

1 **Probabilistic leak detectability assessment via state**  
2 **estimation in water transport networks**

3 **Sarai Díaz · Roberto Mínguez · Javier**  
4 **González**

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9 **Abstract** Leak detectability or leakage awareness refers to the capability of sensing  
10 losses from a water supply system. Several methods exist in the technical literature  
11 to tackle this problem, but only few address it with a state estimation approach. The  
12 aim of this paper is to present a new methodology that enables probabilistic assess-  
13 ment of the extent to which water loss could be detected using state estimation by  
14 only analysing a single hydraulic state, i.e. one time period. Significant leaks are  
15 sensed by identifying unusually high normalised state estimation residuals, which  
16 can be identified based on the largest normalised residual test. More specifically, the  
17 probability of detecting leaks is computed here by working with the multivariate dis-  
18 tribution among measurements and estimates to take into account the noisy nature  
19 of measurements with an analytical approach rather than with sampling experiments,  
20 which are time-consuming. The methodology set out herein also provides a procedure  
21 to systematically assess the minimum leak that could be detected in different parts of  
22 the network for a specific measurement setting and operating condition. The method  
23 has been applied to a water transport network case study to show its potential and  
24 to highlight the usefulness of such a tool for practitioners. The limitations of such a

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Sarai Díaz  
Dept. of Civil Eng., Univ. of Castilla-La Mancha, Av. Camilo José Cela s/n, 13071 Ciudad Real (Spain).  
Tel.: +34 926 295 300 (Ext. 96635)  
ORCID: [orcid.org/0000-0002-5478-1768](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5478-1768)  
E-mail: Sarai.Diaz@uclm.es

Roberto Mínguez  
HIDRALAB INGENIERÍA Y DESARROLLOS, S.L., Spin-Off UCLM, Hydraulics Laboratory Univ. of  
Castilla-La Mancha, Av. Pedriza, Camino Moledores s/n, 13071 Ciudad Real (Spain)  
E-mail: roberto.minguez@hidralab.com

Javier González  
Dept. of Civil Eng., Univ. of Castilla-La Mancha, Av. Camilo José Cela s/n, 13071 Ciudad Real (Spain). //  
HIDRALAB INGENIERÍA Y DESARROLLOS, S.L., Spin-Off UCLM, Hydraulics Laboratory Univ. of  
Castilla-La Mancha, Av. Pedriza, Camino Moledores s/n, 13071 Ciudad Real (Spain)  
E-mail: Javier.Gonzalez@uclm.es

methodology are also discussed, including its possible use for on-line leak detection strategies.

**Keywords** Leakage awareness · State estimation · Bad data analysis

## 1 Introduction

Leakage in water systems has been extensively discussed by both practitioners and researchers in recent years so as to better characterise and reduce water loss [5]. According to [30], leak management models can be broadly classified as: (1) leakage assessment or water audit methods, which aim to quantify the amount of water lost, (2) leakage detection methods, which intend to detect if and/or where leaks are taking place, and (3) leakage control models, which focus on effectively controlling and forecasting leakage. Leakage detection methods are outstanding amongst these, as they constitute one of the most sophisticated and active topics of ongoing research and it is common practice to use them in conjunction with other methods [30]. Within the leakage detection field, two types of analysis can be distinguished: (1) leakage awareness, which refers to the capability of sensing loss of water in a supply system, without giving any information about its precise location, and (2) leakage localisation, which focuses on identifying and prioritising leaking areas to accurately locate the source of leakage. Note that leakage awareness aims to identify if water is being lost in the system, i.e. it is a prior analysis that should be undertaken before running leak localisation algorithms to accurately pinpoint the leak. In this study, the problem of leakage awareness or leak detectability is tackled through state estimation techniques as an alternative to other existing methods, many of which are based on artificial intelligence [27,31].

State estimation techniques have been used in the power supply field for decades [36] and were introduced on an academic level in the water industry shortly afterwards [9]. The state estimation problem is normally set out as a weighted least squares (WLS) problem where the difference between measurements and estimated variables is minimised. Therefore, such techniques provide the most likely hydraulic state of a water system based on readings from available metering devices and flow governing equations [13]. Note that the state estimation problem enables the hydraulic state (i.e. flows, demands and pressures) of the system to be determined based on the available measurements, and this problem has traditionally been considered independent from the so called parameter estimation or calibration problem [34,14], where model parameters are inferred from existing measurements. There is significant literature on off-line state estimation approaches [1], and these techniques are also regarded as effective tools that should be relied upon to take full advantage of the huge amount of real-time data provided by telemetry systems [2]. Hence, they have the potential to identify if water is being lost in the system. This possibility has been explored before by [8] and [37], but the truth is that online state estimation has hardly been implemented in water networks to date [15]. However, due to the recent surge in the installation of telemetry systems worldwide, it is worth exploring the prospects state estimation has for leak detection.

67 There are many issues and sources of uncertainty that must be taken into account  
68 in order to build a consistent on-line leakage awareness algorithm based on state  
69 estimation results. For this reason, we believe that before proposing a method for  
70 real-time detection, it is necessary to assess the viability of detecting leaks according  
71 to the existing metering devices in the network. This is of utmost importance in water  
72 systems, which traditionally have been poorly metered [22] and subjected to a great  
73 deal of uncertainty [3], which has thus limited the usefulness of real-time monitor-  
74 ing. In this paper, we develop a method that enables the probability of detecting a  
75 leak in real time via state estimation to be evaluated by only analysing a snapshot  
76 of the state of the system. Note that this is in keeping with the same line of work  
77 of other state estimation related techniques, as assessing the viability of undertaking  
78 state estimation on-line has become as important as developing algorithms for state  
79 estimation itself. For example, prior analyses have been developed to assess if suf-  
80 ficient measurements exist to undertake state estimation (observability analysis, e.g.  
81 [28], [11]), if there are sufficient measurements to infer pump and valve settings from  
82 real-time data (topological observability analysis, e.g. [15]), if the uncertainty of the  
83 measurement devices enables good estimates to be obtained (uncertainty evaluation,  
84 e.g. [3], [12]), or whether additional metering devices must be included at strategic  
85 locations (optimal meter placement, e.g. [39], [22]), among others. A probabilistic  
86 leak detectability assessment is set out here to evaluate beforehand to what extent the  
87 presence of leakage could be sensed based on state estimation results in water supply  
88 systems subjected to measurement noise.

89 As will be presented in detail further on, in this paper detecting leaks is based  
90 on the fact that when a noticeable amount of water is lost throughout the network,  
91 the metered values and the variables obtained from the state estimation process dif-  
92 fer considerably. In such cases, state estimation normalised residuals are high, and  
93 statistical tests can be undertaken to systematically identify the presence of unex-  
94 pected leakage. Such a procedure is analogous to what is currently known as “bad  
95 data analysis” or “bad data processing” in the power supply field, where the method  
96 is standard practice for online state estimation evaluation. In the power industry, bad  
97 data analysis, and more specifically bad data identification, is normally carried out us-  
98 ing the traditional largest normalised residual test [35], which gives a positive result if  
99 a specific normalised residual (computed from the measured value and the estimated  
100 variable) is above a chosen threshold [7]. This analysis has also been adapted to eval-  
101 uate state estimation errors in water systems [2], but in this paper the method is used  
102 to systematically assess the existence of leakage for the first time. Note that in order  
103 to compute the probability of leak detection, sampling experiments (i.e. Monte Carlo  
104 simulations) on the normalised residual test are required to assess the effect of mea-  
105 surement noise. However, this type of experiments is known to be time-consuming  
106 [23] and can become tiresome when used to assess the behaviour of the overall sys-  
107 tem.

108 The aim of this paper is to present a new probabilistic methodology to previously  
109 assess leak detectability via state estimation in water transport networks. Water trans-  
110 port networks are pipeline systems that provide water to larger communities, e.g. Dis-  
111 trict Metered Areas (DMA), where incoming flows are normally monitored. There-  
112 fore, they represent the “main arteries” that enable large urban areas to be supplied

113 with water, and they are better metered than conventional water distribution systems.  
 114 This explains why other state estimation related applications have focused on water  
 115 transport networks [11,37], which is the same area explored in this study. The method  
 116 represents a step forward in terms of bad data analysis, as it propagates measurement  
 117 noise to normalised residuals without the need for sampling experiments. Here, ob-  
 118 taining the probability of leak detection is based on the measurement-estimate joint  
 119 bivariate covariance matrix. This probability can then be used to identify the mini-  
 120 mum leak that could be detected at different positions within the system for a specific  
 121 measurement setting and operating scenario, providing a useful tool to better under-  
 122 stand the behaviour of the network in terms of leakage.

123 The organisation of this paper is as follows: firstly, the state estimation problem  
 124 and the two commonly adopted procedures for bad data analysis are presented to then  
 125 explain the principle assumed here for leakage awareness. Secondly, the probabilistic  
 126 methodology for leak detectability assessment is set out, and then this analysis is built  
 127 into a strategy for minimum leak assessment in order to estimate the minimum leak  
 128 that could be detected according to the available metering devices. Afterwards, the  
 129 method is applied to a case study, and the applicability of the algorithm is discussed,  
 130 highlighting its potential and limitations. Finally, concise conclusions are drawn.

## 131 2 State estimation, bad data analysis and leakage awareness

### 132 2.1 The state estimation problem

133 State estimation can be formulated as a constrained WLS mathematical programming  
 134 problem as follows:

$$\text{Min}_{\mathbf{x}} J(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}) = \frac{1}{2} [\mathbf{z} - \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{x})]^T \mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{Z}}^{-1} [\mathbf{z} - \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{x})] \quad (1)$$

135 subject to

$$\mathbf{A} \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{K} \mathbf{Q} |\mathbf{Q}|^{b-1}, \quad (2)$$

136

$$\mathbf{B} \mathbf{Q} = -\mathbf{q}, \quad (3)$$

137

$$q_i = 0; \forall i \in \mathcal{V}^T, \quad (4)$$

138

$$-\mathbf{Q}^{max} \leq \mathbf{Q} \leq \mathbf{Q}^{max}, \quad (5)$$

139

$$\mathbf{x}^{min} \leq \mathbf{x} \leq \mathbf{x}^{max}, \quad (6)$$

140 where  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$  corresponds to the optimal solution. Note that the objective function  $J$  in  
 141 Eq. (1) involves the  $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}^m$  vector of available measurements, the  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$  state  
 142 variable vector (constituted by head levels in this paper), the  $\mathbf{h} : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$  non-  
 143 linear relationship between  $\mathbf{x}$  and  $\mathbf{z}$ , and the  $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{Z}}$  matrix, which is the  $m \times m$  mea-  
 144 surement variance-covariance matrix, i.e. the inverse of the traditional weight matrix  
 145  $\mathbf{W} = \mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{Z}}^{-1}$ . At the same time, the  $\mathbf{h}$  relationship is defined by hydraulic constraints  
 146 (2)-(6). Eq. (2) represents the headloss equation, where  $\mathbf{A}$  is the connectivity matrix  
 147 (+1 at initial node and -1 at final node),  $\mathbf{K}$  is the flow resistance pipe coefficient,  $\mathbf{Q}$

148 represents pipe flow, and  $b$  is the equation exponent, which is  $b = 1.852$  for Hazen-  
 149 Williams headloss equation. On the other hand, Eq. (3) is the continuity equation that  
 150 enables water demand  $\mathbf{q}$  to be computed, where  $\mathbf{B}$  is a topological incidence sub-  
 151 matrix that contains +1 values when water enters the node and -1 when it flows out.  
 152 Note that an additional constraint (4) exists to simulate the existence of nodes known  
 153 to have null demand (i.e. transit nodes). Such nodes constitute a subset  $\forall i \in \mathcal{V}^T$   
 154 of the set of nodes in the system  $\forall i \in \mathcal{V}$ . Additionally, Eqs. (5)-(6) impose physi-  
 155 cal limits on water flows and head levels, respectively. Note that the state estimation  
 156 problem (1)-(6) traditionally assumes that model parameters (e.g. roughness param-  
 157 eters, pumps and valve settings) are known beforehand [11], i.e. the system has been  
 158 previously calibrated and the network topology is known, thus only measurement  
 159 errors are taken into account.

## 160 2.2 Bad data analysis

161 Bad data analysis is essential for assessing the result of any state estimator [7]. Bad  
 162 data analysis has traditionally been used to detect any erroneous measurements in the  
 163 system, i.e. to identify if there are significant deviations between the metered and the  
 164 estimated values. Bad measurement treatment typically consists of two phases: (1)  
 165 bad data detection, and (2) bad data identification.

### 166 2.2.1 Bad data detection

167 Bad data detection is typically formulated as a hypothesis testing problem. The null  
 168 hypothesis  $\mathcal{H}_0$  corresponds to a scenario in which no bad data are present, whereas  
 169 the alternative hypothesis  $\mathcal{H}_1$  considers that bad data exist. According to [2] and [7],  
 170 the Chi-square test is normally applied for bad data detection:

$$\hat{J} \begin{cases} \leq \chi_{m+p-n,\alpha}^2, & \text{accept } \mathcal{H}_0 \\ > \chi_{m+p-n,\alpha}^2, & \text{reject } \mathcal{H}_0 \end{cases}, \quad (7)$$

171 where  $\hat{J}$  refers to the value of the objective function at the estimated state, and  
 172  $\chi_{m+p-n,\alpha}^2$  is the Chi-square distribution function corresponding to  $m + p - n$  de-  
 173 grees of freedom and a  $1 - \alpha$  confidence level (typical values for  $\alpha$  are 0.1, 0.05, or  
 174 0.01). Note that  $p$  refers to the number of equality and binding inequality constraints  
 175 provided by Eqs. (2)-(6).

### 176 2.2.2 Bad data identification

177 Bad data identification is typically undertaken when bad measurements have been  
 178 detected. It traditionally consists of applying the largest normalised residual test [35].  
 179 According to [7], this procedure requires the computation of the normalised residual  
 180 vector  $\mathbf{r}^N$  as follows:

$$r_i^N = \frac{|z_i - \hat{z}_i|}{\sqrt{\Omega_{ii}}}, \quad (8)$$

181 where  $\hat{z} = \mathbf{h}(\hat{\mathbf{x}})$  refers to the estimated variables depending on the optimal state  
 182 variables  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ , and  $\mathbf{\Omega}$  is the residual covariance matrix. The residual covariance matrix  
 183 can be computed as shown by [6] in power systems, or by [12] in water systems:

$$\mathbf{\Omega} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}\mathbf{S}_{xz})\mathbf{C}_Z(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{H}\mathbf{S}_{xz})^T, \quad (9)$$

184 where  $\mathbf{I}$  is the  $m \times m$  identity matrix,  $\mathbf{H}$  represents the  $m \times n$  measurement Jacobian  
 185 matrix [11], and  $\mathbf{S}_{xz}$  is the  $n \times m$  sensitivity matrix of the state variables (i.e. nodal  
 186 heads) with respect to the available measurements [12]. Once  $\mathbf{\Omega}$  has been computed,  
 187 normalised residuals for each  $i$  measurement can be calculated according to Eq. (8)  
 188 and compared with a chosen identification threshold, e.g.  $\Phi^{-1}(1 - \alpha/2)$ , which refers  
 189 to the inverse of the normal distribution function for a given confidence level  $1 - \alpha$ .

### 190 2.3 Leakage awareness

191 In this paper, we assume that leakage can be detected thanks to the same principle  
 192 that has been traditionally used for bad data analysis in both the power supply field  
 193 [7], and the water industry [2]. Note that the presence of a leak acts as an addi-  
 194 tional demand node in the system, leading to inconsistencies among measurements  
 195 and estimated variables: readings from metering devices are altered by the loss of  
 196 water, whereas the estimated variables are the result of minimising the difference be-  
 197 tween measurements and estimates while also taking into account the flow governing  
 198 equations specified in (2)-(6). Therefore, when there is a loss of water, the result-  
 199 ing objective function is abnormally large, and so are the normalised state estimation  
 200 residuals. In other words, a leak can be sensed by either: (1) subjecting the estimated  
 201 objective function  $\hat{J}$  to a chi-squared statistic test (Eq. (7)), which is analogous to bad  
 202 data detection, or (2) assessing the deviation of normalised residuals obtained with  
 203 Eq. (8), which is analogous to bad data identification.

204 As mentioned before, the detection phase is normally carried out prior to the iden-  
 205 tification process. The purpose of this strategy is to skip the second step according to  
 206 the results of the first one, thus minimising the computational expense. However, as  
 207 both analyses are independent, they may not always be consistent with each other: for  
 208 example, the test described in Eq. (7) can indicate that leakage does not exist while  
 209 the second analysis shows there is a loss of water due to the existence of abnormally  
 210 large residuals. This is because the detection phase is normally a poorer indicator  
 211 due to the reliance on an aggregate value of the WLS, i.e. the objective function. For  
 212 this reason, in this paper residual analysis is used straight away to detect leakage, i.e.  
 213 each measurement normalised residual is subjected to a test rather than the objective  
 214 function on its own. This is sustained by the fact that leaks affect the estimation of  
 215 not only the flow measurements nearby, but also the remaining hydraulic variables  
 216 (i.e. head levels) in the system. Note that we assume that the hydraulic problem set  
 217 out in Eqs. (2)-(6) has been previously calibrated, i.e. it includes background leak-  
 218 age. Hence, only pipe bursts or other events that induce abnormal pressure or flow  
 219 variations with respect to the calibrated model can be detected with the methodol-  
 220 ogy presented hereafter. This brings out the importance of periodic calibration of  
 221 hydraulic models [14].

### 222 3 Probabilistic leak detectability assessment via state estimation

223 In this section, a new probabilistic methodology for prior leak detectability assess-  
 224 ment is provided. This approach works with mean metered values and the measurement-  
 225 estimate joint covariance matrix to cover all likely perturbations of state estimation  
 226 normalised residuals. On this basis the probability of leak detection according to the  
 227 limit state equations can be calculated. Hence, there are three main blocks in this sec-  
 228 tion: firstly, the construction process of the measurement-estimate joint covariance  
 229 matrix is presented. Secondly, the limit state equations inferred from the largest nor-  
 230 malised residual test to detect leakage are put together. Finally, the probability of leak  
 231 detection is computed based on the previous information.

#### 232 3.1 Computation of the joint bivariate covariance matrix

233 The traditional largest normalised residual test can be used to identify leaks by re-  
 234 lying on computation of normalised residuals according to Eq. (8), which considers  
 235 isolated values of measurements  $z_i$  and their corresponding estimated variables  $\hat{z}_i$ .  
 236 However, readings from metering devices are subject to noise. Note that so far, we  
 237 have been talking about realizations of such variables, i.e. particular sets of readings  
 238 from a measurement device  $i$ . Nevertheless, the objective of this paper is to compute  
 239 the probability of leak detection by analysing a single hydraulic state, i.e. one time  
 240 period, rather than undertaking sampling experiments of a large number of realiza-  
 241 tions. Therefore, from now on it is necessary to work with random variables  $Z_i$  and  
 242  $\hat{Z}_i$  rather than with individual variable realizations  $z_i$  and  $\hat{z}_i$ . Thus, a  $2 \times 2$  variance-  
 243 covariance matrix  $C_{Z, \hat{Z}}^{(i)}$  can be built for each measurement  $i$  as follows:

$$C_{Z, \hat{Z}}^{(i)} = \begin{bmatrix} C_Z^{(i)} & C_{Z, \hat{Z}}^{(i)} \\ C_{\hat{Z}, Z}^{(i)} & C_{\hat{Z}}^{(i)} \end{bmatrix}; \forall i = 1, \dots, m. \quad (10)$$

244 In this expression,  $C_Z^{(i)}$  refers to the variance of measurement  $i$ , i.e. diagonal compo-  
 245 nent of matrix  $C_Z$ . Component  $C_{\hat{Z}}^{(i)}$  represents the variance of the estimated variable,  
 246 which can be obtained by propagating measurement uncertainty with the First-Order  
 247 Second-Moment method as shown by [12]. The crossed component or covariance  
 248  $C_{\hat{Z}, Z}^{(i)}$  can similarly be obtained from the corresponding matrix among:

$$C_{\hat{Z}_x, Z_x} = S_{xz} C_Z, \quad (11)$$

$$C_{\hat{Z}_Q, Z_Q} = H_Q C_{\hat{Z}_x, Z_x}, \quad (12)$$

$$C_{\hat{Z}_q, Z_q} = H_q C_{\hat{Z}_x, Z_x}, \quad (13)$$

251 where  $H_Q$  and  $H_q$  correspond to the rows related to flows and demand values in the  
 252 measurement Jacobian matrix  $H$ , respectively.

253 Once all required matrices have been computed, it is straightforward to extract  
 254 the components that correspond to measurement and estimated variable  $i$ . Hence, its  
 255 variance-covariance matrix (10) can be built immediately. It must be noted that each

256 of these variance-covariance matrices contains all the possible perturbations that can  
 257 be induced to the state estimate  $\hat{Z}_i$  as a result of measurement noise in  $Z_i$ . This  
 258 approach represents a step forward with respect to the traditional largest normalised  
 259 residual test, which only evaluates the normalised residual for the measurement value  
 260 rather than considering all likely perturbations.

### 261 3.2 Limit state equations

262 As commented before, the largest normalised residual test is based on comparing the  
 263 normalised residual of each measurement with a chosen threshold. According to Eq.  
 264 (8),  $z_i$ ,  $\hat{z}_i$  and  $\Omega_{ii}$  must be known to compute residuals, but an implicit relationship  
 265 (9) exists between  $\Omega$  and the state estimation solution. As readings from metering  
 266 devices are not expected to produce gross errors, it has been tested numerically that  
 267  $\Omega$  does not vary considerably with noise (see Hanoi case study for details). Thus,  
 268 this matrix can be computed only for the mean value of the measurements and be  
 269 considered constant here. Thanks to this assumption, we can derive from Eq. (8) that  
 270 an estimated variable  $\hat{z}_i$  indicates the existence of leakage when it falls out of the  
 271 confidence intervals around the metered variable  $z_i$ :

$$\hat{z}_i \geq z_i + \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}}; \forall i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (14)$$

$$\hat{z}_i \leq z_i - \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}}; \forall i = 1, \dots, m. \quad (15)$$

### 273 3.3 Probability of leak detection

274 According to limit state equations (14) and (15), leaks can be detected by comparing  
 275 the result of an estimated variable  $\hat{z}_i$  and its measured value  $z_i$ ;  $\forall i = 1, \dots, m$ . Note  
 276 that both measurements  $Z_i$  and estimations  $\hat{Z}_i$  are random variables, and therefore  
 277 the probability of leak detection is as follows:

$$\text{Prob} \left\{ \left[ \hat{Z}_i \geq Z_i + \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}} \right] \cup \left[ \hat{Z}_i \leq Z_i - \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}} \right] \right\} \quad (16)$$

278 Means ( $\mu_{Z_i}$  and  $\mu_{\hat{Z}_i}$ ) and variance-covariance matrix ( $C_{Z, \hat{Z}}^{(i)}$ ) of these random  
 279 variables can be easily determined. On the one hand, as this methodology evalu-  
 280 ates the viability of detecting leaks according to the available metering devices by  
 281 analysing a snapshot of the system, the mean value of measurements  $\mu_{Z_i}$  is consid-  
 282 ered to be equal to the value of such variables in the flow network solution associated  
 283 with the selected operating condition and including the artificial presence of the leak.  
 284 Then, the associated  $\mu_{\hat{Z}_i}$  can be obtained by solving the state estimation problem  
 285 for the mean value of measurements  $\mu_{Z_i}$ . On the other hand, the variance-covariance  
 286 matrix for each measurement  $i$  can be obtained from Eq. (10).

287 This information enables the associated measurement-estimate probability den-  
 288 sity function to be plotted in a  $z_i$ - $\hat{z}_i$  space, whose contours are shown in Figure 1a.



289 Additionally, limit state equations (14) and (15) are represented in this figure: Eq.  
 290 (14) corresponds to the shaded grey area above line  $LSE_{i1}$ , and Eq. (15) is related  
 291 to the shaded grey area below line  $LSE_{i2}$ . Therefore, the probability of detecting a  
 292 leak for a measurement  $i$  ( $P_{detect_i}$ ;  $\forall i = 1, \dots, m$ ,) is equal to the probability that  
 293 random variables  $Z_i$  and  $\hat{Z}_i$  hold limit state equations (14)-(15), as described in Eq.  
 294 (16). Thus, this probability can be computed by integrating the joint probability density  
 295 function of both random variables over the grey region.

296 Starting with  $LSE_{i1}$ , the probability of random variables  $(Z_i, \hat{Z}_i)$  being above  
 297 that line (i.e. holding to Eq. (14)) can be calculated with well-known First-Order  
 298 Second-Moment structural reliability methods. According to [20], the probability of  
 299 being above that line can be obtained by using expression  $\Phi(\beta_{i1})$ , where  $\Phi$  repre-  
 300 sents the normal distribution function and  $\beta_{i1}$  is the so called reliability index, which  
 301 corresponds to the minimum distance between the centre of the joint bivariate proba-  
 302 bility density function  $(\mu_{Z_i}, \mu_{\hat{Z}_i})$  and line  $LSE_{i1}$  [25]. Note that line  $LSE_{i1}$  is equal  
 303 to constraint (14) but uses an equality. Similarly, the probability that Eq. (15) holds  
 304 can be calculated from the distance between  $LSE_{i2}$  ( $\beta_{i2}$ ) and the normal distribution  
 305 function. Therefore, the problem of calculating the probability of detection reduces  
 306 to calculating distances  $\beta_{i1}$  and  $\beta_{i2}$ . According to [20],  $\beta_{ij}$ ;  $\forall i = 1, \dots, m$ ;  $\forall j = 1, 2$   
 307 can be invariantly defined for each limit state equation as:

$$\beta_{ij} = \text{Min}_{z_i, \hat{z}_i} \sqrt{\begin{pmatrix} z_i - \mu_{Z_i} \\ \hat{z}_i - \mu_{\hat{Z}_i} \end{pmatrix}^T \mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{Z}, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}}^{(i)-1} \begin{pmatrix} z_i - \mu_{Z_i} \\ \hat{z}_i - \mu_{\hat{Z}_i} \end{pmatrix}} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{subject to} \\ \hat{z}_i = z_i + \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}} \quad \text{if } j = 1 \\ \hat{z}_i = z_i - \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}} \quad \text{if } j = 2 \end{array} \right\} \forall i = 1, \dots, m; \forall j = 1, 2. \quad (17)$$


308 This system of equations could be solved more straightforwardly if the original  $z_i$ - $\hat{z}_i$   
 309 space was converted to a standard normal space  $y_{i1}, y_{i2}$  [26] through the orthogonal  
 310 transformation:

$$\begin{bmatrix} z_i \\ \hat{z}_i \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \mu_{Z_i} \\ \mu_{\hat{Z}_i} \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{L} \begin{bmatrix} y_{i1} \\ y_{i2} \end{bmatrix}, \quad (18)$$

311 with  $\mathbf{L}$  being the lower triangular matrix from Cholesky decomposition of the measurement-  
 312 estimate variance-covariance matrix  $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{Z}, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}}^{(i)}$ ;  $\forall i = 1, \dots, m$ . Using (18), problem (17)  
 313 can be rewritten as follows:

$$\beta_{ij} = \text{Min}_{y_{i1}, y_{i2}} \sqrt{\begin{pmatrix} y_{i1} \\ y_{i2} \end{pmatrix}^T \begin{pmatrix} y_{i1} \\ y_{i2} \end{pmatrix}} \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{subject to} \\ y_{i2} - \left( \frac{l_{22}}{l_{11}} + \frac{l_{21}}{l_{11}} \right) y_{i1} = l_{22} \left[ \mu_{Z_i} - \mu_{\hat{Z}_i} + \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}} \right] \quad \text{if } j = 1 \\ y_{i2} - \left( \frac{l_{22}}{l_{11}} + \frac{l_{21}}{l_{11}} \right) y_{i1} = l_{22} \left[ \mu_{Z_i} - \mu_{\hat{Z}_i} - \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}} \right] \quad \text{if } j = 2 \end{array} \right\} \forall i = 1, \dots, m; \forall j = 1, 2, \quad (19)$$

314 where  $l_{ij}$  refers to  $\mathbf{L}^{-1}$  matrix components. Note that in the standard normal random  
 315 space, the reliability index corresponds to the minimum Euclidean distance between  
 316 the origin and the limit state equation, as shown in Figure 1b.



**Fig. 1** Graphic illustration of measurement-estimate joint probability density function and limit state equations (LSE) for a measurement  $i$ : a) original space, b) standard normal space


317 Problem (19) can be solved analytically, with  $\beta_{i_1}$  and  $\beta_{i_2}$  being the respective  
318 distances:

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \beta_{i_j} &= \sqrt{\frac{a_0^2}{a_1^2 + a_2^2}}, \\ \text{with} \\ a_0 &= -l_{22} \left[ \mu_{Z_i} - \mu_{\hat{Z}_i} + \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}} \right]; & \text{if } j = 1 \\ a_0 &= -l_{22} \left[ \mu_{Z_i} - \mu_{\hat{Z}_i} - \Phi^{-1} \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2} \right) \sqrt{\Omega_{ii}} \right]; & \text{if } j = 2 \\ a_1 &= - \left( \frac{l_{22}}{l_{11}} + \frac{l_{21}}{l_{11}} \right) \\ a_2 &= 1; \end{aligned} \right\} \forall i = 1, \dots, m; \forall j = 1, 2. \quad (20)$$

319 Once the distances to both  $LSE_{i_1}$  and  $LSE_{i_2}$  have been computed, it is only a  
320 matter of combining them with the normal distribution function to obtain the proba-  
321 bility of detection. In order to compute  $P_{detect_i}$ ;  $\forall i = 1, \dots, m$ , three scenarios must  
322 be distinguished to cover all the possible relative positions of the limit state equations  
323 with respect to the joint bivariate distribution (see Figure 2). For each of these cases,  
324 the probability of leak detection (Eq. (16)) can be computed as:

$$P_{detect_i} = \left\{ \begin{aligned} 1 - [\Phi(\beta_{i_2}) - \Phi(\beta_{i_1})] &= 1 - \Phi(\beta_{i_2}) + \Phi(\beta_{i_1}) & \text{if Case a)} \\ 1 - [\Phi(-\beta_{i_2}) - \Phi(-\beta_{i_1})] &= 1 + \Phi(\beta_{i_2}) - \Phi(\beta_{i_1}) & \text{if Case b)} \\ 1 - [\Phi(\beta_{i_2}) - \Phi(-\beta_{i_1})] &= 2 - \Phi(\beta_{i_2}) - \Phi(\beta_{i_1}) & \text{if Case c)} \end{aligned} \right\}; \forall i = 1, \dots, m, \quad (21)$$

325 Note that the joint bivariate distribution can be seen as a normal distribution whose  
326 axis is perpendicular to the limit state equations and passes through the origin. It must  
327 be noted that this procedure enables the probability of detecting a given leak located  
328 at a specific node to be computed according to each of the  $m$  available measurements  
329  $i$  ( $P_{detect_i}$ ;  $\forall i = 1, \dots, m$ ). Hence, the maximum value of this probability determines  
330 the overall network probability of detection ( $P_{detect}$ ) for a specific magnitude of leak  
331 at that location considering the existing measurement setting and the selected flow  
332 scenario, i.e.  $P_{detect} = \max(P_{detect_i}; \forall i = 1, \dots, m)$ .



**Fig. 2** Relative positions of the limit state equations (LSE) with respect to the centre of the joint bivariate distribution in the standard normal space: cases a, b and c

333 Finally, note that once  $P_{detect}$  is obtained, the user should define the admissible  
 334 threshold for leakage detection ( $P_{lim}$ ), which is the likelihood above which it can  
 335 be said that the leak is noticed. For example, there could be considered to be a leak  
 336 when there is a probability of detection greater than 80%. We believe that this is a  
 337 reasonable value, as in water transport networks demand values are expected to be  
 338 measured reasonably well and the likelihood of positive or false scenarios occurring  
 339 is not that high. In any case, if this limit is increased, only greater values of leak will  
 340 be detected at the leaking position; however, if this limit is reduced, lower values of  
 341 leak could be identified but there will be a higher risk of false positive or false nega-  
 342 tive scenarios occurring. This demonstrates the importance of selecting a reasonable  
 343 detection threshold for the water transport network under consideration.

#### 344 4 Minimum leak assessment

345 The aforementioned procedure for leak detectability assessment could also be used  
 346 to test the overall response of a water system to leak detection, i.e. so as to plot  
 347 the minimum leak that could be detected in different parts of the network with the  
 348 available measurement setting and for a given operating condition. Note that the aim  
 349 of the approach presented in this paper is to assess the leak detection possibilities  
 350 of the system on the basis of the largest normalised residual test beforehand, and  
 351 estimating the minimum leak that could be sensed in different parts of the network  
 352 gives an idea of how well-prepared the system is for on-line detection according to  
 353 the available instrumentation and detection strategy assumed.

354 As schematically described in Figure 3, this application requires evaluation of  
 355 leak detectability at each of the nodes in the system, one at a time. Once a node has  
 356 been selected, the leak value at the node has to be initialised in order to artificially  
 357 simulate the occurrence of a leak. This can be done by increasing its demand. Leaks  
 358 could alternatively have been divided at the two end nodes of a pipe, but this would  
 359 still be a simplification that would not preserve the energy balance equation of pipes  
 360 and could lead to head loss errors [17]. For this reason, we have simplified the prob-  
 361 lem by concentrating water loss at one node of the system at a time. Then, the flow  
 362 network solution is computed. Note that, as mentioned before, the solution of the flow  
 363 network represents the mean value of the measurements when the system is leaking


364 ( $\mu_{Z_i}$ ). Therefore, state estimation can be undertaken (e.g. via mathematical program-  
 365 ming) considering the values obtained from the flow network solution as metered  
 366 variables. Subsequently, the probability of leak detection  $P_{detect}$  is obtained from the  
 367 limit state equations and the measurement-estimate joint bivariate distribution at the  
 368 standard normal space, as commented before. If this probability is above the assumed  
 369  $P_{lim}$ , the leak value has to be reduced in order to approach the minimum leak value.  
 370 However, if the probability is below  $P_{lim}$  the leak value has to be increased in order  
 371 to better adjust the minimum value. In this paper, the leak value is updated according  
 372 to the bisection method [4] up to  $P_{detect} = P_{lim}$  with a given tolerance. When this  
 373 probability of detection is obtained, the leak is considered to be the minimum leak  
 374 value for the node under study, and we can proceed with the next junction.

375 Implementation of this process enables a map to be plotted that shows leak de-  
 376 tectability within the system, thus intuitively providing an insight of where to locate  
 377 additional metering devices to enhance network performance in terms of leak detec-  
 378 tion, as will be shown in the case study. Note that this approach provides probabilistic  
 379 information about how the different parts of the network behave in terms of leakage  
 380 detection, but only mean values are assessed because metered values correspond to  
 381 the flow network solution. As commented before, this analysis allows planners to  
 382 evaluate the capability of the largest normalised residual test to detect leaks in real-  
 383 time, i.e. considering the state estimation solution when online readings from meter-  
 384 ing devices are gathered.

## 385 5 Case study: Hanoi Network

386 The Hanoi network presented by [16] has been used in this paper as a case study.  
 387 More specifically, the modified version presented by [12], which considers nodes 3,  
 388 16, 23 and 25 as transit nodes or nodes with null consumption, has been adopted here  
 389 (see Figure 4) in order to introduce some hydraulic constraints for the computation  
 390 of  $\Omega$ . Therefore, in this particular case study we work with a head level vector  $\mathbf{x} =$   
 391  $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{32})$ , a water demand vector  $\mathbf{q} = (q_1, q_2, \dots, q_{32})$  and a flow vector  
 392  $\mathbf{Q} = (Q_{1-2}, Q_{2-3}, \dots, Q_{25-32})$ . Appendix S1 gathers the specific components of  
 393 such vectors for this particular example.

394 Regarding the measurement configuration, we assume that the modified Hanoi  
 395 network is a water transport network: water consumption is metered at all demand  
 396 nodes, as is likely to be the case if they were DMAs in a sectorised water system.  
 397 Also, the water level at the tank ( $x_1$ ) is measured. Note that these settings ensure the  
 398 system is observable [11]. Moreover, two different scenarios that consider different  
 399 sets of additional redundant devices are evaluated in this paper: (1) a pressure meter  
 400 at node 30 ( $x_{30}$ ), i.e. one degree of redundancy exists, and (2) pressure meters at  
 401 nodes  $x_9$ ,  $x_{18}$  and  $x_{30}$ , and flow meters at pipes  $Q_{3-4}$  and  $Q_{23-24}$ , i.e. five degrees  
 402 of redundancy exist. Table 1 gathers the measurements included in each of these  
 403 settings. In both scenarios all measurements are assumed to be independent, which  
 404 is reasonable as all are readings from metering devices. In this paper, we assume  
 405 that flow meters are subjected to standard deviation  $\sigma_q = 2\%q$  or  $\sigma_Q = 2\%Q$ ,  
 406 depending on whether they measure demand values or flows, with  $q$  and  $Q$  equal to




**Fig. 3** Flow chart for minimum leak assessment

407 the value of these variables according to the flow network solution when the leakage  
 408 is included. Note that the flow network solution must be computed considering extra  
 409 demand in the leaking node, but the metered demand at the leaking node itself must  
 410 be the original value (see Appendix S2 for details). This is because leakage takes  
 411 place in the water transport network, but the flow meter at the DMA remains unaware  
 412 of its existence. Similarly, pressure meters are associated with  $\sigma_x = 0.01$  bar and  
 413 water level meters are subjected to  $\sigma_x = 0.01$  m, which are typical values for current  
 414 instrumentation. Regarding operating conditions, we assume average demand values,  
 415 which correspond to those included in Appendix S1.

416 Once both measurement scenarios have been explained, the aforementioned method-  
 417 ologies are applied. Firstly, the probabilistic leak assessment proposed in this work

**Table 1** Measurement scenarios for Hanoi network case study


Measurement scenario	Pressure meters	Flow meters	Demand meters
One degree of redundancy	$x_1, x_{30}$	-	All nodes
Five degrees of redundancy	$x_1, x_9, x_{18}, x_{30}$	$Q_{3-4}, Q_{23-24}$	All nodes

**Fig. 4** Case study: Hanoi network

418 is used to test if a specific leak value could be detected when one or five degrees of  
 419 redundancy exist in the system. Then, the minimum leak assessment is carried out  
 420 for the same settings. The confidence level is assumed to be 95% ( $\alpha = 0.05$ ) and the  
 421 probability threshold is considered to be  $P_{lim} = 0.8$  all along.

#### 422 5.1 Probabilistic leak detectability assessment

423 In this part of the paper, the probability of detecting a  $200 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$  leak occurring at  
 424 node 6 is assessed with the two measurement settings previously described. Note that  
 425 this value corresponds to water loss of approximately 1% of the total system inflow,  
 426 which is reasonable for a network such as this. The probability of leak detection is  
 427 computed with both the method presented in this paper and the largest normalised  
 428 residual test considering a Monte Carlo sampling of 1000 measurement configura-  
 429 tions. Note that the Monte Carlo simulation fundamentally consists in applying the  
 430 largest normalised residual test 1000 times: for each measurement configuration, nor-  
 431 malised residuals must be computed according to Eq. (8) and compared with the  
 432 specified threshold  $\Phi^{-1}(1 - \frac{\alpha}{2})$ . The probability of detection is computed by count-  
 433 ing the number of measurement configurations that lead to residuals greater than the  
 434 threshold.



**Fig. 5** Measurement-estimate joint probability density function ( $f$ ) and limit state equations (LSE) for measurement  $x_{30}$  when a  $200 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$  leak exists at node 6 in Hanoi network case study: a) original space, b) standard normal space

### 435 5.1.1 One degree of redundancy ( $x_{30}$ )


436 As explained before, in order to evaluate the probability of detecting a leak according  
 437 to the methodology presented in this paper, the joint bivariate covariance matrix must  
 438 be computed for all the measurements that exist in the system, i.e. head levels at nodes  
 439 1 and 30, and all water demand values. The covariance matrix for measurement  $x_{30}$   
 440 is provided by way of illustration:

$$C_{x_{30}, \hat{x}_{30}} = \begin{bmatrix} 0.0100 & 0.0095 \\ 0.0095 & 0.0095 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (22)$$

441 This matrix has been obtained by selecting the convenient rows and columns from  
 442 covariance matrices of the metered and estimated variables. Note that element (1, 1)  
 443 corresponds to the measurement variance, which is here assumed to be  $(0.1 \text{ m})^2$  for  
 444 pressure meters. However, element (2, 2) shows the variance of the estimated vari-  
 445 able, which is lower than the previous one because it refers to the result of the optimi-  
 446 sation problem (1)-(6). Element (1, 2) is equal to element (2, 1), and they show that a  
 447 correlation  $\rho = 0.9763$  exists between measurement  $x_{30}$  and its estimated value  $\hat{x}_{30}$ .

448 Once the joint covariance matrix is obtained, the measurement-estimate joint  
 449 probability density function can be plotted as in Figure 5a. Also, limit state equa-  
 450 tions can be derived and represented in the  $x_{30} - \hat{x}_{30}$  space. As this figure shows,  
 451 most of the joint distribution lies within the space between the two limit state equa-  
 452 tions, thus the associated probability of leak detection is low. In order to quantify this  
 453 probability, the joint distribution and the limit state equations are transformed to a  
 454 standard normal space, where  $\beta_{x_{30},1} = 0.2085$  and  $\beta_{x_{30},2} = 3.7115$  according to Eq.  
 455 (20). Bearing in mind that limit state equations are at each side of the origin (case  
 456 c in Eq. (21)), the probability of detecting a leak based on measurement  $x_{30}$  can be  
 457 calculated as  $P_{detect,x_{30}} = 2 - \Phi(\beta_{x_{30},2}) - \Phi(\beta_{x_{30},1}) = 0.4175$ .

458 Nevertheless, there are 28 measurements more that must undergo the same anal-  
 459 ysis. Table 2 shows the probability of leak detection based on each of the available



**Fig. 6** Histogram of the relative error in the computation of the  $\Omega$  matrix in the 1000 Monte Carlo experiment with respect to the mean matrix assumed for the proposed methodology: one degree of redundancy

460 measurements according to the methodology presented in this paper and the largest  
 461 normalised residual test considering a Monte Carlo sampling of 1000 measurement  
 462 configurations. Results prove that the new approach provides a good approximation  
 463 while considerably reducing the computational time: 5.1 s are required to compute all  
 464  $P_{detect_i}$  measurements with the new methodology, whereas 2920.0 s are needed for  
 465 the largest normalised residual test simulation in a MatLab 7.12.0 (R2011a) 64-bits  
 466 version and a 23.3 GAMS 64-bits version when run in an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700  
 467 CPU 3.40 GHz 16 GB RAM desktop computer. Moreover, Figure 6 provides the  
 468 relative error of the elements in the diagonal of the  $\Omega$  matrix in the 1000 simulations  
 469 with respect to the mean value used in the methodology put forward (gathered in  
 470 Appendix S2). This figure shows that the relative error remains relatively low, thus  
 471 validating the assumption of a constant  $\Omega$  for the probabilistic assessment presented  
 472 here.

473 Finally, the probability of detection in the whole network can be obtained as  
 474 the maximum value of the probabilities obtained for each measurement:  $P_{detect} =$   
 475  $\max(P_{detect_i}; \forall i = 1, \dots, m) = 0.4185$  for the proposed approach and  $P_{detect} =$   
 476  $\max(P_{detect_i}; \forall i = 1, \dots, m) = 0.4010$  for the largest normalised residual test  
 477 Monte Carlo sampling. Note that in this case the probabilities of detection for all  
 478 measurements are very similar with both methods because of low redundancy, but  
 479 greater variability will be obtained when more meters are added. In any case, as this  
 480 probability  $P_{detect} \approx 0.4$  is below  $P_{lim} = 0.8$ , it can be concluded that it is not  
 481 possible to detect the leak with the available measurement setting.



**Table 2** Probability of detection based on all available measurements when a 200 m<sup>3</sup>/h leak exists at node 6 in Hanoi network case study: one degree of redundancy

Measurement	Proposed methodology	Largest normalised residual test
	$P_{detect_i}$	$P_{detect_i}$
$x_{30}$	0.4175	0.3990
$x_1$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_2$	0.4166	0.3970
$q_4$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_5$	0.4170	0.3980
$q_6$	0.4162	0.3970
$q_7$	0.4184	0.4010
$q_8$	0.4179	0.3990
$q_9$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{10}$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{11}$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{12}$	0.4177	0.3990
$q_{13}$	0.4173	0.3980
$q_{14}$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{15}$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{17}$	0.4178	0.3990
$q_{18}$	0.4185	0.4010
$q_{19}$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{20}$	0.4166	0.3970
$q_{21}$	0.4176	0.3990
$q_{22}$	0.4174	0.3990
$q_{24}$	0.4172	0.3980
$q_{26}$	0.4167	0.3970
$q_{27}$	0.4176	0.3990
$q_{28}$	0.4174	0.3990
$q_{29}$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{30}$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{31}$	0.4175	0.3990
$q_{32}$	0.4171	0.3980


### 482 5.1.2 Five degrees of redundancy ( $x_9, x_{18}, x_{30}, Q_{3-4}, Q_{23-24}$ )

483 The same analysis is undertaken considering the five degrees of redundancy measure-  
484 ment setting. Table 3 provides the probability of detection for each measurement ac-  
485 cording to the methodology presented in this paper and the largest normalised resid-  
486 ual test with a Monte Carlo sampling of 1000 measurement configurations. Results  
487 prove that the new procedure provides a good approximation while significantly re-  
488 ducing the computational cost: 5.5 s are required to compute  $P_{detect}$  with the method-  
489 ology described herein whereas 2876.2 s are needed in the sampling approach. Note  
490 that the approximate probability of detection in both cases is  $P_{detect} \approx 0.8$ . These

**Table 3** Probability of detection based on all available measurements when a 200 m<sup>3</sup>/h leak exists at node 6 in Hanoi network case study: five degrees of redundancy

Measurement	Proposed methodology	Largest normalised residual test
	$P_{detect_i}$	$P_{detect_i}$
$x_9$	0.4193	0.4010
$x_{18}$	0.0503	0.0430
$x_{30}$	0.1103	0.0940
$x_1$	0.4565	0.4320
$Q_{3-4}$	0.0883	0.1020
$Q_{23-24}$	0.0527	0.0460
$q_2$	0.4551	0.4320
$q_4$	0.6796	0.6650
$q_5$	0.7882	0.7780
$q_6$	0.8156	0.7950
$q_7$	0.8170	0.7960
$q_8$	0.7831	0.7760
$q_9$	0.7432	0.7280
$q_{10}$	0.7608	0.7440
$q_{11}$	0.7608	0.7440
$q_{12}$	0.7610	0.7460
$q_{13}$	0.7605	0.7440
$q_{14}$	0.7713	0.7580
$q_{15}$	0.6614	0.6640
$q_{17}$	0.2670	0.2440
$q_{18}$	0.1541	0.1370
$q_{19}$	0.2890	0.2510
$q_{20}$	0.3616	0.3300
$q_{21}$	0.3624	0.3300
$q_{22}$	0.3621	0.3300
$q_{24}$	0.0838	0.0950
$q_{26}$	0.1479	0.1510
$q_{27}$	0.1862	0.1860
$q_{28}$	0.0792	0.0840
$q_{29}$	0.0500	0.0450
$q_{30}$	0.0558	0.0430
$q_{31}$	0.0545	0.0420
$q_{32}$	0.0531	0.0540

491 results prove that leakage awareness is possible in the Hanoi case study when more  
492 metering devices are included in the system. Also, Figure 7 shows that the  $\Omega$  error  
493 has decreased with the addition of metering devices, reinforcing the validity of the  
494 constant  $\Omega$  hypothesis.



**Fig. 7** Histogram of the relative error in the computation of the  $\Omega$  matrix in the 1000 Monte Carlo experiment with respect to the mean matrix assumed for the proposed methodology: five degrees of redundancy

## 495 5.2 Minimum leak assessment

496 In this section, the minimum leak that could be detected in different parts of the net-  
 497 work is identified for both measurement settings. Note that the process for assessing  
 498 minimum leaks (as described in Figure 3) fundamentally consists of repeating the  
 499 probabilistic leak detectability assessment set out for different leakage values until  
 500 the minimum is identified at every node of the system.

### 501 5.2.1 One degree of redundancy ( $x_{30}$ )


502 Table 4 shows the minimum leak that could be detected at each node and the asso-  
 503 ciated probability of detection once the algorithm for minimum leak assessment has  
 504 converged (i.e.  $P_{detect} \approx 0.8$ ) at all nodes. This information is also summarised in  
 505 Figure 8, which provides the interpolated map of minimum leaks throughout the sys-  
 506 tem. Note that nodes represent DMA themselves, which are connected to each other  
 507 by means of the water transport network, and the shadowed region represents the area  
 508 of each DMA. This figure shows that the values obtained are consistent with the mea-  
 509 surement distribution throughout the network: leakage of around  $80 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$  could be  
 510 detected in the surroundings of the redundant measurement  $x_{30}$ , but only major losses  
 511 could be noticed on the right-hand side of the system. Moreover, leakage could not be  
 512 sensed at all if it was happening at the branch that provides water from the tank. This  
 513 figure shows that additional meters should be placed on the right-hand side of the net-  
 514 work to improve absolute leak detectability in the system according to the selected  
 515 operating condition.

516 The previous figure can also be obtained in relative terms by working with the  
 517 minimum leak value divided by the maximum flow entering each node. Figure 9


**Table 4** Minimum detectable leaks in Hanoi network case study: one degree of redundancy

Leaking node	Minimum leak value (m <sup>3</sup> /h)	$P_{detect}$
2	-	0
3	386.7188	0.8006
4	367.1875	0.8043
5	343.7500	0.8048
6	320.3125	0.8033
7	316.4063	0.8071
8	287.1094	0.8034
9	267.5781	0.8041
10	253.9063	0.8042
11	253.9063	0.8042
12	253.9063	0.8041
13	253.9063	0.8042
14	234.3750	0.8055
15	201.1719	0.8039
16	185.5469	0.8008
17	230.4688	0.8067
18	289.0625	0.8040
19	347.6563	0.8049
20	304.6875	0.8048
21	304.6875	0.8048
22	304.6875	0.8048
23	187.5000	0.8074
24	149.4141	0.8038
25	131.8359	0.8040
26	154.2969	0.8009
27	161.1328	0.8040
28	151.3672	0.8032
29	100.5859	0.8051
30	75.1953	0.8017
31	78.1250	0.8043
32	109.3750	0.8042

518 shows the relative leak detectability map in the Hanoi case study with this one de-  
519 gree of redundancy measurement setting. It shows that on the lower right-hand side  
520 of the network there is better behaviour in terms of leakage awareness in this sce-  
521 nario, because even though the minimum leak that could be detected is greater when  
522 compared to the left-hand side (see Figure 8), the circulating flow is greater in this  
523 area (see Appendix S1). For this reason, around 20% relative leakage can be detected  
524 on the left-hand side, but this figure can fall to around 3% on the lower right-hand  
525 side. Therefore, additional meters should be added on the left-hand side of the sys-  
526 tem to improve relative leak detectability in the network based on the flow condition  
527 considered in the assessment.



**Fig. 8** Leak detectability map (in  $\text{m}^3/\text{h}$ ) for Hanoi network case study: one degree of redundancy



**Fig. 9** Relative leak detectability map (in %) for Hanoi network case study: one degree of redundancy

**Table 5** Minimum detectable leaks in Hanoi network case study: five degrees of redundancy

Leaking node	Minimum leak value (m <sup>3</sup> /h)	$P_{detect}$
2	-	0
3	279.2969	0.8051
4	250.0000	0.8048
5	230.4688	0.8044
6	197.2656	0.8065
7	187.5000	0.8044
8	142.5781	0.8028
9	115.2344	0.8011
10	127.9297	0.8034
11	127.9297	0.8034
12	127.9297	0.8034
13	127.9297	0.8034
14	144.5313	0.8022
15	187.5000	0.8041
16	187.5000	0.8014
17	160.1563	0.8044
18	121.0938	0.8018
19	201.1719	0.8057
20	253.9063	0.8006
21	253.9063	0.8006
22	253.9063	0.8006
23	154.2969	0.8018
24	125.9766	0.8037
25	116.2109	0.8065
26	146.4844	0.8057
27	156.2500	0.8058
28	123.0469	0.8022
29	74.7070	0.8028
30	51.7578	0.8060
31	54.1992	0.8041
32	87.8906	0.8059

528 *5.2.2 Five degrees of redundancy ( $x_9, x_{18}, x_{30}, Q_{3-4}, Q_{23-24}$ )*

529 Table 5, Figure 10 and Figure 11 provide the same information when more meters  
530 are added. Table 5 and Figure 10 show an improvement in the overall leak detection  
531 capability and it is possible to sense leaks of up to 51.76 m<sup>3</sup>/h on the left-hand side  
532 of the system, which is remarkable considering that the tank provides 17565 m<sup>3</sup>/h  
533 to the network. This improvement is also noticeable in relative terms (Figure 11). As  
534 before, these figures help to see where meters should be placed in order to reduce  
535 the absolute and relative leak detectability in the system for the specified operating  
536 condition and, hence, are a useful tool for practitioners.




Fig. 10 Leak detectability map (in  $\text{m}^3/\text{h}$ ) for Hanoi network case study: five degrees of redundancy




Fig. 11 Relative leak detectability map (in %) for Hanoi network case study: five degrees of redundancy

## 537 6 Discussion

538 The purpose of this section is to discuss the potential and limitations the methodology  
539 set out here has to carry out an assessment of a probabilistic leak detectability of a wa-  
540 ter supply system. As mentioned in the Introduction, the method put forward here has  
541 been specifically developed for water transport networks because these systems tend  
542 to be better metered than traditional water distribution systems. Note that identifying  
543 water transport pipelines may be complicated in some cases, but the International Wa-  
544 ter Association (IWA) recommends dividing water distribution systems into DMAs  
545 that must be connected to each other by means of water transport networks in order to  
546 better control water loss. Hence, modern water utilities are currently upgrading their  
547 systems to water transport network-DMA schemes, with DMA design itself being an  
548 active topic of research [10,33]. In general, at least one flow meter exists at the en-  
549 trance to each DMA in order to measure the amount of water being provided to each  
550 sector, and additional devices are progressively being included to better characterise  
551 water flow through the main arteries. Note that instrumentation enhancement is also  
552 taking place on a DMA scale thanks to the reduction in terms of cost of both pressure  
553 and flow instrumentation [21]. Even if some of these measurements fail (e.g. sensor  
554 failure, communication failure), pseudo measurements (i.e. estimations of demand  
555 based on historical records) could be used instead [38]. This would mean increasing  
556 uncertainty in the problem and hence, it would have an impact on the leak detection  
557 potential of the network, but the methodology shown here would still be suitable.

558 The availability of metering devices plays a crucial role when characterising wa-  
559 ter loss. If the number of meters were sufficient and not noisy, a simple water bal-  
560 ance could be applied. However, their inherent inaccuracy requires more sophisti-  
561 cated methods to take the effect of measurement noise into account. In this particular  
562 case, state estimation is used to provide the most likely hydraulic state of the sys-  
563 tem bearing in mind all the available measurements in the network. Note that state  
564 estimation techniques are required to process the on-line information provided nowa-  
565 days by telemetry systems, but despite their massive use in the power field they have  
566 hardly been implemented in the water industry. One of the reasons for this is that  
567 the leak detection problem, as well as calibration or topological analysis, have been  
568 addressed in isolation from the state estimation conception. This paper represents an  
569 effort to tackle one of these traditional water systems problems from the state estima-  
570 tion perspective, emphasizing the appeal of adopting a comprehensive state estima-  
571 tion approach to extract as much information as possible from the available on-line  
572 measurements in the network.

573 Nevertheless, due to the immaturity of real-time state estimation techniques in  
574 water systems at present, the methodology explained here is oriented towards assess-  
575 ing if it would be possible to obtain leakage information from state estimation results  
576 rather than providing a method already suitable for the on-line detection of leaks. As  
577 mentioned in the Introduction, many off-line state estimation approaches have been  
578 developed over the past 20-30 years, but such techniques have not been successfully  
579 implemented on-line. For this reason, the methodology presented here enables tests  
580 to be carried out to find if a specific leak value could be detected at a given location  
581 with the available measurement setting, but it does not assess on-line measurements



582 provided by telemetry systems. We believe that this prior analysis is essential to show  
583 water utilities and practitioners the genuine possibilities of detecting leakage based  
584 on state estimation results.

585 Moreover, the methodology explained herein can be used as the basis for optimal  
586 meter placement. Note that minimum leak value maps quickly show the regions of  
587 the network where there is less likelihood of noticing the loss of water, i.e. the regions  
588 of the network where more metering devices should be added. However, it must be  
589 stressed that the method shown at present provides clues but does not enable the most  
590 suitable location for additional metering devices to be identified systematically. This  
591 is because only one flow scenario has been considered in the case study for the prob-  
592 abilistic leak detectability assessment. However, water utilities are usually familiar  
593 with several normal operating scenarios in their networks and it is advisable to ap-  
594 ply this methodology to as many flow configurations as possible in order to further  
595 comprehend the leakage awareness capability of the existing measurement setting in  
596 different circumstances. For this reason, specific optimal meter placement schemes  
597 [24] based on state estimation are a subject for further research. In any case, the min-  
598 imum leak maps shown here are useful, because with them it can be determined if  
599 the available measurement setting is enough for the operating condition under con-  
600 sideration: if the minimum leak values are not within the desired levels, additional  
601 meters must be placed, but if they are, this analysis should encourage investors to  
602 implement state estimation techniques, which should in turn be adapted to detect and  
603 locate water loss in real time.

604 Note that adaption of state estimation techniques to the detection of leakage on-  
605 line is not straight forward. The same strategy of analysing state estimation residuals  
606 according to the largest normalised residual test can be used, but several operational  
607 aspects must be addressed first. To begin with, the method set out here to identify  
608 leaks is analogous to the traditional procedure for bad data identification, but bad  
609 measurements and leaks can coexist in real time and both should be addressed to  
610 ensure the tool is performing well. Also, the possibility of more than one leak occur-  
611 ring at the same time should be explored, as they may cancel each other out in some  
612 cases. For this reason, we believe that consideration of sequent hydraulic states (i.e.  
613 based on an extended period simulation) is essential for on-line detection, increas-  
614 ing the confidence in prediction. Similarly, other challenges associated with network  
615 modelling should be conveniently solved in order to develop a consistent real-time  
616 tool. In this regard, uncertain model parameters (e.g. pipe roughness coefficients),  
617 or unknown settings of valves should be conveniently adjusted before using state  
618 estimation to detect leaks in real-time. In other words, parameter estimation (i.e. cal-  
619 ibration) should periodically be undertaken to ensure the hydraulic model remains  
620 valid. Note that a deviation in, for example, pipe roughness coefficients could mask  
621 abnormally high residuals. In this respect, [2] and [29] have presented some work  
622 on the possible causes for bad data, with the latter having identified five possible  
623 types: measurement noise, meter semi-failure, meter total failure, parametric model  
624 failure, and topological model failure. Therefore, residual processing tools must also  
625 be adapted to identify leaks as an additional cause of bad data. For this reason, the  
626 methodology set out here is an initial approach to the leakage awareness problem via  
627 state estimation, but further research is required to develop a robust on-line tool.

628 Once these limitations have been addressed, a suitable platform for on-line detec-  
629 tion based on the largest normalised residual test could be used for detecting leaks in  
630 water systems. According to the analysis shown in this paper, this test has potential  
631 for identifying if there is any leakage, but the reality is that it may also give an idea  
632 of where water is being lost (i.e. leak localisation). Note that in Tables 4 and 5 only  
633  $P_{detect}$  is shown, but the locations at which the maximum of  $P_{detect_i}; \forall i = 1, \dots, m$   
634 is attained are also important. High detection probabilities are the result of high resid-  
635 uals, which in turn correspond to great differences between measurements and esti-  
636 mated variables. Table 6 ranks the top five measurements associated with the greatest  
637 detection probabilities in the minimum leak assessment analysis of the previous case  
638 study when one and five degrees of redundancy exist. Results show that with one  
639 degree of redundancy, information cannot be extracted about the approximate loca-  
640 tion of the leak. However, the measurement set associated with greater probabilities  
641 of detection varies with the location of the leak when there are five redundant mea-  
642 surements. For example, measurements  $h_1, q_2, q_{19}, q_{21}$  and  $q_{22}$  are associated with  
643 the greatest detection probabilities when the leak is artificially simulated at node 3,  
644 whereas measurements  $q_{32}, q_{31}, q_{30}, q_{29}$  and  $q_{26}$  are selected when the leak is simu-  
645 lated at node 32. Therefore, it can be concluded that when sufficient redundant mea-  
646 surements exist, the largest normalised residual test also has potential to give an idea  
647 of where water loss is taking place. This fact, together with a systematic assessment  
648 of how the remaining hydraulic variables evolve over time, must be explored in order  
649 to set up a consistent methodology for leak localisation, which is beyond the scope  
650 of this paper. Furthermore, leak information could be used as an input for reliability  
651 assessment [18], which is an ongoing topic of research in the field [32, 19].

## 652 7 Conclusions

653 In this paper, a new methodology for probabilistic leak detectability assessment is  
654 set out. This approach consists in analysing state estimation normalised residuals for  
655 a particular hydraulic state in the system, which are likely to be high when notice-  
656 able leakage exists. The procedure presented herein is conceived as a previous step  
657 that enables assessment of the extent to which leakage could be sensed in subsequent  
658 state estimation stage with the available noisy measurements. The probability of leak  
659 detection is calculated here considering the measurement-estimate joint bivariate dis-  
660 tribution rather than undertaking sampling experiments (i.e. Monte Carlo method)  
661 with the traditional largest normalised residual test, which is time-consuming. Addi-  
662 tionally, a procedure is shown to estimate the minimum leak that could be detected in  
663 different parts of the network at a later stage of state estimation.

664 The potential of this methodology is set out by means of a case study, which cor-  
665 responds to a water transport network due to the better level of instrumentation of  
666 such networks in comparison with conventional water distribution systems. Results  
667 show that this alternative approach for computing the probability of leak detection  
668 provides sound approximation and is computationally much faster than the sampling  
669 procedure. Moreover, minimum leak value maps provide a fair overview of the sys-

**Table 6** Ranking of top five measurements associated with the highest probabilities of detection in the minimum leak assessment for Hanoi network case study

Leaking node	Set of 5 measurements with greatest $P_{detect_i}$	
	One degree of redundancy	Five degrees of redundancy
2	-	-
3	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$h_1, q_2, q_{19}, q_{21}, q_{22}$
4	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_4, q_5, q_6, q_7, h_1$
5	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_5, q_6, q_4, q_7, q_8$
6	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_7, q_6, q_5, q_8, q_{14}$
7	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_7, q_6, q_8, q_{14}, q_{12}$
8	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_8, q_{12}, q_{10}, q_{11}, q_{13}$
9	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_9, q_{12}, q_{10}, q_{11}, q_{13}$
10	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{12}, q_{10}, q_{11}, q_{13}, q_{14}$
11	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{12}, q_{10}, q_{11}, q_{13}, q_{14}$
12	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{12}, q_{10}, q_{11}, q_{13}, q_{14}$
13	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{12}, q_{10}, q_{11}, q_{13}, q_{14}$
14	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{14}, q_{12}, q_{10}, q_{11}, q_{13}$
15	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{15}, q_{14}, q_5, q_6, q_7$
16	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{15}, q_{27}, q_{26}, q_{21}, q_{22}$
17	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{17}, q_{19}, q_{18}, h_1, q_2$
18	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{18}, q_{19}, q_{17}, h_{18}, h_1$
19	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{19}, q_{18}, q_{17}, h_1, q_2$
20	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{21}, q_{22}, q_{20}, h_1, q_2$
21	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{21}, q_{22}, q_{20}, h_1, q_2$
22	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{21}, q_{22}, q_{20}, h_1, q_2$
23	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{28}, q_{29}, q_{21}, q_{22}, q_{20}$
24	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{24}, q_{26}, q_{27}, q_{32}, q_{31}$
25	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{26}, q_{32}, q_{27}, q_{24}, q_{31}$
26	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{27}, q_{26}, q_{24}, q_{32}, q_{15}$
27	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{27}, q_{26}, q_{24}, q_{32}, q_{15}$
28	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{28}, q_{29}, q_{31}, q_{30}, q_{32}$
29	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{29}, q_{31}, q_{30}, q_{32}, h_{30}$
30	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{30}, q_{31}, q_{29}, q_{32}, h_{30}$
31	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{30}, q_{31}, q_{29}, q_{32}, h_{30}$
32	$q_{18}, q_7, q_8, q_{17}, q_{12}$	$q_{32}, q_{31}, q_{30}, q_{29}, q_{26}$

670 tem response in terms of leak detectability, and they constitute the foundation on  
 671 which optimal meter placement strategies can be based.

672 Also, adaption of the largest normalised residual test for use in leakage awareness  
 673 in real time is discussed. Several issues, such as the simultaneous presence of both  
 674 erroneous measurements and leaks, the existence of more than one leak at a time, or  
 675 consideration of parameter or topology uncertainty, must be addressed before using  
 676 the test for on-line leak detection. Nevertheless, this application shows the poten-  
 677 tial state estimation has for leak detection, which has been hardly explored to date.

Therefore, it should be used to motivate further research on state estimation related techniques applied to detecting leaks.

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