

**The significance of ECOWAS Norms and Mechanisms in  
Conflict Prevention and Security-Building in West Africa  
since 2000**

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The significance of ECOWAS Norms and Mechanisms in Conflict Prevention  
and Security-Building in West Africa since 2000

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## ABSTRACT

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**Key Words:** ECOWAS, Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding, Security-building, Security Sector Reform, regional security, norms, regional security institutions, West Africa, regional organisations.

This thesis examines the roles and significance of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa States) in conflict prevention, crisis response and security-building processes in West Africa, particularly since 2000. The importance of developing regional institutions and capacities for peace and security-building in Sub-Saharan Africa has been widely recognised since at least the mid-1990s. Not only has the African Union developed important peace and security building aims and roles, but so too have several of the sub-regional organisations in Africa, including ECOWAS in West Africa. In the late 1990s, ECOWAS Member States achieved a number of noteworthy sub-regional agreements on ECOWAS norms and mechanisms for conflict prevention, crisis response, and peace and security –building in West Africa. These agreements and mechanisms have subsequently been further developed since 2000, in a dynamic process that was informed by experience with efforts to respond to a range of crises and conflicts in the region. This thesis critically examines this process, focussing particularly on the extent to which, and how, ECOWAS norms, institutions and mechanism have continued not only to develop but also to be influential in practice.

Our research demonstrates that the ECOWAS agreements and norms established by 2000 have continued subsequently to be dynamically developed and used by ECOWAS member states and West African networks, in close interaction with several international partners. It argues that these norms and mechanisms have played significant roles in influencing actual policies, practices and missions. They have therefore proved to be more than shallow

symbolic or paper agreements, despite the political fragility and divisions of the region and most of its states. We argue that this cannot be adequately understood using single explanatory frameworks, such as Nigeria's hegemonic influence or instrumental influence of external Actors such as UN, EU or USA, as has often been suggested. Adequate explanations need to combine these factors with others, including relatively consistent investment in regional norms and institutions by coalitions of some West African states (including Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria) together with civil society and parliamentary networks.

Our research then examines in detail the extent to which, and how, ECOWAS norms and mechanisms on conflict prevention, crisis response and security sector reform were significant and influential in ECOWAS' responses to the crises and conflicts in Cote D'Ivoire, Mali and to a lesser extent in Gambia since 2003; and also how these crises were in turn influential in the further development of ECOWAS norms in these areas. We demonstrate numerous weaknesses in the implementation and effectiveness in these norms; and limitations in their diffusion and influence. However, we argue that such weaknesses and limitations are typical of regional peace and security norms everywhere, including much more stable and developed regions. Equally significant is that substantial coalitions exist between ECOWAS member states and stakeholders. Despite obvious tensions, ECOWAS, AU, UN and other countries such as France continue to work to address inherent tensions and develop mutually beneficial collaborations that enhance effective conflict prevention in the sub-region. The study draws on the knowledge created within this this thesis to propose a framework for conflict intervention.

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### **LIST OF ABBREVIATION**

CP	Conflict Prevention
CEWS	Conflict Early Warning System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
DCAF	The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Cease Fire Group
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Warning and Response Network
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
EPFSSRG	ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIIA	Nigeria Institute of International Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SERAP	Social Economic Rights and Accountability
SSR	Security Sector Reform

SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSR/G	Security Sector Reform/Governance
SST	Security Sector Transformation
SSS	Security Sector Stabilization
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WACSOFF	West Africa Civil Society Forum

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATION.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1. Introduction.....	1
<b>1.1 History and Context</b> .....	3
1.2 Research Problem and Research Questions.....	6
1.3 Significance of the research.....	10
1.4 Research Methodology.....	12
1.4.1 Introduction.....	12
1.4.2 Research Philosophy.....	13
1.4.3 Research Design.....	16
1.4.4 Information and Data sets for the study.....	17
1.4.5 Data Analysis.....	24
1.4.6 Ethical Considerations.....	26
1.4.7 Limitation of the research method.....	29
1.5 Structure of the thesis.....	30
CHAPTER TWO.....	33
LITERATURE REVIEW.....	33
2. Introduction.....	33
2.1. Conflict Prevention: Theories and definitions.....	33
2.2 Understanding security – state and private.....	35
2.2.1. Security Sector.....	38
2.2.2 SSR Ownership and participation.....	45



2.2.3	Universalisation and regionalisation .....	47
2.3	Evolution of security and expanding intervention .....	50
2.3.1	Security Regionalisation and regionalism .....	50
2.3.2	ECOWAS as regional organisation in West Africa .....	53
2.3.3	Success of ECOWAS as regional organisation .....	54
2.3	Security Sector Reform and Conflict Prevention in ECOWAS .....	56
2.3.4	ECOWAS Regional Norms in Peace and Security .....	57
2.3.5	ECOWAS Protocols .....	57
2.5.	ECOWAS Regional Mechanisms .....	61
2.5.1	The Authority .....	61
2.5.2	Mediation & Security Council .....	61
2.5.3	Executive Secretary .....	62
2.5.4	Commission of Defence and Security (CDS) .....	63
2.5.5	The Council of Elders .....	63
2.5.6	ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) .....	63
2.5.7	ECOWAS Peace and Security Observation System (Early Warning) .....	64
2.5.8	ECOWAS Court of Justice .....	65
2.6	ECOWAS Parliamentary and Civil Oversight .....	66
2.6.1	ECOWAS and Supranationality .....	68
2.7	Chapter summary .....	68
CHAPTER THREE .....		70
ECOWAS NORMS AND MECHANISMS SINCE 2006 .....		70
3.	Introduction .....	70
3.1	ECOWAS SSR Norms and Standards since 2006-2015 .....	70
3.2	Political Drivers of Security Sector Reform in West Africa .....	73
3.2.1	Security Drivers of Security Sector Reform in West Africa. ....	75

3.2.2 Development of Institutional Norms (2006-2015).....	80
3.2.3 Normative Institutional Standards, Norms and frameworks.....	81
3.4 Conventions and Instruments: 2006-2015.....	81
3.4.1 Formation of the secretariat – Heads of states.....	83
3.4.2 The role of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) .	85
3.4.3 possible challenges of drafting a collective framework.....	89
3.4.4 Military and non-military intervention .....	91
3.4.4.1 Military Intervention .....	92
3.4.4.2 Non-Military: West Africa Health Organisations (WAHO) .....	95
3.4.4.3 Implementation.....	98
3.4.4.4 ECOWAS Challenging Experience.....	99
<b>CHAPTER FOUR.....</b>	<b>108</b>
<b>FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF GHANA AND NIGERIA .....</b>	<b>108</b>
4. Introduction .....	108
4.1. Effects of disparate contribution and influence .....	109
4.1.1 Hegemony and patronage.....	110
4.1.2 Influence and inter country relationship .....	112
4.1.3 Stability in Ghana and Nigeria and ECOWAS SSR .....	113
4.1.4 Military Diplomacy: Political development in Ghana and Nigeria...	113
4.2 Democratic Transition in Nigeria and Ghana .....	117
4.3 Nigeria’s power beyond ECOWAS .....	119
4.3.1 Nigeria’s leadership role in Africa.....	119
4.3.2 Babangida years and ECOWAS .....	120
4.3.3 Anglophone-Francophone Influence.....	122
4.3.3.1 Continuation of bloc and external influence in the 1990s.....	124
4.3.3.2 Internal Power Dynamics.....	125
4.4 Interest of Nigeria and Ghana.....	129

4.4.1 Role of Nigeria’s Foreign policy and key treaties and protocols ....	129
4.4.2 The Lagos Treaty .....	130
4.4.3 Protocol on Non-Agression (PNA) .....	131
4.4.4 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD).....	131
4.4.5 The July 1991 Declaration of Political Principles .....	132
4.5 Norms, Mechanisms, and Instruments: 1993 Revised Treaty to ECPF .....	132
4.5.1 The Revised Treaty in 1993 .....	133
4.5.2 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention: Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 1999.....	135
4.5.3 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, December 2001 .....	137
4.5.4 Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), June 2006 .....	137
4.5.5 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) .....	138
4.5.6 Third Generation Norms, Mechanisms, and Instruments.....	139
4.6 Ghana’s Foreign and security policy.....	141
4.6.1 Ghana’s foreign policy influence and interests .....	141
4.6.2 Tensions in the Ghana and Nigeria policy interest.....	144
<b>CHAPTER FIVE</b> .....	145
<b>CASE STUDY OF COTE D’IVOIRE AND MALI</b> .....	145
5. Introduction .....	145
<b>5.1 Analytical framework</b> .....	147
5.1.1 Cote d’Ivoire’s Political Crises and Conflicts (2000-2008) until his arrest in April 2011.....	148
<b>PART ONE</b> .....	151
<b>CASE STUDY ONE</b> .....	151
5.2. Context of ECOWAS interventions in Cote d’Ivoire 2002 – 2008 ....	151

5. 2.1 Deployment of ECOWAS conflict prevention 2000 - 2008 .....	151
<b>5.2.2 Application of ECOWAS Early Warning System .....</b>	<b>152</b>
5.2.3 Conflict indicators in the first civil war in 2002 and ECOWAS response.....	154
5.2.4 Indicators relative to Military Intervention.....	156
5.2.5 Indicators relative to the roles of AU, UN and ECOWAS institutions. .....	157
5.3 Assessment of ECOWAS Peace Initiatives and AU, UN Intervention .	158
5.3.1 Peace Process: Accra Agreements (2003) .....	159
5.3.2 Assessment of Accra III .....	159
5.3.3 Assessment of ECOWAS SSR norms and mechanisms during the second civil war .....	161
5.3.4 Assessment of Post-conflict reconstruction: ECOWAS post-conflict recovery norms and mechanisms .....	163
5.4 Lessons-learned in ECOWAS intervention in Cote d'Ivoire.....	165
5.4.1 Conflict Prevention Mechanisms .....	165
5.4.2 ECOMICI and Peace Processes.....	168
5.4.3 ECOWAS norms and lessons learned .....	168
PART TWO.....	170
CASE STUDY TWO.....	170
5.5. ECOWAS Engagement and Responses in Mali (2000-2016) .....	170
5.5.1. Historical Background of the Malian Crises: from Independence to 2000 .....	170
5.5.2. Context: Security-related development: Tuareg Rebellions .....	173
5.5.3. ECOWAS Intervention in Mali.....	175
5.5.4 Deployment of ECOWAS Mechanisms, SSR, EWS in Mali .....	177
5.5.5 Peace Process: Tuareg Rebellion Transformation and SSR Mechanism.....	183

<b>5.6 Lessons Learned of ECOWAS Intervention in Mali</b> .....	187
CHAPTER SIX.....	191
EFFECTIVENESS OF ECOWAS SSR/G, EWR, ECPF, NORMS AND MECHANISMS .....	191
6. Introduction .....	191
6.1 Change and Dynamism in ECOWAS SSRG and ECPF frameworks .....	192
6.2 Implementation of ECOWAS norms and mechanism from 2014-2017 .....	194
6.3 Early Warning Early Response (EWER) .....	197
<b>6.4 Development of ECOWAS SSR/G norms 2014-2017</b> .....	201
6.4.1 Foundation of ECOWAS SSR/G .....	202
6.4.2 Implementation as aspect of control and ownership .....	205
6.4.3 ECOWAS Challenges 2014 - 2016.....	208
6.4.4 Application of SSR/G in Gambia .....	211
<b>6.5 Contributions of International Partners 2014-2017</b> .....	213
6.5.1 Financial and technical support.....	214
6.5.2 Capacity and constraints .....	216
6.6 Empirical findings (semi-structured interview).....	218
6.6.1 Themes relating to research question one .....	219
6.6.1.1 Progressive development.....	219
6.6.1.2 Implementation challenges.....	223
6.6.2 Themes relating to research question two.....	227
6.6.2.2 Nigeria’s negative influence .....	229
6.6.2.3 Nigeria as leader .....	230
6.6.2.4 The role of Ghana.....	231
6.6.3 Themes relative to research question three .....	232
6.6.3.1 Distorted cohesion between member states .....	232

6.6.3.2 Uncertain relationship with AU, EU and UN .....	233
CHAPTER SEVEN.....	237
CONCLUSIONS .....	237
7. Introduction and Overall Finding .....	237
7.1 Reflections on our methodological approach.....	248
7.2 Reflections on the policy implications of the findings .....	250
7.3 Issues for future research .....	253
1 Bibliography .....	254
2 Appendices .....	267
2.1 Transcribed semi-structure interview .....	267
2.2 Semi-structured interview questions.....	293
2.3 Ethical Clearance.....	294
2.4 Access to Data Collection Consent .....	296

## List of Tables

1.1 Names of participant, their organisations, and positions for the semi-structured interviews.....	21-22
2.1: List of ECOWAS Protocols.....	58
3.1 Summary of ECOWAS Institutional Norms/Standards (2006-2015).....	89-90
4.1 Regime changes in Ghana and Nigeria.....	103-104
4.3: ECOWAS Chairmanship between Anglophone and Francophone Countries from.....	112-113
5.1 CAPAR framework.....	131

## List of Figures

1.1 Process of thematic analysis and integration.....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
1 Map of Mali.....	151
6.0 Alert and Responses Structure of the Mechanism.....	175
7.1 ECOWAS framework for effective SSR/G, EWER, CP, norms, and mechanisms.....	209

# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Introduction

This thesis examines the development, roles and significance of ECOWAS' (Economic Community of West Africa States) agreements, norms and institutions on conflict prevention, crisis response and security-sector reform processes in West Africa, focussing on the period since 2000.

Conflict early warning and response mechanisms required to address the many conflicts around the world has been a concern for international organisations involved in negotiating peace across the world. However, the multiple context in which conflicts develop and the various forms they take has made it difficult for practitioners and academics in peace studies and political sciences to develop universally applicable mechanisms (Ansorg and Gordon, 2019, Boateng, 2019, Wulf and Debiel, 2009).

There is a substantial literature on the debates and processes of developing regional and sub-regional institutions and capacities for peace and security-building in Sub-Saharan Africa since the mid-1990s. Achieving such changes was a major purpose of the transformation of Africa's regional institution into the African Union, and the subsequent development of the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture and associated conflict prevention and peace and security-building mechanisms and programmes; which have been the focus of most research. Similarly, since the mid-1990s several sub-regional organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa have changed their mandates to address peace and security issues and have developed associated sub-regional agreements and mechanisms in support of these agendas.

ECOWAS has been prominent amongst these African sub-regional organisations. In the late 1990s, ECOWAS Member States negotiated several landmark sub-regional agreements to help its efforts to: prevent conflicts, respond effectively to political and security crises in West Africa, prevent and



reduce inadequately controlled flows and holdings of small arms and light weapons (SALW), and mount peace-keeping and peace-support missions (Ezoegidi, 2020). These further provided a platform enabling ECOWAS states and the ECOWAS Secretariat to play prominent roles in support of similar arrangements in the African Union and the United Nations.

These developments of ECOWAS in the late 1990s and early 2000s attracted substantial attention from researchers as well as policy and practitioner communities, resulting in a substantial research literature. However, the literature on the subsequent development and use of ECOWAS agreements, norms and mechanisms is less well developed, and has significant gaps. This may be partly because these further developments since the early 2000s can be regarded as being an elaboration and refinement of the ECOWAS norms that had been established by then, and thus perhaps less worthy of detailed scholarly examination. It may also partly be due to researchers giving higher priority to examining the international and regional responses to the numerous conflicts and crises that have taken place in West Africa since the early 2000s, where ECOWAS norms and institutions have been significant but perhaps regarded as just one factor amongst many. Whatever the reason, this thesis aims to address such gaps, by focussing on the detailed development of ECOWAS norms and institutions for peace and security since around 2003, and the extent to which they have been significant or influential.

In this introductory chapter, we briefly provide some context for the topic area of this thesis, and then proceed to present our research focus and the main and secondary research questions for this project. We then proceed to outline our methodological approach, including primary data collection methods; including discussion of some constraints and limitations. The chapter finishes by presenting the thesis structure and the aims and scope of each chapter.

## 1.1 History and Context

After independence, West African nations have witnessed high level political instability and consistent conflicts that led to the region being labelled as a 'strategic danger' threatening international peace and security (Kaplan, 2006). Thus, the recurring theme of political instability and outbreaks of violent conflicts and civil wars in the region with their possible spill-over effect to neighbouring countries risk of creating further instability. Hence there has been calls to rethink for research aimed at understanding the security and conflict context in West Africa in order to assist in the effective deployment of regional peace and security intervention in West Africa with ECOWAS at the centre of this function (Adebajo, 2004, Adeniji, 1997, Adeleke, 1995, Tavares, 2010, Francis, 2006).

ECOWAS is a regional organisation of the West African States established on the 28 May 1975 with the initial mandate to promote customs union and common market as a means of achieving regional integration and cooperation among its 15 member states<sup>1</sup> (Adebajo, 2004, Francis, 2006). The pressure of political events and the spread of insecurity in the early 1990s stimulated the extension of ECOWAS mandate into peace and security which aimed at tackling the problems of both militarisation of politics and militarisation through conflicts as made evident by the rebellions, civil wars and armed conflicts in the region (Bagayoko, Yabi, 2010).

Despite the fact that ECOWAS protocols prior to 1990 included the Non-aggression Treaty and Mutual Assistance on Defence which were part of its peace and security architecture to prevent inter-state conflicts and promote collective defence among member states from external aggression or re-colonisation, the new wave of intra-state conflicts and the possible fear of conflict spill-over initiated the rethinking of peace and security in region. Most scholars have argued that ECOWAS's high expectation peace and security imposed the creation of an enabling environment. Such an atmosphere would

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<sup>1</sup> Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

legitimise its initial mandate for regional cooperation and economic integration, further engendering economic, social and political development among member states in the region.

How ECOWAS has further developed to respond to the challenges of peace and security in West Africa and among its member states is a focus of this thesis. One of such areas is in the area of early warning response. If ECOWAS could ensure that it is able to detect, intervene and address, conflicts from inception through early warning intervention, it could be in a position to take effective action before conflicts degenerate into civil wars.

A recurring promise of successive African governments since independence in the 1960s is to address the social problems of unemployment and underemployment. However, sporadic conflict in the continent has led to devastating levels of social degradation, poverty and suffering. These conflicts develop out of the complex cultural diversity that is characteristic of Africa (Kazeroony and Burr, 2017, Rindap and Mari, 2014). As long as this diversity remains alongside the external influence of countries like France, China and other Western nations in the face of scarce resources, conflict is bound to continue.

Until the turn of the millennium, the West African region remained the Africa's most unstable region, including the political crises and conflict that stimulated peace-support interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s. Although ECOWAS has made advances in its peace interventions and development of mechanisms and norms for peace and security across the region, conflicts have continued and some of its interventions have been less than successful. ECOWAS faced up to the numerous conflicts in the West African region. Across the sub-region, countries faced challenges of political instability, violent civil wars, and the more recent emergence of new security threats from terrorism, organised criminal crime Francis (2006). Even the more stable countries like Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal witnessed conflicts as the case of Niger Delta, Southern Senegal and Northern Ghana where regional instability has been an ongoing concern. Besides these in-country regional conflicts, West Africa has

experienced civil wars in Cote d'Ivoire. Nigeria has witnessed protracted Boko Haram Islamic insurgency, while political tensions have continued in Mali (Boateng, 2019). These events have created an escalating number of refugees, mercenaries, drugs and arms spill-over across the porous borders of nation states within and without ECOWAS region. Left unchecked, the effect of continued conflict could further weaken the capacity of the member states to meet the security needs of their citizens (Adebajo, 2004).

For most of these conflicts ECOWAS has been called upon to contribute towards stabilisation and peace building. However, questions remain about the effectiveness of the mechanisms, norms, EWR policies it deploys – particularly in the midst of some member states suspected of exercising hegemony and therefore seeking specific foreign policy interests, while others engage in signing multilateral relationships that are beyond the remit of ECOWAS. It is in this context that this doctoral thesis intervenes to gain a better understanding of ECOWAS processes and shed light on advancements made in developing a more effective EWR, peace building, military intervention and policy development strategy in the sub-region.

In response to these civil wars, insurgencies and regional upheavals, ECOWAS – as a regional organisation has emerged as the most active regional body seeking to contain these events and bring peace to affected nations. In the process, it has made some progress in its peace and security architecture and in evolving norms and mechanisms for effective intervention. However, the search for 'the magic formula' for conflict prevention and the promotion of democracy and good governance in West Africa remains a daunting endeavour and an issue of interest and concern for scholars, practitioners and the regional body ECOWAS. Insecurity and loss of human life and property is a constant concern for the African Union (AU) and the United Nation (UN) and other regional organisation and countries involved in peace keeping and conflict prevention missions including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has since the early 2000s become an important feature of peacebuilding interventions and is usually undertaken by a state

alongside national and international partners (Ansorg and Gordon, 2019). In West Africa, ECOWAS has been the most active regional organization undertaking the role of conflict intervention, early warning response (EWR) and SSR (Boateng, 2019).

ECOWAS's mandate and legitimacy derive from chapter V of its charter which empowers ECOWAS to apply the regional protocols and mechanisms in some circumstances to mediate or intervene. That mandate allows ECOWAS to intervene for the purpose of securing peace and stability in the case of:

“Aggression or conflict in any Member State threat thereof; conflicts between two or several Member States; internal conflicts that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; in the event of serious and massive violation of human rights and rule of law; in the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government; and any situation as may be directed by the Mediation and Security Council”<sup>2</sup>

## **1.2 Research Problem and Research Questions**

### **The Problematic**

Although ECOWAS benefits from the above mandate, critics (Boateng, 2019, Bah, 2010) have highlighted short-comings, limitation and policy lapses in its systems and interventions. It is these shortcomings that this study sets out to investigate in order to develop a framework for effective peace keeping intervention for ECOWAS.

In a more recent work Boateng (2019), argued that there are elements and instruments of policy responses lacking legitimacy, technical and financial capacity. He observed further that these shortcomings impede the ability for ECOWAS to practically implement a holistic delivery and contests the effectiveness of ECOWAS and commitment of member states in interventions in Cote D'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. Against this backdrop, this study is

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<sup>2</sup> Chapter V of ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace –Keeping and Security

undertaken to contribute into research seeking a better understanding of ECOWAS and the West African security landscape for better theorising.

This intervention has become even more pertinent in the light of the implementation of the United Nation's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for which West African nations are signatories. Through the SDGs, the UN seeks to achieve sixteen objectives, notably: the eradication of poverty, ensuring good health and improving well-being, and provision of clean water and quality education and so on (United Nations, 2016). If these goals are to be realised, then peace and security must be guaranteed.

Against this backdrop, the wider problem which this study seeks to address is that of peace and security in West Africa. It does so by interrogating the evolution processes and effectiveness of the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS as well as the actions and decisions taken to address selected conflicts in West Africa. This knowledge would enable the researcher to propose a framework for effective intervention for future challenges. It is against the problematics faced by ECOWAS so far that this study was conducted.

### **Research questions**

This PhD research project aims to advance understanding of the roles and significance of ECOWAS as a sub-regional institution in peace and security in West Africa since 2000. This means taking ECOWAS's specific agreements, norms, mechanisms, and programmes seriously, and examining the extent to which, and how, they have influenced or shaped efforts to prevent, manage and respond to political crises or violent conflicts in West Africa. It also means examining the extent to which, and how, relevant ECOWAS norms and institutions have developed over time, as part of a dynamic process in which efforts are made to strengthen and adapt ECOWAS norms to enhance their effectiveness.

In principle, a regional institution can influence peace and security processes and outcomes through a number of different mechanisms. For example, the regional organisation can provide a political forum that facilitates and enables mobilisation of regional initiatives or responses to problematic events; or helps

to legitimise or constrain initiatives from powerful member states or regional 'coalitions of the willing'. At a deeper level, a regional organisation can develop pooled capacities, resources, and institutional mechanisms that can empower, facilitate or coordinate significant co-operative actions and procedures; which work relatively autonomously alongside relevant national and international actors. Norms established through regional agreements can be diffused and adopted at national and local as well as regional levels, influencing decisions by a wide range of relevant stakeholders both directly and indirectly (UN, 2020).

In this PhD project, and thesis, we are concerned with assesses the extent to which, and how, each of these types of mechanisms have been influential in the case of ECOWAS as a sub-regional institution with a mandate to promote peace and security in West Africa. This thesis focuses particularly on the period since 2000, since (as noted above) this is less well covered in academic literature compared to the literature on the earlier phases of development of ECOWAS norms in this area. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that deeper influence of regional norms and institutional resources takes time to develop, as norm diffusion proceeds and as institutional mechanisms and recourses become more elaborated and embedded in practices. Thus, our study of ECOWAS's roles and significance as it has developed over the last two decades is well-placed to assess the extent to which the relevant ECOWAS agreements have become more than symbolic or political statements and forums, to also have wider and deeper institutional and normative significance.

Peace and security are wide agendas, touching on virtually all aspects of ECOWAS mandates and activities. In this research, we focus on specific ECOWAS norms and mechanisms in this area: on conflict prevention (CP); early warning and early response mechanisms (EWER); crisis management and response (CMR); and peace and security building (PSB) in conflict-affected West African states. In each of these issue areas, ECOWAS had established agreements and norms by around 2000, but these were subsequently further developed, used and adapted by ECOWAS in efforts to make them more effective and operational. In this context, ECOWAS developed new regional norms and programmes on security and justice sector governance and reform,

as awareness and international support for this agenda grew from the mid-2000s onwards. These SSRG norms were developed by ECOWAS as contribution to the already established norms to promote conflict prevention and post-conflict peace and security. These norms are also therefore included as a focus for this PhD research.

Thus, this thesis examines the roles and significance of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa States) in conflict prevention, crisis response and security-building processes in West Africa, particularly since 2000 but makes inferences to earlier interventions such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Our main research question is:

*To what extent, and how, have ECOWAS norms, mechanisms and institutions on conflict prevention, security and justice sector governance, crisis response, and peace and security building in conflict-affected countries played significant roles in West African peace and security since 2000?*

In order to fully to address this question, the thesis includes examinations of the following three major themes, or secondary research questions.

- i. How have ECOWAS' norms, mechanisms, and programmes for conflict prevention, security and justice sector governance, crisis response, and peace and security building in conflict-affected countries been further developed, elaborated and institutionalised since 2000, and to what extent have these developments incorporated lessons from experience to enhance their effectiveness?
- ii. What factors are needed to adequately explain the interests and capacities that enabled ECOWAS to develop increasingly strong and elaborated norms and mechanisms in the above areas since the early 2000s, in view of the challenging sub-regional conditions of conflict, fragility and limited development?
- iii. To what extent have these further developed ECOWAS norms and mechanisms been mobilised and used as ECOWAS member states and institutions, with their partners, to respond to major conflicts and crises



in West Africa since the mid-2000s, including in Cote D'Ivoire, Mali and Gambia; and what are the lessons from these experiences?

These three secondary questions and thematic issue are considered throughout the thesis and come into particular focus in different research chapters.

### **1.3 Significance of the research**

The thesis aims substantially to contribute to knowledge by addressing each of the above secondary questions and themes, drawing on a combination of detailed analysis of secondary literature with insights and data from primary research. In doing so, the research aims to add to knowledge and understanding concerning the main overall research question.

In relation to the first secondary question above, we aim to contribute an original detailed examination of how the ECOWAS' norms, mechanisms, and programmes for conflict prevention, security and justice sector governance, crisis response, and peace and security building were further developed, elaborated and institutionalised since 2000. This addresses a relative gap in the current literature, which has tended to focus on the ECOWAS agreements and basic norms that had already been established by the early 2000s, and insufficiently recognises the significance of their subsequent elaboration and development. The extent of our original contribution on this tends to increase as we proceed beyond 2010: there is very little systematic and detailed academic research on the development of such ECOWAS norms and mechanisms since 2011. For example, one key additional instrument that has not received much academic scrutiny is the ECOWAS policy framework on security sector reform and governance adopted in June 2016. Analysis of these new document will be important in contributing to the existing literature which establish connection between SSR and conflict prevention (Greene, 2003). Moreover, our focus on examining the dynamic process by which these norms have been elaborated and strengthened enables us to contribute to better understanding of the drivers of continued development, including the extent to which lessons-learned processes have played a significant role.

By addressing the second secondary question noted above, the thesis contributes to better understanding of the factors required to explain how and why ECOWAS member states, and other stakeholders, were able to further develop and strengthen ECOWAS relevant norms and mechanisms, despite the structural challenges of doing so in a sub-region characterised by conflict, fragility, problematic governance, and political and cultural division.

The unpromising origins of ECOWAS agreements and missions in the 1990s have been widely acknowledged and researched. Many scholars have questioned ECOWAS's intervention in the early violent conflicts of the 1990s in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea (Adebajo, 2004, Francis, 2006). Many analyses have highlighted the dilemmas and tensional interest of national foreign and security policies in the development and implementation of ECOWAS's norms on peace and security. We can always expect underlying complexity between national and regional institutional power relations, and that diverse national interests affects ECOWAS decisions and effectiveness (Aning and Bah, 2010). There is limited research into the role and contributions of influential member states of ECOWAS in the development of the norms and mechanisms of ECOWAS, particularly since the early 2000s. Building on analyses of early ECOWAS military interventions as being reflections of Nigerian regional power and interest, some analysts have emphasised Nigerian regional hegemonic power as a key explanatory factor for the development of ECOWAS norms and programmes. Others have referred to a powerful Anglophone coalition of Ghana and Nigeria; or alternatively to pressures and incentives from international actors. This thesis critically examines these and other possible explanations, in relation to the actual norm development process, and thus aims to contribute to knowledge on this debate.

In examining evidence and experience relating to the third secondary question above, it aims to contribute to knowledge and understanding of the details of ECOWAS roles and significance in its responses to some important peace and security missions since 2003; namely those relating to Cote D'Ivoire, Mali and Gambia. There are detailed existing studies of the conflict dynamics

and of the stabilisation and peace-building challenges for Cote D'Ivoire and Mali; and of the complex international peace-support missions in each of these countries, involving a complex coalitions of UN, EU, African Union, ECOWAS and individual states. However, these have not focussed specifically on the roles and significance of ECOWAS as a regional institution with specific norms and mechanisms. Only limited studies have explored ECOWAS intervention in a systematic manner and conceptualised how lessons learned could be useful in theorising future interventions. This study contributes knowledge, by analysing ECOWAS intervention in the conflicts in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire and the Gambia between 2003 to 2019. This knowledge informs the proposed framework developed within this study.

Ultimately, the overarching rationale of the study is to advance the search for peace and security in Africa. A better understanding of ways through which West African countries and by extension all African countries can achieve peace has become imperative (AU, 2013; UN, 2020). In the light of a changing global security dynamics, regional bodies like ECOWAS have become important by virtue of proximity, familiarity and embeddedness in local conflict to act swiftly and decisively to stop conflicts from degenerating into civil war mainly due to various complex forms of ethnic and regional difference some of which are historical (Anazodo et al., 2012, Rindap and Mari, 2014, Jacob, 2014). In this context, it is important to advance policy as well as academic understanding by studying the extent to which ECOWAS has managed to develop and elaborate influential norms and mechanisms for conflict prevention, crisis management and peace and security building.

## **1.4 Research Methodology**

### **1.4.1 Introduction**

To address the research questions, the research adopted approaches appropriate to the desired information requirements for the study. The nature of the questions to be explored also influenced decisions on research design, data collection methods, and processes of data analysis. These decisions were

made in relation to the philosophical standpoint of the study. Each of these aspects of the methodology is explained below.

#### **1.4.2 Research Philosophy**

Overall, we have adopted a relatively open epistemological approach, to enable the research to take advantage of multiple perspectives in order to achieve rounded and robust knowledge and understanding of our research topic and research questions. This can broadly be categorised as a pragmatic realist approach. Within this framework, the main research question is concerned with understanding the development, diffusion and influence of norms, and thus we have aimed to incorporate insights from interpretivist epistemological world views, with their relativist ontology (Bryman, 2016; Hall, 2003). From an interpretivist perspective, it is considered that reality is created through the process of interaction between persons. To this extent, reality is considered to develop out of a process of social construction and therefore could be interpreted in different ways by different people in a subjective manner (Bryman, 2008, Robson, 2011, Sayer, 1992). Having said this, it is important for our purposes to also take serious account of more positivist approaches in which we examine available data with a view to developing an understanding that can be accepted as valid by analysts coming from a variety of perspectives.

#### **Taking Account of The Philosophy of Ubuntu**

In conducting this research, I have tried at least to remain aware of the philosophy of Ubuntu, and to take its perspectives and insights into account when approaching interpretation of events and data. In this study the theory of Ubuntu served to provide a perspective, helping the researcher to visualise and make sense of the unfolding events and processes in ways that provide a path towards understanding the complex information examined within the study.

The term Ubuntu refers to a uniquely Afrocentric body of theories that constitute ways in which indigenous African communities or nation states make sense of the complex processes that constitute perceptions constructed about the planet (Mbigi, 2005). Put simply, the Ubuntu philosophy provides an Afrocentric reading or world view of reality and truth for different problems and

phenomenon (Khoza, 2012). This theory was considered appropriate for this study for the reason that theories represent various ways in which observers see their environment. By adopting Ubuntu, the researcher is able to construct a sense of ECOWAS interventions in Africa, in a way that takes account of the manner in which reality is perceived in the African context. As Littlejohn has explained when referring to human communication (1983, p. 12), “theories are abstractions, every theory is partial”. Each theory delineates a way of exploring different social phenomena. The value of any theory is measured in terms of how well it is constructed and applied in research to improve meaning and understanding. Although, there is much disagreement about what constitutes an adequate theory, it remains a central aspect of social research.

Although, less considered in peace studies and international relations, the philosophy of Ubuntu has been adopted in many studies in anthropology and management studies to present non-western illumination into how the African society is organised. The majority of research in peace studies have adopted a Western approach to intervention. Very few studies have explored the African context from an Afrocentric perspective in peace studies. It has been argued across emerging critical social sciences that such studies could be misleading as they study events in Africa using typically Western approaches or lenses (Ford, 2010). For this reason, the study adopted the Afrocentric theory of Ubuntu as a lens to stir the research and analytical processes. Ubuntu has been presented as an indigenous African theory (Inyang, 2009; Khoza, 2012; Mangaliso, 2001; Msila, 2008; Sarpong, Bi, & Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). The notion of Ubuntu accords primacy to the reinforcement of social ties in society. Applied to peace studies, it encourages high consideration for social relations, encourages closer affinity and promotes collective interest through community interdependence and conscientious mutual respect between people (Karsten & Illa, 2005; Mangaliso, 2001; Mbigi, 2005; Ncube, 2010). The spirit of the theory is encapsulated in the South African (Shona) expression *Ubuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*. This expression conveys the notion that the existence of a person in an organization like ECOWAS or country as the case of the member states constituting the West African sub-region is possible through the existence of other persons in the region and beyond. Under this premise, our lives become interrelated with others in the world such

that our own survival depends on the others. This way, the notion of living is conceptualised alongside other humans rather than in isolation from others. In English language the word Ubuntu means: “humanity” or an expectation that everyone demonstrates humane behaviour. Karsten & Illa (2005). Within the remit of Ubuntu, peace becomes the outcome of individual and collective selfless participation of all for its cultivation within the community or country in respect of the dignity of all (Khoza, 2012; Nkomo, 2006; Sigger et al., 2010). By adopting this theory, the researcher was able to explore beyond the often superficial meanings constructed on the basis of what is observed into making sense of ECOWAS systems, evolution and challenges in a deeper manner, rooting into African cultural value systems, some of which defy Western logic and rational thinking.

#### **1.4.3 Research Approach**

Methodologically, this research adopts a mixed methods approach, combining several qualitative research methods and approaches (Hall et al., 2003, Mahoney, 2010). We combine iterative content analyses of ECOWAS agreements norms and mechanisms from relevant institutional records and written texts with primary data collected in the field through interaction, particularly through interviews with key informants or participants. Content analysis of ECOWAS documentations and secondary data analysis (Process tracing) drawn from the research and policy literatures, as well as documentation from practitioner communities were triangulated with empirical data from key informant obtained through interviews. These processes provided a deeper analysis of ECOWAS programmes and interventions, as well as the extent to which these were influenced by existing and emerging norms and mechanisms (Johnson et al., 2007). We include some specific case studies to enable focussed historical process tracing to uncover member state influences processes and security and foreign policy strategies to further illuminate the complex aspirations at play.

The mixed method approach adopted enabled the attainment of higher levels of credibility and trustworthiness about the result and the phenomenon and events under study (Johnson et al., 2007). Mixed method approach was also a good fit

for the type of research considering the study involves multiple sources of data and thus, necessitating different analytical lenses to make sense of key underpinning issues (Tashakkori, 1998).

### **1.4.3 Research Design**

Within the above framework, the analysis of the development of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms since the early 2000s was based on detailed textual analysis of official texts and records and empirical data collected in the field. The overall exploration anchored around two main ECOWAS interventions or cases. It follows that case study research design was adopted.

Although considered in relation to previous conflict missions engaged by ECOWAS, the focus was in Cote D'Ivoire and Mali representing the two most important interventions since 2000. Whilst there is an element of comparison, the study is not primarily comparative here, but rather designed to better understand qualitatively the processes by which ECOWAS and its member states took and operationalised decisions, and the extent and ways in which ECOWAS norms and mechanisms were used. These thus represent two case studies (plus the smaller case study of ECOWAS engagement with The Gambia), to provide qualitative exploratory understandings. This methodology is described by Stebbins (2001) as a vehicle to support in-depth examination of a topic of interest where only limited research is available to facilitate knowledge. The two cases, served as reference points for deeper exploration of the norms, mechanisms and other systems deployed by ECOWAS. Although the focus was on the cases of ECOWAS intervention in Cote D'Ivoire, Mali and The Gambia, the study takes account of information relating to ECOWAS interventions elsewhere. A further, expansion of the general *modus operandi* of ECOWAS case studies enabled the study to reach greater depth in decision and policy analysis as well as in making sense of the challenges faced by ECOWAS operatives in the field. Case study approach has been widely used in peace study research and has been recommended for explorative research. Given the flexibility associated with case study research, its use made it possible to incorporate the different data sets and distinct analytical processes engaged in the study (Yin, 2003).

#### **1.4.4 Information and Data sets for the study**

Following the mixed method approach adopted, data was collected in three different ways including analysis of the two cases of ECOWAS intervention, analysis of key theories, concepts and issues of debate within peace study literature relating to intervention in conflict and empirical data collected through interviewing in the field (Creswell and Clark, 2007).

For written content on ECOWAS intervention in Cote D'Ivoire and Mali, data were collected from institutions such as the Research Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Lagos and National Institute of Policy and Strategic studies Jos. Further written data were derived from civil society organisations working on peace and security including the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOFF), the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), the Kofi Anan Research Centre, ECOWAS Court of Justice and ECOWAS Parliament.

These were complemented by archives, memos from experts in the AU, ECOWAS as well as information reported by the press and media. Further written content by relevant institutions beyond Africa served as sources of data (Abowitz and Toole, 2010). Secondary data was gathered from written articles on conflict resolution, early warning and response, intervention and other topical areas in the literature. Empirical data was collected through face to face interviewing at ECOWAS headquarters at Abuja Nigeria and regional offices at Accra in Ghana.

#### **Primary Data Collection Method**

Data for the research were collected using three main instruments. Empirical data was generated through the use of semi-structured interviewing. This was complemented with process tracing technique and secondary data analysis – both of which constitute the content analysis element of the study.

Primary data was collected through Key Informant Interviews with semi-structured interviews (Enuka, 2010). The guiding questions are presented as appendix B below. All participants were ECOWAS executives with involvement in ECOWAS conflict intervention. Most were former top military officers of



ECOWAS, Policy experts, government officers in peace and security, directors of political affairs and peace and security (PAPS). Participants also included directors of Small Arms Unit (SAU), directors of Early Warning and Early Response (EWR) directors of ECOWAS Standby force, Senior Policy lecturers in Nigerian and Ghanaian Universities and Defence Academy heads.

### **Semi-structured Key Informant Interviews**

As indicated above, semi-structured interviewing approach was adopted. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes to one hour and were recorded using a simple voice recorder and in some cases video recorder. Where participants refused to be recorded or videoed, notes were taken manually in the course of the interview (Horton et al., 2004), with main points taken noted (Blaikie, 2010, Patton, 2002).

Thus, semi-structured interview was the main data collection instrument used for primary data collection. Semi-structured interview allows the interviewer to explore questions using a priori set questions but not necessarily strictly following the formalised list of questions. In this respect, although there were clear questions as presented in appendix B. The set questions were crafted in an open-ended manner to enable further probing by way of follow-up questions. Through this interactive approach, it was possible to explore questions and participant experiences in greater detail. The interviews took place as face to face discussions within ECOWAS premises with ECOWAS executives charged with the responsibility of directing and implementation of policies. These were used to complement secondary data assembled and analysed using process tracing of events and extant literature as detailed below. The interactional nature of the semi-structured interview provided the interviewer with the opportunity to question certain responses in greater depth, thus allowing for reflection, introspection and reconfirmation of the information provided (Bryman, 2008, Grindsted, 2005, Horton et al., 2004). In doing so, the interviews sometimes took a more narrative and conversational approach in ways that allowed participants to address research questions through their own direct quotes or power phrases (Pratt, 2009). Through this inter-subjective

approach informed by social constructionism (Cunliffe, 2008), research questions were sometimes inductively addressed (Gray, 2013).

The purposive sampling technique was used for the selection of participants. Purposive sampling, also known as judgmental, selective, or subjective sampling, is a form of non-probability sampling in which researchers rely on their own judgment when choosing members of the population to participate in their study (Patton, 2002). However, participants included must be bearers of the knowledge or experience relevant to the purpose of the study. Creswell and Clark (2007) and Bryman (2008) argue that purposive sampling technique is appropriate where participants need to have specialist knowledge about the subject under investigation. In accordance with this criterion, only ECOWAS executives or experts with knowledge of ECOWAS processes and interventions were included in the study.

The targeted sample was 40 participants for the face to face interviews. However, eventually 20 were retained, 10 in Nigeria and 10 in Ghana. Reducing to a small number of 20 ensured that the study attained the estimated deeper engagement with participants.

Table 1.1 below shows the list of participants, their organisations and positions for the semi-structured interviews. Although there were more than 20, as indicated above only 20 were retained for the study to achieve deeper and manageable exploration (Patton, 2002).

### 1.1 Participant profile

No.	Name of Organisation or Entity	Designation	Number of Interviewees
1	ECOWAS: Directorate of Early Warning,	Senior management officers	4

	Regional Security Division and SSR division		
2	ECOWAS: Directorate of Early Warning, Regional Security Division and SSR division	Middle-level management officers	5
3	Institute of peace and conflict resolution, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nigeria	Senior leadership	2
4	Institute of Security Studies Nigeria	Senior Researcher/lecturer	1
5	Defence College in Nigeria	Senior Research Fellow	1
6	The KUKAH Centre for Faith and Leadership Research	Senior leadership	1
7	Centre for Strategic Research and studies-Nigerian Defence College	Research Fellow	1

8	Search for Common Ground Nigeria	Senior leadership	1
9	Network of Human Rights institutions in West Africa	Senior management officer	1
10	OSIWA	Grants, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator	1
11	International Institute of Leadership and Governance	Senior leadership	1
12	CLEEN Foundation- Justice and Security Reform	Middle-level management officer	1
13	MacArthur Foundation	Senior management	1
14	Centre for Democracy & Development Nigeria	Senior management officer	1
15	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding	Senior management officers	3
16	Centre for Democracy and Development Nigeria	Senior management officer	1
17	Nigerian Institute of	Senior Researcher	1

	International Affairs (NIIA)		
18	National Peace Council Ghana	Senior management officer	1
19	Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana	Research Fellow	1
20	Ghana Centre for Democratic Development	Middle-level management officer	1
21	Kofi Annan International Peacebuilding Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra Ghana	Senior management officer	1
22	Force Commander in Cote D'Ivoire intervention	Retired senior leader	1
23	West African Civil Society Institute (WACSI)	Senior management officer	1
24	West African Civil Society Forum (WASCOSOF)	Senior management officer	1

<b>Total</b>	<b>34</b> <b>Respondents</b>
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### **Process Tracing Method (content analysis 1)**

Process tracing method or technique (PTM) was used for secondary data identification. PTM is defined as the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in the light of research questions posed by the researcher in qualitative studies (Bennett, 2008, Bennett, 2010). Scholars deploying PTM (see e.g., (Tilly, 2001) on mechanisms of political processes) proffer that it is most effective in research describing political and social phenomena – particularly when evaluating causal narratives and claims, also referred to as procedure of discerning (Yin, 2008). In practice, the process tracing approach focussed in highlighting the unfolding of events or situations in which ECOWAS has been involved in over time. Events, conflict situations and norms and mechanisms as well as member state foreign and security policies were identified and adequately described at different points in time (Collier, 2011). The descriptive component of process tracing proceeded with observing ECOWAS change sequence, taking good synopsis at a series of specific moments and events between years and different interventions. The process also involved noting key steps in the process, highlighting irregularities, and identifying consequences of decisions while mapping learnings from failures (Mahoney, 2010).

The entire process enabled the historical evolution process of events, decisions and interventions to be traced sufficiently to improve understanding of the ways and extent to which particular ECOWAS norms or mechanisms were influential. The Fewer (1999) model discussed in detail in chapter five and six enabled the researcher to present secondary findings relative to the context, key conflict indicators and effectiveness of ECOWAS mechanisms, SSR, CEWS and conflict prevention (Tansey, 2009). It also assisted in profiling intervention decisions in Cote D'Ivoire and Mali, unearthing, causal mechanisms, evaluating outcomes and identifying key players and relevant contextual variables as well as limitations and impediments for success (Pedersen and Beach, 2010, Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2010).

## **Secondary data analysis (content analysis 2)**

Secondary data analysis formed an important third instrument for data collection for the study. The content derived through this are mainly contained in chapters two and three. In order to identify relevant published work relating to ECOWAS processes, norms and mechanisms and wider relevant literature on conflict intervention, early warning and the politics of peace prevention and peace keeping, a combination of data base search and snowballing' technique were used (Greenhalgh and Peacock, 2005). First, university repositories were sourced from such data bases as Thompson Reuters Web of Knowledge, Ebsco Host, Science Direct and so on. To these were added memos, information from press and media prints. The search term was often ECOWAS conflict prevention and proxies such as ECOWAS and peace keeping in Africa. For the wider literature, journal articles, book and wider information from peace and security organizations and served as data search sources. A greater focus was on papers published in security, peace and international relation and political science-based journals.

The above process permitted the identification of papers and information that were both significantly or frequently cited and considered to have made valuable contribution into the literature on peace studies. The lists of references in key articles were then used to snowball other relevant sources and books chapters and debates in both ECOWAS processes and general theories on peace keeping, early warning and other topical areas. Ultimately, more than 300 articles and book chapters were included in the process analysis of the secondary data as cited within the thesis. The third source of data specific to ECOWAS were assembled systematically from ECOWAS archives and from press information some of which were recommended by ECOWAS executives who were themselves architects of such policy documents.

### **1.4.5 Data Analysis**


As discussed above, secondary data was analysed through the use of the model for conflict analysis developed by the forum for early warning and early response known by the acronym FEWER. The model examines the context of conflict, key signifiers and possible approaches (FEWER, 1999). Data on ECOWAS processes were analysed systematically using process tracing (Tilly,

2003). Meanwhile, empirical data was analysed thematically (Silverman, 2016, Silverman, 2015). The process involved three key steps. First, the audio recorded interview was transcribed into text and a process of data reduction was undertaken, removing repetition, side conversations and unrelated content. An example of transcribed recording is presented as appendix (A) of the thesis. The second stage essentially involved open data coding by way of continuous reading, identifying recurring phrases, paragraphs and narratives, manually extracting key chunks using different font colours and backgrounds and merging statements relating to specific research questions (Corbin and Strauss, 2014).

The third step was to create links and establish relationships between the emerging categories, thus transitioning from open to axial coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2014). Following Pratt (2008), pertinent statements, sentences or power quotes were clustered to develop codes establishing first-order themes and repeated to establish second-order themes. Summarised memos, press and media reports were then incorporated into the relevant codes relative to the research questions. The interpretation of the outcomes of these data sets secondary and empirical constitute the findings of the study as recommended for mixed qualitative research (Berg and Lune, 2004). The framework for qualitative data analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994) which has been frequently used for qualitative data analysis was adapted to fit the research and applied as illustrated in diagram 1.1 below.



Fig 1.1 Process of thematic analysis and integration



The above diagram explains the process of data harmonisation, combining data from the semi-structured interview, secondary literature analysis and ECOWAS process tracing. The essence was to construct a robust and trustworthy process encompassing input from all three data sets (Creswell and Clark, 2007). The result constitutes the findings of the study as presented in the chapters: 3,4,5 and 6 as harmonised and discussed in chapter seven.

#### 1.4.6 Ethical Considerations

The research was conducted according to good practice guidelines for ethical research in social science, and particularly on issues of peace and security

research. Despite the fact that the guidelines provided by the ethics committee could be useful starting point for good ethical practice in the field, guidelines often fail to consider the specific context of the research and therefore not often comprehensive enough. (Höglund and Öberg, 2011). In this respect, the principal ethical guidelines followed were those enshrined in Bradford University ethical codes of conduct. However, in doing so, the particular context of West Africa was considered particularly in the process of empirical data collection. For example, in certain cases, one to one interviewing took the form of a three and at times four-person conversation. In this context, it was common for an interviewee to seek clarification from another colleague or invite such into the discussion. Accordingly, certain aspects of confidentiality had to be compromised. However, this only happened in two interviews and was at the volition of the participant. In both cases, though, the participants were informed about this breach, but it was considered by ECOWAS as normal practice in context. Considering the academic nature of the study, the British Educational Research Association (BERA, 2018) guidelines was also adopted, alongside the much wider British Sociological Association ethical guidelines (BSA, 2017). Ethical clearance was obtained from Bradford University Ethics Panel as presented in appendix (C) of the thesis.

The general practice imposed more respect for participants and a determination to minimise power relations challenges with the elite interviewees involved in the study – particularly considering that the interviews take place at the comfort of the offices of participants who often tend to exude perceived military power. For both guidelines, the do-no-harm policy was observed through ensuring the wellbeing and safety of the participants and *other people*<sup>3</sup> at all time throughout the research period (Höglund and Öberg, 2011). More generally, the principles of anonymity, participant informed consent, confidentiality, integrity, and humanity were observed at all time (BSA, 2017). To ensure confidentiality, the researcher saved all his data collected in a pass-worded computer and file which was always kept in a key-locked cupboard (Oliver, 2010, Höglund and Öberg, 2011).

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<sup>3</sup> Local research assistants, interpreters, transcribers, enumerators etc

Participants were recruited with the help of gatekeepers, mainly heads of WANEP Ghana and Nigeria. A letter authorising access is presented as appendix (D) of the thesis. In both countries, gatekeeper identified senior government officials working in the foreign affairs departments, academic lecturers and experts in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, security sector and research institutions, ECOWAS and civil society organisations. The researcher has experience in Gambia, West Africa, having previously worked as a non-state facilitator in peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes for WANEP as project officer for World Peace Prayer society. This prior acquaintance made access to participants easier than would have been the case with no contacts at WANEP. In line with the need to obtain informed consent, all participants were provided with briefs about the project, sample questions and asked to complete a consent form (Oliver, 2010). Participants were also informed that the researcher and project supervisor will have access to the participant's interview script. Considering that the names to share were pseudonyms or anonymous, there were no objections from participants. Consent was also sought and obtained from participants before recording or note taking where the participant objected to being recorded. Furthermore, all participants were informed of their right to withdraw from participation at any stage of the research.

The researcher did not face any major unexpected challenges in the field. In both country contexts ECOWAS executives and other participants were generally willing to allow access and share policy documents and other necessary information. It was a privilege and joy to meet directly and work with the members of the highest decision-making body of ECOWAS representing heads of states of and Directors of programmes. With respect to safety, the number of potential security issues were taken into account, including the insecurity caused by the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, given that participants for the research were located in Lagos, Abuja and Accra, risks were minimal. Hence, no incidents were recorded.

#### **1.4.7 Limitation of the research method**

Although the data collection process, the instruments and analytical process were carefully considered, it is important to acknowledge some limitations. One possible issue is perhaps that of language. The use of multiple sources of data written in different languages naturally lends itself to misinterpretation. Perhaps a more focused process tracing technique or literature review based on document in English language only might have attained greater specific understanding. Nevertheless, the study consistently sought expert interpretation in for languages other than English. Also, when analysing multiple documents, there is the odd chance of contradiction, confusion and defragmentation (Ford, 2006). To mitigate this confusion, the researcher always sought explanation from within and without the research team and as well as expert advice from ECOWAS institutions. Furthermore, when dealing with huge volumes of data, there is always the danger of missing out relevant documents or questions. In recognition of this, the researcher built a clear plan including key documentation to be examined and questions for empirical conversations. Where it was felt that an aspect of the research had not satisfactorily been examined, the researcher returned to the source of participant a second time to make sure that this was well covered or clearly explained.

Finally, the methods and processes were applied within the means, skills and time allowed for the study. There are inevitable limits in the range of locations and perspectives on which primary research information could be collected. Perhaps a much longer engagement with the field and the application of other methods such as quantitative approaches would have produced additional insights. There is no doubt therefore that there is scope for further research. But we nevertheless are confident that the approach adopted was sufficiently broad and robust to generate substantial and reliable contributions to knowledge.

## **1.5 Structure of the thesis**

The thesis is composed of seven chapters. The following chapter (two) presents a review of literature which engages with extant research in the field, highlights key debates and locates gaps in the literature. Here key concepts and theoretical frameworks on SSR, conflict prevention, regional organisations and evolution of ECOWAS norms are reviewed. Also, the specific context of ECOWAS in West Africa is examined in a bid to identifying members states, case of conflicts for which ECOWAS has been involved and other aspects of conflict intervention more generally including theories, definitions and key debates. Furthermore, the chapter outlines the development of ECOWAS' regional norms and mechanisms for conflict prevention, regional security, and crisis response in bid to identifying gaps in ECOWAS's processes and in the literature more generally. For this, it draws on material from peace studies, international relations and at times from the area of political science.

Chapter 3 is the first of the substantial research chapter. In chapter three, the focus is to examine the development of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms relating to peace and security, particularly in relation to conflict prevention (early warning and early response mechanisms), crisis response and (later) Security and Justice Sector Governance. It provides a critical understanding of the political, security, institutional factors that have shaped ECOWAS processes from its creation in 1975, to the 1993, and the subsequent ECPF revised treaty in 2008. The chapter further examines the development of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms since 2000, using detailed textual analysis and historical process tracing to illuminate the historical development of these ECOWAS norms as well as the factors that drove or informed their development and implementation. The analysis includes a discussion on the extent to which, and how, SSR became connected to ECOWAS's Conflict Prevention and Conflict Reduction mechanisms and policies, and how it was operationalised.

The fourth chapter focuses primarily on addressing our secondary research question 2, as presented above. That is: how can we adequately explain the interests and capacities that enabled ECOWAS to develop increasingly strong and elaborated norms and mechanisms in the above areas

since the early 2000s. It considers how mechanisms were developed in the challenging sub-regional conditions of conflict, fragility and limited socio-economic development. It critically examines the argument that this can be explained primarily by Nigerian interests as a regional hegemonic power and shows that this is an inadequate explanation. The chapter further turns to examining more complex coalitions of interest and influence within ECOWAS, those initiated by Ghana and Nigeria in particular, as leading member states. The consequences of Ghana and Nigeria foreign and security policy towards ECOWAS is also outlined. The chapter enables a more detailed understanding of the complex roles these two leading states have played in the development of regional agreements and mechanisms and other factors such as the Anglophone-Francophone divide and external interests. The chapter contributes a better understanding and appreciation of the internal dynamics of ECOWAS and the interest drivers behind its decision-making processes.

In chapter five, process tracing technique is applied to analyse the deployment and influence of ECOWAS' regional norms, policies and mechanisms on conflict prevention SSRG, and post-conflict security building, in the two cases of Cote d'Ivoire and Mali. These case study aspect of the study assess the extent to which additional protocols, norms and mechanisms contributed towards CP in West Africa from 2000 to about 2015, and after the intervention in Mali.

The sixth chapter focuses on ECOWAS's agenda-setting and priorities in relation to crisis response, stabilization, SSR/G for conflict prevention since 2014-2017 and assesses the effectiveness of initiatives and actions taken in promoting SSR/G between 2014-2017. Other sections examine ECOWAS SSR/G norms, mechanisms and policies and wider issues and debates on ECOWAS functions during the period. This is followed by an assessment of roles and contributions of international partners in the implementation and adoption of ECOWAS SSR/G norms and mechanisms between 2014 and 2017. Further examination of ECOWAS capacities and constraints and intervention decisions is analysed.

The final chapter (seven) presents the main research findings and contributions of this research and discusses implications for future research as well as policy development. The chapter also presents a proposed framework for ECOWAS conflict intervention and a conclusion.

Having explained the methodological approaches adopted for the study and a synopsis of all the constituent chapters, the thesis continues by examining ECOWAS initiatives and policies on SSR and how these have been considered and applied in its conflict prevention and conflict reduction strategies in the next chapter two.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2. Introduction**

This chapter presents a review of the literature on security sector reform/governance (SSR/G), conflict early warning system (EWS), conflict prevention (CP) and the functioning of the West African regional conflict prevention organisation known as ECOWAS. The first part reviews conflict prevention. It provides an understanding of the concept of conflict prevention in line with ways in which conflicts have been prevented using preventive diplomacy and SSR/G approaches. The second part of this chapter examines the security sector institutions and reform processes. It progresses to develop issues, theories and debates from extant research on security sector reform and associated mechanisms. Furthermore, the section evaluates the efficiency and effectiveness of SSR and EWS frameworks for conflict prevention. This leads to considering how ECOWAS tries to achieve peace and security by way of reforming peace enhancing institutions and application of good governance and democratic principles by member states. The third part examines the role and significance of regional organisations specifically in the area of peace and security and explores the concepts associated with SSR mechanisms and EWS. This leads to an understanding of the complexity involved in the formation of regional organisations and the challenge of engaging member states for the purpose of achieving regional peace and stability.

#### **2.1. Conflict Prevention: Theories and definitions**

As a result of the many conflicts across the world, there has been an escalating interest in the study of conflict prevention. However, scholars have argued that this new-found interest is regrettably more narrowly focused and seen as a 'basic concept with a solid inherent logic and a potentially valuable utility' (Jentleson, 2000). As such, the main purpose of conflict prevention is to reduce manifested tensions in ways that prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflicts. The concept of conflict prevention appears to be straightforward and the more recent studies have likened to its relevance as a moral obligation for



nations and organizations to intervene to prevent human suffering. However, diversity of the conflict prevention discourse and the fact the conflict prevention is often embedded in projects of global governance presents a sense of CP as humanitarian action to normalise society (John, 2005). The idea of prevention often carries with it a mark of hegemony of the dominant powers who dictate as to what is a preventable conflict, when prevention should take place and what mode is appropriate in different contexts of conflict (Boateng, 2019).

It follows from the above that conflict prevention involves many different types of actions including diplomacy, mediation, institution building, peace building measures, measures to address particular grievances and measures to address underlying causes of conflicts (Greene, 2003). Given the different meanings associated with CP, both qualitative and quantitative scholars agree that there is ambiguity and confusion in the literature (Lund, 2002). Accordingly, various theories have been linked to the CP. Some of the most cited include: Basic human needs (Burton, 1990), protracted social conflicts (Azar, 1990), ethnic/communal conflict (Black et al., 2003), and social identity and social categorisation theories on CP (Turner and Tajfel, 1982). Some of these theories have been linked to the findings of the research from the empirical data gathered on ECOWAS interventions, secondary analysis and process tracing evaluation of Ghana and Nigeria foreign and security policies as elaborated in chapters, four, five, six and seven below.

Although, the concept of CP has been used in academic circles, practitioners dealing with peace and diplomacy use a different expression emphasising its preventive role. Roberts and Kingsbury (1988) argue that 'conflict prevention' is construed and embedded in the same ideological conception as 'preventive diplomacy'. This definition mirrors the definition provided by a former UN Secretary General who defined conflict prevention as: '*Action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit spread of the latter when they occur*' (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). A similar conceptualisation in respect to prevention has been suggested by (Hampson and Malone, 2002) defining CP as a process of anticipating conflict even prior to the formation of parties with incompatible goals. What is however common from the different definitions is the general recognition amongst scholars that CP involves the diffusion of

tensions to prevent the outbreak, escalation, recurrence of violence (ECOWAS, 2008). More recent studies sought to extend CP beyond its interventionist and prevention role during conflict. In this respect, (Yabi, 2010) proffer a more extended definition implying that CP also involves carrying out reforms in security sector, preventing the involvement of military leaders in crime, reforming public administration and improving the economic management of states and restoring credibility in deprived states.

Understandably, there are no universally agreed conceptualisation as every regional organization constructs a sense of CP relative to the context in which it intervenes. A more expanded definition (Zartman, 2001) as “the demotion of conflict from the level of violence to that of politics”. Whilst there is divergence of views in defining CP, there is common ground in approaches that are often adopted notably: *direct and structural prevention*. Direct prevention is when the conflictual situations has already occurred. Structural prevention refers to a pre-emptive approach of engaging with indicators of conflict possibility before it materialises (Lund, 1996). Also, common amongst scholars is the understanding that conflict results from contradictions inherent in power relations. These differences manifest themselves in individual and group interactions and driven by the pursuit of limited resources or opportunities tensions both social, political, intellectual and ideological degenerate into conflict (Hampson and Malone, 2002). In terms of solutions, many studies agree that conflict resolution begins with identifying the origins, development, and life cycle of conflicts and the key factors that lead to conflict escalation and de-escalation. Sandole (2009) for instance, found knowledge of the attitudes, behaviours, situations, goals, and values of communities and how they influence individual and collective interaction and response action is key to effective CP.

## **2.2 Understanding security – state and private**

A great influence in understanding and conceptualising security originates from the perspective of building military defence<sup>4</sup>. However, more recent constructs of the security encompass a wider range of threats against human life (Kirchner

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<sup>4</sup> Security from war and conquest

and Sperling, 2007). Traditional and non-traditional concepts of security has been an emergent discourse in security studies (Collins, 2006). Particular interest has been around what constitutes a security threat and the nature of threats to states and humans. Perceptions on these aspects of security vary in the literature on security studies depending on the context, unit of reference and the type of organization involved. Imobighe *cited in* (Ekoko and Vogt, 1990) defined threats when applied to nation-state as:

‘Anything that can undermine the security of the nation, or anything that constitutes danger to its survival as a corporate entity, as well as undermine the prospects of the harmonious relationship of the various communities that makes up the nation, or the peaceful co-existence of its people. Any act or intention that has the potential of undermining the peace, stability and progress of the nation could be regarded as a threat. In this sense, threat to internal security has to do with anything that has the tendency to undermine the socio-political and economic stability and progress of the state’ The above quote takes a national security perspective. Scholars conceptualising security from the perspective of a nation or state limit their understanding to state institutions like the Army, Police or Navy. Bryden et al. (2008) examining from this perspective presented security as the pursuit of governance agenda that puts citizens at the centre of security planning and provision in ways that make states stable and secure environments where development can thrive. As alternative to this view. Due to the rise of new security threats, such as civil war, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and transnational crime, the study of international relations, there have been calls made from the 1990s for theoretical concepts highlighting the merits and demerits of broadening the notion of security from states to societies and individuals. This has accentuated the reconfiguration of the notion of security from military to non-military premises (Rothschild, 1995, Krause and Williams, 1997, Krahmann, 2008). What this shows is that the notion of security is changing. Also, different contexts will present different meanings. Already, private security firms are proliferating at the national level; private military companies are also taking over an increasing range of military functions in both national defence and international

interventions. This has led to novel conceptualisations of security, introducing civilian notions and new complex meanings (Krahmann, 2008). It follows from the changing dynamic that scholars identify two types of security organizations notably: *military*<sup>5</sup> and *non-military*<sup>6</sup>. Both types of security deal with similar threats at individual and state level using different approaches.

Closely linked to security is the notion of threat. The traditional approach considers threats as potentially destabilising events or action that call for the use and control of military force to prevent or address (Walt, 1991). Contrary to this view, recent work presents security threats from a non-*military* perspective. (Tsai, 2010) considers security threats from an economic, political, environmental and societal perspective. While views security threats beyond national borders and defence of the state, to an approach encompassing all issues that may guarantee freedom from fear and freedom from want.

From the point of view of human security, the international system (AU, EU or UN) has accepted the 1994 Human Development Report published by the UNDP as the foundational document of the human security doctrine (Anand and Sen, 1994). In this report, the concept of human security was defined in relation to the ideas of '*freedom from fear*'<sup>7</sup> and '*freedom from want*.'<sup>8</sup> Against this backdrop, the concept of SSR is influenced by broader 'human security' agenda on two perspectives (Ball and Hendrickson, 2005):

- i. The protection of individuals that is critical to both national and international security
- ii. The security conditions required by people for their development which are not limited to traditional matters like national defence and law and order, but rather incorporate broader political, economic and social issues that ensure a life free from risk and ill-being.

Therefore, the UNDP report takes into further considerations the seven dimensions of the human security concepts which include: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security,

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<sup>5</sup> Danger of military action, military challenge or military risk

<sup>6</sup> Non-military challenges to security, e.g. Health issues (HIV/AIDS, SARS), environment disaster (earthquakes, floods), economic and socio-political issues

<sup>7</sup> 'Freedom from fear' aims at the elimination of direct and indirect violence in the daily life of the individual

<sup>8</sup> 'Freedom from want' characterises human security more broadly and also considers the basic needs of the individual regarding to development and welfare

community security and political security. Though, (Paris, 2001) argues that the concept of human security tends to be vague and provides little guidance to policymakers in the prioritisation of competing goals and limited resources. (Tsai, 2010) believes that human security concepts are socially constructed and argues that it is important to examine human security through the prism of constructivism because its emergence security reflects the influence of values and norms on security studies, as opposed to the influence of national security.

In sum, the researcher will adopt Delgado<sup>9</sup> *cited in* (PEñAS, 1994) based on the assumption that human security is not only a unifying concept, or either opposite to national security, but views both as complementary ideas<sup>10</sup>. The assumption that human security has either been neglected or that limited attention has been given to it has continued to be a central discourse in the security literature. The focus on more regime or state-centric security has negated the attention to human security (Bryden et al., 2008, Adebajo, 2004). Kirchner and Sperling (2007) argues that security is not only about surviving threats but the act of surviving threats that could be linked to almost all entities ranging from the level of individual, as in human security, all the way up to the global security. Therefore, one could deduce from literature that security threats at all levels could be minimised by the efficient and effective use of security apparatus by the state and by the private sector. The debates around the definition of security, threat and how they should be deployed and managed remains inconclusive. How this is perceived and managed in ECOWAS is presented later.

### **2.2.1. Security Sector**

Existing literatures have identified formal and non-formal institutions charged with the responsibility of providing security as security sector institutions (Collins, 2006, Bryden et al., 2008). (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2006) have argued that because the actors involved in delivering security services and the

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<sup>9</sup> DELGADO, J. 2007. Repensar el concepto de Seguridad en África: la ‘Seguridad Humana’ en el proceso de construcción y consolidación de la paz. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia.

<sup>10</sup> In similar note, Delgado stated that one does not replace the other- and it must be understood that security of the state is not an end in itself but, on the contrary, is the means to guarantee the security of the people within national borders.

relationships between them vary from country to country, there is not a universally applicable definition of the security sector. Nonetheless, security sector has been defined by (Baly et al., 2002) as state institutions and authorities that have a responsibility to protect both the state and the communities within it. Security sector therefore includes:

“core security actors or organisations authorised to use force<sup>11</sup>, security management and oversight bodies<sup>12</sup>, justice and law enforcement institutions<sup>13</sup> and non-statutory security forces<sup>14</sup>(UNDP, 2002, OECD-DAC, 2008). Whereas, (UNDP, 2002) went further to include non-statutory civil society groups<sup>15</sup> as an additional component of the security system.”

Despite the fact that security sector institution is a legal security framework of every country, the conventional western-centric narrow focus on security actors, for example, armed forces, police and intelligence services does not capture the diversity of security actors in other country (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2006). Therefore, conceptualising security sector and its actors still remain contextual and debatable. Furthermore, Williams (2000) argues that the formation of presidential guards and militia forces are still common in the African context, as well as the emergence of a whole range of private security actors due to the collapse of state security structures calls for a reconceptualization of the notion of security sector. However, several narratives, lenses and definitions have been deployed to capture this important international instrument for peace requiring further elucidation. The meaning of

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<sup>11</sup> Armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, gendarmeries, intelligence and security services 2012. WEST AFRICA: Mixed interests will blunt ECOWAS role. United Kingdom: Oxford Analytica Ltd., secret services, coast guards, border guards, customs and immigration authorities, reserve and local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, presidential guards, militias)

<sup>12</sup> President and prime minister, national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees, ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies( finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units), civil society organisations( civil review boards, public complaints commissions)

<sup>13</sup> Judiciary, justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human right commission and ombudspersons, correctional services, customary and traditional justice systems

<sup>14</sup> Liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private bodyguard units, private security companies, political parties militias

<sup>15</sup> Professional groups, the media, research organisations, advocacy organisations, religious organisations, non-governmental organisations, and community groups.

security sector from the African context has metamorphosed into both private and state institutions however a key gap that remains both in theory and practice is a conceptualisation of mechanisms that can harmonise private and state security systems for security intervention across borders. This is an area for future studies.

### **2.2.2 Security Sector Reform/Governance**

In the aftermath of every conflict, Security Sector Reform (SSR) continues to be widely regarded by scholars, policy makers and practitioners as one of the most vital tasks in the peacebuilding endeavour (Jackson and Bakrania, 2018a, Sedra, 2010a, Sedra, 2018, UN, 2008, UN, 2013).

#### **2.2.2 Definition of SSR**

There is no agreed definition from scholars, policy makers and practitioners for SSR. However, SSR typically refers to the reform, construction or reconstruction of security and justice sector institutions, including oversight and management bodies (DECAF, 2015a, Sedra, 2010b, Wulf, 2011). Mainstream practitioner and institutions (UN, 2013, DECAF, 2015a) tend to define SSR by considering some of the key micro functions associated with immediate peace building efforts. The alternative from scholars adopting a critical perspective define SSR from a holistic perspective (Ansorg and Gordon, 2019, Sedra, 2018)). Thus, a key chasm amongst scholars and institutions remains whether SSR should incorporate the legal and justice sector. There is further nuance regarding the language of reform with contentions as to whether transformation, development or construction might be more appropriate terms than 'reform' given the comprehensive nature of most reform efforts. Amidst these consternations, several definitions and characterisation of SSR have been suggested within the literature. Hence, (Donais, 2008) argues that in practice, the borders of SSR domain remain elastic.

Extant literature has identified the two common perspectives of the definitions of SSR often presented frequently expressed as minimalist and maximalist. (Chuter, 2006) summarises these two perspectives to observe that from the minimalist perspectives, SSR is limited to the reform of the public sector security forces including the statutory military, police and security forces and the management and oversight of these bodies. Alternatively, from the maximalist perspective, SSR describes the holistic and all-embracing public

and private sector military and security forces including statutory and non-statutory military forces and rebel armies or armed groups, justice and law enforcement services and oversight bodies. Recognising the encompassing nature of evolving contemporary changes in the constitution of state security architecture as discussed above, more recent research seems to have moved towards maximalist expressions of SSR. This is because the maximalist perspective provides a more holistic approach as it has become apparent that violent conflicts and threats to both state and human securities can be addressed by both statutory state security agencies and non-statutory private security institutions (Bryden et al., 2008). In the case of ECOWAS, the expansion of SSR could involve consideration of financial and human resource capacities that can be tapped not just from member states, external partners and the AU or UN, but equally from private security organization, financial institutions and the general public. This is a gap within the literature on SSR which this study identifies and for which change in approach is proposed within the suggested framework in chapter seven. Already, the process tracing data uncovered within this study found that the ECOWAS continues to adopt the minimalist view of SSR. The study argues therefore that by adopting a holistic SSR perspective, the ECOWAS will be able to undertake a reform approach involving the statutory military, police and security forces as well as the management of the oversight of these bodies, while incorporating non state actors (Ansorg and Gordon, 2019, Sedra, 2018). The need to adopt maximalist approaches has been prominent among scholars in particular, warranting a recent special issue on introduces the special issue on 'Co-operation, Contestation and Complexity in Post- Conflict Security Sector Reform' in the Journal of Intervention and State building in 2018.

Further nuance in respect to theorising and understanding SSR has been what has been characterised confusion in expression (Talbot and Wilde, 2011). For instance, the term security sector reform has sometimes being used interchangeably by international actors as security and justice sector reform, and 'rule of law'(OECD-DAC, 2008). In the context of stabilization operation, SSR and SSR-related activities are referred to as Security Sector Stabilization (SSS) (Talbot and Wilde, 2011). Therefore, Talbot and Wilde (2011) argues that SSR and SSR-activities with a central focus on stabilization which seems to



strengthen the ability of host nation to provide security, thereby allowing it to assume the responsibilities of protecting itself and the communities that exist within it. The above confusion remains evident in SSR literature with several expressions often used to mean the same mechanism.

For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher makes use of SSR as a shorthand to capture all these different approaches. The SSR agenda emerged within development and security policy circles in the late 1990s in recognition of the need for a broader approach to security assistance, and was heavily influenced by a parallel process of rethinking security concepts underway in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Ball and Hendrickson, 2005). The overall objectives of SSR according to (DCAF, 2009) is to create a secure environment that is conducive for development, poverty alleviation and democracy. Despite the fact that SSR aims to enhance SSG through the effective and efficient delivery of security under conditions of democratic oversight and control (Hänggi and Winkler, 2003, DCAF, 2009). (Hänggi and Winkler, 2003) argues that the establishment of SSR was meant to shape the international programmes for development assistance. Peake et al. (2006) further argue that the goals of SSR can be achieved in the immediate and long-term basis:

In the short-term, it is intended to improve the ability of the country's military, police and intelligence organisations to provide basic security to countries or regions emerging from conflict; While its long-term aims however are much more ambitious as it seeks to reconstruct a state's governance so as to ensure that its security institutions serve the interests of society as a whole, rather than those of political elite.

As much as the divergence observed in the expression and definition of SSR as discussed above. There is even more divergence of views as to how SSR programmes should be delivered. One of the major challenges facing SSR programmes as (Hendrickson, 1999) identified, is lack of consensus among donors on what the long term objectives of reform should be, and how best these goals can be promoted. (Greene, 2003) summarises the aims of SSR to include:

Enhancing the efficiency or effectiveness of the security sector to meet the needs of national security or policing policies; adapting the security sector to changes in national security needs and policies; state-building, enhancing

civilian control; enhancing democratic control and oversight; enhancing state or security sector legitimacy; right-sizing the security sector to enable resources to be re-allocated according to societal priorities, conflict prevention; and the implementation of peace agreements.

By assessing the needs of the countries, donor partners and actors in SSR programmes aim to identify the type of reform that addresses immediate and long-term objectives. However, these objectives are not often clear, leading to failure. The reason most cited for this is often the complex and interweaving nature of SSR programmes in practice. SSR is usually undertaken by a state alongside national and international partners, with the ostensible aim of improving the provision of safety, security and justice to its citizens, in recognition of security being a precursor to long term peace (Jackson, 2011, Jackson and Bakrania, 2018a). To this extent, underpinning SSR objectives is the importance of improving Security Sector Governance (SSG), ensuring security sector institutions are accountable, affordable, effective and

responsive to the needs of the people (DCAF, 2015b). While these objectives are clear enough the failure rate of SSR has emerged as alarming across the major intervening bodies ECOWAS, UN, EU, USA etc (Ansorg, 2017, Boateng, 2019, Bryden, 2018). One reason emerging from the literature is that SSR programmes tend to be overloaded. For instance, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is often attached or interrelated with SSR. Scholars have argued that considering that DDR is fundamentally a process through which armaments are removed from former combatants, who are also removed from military structures and assisted in reintegrating into civilian life, and sometimes into state security institutions, DDR should not form part of SSR (Lamb and Stainer, 2018). This is because DDR programmes are often highly political exercises with serious implications, involving the redistribution of power and generally aiming to re-establish the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force (Ansorg and Gordon, 2019, Jackson and Bakrania, 2018a). These political processes often become contentious, leading to failure as evident in the two cases under study Mali and Cote D'Ivoire where DDR negotiations failed in each case as elucidated in the subsequent chapters.

Another reason provided is the view that SSR projects often derail from their mission. Greene (2003) argues that SSR programmes fail to achieve their aims in contributing to conflict prevention because many efforts to reform the security sector are not primarily concerned with conflict prevention. This being the case, their contribution to these goals of SSR become misdirected and ill focused to address the problem at hand. Although, Greene agrees that SSR can contribute in many ways to conflict prevention and reduction, he observes that for it to be effective, an appropriate combination of high-level political commitment from domestic constituencies is necessary. Added to this is the need for significant input from elements of the wider security sector to be involved alongside legitimate and realistic policies, effective consultation and planning, and adequate resources to accompany such strategies.

Despite the measures set in place to improve the relationship between SSR and Conflict Prevention (Bryden Alan, 2010), Talbot and Wilde (2011) identified the four key areas for SSR modelling which includes: Capacity Building Model (CBM)<sup>16</sup>, Capacity Building Activity<sup>17</sup>, National Reform Metrics (NRM)<sup>18</sup> and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)<sup>19</sup>. However, one may deduce that for SSR to serve as a conflict prevention tool, the aim and focus of reform should be to put conflict prevention at the fore of the planning, executing, monitoring and evaluation of the reform process as well as looking at SSR and related activities from the perspective of stabilisation operations. To this extent, how the stabilisation operations link with the SSR and related activities present another layer of problem as much as the DDR aspect of SSR discussed above. Understanding the application of SSR theory and its modelling techniques could provide good insights in enhancing stabilisation operations and war-gaming. However, there is little research around how DDR, stabilisation and other post conflict missions are best conceptualised (Talbot and Wilde, 2011). Furthermore, the issues of what or

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<sup>16</sup> A means of measuring the improvement of a host nation's security actors at the unit level

<sup>17</sup> A means of representing Mentoring, Monitoring, Partnering and enabling activities in accordance with the operational approach adopted in Afghanistan

<sup>18</sup> MMR is a means of observing and measuring the predominantly political process that reforms the institutions, structures, organisations and bodies that lead, manage, govern and oversee the security sector. The NRM attempts to measure SSRs in order to understand pure SSR and design a dynamic model capable of representing the process of organisational and institutional reform.

<sup>19</sup> A means of removing combatants from the fight in order to terminate conflicts

who should reasonably be included in SSR programmes across variety of context should consist, and how they can be better implemented for greater impact, remain a subject of much debate and limited research (Bryden Alan, 2010). Despite these weaknesses and limitations in SSR literature (Peake et al., 2006) argues that international actors developing and managing SSR programmes need to remain open to United Nations, regional organisations and development banks when designing and implementing SSR programmes. Further, he proposes a culture of inclusiveness in the construction of agreements involving governments, non-governmental organisations and private contractors.

### **2.2.2 SSR Ownership and participation**

Close linked to the above issues of composition, involvement and success factors discussed above is another contentious issue – that of ownership and participation. Many scholars have argued that SSR projects are mostly driven by governments and *external actors*<sup>20</sup>, with little or no engagement of local ownership and participation (Ebo, 2010, Bryden and Hänggi, 2004, Donais, 2008). Despite the on-going contentions that emphasises local ownership and participation in the SSR projects; Bryden et al. (2008) argues that there is still a gap between local ownership and democratic participation and oversight function in SSR projects. Therefore the involvement of a coordinated civil-military relations remains a challenge to SSR projects (Francis, 2012). Most times, when organisations have considered local participation and ownership, those called to participate are often retired military officers (UN, 2013). However, it has been argued that the dominant selective inclusion of political elites, retired military and police officers does not amount to real ownership and participation of local community and has ended up derailing the objectives of SSR projects (Francis, 2012). Hence, (Chuter, 2006) called a new approach that considers both political elite and representatives of local populations for effective SSR ownership.

Against this backdrop, Bryden et al. (2008) further argued that the best case scenario for Africa where a culture of good governance has been

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<sup>20</sup> National donors, international and intergovernmental organisations supporting SSR

consistently lacking and elites have persistently replicated bad practice, that 'transformative' or SST<sup>21</sup> should be strongly emphasised rather than SSR stating:

Transformative SSR or SST is a better approach than SSR because it encompasses a far-reaching change and commitment on the part of the governments to systematically align the activities of security organisations within the principle of democratic governance, while SSR approach may not sufficiently address underlying institutional flaws that entrench old patterns of abuse of insecurity in Africa."<sup>22</sup>

Here, Bryden differentiates SSR and SST and considers the latter to be more inclusive to allow for greater local ownership and participation than prototypical SSR programmes. As discussed earlier, emergent literature has further identified that the creation of private securities that are well trained and well paid by many African heads; and the use of Western private security companies that precludes the legal security sector remains options to achieving SSR objectives at both regional and continental levels (Chuter, 2006). The debate on when and why non-state actors and informal security mechanisms should be engaged in SSR continues to emerge in the regional, national and international security discourses. Lawrence (2012) argues that, an SSR strategy that engages non-state actors and informal security mechanisms may be due to the fact that many states are yet to modernise. Thus, many states still lack capacity in the informal governance alternatives such as local organise population and private security organization capable to impact on SSR in a significant way.

In the light of the above, state-centric SSR approaches remain the dominant approach approved by donors' countries and institutions, host governments, society and the very informal security organizations that are supposed to take greater ownership. In the absence of proper state and civil society ownership of our understanding of SSR continues to adopt western-centric architecture for many states even as scholars and practitioners continue to call for reform that meets both the legal security needs of the state, while guaranteeing and

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<sup>21</sup> Security Sector Transformation

<sup>22</sup> References can be made to the many past instances of cosmetic reforms in Africa security sectors where newly kitted soldiers return only to terrorise civilian populations.

protecting human life, dignity and private property. This is a gap in the literature as conversations are only nascent and under-developed (Ansorg and Gordon, 2019, Jackson and Bakrania, 2018a, Boateng, 2019).

### **2.2.3 Universalisation and regionalisation**

An obvious gap that has surfaced in the SSR literature has been the debate over universalisation and regionalisation. A key question posed by in this debate is whether SSR programmes should be universal or contextualised. It has been observed that the idea of SSR often carries with it a mark of hegemony of the dominant powers who dictate as to what is a preventable conflict, when prevention should take place and what mode is appropriate in a particular circumstance(John, 2005). Proponents of local or regional approaches proffer that in order to achieve effective SSR, it is imperative to develop contextually resonant regional approaches akin to local culture, geopolitics and inter-community relationships. However, this regional approach is yet to be developed or implemented and there are no streams of literature specifically differentiating approaches relative to regions. This is a gap which needs to be filled.

Up to this point, the vision of SSR at global level has followed a similar pattern and applied in different context. The most applied approach that has been was developed by the Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) – see e.g.(DCAF, 2012). As one of the world’s leading institutions in the area of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Security Sector Governance (SSG), its main aim is to increase the capacity of the international community to support Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes, to enhance the effectiveness and quality of SSR programming, and to facilitate the coordination and coherence of international assistance for nationally-driven SSR processes (DCAF, 2013). From this perspective, like other similar SSR promoting organisation including the UN, their unit of reference is usually the state. The OECD for instance describes SSR as a process in which a ‘country’ seeks to increase ‘its’ ability to meet the range of security needs within constituted societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law (OECD, 2007).

It is important to note the common denominator of democracy, which from a western perspective makes all countries the same. This universalist view is rather erroneous considering that many third world countries – particularly those in Africa are not democratic (Agulanna, 2006). From a universalist standpoint therefore, organisations charged with SSR provide advisory field support, operational guidance tools, knowledge services and training support based the deceptive one size fits all ideology which seldom lead to the desired outcomes. Under this vision, all states operate in a similar manner and therefore SSR should be the same and replicable from one nation to another. This ideology is often taken through into the third world countries by western security experts deployed for conflict and peace keeping function. At the same time, some local customs and traditions in Africa and other developing nations often fall short of the fundamentals of human rights. A former force commander and head of mission with UNPROFOR highlighting the mismatch between local culture and systems and international SSR processes remarked:

“one of the key problems that representatives from developed countries face when trying to re-establish the judiciary and law and order mechanisms in countries emerging from conflict is that they try to apply their rules and their standards to the local community, which won’t work” (UNPROFOR, 2010).

One of the local rules that do not match international standards are issues around negotiation, compromise which in third world countries is negotiated differently relative to age, patriarchy and social status in a local indigenous traditional sense as expressed in indigenous African leadership studies (Eyong, 2017, Khoza, 2012, Muchiri et al., 2019).

Contrary to the universalist perspective, an alternative notion of SSR has been suggested by a small but growing body of work calling for the development of context-resonant approaches to SSR e.g. (Nathan, 2007). Such scholars argue that adjusting SSR to the local context enhances local ownership and implies that “the reform of security and policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors” (Nathan, 2007). What we find within this novel approach is a context-resonant approach involving all relevant stakeholders and which takes account of the specific socio-cultural

environment in which the beneficiaries of the SSR action are embedded. Proponents of context-resonant approaches posit that a localised approach is more likely to enhance civic empowerment through participatory and problem-solving as relevant to the context. Such scholars drawn on complexity theory to peacebuilding (De Coning, 2018) to underscore how problematic it can be to influence social systems – particularly post-conflict social systems – which are already complex, dynamic and nonlinear. Complexity theory has been applied to peacebuilding (De Coning, 2018) but, as yet, not specifically to the study of SSR. More studies in this direction is encouraged to unravel the real challenges of SSR between cultures.

Emerging new thinking around SSR result from the almost indelible differences between western countries and African and other third world countries which suggest that what works in the UK or USA may not be effective in Mali or Cote D'Ivoire. The recognition of differences has led to a developing literature on regional peace and security with such terms as regionalisation, regionalism and regional organisations and their links to peace and security (Francis, 2006, Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995). Francis (2006) argues that the notion of region, 'regioness', regionalisation, regionalism and regional subsystem in Africa for example remains unclear because of the difficulty of qualifying what constitutes a regional subsystem. Nevertheless, the notion of what constitutes a region continues to evolve, producing varying contextual definitions. by some scholars. (Buzan, 1991), defines 'region' as a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations existing among a set of states such as geographical proximity with each other. (Falk and Mondlovitz, 1973) argues that regions and regionalisms are not only based on geographical proximity, but could be seen as associations among states that are equally geographically separated. Examples are the British Commonwealth and global agencies with specialised functions such as the International labour Organisations.

Nonetheless, regional geography and boundaries of a region may be drawn either by ideological construct (Western and Eastern Europe) or by reference to ethnic factors ( Arab world) (Falk and Mondlovitz, 1973). Buzan (1991) also draws attention to the crude media references that use 'region' to describe whatever location that currently contains a newsworthy level of political turbulence. This further supports Emanuel Alder assertion that all



regions are to some extent subjectively defined, to what he referred to as 'cognitive region'(Adler, 1997). What is however, missing is the absence of SSR models developed for each regions, country or continent. This is another gap which this study addresses drawing on ECOWAS SSR intervention in West Africa.

### **2.3 Evolution of security and expanding intervention**

In the 1980s the concept of security received a new attention when it was suggested that the predominantly military definition of security prevailing in European and North American academics and practitioners was increasingly outdated (Buzan, 1991, Ullman, 1983) for instance, argued that the definition of security strictly in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality and causes states to concentrate on military threats and ignore other social and political harmful dangers. This strong critique led new ways to conceptualise security. Towards the end of the Cold War, academics and non-academics popularised the argument to broaden the understanding of security (Paris, 2001). These scholars suggested two main changes, the first of which was to widen the notion of security from state to non-state actors and entities to include individuals and social groups. The second was to include the concept of security to include not just military but equally non-military collective threats, such as environmental degradation and infectious diseases (Elbe, 2005). This broad notion of security is widely shared among academics, politicians, security experts (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). This move is mirrored in the evolution of ECOWAS as seen through the various aspects in which it intervenes in conflicts in West Africa – military, negotiation, community and confidence building for the resumption of economic activity (ECOWAS, 2007).

#### **2.3.1 Security Regionalisation and regionalism**

The concept of security regionalism has been championed as a viable alternative approach to addressing global peace and security in the post-cold war era. Security regionalism refers to

the marshalling of efforts and resources by regional entities to respond to common security challenges (Malangwa, 2017) *cited in* (Adams, 2019). In spite of advancements in understanding the meaning of security, the changing notion of SSR and the recognition of social and cultural context, extant literature shows complementarity between the UN and regional organisation such as ECOWAS. However, intervention is not often easy in spite of similar objectives (Francis, 2006, Tavares, 2010). This is obvious considering that the UN collaborates with regional organisations either directly or via member states, and in turn contributes to the activities of regional organisations as security providers (Kirchner and Dominguez, 2011). However, there is not clear framework for cooperation between regional organisations and the United Nations in regional peacekeeping (Barton, 2000). That there exists no framework for collaboration is striking considering that many of the challenges facing the UN and regional organisations in promoting regional security and tackling the proliferation of regional conflicts particularly in Africa are regional. A key question that scholars have raised is how the UN and regional organisations have collaborated in preventing and intervening in these conflicts. The process of collaboration between regional organizations and the UN remains unclear. Here again is gap which needs to be filled as through a theorising of ways in which the EU, AU, UN, France and other external partners collaborate with ECOWAS is vital to maximise on synergies. This study provides early suggestions through the proposed framework.

Many scholars (Boateng, 2019, Ansorg and Gordon, 2019) have argued that the failure of peace keeping regimes such as the UN to respond promptly to regional conflicts or their inaction in these conflicts in Africa for instance, may have resulted to several unmitigated disasters. The case for the conflict in Liberia in 1989 is frequently cited as a case in point where the UN was hesitant. It can be argued that such reluctance and inability to act promptly could be partly because of the absence of collaborative framework with the regional institution ECOWAS. In hindsight, critics argued that the bloody insurrection in Liberia which led to the massacre of thousands of civilians out of a total breakdown of law and order, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians would have been averted had there been frameworks for regional

intervention or a coordinated system of regionalism between the UN, AU, EU and regional peace keeping institutions (Kwakwa, 1995). Taking this critique further (Malan, 2011) argues:

“The United nations does not have, at this point in history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement under present conditions, with adhoc member States’ on the basis of forming a coalition. This approach does not offer an effective deterrent to aggression or the escalation or spread of an ongoing conflict.”

In the light of the above, the departure from the global security policy to new regionalism has been demonstrated by the shift in responsibility prompted by the Boutros –Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1995) and (*Henrikson, 1996*) argues that:

“Yet, even if the international community has not completely ignored these conflicts, the burden of regional security in Africa has largely been abdicated by the great powers in the post-Cold War world. The United Nations has also sought to withdraw from much of its peacekeeping responsibilities, seeking to transfer authority to state actors and regional organisations in the hope of alleviating the tremendous burden of peacekeeping.”

The question on how the regional mechanisms could function effectively to respond to its regional conflicts without the support of the UN and the international community puts a doubt on the complementarity and interdependency in security. Therefore, it is fair to argue that for the regional organisations to function effectively and minimise or stop violent conflicts within its regions, the UN must develop their institutional capacity through a framework for regional collaboration Kirchner and Dominguez (2011).

The lack of regional framework formation and the challenge to achieve regional peace and security has been hampered by the issue of national sovereignty (Adebajo, 2004, Francis, 2006). Despite the growing disagreement about best approaches to prevent violent conflicts by member states or regional organisations, Wulf and Debiel (2009), argues that:

Regionalisation challenges the narrow concepts of national sovereignty since the organisation is meant to take over certain state functions-in some cases more, in other less. At the same time, the member states anxiously

guard their sovereignty and continue to create more and more elaborate regional organisations and expand their responsibilities.’

Adding to the above, (Clements and Foley, 2008) observed further that:

For regional organisations to be successful, each regional member state requires a degree of de-territorialisation and lowering of border and some ceding of hard notions of national sovereignty.

The study concurs by stating that such a territorial and sovereignty claim relaxation is more able to enable easy collaboration and development of frameworks that easy intervention for SSR, DDR and other peace initiatives by stakeholders (Bryden and N'Diaye, 2011, Francis, 2006, Adebajo, 2004, Tavares, 2010).

### **2.3.2 ECOWAS as regional organisation in West Africa**

ECOWAS has been the most organised and active regional peace keeping institution in Africa since its creation in 1975 and has intervened in most conflicts that have erupted in West Africa (Atuobi, 2010, Chuka, 2016). West Africa is among the world’s most unstable region. In the last decade about a third of the region’s member states have witnessed conflict of one form or another. Countries affected include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Gambia and Senegal. Also, Nigeria, and Niger have been plagued by internal conflicts for which ECOWAS could not intervene even as they exposed the feeble capacity of these countries to maintain the peace and security to their citizens (Haysom, 2014). The various conflicts experienced in West Africa have been complex in nature and difficult to understand and address, having resulted from various interconnected webs of factors. Whatever the factors, these conflicts have seen refugees, rebels, and arms spill across the porous borders between member states in West Africa. Democratisation efforts suffered setbacks in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, and Togo (Adebajo, 2004). Although with challenges and difficulties ECOWAS is considered to have played a pivotal role in achieving peace and security in West Africa not just in intervention but equally in alerting to United Nations on the conflict situation in West Africa Alagappa (1997) stated:

ECOWAS has assisted the United Nations in monitoring regional conflicts at early stage, before they have triggered the interest of Security Council

members or individual states such as the United States. ECOWAS has served as a valuable early-warning device to alert the United Nations of conflicts with the potentials to have global impact. Because ECOWAS has much closer economic, cultural, and political ties with its neighbours in West Africa, it has had a greater capacity to appreciate the significance of early-warning signs as they emerge in the early stages of conflict.

This appreciation sums up more recent evaluation of the successes recorded by ECOWAS (Kennedy, 2018, Francis, 2017). ECOWAS has continued to evolve to establish itself as a reliable institution for peace in Africa. In an effort to be effective in its missions, ECOWAS has over the years evolved from the role of conflict intervention and peace keeping to the more expanded role of assisting in efforts to develop regional economic integration and cooperation. This expanding role results from the perception that one way to avoid conflict is to maintain an enabling environment, promote peace and a secured environment (John, 2005). This turn toward non-conflict-based pre-emptive action has been a growing consideration in peace studies against the argument that peaceful and stable environments engender sustainable development that post-war reconstruction (Jaffe, 2020). Hence, security peace through regional political and economic integration has become a priority for ECOWAS in the region. Recognised as one of the World's first security mechanism to manage regional conflicts (Adebajo, 2004), ECOWAS has continued to develop its regional Mechanisms and Protocols to effectively support the implementation of its role in providing peace and security among its member states within the region and beyond. How successful ECOWAS has been in doing so remains inconclusive.

### **2.3.3 Success of ECOWAS as regional organisation**

The effectiveness of the protocols, mechanisms and legal framework deployed by ECOWAS in its effort to achieve the peace and security at national, regional and international levels has been the subject of intense critique (Adebajo, 2004, Francis, 2013). Haysom (2014) for instance, stated:

While ECOWAS does appear to offer the most functional framework for a regional response, its limitations and the relationships between its member

states should be factored into any analysis of how to support a response to the crisis at this level.

Similarly, (Møller, 2009) argues that although ECOWAS has undertaken conflict resolution and conflict prevention roles in the West African region in its efforts of promoting peace and security within the region, success in these interventions is relative. Several issues have been identified as problematic, three of which are often cited.

The first, the disproportionate capability and influence of member states. For instance, Nigeria enjoys high level influence and contributes the lion share of ECOWAS budget. This imbalance results to various forms of power interests and foreign and security interest influences within ECOWAS as further elaborated in chapter five. One consequence of heavy reliance on Nigeria and the corresponding influence it enjoys is that ECOWAS has been unable to address insurgencies and unrest within Nigeria and other influential or less considered nations. To this extent, with (Jaye, 2011) argued:

There are also armed violent conflicts in Nigeria (Niger Delta), Senegal (Casamance), Ghana (Dagomas and Komkomas) and Mali (Tuareg), which have the potential to degenerate into the kind of violent conflicts experienced in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Unfortunately, they have received less coverage and perhaps less attention by ECOWAS than previous ones perhaps because they are national in their scale but viewed rather as localised low intensity conflicts.

A second factor which is somewhat related to the issue of collaboration mentioned above is the lack of clear role between ECOWAS and other intervening organizations. As Haysom (2014) observes, in practice, the relationship between the AU and ECOWAS has been marked by rivalry, tension and a lack of coordination (Théroux-Bénoni and Dakono, 2013, Théroux-Bénoni, 2013). It is not often clear what role either ECOWAS or the AU really is and at times the two institutions are at tensional and contradictory. Generally, though these parties agree in the fundamental principles of peacebuilding and the need for intervention. Lederach (2013) *cited in* (POPOVSKA, 2013) conceives peacebuilding as a “comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages

needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 2013). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) further defines peacebuilding as involving attempts at establishing structures that address both ‘structural and proximate’ causes of conflicts and ‘delegitimize’ brutality as a mechanism for resolving disputes. It also involves enhancing the capacity of societies to peacefully deal with conflicts (Melander, 2015). In spite of the common understanding of these definitions, it is often difficult of ECOWAS and other organisations and external countries like France to engage in peacebuilding efforts along the lines of these definitions and in collaboration. High level of bureaucracy and discrete nature of ECOWAS, AU, EU, UN and other organisations as well as the diverse interests of these organizations has been blamed for the lack of a clear role for each at different places and times (Ansorg and Gordon, 2019). These are significant issues and gaps which need to be addressed to maximise intervention success in the SSR and conflict prevention roles of ECOWAS as further discussed below.

Third, is the issue of financing. It is no cliché that conflict resolution comes with heavy financial costs. While ECOWAS was quick to stand firm on its protocols, analysts observed that lacked the necessary sufficient finance. The main funding states in terms of conflict intervention has been the UN and member states. However, ECOWAS continues to struggle to get member states to commit to their financial obligation. This ECOWAS’s intervention in the sub-region continues to be hampered by financial constraints. This affects its ability to independently intervene in regional conflicts, and undertake the development s framework for human security in post-conflict reconstruction (Boateng, 2019). These issues are further elaborated in chapter four.

### **2.3 Security Sector Reform and Conflict Prevention in ECOWAS**

Existing research has shown that there is relationship between conflict prevention and SSR (Greene, 2003, Bryden et al., 2008). Identifying the major challenges facing the SSR policies and programmes of ECOWAS, in contributing to conflict prevention in West African remains one of the focuses of this research. Existing literature has further shown that the main challenges

confronting ECOWAS conflict prevention mechanisms includes not only the implementation of the preventive aspects of the mechanisms but equally the strategic approach characterised by weak internal coordination, underutilisation and misdirection of existing human capacities as well as the deployment of limited instruments (ECOWAS, 2008).

#### **2.3.4 ECOWAS Regional Norms in Peace and Security**

Regional norms and mechanisms represent the institutional frameworks developed for the realisation of the objectives, mission and vision of ECOWAS (ECOWAS, 2008). In the context of ECOWAS, the protocols and institutional mechanisms or conflict prevention organs that have been developed to enhance the capacity of implementation of its mandates in peace and security include: ECOWAS Protocols, Early Warning System (EWS), Authority of Heads of Member States and Government, Mediation & Security Council, The Council of Elders, ECOWAS Court of Justice, ECOWAS Parliament and Civil Oversight. The lack of strategic approach characterised by weak internal coordination, underutilisation and misdirection of existing human capacities as well as the deployment of limited instruments remains a problem (ECOWAS, 2008). However (Aning and Bah, 2010) argue that:

“The development of strong binding norms would help to serve as a check on the actions and activities of the bigger and stronger members that may be inclined to ignore pressure from members, thereby reducing the risk of the outbreak of conflicts in the sub-region.”

#### **2.3.5 ECOWAS Protocols**

The ECOWAS Protocols<sup>23</sup> are established as regional collective measures to achieve peace and security in West Africa. The Protocol relating to Non-Aggression (PNA) was adopted in April 1978 which enjoined Member States of

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<sup>23</sup> (i) the Protocols on Non-Aggression adopted on 22 April 1978; ALLOU, I. 2012. Regional Organizations and Opportunity in Nigeria. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT. the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters of 29 May 1981; ibid. the ECOWAS Declaration of Political Principles of 6 July 1991; (iv) the ECOWAS Declaration on a Moratorium on Import, Export and Manufacturing of Light Weapons dated 31<sup>st</sup> October 1998; (v) the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security dated 10 December 1999; (vi) the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 21<sup>st</sup> December 2001; ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008)



ECOWAS to “refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression” against each other. In May 1981, a subsequent Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) was signed in Freetown Sierra-Leone which became effective five years later. The PMAD was adopted by the ECOWAS member states as part of its commitment to a collective defence treaty. The Protocol was accepted by member states to ensure that armed threat or aggression against one constitute a threat or aggression against the community as a whole, and with a resolve, to give mutual aid and assistance for defence. The Protocols aims to provide collective response where a member state becomes a victim of internal armed conflict that is engineered and supported actively from external and could likely pose danger to peace and security of other member states. To what extent has PMAD achieved its objectives has been critiqued by some scholars. (Bagayoko) argued that the ECOWAS members proved unable to find an agreement to activate the PMAD when the Liberian conflict broke out in 1989.

Another Protocol on the Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS (A/DCL.1/7/91) was established in Abuja on July 1991 to promote democracy in the sub-region on the basis of political pluralism and respect for fundamental human rights as embodied in universally recognised international instruments on human rights and in the African Charter on human rights and in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. The Protocol adheres to the principles of equality and interdependence of Member States of ECOWAS; solidarity and collective self-reliance; interstate cooperation, harmonisation of policies and integration of programmes; non-aggression between member states; maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness; peace settlement of disputes among Member States, active cooperation between neighbouring countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite for economic development; recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter in Human and

Peoples' Rights and accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development.<sup>24</sup>

ECOWAS was the first regional organisation in Africa to establish measures to halt illicit weapons proliferation. In response to the human security threat posed by the proliferation of small arms in the region, ECOWAS in October 1998 adopted the declaration of the Moratorium on Import, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa (ECOWAS Moratorium)<sup>25</sup>. The Protocol was spurred by the Timbuktu Flame Peace, a symbolic act that took place in Mali in March 1996, where approximately 3000 arms were burned. This was a decisive event that spurred awareness not only in ECOWAS but within the international community regarding the necessity of destroying post-conflict weapons (Poulton and ag Youssouf, 1997).

The 1999 Protocol subsumed the PNA and PMAD as part of the new ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The fact that ECOWAS Mechanism lacks the potentials to deeply address structural roots of conflicts, led to the establishment of additional Supplementary Protocols on Democracy and Good Governance in December 2001.

Consequently, both the Security Mechanism and the Supplementary Protocol represent an important step in the regional process of building a democratic political governance framework for supporting peace and development in West Africa. Hence, the ECOWAS Security Mechanism and its Supplementary Protocol are respectively the instruments designed to a twofold requirement for security, democracy and development: "the 1999 Mechanisms aims to control the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts whereas the Supplementary Protocol is facing the challenge of democratisation and good governance"(Bagayoko). This is illustrated in table 2.1 below.

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<sup>24</sup> Article 4 of ECOWAS Revised Treaty

<sup>25</sup> ECOWAS issued the Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa at the Twenty-first Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in Abuja, Nigeria, 30-31 October 1998.

Table2.1: List of ECOWAS Protocols

Protocols		Date
1	The Protocols on Non-Aggression (PNA)	22 April 1978
2	The Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD)	29 May 1981
3	The Declaration of Political Principles	6 July 1991
4	The Declaration on a Moratorium on Import, Export and Manufacturing of Light Weapons	31 October 1998
5	The Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security	10 December 1999
6	the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance	21st December 2001
7	Declaration of Regional Approach to Peace and Security	2003
8	ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunitions and other Related Materials	2006
9	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)	January 2008

## **2.5. ECOWAS Regional Mechanisms**

### **2.5.1 The Authority**

Article 7 of the ECOWAS Treaty empowers the *Authority* of Heads of States and Governments of member states of ECOWAS to be the supreme institution of the community (ECOWAS Secretariat, 2006). According to the protocols “the Assembly of Heads of States shall be the highest decision making body on issues relating to conflict prevention, management, and resolution, peacekeeping and security, humanitarian support, peacebuilding, control of cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms as well as other issues covered by the provisions of the mechanisms.” The Assembly shall delegate to the Mediation and Security Council the power to take on its behalf decision for the appropriate implementation of the provisions of the Mechanism.”<sup>26</sup>

Deriving from the assessment of the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Good Governance conducted by (WANEP), the *Authority* has not shown enough preventive measures in a sub-region riddled with conflicts , instead its response to most violent conflicts has always taken a fire brigade approach. The *Authority* has shown lack of capacity by its inefficiency in developing and implementing enough preventive measures, as well as lack of proactive strategy and clear indicators to prevent violent conflicts (WANEP). Considering the fact that other supporting organ of the institutional mechanisms depends on the decisions and appointments of the *Authority*, the researcher examines the roles of MSC in regional peace security of ECOWAS.

### **2.5.2 Mediation & Security Council**

The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) is one of the core structures of institutional mechanisms established by the Authority of ECOWAS heads of states and governments. The MSC comprises nine Member States with seven elected by the Assembly, and the two other members being the current chairperson and the immediate past chairman. Members of the MSC can serve for two-year renewable term. The MSC according to the Protocol<sup>27</sup>, shall take decisions and implement policies on issues of conflict prevention,

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<sup>26</sup> Article 6 and 7 of Chapter II of the Protocol to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security

<sup>27</sup> Article 10, Chapter II of the Protocol

management, resolution, peacekeeping and security; authorise all forms of intervention and decide among others on the deployment of political and military missions; approve the mandate and terms of reference of these missions; revise periodically these mandates and terms of reference in accordance with developments; and upon the recommendation of the Executive Secretary and the Commander of the force (in case of the deployment of a military mission in a Member State). The MSC can meet at three levels:

- The Heads of State and Government levels
- Ministerial level (Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior and Security)
- The Level of ambassadors of member States of the Council accredited to ECOWAS in Abuja

### **2.5.3 Executive Secretary**

The Executive Secretary, according to the Protocol<sup>28</sup>, shall have the power to initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security in the sub-region. The actions may include fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict. Others recommends the appointment of the Special Representative and the Force Commander for approval by the Mediation and Security Council; appoints members of the Council of Elders; supervises political, administrative and operational activities and provide logistic support for the mission; prepares periodic reports on activities of the Mechanism for the Mediation and Security Council and Member States; deploys fact-finding and mediation missions, on the basis of his/her assessment of the existing situation; convenes, in consultation with the Chairman of the Authority, all meetings of the Mediation and Security Council, the Council of Elders, and the Defence and Security Commission; and implement all decisions of the Mediation and Security Council. The Executive Secretary Shall be assisted by the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of Political, Defence and Security Affairs (which has become since 2007 the commissioner in charge of Political Affairs, Peace and Security) (Yabi, 2010).

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<sup>28</sup> Chapter II, Article 15 of the Protocol

The organs that support the MSC and Executive Secretariat are the Commission of Defence and Security, the Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).<sup>29</sup>

#### **2.5.4 Commission of Defence and Security (CDS)**

The Member States are represented on the Commission of Defence and Security by Chiefs of Defence Staff or their equivalents; Officials of Ministries responsible for Internal Affairs and Security; Experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of each Member States and depending on the agenda, heads of other services such as Immigration, Custom, Drug/Narcotic Agencies, Border Guards or Civil Protection Force.

The CDS deals with the technical and administrative aspects and determines logistics requirement of peacekeeping operations. It supports the MSC especially in formulating the mandate of peacekeeping forces, defining the terms of reference of these forces, nominating the commander and determining the composition of the contingents.<sup>30</sup>

#### **2.5.5 The Council of Elders**

The Council of Elders consist of eminent personalities who can, on behalf of ECOWAS, use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators. The list comprises of eminent personalities from various segments of the society, including women, political and religious leaders. The lists are approved by the MSC at the level of the Heads of State and Government. These personalities are called upon when the need arises by the Executive Secretary or the MSC to deal with a given conflict situation<sup>31</sup>.

#### **2.5.6 ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)**

ECOMOG is a structure composed of several stand-by multipurpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and in readiness for immediate deployment. ECOMOG conducts among others observation and peace monitoring missions, peacekeeping and restoration operations, humanitarian

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<sup>29</sup> Chapter III of the Protocol

<sup>30</sup> *ibid*

<sup>31</sup> *ibid*

action support missions, missions to monitor the enforcement of sanctions, including embargos, preventive deployments, peace-building operations, disarmament and demobilisation, policing activities to fight fraud and organised crime and any other operations that may be ordered by MSC.<sup>32</sup> ECOWAS reform agenda to build and strengthen ECOMOG capacity for future peace support operations resolved in 2001 to engage in a P-3 Agreement with the US, France and UK<sup>33</sup>. Deriving from Adedeji Ebo interviews from the ECOWAS regional security programmes officer *cited in* (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004), appointment of secondment officers to ECOWAS Secretariat were part of the agreement between ECOWAS and, specifically the three donor countries: The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which was later renamed the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) for America, The French programme, known as the RECAMP<sup>34</sup> and the British assistance which is carried under the auspices of the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme. How have this agreement and the secondment translated in practice in modifying or restructuring the peace and security framework of the post-war society in the region is another research interest.

### **2.5.7 ECOWAS Peace and Security Observation System (Early Warning)**

The ECOWAS Early Warning System, otherwise referred to as “The System” is a sub-regional peace and security observation system. In accordance with Article 58 of the Revised Treaty, The System was established for the purposes of conflict prevention. The System is made up of an Observation and Monitoring Centre which is located at the headquarters of ECOWAS, and also the Observation and Monitoring Zones<sup>35</sup> within the sub-region. The information collected in each of these zones is transmitted to the Observation and

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<sup>32</sup>ibid

<sup>33</sup> Adedeji Ebo *cited in* BRYDEN, A. & HÄNGGI, H. 2004. *Reform and reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Lit Verlag.

<sup>34</sup> RECAMP involves practical training to strengthen cohesion and effectiveness of African capacity for peace support operations.

<sup>35</sup> Zone 1- Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal( Headquarter - Banjul); Zone 2- Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger ( Headquarter - Ouagadougou); Zone 3-Ghana, Guinean, Liberia, Sierra Leone( Headquarters is Monrovia); Zone 4- Benin, Nigeria, Togo( Headquarter-Cotonou)

Monitoring Centre in Abuja to enable the Department of Political Affairs and Security to forecast and react to potential crisis situations<sup>36</sup>.

### **2.5.8 ECOWAS Court of Justice**

The ECOWAS Court of Justice, ECJ was established in 1991, with Revised Treaty of the community ushered into existence in 1993 and its protocol that entered into force on 5 November 1996. This evolved as an additional institutional norm responsible for the transformation process within the structures of ECOWAS. Despite the fact that the primary function of the court centres on the interpretation and application of the ECOWAS Treaty and the protocols and conventions annexed thereto (The rule of the Community Court of Justice:2002), one of the major mandates of the court makes it compulsory that the decision of the court stays binding on the Member States, the institutions of the community and individuals and corporate bodies(Banjo, 2010). The question here does not only emphasise on the existence of this institution but hinges on how the character of the politics of access to the ECJ affects the right to justice and rule of laws by ECOWAS citizens, and also how member states are made to comply with the decisions of this court.

The previous studies by Banjo (2010), has identified logistics, limited public awareness among ECOWAS citizens, and non-use by member states as integral part of the challenges facing ECJ, but this research will review further to understand how this institution has fared in addressing issues pertaining to peace and security through its adjudicative processes within the West African region. Drawing upon the studies of (Banjo, 2010) and (Amnesty, 2012), it has been revealed that ECJ has not made much impact in conducting due processes of the judicial systems across its member states, but the recent judgements have been productive. For examples:

“Cases of Mr Afolabi Olumide (Plaintiff) versus the Federal Republic of Nigeria; Niger in their human rights violation of one of its citizens; Social-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) and Nigeria Government”

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<sup>36</sup> Chapter III of the Protocol



The judgement of Mr. Afolabi Olumide has raised contradictory questions which has challenged the interpretation of ECOWAS Treaty. The *Interights*<sup>37</sup> more or less argues that ECJ initial mandates did not provide more access to the rights of individuals but rather focuses on the rights and obligations of states towards each other.

## **2.6 ECOWAS Parliamentary and Civil Oversight**

The ECOWAS Parliament evolved from the supplementary protocol of June 2006 in disposition to replace the initial community parliament established in article 6 of the 1993 Revised Treaty. ECOWAS parliament plays more or less advisory role and has limited authority and scope in defining regional security issues. The dominant nature of the Executives, the Authority and the ECOWAS Commission on issues concerning the security of member states, as well as in making and implementing policy decision on regional security matters could be the possible reason why the parliament remained *minimised* in the regional role for peace and security in West Africa. Born et al. (2003) argued that the domination of the security issues by the executive was not only based on the general assumption that security sector policy is a 'natural' task for the executive but also on the fact that they have the requisite knowledge and ability to act quickly. Drawing up further from (Born et al., 2003), the existing stubborn perception that parliament should be kept out of security issues remain debatable in the security literature. The reason being that parliaments are less suitable institution for dealing with security issues, it is often a time-consuming procedure, lack full access to the necessary expertise and information, and most often times regarded as ill-situated institution for keeping classified information secret (Born et al., 2003). Despite the fact that parliaments were charged with the responsibilities of safeguarding the democratic element of overseeing the security sector institutions and persons within the framework of rule of law and human rights, its function of oversight sets limits on executive power by setting legal parameters and adopting budgets (Hans Born and DCAF, 2011).

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<sup>37</sup> <http://www.interights.org/news>

The essence of parliamentary involvement in security policy and security sector reform does not only ensure that citizens are being heard but also that new directions and actions of security services are consistent with the constitution, international humanitarian law and human right. The role yet unidentified as the researcher would like to argue is how ECOWAS parliament whose opinion is seldom sought in peace and security and which also lacks the power to make laws could be strengthened to bring to the fore the ECOWAS Vision 2020 – the supposed transition from *ECOWAS of the State* to *ECOWAS of the People*. Therefore, it would be worth considering by not only limiting the role of ECOWAS parliament to mere advisory functions but also incorporating it as a co-decision making and law-making body in regional peace and security. However, the reform that have re-introduced ECOWAS parliament into peace and security did not only consider its oversight functions but its role to ensure that transparency and accountability are maintained in the armed forces and security services (Fluri and Johnsson, 2003). Lar (2009) have argued that giving ECOWAS parliament more direct role in regional peacekeeping and also enhancing their civilian oversight functions on SSR in member states, may not only promote checks and balances, but it may as well provide coherence and compliance with ECOWAS protocols within the member states including Nigeria and Ghana. The creation of the civilian oversight function of the parliament within national security policy of member states could represent a good mechanism for enhancing good governance of security sector institutions but how ECOWAS parliament interferes with conflicts and security issues of member states still remains a problem.

However, Hon. Mahamane Ousmane, Speaker of the ECOWAS Parliament as *cited* in (Fluri and Johnsson, 2003), asserts that the essential entry point for addressing West African region's security concerns is to strengthen parliaments as institutional actors of security sector governance. To what extent does the ECOWAS parliament influence member state governments more especially the leading member states? Though parliamentary and civilian oversight of the security sector have been incorporated into their national policy framework, the parliamentary authority still remains weak relative to the executives (Aning and Lartey, 2009). Despite the limited structural and

functional roles which ECOWAS parliament were meant to operate, they have contributed in various ways in promoting regional security and good governance. ECOWAS parliament for example has participated in election observer in Nigeria (April 2003), Togo (June 2003), and Guinea-Bissau (2004). ECOWAS Parliament have engaged in several peace and fact finding missions e.g. Cote d'Ivoire Crisis (January 2003) and its effects in Burkina Faso and Ghana(Hans Born and DCAF, 2011).

### **2.6.1 ECOWAS and Supranationality**

The aim of ECOWAS is to boost the security cooperation within West Africa which claims to be the defining features of the principles of supra-nationality. The question here is, does ECOWAS have that regional power of supra-nationality in the region where national sovereignty right still prevails and takes precedence? The dilemma of respecting the wishes of people and implementing ECOWAS's norms has exposed the underlying tensions between national and supranational institutions (Aning and Bah, 2010). In response to this, ECOWAS has developed in its 2020 strategic vision which seeks to transform the sub-region from an 'ECOWAS of States' to 'ECOWAS of the Peoples'. The *supra-nationality* sometimes has failed in addressing regional conflicts and insecurities due to the multi-contextual factors in which member states were found to operate (Francis, 2006, Adebajo, 2004). The researcher will be contributing to the challenges of supra-nationality in the context of ECOWAS.

### **2.7 Chapter summary**

This chapter has explored key debates in the literature on conflict prevention, security sector reform and regions and regionalisms. It has also examined the theories, debates and issues in the wider academic field of peace studies and how ECOWAS's interventions fit within the dominant conversations relating to the key questions addressed in the thesis. While the chapter has highlighted key debates and delineated key arguments, definitions of SSR and other instruments in SSR, EWR and other norms and mechanisms deployed by ECOWAS, the review raises more questions than answers. Some of the questions relate to the gaps established and which form the basis of the three

guiding research questions presented in chapter one. The subsequent chapters will attempt to fill these gaps and provide illumination into the research questions through process tracing of ECOWAS's interventions and composition, Ghana and Nigeria foreign and security policy, interest and influence and well as content analysis of ECOWAS processes.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **ECOWAS NORMS AND MECHANISMS SINCE 2006**

#### **3. Introduction**

This Chapter responds to the research question No.3 which examined in detail the development of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms since 2006. The approach is to apply process tracing techniques to explore the historical development of ECOWAS SSR norms and standards which have been formulated and applied in many peace and security initiatives and projects in the West African region. Such a historiography will develop a detailed and critical overview of areas of strength and difficulties in view of possible theoretical re-alignment, new insights or fresh policy architecture that responds more effectively to the contemporary peace and security questions in the region. The main political, security, institutional and diplomatic factors that drove and shaped the process of SSR initiatives and policies and the outcomes are discussed. The examination encompasses research, debates, events and commentaries that evaluated the extent to which ECOWAS's SSR and Conflict Prevention and Conflict Reduction mechanisms and policies have been effective in delivering sustainable peace and stability in the sub-region.

#### **3.1 ECOWAS SSR Norms and Standards since 2006-2015**

The Processes that led to the evolution of ECOWAS SSR norms and mechanisms may have originated from the nuanced search for effective democratic security sector governance by ECOWAS and its member states. On this note, (Aning and Bah, 2010) argued that, the processes that have resulted in the recent trend towards security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) emanated from the need and 'demands' for either 'management', 'reform', 'transformation' or 'governance' derived by domestic imperatives for change or occurring as a result of external conditionalities. Okey Uzoechina, the Programme officer of ECOWAS SSR Programmes who preferred to use the term 'pulling factor' instead of 'driving factor' in describing the motivation behind the development of ECOWAS SSR programmes in West Africa, highlighted that SSR originated based on:

“The need to promote governance and legitimacy of the security institutions; promoting accountability and transparency in security sector management; improving efficacy and effectiveness in security management”

The first demand to reform security sector in ECOWAS member states was in the 1980s and 1990s and was driven by donors as part of general public security sector reforms. Several ECOWAS Member states from 1982 to 1992 showed strong resistance to SSR despite the series of extensive reforms going on within the West African public sector. Why the security sector was resisted or excluded from these reforms was not clear though Anning and Bah in their own opinions described the exclusion as a rule. Sherman (2009) further illustrates that the need to reform security institutions became paramount and later garnered more support even more than the public sectors. Drawing from Sherman, ECOWAS viewed SSR as a strategic advantage in mitigating the long history of unconstitutional involvement of security sectors’ role in undermining political governance in the sub-region. According to one participant, under the pseudonym Dieng – a head of division in one of ECOWAS regional offices explained that there was a need to develop SSR/G was a key condition for compliance to ECPF:

“ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework that has been adopted since January 2008 is about all prevention. ECOWAS should prevent and if we are not able to stop the crisis from happening, we have to intervene to help solve the problem and if we have done all what we are able to do and we are not able to stop the crisis we have to come in the last stage to rebuild. If you take all these stages, you see it is all about ‘Security Governance’. In our approach to security, our target mainly is about what we call security institutions, statutory institutions, non-statutory institutions and bodies; we are talking about those in charge of overseeing the security sectors, the private security institutions as well as this local level dealing security issues. All these constitute part of what we are interested in from our perspective and we are seen that ECOWAS should develop a kind of framework – a common framework in order to give all member state a kind of guidance or

steps to be taken in order to change...the status of the security operators in the countries” (Fieldwork, 2014)(Imobighe, 1987)

An ECOWAS Colonel pseudonym *Dieng* further argued that the main reason why SSR/G is paramount stated that the colonial structures continue to shape ECOWAS approaches even when ECOWAS is an African organization created and initiated by West African heads of state. For example:

“The main reason is that we know that in Africa, mainly West Africa, during the colonial time, the security institutions we had was set up in order to maintain the status of the colonial people. Unfortunately, when we get our independence the new elite didn’t change the arrangement, didn’t change the settings they just continue to do the same thing. The new elite decide to set up institution that will be favouring their position which was the domination of the population. It was not something done for the protection of the population, immediate population but only to maintain the position of the new elite- either military or political- let us say civilian. This time we face a lot of issues like coup detat, civil war, many other crises that show that what, we, the choice of our first leaders during the post-independence era was not good choice. It is something that we need to change, we need to change it in order to accommodate new principle, new organisation that will take into account the human being as the main element...put the human being in the centre of our Security” (Fieldwork: 2014)

By deducing from the above empirical information, one may argue that the motivation towards the development of SSR/G policy in the region focuses more on political factors and human security. In addition, ECOWAS should draw further attention to the new emerging security threats like terrorisms, human trafficking and Public health emergencies. How have ECOWAS developed its ECPF normative framework on security governance to address these political and security threats in the region? According to (Uzoechina, 2014), ECOWAS head of states are yet to adopt the final draft of RGSSR policy which started in January 2009. Therefore, the next section will examine the political and security drivers to ECOWAS RGSSR policy and how they have triggered the development of SSR/G institutional norms.

### **3.2 Political Drivers of Security Sector Reform in West Africa**

The historical trajectory of SSR processes was traced to the authoritarian regimes of governments in West Africa. The struggle for political power embedded in the Military as instrument to support the security of the state government or join forces with opposition to the government as well as a tool to manipulate the civilian elective positions of governance remains among the causes of most of the violent conflict and political instability in the region. The inability of the region to conduct a successful DDR in the aftermath of these devastating conflicts have continued to leave small arms and light weapons in the hands of the militias from the civilian population which in essence remains a challenge to regional stability.

Externally driven and discrete DDR and SSR by donor agencies continue to disharmonise the coordination of collective security frameworks of ECOWAS and its member states. The region has been traumatised with series of Coup d'état, dictatorships, transnational crimes, terrorisms which has put in question the degree of good governance within the security institutions in West Africa. In the light of these, most scholars have argued that the dysfunctional practices and bad governance of the security sector institutions which consistently seek the interest and protection of the 'state' rather than 'individuals; have remained the cornerstone of most the virulent conflicts and instability in the region.

However, SSR and post-conflict induced SSR were evident in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The need to reform security in these countries was not only politically driven, but to shift state-centred security to a more nuance human security or balanced perspective of both. Their regimes were developed to serve the political interest of the government and patrimonial agenda of ruling elites in the state (Francis, 2012). Most scholars have argued that the negligence of the human security perspectives in the state actor's security agenda has left gap which is still a worrying concern in the region following the negative experiences of state fragility and failures in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Mali for examples (Jaye, 2011, Aning and Bah, 2010).

In the light of the above, it can be deduced that the weak security institutions due to fragilities and state failures within the member states of



ECOWAS could be instrumental to the violent conflicts and insecurity witnessed in the region for more than two decades ago. Drawing from the experiences of numerous illustrations of countries across West Africa, the absence of effective, democratic governance of security sector has been a major significant causal factor in many cases of state fragility and civil war. Apart from Ghana which SSR was embedded in its democratic practice and not systematically entrenched in its conceptual or policy framework. Sierra Leone and Liberia emerged as the first two member states of ECOWAS with SSR as a significant post-conflict reconstruction standalone project (Sherman, 2009). For example, the SSR in Liberia was driven by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in Accra on 18 August 2003. Against this backdrop, one may argue that despite the fact that SSR is more of a post-conflict process than pre-conflict; it is sometimes driven by CPA in post-conflict society. (Francis, 2012, Sherman, 2009) and (Bryden et al., 2005) argues that the politicisation of security sector, degradation of professionalism and command and control, predation, rampant impunity, and loss of public trust contributed and exacerbated the armed conflicts in the Manor River sub-region. It was also evident that in many cases: “the security institutions were destroyed during conflicts, are extremely corrupt or played a role in government and were/are not subordinate to civilian control. In addition, governments have rarely come close to having a monopoly on the use of force, which has to be shared with militias, informal groups, and private security companies among others”(GFN; Beckit.P, 2010).

In the light of the above, the transition from war to peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone presented two immediate challenges with respect to security reconstructions. However, John Kabia *cited in* (Francis, 2012) argues that how to transform the police from regime protection, corrupt and oppressive institution to one that responds to and meets the policing needs of post-war society was a major challenge. Taken aback history, Dorina Bekoe *cited in* (Francis, 2012) argued that the mission of Liberia’s security services was not designed to protect Liberians as much as it was to satisfy Monrovia-based politicians who in essence have generally played a negative role in Liberian history. Similarly to Sierra Leone case, John Kabia *cited in* (Francis, 2012) argued that despite the fact that the security institutions were already weak and

politicised prior to the war, the conflict wreaked further damage on the police and other security and justice sector institutions. Therefore, providing efficient security governance that will maintain peace and order in ECOWAS member states continues to be a challenge. According to (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004), restoring peace and order in these two countries can be feasible by taken into perspectives the following:

- Establishing effective and accountable security agencies that can provide the base for broader socio-economic reconstruction that will be capable of protecting the security not only of the state, but also of its citizens
- Establishing effective civilian oversight of the emergent armed forces and security agencies
- Settling the questions of the composition, disposition, and oversight of force structure in the security institutions which is central to any political settlement and, ultimately, democratisation itself.

How to achieve effective and accountable SSR that will enhance the security sector institutions success in restoring normalcy in Sierra Leone and Liberia continue to be a problem affecting peace and stability in the region.

One may deduce that the antecedent of insecurities in the region was created out of the political factors. This could be demonstrated visibly by the simultaneous assassination of President Joao Bernado Vierra of Guinea Bissau and the Country's Chief of Staff, General Tagma Na Waie in 2008. Also, more supporting evidence was a speculated military takeover in Guinea Conakry which immediately manifested after the expected death of its long –term leader, President Lansana Conte in December 2008 (Aning and Bah, 2010).

### **3.2.1 Security Drivers of Security Sector Reform in West Africa.**

The drive to reform security sector in West Africa stemmed from the guise of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction programmes. The index of violent conflicts and insecurities in the Mano River and its link with the misuse of the security sector institutions remain a major regional concern since the 1990s (Mgbeoji, 2004, Ebo, 2007). The need for more concerted regional

efforts on human security against state-centred security may not only have driven the need to reform security but also to provide a balanced approach to the protection of human- and state security.

(Clarke, 2008) argues that countries that have been through years of civil war (Liberia and Sierra Leone) have the commitment of reforming the security sector. Despite the numerous protocols and mechanism set in place by ECOWAS and its member states to establish a safe and secured state and regional environment that will promote, security, development and cooperation, the region continues to be faced with multifaceted and multidimensional security challenges which has continued to expose the incapability of the security sector's weaknesses in the region. Identifying the factors that poses these insecurities could suggest the first step in addressing the problems. The second step is to identify the nature of vulnerability of threats caused by unconventional terrorism and warfare in the state and region. Thirdly reassessing the capacities to which the security institutions are able to manage and respond effectively to these insecurities and their root sources becomes paramount.

The fourth could be to reassess the role of civilian population in contributing to security issues at national and regional level.

However, (Uzoehina, 2014) argues that since the formation of ECOWAS in 1975, the West African region have witnessed three waves of insecurity on a scale large enough to prompt bilateral and collective responses by its member states and the intervention of external actors. Uzoehina divided the sources of insecurities in three phases:

1. The competition for control of the state apparatus between armed opposition groups and the state, or competition for a higher stake within the state and between different armed groups.
2. Internal armed conflicts which are linked to the failure of disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration processes and poorly conceived and implemented SSR processes in some states particularly the Mano River Union.

3. The new forms of insecurities such as terrorism, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, arms transshipment through loosely controlled airports and seaports, money laundering and cybercrime.

In contrast to the above mentioned sources of insecurity, the outbreak of Ebola in March 2014 was a security challenge not only to the affected states but to the region and the world at large (Meyers et al.). The Centre for Disease Control *cited in* (Meyers et al.) statistics of September 30, 2014 shows that out of total cases of 6,574, there were 3626 laboratory confirmed cases across 5 countries (Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone). Prior to this, the Ebola Crisis was already declared a Public Health emergency of international concern (Meyers et al.).

Against these backdrops, one may argue that Ebola crisis which necessitated the Public Health emergency escalated a new wave of insecurity in the region. One may argue that responding to Public Health emergency of such kind and magnitude was new to ECOWAS and was not included in its broader security agenda. This may also indicate that ECOWAS may have placed more emphasis on military threats than on non-military threats which may suggest a rethinking of its SSR policy/strategy. This poses a question on the extent of coverage on what ECOWAS considers as 'security' in broader perspective. According to history, ECOWAS has been recognised and highly appraised for its significant role in promoting the collective responsibility to some military related conflicts and insecurities in the region. The evidence was shown by ECOMOG intervention in the Liberia and Sierra Leone. What has remained a big task to ECOWAS is the incapacity to respond collectively to most of the non-military security issues in the region. For example, how prepared was ECOWAS to save the region on Public Health emergency of international concern has remain the biggest challenge to ECOWAS's broader agenda to regional insecurity.

It is not surprising that scholars are quite unclear about ECOWAS's political prowess in post conflict management given the complexity of this question. To this extent, (Jaye, 2011) argued that whilst ECOWAS has consistently been involved with peacekeeping in the military-related conflicts its role in peacebuilding remains questionable. (Uzoehina, 2014), explains by

stating that ECOWAS has not developed the capacity to address the issues of trans-border crimes such as money laundering, human trafficking, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, drugs trafficking, spread of HIV/AIDS and other related issues. Therefore, there is need for ECOWAS to refocus its narrow-minded military security space to a broader security perspective that takes into perspective non-military security issues such as the current public health security emergency posed by Ebola virus in the region.

More so, the experience in the Mano River Union has amply demonstrated how bad governance practice in the security sector in one country could negatively impact on the security situations of the adjoining states (Ball and Fayemi, 2004). One may argue that, the West Africa region is still considered to be vulnerable particularly in the affected states where terrorisms is in serious operations like Nigeria (Boko Haram) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The lack of capacity of the security institutions in responding to insurgencies such as terrorisms remains among the reasons why SSR is paramount in the ECOWAS region.

To further complement the assertion made by (Jaye, 2011) that for ECOWAS to consolidate its regional security in West Africa, there is need to address the problems that lead to conflict, threaten the physical survival of individuals and entire communities, and encroaches upon the process of security change. How does ECOWAS developed its regional SSR policy to address the aforementioned problems has not only tried to respond to the security issues at security governance of security institutions but looked beyond on the non-military security issues. How would ECOWAS agenda in transforming ECOWAS of States to ECOWAS of the People in security matters be realisable, since empirical evidence has shown that ECOWAS citizens have no knowledge about ECOWAS and their regional policies specifically SSR/G policies. This could help explain the level of ownership by ECOWAS citizens for their own security. Mainstreaming of gender in SSR/G remains another issue that could drive SSR/G in the region. Therefore, there is in dire need for ECOWAS and its member states to shift their orientation towards a security sector reform that will be holistic in nature- taking into broader perspectives the military and non-military security issues that have the potentials of mutating into violent conflicts or insecurities.

More so, gender mainstreaming in the security institutions remain among the factors that is driving SSR processes in West Africa. SSR process has been critiqued for its inadequate consultations with, and underrepresentation of women, as well as for its tokenistic approach to issues of gender-based violence (Alaga and Valasek, 2008). The gender driven SSR is facilitated through the DCAF-WIPSEN –Africa partnership which has two-pronged goals. The first is to strengthen the integration of gender and women’s issues in SSR processes. The second is to enhance the capacities of female security personnel to act as drivers of the desired change from within. (Alaga and Valasek, 2008) emphasises that a gender driven SSR in West Africa will help in the following ways:

- Establish the interactive platform for female security sector personnel (if needed and where one does not exist) and by extension provide space for them to engage in the discourse on SSR.
- Enhance the capacity of key parliamentarians, female armed forces and law enforcement personnel and women’s organisations to mainstream gender and women’s issues into new/ emerging security structures and operations.
- Develop and distribute lessons learned and good practices of integrating gender into SSR processes in West Africa.

One may in similar contention with Alaga and Valasek agree that the gap between gender and SSR may be closed if for example the widely men dominated security sector will be reformed to mainstream gender. Evidence has shown based on statistics of survey taking from two of the Post-conflict West Africa states (Liberia and Sierra Leone) that:

‘out of the 94 Parliamentarians in Liberia only 14 are females, of the 135 personnel in the Drug Enforcement Agency in Liberia, a little over 15 are female; 422 personnel in the Ministry of National Security in Liberia only 20 are female. The Bureau of immigrations has a staff strength that ranges from 1,947 to 2000, but only 500 are female. The Sierra Leone Prison Service has 1,125 personnel, but only 208 are women.’

Drawing from above, one may argue that there is need for institutional security reform policy that will guide not only post-conflict but also transitional societies to consolidate their democracy as well as mainstream gender in SSR as enshrined in the UNSC Resolution 1325. Therefore ECOWAS and its member states requires institutionally driven SSR that adopts gender into national and regional SSR policy and programmes of the West Africa States. One way to address this is to emphasise the importance of gender in SSR in the new yet to adopt Regional Governance and Security Sector Reform Policy framework of ECOWAS and its member states on the operationalization of the political will of member states in SSR policy and implementation.

### **3.2.2 Development of Institutional Norms (2006-2015).**

In this section, I would argue that the above mentioned political and security factors may have driven the development of institutional norms in response to the new security challenges they generate. I would also examine how each of the regional norms developed between 2006 and 2015 have responded to the security challenges in the region: *ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and other Related Materials (2006)*, *ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008)*, *Supplementary Act on the Code of Conducts for the Armed Forces and Security Services of ECOWAS, 2011.*, *ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation (2013)*; *The ECOWAS-ECCAS Declaration on Maritime Security 2013 and Draft ECOWAS Maritime Security Strategy*; and *the draft ECOWAS Regional Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (2009-2014)*.

Traditionally, ECOWAS is noted for its multifarious protocols and norms that remained inefficient and ineffective in their ability and capacity to implement and respond to regional insecurities and potential escalation of low intensity conflicts to high intensity violent conflicts. Therefore, there is need to assess how the protocols and norms 'between' 2006 to 2016 have thematically developed to promote security and conflict prevention in the region. I would explore the nature of conflict reduction between these two periods 1975-2006 and 2006-2014 as a result the security consciousness of ECOWAS and the development of its security governance in relation to preventing violent conflicts in the region.

### **3.2.3 Normative Institutional Standards, Norms and frameworks**

ECOWAS previous experiences on violent conflicts and the lessons learnt, as well as the new emerging security challenges may have spurred the reviews and establishment of its old and new normative policy framework respectively. To address these regional insecurities posed by the political and security factors mentioned in sections 0 and 0, ECOWAS believed that establishing effective and efficient normative standards and policy frameworks on security will help to address the security issues in the region which have continued to register poor results due to lack of implementation. However, I shall proceed to trace the historical developments of these normative standards and policy framework of ECOWAS in chronological order 'between' 2006-2015 to explore how they have interacted in promoting the regional security stability and prevention of conflicts.

### **3.4 Conventions and Instruments: 2006-2015**

In June 2006, ECOWAS heads of state and government adopted the Convention on SALW, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS, 2006). The fact that the emerging fragile peace in West Africa continues to be threatened by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons remained a worrying concern. However, ECOWAS Heads of States were not satisfied with the efficacy of Moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of small arms in 1999, which invariably was seen as a political instrument. Drawing from Lai Hassan *cited* in (Greindl, 2013), the move to develop Convention on SALW was based on the dis-satisfaction of ECOWAS Heads of States on the failure of Moratorium in addressing the purpose of its establishment. Therefore, the ECOWAS Convention on SALW was created to fill the policy gaps in the Moratorium which may not have responded to the increasing proliferations of arms in the region. It was also identified that the moratorium had more or less a political undertone which also contributed to its ineffectiveness and bias. On this note, ECOWAS deemed it necessary to transform the regional moratorium on imports of SALW into legally binding instrument- Convention on SALW with the purpose to:



“Prohibit all international transfers of small arms within the sub-region unless a Member State obtains an exemption from ECOWAS Secretariat. It stipulates strict controls on the manufacture of SALW and lays down measures to support transparency and exchange of information between Member States. Further provisions deal with civilian possession, stockpile security, marking, tracing and brokering”

Among other reasons that suggested the creation of ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms was created was to increase the impact of UN arms embargoes in the region based on the limited impact it had on Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire(Vines, 2005). In addition, the voluntary nature of the Moratorium and its lack of details made it difficult to implement in practice, hence other measures including sanctions could not be achieved (Berkol, 2007). Berkol also argued that the moratorium lacked not only effective strategy that ensures communication between ECOWAS member states but it as well lacked harmonisation of some key mechanisms for verification which made it difficult for both governmental actors and civil society to implement.

To what extent has the creation of the Convention on SALW made significant impact on the proliferations of SALW? One may argue that despite the claims that moratorium was inefficient, still the creation of Convention on SALW still have not achieved its purpose and have not impacted differently from the moratorium. Proliferations of SALW have continued to be on increase despite the Convention. The additional mechanisms such as the establishment of ECOWAS Small Arms Unit which is charged with the responsibility of developing and implementing the Action Plan for the Convention still have not proven to be effective and efficient in its coordination and monitoring processes. Therefore, some scholars have argued that the ineffectiveness of the Convention on SALW has contributed not only to the failure of disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDR) processes but also to violent armed conflicts in the region(Berkol, 2007). How have ECOWAS Convention on SALW impacted on the lessons learnt from the poorly conceived and implemented SSR and governance processes in some states particularly the Mano River Union. However, eliciting from Onigbinde:

“There is heightened trafficking in small arms in West Africa and with porous borders between different countries, it has become increasingly difficult to address the spread of these weapons. Small arms have been recycled in West Africa countries of Nigeria, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea and Burkina Faso. Rebel groups and armies supply each other with arms in past and present conflict situations in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Liberia. In the end the proliferation of these weapons undermines SSR”(Onigbinde, 2008)

In light of the above, one may agree with(Aning and Bah, 2010) that:

“The failure of governance in some countries constitutes a threat to national and sub-regional stability; the proliferation of illicit SALW continues to increase the propensity for societal insecurity. However, it is the growing use of the sub-region as a transit point by Latin America drug cartels that possess the most serious threat to national and regional security”.

To further improve the issue of governance in reducing the proliferations of illicit arms, Regional and National Arms Unit were created as part of the transformational processes of ECOWAS Secretariat to Commission. One may proceed to look at the impact of the new ECOWAS Commission and the establishment of Regional and National Arms Unit on the governance and control of the illicit weapon in West Africa since its establishment in 2007.

#### **3.4.1 Formation of the secretariat – Heads of states**

In 2007, the Authority on Heads of States and Government (AHSG) of ECOWAS launched the transformation of ECOWAS Secretariat into a Commission and the restructuring of ECOWAS institutions. Among other reasons for this transformation includes setting up a platform for the implementation of the Convention on SALW. The creation of the Commission was an opportunity for ECOWAS Small Arms Unit to function well specifically in the management and implementation of Convention on SALW. However, one may argue that despite its laudable objectives, proliferation of SALW continues

to increase in significant proportions. The ability to implement the Convention on SALW which came into force in November 2009, and the March 2010 five-year plan of action which was adopted by the ECOWAS ministers in charge of defence and security still was unsuccessful in curbing arms proliferations in the region. Drawing from one of my interviewees, the ECOWAS SSR programme Officer, He claimed that ECOWAS SALW Unit has recorded a partial success with the following assertion:

“ECOWAS Small Arms Unit has made effort in monitoring and regulating the legal control and management of arms between and within member states in the region; established National Arms Control Unit in every member states to support the regional Unit; has exercised significant control for legal usage and transfer of SALW across member states but what remains the major problem with ECOWAS in dealing with proliferation of SALW could be blamed on its inability to control and manage illegal trade and movement of SALW in the region due to the nature of porous border and weak security in the border posts of the region and member states”

Tracing from the above discourses, the issues of failed governance has continued to generate a multiplying and debilitating effects on regional peace and security, but also on the way SALW are controlled within ECOWAS and its member states. ECOWAS still lack that holistic approach to manage and control both the legal and illegal arm proliferations and control in the region. Therefore, promoting a governance led framework that will contribute in solving its broader conflict prevention issues is what ECOWAS needed and this confirms (Aning and Bah, 2010) assertions that:

“ECOWAS’ realisation that governance challenges in several of its member states had contributed to the outbreak of conflicts led it to specifically place governance related issues spanning the activities of political parties and security sectors at the centre of the ECPF. This was recognition on part of ECOWAS’ political leaders and civil societies that a stable and functional region would need to improve on its governance practices”.

On this note, the next paragraph explored the need for developing ECPF as a normative regional framework for governance, security sector reform and conflict prevention. It will also analyse some of the challenges that ECPF has faced since its establishment in 2008.

In 2008, ECOWAS developed its Conflict Prevention Framework(ECOWAS, 2008). Section VI, Article 27 highlighted the overall aim of ECPF as a reference document to:

“Strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa. The intermediate purpose is to create space within the ECOWAS system and in Member States for cooperative interaction within the sub-region and with external partners to push conflict prevention and peacebuilding up the political agenda of Member States in a manner that will trigger timely and targeted multi-actor and multi-dimensional action to diffuse or eliminate potential and real threats to human security in a predictable and institutional manner” (ECOWAS, 2008).

Against this backdrop, ECOWAS believed that the ECPF objectives can only be achieved through the facilitation of the implementation of its Article 72(Security Governance) and that of relevant provision of Article 58 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty particularly Article 19-24 of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Governance mentioned early on section

### **3.4.2 The role of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)**

It is imperative to note that Article 72 of the ECPF was developed to support ECOWAS and its member states in managing the implementation and structural effectiveness of the regional policies and programmes on security governance and SSR related activities in the region(ECOWAS, 2008). Lack of democratisation and good governance has continued to manifest in continuum as major sources of violent armed conflicts and insecurities in the region. How to make security sector institutions effective and capable in addressing these issues that threaten human security continues to pose problems for ECOWAS and its member states. Therefore, ECOWAS believe that the best way it could achieve a democratic and effective governance of security sector institutions is

by ensuring that all security sector institutions in the region conforms to the realisation of the following objectives(ECOWAS, 2008):

“eliminate threats to individual and group rights, safety, life, livelihoods, and property, and the protection of the institutions and values of democratic governance, human rights and the rule of law under human security umbrella; to orient the focus and capacities of individuals, groups and institutions engaged in the security system to make them responsive and responsible to democratic control and adhere to basic human rights; to ensure the emergence and consolidation of accountable, transparent and participatory security systems in member states”.

Drawing from ECPF, Article 73(a-f) has identified the target groups for security governance while Article 74(a-q) highlighted the activities that shall be undertaken by stakeholders to ensure that efficient and effective security governance is achieved in tandem with the above stipulated objectives. Among all the highlighted activities, SSR/G remains the focus of my research and I will be looking at how ECOWAS SSR/G policies have developed to achieve the objectives in practice.

Among the reasons highlighted in the ECPF were to help ECOWAS facilitate the conduct of study into military and security agencies as part of SSR needs analysis for West Africa which will enable it to identify and define areas of intervention. It will also help ECOWAS to develop a security governance framework with a Plan of Action that will take into account peculiarities of the region to feed into continental and global processes on SSR. In addition, ECOWAS will be strengthened to facilitate the mainstreaming of security governance into relevant conflict initiatives, including DDR, practical disarmament, cross-border programmes, youth empowerment and the protection of human rights and rule of law. However, before exploring further on the effectiveness of ECPF in relation to SSR/G, one may ask if ECOWAS at the present has got any adopted policy/strategy plan of action for SSR/G in the region. If not yet, what is the level of development of these documents?

The ECOWAS SSR/G policy and programmes is still in the final draft waiting to be approved by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, and the document is expected to be adopted before the end of 2015. Afterwards, the strategic plan of action for the implementation will be drawn from the adopted ECOWAS SSR/G policy and programmes. It is believed that the adoption and development of a strategic plan of action for the implementation of SSR/G processes will help to achieve objectives of Article 72 of the ECPF. What remains imperative as challenges that could debar the successful implementation of ECPF have been argued by (Aning and Bah, 2010) as thus:

“ there is the general and perennial problem of generating the political will among ECOWAS’ leaders to initiate the domestic policies and decisions that should complement the principles and mechanisms contained in the ECPF;...there is a historical chasm between the rhetoric of promulgating such community documents and the reality of getting community citizens on board such processes through raising public awareness of the existence and rationale for the ECPF;...there is need to improve both intra-and inter-agency coherence and collaboration among the different parts of the ECOWAS Commission-for example the political and economic aspects of the Commission working in tandem to realise set goals-to ensure the effective implementation of the ECPF, but more importantly, to take the lead in liaising with member states;...it is essential for adequate investment in financial and human resources-particularly in the political affairs, peace and security (PAPS) directorate-to ensure the smooth implementation of ECPF....there is a necessity for political awareness that, after the publicity and fanfare of the inauguration of the framework, prevention is a long term, slow process and not a high profile single event.”

Deducing from the above challenges, one could question on the relative impact these aforementioned challenges could have on the development and implementation of the regional ECOWAS SSR/G policies and programmes. How have this document developed to respond to the security challenges including the new emerging regional threats such as terrorism? In order to

respond to these challenges several forum<sup>38</sup> discussions were organised by ECOWAS in January 2009, exactly one year succeeding the ECPF adoption in 2008, to draft the ECOWAS Regional Framework on SSR/G (Uzoechina, 2014). Developing the regional SSR/G policy by ECOWAS does not only depend on the degree of its supranationality but requires the full support of its member states.

Drawing from ECPF, the regional SSR/G policy in principle should be drawn and drafted from the member states National Security Policy to promote effective coordination and harmonisation of security architecture in the region. Empirical research has shown in contrast that there may be possible top-bottom approach towards the development of ECOWAS SSR/G policy. There was also empirical evidence that most member states of ECOWAS still do not have National Security Policy (NSP) for example Nigeria and Ghana. Nigeria instead, has a National Defence Policy (UNDP) which questions its origin since ideally NDP is supposed to be drawn from NSP- same is applicable to Ghana. By tracing the processes that led to the development of the draft copy of ECOWAS SSR/G policy document and how? The Regional Head of Security of ECOWAS responded as thus:

“I said we are giving member states the guidance and what we can do is to help them by giving them technical assistance, which they start during the first phases. The first phase of the security sector reform system is to be able to gather the main stakeholders in the country and ask them, what is our qualm? What do we need to achieve? ECOWAS can be there to help them to do the first assessment of the situation, ask the question what kind of security we have. What are our weaknesses? What are our advantages? Do we have another parent security system, what do we need to do? And we can be there telling them what we are going to have in the meetings, when they are developing the instruments. ECOWAS can provide the needed support, either technical support, either by going to see our technical partners or financial partners to provide them with tools they need to

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<sup>38</sup> Internal sensitisation workshop held on 21-22 January 2009 in Abuja, Nigeria, by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Regional Office, in partnership with the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and the West African Network for Security and Democratic Governance (WANSED).

organise themselves but ECOWAS cannot from the region come to tell to a country this is what you need”.

Against this backdrop, opinions on whether ECOWAS has taken the appropriate process and approach in the development of its regional SSR/G policy is mixed (Boateng, 2019). Based on the empirical and secondary data analysis undertaken within this study, it is considered that a more complex approach considering the specificity of each conflict could be more effective beyond the seemingly bottom-top approach suggested in the above quote. Added to this, is the need for all member states to declare their national security policy within a reasonable timeline such that these are considered in any future conflict. This way, ECOWAS would have used the collections of NSP of member states to develop a regional framework on SSR/G that is holistic and representative of member states specific and collective position. The framework presented in chapter seven considers this approach.

### **3.4.3 possible challenges of drafting a collective framework**

The historical relationship between France and Francophone countries in ECOWAS emerges as a key challenge when developing an ECOWAS regional SSR/G policy. Considering the Anglo-Francophone divide relative to France and level of commitment to ECOWAS and the country's preferred approaches to security and governance, scholars (Bryden and N'Diaye, 2011, Bryden et al., 2008), have argued that attempting an imposed framework would be counterproductive. Expected challenges has already arisen in promoting a coordinated and coherent response in joint responses such as ECOWAS standby forces. At the same time, the imposition of an already written draft policy document by regional experts and external actors for ECOWAS member states to and approve may not yield positive outcome. Empirical data gathered during fieldwork indicates that national representatives are not often knowledgeable about the current security needs of their own states, let alone that of the region. Empirical data further reveals that the busy and dual nature of the jobs and functions consisting of domestic and regional security issues allow little or no time for experts of member states them to review documents. Thus, work overload emerges as a key challenge to in ECOWAS's attempts to



draft a final draft a comprehensive policy documents on time and ready for deployment. Nevertheless, the consultative approach is supported by member states as it assists the to produce their NSP in their context and to design more elaborate national security policy easier to reference by other member states and adoption and ratification by Heads of States.

Added to the above challenge secondary analysis identified the difficulty of language. ECOWAS SSR/G policy document starting from the zero draft to the various improved versions have been developed in three main translations in English, French and Portuguese. This linguistic divide is not often easy to handle and often lend itself to difficulties in conveying the same message due to differences in interpretations and understanding. Often time there are no copies for Lusophone states with no copies translated into Portuguese for instance. Thus, the problem of language emerged as a challenge in the coordination and harmonisation of SSR/G policy documents by ECOWAS. With particular reference to Portuguese speaking countries, empirical findings show that most ECOWAS publications are written in English and French which for critics amount to downplaying the importance of Lusophone member states. The absence of translated versions is perceived as not enabling equal access and understanding of the regional security processes and frameworks. Notwithstanding this observation, the final improved, harmonised versions written in English and French has sometimes been produced by DCAF in Consultative request by ECOWAS Regional Security Division. For all these challenges, (Uzoehina, 2014) argues that the ECOWAS Regional Framework on SSR/G is still a draft, its endorsement by member states' experts and its final adoption by ECOWAS Council of Ministers and heads of state and government, and the formal presentation to the ECOWAS Parliament will be major steps in strengthening democratic norms through SSR/G in West Africa.

It has taken ECOWAS six years (2008-2014) to produce the final draft of the SSR/G policy document since the adoption of ECPF. The development of strategic action plan for SSR/G is still in embryonic state waiting to kick off as soon as the regional policy framework on SSR/G is adopted. It can only be imagined how long will it take ECOWAS to adopt its SSR/G policy document with operationable and effective action plan for responses remain a big challenge. Looking at the final draft of the SSR/G policy document, it seems to

have considered the principles and main objectives of security governance. A key indicator in this regard is putting democratic governance and human security at the core of the strategy and making security a regional public good and an essential service for citizens and vital for development. For the draft framework to be used as important steps to achieve the objectives of the security governance, (Uzoechina, 2014) suggests further that the following processes should form the integral components of the ECOWAS SSR/G:

- Development of relevant security legislation, such as national security policy
- A national framework for cooperation and partnership building
- Conducting periodic security sector reviews and needs assessment
- Involvement of customary authorities and community-based security providers
- Effective involvement of CSOs and the media
- Establishment of effective democratic control and oversight institutions
- An effective resource mobilisation strategy and financing
- An effective communication strategy
- A monitoring and evaluation mechanism

The third point above highlighting the need to conduct periodic security sector reviews and needs assessments raises several questions. How would these reviews and needs assessment be made on regular basis in the face of the above articulated challenges? Could ECOWAS consider the health sector as part of its security architecture given for instance, the declaration of Ebola Crisis as a public health emergency in West Africa? Considering that security actors such as the military were used to quarantine Ebola patients in Liberia and Sierra Leone after World Health Organisation (WHO) declared Public Health Emergency in West Africa. It has been suggested that ECOWAS includes health within the regional norms and mechanisms since military intervention is now being deployed in non-military health security threats (ECOWAS, 2020).

#### **3.4.4 Military and non-military intervention**

ECOWAS has mainly been a political organisation with a strong military involvement in the sub-region. Its functions have however, extended, beyond political and military intervention to non-military roles although the latter is yet

to be developed as the military wing which is the subject of this thesis. The development of each these two roles is developed further

#### **3.4.4.1 Military Intervention**

Secondary analysis found that military intervention has been deployed in a non-military public health emergency – in this case the outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD). Whilst this could be tagged as a misuse of security sector institution since the purpose was meant to exercise some control on the spread of vicious Ebola disease across the unaffected communities and sub-regions ECOWAS intervention received general approval. (Tambo, 2014) for instance stated: “The legal status of military humanitarian intervention, although challenging, may be justifiable in the Ebola crisis and the joint WHO-ECOWAS community is united in demanding such action”. Secondary analysis revealed that ECOWAS and its member states have not been proactive in recognising that some non-military threats could be dangerous and deadly. Thus, it has been recommended – even as an adhoc agreement ECOWAS to revisit and reassess its institutional norms on security in addressing not just military but also non-military security threats (Tambo, 2014). ECOWAS needs to rethink security from the broader security perspective that would promote domestic and regional institutional norms capable of responding to both military and non-military threats. One way suggested is to define the role of security sector actors in the case of public health emergency and clearly state this in the national and regional normative framework for security responses e.g. (Pugh, 1998). It has been suggested that the application of humanitarian military intervention in practice in the Ebola and other future health crises in West Africa can take a variety of forms: material assistance (through relief aid); sanctions (coercive, non-military pressure to end abusive practices); and the dispatch of military forces to remedy a human tragedy. Response in the form of material preventive or protection relief is difficult and has seldom proven capable to stop the Ebola outbreak based on ongoing unnoticed and counter-productive efforts of relief organisations (Tambo, 2014). Increasingly, discourses on Public Health Emergency as a security issue is gaining ground in global security response systems as evident in the current Covid 19 epidemic where the British Armed Forces was called to support logistics, construct emergency hospital and deliver

personal protective equipment (BBC, 2020). non-military threat in their core security policy and strategic planning. In this regard, ECOWAS has engaged in a number of structural programmes for non-military intervention with little success as further developed in the following sub-sections.

In 2011, ECOWAS envisaged a lack of common standards as one of its institutional problems in its conduct for democratic governance of uniformed personnel in West Africa. To address this, ECOWAS sees the need to make the Armed Forces and Security Services to be harmonised, coordinated and effective in its operations. It was on this note that ECOWAS developed the Supplementary Act on Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services 'between' 17-18 August, 2011 when ECOWAS Council of Ministers in Abuja adopted *the Supplementary Act on the Code of Conduct for the Armed forces and Security Services of ECOWAS*. The objective of the Supplementary Act on CoC was a demonstration of political will to promote the integration of democratic norms into the behaviour of the armed forces and security services in member states. The CoC was developed to promote conditions that could deter unconstitutional changes of government and strengthen democratic civilian control and governance of the security sector in the region. It is also believed that one of the objectives of CoC was to reaffirm the subjection of the armed forces and security services to democratically elected constitutional authority, but one may ask, to what extent is this true in the context of ECOWAS. How should we align this to the context of Cote d'Ivoire crisis and the current unconstitutional takeover of government in Burkina Faso? The military has played a major role in breaching the national and regional code of conduct that undermined the democratic process in their member states and the entire region. How effective is the zero-tolerance policy of ECOWAS been implemented in the defaulted states?

The same democratically elected constitutional authority in ECOWAS member states that adopted the democracy and good governance policy, the same that contravenes it. This further asks the question on what for example, 'democratic processes' and democratic governance of security sector in Countries like Gambia and Burkina Faso means? How does member states National CoC for the Armed Forces Security Services integrated and coordinated into the

regional CoC. One may also ask on how the member states National CoC functions in states without NSP. What mechanisms are in place to make the national and regional CoC effectively employed during joint combat operations among member states?

Against this backdrop, one may argue that the need to promote the CoC was part of ECOWAS SSR strategy to make its security sector governance effective and efficient. The aftermath of ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in its member states internal conflicts received a wide range of criticisms as well as commendations by the international community. One may argue that among the reasons why ECOMOGs intervention needed reassessment was to examine the institutional strengths and lapses in order to provide a more nuanced framework for ECOWAS and its member states to restructure their security institutions for effective collective security and regional responses. One may argue further that despite other reasons behind the need to reform security sectors programmes and policies in West Africa, the following could be articulated as among the institutional drivers/factors of ECOWAS SSR development:

- The professionalisation of the army by moving them away from traditional role of providing security to providing service for the public.
- A change of government from military to democratic rule
- To change the culture of the army from being subversive to being republican and respecting civilian rule
- To change focus from state-centric to human-centred security
- To reduce the number of army personnel for budget purpose
- Gender mainstreaming in SSR project

In further proofing, the case of Terrorism as a threat to regional security as mentioned in section 0 , ECOWAS and its member states in February 2013 adopted the Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism.

In 2013, ECOWAS and its member states thinks that there is need for a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan to respond to some of the

emerged terrorism threats as pointed out in section 0. Based on this premise, the ECOWAS heads of state in February 2013 adopted the *Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism* annexed to the Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan. This normative framework was developed to unequivocally reject and condemn the act of terrorisms in all its ramifications and manifestations which included kidnapping, hijacking, hostage taking, demand and payment of ransom, bombing of public and private property and critical infrastructure, acts of sabotage and desecration of religious and other cultural sacred places(ECOWAS, 2013). In order to enhance the implementation of this norm, the heads of States adopted the Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan which spurred the approval for the establishment of the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit, an ECOWAS arrest warrant and a blacklist of terrorism and criminal networks(ECOWAS, 2013). The ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy was developed to enhance the regional, continental and international counterterrorism instruments which shall enable a common operational framework for action to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related criminal acts within the region. To ensure operational effectiveness, necessary actions which should be based on the three pillars of prevent, pursue and reconstruct need to be integrated in the responsibility for implementation of actions by relevant partners. The implementation structures includes ECOWAS Commission and Court of Justice, the West African Police Chiefs committee, the ECOWAS Warning and Response Network, Intergovernmental Action Group against Money laundering in West Africa, the West African Economic Monetary Union, civil society organisations and the media networks. Whilst, the above interventions and processes have been relevant, there are early steps in non-military intervention.

#### **3.4.4.2 Non-Military: West Africa Health Organisations (WAHO)**

Non-military intervention refers to non-forcible methods, namely intervention undertaken by organizations such as the AU, EU, NATO etc. which do not require the use of military force to alleviate mass human suffering within and without the sovereign borders of the countries affected (Henderson, 2020). Non-military intervention is often in response to situations that do not

necessarily pose direct threats to states' strategic interests. Rather such action is often conducted on the basis of the people to people principle (p2p) and protect principles generally motivated by humanitarian objectives (Welsh, 2020). Dembinski et al. (2019) proffer further that, sometimes non-military humanitarian intervention interweaves into military intervention of humanitarian interventions whereby military as well as non-military means are simultaneously undertaken to 'protect civilians or people', in the course of stopping a war. They further raise the controversies that are often associated with non-military intervention in the sense that such actions are often against the wishes of one of the warring factions as is the case in Syria (BBC, 2020).

ECOWAS has rarely intervened in a non-military project. Perhaps its most visible intervention was in the case of the outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa in 2014 - 2015. However, this intervention was spontaneous and did not result from existing SSR, EWR and other constituted mechanisms. In this respect, the WAHO has been suggested as a synergetic reform and cooperation instrument between the core security institutions of ECOWAS dealing with military and threats and health emergencies in the region such as was the case with the Ebola outbreak and the current Covid19 global pandemic. A well-established structure could within existing mechanisms include such areas as citizen health care intervention whereby ECOWAS is ready either through member state specialists or in-house built capacity to create the West African Health Organisation (WAHO), in the same ways as it responds towards terrorism and counter-terrorism. The WAHO could help in case of public health emergency and other associated biological terror threats and warfare instead of allowing its regional role to be subsumed into that of WHO.

Another aspect of ECOWAS non-military intervention has been in considering the regional norms developed in 2013 with declarations on Maritime Security and safety. The norm was driven as a result of growing awareness that the vast resources and potential in the Gulf of Guinea are being undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. (Gilpin, 2007) argues that the vast resources and potential:

“Rather than contributing to stability and economic prosperity for countries in this sub-region, pervasive insecurity in this resource-laden maritime environment has resulted in more than \$2 billion in annual financial losses,

significantly constrained investment and economic prospects, growing crime and potentially adverse political consequences”.

It is quotes like the above that led (Gilpin, 2007) to agree that the historical conception of security was based on the acts of governments and not necessarily on the welfare of a country and its inhabitant. Antecedent meanings associated to security and intervention matters have mainly been land-centric, focusing on governance issues but ignoring such vital aspects of maritime security, health care intervention. These areas have received scanty policy attention in ECOWAS. (Onuoha, 2012) has therefore argued that other non-military threats and vulnerabilities require the collective responsibilities of member states not just within ECOWAS but more widely. It is becoming more evident that new waves of insecurities such as piracy, armed robbery and other illegal activities constitute a major problem for ECOWAS. The extent to which these new security challenges impacted on the social, economic and environmental wellbeing of the sub-regions cannot be overemphasized. It is no doubt that these matters are now coming to the forefront of emergent ECOWAS treaties. For instance, the ECOWAS and ECCAS heads of states and government held in June 2013, adopted a Political Declaration on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea. Taken this forward, a transitional Code of Conduct which focused on the Repression of Piracy, armed Robbery against Ships, and illicit Activities in West and Central Africa was adopted by heads of state through multilateral agreement aimed at eradicating illegal activities in the common maritime domain of both sub-regions. The strategic interest of ECOWAS and ECCAS in adopting these principles is to eliminate illegal activities in their common maritime environment. This general resolve to protect maritime and the value of resource that needs protection is captured in following explanation by (Onuoha, 2010) declaring:

The region’s geostrategic and maritime potentials are quite attractive. The GoG is endowed with enormous mineral and marine resources such as oil, diamond, gold, and fishes among others. In particular, it is home to huge hydrocarbons deposits. Nearly 70 percent of Africa’s oil production is concentrated in the West African Coast of GoG. Experts forecast in 1999 that Western oil companies will invest between \$40 billion and \$60 billion in



the GoG alone over the next 20 years. It is estimated that the deep water drilling will account for 25% of offshore oil production in 2015, compared to just nine percent in 2007.

On the basis of the huge potential as presented in the above quote inevitably compels ECOWAS and regional member states to pay much greater attention in addressing joint maritime problems (Onuoha, 2012). In trying to strengthen further the implementation of the objectives of the political declaration on Maritime Security and Safety, an additional transitional code of conduct was developed. It enabled ECOWAS and ECCAS to build the ability and capacity. Accordingly, member states declared their member states' expressed intention to promote coordination, information sharing and assistance, cooperate on the development of training and educational programmes and management of the maritime environment, and review and update of relevant national legislation, among others (CoC, 2013).

#### **3.4.4.3 Implementation**

Implementation of non-military aspects of intervention is often not effective mainly because member states hardly fulfil their financial obligations even after signing up the treaties like the above ECOWAS – ECCAS framework plan. In order to achieve the objectives of the joint declaration, it will require the political will, financial capacity, consensus building and logistics when implementing regional security/governance policy (Boateng, 2019). Regrettably, fieldwork indicated that it has not been feasible for ECOWAS to contribute its own quota in making this joint operation a reality. How ECOWAS manages and controls its inter-regional space in terms of information and intelligence sharing with other regions for the protection of individuals for humanitarian non-military intervention in the sub-region and wider Gulf of Guinea remains a challenge (Onuoha, 2012). Therefore, the Political Declaration on Maritime Security on Safety requests ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission to promote activities aimed at cooperation, coordination, pooling together of resources and interoperability between and among member states has been seen as a step in the right direction if properly implemented (Dembinski and King, 2020).

The joint Declaration on Maritime Security and the non-binding transitional code of conduct which is developed as a consensus-building instrument amongst member states intentions in promoting the yet to be adopted draft ECOWAS Maritime Security Strategy is another policy area for future development. For these well-intentioned policies and cross regional non-military options to impact upon the life of citizens, ECOWAS would have to adopt more rudimentary implementation strategies including onward monitoring, evaluation and adjustment in country context (Dinshak, 2020).

#### 3.4.4.4 ECOWAS Challenging Experience

Despite the many protocols, treaties, mechanism and norms, whether for military or non-military intervention as illustrated in table 3.1 below, ECOWAS faces many challenges.

Table 3.1 Summary of ECOWAS Institutional Norms/Standards (2006-2015)

	Institutional Norms/Standards	Date
1	The Convention on SALW, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials	<b>June 2006</b>
2	The transformation of ECOWAS Secretariat into a Commission and the restructuring of ECOWAS institutions.	<b>2007</b>
3	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework	<b>2008</b>
4	Discussions and initiatives to draft the ECOWAS Regional Framework on SSR/G (still in progress)	January 2009
5	Convention on SALW came into force?	November 2009
6	Adoption of five-year plan of action for implementation of Convention on SALW	March 2010

7	Adoption of the Supplementary Act on the Code of Conduct for the Armed forces and Security Services of ECOWAS.	17-18 August, 2011
8	Adoption of the Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism annexed to the Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan.	February 2013
7	The declaration on Maritime Security and safety.	2013

(Aning and Bah, 2010) proposes ways through which ECOWAS can be able to face up to some of its challenges is by preventing or mitigating the chances of outbreaks in the first place through policy tightening and member state accountability stating:

The development of strong binding norms would help to serve as a check on the actions and activities of the bigger and stronger members that may be inclined to ignore pressure from members, thereby reducing the risk of the outbreak of conflicts in the sub-region.

The above table shows the multiple norms developed over time. Further analysis conducted within this thesis as presented in chapters five and six traces the development and implementation of policies between the periods of 2006-2015, illuminating the historical trajectory of agreements and evolution of norms within the context of ECOWAS. The analysis reveals consistent limitation in the implementation of norms. Hence, Dinshak (2020) concludes that the absence of a principle of implementation is the single main contributor to dysfunctionalities within the security sector institutions. The result has been that the West African sub-region continues to witness violent conflicts such as the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria for which ECOWAS has failed to deploy. Yet, there is limited research investigating and explaining factors that make the implementation of SSR/G normative framework and policy difficult. One of a few studies in this focusing on ECOWAS, SSR challenges arising out of

analysis of ECOWAS documents on *Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa* (Uzoechina, 2014) found that there was a long gap between the stage of agreeing on norms to the effective implementation of such norms, chequered with many hurdles and gaps. The study further identified five critical challenges that hamper the effective implementation of ECOWAS regional policy documents on SSR/G.

The first of such challenges is the limited capacity in human resource terms to support implementation of ECOWAS policy document. From the analysis, it was obvious that there is a gap not only on the number but also the quality (technical) of human resources working on the development and implementation of the SSR/G programmes. Summing up the extent of the gap (Uzoechina, 2014) stated:

The limited human capacity at the ECOWAS Commission is not unrelated to the recruitment freeze instigated by ECOWAS heads of state and government in 2008. The ECOWAS Regional Security Division presently has no dedicated focal officer on SSR; the division has only two professional staff. Although the recruitment freeze was partially lifted in 2012 and the position of Programme Officer was advertised in November 2012 along with 51 other positions (only 18 percent of vacant posts) within ECOWAS Commission, the recruitment process is still ongoing as at November and the positions may only be filled in 2014.

Throughout, empirical fieldwork, process tracing and secondary analysis undertaken by this research, it became evident that ECOWAS had at times been hasty in its processes and approaches in the development of its regional SSR/G policy. Most often, ECOWAS acted without a clear structural and functional mechanisms in place to develop and implement the SSR/G? The research revealed that even at the beginning of the Discussions and initiatives to draft the ECOWAS Regional Framework on SSR in 2009, there was no dedicated focal officer on SSR. The lack of personnel was confirmed in the field. Evidence of shortage was obvious with personnel constantly struggling to maintain a balance between their roles as employees of member states and their missions to support ECOWAS processes. The effect is a common practice whereby ECOWAS institutions lacked available staff at headquarters at any

given time and having to frequently rotate between personnel on the basis of availability (ECOWAS archives). This limited human resource and expertise meant ECOWAS is compelled to outsource the conceptualisation and articulation of norms to hired consultants. Most often such hired expert tend to be disconnected from the vital internal dynamics and political consultation processes within the organisation. This leads to the slow policy development, wrong decisions and other undesired outcomes.

Against this backdrop, ECOWAS could not effectively respond to its member states political crisis or emergencies with such limited human capacity. On the above account, this study supports the findings of (Uzoehina, 2014) alluding to the view that the inability of ECOWAS to implement its normative framework on SSR/G could be blamed on the limited human resources but also on the capacity lapses at the directorates. For examples, the Peacekeeping and Regional Security, Political Affairs and Humanitarian Affairs directorate was reported in fieldwork as so overstretched that it makes it difficult for ECOWAS to follow through on policy implementation. Therefore, it has been suggested that one way of improving effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of policy and norms on SSR/G as well as on non-military humanitarian courses could be to establish local offices for National and Regional SSR/G and also fill up the vacant positions necessary to increase its human capacity (Dinshak, 2020, Uzoehina, 2014)

The second challenge identified as frustrating to the implementation of normative standards is the selective ratification of ECOWAS policy documents by member states. The process of ratification is most times delayed and it is not all member states that comply with these terms. Ratification is based on consensual quota system which makes some member states non-signatories to the ratification. Hence scholars have argued that making laws and policies which cannot be ratified and enforced on member states puts ECOWAS does not demonstrate seriousness and equally make the implementation of norms difficult. Thus, ECOWAS has been considered as limited in its capacity to enforce multilateral ratification of norms (Dembinski and King, 2020). Inevitably, this makes implementation difficult and impact disproportionate for signatory and non-signatory member states.

An example of challenges linked to ratification is Article 49 of 2001, the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. This statute prescribes that the protocol shall enter into force upon ratification by at least nine signatory states in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each member state. Also, that the intrinsic requirements are built into policy instrument as conditions *sin qua non* to the implementation or entry into force of the Article. From secondary research undertaken by the researcher, it emerged that 11 member states have ratified the protocol. However, it is yet to be ratified by Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Nigeria. Following the above and by virtue of Article 57 of the same statute, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention is deemed to have entered into force upon signatory by heads of state and government. Accordingly, signatory member states and the ECOWAS Commission could implement all its provisions upon signature, but this does not extend to member states which are yet to ratify the mechanism. Not surprising, although there are enough signatories, the provisions of Article 49 remain dormant and have not been applied.

Against this backdrop, it is fair to observed that ECOWAS is producing new policy documents without collective ratification of the previous one by member states. Therefore, to make norms efficient and implementable, ECOWAS could evaluate and ratify previous polices before establishing new ones to avoid the existence of several overlapping and partially unratified documents which sometimes may delay or make norms' implementation difficult. (Uzoehina, 2014) gave example with the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security which was not ratified by the requisite nine member states so that it can be considered to have definitely entered into force stating:

After 14 years of blazing the trial and being commended as an essential regional security instrument, it is yet to be ratified by Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Liberia and Nigeria. This situation of selective ratification by member states not only limits its implementation but also raises the question of whether the protocol, which in effect is an extension of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, can effectively enter into force when its progenitor is so limited in effect.

Logically drawing from the above, it is important to see how the ECOWAS policy on SSR/G will be multilaterally and unanimously ratified by all member states including the yet to ratify signatories to the previous policies and programmes. Considered a critical challenge to norm implementation by ECOWAS and its member states is the non-operationalization of the ECPF. (Aning and Bah, 2010), highlighted the challenges to the implementation of the ECPF. It is based on the fact that the ECPF was not operational that the ECOWAS Technical Steering Committee on ECPF in 2010 added the fifteenth operational component (enabling mechanism) to the 14 thematic components encapsulated in the document. How did the enabling mechanism contribute to the operationalization of the ECPF? How would ECPF expected to be operational when there was no implementation plan developed and adopted after it was established in January 2008. (Uzoechina, 2014) argues that, even with the ECPF priority implementation plan designed to be rolled out from 2013 to 2015 that:

ECOWAS clearly did not possess the wherewithal to forestall the political crisis in Niger in 2009, the electoral violence in 2011 and *the coups d'état* in Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. Interviews with various ECOWAS directorate suggest that the level of implementation of activities for ECPF components going into the last quarter of 2013 is still very low.

Against this backdrop, two reasons were mentioned as obvious why the level of implementation of activities for ECPF components in the last quarter of 2013 was very slow:

“The first reason was that the generic timeframes for several activities in the three-year priority plan do not help matters in monitoring, evaluation and reviewing progress. Given as an example that start and end dates for most activities are simply stated to be from 2013-2015 with no benchmark and many overlaps. The second reason is the already huge gaps between budgeted amounts, available amounts and expected donor funding are indications of potential limitation in implementation. Donor confidences in ECOWAS’s

capacity to manage dedicated funds and adequately report on activities may presently be at low ebb<sup>39</sup>:

ECOWAS Pool was launched in March 2010 to support the capacity building, with partner contributions of US\$54 million at launch and further pledges. One of the activities supported was finalizing of a joint financing arrangement and operational guidelines to cover all ECOWAS capacity-building activities. Pool fund disbursements were suspended in January 2011 due to ECOWAS's partial reporting on activities in 2010; however, funds have been spent on activities that were agreed prior to the suspension.

The tardy processes of developing operational tools and structures are reflective of the teething problems and it is only when these processes have taken root and been sustained over time can one appropriately assess the capacity and fitness of ECOWAS to dealing with issues pertaining to regional security challenges. More so, lack of political will is another important extrinsic factor that affects policy implementation on parts of leaders, particularly the Authority of heads of State and Government of ECOWAS. How to boost the political will of member states to implement already established norms remains a big challenge. Limited resources have been identified as one of the factors that undermines norms implementation since there are often dilemma in taking decisions as to where and how to channel available resources and the extent of support to be given in each case are often considered through politically coloured lenses. One may argue for example, that the Franco- Anglophone divide in their political differences and interests may bloc norms implementation. However, *Uzoechina* argues that sometimes political consensus-building and decision making are not only unavoidable but very slow and on the same note that political considerations may even lead to unwillingness to act. Given examples as thus:

The decision to deploy a mediation team or Council of Wise, ECOWAS Emergency Response Team (EERT), the ECOWAS Standby Force

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<sup>39</sup> See for instance, DFID, Annual Review of the DFID Support to West African Regional Integration Programme (SWARIP), May 2011- April 2012", p.3, <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/jati/document/3487059>.



(ESF), or substantial support to SSR activities in a member state first has to scale the hurdles of articulating and agreeing on clear mandate for the mission, mobilizing needed resources and approving budget and timeline. In most cases, agreement also needs to be reached with member state on the scope of such engagement or intervention in order to bypass the sovereign walls. The memorandum of understanding between the ECOWAS Commission and the Government of Guinea Bissau to support SSR, the ECOWAS Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) roadmap for Guinea-Bissau and the chronogram of activities took many years in the making and has taken over even longer to implement (Uzoehina, 2014).

Finally, resource mobilisation, utilization and coordination are among the biggest challenge to bridging the gap between norms and implementation. Analytical Jump? Due to the strategic importance of security concerns, the subject continues to attract massive donor funding, often exceeding a recipient's absorptive capacity. Internally, ECOWAS's practice has been to present its donors with a ready-made annual programme and budget at annual coordination meeting with development partners, and to solicit donor support on those terms.

However, direct donor engagement in member states is often devoid of such leverage. At the regional level, the Community levy has the primary source of internally generated revenue for ECOWAS since 2006. For example:

The Community levy (or Community Solidarity Levy for the countries number of the West African Economic and Monetary Union) represents a 0.5 percent tariff on imports from third countries, which proceeds are passed on ECOWAS. However, some countries in arrears of payment of the levy may commit up to 1.0%. Other significant sources and funding baskets include the ECOWAS Peace Fund, the African Peace Facility, the European Development Fund and bilateral contributions from West African and other countries.

The levy is projected to cover up to 70 percent of ECOWAS's core funding, which primarily takes care of salaries and emoluments, facilities and equipment. This means that ECOWAS looks to its development partners to fund its projects and programmes in all sectors, including peace and security.

In 2010 ECOWAS rejected EU proposals to evolve a template to fund some development projects which would involve the payment of counterpart funds by ECOWAS and member states and the suppression of the Community Levy. In an effort to raise its internally generated revenue, in March 2013 finance ministers of ECOWAS member states agreed to create 1.5 percent Community Integration Levy whose scope will be the subject of further negotiations. If adopted, this will replace the ECOWAS Community Levy. The next chapter looks at some of the foreign and security policies of Ghana and Nigeria, key members of ECOWAS.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF GHANA AND NIGERIA

#### 4. Introduction

The previous chapter identified and explored some of the mechanisms deployed for peace and security projects within ECOWAS. This chapter focuses on the foreign policy strategy adopted by Nigeria and Ghana, two key players in ECOWAS to achieve both national and regional influence as the regional organization seeks to maintain peace and stability in West Africa. The analysis of this literature indicates that whereas the general principle of ECOWAS has always remained the pursuit of collective peace, the individual member state aspirations and political interests has similarly been pursued at different times. The individual foreign policy objectives of key players have produced the dual effect of hampering consensus and creating wider synergy amongst member states. The analysis also shows that member state positioning within the very inter-governmental nature of the organization lends itself to member states playing disparate roles, seeking differentiated interests and engaging in political manoeuvring and bloc formation. This chapter critically examines, the distinct roles played by member states at different times, explores the influence enjoyed and how such influence is manifested. The chapter further, investigates the foundations of such influence identifies the roles of key actors and their political positioning and suggests foreign policy benefits. The issue of bloc formation is examined along linguistic lines to eventually layout the effects of bloc formation for cohesion between member states. The chapter is divided into the following sub-sections:

- Historical Background of Ghana and Nigeria's Foreign Policies relating to peace and security in West Africa.
- Emergence of Ghana and Nigeria as Influential States in West Africa amid the Anglophone and Francophone divide
- Critical Reflection of ECOWAS' Norms, Values and Activities as expressions of Nigerian and Ghanaian Foreign and Security Policy Interests.

- Nigeria and Ghana's Influence in Promoting Peace and Security and Regional Security Sector Norms and Programmes in ECOWAS/West Africa
- Interplay between Nigeria and Ghana's Regional Interests and International Actors' Geo-Political Interests.

Foreign policy is defined here in the light of the desires sought by Ghana and Nigeria in their involvement in ECOWAS but also more generally as it is at times difficult to dissociate ECOWAS policies and the general foreign policies of both Nigeria and Cameroon.

Northedge (1985), defined Foreign Policy as “the use of political influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by the states concerned: it is an interaction between forces originating outside the country's borders and those working within them”. Willace (1991:9), states it as “the general orientation of one government towards other governments: building alliances and coalitions in pursuit of defined national interest and preferred models of international order”. Webber and Smith (2002), also defined foreign policy as “the goals sought, values set, decisions made and actions taken by states, and national governments acting on their behalf, in the context of external relations of national societies. More generally, foreign policy constitutes an attempt by countries to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies” (Webber and Smith, 2002). It is in this light that the chapter explores actions, influence processes and envisioned achievements of successive governments in Nigeria and Ghana in the evolution of the ECOWAS SSR and other peace mechanisms and norms that govern the sub-regional organization.

#### **4.1. Effects of disparate contribution and influence**

Considering the different role played by member states, it has been observed that certain decisions are the result of member state strategic positioning and therefore beneficial to members with more influence. Influence result of the role of member states which often differs significantly based on GDP size, economic stability and financial capability(Aworawo, 2010). A second foundation of disproportionate influence is the fact that member states do not make equal

financial contributions into ECOWAS budget. This inequality in financial commitment has implication for the level of influence enjoyed by each member state. Over the years, some member states, particularly Nigeria and Ghana, have played more dominant role in the development of the security architecture of ECOWAS (Bamali, 2007). Both countries have contributed significantly directly and indirectly in responding to crises as well as promoting security sector reform/governance policy initiatives and intervention projects (Adebajo, 2002a, Francis, 2006, Bamali, 2007, Obi, 2009, Aworawo, 2010, Aning and Bah, 2010).

Given the relatively stronger financial capability, military strength and political stability enjoyed by Ghana and Nigeria, these two countries have emerged as leading member states. What is interesting here (developed in more detail later) is that both of these countries are from the English-speaking (Anglophone) bloc. It is observable in many ECOWAS policy documents that Ghana and Nigeria have adopted a similar position and collaborated ever so closely in many instances to pursue and promote a common. While Nigeria has had disproportionate financial contribution into ECOWAS missions, Ghana is has been more influential in the development of norms and policies guiding ECOWAS actions and intervention in peace missions (Birikorang, 2007, Obi, 2009, Aworawo, 2010, Aning and Bah, 2010).

#### **4.1.1 Hegemony and patronage**

The political influence and leverages of Nigeria and Ghana have led to some scholars and commentators describing both countries rightly or wrongly as hegemon in ECOWAS. The most popular assumption has been that Nigeria is a 'hegemon' while Ghana is a 'supporting hegemon' (ref). Nevertheless, the perception of hegemony has been refuted (Omaamaka, 2020). For some analysts, both countries do not meet the criteria to be described as hegemon of West Africa. Scholars opposing the tag of hegemony draw on definitions of hegemon. For instance, Goldstein (1988) defined hegemon as a state or entity having the ability and capacity to "dictate or at least dominate the rules and arrangements by which international relations, political and economic are conducted." Going by this definition, scholars have argued that at some point in time Nigeria was a hegemon in West Africa. According to the neo-Gramscian

scholars, hegemony is defined “as a source of power” (Wang, 2003) from the constructionist point of view. Kennedy (1987) went further to state that:

“The power that wants to remain as hegemonic leader requires not just military capability and national will, but a vibrant and efficient economic base, ‘strong finances and healthy social fabric for it is upon such foundations that the country’s military strength rests in the long term’.”

(Francis, 2006) tends to concur with Kennedy on the grounds that geographic size, population, economic strength, military might, ideas and political will are measures for the definition and construction of hegemons. Francis (2006) described a hegemonic entity as:

“When a single great power of state develops a sufficient preponderance of material resources (i.e. military capability, economic and financial wealth, security, power etc.) so that it can dominate; this preponderant position gives the hegemon the ability to promote rules for the whole global /regional system, that protect the hegemons own interests.”

Francis advances that the size, population, military might, and oil wealth of Nigeria were critical in enabling the country “to play a preponderant role in the politics of Africa.”

Therefore, it stands to reason that Nigeria was at some point a regional hegemon, especially taking into consideration its contributions and involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone where the regional bloc undertook its first military intervention under ECOMOG for the maintenance of peace and security. Nevertheless, the aim of this chapter is not to delve into this academic debate to prove or disprove whether Nigeria and Ghana were or are hegemons in West Africa but to critically assess their role and contributions to the development of the norms, mechanisms and security architecture of ECOWAS. There is limited academic studies regarding the influence of leading member states in relation to the regional processes of peace and security of ECOWAS. It is important to understand the interplay between the influential states and the development of regional mechanisms and norms in peace and security. Research around the asymmetrical influence of member states is the subject of research question

(Aning and Edu-Afful, 2016) of this thesis and produced interesting findings as reported in chapter seven later. Although, there is limited empirical evidence to support suspicions of asymmetrical interests and – to some hegemony as discussed above, secondary analyses suggest some degree of issues and concerns as further elaborated below.

#### **4.1.2 Influence and inter country relationship**

Scholarship on ECOWAS shows that there is a transactional relationship between Ghana and Nigeria. This can be seen in the manner in which they leverage their influence in ECOWAS projects and proceedings. Beyond the Ghana-Nigeria network, this scholarship shows the existence of a linguistic divide and dispute between the Francophone and Anglophone countries in ECOWAS (Ampomah, 2019). Besides the Anglophone and Francophone bloc is the Portuguese-speaking (Lusophone) bloc as well. It seems therefore that at certain times, it is not the policies that matter in decision making. Rather, for certain peace and prevention initiatives, the colonial history of countries places a role in the political positioning of nations (Terwase et al., 2018). The Anglophone bloc comprise of five countries (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone), while the Francophone bloc is made up of 8 countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo). The two Lusophone countries (Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau) have much closer affinities with the Francophone bloc due to their proximity, historical and economic ties.

An understanding of the interactions between Ghana and Nigeria within ECOWAS to deal with the Francophone influential states to achieve their strategic objectives of shaping and influencing the actions and agenda in West Africa provides insights into the political dynamics and workings of the regional bloc. Developing an understanding of the roles and influence of the leading member states within ECOWAS enables a better appreciation of some of the limitations faced by the regional bloc in the design, ratification and implementation of SSR/G norms and mechanisms across member states.

Added to the above juxtapositioning are the effects of multilateral, bilateral relations and international accords signed by individual ECOWAS nations with countries like France, USA and UK, Portugal, China and so on. These extra-regional actors also impact upon the implementation of ECOWAS SSR/G. Nevertheless, much it has been argued that the degree of stability of the governments of Ghana and Nigeria has also impacted upon the manner and ways in which SSR regimes have been implemented.

#### **4.1.3 Stability in Ghana and Nigeria and ECOWAS SSR**

The foreign policy trajectories of Ghana and Nigeria has never been linear and consistent (Osaghae, 1998, Aning, 2004, Birikorang, 2007, Hill, 2012). It has taken various forms under civilian and military governments in response to domestic and international threats and opportunities. Political science literature suggest that the foreign policy of a country is shaped and influenced by the nature of its leadership and the prevailing circumstances at home and abroad (Boateng, 2019). This reality speaks to the case for the nature, stability, and consistency of the various governments of Ghana and Nigeria and how their governance at key periods of time has impacted on ECOWAS. Both countries have undertaken various forms of government including military, democratic and quasi-democratic governance. These changing forms of government has impacted upon the ability for ECOWAS to maximise its SSR action in the region.

#### **4.1.4 Military Diplomacy: Political development in Ghana and Nigeria**

Nigeria became an independent state in 1960 (Osaghae, 1998, Falola and Heaton, 2008, Hill, 2012), while Ghana gained independence in 1957 (Birikorang, 2007), making it the second country in West Africa after Liberia to become an independent state. Ghana became a republic on 1 July 1960 with Nkrumah abandoning his position as prime minister to become the first president (Birikorang, 2007). The situation was different in Nigeria where the country was divided along regional (north and south), ethnic (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) and religious (Muslim and Christian) lines (Diamond, 1988, Osaghae, 1998, Hill, 2012). When the country became a republic in October 1963, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was the prime minister at independence, retained his premiership, while Nnamdi Azikiwe, the then governor general,



became the first president of Nigeria (Diamond, 1988, Hill, 2012). However, Azikiwe's presidential role was largely ceremonial and meant to create a sense of unity as the country struggled to mend its regional, ethnic and religious fault lines (Osaghae, 1998, Agbese, 2003, Suberu, 2013). Balewa was a Hausa and Muslim from the north, while Azikiwe was an Igbo and Christian from the south-east (Agbese, 2003, Suberu, 2013).

Immediately after independence, Ghana's foreign policy thrust under President Kwame Nkrumah (1957-1966) was the pursuit of a Pan-Africanist political union of all newly independent African States. Ghana was among the vanguard countries fighting for decolonization and total liberation of Africa (Botwe-ASamoah, 2005). The ambitious pan-Africanist project of Nkrumah overrode any regional integration project like that of ECOWAS. As a result, Ghana under Nkrumah never considered the creation of a regional bloc as a viable project. For Nkrumah, the creation of ECOWAS would only help to undermine the creation of the 'United States of Africa' (Botwe-ASamoah, 2005).

On the contrary, Nigeria's foreign policy focus was to adopt a more gradualist approach with greater focus at national level to keep the country together (Soremekun, 2010, Dokubo, 2010). Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was more concerned about consolidating the newly independent state rather than pursuing a grandiose Pan-Africanist union sought by Nkrumah (Akinterinwa, 2007). Colonial historians have posited that unlike the more Pan-Africanist Nkrumah who wanted total independence and would make decision on his own, Balewa was very much pro-western. Writers go as far as claiming that Balewa often consulted with London on many international issues before taking decisions (Akinterinwa, 2001). Balewa's pro-western leaning as well as its non-alignment policy and membership of the Non-Aligned movement placed him at odds with Nkrumah. Balewa demonstrated a strong stance in favour of a looser African union. In the end, Nkrumah could not succeed in his vision of a political union but had to work with Balewa for the creation of the continental bloc, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1965.

Shortly after the birth of OAU, political events at home took a turn for the worse. The political arrangement to have Balewa as prime minister and Azikiwe as ceremonial president could not keep for long the ‘three-headed’ genie in the bottle (Akinterinwa, 2007). In January 1966, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, a Christian Igbo soldier, staged the first military coup overthrowing the government of Balewa (Diamond, 1988). A month later in Ghana, Nkrumah was also overthrown but not assassinated (Botwe-ASamoah, 2005).

The political development in both Ghana and Nigeria was anything but orderly. From independence to the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, Ghana has had six heads of state, with Nigeria having its third head of state. This period is described by Aning (2004) as the “endemic process of militarization.” Birikorang (2007) noted that “Ghana was a state at the brink of collapse, characterized by a legitimacy crisis, together with shrinking economic and institutional capacity. After, the creation of ECOWAS, Ghana experienced two short-lived civilian government and two military coups by Jerry Rawlings while Nigeria saw one short-lived civilian government and six more military takeovers. Multi-party democracy only returned to Ghana in 1993 and in 1999 for Nigeria. Table 4.1 below provides an illustration of the dramatic political changes experienced by both Nigeria and Ghana from independence to present.

**Table 4.1 Regime changes in Ghana and Nigeria**

<b>Ghana</b>		<b>Nigeria</b>	
<b>Period</b>	<b>Head of State/Type of Regime</b>	<b>Period</b>	<b>Head of State/Type of Regime</b>
1957-1966	Kwame Nkrumah / One-party democracy	1960-1966	Abubakar Tafawa Balewa / One-party democracy
1966 -1969	Joseph Arthur Ankrah / Military	Jan-July 1966	Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi / Military
1969-1970	Brigadier Akwasi Afrifa/ Military	1966-1975	Yakubu Gowon / Military

7 Aug-31 Aug 1970	Nii Amaa Ollenu / Military	1975-1976	General Murtala Mohammed / Military
1970-1972	William Akufo-Addo / Interim Civilian regime	1976-1979	Olusegun Obasanjo / Military
1972-1978	Ignatius Acheampong / Military	1979-1983	Alhaji Shehu Shagari / Democracy
1978 - 1979	Frederick William Kwasi-Akuffo /	1983-1985	Muhammad Buhari / Military
June-Sept 1979	Jerry Rawlings / Military	1985-1993	Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida /
1979-1981	Hilla Liman / Democracy	Aug-Nov 1993	Shonenkan / Interim Civilian regime
1981-1992	Jerry Rawlings / Military	1993-1998	Sani Abacha / Military
1993-2000	Jerry Rawlings / Democracy	1998-1999	Abdulsalami Abubakar / Military
2001-2007	John Kuffour / Democracy	1999-2007	Olusegun Obasanjo / Democracy
2007-2012	Atta Mills / Democracy	2007- 2010	Umaru Yar'Adua / Democracy
2012-2017	John Mahama/ Democracy	2010-2015	Goodluck Jonathan / Democracy
2017-	Nana Akufo-Addo/ Democracy	2015-	Muhammadu Buhari / Democracy

In looking at the political development of both countries, there are three political administrations of utmost significance in the creation and evolution of ECOWAS and its security agendas and architecture.

In Nigeria, these political administrations are:

- The Yakubu Gowon administration (July 1966 – July 1975)
- The Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida administration (1983 – June 1993)

- The Olusegun Obasanjo administration (May 1999 – May 2007)

Whereas in Ghana, the political administrations are:

- The Ignatius Kutu Acheampong administration (January 1972 to July 1978)
- The Jerry Rawlings administration (December 1981 – January 2001)
- The John Kufour administration (January 2001 – January 2009)

Each political period marked a significant turning point in the development of ECOWAS. Notable turning points include the birth of the 1975 Treaty that created ECOWAS, the first ECOWAS military intervention in Liberia in 1983, the 1993 Revised Treaty and the promotion of democracy and good governance in West Africa from 2000.

Between, 1970s and early 1990s, both Ghana and Nigeria had specific foreign policies in Africa. This policy was more than internal development through multilateral agreements with a range of countries. Ghana was more drawn towards the communist world while, Nigeria sought to consolidate relationships with Europe, USA, and the UK. This policy of openness to trade saw the attraction of Western foreign direct investment (FDI), bringing in companies like Volkswagen, Peugeot into Nigerian automobile and Julius Berger, Unilever and other western giants in a range of sectors.

The Gowon/Acheampong period gave birth to the 1975 Treaty leading to the creation of ECOWAS, the Babangida/Rawlings period was responsible for the first ECOWAS military intervention as well as the 1993 Revised Treaty, while the Obasanjo/Kufuor period marked the turning point for the promotion to democracy and good government in West Africa, ushering the 1999 Mechanisms and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol of Democracy and Good Governance and the ECPF among others.

#### **4.2 Democratic Transition in Nigeria and Ghana**

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1990s, the wind of change brought along a new wave of democratisation in Africa. This gave rise to domestic and international pressure for many countries to embrace multiparty democracy (Ake, 1996). Although there had been earlier attempts to institute democratic

rule in Africa from independence, this policy approach was soon to be hijacked by mono-parties and dictatorships. The first country in West Africa to embrace multiparty democracy was the Republic of Benin in the late 1980s. The new trend from the wind of change began in Ghana in January 1993. The then President, Jerry Rawlings transformed Ghana from a military dictatorship to multiparty democracy. The process continued with subsequent consolidation of democratic practice leading to four main elections in the course of which four presidents have been elected into office from 1995 to 2017. This change and consistency in the democratic process in Ghana was a significant step towards the promotion of the democratization process in West Africa(Ake, 1996).

In Nigeria, the democratization drive gained momentum following the death of the military dictator, Sani Abacha in 1998. Abacha was succeeded by Abdulsalami Abubakar, who eventually organised multiparty elections in 1999 and facilitated the peaceful transfer from military to democratic rule under President Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military leader. With the move to democratic rule, Nigeria's foreign policy orientation began to change from erstwhile internal economic interest driven to geo-political interest positioning (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Akinterinwa, 2007, Soremekun, 2010, Dokubo, 2010). This change is evident in Section 19 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. The stipulation envisages the promotion of economic development, integration and unity, peace and security in Africa and the world as the goal of Nigeria's foreign policy. What we see is the movement from a policy of FDI and economic stability to a policy of geo-political control, not just of the ECOWAS sub-region but of Africa as a whole. Analysts have argued that this move was necessary to protect Nigeria's interest in Africa as it seized the opportunity to take up leadership role in Africa and to counter western economic interest as neo-colonialism was taking route in many states (Shaw, 1982). Evidently, the emerging foreign and security policies in 1990s – 2000s led to a return to democracy. This transition is important in the sense that it meant that both Nigeria and Ghana became more supportive of democratic norms internationally and regionally. The transition also enabled greater involvement of both countries in SSR and other peace related initiatives in ECOWAS. For Nigeria, this was more across Africa than was the case for Ghana as further developed below.

### **4.3 Nigeria's power beyond ECOWAS**

This section examines the wider foreign and security policy of Nigeria in terms of its leadership role in driving and shaping the overall African agenda. This will enable a better understanding of the disproportionate level of influence enjoyed by Nigeria compared to Ghana and would further present reasons why some of decisions relative to SSR tend to hold more gravitas than those of other member states.

#### **4.3.1 Nigeria's leadership role in Africa**

Earlier, the foreign policy orientation of Ghana and Nigeria were examined. However, unlike Ghana, Nigeria has always sought an Africa-wide foreign and security policy. In the 1960s and 70s, Nigeria's power was more felt beyond the shores of West Africa. The extent of this influence was expressed in the proclamations of African leaders from the four geographic corners of the continent. For instance, in March 1977, the then President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe remarked: "Africa without Nigeria is hollow" (Akinterinwa, 2001). This was as a result of Nigeria's leadership role in supporting liberation movement as well as promoting peaceful resolution of conflict among African states. Nigeria was actively been involved in mediating tensions between Zaire and Angola following Zaire's accusation against Angola's "support of the invasion of its copper-rich Shaba province" (Akinterinwa, 2001). Nigeria was also involved in mediating "the Libyan-Chadian dispute over the Aousou strip".

Other notable policy interventions include engagement in the pursuit of Africa's liberation such as against Apartheid in South Africa and support of resistance movements in the still to be liberated territories in Africa such as Namibia. (Okon, 1998). In this respect, Obasanjo employed a more confrontational foreign policy drive consisting of open repudiation of discriminatory policies by western countries on Africa. For examples, the Obasanjo administration set up the Southern African Relief Fund (SARF) in December 1976, a special fund for liberation movements in Southern Africa. The SARF was Nigeria's contribution to the Non-Aligned Solidarity Fund. As quoted by Akinterinwa (2001), Obasanjo's defiant foreign policy style was prominent in his speech to the western powers saying that "Nigeria mounted survival lance on all those enterprises who depend on our raw materials and

markets but continue to help our enemies." When mentioning 'enemies', Obasanjo was alluding to western government doing business with South Africa during apartheid. South Africa was receiving uranium from France for its nuclear reactor, while British Petroleum and Shell were supplying fuel and the United States was overseeing the construction of a nuclear research centre in Penindaba (Akinterinwa, 2001). The Obasanjo administration established an intelligence unit to bar all foreign contractors with ties to South Africa. As a result, The Obasanjo administration "withdrew government account from the Barclays Bank and nationalized the British Petroleum particularly because of their South African operations" (Akinterinwa, 2001). In addition, the Obasanjo administration joined the rest of the world "to boycott the 1977 Olympic Games in Canada due to the participation of New Zealand in the games".

With the departure of Obasanjo, who ushered in a brief period of democracy under Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Nigeria's more energetic foreign policy took a break. This break was prolonged following the ousting of the Shagari administration by Muhammad Buhari, his first coming as a head of state of Nigeria (Akinterinwa, 2004, Soremekun, 2010). The Buhari administration was short-lived. During the short period, Buhari's priority was to build the local economy. Buhari closed Nigeria to the world, practically limiting the country's participation in foreign relations. Buhari "refused to accept the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund for development loans". However, although the subsequent heads of state of Nigeria were not as defiant, audacious, and forthcoming as Obasanjo, the gains of Nigeria's foreign policy at the time continues to offer its relative influence in SSR policy than other member states.

#### 4.3.2 Babangida years and ECOWAS

As articulated above, after the creation of ECOWAS, Nigeria's foreign policy briefly diverted away from West Africa to focus on wider Africa's interest (Akinterinwa, 2004). The foreign policy concerns of Nigeria shifted from Africa-wide focus to internal threats arising from contestations of power by non-state actors, thereby undermining political stability. Almost a decade after, Nigeria increased its influence in West Africa that led to the first peacekeeping mission

in the region in the early 1990s. This change in foreign policy focus was as a result of the coming to power of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida in 1985 (Akinrinade, 1992). Benefitting from a buoyant Nigerian economy out of booming petroleum sector in the mid-eighties, Babangida was able to project Nigeria's military and financial might in West Africa. The Babangida administration made Nigeria's foreign policy more influential by making bolder investment and intervening more forcefully to ECOWAS peace and security initiatives (Akinrinade, 1992, Ajulo, 1998). Under Babangida, it was the first time the Nigerian government had a well-articulated foreign policy. The new policy was a change from the confrontational posture of predecessor as discussed above to that of "openness to the world" Akinterinwa (2004). This more open policy was championed by Babangida's first Foreign Minister, Bolaji Akinyemi. The main principle undergirding Nigerian foreign policy (NFP) at this time is captured in what was referred to as "the doctrine of consultation". Under this principle, Nigeria's support or position could be made only after consultation with the government. Given his academic background as a professor in international relations, Akinyemi propounded "the concept of Concert of Medium Powers which later changed name to Lagos Forum". The Lagos Forum was the start of Babangida's projection of Nigeria's hard power and audacious interventions in ECOWAS missions with emphasis on West Africa. The firm determination with which Nigeria stood to dictate both African and ECOWAS policies is captured in Babangida's foreign policy speech in 1985 where he stated: "Africa's problems and their solution, should constitute the premise of Nigeria's foreign policy" Ajulo (2009 p.18).

Nigeria's conviction that it needed to lead African and ECOWAS foreign policy strategy continued Babangida's second foreign minister Gambari with the introduction of the concept of "the Concentric Circle Model for its foreign policy" (concentricism) (Akinrinade, 1992, Ajulo, 1998, Dokubo, 2010). Under Gambari, the Babangida administration also created the Voice of Nigeria (VON) in January 1990 as part of the foreign policy instrument of the Federal government. VON was meant to compete with international broadcasting corporation such as BBC and VOA to project Nigeria's soft power and present West Africa in good light and to step in as its leading contributors and through



that fend off western intervention. In order to achieve this the Babangida administration invested heavily into ECOWAS project. First was in the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was created to undertake the first military intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia.

With the arrival of Sani Abacha following the departure of Babangida in 1993, Nigeria's active military engagement in Liberia continued. The Abacha administration was isolated internationally due to his brutal rule and massive human rights violation (Okon, 1998, Osaghae, 1998) Nonetheless, Abacha continued the interventionist foreign policy of Babangida in Liberia and extended it into neighbouring Sierra Leone. The Abacha administration approved the intervention of ECOMOG led mainly by Nigerian forces into Sierra Leone (1997-2000) to restore Tejan Kabbah, the democratically elected president ousted by Johnny Paul Koroma (Adebajo, 2002b). It was ironically that a military regime in Nigeria could put Nigerian troops in harm's way to restore democracy in another West African country. It is very likely that Abacha was less concerned with restoring democracy. His strategy was to deflect attention away from his brutal regime at home and his ploy to prolong his stay in power by transforming himself from military to a civilian leader.

Nonetheless, "by 1999, it was estimated that Nigeria had committed over 13 billion US dollars to peacekeeping operations in West Africa" (Bamali, 2007). Although, Nigeria did not receive authorization under Article 53 of the UN Charter for its military intervention in Liberia, its actions received wide commendations from the international community. The Nigeria-led ECOMOG was able to end the war in Liberia in August 1997 with Charles Taylor elected as president and reinstate the democratically elected President Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone the following year. The military success of Nigeria in Liberia and Sierra Leone cemented its position as the most powerful state in West Africa (Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009).

#### 4.3.3 Anglophone-Francophone Influence

The evolution process of ECOWAS SSR and norms has been influenced by a multiplicity within and between country influence factors as well as external power influence from previous western colonial powers – particularly for

anglophone countries. This results to a more complex sets of interests and objectives at play at different times and occasions. Focusing on ECOWAS internal influence mechanisms, analysts have identifies the possible role of power struggle between the Anglophone bloc led by Ghana-Nigeria partnership discussed above and the Francophone bloc led by Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal (Bagayoko, 2010, Dumbuya, 2008, Sambo, 2020). It is contended that the Franco and Anglophone bloc formation might have been initiated by France to maintain influence over West Africa as it tried to circumvent the de-colonisation constraints of independence. For this reason, France has been keen to maintain a strong influence in the internal affairs of its former colonies (Koepf, 2012). Whilst Francophone countries sought to continue bilateral relations with France some of which root from colonial times, Anglophone countries were trying to cut free from their previous western colonial master Britain to form a truly African SSR and mechanism. It would seem that the Francophone countries trusted France for their security more than the emerging ECOWAS and therefore were at times reluctant to come forth with financial contribution and firm commitment (Sambo, 2020). This influence impacted upon the freedom of Francophone countries to quickly ratify ECOWAS treaties.

The above reluctance is contrarian to the approach taken by Anglophone countries. For instance, Ghana and Nigeria in particular, wanted newly independent African states and their former colonial masters to be separated to ensure full independence. Whereas, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal were comfortable in maintaining some financial and commercial links with France (Koepf, 2012). Similarly, Senegalese President Sedar Senghor and Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny were opposed to any radical plan to cut all ties with France (Bagayoko, 2010). However, the desire to continue to benefit from the financial and political influence of France was not a common strategy amongst Francophone countries. President Modibo Keita of Guinea for instance, sought a clean break away from France (Dumbuya, 2008). These different positioning complex strategies and influence factors impacted upon the rapid deployment of resources for peacekeeping missions as well as in the development of more congruent SSR policies.

#### 4.3.3.1 Continuation of bloc and external influence in the 1990s

Although, the tensions and positioning articulated above are associated to the 1980s mainly, same issues and tensions continued in the 1990s and as we see later might continue to date.

France's strong engagement with its former colonies was largely driven by its suspicious of Nigeria's regional ambition to project its power across West Africa. This led to increased French strategy to control and influence ECOWAS SSR projects. On the Nigerian sides, whilst regional integration was still proclaimed as a prime objective of Nigerian regional foreign policy, behind this was the agenda to stabilise and control its immediate external environment from the increasing encroachment of France and other Western powers (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004). Similarly (Adebajo, 2002a) argues that Nigeria's interest in the formation of ECOWAS was based on its leadership aspirations. Nevertheless, Ojo (1980) disputed this assumption by arguing that the interest behind the creation of ECOWAS was for no other reason than 'to provide an instrument to promote Nigeria's foreign policy in West Africa'. It was thought that through SSR mechanisms and norms, Nigeria would be able to defuse the political and economic influence of France in the entire sub-region. This affirms with the statement made by the former Nigeria External Affairs Minister, Professor Isaya Audu, cited in (Imobighe, 1987) that:

'It is in Nigeria's national interest to seek closer cooperation and greater participation in the affairs of our neighbouring states in order to ensure that these states are not turned into areas of activities that are likely to impair our national security.'

To ensure French presence in West Africa, it created the Commuaute Des Etat De L'afrique Occidental (CEAO)<sup>40</sup>. Whilst, it held for a while, a couple of West African French-speaking countries including Niger and Togo, avoiding continuous colonialism by France and aligned to Nigeria consolidation in the 1990s. France had to increase its pressure on Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal to expedite the creation of CEAO as it was at risk of collapsing and being supplanted by Nigeria's initiative to create ECOWAS. In the words of President

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<sup>40</sup>Translation in English: Community of West African States

Georges Pompidou in 1972 reported by *Jeune Afrique*, “the francophone states should coordinate their efforts in order to counterbalance the heavy weight of Nigeria” *cited* in (Bach, 1983).

Almost a year after Pompidou’s statement, the CEAO was founded by the Abidjan Treaty to replace the Custom Union of West African States (Union Douaniere des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest: UDEAO). UDEAO was born out of the pre-independence grouping, the Union Douaniere de l’Afrique Occidental (UDAO), set up by France in 1959. The purpose of UDAO was “to redistribute the customs duties which the coastal states collected on transit trade with the land-locked members”(Bach, 1983). The coastal states, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal were the main beneficiaries of UDEAO, thus had greater interest to maintain a custom union. Later, the CEAO was transformed to the present-day West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) otherwise known in its French appellation as Union Economic et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA). It is against these historical struggles particularly between France and Nigeria that ECOWAS gradually emerged to dominate peace and security organization in West Africa.

#### **4.3.3.2 Internal Power Dynamics**

While the Abidjan Treaty created CEAO, the Lagos Treaty created ECOWAS. These two institutions were the result of the struggles for influence and strategies for power in the region discussed above. Nigeria’s source of power is derived from its crude oil and petroleum which was plentiful, highly marketable in the 1990s contributing to high revenues for the Nigeran economy. Another factor considered in favour of Nigeria was also the size of its population. Also important is Nigeria’s location at the coast of the Atlantic immediately bordering Ghana, Togo and Benin Republic to the West and Niger to the North. Other factors were the level of industrialization and maturity as a nation and in dealing with political instability including the Biafran war. All these factors combined to enable Nigeria to prevail in enforcing its position in the creation of ECOWAS and the various policy agendas pursued by the bloc in the 1990s.

Nigeria decided to bear the lion's share of the financial cost to ensure the existence of ECOWAS. Nigeria had to sell fuel to its neighbouring countries including Benin, Niger and Togo at a subsidized rate to win over their support (Ojo, 1980). Nigeria sought the assistance of Togo to persuade other Francophone countries to buy in the creation of ECOWAS (Adejo, 2010, Aworawo, 2010). Togo's efforts in the creation of ECOWAS was further rewarded by making the Togolese president the first chairperson of the regional bloc. Further, the head office of the funds of the regional bloc was based in the Togolese capital, while the headquarters of ECOWAS was located in Nigeria's capital (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004).

After the creation of ECOWAS, Nigeria tried to promote the participation of all especially the Francophone countries. This was a strategy to sell the ECOWAS project as a collective aspiration of West African countries. Therefore, Nigeria endeavoured to ensure that more Francophone countries assume the chairmanship of ECOWAS than Anglophone countries (see table of list of ECOWAS chairperson as outlined in table 5.3 below).

Table 5.3: ECOWAS Chairmanship between Anglophone and Francophone Countries from 1977-2016

<b>No.</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Francophone States</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Anglophone States</b>
1	1977-1978	Gnassingbé Eyadéma (Togo)	1978-1979	Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria)
2	1979-1980	Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal)	1984-1985	Siaka Stevens (Sierra Leone)
3	1980-1981	Gnassingbé Eyadéma (Togo)	27 Aug 1985-1989	Muhammadu Buhari (Nigeria)
4	1981-1982	Mathieu Kérékou (Benin)	1989-1990	Ibrahim Babangida (Nigeria)

5	1982-1983	Ahmed Sékou Touré (Guinea)	1990-1991	Dawda Jawara (Gambia)
6	1983-1984	Lansana Conté (Guinea)	1991-1992	Dawda Jawara (Gambia)
7	1985-27 Aug 1985	Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso)	1994-27 Jul 1996	Jerry Rawlings (Ghana)
8	1992-1993	Abdou Diouf (Senegal)	27 Jul 1996-8 Jun 1998	Sani Abacha (Nigeria)
9	2001-2005	Mathieu Kérékou (Benin)	9 Jun 1998 – 1999	Abdulsalami Abubakar (Nigeria)
10	1999	Gnassingbé Eyadéma (Togo)	31 Jan 2003-19 Jan 2005	John Agyekum Kufuor (Ghana)
11	1999-21 Dec 2001	Alpha Oumar Konaré (Mali)	19 Feb 2008-18 Feb 2010	Umaru Yar'Adua (Nigeria)
12	21 Dec 2001-31 Jan 2003	Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal)	18 Feb 2010-16 Feb 2012	Goodluck Jonathan (Nigeria)
13	19 Jan 2005-19 Jan 2007	Mamadou Tandja (Niger)	28 Mar 2014-19 Mar 2015	John Dramani Mahama (Ghana)
14	19 Jan 2007-19 Dec 2008	Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso)	4 June 2016 - 2017	Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia)
15	17 Feb 2012-28 Mar 2014	Alassane Ouattara (Côte d'Ivoire)		
16	19 Mar 2015-04 Jun 2016	Macky Sall (Senegal)		
17	2017-	Faure Gnassingbe (Togo)		

Source: ECOWAS website

In spite of Nigeria's success in bringing the Francophone and Anglophone countries together under ECOWAS, the power tussle and mistrust remains an

issue to date (Dokubo, 2010). The occupation of the ECOWAS chairmanship reflected this power struggle and mistrust. In principle, the ECOWAS chairman position is meant to be occupied for a year on a rotating basis. However, from 1985 to 1998, the ECOWAS chairmanship was in the hands of Anglophone countries, dominated mainly by Nigeria. During this period – when Buhari assumed the ECOWAS chairmanship in 1985 to June 1998 when Abacha died in office, Francophone countries limited their participation in ECOWAS, heightening suspicion of Nigeria's hegemonic ambition (Okon, 1998).

General Buhari was the first to occupy the position for almost four consecutive years. His time as the ECOWAS chairman was when Nigeria curtailed significantly its active participation in seeking to improve bilateral relations with ECOWAS member states (Adejo, 2010). Regional cooperation was at its lowest ebb under Buhari whose military government's main focus was to promote Nigeria's local economy and industry through his indigenization policy agenda (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Akinterinwa, 2007).

The Francophone influential countries more often than not try to keep Nigeria in check, acting as a counter-weight (Bagayoko, 2010). Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal are keen to maintain the Francophone sub-regional bloc, UEMOA, which is largely to the advantages of the economies. Nigeria's ultimate objective is to see that ECOWAS is transformed into a viable custom and monetary union in the long term (Okon, 1998). The internal power dynamics between the Anglophone and Francophone bloc was in display at the time when Nigeria decided to drag along ECOWAS into ending the civil war in Liberia in 1990. All members of CEAO decided not to endorse Nigeria's decision to intervene militarily in Liberia. Only the Anglophone countries and Guinea (a Francophone outlier and not a member of CEAO) heeded the call of Nigeria (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Akinterinwa, 2007).

The division at the time was visible in the setting up of the May 1990 Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), which comprised only of Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The SMC was borne out of a consultative meeting held in the Gambian capital Banjul. By then, the Anglophone bloc was

occupying the chairmanship of ECOWAS. With the strong support of Ghana, Nigeria was able to convince the SMC to intervene in Liberia. The mandate of the SMC was to ensure the maintenance of peace and security not only in Liberia but across the region. In August 1990, the SMC approved the creation of ECOMOG in Liberia, enabling the regional bloc to launch its first ever peacekeeping mission. A key achievement of the SMC was to have brokered the first ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia signed by the three warring factions (Adebajo, 2002a, Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009).

#### **4.4 Interest of Nigeria and Ghana**

As has been articulated above at the foundations of ECOWAS formation and evolution processes, Nigeria and Ghana played different roles and sought different interests. In the first instance at independence, Ghana sought a United Africa while Nigeria sought stability, economic support from Britain alongside an interest to curb French incursion into West Africa. What is however common is that whilst Nigeria influenced the creation of ECOWAS both countries realised that in order to gain unity, they were not to allow their foreign policy to influence SSR proceedings.

This section critically analyses the influence and contributions of Nigerian and Ghanaian foreign and security policy on the creation of ECOWAS in 1975 right through to the Revised Treaty and its latest military intervention in Gambia following the December 2010 to later progression. The section brought out empirical analysis of the processes and political machinations behind the development of ECOWAS norms, standards, and policies in relation to the roles played by Ghana and Nigeria. The key question is to determine the extent to which ECOWAS regional conflict prevention and SSR norms and mechanisms depend on the geo-political and strategic interests of Ghana and Nigeria.

##### **4.4.1 Role of Nigeria's Foreign policy and key treaties and protocols**

The focus here is on the roles on member states and wider regional politics – particularly relating to Ghana and Nigeria. This should illuminate and explain how and why the norms discussed in chapter 3 were achieved. The first generation norms and mechanisms of ECOWAS include the 1975 Treaty, the Protocols on Non-Aggression (PNA), adopted on 22 April 1978, the Protocol on



Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD), adopted on 29 May 1981, the Declaration of Political Principles on 6 July 1991, and the Standing Mediation Committee that gave approval for the creation of ECOMOG resulting in the first ECOWAS military Intervention in a Member State. This development is an offshoot of a number of treaties undergirded by the objective of consolidating Nigerian foreign policy interests. One of such treaties is the Lagos treaty.

#### **4.4.2 The Lagos Treaty**

The Lagos treaty was one key instrument employed by Nigeria to introduce significant foreign policy ideas into ECOWAS. In order to achieve this goal, Nigeria single-handedly financed the initiative for the establishment of ECOWAS (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Adejo, 2010, Aworawo, 2010). In recognition of Nigeria's contribution and leadership role, the 28 May 1975, giving birth to ECOWAS was adopted in Lagos. The Nigerian foreign policy action to create a regional organization was broadly instigated by the ongoing interest to continue to limit the interest of France which had supported the Biafran secession and curtailed full commitment by some countries (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Adejo, 2010, Aworawo, 2010). The foreign policy thinking at this time was that if France was allowed to continue to grow its interest, Nigerian integration as a nation would be compromised (Adebajo, 2015, Obi, 2018, Ogunbadejo, 1976).

For the then President Gowon, the creation of ECOWAS, where Nigeria would help shape the agenda of the regional bloc, was a means to reduce France's influence in West Africa. The Lagos Treaty put forth four organs, which are the Authority of Heads of State and Government (Authority), the Executive Secretariat (changed into the present-day Commission in 1999), the Fund of the Community and the Tribunal of the Community to enforce the provisions of the Treaty and settle dispute between treaty parties. However, Article 4 of the Treaty provides for the creation of special bodies when the need arises in the future. The Nigerian foreign policy approach towards ECOWAS regional agenda has since the Lagos treaty been based on an Afrocentric foreign policy doctrine. The premise of its foreign policy is primary to support the cause of Africa's struggles after independence in the 1960s. Nigerian Afrocentric foreign

policy doctrine has been made effective at the regional level by its African neighbours because Nigeria sees the West African region as its natural territory (Omo-Ogbebor D.O., 2017). The Afrocentric foreign policy doctrine is the cardinal point of Nigerian foreign policy direction and some key aspects of these can be found in SSR policies such as those to do with state intervention (Akinbiyi, 2018).

#### **4.4.3 Protocol on Non-Agression (PNA)**

Another important foreign policy instrument utilised by Nigeria is the Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA) adopted in April 1978. Initially referred to as the “Protocol on non-recourse to force by Member States of the Community”, PNA immediately followed the Lagos Treaty at the Summit of Heads of State and Governments held in Lome in November in 1976.

When the PNA was adopted, Nigeria was under its fourth military ruler, while Ghana was under its fifth military ruler (Graf, 1988, Lewis, 1996, Hill, 2012, Birikorang, 2007). Thus, military rulers in West Africa at that time were keen to prevent external interference. With the PNA, proposed by Nigeria and endorsed by Ghana, it served as a reassurance for member states of ECOWAS, which was being transformed into a ‘club of military heads of state’. The PNA was adopted from 1976 to 1979. The centrepiece of Nigerian foreign and security policy (NFSP) through the implementation of PAN treaty in ECOWAS was part of a wider aspiration to achieve wider African ‘emancipation’, ‘development’, and ‘unity’ of Africans both within and outside of ECOWAS (Akintola, 2007, p.439).

#### **4.4.4 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD)**

A third instrument used by Nigeria and to a lesser extent Ghana to materialise their foreign and security policy is the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD). One of the driving motives for the adoption of PMAD in May 1981 was Nigeria’s desire to ensure ECOWAS has in place a defence agreement that could supersede any defence agreement member states have with a third party. Here we see in practical terms how the previous foreign policies discussed at the creation of ECOWAS came into force. For instance, PMAD was invoked for

ECOWAS military intervention in Liberia providing Nigeria with a golden opportunity to demonstrate its military and financial capability in a major ECOWAS conflict alongside Ghana.

#### **4.4.5 The July 1991 Declaration of Political Principles**

By the 1990, a key foreign and security policy agenda for both Nigeria and Ghana, was the pursuit of human rights and democracy. This policy redirection resulted to the Declaration of Political Principles in 1991. This treaty highlighted the intention by both governments to use ECOWAS as a platform to promote human rights, freedom of speech and democracy. However, it has been argued that this policy would have been forced upon Nigeria and Ghana by the prevailing wind of change that swept through Africa at the time. This was the period of international pressure for countries to embrace multiparty democracy (Ake, 1996, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). It is thought that ECOWAS heads of state gradually began to change from outward-looking concerns to internal threats arising from contestations of power by non-state actors. To this effect, the principles of democracy and good governance were considered as key policy attributes required to afford Nigeria the moral high ground to intervene in other less democratic nations (Adebajo, 2002a, Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009). It is on the basis of political principles that both Nigeria and Ghana set the pace for democratic practice in the two countries to date. This were the foundations of a second wave of norms and mechanisms in the more recent times as further discussed below.

#### **4.5 Norms, Mechanisms, and Instruments: 1993 Revised Treaty to ECPF**

The focus here is to examine the roles and interests of member states in achieving the norms reviewed in chapter 3 - particularly in relation to interests of Ghana and Nigeria as leading states. As explained in chapter three, the first generation norms and policies of ECOWAS were a reflection of the outward-looking concerns of the military leaders. The second generation set of instruments discussed here were triggered by the military intervention of ECOWAS led by Ghana and Nigeria in Liberia. This pivotal event brought about the 1993 Revised Treaty, the December 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, the

December 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the June 2006 Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and the January 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). Each of these norms are analysed in relation to interests of Ghana and Nigeria as 'leading states' on this issue.

#### **4.5.1 The Revised Treaty in 1993**

During the brief period of democratic rule under Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Nigeria's foreign policy activism took a break (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Adejo, 2010, Aworawo, 2010). This break was prolonged following the ousting of the Shagari administration by Muhammad Buhari, his first coming as a head of state of Nigeria. Although the Buhari administration was short-lived, his policy priority was to build the local economy. Buhari closed Nigeria to the world, practically limiting the country's participation in foreign relations. For instance, Buhari "refused to accept the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund for development loans"(Akinterinwa, 2001).

Nevertheless, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida's ascension to power in 1985 brought back Nigeria's active participation in the foreign policy sphere. The Babangida administration took Nigeria's foreign policy framework to a new territory. Under Babangida, it was the first time the Nigerian government had a well-articulated foreign policy philosophy and mechanism. Akinterinwa (2001) argued that Babangida "made consistent efforts to use foreign policy as an engine of growth. He changed the confrontational posture of his predecessor to that of openness to the world". Under Babangida's Nigerian foreign policy adopted a 'concentric' circle foreign policy model where. Under this policy, Nigeria grouped its policy interests into four circles representing: national integrity of the state; peace and security with neighbours; West African dominance and Africa as the last circle covering the international scene (Alli, 2006).

The Babangida regime with the support of Rawlings, dragged ECOWAS into Liberia's civil war (Adebajo, 2002a, Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009). The experience of ECOWAS in Liberia led to the birth of the Revised Treaty in

1993. Though the intervention was later acclaimed a success, there were many mistakes and excesses. Moreover, the Liberia intervention brought to the fore the glaring need for the regional bloc to have in place a comprehensive framework to promote peace and security in West Africa (Adebajo, 2002a, Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009).

Furthermore, after the Liberia saga, Rawlings' Ghana was ready to embrace multiparty democratic rule (Birikorang, 2007). It could be argued that as a newly democratically elected president of Ghana's fourth republic, Rawlings wanted to seize the leadership role from Nigeria in terms of promoting peace and security, democracy, and human rights in West Africa. Ghana together with other member states wanted to revise the 1975 Treaty to put in place better norms and more mechanisms to constrain Nigeria's military might and adventurism. With the backing of Nigeria, Ghana ensured that the 1993 Revised Treaty maintained the supremacy of ECOWAS over any sub-regional economic bloc particularly the Francophone UEMOA economic bloc.

Article 2 of the Revised Treaty stipulates that:

“the high contracting parties, by this Treaty, hereby re-affirm the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): and decide that it shall ultimately be the sole economic community in the region for the purpose of economic integration and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community”.

As a measure to constrain Nigeria's military might and aspirations, the Revised Treaty increased the number of institutions from only three in PMAD to nine: i) the Authority of Heads of State and Government; ii) the Council of Ministers; iii) c) the Community Parliament; iv) the Economic and Social Council; v) the Community Court of Justice; vi) the Executive Secretariat; vii) the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development; viii) Specialised Technical Commissions; and ix) Any other institutions that may be established by the Authority. With the Revised Treaty in place, it was clear that PMAD was no longer fit for purpose. This gave way to the December 1999 Protocol.

However, under the democratic government of Obasanjo, Nigerian foreign policy was to cut back on its largesse and engagements in regional military interventions. Obasanjo was categorical in his speech at the UN in 1999 that:

“For too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in Africa has been left almost entirely to a few states in the sub-region. Nigeria’s continued burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining Nigeria financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop” (Alli, 2006).

In spite of Obasanjo’s determination to cut back on Nigeria’s spending, he was supporting other ECOWAS member states. Nigeria’s vision 2020 maintains the primacy of the country’s leadership role in Africa and West Africa. At present, Nigeria serves as the headquarters to the ECOWAS brigade and the Nigerian Army 130<sup>th</sup> battalion in Calabar is the standby force for ECOWAS (Alli, 2006).

#### **4.5.2 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention: Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 1999**

Article 58 of the Revised Treaty of 1993 provided the framework for regional security. Paragraph 3 of the said Article stated that “the detailed provisions governing political cooperation, regional peace and stability shall be defined in the relevant Protocols. The December 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, known for short as the Mechanism, is meant to provide a comprehensive framework for regional peace and stability. As such, the advent of the Mechanism, replacing the two preceding protocols PNA and PMAD, marked a turning point in the approach of ECOWAS in addressing peace and security matters in West Africa. With the Mechanism, ECOWAS “sought to institutionalize norms and processes with structures that ensure consultation and collective management of sub-regional security concerns”(Aning et al., 2010). If the Nigeria-led ECOMOG intervention in Liberia gave birth to the Revised Treaty, ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone expedited the development of the Mechanism. ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone was staged under the administration of Sani Abacha whose regime was notorious for human right violations. Ghana refused to get involved in Sierra Leone and Rawlings had to distance his administration from Abacha.

For Abacha to demonstrate his willingness to subject Nigeria's military might under the control of the regional bloc, he held the fourth extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government in Lomé, in December 1997. The session gave directives for the establishment of a sub-regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, and security. Though the Abacha administration was successful in ending the war in Liberia in August 1997 and reinstated the democratically-elected President of Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone in 1998, the irony of promoting democracy abroad while denying it at home presented questions about Nigeria's moral high ground and legitimacy to lead security effort in West Africa. Adebajo (2004), stated that "no country that is confronted with a long period of political instability, stagnation and regression, and is reputed to be one of the most corrupt societies in the world, has a moral basis to lead others. If it tries to, it will be resisted". As proffered, Ghana together with other member states including Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire were all pushing for the elaboration of the Mechanism. With the death of Abacha in 1998, the Abdul Salami Abubakar administration lent its support to the process. Nigeria decided not to participate in the ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Guinea Bissau (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Adejo, 2010, Aworawo, 2010)

The development of the Mechanism was informed by the "lessons learned from successive peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, especially pertaining to the illegality and unilateralism of the mission" (Aning et al., 2010). The Mechanism calls for the establishment of institutions to prevent the occurrence of similar ad hoc structure such as the Standing Mediation Committee set up by Nigeria to enable its military intervention in Liberia. The Mechanism adds a new organ, which is the Mediation and Security Council. By the time, the Mechanism was adopted both Ghana and Nigeria had returned to multiparty democracy with Rawlings and Obasanjo elected into office democratically. This gave momentum to the agenda of ECOWAS to push for the promotion of democracy and prohibition of military rule. As a result, the Supplementary Protocol was established.

#### **4.5.3 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, December 2001**

Before the ushering of the Supplementary Protocol, visible political changes were taking place in West Africa with long-time opposition figures trying to unseat incumbent president (Ake, 1996, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). In Senegal, a country that has not experienced a successful military takeover, Abdoulaye Wade was able to unseat Abdou Diouf. In Ghana, Rawlings was completing his final and second four-year term in office. Rawlings handed over power peacefully to the opposition candidate, John Kufour. In Nigeria, Obasanjo had begun his first four-year term in office.

This was the period in West Africa where democratically elected presidents began to outnumber civilian leaders that had acceded to power through military coups. The coup plotters turned-civilian leaders included Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo, and Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia. Thus, the new civilian governments in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali were resolved to put an end to military government. Thus, the Supplementary Protocol had support from both Anglophone and Francophone divides.

Foremost in their minds of the new democratic leaders was to promote credible elections and end military regimes. Their thoughts were expressed in Section 1 of Constitutional Convergences Principles, which state among others: “Every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections” and “Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”(ECOWAS, 2001). With the promotion of democratic rule on top of the agenda of ECOWAS, member states turned their attention to transforming the Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa to a Convention Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

#### **4.5.4 Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), June 2006**

The campaign for the control of SALW in West Africa was largely an externally driven initiative. At the global level, there efforts to replace the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (COCOM), a Cold-war era structure for arms control. These international efforts led to the Wassenaar Arrangement



in July 1996 of which ECOWAS was a signatory. Like the COCOM agreement, the Wassenaar Arrangement was not legally binding.

During this period, it was clear that there was a need for an instrument or mechanism in West Africa to address the proliferation of SALW that was fuelling armed conflicts in ECOWAS member states. The United Nations held a conference on conflict prevention, disarmament, and development in Bamako in November 1996. The conference was organized following a recommendation by the 50<sup>th</sup> Sessions of the General Assembly for disarmament in West Africa. In 1998 under the chairmanship of Nigerian dictator, Sani Abacha, members state intensified their efforts to curb the flow of arms (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Aworawo, 2010). At the April 1998 Oslo Conference, ECOWAS member states declared their commitment towards a proposal to place a moratorium on light weapons in West Africa. Following the death of Abacha in June 1998, the new Nigerian leader, Abdul Salami Abubakar gave the project greater impetus. The Oslo conference was followed by meetings of Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Security and of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of member states held in Banjul June and in Abuja in October 1998. The outcome of the meetings was a proposal for a declaration of a moratorium, which was endorsed by ECOWAS heads of state in Abuja in October 1998.

The efforts to transform the declaration to a convention escalated under the democratic dispensation of Ghana and Nigeria. In December 1999 at the same time the Mechanism was being adopted, ECOWAS member states adopted a code of conduct for the implementation of the Moratorium. Under the leadership of Ghanaian president, John Kufour, who held the position of ECOWAS chairman from 2003 to 2005, the Moratorium was transformed into the June 2006 Convention.

#### **4.5.5 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)**

The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was signed in January 2008 by the then chairperson of the Mediation and Security Council, who was the minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation of Burkina Faso for and on behalf of Council. The framework is not a legal instrument, only a reference document to guide interventions by ECOWAS and its member states

in the prevention of conflict. According to Paragraph 5, Section II of the ECPF, “the purpose of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) is to serve as a reference for the ECOWAS system and Member States in their efforts to strengthen human security in the region” (ECOWAS, 2008). However, the ECPF is one of few documents that was not driven by member states but by a bottom-up approach with the great involvement of civil groups in West Africa. Nonetheless, the civilian individual that led the initiative of the ECPF was a Ghanaian employed by ECOWAS (Fieldnotes, 2014). The adoption of the ECPF was clearly meant to professionalise the processes and actions of member states in building the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS.

#### **4.5.6 Third Generation Norms, Mechanisms, and Instruments**

The start of the second decade of the new millennium could arguably be the departure point for the emergence of third generation instruments of ECOWAS to consolidate the gains in the promotion of peace and security and democratic rule as well as to deal with new and emerging threats. ECOWAS produced its 2010 strategic document, encapsulating its Vision 2020 to transform from an “ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of people”. This was meant to be achieved through the creation of a borderless region and a single custom and monetary union for citizens of member states to “live in dignity and peace under the rule of law and good governance” (ECOWAS, 2010). The Vision 2020 is far from being achieved as the regional bloc battles with the Francophone and Anglophone economic divide as well as ongoing security threats posed by terrorist groups. Nigeria remained resolve in playing a leading role in the next generation of ECOWAS norms, mechanisms, and other instruments. In August 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan stated in his opening statement of the National Conference on the Review of Nigerian Foreign Policy organized by the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC)

“In the era of globalization, at a time of grave challenges to national and international security such as we face from terrorism and transnational criminal networks, our commitment to regional and international peace and security must remain as strong as ever” (Alli, 2006).

Given the increasing threat of terrorism in member states, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al-Qaida in the Sahel, ECOWAS member states adopted the Political

Declaration and Common Position Against Terrorism in Yamoussoukro in February 2013. This instrument provides for an ECOWAS Counter Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan that lays emphasis on regional information exchange and legal cooperation in fighting terrorist activities. There are other sets of policy actions and instruments to promote peace and security in west Africa. These include the ECOWAS Humanitarian Policy and Plan of Action (2012), the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (2014) and implementing the African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap 2016-2020.

There were also calls for the harmonization of legal instruments for rule of law, democracy, and good governance. These calls were made in the Bamako Declaration on Impunity, Justice and Human Rights at a conference organised in 2011 to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. It has been argued that “The development of strong binding norms would help to serve as a check on the actions and activities of the bigger and stronger members that may be inclined to ignore pressure from members, thereby reducing the risk of the outbreak of conflicts in the sub-region”(Aning and Bah, 2010). With the support of international partners, ECOWAS is working towards updating a number of its policy documents and instruments including the ECOWAS Conventions on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1992) and Extradition (1994 and 2005) as well as the setting up of a regional Criminal Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (CIIB) to fight transnational crime(Fieldnotes, 2017). It was noted that the inadequate organisational mechanisms and legal frameworks across ECOWAS member states are undermining the fight against trafficking and transnational organised crime are regional level (Field notes, 2017).

Aboagye (1999) went further to question Nigeria’s claim of having spent between USD2-3 billion in the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. Aboagye claimed that “Ghana spent in excess of USD25 million on troop maintenance and operations, excluding the bills for equipment, the sea and airlift of contingents, and other diplomatic activities”. Beside Ghana’s financial resources, the country’s technical know-how and expertise in many technical areas including military and general security earned it a special place. Moreover, Ghana has accumulated experiences from its participation in UN

missions across the globe. These experiences places Ghana in high regard in West Africa.

#### 4.6 Ghana's Foreign and security policy

Above Nigeria's policies, the foreign policy influence was examined in extraction. However, it is safe to note that these actions are not mutually exclusive in certain instruments, rather treaties and mechanisms of both countries were either tied to the hip are tolerant to the other. At other times there were tensions between the two nations as explored later below. Here, the most visible aspect of Ghana's foreign policy interest is summarised. Overall, Ghana's foreign and security policy has been less visible compared to Nigeria, hence, there is much more literature around the role of Nigeria and relatively less research and writing on the role of Ghana and the policy instruments it pursued on its own as different from the partnership projects discussed above. It could be argued that the general premise of Ghana's external policy objectives includes – opposition to any military alliance, apartheid, arm race, establishment of foreign military bases on the territories of member states. Based on these key objectives, a key foreign policy aim has been to strengthen the United Nations, encouraging democratization, international relations, socioeconomic development and restructuring the international economic system. In all of these, Ghana has sought a foreign policy oriented towards achieving wider international cooperation with partners on an equal footing. A policy encapsulating this policy agenda is the policy and ideology of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Bluwey, 2003). Along with this wider foreign policy are other specific policies related to ECOWAS as further elucidated.

##### **4.6.1 Ghana's foreign policy influence and interests**

Since its political reforms in 1992, Ghana has established itself as an anchor in political dispensation on the African continent. Ghana always played a positive role in West African affairs. However, like Nigeria its foreign policy and policy implementation vis-à-vis ECOWAS interest has been less than consistent between the periods of 1992-2016 (Evans, 2007; Rodrigo, 2011; Herbert, 1996). In the sub-region, Ghana is seen by other countries as a leader by exhibiting its competencies and maturity in political change and good

governance, and its peacekeeping involvement in the sub-continent. While Ghana takes credit for these attributes; her response to regional issues has not always been as readily forthcoming as in others (Sanusi and Adu-Gyamfi, 2017).

In terms of promoting peace and security, Chapter 6 Article 40 of Ghana's Constitution states, "in its dealings with other nations, the Government shall (a) promote and protect the interests of Ghana; (b) seek the establishment of a just and equitable international economic order; (c) promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and settlement of international disputes by peaceful means (d) adhere to the principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of the UN Charter, the OAU Charter, the Commonwealth, the ECOWAS Treaty and any other organisations of which Ghana is a member" (Government of Ghana, 1995).

Though Ghana is not as naturally endowed in natural resources like Nigeria, it had the financial resource as well to leverage for political influence. It was noted that "Ghana sponsored its own contingent to Liberia and paid for the troops" during the first ECOMOG intervention in the country (Birikorang, 2007).

While involved in ECOWAS unity and peace, analysts argue that Ghana was involved in the internal politics of some member states. For instance, the Togolese government accused Ghana for supporting an armed attack on the military camp at Lome, which led to the killing of 12 Ghanaians, and the arrest of Ghanaian charge d'affaires (diplomat) in Togo in 1993 (McCakie, 2004) *cited in* (Sanusi and Gyamfi, 2017). This was followed by further accusations of involvement in the Togo crisis in 2005,

Niger crises in 1999, and the Cote d'Ivoire crises between in 2010-2011. These accusations have been met with cautious silence from the Ghanaian government which suggest some form of involvement.

Under President Rawlings (1992-2000), Ghana was opposed to meddling in other countries affairs. That was a departure of Dr. Nkrumah's Non-Aligned policy. His government believed in the principle on political freedom and social development without interfering in other country's affairs. In the case of the Cote d'Ivoire coup (1999) for instance, President Rawlings government condemned the act and suspended co operations with Cote d'Ivoire. But in the

case of the April 1999 coup in Niger, the Ghanaian government responded differently. Although they condemned the act, Rawlings did not establish any strong relations with Niger as he did with countries such as Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria (Nuamah, 2012) *cited in* (Sanusi and Gyamfi, 2017). This is a classic case of inconsistency in Ghana's foreign and security policy. However, Ghana became the leading mediating country for West Africa in the Ivorian peace process from 2003 when President Kufour became the chairperson of ECOWAS. After the first peace summit in France in January 2003 that brought about the Linas-Marcoussis agreement, the Ghanaian president held another round of peace talks with the belligerents (the Accra II) in March 2003. The Accra III peace talks in July 2004 was partly a display of Ghanaian leadership with Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General in attendance. It would seem therefore that Ghana's foreign and security policy became stronger when its officials occupied strategic position in ECOWAS and more or less more participatory and strategic in partnership with Nigeria at ordinary times (Kwesi, 2007).

In terms of ECOWAS intervention, critics have pointed to Ghana pursuing the benefits of participation rather than necessarily following any particular foreign policy. Ghana's involvement in international peacekeeping functions is sometimes also driven more by a desire to raise funds for its military than peace and security concerns. Birikorang for instance observed that Ghana has benefited from programmes such as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) from the United States, and the African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), from the United Kingdom Government (Birikorang, 2007). Volman (2003) argued that Ghana was more interested in the training assistance it gets from Western countries when it participates in regional conflicts. This is because after participating in a conflict, the law enforcement officers' lifestyles are enhanced and they attain a broader upscaling in aspects of professionalism including human rights, different peacekeeping methods, and the image of Ghana on the international (Volman, 2001) *cited in* (Sanusi and Gyamfi, 2017)

Another observable characteristic associated with Ghana's foreign policy in ECOWAS is what can be described as selected intervention and selective

neutrality. This neutrality was evident in 2010-2011, where the Ghanaian government chose to remain silent on the Cote d'Ivoire political crises even when many ECOWAS countries and international organizations such as the UN, AU had recognized the opposition leader Allassane Ouattara as the legitimate president of the country (Aning and Atuobi, 2011). This policy position by the then President Aiah Mills was considered as disappointment as analysts thought it betrayed the foundations of ECOWAS peace and security framework and previous engagements undertaken by Ghana (Sanusi and Gyamfi, 2017). The subsequent presidents have more or less operated an inconsistent and case by case intervention foreign policy. This inconsistency both by Nigeria and Ghana has been the source of often tensional and collaborative relationship between Nigeria and Ghana in ECOWAS SSR as further analysed in the next section.

#### **4.6.2 Tensions in the Ghana and Nigeria policy interest**

The Nigeria-Ghana partnership has never been all smooth. Nonetheless, the two countries have stuck together. In the early days, the relationship was one of a competition. The relations began to improve at the time when Ghana started looking for financial support from Nigeria following the country's dramatic economic decline in the late 70s and early 80s. At the time of Ghana's economic decline, Nigeria's economy was attracting migrant workers from other ECOWAS countries. Consequently, Ghana was experiencing brain drains into Nigeria. A series of military governments in both countries brought along different policies. The military government of Buhari expelled foreigners mainly Ghanaians as Nigeria's economy was starting to feel the effects of the fall in the price of oil. This political event had repercussion on the Ghana-Nigeria partnership in ECOWAS affairs. However, things would soon normalise as Ghana's economy improved.

Relations between Ghana and Nigeria improved following the commencement of the importation of crude oil from Nigeria (Birikorang, 2007). Though many military regimes tried to move closer to Nigeria, the bilateral relations between both countries greatly improved under the Rawlings – Babangida administrations. This improvement was brought about by Babangida's outward-looking foreign policy in contrast to that of his predecessor, Buhari.

Furthermore, Babangida was trying to divert attention from his unconstitutional government by playing the saviour of the Liberia's civil war (Ajulo, 1998, Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Bamali, 2007, Aworawo, 2010). However, Nigeria could not pursue its military adventurism into Liberia without the backing of Ghana. Moreover, Nigeria wanted to present its intervention in Liberia as a regional project so as to negate any accusation of Nigeria's hegemonic ambition (Adebajo, 2002a, Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009).

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CASE STUDY OF COTE D'IVOIRE AND MALI**

#### **5. Introduction**

The previous chapter examined the role and contribution of leading member states in the creation and evolution of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms through their foreign policy orientations as manifested in selected treaties on conflict prevention (CP), conflict resolution (CR), security sector reform (SSR) and military interventions. This chapter examines two case studies, to provide illumination to the extent to which and how ECOWAS norms were influential and effective in both shaping ECOWAS actions and influencing outcomes of intervention in the two countries.

The first case study examines ECOWAS engagement and responses to Cote d'Ivoire's political crises and emergencies. The first section focuses on the earlier period 2002 – 2008 – particularly as it concerns the influence of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms with a view to understanding how influential the relevant ECOWAS norms and mechanisms were as they existed by 2000 in the efforts to prevent and respond to the first phase of the Cote D'Ivoire conflict (2002 – 2007/8). The section further examines the onward development of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms post-2009, examining the extent to which ECOWAS engagement post 2012 reflected changes in ECOWAS approaches and the lesson learned by ECOWAS from pre-2008 period.

The second segment of the chapter presents an analysis of the second case study, ECOWAS engagement and responses to Mali's Tuareg rebellion



and Islamist insurgency from 2000 to 2013. The section identifies differences and draws similarities between the two cases with a view to having a better appreciation and understanding of the organisation's intervention evolving norms, mechanisms and SSR and other strategies. It also examines how influential the (revised and further developed) ECOWAS norms and mechanisms were in the earlier case in Cote D'Ivoire and subsequent intervention in Mali post-2012. The analysis profiles ECOWAS decision-making and implementation processes and the interrelationships between external country involvement and the impact of this in the independence, leverage and limitations of ECOWAS relative to influence between France and Francophone countries as examined in chapter four.

The chapter evaluates and questions the effectiveness of regional norms, policies and mechanisms of ECOWAS post-1999 in responding to the crises and emergencies in the case of Cote d'Ivoire and Mali. The rationale for looking closely at these two case studies is to provide critical understanding of ECOWAS engagement and the application of its norms, policies and mechanisms in responding to the crises within the framework of its SSR, norms, mechanisms and wider events and actions. The iteration and evolution process analysis enables the study to determine and outline necessary changes undertaken by ECOWAS, while highlighting some of the influencing factors that accounted for a classic case of misunderstanding and failure of military to act militarily in an internal conflict and a decision to intervene in defence of a member state against external influence and also to work collaboratively with an external player France – previously considered as a challenger as elucidated in chapter four above. The analysis relies on extant content analysis of written information from ECOWAS archives, press information and memos. Furthermore, information was gathered from memos explicating how institutional frameworks were implemented as noted by key actors. This knowledge is complemented by empirical findings from fieldwork conducted in Nigeria and Ghana with ECOWAS experts as presented in chapter seven.

The decision to focus on these two cases is informed by studies in international relations and peace studies in Africa identifying the two cases of Cote D'Ivoire and Mali as the most difficult ECOWAS interventions in terms of

the success and failure. Thus, these two cases stand out as distinct events to probe the efficacy and individual country foreign policy influence explored in the previous chapter, ECOWAS sovereignty and the effectiveness of SSR, norms and mechanisms in achieving peace and stability in West Africa. A growing body of literature see e.g., Sanusi and Gyamfi (2017) further suggests that in peace and development studies in Africa, the two cases of Mali and Cote D'Ivoire have had the most significant influence in the development of ECOWAS norms, policies, mechanisms and SSR policies post-2012. For these reasons, these two cases stand out as ideal cases to provide deeper illumination into ECOWAS systems and mechanisms more generally. Each of these two cases are examined in detail, starting with the case for Cote d'Ivoire in part one which follows.

### **5.1 Analytical framework**

Several models or frameworks have been proposed to examine conflict and early warning and early response processes. For both cases, the Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response (CAPAR) manual was adopted and developed by forum for early warning and response group (FEWER, 1999) was adopted as the analytical framework. Although several other models have been advanced and used in conflict case study analysis, the CAPAR model is recognised as the foundation of many subsequent models in conflict analysis (Wulf and Debiel, 2009). The CAPAR manual draws on theoretical developments in the field of conflict early warning and FEWER's operational experiences from its Caucasus and African Great Lakes conflict warning and response programmes. Given the multiple layers and process iteration characteristic of both cases under study, with the intervention of several actors and personalities at different times, the CAPAR framework was considered as the most appropriate tool to enable a better analysis of the build-up to both conflicts, while identifying opportunities missed before, during and after the conflict. It also offers, a better chance of identifying approaches to conflict prevention, peace building and intervention strategies deployed. Further, by virtue of the dynamic nature of the framework, it was slightly adapted to fit the context.

The CAPAR framework suggests five main conflict indicators for conflict analysis notably: trends and scenarios, strategies and opportunities for peace; balanced situational analysis, based on the interaction of the different conflict and peace factors and translating these conclusions into response options and action strategies for local, regional and international actors. The framework proposes analysis in three parts as illustrated in table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1 CAPAR framework

Part one
Step 1: Understanding the Context
Step 2: Identifying Conflict Indicators
Step 3: Identifying and Assessing the impact of existing Peace Initiatives
Part two
Step 1: Identifying key actors and Stakeholders and their Visions of Peace
Step 2: Exploring the Paths to Peace
Step 3: Identifying the Tools and Opportunities for Peace
Part 3
Step 1. Developing Response Options and Time-based Strategies
Step 2. Prioritising & Phasing Actions for Response
Step 3. Towards Viable and Sustainable Responses

For this analysis, the three parts were modified and limited to the part one only. Aspects of the analysis in part two and three and the associated steps were embedded in the three steps in part one. By converging the other parts into one, it was possible to present a composite analysis of both cases for ease of understanding.

#### 5.1.1 Cote d'Ivoire's Political Crises and Conflicts (2000-2008) **until his arrest in April 2011.**

##### *Step one: Understanding the context*

The case of the conflict in Cote D'Ivoire can be analysed on the one hand around the endogenous and exogenous factors that hitherto ensured the political stability of Cote d'Ivoire during the era of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, and on the other hand, Henri Konan-Bedie, Houphouet-Boigny's successor and the subsequent Presidents - Laurent Gbabo (2000-April 2011),

succeeded by President Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO) in 2010. The period of the Ivorian conflicts is divided into five major phases, namely: i) emergence of identity politics to first military government ii) outbreak of the first civil war to its resolution, iii) the interregnum iv) the outbreak of the second civil war to its resolution and v) post-conflict reconstruction.

The earlier phases of the Ivorian conflicts 2000 – 2010 can best be understood through a better understanding from the historical context by exploring underlying tension in the evolving demographics in Cote D'Ivoire. Cote d'Ivoire is a relatively large West African country with a population of about 21,500,000 as of November 2010, and bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, Ghana and Liberia (Oche', 2011). About a quarter of people living in Cote d'Ivoire are foreigners from several neighbouring countries, including Nigeria and with a sizable population of Lebanese and French citizens (Alli, 2006). It became a French colony in 1893 and was registered as one of the constituent units of the Federation of French West Africa between 1904 and 1958. This was the period when France's policy in West Africa was mainly reflected in the philosophy of 'association' which meant that all Ivoirians were officially French subjects (Alli, 2006). Between 1946 and 1959, French policy constituted units of French West Africa with representatives in the French national Assembly in Paris. Under the France Overseas Reform Act (Loi Cadre) 1956, powers from Paris were decentralised to the elected territorial governments in West Africa (Alli, 2006). Cote d'Ivoire benefited from this reform and became an autonomous Republic in December 1958 within the French community (Bagayoko, 2010, Zounmenou and Loua, 2011). The independence of formerly French territories overseas (La France D'outre Mer) provided country status to all members of old Federation of French West Africa except Guinea, which had voted against association (First, 1993).

After independence, there was relative stability and a period of relative peace in Cote D'Ivoire. Cote d'Ivoire gained Independence from France on the 7th of August 1960 under the leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny who ruled until his death in December 1993. Houphouet-Boigny's demonstration of capability in his various previous roles won him the confidence to be voted as the first elected president of Cote d'Ivoire. His primary focus was to consolidate

the relative peace and stability in Cote d'Ivoire. Between 1960 and 1978, Cote d'Ivoire enjoyed an economic boom after independence under its first president, becoming the fastest-growing economy in Africa (Alli, 2006). This economic success attracted a large wave of migrant workers from many countries across West Africa, in particular Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo resulting to a crisis of nationality – the root cause of subsequent conflict post-Houphouet-Boigny (Cutolo, 2010). However, the period of relative calm and peace after independence under the Presidency of Houphouet-Boigny was short-lived. Cote D'Ivoire went on to experience instability with successive presidents starting with Henri Konan Bedie who succeeded Boigny to the outbreak of conflict following the 2010 presidential election. This created a political stalemate, leading to a fresh outbreak of violence (Ayangafac, 2007, Bah, 2010).

The outbreak of the first civil war in Cote d'Ivoire started in September 2002. Suspected human rights abuses and mass graves discovered at Yopougon led to agitations and explosion of frustrations among the Movement Patriotique du Cote d'Ivoire (MPCI). In response, MPCI launched an unsuccessful coup d'état against Gbagbo government, which resulted in a full-scale rebellion with simultaneous attacks on the cities of Abidjan, Bouake and Korhogo (Bah, 2010, Bagayoko, 2010, Bryden and N'Diaye, 2011).

By the end of September 2002, Cote d'Ivoire was split into two with the rebel forces in support of the challenger Ouatarra taking control of the northern part of the country and the main town Bouake, Korhogo and Man, while the southern part remained under the Gbagbo government control, including Daloa, both the economic and political capital Abidjan and Yamoussoukro respectively (Chelpiden Hamer, 2010, Bah, 2010, Bagayoko, 2010, Bryden and N'Diaye, 2011).

Bah (2010) argued that Gbagbo's stance not to vacate the presidency was premised on a suspicion of 'neo-colonial agenda' and this could partly explain why the international community-led mediation process was not effective. Gberie and Addo (2004) argued that France was according legitimacy to rebel factions. The context of the conflict was one enmeshed in suspicion with the French claim of neutrality questioned by its overt support of the challenger

Outarra(Koepf, 2012). Hence, Laurent Gbagbo did not accept France as a conflict broker. Bah (2010) argued that the peace agreement engineered by the international community failed to end the conflict largely because they relied heavily on traditional peace formulas and paid insufficient attention to the underlying issue of citizenship. The protracted conflict eventually concentrated the efforts of multiple actors including ECOWAS, AU, UN and France. It is in this context that ECOWAS was involved in deploying its SSR, EWS and other mechanisms and norms for peace and security in Cote D'Ivoire.

## **PART ONE**

### **CASE STUDY ONE**

#### **5.2. Context of ECOWAS interventions in Cote d'Ivoire 2002 – 2008**

Against the above context, ECOWAS intervened overtly and covertly at the various stages of conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire between 2000-2010, applying the various norms and mechanisms relating to early warning system, crisis response, peace-making, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, mediation, SSR and post-conflict recovery at its disposal or subsequently created for this purpose. Accordingly, various modes of intervention were considered as detailed in chapter three. ECOWAS was engaged in the conflict in each of five major phases namely: i) First military takeover arising from ethnic politics and succession struggle, ii) Outbreak of the first civil, iii) Interregnum, iv) Outbreak of the second civil war, and v) Post-conflict reconstruction. The ensuing analyses examines detail actions characterising intervention strategy at various times, opportunities and phases.

*Step two: Identifying Conflict Indicators*

##### **5. 2.1 Deployment of ECOWAS conflict prevention 2000 - 2008**

Prior to the first military takeover in Cote d'Ivoire in 2000, ECOWAS normative frameworks by then were limited to the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA), the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence, the 1990 Standard Mediation Committee (that created ECOMOG), the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles, the 1993 Revised Treaty and the 1998 Declaration on a Moratorium on Import, Export and Manufacturing of Light Weapons. ECOWAS had just

negotiated and adopted the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security that sets out the framework for the development of ECOWAS elaborate conflict prevention norms and mechanism including its Early Warning System and ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) (ECOWAS, 2008). Although it has been argued that these SSR systems were limited at the time – drawing on the case for the civil war in Liberia (1989 – 1996) (Aning, 1999) the available instruments were deployed and served to identify early conflict indicators in Cote D'Ivoire.

At the early stage of the Ivorian conflict for instance, ECOWAS Secretariat had not yet transformed into a Commission with the restructuring of its institutions. Nonetheless as Aning and Edu-Afful (2016) have argued, the normative and institutional frameworks were effectively deployed at the early stage of the Ivorian conflict and after the military takeover as further analysed.

### **5.2.2 Application of ECOWAS Early Warning System**

The peace and security architecture of ECOWAS was underdeveloped at the early stage of the Ivorian conflict in 2002. The ECOWAS Early Warning System (EWS), otherwise referred to as “The System” was to be developed as a sub-regional peace and security observation system as provided by Article 58 of the Revised Treaty. The EWS was to serve the purpose of conflict prevention with the creation of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the headquarters of ECOWAS, and OMC sub-centres across West Africa (Wulf and Debiel, 2009). Nonetheless, ECOWAS was able to pick up signs of conflict in Cote D'Ivoire. A key limitation observed during this time however is that rather than being proactive, ECOWAS was reluctant to share information, explore instruments for application and take immediate actions for conflict prevention. In this respect, (Alli, 2006) argued that the Côte d'Ivoire conflict which erupted in 2002 was the first major test for the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted by ECOWAS in 1999 providing an ideal scenario to deploy these mechanisms.

However, despite obvious early warning signs identified by EWS-ECOWAS, intervention and decision making suffered from significant delay.

Hence, EWS whilst not completely missed, the instruments for intervention were ineffectively deployed, leading to the degeneration of the conflict years later (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2016). In this case, ECOWAS failed to make use of the invaluable hands-on experiences it had gained through its interventions in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Thus, scholars have concluded that although ECOWAS was in a position to identify the early warning signs and risks from the political and sectorial disputes in Cote d'Ivoire, it failed to intervene before the political situation degenerated into a protracted instability and intermittent eruption of violent conflict (Ampomah, 2019, Boateng, 2019) for instance, observed that with the unstable nature of security in Ivory Coast prior to the elections and especially due to the unwillingness of the warring factions towards disarming, ECOWAS should have anticipated the possibility of recurrence of violence in the country.

Another area of SSR policy and EWS implementation and decision making identified in extant literature as failure in the case of Cote D'Ivoire is the non-application of the 1991 Declaration of Political Principles. This 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance was meant to promote democracy in the sub-region. It is based on political pluralism and respect for fundamental human rights as embodied in universally recognised international instruments on human rights as inscribed within the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Moreover, ECOWAS could have called on the Algiers Declaration of July 1999 of the AU. Both of these protocols were not deployed. Instead of applying this existing relevant protocol, ECOWAS heads of government erred in favour of caution, relying on the Protocol relating to Non-Aggression (PNA), adopted in April 1978, which enjoined Member States of ECOWAS to "refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression" against each other. Critiques have argued that rather than be cautious, ECOWAS could have used the May 1981 Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) ensuring collective defence treaty in the conflict in Cote D'Ivoire.

A credible explanation of the above hesitation has been suggested evidence of confusion and absence of synchrony between the role of the intervention of Ivorian internal systems and external forces for peace including



ECOWAS, the AU and the UN. Ansorg (2017) stated: “despite recurrent criticism, SSR practices of international organisations and bilateral donors often remain focused on state institutions, and often do not sufficiently attend to alternative providers of security or existing normative frameworks of security”. Considering that the conflict was internal between two protagonists in the same country, ECOWAS member states were unable to find an agreement to activate the PMAD. This is mainly because ECOWAS was unwilling to rush to judgement as was the case in the previous experiences in the Liberian conflict in 1989 discussed in chapter four above. The political nature of the conflict was also a constraining factor for ECOWAS to act in a timely manner in the conflict (Bryden and N'Diaye, 2011, Bryden et al., 2005). Nonetheless, In the aftermath of conflict, Security Sector Reform (SSR) continues to be widely regarded by policy makers and practitioners as one of the most vital tasks in the peacebuilding endeavour (Jackson and Bakrania, 2018a, Sedra, 2018, Sedra, 2010b, UN, 2014, UN, 2013, UN, 2008).

### 5.2.3 Conflict indicators in the first civil war in 2002 and ECOWAS response

As already provided when analysing the context of the Ivorian conflict in section 5.2.1 and 2 above, the conflict developed in several stages. In the first civil conflict between President Laurent Gbagbo and challenger Allasane Ouatarra ECOWAS responded by immediately convening emergency meeting of the Heads of State and government. The meeting activated the provision of the Protocol Relating to Mechanisms, set up a High Level Contact Group (HLCG) and established contact with the rebels in a bid to restore normalcy (Alli, 2006). At this stage of the conflict, the division of the country into two administrative regions was a clear indicator of conflict picked up by ECOWAS, leading to the immediately triggering of Article 25 of the Mechanism of ECOWAS to intervene (ECOWAS, 2010). A second conflict indicator was the fact that both the challenger Ouatarra and the government of Cote d'Ivoire under President Gbagbo recruited mercenaries from Burkina Faso and Liberia. It has been argued that having recruited mercenaries from other member states the belligerent forces and actors made it difficult for ECOWAS to intervene in conflict (Kirwin, 2006).

Even so, it is argued that given that the PMAD provides for collective response where a member state becomes a victim of internal armed conflict that is engineered and supported actively by external actors. Hence, Obi (2011) argued that ECOWAS had the legal grounds to intervene militarily to assert peace and security given the presence of external forces in Cote D'Ivoire. However, it is worth recognising that ECOWAS was faced with multiple events. First, the other regional and international bodies such as the AU, UN and France made it a challenge to intervene. Second, apart from foreign mercenaries, the case of French forces already positioned in Cote D'Ivoire and ready to intervene on the side of Ouatarra. Third, there was division amongst African countries and dispersed political positioning by their leaders. Contention was evident in the January 2011 AU summit held in Addis Ababa. Tension mounted between the West African countries constituted of Nigeria, Senegal and Burkina Faso and the Southern African side headed by South Africa and Angola.

Yabi (2012) observed that whilst Nigeria maintained that Gbagbo had lost the election, South Africa was more favourable towards Gbagbo. This difference meant that the AU's proposal for power-sharing between the candidates was far from a consensus and was therefore not implemented (Ramis, 2011). These factors meant that ECOWAS was unable to deploy the protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security which was adopted in 1999. Analyst content that the deployment of this instrument could have at the very least (Chelpi-den Hamer, 2010, Bah, 2010, Bagayoko, 2010, Bryden and N'Diaye, 2011). In the absence of consensus and much larger high-level committee of governments (HLCCG) grouping was constituted. The HLCCG comprised of five Heads of State and Government of Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Togo and representatives from the AU and UN as well as other development partners including France, United States, United Kingdom and Russia. The head of the HLCCG, President Eyadema of Togo was charged with the responsibility of coordinating the day to day management of the efforts to establish contact with insurgents and try to achieve ceasefire and restore normalcy to the occupied cities and towns and negotiate a general framework

for the resolution of the crisis. At this stage of the conflict ECOWAS legitimacy, sovereignty and leading role was curtailed.

In the light of this, the HLCG abandoned the mission and returned to Abidjan, and later consulted the then ECOWAS chairman, President Abdoulaye Wade, who after further consultation with president Gbagbo through the Senegalese Foreign Minister was able to achieve an acceptance in principle, of an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. With the help of France, ECOWAS finally succeeded in obtaining a ceasefire accord, signed by representatives of the government and the rebels on the 17 October 2002 (Fawole, 2004, Gberie and Addo, 2004). The ceasefire was violated severally to signal the inevitable civil war that ensued. The third conflict indicator was confusion, disagreement between belligerents and multiple intervention by forces beyond ECOWAS. The inability of ECOWAS to successfully resolve the Cote D' Ivoire crisis demonstrates key limitations of its capacity to emerge as the peace guarantor in West Africa. Similarly, the inapplicability of its numerous SSR and EWS mechanisms poses significant question to the robustness of these instruments for conflict prevention and resolution. It is further argued that the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity, comparative cost advantage as well as bureaucracy and the requirement of AU and the UN approval respectively has in the most cases delayed the timely ECOWAS response and intervention in conflicts (Odigie, 2017, Von Staden, 2016, Bappah, 2018).

#### **5.2.4 Indicators relative to Military Intervention**

ECOWAS intervened following an outbreak of violence after the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement on 26 January 2003 to impose a temporary ceasefire. To monitor the ceasefire and enforce the fragile peace, ECOWAS called for the deployment of an inter-positional force. The Mediation and Security Council approved the Defence and Security Commission's proposal to deploy Peacekeeping Force to safeguard the ceasefire agreement in Cote d'Ivoire (Fawole, 2004, Gberie and Addo, 2004). The mandate of the ECOWAS Force was broad and overly ambitious including not only to separate the two contending forces from direct combat, but to also ensure a host of activities such as return of normal and public administration services, free movement of

goods and services, and the safety of civilians, observers and humanitarian staff (Fawole, 2004, Gberie and Addo, 2004, Alli, 2006). Even with this intervention, the conflict continued unabated.

The reasons for this have been articulated – one of which was French presence in Cote D'Ivoire. France had intervened to stop the civil war with its forces stationed in the country since its independence in 1960 protecting the approximately 20,000 French nationals living in Cote d'Ivoire (Bovcon, 2009, Koepf, 2012). France launched a large-scale Operation known as: Licorne to create a 'confidence zone' between the North and the southern parts of the country and to monitor the ceasefire agreement brokered by ECOWAS in October 2002 (Bovcon, 2009, Koepf, 2012). During this time, ECOWAS was rather busy engaging in high level policy discussions and debates on how to intervene immediately the crisis started while France was already on the ground taking the lead. It has been argued that at this stage, ECOWAS abdicated its SSR and EWS responsibilities and ceded its field of operation to a major foreign colonial master France. This was another indicator that conflict was bound to arise as ECOWAS military could not play any major role. Fawole (2004) argued that the outbreak of the civil war may have provided the surest indication of either the failure of ECOWAS organisation to perceive that the country was sitting atop a keg of gunpowder, or a collective unwillingness to sanction a sitting president. This argument places the functionality of ECOWAS early warning and response system in question. The military cold feet demonstrated by ECOWAS exposes fundamental malfunction of SSR regimes' capacity to monitor, discern, and act decisively (Andersen, 2011, Jackson and Bakrania, 2018a). The conclusion one can make here is that ECOWAS capabilities were sound, able and the military competent enough to diffuse the tension. However, failure was evident at the implementation level.

#### **5.2.5 Indicators relative to the roles of AU, UN and ECOWAS institutions.**

Despite all challenges faced by ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire and its subsequent absorption into the Multinational force of United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire on April 2004, the Commander of ECOMICI, General Faal claimed that the mission recorded great success. This assessment is based on

the ability of ECOWAS to establish a ceasefire line along the zone of confidence pushing further away the spectre of direct confrontation, the restoration of dialogue between the belligerents which allowed for the release of war prisoners and the development of joint DDR. This effort open Cote D'Ivoire up for trade by creating humanitarian corridors and in expanding the operations of impartial forces throughout the territory. Through these efforts, ECOWAS restored confidence, assisting and regrouping combatants for the provision of food and free medical assistance to the population (Fawole, 2004, Gberie and Addo, 2004, Alli, 2006).

However, this is a rather general self-appraisal considering that this was no longer an ECOWAS project as such. The intervention of the AU, UN and French forces made it difficult to establish clear indicators regarding the actual role of ECOWAS in the conflict. Nonetheless, the above range of evidence distilled in step two of the analysis, has identified the main thematic questions regarding the significance, roles and relative importance of ECOWAS norms, institutions, capabilities and mechanisms as well as the interposing influence of AU, France and UN. The next step examines the

Step three: Identifying and Assessing the impact of existing Peace Initiatives

### 5.3 Assessment of ECOWAS Peace Initiatives and AU, UN Intervention

When identifying and assessing the impact of existing peace initiative relative to the conflict in Cote D'Ivoire, the inevitable problem that arises from the analysis is the question of ECOWAS sovereignty and right to act. A case in point in point challenging ECOWAS claim of territorial jurisdiction and thus, legitimate *locus standi* to act in West Africa is the signing of the Linas-Marcousis agreement. In spite of the Cote D'Ivoire conflict supposedly located under ECOWAS mandate, the Linas-Marcousis agreement is the first of a series of agreements signed between the warring parties and Gbagbo's government. The Linas-Marcousis agreement was signed in France on 15-26 January 2003, brokered by the French Government with little contribution from ECOWAS. In a bid to back the Linas-Marcousis agreement, the UN Secretary General appointed Albert Tevoedjre as the Special representative to lead the UN Monitoring Committee to supervise the implementation of the Accord.

Zounmenou and Loua (2011) argued that the 2003 France's initiated Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the UN involvement may have blocked ECOWAS and the implementation of existing ECOWAS peace treaties.

#### 5.3.1 Peace Process: Accra Agreements (2003)

The search for a further solution to resolve the crisis ECOWAS into the Accra II agreement was headed by then Ghanaian president John Kufor and made some progress in ECOWAS's conflict prevention initiatives. In March 2003, the ECOWAS Contact Group on Cote d'Ivoire brokered the Accra II Agreement at Lome to achieve a ceasefire agreement (Fawole, 2004, Gberie and Addo, 2004, Alli, 2006, Bah, 2010). ECOWAS Accra II agreement seems to have been more significant than the initial France's Linas-Marcousis agreement discussed above. This shows that had ECOWAS persisted in enforcing its legitimacy and in implementing its EWS, SSR mechanisms the gravity of the conflict might have been mitigated (Jackson, 2019). The fact that the Accra II agreement was able to maintain peace a week longer than the Linas-Marcousis agreement is evident of the strength of ECOWAS instruments. Accra II agreement was more successful as it was able to launch a joint operation involving government and the rebels, as well as French and ECOWAS Peacekeepers. Secondly, Gbagbo's acceptance of Accra II agreement and rejection of Linas-Marcousis agreements – although contentious suggests that African leaders are more adherent to regional intervention arrangements than the foreign driven intervention. Third had ECOWAS been free to implement its own policies, the deeper roots of the problem resolving around the question of citizenship would have been better understood and factored into proposed resolution treaties (Fawole, 2004, Gberie and Addo, 2004).

#### 5.3.2 Assessment of Accra III

Continued French involvement in the conference necessitated the holding of a follow-on conference dubbed Accra III talks in Ghana from the 29th to 30th July 2004. At this time, Ghana's President was the sitting Chairman of ECOWAS, providing an opportunity to reposition ECOWAS as the leading peace maker in the conflict. However, internal political manoeuvring frustrated this latest effort. The FN accused Gbagbo of retaining power contrary to the Linas-Marcousis

agreement and also the formal sacking of the ministers. Moreover, the ruthless suppression of the March 2004 anti-Gbagbo protesters by the government authorities sparked another violence that led to the death of 200 people (Fawole, 2004, Gberie and Addo, 2004, Alli, 2006). These factors meant that Accra III agreement could not be implemented. A second concern is the view that the Accra III agreement contravened ECOWAS fundamental principles of independence and non-partisan positioning (Bah, 2010), allowing for multi-stakeholders engagements in supervising the implementation of the agreed terms. In spite of the repositioning of ECOWAS in the conflict the contested President Laurent Gbagbo not content with Western neo-colonialist tendencies remained unfavourable to the implementation of the terms and conditions of the peace process.

In 2005, the supportive role of ECOWAS continued within operations of AU and the UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire. Following the November 2004 events, France assumed a low diplomatic profile and the African Union, represented by South African President Thabo Mbeki, took over the role of mediator (Koepl, 2012). The feasibility and leadership of AU was made manifest in April 2005 with the establishment of Pretoria Agreement. The signing of the Accord was spearheaded by the South African President Thabo Mbeki who invited the leaders of the disputing factions to South Africa to an African Union sponsored mediation effort. The Pretoria Agreement formally ended the country's state of war, and addressed issues such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. The return of Forces Nouvelles' Ministers to government, and the reorganisation of the independent Electoral Commission.

Subsequent agreements were the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, an internationally brokered agreements signed in 2007. The quest for locally driven mediation was at the heart of Ivoirians which manifested in the signing of Ouagadougou Agreement in March 2007 by the two political parties at play notably the FPI government and FN. What was different between the Ouagadougou Accord and other previous international Accords stem from the distinction that the locally driven Accord seem to have been quite successful and had greatly improved security and provided plausible platform to achieving durable peace in Cote d'Ivoire, despite the delay in its implementation. Here,

ECOWAS was only a participant. Again, relinquishing its leading role. The Ouagadougou accord did not substantially depart from the previous internationally negotiated agreements. If anything, Ayangafac (2007) argued that the Ouagadougou political accord was a strategic political ploy of Gbagbo to seize control of the peace process that had been allegedly 'hijacked' and controlled by the international community as well as to circumvent the UNSC Resolution 1721. Again, the Cote d'Ivoire crisis was not addressed by the Ouagadougou Peace Accord. Rather, it saw the emergence of mobile courts for the judgement of birth certificates and establishment of documents attesting to the national identity of citizens. What is clear from the above analysis on the assessment of ECOWAS policies and intervention is that as the conflict progressed, the relevance and influence of ECOWAS dwindled (Jackson, 2019). This inevitably led to the second phase of the conflict.

### **5.3.3 Assessment of ECOWAS SSR norms and mechanisms during the second civil war**

The second civil war occurred at the time when ECOWAS conflict resolution mechanism had improved. For instance, ECOWAS had established the early warning system (ECOWARN) and elaborated its conflict prevention framework (ECPF). The political stalemate in the first civil war led to another violent bombing campaign against the rebels' targets in the north by the Gbagbo government that was determined to derail ongoing peace processes. During this second civil war, there was no clear evidence of ECOWAS position as by this time there was excessive retaliation of France on Cote d'Ivoire's military facilities rather. This point signalled the end of ECOMICI and its subsequent subordination into the UNOMICI. ECOWAS SSR intervention strategy and active involvement was relegated.

In 2006, ECOWAS took a strong stand, reiterating that no party should withdraw from the process, because withdrawals and the threat of withdrawals in the past have not helped but only delayed the return to peace. In attempting to further strengthen its position, ECOWAS promised to intensify negotiations with all sides and urged parties to trust the motives of foreign mediators. However, this demand was simply ignored by the warring parties. France



continued to enjoy unilateral use of force while ECOWAS remained immobile (Fawole, 2004, Gberie and Addo, 2004, Alli, 2006, Bah, 2010).

ECOWAS's later intervention was as an election observer. Subsequently, ECOWAS recognised Ouattara as the rightful winner of the presidential election. Following ECOWAS's recognition of Ouattara as the elected president, international partners including the US and the UN recognised Ouattara. This came following the adoption of a common resolution by the UN Security Council. On 6 January 2011, ECOWAS received a request from the President-elect Alassane Ouattara to intervene in order to remove incumbent Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to leave power following the democratic presidential elections of November 2010 (Gagnon, 2013). ECOWAS gave an ultimatum to Gbagbo and his loyalist soldiers to recognise the results by the Electoral Commission and cede power, otherwise there would be military intervention. Despite ECOWAS' threat of final ultimatum and request on ceding power in December 2010, and the warning that it would be compelled to use legitimate force to serve the demands of the Ivorian people, Laurent Gbagbo refused to comply with this order. In response to Gbagbo's refusal, ECOWAS took an executive decision to suspend the membership of Cote d'Ivoire until Gbagbo handed over power to Ouattara. However, no military intervention followed the suspension of Cote d'Ivoire's membership both from ECOWAS and AU and the subsequent trade embargo. Gagnon (2013) posited that ECOWAS could not have lawfully intervened in Cote d'Ivoire in order to install Alassane Ouattara as it would be illegal to use military intervention to resolve election disputes in contravention of the U.N. Charter. Moreover, the ECOWAS intervening force, ECOMICI was not longer operational as it had been dissolved and subsumed into UNOCI. In short, ECOWAS did not have a standing military unit on its own to intervene even if it wanted to do so.

ECOWAS intervention in the political disputes was compromised as Gbagbo perceived the regional bloc as a party to the conflict by siding with Ouattara. As a result, mediation by ECOWAS did not bear fruit and its efforts were frustrated by Gbagbo at every turn. Moreover, many observers considered ECOWAS threat to use military force to oust Gbagbo as a bluff. It would have been unprecedented to use military force to resolve an election dispute. Also,

ECOWAS would have found it almost impossible to secure the required number of troops to deploy in Cote d'Ivoire to resolve the crisis. After several unsuccessful attempts at negotiations and sporadic violence, a civil war broke out with the country divided into two with the rebel forces loyal to Ouattara took control of most part of the country, while Gbagbo maintained control of the economic capital Abidjan. The civil war lasted for almost four months from January to April 2011 with tens of thousands of lives lost and wanton destruction of property running into millions of dollars. The war ended with the capture of Gbagbo at his residence after the country's soldiers were overwhelmed by rebel forces with the military and technical support of French and UN forces( Fieldwork,2014).

Iwilade and Agbo (2012) argued that ECOWAS role was significant and demonstrated to be a formidable force ready to claim some form of leadership and ownership of the resolution of the conflict. In order to showcase its readiness and willingness to regain back its regional authority and leadership which it seemed to have lost since ECOMICI was absorbed into UNOCI, it responded in three significant ways: It first responded by threatening to suspend Cote d'Ivoire from its activities and to insist that Gbagbo hand over power. It was noted that the firmness of the initial ECOWAS response left no one in doubt that it was prepared to defend, even possibly with the use of force.

#### **5.3.4 Assessment of Post-conflict reconstruction: ECOWAS post-conflict recovery norms and mechanisms**

The end of the four-month long civil war and the arrest of Gbagbo and his allies marked a new phase in the country's political stability and economic development under President Ouattara. With the installation of Ouattara, ECOWAS continued to play important role in aiding Cote d'Ivoire in its post-conflict recovery. ECOWAS and AU reinstated the membership of Cote d'Ivoire and subsequently lifted the trade embargo. Nonetheless, the end of the civil war did not translate automatically to the end of political violence in the country. Many of Gbagbo loyalists with arms and ammunition fled the country into neighbouring Ghana and Liberia with the aim to launch a low intensity insurgency. On the other hand, Ouattara's post-election administration was

accused of undermining national reconciliation by pursuing a victor's justice, bringing to justice only those perceived to be allies of his arch rival, Gbagbo (Bryden and N'Diaye, 2011, Koepf, 2012). On 18 April 2012, the Committee's chair of the 1572 Committee briefed UN Security Council members about the committee's activities. The outcome resulted in the councils' adoption of UNSC resolution 2045 on 26 April which aimed at renewing the Cote d'Ivoire sanctions regime.

With the UN assuming the leading role and initiative, ECOWAS intervention was limited to providing some technical and moral support. ECOWAS continued to maintain its troops under UNOCI even though at political level, the regional organisation was not taking proactive stance to curb some of the excesses of the Ouattara administration including engaging with the administration to promote rule of law and human rights. One could argue that the limited participation of ECOWAS at this stage was contrary to its norms to promote democracy, good governance and human rights to ensure last peace and stability. This policy was not very effective even after the conflict had ended. In response, ECOWAS developed the Supplementary Act on the Code of Conducts for the Armed Forces and Security Services in 2011 (ECOWAS, 2013). However, regarding the role of ECOWAS in supporting the SSR including DDR in Cote d'Ivoire, the organisation had yet to have in place its Regional Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (RFSSR/G). The ill-preparedness of ECOWAS SSR Programmes is captured in a presentation to ECOWAS head of states by one of its policy writers. It states:

“The limited human capacity at the ECOWAS Commission is not unrelated to the recruitment freeze instigated by ECOWAS heads of state and government in 2008. The ECOWAS Regional Security Division presently has no dedicated focal officer on SSR; the division has only two professional staff. Although the recruitment freeze was partially lifted in 2012 and the position of Programme Officer was advertised in November 2012 along with 51 other positions (only 18 percent of vacant posts) within ECOWAS Commission, the recruitment process is still ongoing as at November and the positions may only be filled in 2014”.

The above statement presents the state of affairs at ECOWAS was between 2010 – 2014. It also explains why it could not effectively deploy in previous conflicts.

#### 5.4 Lessons-learned in ECOWAS intervention in Cote d'Ivoire

Since the creation of ECOWAS, its legal and institutional frameworks have evolved over time to meet the political challenges and security threats of its member states. to engage in preventing conflicts from occurring or intervening in conflicts and at post-conflict level. During the Ivorian political crisis, ECOWAS developed new sets of normative frameworks based on its experience on the ground. Some of these learning points are presented with a view to highlighting some of the lessons learnt from the Ivorian conflict.

##### 5.4.1 Conflict Prevention Mechanisms

Theoretically, conflict prevention activities should aim not only to reduce manifest tensions and/or prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflicts, they also involve many different types of actions which includes diplomacy, mediation, institution building, peace building measures, measures to address particular grievances and measures to address underlying causes of conflicts (Greene, 2003). Other scholars (Hampson and Malone, 2002) defines conflict prevention as a process of anticipating conflicts even prior to the formation of parties with incompatible goals. (Yabi, 2010) underscored that “conflict prevention does not only imply carrying out successfully far-reaching reforms in security sector, but also put a stop to the involvement of military leaders in crime, as well as the reform of public administration and improvement of economic management in order to restore credibility in a particular deprived state”. By the definition of ECOWAS, conflict prevention involves building societies with little likelihood of violent conflict or conflict transformation that encompasses activities designed to defuse tensions and prevent the outbreak, escalation, recurrence of violence (ECOWAS, 2008).

At the start of the Ivorian political disputes in 2000, ECOWAS was a passive bystander without taking any concrete steps to promote dialogue and amicable resolution of the differences between the main protagonists. The adherence to

the Revised Treaty, which placed emphasis on non-interference of internal matters of the state, was probably one of the main factors behind the lack of involvement of ECOWAS during the struggle for succession between Bedie and Ouattara and the introduction of a policy of exclusion by the Bedie administration. The right to sovereignty of member state was one of the key considerations for ECOWAS, at this stage of the Ivorian conflict, to prevent being perceived as an external aggressor. Although legally speaking, ECOWAS has no automatic mandate to engage or intervene in member states conflicts unless they are invited by the concerned state government, the organisation did not at the time have a well elaborate conflict prevention mechanism including a structured early warning system.

Another factor to account for the lack of involvement of ECOWAS was the Franco- Anglophone divide within the organisation. Cote d'Ivoire was part of France's sphere of influence, so Nigeria and Ghana, the Anglophone hegemons of ECOWAS did not want to seek diplomatic confrontations with France. Moreover, given that France had a military base in the country, it was taken for granted by ECOWAS that France was in the position to resolve the matter. Political consensus building and decision making are critical within ECOWAS, which can be time-consuming and create a lot of inertia and unwillingness to act by other member states with self-interests in the matter at hand.

In many instances, ECOWAS has been accused of "selective regionalism" as Jaye (2011) pointed out that: "There are also armed violent conflicts in Nigeria (Niger Delta), Senegal (Casamance), Ghana (Dagomas and Komkomas) and Mali (Tuareg), which have the potential to degenerate into the kind of violent conflicts experienced in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Unfortunately, they have received less coverage and perhaps less attention by ECOWAS than previous ones perhaps because they are national in their scale but viewed rather as localised low intensity conflicts".

Apart from the legal provision not to interfere in the internal affairs of member states and the Franco-Anglophone divide, the Ivorian political disputes prior to the first civil war exposed the lack of preparedness of ECOWAS to engage in

conflict prevention. ECOWAS at this stage was on the process of establishing its peace and security architecture including its early warning system and its response mechanisms. The December 1999 military coup took place shortly after ECOWAS introduced the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999. Nonetheless, ECOWAS did not have its other frameworks in place including the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance adopted in 2001, SALW in 2006 and the ECPF in 2008 to guide its interventions. Notwithstanding the absence of important normative framework at the time, it has been highlighted that ECOWAS could have relied on continental mechanisms of the AU, its supranational body. ECOWAS was in the position to solicit the support of AU based on the Algiers Declaration of July 1999, which established a framework for reaction to unconstitutional change of government(Gberie and Addo, 2004).

As the political situation unfolded, the Ivorian crisis generated enormous international attention that made it inevitable for the direct involvement of ECOWAS. The outbreak of the first civil war brought ECOWAS into its usual reactive responses to conflicts in West Africa. The relevance and impact of ECOWAS regional interventions within the frameworks of its norms, policies and mechanism in Cote d'Ivoire received mixed reviews. There was no doubt that ECOWAS has been deeply involved in the international efforts in resolving the Ivorian crisis since it first blew into global consciousness in 2002 (Butera, 2014 ). However, ECOWAS was the second actor after France to intervene in seeking to resolve the outbreak of the civil war. Some scholars considered the intervention of ECOWAS in the country to be of limited success due to the lack of strategic approach by the organisation, characterised by weak internal coordination, underutilisation and misdirection of existing human capacities as well as the deployment of limited instruments. Other scholars have credited the quick diplomatic response of ECOWAS in bringing about a ceasefire and resolution of the first civil war (Bovcon, 2009).

#### **5.4.2 ECOMICI and Peace Processes**

The setting up of ECOMICI was a key change derived from ECOWAS' experience in Cote D'Ivoire and other previous conflicts. It helped to shore up the organisation's relevance and increased its resolve to respond more appropriately to stabilise any future conflict situations (Alli, 2006). The setting up of ECOMICI also enabled ECOWAS to deal with previous difficulty in decision-making and consensus-building. Experience in Cote D'Ivoire as set out a process of assembling the required number of the troops without troops from the member states whose military could not join the contingent intervention forces because of their country or leaders entrenched position - as was the case in Cote D'Ivoire where Malian forces were not allowed to join ECOWAS forces. The solution here was the creation of the ECOWAS Standby force. Its formation helped to overcome the political bottleneck previously involved in forming an intervention force. The formation of a task force involving all member states for any conflict was another lesson in so far as it compels member states to contribute forces and removed the right of leaders to hold back their forces. (Alli, 2006) argued that even though the involvement of the troop did not resolve the crisis or keep the peace as expected, however, it provided enough room and confidence for peace negotiation to take place. Through this reform, ECOWAS continued to provide 'regional oversight' on the processes of UNOCI alongside other multinational actors in Cote d'Ivoire. ECOMICI helped to kick start dialogue between the belligerents, resulting in the release of war prisoners and the development of joint DDR. Its presence also opened up trade and humanitarian corridors and provided food and free medical assistance to the population.

#### **5.4.3 ECOWAS norms and lessons learned.**

ECOWAS norms and mechanisms were successful to a certain degree in restoring relative peace and stability in Cote d'Ivoire. Nonetheless, the intervention of ECOWAS in Cote d'Ivoire revealed the organisation's limited logistic capabilities and its dependency on the technical expertise and support of external actors mainly the UN. ECOWAS learned the principle of measuring the limitations of its legitimacy in an international conflict and made adjustments

to its DDR and SSR policies which had no real estimation of capacity level. As part of the conflict prevention mechanism of ECOWAS, recommended that: “The development of strong binding norms would help to serve as a check on the actions and activities of the bigger and stronger members that may be inclined to ignore pressure from members, thereby reducing the risk of the outbreak of conflicts in the sub-region”(Aning and Bah, 2010). Moreover, the expectations on ECOWAS what had often been overambitious given its limited human and material resources became more realistic as evident in the ECOMICI and UNOCI.

Furthermore, ECOWAS began to allow enough time to plan the deployment of its early warning system and engage the necessary diplomacy to deal with conflict drivers to avert political crisis and civil unrest. In this respect, ECOWAS became more proactive in its EWS, SSR and other policies for peace negotiation rather than reactive as previously (Bah, 2010). This resulted to better resource mobilisation, utilization and coordination and more adept planning and strategy development for mission which was in the past one of ECOWAS’ biggest challenge that compromised the movement from initiating norms and mechanisms and their implementation in the field (Afolabi, 2009). Broadly, the second phase of the Ivorian conflict, made significant improvements on two main protocols, notably Article 22 of the 1999 Protocol which gave responsibility to ECOMOG for “observation and monitoring; peace-keeping and restoration of peace; humanitarian intervention; enforcement of sanctions, including embargoes, preventive deployment; peace building, disarmament and demobilisation; and policing activities involving the control of fraud and organised crimes.

Further adjustments were on Article 40 of the Protocol highlighting human security elements through the declaration of ECOWAS’ role in humanitarian emergencies. The conflict also made more useful, the provisions on Articles 42 to 45 emphasising ECOWAS’ obligation to peace building in societies affected or recovering from conflicts. Finally, it placed more responsibility on leaders of member states to be accountable for their actions. In this respect, ECOWAS could be bolder in allocating blame to the Gbagbo government to concede defeat and leave office which can be seen as an advancement from the 2001



Protocol on Good Governance supplementing the 1999 Conflict Prevention Protocol, seeking to address political causes of insecurity (Boateng, 2019).

## **PART TWO**

### **CASE STUDY TWO**

#### **5.5. ECOWAS Engagement and Responses in Mali (2000-2016)**

##### *Step one: Analysis of the Context of intervention in Mali*

The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) organized military mission sent to support the government of ECOWAS member nation Mali against Islamist rebels in the Northern Mali conflict. The Cote d'Ivoire and Mali case studies share some commonalities in that both countries experienced political and constitutional crisis following a military coup and a rebellion. In addition, Mali suffered a third crisis, which is the introduction of Islamist militancy. Foreign armed Islamist groups set up after the invasion and seizure of the northern Mali by Tuareg and Arabs from Libya and Algeria. While the military coup in Cote d'Ivoire was the trigger that brought about the civil war and the rebellion, it was the other way round in Mali as the outbreak of the Tuareg rebellion served as the catalyst for the overthrow of the constitutional order. The Malian crisis started in January 2012 with the outbreak of the Tuareg Rebellion, less than a year after the resolution of the Ivorian conflict in April 2011.

The conflict involved on the one hand the Malian government and Islamist groups including: AQIM, Al-Murabitoun, Ansar Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front (FLM). These groups operated under the co-ordination of AQIM, which was competing with the Islamic State for influence in Mali and Sahel.

##### **5.5.1. Historical Background of the Malian Crises: from Independence to 2000**

Mali is landlocked and sharing border with seven countries, namely: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. Two of Mali's neighbours, Algeria and Mauritania are not member states of ECOWAS. While Algeria has never been a member of ECOWAS, Mauritania was a member until it left in December 2000 to be a member of the Arab league. Mauritania submitted its request for withdrawal in December 1999, which took

effect in 2000 after a year elapsed in accordance with the Revised Treaty of ECOWAS. Mali's sharing of borders with two non-member states of ECOWAS often limits security cooperation among them to fight transnational crimes and terrorism.

**Figure 2 Map of Mali**



Source: CIA World Factbook, 2017

Mali became an independent state in September 1960 following the dissolution of the Mali Federation, which comprised of the Sudanese Republic and Senegal. The Sudanese Republic was renamed Mali as an independent country.

Mali is ethnically diverse and multicultural with Bambara and Fulani (Peul) forming the majority (34.1% and 14.7% respectively) while Tuareg 0.9% falls among the minorities (CIA World Factbook 2017). The Bambara ethnic group is predominantly based in the southern part of the country, whereas the Fulani and Tuareg are predominantly found in the semiarid Sahelian central and arid Saharan northern parts of the country respectively. The country's political and economic capital, Bamako is located in the south, where the majority of the

population resides. The ethnic and sectarian conflicts that Mali has suffered involve largely these three ethnic groups.

Prior to independence, the Tuareg people had agitated to have their own sovereign state, called Azawad, which comprise the entire north (about 60% of Mali's total land mass). The first Tuareg uprising for self-rule was against France in 1916. According to (Devon, 2013), the revolt was "in response to the French not giving the Tuareg their own autonomous zone (called Azawad) as was promised. Devon (2013) noted that the French violently quelled the revolt and "subsequently confiscated important grazing lands, using Tuaregs as forced conscripts and labour in fragmented Tuareg societies. However, the crushing defeat of Tuareg in the hands of the French did not completely extinguish the group's burning desire to attain self-rule, resurfacing into what became a protracted crisis.

After independence, Mali experienced over three decades of a mix of one-party rule and military dictatorship under presidents Modibo Keita and Moussa Traoré. The periods under both presidents witnessed strong resistance to any process of multiparty democracy. The resistance to pluralism was – a characteristic shared by former French colonies (Bagayoko, 2010). President Madibo Keita, became the country's first president after serving as a prime minister. He imposed a one-party system to pursue his socialist agenda and grand plan of promoting pan-Africanism by creating a political and economic union at the continental level. As a fervent pan-Africanist, Keita was among the founding fathers of the present-day Africa Union (AU), which was known by then as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). However, his downfall began with the devaluation of the Malian franc and the rising cost of living and economic hardship resulted in civil protests and riots. In trying to extricate Mali's from the vestige of colonialism, Keita decided to create a national currency, which was the Malian franc (Chauzal and Van Damme, 2015). Keita suspended the Constitution and created in 1967 the National Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comité National de Défense de la Révolution: CNDR) to restore law order (Afrique, 2015). However, Keita was unable to quell the civil unrest. The worsening socio-economic situation and popular disenchantment

against Keita's government presented an opportunity for Moussa Traoré, who was then a lieutenant, to overthrow his government in a military coup in 1968.

Under the Traoré administration (1968 – 1991), there was widespread corruption in the public service and abuse of office and the mismanagement of the economy and foreign aid to the benefit of his political acolytes and loyalists in the army. In 1985, Traoré got re-elected with relative ease and continued with the centralisation of power. A military coup ousted Traore from office in 1991. The end of the Traoré's administration paved the way for the introduction of multiparty democracy in Mali.

The next president was Alpha Oumar Konaré, first president to have been elected through the democratic process. He led Mali between 1992 and stepped down in 2002 at the end of his mandate. A key achievement of Konare's administration was to resolve the second Tuareg rebellion through a negotiated settlement with the various armed groups in the north. He also implemented some amount of decentralisation of government and integration of Tuaregs into the government and the army. Konare was succeeded by President Amadou Toumani Touré.

### **5.5.2. Context: Security-related development: Tuareg Rebellions**

Since independence Mali has experienced four spates of rebellions from independence to 2012. The problems in Mali predate the existence of ECOWAS. However, the West Africa regional body for peace, stability and good governance became involved in the conflict in Mali, assisting to a limited extent to ending a conflict which remains unresolved to date. The first rebellion (1963-1964) was followed by a second in (1990-1996).

By the time the second Tuareg rebellion broke out, ECOWAS was already involved in the civil war in Liberia. The second Tuareg rebellion brought to the fore the deep-seated internal divisions among the Tuareg and Arab populations in Mali. The search for peace and security led to the integration of Tuareg combatants into the Malian armed forces, demilitarization of the north, economic integration of northern populations, and a more detailed special administrative structure for the three northern regions. The National Pact brought in some degree of respite as fighting halted and gave way to dialogue,

semi autonomy for the north and the formation of the Arabic Islamic Front (AIF). However, analysts have argued that the introduction of the Arabic Islamic Front to the Tuareg rebellion introduced radical Islam into the Tuareg fight for independence (Devon (2013)). The sectarian dimension brought by the Arab-Tuareg merger has been blamed for amplifying and uniting armed Islamist groups, including Al-Qaeda all of which hold a global jihadist ambition of territorial claim and formation of Islamic States (Aning and Bah, 2010). The collaboration between foreign Islamist fighters and groups of Malian Tuareg and Arabs agitating for self-rule was a key feature in the third Tuareg rebellion (2006-2009) and fourth rebellion (2012-2015).

At the end of the second Tuareg rebellion, the rebels were not entirely demobilised and disarmed. Some were integrated into the Malian army and deployed in their communities in the north. This unfinished solutioning of the existing crisis led to a mutiny staged largely by Tuareg soldiers within the Malian army. This marked the period referred to as the third rebellion starting in 2006. The mutiny escalated into an insurgency, when a group of Tuareg army deserters attacked military barracks in Kidal region, seizing weapons and demanding greater autonomy and development assistance (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2016). The Tuareg army deserters attracted other armed groups to form a rebel coalition called the 23 May Democratic Alliance for Change (Alliance Democratique du 23 Mai pour le Changement: ADMC) led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. Although, the government and the rebels brokered a peace arrangement, this was constantly violated leading to continuous intermittent fighting lasting three years.

The Malian government was forced to deploy a large military offensive force to quell the rebellion. Gaddafi's intervention in 2009 brought the third rebellion to a temporary halt. However, hostilities continued, leading to the fourth rebellion.

During the fourth rebellion, Mali was faced with "three crises: political and constitutional crisis (military coup), secessionist crisis (Tuareg rebellion) and terrorism (Islamist militants and terrorist groups) (Francis (2013)). The demise of Gadhafi in Libya, is thought to have prompted the degeneration of the Malian crisis. Roland (2012a) argued: "the arrival of experienced fighters (from Libya) and the widespread access to weapons, ammunition and money were likely

triggers to the conflict” This assertion is valid given, the large contingent of Tuaregs and Arabs who were living and working in the Libyan army returning to fight in Mali in 2011, bring along heavy weapons. In the fourth rebellion, therefore, it was obvious that the Tuareg-Arab rebels were better prepared and well-armed than the Malian army in decline under the administration of President Touré. The militarily superior MNLA overpowered the Malian army and took control of the key regional towns including Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. They effectively took over the entire north of the country and establish Shariah law in towns under their control including Timbuktu (Lunn, 2012, Sandor, 2013, Elischer, 2013, Francis, 2013, Plett, 2013).

It is in the context of the above historical evolution of conflict that ECOWAS was called to intervene in different ways and times as further elaborated to the second step of the analysis involving evaluation and identification of conflict indicators and later in identifying and assessing the impact of existing Peace Initiatives and mechanisms.

### **5.5.3. ECOWAS Intervention in Mali**

#### *Step two analysis: Identification of conflict indicators- 2000 - 2016*

Prior to 2000, ECOWAS was ‘preoccupied with starrng, undertaking studies and carrying out rule-carrying decisions and evaluation necessary to evaluate the situation in Mali and to identify conflict indicators. This was important to measure and implement the best mechanisms, norms and build the necessary manpower and structures to ensure peace in Mali. ECOWAS did not play any role in the first Tuareg rebellion because the conflict started before it was formed. In the second rebellion, ECOWAS involvement was negligible considering that its main focus at the time was to promote regional economic integration and trade, and not to guarantee the internal security matters of member states. However, the first indicator of the severity of the conflict came when the Malian state requested ECOWAS’ intervention. Even so ECOWAS was hesitant as it was already involved in interventions in Liberia (1989-1996 and 1999-2003) Sierra Leone (1991-1995 and 1997-2002), Guinea Bissau (1998) and Cote d’Ivoire (2002-2007 and 2010-2011) (ECOWAS, 2016b)

The second conflict indicator was the continuously failing democratisation process and the subsequent military coup in 2012 as discussed above. Both signals were picked up by ECOWAS early warning systems, leading to the adoption of the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 for Mali. What was however difficult for ECOWAS was the intermittent return to peace in Mali and indicated in the different shades between peace and conflict Roland (2012a). For instance, the smooth and peaceful transfer of power in 2002 from one democratically elected president to another was regarded at the time as a strong sign that the democratisation process in Mali had gained a strong foundation for lasting peace. Touré's exemplary action led analysts to conclude that Mali could be considered as having a security apparatus operating effectively under democratic government (Bagayoko, 2010).

Although, these episodes of peace and democracy were evident, the fact that Touré administration was corrupt with numerous local media reports of collusion between members of his government and organised criminal networks alerted ECOWAS to the inevitability of social upheaval (Roland, 2012b, Francis, 2013, Aning and Atuobi, 2012, ECOWAS, 2014a) signals noted by ECOWAS in its report (2014, p.12) was the danger of Touré appointing "controversial Tuareg commanders in the northern garrisons. Also, "underequipping and demoralizing Malian troops and turning a blind eye to the fraternization among terrorist elements, and criminal networks in the north". These indicators required ECOWAS to improve on the 1999 Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, alongside the establishment of ECOWAS parliament in March 2002. The introduction of these normative frameworks and strengthening of institutions was regarded as the readiness of West African polities to depart from authoritarianism and dictatorships of the Cold War years to the nation-building within the framework of good governance (Lar, 2009). However, ECOWAS was rarely involved in the promotion of democracy and good governance in Mali. Given the inevitability of conflict as signalled by the above and other socio-economic indicators, ECOWAS was progressively interested in

nation-building efforts in Mali through mediation, a policy deviation from erstwhile response and reaction to events when things go wrong (Fieldnotes, 2016).

Political indicators for conflict were also evident. The mismanagement of the economy and state resources of President Touré left the state and the Malian army unprepared to fight and contain the rebels. The state of the Malian army so poor, (Roland, 2012b, Roland, 2012a) observed that they “had not the elementary means to maintain law and order in northern Mali: a lack of fuel and ammunition was the norm, despite the continued deterioration of the security situation in the northern region.” The Malian army was wary of going to the war front losing their lives due to the ineptitude of the government. A visit by the minister of defence with some of the army leadership ended acrimoniously. The row suddenly morphed into mutiny against the government to demand better equipment, regular payment and improved services. The mutiny in March 2012 led to a takeover. The 12 March 2012 military coup was led by low- and mid-level soldiers. The coup was not a pre-planned as it was opportunistic (Roland, 2012a, Lunn, 2012, Francis, 2013). Toure fled to neighbouring Senegal as the military led by captain Amadou Sanogo took over the country. The military coup was in contravention of the 2001 Supplementary Protocol that prohibits the change of government through unconstitutional means. However, ECOWAS was powerless to enforce this protocol.

In sum, several indicators could be identified notably, persistent instability, reluctance of belligerents to agree on nation-building measures, the successful coup in Mali, disrespect of peace treaties and political interests by leaders of factions. Added to this is the more recent expansion of the conflict from historical differences and events to a religious war with the new goal of territorial occupation and formation of an Islamic caliphate.

#### **5.5.4 Deployment of ECOWAS Mechanisms, SSR, EWS in Mali**

*Step three analysis: identifying and assessing the impact of existing Peace Initiatives and mechanisms.*

ECOWAS played a very marginal role in resolving the third rebellion, which lasted for almost three years (ECOWAS, 2014a). ECOWAS was mainly an observer in all the peace negotiations. Again, the limited role played by



ECOWAS was the fact that the organisation was acting in accordance with its 1993 Revised Treaty not to interfere in internal matters that the government of the day could handle. Moreover, ECOWAS was at this time fully engaged in peace negotiation and peacekeeping missions in Cote d'Ivoire (Fieldnotes, 2016). Furthermore, there was no official request from President Touré to ECOWAS for intervention or support. However, by its own admission, ECOWAS noted in its After-Action Review report (ECOWAS, 2014a) that it had "insufficient appreciation of the internal dynamics in Mali due partly to the non-involvement of ECOWAS in previous attempts to resolve the identity-based and secessionist conflicts' in Mali. Instead of ECOWAS championing such negotiations, it was Algeria that brokered three peace accords including the 1991 peace deal, the so-called National Pact in 1992 and the peace treaty in 2006. At this stage, ECOWAS lacked "an effective framework for intelligence gathering and sharing" to complement its early warning system (Fieldnotes, 2014). ECOWAS could only make a more significant impact in the fourth rebellion when it played an active and leading role in containing the violence and in the ongoing efforts in search for durable peace.

The initial reaction of ECOWAS was to make a public declaration condemning any act of aggression and urged the northern rebels to seek peaceful means to redress their grievances (ECOWAS, 2012b). Again, the Malian government did not request the direct intervention of ECOWAS or support to tackle the outbreak of the rebellion. Touré, who was coming to the end of his term, was more focussed on the democratic transition as well as using the Malian army to contain the rebels. However, the poorly equipped Malian army was no match for the Tuareg-Arab rebels. As the rebels were seeking to gain more grounds in the north and consolidate their stronghold, the Malian army was in disarray with regular reports of military defection into neighbouring Algeria (Thurston and Lebovich, 2013). Five days after the coup, the sitting chairperson of ECOWAS, who was President Alassane Ouattara of Cote d'Ivoire convened a urgent Summit in Abidjan over the overthrow of Malian President Touré and the military takeover of government by the Comité National de Redressement pour la Démocratie et la Restauration de l'Etat (CNRDRE). The African Union, UN, Algeria and Mauritania were invited as special observers to the Summit.

The Summit came on the back of the ECOWAS Fact-Finding Mission, which included members of the Council of Elders, to Mali from 16-18 March 2012 and the joint mission of ECOWAS, AU and UN to Mali on 23 March 2012, as well as the briefings on the emergency meeting of the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) on the threats in the Sahel region and the Gulf of Guinea held in Abidjan on 29 March 2012. The final communique of the Abidjan Summit on 29 March stated that the “Authority reaffirms the inviolability of ECOWAS Protocols, in particular the pertinent provisions of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001), which declare “Zero Tolerance” for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”, (ECOWAS, 2012a). On the basis of the violation of ECOWAS norms, the “Authority suspended Mali from all decision-making bodies of ECOWAS with immediate effect, in accordance with Articles 1(e) and 45(2) of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the provisions of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance” (ECOWAS, 2012a).

Following ECOWAS decision, the AU Peace and Security Council suspended the membership of Mali until the restoration of constitutional rule. With the threat of further sanctions looming over the military government, ECOWAS activated its mediation efforts by dispatching a high level delegation with six heads of state, including the sitting chairperson of ECOWAS, the sitting chairperson of the AU, who was the president of Benin, to negotiate with the coup leaders to return power to a civilian administration. The intense pressure and negotiation of ECOWAS led the military leaders make concessions (ECOWAS, 2014b). Here, it was the sustained engagement of ECOWAS with the support of the AU that yielded result. Under the leadership of the ECOWAS mediator President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, the military junta signed the “Framework Agreement on the Implementation of the Solemn Commitment” on 6 April 2012 to end the constitutional crisis. The military leaders adhered to the agreement and handed over in April 2012 to a civilian-led transition with the appointment of President Dioncounda Traore. As a compromise, the military leaders were compensated with some senior positions in the cabinet. Moreover, ECOWAS negotiated for an amnesty for the coup leaders and their subordinates (Field notes, 2016).

With the swift resolution of the military coup, the AU announced in October 2012 that it was reinstating Mali's membership. This came shortly after ECOWAS restored the country's membership following the political agreement with the military leaders to hand over power to a civilian government and agreed to a roadmap to return the country to a democratically elected government in a year's time. The office of the Special Representative of the President of the ECOWAS Commission to Mali (SRPC) was then established in Bamako as the vehicle to closely monitor the situation and ensure communication lines were open (ECOWAS, 2012b). The swift restoration of Mali's membership by ECOWAS and AU received some criticism. According to Lunn (2012), "some will view this as a problematic step, arguing that the AU has come close to endorsing an ineffective transitional government in Bamako, within which the army is still a powerful force". This criticism failed to take into consideration the incremental approach of peace-making processes by the AU and ECOWAS. The lifting of the sanction was meant to serve as reward for the military junta to be seen as complying with the orders of the regional bodies. Nonetheless, the After-Action Review report of ECOWAS admitted that it was ill-advised for the organisation to have taken a "wholesale lifting" of the blanket sanction soon after the signing of the Framework Agreement. The report claimed the action sent the wrong signal. The report recommended for a "graduated application and lifting [of sanctions] tied to the achievement of set objectives" (ECOWAS, 2014b).

Following the handing over of the mantle of power to a civilian-led government, ECOWAS and AU together with the international community- in particular, the UN and France engaged in the process of organising a presidential election amid the chaos created by the coup. ECOWAS was given the mandate to take the lead in resolving the Malian crisis following the organisation's successful intervention in convincing the coup leaders to hand over to a civilian government. The mandate was enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2056 assigning ECOWAS the lead role to help Mali resolve the crisis. ECOWAS mechanisms enabled it to prepare Mali to return to civilian rule.

Alongside the preparation to return the country to democratic rule, ECOWAS was also preparing for a military intervention in the north to support

the Malian army to reclaim the territory under rebels and Islamist groups. In response, The Committee of ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) held an extraordinary meeting in August 2012 in Bamako to consider the practical details for the deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force in Mali. This was in accordance with the directives of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government (ECOWAS, 2012a). Before the Bamako meeting, CCDS had undertaken “various planning stages from the Initial Planning Conference, the Technical Assessment Mission” through to the adoption of the Consensual Concept of Operation from 25 to 26 July 2012 in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire (ECOWAS, 2012b)).

The report of the extraordinary meeting revealed the significant challenges ECOWAS faced to ensure troops deployment. Moreover, the report also revealed the political infighting within ECOWAS that at times undermine operational capacity. According to the report, the areas of concerns around the planning include troops strength, unit’s autonomy, air support and funding of the operation. Ghana decided “it would no longer provide an infantry company but .... an engineer construction company instead”, while Senegal decided to no longer provide the engineer construction company but reaffirmed its pledge for the Motorized Company and Artillery Battery. The Gambia “pledged a military police and demining platoon and also requested to move its Infantry Company from the Senegalese led Battalion to the Nigerian led Battalion”.

The request by The Gambia to move its infantry company from Senegal-led battalion to Nigeria was an indication of the deteriorating bilateral relations between the two countries. The report noted that air support was considerably lacking, which could significantly delay the intervention. Lunn (2012) stressed that stating “some observers argue that an ECOWAS military intervention cannot work unless it is backed up by large-scale air support”. The report also revealed the concerns of the UN Security Council before the passage of the resolution to authorise ECOWAS military intervention. Among the issues raised were the “Lack of harmony between ECOWAS political and military concepts; and Alignment of the strategy with the situation on ground and development of a concrete exit strategy”. (ECOWAS, 2012c).

Despite the intensive planning by ECOWAS, the organisation did not have the wherewithal to effectively deploy troops on the ground. The ESF did not have all the logistics, personnel and funds to make the mission possible. The International Crisis Group (2012), was concerned about the slow actions of the external actors including ECOWAS to quickly seek political solution to the Tuareg rebellion. The Group noted that military action should not be ruled out and as this might be necessary. However, it was sceptical about prioritising it at the expense of other political and diplomatic initiatives. ICG (2012) posited:

In the absence of rapid, firm and coherent decisions at the regional (Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS), continental (African Union, AU) and international (UN) levels by the end of September, the political, security, economic and social situation in Mali will deteriorate.

With ECOWAS dragging its feet to deploy troops amid the power vacuum in Bamako following a civil uprising that resulted in the attack of the interim president at the State House, the rebels and Islamist groups carried out several attacks. As (Francis, 2013) “the Islamist jihadists and their allies attacked and captured the central city of Konna on January 10th 2013 and planned to advance on Bamako. This military attack on Konna changed the direction of the Malian crisis because events on the ground now dictated the nature and urgency of the response to it, shifting the focus from political dialogue to military action.”

The swift intervention of France quickly reversed the gains of the rebels and Islamist groups. With the initial success, France was supported by Malian troops, the ECOWAS-led African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) forces and other Western countries to recapture all the major cities in northern Mali, and dispersed the rebels and Islamist groups, “most of whom melted into the civilian population and tactically retreated into the mountains, caves and inhospitable desert terrain that they are familiar with” (Francis, 2013).

The UN Security Council later unanimously adopted Resolution 2100 (2013) in April 2013 to authorize the transformation of AFISMA into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with a robust mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Resolution approved a combined MINUSMA strength of 12,600, made up of military and police elements, to be deployed in Mali for an initial period of twelve months, beginning from 1 July 2013. The Resolution also authorized the deployment of a rapid reaction parallel force with a counter-insurgency mandate to neutralize the threats posed by the remnants of terrorist and jihadist groups.

Following the temporary defeat of the rebels and Islamist groups, ECOWAS took over the initiative to assist the transition government to organise the presidential elections (Field notes, 2016). Though there were concerns that the country was not ready for an election, ECOWAS with the support of France and other partners, assisted Mali to hold the presidential election in July and a second round in August of 2013 that led to the victory of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.

The return of Mali to constitutional and democratic rule was a significant achievement for ECOWAS and its partners, notably France. The French forces later downsized and renamed its operations from Operation Serval to under Operation Barkhane in August 2014 with a broader mandate than its predecessor to cover five countries in the Sahel. However, the election of Keita did not stop the rebellion and the Islamist insurgency. With President Keita installed, ECOWAS using the president of Burkina Faso as its mediator helped the new Malian government to engage the various northern armed groups in search of a peace agreement (Field notes, 2016).

#### **5.5.5 Peace Process: Tuareg Rebellion Transformation and SSR Mechanism**

Toft (2010) postulated:

“since 1990 the preferred means for ending civil wars has been negotiated settlements, [but] these have proven largely ineffective: Civil wars ended by

negotiated settlements are more likely to recur than those ending in victory by one side.”

This postulation does seem to hold true for the Malian rebellion, where since 1996 there had been peace agreement after agreement without any enduring peace. The peace process in Mali was complicated by the fact that the Bambara-dominated central government was never committed to fully implement all of the peace agreements. Moreover, the recurring conflicts had created too many small groups competing for power and means of survival in the north by controlling trafficking routes. The conflict “is a complex and multidimensional mixture of long-term fundamental grievances by diverse actors and groups” (Roland, 2012b). These competing interests arising from long-term grievances have created a sense of tension and rivalry, leading to conflict.

In the fourth Tuareg rebellion, the three main protagonists of the conflict are the central government; the Coordination of the Movements of Azawad (Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad: CMA), the pro-autonomist alliance; and the Platform movement (La Plateforme), the pro-government alliance. Within these alliances are sub-groups pursuing their own agenda, which at times gives rise to infighting. The CMA is comprised of the MNLA, the High Council for Unity of Azawad (Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad: HCUA), and the Arab Movement of Azawad (Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad: MAA), whereas the Plateforme is led by the Self-defence Group of Tuareg Imghad and Allies (Groupe Autodéfence de Touareg Imghad et Allies: GATIA).

Reminiscent of the third rebellion, a number of splinter groups from both the CMA and Platform merged to form the Coordination of the Movements in Support of the 15 May 2015 Peace Agreement (Coordination des mouvements prônant l’ exclusivité et signataires de l’accord du 15 mai 2015: Compis-15). The common objective of this alliance was their commitment to the initial peace agreement signed on 15 May 2015 as the alliance was opposed to the new Algiers agreement.

In accounting for factors protracting the continuation of civil war, Bestor et al (2014) posited that “negotiations between the regime and the rebels will be ineffective... because of the following factors: the number of rebel groups, the incentives for internal and external groups to spoil any agreement, the unwillingness of external powers to guarantee an agreement, and the perception on both sides that more will be gained through battle than negotiations”. This postulation sums up the difficulties and challenges ECOWAS and other partners faced in resolving the Malian conflicts.

Moreover, given the regional and international dimension of the crisis in the north with the involvement of the transnational criminal groups and terrorist networks, ECOWAS knew it did not have the capacity and resources to resolve the situation (Fieldnotes, 2016). For the first time in ECOWAS intervention, the organisation called for an external review of its actions in the course of a conflict to draw lessons that would shape and inform its future intervention. The Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government requested at the 43rd Ordinary Session in Abuja for an after-action review of its intervention in Mali. The term of reference for the review was for “the Commission to expedite a review of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture with regard to preventive diplomacy and rapid military response capability, against the background of the lessons learned in Mali” (ECOWAS, 2014a).

The review was a yearlong with wider consultations involving experts, activists, government officials, development partners and other relevant partners. The review was ambitious in scope as it sought “the requisite overhaul and repositioning of the decision-making and response mechanisms underpinning the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture (EPSA) with a view to enhancing the anticipatory, response, and peacebuilding postures of the Community, based on the experiences in Mali and elsewhere. The Frameworks and systems under review include Community Acts, Institutions, Organs, and the ECOWAS Standby Force. They also include the ECOWAS mediation and diplomatic methodology, as well as the administrative, logistical, and financial systems and processes undergirding EPSA” (ECOWAS, 2014a).



The report of the after-action review was adopted by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council at its 31st Ordinary Meeting in Abidjan in March 2014. This meeting was on the basis of a recommendation made by the Permanent Representatives to ECOWAS and the ECOWAS Technical Committee of Experts in charge of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (TCEPAPS) after the validation of the report in Accra, Ghana, a month earlier. The report revealed ECOWAS appreciation and admission in public of its strengths and limitations in terms of promoting peace and stability in the region.

ECOWAS recognised its old-age problem that “the political commitment of ECOWAS leaders is often not complemented by sufficient willingness and/or capacity to effectively implement decisions taken at the regional level” (ECOWAS, 2014b, p.5). However, the review helped shape ECOWAS engagement in subsequent peace process. ECOWAS carried out its future actions with the acknowledgment of a key finding of the review that “the definitive resolution of the separatist tendencies in the north, particularly in the Kidal Region, within the framework of the national dialogue and reconciliation process, to ensure equitable development, key role in local administration and meaningful role in central government, and decentralization deep enough to satisfy the aspirations of the minorities, including the Tuareg, holds the key to lasting peace in the north of Mali”.

In subsequent peace negotiation, the ECOWAS mediator, Compaore was able to mediate between the central government and the rebel groups to include some of the considerations above. There was a preliminary success in the signing of an initial peace accord in May 2015. There was pledge of multi-billion dollars financial aid to rebuild the country and promote infrastructure and development in the north. However, some of the leading rebel groups including MNLA and members of the CMA refused to recognise the agreement that it did not go far enough to grant them the very least great autonomy.

The pressure was mounted on the conflict parties by regional and international actors to reach an agreement. The Algerian government took the initiative to host the next round of peace negotiations in its capital as obtained in the third Tuareg rebellion. This time around there was no Gaddafi to “buy” the peace.

The Algiers meeting produced a revised a peace accord in July 2015, which the establishment of autonomous local authorities in the north.

The organisation recognised its limitations in its After-Action Review report that its “Peace and Security infrastructure was configured strictly for peacekeeping operations and as such, it is not flexible enough to fight a successful counter-terrorism war” (ECOWAS, 2014:5). Another indictment was the assertion that “ECOWAS lacks the requisite strategic, military, logistical and financial base for autonomous action in complex emergencies”. As a result, ECOWAS will continue to rely on external support. The organisation depended on external expertise and support including from the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) to deal with the regional threat posed by Islamist armed groups (Maliactu, 2015). The ECOWAS forces as part of MINUSMA have suffered fatalities in the hands of Islamist militants. MINUSMA has suffered over 70 deaths by malicious act arising from attacks by Islamist militants between 2013 to end of 2016. MINUSMA suffered about 30 fatalities in 2016 alone, which put to the intensification of jihadist attacks. Most of the fatalities are from Guinea, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Chad.

ECOWAS forces remain part of MINUSMA and they are learning the hard way to combat transnational organised crimes including terrorism. The organisation is in the process of developing a policy framework and mechanism on combatting terrorism. The fight against terrorism will be a long one. ECOWAS would need the military support of Algeria and Mauritania to provide a long-term solution to the operations of armed Islamist groups in the north. Mali and ECOWAS are unable by themselves to provide effective security of the border in a bid to stop the contraband trade that continues to threaten peace and stability in the region.

## **5.6 Lessons Learned of ECOWAS Intervention in Mali**

An important aspect of ECOWAS peace keeping and SSR involves physical intervention in member states when needed. In this, ECOWAS has learnt some important lessons. Oppenheim (1992) defines intervention as a forcible or dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other State. One observation

made by analysts is that the military intervention by ECOWAS has not been totally successful in quelling conflicts, crisis of regime change and political succession or military intervention into politics in the West African sub-region (Ansorg and Gordon, 2019, Haysom, 2014). ECOWAS intervention in West Africa has taken the form of military intervention, removal of subversive regimes, economic liberation, diplomatic mediation. In the case for Mali discussed above the mission was to restore democracy by forcing the military back to the barracks or restricting it to its constitutional role of protecting the territorial integrity from internal insurrection and external aggression. However, a key limitation of ECOWAS in pursuing these goals is its inability to address the root causes that often cause military intervention. In the case for Mali, the causes of conflict result from history, internal politics and difficulty with political transition, demographic, soil fertility and drought which do not feature within ECOWAS mandate. Hence, although ECOWAS has been able to learn from experience in the areas for which it has competence, it has faced challenges in dealing with internal member state problem including: poor governance, bad leadership, political leadership failure, political corruption, electoral crisis and political violence. These matters remain largely unattended and ignored not just by ECOWAS but equally by other organizations charged with these matters such as the United Nations and the African Union (Boateng, 2019).

A key challenge faced by ECOWAS is that the political conditions in most of the countries in the sub-region and indeed Africa as a whole, are not democracy friendly. Some have argued that Africa countries may be unsuitable for universal or western forms of democratization and demilitarization (Aning and Bah, 2010, Sperling, 2011). Thus, Nowrot and Schebacker (1998) questions the legality and effectiveness of ECOWAS intervention in countries which do not adhere to the fundamentals of human rights and democracy. Hence, Olonisakin (2010) and Bryden et al. (2010) argue that military intervention is always bound to be ineffective in quelling conflicts in the West African sub-region. The challenge of legality was evident in Mali and became a key learning point for ECOWAS with citizens of Mali and some segments of the military questioning ECOWAS's intervention. Although ECOWAS had a genuine reason to intervene in Mali to secure peace in accordance with treaties undersigned by Mali, local forces within southern Mali were opposed to the idea

of an ECOWAS military intervention – including some within the military itself (Lunn, 2012). The Malian forces aligned to the coup leaders, were reluctant to allow ECOWAS set up a base in the country. They were fearful of ECOWAS dictating the direction of the country. This was a lesson for ECOWAS to know that sometimes even the citizens of a country may not unanimously endorse intervention. The various challenges faced by in Mali enabled it to formulate SSR, EWR and other norms and mechanisms for effective intervention in conflicts.

Perhaps the most important development in ECOWAS intervention in Mali was the organisation's decision to open itself up to public scrutiny by requesting for the After-Action Review report. This was a bold step, indicating the organisation's willingness to learn and evolve. In the past, it would have been unusual for such a review to have been conducted. Up to the aftermath of the Mali conflict, ECOWAS actions were decided and executed with no critical examination to ascertain key learning points. The creation of the After-Action, review Report was an innovation and key introspective learning point which served the purpose of improvement and more effective intervention for future conflicts (ECOWAS, 2019).

Besides the above post-intervention reflection and change, ECOWAS evolved an incremental improvement of its mechanisms. For instance, intervention in Mali showed some remarkable improvements in the application of its normative framework in comparison to its response in the Ivorian conflict. Evidence of this is that ECOWAS was quick to respond to the outbreak of the fourth rebellion and the ensuing military coup in Mali as elucidated above. In doing so, it deployed its normative frameworks and mechanism which by now were far more developed than in the previous conflicts in Liberia for instance where Nigeria basically intervened on its own accord. Thus, a key learning was more coordination and collaboration between member and basing decisions on applicable norms and mechanisms rather than hegemonic country influence that characterised early interventions (Bah, 2010). This new approach was evident in the organisation's three key strategic objectives, "a) to assist Mali restore the country's unity and territorial integrity; b) to assist Mali to restore constitutional legality and order in the country; c) and by extension, preserve regional peace and security" were to a varying degree met (ECOWAS, 2014b).

ECOWAS was able to demonstrate its “political commitment to the ideals of regional integration and mutual assistance” and for the first time it upheld the inviolability of its Supplementary Protocol.

Another, key lesson was a move towards political solution in the form of mediation rather than intervention. A notable act in this respect was the decision to assist Mali in efforts to revisit the political system, nurture and, strengthen political party culture in the country. Were ECOWAS’ recommendation to be implemented, this would have signalled a radical departure from reactive intervention to a greater engagement and involvement in the nation-building process of member states. This new approach observed in Cote D’Ivoire and Mali respectively was a realization that military solution is not often the best approach from the onset of a conflict. Boateng (2019) observed that whilst elements of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms are clear in their instruments and policy responses, they sometimes lack legitimacy, technical and financial capacity which impede their practical implementation for holistic delivery. In this respect, ECOWAS mediation in Cote D’Ivoire for instance was the bedrock for the Framework Agreement and Transitional Roadmap mediation for the restoration of constitutional order in Mali. ECOWAS was behind efforts to create the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission and produce the Preliminary Agreement towards Elections and National Dialogue. All these actions resulted in the successful organisation of the 2013 presidential and 2014 legislative elections in Mali. ECOWAS was also actively involved the various stages of the peace process that led to the final Algiers agreement in its mediation functions.

A further learning has been how ECOWAS is able to work with external actors, UN, AU and France in the same conflict. Increasingly, ECOWAS came to recognise the force of external partners and the effects of bilateral and multilateral agreements signed by other countries especially with the Francophone bloc discussed in chapter four above. In response, the organisation was able to develop the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), a blueprint for concerted international action to assist Mali in the restoration of its territorial integrity (ECOWAS, 2014b). The development of CONOPS was another improvement of ECOWAS from its engagement in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali. Having encountered numerous challenges due to the multiple dimension

of both conflicts, multiple threats and limited resources and expertise ECOWAS became more willing to learn from Western partners such as France which had a more sophisticated weaponry on land, air and sea as well as a more professional army in all divisions. It became evident that dependency on outside assistance for requisite financial, logistical, and military resources could be compromised for autonomy, pride and show of strength. Given that the majority of member states are among the least developed in the world with a fragile economy, ECOWAS recognises that it would continue to depend on external funding and support to execute its military intervention.

The move towards more collaborative approach to conflict intervention came also as a result of a recognition of ECOWAS limitations at the diplomatic level in African Union and UN. In the discussions in these bodies, ECOWAS was relegated to a regional organization with no strong voice. Hence, diplomatic efforts to enforce its will were far from successful at the AU, UN even when it thought its mechanisms and norms were critical to achieve the objectives for peace (ECOWAS, 2014b). The recognition of the weakness in its diplomatic efforts may account for the organisation's tendency to relegate itself to a secondary role at the height of a conflict as was the case in Cote d'Ivoire and Mali.

In the next chapter, the empirical finding is presented and harmonised to highlight the key findings of the research.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **EFFECTIVENESS OF ECOWAS SSR/G, EWR, ECPF, NORMS AND MECHANISMS**

#### **6. Introduction**

The last chapters (three, four and five) presented findings from secondary content analysis and process tracing approaches. The findings identified ECOWAS processes, SSR/G norms, mechanisms in terms of their creation, evolution, implementation and challenges in deployment in the case for Cote

D'Ivoire and Mali and more widely over time. The chapters also presented secondary findings regarding the internal foreign and security policy as well as the interest of Ghana and Nigeria and how these were manifested in treaties, conflict interventions and in the level of commitment shown by both countries using content analysis and process tracing technique for the case studies.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first evaluates ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), explores its agenda-setting and priorities in relation to crisis response, stabilization, SSR/G for conflict prevention since 2014-2017 and assesses the effectiveness of initiatives and actions taken in promoting SSR/G, EWER and general CP efforts between 2014-2017. ECOWAS norms, mechanisms and policies and wider issues and debates on ECOWAS functions during the period are also analysed in the chapter. The chapter further examines the role and contributions of international partners in the implementation and adoption of ECOWAS SSR/G norms and mechanisms between 2014 and 2017, highlighting capacity constraints, intervention decisions and other paralysis affecting effective CP, EWER mechanism and intervention and crisis discrepancies as well as the later post Cote D'Ivoire Gambia mission is covered in the chapter.

The second section of the chapter presents empirical findings from semi-structured interviews conducted in the field with ECOWAS top executives at its offices at Abuja and Accra in Nigeria and Ghana respectively and experts in the knowledge area of ECOWAS operations as explained in chapter one section 1.4 above. Here the main themes are presented alongside power quotes and theme codes.

### **6.1 Change and Dynamism in ECOWAS SSRG and ECPF frameworks**

ECOWAS's new approach towards conflict prevention (CP) began after 2010. The ECPF comprises 15 components including its Enabling Mechanism (EM) which is at the heart of reinforcing intra-ECOWAS cooperation and ensuring the coordination of the implementation of the ECPF plans of action that contributes to a measurable improvement of peace, security and stability in the region (ECOWAS, 2020b). The main purpose was to develop Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSR/G) norms and frameworks that are more adaptable to the unfolding complex crisis observed in the sub-region which required not just

military intervention but equally non-military involved as expatiated in chapter - section 3.4.4. Since 2013 - two years after the end of the Ivorian conflict and in the midst of its response to the post 2012 Mali crisis, ECOWAS started working towards developing a Security Sector SSR/G norm and mechanism for CP. It considered the development of SSR/G norms as its bulwark for CP across West Africa. This new approach developed out of the call for Africa to adopt effective SSR programme as part of the broader conflict prevention strategy as enunciated in the statement of the Security Council of 16 July 2010 (UN, 2010). In response, several changes were made in respect to upscaling ECPF framework by heads of member states with the latest concluded just recently at Abuja, Nigeria in January 2019 (ECOWAS, 2020). The Abuja meeting set out plans of action (PoA) to enable effective implementation. This latest upscaling builds upon ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (EPFSSRG) adopted in June 2016 to enhance African and West African solidarity and partnership, respect of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Given, this new approach, the SSRG policy objective became open to regional integration, regional and national ownership as well as context specific ECPF and SSRG. It also expanded to non-military interventions and sensitivity to CP strategies by including issued related to gender and human rights. This change is evident in Section III of the EPFSSRG comprising 10 essential features:

- i) a National Security Policy,
- ii). a periodic security sector review and needs assessment,
- iii) a comprehensive professionalization and modernization of the security sector,
- iv) the involvement of customary authorities and community-based security providers,
- v) the effective involvement of CSOs and the media,
- vi). the establishment of effective democratic control and oversight institutions,
- vii) an effective resources mobilization strategy and financing of SSRG,
- viii) a national framework for cooperation and partnership building,
- ix) an effective communication strategy,
- x) a monitoring and evaluation mechanism.



The 10 features were designed to encompass broad thematic areas of traditional and emerging security threats such as counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, maritime security, control of small arms and light weapons, border security and cross-border initiatives, humanitarian assistance, combating transnational organized crime, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), early warning, peace education (the culture of peace), peace support operations, women and youth empowerment, and democratic governance.

It is expected by ECOWAS heads of state that new PoA launched in Abuja in January, 2019 will drive the activities of the components of: Early warning, preventive diplomacy, democracy and political governance, human rights and rule of law, media, natural resource governance, cross-border initiatives and security governance. Others are: Women, peace and security, youth empowerment, ECOWAS Stand-By Force, Humanitarian assistance, peace education (Culture of peace) as well as the Enabling Mechanism. The PoA reinforces learning and strategizing for effective resource mobilization initiatives and project implementation best practices. Therefore, it is fair to argue that the adoption by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC) in January 2008 as a framework for identifying, designing and implementing programs and activities for operational and structural conflict prevention has been dynamic and made more effective than previously as it is now a more collective project that influenced by hegemonic member states (Boateng, 2019).

## **6.2 Implementation of ECOWAS norms and mechanism from 2014-2017**

With the end of the Ivorian conflict in April 2011 and the start of the Malian complex political and ethnic conflict in January 2012, there was a gradual shift of the agenda-setting of ECOWAS in its approach to conflict prevention (Jaye, 2011, Uzoechina, 2014). The shift was a move away from its heavy and reactive focus on crisis response and stabilization approach to embracing the proactive approach of promoting SSR/G, with greater emphasis on the building and reforming of political and security institutions (Bryden et al., 2008). In other words, since 2013, post-Cote d'Ivoire intervention, ECOWAS has increased its engagement in promoting and implementing SSR/G (Uzoechina, 2014). In

order to make implementation of not just of SSR and EWER norms and mechanism more effective and adaptable, ECOWAS has adopted a broader framing of its approaches in line with other regional and supranational CP and EWER organizations such as NATO, EU and the UN. This is considering that in practice, post-conflict operations have attracted most international attention and from this has been the chance for regional organisations like ECOWAS to benefit from global funding opportunities which has boosted member states and in particular participating armies in terms of offering better training and wages (Sanusi and Gyamfi, 2017).

However, the adoption of more general approaches – in spite of the above opportunities for funding and collaboration with external partners, the universal approach has been resented in certain research communities and some ECOWAS advocates, ostensibly as part of their agenda-setting work within ECOWAS. Some scholars and critics have called instead for an African specific approach to peace intervention (Uzoechina, 2014). While others have advocated a country-level approach. Reiterating the country-specific approach, the title of an article on UNOWAS – a quarterly E-Magazine for West Africa and Sahel countries on security matters read:

“National ownership is a must for the success of the security sector reform in West Africa and the Sahel” (UNOWAS, 2017). This local country-level approach is built around the view that each country is different and therefore it should be able to better address the specific demands for peace and security as the journal further stated:

“It is the deficit in the governance of security institutions and their inability to respond to security needs of the people and the State that often create the necessity to conduct reforms. Security sector reform (SSR) is therefore a process led and owned by national actors, aimed at ensuring that security providers are effective and accountable to the State and its people without discrimination and with full respect for human rights (UNOWAS, 2017). However, ECOWAS has ignored the country level argument and proceeded with committing all member states towards a collective approach and opening up for collaboration with the AU, EU and UN as evident in the Cote D’Ivoire conflict and subsequent tentative intervention in the Gambia. This shift in the agenda-setting was the focus of the 45th Ordinary Summit held in Ghana July

2014 where the Heads of State and Government adopted the 2014 Interim Report of the President of the Commission and the Reports of the 72nd Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and the 32nd Meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council(ECOWAS, 2014b).

The communique of the Summit made key declarations emphasizing this gradual shift. Notable outcomes of this Summit include paragraph 34, stating the commitments of ECOWAS to the unity and territorial integrity of Mali and the non-negotiable and sacrosanct sovereignty of its Member States. The regional bloc emphasized the importance of dialogue between the Tuareg insurgent and the Malian Government but maintained its “commitment to respect the unity, territorial integrity and secularity of the Republic of Mali” (ECOWAS, 2014b). In addition to this commitment, the regional bloc, stated in paragraph 42 that the Malian government should pursue “a comprehensive reform agenda, encompassing national dialogue and reconciliation, economic recovery; the reform of the governance and political institutions and processes to sustain the stabilization and recovery efforts” (ECOWAS, 2014b). They pledged the assistance of ECOWAS and the rest of the international community in the implementation of the reforms.

The above openness addresses the issues of lack of collaboration discussed in chapter three, the issues of Ghana and Nigerian specific foreign and security policies discussed in chapter four and the difficulties of collaboration between France, AU and UN in the case analysis of Cote D’Ivoire and Mali in chapter five. To the extent that ECOWAS has shown the desire to develop, innovate, change and collaborate, it is evident that its SSR/G and associated mechanisms have been made more effective in the later years 2014 – 2017 than they were in the previous period 2000 – 2010.

The effectiveness of the renewed approach and upscaling of mechanisms was evident in dealing with Guinea Bissau and the Gambia. In terms of Guinea Bissau, the Summit demonstrated its resolve to move embrace a holistic approach to reforming the country’s political and security sector. Paragraph 43 of the Communique spelled out the approval of the regional bloc of a Post-Election Reform Programme. The regional bloc also agreed “to support the Government of Guinea Bissau in the process of resource mobilization for the

implementation of the reforms, including but not limited to the facilitation of an International Donor Conference” for the creation of a Special Emergency Support Fund. Furthermore, paragraph 48 stressed the need for “the ECOWAS Commission to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the Defence and Security Sector Reform (DSSR) programme” (ECOWAS, 2014b).

### **6.3 Early Warning Early Response (EWER)**

The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) is an observation and monitoring tool for conflict prevention and decision-making in West Africa. Its legal framework is found in Article 58 of the revised 1993 ECOWAS Treaty. However, its establishment and functioning are defined by the Protocol, Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999. The implementation of this tool began in 2003 but has been carried through via various succeeding mechanisms (Sagna, 2009).


ECOWAS early warning and early response (EWER) was not system on its own with specific mandate, intervention structure, information sources, analytical methods from heads of member states as is the case for SSRG (ECOWAS, 2019). Although it existed as a mechanism for the prevention, or reduction of the impact, of conflicts – as analysed in chapter three and four above, the problem of capacity and indecision plagued ECOWAS EWER interventions in almost of its interventions (ECOWAS archives). However, realising that opportunities were missed to address conflicts before they became fully out blown civils wars such as in the case of Cote D’Ivoire and Mali analysed in chapter five, it took steps to address these deficiencies. Analysts argue that in the absence of an effective EWER strategy and mechanism, ECOWAS relied on member states to address early warning situations. Ghana for instance, tends to carry out EWER processes politically and internally without the input and recognition of the ECOWAS Commission (Aning, 2004, Opoku et al., 2007). Similar approaches were observed in many post-conflict countries such as Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Niger (Bryden et al., 2008). Thus, EWER mechanisms remain less developed as ECOWAS has mainly adopted SSR/G as its preferred option for conflict prevention and has continued to rely on crisis response and stabilization mechanism to deal with conflict situation in

its member states from 2014 to 2017 (Field notes, 2017). However, there has been a realisation of the importance of EWER mechanism as an integral part of the overall conflict prevention strategy for ECOWAS and the necessary steps taken to address this arm of its policies. This development is clearly the result of lessons learnt in previous interventions as well as benefits of collaboration and engagement with France, EU, the UN and other partners within the emerging global agenda on CP. Change has also been necessary in view of responding to the resource mobilisation and capacity deficiency issues raised in past cases as highlighted in chapter three and five. The new orientation is triggered by both internal ECOWAS processes and previous failures as well as member state desire to intervene earlier politically in their countries to avert war and conflict (Boateng, 2019).

Following from the above, one step taken by ECOWAS was to recognise the complexity of EWER tasks by learning from the past and developing a flexible redesigned centralised approach to EWER systems but equally complementing and reinforcing individual country approaches. Paragraph 51 of the communique of the Summit indicates this change by calling for the establishment of National Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (NEWRM) across member states. Since 2016, the ECOWAS Commission has started a pilot project of establishing NEWRM in five post-conflict countries, namely: Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Mali (Field notes, 2017). The introduction of NEWRM is a demonstration of the resolve to decentralise crisis response at the national level to ensure that first responders will be able to contain simmering conflicts and tensions from boiling over (Fieldnotes, 2017).

Following the experiences of ECOWAS in responding to conflicts and political crises across West Africa notably in Cote d'Ivoire and Mali, the ECOWAS Commission came to the conclusion that its early warning reports were not producing early interventions in many instances (Fieldnotes, 2017). The ECOWAS Commission noted that the reason for the delay in responses was partly due to the fact that the regional bloc was not well-equipped to make timely intervention in instances of apolitical crises such as inter-ethnic conflicts, farmers-cattle herders conflicts, domestic terrorism among others (Fieldnotes, 2017). As a result, the ECOWAS Commission proposed an enhancement of its

current national early warning system known as ECOWARN. The current ECOWARN mechanism is a bottom-up approach whereby data of conflict and crises are collected by monitors at national level and fed into the regional system (ECOWAS, 2015). However, the response mechanism has been so far limited at the top level as shown in the illustration below.



Thus, there is need of a change in the mechanism to enable locally driven response informed by the early warning data (Fieldnotes, 2017). A key change was to decentralise the early warning system in a way that early warning reports could help trigger early response at national level by the competent authorities or non-state actor bodies and leaders. The basis for the decentralisation of the early warning and early response system was initially expressed in Articles 8 and 9 of the 2010 Monrovia Declaration on Two Decades of Peace Processes in West Africa, stipulating that:

ECOWAS should enhance its capabilities to engage in the prevention, management and resolution of local intensity conflicts by developing bottom-up mechanisms (i.e. alternative dispute resolution methods, including

traditional approaches) to reinforce the existing peace and security architecture.

ECOWAS should engage Member States in the enhancement of their capacity to manage and resolve local and low intensity conflicts by developing national mechanisms to reinforce the existing peace and security architecture” (ECOWAS, 2010).

The expansion and decentralisation of the EWER system was presented as a model to address late response to both political and apolitical crises and conflicts in West Africa. The commitment of the Heads of State and Government for enhancement and expansion of ECOWARN was also expressed in Article 51 of the communiqué of the 45th ordinary session of ECOWAS held in Accra on 14 July 2014. As such, ECOWAS sought funding primarily from the US Government through its embassy in Abuja. This decentralisation of the project was considered of strategic importance by the US government. President Barack Obama underscored the importance of ECOWARN in his concluding remarks at the conclusion of the August 2014 US-Africa Summit, stating that the US would provide funds to enhance and expand the capacities of ECOWARN as a first stage of a global support to early warning mechanisms within the regional communities in Africa (ECOWAS, 2015). It was at the Summit in Abuja in December 2015 that Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government adopted the Regulation on the Establishment of National Early Warning Mechanisms (NEWRM). The adoption of NEWRM came following the signing of the partnership between ECOWAS and the US Government in November 2015 to provide among others substantive funding for the implementation of the NEWRM project over a five-year period (2016-2020) and logistics (equipment/furniture and vehicles) required for the setting up of the national centres.

With funds from the US government for the project, the ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate set about the creation of NEWRM national centres for the coordination of the early response especially in relation to apolitical crisis situations (Fieldnotes, 2017). The NEWRM is a pilot project for implementation in five post-conflict countries, namely: Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Mali (Field notes, 2017). To launch the project, ECOWAS

dispatched a mission led by the Special Representatives in Mali, Guinea Bissau and Liberia to discuss modalities of the project, which included the setting up of an implementation task force by the Vice President of each pilot country. The NEWRM project started in 2016 with the establishment of national task force in each country. The introduction of NEWRM is a demonstration of the resolve of the regional bloc to decentralize crisis response at the national level to ensure that first responders will be able to contain simmering conflicts and tensions from boiling over (Fieldnotes, 2017). As the above analysis shows, much more needs to be done to develop a more effective EWER for ECOWAS considering its importance in CP and the maintenance of peace and stability in the sub-region.

#### **6.4 Development of ECOWAS SSR/G norms 2014-2017**

As ECOWAS worked towards advancing its conflict prevention norms and mechanisms by promoting SSR/G reforms and establishing national early warning and response mechanism, the regional bloc increased its intervention between 2014 and 2017 in an assertive way to stop the military assuming power through unconstitutional means in West Africa. This was the period when the number of democratically elected civilian heads of state of ECOWAS member states was on the increase. This brand of new democratically elected presidents had little patience for the military officers that seek to take power through unconstitutional means and later transformed themselves to civilian president. From 2014, it was only the presidents of Burkina Faso and the Gambia had acceded power through military coups and later transformed themselves to elected civilian presidents.

It is important to examine how and why SSR/G norms were developed and established in ECOWAS from the late 2000s through to 2016 in order to assess the extent to which the norms established and agreed by ECOWAS are similar to or distinct from wider international norms of SSR – including by AU; UN; EU; and OECD-DAC. In exploring these issues, it will become apparent as to whether ECOWAS norms are mostly an official adoption (in parallel with the AU) of international norms as accepted by the above international bodies or framed to fit within ECOWAS norms. This is the focus of this section.



#### **6.4.1 Foundation of ECOWAS SSR/G**

It is posited that the integration of SSRG directly in the design stage of the conflict prevention programmes could stimulate reform process to promote and enhance security (Greene, 2003). ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (EPFSSRG) was adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Governments in June 2016. Before its final adoption, the EPFSSRG had to go through first the various levels of quality control and expertise, which included a group of external experts and the Mediation and Security Council (MSC). The EPFSSRG seeks to provide the framework to accompany the Supplementary Act on the Code of Conducts for the Armed Forces and Security Services of ECOWAS adopted in 2011. According to ECOWAS, the EPFSSRG aims to promote accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in the security sector. The emphasis on governance encompasses the management and operations of oversight institutions of the security sector across West Africa.

The SSRG seeks to be ambitious in its coverage and areas of intervention. It covers the broad spectrum of security actors in Member States including defence (army, navy and air force), police, gendarmerie, prisons and corrections, intelligence, anti-terror units, customs, immigration, border guards, coast guards, civil defence corps, civil emergency units, justice and rule of law bodies, security management bodies, oversight institutions, civil society, non-state and informal security providers. The mechanism envisaged for implementation and compliance include member state led assessments and biannual reviews to identify the areas of greatest need in the SSR process, which should be given the highest priority. The development of the EPFSSRG is not meant for only post-conflict countries but to be used by all Member States in every contexts whether the country is at peace or showing visible signs of severe vulnerability that could lead to conflict and state collapse (ECOWAS, 2016a).

Although the evolving EPFSSRG is conceptualised as an ECOWAS mechanism, its formation and statute composition are not distinct. Rather, these policies and mechanisms sit within wider international norms of SSR as

adopted by the AU; UN; EU; and OECD-DAC and membership countries. For instance, the expansion of SSR adopted by ECOWAS is similar to content of the Handbook of the Network for Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (now INCAF). The operational handbook is intended to assist organizations and donors implement SSR at field-level in line with international norms and standards. After an extensive period of consultations – including those with recognised experts and partners from the South – the SSR Handbook was officially endorsed by OECD DAC Ministers and Heads of Agency on 4 April 2007. Amongst other changes, the SSR Handbook which is also adopted in large part by the EU and UN agencies provides similar ideas and changes to those adopted by ECOWAS. Key aspects include fostering a supportive political environment through in-depth knowledge of a given reform context in order for international actors to avoid exacerbating domestic divisions and capitalise on opportunities to put SSR on the national agenda. The SSR Handbook also emphasises that while profoundly established security, political and economic conditions can only to a certain extent be influenced by external actors, it is critical to take these into account if appropriate entry points for SSR are to be identified. In this respect it encourages context-specific knowledge and expertise which it considers to be essential in the assessment process and subsequent design of SSR programmes.

Other recommendations of the SSR Handbook include emphasises on local ownership, built on a foundation of high and meaningful participation by domestic stakeholders. This implies that resources provided to support SSR must be tailored to the capacities and budget limitations of national authorities and that, more broadly, adopting a long-term approach is vital. Furthermore, it proposes that building national capacities to manage and oversee security and justice provision represents a major component of sustainable SSR programming. However, making local ownership operational requires a significant culture change in donor behaviour which departs from allowing narrow timeframes, tight budget cycles and the demand for short-term, output-driven results to more realistic budgets, planning and capacity (OECD, 2019).

The above expansionist ideology adopted by ECOWAS SSRG, norms and mechanism are further replications of the UN resolutions. For instance,

Article 17 of The Security Council, resolution 2151 adopted by the UN at its 7161st meeting, on 28 April 2014 encourages the Secretary-General to continue to promote cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, consistent with the framework agreement for the 10-year capacity-building programme for the African Union, towards its efforts to strengthen its continent-wide policy framework for security sector reform. Such reform it states should be informed by and in support of the African Peace and Security Architecture, and further encourages all partners (including ECOWAS) to continue to assist the African Union in building its capacities in this regard. With regards to content, the similar SSRG objectives of ECOWAS feature prominently in the preamble stating:

Reforming the security sector in post-conflict environments is critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate State authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict, and further stressing that, in this regard, a professional, effective and accountable security sector and accessible and impartial law-enforcement and justice sectors are equally necessary to laying the foundations for peace and sustainable development (UN, 2014).

These two SSR directives analysed above suppose that there is scope for slight differences in implementation and conceptualisation relative to the specificity of the context. In this respect although ECOWAS has long experience and local knowledge and has struggled to address key conflicts not least those in Mali and Cote D'Ivoire for which its position was undermined by France due to capacity, resource mobilisation power and military expertise as concluded in chapter five.

It follows that developed a draft Implementation Plan for the EPFSSRG. The strategic objectives of the Implementation Plan including the objective to:

- Create an enabling environment that would be conducive for/supportive of SSRG
- Support a nationally led vision of security and mandate for SSRG
- Increase confidence and trust in the security sector
- Improve effectiveness and professionalism of security departments and agencies

- Consolidate gains and institutionalize a culture of SSRG promotion
- Review progress and feed lessons back into the planning process (M&E)

ECOWAS archives reviewed during fieldwork revealed that ECOWAS frameworks were essentially replications of UN, EU and AU directives and approaches. For this reason, it has been argued that the use of these external instruments does not allow for local ownership of the SSR process (Donais, 2008). However, ECOWAS and member states still hold significant leverages of power when it comes to implementation.

#### **6.4.2 Implementation as aspect of control and ownership**

To ensure the concerns of ECOWAS are taken into consideration during the implementation of SSR, the Special Representative of the President of the ECOWAS Commission was created. This is a special vehicle through which the ECOWAS Commission pushed through its SSR policies in member states. For instance, in Guinea Bissau, the monitoring of the implementation of the Defence and Security Sector Reform (DSSR) was done by the Special Representative of the President of the ECOWAS Commission (Bappah, 2017). Furthermore, the development of the EPFSSRG serves to complement the Code of Conduct of Armed Forces and Security Services (CCAFSS), which was adopted in 2011. The strategic objectives of the Code of Conduct which has as objective to:

- Promote the inculcation of democratic norms into the behaviour of personnel and institutions of the armed forces and security services in ECOWAS Member States
- Promote conditions that will deter unconstitutional change of government and strengthen democratic civilian control and good governance of the security sector
- Reinforce democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights, international humanitarian law, as well as restructuring of civil-military relations
- Provide specific confidence-building measures among Member States and sets out common principles and standards defining politico-security relations

- Support fundamental shift in the way security is perceived, managed, controlled and overseen, coupled with positive change of the attitude and conduct of security actors
- Orient the focus and capacities of institutions, individuals and groups engaged in the security sector to make them efficient, effective, responsive, and responsible to democratic control

According to senior ECOWAS officials in the field, the EPFSSRG provides the political and strategic commitments on norms and standards of democratic security governance by the Authority of Heads of State and Governments, in light with international principles of human rights for instance. In promoting the implementation of EPFSSRG and CoC, the ECOWAS Commission sets itself the following roles: normative role, facilitating role, enabling role and supervisory role. In terms of its normative role, the ECOWAS Commission will seek to ensure that member states adopt standards, resolutions and decisions of democratic security governance as agreed by all Member States. Its facilitating role is to support the smooth implementation of peace accords where necessary as well as support the development of national SSR strategies and resource mobilization. Its enabling role seeks to accompany national initiatives through advocacy, training and capacity building, joint exercises, DDR, while its supervisory role entails undertaking assessment and fact-finding, monitoring compliance, evaluating impact of SSR/G programmes. To facilitate the implementation and promotion of the SSR/G and CoC, the Commission inaugurated in June 2017 an Interdepartmental Working Group on SSRG to serve as an oversight and coordinating within the Commission (Fieldnotes, 2017).

Furthermore, to ensure the concerns of ECOWAS are taken into consideration at the level of member states during the implementation of SSR, the Special Representative of the President of the ECOWAS Commission was created. This is a special vehicle through which the ECOWAS Commission pushed through its SSR policies in member states. For instance, in Guinea Bissau, the monitoring of the implementation of the Defence and Security Sector Reform (DSSR) was done by the Special Representative of the President of the ECOWAS Commission (Bappah, 2017).

Before its final adoption, the EPFSSRG had to go through first the various levels of quality control and expertise, which included a group of external experts and the Mediation and Security Council (MSC). The Commission held a meeting of experts from all member states first to validate the implementation plan and conduct joint SSRG assessment missions with the UN, AU and other interested parties in member states, starting with The Gambia to promote common understanding and identify entry points for support (Fieldnotes, 2017). Further activities were planned by the ECOWAS Commission for the promotion and implementation of the SSRG and CoC. The Commission plans to conduct an SSRG data project for West Africa to collate, analyse and present quantitative data in useful and user-friendly formats so as to enable evidence-based decision making as well as facilitate the capacity building for ECOWAS Commission and field missions to better support SSRG in member states. The Commission would develop derivative tools on CoC to be used by other stakeholders including CSOs in sensitisation, information and education of security officers of different cadres. The Commission planned also to facilitate reorientation, civil-military dialogue, and exchange of good practice in pilot member states. As a monitoring mechanism, the Commission planned to organize a high-level strategic workshop and biennial (two-yearly) review meetings with participation of both government and civil society representatives. Moreover, the Commission encouraged member states to designate national focal points for reporting and monitoring on the progress of the Code of Conduct to sustain momentum in its implementation. The Commission demands also official annual reports from member state(Fieldnotes, 2017).

These initiatives and actions of ECOWAS are laudable in trying to develop SSR/G norms and mechanisms for the adoption by member states. The initiatives and actions are not without its challenges as the regional bloc struggles with limited human, financial and other material resources. There is no doubt that ECOWAS Commission had placed emphasis on SSR/G from ECOWAS as critical conflict prevention tool for the adoption and implementation by member states. However, it remains the case that SSRG is largely a political process that involves political decision making and requires support of the national leadership for it to succeed (Bappah, 2017). In a sense,

SSRG offers opportunities for improving political engagement across the security sectors, while at the same time creating the conditions that would enable reform efforts to take root. Although technical expertise and operational tools to support SSRG processes are important, SSRG would not succeed if it is removed from the specific political context. Thus, it is imperative that there is thorough understanding of SSRG especially at the strategic level. However, it is observed that there is poor understanding of SSRG among the senior leadership in many countries (Fieldnotes, 2017). For instance, in Guinea Bissau, the DSSR programme is largely limited to one-off short-term technical training and provision of equipment such as computers and vehicles instead of developing a more structured programme to inculcate in the ethos of the armed forces the respect for constitutional democratic control, human rights, and relations with civilians. Poor understanding undermines prioritisation of actions and programmes to tackle the most pressing problems that pose threats to the state (Fieldnotes, 2017).

The above analysis confirms that ECOWAS SSRG development from 2014 – 2016 is a follow-up to wider international resolutions, practices and directives. However, how these international directives are implemented is a matter for which ECOWAS retains significant control. In some case ECOWAS implementation has been successful as in the case for Gambia, however, the analysis also shows that problems of delays, hesitation and uncertainty has hampered implementation at different levels.

#### **6.4.3 ECOWAS Challenges 2014 - 2016**

As much as in the earlier period 2000 – 2010, ECOWAS continues to face similar challenges of shortages in expertise as well as human and financial resources. However, the difference in the more recent times is an increased commitment from member states. A key challenge faced by ECOWAS has been that of encouraging member states to comply with the requirement of paragraph 66 (a) of the EPFSSRG. This Article urges member states to “provide a legal framework that includes a national security policy, a national security strategy, a national security sector reform vision and strategy, action plan and other relevant instruments to support SSRG programmes” (ECOWAS,

2016a). So far, none of the pilot countries including Guinea Bissau, had published the Code of Conduct (CoC) in National Gazettes of all Member States. No structures or mechanism had been put in place to harmonise the existing national codes of conduct with the CoC of ECOWAS. A further challenge is that only a few of the member states, including Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal would have the capacity to integrate the CoC into the curriculum of their training schools. Despite a slow start, member states are beginning to align their internal systems to the recommendations provided by ECOWAS. However, there is still a long way to go before all countries comply to adopting and integrating their military training curriculum to ECOWAS standards and requirements. This is understandable given the heterogeneity between countries within the sub-region. None the less, the confidence and preparedness of member states to act promptly even without treaties, agreements and pre-arranged mechanism – reflects an Afrocentric world view of interdependence, informality and trust as ascribed in the philosophy of Ubuntu. This way ECOWAS can declare its Vision 2020 Peace and Security pillar (Theme II), even in the midst of reorganisation and challenges stating:

We envision, by 2020, a secure and socially cohesive West Africa devoid of conflicts, whose leaders and people place a high premium on peace and collective regional security, effective operation of an ECOWAS regional defence and security system that will effectively combat illegal arms and drugs. There will be conscious and sustained collective effort to eliminate social discrimination or exclusion, and there will be a demonstrable strong drive to inculcate acceptance of the socio-cultural diversities of the region as a positive factor that enriches life in the region.

Another important challenge faced by ECOWAS has been consistent delays in adopting SSR/G structures. Delays in the development of new ECOWAS norms and mechanisms specific to SSR/G were the result of many factors some of which are related to member state internal leadership situations. Therefore in spite of agreed policy statements in the ECPF and the UN call for regions to strengthen SSR/G regimes between 2008 - 2010, the fact that the chairpersonship of ECOWAS was in the hands of Nigeria cause a delay considering that Nigeria was experiencing some internal leadership challenges



(Fieldnotes, 2016). Nigeria held the chairmanship of ECOWAS from 2008 to 2012 between the late Umaru Yar'Adua (19 Feb 2008-18 Feb 2010) and Goodluck Jonathan (18 Feb 2010-16 Feb 2012). Under the Yar'Adua, Nigeria's focus was on its internal challenges as the president was largely incapacitated by long illness (Fieldnotes, 2016). According to a retired Nigerian civil servant, the government under Yar'Adua was more focused on hiding the fact that the president was sick and could not carry out his functions properly. Also, there was internal politics taking place as to who would eventually succeed him. Following the death of Yar'Adua on 5 May 2010 after battling his ailment for years, his vice president Goodluck Jonathan succeeded him. At the level of ECOWAS under Yar'Adau, the regional bloc internally was preoccupied with finalising the Vision 2020 document, which was first mooted in 2007.

Under the chairmanship of President Goodluck Jonathan, the focus of Nigeria was still inward as the president was engaged trying to consolidate his power and secure his own legitimacy and mandate in the presidential elections of the following year. In April 2011, Jonathan won the presidential elections to start his own mandate as the elected president of Nigeria. It was also at this point that the second civil war in Cote d'Ivoire broke out. At this point, there was little internal focus within ECOWAS to push the agenda for the development of SSR/G norms and mechanisms as the ECOWAS Commission was busy trying to finalise its Vision 2020 document (Fieldnotes, 2016). Thus, with the launch of the Vision 2020 document in June 2010, the end of the Ivorian second civil war and the installation of Alassane Ouattara as president opened up more of the internal space for forward-thinking and planning within ECOWAS and its Commission.

As President Goodluck passed on the ECOWAS chairmanship to the reform-minded Alassane Ouattara, who served in that position between February 2012 to Mar 2014, there was this renewed energy with ECOWAS for SSR/G norms and frameworks to reform the military across West Africa. According to an Ivorian former minister, there was a particular national interest in the Ouattara administration for an SSR/G instrument to promote a republican army in West Africa, particularly given the nefarious role played by the military in the two Ivorian civil wars (Fieldnotes, 2016). Thus, from 2013, two years after the end of the Ivorian conflict and also in the midst of its response to the post

2012 Mali crisis, ECOWAS started working towards developing a SSR/G policy framework and decentralising its regional early warning system. The regional bloc considered the development of SSR/G norms and the decentralisation of its regional early warning system as its bulwark for conflict prevention across West Africa (Fieldnotes, 2016).

It is on the basis of Ubuntu that most of what has been accomplished by ECOWAS has been possible. An example of this is for instance the willingness for Nigeria to go it alone sometimes when other nations cannot afford to participate financially. SSR/G is a political project that requires a long-term commitment by both national and international actors. It is not for the faint of heart; the effort requires endless reserves of patience and perseverance. The experience of Sierra Leone shows how dedicated, capable people who are provided political and professional space to conduct such activities can achieve a great deal under challenging circumstances. Ultimately, it is the people and a culture of love and community that often prevails after wars as exemplified in Rwanda.

#### **6.4.4 Application of SSR/G in Gambia**

Although, some member states to ratify and integrate ECOWAS principles and against the odds of the above challenges, three common behaviour were evident by ECOWAS and member states characterising a change from previous intervention in 2014 – 2016. This change was exhibited in the Gambia mission. First, is the ability for ECOWAS to make quick decisions. Quick decision making meant that the defeated president Yaya Jammeh could not remain in power knowing ECOWAS was resolute in its decision. This was different from the case of Mali and Cote D'Ivoire for instance where ECOWAS and member states were hesitant, confused and at times divided on the best approach to take (Caparini, 2015). In the Gambia mission, this time, ECOWAS quickly dispatches an assessment missions to hold consultations with the government of President Adama Barrow in a bid to undertake a defence and security sector reform (SSR) (African Union, 2017). On the back of the mission, the mandate of the ECOWAS Security Mission in Gambia (ECOMIG) was extended for another 12 months from June 2017 to June 2018 at the end of its initial six months deployment as an intervening force to remove the former

president Yahya Jammeh. The decision was firm, resolute and sent a clear signal that ECOWAS would intervene if Jammeh continued to claim the Presidency.

The second change was to build an international collaboration with the AU, and UN. On the 10<sup>th</sup> of December 2016, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued a strong release that strongly condemned the attempt to remain in power by rejecting the results of the election. This was followed by a joint statement by the UN, AU and ECOWAS to abide by constitutional responsibilities and international obligations. This level of collaboration and partnership was different from previous tensions between ECOWAS and the AU for instance as was particularly the case for Cote D'Ivoire. The third change was in the deployment of human and material resources. Benefitting from a broader consensus with the AU and UN, resources were made readily available with all member states ready to contribute into the ECOWAS deployment. These three key differences provide a sense of the extent of change and learning gained from previous SSR/G interventions (Helal, 2017).

With better collaboration, quick response and better planning, ECOWAS was able to carry out assessment missions to hold consultations with the government of President Adama Barrow in a bid to undertake a defence and security sector reform (DSSR) (African Union, 2017). On the back of the mission, the mandate of the ECOWAS Security Mission in Gambia (ECOMIG) received a unanimous decision for extension for another 12 months from June 2017 to June 2018 at the end of its initial six months deployment. The Adama Barrow administration stressed the urgent need for a DSSR programme in the country given that the current set up of the armed forces was filled with loyalists of the former president (Fieldnotes, 2017). This was quickly completed by ECOWAS benefitting from stronger legitimacy and corporation from the AU and the UN. Furthermore, after 22 years of dictatorship characterized by rampant human rights violation and excessive use of forces, it was noted that the armed forces and security sector was largely corrupt, characterised by the reputation to violate the rights of the civilian population and plunder of public funds (Fieldnotes, 2017). Despite wide support, the DSSR process in Gambia took longer. ECOMIG had to spend some more years to ensure the security of the Adama Barrow administration. The analysis above shows that ECOWAS drew

from lessons learnt in other conflicts to make this latest intervention the most effective. Not only was bloodshed avoided but equally, it instituted a democratic culture in Gambia – a country which had mainly experienced dictatorship since independence.

### **6.5 Contributions of International Partners 2014-2017**

ECOWAS is cognisant of the fact that it does not have the financial and material resources to see through the implementation of its SSRG agenda across member states. The regional bloc also recognizes the supranational role played by the African Union (AU). As such, the EPFSSRG on the AU to “advocate with ECOWAS for the dissemination and implementation of the norms, values and principles of this Policy Framework in ECOWAS Member States as well as promote synergy and collaborate in areas of convergence between this Policy Framework and the AU Policy Framework on SSR in supporting SSRG in Member States” (ECOWAS, 2016a, p.29). The AU was also required to provide capacity building support in key technical areas including the establishment of a roster of regional SSRG experts, the conduct of joint needs assessment missions and the mobilization of external resources to support national SSRG process. However, even the AU lacks capacity and human resource as was evident in the Cote D’Ivoire conflict, relying mainly on South Africa (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2016). In many cases, ECOWAS has appeared to be more experienced, more equipped, and more involved in conflicts. Hence it is argued that ECOWAS has better capacity than the AU in many areas. Laibuta (2014) for instance, argued that AU’s ability to prevent or intervene in conflicts in Africa are weak.

Regarding the participation of the UN, the EPFSSRG makes a special request for its support to “ECOWAS in developing and adapting tools, guidance notes, templates and training manuals for the implementation of the principles, norms and values contained in this Policy Framework” (ECOWAS, 2016a). In the same breath, the EPFSSRG calls on the UN to help in the mobilization of resource and the provision of other technical expertise. ECOWAS and UN had jointly developed a Support Programme for SSRG and plans to mobilize resources for key actions in Member States, in particular The Gambia (African Union, 2017). In the same vein, similar requests for resource mobilization and

technical support for capacity building and exchange visits to the ECOWAS Commission and member states were made to international partners such as France, UK, US and EU for the promotion of SSR/G norms, mechanisms and agendas in West Africa. At present, several countries are providing support on bilateral basis while the EU provides funds on a multilateral basis. The Danish International Development Aids (DANIDA) has been supporting the implementation of the Plan of Action and dissemination of the SSRG Policy Framework and Code of Conduct. The EU is providing funding under its 11th European Development Fund (EDF) to support some components of SSRG (Fieldnotes, 2017).

### **6.5.1 Financial and technical support**

In the light of the new approach adopted by ECOWAS towards greater collaboration and partnership with international partners, ECOWAS has received substantial support both technical and financial. However, the support always comes with strings attached or conditions. Hence, there is mixed opinions in relations to the roles and contributions of international partners particularly western donors in the promotion of peace and security in West Africa. For many, the positive aspects of external assistance have been in terms of providing ECOWAS with the much funds and technical support for the regional bloc and its member states to undertake vital projects and programmes in key areas that would have otherwise been neglected. For some, the negative aspects stem from the fact that western donors tend to push their agenda at the detriment of the main security concerns and interests of ECOWAS and its member states. From the technical perspective, the policy prescriptions of external partners such as the UN is considered by critics as infringing upon the interest of member states whole favouring the political and geo-strategic interests of donor partners (Ebo, 2010, Jaye, 2011, Uzoechina, 2014). For instance, it was pointed out that western donors were reluctant to contribute to the pension funds for soldiers in the armed forces of Guinea Bissau to allow them to retire in peace (Bappah, 2017). Despite the above reservations, ECOWAS has consistently received financial support from external partners (ECOWAS, 2020b).

The EPFSSRG makes a special request for its support to “ECOWAS in developing and adapting tools, guidance notes, templates and training manuals for the implementation of the principles, norms and values contained in this Policy Framework” (ECOWAS, 2016a). In the same breath, the EPFSSRG calls on the UN to help in the mobilization of resource and the provision of other technical expertise. As a results, ECOWAS and UN had jointly developed a Support Programme for SSRG and plans to mobilize resources for key actions in Member States, in particular The Gambia, according to the (African Union, 2017). In the same vein, similar requests for resource mobilization and technical support for capacity building and exchange visits to the ECOWAS Commission and member states were made to international development partners such as France, UK, US and EU for the promotion of SSR/G norms, mechanisms and agendas in West Africa. At present, several countries are providing support on bilateral basis while the EU provides funds on a multilateral basis. The Danish International Development Aids (DANIDA) has been supporting the implementation of the Plan of Action and dissemination of the SSRG Policy Framework and Code of Conduct. The EU is providing funding under its 11th European Development Fund (EDF) to support some components of SSRG (Fieldnotes, 2017).

Notwithstanding the requests directed to the UN and development partners, in some instances, the policy prescriptions of external players on the basis of their national and geo-strategic interests do run counter to those of ECOWAS (Ebo, 2010, Jaye, 2011, Uzoechina, 2014). According to senior officials at the ECOWAS Commission, there were programmes that had been ‘imposed’ on the regional bloc including fighting illegal migration to Europe, which are not the focus and interests of ECOWAS (Fieldnotes, 2017). Some activities that ECOWAS regarded as crucial in some countries for the implementation of the SSR/G project, some development partners had refused to fund those activities (Fieldnotes, 2017). For instance, it was found that western donors were reluctant to contribute to the pension funds for soldiers in the armed forces of Guinea Bissau to allow them to retire in peace (Bappah, 2017). Whereas according to ECOWAS, the retirement of a good number of these veterans is critical in the successful implementation. For ECOWAS, the DSSR programme

for Guinea Bissau was considered as crucial to help overhaul the armed forces and introduce a new breed of soldiers amendable to attitudinal and cultural change (Fieldnotes, 2017). However, by failing to comply with pension contributions, these donor countries would have compromised ECOWAS's vision. However, it must be noted that the funding received by ECOWAS from external partners is substantial and plays an important role in the further development of peace and stability in the sub-region through the support and capacity building impetus it brings to ECOWAS and directly to member states (Bappah, 2017).

### **6.5.2 Capacity and constraints**

At present, ECOWAS is undertaking several new initiatives and actions to strengthen its conflict prevention norms and mechanisms in the realization of its Vision 2020. Critical among these initiatives and actions include its SSR/G programme, the restructuring of its early warning and early response system to decentralize it to the national level as well as the reconfiguration of its mediation capacities. However, many of the new initiatives particularly its SSRG policy framework, are overambitious in scope and specifications in seeking to address the root causes of violent conflict, insecurity and instability in the ECOWAS region. According to senior officials at the ECOWAS Commission, the policy framework of the SSRG has two key components, namely the human security aspect and the conflict prevention aspect (Fieldnotes, 2017).

The human security component seeks to place “the individual and Community citizens at the centre of security determination, provision, delivery, management, accountability and oversight. The conflict prevention component seeks to move away from the traditional Western conceptualization of Security Sector Reform as a post-conflict intervention measure to one that places it as an aspect of conflict prevention. As such, we do not have to wait for crisis to erupt and for the capacity of our security sector to fall short before we take steps to improve it. In this sense, our SSR is proactive” (Field notes, 2017). This demarcation is problematic as the regional bloc tries to make SSRG an all-encompassing strategy to tackle the problem of insecurity and instability in the region. Furthermore, the regional bloc is working on limited capacities in dealing

with the challenges and constraints to push through its agendas at the national level (Arthur, 2010). As such, many of the new areas of intervention would remain an aspiration without the technical and programmatic supports of national, regional, and international partners to ECOWAS and member states to promote peace and security in West Africa.

It is noted that SSRG is largely a political process that involves political decision making and requires support of the national leadership for it to succeed (Bappah, 2017). In a sense, SSRG offers opportunities for improving political engagement across the security sectors, while at the same time creating the conditions that would enable reform efforts to take root. Although technical expertise and operational tools to support SSRG processes are important, SSRG would not succeed if it is removed from the specific political context. Thus, it is imperative that there is thorough understanding of SSRG especially at the strategic level. However, it is observed that there is poor understanding of SSRG among the senior leadership in many countries (Fieldnotes, 2017). For instance, in Guinea Bissau, the DSSR programme is largely limited to one-off short-term technical training and provision of equipment such as computers and vehicles instead of developing a more structured programme to inculcate in the ethos of the armed forces the respect for constitutional democratic control, human rights, and relations with civilians. Poor understanding undermines prioritisation of actions and programmes to tackle the most pressing problems that pose threats to the state.

Furthermore, poor understanding of the SSRG breeds mistrust among member states who are wary of losing power and complete control over key sources of revenue generation. Thus, for some member states, there are minimal incentives for reform. This gives rise to member states paying lip service to SSRG programmes, focusing on making cosmetic changes. As a result, the SSRG programme is reduced to some sort of tick-boxing exercises instead of making transformative changes at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels. Without an effective SSRG programme in place, security institutions in member states would not be adequately equipped to fulfil their primary responsibility of subduing to civilian control, respect for democratic principles, safeguarding the



lives and property of their citizens and the integrity of their territory in a bid to achieve lasting peace, stability and sustainable regional development.

Other challenges include limited human and technical capacities both at the headquarters and the field missions of the ECOWAS Commission. There is also the problem of inadequate communication between the headquarters in Abuja and its field missions as well as between the headquarters and member states. There is the perennial issue of inadequate financial resources to pursue SSRG programmes to its logical conclusion. Because the ECOWAS Commission tends to be overambitious with its SSRG, it runs the risk of spreading itself very thin on the ground, which would undermine the expected outcomes of the programmes.

## **6.6 Empirical findings (semi-structured interview)**

Chapter six provided an evaluation of the effectiveness of ECOWAS, opportunities for partnerships and collaboration, constraints to effectiveness and challenges in implementation overall and for the case of Gambia and Guinea Bissau. Key processes of the empirical analysis involved re-listening recorded interviews several times and transcribing into text. Once the oral data was transcribed, it was coded manually. The coding process involved data reduction where unrelated text and repetitions were deleted to reduce the data to manageable size. Manual coding was first open by ways of locating and highlighting related and recurrent narratives and constructions (stories, words, explanations, meanings etc.) to develop main and sub-themes (Robson, 2011). The next step was to connect related phrases, summaries, and statements relative to key debates from the literature and research questions (Bryman, 2016). The process was facilitated by the application of template technique (King et al., 2018). Template analysis involves the development of a coding 'template', which summarises themes identified by the researcher as important in a data sets and organises them in a meaningful and useful manner. Hierarchical coding is emphasised, using broad themes such as broad 'responses', successively narrated to more specific discourses including 'change', challenges, evaluation of what is acceptable and what is not and why (Gray et al., 2013). This process applied as previously explained in chapter one section 1.4 led to 9 themes relating to the three research questions.

The main findings were further reviewed academics and researcher and ECOWAS experts for confirmation. The further expert examination, discussion and reflection was intended as a continuous social construction process of knowledge rather than for the purpose of attaining objective truth. This process added credibility and trustworthiness to the study and limited the possibilities for error of judgement. In line with interpretivist and in particular constructionist and considering the exploratory nature of the study, many themes emerged from the empirical reflecting the rather complex, diverse and at times ambiguous evolution of ECOWAS processes of engagement and development in the field (Ford, 2006). However, common dominant discourses as well as unique narratives came out of the researcher's interaction with participants. The empirical findings are grouped under four major themes, each of which includes sub-themes relating to the research questions. As presented below. First, a reminder of the questions:

i) To what extent are the existing ECOWAS Policies on SSR, EWR, norms and mechanisms for appropriately developed to address the overall conflict prevention and reduction capacity and how successful were its interventions in Cote D'Ivoire and Ghana?

ii) How has the foreign policy interests of Nigeria and Ghana influenced ECOWAS decisions and processes and how have both countries contributed to the development of existing norms, mechanisms and policies.

iii) How has the inter-relationships between West African member states, the role of EU, UN and AU and the relationship between France to Cote D'Ivoire and Mali affected ECOWAS interventions and member states' support for intervention?

### **6.6.1 Themes relating to research question one**

The semi-structured questions revealed three main themes notably: progressive development, implementation challenges, learning for improvement. Each of these is elaborated in detail.

#### **6.6.1.1 Progressive development**

The general view expressed by participants indicates a favourable progressive development and amelioration of ECOWAS SSR/G, EWER, norms, and

mechanism overall. Participants agreed that although at the initial stage in 1975 ECOWAS mechanisms were not quite strong enough to address conflicts, this gradually change overtime to meet global standards even as implementation remains a challenge as revealed in the secondary content analysis in chapter six above. The incubating stage examined ECOWAS from its creation to its first military intervention in a member state, in Liberia. Most participants noted that at the early stages of ECOWAS development, its norms and mechanisms emerged out of chance and not out of deliberate efforts (Bryden et al., 2005, Bryden et al., 2008). The military intervention of ECOWAS into the internal matters of a member state was at the time a radical departure from the founding principles of the regional bloc which was to avoid confrontation between member states within the region referred to as the non-aggression pact (Adebajo, 2002a, Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009). Considering this disconnect between the original intention and what has become and economic and soon monetary union, earlier interventions were not carefully thought through. Hence, intervention for CP met with many inadequacies in the process and excesses in human rights violation (Adebajo, 2002a, Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009).

Although the impromptu intervention of ECOWAS was considered a success at many level, by participants, agreed in majority that these early mis-steps helped ECOWAS to realise and recognise the inadequacies of its norms and mechanisms to deal conflict intervention approaches in the future (Ebo, 2010, Jaye, 2011, Uzoechina, 2014).

One participant captured this sentiment vividly saying:

I think somehow, we all take inspirations from a body like ECOWAS, in the peace council for example, we quote their norms to support what we do – that ECOWAS protocols say this and that. So, I think, by and large, the policies and protocols that ECOWAS have come up with over the years have made, in my opinion, some significant influence over our national policies, for example, the law for the peace council was passed before ECOWAS really came with its agenda. I for example, quote ECOWAS and we now have to streamline all our activities to be in line with the structures ECOWAS has brought up (V28, Abuja).

The above progressive positive estimation was constantly associated with the contributions of Ghana and Nigeria. These two countries are considered to have played a pivotal role in facilitating the regional bloc's first steps into military interventionism in West Africa. Although inherent political machinations and manoeuvres of Ghana is recognised but this is seen in a positive light rather than as antagonistic. The relationship and understanding between Nigeria and Ghana in decision-making processes in terms of norm development and intervention is considered to have assisted in the development and evolution of ECOWAS SSR/G and EWER programmes. Apart from developing norms and mechanisms both were also identified by participants as having promoted democratic principles, even when at times they were not espousing democracy in their own countries (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Birikorang, 2007, Adejo, 2010, Aworawo, 2010). Ironically, it was evident that without military regimes in many of the member states of ECOWAS, it would have been practically challenging to push through many of the reform agenda before and after the intervention in Liberia. Nigeria, most especially, had to commit substantial financial and material resources to push reform agenda abroad across ECOWAS. Similarly, most participants were of the view that without ECOWAS SSR/G, EWER and norms the oppression of citizens in ECOWAS countries would have continued including in Ghana and Nigeria (Akinterinwa, 2001, Akinterinwa, 2004, Birikorang, 2007, Adejo, 2010, Aworawo, 2010). A participant made this point saying:

I think our governance system is a good example for ECOWAS member states, one we have been able to keep the country in peace, we have gone through a number of elections that a number of countries couldn't successfully go through, the closest ever election in Africa [...] I think we have been able to manage that and I think that is an example, We have also shown that it is independent (V27, Accra).

The above narrative is consistent with findings from secondary analysis and the case study on Ghana and Nigeria developed in chapters four and five above which observe that the developmental stage starting from the establishment of the 1993 Revised Treaty and ushering the Protocol relating to the Mechanism and the development of the ECPF in 2008 has been a progressive developmental pattern from no mechanisms to workable SSR/G and EWER

systems that have become more reliable. This progressive shift in the development and evolution of ECOWAS systems, have enabled it to be actively involved in the participation and promotion of peace and security across West Africa and beyond. As in chapter five examining the implementation of the new norms and mechanisms by ECOWAS in Cote d'Ivoire and Mali. Interviewees presented mixed views when evaluating the extent to which SSR/G and EWER mechanisms were deployed not just in Cote d'Ivoire and Mali but in other conflicts. The dominant view however was that the regional bloc did not try to adhere to its norms and policies in intervening in Cote d'Ivoire. However, they tended to blame failures on the belligerents and foreign European intervention such as the case for France in Cote D'Ivoire and Mali against the expectation that with new norms and mechanisms of ECOWAS should thrive in the future as governments will be more effective by adopting acceptable codes of conduct. A participant said:

ECOWAS has adopted what we call the Code of Conduct for the armed forces and security services. Which is telling clearly based on the supplementary protocol on Democracy and good governance. Inside that document you have principles talking about the supremacy of the civilian, what do you call it, the civilian power, the political power in charge of the military and other security institutions which they must obey. Once the Code of Conduct has been adopted by all the member states, all military will adopt the system of non-interference in the political activities and do whatever have been decided by politicians.

The optimistic hope evident in the above quote was a constant response provided by respondents. In doing so, most suggested that the process of developing ECOWAS SSR/G, EWER and other CP mechanism had not reached maturity stage (V1, Abuja).

The post-Cote d'Ivoire intervention period was generally perceived as marking the start of the maturation stage of the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS. The starting point of this maturation period tended to be linked to the introduction of the Supplementary Act on the Code of Conducts for the Armed Forces and Security Services of ECOWAS in 2011 which set the foundation for the development of SSR/G policy framework of

ECOWAS. The maturation stage covers the point from 2014 when ECOWAS called for the decentralization of its early warning and response system to its increased resolve to end military regime in West Africa including its intervention in Gambia in 2017. The maturation stage saw the production of a series of new norms and political declarations to enhance the regional bloc's SSR/G and conflict prevention norms, mechanisms and practice to address traditional as well as new and emerging threats in West Africa. As outlined in chapter six, the new norms and policies include the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation of 2013, ECOWAS-ECCAS Declaration on Maritime Security 2013 and the draft ECOWAS Maritime Security Strategy, and the EPFSSRG, adopted in June 2016. These new orientation alongside international partnerships and greater legitimacy construct a sense in which participants sounded confident that ECOWAS was now at a stage where it can do things better in CP in West African the sub-region.

#### 6.6.1.2 Implementation challenges

Whist participants sounded confident in ECOWAS SSR/G, EWER, norms and mechanism, in terms of the theme on implementation, a more nuanced and cautious evaluation was presented by most participants. Many signifiers and indicators were gathered in interactions indicating that participants were not so positive about ECOWAS implementation of its SSR/G agenda. First, some participants thought that they were so many instruments, and this led to confusion by member countries and ECOWAS executive as to when to deploy one or the other instrument – CP, EWER. In particular, participants thought the 10 essential features of the EPFSSRG, is overambitious in its scope and specification. It was explained that this is the reason why no member state has adopted its recommendations. Also, member states have not been enthusiastic about updating their Code of Conduct for their armed forces and security services in line with guidance and doctrine of the 2011 Supplementary Act. There was a sense in which participants thought ECOWAS has taken too many, some of which are redundant rather than strengthening and that sometimes these are imposed on member countries without opt out possibility at the level of implementation. This imposing culture was seen to have endured in

ECOWAS mainly enforced by Nigeria and has left the organization with limited capacity to undertake significant cultural institutional and organisation change (Uzoehina, 2014, Bappah, 2017, Bappah, 2018). These culture along with the influence of Nigeria and Ghana in ECOWAS and at times other member state interests as was the case in Mali and Cote D'Ivoire implementation of ECOWAS SSR/G and EWER were adjudged to have been averagely successful. Evaluating implementation success, a participant put the blame more on resources rather than on the SSR/G policies saying:

We have seen what have happed in Mali, we were pledged units, pledged forces by the member states but in the implementation, it was very difficult for those country which pledged for units to provide it on time. Because of lack of capacity, lack of financial resources, lack of human resources, lack availability, permanent availability of resources [...] Standby force is an issue. Putting people together and ... tell them to wait, for a thing to happen while you need this people to do some other jobs in the country, while you need to have resources to maintain this people on standby.

In acknowledging implementation weaknesses and at the downplaying ECOWAS internal organizational culture by some, what was common amongst participants is the fact that lessons have been learnt. Key areas in which learning had surely taken place in the view of participants was in the area of EWER, CP and post-conflict reconstruction. This learning seemed to have moved the thinking of ECOWAS executives and the Organisation as a whole towards more early intervention approaches rather than reactive conflict intervention strategies which has dominated early interventions and more recent interventions in Mali, Cote D'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau. This learning seems to have paid dividend in the case or Gambia in terms of making friends, collaborating and speaking in one voice as articulated by the following participant saying:

I think that is useful, to the extent we collaborated with the French and others in managing the situation I think one was one good lesson but then how can we make such partnerships consistent and predictable arrangement, is one thing I thing we have not been able to do (V19, Accra).

This learning concurs with the view of analysts and experts as established in the secondary analysis

noting that ECOWAS learnt several lessons including early intervention in terms of crisis response and engaging in the stabilization process and the promotion of SSR/G as a post-conflict mechanism to prevent further conflict (Bah, 2010, Bryden and N'Diaye, 2011). In Mali, while ECOWAS successfully intervened early in containing the March 2012 military takeover, the regional bloc was slow in intervening in the outbreak of the Tuareg insurgency that started by the end of 2011 (Arthur, 2010, Sperling, 2011, ECOWAS, 2014a). While ECOWAS took an active role and interests throughout the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, the regional bloc was not seeking to take full control.

It would seem that this learning is spreading not just in ECOWAS but also in member states. For instance, Guinea Bissau is in the process of implementing an ECOWAS-led DSSR while the Gambia will soon undertake one. ECOWAS claims success of the programme, noting that the Bissau Guinean military had been able to refrain from intervening in the political dispute that had brought the country to stand still since 2016 (Bappah, 2017, Bappah, 2018, Fieldnotes, 2017). However, when asked about the success of this, participants were cautiously optimistic rather than enthusiastic.

#### Improving the future

ECOWAS has been engaging in SSR, largely as a post-conflict reconstruction mechanism to prevent a member state from relapsing into conflict. The regional bloc has embraced SSRG as its main conflict prevention strategy to tackle the root causes of violent conflict, insecurity and instability in the West African region. The regional bloc is championing its two main instruments of SSRG, which are the EPFSSRG and the Supplementary Act of the Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security Services to promote democratic governance in the security sector. The underlying assumption of participants is that security sector has been the main source of long years of civil wars, coups d'état and military rule that fundamentally undermined the growth of democracy and good governance across the region. Interviews revealed the assumption that the successful implementation of SSRG would eradicate human rights abuses, improve efficiency and professionalism within the security sector as well as trust and confidence between the citizens and security actors.



Overall, participants gave the view that the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS is positive. They noted that the level of progress made was significant for progress and would enable ECOWAS to achieve greater success in the future. However, it was not stopping war per se that gave them confidence. Rather, it was the milestones achieved by countries in the democratisation process. Also, the fact that ECOWAS has adopted a firm strategy preventing military officers from staying in power after overthrowing a government or losing an election was mentioned numerous times as the way forward towards a better future as explained:

I guess one thing that big countries like Nigeria and Ghana and that middle level countries like Senegal can also do is continue playing these role, for example, that Ghana and Nigeria are said to have been playing, defusing certain norm with the region, that democracy is the way forward and there is no point going back to *coup d'états*, and things like that. If we can keep doing that it will help defuse the norms so at some point, we will get to a level when it becomes simply unacceptable to deviate from the norms. So, there may be smaller countries that can actually pull even the big countries along in some of the moral and diplomatic democratic norms (V19, Abuja).

The above quote presents a brighter future based on political stability of member states rather than ECOWAS SSR/G, EWER, norms and mechanism. In terms of promoting SSRG across the region, the new democratic endeavour will take decades to mature and start bearing fruit. Nevertheless, the early signs are that member states are adhering to democratic principles which by far has reduced conflicts in the more recent time in West Africa than ECOWAS mechanisms. Hence, participants constantly presented a word of caution for the conflicts in Mali and Cote D'Ivoire which some participants saw as sleeping dogs and ticking time bombs which could erupt at any moment without careful monitoring. As a way of dealing with these future problems, a small number of participants rather than refer to ECOWAS for a better promising future, found hope in the growing civil society organisation saying:

Certainly organizations like West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) played significant role because of the interface between WACSOF and

ECOWAS, Centre for Democracy and Development has also played a significant role in that direction and I am sure there are other NGOs that have engaged the ECOWAS in the process of reforming the security systems in the region. I think that relationship has been there for a very long time in terms of the people who worked in the civil society and who are now in ECOWAS or people in civil society who are trying to influence the institution itself (V17, Accra).

It follows from this excerpt that ECOWAS cannot keep relying on its crisis response approach to tackle conflicts and political intransigency. The new approach of expanding SSR/G, EWER and norms to include internal politics, education, human rights and good governance was considered by the majority of participants as the new way for CP in the sub-region.

### **6.6.2 Themes relating to research question two**

The second research question focused on the influence of Nigeria and Ghana in ECOWAS. This question is a research and policy debate topic of interest with which participants enthusiastically engaged in interactions. Three themes emerge on this question notably: positive and negative influence of Nigeria, The leadership role of Nigeria and the supporting role of Ghana. Each theme is explored in detail.

#### **6.6.2.1 Positive influence**

Although many factors have contributed to the evolution of the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS over time (Wulf, 2009, Wulf and Debiel, 2009, Arthur, 2010, Sperling, 2011, ECOWAS, 2014a) the positive role of Nigeria in particular emerged as the main contributing factor. However, perceptions were mixed as to whether this influence was for the good of ECOWAS or not. In the early days of ECOWAS intervention especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s Nigeria was largely the power behind ECOWAS. This being the case ECOWAS interventions were carried out in an adhoc and arbitrary manner as elicited in chapter five (Adebajo, 2002a, Adebajo, 2002b, Obi, 2009). However, the introduction of the Revised Treaty and the Protocol relating to the

Mechanism, brought along a more structured approach was established with specific organs charged with the responsibility in the decision-making process of the regional bloc (Kabia, 2011, Iwilade and Agbo, 2012). Today, across the African continent, ECOWAS has emerged as the leading regional economic community (REC) in terms of not only playing an active role in the resolution of conflicts but also having a more evolved and robust peace and security architecture for the promotion of regional peace and security among its member states (Uzoehina, 2014, Bappah, 2017, Bappah, 2018). It thought that ECOWAS has been instrumental in promoting West African regional security. From this positive posture, the role of Nigeria comes across as a key positive influence not just for its military might but equally for its economic power particularly during the oil boom when it has been able to spend heavily in conflict prevention and reconstruction efforts in member states.

In trying to understand the role of ECOWAS in the interplay between promoting SSR and conflict prevention in West Africa, the research examined critically three major stages of the peace and security architecture of the regional bloc. These three stages were broadly i) the incubating stage, ii) the development stage and iii) the maturation stage where ECOWAS is focusing on the implementation of SSRG as an all-encompassing conflict prevention mechanism. In all of these stages, a recurrent theme that emerged from conversations with expert was Nigerian positive influence strategically, materially and in manpower.

Key expressions on the positive influence were, pro-active, decisive, bold, encouraging, understanding and sacrifice. These expressions present Nigeria as a reliable member state without which ECOWAS would not have been as strong as it is as suggested in the below excerpt:

When you are talking of security in a conflict situation, such as from the past experience, Nigeria has the capability, boldness, and courage it takes to go up. So, we should not forget that Nigeria is the father of the sub region, in terms of population, in terms of resources and in terms of the competence in many dimensions. It is a good opportunity for West Africa to rely on Nigeria (V19, Accra).

#### 6.6.2.2 Nigeria's negative influence

At the same time negative influence was seen in the sense of its disproportionate dominance, bully attitude and at times in projects perceived to be illegitimate intervention.

While the role of Nigeria was mainly seen in a positive light, there were resentment from a few participants. This was more to do with the dominant role enjoyed by Nigeria in decision making within ECOWAS. This dominance was seen in the often controlling and imposing attitude that Nigeria seems to have exhibited in ECOWAS. Some participants were uncomfortable with the disproportionate influence and power enjoyed by Nigeria. A participant explained:

It is now obvious that no single country is able to address the sort of conflicts we witness in the region but we also understand that Nigeria's economic and military capacity gives it that leverage to serve as lead nation, that we recognize and understand since the days of Liberia so there has to be that common understanding that Nigeria cannot do it alone or force others at will (V15, Abuja).

Another sense in which resentment towards Nigeria's dominance of ECOWAS was expressed negatively was to the extent that in certain cases, it talks but fails to do the walk. In other words, participants holding this view pointed that what Nigeria often requires other member states to do – such as the practice of democracy is not usually the case in Nigeria. This unsettling aspect of Nigeria's bad example was repeated regularly in interviews as evident in the below excerpt:

You say there is need for respecting people's rights, ensuring the rule of law, having a security that respects people's rights and is there to set people's rights. So, if you have common norms in terms of the countries respecting these norms and practicing them in their various countries, it is easier for them to converge at the regional level and so becoming the kind of norms that is accepted and practiced in the sub region, broadly speaking.. but this

is not the case for Nigeria like for democracy, it still struggles to hold free and fair elections (V28, Accra).

#### 6.6.2.3 Nigeria as leader

Interview data revealed further that in spite of the above negative sentiments and issues raised, by some participants, Nigeria was seen as the leading nation and no member state could challenge its leadership role. Nigeria's leadership was expressed in terms of its firm stand on matters not just in West Africa but equally in Africa as a whole. Nigeria was seen as the only African nation that speaks for Africa and which dared to challenge the legitimacy of France in West African affairs as captured in this excerpt:

You cannot be the most populated, have more wealth and you cannot provide leadership. So, naturally, it is up to them to take that leadership in the region [...] leadership is the way you position yourself, we know that Africa wants a sit like France, or US in the United Nations [Security Council] so how do you win that battle when you don't bring that leadership. So, if we take Africa level (that is) but at international level also, Nigeria wants to play that leadership role so it has to show some leadership at regional level or continental level before people can say we agree to support you to be at international level (V19, Accra).

Clearly, Nigeria's leadership is celebrated more generally. Only few voices were muted in recognising Nigeria's influence. However, rather than outright condemnation, some participants merely pointed at areas where there are weaknesses in Nigeria's leadership of ECOWAS as explained:

The problem with Nigeria as leader of ECOWAS is just our inability, incoherence and incompetence to articulate what are the kinds of benefits that we are going to get after all these sacrifices, but my general sense is that when the country intervene as leading nation in these kinds of situations it really doesn't intervene with some material interests. I think that is where the challenge is: inability to articulate - that is may be our problem.

The above excerpt raises the issue of Nigeria's interest in interventions and the politics often involved in CP interventions led by Nigeria. These issues have also surfaced in the secondary analysis in chapter five but somehow become

subdued when a mission succeeds as was the case in Gambia and more worrying and spoken about in case of a failed intervention as in Mali and Cote D'Ivoire. More generally, by virtue of wider sacrifices in human and material resources deployed consistently, Nigeria's leadership is generally acknowledged and supported rather than rejected.

#### 6.6.2.4 The role of Ghana

In respect to Ghana, its role was seen by participants as mainly supportive and where it cannot support to abstain from collective intervention as it did in the Cote D'Ivoire conflict (chapter five). Although, a much smaller nation than Nigeria, participants thought Ghana was punching more than its weight in ECOWAS decision-making. This, however, was seen in the light of its policy of alignment with Nigeria most of the time. In that sense, Ghana was seen more as the number two nation in influence, mainly a close second to Nigeria as explained:

Ghana's role is mainly supportive and a loyal ally, so ECOWAS will have a wide range of policies but don't have the funding to commit so when it comes[...] Ghana can you please send us those troops, or UN comes in, this is a national crisis and we have to act as one body, then UN can bring in troops, machine and that is Ghana's role.

Whilst, in chapter five Ghana's role was seen as stronger in ECOWAS evolution, the conversations presented Ghana as more of a normal supporting partner to Nigeria and merely a contributor to ECOWAS CP and SSR/G initiatives without much influence in the group of member states as another participant mentioned:

Two among the three centres of excellence of ECOWAS are located in Nigeria and one in Ghana. One is Koffi Annan IBTC and the other one is the War college of Nigeria, which are the centre of excellence for security sector. If you take it from this angle, we can say they, yes, they are sharing, capacities, they are helping the region to develop (V1, Abuja).

Thus, Ghana's involvement in ECOWAS is not as much influential as that of Nigeria. However, its supporting role alongside Nigeria, makes it seem as though it has more influence than the resources it contributes some of which is sometimes not different from Cote D'Ivoire before the conflict. It could be argued that the English language spoken in Ghana, associates Ghana closer to Nigeria, making Ghana to be considered to be more influential at face value than its actual overall contribution into ECOWAS SSR/G, EWER and other CP interventions, policy development and decision making.

### **6.6.3 Themes relative to research question three**

The third research question posed by this study sought to explore the inter-relationships between West African member states, the role of EU, UN and AU and how the relationship between France and Cote D'Ivoire and Mali affected ECOWAS. The analysis of narratives relating to this question revealed three main themes emerged including: Distorted cohesion between member states, Uncertain relationship with external bodies and France as interposing force between ECOWAS and Francophone countries. Each of these is explained in detail, supported with power or direct quotes (Pratt, 2008).

#### **6.6.3.1 Distorted cohesion between member states**

A majority of participants expressed the view that the relationship between the member states was disjointed and at times disunited. For all cases of ECOWAS CP intervention including Mali, Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, in the more recent times between 2000 to 2016, there was always one member state or another which took a different position or view. This meant that the issue of consensus was sometime missing and thus, affecting cohesion amongst members. At some points it was the chasm between Anglophone and Francophone countries and at other points participants made referring to the hegemonic tendencies of Nigeria in particular. One participant explained:

So, member states have these opportunities at experts level, ministerial level as well as member state level to bring in the concerns of each country, and of course being an intergovernmental organisation, the level of influence you have depends on coherence but this is not often the case. As a member of the community which depends on your contribution, size and whether or not

you are chairing ECOWAS at that particular time, which is also a source of influence in the Community, politics comes in the way of unity. My answer to that is, given the important position of Nigeria in the region, really being the regional hegemony; definitely it does have a lot of influence in the articulation of regional policies such as the SSR which is sometimes different from others but is being forced through.

The issue of cohesion and collective endeavour also surfaced in the approach often adopted by some country's internal politics. Depending on relationships between countries, some member states were unwilling to engage in collective EWER or CP initiatives. The case of Cote D'Ivoire was frequently referred to as were the cases of Mali where the intervention of Algeria, a non-ECOWAS nation was considered as destabilising and causing disagreements between member states. There was a general sense in which participants thought that the decision making powers of ECOWAS had to be taken out of the hands of politician but left in the hands of experts who would speak for countries as it the case with the European Union (EU) where the commission acts on behalf of member states.

But I guess one thing that big countries like Nigeria and Ghana and that middle level countries like Senegal can also do is continue playing the role of building cohesions and closer corporation. For example, Ghana and Nigeria are said to have been defusing certain norm with the region, that democracy [...] things like that. If we can keep doing that it will help defuse tension between and within member states [...]at some point, we will get to a level when it becomes simply unacceptable to deviate from the norms.

Although, there is clearly a recognition of distortion of harmony and coherence, what was common amongst participants was a strong conviction about what needed to be done and the confidence that member states were getting better understanding as that eventually, unity and understanding will be achieved as indicated in the above excerpt.

#### 6.6.3.2 Uncertain relationship with AU, EU and UN

The relationship between the AU, EU and UN was triggered interest in the conversation with almost every participant making a strong case for and against



and suggesting best ways through which ECOWAS could engage with these bodies. The general view was that ECOWAS needed to build strong and productive relationships with each of these external institutions particularly the UN and AU. Reasons suggested in the particular case of the EU and UN was in respect to the potential for financial contribution and expertise that is often gained when collaboration with these bodies. One participant put it as follows:

Here you have a situation where ECOWAS is acting within the framework of the international community, particularly within the framework of the UN system. So, you have African troops but it was more of a UN type thing but then ECOWAS played a role in the negotiations[...] UN collaboration is an important factor [...] ECOWAS is doing what they are trying achieve, it is a combination of both regional and extra regional factors. Moreover, the sort of challenges we are facing requires greater collaboration with external partners (V26 and 27, Abuja).

The above excerpt stresses the aspect of legitimacy and world system which ECOWAS is a part of a hierarchical global SSR/G, EWER and CP mechanisms binding UN countries at a higher level. This means the UN's assistance was expressed in relation to its fundamental duties and therefore considered as part of ECOWAS's mission. However, narratives and response were different for the European Union (EU). Many ECOWAS executives were quite receptive to EU collaboration but expressed caution in the manner in which they should intervene. The discussions suggested that there are no formal arrangements with the EU in relation to future partnerships. In this respect, participants did not think that the EU had the level of legitimacy enjoyed by the UN and therefore expressed the need for limited intervention in ECOWAS CP missions without an agreement as explained:

I remember that recently there was a delegation to the Commission that was asking whether ECOWAS should sign something or needed to be built collaboration with EU, specifically. And my answer to that was that it could be done but we have to observe the principles of subsidiarity. So, you don't just come into somebody's neighbourhood to do something without letting them know (V3 Accra).

The case of the African Union (AU) was more nuanced. Although, participants agreed that the AU does have some degree of legitimacy and power over ECOWAS, the fact that the AU does not have a standing army and is often reluctant to engage in EWER and CP projects presented ECOWAS with much more responsibility to act with or without the AU. There was a sense within the expert community that not only did AU have limited capacity in human resource, it was also short in funding and at times depended on member state's willingness and UN funding. Thus, to many participants, it was not necessary for AU to be involved in regional conflicts particularly in West Africa which has a strong functioning institution as ECOWAS. If the AU had to be collaborated with, it was thought that such collaboration needed to be limited to providing legitimacy by supporting regional institutions to intervene. There was a sense in the views of some participants that the involvement of the AU militarily would be counterproductive and time wasting as expressed in the next excerpt:

We have been having this crisis for how long. So, it shows that we are mostly reacting and the absence of speaking truth to power actually undermines the system itself, even within the broader AU context. It is only states like Botswana that have the guts to tell the AU mechanisms the truth about having them stay away because they do not bring any good sometimes.

The case of the tensions highlighted in chapter five between the AU's position to seek a peaceful approach and seeming to support President Laurent Gbagbo, while Nigeria want Gbagbo out and would have liked a swift military intervention as suggested in chapter five would seem to reflect the above view which was popular amongst participants. For many, analyst involved in the study in the field, it was not clear which contribution the AU brought to SSR/G projects beyond talking and supporting.

The last theme arising from research question three concerns the role of France. For this question, participants were not very enthusiastic about France's energetic and consistent intervention particularly in Francophone ECOWAS member states. To many, it was a clear state of continuation of colonialism. In saying so, some participants recognised the superior military

power of France and their participation in bringing finality to the case of Cote D'Ivoire and to a lesser extent in Mali. The fact that France could come into West Africa without the consent of ECOWAS was seen as confrontational and unacceptable to many. Few voices thought that ECOWAS needed to build stronger relationship with France and seek ways through which both ECOWAS and France could work together. However, it seems that the attitude of France is one in which it feels that by virtue of its colonial agreements and co-operation treaties with Francophone countries it has the mandate to intervene in Africa without the consent of ECOWAS or the AU. This attitude of France came across as highly controversial and unacceptable as one participant explained:

You can also understand how important the intervention of France in West Africa has for ECOWAS and Nigeria's self-image and the contestation it had with France. It is surprising that French colonies were always antagonistic to Nigeria playing the lead role, we must understand that in the political context and dynamics within the sub region that affects ECOWAS from performing its right duties, this inevitably leads to contestation for power between Nigeria and France.

Clearly, the colonial relationship between Francophone countries in ECOWAS prevents it from having greater cohesion in the group. Most often the heads of state of Francophone countries align themselves to France more than to ECOWAS when they have to choose. This dual belonging of Francophone countries where some have effectively contracted their security to France and at the same time are part of ECOWAS emerged from conversations with participants as the most challenging factor. Participants blamed this on France's superior military capability, financial resources, and its domineering relationship with French speaking African countries for decades even after independence. In spite of this difference, some voices opined that Nigeria needed to find a framework through which it could engage France to facilitate a better working relationship between France and ECOWAS.

The next chapter undertakes a discussion of all the findings and presents the contribution and implication of the study.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSIONS

#### 7. Introduction and Overall Finding

The main objective of the research and analysis presented in this thesis is to contribute to knowledge and understanding of the development, evolution and deployment of ECOWAS SSR/G, EWER, and crisis responses norms and mechanisms in West Africa since 2000. Our detailed analysis and findings are presented in chapters 3 – 6. In this concluding chapter, we aim to bring together our conclusions and findings to address our main research question and the three key secondary questions, and to present our main contributions to knowledge.

As presented in Chapter 1, our main overall research question is:

*To what extent, and how, have ECOWAS norms, mechanisms and institutions on conflict prevention, security and justice sector governance, crisis response, and peace and security building in conflict-affected countries played significant roles in West African peace and security since 2000?*

On the basis of the information and analysis in this thesis, we have demonstrated that ECOWAS has indeed been influential in West African peace and security processes since 2000. It has played a range of significant roles. Moreover, these go beyond the basic roles that a regional organisation can play by providing a political forum that facilitates and enables mobilisation of regional initiatives or responses to problematic events; or that helps to legitimise or constrain initiatives from powerful member states or regional 'coalitions of the willing'. In addition to these, the analysis has shown that since 2000 ECOWAS has developed pooled capacities, resources, and institutional mechanisms that have, *at least sometimes*, empowered, facilitated or coordinated significant West African co-operative actions and procedures; which have not only worked alongside relevant West African governments and other actors but also shaped such actors perceived interests and approaches.

We have, moreover, demonstrated that the relevant ECOWAS norms established through regional agreements have been sufficiently elaborated, diffused, and embedded in operational systems and procedures across the sub-region that they have influence as a relatively independent factor. Thus, it has been valuable and important to include a social constructivist awareness in our research approach to our PhD project. These norms have become a significant element in the mixture of factors that routinely shape decisions and programmes by ECOWAS and its member states. Arguably, on occasions that have been a key factor in shaping outcomes in ECOWAS decision making, as we have argued for example in relation to ECOWAS responses to the Crisis in the Gambia in 2017 and subsequently.

We believe that this demonstration is in itself a significant contribution to debates about the significance and roles of ECOWAS on peace and security issues and can usefully stimulate further reflection and comparison with similar sub-regional organisations in Africa and elsewhere. But the formulation of our main question demands that we elaborate such overall findings in more depth, in order to address the question of ‘to what extent, and how?’.

The next section of this concluding chapter aims to further elaborate and refine our research findings. For the purposes of clarity, we do this by presenting our main findings as they relate to each of our main secondary questions in turn. The subsequent sections then are focussed as follows: reflections on methodological lessons from applying our research approach; implications of our research findings for policy and for further research; and final observations.

## **7.1 Research findings relation to the three secondary questions**

### **7.1.1 Examining the Development of ECOWAS norms since 2000**

The first of our thematic, or secondary research question is: *How have ECOWAS’ norms, mechanisms, and programmes for conflict prevention, security and justice sector governance, crisis response, and peace and security building in conflict-affected countries been further developed, elaborated and*

*institutionalised since 2000, and to what extent have these developments incorporated lessons from experience to enhance their effectiveness?*

This question is addressed in parts of chapter 2, and then particularly in chapters 3 and 6. Although the relevant ECOWAS norms, mechanism and programmes are in the public record, and are regularly referred to in diplomatic and policy documents, our detailed critical examination of the development and substance of each of these key norms and associated mechanisms since 2000 contributes by filling a relative gap in the academic literature (as noted in chapters 1 and 2). This is particularly the case for the developments since 2010.

Using our combination of information sources and methods, the thesis demonstrates in detail that the developments in the early warning and early response (EWER) norms and mechanisms for conflict prevention since the early 2000s have been substantial, in terms of their detailed elaboration and refinement, and in the gradual development of ECOWAS's capacities to operate and use them. At the beginning of our research period, ECOWAS' EWER norms were mainly declaratory; whereas by fifteen year later they had been substantially elaborated, refined and linked to relevant mechanism and resources to enable them to be operationalised.

As examined particularly in chapters 5 and 6, this strengthened ECOWAS EWER system was no guarantee that ECOWAS would actually take effective and timely conflict prevention measures. On the contrary, in this respect, ECOWAS performance was patchy at best. But this is not the only criterion by which to assess whether an EWER mechanism is significant. Effective regional preventive action is always a challenge in every region of the world, including regions with much less fragility and risk of conflict and with more capable and robust institutions. It is also relevant to assess whether EWER mechanism have become sufficiently operational and influential to at least influence high-level political decisions, and by the criterion we provide evidence to show that the ECOWAS EWER mechanisms have developed to a significant degree of maturity and influence.

Moreover, the development of EWER systems has in practice been relevant not only to ECOWAS conflict prevention agendas but has also helped to enrich ECOWAS political leaders' knowledge and capacities for crisis response and post-conflict peace and security building. This is because operational EWER mechanisms contribute to the availability of up-to-date conflict analyses for decision makers, and products emerging from legitimised ECOWAS regional mechanisms are more readily accepted as references during regional political consultations.

An important new dimension of ECOWAS norms relating to peace and security has been developed during our research period, concerning security sector reform and governance (SSRG). As we have traced, the ECOWAS policy framework on security sector reform and governance was not adopted until June 2016; after a long process during the previous 12 -15 years. Civil society and parliamentarian networks in West Africa were relatively quick to seize upon the developing international agenda for Security and Justice Sector reform as it developed in the early 2000s, and to promote the agenda for Western African states. It became a major focus for international post-conflict peace-building programmes in Sierra Leone, but not surprisingly was a sensitive topic for many West African governments. It was closely linked with controversial issues of democratisation and increased accountability, as well as with challenges of transforming security and justice agencies away from being instruments for ensuring elite political power to security and justice service providers for the wider population.

This thesis has traced the complex process by which regional ECOWAS norms for conflict prevention and crisis management became increasingly associated with regional norms against military coups and in favour of respect for outcomes of democratic elections; and how this strengthened coalitions in West Africa in favour of SSRG. Our analysis has shown that the strengthening of regional norms on SSRG were not simply a consequence of increased democratisation amongst ECOWAS member states, but rather an integral factor in the overall process. Clearly progress on this issue depended on commitments to democratisation of key member state governments, including Nigeria, Ghana

and Senegal; but the development of ECOWAS norms on SSRG also contributed to regional pressures towards democratisation within a range of ECOWAS countries. As discussed in chapters 3, 5 and 6, initiatives include the Supplementary Act on the Code of Conducts for the Armed Forces and Security Services of ECOWAS in 2011 were important milestones in the process.

Since ECOWAS decisions generally require at least 'consensus minus one', it required relatively widespread political commitment towards democratisation amongst member states before the ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (EPFSSRG) could be adopted in June 2016. But the principles had by that time become widely diffused and adopted, as reflected for example in the strong political positions adopted by ECOWAS in response to the second crisis/ conflict in Cote D'Ivoire. BY the time the SSRG norms were adopted, The Gambia was the only member state of ECOWAS with a president that had not only come to power through military coup but also transformed himself to a civilian dictator by refusing to accept an election outcome in order to stay in power.

The combination of ECOWAS conflict prevention and SSRG norms has proved to have powerful synergies, as our analysis in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate. This is why the research defined as the maturation stage of the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS from 2013 when the regional bloc ECOWAS increased its resolve to end military regime in West Africa to its intervention in Gambia in 2017. At this stage, ECOWAS took several initiatives and actions to strengthen its existing norms and mechanisms and develop new ones in relation to SSR/G and conflict prevention. The maturation stage saw the production of a series of norms and political declarations to enhance the regional bloc's SSR/G and conflict prevention norms, mechanisms and practice to address traditional as well as new and emerging threats in West Africa. This initiative included not only the further development of the EWER and military code of conduct (2011), but also ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation of 2013, ECOWAS-ECCAS Declaration on Maritime Security 2013 and the subsequent draft ECOWAS Maritime Security Strategy.



Our analysis of the process by which ECOWAS has developed these norms since the early 2000s confirms that it has been a complex, multi-factorial and messy process. In the early days of ECOWAS, its conflict prevention and SSR operations were entirely driven by a mix of aspiration, pragmatism and realism. ECOWAS, like most regional political organisations, has generally been reactive to crises. The need for reflection and evidence-based policy and decision-making for strategy and planning have often been referred to, but only occasionally put into practice. Strategy and planning were often driven by the short term focus of conflict resolution and national security interests of major players like Nigeria and Ghana as well as international partners.

Nevertheless, the determination of a critical number of ECOWAS member states that ECOWAS should play an important role in responding to peace and security problems and crises has ultimately proved to be a powerful and consistent driver for the development and strengthening of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms. Where ECOWAS' efforts to prevent or respond to a crisis in West Africa have proved inadequate, there has typically been a 'winning coalition' of member states and other stakeholders arguing that this experience demonstrates the need for further investment in ECOWAS institutions – including the elaboration and strengthening of ECOWAS norms, capacities and co-ordinations and consultation mechanisms. As the ECOWAS Secretariat and its associated network of technical experts developed, more systematic and technocratic approaches became influential. We argue that the development and implementation of ECOWAS instrument in the post-Ivorian conflicts have increasingly been influenced by technocrats trying to change the organisations by bringing together theory and experience. In this sense, we argue that lessons-learned processes have increasingly informed and shaped the on-going processes of norms development in ECOWAS over the last 20 years.

Despite, these advances, there are security threats and political challenges in the region, this discussion highlights that ECOWAS as a regional organisation has made great strides in the evolution of its peace and security architecture. One great achievement, in which ECOWAS institutions and norms have played a substantial contribution, is the fact that for the first time, the regional bloc has

no member state with a sitting president that came to power through undemocratic and unconstitutional means. This is no small feat in a sub-region where military dictatorship was more the norm than the exception.

### **7.1.2 Understanding why ECOWAS has proved able to develop increasingly strong regional norms and mechanisms**

The second thematic, secondary, research question addressed in this PhD research is:

*What factors are needed to adequately explain the interests and capacities that enabled ECOWAS to develop increasingly strong and elaborated norms and mechanisms in the above areas since the early 2000s, in view of the challenging sub-regional conditions of conflict, fragility and limited development?*

As discussed in chapter 1, by addressing this question, the thesis aims to contribute to better understanding of the factors required to explain how and why ECOWAS member states, and other stakeholders, were able to overcome the structural challenges of further developing and strengthening ECOWAS relevant norms and mechanisms so in a sub-region characterised by conflict, fragility, problematic governance, and political and cultural division. This question is particularly addressed in chapter 4, but with relevant evidence also in chapters 3, 5 and 6.

Even in the context of poverty and widespread fragility and conflict, it is not particularly puzzling that a viable sub-regional organisation develops and functions with a peace and security mandate. Experience shows that most parts of the world have developed such inclusive sub-regional organisation. There are many diplomatic incentives and UN and other international frameworks that encourage and support the establishment and maintenance of such organisations. Even in the context of fragility and political division, government leaders find it convenient regularly to meet with their sub-regional counterparts, which quickly generates a need for preparatory and expert meetings and the

occasional declaratory agreements and approval of (often donor-supported) sub-regional programmes.

The puzzle is rather when sub-regional organisations in fragile and conflictual areas manage to develop substantial institutional capacities, influence and momentum; and where regional agreements generate increasing strengthened and elaborated norms and mechanisms. In this thesis, we argue (and demonstrate) that this is the case for ECOWAS. Our second thematic research question encourages us to contribute to a better understanding of how and why this has been achieved.

As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, much of the academic literature on ECOWAS's early programmes and interventions for peace and security in the 1990s and early 2000s understood these primarily as an expression of Nigeria's regional power and interests. In chapter 4, we therefore examined the extent to which the analytical framework of Nigeria as a sub-regional hegemonic power provides an adequate explanation of the ways and extent to which ECOWAS peace and security norms have been developed and used. Our finding from this analysis is that Nigeria has undoubtedly been an important power and influence in the process. It is undoubtedly the biggest and most influential state in the ECOWAS sub-regional, and it has for example contributed annually some 50% of the total ECOWAS institutional budget. But we provide a range of arguments and evidence to demonstrate that this hegemonic power framework is entirely inadequate to provide a good understanding of the development and roles of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms, at least since the mid-2000s.

We then similarly critically analysed the often-argued case for understanding the development of ECOWAS norms and mechanisms as the consequence of external influences, including the UN, EU or international powers with extensive influence in West Africa, such as the USA, France and the UK. In this case too, we argue that such external influences have indeed been influential in the development of ECOWAS norms and roles in peace and security since the early 2000s. The UN, EU and individual powers have certainly looked to ECOWAS as a valuable sub-regional counterpart and partner for enabling them to pursue their peace and security objectives in West Africa. In the process,

they have exerted political influence, supported many capacity-building, expert and operational programmes.

But we argue that this too is an inadequate framework for understanding ECOWAS norms and how they have been operationalised. This is partly because this influence has been a two way process: ECOWAS and its member states have been active in shaping UN and other international norms and programmes; and have actively sought co-operation and support from the US, European and other actors to enable ECOWAS to pursue its own agendas. Moreover, the information we have gathered for this research clearly shows that the significance of such diverse international influences and actors can only be properly understood as part of a wider and more complex process.

In this context, in chapter 4 we then examine in detail the evidence that the dynamic development of ECOWAS institutions, norms and mechanisms for conflict prevention, peace and security is primarily the outcome of a more complex West African political dynamics, driven not by a single Nigerian hegemonic power but rather by complex coalitions of west African states and governments, re-enforced by West African civil society networks and a growing technical secretariat and regional expert network. This approach to understanding the process is developed in detail in chapter 5, and demonstrated to be a complex and dynamic process, with some shifting coalitions and constraints, but nevertheless with some consistent features.

We find that one consistent feature has been a 'winning coalition' of influential states and stakeholders supporting the imperative that West Africans should play leading roles in addressing peace and security challenges in their sub-region, and that ECOWAS norms and mechanisms need to be invested in order to enable and legitimise such leading roles. Nigeria has been at the heart of these winning coalitions, supporting the regional adoption and diffusion of conflict prevention and security norms even when the Nigerian government themselves was reluctant to implement them domestically. But Nigeria could not, and has not, achieved such aims alone. The process has required partnerships with other key ECOWAS states.

We argue that the combination of Ghana and Nigeria in leadership roles has proved particularly potent and influential in initiatives to strengthen ECOWAS norms and institutions throughout the last 20 years. We trace how these two states developed similar or coinciding national policy perceptions and interests relating to the priorities for regional security and stability in West Africa, and explore the complex interplay not only between these two countries' governments and civil society networks, but also between their domestic and regional political agendas.

Thus, the findings from this chapter demonstrate the fluctuating role, influence and contributions of Nigeria and Ghana in promoting and shaping peace and security and SSR norms and agenda in West Africa. It emerges that at some points, the actions and interventions of these two countries were driven by coherent national policies while at other times, they seemed incoherent and dictated by the whims of the incumbent head of states. When they were under military dictatorship, both Ghana and Nigeria were more active and assertive in unilaterally pursuing their national policies on peace and security. However, as democratisation processes proceeded in both countries, though at different pace, they each became more engaged and supportive of developing elaborated regional norms by working more concertedly through ECOWAS and investing in associated regional mechanisms. These periods led to the development of the ECOWAS early warning mechanism, improved conflict prevention framework, SSR governance framework in 2016.

Although the Francophone – Anglophone divide remained significant, it proved more manageable from the late-2000s in relation to developing ECOWAS norms, as Senegal in particular increasingly became a like-minded partner in this process.

### **7.1.3: ECOWAS Crisis Response and Peace-building Missions**

The third of our three key thematic questions is:

*To what extent have the further developed ECOWAS norms and mechanisms been mobilised and used as ECOWAS member states and institutions, with*

*their partners, have tried to respond to major conflicts and crises in West Africa since the mid-2000s, including in Cote D'Ivoire, Mali and Gambia; and what are the lessons from these experiences?*

This thematic question is particularly examined in chapter 5, and in also in chapter 6. Through the detailed case studies of ECOWAS responses and missions to Cote D'Ivoire and Mali, our research enable a tracing of the ways and extent to which ECOWAS referred to and used its relevant norms and mechanisms to shape and enable its responses and missions in these cases. We also trace the ways in which the experience from these missions contributed to processes of subsequent further development of these norms. In doing this, we built upon a number of detailed existing studies, as well as open official sources, on international responses to the crises and conflicts in these two countries, and on the subsequent stabilisation and peacebuilding missions; including material on roles of ECOWAS and ECOWAS member states in these responses. But this information is enriched with the other secondary and primary information that we gathered as part of our research approach and activities. In doing so, we have been able to contribute original insights and analyses of the significance and interplay between the missions and the specific influences of ECOWAS norms in relation to Cote'D'Ivoire and Mali, and also (in chapter 6) in The Gambia.

These analyses have also provided more specific tracing and analysis of the roles of Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal in these crisis responses, normally through ECOWAS frameworks and thus in close interplay with ECOWAS and their international partners. The interventions of ECOWAS in Mali and Cote d'Ivoire underscored the fluctuating role, influences and contributions of Ghana and Nigeria in norm-setting and norm-implementation of the regional organisation. it is important to juxtapose the early intervention of the regional bloc and its later interventions following the emergence of its peace and security architecture. To our knowledge, this provides original perspectives.

These case studies confirm that there were many inadequacies and inefficiencies in ECOWAS's response the emerging crises. The EWER

mechanisms operated, but not sufficiently to consistently mobilise timely and effective ECOWAS actions, and sometimes proved more influential in informing post-conflict engagements. The key ECOWAS norms relating to military code of conduct and respect for election outcomes were certainly influential, but it was not until after the Mali and Cote D'Ivoire experiences that the more elaborated and strengthened SSRG norms came into play (and then used in The Gambia). Lack of military capacity and resources frequently meant that ECOWAS turned out to depend substantially on USA, EU, and UN partnership and support. The lessons from these experiences are highlighted in chapters 5 and 6, and inform discussions later in this concluding chapter.

One finding from chapter 5 is that on the basis of lessons learned from the intervention of ECOWAS in Cote d'Ivoire, ECOWAS and its member states started to move away from its initial bias for action over reflection. It was in the intervention of Mali that the regional bloc organised reviews of its ongoing interventions bringing together non-state actors and experts to inform its planning and further actions. Whereas in Cote d'Ivoire, most of the planning and further actions of the organisations were organised behind closed doors and in greater secrecy. The shift from bias for action over reflection and learning from experience and technocrats' points to a gradual departure of the regional organisation towards a well-informed policy and decision-making process in its conflict resolution and prevention frameworks.

## **7.1 Reflections on our methodological approach**

Throughout this research, we have been aware of the challenges within the resources available of gathering combinations of sufficiently reliable and detailed information to be able to achieve our aims. We have noted the limitations from the outset and remain aware of them. For example, a wider geographical and cultural scope for field work, including all member states would help to ensure that we take into account a wider range of perspectives.

Moreover, in this study we focussed our Key Informant Interviews on senior ECOWAS officials' executives and experts. This was justified in view of our

practical constraints. But it means that the foot soldiers and other operatives at the lower rungs of ECOWAS hierarchy who are often on the frontline were excluded. This group constitute an important source of knowledge informing the more practical day to day tasks and experiences in ECCOWAS SSR/G, EWER, CP missions. Future studies should explore the possibility of including this group to explore their experiences.

On reflection, however, we believe that the combinations of process tracing, content analysis and empirical research using secondary data supplemented by primary data from key informant interviews has been sufficient and effective. By combining three methods, the approach enabled deeper exploration, recognising that grounded research needs to examine from several perspectives to access deeper meanings and real life scenarios that enrich understanding while experiencing key research questions in their real life manifestation (Bell et al., 2018, Pratt, 2008, Silverman, 2015).

Our framework for analysis therefore has proved to be robust, and I plan not only to apply it myself in future research where it has similar aims, but also to encourage its wider use. The framework can perhaps be used as a guide for scholars to assess the significance of institutional EWER and SSRG norms and mechanism in complex peace and security processes, and also to help students. It is hoped the framework will be published in a planned publication for wider dissemination as these kinds of models are limited in peace and development studies particularly in the African context (Atieno and Robinson, 2018).

Furthermore, it has been argued that SSR/G, EWER and CP are all practice-based aspects of peace building (Jeong, 2017). To this extent, the practical steps proposed within the framework enables practitioners to be aware of the practical aspects of SSR/G intervention to consider before, during and after peace missions. It will be interesting, for instance, to see what practical steps are necessary to achieve closer collaboration. Practitioners could also reflect about what practical steps are necessary for effective logistics for instance. The proposed framework provides opportunities and an iterative map and checkers



for practice change for regional organisation involved in conflict prevention missions.

Nevertheless, future research could usefully aim to incorporate quantitative as well as qualitative research approaches to measure some of the variables developed from the themes of the study. For instance, the measure of collaboration to investment and success propensity. A well-developed questionnaire in a quantitative study that focuses on the themes from this study could for example provide more precision on how much ECOWAS employees consider as important the various tentacles of peace keeping mission.

## **7.2 Reflections on the policy implications of the findings**

All in all, at the end of the investigations the research has come to the conclusion that ECOWAS continues to face enormous challenges in all three areas we have considered (EWER, SSRG and crisis response) (Boateng, 2019, Ansorg and Gordon, 2019, Ampomah, 2019, Sanusi and Gyamfi, 2017). With respect to SSR/G, there is need for a new regime which considers the specific context of Africa where violence can degenerate faster and sporadically relative to ethnic and tribal lines. Hence, scholars have proposed a contextual analysis of the context to accommodate peculiar African complexities rather than impose universal approaches in a verbatim manner Kazeroony (2016); (Kazeroony and Burr, 2017); (Oghojafor et al., 2013).

In doing so, Ubuntu as an Afrocentric theory for community building and peace could serve as a guiding principle to construct novel approaches to revamping the peace intervention architecture. Such an approach will emphasise the need to include non-military – humane, inter-personal, people-oriented philosophy underpinning the concept of Ubuntu (Khoza, 2012). Linkage between SSR/G, EWER and CP strategies and the local socio-political context could mitigate on some of the tensions of creating a discouraged military personnel and peace negotiators which is unattended can create an organizational climate capable of negatively impacting ECOWAS missions (Darj et al., 2015, Elias and Paradies, 2016, Fapohunda, 2017).

Our research findings also draw attention to the need for ECOWAS to set appropriate systems in place in anticipation of problems. From this perspective there is need to continue to move away from a reactive approach to more proactive planning as we now know that instability is a constant feature in West Africa. Secondary analysis conducted within this study indicates that, although its norms and institutions have developed, ECOWAS still tends to rush to intervene without the necessary resource allocation, planning and collaboration etc. that increase chances of success (Boateng, 2019). Also, the nature of collaboration between ECOWAS, France, AU, EU and UN has been rather haphazard (Sanusi and Gyamfi, 2017), which means that ECOWAS has not made the most of the benefits of prior collaboration and negotiation to share the burden of conflicts such as in Cote D'Ivoire and Mali which became a more global challenge implicating the UN, Algeria and France. Effective collaboration diffuses tensions and sentiments of mistrust and intrusion into West African space for which Nigeria in particular has found to be intrusive and unacceptable (Sellassie, 2020).

Manpower shortage also emerged as a key operational gap as well as a gap identified in the literature in terms of the lack of sufficient effective and measured training and development. This study implies that although ECOWAS centres have been created, there is need for a standing force in place that is not responsive to own country, but which is trained for rapid intervention and composed of forces from all ECOWAS member nations. These gaps call for the construction of a comprehensive framework which takes account of the range of issues and challenges as well as the opportunities uncovered within this work. The proposed framework is presented next.

Based on the knowledge generated from the empirical data collected in the field, analysis of content considered and the tracing of events and interventions the thesis provides a basis for developing a synthesised framework for future ECOWAS interventions in West Africa. Carefully considered, there is need for any framework on SSR/G in the African context, to factor the link between African culture and context and CP initiatives. This is because the behaviour of ECOWAS operatives can only reflect key elements of African culture (Ford,


2010) At the same time, as this study has shown, some of the cultural rules can be counter-productive, thereby constraining effective collaboration, deployment and planning (Giddens, 1997; Goffman, 1974; Hofstede, 2003).

An understanding of this complexity has been a key learning from this thesis. It is important therefore for the success ECOWAS SSR/G, EWER, CP and other mechanism initiatives development initiative to be undergirded by the issues raised within this these which is the result of the proposed conceptualization. The conceptual model emphasises the importance of three dimensions relative to the context and key success factors for effective deployment.

- (1) Setting and management of ECOWAS goals before, during and after conflict.
- (2) Establishing Productive relationships.
- (3) Building resource capacity

This propose framework is based on three dimensions derived from the review of the extant literature and gaps identified from previous work on peace studies and political science and ECOWAS operations in Africa. It also takes account of the key debates and analysis of lessons learnt, challenges faced and projections into the future. Applied consistently by ECOWAS and other regional organisations this researcher hopes that the objectives of SSR/G, EWER, CP, norms and mechanisms will be deployed in a more structured and informed manner leading to the satisfaction of stakeholders.

Fig. 7.1 Suggested future ECOWAS framework for effective SSR/G, EWER, CP, norms and mechanisms



### 7.3 Issues for future research

There are several important areas for future research that flow reasonably directly from our findings, relating to the complex roles and significance of ECOWAS and other sub-regional organisations in Africa in contributing to peace and security.

In this context, as noted in chapter 1, I am very attracted to the opportunities for building from Ubuntu an Afrocentric theory, in which we become more aware of how to conceptualise events and phenomena in Africa using indigenous African concepts as well as existing international analytical approaches. The implications of this research further highlight the need for a broader conceptualisation of the leading a multi-government regional institution and the role of humility and collaboration and negotiation in decision making and coalition building within and without ECOWAS.

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## 2 Appendices

### 2.1 Transcribed semi-structure interview

Voice 1

**Interviewee:** ECOWAS conflict prevention framework that has been adopted by ECOWAS since January 2008 (...I have some...ah, keep very well this one we may need it in the future) I think this ah article 72 is about Security governance.

**Interviewer: *okay***

Interviewee: you know ah... that you have to know that ECOWAS has adopted prevention, conflict prevention as the basis of all policies in terms of security...peace and security.

**Interviewer: *hmm! Yeah***

Interviewee: it is about as I said first of all prevention ECOWAS should prevent and if we are not able to to to stop the crisis from happening. From eh! Coming up we have to intervene to help to solve the problem and if we have done all what we are able to do and we have not able to stop the crisis we have to come in the last stage to rebuild if you take all these stages, you see it is all about security governance, our approach to security and eh! Our target mainly is about what we call security institutions, statutory institutions, we talking about non-statutory institutions, bodies, we talking about those in charge of eh! What do you call it eh! Overseeing the security sectors we talking about the private security institutions as well as the organisation at this local level dealing with security issues.

All these constitute part of what we are interested in from our perspective and we are seen that huh! ECOWAs should develop a kind of framework- a common framework in order to give to all member state a kind of guidance or steps to be taken in order to change the let say the status of the security operators in the countries why? The main reason is that we know that in Africa, mainly West Africa eh! During the colonial time the security institutions are had was set up in other to maintain the status of the colonial people unfortunately, when we get our independence the new elite didn't change the arrangement, didn't change the settings they just continue to do the same thing the new elite decide to set up institution that will be favouring their position which was the domination of

the population. It was not something done for the protection of the population, immediate population but only to maintain the position of the new elite- either military or political- let us say civilian. This time we face a lot of issues like coup detat, civil war, many other crises that show that what, we, the choice of our first leaders during the post-independence era was not good choice. It is something that we need to change, we need to change it in other to accommodate new principle, new organisation that will take into account the human being as the main let us say the main... element the main...eh! What do you call it... put the human being in the centre of our...

**Interviewer: Security**

**Interviewee:** yeah security. We are not taking only about security of selves but we have to think of security of the population. And ECOWAS is working towards all these. It has been checked...we have been given ...a number of targets, of objectives in this ECOWAs conflict prevention and we have been said that to achieve the objective set under security governance the following activities shall be undertaken by stakeholders

Interviewer: *eh!*

Interviewee: (a) ECOWAs shall develop a security governance framework – we are working on it, with a plan of action that takes into a complete----- of the sub region to fit into continental and global processes of security system reform. Towards this objective an expert group composed of relevant ECOWAS departments, experts and individuals shall be established by the commission. This one was established as you can see in 2009, we had our meeting and since then we are working towards the development of the framework.

**Interviewer: hmmm!**

Interviewee: okay? It has be said that ECOWAS shall facilitate the conduct of a study into the military and security agencies as part of exercises need for West African and environs in different areas of intervention.

**Interviewer: yeah!**

Interviewee: so we are looking towards the implementation of this one that is why I said that when you get into this the ECOWAS conflict prevention you have all the evidence applied to ----- and I the way of implementing this we constitute groups of ...we had consultation, we have, we met, we had several meetings to come up with studies and the first draft that has been adopted by...

the internal department in ECOWAs ( the contents here) you can have all the studies, what we have done, security challenges and providing in Africa everything is here(okay) let me give it to you so you may able to read and eh! Take all the elements.

**Interviewer;** *it's okay*

**Interviewee:** okay. That is one. I have done is that I took into account the critics made by mu colleagues from other departments telling me that this document, it was looking like a research document so why it will be good for you...you understand and eh! And a research document is not something that you can just put on the middle of an institution, telling people, asking people to develop a plan of action it is said; it is said that after we develop the framework, it is said that we should develop a plan of action ha! You see with a plan of action that takes into account...you know ECOWAS shall develop a security governance framework with a plan of action...so it was very difficult for us to take such document and make a plan of action from this...

**Interviewer:** *yeah!*

**Interviewee:** so I decide to take with DECAF

**Interviewer:** *okay*

**Interviewee:** you know DECAF.....

**Interviewer:** *Democratic.....( you completed it)*

**Interviewee...** okay, in particular, to the sector of ISAT... international security Adviser tee, and I told them look I have ha! A working since 2009 with my people in ECOWAS and within the region and this is our findings but the document is looking like a research document, is ha! Too much elaborated to be considered as ha! Policy document. Is it possible for you to help me put it ha! To rephrase it and turn it into a policy document so, and ha! We discuss on the detail, we exchange some mails and at the end of the day we had ha! What do we call it ha! Something that was better written than this one.

**Interviewer:** *okay*

**Interviewee:** and ha1 and I call all the directors of ECOWAs involved in the matter, and we had a meeting in Abuja, no in Lagos and it has been adopted by ECOWAs. Now the next step, the next step will be the meeting of government experts we are currently working on it.

**Interviewer:** *okay*

Interviewee: it will take place, I don't know, maybe you need to see my deputy, he will give you the exact date and maybe when we are doing the meeting you will be able to come and , and ha!

**Interviewer:** *hmmmm!*

Interviewee: we send the concept to all the other sectors , we give the 2 months to look at it those are ethics, proposal of amendments and everything and we will meet together for 3 days to discuss all the defects and adopt the paper as an ECOWAs document.

Interviewer: *okay, okay*

Interviewee: but as I said , I was talking about government expert meeting after that we need to push it in front of the emergency and security council at the level of the ministers and if needed to the level of head of states ... that is..

**Interviewer:** *head of state*

**Interviewee:** since this one has been adopted by the head of states (this one) oh! This is the ministers we don't need to go to the level of the head of states. It's just recommendation from this ministers, and when the ministers sign this one it will be a regulation that will be implemented by all ECOWAS people. So ha! This is what has been done so far in ECOWAS.

Interviewer: *but from your own perspective looking at the regional mechanisms and security system reform per se because you said before, earlier that ehm! The period security were part of a, has a colonial traits and that kind of stuff and again the new dimension of security is also looking at human security not only of state now then what actually do you think apart aside that, in your own opinion, do you think motivated ECOWAS security sector reform policies and programmes in West Africa.*

**Interviewee:** you know during long time we have seen that eh! Let us say that ECOWAS at its onset didn't have any security programmes we were just seeking of eh! Mutual assistance in case of emergency or non- aggression is what we... but you know eh! Towards 1989 at the end of the cold war, we witnessed a lot of crisis in our region, if you remember the crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leone and also we witnessed at least 80 or 84 attempted or successful coup detat meaning that the military operators was intervening in the political arena or we have also witnessed that the politician was manipulating the insurgence in other to reach their own target, their own objective. All these

continues until what we have seen in the Mali where we witnessed a failure , total failure of certain institution and mainly the military weren't able to defend their own countries and when you look at all the countries, where you have a coup detat, in a way or another you, you see that eh!, the main role that is given to the state if you take into account the theory relating to the social contract telling that the citizens are releasing part of their liberty, in the hand of a sovereign institution, we call it state or king, or... and this one should give them security. The social contract as will be expected anywhere... we had this issue of coup detat everywhere except in Senegal and Cape Verde. So mean that something was wrong. The ... and seen that one of the major objective why we are...state is security, human security. Security of institution, security also of people, providing all they need and protecting the population against hazard, against danger, against any kind eh! Thing that can harm them. Okay? So if a state is not able to do that is not good state. And we have also witnessed a presence of non-sec actors as armed groups, as mercenaries. But also a more and more we are witnessing the presence of private security operators. If you take into account all these a you are wondering what is not really working something is not properly done and a if you go in the countries, you see that many of these countries a...have a lot of excuse me (conversation with secretary), so if you look at also a the way a the military operators are set you see different treatments between what we call generally the president's guard and the rest of the army. The president's guard are like personal ministers surrounding the president himself a they have more means than the rest of the army but this way of setting the presidential guard is only to maintain their own interest. Most of these people in charge the presidency guard are coming from the same tribe, the same a ethnic group as the president. All this is wrong and if you see the kind of expenses, the budget of the military and the civil operators is done at the level of the assembly, something was wrong also eh!, no control, no control of the budget generally it is accepted by the the reps- national reps without discussion and nobody is also really questioning the way this money has been allocated for use by this people. In some countries we even witnessed exiled stages whereby even the prisons disappear. In a country like Guinea Bissau you don't have a prison, yeah! How

**Interviewer:** *wow!*

Interviewee: yeah. How can you ensure that the work of the police, or generally all these em! Law enforcement agency is effective. One, the court obey any instruction given by the military, corruption is there, broke is there, the military are doing whatever they want and in other side the prison. It does not make sense. So something was em! This are other elements showing that our security institutions in West Africa are wrong they are not looking very well. And we witness countries like Nigeria where you have , I don't know more than 20 years of military dictatorship, the same thing happen in Mali's and a... if you see countries like Togo you will see that the states the main pillar of the state is the army. Which is not normal. Everything is turning around army.

**Interviewer:** *which country?*

Interviewee: Togo (interviewer: okay) yes. The most, the strongest pillar of the region is army, constituted by the people coming from the ethnic group of the president. All these is wrong. So what should be done? ECOWAS is trying to give guiding principles relating, how at the level of governance things should be done. We should have regulation, laws explaining how the security operators should be under the control of the civilian, political authority. One , inside the political authority the civilian authority, , you should have oversees body that can be, the authority itself, the head of state being the head of the army, you should the possibility to have financial control during the execution of the budget, the parliament should play its role in terms of oversees , oversee body to see what is happening in the security operators and we should also explain to all our member states what we need from the , all this security operators is for them to have professional , well trained , well paid, with clear vision about their career, people we know are entering because they are gather some criteria and after sometime, they have to retired, and when they retire, thy should be entitled to pension. It is not something as obvious as we can see. All the problem we are facing in Guinea Bissau is about the pension and either the pension is very, very bad; very low, very small or it doesn't exist as in guinea Bissau. And that ha... the link between the police, the other security ha.. Institution should be made very clear the link between this security institutions and the ministries, as in interior or justice or something that, those in charge of security, bearing links with the prisons administration of prisons, you understand all this should be drawn clearly and what we want from every

member state is to build all these based on first criteria. The first criteria is to determine what is our national interest from the national security strategy and this national security strategy will say what are the objectives of the country , in terms of security , taking into account the national context, regional context, international context. National context how many people, do you have in your country you know there is a ratio between the number of people and the number of police officers for example. So how many policeman do you need,, which kind of army do you need ha! Towards you, the need to shocking you borders and internal territory to participate in the security of the region as a member of ECOWAS for example but also to be sometime involved in peace-keeping with as a member of the international community like ha! UN and so and so. We take into account all these and you will be able to build, tell yourself this is “the number of military I need in the army, in the navy, in air force. This is the kind of security people I need to have-police , custom, a little bit all other setting of this security institution and the clear line of hierarchy (you understand) and organise all this. It should be based nationwide not in terms of regional interest, or administrative interest but national- the nation.

This is what we are telling the people and already also ECOWAS has adopted what we call the Code of Conduct for the armed forces and security services. Which is telling clearly based on another document (the document is ha!) the supplementary protocol on this one you have (this one) the supplementary protocol on Democrat and good governance inside you have principles talking about the supremacy of the civilian, what do you call it, the civilian power, the political power in charge of the military and other security institutions obey. We extract it and we have ha! Developed a protocol (not a protocol) a Code of Conduct that has been adopted by all the member states. Asking all military to adopt the system of non-interference in the political activities in the barracks or defend the country or do whatever have been decided by...

**Interviewer:** *the state*

Interviewee: yeah...yes... and our setting under the institution is done in order to repress the population but put all nations in order. This is how, but the last principle is to say we are giving guiding principles, but security sector reform as



a system is not something that should be drawn from ECOWAS to the member states, it is a national process, we are just giving principles.

Interviewer: ...*principles*.

Interviewee: Every, every, every, ha! Security sector reform should be context based, should be owned by the population, by the country itself

Interviewer: *yeah! And from your own opinion (sir thank you so much) from your own opinion again how have, how do you think that this nation, because you made mention of eh!, drawing the security sector reform policies from the nation or the national security strategy by the member states, so how do you think from your own opinion that the national security policies and programmes of member states (you know) will contribute to the implementation of regional security sector eh! Programmes.*

Interviewee:... it's what I said we are giving them the guidance and what we can do is to help them to help them by assisting them, giving them technical assistance, which they start during the first phases. The first phases of ha! Of all the security sector reform system is to be able to gather the main stakeholders in the country and ask yourself what is, what is ha! What is our qualms? What do we need to achieve? ECOWAS can be there to help them to, to, to do the first assessment of the situation, ask the question what is ha! What kind of security do we have? ha! What are our weaknesses? What are our advantages? Do we have ha! Ha! What do we call it ha! Another parent security system, what do we need to do? And ha! We can be there telling them that ha! What we are going to have their meetings ha! When they are developing the instruments. ECOWAS can be, can be assisting can provide the support, the needed support. Either technical support, either by going to see our technical partners or financial partners to provide them with ha! Ha! The tool they need to organise themselves, but ECOWAS cannot from the region come to tell to a country this is what you need. It will not be accepted. But when we have, when we have a guidance, then we saying this is the framework and they accept, all the member states accept that this is the framework that we want to ha! Adopt for our region and you know we are in the process. Why, when they do that, whatever they are doing in their country is fitting the principle developed by at the regional level. That why when we are developing ourselves, our framework, we do it with them, we involve all the member states, we tell them this is what

ECOWAS is proposing if they accept it whatever they are doing at the national level should be in conformity with this guiding principles.

Interviewer: so, so *what you are saying now is that at the moment there is, ECOWAS has no standby, they don't have any framework, any regional policy framework on SSR it's still developing*

**Interviewee:** We are still developing it

**Interviewer:** *okay developing it. Okay.*

Interviewee: it is the provision for the creation of the framework are already in the ECOWAS conflict framework. As I, as I show you since 2009 we are still working on the development of this framework. But you know that if you want to develop this kind of framework you need to consult. First of all you need to have ha! As it is said, we did what was called first study in the region by NGO, scholars, people coming from diverse ha! Origins but all of them were originating from the region, scholars, NGOs, ha! All these persons living in America or in Switzerland but all of them originating from Africa we call them and we ask them to do the first assessment and when they did the first assessment, on the need to have guiding principle on security sector reform. They came up with some conclusion and this meeting I show you was the first meeting whereby all of them came to us Africa, here in Abuja and we discussed and we had our first conclusion.

This conclusion we show to civil society organisations, all the civil society organisation, we discuss it, we came back in ECOWAS and since 2 years within the ECOWAS department we are discussing, we are discussing. Because you know it's not all about police or defence, we have other department, we have justice, and we have-----

Interviewer: *independent system; judiciary...*

**Interviewee:** independent system...all these should be consulted, should be involved in the matter. It, it, you know there is no need to rush if you want to do something good, you should be convinced that ha! Your, your own technical people ha! accept the system as it is before sending it as a proposal, as a proposal made by ECOWAs as a body to the member states. When we send the proposal to the member states during the time its becomes the property of the member states. They can discuss it, amend it, do whatever they want and we call them back for a meeting, the expert, the government expert meeting

during 3 days we remind them what we proposed, what the proposes are, and we tell them this is your process, do whatever you want about it, they can accept, they can change it, they can amend it, whatever they want will be a document proposed by the member states to ECOWAS. You see and we take it to the political level so, we have only two stages that are remaining, the government expert meeting and the ministerial level meeting. So it means that by the end of this year (2014) this framework will be available.

**Interviewer:** *okay...the SSR framework*

**Interviewee:** yes. By likely by December if not December. It will be earlier, early 2015 and from there we develop an action plan for its implementation but already we have the Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct for the armed forces and security services. We are developing now a plan of action for its implementation.

**Interviewer:** *...and that Code of Conduct you think is, is it basically for ECOWAS standby forces or just for...*

**Interviewee:** it has...what is ECOWAS stand by force? ECOWAS standby forces is supposed to be run from principles developed at the ECOWAS, at the African Union stand by force. Which was based on the principle of brigade-one brigade developed from each, from the five pillars of the continental arrangement of ABSA- African.....

**Interviewer:** *ABSA.....(you completed it)*

**Interviewee:** West African, central African, South African, North African, east Africa. Ha! So ha! We have seen what have happed in Mali, we have seen pledged units, pledged forces by the member states but in the implementation, it was very difficult for those country with pledged for units to provide it on time. Because of o! Lack of capacity, lack of financial resources, lack of human resources, lack availability, permanent availability of resources. Standby force is a issue of, is a issue of putting people together and eh!, tell them to wait, for a thing to happen while you need this people to do some other jobs in the country, while you need to have resources to maintain this people on standby. All things that were available... remember that when we talk about forces, when we talk about army, let us say military ha! At the end am use to tell people that the end of the war, Second World War in 1945 Japan was asked not to have military forces, a dispensing up to now is running, is still in force. But Japan has

100,000 people in-charge of defending it and it is not called an army do you have, except for Nigeria, do you any other country with people that are able to put into place 100,000 people, we don't have it , in west Africa, we don't have armies, and we don't have armies in the AU standby force, we don't have adequate forces at the national level, no, no, no fight, no no plane, no no vessels, in the ---for for the navies ha! No no enough what do we call it financial resources in the armies, talking about army it is a military, it is always impossible to talk about standby forces, it's a principle, it's a concept but ha! Ha! I know that down stairs we have ha! Headquarters but am not sure that eh! It was ha! Really effective...even this standby force should be reformed.

**Interviewer:** *yeah*

**Interviewee:** ... and we have to be very careful when we talk about the word reform. The military acceptance of the word reform is the same has when we are using the Portuguese language. Reform for the army is to retire and throw away from the army...

**Interviewer:** *(laughs)*

**Interviewee:** that is why more, and more people are talking about security sector transformation. Am sure you have the notion and is more acceptable than before because if it said to the military your reform, it means that you are out of the system. It is the same accepted, understanding for Portuguese-okay. Interviewer: hmmm! So sir just, one more or two questions. I just want to look at, you look at for me what you have said, you have really narrated ehm! Basically how the regional framework will have to interplay with the national framework. But do you think in any way that the ECOWAS SSR norms, policies and mechanisms in any way respondent to the post 2006 crisis or emergency in Cote d'ivoire and Mali. Is there anyway the reform processes...

Interviewee: yeah. Whether, look if you look at what happened in Mali. In Mali you had, we witnessed a situation whereby you have a military that is not reflecting really the national setting of the population, we don't have all population represented in the army. What you had is, one side, let us say, the black people, (interviewer: okay) and those that have been set inside the army from the, the three peace process that happened in the country. In past. Remember in like in 1996 when they have this eh! Peace process with ehm! The lave of Tombokutu (interviewer: yeah) many Kowari people was sent

inside the army and they hadn't before and you know 3 times the, the, the Malian army accepted the re-integration of the Kowari people forces that were fighting against them before. The mix has never really worked because at this time there is a crisis those that have been re-integrated ran away and joined the rebels. (Interviewer: laughs) you understand? It, it, it impacted the morale of the troops in that military army. The, the Malian army because you will see that somebody that is quite illiterate was not educated at all at the time of the re-integration was given the rank of Colonel. Somebody that was not able to, to, to speak French or Bomana, was not able to talk to the troops and something else is what we call the system of Madarina. Madarina means that in the, in the military system of Mali, if you have a boss someone with your, with your relative, who adopted you as a tutor the way you are educated, the way you are growing in the hierarchy becomes very easy. Those who don't have it they are suffering you understand at the end of the day instead of developing their capacities in terms of training, in terms of colleges, in terms of operational activities the officers was more oriented towards ha! How to get money, how to be involved in other illegal, illicit and illegal activities we have witnessed that eh! Somehow, somewhere, the drings people were given with the authorities of the army as well as the government.

Interviewer: *yeah.*

**Interviewee:** you understand. at the end of the day nothing was there to oppose the advance of the rebellions; everything has destroyed, and the army was quite dis-organised at the time of the military coups and also when the rebel start. So it mean that, this army need really to be re-organised, to be restructured, to be thought about again. So the need for the Malian army to be reformed was real and for this one is really coinciding with the thought of ECOWAS eh! Ha! Framework on security reform. If you go back to to tot to Cote d'ivoire army ha! was constituted by ha! Lets say allied officers well treated by the former president ha! His name is Ofor Banye; was given all the facilities, all good conditions whatever they wanted. For example ha! Ha! A military in cote d'ivoire, when he is just coming out from school he was given a car, he was offered a house which he will be able to pay gradually all his career. All the comfort just to put them in a corner and oblige them not to interfere with political

affairs that why during all the time of of, we have not seen interference of the military in the political arena because (Interviewer: they were settled)

**Interviewee:** yes. Am talking about the officers at the same time the non-commissioned officers were not receiving the same , similar treatment and you had the army which is divide in terms of treatment. And what people should know that, is that those who made the Coup detat was the non-commissioned officers and they went to take this man, what is his name again General Gaye, and told General Gaye you have to take the power, is what happened. Is what happened in Cote d'ivoire and you know if you have a army where the officers are not training their troops, whether going together to, to, to prepare themselves for operation what they are not developing cohesion at the end of the day is a similar thing that is happening . You will see that non-commissioned officers will revolt; and change all the setting. It happened in Cote d'ivoire, it happened in Liberia where you see, you have Samuel Ikpute (Interviewer: yeah) similar things and it , it possible in every country where they have this kind of attitude of the officers. And eh! You see Cote d'ivoire was also put in a situation whereby the army was intervening for peace-keeping, what was happening outside was that really the the business of this army they were used to sitting inside a country, ha1 as far as there is peace ha! Don't do anything; is what we call Bourgeoisie. You understand, people that they have everything they end they don't need to turn themselves, no need to bother themselves about the real tension. But you know the story of Cote d'ivoire, is a story of a country that has be built ha! By people coming from ha! All the countries of West Africa to gain ha! Originating people that was not really active in the development of their land. Those who worked the land was paying the owner but the next generation found people, people that are let us say, they was born in Cote d'ivoire their parents was coming from abroad, and they did not know any other country than |Cote d'ivoire. This people, because their parents was working get access to education and at the end of the day they were controlling the tool, the financial tool of the country so the original people of cote d'ivoire have found themselves in a situation whereby let us say ha! (People coming from, originating from abroad was dominating the country) that is the truth.

**Interviewer:** *okay*

Interviewee: but it was the choice by, by Ofor, he wanted ha! Resources coming from everywhere to develop the country. The heritage of Ofor was not well managed by his successors and round the crisis a notion of Ivority was raised. In other to be an Ivorian head of state, you should be ha! From Cote d'ivoire from fathers and mothers originating from Cote d'ivoire and themselves should be Ivorians. It was so, the issue of exclusion come up and this issue of exclusion was so deep run that it reach the army until revolt divide the country in two. All the rebels run away because it were good and the other people remain. This is the divide, it is all about once, once more about security what kind of security apparatus was drawn, was set-up, by the new elite in Cote d'ivoire in 1966. Ofor set-up an army not for war but army just a make-up institution. Its own institution. It was a mission centred army, it was a military system based on the protection of the system built by Ofor. It was a republican and the crisis divided the country into two. So the first republican the Cote d'ivoire won the war and they are the one in-charge now. But something should be done is not because you are the winner of, of war that your people should be in-charge of everything. The army, the military system, the Police system, the security system of Cote d'ivoire should be rebuilt based on nations, let's say certain consideration. All the people in Cote d'ivoire should be reflected in the ha! System and in their activities should protect all the people from Cote d'ivoire... the population. So once more I said that ha! What ECOWAS thought is visible in Cote d'ivoire. The security system of Cote d'ivoire led to a crisis which lasted 10 years, meaning that this security system was adapted, was not able to guarantee the security of the nation of Cote d'ivoire, so it should be res, it should be thought again, it should be re-built, on new base, base which will help Cote d'ivoire to have a security system that will guarantee the security of the nation , the population as well, that is security institutions and if you take it into consideration what I have just said its exactly what ECOWAs want reflect in the guiding principles that we have in our ha1 SSR framework...yes.

**Interviewer:** *okay. That ehm! That's so interesting am just ehm, enjoying this, ehm the word of ehm, second to the last question, I wanted to ask ehm, is that ehm, looking at the ha1 the ha1 national security sector policies, you know, how will you look at, at ehm for instance Nigeria and Ghana do you think, that ehm, this will, what way do you think they are really influencing this regional security*

*sector framework. Do you think that they are using their National Security policies or their national policies you know, to influence regional policies or vis-à-vis?*

**Interviewee:** this question is very specific one ha! Let us say that if you think of ha! Peace keeping, peace keeping operation we can say that ha! Nigeria is playing a major role because most of the successful ha! Peace keeping operation conducted by ECOWAS were headed by Nigerian militaries. Ha! It mean that ha! They are playing a major role ha! About the security of the region the setting of the security, their intervention in the, in order to bring back peace, ha! (Telephone interruption). Okay so, and I know that something has happened actually in Ghana, they have, they witnessed, mixture of the army in the political arena, under Rawlings and if you see ha! The way their ha! Organizing their military, their police they seem to be very effective. But I don't know actually if ha! The new setting of their, their security sector really impacting the regional ha! Arrangement, regional approach on security sector. They have ha! Quality centre of training ha! Two among the three centre of excellence of ECOWAS are located in Nigeria and ehm, and in ha! Ghana. One is Koffi Anan IBTC and the other one is the War college of Nigeria, which are the centre of excellence, of excellence of, of security sector are discussed during the training maybe ha! If you take it from this angle we can say they, yes they are sharing ha! Capacities they are helping the region to develop their ha! Ha! Capacities in terms of ehm, ehm, security sector development or something like that. But I am not sure that inside these countries their security apparatus are really adopted you have more than 380,000 police officers in Nigeria but Nigeria is the most dangerous country in the region. In terms of security. It's the less secured country in the region -380,000 more but it is the most dangerous country in the region. Does not have enough policemen, do can we say that the police is well equipped, are they well trained, are they well organised, I am not sure. All I can say is that, is that the most dangerous country in the region. Okay you can compare to New York where every 5 mins you have a murder, but New York is at another level. We are in West Africa. We are as a foreigner, we don't feel secured at all in this country. People are afraid of Nigeria because of armed robberies, corruption, of ehm! Cybercrime people are abduct, you have terrorism, and you have all kinds of insecurity. For example, in in maritime



domain it is only Nigeria in the world that you have oil thefts you don't have it somewhere else, you can, you can ha! Assess it, you have it only in Nigeria how come? This is the first economy of Africa but the security apparatus is BAD! If you don't have the capacity to secure your own country are you able to impact the security of a region? Am not sure. If you ask to the Navy of Nigeria why do we have the the the epicentre of all this issues on, on terrorism, no no am piracy, why do you have it in Niger-delta do you know what is their response? They have 3000 creeks, 3000 creeks in Niger-delta they are not able to put 1 ship in every, in front of every creeks. But the security in terms of territorial water is that what you are not patrolling, you are not controlling. And what you are not controlling you are not able to say that it it safe, you are not, you are not securing it. So Nigeria is not securing its own waters. How Nigeria can influence the security agenda of the region or in the other side let us be very honest if you want this is academic approach. If there is a influence it's a bad influence because all the world know that the problem, the main location of piracy of all this illicit activity is coming from Nigeria. And the biggest ha! The biggest Navy in the region is the one of Nigeria but is not appropriate (telephone conversation interrupts)

So sorry I know that you know, Nigerians are absolutely proud but let us just open our eye for once and see what is happening. I said that when we talk about securing your territorial waters, I said that if you are not patrolling, and if you are not able to patrol your territorial waters you cannot talk about security. And the response of the Navy of Nigeria is to say they are not able to to secure the 3000 creeks they have in Niger-delta that's why all piracy activities are coming from, emanating from here in the gulf of guinea. So when you talk about impacting the agenda of the security sector, it's in a negative way. Am, am, you understand what I say? (Interviewer: yeah) am sorry, I know that you are Nigerian but its objective.

**Interviewer:** *yeah... this is , no you know the importance of research (interviewee: I know) its not actually like a... you know . I think a in most scholars or most people have counted that Nigeria influences the regional mechanism of ECOWAS. Sir, I think here, the basis here is to look at how...*

**Interviewee:** I want to be objective, I said that when we comes to a time to send people for peace keeping in terms of number, in terms of ha! Means, in terms

of ha1 financial support, Nigeria is impacting because it's the first economy of Africa but if we take it objectively we ask our self in order to have effective security sector at the regional level, we need strong, effective security sector at the national level, even if Nigeria has the biggest persons, staff in terms of staffing, in terms of military resources in the region, Nigeria is not able to secure its own country. Its own territory let us be, let us be frank. This is terrible if I say it in a public, they, they will kill me but it is the truth.

**Interviewer:** *yeah.*

**Interviewee:** it is not possible to stand to saty, to spend one day without 10 people die, killed in the North. It is not possible to stay, one day without hearing that something is happening in the Niger-delta is it possible? Let us be honest and you have 380,000 people, officers paid regularly by a government that are not able to secure the population. Am I, if am wrong you tell me the truth, are you feeling entirely safe in this country? You as a Nigerian, it is the truth. So you are not able to secure your own country, and you say that I am a leader, am able to do it outside? That does not make sense. Nigeria needs security sector Reform.

*Interviewer: hmmm! So finally ehm!, you are said it all, I am , and ha! I think you also, you have mentioned the challenges that ehm, actually have, is affecting the implementation of ha! SSR policies, so but ,ehm, and ehm, from your own perspective in general how will you recommend that some of these ehm, SSR policies you know, will actually be put in practice, you know the framework, be put in practice by all member states. And also join-off on their own national security strategy; how you could also you know liaise with those in-charge of the national poly..Ehm, security strategy in order to achieve a kind of ehm, a, a collaboration between the regional and the national and the...*

**Interviewee:** you know, as I said that each country at the level of each country, the first thing that should be drawn, should be developed is what we call National Security Strategy, it cannot be developed if the stakeholders of the country are not sitting together to think of what is our national interest? What are our national interests? What are the objectives we want to realise? To achieve? If we want our country to be secured our population to be secured? This first assessment should be done at the level of each country, the citizen of a country should put their energy together, should sit down instead of talking

about bloody civilians or whatever, civilians and military and other stakeholders, politicians, all them should sit down and think this is what we want for Nigeria. This is what we want for Senegal. If you do that we be, we be able to achieve our National security, and we be able to achieve our regional ha! Security, we be able to to play our role at the international level. If you finish doing this one you ask yourself what are the step we should pass through to get to this objectives? What are the number of people we need in the police, in the army, in the, in the air force, in the immigration, do we need to have separate bodies? You know that in Nigeria for example, you have one institution by item while in French countries you have the police dealing with immigration , drugs etc. the police in the French country is dealing with the 3 aspects and for, for, for Nigeria each of them have a difference institution. The multiplication of institution is it effective or not? All are questions to be responded for effectiveness.

The other thing is to say if you gather this people what will be their status? How are we recruiting them? What will be their profile? What kind of career do you have? At the end of their career what do we expect? What are they able to expect from them, from us? And when we have this forces they will be under the control of who? Who have the possibility of check what they are doing? What kind of, who is responding, who is, they placed under the authority of who? Who is able to do who, what? Are they able to interfere in the military, in the political arena? If we solve all this things we put it into regulation. Security sector cannot go without reform of the governance. The governance setting should be very good and this people in-charge of security should feel themselves shackled as individual as a group but you know that is not only the official setting that our interest, we got to put 1 police behind every citizen, we need to have private security system. This private security system should fall under the legislation, the regulation. Yes, and we have to work on the way people are using guns, arms, the license to harbour arms, in which condition you are allowed to use it etc. etc. but also when we talk about the current bill, talking about Security system without thinking of judiciary, when you arrest people, you should think of human rights, how to protect the victim, how to protect the perpetrator, how to try them, those one that are tried what should be done in order to implement the sanction? What is the, the, the prison system, how sanctions are enforced in each country. All these should

be taken into account to to to ensure that every citizen feel that his right to abandon part of his liberty as an individual and give it to ha! To a caste which ensure his own individual security, and security as a part of a global settings. Yes.

**Interviewer:** *thank you so much*

**Interviewee:** you are welcome.

Interviewer: *I think that you've really given me what I expected. I am really so much grateful. Thank you so much.*

### **Voice 003**

#### ***What do you think motivated the development of ECOWAS security sector reform policy and programs in West Africa?***

I don't know, I am not actually very familiar with the, I know that there is draft SSR policy which was supposed to have been discussed about 12 months ago, I am not aware where we are, at what point we are with that, because it is being handled by a sister directorate, the directorate of peace keeping and regional security, specifically, the regional security division.

But I do not that going by the various challenges we have in some of our member states, if you take Guinea Bissau for example, the issue of Security Sector Reform has been in the pipeline for a very long time. You know the enormous influence that the military in that country has on the political landscape of Guinea Bissau. And Of course the antecedent to that was the long independence war that was fought with Portugal and finally in 1974 Guinea Bissau gains its independence. But the military has been really the ones determine who rule the country, and part of what is needed in that country is to undertake a comprehensive SSR you know because i think from what we know people just get to the military and never leave.

So, you have people that are way beyond the working age that were still there because Guinea Bissau is too poor to have a pension scheme which should also be tied to whatever SSR to be effected in that country. And the same can be said of various member states that are in post conflict situation, Liberia and

Cote d'ivoire for example, we need to x-ray the influence of the various military establishments in those countries in the political affairs of those countries. And sometimes is not even post conflict, SSR doesn't necessarily, in my own personal opinion, have to do with post conflict countries. In Nigeria where you would call us a post conflict country, but we have issues surrounding the security agencies within the country and I think that the democratisation of the security agencies is very important as well as proper delineation of their roles and responsibilities so that they are not also unduly fighting tough wars like we have it in Nigeria where other than the challenges of insurgency, people and agencies are not sharing information which affect the effectiveness of the security sector as a whole. But I also think that the ordinary people need to be brought into any SSR we want to undertake within the region, because we have seen that even when the formal security agencies get their arts together, the sort of security challenges that we have this days go beyond what the formal security agencies can take care of. So, in order to get to the root of conflict prevention, you need to involve individuals, ordinary citizens in security issues, as well.

***Looking at SSR and conflict prevention, being the head of ECOWAS Early Warning and Response program, how do you think these ECOWAS policies on SSR has responded to the post 2006 crises in Cote d'voire and Mali?***

Ok! Well As I said, there is a draft policy and since it is draft form we haven't start implementing it to the best of my knowledge, there may be certain aspect of it I am not aware of. But of course you are probably aware of the various... frameworks that guide conflict prevention in the ECOWAS region within the ECOWAS member states if you take for example the ECPF which was developed in 2008 there is an element about the role of security sector within the ECPF. I think what probably what one needs to is to interrogate the two countries that you are interested in studying have implemented it which I don't have I direct response to. At the regional level, we have just finished developing a plan of action to start implementing that particular component of the ECPF.

So, that is where we are in terms of the regional approach as to that component of SSR.

(Interruption)

***From your own perspective, how do you think the national policies of Ghana and Nigeria are influencing the regional mechanisms of conflict prevention, do they have any impact at all?***

Well, I guess they would have an impact because of course you will understand that the role of ECOWAS in a lot of these issues of security is to harmonise the national policies of member states to make sure that all the member states have the same vision in terms of how conflict should be prevented in each member state. And if you take that along with the understanding that member states still have the primary responsibility for security in their countries, then it makes sense that there will be issues of complementarity, subsidiarity.

So, for example in formulating regional policies and frameworks, you will have the member states speaking from their national experience but eventually it is a regional document and decisions are taken in ECOWAS consensually. So, yes, there is definitely the national experience is brought to bear on regional formulation of policies.

***In that case, to what extent are Nigeria and Ghana using their national security experiences in policy formulation in security policy formulation at the regional level of ECOWAS?***

The way we work is that when regional policies are being articulated ECOWAS takes the lead as the secretariat for member states, for example what happened with the risk assessment, the Early Warning Directorate took the lead in getting the consultants to undertake the study and then we call experts from member states ( like we did a few days ago) who come with recommendations based on their national experiences and which is used to enrich the document which was put together by the consultants and once it scaled that expert level, it is taken to the ministerial level before it is subsequently taken to the level of heads

of state for final adoption. So, member states have these opportunities at experts level, ministerial level as well as member state level to bring in the concerns of each country, and of course being an intergovernmental organisation, being an inter-governmental organisation, the level of influence you have depends on a lot of issues, as a member of the community which depends on your contribution, size and whether or not you are chairing ECOWAS at that particular time, which is also a source of influence in the Community.

My answer to that is, given the important position of Nigeria in the region, really being the regional hegemony; definitely it does have a lot of influence in the articulation of regional policies such as the SSR.

***In case these policies are meant for all member states, is there any mechanisms in place within ECOWAS that compel member states to implement or abide by the regional policies or frameworks?***

There are several mechanisms one of them was actually at the end of last year. My colleague at the Directorate of Legal Affairs had a meeting in which all member states were in attendance, it was basically to look at the various treaties, conventions and protocols signed by member states at regional level to ascertain how far member states have gone in implementing it as well as understand the challenges they were facing in implementing them. That is one way of doing it. In the past, our protocols and conventions were only brought into force if each of our 15 member states ratifies the particular legal framework, then we can start implementing it as a region.

Now, part of the beauty of the transformation from an executive secretariat to a commission is that it has enhanced the supranational powers of ECOWAS as a community. So that once a decision is taken by whether a council of ministers or mediation and security council it becomes binding on members states so there is no need for the process of ratification, which even though all of us want the democratisation process, in democracy, it takes longer for you to convince your parliament that the recommendations for the particular nation to be part of

a particular convention or treaty is to the country's best interest. So that facilitates issues but of course signing and agreeing on issues is one thing and implementing them is another.

We have a number of sanctions but I will call them benign sanctions because they are usually applicable if you break rules, for example in my area, we have the protocol, the mechanisms and the supplementary protocol of 2001. So, there are certain provisions there if you break the rule and if you look at especially the 2001 protocol, you will see that there are a few sanctions there. For example, if you break certain rule, you cannot be represented in decision making within ECOWAS. Some believe that some of these sanctions are not robust enough hence the campaign to strengthen them.

***Looking at the ECOWAS protocols like the protocols on non-aggression and Mutual Defence Assistance and the ECOWAS mechanism as a whole... and of course looking at the issue of Boko Haram, which though is not within the confine of my study, even though Nigeria has its own sovereignty, this issue has glaringly spilled over to other ECOWAS countries. How does ECOWAS influence some of these policies within member states like Nigeria?***

That is good question, if you look section 25 of the 1999 mechanisms set about 6 different conditions that could apply for the mechanism to be put into motion, one of which is any potential crisis or crises that have regional implications. Of course, definitely anything that happens in Nigeria has regional implications because of its population and size. So, normally the onus is on the president of the Commission to take action and that analysis can be taken based on his own analysis of what is going on, based on information he is getting from the early warning system. If a member state calls the attention for the Commission to take action because a certain issue is particularly serious or the AU, UN require ECOWAS to take action.

So, what usually happens is that, depending on the degree of challenge that is facing us. The president has recourse to a number of different actions. He can



use one of the institutions of the 1999 mechanisms which include the mediation and Security Council and head of state etc. or the supporting organs which include the committee of chiefs of defence staff, council of the wise. As such, the president himself can talk or engage the parties. In the case of Nigeria, it has always been difficult and I think it is not only limited to Nigeria; instead, when you have regional hegemony it becomes very difficult for other members to intervene especially when the hegemonic state is hosting the regional organisation.

From the early warning directorate point of view, we have been raising these issue about the threat to Nigeria and the destabilising risk to the whole region and until very recently nothing has actually being done. I was very happy to hear the current chairman of ECOWAS and the president of Ghana saying ECOWAS as an organisation wants to come to the aid of Nigeria and he talked about operationalizing the anti-terrorism strategy that was only recently adopted last year. So that is very comforting because I do think that Nigeria needs assistance.

***In terms of these polices on SSR, though you have said that there is still no approved policy on SSR, I am still looking at how member states interact with the international community in terms of implementing their own national strategies. Now Nigeria has a problem, does ECOWAS as a regional body, has the right to interfere in Nigeria's call for support from US, Canada etc; meaning do member states have the right to call for support from these countries even without the approval of the regional body. For example, Mali has bilateral relationship with France thereby putting France at the core of their security strategy without necessarily doing so through ECOWAS who sould say these challenge is beyond us, let's call France or US.***

I think they all work in parallel because as sovereign member states, each has the right to have defence pacts with other countries outside the region, but I think those defence pacts have to be done without negating the ECOWAS normative frameworks. So, for example you mentioned Mali, but before that

even ECOWAS as a body is very mindful of its own difficulties, that if you look at the collective security frameworks we have are quite robust but quite often what we are facing is the challenge of logistics and financial backing for the implementation of such frameworks. So, if you are faced with such a challenge you have to be realistic and allow member states who want to benefit from any bilateral agreements they have with third countries, to do so.

The only thing is that both the UN Charter of 1948 and the ECOWAS frameworks are very big on the issues of complementarities, subsidiarity and comparative advantage so if you feel that there is comparative advantage in Mali going to seek for France's assistance, yes, that is accepted; but it should be done with full consultations. I don't think it is proper for things to happen without ECOWAS knowing what the arrangement is and what the intentions of a particular member state is, in terms of bringing support for a crisis. I think those are the issues that need to be sorted out.

I remember that recently there was a delegation to the Commission that was asking whether we thought .....was something that needed to be built up in collaboration with EU, specifically. And answer to that was that it could be done but we have to observe the principles of subsidiarity. So, you don't just come into somebody's neighbourhood to do something without letting them know this is what going to happen.

***Finally, in your own opinion, though the SSR policy is still in draft form, if you are to suggest to the experts working on that, how would you advise ECOWAS SSR polices be made effective considering that different member states are signatories to bilateral agreements with countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone the US, UK?***

I think that probably what we need to have is a framework for the region since the countries situations are different going from one country to another, what is applicable in Guinea Bissau may not be applicable to Ghana. So, if you have a framework which identifies crucial issues that each national SSR needs to

observe or needs to reflect, then I think the other things should be left within member states to actually articulate how to implement the details.

***Looking at SSR in general which is one of the elements of the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework, how do you think SSR policy makes conflict prevention more effective?***

Well, I think my answer that is what I said earlier, that you probably need to involve other people in SSR, other than security agencies because even if you look at border issue of national security is about society, foreign policy and defence. This is why even within ECOWAS I have a problem with the office handling SSR because it's being seen as purely a defence thing which is why it is being handled by the Directorate of Peacekeeping and Security, so the political angle is not being drawn about. You are talking about security and we are also talking about human security in the last 10 years, so why should it be seen just from military point of view.

For example, I want to link that to one of the programs of the Early Warning Directorate that in doing early warning you take information from the military, civilians and the civil society, and we are also trying to extend that to the member states, I don't know if Onyinye told you about the policy framework that we did on early warning and early response mechanisms. So, if we are talking about human security, I don't think we should just restrict it to security agencies giving us information to prevent conflict, I think if we widen it, open it up to include the civil society, women and the general populace by training them to know what to look for. In many countries, they say the women know when there is going to be a problem, because they see their husbands or sons carrying guns around or can even know that from just their mood within the house. So, I think we need to engage different stakeholders, engage people, in terms of operationalizing our security sector reform policies.

***How do we incorporate this civilian component into the SSR project, looking at it from the perspective that most of these civilians do not have the capacity, so it shouldn't be just like putting civilians as figureheads? How are they (the civilians) capacitated to really play that role, is there any kind of formal training given to those civilians who work in the SSR?***

I believe there is, within the UN, for example, I know that they do provide when they are planning deployment, taking over of AFISMA, the African-led mission, they did talk about training people, civilians, even the police, just a brief training before they go to the theatre. So, this can be provided and then of course there are small booklets that are given to such people but I think that even though the trainings are short, 1 week, 2 weeks sometimes, I think it is better than having an all military, because there are certain needs the military cannot adequately take care of. I participated, for example, in AMANI AFRICA which was like a field exercise for a mission and you had civilians such as people taking care of gender issues, humanitarian issues involved in such a mission

## **2.2 Semi-structured interview questions**

1. What do you think is the main reason(s) why SSR becomes a prerogative of ECOWAS and its member states?
2. What initiatives and policies has ECOWAS put in place to achieve the implementation of its regional SSR programmes across its member states?
3. How are ECOWAS SSR Policies and programmes connected to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in West Africa?
4. At what stage of conflict is ECOWAS allowed to implement its SSR policies and programmes across its member states?
5. How does ECOWAS influence its leading Member states national SSR policies and programmes?
6. Would you think that Nigeria and Ghana as leading member states of ECOWAS could influence the way SSR regional processes are conducted across its member states?

7. Do you think that ECOWAS Policy on SSR, in any way contributed in preventing and reducing the conflicts in Mali and Cote d'Ivoire (2006-2013)?
8. What evidence would you give to show that implementation of ECOWAS SSR policies was responsible for the prevention and reducing of the violent conflicts in these two countries?
9. Who are the actors behind the ECOWAS SSR Policy and programmes
10. To what extent is ECOWAS parliamentarian involved in the policy initiation and implementation, as well as oversight functions to SSR policies and programmes?
11. How would you describe the interaction between the SSR policies and programmes of ECOWAS and its member states?
12. How would you describe the interaction between Nigeria/Ghana and ECOWAS SSR policy and programmes in West Africa?
13. What has ECOWAS achieved so far with its SSR norms and Mechanisms?
14. What are the challenges facing ECOWAS SSR Policies and Programmes?
15. What could you suggest as recommendation(s) to make ECOWAS SSR programmes more effective as a conflict prevention tool?

### **2.3 Ethical Clearance**

Dear Ignatius,

Ethics

Application: E361 Greene/Onyekwere  
PEACE Studies

Title: Understanding ECOWAS's Roles in the interplay between the processes of Security Sector Reform and Conflict Prevention in Nigeria

Thank you for your time in meeting with the reviewer and making the appropriate amendments to the documentation as required.

The documentation has now been reviewed and I can confirm that the reviewer is happy with the changes/amendments made.

I can confirm that Claire Beckett, Chair of the Humanities, Social & Health Science Research Ethics Panel is happy to take Chair's Action to approve your amended ethics application on behalf of the Research Ethics Panel.

Please add a sentence to any information given to participants to say that Ethics Approval was given for this study by the Humanities, Social & Health Science Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford on 7<sup>th</sup> April 2014.

Best Wishes

**Omar Ali**

Research Funding Coordinator

Research & Knowledge Transfer Support

Room C.21, Richmond Building

University of Bradford

BD7 1DP

Tel: 01274 233112

Email: [o.f.ali@bradford.ac.uk](mailto:o.f.ali@bradford.ac.uk)

## 2.4 Access to Data Collection Consent



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BRADFORD  
MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK™

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School of Social and International Studies  
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Tel: +44 (0)1274 235235 Fax: +44 (0)1274 235240  
www.bradford.ac.uk

### Fieldwork Consent Form for Participants

Title of Project: ECOWAS's role in the Interplay between the Processes of Security  
Sector Reform and Conflict Prevention in West Africa

I declare that the purpose and the requirements of this study have been clearly communicated to me verbally and in writing.

Following the Researcher's explanation, I understand the following:

1. That my decision to participate is voluntary and I can withdraw my consent to be a participant up to the point of the thesis being submitted, even following the interview, without giving any reason. This would mean that I would not be listed as a participant and no quotation, even anonymised, from me would appear in the thesis or publication from the research. If I wish to withdraw my consent, I will inform the researcher as soon as I make the

decision to withdraw.

2. That all information I provide will be treated Confidentially.

3. That I am happy to have my interview audio Recorded

4. That I prefer handwritten notes to be taken during my interview

5. I agree that the researcher may contact me.

I have also read the *information brief* which I deemed satisfactory and will be happy to participate in the interview process.

Participant's Name: Colonel Abdourahmane DIENG

Signature:

Telephone: 0806 209 2769

Date: 05/05/14



Confronting Inequality. Celebrating Diversity

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decision to withdraw.

YES  NO

2. That all information I provide will be treated Confidentially.

YES  NO

3. That I am happy to have my interview audio Recorded

YES  NO

4. That I prefer handwritten notes to be taken during my interview


YES  NO

5. I agree that the researcher may contact me.

YES  NO

I have also read the *information brief* which I deemed satisfactory and will be happy to participate in the interview process.

Participant's Name: Thomas Taylor

Signature: 

Telephone: 00 233 549 749 140

Date: 15/07/14





**Fieldwork Consent Form for Participants**

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YES  NO

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YES  NO

3. That I am happy to have my interview audio Recorded

YES  NO

4. That I prefer handwritten notes to be taken during my interview

YES  NO

5. I agree that the researcher may contact me.

YES  NO


I have also read the *information brief* which I deemed satisfactory and will be happy to participate in the interview process.

Participant's Name: Abdullahi Jembo

Signature: 

Telephone: +23 241543227

Date: 21/07/14



**Fieldwork Consent Form for Participants**

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YES  NO

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YES  NO

3. That I am happy to have my interview audio Recorded

YES  NO

4. That I prefer handwritten notes to be taken during my interview

YES  NO

5. I agree that the researcher may contact me.

YES  NO


I have also read the *information brief* which I deemed satisfactory and will be happy to participate in the interview process.

Participant's Name: ADEREMI A. ADEGBA, PhD, FMIA

Signature: [Handwritten Signature]

Telephone: +234 7034103880

Date: 4/6/2014



## 2.5 List of Key Informant Interviewees for PhD Fieldwork

List of Key Informant Interviewees for PhD Fieldwork			
No.	Name	Organisations	Position
1.	Col. Abdourahmane Dieng	ECOWAS	Head of Division Regional Security
2.	Mrs. Florence IHEME	ECOWAS	Director of Early Warning Directorate.
3	Dr. Joseph GOWAL	Institute of peace and conflict resolution, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Director
4	Professor Oshita Oshite	Institute of Security Studies Nigeria	Senior Researcher/lecturer
5	Dr Kio Bob-Manuel	Nigeria Defence College	Senior Research Fellow
6	Mr. Mike Utsaha	The KUKAH Centre for Faith and Leadership Research	Director
7	Mr. Christian C.M. Ichite	Centre for Strategic Research and studies-Nigerian Defence College	Research Fellow
8	Mr. Isaac C. Armstrong	ECOWAS Commission	Programme Officer Regional Security
9	Mr. Okey Uzoechina	ECOWAS Commission	Programme Officer, Security Sector Reform
10	Mr. Chom Bagu	Search for Common Ground Nigeria	Country Director
11	Mr. Saka Azimazi	Network of Human Rights institutions in West Africa	Executive Secretary
12	Mr. Peter Ocheikwu	OSIWA	Grant s, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator
13	Dr. Paddy Kemdi Njoku	International Institute of Leadership and Governance	President
14	Dr. Onyinye Onwuka	ECOWAS	Principal Programme officer.
15	Mr. Chinedu Nwagu	CLEEN Foundation- Justice and Security Reform	Programme Manager
16	Dr. Kole A. Shettima	MacArthur Foundation	Director, Africa Office
18	Dr. Isaac C. Armstrong	ECOWAS Commission	Programme Officer Regional Security
19	Mr. Gnacadja Constaut Cocon	ECOWAS Commission	WANEP Liaison Officer
20	Mr Dawda Garuba	Osiwa	Principal Programme Officer

21	Dr. Adeyemi Ajibewa	ECOWAS Commission	Director, ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs.
22	Okey Uzoechina	ECOWAS	Programme Officer, Division of Regional Security
23	Dr. Idayat Hassan	Centre for Democracy and Development Nigeria	Director
24	Professor Charles Okubuwa	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs(NIIA)	Senior Research Fellow/ Lecturer.
25	Dr. Chukwuemeka Eze	West African Network for Peacebuilding Ghana.	Executive Director
26	Mr George Amoh	National Peace Council Ghana	Director, Conflict Resolution & Management.
27	Dr. Linda Darkwa	Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana	Research Fellow
28	Mr. P.N.K Aborampah Mensa	Ghana Centre for Democratic Development	Programs Officer
29	Dr. Thomas Jaye	Kofi Annan International Peacebuilding Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra Ghana	Deputy Director of Research
30	Brigadier General Kusi	Retired Military General	Deputy Force Commander in Cote D'Ivoire intervention
31	Mr. Francis Mendes	Caritas Gambia	National Director
32	Mr. Ferdinand Kwaku Danso	Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra.	Research Associate
33	Mr. Murtala Touray	West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)	Former WANEP Regional Coordinator for WANEP Warning and Response Network.
34	Mr. Francis Oke	Election Assistance Division, ECOWAS	Principal Programme Officer