



Monetary–fiscal crosswinds in the European Monetary Union[☆]

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ABSTRACT

We study the monetary–fiscal mix in the European Monetary Union. The medium and long-run effects of conventional and unconventional monetary policy are analysed by combining monetary policy shocks identified in a Structural VAR, and the general government budget constraint featuring a single central bank and multiple fiscal authorities. In response to a conventional easing of the policy rate, the cumulated response of the fiscal deficit is positive. Conversely, in response to an unconventional easing affecting the long end of the yield curve, the primary fiscal position barely moves. This is consistent with the long-run effect of unconventional monetary easing on the price index, which is about half that of conventional easing. The aggregate long-run cumulated surplus is mainly driven by Germany's fiscal policy during the period in which unconventional monetary policy was adopted.

1. Introduction

The Maastricht Treaty was designed to ensure a rigid separation between monetary and fiscal policy. The Treaty is the legal consequence of the belief that in an asymmetric federation, with a single monetary policy authority and nineteen fiscal authorities, macroeconomic stability is best achieved by a combination of a credible and independent central bank targeting price stability, and fiscal rules setting public deficit and public debt limits. Fiscal policy undertakes stabilisation policy at the level of each member state, taking the common monetary policy as given, and subject to a set of fiscal rules – the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ (SGP) – that was created to operationalise the prohibition of excessive deficits.

Operationally, the ECB should act on its price mandate, while fiscal authorities independently aim at achieving their policy goals conditional on the price level and passively adjusting to monetary policy changes. This design provides a form of coordination whereby monetary policy always controls the price dynamics, and fiscal authorities take that as given. Since both the central bank and the fiscal authority are part of the government sector, this design corresponds to a particular institutional choice motivated by the idea that an independent central bank with a mandate of price stability should take the lead (‘active’ in the influential classification of Leeper, 1991) while fiscal policy is constrained (hence ‘passive’) and cannot monetise public debt so that has to generate real surpluses to pay for it. This design of ‘monetary dominance’ does not deny the inevitable interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, but it favours a particular coordination scheme between the monetary and fiscal authorities. In fact, implicit in

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this design is the idea that active coordination between monetary and fiscal policy is not necessary to pin down the price level provided that all authorities follow the rules.

Recent history, however, has shown that, when the economy is hit by large shocks, the fiscal rules may become pro-cyclical and offset the direction of monetary policy (Bianchi and Melosi, 2019; Corsetti et al., 2019; Bartsch et al., 2020). Moreover, there are situations in which interest rate policy loses its effectiveness while fiscal policy is a more powerful stabilisation tool and therefore should be used forcefully. This is the case when the policy rate is close to the effective zero lower bound or when the economy is hit by a shock that breaks down the flow of payments between sectors, as in the lockdown related to the Covid crisis (Woodford, 2020). These considerations have recently motivated policy makers to advocate monetary–fiscal policy coordination (Draghi, 2014; Lagarde, 2020; Schnabel, 2021), while an active discussion is ongoing in Europe about reviewing the fiscal framework.

Even independently of this normative discussion on ‘what should be done’, the issue of monetary–fiscal interaction has assumed an increasing importance as a consequence of the policies that central banks have conducted in the last 15 years which, via quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance, have targeted long term interest rates. Although it is always the case that monetary and fiscal policies interact, via the general government budget constraint, in affecting the price level, the nature of this interaction is more obvious when public debt is large and the central bank has a large balance sheet.

This paper is a study of the monetary–fiscal interaction in the Euro Area, through the lens of the aggregate government budget constraint.² We ask a positive rather than a normative question and suggest an empirical framework to study the adjustment of fiscal variables, returns and inflation to unexpected monetary policy changes.

Our framework is inspired by Hall and Sargent (1997) and Cochrane (2022, 2020a). Common to their approach is that we start from the general government intertemporal budget constraint as an equilibrium identity linking the market value of the debt to future discounted primary surpluses. Since this identity involves bond returns, inflation and fiscal variables, it can be used to learn about the fiscal–monetary adjustment dynamics in an otherwise unrestricted empirical model. While Hall and Sargent (1997) have used the budget constraint condition to propose an accounting exercise aimed at understanding contributions to the US government debt dynamics in the post World War II period, Cochrane (2022) has employed it to study how different components of the constraint adjust to different shocks for the US. We follow this second approach but extend it to apply it to the peculiarities of the monetary union.

As in Cochrane (2022), we use the linearised version of the budget constraint to derive an expression for unexpected inflation as a function of the changes to the present value of primary surpluses, future real returns, and output growth rate. We then employ the linearised budget constraint in conjunction with a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. This set-up allows us to study the adjustment to different forms of monetary policy — standard short-term interest rate policy or policies aimed at compressing interest rate spreads. The budget identity is then exploited to obtain estimates of the conditional contributions of its different terms at the business cycle frequency, and in the long-term. The VAR’s impulse response functions, on the other hand, provide a visualisation of dynamics at business cycle frequency.

Since the Euro Area is not a unitary system as the US, where there is a single monetary authority and a federal yield curve, we need to extend the framework to the case of a single central bank and multiple fiscal authorities. In the federal case, inflation is determined jointly by fiscal and monetary, possibly under different regimes (as in Leeper, 1991). In the extreme case, the Euro Area can be seen as a set of fiscal authorities independently balancing their budget constraints, by taking the inflation path as given.³ A more nuanced view is the one in which inflation is determined by the aggregate fiscal and monetary stance, and the aggregate fiscal stance is the sum of the fiscal positions of individual states that may or may not balance their budget independently, and take inflation as given.

Our baseline specification, incorporates this view, that encompass also the case of countries independently balancing their budget. In particular, we adopt this perspective in a model that includes only the four largest countries of the Euro Area: Germany, France, Italy and Spain.⁴ While in the benchmark case, we only consider aggregate inflation, we also consider a specification in which national inflations can have differential dynamics. A contribution of the paper is the construction of a new quarterly fiscal dataset of market value of government debts, for the four main Euro Area economies which includes the pre-euro sample (our sample covers the period 1991–2019). The start of the sample marks the German reunification and, shortly thereafter, the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992.

As a word of caution, we should stress that the empirical analysis is very challenging, and hence our empirical results provisional. Indeed, in studying the joint monetary–fiscal dynamics in the Euro Area we need to deal with at least three major challenges.

First, it is difficult to identify ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ monetary policy shocks, in a time period during which the policy framework in the Euro Area has been constantly evolving in response to a sequence of large macroeconomic events. We deal with this issue by adopting the narrative sign restrictions proposed by Antolin-Diaz and Rubio-Ramirez (2018), and support our identification with a handful of clear policy events.

Second, we need to take implicitly or explicitly a view on how country dynamics aggregate up to the Euro Area dynamics across fiscal and macroeconomic variables. Our formulation of the intertemporal EA budget constraint is an attempt at this. It allows for rich adjustment patterns, yet its interpretation is not univocal.

² Key references for this type of analysis are, among others, Sims (2013), Leeper and Leith (2016), Reis (2019) and Cochrane (2020b). For the Euro Area, see Sims (1999, 2012), Leeper (2017), and Jarociński and Maćkowiak (2018).

³ While the national inflations can deviate due to asymmetry shocks, in the medium- and long-run they are tied to the path set by the central bank.

⁴ The setting could accommodate the modelling of explicit default. This would feature as a specific reduction in the nominal quantity of debt between periods for a given country. A partial default would instead appear as a low return. We abstract from the case of default that is not empirically relevant for the countries and sample considered.

Third, the study of the long-run adjustment involves choices on the steady state and trend. Such assumptions are always difficult to make, and the long-run is an ill-defined concept. In a monetary union that sees itself in transition towards a closer political union, and over a very short data sample, those concepts are particularly difficult to define.

Notwithstanding these caveats, some results appear to be insightful. They point to an interesting difference in the adjustment to a short term interest rate shock (conventional) and a shock compressing the maturity spread (unconventional).

In the conventional case, fiscal policy responds to the easing by leaning in the same direction, i.e. by a decline in the primary surplus in the short-run. In the long-run, this is absorbed by an increase in inflation, while the contribution of nominal returns is less important. Conversely, in response to an unconventional shock compressing the term spread, the primary surplus' change is not significant — short-run fiscal policy is nearly neutral. The effect on long term inflation is smaller than in the conventional case and, as expected, movements in nominal returns are larger.

This pattern of responses is common, albeit with minor differences, to the four countries we consider, for the aggregate results and for the model with country level inflation. Indeed, national inflations show very similar conditional dynamics. In a final exercise, we consider a quasi-fiscal shock that we label 'convertibility' shock, which is defined by an opening or a compression of the periphery (Italian and Spanish) sovereign spread relative to Germany. This is to tease out the effects of shocks to premia, over and beyond the effects of shock to the artificial common yield curve, that can be thought of as the OIS rates. In this case we find that the fiscal response is muted in all countries.

At a high level, these results suggest that the claim that fiscal policy has been offsetting the effect of monetary policy is only true conditionally on non standard monetary policy. Indeed, we cannot rule out the conclusion that the small effect on GDP and prices in response to these policies is explained by the concomitant active role of fiscal policy.

Our result suggests that a form of coordination of fiscal and monetary policy is needed in the euro area to ensure that the monetary and fiscal stance at the aggregate level are coherent (on this point, see the recent discussion and proposal in [Reichlin et al., 2021](#)).

The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss different ways of understanding how the budget constraint of the general government can be represented in a monetary union. In Section 3, we discuss the construction of the dataset, while, in Section 4 we outline the econometric framework and the identification strategy. Empirical results are reported in Section 5. The last section concludes.

2. A fiscal–monetary framework for inflation

In discussing monetary–fiscal interactions, the literature has generally modelled them as the dynamic interaction between one single monetary authority and one single fiscal authority, and focussed on the United States (see [Cochrane, 2022](#)). In this section, we extend this framework to discuss the case of the Euro Area, a monetary union with a single central bank and multiple fiscal authorities, at country level.

Fiscal Federation. In the case of a perfect federation, as in the US, there is a single monetary policy, a common inflation and a federal issuance of debt. Hence bonds live on a common yield curve and there is a single aggregate maturity structure. Only the aggregate variables matter and not their state level counterpart (debt is only defined at federal level). As it would be in the case of a single country, the federal government debt flow identity is⁵

$$\rho v_{t+1} = v_t + r_{t+1} - \pi_{t+1} - g_{t+1} - s_{t+1} . \quad (1)$$

The log debt to GDP ratio at the end of period $t + 1$, v_{t+1} , is equal to its value at the end of the previous period t , v_t accrued by the log nominal return on the portfolio of government bonds r_{t+1} and balanced by (federal nation-wide) inflation π_{t+1} and log output growth g_{t+1} , and less the (scaled) real primary surplus to GDP ratio s_{t+1} . In the equation, ρ is a linearisation constant that depends on the steady state growth rate and returns for the country, i.e. $\rho \equiv e^{-(r-\pi-g)}$.

Iterating this equation forward, we obtain the budget constraint:

$$v_t = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j-1} g_{t+j} + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j-1} s_{t+j} - \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^{j-1} (r_{t+j} - \pi_{t+j}) , \quad (2)$$

that shows that the log value of government debt, in ratio to GDP, is the present value of future surplus to GDP ratios, discounted at the ex-post real return, and adjusted for growth. Taking time $t + 1$ innovations $\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} = \mathbb{E}_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_t$ and rearranging, we have an expression for unexpected inflation,

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} (\pi_{t+1} - r_{t+1}) = & - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} (s_{t+1+j} + g_{t+1+j}) \\ & + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} (r_{t+1+j} - \pi_{t+1+j}) . \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

⁵ Following [Hall and Sargent \(1997, 2011\)](#), we explicitly recognise that governments issue debt at different maturities. $r_t = \log(1 + R_t)$ therefore captures all sources of payments to debt holders: explicit ones, in the form of coupon payments and principal repayments, and implicit ones in the form of capital gains from the diminished term to maturity of the debt and interest rate changes on the existing debt.

This is the case discussed in [Cochrane \(2022\)](#).

A monetary union with multiple fiscal policies. Now let us compare this to the case in which several countries share a common monetary policy but have independent fiscal policies, as is the case in the Euro Area. Absent fiscal transfers among countries, for each country a flow budget constraint holds. It can be linearised as

$$\rho_i v_{i,t+1} = v_{i,t} + r_{i,t+1} - \pi_{i,t+1} - g_{i,t+1} - s_{i,t+1} \quad \forall i. \tag{4}$$

The flow constraints is, country by country, of the form of Eq. (1), but variables are country specific and ρ_i depends on the country-specific steady state growth rate and returns.

A common aggregate debt flow identity can be obtained by re-summing over the countries' flow identities weighting them by their output share in the monetary union output $\psi_i \equiv Y_i/Y = V_i/V$

$$\rho \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i v_{i,t+1} = \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i (v_{i,t} + r_{i,t+1}) - \pi_{t+1} - g_{t+1} - \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i s_{i,t+1}, \tag{5}$$

where $\pi_t = \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i \pi_{i,t}$ is the currency area wide inflation rate, and we assume that $\rho_i \equiv \rho \forall i$. This is consistent with assuming that all countries have the same growth rate and returns at the steady state. As done in the case of a federation, it is now possible to obtain an expression for unexpected inflation in the monetary union

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \left(\pi_{t+1} - \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i r_{i,t+1} \right) &= - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i s_{i,t+1+j} + g_{t+1+j} \right) \\ &\quad + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i r_{i,t+1+j} - \pi_{t+1+j} \right). \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Eq. (6) is quite general and extends to the case of transfers across countries. In fact, the presence of fiscal transfers in the monetary union would alter Eq. (4) but not Eq. (5) since transfers would cancel out in the aggregation across countries.

It is worth stressing that both in the case of a fiscal federation and of a monetary union, it is possible to obtain an expression of unexpected inflation in terms of only aggregate quantities at the level of the monetary union (Eqs. (3), (6)). While these expressions are always satisfied, the underlying adjustment dynamics may differ whether inflation is purely determined by the monetary authority and taken as given by the fiscal authorities, and whether there are fiscal transfers or not.

The expression for unexpected inflation (Eq. (6)) will be crucial in our empirical discussion and provide us with a decomposition of how adjustments to the common rate of inflation, relate to surpluses, returns and growth rates in the short and long run at country level. However, it is important to stress that Eq. (6) is agnostic on the specifics of the institutional framework, and is silent about the causal mechanisms.

In order to better understand the meaning of the unexpected inflation decomposition, it is worth to observe that an unexpected increase in inflation has to correspond to a decline in the present value of surpluses, coming either from a decline in surplus to GDP ratios, or a decline in GDP growth; or a rise in the discount rates. These adjustments in the aggregate can happen as combination of symmetric or asymmetric changes at country level.

Indeed, several causal mechanisms of adjustment can be possible empirically, given the institutional framework, the maturity structure of the debts issued and country-level dynamics. For example, the institutional setting formalised by the Maastricht Treaty corresponds to a case of monetary dominance where the central bank target the common rate of inflation, while each country balance its own budget constraint under stringent fiscal rules, by taking the aggregate inflation as given. In such a case while the inflation rates can and do deviate at country level from the common inflation rate, the fact that the central bank targets average inflation and that country fiscal policy are self-balancing implies that the average inflation rate is a constraint to the budget determination of each country.⁶ From this prospective, the Euro Area is not different from a set of countries having to borrow in a foreign currency and hence having to adjust real surpluses to avoid defaults.

It is possible to rewrite the inflation decomposition in Eq. (6) in terms of interest rate differentials at country level. In fact, it is possible to define an effective rate of return on the aggregate governments' debt portfolio as the rate that balance the total debts

$$\hat{r}_{t+1} \equiv \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i r_{i,t+1} = \bar{r}_{t+1} + \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_i prem_{i,t+1} \tag{7}$$

where $\bar{r}_{t+1} \equiv \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n r_{i,t+1}$ is the average rate across countries and can be seen as a base rate – connected to a synthetic common yield curve –, while the return premia are defined as $prem_{i,t+1} \equiv (R_{i,t+1} - \bar{R}_{t+1})/\bar{R}_{t+1}$.

Substituting in the expression for unexpected inflation one obtains a new formulation that highlights a crucial difference between a federation and a monetary union, that is the lack of a common yield curve and hence the presence of country spread dynamics. Indeed, this is of particular importance in the EA where the ECB needs to have an eye on both the position of the yield curve and the average financial conditions that crucially depends on the country-level premia.

This formulation in terms of country-level premia provides a different angle to our discussion, highlighting the potential heterogeneous dynamics of returns at country level. Such dynamics – that can involve flight to safety events – has been at the

⁶ While in the short-run the inflation rate in each country can deviate from the common path, in the medium run it is determined by the common monetary policy. We use this assumption to substitute the country specific inflation $\pi_{i,t}$ with the common inflation rate π_t .

forefront of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011, and featured very high in the policy concerns of the ECB during the COVID pandemic. Such observation provides motivation to explore these type of events in studying the consequences of a ‘convertibility’ shock that compresses (or opens up) country spread.⁷

In the next section we will describe the empirical model that we use to estimate the responses of the variables entering the budget identity to monetary policy shocks. The following one will discuss the inflation adjustment at different horizons empirically, and using the framework presented.

3. Market values of debts and total returns

We construct a new quarterly fiscal dataset for the four main Euro Area economies covering the period 1991–2019. As mentioned in the introduction, we are interested in collecting information on the market value of government debt and on total return that accounts for capital gains on outstanding debt stemming from the diminished term to maturity of the debt or interest rate changes. This measure makes the debt dynamic identity in (2) hold with equality.⁸ We do not net out the holdings of Euro Area government bonds at the ECB. In principle, one should exclude them from our measure of the market value of the debt for each country. However, these purchases are matched with interest-paying deposits on the liability side of the central bank’s balance sheet, which should also form part of the measure of public debt, and therefore the purchases of debt by the ECB just substitute one form of government liability for another (Sims, 2013; Cochrane, 2014; Reis, 2019).⁹

We derive the data for the market value of debt by aggregating information from various sources. The IMF International Financial Statistics provide data at quarterly frequency from 1999. Eurostat, in turn, provides annual data starting in 1995 from the consolidated Financial Accounts. Historical series, available at annual and quarterly frequencies from national sources, are used to reconstruct these back to 1991, and mixed-frequency methods are used whenever necessary to temporally disaggregate the annual data using closely related quarterly series. Government primary surpluses are constructed in a similar manner. Both data are then seasonally adjusted using the Census X-13 program. Full details are given in Appendix B.

With data for surpluses and debts at market value at hand, we back out the returns on the government debt portfolios from the non linear equation written in Appendix B.5. This is the same approach followed for the United States by Eisner and Pieper (1984), Eisner (1986), and Bohn (1992). The advantage is that we do not need prices, quantities, and descriptions of all securities issued by the governments from 1991 onward, that Hall and Sargent (2011)’s approach would require. The disadvantage is that any measurement error in the calculation of the surplus, or any discrepancy in definition between the debt and the deficit will contaminate the return series. This concern is important in the Euro Area, where a number of very large fiscal events, such as government bailouts to financial institutions after the 2008 crisis, or the bailouts associated with the European Sovereign Debt Crisis are accounted differently across debt and deficits in a number of countries. These outlier movements in fiscal variables can be thought of as one-off large events that come from a different data generating process than the one governing the usual dynamics of government deficits, but could have an out-sized effect on VAR estimates. For this reason, we systematically remove them from the series while maintaining consistency of the budget constraint equation.¹⁰ We complete the database with series for Euro Area-wide GDP and price index, as well as the 3-month interest rate and the yields on 10-year government bonds for the four countries. Finally, to capture the low-frequency decline in inflation present in the data, we include a measure of long-term inflation expectations, defined as the mean expected inflation rate over the next 10 years from the survey of professional forecasters run by Consensus Economics.

Fig. 1 plots the key fiscal variables for the four largest Euro Area economies in each row. The first column plots $V_{i,t}/P_t Y_t$, the ratio of the value of debt to Euro Area GDP. The second column plots 100 times $SPY_{i,t}$, the ratio of the primary (excluding interest payments) surplus to euro-area GDP. The third column plots (i) in black, the nominal return on the government debt portfolio, r^n , (ii), in dotted blue, the 3-month interest rate, common to all countries, and (iii) in light red, the one-period holding return on a 10-year bond. All variables are expressed at annual rates.

Three observations are in order. First, the debt is highly persistent over the sample, trending strongly upwards in France and Spain and somewhat less so in Germany and Italy. Second, and relatedly, there is substantial heterogeneity in the surplus processes of the four economies. Germany and Italy have run primary surpluses on average over the sample, whereas France and Spain, which were on balance before the crisis, struggled to achieve a primary surplus in the post-crisis period. On aggregate, the total Euro Area surplus is highly cyclical and close to balanced over the sample. The third observation concerns the returns on the government’s debt portfolios. These co-move strongly with the returns on 10-year zero-coupon bonds (light red), although they are less volatile. The returns on the government debt portfolio are reasonably well approximated by a linear combination of the short-term interest rate (dotted blue line) and the long-term bond return.

⁷ Monetary policy affects different terms of real returns: (i) the expected path of inflation; (ii) the expected path of the short term interest rates or the average returns on one period bonds, that could be thought of as the OIS curve; (iii) the term premia over the average returns; and (iv) the country-specific premia, that blend idiosyncratic risks and maturity structure. Different types of policies – short term interest rate changes, spread compression via quantitative easing, forward guidance or policies aimed at decreasing sovereign premia – affect these components in differential ways.

⁸ Notice that in an environment in which the government only issues one-period debt, the two concepts coincide.

⁹ While the total amount of government liabilities does not change, its maturity does, and so does the flow of seigniorage payments from the central bank to the treasury. A more detailed treatment of this issue will become quantitatively important in coming years, as the ECB has increased its purchases of Euro Area government debt securities as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic.

¹⁰ Full details are given in Appendix B.




Fig. 1. Fiscal variables for main Euro Area countries. **Note:** The figure plots the key fiscal variables for the four largest Euro Area economies in each row. The first column plots $V_{i,t}/P_t Y_t$, the ratio of the value of debt of each country to the Euro Area GDP. The second column plots $100 \text{ SPY}_{i,t}$, the ratio of the primary (excluding interest payments) surpluses to GDP. The third column plots (i) in black, the return on the government debt portfolio, r^g , (ii) in dotted blue, the 3-month interest rate, common to all countries, and (iii) in light red, the one-period holding return on a 10-year bond. All variables are expressed at annual rates. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

4. Econometric framework

We model the variables in our dataset as evolving according to a structural vector autoregression (SVAR), written compactly

$$y'_t A_0 = x'_t A_+ + \varepsilon'_t \quad \text{for } 1 \leq t \leq T, \tag{8}$$

with $A'_+ = [A'_1 \ \dots \ A'_p \ \mathbf{d}']$, $x'_t = [y'_{t-1}, \dots, y'_{t-p}, 1]$, where y_t is an $n \times 1$ vector of observables, ε_t is an $n \times 1$ vector of structural shocks, A_ℓ is an $n \times n$ matrix of parameters for $0 \leq \ell \leq p$ with A_0 invertible, \mathbf{d} is an $1 \times n$ vector of parameters, p is the lag length, and T is the sample size. The vector of shocks ε_t , conditional on past information and the initial conditions y_0, \dots, y_{1-p} , is distributed $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}_{n \times 1}, \mathbf{I}_n)$, where $\mathbf{0}_{n \times 1}$ is an $n \times 1$ matrix of zeros and \mathbf{I}_n is an $n \times n$ identity matrix. The reduced-form representation implied by Eq. (8) is

$$y'_t = x'_t \mathbf{B} + u'_t \quad \text{for } 1 \leq t \leq T, \tag{9}$$

where $\mathbf{B} = A_+ A_0^{-1}$, $u'_t = \varepsilon'_t A_0^{-1}$, and $\mathbb{E}[u_t u'_t] = \Sigma = (A_0 A'_0)^{-1}$. The matrices \mathbf{B} and Σ are the reduced-form parameters, while A_0 and A_+ are the structural parameters. Similarly, u'_t are the reduced-form innovations. While the shocks are orthogonal and have an economic interpretation, the innovations may be correlated and do not have an interpretation.

As it is well known, the model defined in Eq. (8) has an identification problem. As described in Lippi and Reichlin (1994), one can reparameterise this model in terms of \mathbf{B} and Σ together with an $n \times n$ orthogonal rotation matrix \mathbf{Q} , such that for a given \mathbf{B} and Σ , a choice of \mathbf{Q} implies a particular, observationally equivalent choice of structural parameters. To solve the identification problem,

one often imposes restrictions on either the structural parameters or some function – such as the impulse response functions (IRFs) – thereof, pinning down a particular \mathbf{Q} (point identification) or narrowing down a set of \mathbf{Q} 's (set identification).

4.1. Bayesian priors

Our sample covers the period 1991Q2 to 2019Q4. Such a short sample, together with the large number of variables included in the model, poses challenges for the estimation of the model. Most importantly, as seen in Fig. 1, the debt-to-GDP ratios are highly persistent and appear to trend up in the sample, whereas both the provisions of Maastricht treaty and the assumptions underlying the derivation of the log-linear budget constraints require them to be stationary. VARs estimated with classical methods or uninformative priors would struggle to produce sensible estimates with highly persistent debt ratios over short samples. We solve this issue by imposing a dogmatic prior over the steady state of the system.

The steady state prior is consistent with the log debt-to-Euro-Area-GDP ratios of each of the countries being equal to their historical average, and the primary surpluses being zero in the long run.¹¹ We also impose that the steady state inflation rate is equal to 1.9%, 'below but close to 2%' as specified by the ECB's inflation objective. For real GDP growth, we fix the steady state at 1.5%, close to the sample average. Consistent with our choice for the steady state surplus, we fix the steady-state returns on the government debt portfolio at $r^* = g^* + \bar{\pi}^* = 3.4\%$.¹² Finally, the short term real interest rate is assumed to be 1% in steady state, the spread between the long- and short-term interest rates to be 100 basis points, the sovereign spread to be 50 basis points for France, and 100 basis points for Italy and Spain.

We implement this dogmatic prior by subtracting the steady state values from each of the series and running the VAR in deviations from the steady state without a constant term.¹³ Moreover, we apply a standard Normal-Inverse Wishart prior on the reduced form coefficients \mathbf{B} and Σ . This prior is centred around autoregressive coefficients being 0 for real GDP growth, inflation minus inflation expectations, returns, and 0.5 for more persistent variables – i.e. short-term interest rate, slope of the yield curve, spreads, surpluses, and debt values. It is instead centred around an autoregressive coefficient equal to 1 for inflation expectation. The tightness of the prior increases with the lag length and is governed by a parameter λ which we set to 0.1 (see Bańbura et al. (2010)).

To ensure the stationary of the system, following Cogley and Sargent (2001), we discard any draw of the parameters that implies any root greater than 0.99. This procedure truncates and renormalises the prior to rule out explosive debt-to-GDP paths.

4.2. Identification strategy

We perform the VAR analysis in response to three identified shocks. The first shock is a conventional monetary policy (MP) shock, intended to capture deviations of the short-term interest rate from the systematic reaction of the central bank to economic developments. The second, is an unconventional monetary policy (UMP) shock, which captures central bank forward guidance and quantitative easing which affect longer-term interest rates.

The third shock, which we call a 'convertibility' shock, can be seen as a shock that either opens up or compresses the core-periphery spread. This type of dynamics is associated to 'flight to safety' events when capitals flow from the periphery to the core countries, putting upward pressure on bond yields of Italy and Spain especially, and downward pressure on the bond yields of Germany. Following a policy announcement – as, for example, the Outright Monetary Transactions program of the ECB – financial markets stress subsides and these movements can be reversed. A possible way to interpret such shocks is to think of them as markets pricing the increased risk of peripheral bonds towards safer German bonds, when a negative shock threatens convertibility in the Euro Area. This shock is not strictly speaking a monetary policy shock, but our goal is to capture the pattern of events surrounding the announcement of the OMT, which aimed to stabilise self-fulfilling fears of a breakup of the Euro Area in the summer of 2012.

We identify the shocks in the model using a combination of sign restrictions, as in Uhlig (2005), and the recently proposed narrative sign restrictions of Antolin-Diaz and Rubio-Ramirez (2018). We discuss both of these in turn. With respect to traditional sign restrictions, we constrain an expansionary conventional MP shock to have a negative impact on the short and long term interest rates, a positive impact on output, and a positive impact on inflation and inflation expectation for the first three quarters (inflation moving by a larger amount). We separately identify the MP and UMP shocks based on their differential impact on the yield curve. The MP shock is assumed to move short term interest rates by a larger amount than long term rates, leading to a steepening of the yield curve. The UMP shock has the opposite effect on the slope. Finally, we identify the (positive) convertibility shock by imposing a negative impact on the sovereign spreads of Italy and Spain and a positive impact on the German long-term yield. As discussed, the latter assumption is intended to capture a 'flight to safety' effect from risky peripheral bonds towards safer German bonds when a negative shock threatens convertibility in the Euro Area. Importantly, all three identified shocks are assumed to be neutral in the long-run for real output.

¹¹ In Appendix E we provide results under the alternative hypothesis that the steady state for the debt-to-national-GDP ratios is at 60%, in line with the Maastricht Treaty, but far away from the observed levels of debt for almost all of the countries we analyse, and hence almost 'counterfactual'. While results are qualitatively in line with our benchmark case, unsurprisingly, the different steady states have bearing for the quantitative results in the long run.

¹² The assumption $r^* = g^* + \bar{\pi}^*$, at the steady state, implies that $\rho = 1$. Such an assumption is also consistent with assuming that the primary surplus is zero at the steady state, as follows from Eq. (4). This choice of the long-run parameters can be criticised on two respects. First and as also discussed in Cochrane (2022), the infinite sums in Eq. (6) may not converge and hence are better thought of as the limit for ρ close to 1. Second, by using the same priors in a VAR model with aggregate variables at the Euro Area level and in the model with country-level variables, we do not account for the presence of country spreads in the long-run.

¹³ Appendix B provides a detailed description of the dataset.

We complement the restrictions on impulse responses with narrative sign restrictions, following [Antolin-Diaz and Rubio-Ramirez \(2018\)](#). Narrative sign restrictions constrain the structural shocks and/or the historical decomposition around key historical events, ensuring that they agree with a narrative account of these episodes. For instance, if based on historical accounts and qualitative sources there is agreement that a contractionary monetary policy shock occurred on a particular date, structural parameters that produce shocks consistent with policy being eased during that period would be ruled out. [Antolin-Diaz and Rubio-Ramirez \(2018\)](#) show that this class of restrictions leads to much tighter inference than traditional sign restrictions, which often fail to reject models with implausible implications for elasticities, shock realisations and historical decompositions.¹⁴ Specifically, we introduce the following narrative sign restrictions.

Narrative Sign Restriction 1: Conventional monetary policy shock *A contractionary (negative) conventional monetary policy shock happened on the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2011. Moreover, it was the single largest contributor to the unexpected movement in the short term interest rate during those two periods.*

Both of these events relate to circumstances in which the ECB increased interest rates on the basis of headline inflation being above target. Observers of ECB policy have argued that both of these events represented policy mistakes, since inflation dynamics was largely explained by oil prices, and the ECB underestimating the severity of the recessions that were already underway during both periods (see [Hartmann and Smets \(2018\)](#) and the discussion contained herein). While for the second of these events the policy rate was raised in April and July of 2011, we place the timing of the shock in the first quarter of 2011 as the ECB had strongly hinted to its intention of increasing the interest rate during the first quarter of the year, and by the time the change occurred, it was widely expected.

Notice that, with these restrictions, the conventional monetary policy shock is identified by using time observations prior to the period when the zero lower bound became a constraint in the euro area. This point is made explicit in Appendix C where we report results from the same identification but for a sample ending in 2014q2, which is the last quarter before the short interest rate turns negative. Results are practically identical.

Narrative Sign Restriction 2. Unconventional monetary policy shock *An expansionary (positive) unconventional monetary policy shock took place on the first quarter of 2015. Moreover, it was the single largest contributor to the unexpected movement in the term spread between the German long-term interest rate and the short-term interest rate during that period.*

This restriction is motivated by the announcement in January of 2015 of a large Asset Purchase Programme (APP), with average monthly purchases of public and private sector securities of €60 billion. Through the portfolio rebalancing and signalling channels, this put further downward pressure on long-term interest rates and flattened the slope of the yield curve ([Cœuré, 2015](#)). While again the programme had been hinted during the previous months, those anticipation effects are confounded with a general decline in growth prospects for the Euro Area at the end of 2014. The announcement itself was much larger than market participants expected, leading us to consider that despite the presence of anticipation effects, an expansionary shock did occur in January 2015.

Narrative Sign Restriction 3. Convertibility shock. *There was a negative convertibility shock in the second quarter of 2012, and a positive one in the third quarter of 2012. Moreover, this shock was the single largest contributor to the unexpected movement in Italian and Spanish sovereign spreads during these periods.*

The negative shock in 2012 Q2 captures the tensions in the European sovereign debt market that led to large increases in sovereign spreads, fuelled by fears of a potential break-up of the Euro Area. The positive shock in 2012 Q3 corresponds to the announcement of the OMT program, after ECB president Mario Draghi declared that the central bank would do ‘whatever it takes’ to preserve the euro.

4.3. VAR specifications

We identify structural shocks and study the fiscal–monetary dynamics in three models: (i) a small VAR in which only Euro Area aggregates are included, (ii) our benchmark specification, i.e. a larger VAR model in which surplus, debt, and return for the four countries enter the VAR individually, (iii) an expanded version of the benchmark VAR model that also includes country-specific inflation. The priors and identification restrictions are the same across the different models.¹⁵ Details of the three models are reported in Appendix B.

5. EA inflation & fiscal–monetary crosswinds

The empirical framework delivers results on adjustment dynamics to monetary shocks both at business cycle frequency and in the long run. We report the dynamic responses in the form of structural impulse response functions to the identified shocks ([Figs. 2–6](#)), and then summarise the long-run adjustment employing the unexpected inflation decomposition derived in [Section 2 \(Tables 1–2\)](#).¹⁶

In Appendix F, we report the plots of the time series of the identified conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks. They provide a reassuring sanity check to our identification. The time series of the conventional shocks shows the unexpected

¹⁴ This point has been forcefully argued by [Kilian and Murphy \(2012\)](#), [Arias et al. \(2016\)](#), [Ludvigson et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Antolin-Diaz and Rubio-Ramirez \(2018\)](#).

¹⁵ To be consistent with our main specification, the spread between the long- and short-term interest rates in (i) is assumed to be 150 basis points in steady state. In (iii), the monetary policy shocks are assumed to have impacts of the same sign on all national inflation rates.

¹⁶ Additional charts and results are in Appendix D. We follow the convention in the literature and report pointwise medians and 68% High Posterior Density intervals to aid the interpretation of the figures, although the drawbacks of this approach have been highlighted by [Inoue and Kilian \(2020\)](#).




Fig. 2. Conventional monetary policy shock. **Note:** The figure shows impulse response functions to a one standard deviation conventional monetary policy shock (easing) in the Euro Area, using the small VAR with only aggregates. The impulse response of real GDP is reported in level, i.e. as percentage deviation from the steady state. All other impulse responses are reported as deviations from the steady state. The dotted lines report pointwise medians across all draws, whereas the bands correspond to the 16% and 84% percentiles. Number of draws: 2000. Variables in the quarterly dataset are defined as follows: (i) inflation and interest rates are in %, annualised, (ii) slope is the euro area long-term interest rate minus the euro area short-term interest rate, (iii) return is the nominal return on the portfolio of government debt, in % (annualised), inferred from aggregate debt and aggregate surplus, (iv) debt is 400 times the logarithm of the following ratio: aggregate debt over quarterly euro area GDP, (v) surplus denotes 400 times aggregate primary surplus over quarterly euro area GDP, scaled by aggregate debt over quarterly euro area GDP at steady state. For more details on the data construction and which variables enter the estimation, see Appendix B.

easing in 2001, the tightening in July 2008 and the subsequent easing episodes in 2008 as significant events. Significant are also the tightenings of April and July 2011. After then, no significant shocks are identified. The time series of the unconventional shocks in shows a cluster of large shocks during the financial crisis which we interpret as risk premia shocks, and two large events when QE started in 2015, and when it restarted at the end of the sample.

5.1. Monetary policy shocks

We first discuss the effects of a conventional monetary policy easing. For this exercise, we report two sets of results. First, a smaller VAR in which only Euro Area aggregates are included (results are reported in Fig. 2). Second, the results from a larger model in which surplus, debt, and return for the four countries enter the VAR individually. These are shown in Fig. 3. We will see that the results of both specifications are qualitatively very similar.

The charts show the dynamic responses to a shock inducing a one standard deviation policy easing. In the sample, this represents a small cut in the short term interest rate, of about 10 basis points for the larger VAR, which reverts within a few quarters. There is a hump-shaped impact on GDP in Fig. 3, peaking at about 0.1% in the second year, and an immediate impact on inflation. In line with the transitory nature of the shock, the impact on long-term yields is both small in magnitude and short lived. Focusing on the responses of the fiscal variables, in the aggregate model we observe a significant immediate decline in the surplus-to-GDP ratio. Looking at Fig. 3, we can see that this is driven mostly by Germany and Italy, whereas the response of the French surplus ratio is negative but not significant, and the Spanish surplus responds with a positive sign. The value of debt-to-EA-GDP ratio falls for all countries in the first two years, although there is a high degree of uncertainty in these estimates.

The response of the return on government debt is ambiguous: recall that the monetary policy shock has a muted impact on long-term yields, which move inversely to returns, and a strong impact on short term interest rates. Finally, we observe that sovereign spreads do not appear to react significantly to the conventional MP shock, indicating a symmetric transmission across the Euro Area.




Fig. 3. Conventional monetary policy shock. **Note:** The figure shows impulse response functions to a one standard deviation conventional monetary policy shock (easing) in the Euro Area, using the larger model in which surplus, debt, and return for the four countries enter the VAR individually. The impulse response of real GDP is reported in level, i.e. as percentage deviation from the steady state. All other impulse responses are reported as deviations from the steady state. The dotted lines report pointwise medians across all draws, whereas the bands correspond to the 16% and 84% percentiles. Number of draws: 2000. Variables in the quarterly dataset are defined as follows: (i) inflation and interest rates are in %, annualised, (ii) slope is the German long-term interest rate minus the euro area short-term interest rate, (iii) returns are nominal returns on the portfolio of government debt, in % (annualised), inferred from debts and surpluses, (iv) spreads are country long-term interest rates minus the German long-term interest rate, (v) debts are 400 times the logarithm of the following ratio: country debt over quarterly euro area GDP, (vi) surpluses denote 400 times country primary surplus over quarterly euro area GDP, scaled by country debt over quarterly euro area GDP at steady state. For more details on the data construction and which variables enter the estimation, see Appendix B.

To summarise, we observe evidence of fiscal–monetary coordination conditional on a conventional monetary policy easing: in response to the decline in interest rates, the fiscal authorities allow the surplus-to-EA-GDP ratio to decline. The overall impact of the policy is an increase in output, an increase in inflation, and an insignificant decline in the debt-to-EA-GDP ratio.

Table 1
Inflation decomposition — Conventional monetary policy shock.

Variable/Country	Germany	France	Italy	Spain	Total
L.H.S. Eq. (6)					\sum_i
$\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}$					0.05
$-\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \psi_{i,t} r_{i,t+1}$	-(0.03)	-(-0.1)	-(0.02)	-(-0.04)	-(-0.09)
R.H.S. Eq. (6)					\sum_i
$-\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} g_{t+j+1}$					0
$-\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \psi_{i,t} s_{i,t+1+j}$	-(0)	-(-0.16)	-(-0.05)	-(0.12)	-(-0.1)
$\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \psi_{i,t} r_{i,t+1+j}$	0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.13	0.15
$-\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \pi_{t+1+j}$					-(-0.12)

Note: The unexpected inflation decomposition follows from the identity in Eq. (6). The first two rows report the left hand side (L.H.S.) of Eq. (6) for each country, and their sum in the last column of the table. These terms are balanced by the right hand side (R.H.S.) of Eq. (6) in the last three rows for each country, and their sum in the last column of the table. Numbers are computed draws by draw, and the means across all draws are reported. Number of draws: 2000.

Table 1 examines the results through the lens of the budget identity in Eq. (6), repeated here for convenience

$$\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \left(\pi_{t+1} - \sum_{i=1}^n \psi_{i,t} r_{i,t+1} \right) = - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \psi_{i,t} s_{i,t+1+j} + g_{t+1+j} \right) + \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \psi_{i,t} r_{i,t+1+j} - \pi_{t+1+j} \right).$$

The results of the table account for the response of inflation conditional on a monetary policy shock, into the contribution of each of the components of Eq. (6). The table reports the average across individual draws of the posterior for each of the quantities reported.

The unexpected inflation decomposition shows that the 10 basis points (bps) decline in the short-term rate corresponds to a small response in nominal returns characterised by a contraction in the short run of 9 bps, and then an increase by 15 bps in the long-run. Unexpected inflation jumps by 5 bps in the short run, and shows a cumulative increase of 12 bps in the long-run. Thus, the real discount rate term is 3 basis points, allowing a cumulated deficit of the same magnitude as $-0.14 + 0.03 = -0.11$ bps.

At the country level, France and Italy loosen their long-term fiscal stance, leaning towards the easing, while Germany maintains an overall more neutral stance and Spain adjusts.

To summarise, the monetary policy shock is accompanied by a small but persistent increase in inflation, and a fiscal easing in the aggregate. As we will see in the next section, this contrasts with the response to unconventional monetary policy.

These results have to be understood as indicative since long-run estimates are necessarily imprecise due to the uncertainty in the assumptions on the level of the steady states.¹⁷ They point to a decomposition of unexpected cumulated inflation which is split by fiscal policy which eases in the same direction of monetary policy and a relatively muted response of returns on the market value of the debt.

5.2. Unconventional monetary policy shocks

Figs. 4 and 5 show the responses to a one standard deviation unconventional monetary policy easing in the Euro Area aggregate and the disaggregated VARs, respectively. In Fig. 4, this represents a 20 basis points decline in the long-term average yield, which reverts within two years. The response of the short-term rate is negligible. We observe a positive reaction of output and inflation, and no significant movements in fiscal variables. This happens despite an unambiguous response of the returns on government debt, which maps to an increase in market value of the debt due to the decline in longer-term yields.¹⁸ While the value of the debt increases on impact, the response is not significant beyond the first period. Results are qualitatively similar in the disaggregate system where one standard deviation shock corresponds to a 10 basis points decline in the long-term average yield (in Fig. 5). The effect on output and inflation appears muted and not persistent. Interestingly, in this case, the response of inflation is estimated to be bigger on impact but less persistent than in the case of the conventional MP shock.

The unexpected inflation decomposition reported in Table 2 shows that the 10 basis points (bps) decline in the long-term rate due to the unconventional monetary policy shock corresponds to a large adjustment in the nominal returns, which jump by 95 bps in the short run and then contract by 69 bps in the future. Overall inflation movements are muted, about a half of what is seen in

¹⁷ Results using a different steady state for debt variables – consistent with a 60% Debt/GDP ratio, i.e. far away from the historical average, especially for Italy – are reported in Appendix E.

¹⁸ In the disaggregated model we can see that Spain (and to a lesser extent Italy) is the exception, with the response of the return not well identified on impact.




Fig. 4. Unconventional monetary policy shock. **Note:** The figure shows impulse response functions to a one standard deviation unconventional monetary policy shock (easing) in the Euro Area, using the small VAR with only aggregates. The impulse response of real GDP is reported in level, i.e. as percentage deviation from the steady state. All other impulse responses are reported as deviations from the steady state. The dotted lines report pointwise medians across all draws, whereas the bands correspond to the 16% and 84% percentiles. Number of draws: 2000. Variables in the quarterly dataset are defined as follows: (i) inflation and interest rates are in %, annualised, (ii) slope is the euro area long-term interest rate minus the euro area short-term interest rate, (iii) return is the nominal return on the portfolio of government debt, in % (annualised), inferred from aggregate debt and aggregate surplus, (iv) debt is 400 times the logarithm of the following ratio: aggregate debt over quarterly euro area GDP, (v) surplus denotes 400 times aggregate primary surplus over quarterly euro area GDP, scaled by aggregate debt over quarterly euro area GDP at steady state. For more details on the data construction and which variables enter the estimation, see Appendix B.

the case of conventional monetary policy. We have a jump by 9 bps in the short run, and then a cumulated decline by 1 bps in the future. Thus, the real discount rate term is -68 bps.

While in the case of conventional monetary policy we have seen a cumulated deficit in the long-run, here we have a cumulated primary surplus to GDP ratio response of 14 bps, generating crosswinds in the aggregate. This is due to the heterogeneous dynamics at country level, where the expansion in France, Italy and Spain is more than absorbed by the adjustment in Germany.

The muted fiscal response conditional on an UMP shock is telling us that when that policy was active, i.e. since the 2008 crisis (first via targeted loans, then via forward guidance and asset purchases), fiscal authorities did not use the fiscal space afforded by the decrease in long-term rates. Unlike in the case of conventional policy, the response of the primary surplus to an unconventional monetary policy easing is insignificant in the short-run and overall positive in the long-run. This long-run finding is mainly to be attributed to Germany.

These results come with two warnings. First, as we have seen, estimates are quite imprecise. Second, long run results are sensitive to assumptions on the steady state, as already commented.¹⁹ This is a problem hard to address given the short sample and the evolving policy landscape.

5.3. Convertibility shocks

Finally, we focus on the impact of the convertibility shock in Fig. 6. The IRFs plot a positive shock, meaning a shock compressing the core-periphery sovereign spreads. The responses to a one standard deviation shock imply a fall of about 15 basis points in Spanish and Italian sovereign spreads, of about 5 basis points in the French spread, and a small increase in German yields. Despite a large reaction of the periphery returns, the responses of fiscal variables are not clearly identified. Only for Italy there is an unambiguous increase in the value of the debt in the very short-term. As for the surpluses, none of the countries reacts significantly.

¹⁹ Results using a different steady state for debt variables – consistent with a 60% Debt/GDP ratio, i.e. far away from the historical average, especially for Italy – are reported in Appendix E.




Fig. 5. Unconventional monetary policy shock. **Note:** The figure shows impulse response functions to a one standard deviation unconventional monetary policy shock (easing) in the Euro Area, using the larger model in which surplus, debt, and return for the four countries enter the VAR individually. The impulse response of real GDP is reported in level, i.e. as percentage deviation from the steady state. All other impulse responses are reported as deviations from the steady state. The dotted lines report pointwise medians across all draws, whereas the bands correspond to the 16% and 84% percentiles. Number of draws: 1120. Variables in the quarterly dataset are defined as follows: (i) inflation and interest rates are in %, annualised, (ii) slope is the German long-term interest rate minus the euro area short-term interest rate, (iii) returns are nominal returns on the portfolio of government debt, in % (annualised), inferred from debts and surpluses, (iv) spreads are country long-term interest rates minus the German long-term interest rate, (v) debts are 400 times the logarithm of the following ratio: country debt over quarterly euro area GDP, (vi) surpluses denote 400 times country primary surplus over quarterly euro area GDP, scaled by country debt over quarterly euro area GDP at steady state. For more details on the data construction and which variables enter the estimation, see Appendix B.

To conclude our discussion, let us mention results from a VAR with country-specific inflation, reported in the Appendix D. We include national inflations in our benchmark model to provide evidence on the potential differential adjustment, at business cycle frequency, in price dynamics. However, our results indicate that, conditional on monetary policy shocks, national inflations adjust in a rather homogeneous manner. The other results do not change substantially.




Fig. 6. Convertibility shock. **Note:** The figure shows impulse response functions to a one standard deviation convertibility shock (easing) in the Euro Area, using the larger model in which surplus, debt, and return for the four countries enter the VAR individually. The impulse response of real GDP is reported in level, i.e. as percentage deviation from the steady state. All other impulse responses are reported as deviations from the steady state. The dotted lines report pointwise medians across all draws, whereas the bands correspond to the 16% and 84% percentiles. Number of draws: 1296. Variables in the quarterly dataset are defined as follows: (i) inflation and interest rates are in %, annualised, (ii) slope is the German long-term interest rate minus the euro area short-term interest rate, (iii) returns are nominal returns on the portfolio of government debt, in % (annualised), inferred from debts and surpluses, (iv) spreads are country long-term interest rates minus the German long-term interest rate, (v) debts are 400 times the logarithm of the following ratio: country debt over quarterly euro area GDP, (vi) surpluses denote 400 times country primary surplus over quarterly euro area GDP, scaled by country debt over quarterly euro area GDP at steady state. For more details on the data construction and which variables enter the estimation, see Appendix B.

6. Conclusion

We have proposed an empirical framework to study the adjustment dynamics through primary deficits, yields and returns, the market value of the debt and inflation, conditional to unexpected monetary policy changes aiming at the short interest rate (conventional), and the long interest rate or the spreads (unconventional).

The framework recognises that monetary–fiscal interactions – a topic of recent policy focus – can be studied by exploiting the general government budget constraint as an identity, while obtaining the dynamics from a rich Structural VAR model. We discuss

Table 2
Inflation decomposition — Unconventional monetary policy shock.

Variable/Country	Germany	France	Italy	Spain	Total
L.H.S. Eq. (6)					\sum_i
$\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \pi_{t+1}$					0.09
$-\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \psi_{i,t} r_{i,t+1}$	-(0.43)	-(0.34)	-(0.17)	-(0)	-(0.95)
R.H.S. Eq. (6)					\sum_i
$-\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} g_{t+j+1}$					0
$-\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \psi_{i,t} s_{i,t+1+j}$	-(0.6)	-(0.33)	-(0.08)	-(0.05)	-(0.14)
$\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \psi_{i,t} r_{i,t+1+j}$	0.03	-0.48	-0.21	-0.03	-0.69
$-\Delta \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \pi_{t+1+j}$					-(0.01)

Note: The unexpected inflation decomposition follows from the identity in Eq. (6). The first two rows report the left hand side (L.H.S.) of Eq. (6) for each country, and their sum in the last column of the table. These terms are balanced by the right hand side (R.H.S.) of Eq. (6) in the last three rows for each country, and their sum in the last column of the table. Numbers are computed draws by draw, and the means across all draws are reported. Number of draws: 1120.

the way in which the long term budget constraint can be understood in a monetary union with different fiscal authorities and a single monetary authority. However, we do not impose on the data any particular equilibrium model and remain agnostic about the size and nature of frictions and rigidities in the economy.

Letting the ‘data speak’ in a short sample over which monetary policy has gone through big changes is challenging. As a consequence, results depend on identification choices that by nature are controversial. Nevertheless, our result is insightful since it points to the fact that the nature of the fiscal–monetary interaction depends on whether unexpected monetary policy affects the short term interest rate (conventional) or the long end of the yield curve (unconventional). Key in this difference are two factors: (i) the effect on the return on the value of the debt, which depends on the change in yields at the relevant maturity, and (ii) the response of the primary surplus which depends on fiscal policy.

Non standard monetary policy has a much larger effect on returns since, given the average debt maturity and duration adjustment, long-term yields changes have a higher impact on returns than short rates. The long-run price level is lower than in the conventional policy case. The primary surplus response is muted and even slightly positive in the long-run, unlike in the conventional case (negative both at business cycle frequency and in the long-run).

It is difficult to extract a clear policy message from these results. The mechanism related to the budget identity is telling us that many factors affect inflation in the long-run: debt maturity, yields and primary surplus. In principle, coordination between monetary and fiscal policy could determine the combination of these factors, given an inflation objective. Historical data suggest that the small effect of unconventional monetary policy on inflation is explained by an unresponsive fiscal policy.

This suggests that the EMU should seriously consider a form envisaging mechanisms for coordination of fiscal and monetary policy to ensure that the monetary and fiscal stance at the aggregate level are coherent. This is obviously difficult to achieve with one monetary authority and nineteen governments in charge of national fiscal policy. In a recent report (Reichlin et al. (2021)) this point is discussed and a proposal compatible with existing Treaties is put forward. Today, when we are experiencing monetary policy tightening in combination with fiscal expansion in several euro-zone countries, this problem is becoming very relevant again.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurocorev.2022.104328>.

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