FEMINIST IMMANENT CRITIQUE: AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN BUTLER, OKSALA, AND DELEUZE

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Abstract

The guiding problem of the thesis is how to reconcile immanence with feminism through the development of the idea of *feminist immanent critique*. Beginning with Judith Butler's account of the constitution of gender through institutions, and the possibilities of its immanent subversion through a-subjective parodic politics, it is shown that this approach to the problem needs to be augmented by Johanna Oksala's investigation of the way in which the gap between experience and language serves to challenge conceptual schema that organise our experience of the world. However, it is argued that both Butler and Oksala end up reinstating a dogmatic image of the critical subject, although in different manners, thereby forestalling the search for a fully realised response to the problem of feminist immanent critique. Given the return of a dogmatic image of the critical subject, I turn to the most rigorous account of immanence in contemporary philosophy through a reconstruction of key aspects of the work of Gilles Deleuze, one that places ethics at the centre of his thought. It will be shown that the development of immanence with Deleuze provides an account of the subject that does not rely upon dogmatism or abstract from situated forms of social criticism but rather invites such engagement in ways that generate a fruitful encounter with feminism. As the argument is drawn together, it is concluded that feminist immanent critique is a positive conception of critique that requires careful consideration of the ways in which the subject is continually constituted, undone and reconstituted, without reinstating a dogmatic image of the critical subject. Feminist immanent critique embraces an asubjective and, therefore, demoralised version of becoming without losing ethical responsiveness to the present, to ourselves, and to others. That said, it is a positive conception of critique that does not reintroduce transcendence by surreptitiously relying upon a presentist view of time and, as such, it frees becoming from a sense of pre-given direction or telos.

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Introduction - Why feminist immanent critique?

This aim of this thesis is to develop a concept of *feminist immanent critique,* from Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble,* Johanna Oksala's *Feminist Experiences,* and several works of Deleuze.[1] While Oksala and Butler are openly involved in the project of feminist immanent critique, Deleuze is not. However, this is not to say that these concepts are absent from his work: Deleuze's whole oeuvre is dedicated to the development of immanence.[2] The concept of critique is also present in a few of his books;[3] and many of his ideas speak to feminist concerns.[4] So the project will involve the creative endeavour of assembling this concept inspired by Deleuze. By assembling I mean the process of putting together, and forming connections, between multiple heterogenous elements (Wise 2011: 91-92).[5] These connections are made without following a pre-determined path. So I did not know what the concept of feminist immanent critique would look like in advance. Furthermore, the unity or consistency that arises from this process is only temporary, since the nature of the concept would change if we added or removed elements (Roffe 2005: 177).[6] However, there is a problem that the project will have to confront. There seems to be a tension between immanence, which demands no pre-given interests (Smith 2012: 6), and feminism, which is usually conceived as an interest or an ideology. Therefore, the guiding problem of the thesis is how to reconcile the demands of immanence and the demands of feminism through the concept of feminist immanent critique. A key aspect of this problem is that by making immanent critique feminist, I am placing myself in a pre-established category (such as feminist or woman), without critically examining that position (at best), or precluding that category from being examined (at worst). Therefore, we need to find a way to establish the collectivity needed for feminism, without relying on identity. The following conclusion will be reached: feminist immanent critique is a

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[1] The main works used are the monographs on Nietzsche (1983) and Spinoza (1988, and 1990a), *Difference and Repetition* (1994)*,* and *The Logic of Sense* (1990b)*.* However, I also refer to other works to a lesser extent, including a few lectures, and some of his co-authored works with Félix Guattari such as *Anti-Oedipus* (1983).

[2] For an account of Deleuze's philosophy of immanence in relation to Deleuze's reformulation of Kant see Kerslake (2009).

[3] The concept of critique is present in two of the main books used in this project: *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition.*

[4] There are many works dedicated to clarifying and developing Deleuze's relation to feminism, which inspired this project. Including Stark (2017), Gilson (2011 and 2019), Braidotti (2012), and several chapters in Buchanan and Colebrook (2000).

[5] Deleuze introduced the concept *agencement,* which is translated as assemblage, in *A Thousand Plateaus.* For a further explanation of the concept see Wise (2011), Patton (2000), Roffe (2005), Buchanan (2015).

[6] As Roffe explains, there is a move away from essence and identity, in favour of how things function together (2005: 177). This will become more clear in chapter 3, when we talk about Deleuze's replacement of essence with power.

positive conception of critique that requires careful consideration of the ways in which the subject is continually constituted, undone and reconstituted, without reinstating a dogmatic image of the critical subject. Thereby, feminist immanent critique embraces an asubjective and, therefore, demoralised version of becoming without losing ethical responsiveness to the present, to ourselves, and to others. That said, it is a positive conception of critique that does not rely upon a presentist view of time, one that frees becoming from a sense of pre-given direction or telos. In order to understand this statement we need to highlight what this type of critique is not, and then this will give us a better idea of what it actually entails.

First, in order to maintain immanence, feminism cannot be associated with the identity of the subject. By this I mean two things in particular. First, there can be no claim about what it means to be a woman. As Butler (1999) and Oksala warn (2016), the problem of this is the exclusion of other expressions of gender that do not fit the category.[7] Second, critique cannot rely on a transcendental subject of reason (Kant). The problem of this subject, according to Deleuze, is that it reintroduces identity into the system, covering up how the subject is constituted by difference. Butler and Oksala also share the concern about explaining the constitution of the subject, although the three accounts are different. The second problem of the transcendental subject, according to Deleuze, is that it is based on the hierarchy of the mind over the body. Deleuze's main issue with this is the reintroduction of transcendence, or the inequality of being. However, this can be connected to feminism, because this hierarchy is associated with the subordination of women.[8]

The second requirement of feminist immanent critique is that it does not rely on transcendental norms, nor on normative criteria.[9] This does not mean that Butler and Oksala reject all norms. However, at least in *Gender Trouble* and *Feminist Experiences,* their version of critique is inspired by Foucault's method of genealogy, and it does not rely on norms, nor does it attempt to come up with normative criteria.[10] Instead, their aim is to provide an account of the constitution of gender, and the means for immanent resistance. Butler focuses on the institutions of compulsory heterosexuality and phallogocentrism, which can be resisted through different types of repetition such as parodic repetition. Oksala focuses on neoliberal governmentality, which can be resisted through a feminist politics of solidarity that is based on our shared feminist past. In the case of Deleuze, I will argue that his concept of critique is connected to ethics as an

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[7] For example, Butler (1999) is worried about the exclusion of women who have different sexual orientations, and Oksala (2016) is worried about the reification of one single experience of womanhood at the expense of others.

[8] For a further explanation of this see Spelman (1982). Furthermore, Stark explains the gendering of thought from a Deleuzian perspective (2017: chapter 1).

[9] For an example of immanent critique that does comes up with normative criteria see Azmanova (2012). Her critique draws from Critical Theory, while mine can be conceived as a post-structuralist form of critique.

[10] For an explanation of the debate between genealogy and critical theory see Ashenden and Owen (1999).

immanent evaluation of modes of existence that does not rely on transcendental norms.[11] One of the problems of transcendental norms is that they are connected to the hierarchy of the mind over the body, since the mind makes the body comply. In opposition to this, Deleuze argues that the body and the mind work in parallel fashion, and not in opposition to the other. Furthermore, in Deleuze critique is also connected to the ethical task of freeing becoming from pre-given models, such as gender categories (this is the demoralised version of becoming mentioned in the thesis statement).

Third, this type of critique can be distinguished from situated social criticism, which does not rely on philosophy.[12] As we will see, both Oksala and Deleuze define their projects as philosophical and metaphysical (Butler does not, and she avoids metaphysics). However, the problem is how to define both concepts. Neither Oksala or Deleuze's define philosophy as a transcendent discourse that articulates the validity of other discourses - this is the type of philosophy many feminists reject (such as Nicholson and Fraser) (Nicholson 1995: 7). Instead, Oksala defines feminist philosophy as a political form of social critique that wants to change the power relations that organise society in an unequal way for beings classified as women (2016: 3). To be more precise, feminist philosophy is involved in the task of analysing, exposing and criticising the way in which experience is organised by metaphysical conceptual schema (2016: 4). However, we need to clarify what Oksala means with metaphysics. She is not referring to the study of essences (Aristotle), nor the universal structures of cognition (Kant), but to '…historical and cultural presuppositions that mediate the way reality appears to us' (2016: 4-5), which can be slowly modified. In other words, metaphysics can be understood as a 'critical questioning of the historical conditions of possibility for our experience' (2016: 6). Oksala asserts that this is the paradox of immanent philosophy, the study needs to be transcendental (2016: 4). As we will see, Deleuze's philosophy also engages with metaphysics. Similarly to Oksala, his involvement with metaphysics is motivated by the question of change. However, as we will see, Deleuze provides a deeper analysis of the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental, which is guided by the question of finding the conditions of the new through a principle of difference. Furthermore, Deleuze's engagement with metaphysics is related to his concern to free becoming from the present, or what already exists in this world. However, as we will see, this does not mean that Deleuze wants to flee the world. The freeing of becoming is done in the name of new presents to come.

Fourth, feminist immanent critique cannot be individualist. Each thinker provides different reasons for this. Butler argues that we do not perform gender alone: 'One is always "doing" with or for another, even if the other is only imaginary' (2004a: 1). This implies that we cannot contest

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[11] Deleuze's position can be understood as a middle ground position between relativism, which would reject any form of evaluation, and strict moral universal norms that are transcendental.

[12] See the debate between Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib in *Feminist Contentions*. Benhabib contends that situated social criticism is not enough, because we need to distinguish between competing sets of narratives and discourses (1995: 28). On the other hand, Fraser argues that the practice of clarifying and reconstructing norms is situated too, and neither requires philosophy (1995: 64). As shown above, Oksala and Deleuze also argue that we need philosophy, but for different reasons to Benhabib.

gender alone either, since as Butler recognises, the social has 'no single author' (ibid). One of the reasons for this is that '…our individual personhood is fundamentally dependent on social norms' (2004a: 2).[13] Oksala also recognises the power of social norms and discourses, she argues that they shape our experience of the world, and become internalised as habits. However, the good news is that metaphysical schemas, which are the rules that organise norms and discourses, are embedded in practices (2016: 35). So even if they cannot be changed by the individual, they can still be changed by collective human effort. For this reason, Oksala argues that feminist political practice and activism cannot be separated from feminist metaphysics. However, the question for Oksala is how to form a feminist politics of solidarity without relying on identity, or strategic alliances. The problem of identity is that it erases the differences between women (such as class, race, sexuality, and age) (2016: 145); and that it reifies the structures and identities that it opposes because the past cannot be redeemed without women losing their identity (2016: 149). On the other hand, the problem of strategic alliances is that it mirrors the current neoliberal conception of the subject, which is based on individual self-interest (2016: 146). Instead, Oksala argues that we can build a feminist politics of solidarity, which is based on our shared feminist past as a source of strength, which disrupts the complacency of the narratives of progress, disrupting the present and opening up the future (2016: 156-158). Lastly, Deleuze provides a more philosophical challenge to individualism. As we will see, he challenges individualism in multiple ways (the following list is not exclusive). First, Deleuze argues that the subject is constituted and undone through its relations with the outside. Second, the subject is constituted passively by time, through syntheses outside of its control. Third, the subject is not an active subject that has the power to initiate thought. In opposition to this, thought happens after an unexpected encounter when something we don't understand forces us to think. This implies that the subject cannot be a foundation for politics and for ethics. So a similar question to Oksala's arises, however in this case it is an ethical question: how can we have a feminist ethics without relying on the identity of the subject, and an ethics that is adequate to Deleuze's conception of time? (this question will be addressed in chapter 6).

Thesis structure

Before I provide a summary of the chapters in this thesis, it is important to note that the three main thinkers in this project synthesise the work of others in order to develop their own arguments. The point of this thesis is not to evaluate their interpretation of secondary literature. I am aware that in many cases both Butler and Deleuze are engaged in creative misinterpretations in order to pursue their own projects (Deleuze is famous for this, and I think this is the case for Butler too). My main concern, however, is to work with the primary thinkers to develop my own

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[13] Here it is important to note that Butler, as some sort of Hegelian, connects this to the concept of 'the other', since we rely on others for recognition. As Stark explains, while Butler recognises the intersubjective nature of the constitution of individuals, the problem is that it is tied to negation: 'things are instituted against what they are not' (2017: 101). In opposition to this, Oksala and Deleuze's accounts do not rely on negation/contradiction. The problem of contradictions will be explained at the end of chapter 1.

problem. Chapter 1 is dedicated to Butler's *Gender Trouble* as an example of feminist immanent critique.[14] According to Butler, this form of critique '…seeks to provoke critical examination of the basic vocabulary of the movement of thought to which it belongs' (1999 vii). In this case, the concepts submitted to a critique are sex, gender, and desire. This critique is necessary in order to fight gender oppression. In addition to this, Butler is also worried about how the establishment of foundations leads to the exclusion of difference. In particular, Butler shows how essentialist claims about the category of 'Woman' erase the differences between women, such as different sexual orientations. For this reason, instead of defining gender, Butler's gives an account of its construction by two institutions: phallogocentrism and institutional heterosexuality, and of the possibilities of immanent resistance through parodic repetition. However, even though Butler sets up the problem of feminist immanent critique in an interesting way, there are a few limitations of her project, which impel the move to Oksala and Deleuze. First, Butler's claim that gender is inscribed in the body by discourse amounts to discursive idealism, which Oksala defines as the idea that language brings things into existence. Butler admits this problem herself: 'Every time I try to write about the body, the writing ends up being about language' (2004a: 198). Second, in her discussion of drag as a parodic form of politics, Butler relies on contradictions for the subversion of gender. However, as David M. Halperin shows, contradictions do not necessarily incapacitate oppressive systems they might actually empower them by allowing them to adapt. This is connected to the third point, Butler relies on contradictions in order to avoid metaphysics. However, this affects her ability to account for change; even more so without an account of time.

Chapter 2 is dedicated to Johanna Oksala's *Feminist Experiences* as the second example of feminist immanent critique. Oksala's work is relevant for this project because she deals with the question of the relationship between philosophy as immanent critique and feminism, which is the guiding problem of the project. She argues that we need both philosophy and feminism in order to improve the status of women in society. The move from Butler to Oksala is necessary because Oksala is better at avoiding the problem of discursive idealism. Oksala argues that discourse does not construct bodies, but they do provide an account of reality that excludes some of its features. Nonetheless, our experience of the world can challenge linguistic practices, since there is a gap between experience and language. In Oksala's words: 'linguistic description will nevertheless inevitably struggle to capture the richness and ambiguity of lived experience' (2016: 62). This opens up the space for the contestation and change of linguistic practices that structure the world, although Oksala recognises that change is not up to the individual and is slow. This brings us to the second point, Oksala provides a deeper account of social and political change than Butler, one more in keeping with the demands of immanence. We have already mentioned that contradictions, in Butler's system, are not enough for the subversion of gender. Oksala's alternative is to turn to metaphysics (a move that Butler rejects), which she defines as the conceptual schema that mediate the way that reality appears to us. However, following Foucault, and in opposition to Kant, Oksala argues that conceptual schema are not universal, they are

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[14] Chapter one is mostly based on *Gender Trouble.* However, I do rely on other works by Butler to expand on the key ideas developed in *Gender Trouble.* Furthermore, I also rely on secondary literature.

cultural and historical so they can be modified. Third, while Butler recognises that gender is constituted in time by repetition, Oksala provides a deeper examination of time, which is relevant for this project because she integrates notions of historical contingency more firmly into a non-identitarian account of feminist solidarity.

Chapters 3 to 8 are dedicated to Deleuze. Even though Oksala advances feminist immanent critique further than Butler, we need to turn to Deleuze to fully realise immanence. Deleuze goes further in at least four ways. First, he conceives the body as productive, since it has the capacity to both affect and be affected. Second, compared to Oksala, Deleuze provides a much deeper analysis of the relationship between the empirical world and the transcendental (this can be referred to as Deleuze's transcendental empiricism). Third, Deleuze provides an in-depth metaphysical examination of time, which accounts for both the constitution and the undoing of experience. Fourth, Deleuze provides an account of thought that does not rely on the higher faculties of the subject, which would reintroduce transcendence. This does not mean that we will forget Butler and Oksala, without them we risk getting lost in pure philosophy, which says nothing about the political problems of the world; and we risk losing track of the feminist side of immanent critique. Chapters 3 to 7 can be understood as a journey that assembles the different elements necessary for immanent critique, which are also important for feminism, as chapter 8 will show. Chapter 3 focuses on the development of an immanent ethics, as opposed to morality. This chapter is important because it shows how there can be a middle ground between following strict moral norms that tell us what to do and following our individual desires without regards for others. The questions become: 'what can we do?', and 'how to increase our power to act?'. While moral questions - such as 'what should I do?' - involve the subordination of the body to the mind, ethical questions concern the rediscovery of the power of the body and the unconscious, which is important for feminism. Chapter 4 dives into Deleuze's philosophy of time. This chapter is necessary because it provides an account of the constitution of the subject in terms of the formation of habits and memories, without losing the openness of the present and future. Chapter 5 is dedicated to Deleuze's critique of the moral image of thought, which is limited to the recognition of what already exists in the world. In opposition to this, Deleuze argues that thought happens after a fortuitous encounter with something that we cannot recognise forces us to think. The critique of the dogmatic image of thought paves the way for a positive conception of critique, which is linked to creativity. Immanent critique is no longer about setting limits to knowledge, but about creation and thinking differently. This chapter is important for at least two more reasons. First, it expands on the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious by focusing on the unconscious side of thought, and the bodily side of learning. Second, it explores the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental, which we need to account for the production of the new. Chapter 6 goes back to the problem of ethics through the question of how to act in response to Deleuze's philosophy of time. In opposition to morality, which relies on the idea of going back to our essence to achieve order in the world (this will be explained in chapter 3), ethics is based on disorder. The reason for this is that the present is always passing, so there is no equilibrium. Furthermore, after Deleuze's reversal of Platonism, becoming lost its pre-given

direction. There is no one right way to go, there are multiple options, which are only limited by a question of dosage (in order to avoid suicide), and by how it affects other bodies (in order to avoid individualism). Chapter 7 concentrates on an important debate in Deleuze's secondary literature: the relationship between the virtual, the actual, and the intensive, and their place in Deleuze's ontology. While this might seem like an abstract philosophical debate, it has important implications for this project: can Deleuze be read as a political and a feminist thinker? Or is he indifferent to the politics of this world? Chapter 8 will reconstruct the philosophical journey of the previous chapters dedicated to Deleuze in terms of its relevance for feminism. It will begin by focusing on the advancement of immanence through Deleuze's reconstruction of Plato, Kant, Nietzsche and Spinoza. Then, we will look at Deleuze's ontological, epistemic, and politico-ethical undoing of the subject. Lastly, we will focus on an important literature debate that concerns feminism: the usefulness of Deleuze's concept of becoming-woman. This chapter highlights the connections between the development of immanence and the development of a feminist project, which is based on difference, as opposed to identity. These include: the critique of the primacy of reason, which is connected to the affirmation of the bodily side of learning and the democratisation of thought; the focus on the constitution of experience; the critique of the gendered moral subject, and more. This demonstrates that there is no contradiction between immanence and feminism. Furthermore, the development of immanence paves the way for a positive conception of critique as creation, which is connected to a feminist ethics that frees becoming from a pre-determined path, without forgetting our mutually constitutive relation with others.

1. Judith Butler: *Gender Trouble* as Feminist Immanent Critique

This chapter provides a reconstruction of Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble* (1999). This book is relevant to my project as an example of feminist immanent critique. In this work, Butler submits the concepts of gender, sex and desire to a critical examination, which was influenced by the work of Foucault, amongst others.[15] The book can be situated in the debates surrounding how essentialist claims about the category of women erase the differences between them, in particular sexual orientation (Ennis 2008: 41-42). We will begin by situating the context of the book in the tradition of immanent critique and the critique of the subject. This will be followed by an exploration of Butler's appropriation of Foucault's method of genealogy, which leads her to the examination of two institutions that construct gender: phallogocentrism and institutional heterosexuality. In order to develop the problem of phallogocentrism we will look at Butler's interpretation of Luce Irigaray, Simone de Beauvoir and Monique Wittig. As Butler explains, these thinkers have in common the problematisation of '…the locality and meaning of both the "subject" and "gender" within the context of socially instituted gender asymmetry' (1999: 16). Next, we will examine institutional heterosexuality, which is based on the assumption of the relation of unity between sex, gender and desire. In this section Butler provides a critical examination of the psychoanalytic account of sexual difference by Lacan, Freud and Kristeva. She argues that the prohibition of incest - which is the mechanism that institutes gender identity - presupposes the prohibition of homosexuality. Butler submits both the incest and the homosexuality taboo to a critique inspired by Foucault. There are two main points of this critique: first these prohibitions create the identities that they attempt to regulate; and second, she critiques the idea of the existence of a type of sexuality or desire before the repression of the law, since this would also be created by the law itself (1999: 94). Even though Butler puts forward a critique inspired by Foucault, she also accuses Foucault of falling into the same trap by assuming the existence of a multiplicity of pleasures before regulation.[16] Finally, in the last section we are going to look at Butler's theory of performativity, as a way of contesting gender immanently.

Gender Trouble

We can begin by situating the context of the book. As Butler explains, the book was written as part of the tradition of immanent critique. This form of critique '…seeks to provoke critical examination of the basic vocabulary of the movement of thought to which it belongs' (1999 vii). Butler clarifies that the point of this critical examination was not to undermine feminism. The goal was to make it more democratic and inclusive (1999: vii). The main concept that was submitted to a critical examination was gender. Even more than twenty years later, this task is still deemed

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[15] *Gender Trouble* also engages with the work of Simone de Beauvoir, Monique Wittig, Jacques Lacan, and many others.

[16] According to Sawicki (2010: 191), Butler is not the only commentator to accuse Foucault of this. Other people include: Leo Bersani, Linda Martín Alcoff, and Joel Whitebook.

controversial, perhaps due to the same worry that Butler identified in the 1990s - that the indeterminacy of gender will lead to the failure of feminism (1999: xxix).[17] However, Butler is worried about the problems of seeking a stable category of women. In particular, she is concerned about the following question: 'Is the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable subject an unwitting regulation and reification of gender relations?' (1999: 7). The first reason for this worry is that, according to Butler, the traditional gender binary, which is often conceived as natural, is produced by power. Secondly, if this is the case and gender relations are constructed by power, then an important problem emerges: is it possible to fight gender inequality without challenging the binary of gender itself? In Butler's words: 'Feminist critique ought also to understand how the category of "women," the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought' (1999: 4). As Butler clarifies, the critique of the subject is not necessarily a negation of the subject, but an investigation of the construction of the subject as a contingent foundation (1995a: 42).[18]

Genealogy

Butler's critical inquiry, which alongside gender also includes the concepts of sex and desire (and the relationship between them), was inspired by Foucault's method of genealogy.[19] This method, replaces the search for the origin of phenomena - for example by finding 'the truth of female

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[17] See for example: Benhabib (1995) and Fraser (1995). Benhabib's question is the following: 'I want to ask how in fact the very project of female emancipation would even be thinkable without such a regulative principle on agency, autonomy, and self-hood?' (1995: 21). Fraser, argues that Butler's view of identity and normativity as oppressive is 'far too one-sided' and that 'Feminists *do* need to make normative judgements and to offer emancipatory alternatives' (1995: 71). Additionally, Fraser contends: 'Feminists need both deconstruction *and* reconstruction, destabilization of meaning *and* projection of utopian hope' (1995: 75). This project is situated against these critiques. First, contra Benhabib, I argue that it is necessary to critique the idea of the autonomy of the subject in order to account for its process of constitution. Out of the three thinkers, Deleuze provides a deeper examination of this by arguing that activity relies on passive syntheses outside of the subjects' control. Second, against Fraser, we will use Deleuze to develop a philosophical critique of norms. Some of the problems of norms include imposing a hierarchy of beings, and the subordination of becoming to a pre-given path. Lastly, I do not disagree with Fraser that we need both deconstruction and reconstruction. Oksala, Butler and Deleuze's projects do this. However, the issue is the definition of utopian hope. While the three of them advocate for change, they argue that it has to come immanently and through experimentation with the present.

[18] According to Butler, theories tend to posit foundations, which remain unquestioned (1995a: 39). Furthermore, she argues that foundations are contingent, indispensable, and secured through exclusionary means (1995b: 133).

[19] For a critique of Butler's appropriation of Foucault's genealogy see Repo (2014). Repo argues that Butler neglects biopolitics, which leads her to focus on a genealogy of gender ontology, and not gender itself (2014: 73). Ennis (2008) provides a detailed account of the main differences between Foucault and Butler. Chambers describes Butler's engagement with Foucault as a 'creative avoidance and misreading of his work' (2007: 48).

desire' (Butler 1999: xxix), or the truth of sex - with an investigation of the political consequences of the establishment of such origin (1999: xxxi). For instance, it can lead to the exclusion of everything which does not fit within the conceived original or natural organisation of the world. To be more precise, if we claim that gender difference coincides with sex, what happens to the people who do not fit this criterion? According to Butler, genealogy shows us that the concepts of gender, sex and desire are not the origin or base of identity, they are the effects of different institutions, practices and discourses with no single but multiple and diffuse points of origin (1999: xxxi). This has important consequences for feminist political struggle, given that there is no authentic origin that we can appeal to in order to oppose the current one. The task of genealogy is therefore to deconstruct and denaturalise gender by showing how it is arbitrarily constituted. Additionally, Butler is concerned about questions surrounding the intelligibility of gender, and its conditions of possibility. For example: 'what will and will not constitute an intelligible life, and how do presumptions about normative gender and sexuality determine in advance what will qualify as the "human" and the "livable"?' (1999: xxii). This implies that the task of genealogy is not to evaluate different expressions of gender, for example in terms of what is subversive or not (1999: xxi), but to open up the possibility for other ways of existing beyond the traditional gender binary. In Butler's words, the denaturalisation of gender '… was done from a desire to live, to make life possible, and to rethink the possible as such' (1999: xx). The genealogical investigation of the gender categories leads Butler to the study of two institutions that constitute it: institutional heterosexuality and phallogocentrism. These institutions are described as regimes of power/ discourse that help construct gender through the establishment of binaries that limit the possibilities of gender configurations (1999: xxx, 13). We can begin by looking at phallogocentrism. As we will see, the different theorists explored by Butler - Irigaray, de Beauvoir and Wittig - provide different accounts of the construction of the categories of gender/sex, the status of the feminine in relation to the masculine, and the strategies for the displacement of gender. However, what they have in common is their critique of the metaphysics of substance, which Butler defines as the attribution of 'being' to sex, gender and sexuality, as if they were an essence that exists prior to signification in language. For example, the idea that one *is* a woman, or a man, due to their sex, or their sexual orientation, and reducing their gender to this (1999: 27, 29-30).[20]

Phallogocentrism

In order to gain a better understanding of the concept of phallogocentrism it is important to take a step back from Butler and look at the work of Jacques Derrida, who coined the term. Simply put, the term phallogocentrism refers to the place accorded to women within a masculine philosophical system and language. As Feder and Zakin explain, phallogocentrism is based on 'masculine meanings which find identity in oppositional difference' (1997: 38). To be more precise, within the male and female dichotomy, man derives its meaning in relation to women's lack of

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[20] See also Butler (1999: 14), for an example of the definition of the concept in the terms of humanist feminism.

meaning. In their own words: 'by determining women's identities to be derivative of an already circumscribed masculine subjectivity, equated with the universal human position, philosophy is itself predicated upon the very process of othering that it regulates' (1997: 21). This implies the dependence of the masculine on the feminine for the production of their own identity; and also the possibility for the feminine to undermine the system that relies on it (1997: 22). In opposition to Derrida, where the question of women is the question of the other (Cornell 1997: 195), Irigaray argues that women is not a lack or an other. As Butler explains, women occupy the paradoxical position of 'the sex' and 'the subject' which is 'not one' (Butler 1999: 14-15).[21] This implies that women are that which eludes representation and cannot be thought. The reason for this is that women are excluded from the closed phallogocentric system. This forecloses the possibility of them having a mutually constitutive relation with men, who eclipse women in their process of constructing and amplifying their own meaning (1999: 18). However, the problem of Irigaray, according to Butler, is the globalising reach of her analysis. The question is the following: 'Is the failure to acknowledge the specific cultural operations of gender oppression itself a kind of ontological imperialism…?' (Ibid).

Butler then turns to de Beauvoir's account of the construction of gender in *The Second Sex.* Her famous claim is that 'one is not born a woman, but, rather, becomes one' (de Beauvoir in Butler 1999: 12). According to Butler, this means that one becomes a woman 'under a cultural compulsion', which does not come from sex (so sex is not a fact) (ibid). The question is: what is women's relation to men? According to Butler's (1999: 14-16) reading, in contrast to Irigaray, for de Beauvoir women are part of the phallogocentric system and are constituted within this system. Women are the negative of men: while men occupy the universal subject position, women constitute an 'Other' which has not achieved universality yet. However, it is important to note that the universal position is not natural for men, they appropriated it and exclude women from it (Butler 1999: 148).[22] This creates problems for both men and women, while men are condemned to disembodiment, women are condemned to embodiment (1999: 16-17). The problem of de Beauvoir, according to Butler's reading, is that she reproduces the Cartesian dichotomy between freedom and the body (1999: 17). Even when this is presented as a synthesis of body and consciousness, it still relies on the dichotomy and the implied hierarchy of the male over the female (1999: 210). Elizabeth Spelman raises the same problem by saying that Beauvoir ties women's emancipation to the realisation of transcendence over immanence, joining men in this realm, which implies the prevalence of the mind over the body (1982: 120-121). The second problem, according to Butler, is that de Beauvoir's theory implies radical consequences, which she did not pursue. If there is a distinction between sex and gender, one does not have to

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[21] This is based on Butler's reading of Irigaray's (1995) *This Sex Which Is Not One.*

[22] Butler refers to this quote from de Beauvoir to explain this point: 'One must understand that men are not born with a faculty for the universal and that women are not reduced at birth to the particular. The universal has been, and is continually, at every moment, appropriated by men. It does not happen, it must be done. It is an act, a criminal act, perpetrated by one class against another. It is an act carried out at the level of concepts, philosophy, politics' (de Beauvoir in Butler 1999: 148).

become a particular gender, and we do not have to be limited to only two genders (1999: 142-143).

Lastly, Butler turns to Monique Wittig's work in order to examine her answer to the question of the construction of woman.[23] Wittig is relevant for Butler because she challenges the metaphysics of substance in two ways. First, she challenges the assumption that being a woman is connected to being heterosexual (1999: 29). Second, she provides an explanation of the role of language in the subordination and exclusion of women. As Butler explains, Wittig argues that gender is naturalised through grammatical norms that gender nouns (1999: xix, 28-29). However, just as language has the possibility of being used as a tool for the oppression of women, language can also be a place for the contestation of gender, and its use can be radically transformed (1999: 35). The reason for this is that Wittig conceives language as materiality that is shaped by the practices of institutions and individuals. To be more precise, Wittig conceives language as '… a set of acts, repeated over time, that produce reality-effects that are eventually misperceived as "facts"' (1999: 157). This leaves open a space for the contestation of language, and its radical use. Having briefly explained Wittig's conception of language, we can move into the relationship between language and sex. Sex, for Wittig, is not a natural fact, it is created by the system of compulsory heterosexuality that produces identities in line with heterosexual desire (1999: 35). Discourse marks the body and gives it a gender, which means sex is not natural but it is inscribed by gender (1999: 11, 143). Sex then '…imposes an artificial unity on an otherwise discontinuous set of attributes' (1999: 146). However, this unity is a false unity, it is actually based on the disunity or fragmentation of the body in sexual parts (1999: 156). The focus on women's bodies leads to the conflation of the category of women with their sexualised bodies and attributes. For this reason Wittig argues (in a similar line to de Beauvoir) that only the female sex is marked, while the masculine represents the universal (1999: 17). Emancipation then, for Wittig, involves assuming the status of the universal subject, which would dissolve the category of women in its particularity (1999: 26-27, 149). In particular, Wittig calls for the lesbian subject to take the universal point of view and destroy compulsory heterosexuality. The lesbian subject is important because its identity is independent of the heterosexual contract (1999: 35, 153). This is based on the distinction between lesbian and woman, while woman exists in opposition to man through the heterosexual contract, the lesbian is free from being defined by this oppositional relation (1999: 143-144). However, Butler is worried about the exclusion of heterosexual women by this theory (1999: 162-163). In her own words: 'What a tragic mistake, then, to construct a gay/ lesbian identity through the same exclusionary means, as if the excluded were not, precisely through its exclusion, always presupposed and, indeed, required for the construction of that identity' (1999: 163). In other words, the relationship of dependency between heterosexuality and homosexuality, where one terms needs the other for the constitution of its own identity in opposition to the other, would be reinstated. Moreover, Butler also criticises Wittig for not going far enough in her critique of the humanist subject and the metaphysics of substance. She argues that Wittig assumes the existence of a pre-social subject that is free before the imposition of gender (1999: 27, 38). Furthermore, Wittig still relies on the agency of the lesbian subject, outside

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[23] A few Wittig's works referred by Butler include: 'One is Not Born a Woman' (1981), 'The Mark of Gender' (1984), and *The Straight Mind and Other Essays* (1992).

of heterosexual identity, for emancipation (1999: 40). As we will see, in opposition to this, Butler argues that the ground for the contestation of identity is immanent to the construction of those identities, not outside of them. This will become clearer when we look at Butler's theory of performativity.

Institutional heterosexuality

Now that we have examined phallogocentrism, we can move to the second regime of power/discourse which constructs the category of women: institutional heterosexuality. According to Butler, within the heterosexual frame, being a woman (or a man) is necessarily connected to heterosexuality, to the extent that being gay is perceived as a challenge to our gender identity itself (1999: xi). This does not mean that sexual practices constitute our gender, the point is that there are normative assumptions or expectations that uncritically forge a connection between gender and heterosexual desire (ibid). For example, the assumption that being a woman means to be sexually attracted to men, and sexual relations with men are perceived as an expression of womanhood. In other words, institutional heterosexuality is based on the assumption of the causal relation, or relation of unity, of the concepts of sex, gender and desire. Even though the distinction between sex and gender is supposed to acknowledge the distinction between biology and culture and avoid biological determinism, Butler argues that this is not the case. The reliance on the binary assumes the mimetic relation of gender and sex, so gender is still restricted by sex (1999: 10).[24] Subsequently gender is connected to the desire of the opposite sex, where desire expresses our gender, and our gender expresses desire (1999: 30-31). Additionally, the heterosexualization of desire institutes the opposition between the conception of 'the feminine' and 'the masculine' as the natural attributes of the male and female sex that desire their opposite (1999: 24). Butler's critique, inspired by Foucault, is that gender and desire are not based on the category of sex, they are the effect of the heterosexual institution of sexuality. Put differently, the positioning of the binary of sex as the origin of sexuality has a regulatory effect that produces and reproduces this binary (1999: 32). As Chambers explains, Butler turns to Foucault because of his critique of sex as an essence that has to be uncovered to know the truth about the subject (even though Foucault does not explicitly mention gender) (2007: 56). Foucault also provides a way to challenge the category of sex, he reminds us that there are always sexual practices that fall outside the norm and resist categorisation. An example of this is the life of Herculine Barbine, a French hermaphrodite that lived in the 19th Century.[25] Herculine had both male and female anatomical elements, which meant she/he fell outside of the gender binary and the discourse of heterosexuality. Butler describes Herculine as the '…sexual impossibility of an identity' (1999: 32). Her/his existence disorganises the rules that govern the relationship between sex, gender and desire. Herculine can be understood as an exception that allows us to understand how the world we take for granted is constituted (1999: 140).

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[24] In simpler terms: 'we tend to assume that if one is a given sex, then it follows that one is a given gender' (Butler 1989: 258).

[25] See Foucault (1980).

Sexual difference and the incest taboo: Lacan, Freud and Kristeva

Butler then moves to examine Lacan, Freud, and Kristeva's accounts of sexual difference. The general point of this section is that even though psychoanalysis provides an important challenge to the subject as the foundation of identity — by showing how the subject is constructed through a complex process — it still reinstates sexual hierarchies and excludes identities that fall outside the traditional gender binary. Butler hints at this problem by asking the following question: 'Is psychoanalysis an antifoundationalist inquiry that affirms the kind of sexual complexity that effectively deregulates rigid and hierarchical sexual codes, or does it maintain an unacknowledged set of assumptions about the foundations of identity that work in favor of those very hierarchies?' (1999: xxxi). Butler contends that the incest taboo - the mechanism that produces both gender identities - presupposes the prohibition of homosexuality. Therefore, heterosexuality is a 'laborious construction' based on the repression of homosexual and bisexual dispositions (1999: 98). Then, Butler, inspired by Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis, argues that prohibition creates the identities it is trying to repress. This implies the relationship of dependance of heterosexuality on homosexuality, in a similar vein that the masculine needs the feminine to posit its own identity (1999: 98). Lastly, Butler critiques the idea of the existence of desire or sexuality before the law by arguing that the idea of a moment anterior to the law is an illusion produced by the law itself (1999: 94).

Lacan

According to Butler, Lacan is important for a feminist account of sexual difference because he does not conceive it as a binary that is based on a metaphysics of substance (1999: 36). As we will see, the masculine and the feminine position are produced by the law, through the prohibition of incest and homosexuality. Similarly to Derrida, for Lacan the question of gender is related to the question of language and signification. This implies a shift away from ontology into how '… the effect of being is produced through the structures of signification' (1999: 56). Lacan refers to the realm of language as the symbolic order, which is the realm of representation of reality, where reality becomes intelligible and meaningful for us (Zakin 2011). As Zakin explains, this means that for Lacan, our entry into the realm of language leads to our experience of the world becoming mediated. In her own words: 'subjects are cut off from the immediacy of bodily experience; relations to things, and to oneself and others, are now mediated by words and representations' (2011). According to Lacan, the symbolic order is structured by the paternal law and its mechanism of sexual differentiation (Butler 1999: 56). To be more precise, the paternal law establishes both the feminine and the masculine positions through the prohibition of incest (1999: 37). This 'original' prohibition also represents the founding moment of the subject, when the infant enters the linguistic structure of culture through the repression of desire (1999: 55). There are two different sexual positions within language: the position of 'Being' the Phallus (men) and the position of 'having' the Phallus (women). The position of having the Phallus implies being the object of masculine desire, that which represents, reflects and signifies this desire. In Butler's words: 'This is an Other that constitutes, not the limit of masculinity in a feminine alterity, but the site of a masculine self-elaboration' (1999: 59). This implies the masculine reliance on the feminine position for the assertion of its own identity. However, women holding the power to reflect and therefore to shatter the illusion of the masculine subject also implies that women's being is being

for a masculine subject (1999: 61). As Zakin explains, both the masculine and the feminine subject experience lack, either by not being or by not having the phallus (2011). In other words, the consequence of this binary is that the excluded term ends up disrupting the possibility of a coherent identity for both positions (Butler 1999: 84). This impossibility of an identity is portrayed as a comedic failure by Lacan, since both positions still need to make an attempt to play their part (1999: 59). Butler portrays this as a religious tragedy: 'If the Symbolic guarantees the failure of the tasks it commands, perhaps its purposes, like those of the Old Testament God, are altogether unteleological — not the accomplishment of some goal, but the obedience and suffering to enforce the "subject's" sense of limitation "before the law"' (1999: 72). For this reason Butler conceives the Lacanian drama as a type of slave morality. We can dive into this comedy to expand on how the female position is constructed. The consolidation of gender identity, according to Butler's reading of Lacan, involves two renunciations. First, women have to renounce to having the phallus, which implies that they are renouncing their wish for masculinity, consolidating their feminine identity (1999: 66). Second, the renunciation of masculinity presumes the renunciation of the desire for a female object (1999: 88). Both renunciations are connected to the idea that women have to masquerade: to appear to be the phallus, women take the characteristics of the lost object (femininity) and incorporate it into their identity (1999: 62). This shows that the prohibition against incest is connected to the prohibition against homosexuality, since femininity resolves the masculine identification which would imply the desire of a female object (1999: 68). In the case of men, they have to renounce their desire for the mother, and masculinity is taken to hide to themselves their own femininity (1999: 66). Lacan is important for Butler for two reasons. First, he challenges the metaphysics of substance, since there is no pre-discursive reality (1999: 70). Second, Butler argues that in Lacan, prohibitions by the law are both prohibitive and generative. According to Butler, this implies that while Lacan does rely on a sharp divide between the sexes, it is still artificial and can be contested from within. However, the problem is that power of the law is denied through the construction of the law as a permanent impossibility (1999: 73).

Freud

As Butler explains, Freud is important for feminist theory because he provides an account of the construction of gender through the Oedipus complex (1999: 97-98). This implies that sexual difference is neither natural, nor cultural. Sexual difference is achieved through a complex psychic process, which complicates the traditional sex and gender distinction and the mind and body dualism (Zakin 2011). Here is a brief account of this process. According to Butler, for Freud the process of gender acquisition is part of the process of the formation of the ego. In this process, the experience of the loss of the loved one - either the mother or the father - leads to its incorporation into the structure of the ego, as a form of identification through taking on its attributes (1990: 73-74). This is aided by the incest taboo, where the prohibition of the tabooed object of desire leads to its internalisation. Interestingly, Freud recognises the possibility of the primary object of desire being the same-sex parent and the existence of both feminine and masculine dispositions (Salih 2002: 54, Butler 1999: 76). In the specific case of heterosexual desire, the love-object is denied and desire moves onto another object of the opposite sex. In the case of homosexual desire, both the love-object and the homosexual form of desire are denied,

which leads to the boy taking on attributes of the father, consolidating his masculinity (Butler 1999: 75); The same thing happens in the girl's case, where her feminine attributes are exacerbated (Reddy and Butler 2004: 121).[26] Therefore, for Freud the repression of homosexuality is fundamental for the development of the ego (Reddy and Butler 2004: 120). The question then is, what determines which disposition is the case (either the same-sex or the opposite-sex parent)? While Freud argues that the object of desire is determined by the strongest disposition, in terms of feminine or masculine, for Butler there are still many unanswered questions. For example: 'What aspect of "femininity" do we call dispositional, and which is the consequence of identification?'; or how do we distinguish between a feminine and a masculine disposition? (1999: 77).

In contrast to Freud, Butler argues that dispositions are not a fact, they are produced by the law (1999: 81). In particular, the Oedipus complex relies on the prohibition of homosexuality, which comes before the prohibition of incest. In Butler's words: 'The young boy and young girl who enter into the Oedipal drama with incestuous heterosexual aims have already been subjected to prohibitions which "dispose" them in distinct sexual directions' (1999: 82). So the Oedipus complex consolidates gender identity through the repression of bisexuality and homosexuality (1999: 105). As mentioned in the case of Lacan, Butler argues that the law actually produces the sexuality it seeks to repress. This argument is inspired by Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis. As Butler explains, Foucault attacks the presupposition of the existence of an original desire which is then repressed by the law (1999: 83-84). The argument is that the law produces, and conceits the production of, this original desire in order to maintain and expand its own power. For example: the law delimits the speakable and the unspeakable, the legitimate and the illegitimate. Furthermore, by positioning an original desire and the need for its repression, the law is able to consolidate its own power through juridical structures (1999: 96). The law does not only prohibit certain types of sexualities, it also produces the desires and identities that substitute it (1999: 97). This has important consequences for resistance, since there is no sexuality outside or after the law that we can appeal to free us from it, as we will see in the next section on Kristeva (1999: 94). However, this does not mean there are no possibilities for resistance. The only way of undermining the law comes from within.

Kristeva

According to Butler's reading, Kristeva's aim is to create a feminine subversion of the paternal law through semiotics and poetic language (1999: 107). The semiotic, for Kristeva, has the power to erode the linguistic dominance of the symbolic order, which according to Lacan is the universal structuring principle of signification and culture (1999: 112). Through the paternal law, the symbolic creates the possibility of meaningful language and experience. However, this is based on the repression of the child's dependency on the maternal body through the incest taboo (1999:

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[26] Butler recognises that this does not account for other types of gay or lesbian identity. In her own words: 'Now it will be a mistake to say that if we are all hypermasculine or hyperfeminine it is the consequence of melancholic incorporation. There are gay male forms of masculinity that will be very complicated to explain in this form, and hyperfemme forms of lesbianism that will be very hard to explain in terms of this formula. But I guess I am talking about heteronormative masculinity and femininity when it is linked towards the repudiation of homosexuality' (Reddy and Butler 2004: 121).

107). Kristeva challenges Lacan's claim that for the production of cultural meaning the relationship to the maternal body has to be repressed (1999: 108). In her theory, the semiotic is the dimension of language that is related to the maternal body. Even though by entering the Symbolic order the child severs their relationship with the mother, Kristeva argues that this relationship can be recovered through poetic language (1999: 111-112). In contrast to the Symbolic order, poetic language embraces the possibility of the existence of multiple meanings. This implies that the semiotic has its own form of meaning (1999: 110), denying the primacy of the paternal law and positioning the semiotic as a source of subversion of the Symbolic order (1999: 108). Additionally, poetic language undermines the coherence of the signifying subject by placing it in a continuous relation to the maternal body (1999: 113).

However, Butler contends that even though Kristeva represents a challenge to Lacan, there are some problems with her theory. First, although Kristeva's work challenges the universalism of the paternal law in language, Butler argues that the semiotic is still subordinated to the Symbolic order. In her own words: 'If the semiotic promotes the possibility of the subversion, displacement, or disruption of the paternal law, what meanings can those terms have if the Symbolic always reasserts its hegemony?' (1999: 108). Secondly, Butler maintains that Kristeva's theory is self-defeating by positing the semiotic as that '…which never can be consistently maintained…' without leading to psychosis and the breakdown of culture (1999: 109). In other words, Butler is worried that the semiotic is only able to achieve a temporary subversion of the paternal law (1999: 119). Thirdly, according to Butler, Kristeva accepts Lacan's positioning of culture as a paternal structure and the maternal as pre-cultural. The consequence of this is that the maternal is uncritically positioned as a foundation, instead of questioning its construction (1999: 109). This in turn closes off the possibility of assigning other cultural meanings to motherhood beyond the pre-cultural domain (1999: 119). Fourth, Kristeva equates the return to the mother through poetic language with the pre-Oedipal incestuous drive that was prohibited as a precondition for the foundation of the subject and culture. This implies the association of female homosexuality with the breakdown of language and the psychosis of the return to the mother (1999: 113-114). In Butler's words, in Kristeva's theory female homosexuality represents '…the emergence of psychosis into culture' (1999: 115). Put differently, female homosexual desire represents a regression to the pre-cultural libidinal state. This forecloses the possibility of the existence of female homosexuality as a non-psychotic cultural expression (1999: 118). Fifth, Kristeva fails to understand the productivity of the law by granting it merely a repressive and a prohibitive function (1999: 116). Following Foucault's work, Butler argues that the body is sexed and gains meaning through discourse and power relations (1999: 117): 'to be sexed, for Foucault, is to be subjected to a set of social regulations…' (1999: 122). This means that the female body cannot be pre-cultural, as Kristeva maintains. In Butler's words: 'Foucault would doubtless argue that the discursive production of the maternal boy as prediscursive is a tactic in the self-amplification and concealment of those specific power relations by which the trope of the maternal body is produced' (1999: 117). To be more precise, the paternal law both constructs and regulates the female body (1999: 118). Therefore, semiotic language is unable to undermine the paternal law, since the law that represses the semiotic is the governing principle of the semiotic itself (1999: 123). The implication of this is that the body will not be liberated through an appeal to a 'natural' or pre-discursive past (1999: 119).

Butler's Critique of Foucault

Butler uses Foucault to show that prohibitions by the law are productive: they create the identities they claim to repress. Therefore, emancipation will not be found before/after the law, since the law has a constitutive relationship to the outside. However, Butler argues that the same criticism can be applied to Foucault himself. In particular, Butler critically examines Foucault's introduction to the journals of Herculine Barbin, and she accuses Foucault of romanticising Herculine's non-identity (1999: 128). We already mentioned Herculine as an example that refuses the categorisation of the gender binary by having both male and female anatomical elements. We are now going to look at this more in detail in order to understand Butler's critique and reformulation of Foucault. Butler argues that Foucault's introduction to the journals of Herculine contradicts his own theory developed in the *History of Sexuality Volume I*. As Butler explains, in this book Foucault argues that the category of sex is not the cause of the specific male and female bodily pleasures and desires, but an effect of a system of discourse and power that '…artificially unifies a variety of disparate and unrelated sexual functions…' (1999: 128). This is also a point about the relationship of power and sexuality. Against the view that sex is repressed by power and in need of liberation, Foucault argues that sex is historically constructed by power (Butler 1999: 128). This means that there is no sexuality outside of the relations of power that produce it. The only way forward is a historical analysis into the construction of the category of sex and the regulations it imposes on bodies. This represents a direct challenge to feminist theories that accept the binary category of sex as a foundation and believe in the possibility of emancipation before or after the regulation of the law (1999: 130). Herculine is important here as an example of bodily pleasures and desires that pose a challenge to the categories of sex. However, Butler argues that this does not mean that before confessing and being forced to legally identify and live as a man Herculine was able to exist freely outside of the regulatory frameworks of sex. Butler accuses Foucault of assuming the existence of a multiplicity of pleasures before regulation. Those pleasures, she argues, are always already embedded in relations of power and constructed by the law they challenge (1999: 133). Put differently, power both constructs and condemns sexuality (1999: 128). Therefore, Herculine's pleasures and desires could not fall outside of the law, since 'the law maintains "this" outside within itself' (1999: 135).

Performativity

We will now turn to Butler's theory of performativity in order to develop the most positive side of her critique of gender as an essence, and the critique of the need to rely on an identity in order to resist.[27] The aim of Butler's theory of performativity is to provide an account of the construction of gender at the level of discourse and signification (Salih 2002: 10). This means that the subject is produced as an effect of discourse through the regulation imposed by the institution of phallogocentrism, which imposes the gender hierarchy; and institutional heterosexuality, which establishes a unity between sex, gender and desire. Additionally, as Ennis explains, discourse creates the illusion of the existence of a prediscursive ontology to which language refers to (2008: 46). In opposition to this, Butler's theory of performativity contends that gender identity is not a cause or an essence, but the effect of acts, gestures, movements and desires, which produce the

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[27] For an explanation of the influences of Butler's theory of performativity see Loxley (2007).

appearance of an internal essence (1999: 173, 179). The identity that these acts, gestures, movements and desires appear to express is fabricated by them and maintained through their repetition (1999: 185). Put in a different way: '… the "I" is the effect of a certain repetition, one which produces the semblance of a continuity or coherence…' (Butler 1993: 311).[28] This applies both to gender and to sexuality. There are three important implications of Butler's theory of performativity. First, it implies that gender (and sexuality) have no prior ontological status apart from the acts that constitute it. Gender is therefore a fabrication which is inscribed on the surface of the body (Butler 1999: 173-174). Secondly, the idea of gender as an interior essence conceals how gender is actually constituted as an effect of regulation and punishment; and in turn, this obscures the political aspect of the constitution of gender (1999: 173-174). Thirdly, just as identity is an effect of repetition, the failure to repeat creates the possibility for the displacement of gender and sexuality (Butler 1993: 311).

To summarise, gender is redefined, not as an inner truth, but as something that we collectively perform and imitate. This idea of imitation is not developed in detail but there is one example that helps us understand it: drag. Butler argues that drag can be a challenge to the concept of gender as an essence. The reason for this is that it is an imitation without an origin (1999: 175). Then, if gender has no origin, this implies that it is neither true or false (1999: 173). Drag therefore subverts gender by providing a parody and a challenge of the idea of an original gender (1999: 175). In Butler's words: '*In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself - as well as its contingency*' (1999: 175). Butler contends that this is what is often overlooked when drag and butch/femme identities are criticised for degrading women or uncritically appropriating gender stereotypes. The relationship between the imitation and the original is more complex than these critiques acknowledge. To be more precise, drag poses a challenge to the unity of sex, gender and gender performance by playing with the distinction between the inner and the outer identity of the performer (1999: 174-175). This does not mean that every parodic repetition of gender is disruptive, since there is always the possibility of domestication. In spite of this Butler avoids the temptation to provide a framework to evaluate this - the task is always context specific. However, she does invite us to ask which type of performances denaturalise the categories of gender identity and desire and play with the distinction between the inside and the outside of gender (1999: 177). Butler quotes Esther Newton to provide an example of this:

> 'At its most complex, [drag] is a double inversion that says, "appearance is an illusion." Drag says [Newton's curious personification] "my 'outside' appearance is feminine, but my essence 'inside' [the body] is masculine." At the same time it symbolizes the opposite inversion; "my appearance 'outside' [my body, my gender] is masculine but my essence 'inside' [myself] is feminine.' (Newton in Butler 1999: 174)

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[28] This is a quote from 'Imitation and Gender Insubordination' where Butler (1993) talks about what it means to be a lesbian.

These two claims contradict each other leading to the displacement of the discourse of gender from truth to falsity: 'genders can be neither true or false, neither real nor apparent, neither original nor derived' (Butler 1999: 180).

Now that we have clarified the relationship between imitation and truth/falsity, there are two more points that need to be clarified. First, the relation between gender and norms, and second the relation between gender and time. As James Loxley explains, the performative process involves bodies ordering themselves in relation to norms: 'bodies compose themselves within the limits of a small range of viable roles. In particular, such acts produce us as men or women in a manner that reinforces the binary system of a 'heterosexual matrix' (2007: 119). While bodies close to the norm become relatively successful gendered subjects, other bodies that defy the norm become excluded or penalised (2007: 121). This account relies on Foucault's conception of power as productive: 'The force she associates with the performative is partly a normalising power that constitutes by exclusion: in producing the normal, it also produces the abnormal, that which falls outside the realm of a 'proper' identity. A heterosexual norm is therefore haunted by the non-heterosexual that it must imagine in order to be what it is' (2007: 123). However, there is always a chance to disrupt norms: 'To the extent that gender is an assignment, it is an assignment which is never quite carried out according to expectation, whose addressee never quite inhabits the ideal s/he is compelled to approximate' (Butler 1993: 231). In Loxley's words: 'the performance of gender might itself be not the participation in the normalising, dissimulating work of power, but instead a kind of enacted critique' (Loxley 2007: 125). Lastly, the possibility of disrupting gender is connected to the relation between gender and time, since gender is only constituted through time by the 'stylised repetition of acts' (Butler 1999: 179). This implies that gender must not be conceived as a stable identity which serves as a ground for action. The occasional discontinuity of acts reveal the groundlessness of gender. This opens up the possibility for the transformation of gender, through the relation between discontinuous acts, the possibility of the failure to repeat, and parodic repetition. Choosing a gender can therefore become a creative task where we interpret received gender norms in a way that reorganises them (Butler 1987a: 131).

Critique and morality

The parodic repetition of norms can be connected to the concept of critique. Butler develops this concept, inspired by Foucault, in an essay titled '"What is Critique?" An Essay on Foucault's virtue (2001)'.[29] As Butler explains, Foucault is relevant for her work because he conceives critique as 'a mode of ethical self-questioning that is akin to virtue, where virtue does not denote obedience to the law but its opposite - a critical questioning relation to the norms by which subjects are constituted' (2004b: 302). However, before we begin the explanation of the concept of critique it is important to clarify what it is not. Butler, following Foucault, argus that the question of critique can never be answered with certainty (2004b: 303). There are two reasons for this. First, in general, questions can only be answered approximately and contingently (there is never a

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[29] This essay can be found in Salih and Butler (2004: 302-322).

final answer). Second, critique can only exist in relation to something outside itself (2004: 306). So its specific definition depends on its objects, which can be an instituted practice, discourse, episteme, or institution (2004b: 304). The second point is that critique is not about 'fault finding' (2004b: 304). It does not tell us which practices, forms of knowledge, power or discourses are bad (2004b: 307). As already mentioned, it is better understood as a mode of questioning (305), which does not lead to epistemological certainty (2004b: 307). This is the case because of the concern about forms of knowledge foreclosing the possibility of thinking otherwise. The point of critique is therefore to examine the limits of the dominant systems of knowledge, what Raymond Williams calls 'the uncritical habits of mind' (2004b: 307). This critical examination happens because we have already been confronted with a crisis of the epistemological field, which opens up the way for its reexamination (2004b: 307-308). Critique is then connected to virtue: 'as if virtue is counter to regulation and order, as if virtue itself is to be found in the risking of established order' (2004: 308). The reason for this is that virtue is said to involve a critical relation to norms. Foucault portrays this critical relation to norms as an art of existence, where we transform ourselves as we make our lives a work of art by inhabiting them differently (2004b: 309). This implies that following norms does not have to be about submission, since we can re-enact them differently (2004b: 308). Over time, practices can produce a settled domain, which limits what we conceive as possible. Therefore, the role of critique is never over. However, it is important to clarify that Butler argues that it is not enough to examine moral codes, what we need to do is to see how the moral codes are lived - the question is what kind of subjects are being produced? (2004: 310). This is what Butler, following Adorno, unusually defines as a moral practice: the way in which individuals appropriate rules in a living way; while ethics is defined as the set of rules detached from life (Chambers and Carver 2008: 98).[30] The problem here is that certain norms make individual life intelligible: 'they are the conditions of possibility for the being appearing before us to be taken as human, to be recognised as a subject' (ibid). Conversely, certain norms make certain lives unintelligible: Being 'is constrained in advance by a regime of truth that decides what will and will not be a recognisable form of being' (Butler 2005: 22). According to Butler, these are the rules that need to be challenged - the rules that make life unlivable (Chambers and Carver 2008: 98).

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide a reconstruction of *Gender Trouble* in order to develop Butler's version of feminist immanent critique. As mentioned in the introduction, her work is relevant for my project as a feminist example of non-normative critique, which is partially inspired by Foucault. However, her work is not only relevant for this project, it is also necessary for the following reason: Butler offers an account of the constitution of the gendered subject through institutions; and an account of immanent resistance to gender norms. These two points are taken on board as demands for immanent feminist critique. As we will see, Oksala and Deleuze also

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[30] It is important to note that morality and ethics are conceptualised differently to Butler in this project. See chapter 3.

respond to these two demands in their own way. The move to their work was motivated by the limitations of Butler's project. First, Butler's main focus is the discursive construction of gender. In her account, gender is inscribed in the body by discourse (1999: 11, 143). As Hannah Stark argues, the implication of this is the diminished power of materiality and the body (2017: 64). This has been acknowledged by Butler herself: 'I confess, however, that I am not a very good materialist. Every time I try to write about the body, the writing ends up being about language' (2004a: 198). As we will see, in opposition to this, both Oksala and Deleuze go further at avoiding discursive idealism, which Oksala defines as the idea that language brings something into existence (2016: 30). Oksala argues that even though discourses do not have the power to construct bodies, they provide an account of reality that excludes some of its features. However, our experience of the world can challenge linguistic practices, which can then be slowly modified by political action (2016: 39). Then, I will argue that Deleuze goes further than Oksala by providing an account of the body as productive: it is constituted through its capacity to affect and be affected by other bodies.

The second problem of Butler's account is that she relies on discursive contradictions to undermine gender. However, As David M. Halperin shows, contradictions do not necessarily incapacitate oppressive systems. They might actually empower discourses by allowing them to adapt (1995: 33-34). For example, the reconceptualisation of homosexuality in 19th century Germany from perversity to a natural condition (for a minority of people) had the unintended consequence of replacing sending homosexuals to jail for fixed terms with sending homosexuals to insane asylums for life. This shows that we can go from one discourse, to another contradictory one, without undermining homophobia. The second example is how the contradictions that portray 'the homosexual' as both sick and blameworthy function together to systematically oppress those who fall into the category, while the contradictions of heterosexuality empower the heterosexual. Heterosexuality is defined simultaneously as a social norm, a natural condition, an accomplishment that should be celebrated, a precarious state that should be protected (Halperin 1995: 46-47). This allows heterosexuality to thrive. Its incoherence is invisible because it is not an object of knowledge, it is conceived as a condition of objective knowledge for other objects including homosexuality.

This is connected to the third problem, Butler relies on contradictions to avoid metaphysics. However, as Oksala and Deleuze show, we need metaphysics in order to be able to account for change. Now, we need to clarify what each thinker means by metaphysics. The three thinkers reject the idea of metaphysics as an immutable essence. As already mentioned, Butler critiques the claim that one *is* a woman or man due to our sex, or sexuality, as if this had any meaning before signification. Furthermore, Butler is worried about the hierarchies associated with metaphysics (men over woman, heterosexuals over homosexuals, etcetera). Similarly, Oksala recognises that metaphysics of substance upholds '…an immutable and potentially oppressive hierarchy of beings' (2016: 24). As we will see in chapter 3, Deleuze replaces the idea of a metaphysical essence with a relational conception of power; and he also criticises hierarchies based on claims to essence. However, for Oksala and for Deleuze this does not mean that we should reject all metaphysics. In Oksala's words: 'not mentioning the word "metaphysics" does

not mean that feminist problems concerning it will disappear' (2016: 22). The reason for this is that the problem of political change is inextricably linked to metaphysics. In particular, we need to contest and modify the conceptual schema that organise reality. How can this change happen? Following Foucault, Oksala argues that metaphysical schema are constituted and maintained by social and practices (2016: 6, 30). However this does not mean that merely imagining alternative less problematic conceptual schema is sufficient (2016: 26). Instead, the point is that 'our ontological order of things is itself the outcome of a political struggle' (2016: 36). Furthermore, there is a gap between experience and language - the richness of our experience of the world is not always captured by the dominant discourses and its normative determinants - that encourages this struggle (2016: 66). It opens up a space for the contestation of discourse and the gradual change of conceptual schema. Oksala describes the struggle as is collective, anonymous, local, partial, slow, and patient (2016: 35). Now, Deleuze's engagement with metaphysics is harder to summarise. For now it should suffice to say that he ties the question of change to becoming and the production of difference. However, in opposition to Butler, in Deleuze difference is not produced through negation - difference is affirmative. Lastly, before we move on, there is another reason why it is necessary to turn to Deleuze and Oksala: they both provide a deeper account of time. Oksala by focusing on how we can turn to the past to form a feminist politics of solidarity that is not based in identity; and Deleuze in order to provide an account of the constitution of habits and memories, while maintaining the openness of the present and the future.

2. Johanna Oksala: *Feminist Experiences* as Immanent Critique

This chapter provides a reconstruction of Johanna Oksala's version of feminist immanent critique in *Feminist Experiences.* The aim of this critique is to change the unequal power relations that organise reality in an unjust manner for women (2016: 3). There are several reasons to move from Butler to Oksala. First, as already mentioned, Oksala is better at avoiding the problem of discursive idealism through her recognition that experience can exceed discourse. Second, Oksala's turn to metaphysics allows her to provide a deeper account of social and political change, and to deepen immanence (Oksala argues that paradoxically, immanence requires metaphysics). Third, Oksala provides a deeper examination of time, which integrate notions of historical consistency more firmly into a non-identitarian account of feminist solidarity. Furthermore, Oksala is relevant for this project in her own right because she puts forward a conception of critique that is both feminist and philosophical. Oksala challenges traditional conceptions of philosophy as contemplation, where there is no place for political ideologies such as feminism. Additionally, Oksala also challenges feminist critiques of philosophy that argue it has nothing to do with reality (2016: 3-4). Against these two views, Oksala argues that feminist theory needs metaphysics in order to expose the conceptual frameworks that produce and organise reality. This shifts the task of feminist theory away from a purely empirical study of women's lives, which Oksala argues is not enough. To be more precise, we need a metaphysical inquiry to grasp how knowledge about the world is conceptualised, organised and legitimised (2016: 4). How is this analysis undertaken? The answer is immanently. The reason for this is that 'there exists no place outside language, power, society, and history from which one could construct a theory of these things' (ibid). Therefore, we can only work from within the social world. Paradoxically, this means that the analysis's must be transcendental, not in the Kantian sense of searching for universal structures, but in the phenomenological and poststructuralist sense of interrogating the historical, cultural and political conditions that shape our experience of reality (2016: 4-5). This transcendental study is important for gender because it shows that it is not an empirical fact. Gender is the effect of power relations and practices that can be questioned and denaturalised (2016: 5). Therefore, feminist philosophy has to ask '...how we have come to understand the world around us as hierarchically gendered, for example, and how genders and their relationship could be conceived otherwise' (ibid).

Oksala's metaphysical study is inspired by phenomenology and Foucault, which provide her with a form of critical and historical transcendental philosophy needed for her feminist project. Here, in opposition to the Kantian universal project, 'metaphysics is understood as a critical questioning of the historical conditions of possibility of our experience' (2016: 6). According to Oksala, phenomenology is helpful because it challenges the idea of the existence of a world that is simply made up of objects as they appear to us. This is done by focusing on the question of the way objects are constituted in our perceptual experience. The implication of this is the recognition of the possibility of different perspectives of the world: 'I am able to recognise the way that I can actually only perceive those aspects of things that are visible from my perspective' (2016: 6).

Furthermore, phenomenology relies on the methodological practice of bracketing, which provides the critical distance needed to move from our own experiences and the assumptions we take for granted, into the study of their constitutive conditions (2016: 7). This is followed by the insistence that metaphysical schemas that organise reality are historically contingent, which implies that we can change them. However, as we will see, Oksala reformulates the phenomenological method in order to be able to account for feminist problems such as gender. On the other hand, Foucault is helpful for Oksala's project due to his conception of philosophy as an ontology of the present, which analyses the historically specific contingent practices that make up the present. One of the ways of doing this is through the method of problematisation, which Oksala introduces as: 'The possibility of contesting and transforming metaphysical schemas understood as the sedimented and normally taken-for-granted background beliefs' (2016: 7). In particular, problematisation focuses on behaviours, practices and actions as objects that can be changed. It is important to highlight that Oksala sees the possibility of contesting metaphysical schemas as evidence that Foucault does not reject transcendental philosophy. The fact that we can target these objects shows that they have already been affected by political or historical forces that made them uncertain and problematic. The role of thought then, is to take a step back from these practices and expose its rationality. As Oksala explains, this is similar to phenomenology's bracketing: '...through a kind of bracketing it is possible to take distance from forms of behaviour and to reflect on these forms as a problem' (2016: 7).

So far we have covered Oksala's use of Foucault and phenomenology in order to take a step back and historicise our present metaphysical schemas that organise the world. Additionally, Oksala also uses phenomenology and Foucault to rethink the role of experience in feminist philosophy, in particular the complex relation between experience and language. Oksala puts forward a nuanced position that avoids the binary between the rejection of experience as a discursive effect, on the one hand, and the idea that experience is independent of language, on the other (2016: 9). Foucault is important here due to his conception of discourse, not as unchanging and deterministic, but as a historically specific practice, which cannot be analysed independently from its use by subjects (2016: 10). This implies that the subject is not merely the effect of language, the subject is an actor in language games: 'they "do things with words", namely interact with each other and the world around them' (ibid). On the side of phenomenology, posits a similar relationship between experience and language. Merleau-Ponty recognised the intersubjective constitution of experience through its situatedness in language, culture and history. Furthermore, Martin Heidegger's (who was Husserl's student) early work was concerned with the problem of retaining the richness of experience without reifying it in language (2016: 10). The point is to retain the meaning of lived experience, without positioning it as pre-discursive, and without reifying it (2016: 10-11).

Feminism and metaphysics

Oksala is aware of the problems of metaphysics: it relies on dualisms where women occupy the inferior term (2016: 22); it essentialises gender difference (by portraying it as immutable); additionally, as mentioned in chapter 1, conceptions of metaphysics as immutable exclude

different ways of being that fall outside of the gender binary and preclude the possibility of change. However, Oksala still contends that we have to engage with metaphysics. The reason for this is that equal opportunities do not necessarily challenge the underlying values and structures of society that position women as inferior to men (2016: 21). For example, in Finland women's education level has surpassed men's but this has not translated into higher salaries or prestige. Secondly, in Oksala's words: 'not mentioning the word "metaphysics" does not mean that the feminist problems concerning it will disappear' (2016: 22). We have to acknowledge the relationship between metaphysics and politics - as the framework that organises and limits the way we think and interact with the political world - and submit it to a critical examination. Thirdly, the feminist concerns about metaphysical hierarchies are based on a particular conception of metaphysics as immutable (20016: 24). However, as Oksala explains, there are two traditions of metaphysics: the Aristotelian and the Kantian. Aristotle's traditional conception of metaphysics is concerned with the study of essences and the issue of gaining knowledge of the structure of the world. Kant, on the other hand, shifted the question of metaphysics to an investigation of our conceptual schema, and not the nature of reality itself (2016: 23). However, as already mentioned, according to Kant conceptual schema are universal structures. In opposition to this, Oksala's project of a feminist ontology of the present can be understood as a historical analysis of practices that are open to change (2016: 6).

Still, the project of developing a feminist metaphysics faces several challenges. Oksala examines Christine Battersby's (1998) project of constructing a new feminist ontology in order to highlight some important issues. According to Oksala, Battersby new ontology is inspired by the subject position occupied by western women in modernity (2016: 24). One of the features of the female subject, according to Battersby, is motherhood, which she integrates to the conception of the self in the following way. Battersby takes the relationship between the mother and the foetus/ children as an indication that there is no ontological distinction between the self and the other, in opposition to how the self traditionally conceived. The problem of this project, according to Oksala, is that not only does Battersby describes the position of women in western cultures, but she also makes a claim about how we should conceive this subject by positioning the female as the norm. This means that this historically specific and normative subject serves as the model for a new ontology. Therefore, the project ends up being caught in circularity: 'why should we take a subject position constructed through an oppressive history and metaphysics as the model for a new ontology intended to revolutionise that history and metaphysics? Are we not in fact ontologizing the historically specific and contingent subject position that we want to radically transform and rethink?' (2016: 25). Secondly, we have the issue of method: how can we expose the metaphysical assumptions regarding women, if we are situated and constituted in this context? The project of a new feminist metaphysics presupposes that we can understand our present ontology, and that it is not necessary (2016: 26). Third, there is no point on imagining new metaphysics if this will not have an effect on reality. For this reason Oksala argues the following: 'To imagine a different future, we have to start by understanding the nature of our present' (ibid). There is a similar problem of method related to language. After the linguistic turn in philosophy, philosophers such as Derrida presuppose that language forms our conceptual schema, so

language is inescapable. The task of philosophy then becomes to understand our metaphysical schema. However the problem is that although some of the ontological assumptions can be articulated, there are some commitments that cannot be challenged from within language, such as phallogocentrism (2016: 26-28). This is Derrida's point: 'There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic and the implicit postulation of precisely what it seeks to contest' (Derrida in Oksala 2016: 28). According to Oksala, in order to challenge Derrida and to be able to construct a new metaphysics (as opposed to only destabilising our existing one), we need to answer the following question: 'how can we attach words to things in a new way?' (2016: 29).

Foucault: ontology, language and metaphysics

Oksala turns to Foucault's work to respond to the challenges raised in the previous section concerning the possibility of a new ontology and the relationship between metaphysics and language. Foucault is helpful for three reasons. First, Foucault's conception of philosophy - as an ontology of the present and ourselves - helps us in the task of opening up the possibility for a new ontology by historicising ours. This is connected to the second point, as already mentioned, for Foucault metaphysical schemas are not shaped by universal reason, they are constituted in a field of historically changing practices, in this sense Foucault is a post-Kantian. In the following quote, Foucault situates his own project in comparison to Kant: 'The aim is not to deduce from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know, but to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do or think' (Foucault in Oksala 2016: 29). Thirdly, Oksala is interested in Foucault's conception of language and its relation to metaphysics. As Oksala explains, language, for Foucault, is not simply an abstract grid of intelligibility. It is a social and historical practice that is not independent from power relations. This means that language can be both a site of domination and a site of struggle through power relations. Foucault describes language as a set of games made up of multiple intersecting practices, which can be contested (2016: 30). Now we need to clarify the status of practices in Oksala's interpretation of Foucault. As Oksala elucidates, Foucault's focus on practices has often been interpreted as a rejection of metaphysics. In her own words, this interpretation contends that 'instead of natural objects or things, there are only practices that are constitutive of discursive objects' (ibid). Against this view, Oksala argues that Foucault's work on practices can be understood as a critique of naturalism - the idea that the world is made up of objects as they appear to us (2016: 6). This does not mean that practices bring objects into existence - which would amount to discursive idealism. It means that the material world can be identified and classified in more than one way throughout different historical discursive practices (for example either as madness or as mental illnesses) (2016: 30). In other words, what we conceive as natural objects can actually be constructed differently in discourse: 'knowledge of everyday reality, is derived from and maintained by social practices, but comes to be understood as the description of the given, objective reality' (2016: 31). This is a metaphysical

study, not in terms of discovering essences, but in terms of exposing the rationality that regulates different social practices (metaphysics can be understood as the rules of the game). Therefore, Foucault's contribution to the study of social practices is not only the idea that they are shaped by power relations, but also that their rules are connected to social norms and hierarchies. For example, gender is conceptualised as a binary where man is portrayed as the norm. Furthermore, the rules of knowledge production, including what counts as knowledge or not, are also shaped by power. Both examples reflect asymmetrical power relations and show how knowledge production and categories and are a site of contestation of power (2016: 31-32).

To sum up, there are three elements that Oksala flashes out from Foucault in order to build a feminist metaphysics: his notion of philosophy as an ontology of the present, his understanding of metaphysical schemas as historical, and his conception of language (in relation to power). Now we need to make the connection between this and Oksala's feminist practice more explicit. We can begin by looking at the relation between feminism and Foucault's ontology of the present. Foucault shows how the rules of knowledge production are historical. In Oksala's words: 'the aim is to understand how fundamental ordering codes, scientific objects, and conceptual divisions developed in historical practices: how our conceptions were made and how the conditions for their formation constrain our present way of thinking' (2016: 32).[31] Then, the historical differences, uncovered by Foucault, help us understand what is particular about our present in relation to the past, and how there are other ways of organising society. Here Oksala makes a connection between Foucault and Heidegger, and how '...it is only against the background of what is different in history that the background beliefs of our present show up' (2016: 33). For example, madness or death have been conceptualised differently across time. This in turn allows us to take a step back from our present and realise it is less necessary and more contingent than we thought: if things have not always been this way, they don't have to be this way now, and they can be different in the future. Oksala argues that this is indispensable for feminism, it shows that 'the subordinate status of women is a fundamental feature of our culture, history, and religion and yet it is not essential or necessary' (2016: 34). Furthermore, Foucault's idea that ontology is embedded in practices helps feminism to clarify the relationship between metaphysics and oppressive social practices. One is not the cause of the other, metaphysics can be understood as the rules of social practices. However, this does not mean that there are only one set of rules. Even though we cannot deny the existence of dominant metaphysical schemas, there is always a struggle between alternative conceptions, and there is always room for the contestation dominant metaphysics by destabilising or problematising them. For this reason, Oksala argues that the task of a new ontology should not fall exclusively on philosophy, feminist politics cannot and should not avoid metaphysics. The role of feminist philosophy is then the following: to contribute 'by exposing historically specific metaphysical schemas and by the creation of new concepts, theoretical tools, and ways of conceiving of the world' (2016: 35). While individuals cannot simply

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[31] This is the point made by Ian Hacking (2002: 70). History is 'the history of the present, how our present conceptions were made, how the conditions for their formation constrain our present ways of thinking.' An example of this is Foucault's account of the transformation of the prison and treatment of criminals, which involved a study of the concept of criminality, for example - in *Discipline and Punish.*

create a new ontology by themselves, new political practices do affect ontology in a local, partial and slow manner. As Foucault reminds us, our ontological order is the outcome of an ongoing political struggle, which we have to be a part of.

Feminism and experience

After her defence of the need of feminist metaphysics, Oksala's rethinks the role of first person accounts of experience in feminism. Her main argument is that even though these accounts have been criticised for being unsophisticated, at best, and illegitimate, at worst, women's experiences are necessary: not as a ground for feminism, but as a challenge to sexist discourses and conceptual schemas (2016: 36). Oksala begins by recognising the problems of a collective female experience, mainly the positioning of a particular experience - for example, that of white middle class women - as the prototype of all female experience, and at the centre of feminist politics, while ignoring the differences between women. An example of this type of critique was given by postmodernism and poststructuralism: 'the contention was that female experience, no matter how inclusive or broadly defined, was a theoretically flawed starting point for feminism, because it was constructed through the vary same oppressive power relations that feminists wanted to challenge and resist' (2016: 37). Secondly, by focusing on experience we risk overlooking how experience is constructed through discourse. This claim is opposed to prediscursive conceptions of experience, that argue identities exist before discourse, and risk naturalising such identities and excluding others (this is Butler's worry too) (2016: 37-38). However, just as Oksala rejects this prediscursive conception of experience, she also rejects the view that everything is constituted through language - discursive idealism (Butler is guilty of this to varying degrees across her work). The problem of this position is that we end up trapped in language without being able to refer to the material world. In opposition to this Oksala argues that 'even though we can only identify something as something by using linguistically mediated conceptual determinations, our linguistic practices do not create the world, but must be capable of interacting with the things that we speak about' (2016: 39). For example, while identity categories - such as man and woman - are discursive, our experiences can exceed or not match these categories. Therefore, feminist theories of experience have to be able to account for the possibility of experiencing something new that forces us to change our linguistic practices (2016: 38-39).

Oksala then turns to John McDowell's account of experience in order to develop the argument that experience is already conceptual and avoid discursive idealism.[32] This means that all sensory experience is mediated through our conceptual schemas, there is no pure sensory experience independent of them (2016: 41). Therefore, empirical knowledge is possible due to the connection between sensory experience and conceptual judgements: 'if we conceive experience in terms of impacts on sensibility that occur outside the sphere of concepts, then we cannot appeal to this non conceptual experience to justify conceptual judgements or beliefs' (2016: 42). Put in a different way, we are not forced to make an impossible leap from non conceptual data to

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[32] Oksala's position is situated between Joan Scott (1992), who argues that there is no separation between experience and language, and Sonja Kurks (2011) who highlights the importance of nonlinguistic experience (2016: 40).

conceptual content (2016: 43). The problem becomes how to account for change in conceptual schemas and how to challenge oppressive discourses. Oksala's answer is that even though experience is conceptually structured, it is never fully expressed or reducible to discourse. Women can be (and often are) dissatisfied with the way their experiences are portrayed by dominant discourses and cultural representations (2016: 45). In Oksala's words: '[women] recognize and are able to voice, in some way, the fact that their experiences are impoverished, painful, distorted, degrading, or disempowering in contemporary culture' (2016: 50). This might lead to the adjustment of our thinking in response to experience, or to new forms of experience in response to new thinking. There is a mutually constitutive relation and constant negotiation between experience and thought (2016: 45).

   To conclude, Oksala's defence of experience is not an appeal to identity politics based on the shared experience of women (2016: 46). To the contrary, Oksala recognises the problems of identity politics that naturalise experience. However she argues that the rejection of identity politics does not mean we have to reject all forms of experience. As long as we understand that experience is culturally contingent, as opposed to natural or necessary, we can use experience to problematise any foundational claim (2016: 51). For instance, listening to the experiences of others might allow us to critically examine our own experience and to 'disidentify' from our own positions. Even if experience is flawed and ideological, as Scott (1992) claims, it can still serve as a motivation for political change. For example, women breaking the silence and raising awareness about rape (without naturalising their experiences). Additionally, experience allows us to understand how ontological concepts directly affect people's lives, and this can motivate us to change the way we conceive the world (2016: 47). Oksala then turns to feminist appropriations of Foucault to provide an example of the importance of the use of experience for feminist practice (2016: 48-49). In particular, Oksala is interested in the reformulation of the outdated feminist practice of consciousness-raising inspired by Foucault's work on the practices of the self. Consciousness-raising can be understood as a practice of the self because it involves a transformation that challenges cultural norms about gender. Foucault's practices of the self are helpful for this by providing a non-teleological account of becoming. This means that consciousness-raising should not be understood as a confession that aims to find the truth about women, nor about finding commonalities between women, but as a problematisation of who we are, who we aspire to be, and the normalised self. Furthermore, this should not be seen merely as an individualistic practice, but as a collective practice that is only meaningful in a shared cultural context. For these reasons, Oksala argues that consciousness-raising is 'conductive to a critical self-transformation and collective political action…' (2016: 48).

Foucault and Experience

After defending the need of metaphysics and first-person accounts of experience for feminist political practice, Oksala turns to the problem of the status of experience in Foucault's work. She situates her reading of Foucault on experience against Linda Alcoff (2000), who argues that Foucault grants discourse the power to attach meaning to feelings and sensations. There are two consequences of Alcoff's reading: first, Foucault is unable to distinguish between discourses and

bodily sensations; and second, this leads to the rejection of subjective descriptions of experience. As Oksala explains, this is a devastating critique, since the reduction of experience to discourse has disastrous consequences for feminism, for example by reducing the experience of rape to dominant discourses (2016: 54). However, contrary to Alcoff, Oksala argues first, that Foucault does not conceive discourse and experience as ontologically coextensive; and second, that he does not ignore the importance of experience (2016: 55). We can begin by developing Oksala's reading of Foucault's conception of experience. Oksala contends that although poststructuralism is usually critical of existentialism and phenomenology for their positioning of lived experience as a staring point, Foucault's studies can still be understood 'as historical inquiries into particular modes of experience' (2016: 55). For example, the experience of madness and sexuality in the *History of Madness* and The *History of Sexuality* respectively. Oksala uses Foucault's definition of experience in *The Use of Pleasure* 'as the correlation, in a culture, between fields of knowledge, types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity' (Foucault in Oksala 2016: 56). This definition is connected to the three axes of Foucault's work: 'regimes of truth (knowledge), relations of power (governmentality), and subjectivization (forms of relations to one-self)' (ibid). There are two implications of this conception. First, experience is heterogenous - it brings together different elements that are not reducible to each other. In Oksala's words: 'Instead of a clearly defined prism, we might think of it as a series of foldings: the subject must fold back on itself to create a private interiority while being in constant contact with its constitutive outside' (2016: 57). Second, this means that experience is both constitutive and constituted: 'the external determinants or historical background structures of experience and the internal, private sensations fold into and continuously keep modifying each other' (2016: 57).

The claim that experience is both constituted and constitutive is also related to the status of practices - ways of doing things - in Foucault's work (2016: 58). On the one hand, practices are *constitutive* in the sense that subjects and objects become intelligible through them. In Oksala's words: 'The intelligibility of our experience of the world is constituted in historically and culturally specific practices, and the the philosophical analysis of ourselves must be a critical study of them' (2016: 58). On the other hand, practices are *constituted* by the acts of the subject in the material world, even when the meaning of those acts is constituted by the rules of the practices. Therefore, practices can be understood as the rules of a game; which then create a field of experience, in which the subject and object change in relation to one another, under certain conditions (2016: 58). This means that even though experience is constituted through the rules of knowledge and power, the subject can also modify these practices (2016: 59). Phenomenology also claims that experience is constituted and constitutive (2016: 66). However, the main difference from Foucault, according to Oksala, is that phenomenology is a philosophy of the subject. This means that the subject is at the centre of the constitution of experience, through the assimilation of the object. Foucault, on the other hand, rejects the positioning of subjective experience as the foundation of ontology and epistemology. However, as already mentioned, this does not mean that Foucault rejects experience (2016: 60). Oksala argues that Foucault still claims that the analysis of experience is indispensable. In particular, experience is necessary for

the social critique of dominant discourses, since experience could be radically transformed if it was governed by different discourses and norms. As already explained, this assumes that there is a gap between experience and language: 'Linguistic description will nevertheless inevitably struggle to capture the richness and ambiguity of lived experience' (2016: 62). For example, the gap between the experience of hysterics, perverts and homosexuals, and the dominant discourses about them, can be used to challenge those discourses (2016: 60). For this reason Foucault was interested in the examination of subjugated knowledges, which are 'forms of discourse that have been disqualified for being below the required level of erudition or scientificity', but can nonetheless help question dominant discourses (2016: 62).

There are a few examples of this. The first one is the 1867 case of a French farm hand who sexually abused a girl called Sophie. This is the case that leads Alcoff to accuse Foucault of dismissing the role of experience by ignoring Sophie's experience. While Oksala agrees that Foucault's dismissal of Sophie's experience is an example of male arrogance and sexism, she does not think that Foucault dismisses all experiences (2016: 62). In fact, what interests Foucault in this case is the appearance of the discourse of the abnormal individual as the object of psychiatry (2016: 60). Additionally, this case shows how experience is discursively and normatively constructed in different manners throughout different historical periods; and that there are competing discursive practices, so there is always room for new transformations and challenges to the dominant discourses. For instance, the difference between the religious discourse of sin and salvation, the legal discourse of culpability, and the psychiatric discourse of pathology. The second example is the case of Alexina Barbin (also known as Heruline Barbin). This is one of the examples that Butler (1999) brings up to criticise Foucault for romanticising Herculine's life of non-identity, before being forced to identity as a man. Although Butler's warning against the romanticisation of non-identity is important (because it always exists in relation to identity), it is unclear if Foucault is actually guilty of this. Notwithstanding, what Oksala finds interesting about Foucault's work on Barbin is the juxtaposition between her/his memoirs and the medical accounts (2016: 63). Even though Barbin's account is shaped by narrative conventions and the dominant discourses of gender of the time, the gap between this first-person account and the scientific and legal discourses helps to problematise both accounts. In Oksala's words: '…Foucault attempts to show that while our experiential embodiment is never independent of dominant discourses and practices of power, it is not reducible to the either' (2016: 64). Thirdly, in *Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, Sister, and Brother* there is an interesting juxtaposition between his own memoirs, and psychiatric and criminal documents, which shows the confrontation between different discourses. Again, this demonstrates how experience is constituted by the three axes of knowledge, power, and the subject's relation with itself (2016: 65). According to Oksala, these three examples show that our experience contains the potential for resistance against the normalising effects of power and knowledge. In Oksala's words: 'Our only option of resistance against the normalising effects of power/knowledge does not lie in waiting for a life-changing event capable of shattering the normalised self, nor do we have to attempt to cross its conventional limits. Our everyday experience already contains fractures and lines of fragility' (2016: 66).

Phenomenology, language and experience

After the defence of the need of a feminist metaphysics inspired by Foucault, where experience plays an important role to challenge dominant discourses, Oksala moves on to reassessing the value of phenomenology for feminism. Phenomenology is relevant for her project because it challenges the postmodern focus on discourse at the expense of experience, just as Oksala's interpretation of Foucault's separation of experience and discourse does. However, Oksala's interest in phenomenology is not an appeal to the return to prediscursive experience either. She is interested in phenomenology's contribution to the study of the constitution of linguistic meaning (2016: 72). As we will see, for phenomenology to be compatible with her feminist project, it needs to be able to account for the irreducibility of experience to discourse, in order for discourse to be open for change. We can begin by looking at the problem of prediscursive accounts, as exemplified by Oksala's examination of Sonia Kruks (2011). The first problem is that of body essentialism — where female experience is determined by their bodies (2016: 72). Second, Oksala argues that Kruks ignores the role of culture and language, also leaving no room for the problematisation of experience. For example, we would make different assumptions after seeing a woman with a black eye compared to a man, not for natural reasons but due to the prevalence of domestic violence (2016: 73-74). Third, even when Kruks recognises the role of discourse by distinguishing between first-person (prediscursive) experience and third-person (linguistic) experience, this leads to experience being reduced either to subjectivism, in the first place, or discourse in the second case (2016: 74). This in turn disregards the issue of the relationship between experience and language that Oksala has already developed through John McDowell's claim that experience is already conceptual. We will now look at phenomenology's contribution to this topic.

Oksala begins with an examination of Husserl, whose work attempted to answer the question of 'How words "stick" to things and meaning supervenes upon reality' (2016: 76). We can begin to answer this question through Husserl's concept of intentionality which Oksala defines as: '...a unique and intrinsic property of consciousness by means of which its relations to the world are intentional relations of meaning' (2016: 77). According to Oksala, the West Coast interpretation of Husserl - by Dagfinn Føllesdal, Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith - contend that the meaning of the intentionality of consciousness, which gives meaning to our experience of the world by mediating our relation with objects, is the same type of meaning as the meaning of linguistic expression (2016: 78-79).[33] In Oksala's words: 'the meanings that we express in language are the very same meaning entities that give structure and significance to our experience' (2016: 79). This implies, first, that meaning is not only subjective, meaning is intersubjective because it can be shared through language and it constitutes a shared cultural reality. Secondly, equating the meaning of our conscious experience to the meaning of language implies that meaning is always potentially expressible in language (2016: 87). However this does not mean that all experiences are expressed in language, nor that language is rich enough to

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[33] The West Coast interpretation is similar to the poststructuralist claim that experience is structured by language.

express all experience (2016: 79-80). While we need language to express the meaning of our experiences, our experience is not reducible to its expression. Now, there is a problem that has to be addressed. Phenomenology relies on the method of transcendental reduction, which allows us to distance ourselves from our experience of the world in order to analyse the intentionality of our consciousness that structures reality. The question then is the following: how can this be done if we equate linguistic meaning to the meaning that structures our experience? Additionally we also have the problem of communicating our findings afterwards through language. As Oksala explains, Husserl argues that the transcendental reduction is accompanied by a change of the sense of language (2016: 80-81). According to Heidegger, this means that the phenomenologist experiences a personal transformation through his/her immersion in lived experience (2016: 83). The question then becomes how to reflect about this experience, without reifying it or violating its meaning. Heidegger's answer is that lived experience is already meaningful. The role of phenomenology is then radically transformed, it is not to describe life and impose systematicity on it, but to enact the meaning of life itself (2016: 83, 85). However, Oksala contends that there is still a problem with this answer: how do we distinguish between reflections that are true to life and violations of experience? (2016: 85). Heidegger answers with the concept of formal indication - these are concepts that have no content and only indicate the way in which we can fulfil their meaning through enactment in our own lived existence (2016: 85-86). If the concepts are empty, then we no longer need bracketing. However, according to Oksala, this answer is still unsatisfactory. Even though we are able to have access to lived experience without claiming it is prediscursive, there is no guarantee we understand the language of life and remain true to it, and there is the risk that we will end up excluding others with different 'embodied experiences and faculties' in the name of the true language of life (2016: 86-87).

The phenomenology of birth

Oksala then turns to the problem of the phenomenology of birth in order to challenge the central assumptions of phenomenology. Namely, the privileged status of the subject and the search for the invariable structures of experience. Oksala's broader goal in this section is to show how the role of a feminist phenomenology is not to 'deepen' or to 'correct' phenomenological accounts - for example, by including feminist experiences such as pregnancy - but to rethink the phenomenological project as a whole (2016: 88). Feminist phenomenology should be therefore understood as a critical current and not as a 'faithful assistant' of the phenomenological project (ibid). The problem of birth leads Oksala to generative phenomenology and to phenomenology of the event. Generative phenomenology is a style of phenomenology that was developed by Husserl and is concerned with the intersubjective conditions of possibility of experiences such as birth, death and sexual difference (2016: 96). This type of phenomenology implies a critique of egological accounts that place the subject at the centre of sense constitution and are unable to account for the problems of birth and death. In opposition to this, generative phenomenology recognises the role of tradition, culture, language and history for the constitution of experience (2016: 90). For example, birth and death are made sense of through cultural rituals and traditions (2016: 91). Birth does not only have different empirical meanings, but it can also be understood as

a transcendental condition of possibility for sense constitution, as Christine Schües (1997) does. As Oksala explains, Schües argues that birth is not the beginning of existence, it is a leap from one mode of existence into another, where we are confronted with a world of objects. Additionally, the fact that we are born, also implies that we are born from someone, which opens up the question of sexual difference (2016: 91). Before moving on to the problem of sexual difference it is important to note how the focus on birth challenges the transcendental subject in two ways. Firstly, the condition of possibility of sense constitution is birth and not the transcendental ego, since we are born from someone else. Secondly, the transcendental subject is challenged because that someone is not a generic term, it is a specific body that can give birth (2016: 91). However, this does not mean that sexual difference can be reduced to reproduction. On the empirical level, sexual difference is contingent and culturally constructed, and can potentially have unlimited meanings. Nonetheless, on the transcendental level, this difference is fundamental for the condition of possibility of birth and sense-constitution. In other words, while reproduction is fundamental on the transcendental level for the condition of possibility, this does not translate to a founding ontological universal difference between two types of beings.

After exploring how the egological account of the subject is unable to account for experiences beyond the subject such as birth and sexual difference, and the need for a generative approach that takes into account the transcendental conditions of possibility and the different historical and cultural intersubjective elements of constitution, we can now move on to phenomenology of the event. Following Dastour (2000), Oksala defines an event as something unexpected that breaks with the flow of time (2016: 95). This challenges the egological account of the subject in a different manner: by presenting something that happens to the subject, but does not belong to it. In Oksala's words: there is an unpredictability to experience capable of shattering the subject's horizon of expectations' (2016: 96). Oksala then ends the section by contrasting Foucault's conception of sexuality to Husserl's in order to show Foucault's compatibility with phenomenology of the event. While Husserl understands sexuality as a goal-directed drive, which creates social bonds and ensures new generations, Foucault's understanding of sexuality is closer to the phenomenology of the event through his concept of a limit-experience. For Foucault sexuality can be a limit-experience that 'throws us outside of ourselves' (2016: 94). Foucault's challenge to traditional phenomenology then is his shift away from the focus on normal experiences in order to find the structures of consciousness, by instead focusing on the possibility of transgressing what are considered normal experiences (2016: 92).

Gender and Phenomenology

After examining the problem of birth, Oksala focuses on the following question: 'how can phenomenology as a philosophical method of investigation account for gender?' (2016: 97). In order to answer this question Oksala critically assesses four different readings of phenomenology in relation to gender: the classical reading, the corporeal reading, the intersubjective reading, and the post-phenomenological reading - which she endorses after showing how the first three methods are insufficient. Oksala begins by looking at the classical reading, which she argues is inadequate to account for gender because of the need to bracket bodily characteristics in favour

of a transcendental analysis of subjectivity, understood as universal consciousness (2016: 97-99). She then moves to the corporeal reading, which was inspired by the work of Merleau-Ponty, who argues that it is impossible to have a complete transcendental reduction of consciousness. As Oksala explains, this has been interpreted as a call to focus on the lived body, and the particular mode of female embodiement, as opposed to transcendental consciousness. However, the problem of this is that the female body is essentialized, even if what is being essentialized is female experience and not necessarily female biology (2016: 99-100). Additionally, Oksala argues that the focus on the body is insufficient to understand how the meaning of gender is actually produced. We need a deeper investigation into the cultural and historical ontological schemas that shape the meaning and value of bodies and experiences (2016: 101). For instance, bodies are moulded in sometimes violent ways to conform to the gender schema, as the example of the surgery of intersex babies shows (2016: 100).

The third reading is the intersubjective reading of phenomenology. The question here is how to conceive intersubjectivity. Oksala explains three ways, which are highlighted by Dan Zahavi (2001). We can begin with the first two: first intersubjectivity as the concrete relation between subjects, and second intersubjectivity as the a priori structure of subjectivity before we actually experience other subjects (2016: 101-102). In these two conceptions, gender is irrelevant, since our shared experience of reality is constituted regardless of the other's gender or particular characteristics (2016: 102). However, there is also a third type of intersubjectivity that refers to the shared cultural sphere or 'homeworld' that can help us account for our gender experience (and its contestation). This third type recognises that as subjects we are '... already situated in an intersubjective, historical nexus of sense' (2016: 102). This implies that gender norms are acquired through our interactions with our communities that teach us what counts as normal and abnormal. Furthermore, these rules are constantly contested and can be altered, for example by women and intersex individuals. While the first two types of intersubjectivity are revealed through an analysis of the structures of perception, the third type is concerned with historical and cultural normative structures (2016: 103-104). Interestingly, the structures of the third type are actually what has to be bracketed in order to reach the a priori transcendental structures of the first and second types of intersubjectivity (2016: 104). This brings us to an important problem of phenomenology in terms of being able to account for gender. Despite the recognition of the importance of the third type of intersubjectivity, phenomenology still relies on the commitment to the universal transcendental structures of consciousness. In other words, there is a tension between its commitment to universal transcendental structures that can be accessed through the transcendental reduction, and the recognition of the historical and cultural specific structures that have to be bracketed for the transcendental reduction. While the transcendental reduction is unable to account for the problem of gender, if we give it up we face the problem of circularity: 'to start the analysis from a woman's experience when trying to understand what a woman is means already assuming that which we seek to explain' (2016: 104).

In order to move from this impasse, and to be able to account for the constitutive role of the social and cultural world, Oksala argues that we need to modify the phenomenological method (she refers to this modifications as the post-phenomenological reading). The first

modification is to abandon the idea that we can completely bracket our ontological commitments and assumptions about the world through reflection (2016: 105). Put in a different way, it is impossible to completely get rid of our assumptions and what we take for granted and consider natural about our experience. Instead, Oksala accepts the idea of the hermeneutical circle: '...our method continuously turns back upon itself, questioning and modifying itself in an effort to articulate what it secretly thinks' (ibid). This implies that our investigations are always partial and incomplete. Secondly, Oksala challenges the primacy of the first-person perspective, which phenomenology posits as the starting point of the analysis that moves from individual consciousness to the universal structures of meaning (2016: 105, 107). Instead, Oksala argues it is helpful to look at anthropological, psychological, or historical studies of gender that allow us to appreciate different systems of normality and reveal features of our ontological schemas. For example, we can learn a lot from psychological studies about gender beliefs in children (2016: 105-106). These sort of studies from different disciplines make us aware of '...the hidden aspects of our own thought' (2016: 106). Before moving on to the third modification, it is important to note that Oksala does not reject the first-person perspective completely, these studies allow the subject to study the way it is constituted, so there is still a deeply personal aspect of post-phenomenology (2016: 107). The next modification is related to the transcendental reduction. Oksala does not completely reject the reduction, it is just transformed into a more partial version. Her conception is closer to Merleau-Ponty's definition of the reduction as '...the indeterminable effort to break our familiar acceptance of the world and to see as strange and paradoxical what we normally take for granted' (2016: 106). The last modification is that ontological schemas cannot be abstracted from our cultural norms, our forms of reflection are intertwined with our language, culture and history, and they can be modified (2016: 107). The implication for gender is that it is constituted both through embodiment and through normative cultural practices (2016: 108).

The critique of the feminine neoliberal subject

So far, Oksala has developed the conditions of possibility of feminist immanent critique through phenomenology and Foucault, who open up the way for the contestation of our metaphysical schema through the problematisation of our experience, which is formed in a community. According to Oksala's reading of Foucault, our everyday experience already contains fractures, which allows us to challenge the normalising effects of power/knowledge (2016: 66). Phenomenology on the other hand, begins with experience and then attempts to denaturalise it in order to understand the constitution of the subject (and gendered subjects) through cultural specific metaphysical schemas. Now we are moving to Oksala's critique of the feminine neoliberal subject. This critique can be understood as an investigation that seeks to explain how the feminine neoliberal subject is constructed. This investigation is inspired by Foucault's work on power and the constitution of the subject, which challenges the distinction between the public and the private realms by showing how the political subject is constituted by power relations that traverse the most private aspects of our life (2016: 111). For example, our relationship with ourselves is already political in the sense that we make ourselves comply with social norms. This

analysis can be understood as a critique of the liberal subject, which is supposed to enter the political arena as a fully formed subject of rights. As Oksala explains, in opposition to this, in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault shows how this subject of increased rights and freedoms is constructed through disciplinary mechanisms (2016: 111). This is also the case for the feminine subject that, as argued by Sandra Bartky (1988), is constructed through the disciplinary habits of dieting, fitness and beauty regimes. The rationality behind this disciplinary apparatus is to turn women into 'the docile and compliant companions of men just as surely as the army aims to turn its raw recruits into soldiers' (Bartky in Oksala 2016: 113). Women are encouraged to take part in these practices due to a powerful system of sanctions and rewards, where they risk the refusal of male patronage which provides women with intimacy and a the possibility of a descent livelihood (2016: 113). These practices are then internalised as normative habits that become part of their gender identity and create the illusion of a gender essence (this is similar to Butler's performative account of gender in chapter 1) (2016: 114). Furthermore, Oksala argues that habits can also be understood as a second nature that allows for some form of historical and cultural variation but is stable enough to create our experience of gender identity.

While Bartky concentrates on the governmental technique of discipline, Oksala critically examines the constitution of the feminine subject under neoliberalism, as a different technique of power. She follows Foucault's insight that 'shifts in techniques of government would have necessitated a shift in the corresponding construction of the subject' (2016: 115). As Oksala explains, according to Foucault, neoliberalism is a governmental practice that produces an atomic self-interested individual that competes for economic gains, and whose tendency to compete can be enhanced (2016: 115). While discipline mechanisms are still at work, through surveillance and normalisation, neoliberalism works under a new logic. The main change brought about by neoliberalism is the governing of society following the principles of the economy. This implies a less direct governmental focus on the social field, in favour of supporting the economy. In terms of government interference, we have a focus on the rules of the game or the environment to maximise economic competition, instead of the players themselves. In Foucault's words: There was 'an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of individuals' (Foucault in Oksala 3016: 117). According to Oksala, this does not mean that discipline's influence at the level of individual behaviour disappeared. However, individual behaviour is now identified as economic behaviour and is controlled at that level through economic gains and losses. The subject is then constructed as a consumer and entrepreneur, and not as the docile and efficient subject of disciplinary societies. This consumer subject makes individual choices based on its own interest that is irreducible and non-transferable. According to the neoliberal rationality, this is the only way that we achieve the common good, by allowing individuals to follow their own interests that end up converging with others. Furthermore, the subject can enhance its capacity to follow its interests by investing in itself through activities such as education, medical care, migration, vitamins, self-care, etcetera (2016: 118).

Now, the question is what about the feminine subject in particular? Oksala's contention is that this neoliberal masculinist subject - 'as an independent, self-interested, economic being' (2016: 112) - also characterises the feminine subject. Neoliberalism has challenged the

traditional gendered binaries which are linked to the division of labour (the binary of the private family realm of women, and the public individual realm of men). For instance, the possibility of women pursuing their careers is facilitated by the commodification of domestic and caring work, which is mostly done by other women (2016: 122-123). This also implies the expansion of the logic of the market into the family realm and caring responsibilities. Moreover, emotional resources and communicational skills that were traditionally associated with women are now expected from all workers. This means that although there is still a gendered division of labour and capabilities, we cannot understand forms of labour exclusively in gendered terms. While, we have experienced an intensification of the normative practices of feminine beauty described by Bartky, the rationality behind this discipline technique has changed. Women are also seen, and see themselves, as 'egoistical subjects of interest making free choices based on rational economic calculation' (2016: 120). As Oksala goes on: 'It is my contention that women are increasingly rationalising their participation in the normative habits of femininity in terms of their own economic interests, not in terms of men's interests' (2016: 124). In other words, there is a link between idealised conceptions of femininity and economic success. Women often look after themselves and enhance their appearance in order to advance their career. This does not mean that the normative subservient femininity has disappeared, but it is now seen as an individual choice among other equally valid choices (2016: 125). However, the problem of choice, according to Oksala, is that while we have the freedom to choose between different options, we do not have the power to shape those options. Additionally, choice masks the existing power imbalances in society in which women make choices, and how this power imbalances not only affect our capacity to make choices but also construct us as subjects (2016: 126). In Oksala's words: 'Women still internalise social divisions and power hierarchies through mundane techniques of gender to the extent that they become part of our subjectivities' (2016: 126). This shows that individual choices are not as free as we might think they are.

The possibilities for resistance: beyond socialist feminism

If we accept that the neoliberal idea of individual choice is problematic, the question then becomes what are the possibilities for resistance? What are the political alternatives to neoliberalism? One of the alternatives that Oksala critically examines are socialist policies, which focus on the problem of the redistribution of wealth in order to challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism, which has led to increasing economic inequality (2016: 127). Socialist politics move beyond the individualist conception of resistance of neoliberalism into an analysis of the structures of global capitalism, calling for a more class-conscious approach to feminism (2016: 130). While Oksala does not question the detrimental effects of neoliberalism on women's welfare; and she does not deny that this could be improved through the implementation of socialist policies, she does not believe that a return to socialist politics is the answer against neoliberalism. In her own words: 'I want to insist that the political challenge that neoliberalism presents to feminism calls for political measures and theoretical inventions that go beyond traditional welfare policies' (2016: 130). The problem of socialist feminism, according to Oksala, is that they hold a reductive conception of neoliberalism, as simply a set of economic policies that have undesirable

consequences for women's welfare, while overlooking the constitutive effects of neoliberalism (2016: 128). In particular, we need to analyse the constitutive effects of neoliberalism in terms of the subject - in this case the feminine subject; and of our political horizon - what is conceived as viable political options (or not) (2016: 128). This analysis is inspired by Foucault's 1979 lectures on neoliberalism, where he defines neoliberalism not as an ideology or economic doctrine, but as a form of governmental rationality that goes beyond the economic realm and produces a new form of political subject and an organisation of the social world. Furthermore, according to Oksala, Foucault argues that neoliberalism and social-democracy are not opposed to each other, they are 'two variants of the same governmental rationality' - which is the liberal rationality (2016: 130). Put in a different way, socialism is not a rationality of its own, the liberal governmentality incorporates socialist policies which are used to compensate for the harmful effects of the market (2016: 131). In Foucault's words: '...socialism and its forms of rationality function as a counter-weight, as a corrective, and a palliative to internal dangers' (Foucault in Oksala 2016: 131).

Towards a feminist politics of solidarity

Given the problems of socialist welfare politics, Oksala argues that there are three other ways to resist neoliberalism. In this chapter we will focus on one of them, which involves challenging the individualism and self-determination of the liberal and neoliberal subject by building a feminist politics of solidarity (2016: 135).[34] However, Oksala recognises that it is difficult to build solidarity amongst women due to economic inequalities between them. Additionally, there are other differences amongst women such as race, sexuality and age that undermine the idea of women as a collective political identity (2016: 145). After poststructuralism, gender is no longer conceived as a foundation, it became '...a historically contingent and resignifiable fiction arduously maintained by an ongoing performance' (ibid). However, although this meant that feminism became more open to recognising the differences amongst women, the dominance of poststructuralism was met with the worry that the possibility of women's politics is seriously compromised. Butler and Scott summarise this position succinctly: 'There appears to be a belief that without an ontologically grounded feminist subject there can be no politics. Here, politics is understood as a representational discourse that presumes a fixed or ready-made subject, usually conceived through the category of "women"' (Butler and Scott 1992: xiv). According to Oksala,

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[34] Oksala mentions two other paths to contest neoliberalism. One of them involves finding out how to achieve economic growth by other means (2016: 133). However, Oksala contends that this task is better suited for economists - so it is beyond the scope of this project. The second path, which is better suited for feminist philosophers is the following: '… to target our current governmentally according to which economic truths are politically neutral and the good life of the population is dependant on economic growth' (ibid). This is the task of genealogy, which leads Oksala to raise questions about the limits of the markets (2016: 139-144). Furthermore, Oksala connects this to the prescriptive task of coming up with alternative rationalities (this goes beyond Foucault's diagnostic project) (2016: 144). However, in this chapter we will only focus on the task of how to build a feminist politics of solidarity. This is the most relevant for this project because it raises the question of how to form feminist alliances without relying on identity. This is important for this project because identity would undermine the immanent side of feminist critique by establishing a region outside of its reach, therefore reintroducing transcendence.

one of the responses to this problem is to conceive feminist politics as a set of strategic coalitions united by certain political goals without claiming a shared experience of womanhood (2016: 146). Although this seems like an appropriate response to avoid the charges of essentialism while still leaving open the possibility of a women's politics, Oksala is concerned about the following: 'my critical concern is that a purely strategic understanding of feminist political identity in fact closely mirrors the current, neoliberal understanding of the subject dominant in our society and discussed in the previous chapters' (2016: 146). In particular, this view of politics is based on the individual who builds coalitions in order to pursue its own interests that happen to coincide with the interests of other individuals. Oksala's alternative is to develop a feminist politics of solidarity based on our shared feminist past with the help of Benjamin and Derrida.

Oksala's aim is to put forward a feminist politics of solidarity, where there is a sense of collective political responsibility amongst women that goes beyond our individual interests (2016: 147). This idea of solidarity is not based on the sameness of women's experience, it is based on the idea of a shared feminist past: 'a shared inheritance and history' (ibid). History, according to Oksala, is one of the elements that constitute our subjectivity: '...our subjectivities carry sedimentations of a collective history that binds us together whether you like it or not' (2016: 148). This shared past can serve as a base for a collective political identity that moves beyond single issue alliances that mirror the neoliberal logic. Oksala turns to Wendy Brown's (1995) critique of identity politics based on women's history of oppression in order to clarify her own position. The problem of this stance, according to Brown, is that it produces a reactive identity both as a response to the history that created it and the present (2016: 148). This leads to the subject becoming invested in its own subjection as the means to recognition. In Oksala's words: 'as a protest against marginalisation and subordination, a politicised identity becomes firmly attached to its own exclusion: an understanding of sustained and unfair suffering becomes a basis for one's sense of who one is' (ibid). This in turn leads to the following paradox: 'the past cannot be redeemed unless the identity of women ceases to be invested in it, and women's identity cannot cease to be invested in the past without giving up their identity' (2016: 149). This has problematic consequences for the possibility of resistance by inadvertently reifying the structures and identities it is trying to resist. Brown's alternative is inspired by Nietzsche's idea of forgetting which is reformulated into remembering without revenge. Furthermore, Brown also puts forward the idea of substituting the language of 'I am' - which would fix the identity of women - with the language of 'I want this for us' - shifting feminist politics focus from the past to the future. However, although Brown argues that this is based on a collective good and not liberal self-interest, Oksala is worried that this conception still relies on self-interest to bind women together. To summarise Oksala's position, she is suspicious of accounts of feminist politics based on shared future goals due to its resemblance to neoliberalism. This criticism applies to Brown's 'I want this for us' feminist project; and Chantal Mouffe's (1992) strategic use of women as a nodal point for feminist struggle (2016: 146).[35] Even though Oksala does not follow Brown's idea of

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[35] As Oksala (2016: 146) explains, Mouffe (1992) argues that we can still retain the notion of women through strategic coalitions, despite the recognition that identities are unstable.

forgetting, she does take Brown's critique of identity politics as wounded attachments that lead us to a reactive identity seriously. In particular, Oksala argues that the answer to this problem is found in Brown's turn to history. Oksala agrees with Brown's that we have to rethink our relationship to history after Foucault's critique of history as a continuous and objectivist foundation (2016: 150). It is precisely because of the dispersal of history that Oksala thinks we can focus on the past without the problem of ressentiment identified by Brown. In Oksala's words: 'Instead of simply forgetting and letting go of our "wounded attachments," could feminists rethink our relationship to history in a way that is more conductive to forms of feminist solidarity? More specifically, could the dispersal of history as an intelligible narrative of progress signal a rethinking that can redeem our politics against the charges of ressentiment?' (2016: 150).

In order to do this Oksala turns to Walter Benjamin (1992) and Jacques Derrida (1993). Benjamin is helpful for Oksala's project due to his critique of the linear conception of history and progress, which is associated with political and economic conformism (2016: 150). Oksala mentions at least three problems of this conception of history. First, it presupposes a pre-given goal, which we will inevitably reach. This misses the singularity of historical events, in particular those minor events that do not support the status quo (2016: 151). Second, the idea that things are continually improving favours the status quo through the erasure of the need of conflict to produce social change. Third, it disguises the fact that history is always written by the winners. As Oksala explains, in opposition to this, history for Benjamin should construct counter histories that challenge this continuum: 'history must instead become an instrument of remembrance capable of rupturing and undermining the consistency of conforming narratives that we tell ourselves' (2016: 151). Here remembrance does not mean to gain access to an eternal image of the past. Remembrance means to have a momentary and unique experience of the past that changes who we are by binding us to these past moments (2016: 152-154). However, it is important to note that we are never fully able to make past injustices right (2016: 154). This events happened, and cannot be denied. Nonetheless, through remembrance, history remains open and transmits its unrealisable possibilities to the present. In Oksala's words: 'The past only exists in remembrance and only through remembrance can it be redeemed in the sense that the suffering and injustice it carries is not completed, sealed, and forgotten. Each generation bears the responsibility not only for the fate of future generations, but also for the fate suffered by past generations' (2016: 154). Politics then becomes a task haunted by ghosts. This is a good point to turn to Derrida, who suggests we have to learn to live with the ghosts of those who are no longer present. This leads him to a conception of politics '...of memory, of inheritance, and of generations' (Derrida in Oksala 2016: 155). This implies that politics is not only about the present and the future, but also about the past. Similarly to Benjamin's openness of the past which contains multiple and inexhaustible possibilities for redemption, for Derrida inheritance is heterogenous, which means it is open to multiple receptions that cannot be predicted in advance. This implies that inheritance is both active and passive. It is passive in the sense that it is imposed on us, and we find ourselves in it; and it is active in the sense that we have different possibilities of reaction to it, including choosing which elements we conserve and which ones we ignore. Furthermore, and again similarly to Benjamin, the role of inheritance is to *disrupt* the linearity of

time: 'inheritance can be located just as much in what is to come as in what has already been' (2016: 156).

Oksala's question is then: what does it mean to be a feminist in relation to the legacy of feminism? (2016: 156). Oksala refuses to let go of our relationship to the past and our feminist inheritance. While she takes Brown's critique of identity politics seriously by recognising the danger of seeing our shared past through resentment and victimhood, Oksala disagrees with Brown's point that we cannot redeem history without loosing our identity investment in it. Following Derrida's idea of heterogenous inheritance - in which we are active recipients of the past, and Benjamin's idea that history always remains open, Oksala argues that our history of oppression and suffering does not necessarily determine our identity. Our identities and futures remain open. This means that we can experience our feminist past as a source of solidarity and strength (2016: 157). In Oksala's words: 'we are not simply the anticipated outcome of a sealed history of suffering, but feminist politics is precisely the possibility of the radical disruption of our history' (2016: 157). The disruption involves 'the complacency of our narratives of progress and disturbing any settled sense of who we are' (2016: 158). So even though we cannot transform the past and make the wrongs of history right, the past can still transform us. This highlights the incompleteness of our identity, while also giving us the possibility of belonging (ibid).

Conclusion

To conclude, Oksala is important for this project because she develops a concept of critique that is both feminist and philosophical. How does she reconcile the two? Her feminist project does not rely on the identity of women, which would end up taking a particular expression of the concept of woman and positioning it as the norm. As Butler reminds us, this would risk the exclusion of others who do not fit the norm. Instead, Oksala provides an account of the constitution of the subject in neoliberalism and a challenge to it, through a feminist politics of solidarity. This project requires philosophy in order to move beyond a purely empirical study of women's life (2016: 4), or a purely empirical study of cultural construction (2016: 107), into an analysis of the metaphysical schema that organise reality and relegate women to an inferior position (2016: 4, 21). Oksala's main argument is that there is a gap between our experience of the world, and the language available to describe it. This gap opens up the possibility to contest the metaphysical schema that structure language and experience. Furthermore, Oksala is important for this project because she advances feminist immanent critique further than Butler in at least three ways. First, she manages to avoid the problem of discursive idealism by highlighting the way in which experience can exceed language, without claiming that experience is prediscursive. Second, her turn to metaphysics implies that she is better than Butler at accounting for change. Following Foucault, and after reformulating phenomenology, she argues that metaphysical schema are tied to language, history, and culture, and can be challenged. Third, she provides a deeper examination of time, which is connected to a politics of solidarity that is committed to social change.

However, we need to turn to Deleuze for several reasons. First, Deleuze puts the body at the centre of his philosophy of immanence. This advances both immanence and feminism, by

overcoming the hierarchy of the mind and body dualism. Furthermore, Deleuze conceives the body as productive, through its capacity to affect and be affected. This goes further than Butler and Oksala's conception of the body. Second, compared to Oksala, Deleuze provides a much deeper examination of the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental, which is important to account for the production of the new. Third, Deleuze goes deeper into the problem of time than Oksala. He develops a philosophy of time which is able to account for the constitution of the subject and memories, without reducing time to the identity of the present and the past; and without relying on an active subject which would reintroduce the hierarchy of the mind over the body. This brings us to the fourth point, even though Oksala does not dismiss the importance of the embodiment of norms, she still relies on an active subject capable of radical philosophical reflection in order to denaturalise and contest metaphysical schema (thus reintroducing the hierarchy of the mind over body) (2016: 108). In opposition to this, Deleuze's conception of thought manages to maintain immanence, through an encounter that forces us to think. This implies that we do not need higher rational capacities for thought. Furthermore, his account of learning takes the role of the body and the unconscious seriously, without imposing a new hierarchy of the body over the mind. However, even though Deleuze pushes immanence forward, we still need Butler and Oksala in order to avoid losing track of the feminist side of immanent critique, and to avoid getting lost in pure philosophy, which has nothing to say about the problems of the world. This is not to say that Deleuze is just an abstract metaphysical thinker. As Williams argues, Deleuze's metaphysics is connected to the development of an anti-reactionary and anti-conservative philosophy.[36] However, there is always the danger of getting lost in philosophy without thinking its political implications.

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[36] Williams points this out in reference to Deleuze's philosophy of time (2011: 4). However, this statement also applies to Deleuze's metaphysics more in general.

3. Deleuze and Ethics

In this chapter we will develop Deleuze's conception of immanent ethics. This is important for several reasons. First, we are going to respond to Butler's accusation that Deleuze's aim is to advocate for the normative quest of the affirmation of desire. It is important to argue against this claim because if this was the case, then Deleuze's immanent project would be undermined, since the principle of affirmation would occupy a higher position above life. In other words, our life would be subordinated to the fulfilment of the principle without regard for the specificity of the situation. As we will see in this chapter, this is not the point of an immanent ethics. One of the main differences between ethics and morality is the ethical concern about the specificity of our bodies, and the particular situation (as we will see in chapter 8 this is important for feminism).[37] Second, we will examine how affirmation and negation are both necessary in Deleuze's ontology (we cannot get rid of negation). While Deleuze does give affirmation a primary role, his point is more subtle than Butler recognises. Affirmation comes first as a productive principle that constitutes reality, conversely negation is secondary because it is not productive (it is only reactive). However, this does not mean that we should always affirm, since unlimited affirmation would lead to suicide (this will be explored more in detail in chapter 6). Deleuze's ethics can be understood as a middle ground between following strict moral norms, and following our individual desires without regard for ourselves and for others. In opposition to the former, an imminent ethics is based on the following questions: 'what can we do in this particular situation?', and 'how to increase our power to act?'. While moral questions, such as 'what should I do?', involve the subordination of the body to the mind, ethical questions concern the rediscovery of the power of the body and the unconscious. This rediscovery is important for the development of immanence in terms of maintaining the equality of being (which implies no hierarchy between the mind and the body). In opposition to the latter (the dangerous affirmation of desire), Deleuze focuses on how the body is constituted, while also being productive, since it has both the capacity to affect and to be affected. This allows Deleuze to avoid an individualist ethics (although this will be explored more in depth in chapter 6).

Butler's critique of Deleuze

In the chapter dedicated to Deleuze in *Subjects of Desire* (1987b), Butler develops a critique of Deleuze's conception of desire as both productive and generative, based on her reading of

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[37] While there is a distinction between normativity and morality, they go hand by hand. As Nathan Jun explains, normativity '... refers to imperatives, duties, obligations, permissions, and principles which do not describe the way the world is but rather prescribe the way it ought to be' (2011: 91). Morality, on the other hand, '…which may be regarded as coextensive with normativity, concerns laws, principles, and norms which prescribe how human beings ought and ought not to act' (ibid). So even though affirmation is important for Deleuze, we can already see that it differs from a normative claim (as defined by Jun), because it is not a principle about how the world ought to be - it is an ontological claim (being is affirmative).

Nietzsche and Philosophy and *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.*[38] Butler accuses Deleuze of putting forward an invariant conception of desire, which is elevated to the status of a universal ontological truth (1987b: 206). The irony of Butler's critique, and what makes the accusation serious, is that Deleuze makes the same accusation against the conception of desire as lack, which he and Guattari historicise by associating it to the capitalist mode of production. In Deleuze and Guattari's words: 'Lack (manque)* is created, planned, and organised in and through social production' - as a function of the market economy (1983: 28).[39] Deleuze and Guattari go as far as saying that '*…social production is purely and simply desiring production itself under determinate conditions*' (1983: 29, emphasis in original). However, Butler's point is that even though Deleuze historicises capitalist desire, his own conception of desire is still ahistorical. The problem, according to her, arises from Deleuze's understanding of desire as 'the privileged locus of human ontology' — which implies that Deleuze fails to understand the social or historical specificity of desire (1987b: 206). Another way of explaining this is given by Philippe Sabot in the foreword to Butler's book: 'His work [Deleuze's] managed to deliver desire to an enigmatic outside —Life or being' (2012: x). According to Butler's reading of Deleuze, this life/being/desire is then turned against itself as an effect of the imposition of the Judea-Christian moral ideology - that Deleuze following Nietzsche calls 'slave morality' (this is based on Butler's reading of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*); or in more contemporary terms: through the imposition of the law of primary repression and scarcity, by psychoanalysis and advanced capitalism respectively, which can also be understood as slave moralities - this is Butler's interpretation of *Anti-Oedipus* (Butler 1987b: 205-206). According to Butler, against these reactive ideologies of negativity and lack - which are historical but open to change - Deleuze posits his own form of affirmative and emancipatory desire which is not historical but universal. Thus, she argues that Deleuze's project can be summarised in two points. First as the critique of desire as negativity. Butler describes this as involving ideology-critique - a method that uncovers the negativity of desire. This is tied to the second point, which is 'the promotion of the normative ideal for desire as affirmation' - inspired by Nietzsche and Spinoza in opposition to Hegel (1987b: 205).

Chapter map

This chapter will begin by addressing the problem of Deleuze's relation to normativity - since Deleuze has been criticised for both being normative, and lacking it. To respond to both claims we will focus on developing a conception of Deleuze's immanent ethics, which is based on the evaluation of different modes of existence. This will show that transcendental norms are not necessary to avoid relativism. The section on ethics is mainly based on Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche and Spinoza across different works, and a small section on Deleuze's reading of Leibniz. However, this task will also require some philosophical work to develop the concept of

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[38] *Anti-Oedipus* was coauthored with Félix Guattari, whom Butler does not mention*.*

[39] 'The French word *manque* may mean both lack and need in a psychological sense, as well as want or privation or scarcity in an economic sense…' (Translator's note in Deleuze 1983: 28).

immanence. In particular, to construct an immanent ethics, we need to avoid giving priority to the mind (and consciousness) over the body, which leads to the discovery of the powers of the body and of the mind beyond consciousness. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the body is now the dominant term over the mind. Following Spinoza (or at least Deleuze's version of Spinoza) the mind and the body are one and the same expression of being (univocity), there is no priority of one over the other. Paradoxically, in order to be able to affirm the univocity of being - which means being is said in the same sense of everything - we need difference. Since that which is said in the same sense, is said of what differs (Deleuze 1994: 36). However, this is a particular type of difference that is not based on the shared identity between beings, nor on the negation of identity - it is difference in itself, as degrees of power. This difference is the only way to evaluate beings, who distribute themselves in an open space (nomadic distribution). The consequence of this is that there are no hierarchies of beings, since in Williams' words: '... all things distribute themselves and are only answerable to themselves in overcoming their internal limits and the way they become fixed' (Williams 2003: 66). Lastly, in part 2 of the chapter we will connect Deleuze's immanent ethics to the question of desire, and respond to Butler's critique directly.

Part 1: Nietzsche, Spinoza, and Leibniz

Deleuze's Nietzsche and Spinoza

We can start by examining Butler's claim that for Deleuze self-affirmation is a normative ideal inspired by Nietzsche and Spinoza. While Butler is right to point out that Nietzsche and Spinoza are two of Deleuze's main philosophical precursors, it is not due to normativity. As Daniel Smith (2012) points out, Nietzsche and Spinoza serve as an inspiration to Deleuze due to their philosophies of immanence. In Smith's words: 'What they [Nietzsche and Spinoza] have in common is an attempt to rethink ethics (and philosophy as a whole) from a purely immanent point of view' (2012: 146). In *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,* for example, Deleuze highlights Spinoza's denial of '…the existence of a moral, transcendent, creator God' (1988: 17), in favour of a conception of God as a single immanent substance. Additionally, in the same work, Deleuze claims that 'Spinoza's ethics has nothing to do with morality' (1988: 125). Similarly, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* Deleuze (1983) emphasises Nietzsche's rejection of transcendental values in favour of the immanent principle of the will to power. Ironically, Nietzsche and Spinoza's philosophies of immanence have also been criticised for the opposite to Butler's critique of Deleuze: '[a philosophy of immanence] seems unable to put forth normative criteria by which certain modes of existence can be judged as acceptable and others condemned as reprehensible' (Smith 2012: 147). This chapter contends that both accusations - of the lack, and presence of normative ideals or criteria - miss the point of Deleuze philosophy. The problem of the first accusation, that of the lack of normative principles, is that it assumes that normativity is the only desirable form of philosophy; and that we cannot have any type of discussion about ethics or

politics without norms.[40] As Dianna Taylor points out, norms and normativity have become normalised within philosophical discourse to the point that it is extremely difficult to challenge this norm. In her own words: 'Normalizing norms thus hinder not only critical analysis itself but also, to the extent that they become naturalized, the recognition that such engagement is needed or possible at all' (Taylor 2009: 47). While Taylor's account of normalising norms is based on the critical response that her non-normative reading of Michel Foucault generated from others; Philip Goodchild also notes a similar response to Deleuze's work on ethics (as opposed to morality) in the form of the following blackmail: 'You will accept the rational, *moral*, disembodied distinctions, or lose your power of reason in undifferentiated desire' (1997: 40, my emphasis). Claire Colebrook mentions a similar blackmail, that Deleuze and Guattari describe in *Anti-Oedipus:* 'We imagine that either we subject ourselves to the prohibiting normativity of *the* law or fall back into a chaotic and nightmarish psychosis' (Colebrook 2012: 84, emphasis in original). While Deleuze gives different reasons for moving beyond normativity, which will be covered in this chapter, for now it is important to say that 'the norm and normativity are not… necessary foundations for ethics and politics, but in fact simply one philosophical approach among many' (Taylor 2009: 45).[41] Additionally, as Braidotti argues, Deleuze provides a solid alternative to the traditional universalistic view of the subject (which is based on rational consciousness), without falling into relativism (2012: 170).[42] Butler's account, on the other hand, misses the point of Deleuze's philosophy by arguing that Deleuze is an advocate of the normative ideal of self-affirmation. While affirmation does play a part in Deleuze's ethics, the point is not always to affirm, as if it were a universal rule. Furthermore, affirmation in Deleuze is part of an ethical quest, not a normative/ moral quest. The question that needs to be answered is the following: what is the difference between morality and ethics?[43] We will look at Deleuze's work on Nietzsche, Spinoza and Liebniz to answer this. The provisional answer is the difference between the question 'what should I do?' - which is based on following moral/normative rules, and the question 'what can I do?' - which is based on the ethical question of increasing our power to act.

The distinction between morality and ethics

To understand the distinction between ethics and morality we can turn to Deleuze's lectures on *Spinoza: The Velocities of Thought* (December 1980 - March 1981).[44] These lectures happened after both of Deleuze's books on Spinoza - *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* and *Spinoza:*

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[40] See Dianna Taylor's (2009) account of this position and her response to it, where she defends a non-normative reading of Foucault.

[41] In this quote, Taylor (2009) is responding to Jürgen Habermas in defence of Michel Foucault.

[42] Braidotti's (2012) puts forward a Deleuzian ethics, which is positioned as an alternative to the liberal conceptions of ethics.

[43] These are Deleuze's terms, he opposed morality to ethics. However, we can use this to argue against Butler's accusation because morality and normativity go hand in hand.

[44] These lectures can be found here: https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/spinoza-velocities-thought

Practical Philosophy - were published.[45] However, most of the lectures were given in 1981, which is the year that the second edition of *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* was published. Mostly, we are going to look at the third lecture (December 9, 1980), which is dedicated to the distinction between ethics and morality; some fragments of the second lecture, which focuses on the equality of being (December 2, 1980); and the fourth lecture, which is centred on the concept of affection (December 16, 1980). In these lectures, Deleuze argues that Spinoza is not a moral philosopher because: 'he never asks what we must do, he always asks what we are capable of, what's in our power, ethics is a problem of power, never a problem of duty' (January 24, 1978). In short, it is a question of power (ethics) versus duty (morality). How is this different? When we talk about our duty as humans beings, there is a claim to essence. For example, for Aristotle man is a rational animal (even if this essence is yet to be realised). The role of morality is then to bring us back to our essence. In Deleuze's words: '…[morality is] an operation that recalls us to essence, that is, to our essence and that recalls us there by means of values' (December 9, 1980). Thus, our essence becomes an end that needs to be realised. Values are then defined as an essence that is taken as an end, which holds a position that is higher to being. This is one of the main characteristics of morality: 'morality is inseparable from a kind of hierarchy… There is no morality if something is of no greater value than something else' (2 December 1980). The moral hierarchy of values is also connected to the hierarchy of the relationship between the mind (also referred to as the soul) and the body. According to this, the relationship between the body and the mind is one where if one acts the other suffers (if the mind acts the body suffers, and if the body acts the mind suffers); however, if we are wise, it is the body that obeys.

Ethics, on the other hand, is not about discovering the essence of man. In Deleuze's words: 'within an ethics, we're not going to discover anything. There will be no essence, no quest for realizing essence, no values taking essence as an end' (December 9, 1980). Therefore, when Deleuze talk about essence in relation to Spinoza, it does not mean human essence, but *power of action*.[46] In other words, essence is converted into power.[47] However, we need to be careful not to fall back into morality when we are talking about power. Power (of action) does not mean the potential of an essence that has not yet been realised, and requires following moral values to be brought into action. In contrast to the moral position, Deleuze argues that in Spinoza there is no

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[45] They were originally published in 1968 and 1970 respectively.

[46] Deleuze makes clear that by focusing on power of action, he is leaving out another Spinozist concept: the *conatus* (defined as the tendency to preserve in being). This concept is not important for Deleuze's reading because the tendency to preserve in being is already there without saying. In Deleuze's words: 'For what he calls an effort to persevere in being is the fact that I exercise my power of action at each moment, as much as there is in me. In fact, it's not an effort…' (16 December, 1980).

[47] This is the philosophical manoeuvre involved in the claim 'essence is power.' In Deleuze's words: 'if you want to call something "essence," well then, in the end, you can only give this word to power of action. Thus, this is a conversion of essence into power of action. This comes down to saying there is no essence. There are only powers of action, "essence is power"' (December 9, 1980).

duality between potential and action: 'all power is in action' (December 9, 1980).[48] The question now is how is power determined? Unlike essence, we cannot determine power (what a body can do) in advance. Power is determined at the level of existence. Different beings have different powers or capacities (for example: the capacity to fly, or the capacity to read), which can change. This implies that not all men have the same power: A man cannot always do what a neighbour can do (December 9, 1980). Some men have a greater power to be reasonable, while others have a greater power to be crazy, for example. Apart from the different capacities, there is a quantitative difference of power: beings are more or less powerful (in comparison to each other, to themselves, and to different times). To avoid misunderstandings, there are two clarifications that need to be made regarding power. Firstly, it is not about individuals wanting more power to dominate others, as some interpretations of Nietzsche suggest. In Deleuze's words: 'Power of action is not what I want, by definition; it's what I have' (as a capacity) (December 9, 1980). Put in a different way, power is not the object of the will, power reflects the differential relationship of forces, which make willing possible (Deleuze 1983: xi). Secondly, even though the difference in power of action is a quantity, it is not an extensive quantity that can be measured numerically (for example as length). It is an intensive quantity: 'things have more or less intensity' (December 9, 1980). For example, the different intensities of the colour red.

From quantitative difference between existents, which is intensive, we can now move to the qualitative difference between modes of existence. The term modes of existence refers to different styles of life. Deleuze's example in the lecture (December 9, 1980) is what happens when a group of people witness and elderly lady fall, while some people might start laughing, others might not find it funny at all. This is due to the different modes of existence of the people involved. While the quantity of power determines the strength or weakness of the body in relation to other bodies, modes of existence determine what a body can do in terms of different styles of action. Therefore, when Spinoza asks: 'what can a body do?' he does not mean any body, he asks 'what can a specific body do?' (December 9, 1980). Spinoza, similarly to Nietzsche, identifies two different polar modes of existence - that of the strong, or free man, and that of the slave, or impotent man (slavery here does not refer to social status, but to a way of life). Apart from the slave, Spinoza also talks of the tyrant and the priest as impotent men. The question is what do they have in common? Both the slave and the priest have different types of power (spiritual and political), but as already mentioned, this is not about possessing power (power is not an object, it only exists in action). Spinoza groups the priest, the tyrant and the slave together because they are examples of a sad mode of existence; while strong men are examples of a joyous mode of existence. This bring us to the notion of *affect.* An affect is defined as 'that which realises power of action' or 'that which makes power of action act' (December 9, 1980); and can therefore help us identify different modes of existence. While both the impotent and the strong men realise their power of action, the difference between them is what is realised in each case - there is a different *affect* that is realised. The main affects identified by Spinoza are sadness and joy - they are the

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[48] To expand on this further: 'Power of action does not mean potential. Power of action is what I can do, and what I can do is the aggregate of what I do and what I undergo' (December 9, 180).

two poles of his theory of the passions. The other affects that make us act - which include different types of perceptions (such as visual or auditory perceptions), feelings (such as hope, love, hate, sadness, joy), thoughts, etcetera - derive from them. The difference between the two poles is the following: when an action is fulfilled by joy there is an increase of power, and conversely when it is fulfilled by sadness there is a decrease of power (December 9, 1980).[49]

The evaluation of modes of existence

So far we have established the difference between morality and ethics. To sum up, the main difference is that morality is based on the realisation of an essence, and ethics is based on power as a particular capacity that cannot be determined in advance (for example: not everyone speaks Spanish). Now, according to Deleuze, the distinction between morality and ethics can also be understood as the distinction between judgement (morality) and evaluation (ethics). While morality is about the judgement of actions based on transcendent universal values (such as good/evil), for Deleuze, ethics is about the evaluation of actions based on its immanent mode of existence. Against accusations of relativism, this implies that we can still evaluate and compare modes of existence by using criteria that are immanent to the mode itself (Smith 2012: 147, 175). However, the question we have to answer now is how is this evaluation done? In the language of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, modes of existence can either affirm or negate - an example of this is the master creating/affirming its own values, as opposed to the slave reacting to the master's values and negating them. Deleuze also mentions the distinction between creating and submitting as different modes of existence in his lectures on Spinoza (December 9, 1980). However, the distinction between the master and the slave is more nuanced than this. As Michael Hardt explains, both the slave and the master affirm and negate, but the difference is the priority, or order, of affirmation and negation. While the slave has to go through two negations in order to arrive at affirmation: 'since you are evil and I am not you, therefore I am good', the master simply affirms: 'I am good, therefore you are evil (Hardt 2006: x). In contrast to Butler's normative reading of Deleuze, Hardt argues that we can understand Deleuze's Nietzsche as an ethical guide, or a principle of selection: 'always seek out the active forces in life and avoid the reactive ones' (ibid). It is important to highlight that this is not a moral imperative - it is not about being good or bad according to values. We seek active forces because they allow us to act, while reactive forces separate us from what we can do. Similarly to Nietzsche, but now in the language of *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,* a mode of existence can be evaluated according to its power, or capacity, to act: '… the manner in which it actively deploys its power by going to the limit of what it can do (or on the contrary, by the manner in which it is cut off from its power to act and is reduced to powerlessness)' (Smith 2012: 148). As we will see, this is also connected to the body's capacity to affect and be affected by other bodies, which leads to either an increase or decrease of its power: 'When a body "encounters" another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes

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[49] Deleuze's point is that both sadness and joy realise our power of action, but the former decreases our power and the latter increases it.

the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts' (Deleuze 1988: 19). Again, in contrast to Butler's accusation of normativity, Deleuze emphasises that the capacity to act is an ethical task: 'the ethical task entails "an amplification, an intensification, an elevation of power, an increase in dimensions, a gain in distinction"' (Deleuze in Smith 2012: 148).

In order to understand what an ethical task entails, it is helpful to compare it to morality in practical terms. There are two approaches that I could follow writing this chapter. On one hand, I can understand writing as a *moral task*: I need to write to be a good student, and to be a responsible adult. Additionally, if I feel like I am not making enough effort to be a good student, I will feel guilty having fun, so I will stay in working to make up for it. On the other hand, I can also understand writing as an *ethical task* where the goal is to increase my power to act. For example, I increase my power by finding a good place to write, getting a hot drink, making sure I am comfortable, and so on. In the *moral approach*, I can judge and punish myself if I do not get work done (and others can judge me too); while in the *ethical approach* I evaluate my capacity to write based on the circumstances and I can react accordingly. For example, if my usual place of work is noisy and that decreases my capacity to write, I can find a new place to work next time. While morality involves the subordination to external principles, and reactive punishments; creating better working conditions is an affirmative task. I can focus on actions rather than reactively following rules and allowing guilt to take over. I can find joy in writing. However, it is also important to know my limits. If I drink one cup of coffee this could increase my power, while if I drink three cups this could make me anxious - decreasing my power to write. This shows that ethics is not about unlimited affirmation, as Butler suggests, but about knowing your limits and knowing how hard to push yourself. It is preferable to take a break now so I can work tomorrow more effectively, than to overwork myself and not be able to finish the chapter.[50]

Furthermore, there is one more difference between ethics and morality in terms of the process of decision making. Let's say that I am unaware of which action I should take. In the moral approach, I decide by following rules or principles. For example, I will focus on being a good student over a bad student. However, the ethical approach is more complicated than focusing on the distinction between good and bad. In the ethical approach we test our actions by submitting them to the test of the eternal return: 'Do you see yourself doing it an infinite number of times?' (December 9, 1980). This helps to eliminate half-willing, which is everything that can only be willed once (Deleuze 1983: xi). As Deleuze explains, Nietzsche was disheartened by the little pleasures or joys that can only be done once: 'Everything that can be done again the next day only on the condition that it be said the day before: tomorrow I will give it up' (Deleuze 1983: 68). Deleuze's example of this is the alcoholic, who promises this will be their last drink. Instead: 'if you do something, do it as if you had to do it a million times. If you don't manage to do it like

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[50] In his *Essays on Deleuze,* Smith provides extremely helpful concrete examples to clarify and bring to life Deleuze's philosophy. For example, he explains how different encounters increase or decrease our power: while drinking increases our power initially, it decreases it next day if we get a hangover; the sun might increase my power, but a sun burn decreases it (Smith 2012: 119). In this chapter, I was inspired by Smith to come up with my own examples.

that, do something else' (9 December 1980). Evidently, it is impossible to always follow the ethical approach of decision making. For instance, if we have a deadline, then we need to force ourselves to write no matter the conditions. However, the ethical approach passes the test of the eternal return: I can see myself writing like this an infinite number of times.

To sum up, the distinction between judgement and evaluation is the following: 'Modes are no longer "judged" in terms of their degree of proximity to or distance from an external principle, but are "evaluated" in terms of the manner by which they "occupy" their existence: the intensity of their power, their "tenor" of life' (Smith 2012: 157). Furthermore, as already mentioned, the distinction between evaluation and judgement coincides with the distinction between immanence and transcendence: an immanent ethics evaluates, whereas morality judges in terms of transcendental principles. Now we still need to answer the following question: who evaluates or is evaluated? The answer is a body, or bodies. This can be understood in opposition to morality, which relies on the hierarchy of the mind over the body (2 December 1980). As Michael Hardt explains, Deleuze focuses on the body in order to avoid the interiority of the mind, which is tied to the subordination of the body, and the disconnection of mind and body (1993: 84). Furthermore, the focus on the body also helps Deleuze to avoid the reintroduction of transcendence as a field of consciousness - 'a transcendental subject that actively synthesises the field of experience' (Smith 2012: 153).[51] In opposition to this, in Deleuze the subject is constituted *within* the plane of immanence by passive syntheses. This implies that when we are evaluating actions, they are not explained in terms of a transcendental subject, or consciousness, but in terms of a multiplicity of parts (in the language of Spinoza); and in terms of a multiplicity of forces (in the language of Nietzsche) that enter in relation with one another. As we will see, these parts or forces constitute and undo the body. The consequence of this is that the body is not natural or given. As mentioned in the previous two chapters, Butler and Oksala argue the same. However, the main difference is that in Deleuze the body becomes productive through its capacity to affect and be affected.[52] It is not only given meaning by discourse, it also produces meaning.

The body: from Nietzsche to Spinoza

In the previous sections, the importance of the body has been alluded: the question of what a body can do has been placed at the centre of Deleuze's ethics, alongside the problem of increasing the body's power of action. However, we still need to define the body, and to highlight the implications of the focus on it. To do so, we will start the journey with Nietzsche, and then move to Spinoza. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* Deleuze argues that 'What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces' (1983: 40). As Smith explains, these forces can

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[51] A different way of explaining this is provided by Beth Lord. As she explains, the problem of the Kantian transcendental subject is that the structures of thought are externally applied to experience, without showing how they are connected to each other (2012: 85).

[52] As Hardt highlights there is a positive relation between the two: 'The more ways a body could be affected the more force it had' (1993: 54). Furthermore, the receptivity of the body is not a passivity but an affectivity (ibid).

be understood as multiple unconscious drives that are always in combat with each other (2012: 178). For example, the drive to write this chapter is in combat with the drive to take a break. When we talk about ourselves (or about someone else) as subjects, the predominant drive at the moment is positioned as the whole ego - as if we were unitary subjects (Smith 2012: 179). However, Nietzsche (and Spinoza) show that we are not unitary subjects. This is also connected to Nietzsche's perspectivism: 'each of us has multiple perspectives on the world because of the multiplicity of our drives—drives that are often contradictory among themselves' (Smith 2012: 178). The role of morality is to rank these drives (Smith 2012: 180). For example, taking a break to eat is more acceptable than taking a break to play a game (there is also guilt associated to some activities more than others). Furthermore, as Nietzsche (2017) explains in *On The Genealogy of Morals*, the moral calculation involved in making the decision of whether to keep writing or not might be a sign of *bad conscience* - it shows that we have internalised the moral rules. I do not need a figure of authority to tell me what to do, I force myself to do it, and I am happy suffering for it.[53] However, as already mentioned, there is an alternative ethical way of understanding writing. Instead of thinking about complying to external moral rules (the need to write to be a good student), we can think about writing from the ethical point of view of increasing our own power of writing. As Smith reminds us: 'I have encounters and am affected by other multiplicities; at each moment these affections increase or decrease the intensity of my power, like a melody, a line of continuous variation or continuous becoming' (2012: 119).

This brings us to Spinoza's notion of the body and his focus on how different affects increase or decrease our power to act. However, in Spinoza, alongside the capacity to affect and be affected, the body is also defined as an aggregate of relations of speeds and slowness (between thinking molecules, and extended molecules) (2 December, 1980). In Deleuze's words: 'it is the relations of motion and rest, speeds and slowness between particles, that define the body…' (Deleuze 1988: 123). It is important to highlight the implications of this definition of the body. We have already mentioned that Spinoza rejects defining the body according to essence in favour of focusing on its power to act. Furthermore, by focusing on the relations of speed and slowness, Spinoza is also moving away from form. Deleuze's example of this is how there are more differences between a plow horse, a draft horse, and a race horse (in terms of what they can do), than between an ox and a plow horse (Deleuze 1988: 124). In addition to the body not being defined by its essence and its form, the body is also not a subject. The body is not a subject because, in Deleuze words: '…individuals enter into composition with one another…' (Deleuze 1988: 126). This implies two things: first, the subject cannot be isolated from its relation to the world; and secondly, there is no transcendental plan that directs subject formation (Deleuze 1988: 128). Put in a simpler manner, the subject is not given in advance, it is constituted through its

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[53] More dramatically, Nietzsche talks about the animal who turned himself into a torturer through the internalisation of moral rules: 'it was this animal in the hands of the tamer, which beat itself against the bars of its cage' (Nietzsche 2017: 257). Additionally, as Deleuze explains in *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* this is connected to the internalisation of pain: I accept suffering because I know I have sinned - without the need of an external accusation (1983: 128-129).

relations with others: 'you do not know beforehand what a body or mind can do, in a given encounter, a given arrangement, a given combination' (Deleuze 1988: 125). This combination is not only limited to different human bodies. Connections can be formed between human and non-human entities (Stark 2017: 73), and between so called natural or artificial things (Deleuze 1988: 124), for example. Furthermore, 'Human bodies are always part of more complex bodies: the family, schools, institutions, and ultimately, a body politic' (Gatens in Stark 2017: 73). These bodies can also be evaluated in terms of their mode of existence.

Leibniz: the body and the (un)conscious

The discovery of the body is also connected to the discovery of the unconscious. As already mentioned, the body according to Deleuze's Nietzsche is constituted by a multiplicity of forces, or drives. However, as Smith highlights, these drives are *unconscious* (2012: 178). Smith turns to Deleuze's work on Leibniz to explain this unconscious aspect of drives. As he explains, the connection between Leibniz and Nietzsche is not accidental: 'In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche praised Leibniz's critique of consciousness and his differential conception of the unconscious…' (2012: 183). We can begin by exploring the relationship between the unconscious and consciousness in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque.* Deleuze argues that there are two sides of having a body: the unconscious, and the conscious. The relationship between them is the following: conscious *macro-perceptions* are constituted by unconscious *micro-perceptions* (Deleuze 1993: 86). For example, when we hear the sound of the sea (macro-perception), this is made of the murmur of each wave (micro-perceptions), which we cannot fully appreciate (at least yet). Another example of this is hearing a big group of people in the library cafe (macro-perception), without being able to appreciate the individual voices or words (micro-perceptions) (Deleuze 1993: 87). It can also be the case that micro-perceptions in the background do not stand out enough for the subject to realise them (Deleuze 1993: 88). For example, I can hear the noise of people in the background without distinguishing who these people are, until someone's annoying laugh stands out to me, becoming a macro-perception. While minute-perceptions form macro-perceptions, they also destabilise them in order for the following macro-perception to appear (Deleuze 1993: 86). In Deleuze's words: 'Tiny perceptions are as much the passage from one perception to another as they are components of each perception' (1993: 87). Furthermore, minute perceptions are not always integrated into present or preceding perceptions, but they can still nourish them. According to Deleuze, this is connected to the constant state of disquiet of the soul, since beyond the clarity of macro-perceptions there is always obscurity (1993: 89). In obscurity there are minute-perceptions that 'render all perception unstable' (1993: 87), and minute inclinations that ply (fold) our soul in every direction (1993: 69).

Now that the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious has been developed, we can turn to the implications of this for ethical decision making. The problem of the examples of decision making I have given in the chapter before bringing Leibniz into the picture is that they are stuck at the level of consciousness. For instance, if I have to decide between continuing to work and taking a break to eat, one might assume that I know my motives, and that

I can analyse the advantages and disadvantages of each option and pick the most rational one (for example in terms of consequences: if I miss my deadline I will get in trouble). However, decision-making is not as simple as this. This is the case for four reasons. First, Deleuze argues that dividing motives into isolated objects is an illusion. Beyond these two objectified motives there are an infinity of motives (1993: 69). In his own words, decision-making involves '…not two separable "objects," but two orientations, each of which carries a sum of possible or even hallucinatory perceptions' (1993: 70). Secondly, there is also the illusion of objectifying motives as if they were weights that can simply be placed on a scale to decide (1993: 69). As Smith explains, it would be a mistake to objectify and isolate the different options as if they 'were objects that could be weighed in a balance, and as if deliberation were an act of judgment in which the "I"— my self, my ego, my intellect—attempts to assess the direction toward which the balance is leaning, "all things being equal"' (Smith 2012: 183). The point here is that the different options are not equal: each inclination involves a different unconscious multiplicity 'of auditory, gustative, olfactory, and visual perceptions—an entire "perceptio-inclinatory ensemble" (2012: 121). What does this mean? Smith's example of this is the conflict between 'going out' and 'staying in.' In the first case: 'My inclination to go to the tavern, for instance, includes not only the minute perception of the effect of the alcohol, or the taste and temperature of the drink, but also the clinking of glasses in the bar, the smoke in the air, the conversation with friends, the temporary lifting of one's solitude, and so on' (2012: 183). On the other hand, the inclination to stay at home to work '… includes the minute perceptions of the rustling of paper, the noise of my fingers tapping at the computer, the quality of the silence of the room when I stop tapping, the comfort (or frustration) that I find in my work' (ibid). This shows that the different options cannot be measured in a scale: it is hard to weigh the benefits and disadvantages of each option, which consists of unconscious drives, or minute perceptions. Third, aside from the different options not being the same, the deliberating self is not the same: 'during the entire time the deliberation is going on, the self is constantly changing, and consequently is modifying the two feelings that are agitating it' (Smith 2012: 185). For example, I might get hungrier as I am deliberating between eating and working, so I might initially decide to work and then change my mind. This implies that decision-making is never the same, even when I am deciding between the same options as yesterday. In Deleuze's words: 'And if we return to motives in order to study them for a second time, they have not stayed the same' (1993: 70). Our priorities change, and the times change too (decisions are made in time). For these reasons Deleuze, following Leibniz, contends that decision making is closer to a pendulum than a scale (1993: 69). The soul is constantly pulling us in different directions, which are difficult to compare since they are made of different perceptions, which are always changing. I am not the same person who began the deliberation. As Smith explains quoting Bergson, when deliberating '…there are not two tendencies, or even two directions, but a self which lives and develops by means of its very hesitations, until the free action drops from it like an over-ripe fruit (Bergson in Smith 2012: 185). When we finally act, we effectuate the amplitude of our soul at a given moment.

The Critique of consciousness: Nietzsche and Spinoza

We can now return to *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* to expand on Deleuze's critique of consciousness. The first point that will be developed, is that consciousness is merely a transitive state. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* Deleuze argues that Nietzsche reminded '…consciousness of its necessary modesty' (1983: 39). In this book, while the body is defined as '… the relation between dominant and dominated forces' (1983: 40); consciousness is a symptom of the activity of these forces, as we are affected by the external world (1983: 39). This implies that consciousness, is not our primary attribute, it is merely one state of the mind (Nietzsche 1974: 305).[54] Deleuze also emphasises this point in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* where the role of consciousness - which happens at the macroscopic level - is to distinguish '…perceptions and appetites that lead to the passage from one perception to another' (Deleuze 1993: 87. Similarly, in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* consciousness involves '…the passage, or rather the awareness of the passage from these less potent totalities to more potent ones, and vice versa' (Deleuze 1988: 21). If the object encountered agrees with me it forms a superior totality with me, and if the object disagrees with me it threatens my cohesion. Consciousness, therefore, has a very particular and limited role: 'we are only conscious of the ideas that express the effect of external bodies on our own…' (Deleuze 1988: 59).

The second point is that consciousness is constituted by an illusion. We can begin by explaining this in Spinozist terms. As Smith explains, the problem of human consciousness is that it: '…registers effects, but it knows nothing about their causes' (2012: 36). In our everyday lives, we constantly enter compositions that agree with our body, or threaten our body. While we are somewhat aware of the passage from one state to the other (the transitions between sadness to joy), we are not fully aware of the causes of this (for example, I might take days to realise that drinking coffee had been making me anxious). In addition to the misunderstanding of effects for causes, there are two more illusions of consciousness: the second one is the positioning of consciousness as the final cause - granting it a position of primacy over the body; and thirdly, when this is not possible, god is positioned as the final cause (Deleuze 1988: 60, Smith 2012: 36). To sum up the problem of consciousness, while it provides us informational value based on our relations with other bodies, this information relates to a transitive state, and it is distorted - since as already mentioned effects are separated from their real causes (Deleuze 1988: 21). To expand on this we can turn to Nietzsche's *The Will to Power.* Nietzsche also mentions the illusion of consciousness, when we believe '…that the only cause is will and that one must be aware of having willed in order to believe in *oneself* as cause' (Nietzsche 1968: 163). This is connected to the critique of morality, which assumes that 'One is responsible only for what one has willed' (Nietzsche 1968: 163). However, the problem of this is that what we become aware of in consciousness is not a cause (Nietzsche 1968: 265). Nietzsche argues that causation and the will

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[54] Nietzsche argues that it Leibniz who showed us that consciousness is not an essential attribute. In his own words: 'what we call conscious· consciousness constitutes only one state of our spiritual and psychic world (perhaps a pathological state) and *not by any means the whole of it…'* (Nietzsche 1974: 305, emphasis in original)

are introduced whenever we do not understand motion and change (Nietzsche 1968: 284). Behind consciousness there is a relation of forces that are withheld from us (Nietzsche 1968: 184). So similarly to Spinoza, consciousness only gives us a partial understanding of thoughts and feelings as they become visible to us, but we are only conscious of the increase or decrease of power (Nietzsche 1968: 370).

Lastly, the third problem of consciousness according to *Nietzsche and Philosophy* is that it is reactive. Despite the similarities between Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche and Spinoza's critique of consciousness, there is an important difference between *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy.* In *Spinoza* Deleuze emphasises that consciousness involves both the passage to more potent and less potent totalities. However, in *Nietzsche,* Deleuze places a lot of emphasis on the reactive role of consciousness - by reducing it to a reactive apparatus (1983: 146): 'Consciousness usually only appears when a whole wants to subordinate itself to a superior whole' (Nietzsche in Deleuze 1983: 39). One way of reading this is in terms of the subordination of consciousness to values. Consciousness is '…an inferior in relation to a superior to which he is subordinated…' (1983: 39). This implies that consciousness is reactive, it separates the body from what it can do (1983: 41). This leads to bad conscience, which involves the interiorisation of moral rules when we force ourselves to comply. According to Nietzsche, dad conscience is intrinsically connected to morality because: 'Without bad conscience, without learning to be profoundly dissatisfied with ourselves, we cannot envisage higher norms…' (1989: 12).[55]

Perhaps more importantly, consciousness is reactive in its relation to the unconscious. This is the way in which Christian Kerslake (2007) reads Deleuze's claim that '…consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to a superior which he is subordinated…' (Deleuze 1983: 39). While Deleuze does mention values, he also mentions that 'Consciousness is never self-consciousness, but the consciousness of an ego in relation to a self which is not itself conscious' (ibid). As Kerslake notes, this mirrors Jung's positioning of the unconscious as an unknown self, and the ego as that which '…by definition subordinate to the self and is related to it like a part to the whole' (Kerslake 2007: 86). However, it is important to note that in Jung the relation between the ego to the unconscious changes at the different stages of the development of consciousness (Kerslake 2007: 82). At the last stage of individuation, the negative relation of the ego to the unconscious is overcome, and the unconscious becomes creative (after being merely what is excluded from consciousness without creating new content) (Kerslake 2007: 84, 86).[56] The implication of this is that consciousness does not necessarily have to be reactive in relation to the unconscious. This is why we need to turn to Deleuze's work on Spinoza, where Deleuze is careful not to position a new hierarchy between the body and the mind. In Deleuze's words: 'Extension is like thought; it is an attribute of substance, and you

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[55] Furthermore, aside from the depreciation of life for higher values, there is also the problem of the rejection of values, leaving life without meaning (Deleuze 1983: 148). While in the first case, the will denies its own power by simply following, in the second case the will simply reacts and sides into nothingness.

[56] In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* Deleuze recognises that the unconscious can also work for the reactive apparatus (see: Deleuze 1983: 112).

cannot say that one attribute is greater than the other: perfect equality of all attributes' (2 December, 1980). The critique of consciousness leads, not to the relegation of consciousness to an inferior position, but to the discovery of the power of the mind beyond consciousness. This is the most positive side of the critique of consciousness. As Hardt explains, the focus on the body and the unconscious will help Deleuze in his search for a 'productive exteriority that is based on affirmation' (Hardt 1993: 38). This is not a rejection of interiority, but a recognition that inner experience is shaped by our relationship with other bodies. In Hardt's words, in Deleuze 'the receptivity of a body is closely tied to its active external expression' (1993: 54).

Spinoza's Parallelism: the implications for morality and thought

The critique of consciousness is connected to Spinoza's claim that '...we do not know what a body can do, or what activity it is capable of' (Deleuze 1983: 41). We do not know what a body can do because, as already mentioned, the question of the body is not a question of essence (so there is no single answer to this question that can be given in advance) (December 9, 1980). Furthermore, we do not know what a body can do because philosophy has given priority to the mind, delegating the body to a subordinate position. The illusion of consciousness leads the mind to assume it is free from the body, and that it holds power over the body, without understanding what moves the body to act (Deleuze 1988: 60). For this reason, as Nietzsche reminds us, we need to be more modest about the role of consciousness (Deleuze 1983: 39). Similarly, according to Deleuze, one of the main theses of Spinoza is the '…devaluation of consciousness *(in favour of thought)'* (1988: 17).[57] However, the devaluation of consciousness does not mean that the hierarchy of the mind over the body is reversed by placing the body over the mind. The thesis of *parallelism* posits that just as there is no primacy of the mind over the body, there is also there is no primacy of the body over the mind: '…an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind' (Deleuze 1988: 18). As Hardt explains, Deleuze's theory of parallelism is constituted by three elements.[58] First, there is a strict separation and autonomy of Spinoza's attributes - thought (the mind) and extension (the body) - so that the body does not control the mind, and equally the mind does not control the body (1993: 80). This rests on the following principle: 'Insofar as two things are different, one cannot be the cause of the other' (ibid). Secondly, the autonomy of the attributes is also connected to their equality: 'Corporeality and thought are equal expressions of being, said in the same voice' (1993: 81). Lastly, not only are the attributes equal, but they are the same expression of being. This implies the unity of the attributes from the point of view of substance. In other words, 'they are the same from the point of view of substance' (ibid). The practical implication of parallelism is that whatever we affirm of one of the attributes has to be affirmed of

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[57] For a detailed account of how Deleuze puts forward the thesis of parallelism in order to avoid the privilege of thought over extension see: Hardt 1993: 79-87. Hardt also mentions the difficulties that arise for Deleuze in Spinoza's texts, where the privilege of the mind reappears.

[58] As Hardt explains, 'parallelism' is not a term used by Spinoza, and was introduced by Leibniz's interpretation (Hardt 1983: 131, note 15).

the other: 'For example, if we are to affirm a certain nature of a true idea of the mind, we must also affirm a parallel nature of a true act of the body' (ibid). The simplest example of this is just as we affirm that the body goes beyond the knowledge we have of it, the same goes for the mind (2 December, 1980).

It is important to highlight two important consequences of the theory of parallelism. First, in terms of the consequences for morality, and secondly in terms of immanence. To address the first point, as Deleuze argues in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,* the thesis of parallelism is directly connected to the critique of morality as the domination of the mind over the body. In Deleuze's words: 'The practical significance of parallelism is manifested in the reversal of the traditional principle on which morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness' (1988: 18). In opposition to this, in Spinoza's ethics there is no primacy of the body or the mind - they act in parallel fashion.[59] This is also related to the discovery of the unconscious. The comparison of the powers of the mind and the body leads to the discovery that there is more about the body than we know, and also more in the mind than consciousness (Deleuze 1988: 90). Since as already mentioned, what we affirm of one attribute can also be affirmed of the other. In Deleuze's words: 'It is a matter of showing that the body surpasses the knowledge that we have of it, *and that thought likewise surpasses the consciousness that we have of it'* (Deleuze 1988: 18, emphasis in original). This goes back to the the critique of consciousness. While consciousness has a particular role, it is also '…completely immersed in the unconscious' (1988: 59). For this reason, Deleuze argues that we need a new image of thought where thinking is no longer conceived as a premeditated or a conscious decision. As we will see in chapter 5, Deleuze argues that thinking is the result of external forces that take hold of thought forcing us to think (Deleuze 2000: 108). The personification of this is the jealous lover who is forced to search for the truth after sensing the beloved lies (2000: 11). This implies that there is no natural desire for truth, nor a prior disposition for it, but a violence that impels us to decipher the signs we encounter (2000: 15). Thought is therefore violent and fortuitous: 'It is the accident of the encounter that guarantees the necessity of what is thought' (Deleuze 2000: 16).

From Spinoza's parallelism to univocity

The second aspect of parallelism that needs to be highlighted is its celebration of the univocity of being. As we will see, this is important for the development of immanence. As already mentioned, according to the thesis of parallelism the different attributes (thought and extension) are one and the same expression of being. The claim that being is always expressed in the same way, is the foundation of the theory of univocity. A theory that was first developed by John Duns Scotus in the Thirteenth century, and Deleuze took on (as a problem) and connected it to Spinoza and Nietzsche (although they do not use the term themselves).[60] As Hardt explains: '*Univocity means*

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[59] As explained by Hardt, for Spinoza an action refers both to the body and to the mind (Hardt 1993: 82).

[60] As Widder explains: Deleuze's '…univocal ontology is certainly not Duns Scotus's. Nevertheless, the conception of univocity that Duns Scotus draws from Aristotle and opposes to analogical conceptions of being is what inspires Deleuze's philosophy of univocal difference' (2009: 28).

precisely that being is expressed always and everywhere in the same voice' (1993: 65, emphasis in original).[61] The parallelism of mind and body goes hand with the affirmation of the univocity of being due to the need to maintain a non-hierarchical relationship between the attributes. As Hardt explains: 'This intellectualist conception of ontology would not only destroy the univocity of being, but would also subordinate any material and corporeal conception of being to the intellectual realm' (1993: 80). This is also connected to immanence, in Deleuze words: '…immanence signifies first of all the univocity of the attributes…' (1988: 52). In order to clarify the connection between immanence and univocity we can contrast univocity to the two other theories of being: equivocity and analogy. The context is the Medieval debate surrounding the relationship between God and its creatures; or put in a different way, the question of how Being is distributed among beings (Smith 2012: 29). In contrast to univocity where Being has only one sense, so for example: 'it is in the same form that bodies imply extension and that extension is an attribute of divine substance' (Deleuze 1988: 52); according to equivocity there are several senses of being with no common measure. For example, God and man are different types of beings. As Smith explains, the problem of both positions is that they lead to scandalous conclusions. Equivocity denies order in the cosmos by positioning a strong separation between God and the world; and univocity implies pantheism: '… there is no categorical difference between the assumed senses of the word 'being' and being is said in one and the same sense of everything which is. In a certain manner this means that the tick is God; there is no difference of category, there is no difference of substance, there is no difference of form. It becomes a mad thought' (January 14, 1974).[62] The middle ground position between univocity and equivocity is analogy - this was the orthodox Christian position (Smith 2012: 29). It implies there is a common measure between all forms of Being without reducing God to its creatures (Widder 2020: 157). For example, qualities such as goodness and wisdom can be said both about God and about humans in different proportions.

As Hardt explains, in contrast to univocity, both analogy and equivocity rely on a transcendent conception of God, although in different manners. Equivocity affirms that God is the cause of the world but does not share the same essence, which means divine essence

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[61] For a detailed explanation of the concept of univocity see: Hardt 1993 chapter 3, Williams 2003 chapter 3, Smith 2012 essay 2, Somers-Hall 2013 chapter 1, and Widder 2009, 2020. Hardt's (1993) chapter focuses on Deleuze's work on Spinoza. He explains how the thesis of parallelism is connected to univocity, and how Deleuze uses Spinoza to combat the privileges of thought over extension. Williams' (2003) chapter is helpful to understand Deleuze's development of a theory of difference in itself (which is connected to univocity). Smith's (2012) essay follows the life of Deleuze's construction of the concept of univocity from its appearance, maturation and passing away - emphasising the dynamic nature of Deleuze's thought. Widder's (2009 and 2020) work looks into the role of Duns Scotus in Gilles Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, and the Aristotelian origins of the concept of univocity, which inspired Scotus. Somers-Hall (2013) provides an in depth explanation of the problem of Aristotle's analogical conception of being, and the development of univocity from Scotus, through Spinoza, to Nietzsche.

[62] This lecture can be found here: https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/anti-oedipus-iii/lecture-02. Deleuze explains the debate concerning the nature of being: equivocity, analogy, or univocity. Furthermore, Deleuze also explains the univocal distinction between beings based on degrees of power using Nietzsche and Spinoza.

transcends the essence of its expression (Hardt 1993: 63). This is connected to a transitive conception of creation where God creates something outside of itself (also known as creationism) (Smith 2012: 32). In analogy, on the other hand, even though God and the world are different in form, God is both the cause and the essence of the world, which means God holds an eminent position as creator and a degree of equivocity (Hardt 1993: 63-64). This is connected to an emanative conception of creation which is '…a cause whose effect is exterior to it, but which none the less remains within itself in order to produce its effect' (Smith 2012: 33). As Deleuze explains: 'Spinoza radically rejects the notions of eminence, equivocity, and even analogy (notions according to which God would possess the perfections in another form, a superior form…' (1988: 52), and we can also add creationism to the list of rejections. In contrast to this, Spinoza's univocal conception of being relies on an immanent conception of creation: 'a cause that not only remains within itself in order to produce, but one whose produced effect also remains within it' (Smith 2012: 33). In other words, even though God is the first and only cause of being, it is never a remote cause (Deleuze 1988: 54). There is nothing above being (in contrast to emanation) (Deleuze 1990: 172), and everything is expressed in being (Hardt 1993: 64).

Univocity, difference and expressionism

However, as Hardt argues, we are still missing something: immanence is not a sufficient condition for univocity (1993: 65). Put simply, we are missing difference. As Deleuze explains in *Difference and Repetition,* the essential of univocity is the following: 'Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, *but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself'* (1994: 36, my emphasis). How is this the case? How can being be said in one and the same sense of everything, while simultaneously allowing for beings to be different? As Deleuze explains: 'Spinoza organises a remarkable division into substance, attributes and modes' (Deleuze 1994: 40) - the answer to this apparent contradiction is going to be found in the complex relationship between these three elements of Spinoza's ontology (Widder 2020: 166). The relations between these three elements are relations of expression. As Daniela Voss argues, Deleuze's achievement was placing the concept of expressionism at the centre of Spinoza's philosophy, creating a new trajectory of thought of pure immanence (2017: 157). Substance is the expressive agent, the attributes are expressions, and the modes are the expressed (Hardt 1993: 64). It is important to note that the expressive agent (substance) and the expressed (the modes) are different in terms of essence, but they share the same form (substance). The way this works is the following: 'Substance first expresses itself in its attributes, each attribute expressing an essence. But then the attributes express themselves in their turn: they express themselves in their subordinate modes, each such mode expressing a modification of the attribute' (Deleuze 1990a: 14). This implies that there are two levels of expression: the expression of the essence of substance by the attributes through its form, and the expression of the attributes in the modes (Deleuze 1990a: 13-14). The attributes serve as the middle term that allows for the difference of essence between the substance and the modes, while maintaining the univocity of being. In Deleuze's words: 'The univocity of the attributes is the only means of radically distinguishing the essence and existence

of substance from the essence and existence of the modes, while preserving the absolute unity of being' (1988: 63).

Having established the expressive relationship between substance, the attributes and the modes, we can now focus on the relationship between substance and the modes in order to clarify the relationship between the One and the many. As Daniela Voss explains, substance complicates (comprehends) all finite beings in itself, the multiplicity of beings (modes) remains implicated in substance (which is its immanent cause), and substance explicates itself in the modes (2017: 158). Voss clarifies that implication is the most important relation, since both complication and explication are an implication: complication being an implication in oneself, and explication being an implication in something else (ibid). The implication of the modes in substance, is a form of participation of powers, where beings participate in the power of God from a particular point of view (2017: 158-159). This means that while all beings express God's power, beings also exercise their power according to their own context. As Voss argues, expressive immanence answers the problem of the relationship between the One and the Many (God and beings), because expression is one in relation to God, and multiple in relation to the beings expressed (Voss 2017: 157). This is how both the univocity of being, and the difference between beings is maintained. Additionally, immanence is maintained because everything is expressed (Hart 1993: 64) - in other words, there is no transcendent cause above being.

Univocity and difference in itself

To clarify the stakes of the debate surrounding the relationship between God and its beings in terms of difference we can compare univocity and analogy. As already mentioned, in analogy God and its beings have a different form but the same essence; and in univocity the reverse is the case: God and its beings have the same form but a different essence. While in both conceptions the effect is different to its cause (at least to an extent in the case of analogy), univocity and analogy rely on a different conception of difference. Analogy is based on difference in a derivative sense - for example: God possesses the same perfections as human beings in a superior form (Deleuze 1988: 52-53). In univocity, on the other hand, Deleuze argues that being is said of *difference in itself* (Deleuze 1994: 36). As Williams clarifies, this is a form of difference that is not based on a shared identity between beings (having the same characteristic to a different degree); nor in the the negation of identities (the difference between two things is one not being the other) (2003: 55).[63] In Spinoza we find difference in itself in the modes as a degree of power (Smith 2012: 40). While all beings express God's power, they do it in a particular manner. To expand on this point, this particular manner to express power is a different capacity to affect and be affected; and a different capacity to act and be acted on (passions) (Deleuze 1988: 27). This form of difference is based on a relational ontology, so apart from the difference of essence between the cause and effect, the effect is also different to itself as it is modified through its relations to other finite beings (some encounters increase/decrease our capacity to be affected/act) (Deleuze 1988:

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[63] For a summary of Deleuze's conception of difference in itself, and how it differs from Aristotle, Hegel, Leibniz and Plato see Williams (2003: 56-57).

53). In Deleuze's words: '…every existing finite thing refers to another finite thing as to the cause that makes it exist and act' (Deleuze 1988: 53). This is connected to Spinoza's claim that we do not know what a body can do. In Hannah Stark's words: '…when Spinoza asks what a body can do he is inquiring about what relations it can enter into and the capacity for affect that will be facilitated by these relations' (2017: 71).

Univocity and ethics / morality and analogy

At the beginning of the chapter we talked about Deleuze's ethics as opposed to morality. However, what was not explained is the connection between morality and analogy. Deleuze's critique of analogy is directly connected to his critique of morality. As Smith summarises: 'For Deleuze, morality is fundamentally linked to the notion of essence and the analogical vision of the world' (Smith 2012: 41). The link is the following: analogy, like morality, creates divisions and categories between beings (for example: the categories of man and animal, and good and evil respectively). We can find an example of the division of beings into categories in Aristotle. As Smith explains, in Aristotle the division of beings into categories is based on what they have in common (2021: 38). For example: two beings differ when they have the same genus but they are from different species (Deleuze 1994: 30). The problem of the analogical conception of difference is that it can not say what constitutes the individuality of beings (Deleuze 1994: 38); and the same can be said about morality - it merely judges in terms of external values, as opposed to reaching the internal principle of the determination of forces (in terms of quantity and quality) (Deleuze 1983: 51).[64] An additional problem of analogy is that it paints an immobile picture of the world, but being is always changing and resists categorisation. In Williams' words: '…things must not only be approached through that they are but also in terms of how they have become and how they are undone' (2003: 70). The second commonality between morality and analogy involves the postulation of a higher form above being. Reality is then ranked according to its proximity to this. For example, in Plato, beings are less perfect than the original idea. In opposition to this, for Deleuze the difference between beings is not based on their departure from an original (Williams 2003: 55). Deleuze argues that difference in itself is not hierarchical (1990a: 173). This implies that the distinction between cause and effect is not a degradation. In Deleuze's words: 'From the viewpoint of immanence the distinction of essence does not exclude, but rather implies, an equality of being: it is the same being that remains in itself in the cause, and in which the effect remains as in another thing' (1990a: 172). However, the equality of being does not mean there are no hierarchies or differences between beings at all (since the role of ethics is to evaluate beings). There is just a different type of hierarchy, which will be explored next.

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[64] This is the difference between a genetic method, and a method of external conditioning, which will be explored in chapter seven. In short, Kant's method of conditioning only reaches the conditions of *possible* experience by tracing the transcendental from the empirical. In opposition to this, Deleuze (following Maimon) argues that we need to reach the genetic conditions of *real* experience (how is experience constituted?), which requires a principle of difference. For an excellent explanation of this see Smith's (2012: 237-241) explanation of the five requirements to reach real experience.

Sedentary and nomadic distribution

As Deleuze recognises in *Difference and Repetition:* 'No doubt there is still a hierarchy and distribution in univocal being…' (1994: 36). It is just a different type of hierarchy, which is based in a different type of distribution. Deleuze distinguishes between two types of distribution: a nomadic distribution, and a sedentary distribution. A sedentary distribution involves allocating things to pre-established categories (Williams 2003: 65). This is based on judgement. In Deleuze's words: 'For judgement has precisely two essential functions, and only two: distribution, which it ensures by the *partition* of concepts; and hierarchisation, which it ensures by the measuring of subjects' (1994: 33). Additionally, there is the claim that the principles of distribution are the best distributed (Deleuze 1994: 36). Deleuze ties this to the notion of common sense, which states that learning is about memorising the correct distribution of things into sets, ignoring how things evolve beyond their established boundaries (we will explore this more in detail in chapter 5) (Williams 2003: 59-60). On the other hand, in a nomadic distribution there is no division of the already distributed, beings distribute themselves in an open space (Deleuze 1994: 36). As Williams explains, this means that we are not able to impose any order nor hierarchies to being, since we do not have access to the principle of distribution (2003: 65). In Williams' words: '… all things distribute themselves and are only answerable to themselves in overcoming their internal limits and the way they become fixed' (2003: 66). Second, Deleuze argues that in a nomadic distribution nothing belongs to any person (Deleuze 1994: 36). This means that this form of distribution is not based on the subject and its properties (Somers-Hall 2013: 41). The problem of focusing on the properties of the subject is that it assumes the fixed identity of beings, separating beings from each other and creating hierarchies; disregarding how beings can form connections with each other which change them beyond these categories. In Williams' words: 'what you are disconnects you from other things, once and for all, and positions you in a hierarchy of distinct sets or categories' (2003: 63). In opposition to this, a nomadic distribution is based on the different degrees of power of the body, and its ability of going to the limit of what it can do. There are two examples that show us the implications of this. First, as Voss explains, when we say things are imperfect or bad for us it is 'not because they lack something in them which is theirs', but because the way they affect us in Spinozist terms (2017: 159). Secondly, as Deleuze explains: 'There is in this respect no difference between wise man and fool, reasonable and demented men, strong man and weak… each tries equally to preserve himself, and has as much right as he has power, given the affections that actually exercise his capacity to be affected' (Deleuze 1990: 258). Therefore, the difference between men is the following: 'They do of course differ in the kind of affections that determine their effort to persevere in existence' (ibid).

To sum up, an immanent theory of ethics relies on the parallelism of the attributes, which states there is no primacy of the mind over the body. This in turn is connected to the univocity of being, where being is said in one and the same sense of all beings, except for the difference in their capacity to affect and be affected (how they realise the same being) (Smith 2012: 40). Therefore, the univocity of being assures both the equality and the difference of being: equality is maintained, since being is equally present in all beings; and at the same time, difference is

maintained as degrees and capacities of power: 'things reside unequally in this equal being' (Deleuze 1994: 37). Furthermore, 'Univocal being is at one and the same time nomadic distribution' (ibid) - any hierarchy is based on power, and not in essence. For this reason, Stark argues that Deleuze's philosophy is about 'doing rather than being' (being is associated with essence) (Stark 2017: 72). This leads to a shift from the question of the essence of individuals and things into their affective capacities (Smith 2012: 40-41). We can connect this to Deleuze's relational ontology which states that bodies are mutually constituted through their external relations with each other. The consequence for identity is the following: 'The body cannot be thought of as the origin or final point of identity because embodied individuals are enmeshed in active processes of engagement with their surroundings' (Stark 2017: 83). This also brings attention to the environment: any kind of body is networked to its environment, reminding us of the primacy of the interactions of the body (rather than the form or content) (Stark 2017: 73); including the interrelations between human and inhuman forces (Braidotti 2012: 172).

Part 2: Anti-Oedipus

Having discussed the ethical dimensions of Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche and Spinoza (in opposition to morality), there are two more topics that need to be examined. First, the ethical dimensions of *Anti-Oedipus;* and second, the issue of how to avoid turning Deleuze's ethics into a normative quest for affirmation. We can begin with the first topic. In the preface to *Anti-Oedipus* Michel Foucault described the book as a book of ethics, even though Deleuze and Guattari do not mention ethics explicitly in it; and 'Deleuze nowhere explicitly attempts to put forward what could be called an "ethical theory" of his own' (Smith 2012: 146). In Foucault's words: 'I would say that *Anti-Oedipus* (may its authors forgive me) is a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time' (Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari 1983: xiii). This statement makes explicit the relation between the immanent theory of ethics developed in Deleuze's monographs dedicated to Nietzsche and Spinoza, and Deleuze and Guattari's theory of desire in *Anti-Oedipus* (Smith 2012: 175). The question we need to answer now is the following: what is the relation between immanent ethics and desire? We have already examined what an immanent ethics entails: increasing our power to act; while transcendence, on the other hand reduces our power of action (since we are following transcendental principles) (Smith 2012: 176). As Goodchild reminds us, our power to act goes beyond consciousness, into '…the unconscious determinants of thought and action' (1997: 41). In other words, thinking and acting, for Deleuze, are not only about consciousness: they are also about the unthinkable and the unthought (2004: 92). This is precisely the question of desire: 'desire is "what remains always unthought at the heart of thought"' (ibid). However, as we will see, desire is always arranged in a particular way by forces outside of our control, which has an effect on our power to act.

Now that we have explained the connection between ethics and desire (ethics is about increasing our power to act, which is connected to unconscious desire), we still need to explore the problem of desire more in detail. We have already talked about desire (without naming it), as a

set of unconscious drives that are in combat with each other (my drive to write against my drive to read, for example). We have also talked about how morality creates a hierarchy, or ranking of drives. In Smith's words: 'Nietzsche attempts to show that what we now call "morality" arises when one particular drive comes to the fore and dominates the selection and organization of all the others' (2012: 181). However, the examples we discussed (the different drives in combat while writing) seem to be about drives from a conscious perspective. For example, I am aware of my different drives - the combat between finishing work for the day and also wanting to continue writing - and I am in command so I decide to keep writing. Yet, Spinoza reminds us that consciousness adds nothing to desire. Consciousness is merely the awareness of how the things we enter relations with affect us.[65] To be more precise, consciousness is the passage from less potent totalities to more potent ones - when we enter a relation with something that its good for our body; or the passage from a more potent totality to a less potent one - when we encounter something that is bad for us (Deleuze 1988: 20-21). For this reason, Spinoza argues that we do not desire what we judge to be good (in a moral sense), we judge something to be good because we desire it (because it increases our power to act).

Braidotti (2012: 177) argues that a Spinozist ethics relies on a higher form of self-knowledge, based on the understanding of the nature of our own affectivity; including realising our interconnections with other forces beyond the individual subject. However, while I do not want to deny that it is necessary to understand our affectivity and connectivity, it is important to remember that knowledge is not the main goal of Deleuze's philosophy (this will be explained more in detail in chapter 5). The reason for this is that things are always in constant motion, including our affections and drives. Things that were good for us can become harmful. For example, even though coffee helped me write a few months ago, it now makes me anxious. Furthermore, as Smith argues, drives are assembled in different ways across different individuals, times and cultures (2012: 180-181); and individuals experience shifts in the relations among their drives (for example, we have different priorities at different stages in life).[66] More importantly, we cannot achieve complete knowledge because our drives remain mostly unknown to the conscious intellect (2012: 179). As Deleuze following Leibniz argues, drives are made up of multiple minute perceptions are inclinations that move us in different directions. When we make a decision they become distinguished, however there are things that we are not aware of that might play a role in the process. During the process of deliberation the subject is constantly changing as it oscillates between the different inclinations, which are also affected by micro-perceptions (Smith 2012: 184).

In addition to the constant change of drives and affections, Deleuze (similarly to Nietzsche) emphasises that desire (or the drives) '…never exist in an unbound state; nor are they merely

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[65] 'The affectio refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of the affecting body' (Deleuze 1988: 49).

[66] As Smith explains, this is the meaning of reason: 'a certain "system of relations between various passions," a certain ordering of the drives' (2012: 180). This implies that there are multiple systems of rationalisation, depending on the ordering of drives.

individual. They are always assembled by social formations…' such as capitalism (Smith 2012: 182). Smith explains that this is related to the idea that conscious thought is determined by forces beyond consciousness. For example, by class (according to Marx), and by familial conflicts (according to Freud). In *Anti-Oedipus,* Deleuze and Guattari connect these two ideas by arguing that political economy and libidinal economy are part of the same infrastructure of desire (Smith 2012: 182-183). The consequences of this is the following: 'your very drives and impulses, even the unconscious ones, which seems to be what is most individual about you, are themselves economic—that is, they are already part of what Marx called the "infrastructure"' (Smith 2012: 183). A good way of explaining this is provided by Deleuze and Guattari in their book on *Kafka,* where they connect Gregor's relationship with his father to political economy (this is their challenge to psychoanalysis): 'he [the father] appears as the man who demands only that the son submit because he himself is in submission to a dominant order in a situation from which there is no way out' (Deleuze and Guattari 1986: 11). In other words, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the familial triangle (father-mother-child) is connected to other triangles (whether it is political, economic, judiciary, bureaucratic, and so on). The assembly of desire is connected to the question of desiring our own subjection; or in other words, desiring transcendence, which separates us from what we can do (Smith 2012: 177). According to Foucault, the major strategic enemy of *Anti-oedipus* is the fascism in all of us '…that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us' (Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari 1983: xiii). Why would we desire our own submission? As Smith explains, we all live in a particular social formation, which structures our drives in a particular way (2012: 186). An example of this is how marketing and advertising shape what we buy. The way desire is assembled then makes different interests we might have possible/impossible. For instance, the interest of attending university is made possible/impossible by the social formation we live in. It might be something we are encouraged to do but is beyond our reach. As Smith clarifies, the conception of desire as lack is connected to our interests as opposed to our drives. It is the social formation which produces the lack, while desire lacks nothing. Furthermore, the interests that fall in line with the structure of the social formation are conceived as rational (ibid).

Response to Butler

Now we are at a better place to respond to Butler's critique of Deleuze. We have shown how Deleuze's aim is not to promote the normative ideal of desire as affirmation. Deleuze is interested in Nietzsche and Spinoza due to their philosophies of immanence, where the aim is to increase our power to act, but this is not achieved only through affirmation. We have to deny too since affirmation taken to the extreme would lead to suicide. This will be explained more in detail in chapter 6, where we will highlight how the question of dosage is crucial for Deleuze's ethics. While he does want to increase connections, and increase our power to act, this is always connected to the question of how much can the body take. For this reason, affirmation cannot become a normative quest, since each body is particular, and it reacts differently to each encounter. In opposition to this, moral norms tend to be blind to the particularities of the situation

- this is what Deleuze is trying to avoid. While Deleuze does privilege affirmation in the sense that affirmation is primary and negation is secondary, this is not a normative point but an ontological one. Negation and affirmation have different roles. It is the affirmation of difference that produces the world we live in, and negation and representation are an effect of this. They are possible but they are not productive principles which would explain the constitution of reality. This will be explained more in detail in chapter 5 and chapter 7, when we talk about thought and Deleuze's ontology. Lastly, Deleuze's evaluation of modes of existence (for example in terms of affirmation or negation) is internal rather than external. It is not about judging based on a transcendental principle, but about evaluating based on immanent criteria. Deleuze and Guattari explain this in detail in *What is Philosophy:*

> 'There is not the slightest reason for thinking that modes of existence need transcendent values by which they could be compared selected, and judged relative to one another. There are only immanent criteria. A possibility of life is evaluated through itself in the movements its lays out and the intensities it creates on a plane of immanence: what is not laid out or created is rejected. A mode of existence is good or bad, noble or vulgar, complete or empty, independently of Good or Evil or any transcendent value: there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 74).

Just as Deleuze does not encourage a normative quest of affirmation, Deleuze's method is not ideology-critique. Throughout his work Deleuze explicitly critiques the concepts of method and critique. For example, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* he argues that method is one of the theses of the dogmatic image of thought, which assumes that in order to avoid being diverted from the natural quest for truth, we need a method that constrains thought (this will be explored more in detail in chapter 5) (Deleuze 1983: 103). Then, in *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature,* Deleuze and Guattari argue that Kafka's non-critique is more powerful and effective than critique. This is not to say that we cannot talk about a Deleuzean method or concept of critique. However, Deleuze redefines both concepts, so any attempt to talk about Deleuze's method or his concept of critique requires a lot of work to explain what the concept does and does not entail. Butler fails to do this. She does not give any definition of the concept ideology-critique. In order to define ideology-critique we can turn to the work of Jane Bennett (2011: 219-221). She provides a helpful way of explaining ideology-critique based on Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (who are heirs of Marx), which she also connects to Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari. Ideology-critique can be described as a practice that has the power of demystifying and debunking the image of the dominant capitalist system. According to Bennett, this practice is similar to Nietzsche's practice of genealogy which demystifies Christian and scientific asceticism. In Bennet's words: Nietzsche's genealogy '…like ideology-critique, sought to undercover the violent, cruel, or simply contradictory elements within conventional ideals and concepts, including those constitutive of the modern self (e.g. moral responsibility, guilt, and conscience)' (2011: 221). However, it is

important to note that Nietzsche's version relies more on aesthetics, while Horkheimer and Adorno's version relies on reason. Lastly, Bennett connects ideology-critique to Deleuze and Guattari's idea that 'there is always something that flows or flees, that escapes... the overcoding machine' (Deleuze and Guattari in Bennet 2011: 221). This seems to be Butler's definition of ideology-critique too, when she claims that in Deleuze's work negativity (which she equates with lack) is instituted through ideological means (Butler 1987b: 206). The consequence of this, according to Butler, is the repression of life affirming desire, which can be deconstructed and liberated.

Butler's interpretation is problematic for three reasons. First, Deleuze and Guattari criticise the concept of ideology. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari go as far as claiming 'there is no ideology and never has been' (1987: 4). In *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari's claim about people desiring their own submission is meant to replace the concept of ideology. They got this idea from Wilhelm Reich: 'Reich raised the problem of fascism in terms of how it was in fact desired by the masses, rather than as a matter of ideology or deception' (Holland 1999: 6). In Deleuze and Guattari's words: '...Reich's cry: no, the masses were not deceived, they desired fascism, and that is what has to be explained' (2003: 257). However, the problem of Reich is that even if he does not believe that social relations are distorted by ideology, he does think psychology is distorted by it (Holland 1999: 7). This is one of the points in which Deleuze and Guattari depart from Reich, which is worth quoting at length:

> 'If Reich, at the very moment he raised the most profound of questions – "Why did the masses desire fascism?" – was content to answer by invoking the ideological, the subjective, the irrational... and the inhibited, it was because he remained the prisoner of derived concepts that made him fall short of the materialist psychiatry he dreamed of, that prevented him from seeing how desire was part of the infrastructure, and that confined him in the duality of the objective and the subjective. (Consequently, psychoanalysis was consigned to the analysis of the subjective, as defined by ideology)' (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 344-345).

For this reason Deleuze and Guattari connect the libidinal economy to political economy, joining the personal and the political/economical. Secondly, when Deleuze and Guattari talk about desire it is not an invariant conception of desire. There are two reasons for this, first, desire is arranged differently across different social formations.[67] Secondly, desire involves difference. In Holland's words: 'Schizophrenia designates... the ontological expression of life force as perpetual differentiation' (Holland 1999: 121). Furthermore, when Deleuze talks about escaping desire this does not mean going back to a more natural form of desire. As Smith explains, we cannot distinguish between natural or artificial desire: 'It is not as if we could simply remove the mechanisms of morality and allow the drives to exist in a "free" and "unbound" state' (2012: 180).

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[67] See Deleuze and Guattari (2003: chapter 3), where they describe three types of social formations: capitalism, despotism and savagery.

Therefore, Deleuze's aim is not to go back to a freer desire, before Christianity and capitalism, as Butler claims. Deleuze's aim is to create lines of escape in the present that open up the future. For example, in *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari identify two types of revolutionary ruptures: a pre-conscious break which looks towards a new socius with new forms of codification and power, and an unconscious break which promotes molecular desire (Holland 1999: 103). Both types of revolutions are important: the former provides new aims and interests, and the latter provides new investments of desire. However, ultimately without new investments of desire the revolution is doomed to fail and it will end up setting up an equally or a more repressive power structure. This is connected to two tendencies, or poles, of libidinal investment: paranoiac which enslaves production and schizophrenic which produces lines of escape (Holland 1999: 103-104). So even though we can never completely liberate desire, we can produce lines of escape, which deterritorialise desire from molar representations that reinforce existing power structures (Holland 1999: 120, 123).

Third and last point, Deleuze's conception of desire is more complex than Butler acknowledges. While it is true that Deleuze is inspired by Nietzsche and Spinoza's conception of desire, there are other important inspirations that Butler ignores. These include Marx and Freud. We can begin by looking at Deleuze's re-appropriation of Marx, which helps us understand Deleuze's re-appropriation of Nietzsche. Ian Buchanan argues that Marx occupies the centre stage in *Anti-Oedipus*, and Nietzsche is used to intensify Marx, and to further the materialist agenda of the project (2008: 135). Before Deleuze and Guattari, Max Weber had already showed how Christian psychology - which was one of the targets of Nietzsche, goes well with the capitalist mode of production - which is Marx's focus (Holland 1999: 11). However, what makes Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* original, is their bringing together of Marx and Nietzsche as historical materialists: 'Both… take as their starting points the body, on one hand – its productive force, its will-to-power – and the historical expansion of "what the body can do" (in Spinoza's phrase), on the other' (Holland 1999: 12). As Holland explains, even though they differ in their objects of analysis - economics (Marx), and psychology and culture (Nietzsche); and they differ in their proposed solutions - collective struggle in the name of communism (Marx), and personal self-transformation (Nietzsche) (ibid); their critiques of christian asceticism and capitalism are historically related. Then, what Deleuze and Guattari add to the mix is their critique of psychoanalysis and the nuclear family as a '…capitalist form of human reproduction, that produces asceticism' (Holland 1999: 13).

This brings us to Freud. Deleuze and Guattari's claim that the nuclear family is a capitalist form of reproduction goes against Freud's conceptualisation of the nuclear family as a universal structure. Nonetheless, what Deleuze and Guattari do borrow from Freud is his concept of libido: 'his [Freud's] greatness lies in having determined the essence or nature of desire, no longer in relation to objects, aims, or even sources (territories)… but as an abstract, subjective essence - libido or sexuality' (Deleuze and Guattari in Holland 1999: 17). Freud's libido is then connected to Marx's concept of labour-power, through Nietzsche's will to power (Holland 1999: 13). It is connected to labour-power because, as Smith explains, our drives (libidinal economy) are part of

the economic infrastructure (political economy). Put in a different way, desiring-production is connected to social production. They are two separate regimes that share the same nature (Smith 2012: 162). What Nietzsche adds to this mix through the will to power, is that repetition is linked to creation, as opposed to being a compulsion (Freud) (Holland 1999: 11). Furthermore, Nietzsche and Freud supplement Marx's concept of exploitation with the concept of guilt: 'money is no longer conceived solely as means of exchange and accumulation, but also as means of imposing debt and guilt' (Holland 1999: 13).[68]

To the list we can also add Kant. As Holland explains, according to Kant our conscious mind utilises different type of immanent syntheses to arrive at knowledge (1999: 14). This can be understood in opposition to the illegitimate transcendent use of the syntheses that arrive at metaphysics. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari claim that our experience is constituted by three different syntheses of unconscious desire (connective, disjunctive and conjunctive);[69] and this can be distinguished from metaphysical illegitimate operations of the unconscious (Oedipal psychoanalysis).[70] While Deleuze is indebted to Kant's conception of desire as productive, the problem of Kant is that he betrays immanence by resurrecting transcendent Ideas (God, the Self, the World) as the the postulates of the moral law (Smith 2012: 117). So one of the aims of *Anti-Oedipus* is to reformulate desire so it does not appeal to the moral law and transcendent Ideas. In Smith's words: 'Deleuze proposes a theory of desire that, rather than seeking out the "higher" form of desire in the will, which has as its condition the synthesis of desire with its transcendent postulates (soul, world, God), instead seeks to explore the movement of desire, in a manner that is no less formal than Kant's, by tracing out the purely *immanent* syntheses of desire (connection, disjunction, conjunction)' - within the social assemblage (Smith 2012: 118).

Conclusion

The positive task of this chapter was to develop Deleuze's conception of immanent ethics, which is tied to the critique of the transcendental subject, in favour of an account of how the subject is constituted. According to Deleuze, the body and the mind are constituted immanently through encounters with other bodies and minds, which increase/decrease our power to act, depending on how compatible the bodies/minds are. This implies that we cannot know the body and the mind in advance outside of the relations that constitute it. This is also the case because of the

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[68] Both Feud and Nietzsche argue that western society imposes guilt on individuals. However the difference is that Nietzsche's account is socio-political, while Freud's account is psychological (Deleuze and Guattari prefer Nietzsche's account) (Holland 1999: 8). Furthermore, Holland explains how just as there are different modes of production, there are different modes go guilt production including one associated with capitalism and the nuclear family (1999: 13).

[69] For an explanation of the three syntheses see Holland 1999: 25-36.

[70] However, it is important to add that desire constitutes the real in a historically specific manner depending on the way desire is assembled by different social formations (Smith 2012: 187).

critique of the transparency of the subject through the discovery of the unconscious. In the language of Deleuze's appropriation of Leibniz, our macro-perceptions are composed (and undone) by the changing relations of micro-perceptions, which we are not aware of. The re-discovery of the power of the body and the unconscious is necessary for the advancement of immanence through the affirmation of the equality of being (which includes the equality of the mind and body). This is connected to the advancement of univocity, which states that all beings are equal, except for the way that they exercise their power (their capacity to affect and be affected). In the next chapter, we will turn to Deleuze's three syntheses of time. The main motivation of the chapter is to provide an examination of Deleuze's concept of the eternal return (the third synthesis), which is important to account for the production of the new. However, the eternal return cannot be understood in isolation, we need to understand its relation to the first and second syntheses. Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 2, we need a deeper examination of time to the one provided by Oksala, one which is able to account for the constitution of the subject. Then, in chapter 6, we will come back to the problem of ethics, in order to examine the question of how to act given Deleuze's philosophy of time.

4. Deleuze's Three Syntheses of Time

This chapter is dedicated to Deleuze's philosophy of time. This investigation is necessary for several reasons. First, in chapter 2, Oksala identified the importance of time to challenge and transform identity. However, we still need a deeper metaphysical investigation into the constitution of the subject in time, and the relationship between the past, present, and future. As we will see, Deleuze's work on time provides an account of the constitution of the subject in terms of the formation of habits and memories, without losing the openness of the present and future, which is necessary for feminist immanent critique. Second, this chapter will continue the task started in chapter 3 of the development of the unconscious, by showing how the active subject relies on unconscious synthesis. Third, we need to provide a deeper examination of Nietzsche's eternal return (third synthesis of time), in order to account for the constitution of the new.

Prelude: from Spinoza to Nietzsche's eternal return

In the previous chapter we turned from Nietzsche to Spinoza, in order to position the equality of the attributes - thought and extension (body and mind). This was connected to the univocity of being - both attributes are one and the same expression of being; and to the development of immanence, since there is no hierarchy of being. As Hardt explains, the turn to Spinoza was needed because in Nietzsche 'there are two elements that block the development of a practical struggle against the sad passions…' (1993: 54). First, while in Nietzsche we find an impersonal account based on an interplay of forces, in Spinoza there is a corporeal desiring agent: 'A corporeal agent such as Spinoza's can lead a struggle against the sad passions and discover a practice of joy' (Hardt 1993: 55). Furthermore, the second block in Nietzsche is that there is no spatial or social synthesis. The eternal return is only a temporal synthesis. While in Spinoza, 'common notions… provide the terms for an expansive collectivity, for the creation of society' (ibid). As Deleuze explains Spinoza's method is '…based on community, working with common notions' (1990a: 48); which are defined as '…the idea of something in common between two or more bodies that agree with each other' (Deleuze 1988: 44). Additionally, 'When the relations corresponding to two bodies adapt themselves to one another, the two bodies form a composite body having a greater power, a whole present in its parts (1988: 54). However, it is important to clarify that it is something common to *some bodies*, which means not all bodies are included, since it is not a universal concept. Furthermore, the focus is on embodiment and not the mind (ibid). Common notions are only common to the mind, to a lesser degree, as the mind is part of the body who is affected by the composition (Deleuze 1988: 54-55).

Now we can turn from Spinoza to Nietzsche again. While Spinoza's expressive conception of being pushes univocity further than Scotus, its precursor, we need Nietzsche to push it further (Deleuze 1994: 40). Scotus' point was that '…individuality must be defined in positive terms' (Widder 2009: 37). In other words, we need positive difference (haecceity), since the definition of an individual is not based on *not* being something else. However, the problem of Scotus is that being is neutral, which means it is indifferent to the distinction between finite and

infinite beings (God and the creatures) (Widder 2020: 159). In other words, in Scotus univocity is able to relate God and its creatures only because it is indifferent to their distinction (Widder 2020: 166). This implies two things, first (in contrast to analogy), we can talk about God without knowing anything further about him (for example: if God is finite or infinite) (Somers-Hall 2013: 31). Secondly, Scotus is more concerned about establishing the unity of God and its creatures than about the problem of the individuality of beings (Widder 2020: 160). However, it is important to clarify that in Scotus the principle of indifference only applies to certain modal differences. The reason for this is the need to limit what can be affirmed about god (for example, the predicate of materiality only applies to beings and not to God) (Widder 2020: 160). As we will see, this is a problem because it allows the preservation of divine transcendence (Widder 2020: 151). In Spinoza, on the other hand, univocity is not neutral but expressive, substance and the modes are connected immanently by the attributes (there is an expressive relation between the three terms) (Widder 2020: 166). Furthermore, while in Scotus univocity is limited to predicates that are indifferent to the distinction between finite and infinite, in Spinoza univocity was extended to all individual difference (haecceity) (Widder 2009: 28, 38). The extension of univocity to individual difference implies the overcoming of transcendence, since in Widder's words: 'if every predicate were considered univocal, it would be impossible to distinguish those concepts that can be affirmed of God from those that cannot' (2009: 39). Second, the extension of univocity to individual difference implies the freeing of difference from identity. The reason for this is that individual difference is an individuating form of difference, which precedes specific differences between beings: it is '...no less capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them temporarily' (Deleuze 1994: 39). As Somers-Hall explains: 'The priority of difference does not, therefore preclude the existence of identities, but asserts that what returns is not these identities themselves, but something prior to identity, which Deleuze characterises as difference' (Somers-Hall 2013: 43). To sum up: 'Deleuze reads Spinoza as revising univocity precisely so as to extend it to individual differences, so that Spinozist pantheism rests on a univocity not only of substance, attributes, and modes, but of difference itself' (Widder 2020: 160).

However, the problem of Spinoza according to Deleuze is that: 'nevertheless, there still remains a difference between substance and the modes: Spinoza's substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance…' (Deleuze 1994: 40). Deleuze argues that the priority of substance over the modes needs to be reversed: 'substance must itself be said *of* the modes and only *of* the modes' (Deleuze 1994: 40). This reversal implies that being is said of becoming, and identity is said of that which is different. In other words, to be is to become, and difference is prior to identity. As Williams explains, identity is secondary for the following reason: '…things only acquire identity because they become, because they express pure variations' (2003: 68). Furthermore, each individual expresses pure variation in their own way: 'You are because you express pure variations in a different way, in different combinations and to different degrees' (ibid). According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's principle of the eternal return satisfies the reversal required for pushing univocity forward. This was already the case in *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* where Deleuze explains that being is not opposed to becoming:

'*Return is the being of that which becomes*' (1983: 48). Secondly, what returns is not the same, but difference: 'identity in the eternal return does not describe the nature of that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of returning for that which differs' (Deleuze 1983: 48). Deleuze returns to this idea in *Difference and Repetition,* where he reiterates: 'the eternal return does not bring back 'the same', but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes' (1994: 41), and identity is produced by difference: returning is the only identity, and it is secondary to difference. It is important to highlight that the difference we are referring to here is pure difference (the individuating kind of difference): the eternal return is said of the pure intensities of the will to power '…which are like mobile individuating factors unwilling to allow themselves to be contained within the factitious limits of this or that individual, this or that Self' (Deleuze 1994: 41). Deleuze argues that this presupposes a world in which 'all previous identities have been abolished and dissolved' (ibid). How is this the case? In summary, the eternal return ensures that 'Identities fall into the past but that part for them that is pure difference returns' (Williams 2003: 103). In order to understand how the eternal return works more in detail we need to look at Deleuze's philosophy of time.

Why does time matter?

This chapter will focus on Deleuze's three syntheses of time developed in *Difference and Repetition*. Given the difficulty of the text, the investigation will also rely on the introductory guides to the book by Williams (2003) and Somers-Hall (2013), and their work on Deleuze's philosophy of time of time (Williams 2011, Somers-Hall 2011). As already mentioned, chapter 3 led us to the problem of time in order to gain a better understanding of the eternal return, which was important for the development of the univocity of being, and immanence. The eternal return is one of the three syntheses of time (the third synthesis of the future). In addition to this, we have the first synthesis of time, which can be understood as the synthesis of the lived present (habit); and the second synthesis of the pure past (memory). It is important to dive into the three syntheses (and not only at the eternal return) because we cannot understand any synthesis without the others, there is a complex relationship between the three (Williams 2011: 113). Furthermore, each syntheses plays an important role in the constitution of the subject, and the production of difference.

In terms of the aim of the project of developing an immanent ethics, Deleuze's philosophy of time is of interest because it helps us to expand on the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. This has already been discussed in chapter three in terms of the relationship between thought (mind) and extension (body), which leads to the discovery of the unconscious body/thought. However, in *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze deals with this in terms of the distinction between consciousness, and passive (unconscious) syntheses. Deleuze's syntheses are a reformulation of Kant's three syntheses.[71] The main difference is that he attempts to provide an account of the organisation of experience, which does not rely on an active subject (Somers-Hall 2013: 56). This means that the syntheses are unconscious. The problem of the

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[71] For a short summary of Kant's three syntheses of time see Somers-Hall (2013: 58-62).

active subject is that it is based on identity. In other words, it presupposes the subject, instead of explaining how it is constituted. The reason for this is that, according to Kant, the subject (and objects) are prior to experience (they are the base of experience): 'As such, while we need to presuppose them, we cannot say anything about them' (Somers-Hall 2013: 61). However, this does not mean that Deleuze rejects the active subject. As we will see, Deleuze argues that active syntheses rely on passive syntheses. As Williams summarises: 'activity presupposes passivity… this passivity involves a different form to active consciousness and one that is inaccessible to the active one' (2011: 81). These syntheses have the power not only to constitute the subject, but also to dissolve it. Similarly to the previous section, there is a shift from the question of the essence of individuals to the processes that create them. In Williams' words: 'It's not what you are but the relation between what makes you and unmakes you - what you create and how you become' (2003: 205). As Williams explains, in the first synthesis, Deleuze will show how any action involves a passive unconscious retention and future expectation (2011: 27). In the second synthesis, Deleuze demonstrates how consciousness relates to the past in memory (2011: 68). The third synthesis ensures we do not end up stuck in habit and memory, since the past presents do not return, and the past only returns as difference. The eternal return of difference does not depend on conscious repetition. However, as conscious beings, we have to endure the no return of identity and affirm the return of pure difference (2011: 121). Therefore, Deleuze's philosophy of time is connected to ethical questions such as how to access the past in order to create something new, and how to live to affirm difference, which we will discuss in chapter 6. Similar questions were raised by Oksala, but they need to be answered more thoroughly.

Overview: How is the subject constituted within the given?

As aforementioned, in Deleuze there is a shift from the Kantian question of 'how is experience given to the subject?' to the Humean question 'how is the subject constituted within the given?' In short, the answer given in *Difference and Repetition* is that the subject is constituted by repetition. To be more precise, the subject is constituted by three types of repetition, which can also be understood as three types of synthesis. The first repetition is that of habit: a woman comes to the coffee shop where you work and orders a latte a couple of times, so there is an unconscious expectation that this woman will return. Then, in the second type of repetition, that of memory: after a few times of seeing that woman, you recognise her and you remember her choice of drink. So as Williams summarises: 'We come to recognise an actual thing and assign a fixed identity to it because habitual repetitions, recorded in memory, lead us to have a fixed representation of things' (2003: 12). However, as Williams warns us: 'The first two repetitions are, in fact, illusory when viewed as final accounts' (ibid). The problem of the coffee house account that I have given is that it seems like it is based on the repetition of the same (the same drink, the same woman, the same coffee house). This goes against Deleuze's account where the first two repetitions are stages in the production of difference in itself (Deleuze 1994: 94). This is not the type of difference between two individuals, but the difference prior to any identity, the difference that not only constitutes individuals, but also undoes them. What this means is that difference was already part of the first two types of repetitions. For example, there is difference in every time

the woman goes to the coffee house: perhaps every time you see her you fall in love more intensely with her. Additionally, the passing of the present changes the whole of the past. The significance of passing events vary in relation to the new present, some aspects of the past become more distinct and others more obscure (Williams 2011: 72). So the appearance of that woman might change the hold that your previous relationship had until to that point in the present. This has very important implications in terms of how we conceptualise time. Time is no longer about minutes, days, and hours, which we can count. Deleuze is moving away from the representational view of time, where time is subordinated to measurement, into an intensive view of time. This does not mean that things cannot be identified or measured, however things always exceed their identity and measurement. The subject is always being constructed and reconstructed by the different syntheses, which are outside of its control. We will now look at each synthesis in detail.

The first synthesis of time

Before we explain how the first synthesis of time works it is important to clarify one point. In each synthesis we will talk about the past, present and future (we do not talk about any time independently from the others). For example, in the first synthesis, there is no past nor future independent from the present since they are both contracted in the present (Williams 2011: 103). However, the relationship between the three times changes in each syntheses. So the present will have three different functions (and the same is true for the future and the past). This can make things confusing, for example, the present of habit is different from the present of memory and the eternal return; so it is always important to remember which synthesis we are talking about. Now we can begin by explaining what the first synthesis of time is not. The first synthesis of time is 'distinct from the present as present instant for consciousness, and from the present as one of three distinct parts of time (past, present and future)' (Williams 2011: 29). Instead, we need to understand the first synthesis of time as a process, which relates the past and the future together in the living present (ibid). The first synthesis of time '…is what gives the present direction from past to future' (Williams 2003: 87). This involves the retention of the past, and anticipation of the future, in the present. In Somers-Hall's words: 'aspects of the past are retained, and aspects of the future are anticipated from within the present' (2013: 63). For example: 'After having observed AB enough times, we anticipate a future, B, when we perceive A. So habit gives us a relation between the past and the future' (Somers-Hall 2013: 63). However, this is not a conscious process, in the first synthesis things acquire consistency free of conscious activity (Williams 2003: 104). For this reason Deleuze calls the first synthesis a passive synthesis: 'This contraction is passive in the sense that we do not have to think consciously about it for it to take place' (Williams 2003: 87). What happens is that we passively acquire an unconscious relation to the future (an habit) (ibid). There is an expectation that there will be some degree of consistency - from the past to the future (in the present) (Williams 2003: 88). This is based on the concept of repetition, which Deleuze does not conceive as a property of the repeated thing (Williams 2003: 87). Repetition brings together two (or more) things that are independent from each other (by contraction) (Williams 2011: 24). In Williams' words: 'There is no repetition until a connection has

been drawn between two things' (2011: 22). This is why we need the first synthesis of time, the repeated terms are synthesised, which means they form a connection with each other (Williams 2011: 29).

To sum up the first synthesis of time: 'In this living present, the past is constituted through a process of retention whereby past events are retained together in the lived present' (Williams 2011: 25). At the same time, in the living present, the future is constituted through anticipation: 'Future events are synthesised by being anticipated, looked forward to or awaited in the living present' (Williams 2011: 25). The synthesis brings together the past and the future into the present as two different processes (Williams 2011: 29). This is how the synthesis of the living present ascribes an arrow of time: 'from the past to the future in the present' (Williams 2011: 28). This movement goes from the particular (actual events that are retained) to the general future events that are not actualised (in the field of expectation) (Williams 2011: 26). However, there are two clarifications that need to be made. First, expectation does not mean there is a particular expectation of 'this or that' outcome: 'it could be better to use "awaits" rather than "expects" to give a sense of waiting free of restricted and particular conscious content' (Williams 2011: 27). Therefore the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious is the following: '…any action is also a passive retention and expectation, for instance, in terms of conscious action, through unconscious and unconsidered effects, as well as possible yet non-conceived general outcomes' (Williams 2011: 27). Secondly, it is important to highlight that the direction of time goes from the past to the future, because if it was the other way around then there would be no expectation since we would know to which particular we are moving to (Williams 2011: 28). For this reason, Williams argues that the relationship between the past and the future is asymmetrical: it sets the arrow of time from past to future, which is from the particular to the general, and not the other way around. In Williams words: 'there is no symmetry between the two because any set of particulars determines a much wider set of generalities, yet also, any given set of generalities neither determines nor includes a set of particulars' (2011: 28-29).

The second synthesis of time

The second synthesis of time, that of the pure past, is the condition for memory (the being of the past). However, the first question that needs to be answered is why do we need a second synthesis of time? As Somers-Hall explains, while the first synthesis involves the living present and its particular anticipations, this present also passes and is replaced by another present (2013: 66). Therefore, we need a second synthesis so that the present can pass. Passing away means, becoming a dimension of the past (whereas in the first synthesis the past is a dimension of the present). However, as Williams warns, this should not be understood as the present '… passing into an inert and unchanged medium or collection' (2011: 54). As we will see, there is a complex relationship between the two synthesis: 'it is a two-way reciprocal determination' (2011: 53). This means that both processes transform one another, although in different manners. However, before answering the question of how the two synthesis determine each other, we need to distinguish them: the first synthesis is a process of *foundation*, and the second is a process of *founding* (2011: 55). The first synthesis is a foundation of time in the sense it gives rise to a facet of time

that allows it to unfold (without being the original foundation) (2011: 25).[72] Furthermore, the first synthesis is a foundation in terms of the occupation of a space by a repetitive pattern (2011: 55). On the other hand, the second synthesis is a process of founding, which means determining the relationship between the passing presents and the living presents (2011: 55-56). As we will see, the present 'passes in a very particular way' (Williams 2011: 52). The present has to pass in such way that we can recall past things - so what Deleuze is looking for is the condition of recollection (2011: 55). As Williams explains, given this requirement we can deduce that the present has to pass into something - it does not get completely obliterated (2011: 55). Secondly, as already mentioned, the present does not pass into an unchanged medium - since there is a reciprocal determination of habit and memory, so both realms need to be open to being transformed by the other. Furthermore, the present does not pass into the chaos of a perpetually changing ground (2011: 56). The reason for this is that the pure past follows a structure, this does not affect the content of the passing present, it means that the pure past structures the changing relations between presents. Lastly, the past does not pass in order to become a final foundation, since the role of the past is not to provide final complete determination to the present (2011: 56). To sum up: 'The pure past will be defined as determining the form of the passing present – that it must pass, and how it must pass – but it does not determine or cause the content of any particular passing present' (2011: 57). The role of the synthesis of memory is to make the present pass, without changing it in the past, while allowing the presents to change in the future (ibid).

Now that we know that the past makes the present pass without being its cause - in other words it is a matter of conditioning as opposed to cause - we need to highlight the distinction between condition and conditioning. Deleuze is looking for the condition of active memory and passing presents (Williams 2011: 58). So the past is the condition for the relations between presents, which are the conditioned. It is important to differentiate the two because, as Williams explains: '…they interact according to different processes, not only internally, in the sense that the relations between habits are different from the relations between memories, but also between themselves, in the sense of the determining relation of Habit to Memory and the determining relation of Memory to Habit' (2011: 58-59). The characteristics of the condition (the past) are going to be deduced: Deleuze '…is deducing the conditions for an empirical process in relation to necessary principle. Here, this means deducing the synthesis required to determine how active memory through representation is possible given the passing of presents' (2011: 58). This is called a *transcendental deduction.* The first thing Deleuze tells us about the past in the second synthesis is that it is general, while the present is particular (Deleuze 1994: 80). The past is general because it is the condition for any passing present (this will be explained furthered later); and the passing present is particular because it 'approaches the past in a particular way and for a particular aim' (Williams 2011: 59). So the search towards the past (in memory) is directed at a general past (2011: 61). This can be contrasted with the first synthesis of time, where the past is particular, and the present remains open to the future as a general expectation (Deleuze 1994: 80).

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[72] The synthesis of the present is not an original foundation 'in the sense of a pure origin, and independent of any other time' (Williams 2011: 52).

Deleuze argues that the reason the past can be represented in the present (active memory) is that it is general (Deleuze 1994: 80). To develop this claim we need to look at Deleuze's critique of active memory. As Somers-Hall (2013: 66) explains, according to Kant, it is the job of the faculty of the imagination to reproduce a past present, which is then recognised as such by the understanding. The implication of this is the past is simply a series of past presents, and that there is no difference between the actual present and the past presents. This relies on a prior synthesis where '…impressions are brought into affinity with one another' (ibid). Therefore, Deleuze states that in Kant active memory is determined by forms of association involving relations of resemblance and contiguity (Deleuze 1994: 80). So in order for a past present to be represented it has to resemble the present one; and it has to be broken up into 'partially simultaneous presents… which are then contiguous with one another' and the present present (ibid). This leads to two interrelated problems. First, it is problematic to base reproduction in resemblance for the following reason: 'we should seek in vain for two ideas which have not some point of resemblance or which do not touch each other somewhere' (Bergson in Somers-Hall 2013: 66). Secondly, how do we relate broken up memories? 'it is impossible to determine the principles by which they are related to one another' (Somers-Hall 2013: 67). This means that we need an external synthesis to establish the relations between the actual present and the past present: if relations are external to their terms, the synthesis cannot be based on the affinity between presents. Therefore, Deleuze's synthesis (inspired by Bergson) is based on the claim that the past does not resemble the present (Somers-Hall 2013: 67-68). This is the reason why that the past is general, while the present is particular (and made up of parts) - since they do not resemble each other.

Now, it is important to clarify that Deleuze does not deny the existence of active memory. The point is that for active memory to be possible it needs to be founded, and grounded, on passive syntheses. These include the empirical synthesis of habit, and the transcendental synthesis of memory. Active memory is *founded* on the first synthesis of time '…since the latter constitutes the general possibility of any present' (Deleuze 1994: 81). Then, active memory is *grounded* on the second synthesis of time because, as already mentioned, we need an external synthesis that relates the different presents (both past and actual) (we need an external synthesis which is not based on resemblance). However, we need to highlight that the passive synthesis of habit and the passive synthesis of memory work in distinct ways: 'Whereas the passive synthesis of habit constitutes the living present in time and makes the past and the future two asymmetrical elements of that present, the passive synthesis of memory constitutes the pure past in time, and makes the former and the present present two asymmetrical elements of this past as such' (Deleuze 1994: 81). Additionally: 'The passive synthesis of habit constituted time as a contraction of instants with respect to a present, but the active synthesis of memory constitutes it as the embedding of presents themselves' (Deleuze 1994: 81). The presents are embedded in the *pure past,* which as already mentioned, is general. This allows for the *reproduction* of the former present, which is accompanied by reflection in the present present. As Williams (2011: 61-2) explains, reflection is the process where an initial enquiry into the past is made from the present.

This present moment is also a representation, but it is different from the past in the sense that it will not be a future object of memory. It is 'that which is reflected at the same time as it forms the remembrance of the former present' (Deleuze in Williams 2011: 61-62). This implies that the active synthesis of memory is made up of two representations, which are distinguished as the process of reproduction (of the former present), and reflection (in the present) (Williams 2011: 62, Deleuze 1994: 81). The general past is then the locus where we can position the representation of the past, in relation to the representation of the present (Williams 2011: 60-61).

So far we have established that the past, as the condition for memory, is general. Now there are three more characteristics of the past that need to be developed: its contemporaneity with the passed present, the coexistence of the whole of the past with the present, and the pre-existence of the pure past to the passing present (Deleuze 1994: 82). These can be understood as three paradoxes. As Williams notes: 'one of the distinctive features of Deleuze's philosophy of time is to embrace paradoxes for their productive power' (2011: 63). Their productive power is based on the fact that they cannot be resolved but they can be transformed creatively (ibid). The first paradox states 'the contemporaneity of the past with the present that it was (Deleuze 1994: 81). Here it is important to highlight that 'contemporaneity is posited on a present that is no longer a living present' (Williams 2011: 66). In other words, the past is contemporaneous with the past presents that pass into it. For example, a fallen apple is contemporary with the past (Williams 2011: 66). There is a distinction between the general pure past and the particular presents that pass into it (and that can be represented). As Williams notes, Deleuze's creative move here is to replace the Kantian idea that the past is the same as the present (which as already mentioned is unable to account for the relation between the past presents and actual presents) with the idea that they are different in kind. So the past is the condition for the passing present (Williams 2011: 64). However, despite being different in form they are still contemporaneous. The past accompanies every present and makes it pass (ibid). If this was not the case the present would not be able to pass. The problem addressed in the paradox is that of the constitution of the past. Deleuze argues that the past cannot be reconstituted from the present (neither actual present nor past present). In particular, the past cannot be constituted after it was present, or after a new present appears. The reason for this is the following: 'In order for this present to be responsible for the constitution of the past, it would have to be replaced by a new present. But a new present can only emerge if the original present has already been constituted as passed (otherwise there would be no temporal 'space' for it) (Somers-Hall 2013: 70). As Somers-Hall continues, this implies that the past is not constituted by a succession of moments, and if this is the case, it must coexist with the present. Therefore, the first paradox provides a reason for the passing of the present: 'Every present passes, in favour of a new present, because the past is contemporaneous with itself as present' (Deleuze 1994: 81). There are two implications of this, first the past was never present, because it cannot be formed after the present (Deleuze 1994: 82). Secondly, the passing presents do not change the past. This does not contradict the claim that habit and memory reciprocally determine each other. The passing of the present does not change the content of the past. However, it does involve a change in its degree of relaxation or contraction. As Deleuze explains, every new passing present 'is also the ever-increasing coexistence of levels

of the past within passive synthesis' (Deleuze 1994: 83). The most expanded state of memory is particular, and the most contracted (which is the point of the present) is general. For example, when we hear a foreign language we can recognise the language in general, or we can think of a particular pronunciation of it we have heard before (Somer-Hall 2013: 69).

After the first paradox we know that the past does not change in relation to the new present, and therefore it coexists with the passing presents. Now in the second paradox we will expand on the idea that the past is the whole of the past. In Deleuze's words: 'If each past is contemporaneous with the present that it was, then *all* of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past' (Deleuze 1994: 81-82). As already mentioned, we know that the past is whole because it is different in kind from the present, so if 'what characterises the present is the self-sufficient, atomic nature of the presents which make it up, the past must be non-atomic' (Somers-Hall 2013: 70). Coexistence is important because it '… is posited on a present that can return to it in active memory. It is the condition for such activity; active memory could not return to the past unless they coexisted' (Williams 2011: 66). The way the present returns to the past is through contraction: 'The new present comes forth only by contracting this past' (Deleuze 1994: 82). Here it is important to clarify that the present is a *dimension* of the synthesis of all the past in the past, it is no longer the synthesis of a particular pattern from the past in the present (like in the first synthesis) (Williams 2011: 65). In Deleuze's words: 'In one case, the present is the most contracted state of successive elements or instants which are in themselves independent of one another. In the other case, the present designates the most contracted degree of an entire past' (Deleuze 1994: 82). The idea of dimensions allows Deleuze to specify the different processes at work in each synthesis that cannot be reduced to one another (ibid). In Deleuze's words: 'The conditioning process ('another (transcendental) passive synthesis proper to memory itself') does not involve the same processes as the conditioned: 'the (empirical) passive synthesis of habit' (Williams 2011: 62). The first synthesis relies on the second synthesis so that the present can pass. To be more precise: 'This means that any present determined as a limited stretch or contraction must pass, because the past as synthesis is an ongoing process of becoming that determines every such present as passing' (Williams 2011: 65-66). Furthermore, active memory, is founded in the passive synthesis of habit (which constitutes the possibility of any present); and active memory is grounded on the passive synthesis of memory - the whole of the past, which is never present is the ground (Deleuze 1994: 82). It is the pure past that allows for the relations between the passing presents. In Somer-Hall's words: 'it is an underlying passive synthesis that provides the affinity between the past and the present that the active synthesis presupposes (Somer-Hall 2013: 70). This pure past is not represented, only the former present or the present present are represented (by reproduction and reflection) (Deleuze 1994: 82). Lastly, the third paradox states the pre-existence of the past in relation to the passing present. As Williams explains, this is the case because in the second synthesis the present is a dimension of the pure past, therefore the pure past pre-exists the present (Williams 2011: 66). To sum up this are the three paradoxes: 'each past is contemporaneous with the present it was, the whole past coexists

with the present in relation to which it is past, but the pure element of the past in general pre-exists the passing present' (Deleuze 1994: 82).

The third synthesis of time

Before we begin, it is important to draw attention to the trajectory from the first synthesis of time to the third. As Somers-Hall explains: 'Chapter 2 [of *Difference and Repetition*] begins with our experience of habit, and shows that what makes habit possible is memory…' (Somers-Hall: 2013: 83).[73] Then, in the third synthesis we are going to see how 'the relation between habit and memory is made possible by the field of intensive difference that is the future' (ibid). This field of intensive difference is the pure form of time. In order to understand what this means we need to look at Deleuze's reconstruction of Kant's critique of Descartes. According to Descartes, the determination 'I think' determines the 'I am' which is undetermined. However, the problem is that determination does not tell us how the 'I am' is determinable. In Deleuze's words: 'the determination ("I think") obviously implies something undetermined ("I am"), but nothing so far tells us how it is that this undetermined is determinable by the "I think"' (1994: 85-86). Kant's solution to this is to add a third term: the determinable, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the determination)' (1994: 86). The determinable is time - so the undetermined can be determined within time. As Williams clarifies, this means that the 'I' is determinable in many ways (it can be thinking, breathing, walking, etcetera) but the condition is time (2011: 81). The consequence of the introduction of time is that, in addition to the active subject (the 'I am'), there is a passive self appearing within time, who experiences their own thought without initiating it (Deleuze 1994: 86). It is almost like there are two subjects, the active subject, and the passive self. However, this does not mean that Deleuze's philosophy is based on the subject. As Williams clarifies: 'Due to its determination in time as a process, the subject is fractured and this presupposes fault lines denying any priority to either a subject as philosophical foundation or to a specific form of time independent of prior processes' (2011: 80). The question we have to answer now is what is the relationship between the active subject and the passive self? The active subject presupposes the passive self '…because the subject is only passively determinable in time through the self' (2011: 81). So the main point here is that activity presupposes passivity. Furthermore, 'this passivity involves a different form to active consciousness and one that is inaccessible to the active one' (ibid). As Somers-Hall explains, when we reflect we do not observe the activity of the subject itself, but the after-effect of the process of synthesis (2013: 76-77). To sum up, the addition of time and the passive self creates a fracture in the I. In Deleuze's words: 'Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the *I* and a passivity in the self' (1994: 86, emphasis in original). However Deleuze argues that the problem of Kant is that this fracture was filled by the identity of the active synthesis.

To develop this claim we can turn to Somers-Hall's explanation of Kant's synthesis. For Kant the process of synthesis involves putting different representations together (2013: 58). In the first synthesis, the transcendental unity of apperception unifies the world of appearances (2013:

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[73] We need memory for the present to pass, although we also need habit as the foundation of time.

77). Without this synthesis, all the different moments we experience would not be part of the same temporal sequence. However, in order to relate the different moments to the other, time also needs to be synthesised into a unified structure (2013: 58). So while time is passively given without a synthesis, we need a transcendental ego that synthesises experience. Experience for Kant is 'a relation to the world that gives us knowledge, rather than just sensation and appearances' (2013: 60). However, experience relies on a subject and an object in order to be possible. The reason for this is that appearances need to belong to a subject (the same subject); and the subject in turn needs to refer to the same object that gives appearances unity. The problem here is that if the subject and object make experience possible, then they are prior to experience and to synthesis, so we cannot say anything about them (Somers-Hall 2013: 60-61). The second problem is that for Kant the passivity of the subject is restricted to receptivity, which leads to the return of identity - since there is no transformation of the subject. Whereas for Deleuze, the subject is transformed through the fracture of time (even if the subject is passively transformed) (Williams 2011: 83). Therefore Deleuze, gets rid of the sharp divide between the passivity of the given (which the passive subject is receptive to) and the activity of consciousness (Somers-Hall 2013: 62). For Deleuze: 'time itself is going to be responsible for constituting both the passive self and the world that the passive self encounters' (2013: 77), without relying on an active self.

The fractured I and the passive self are possible due to Kant's introduction of the pure and empty form of time into thought. What is this pure form of time? Deleuze associates the empty form of time with the idea of 'time out of joint'. Before explaining time out of joint we need to look at 'time in joint'. In Deleuze's words: 'The joint, carda, is what ensures the subordination of time to those properly cardinal points through which pass the periodic movements which it measures' (1994: 88). An example of this is the movement of the planets around the sun, which allow for the measuring of time. In this conception time is a measure of motion (Somers-Hall 2013: 74). This implies that time is not empty because 'time is a way in which something else (in this case, the number, or measure of motion) presents itself' (ibid). So time is an expression of another type of order. Furthermore, time in joint is based on a prior representational structure (for example: the cardinal numbers) (Somers-Hall 2013: 75). On the other hand, if time is freed from motion (and representation), then time becomes empty and disordered, or in Deleuze's words: 'demented' (1994: 88). However, before we expand on this we need to answer the following question: how does Kant make time out of joint? As Somers-Hall explains, in Kant's theory of intuition instead of time being a mode of succession, succession is one of the modes in which time appears to us. In other words, succession is simply a way in which we organise time. To be more precise: 'Rather than time being a mode of the appearing of an underlying succession, for Kant, succession is a way of synthesising a prior intuition of temporality' (2013: 78). This opens up the possibility of conceiving the empty form of time before succession (2013: 75). Furthermore, it also creates the possibility of the freeing of time from representation (for example, how time is represented numerically). The point is that representation is grounded on the non-representational pure form of time. Lastly, when time is freed from content (such as dates), time is also purified of the values associated with them (Williams 2011: 89). This becomes clear in the following example:

'For Hamlet, once his father's ghost has spoken, the numbering and legitimacy of kings is out of joint and his time becomes empty (there is no next numbered ruler) and pure (there is no legitimate ruler). Hamlet's task is then to revenge his father by killing his uncle, thereby re-establishing numbered order and legitimacy based upon it' (2011: 88-89).

Now that we have explained the concept of time out of joint it is important to clarify that the pure form of time does not mean that time becomes nothing (Williams 2011: 89). Deleuze claims that the pure and empty form of time 'ceases to be cardinal and becomes ordinal, a pure order of time' (Deleuze 1994: 88). What does this mean? First, there is a 'caesura' or cut that orders time - there is a before and an after. In the case of Hamlet there is a before and after the appearance of his father's ghost (Williams 2011: 89). This ordering introduces an asymmetry in time: 'because it was distributed unequally on both sides of a 'caesura' (Deleuze 1994: 89). This is a formal and static distribution, as opposed to an empirical and dynamic distribution found in the first and second syntheses respectively. As Williams (2011: 89-90) explains, the first synthesis is empirical because it is made of multiple syntheses that contract the past and the future *in the living present.* Alternatively, the second synthesis of time is dynamic because it is made of relations of ongoing variation in the pure past. In Williams' words: the past is always synthesising its relations in different ways and is never static' (2011: 89). The third synthesis of time is static because it cuts the present into a before and after and this cut remains the same. Additionally, the synthesis is static because time is not subordinated to movement anymore: 'time is the most radical form of change, but the form of change does not change' (Deleuze 1994: 89). Lastly, the third synthesis is formal due to the process it involves, which is a cut (Williams 2011: 89-90).

In addition to the three forms of distribution (empirical - first synthesis, dynamic - second synthesis, and static - third synthesis) there are also three types of repetition at work in each synthesis. The first two will be explained first. The repetition of habit (first synthesis of time) - also known as material repetition - brings together successive independent elements or instants (by contracting the past and the future in the present). Then, we have the spiritual repetition of the second synthesis of time (memory). As Williams explains, even though the word 'spiritual' is usually associated with religion and the soul, the French world 'esprit' can also mean 'mind' (2011: 69). This type of repetition contracts the different levels of the whole of the past as different degrees of relaxation and contraction (Deleuze 1994: 84). Now, it is important to highlight the differences between the first two types repetitions (of the first and second synthesis of time). The first one is a repetition of parts, while the second one is a repetition of the whole. Furthermore, the first repetition is actual, while the second one is virtual. As explained previously, according to Deleuze (following Bergson), the pure past is different in form from the present. The pure past is not made of actual separate moments, it is made of the whole of the virtual past. While the actual is empirical; the virtual is transcendental, which means it is the condition for the

empirical process. As already mentioned, the transcendental condition is deduced.[74] In particular, Deleuze deduced 'the synthesis required to determine how active memory through representation is possible given the passing of presents' (Williams 2011: 58). Furthermore, it is important to note that the virtual is also real (like the actual), as opposed to abstract and imaginary: 'It is real because it completes the actual in real processes of reciprocal determination' (Williams 2011: 74).

The two types of repetition are connected to two types of difference. In the first synthesis, that of material repetition, difference is subtracted. The reason for this is that '…a selection is made of a particular series within many differences' (Williams 2011: 74). In the case of spiritual repetition, difference is included: 'because all differences are taken up, but at a particular level and degree' (ibid). Now it is important to highlight the relation between the difference of one synthesis and the repetition of the other. The repetition of the same elements (first synthesis) requires the adding of pure variations, and the repetition of pure variations (second synthesis) requires a subtraction. In Williams' words: 'It is because difference is between the living present and the passing present that they belong together. One subtracts from the other while the other adds it back, but always differently in an ongoing creative process' (2011: 75). Additionally, Deleuze argues that these two repetitions are not strictly speaking representable (Deleuze 1994: 84). The reason for this, according to Williams is the following: 'the difference they either subtract or add cannot be represented, since it is always between two realms' (the actual and the virtual) (Williams 2011: 75). When material repetition (first synthesis) is represented by active synthesis, difference is subordinated to the identity of the elements (Deleuze 1994: 84). This is the case because 'Representation demands identity in the representation and the represented thing' (Williams 2011: 98). On the other hand, in the representation of spiritual repetition (second synthesis) difference is subordinated to the identity of the present present (reflection), or the resemblance of the former present (reproduction) (Deleuze 1994: 84). However, if passive syntheses are sub-representative, then the following question arises: 'the question for us, however, is whether or not we can penetrate the passive synthesis of memory; whether we can in some sense live the being in itself of the past in the same way that we live the passive synthesis of habit' (Deleuze 1994: 84). This is not only about accessing the past, but also about avoiding reducing it to representation. In Deleuze's words: 'The whole past is conserved in itself, but how to save it for us, how to penetrate into that in itself without reducing it to the old present that it

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[74] Williams explains that Deleuze's deductions follow the following pattern: 'beginning each time with a cursory observation; deducing transcendental conditions revealing syntheses dependent on repetition… then finally drawing all the syntheses together through an explanation of the role of difference in itself in repetition ' (2011: 75). In the first synthesis, there was 'a deduction of the conditions for particular properties of past and future events in the living present as contraction involving a past and future dimension' (2011: 26). So for example: 'An activity, the tensing of a muscle, say, must synthesise earlier movements and later ones' (ibid). The third synthesis is deduced as an a priori condition for action (2011: 94). The processes for action involves the cut, assembling, ordering and seriation of time. Additionally, in the third synthesis: 'They deduce the conditions for a difference across inseparable ontological realms as they connect to and determine one another, where the form of a difference in one realm is conditional on a difference in another' (2011: 80).

was, or to the actual present in relation to which it is past. How to save it for ourselves?' (1994: 84). The short answer is that the past is saved for us so that the living present can pass, but it is preserved as forgotten so it can be recreated in the present 'as in need of being lived differently' (Williams 2011: 78). This leads us to the third type of repetition, which is the repetition of the future as the eternal return of difference in the third synthesis of time (Deleuze 1994: 90).

We can begin by answering why do we need a third type of repetition, or a third synthesis of time? To be more precise: 'why is the third synthesis necessary when we already have the pure past in which we can situate the self in time, as the most concentrated tip of the expanding cone of the pure past' (Williams 2011: 84). The answer is that we need a third synthesis of time in order to move beyond the problem of identity and representation. In Williams' words: 'The problem of identity and representation of the past is not fully solved by a pure past that eludes representation if this past becomes identified in relation to a new present, either through the identity of the actions of a subject, or through the passivity of a self, or through resemblance of new presents to a former mythical one' (Williams 2011: 86). This is a reference to Kant and to Plato respectively. As Williams explains, Kant reintroduces the identity of the subject and the self 'through synthetic active identity (the way in which a free moral action establishes the identity of the actor)' (2011: 83). Secondly, Kant reintroduces identity by restricting the passivity of the self to receptivity: 'so the self becomes something that is purely receptive rather than as transforming of other things even in its passivity' (ibid). Put simply, receptivity (without the power to transform) is a form of identity of the self. In contrast to this, Deleuze's syntheses reciprocally determine one another, Furthermore, in Deleuze 'the destructive and constructive interplay between subject and self – ensures the openness and variability of subjects and selves, but also their necessary failure as foundations' (Williams 2011: 83). In Plato, on the other hand, identity returns through resemblance of new presents to a former mythical one. Before explaining Deleuze's remarks on Plato it is important to clarify that in comparison with Kant, Plato is closer to Deleuze's account of time. Plato and Deleuze share the following: 'a circular notion of time, a relation between a phenomenal world and a world of Ideas (the actual and the virtual in Deleuze), and the foundation of time through the past rather than the present (explaining the priority of reminiscence for Plato and the necessity of the second synthesis of time for Deleuze)' (Williams 2011: 84). The difference, however, is that Plato's circle is based on the return of resemblance, while in Deleuze's only difference returns (Williams 2011: 85). In Plato the pure past of Ideas '…arranges the order of presents in a circle according to their decreasing or increasing resemblances to the ideal, but also removes from the circle those souls which have been able to preserve or recover the realm of the in-itself' (Deleuze 1994: 88). Ideas are therefore the ground (or foundation). To avoid the return of identity in both Kant in Plato, according to Deleuze: 'The circle of time, the way the past returns, must then itself be thought in such a way that when the past returns with a new present it does so free of any determinations. The new present must therefore be new in a very radical manner, that is, it must be completely undetermined, yet determinable' (Williams 2011: 86). This is why we need a pure and empty form of time, so the new present is undetermined, but also determinable (ibid).

Now we can look at the relationship between the three syntheses in terms of conditioning. The third synthesis is the condition for the new in the first and second syntheses, while the past and the present are the conditions for the necessity of novelty (Williams 2011: 96). The third synthesis is the condition of the new in the first two syntheses because the repetition of habit involves a transformation of earlier series. This means that the repetition of the first synthesis of time is not a repetition of the same events, but a metamorphosis (Williams 2011: 116). Similarly, the repetition of the past is not about repeating the same events, it is a repetition of dynamic changes of relations in the past: 'we repeat the past by changing it' (Williams 2011: 95). As Williams clarifies, the 'constant variation of relations in the pure past makes every present pass and pass as different from itself and from all other presents' (2011: 116). So put simply, the first two syntheses need the novelty or pure difference of the third. On the other hand, they are the conditions for the necessity of novelty because any action in the present creates a transformation in the series that it contracts, so we cannot repeat the present towards the future (Williams 2011: 95). Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the pure past determines how the present must pass by making the return of the presents that pass into it impossible (Williams 2011: 56, 95). So both syntheses ensure the present present and the past present do not return, while also needing novelty. The need for the new cannot be overstated. The reason for this is that both the first and the second synthesis depend on activity, so we need the third synthesis to make sure that they are not reduced to this (Williams 2011: 116). The first synthesis depends on activity in the present for the contraction of the past and future. However, it is not reduced to this, since the return of difference makes the present a one-off. The second synthesis explains active memory, however the past only returns as difference. Furthermore, the second synthesis is an ongoing process - it does not stop or slow down - due to the eternal return of the past as a new future in the present. To sum up: 'The eternal return of difference underwrites the openness of Deleuze's system while explaining the necessity of identity as unrepeatable' (Williams 2011: 116).

As Somers-Hall summarises, any act in the present incorporates the past into the present (by repeating it differently), and this generates the future as something new. This implies that the future is constituted through the return of the past as an excess of the present. The role of the third synthesis then, is to relate the past to the present for the future (Somers-Hall 2013: 81).[75] This implies a change of dimensions from the first and the second synthesis of time. As we already know, the first synthesis of habit gives rise to a facet of time that allows it to unfold (Williams 2011: 25). The first synthesis is the *foundation* of the past and the future. Then, in the move to the second synthesis of the past, the pure past is what allows for the present to pass and do not return. The past *founds* the present as passed, and the future as open. Lastly, in the change of dimension of the third synthesis the repetition of the future strips the autonomy of the past as foundation, and the present as founding. Instead, we will see that the past becomes the

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[75] 'We act by incorporating the pure past into the present (we repeat), but this generates something truly novel, the future as new. In other words, it is on the basis of the return of the past (through memory) that the future is constituted as being in excess of the present. It is thus the future that allows us to relate the past to the present' (Somers-Hall 2013: 81),

condition of the future, and the present becomes an agent (Williams 2011: 103). So we move from the past and future being a dimension of the present (first synthesis), to the present and future being a dimension of the past (second synthesis), to the past and the present being a dimension of the future (third synthesis). The past and the present are produced by the future through a cut, assembly, order and seriation of time (Williams 2011: 94). However, before we explain what these processes entail, and what it means for the past and present to be a condition and agent (respectively) for the future, it is important to note that the present and the past are only subordinated to the third in that synthesis, the present is autonomous in the synthesis of habit, and the past is autonomous in the synthesis of memory. As Williams notes, this means that there is no hierarchy between the syntheses: 'because each one has a moment where it is prior to the others and because even when there is a relation of priority, this depends on other such relations' (2011: 114).

The third synthesis is a *cut* because, as already mentioned, it arranges time in a before and an after. However, there are three points relating the cut that need to be highlighted. Firstly, the cut is the fracture of the I created by the empty form of time - which means the passive self is determinable in time (Williams 2011: 81). Secondly, it is important to emphasise that the two parts are unequal (Deleuze 1994: 89). So the fracture is not simply a break, Deleuze is '…insisting on the asymmetry of the cut and the difference between the before and after' (Williams 2011: 90). This will be clarified further when we move to the concept of seriation. Thirdly, the cut takes place with the passing present (Williams 2011: 125). Then, the third synthesis of time also involves the *ordering* of time: 'the caesura ordains once and for all' (Deleuze 1994: 89). This is the case because, as already mentioned, the distribution of the third synthesis is static, which means that the cut remains (Williams 2011: 89). We cannot go back in time. This is a process of 'gathering and tearing apart' (Williams 2011: 91), because the whole of time is ordered in two different ways (the before and after). So even though the cut stays the same, the two sides are different from each other. Everything that remains the same is ordered so it cannot return (the passing present), and pure difference is a cycle that eternally returns (Williams 2011: 122). The eternal return is also an *assembly* of events because it 'assembles all the other events in a novel manner. It travels through them' (Williams 2011: 15). Therefore, the assembly is a transformation (Williams 2011: 99). The cut is assembled in relation to action through the symbolic image (Williams 2011: 98). The meaning of action and symbolic image needs to be explained. An action is a selection (from one determination to another), which is not necessarily conscious, and involves the return of pure difference (ibid). Moving on to the concept of symbolic image, Deleuze argues that any cut is determined in a symbolic image (Williams 2011: 99). This is not an image based on representation, since the image is torn between two unequal parts that are drawn together (the before and after) (Deleuze in Williams 2011: 99). This is also not a mental image, what Deleuze is referring here is the process of assembly of time (Williams 2011: 93). The image is a symbol, which can be understood in terms of the Greek sign which is made of two broken unequal parts, while also having the power to unify them. So, in Williams' words: 'The symbolic image must itself be broken or fractured, despite its power to unify' (Williams 2011:101). Deleuze states that the

image must be adequate to the whole of time. However, this does not mean that the image is the same, nor that it corresponds to the whole of time (2011: 100). In Williams' words:

'A symbol is not judged according to criteria based on resemblance, but rather on the singular tests of how it draws conformity between the act and the times it subsumes without either identifying them or erasing their differences. So the adequacy of the symbol lies in how well it draws together the entirety of time while still maintaining the inequality of before and after, and the fracture of the subjects creating the new within the time it assembles' (Williams 2011: 101).

Lastly, the assembly of the third synthesis of time also implies a *seriation*: 'a process running through all events, setting them into series according to the singular work on difference in that novel event' (Williams 2011: 15). In other words, a new event cuts and divides the series. The series involves the whole of time, but as already mentioned, the whole of time is ordered differently through a series (Williams 2011: 91-92). The seriation is what distinguishes the before and the after - which means time is asymmetrical (Williams 2011: 94). To be more precise: 'The seriation is in the difference between the pure past and its return as a novel difference' (Williams 2011: 125). So when we mentioned the ordering of time in a before and an after, which are asymmetrical, we were getting ahead of ourselves. The difference between ordering and seriation is the following: 'The difference between the order and series lies in this irreversibility or asymmetry of time. For Deleuze, time is not only ordered into before and after and around any event, it is also set into a series such that there are intrinsic differences between the before and the after' (Williams 2011: 98). Williams adds: 'All these processes need to be determined in an action in relation to the new, where this action is a selection' (ibid). As Deleuze explains, the past is the part of the symbol where the image of the act is too big; the present is the part of the symbol where there is a transformation that involves a becoming-equal to the act, in other words, 'the self becomes capable of acting' (Somers-Hall 2013: 80); lastly, in the time of the future there is a secret coherence between the act and the event (Deleuze 1994: 89-90). The secret coherence happens in the future when the two moments - the past and the present - are related (Somers-Hall 2013: 80). So while, as already mentioned, the series encompasses the whole of time (the pure past, the present, and the future), in the third synthesis there is a change of priority of the dimensions.

Now that we have explained what the processes of cut, assembly, order and seriation imply, we can move on to clarifying the shift from the priority of the present in the first synthesis to the present as actor in the third, and from the priority of the past in the second synthesis to the past as a condition in the third. To begin with, in the synthesis of the eternal return the present no longer selects singular series (first synthesis), it now joins all the other presents that are ordained not to return. The present becomes an actor that is erased by the return of difference of the third synthesis of time (Williams 2011: 104-106). However, the concept of actor is complex and needs further clarification. The complexity lays in the relationship between the determinable self and the actor, which is circular:

'The self is determinable in time through the dramatic actions of the subject. This subject, though, is fractured due to its dependence on the passive self. The subject is then not the foundation for the determinability, but rather the vehicle whose actions are further conditioned by passivity…' (Williams 2011: 87)

It is is important to highlight that this circle is open - this means that while the activity of the subject is conditioned by the self, it is still undetermined in terms the novel differences introduced by the eternal return. The consequence of this is the possibility of genuine novelty, as opposed to the return of the past (ibid). Similarly to the present becoming an agent (that is erased), the role of the past is also transformed in the third synthesis of time. In the second synthesis the present and the future are founded by the past, which makes the present pass and not return in the future. As Williams summarises, in the third synthesis: 'The goal of time is no longer to make presents pass, but rather to make the past pass' (Williams 2011: 104). This means that the priority of time is the future as open, which in turn implies that the present is undetermined. However, if the past is not the founder of time anymore, what is the role of the past? The answer is that the past becomes a condition that fails, since the future is what sets what returns from the past (Williams 2011: 103-105). So the present and the future are subjected to the processes of the third synthesis, which we have explained one by one: cut, order, assembly and seriation.

Now that these processes have been developed, there are two more points that need to be highlighted. Firstly, it is important to note that the third synthesis is necessary to undo the first and second syntheses and their 'effort to live with memory in the present' (Williams 11: 88). Deleuze explains this as a struggle against memory and against habit (Deleuze 1994: 94). Secondly, as Williams explains, the new is not internal to the system. The reason for this is that any activity in the present (first synthesis) is connected to the whole of the past through its passing into it (second synthesis); and this creates a change of intensity of the present in relation to the whole of the past. So the new is created by the relation between the first and second syntheses, which are stages to the pure difference third (Williams 2011: 105-106). We can explain this in terms of repetition. The two different types of repetition of the first and second syntheses complete one another: 'The past itself is repetition by default, and it prepares this other repetition constituted by the metamorphosis in the present' (Deleuze 1994: 90). This has important consequences for difference: 'Difference is not an intrinsic property or essence of any repetition. It is rather the reason why each repetition is conditioned by another' (Williams 2011: 75). However, what we are missing from this is the third type of repetition: the two repetitions 'are not independent, existing as they do only for the third moment… the production of something new' (Deleuze 1994: 93). Thus, novelty relies on three repetitions: 'We produce something new only on condition that we repeat - once in the mode which constitutes the past, and once more in the present of metamorphosis. Moreover, what is produced, the absolutely new itself, is in turn nothing but repetition: the third repetition, this time by excess, the repetition of the future as eternal return' (Deleuze 1994: 90). To sum up, any novel action depends on three different types of repetition. Difference is created by the relationship between the repetition in the two realms of the

first and second synthesis (virtual and actual), which lead to the third type of repetition, which ungrounds their work. In Williams' words: Eternal return refuels the pure past and reignites the living present' (2011: 116).

Conclusion

To sum up, in this chapter we dived deeper into the process of constitution of the subject in time. Similarly to chapter 3, this chapter can also be understood as a critique of the transcendental subject. In this case, it is the multiple processes of time that constitute and undo the subject passively. In the living present habits are created, as the retention of the particular past and a passive general expectation in the future. This relies on difference, because each synthesis changes the past and the future in the present by synthesising them differently (Williams 2011: 10). Then, the first synthesis relies on the second one, which makes the particular present pass into a general memory. While the second synthesis serves as the condition of active memory and representation, it is also about the creation of the new. The past presents are set to only return as difference. For example, when actors are in a play, they do not copy previous representations of said play, but express them in a different manner (Williams 2011: 13). Lastly, the third synthesis of time ensures that the past and the present are not reduced to identity, by introducing the undetermined but determinable form of time. This creates a fracture in the subject, which allows for its passive determination by time. However, while we have provided a deeper examination of the processes that constitute time and the subject, and we have explained how the third synthesis introduces difference into the system, the practical implications of this are still underdeveloped. It is unclear how this conception of time can be of use for feminism and for critique, apart from developing the conditions of the new. In the next chapter, we will talk about the conditions of the new and thought; and then in chapter 6 we will answer the ethical question of how to live according to Deleuze's philosophy of time, and this will be connected to feminism in chapter 8.

5. Deleuze: Thought Beyond Morality

This is a good point to provide a summary of our journey in the previous chapters dedicated to Deleuze. In chapter 3, we responded to Butler's critique of Deleuze by showing that his project is ethical as opposed to moral/normative. This is important for this project, because if Deleuze was advocating for affirmation as a normative principle, then this would lead to the reintroduction of transcendence. Furthermore, Deleuze's immanent evaluation of modes of existence serves as a middle ground between the masculine transcendental norms of morality (which are based on the subordination of the body to the mind); and the fall into relativism, which would mean feminist immanent critique is unable to say anything about the world.[76] In opposition to this, ethics as an immanent evaluation is able to account for the specificity of the body and mind, and encourage the rediscovery of their power, beyond what we already know about them. In chapter 4, we looked at Deleuze's three syntheses of time in order to provide an alternative account of time to Oksala's (chapter 2). While Oksala identified the need of a non-linear conception of time in order to challenge identity and disrupt the present, Deleuze provides a deeper examination of time that is able to account for the constitution and undoing of the subject, without relying on an active subject. Now, this chapter is dedicated to the critique of morality in *The Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition.* This includes the critique of the moral image of thought, which is limited to the recognition of what already exists in the world. This paves the way for a positive conception of thought and critique. Immanent critique is no longer about setting limits to knowledge (Kant), but about creation and thinking differently. Furthermore, this chapter expands on the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious by focusing on the unconscious side of thought, and the bodily side of learning. Lastly, we will begin the explanation of the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical (also referred to as problems and solutions) (this will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 7). As we will see, Deleuze, following Maimon, requires the transcendental to be of different nature than the empirical, in order to account for the production of the new (pre-individual singularities create particular individuals and worlds). Then, in the counter process, more difference is introduced into the actualised worlds.

The Logic of Sense: the critique of morality

In the last chapter of his book on *Deleuze's Philosophy of Time*, Williams turns to *The Logic of Sense* to develop the moral implications of Deleuze's philosophy of time. However, he clarifies that his use of moral is unusual: 'it does not imply a morality as general set of laws prescribing well-determined general distinctions between courses of action' (Williams 2011: 143). As we will see, it involves an art of living which is characterised by questions of dosage (ibid). Therefore, Williams' use of morality is closer to what we have called ethics in this project. We will now turn to Deleuze's critique of morality in said book in order to strengthen this claim. Whether we call it

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[76] As mentioned in chapter 3, it also avoids individualism by focusing on the body's capacity to affect and be affected.

morality or ethics, it involves a reversal from common conceptions of morality concerned with justice, the good, pre-existing rules, and the dogmatic image of thought.[77] In order to show this reversal we need to assemble the different points about morality that are scattered across the different series of *The Logic of Sense*. To begin with, in the 'Eighteenth Series of the Three Images of Philosophers', Deleuze associates morality with the image of philosophy as height, and the philosopher as the being of ascents: 'the popular image of the philosopher with his head in the clouds…' (1990b: 127). In Deleuze's words: 'Around this "ascensional psychism," morality and philosophy, the ascetic ideal and the idea of thought, have established closed links' (ibid). Here Deleuze is referring to the conception of thought that he criticises both in *The Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition,* which will be explained in this chapter.[78] In short, the problem of the connection of morality and thought is that the latter is limited to established values, as opposed to the creation of the new. Furthermore, this is connected to the ascetic ideal, which Deleuze diagnoses in *Nietzsche and Philosophy.* It can be defined as the triumph of reactive forces in their pursuit of the will to nothingness (the search for values that are superior to life, such as in the case of morality) (Deleuze 1983: 97). This shows that aspects of Deleuze's critique of morality in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* are still present in *The Logic of Sense.* Going back to the eighteenth series of *The Logic of Sense*, this image of philosophy as height is compared to Nietzsche's philosophy of depth, and stoic philosophy as the art of surfaces.

However, even though Deleuze critiques the philosophy of heights and the moral values associated with it, the relationship between the tree images is more complex than we might think. Williams makes a few clarifications about this. Firstly, these images of philosophy are not fixed - the study of the images is based on movement (2008a: 79). Movement here has a precise meaning that has to be explained. It is not about providing a chronology of different types of philosophy across history. For Deleuze, the concept of movement cannot be understood independently of the concept of the event. In *The Logic of Sense,* an event is something that introduces change into a series, which is composed of bodies, ideal structures (such as language), and virtual structures (2008a: 1). This implies that events are not a completely new occurrence (there is no creation ex nihilo). An event has two sides: one side is the actualisation in states of affairs (for example in a particular battle); and a virtual side which cannot be reduced to its particular actualisation (that can be expressed by the infinitive verb to battle). Deleuze provides a diagram of event-created movements, which can later be judged, but judgement is not the goal. So the point is not to judge philosophy as height negatively, for example. This would be mistaken because it misses the interconnection of the three positions and their dependence on the event that they are an expression of (which also communicates with other events) (2008a: 82). In Williams' words: 'Depth, height and surface are different for different events and for how they are expressed through individuals. These events communicate but cannot be reduced to one another

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[77] These points were assembled from the following series: 'Tenth Series of the Ideal Game', 'Eighteenth Series of the Three Images of Philosophers', and 'Twenty-First Series of the Event'.

[78] This conception of thought is also attacked in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Proust and Signs*.

or to laws that hold for the axes' (ibid). This can be explained further by looking at the concept of diagram. A diagram is not a representation of a particular state, nor the movement from one state to another: 'a diagram is then itself in movement and designed to convey displacement and change…' (2008a: 79). There are three axes of the diagram: height, depth and surface; and each movement involves different processes than the others (so going upwards is not the opposite of going downwards, for example) (2008a: 80). Axes help us account for the communication of events or individuals, while allowing for a temporary classification of them. However, there is always a struggle between different directions. For example, Nietzsche's philosophy of depth is in tension with Plato's philosophy of height (2008a: 83). In Stoic thought, on the other hand, there is a struggle between the mixture of bodies (depth) and the immobility and abstraction of height (2008: 84). To conclude, directions in philosophy are helpful to understand what is at stake in philosophy in the different choices as directions. However, it is important to remember that positions are not final: 'Positions and directions in philosophy only work to the extent that they guide thought in relation to events for individually modulated but communicating problems' (2008b: 85).

Another example of Deleuze's critique of morality can be found in the 'Tenth Series of the Ideal Game' where Deleuze differentiates between two types of games. One based on pre-existing rules, and another one where each move invents its own rules (Deleuze 1990: 58-59). In the first instance, the game relies on an implicit order which can be moral (although there are other orders that it can be based on). Deleuze argues that while the former type of game is 'not at all the world as a work of art' (Deleuze 1990b: 60); the latter game 'can only exist in thought' (this will be explained later), and 'has no other result than the work of art' (ibid). This implies that Deleuze is after a conception of ethics which is closer to art, as opposed to morality as a set of pre-existing rules. The question is why is ethics connected to art (or aesthetics), in opposition to morality? We can answer this question with the help of Michel Foucault. However, we need to be careful not to read Foucault in a prescriptive manner. In an interview, Foucault explains how the reason that we cannot find any normalisation in Stoic ethics is that it is connected to aesthetics (1997: 254). In Foucault's words: stoic ethics '...was not a question of giving a pattern of behaviour for everybody' (ibid). This is relevant for us because we are also trying to avoid a more rigid and normalising form of morality that is universal. Foucault also mentions Greek ethics which can be conceived as an aesthetics of existence that is not related to the legal and religious systems of the time (1997: 255). He is interested on this because of the shared problem with Deleuze of not wanting to found ethics in religion and law. However, this does not mean that we should simply copy Stoic or Greek ethics today: 'you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people' (1997: 256). Therefore, Foucault's work is not about finding alternative solutions; what he is interested in is the genealogy of problems (as we will see, this is something he has in common with Deleuze who is also more interested in problems than in solutions). However, as Deleuze will show us, we can take on problems or events and re-work them in the present in a different manner, since there is always a

side of problems that exceeds their solution.[79] The problem that we need to take on here is the following: '…couldn't everyone's life become a work of art?' (Foucault 1997: 261). The implication of this is that 'We have to create ourselves as a work of art' (1997: 262). So life becomes a material for 'an aesthetic piece of art'; and ethics becomes a '…structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical perse, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure' (1997: 260); and also, without a necessary relation to scientific knowledge and the concept of truth (1997: 161-162). However, there is a warning that we need to be aware of. Foucault urged everyone to be cautious about the dangers of the present. These includes being wary about the techniques we use to fight power. His point is that everything is dangerous and, if this is the case: 'then we always have something to do' (1997: 256). This does not lead to apathy, but to 'a hyper - and pessimistic activism' (ibid).

To sum up, we have shown that Deleuze associates morality with a philosophy of height which he challenges in the *Logic of Sense,* although this does not mean that height should always be avoided (this is not a universal rule). Deleuze also challenges games based on pre-existing rules (including moral rules), putting forward a conception of ethics that is closer to art. Foucault is helpful for explaining the place of art in the formulation of a different type of ethics, which is not based on law, religion, or any kind of universal principles. So when Deleuze and Williams talk about morality in the *Logic of Sense* it implies a reversal of the meaning of the term that is closer to ethics as the aesthetics of existence. Art is important because it disturbs reality, morality and the economy of the world (this is also the case of thought) (Deleuze 1990: 60). We can see this reversal in the following quote: 'What is really immoral is the use of moral notions like just or unjust, merit or fault' (Deleuze 1990: 149).

The critique of the moral law

We can now move on to the critique of morality in *Difference and Repetition.* There are two ways in which Deleuze criticises morality. First, he critiques Kant's moral law; and second he critiques the moral image of thought. We can begin with the critique of the moral law. Deleuze begins the introduction of the book by stating: 'Repetition is not generality' (Deleuze 1994: 3). So the problem of moral laws is that they are general, as opposed to Deleuze's conception of repetition which is singular. However, before explaining the problem of generality more in detail, we need to understand the relationship between repetition and the moral law. Kant's moral law states the following: 'Act only in accordance with a maxim through which you can at the same time will that it will be a universal law' (Kant 1998: 31). As Deleuze, explains, Kant offers a 'criterion which should decide what *can* in principle be reproduced - in other words, what can be repeated without contradiction in the form of moral law?' (1994: 4). Put simply, we need to ask what would

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[79] Foucault, similarly to Deleuze, argues that we can abstract the problem of the aesthetics of existence from its particular actualisations. In particular, we can abstract it from the way it was resolved by the Stoics and the Greeks, which was problematic. He was aware that Stoic ethics was limited to a small elite (1997: 254); and in Greek society 'ethics were linked to a purely virile society with slaves, in which the women were underdogs whose pleasure had no importance…' (1997: 256-257).

happen if a given action was repeated like if it were a universal law. If it could be repeated without contradiction, then it can be a moral act (Somers-Hall 2013: 10). For example, if everyone lied when making a promise, then promising would lose its meaning (hence the contradiction). However, the problem of Kant, according to Deleuze, is that 'the moral law, far from giving us true repetition, still leaves us in generality' (1994: 4). Here Deleuze is referring to the generality of habit, which is based on *resemblance* when we attempt to acquire the habit; or *equivalence*, when the habit has been acquired but the situation is different (Deleuze 1994: 4-5). Deleuze's point is that there is a deeper form of repetition beneath generality (1994: 5). So as we already know, the repetition of habit is not a repetition of the same: 'habit cannot be understood in terms of generality but must be understood in terms of a constantly altering scene where either an action has to change in order to reinforce the intention to acquire a habit… or where the action remains the same but in a different context…' (Williams 2003: 35). As Williams explains, this claim is later developed into the assertion that pure difference is the condition of habit. This implies that the elements that are contracted together by the first synthesis of time do not resemble each other: 'Repetition makes things by altering them' (2003: 90). For example, the last push-up in a series feels much harder than the first ones. To sum up, Deleuze critiques the repetition involved in Kant's conception of the moral law, which he argues is stuck at the level of generality by ignoring what makes repetition singular (different contexts, and different acts in the attempt to be perfected). Put differently, moral obligation - understood as 'the habit of acquiring habits' (Deleuze 1994: 4) - relies on the repetition of the similar. However, the problem of this conception of habit is that by focusing on the similarities we ignore difference (Somers-Hall 2013: 11).

The critique of the moral image of thought

In *Difference and Repetition,* Deleuze attacks what he calls the moral, or dogmatic, image of thought. This image had already been attacked in *Proust and Signs*. As briefly mentioned in chapter 3, Deleuze argues that there are three things that thought is not: the result of the good will of the thinker, a premeditated decision, and something natural and easy (2000: 94). In opposition to this, Deleuze conceives thought as an involuntary exercise: we are forced to think after a fortuitous encounter with a sign that we need to decipher. The critique of the dogmatic/moral image of thought is developed further in *Difference and Repetition.* However, it is important to note that Deleuze is not simply criticising mistaken forms of thought. As Williams reminds us, there is always a positive side of Deleuze's critique (2003: 112-113). This positive side seeks to move beyond what we already know about the world (which the dogmatic image of thought is based on), and find the conditions for creative thought. In Deleuze's words: 'and as long as the critique has not been carried to the heart of that image it is difficult to conceive of thought… as involving encounters which escape all recognition' (Deleuze 1994: xvi). This is connected to the quest for difference and repetition: 'the powers of difference and repetition could be reached only by putting into question the traditional image of thought' (ibid). The concepts that are going to be critiqued are the following: identity, common sense, good sense, recognition, representation, and knowledge.

We can begin by looking at the first presupposition of the dogmatic image of thought: the claim that 'thought is the natural exercise of a faculty' (Deleuze 1994: 131).[80] This is related to the claim that thought has good nature, and the thinker a good will (we want to find the truth). This image is moral because it tells us how 'thinkers and thought ought to be, independent of how they are' (Williams 2003: 114). In Deleuze's words: 'When Nietzsche questions the most general presuppositions of philosophy, he says that these are essentially moral, since Morality alone is capable of persuading us that thought has a good nature and the thinker a good will, and that only the good can ground the supposed affinity between thought and the True' (1994: 132). The assumption that thought is good relies on common sense and good sense (the second postulate of the image of thought). We already came across common sense, in chapter 3, in Aristotle's classification of beings into categories, and good sense in the hierarchies established by this distribution (Williams 2003: 62). As mentioned earlier, the problem of Aristotle's categories is that they are unable to account for change, and they do not reach what makes each individual unique (for example, what makes one woman different from another). In Kant, on the other hand, common sense and good sense work differently. For thought to be good (and sharable) it must unify the different faculties of the thinker, and between thinkers. So common sense is the 'employment of all the faculties on a supposed same object' (and by the same subject) in order for recognition to be possible (Deleuze 1994: xvi); and good sense is what makes it possible for the different thinkers to have the same common sense (Williams 2003: 118). The faculties are united by recognition (third postulate), which works across all of them (we can recognise thoughts, and sensations for example). The limitation of recognition is that it works by comparing the new to what we already know or experienced (ibid). So while Deleuze is not denying that recognition plays a role in knowing the world - '… it is apparent that acts of recognition exist and occupy a large part of our daily life: this is a table, this is an apple, this the piece of wax, Good morning Theaetetus' (1994: 135) - the point is that thought should not be limited to recognition: 'But who can believe that the destiny of thought is at stake in these acts, and that when we recognise, we are thinking?' (ibid). We need to be able to account for change and for the new. Recognition is also tied to representation (fourth postulate). Representation works differently depending on each faculty, but what each representation has in common is that it is based on identity, and it is therefore unable to conceive difference in itself and repetition for itself (Deleuze 1994: 138). Furthermore, whatever cannot be identified is excluded from this system of thought (Williams 2003: 120). The point again is not to deny the existence of identity, but to explain how it is constituted by difference and repetition. As Williams explains: 'These conditions for actual identities cannot be identified but they underlie all identities and allow us to explain their changes and evolutions. True difference and repetition are excluded by representation' (2003: 120).

So far we have explained four postulates of the image of thought. However, before we continue, we need to explore the relationship between thought and values, which can either be one of preservation or creation. Deleuze argues that the reliance of thought on the model of recognition is linked to the preservation of established values (1994: 135-136), since we only

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[80] For a summary of the eight postulates of the dogmatic image of thought see Deleuze (1994: 167).

recognise things by relating them to what we already know about the world. This is opposed to the Nietzschean task of creating new values. As Deleuze reminds us in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, values should not be superior to life and untouchable (Deleuze accuses Kant of this, which is diagnosed as a form of nihilism). Furthermore, it is not enough to reverse the value of values (negation) - like in Nietzsche's example of the slave's reversal of good and evil (Deleuze 1983: 121). It is also insufficient to simply live without values (this is another form of nihilism) (Deleuze 1983: 170-171).[81] The task is to bring together destruction and affirmation, also referred as the transmutation of values. In Deleuze's words: 'sovereign affirmation is inseparable from the destruction of all known values, it turns this destruction into a total destruction' (1983: 176). This moves us away from negative thought, which dominates our ways of feeling and evaluating when reactive forces take hold of thought (1983: 176). This is the most base form of thought (1983: 105), which Deleuze identifies with the task of recognition in *Difference and Repetition.* In opposition to this there is active and creative thought: '…the new - in other words, difference - calls forth forces in thought which are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model, from an unrecognised and unrecognisable *terra incognita'* (Deleuze 1994: 136). So we need to move beyond the traditional image of thought in order to be able to create new values and new ways of living. Thought is therefore inextricably link to creation: 'to think is to create - there is no other creation - but to create is first of all to engender "thinking" in thought' (1994: 147). This is what happens when an encounter forces us to think: 'We are not going to think unless as we are forced to go where the forces which give food for thought are, where the forces that make thought something active and affirmative are made use of' (Deleuze 1983: 110).

Now that the connection between thought and creation has been established, we can connect Deleuze's critique of the moral/dogmatic image of thought to Deleuze's reformulation of Kant's conception of critique. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* Deleuze argues that Kant discovered a new form of immanent critique, which he was unable to complete. In Deleuze's words*:* 'Kant's genius, in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* was to conceive of an immanent critique' - which is a critique of reason *by* reason (Deleuze 1983: 91). However, the problem of this critique was that while it it was applied to claims to knowledge and truth, for example, it did not question the concepts of knowledge and truth themselves (1983: 89). In other words, it denounced the misuses and infringements of different concepts such as reason and morality, while leaving these concepts untouched (1983: 90). Critique, for Kant, is therefore about setting limits. As Williams explains, in Kant's philosophy, placing limits on the faculties helped to avoid the possibility of illusions which Kant conceives as internal to thought (2003: 119). Kant replaces the idea of external error (for example, error as the effect of bodily causes) with internal illusions (external error is the fifth postulate of the image of thought) (Deleuze 1994: 136). The recognition that error is internal to thought leads Deleuze to believe that Kant was equipped to overturn the dogmatic image of thought. However, this did not happen because Kant failed to renounce to its

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81 For a detailed explanation of these two forms of nihilism, which Deleuze refers to as reactive nihilism and negative nihilism see: Deleuze 1983: 148-147.

presuppositions: 'Thought had to continue to enjoy an upright nature, and philosophy could go no further than - nor in directions other than those taken by - common sense or 'common popular reason'' (1994: 136). So the task of critique as the creation of values in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* is connected to the freeing of thought from its moral presuppositions in order to reach novelty in *Difference and Repetition.* As Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition:* 'The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same: the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself' (1994: 139).

Now we still need to explain what the genesis of thought entails. In order to do this we will examine Deleuze's account of thought step by step. To begin with there is a distinction between things that do not disturb thought and things that force us to think (Deleuze 1983: 138). As already mentioned, the things that do not force us to think are the objects of recognition. Therefore, thought should be sought in 'stranger and more compromising adventures' (Deleuze 1994: 135). It all begins in sensibility. There is 'an original violence inflicted upon thought' which is fortuitous (Deleuze 1994: 139). This means that we cannot make it happen ourselves by following a method, as in the case of the dogmatic image of thought. Now it is important to highlight that, in contrast to Oksala, Deleuze argues there is no natural affinity between sensibility and the encountered sign.[82] In Deleuze's words: '…it is the fortuitousness or the contingency of the encounter which guarantees the necessity of that which it forces to be thought' (1994: 145). From the point of view of recognition this encounter is imperceptible: it is only sensed by sensibility but it is not grasped by the other faculties (1994: 140). This stands in opposition to the model of common sense where the faculties work together to recognise the object (1994: 141). In Deleuze's model each faculty is pushed to their limit when they are confronted with something they cannot recognise - Deleuze refers to this as the transcendent exercise of the faculty (1994: 143). When each faculty confronts its own limit it communicates this to the others (through difference in intensity) (1994: 141). In Deleuze's words: 'the harmony between the faculties can appear only in the form of a *discordant harmony,* since each communicates to the other only the violence which confronts it with its own difference and its divergence from the others' (1994: 146). We move from sensibility, to the imagination, to memory, and to thought; as each faculty is pushed to a superior exercise (1994: 144). As Williams summarises: 'It is, therefore, not a matter of the fixing of faculties and determining their proper fields but of transforming those faculties and fields by transgressing

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[82] As mentioned in chapter 2, Oksala relies on the affinity between experience and language (experience is already conceptual), although it can be conceptualised in different manners, and the way we conceptualise things is historical. This implies that our experience of the world is always mediated by conceptual schema (2016: 41). Oksala's concern is how to acquire empirical knowledge: 'because experience is conceptual, it can provide the traction on reality that warrants empirical knowledge' (2016: 43). This is important for her because she wants to show how experience is necessary for knowledge production, if we engage critically with it. However, in contrast to Oksala, Deleuze's concern is not how we acquire knowledge, but how we challenge what we already know about the world when recognition fails. For this reason, it makes sense for him to argue that there is no natural affinity between sensibility and the sign. Furthermore, Deleuze challenges Oksala's claim that we need a subject that is capable of higher philosophical reflection to change the world.

established boundaries and laws' (2003: 122). Furthermore, aside from the move from limits to transgression, and from common sense to a discordant use of the faculties, there is also no subjective unity in the form of an 'I think'. As mentioned in chapter four, there is a dissolved self (through the passive syntheses outside of its control) and a fractured I (by the empty form of time) (Deleuze 1994: 145). That which can only be sensed forces the soul to pose a problem. The concept of problem has a very specific meaning for Deleuze: 'It is a problem because it does not yet have a solution and because it does not even allow for solutions that cancel it out' (Williams 2003: 121). Furthermore, it is not solved by past solutions that are stored in memory. Instead, the problem asks for creative reactions that are never final. Now the question we have to answer is why can problems not be solved completely? The answer is the following: 'problems allow for many different responses, each of which solves the problem on its own terms but only in a limited way with respect to the problem as a whole' (Williams 2003: 133). Additionally, problems are changed by their solutions (Williams 2003: 134). So there is a constant back and forth from problems to solutions and the other way around. For example, you can learn how to cook a particular dish, but using the same recipe will not always work. There are other factors that we need to adapt to, for example the different taste of the ingredients during different seasons, or the different conditions such as altitude. Every time we cook the dish we are confronted with different issues that change how we see the initial problem (for example from learning how to bake a cake, to learning how to bake a cake at a certain altitude).

Learning

Learning, according to Deleuze, is the act of confronting a problem (1994: 164). However, the goal of learning is not to exclusively to gain or to produce knowledge, as it is the case in the dogmatic image of thought (eighth postulate) (Deleuze 1994: 167).[83] In Williams' words: 'Learn to learn - do not learn to know' (2003: 135). This does not mean that Deleuze rejects the pursuit of knowledge. Deleuze wants to shift the attention to the process of learning, and away from the end product. To be more precise, knowledge is a by-product of another process: the transcendental use of the faculties after an encounter forces us to think (Somers-Hall 2013: 128); and we should not

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[83] We skipped postulate six and seven (of the dogmatic image of thought). Postulate six is the privilege of designation over sense. As Somers-Hall explains: 'designation is simply a relation whereby either the structure of the proposition mirrors a state of affairs in the world (and hence is true), or does not (and hence is false)' (2013: 123). However, Deleuze argues that there is more to propositions than truth and falsity: sense (a proposition can make sense, without being true). Sense is what is expressed in a proposition. However, the problem of sense is that it is usually explained with reference to other propositions ad infinitum. Instead, Deleuze links sense to problems (Ideas) in order to be able to account for the genesis of sense, and not merely its condition. This implies the following: 'what will give sense to propositions is something that is different in kind from the propositional…' (ibid). Postulate seven is the modality of solutions, which implies that problems are traced from propositions or defined by the possibility of their solution (Deleuze 1994: 167). Instead Deleuze argues that for problems to escape the dogmatic image of thought, they need to be different in nature to solutions (just as sense is different to propositions). For a further explanation of both postulates see Somers-Hall (2013: 122-127), and Williams (2003: 126-131).

confuse the two (Hughes 2009: 85).[84] The reason for this is that Deleuze's concern is to respond creatively to problems, as opposed to giving a final solution that can be represented in knowledge. If we solely focus on the solution then we loose track of the mutually constitutive relation between problems and solutions. When we learn, or when we confront a problem, we come into contact with the differential relations that compose it. For example: when we are learning how to swim our body enters a relation with the movement of the waves. As Cutler and MacKenzie (2011: 53) explain, there is both a universal and a singular aspect to bodies. The universal involves the differential relations that constitute bodies (for example, the relations of height and depth); and the singular involves the particular variations within the relations of the universal - in this case it is the particular body that comes into contact with the particular depth, and temperature of the body of water, for example. The particularity of bodies implies that it is not enough to know the rules of swimming; nor is it enough to passively acquire knowledge from an expert (Cutler and MacKenzie 2011: 53). To be able to learn how to swim we need to be able to attempt it ourselves (with our particular body and a particular body of water); and this needs to be recreated in different conditions (for example swimming in a pool is different to swimming in the sea). This goes against the idea that one stops learning when we already know how to do something (which is a consequence of making knowledge and end) (Cutler and MacKenzie 2011: 54). Going back to the example of cooking, it is helpful to see it as an ongoing process, where we are always learning how to respond creatively to the different ingredients, the different cooking environments, and the different utensils, for example. The knowledge we acquire in the process can help us to become better cooks, but it cannot predict all the problems that we will encounter in the future. Therefore, we can say that the goal of learning to cook should not be to know the rules or the recipes, but to learn how to creatively respond to problems.

One of the reasons that we cannot always predict the result of a task that we learnt is due to the unconscious side of learning. As Williams explains, learning goes beyond our conscious faculties (2003 137). This implies that learning is not something we can simply decide to do. We can try to learn an activity, but it is hard to predict when and how it will happen. In Deleuze's words: 'We never know in advance how someone will learn: by means of what loves someone becomes good at Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they learn to think' (1994: 165). This does not mean that there is no conscious side of learning. As Deleuze explains, our acts are adjusted to our perception of the differential relations - so we do perceive part of the problem and we sometimes consciously decide to try a different approach to learn, for example. However, there is always a side of the problem that we are unable to grasp. These are the minute perceptions, mentioned in chapter three. In the case of the sea, we consciously apprehend its sound (macro-perception), but not the murmur of each wave that compose it (micro-perception), for example (Deleuze 1994: 213). When we learn we have to connect with the unconscious processes that relate us to the other body that we are entering a relation with (for instance the body of water, or the pizza dough in the cooking example) (Williams 2003: 137). Learning can therefore be understood as the unconscious acquisition of habits, both

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84 In Hughes' words: 'don't let the product determine the process of production in its image' (2009: 85).

of the body and of the mind; which can lead to the formation of knowledge in our bodies, which we subsequently become conscious of (Cutler and MacKenzie 2011: 56). It is important to highlight that Cutler and MacKenzie avoid giving priority to the body over the mind by extending the concept of the acquisition of habits to the mind. Due to the unconscious side of learning it is no longer understood as an activity of the subject. Instead, we can say that the subject is constituted by the process of learning (ibid). However, as Cutler and MacKenzie argue, this does not tell us what makes the body specific (2011: 57). The answer is our capacity to affect and be affected, and how we are capable of intensifying affects and the system of relations that constitute our body. To sum up, learning is a creative process where we form new relations that transform all the bodies involved (in the case of cooking there is a transformation of the cook, the pizza dough and the body of knowledge, for example). Including the transformation of sense of ourselves, so we can account for the sensation of learning at a conscious level, without forgetting the passive side of learning (Cutler and MacKenzie 2011: 57). Furthermore, as Williams reminds us, the problem is also transformed (so for example the problem of making pizza becomes the problem of making pizza without burning it).

Thought in *The Logic of Sense*

Some of the aspects of the critique of the dogmatic image of thought are also found in *The Logic of Sense.* However, the topic is not dealt with in a systematic matter as in the case in *Difference and Repetition,* where there is a chapter dedicated to the image of thought. In order to learn about thought in *The Logic of Sense* one has to read across the different series. Additionally, we will look at Williams' (2008a) chapter 'Thought and the unconscious' in his critical introduction to *Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense,* where he gives a more systematic explanation of the role of thought in the book. Williams starts by explaining that thinking is not a fixed process. This means that repeating rules or procedures does not lead us to thought. We get closer to thought when we sense the limitations of those rules and procedures and we are forced to respond creatively to a problem (2008a: 176). However, it is important to note that this does not mean that trying to foster thought is a useless task. The point is that thinking takes places within wider processes. So familiar tactics that we may use to think, such as going for a walk or drinking coffee, might work because they insert ourselves within these wider processes (2008a: 175). This is connected to the claim that describing things in terms of their limited content leads to an incomplete description - since things are not independent from the wider process that constitute them. In Williams' words: 'In principle, anything is without limit and it will be differentiated by how it selects within multiple infinite series, rather than how it imposes finite boundaries on them' (2008a: 179). The consequence of this is that any representation, for example of the process of thinking, is incomplete, since thinking always exceeds its representation (2008a: 179-189). However, the claim that thinking is not about procedures or rules does not mean that thought has no structure, there is a structure but it is one that is open for transformation. While some series lack structure, others have it in excess so they can be related to each other and mutually transform one another. In Williams' words: 'Thought is therefore an empty place and an overflowing potential running

along series in structures' (2008a: 176). The series are composed of a combination of different elements: bodies, ideal structures (such as language and moral codes) and virtual structures (for example: different intensities of emotions like fear) (2008a: 1). The consequence of this is that thought does not have an independent well established identity that we can measure: 'thinking varies with problems, events, series and individuals' (2008a: 177). This is similar to *Difference and Repetition,* where the use of the faculties is different depending on the individual, and the faculties are pushed to their limits in different ways too (Williams 2003: 136).

Procedures are not the only thing that fails in the quest for thought, in the 'Twenty-Ninth Series - Good Intentions Are Inevitably Punished' Deleuze argues that good intentions go wrong too. In this series Deleuze offers his own interpretation of the Oedipus complex. We will not examine this reading in detail, what is relevant for us is that the child has good intentions, but things turn out badly (the child wishing to restore the mother, ended up castrating her; and the child wishing to bring back the father ended up killing him). Williams develops the implications of this for Deleuze's conception of thought in terms of the relation between thought and bad unwilled outcomes (2008a: 180). Why can good intentions turn out so badly? As Williams explains, Good-intentions, and good-intentioned actions, have unconscious fault lines which interfere with them and sometimes prevent them from reaching good outcomes. Faults can be hereditary through genes, and also through the environment. The consequence of this is that actions are never free from these fault lines, we are only free to replay them differently. Williams (2011) makes a similar point in his Critical Guide to *Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time*, where freedom is about staging a new version of a play we inherited. Put in a different manner, we cannot change the presents that have passed, but we can change the intensity of the relations in the pure past, as some events become more significant than others (2011: 71-72). Another similarity with *Difference and Repetition* is that if intentions are shaped by unconscious faults, then the failure of thought to reach a good outcome is not something external to thought, but something internal to it (on its surface - in the language of *The Logic of Sense*) (Williams 2008a: 180, 182). To be more precise, the good intentions of thought fail in the passage from the ideal to the physical, and the other way around. The reason for this is that the physical exceeds the ideal, and the ideal exceeds the physical. The ideal exceeds the physical because, as already mentioned, and as Deleuze explains in the 'Ninth Series of the Problematic', solutions do not suppress problems: 'there is… an aspect in which problems remain without a solution, and the question without an answer' (Deleuze 1990b: 156). In Williams' words: '…problems remain latent and capable of morphing into new and unexpected forms' (2008a: 181). On the other hand, the physical exceeds the ideal because the problem is composed of variations of intensities which can be actualised in different manners (Williams 2008a: 181-182). This is connected to time, good intentions fail because things return differently (the paradoxical relationship between Chronos and Aion, which will be explained in the next chapter). For now it should suffice to say that all intentions fail (not only good ones) because bodies are always in contact with other changing bodies, values and ideas that transform them (Williams 2008a: 183). So the problem of thought is not about defining it, nor about how to think right. In Williams' words: 'The problem of thought is

therefore not how to arrive at a given end. It is rather, how to live with the unforeseeable yet structured legacies of thought and the desires accompanying it' (2008a: 182). This conception of thought takes into account the different values, motivations, and levels of significance, which cannot be separated from it and are also part of the problem that compose it (for example: the thought or intention to arrive on time can be composed of different motivations, and can have different degrees of significance) (Williams 2011: 181). So the point is not to get rid of the influence of elements that are external to thought, but to recognise that they play an important role for thought. To sum up: 'We need to think because we are caught in a web of series and events - we are caught in this web because we think, feel, dream and fantasise' (Williams 2008a: 184).

The distribution of the transcendental and the empirical

So far we have distinguished the problem from its particular solution(s). Similarly, the event can be distinguished from its temporal actualisations. For example a battle can be actualised in diverse manners, even at once (depending on the perspective of the different participants) (Deleuze 1990b: 100). Another example of this is how different people express the same instinct, and work with it differently (Williams 2008a: 181). Therefore, there are two sides of the event: the potential energy of the pure event (also referred to as singularities), and the forms of actualisation of the realised event (Deleuze 1990b: 103). Singularities are distributed in a problematic field according to a nomadic distribution, which in turn produce the different individuals (1990b: 102-104). As explained in chapter 3, a nomadic distribution is one where beings distribute themselves in an open space with no fixed limits. On the other hand, a sedentary distribution is one where being is distributed according to their fixed identities, and it is therefore unable to reach individuating differences) (Deleuze 1994: 36, 270). The sedentary distribution is connected to the dogmatic image of thought, in so far as it is based on the correct distribution of beings into categories (common sense); which implies a hierarchy of beings (good sense) (Williams 2003: 62); and the principles are declared as the best distributed (good sense) (Deleuze 1994: 36). In 'The Fifteenth Series of Singularities' of *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze claims that singularities are the true transcendental events. This is an attack on Kant's transcendental method, which leads Deleuze to a reformulation of the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical. This critique was already present in *Difference and Repetition* - it was one of the points that Deleuze made against the dogmatic image of thought. Deleuze's (1994: 143) argument was that the transcendental exercise of the faculties should not be traced from their empirical exercise. The reason for this is that the faculties are capable of apprehending that which cannot be grasped by common sense. So if we limit the role of the faculties to the empirical world, this will provide a limited view of reality.

Deleuze (1994: 149-150) uses a similar argument to critique the conception of error in the dogmatic image of thought. The point again is to question the legitimacy of the distribution of the empirical and the transcendental. The problem, according to Deleuze, is that the dogmatic image of thought takes empirical instances of error and illegitimately extrapolates them into the

transcendental. Errors such as saying: '"good morning Theodorus" when Theaetetus passes, "It is three o'clock" when it is three-thirty, and 7 + 5 = 13' (Deleuze 1994: 150). In opposition to this, Deleuze argues that: 'Cowardice, cruelty, baseness and stupidity are not simply corporeal capacities or traits of character or society; they are structures of thought as such' (Deleuze 1994: 151). In other words, stupidity is a form of thinking (Dillet 2013: 266). Therefore, instead of condemning simple everyday errors, we should be asking how is stupidity as a system of thought possible? Deleuze's answer is that there is a background to thought that makes it particular (as opposed to a shared universal faculty): 'our thoughts reflect the physical and biological but also the virtual repetitions that have made us individual thinkers as opposed to identical subjects and selves defined by right' (Williams 2003: 125-126). Stupidity is therefore found in the relation to this background, or ground, when it is brought to the surface without giving it form (Deleuze 1994: 152). As Williams highlights, what distinguishes Deleuze's position from the dogmatic image of thought is the demand to give form to the ground (Williams 2003: 126). In more simple terms, giving form to the ground refers to our relation between problems and solutions: stupidity '…is the faculty for false problems; it is evidence of an inability to constitute, comprehend or determine a problem as such' (Deleuze 1994: 159). This is connected to the relationship between thought and individuation. Individuation is the process where the indeterminate ever-shifting ground becomes determined (there is a solution in response to a problem). However, if we do not understand the relationship between problems and solutions, the solution seems to exist independently of the problem that constitutes it. Therefore, Deleuze argues that solutions have the truth they deserve in relation to problems. If a problem is badly posed, we cannot expect good solutions (Deleuze 1994: 159). For this reason Deleuze argues that it is more common to find banalities mistaken for profundities than errors or falsehoods (unless we are doing a pub quiz or something of that sort) (1994: 153). This point is also mentioned in *The Logic of Sense:* '…a problem always find the solution it merits, according to the conditions which determine it as a problem' (Deleuze 1990b: 54).

Salomon Maimon: the genetic conditions of real experience

After having looked at two examples of the critique of the distribution of the transcendental and the empirical in *Difference and Repetition* (in particular Deleuze denounces the tracing of the transcendental use of the faculties from the empirical, and the extrapolation of the transcendental conception of error from empirical error), we can return to the 'Fifteenth Series of Singularities' in *The Logic of Sense* to dive into Deleuze's (1990b: 100-108) critique of Kant. Deleuze's first point is that the transcendental does not resemble the empirical. So if the empirical world is made up of actualised things and individuals, the transcendental world is made of impersonal and pre-individual singularities. In Deleuze's words: 'Far from being individual or personal, singularities preside over the genesis of individuals and persons; they are distributed in a "potential" which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them by actualizing or realizing itself, although the figures of this actualization not at all resemble the realized potential' (1990b: 103). The second point is that the transcendental field should not be confused with undifferentiated depth. Now,

there are two questions we need to answer. First, why does the transcendental not resemble the empirical? And why is it not undifferentiated?

In order to answer these questions we are going to turn to Daniel W. Smith's (2012: 65-69) work on Salomon Maimon and the Post-Kantian tradition. Maimon was an eighteenth century philosopher, contemporary of Kant, who never attended university. He received an education while training to be a rabbi. He was a Polish-Russian Jew who was exiled for his radical views and somehow ended up in Berlin. There, he wrote a critique of Kant's transcendental philosophy, which Kant himself read. This was Kant's response to his work: 'But one glance at the work made me realize its excellence, and that not only had none of my critics understood me and the main questions as well as Mr. Maimon does, but also very few men possess so much acumen for such deep investigations as he' (Kant in Smith 2012: 66). As Smith explains, Deleuze took on the polemic generated by Maimon and came up with his own solution. Maimon is relevant for Deleuze because he pushed Kant's immanence to its conclusion, getting rid of the vestiges of transcendence. This is the same reason for Deleuze's interest on Nietzsche (and Leibniz), used to respond to Maimon's demands.[85] In particular, there are two demands that need to be met to push immanence forward: 'the search for the genetic elements of real thought (and not merely the conditions of possible thought), and the positing of a principle of difference as the fulfilment of this condition' (Smith 2012: 67).

How did Nietzsche meet Maimon's demands? As Smith explains, Nietzsche's method of genealogy was able to provide a genetic account of values; and he developed a principle of difference as the condition of the real (the difference between active and reactive modes of existence) (2012: 68). Deleuze takes on these demands in his method of *transcendental empiricism*. The explanation of these two exigencies posed by Maimon will help us answer the question of why does the transcendental not resemble the empirical by showing the problems of Kant's method. To begin with, the problem of Kant's method is that he assumed the facts of reason (knowledge and morality) and then tried to find their condition of possibility in the transcendental realm. So the condition (of possibility) refers to the conditioned (facts) reproducing its image (in a circular argument). According to Maimon, instead of assuming the facts, Kant needed to show how they are engendered immanently (this is the method of genesis). However, before we talk about what a method of genesis entails, there are a few more problems with the possible that need to be developed. As Smith and Protevi (2020) explain, the problem of the possible is the claim that there is less in it (compared to the real): 'When we think of the possible as somehow "pre-existing" the real, we think of the real, then we add to it the negation of its existence, and then we project the "image" of the possible into the past. We then reverse the procedure and think of the real as something more than possible, that is, as the possible with

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[85] Deleuze argues that we can use the work of Leibniz to fulfil Maimon's demands. In his own words: 'all the elements to create a genesis such as the post-Kantians demand it, all the elements are virtually – not actually because Leibniz's problem was something else – they are virtually there in Leibniz' (20 May 1980). In particular, in Leibniz we find the idea of an unconscious side of thought, which is made of differentials that can perform the method of genesis. See also: Smith's chapter on Leibniz, where he explains Deleuze's formulation of a principle of difference from the principles of Leibniz' philosophy (2012: 43-58).

existence added to it. We then say that the possible has been "realized" in the real' (Smith and Protevi 2020). In short, the possible is conceived as the real minus existence. However, as Deleuze explains, apart from this being a circular argument, if this was the case there would be a leap from the possible (non-real) to realisation. In his own words: 'Every time we pose the question in terms of possible and real, we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind our backs and is subject to a law of all or nothing' (1994: 211). This in turn subordinates difference to the negative (in the opposition from the possible to the real). Contrary to this, Deleuze replaces the idea of the possible with the virtual, which is fully real even before it is actualised. In the process of genesis, the virtual (real) is actualised (real) (Smith and Protevi 2020). There is no leap between the virtual and the actual (in terms of existence), only difference. The process of genesis relies on a principle of difference because it needs to be able to account for the production of the new (Smith 2012: 239). In Smith's words: 'When this field is actualized, it therefore differs from itself, such that every process of actualization is, by its very nature, the production of the new: that is, the production of a new difference' (2012: 240).

To sum up, we need to replace the idea of the possible with something that does not resemble the empirical to avoid a circular argument, which would be unable to account for the production of the new. If actual terms do not resemble the singularities that created them, we have genuine creation (Deleuze 1994: 212). Now we still need to answer why we should not confuse the transcendental with the undifferentiated (Deleuze 1990b: 102). As already mentioned the process from the virtual to the actual (or from the transcendental to the empirical) does not involve a jump from non-existence to existence. The virtual is real, and made up of difference that creates more difference. In Deleuze's words: 'The actualisation of the virtual… always takes place by difference, divergence, differenciation' (1994: 212). Furthermore, as Deleuze argues in *The Logic of Sense,* transcendental philosophy and metaphysics impose a false alternative: '*either* an undifferentiated ground, a groundlessness, formless non-being, or an abyss without differences and without properties, *or* a supremely individuated Being and an intensely personalized Form. Without this Being or this Form, you will have only chaos' (1990b: 106). As opposed to being undifferentiated, the virtual can be understood as a changing mass of relations, or structures of pure becoming (Williams 2003: 14). This implies that if the condition changes, the conditioned needs to change too - the conditions are therefore plastic and mobile (Smith 2011: 240). In other words, the relationship between the condition and the conditioned is one of reciprocal determination (as mentioned when talking about Deleuze's philosophy of time). What we are missing from this is the unconditioned, which is capable of determining the condition and conditioned (Deleuze 1990b: 122). In Deleuze's philosophy of time the unconditioned is the future (the difference that returns in the eternal return) (Williams 2011: 108, Deleuze 1994: 297). In other words, we do not only need the foundation (first synthesis), and the ground (second synthesis), but also the ungrounded or the unconditioned of the new (third synthesis) (Smith 2012: 241). In *The Logic of Sense* (in the seventeenth series), Deleuze argues that we need the unconditioned so we do not fall into the trap of consciousness (1990b: 123-124). As already mentioned, the

problem of consciousness is that by presupposing the identity of the subject, we are unable to explain how it comes to be. Contrary to this, Deleuze shifts the focus to the singularities that occur in the unconscious surface (of the transcendental field) which compose the individual. This is the world that Nietzsche explored, the world of the pre-individual singularities of the will to power (Deleuze 1990b: 107).

So far we have explained four of the requirements for the conditions of real experience, as opposed to possible experience: a method of intrinsic genesis which is able to account for the conditions of the new (this based on a principle of difference); the stripping of resemblance of the transcendental to the empirical (which also implies stripping the transcendental field of the presupposition of the subject as a field of consciousness); the conditions are determined alongside the conditioned; and something unconditioned in the form of the future as open (Smith 2012: 239-241). The last point that we are missing, according to Smith, is a static genesis, which happens between the virtual and its actualisation (or from the conditions of a problem to its solution). Furthermore, in *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze also talks about a dynamic genesis which goes from the actual to the virtual. We will come back to the importance of this distinction for thought in the next section.

Now it is important to highlight the political implications of Deleuze's transcendental empiricism. It is helpful to remember that the journey began with Deleuze's critique of the dogmatic or moral image of thought. The problem is that by limiting the role of thought to recognition, or to solving questions that already have a fixed answer, we end up stuck with what already exists in the world, and what we already know about the world. It is therefore necessary to have a conception of thought that is open to creativity and to changing the world. For this, we need a method that does not start with what already exists in the world and simply replicates this in the transcendental. In Levi Bryant's words:

> 'Where the relation between transcendental condition (as structure of possibility) and conditioned experience (the real) becomes indiscernible, it becomes impossible to determine whether these conditions are indeed conditions of all possible experience, or rather retroactive constructions of real, lived, and consequently conventional and arbitrary experience. In other words, what we call the possible is treated as something forever governing the structure of the real, even though it is drawn from a contingent moment in the real and is illicitly universalized to cover all experience' (Bryant 2008: 48).

In short, Bryant argues that the problem is the tendency to conflate what we are accustomed with the possible. James Williams underlines the conservatism of this position: '…the model of recognition is necessarily conservative since it depends on identifying something anew by comparing it with what is already known or what has already been experienced' (2003: 118). This is also tied to the protection of the the current moral values, as opposed to the creation of the new. We can now begin to appreciate the radical implications of Deleuze's thought. The transcendental is important, not to escape the world, but to account for the production of the new in the world (through the complex relationship between the conditions, the conditioned and the

open future). In Deleuze's words: 'transcendent in no way means that faculty addresses itself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world' (1994: 143).

Static and dynamic genesis

In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze explains two types of genesis: dynamic and static. As already mentioned, static genesis goes from a virtual event to its actualisation in state of affairs, while dynamic genesis goes from states of affairs to virtual events (Deleuze 1990b: 186). However, we still need to explain the importance of both geneses for Deleuze's philosophy. We can begin by looking at static genesis in the 'Sixteenth Series of the Static Ontological Genesis' (Deleuze 1990b: 109-117).[86] We have came across static genesis before, without mentioning it explicitly, when talking about impersonal and pre-individual singularities, which make up the transcendental field, and constitute particular individuals and worlds (Deleuze 1990b: 109). The relationship between individuals and the world is the following:

> 'A world already envelops an infinite system of singularities selected through convergence. Within this world, however, individuals are constituted which select and envelop a finite number of singularities of the system. They combine them with the singularities that their own body incarnates. They spread them out over their own ordinary lines, and are even capable of forming them again on the membranes which bring the inside and the outside in contact with each other.' (Deleuze 1990b: 109-110).

So the first level of static genesis creates the individuated world and the worldly individuals which populate it (1990b: 111). Static genesis is important because it explains how actual identities are constituted. As Williams argues, this is crucial for Deleuze's project, which would fail if he was not able to show how difference (as the differential relations of singularities) is connected to identified actual things (Williams 2008a: 124). However, even though static genesis gives rise to the identity of actual things, identities are not fixed (Williams 2011: 128). To begin with, there is still a limited power of renewal that belongs to this level (and not to the level of singularities) (1990b: 110). The reason for this is that individuals are not cut off from the world they inhabit. In Deleuze's words: 'the individual monad expresses a world according to the relation of other bodies with its own' (Deleuze 1990b: 110). Then, in contrast to the actualised world, singularities have an unlimited power of renewal (we are now moving to the process of dynamic genesis). This can be understood as the change in the relations of infinitives (sense) in the virtual realm. For example, the variations of intensity in the relations between 'to hate', 'to anger' and 'to despair" against the background of all infinitives (Williams 2008a: 33). This is explained in this way by Williams

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[86] For a further explanation of Deleuze's concept of static genesis, and Deleuze's relationship to Leibniz see: Bowden (2010). Bowden provides and outline of Leibniz's philosophical system and Deleuze's appropriation of his work, which also highlights where Deleuze's departs from Leibniz. Additionally, Bowden clarifies Deleuze's complex arguments in the sixteenth series of *The Logic of Sense.*

because becoming does not happen in isolation, for example we can go from sadness to anger so there is a change in the relations between the two, and between other infinitives in the background (this will be explained more in detail in chapter 6, when we talk about the paradox of pure becoming). Now it is important to clarify that even though we have separated both realms - we have talked about the relations of bodies in the actual, and the relation of infinitives in virtual - they rely on each other. Singularities need to be expressed in individuals in order to exist (static genesis) (Deleuze 1990b: 110). Deleuze's example of this is the expression of the infinitive verb 'to green' in a particular tree; or the infinitive verb 'to sin' in a particular individual - Adam (1990b: 112). On the other hand, without the change in relation of infinitives events would lack significance and sense (dynamic genesis) (Williams 2008a: 33). So while static genesis is important to explain the creation of identities, dynamic genesis is important to understand how thought renews itself and generate new forms (Williams 2008a: 198).

However, before moving on to the question of thought, we need to further clarify the relationship between both geneses. As Williams explains, the process from actual to the virtual is primary, and the process from the virtual to the actual is secondary (2008a: 194-195). Deleuze also refers to this distinction as the primary order and the secondary organisation (Deleuze 1990b: 125). The reason for this is that 'secondary organisation, though necessary, has no form of permanence and is engulfed by the primary order…' (Williams 2008a: 195). This is connected to the eternal return, as an aspect of the virtual that returns eternally as a primary process. To be more precise, the infinitives are unchanging but their relations are constantly altered. To sum up: while static genesis allows the emergence of static states, which enable temporary distinctions (based on identity); dynamic genesis as a counter process moves from temporary stable identities to movement and difference (Williams 2008a: 196). In other words, dynamic genesis overcomes the temporal boundaries created by static genesis. The virtual is important because it ensures the return of pure difference, as opposed to the filling of the world with the same. How is this connected to thought? As Williams explains, thought can be understood as '… a creative relation between, events, intensities, and actual things, that can experiment with novel contacts with infinitives' (2008a: 196-197). This implies that thought combines the actual and its virtual conditions through intensities. Intensities work at the surface and are invested both in the relations of actual things, and infinitives in the virtual (Williams 2008a: 196). We will now examine an example of the process of dynamic genesis, which Deleuze develops in the 'Twenty-Seven Series of Orality'.[87] In this example, he moves from bodily states to an incorporeal event, tracing how sound becomes independent from the organisation of bodies (Deleuze 1990b: 187). The process begins with the separation of the mouth of the nursing infant from the mother's breast. The world around the mouth, is conceived as one of wounding mixtures (the separation of the mouth and breast is a wound) (Williams 2008a: 197). As Williams explains, this separation also breaks up the mouth from its functions and allows it to float freely, which leads to novel and

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[87] For a further explanation of Deleuze's concept of dynamic genesis see Smith (2006). Smith clarifies the three steps of dynamic genesis, which are the primary order of language, the tertiary arrangement of language, and the secondary organisation of language. Additionally, Smith provides an interpretation of the transition from *the Logic of Sense* to *Anti-Oedipus.*

perverse orientations (which can be both liberating and dangerous if they get blocked), culminating in the body without organs. This process can also be summarised as going from the actual world to the unconscious, as a condition which brings novelty into the actual.

Now we still need to answer two questions concerning the relationship between thought and novelty: how does thought alter sense and values? And how does it renew itself? Williams answers this questions by looking at the 'Thirty-Fourth Series of Primary Order'. In this series, Deleuze explains the concepts of static and dynamic genesis further. He elucidates how the order of language (manifestation, denotation and signification) comes about through static genesis (1990a: 241). Then, the counter process of dynamic genesis moves from the physical wound (for example bleeding), to the cry (which doubles the wound), to its description (as my wound), culminating in its association with the universal potential of infinitives (to bleed) (Williams 2008a: 199). This last step is where thought alters sense and value, because infinitives can be connected in unlimited ways to a varying degree of intensity. Thought is able to renew itself because of its place in Deleuze's structure. As already mentioned, things do not exist outside the series that they are part of (2008a: 184). However, these series should not be understood as fixed. Seriation involves: '… an interaction of multiple series with no overall formal logic or limits' (2008a: 186). The series have empty spaces between them, which overflow with potential, and make them communicate with one another. While some series are composed of lack, others are composed of excess (2008a :176, 199). As Williams explains, 'thinking relates lack in some series of a structure to excess in others; thereby it allows a space demanding to be filled to be put in touch with a source of intense potentials' (2008a: 176). In other words, the role of thought is to introduce forced movement into series in empty places (2008a: 198). This implies that there is a struggle between inertia and dynamism. However, we are saved from entropy through the creative power of thought, and from chaos by the pendulum-like movement between series (2008a: 199).

Thought in practice

Before we wrap up, there are two more points on thought that need to be addressed. The first one concerns the topology of thought. According to Deleuze, thought '…is not a question of causality, but rather a geography and topology' (Deleuze 1990: 220). As Williams explains, thought is a matter of topology because '...it alters things through movements between bodies, ideas and surface intensities (rather than causes and effects governed by laws)' (2008a: 191). What are the implications of this? As Deleuze explains in the 'Thirty-first Series of Thought', thought does not simply think about sexuality or marriage, for example. Thought is a metamorphosis of sex, the thinker and the couple (Deleuze 1990: 220). There is a move from the figurative to the abstract. From the actual couple and its actual connections, to the formation of new connections. In Williams's words: 'Thought connects by changing things along abstract lines, altering relations across wounds, ideas and values' (Williams 2008a: 191). This is connected to the productive relationship to the outside, as a limit which can be overcome. Sexuality is a limit because it can mark the passage to the pure event of infinitives (dynamic genesis) (Williams 2008a: 199). In opposition to this, static genesis involves a process of limitation of the series in the actual world, which in turn determines the virtual (Williams 2008a: 126). How does this work in practice?

Williams explains that thought is creative because it allows for the different and unlimited connection of infinitives. So for example, if the question is 'Will I marry Albertine?', the pure event 'to marry' is made up of potential for different relations between infinitives such as 'to desire', 'to love', 'to commit', etcetera. This implies that the infinitive to marry can have different expressions beyond what already exists in the world. In Williams' words: 'there is a glory and freedom in the refusal to tie an infinitive, such as 'to love' to given rules and actualities…' (Williams 2008a: 192). This brings us to the   second point, which is the problem of counter-actualisation, as a re-enactment or replaying (Williams 2008a: 193). The role of thought is to replay the events by making new connections, which according to Williams, diminish the actual injuries that stop new relations from forming. As we will see in the next chapter this is connected to the ethical task of grasping ourselves as events, which implies seeing ourselves as unanswerable questions as opposed to a particular solution in the present (Lawlor 2022).

Summary of the journey

To sum up, this chapter was dedicated to Deleuze's critique of moral laws, and the dogmatic image of thought. The critique of moral laws is important because it shows how underneath the repetition of moral codes we find difference (either in different contexts, or in the different action we are trying to perfect to fit the moral law). The critique of the dogmatic image of thought is crucial because it shows how the role of thought is not to recognise, or recreate what already exists in the world, but to create. However, the process of creation is not a simple nor a comfortable endeavour. There is no method that can steer us away from error, or from bad outcomes. Thought happens to us in the most unexpected places, or moments, sometimes after many failed attempts. For this reason, Deleuze highlights the importance of learning, not as a direct way to knowledge, but as a process that recognises the need of practice and experimentation in the acquisition of habits (for example learning to swim). Furthermore, habits are not based on identity, but in difference, as we learn to respond creatively to problems, which are always changing alongside solutions. Therefore, learning is always an ongoing process, where knowledge is produced along the way but it is never final. Some of these points are also present in *The Logic of Sense,* not in an identical manner, since the guiding problem of both books is different. Nonetheless, both books help to answer questions that are asked in the other, so it is helpful to read them along each other. What is interesting about thought in *The Logic of Sense* is the focus on the body, without forgetting ideas. In this book thought is always part of a wider process that includes events, bodies and ideal structures (such as language and morality). Thought is not independent from the actual world and the singularities which compose this world. For this reason, even if we have good intentions, it is hard to reach good outcomes (as in the example of Oedipus). This is connected to the relationship between thought and the unconscious. In Deleuze's words: 'One would have to be too "simple" to believe that thought is a simple act, clear unto itself, and not putting into play all the powers of the unconscious…' (1990b: 74). As Williams explains, unconscious fault lines interfere and engulf conscious intentions, consciousness is never independent (2008a: 180). Due to the unconscious side of thought, the

process of thinking is better understood as a game of chance, where we cannot fully know or control the rules, we can only have a partial and intermittent understanding of them (Williams 2008a: 188). All of these points cannot be understood independently from Deleuze's critique of Kant which is both present in *The Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition.* In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze explains how the transcendental field is made up of pre-individual singularities, which are actualised in bodies and states of affairs. The transcendental field cannot be drawn from the empirical, since different processes are at work in each realm, and their relation to the other. Furthermore, in both books Deleuze emphasises how transcendental problems do not disappear once a solution is found, or as we acquire knowledge. All of this was inspired by Maimon's criteria in order to push immanence to its limit: we need a genetic method (as opposed to a method of conditioning), and a principle of difference which fulfils this condition. In *The Logic of Sense,* Deleuze distinguishes between two types of genesis: one that goes from the transcendental to the empirical (static genesis), and anther that goes from the empirical to the transcendental (dynamic genesis). They are both important for thought in different ways. Static genesis is important to explain the constitution of identified beings (Williams 2008a: 125). On the other hand, Dynamic genesis is important to bring novelty into the actual world. The role of thought is to introduce movement between the different series which resonate with each other based on their difference.

Conclusion

This chapter was necessary to provide an account of thought, which does not rely on the activity of the subject; and that does not conceive thinking as a higher philosophical activity as in the case of Oksala. The problem of those accounts is that they reintroduce the hierarchy of the mind over the body, which relegate women to a subordinate position to men. Instead, Deleuze argues that thought is involuntary after and encounter forces us to think. The consequence of this is the democratisation of thought (Stark 2017: 20). Furthermore this conception of thought is able to account for its specificity, which is connected to the specificity of the body and the mind of the learner; and their particular context, since thinking is no longer about isolated individuals. We need to connect to the world in order to think. This is related to the advancement of immanence for two reasons. First, thinking happens through immanent encounters with others (as opposed to higher ideas), that have the power to constitute us and undo us. Secondly, (as already mentioned) there is no hierarchy of the mind over the body, due to the focus on the neglected bodily side of learning. Moreover, in this chapter we began the closer examination of the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental realms, which is necessary in order to account for the creation of the new. Although this still needs to be explored in more depth in chapter 7, it was necessary to embark on this task here in order to understand the genetic conditions of thought; and how thought introduces novelty into the actual.

6. The Ethical Implications of Deleuze's Philosophy of Time

This chapter goes back to the problem of ethics through the question of how to act in response to Deleuze's philosophy of time, inspired by the work of Williams and Lawlor. This question can be understood in opposition to morality. While morality is based on the idea of realising our essence in order to achieve order (as explained in chapter 3), Deleuze's immanent ethics is based on disorder (while still avoiding complete chaos). As Lawlor explains, the reason for this is that the present is always passing, so there is no equilibrium (Lawlor 2020: 110). In addition to this, following Deleuze's reversal of Platonism, there is no pre-determined model for becoming that we need to imitate (Lawlor 2020 and 2022). The consequence of this is the freeing of becoming. In other words, there are multiple directions of becoming open for experimentation (Williams 2011). However, this does not lead to an individualist ethics without care for ourselves and others. While becoming is not limited by moral questions of right and wrong, it is limited by the consideration of how it affects our own body and other bodies (as shown in chapter 3); and by a question of dosage - 'how much of this can my body bear?' - in order to avoid suicide. Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 3, the point of ethics is also to increase our capacity to act (this capacity can also be collective); and to this we need to add the necessity to move beyond the presentist view of time that judges events morally (Lawlor 2022). However, the focus on other times beyond the present leads to the accusation that Deleuze wants to flee the world. So we need to show how Deleuze's philosophy engages with time *for the present*. The point is to make space for new presents, for more connections, and for the change of sense of events.

Time, morality and thought

The previous two chapters were dedicated to Deleuze's philosophy of time in *Difference and Repetition,* and Deleuze's reformulation of thought beyond the moral image both in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*.[88] The problem of time is connected to the problem of ethics because we need to know how to act in response to time. This is a question explored by Williams who turns from *Difference and Repetition* to *The Logic of Sense* in order to answer: 'can Deleuze's philosophy of time provide a basis for moral distinctions and actions?' (2011: 138). As already mentioned, Williams use of the word moral is closer to the word ethics in this project. The concept of time is also connected to the concept of thought. In *Difference and Repetition,* Deleuze argues that Plato introduced time into thought (Deleuze 1994: 142). However, the problem of Plato is that this cycle is organised through resemblance to an ideal: 'Things resemble the ideal to greater or lesser extent and those more capable of returning are closest to the ideal' (Williams 2011: 85). For Deleuze, on the other hand, time is introduced into thought, not as resemblance, but as difference through the concept of the empty form of time (Deleuze 1994: 167). Following Kant's critique of Descartes, time is the form under which existence is

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[88] The idea of the moral image of thought is found in *Difference and Repetition* but some of the points are also addressed in *The Logic of Sense,* even though the concept does not appear there. For example the critique of the concepts of common sense, and good sense.

determinable (1994: 169). This leads to the fracture of the subject, or thinker: '…it is an I fractured by this form of time which finds itself constrained to think that which can only be thought…' (Deleuze 1990b: 144). Thinking is therefore not based on the identity of the subject, but in difference through the empty form of time. Lastly, according to Deleuze, thought and morality are connected through the moral presuppositions of the dogmatic image of thought (for example: thinking has a good nature, and the thinker has a natural inclination for truth); and the joint task of protecting established values. Therefore, Deleuze's task of developing a new conception of thought is tied to the task of replacing morality with an ethics, and to the problem of time - in order to be able to move beyond established values and account for the production of the new.

Now that we have highlighted the connections between the concepts of time, morality/ ethics and thought, it is important to focus on the reformulation of the concept of morality. As already mentioned at the beginning of chapter 5, when Williams talks about morality in *The Logic of Sense,* there is a reversal from common conceptions of morality associated with justice, the good, pre-existing rules, and the dogmatic image of thought; in favour of a conception closer to ethics that can be understood as an aesthetics of existence. Furthermore, as Williams argues, Deleuze provides a different interpretation of morality that is not grounded in the free will of the subject. In his own words: '… *Logic of Sense* provides an alternative account where relations between series, sense and events take precedence and explain the emergence of other identities, thereby insisting that we never have a complete reality until we chart underlying processes' (Williams 2008a: 135). Deleuze also attacks the conception of the subject as a ground in *Difference and Repetition,* where he argues that the process of production of the subject by difference is primary and identity is secondary (if we assume the identity of the subject then we are unable to explain its constitution). There are two more points about Deleuze's reformulation of morality pointed out by Williams. First, aside from the rejection of prior identities as the base for morality, Deleuze also rejects the idea that the aim of morality should be to establish universal criteria to evaluate the world. In Deleuze's philosophy, there is no place for universal values or laws that can guide us to action. As we will see when we talk about individuation, the moral problem is 'how to respond to events that constitute and dismember persons, individuals and worlds?' (Williams 2008a: 136). Second, Deleuze also challenges the modern idea that order and consensus should be the grounds for moral action. In Williams' words: 'Consensus is neither an end in itself nor a necessary condition; it is rather a secondary position stemming from belonging to a reality connecting many different individuals through multiple series and events' (ibid). The idea of consensus is replaced by creativity in relation to events: 'There is a novelty in each event calling for a corresponding creativity' (ibid). This will be explained further when we look at the concept of counter-actualisation. Furthermore, the idea of order and consensus cannot be the ground for ethics in *Difference and Repetition* either. As Leonard Lawlor (2020: 110-111) explains, in this book Deleuze argues against the belief that the universe has an equilibrium position. This is not the case for two reasons. First, the universe does not have such a point because it is still becoming. In his own words: if any thing that is becoming 'were in a state of equilibrium, as a

perfect self-identical something, then it should not have emerged from itself and become' (2020: 110). Secondly, the present is always passing, so the present is never a self identical thing. Therefore, if what returns is always difference, then we have no firm ground for morality, nor for consensus. This brings us back to the question identified by Williams: how should we act given Deleuze's philosophy of time?[89] There is a similar question inspired by Lawlor: how to act in relation to others in a way that is adequate to the eternal return? (2020: 112).

The chapter will begin with a summary of Deleuze's conception of time in *Difference and Repetition;* followed by an explanation of Deleuze's conception of time in *The Logic of Sense,* and an explanation of the relationship between both works. We will then turn to the ethical implications of *Difference and Repetition,* which are developed by Lawlor (2020). He explains the implications of the demoralisation of becoming, which means that becoming has no beginning nor end, so there is no predetermined path we need to follow as we become. In other words, there is no model of becoming to imitate. This is connected to the demoralisation of sufficient reason, which involves avoiding the explication of difference once and for all. According to Lawlor, there are two ethical imperatives which help in this task: to not explicate too much, and to affirm the lowest. This has important implications for how we see ourselves and others: we are intensive individuals who are constituted and undone by time. The demoralisation of sufficient reason is connected to the demoralisation of becoming because it opens up the way for the difference of new becomings. We will then move to the ethical implications of *The Logic of Sense,* where there is a further elaboration of the demoralisation of becoming through the figure of becoming-Alice, and the overturning of Platonism. Next, we will look at the concept of counteractualisation. Lawlor (2022) divides the concept in two: thinking the event (mind) and living the event (body), which affirm the univocity of being (since being is said in the same sense of the body and the mind). After this, the question of how to act given Deleuze's philosophy of time will be answered, bringing together the work of Williams and Lawlor. As we will see, this is not an individualist question which is tied to the dangerous affirmation of desire without regard for ourselves and others. Furthermore, this is not a moral question, but a question related to the art of living. Lastly, we will argue against the claim that Deleuze prioritises the time of Aion; and we will look at an example of the relationship between Chronos and Aion through the concept of love, based on the work of Chantelle Gray.

Time in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*

We can begin with a summary of Deleuze's conception of time in *Difference and Repetition.* There are three syntheses of time. In the first synthesis of habit, the (empirical) living present is constituted by the contraction of different successive independent instants (Deleuze 1994: 70-72). This contraction includes the past (as the preceding instants are retained) and the future (as expectation) - as dimensions of the present. For example, the repetition AB AB is retained, so after hearing A we expect B in the future. The synthesis of the present sets the arrow of time: from

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[89] This is the problem addressed by Williams (2011: chapter 6). For a more extensive examination of morality in *The Logic of Sense* see Williams (2008: chapter 4).

a particular past to a general future, in the present. In order for the present to pass, we need the second synthesis of memory. The past becomes a (transcendental) ground, from which the former present is approached (Deleuze 1994: 80-81). This past is now general, while the passing present (and the present present) are particular. The main difference between the synthesis of habit and the synthesis of memory is that while the past and future are dimensions of the present in the first synthesis, the present and the future are dimensions of the past in the second synthesis. The relationship between the present and the future in the second synthesis is the following: it is founded by the impossibility of the return of the present; since the present is founded as passed, and the future is left undetermined by the past (Williams 2011: 103). Lastly, in the third synthesis of time - the synthesis of the eternal return - the present and the past become dimensions of the future. Here Deleuze introduces the idea of the empty form of time as the form in which the undetermined is determinable (Deleuze 1994: 86). Time is empty because it is not subordinated to motion anymore (for example: time measured by the movement of the earth around the sun).[90] This implies that time is freed from cardinal numbering and the hierarchies associated with it (Williams 2011: 88). Furthermore, in terms of the reversal of Platonism, 'time out of joint means that the ideal is removed from the cycle' (ibid). Therefore, the cycle does not work through identity, since the empty form of time means that only difference returns. As Williams, explains, this is connected to Deleuze's development of a philosophy of immanence because nothing escapes the return of difference (there is no transcendent realm of sameness) (2011: 115). There is also no transcendental subject. Deleuze's philosophy of time is not subjective because the first two syntheses are passive (the subject does not initiate them), and the empty form of time creates a fracture in the I (the I thinks in time). This is also the case in *The Logic of Sense*, where we cannot think of the individual independently from the different series it is part of, and the individual is lost in the process of pure becoming (2011: 143). For this reason, Williams argues that moral problems are not specifically human, since problems occur through different series and events which the individual does not create (we are only free to re-play the event differently) (2008a: 137).

Now while in *Difference and Repetition* there are three syntheses of time, in *The Logic of Sense* there are two times: time as Aion, and time as Chronos. The time as Chronos is the time of the present. In this synthesis the past and the future are dimensions relative to the present (Deleuze 1990b: 162). The present is mostly corporeal: it is made up by the mixture of different bodies in relation to one another. However, there is a distinction between the body's actions and passions (which compose the present). Each body is a cause (it is capable of actions), but acts can be limited by the acts of other bodies (passions) (Williams 2011: 148). In Deleuze's words: 'the passion of a body refers to the action of a more powerful body' (Deleuze 1990b: 163). This is where the concept of the wound becomes important. As Williams explains, in *The Logic of Sense,* the contraction of the living present can be understood as a physical wound (2011: 146). In his

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[90] For an explanation of the concept of time out of joint see Somers-Hall (2011). Smith (2013) also provides a good explanation of the freeing of time from its subordination to movement, in the context of the relationship between temporality and truth. Voss (2013a), on the other hand, provides an in depth examination of the different elements assembled by Deleuze in the third synthesis of time.

own words: 'The living present is therefore necessarily a time of wounds brought about by the clash of causes among each other' (2011: 148). While the present includes and is determined by all the bodies that compose it, each body occupies a particular place (or perspective) in the mixture. Additionally, the present embraces the entire universe, which means that 'the living present contracts the whole of the universe' (in the language of *Difference and Repetition*) (2011: 147); but each contraction is different to the others in terms of activity and passivity. In Williams' words: 'To exist is to exist as a cause and as a passion, with a set destiny among other causes' (2011: 148). Here destiny does not mean a determined place within the world, but participating in the same life from a particular perspective: we all contract the whole of the present from a particular perspective, just as we contract the whole of the past at different degrees, or we all replay the same story differently (Deleuze 1994: 83, Williams 2011: 69-71).

However, the mixtures of bodies also have an effect outside the time of the living present (Williams 2011: 148). Here we move from the corporeal present, into the locus of incorporeal events (Deleuze 1990b: 165). In Deleuze's words: 'Whereas Chronos was inseparable from the bodies which filled it out entirely as causes and matter, Aion is populated by effects which haunt it without filling it up' (ibid). Incorporeal effects can be understood as the changes of intensity in the relations of infinitives that we mentioned in chapter five. As Williams highlights, Deleuze uses the concepts of cause and effect in a novel way (2011: 148). The concepts are separated: causes are in the living present, and effects in the time of Aion. Causes are only in the living present for the following reason: 'To cause is to be a synthesis and the synthesis is not an effect of an external cause' (ibid). This implies that while bodies are able to limit each other, they are not a cause for the other. Thus, the present can be understood as a competition of causes. Now, aside from the existence of causes (as actual things in the living present), there is also the subsistence of effects - infinitives in the past and future (Williams 2011: 149). Without effects, there would be no sense or value to actual events. So we could say that events are divided in two processes: 'one of bodily mixtures and another of changes in the intensities associated with infinitives' (ibid). However, as in the case of the three synthesis of time in *Difference and Repetition,* these processes are incomplete without the other. The living present, although complete in terms of being a synthesis of the whole of the past and the future, it is not complete until it is determined by the past - in terms of how to pass away and only return as difference in the future (Williams 2011: 150).[91] Similarly, the past is complete in terms of being a contraction of the whole of the past at different intensities, and incomplete without its determination and expression in the present. Lastly, the future is complete in terms of pure becoming, but incomplete in terms of its determination in the present. To summarise: 'so though Chronos and Aion are both complete, the former requires the latter to move outside itself into the past and into the future, whereas the latter requires the former to move from a pure and chaotic potential to a fully determined set of relations' (Williams 2008a: 150).

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[91] As Williams (2011: 150) notes, this is not a contradiction because different times can be complete on their own grounds in one aspect, while also being completed by another dimension time in another aspect.

Now that we have summarised Deleuze's conception of time in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, it is a good point to ask what is the relationship between the two books? William argues that despite the conceptual differences of the books, the two times in *The Logic of Sense* (Aion and Chronos) involve the same six relations of time as in *Difference and Repetition*. There is therefore no inconsistency in terms of processes (Williams 2011: 154). The relations can be summarised as follows: 'the past and the future as dimensions of the *present*, in Chronos; the past and the present as dimensions of the *future*, in Aiôn; and the present and the future as dimensions of the *past*, in the relation between Aiôn and Chronos, as mediated through intensity' (Williams 2011: 138). To be more precise, we have Chronos as the corporeal present composed of the mixture of bodies, which synthesises the past and future (Deleuze 1990b: 162). Then, we have Aion as the pure and empty form of time that divides the present into past and future (like the cut in the third synthesis of time) (Deleuze 1990b: 165). Lastly, there is the relationship between the two - Chronos versus Aion - as the movement that contracts and renews the present (Deleuze 1990b: 163). The difficulty is that whenever we talk about a particular time, or synthesis, it is impossible to abstract it from the others. We always need to keep in mind its relation to other processes that constitute time. In addition to the question about the relationship between the two conceptions of time, we also have the issue of the relation between the two books in general. As argued in chapter five, despite the differences between the books, they share some problems (including thought and time); and they have enemies in common (including the identity of the transcendental subject, and the dogmatic image of thought). The two books have been approached through the common guiding problem of developing an ethics based on them. For this reason it is productive to read the books together. As Williams argues, the boundaries set between the covers and letter of books are arbitrary and they should not stop us from reading them together. In his own words: 'The point of an interpretation is to explain and perhaps enhance, to connect and differentiate, to exemplify and add voices, to chime with and offer counterpoint, to develop and to unpick, to analyse and give reasons, to criticise and, with luck, to expand' (2011: 153). Williams argues that this is consistent with Deleuze's concept of counter-actualisation, where we replay something in a novel manner in the present. However, we should not erase the differences between the books, which include: the lack of the central role of Nietzsche's eternal return, the stronger human and moral focus, and the greater role of psychoanalysis in *The Logic of Sense* (Williams 2011: 154). On the other hand, the two books are consistent in the following manners: the contraction in the present, the asymmetry and relations of reciprocal determination of the processes, and the changes of intensity in the realm of pure becoming which is divided into past and future (ibid).

The demoralisation of becoming in *Difference and Repetition*

One of the consequences of Deleuze's philosophy of time is the demoralisation of becoming. How? As Lawlor (2020) explains, in *Difference and Repetition,* Deleuze challenges the idea of the equilibrium of the universe, which is connected to the moral interpretation of becoming. In this view, the time of equilibrium has been shattered by the process of becoming (the fall). In Lawlor's

words: 'How would we explain the world emerging from an equilibrium state unless something went wrong, badly, or evil?' (2020: 112). According to this moral view, becoming should correct and make right the fall from the perfect state of the universe. However, for Deleuze, the moral ground of becoming is inadequate to the essence of time. There is no equilibrium of time, time is disparate because the present is always passing away (2020: 110). The only thing that remains constant is the return of difference or the disparate (the empty form of time). Therefore, to be adequate to the essence of time, becoming needs to be demoralised (2020: 112). This task can be understood as the demoralisation of sufficient reason, which is also the ethicalisation of sufficient reason. As Lawlor explains, there are two sides of sufficient reason (grounding) (2020: 114). On one hand, it can determine pre-existing differences within the identity of the concept (grounding as representation, or conditioning). On the other hand, it can determine the indeterminate. This type of grounding (genetic) produces difference. Grounding is divided in two because it is bent (or it is ambiguous): either towards representation (which means it traces the ground off the grounded), or beyond representation (groundlessness) - due to the metamorphoses of the eternal return (Lawlor 2020: 114-115). However, there is an illusion that arises from the ambiguity of sufficient reason. While the eternal return involves only the return of the disparate, it produces an image of resemblance as an external effect (2020: 116). Then, illusion leads to an error 'when representation takes advantage of and profits from the simulated sense of sameness' (ibid). Representation projects sameness into the disparate so it seems like difference is only valuable in relation to sameness that pre-exists. Therefore, the goal of repetition appears to be the reproduction of the same. This is connected to common sense as the norm that classifies individuals and things (2020: 117); and to good sense, which sees any extreme difference as an error that needs to eventually compensate for its inequality (2020: 118). Lawlor also connects the problem of good sense to the first synthesis of time and the pleasure principle: 'if A happened and then B appeared as pleasure, then I should make A happen so pleasure B returns' (2020: 120). So, according to good sense, whenever there is disorder this must eventually become pleasure and order. In the dogmatic image of thought, the pleasure principle becomes the only principle in thought, leading to the projection of the generalities produced by the first synthesis of time (which works from the particular to the general) into the past and future.

The way back from the error created by representation is found in the encounter with others (2020: 112). As Lawlor explains, others are both the place where sufficient reason bends into identity; and where sufficient reason bends beyond representation and towards the production of difference. Why others? Because 'what everybody knows' (common sense) is connected to a community of people (2020: 121). This can serve as the condition for representation as sufficient reason copies the ground it grounds (the empirical is confused with the transcendental). However, others can also serve as something without explanation (groundlessness), which generates difference: 'to ground is to metamorphose' (Deleuze 1994: 154). Therefore, Lawlor argues that 'it is through others that we truly reverse Platonism' (2021: 121). Now we need to examine what Deleuze means by others: they are the expression of possible worlds (2020: 122). They are what is *prior* to the system of subjects and objects (the 'I' and the self respectively). This implies that the other holds 'an essential function in the

represented world of perception' (Deleuze in Lawlor 2020: 122). Why? Because it gives expression to possible words, by integrating pre-individual fields of intensity within subjects and objects, while also allowing for the possibility of something else being implicated (intensities) that can be explicated (as extensities and qualities) (2020: 123).[92] Additionally, the 'I' and the self rely on others to be perceived as individuals. However, as already mentioned there is an error that arises due to good sense when we see subjects and objects as an origin or foundation, as opposed to the result of the process of individuation. While the other plays a part in the emergence of this error, they can also provide a way out by following the path from extensities and qualities to others as pre-individual fields of intensity. These are the steps: step one involves moving away from the subject that actualises the other-structure into the other-structure itself. This allows us to see the other as neither subject nor object ('no one'). Step two: pursue the bend of sufficient reason to the point where the other-structure no longer works as the condition of perception of subjects and objects. Step three: arrive at pure ideas and intensities that are far from subjects and objects. This is the point of the solipsistic thinker. To reach this point we need an encounter that forces us to think. As already mentioned, the encounter can only be sensed, it is not a sensible object which can be represented (2020: 124). However, as Lawlor adds: 'there is no encounter without other people' (2020: 123). The reason for this is is that others are not merely representers: 'they are also centres of envelopment, that is, centres which still testify to the true origin in fields of individuation and intensities' (2020: 124). Put differently the others are locations of disorder in the system. So the solipsism of thought does not necessarily lead to an isolated existence from the community but to the other as a pre-individual field of intensity (2020: 127). The example of this is the terrified face, 'which sucks one into the groundless' (Deleuze 1994: 152).

The terrified face does not resemble the cause of the terror it expresses (Lawlor 2020: 124). However, it can be explicated, which means that we can find a solution to the problem, especially if we see its cause. By doing so we reduce the other to a subject or an object that caused the terror. On the other hand, the terrified face can also be the product of an encounter that suck us into the terror of the groundless (2020: 125). This is the case when we are not able to see the cause of the terror. So we are not able to explicate it (into extensities and qualities). While the explicated face does not involve an encounter with others, the non explicated face can lead to this. However, this is not enough to come back from the error of representation. What we need, according to Lawlor, is an ethics of intensive quantities. Intensity can be defined as a quantity that cannot be equalised (since it includes the unequal itself). This implies that intensity affirms difference. The explanation of this is the following: intensity includes a series of lower differences, similarly to how we cannot state the number 10 without stating the existence of the numbers bellow it. Therefore, when we affirm intensity, we affirm the lower differences that it includes. The question now is how is this connected to ethics? In Lawlor's words: 'we need the ethics because, under the influence of good sense, we might take the intensive quantity as a quantity that is

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[92] For an explanation of the concepts of implication and explication, as well as perplication and complication see Lawlor (2020: 121-122).

equalisable; we might take it as a quantity that can be annulled eventually' (2020: 125). So the ethical imperative is to affirm the lowest, the disparate in itself, that lies beneath qualities and quantities. The second ethical imperative is to not explicate the other too much (2020: 126). This principle is set against the moralisation of sufficient reason (through common sense) that leads to the explication of difference once and for all. This means that the difference in intensity is annulled, and the qualities and extensities are seen as primary. The explication of difference is connected to the elimination of the type of repetition that makes difference. In opposition to this, Deleuze is interested in developing a conception of repetition that is based on the difference between each terms. According to Lawlor, only this type of repetition, which is not based in a model, can serve as the ground for conduct. Now, in order to understand what well-grounded conduct is we need to expand on what it means to *not* explicate the other too much (2020: 127). Mainly, it means the affirmation of the lowest (the disparate), which are the intensities implicated in the other (2020: 128). This allows for the preservation of the other's intensive values (Deleuze 1994: 261). Lawlor derives a series of sub-imperatives from this (2020: 128). First, maintaining intensive values means not to generalise the other, to not reduce it to extensities and qualities, nor to reduce difference to the identity of a concept (for example reducing man to rational animal). Secondly, it means to not treat the other economically: the other is a singular non-exchangable person. This can be understood in opposition to the domain of generality where we can replace anything with something that resembles it or is equivalent to it (Deleuze 1994: 1). Thirdly, to not explicate the other too much implies letting the other go in their own direction. We can connect this to love: if love means to explicate the worlds enveloped in the beloved, then we need to not love the other too much to the point of possession.

As mentioned above, the imperative to not explicate too much is tied to the prohibition of good sense, which sets the model of the good direction of becoming (Lawlor 2020: 128). This model is projected into the past and future, so there is a pre-given origin and an end, and any deviation from the origin can be judged negatively. In opposition to this, according to the ethics of intensive quantities, there is no beginning nor end, so without an original and a final thing, becoming is not based on resemblance (2020: 129). Therefore, this form of ethics can be understood as 'an indeterminate ethics, an ethics without a determinate model that one could imitate and without a determinate purpose that one could intend' (2020: 128). Judgement is suspended, since there is no original that serves as a base for comparison. However, the question now is the following: how does an indeterminate ethics work? As Lawlor (2020: 129) explains, the imperatives of an intensive ethics cannot be conceived as conditional and hypothetical ('if I want X, I must do Y'). The reason for this is the following: 'Hypothetical imperatives posit a pre-given end which necessitates the means or conditions that allow the action to reach that end' (2020: 129). Instead, the imperatives are unconditional and categorical, in order to be adequate to the essence of time (empty/disparate). To reiterate, the being of the disparate implies the freeing of becoming from a pre-given model. Then, if there is no origin nor end, becoming does not fall into the circle where the condition resembles the conditioned (Deleuze refers to this as the non-resemblance principle). So we move from the ontological claim of the essence of time, to the

principle of non-resemblance that frees becoming from the identity of the original. Following this principle, the foundation of ethics cannot resemble what it founds. In other words, established values cannot serve as a ground for ethics. Only a categorical imperative, which is freed from empirical content can maintain the disparate as the essence of time (2020: 128). For this reason Lawlor argues that Deleuze's famous claim of not being unworthy of the event means rejecting hypothetical imperatives (which are based on empirical content), and reaching the categorical imperative (2020: 130).

From *Difference and Repetition* to *The logic of Sense*

To sum up the previous section, the idea of the empty form of time requires an ethics that it is able to affirm the difference of intensity at the heart of becoming. This type of ethics - of intensive quantities - relies on the other to perceive and be perceived as singular individuals made up of difference that has not yet been fully explicated, as opposed to already constituted subjects or objects. Ethics is necessary in order to avoid the error of representation, which involves submitting difference and repetition to identity. While intensity can be explicated too much, to the point of its annulment; it can also lead to groundlessness through the metamorphosis of what it is supposed to ground. The two principles that allow us to come back from error into groundlessness are: to not explicate too much, and two affirm the lowest. These principles are empty of empirical content, which means they generate difference, as opposed to replicating what already exists in the world. The role of ethics is therefore to allow us to move beyond the presentist view of time, where the present that has just passed is expected to return as the same in the future. Against this view, Deleuze shows that the repetition of the present involves a transformation; the past is changed by the passing of the present; and what returns in the future is only difference. To act ethically is to act accordingly to this view of time which is based on difference. Now that we have examined Lawlor's conception of ethics derived from *Difference and Repetition,* we can turn to *The Logic of Sense.* We will begin by looking at Deleuze's further elaboration of the demoralisation of becoming through the figure of becoming-Alice. This will take us into a deeper examination of Deleuze's reversal of Platonism, which allows him to free becoming from common sense and good sense. Then, the relationship between pure becoming and the simulacrum will be explored. This leads to an important aspect of ethics that we have not talked about yet: the problem of dosage as opposed to moral prohibition.

The reversal of Platonism: pure becoming

In *The Logic of Sense,* Deleuze argues that becoming is not limited to the living present, where there is a selection between different series. The series also resonate from the living present into the pure past and the future as the eternal return of difference. In other words, the selections in the living present renew actualisations by tapping into the time of Aion (Deleuze 1990b: 110). An example of this process is Alice's becoming in the first series: 'When I say "Alice becomes larger," I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now' (Deleuze 1990b: 1). As Deleuze goes on: 'Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller

at the same time' (ibid). The point is that becoming does not happen in an instant; the variations of pure becoming happen outside the present and undo the present (Williams 2011: 139-140). There is a simultaneous change of the intensity of the infinitives 'to grow' and 'to shrink'. This goes against common sense and good sense. According to good sense becoming has a determinable sense or direction (Deleuze 1990b: 1). So we cannot have all the processes at the same time, nor do them too fast (Williams 2011: 141). Common sense, on the other hand, implies the correct assignation of fixed identities (Deleuze 1990b: 3). This is the case in the actual realm, which according to Plato's philosophy is the realm of limited and measured things (Deleuze 1990b: 1). However, the realm of pure becoming - where Alice becomes small and big - is a realm without measure (or becoming-mad). This is also the realm of the past and the future (Deleuze 1990b: 1-2), which undo the present. Deleuze refers to the undoing of the present as the paradox of pure becoming, which states that becoming eludes the present (Deleuze 1990b: 2). As we will see, the consequence of this is the challenging of Alice's personal identity, and the permanence of knowledge (Deleuze 1990b: 3). While Identity and knowledge are embodied by proper names, which maintain a connection to substantives and adjectives, the role of pure becoming is to dissolve these substantives and adjectives.

In order to develop the concept of pure becoming Deleuze reformulates Plato's philosophy. In particular, Deleuze reconstructs Plato's concept of the simulacrum. We will begin by looking at Deleuze's overturning of Platonism, before we explain the relationship between pure becoming and the simulacrum.[93] The overturning of Platonism is important in terms of the task of advancing a conception of difference that is not based on identity. As Smith explains, the problem addressed by Plato was how to distinguish between the true claimant from its false rivals (in the context of Athenian democracy, but this problem also applies to the claims made by philosophers) (2012: 5-6). The solution is found in the concept of the Idea - as a foundation from which different claims can be judged. The Idea is a pure quality that is shared by the claimants (to a lesser degree), or not at all (as in the case of the simulacrum) (2012: 8-9). The simulacrum can be defined as: '…false claimants, built in a dissimilarity and implying an essential perversion or deviation from the Idea' (2011: 11). However, it is important to highlight that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, it calls into question Plato's model of the idea and the copy itself (Deleuze 1994: xx, Deleuze 1990b: 2). This is the case because simulacrum elude the order of Ideas (Smith 2012: 12). Nonetheless, the problem of Plato is that he defined the simulacrum in negative terms, by subordinating them to the copy. Therefore, Deleuze's reversal of Platonism requires the affirmation of simulacrum. According to Smith (2012: 12-16), there are three characteristics of Deleuze's version of the concept. First, the simulacrum are defined as an image without resemblance, which means that it simulates the effects of identity but this is an external effect (an optical effect); this can be understood in opposition to the copy as an image with resemblance. Second, for the simulacrum to be an image without resemblance, the Idea has to no longer be made of identity but of difference. Identity then becomes an external effect of internal difference.

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[93] For an excellent explanation of Deleuze's overturning of Platonism, which was used in this chapter see Smith (2012: 3-26).

Lastly, the simulacrum can only appear as a problem which forces us to think. However, the answer is no longer true or false since there is no longer a hierarchy based on resemblance (resemblance is now only an effect of difference).

Deleuze's reformulation of Platonism is connected to three concepts that are relevant for this project: immanence, thought and ethics. We can begin by looking at the first concept - immanence. As Smith explains, Deleuze criticises Plato's appeal to transcendence, and reformulates it in order to develop his own philosophy of immanence (2012: 17). This is achieved by replacing transcendental Ideas, which are based on identity, with Ideas that are immanent to the simulacrum through the concept of internal difference. This is related to Kant, who denounced the illusion of assigning ideas to a transcendent object, but was unable to complete the project of an immanent conception of Ideas (2012: 16-17). For Deleuze, Ideas are immanent to experience as a problem that constitutes things but cannot be reduced to them. It is important to clarify that determining a problem is not a question of essence (a 'what is..?' type of question). A problem is determined by questions that require a particular (as opposed to a universal) answer such as: 'who?', 'how?', 'where?', 'how many?' (2012: 21). This immanent theory of Ideas can also be understood as Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, which we have explained before in relation to Deleuze's reformulation of Kant. We can now move to the second concept - thought. As Smith explains, Plato introduced time into thought. However, Plato's conception of thought is tied to identity through the return to a mythical present where the Idea has already been observed, and can be repeated in the future. In opposition to this, for Deleuze thought is about difference. This implies that there is no first term to be repeated, but there is difference between every repeated term as they differentiate each other (Smith 2012: 22-23). Smith refers to Deleuze's *Proust and Signs* to give an example of this: 'In Proust's novel *In Search of Lost Time,* the hero's various loves (for Gilberte, Mme. de Guermantes, Albertine) indeed form a series in which each successive love adds its minor differences and contrasting relations to the preceding loves' (2012: 22). Furthermore, there is no original term to be repeated (the mother). So difference is not subordinated to the identity of the first term, difference happens from one term to another (this is the clothed type of repetition that we mentioned in chapter 4 on Deleuze's philosophy of time - the repetition associated with the second synthesis of time). Lastly, Deleuze replaces Plato's concept of selection (which is associated with morality), with an ethical mode of selection. While Plato's problem is to come up with criteria to distinguish between the simulacrum and the copy in relation to a transcendent Idea, for Deleuze, selection is about evaluating different modes of existence that depend on an internal difference (between activity and passivity) (Smith 2012: 24). In other words, while morality judges according to *external* values (Ideas), ethics evaluates in terms of *internal* modes of existence.

Now that Deleuze's reformulation of Plato has been explained, we can look at the relationship between pure becoming and the simulacrum. As Williams explains: 'Like the time of pure becoming, the simulacrum avoids the control of the ideal measure as set by common and good sense. It therefore also avoids the rule of judgement through the model and its copies' (2011: 141). In other words, Deleuze's reversal of Platonism frees the simulacrum and pure

becoming from the identity of the Idea (the Idea is now made of difference). The implication of this is that becoming can escape the rules of common sense and good sense in the actual (which allow for judgement), since there is no right or wrong direction in relation to the Idea. While the actualisation of Ideas can create order, this order can also be dissolved by the becoming-mad of pure becoming. The reason for this is the problematic nature of Ideas, if there is no final answer to questions, the order can be undone. As Williams summarises: 'Simulacra then complete pure becoming by providing a way of allowing difference into actual series, into Alice as actual series, but out of reach of common and good sense' (2011: 142). The implication for action is the following: '…any decision in the present is subject to the madness of not knowing the right answer' (ibid). This is also connected to the paradox of infinite identity, which implies that all the ways of becoming are equivalent - in terms of all being an answer to the question 'which way?' (since Deleuze's overturning of Platonism means there is no hierarchy of becoming). However, the question 'which one?' Is replaced with the question 'how much?'. In Williams' words:

> 'Instead of a moral mode of thinking based on exclusive options indicated by the question 'Which one?', we therefore have a challenge of infinite mixtures and degrees, and the problem becomes 'Each one to which degree?' This is a practical question in relation to ways of becoming viewed as singular and incomparable, yet also as interlinked in relation to any action' (Williams 2011: 143)

As we can see, the concept of morality is reformulated by Williams. It is not about prescriptive rules that can guide us through different courses of action in terms of right or wrong. Instead, Williams draws principles from Deleuze's philosophy of time, which he characterises as an individual art of living based on questions of dosage: 'how much of this can this body bear?' (ibid). However, as Williams clarifies, this should not be understood as an individualist form of action where there is no collective responsibility; nor as a dangerous experimentation with limits, guided by the quest of the maximisation of desire. Deleuze's philosophy is not individualist because, as already mentioned, the individual is lost in pure becoming. In the language of *The Logic of Sense*, the consequence of the paradoxes of pure becoming (which states that becoming eludes the present) (Deleuze 1990b: 2), and the paradox of infinite identity (which states the equivalence of becomings), are 'the contesting of Alice's personal identity and the loss of her proper name' (Deleuze 1990b: 3). This also challenges the permanence of knowledge, since, in Williams' words: '…each moral situation is singular and resistant to general knowledge' (2011: 144). Secondly, Deleuze's philosophy of time is not individualistic because, as already mentioned, the processes of becoming are all connected in the time of Aion. All actual beings participate and express pure becoming from a particular perspective (Williams 2011: 145). In the language of *Difference and Repetition,* each life replays the past at a different level of contraction (Deleuze 1994: 83). Additionally, in the present, bodies affect and are affected by their relations with other bodies; which in turn has an effect in the time of Aion. Therefore, 'Far from defending a

philosophy based on individual desires and self-protection, his position stresses the connectedness of individual to the world, of worlds to other worlds and of evens to all other events' (Williams 2008a: 150). The weakness of Deleuze's philosophy, according to Williams, is more likely to be the incapacity to differentiate, and not the falling into individualism (ibid). As mentioned in chapter three, in *Difference and Repetition,* Deleuze argues that univocity signifies the equality of being, since all beings participate in being: 'none of them participates more or less in being, nor receives it by analogy' (Deleuze 1994: 37). In the language of Deleuze's philosophy of time in *The Logic of Sense*: '…the philosopher and the pig, the criminal and the saint, played out the same past at different levels of a gigantic cone' (1990b: 83); each choosing their pitch or tone but the tune remains the same (Deleuze 1990b: 83-84). Thereby, the only difference is in terms of internal modes of existence as the power to affect and be affected. This does not necessarily lead to a dangerous experimentation with limits. The point is to highlight both sides of the process: 'the antidote to the focal wound is in the pure becoming. The antidote to the pure becoming is in the physical actual body' (Williams 2011: 144).

Counter-actualisation

In order to expand on the relationship between the pure becoming of the event and the actual body we need to turn to the concept of counter-actualisation. We know that events are actualised, or expressed, in the present in individual bodies and states of affairs - this is the process of actualisation (static genesis). On the other hand, there is also the side of the event that side-steps the present, dividing it into past and future - this is the process of counter-actualisation (dynamic genesis) (Deleuze 1990b: 151). In the 'Twenty-First Series of the Event', Deleuze distinguishes these two sides of the event as that which is actualised or accomplished; and 'the part of the event which cannot realize its accomplishment' (1990b: 152). The unaccomplished side can be understood as the potential or excess that can be expressed in the actual world, without exhausting itself (hence why it is never fully accomplished). The role of counter-actualisation is to redouble the actualisation of the event in its own way (1990b: 150). It involves not allowing the event to be actualised without enacting it (1990b: 152). In other words, there is a doubling that moves beyond actualisation, with the help of the unaccomplished potential (1990b: 212). Deleuze argues that this is where freedom lies, not as independence from the world, but as the potential to transmute the event. Now it is important to clarify that the act of counter-actualisation splits the event into two sides: the physical and the ideal (Williams 2008a: 156). The physical side of the event is condensed in the present and includes the whole of the past and the future. Then, when we talk about counter-actualisation, it does not mean denying the event in the present. The point is to select something in the present to be redoubled. This task relies on the other side of the event, the ideal side, where there can be a change in the ideas and intensities associated with the event (independently from the present). However, it is important to not see these two sides of the event as independent from one another. Even when Deleuze is talking about one side of the event, we need to keep in mind its relation to the other side. As already

mentioned, Williams explains the relationship between the two times as one where each time is complete on its own terms, but relies on the other for further determination (2011: 150).

The concept of counter-actualisation is also connected to the concept of thought and the phantasm. The short explanation of this is that the phantasm changes the sense of actions and passions (from the actual to the virtual, and to the actual again). In the 'Thirtieth Series of the Phantasm', Deleuze delineates three characteristics of the phantasm. First, it is an effect of action and passion. As an effect, it differs in nature from its cause (the realm of bodies and states of affairs); and it holds the power of counter-actualisation (Deleuze 1990b: 210-211). Secondly: 'it is the chance-driven movement where the ego opens onto novel impersonal and pre-individual intensities' (Williams 2008a: 188). Thirdly, the transformation of the phantasm is expressed in the infinitive form of the verb, which is undetermined but determinable (Deleuze 1990: 214-115). Now, we still have to clarify how is the phantasm related to thought? In order to start answering this question we can look at the topology of the phantasm. It works at the surface, and covers the distance between consciousness and the unconscious (Deleuze 1990b: 217).[94] However, as Williams clarifies, the role of the phantasm is not create a conscious or unconscious representation of what happens to us (2008a: 188). Its role is to transform the sense of actions and passions: 'We can use some symbols generated by our actions and passions, yet others are reworked independent of consciousness and return differently, changing not only our relation to the chains of symbols, but also our relation to the ones we selected for conscious manipulation' (2008a: 188). This is achieved through the disengagement of the infinite verb from things, bodies and states of affairs (Deleuze 1990b: 221). The phantasm then, recovers the power of the pure event and it is able to duplicate its actualisation in a counter-actualisation. This is connected to the process of thought because thinking incorporates infinitives through phantasms at different degrees of activity and passivity (Williams 2008a: 189). This is also related to actions because, for example: 'When we fantasise a murder, begin to plan it, or even when we arrive at the semi-autonomous physical accomplishment of what began with a phantasm, our thoughts take their place in a series of processes underway consciously and unconsciously long before any accomplishment' (ibid). As mentioned in chapter five, the link between unconscious thoughts and actions implies that good intentions do not necessarily translate into good outcomes. Furthermore, good intentions might experience a change of sense after the action. For example, the sense of a lie 'to protect' someone's feelings might change after the person stops trusting us - moving from 'to protect' to 'to deceit' (Williams 2008a: 190). Lastly, the phantasm is connected to the moral task of the separation of verbs and actions from actual wounds (counter-actualisation) in order to be worthy of the event (2008a: 192). In Williams' words: 'Thought has to replay physical events in order to draw out their potential to be minimised in the present as passions, that is as negativity, but maximised in the past and future as activities, as novel and intense connections to multiple turning points and infinitives' (2008a: 193). The example of this process (mentioned in chapter five) is the question: 'Will I Marry Albertine?' - where the infinitive 'to marry'

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[94] This can be understood in opposition to the simulacrum as an object of depth, and the idol an object of heights (Deleuze 1990: 216).

can be connected in a creative manner to other infinitives outside the rules of actuality (2008a: 191-192). In other words, marriage can take many forms beyond what is traditionally associated with it. The role of the phantasm, here, is to transform the traditional image of marriage.

However, the process of counter-actualisation is not only about thought since '… the event is *properly* inscribed in the flesh and in the body…' (Deleuze 1990b: 221-222). A helpful way to approach these two sides of counter-actualisation (thought and the body) is provided by Lawlor (2022). The argument is that counter-actualisation has several meanings that can be divided into two: thinking the event (state of mind), and living the event (bodily action) (2022: 114). These two sides of counter-actualisation lead to its ultimate sense, which is the affirmation of the univocity of being. As mentioned in chapter three, univocity can be understood in opposition to analogical conceptions of being, where beings are related to a higher Being through a common measure. In opposition to this, according to univocity being is said in one and the same sense of everything (Deleuze 1990b: 179). Now before exploring these two sides of counter-actualisation of the event we have to remember two points about univocity mentioned in chapter 3. First, the point that being can be said of all beings equally does not mean that all beings are the same, since '… things reside unequally in this equal being' (Deleuze 1994: 37). As Lawlor explains: 'being belongs to them [beings]; it revolves around the beings, allowing them to take their power to the nth degree' (2022: 115). So while all beings participate in being, we have different capacities to affect and be affected, which are constantly changing, and this is what differentiates us from each other. Second, the affirmation of univocity challenges the mind and body dualism, which implies the hierarchy of the mind over the body. The dualism is challenged because there can be no hierarchies of being according to univocity. The body and the mind, or in the language of Spinoza thought and extension, are equal attributes of being.

Now we can return to Lawlor's work and his explanation of the two sides of the event, starting with thought and then moving on to the body. As Lawlor explains, the first meaning of counter-actualisation involves the work of grasping what happens to us as an event (2022: 120). This can be understood in opposition to resentment against the event: grasping the event as '...unjust and unwarranted (it is always someone else's fault)' (Deleuze 1990b: 149). Resentment is connected to morality: 'grasping what happens to us according to moral notions' (Lawlor 2022: 120); and to judgement: judging what happens to us by means of the present. To be more precise: 'what happens to us is judged by means of the present that I am occupying; the accident is then made relative to me: "I did not deserve this"' (ibid); or by means of a divine present where there is justice. This *relative* mode of understanding events - either in terms of my present or a cosmic present - is associated with Chronos. The other option is grasping the event in terms of Aion, which is *absolute*. Lawlor argues that the absolute mode of understanding prevents judgements, since there is no longer a divine present based on justice from which we can compare what happens to us. Furthermore, Aion has no telos, which means it does not measure events in terms of a determinate present, something fixed, or an equilibrium point. In Lawlor's words: '...understanding and grasping what happens to us in relation to unlimited Aion, as un-measured and judged, we free ourselves from the feeling of resentment' (2022: 120). Now, even though

Deleuze does not describe what this non-resentful feeling entails, Lawlor argues that we can understand it as Deleuze's reinterpretation of beatitude in Spinoza (2022: 121). According to lecture 7 in 'Spinoza: the Velocity of Thought', this implies realising 'your power of action in such a way that this power of action increases to the maximum' (January 20, 1981).[95] Therefore, the first meaning of counter-actualisation is beatitude against resentment. The second meaning of counter-actualisation involves disengaging the event's sense from its actual occurrence (2022: 121). This is connected to the first meaning because not grasping the event in terms of a judgement or signification paves the way for a change of sense in the event (as different relations of infinitives). This process has already been explained in relation to the phantasm in chapter 5 (the example given was transformation of the meaning of marriage). However, Lawlor clarifies a few key points about this process. First, it is important to emphasise that sense differs in nature from its corporeal actualisation. Nevertheless, this distinction is fragile: '...sense can always collapse into the occurrence which produced it' (2022: 121). According to Lawlor, this can be avoided by attaching sense to a quasi-cause. The quasi-cause can be understood as an empty form, which is completely undetermined, and can also be expressed as a question. This question is '…indeterminate, unanswerable and eternally open or empty' (2022: 122). So we can attach sense to an open question in order to disengage it from its actual occurrence. These type of question affirms all possible answers, and denounces final answers. While it is careless to think of an answer as final, we take care of sense by being aware of its openness. Taking care of sense is therefore the second meaning of counter-actualisation (2022: 123).

Now we can move to the bodily side of the counter-actualisation of the event since, as Lawlor explains: '*Not only must one think and say the event, one must also be it and live it*' (2022: 123, emphasis in original). This is where the figure of the actor becomes important: the actor redoubles the physical actualisation of the event in their own way (Deleuze 1990b: 150). The role of the actor can be distinguished from performing a character, since the character is '…always and only one self-same role…' (Lawlor 2022: 123). To the contrary, the actor performs a multiplicity of roles; and like the mime, he performs something that is not fully present. This something is incessant hoping and remembering, as opposed to one hope and one memory (2022: 124). Therefore, the third sense of counter-actualisation is 'the embodiment of plural hopings and rememberings "against" (*contra*) the embodiment of one hope and one memory. One constantly hopes for more futures and one constantly remembers more pasts' (2022: 124). However, it is important to highlight the risk of the embodiment of the event. Sense is caused by corporeal mixtures, when the bottom rises to the surface producing a wound. This could lead to death. There are two types of death: personal (my death) and impersonal (the death of others). While there are small and unnoticeable wounds by the passing of time that are connected to the

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[95] For an explanation of beatitude Lawlor refers us to Deleuze (1990a, 2001), and Hélène Frichot (2009). Furthermore, Deleuze mentions the concept in several lectures in 'Spinoza: the Velocity of Thought'. The definition used in this chapter is from lecture 7 (January 20, 1981), but it is really similar to the definition provided by Frichot: 'Beatitude is the mode of being in which one achieves the maximum of active power or force of existing, and the minimum of reactive passions' (2009: 247).

death of others - as the background destruction of living forms (impersonal death); there are also big pronounced blows that come from other bodies, such as a failed marriage (personal death). These two are associated through the use of alcohol, madness and suicide. The bringing together of the two sides of death (the personal and the impersonal) can be understood as the full actualisation of the event (death or suicide). So the point is to avoid the full actualisation of the event in our bodies: 'if I can avoid the full actualization of the event in my body, the embodiment of the event amounts to being only "a little alcoholic, a little crazy … just enough to extend the crack but not enough to deepen it irremediably"' (Lawlor 2022: 125, Deleuze 1990b: 157-158). Therefore, the fourth sense of counter-actualisation is a matter of dosage: just enough embodiment, as opposed to full embodiment.

To sum up the first four steps of counter-actualisation: there is an encounter, which means the bottom rises to the surface. Then there is a test: 'either select something in the accident or select the accident itself' (Lawlor 2022: 125). Selecting the event in the accident paves the way for the several senses of counter-actualisation. The first sense is beatitude against resentment, which means understanding the event in terms of the openness of Aion (as only difference returns). Secondly, caring for the sense of the event, which means denouncing any attempt to provide a final answer to what happens to us, in favour of an unlimited number of answers. Now we are moving from thought to the physical incarnation of the event by the actor, who plays many roles at once, as opposed to the same character. Thus, the third meaning of counter-actualisation is multiple hopings and rememberings, against one hope and one memory. The risk that needs to be avoided here is confusing sense with its actualisation in bodies (through the wound). The most extreme example of this is suicide. This leads us to the fourth sense of counter-actualisation, which is being able to have just enough embodiment (avoiding death).

Lastly, this brings us to the ultimate meaning of counter-actualisation, which is connected to univocity as the universal communication of events (Lawlor 2022: 126-127). For this to happen we need to understand ourselves (individuals) as an event, which leads to the understanding of other individuals as events. Lawlor divides this process into a few steps. First, the grasping of myself as an event implies that I understand myself as an open unanswerable question, as opposed to an identity. The consequence of this is the liberation from my determinate spatio-temporal determinations. Second, by grasping myself as an event, I understand my event as another individual grafted onto me, which constantly generates something new. This allows me to see all other individuals as events. There is a relation of sameness and difference to other individuals, sameness in terms of the grasping to events, but difference in terms of perspective. The relation of sameness allows me to also see other individuals as unanswerable questions, liberating them from their spatio-temporal determinations. Lastly, if I understand myself and other individuals as many possible answers to questions, then all individuals communicate universally in the following way: each individual has the same form, that of the unlimited question (Lawlor 2022: 128). This unlimited question is the event. The implication of this is that 'we must see (and treat) others, since they share one form, as compatible with one another' (ibid). This is connected to univocity because being is said in one and the same sense of everything (Deleuze 1990: 177) - as a question (the same form). However, this question is empty, it has no identity, so beings can

affirm their difference by answering the question of being in different manners without ever providing a final answer. As already mentioned, univocity is a doctrine of equality: 'all beings are equal in their differences' (Lawlor 2022: 22). Lawlor sees the ethics of univocity as a positive completion of Deleuze's reversal of Platonism. In particular, the completion of the project of the demoralisation of being, since there are no more hierarchies based on the relationship between copies and simulacrum, and between copies and the Idea. The positive side of this project is the liberation of being in order for beings to exercise their power and push to the limit of what the mind and body can do. However, this is also connected to the experience of powerlessness, when the encounter forces us to think and act. Lawlor's work on counter-actualisation is important for this project because of his affirmation of the power of both the mind and the body, which is necessary to avoid the mind and body dualism (this will be explained in more detail in chapter 8). Second, Lawlor highlights the importance of not only understanding ourselves as events, but also seeing all individuals as such, which helps avoid individualism through the universal communication of events. Third, the ethics of the univocity of being affirms equality, while celebrating difference. This is important to address gender (and other types of) inequality, without erasing the difference between women. Fourth, counteractualisation affirms the empowerment of beings by increasing our power to act, and decreasing resentment. This is necessary for feminism as a positive project, and not merely a reactive project.

How to act?

We are now able to start answering the question of how to act given Deleuze's philosophy of time. Before we start, there are three clarifications that need to be made. First, it is important to note that these are not universal moral prescriptions which would provide us with a simple guide for action. The reason for this is the recognition that every body and every situation is different. So what works for one body today might not work tomorrow, or might not work for other bodies. Secondly, these principles are not individualistic principles - they involve our relations with others (Williams 2008a: 167). Thirdly, it is necessary to provide a reminder of the terminology that is being used. Williams (2011) calls these principles morality, although as already mentioned the concept has been reformulated to the art of living (which has been referred to as ethics in this project); and Lawlor calls this an ethics of the univocity of being, and an ethics of intensive quantities. Now, to answer the question, since becoming has been freed from the concepts of common sense and good sense, the question of how to act moves away from the prohibition of actions based on moral codes, and becomes a matter of dosage: 'how much of this can this body bear?' (Williams 2011: 143). Lawlor (2022) refers to this as avoiding the full actualisation of the event in our particular bodies (suicide). So while Deleuze does encourage to push the limit of what our bodies and minds can do, this should not lead to the maximisation of desire without regard for life. The problem of suicide and death are not overlooked by Deleuze; and suicide is not an outcome that we should simply accept, or resign ourselves to (Deleuze 1990b: 149). As Lawlor (2022: 126) argues, counter-actualisation is against suicide, even though there are no particular rules that tell us how to avoid it. Additionally, affirmation should not happen at the expense of other bodies. Both Williams and Lawlor highlight the importance of the care for others. Lawlor

(2022) by emphasising the point that each individual is an event, who is also undergoing a process of transformation (just as ourselves). Williams through the awareness that the world is made of multiple bodies (causes) as perspectives that include others in their contraction of the present (Williams 2011: 151). So the question is: 'How have you included others in your present?', and 'Whom have you excluded?' (Williams 2011: 157). This implies that we are always transforming each other: 'When we act according to our durations we transform those we include within them, as we are included in those of others' (ibid). However, this also means that we can hurt each other through our actions. The individual's capacity of transformation, of affecting and being affected by others, is at the heart of Deleuze's ethics. There is no fixed subject as a base for moral action. As Williams explains: 'Any act is active in relation to some durations and passive in relation to others' (ibid). Therefore, actors are possible but incomplete (Williams 2008a: 163). This is connected to a reformulation of freedom - we are free not because we are independent or self-sufficient beings (since we are also passive and we are affected by others), we are free because we can replay the past differently.

This brings us to the question of how to act in response to Aion. This question is important because while we interact with other bodies in the present (hence the importance to taking care of ourselves and of others), the present is always a passing moment (Lawlor 2020: 110). For this reason, both Williams and Lawlor stress the need to move beyond the present wound, and the present understanding of time in terms of Chronos (and the first synthesis of time), which leads to resentment. The present of Aion is the present where actors redouble what came before, and refuse to believe in a final subversion of the series (Williams 2008a: 174). This is how we communicate with the past and the future from the present: through our attempt to replay differently (Williams 2011: 153). The whole of the past is changed as it is contracted by the passing present, and it only returns as difference, and the future remains open. All individuals participate in this process from their particular perspectives (univocity). This activity is also what connects us to others: 'It is because the infinitive can be expressed differently that we connect though the multiple ways we express it' (Williams 2008a: 167). In short: we communicate though our divergences. Again, Deleuze's ethical philosophy is not a philosophy of lone individuals, but of actors within communicating series (ibid). Furthermore, as Lawlor (2020) shows, the others are also important due to their expression of multiple worlds. While sometimes we try to explicate others too much to the point of the subordination of their difference to representation, others can also lead us to affirm groundlessness through a transformation. This is the case when we do not explicate each other too much, which means that we affirm each other's difference. To sum up, living is about following as many lines of becoming in different dosages as possible; and allowing others to do the same. It is about taking care of ourselves (avoiding suicide) and taking care of others. It is about moving beyond the present present, redoubling the past presents, for the presents to come.

Is there a hierarchy between Chronos and Aion?

Deleuze's focus on Aion as the time of potential for counter-actualisation has been interpreted as the positioning of a hierarchy between Aion and Chronos, with Aion on top. This is Jack Reynolds'

(2007 and 2008) argument. While he recognises that there is a double causality between Aion and Chronos, contra Hallward (2006), Reynolds contends that Deleuze devalues the ordinary causality of Chronos, bodies, and states of affairs. In terms of ethics, the consequence of this is that Chronos is insufficient for an ethics (2007: 156). The reason for this, according to Reynolds' reading, is that Aion is the condition for the event. This is then interpreted as a normative stand (2007: 152), which is embodied in the normative principle of counter-actualisation (2007: 156). Now there are a few consequences of this alleged prioritisation of Aion. First, Reynolds argues that one is encouraged to 'become offspring of one's event, not of one's actions' (2007: 154); and to reject one's emotions and passions (ibid). Second, Reynolds asserts that it is not clear if the fault-line that traverses us can be distinctive for us, or if it should be understood as one transcendental wound. Third, the prioritisation of the potentialities of the virtual means that inscribing the event in one's flesh is not a key aspect of Deleuze's ethics. Fourth, this ethics is read as an ethics of the virtual, which is problematic for the following reason: 'How can an ethics be based on time, and on the aspect of an event that never actually occurs but is understood as something within that which occurs, and which is also said to be both always already passed and yet to come?' (2007: 155). Before we respond to these claims, it is important to clarify that Reynolds is not the only commentator that has accused Deleuze of prioritising the virtual over the actual. Hallward (2006: 2) claims that virtual creating is placed above worldly creatures; and that the point of creatures is to evacuate the actual - this is the only route for creation since 'creatures get in the way of creation' (2006: 55). The consequence of this is that Deleuze's is indifferent to the politics of this world (2006: 162). Badiou, on the other hand, argues that virtual Being is placed above actual being, since the actual is grounded by the virtual (1999: 42). However, in this chapter we are manly focusing on Reynolds' critique of Deleuze because he focuses on the ethical implications of Deleuze's ontology, which are relevant for us.[96]

Williams responds to Reynolds (and the others) in no uncertain terms: 'Reynolds, Hallward, Badiou… all want to pretend that the virtual wants to flee the actual. It can't. It does not want to' (2008b: 98). For Williams, it is strange to talk about priority as placing value on one term, since there is a necessary relation between the virtual and the actual: 'what does it mean to prioritise something when it is in a necessary relation to other things that its effectuation is completely dependent on?' (ibid). The answer is that priority means the difference between interrelated processes, not the superiority of one process over the other. Williams expands on this argument in his *Critical Introduction* to *The Logic of Sense*, where he argues that primary and secondary processes are defined as such in terms of their imperviousness to passing away (2008a :195). As already mentioned, secondary organisation (from virtual to the actual) has no permanence and is engulfed by the primary order (from actual to the virtual). In simple terms, it is the virtual side which returns eternally as difference, hence its primary status. What changes is sense - the

[96] For a response to Badiou see Roffe (2012). For a response to Hallward see Gilson (2009) and Protevi's (2007) reviews. Furthermore, Gilson (2011) also responds to Hallward by arguing that Deleuze's ethics is responsive to the socio-historical context and others (we will explore this more in detail in the conclusion). Kerslake (2009) situates Deleuze in the post-Kantian tradition, against Hallward's claim that Deleuze is a pre-Kantian metaphysician.

relations of infinitives of events. As Williams notes, this is a type of genetic function 'that allows for novelty without having to posit it on an inevitably violent production of the event *ex nihilo*' (2008b: 98). There is a change of identities in the actual, while leaving sense open for further transformations by preserving the distance between sense and its expression (2008b: 99). This brings us to the concept of intensity (surface), which as Williams points out dualist interpretations of Deleuze overlook (ibid). Intensity works both in the actual and the virtual - it transforms both realms. The surface is shared by virtual and the actual. Counter-actualisation involves actual experimentation on intensity, which feeds to intensity in the virtual, and back to the actual (it is important to note that intensity works differently in each realm). Deleuze does not reject or disparage the actual, since any action happens in the actual. In Williams' words: *'every practice is actual, the practice is necessarily experimental, it never arrives at a goal, it is not directed towards the virtual or towards sense, and it is directed towards a clinical and critical affirmation of our actual lives and shared communication through events'* (Williams 2008b: 99, emphasis in original). Furthermore, Williams also notes that 'no given practice can be a secure blueprint for another' (ibid), hence the need for experimentation, since we cannot always predict the outcome of our actions. The change of sense of actual wounds is not done for the virtual, it is done to enrich the actual, and allow us to move on, to create new meanings and form new relations.

Now that we have addressed the issue of virtual priority in general, we can respond to Reynolds points.[97] First, Reynolds claims that Chronos is insufficient for an ethics (2007: 156). However, given the relation of reciprocal determination between both times, Aion is insufficient for an ethics too. As already mentioned, without Chronos there would be no determinate expression of Aion, and there would be no selection of the event for counter-actualisation. On the other hand, without Aion the present would not pass, and there would be no return of difference. This means that we need both realms for ethics. As already mentioned, in terms of Chronos ethics involves the relationship between bodies; and in terms of Aion, it involves the passing of the present and embracing the return of difference and the open future. Second, Reynolds (2007: 154) contends that the only possibility for Deleuze is to 'become offspring of one's event, not of one's actions'. Hallward makes a similar argument by saying that only the virtual is active in creating, while the actual is passive (2006: 30). However, this does not take into account that one can be both active and passive in the present. Deleuze's point is not to deny activity, but to recognise that active processes rely on processes that are outside of our control. Furthermore, becoming the offspring of one's event involves an active selection in the present, where we replay the past differently, although we do not fully control the process, nor the outcomes of our actions.[98] Although Deleuze

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[97] In the section on Reynolds above we listed four main points in total, which will be broken into more points here in order to respond to them in detail.

[98] Active means selecting and introducing novel differences, this does not have to be a conscious choice, although it could be (but it could have unforeseen consequences) (Williams 2011: 90). Williams explains this further in the following quote (in the language of *The Logic os Sense*): 'Selection means the emergence of transformed and connected series, not the deliberate choice of one series or another' (2011: 5).

does undermine the idea of an independent subject based on identity as the ground for moral action, this does not mean that the subject is fully passive. Now, we still have to deal with the problem of creativity more in depth (this will be done in the next chapter). However, for now we can say that: 'a creature is not the passive substratum or medium through which an active force of creation operates' (Gilson 2009: 432). Third, according to Reynolds (2007: 154), becoming the offspring of one's event implies that we cannot become the offspring of one's emotions or passions, nor we can intensify them. To respond to this we need to look at Deleuze's construction of time. As Williams (2011: 134-135) argues, Deleuze's philosophy of time is not a neutral theory of time, where each instant is equal to any other. There is no single line of time that can be divided in equal parts. Deleuze's philosophy is capable of expressing the singularity of events. The change of sense (as different relations of infinitives) includes the variations of value and emotional significance of the present (2011: 72). For example, a present that used to be high in significance can become less significant in the future. Moreover, the change of sense includes infinitive verbs such as 'to love' and 'to hate', which are expressed in a singular manner by different individuals (Williams 2008a: 167). So it is unclear why Deleuze would reject emotions or passions, as Reynolds alleges. Deleuze does advocate for the minimisation of the physical wound. However this involves a change of intensity of sense, which leads to a different embodiment of emotions. The point is to express as many infinitives as distinctly as we can, at the highest intensity (Williams 2008a: 171). Therefore, Williams argues that Deleuze's philosophy involves a balancing act in terms of intensity and inclusion, without leading to self-destruction. The acknowledgement of the passing of time does not mean the renunciation of the present, but the affirmation of a present that doubles and replays differently. Fourth, Reynolds (2007: 154) argues that since we are all transversed by a kind of virtual fault line, it is unclear how it can be distinctive for each of us. While Deleuze does make the claim that wounds exist before us - as an impersonal and pre-individual form before we embody them (Deleuze 1990b: 148), this does not mean that all wounds are the same. The wound (as an event) is expressed in bodies in a singular manner. The actor keeps only the contour of the event and counter-actualises in its own way (Deleuze 1990b: 150). The point is not to deny, blame or ignore the wound, but to reinvent it by altering its sense (Williams 2008a: 155). In Williams' words: 'creation cannot negate what occurs, but it can put it in touch with a source of values running counter to its suffering and injuries' (ibid). This in turn changes the intensity of relations between the present, the past and the future (2008a: 156), since later actions (in the present) can change the value of earlier ones (2008a: 161). However, as Williams explains: 'We can only counter or redouble events through the past and the future, *the whole of the past and the future*, since in the present they are already happening' (2008a: 158). So we have a side of the wound which has happened, is happening, and will have happened (Chronos); and on the other side, we can change the sense of the event and make it independent from its present occurrence (Aion). The actor is caught in between these two sides of the wound. We can tap into its structure without being independent from it. In simple terms, we cannot escape the process of determination, but we can select within it experimentally (Williams 2008a: 157). An important part of the process of selection is to make the wound individual: '…the physical wounds, the meanings and the ides in the act should be made as individual as possible

rather than mixed and confused with others' (Williams 2008a: 149). Fifth, Reynolds (2007: 154) maintains that while inscribing the event in one's flesh is necessary, it is not a key aspect of Deleuze's ethics. However, as Lawlor (2022) argues, the the inscription of the event in one's body, and the preservation of the difference of sense from corporeal causes, are both necessary principles of counter-actualisation. In fact, we cannot have the first two senses of counter-actualisation - beatitude against resentment, and caring for the sense of the event - without the body, since we must be and live the event (alongside thinking it). However, we have to be aware of the most extreme risk of actualising the event in one's body - suicide. Hence the need to take care of the sense of the event, which allows us to move away from the presentist mode of thinking. Again, this does not mean that we reject the present, but there needs to be a balance between the two sides of the wound (the physical and the ideal). Lastly, we still need to answer the following question: 'How can an ethics be based on time, and on the aspect of an event that never actually occurs but is understood as something within that which occurs, and which is also said to be both always already passed and yet to come?' (Reynolds 2007: 155). First of all, we know that ethics is not completely based on the time of Aion, since there is a relationship of reciprocal determination between the two times. Secondly, the appeal to the already passed and the yet to come makes more sense if we accept that the present is always already passing, so it is hard to use it as a stable foundation for ethics.

Between corporeal and incorporeal love

In order to show the need to move beyond the actual without escaping the world we can look at Chantelle Gray's (2018) paper 'Love at the Limits: Between the Corporeal and the Incorporeal'. The aim of this paper is to address one of the limitations of materialism(s), which is its inability to account for immaterial events (such as space and time).[99] In particular, Gray asks: 'How can we account for the immaterial space and time tracings of love without negating the material in the process?' (2018: 469). This is relevant for us because, following *The Logic of Sense*, Gray shows that an ontology of love is both corporeal and incorporeal. To be more precise, Gray works at the border between the subjective and the asubjective, the corporeal and the incorporeal (2018: 465). The fight is against common sense conceptions of love, which are easy to market and based on the couple (2018: 471); despotic love, which is based on subjectification, possession and power (2018: 472); the bureaucratisation of love, which is normative, prescriptive and proscriptive; and cynical love: 'Cynicism has said, or claimed to have said, everything there is to say about love: that it is a matter of a copulation of social and organic machines on a large scale (at bottom, love is in the organs; at bottom, love is a matter of economic determinations, money)' (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 292). To combat these types of love, Deleuze and Guattari propose becoming-woman: 'as one way of deterritorialising conventional, normative, and externally conditioned subjectivities' (Gray 2018: 473); which then leads to becoming-imperceptible. However, these two concepts are controversial, particularly for feminist critics of Deleuze. For example, Alice Jardine (1984) accuses Deleuze and Guattari of putting 'forth some surprisingly sterotyped genderizations

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[99] This concern is raised by Elizabeth Grosz (2017) and is taken on by Gray.

and images of women' (1984: 47); 'the female body as invented by men' (1984: 50); which has 'little to do with *women*' (1984: 52). It seems to be a similar critique to Hallward, where becoming takes us out of this world: forms and subjects are 'only kept in order to liberate floating affects' (Jardine 1984: 49); and they do away with 'any static concept of the body' (1984: 50), including the human body. However, the specific risk of this for women, according to Jardine, is that woman will disappear while man stays: 'Is it not possible that the process of "becoming woman" is but a new variation of an old allegory for the process of women becoming obsolete? There would remain only her simulacrum: a female figure caught in a whirling sea of male configurations' (1984: 54); or worse: the woman is used for the metamorphosis of man.

As Gray explains, these type of critiques emerge from the tension between the corporeal experiences of the female subject and the concept of the virtual (2018: 474). However, the problem of these readings is that they deny the materiality of flows, which are configured by assemblages. In order to combat the material structurations of love, which include the figure of men and women, we need to understand both the corporeal and incorporeal processes that constitute them. We need the unheard-of becomings like becoming-witch, which are not defined by the family, the state and the church. We practice becoming-Alice to move beyond the actualisations of love: 'beyond the binary territories of gendered sexualities which allow for narrow either/or categories' (2018: 475). Love as a war machine is not tied to such boundaries.[100] This project takes us beyond the description of other kinds of love, which are significant, but are still formalised and reproduced by existing structures. The point is that intensive phenomenon affects both material actualisations and the virtual. The transformation of the virtual involves 'perturbing causal structures which give rise to embodied ideas and experiences of sexuality and love so that the ordinary and singular points of structural arrangements are redistributed' (ibid). Therefore, the different types of intensive becomings of love (becoming-woman, becoming-witch, becoming-Alice) function at the border of the corporeal and the incorporeal, the subjective and the asubjective. Love is made possible by disjunctive synthesis, which affirms both the individual subject or body, and the dissolution of the subject. The void of becoming woman is not only virtual, since there is an asymmetrical relation between the virtual and the actual - this is also referred to as the double direction of the incorporeal (2018: 476). Each direction works in a different way: there is the material logic of the corporeal which also includes incorporeal transformations at the surface of things (incorporeal transformations are thus effects of the material) - this corresponds to the time of Chronos. On the other side, there is the ideal incorporeality of Aion (2018: 478-479). Incorporeal transformations are part of material processes which do not change bodies in a physical way - they create a change of sense. However, sense moves in two directions: from the actual to the virtual (dynamic genesis), and from the virtual to

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[100] For an explanation of the term war machine see Holland (2013). He explains that there are different meanings of the word in *A Thousand Plateaus.* The variation arises from the fact that the aim of war machines is not always war. Its objective can simply be a transformation of social relations. Another meaning of the term is constructing revolutionary connections against capitalism. This does not always involve war, the ultimate aim is to make social relations nomadic through minoritarian becomings (2013: 126-127).

the actual (static genesis). In other words, sense is both an effect and a producer (Deleuze 1990: 94-95). On one hand, sense can be understood as an effect of corporeal interactions and states of affairs (dynamic genesis); and on the other, sense has productive or genetic power (static genesis): 'it also partakes in the structural organisation of an incorporeal surface', which determine bodies and mixtures (Voss 2013b: 21). How can sense produce states of affairs and also be produced by them? This can only be the case if the two processes are different: so as already mentioned, we have sense as a result of the interaction of bodies; and sense as an expression of an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field (which generates propositions and bodies) (Voss 2013b: 19-20). Therefore, the key move is the introduction of a pre-individual and impersonal field (Deleuze 1990b: 99). Sense is therefore granted a problematic status that can be expressed in a solution with no final answer, which also alters the problem (so there is an ongoing transformation between virtual and actual - the virtual is not an unchanging ground).

This brings us to the concept of counter-actualisation. As previously explained, love has a corporeal existence through its embodiment in subjects, and the incorporeal transformations it creates (which are still material) (Gray 2018: 480). On the other hand, the counter-actualisation of love affirms the pure incorporeal side of the event. However, counter-actualisation is tied to the double direction of sense (through the intensive). The intensive helps the recomposition of the plane of immanence through the redistribution of virtual singularities on the surface. This process is also known as the crack-up (or the wound), which is connected to the undoing of the identity of the subject. However, the question we still have to answer is the following: 'If the incorporeal is the asignifying, apersonal break, where is the subject of love—the subjective break?' (2018: 480). In particular, 'where is the subjective break of the feminine subject?' (Ibid). Gray's answer is that there are two logics at work in Deleuze. The first logic relates to the body's capacity to affect and be affected, and the incorporeal transformations of these interactions (including ideological investments). The second logic adds something unconditioned, which allows for a new ethics of love: 'one which does not negate the female subject as such, but which is intensified in its becoming-imperceptible, the true eternal return that returns only which is affirmed' (Gray 2018: 483).

Conclusion

This chapter was necessary to expand on chapter 3 which was also dedicated to ethics, and to bring together the question of ethics and the question of time (which was developed in chapter 4). As mentioned in this chapter, the problem of time is that it creates disorder in the universe. The present is always passing, and the only thing that returns is difference, so there is no stable foundation for ethics. Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 4, even though time is able to account for the formation of habits and memories, which could be reduced to identity and order, the third synthesis of time undoes the work of the first two syntheses and refuels them by introducing pure difference and the undetermined into the system. So we need an ethics that is appropriate to the disparate essence of time (Lawlor 2020). In chapter 3, we established that ethics is about increasing our power to act, and about freeing becoming from essence. In this

chapter we expanded on this, through the concept of counter-actualisation which increases our power to act in relation to events; and the ethics of intensive difference which affirms the disparate as opposed to explicating and cancelling intensity. Furthermore, we emphasised on the problem of dosage (in terms of the different paths of becoming), and evading suicide, which helps to avoid falling into individualism and dangerous and reckless affirmation without regards for others. Lastly, we emphasised that the point of this ethics is not to flee the world but to take care of it, by opening up the space for more connections with others, and new senses of the actual.

7. The Problem of Creativity: the Virtual, the Actual, and the Intensive.

This chapter will deal with the problem of the creation of the new. This involves the relationship between the empirical and the transcendental (the actual and the virtual). We have already started developing this relation. In chapter 4 we showed how the empirical synthesis of habit is related to the transcendental synthesis of memory. In chapter 5 we dealt with the genetic conditions of thought, and the relation between static and dynamic genesis. Lastly, in chapter 6 we discussed the relationship between Chronos (the actual) and Aion (the virtual). In the three chapters it was argued that there is no priority between the actual and the virtual (and between static and dynamic genesis, in the language of chapter 5). However, given the scale of this literature debate, we still need to explore this relation and concepts in more depth. This task is further complicated by the debate surrounding the place of the intensive in relation to the virtual and actual couple (Clisby and Bowden 2017). While this might seem like an abstract philosophical debate, it has important implications for this project: can Deleuze be read as a political and a feminist thinker? Or is he indifferent to the politics of this world?

Creativity and critique

The problem of creativity lies at the heart of this project. In *Difference and Repetition,* Deleuze argues that 'the conditions of a true critique and a true creation are the same' (1994: 139). First, they both rely on the destruction of the dogmatic image of thought that limits thinking to the recognition of what we already know (the conditions of possible experience). Secondly, both creativity and critique necessitate the move towards a method of genesis that reaches the conditions of real experience, which are 'the conditions for the generation of specific phenomena' (Somers-Hall 2012: 39). This move was already explained in chapter five. However, a short summary will be provided for this chapter. As Smith (2012: 237) explains, in Kant, the transcendental conditions of possible experience are found in the categories. The categories are universal concepts 'to which all objects must conform in order to be constituted as objects' (Hughes 2009: 143). For example, causality is a category because an object would not be an object without a cause (Kant in Hughes 2009: 143-144). However, the problem of Kant is that he assumed the facts of reason, such as knowledge and morality, and he tried to find their transcendental condition of possibility (Smith 2012: 238). Therefore, tracing the transcendental from the empirical.[101] According to Maimon's critique of Kant, what is needed is a method of genesis, based on a principle of difference, which shows how facts are constituted. Smith (2012: 239-241) lists five requirements to achieve these demands. First, the conditions of real experience must account for the new. Second, the condition can not resemble the conditioned, and the transcendental field can not rely on a transcendental subject. Third, the condition cannot be

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[101] Furthermore, the transcendental structures of apprehension, reproduction and recognition were traced from empirical acts of psychological consciousness (Smith 2012: 239).

broader from what it conditions.[102] This means that the conditions are mobile, they are determined along with the condition, and the condition changes with the conditioned. Fourth, there needs to be something unconditioned that determines the condition and conditioned (in Deleuze's philosophy of time the third synthesis plays this role). Fifth, this genesis takes place between the virtual and the actual.

The virtual

Now that we have established the requirements for determining the conditions of real experience (the virtual), we need to look at a model that fulfils these requirements: calculus (Smith 2012: 241).[103] As Somers-Hall explains, calculus is important for Deleuze because it provides a way for relating two structures that are different in kind (the virtual and the actual) (2013: 141). Furthermore, calculus provides a theory of reciprocally determined relations, as opposed to relations being defined in terms of negation (2013: 133). However, before we begin looking at calculus, it is important to clarify Deleuze's project. As Smith explains, Deleuze's aim is not to develop a philosophy of mathematics (2012: 242). Deleuze describes *Difference and Repetition* as his first attempt to 'do philosophy' in his own name (1994: xv). This task involves an alliance with the arts and sciences, to respond to them, and to draw inspiration from them for the creation of concepts. According to Deleuze: 'philosophy cannot be undertaken independently of science and art' (1994: xvi). One of the aims of the book is therefore to 'constitute a philosophical concept from the mathematical function of differentiation…' (Deleuze 1994: xvi). To be more precise, this function provides Deleuze a model for the philosophical principle of difference needed for the genetic conditions of real experience (Smith 2012: 242). The problem of differentiation concerns problematic Ideas (virtual), which will find an actual solution. There are two points about Ideas that Deleuze borrows from Kant. First, Ideas are problematic because they go beyond empirical experience and cannot be known (Somers-Hall 2013: 129). Second, following Kant, Deleuze argues that Ideas are simultaneously undetermined, determinable and determined (Deleuze 1994: 171). As Somers-Hall (2013: 130-131) explains, these three moments of Ideas can be used for a genetic method that moves from the problem to a solution (from the virtual to the actual). Therefore, 'Genesis will be defined as the ongoing solution of problems' (or Ideas) (Roffe 2020: 197). Ideas are undetermined, which means they are different in kind from the actual world and cannot be represented (the conditions do not resemble de conditioned); they are determinable, meaning that they are capable of sustaining predicates; and then they are determined, which

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[102] In Deleuze's words: 'These [categories], however, are too general or too large for the real. The net is so loose that the largest fish pass through' (1994: 68).

[103] For a further explanation of Deleuze's use of calculus as the method for thinking the conditions of the new see Smith (2012: essay 14). Furthermore, Bowden (2011: chapter 3.1, and 3.2) examines Deleuze's use of calculus to reformulate Kantian problematic Ideas, and he focuses on Albert Lautman's influence on Deleuze. Somers-Hall (2012: chapter 6) provides a very clear explanation of Deleuze and calculus (the point of the chapter is to compare Hegel and Deleuze); see also Somers-Hall's (2013: chapter 4.1-4.3) clarification of Deleuze's reformulation of Kantian Ideas with the help of calculus, and the inspirations behind it.

implies that they can take actual properties (Somers-Hall 2013: 130-131). These moments are able to 'provide an account of how a problem finds expression in empirical solutions without having to understand the problem itself in empirical terms, as the Idea remains indeterminate in relation to that in which it is expressed, while nonetheless determining it' (2013: 131). However, in Kant the Idea is still understood in terms of the solution since they are thought by analogy to empirical objects (ibid).[104] In contrast to Kant, Deleuze's needs Ideas to relate intrinsically to the empirical world, while also being different in kind.

Deleuze uses calculus to reformulate the Kantian model of Ideas, and think the conditions of the real (Somers-Hall 2013: 129, Smith 2012: 242). As Somers-Hall explains: 'calculus allows us to characterize quantities whose relations to one another vary' (2012: 162). For example, we can use calculus to depict the velocity of a system in a graph, which is the distance travelled over time. If the velocity is constant the line will be straight, and any point on the line will show the same speed (2012: 163). However the problem is that velocity is not always constant, and a graph can look like a curve as opposed to a straight line.[105] The difficulty here is how to measure the velocity at any point, since at each point the slope will be different (Roffe 2020: 198). There are different approaches to solve this problem. One of them is given by internal calculus, invented by ancient Greek mathematicians, where they tried to find a measurable shape that most closely fits the unmeasurable one (see Roffe 2020: 199-200). Another approach is to draw a line parallel to a particular point of the curve, but it can only be approximate (see Somers-Hall 2012: 163). As Somers-Hall goes on, drawing a line between two points of the curve is also flawed, since we are dealing with a curve and not a line. Leibniz answer was the following:

> '...draw a line between the point whose velocity we wish to measure and another arbitrary point on the curve and then to imagine the distance between these two points decreasing toward zero. As we now have a straight line between these two points, we can treat the case in the same manner as the case of constant velocity described above, measuring the change in values of both axes along a length of the line. Thus, mathematically, we end up with two lines, one representing the change over the section in terms of distance and one in terms of time, neither of which on its own will have any determinate value, as the lines are infinitely short, but when divided, one by the other, will give a vector at the particular point' (Somers-Hall 2012: 163).

Leibniz' symbolism for these two values, also known as differentials, is dy/dx (in this case, dy represents the infinitesimal distance, and dx represents the infinitesimal time). As mentioned above, we can determine the instantaneous velocity by dividing them (Somers-Hall 2013: 133, Somers-Hall 2012: 163)). However, there is a contradiction since dx needs to have a determinate value (in order to form the ratio dy/dx), while also having no value 'in order to capture the gradient

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[104] Bowden also makes this point: in Kant, 'the object of an Idea is determinable "by analogy" with those objects of experience upon which it confers unity' (2011: 103).

[105] See Roffe for a representation of the two types of graphs (2020: 197-198).

at a point' (Somers-Hall 2013: 133). Subsequent mathematicians were troubled by the idea of infinitely small quantities, and replaced them with the idea of the limit: 'what characterises the function when x approaches 0?' (Roffe 2020: 201). While Deleuze also agrees that 'it is a mistake to tie the value of the symbol *dx* to the existence of infinitesimals', he does not want to deny them any ontological value (1994: 170). In his own words: 'there is a treasure buried within the old so-called barbaric or pre-scientific interpretations of the differential calculus, which must be separated from its infinitesimal matrix' (ibid). Deleuze's solution is the following: 'In relation to x, *dx* is completely undetermined, as *dy* is to *y*, but they are perfectly determinable in relation to one another' (1994: 172). So *dx* and *dy* are the undetermined - this implies that while they are real they fall outside of intuition (Somers-Hall 2012: 173); *dy/dx* represents reciprocal determination between *dx* and *dy;* and then, the specific values given to *dy/dx* correspond to complete determination (Deleuze 1994: 171). Therefore, the Idea (*dx*) can be defined as 'a system of differential relations between reciprocally determined genetic elements' (*dy/dx*) (994: 173-174), which will be expressed in a solution. It is important to highlight that reciprocal determination implies that relations are not defined in terms of negation (Somers-Hall 2013: 133). In Deleuze's words: 'Just as we oppose difference in itself to negativity, so we oppose *dx* to not-A, the symbol of difference… to that of contradiction' (1994: 170).

Deleuze's reinterpretation of calculus, which takes *dx* seriously, was inspired (although not exclusively) by these three names: Salomon Maïmon, Hoëne Wronski, and Jean Bordas-Demoulin. Somers-Hall (2013: 134-141) provides a summary of Deleuze's use of these three figures. To begin with, Bordas-Demoulin is relevant for Deleuze because he wants to find a way to represent mathematical universals as they are in themselves (without particular values) (2013: 134). This is the difference between algebraic and differential equations. For example, while Descartes' algebraic equation of a circle $X^2 + y^2 - R^2$ depends on a particular value chosen for R; this is not the case for the differential equation $ydy + xdx = 0$, where *dx* and *dy* cannot be assigned a value (Deleuze 1994: 171, Somers-hall 2013: 135). In other words, the difference between the two equations is that the former represents a particular circumference (since it has a specific value), while the latter signifies the universal circumference. This is where calculus becomes important, since it allows us to extract the universal from functions. In Somers-Hall's words: 'when we differentiate a function we receive another function that no longer gives us the precise values of the function, but instead, the variation of the function' (2013: 135). The reverse process to this is integration, where we go from the universal to the particular. There are three important points to highlight here. The first point is the distinction between the two functions, the primitive function (the equation that generates the curve), and the derivative (which gives us the gradient at each point - the variation of the function) (2013: 133, 135). The second point is that the derivative is constituted in terms of *d*y and *d*x, so it is does not give us particular values (which means it is inexpressible as a primitive function, although it can be integrated into one) (Somers-Hall 2013: 135). The third point is that while the differential can be distinguished from the primitive function, it has an intrinsic relationship to it. This can be translated to the language of the Idea: there is a difference in kind between the Idea and its actual expression, and there is a relationship

of immanence between the two (Somers-Hall 2013: 136). Bordas-Demoulin compares calculus to Spinoza: 'The God of Spinoza is the differential of the universe, and the universe, the integral of the God of Spinoza' (the integral can be assigned particular values) (Bordas-Demoulin in Somers-Hall 2013: 136).

The second figure is Maïmon. He is relevant for the following reason: 'Just as Bordas-Demoulin took the differential to provide the universal for particular mathematical figures, Maimon takes the differential to be the source of a construction, this time of the phenomenal world' (Somers-Hall 2013: 136). Like the Kantian noumenon, the differential *dx* cannot be presented in sensible intuition (it is undetermined) (Somers-Hall 2013: 138). However, as already mentioned, the relationship between differentials *dy/dx* gives rise to the sensible objects that appear in intuition. The process involves Ideas put into a relation with each other (becoming determinable), which means we can specify the range of values of the function. Lastly, when the Idea is fully determined, we can know the specific values of the function at particular points. Given this three moments, the process of thinking objects should not be understood as a completed synthesis, but as a synthesis in process. The empirical side of the object (given in intuition) emerges from the failure of the intellect to think differential relations all at once (we cannot think the virtual side of the object) (Somers-Hall 2013: 137-138). The implication of this is that we can only perceive empirical objects in a confused manner. This gives rise to an illusion, where we think that the objects of consciousness are merely representations (since we do not have access to the non-representational side of the object) (2013: 138).

The last figure is Wronski, who wants to maintain the distinction between differentials and normal (finite) quantities. While finite quantities are related to objects of cognition, the differential is related to the generation of cognition (Wronski in Somers-Hall 2013: 139). Wronski shows that when differentials are put in relation with each other, they give us an equation that is determinable. This equation is made up of singular points that identify where its nature changes. Then, by specifying the value of x we can determine the rate of change of any point, therefore fully determining the Idea. As Somers-Hall sums up: 'we therefore have a particular determined value (intuition), a determinable equation that subsumes it (the concept), and a field of differentials themselves which engenders both the determinable and determination' (Somers-Hall 2013:140). This implies that the differential, which is the problem, contains the solution. So the main point Deleuze is trying to make using these three thinkers is that differentials are different in kind from what they constitute, and that there is an intrinsic relation between the three moments of the Idea.

The virtual and the actual

Up to this point we have examined how the differential relationship of virtual Ideas gives rise to the actual, as a solution to a problem. However, we need to expand on this relationship further in order to avoid misinterpretations and address an important debate in the secondary literature, which was briefly mentioned in chapter six. The question is the following: does the virtual hold any priority over the actual? Or is the relationship between them based on reciprocal determination? So far in this chapter it might seem like the relationship between both terms goes

in one direction (from the virtual to the actual), but as we expand on this topic (and as mentioned in chapter five) it will be shown this is not the case. The debate is relevant for us because if the virtual holds any priority, then creativity will be limited to this side. The consequence of this would be the devaluation of the actual world. This would undermine the project of feminist immanent critique, which requires a careful engagement with the present (as opposed to fleeing the present).

We can begin by examining the virtual priority claim. As mentioned in chapter 6, some of the thinkers of this camp include: Badiou (2000), Hallward (2006), and Reynolds (2007 and 2008). Badiou argues that the virtual is the (eternal) ground for the actual, and as such, Deleuze's virtual holds sovereignty over the actual (2000: 43-45). Hallward claims that the actual is dependent on the virtual, since creation is primordially a movement of virtuality (2006: 26-27). In his own words: the '...purely creative processes can only take place in a wholly virtual dimension...' (2006: 3). Reynolds disagrees with Badiou's claim that Deleuze is a philosopher of eternity or the One (2008: 102). However, he does think that there is a reification of the virtual at times; and that 'Deleuze *didn't* understood his own engine from time to time…' (2008: 101). Furthermore, while Reynolds recognises that there is a double causality (between the virtual and the actual) at work in Deleuze (against Hallward), he still thinks that there is a prioritisation of the virtual that leads to the devaluation of the everyday life (2007: 150-151). Butler's (1987b) interpretation of Deleuze can also be broadly identified with this camp, even though her critique of Deleuze was much earlier than the others, and she does not use the terms of the debate. As mentioned in chapter 3, Butler (1987b), argues that Deleuze holds an invariant conception of desire, which has been repressed by slave morality, and needs to be emancipated. It seems like in this reading emancipated desire is the virtual, and repression by psychoanalysis and advanced capitalism is actual. So virtual desire (which Butler labels desire as affirmation), is prioritised over actual desire (which is negative), through the attempt to liberate it.

The key to respond to these claims lies in the difference between the processes of differen*ciation* and differen*tiation*. The first instance (differen*ciation)* refers to the constitution of the actual, while the second instance (differen*tiation)* refers to the constitution of the virtual. In Deleuze's words: 'Whereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem, differenciation expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions' (Deleuze 1994: 2009). There can be no priority if both sides constitute the other. In terms of the secondary literature that supports this view we have mostly followed Williams' interpretation of reciprocal determination between the virtual and the actual. Furthermore, Clisby (2015) also groups other commentators mentioned in this project in this camp including Somers-Hall (2012), Smith (2012), and Hughes (2009). According to Williams the process of expression of virtual ideas in the actual has two sides (it involves a process and a counter-process). On one hand, actual things are altered through the expression of pure difference of the virtual (differen*tiation*). On the other hand, pure difference (virtual) is determined through its expression in the actual (as actual things

become identifiable) (differenciation) (Williams 2003: 11, 164).[106] So reciprocal determination means that both the actual and the virtual change in different manners.[107] While actual identities change through expressed sensations which are clear and confused, Ideas change in terms of distinctness and obscurity (Williams 2013: 175-176).[108] In order to understand the difference between clear-confused and distinct-obscure Ideas we can turn to the example of the murmur of the sea (see Deleuze 1994: 213 and Somers-Hall 2012: 118).[109] On one hand if we focus on the whole noise of the waves, we can perceive it clearly (in terms of the whole), but *confusedly* in terms of not being able to distinguish the noise of the particular waves which compose the whole. On the other hand, if we focus on the particular waves (as micro-perceptions), they are *obscure* in terms of the whole (they have not been constituted as a whole yet in terms of being perceived), and *distinct* in terms of the differential relation between the waves. So clear and obscure refer to the whole, and confused and distinct to the differential relation. While we can be conscious of the whole, we are not conscious of the parts yet. The parts (micro-perceptions) are real but they have not yet been actualised in an apperception (Deleuze 1994: 213). This means that we can only appreciate them in fleeting states (Smith 2012: 248).[110] Smith also highlights the two way relationship between the virtual and actual. He describes them both as 'the recto and verso of a single coin' (Smith 2012: 253), so there can be no priority between them. Furthermore, Smith explains how the move from the conditions to the conditioned (virtual to actual) produces more difference, so the condition does not resembles the conditioned;[111] and in the next step: 'the actualization of the virtual also produces the virtual' (ibid). As Smith explains, this is what Deleuze means when he says that the conditions and the conditioned are determined at the same time.

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[106] These two processes can also be understood as dynamic and static genesis, in the language of *The Logic of Sense.*

[107] Furthermore, Williams argues that there is also a reciprocal determination between the present (first synthesis of time) and the pure past (second synthesis of time), since they both transform each other (2011: 53-54).

[108] This is based on the second edition of Williams' *Critical Introduction and Guide* where he corrected his earlier use of 'clear and distinct' (this is the term used by Descartes) in the first edition (2003), and replaced it with 'distinct and obscure' in the second edition (2013), as Deleuze does in *Difference and Repetition* (See Deleuze 1994: 213).

[109] It is important to note that there is a difference between Deleuze's reading of Leibniz in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque,* and in *Difference and Repetition.* In the former he claims that Ideas are either *clear and distinct*, or *confused and obscured*. In the latter, Deleuze argues that ideas are either *clear and confused*, or *distinct and obscure.* The latter makes more sense in terms of the distinction between the virtual and the actual. The reason for this is that clear and confused, and distinct and obscure, highlight the distinction between differenciation and differentiation.

[110] Smith (2012: 248) also provides a good explanation of the difference between the clear-confused and the obscure-distinct.

[111] The move from the virtual to the actual produces difference in the following way: 'When this [transcendental] field is actualized, it therefore differs from itself' (Smith 2012: 240). In Somers-Hall's words: difference gives rise to diversity (2012:117).

This has important consequences for our conception of the virtual. As Williams explains, the virtual is not chaotic, nor undifferentiated, it is best described as a changing mass of relations (2003: 14). For example, in the language of *The Logic of Sense,* the infinitives 'to love' and 'to hate' form a stronger relation in response to the clash of bodies in the actual, while their relation to other infinitives becomes weaker.[112] In the counter process (from virtual to the actual), we can also say that 'to love' and 'to hate' become brighter (as they are actualised), while other infinitives become more obscure (Williams 2005: 28).

Somers-Hall (2012: 91) explains the virtual and the actual in terms of two types of multiplicities (discontinuous and continuous respectively). The two multiplicities can be understood as tendencies that differ in kind while also being inseparable from the other (2012: 105). They are inseparable because the logic of multiplicities needs to be able to deal with what happens between the two tendencies (2012: 92). In Somer-Hall's words: 'In Deleuze's system, everything in fact takes places 'in the middle,' even though it is to be understood in terms of the two tendencies' (2012: 111). This is reiterated in different words: 'for Deleuze, everything occurs between pure virtuality and actuality' (2012: 118). The implication of this is that there can never be pure virtuality nor actuality. If we had pure actuality the object would not be able to be further differentiated, and with pure virtuality the object would not be crystallised. Therefore, we need both sides to give a complete account of the world. Hughes also emphasises both sides of the object: 'One half of the object is virtual. The other half is actual, and the "integrity" of these two moments is captured by this odd word: different/ciation' (2009: 142). In the process of differen*t*iation the problem becomes determined; and in the process of differen*c*iation the solutions are constituted. Neither process is able to determine the integrity of the object by itself. Furthermore, there is no virtual priority because 'by itself the virtual is useless' (ibid). So against Hallward (2006), 'the object is not at all constituted by the one directional creativity of the virtual…' (Hughes 2009: 142). Lastly, it is also helpful to turn to Kathrin Thiele's (2016: 119-121) work and her use of the concept of vice-diction. Thiele (2016: 119) argues that there is no oppositional relation between the actual and the virtual. In other words, they are not contradictory terms. Instead the relationship between them can be referred to as vice-diction. In her own words: 'vice-diction acts transversally: it relates laterally rather than vertically, it correlates rather than opposes…' (ibid). This implies that there is no hierarchy between the virtual and the actual. They are related within the same creative process of different/ciation. This allows for the achievement of radical immanence, when immanence is only immanent to itself, leaving nothing out to which it could be immanent to (ibid).

Why is the intensive important?

So far we have explained the relationship between the virtual and the actual, and we have argued that the virtual and the actual reciprocally determine one another (against the virtual priority camp). Now we need to examine the role of a third term: the intensive. The intensive is important

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[112] Williams example of this is the synthesis of 'becoming fear' and 'becoming violent', however I used the language of *The Logic of Sense* for consistency with the previous chapter.

for three reasons. First, as Williams argues in his response to Reynolds, this term is often overlooked in dualist interpretations of Deleuze (2008b: 99). Clisby accuses Badiou and Hallward of conflating the distinction between the virtual and the intensive (2017: 251). In his own words: 'Much of the confusion and critique of the so-called 'power' or 'force' of the virtual comes from a basic misunderstanding of the way in which the productive potential of intensity is either connected with, or attributed to the virtual' (ibid). Second, it is important to examine the role of the intensive because without it the relationship between the virtual and the actual is incomplete. As Deleuze argues in chapter 5 of *Difference and Repetition*, the process from the virtual to the actual cannot be accomplished without the intensive (1994: 245). As we will see, this process involves a complex relationship between virtual Ideas, intensity, and actual extensities (in which intensity is expressed). While virtual Ideas are completely determined (differentiated), they lack the determinations of actual existence (they have not been differenciated yet) (1994: 280).[113] The role of the intensive is that of the determinant, which will make ideas go from distinct and obscure to clear and confused (1994: 245). For this reason, Roffe clarifies (against dualist interpretations): 'the virtual has absolutely no active role in the production of the actual. The virtual is actualized, but it is not the agent of actualization' (2012: 63). Now that we have briefly introduced the importance of the intensive, we can move on to a deeper explanation of the concept. We will begin by looking at the three characteristics of intensity developed in chapter five of *Difference and Repetition*; then, we will examine the relationship between the process of the intensive (individuation) and differenciation (also known as actualisation); and lastly, we will address the problem of the place of the intensive in Deleuze's ontology: is it virtual, actual, or a shared ontological realm?

What is intensity?

As Roffe (2020: 207) argues, one of the goals of *Difference and Repetition* is to develop a concept of difference in itself. Intensity is such a concept: 'the unequal in itself' (this is the first characteristic of intensity) (Deleuze 1994: 232). This can be understood in opposition to Aristotle, where difference defines divisions within beings; against Hegel, where difference subsumes all identities through contradiction; against Leibniz, where difference is infinitely small difference at the limit of identity; and contra Plato, where difference departs from an original (Williams 2013: 60).[114] How is intensity the unequal? The answer is found in two ways of thinking about numbers: cardinal and ordinal. While cardinal numbers are extensive, ordinal numbers are intensive. As Roffe (2020: 206) explains, cardinal numbers help us to think about homogenous quantities (for example, the cardinal number 10 can be divided into 2 equal halves). On the other hand, ordinal numbers have no homogenous measure between them (for example, the difference between the first, second and third places in a race is not necessarily the same). An example of an intensive quantity, is temperature. As Roffe clarifies, temperature is not made up of homogenous elements

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[113] This does not contradict the earlier claim that Ideas are undetermined, they are undetermined in relation to the empirical world (differenciation), but determined in terms of (differenciation).

[114] For a detailed critique of these conceptions of difference see Williams (2013: chapter 3).

(50 degrees is not made of 50 equal parts). The consequence of this is that you cannot divide an intensive quantity into homogenous parts (for example dividing one 50 degree cup into two does not create 25 degrees). Similarly, you cannot add ordinal quantities the same way you can add cardinal quantities (two cups of thirty degrees of water do not make sixty degrees). If you cannot divide or add temperature, like you do with extensive quantities, what happens when different temperatures are brought into relation with each other? The answer depends on whether the quantities are the same or different. For example, if two temperatures that are the same are brought into contact they will stay the same (this is the Zeroth law of thermodynamics) (Clisby 2017: 242).[115] On the other hand, if they are different, they will change in nature (Somers-Hall 2013: 174-175). For example, If you add two cups of water of different temperatures, their temperatures will equalise. It is important to highlight that this is not the case for extensive quantities, they do not change in nature if you combine them. Now that we have distinguished intensity and extensity we can look at the relationship between them; which can also be understood as the relationship between inequality and equality (Deleuze 1994: 232). Deleuze's point is that cardinal numbers result from ordinal numbers. In Somers-Hall words: 'An uncancellable difference (intensity) gives rise to a new domain (extensity) within which that difference is cancelled' (Somers-Hall 2013: 176). The process at work here is that of the explication of intensity: 'if a type of number cancels its difference, it does so only by explicating it within the extension that it installs' (Deleuze 1994: 232). However, Deleuze argues that while the difference is cancelled in the explicated order, it is maintained in the implicated order.

The second characteristic of intensity is: 'intensity affirms difference' (Deleuze 1994: 234). As Deleuze goes on: 'Since intensity is already difference, it refers to a series of other differences that it affirms by affirming itself' (ibid). For example, the ordinal number 4 (the fourth in a race) affirms the difference of 3, 2, and 1 (Roffe 2020: 209). This is what Lawlor (2020) refers to when he talks about an ethics of intensive quantities that affirms the lowest (as mentioned in chapter six). In Deleuze's words: everything goes from high to low, and by that movement affirms the lowest: the asymmetrical synthesis' (1994: 234). For this reason Deleuze argues that it makes no sense to talk about the unequal as negative. This can be understood in opposition to extensive qualities that are characterised by negation: 'if x differs from y, x is not y' (Somers-Hall 2013: 177). Again, Deleuze is not denying the existence of the negative. The point is to show how intensive difference gives rise to extensive qualities, which can then be distinguished from each other through negation: 'difference is tied to the negative only within extensity and quality' (Deleuze 1994: 235). As Roffe explains, there are two implications of this second characteristic of intensity. First, intensity is the name of being (of the sensible) itself: 'everything that exists arises from an interplay of intensive quantities or differences-in-themselves' (2020: 207-208). Second, when there is an encounter with intensity we are forced to think beyond recognition. Intensity is that

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[115] Thermodynamics is relevant here because it deals with the relationship of the intensive and the extensive; although as we will see, Deleuze criticises thermodynamics for privileging the extensive over the intensive (Clisby 2017: 240). For an in depth explanation of thermodynamics and its reformulation by Deleuze's see Clisby (2017).

which cannot be sensed (from the point of view of the empirical exercise of the faculties), but can only be sensed (from the point of view of the transcendent exercise) (Deleuze 1994: 237).

The third characteristic of intensity, which includes the other two, is that it 'is an implicated, enveloped or 'embryonised' quantity' (ibid). This means that, as mentioned above, a specific intensity affirms all the lower differences in the series (Lawlor 2020: 125). Furthermore, as already mentioned, since intensive quantities are not composed of equal elements (as in the case of extensity), they are not divisible (at leas not in equal parts). If it is divided, it changes in nature (Deleuze 1994: 237, Somers-Hall 2013: 178). As Williams summarises: 'intensities have to be thought of as indivisible, with respect to measure, but divisible, with respect to the configurations they take on with respect to other intensities' (2003: 183). So what changes is the configuration of intensities, and the way they envelop one another. Williams' example of this is the intensity to hate enveloping the intensity to love. This implies that there is no negation of intensities, they just express different Ideas at different levels of distinctness and obscurity (2013: 197). The whole configuration of intensities is referred to as the intensive spatium (implicit multiplicity). It is the transcendental condition for actual space (explicit multiplicity) (Williams 2013: 196, Deleuze 1994: 238). In this process, intensity is explicated (while remaining implicated). This means that intensity is not really cancelled: it is only canceled outside itself (Deleuze 1994: 240). There are two orders of implication a *secondary implication* where intensities are enveloped by qualities and extensities which explicate them; and a *primary implication* where intensity is implicated in itself. The confusion of these orders leads to the illusion of the cancellation of intensity. To sum up: 'Intensity remains implicated in itself and continues to envelop difference at the very moment when it is reflected in the extensity and the quality that it creates, which implicate it only secondarily, just enough to 'explicate it'' (ibid). However, to avoid accusations of priority we need to clarify the relationship between the transcendental (intensity) and the empirical (extensity). Deleuze (1994: 241) explicitly says that the transcendental does not govern the empirical. The empirical domain is created by the transcendental (difference in intensity); the transcendental 'maintains itself in itself, beyond the reach of the empirical' (ibid) - since intensive difference is not cancelled; and the empirical principle cancels difference in the empirical. In Deleuze's words: 'the transcendental principle does not govern any domain but gives the domain to be governed to an empirical principle' (ibid).

Eternal return

The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical realms is connected to the eternal return. In Deleuze's words: 'while the laws of nature govern the surface of the world, the eternal return ceaselessly rumbles in the other dimension of the transcendental…' (1994: 241). Therefore, the eternal return is said of the world of intensity (the world of disparities): 'The eternal return is neither qualitative nor extensive but intensive, purely intensive. In other words it is said of difference' (Deleuze 1994: 242). Deleuze argues that it was Nietzsche who made the connection between the eternal return and the unequal (ibid). Conversely, this implies that the eternal return is not said of identity, resemblance and equality, which never return (Deleuze 1994: 241). Now there

are two questions that have to be answered, the first one is what is the relationship between the will to power and the eternal return? As Deleuze explains, difference is the will to power, and the eternal return is repetition (1994: 241). In other words, only the difference of the will to power returns, or repeats itself, affirming more difference. Difference is the first affirmation, and eternal return the second. The second question we have to answer is why does the same not return? To answer this we have to remember that there are two realms: the realm of intensity and of extensity. Qualities and extensions exist in both realms in different states (Deleuze 1994: 243). As Deleuze explains, qualities are like a sign created by difference in intensity, which is later explicated and its difference is canceled. Extensions exist as implicated in the order of differences, and are later explicated and their difference is canceled. So qualities and extensities do not return because their difference is canceled in one realm: they are explicated once and for all (Deleuze 1994: 244). In this realm we can talk about identities (and negation), but not in the other.

What is the relationship between individuation and differenciation?

Now that we have defined the intensive we need to explain how it is related to differenciation. Deleuze makes two claims about the relationship between individuation and differenciation. First, individuation and differenciation are different in kind. Second, individuation precedes differenciation (Deleuze 1994: 247). To clarify the first point, individuation and differenciation are different in kind because they concern different ontological orders: intensity and Ideas respectively (Bowden 2017: 227). While Ideas are defined as 'perplexed' virtual multiplicities, which are determined by relations between their differential elements; intensive quantities are 'implicated' multiplicities, made up of relations between asymmetrical elements (Deleuze 1994: 244-245). However, the second claim, that individuation precedes differentiations is more complicated. The question is the following: 'How could it be the case that the actualisation of virtual Ideas is determined by a process that is different in kind to actualisation?' (Bowden 2017: 217). The key to understanding this relation is the concept of expression. Bowden (2017) turns to Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* to clarify this concept. It has five features. The first point is that 'what is expressed in the expressive relation *does not exist outside of its expression*' (2017: 220).[116] In other words, there is an ontological inseparability between the expressed and its expression. For example, a smile expresses friendliness, but the friendliness does not exist outside of the smile. Second, the expressed does not resemble its expression (the condition does not resemble the conditioned). This allows for the possibility of multiple expressions of the expressed (the problem can be solved in many ways). For instance, a friendliness and a smile are not the same thing, and friendliness can be expressed in many ways. Third, the expressed is not fully formed before its expression, it is a creative accomplishment (2017: 221). This implies that the expressed cannot be understood as a separately identified cause (hence the distinction between an expressive and a causal relationship) (2017: 222). For example, friendliness is not something fully formed, so a smile is an accomplishment of

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[116] This point is also made in *Difference and Repetition* (1994: 260), and *The Logic of Sense* (1990b: 110).

friendliness. Fourth, even though the expressed is not a cause, it still plays an explanatory role of a different kind. The expressed is 'not external to its expression, but somehow *internal* or *immanent* to the unfolding of its expression' (ibid). For instance, a smile is referred back to friendliness, as something internal to it. This means that what is expressed remains in its expression as something else. So while expressions progressively explicate what is expressed, what is expressed complicates and remains implicated in its expression. This is the dual role of intensity, it explicates itself as something new, while remaining implicated in its expression. Therefore, the concepts of immanence and expression are inextricably connected. In Bowden's words: 'immanence is nothing other than the expressive unity of explication and implication' (2017: 223). Fifth, the movement of expression involves a form of comprehension. There are three steps for this. First, there is an expressive element that is revealed (my smile says that I am friendly). Second, there is a relationship between the expression, what is expressed, and its comprehension. This brings us to the concept of sense: 'The expression 'says something' about the expressed, but the sense of what the expression says depends on how it is comprehended' (2017: 223). In short: the expression says something and is comprehended by myself and others (although it can be comprehended in multiple ways). Third, the comprehension of the sense of the expressed (in an expression) has consequences for the movement of expression (2017: 224). Bowden's example of this how the way in which a behaviour is grasped (for instance my friendliness) will influence future behaviour.

These five features of expression are also found in *Difference and Repetition* and help us clarify the relationship between virtual Ideas (as an immanent cause), the expression of said cause, and the sense of the cause (Bowden 2017: 225). The first point is that the virtual idea is ontologically inseparable from both the actual and intensity (2017: 227-229). First, the *Idea* is inseparable from the *actual* because even though the virtual Idea exists on its own as completely determined, it does not have actual existence (yet). In Deleuze's words: 'What the complete determination lacks is the whole set of relations belonging to actual existence' (Deleuze 1994: 2009). This is similar to Williams' claim about the relationship of each time with the others, each time is complete on its own terms, while also needing further determination in other terms (Williams 2011: 150). Second, *intensity* is ontologically inseparable from the *Idea* because even though intensity is independent from differenciation (by virtue of its own process), intensity determines the differential relations of the Idea. In Bowden's words: 'intensity produces the concrete terms and relation in which virtual Ideas have their actual existence, *by expressing…* the differential relations constitutive of virtual Ideas in the production of these existents' (2017: 228). So the differential relations of the Idea are inseparable from intensive differences, which explicate themselves in concrete entities (individuation), and simultaneously actualise virtual Ideas in qualities and extensities of those entities (2017: 229).

The second point is that virtual Ideas do not resemble intensities, and they do not resemble the actual qualities and extensities in which they are incarnated (Bowden 2017: 229). Here Bowden clarifies that the virtual structures the actual, only insofar as it is expressed in the intensive process of individuation, which then produces actual entities. So while the power of

intensity is grounded in the potentiality of the virtual, the intensive determines the way in which this potentiality is actualised (Bowden 2017: 230). The third point is that expression is a creative accomplishment of what is expressed. This implies that individuation does not only govern actualisation (though the expression of the differential relations of Ideas), individuation also constitutes what is expressed (virtual Ideas). In Bowden words: the 'virtual Idea is determined at the same time as it is actualised or 'solved'' (ibid). The reason for this is that the virtual structure cannot be ready-made, it must change over time (Bowden 2017: 231). The fourth point is the relation of immanent causality between the expressed and its expression (as opposed to external causality). This means that intensity is already-implicated in itself as a transcendental principle. There is novelty but no creation ex nihilo (Smith 2012: 253, Williams 2008b: 98). Again, the virtual idea is a potentiality, and the intensive expresses this potentiality in a creative manner, also changing the potentiality.

The fifth point can be divided in two for clarity. First, the expression expresses the sense of its immanent cause (Ideas) (Bowden 2017: 233). This implies that the virtual Idea is both an immanent cause and a sense of an immanent cause, since individuation expresses virtual Ideas as the senses of the entities these processes generate. Second, the comprehension of this sense has consequences for the movement of expression. The key to understand this is that virtual Ideas are also constituted by intensity. While the Idea is a fully determined state of differential potentiality, individuation 'progressively determines the particular elements, relations and singularities characterising the differential structures of actual entities' (Bowden 2017: 231). In short, individuation alters both what is expressed (virtual Ideas) and its expression (actual qualities and extension). In this process the idea is first incarnated in the fields of individuation, and then in qualities and extensities (Deleuze 1994: 279). Bowden clarifies that the Idea expressed by intensive processes is intensity (Bowden 2017: 233). This does not violate the non-resemblance criterion because intensity differs from the specific differential intensive processes that actualise it. So the differential potentiality of the virtual Idea (immanent cause), is implicated, constituted, and actualised by intensive processes. The question now is how is the immanent cause expressed in the intensive production of reality made sense of? The answer is that thinkers are intensive individuals. The thinker is able to grasp encountered signs - virtual Ideas that are expressed by intensity. However, as we already know, a sign is not an object of recognition. It can only be grasped as a problem, which the thinker constitutes, and can then be solved in actual terms (although never as a final solution). To sum up: 'thinking itself is an intensive process that constitutes and actualises problematic or virtual ideas as a response to the experience of intensity' (Bowden 2017: 235).

The intensive: is it virtual, actual, or a third term?

While we have made some progress clarifying the relationship between the virtual and the actual, and then between Ideas the intensive and extensities in the process of individuation, we still need to answer what is the place of the intensive within Deleuze's ontology. As Clisby (2015) summaries, there are three positions in this debate: the intensive as a third ontological term, the intensive as actual, and the intensive as virtual. I will argue against these three positions. Instead, I

contend that the intensive is a shared transformer of the virtual and the actual. This is James Williams' (2008b) interpretation, even though he has been placed on the intensive as virtual camp (this issue will be addressed later). Sean Bowden offers a similar interpretation of the intensive as a mutual constitutor of the virtual and actual. However, the main difference is that Williams talks about virtual and actual intensities; while Bowden claims that the intensive can be neither virtual nor actual.

The intensive as a third realm

This position is held by Manuel DeLanda, as we can appreciate in the following quote: 'the virtual, the intensive and the actual would constitute the three spheres of reality' (2005: 86).[117] John Protevi holds the same position: 'I would argue that we should consider the intensive as an independent ontological register, one that mediates the virtual and actual, which are its limits' (2007). Therefore, he describes Deleuze's ontology as a 'tripartite ontology' (Protevi 2010: 419). Furthermore, Protevi contends that even if its not conceived as a different ontological realm, it should still be distinguished from the virtual (ibid).[118] However, even though both DeLanda and Protevi understand individuation as a process that joins the virtual and the actual, and they both highlight the two way relation between the virtual and actual through the intensive, I am hesitant to conceive the intensive as a third realm. The reason for this is that Deleuze talks about the virtual and the actual as two (real) halves of an object that complete each other - not three, with the intensive as a connector between the two. In Deleuze's words:

> 'It is as everything has two odd, dissymmetrical and dissimilar halves, the two halves of the Symbol, each dividing itself into two: an ideal half submerged in the virtual and constituted on the one hand by differential relations and on the other by corresponding singularities; an actual half constituted on the one hand by the qualities actualising those relations and on the other by the parts actualising those singularities. Individuation ensures the embedding of the two dissimilar parts' (Deleuze 1994: 279-280).

The intensive as actual

Roffe claims that 'Intensity is *the actual*: it is actual being' (2012: 142). This implies that both the implicated and the explicated side of intensity are actual. In his own words: 'It is intensity that characterises the being of the actual, both as implicated quantity and as explicated quantity and

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[117] DeLanda (2005: 86) also argues that the virtual constrains and guides intensive processes. However, this does not seem to be the case in Deleuze, who argues that the virtual is the potential, while the intensive is the determinant of the process of actualisation (1994: 244-245).

[118] Even if Protevi's (2007) claims that the intensive is a third ontological realm, his position is closer to Clisby and Roffe's: 'Even if one doesn't accept this and insists on a dualism of virtual and actual, one would have to say that the intensive belongs with the actual. Intensive morphogenetic processes exist here on earth, they are things of this world; they are not "out of this world," as Hallward would have it by locating them exclusively in the virtual'.

extensity' (ibid). So, according to Roffe, 'the entire process of actualization (or differenciation) necessarily lies on the side of the actual itself', as the movement of explication of intensity (2012: 143). According to him, this is how the process works: virtual ideas are expressed by individuals in the actual: 'the actual is characterised as the regime of the individual' (2012: 147);[119] however, at this stage individuals are 'nascent formations that await extension, and qualification, spatialization and temporalization' (2012: 144); these are achieved by the move from implicated intensity to extension; and lastly, there is the reverse process from extension back to the implicated order of the individual (2012: 146). Thus, the actual should not be understood as a fixed state, it is fluid (2012: 143). The role of the virtual is only that of posing problems, while intensity in the actual expresses them and solves them (Roffe 2012: 149). Intensity, therefore, is the '*determinative context and content of actualisation*' (Roffe 2012: 143). Clisby agrees with Roffe's point that intensity is actual. He also claims that the role of the virtual is merely to problematise, and that the actual solution depends on the intensive environment (Clisby 2015: 145). However, Clisby claims that actualisation happens first and individuation comes second. To be more precise, virtual Ideas are expressed by intensity (they are actualised): 'to express the virtual is to actualise the virtual Idea' (Clisby 2015: 142), followed by the process of individuation. In Clisby's words: 'from the virtual field Ideas are actualised and then individuated' (2015: 141). So, '*individuation must not be thought as part of actualisation*' (2015: 145). The implication of this is that creativity is actual: it is with the dramatising potential of intensity that Deleuze's metaphysics becomes creative, while the virtual only provides the function of the structuring problematic field' (2015: 146). In other words, it is the already-constituted intensive environment, which holds dramatising potential, that mobilises Ideas into extended form (2015: 145).

While Roffe and Clisby are correct to point out the importance of the intensive, it cannot be exclusively actual - the movement from implicated quantities and explicated quantity cannot happen only on the side of the actual. The reason for this is that, as Bowden explains, the intensive serves as a transcendental principle for actual entities, so it has to be something other than actual (2017: 236). Furthermore, Bowden also notes that the intensive remains uncancellable (it is only cancelled in the domain of extensity). This is something Deleuze makes clear - there are two domains: the implicated one and the explicated one (the explicated plane is created by intensity) (1994: 232). So it makes more sense to understand the intensive as a middle term between the virtual and the actual that is not fully either of them. Therefore, the intensive cannot be virtual either (we will explain this more in detail soon). However, before we move on to examine the claim that the intensive is virtual, there are a few more problems with Clisby's account that need to be addressed. The first one is that he claims that actualisation comes first (although it depends on a prior intensive environment), and individuation comes second, since 'Ideas are actualised and then individuated' (2015: 141). The difficulty of this is that he seems to separate the processes too much, since 'Individuation must not be thought as part of actualisation' (2015: 145). It seems like intensity is only related to the actual by virtue of being 'an already constituted intensive environment' (ibid). However, in Deleuze's (1994: 245-247) account, even though the two

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[119] To be more precise, individuals express whole of virtual from particular perspective (Roffe 2012: 144).

processes must not be confused, they seem to be closely interrelated. Deleuze explains that the movement of Ideas is inseparable from the process of actualisation; however, intensity is what determines the relations within the Idea, which are the differential relations to be actualised (by establishing communication between disparates). So actualisation is inseparable from individuation. Individuation creates qualities and extensities, in which it is explicated; and it also creates the lines of differenciation (actualisation): 'in this way, after a fashion… (but, as we shall see, only after a fashion) the movement and the categories of differenciation reproduce those of explication' (Deleuze 1994: 245).

The intensive as virtual

As mentioned before, dualist interpretations of Deleuze tend to confuse the virtual and the intensive (Williams: 2008b, Clisby 2017). For example, Hallward is guilty of this in the following quote: 'Differentiatings or creatings are *virtual*, and are intensive rather than extensive' (2006: 27).[120] This view has already been challenged in this chapter by emphasising the difference between the process of differentiation and individuation (although it is also a mistake to separate the processes too much). Deleuze (1994: 244) is very clear on this - there are two types of relations: differential relations in the reciprocal synthesis of the virtual Idea, and relations of intensity in the asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible. It is the second type of relation, between intensities, 'which direct the course of the actualisation of Ideas and determine the cases of solutions for problems' (ibid). However, we cannot deny that there is affinity between Ideas and intensity: 'the power of intensity is grounded in the potentiality of the Idea' (ibid). To be more precise, different potentials are distributed within the Idea, forming singular points (Deleuze 1994: 246). The role of individuation is to establish communication between these points, which leads to the actualisation of the Idea. This implies that intensive individuation determines both the relationship between virtual Ideas, and the actual solution of the problem. This is what we meant when we said earlier that the problem is constituted at the same time as the solution (Deleuze 1994: 163). However, it is important to remember that determination of the (virtual) problem is different to the (actual) solution (so the virtual and the actual do not resemble each other).

Therefore, the intensive serves as a middle term which connects and transforms the two realms. There are two helpful ways of understanding this, they are different but they both make sense for this project. The first one is given by James Williams, and the second one by Sean Bowden. Williams (2008b: 99) claims that the intensive is a shared transformer of the virtual and the actual. This implies that the intensive works both in the virtual and in the actual (albeit in different ways), so we can talk both about actual and virtual intensities. Second, Bowden (2017: 236) also highlights that the intensive both constitutes the virtual, and it actualises it. However, unlike Williams he claims that the intensive is neither virtual, nor actual. It cannot be actual because it is the transcendental principle for actual entities; and it is 'uncancellable'. It cannot be virtual because it differs in kind from the Idea. These two ways of understanding the intensive are

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[120] Williams (2008b) also accuses Reynolds (2007) of this, and Clisby (2017) accuses Hallward (2006) and Badiou (2000) of this.

helpful because they do not prioritise neither the virtual or the actual; and they place a lot of emphasis on their interconnectedness, and how they mutually transform one another. We will turn to Williams in order to develop his position more in detail. It is important to highlight that Clisby, Roffe and Bowden argue that Williams posits the intensive on the virtual side, so I will show how this is not the case. After that we will develop Bowden's position with more precision.

James Williams: the intensive as a shared transformer

As mentioned above, Roffe (2012: 150), Clisby (2015: 134-135), and Bowen (2017: 236) argue that James Williams conceives intensity as purely virtual. The consequence of this is that the creative potential of intensity is sided with the virtual (this is also Hallward's argument) (Clisby 2015: 134-135). In a footnote, Clisby claims that this is the case for both the first edition (2003) and the second edition (2013) of Williams' *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition Critical Introduction and Guide;* although he states that Williams 'has softened his account somewhat conceding that intensity has a relation to the virtual and actual' (Clisby 2014: 148). While this interpretation is more plausible in the first edition of the *Critical Introduction and Guide* (2003), this is not Williams' position in his later work where he addresses the question more directly (including Williams 2005, 2008a, and 2008b). In the first edition, there are a few moments where he does seem to suggest that intensity is virtual. For example: 'the virtual is the realm of intensity and the actual the realm of depth and distances' (Williams 2003: 173). Furthermore, Williams uses the term 'virtual intensities' (2003: 8, 184); and he claims that 'they cannot be accounted for in terms of the actual identities' (Williams 2003: 8). This would not necessarily imply that intensity is purely virtual if there was a recognition of the actual side of intensity, but this does not seem to be the case, at least explicitly in this book. Intensity appears to be associated with the virtual, while sensation is associated with the actual (2003: 183).

However, as we will see, in his later work Williams does speak of actual intensities, in addition to virtual intensities (see for example Williams 2005, 2008b, 2011). Furthermore, Williams challenges the meaning of priority in the context of the process of reciprocal determination. The argument is that it makes no sense to talk about priority (in terms of value) when there is a necessary relationship between both realms (2008b: 98). So even if he unintentionally placed intensities on the virtual side in his earlier work, it makes more sense to conceive intensity as working in the two realms: 'Intensity, or the surface, is a shared transformer of the actual and virtual' (Williams 2008b: 99). This was also the case in his earlier work. In *The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze,* Williams divides reality in two: 'one one hand, virtual Ideas and intensities and, on the other, actual sensations, intensities again, and identifications' (2005: 21). So intensity operates both in the virtual and in the actual realm (2005: 118). Now, we need to understand the role of actual sensations and their relation to intensity. Williams explains that virtual intensities are the condition for actual sensations, and then actual sensations create 'disruptions within actual identifications' (2005: 27). However, it is important to note that while actual sensations are 'signs of the expression of Ideas and intensities in actual structures', expressed intensity is still intensity. Somers-Hall makes this point too: 'intensity expresses itself as extensity without itself ceasing to

be intensity' (2013: 183-104). The consequence of this is that 'there is no self-sufficient cold actuality — it always depends on the lighting of intensities through sensations to acquire significance and evolve' (Williams 2005: 29). Furthermore, in the process from the actual to the virtual 'sensations relate flows of intensities to events at the level of unconscious Ideas' (2005: 29).

To sum up Williams' position in the two main debates addressed in this chapter: there is a relation of reciprocal determination between the virtual and the actual, which means that they mutually transform one another. In Williams' words: 'Any individual is therefore determined through the way its actual differences give form to a chaos of virtual Ideas; but it is also determined through the way its singular Idea and associated intensities undo its actual form by introducing singular transformation of intensities' (2005: 105). Second, the process of transformation of both realms relies on intensities working on each side in different manners. In the actual intensity creates new identities, and in the virtual intensity alters the relationship of distinctness and obscurity of the Idea (2005: 161). In Williams's words: 'Differentiation is a matter of degrees (of relative distinctness and obscurity). Whereas differenciation is a matter of different identities (for example, in terms of presence and absence of properties and predicates' (ibid). Williams makes the same point when he responds to Reynolds (2007): 'since surface or intensity works differently on the actual and the virtual these are distinguished yet always connected' (Williams 2008b: 99).

Sean Bowden

We are now turning to Sean Bowden's (2011) account of the relationship between the problematic Idea, intensive individuation, and the actual solution of the problem. Even though this relationship has already been explained earlier, it is helpful here as a reminder of what we have covered in this chapter. Furthermore, Bowden's account is useful for this project because he explains Deleuze's reformulation of the work of Gilbert Simondon in order to explain the progressive determination of the virtual; and he examines the arguments in both *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense.* As we already know, the 'problem' as a concept is introduced to establish the conditions for internal genesis (Bowden 2011: 101). In the language of *The Logic of Sense,* the problem is 'sub-representative' and 'non-propositional', while at the same time only existing in the propositions that express it (Deleuze 1990b: 122). Now it is important to clarify that propositions refer to an object, however this object is only fully determinable in relation to problematic Ideas. To be more precise, the object 'will be determined at the same time that the problem itself is completely determined or solved' (Bowden 2011: 101). The problem is solved reciprocally, completely, and progressively (2011: 102). However, this relies on the process of individuation that relates Ideas to actual things. Therefore, intensive individuation presupposes a pre-individual field (the problematic Idea), while also showing how the problematic Idea is the problem for particular actual solutions (individuals, persons, and concepts). Williams makes a similar point by saying that Ideas become related to particular actual things through the process of individuation (2013: 201). Therefore the process of individuation responds to the question 'who?' - since the Idea as a

problem is particular to an individual. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Deleuze uses calculus in order to show how the problematic Idea is internally determined (as opposed to externally determined in Kant's work) (Bowden 2011: 103). This process involves relating different potentials to each other. In the language of calculus, *dx* symbolises the undetermined problematic Idea, which can be reciprocally determined if it is put into a relation with other differentials, this leads to the discovery of singular points (where the curve changes behaviour), which then allow the complete determination of the curve (2011: 106-107). So 'the solution emerges the more the problem is determined' (2011: 107). This implies that when singularities are specified they help to accomplish the complete determination of problems, while also directing the solution (2011: 109).

Now that we have explained how the problematic Idea is solved reciprocally and completely, we still need to explain how it is a progressive determination. Intensive individuation progressively actualises the virtual (in qualities and extension) (2011: 116). To understand this process Bowden turns to Deleuze's appropriation of the work of Gilbert Simondon. As Bowden explains, Simondon understands the individual as a result of a prior process of individuation (2011: 117). There will be two corresponding individuations: one of being that generates individuals, and one of thought that generates the thought of their individuation (2011: 118-119). This implies that the process of individuation cannot be based on already constituted individuals. There needs to be a pre-individual field (which Deleuze calls the virtual), which is made up of different orders of magnitude (Bowden 2011: 119-120). Individuation as a process structures these relations - by establishing communication between the different orders - and actualising them. It is important to highlight that the individual does not exist before the constitutive relation between different orders of magnitude that lead to actualisation. The question now is, if the individual does not exist yet, what starts the process of individuation? The answer, according to Bowden's reading of Simondon is a (pre-individual) singularity (2011: 120). In addition to this, Simondon argues that individuals can also serve as singularities for other structures (2011: 123). As Bowden explains, similarly to Simondon, Deleuze understands identities as secondary, while the difference that produces identity is primary (2011: 126). In this process, the differential Idea (made up of singularities) is actualised by the intensive process of individuation (singularities are enveloped by intensive series which progressively determine the differential relations between different orders of magnitude) (2011: 127). Additionally, in both Simondon and Deleuze, the processes of individuation involves different domains including: physical, biological, and social (which can be combined in the production of individuals) (2011: 128-129). The subject is divided into a dissolved self, as the individual is reconstituted by the process of individuation; and a fractured I, which is passively determined by time (Deleuze 1994: 276).

Now that we have briefly summarised Simondon's contribution to Deleuze's development of the concept of individuation, we can move to the relationship between *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense.* Bowden examines the five characteristics of singularities presented in *The Logic of Sense,* in order to show that the definition of the problematic Idea in *Difference and Repetition* is applicable to the time of Aion in *The Logic of Sense* (2011: 140). First, singularities and ordinary points form heterogenous series (this is another way to refer to the

problematic Idea). These ordinary points exist only in relation to one another (reciprocal determination), and produce singular points (2011: 133). Then when Deleuze talks about the potential energy of the pure event, he is referring to the distribution of difference of the problematic Idea (virtual); conversely, when he talks about the realisation of the event, he is referring to actualisation. Actualisation happens when singularities are prolonged over a line of ordinary points next to neighbouring singularities forming a relation. Therefore, the second characteristic of singularities is that they possess a process of auto-unification (complete determination), which can only happen progressively (2011: 134). We reach solutions at the same time that the problem determines itself (Deleuze 1990: 135). The problem is determined by the singular points of the series (Deleuze 1990: 56). The paradoxical element refers to the personal moment of the 'questioner' (the divided subject mentioned above), and an impersonal moment since the problem is prior to any determination (Bowden 2011: 136). These two moments are brought together as 'imperative questions': 'that a question is imperative means that the question is forced upon or experienced as a 'problem' by a questioner. The experience of a problem… puts the worldy questioner 'into question', as it were, and forces him or her to answer' (2011: 136). However, since the questioner itself is a solution to a problem, it cannot be the ultimate source of problems. The third characteristic of singularities is that they haunt the physical surface, which is intensive (2011: 138). Williams (2008b: 99) also conceives the surface as intensive. However, there is also a metaphysical surface (the transcendental field), which is the locus of sense (this is the fourth characteristic of singularities), and is hunted by singularities-events. These two surfaces are irreducible to one another (Bowden 2011: 231). The question is what is the relationship between physical surface and the metaphysical surface? As Bowden explains singularities-events (virtual) do not have sense until they are organised at the surface through the resonance of at least two series (2011: 139). These series will mutually transform one another, as they progressively become completely determined. As singularities become actualised in the world they form series that converge with each other (Deleuze 1990). In other words, the body incarnates a finite number of singularities, which converges with other bodies, and the individuated world (which can only be renewed to a certain degree). So we can talk about virtual or singularities-events, then singularities that are enveloped by intensive series at the surface, and actual singularities that express pre-individual relations. Lastly, the fifth characteristic of singularities is that the world of sense is problematic, while propositions are the resolutions (Bowden 2011: 140, Deleuze 1990: 104-105).

Conclusion

This chapter provided an in depth examination of the expressive relationship between the virtual, the actual, and the intensive. This is crucial for this project because if the virtual was prioritised, and if we confused the virtual with the intensive, then this would be a problem for a political, feminist, and critical interpretation of Deleuze, which require a deep engagement with the world, as opposed to fleeing the world. It was argued that there can be no relation of priority because without the actual world the virtual would not be expressed. Furthermore, without the virtual we would not be able to account for change in the actual world, for example the change of sense of

events. Lastly, without the intensive there would be no way to connect the virtual and the actual; and to modify both of them in the process of expression. Following Williams, the intensive has been described as a shared transformer of the virtual and the actual. Bowden also emphasises how the intensive both constitutes the virtual and the actual. However, the main difference is that Williams talks about virtual intensities, and actual intensities (which work in different ways in each realm); while Bowden, emphasises that the intensive cannot be virtual nor actual. It cannot be virtual because it differs in nature from Ideas, and it cannot be actual because it is a transcendental principle. While both ways are helpful, it might be better to follow Bowden's approach to avoid confusions. Now that we have demonstrated that Deleuze does not prioritise the virtual, so he does not want to flee the world, we can develop the relationship between immanence and feminism in the next chapter. The claim that there is a tension between these two elements is connected to the misinterpretation of the virtual and the actual. However, once we understand the mutually constitutive relation between the virtual and the actual, we can apply this to feminism and immanence.

8. Assembling Feminist Immanent Critique from Deleuze

As mentioned in the introduction, while Butler and Oksala are involved openly in the project of feminist immanent critique, this is not the case for Deleuze. Therefore, this chapter will be dedicated to the assembly of this concept. The philosophical work has already been done in the previous chapters dedicated to Deleuze. We can understand them as as a journey for the attainment of immanence. Now we need to connect this to feminism. How is this going to be done? Given the creative nature of the task of assembling, it is not suitable to simply summarise the previous chapters, and translate them into feminist terms. Instead, we are going to forget the order of the previous chapters, and we are going to reassemble the journey. We will begin by focusing on the advancement of immanence through Deleuze's reconstruction of Plato's concept of Ideas, which is then picked up by Kant and reformulated again by Deleuze, followed by Deleuze's use of Nietzsche and Spinoza to complete Kant's immanent project. Then, we will look at Deleuze's ontological, epistemic, and politico-ethical undoing of the subject. As Gilson (2019) argues, these three undoings are shared between Deleuze and feminism. They have been explored in this thesis, although we haven't explicitly called them that. I will provide a reconstruction of Deleuze's philosophy of time as an ontological undoing; his concept of learning as an epistemological undoing; and Deleuze's freeing of becoming from moral notions as a politico-ethical undoing. This will lead to Deleuze and Guattari's concept of becoming-woman, which poses a challenge to my reading of Deleuze as a feminist thinker. The reason for this is that the concept has been critiqued by many feminists for ignoring the specificity of women. However, Gilson's interpretation of the concept challenges this reading.

Plato

As mentioned in chapter 6, one of Deleuze's aims in *Difference and Repetition* was to develop an immanent theory of Ideas, which is tied to a principle of difference. In order to explain this we can begin by looking at Deleuze's reformulation of Plato. As Smith explains, Deleuze's anti-Platonism is mostly about restoring immanence, and freeing difference from identity in the process (2012: 17). In Plato, while the copies resemble the transcendental Idea, the simulacrum are made up of pure difference (there is no relation of identity linking them to ideas) (2012: 11). Therefore, for the simulacrum difference is primary, and similarity or resemblance is secondary - it is simply an external effect (2012: 14). The primacy of difference is important for Deleuze because if simulacrum are made of difference, they can no longer be judged in terms of their resemblance to a transcendental Idea (2012: 16). This challenges the system of the model and the copy, which grants a privileged position to the Idea (as the model), and judges everything in terms of its resemblance to the idea (Deleuze 1994: 69). Deleuze's reformulation of Plato can be of use for feminism in at least two ways. First, his critique of judgement can be applied to gender. If beings are constituted by difference, then we can no longer judge each other in terms of resemblance to a gender model. In other words, there is no longer a perfect expression of womanhood/manhood which we have to imitate, we are free to express our gender in our own way. Second, if difference

is primary and identity is secondary, then we can conceive gender identity as an external effect - an illusion that conceals our individuality as beings. The consequence of this is that any attempt to define what it means to be a woman is problematic because it erases the differences between us. However, as we will see in the next section, this does not mean that we cannot ask any questions about gender, we just need to replace general questions with more particular ones.

Kant

The next step in the advancement of immanence is Deleuze's reformulation of Kant's concept of Ideas.[121] As mentioned in chapter 7, there are three components of this concept (Smith 2012: 109-110). First, Ideas are *indeterminate*. The reason for this is that Ideas lie outside of empirical experience, so they can only be known as a problem (without solution). Second, Ideas are *determinable* through analogy to the empirical world. Third, Ideas imply infinite determination in relation to the concept of understanding. The reason for this is that 'concepts are capable of comprehending more and more differences on the basis a properly infinite field of continuity' (Smith 2012: 110). In other words, Kant relies on infinite determination to specify objects completely in terms of properties they can possess (Somers-Hall 2013: 130). However, the problem of Kant, according to Deleuze, is that two of these components (the determinable and determined) are extrinsic characteristics of the Idea (as opposed to intrinsic) (Somers-Hall 2013: 131). The implication of this is that Ideas are understood in relation to existing states of affairs (the empirical). This is a problem because the Idea is therefore still understood in terms of solutions (ibid). In opposition to this, Deleuze needs to develop a fully intrinsic theory of Ideas, based on a principle of difference, in order to achieve immanence (Smith 2012: 110). This is where Deleuze turns to Leibniz (following Maimon's demands). In Deleuze's reformulation, the Idea has three co-existing moments (Smith 2012: 116). First, its elements are completely undetermined (virtual). Second, the elements are reciprocally determined when they enter a relation. Third, it can reach complete determination, which implies a set of singular points which define the multiplicity (along with ordinary points). The questions we have to answer now is how does Deleuze's reformulation of Kant contribute to Deleuze's reformulation of Plato? As Smith explains, Deleuze's theory of Ideas provides an answer to Plato's question of 'what *is* a thing, what is its essence?' (Smith 2012: 116). Given Deleuze's relation between the virtual and the actual, which involves the three moments of Ideas, the answer is the following: 'everything is a multiplicity, which unfolds and becomes within its own spatio-temporal coordinates… in perpetual relation with other multiplicities' (Smith 2012: 116). Therefore, the question of essence 'what is?' is replaced by the questions of becoming: 'How? Where? When? How much? From what point?' (Ibid). Since each thing follows its own movement of becoming, so we can only answer particular questions in relation to a particular moment in time. This can have important consequences for our conceptualisation of gender. As mentioned when talking about Deleuze's

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[121] As Smith explains, Kant's concept of Ideas is a reformulation of Plato. He critiqued Plato for granting Ideas a transcendent status. Deleuze's placing himself in the post-Kantian tradition involved a stand against Hegel, who is Kant's rival as a successor to Plato's theory of Ideas (2012: 106).

reformulation of Plato, it no longer makes sense to ask 'what is a woman?' However we can now ask particular questions about different expressions of gender. Second, if the Idea is no longer understood in terms of its solution, then we can understand the already existing expressions of the question of woman as temporary, there will always be more answers or expressions in the future. Third, the dynamic relationship between the virtual Idea and its actual expression can be of use for feminist theory for two reasons. As mentioned in chapter 6, particular expressions of a problem can be altered. For example, the infinitive 'to marry' can be connected to other infinitives beyond its particular expression in the actual (Williams 2008a: 191-192). The same can be done to the infinitive 'to love' - transforming common sense conceptions based on the couple, despotic love based on possession, bureaucratic love based on normalisation, etcetera (Gray 2018: 471-472). So the infinitive 'to be a woman' can be transformed through its different relations with other infinitives.

The body: Nietzsche and Spinoza

We can now move to Nietzsche as the next figure in the development of immanence. Similarly to Leibniz, Nietzsche is another figure that helps Deleuze to complete the Kantian project of immanence. However, now we are going to focus on the concept of critique, which will lead us to ethics. The problem of Kantian critique is that it leaves values untouched - making them transcendental. In Deleuze's words: 'Kant merely pushed a very old conception of critique to the limit, a conception which saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not on morality itself' (Deleuze 1983: 89). Therefore, while Kant judges life in the name of established values, Nietzsche's genealogy involves an evaluation of values in terms of their immanent mode of existence, which can be affirmative or negative (1983: 1-2). The critique of established values leads us to ethics as the evaluation of modes of existence, which are expressed by those values. This also brings Nietzsche and Spinoza together. As Robert Hurley explains, Nietzsche and Spinoza share 'a philosophy of forces or powers that compose such forms [man]' (1988: i). Therefore, they can be placed in Deleuze's project of moving beyond essence, since individuals are composed through the relations between different type of forces. As mentioned in chapter 3, according to Spinoza, if we form a relationship with something that agrees with us it increases our power to act, and conversely if we form a relationship with something that disagrees with us our power is decreased. Bodies can therefore combine with other bodies to form a more powerful whole, or destroy the cohesion of its parts (Deleuze 1988: 19). The same can be said of the mind. This is not about morality or values, but about how different relations affect bodies/minds in different ways. While we can be aware of the effects of compositions and decompositions (through the affects of sadness or joy), conscious knowledge is partial since we can only appreciate things from the particular perspective of our mind and body, and we are only aware of the transition between different states (potent and less potent ones, and vice versa) (Deleuze 1988: 20-21). The consequence of this is the devaluation of consciousness in favour of unconscious thought. A good way of explaining this is provided by Leibniz, who argues that our conscious perceptions are derived from minute unconscious

perceptions, which are then integrated into consciousness (Smith 2012: 119). For example, we apprehend the noise of the sea (conscious perception), which is composed of individual waves in relation to each other (minute unconscious perceptions).

However, it is important to clarify that the devaluation of consciousness in favour of unconscious thought does not involve putting the body above the mind. In order to maintain immanence, Deleuze needs to assure the equality of being, which involves the equality of the attributes of thought and extension (mind and body). While it might seem like the body is placed at the centre of Deleuze's ethics and over the mind, this is only to push the body to an equal position with the mind, since it has been traditionally relegated to the inferior position of the dualism. This attempt is inspired by Spinoza's theory of parallelism, which is constituted by three elements (Hardt 1993: 80-81). First, the separation of the mind and the body (in order to avoid one controlling the other); second, parallelism states that 'corporeality and thought are equal expressions of being' (Hardt 1993: 81); and third, both attributes are the same from the point of view of substance. This third point implies that whatever we affirm of one attribute can also be affirmed of the other. For example: '…an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind' (Deleuze 1988: 18). As argued in chapter three, the theory of parallelism has important consequences for the advancement of an immanent ethics. The reason for this is that it challenges the idea that the mind should control the body, which morality is based on (Deleuze 1988: 18).

Deleuze's rescuing of the body from its subordinate position to the mind aligns him with feminism. As we know, women have traditionally been associated with the body and the passions, placing them in an inferior position to men, who have been associated with consciousness. Therefore, the equality of the attributes can be connected to the fight for gender equality, since there is no longer a privileged term in the binary. However, the claim here is not that women, who are associated with the body, are now equal to men, who are associated with the mind. Deleuze's philosophy goes further than this: the point is that we cannot make this type of generalisations, since 'we do not know what a body can do' (Deleuze 1988: 17). As Hannah Stark argues: 'this remark positions the body as neither a definable nor knowable entity, but as a site of knowledge production and the location of experimental practices' (2017: 70-71). This implies the following: '…when Spinoza asks what a body can do he is inquiring about what relations it can enter into and the capacity for affect that will be facilitated by these relations' (2017: 71). In other words, there is a shift away from essence (what is a body?), into power (what can this particular body do?). The answer of the latter question is not fixed, it is constantly changing depending on the inter-relations of bodies (ibid). This poses a challenge to the individualist subject of liberal humanism, whose nature is portrayed as unchanging (Stark 2017: 10). Since bodies (in the broad sense of the word beyond the human) are defined by changing actions and affects, as opposed to their identity (2017: 72).[122] In Stark's words: 'the body cannot be thought of as the origin or final point of identity because embodied individuals are enmeshed in active processes of engagements with their surroundings' (2017: 73). This is connected to ethics and politics because of the

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[122] As Stark clarifies, the bodies that relate to each other do not need to be of the same type (2017: 73).

emphasis on the productive spaces between bodies, where bodies encounter each other making and re-making each other and the world (ibid).

Deleuze's conception of the body can be understood in terms of the undoing of the subject. Erinn Cunniff Gilson (2019) distinguishes three ways in which the subject is undone which Deleuze and feminism share. First, as shown in chapters 3 and 4, there is an ontological undoing of the subject: 'the subject is conceived as divided, split within itself, fragmented, and/or multiple' (2019: 58). This type of undoing refers to the different manners in which the self is constituted through external relations. While different theories disagree on the specific nature of this relationality, what they have in common is that the subject is not unified nor coherent (2019: 58-59). The subject is relational in two ways: it is always in the making, and it is composed of synthesis of different pieces (such as gestures, affects, ideas, etcetera) (2019: 59). Secondly, as shown in chapters 3 and 5, there is the epistemic undoing of the subject in which the knowing subject is decentered and destabilised. This is connected to the critique of the primacy of reason and conscious awareness, the critique of the biases of the dominant subject (as a white male, for example), and the presupposition of the transparency of subject (ibid). Lastly, as these thesis established throughout, there is a politico-ethical undoing: 'turning away from the quintessential idea of the individual as the locus for experience thought, value, and action' (2019: 59). This undoing is premised on the ontological undoing, but it has ethico-political implications, and it can be used as an ethico-political move. We have already touched on these three forms undoing in the previous paragraphs. However, they still need to be developed more in detail.

Time as an ontological undoing of the subject

We have already mentioned the importance of the inter-relations between different types of bodies, which increase or decrease their power to act (chapter 3). However, there is an important way in which Deleuze challenges the coherence of the subject which has not been addressed in this chapter yet - time. How? As developed in chapter 4, time involves three syntheses - the synthesis of habit, memory and the eternal return - which are unconscious. Therefore, the syntheses provide an account of the organisation of experience, without relying on an active subject (Somers-Hall 2013: 56). This can be understood in the context of Deleuze's critique of Kant's transcendental subject, where the subject is prior to experience, as opposed to being constituted through it. However, this should not be read as a rejection of consciousness, the point is that consciousness is a result of unconscious processes. In the first synthesis (habit) the arrow of time is established: from the past, to the future, in the present. So in the present, the past is retained, and the future is anticipated. In other words, an habit is created. After hearing a few ABs (AB AB AB), the next time we hear A we will expect B. In opposition to Kant, this does not rely on the activity of the subject, but on passive anticipation. This implies that we do not need to have advanced cognitive faculties to form habits, for instance, the rhythm of the heart can be seen as an habit (Somers-Hall 2013: 62-64).[123]

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[123] For this reason, Somers-Hall argues that the world is constituted as a field of different rhythms (2013: 65).

Then, we need a second synthesis of time in order for the present to pass into the past, and for the possibility of new presents. However, this does not mean that the present is simply stored in the past (like an archive). The past for Deleuze is a general past, which means it is not made up of separate memories (in opposition to the past of the first synthesis that is made up of particular instants) (Somers-Hall 2013: 68). The past exists prior to the passing present, as a ground - so the present can pass into it, becoming a dimension of it. The passing of the present into the past does not change the content of the present, nor does the past determine the present in any way. Nonetheless, the past does determine that the present must pass, and how it passes. It passes in two ways. First, to only return as difference. Second, as a change in the degree of contraction/relaxation of the past, as the present adds more levels into the past (Williams 2011: 82-83). This implies that the passing of the present does not change the past either, it just adds levels to it. The question that we have to answer is the following: how is active memory possible? (this is the guiding question of Deleuze's second synthesis of time). For active memory to be possible, the whole past needs to coexist with the present, since the present returns to the general past in order to remember (Williams 2011: 66). This return happens through contraction. However, there are two types of contraction: the one that relates the present and the past presents (which are then represented in active memory); and the contraction of the different levels of the past, where each level represents a different degree of contraction/relaxation of memory (Somers-Hall 2013: 71). The present is the most contracted state of the past, which is also the most general in terms of memory; and conversely, the most expanded memories are particular (Somers-Hall 2013: 69).[124] To sum up, the search towards the past is directed at general past (Williams 2011: 61), that is not broken up into different parts or memories - it is a whole (Somers-Hall 2013: 67-68), and that is approached at different degrees of contraction/relaxation which involve a different degree of generality/particularity.

Lastly, the third synthesis of time is important to move beyond identity and representation (Williams 2011: 86). Even though Deleuze's account of the pure past is not about representation (only active memory can be represented, while the pure past is the condition for this), the past can still form a relation of identity with the new present (for example through the identity of the subject) (ibid). Therefore, we need a subject that can be undone by time; and a present that is undetermined yet determinable by the pure and empty form of time. We can begin by looking at this form of time, then move to the subject. Deleuze was inspired by Kant's freeing of time from movement.[125] According to Kant, time was not a mode of succession, but succession is a way in which we organise time (Somers-Hall 2013: 75). So there is the possibility of conceiving time in a free state before being organised by succession. This does not mean that time cannot be ordered, it means that the representation of time is grounded in a non-representational form of time.

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[124] The present as the most contracted state of the past is different to the present of the first synthesis of time, which is the most contracted state of successive instants (Deleuze 1994: 82).

[125] This is the ancient conception of time where time was subordinated to the movement of the planets, for example. For a further explanation of the idea of time out of joint see Somers-Hall (2011 and 2013), Smith 2013, and Voss (2013a).

Furthermore, time becomes ordinal (Deleuze 1994: 88), which means that the way it is ordered is based on difference (for example, the difference between the first, second and third places in a race is not necessarily the same). Now we can move on to the conception of the subject. The problem of Kant was that he relies on a transcendental subject to synthesise experience into a unified structure (Somers-Hall 2013: 58). However, for the subject to be the condition of experience it has to be prior to experience (and prior to the synthesis that creates experience), which means we cannot explain its constitution (2013: 60-61). Additionally, while in Kant the subject is determined passively by the form of time, the problem is that passivity is restricted to receptivity, without transforming the identity of the active subject (Williams 2011: 83). Contrary to this, according to Deleuze, time transforms both the subject and the world. He does not get rid of the active subject, but activity presupposes passivity through the passive syntheses of time (2011: 81). In order to understand the openness of the system, we need to examine the third synthesis of time, which guarantees it (2011: 116). The third synthesis is the condition of the new in the first two (2011: 96). Why do they need novelty? The present needs novelty because it involves a transformation of the earlier series (for example: each AB sound gets more annoying). The past needs novelty because it relies on the change of relations in the past through different degrees of contraction and relaxation. Every time we repeat the past we change it (for example: the more essays I write the easier they tend to get). However, the first and second syntheses are also the condition for the necessity of novelty because they assure the impossibility of the return of the present (first synthesis), and the impossibility of the return of the past present (second synthesis) (2011: 104). Therefore, the third synthesis creates a fracture in time where everything that remains the same is ordered not to return, and only difference returns. This implies a struggle against habit and memory, where the actor of the first synthesis is erased by difference, and the past as condition in the second synthesis fails, since now the future sets what returns from the past - only difference (2011: 103-105). Nevertheless, it is important to remember that we need the three syntheses. Any activity in the present is connected to the whole of the past which it passes into, which then creates a change of intensity in the present in relation to the past; and then both syntheses lead to the third one that undoes their work and refuels them (2011: 2016).

Time and Feminism

Deleuze's philosophy of time can be of use for radical politics, such as feminism, because it provides an account of the constitution of habit and memory, while still maintaining the openness of the present and the future. According to the first synthesis of time every repetition of habit - which is retained as an anticipation of the future on the basis of the past (Somers-Hall 2013: 63) - introduces variation into the series. The consequence of this is that habits are more flexible than we would traditionally assume, since we are not actually repeating the same. However, it is important note that learning and unlearning habits, for Deleuze, is not about conscious repetition (Williams 2011: 37). While it is possible to attempt to repeat differently to challenge norms and habits, the process of habit acquisition is not fully conscious, so while we might experiment with it we cannot control it or anticipate what will work. Hence Deleuze's famous quote: 'there is no more a method for learning than there is a method for finding treasures…' (1994: 165). We can

understand this in opposition to Butler's parodic repetition of norms, which seems to rely on an active subject. Deleuze's approach to the past is also helpful to feminism. In chapter two, we looked at Oksala's turn to our shared feminist past in order to build a feminist politics of solidarity that moves beyond the single issue alliances of neoliberalism. The past, according to Oksala, is always incomplete in the sense of the different possibilities to respond to it from the present. Even though we cannot choose our past, we can pick which elements we want to use, and this changes who we are. Therefore, our identities and futures remain open. These are all points which Deleuze would broadly agree on, even though his justification is different to Oksala's, and he provides a deeper analysis of time. For Deleuze the past is also incomplete in the sense of the unlimited possibilities it holds. It is always open to new interpretations, levels of significance, and enactments, given that we change the meaning of the past by repeating it differently in the present. This also involves a selection of an element of the past to repeat in the process of counteractualisation (although this does not necessarily have to be a conscious selection, and if it was, it is hard to predict the consequences). Furthermore, according to Deleuze, our relationship with the past also involves a transformation of the subject in the present, although this transformation also includes the change of relations in the past in terms of contraction/relaxation. Lastly, for Deleuze the past also includes a collective aspect, although in a different way to Oksala. The past is the shared medium in which different lives communicate with one another by contracting it differently (Williams 2011: 74). However, as argued before Deleuze provides a deeper account of the constitution of the subject in time, which explains both the conditions of the production of difference and identity; without relying on an active subject, which would reintroduce transcendence.

   We can now turn to the work of Elizabeth Grosz (2000) to further examine how Deleuze's philosophy on time, in particular his commitment to thinking the concept of the new, can be of use for feminism. She argues that the question of time lies at the heart of any type of radical politics, even if this is not always recognised (2000: 214). However, it is important to note that Grosz focuses on Deleuze's work on Bergson, while we focused on the three syntheses of time in *Difference and Repetition.* Nonetheless some of the points that she makes are still relevant for us, since Deleuze's conception of time in *Difference and Repetition* was partially influenced by Bergson's ideas (particularly his conception of the past in the second synthesis of time).[126] Additionally, there are other points we can borrow for the purpose of this chapter, even if Bergson was not one of the main figures in this project. We can begin by looking at the role of the brain, which is to insert a gap between stimuli (perceptions and affections) and response (action) (2000: 220). This gap is important because it allows for unpredictable reactions. This is the case for more complex beings, as opposed to the automatic reactions of simpler beings: 'the more simple the form of life, the more automatic the relation between stimulus and response' (2000: 219). We can connect this to the concept of the virtual in the following way: there is a potential that lies in the gap that exists between the individual and the object encountered, something that is not acted on

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[126] For an explanation of the second synthesis of time and its relation to Bergson see Somers-Hall (2013: 65-72).

yet, which enriches and complicates life (2000: 221). This virtual potential is associated with the past (memory), so perceptions and affections are not completely embedded in the present (2000: 222). Bergson distinguishes between two types of memories. First, there is the memory of bodily habits, which is forward-looking (2000: 221) - this seems to coincide with the first synthesis of time, which Deleuze develops with the help of Hume.[127] Secondly, there is the memory of recollection, which takes us into the past (this coincides with the second synthesis of time). Here, the effects of the actual objects we encounter can be diminished, through the movement from the actual to the virtual (some aspects of the object are obscured, while others are distinguished). This is a similar movement to the one found in *The Logic of Sense,* where there is a change in relations of infinitives in the time of Aion (also from the actual to the virtual), which transform the meaning of marriage, or love, for example. The openness of the concept of the virtual, Grosz argues, can be of use for the development and reinvigoration of the notion of a radical future, without limiting to what already exists in the world (2000: 228); and as Smith reminds us, without creation ex-nihilo (2012: 253). Furthermore, we cannot forget the counter-movement from the virtual to the actual. Grosz describes this process as one of genuine creativity and innovation, since the virtual does not resemble the actual, so there is space for unpredictability (2000: 228). This shows that both movements are necessary for creativity and to bring unpredictability into the system, so there is no virtual priority. This is important for a feminist politics because the future is no longer understood 'in terms of tendencies and features of the present' (2000: 229). Instead, there is a sense in which the future is not entirely contained in the present (2000: 230). However, the problem of this account is that it is missing the third synthesis of time. As Williams argues: 'if we remove the eternal return, then we also neuter Deleuze's accounts of habits and repetition and memory as repetition' (2011: 118). As already mentioned, we need the third synthesis of time as the condition of novelty in the other two syntheses.

The epistemic undoing of the subject through learning

There are different ways in which Deleuze achieves an epistemic undoing of the subject. As mentioned in chapter 3, there is a critique of the primacy of reason and consciousness through the discovery of the unconscious (and unconscious thought) (this is inspired by Nietzsche, Spinoza and Leibniz). As Gilson explains, this is tied to the critique of the presupposition of the transparency of subject (2019: 59), since conscious perception is made up of unconscious minute perceptions (in the language of Leibniz), or the active (conscious) subject is constituted by passive syntheses beyond its control (in the language of *Difference and Repetition*). Now we can focus on the critique of the knowing subject. As mentioned in chapter 5, in *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze argues that learning has value in itself, independently of the production of knowledge (and the finding of already established solutions). The reason for this is that learning should be about creativity and change, not about what we already know about the world. This does not mean that Deleuze rejects knowledge, the point is that there needs to be a distinction between the process of learning (which involves creativity), and the end product (knowledge,

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[127] For an account of the first synthesis of time and its relation to Hume see Somers-Hall (2013: 62-65).

which comes about through creativity) (Hughes 2009: 85). This distinction (which is close to the distinction between the virtual and the actual) is crucial for explaining the production of difference. In other words, the conditions cannot resemble the conditioned, or we risk merely replicating what already exists in the world (Deleuze 1990b: 105). While learning is not purely virtual, when we learn we confront a virtual problem and the differential relations that compose it. In other words, our body expresses the virtual intensities of the problem, which lead to an actual solution, which we can then represent (knowledge).[128] The problem of focusing on knowledge is that we erase the constitutive relation between problems and solutions. This erasure leads to an illusory sense of closure, as if we had solved the problem definitively. However, the problem is never definitively solved, since it is never exhausted by a solution. In other words, a solution is merely one of the many singular expressions of the problem. Furthermore, solutions alter the problem, so there is always a two way relation between them. Thus by prioritising knowledge/solutions, we end up hindering the production of knowledge.

Deleuze's conception of thought is of use for feminism for several reasons. First, the focus on the bodily side of learning challenges the subordination of the body to the mind, and the hierarchy associated with it (men are placed higher than women). Furthermore, as Stark explains, the discovery of unconscious thought is also valuable for the same reason. In her own words: 'Removing thought from consciousness… challenges the very foundation of the system in which the alignment of man and mind has led to the masculine purchase of thinking' (2017: 18). Second, just as the subject is not autonomous, thinking is not an autonomous activity (Stark 2017: 19). Thinking is the result of an encounter with something that forces us to think and go beyond recognition. This challenges the idea of the autonomous (masculine) thinker of liberal humanism. Thirdly, Deleuze democratises thinking - it is not about higher (transcendental) ideas (Stark 2017: 20); nor about a transcendental subject with higher faculties. Thinking is an immanent process, in which we relate to the world (both the world and the subject are constituted by thinking) (ibid). Fourth, Deleuze's conception of thought also challenges other types of hierarchies, not only gender hierarchies (such as racial hierarchies, and the hierarchies between humans and not-humans, for example) (Stark 2017: 22). The reason for this, is that Deleuze recognises the specificity of thought, since thought arises from specific bodies that can have different capacities, genders, and races. There is no way in which a particular form of thinking could be deemed better, since there is no base for comparison. However, this does not mean that beings cannot be distinguished - we have different capacities to affect and be affected, although these are always changing. Lastly, thinking is not about what everybody knows about the world (ibid), but about creativity and producing more knowledge. This allows us to move beyond common sense ideas, which are used to reify gender inequalities.

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[128] Cutler and MacKenzie (2011: 53) argue that learning requires the engagement of one's own body with other bodies (for example: the body of the water while learning to swim).

The politico-ethical undoing of the subject

As Gilson explains, the politico-ethical undoing of the subject implies the 'turning away from the quintessential idea of the individual as the locus for experience thought, value, and action' (2019: 59). This is based on the ontological undoing of the subject, which has important consequences for ethics and politics. For example, in chapter 6, we addressed the ethical question of how to act in response to the ontological undoing of the subject (through time). This was also connected to the epistemological undoing of the subject because we think in time, and time introduces difference into thought (as the form in which existence is determinable). The implication of the two undoings is that ethics can not be grounded in the free will of the subject, nor in the identity of the subject. The question then becomes: how can we have ethics without the subject as a stable ground? James Williams and Leonard Lawlor work on this question. Williams asks: 'how to respond to events that constitute and dismember persons, individuals and worlds?' (2008a: 136); and the question inspired by Lawlor (2020) is: how to act in relation to others in a way that is adequate to the eternal return?

In order to answer these questions we are going to focus on the problem of becoming. As Lawlor (2020) explains, Deleuze's philosophy achieves the demoralisation of becoming. How is this the case? Since the present is always passing, and the only thing that is constant is the return of difference, time is disparate as opposed to ordered. Put in a different way, disorder is primary - because the return of difference is always disorganising things; and order is secondary - we can impose order to reality but things will always change. Therefore, the role of ethics is not to achieve order in the universe (this would go against the essence of time), but to embrace the disparateness of time. The problem, however, is that the return of difference produces the illusion of resemblance as an external effect. In other words, it seems like repetition is a repetition of the same. The role of ethics is therefore to help us avoid this illusion through the concept of others. While others can be reduced to identity and representation, and to common sense (what everybody knows), they can also be understood as the expression of possible worlds (the pre-individual fields of intensity that constitute and dissolve us). Therefore, others can be the location of disorder in the system. An example of this is the terrified face, which can be explicated (we can find the cause of terror), but it can also lead us to the terror of groundlessness (if we do not know the source). In order to assure the affirmation of groundlessness, Lawlor (2022) proposes an ethics of intensive quantities. The reason for this is that intensive quantities cannot be equalised, since they are composed of lower quantities or differences (for example, the number ten includes the numbers below it). So the first ethical imperative is to affirm the lowest (affirm the difference that constitutes/undoes us). The second ethical imperative is to not explicate the other too much - this happens when we reduce the other to an identity, which can be exchanged by another term. Conversely, not explicating the other too much means to let them go in their own direction (not to love them to the point of possession). To sum up, the point of both imperatives is to avoid the explication of difference once and for all. However, it is important to clarify that these two principles are unconditional categorical imperatives, which means they are emptied from empirical content. The reason for this is that the condition cannot resemble the conditioned. So ethics is not based on pre-established values, but on the empty form of time (Lawlor 2020: 130).

This is connected to the demoralisation of becoming because, if time is disparate, becoming is purified from empirical content. The point is not to become this or that thing, but to let individuals follow their own becoming in different directions (for example: becoming beyond the gender binary).

We can connect this to Deleuze's reversal of Platonism, where the process of becoming of the simulacrum is freed from the Identity of the Idea. So the point of ethics is not to resemble a higher Idea or principle, but to follow your own process of becoming which is based on difference. In other words, there is no right or wrong direction of becoming. As Williams (2011: 142-143) explains, the question 'which way (to become)?' becomes the question 'how much?'. So we can try different paths to different degrees (depending on how much our bodies can bear). Therefore, we can say that ethics embraces the ontological undoing of the subject, since it encourages the formation of different connections between bodies. Furthermore, ethics embraces the epistemological undoing of the subject by challenging the permanence of knowledge, since each ethical situation is singular (depending on the combination of bodies) (Williams 2011: 144). This implies that there can be no universal prescriptions. Nonetheless, there are some important clarifications that need to be made. First, this ethics is not individualistic, since it recognises our interconnectedness to others: we mutually affect each other, and we can increase our collective power when we come together. Furthermore, the is the recognition that the other is ongoing a process of transformation similar to ours, which should be respected (as Lawlor 2020 reminds us, do not explicate the other too much). Second, ethics is not about the maximisation of pleasure or individual gain. While experimentation is encouraged, the question of dosage is important, and there is a warning against suicide (Lawlor 2022).

Now, as explained in chapter 6, the question of becoming involves a move away from the presentist view of time into the realm of pure becoming, which is virtual. While the present (the time of Chronos) follows the rules of common sense (becoming follows one determinable direction), and good sense (which involves the correct assignation of identities); the realm of pure becoming, on the other hand, is the realm without measure. For example, when Deleuze claims that Alice becomes larger and smaller simultaneously, this goes against common sense. However, as Williams explains, the point is that in the virtual time (Aioin), there is a change of intensity in the relations of infinitives 'to grow' and 'to shrink' (2008a: 24). In other words, Alice is becoming larger than she was (if we are looking forward), smaller than she is (if we are looking backward), since we are taking into account the two changes (2008a: 28). This is important because becoming does not happen in a detached moment in time, becoming involves constant changes in intensity in all directions (2008a: 29). The question now is what is the relationship between the two sides of the event - the actual and the virtual? While the ideal side of the event gives events significance and sense, the bodily side of the event expresses these changes (without this infinitives would lack determination) (2008a: 33). However, the sense of the event is constantly changing. In order to understand this we need to look at the concept of counter-actualisation, which involves the transmutation of events. Put in a different way, there is doubling of the event beyond its actual expression. How does this happen? Lawlor (2022) explains this through the following steps: first, we need to understand the event as something that is not fixed (this implies understanding it in

terms of Aion); which leads to disengaging the event from its actual occurrence (and the denunciation of any final answer); then, we need to live the event, but not as a single hope or memory, but as incessant hoping and remembering; fourth, we need to avoid the full actualisation of the event which would lead to suicide (this is connected to the question of dosage: just enough embodiment). Lastly, this leads to understanding ourselves and others as unlimited questions. This is connected to the univocity of being, which implies all beings are equal (we all have the same form as a question), while also affirming difference (we are different answers). Lawlor (2022) understands the affirmation of univocity of being as the completion of the demoralisation of becoming. While this started as an attack of hierarchies between beings, the most positive side of the project is the liberation of becoming so beings can exercise their own power and push to the limit of what the mind and body can do.

Commonalities between feminist ethics and Deleuze's ethics

We can now turn to Gilson's work to sum up the main commonalities between feminist ethics and Deleuze's ethics. Broadly speaking, the main commonality between them is their approach, which can be described as both critical and constructive (2011: 64). They both involve an attack on traditional ethical theories, in addition to developing a different understanding of ethics as a counter-movement (ibid). In particular, Gilson identifies four main commonalities: the focus on experience, the focus on practices, their critique of the conventional understanding of subjectivity, and the political aspect of ethics. We can begin by looking at experience. Gilson argues that in both Deleuze and feminism ethics is connected to experience, as opposed to being purified from it (2011: 64). However, the difference is that while feminists want to remedy the occlusion of women's experience in ethics, for Deleuze the focus on experience is guided by the evaluation and creation of modes of existence. The second commonality between Deleuze and feminism is that ethics is about practices as opposed to adherence to rules (2011: 65). An example of this is how the value of care is embodied in practices and relations. This is similar to Deleuze's concern about the relationships between individuals. However, the difference is that Deleuze also focuses on pre-individual singularities. In Gilson's words: 'while feminist care ethics is certainly interested in the constitutive nature of relations, its emphasis is on the constituted subject rather than the singularities that constitute it' (2011: 65). Furthermore, Deleuze's emphasis is on transformative relations, as opposed to caring ones. The third commonality is the critique of the ethical subject as autonomous, rational, and independent. The argument is that this form of subjectivity demands submission: 'submission to a norm of what it means to be a "good" person, which implicitly determines the qualities of the virtuous as being masculine, as well as obedience to the moral law itself' (2011: 65-66). According to feminist philosophy, the moral subject is gendered and misleading due to its blindness of the role of constitutive relations. Similarly, Deleuze's critique of the subject moves away from the idea of autonomy by focusing on constitutive relations. This critique is connected to the undermining of dualist thinking and the hierarchies implied by it. Fourth, both Deleuze and feminism approach ethics in a political manner: 'the question of how to live ethically is fundamentally a political question' (2011: 66). The reason for this is that the conception of the subject that is being contested has political implications. The subject as

autonomous is based on a series of hierarchies that leads to the subordination of certain groups (including women). Contrary to this, both Deleuze and feminism enlarge the concern of ethics to a way of living that goes beyond the human.

Becoming-woman

In this chapter, I have argued that Deleuze's development of immanence is of use for feminist theory, and that feminism and Deleuze share important commonalities. However, it is important to mention that the possible alliance between Deleuze and feminism is complicated by the controversy of the concept of becoming-woman. As Gilson explains: the concept '…has evoked the most debate and skepticism from feminist readers of Deleuze' (2011: 66). Gilson mentions four charges made against becoming-woman by feminists: it is based on a stereotypical reading of femininity, it appropriates femininity for men's becoming, it neglects women's specificity, and it disregards the lives of actual women (in favour of virtual becoming) (2011: 67). These attacks are serious: 'if the most significant treatment of women, sex, and sexuality in Deleuze's work amounts to an effacement of women, then his thought is likely to be of little use to feminists' (Gilson 2011: 67). We have already mentioned some of these critiques. As mentioned in chapter 3, even though Butler (1987b) does not mention the concept of becoming-woman, she accuses Deleuze of holding an invariant/ahistorical conception of desire. So we can assume that he would be unable to account for the specificity of female desire, for example. However, according to Deleuze and Guattari, desire is always assembled in a particular way by social formations, so there is no free (invariant) desire (Smith 2012: 182). Moreover, Butler states that the subjection of desire is achieved through ideological means (Butler 1987b: 206). This underplays the way Deleuze and Guattari pair Nietzsche and Marx to further the materialist agenda of their project.[129] Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 6, Alice Jardine accuses Deleuze and Guattari of putting 'forth some surprisingly sterotyped genderizations and images of women' (1984: 47); 'the female body as invented by men' (1984: 50); which has 'little to do with *women'* (1984: 52). As Gray (2018) argues, these type of critiques arise from the tension between the corporeal and the incorporeal in Deleuze's work. To respond it is important to note that Deleuze does not privilege the incorporeal. The point is that incorporeal transformations in the realm of bodies and states of affairs are the effect of the material interaction between bodies and assemblages. This creates a change of sense in the pure incorporeal realm of Aion, which then feeds back into Chronos. Therefore, Deleuze can affirm both the constitution of the individual subject or body, and its dissolution.

Another example of a feminist critique of Deleuze and Guattari is given by Elizabeth Grosz (1994: 182). She makes three points: first, she criticises Deleuze and Guattari for not being attentive to the specificity of women, and for not being aware of the masculinity of their statements; second, she claims that women are the vehicles for male becoming; and third she argues that they deterritorialise women's bodies and subjectivities only to re-territorialise them in a universalistic movement of becoming. While she recognises that they have much to offer to feminism, she argues that the issue of becoming-woman is extremely serious: 'Until it becomes

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[129] Here I am using Buchanan's (2008: 135) point to respond to Butler.

clearer what becoming-woman means for those beings who are women, as well as or those beings who are men, the value of their work for women and form feminism remains unclear' (Grosz 1994: 182).[130] Gilson offers an alternative account of becoming-woman in order to respond to Grosz's concern about the specificity of women. The question she asks is the following: 'is becoming woman a process that ignores the specificity of women or is it rather is it a process that attends to that specificity? And, if the latter, in what ways might it so attend?' (Gilson 2011: 68). In order to answer she specifies three components of the concept. To begin with, one of the components of becoming-woman is the concept of becoming-minoritarian, which relies on the distinction between the minor and the major. As Gilson explains, since all becoming is minoritarian, becoming always happens in relation to minor terms, and it destabilises the major term. The role of major identities (such as male, white, rational) is to serve as a standard, which imposes a hierarchy on everything that differs. However, it is important to note that even major terms depart from the standard in some way; and even minor terms are formed in relation to the standard. So both major and minor terms have to become-minoritarian to challenge it. In Gilson's words: 'Becoming, then, is a process of departing from the standard, the norm, and the dominant pattern, a transformation not just of majoritarian identity but of the minor, which has been defined in relation to it' (2011: 68). This explains why Deleuze and Guattari claim that man is always the subject of becoming, not because only men become, but because becoming always happens in relation to the male standard (2011: 68-69). In other words: 'the subject that desubjectifies itself, undoes its constitution in relation to the dominant paradigm, is a subject that has been defined in relation to "man"' (2011: 69). So becoming-woman breaks with dualist thinking by creating a rupture with the relationship to the man-standard, and femininity which is constructed in opposition to it. Therefore, becoming-woman (as a form of becoming-minoritarian) is not about woman as the inferior side of the binary with men; nor as adopting feminine characteristics (it is not a process of imitation).

The second component of the process of becoming-woman is the relationship between the body and normalised subjectivity (Gilson 2011: 70). As already mentioned, becoming-woman, as a minoritarian process, breaks away from the dominant paradigm of men and woman (masculinity and femininity). This implies that becoming-woman diverges from the model of sex/ gender. To sum up, while the the molar subjectivities of men and women are constituted by the theft of the body and the domestication of bodily affects, becoming-woman is a way of de-structuring the body (2011: 70-71). How? We can begin by explaining the theft of the body. This involves the normalisation of the body by enforcing sexual dimorphism (the male or female sex), and the gender binary (for example, two gender attitudes and roles associated with sex). As Gilson explains: 'Such a system involved taming the body so that it falls in line with the appropriate one of these two options. This "theft" of the body — the teleological organisation of its sexual organs, the restriction and channeling of forces, the modelling of its capacities into acceptable patterns — sexes and sexualizes it' (2011: 70). The theft includes the organisation of

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[130] For example, Grosz recognises that Deleuze and Guattari's critique of the dualisms of Cartesianism is helpful for feminism (1994: 182-183).

the sexual organs, which codifies the erogenous zones of the body: 'when the genitals are deemed the appropriate erogenous zones, erotic and sexual activity is both limited to activity between the two sexes and subordinated to reproductive ends' (ibid). On the other hand, becoming-woman - as the process of deterritorialization of men and women - steals back the body from the organisation of sexed subjectivity. This challenges the sex binary and unhinges sexuality from the teleological paradigm (2011: 71). The third component of the concept of becoming-woman, according to Gilson, is that becoming is a matter of 'alliance, contagion, and involution in contrast to filiation, heredity, and evolution: what is at stake In becoming is production rather than reproduction' (2011: 71). While relations of sexual reproduction depend on two fixed and opposite sexes, relations of production based on the alliances of becoming-woman lead to a different conception of sexual difference beyond the binary of men/women. Sexual difference can be conceived as a multiplicity of sexual differences "n sexes". Furthermore, while becoming as an evolution involves progressive formation and development, becoming as an involution entails a process of simultaneous deformation and recreation (ibid).

To sum up, Gilson uses the last two components of becoming woman — 'that becoming-woman is a matter of loosening the trip of normative sex/gender arrangements on the body, and that becoming-woman creates sexual differences outside of these arrangements through its "unnatural nuptials"' (2011: 71) — to specify the relation between becoming-woman and specific women, in order to respond to Grosz (1994). The argument is that becoming-woman is an answer to the bodily subjection of normalised subjectivity based on the binary of sex/gender. Therefore: 'the concept speaks directly to the conditions in which actual women live rather than viewing them as vehicles for men's becoming or sweeping them up in a broader movement of transformation' (Gilson 2011: 71-72). In particular, the concept is connected to women's bodies (and their relation to men's bodies). The aim is to increase the capacity of bodies to affect and be affected, in ways unaccounted by dualist interpretations of sex/gender. Furthermore, even though becoming-woman is an abstract concept it allows Deleuze and Guattari to account for the singularity of bodies. How is this the case? To answer the question we need to understand that the categories of sex/gender are general concepts. The difference of individuals is thus subordinated to one of the two groups they can belong to (men/woman). Deleuze and Guattari challenge this system, which means they are able to account for the difference that produce the multiplicity of individuals ('n sexes'). Lastly, Gilson argues that given the critique of the theft of the body, it is unlikely that the concept of becoming-woman would permit women becoming the vehicles for men's becoming. In Deleuze and Guattari, corporeality is a place of resistance to normalisation (2011: 74). However, it is important to clarify that the body is conceived as an active force, which is productive of meaning, as opposed to a natural given, or a surface which meaning is constructed through representations and ideological systems (2011: 72). In Colebrook's words: 'Masculinity and femininity are more than mental or cultural representations; but at the same time they cannot be appealed to as self-presenting substances or essences given once and for al through certain attributes or qualities' (Colebrook in Gilson 2011: 73). This is one of the main differences between Deleuze and Guattari and Butler (1999), for Butler the body is a discursive site (Stark 2016: 64), and gender is inscribed on the surface of the body.

Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter is important for the project of feminist immanent critique because it joins the task of the attainment of immanence to feminism. The journey from Plato to Kant, Nietzsche and Spinoza achieves the following. First, the development of a concept of pure difference leads to the impossibility of judgement. The reason for this is that if beings are constituted by difference, there is no original to compare them to. So we cannot say that a particular expression of womanhood is superior to others, for example. However, this does not mean that we cannot say anything about beings at all. Beings can still be evaluated in terms of their mode of existence, or the mode of existence of the collectivities they form, and their effects on themselves and others. We cannot encourage the unlimited affirmation of desire at the expense of others, and ourselves. Furthermore, we can also ask particular questions about being, which replace the question 'what is it the essence of a thing?'. For example, we can ask 'how much of this path of becoming? And how much of the other path?' Instead of being limited to an essence of womanhood, or to any particular identity. Second, given the distinction between problems and solutions, we can encourage multiple expressions of the question of gender, as opposed to a single answer; and we can change the sense of events such as marriage and love. Third, there is a devaluation of consciousness in favour of thought and the body, which democratises them. The reason for this is that they cannot be defined in advance, and there can be no universal standard which is used as a measure to subordinate others. This achieves the equality of being, while taking into account differences in terms of capacities (univocity). Furthermore, the body and the mind work together (instead of in opposition to the other), and they become sites of active experimentation, which link us to others. Lastly this is all connected to the ethical task of increasing our collective capacity to act, and freeing becoming from a pre-given path or telos, and from the limitations of the present.

Conclusion: The Encounter Between Oksala, Butler, and Deleuze

To conclude, feminist immanent critique is a positive conception of critique that requires careful consideration of the ways in which the subject is continually constituted, undone and reconstituted, without reinstating a dogmatic image of the critical subject. Thereby, feminist immanent critique embraces an asubjective and, therefore, demoralised version of becoming without losing ethical responsiveness to the present, to ourselves, and to others. That said, it is a positive conception of critique that does not rely upon a presentist view of time, one that frees becoming from a sense of pre-given direction or telos.

This conception of critique was inspired by Butler's *Gender Trouble,* where she develops an account of how gender, sex, and desire are constituted by the institutions of phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality. Phallogocentrism refers to the construction of masculine meaning in opposition to the feminine, which is subordinated to the masculine. Compulsory heterosexuality, on the other hand, assumes the causal relation between sex gender and desire. Furthermore, Butler provides an account of immanent resistance through the parodic repetition of norms. Therefore, following Butler, I argue that the two requirements of immanent critique are providing an account of the constitution of the subject, and its undoing. These two elements are also present in Oksala and Deleuze. In addition to this, Butler was a good starting point for this project because she submitted the feminist movement of thought to a much needed immanent critique through her examination of the concept of woman as a foundation. Butler's concern is how the restriction of the meaning of gender to received notions of masculinity and femininity often has homophobic consequences, even when this is done by feminism (1999: vii-viii). This is part of a more general concern about the political consequences of establishing single causes and foundations, or as an origin to phenomenon, which can lead to the exclusion of whatever does not fit this model (1999: xxix, 8). This critique applies to the fixing of gender by biology, but also by culture through a set of laws (psychoanalysis) (1999: 12). In opposition to this, Butler's aim is to open up the category of gender: 'the aim of the text was to open up the field of possibility for gender without dictating which kinds of possibilities ought to be realised' (1999: viii). Butler's concern about the exclusion of others by categories, and her aim to open them up without a pre-given direction, is an endeavour to which this project seeks to contribute.

However, one of the problems of Butler's account is that she ends up reinstating the subject through her appeal to contradictions. We have already mentioned how discursive contradictions do not necessarily undermine dominant discourses. It can make them more flexible and adaptable.[131] However, we haven't mentioned how contradictions are connected to Butler's political goal: recognition. As Stark explains, Butler argues that things are constituted through negation - in opposition to what they are not (Stark 2017: 106). The implication of this is our interdependence to others: 'existence is confirmed by the acknowledging look of the Other' (2017: 107). This refers back to the point, mentioned in chapter 1, that some bodies are recognised and others are not, and some qualify at humans and others do not, which has

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[131] For a further explanation of this see Halperin (1995).

dangerous consequences for those at the outside (their lives might be considered less valuable) (1999: xxii). As Stark argues, the problem of recognition is that it risks complicity with regimes of visibility: 'recognition becomes coded as that which is visible and articulable and what is beyond recognition is rendered invisible' (2017: 103). Moreover, an unintended consequence of the fight for intelligibility is the erasure of difference. This is Grosz' point, she explains that the new is tied to what is already known (2001: 103). Contrary to this, Stark reminds us that the struggle should not be for identity, but for opening up the category of women (2017: 104). This was Butler's aim too, but the appeal for recognition undermines this. As we will see, Deleuze's philosophy of difference offers an alternative to the concept of recognition. His main argument is that identity and recognition are secondary effects of difference (2017: 105). However, this does not mean that we should reject all molar politics, as the type of politics that is concerned with the recognition of female subjectivity.[132] As Colebrook argues, there might be tactical justifications for molar politics (2000: 1). This is something that Deleuze and Guattari recognised: 'it is indispensable, of course, for women to conduct molar politics, with a view to winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity…' (1987: 276). Nonetheless, as Colebrook explains, we need to be aware that the female subject as a ground might limit the process of becoming of the women's movement (2000: 1).

The second inspiration of this project is Oksala. She is helpful for this project because of her defence of the positive relation between feminism and philosophy; and her motivation to avoid the appeal to identities, which would reify the oppression of women.[133] Furthermore, similarly to Butler, she also provides an account of the constitution of the subject that is inspired by Foucault. They both talk about the role of institutions, practices, discourses, and discipline in the constitution of gender, although their main focus is different. Oksala provides an account of gender under neoliberalism, while Butler focuses on institutional heterosexuality and phallogocentrism in theories of gender construction. However, the main difference between them, and what makes Oksala's approach better at accounting for change, is their approach to transcendental philosophy. In opposition to Butler, Oksala argues that immanence requires transcendence.[134] Oksala spends a lot of time developing the transcendental conditions of feminist immanent critique. This is the gap between experience and language (experience exceeds the discourses used to describe it), which opens up a space for the denaturalisation and transformation of the historically contingent metaphysical schema that organise reality. According to Oksala, metaphysical schema can be contested because they are embedded in practices and

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[132] Colebrook defines molar politics as the politics 'concerned with a specifically female subjectivity' (2000: 1), Above, I added the word 'recognition' to this definition to connect it to Butler.

[133] The problem of identity politics is the following: 'the past cannot be redeemed unless the identity of women ceases to be invested in it, and women's identity cannot cease to be invested in the past without women giving up their identity' (Oksala 2016: 149).

[134] This is something that Oksala and Deleuze have in common. Oksala develops this point through Foucault (she argues that Foucault does not reject metaphysics) and phenomenology. For a comparison of phenomenology and Deleuze's transcendental approach see Lawlor (2012).

they are shaped by power, so even though individuals alone cannot alter them, there can be a collective political struggle against them that slowly brings about change.[135] Furthermore, Oksala deals with the issue of how to create a feminist politics of solidarity without relying on identity. Her answer is relying on our shared feminist past as a source of strength that disrupts the narratives of progress, and open up the present and the future. The first benefit of Oksala's approach is that there is a greater sense of historical contingency in the constitution of the subject, since experience exceeds discourse (experience is not simply made possible by discourse). This allows Oksala to avoid discursive idealism. Moreover, there is also a greater sense of historical contingency through her appeal to the past, which has the power to disrupt the present. In this sense, Oksala is more in tune with Foucault than Butler. This bring us to the second benefit of Oksala's approach, her appeal to transcendental philosophy makes her better able to account for change without relying on contradictions. However, we need to turn to Deleuze, because we are still missing a deeper account of time, and a deeper examination of the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical. Furthermore, the problem of Oksala is that she reintroduces the subject through her appeal to the active subject of higher philosophical reflection needed to denaturalise metaphysics. So while Butler reintroduces the subject through her Hegelian influence, Oksala does so through phenomenology.

Now, Deleuze provides an account of the constitution of the subject in different ways. To begin with, as shown in chapter 3, Deleuze challenges the idea that the subject is based on an essence, which needs to be realised by morality. Instead, Deleuze replaces essence with power of action, which cannot be known in advance. This difference can be quantitative; and qualitative, in terms of the different modes of existence (as the different ways in which people realise their power of action). Spinoza identified two main modes of existence, from which others derive: sadness and joy. The difference between them is that sadness decreases our power to act, and joy increases it. This is connected to our relations with others: 'When a body "encounters" another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts' (Deleuze 1988: 19). Therefore, the body (and the mind) are defined by their capacity to affect and be affected by other bodies (and minds). This challenges the idea of the subject as a foundation for ethics because the subject is not known in advance, we are constituted through our relations with an external world, and the re-discovery of the body leads to the discovery of the unconscious (we are constituted by relations between unconscious forces). Furthermore, this conception of the subject maintains immanence, through the affirmation of the equality of being (all beings are part of the same expression of being), while recognising their differences in power. Then, as shown in chapter 4, Deleuze provides an account of how the subject is constituted in time (as the form in which existence is determinable) by syntheses outside of our control that constitute habits, memories, and ensure only the return of difference. Subsequently, in chapter 5, we examined Deleuze's account of the constitution of thought, without relying on an active

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[135] The disagreement here is about the status of practices. While Butler understands Foucault's focus on practices as a rejection of metaphysics, Oksala does not.

subject. Thought is produced through an encounter with a sign that cannot be recognised and forces us to think. This is connected to learning, which also involves an encounter with signs, which we grasp in the form of a problem that can have different solutions (Bowden 2017: 235). However, this is not only about the mind, learning involves the encounters between particular bodies that transform each other. Lastly, in chapter 6, we looked at how the interactions between bodies in the actual (the time of Chronos in the language of *The Logic of Sense)* also have an effect in the virtual (the time of Aion). The relation between bodies involves a transformation of the sense of the event, which then feeds back into the actual. While the virtual would not exist without being expressed in the actual, without the virtual there would be no change of sense of events. Aside from the constitution of the subject, Deleuze is important for this project because of his affirmation of the demoralisation of becoming. This is done in two ways. First, the constant passing of the present means that there can be no order or stable foundation, and since there is no essence to achieve either, becoming is freed from a pre-given path. Second, becoming is freed from a presentist view of time through the return of difference.[136]

As summarised above, in Deleuze there is a clear consideration of how the subject is constituted through external relations, and within time. In opposition to Butler, Deleuze avoids the problem of relying on contradictions through the mutually constitutive relationship between the virtual and the actual (related by the process of different/ciation, and individuation, as shown in chapter 7).[137] In opposition to Oksala, Deleuze avoids the reintroduction of the active subject through his appeal to involuntary thought, and the introduction of time into thought as the undetermined. Furthermore, the positive side of the demoralisation of becoming is the liberation of beings so that they can exercise their own power (Lawlor 2022: 129). However, there are still some dangerous misunderstandings of Deleuze that we need to avoid. These misunderstanding would undermine the project of feminist immanent critique assembled from him work. First, feminist immanent critique cannot be about the unlimited affirmation of becoming without regards for ourselves and for others. This is connected to the second point, feminist immanent critique cannot be simply about individual becomings in isolation to others and the world. Third, the feminist immanent critique cannot escape the present and the politics of this world.[138] If this was the case, then the project of feminist immanent critique inspired by Deleuze's ethics could be deemed as 'unresponsive' to the present and to the subject.[139] As Gilson explains, this can be understood as part of a broader worry from feminist thinkers: '…which is that the ethos of Deleuze's philosophy does not advocate responsibility and lacks attentiveness to social, historical context because the insistence on creative deterritorialization and the production of novelty

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[136] See Lawlor 2020 and 2022.

[137] As Thiele highlights, the virtual does not oppose the actual, there is a relation of vice-diction, which acts transversally (as opposed to a relation of contradiction) (2016: 119-121).

[138] See Hallward (2006).

[139] The use of the term 'unresponsive' is inspired by Gilson (2011). She refers to the worry about the unresponsiveness to the particularity of subjects in favour of a universalist movement of becoming (2011: 75).

precludes such contextualization and responsiveness' (2011: 75). Against this view, Gilson argues that Deleuze's ethics does entail the responsiveness that feminists seek (ibid). In order to demonstrate this, she turns to the relationship between problems and solutions in *Difference and Repetition*), the relationship between events and solutions in *The Logic of Sense*, the concepts of utopia and responsive becoming in *What is philosophy?*, and the idea of caution in *A Thousand Plateaus*.

To begin with, Gilson argues that the dynamic between problems and solutions is responsive. The reason for this is that problems, for Deleuze, are productive. This implies that they generate responses through experimentation. Therefore, for solutions to be responsive to the world, we need them to not be determined in advance (as opposed to being traced from what already exists in the world). Furthermore, solutions never fully solve the problem, which means we must keep experimenting and responding to the world. If we forget the problem, we end up with abstract general solutions, which are not meaningful anymore (2011: 76). To this we need to add that problems are also transformed by solutions (Williams 2003: 134), so the movement from problems and solutions, and from solutions to problems, is even more necessary and responsive. We can also say something similar about Deleuze's concept of the body developed in this thesis. Similarly to problems, the body is also productive, in this case through its capacity to affect and be affected. This implies that the body is not determined or defined in advance. We do not know how a body might be affected when it encounters other bodies, or how it will affect them. Therefore, we can say that the body is responsive to the world. It needs to experiment with it in order to learn and to produce temporary knowledge. To paraphrase Stark, the body is not a definable or knowable entity, it is a site of knowledge production and the location of experimental practices (2017: 70-71). Furthermore, Deleuze's conception of the body challenges the unresponsiveness of individualism (it is unresponsive because the subject is already constituted) through the emphasis of our relations to others. In Stark's words, bodies 'form aggregates with other bodies' (2017: 71).

Second, Gilson connects the responsiveness to the problem in *Difference and Repetition* to the responsiveness to the event in *The Logic of Sense.* As already mentioned, the event has two sides: its particular embodiment in bodies and states of affairs (what actually happened), and the incorporeal side of the event which gives it sense or meaning. Deleuze's ethics involves willing and expressing the event in order to be worthy of it. Gilson argues that willing the event is responsive because it demands engaging with it creatively, as opposed to passive acceptance (Gilson 2011: 77). However, this creative engagement does not mean that we deny what happened to us. As both Gilson and Williams (2011: 156) reminds us, willing the event involves the two sides of the event: its embodiment in states of affairs (in the physical side, which is not denied), and its change of sense - *in the ideal side*. The move from the actual side of the event to the physical side can be understood as a re-doubling or a counter-actualisation. Lawlor (2022) explains this process in detail. It has four senses. We first grasp the event in terms of the time of Aion, which is unlimited.[140] This does not mean that we escape the present, it means that the

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[140] For an explanation of the unlimitedness of the event see Lawlor (2012).

present can have unlimited meanings. This brings us to the second sense of counteractualisation, which involves the affirmation of the multiple possible answers to the question of 'what happened' (in relation to the event), against one single answer. The third sense involves the embodiment of hoping and remembering, as opposed to one hope and one memory. However, embodiment is dangerous, if taken to the extreme it can lead to suicide. So the fourth sense of counter-actualisation is embodying events just enough, while avoiding suicide. As Williams explains, it is a question of dosage (2011: 143). Lastly, the ultimate meaning of counter-actualisation involves understanding ourselves, and others as events. This implies that we are all different open answers to the same question (the question of being). This shows that counter-actualisation is responsive to the present - it engages creatively with what happens to us; it is not individualistic, since there is the understanding of others being events just like us (without forgetting that we are all open questions); and it is not about the limited affirmation of desire: while experimentation is encouraged we need to think about the question of dosage.

Third, Gilson turns to Deleuze and Guattari's *What is Philosophy?* to show that concepts are also responsive to events and to problems (2011: 78). To be more precise, concepts express events, and they determine problems and their solutions. Therefore creating problems can be understood as an ethical activity due to its relation to the event. Furthermore, Gilson argues that concept creation is responsive to the present through the concept of utopia. This concept does not mean an ideal which we aspire to, but a form of revolution that links concept to their own epoch in order to transform it. Deterritorialisation is always connected to the present. We can now appreciate the relationship between creativity and critique: utopian becomings are responsive to the present 'because they productively react against the limiting conditions of the present' (ibid). So as I argued in chapter 6, the point of becoming is not to flee the present. Becoming is done for the present: we free the present from what already exists. Becoming-woman, therefore, can be understood '…as a creative way of taking up, inventing, or resisting modes of sexed corporality because there are modes of sexed subjectivity to which to respond' (Gilson 2011: 78).

The question then becomes what is the relationship between becoming and history? As Gilson explains, becoming responds to the historical conditions of the present, without being historical. However, this does not mean that Deleuze, lacks attentiveness to the historical present. As Gilson explains, history is important as the negative conditions that make experimentation possible in order to move beyond it (2011: 79). Furthermore, this does not mean that Deleuze is not attentive to the concreteness of women's experience: 'One does not have to fix experience, a process, an event in a determinate moment in time in order to achieve concreteness' (ibid). We can connect the creation of concepts to the creation of values in *Nietzsche and Philosophy.* Following Gilson's argument about concepts, we can argue that values are also responsive to events and to problems. This is the case because values are not created in the abstract. We first need an ethical evaluation of current values in terms of the mode of existence they express, which paves the way for the creation of new values. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze argues that the conditions for critique and creation are the same, we need to get rid of the dogmatic image of

thought that limits thinking to what already exists in the world. So then we can move away from the old values by changing their sense, or create new ones.

Now before we move on to Gilson's engagement with *A Thousand Plateaus,* there is an important concept in *What is Philosophy*? that she examines: responsibility. This concept highlights how the process of becoming is not only responsive to historical conditions, but also to others (2011: 79). However, this concept is redefined to being responsible *before others,* meaning: 'being among and within the singularities of a multiplicity which we cannot recognise, something that lost its molar form' (Lawlor in Gilson 2011: 79). Therefore, in Gilson's words, responsibility as a question of becoming '…involves and demands a certain mode of relationship and engagement with others, and not simply with them as molar entities but with that which composes them' (2011: 79). We are responsible before others because we are linked to and we become with others. This is an ethical endeavour which focuses on the transformation of the capacities of bodies in relation to other bodies (2011: 80). As Gilson explains, to be responsible implies avoiding connecting with bodies that diminish our power, in favour of compositions that increase our mutual power. This is another reason why, according to Gilson, becoming-woman does not involve using women for men's becoming. Becoming-woman by men requires the facilitation of others becomings, including women's. However, we need to add a clarification to Gilson's argument. Responsibility should not be understood as a moral value. The reason for this is that we cannot tell which relationships are beneficial for us in advance, so there needs to be room for experimentation. Furthermore, prohibitions are not universal, they depend on the particular bodies involved; and they can change (things that were beneficial for us can become toxic). We can connect Gilson's use of the concept of responsibility to Lawlor's (2020) claim that we should not explicate each other too much by allowing them to follow their own becoming. This is connected to not loving the other too much, to the point of possession.

Lastly, Gilson turns to *A Thousand Plateaus* to explain that becoming is responsive because it is is cautious, planned and deliberate (2011: 81). This does not mean that there is a particular goal to becoming. It means that there has to be a deliberate mode of attack or engagement against a particular strata. Furthermore, we cannot have unlimited becoming. In Deleuze and Guattari's words: 'you have to keep small supplies of signifiance and interpretation, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality' (1987: 160). In terms of gender: 'Only through such a relation with the norms and forms of subjectivity that one seeks to evade and subvert is one able to do just that' (2011: 81). So Deleuze and Guattari do not advocate for the excessive deterritorialisation of everything. The movement of becoming is tied to the construction of specific forms of resistance, for example the construction of new forms of living beyond the gender binary (2011: 82). To sum up, ethics according to Gilson is simultaneously responsive and creative: 'for the creation of the new to be constructive (rather than haphazard or destructive), it must be responsive, and for responsibility or responsiveness to be forward-looking (rather than merely retroactive), it must be creative' (2011: 83).

To conclude, feminist immanent critique is responsive to the present for several reasons. First, it fights against the subordination of difference to the identity of a category (such as gender). Second, it fights against the hierarchy of the mind over the body, which places women in a subordinated position to men. Third, it fights against the hierarchies established by active conceptions of thought (for example between the rational and the irrational, with women often associated with the irrational side of the binary), and in favour of the democratisation of thought.[141] Fourth, it fights against the dominant norms of subjectivity, which pre-determine and limit the possibilities for becoming.[142] Fifth, it fights against the exclusion and the violence of normalisation.[143] Sixth, it fights agains the individualism of liberal and neoliberal feminism. Seventh, it prioritises connecting to the world and changing it, as opposed to representing it. In its positive form, feminist immanent critique embraces the demoralisation of becoming, beyond pre-determined paths, and beyond what already exists in the world. Becoming is grounded in relations with others, which mutually transform us (Gilson 2011: 83); and empower us; it is cautious (Gilson 2011: 81), it is against suicide (Lawlor 2022), it is concerned with matters of dosage (Williams 2011). All of this is done hoping for new presents.

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[141] This is inspired by Stark's claim that Deleuze democratises thinking (2017: 20).

[142] This point is inspired by Gilson's claim that Deleuzian ethics contest the dominant norms of subjectivity, and it is therefore inherently political and responsive to the present (Gilson 2011: 83).

[143] See Taylor (2009); and Chambers and Carver's (2008) explanation of the concept of normative violence, inspired by Butler.

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