

## 18 “Incepit quasi a se”

### Averroes on Avicenna’s Philosophy in the *Long Commentary on the De anima*

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In a very dense passage of the *Long Commentary on the De anima*, translated into English by Richard C. Taylor in his masterly annotated version of the work, Averroes (Ibn Rushd, d. 1198 CE) gives us a glimpse of how he sees the nature, aim, and impact of Avicenna’s (Ibn Sīnā, d. 1037 CE) philosophy.<sup>1</sup> In this passage, Averroes critically engages with Avicenna, as he often does elsewhere. However, unlike other passages in which he criticizes Avicenna, Averroes here does not take issue with a particular doctrine that he regards as false and untenable. Instead, he makes a more general statement about the distinctive features of Avicenna’s philosophy and its position in the history of philosophy. More specifically, Averroes highlights what he considers to be the fundamental weakness of Avicenna’s thought, namely, its distance from the ideal philosophical standard as established in Aristotle. Complementary motifs of dissent against Avicenna emerge in other commentaries: Averroes criticizes his affinity to Platonism and Islamic revealed theology, on the one hand, and his methodological feebleness—his incapacity to reach a properly demonstrative level of argumentation—on the other.

In the passage at issue here, Averroes’ attack on Avicenna’s general pretension to dispense with Aristotle is articulated in three points: (1) that Avicenna—as chief of the *moderni*—exerted a deleterious influence in Andalusia with effects reverberating on Ibn Bājja (the Latin Avempace, d. 1138 CE) and Averroes himself; (2) that logic is the most faithfully Aristotelian and, therefore, the strongest part of Avicenna’s philosophy, whereas other domains of Avicenna’s system, namely natural philosophy and metaphysics, are originally (and dangerously) Avicennian, with metaphysics displaying the greatest hiatus between Aristotle and Avicenna; and (3) that Avicenna’s philosophical project intends to begin natural philosophy and metaphysics anew, after and distinct from Aristotle, a project which clashes radically with Averroes’ own.

In other words, the passage in question is one of the most extensive, informative, and far-reaching discussions of Avicenna ever made by Averroes. The present chapter focuses on this passage, using the methodology that Taylor has so painstakingly applied for other crucial points of Averroes’ *Long Commentary on the De anima*—and, more generally, for

the Commentator's noetics and psychology—in pioneering essays that have substantially advanced the scholarship. Particularly inspiring for the present contribution is Taylor's analysis of the *loci paralleli* in the various writings of Averroes and his investigation of the textual and doctrinal sources of Averroes' contentions. Specifically, this chapter has three interrelated aims: to clarify the details of the passage from Averroes that are still debated in scholarship, on the basis of similar passages in other Aristotelian commentaries and other works by Averroes; to emphasize the historical importance of this passage as a precious *testimonium* of the entrance of Avicenna's philosophy in Andalusian *falsafa* and document that Averroes' knowledge of Avicenna's philosophy is probably based on a specific *summa* by Avicenna, the *Kitāb al-Shifā'* (*Book of the Cure, or of the Healing*), which he apparently knew firsthand; and finally, to call attention to the possibility that, concerning what he says about Avicenna in the passage under discussion, Averroes might have depended on the Introduction of the *Kitāb al-Shifā'*, authored by Avicenna's biographer and secretary al-Jūzjānī.

### The Fundamental Text and the Problems of Its Interpretation

Averroes' *Long Commentary on the De anima*, to which the passage that concerns us here (Text 1) belongs, dates from shortly before 1186 and is almost completely lost in the Arabic original. Fortunately, it is preserved in its Latin medieval translation, commonly ascribed to Michael Scot. The passage reads:

Text 1: Averroes, *Long Commentary on the De anima* Γ.30 (Averroes Latinus, *Averrois Cordubensis commentarium magnum*, ed. Crawford, 470.41–48):

[a] But what made that man [i.e., Ibn Bājja] err, and us too for a long time [*longo tempore*],<sup>2</sup> is that modern thinkers [*moderni*] set aside the books of Aristotle and consider [only] the books of the commentators, and chiefly in the case of the soul, since they believe that this book [i.e., Aristotle's *De anima*] is impossible to understand.

[b] This [i.e., the *moderni*'s neglect of Aristotle's *De anima* and their exclusive consideration of the commentators in psychology] is due to Avicenna [*et hoc est propter Avicennam*], who followed Aristotle only in logic [*dialectica*], but in the other [parts of philosophy] [*in aliis*] he [did not follow Aristotle, and hence] erred, and chiefly in the case of metaphysics.

[c] This [happened] because [*et hoc quia*] [Avicenna] began [*incepit*] [these other parts of philosophy] as if [he was drawing them] from himself [*quasi a se*].<sup>3</sup>

This criticism complements a comment a little earlier in the same passage, where Averroes accuses Ibn Bājja of misunderstanding Aristotle:

He [i.e., Aristotle] also expressly says that the relation of the intelligibles to images is just as the relation of color to the colored body, not as the relation of color to the sense of sight, as Ibn Bājja thought.<sup>4</sup>

In section [a], Averroes stigmatizes the tendency of modern philosophers to dispense with Aristotle's books, especially in the case of cryptic works like the *De anima*, in favor of the commentators' interpretations. This new trend is portrayed as very influential, since, according to our text, it determined how the "father" of philosophy in Andalusia, Ibn Bājja, approached Aristotle and it exerted a lasting impact upon Averroes himself. The neglect of Aristotle's *De anima* by the *moderni* and their preference for the commentators' views in psychological matters are said in section [b] to be determined by Avicenna. In Averroes' eyes, Avicenna imitates Aristotle only in a single area of philosophy, namely logic (or one of its branches, dialectic), whereas in the rest of philosophy, psychology included, he is original, diverging from the First Master. According to Averroes, Avicenna's independence from Aristotle reaches its climax in metaphysics. As independence from Aristotle amounts, in Averroes' view, to error, metaphysics is by implication the most flawed area of Avicenna's philosophy. The most obvious interpretation of the bulk of section [c] (*inceptit quasi a se*, lit.: "he began almost on his own") is that Avicenna undertook the task of beginning a large part of philosophy anew, almost independently from Aristotle, establishing himself as new *inceptor* of the discipline.

There are several debatable elements of this text. First, the relationship between the three classes of thinkers outlined in sections [a] and [b]—Ibn Bājja and Averroes; the *moderni*; and Avicenna—is not totally clear. Even if, for merely chronological reasons, Ibn Bājja and Averroes cannot but be counted among the *moderni*, there is good reason to keep them distinct from these, who are portrayed as the cause of the two men's error. The relationship between Avicenna and the *moderni* is even more unclear. In section [b], Avicenna is adduced to explain the error of the *moderni* in section [a]—their reliance upon the commentators rather than Aristotle—but this is different from the error that is ascribed to Avicenna himself in section [c], namely his independence from any previous authority in philosophy.

Second, the term *dialectica* in section [b] can be interpreted in either its literal sense of "dialectic," as a counterpart to the Arabic *jadāl*, thus limiting the field of consensus between Avicenna and Aristotle to the fifth part of the *Organon*, or as referring more broadly to logic (*manṭiq*) in general.<sup>5</sup>

Third, the overall sense of section [c] depends on ambiguous language: the reference of "This" (*hoc*) in the sentence "This [happened] because" (*et hoc quia*), the object of "begun" (*inceptit*) if read as a transitive verb, and the precise meaning of "as if [. . .] from himself" (*quasi a se*) remain unclear.

### ***Loci paralleli* in Other Works by Averroes**

Hints toward the resolution of these doubts can be found in other works by Averroes. As to the first doubt, Avicenna is included among the *moderni*, with relevant information given on both Avicenna and the *moderni*, in one of Averroes' *Quaestiones in Logicam* regarding the *Prior Analytics*, preserved in the Arabic original and dated to 1196, *Maqāla fī ma'nā l-maqūl 'alā l-kull wa-ghayr dhālika* (Treatise on the Meaning of What is Predicated Universally and Other Issues).<sup>6</sup> The relevant passage (Text 2), never fully translated before, also sheds further light on the doctrinal areas in which Avicenna distances himself from Aristotle, as well as on the reasons why Avicenna pursued independence from Aristotle. In comparison with Text 1, Text 2 displays a more openly critical attitude toward Avicenna (as well as al-Fārābī), which might, in a work written about ten years after the *Long Commentary on the De anima*, indicate a crescendo in Averroes' polemic against Avicenna.

Text 2: Averroes, *Treatise on the Meaning of What is Predicated Universally and Other Issues* (Averroes, *Maqālāt fī l-manṭiq wa-l-'ilm al-ṭabī'ī*, ed. Al-'Alawī, 175.1–8):

[i] From this, the goal of this man [i.e., Aristotle] has clearly appeared, and the doubts regarding him that have remained until this our time have been solved. This was the habit of this man toward those who doubted against him, namely [to believe that] time was the guarantor of the solution of what had been doubted against him.

[ii] This [persistence of doubts against Aristotle] is due to [*wa-dhālika li-*] people who most weakly consider and least know his [i.e., Aristotle's] worth in philosophy [*qadrihī fī l-ḥikmati*] among those who have ventured to raise doubts against him and to refute his way of stating what became manifest to him, especially if [something similar] had not become manifest to his predecessors, as we find that Ibn Sīnā is doing, so that all his books [*kutubahū kullahā*] are nothing else than doubts against this man, especially in important questions.

[iii] One of the worst things that a posterior [thinker] [*muta'akh-khir*] can do is to wander far from his [i.e., Aristotle's] teaching and to follow another way different from his, as this happened to Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī] in his books on logic [*al-manṭiqiyya*], and to Ibn Sīnā in the physical and theological [i.e., metaphysical] sciences.<sup>7</sup>

The second and third sections of Text 2 relate directly to Avicenna, with a more cursory reference to al-Fārābī in the third section. As regards Avicenna, Text 1 and Text 2 have several points in common: both connect Avicenna with a larger group of thinkers (Text 1 [a]; Text 2 [ii]); both say that Avicenna's attitude to Aristotle had lasting effects until Averroes' time

(Text 1 [a]; Text 2 [i]); and both say that the originality of Avicenna with regard to Aristotle concerns the areas of philosophy that lie outside logic (Text 1 [b]; Text 2 [iii]).

In the context of this general similarity, Text 2, being less elliptical than Text 1 and surviving in Arabic, brings clarity.<sup>8</sup> As to the relationship of Avicenna with the *moderni*, Text 2 [iii] informs us, first of all, of an Arabic term (*muta'akhhkir*, “posterior [thinker],” pl. *muta'akhhkirūna*) that is closely related to the one that lies behind Michael Scot’s recourse to the adjective *modernus* in Text 1 [a] (arguably stemming from the root *ḥ-d-th*). Thus, Text 2 [iii] makes it clear that, for Averroes, Avicenna belongs to the class of the *muta'akhhkirūna/moderni*, along with al-Fārābī, and that his negative impact on the *moderni* in Text 1 [a] should therefore be taken as coming from one particularly influential member of the same group, not from someone who is not a *modernus*.<sup>9</sup>

Most importantly, Text 2 [ii] helps to elucidate the relationship between Avicenna and the *moderni*, problematically adumbrated in Text 1, in which Avicenna is said to have influenced the *moderni* and, nonetheless, the *moderni* are portrayed as relying on the commentators rather than on Aristotle, whereas Avicenna is depicted as independent from all previous authorities. On the one hand, the group, comparable to that of the *moderni* in Text 1 [a], in which Avicenna is inserted in Text 2 [ii] is formed by “those who have ventured to raise doubts against him [i.e., Aristotle] and to refute his way of stating what became manifest to him.” This description fits the portrayal of the *moderni* in Text 1 [a] as scholars ready to dispense with Aristotle’s books due to the difficulty of understanding how these books formulate crucial tenets in pivotal areas of philosophy such as psychology. On the other hand, Text 2 [ii] distinguishes within this larger group a more restricted sub-group, formed by those with little consideration for and insufficient knowledge of Aristotle’s value in philosophy. This feature, presented as typical of certain “people” (*nās*) at the beginning of section [ii], applies especially, if not exclusively, to Avicenna at its end. By implication, Avicenna appears as not only, along with the other members of the larger group, dismissive toward Aristotle’s statements about given doctrines or disciplines but also, as a prime representative of the smaller sub-group, moved by personal lack of esteem for the Greek master and hence systematically critical of him as a philosopher *in globo* (“all his [i.e., Avicenna’s] books are nothing else than doubts against this man [i.e., Aristotle], especially in important questions”). The constant animosity against Aristotle ascribed to Avicenna here well explains what Text 1 [c] contends about Avicenna’s decision to dispense with the Stagirite and to do philosophy on his own in some domains.<sup>10</sup>

As to the second doubt, the exact meaning of *dialectica* in Text 1 [b], Text 2 sheds clarifying light. In fact, Text 2 [iii] offers good reasons to understand it as “logic.” In this section, Avicenna is said to part company with Aristotle only in natural philosophy and metaphysics, to the

exclusion of logic, an area of philosophy in which distance from Aristotle is imputed only to al-Fārābī. Thus, if we take *dialectica* to mean “logic” in Text 1, we obtain a precise correspondence between Texts 1 and 2 as to the areas of distance between Aristotle and Avicenna. These areas would include all of philosophy other than logic, with particular regard to metaphysics, in Text 1; natural philosophy and metaphysics, logic excluded, in Text 2.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, the literal, narrower, interpretation of the term *dialectica* in Text 1 as “dialectic” (*jadal*) is hardly tenable in light of Averroes’ quotation of the epilogue of the section on sophistry (*safsafa*) of Avicenna’s *Shifā’*, in which Avicenna pays tribute to Aristotle as an unmatched model of this branch of logic and, possibly, of logic in general. The quotation appears in Averroes’ *Middle Commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi*.<sup>12</sup> Averroes therefore knows firsthand a text by Avicenna in which Avicenna claims to be following Aristotle in the art of sophistry as well—that is, outside the narrow boundaries of dialectic. Since Averroes does not rebuke Avicenna for a similar contention in the *Middle Commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi* or elsewhere, he probably agrees with the statement. Moreover, the looser interpretation of *dialectica* in Text 1 as meaning logic in general is corroborated by the vocabulary of some Arabic–Latin translations and by specific passages of the Arabic–Latin translations of Averroes made by Michael Scot (in all likelihood the translator of the *Long Commentary on the De anima*), in which *dialectica* corresponds to “logic” (*manṭiq*).<sup>13</sup> Thus, although the narrower meaning of *dialectica* as “dialectic” might fit with other motifs of Averroes’ anti-Avicennian polemic,<sup>14</sup> the broader understanding of it as “logic” is decidedly preferable in the context of Text 1.

Concerning the third doubt, the “This” (*hoc*) occurring at the very beginning of Text 1 [c] might refer either to Avicenna’s independence from Aristotle’s natural philosophy and metaphysics in general or to his independence from Aristotle’s metaphysics in particular, both expressed in the previous section 1 [b].<sup>15</sup> As to what exactly Avicenna began (*inceptit*)—whether it was studying natural philosophy and metaphysics, or writing works of natural philosophy and metaphysics, or proposing a new trend in natural philosophy and metaphysics—we can only speculate. The exact meaning of the closing *quasi a se* (“as if [. . .] from himself”) is equally elusive.

Since the same pronoun “This” (*hoc*) in the sentence “This is due to Avicenna” (*Et hoc est propter Avicennam*) at the beginning of Text 1 [b] refers to the part of the previous sentence delimited by “chiefly” (*maxime*), namely the case of the science of the soul, one would be tempted to assume that the pronoun “This” (*hoc*) in Text 1 [c] also refers to the part of the previous sentence delimited by “chiefly” (*maxime*), i.e., the case of metaphysics. However, Text 2 [iii] suggests a broader interpretation: an application of the point not only to metaphysics, but also to natural philosophy, as other statements in Averroes’ works confirm.<sup>16</sup>

The following passages of Averroes' *Middle Commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi* and of his *Epitome of the Metaphysics* clarify, respectively, the meanings of *inceptit* and of *a se*:

Text 3: Averroes, *Middle Commentary on the Sophistici Elenchi* (Averroes, *Talkhīṣ maṭīq Aristū*, ed. Jihāmī, 2:729.16–17):

Because the one who undertakes to understand his [i.e., Aristotle's] statements without anyone else who precedes him in that, is similar to the one who *begins* [*yabtadi'u*] the art.<sup>17</sup>

Text 4: Averroes, *Epitome of the Metaphysics* (Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, ed. Quirós Rodríguez, 14.10–11; English translation in Menn, "Fārābī," 74, emphasis added):

All this [i.e., the falsity of Avicenna's position] is clear on the slightest reflection, but that is the nature of this man [i.e., Avicenna] in much of what he brought forth *out of himself* [*min 'inda nafsihī*].<sup>18</sup>

In Text 3, which is part of the colophon of the commentary, Averroes applies to himself this role of new initiator of the "art" (or discipline) of sophistry, because of the lack of previous satisfactory commentaries on Aristotle's *Sophistici Elenchi* and the ensuing need for direct recourse to Aristotle's doctrine. In Text 4, many metaphysical theories of Avicenna are declared by Averroes to be false insofar as they result from Avicenna's own point of view rather than from the scrutiny of previous authorities. If applied to the case of Text 1, the content of these passages shows that, for Averroes, Avicenna is initiating anew the disciplines of natural philosophy and metaphysics much more radically than Averroes does in the case of the sophistic art, because Avicenna performs this new beginning not only autonomously from Aristotle's commentators, like Averroes, but also—quite audaciously—from Aristotle himself, relying almost exclusively on his personal talents and substituting himself for Aristotle, which makes him almost totally independent from any previous source.

The adverb *quasi* that one finds in Text 1 [c] is very frequent in Averroes' *Long Commentary on the De anima*, as it is in his *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*. In the latter, it very often translates the Arabic *ka-anna* ("as if," "as though"),<sup>19</sup> as is probably the case in Text 1.<sup>20</sup> This correspondence, if confirmed, would indicate that *quasi* in Text 1 [c] does not convey primarily an approximation in mode ("as it were") or in quantity ("almost"), thus qualifying the following *a se*, but expresses the way in which Avicenna is acting, according to Averroes. In Averroes' eyes, Avicenna performs natural philosophy and metaphysics as if he were drawing these disciplines from himself, rather than from their real and authoritative source, which in Averroes' opinion is Aristotle.

The idea that Avicenna intended to be the new initiator of natural philosophy and metaphysics after Aristotle, contrary to his faithfulness to the Stagirite in logic, occurs in a particular passage of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Shifā'*



which might be the source of Averroes' contention. This passage has no correspondence in the other *summae* by Avicenna, since it is not written by Avicenna himself, but by a member of his school. Before focusing on this passage later in my chapter, I wish to argue in the following section that Averroes resorted to the *Shifā'* as his main source of knowledge of Avicenna's philosophy, not only in the case of Text 1, but more generally in his many references to Avicenna throughout his commentaries on Aristotle, as well as elsewhere.

### Averroes as a Reader of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Shifā'*

The exact date, the number of texts, and the precise channels for the introduction of Avicenna's philosophy into Andalusia still require assessment. The first documented familiarity with Avicenna's thought in Andalusia dates approximately to the first decades of the twelfth century CE,<sup>21</sup> largely before the famous *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* (composed between 1177 and 1182) by Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185), which has been traditionally taken as the starting point of Andalusian Avicennism.<sup>22</sup> Whatever the exact *terminus post quem* of the introduction of Avicenna's works in Andalusia may be, Averroes' early works, especially his epitomes, composed in the 1160s (after 1158) and containing extensive explicit quotations of Avicenna, provide an indisputable *terminus ante quem*.<sup>23</sup> The chronology of the beginning of the translation activity regarding Avicenna in Andalusia (before 1166),<sup>24</sup> and the recourse to Avicenna in the work *al-'Aqīda al-raḥī'a* (The Exalted Faith), composed around 1160 by the promoter of the Andalusian translations of Avicenna, Abraham ibn Daud (ca. 1110–1180),<sup>25</sup> confirm this approximate date. Whether Ibn Bājja had access to Avicenna's texts is disputed. On the one hand, in specific doctrinal areas of his writings, one can detect traces of Avicenna's influence.<sup>26</sup> On the other, the fact that Ibn Bājja never explicitly quotes Avicenna, even when discussing topics of shared interest, can be taken as a sign that he lacked knowledge of Avicenna's works.<sup>27</sup> It should also be recalled that Averroes himself—doubtlessly a connoisseur of Andalusian philosophy—highlights in Text 1 [a] a pervasive and profound, albeit negative, influence of Avicenna's philosophy on Ibn Bājja (“But what made that man [i.e., Ibn Bājja] err”). Averroes' testimony should not be overlooked in any future, more comprehensive, considerations of the issue.

As to the works of Avicenna known in Muslim Spain at the time of Averroes, one can surely point to the *Shifā'*, since parts of this *summa* were translated into Latin in Toledo during Averroes' lifetime in the second half of the century.<sup>28</sup> Several manuscripts of this work were apparently at the translators' disposal.<sup>29</sup> The diffusion of the *Shifā'* at that time in Andalusia is confirmed by its noticeable presence among the sources of the *al-'Aqīda al-raḥī'a* written by the initiator of the Latin translation, Ibn Daud, in Toledo around 1160.<sup>30</sup> Information about other works by Avicenna that may have



spread throughout Andalusia is less certain.<sup>31</sup> The route by which the *Shifā'* (and other Avicennian works) were transmitted to the Muslim West remains undetermined, although the diffusion was surely rapid. One can explain this rapidity by recalling that Baghdad, the capital of the Muslim empire, was the city in which the *Shifā'* was repeatedly copied at the very beginning of the twelfth century CE (its metaphysical section was copied in 1110 and 1115).<sup>32</sup>

This being the case, it comes as no surprise that Averroes' knowledge of Avicenna's philosophy appears to depend primarily on the *Shifā'*. First of all, Averroes mentions the title of this work on several occasions.<sup>33</sup> Although he points to a variety of works by Avicenna with which he was acquainted,<sup>34</sup> the evidence of his knowledge of other ones than the *Shifā'* is much less extensive.<sup>35</sup> In light of these numerous explicit references, the writing by Avicenna that Averroes simply mentions as "Avicenna's book" (*suo libro*) without further qualification can hardly be anything other than the *Shifā'*.<sup>36</sup> In fact, many quotations attributed to Avicenna by Averroes concern doctrines that can be found in the logic,<sup>37</sup> natural philosophy,<sup>38</sup> and metaphysics of the *Shifā'*.<sup>39</sup> The same applies to the tacit quotations of doctrines of Avicenna that can be detected here and there in Averroes' writings.<sup>40</sup> The technique of Averroes' quotations of Avicenna has been described as "condensed paraphrase," on account of the liberty that Averroes takes in reporting Avicenna's text.<sup>41</sup> The abridged character of these accounts, however, cannot hide a very significant fact: several doctrines of Avicenna that Averroes quotes, either explicitly or tacitly, occur *only* in Avicenna's *Shifā'*.<sup>42</sup>

The frequency and comprehensiveness of Averroes' explicit critical references to Avicenna's philosophy suggest a wide-ranging familiarity with the *Shifā'*, although it is difficult to determine the limits of his acquaintance with this work, i.e., whether it was exhaustive or not. Despite the existence of indirect sources of information about the *Shifā'* (such as al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, Incoherence of the Philosophers, which Averroes famously refuted in his *Tahāfut al-tahāfut*, Incoherence of the Incoherence),<sup>43</sup> Averroes' access to the work appears to have been mainly firsthand.<sup>44</sup> Sometimes he refers to doctrines of the *Shifā'* as if he were quoting the passages in which they are expressed,<sup>45</sup> while also providing information on the mode through which the work was transmitted to the Islamic West.<sup>46</sup> Likewise, he mentions doctrines of Avicenna that he is unable to understand, as if he were struggling with Avicenna's formulations.<sup>47</sup> Finally, he discards the authorship of doctrines wrongly ascribed to Avicenna, referencing their discordance with Avicenna's original texts (the "evidence of his statements," *al-ẓāhir min kalāmihī*).<sup>48</sup>

### **Did Averroes Read al-Jūzjānī's Introduction to the *Shifā'*?**

From the evidence presented in the previous section, one can conclude that Averroes was most probably acquainted with Avicenna's *Shifā'*, that

the *Shifā'* was his privileged way of accessing Avicenna's philosophy, and that he knew this work extensively, if not exhaustively.

If the interpretation of Text 1 that I presented earlier in this chapter is correct, the text may further determine Averroes' familiarity with the *Shifā'*, by providing evidence that he knew of one special part of Avicenna's work, a part that, though traditionally transmitted with the rest of the work, was penned not by Avicenna himself, but by his eleventh-century secretary and biographer Abū 'Ubayd 'Abd al-Wāḥid ibn Muḥammad al-Jūzjānī, namely the Introduction. Al-Jūzjānī's Introduction to the *Shifā'* was surely one of the parts of the work available in Andalusia in Averroes' time, since it is among the portions translated from Arabic into Latin in Toledo in the second half of the twelfth century.

In the Introduction to the *Shifā'* (whose relevant parts are gathered in Text 5), al-Jūzjānī contends the following: that Avicenna intended to compose the *Shifā'* in an original way; that he fully implemented this plan in the sections of the work concerning natural philosophy and metaphysics, writing most of the former and all the latter without the help of any book; and that he reverted to a more traditional way of composition, and consequently to a more faithful attitude to the transmitted corpus of philosophy, in logic and in the remaining portion of natural philosophy. In all this, al-Jūzjānī's Introduction strikingly mirrors Text 1 (as clarified in Texts 2–4). There, Averroes assesses the main parts of Avicenna's system in terms of their comparative fidelity to the writings of Aristotle. In Averroes' estimation, for example, Avicenna's logic is dependent on Aristotle, whereas the other parts of his philosophy, especially metaphysics, are not. Averroes also suggests that the parts of Avicenna's system less faithful to Aristotle were originally produced by Avicenna himself. This is precisely what al-Jūzjānī, in a different form, maintains in the Introduction. On the basis of this resemblance, one should not overlook the possibility that Averroes' main points in Text 1 might reflect motifs of al-Jūzjānī's Introduction.

Text 5: Abū 'Ubayd 'Abd al-Wāḥid ibn Muḥammad al-Jūzjānī (fifth/eleventh century), Introduction to Avicenna's *Shifā'* (Avicenna, *Al-Shifā'*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Madkhal*, ed. Qanawātī, al-Khuḍayrī, and al-Ahwānī, 2.11–13, 2.19–3.2, 3.10–11, 4.1–5; ed. Di Vincenzo, 4.21–6.23, 6.27–29, 8.36–38, 8.41–10.44)

[a] I [i.e., Avicenna] have neither the time nor the inclination to occupy myself with close textual analysis and commentary. But if you [pl.] would be content with whatever I have readily in mind [which I have thought] on my own [*bi-mā yatayassaru lī min 'indī*], then I could write for you [pl.] a comprehensive work arranged in the order that will occur to me [*lī*]. We readily offered our consent to this and urged him to start with Physics. He began with that [ . . . ].

[b] He [i.e., Avicenna] voluntarily applied himself with great earnestness to its [i.e., the *Shifā*'s] composition, and in a period of twenty days he finished Metaphysics and Physics (except for the two books on Zoology and Botany) without having available any book to consult, but by relying solely upon his natural talents [*tab'ahū fa-qattf*] [. . .].

[c] There [in Hamadhān] he worked on the Logic [of the *Shifā*']. He had access to the books [of Aristotle and the commentators], and it consequently happened that he followed a course parallel to them, proceeding according to the order followed by people [in the Aristotelian tradition] and discussing their statements of which he disapproved [. . .]. He composed also the Zoology and Botany.

[d] My [i.e., al-Jūzjānī's] purpose in recounting these stories is to tell the reason why [. . .] there is a disparity between his [i.e., Avicenna's] organization of the Logic and that of the Physics and Metaphysics, and also to provoke wonder for his ability to compose the Physics and the Metaphysics in a period of twenty days without having access to books but by taking dictation only from his heart [*wa-innamā yumli 'alayhi qalbuḥū . . . fa-qattf*] which was preoccupied with the afflictions [then] besetting it.<sup>49</sup>

Text 5 matches Text 1 in several aspects. First, it explains that “from himself” in Text 1 [c]—corresponding to “on my own,” “relying solely upon his natural talents,” and “taking dictation only from his heart” in Text 5 [a], [b], and [d]—means “without having available any book to consult” (Text 5 [b]), where “book” refers in all likelihood to the works of Aristotle and the Aristotelian commentators (Text 5 [c]).<sup>50</sup> Second, it confirms that the logic of the *Shifā*' in its entirety (not only the dialectic) is the part of Avicenna's system most similar to Aristotle's counterpart, the *Organon*, which Avicenna imitated (“he followed a course parallel to them [i.e., Aristotle's and the commentators' books]”) and of which he adopted the traditional order for the exposition of topics (Text 5 [c]). Third, it also provides some clues for understanding the expression “chiefly in the case of metaphysics” in Text 1 [b], insofar as it asserts that most of the natural philosophy of the *Shifā*' was original with respect to Aristotle, but also that the two sections of natural philosophy on botany and zoology were written by Avicenna according to a more traditional style (Text 5 [b]–[c]); in this way, the partial originality of the natural philosophy of the *Shifā*' with respect to Aristotle's natural philosophy turns out to be lower than the full originality of the metaphysics.

One can therefore suppose that Averroes had in mind Text 5 when he was writing Text 1, and that he fairly reported in Text 1 the amount of originality (or lack thereof) of the actual content of the *Shifā*' with respect to Aristotle not only because he personally evaluated sources and formats of the various sections of Avicenna's *summa*, but possibly also because he relied on the information on this point offered by al-Jūzjānī in Text 5.<sup>51</sup> If

the parallels between Text 1 and Text 5 detected here should be confirmed and corroborated by further research, we would be entitled to add al-Jūzjānī's Introduction to the *Shifā'* to the parts of Avicenna's work known to Averroes and to extend to this section his acquaintance with Avicenna's masterpiece.

## Conclusion

Three points lie in the background of what we have observed in the preceding pages. First, independence from Aristotle not only inspires Avicenna's own self-perception and self-description in famous texts well-known to Avicennian scholars,<sup>52</sup> but also governs the concrete praxis of his way of doing philosophy, even in works avowedly lenient toward the Peripatetic tradition such as the *Shifā'*. One can grasp this tendency with particular clarity in the metaphysics of this *summa*, in which several veiled criticisms of Aristotle can be detected.<sup>53</sup> Whereas the former level may shed light on the question of the "self-marketing" promoted by Avicenna as a conscious innovator of the praxis of philosophy, the latter level is far more complex, and cannot be answered in the frame of a single paper. What is important for the present purposes is that in their remarks on the varying degree of Avicenna's faithfulness (or better, unfaithfulness) to Aristotle, both Averroes and al-Jūzjānī capture a real and pivotal aspect of Avicenna's philosophy.

Second, independence from Aristotle is fundamental not only in Avicenna's own understanding of the development and implementation of the philosophical heritage, but also in Averroes' animosity against his Eastern predecessor. In this perspective, the texts of Averroes analyzed here show that the quintessence of the Commentator's philosophy lies in a twofold relation with the previous philosophical tradition: positive in the case of Aristotle, and negative in the case of Avicenna. If Avicenna's way of doing philosophy follows the path of novelty (not only in programs, but also in practice), whereas Averroes' philosophical agenda consists in loyally following Aristotle on the basis of an almost "reactionary" assent to the idea of school tradition, Avicenna and Averroes turn out to propose different values and norms of what it means to do philosophy.<sup>54</sup> In fact, using a terminology commonly adopted in the history of science, we can speak of two different and opposed "paradigms" of the praxis of philosophy. The repercussions of these two paradigms on the fate of Aristotelian philosophy in the Latin West until the Renaissance, as assuring its continuity (Averroes) but also allowing its final dismissal (Avicenna), are worthy of attentive consideration.<sup>55</sup>

A third element may be relevant to the present discussion in connection with al-Jūzjānī's insistence on the "disparity between his [i.e., Avicenna's] organization of the Logic and that of the Physics and Metaphysics" (Text 5 [d], emphasis added). If it is true, as Dimitri Gutas has proposed, that this

insistence is “an attempt to answer Avicenna’s Peripatetic critics (actual or potential) who would have expected him to follow [. . .] the order and the contents of the Aristotelian canon of writings,” and that “the tenor of Jūzjānī’s Introduction is apologetic [. . .] and [. . .] its main thrust is to defend Avicenna’s Peripatetic orthodoxy,”<sup>56</sup> these advocates of Peripateticism are not necessarily to be sought only outside Avicenna’s circle, but might well be among the members of his own school. In fact, al-Jūzjānī himself could be one of them. The same “apologetic” attitude is reflected in the transmission history of the metaphysics of this *summa*, a process to which al-Jūzjānī surely contributed in his capacity as Avicenna’s secretary. In this part of the work, a more originally Avicennian way of arranging the doctrine of the universals in treatise 5 (attested, at least in part, by the Latin translation and some Arabic manuscripts) is transformed into a much more traditional way of expounding the doctrine. This less innovative and more customary account is the one transmitted by the Arabic *versio vulgata* of the work—that is, by the majority of its extant Arabic manuscripts.<sup>57</sup>

By the same token, al-Jūzjānī’s “bibliographical” explanation of why the natural philosophy and metaphysics of the *Shifā’* (dictated by Avicenna’s individual heart) are much more original than its logic (grounded in the solid textual support of a previous millenary tradition) may not be designed only to increase the appeal of the work for an external audience expecting a more uniform and traditional manner of exposition in the various parts of the *summa*. Merchandising strategies apart, his explanation may have also served to silence the Peripatetic orthodoxy internal to Avicenna’s school, which could not help noticing the unbridgeable difference within the *Shifā’* between the logic, on the one hand, and the natural philosophy and the metaphysics, on the other, in terms of closeness to Aristotle and his commentators. That orthodoxy arguably preferred the logic over the natural philosophy and metaphysics precisely because of its traditional character. One may surmise that al-Jūzjānī’s own philosophical tastes went in the same direction. After all, the *Shifā’* was Avicenna’s response to al-Jūzjānī’s request for a work replicating Avicenna’s previous commentaries on the philosophical corpus in a quite traditional format. In the Introduction, citing Avicenna’s reluctance to engage in such an endeavor as the reason why the *Shifā’* did not take the shape of a commentary, and invoking external circumstances such as the availability or unavailability of books to explain why Avicenna’s masterpiece turned out uneven in style and content, were also ways to downplay the failure of al-Jūzjānī’s solicitations and the shortcomings of his promotional activity, in a sort of self-apology.

If this line of interpretation is correct, and if the tentative conclusions reached in the present chapter are tenable, we would then be confronted with an interesting similarity between the closest disciple of Avicenna in the East, al-Jūzjānī, and his archenemy in the West, Averroes, concerning Avicenna’s attitude to Aristotle. Being equally unable to manage

Avicenna's extreme originality with respect to Aristotle in natural philosophy and metaphysics, Averroes would have resorted to overtly criticizing and rejecting it, whereas al-Jūzjānī would have obliquely attempted to justify its presence and minimize its outcomes.

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## Notes

- 1 Averroes, *Long Commentary*, 374–75. The passage in question is further discussed by Taylor, “Introduction,” xciv.
- 2 The expression *longo tempore* in section [a] has been interpreted either as “for a long time,” as in the above translation, or as “a long time ago”: Averroes, *L'intelligence*, 139 (“il y a longtemps”); Janssens, “Ibn Rushd,” 405, modifies the French translation as “longtemps,” although he acknowledges the fundamental ambiguity of the expression *longo tempore*, since Averroes continued to hold “admiration pour les ‘Commentateurs’” for a long time (*ibid.*, n. 1). Although the two competing interpretations are not mutually exclusive (Averroes might be talking about a state of affairs that happened a long time ago *and* continued for a long time, with reference to the time period covering the composition of his epitomes, which lasted about a decade), it seems difficult to totally exclude the first interpretation, since the more natural way to understand the expression *longo tempore* is that it designates duration, and one wonders why Michael Scot did not translate the Arabic text that he had in front of him with *olim* or *quondam*, rather than with *longo tempore*, if he understood it solely as “a long time ago.” It is important to stress in this context that the wrong attitude of which Averroes accuses the *moderni* in section [a] is not simply reliance on the commentators, but reliance on the commentators without recourse to Aristotle's text.
- 3 “Sed illud quod fecit illum hominem errare, et nos etiam longo tempore, est quia Moderni dimittunt libros Aristotelis et considerant libros expositorum, et maxime in anima, credendo quod iste liber impossibile est ut intelligatur. Et hoc est propter Avicennam, qui non imitatus est Aristotelem nisi in Dialectica, sed in aliis erravit, et maxime in Metaphysica; et hoc quia incepit quasi a se.” English translation by Taylor in Averroes, *Long Commentary*, 374–75; slightly modified (Taylor translates *dialectica* as “dialectics,” *in aliis* as “in other things,” and *quasi a se* as “as it were, [doing philosophy] from his own perspective”); insertions are mine. The French translation in Averroes, *L'intelligence*, 139 (“Mais ce qui a fait errer cet homme [Avempace], et nous aussi il y a longtemps, c'est que les Modernes laissent de côté les livres d'Aristote et examinent [plutôt] ceux des commentateurs—principalement pour *L'Âme*, car il pensent que ce livre est impossible à comprendre. Et tout cela est la faute d'Avicenne, qui n'a imité Aristote que dans sa *Dialectique*, mai qui a erré pour tout le reste, particulièrement dans la *Métaphysique*; car il a, pour ainsi dire, [re]commencé [à partir de lui-même]”), is reproduced, slightly modified, in Janssens, “Ibn Rushd,” 405. The importance of section [a] of this text is stressed by Endress, “Le projet d'Averroès,” 13.

- 4 Averroes Latinus, *Averrois Cordubensis commentarium magnum*, 469.27–31; Averroes, *Long Commentary*, 374 and n. 219.
- 5 The interpretation of *dialectica* as “logic” is upheld by Janssens, “Ibn Rushd,” 405, in an integration (“à notre avis, il s’agit de toute la logique, et pas seulement du livre de ce titre”) of the French translation in Averroes, *L’intelligence*, 139. The French translation opts for “Dialectique” (although “Dialectique” is then paraphrased as “Logique,” 335 n. 638).
- 6 Averroes, *Maqālāt fī l-mantiq wa-l-‘ilm al-ṭabī‘ī*, 175.1–8. The work is recorded under no. 3.7 in Endress, “Averrois Opera,” 368.
- 7 Section [iii] of this text (Averroes, *Maqālāt fī l-mantiq wa-l-‘ilm al-ṭabī‘ī*, 175.6–8) is translated as follows by Elamrani-Jamal in “Ibn Ruṣd et les *Premiers Analytiques*,” 52: “ce que l’auteur postérieur à Aristote peut faire de pire est de s’écarter de son enseignement et de suivre une autre voie que la sienne, comme cela est arrivé à Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī] dans ses livres de logique et à Ibn Sīnā dans les sciences physiques et théologiques.”
- 8 The causal clause at the beginning of Text 2 [ii] (“This is due to,” *wa-dhālika li-*) even suggests the Arabic equivalent of the sentences “This is due to Avicenna” (*et hoc est propter Avicennam*) and “This [happened] because” (*et hoc quia*) in Text 1 [b]–[c] (arguably, *wa-dhālika li-bni Sīnā* and *wa-dhālika li-annahū*, respectively). This parallelism supports keeping the reading *Et hoc est propter Avicennam* in Text 1 [b], contrary to the alternative reading *Et hoc est proprie Avicennae* proposed by Janssens, “Ibn Rushd,” 406–7.
- 9 Since Text 1 belongs to a commentary on natural philosophy (*De anima*), al-Fārābī is understandably not mentioned there: in Text 2 [iii], al-Fārābī is depicted by Averroes in an equally negative light, but only with regard to the province of logic.
- 10 Since Averroes speaks generically of “all his [i.e., Avicenna’s] books,” in Averroes’ understanding Avicenna’s critical attitude to Aristotle appears in natural philosophy and metaphysics, but it also surfaces in logic, and should be taken as the motivating force of Avicenna’s choice to follow an independent course from Aristotle in natural philosophy and metaphysics.
- 11 If we take *dialectica* to mean logic, as Text 2 suggests, we also obtain a more balanced contrast between logic and metaphysics in Text 1 [b]. In this case, two entire parts of philosophy would be contrasted, rather than a section of a part, i.e., dialectic, and an entire part, i.e., metaphysics.
- 12 See the passage of Averroes’ *Middle Commentary on the Elenchi Sophistici* (Averroes, *Talkhūṣ mantiq Aristū*, 2:729.9–730.3) translated into French in Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:31–32. The pericope of Avicenna’s *Shifā’* quoted by Averroes in this passage is translated into English in Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 28. See, in particular, Avicenna’s statement: “we [. . .] found no method for [the study of] sophistical matters other than the one Aristotle gave”; the expression “this art” in the sentence “And did there appear after him anybody who added anything at all to this art beyond what Aristotle said?” might refer to logic in general (cf. the French translation in Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, 1:32 n. 3).
- 13 For *dialectica* as a translation of “logic” (*mantiq*) rather than “dialectic” (*jadal*), see, for instance, Al-Fārābī, *Über die Wissenschaften*, 22–62. The same correspondence *mantiq*–*dialectica* can be noticed in passages of the Latin translations of Averroes’ commentaries: for instance, the expression ‘*alā sabīli l-mantiqi*’ in Aristoteles Arabus, *Al-ṭabī‘a*, 908.3 (= λογικῶς, *Phys.* Θ, 8, 264a8), is translated as *secundum dialecticam* in Averroes’ *Long Commentary on the Physics* (book Θ, c. 70, Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 4:414B); the same correspondence with *mantiq* and related expressions applies to *dialectica* and *sermones dialectici* in Averroes’ explanation of Aristotle’s passage,



- Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 4:414G–K. For a more straightforward translation of *mantīq* as *logica* in the *Long Commentary on the Physics*, see, e.g., the expression *naẓaran mantīqiyyan*, 227.4, corresponding to λογικῶς in *Phys.* Γ, 5, 204b4, translated as *consideratione logica* in book Γ, c. 40, of Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 4:103A (I thank Matteo Di Giovanni for this information).
- 14 Significantly, the *Topics* are the only part of logic commenting on which, in his so-called Middle Commentaries, Averroes quotes Avicenna without explicitly refuting him (see Averroes, *Talkhīs Kitāb al-Jadal*). Moreover, the emphasis on dialectic as the exclusive area of similarity between Avicenna and Aristotle might aim to underscore the dialectical character of Avicenna's method and his failure to attain a properly demonstrative approach—a critical remark that Averroes frequently makes (see, for instance, the passage of Averroes' *Long Commentary on the Physics*, book A, c. 83 (Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 4:47F–K), quoted in Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God's Existence," 86–87; see also the text of the same commentary cited in note 36 below).
  - 15 The absence of any specification might even suggest a wider application to philosophy *tout court*, as current translations seem to imply. See Averroes, *Long Commentary*, 374–75: "This is because he began [*inceptit*], as it were, [doing philosophy] from his own perspective." In Averroes, *L'intelligence*, Text 1 [c] is translated as "car il a, pour ainsi dire, [re]commencé [à partir de lui-même]" (139) and paraphrased as "parce qu'il a commencé comme s'il était le premier," "parce qu'il a voulu *tout* tirer de son propre fonds" (335 n. 638, emphasis added). However, neither the content of Text 1 [b], in which Avicenna is said to follow Aristotle in *dialectica*/logic, nor the testimony of Text 2 [iii], in which the distance from Aristotle's logic is ascribed to al-Fārābī rather than to Avicenna, lend themselves to this interpretation.
  - 16 A broader interpretation is supported by the following remark about natural philosophy at the end of a lengthy criticism of Avicenna in the *Long Commentary on the De caelo* (book Γ, c. 67, Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 5:227D–F; Averroes Latinus, *Averrois Cordubensis commentum magnum super libro De celo*, 635.115–39): "The insufficient training of this man in natural philosophy, and his excessive confidence in his own intelligence [*bona confidentia in proprio ingenio*], lead him to these errors" (emphasis added; on this criticism of Avicenna by Averroes, see Eichner, *Averroes' Mittlerer Kommentar*, 142–45). See also the following passage of *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* regarding a particular aspect of Avicenna's psychology, a part of natural philosophy (Averroes, *Tahafot at-tahafot*, 500.12–3; English translation in Averroes, *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut*, 305): "As to the theory he [i.e., Avicenna] gives here about the cause of revelation and dreams, *this is the theory of Avicenna alone*, and the opinions of the ancient philosophers differ from his."
  - 17 فإن من يتعاطي فهم كلامه من غير أن يسبقه فيه غيره هو شبيهه بمن يبتدئ الصناعة French translation in Averroes, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:31.33: "Car celui qui se préoccupe de comprendre ses [i.e., Aristotle's] propos sans que quelqu'un d'autre le précède en cela est pareil à celui qui commence un art."
  - 18 وهذا كله بين بأيسر تأمل ولكن هذا شأن هذا الرجل في كثير مما يأتي به من عند نفسه Averroes, *On Aristotle's "Metaphysics"*, 29–30: "All this becomes clear upon a moment in reflection, but this is the case with many things presented by this man as being [original inventions] by himself."
  - 19 See, for instance, Averroes, *Tafsīr mā ba'd at-ṭabī'at*, 6.1, 7.6, 18.2, 37.2, 55.5, 56.2, 70.14, 79.11, 80.11, 81.5, 82.5, 84.5, 116.10, 138.17, etc. No passage containing *quasi* is among those taken into account in Averroes, "Grand Commentaire."

- 20 The Arabic behind Text 1 [c] might therefore be: وذلك لأنه ابتداء كان من عند نفسه *wa-dhālika li-annahū btada'a ka-anna min 'inda naḥṣihī*.
- 21 The most recent scholarship tends to posit the first entrance of Avicenna's philosophy in Andalusia around the beginning of the twelfth century, if not before, as already argued by Badawī, "Avicenne en Espagne," 12, according to whom it is difficult to maintain that Avicenna's philosophy had not yet arrived in Andalusia in the first decades of the twelfth century, due to its traces in the works of disciples of Ibn Bājja (d. 1138) and on account of the introduction of Avicenna's *Canon of Medicine* in Andalusia around 1095–1125. Harvey, "Avicenna's Influence," 328, contends that Avicenna's philosophy entered in Spain in the late 1130s (the date of the completion of the *Kuzari* of Judah Halevi, ca. 1075–1141, where Avicenna is quoted and criticized) or even earlier, due to the recourse to Avicenna in the anonymous *Kitāb ma'ānī al-naḥṣ*, datable between the mid-eleventh and the mid-twelfth century (ibid., 331 and n. 15).
- 22 The widespread opinion according to which Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185) was the first Andalusian author to be acquainted with Avicenna's philosophy (see, for example, Cruz Hernandez, "Islamic Thought," 789) is no longer tenable. See the critical remarks in Harvey, "Avicenna's Influence," 329–30.
- 23 The frequent quotations of Avicenna in Averroes' epitomes, and the references to the contemporary investigators or followers of Avicenna's philosophy elsewhere (e.g., *Long Commentary on the Physics*, book Θ, c. 78; Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 4:424L), seem to imply a wide previous diffusion of Avicenna's thought in Andalusia. In the treatise *De separatione primi principii*, the author, supposedly Averroes, states: "Et quando pervenerunt ad nos libri Abolay ben Cine" (Averroes Latinus, "De separatione primi principii," 96). If taken literally, this statement would imply that Averroes came into contact with Avicenna's works at a certain point of his lifetime, being unaware of them before. It remains unclear, however, which city or geographical area of Averroes' biography (Cordoba, Marrakesh, Seville, etc.) may be referred to in this statement.
- 24 See Avicenna Latinus, *Logica*, 11.
- 25 See Fontaine, "'Happy Is He Whose Children Are Boys'"; Fontaine, "Avicennian Sources." Ibn Daud (Lat.: Avendeuth) was a Jew from Cordoba who moved to Toledo around the middle of the twelfth century.
- 26 For example, the divergence of opinions on the role of logic in philosophy (instrument vs. part) that Ibn Bājja reports in his glosses on al-Fārābī's commentary on the *Isagoge* (trans. in Forcada, "Ibn Bājja and the Classification," 300; see Di Giovanni, "Motifs of Andalusian Philosophy") has definite Avicennian overtones. Other doctrinal similarities between Ibn Bājja and Avicenna are underscored by Puig Montada, "Philosophy in Andalusia."
- 27 Akasoy, "Ibn Sīnā in the Arab West," 288.
- 28 The project of translating three of the four sections of the *Shifā'* (logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics) from Arabic into Latin in Toledo in the second half of the twelfth century, although not performed comprehensively (only some sections of these parts were in fact translated; see Bertolacci, "Community of Translators"; Bertolacci, "Translator's Cut"), seems to attest the circulation of an overall, if not complete, version of this work in Andalusia in Averroes' times.
- 29 The main promoter of the Latin translation of the *Shifā'*, Ibn Daud, had at his disposal several manuscripts of the *Shifā'*, since in the foreword to the Latin translation of the initial part of the work he contends that "in most manuscripts" (*in plerisque codicibus*) al-Jūzjānī's Introduction precedes Avicenna's Prologue (see the text in Birkenmajer, "Avicennas Vorrede," 314.7–8; now in Avicenna Latinus, *Logica*; Bertolacci, "Community of Translators," 53).

- 30 See Fontaine, “Happy Is He Whose Children Are Boys”; Fontaine, “Avicennian Sources.”
- 31 Ibn Ṭufayl’s *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* documents acquaintance with Avicenna’s *Shifāʾ*, *Ishārāt*, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*, and/or *Risālat al-qadar* (see Gutas, “Ibn Ṭufayl,” 229). The diffusion of Avicenna’s *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* in twelfth-century Andalusia is confirmed by the Hebrew translation/adaptation by Abraham ibn ‘Ezra’ (1089–1167) (see Harvey, “Avicenna’s Influence,” 329; Szpiech, “In Search,” 201; Fontaine, “Avicennian Sources,” 244). Gutas’ contention that Avicenna’s *Ḥikma mashriqiyya* was not known in Andalusia (Gutas, “Ibn Ṭufayl,” 228–29) has been partially revised in Gutas, “Avicenna’s Eastern Philosophy,” 171–72. The dependence of Jehudah Halevi’s (d. 1141) *Kuzari* on Avicenna’s *Risāla fī l-naḥs* was documented by Landauer in 1876 (see Harvey, “Avicenna’s Influence,” 330 n. 9; Fontaine, “Avicennian Sources,” 244). On the works of Avicenna other than the *Shifāʾ* known to Averroes, see note 35 below.
- 32 See Bertolacci, “Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Shifāʾ*,” 277–79. Puig Montada, “Transmission and Reception of Arabic Philosophy,” 7–8, remarks that during the reign of the caliph al-Ḥakam II (961–973) “a library containing most of the books available in the East was established” in Cordova, and that “*Falsafah* arrived materially in the books gathered by al-Ḥakam II,” although “its intellectual reception is much later.” One might assume that the circulation of *falsafa* from East to West continued afterward and that Avicenna’s philosophy was part of the transmitted material.
- 33 Explicit mentions of the *Shifāʾ* can be found in the colophon of Averroes’ *Middle Commentary on the Elenchi Sophistici* (Averroes, *Talkhīṣ manṭiq Aristū*, 2:729.12–14: “We have found no commentary on it [i.e., of Aristotle’s *Elenchi Sophistici*] by any of the commentators, either *ad litteram* or *ad sensum*, except what little there is of that in the *Kitāb al-Shifāʾ* by Abū ‘Alī ibn Sīnā”; English translation in Gutas, “Aspects of Literary Form,” 33, slightly modified; compare the French translation in Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:31–32), and in his *Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics* (Averroes Hebraicus, *Il commentio medio*, 343.21–22: “ed è questa la via nella quale [Avicenna] procede nel suo libro chiamato *al-Shifāʾ*”—I am indebted to the late M. Zonta for having kindly shared with me his Italian translation of the passage; see also Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, 334 n. 133). A joint mention of the *Shifāʾ* and the *Najāṭ* occurs in *Al-Qawl fī l-muqaddima al-wujūdiyya aw al-muṭlaqa* (Averroes, “Al-Qawl,” 33.1–2; Latin translation in Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 1.2b:80B–C; English translation in Averroes, “Averroes’ Quaesitum,” 103–4: “That is what he says in the *Kitāb al-shifāʾ*. As to [what he says] in the *Kitāb al-najāṭ*”). The *Shifāʾ* is mentioned in the title of one of the works of Averroes recorded by Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a (*Kitāb fī l-faḥṣ ‘an masā’il waqa‘at fī l-‘ilm al-ilāhī fī Kitāb al-Shifāʾ li-bn Sīnā*; see Anawati, *Bibliographie d’Averroès*, 31, no. 37).
- 34 See the expression “all his [i.e., Avicenna’s] books” (*kutubahū kullahā*) in Averroes’ “Treatise on the Meaning of What is Predicated Universally and Other Issues” (above, Text 2 [ii]).
- 35 The only other *summa* of Avicenna that Averroes explicitly quotes is the *Najāṭ*, mentioned together with the *Shifāʾ*, in Averroes’ *Al-Qawl fī l-muqaddima al-wujūdiyya aw al-muṭlaqa* (see the passage quoted in note 33 above). For the rest, the evidence is uncertain and speculative: a passage of Averroes’ *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* on the alleged superiority of Avicenna’s proof of God’s existence, based on the analysis of being *qua* being, with respect to the Ancients’ proof, based on motion and time (Averroes, *Tahāfut at-tahāfut*, 419.10–14; English translation in Averroes, *Averroes’ Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, 253), might echo another *summa* by Avicenna, the *Inṣāf* (Avicenna, *Commentaire sur le livre Lambda*,

- 49.47–51; cf. Avicenna, “Sharḥ ḥarf al-Lām li-Ibn Sīnā,” 23.21–24.1; English translation in Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 299). Gutas, “Ibn Ṭufayl,” 228–29, on the other hand, contends that Avicenna’s *Inṣāf* was not known in Andalusia. As regards the shorter treatises by Avicenna, according to Francesca Lucchetta, Averroes’ *Faṣl al-maqāl* depends directly on Avicenna’s *Risāla adḥawiyya fī amr al-ma’ād* (Averroes, *L'accordo*, 6.20). On whether Averroes might have been acquainted with Avicenna’s *Risāla ‘arshīyya*, see Adouhane, “Al-Miklātī,” 188.
- 36 Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Physics*, book Θ, c. 3 (Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 4:340E–F): “Et quod existimavit Avicenna, quod divinus debet monstrare primum principium esse, est falsum, et via eius, quam finxit ipsum invenisse eam, qua usus est *in suo libro* et similiter Algazel sequens eum, est via tenuis et non est demonstrativa aliquo modo. Nos autem de hoc fecimus tractatum singularem super hoc. Et qui voluerit accipere quaestiones accidentes in ea, videat hoc ex libro Algazelis: plures enim, quas induxit contra alios, verae sunt” (emphasis added). Cf. book A, c. 83 (4:47F–K): “On this issue, in his [i.e., Avicenna’s] book on divine science [*in suo libro de scientia divina*].”
- 37 See the quotations (with explicit mentions of Avicenna) of: (1) chapter 2. 3 of the section of the *Shifā’* corresponding to the *De interpretatione* in *Qawl fī l-maḥmūlāt al-mufrada wa-l-murakkaba wa-naqd mauqif Ibn Sīnā* (Avicenna, *Al-Shifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-‘Ibāra*, 96–111; see Benmakhoulouf and Diebler, *Commentaire moyen sur le De interpretatione*, 152–55; Averroes, *Maqālāt fī l-manṭiq wa-l-‘ilm al-ṭabī‘ī*, 87–94; French translation in Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 157–63); (2) chapter 1. 7 of the section of the *Shifā’* corresponding to the *Prior Analytics* in the *Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics* (Avicenna, *Al-Shifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Qiyās*, 66.7–15, 67.14–70.9; Averroes, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Qiyās*, 197.13–15 (#174); see Aouad and Rashed, “Commentateurs,” 102; and Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:33); (3) chapters 2. 4 and 4. 3 of the section of the *Shifā’* corresponding to the *Topics* in the *Middle Commentary on the Topics* (Avicenna, *Jadal*, 139.5, 227.9–14; Averroes, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Jadal*, 87.12–13 (#85), 156.4–5 (#214); see Aouad and Rashed, “Commentateurs,” 102; Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:33); and (4) chapter 2. 6 of the section of the *Shifā’* corresponding to the *Elenchi Sophistici* in the *Middle Commentary on the Elenchi Sophistici* (Avicenna, *Al-Shifā’*, *al-Manṭiq*, *al-Safsāṭa*, 114.1–10; English translation in Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 28; French translation in Aouad and Rashed, “Commentateurs,” 101 n. 56; Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:32 n. 3; Averroes, *Talkhīṣ manṭiq Aristū*, 2:729.25–730.3, French translation in Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:32).
- 38 For the criticisms of Avicenna contained in Averroes’ *Long Commentary on the Physics*, see Bertolacci, “Averroes ubique Avicennam persequitur”; for those contained in Averroes’ various commentaries on *Physics*, *De caelo*, and *Meteorologica*, see Cerami, “Map of Averroes’ Criticism.” About the criticism of Avicenna contained in Averroes’ *Long Commentary on the Physics*, 66G–67A, Belo, *Chance and Determinism*, 147–48, observes: “one is led to believe that Averroes was in some way familiar with the passage of the *Physics* of the *Shifā’* that paraphrases the Aristotelian passage in question (*Physics* 195b31–200b8).”
- 39 For the criticisms of Avicenna contained in Averroes’ *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, see Bertolacci, “Averroes against Avicenna on Human Spontaneous Generation”; Bertolacci, “From Athens to Buḥārā”; Bertolacci, “Avicenna’s and Averroes’ Interpretations.” For those contained in Averroes’ *Epitome of the Metaphysics*, see the notes to the English translation in Averroes, *On Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’*; Menn, “Fārābī.”

- 40 See the implicit quotations of the section of the *Shifā'* corresponding to the *Rhetoric* in Averroes' *Middle Commentary on the Rhetoric* (Aouad and Rashed, "Commentateurs," 98–124; Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:31–50). Eichner's critical edition *Averroes' Mittlerer Kommentar* documents similarities and differences between Averroes' *Middle Commentary on the De generatione et corruptione* and the corresponding part of the *Shifā'*. See also Menn, "Fārābī," 74: "As usual, Averroes mentions Avicenna by name only a few times [in *Epitome* I.34–43 and III.34–48], but in such a way as to make clear that Avicenna is on his mind throughout," and 73: "Averroes has presumably been thinking mainly of Avicenna throughout I.21."
- 41 The expression *paraphrase condensée* occurs in Averroes, *Commentaire moyen sur le De interpretatione*, 154 n. 1.
- 42 A passage of Averroes' *Epitome of the Meteorologica* (Averroes, *Risālat al-āthār al-'ulwiyya*, 84.21–85.2, 85.21–22) is a quotation (with explicit mention of Avicenna) of a passage of the fifth section of the *Shifā'* (2. 3): "Ibn Sīnā rebuked them [i.e., the commentators] on this issue by saying: 'Our brothers Peripatetics have contributed nothing to [clarifying] the arrangement of colors [in the rainbow].' This is so because he believed that the green does not differ from the reddish and the purple only in terms of excess and defect, since, on the contrary, this difference applies exclusively to the reddish and the purple. On this issue this man does not say anything [on his own], but only casts doubts against them. No doubt, this rebuke would apply most properly to Aristotle, since he was the chief of the Peripatetics. [ . . . ] In either case [i.e., regardless whether or not the commentators have rightly reported Aristotle's thought on the colors of the rainbow], Ibn Sīnā should have excluded Aristotle from the group of the Peripatetics, and should have not spoken in absolute terms [of all of them together]." Averroes probably here refers to Avicenna, *Al-Shifā'*, *al-ṭabī'īyyāt*, *al-Ma'ādīn wa-l-āthār al-'ulwiyya*, 50.10–11, 50.14–15, paraphrasing Avicenna's contention: "I am not satisfied with what our companions Peripatetics say about it [i.e., the rainbow] [ . . . ]. As to the colors, their status has not resulted verily to me, and I have not grasped their cause; I am not satisfied with what they say, since it is all falsity and nonsense." Likewise, several quotations of Avicenna's metaphysical doctrines have a counterpart only in the *Shifā'*. For instance, Avicenna's statement according to which only metaphysics provides the proof of God's existence, criticized in several of Averroes' commentaries (see Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God's Existence," Texts 6–7, 9), occurs only in the metaphysical section of the *Shifā'* (*Ilāhiyyāt*) 1. 1 (see *ibid.*, Texts 3–4), being absent in the other metaphysical writings of Avicenna. More specifically, the "universal method" (*al-ṭarīq al-kullī*) by means of which Avicenna aims to prove God's existence in metaphysics, mentioned in Averroes' *Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics*, book A, c. 70 (Averroes, *Sharḥ al-burhān li-Aristū wa-talkhīṣ al-burhān*, 298.16–9; Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 1.2a:154F) probably echoes the expression "the method of universal and intelligible premises" (*ṭarīq muqaddimāt kullīyya 'aqliyya*) in *Ilāhiyyāt* 1. 3, Avicenna, *Al-Shifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt*, 1:21.4; Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia*, 23.33–34 (see Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God's Existence," 94 n. 66). Some other doctrines of Avicenna criticized in the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (such as the theory according to which mice can be generated from earth) come exclusively from the *Shifā'* (in the case at stake, from the *Ma'ādīn wa-l-āthār 'ulwiyya*, the fifth section of the part on natural philosophy; see Bertolacci, "Averroes against Avicenna on Human Spontaneous Generation"). The same happens in the *Epitome of the Metaphysics*: Averroes asserts that the consideration of a sensible thing simply as



- existent is tantamount to its consideration as immaterial (Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, 6.21–7.2; Averroes, *On Aristotle's "Metaphysics,"* 22–23), which probably refers (non-critically) to Avicenna's doctrine in *Ilāhiyyāt* 1. 2, Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt*, 1:15.13–16; Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia*, 16.95–99, according to which “existent *qua* existent” is, in principle, immaterial, since it applies not only to material, but also to immaterial realities (see Bertolacci, *Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 126); likewise, when Averroes states, “What has become manifest in the natural science about the existence of separate principles is not superfluous in this science, as Avicenna says, but rather necessary” (Averroes, *Compendio de Metafísica*, 8.19–20; Averroes, *On Aristotle's "Metaphysics,"* 24), he refers to *Ilāhiyyāt* 1. 1, Avicenna, *Al-Shifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt*, 1:7.3–4, Avicenna Latinus, *Liber de Philosophia*, 5.91–93: “What appeared to you about this [topic] in [the science of] natural things was extraneous to [the science of] natural things; of it [i.e., of this topic] it was used in it [i.e., in the science of natural things] what was not part of it [i.e., of the science of natural things].” See also the “argument that Avicenna makes in *Shifā' Metaphysics* I.5, 10–11” and the “fairly accurate summary of some of Avicenna's arguments in *Shifā' Metaphysics* III” that Averroes submits to criticism in the *Epitome of the Metaphysics*, as discussed by Menn, “Fārābī,” 73, 79.
- 43 Averroes also knew al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*, *Intentions of the Philosophers*, a work which is much less dependent on the *Shifā'* than the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*. See Averroes, *Epitome of the Physics*, Prologue (Averroes, *Al-Jawāmi' fī l-falsafa*, 8.1–7): “We have endeavored to transmit this [i.e., Aristotle's] opinion among those of the ancients, because it has already appeared evident to all [of them] that it [i.e., Aristotle's opinion] was the most convincing and well-grounded of all. What prompted us to [do] this is the fact that many people undertake the rebuttal of Aristotle's doctrine without considering its truth; this is why the consideration of the truth, or of its contrary, that can be found in it [i.e., in Aristotle's doctrine] is performed secretly. Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] has pursued this [same] aspiration in his book known as *Intentions of the Philosophers*, but he has not attained in them [i.e., in the *Intentions of the Philosophers*] what he aimed for. Therefore, we have esteemed convenient to strive for his [same] intent, because in this way we hope to bring to the people of our time the [same] benefit that he hoped, for the [same] reason that he mentioned.” On this text, see Griffel, “Relationship between Averroes and al-Ghazālī,” 54; Stroumsa, “Philosophes almohades?,” 1147 n. 40.
- 44 Davidson's claim that Averroes “must have relied on derivative accounts of Avicenna's philosophy, such as Ghazali's account, in addition to whatever incomplete copies of Avicenna's works might have reached him in Spain” (Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, 334), appears questionable: the unavailability of Mu'tazilite works that Averroes laments (*ibid.*, n. 133) might be due to theological restrictions not affecting the circulation of philosophical works. Likewise, the quotation of Avicenna in Averroes' *Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics* (see note 33 above), according to which in the *Shifā'* Avicenna would have advocated a proof of God's existence based on the concepts of “necessarily existent” and “possibly existent,” does not necessarily indicate a derivative or incomplete acquaintance with the work, since the presence or lack of such a proof in the *Shifā'* is debated in Avicennian scholarship. See Bertolacci, “Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God's Existence,” 78.
- 45 For instance, in the first criticism of Avicenna occurring in the *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* (book α, c. 15), about a doctrine expounded only in the *Shifā'*, one reads: “Thus, we find [*najidu*] that Avicenna [ . . . ] says [*yaqūlu*]” (see Averroes, *Tafsīr mā ba'd at-ṭabī'at*, 46.19–47.1; Bertolacci, “Averroes against Avicenna on Human Spontaneous Generation,” 41).

- 46 The aforementioned quotation of the *Shifā'* in the colophon of Averroes' *Middle Commentary on the Elenchi Sophistici* (note 12 above) contains the following remark: "L'écrit [*al-kitāb*] qui nous est parvenu de cela [i.e., of the *Shifā'*, or of its section on sophistics] se présente dans un désordre maximum [*ghāyat al-ikhtilāl*]" (Averroès, *Commentaire moyen*, ed. Aouad, 1:31). The term *ikhtilāl* in this passage might also mean "defectiveness," which would amount to an attestation of the possible incomplete circulation of the *Shifā'* in Andalusia.
- 47 Averroes, *Epitome of the Physics* (Averroes, *Al-Jawāmi' fī l-falsafa*, 56.11–14): "I do not understand Ibn Sīnā's contention that circular motion is not in space at all, but only in place. Most likely, by [saying] this he meant that [the object having circular motion] passes from a place to another without changing space in its entirety. If that is what he meant, it is correct. If, on the other hand, he meant that its motion is in the very place that is the category [of place], that [contention] is not correct." For Avicenna's exposition of this doctrine in the *Shifā'*, see Hasnaoui, "Le statut catégorial."
- 48 Averroes, *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, book α, c. 15, Averroes, *Tafsīr mā ba'd at-ṭabī'at*, 47.5–13 (Averroes Latinus, *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, 8:35D–E; Averroes Latinus, *In Aristotelis librum II*, 77.30–78.38): "As to his [Aristotle's] statement 'It occurs to some people to search for the witness of poets' (*Metaph. α. 3*, 995a7–8), this also occurs to them by nature. These persons are those whose imaginative faculty overcomes the intellectual faculty. Hence, we find that they do not assent to demonstrative things [i.e., facts proved by demonstration] if imagination does not accompany them. Therefore, they are unable to assent to the fact that there is no plenum, no void and no time outside the world, and to the fact that there are existents which are not bodies, and do not exist in space and time. This occurred to many investigators of Avicenna's philosophy [*kathīr mimman nazāra fī falsafat Ibn Sīnā*], who ascribed this doctrine to him. But the evidence of his statements [*al-zāhir min kalāmihī*] [attests] that the ascription of this doctrine to him is false. This occurs because of habitude, and because of lack of instruction in the science of logic" (emphasis added).
- 49 English translation in Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 31–34 (slightly modified). Compare the translation by Di Vincenzo in *Avicenna, The Healing, Logic*, 7–11.
- 50 The sentence "We readily offered our consent to this and urged him to start [*an yaqā'a minhu l-btidā'*] with Physics" might be related to the *incepit* of Text 1 [c]: but in al-Jūzjānī's Introduction the noun *ibtidā'*—though stemming from the same root *b-d-*' of *yabtadi'u* in Text 3—appears to have a mere chronological connotation, without involving any idea of the new foundation of a discipline.
- 51 In the Autobiography, Avicenna reports that his first studies of natural philosophy and metaphysics were no longer supervised by a master, contrary to what had happened in the previous phase of his education when he learned logic under the supervision of the master al-Nātilī (Avicenna, *Life of Ibn Sina*, 24.6–7; on this passage, see Bertolacci, *Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 39–43). But even assuming access to Avicenna's Autobiography (not attested in Andalusia), the point Averroes wants to make in Text 1 [c] is different, since in this text what is at stake is not Avicenna's debt toward his immediate teachers (as in the Autobiography), but his attitude toward Aristotle as First Teacher (as in al-Jūzjānī's Introduction).
- 52 See Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 325–26.
- 53 See Bertolacci, *Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 319–20; Bertolacci, "Different Attitudes to Aristotle's Authority," 159–60.



- 54 I comprehensively discussed this topic in a paper presented at the SIEPM conference *Averroès, l'averroïsme, l'antiaverroïsme*, Geneva, October 4–6, 2006, “The ‘Andalusian Revolt Against Avicennian Metaphysics’: Averroes’ Criticism of Avicenna in the Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.” See also the publications mentioned in notes 38 and 39 above.
- 55 See Hasse, *Success and Suppression*.
- 56 Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 111–12.
- 57 Bertolacci, “Latin Translation,” 505 and n. 41.

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