means that even with an inferred infection date, there is little information available to  
68 understand how the route (e.g. fomite, imported animal) of pathogen introduction impacts  
69 the dynamics. For example, it is unknown if a shipment of one or two infected animals  
70 into a herd will result in different dynamics than if twenty percent of the herd or flock  
71 was infected via local spread (i.e. transmission through a non-shipment related event).  
72 Understanding how the number or proportion of the initially infected population within a  
73 herd or flock influences disease dynamics could be important for allocating control strategies  
74 and understanding both within and between entity transmission.

75 A factor that can further complicate the parameterization of within-herd models is that  
76 estimates of epidemiological parameters from experimental infections are often based on  
77 proxies of infectiousness rather than direct observations of transmission (Clancy et al., 2006;  
78 Bos et al., 2009; Rohani et al., 2009; Mardones et al., 2010; Charleston et al., 2011; Ypma  
79 et al., 2013). Using a coupled experimental design, Charleston et al. (2011) showed that the  
80 timing of clinical signs and the onset of infectiousness of FMD in cattle changes depending  
81 on the methods used to identify infectious animals (Charleston et al., 2011). Results from  
82 a transmission challenge experiment suggest that cattle develop clinical signs shortly before

83 they are capable of transmitting the virus to other susceptible cattle; however, if cattle are  
84 monitored using more traditional measures of viremia in various bodily fluids, the results  
85 suggest they are infectious before they show clinical signs. The two differing disease progres-  
86 sions in cattle, one suggested by the transmission challenge experiment, one suggested by  
87 traditional measures, could manifest in different dynamics within a herd and could impact  
88 the length of time a herd is infectious as well as the detectability assumptions about that  
89 herd. The results presented in Charleston et al. (2011) also suggest that FMD progression in  
90 cattle may differ from the progression in pigs (Charleston et al., 2011; Stenfeldt et al., 2016;  
91 Paton et al., 2018). Uncertainty in the timing of disease stages, such as periods when animals  
92 are infectious or showing clinical signs, has also been acknowledged in other transboundary  
93 livestock diseases, including HPAI and ASF (Bos et al., 2007; Backer et al., 2009; Guinat  
94 et al., 2017). Uncertainty in disease stages, both within a species or among different species,  
95 could have ramifications for detection, and possibly control or surveillance, in both endemic  
96 and epidemic disease situations. In outbreaks, the time to detection is considered a critical  
97 factor in minimizing potential losses (Carpenter et al., 2011; Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2013);  
98 therefore, exploring the impact of uncertainty and, in the case of FMD, conflicting findings  
99 on the disease stages would be highly beneficial both for policy makers and modeling groups.

100 In this study, we focus on developing within-herd models for one transboundary live-  
101 stock disease, FMD, which is a highly contagious virus that infects divided hoofed animals,  
102 including important livestock species such as cattle, sheep, and pigs (Haydon et al., 2004).  
103 FMD outbreaks are expensive because of the restrictions on trade that are placed on infected  
104 countries and the control measures implemented by non-endemic countries (Anderson, 2002;  
105 Thompson et al., 2002; Knight-Jones and Rushton, 2013). This makes FMD a policy con-  
106 cern for both countries that are not infected and for countries that are dealing with endemic  
107 spread. The United States (U.S.) has not experienced an FMD outbreak in almost a cen-  
108 tury, and as with many FMD-free countries, preparing for the potential introduction of FMD  
109 means having to rely on information gained from outbreaks in other countries; this includes

110 information on between and within-herd spread. Understanding how within-herd dynamics  
111 may be influenced by the factors discussed above will be helpful for informing assumptions  
112 about larger-scale between herd processes and control.

113 For epidemic FMD, it is rare that models focus solely on within-herd dynamics. More  
114 often within-herd models are embedded in the larger between-herd models that are of more  
115 interest for policy and preparedness. There are a few notable exceptions where within-  
116 herd dynamics or transmission have been specifically studied (Chis Ster et al., 2012; Brito  
117 et al., 2011; Carpenter et al., 2004). These studies have focused on understanding the role  
118 within-herd dynamics or transmission played in previous outbreaks of FMD (Chis Ster et al.,  
119 2012; Brito et al., 2011), and improving our understanding of the epidemiology, detection  
120 (Chis Ster et al., 2012), vaccination (Brito et al., 2011) and diagnostics (Carpenter et al.,  
121 2004). From these studies, it is clear that within-herd dynamics do affect the overall outbreak  
122 trajectory or parameter estimates and that there are a number of unknowns associated with  
123 understanding within-herd dynamics, including a quantitative exploration of the animals  
124 initially infected in a herd (Chis Ster et al., 2012).

125 Here, we performed a systematic exploration of the impact of herd size, the number of  
126 animals initially infected within herds, and model structure (disease progression) to develop  
127 a better understanding of within-herd FMD dynamics in cattle. We developed a set of three  
128 stochastic compartmental models of within-herd FMD, which are based on the differing as-  
129 sumptions about disease progression that could be made based on experimental studies. By  
130 running simulations with these models across herd sizes from 5–10,000 head and initial in-  
131 fection sizes representing 1–25% of the herd, we quantified how these herd characteristics  
132 impact the length of time a herd is infectious and potentially contributing to onward spread.  
133 Additionally, we investigated the predicted differences in the detectability of infected herds  
134 between model structures. The results from these models provide information about the  
135 length of time herds of different sizes could be infectious and the impact the inclusion of  
136 within-herd dynamics may have on overall outbreak dynamics. By exploring the effect of



137 disease progression on predictions, these results show that uncertainty in the progression also  
138 results in uncertainty in herd detectability which could have impacts on decision making.  
139 These results also provide predictions that could be used to inform nation-scale between-herd  
140 outbreak models, including assumptions about the reporting of infected herds and possibly  
141 the timing of control in relation to onset of infectiousness. Together these results provide  
142 information about how herd demographics and assumptions about disease progression im-  
143 pact the predictions about a transboundary disease system and point to the importance of  
144 understanding the underlying biology.

## 145 **Methods**

146 We developed three stochastic compartmental models to study the within-herd dynamics  
147 of FMD in cattle. The three model structures reflect the differing disease progression results  
148 from empirical studies (Charleston et al., 2011; Mardones et al., 2010) and are all variations  
149 on standard susceptible, exposed, infectious, removed (SEIR) models. For all three model  
150 variants, we make the assumption that we are dealing with a closed population, such that  
151 there are no births, deaths, emigration or immigration. The speed of FMD spread through  
152 a herd is on a faster time scale than the processes affecting the herd size and can therefore  
153 justify this assumption. We also make the assumption that the cattle herd is immunologically  
154 naive, which mimics the situation in an outbreak setting or in an endemic situation with a  
155 novel strain, as there is little cross-immunity between strains (Paton and Taylor, 2011).

156 We assume that FMD will be introduced into a herd through the exposed class, rather  
157 than through the infectious class. We make this assumption because it is the first disease  
158 stage, and regardless of model variant, the exposed stage is both non-infectious and without  
159 clinical signs. Since there is not clear experimental evidence for within-herd FMD transmis-  
160 sion being density- or frequency-dependent, we built both transmission types for our three  
161 model variants. There is some evidence that between-herd transmission of FMD is density-  
162 dependent (Ferrari et al., 2011), and we therefore present the density-dependent versions

163 of the models in the main text and the frequency-dependent versions in the Supplementary  
164 Methods.

165 The first model, which will hereafter be referred to as the Base model, is an SEIR  
166 model (Figure S1). In this model, we assume that cattle are infectious and clinical in the  
167 infectious stage, such that cattle become infectious and detectable at the same time. This  
168 model represents the simplest assumption regarding relative timing of infectiousness and  
169 clinical signs and is therefore useful as a benchmark for comparing with the other two models  
170 presented below. Cattle move through the compartments of the Base model as follows:

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\beta SI \tag{1}$$

$$\frac{dE}{dt} = \beta SI - \sigma E \tag{2}$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \sigma E - \gamma I \tag{3}$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \gamma I \tag{4}$$

171 where,  $S$ ,  $E$ ,  $I$ ,  $R$  represent susceptible, exposed, infectious, and removed individuals, respec-  
172 tively. The transmission rate is given by  $\beta$ , the transition between exposed and infectious  
173 (infectious rate) is given by  $\sigma$  and the recovery rate is given by  $\gamma$ . The stage transition rates  
174 for this model and the following two models are in units of days<sup>-1</sup> (Table S1). Equations  
175 1–4 show density dependent transmission (see the Supplemental Methods for the equations  
176 describing frequency-dependent transmission).

177 The second model, which will be called the Clinical First model, includes an additional  
178 compartment for cattle that are showing clinical signs but are not yet infectious. This model  
179 follows the results of the transmission challenge experiment conducted by (Charleston et al.,  
180 2011). The Clinical First model compartments are: Susceptible, Exposed, Clinical Not  
181 Infectious, Infectious & Clinical, Removed (SEAIR) (Figure S2). The model equations are  
182 given by:

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\beta SI_1 \quad (5)$$

$$\frac{dE}{dt} = \beta SI_1 - \phi E \quad (6)$$

$$\frac{dA_1}{dt} = \phi E - \omega A_1 \quad (7)$$

$$\frac{dI_1}{dt} = \omega A_1 - \theta I_1 \quad (8)$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \theta I_1 \quad (9)$$

183 assuming density-dependent transmission. The transmission rate,  $\beta$ , is the same parameter  
 184 as used in the base model. The stages are given by  $S$ ,  $E$ ,  $A_1$ ,  $I_1$ ,  $R$ , where  $S$ ,  $E$ , and  $R$  are  
 185 the same as the Base model and  $A_1$ , and  $I_1$  represent the clinical not infectious, and clinical  
 186 and infectious stages unique to the Clinical First model. The rate of transition from exposed  
 187 to clinical not infectious is given by  $\phi$ , the rate from clinical not infectious, to clinical and  
 188 infectious, is given by  $\omega$  and the recovery rate is given by  $\theta$ .

189 The third model will be called the Infectious First model, and follows the results from  
 190 measures of viremia in fluid. In this model variant, cattle are assumed to be infectious before  
 191 they show clinical signs. The five compartments of the Infectious First model are: Suscepti-  
 192 ble, Exposed, Infectious Not Clinical, Infectious & Clinical, Removed (SEIAR) (Figure S3)  
 193 and is described by:

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = -\beta S(I_2 + A_2) \quad (10)$$

$$\frac{dE}{dt} = \beta S(I_2 + A_2) - \eta E \quad (11)$$

$$\frac{dI_2}{dt} = \eta E - \rho I_2 \quad (12)$$

$$\frac{dA_2}{dt} = \rho I_2 - \mu A_2 \quad (13)$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \mu A_2 \quad (14)$$

194 assuming density-dependent transmission. The transmission rate,  $\beta$ , is the same parameter  
195 as used in the base model. The stages are given by  $S$ ,  $E$ ,  $A_2$ ,  $I_2$ ,  $R$ , where  $S$ ,  $E$ , and  $R$   
196 are the same as the base model and  $A_2$ , and  $I_2$  represent the infectious not clinical, and  
197 clinical and infectious stages unique to the Infectious First model. The rate of transition  
198 from exposed to infectious not clinical is given by  $\eta$ , the rate from infectious not clinical, to  
199 clinical and infectious, is given by  $\rho$  and the recovery rate is given by  $\mu$ .

200 All three model variants were parameterized from the empirical cattle study by Charleston  
201 et al. (2011) (Table S1). We chose to use this study because it experimentally estimates  
202 each model parameter and uses Bayesian inference to estimate uncertainty in each param-  
203 eter estimate, which is used in the sensitivity analysis described below. Charleston et al.  
204 (2011) also allows consistent parameterization methods among models because it coupled a  
205 transmission challenge experiment with measurements of viremia in bodily fluids. Whilst  
206 the results from the transmission challenge part of the Charleston et al. study are differ-  
207 ent from results previously reported, the results from the measures of viremia are consistent  
208 with previous FMD studies (Mardones et al., 2010; Charleston et al., 2011). The Base model  
209 and Clinical First models were parameterized using the transmission challenge experiments;  
210 however, in the Clinical First model, the exposed stage is split into two so that there is  
211 a distinct stage for clinical but not yet infectious cattle. The Infectious First model was  
212 also parameterized using the same experiment, but Charleston et al. (2011) defined the  
213 infectious state based on a commonly used proxy for infectiousness: detection of the virus  
214 in fluids by PCR. Specifically, Charleston et al. (2011) measured viremia in blood, nasal  
215 fluid, and oesophageal-pharyngeal fluid (OPF), which resulted in three estimates for stage  
216 durations (Charleston et al., 2011). Therefore, we used three different parameterizations for  
217 the Infectious First model, corresponding to the different fluids.

218 Twelve herd sizes ranging from 5 to 10,000 head were selected based on the category  
219 divisions in the NASS Agricultural Census herd sizes (USDA, 2014). For each herd size,  
220 infection was seeded with 1%, 5%, 10%, and 25% of the herd initially infected with the

221 virus. For smaller herd sizes, the initial number of animals exposed at the start of the  
222 simulation will either be the stated percentage above or 1 animal, whichever is larger. For  
223 larger herds, the initial number of animals exposed will be the stated percentage above or 100  
224 animals, whichever is smaller. All percentages will be rounded to the nearest whole animal,  
225 see Table S2 for a complete list of herd sizes and the number of initially exposed animals.  
226 All models were stochastically simulated using the adaptive tau-leaping method (Cao et al.,  
227 2007) coded in the R programming language (version 3.0.3) with the adaptivetau package  
228 (Team, R Core, 2014; Johnson, 2019). We ran 1000 simulations for each combination of  
229 model variation, initial condition, and parameter set.

230 We analyzed the results to estimate the length of time in days herds are predicted to be  
231 infectious. For the Base and Clinical First models, this is the length of time cattle remain  
232 in the infectious ( $I$  and  $I_1$ , respectively) class. For the Infectious First model, the length  
233 of time animals are infectious is the total length of time they are in either the Infectious  
234 Not Clinical stage ( $I_2$ ) or the Infectious and Clinical stage ( $A_2$ ). As we are interested in  
235 understanding the potential ramifications of when cattle become detectable, for the Clinical  
236 First and Infectious First models we also studied the length of time the cattle could be  
237 detectable before they are infectious and the length of time cattle could be shedding virus  
238 before they are detectable, respectively. For Clinical First model, the length of time before  
239 cattle are clinical but not yet infectious, is the length of time they remain in the Clinical  
240 Not Infectious stage ( $A_1$ ). For Infectious First model, we are interested in the length of time  
241 cattle are in the Infectious Not Clinical stage ( $I_2$ ). For each of these quantities of interest  
242 we found the median and the 2.5 and 97.5th quantiles.

243 We conducted a sensitivity analysis to assess the relative importance of herd size, num-  
244 ber of initially infected animals, and each epidemiological parameter for the length of time  
245 herds are infectious. Using Latin Hypercube Sampling, we generated 1000 epidemiological  
246 parameter values for the 4 herd sizes between 100 and 1000 head, and 4 initially infected  
247 sizes, resulting in 16,000 parameter sets (Marino et al., 2008). The sensitivity analysis was

248 localized to the epidemiological parameter ranges based on the 95% credible interval from  
249 the Charleston et al. (2011) study (Table S1). We calculated model sensitivity based on the  
250 median infection times from 1000 simulations of each parameter set. We define sensitivity  
251 as the change in infection time for one standard deviation change in each parameter and  
252 use a linear regression to assess the contribution of each parameter as well as interaction  
253 terms between parameters (Buhnerkempe et al., 2014; Tsao et al., 2019). We report anal-  
254 yses for each model separately and for the Infectious First model focus on the viremia in  
255 blood parameterization sensitivity results.


## 256 **Results**

257 The results from all three model variants, the three parameterizations of Infectious First  
258 model and both the transmission types, show that the length of time herds are infectious  
259 increases with increasing herd size (Figures 1 & S4-S5). We see very little difference between  
260 the results from the density and frequency-dependent transmission versions of the models.  
261 Similarly, there are only slight differences between model variants in the predicted length of  
262 time herds are infectious. The largest difference in the predicted duration of infectiousness  
263 is between the blood parameterization of the Infectious First model and all other model  
264 variants and parameterizations. The blood parameterization of the Infectious First model  
265 predicts that at larger herd sizes, the length of time the herds will be infectious is lower than  
266 the predictions from other parameterizations and model variants, such that the slope of the  
267 duration of infectiousness by herd size is lower for the blood parameterization (Figure 1c &  
268 S4c).


269 Our results also indicate that the size of the herd is more important in determining  
270 the length of time the herd will be infectious than the number of animals initially infected  
271 (Figures 1 & S4-S5). This is also supported by results from the sensitivity analysis. Herd size  
272 is consistently the best predictor of infection duration while the initial size of the infected  
273 population has a minimal effect (Figure 2 & S6). For example, in the base model assuming

274 1% of a herd is initially infected, an increase in herd size from 100 to 1000 individuals is  
275 associated with an increase in the median duration the herd is predicted to be infectious  
276 by 10.4 days. An increase in the initially infected size from 1% to 5% is associated with no  
277 changes in duration. Epidemiological parameters are also more important than the initial  
278 size of the infected population in influencing the duration a herd will be infectious. Longer  
279 exposed and infectious periods are associated with longer infection times.


280 In the Clinical First model, cattle develop clinical signs before becoming infectious, such  
281 that the virus may be detectable before transmission begins. Our results indicate that the  
282 median estimated length of time that herds could be showing clinical signs but not transmit-  
283 ting is less than half a day for both the density and frequency-dependent models (Figures 3  
284 & S7-S8). The duration that herds show clinical signs is sensitive to epidemiological param-  
285 eters but not herd size or initial infection size (Figure 4). However, there is more variation  
286 at smaller herd sizes than those studied in the sensitivity analysis; the estimated 97.5th  
287 quantile for herds of 20 or smaller being 2 days and for herds of 5 being 3 days. The results  
288 of the Clinical First model suggest that detecting the infection in cattle herds before the  
289 onset of transmission would be unlikely but that the chances increase in small herds.



(a) Base model



(b) Clinical First model



(c) Infectious First model

Figure 1: The length of time in days herds of 100 to 1000 head are infectious assuming density-dependent transmission. The top x-axes show the number of animals initially exposed to the FMD virus and the bottom axis shows the herd size. The Base model results are shown in panel (a), Clinical First model results are in panel (b) and Infectious First model results are in panel (c). On the Infectious First model plot (c), the round points show results using OPF parameters, triangle points show results using nasal fluid parameters and square points show results using blood parameters.






Figure 2: Sensitivity analyses across model parameters. Effect size represents linear regression coefficients and 95% confidence interval for models fit to the median duration a herd is infectious in the (a) Base model, (b) Clinical First model, and (c) Infectious First model assuming density-dependent transmission. We have standardized both predictor and response variables for comparison among parameters.




Figure 3: Median length of time herds of size 100 to 1000 head are predicted by the Clinical First model to have cattle with clinical signs that are not infectious assuming density-dependent transmission with the 2.5 and 97.5 quantiles. The x-axis shows the initial size of the exposed population. The color of the points and lines correspond to the herd size, shown in the legend.




Figure 4: Sensitivity analyses across model parameters for (a) the median length of time herds could be showing clinical signs but not transmitting and (b) the median length of time herds are transmitting the virus without clinical signs. Effect size represents linear regression coefficients for models fit to the median duration a herd is infectious assuming density-dependent transmission. We have standardized both predictor and response variables for comparison among parameters.




Figure 5: Sensitivity analyses across model parameters for models assuming frequency-dependent transmission. Model sensitivities are displayed for (a) the median length of time herds could be showing clinical signs but not transmitting and (b) the median length of time herds are transmitting the virus without clinical signs. Effect size represents linear regression coefficients for models fit to the median duration a herd is infectious assuming density dependent transmission. We have standardized both predictor and response variables for comparison among parameters.

290 In the Infectious First model, cattle develop clinical signs after becoming infectious,  
 291 such that cattle may be transmitting the virus for several days before they are visually  
 292 detectable. Our results show that the median length of time herds can be transmitting the  
 293 virus without clinical signs is 2 days for the majority of herd sizes, number of initially infected,  
 294 and parameterizations (Figure 6 & S9). This also holds for both the density and frequency-  
 295 dependent versions of this model, though there is a bit more variation in the frequency-  
 296 dependent case (Figures 6 & S9-S10). The variation in the length of time that herds can  
 297 be silently transmitting ranges between one and four days, with the variation decreasing  
 298 as herd size increases (Figure 6 & S9). The duration of transmission prior to clinical signs  
 299 is less sensitive to epidemiological parameters than the duration of clinical signs but no  
 300 infectiousness from the Clinical First model. Instead the duration of infectiousness without  
 301 clinical signs is slightly sensitive to herd size, number of initially infected, the epidemiological

302 parameters and some of the interaction terms (Figure 4 & 5).




Figure 6: Median length of time herds of size 100 to 1000 head are predicted by the Infectious First model to have infectious cattle that are not yet showing clinical signs assuming density-dependent transmission with the 2.5 and 97.5 quantiles. The x-axis is the number of initially exposed animals. The color of the points and lines correspond to the herd size, shown in left legend. The round points show results using OPF parameters, triangle points show results using nasal fluid parameters and square points show results using blood parameters (right legend).

## 303 Discussion

304 The length of time a herd or premises is infectious is important to decision makers and  
305 a parameter common to many livestock disease models (Backer et al., 2009; Buhnerkempe  
306 et al., 2014; Bradhurst et al., 2015; Carpenter et al., 2004; Gulenkin et al., 2011; Jewell  
307 et al., 2009; Keeling et al., 2001; Tildesley et al., 2006; Tsao et al., 2019; Hayama et al.,  
308 2013; Ward et al., 2008). This value is often estimated from outbreak data, which can be  
309 difficult because herds are often identified and controlled before the full infection dynamics  
310 are observed such that the estimated infectious times may be too short. Using empirical  
311 studies to parameterize herd-level infection parameters removes the uncertainty and uncon-  
312 trolled elements of infection dynamics observed in outbreaks; however, these data are on the  
313 individual animal-level, which does not necessarily provide a good estimation of a herd-level  
314 duration of infection. Our study provides estimates of the infectious period of FMD at the  
315 herd-level when the infection is allowed to run its course without intervention. Our results

316 suggest that if left uncontrolled, herds can transition from having very few infected animals  
317 to many infected animals rapidly. Additionally, once infected, herds may be infectious for  
318 several weeks to over a month for larger herds. From these results, we can see that the  
319 duration of infectiousness is highly influenced by the size of the herd.

320 Our results also indicate that the size of the herd is more important in determining  
321 the length of time the herd is infectious than the initial size of the infected population  
322 regardless of the model variant or the transmission version of the models. The sensitivity  
323 analysis also supports the importance of herd size in determining the length of time herds  
324 are infectious. This finding suggests that large farms could drive between farm transmission  
325 by being both more transmissible and by staying infectious longer and that therefore, from  
326 a policy perspective, large farms should be considered for targeted control in the event of an  
327 outbreak. This finding also suggests that in larger between-herd spread models, accounting  
328 for herd size may be the most important variable for estimating the length of time herds  
329 will be infectious and is more important for capturing the dynamics than the number of  
330 animals that initiated the infection in that herd. The relationship between initially infected  
331 population and duration is extremely hard to estimate from observed data because of the  
332 many different factors influencing the outbreak. Additionally, while we estimate herd size to  
333 be more important in determining duration than the proportion of the herd initially infected  
334 for cattle only premises that are infected at a single time point, in an epidemic setting  
335 herds may be infected through multiple routes at different times which has the potential to  
336 change the dynamics. Additionally, the presence of multiple species on a single premises may  
337 change the interaction between the proportion of the herd initially infected, the herd size  
338 and the duration. Within-herd FMD dynamics on multi-species premises may be particularly  
339 complex because not all susceptible species have the same disease progression (Charleston  
340 et al., 2011; Stenfeldt et al., 2016; Paton et al., 2018).

341 The duration of the infectious period chosen in models may not have a substantial impact  
342 on outbreak scenarios that are well controlled; however, this parameter could have measur-

343 able impacts on scenarios where control resources are assumed to be limited. In a scenario  
344 with a limited control resource, it may not be possible to control herds as expeditiously as  
345 when the resource is unlimited. For example, in the event of a delay in culling owing to  
346 personnel or disposal constraints, the results from this study could provide an estimate of  
347 the length of time herds may continue to contribute to spread. In this study, we do not study  
348 potential impacts of transmission from asymptomatic carriers because the transmission risk  
349 from these animals has been estimated to be fairly low and potentially context dependent  
350 (Parthiban et al., 2015). Therefore, the estimated length of spread does not account for  
351 potential carriers, which would be an important consideration in the context of uncontrolled  
352 long-term infection dynamics both of FMD and other livestock diseases. Additionally, the  
353 application of control measures, which is not studied here, would alter the length of time a  
354 herd is infected, either by removing infected animals before the infection has run its course  
355 or by changing the susceptibility of a herd through vaccination. However, the estimates  
356 provided in this study give an upper bound on the length of time herds are contributing to  
357 transmission during the non-carrier phase of transmission. Estimates of the potential length  
358 of spread could be used in economic analyses of the cost of allowing animals to remain on  
359 a control wait list for specific lengths of time or investing in additional resources to move  
360 through the wait list more swiftly. These types of economic and epidemic trade-off analyses  
361 are invaluable when creating preparedness plans or estimating the impact different control  
362 strategies would have on outbreaks.

363 The duration that individual herds contribute to transmission will also be important for  
364 understanding how the composition of premises contributes to the overall outbreak dynamics.  
365 Studies have shown that aspects of demography, including premises clustering, and the  
366 number of large farms in a given area, impact the outcome of potential FMD outbreaks  
367 (Werkman et al., 2016; Tsao et al., 2019; Gilbertson et al., 2022). Using well informed  
368 estimates for the duration of infectiousness for herds of different sizes will help disentangle  
369 the impact of herd size on duration of an outbreak within a herd versus the duration of an

370 outbreak across multiple herds. Depending on the demography, it is possible that a single  
371 large farm in isolation will have a shorter outbreak duration than many small farms that  
372 all become infected in a transmission chain. Using herd size-specific infectious durations  
373 may also be helpful in accurately determining high risk regions or areas because of the  
374 livestock demography. This finding that the transmission dynamics of FMD within-herds  
375 contributes to the overall outbreak has also been found by previous explorations of epidemic  
376 FMD outbreaks (Brito et al., 2011; Chis Ster et al., 2012). Chis Ster et al. (2012) points  
377 to the importance of herd size and species composition for understanding the UK 2001  
378 FMD outbreak and how little is known, quantitatively, about the initially infected animals  
379 within a herd. The work we present here builds on these results, focusing on a single  
380 susceptible species, and shows that the herd size is more impactful to the duration a herd  
381 is infectious than the number or proportion of initially infected animals. Additional studies,  
382 exploring the interactions among species within and between-herds will be important for fully  
383 understanding how within-herd dynamics and livestock demography interact to influence  
384 overall outbreak dynamics.

385 The suggestion that cattle may not be infectious until after they are symptomatic presents  
386 an opportunity to catch, and potentially, control the onward spread of FMD very early in an  
387 outbreak. Additionally, the onset of clinical signs corresponding closely (less than one day)  
388 to the onset of infectiousness, could be used to target efforts in determining which herds  
389 could have been infected by the focal herd by narrowing the search window. The results  
390 from our simulations suggest that the short time window where cattle are not infectious but  
391 are showing clinical signs, does not offer much opportunity of identifying the virus before  
392 transmission has begun; the median for all herd sizes is less than one day. However, at  
393 smaller herd sizes, there is greater variation in this time period and therefore there is more  
394 opportunity for catching it, though logistically the time is short enough that it is still unlikely.

395 While the Clinical First model suggests that the window of time cattle are symptomatic  
396 but not yet infectious is too short for an actionable difference in detection in comparison

397 to the Base model, it does provide a substantial head start in detection in comparison to  
398 the Infectious First model. The Infectious First model, that follows the traditional idea of  
399 cattle silently transmitting FMD before developing symptoms, suggests that visual detection  
400 is not possible until after several days of viral shedding. The difference between a few days  
401 of silent spread (median 2 days, Figure 6 & S9) and simultaneous or closely timed onset of  
402 clinical signs and infectiousness could result in substantial differences in assumptions about  
403 detection. Rapid detection of FMD outbreaks is considered to be an important aspect of  
404 containing spread and mitigating the impacts of the outbreak (Carpenter et al., 2011). Gen-  
405 erally in models the first few herds to be infected take longer to be reported than subsequent  
406 infections; an assumption that follows data from FMD outbreaks and results from the in-  
407 tensification of surveillance after the outbreak has been officially reported. Models assuming  
408 that FMD spreads silently could predict longer detection times and unchecked transmis-  
409 sion than those models assuming transmission with clinical signs. Given the importance  
410 of the FMD disease progression in determining herd detectability and outbreak dynamics,  
411 additional research on the timing of infectiousness and clinical signs would be beneficial.  
412 Additionally, empirical research suggests that unlike cattle, pigs do transmit FMD before  
413 developing clinical signs (Paton et al., 2018; Stenfeldt et al., 2016). Research into the bio-  
414 logical aspects of FMD infection across serotypes and susceptible species, and more broadly  
415 into the timing of disease stages in other transboundary livestock diseases would be useful for  
416 informing decision making and parameterizing mathematical models. Additional research is  
417 of particular importance for diseases that infect more than one species because these can, as  
418 has been found with FMD, have differ between susceptible species (Charleston et al., 2011;  
419 Paton et al., 2018; Stenfeldt et al., 2016).

420 The results we present here are based on simple compartmental models exploring within-  
421 herd infection dynamics of FMD independently of between herd transmission, control or  
422 immune dynamics. The simplicity of the model limits our ability to fully study the potential  
423 impacts of the different model assumptions, parameters, and herd sizes on overall outbreak



424 trajectory. Additionally, the models presented here are for a single species and FMD infects  
425 multiple important livestock species. As a result of this, we were not able to study the  
426 potential dynamics of mixed species herds. The cattle only scenario does however cover  
427 the most commonly observed outbreak scenario as 72.1% of FMD outbreaks internationally  
428 have been in cattle only (USDA APHIS VS Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health,  
429 2017). Additionally, approximately 71% of FMD outbreaks in non-endemic countries have  
430 been first suspected in cattle (McLaws and Ribble, 2007). To the best of our knowledge,  
431 cattle are the only livestock species, at least so far, where the silent spread portion of the  
432 FMD infection has been brought into question (Charleston et al., 2011; Paton et al., 2018).  
433 If the almost concurrent appearance of clinical signs and transmission is unique to cattle,  
434 then herds that are mixed or consist solely of non-cattle divided hoofed species would silently  
435 transmit the virus and detection on these premises would be delayed. Another assumption  
436 we make is that herds are uniformly mixing. While we feel this assumption is justifiable  
437 because of the high degree of infectivity, we do recognize that there are certain production  
438 types (e.g. U.S. dairy) that could lead to non-uniform mixing. In such situations, the  
439 differences resulting from assumptions regarding onset of infectiousness and detectability  
440 may have greater impacts on the predicted results than those presented here. The models  
441 used in this study are limited in scope, but they still provide information that can point to  
442 additional studies and new avenues of research. These models could also be easily adapted  
443 to study other livestock species susceptible to FMD.

444 The implications of the difference in potential for detection on overall outbreak trajectory  
445 and the potential for control are beyond the purview of this study; however, it is a very in-  
446 teresting finding that could be studied further by larger between-herd models. As mentioned  
447 in the previous paragraph it is unclear if cattle are the only species affected by FMD that  
448 can be detected before or at the same time as infectiousness begins. Should it be found for  
449 FMD or more broadly for any livestock infection that certain species are detectable earlier  
450 in infection than others, it opens up new possibilities for surveillance and control strategies.

451 For example, one common control tactic in highly infectious agricultural pathogens, is to  
452 assign a higher risk status for herds that have had an epidemiologically relevant contact  
453 with infected herds. Higher risk herds are controlled preemptively or given more stringent  
454 movement restrictions than lower risk herds (Tildesley et al., 2009; Perez et al., 2004a). In  
455 situations where certain species transmit silently and others do not, control prioritization of  
456 high risk herds could be optimized taking this information into account.

457 The importance of within-herd dynamics to overall outbreak dynamics is not always  
458 apparent, particularly in non-endemic settings where herds are fully susceptible and the  
459 spread between them is rapid. However, there are a number of aspects about FMD that  
460 cannot be understood in the absence of within-herd dynamics. In this study, we used a  
461 series of compartmental models to gain a better understanding of how changes to the most  
462 basic assumptions, such as the ordering of the infection stages, can alter the predicted within-  
463 herd dynamics of FMD. Our findings suggest that regardless of the model structure and type  
464 of transmission, herd size is more important in determining the length of time herds remain  
465 infectious than the size of the initially infected population. We also found that the differences  
466 in disease progression lead to a two day difference in detectability; which results either in  
467 silent spread or detection concurrent with transmission. The magnitude of this difference  
468 could have interesting implications for larger between-herd transmission models and could  
469 influence surveillance and response plans. The information gained from this study can be  
470 used to inform herd-level parameterizations for models and provide a basis for incorporating  
471 herd demography data into outbreak simulations to guide future surveillance and response  
472 plans. Additionally, the results of this study demonstrate the importance of understanding  
473 the within-herd dynamics of fast-spreading livestock diseases and could be applied to other  
474 systems, such as HPAI and ASF.

475 **Declaration of Competing Interests**

476 The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal  
477 relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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488 **CRedit authorship contribution statement**

489 **Lindsay M. Beck-Johnson:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Formal anal-  
490 ysis, Validation, Investigation, Data Curation, Writing - Original Draft, Writing - Review  
491 & Editing, Visualization **Erin E .Gorsich:** Conceptualization, Software, Formal analysis,  
492 Data Curation, Writing - Review & Editing, Visualization **Clayton Hallman:** Concep-  
493 tualization, Methodology, Writing - Review & Editing **Michael J. Tildesley:** Conceptu-  
494 alization, Methodology, Writing - Review & Editing **Ryan S. Miller:** Conceptualization,  
495 Methodology, Writing - Review & Editing **Colleen T. Webb:** Conceptualization, Method-  
496 ology, Resources, Supervision, Funding acquisition, Writing - Review & Editing, Project  
497 administration

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Supplementary material for  
**An exploration of within-herd dynamics of a  
transboundary livestock disease: a foot and mouth  
disease case study**

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**Supplemental Methods**




Figure S1: Base model structure. The within herd cattle population is closed and moves sequentially through four compartments: Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, and Removed.




Figure S2: Clinical First model structure. The within herd cattle population is closed and moves sequentially through five compartments: Susceptible, Exposed, Clinical, Not Infectious, Clinical And Infectious, and Removed.




Figure S3: Infectious First model structure. The within herd cattle population is closed and moves sequentially through five compartments: Susceptible, Exposed, Infectious, Not Clinical, Clinical And Infectious, and Removed.

The three model variants were also run with frequency-dependent transmission. The base model variation is given by the following equations.

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \frac{-\beta SI}{N} \quad (\text{S1})$$

$$\frac{dE}{dt} = \frac{-\beta SI}{N} - \sigma E \quad (\text{S2})$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \sigma E - \gamma I \quad (\text{S3})$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \gamma I \quad (\text{S4})$$

$$N = S + E + I + R \quad (\text{S5})$$

Where,  $S$ ,  $E$ ,  $I$ ,  $R$  represent susceptible, exposed, infectious, and removed individuals, respectively.  $N$  represents the total number of animals in the population. The transmission rate is given by  $\beta$ , the transition between exposed and infectious is given by  $\sigma$  and the recovery rate is given by  $\gamma$ .

The frequency-dependent version of the Clinical First model, which describes the situation where cattle develop clinical signs before they become infectious, is given by:

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \frac{-\beta SI_1}{N} \quad (\text{S6})$$

$$\frac{dE}{dt} = \frac{-\beta SI_1}{N} - \phi E \quad (\text{S7})$$

$$\frac{dA_1}{dt} = \phi E - \omega A_1 \quad (\text{S8})$$

$$\frac{dI_1}{dt} = \omega A_1 - \theta I_1 \quad (\text{S9})$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \theta I_1 \quad (\text{S10})$$

$$N = S + E + A_1 + I_1 + R \quad (\text{S11})$$

The transmission rate,  $\beta$ , is the same parameter as used in the base model. The stages are given by  $S$ ,  $E$ ,  $A_1$ ,  $I_1$ ,  $R$ , where  $S$ ,  $E$ , and  $R$  are the same as the base model and  $A_1$ , and  $I_1$  represent the clinical, not infectious and clinical and infectious stages unique to the Clinical First model.  $N$  represents the total number of animals in the population. The rate of transition from exposed to clinical, not infectious is given by  $\phi$ , the rate from clinical, not infectious, to clinical and infectious, is given by  $\omega$  and the recovery rate is given by  $\theta$ .

The Infectious First model, in which cattle become infectious before clinical signs, with frequency-dependent transmission is described by the following equations.

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \frac{-\beta S(I_2 + A_2)}{N} \quad (\text{S12})$$

$$\frac{dE}{dt} = \frac{-\beta S(I_2 + A_2)}{N} - \eta E \quad (\text{S13})$$

$$\frac{dI_2}{dt} = \eta E - \rho I_2 \quad (\text{S14})$$

$$\frac{dA_2}{dt} = \rho I_2 - \mu A_2 \quad (\text{S15})$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \mu A_2 \quad (\text{S16})$$

$$N = S + E + I_2 + A_2 + R \quad (\text{S17})$$

The transmission rate,  $\beta$ , is the same parameter as used in the base model. The stages are given by  $S$ ,  $E$ ,  $A_2$ ,  $I_2$ ,  $R$ , where  $S$ ,  $E$ , and  $R$  are the same as the base model and  $A_2$ , and  $I_2$  represent the infectious, not clinical and clinical and infectious stages unique to the Infectious First model.  $N$  represents the total number of animals in the population. The rate of transition from exposed to infectious, not clinical is given by  $\eta$ , the rate from infectious, not clinical, to clinical and infectious, is given by  $\rho$  and the recovery rate is given by  $\mu$ .

The herd sizes and the size of the initially infectious cattle on a premises are shown in Table S2. Each model variant and herd size and initial exposed population size were simulated 1000 times.


Table S1: Parameter Values

Model	Parameter	Description	Value	Range
Base model	$\beta$	Transmission Rate	21.84	0.34–141.62
	$\sigma$	Infectious Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.22	0.32–0.14
	$\gamma$	Recovery Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.77	3.33–0.21
Clinical First model	$\beta$	Transmission Rate	21.84	0.34–141.62
	$\phi$	Clinical, Not Infectious Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.25	0.34–0.17
	$\omega$	Infectious Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	1.92	6.25–0.77
	$\theta$	Recovery Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.77	3.33–0.21
Infectious First model OPF	$\beta$	Transmission Rate	21.84	0.34–141.62
	$\nu$	Infectious, Not Clinical Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	2.17	5.56–1.19
	$\rho$	Clinical Signs Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.27	3.6–0.19
	$\mu$	Recovery Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.22	0.27–0.18
Infectious First model Nasal Fluid	$\beta$	Transmission Rate	21.84	0.34–141.62
	$\nu$	Infectious, Not Clinical Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.39	0.59–0.22
	$\rho$	Clinical Signs Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.65	0.75–0.57
	$\mu$	Recovery Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.20	0.30–0.12
Infectious First model Blood	$\beta$	Transmission Rate	21.84	0.34–141.62
	$\nu$	Infectious, Not Clinical Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.43	0.67–0.26
	$\rho$	Clinical Signs Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.58	0.69–0.43
	$\mu$	Recovery Rate (Days <sup>-1</sup> )	0.41	0.48–0.37


Table S2: Herd sizes and number of animals in the herd infected at the start of the simulations.

<b>Herd Size</b>	<b>Percent Infected</b>			
	1%	5%	10%	25%
5	1	1	1	1
10	1	1	1	3
15	1	1	2	4
20	1	1	2	5
50	1	3	5	13
100	1	5	10	25
200	2	10	20	50
500	5	25	50	100
1000	10	50	100	100
2500	25	100	100	100
5000	50	100	100	100
10000	100	100	100	100


## Supplemental results



(a) Base model




(b) Clinical First model




(c) Infectious First model


Figure S4: The length of time in days premises are infectious assuming density-dependent transmission. The x-axes show the size of the herd before the period and the number of animals initially infected with the FMD virus (after the period). The top x-axis is the number of animals that are initially infected and the bottom x-axis is the total number of animals in the herd. The base model results are shown in panel (a), the Clinical First model results are in panel (b) and the Infectious First model results are in panel (c). On the Infectious First model plot (c), the round points show results using OPF parameters, triangle points show results using nasal fluid parameters and square points show results using blood parameters.



(a) Base model



(b) Clinical First model



(c) Infectious First model

Figure S5: The length of time in days premises are infectious assuming frequency-dependent transmission. The x-axes show the size of the herd before the period and the number of animals initially infected with the FMD virus (after the period). The top x-axis is the number of animals that are initially infected and the bottom x-axis is the total number of animals in the herd. The base model results are shown in panel (a), the Clinical First model results are in panel (b) and the Infectious First model results are in panel (c). On the Infectious First model plot (c), the round points show results using OPF parameters, triangle points show results using nasal fluid parameters and square points show results using blood parameters.






Figure S6: Sensitivity analyses across model parameters for models assuming frequency-dependent transmission. Effect size represents linear regression coefficients for models fit to the median duration a herd is infectious in the (a) Base model, (b) the Clinical First model, and (c) the Infectious First model assuming frequency-dependent transmission. We have standardized both predictor and response variables for comparison among parameters.




Figure S7: Median length of time premises are predicted by the Clinical First model to have cattle with clinical signs that are not infectious assuming density-dependent transmission with the 2.5 and 97.5 quantiles. The top x-axis is the number of animals that are initially infected and the bottom x-axis is the total number of animals in the herd.




Figure S8: Median length of time premises are predicted by the Clinical First model to have cattle with clinical signs that are not infectious assuming frequency-dependent transmission with the 2.5 and 97.5 quantiles. The top x-axis is the number of animals that are initially infected and the bottom x-axis is the total number of animals in the herd.




Figure S9: Median length of time herds are predicted by the Infectious First model to have infectious cattle that are not yet showing clinical signs assuming density-dependent transmission with the 2.5 and 97.5 quantiles. The top x-axis is the number of animals that are initially infected and the bottom x-axis is the total number of animals in the herd. The round points show results using OPF parameters, triangle points show results using nasal fluid parameters and square points show results using blood parameters.




Figure S10: Median length of time herds are predicted by the Infectious First model to have infectious cattle that are not yet showing clinical signs assuming frequency-dependent transmission with the 2.5 and 97.5 quantiles. The top x-axis is the number of animals that are initially infected and the bottom x-axis is the total number of animals in the herd. The round points show results using OPF parameters, triangle points show results using nasal fluid parameters and square points show results using blood parameters.