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**The Peculiar Relationship: Contemporary Anglo-French Defence
Cooperation**

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the current status of contemporary Anglo-French defence cooperation and consider its relevance to British defence policy. To do so it provides an overview of both existing literature on Anglo-French relations and the historical background of the relationship. It also considers several international relations theories which are relevant to the relationship. To further its analysis it considers three case studies, those being the Lancaster House Treaty, the 2011 intervention in Libya and Brexit. The thesis concludes that defence cooperation with France is of vital importance to the UK, but the relationship has been imperilled by Brexit.

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Abbreviations

AHB – Air Historical Branch

ARRC - Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

BEF - British Expeditionary Force

BTO – Brussels Treaty Organisation

C2 - Command and Control

CARD – Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

CDS – Chief of the Defence Staff

CJEF – Combined Joint Expeditionary Force

CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy

E3 – European Three

EAG – European Air Group

EC – European Community

EDA – European Defence Agency

EDF – European Defence Fund

EEC – European Economic Community

EFP - Enhanced Forward Presence

EI2 – European Intervention Initiative

ESC - European Security Council

ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy

EU – European Union

FC/ASW – Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon

FCAS – Future Combat Air System

Finabel - European Army Interoperability Centre

GPS - Global Positioning System

HLWG – High Level Working Group

HQ - Head Quarters

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IR – Integrated Review

ISTAR - Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance

LRG - Littoral Response Groups

MdCN - Missile de Croisière Naval

MINUSMA - United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MMCM - Maritime Mine Countermeasures

MoD – Ministry of Defence

MoD – Ministry of Defence

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NRF – NATO Reaction Force

OCCAR - Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation

PANG - Porte Avion Nouvelle Generation

PESCO – Permanent Structured Cooperation

RAF – Royal Air Force

RUSI – Royal United Services Institute

SAS – Special Air Services

SBPP - Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing Programme

SCALP - Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée

SDSR - Strategic Defence and Security Review

SIS – Secret Intelligence Service

SLG - Senior Level Group

STOVL – Short take-off and vertical landing

UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UCAS - Unmanned Combat Air System

UK – United Kingdom

UK GPSS - UK Global Positioning Satellite Service

UN – United Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

US – United States

USA – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1. Introductions and Outlines

Introduction

In season three of the award-winning sitcom *Yes Minister*, the eponymous minister Jim Hacker discusses Britain's nuclear deterrent with his chief civil servant Sir Humphrey Appleby. During their conversation Hacker expresses anti-nuclear sentiments, stating that a British nuclear deterrent was unnecessary as ultimately the US would protect the UK from a Russian attack. Appalled Sir Humphrey responds "Russians? Who's talking about the Russians...It's to protect us against the French!" (BBC 1982). When Hacker asks why the UK needs to defend itself against France which is an ally and partner Sir Humphrey retorts: "Well, they are now, but they've been our enemies for the most of the past 900 years. If they've got the bomb, we must have the bomb!" (BBC 1982). In its usual fashion *Yes Minister* had managed to strike at the heart of the issue with a few pithy lines of dialogue. When thinking of Anglo-French relations, it is often attitudes like this that are most prevalent. Sir Humphrey's insistence that if the French have the bomb then we must have the bomb rang as true then as it does today. Memories of the French as the historic enemy are embedded in British society. For many the French are *the* old enemy. Britain and France have fought battles as far apart as Hastings and Waterloo. For most of British history the foreign despot seeking dominion over Europe did not come from Germany, but from France. Once relations were characterized by war with peace being the exception. As one former British officer put it anonymously "every century we've had a crack at them" (Anonymous 2021).

Rarely are images of Britain and France standing side by side popular in the public imagination. Even in wars where Britain and France have been allies, popular imagination tends to omit or downplay the other. In the UK the First World War evokes images of

Tommie's in trenches, holding the line against German aggression (Philpott 2013). The fact that most of the Western front was manned by the French is conveniently forgotten. The battle of the Somme looms particularly large in the British imagination, though French involvement is usually omitted. In France the Great War is remembered as a patriotic struggle to defend their homeland from invasion, whilst in the UK it is often viewed as a rather futile endeavour (Winter 2013). When considering the Second World War similar differences emerge. Indeed, the French wartime contribution is often unfairly ridiculed in the British imagination (Frank 2013). British historical memory lionises fighting Nazism alone while the French surrendered, or worse collaborated. Equally in France, popular imagination sees the Free French as more important in their liberation than the British (Frank 2013). The incident that best embodies these differing memories is Dunkirk. For the British this was a heroic evacuation that let them live to fight another day. For France it was another betrayal by the perfidious Albion (Frank 2013). Despite this the Anglo-French relationship is far more complex than the popular narrative would suggest. Twice in the last century Britain and France considered a formal union with one another. Arguably the first 'British' Empire, at least in the popular imagination, was the Angevin empire that briefly dominated much of France. The institution of the British monarchy traces its origins back to William the Conqueror, a French speaking Norman, and her Majesty the Queen continues to style herself as the Duke of Normandy. Indeed, it is an enduring irony that the French still refer to the British as *Les Anglo-Saxons*, a thousand years after the Normans sailed from France to supplant the actual Anglo-Saxons.

Outside of the United States no other ally is as important to the UK as France. This is a striking transformation, made even more extraordinary by the influence that history has had on the contemporary relationship. Today Britain and France find themselves bound together despite

their complicated past. That is why this thesis refers to this dynamic as the “Peculiar Relationship”, because of its complex and sometimes contradictory nature.

Despite its importance the Peculiar Relationship has been neglected by contemporary academia. When studying Britain’s alliances academic focus has overwhelmingly been on other partners. Primus, and definitely not inter pares, has been the focus placed on the “Special Relationship” with the US. Consequently, there have been few examinations of the Anglo-French relationship and how it functions in the modern day. That is a flaw that this thesis seeks to rectify. It provides a comprehensive answer to the question of just how relevant defence cooperation with France is to contemporary British defence policy. It also provides an in depth look at the nature, structure and implementation of contemporary Anglo-French defence cooperation.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, it outlines the current state of the field. It briefly considers current literature and debates within the study of British defence policy. It then outlines why this research matters and its relevance to modern academia. This is followed by a discussion of the thesis’ objectives and research questions. Its methodology is then outlined in full. Finally, the structure of the thesis is explained.

The current state of the field

As alluded to above defence cooperation between the UK and France is currently under researched within the field of international relations. British academics have primarily focused upon the so called “Special Relationship” with the US. This is considered in detail later in the thesis and is understandable given the position of the US in the global system. As a nation that likes to present itself as the primary ally of the world’s only superpower, it is natural that British academia would focus on the “Special Relationship” to better understand

the dynamics at play. This is not inherently negative, and this thesis does make use of this literature when necessary. However, by focusing so much on the Anglo-American relationship scholars have often neglected to study other areas which are also of great importance to the UK. This thesis contributes therefore towards expanding our understanding of another vital defence relationship.

When Anglo-French defence cooperation is considered by academia, it is often within a wider European or European Union context. Franco-British cooperation is usually of interest to scholars when they are studying European military cooperation, particularly the history of military integration within the EU (Maclean and Trouille 2001). Anglo-French relations have often been subsumed into a wider debate on European integration. Naturally, given their place as Europe's main military powers (Bond 2021), Anglo-French influence is of interest to scholars, as understanding it is necessary to fully understand developments within the EU over the previous decades (Ginsberg and Penska 2012). As considered in detail later, Britain and France have often been both the drivers and inhibitors of European defence cooperation. Modern scholarship has tended to focus upon how they have either supported or opposed greater defence cooperation within the EU. This has tended to emphasise the impact that British and French policies have had on the EU, particularly when Britain and France have not agreed (Howorth 2007). What influence these disagreements have had on their bilateral relationship has often been left unexplored. This oversight needs to be corrected. Obviously the dynamics of Anglo-French cooperation within the EU must be studied, but they are just one area amongst many in which they collaborate. They also cooperate in numerous ways that are not related to the EU. There are relatively few studies that have considered Anglo-French relations on their own merits and even fewer that have considered cooperation within more than one domain.

Unlike international relations, the field of history has examined Franco-British relations in detail. There is a wealth of work on the Anglo-French relationship covering its origins and how it has evolved. This reflects the complicated nature of their shared past. A conservative estimate would place the start of their shared history in 1066 with the Norman invasion. Since then, almost every century has begun with British troops sailing across the Channel to fight a war in France. The current century is the exception. This transition from rivals to allies has been documented extensively by eminent historians. Richard Mayne, Douglas Johnson and Robert Tobs (2004) and Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (2000) have edited impressive works that chronicle the origins and evolution of the Peculiar Relationship. These sources are drawn upon to provide historical context later in this thesis. However, whilst this transition is well documented, there is very little that examines how this history relates to contemporary relations. That is where this thesis is useful. Drawing on both historical literature and contemporary material it provides a comprehensive overview of the military dimension of Anglo-French relations. It is not possible to understand the Peculiar Relationship today without a detailed appreciation of its past. This thesis thus complements the existing historical literature and builds upon the excellent work that has already been done in this area.

Whilst the Anglo-French defence relationship has been considered within think tank circles this has often been limited to specific areas. Usually this has focused on discussions around important events within the relationship. The tenth anniversary of the Lancaster House Treaty received commendable attention from certain quarters (Ellehuus and Morcos 2020, Ricketts 2020). Otherwise, discussion of the Entente is often limited. A 2018 report produced jointly by Kings College London and the Institut Montaigne entitled *The UK-France defence and security relationship: How to improve cooperation* stands out as a rare example of a think tank

study that takes a holistic look at the Entente. Even this report, whilst useful, does not discuss the history of the relationship and how that impacts contemporary defence cooperation.

Why this research matters

As outlined above the Anglo-French relationship is severely understudied. This deficiency must be rectified so that the UK can better understand this key strategic relationship. France is the UK's second most important ally. Not only that but their relationship is unique. Britain and France are equals in a way that no other ally can match. Their strengths and weaknesses are often shared. Their economies are practically the same size (IMF 2021). For years now they have jockeyed with each other in the global rankings, usually with one only marginally ahead. In military terms they both possess full spectrum capabilities. They are both part a small group of nations able to maintain a blue water navy as well as an aircraft carrier capability. They are also both nuclear powers. Their air forces are at the forefront of modern technology and their armies have significant experience of combat operations. Furthermore, they both possess a network of bases around the world that provide them with a global presence (IISS 2021). Crucially both are also limited in the resources they can deploy. Not only are their resources and capabilities equally matched, but they also share similar histories and outlooks on the world. France and Britain both have a long imperial history (Sharp and Stone 2000). Even after they gave up their respective attempts to subjugate one another they both enjoyed a long period of imperial rule abroad. Both nations have experienced periods as the dominant power in Europe, and arguably the world. Even in a post-imperial age they both maintain a strong belief that they have a role to play on the international stage. These similarities are unmatched by any other ally either nation possesses. The UK may pride itself on its close relationship with the US, but America will never see it as an equal. That will always

be an unbalanced relationship. France may tout its partnership with Germany, but until recently the Germans have refused to match their economic clout with military capabilities (Giegerich et al 2021). Whilst Germany has announced a massive defence spending increase, this will take time to come into effect and it remains to be seen if it will be matched with a renewed willingness to deploy forces abroad. Almost all other British and French allies have both weaker militaries and smaller economies. The Anglo-French relationship is therefore unique as it is an alliance between two equal nations.

Just as they share similar capabilities, they also share similar interests and common threats. As Western democracies they have a common interest in ensuring a rules-based order. Britain and France have both benefited massively from the post-War liberal order (Ikenberry 2018). Their positions of importance within this system have assisted in sustaining their global roles long after their empires declined. Therefore, they both have a vested interest in ensuring its continuation. The threats faced by one are threats faced by the other, they are neighbours after all. A threat to continental Europe is a threat to both. Since the turn of the century, they have both been the targets of international terrorism and have worked together to counter the danger it poses. The rise of revisionist states threatens the foundations of the global system that has benefited them both (Guillen 2018). Russian aggression in the East threatens the peace and stability of the continent they both call home. An emboldened Russia poses a threat not just in Europe, but to Anglo-French interests in Africa and the Middle East. This has already been seen with Russian support for the Assad regime in Syria (Rumer and Weiss 2019) and increasing Russian involvement in states such as Mali (Stronski 2019). Equally, the rise of China and its potential for hegemony in Asia could shift the balance of global power in ways that threaten both sides interests. Chinese dominance of vital trade routes in the Indo-Pacific would endanger both of their economies (Doshi 2021), and in France's case its overseas

territories as well. Chinese economic influence risks not only undermining their interests abroad, but also undermining their respective democracies (Bartlett 2022). Furthermore, the threat posed by climate change endangers both nations in profound ways. As close neighbours they share many of the dangers posed by rising global temperatures, including rising sea levels. Given all these shared interests and threats, it is clearly in both their interests to cooperate. It is imperative therefore that the dynamics of this relationship are studied so that it can be better understood. As already mentioned, Anglo-French defence cooperation is often misunderstood. The popular conception on both sides is of two nations that are rivals rather than allies. This must be corrected so that both sides can have a clear idea of the importance of continued cooperation. Furthermore, if existing Anglo-French cooperation can be understood better, then it can also be improved upon.

Alliances are not static. As the Anglo-French relationship changes it is essential that our understanding of it changes too. This has been brought into particularly sharp focus post-Brexit. With Anglo-French relations entering a new phase, understanding the underpinnings the relationship is vital to ensuring that it is preserved. When considering the recent state of the political relationship between the UK and France it would be easy to surrender to pessimism and think that the Peculiar Relationship is doomed (Ricketts 2022). However, by understanding the relationship at its core and identifying its key building blocks it is possible to adopt a more positive outlook that accepts that while Britain and France may disagree, their core interests are aligned. There are several key areas that continue to bind them together. By clearly identifying these it is possible to look past temporary political differences and preserve the spirit of the relationship. It is necessary therefore to support academic scholarship that seeks to do just that by wiping away the misconceptions of the Peculiar Relationship and bringing its fundamentals to the fore.

There is also, as mentioned above, a need for a contemporary review of the Anglo-French defence relationship. In particular there is a need for one that places the contemporary relationship within the correct historical context. Existing research has only considered aspects of the relationship in isolation. Indeed, as already mentioned existing research has tended to study the Anglo-French relationship from an external perspective, such as the EU, rather than as a standalone alliance (Howorth 2007). Furthermore, while there is extensive work covering the historical development of the relationship, there is little that brings together historical scholarship and contemporary analysis. The works of Mayne et al (2004) and Sharp and Stone (2000) whilst comprehensive, limited their reviews of the relationship to the previous century. This thesis is therefore vital in filling that gap and providing a modern analysis of how Anglo-French defence cooperation functions. Alice Panniers' 2020 book *Rivals in Arms* is a notable exception to this and makes an excellent contribution to the field. However, its focus is solely on the contemporary relationship. This thesis differs by placing the relationship within its historical context to provide a more holistic understanding. *Rivals in Arms* (Pannier 2020) bases its analysis around the Lancaster House Treaty and its aftermath. This is of course a valid approach, and this thesis will discuss Lancaster House in great detail, however it also looks beyond studying other aspects of the alliance in equal measure. For example, this thesis goes further by offering a detailed analysis of Brexit whilst also looking to the future and outlining how defence cooperation may be improved. It also employs alliance theory to provide a theoretical underpinning that is useful for further academic study of Anglo-French defence cooperation.

There is also a need to counter the popular myths and misconceptions surrounding Anglo-French relations. As discussed above there is a popular misconception that Britain and France are more rivals than allies (Ricketts 2022). When considering military matters, conflict rather

than cooperation is the norm. This is in large part because of a general ignorance of the Anglo-French relationship. The extent of military cooperation between the two is rarely high profile and is often unknown to the public at large. Over the last decade Britain and France have reached a previously unseen level of cooperation that has largely gone unnoticed. British and French forces regularly train together, personnel are exchanged, and their defence industries are intertwined. They even conduct joint nuclear research in France. That alone is an indication of the importance of the relationship. Despite this Anglo-French cooperation is rarely popular or given the attention it deserves. In Britain the focus is on NATO or the US, while in France their attention is on Europe or their own operations abroad. This thesis thus serves to highlight the high levels of cooperation that do take place between Britain and France and to demonstrate that below the political surface cooperation is regular and commonplace.

Research Questions

The overarching research question of this thesis is: What is the relevance of Anglo-French defence cooperation to British defence policy in the twenty first century? This question guides the direction of the thesis and informs how it is structured. It is intended to identify how defence cooperation with France relates to British defence policy.

There are also three sub-research questions. The first of these is: Has the Lancaster House Treaty been successful in improving Anglo-French defence cooperation? The Lancaster House Treaty is a wide-ranging treaty that set numerous goals aimed at improving Anglo-French defence cooperation. It also set out deadlines by which those goals should be met. The purpose of this question is thus to identify how the Lancaster House Treaty has been

implemented and whether it has achieved its desired objectives of improving Anglo-French defence cooperation.

Secondly this thesis asks the question: Can Libya serve as a blueprint for future Anglo-French military interventions? The UK and France played a leading role in the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, making it of particular importance for Anglo-French relations. This question therefore seeks to identify if the role played by the UK and France could offer a blueprint for UK-France leadership of future military interventions.

Finally this thesis asks: What impact has Brexit had on Anglo-French defence cooperation? Brexit is a profound change to Britain's place in the world and Anglo-French relations. This question thus seeks to identify how these changes have influenced the Anglo-French defence relationship. Whilst this chapter looks at institutions within Europe the impact is one that has been felt across the whole relationship.

Methodology

This thesis uses a variety of sources for its data collection. It makes extensive use of official documents from both the UK and France. Government publications such as treaties and defence reviews are referenced repeatedly throughout. These documents are critically assessed to compare political spin with practical reality. They are therefore a useful resource when analysing how defence cooperation actually functions, as opposed to how political leaders on both sides choose to frame it. It also makes use of news reports from both the general media and industry websites. These provide additional context and detail, particularly when dealing with niche areas. Think tank reports that consider the different aspects of cooperation are also examined, as these can offer expert insights into various aspects of the relationship.

When appropriate, interviews conducted with defence practitioners are also included to provide additional context and analysis. Individuals were selected based on their relevant experience and knowledge of the thesis' primary case studies. As such former politicians and military officers feature prominently. These interviews used a semi-structured approach, in which interviewees were asked a list of initial questions, but the conversation was relatively free flowing. Participants were encouraged to share any information that they thought was relevant, even if it was not strictly related to the initial question. This ensured that each interview covered as wide a range of topics as possible. These interviews were primarily conducted at the elite level, as this thesis' main focus is on intergovernmental and inter-military relationships.

There are three broad areas in which Britain and France cooperate militarily identified within this thesis. These are bilateral cooperation, cooperation through NATO and cooperation within Europe. Specifically, this refers to the European continent as a whole rather than just the EU. Whilst the EU was an avenue through which Britain and France cooperated in Europe, it was only one within a range of others. To better understand each of these areas this thesis applies a case study approach to its analysis. One major case study is identified that corresponds to each of these broader areas. These case studies encapsulate the main themes of each area and illustrate them in a practical way. The case studies selected are as follows. Firstly, the Lancaster House Treaty of 2010 which covers bilateral cooperation. This was chosen as the Lancaster House Treaty established the framework through which modern bilateral cooperation takes place. All bilateral cooperation, even when not specifically referencing the Treaty, takes place within the framework it established. For cooperation through NATO the 2011 intervention in Libya has been selected. As explained later this intervention offers a unique insight into how Britain and France can cooperate within a NATO

context. Finally, for cooperation within Europe the case study selected is Brexit. Whilst this chapter does not limit itself exclusively to the EU, the fallout of Britain's vote to leave has had an impact on other European defence structures. As such both the EU and non-EU organisations are evaluated.

A key distinction of this thesis is that its focus is on military cooperation. Therefore other related fields such as security or intelligence cooperation are only included when they relate to military cooperation. This has been done to ensure that a meaningful study could be undertaken. Whilst intelligence cooperation in terms of military operations is included, general cooperation between British and French intelligence agencies is not. Equally, whilst counterterrorism operations involving the military are of interest to this thesis, policing or judicial cooperation in countering terrorism is not.

It should also be noted that the Covid-19 pandemic has had an impact upon the research of this thesis. It was initially planned that research for this thesis would include in person interviews and archival work. As originally envisaged interviews would be conducted in three main locations. Firstly, in London with officials from the Ministry of Defence, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the armed forces and the French embassy. Secondly, in Paris with officials from the British embassy and Ministère des Armées. Thirdly at NATO Head Quarters in Brussels. Because of the pandemic overseas travel has not been possible, eliminating the possibility of conducting interviews in Brussels and Paris, whilst domestic restrictions and university guidance have made it unfeasible to travel to London for interviews. It was also originally intended that this thesis would draw upon original research at both the National Archives and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. The practicalities of COVID restrictions, combined with wider health concerns, made it impossible

to conduct archival work there. By the time that conditions improved to the point where this was possible, the deadline to spend the funding grants awarded by the School of Politics and International Relations had expired, meaning it was not financially viable to conduct these trips. Consequently, this thesis has drawn upon less interview material that was originally intended. This has been compensated for by alternative primary source material such as memoirs and transcripts from official meetings such as committee hearings.

Terminology

This thesis employs several terms that must be identified here. The first is the Entente Cordiale. The Entente Cordiale was the name given to the agreement reached between the UK and France in 1904 to resolve outstanding colonial differences. It has since become a catch all phrase used to describe Anglo-French relations as a whole. This thesis regularly refers to the Entente Cordiale, or the Entente for short, as a means of describing the Anglo-French defence relationship. It also uses terms such as Anglo-French and Franco-British interchangeably. The choice of whether to use Anglo-French or Franco-British is a purely semantic one and in no way indicates a bias for preference for one side over the other. Additionally, the United Kingdom is also referred to as the UK or Britain throughout. Whilst there remains some debate over the correct shortened version of the UK should be, this thesis uses Britain as an accepted shorthand given that the British government has indicated that this is acceptable terminology (UK Government 2021). Terms such as Great Britain or England which may be popular in colloquial conversation when referring to the UK are not used here as they do not adequately refer to the whole state. In contrast France is simply referred to as France. While its official name is the French Republic it is universally accepted that France is an appropriate shorthand. When referring to its chosen case studies this thesis will often use

a shorthand to describe them. For example, when referring to the 2011 intervention in Libya it will often refer simply to Libya. Equally when discussing the Lancaster House Treaty it will often use the term Lancaster House or the Treaty. This also includes the Teutates Treaty, which while technically a separate treaty was signed simultaneously and is considered part of the wider Lancaster House process. As such when referring to Lancaster House in the collective this thesis is also referring to the Teutates Treaty. When discussing the UK's decision to withdraw from the EU, this thesis uses the commonly accepted Brexit to refer to the entire process

Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into a series of chapters, each dealing with a specific topic. This introduction is followed by a theoretical chapter outlining the theoretical framework of the thesis. It considers alliance theory in detail. The main theoretical grounding and contribution of this thesis is in alliance theory, and this chapter outlines how it can be applied to Anglo-French defence cooperation. It also discusses the peculiarity of the Entente Cordiale from a theoretical perspective and highlights the difficulties of ascribing the Entente to a particular alliance typology. This is important as alliance theory is discussed throughout the thesis, particularly in the empirical chapters where relevant alliance typologies are discussed in detail. This is followed by a literature review summarising the existing state of the field. This review considers some of the literature mentioned above and places the Anglo-French relationship within the current context of the field. It also considers literature on other key alliances and how they influence Franco-British relations. This is then followed by a historical chapter in order to provide the necessary historical context to properly understand the military development of the Entente Cordiale. A relationship as complex as this has a

significant amount of history that that must be considered to fully understand its current state. Moments of military significance to the relationship, from the signing of the original Entente Cordiale until the end of the previous century, are considered here in detail. This chapter therefore covers some of the key moments in the development of Anglo-French defence cooperation and teases out some of the key themes present within the peculiar relationship.

This is then followed by three chapters, each dealing with one of the case studies identified above. The first analyses the Lancaster House Treaty. This chapter looks at the Treaty in-depth, considering the different areas of cooperation that it envisaged and analyses whether they have been successfully implemented. The Treaty's various successes and failures are analysed in detail to allow a conclusion to be reached. It identifies that while not all the objectives set out by the Treaty have been achieved, it still succeeded in improving Anglo-French defence cooperation. Next is the chapter covering the NATO intervention in Libya. This chapter provides an overview of the conflict and concludes that it is not a sufficient blueprint for future Anglo-French interventions. However, it does identify a series of lessons that could improve Anglo-French cooperation in the future. It also outlines if the UK and France have made any progress in learning those lessons in the years since the intervention. The thesis then continues with a chapter considering Brexit. This chapter identifies many ways Brexit has already influenced Anglo-French defence cooperation, almost all of them negative. This influence is not limited to relations with the EU and has already split over into other areas in which Britain and France cooperate. As such the impact of Brexit on European institutions outside of the EU is also evaluated here. It also identifies that many of the implications of Brexit are still unfolding and that it retains the potential to undermine the Entente further.

The future implications of Brexit are also analysed, with several possible scenarios outlined for consideration.

This is followed by a chapter looking to the future which considers how Anglo-French defence cooperation can be improved. It identifies numerous strengths and weaknesses from throughout the thesis and proposes concrete steps to improve defence cooperation. These proposals consider a range of options that could enhance defence cooperation in all the areas considered throughout the thesis. The thesis then concludes with a final chapter that summarises its findings.

Key themes

Throughout this thesis there are a number of themes evident within the Entente Cordiale. The first is its peculiar nature. As mentioned at the outset this thesis refers to the Anglo-French relationship as the Peculiar Relationship throughout. This is because of the complex and often contradictory nature of Anglo-French relations. As outlined extensively later Anglo-French interests have often created a curious mixture of simultaneous cooperation and competition. There is a recurring theme of misunderstanding throughout the relationship. Even at its very inception there were differing interpretations of what the Entente Cordiale meant to both governments. Britain and France have also both repeatedly found themselves needing to cooperate but have been prevented from doing so by ideological fixations on both sides. This is not limited to history and can be seen time and again within the relationship. This history of misunderstanding and confusion is covered extensively throughout this thesis. Britain and France have also often pursued cooperation in the hopes of achieving significantly different aims. As shall be demonstrated later, on many occasions they have approached each other to cooperate in the hopes that they will be able to achieve different objectives. Quite often

their respective ends will differ but the means to achieve them are aligned. This has made relations difficult and often hampered cooperation when it was needed most. It is also clear that they have repeatedly favoured different strategic doctrines and postures. These have often clashed and limited their ability to cooperate. These differences are exacerbated by the fact that Britain and France often desire similar outcomes but employ different techniques to achieve them. The history of the Entente has also shown that Anglo-French cooperation is at its strongest when there is a shared threat to bring the two sides together. Whether it was the World Wars, the Suez Crisis or the Great Recession, an external crisis is often the catalyst for improved periods of cooperation that bolster the Entente.

Studying the Peculiar Relationship

The Entente is indeed a complex relationship. As this thesis demonstrates it is a multifaceted relationship that has earned the sobriquet of the “Peculiar Relationship”. As this thesis progresses it delves deeper into this relationship, drawing out its intricacies. Its complicated nature is analysed in great detail in order to better understand why Britain and France have such a peculiar relationship. In doing so a long overdue comprehensive understanding of the Entente Cordiale and its relevance to British defence policy is established.

2. Peculiarity in theory as in practice

Introduction

What exactly is the Entente Cordiale? While this seems like a relatively simple question, it is hard to identify an equally straightforward answer. When asking the same question of Britain's primary strategic partnership, its alliance with the United States, it is easy to find an answer. It is the special relationship, the bedrock of British foreign policy. Many volumes both academic and otherwise have been written on the subject explaining how it functions in intricate detail, much of which is examined in the next chapter. Yet when it comes to the Entente Cordiale no such clarity exists. For a relationship of such vital importance to the UK, the Entente Cordiale is remarkably complex and at times contradictory. Its precise nature can seem ephemeral and ambiguous. It is these complexities that make the Entente such a peculiar relationship.

The purpose of this chapter is to use alliance theory to explain the nature of Anglo-French defence cooperation. This underpins the theoretical framework of the thesis going forward. To accomplish this the chapter evaluates various alliance definitions and alliance typologies. In doing so it provides clarity on what it means for two nations to be allied. Furthermore, it outlines why alliance typologies are beneficial in studying the Entente, whilst also identifying several typologies that are employed throughout the thesis. In doing so this chapter ensures that the thesis is grounded in alliance theory, whilst also clarifying some of the complexities and peculiarities of the Entente Cordiale.

The chapter begins by considering various alliance definitions and outlining the criteria that this thesis uses to define an alliance. It then outlines in brief various international relations theories and the explanations they give for alliance formation. This is followed by an analysis

of alliance typologies, which considers how to classify the Entente Cordiale. Finally, there is a discussion of alignment and its relevance to Anglo-French relations, both historically and in the modern day.

Alliance Definitions

To lay the foundations for the remainder of the chapter it is necessary to discuss definitions. The study of alliances has long been an important aspect of international relations. Thucydides' seminal work on the Peloponnesian War was after all a study of two alliances striving for dominance (Viotti and Kauppi 1999). Alliances are regularly referenced in existing literature when discussing relations between states. However, there is little consensus on how to define them. Edwin Fedder for instance defines alliances as "a limited set of states acting in concert at X time regarding the mutual enhancement of the military security of the members" (1968: 68) while also recognising that "the concept of alliance in the literature of international relations is ambiguous and amorphous" (Fedder 1968: 68). Arnold Wolfers offers a more straightforward definition stating that an alliance is "a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states" (1968: 268). Kegley and Raymon expand upon this definition further by stating that alliances are "formal agreements between sovereign states for the putative purpose of coordinating their behaviour in the event of specified contingencies of a military nature" (1992: 50). While these scholars offer practical definitions of alliances, the literature also contains definitions of a more theoretical nature. Pitman Potter for instance defines alliances as the "simplest form of international union approaching the forms of international government" (Potter 1948: 396), while Hans Morgenthau argues that alliances are simply a means of manipulating the international equilibrium (Morgenthau 1948). Within this definitional debate there is also disagreement on

whether alliances must be formal or informal. While Fedder (1968) and Kegley and Raymon (1992) stipulate that alliances necessitate a formal agreement, other authors such as Morgenthau (1948) and Walt (1987) both argue that it is possible for states to establish informal alliances. Equally, there is debate as to whether alliances must be for a specific purpose (Kegley and Raymon 1992) or can be more general in nature (Snyder 1990). Considering these factors, it is possible to craft a new definition for the purposes of this thesis that draws upon various aspects identified in the existing literature. For the continuation this thesis considers an alliance to be a formal agreement between two or more states that seeks to provide for and enhance military cooperation and security. Informal agreements are not considered to be a true alliance as these are a form of alignment, a concept discussed later in the chapter.

Why form alliances?

Having considered these alliance definitions, it is relevant at this juncture to consider some of the theoretical explanations as to why states form alliances, and the relevance of these theoretical traditions to the Entente Cordiale. These are outlined in brief here as alliance theory grew out of traditional international relations theory. As such it is not possible to consider alliance theory without a basic overview of its conceptual roots.

Alliance theory was arguably born out of three different schools of international relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism. For both classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau (1948) and neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), alliances are a by-product of an anarchic international system. To them states are primarily concerned with the balance of power and will form alliances as necessary to ensure that their own power in the international system is in equilibrium with their rivals (Waltz 1979). This is furthered by Stephen Walt who

argues that states are preoccupied with balancing threats rather than power per se (Walt 1987). Walt contends that states will thus form alliances to balance against threats in the international system (Walt 1987). Liberal theorists agree that states operate in an anarchic system, but argue that they will form alliances for reasons other than maintaining a balance of power. Rather states may form alliances because they are both democracies (Doyle 1986), there are economic benefits to be gained (Keohane 1984) or they can achieve their military goals through cooperation rather than competition (Gibler and Walford 2006). Lastly constructivists argue that it is a state's identity and norms that influence how it interacts with others (Hemmer and Katzenstein: 2002). As such states construct their own national interest based upon factors such as norms and identity (Finnemore 1996). Therefore they may form alliances because of a number of reasons such as religion, geography, history, culture, or ethnicity (Katzenstein 1996).

Whilst these theories can all be applied to the Entente Cordiale at a basic level, none of them can account for the complexity of the relationship. The Entente is a peculiar relationship that far exceeds traditional international relations theory. That is why the focus of this chapter is on alliance theory, in particular alliance typologies, as this provides a richer conceptual understanding of Anglo-French defence cooperation.

Alliance Typologies

One aspect of alliance theory which is useful when analysing the Entente is that of alliance typologies. This chapter considers three different typologies and their usefulness for studying the Entente Cordiale. Firstly, there is the typology developed by David Singer and Melvin Small (1966). Singer and Small (1966) identified three types of alliance: defensive pacts, neutrality and non-aggression pacts and ententes. In defensive pacts states are obliged to come to each

other's aid and intervene militarily on their behalf. This is what many would consider to be the classic military alliance such as NATO. It would also be most similar to the realist conception of an alliance based purely on military power. Neutrality and non-aggression pacts are agreements between states to abstain from aggressive action towards each other. Finally, Singer and Small (1966) define ententes as a looser arrangement where states are obliged to consult with one another in certain circumstances. The Five Powers Defence Agreements between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia would be a prime example here (Thayer 2007). These agreements commit each nation to consult each other in the event of an attack upon a signatory but do not commit them to military action. Singer and Small's (1966) ententes would be comparable to constructivist alliances as they foster collective norms and consultation.

When considering the relevance of this typology to the Anglo-French dynamic, the Entente Cordiale would best fit into Singer and Small's (1966) conception of a defensive alliance. Given that Britain and France are both NATO allies and have signed other defence treaties such as Lancaster House, on the most basic level Britain and France are defensive allies. This type is the easiest to classify and so it has been considered first. It is, however, also important to consider Singer and Small's use of the term entente as opposed to this thesis' use of the term. Singer and Small use entente to refer to a type of alliance in which members are only obliged to consult each other on military matters. This thesis has, and shall continue to, refer to the entire Franco-British relationship as the Entente Cordiale or the Entente for short. This is not to say that the Entente Cordiale has not also been an entente in the Singer and Small mould. As shall be expanded upon in subsequent chapters the Entente originated as an agreement on colonies that was subsequently expanded to include military consultation. Crucially it did not provide a military guarantee. As such while the Entente Cordiale may have been

conceived as a Singer and Small type entente, over time it has evolved into a fully-fledged defensive alliance. Furthermore, Singer and Small's (1966) classification of neutrality and non-aggression pacts as a type of alliance is problematic. An infamous example of a non-aggression pact would be the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact signed in 1939. While Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union agreed not to attack each other for a specified period, it would be unreasonable to claim that they had formed an alliance at this time (Singer and Small 1966). As such non-aggression pacts are merely agreements intended to restrain states from hostile action, rather than improve cooperation between them (Singer and Small 1966). As such they do not satisfy the criteria to be classified as an alliance set out earlier in this chapter. Rather they are another form of international agreement at a lower level than that of alliance.

The second typology is that developed by Edwin Fedder (1968). Fedder (1968) argues that alliances take three distinct forms. Firstly, there are augmentative alliances. These are alliances in which state A seeks an alliance with state B in order to supplement their own capabilities, thus improving state A's security. This contrasts with pre-emptive alliances in which state A allies with state B in order to prevent them from allying with state A's enemy. The third type of alliance is a strategic alliance, in which state A allies with state B for the sole purpose of gaining access to state B's territory for strategic purposes, for example as a forward operating base. Fedder's (1968) typology is built primarily upon realist thinking as each of his three alliance types are alliances based upon realist calculations of national interest and security.

When considering this typology analysis of the Entente becomes more complex. The complicated nature of the Entente's origins prevents it from being easily ascribed to any one of Fedder's (1968) categories. As the Entente has evolved over the course of its history it has

complied with each of Fedder's (1968) categories. Upon its initial inception the Entente could have been classed as all three of Fedder's (1968) alliance types. For instance, there is significant evidence to consider the Entente as a pre-emptive alliance. Prior to the signing of the Entente Cordiale France's primary international ally was Russia. While both states possessed Empires of their own, they felt increasingly threatened by the rise of Germany (Otte 2000). During this period Russia was also engaged in a fierce imperial rivalry with the UK, particularly in central Asia. For its part for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain considered Russia to be its major strategic rival (Otte 2000). However, the rise of Germany also threatened British naval dominance around the globe, forcing Britain to seek permanent allies for the first time in nearly a century. To that end British statesmen saw in France a means of securing better relations with Russia. It was believed by many in Whitehall at the time that by undertaking a rapprochement with France, Britain could improve its own relations with Russia (Otte 2000). The logic of a friend of a friend clearly being prevalent in British thinking. As such improved relations with France were in many ways just ancillary to the real prize which was a potential alliance with Russia (Le Breton 2004). For France the Entente was a method of preventing a potential Anglo-German alliance. Prior to the Great War German statesmen had made securing an alliance with Britain one of their top priorities (Rich 1992). If this were to happen then France would be imperilled by hostile states both in Europe and the colonies. British aloofness during this period, coupled with the Fashoda incident heightened French fears of such an alliance. Consequently, the Entente with Britain was the primary way through which they ensured that such a nightmare scenario did not occur (Andrew and Vallet 2004). Given this it can be argued that historically the Entente Cordiale also took the form of a pre-emptive alliance.

Equally the Entente was also an augmentative alliance. Historically Britain has always been a naval power and maintained the world's largest navy in 1904, when the Entente was first signed, and in 1914 when the Entente transitioned into an official military compact (Sheffield 2013). For instance, in 1914 Britain had twenty-two dreadnoughts ready for deployment with another thirteen under construction (Halpern 1994). This contrasted with France which had only four dreadnoughts and eight under construction (Halpern 1994). France has traditionally focused on its land forces and during the same period maintained one of the largest armies in Europe, significantly dwarfing those of Britain (Britannica 2020). At the outbreak of the Great War the British army numbered some 250,000 men (Chandler 2003). This was dwarfed by the French who commanded some 1.3 million men in 1914 (Gorce 1963). As such by uniting their combined might in an alliance, they were able to augment each other considerably. The Anglo-French naval agreement is a perfect example of this. By agreeing to concentrate their respective naval forces in particular theatres Britain and France augmented their warfighting capabilities. Equally the division of responsibilities on the Western Front allowed Britain to concentrate its relatively smaller numbers in a single area which relieved pressure on the French and allowed the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to fight more effectively.

In the same vein it can also be argued that the Entente has exhibited aspects of Fedder's strategic alliance. By agreeing to coordinate their forces Britain gained access to French territory which provided it with a base from which it could fight a major European war against Germany. Had a war occurred between Britain and Germany without such a base then it would have been extremely difficult for Britain to prosecute a continental campaign. In this instance Britain was once again playing the offshore balancer role described by John Mearsheimer (2001). By combining its resources with France, a continental power, Britain was ensuring that the balance of power in Europe remained in place.

In the modern day the Entente most resembles an augmentative alliance, as Britain and France's capabilities complement each other in various areas. As shall be discussed in greater depth in subsequent chapters the Entente has the potential for both partners to compensate for the capability gaps that they possess. Greater military cooperation can augment their already considerable military capabilities and fill any capability gaps that may be present in their respective arsenals. This has been the case in Mali where British logistical support has aided the French with enhanced transport capabilities (Shurkin 2020). NATO membership is also of major significance to the contemporary relationship which arguably resembles elements of Fedder's (1968) strategic alliance. By participating in multilateral structures such as NATO both states can enhance their capabilities and ensure a stable order in Europe is maintained. Fedder's (1968) pre-emptive category has lost relevance in the modern day as neither side seeks to prevent the other from allying with a rival. This does however demonstrate the evolving and complex nature of the Entente over the course of its existence. As discussed previously the Entente has not been a static relationship. It has waxed and waned at various points in the last century. Consequently, its classification according to Fedder's (1968) typology has changed in accordance with this.

The third typology was conceived by Jeremy Ghez (2010), who again identifies three types of alliance that states may form. The first are tactical alliances. These are primarily opportunistic and limited in nature, intended to respond to a sudden change in the international arena. These alliances will usually dissipate once their objective has been met. The collaboration between the Western allies and the Soviet Union during the Second World War would be an example of such an alliance. These are alliances based on traditional realist notions of national security. Tactical alliances contrast with the next alliance type, historic alliances. These are alliances that are well established and built upon a firm foundation and common

understanding such as shared values and a common history. Historic alliances are likely to survive temporary ruptures and shifts in geopolitics, unlike alliances of a more tactical nature. At this stage of its development NATO is arguably a historic alliance, both due to its longevity and that it brings together a group of democracies with common values and traditions. Finally, Ghez (2010) identifies natural alliances. These alliances are formed between states of a common culture or political structure. Such alliances are likely to endure in the long term regardless of changes to the international stage. The enduring friendship between the Scandinavian nations given their shared culture would match the definition of a natural alliance. Both historic and natural alliances exhibit elements of liberalism and constructivism as they are based upon shared values and identity rather than simply military calculations. It should be noted that these alliances do not remain static. Ghez (2010) notes for example that it is possible for an alliance to begin as a temporary tactical nature but then endure and evolve into a historic alliance. Equally the natural alliance is in many ways an evolution of the historic alliance.

When applying the same considerations as before, it is clear that the Entente Cordiale has reflected all three of Ghez' (2010) alliance types. Upon its creation the Entente best resembled a tactical alliance. It quickly evolved into a counterweight to German power in Europe, culminating in its militarisation in 1914. Following the defeat of Germany disagreements over the post-war settlement caused it to rapidly fall into discord. The seemingly limited nature of the Entente in its early years illustrates its once tactical nature. Equally as the Entente has developed over the last century it has taken on the form of a historical alliance. While both nations have encountered difficulties in their bilateral relationship, overall, the Entente has endured. As such it would not be inaccurate to say that Britain and France are allies today and have been, for better to worse, for over a century.

Furthermore, the Entente is also arguably a natural alliance (Mayne et al 2004). Prior to the Second World War Britain and France were natural allies as the only two democracies capable of resisting Nazi aggression. This democratic solidarity largely persisted through the Cold War in response to the Soviet threat, despite differences in their respective defence policies. In the contemporary world Britain and France are the only major military powers in Europe (RAND 2017). They are the only states capable of operation on a large scale for extended periods of time. For instance, they have the two largest defence budgets in Europe (IISS 2020). They also possess the widest spectrum of military capabilities in Europe, such as aircraft carriers, rapid deployment capabilities and nuclear weapons. As the threats faced by one are likely to be threats face by the other it follows that they are best suited to complement each other in the defence sphere. As such it is logical that they should seek to work together on defence matters. The fact that the Entente has also exhibited features of all of Ghez' (2010) alliance types once again demonstrates the complex nature of the alliance that has been demonstrated throughout this chapter and shall continue to be apparent throughout this thesis.

What form of alliance do Britain and France currently have?

Having considered the above typologies it is now possible to assess the present form of the Entente Cordiale. Firstly, it is clear that the Entente Cordiale is indeed an official alliance. By virtue of NATO membership since 1949 the Entente satisfies the criteria to be considered an alliance put forward in all of the definitions considered above. As for what form of alliance it takes, the contemporary Entente best conforms to the typologies of Jeremy Ghez (2010) and Edwin Fedder (1968). In its present form the Entente is both a historic alliance and a natural alliance. Its historic character has been outlined extensively in previous chapters and

reiterated here. Equally, reasons why the Entente is a natural alliance are readily apparent. As Europe's only major military powers it is logical that Britain and France would collaborate on defence matters. Furthermore, their shared history builds upon these reasons for cooperation. The Entente is also an augmentative alliance. Through cooperation Britain and France offer each other access to capabilities that they do not possess independently. This further reinforces the Entente's nature as a natural alliance as there are no other nations in Europe that offer the same capabilities as the UK and France.

Alignment

Having discussed both alliance definitions and typologies there is another relevant concept that must be considered by this chapter. That is the principle of alignment. The term alliance has traditionally been used to describe all manner of different agreements between states in the international system. As illustrated in the above typologies scholars have counted amongst alliances: formal defensive guarantees, agreements to consult another state, neutrality agreements and non-aggression pacts. While the authors discussed previously do make a valid case as to why these should all be considered forms of alliance, the variety of alliance types further illustrates the definitional problem within alliance literature. After all, an agreement to defend another state from armed attack is significantly different from an agreement to remain neutral in the event of a war. As such there are several authors that have developed the concept of alignment as a remedy for this problem. Thomas Wilkins (2012) argues that the term alignment should actually be used as a substitute for many of the arrangements currently considered alliances in the existing literature. Wilkins (2012) argues for a limited definition of alliance citing that put forward by Robert Osgood as "a formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military against a specific state or

states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to the use of force, or to consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force in certain circumstances” (Osgood 1968: 17). For Wilkins (2012) alignment is a more general concept in which states agree to support one another in the international arena and expect certain obligations such as policy coordination in certain circumstances. Crucially a formal military commitment is not in place. It is Wilkins argument that an alliance is the formal codification of a state’s alignment. This is supported by Michael Ward who postulates that:

“alignment is not signified by formal treaties but is delineated by a variety of actions.

It is a more extensive concept than alliance since it does not focus on the military dimension of international politics. Degrees of alignments in political, military, and cultural spheres present a multifaceted sculpture of national and supranational postures” (Ward 1982: 7).

Having identified the theoretical distinction between alliance and alignment it is now possible to apply this to the study of the Entente Cordiale. Considering Wilkins’ (2012) model it is arguable that during the early days of the Entente Britain and France were in alignment rather than alliance. As has been noted previously, and shall be expanded upon subsequently, the conventions of 1904 did not place any legal onus on either party to assist the other in times of war. Equally the Anglo-French staff discussions that emerged out of the Moroccan Crisis were not formal military commitments. However, these could all be considered acts of alignment. By agreeing to coordinate their military forces and working together on the diplomatic front Britain and France were clearly aligned with each other. The Treaty of London in September 1914 therefore marks the point at which the Entente attained the formality necessary for it to transition from alignment to a formal alliance. The same process was also

evident during the interwar period. While the treaty signed in 1914 was limited to the duration of the war Britain and France did continue to coordinate their policies to a certain extent. While the 1920s were a time of considerable disagreement between both states the rise of fascism in Europe rapidly brought them back into realignment. Cooperation over the Spanish Civil War, and the Franco-British naval agreement are both examples of Britain and France working in alignment with each other (Stone 2000). This alignment would remain in place until the formal signing of another treaty of alliance following the outbreak of the Second World War. Of course in the modern day Britain and France remain allies through agreements such as the Washington Treaty of 1949, which established NATO, and the Lancaster House Treaty.

When considering the Entente it is also possible to argue that two states can be allied but not in alignment. Franco-British relations throughout the Cold War, and indeed in certain instances in the modern world would indicate that two states can possess a formal alliance but can also suffer from a serious misalignment of interests. Throughout the Cold War Britain and France remained official allies but were often misaligned on defence issues. As outlined extensively later in this thesis Britain and France adopted radically different defence postures throughout most of the Cold War. Despite allying in NATO to contain the Soviet Union, their day-to-day interests regularly conflicted. The Nigerian Civil War encapsulates this tension perfectly. It saw two NATO allies financing, equipping and training different sides in a civil war, with one doing so with the firm intention of undermining the other (Uche 2008). In this instance Britain and France were clearly not in alignment. A more contemporary example would be the Second Gulf War, in which French diplomatic efforts actively sought to prevent and then undermine support for the Anglo-American invasion (Cogan 2004). These examples clearly demonstrate that while Britain and France are allied, they are not always in alignment.

When looking at the history of the Entente it is remarkable that there have been numerous occasions in which Britain and France have remained official allies but actively worked against each other. For many other nations this would have destroyed their alliance. It is thus a testament to the peculiarity and uniqueness of the Entente that it has survived these fluctuations. The foundations of the Entente are strong enough that it can survive even when one partner is actively working against the other.

Evidently considering the concept of alignment allows for additional complexity when studying the Entente Cordiale. By allowing for distinctions between alliance and alignment it is possible to analyse periods in which Britain and France lacked a formal military agreement but nevertheless acted in a collaborative manner. This further exemplifies the peculiar nature of the Entente. There have been times when Britain and France have lacked a formal alliance, such as pre-1914, when they have acted in concert with one another. Equally, there have been times when they possessed a formal alliance, but still acted with notable hostility towards each other such, as the levant crisis or over Nigeria. Alignment is a particularly useful concept when considering the prelude to the First World War and the actions taken by both states during that period.

Conclusion

As has been illustrated throughout this chapter, the Entente Cordiale is a peculiar relationship. Over the course of its century long existence, it has evolved and adapted to suit the times. As such it has been difficult to categorise and fully explain. Since its foundations the Entente has matched multiple alliance definitions and typologies. It has also alternated between phases of actual alliance and looser alignment. In its present form the Entente would best conform to the typologies defined by Ghez (2010) and Fedder (1968). Its continued

endurance is clearly the sign of a historic alliance. Equally it is also a natural alliance as Britain and France remain Europe's only major military powers. As such it is logical that they will ally with each other to confront the various threats that they both face. Their respective capabilities also complement each other, fulfilling capability gaps and augmenting both nations. The complex nature of the Entente elucidated in this chapter is evident throughout the remainder of the thesis, with repeated references to these alliance typologies. Chapter four considers the background of the relationship in depth and highlights the complicated origins of this peculiar relationship. Equally the empirical chapters dealing with the relationship's contemporary form also make reference to the complexities outlined in this chapter, as each of these chapters demonstrates alliance theory in action.

3. The Entente in Academia

Introduction

This chapter analyses some of the literature relating to the Entente, considering many of the themes and schools of thought present within it. It is divided into three sections. Firstly, it considers literature that pertains to the historical background of the Anglo-French defence relationship. This literature forms the basis of the historical review explored later on. For clarity, this segment predominantly focuses upon the period from 1904 to 1998. This is the period of the Entente's history which lies outside of the thesis' scope but remains relevant for a more comprehensive understanding. Historical events of significance in the development of the Entente are referenced in this section and expanded upon in greater detail in subsequent chapters. It also identifies a number of key themes that are present throughout the historical literature and considers how they relate to the contemporary Entente. Second, the chapter considers literature relating to defence cooperation between the UK, France and Germany. Bilateral relations between Germany and both Britain and France are evaluated here. Additionally, trilateral relations between all three nations are also considered. Literature covering these relationships in both a historical context and the contemporary world are evaluated here. Anglo-French relations with Germany are considered here as Germany is the other dominant power in Europe. As such it is necessary to consider how it relates to the Entente Cordiale. Third, the chapter considers literature on defence cooperation between the UK, the US and France. Given the position of the US in the global system it is necessary to assess its relevance to the Anglo-French relationship. As with Germany these relationships are considered through both historical and contemporary lenses.

Lessons from the Past

Throughout the literature on the history of the Entente Cordiale one theme is overwhelmingly evident: the concept of misunderstanding. It is evident that since the Entente Cordiale was conceived both Britain and France have perceived it to mean different things and misunderstood each other's intentions. This confusion was apparent from the relationship's foundation. As Jean-Jacques Becker (2004) notes, the French government viewed the agreements of 1904 as the foundation of a new alliance with their previously erstwhile British rivals. However, this differed significantly from the British perspective. British authorities placed limited importance upon these agreements, considering them to be little more than an understanding on colonial possessions. These radically different interpretations stemmed from differing notions of the global stage that existed within Britain and France at the time. These confusions would continue to reappear throughout the early stages of the relationship. John Keiger (2004) also notes that it was only at the eleventh hour that Britain chose to side with France in the Great War, a delay that caused much consternation in Paris and sparked a diplomatic incident. Once again confusion reigned as the French authorities believed that Britain was their committed ally, while the British government considered themselves to have no such military responsibility to France. Equally, Kenneth Morgan (2006) discusses how at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, British diplomats were appalled by the demands their French colleagues were making. The French delegation made a string of demands aimed at severely punishing Germany for its actions during the war. This caused much consternation amongst British attendees, who feared that the motivation for France's hard-line stance towards the Germans was an embryonic Gallic bid for European domination. The French for their part, could not understand why the British were so reticent to agree with them. The

French believed their proposals were perfectly reasonable measures intended to ensure that Germany could not pose a major threat to them again as it had done in the past. Margaret MacMillan (2003) argues that the British were able to take a more detached view at the negotiations as they had not suffered to the same extent as France which damaged their ability to negotiate effectively. Morgan (2006) records how this inability to understand each other's point of view contributed to Britain and France being unable to form a united front in the peace negotiations. This acrimony would continue to influence Anglo-French relations throughout the interwar period.

An example that best illustrates the levels of misunderstanding that have plagued the relationship is recorded by Robert Boyce (2006). Boyce (2006) notes that during the interwar period British and French officials held discussions on the possibility of building a channel tunnel to physically link both nations. While French officials thought this would be a powerful symbol of the friendship between their two nations, the British ultimately withdrew from the project. Officially they cited budgetary constraints, but in actuality there existed very real fears within the British government that a channel tunnel could be utilised by France as a method for invading the British mainland. Whilst in hindsight this appears to be a ludicrous concern, Boyce (2006) himself notes that even for the time this was a phantom fear given France's continuing fixation on Germany, nevertheless it illustrates the level of confusion and misperception that has plagued the Entente. Even during the latter half of the century, when both nations sought to liquidate their vast imperial holdings, disagreements managed to occur. Marc Michael writes that "France and Britain acted as rivals in decolonisation, as they had in colonisation itself" (Michael 2004: 144). Michael (2004) elaborates that there remained residual animosity within both states, as they both believed the other sought to utilise decolonisation as a tool to weaken the others geopolitical position. This further illustrates the

level of mistrust that has existed at times between Britain and France. Even when they sought to bring about an end to their colonial responsibilities, elements within their governments still perceived the other to harbour hostile intentions.

Another theme evident throughout the literature is a sense that the Entente Cordiale has grown far beyond its original intentions. The Entente has come to encapsulate Anglo-French relations for over one hundred years. The dynamics of this relationship dictated the course of two world wars and continue to influence the global agenda. This is despite the original agreement amounting to little more than a “formal tidying up of remaining, mildly contentious issues” (Otte 2008: 74). As Maurice Vaisse and Robert Frank eloquently noted “the Entente Cordiale has largely overtaken, in historical importance, the event itself” (2004: 9). It is evident from the wording of the original 1904 agreements that there existed no formal military commitment between either state. Implied or unofficial commitments are another matter which caused significant tensions as shown above. The text of the 1904 declaration repeatedly states that Britain and France “shall not obstruct” (Parliament 1904: 1) one another in their respective colonial spheres. A commitment not to obstruct one another, however, hardly amounts to a declaration of friendship that would endure for the next century. John Keiger (2004) affirms this view by noting that these agreements did not bring both sides together. Rather they “physically pushed them apart by establishing respective spheres of influence” (Keiger 2004: 3). Keiger (2004) elaborates that the 1904 declaration was not initially intended to foster closer cooperation. Instead, it ensured that Britain and France would remain confined to their separate imperial possessions. This is further supported by Catherine Gavin (1941) who writes that, when it was first envisioned, the term Entente Cordiale was intended to be a meaningless platitude. Entente Cordiale, or friendly agreement in English, was selected specifically because it was ambiguous and allowed Britain to avoid

using the word alliance. It is somewhat ironic therefore that what began life as a minor agreement intended to avoid conflict over far flung colonial possessions, has since morphed into a term encompassing one of the most important defence and strategic relationships in modern history.

Also apparent within the historical literature is that the Anglo-French defence relationship tends to vacillate between phases of close cooperation and disagreement. Since 1904 the UK and France have alternated between cooperation, indecision and on some occasions outright conflict. Given the complications inherent within the relationship outlined above, this is not unexpected. While both nations fought side by side in the First World War, this cooperation ceased not long after. As demonstrated by Capet et al (2006) Anglo-French cooperation on military matters quickly crumbled over the issues of German remilitarisation, disarmament and Turkey, as both sides could not agree upon a common course of action. Cooperation would be revived again with the rise of the Third Reich, with Raphaele Ulrich-Pier (2004) arguing that during the Second World War cooperation was at its strongest point since the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Following that war, there was another bout of cooperation which culminated in the joint Anglo-French invasion of Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956. This is arguably the most significant instance of military cooperation between Britain and France throughout the entire Cold War (Beach 1989). However, as Hugh Beach (1989) notes this was a unique situation and operations on the scale of Suez would not occur again. After Suez the old disagreements would emerge in a whole host of new arenas covering NATO, French weapons sales to Argentina and decolonisation. The case of Nigeria in particular stands out. During the Nigerian Civil war that lasted from 1967-1970, Britain and France actively armed opposing sides in the conflict in what Tony Chafer characterised as an exhibit of France's "Fashoda Syndrome" at work (Chafer and Cumming 2010). Throughout the remainder of the

Cold War, British and French defence policies would remain at arm's length from one another (Alford 1989). It was only following the fall of the Berlin Wall that both sides would begin to re-establish high level defence cooperation. Most notably this was with the St Malo Declaration that emerged from the 1998 Anglo-French summit. Against a backdrop of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Britain and France came together to articulate a shared vision on defence for the first time in decades. This summit has been described as groundbreaking by various commentators who noted that this declaration required both sides to cross what had previously been a red line (Chafer and Cummings 2010) in terms of the European Union and joint defence cooperation.

Many authors have also commented throughout the literature that the history of the Entente Cordiale is littered with examples of missed opportunities for greater military cooperation. Robert Boyce (2006) for instance notes that the aftermath of the First World War was a perfect opportunity for Britain and France to establish closer bilateral defence links. Having just fought a major war together this was the time to establish joint measures for the preservation of European defence. Boyce (2006) argues that the naval agreements that had operated throughout the Great War could have served as the basis for this cooperation in other spheres such as land forces and the air force. However, due to mutual misunderstanding and particularly the previously discussed British mistrust, this opportunity was lost.

A major example of this kind of missed opportunity is the Treaty of Dunkirk and subsequent Treaty of Brussels. The Treaty of Dunkirk was a mutual defence treaty aimed at containing Germany, while the Treaty of Brussels established the Western Union as a larger multinational defensive alliance. Both of these treaties shall be discussed in greater detail later in the thesis. Richard Ovendale (1994) discusses how these treaties had the potential to form the

foundation of broader Anglo-French defence cooperation that could have shaped European defence architecture. However, Ovendale (1994) notes that Britain remained reticent to become entangled in any European alliance, while France was unwilling to embark upon major initiatives without British involvement. After this, both nations would become increasingly focused on other areas and neglect their bilateral cooperation.

Anne Deighton (2008) also considers this phenomenon in relation to decolonisation within Africa. Deighton argues that Anglo-French withdrawal from Africa during the post-war period need not have been inevitable, had both nations been able to cooperate. During this period there was ample opportunity to cooperate, and indeed discussions were held on joint action aimed at preserving European colonial rule in Africa. Once again, Britain and France failed to grasp the opportunities before them. Deighton (2008) notes that British inclinations towards the Commonwealth prevented it from committing to some sort of multinational European military force to preserve its rule in Africa. This was compounded, according to Deighton (2008), by mutual suspicions in France, particularly amongst more reactionary members of the French government who viewed these proposals as an attempt by *la perfide Angleterre* to usurp France's colonies.

Defence Cooperation within the E3

While the purpose of this thesis is to study the contemporary Entente Cordiale, it does not exist in a vacuum. While the Entente is both powers primary defence relationship in Europe, there is a third European power that cannot be ignored: the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany is the third partner in the awkward waltz of the European Three (E3). Collectively these are the three most politically, militarily, economically, and culturally influential states

in Europe. As such it is important to consider how relations with Germany influence the Entente cordiale.

The European Engine

Defence cooperation between France and Germany has been in development since the 1960s. Franco-German defence cooperation is imbedded in the Elysee Treaty of 1963. The Elysee Treaty allowed for regular exchanges in military personnel, the commencement of joint armaments programmes and called for a convergence of both states' strategic cultures (Elysee Treaty 1963). Additionally, it also established regular consultations and meetings between the French President, German Chancellor and both sides foreign ministers (Elysee Treaty 1963). Subsequently, a Franco-German Defence and Security Council was established in 1988 to allow for regular meetings between their respective defence ministers. The Franco-German defence relationship is thus highly institutionalised in a way that the Entente Cordiale is not. However, the consensus within the literature is that whilst Germany and France are tightly bound institutionally, their strategic outlooks are often highly divergent. This point is made by Ulrich Krotz and Katharina Wolf (2018) who write that “bilateral Franco-German cooperation in security and defence is characterized by a paradox”. They discuss at length how Franco-German relations are dominated by a form of “double logic” in which institutional cooperation and diverging preferences coexist (Krotz and Wolf 2018). This point is expanded upon by Philip Gordon who writes that “Franco-German military cooperation in the post-war period seems to have taken place despite important differences in perspective between the two countries, not because of a fundamental rapprochement of views” (Gordon 1995: 11). Delphine Deschaux-Dutard (2021) echoes this view by arguing that Franco-German defence cooperation has been built upon divergent views since the Elysee Treaty was signed.

If such a tension exists at the heart of Franco-German defence cooperation, then the question that must be asked is why? Why do France and Germany have such divergent approaches to defence policy? It is clear within the literature that the answer lies in the past. A recurring theme is that since the Suez Crisis France has sought to maintain an independent foreign policy (Sharp and Stone 2000). To that end it has maintained sizeable expeditionary capabilities and has not been hesitant to use them. For France the EU has been a means through which French power could be enhanced and European autonomy achieved (Franke and Varma 2019). Crucially, France has been keen to maintain its sovereignty in terms of defence, thus while it has supported greater intergovernmental efforts to promote European defence cooperation, it has generally opposed more institutional efforts that might have constrained French autonomy (Franke and Varma 2019). The literature on Germany makes it clear that Germany has maintained a contrasting position to France, seeking to position itself firmly within both NATO and the EU. As Rainer Baumann (2002) points out, since the Second World War German defence policy has embraced multilateralism. Patrick Keller (2012) reiterates that NATO has been the bedrock of German defence policy since it joined in 1955. While France has actively sought to achieve maximum independence from the United States, Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild (2013) argue that Germany has embraced its dependence upon the US. For Germany the political legitimacy granted by these multilateral frameworks is essential for their place in the modern world. Therefore, German politicians have long been advocates of both NATO and greater defence integration within the EU. Constraints on sovereignty have become the norm for Germany and are not viewed in the same negative light as in France.

Similar to the UK and France, differences also exist between France and Germany's strategic cultures. Julian Junk and Christopher Daase (2013) argue that given their history German

politicians are loathe to participate in foreign adventurism in the same manner as France. Unlike in France, the idea of deploying military forces unilaterally would be unthinkable for any German government (Junk and Daase 2013). This has caused tension between both governments as France has sought greater German involvement overseas, which has been repeatedly opposed by German politicians. This is reminiscent of the Franco-British debates over how and where forces should be deployed abroad. Additionally, Germany's area of interest is Europe and the north Atlantic, while France considers itself to have global interests. Consequently, France has a network of forces deployed across the globe allowing it to deploy rapidly if necessary. Germany by contrast has no such capabilities, making it difficult for them to cooperate with France when the need arises (Huntley 2020). Collectively these differences have repeatedly hindered Franco-German defence cooperation. It should be noted that even if Germany possessed similar capabilities to France this would not necessarily lead to greater defence cooperation. The Franco-British literature illustrates that comparable capabilities do not necessarily result in enhanced cooperation.

Despite these differences the literature does identify various attempts in the recent decades to promote greater Franco-German defence cooperation. However, it also notes that these efforts have met with limited success. The highest profile to date has been the creation of the Franco-German Brigade. The Franco-German Brigade is a binational force consisting of an infantry brigade drawn from both nations' armies. It is a standing force stationed in both France and Germany. Ulrich Krotz and Katharina Wolf (2018) take a rather negative view of the Franco-German Brigade arguing that it has been hamstrung by German unwillingness to engage in combat operations abroad. They further argue that the divergent strategic cultures of Germany and France have rendered the Franco-German Brigade a largely symbolic unit, rather than a vehicle for actual intervention. Ulrich Krotz (2013) furthers this by pointing out

that Germany has repeatedly resisted deploying the brigade in full, insisting that it is not an expeditionary “Afrika Korps” to intervene abroad. Similarly, Francois Heisbourg has described the brigade as a “military language school” intended to defend the Black Forest from an imaginary enemy, rather than a serious fighting unit (Heisbourg 2004: 2). The Franco-German Brigade also forms the heart of the Eurocorps, a multinational force consisting of France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Poland (Eurocorps 2022). Theoretically, it is intended to serve as a rapid response force for NATO or the EU, should the need arise. However, the Eurocorps has also fallen victim to traditional Franco-German squabbles. Differences over doctrine have ensured that it has only been deployed three times, and only in a peacekeeping capacity. It has also been constrained by a lack of credible strength.

Outside of the Eurocorps there have been other attempts to bolster Franco-German defence cooperation, but perspectives on these have been mixed at best. A Franco-German Defence and Security Council was established in 1988 to provide for regular communication between both nations. While contributing to the institutionalisation of the Franco-German relationship, thus creating a standing forum for regular communication between French and German defence officials, Ulrich Krotz and Katharina Wolf (2018) have noted that this has not contributed to any meaningful convergence of Franco-German defence doctrines. Rather they have remained just as separate as ever. In 2019 both nations signed the Treaty of Aachen, a broad ranging accord covering numerous areas including defence. This Treaty called for a further convergence of France and Germany’s defence objectives and strategies and included a mutual assistance clause committing both parties to offer assistance should one suffer an armed attack (Franco-German Treaty 2019). Article 4 of the Treaty states that both governments shall intensify cooperation between their armed forces with the intention to build a common culture and conduct more joint deployments in the future (Franco-German

Treaty 2019). The French government said the Treaty of Aachen was supplemental to the Elysée Treaty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019), while the German government claimed that the Treaty of Aachen represented the creation of even closer ties than the Elysée Treaty (German Federal Foreign Ministry 2019).

However, the reception of the Treaty of Aachen has been decidedly more muted than the bold claims of the French and German governments. For instance, Ronja Kempin and Barbara Kunz (2019) both point out that while the Treaty adds to the Franco-German defence agenda, it does not explain how its objectives will be achieved. They note that promoting a convergence of Franco-German strategic doctrines has been a goal since the Elysée Treaty, and that the Treaty of Aachen merely reiterates that objective without providing any indication as to how it is to be achieved. If it has not been achieved since 1963 then it is doubtful that more rhetoric will help to achieve it now. The Jacques Delors Institute (2019) published a report not long after the Treaty was signed criticising its tepid approach to defence. This report points out that the Treaty offered no meaningfully new proposals to improve Franco-German defence cooperation. It also criticises the Treaty for designating the Franco-German Defence and Security Council as the primary vehicle for defence cooperation, calling it an antiquated institution in need of an update. The report also points out that institutional arrangements will not magically solve the main areas of contention between Paris and Berlin. Given that the same issues have plagued Franco-German defence cooperation for decades despite the highly institutionalised nature of the relationship, this is an accurate assessment.

The Jacques Delors Institute also rightly points out that the Treaty states an intention to agree a joint approach on defence matters but does not state when that agreement will be made

or how agreement will be reached. Nicholas Dungan (2019) of the Atlantic Council also notes how the Treaty is highly symbolic in nature. The city of Aachen was once the capital of Charlemagne and has been the backdrop of many Franco-German conflicts in past centuries. Signing a new treaty of friendship there offers significant symbolic value. Dungan is somewhat positive about the Treaty as he points out that it is a useful tool for committing France and Germany to greater defence integration. However, he also highlights how some of the contents are irrelevant, such as the commitment to mutual defence which is already covered by membership of both the EU and NATO.

From the existing literature it is clear that Franco-German defence cooperation is hampered by numerous obstacles that have prevented it from developing its full potential. While both governments have attempted to improve the situation, such as with the Treaty of Aachen, clear differences remain which have yet to be reconciled. Franco-German defence cooperation is therefore the story of much unrealised potential.

The silent alliance

Defence cooperation between Germany and the UK is significantly underdeveloped in comparison to the Franco-German relationship. On a surface level Britain and Germany share some priorities in defence. They both have a strong Atlanticist outlook which as mentioned above has caused tension with France. The special relationship between the US and UK and German dependence upon America for its defence have fostered views in both London and Berlin that the Atlantic alliance is the bedrock of their defence policy. Throughout most of the Cold War this resulted in remarkable convergence in defence between the UK and Germany. Britain's commitment to NATO and its focus on European security, corresponded neatly with post-War Germany's self-image as an alliance nation. However, despite this historic alignment

there has been little bilateral cooperation between Germany and the UK. Karl Kaiser and John Roper (1988) have referred to Anglo-German defence cooperation as the “silent alliance”, given the low profile it occupied in public discourse.

Given their shared Atlanticist outlooks and the economic and diplomatic weight that Germany possesses, why has defence cooperation between Germany and the UK never developed in a similar manner to Britain’s other allies? As with France and Germany, the literature offers three main explanations: divergent strategic cultures, differing national perspectives and differences over the EU. Firstly, just as with France, Germany and the UK have significantly different strategic cultures. As mentioned above Germany is restrained in its global outlook confining itself to being a European power (Biolley 2018). The German armed forces are thus configured to conduct operations within the Euro-Atlantic theatre. There is an oft repeated adage that Germany is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm (The Economist 2017). Germany does not possess the same military capabilities as France and therefore does not offer the same potential for defence cooperation to the UK. Being a nation with full spectrum capabilities and a history of expeditionary warfare, the UK has not looked to Germany as a potential partner outside of the European theatre (Johnson and Matlary 2018). Furthermore, German unease at expeditionary operations has led Britain to turn to France as its European partner of choice (Johnson and Matlary 2018). German military capabilities have also been chronically underfunded since the end of the Cold War (Johnson and Matlary 2018). While the UK has not always provided its forces with the necessary resources, a point that is explored in great detail in subsequent chapters, the UK has maintained a credible level of readiness. The German government by contrast failed to do this after the Cold War and has only seriously looked at reinvesting in its military in the wake of Russia’s annexation of Crimea (Johnson and Matlary 2018). As such while the UK has

cooperated with Germany within wider frameworks such as NATO and the EU, their differing strategic postures have ensured that there has been precious little bilateral cooperation (Johnson and Matlary 2018).

Connected to their opposing strategic doctrines are the differing national identities of Britain and Germany. Unlike Britain and France which both share a belief in themselves as global powers, Germany is still reluctant to see itself as a world player. As Vanda Knowles and Silke Thomson-Pottebohm (2004) rightly identify, historic factors are major inhibitors on German power. As already mentioned it is clear from the literature that Germany's preference is to operate multilaterally through international institutions (Keohane 2016). It rarely acts unilaterally or outside of established structures. The UK has no such inhibitions. The UK still views itself as a major international player. The 2021 Integrated Review sets out a vision for a "Global Britain" that will operate both in conjunction with existing institutions and bilaterally as needed (MoD 2021). This thus limits the potential for Anglo-German defence cooperation as both nations have fundamentally opposing views of their respective places in the world. In that way Anglo-German defence cooperation suffers from the same problems as Franco-German defence cooperation. A capable and interventionist minded power is unable to reconcile its own views with that of its restrained neighbour. This highlights some of the similarities between the Franco-German and Anglo-German relationships. In both cases German reluctance prevents it from acting in a manner that its more adventurous partner would like. It is also ironic that despite their historic rivalries both Britain and France are frustrated by German pacifism, a pacifism that is a result of past German aggression against Britain and France.

The third factor evident within the literature is a clear difference in British and German views on the role of the EU in their respective defence policies. As Knowles and Thomson-Pottebohm (2004) argue; Germany has long favoured greater institutionalisation of defence policy at the EU level, while the UK has traditionally opposed major EU defence initiatives. This differs slightly from Franco-German disagreements over the EU, and indeed also from Franco-British perspectives on the EU. While both France and Germany have pushed for the EU to take on a greater role in defence matters, they have divergent views on what form this should take. Germany has been keen to institutionalise defence within the EU, while France has pushed for a more intergovernmental approach that would allow it to take the lead. The UK did not completely oppose intergovernmental defence cooperation within the EU but always sought to keep it as limited as possible. This is therefore a major area of disagreement between Germany and the UK, as Britain has often been the main obstacle to enhanced EU defence cooperation (Longhurst and Miskimmon 2007). This has ensured that while Britain and Germany may agree on many of the main defence issues facing them, they regularly differ on how they should respond (Longhurst and Miskimmon 2007).

Defence cooperation between Germany and the UK can best be viewed as two nations working alongside one another, rather than working together. They cooperate through multilateral institutions such as NATO, and formerly the EU, but there is little bilateral cooperation. Cooperation between Germany and the UK is thus an area of untapped potential (Becker, Mölling and Schütz 2020). Britain and Germany could cooperate more bilaterally if they invested the time and effort. As European powers committed to NATO, there is scope for greater Anglo-German defence cooperation within the European sphere. For instance, Germany could contribute troops to the UK-led NATO battlegroup in Estonia while the UK

could reciprocate for the German-led battlegroup in Lithuania. Alas at present this does not appear to be a priority for either government.

The E3 combined

If Franco-German defence cooperation is a story of unrealised potential and Anglo-German defence cooperation a story of untapped potential, then trilateral defence cooperation is a story of unexplored potential. The literature makes it clear that despite being the three main powers in Europe the E3 have tended to focus on bilateral defence relations, to varying degrees of success, while ignoring the potential for cooperation as a group. One notable exception to this was the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), later renamed CSDP. While CSDP was instigated by an Anglo-French initiative, it was adopted by the European Council under a German presidency. This was thus a rare example of trilateral defence cooperation between the E3. There have been few instances like this in the years since.

While France and Britain are closer to each other in strategic culture than they are to Germany, defence cooperation between the E3 would be beneficial for all sides. Alice Pannier and Olivier Schmitt (2014) have argued that meaningful cooperation between all three would be the best way towards a meaningful improvement in European defence. How exactly this would be achieved is the main question. As discussed already the E3 have an array of policy divergences that make defence cooperation difficult. German pacifism and Anglo-French adventurism are hard to reconcile. Equally Germany has for years found itself caught between Atlanticist Britain and Europeanist France (Pannier and Schmitt 2014). Consequently, achieving any meaningful cooperation is incredibly difficult. Such cooperation has therefore remained largely theoretical, but in a post-Brexit world it has taken on an increased relevance.

Enhanced trilateral defence cooperation with France and Germany offers a way in which Britain can continue to exercise influence in both Europe and the EU (Keohane 2017). Anna Wieslander (2020) argues that this kind of cooperation could allow for the creation of a European pillar of NATO. This would be in all three nations interests as it would bolster both NATO and European security. It would also increase their influence within the alliance by establishing them as leaders amongst NATO's European members. How this will change in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine remains to be seen. The German decision to increase defence spending by €100 billion could make change the nature of European defence. However, this spending plan still lacks detail and there is no substantive literature on how this will impact defence cooperation with either the UK or France.

The United States, its "Oldest Ally" and the "Special Relationship"

Having considered the influence of defence cooperation between France, Germany and the UK, it is now time to consider transatlantic relations. It is important to understand the role of the United States in both British and French defence policy in order to appreciate all the factors that influence the Entente Cordiale.

The relationship between France and the United States is a complicated one. Officially they are firm friends. The US refers to France as its oldest friend and ally (US Embassy 2020). Equally France states that their relationship is built on bonds dating back to the French and American revolutions (France in the United States 2020). However as is clear within the literature the reality is more complicated. Existing research on Franco-American defence cooperation highlights that relations between the US and France tend to oscillate between strong cooperation and acrimonious disagreements. It is also clear from the literature that the latter outweighs the former.

A major theme within the literature is that France and America have repeatedly clashed over their perceived world roles. As James Sperling (2019) argues the United States, as the dominant power in the West, is accustomed to taking a leadership role when it comes to its dealings with Western nations. To a certain extent America expects its allies to show a degree of deference to it as the 'leader of the free world' (Sperling 2019). The US has used NATO as a means to extend its influence and has been happy to support European integration, so long as that integration strengthens European states' ability to support US interests (Sperling 2019). As Joanne Wright highlights (2000) France has been suspicious of the United States since the end of the Second World War. Wright asserts that while France accepted the necessity of American support to counterbalance the Soviets during the Cold War, France also pursued a policy which aimed to secure their own independence and autonomy while weakening American influence over the continent. Maurice Vaisse (2009) agrees, arguing that France has pursued an independent role in the world intended to preserve their own influence and prevent American encroachment onto what it views as French national interests. This clashing of views between two states, which both see themselves as world leaders, has repeatedly undermined cooperation between both nations.

The literature on Franco-American disagreements highlights how discord between the two tends to occur when one nation perceives the other as undermining their core interests. Sophie Meunier (2005) argues that French opposition towards the US has been driven by concerns over the American preponderance of power in the global system. Meunier (2005) claims that France has viewed American dominance as a threat to its own place in the world and perception of itself as a global power. Peter Schraeder (2000) has argued that French anger has been particularly acute when it perceives America to be overstepping in its sphere of influence in Africa. Schraeder (2000) argues that American involvement in former French

colonies greatly irritates France, as it considers them to be within its sole sphere of influence. Equally, Thierry Tardy (2003) argues that clashes over the defence of Europe have generated much animosity over the years. The US has often viewed French attempts to build an autonomous European defence capability as a threat to the Atlantic alliance (Tardy 2003). This view is supported by the literature which agrees that the French withdrawal from NATO's military command structure, attempts to pull Germany away from NATO with the Elysée Treaty (Kempin and Kunz 2019) and efforts to build an EU defence capability independent of NATO all strained relations with Washington (Lightfoot and Bel 2020). Charles Cogan (Cogan 2010) has argued their historical rivalry drove "intellectual competition" between the two, giving rise to an ambiguous relationship France and America may be allies but they have traditionally been uneasy ones. John Keiger (2010) agrees arguing that the historical legacy of French suspicion towards *les Anglo-Saxons* has influenced their perceptions of the US and its actions.

There is a consensus within the literature that relations between France and the US reached their lowest point during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Celia Belin (2018) argues that French opposition to the Iraq War provoked such anger in America that bilateral relations were plunged into an abyss. American accusations of cowardice sent France back into the darkest moments of its history (Belin 2018), devastating Franco-American relations. Jeffrey Lightfoot and Olivier-Rémy Bel (2020) also conclude that the Franco-American schism in 2003 was particularly damaging. They argue that this split was in part fuelled by existing stereotypes of American arrogance and French obstinance, inflaming acrimony on both sides (Lightfoot and Bel 2020). Charles Cogan (2004) refers to this dispute as a breakup of a transatlantic alliance that had stood since the Second World War. While not as hyperbolic, Irwin Wall (2004) agrees

with Cogen that the Iraq War caused a major rift in US-France relations, causing France to turn towards Europe as a counterweight to American unilateralism.

While historic relations between France and the United States have been strained, allowing for little bilateral defence cooperation, recent literature takes a more positive tone. There is a sense within the literature that America and France have embarked upon a convergence of ideas in recent years that has helped boost defence cooperation in previously unseen ways. There is general agreement that this trend began with the Presidency of Nicholas Sarkozy (Belin 2018, Lightfoot and Bel 2020). President Sarkozy re-joined NATO military command and adopted a more Atlanticist outlook than his predecessors. It has been noted that Sarkozy's election marked a turning point in Franco-American relations (Grossman 2010). Whilst French reintegration into NATO was not the solution to all the bilateral issues between them, it was a positive step in the right direction (Grossman 2010). Frederic Pesme (2010) described this moment as a sea change in the relationship. Within the literature NATO reintegration is often seen as the starting point for a Franco-American rapprochement. American views on France also became more positive after French leadership in the 2011 intervention in Libya (Lightfoot and Bel 2020) and have improved further since France began conducting counter terrorism operations in the Sahel (Scheffer and Quencez 2018). Michael Shurkin and Peter A. Wilson have even argued that France has begun replacing the UK as America's primary European ally (Shurkin and Wilson 2015).

Another theme evident throughout the literature is that despite their differences, a failure to cooperate would be detrimental to French and American interests. For instance, Andrew Lebovich (2021) claims that while France has taken the lead in the Sahel, greater American support would be in both of their interests. Lebovich argues that a stable Sahel is in both

nations interests but it is too remote from the United States to be a primary concern. Therefore, providing France with both greater military and political support would ensure that stabilisation operations are able to continue functioning there effectively. Celia Belin (2018) reiterates this point by arguing that Franco-American defence cooperation has proven effective in the fight against Islamic State with France providing the US with a reliable ally that possesses full spectrum capabilities. As a nation with global ambitions but limited resources France is at risk of overstretching itself. This is a problem highlighted by Alice Pannier (2017) who argues that greater cooperation with allies is the best way for France to achieve its strategic goals without overstretching itself.

The "Special Relationship"

The defence relationship between the UK and the US is well known as the "Special Relationship". This has been the UK's most valued strategic relationship since the end of the Second World War. This is a relationship that has survived numerous ups and downs over the years (Dumbrell 2006). Existing literature exhibits a consensus that cooperation between the US and UK in the post-War period was unusually close, even for two allies (Harris 2013). There is general agreement that throughout the Cold War Britain and America enjoyed a defence relationship that was unique to any other country (Clark 1994). While the US may have close defence relations with other allies such as Australia or Israel, the level of integration and interoperability between the US and UK is unmatched (Rees 2014). One area in which the relationship is particularly close is in terms of nuclear cooperation, where the two maintain levels of cooperation and integration unseen anywhere else in the world (Young 2007).

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a trend in the literature to argue that the "Special Relationship" has ceased to be particularly special. John Dumbrell (2001) argues that

it was the global conflict of the Cold War that gave the “Special Relationship” its relevance. Without the threat of the Soviet Union Dumbrell (2001) argues that the relationship has lost its significance, particularly to the US. Thus, he argues that without the need to face down the Soviets in Europe, much of Britain’s importance to American strategic thinking is gone. Not long after the collapse of the Soviet Union John Dickie (1994) argued that the fundamental purpose of the Anglo-American alliance was now gone. An alliance that had been formed to fight fascism and been sustained by the struggle against communism now faced neither. Steve Marsh and Alan Dobson (2014) also note that in the wake of the Cold War British and American interests began to diverge. While Britain remained firmly committed to European security and determined to ensure the peace dividend that allowed for reduced defence spending, America was enjoying its unipolar moment and becoming increasingly adventurous on the world stage. As an alliance built on interests it was natural that the “Special Relationship” would start to lose its lustre once national interests were no longer aligned (Danchev 2006).

Despite this wave of post-Cold War negativity, more recent works argue that the “Special Relationship” has endured despite the changing global circumstances. The US and UK have maintained an elevated level of defence cooperation and their militaries continue to be highly integrated and interoperable (Rees and Davies 2019). Steve Marsh (2014) argues that despite the initial divergence of British and American interests, their interests have realigned. This has ensured that bilateral defence cooperation has continued. The experience of fighting alongside each other in Iraq and Afghanistan sustained the “Special Relationships” relevance in the eyes of policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic (Dumbrell 2006). John Baylis & James J. Wirtz (2012), argue that while the relationship has been strained there is still sufficient goodwill on both sides to see it maintained. It has also been argued that the UK remains

America's most closely aligned European ally (Vinjamuri and Kundnani 2021). On issues such as China, counterterrorism and Russia, Britain and America hold much closer views than they do with their European allies. This means that Anglo-American defence cooperation remains relevant and will continue as they face an array of common challenges.

The question that must be asked is why are the US and UK such close allies? This question remains contested within existing literature. On the one hand there are those who argue that the relationship is built upon shared values and ideals, while on the other are those who view it as being based upon national interests which happen to have aligned for much of the last century. Those who argue that the "Special relationship" is maintained through common values often point to the existence of a common language, culture and history that sustains cooperation between the US and UK (Allen 1954). Arthur Turner (1971) argues that common legal and political systems based on the rule of law and democracy offers a common foundation upon which the "Special Relationship" is built. As democratic states it is only natural that Britain and America would be allies. Leslie Vinjamuri and Hans Kundnani (2021) argue that the US and UK share a common sense of purpose and willingness to act, both of which naturally bring them together as defence partners. John Dumbrell (2006) also argues that while Britain's place in the world has been in decline, common interests and culture were a major contributing factor to the "Special Relationship" throughout the Cold War.

Those holding the contrary view argue that the "Special Relationship" exists because of shared national interests and little more. During the Cold War David Reynolds (1985) argued that with America being a superpower and Britain a regional power, their alliance was only sustained because America's global interests were closely tied to the region in which Britain was located. As a major player in Europe Britain was useful to America because it provided

substantial capabilities for regional defence. In the rest of the world Britain was of little consequence to America. Kathleen Burk (2009) argues that there is an inherent flaw in the “Special Relationship”, namely that it is only special to America when it wants something from the UK. In instances where America needs British support, such as the invasion of Iraq, then it will speak of the importance of their relationship. However, when its interests are not served by British support then the “Special Relationship” quickly loses its appeal. Steve Marsh (2019) goes even further arguing that the special component of the “Special Relationship” is a myth created by policy makers. Marsh does not deny the existence of the “Special Relationship” however, he claims that it suits the interests of both the US and UK to promote the idea of the “Special Relationship”. This has led both governments to support a mythologised version of their history that glosses over an alliance based purely on national interests. Andrew Mumford (2017) makes the point that while the US and UK are allies, this alliance is often undercut by their conflicting national interests. Mumford (2017) goes so far as to refer to the term “Special Relationship” as vacuous.

The debate over the nature of the “Special Relationship” reflects the debate within the literature on the Entente Cordiale. The exact nature of the Anglo-French relationship is hard to quantify and is debated at length, both in the literature considered already and in a subsequent chapter. However, this thesis agrees with scholars such as Marsh and Mumford that the “Special Relationship” is often overblown and only special when it is useful to the US. Whilst the US and UK may have a particularly close relationship, its importance to the US is greatly exaggerated by British policy makers. It is noteworthy that the literature on Britain’s two primary defence relationships contains numerous parallels. Debates over ideals versus interests are common within Anglo-French and Anglo-American literature.

It is also important to consider that the Anglo-American defence relationship is not an even one. While the Franco-British relationship is largely symmetrical, the “Special Relationship” is clearly asymmetric in America’s favour. Michael Parsons (2002) makes the point that while there is a “Special Relationship” between Britain and America, the US has always been able to enforce its will when its interests have conflicted with those of Britain. Ruike Xu (2016) also points out that while Britain is America’s preferred partner of choice, this is based on its perceptions of British value. Reductions in British defence spending or changes in American priorities may reduce the value that America places upon cooperation with the UK. Andrew Mumford (2017) agrees with this point arguing that the “Special Relationship” was invented by the UK in an attempt to latch onto rising American power as its own world role was in decline. Thus, while the UK has value to the US, the relationship is of far greater importance to the UK. John Dumbrell (2006) also argues that there is a power asymmetry at the heart of the relationship. It is his view that given America’s preponderance of power in the relationship, Britain cares far more about America than vice versa. Dumbrell (2006) also makes the point that the relationship is somewhat hegemonic. Britain accepts that it is the junior partner and in return is rewarded with a degree of influence in Washington. Kathleen Burk’s (2009) argument that the “Special Relationship” is only special when America wants something from the UK is relevant here. Washington is happy to speak of the “Special Relationship” when it requires British support or to humour visiting British dignitaries. However, the concept of the “Special Relationship” is not one that makes its way into policy discussions. In his discussion on the mythologising of the “Special Relationship” Steve Marsh (2019) is keen to point out that it is British officials who push the “Special Relationship” myth more than their American counterparts. America is of course happy to agree with this version of events, as discussed above it serves its interests that the “Special Relationship” appears to

be built on shared values such as democracy. However, it is of greater importance to the UK. Marsh argues that propagating the idealised version of the “Special Relationship” is key to British perceptions of their place in the world. By identifying themselves as America’s partner of choice Britain can bolster its global influence by appearing to hold sway in Washington.

Between the Continent and the Sea

The concept of trilateral defence cooperation between the US, UK and France is a relatively new one. While they have cooperated as part of larger alliances, such as in Afghanistan, there has been relatively little discussion of a purely trilateral grouping of these three states. However recently this idea has garnered more attention as it offers tangible benefits for all three states. Alice Pannier (2017) writes that there has been somewhat of a reorientation of French defence policy towards a middle ground between their traditional Gaullist approach to defence and the Atlanticist stance of their British and American allies. This makes the potential for greater trilateral cooperation a real possibility. Adrien Abecassis and Jolyon Howorth (2020) both argue that changes on the global stage raise the possibility of renewed trilateral cooperation. They argue that the old unipolar order has gone and been replaced with an increasingly multipolar world. To that end a realignment of the US, UK and France is necessary. As the US continues its pivot to the Indo-Pacific it will devote less attention to Europe and its neighbourhood. Abecassis and Howorth (2020) argue that London and Paris should therefore cooperate with Washington to bring about a Europeanisation of NATO with themselves in the lead. This would allow for greater burden sharing between the US and its European allies, while ensuring that all three nations vital interests are protected. Recent developments have also attracted considerable attention and indicate that there may be greater trilateral defence cooperation in the near future. In June 2021 the heads of all three

navies met and agreed to bolster trilateral cooperation in the future. Joint exercises, including with *HMS Queen Elizabeth* and the *Charles de Gaulle*, were held indicating that greater trilateral cooperation is a priority and likely to continue (Eckstein 2021). Élie Tenenbaum (2017) also argues that there has been increasing alignment in British, French and American counter insurgency doctrines, based on their shared experiences in recent conflicts. This has built common operational procedures and raises the prospect of greater trilateral cooperation in the future.

Conclusion

The Entente Cordiale has naturally attracted significant academic study over the years. This literature review has thus sought to collate and identify a portion of that body of work in order to identify several themes and trends. Firstly, within the historical literature it is evident that there are a number of themes present throughout. Foremost is the issue of miscommunication. Clearly Britain and France have misunderstood one another from the beginning of their relationship. This has complicated their interactions and increased the difficulties of defence cooperation (Keiger 2006). In line with this, the relationship has suffered from periods of neglect and hostility as well as times of good cooperation. While the UK and France have proven capable of uniting when in the face of a dire crisis, as demonstrated by both world wars, they have also shown that they are prone to rancour and disagreement when lacking such a unifying threat. This facet of the relationship has inevitably hindered peacetime defence cooperation, particularly during the Cold War (Capet et al 2006). This is further illustrated by the numerous missed opportunities for deeper defence cooperation that were outlined above. It is evident from surveying the literature that the Anglo-French defence relationship has in many ways surpassed all expectations held for it

upon its inception (Otte 2008). That such a crucial strategic partnership should grow out of a relatively minor political agreement should be considered astonishing to modern observers, never mind those who partook in its founding.

As discussed above some of the biggest influences on the Entente Cordiale are Britain and France's relationships with their other allies. Within Europe relations with Germany have had a major impact upon the Entente Cordiale. The Franco-German relationship has suffered from many of the same problems as the Franco-British relationship. Differences over Europe and NATO have plagued France and Germany, just as they have plagued France and Britain. French desires to maintain an independent defence posture have repeatedly clashed with German dependency upon NATO. Since the Second World War Germany has been as dependent upon the US almost as much as France has sought to distance itself from it. While both nations have agreed on the need to build an autonomous European defence capability, the literature has shown that they have repeatedly failed to agree on what form this should take. For France European autonomy is a tool to combat American influence on the continent by reducing Europe's need for NATO. For Germany, European capabilities should be improved in order to strengthen NATO. It is also clear from the literature that despite heavily institutionalising their relationship, more so than either nation has done with any other ally, there is still a deep divide between France and Germany's strategic postures and defence doctrines.

Similarly Anglo-German relations have also been beset by difficulties. While Britain and Germany may share the same basic Atlanticist outlook, as the literature has shown this has not been enough to build a meaningful bilateral defence relationship. It is clear that Britain and Germany maintain fundamentally different outlooks on defence that have prevented them from cooperating more meaningfully. While the UK has embraced coalitions as its main

means of fighting wars, it has been unable to stomach the kind of institutional defence cooperation at the EU level that Germany favours. The UK also maintains an activist streak within its defence policy that is at odds with Germany's latent pacifism. As discussed at length, German reluctance to deploy forces abroad has curtailed cooperation with both the UK and France.

Given the differences between their outlooks there has been limited trilateral cooperation between Britain, France and Germany. As the literature has shown there is little discussion of this happening in the future. This is disappointing as trilateral cooperation is the most viable way of improving European defence for everyone. As mentioned this may change after events in Ukraine, but at the time of writing this is still an unknown and there is no literature on the topic to consider.

Relations with the United States have also influenced the Entente Cordiale. Since the end of the Second World War France has sought to carve out an independent role for itself. This has often brought it into conflict with the US, as France has never been comfortable with American influence in Europe. This has caused great consternation in Washington which has been repeatedly frustrated by French refusal to fully align itself with American interests. The literature is clear however that despite their differences France and the US cannot afford to not work together. In an increasingly complex world cooperation between Western militaries is more important than ever. As the literature notes since 2008 relations have been improving with both sides developing a deeper respect for each other's capabilities.

France's independent sentiment has repeatedly clashed with Britain's Atlanticism. Since the Suez Crisis the UK has accepted that it is the junior partner in its relationship with the US. In accepting that position the UK has attempted to maintain its global influence by seeking to

influence decision making in Washington. By positioning itself as America's partner of choice the UK has often tied itself to America at the expense of its relationship with France. This has led to the US and UK militaries being more integrated and interoperable than any two allies in the world. This is of course not an equal relationship. As the literature has shown, while the UK is willing to accept that it is the junior partner it has often placed greater importance on this relationship than the US. For Britain the "Special Relationship" is a lifeline to maintain global influence. For America it is a convenience that keeps a useful ally onside when it is needed.

Given their complicated relationships there has traditionally been limited trilateral cooperation between the US, UK and France. While the US and UK have cooperated extensively, and France and the UK have cooperated reasonably well in recent years, there has been little effort to bring the three together. As shown in the literature above there has been a move towards greater trilateral cooperation within the last decade. It has been recognised that cooperation between the West's three premier military powers is in all their interests. While it is too early to predict how this will develop the literature is positive about the prospects.

The Entente Cordiale is a complex topic. As has been outlined by this chapter, this peculiar relationship has had a tumultuous development. The transition from enemies to allies was not easy, nor was it certain. The constant disagreements between Britain and France at the onset of the Entente could have derailed the alliance in its infancy. It is also clear that relations with other states also have a major impact upon Anglo-French defence cooperation. The Entente does not exist in a vacuum, it is influenced by its relations with other states. Clear

within the literature is the peculiarity of the relationship. It is a complex relationship that has evolved over one hundred years of conflict and cooperation.

4. One Hundred Years of Peculiarity

Introduction

If the history of Anglo-French relations was a novel, the creation of the Entente Cordiale would be an eleventh-hour plot twist that stretched credulity. The transition from enemies to allies in a few short years was a remarkable transformation. It upended the traditional paradigm of conflict that had characterised Anglo-French relations. Very rarely would Britain and France find themselves aligned on any substantive issue. Attempts were often made to improve relations but competing interests would inevitably draw them apart. From Agincourt to Waterloo troops from these islands have fought their French counterparts. It was only in 1904 that Britain and France proactively sought to avoid further military conflict. Prior to this accord both sides managed their relationship through an ad-hoc combination of tacit agreements, international conferences and no small amount of “muddling through”. This transformation was a remarkable, albeit slow, process. That transition is outlined in detail in this chapter. Understanding the development of the Entente as a military alliance and the factors that have influenced it throughout its history is necessary to fully appreciate the context within which the defence relationship operates today.

The chapter is divided into several sections that consider the historical development Anglo-French defence cooperation in further detail. Each of these sections is built upon a particular theme that is present throughout the thesis. Some of these themes have already been touched upon in the literature review. Firstly, the chapter considers how the existence of a common threat has routinely served as a catalyst for greater defence cooperation between both nations. This is followed by a section that deals with situations in which the aforementioned threat is removed. Next there are two interrelated sections. The first deals

with the debate between Atlanticism and Continentalism. It pays particular attention to how this debate has shaped Anglo-French cooperation, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century. The second section considers the issue of British preferences for multilateralism in contrast to France's desire to preserve defence autonomy. As such the chapter does not adopt a strict chronological approach. This is done to ensure the clarity of its argument. Furthermore, straight chronological accounts of the Entente have been recounted elsewhere. Whilst this chapter serves to provide the necessary historical context for the modern Entente it also seeks to draw out its key themes. The themes discussed here are present throughout the history of the Entente, but its turbulent nature means that their presence often ebbed and flowed depending on the status of the relationship at that time. That is why this chapter is organised around themes rather than chronology. This brings the key themes of the relationship to the fore whilst still providing a historical overview of the relationship.

The Fashoda Crisis

One incident that must be considered vital in the development of the Entente Cordiale is the Fashoda Crisis. This incident was the driving force behind the rapprochement of 1904. As such it is necessary to discuss it in some detail before considering the various themes outlined above. The incident that would become known as the Fashoda Crisis began in July 1898. A French Captain by the name of Jean-Baptiste Marchand had arrived at the town of Fashoda, in modern day Sudan. Marchand had just completed a fourteen-month long expedition from French territory in Senegal and intended to raise the French tricolour over the Sudan. To that end he proceeded to occupy a small fortress located in Fashoda. Marchand's intention was to link France's West African holdings with French Somaliland, thus creating a continent

spanning belt of French territory across Africa (Rollo 1969). These ambitions conflicted with British aspirations for a Cape-to-Cairo Empire ranging from Egypt in the north and the Cape colony in the south. French control over the Sudan would also threaten British influence in Egypt, which had become a de facto British colony ten years prior. As such British troops led by Sir Herbert Kitchener moved to investigate Marchand's expedition. Sir Herbert had recently defeated rebel Sudanese forces in the name of the Khedive of Egypt, a British client and nominal ruler of the Sudan. The British government was therefore unwilling to see its recently secured influence over the Sudan threatened by France (Keiger 2004). As such Kitchener was ordered to ascertain what France's intentions were. Upon discovering that Marchand intended to claim the region for France, Kitchener raised the Egyptian flag in Fashoda and ordered his men to surround the fort Marchand had occupied. A tense standoff ensued in which Marchand refused to withdraw, while Kitchener, who enjoyed numerical superiority, refused to stand down without a French surrender. Both governments commenced negotiations in order to resolve the situation, with France ultimately retreating in October 1898.

The crisis was received remarkably differently by both nations. For Britain, Fashoda marked the latest in a long line of French pinpricks in Africa (Rollo 1969). While irritating, Fashoda was nothing out of the ordinary and quickly forgotten. For France Fashoda was a turning point in history (Otte 2008). In the French government's eyes, they were offered a choice between national humiliation or war with the British Empire. While neither of these options appealed, French statesmen rightly calculated that short-term humiliation was preferable to fighting a war against Britain that they were bound to lose. Retreat was met with howls of indignation from the French public and Anglophobia reached an all-time high (Gavin 1941). Some in the government had even called for war, although they were drowned out by more measured

voices. The following year when Britain went to war with South Africa's Boers cries of 'vive le boer' could be heard in Parisian high society (Sharp and Stone 2000). Despite the anger of public opinion however, the embarrassment of Fashoda offered France two important lessons. The first of which was a realisation that reconciliation with Britain was not only overdue, but necessary if France were to maintain its position in the world (Rollo 1969). This was not an easy lesson to learn, and it was not always adhered to. French suspicions remained and there were still those who would have preferred war. However outside of the world of espionage this went no further (de Wiel 2011). Antithetically the second manifested itself as an extreme paranoia towards British intentions abroad, compelling French policy makers to zealously guard their perceived interests lest 'perfidious Albion' undermine them (Gegout 2017). This wound inflicted upon the French national psyche has been dubbed "Fashoda syndrome" and continued to linger throughout the twentieth century (Gegout 2017). The change in attitude imbued in the French establishment by Fashoda would ultimately result in the rapprochement of 1904, which was reluctantly embraced by the British. It is also interesting that this incident was interpreted in such radically different ways. For Britain it was business as usual but for France it was a national humiliation. Divergent interpretations of their shared experience is a recurring theme that continues to influence Anglo-French defence cooperation to this day.

Cooperation when facing a threat

It is notable throughout their relationship that cooperation between Britain and France is often most effective when they are facing a common threat. Almost immediately after signing the Entente in 1904, both nations faced a strategic threat from Germany. It is arguable that the militarisation of the Entente may never have occurred without the threat posed by

Imperial Germany. German provocations in Morocco in 1905 and 1911 coupled with the ongoing Anglo-German naval arms race compelled both sides to enhance bilateral military cooperation. Following the first Moroccan Crisis in 1905 Britain and France began a series of staff discussions. These were high-level conversations held multiple times between defence officials from both sides of the channel. The topic was the possibility of a joint war against Germany. Whilst this did not constitute an official military commitment, it was a tangible first step towards greater military cooperation (Keiger 2004). In 1911 during the second Moroccan Crisis, Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George issued a public statement asserting that national honour was of greater import than peace in Europe. This was interpreted by many as a clear commitment to support France militarily should war with Germany occur (Andrew and Vallet 2004). Prior to Lloyd George's proclamation the Anglo-French dialogue had been conducted in private. It was so private that it was largely unknown to much of the British government (Keiger 2004). By aligning Britain with France in such a public manner Lloyd George took the Entente closer towards becoming a formal agreement bound by treaty, rather than the informal understanding it was at the time. This second war scare over Morocco also prompted an acceleration of joint Anglo-French war planning, including plans to commit a BEF of 150,000 men to the continent in the event of war (Keiger 2004). In 1912 the militarisation of the Entente Cordiale continued as both sides concluded the Franco-British naval agreement. This stipulated that France would concentrate its naval forces in the Mediterranean, while the Royal Navy would focus its efforts on the English Channel and the North Sea. The intent of this arrangement was clear. In the event of war Britain and France would be able to concentrate their respective naval assets in the areas that they were strongest enabling them to better counter external, realistically German, aggression. While

this was still not a formal military commitment, it nonetheless placed a moral obligation on Britain to come to France's defence if she was attacked (Keiger 2004).

The outbreak of the First World War was the first real test of the validity of the Entente Cordiale. Whilst some members of the British government argued that Britain should remain neutral in the event of a continental war, in reality this was never an option. While military preparations had been conducted unbeknownst to many in the British establishment, their mere existence placed an onus on Britain to come to the aid of France should she be attacked. Furthermore, should Germany defeat France once again then Britain could well find itself isolated from a German dominated Europe (Howard 1972). Such an outcome had to be prevented. The British decision to go to war in 1914 was ultimately justified as protecting neutral Belgium, rather than aiding an ally many in Britain thought of as a foe (Sheffield 2013). However, just prior to the German invasion of Belgium British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey delivered a warning to the German ambassador. Even if Britain remained neutral in a future war, the Royal Navy would still engage the German Navy if it attempted to attack northern France. This commitment demonstrated that British neutrality would have been couched in France's favour. Furthermore, cabinet discussions from the time indicate that the Government was hesitant to openly support France prematurely out of fear that this would make war more likely (Becker 2004). There were concerns in Whitehall that such an action would embolden the French in becoming more recalcitrant in their diplomacy while also failing to deter the Germans. As such it is possible to infer that the British government was more concerned with the timing of its support for France rather than with supporting it in general (Sheffield 2013). Furthermore, from 1909 all strategic planning conducted by the British army considered a German attack on France to constitute a *casus belli* for Britain. The General Staff at the War Office theorised that without British military support, Germany

would enjoy an intolerable numerical superiority over France which would make a French capitulation inevitable. As such the military considered it to be in Britain's interest to intervene to prevent such a collapse, lest Europe fall under German hegemony (Howard 1972). As such it can be argued that had Germany not invaded Belgium it is probable that Britain would have eventually joined the fray in France's defence. The collection of military plans intended to counter German aggression bound Britain to France and would have likely compelled them to aid France regardless of the circumstances. In addition, British fears of German hegemony over Europe, as mentioned above, would also have influenced British actions in favour of France.

The experience of the Great War demonstrates the effectiveness of Anglo-French defence cooperation when faced with a joint threat. While difficulties did exist, particularly over how much of the Western Front Britain should take responsibility for (Greenlaugh 2013), World War One was an opportunity for the Entente to take its place as a fully-fledged military alliance. On the 5th September 1914 Britain and France concluded the Treaty of London officially making them wartime allies. This was an important step as they had previously been co-belligerents against Germany, rather than official allies. The logistical challenges of transporting the initial BEF to France and then integrating it into the front line necessitated a major improvement in bilateral cooperation. At the operational and tactical level Anglo-French forces learned how to cooperate on a daily basis. In 1918 French Marshal Ferdinand Foch was appointed Supreme Commander of all allied forces. Prior to this decision the war had been fought in accordance with the traditional alliance model of previous wars. Britain and France had manned their own sections of the Western Front, fought their own battles and developed their own strategies (Dutton 2000). While there had been some joint planning, most decisions were made at the national level then carried out independently of what the

other was doing. With the appointment of Foch as Supreme Commander this changed as both sides now fought under a unified command with a joint headquarters (Dutton 2000). This development allowed for major improvements in bilateral military cooperation and laid the foundations for joint military action in the future.

Anglo-French cooperation would again become prominent in the late 1930s, as Nazi Germany sought to redraw the map of Europe. During much of the interwar period the Anglo-French relationship was characterised by discord rather than cooperation, as is further discussed below. However, in the late 1930s it became clear to both sides that the threat posed by Germany, and to a lesser extent Italy and Japan, warranted a rejuvenation of the Entente Cordiale. The trigger for this realignment was the Abyssinian Crisis of 1935 (Stone 2000). In October 1935 Italy invaded and swiftly conquered the African nation of Abyssinia. Both Britain and France had attempted individually to convince Italian dictator Benito Mussolini not to undertake such a course to no avail. Italy's actions also demonstrated the impotence of the League of Nations, which had been founded to prevent precisely this kind of action (Ulrich-Pier 2004). It was apparent that both unilateral and multilateral attempts to maintain world peace had failed. It would therefore be necessary to resuscitate the Entente Cordiale and coordinate their policies. In the immediate aftermath of the Italian invasion Britain and France commenced a series of naval staff talks, reminiscent of those held prior to the Great War. These produced an agreement for joint naval action in the event of war in the Mediterranean. France also agreed to allow the British to base the Royal Navy on their southern coast, the first such agreement since the end of the First World War (Stone 2000).

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War was also a moment of convergence. While both governments favoured different belligerents initially, Britain being more inclined towards

Franco while France favoured the Socialists, they were both alarmed by the levels of intervention conducted by other European states (Stone 2008). German and Italian support for the nationalists raised the possibility of a third fascist state aligning against the Entente, while Soviet support for the socialists raised the spectre of international communism once more. As such a policy of joint non-intervention was adopted towards Spain. This was intended to isolate the civil war from sparking a larger European conflagration that would drag in the great powers (Alpert 1998). Given that the war remained limited to Spain, and Franco's eventual neutrality in the Second World War, this proved to be successful.

By 1939 it had become clear that war in Europe was increasingly likely. This spurred a rapid increase in joint military planning. In March 1939 an agreement was made to deploy a BEF to defend France should war occur. This complimented an agreement from the previous year that committed the Royal Air Force to assist in the defence of France. When war finally did come plans had been laid for a joint struggle against Germany. It was agreed by both sides that their best hope of victory was through a long war of attrition. This would allow the full weight of their respective empires to be brought to bear. To this end plans were drawn up to hold the Germans at the French border, while the BEF would compensate for the capability gaps this left in the French line. This plan was primarily driven by the French since it was envisaged that the bulk of the fighting would take place on their soil (Stone 2000). This level of joint planning and cooperation meant that by the outbreak of war in 1939 the Entente Cordiale was stronger than it had ever been (Ulrich-Pier 2004).

At the onset of the Second World War Britain and France made good use of their past experience and established a Supreme War Council, consisting of both Prime Ministers and their military advisors. They also began enhanced economic cooperation in order to bolster

their respective armament programmes. The BEF consisting of some 152,000 British troops was deployed to France by the end of September 1939 and took up defensive positions (Ellis 2004). They also issued a joint declaration stating that neither would seek to negotiate a separate peace with Germany. All in all, the prognosis for Anglo-French defence cooperation looked positive (Bell 2000). The Entente would however be dealt a serious blow in June 1940 when France formally capitulated to Germany following an invasion the previous month. The fallout of this, and the British relationship with Vichy France, shall be discussed later in the chapter. Despite this Anglo-French cooperation would continue under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle and the Free French. Britain would act as a safe haven for the Free French, who in turn proved to be invaluable, in particular on the colonial front where Free French forces helped to secure the French Empire for the allied cause. This was at times a tense relationship, with Churchill and de Gaulle clashing on numerous occasions (Kersaudy 2004). De Gaulle was determined to protect French independence, often to the point of causing rifts between himself and the other allied leaders (Kersaudy 2004). Despite this British and French forces would continue to fight beside one another until the war's conclusion. British support for the Free French would include championing them during interallied disputes (de la Gorce 2004). This was as France's defeat in 1940 had damaged its standing amongst the Americans and Soviets, its capitulation and occupation had reduced it to the level of countries such as Belgium or Denmark in their eyes. As such it was at British insistence that France was granted an occupation zone in Germany and a permanent seat on the UNSC (de la Gorce 2004).

It was during the Second World War that a particularly bizarre episode occurred that is worth mentioning here. In June 1940 and faced with imminent French defeat a proposal was put forward by the British war cabinet and accepted by the French Prime Minister to establish a Franco-British Union (Mayne 2004). A declaration prepared by the cabinet stated that:

“France and Great Britain shall no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union.

The constitution of the Union will provide for joint organs of defence, foreign, financial and economic policies. Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France” (Shlaim 1974: 27)

The French government however proved much less enthusiastic about this proposal. Marshal Philippe Petain was particularly opposed arguing that it was nothing more than a British attempt to steal France’s colonies before the Germans did (Druon 2004). In the face of this opposition the proposal floundered, and France surrendered. While this ultimately came to nothing it is worth noting just how radical this proposal was. The suggestion that Britain and France merge into a single entity would have been ludicrous just a few months earlier. Yet in June 1940 Churchill and de Gaulle, both ardent nationalists, saw it as the only way to preserve France’s fighting strength and continue the war.

After the Second World War Britain and France immediately faced another threat in the form of the Soviet Union. While they had been war time allies, relations quickly soured, and the Cold War began. The relationship between France and the UK during this period was a complicated one influenced by numerous factors. However, there are several key instances of defence cooperation in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union. Firstly, Britain and France signed the treaty of Dunkirk in 1947. This was initially intended to safeguard against a revanchist Germany however it laid the groundwork for the Treaty of Brussels signed in 1948 (Young 2000). This treaty established the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO), a multilateral defensive alliance intended to defend Western Europe. It was intended that this alliance would eventually expand to include Germany and Italy. As such its primary purpose was to defend Western Europe from an external attack, primarily from the Soviet Union (Young

2000). Britain and France would also both be founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949. Disagreements over the status of NATO will be discussed later in the chapter but it should be noted that both Britain and France joined NATO enthusiastically as a method of countering the Soviet Union. For France in particular, the BTO and NATO were means of ensuring that Britain would remain committed both to them and to the European continent (Young 2000).

During the Cold War the high watermark of Franco-British defence cooperation was during the Suez Crisis (Beach 1989). The Suez Crisis began in July 1956 when Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalised the British owned Suez Canal Company. This precipitated an Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in October of that year intended to return the Canal to British hands. While the seizure of the Canal did not pose an existential threat to Britain and France's existence, as the Germans had during both World Wars and the threat of nuclear war did at the time, they nevertheless considered their vital interests to be at stake. Nasser was considered by many to be the chief puppeteer of Arab nationalist movements across the Middle East. This was viewed by both states as a threat to their imperial positions in the wider world. For Britain, Suez was a vital economic lifeline upon which the nation's economy depended. France meanwhile viewed Nasser as the primary financier of the rebel National Liberation Front in Algeria. At this time France considered Algeria a component of the metropole rather than a colony, so in French eyes Nasser was funding a rebellion on their home soil. A military intervention was viewed as the only option to counter the threat posed by Nasser. The invasion consisted of a combined force of nearly 80,000 men, consisting of 45,000 British and 35,000 French (Varble 2003). This was both the largest joint operation since the Second World War and the largest operation conducted during the Cold War (Beach 1989). Furthermore, it remains the largest post-1945 bilateral operation conducted between

the UK and France to this date. The Suez intervention proved to be a political disaster necessitating an Anglo-French withdrawal. Economic pressure from the United States threatened to unleash economic catastrophe upon Britain if it did not abandon the invasion (Carlton 1988). However, it should be noted that from a military perspective the operation was a success with Anglo-French forces routing their Egyptian counterparts in little over a week (Carlton 1988). While Egypt was not yet a major military power, the speed with which Britain and France established a taskforce of this size and achieved their initial military objectives demonstrated how effective Anglo-French defence cooperation can be when necessary.

The creation of the ESDP in 1999, the precursor to the 2009 CSDP, was also driven by a response to a common threat to Franco-British interests. While the CSDP shall be considered in further detail in subsequent chapters, it is worth noting the historical background that led to its creation here. The catalyst that spurred this round of defence cooperation was the breakup of Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. When that former communist country descended into ethnic violence and civil war the international community failed to intervene. The UNSC was unable to find a consensus as Russia and the United States differed over how to resolve the Crisis. Early on in the conflict the United States made clear its desire to avoid entanglement in events there. In the eyes of the Clinton administration war in the Balkans was a purely European affair (Bert 1997). Consequently, the European Community (EC) also refused to get involved. Despite wishing to prevent further loss of life European leaders felt they could not act without US assets or UN approval. Thus, faced with a mounting genocide the powers of Europe were confronted with their own powerlessness. The disintegration of Yugoslavia posed a risk to the newly born post-Cold War order and threatened the triumph of liberal democratic values that Britain and France had championed. If Yugoslavia was

allowed to descend into ethnic strife, then similar conflicts could break out in other post-Communist states. Evidently European nations needed the capability to act independently of America. This lack of a collective ability to act spurred Britain and France to issue the Saint Malo declaration leading to the creation of the ESDP.

Times of discord

Just as Britain and France have cooperated when they have faced a threat to their common interests, they have also fallen into discord when said threats are removed. As Andre Fontaine once noted “England and France have always been enemies, except when they joined together against a common foe” (Fontaine 1980: 351). While Fontaine may exaggerate slightly, the sentiment rings true. The immediate aftermath of the Great War is a prime example of this. The common front presented against Germany since 1904 fell apart almost as soon as the armistice was signed. The negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles were fraught with rancour and disagreement as both nations had radically different stances on how a defeated Germany should be handled (Lentin 2000). The final terms agreed at Versailles have been etched into the public consciousness, with its implications for world history continuing to be debated by historians (Boemeke et al 1998). However, it should be remembered that these final terms were a compromise between the great powers, in particular Britain and France (Lentin 2000). British aims at the peace conference were relatively straight forward. While they desired war reparations from Germany and the dismantling of the German colonial empire, Britain was otherwise inclined towards a relatively lenient peace. Prime Minister David Lloyd George was well aware that Europe would need to reconcile with the Germans one day and so sought to limit the damage done to Germany proper. France in contrast sought to punish Germany severely for its actions during the war. French Prime

Minister George Clemenceau's stated aims were for Germany to pay for the full damage it had inflicted upon France over the last four years, the dismantling of Germany's colonial possessions, French annexation of the Saarland, independence for the Rhineland with an indefinite French military presence and the demilitarisation of Germany. These measures were intended to ensure that Germany would not invade France for a third time (Lentin 2000).

Naturally these objectives contrasted markedly with each other, sparking a series of disagreements between the British and French governments. Here the misunderstandings that had plagued the relationship before once again resurfaced. For the French these demands were commensurate with the damage that had been inflicted upon them in recent years. Charting a path back to the Franco-Prussian War Clemenceau argued that France had been invaded twice by Germany in the last forty years. Additionally, Germany had issued numerous provocations that served as a prelude to the Great War. Furthermore, France had borne the brunt of the fighting and suffered the most in terms of men and materials. Given these factors the French considered it only natural that they should seek appropriate compensation (Lentin 2000). In addition, it was perfectly reasonable that France should try to ensure that she would never again face a Teutonic invasion from the east (Lentin 2000). In contrast British statesmen readily fell back into traditional modes of thinking that harboured an innate suspicion of all things Gallic. Britain did not see an ally seeking protection from future invasion. Rather it saw an old foe awaken from their slumber and once again seek hegemony in Europe (Lentin 2000).

It was mostly at British insistence that the French moderated their demands at Versailles and renounced their claims on the majority of German territory, though Alsace-Lorraine would be restored to French control. However, this moderation came at a price. On the same day the

treaty was signed Britain and America both signed treaties of guarantee with France. This treaty committed Britain to defending France's territorial integrity and pledged that it would come to France's aid should she be attacked by Germany in Europe. With this pledge of future British support France felt sufficiently safe to abandon its claims on the Saar and Rhineland. This guarantee would however never come into effect. The British had extended their guarantee under duress to save the peace conference, not as an ally wishing to reassure a friend. As such they immediately sought a way to renege on their commitment. To this end British diplomats quietly inserted a clause into their version of the treaty stating that it would only come into effect if and when the Americans ratified their own version. David Lloyd George gambled that the American Senate would never ratify such a treaty. This assumption proved to be correct and with the failure of the American treaty, the British guarantee was also rendered null and void (Lentin 2000). This delighted British officials but infuriated the French, who viewed this as a British betrayal of their commitments (Lentin 2000). Evidently without a common threat to unite them defence cooperation fell by the wayside.

This level of discord continued throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. One area of rancour was the Middle East. Having passed into Entente hands following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East was a relatively new imperial possession for both Britain and France. As both states sought to assert control over a region so recently ravaged by war disputes soon emerged. These disputes quickly escalated into a low-level proxy war as both nations took steps to undermine the other. France for instance provided military support to opponents of the pro-British Hashemite dynasty, while Britain supported Syrian nationalists against the French (Thomas 2008). Disputes over the precise borders of their respective mandates would continue well into the 1930s. At one point in 1925 British intelligence attempted to spark an uprising in southern Syria in order to provide a pretext to launch a military intervention and

annex the region (Thomas 2008). Both sides also courted the Turks with promises of territorial expansion at the others' expense, should Turkey choose to act in their favour (Thomas 2008). The French were particularly keen to sponsor a Turkish invasion of Iraq in order to pry Mosul and its oil reserves away from the British. Evidently, without a shared enemy their old imperial rivalry returned to the fore bringing with it new conflicts.

These disagreements were not solely limited to the colonial sphere either. In Europe tensions also quickly returned. Following the Treaty of Versailles France began a massive building project aimed at modernising and expanding its air force and increasing its submarine fleet. While the stated reason for such a build-up was to defend against a potential German attack, these aircraft also proved useful in policing operations over the Middle East. Britain meanwhile perceived this armaments programme as a direct threat, fearing that France sought to launch a pre-emptive attack on the British mainland (Capet et al 2004). The memory of Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare further coloured British perceptions. France was the only other nation to still possess a significant colonial empire, which was once again a source of conflict, and this further influenced British perspectives. The French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 further exacerbated tensions (Sharp 2000). While the French justified their actions as enforcing the treaty of Versailles, Britain viewed this as further proof of French designs for dominion over Europe.

As previously noted, the rising threat of fascism in Europe compelled reconciliation and resulted in a rejuvenation of the Entente Cordiale. This culminated in the Anglo-French declaration of war against Germany in 1939. In June 1940 France was forced to capitulate after the shock of the German blitzkrieg. After fleeing to Britain General Charles de Gaulle would lead the Free French forces in continuing to fight alongside Britain for the remainder

of the war. However, despite many calling the Second World War the Entente's greatest moment (Ulrich-Pier 2004) it is also the last time that British and French forces actively fought each other on the field of battle. Following the armistice in 1940 a new French government under Marshal Petain would continue to administer southern France and the French colonial empire. Petain was a rabid Anglophobe with a deep mistrust of 'perfidious Albion' and its intentions. It was Petain who had led the charge against continuing the war with Germany (Mayne 2004). Now ensconced at the head of a collaborationist regime, Petain realigned away from Britain and towards Germany.

Of particular concern for Britain was the fate of the French Navy. While Britain was confident that it could counter the German navy, the prospects of combating the French navy simultaneously were bleaker. Should the sizeable French fleet be added to the Axis powers then an invasion of the British mainland would transform from a remote possibility to a credible threat. To that end British officials made overtures to Vichy France attempting to convince them to place their fleet out of Germany's reach. While it was Britain's preference that the French hand their fleet over to them, they would have accepted Petain redeploying the fleet to France's distant colonies. Petain however refused all such entreaties. This decision resulted in the Battle of Mers El Kebir. On the 3rd July 1940 the Royal Navy bombarded the French fleet at Mers El Kebir in Algeria, as the continued presence of the French fleet in the Mediterranean was a clear and present threat to Britain (Bell 2000). In order to prevent Hitler from making use of it Britain had struck first, killing 1,297 French sailors and sinking many ships (Bell 2000). In retaliation French bombers raided Gibraltar several weeks later. This was the start of an undeclared war that was fought between the UK and Vichy France for the remainder of the Second World War. This conflict would cause the aforementioned tensions in the Middle East to culminate in a British invasion and occupation of Syria and Lebanon.

Similar clashes would occur across the French colonial empire as the British forcibly installed Free French forces as local administrators (Bell 2000).

After the Second World War, Britain and France found themselves thrust into the Cold War. As discussed above both states were aligned with the Western bloc during this conflict. However there still remained avenues for disagreement. Once again, the Middle East would prove to be a source of conflict. Following the defeat of Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon, Britain compelled the Free French to declare them independent states in 1943. This move was criticised by many in France as an attempt by Britain to assert sole control over the Middle East (Thomas 2008). However French forces remained in these newly independent states until 1945 ostensibly to ensure law and order. This inevitably sparked resentment amongst the local populace who began to view their newfound freedom as independence in name only (Thomas 2000). An insurgency broke out which was violently crushed by the French. In response to this Winston Churchill ordered British troops to reinvade Syria in May 1945 and a tense standoff ensued. Ultimately, faced with an unwinnable scenario the French withdrew (Thomas 2000). However, this illustrates how quickly animosity could resurface within the Entente Cordiale as less than a month after victory in Europe British and French troops almost came to blows.

Another incident of conflict between Britain and France occurred during the Nigerian civil war. This was a particularly bitter conflict between the Nigerian government and the separatist region of Biafra in the east of the country that raged from 1967-1970. Britain supported the Nigerian government throughout the conflict. Having recently granted Nigeria independence, the British government considered it of vital importance to demonstrate to the world that the state they had so recently created was viable (Stremlau 2015). The French

meanwhile covertly supplied the Biafran rebels with arms and equipment. Nigeria was a bastion of British influence in an otherwise French dominated West Africa. Undermining Nigeria was therefore a way to drive the British out of the region (Griffin 2015). The French made use of their influence in neighbouring countries to smuggle weapons into Biafra to sustain the rebellion. While the Nigerian government was ultimately victorious this incident strained relations considerably between London and Paris. It has been noted that this episode could be considered the last gasp of France's 'Fashoda syndrome' (Chafer and Cumming 2010).

Globalism/Atlanticism versus Continentalism

Throughout the history of the Franco-British relationship there has been a continuous debate between two differing conceptions of how national defence should be organised. The first position is that of Globalism, long upheld by British statesmen it holds that Britain should not be tied down to any sort of continental commitment and should instead focus on its global role. France's conception of continentalism meanwhile postulates that France is a European nation first and a global nation second. Of course, this does not mean that Britain does not consider itself to have a role in European affairs, and that France does not view itself as a global player. Rather these are perspectives that place different emphasizes on how both nations view themselves.

Throughout the existence of the Entente Cordiale Britain has been hesitant to make significant commitments to the European continent, motivated by a fear of becoming embroiled in European conflicts. Instead, Britain has preferred to focus on its role in international affairs. This has usually been coupled with efforts aimed at making the bare minimum necessary to satisfy Britain's continental neighbours, foremost amongst them

France. The fact that the Entente Cordiale originated as an agreement over a few minor colonies rather than some form of alliance illustrates this clearly. Evidently Britain has long been focused with the global, a stance that has repeatedly clashed with France's preoccupation with Europe. British Atlanticism took two primary forms over the last century. The first was a focus upon the British Empire. Prior to 1945 Britain's main strategic priority was the defence of its Empire and the Commonwealth. It was to this end that Britain initially retreated into semi-isolation, preferring to focus upon imperial matters and leave "Europe to itself" (Sharp 2008: 123) after the Great War.

This preoccupation with colonial affairs no doubt contributed to British perceptions of France as their primary global rival post-1918 as discussed above. As France was the only European nation to retain a sizeable Empire after the Great War it was perhaps inevitable that British statesmen would consider this to be a threat. As late as 1937 British strategic planning still placed the defence of the colonies above that of continental Europe (Otte 2008). This was despite the joint Anglo-French defence planning that was ongoing at the time. Following the Second World War British Globalism gradually transformed into the Atlanticism that is more recognisable today. This places primary importance upon the 'special relationship' with the United States. In the aftermath of this most cataclysmic of wars it became apparent that Britain was increasingly reliant upon the United States for economic and military support. Subsequently Britain began to place particular emphasis upon the views of Washington and sought out new ways to maintain and improve its privileged position as America's primary ally (Self 2010). Naturally, Britain's focus on its empire did not simply disappear and colonial matters remained an important concern for British policy makers. The empire did however gradually lose its relevance to British defence planning as the former colonies transitioned to independence and Commonwealth membership. As this occurred British preoccupation with

the 'special relationship' became increasingly pronounced until it became the primary assumption of British defence planning throughout the Cold War (Self 2010).

For France, the European stage has always been its primary focus. Imperial affairs have traditionally played a secondary role to France's European designs. While Britain desired colonies as an end in themselves, French governments viewed colonialism as a means to dominate Europe through the acquisition of new resources and materials. This is why Napoleon abandoned the first French colonial empire in favour of European ambitions and why the second French colonial empire was born out of the ashes of 1871, as a means of countering German might (Fontaine 1980). This European focus was the primary theatre of French defence planning throughout most of the twentieth century. It motivated France to push for such harsh terms at the Versailles peace conference as a means to secure its position on the continent. For as long as Germany retained the bulk of its European territory then French statesmen would continue to consider it their foremost threat. While new colonial possessions were a source of tension with Britain in the Middle East, this did not stop France from seeking a permanent alliance with Britain. French officials believed that such an alliance would fashion them with sufficient security in the event of a European war (Lentin 2000). A similar mentality played out in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. While reasserting control over its colonial holdings was important to the French government, of much greater importance was securing British support for a continued military alliance intended to avert a future war with Germany in Europe.

This debate was evident in the difference of opinion over how defence architecture in Europe should be established during the Cold War. Initially there was a level of agreement on how to approach European defence. As previously mentioned in 1947 Britain and France concluded

the Treaty of Dunkirk, which they followed up with the Treaty of Brussels in 1948. British statesmen remained uneasy about these purely European alliances, however. Indeed, despite forming an ostensibly military alliance in 1947 British military officials were still unwilling to hold staff talks with their French counterparts (Young 2000). Policy makers in London would have preferred to either leave western Europe to defend itself while they offered support from the side-lines, or to include the United States in some all-encompassing agreement (Greenwood 2000). In this Britain would get its wish as NATO was established in 1949. Britain would be quick to reallocate the vast majority of the resources assigned to the BTO to NATO, judging that the perilous state of most continental militaries meant that British forces would be better served as part of a NATO operation. This would leave the BTO as a paper tiger, hollowing out any independent European defence capability before it truly got off the ground (Young 2000). France was initially supportive of NATO believing that it would ensure their security against future conflict in Europe. Therefore, a form of post-war consensus was forged on how to best defend Europe.

Despite tensions elsewhere in the world, particularly in the ongoing decolonisation process, Britain and France largely agreed on how best to defend Europe. In the face of the Soviet threat NATO was viewed as the most effective way of guaranteeing western security. However, this consensus would not be sustained. The events of the Suez Crisis would derail Anglo-French agreement and severely undermine the Entente for most of the Cold War. For Britain Suez confirmed that relations with the United States was of paramount importance. The US had been deeply opposed to military intervention in Egypt and British actions had left them dangerously isolated on the world stage. The Suez Crisis was to Britain what the Fashoda Incident had been to France. It convinced British policymakers that it would be essential to maintain good relations with America, despite American interference being the primary

motivator for the British withdrawal from Egypt. As such it was necessary to repair those relationships as expediently as possible. This would be achieved within a matter of months as the special relationship was put back on track with remarkable haste. For the remainder of the Cold War British politicians would hold Atlanticism as an article of faith. As decolonisation increased in pace and the Commonwealth lost relevance in British strategic planning NATO and the Anglo-American relationship would only increase in importance for British policy makers. To this end they began to consider anything that threatened the Atlantic alliance as a threat to Britain's vital interests.

The allied withdrawal from Egypt, precipitated in large part by American pressure sparked a deep-set mistrust of all things American within the French government. The rapid speed at which Anglo-American relations were restored appeared suspicious to French eyes. In Paris there were fears of a conspiracy that sought to subordinate them to 'Anglo-Saxon' interests (Carlton 1988). Clearly NATO would be the vessel through which such a scheme would come to fruition. In response French statesmen began to seek alternative ways to bolster their security. The natural avenue for such an approach was Europe. As such France began to seek new ways to foster European cooperation and integration as a tool for promoting their own influence in the world.

This approach became increasingly prominent during Charles de Gaulle's tenure in the Elysée Palace. De Gaulle had an innate mistrust of American motives, in part brought on by his poor wartime relationship with President Roosevelt (Wright 2000). It was de Gaulle's firm belief that America sought to keep Europe, and in particular France, subordinated to its interests. As an extension of this belief de Gaulle mistrusted British motives towards Europe. In his mind the UK was far too dependent on America for it to be considered truly European. As such

British Atlanticism was merely a disguise designed to hide that Britain sought to do America's bidding on the European continent (Wright 2000). For de Gaulle a continentalist approach offered the only chance to maintain French 'grandeur' on the world stage. To that end de Gaulle actively sought to curtail British involvement in the nascent European Economic Community (EEC). Furthermore, de Gaulle sought to develop a military aspect to the EEC. This would have had two functions. Firstly, it would establish the EEC as a rival to NATO thus limiting the influence that America held over Western Europe. Secondly as Britain would not be a member, leadership would fall to France as the only other credible military power in Western Europe. This would achieve a long-standing French goal of military supremacy in Europe. It should be noted that de Gaulle was not inherently Anglophobic. Rather it was British attachment to Atlanticism that he opposed (Wright 2000). For de Gaulle British economic and military dependence upon America and emotional attachment to the Commonwealth meant that it could not act as a true European nation. Rather it would always act in America's interest until it adopted a truly continentalist mindset (Wright 2000). This perception of Britain would pervade French thinking for the remainder of the Cold War.

Multilateralism versus autonomy

Another facet of the Entente Cordiale evident during the latter half of the twentieth century was a debate between multilateralism and autonomy. This debate emerged following the debacle of the Suez Crisis. After their withdrawal from Egypt, Britain and France embedded contrasting lessons in their national psyche. For Britain the lesson was that it could no longer operate unilaterally on the world stage. The British belief that it could continue to act as it had during the Imperial Century had been shattered (Louis and Owen 1989). It was clear to British statesmen that they would remain a great power, their remaining colonies and global

obligations would not simply disappear overnight, however they were no longer a superpower (Louis and Owen 1989). The realities of economic and military decline since 1945 had finally caught up with them. Consequently, the freedom of movement that Britain had previously enjoyed in international affairs would henceforth be curtailed (Self 2010). It would therefore be necessary to seek alternative methods of ensuring British security. The solution was to embrace either bilateralism or multilateralism in almost all aspects of defence planning.

France meanwhile adopted the opposite approach. For France Suez had demonstrated the vulnerabilities of overreliance upon one's allies in the international arena. As far as the French were concerned, they had defeated the Egyptians and should have continued the march on Cairo (Carlton 1988). It was at British insistence that the invasion had been halted. As the operation was under British command and they had provided the majority of the fighting men France had no choice but to comply, despite considering the removal of Nasser to be of vital interest. In France's post-Suez autopsy, it was dependence on others that had driven them to defeat. France had been forced to withdraw because they were too dependent upon Britain for military support, while the British had been forced to withdraw because they were too dependent upon America for financial support. Therefore, to avoid another Suez, it would be necessary for France to ensure that it would always be capable of acting independently in international affairs (Vaisse 1989).

These diametrically opposed lessons inevitably manifested themselves as two adversarial defence policies, compounding the divisions within the Entente even further. For Britain this meant committing itself wholeheartedly to NATO and the special relationship. For the remainder of the Cold War the bulk of British forces would be dedicated to NATO missions

defending continental Europe and the Atlantic area (Beach 1989). By 1989 a total of 95% of British defence spending went towards NATO missions (Duval 1989). The primary assumption of British defence planning in the decades after Suez was that British forces would only be taking part in combat operations in conjunction with the United States or another multilateral force. The main adversary that the UK was likely to face was the Soviet Union therefore the armed forces would be configured accordingly. This included the deployment of British nuclear weapons. As it was assumed that the only nuclear threat to Britain would originate in the USSR, British nuclear forces were configured to be part of a NATO nuclear response. While Britain maintained full operational control, it was understood that a nuclear strike on a NATO member would warrant a retaliatory nuclear strike from Britain (Roper 1989). British forces would not be expected to conduct interventions abroad or operate in theatres outside of the euro-Atlantic area for extended periods of time. This attitude was also apparent in Britain's withdrawal from its remaining imperial possessions. Following Suez Britain rapidly decolonised the majority of its imperial territories. Simultaneously to this it also divested itself from most of its defence commitments to these newly independent nations. By the end of the 1960s most British forces had been withdrawn from East of Suez to focus on NATO operations. At the beginning of the 1970s British installations were only maintained in Brunei, Belize, Singapore, Bahrain and Oman (Alford 1989). Of these the British presence in Bahrain would be withdrawn while the forces in Singapore and Oman would be scaled back. While troops were maintained in the few remaining dependent territories, these were largely token garrisons. With the sole exception of the Falklands War Britain would not fight another overseas conflict throughout the entire Cold War.

The French approach was to ensure that their military could operate autonomously in a variety of theatres. To this end France withdrew from NATO's combined military command, a

process that began in 1959 and was completed in 1966. While France remained a member of the alliance this move required all non-French military personnel to vacate French soil, including NATO's entire European headquarters that had been located at Rocquencourt near Paris. This move ensured that France alone would command French forces in the event of a war in Europe. It also worked to lessen American influence over France as discussed above. In tandem with this France developed its own nuclear weapons capability. To this end France developed a nuclear triad that was fully independent in control and policy, meaning that a nuclear attack on a NATO member would not be considered sufficient to warrant a French nuclear response, as was the case with Britain (Alford 1989). This focus on strategic autonomy was also prevalent in the French approach to decolonisation. While France did grant independence to the bulk of its former colonies it conspicuously maintained forces there. This was particularly evident in Africa where France signed numerous agreements with local leaders authorising it to station troops there and intervene militarily if necessary (Gegout 2018). Furthermore, France maintained a significant number of 'prepositioned forces' in their remaining overseas territories. These troops acted as a defence force for France's overseas territories and could also intervene abroad if necessary. During the Cold War these forces amounted to 30,000 men permanently stationed overseas. France complimented them with a further 47,000 men in the Force d'Action Rapide that was capable of being deployed abroad if necessary (Duval 1989).

It is worth noting a certain irony evident in both nations' defence policy during this period. For a nation that spent much of the previous century actively seeking to avoid becoming entangled in continental commitments, Britain ultimately committed the majority of its military resources to defending Europe for most of the Cold War. The British desire to embrace the multilateralism that NATO offered ultimately resulted in British troops being

permanently stationed on the river Rhine, directly on the front line of a hypothetical future war. From the French point of view, it should be noted that despite their desire to develop an independent defence capability for the EEC, France devoted far more of its resources to interventions abroad than it did to the collective defence of Europe.

Conclusion

Evidently France and Britain have historically had a complicated relationship. The many facets of this relationship have placed significant strain on the Entente Cordiale over the years as it has sought to adapt to changing circumstances. The alliance has clearly been at its strongest when both nations have been faced with a common threat. That is why during both World Wars and to a lesser extent the Cold War they were in lockstep together. Without the existence of a common threat it is questionable if the Entente would ever have developed in the direction that it has. It is equally true that when lacking a common foe there is a tendency to revert to traditional modes of thinking. At the institutional level, states that have historically seen each other as rivals will find it difficult to change those perceptions. British perceptions of France seeking European domination in the aftermath of the Great War is an obvious example of this. Such thinking is equally true of the French. Fears of the 'perfidious Albion' coming to steal their colonies and undermine *la patrie* are particularly prevalent in French thinking during the interwar period. This attitude would resurface to a lesser extent during the Cold War as France struggled to banish the ghost of 'Fashoda syndrome'. While the prospect of Franco-British armed conflict is now non-existent tensions between both sides remain that continue to hamper effective cooperation. As the global situation has evolved so too has the Entente, though this has not always been an easy change. The aftermath of the Suez Crisis was of particular importance for the evolution of the Entente in the latter half of

the twentieth century. This ill-fated adventure set Britain and France onto diametrically opposed paths that defined Anglo-French relations for the remainder of the Cold War. Britain would embrace its innate Atlanticist nature and commit itself to the multilateralism offered by NATO, while mistrusting any attempts to build a common European defence posture. France, motivated by its own misgivings about American involvement in Europe, would zealously guard its defence autonomy and seek to sponsor a continental defence architecture. These opposing defence postures would limit the possibility for Franco-British defence collaboration until the conclusion of the Cold War and the rapprochement established by the Saint Malo declaration.

5. The Lancaster House Treaty: A Surprise to be sure, but a welcome one

Introduction

Lancaster House is a perfect example of alliance theory in operation, encapsulating several of the alliance typologies outlined earlier in this thesis. The logic behind it is a clear example of an augmentative alliance as proposed by Edwin Fedder (1968). Both parties entered into the agreement to supplement their own capabilities and build upon them through collaboration. The mutual interdependence it created further compliments this concept; Lancaster House is an acceptance that Britain and France need to collaborate to maintain their global positions. Equally, the creation of bodies such as the Senior Level Group and Defence Ministerial Council are examples of institutionalisation and norm creation as put forward by David Singer and Melvin Small (1966) in their concept of ententes. Lancaster House is also undoubtedly an embodiment of the historic and natural alliances postulated by Jeremy Ghez (2010). Britain and France have enjoyed over a century of bilateral cooperation. The agreements of 2010 are a modern iteration of this enduring partnership. Furthermore, as Europe's only major military powers it is natural that Britain and France would seek to improve bilateral cooperation. This has been recognised by policy makers, with the French National Assemblies Defence and Armed Forces Committee which referring to the natural character of the Franco-British alliance (Defence Committee 2020). When considering the alliance typologies analysed previously, the Lancaster House Treaty also illustrates the peculiar nature of the Entente Cordiale. The contrasting motivations behind its creation are yet another example of divergent national priorities resulting in the same outcome. These typologies are discussed at length below. There are numerous examples where it is possible to see alliance theory in operation, which are evaluated throughout the chapter. In doing so it highlights how alliance

theory can enhance our understanding of Anglo-French defence cooperation, particularly at the industrial and political levels.

In November 2010 the Lancaster House Treaty was concluded. Accompanying it was a joint declaration issued by Downing Street. Of note was the following claim: “Today, we have reached a level of mutual confidence unprecedented in our history” (Downing Street Declaration 2010: 1). This bold claim was reflected by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly which referred to the Treaty as the beginning of cooperation on an unprecedented scale (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011). In November 2020, the Defence Ministers of Britain and France held a summit to mark the ten-year anniversary of the Treaty. After this summit they released a joint statement which said: “Our Armed Forces are now closer and more interoperable than they have ever been” (Joint Declaration 2020: 1). This again was a significant assertion. As detailed extensively already the Entente Cordiale is a complicated and peculiar relationship. Its nature is often hard to define and has changed with the times. Nevertheless, it has endured both world wars and the Cold War. Consequently, the claim that a treaty concluded during peacetime represents a level of confidence in the Entente previously unseen warrants attention. That is the purpose of this chapter.

This chapter examines the Treaty and its consequences. It reviews how cooperation has evolved since 2010 and argues that the Lancaster House Treaty has successfully improved bilateral cooperation over the last decade. The chapter begins by explaining the background of the Treaty and the context surrounding its signing. This is followed by a brief overview of the treaty’s goals and objectives in order to provide greater conceptual clarity. As part of its analysis the chapter identifies four broad categories of cooperation contained within the Treaty. These are operational cooperation, industrial cooperation, institutional cooperation

and nuclear cooperation. Each category is considered in turn to measure its level of success. Going forward the chapter considers a success to be when Britain and France have either delivered upon a specific capability within the timeframe outlined in the Treaty, or made substantive progress if no timeframe was specified. Equally, it considers a failure to be when a capability or programme has not been delivered within its allotted timescale or failed to materialise. Accompanying this assessment is an analysis of what this success or failure means for the future of Anglo-French cooperation. The chapter concludes by arguing that the Lancaster House Treaty has been successful in improving Anglo-French defence cooperation, even if this success is less than what was initially envisaged.

Background to 2010

The Lancaster House Treaty was signed at Lancaster House in London, by David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy. At the time there seemed to be three primary rationales for the Treaties signing. Firstly, it was noted that both nations faced the unenviable task of meeting their defence commitments at a time of budgetary constraint. Lancaster House was signed during the 'Great Recession' when both governments had to grapple with limited financial resources. The new treaty was even dubbed the "Entente Frugale" (Strategic Comments 2011) due to the numerous measures that it contained aimed at reducing costs. Dr Liam Fox, British Defence Secretary at the time, asserted that Lancaster House was part of the governments overall financial strategy to reduce costs and the overspend at the MoD (Fox 2021). This was a sentiment reflected by Air Vice Marshal Sir Stuart Atha who argued that the governments overriding concern was the black hole in the defence budget that needed to be dealt with (Atha 2021). A report produced by the French Sénat in 2010 acknowledged that both governments faced significant financial hardship, and this created an incentive for greater

bilateral cooperation (Sénat 2010). While the financial crash had curtailed their resources, it had not altered Anglo-French perceptions of themselves as global powers. Consequently enhanced cooperation was a method through which their ambitions could be maintained. This motivation was clearly rooted in Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance type, as cooperation would compensate for financial constraints by allowing Britain and France to make use of each other's assets. They could therefore sustain their respective world roles by augmenting each other. This is also an example of Ghez' (2010) natural alliance. Neither nation had another ally that they could rely on to fulfil such a role. Turning to the US would further unbalance an already lopsided relationship, whilst Germany refused to develop the necessary capabilities. Therefore, Britain and France saw in each other a natural ally in their respective quests to maintain global relevance. The French Sénat also noted that the UK and France had identified matching threats in their recent defence strategies (Sénat 2010). This further reinforced the rationale for greater cooperation, common threats have often been the greatest motivation for cooperation throughout the Ententes history.

There was also a personal element to the Treaty. Both Cameron and Sarkozy liked each other personally and were aligned on the political spectrum. The former British air attaché in Paris, Wing Commander Andre Adamson, noted that the personal chemistry between the two leaders allowed Lancaster House to cover such a wide range of areas (Adamson 2021). Sir Stuart Atha agrees describing the relationship as a "bromance" and citing it as a critical factor in the Treaty's creation (Atha 2021). Sir John Sawers, the former head of MI6, advances this point further by arguing that Sarkozy was the world leader that David Cameron got along with the best (Sawers 2022). Liam Fox also notes that Lancaster House was the means through which Cameron could demonstrate to his French counterpart that the UK was not anti-Europe, even if it was opposed to greater EU integration (Fox 2021). In some ways Lancaster

House could thus be seen as an olive branch from the Prime Minister to the President, offered in response to Sarkozy's decision to rejoin NATO's unified command. Lord David Richards, former Chief of the Defence Staff, stated in his memoirs that cooperation with France was one of the government's top priorities during his tenure as CDS, in large part because of David Cameron (Richards 2015).

The inadequacy of existing structures also incentivised the creation of additional avenues of cooperation. The cumbersome nature of NATO structures posed a problem for further cooperation. While France had rejoined NATO's military command structure in 2009, NATO's multilateral nature meant that any future intervention would require agreement from other member states, particularly the US. As such there was no formal mechanism through which Britain and France could respond bilaterally to an international crisis, should one emerge. This spurred an operational motivation for enhanced cooperation which would provide both sides with greater flexibility on the world stage. It was this niche that further cooperation through the Lancaster House Treaty could fulfil. It should be noted that the creation of a joint battlegroup through the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), mirrored both NATO and the EU which have both established similar structures.

Equally, while the EU had established ESDP and then CSDP it had proven to be limited in utility (Biscop 2012). While the impetus for CSDP had been the Anglo-French Saint Malo declaration, the UK had subsequently moved away from further European military integration for a variety of factors. For Britain while the security aspect of CSDP had proven beneficial in certain contexts, such as counter terrorism in Africa, it often fell short in the realm of defence (Martill and Sus 2018). Equally, given Britain's proportion of European defence spending, CSDP would

have required sizeable commitments from other EU member states to make it a viable avenue of military cooperation which was not forthcoming (Martill and Sus 2018).

Consequently, Lancaster House signalled a pivot from the traditional ideological positions of both Britain and France on defence and towards a more pragmatic approach to defence cooperation (Ostermann 2015). As alluded to in chapter four, throughout the post-war period Britain and France traditionally took differing stances on the issue of defence cooperation. Differences which former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Sir Graham Stirrup referred to as “theological” in nature rather than military (Stirrup 2010). Successive British governments have primarily favoured the ‘special relationship’ with the US, while opposing greater integration of defence policies at the European level. France in contrast has long harboured a distrust of the US and advocated for Europe to play a greater role in defence issues. The signing of the Lancaster House Treaty symbolised a potential realignment away from these traditional ideological bases and towards greater bilateral thinking (Ostermann 2015). For the UK this was an acceptance that the special relationship had failed to live up to its expectations (Antil et al 2013). On the part of France, Lancaster House represented a tacit acceptance that the EU lacked both the necessary capabilities and will to function as a military force (Ostermann 2015). The French Sénat for instance noted that the UK’s position on Europe had evolved (Sénat 2010). It commended the new found sense of pragmatism within British policy and indicated that there would be greater scope for enhanced cooperation. At the same time this report argued that French support for greater EU capabilities did not need to be antagonistic towards NATO and so there could be common ground between British and French positions. Therefore in line with Ghez’ (2010) typology, upon accepting these limitations Britain and France turned to each other as the natural choice for enhanced bilateral cooperation. Their other European partners lacked the means to act independently

and so there was a natural alignment of their interests in developing greater shared capabilities. A House of Commons Library report produced in 2010 also highlights that Anglo-French defence cooperation had traditionally been predicated on outside pressures driving them together and identifies Lancaster House as continuing in this tradition.

There was also a contradiction underlying these motivations, as there so often is when dealing with Anglo-French relations. Yes, Lancaster House did represent a shift in the traditional ideological positions of both nations, however this shift was motivated by a reciprocal desire to move the other closer to their way of thinking. For Britain Lancaster House was a way to bind France closer to the Atlantic Alliance. Following President Sarkozy's decision to rejoin NATO's integrated military command Britain saw an opportunity to reinforce France's recent realignment. Greater bilateral cooperation was thus a way to move France away from the EU and closer to NATO. This was the position taken by Liam Fox who argued that the Treaty served to tie France into the NATO orbit (Fox 2021). Equally for France this was an opportunity to influence the UK towards a more autonomous military stance and away from NATO. By creating CJEF France saw a means through which Britain could be convinced to operate outside of the NATO framework (Heisbourg 2021). Ironically, both sides conceded on their traditional positions in the hope that the other would concede more. This encapsulates the peculiar relationship perfectly. Agreeing a treaty in the hopes that it would influence the other towards their position is quintessential Anglo-French politics.

Given these changes Lancaster House was hailed by many commentators as the beginning of a new era in Anglo-French defence cooperation. For instance, Alice Pannier (2018) wrote that Lancaster House was the first bilateral defence treaty signed by the UK and France since the abortive Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947. Throughout the Cold War there were several joint

weapons programmes but bilateral cooperation remained limited. In the 1990s a series of Letters of Intent were exchanged, but these mostly outlined existing areas of cooperation rather than proposing new ones (MoD 1996). Furthermore, Lord Browne of Layton, British Defence Secretary from 2006 – 2008, claims that there was no specific engagement on bilateral defence cooperation during his tenure (Browne 2022). As such Lancaster House signalled an important turning point towards greater bilateral cooperation. The importance of Lancaster House in bolstering bilateral cooperation was also noted by various think tanks within the defence world. For example, a 2011 Chatham House report discussed the importance of bolstering defence cooperation and pointed to the 2011 Libyan campaign as an example of effective Anglo-French cooperation (Gomis 2011). A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report concurred with Chatham House's assessment and argued that Lancaster House had the potential to greatly improve bilateral defence cooperation in the twenty-first century (Antil et al 2013).

The immediate aftermath of the Treaty's signing inadvertently proved that it was a prescient strategic move. The subsequent decade bore witness to the emergence of a number of new threats from a variety of hostile actors. The Arab Spring in 2011 sent shockwaves through the world. Since then the global landscape has become increasingly fractured. In 2013 Tuareg rebels seized northern Mali, triggering a French intervention which has since also involved British troops. In 2014 a previously little-known group called Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) launched a blitzkrieg campaign into Iraq capturing the city of Mosul and threatening the capital of Baghdad. Also in 2014 Russia annexed Crimea and began a hybrid war in the Donbass region, a conflict which has since escalated into full scale war. Concurrently, beginning in mid-2013, China began a large-scale land reclamation project in the South China Sea in contravention of international law. The strategic landscape was further upended by

domestic political events in both the UK and the US. In June 2016 the UK voted to leave the EU, throwing fifty years of British foreign policy into doubts. This seemingly brought an end to the prospect of cooperation through EU structures. Equally, in November 2016 Donald Trump was elected President of the US. President Trump subsequently unsettled many in Europe with his mercurial foreign policy, most notably by questioning the relevance of NATO. President Emmanuel Macron of France has also raised eyebrows by speaking of the “brain death of NATO” (Macron 2019). Both these leaders brought into doubt the continued efficacy of NATO as an institution. These changes to the international arena since 2010 have increased the relevance of the Lancaster House Treaty and made bilateral Anglo-French cooperation more vital than ever.

Objectives of the Lancaster House Treaty

The Lancaster House Treaty set out a number of ambitious objectives that aimed to improve bilateral defence cooperation. Article 1 of the Treaty lays out the Treaty's five objectives:

1. maximising their capacities through coordinating development, acquisition, deployment and maintenance of a range of capabilities, facilities, equipment, materials and services, to perform the full spectrum of missions, including the most demanding missions;
2. reinforcing the defence industry of the two Parties, fostering cooperation in research and technology and developing cooperative equipment programmes;
3. deploying together into theatres in which both Parties have agreed to be engaged, in operations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy or

in a coalition or bilateral framework, as well as supporting, as agreed on a case by case basis, one Party when it is engaged in operations in which the other Party is not part;

4. ensuring the viability and safety of their national deterrents, consistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

5. ensuring their support for action in the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union under the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as complementarity between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union in all relevant areas (Lancaster House Treaty 2010: 4)

These are ambitious goals that covered a wide array of cooperation. Noticeably this included a commitment to ensure that bilateral action could be utilised to support third parties such as NATO, the EU and the UN, which shall be discussed later on. Within these objectives it is possible to see both Ghez' (2010) and Fedder's (1968) typologies at work. Firstly, given the level of ambition outlined here it is only natural that France and Britain would turn to each other to achieve these objectives. No other European partner could provide similar capabilities. The first three objectives also set out the augmentative nature of the Treaty. The commitment to coordinate the development and deployment of their respective capabilities and assist in their respective operations indicated that both governments sought to utilise the Entente to augment their own capabilities.

Operational Cooperation

The headline feature of the Lancaster House Treaty was undoubtedly the creation of CJEF. CJEF was initially outlined as "a non-standing bilateral capability able to carry out a range of operations in the future whether acting bilaterally or through NATO, the EU or other coalition

arrangements” (Joint Declaration 2010: 1). Both governments agreed that the concept would be further developed at future summits. At the 2012 Anglo-French Summit it was confirmed that CJEF would consist of “an early entry force capable of facing multiple threats up to the highest intensity” (Joint Declaration 2012: 2). It was further specified that this force would be available for “bilateral, NATO, European Union, United Nations or other operations” (Joint Declaration 2012: 2) as required. Both governments also agreed to put into place a five-year exercise framework to ensure that CJEF would have full operating capacity by 2016, and be ready for its first full combat deployment by 2020. On an operational level it was intended that CJEF would bring together land, air and maritime components to conduct combined arms operations.

Sir Stuart Atha, who led the British team negotiating CJEF, makes an interesting point that it was a compromise between British and French objectives (Atha 2021). At the onset of negotiations the UK was wary about creating a large scale force that could be a duplication of NATO. The UK’s objective was for a limited force that could partake in small scale operations such as humanitarian relief missions. France however desired a force that was capable of warfighting at scale. In Sir Stuarts words the UK was “trying to play down the level of ambition while France was trying to play it up” (Atha 2021). These are obviously two competing objectives and speak to the wider issue within Anglo-French relations of differing NATO priorities. CJEF’s final form was thus a compromise measure. The upper limit of 10,000 troops was included so that CJEF would be able to undertake high intensity operations, but not warfighting at scale. Crucially it could be used for interventions abroad but would not be suitable for an Article 5 scenario. This satisfied both parties and left a high degree of flexibility in the types of operations CJEF could be deployed for.

It is also prudent to consider why Britain and France thought it necessary to establish their own binational force, given their memberships of both NATO and, at the time, the EU. In 2010 NATO already maintained formations which could deploy multinational forces when necessary. The NATO Reaction Force (NRF) was established in 2002 to provide the alliance with the capacity to deploy troops to conflict zones around the globe (NATO 2021). The NRF consists of land, air, naval, logistical and Special Forces components. Since its founding the NRF has been deployed for a variety of missions, in Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US (NATO 2020). Additionally, NATO also maintains the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a land-based formation under the command of the UK, with twenty contributing nations in total (ARRC 2020). The ARRC has formed the land component of numerous different NATO operations over the years, including in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq (ARRC 2020). While these formations represent an established avenue of cooperation, they also possess a number of limitations that necessitated the creation of a separate Anglo-French force. For instance, they are both part of NATO's command architecture. Any decision to deploy either force must be approved by the North Atlantic Council. NATO is an alliance of thirty member states and these members often have differing interests that do not align. Consequently, if Britain and France felt that their interests were threatened and wished to deploy NATO troops in response, it could be difficult for them to secure the necessary approval. The Libyan case illustrates this perfectly. As shall be discussed later, the reluctance of certain NATO members to support action in Libya hampered Anglo-French efforts to intervene. This divergence of interests within NATO was a primary reason why Britain and France sought to establish their own force through which they could intervene abroad when they considered it to be in their interests. Additionally, even if approval was secured to deploy NATO forces in support of Anglo-French interests these forces would remain under overall NATO command. As such Britain and France

would have only a limited say over how these forces would operate. The command structure of the NRF exemplifies this. Operational command of the NRF alternates between Allied Joint Force Commands in Brunssum, the Netherlands and Naples, Italy every six months. The component parts of the NRF also regularly rotate, with different member states assuming command upon becoming the primary contributor. Therefore, even if Britain or France secured the deployment of the NRF it would largely remain outside of their control and would be subject to the whims of their other NATO allies who could withdraw support at any time.

The EU has also established its own battlegroups, but these were not appropriate for joint Anglo-French action. Firstly, there were perennial British concerns over defence integration at the European level (Whitman 2016). EU Battlegroups are a component of CSDP, which as noted previously the UK was hesitant to fully embrace. This hampered the development of these battlegroups as the UK's size meant that its participation was essential to making the concept a reality (Whitman 2016). Secondly, these battlegroups are intended to be of battalion size, around 1,500 troops ground (European Commission 2013). This presented them with a limited capacity to intervene in conflicts abroad (Biscop 2021). Additionally, they are subject to constraints similar to their NATO counterparts, namely that they require input from EU institutions and the approval of all EU member states to be deployed (Ginsberg and Penksa 2012). These complicated decision-making procedures are a major contributor to why the EU has never deployed such a battlegroup in combat (European Commission 2020). The other significant French attempt to develop a binational force, the aforementioned Franco-German Brigade also failed to produce tangible results. Whilst useful for symbolic purposes France has been forced to concede that the Brigade has had little military value given the differences in Franco-German opinion (National Assembly 2011).

Given the limits of existing battlegroups, it was only natural that Britain and France would seek to establish a more effective bilateral formation. This again displays Ghez' (2010) natural alliance type. As the only European nations with substantial militaries Britain and France are natural partners in establishing expeditionary forces. It is logical that they would not want their interests to be solely tied to structures that include less capable allies. Thus, the creation of CJEF fits perfectly within Ghez' paradigm of natural partners. CJEF also corresponds to Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance type. The flexible nature of CJEF allows both governments to deploy assets as needed. A CJEF deployment could for example feature a British aircraft carrier with French support vessels or French ground troops with British air support. This flexibility will allow future governments to deploy the combination of assets that they need most in order to augment each other's capabilities.

Having outlined the basic components of CJEF it is now possible to analyse if it has been successfully implemented in accordance with the Treaty. The aforementioned joint exercise framework was successfully implemented and completed on schedule. In June 2011 1,500 personnel from the British 7th Armoured Brigade and the 3rd French Mechanised Brigade conducted Exercise Flandres in France. According to Lieutenant Colonel Nigel Rhodes, Chief of Staff of 102 Logistic Brigade, which provided support for the operation, the purpose of this initial exercise was to demonstrate interoperability between France and the UK (Rhodes 2011). The British MoD argued that the exercise was a major success and highlighted several areas where cooperation could be improved (MoD 2011). This was followed by the larger Exercise Corsican Lion in October 2012 which brought together 5,000 men and 13 naval vessels from both nations (Ministère des Armées 2012). Primarily intended to test naval cooperation, Corsican Lion saw the Royal Navy coordinating with the Marine Nationale to conduct seaborne manoeuvres, while the Royal Marines and the Troupes de marine carried

out a simulated amphibious assault. In 2013 the UK hosted Exercise Joint Warrior, an annual multilateral exercise that brings together NATO, UK and allied forces from around the globe. During this exercise France contributed a sizeable force, including the *Charles de Gaulle* and its entire air wing (AeroResource 2013). The inclusion of the *Charles de Gaulle* is important given its status as France's flagship. In addition to collaborating multilaterally with their other partners, Britain and France also held Exercise Capable Eagle at RAF Leeming in North Yorkshire. This exercise involved Typhoons from No 1(F) Squadron and Mirage 2000Ns from the *La Fayette* squadron with a combined total of 700 personnel (Global Aviation Resource 2013). While part of the wider Joint Warrior umbrella, Capable Eagle was intended to test the aerial component of CJEF.

Exercise Capable Eagle was followed by Exercise Rochambeau in 2014. This was a multinational exercise consisting of some 3,200 personnel from 14 different nations (MoD 2014). In command of this force was a joint UK – France Headquarters whose purpose was to test and improve interoperability at the command level. This exercise was described as “a key milestone” and “the most tangible demonstration of the Anglo-French defence partnership envisaged by the Lancaster House treaties in 2010” (MoD 2014). A similar exercise was conducted in 2015 under the banner of Exercise Griffin Rise. The purpose of Griffin Rise was to assess the effectiveness of both militaries in “planning and joint leading...a Franco-British expeditionary force deployment” (Ministère des Armées 2015). Griffin Rise featured land, sea and air components with a total of 1,200 personnel involved (Ministère des Armées 2015). The maritime component consisted of a simulated exercise featuring both the *HMS Ocean* and the *Charles de Gaulle* acting as a joint carrier task force, described as “an impressive combined French and UK amphibious force with a heavier punch than either nation could deliver alone” (Radakin 2015: 2). This not only furthered CJEF's command and control

infrastructure but also contributed to the development of a joint Franco-British carrier group proposed at the Lancaster House summit.

In 2016 Exercise Griffin Strike, the largest to date, took place consisting of over 5,000 personnel from all three branches of service. During this exercise, units operated across the UK, including Typhoon and Rafale jets from RAF Leeming in North Yorkshire. Simultaneously, the British ships *HMS Ocean*, *HMS Bulwark* and *HMS Duncan* operated off the south and west coast of England with their French counterparts *FS Dixmude*, *FS Cassard* and *FF La Motte Piquet*. On the Salisbury Plain, a land component consisting of elements of the British Army's 3rd Division and French 7th Mechanised Brigade including paratroopers, armoured units and infantrymen, conducted armoured warfare drills together (MoD 2016). According to both governments this exercise demonstrated a 'full validation of concept' (Ministère des Armées 2016, MoD 2016) for CJEF and embodied "an unmatched level of interoperability" between Anglo-French forces (Joint Statement 2016).

The completion of this training programme is commendable. This was an ambitious programme, on a scale which had not been previously conducted bilaterally by either side. Exercise Corsican Lion stands out for its sheer scale. The deployment of 5,000 personnel merely two years after the Treaty was signed, and one year after ratification, signified a level of commitment on both sides of the channel to cooperation that had not previously existed. Another tangible benefit has been the sheer number of troops involved in these exercises. With thousands of personnel from both militaries involved Britain and France have now developed a greater understanding of how each other operate. In line with Singer and Small's (1966) entente alliance typology this has also allowed for the development of shared norms of operation. This will prove valuable for future operations, as both militaries will have a

practiced understanding of how to work together. The decision to test the individual components of CJEF was particularly wise. By ensuring interoperability between respective branches, both militaries ensured that CJEF would have the necessary flexibility to respond to a variety of crises with the requisite forces (Pannier 2018). Exercise Rochambeau is also of note, having incorporated third party assets in a wider multilateral exercise under Anglo-French command. This developed the concept of CJEF further and laid the groundwork for CJEF to be deployed as part of a multinational force if necessary. Theoretically, this further enhanced the benefits of CJEF as a force multiplier by preparing it to operate in concert with allied forces. However, it should be noted that neither government has specified the conditions under which CJEF would be deployed to support third party operations, or how it would operate if it was (Pannier 2018). Given the stated objective of making CJEF available for allied missions this is a significant omission that should be rectified if CJEF is to reach its full potential.

Equally, achieving operational capability on schedule by 2016 is an achievement that should be noted. This was a bold commitment that required significant resources to deliver. There were numerous logistical challenges that had to be overcome. In 2013 for instance, Exercise Djibouti Lion had to be cancelled due to local administration issues (Hansard 2013). However, an alternative was found, and Exercise Capable Eagle was held instead. This illustrated a resilience and determination to further Anglo-French cooperation. As noted previously the global stage has changed considerably since Lancaster House was signed in 2010. Both states have struggled with defence cuts and limited budgets. France also saw a transition from the Republican to Socialist parties. However, this did not seem to impact Anglo-French cooperation which continued apace. Therefore, the successful validation of CJEF despite

these challenges illustrates the perseverance of political commitment to bilateral cooperation, which should be counted as a success (Harrois 2020).

Having validated the CJEF concept in 2016, it was reaffirmed in 2018 that CJEF was available for peace enforcement missions should it be necessary. Additionally, at the 2016 Anglo-French summit, new multi-annual training programme that would run from 2017-2022 was announced. This was to bolster existing progress and to ensure that the new target of having CJEF fully operational by 2020 was met. In 2019 Exercise Griffin Strike 19 was held in the UK. It focused upon the naval component of CJEF and included the UK's Amphibious Task Group, 3 Commando Brigade, the Royal Navy's flagship *HMS Albion*, the Royal Navy's Mine Warfare battle staff, Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships and several British submarines. Additionally, helicopters from the British Army combined with jets and surveillance aircraft from the RAF also participated (Royal Navy 2019). The French contingent consisted of the *FS Tonnerre*, a French helicopter carrier with its accompanying airwing, and a contingent of French marines. This exercise was considered a great success with the French commander Captain Eric Janicot stating that it was "a great opportunity to enhance common Anglo-French team understanding" (Janicot 2019) while Rear Admiral Andrew Burns claimed that Griffin Strike 19 had "delivered a degree of complexity that leaves the maritime component of CJEF ready to take its place in full joint and combined operations" (Burns 2019). At the 2020 Anglo-French summit it was confirmed that CJEF had attained full operating capability. In a joint statement British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace and French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly announced that CJEF was now capable of deploying up to 10,000 personnel to respond to a full range of operations. It was also agreed that the CJEF framework would be utilised to further improve interoperability between both armed forces (Joint Statement 2020).

Having CJEF ready as a deployable force is a great success of the Lancaster House Treaty and an asset to both Britain and France. Both governments and their militaries should be commended for successfully delivering on this capability. The ability to deploy a 10,000 strong force across the globe will undoubtedly be a vital tool in the years ahead. The last decade has demonstrated on multiple occasions that the international arena remains incredibly volatile and unstable. Since Lancaster House was signed there have been multiple instances in which having a force such as CJEF would have been useful. The Libyan intervention in 2011 is one such example. While this shall be discussed extensively in a subsequent chapter, it should be noted for now that Libya was the exact scenario envisaged for a CJEF deployment. Encompassing both naval and air assets, the Libyan intervention would have undoubtedly been more effective if Britain and France had been able to operate bilaterally through CJEF. The conflict in Mali is another scenario where CJEF could have been deployed had it been ready. If situations like these arise in the future, and that is by no means a remote possibility, then CJEF will be a useful asset in responding to them. Sir Stuart Atha also argues that there is a wide scope for CJEF deployments in support of humanitarian relief missions or peace enforcement operations in the future (Atha 2021). Francois Heisbourg suggests that CJEF could be a useful vehicle for jointly projecting power abroad, citing freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea as a strong candidate for a CJEF deployment (Heisbourg 2021). The French National Assembly has been particularly positive towards CJEF, praising it as an example of “unparalleled integration” in a report marking the decennial anniversary of Lancaster House (Defence Committee 2020). CJEF also embodies the augmentative nature of the Anglo-French relationship. By combining their forces in this manner, they are capable of projecting power in ways that they cannot achieve individually.

However, this success must be considered with a caveat. While many joint exercises have been conducted, none of these have been on the scale of 10,000 personnel from all three branches of service. Furthermore, CJEF remains untested in combat and so it is not possible to analyse how it will perform in actual combat situations. However, given the level of training that has been conducted over the last ten years, in addition to the various operational deployments that both militaries have conducted through avenues outside of CJEF, it is likely that CJEF will perform well in a future combat scenario. Andre Adamson argues that it was the process of creating CJEF that matters more than the capability itself. The deepening of engagement, the creation of structured military cooperation and the increased familiarity between both armed forces have resolved many of the problems that hindered cooperation at the military level (Adamson 2021). This alone is beneficial even if CJEF is not deployed.

Another aspect of operational cooperation envisaged at the Lancaster House summit was the development of an integrated Anglo-French carrier group. Naval cooperation is one of the easiest ways to build effective military cooperation (Heisbourg 2021). The joint statement issued by both governments stated that they sought to build “on maritime task group cooperation around the French carrier Charles de Gaulle” with the aim that they would possess “by the early 2020s, the ability to deploy a UK-French integrated carrier strike group incorporating assets owned by both countries” (Joint Declaration 2010: 1). This commitment was reaffirmed at summits from 2012 to 2018. As with CJEF attempts to create an integrated carrier group were an example of Fedder’s (1968) augmentative alliance in action. Given the assets required to adequately escort an aircraft carrier and the multiple commitments both nations faced, an integrated strike group would have taken advantage of the assets both nations possessed. This would have allowed them to field a functioning carrier group without

sacrificing their other commitments. This is therefore clearly an example of an augmentative alliance at work.

Collaboration on aircraft carrier capabilities was not a new idea within defence circles. In 2006 the UK and France signed an agreement to cooperate on the design of their future carriers. It was agreed that France would pay 33% of the demonstration phase costs while also reimbursing the UK for some of the expenses it had already incurred for starting the carrier design process (MoD 2006). France's defence budget for 2008 allotted a sum of €3 billion for the construction of a next generation aircraft carrier (Ministère des Armées 2008) However, this was later scrapped in 2008 as rising costs and concerns about the mode propulsion (Defence Talk 2008). This prompted Britain to carry on alone with the programme which subsequently became the Queen Elizabeth Class carrier programme.

It should be noted that both governments have abandoned the concept of an integrated carrier group, instead opting for a joint carrier group. This is disappointing, especially when considering that some good progress had been made towards developing an integrated carrier group. From 2011 to 2015 the carrier group was developed in tandem to the various training exercises discussed previously, with *HMS Ocean* leading joint exercises in 2012, the *Charles de Gaulle* leading exercises in 2013 and joint participation in 2015. Additionally Royal Navy helicopters were integrated into the *Charles de Gaulle's* carrier group to provide logistical and intelligence support in both 2016 and 2019 (Royal Navy 2016, 2019). While these were not combat operations; they improved maritime interoperability and brought an Anglo-French carrier group closer to fruition. Furthermore, as these exercises were part of the wider CJEF process they allowed for greater joined up command and raised the possibility that such a carrier group could be deployed unilaterally or as part of a wider CJEF operation.

These operations have undoubtedly proven beneficial for the UK. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) decided that Britain would undertake a “carrier holiday” in which the *HMS Ark Royal* would be scrapped and not replaced immediately (MoD 2010). By maintaining links with the *Charles de Gaulle* and the French navy more generally, the Royal Navy has been able to maintain experience of operating within carrier group. This ensured that the institutional memory of carrier operations was preserved. British ships have escorted the *de Gaulle*, while Royal Navy aircraft have flown from it in combat zones. Without this access to the *Charles de Gaulle* it is likely that a generation of Royal Navy personnel would have entered service with no experience of carrier operations. For this the Royal Navy certainly owes the French navy a debt of gratitude. The British decision to scrap its carrier capability was a foolish one as it left the UK without a vital asset that it would need, which chapter six discusses in greater detail. Foolish though it may have been, it does at least illustrate an area where Britain and France have been able to augment each other. For the last decade Britain has been willing to rely upon France to provide it with a carrier capability, albeit a limited one, while France has accepted British escort vessels rather than bearing that burden itself. This reinforces the point that an integrated carrier group is emblematic of Fedder’s (1968) augmentative alliance.

However, the development of a truly integrated carrier group was handicapped by the British governments design decisions for the Queen Elizabeth-class. During the initial design phase, it was decided that they would be equipped with an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System or ‘cats and traps’, and that the Royal Navy would operate catapult launched F-35C aircraft which could also operate from the *Charles de Gaulle*. The installation of catapults would also allow French Rafale jets to operate from a future British carrier, thus increasing interoperability. In 2012 however, it was decided that the Queen Elizabeth-class would not

be equipped with catapults and would instead operate the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35 Lightning B (Royal Navy 2012). This prevented the possibility of not only French jets, but all non-F-35B aircraft, from operating from the *Queen Elizabeth* and the future *HMS Prince of Wales* (RUSI 2012). Admittedly from a financial perspective, with estimates of the installation costs at around £1 billion, a price tag that had doubled by 2012, this decision is understandable. Liam Fox argues that the issue of 'cats and traps' was largely overblown. In his view this was really an issue for the French as their jets were limited by their need for a catapult assisted take-off. British jets meanwhile could still land on a French carrier because of their STOVL capability. In his view the real problem for interoperability came from the *Charles de Gaulle* as it was old and unreliable (Fox 2021).

Whilst the *Charles de Gaulle* is an older vessel, the problems it presented were largely short term and so the decision not to install 'cats and traps' was indeed rather short sighted. By limiting the range of aircraft that can operate from *HMS Queen Elizabeth* the potential interoperability of a future joint carrier group has been reduced (RUSI 2014). The UK should have taken a long-term view on which allies would be likely to operate from British carriers and planned accordingly. The failure to do so curtailed the development of an integrated carrier group in the long run and limited the extent of cooperation that is possible currently. As it stands British and French strike fighters cannot operate from each other's respective carriers. With the failure of FCAS to produce a joint programme, as discussed later, it is even less likely that British and French aircraft will be able to operate from their respective carriers in the future. Further France has announced the specifications for its next generation carrier, *Porte-avions de nouvelle génération (PANG)*, and no mention was given on whether it would be STOVL compatible, casting further doubt on the future of an Anglo-French carrier group (Naval Technology 2021). Even if PANG does include a STOVL capacity it is not due to enter

service until 2038 meaning that British jets would not be capable of realistically operating from a French carrier for nearly twenty years. That makes this decision one of generational importance (IISS 2018). If PANG is not STOVL compatible, then another generation will pass before cooperation of this scale is possible again.

There have also been rumours that the British liaison officer on the *Charles de Gaulle* will not be replaced when their current rotation ends (Anonymous 2020). Additionally, there has been no noticeable discussion about creating an equivalent French post onboard *HMS Queen Elizabeth*. From a logistical point of view there seems no reason why such a position should not be created. In the near future it is likely that the nucleus of a joint carrier group would be one of the UK's new carriers, especially as France is only now making moves to replace the aging *Charles de Gaulle*. If a French liaison officer is not present in the same way as their British counterpart this would limit interoperability between both navies. While nothing has been said officially, it is reasonable to theorise that Brexit may have played a role here in cooling relations between both sides. It could also be argued that sensitivity over the F-35 programme is complicating the relationship. As France is not an F-35 operator, and the *Queen Elizabeth* cannot support French Rafale jets, it is plausible that this has prevented cooperation on the *Queen Elizabeth*. This demonstrates how procurement decisions taken over a decade ago are having a very real impact on cooperation today. This further highlights the importance of getting such decisions right, especially in regard to France's future carrier capability. It would be a great shame if the progress that has previously been made towards making this concept a reality was to be lost in the years ahead. If decisions are not taken now to ensure greater interoperability in the future, then the Entente Cordiale will suffer in the years to come.

These problems have essentially killed the possibility of an integrated carrier group. What is possible now is a joint carrier group. Instead of aircraft and personnel stationed on each other's vessels and making use of their respective assets, operations will be limited to naval vessels operating alongside one another. Whilst still beneficial for Anglo-French cooperation this lacks depth that an integrated carrier group would have provided.

Another aspect of operational cooperation that was born out of Lancaster House was the operational deployment of Anglo-French troops alongside one another. In 2013 the UK launched *Operation Newcombe* to support France's *Operation Serval* in Mali. The UK and France share a common interest in stabilising the Sahel, making this a perfect example of cooperation in the spirit of the Lancaster House Treaty. Since 2013 British troops have been continuously deployed in support of French counter insurgency operations in Mali, and the wider Sahel region. In 2013 RAF C-17 Transport aircraft were used to ferry French armoured vehicles to the Malian capital Bamako (MoD 2013). This was accompanied by the deployment of an RAF Sentinel aircraft to provide intelligence and reconnaissance support to French troops on the ground. In tandem, the UK deployed 40 military advisors as part of the EU Training Mission Mali, of which France was the lead nation. Both these advisors and RAF C-17 transports would remain on deployment after *Operation Serval* transitioned into *Operation Barkhane*. In 2018 the RAF deployed three Chinook CH-47 helicopters to provide logistical support to French troops engaged in *Operation Barkhane*. These aircraft are supported by 100 personnel operating in a non-combat role (RAF 2020). In 2020 it was announced that these aircraft would extend their tour of duty in Mali in order to continue providing support to French forces. According to the RAF from 2018 to 2020 these craft transported 13,000 passengers and 1,100 tonnes of equipment across the region (RAF 2020). Furthermore, in 2019 members of the Royal Signal Corps were also deployed to Mali to provide information

and communication support. The UK has also committed 300 troops to MINUSMA, the UN's peacekeeping operation in Mali (MoD 2020). Given that the UK traditionally supports one UN mission at a time, this further highlights how the UK and France have bolstered their cooperation since 2010.

These deployments are significant for several reasons. Firstly, the UK has traditionally been reticent to become involved in conflicts in Africa. Since decolonisation Whitehall has mostly avoided entanglements in Africa's myriad conflicts. As such the decision to deploy troops to the Sahel to support France is an important development that has been born out of the Lancaster House Treaty. Secondly, they involved British troops acting as part of an EU mission. While these were not combat troops this is still worthy of note. Britain has traditionally been sceptical of EU operations such as this. This of course contrasts with France's pro-EU stance. By participating in an EU deployment under French command Britain demonstrated its commitment to the Entente Cordiale. Furthermore, the nature of this deployment was wholly within the spirit of the Lancaster House Treaty and built upon the lessons of the past. As discussed above one of the main aims of Lancaster House was to allow Britain and France to compensate for any capability gaps they may possess. By deploying C-17 transport planes and Chinook helicopters Britain was fulfilling exactly that role by providing France with the transport capacity it lacked. Francois Heisbourg observes that the RAF has been doing great work in Mali, as it has provided France with a crucial capability that could not be replaced elsewhere (Heisbourg 2021). This demonstrates Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance at work. By providing France with strategic lift capabilities the UK is augmenting its French allies capabilities to their mutual benefit. This is also an example of Ghez' (2010) natural alliance as they both share an interest in stability in Mali. Whilst the UK has higher priorities elsewhere,

providing these strategic capabilities to France in Mali has served British interests by helping to stabilise the region at minimal cost. Additionally, the deployment of RAF Sentinel aircraft and the Royal Signal Corps built upon mutual experiences of the Libyan campaign. While Britain and France conducted the bulk of combat operations during that intervention, they were often dependent upon intelligence provided by the US. In Mali Britain stepped up to provide field intelligence which illustrated that the Entente was developing an independent capability in response to the lessons it had learned previously. This not only shows the theoretical typologies of the Entente in action, it also demonstrates a real success of Lancaster House.

French forces have also been deployed to Estonia under British command as part of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). This battlegroup was announced at NATO's 2016 Warsaw summit and deployed in 2017. Whilst technically a multinational battlegroup only Britain and France made meaningful contributions, as Denmark and Iceland contributed a combined total of four personnel (EATA 2017). In reality this resulted in a Franco-British battlegroup operating within NATO. This was a significant development, particularly because of France's historic ambivalence towards NATO. Given that France had only returned to NATO's integrated command structure in 2009 it is significant that they would choose to participate in such a battlegroup under British command. In many ways this was France supporting Britain through its favoured institution, NATO, just as Britain supported France through its favoured institution, the EU, in Mali. This also reinforced the principles of Lancaster House as it demonstrates the ability of Britain and France to deploy forces together bilaterally in support of third-party organisations.

Industrial Cooperation

Lancaster House set out numerous avenues of industrial cooperation to explore. This aspect of the Treaty has yielded mixed results. There have been some high-level successes that should rightly be celebrated, but there have also been some disappointing failures. Prior to Lancaster House Julian Miller, Deputy Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, highlighted that there was great potential for cooperation in the industrial sphere that should be exploited (Miller 2010). At the 2010 summit both governments committed to “extending bilateral co-operation on the acquisition of equipment and technologies” (Joint Statement 2010: 2), while also “developing a stronger defence industrial and technology base” (Joint Statement 2010: 2). This commitment led to the commencement of several high-profile programmes. Preeminent amongst these was cooperation on aircraft development, complex weapon systems and maritime mine counter measures. Cooperation in these areas not only offered potential financial rewards, but also made practical sense. Once again in line with Fedder’s (1968) typology Britain and France’s respective industrial experience could be leveraged to augment the Ententes industrial potential.

The UK already possessed experience in collaborative aircraft development, with its previous involvement in the Eurofighter and F-35 programmes, the former of which France had briefly been involved in. Historically, Britain and France also cooperated on the development of the Gazelle, Puma, and Lynx helicopters, as well as the Jaguar fighter jet (Pannier 2018). It made sense therefore to exploit this experience to develop a joint air capability. The air combat sector is an area in which Britain and France have a major advantage over the rest of Europe, given that they both host some of the only companies in the world capable of delivering such programmes (Heisbourg 2021). The development of complex weapons sector also aligned

with both states core interests. The establishment of a single European contractor contributed to France's vision of greater European strategic autonomy. Securing British support in this endeavour was critical if this was to be a success. Additionally, BAE holds a 33% stake in MBDA (MBDA 2022). This gave a British company a major say in the development of the wider European market, supporting the British defence industry and curtailing potential competition. The potential financial rewards from future exports also incentivised joint development of these new systems. The joint production of maritime mine countermeasures (MMCM) would further enhance the steps taken towards greater naval cooperation by developing common systems and capabilities, thus complimenting the operational aspects of the Treaty. Attempts to take advantage of joint industrial capacity is yet another example of Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance. Whilst separately Britain and France possess significant defence industrial bases, collectively they dominate the European market and so by attempting to align their industrial capacities they sought of augment and bolster their national capabilities.

Primus inter pares was the development of a Future Combat Air System (FCAS). FCAS was intended to develop a joint air capability for both nations. While the exact nature of FCAS was not initially stated, it was speculated to be an advanced Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS). The development of FCAS was spurred by the need to replace both nations stocks of unmanned combat air systems. Both the UK's Reaper and France's Harfang drones had entered service in the early 2000s. As such a next generation replacement was necessary in the long term. Collaboration on a joint system would be beneficial as it could provide significant savings on joint development and avoid the competition that had plagued the development of the Typhoon and Rafale. Cooperation on aircraft technology would also compliment the oneMBDA strategy and further the integration of Europe's defence

aerospace industry. Furthermore, as pointed out by General Jean-Paul Paloméros, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, Britain and France had few air assets in common (Paloméros 2011). This made cooperation between their air forces more difficult and so designing a shared platform would contribute towards rectifying this.

Unfortunately, while FCAS held much potential, it has failed to materialise. Initially, FCAS was enthusiastically supported by both governments. At the 2012 Anglo-French summit it was agreed that a joint demonstration programme would be undertaken in 2013 (Joint Declaration 2013). It was also specified that Dassault-Aviation and BAE Systems would be designated industrial leaders on the project. After the success of this programme a joint feasibility study was announced in 2014 (Joint Declaration 2014). This was a two-year programme worth £120 million and was conducted by a consortium consisting of Dassault Aviation, BAE Systems, Thales France, Selex, Rolls Royce and Safran. It was also supported by additional research conducted nationally, at a combined cost of £80 million. In 2016 it was confirmed that FCAS would be centred around a UCAS with the possibility of a manned system as well. Both governments also committed to the next phase of development, with an operational demonstrator planned for 2025 and a full model ready for deployment by 2030 (Joint Declaration 2016). A lofty sum of €2 billion was committed with a further technical review planned to take place in 2020.

Unfortunately, after 2016 progress quickly stalled. At the January 2018 Anglo-French Summit discussion of FCAS was significantly curtailed in comparison to previous years. While the previous summit had set out ambitious plans, including a timeframe and spending commitments, this summit merely pledged that both governments would “continue our work on assessing the emerging conclusions before decisions are taken on future phases” (Joint

Declaration 2018). This severely muted commitment signalled that cooperation on FCAS had lost momentum. Later in 2018 this loss of momentum was confirmed when two separate national programmes were announced. At the ILA Berlin Air Show in May, Dassault announced that it would be partnering with the German Airbus on the future development of FCAS. This was followed by the Farnborough Air Show in July when British Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson unveiled the BAE Systems Tempest, a next generation fighter for the RAF that will also incorporate UCAS support systems. In February 2020 Dassault confirmed that not only had cooperation ceased but that the rift had occurred in early 2017, when the project had failed to advance to the next phase as planned (FlightGlobal 2020).

The failure of FCAS to deliver a joint capability is both disappointing and damaging to the Entente. Sir Stuart Atha described it as a symptom of the failures of Lancaster House (Atha 2021). FCAS presented a prime opportunity to reset relations between the British and French defence sectors. After decades of competition it seemed as though old rivalries had finally been exchanged for a new spirit of cooperation. It also appeared as though Europe had learned the lessons of the Rafale/Eurofighter split of the 1980s. This hope has proven false. Instead Europe shall once again play host to two competing aircraft projects, an undertaking that it may struggle to sustain in the long run. Furthermore, with Tempest due to enter service in 2035 and FCAS in 2040, it seems unlikely that there will be room for significant Franco-British cooperation in this field for at least two decades. Given France's unwillingness to adopt the F-35, two fighter generations will have passed before it is possible for Britain and France to potentially operate the same aircraft. The prolonged development period of modern aircraft also means that it could be the end of the century before British and French pilots operate the same aircraft.

The motivation for this split was almost certainly Brexit. Given that further cooperation was announced in 2016, prior to the Brexit referendum, and problems began to materialise in 2017, it is logical to blame Brexit for this unfortunate development. Furthermore, the impetus seems to have originated from Britain. In September 2018 French Defence Minister Florence Parly confirmed that it was the UK that had pushed for a shift in focus from a joint UCAS programme to the more limited the study of “technology areas” (Defense News 2018). Dassault Chief Executive Eric Trappier has also cited both Brexit and financial constraints as the root causes. Trappier has stated that the UK withdrew from the project but would not provide a clear answer as to why (FlightGlobal 2020). Given the initial progress made on FCAS it is disappointing that this programme has become a casualty of Brexit. This disappointment is compounded further, given that France had indicated a willingness to proceed with the programme despite the complications of Brexit. This makes the British decision to withdraw more unfortunate as FCAS was precisely the type of programme that could have sustained Franco-British cooperation through the uncertainties of the Brexit process. Competition between these two programmes will only drive-up costs and reduce profits from their eventual export, both of which run counter to the intentions set out in the Treaty. This failure also locks Britain and France into using differing air systems for decades, further hampering development of a joint carrier group.

Sir Stuart Atha offers an additional explanation for this split. Sir Stuart argues that the UK’s objectives were never achieved as the project evolved over time. The UK originally preferred an unmanned aircraft and thought collaboration would focus on the Taranis programme. The joint approach eventually changed and reoriented towards a next generation fighter, which France approached with greater enthusiasm than the UK. A problem then emerged because the UK had a fifth-generation capability in the F-35 while France did not (Atha 2021). The UK

thus did not have the same incentive as France which needed a replacement for its Rafale fleet. Andre Adamson, now head of UK-France at MBDA agrees saying that Brexit exacerbated existing tensions but that differences in capability needs were a pre-existing issue (Adamson 2021). As a result, divergent requirements compounded the political fallout of Brexit to drive the UK and France apart. This view is reinforced by the French National Assembly which concluded that French operational needs had been more urgent than the UK and thus in this case aligned more with Germany which also needed a next generation aircraft (Defence Committee 2020). Interestingly Francois Heisbourg argues that the UK has come out of this split better off than France. By partnering with Sweden and Italy the UK has secured more capable partners than France which has partnered with Germany. Furthermore, the UK has benefited from technology transfers from the US. Combined these factors mean that the UK's Tempest programme may well out perform FCAS (Heisbourg 2021).

In contrast to the unfortunate fate of FCAS, cooperation on complex weapons has produced greater success. Since 2010 both governments have supported the oneMBDA strategy. Antoine Bouvier, the former Chairman and CEO of MBDA described this as being at the heart of the Lancaster House process (Bouvier 2011). The ultimate objective of oneMBDA was to rationalise Europe's missile sector under a single prime contractor. This was intended to eliminate duplication and deliver savings for both governments by taking advantage of experience and expertise on both sides of the Channel, while also producing standardised systems for use throughout Europe. A primary result of oneMBDA has been the establishment of centres of excellence in both Britain and France, and the promotion of MBDA as Europe's primary contractor for complex weapons. From 2010 to 2015 sterling progress was made towards these centres. An agreement was signed in 2015 which defined Centres of Excellence as "technical centres located in MBDA-UK and MBDA-France that consolidate those

companies' expertise in order to secure improvements in efficiency to the benefit of both Parties" (MBDA Agreement 2015). These Centres of Excellence include test equipment and weapon controller facilities located in France and actuators and data link facilities located in the UK (MBDA 2015). The creation of these Centres was a key step towards creating greater Anglo-French interdependence as stipulated by the Treaty (Joint Declaration 2016). This also reflects Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance. Developing national variants of these Centres would be both costly and prevent either side from taking advantage of the others expertise. Joint centres reduce costs and augment both sides scientific and industrial experience. The French National Assembly has referred to oneMBDA as an example of the exemplary bilateral relationship that exists between the UK and France (National Assembly 2016).

Since then MBDA has been the contractor of choice for both governments. This agreement has been quite successful in breaking down many of the barriers that existed between the Franco-British defence industries, while also promoting greater cooperation and interdependence. For instance, components for Britain's Brimstone missiles have been manufactured in Bourges by MBDA-France while components for the French MMP Land Missile have been produced in Stevenage by MBDA-UK. The agreement also ensures that the UK and France have full access to all facilities and that neither party will hinder the transfer of equipment from one to the other. This has deepened mutual interdependence and reduced the costs of missile procurement, two key goals of the Treaty. This also indicates the augmentative nature of the alliance as Britain and France have been able to take advantage of expertise in both countries. Crucially, the Treaty also stipulates that neither party shall prevent the export of a complex weapons system to a third party, unless in the interests of national security. This is particularly important as Britain and France have traditionally competed when it comes to defence exports. The conflict between Rafale and Typhoon is a

prime example of this. By agreeing not to hinder the other from exporting jointly produced weapons, this agreement has laid the foundation for a more cooperative relationship in the realm of defence exports. In certain aspects this has counterbalanced the devolution back to competition created by FCAS.

Under the auspices of oneMBDA the jointly developed Sea Venom Anti-ship missile has been brought to fruition and will soon enter general service with the Royal Navy (Joint Statement 2020). Sea Venom has been developed by MBDA and is jointly funded by both governments. It is intended to act as a new medium range anti-ship missile for naval helicopters. It will be operated by the Royal Navies Wildcat helicopters and the Marine Nationale's future maritime aircraft (MBDA 2020). The successful development of Sea Venom is an indicator of what can be achieved through Anglo-French cooperation. Once it is in use by both navies it will greatly increase interoperability, particularly in regard to the Anglo-French Carrier group that is currently being developed.

MBDA has also been given a joint contract to carry out the refurbishment of both nations' stocks of Stormshadow/SCALP missiles. Stormshadow and its French equivalent Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée (SCALP) are long range cruise missiles operated by both the Royal Air Force and the French Air Force. This commitment from both governments demonstrates a willingness to sustain industrial cooperation to some extent in the future. It will also maintain interoperability between both air forces which will be of benefit for existing and future operations. Andre Adamson argues that the success of these missile programmes proves that mutual dependence in the complex weapons sector delivers real benefits for both countries (Adamson 2021).

The oneMBDA strategy has also seen the development of the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) program. FC/ASW is intended as a long-term replacement both nations Stormshadow/SCALP, harpoon and Exocet missiles. A concept phase for FC/ASW was launched in 2017 and is estimated to be worth €100 million (Naval News 2019). At the 2018 Anglo-French summit it was agreed that this concept phase would continue until 2020 when a decision would be taken on whether to place a production order. The joint summit held in November 2020 was noticeable for its lack of a decision on the future of FC/ASW. Rather than a procurement decision it was stated that both governments would “now be conducting our respective national project scrutiny and approval processes over the winter in advance of a decision on a follow-on joint assessment phase in 2021” (Joint Declaration 2020: 1). This lack of a decision was disappointing given the scale of the project at stake. FC/ASW is intended to replace two core systems currently in use. This delay raised the prospect of leaving both nations without a useable capability, which would be detrimental to their respective interests. Thankfully, in February 2022 it was announced that both governments had agreed to begin preparatory work for production (DGA 2022). It was also revealed that the project had now evolved into two separate missiles, a supersonic anti-ship missile and a subsonic anti-surface missile for striking land targets (DGA 2022). Both systems should be operational by the end of the decade. The decision to proceed with FC/ASW signals that there remains a willingness to continue industrial cooperation in the years ahead. A failure to do so would have implied that industrial cooperation may not have continued in a post-Brexit world. The interoperability of both armed forces is greatly bolstered through the use of shared equipment. If Anglo-French defence procurement was to diverge this would create additional difficulties for joint operations in the future. The failure of the Cameron government to equip the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers with catapults has already hampered the development of

a joint carrier group. It would have been highly regrettable if FC/ASW had become another victim of Brexit and created further barriers to naval cooperation in the future. As such it is a positive sign that this programme has finally been take forward.

The development of a joint MMCM programme has been an unequivocal success. First announced in 2012 it was agreed that work would begin on an unmanned prototype that would be functional by 2013 (Joint Declaration 2012). In 2014 this was followed up by an agreement that the MMCM programme would aim to deliver “unmanned underwater vehicles capable of finding and neutralising seabed mines” (Joint Declaration 2014). A design stage worth £10 million to each party was also agreed with a deadline of 2016 for a decision on whether to take the programme forward for manufacture. This decision was taken in 2016 when it was agreed that prototypes worth €150 million would be produced. At the November 2020 summit it was agreed that a contract would be signed later that month which was subsequently awarded to Thales and BAE systems (BAE 2020).

The success of the MMCM programme demonstrates the benefits of improved industrial cooperation. The UK is to invest £184 million in the programme with a comparative amount invested by France. This represents a significant saving as Britain is not footing the bill for the entire project. It is likely that similar savings could be made through similar cooperation on other projects.

Institutional cooperation

On the institutional front the Lancaster House Treaty established numerous new avenues of cooperation that have bolstered the bilateral relationship. Summits are important for any bilateral relationship. As Andre Adamson rightfully points out they set the tone for the relationship and provide the platform for new areas of cooperation (Adamson 2021). Article

IV of the Lancaster House Treaty designated the British Prime Minister and the French President as the primary supervisors of bilateral cooperation. To support them in this endeavour Article IV also established the Senior Level Group (SLG) to oversee and implement cooperation. In particular the SLG is responsible for:

- a) Determining the long-term aims, priorities and benefits of the cooperation entered into under this Treaty;
- b) Exercising oversight of all co-operation including the security aspects entered into under this Treaty;
- c) Identifying new areas for co-operation to be proposed to the Summit;
- d) Resolving issues and disputes which may arise in the context of the implementation of co-operation under this Treaty;
- e) Recommending any proposed amendments to this Treaty.

(Lancaster House Treaty 2010: 6)

The SLG consists of both leaders as well as the British National Security Advisor and the French Presidents diplomatic and military adviser. Below the SLG there are various committees headed by their respective CDS' and the heads of their national procurement agencies. The Treaty also established the High-Level Working Group (HLWG) that brings together junior ministers from both sides to coordinate different aspects of cooperation. Additionally, in 2018 steps were taken to establish a Defence Ministerial Council. This consists of both parties' defence secretaries and is intended to meet three times a year. The purpose of this council is to create a permanent forum through which the UK Defence Secretary and French Defence

Minister can meet regularly to discuss defence matters (MoD 2018). It should also be noted that while these structures are permanent, they are not standing bodies.

The creation of these groups has ensured that there is regular contact between British and French officials at all levels of government. This has allowed for regular communication and has built relationships between key personnel that is vital for ensuring the longevity of Anglo-French cooperation. Furthermore, the existence of the SLG ensures that there is always a forum through which defence cooperation can be coordinated. This ensures that there is a clearly designated structure to make cooperation more efficient. The non-standing nature of the SLG is also beneficial as it avoids duplicating structures that already exist through organisations such as NATO. This ensures that the SLG can remain responsive to the needs of bilateral cooperation without creating unnecessary bureaucracy, further enhancing the flexible nature of cooperation envisaged by Lancaster House. These groupings also embody the codification of norms and procedures put forward by Singer and Small's (1966) concept of ententes, by providing established processes that govern bilateral cooperation. This has helped to strengthen the Entente and by extension bolster its status as an augmentative and natural alliance.

Additionally, it should be noted that since 2010 there have been biannual summits between the British Prime Minister and French President. These summits have allowed for regular meetings that have sustained cooperation at the top level over the last decade. This has proven beneficial as both states have gone through several changes of government. Since 2010 both countries have experienced transfers of power to leaders with varying political beliefs. Consequently, these regular summits have ensured that face to face meetings have occurred at steady intervals, despite political uncertainties on both sides of the channel.

Allowing leaders to meet face to face allows relationships to be built which are vital to sustaining bilateral cooperation. It is a testament to the importance of these summits that one was still held in November 2020 despite the COVID-19 pandemic. This contrasts with previous years when specific Franco-British summits were a rarity. Anglo-French leaders primarily met at summits convened in response to a specific crisis, or they held talks on fringes of larger multilateral events. The continuation of these meetings will take on a greater importance in the years to come now that the UK has withdrawn from the EU. Since British officials no longer have daily contact with their French counterparts through EU institutions, the maintenance of these bilateral summits will assist in mitigating the effects of Britain's withdrawal from the EU.

There have also been significant personnel exchanges between both militaries. Andre Adamson notes that this network of exchanges is second only to the UK and US (Adamson 2021). In 2020 this amounted to some 56 French personnel in the UK and 54 British personnel in France (Defence Committee 2020). Since 2010 a British liaison officer has served aboard the *Charles de Gaulle* bolstering cooperation on carrier capabilities. At the annual summit in 2016 it was agreed that both armies would establish a permanent exchange of deputy divisional commanders. A French officer became second-in-command of the UK's 1st Division in York and a British officer took on an equivalent position in the French 1st division based in Besançon (Joint Summit 2016) Similar exchanges have taken place with the other armed services. These exchanges have bolstered general interoperability between both armed forces. These are another example of Singer and Small's (1966) entente typology at work. With military personnel gaining experience working within the others hierarchy the norms created through the CJEF exercise programme have been reinforced with additional

experience and understanding. These will enhance future cooperation and will be beneficial when a CJEF deployment is undertaken.

Nuclear Cooperation

The final branch of cooperation agreed at the Lancaster House Summit was on nuclear deterrence. In their joint declaration both governments agreed to collaborate research;

“in the technology associated with nuclear stockpile stewardship in support of our respective independent nuclear deterrent capabilities, in full compliance with our international obligations, through unprecedented co-operation at a new joint facility at Valduc in France that will model performance of our nuclear warheads and materials to ensure long-term viability, security and safety - this will be supported by a joint Technology Development Centre at Aldermaston in the UK” (Joint Declaration 2010)

This agreement was codified in the Teutates Treaty, named for an ancient Celtic deity worshiped in Gaul and Britannia, that was also signed at the summit. The Teutates Treaty, or to use its drier official title the “Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities” (Teutates Treaty 2010: 1), has not received the same level of public study or scrutiny as its more famous sibling. In part this is due to the sensitive nature of nuclear technology. Given this sensitivity the quantity of information available to the public is limited. However, it remains a key component of wider Lancaster House cooperation and so has been evaluated here to the greatest extent feasible.

Progress on Teutates has been made steadily since 2010. The joint commitment to develop a testing facility at Valduc was reaffirmed in 2012 and in 2014 final investment approval was

granted for construction to proceed. It was also announced in 2014 that nuclear cooperation would be expanded. Joint research into the 'Orion' nuclear test laser would be undertaken at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in Aldermaston and the 'Laser Megajoule' (LMJ) at the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique – Direction des Applications Militaires (CEA-DAM) Cesta site near Bordeaux (Joint Declaration 2014). At the 2016 and 2018 summits Teutates was not mentioned specifically, but this was largely because construction of the Valduc facility was still ongoing. Both governments did however restate their commitment to maintaining their respective nuclear deterrents. In 2020 it was confirmed that good progress on the Valduc facility had been made with construction due to conclude in 2022.

The steady, if understated, progress made on the Teutates Treaty should not be dismissed. Indeed, the Treaty is an achievement by virtue of its very existence. Nuclear cooperation has traditionally been a nonstarter for both governments. Britain and France are both rightly proud of their independent nuclear deterrents and so cooperation in this sphere was traditionally a red line. This sentiment was especially true in France. French suspicion of American involvement in British nuclear development raised fears that Britain's capabilities were in actuality an extension of the United States. As such this willingness to collaborate should be celebrated and commended. Sir Stuart Atha referred to Teutates as an obvious area where Britain and France should cooperate (Atha 2021). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Liam Fox, a longstanding Eurosceptic, described Teutates as an “essential technological advance” (Fox 2021) for both countries. French officials have also praised Teutates calling it a one-of-a-kind form of cooperation (Defence Committee 2020).

The progress that has been made in establishing the joint Epure facility at Valduc is another success of this Treaty. While it has taken some time to get off the ground it is still on schedule

to be operational within the next two years. According to French sources significant savings have also been made on the facilities construction, estimated to be around €200 million with an additional €200 million in the years to come (KCL 2018). While the British government has not published a similar cost/benefit analysis, it can be estimated that Britain has made similar savings. Once again this shows the augmentative nature of the relationship as these are significant savings to make. This is important as it demonstrates that Anglo-French cooperation can deliver significant cost reductions and value for money, as envisaged by the Lancaster House Treaty. This facility is also a major example of the augmentative nature of the Entente. By operating a joint facility Britain and France are investing significant reliance upon each other in this most sensitive of areas. Teutates also reinforces Ghez' (2010) typology of the Entente as a natural alliance. No other nation in Europe possesses nuclear capabilities and so if Britain and France sought collaborators in this area their only options were each other. This is recognised by the French Sénat which refers to Teutates as an extension of Britain and France's natural partnership (Sénat Defense Committee 2011). This is further reinforced in a report by the National Assembly which rightly argues that despite their differences Britain and France are natural partners (National Assembly 2011). Interestingly this report references the history of the Entente and places Teutates as the culmination of a period of cooperation that began in the nineteenth century (National Assembly 2011). Whilst the report does gloss over the numerous disagreements Britain and France had during that period, its sentiment that Teutates is a natural progression of Franco-British cooperation is nonetheless correct.

Teutates' expiration date is also significant. It is to remain in force for the entire life cycle of the joint facilities it established. This is stipulated as a minimum of fifty years but can be extended if the parties choose to do so. In effect, this binds Britain and France together for

another forty years of nuclear cooperation. This will take on an increased relevance in a post-Brexit world where the probability of strained relations is increased and regular contact through EU institutions no longer occurs. Consequently, bilateral linkage's such as Teutates will prove critical for the preservation of the Entente.

Conclusions

Lancaster House clearly shows alliance theory in action. This chapter has highlighted a number of areas in which alliance theory can be used to develop a complex understanding of the Lancaster House process. Its various aspects have all embodied different alliance typologies and demonstrate the complex strands of the relationship at work. In multiple instances, whether it be operationally, in weapons production or through research and development Britain and France have repeatedly demonstrated a mutual willingness to depend upon the other to support and defend their national interests. Given their position within Europe it is logical that Britain and France have sought to improve bilateral cooperation, as outlined by Ghez' (2010) natural alliance typology. This in part drove them to sign the Treaty in 2010. Equally the progress made towards improving defence cooperation highlights Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance type. Operationally, industrially and in the nuclear sphere Britain and France have developed new avenues of cooperation that augment their national capabilities. This increased cooperation has also aligned with Singer and Smalls (1966) entente typology. By increasing regular communication between both governments through forums such as the SLG and Defence Ministerial Council, Lancaster House has engendered the creation of new norms of cooperation that have bolstered the relationship. This norm creation has extended to the armed forces through the expansion of their bilateral exchange programme and the holding of regular military exercises. These have allowed

military personnel to meet on a regular basis and gain an understanding of how their opposite numbers operate. This has improved interpersonal links and made interservice cooperation easier. That multiple different typologies can be applied to Lancaster House also perfectly encapsulates the peculiar nature of the Anglo-French alliance. This further highlights the utility of alliance theory as it provides an array of tools with which to further our understanding of Anglo-French defence cooperation.

It is evident that the implementation of the Lancaster House Treaty has been difficult and in some instances it has failed outright. Nevertheless, it has ushered in a period of enhanced cooperation that is vastly superior to decades prior. In that sense Lancaster House has indeed succeeded in improving bilateral cooperation in several realms.

On an operational level Lancaster House has brought the French and British militaries together in a way not seen since the Suez Crisis. The successful operational readiness of CJEF is a milestone achievement in Anglo-French cooperation. The ability to deploy British and French troops as a binational force, is a capability not possessed since Suez. The ability of CJEF to tackle the highest intensity of operations will enhance the ability of Britain and France to respond to future crises. CJEF will no doubt prove to be a useful tool as future governments seek to combat the myriad threats both nations face. The French commitment to EFP and Britain's deployment to Mali are also significant improvements in cooperation. Anglo-French involvement in EFP demonstrates both a French commitment to NATO and an awareness of British sensibilities around NATO that further enhances both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Equally, British support for France in the Sahel proves that Britain can be a reliable partner and ally of choice. It has also allowed Britain to provide France with vital capabilities, thus further bolstering the logic of mutual interdependence inherent in Lancaster

House. These deployments are both clear evidence of the increased cooperation since 2010 instigated by Lancaster House. Progress on a joint carrier group, while slow, is also important. Substantial progress has been made towards implementing this capability and if sustained, it is likely to be delivered. Not only would this compliment potential CJEF operations, but it would also increase the flexibility with which Britain and France can respond to crises around the globe.

Industrially Lancaster House has also borne fruit, with the successful development of Sea Venom and MMCM programmes. It has also delivered significant savings and bolstered inter-industry cooperation. The oneMBDA programme illustrates the possibilities of successful Franco-British cooperation in this sector. Whilst it has taken some time FC/ASW is finally moving towards production. It is imperative that this progress is sustained in order to preserve the gains of industrial cooperation. It is clear from the past ten years that collaboration on defence procurement can achieve real and tangible results. Lancaster House has also created new bilateral institutions such as the SLG and HLWG both of which have fostered regular communication and collaboration. Biannual summits have been held, fostering a style of cooperation that is of even greater importance in a post-Brexit world. These summits have enabled cooperation to be sustained despite political upset on both sides of the Channel. On the nuclear front the Teutates Treaty has broken down barriers and erased old taboos, opening new fronts for collaboration in the process. Teutates stands as an exemplar of what can be achieved when policy makers are willing to take a pragmatic approach to cooperation as a means of protecting their nation's interests.

These successes do not mean that Lancaster House is without flaws. The Treaty created a network of interconnected realms of cooperation, were failure in one influences cooperation

in others. As noted, while operational cooperation may be at a new record, progress towards a joint carrier group has been sluggish. While it is still possible to salvage this capability, the likelihood appears to have dimmed. The limitations of industrial cooperation have also been laid bare. Failure to continue the joint FCAS programme blots the record of what could have been a decade of exceptional success and innovation for both nations. FCAS in particular will further hamper military cooperation, particularly the joint carrier group, if it is not made compatible with British assets such as the *Queen Elizabeth*. It would be both a waste of resources and damaging to bilateral security if industrial cooperation is not sustained in the years ahead.

Now that the UK has left the EU cross-channel relations are uncertain. It is more vital than ever that the progress made since 2010 is maintained and continued. The rationale for cooperation has not changed. The vital interests of one cannot be threatened without also threatening the vital interests of the other. The world is arguably more unstable now than it was in 2010. A multitude of threats have spread across the globe, all of which highlight the necessity of greater Anglo-French cooperation. The continuing military malaise in Europe proves that Britain and France cannot rely upon their other European partners to the same extent that they can each other. For that reason alone, Lancaster House is, and will remain, vitally important to both sides.

Despite its shortcomings Lancaster House has been instrumental in promoting greater cooperation. Arguably it managed to achieve a previously elusive policy success, it has enhanced cooperation through a means that is both French and British in equal measure. By existing outside of the EU it allayed British fears of “ever closer union” and continental entanglements. Equally, it has bolstered Anglo-French autonomy and independence, a

fundamentally French objective. The bridging of these two traditions is an achievement that has not previously been realised. Through these efforts it is unquestionable that cooperation is greater now than it was a decade ago. Lancaster House has delivered on its aims and it is vital that it continues to deliver in the years ahead. It has established a strong foundation at the military level which has not been eroded despite the difficulties of Brexit (Adamson 2021). Lancaster House may not represent a shift as major as the Entente of 1904 but it is no Saint Malo Declaration, doomed to fall by the wayside of history, rather it is a pivotal moment in this most peculiar relationship.

6. War in the Desert: The Entente in Libya

Introduction

The 2011 intervention in Libya is another useful case study which highlights alliance theory in action. Particularly it showcases how alliance theory functions on an operational level. The lessons drawn from Libya can be used as indicators for how alliance theory can be used to further our understanding of Anglo-French relations in future conflicts. On paper Libya represented a perfect opportunity to see both Ghez (2010) and Fedder's (1968) typologies in action. Firstly, as the only allied states in Europe with significant expeditionary capabilities Britain and France were natural allies in leading operations in Libya. Outside of the US no other NATO member has the same range of capabilities as they do, and so it was natural that in the absence of American leadership Britain and France would turn to each other. Equally, Libya also offered an opportunity for Britain and France to utilise the augmentative nature of their alliance. By deploying different capabilities Britain and France had the opportunity to complement each other in order to achieve victory. However, the reality of the operation was often different. As shall be highlighted throughout this chapter there were times when the Entente did not live up to its theoretical foundations. This does not mean that this never happened, indeed there are many instances in which Anglo-French operations did correspond to Ghez' (2010) and Fedder's (1968) typologies, however applying theory to this intervention is complex, as discussed later on. This chapter therefore demonstrates both the benefits that can be gained during military operations when the Entente functions effectively as an augmentative alliance, as well as the consequences of when it fails to do so.

In February 2021 the UN brokered an agreement which tentatively ended the second Libyan Civil War. Since 2011 Libya has experienced two bitter civil wars. The first of these wars is the

focus of this chapter. From March to September 2011, Western powers actively assisted Libyan rebels in overthrowing the long-standing dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. This intervention is notable as it featured the emergence of an Anglo-French leadership that shaped the Western response to the Libyan conflict. The role played by the UK and France in 2011 was previously unseen. Libya thus offers a unique case study through which to consider Anglo-French defence cooperation within a multilateral framework. This was a localised conflict in a minor nation, in which the UK and France considered themselves to have both an interest in intervention and the capacity to do so. It is probable that future Anglo-French interventions will occur in similar scenarios. In an increasingly multipolar world, Britain and France will have to become accustomed to conducting more independent operations. As the American pivot to the Indo-Pacific continues, the likelihood of American involvement in other regions will decrease (Bildt 2021). Therefore, when conflicts emerge that threaten British and French interests, but are of less importance to the US, the UK and France must be ready to intervene.

Studying Libya is valuable therefore as it provides an indication as to how such an intervention may be conducted in the future. It also provides a useful insight into how Britain and France cooperate militarily through multilateral structures like NATO. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Anglo-French leadership during the Libyan campaign and ascertain if this intervention can provide a blueprint for UK-French interventions in the future. It also considers how Britain and France operated together and the implications of this for future campaigns.

The chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the 2011 Libyan Civil War. This is followed by a consideration of the existing literature on the topic, where specific attention is paid to

the role of UK and France. Following this, several key lessons from the intervention are identified and elaborated upon. Each lesson is supported by an analysis of whether they have been learned and how they relate to contemporary Anglo-French capabilities. The state of the Anglo-French relationship at the time is also assessed and comparisons are made with the status of the relationship today. The chapter concludes by explaining that while deficiencies in the operation mean that Libya is not a blueprint for future operations, it contains several lessons which if learned, would provide a framework for future Anglo-French operations. By considering these lessons it is possible to chart the development of the Entente Cordiale at an operational level, just as the previous chapter evaluated its development in political and industrial terms.

Historical Background

The first Libyan Civil War was born out of the Arab Spring. In December 2010 a Tunisian fruit seller called Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated to protest the confiscation of his goods. This sparked nationwide protests against the regime of President Ben Ali, protests which were soon replicated across the Arab World. These protests spread to Libya in January 2011 when people in Benghazi began protesting a lack of housing. These protests quickly escalated into a general anti-government movement. The Gaddafi regime's response was characteristically brutal, deploying troops who showed little compunction against firing upon the unarmed protestors (FIDH 2011). This sparked a rapid escalation as protests turned to open rebellion, driving regime forces out of the city in late February. Similar events played out in other cities as the rebels advanced west along the Gulf of Sirte towards the capital, Tripoli. On the 6th March the regime launched a counter offensive and its superior firepower allowed it to retake most of the territory it had lost to the rebels within a week (Chivvis 2015). By the 19th March

government forces were closing in on Benghazi, threatening to crush the uprising completely (Chivvis 2015).

Throughout this rapidly evolving situation, Western powers had watched the escalating violence with mounting concern. Western condemnation of Gaddafi's actions was swift. Nicholas Sarkozy was the first Western leader to call for military action to prevent the massacre of civilians in Libya. Sarkozy was soon joined by David Cameron who surprised many by forcefully comparing Benghazi with the massacre of Bosniaks in Srebrenica (The Times 2019). Together they proposed UNSC Resolution 1973 which demanded an immediate ceasefire and authorised the creation a no-fly zone over Libya. Crucially, the resolution also authorised UN members "to take all necessary measures" (UNSC 1973: 3) to protect civilians in Libya. This resolution was adopted on the 17th March allowing military operations to commence. France was the first to carry out airstrikes, hitting regime forces outside Benghazi on the morning of the 19th March, which according to French sources at least, secured air superiority over Benghazi (Desclaux 2012). This announcement surprised both the UK and the US but played a crucial role in preventing the city from being overrun. Later that day British and American submarines launched tomahawk missiles at targets across Libya, crippling Libyan air defences. What followed was a brief period in which the US, UK and France conducted separate operations codenamed *Odyssey Dawn*, *Ellamy* and *Harmattan* respectively. Overall command was transferred to NATO on the 23rd March under the banner of *Operation Unified Protector* (Weighill and Gaub 2018).

This transition was not an easy one. There was great debate within NATO about the merits of intervention. France was vocally opposed to any NATO involvement. President Sarkozy desired to "Arabise" the campaign (Le Monde 2011), in an attempt to avoid the potential

backlash of perceived NATO meddling in another Muslim country and accusations of imperialism. To that end he instead proposed an ad-hoc coalition, with France and the UK at its head. The French proposal was to utilise CJEF. CJEF had only been recently established and how this would have worked in practice was unclear. It is possible that France intended to imitate the framework nation concept devised by the Berlin Plus Agreement in 2002, with Britain and France fulfilling the eponymous role (NATO 2006). Under such a model Britain and France would have served as the “backbone” of the intervention into which other allies would plug their capabilities into (SWP 2014). In contrast the UK, despite allegedly flirting with the idea, supported NATO assuming overall command. French Lieutenant General Gilles Desclaux has claimed that David Cameron was in favour of Anglo-French command but decided against it as these frameworks were not yet in place (Desclaux 2012). Once again, divergences between British and French strategic outlooks had emerged. Evidently, French re-entry into NATO’s joint command structure and the Lancaster House Treaty were both too recent to prevent this kind of divergence. Additionally, other NATO members such as Germany and Turkey opposed any form of military intervention (Chivvis 2015). A compromise was eventually reached allowing NATO command structures to be utilised, but participation in the campaign was limited to a small number of willing members. These internal divisions highlighted the need for greater Anglo-French coordination, as a unified Anglo-French command structure unencumbered by the restraints of intra-NATO division, could have resolved many of the operational difficulties discussed later in this chapter. The addition of non-NATO allies gave *Operation Unified Protector* the appearance of a “coalition of the willing” rather than a unified NATO operation. Somewhat ironically, this essentially amounted to NATO command of an ad-hoc coalition, thus partially encompassing what both Britain and France had wanted. Sir Stuart Atha referred to this array of contributors as a “Star Wars bar

type situation” that required a “bastardisation” of NATO structures to make the coalition function (Atha 2021).

At this point the US withdrew from the majority of combat operations, and instead offered logistical support. From then on other coalition partners carried out the majority of sorties, with France and the UK completing the most. The commitment of NATO assets decisively shifted the Libyan balance of power in the rebel’s favour. Initial airstrikes halted the advance of pro-Gaddafi forces providing the rebels with the chance to regroup and launch a counter offensive. The overwhelming nature of NATO airpower quickly neutralised Gaddafi’s advantages in armoured vehicles and heavy equipment, and the regime was often forced to abandon these assets lest they be picked off from above. The clause in UNSC 1973 authorising members “to take all necessary measures” (UNSC 1973: 3) was interpreted widely to include regime property that facilitated Gaddafi’s war machine, such as ammo depots and army barracks, the destruction of which was a major boon to the rebels.

In the summer of 2011 fighting seemed to stagnate, risking the onset of a military stalemate. However, close fire support from Western helicopters transformed this stalemate into a solid rebel advance (Grand 2015). By mid-August rebel forces had Tripoli surrounded. The city fell after a brief battle on the 23rd August, however Gaddafi and some of his family managed to escape. Regime loyalists retreated to Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte where they managed to hold out for another two months (Chivvis 2015). On the 20th October Gaddafi was killed by rebel forces while he attempted to flee the city. Gaddafi’s convoy was struck by an Anglo-French airstrike allowing the rebels to overrun it and kill the fleeing Libyan leader. With Gaddafi dead and his last stronghold in rebel hands, Operation Unified Protector was formally

brought to a close on the 31st October and with remaining NATO troops withdrawn (Chivvis 2015).

Debates within the literature

Since 2011 the Western intervention in Libya has garnered significant attention from scholars and policy analysts. Much of the literature has focused upon the unique characteristics of the operation, namely that it was primarily coordinated and led by the UK and France, rather than by the US. This section analyses that portion of the literature to better understand how observers have interpreted the roles played Britain and France.

The debate surrounding the intervention is broadly divided into two camps. Firstly, there are those who view the Libyan intervention as largely successful and as a potential model for future NATO interventions. This school of thought largely believes that the UK and France provided effective leadership for the alliance when the US was unwilling to step up to the mark and consider it to be a blueprint for the future. The opposing camp postulates that the Libyan intervention was a close-run thing that had the potential to fail drastically had conditions not been fortuitous for NATO forces. This school of thought is critical of the capabilities, or lack thereof, that Britain and France brought to bear. For convenience's sake the chapter refers to the former as the 'positive camp' and the latter as the 'negative camp' throughout.

Firstly, this section deals with the positive camp. Authors within the positive school tend to put forth several arguments as to why the Libyan intervention was a success. This is also the official narrative from the British and French governments. The MoD has claimed that Anglo-French cooperation in Libya was exemplary, (MoD 2011) whilst former defence minister Nick Harvey argued that Britain and France not only led the coalition but established they could

do so in the future (Harvey 2011). Equally, General Jean-Paul Paloméros spoke of the close cooperation between the French Air Force and RAF in Libya (Paloméros 2011).

The positive school argues that Britain and France effectively provided leadership, not just for NATO but for the non-NATO coalition members that also partook in the intervention. This leadership was sorely needed as the US was reticent to become embroiled in the Libyan conflict. A RUSI report from September 2011 argued that the UK and France “deserve the plaudits” for “uniquely” taking the lead in the operation (RUSI 2011). This report asserts that Britain and France were alone amongst the international community in demonstrating the leadership necessary to push for a robust response to Gaddafi’s actions in Libya. Jeffrey Michaels (2014) concurs, noting that it was Britain and France that took the lead in preparing the groundwork for NATO intervention. This included drawing up plans for a joint no-fly zone prior to official UN authorisation. This is further supported by Fabrizio Coticchia (2011) who argues that French and British military leadership was essential in ensuring that the intervention was successful as neither America nor NATO’s other European members were willing to take on this role. This would align with Ghez’ (2010) typology as Britain and France proved to be a natural combination when looking for an alternative to US leadership. Their other European allies lacked either the will or capacity to act decisively and so they naturally turned to each other.

The positive camp adds that the intervention was highly effective in terms of both cost and military outcomes. The relatively quick resolution to the initial intervention is argued to be largely due to British and French efforts. Anders Nygren (2014) is particularly complimentary of Anglo-French efforts throughout the campaign. Nygren covers the initial air campaign in great detail, providing a wealth of information on how events unfolded. Of particular interest

is the fact that British, French and also American airstrikes began on the 19th March 2011. As mentioned, NATO did not assume command of the no-fly zone until the 23rd March. However, the RAF also announced on the morning of the 23rd, just prior to NATO's own announcement, that the Libyan air force had ceased to exist as a fighting force. This, Nygren argues demonstrates the importance of Anglo-French involvement in the intervention for without that initial week of airstrikes the NATO no-fly zone would have been ineffective.

The military contribution made by both Britain and France is further praised by Fabrizio Coticchia (2011) who notes only four other European NATO members could participate in direct combat operations during the intervention. The remaining European contributors confined themselves to policing the no-fly zone, a relatively simple task given that the British and French air forces had already liquidated their Libyan counterparts prior to the commencement of official NATO operations. This is particularly notable when considering that out of an eighteen-nation coalition, twelve participants were European nations (NATO 2011). This means that only half of coalition members could actually participate in combat operations, which places even greater importance upon the contributions made by the UK and France.

This point is further discussed by both Christian Goulter and Camille Grand in the 2015 edited collection *Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War*. Both authors stress the importance of the Anglo-French decision to deploy attack helicopters in support of the Libyan rebels. France dispatched the *Tonnerre*, a helicopter carrier with a complement of twelve Tiger attack helicopters (Atlantic Council 2011), while the UK complemented this with four Apache attack helicopters on board *HMS Ocean*. They argue that the decision to deploy these aircraft in a support capacity provided a psychological advantage to the rebels. Additionally, they

greatly enhanced allied capabilities during the campaign. For instance, they allowed Britain and France to target regime forces located in urban areas that had previously been out of reach and would prove vital in providing the support necessary for the rebels. Crucially, it was only the UK and France that chose to deploy these assets. Other NATO members declined to do so, leaving the burden with Britain and France. Support for this position is further provided by Coticchia (2011), Nygren (2014) and Amitai Etzioni (2012), all of whom concur with the belief that Franco-British helicopter support proved vital to NATO success in Libya. This would align with Fedders (1968) typology of the Entente as an augmentative alliance. Britain and France augmented each other by deploying helicopters that were able to bolster coalition operations at a crucial time in the campaign.

The positive camp also points to the number of combat operations conducted by Britain and France, in addition to the quantity of assets contributed to the campaign, as proof that their contributions were vital to the mission's overall success. While exact figures vary depending on the source, it is widely accepted that Britain and France conducted the largest proportion of NATO combat operations during the intervention. Amitai Etzioni (2012) for instance notes that France alone provided 30% of all military assets involved in combat operations in Libya. Ivo Daalder and James Stavridis (2012) further argue that between them Britain and France conducted at least 40% of all combat operations during the intervention. It was also the UK and France which provided the bulk of NATO's naval assets which proved crucial in crippling the Libyan navy (Nygren 2014, Goulter 2014 and Grand 2015).

Throughout the literature in the positive camp, it is clear that the Libyan campaign highlights some of the alliance typologies discussed earlier in this thesis. Evidently, the nature of Anglo-French operations embodies Edwin Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance type. Throughout

the campaign Britain and France deployed different capabilities that complemented each other. For instance, the deployment of both British and French helicopters offered different, but complementary, capabilities. The French Tigers undertook generalised operations in support of rebel forces while the more modern British Apache's conducted precision strikes against regime targets (Goulter 2015). Equally, the British deployment of *Trafalgar-class* submarines complemented the deployment of French Frigates during alliance naval operations. Clearly, Anglo-French leadership was made more effective through both nations deploying assets that complemented each other. It is also possible to see Jeremy Ghez' (2010) natural alliance type at play here. Given American unwillingness to become involved, and the general European inability to do so, Britain and France were natural partners to assume leadership of operations in Libya. As the only European nations with the expeditionary capabilities and experience necessary to oversee operations in Libya, it is logical that London and Paris would have viewed each other as the natural option for leadership in this campaign.

However, the positive camp does not hold a monopoly on the literature. The negative camp provides several counterpoints to those positions put forward above. Firstly, the negative camp argues that Anglo-French leadership was only feasible because of American support. Ellen Hallams and Benjamin Schreer (2012) argue that without American support in crucial areas such as Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) then the entire enterprise would not have succeeded. While Hallams and Schreer do note that Britain and France conducted the bulk of the military operations, they are at pains to illustrate that these sorties were only possible because of NATO provided ISTAR, 75% of which was sourced from the US. This point is further made by Stephen Larrabee et al (2012) who argue that without American involvement in the initial phase of operations, in particular the use of American tomahawk missiles to neutralise Libyan air defences early on, then the coalition

would not have met with the same levels of success that it did. In Larrabee's assessment, the Anglo-French contribution was beneficial but not essential to operational success.

The negative camp also points to the unique circumstances of the Libyan intervention, arguing that it was a *sui generis* situation that is unlikely to be replicated in the future. Reykers (2017) discusses this point in detail, arguing that Libya was unique given its geographical proximity to Europe. As Libya was relatively close to the European continent, it made practical sense for Europeans to take the lead in any intervention there. They could conduct operations with greater logistical efficiency than the US or Canada. Furthermore, the Libyan military was relatively outdated and facing an identifiable opposition that could be provided with support relatively easily. These factors combined to provide NATO with a perfect storm that enabled its European members to carry the bulk of the military burden. The probability of these various factors aligning again in the future is low and so it is likely that the US will continue to take the lead in future operations. Even Amitai Etzioni (2012), an otherwise enthusiastic supporter of Anglo-French leadership of the Libya intervention, concedes that had the situation been more complex the US would probably have stepped in and taken overall command. This, the negative camp argues, is the crux of the matter. While Britain and France may have led this intervention, they lack both the resources and the will to replicate this in other conflicts. Libya's unique characteristics meant that Anglo-French leadership was an interesting quirk of this specific operation, rather than a possibility for future interventions.

Writers within the negative camp also argue that the circumstances of the intervention came quite close to failure and the entire operation could have ended that way with only mild adjustments. Jean-Loup Samaan (2018) notes the level of political disquiet amongst NATO members over the principle of intervention. Turkish and German opposition nearly resulted

in the entire operation being stillborn as internal dissent hampered the ability of NATO to operate. Disagreements between the UK and France over command logistics further hampered operational effectiveness. Larrabee et al (2012) note that while Britain and France did conduct a substantial number of combat operations, the Libyan campaign greatly stretched their resources, particularly their stockpiles of precision guided munitions which came perilously close to running out during the campaign. If Britain and France could barely sustain their own operations, then how could they oversee coalitions in the future? Andrea Carati (2017), while not resolutely negative about the campaign, does make the point that initial operations were conducted unilaterally by the US, UK and France with minimal coordination. French reticence to involve NATO caused initial rancour in London which had the potential to undermine Anglo-French cooperation before the operation commenced. If these diverging national outlooks are still plaguing Anglo-French attempts at cooperation then, the negative school argues, how could they coordinate future coalitions without US support?

While both schools provide valid points neither is wholly right. The debate on Libya is too polarised between its supporters and detractors. The positive school is correct in its assumption that the Libyan intervention demonstrates the benefits of Anglo-French cooperation. Had Britain and France not taken the diplomatic initiative in pushing for intervention then it is unlikely that the operation would have taken place at all. It was Anglo-French diplomacy which secured UN authorisation and it was the RAF and French Air Force that conducted the bulk of strike operations. It is also true that the operation did present logistical challenges for both Britain and France, including in the area of munitions. However, as noted by RUSI (2011) these problems were confronted and overcome as both sides were able to step up production of the necessary munitions to continue launching offensive

operations. While disagreement over the precise nature of the operations command structure persisted, this could be managed even if coordination was never perfect. However, the importance of the US should not be understated as there were still clear limits to Franco-British leadership which had to be compensated for. While Anglo-French leadership was necessary in driving the mission forward, American logistical support was critical to its success. If the US had not provided several key capabilities, then the campaign would have floundered. Thus, the operation was not solely Franco-British as the positive camp argues, though nor was it wholly reliant on the Americans as the negative camp suggests. Rather, it was an uneasy synthesis of both sides in which Anglo-French leadership was sustained by American logistical support.

Lessons from the Libyan Campaign

The United States remains an essential partner

The primary lesson of the Libyan campaign is that the US was still critical for military success. This is the assessment of Liam Fox who makes it clear that without American support in key areas the intervention would not have happened (Fox 2021). While the US did not take on an active leadership role for most of the campaign, American influence was still necessary for the campaign's success. American involvement was needed to provide the campaign with the political clout necessary to convince other coalition partners to participate. While the UK and France possessed sizeable capabilities of their own, this was insufficient to reassure their allies that they could oversee operations successfully. While other coalition members were willing to acquiesce to Franco-British leadership once the campaign commenced, it was only with American persuasion that the coalition was able to exist in the first place. This fact is key to

all the other lessons drawn from Libya and underpins the context in which these lessons should be learnt.

Full spectrum in name only is asking for failure

It is clear from the Libyan campaign that a broad range of capabilities are essential to lead modern coalition warfare. While both the UK and France possess full spectrum capabilities, those capabilities are in many cases limited. These limits were on full display in 2011. Arguably the UK suffered from greater limitations, given the decisions taken in the 2010 SDSR. Most noticeable was its lack of a carrier capability. In contrast France was able to dispatch its own Force d'action navale, including the *Charles de Gaulle*. The Force d'action Navale is France's primary naval formation intended for major operations encompassing a wide variety of naval and airborne assets (Ministre des Armees 2021). This capability allowed France to conduct strikes with both land and naval based aircraft, significantly improving their operational choices during the campaign. Britain by contrast, was restricted to land-based aircraft. While in this instance the UK was able to overcome these shortcomings, this was still a serious gap in the Royal Navy's capabilities (Defence Select Committee 2012). Furthermore, many of the RAF's initial solutions presented new problems that Britain struggled to overcome, namely a lack of logistical aircraft. This also required France to shoulder more of the operational burden, an imbalance that was evident throughout the operation and is discussed at great length later in this chapter. Whilst this did not prevent the Entente from maintaining its augmentative nature, it was clear that France was augmenting Britain more than Britain was augmenting France, thus demonstrating an unbalanced version Fedder's (1968) typology.

In addition to Britain's missing carrier capability, Britain and France also suffered from a deficiency in logistical aircraft throughout the operation. France initially stationed its strike

aircraft in Corsica (Air Actualitiés 2012), allowing it to take immediate action prior to the arrival of the *Charles de Gaulle* in the Mediterranean. Equally, the UK was able to conduct airstrikes from the British mainland, the first such operation carried out since the Second World War (Goulter 2015). The British Sovereign Base Areas on the island of Cyprus were also in range offering additional flexibility for British policy makers. However, operating from their respective sovereign territories posed a new set of challenges, namely the necessity for air-to-air refuelling. While they both faced this problem, it was especially acute for the UK. RAF Tornado's operating from RAF Marham in Norfolk had to undertake a 3,000-mile round trip to strike their targets (MoD 2011). This initial operation alone required three in-air refuelling craft to ensure the strike craft had sufficient fuel for the journey (Goulter 2015). The Tornado's were also obliged to refuel three times whilst enroute and another time on their return journey, which Lord Richards called "an amazing feat of airmanship" (Richards 2015: 338). Impressive this may have been, but it also highlighted the difficulties of conducting strike sorties at the beginning of the operation. Three of the four in air refuelling craft the UK deployed were needed for this one mission, hardly a promising sign for the rest of the campaign.

Throughout the campaign it soon became apparent that neither Britain nor France possessed the requisite inflight refuelling assets to sustain operations at a high tempo. This required the US to step in and make up for the shortfall. Sir Stuart Atha notes that the US injected a lot of behind-the-scenes support to keep operations running (Atha 2021). Throughout Operations *Ellamy* and *Unified Protector* the UK committed two Lockheed Tristar's and two Vickers VC-10's to conduct inflight refuelling operations (Defence Select Committee 2012). France meanwhile committed six KC-135 tankers throughout the course of operations (Drape 2012). The combined Anglo-French contribution therefore amounted to ten aircraft for the entire

campaign. In contrast the US provided four KC-10's and twenty KC-135's for a total of twenty-four aircraft (Kidwell 2015), dwarfing the contributions made by the UK and France. See Figure 1 for a full breakdown of the refuelling of assets deployed by the three nations. This deficit was significant enough that after the US adopted a supporting role in the campaign, it was necessary to continue offering in-air refuelling support to the UK and France as neither could support all of their deployed aircraft simultaneously. Britain could have somewhat compensated for this deficiency if it had possessed a carrier capability. France was able to do so by utilising the *Charles de Gaulle*, allowing it to deploy aircraft much closer to the battlespace. Despite this however General Paloméros admitted that French force projection had been reliant upon American assets (Paloméros 2011). Granted, a carrier capability would not have been a miracle solution to all the problems the UK faced in 2011. As noted by the First Sea Lord Sir Mark Stanhope, Harrier aircraft were not capable of carrying Brimstone missiles, therefore they could not undertake the same type of operations as Tornados (Defence Select Committee 2012). However, their deployment could have assisted in enforcement of the NFZ, therefore freeing up RAF Tornados to fulfil other roles, reducing the need for in air refuelling craft in the process. This point is further reinforced by a 2011 paper produced by the French Prime Minister's Office which highlighted the shortfall in European logistical capabilities as a major inhibiting factor for operations in Libya (Chivvis 2015).

This deficiency was thus a major limiting factor on Anglo-French leadership. Given that they could not fully support their own aircraft, they would have been unable to support their coalition partners as well, had the United States chosen not to participate. Sir John Sawers argues that whilst the US may have been "playing second fiddle" to the UK and France on the political front, their logistical support was absolutely essential in making Anglo-French

leadership a reality (Sawers 2022). This again highlights the necessity of US involvement in the campaign. Britain and France’s ability to take the lead in combat operations would have meant little had the United States not provided the necessary logistical support. If the UK and France were to take joint command of a similar intervention in the future, then they would need to compensate for this discrepancy. Whilst they can augment each other effectively, if they both lack the means then this theoretical aspect of the relationship unravels. Unfortunately, it appears that policy makers in London have not learned this lesson. As noted in Figure 1 below, the UK has actually decreased its stocks of air-to-air refuelling aircraft from seventeen to nine. This would seriously undermine any British leadership of a campaign that emphasised airpower. Conversely, France has increased its air-to-air refuelling aircraft by a modest amount from fourteen to eighteen. While is this a positive sign, they would still not possess sufficient aircraft to sustain a coalition of a similar size to that put together in 2011. Furthermore, Britain and France collectively now barely possess more aircraft than the US committed in 2011. This would further hamper their ability to lead a coalition without the support of the United States.

Figure 1: UK-France Air refueling Aircraft Comparison

<i>UK</i>				<i>FR</i>				<i>US</i>	
<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>Libya</i>	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>Libya</i>	<i>Aircraft</i>	<i>Libya</i>
Tristar KC1	6	0	2	A330 Phénix	0	2	0	KC-10	4
VC 10	11	0	2	KC130-J	0	2	0	KC-135	20
Voyager	0	9	0	KC-135	14	14	6	Total	24
Total	17	9	4	Total	14	18	6		

Source: Ministry of Defence and Ministère des Armées

Another key factor in the success of the campaign was the deployment of aircraft capable of fulfilling ISTAR roles. Superior ISTAR capabilities enabled coalition forces to dominate the battlespace. Coalition aircraft were able to monitor regime activity across Libya and intervene

as necessary to tip the balance in favour of rebel forces. Once again this was an area in which the UK and France failed to provide an adequate contribution. As mentioned earlier approximately 75% of coalition intelligence was drawn from ISTAR capabilities provided by the US (Hallams and Sheer 2012). While exact figures are unknown, over the course of the campaign the US deployed at least sixteen ISTAR dedicated aircraft (Kidwell 2015). In contrast France and the UK deployed seven each (Defence Select Committee 2012, Drape 2012). This allowed the US to sustain continuous ISTAR operations long after it had adopted a supporting role in the coalition. Granted, this should not be seen as diminishing the contributions of the British and French, their material contribution in this instance is far greater than their contribution of refuelling craft and they made use of less conventional ISTAR capabilities to compensate. RAF Tornados equipped with RAPTOR Pods were able to acquire inflight intelligence whilst conducting sorties, which contributed to allied intelligence despite not being dedicated ISTAR platforms. The RAF's Air Historical Branch (AHB) noted in its 2016 history of the Libyan campaign that these assets helped to compensate for the shortage of British ISTAR capabilities but were not available in sufficient quantities to eliminate the problem. Therefore, in comparison to the US Britain and France both fell short of the mark. Liam Fox bluntly admits that the UK and France simply did not have the capabilities to provide the level of support they wanted (Fox 2021). If Britain and France were to lead a similar coalition in the future, they would need to improve their ISTAR capabilities significantly.

This is a lesson which appears to have been learned, at least by the British. The UK has increased its stocks of dedicated ISTAR aircraft across the board. The RAF and Royal Navy have increased their stocks of fixed wing, rotary wing and UAV platforms increasing overall British capacity from twenty-six to fifty-six. In contrast France has decreased its overall capacity from forty-nine to thirty-eight. See Figures 2 – 3 below for a full comparison. However, recent

operations in Mali indicate that the UK and France have since learned to compensate for each other's capability gaps in this regard. The RAF has previously deployed a Sentinel R1 surveillance craft to support French operations there (MoD 2013). This would imply that policy makers have learned that while both nations have different capabilities, when operating together they can deploy assets in a complimentary manner. This again highlights the augmentative nature of the alliance as Britain has been providing France with access to assets that it does not possess itself. This bodes well for future deployments as it has provided operational experience that incorporates the lessons learned from Libya.

Figure 2: UK Surveillance Aircraft Comparison

Aircraft	2011	2021	Libya
Fixed Wing			
Boeing Air Seeker	0	3	0
Boeing E-3 Sentry	5	5	3
Boeing P-8 Poseidon	0	5	0
Nimrod R1	1	0	1
Raytheon Sentinel	4	4	1
Total	10	17	5
Rotary Wing			
Merlin HM2	0	30	0
Sea King MK 7	11	0	2
Total	11	30	2
UAV			
Reaper	5	9	0
Total	5	9	0
Overall Total	26	56	7

Figure 3: France Surveillance Aircraft Comparison

Aircraft	2011	2021	Libya
Fixed Wing			
ALSR	0	2	0
Atlantique 2	22	22	2
Boeing E-3 Sentry	4	4	1
C-160G	2	2	1
Falcon 2000LXS Albatros	0	0	0
Mirage FC1	17	0	2
Total	45	30	6
UAV			
Harfang	4	0	1
Reaper	0	8	0
Total	4	8	1
Overall Total	49	38	7

Source: Ministry of Defence and Ministère des Armées

A third capability that was key to success in Libya was the use of seaborne surface-to-surface missiles. As mentioned above France conducted the first Western airstrikes on the morning of the 19th March. While France should be commended for its swift action in preventing regime forces from overwhelming rebel positions, the French nevertheless took a significant risk in doing so. Libya's air defence network was still in operation, putting the French pilots in

real danger of being intercepted by Libyan defences. It was not until that night that American and British submarines would launch 197 Tomahawk missiles, 192 American and 5 British, crippling Libya's air defences (Kidwell 2015). This operation was crucial in ensuring that coalition aircraft could operate unmolested throughout Libyan airspace, in turn creating the space for Anglo-French leadership to take place. Furthermore, as pointed out by Francois Heisbourg, only the Americans had the capabilities to carry out such an operation so quickly (Heisbourg 2021). This was undoubtedly the most substantial American frontline commitment to the conflict. While the US followed this up with a series of airstrikes once these aircraft were withdrawn Britain and France were able to make up the shortfall. The same could not be said for their submarines. At the time the UK only possessed a total of seven attack submarines, of which two were deployed to Libya. France maintained six attack submarines, but crucially they did not possess surface-to-surface strike capabilities (Naval Technology 2001). As such, without American support at this critical juncture coalition aircraft could not have operated with the effectiveness or impunity that they did.

Since 2011 Anglo-French submarine numbers have remained constant. While this would not prevent a successful intervention, it would place a strain on their already limited resources and raise the difficulty of operating successfully. France has however developed the Missile de Croisière Naval (MdCN), a variation of SCALP (MBDA 2021). MdCN is launched from French frigates and would provide this kind of surface-to-surface capability for a future intervention. MdCN was first used in 2018 when the US, UK and France launched strikes on Syria. This is another example of the augmentative nature alliance as MdCN was developed by MBDA taking advantage of Anglo-French expertise. Its introduction is a positive step as not only is it an additional capability developed to fill an operational gap, but it is also a jointly designed weapon which further solidifies the Anglo-French relationship and promotes greater

cooperation. Antoine Bouvier argued that Libya demonstrated the effectiveness of jointly developed weapons systems, even if their use was limited at the time (Bouvier 2011). As such the proliferation of jointly manufactured systems is another positive sign of Anglo-French cooperation. However despite these steps, it should be noted that questions remain over the quantity of vessels that would be available to conduct these kinds of operations in the future and whether Britain and France could commit the number necessary to have the same effect as in 2011 (Defence Select Committee 2021).

Figure 4: UK-France Submarine Comparison								
<i>UK</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>Libya</i>		<i>France</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>Libya</i>
Fleet/Attack Submarines					Fleet/Attack Submarines			
Trafalgar-Class	6	3	2		Ruby-Class	6	5	0
Astute-Class	1	4	0		Suffren-Class	0	1	0
Total	7	7	2		Total	6	6	0
Ballistic Submarines					Ballistic Submarines			
Vanguard-Class	4	4	0		Triumphany-Class	4	4	0
Total	4	4	0		Total	4	4	0

Source: Ministry of Defence and Ministère des Armées

Poor coordination is a recipe for disaster

Operations in Libya also made it clear that effective coordination between allies is key to ensuring that an intervention runs smoothly. Clear Command and Control (C2) procedures are necessary for coalition warfare to be effective. The Libyan example demonstrates both the results of both good coordination and bad.

Throughout all phases of the operation coalition forces faced confusion over who held overall command. This was most noticeable during the initial phase of separate national commands. When preparing for initial operations there was some controversy over how they would be commanded. Here the diverging national perspectives of the UK and France can again be seen. The UK wished to work closely with the US and argued for any military action to be part

of a NATO response. In contrast France, as mentioned, was apprehensive about another NATO operation in a Muslim country and instead preferred a “coalition of the willing” approach (Grand 2015, Goulter 2015). Sensing American unwillingness to become involved, France proposed using CJEF, recently established by the Lancaster House Treaty, thus cutting NATO out of the equation entirely. There was also a sense in France that since they had been the ones pushing for intervention, leadership should not then be given to someone else. As the French Foreign Minister at the time, Alain Juppé, pointed out, it was “not NATO that had taken the initiative” on Libya (Stroobants 2011). French officials prepared to set up a joint Anglo-French headquarters at the French Air Forces Lyon – Mont Verdun Air Base. The exact sequence of events at this point is somewhat unclear, highlighting the problems of poor communication and coordination during coalition warfare. As mentioned above there are some suggestions that British officials may have initially approved such a structure but were then countermanded by higher ranking members of British military command. A French team even travelled to Joint Forces Command, Northwood to discuss these arrangements, only to discover that the British had already made plans with the Americans (Grand 2015). Francois Heisbourg maintains that at the political level both David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy were in favour on running operations jointly. According to him it was the militaries of both countries that rejected this idea, arguing that the structures to do so were simply not in place (Heisbourg 2021). Other reports suggest that while the UK was sympathetic to the idea, the Lancaster House structures were too underdeveloped to coordinate operations effectively at this stage and so Britain advocated for tried and tested C2 methods (Grand 2015). Lord David Richards alleges that advisors around David Cameron were partial to the idea of an Anglo-French operation but that such an undertaking was impossible given the need for American ISTAR assets (Richards 2015). Sir Stuart Atha holds the view that while France was keen to use

CJEF to coordinate operations the UK was not. In his view the UK deemed Lancaster House to be too underdeveloped and unready for combat operations. The UK and France simply did not have the connectivity necessary to coordinate a coalition. Furthermore, he rejected the suggestion that David Cameron had initially supported the idea before backtracking (Atha 2021). In Sir John Sawers mind it seems likely that if such an incident occurred, it was because a miscommunication between Sarkozy and Cameron emerging from their respective enthusiasm for rapid intervention (Sawers 2022). Regardless of the exact sequence of events, it is clear that French unwillingness to involve NATO was a strain on coalition planning and coordination (IFRI 2013).

While this controversy was unfolding Britain, France and the US all drew up plans for their respective operations. As mentioned previously, France began operations on the 19th March by striking regime forces advancing on Benghazi. These strikes actually took the US and UK by surprise as they had no idea that France had already commenced operations (Goulter 2015), as they themselves did not intend to begin until later that evening. In Sir John Sawers view this was emblematic of an attitude in both militaries as throughout the campaign they jostled to see who would act first in different parts of the country (Sawers 2022). This incident highlights the initial problems the operation faced. While the US and UK sought to coordinate Operations *Odyssey Dawn* and *Ellamy* as much as possible, France remained somewhat aloof. Interestingly the AHB (2016) states that the French airstrikes took place within an agreed timetable that allowed for French airstrikes to precede Anglo-American ones, no doubt a posthumous effort to smooth over the diplomatic rancour this incident caused. This is interesting as at least one European diplomat at the time claimed that this move nearly “broke up the coalition” (Warrick 2011: 1). For instance, the Italian Prime Minister Silvio

Berlusconi felt insulted at France upstaging NATO and threatened to deny access to vital bases in Italy in retaliation (Warrick 2011).

During this initial phase of the operation a joint headquarters was established at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. However, existing obstacles to cooperation came into play here. While the US and UK had an established relationship that allowed for intelligence to be shared and planning to be conducted, largely, in cooperation, France had no such relationship with either. While France and the UK had recently signed the Lancaster House Treaty, it contained little on the sharing of intelligence, and even if it had, the British would have been prevented from doing so by the lack of any such agreement between the US and France. According to Sir John Sawers whilst France is Britain's most important intelligence partner after the Five Eyes, the two countries foreign intelligence services lack the closeness that such a relationship would warrant. As such there was very little sharing of intelligence or intelligence analysis throughout the operation (Sawers 2022). This gave rise to a C2 situation in which the US and UK would strive to coordinate their operations, while France would only inform its allies of its operations (Drape 2012). Sir Stuart Atha summed up the situation aptly by stating that the French "saw what we needed to do and they went out and did it. They just didn't do it in collaboration" (Atha 2021). This often resulted in a pointless duplication of resources, such as aircraft launching sorties against the same targets and already limited ISTAR or refuelling assets covering the same areas. This was also counterintuitive to Ghez' (2010) typology of the Entente as a natural alliance. Despite Britain and France being natural allies in this operation their cooperation was hindered by the poor C2 structures they had in place. Had more effective infrastructure been ready in 2011 then the Britain and France could have taken their position as natural allies in this operation without unnecessary bureaucratic hindrance.

Even after the transition to NATO command, these kinds of issues continued to hinder coalition effectiveness. The deployment of British and French helicopters to assist rebel forces is a clear example of this. As mentioned above the UK and France dispatched helicopters to assist rebel forces, which were a major asset to the rebel cause. Despite their evident military effectiveness (Soutien Logistique Defense 2015), they also brought confusion as it was unclear whether these forces would remain under national command or be placed under NATO command (France 24: 2011). Thus, while this clearly demonstrated Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance, it also made allied operations more difficult. The AHB (2016) notes that Britain and France separately drew up proposals to deploy helicopters and expand coalition operations but failed to coordinate their efforts, despite proposing similar things. NATO's primary role in this was described by Sir Stuart Atha as to deconflict between allies, while also undertaking some coordination (Atha 2021). NATO did not however get the chance to integrate and any integration that did occur was done along national lines. This further confused the situation and hampered the effectiveness of the coalition as a whole.

Since 2011 Britain and France have learned this lesson and moved to improve their C2 capabilities. In October 2011 for instance, the Chief of Marine Nationale stated that any lessons learned from the campaign would be shared with the UK (Rogel 2011). This was an indication that France was aware that coordination between both allies needed to be improved for the future. Nick Harvey MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, also admitted in 2011 that there had been communication problems when operations began (Harvey 2011). However, he was keen to stress that Britain and France managed to identify solutions which would be useful for the relationship going forwards. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis CJEF is now fully operational (MoD 2020). This will ensure that should Britain and France wish to deploy joint forces in the future then they will possess the structures necessary

to do so. CJEF includes provisions to create a joint HQ, which would allow problems such as the Lyon-Mont Verdun incident to be avoided. Crucially, Exercise Capable Eagle held in 2014 allowed allied nations to participate in a CJEF exercise. Just as they are natural allies, this would also make Britain and France the natural leaders of a future coalition of which CJEF could be the nucleus. The experience of allied operations in Mali would also indicate that this lesson has been learned. During *Operation Serval* and the succeeding *Operation Barkhane* France took a clear lead with allied forces working in greater cooperation with French forces and deferring to French command (Joint Declaration 2018). Francois Heisbourg argues that the unity of command that operations in Mali have shown proves that this lesson has been learned (Heisbourg 2021). This indicates that future deployments should follow this same pattern making Anglo-French leadership more effective. As discussed previously operations in Mali are another example of Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance at work. CJEF would also allow for future operations to function as more effective "coalitions of the willing". As discussed already NATO suffered from internal divisions as nations such as Germany and Turkey opposed military action in Libya (Chivvis 2015). Equally, non-NATO members such as the UAE and Jordan also participated in military operations further complicating the use of NATO structures. Using CJEF, with a clear Anglo-French C2 system, as the basis for coalition operations would avoid these problems as only allies that wish to participate would need to be involved. This would both avoid internal opposition from hesitant allies and allow regional partners to engage on a case-by-case basis. While tensions may exist because of Brexit, the creation of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) offers a forum outside of the EU through which CJEF could be deployed to support Anglo-French interests.

Strategic tunnel vision leaves the Nation blind

The Libyan intervention also made it abundantly clear that maintaining flexible armed forces is essential in the modern world. When fighting began in Libya, the main focus of British overseas operations was the war in Afghanistan. Just prior to operations in Libya the UK had some 9,500 personnel deployed in Afghanistan (MoD 2010). This comprised forces from all three services, including a significant number of aircraft and Britain's entire complement of UAVs. Consequently, the sudden commitment to operations in Libya raised concerns amongst British officials that they would not be able to adequately support the "main effort" (Goulter 2015) in Afghanistan. For instance, Sir David Richards cautioned against becoming distracted in Libya and argued for a British presence limited to enforcing a no-fly zone (Goulter 2015).

The 2010 SDSR had envisaged a reduction in British commitments abroad (MoD 2010). It assumed the maximum number of UK personnel operating overseas would be 30,000 (MoD 2010). Given that 9,500 were deployed to Afghanistan alone in 2011, there was little leeway for British forces to be committed to Libya. This contrasted sharply with France, which had adopted a national strategy of dispatching small expeditionary forces abroad as necessary. The 2008 French White Paper on Defence and National Security assumed that France would need the ability to deploy small expeditionary forces of between 1,000 – 5,000 troops, excluding naval and air assets (White Paper on Defence and National Security 2008). It also stressed the need for flexibility and for these forces to adapt to circumstances as they changed (White Paper on Defence and National Security 2008). These differing national security strategies go some way to explaining why the French were not only more willing to become involved in Libya but also why, as shall be discussed further below, they contributed more assets than their British allies. Upon commencement of operations in Libya, France was

able to easily commit some twenty aircraft from the *Armée de l'Air* and maritime air assets from Task Force 473 (Klingelschmitt 2020).

While British forces were able to carry out operations successfully, resources were often strained. Given the limits imposed by the 2010 SDSR and the uncertain nature of the Libyan theatre, there were concerns in Whitehall that operations there would undermine British involvement in Afghanistan (Goulter 2015). An over emphasis on *the* war, namely Afghanistan, rather than preparing to fight *a* war necessitated a major ad hoc restructuring of British thinking, on both tactical and strategic levels (Goulter 2015). Britain's last high-end operation against an opponent with significant air defence capabilities had been *Operation Telic* in 2003. Consequently, many RAF pilots had become accustomed to operating in a relatively benign climate in Afghanistan, where the risk to themselves was minimal. Many also had limited experience operating in urban settings, as operations in Afghanistan usually called for sorties against insurgents in more rural areas. The existence of both the Libyan air force and air defence system forced many pilots to mentally adjust their attitudes towards combat sorties. Nevertheless, the British contribution was still significant. Despite concerns over the impact of operations in Afghanistan the UK deployed some 2,300 personnel from all three services (Defence Select Committee 2012). This was a significant deployment, especially given the political constraints imposed by the 2010 SDSR.

Britain's short-sighted decision to abandon its own carrier capability and rely upon France for close to a decade, again indicates the augmentative nature of the Entente. The assumptions included within the 2010 SDSR imply that the British government considered it acceptable for the UK to go without this capability and instead rely upon its French ally to provide it. This is another example of Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance. It also reflects Ghez's (2010)

natural alliance as only two close allies would be willing to share such a vital national capability. Liam Fox argued at the time that the success of British operations in Libya demonstrated that a carrier capability was not essential (Fox 2012). This was of course disputed by many other figures, not least of which was the British Defence Select Committee, which concluded that the lack of a British aircraft carrier was damaging to British capabilities and needed urgent rectification (Defence Select Committee 2012). When questioned on the carrier issue by the Committee Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper, the British military representative to NATO, tried to downplay the lack of a carrier arguing that by deploying *HMS Ocean* the UK had in fact contributed a carrier capability (Harper 2011). Whilst British helicopters did come in useful, it is disingenuous to claim that this was on the same level as a full aircraft carrier. In his memoirs Lord Richards admitted that whilst the UK managed without an aircraft carrier, one would have made operations a lot easier (Richards 2015).

Given the high level of prestige a carrier capability is usually awarded in the international arena, this temporary dependency indicated the strength of the Anglo-French relationship at the time. However the acquisition of *HMS Queen Elizabeth* and *HMS Prince of Wales* would indicate that the British government did not consider this to be acceptable in the long term. This is a positive step as the UK cannot credibly claim a leadership role if it is not willing to support that claim with the necessary assets. Claiming leadership in Libya without such a capability was a lucky break and it would be foolish to assume that the UK could replicate such success in the future.

In contrast, with no major ongoing operations France was able to deploy a substantial force quite quickly. During Operation Harmattan, France deployed an estimated 4,300 service personnel (Ministér des Armées 2011). While these were mostly air and naval personnel, and

thus excluded from the expeditionary estimates made in the 2008 White Paper, this was still a significant commitment. The French air force was able to rapidly deploy assets to Corsica, which was followed up with the deployment of naval assets, including the *Charles de Gaulle*, later in the campaign. The lack of political constraints on further deployments was also most likely a significant factor in the imbalance between British and French forces throughout the campaign.

Libya also highlighted that the best way to maintain this flexibility is to retain a full spectrum of expeditionary capabilities, not least of which is a carrier capability. As part of the 2010 SDSR the UK embarked upon a “carrier holiday”, a period in which it would not possess any aircraft carrier capabilities. This was achieved by scrapping *HMS Ark Royal* in 2011, instead of its original decommissioning date of 2016 (SDSR 2010). This would be a decade before *HMS Queen Elizabeth* would enter service. Sir Stuart Atha argues that the government assumed the UK would only need to fight “a war amongst the people type operation” and so deleted major capabilities such as the Harrier force (Atha 2021). In a pique of geopolitical irony, *HMS Ark Royal* was officially decommissioned on 11th March 2011, just eight days before *Operation Ellamy* began. This was based on the, evidently foolish, assumption that the UK would not be engaged in any major conflicts outside of Afghanistan until the Royal Navy’s new carriers came into service. This was more wishful thinking than strategic planning, based on how the SDSR wanted the world to be, rather than how it was. While the UK was able to carry out operations successfully, in many ways this was by luck rather than by design. Libya’s proximity to Europe allowed the UK to launch strikes from both the British mainland and the sovereign base areas on Cyprus. The RAF could also later position aircraft in Italy to reduce the range its sorties had to undertake (Goulter 2015). However, as already discussed, aircraft launched from the UK itself had to be refuelled mid-flight several times. Given the UK’s limited number

of air-to-air refuelling assets, American support was crucial in making these strikes viable. Without this assistance the UK would not have been able to conduct sorties at the same pace. While the British government claimed that the success of the Libyan campaign validated the policy decisions taken in the 2010 SDSR, the First Sea Lord admitted to the Defence Select Committee that had a carrier strike force been available, then it would most likely have been deployed (Defence Select Committee 2012). This indicates that the UK was fortunate that Libya was close enough that a carrier capability was not needed. Had such operations been needed in a more remote country then it is likely that the UK would not have been as successful, and most certainly could not have claimed joint leadership of the operation.

France in contrast was able to rapidly deploy the *Charles de Gaulle* and its accompanying battlegroup to support operations in Libya. Once it became apparent that it was no longer required France withdrew the *Charles de Gaulle* and concentrated its effort on land-based aircraft. However, given its closer proximity to Libya this was more feasible for France. Furthermore, it had the luxury of choosing whether or not to deploy its carrier force, something that the UK did not possess. Had it been necessary to launch operations further afield than Libya, then it is unlikely that the UK would have been able to take on a leadership role in partnership with France. The Defence Select Committee also noted in its 2012 report on Libya that in addition to *HMS Ocean*, three other vessels capable of carrying aircraft were deployed during the operation. Two belonged to France, the *Charles de Gaulle* and the *Tonerre*, while the third was the Italian aircraft carrier *Garibaldi*. Given that the driving force of this operation was an Anglo-French axis, it is embarrassing that Britain did not possess this capability, especially, given that a lesser power such as Italy was also able to deploy an aircraft carrier. The deployment of a French aircraft carrier with supporting British naval assets also further demonstrates how Britain and France can utilise the Entente Cordiale to complement

their respective capabilities. While the government's "carrier holiday" was definitely a major strategic mistake which has since been corrected, the wider Anglo-French relationship is at its strongest when London and Paris work in concert to complement each other's capabilities. As such while the circumstances of this particular example are unfortunate, it nevertheless demonstrates the kind of collaborative thinking that should be welcomed and fostered.

As of 2020 the UK finally has access to its own carrier, *HMS Queen Elizabeth*. This will allow for greater expeditionary operations in more remote parts of the globe and support future Anglo-French operations. Had a similar capability been available in 2011 it would have dramatically increased the effectiveness of the coalition and cemented British claims to joint leadership of the operation. Thankfully, similar operations in the future will be able to rely upon a British carrier for support, significantly increasing their potential. This will also reinforce the augmentative nature of the alliance as both sides will have access to a full suite of capabilities to support each other.

Collaboration can be a real force multiplier

The decision to deploy special forces was an effective collaborative move demonstrating strong Anglo-French leadership. While resolution 1973 forbade an army of occupation, it did not explicitly prevent the use of special forces on Libyan soil (UNSCR 1973). While information on the role that special forces played is obviously limited, it is clear that they played a key role in coordinating with rebel forces on the ground (IFRI 2013). It is understood that special forces were pivotal in coordinating airstrikes and ensuring that coalition operations assisted rebel forces more effectively (Goulter 2015). In particular Britain and France, alongside Qatar and the UAE, were key in training and advising rebel forces on how to function as an effective fighting force (Aldrich and Cormac 2016). They also offered crucial tactical advice on how to

capture Tripoli (Cormac 2018). Lord Richards asserts that the initiative for this came from himself and his French counterpart Admiral Edouard Guillaud (Richards 2015). Lord Richards argues that Britain and France took the lead on covert action in Libya and they were the ones that convinced the Qataris and Emiratis to get involved (Richards 2015). This clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of Anglo-French cooperation as these operations were essential in transforming the Libyan rebels into a coherent fighting body that could effectively counter regime forces. This was not a seamless process however. Sir John Sawers recounted one incident early in the campaign when two rebel groups in Benghazi, one trained by Britain and the other by France, fired on each other, whilst their special forces advisors were still embedded (Sawers 2022). Whilst this reads like a homage to an earlier imperial age, it demonstrates the chaotic nature of the early campaign. The fact that this was resolved quickly, demonstrated that when Britain and France were able to coordinate effectively, they could affect real leadership over the campaign.

The deployment of combat helicopters also demonstrated impressive ingenuity by both nations. The French Gazelles and Tigers, and the British Apaches, are operated by their respective army air corps. Accordingly they are usually deployed from ground bases to support infantry operations. Libya marked the first time that these assets had operated from a naval platform. This was a risky decision and required some adjustments to ensure that the aircraft and their crews could operate safely from on board the *HMS Ocean* and *Tonnerre* respectively (SLD 2012). However, once these adjustments had been made these aircraft played a pivotal role in supporting rebel forces. Helicopters could strike regime forces in urban areas and offered a level of close support to rebel forces that fixed wing platforms could not (Goulter 2015). If the UK and France wish to take a leading role in the future, they must make use of whatever assets they have to maximum effect. Therefore, this kind of ingenuity

represents exactly the kind of creative thinking and flexibility that is necessary for Anglo-French leadership to succeed. This is an effective example of recognising limitations and overcoming them by deploying the minimum number of assets necessary to provide the force multiplication necessary to achieve victory.

Burden sharing should be more equal

While operations in Libya were driven by Anglo-French leadership, as briefly mentioned above, the French contribution outweighed that of their British counterparts. In terms of personnel France deployed 4,300 personnel operations in Libya (Grand 2015). This was nearly double the 2,300 personnel deployed by the UK (MoD 2011). In material terms French contributions also outstripped the UK. France deployed ten more fixed wing strike aircraft and two more in-air refuelling craft. These differences are significant as they represent a French commitment that was 50% higher than Britain's. Even when it came to the critical deployment of attack helicopters to the region, France deployed a full complement of twenty-four aircraft, dwarfing the British contribution of five aircraft (Grand 2015). Most notably there was also the discrepancy in aircraft carriers, as France deployed both the *Charles de Gaulle* and the *Tonnerre*, while the UK was only capable of deploying *HMS Ocean*, a helicopter carrier. This imbalance in contributions translated into an imbalance in operations as well. According to official statistics France conducted nearly 5,600 sorties of which 3,100 were strike sorties (Ministère des Armées 2011). The UK conducted 3,220 sorties of which 2,000 were strike sorties (Defence Select Committee 2012). Out of a total 26,500 sorties and 9,700 strike sorties (NATO 2011), this amounted to France conducting approximately 25% of coalition sorties and 32% of strike sorties (Ministère des Armées 2011), while the UK launched 11% of coalition sorties and 21% of strike sorties (Defence Select Committee 2012). Indeed,

in June 2011 the then Chief of the French Defence Staff, Admiral Edouard Guillaud, complained that financial restraints had prevented the UK from contributing to the same level as France (Guillaud 2011). Here again we see this discrepancy between British and French contributions. While collectively the Anglo-French contribution was undoubtedly pivotal to the operation, cumulatively they conducted 36% of overall sorties and 53% of strike sorties, individually this discrepancy indicates a flaw within the Anglo-French leadership of the campaign. This does however represent the augmentative nature of the relationship in line with Fedder's (1968) typology. Britain and France clearly augmented each other's capabilities, even if this augmentation was clearly unbalanced in favour of France. This was a recurring theme throughout operations in Libya and demonstrates the complicated nature of the Entente. Whilst this is clearly Fedder's (1968) typology in action, it is functioning in a manner not originally intended.

This discrepancy would indicate that while Britain and France took the political and military leadership in driving the campaign forwards, Britain was the junior in that dynamic. This conclusion is one that was denied by the British government at the time, which asserted that decisions were taken jointly by the UK and France both before and during the campaign (Hague 2016). This was disputed by the UK Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which published a report in 2016 arguing that British policy makers followed decisions already made in France (Foreign Affairs Select Committee 2016). Sir Stuart Atha articulated a more nuanced view, arguing that while France did not drive the military operation, it was better at combining political intent with military action (Atha 2021). In his view France was also better at managing the politics of the intervention at the strategic level. The lack of coordination at NATO headquarters contributed to a perception that France was leading the intervention which was untrue. Sir John Sawers concurs arguing that the situation was so fluid that the more effective

messaging emanating from Paris gave the impression that France was in the lead while in reality Britain and France were operating more in tandem (Sawers 2022). Whilst France may not have been directing the overall scope of the intervention it is clear that the UK was willing to rely upon France to do much of the heavy lifting throughout the operation. The disparity between their two contributions makes this abundantly clear. If another operation like Libya was to be conducted, it would be imperative that the UK is able to step up and take on its fair share of coalition operations. While this kind of imbalance may have been sustainable in a campaign with American support, it would render a purely Anglo-French campaign unsustainable.

Since 2011 the UK has learned this particular lesson and has invested considerable resources in improving its ability to contribute to expeditionary warfare around the globe. The 2015 SDSR took several steps to correct its predecessors' flaws. Most notably it proposed an overhaul of British defence posture which would allow for multiple mid-level operations to be undertaken simultaneously (MoD 2015). The maximum number of troops for large scale operations was also increased from 30,000 to 50,000 (MoD 2015). Notably, on cooperation it stated that whilst the armed forces must be ready to act alone, they should normally be expected to deploy alongside allies such as the US or France (MoD 2015). It also announced that the UK would be placing greater emphasis on cooperating with its allies, mentioning CJEF as an example of how that could be done. France for its part has continued to maintain its ability to participate in expeditionary warfare. For instance, France's 2017 Defence and Security Strategy outlined that France should maintain its ability to act as a framework nation, capable of forming the nucleus of an international coalition. The strategy also highlights that autonomy does not mean isolation and stresses the importance of collaborating with allies. To that end it refers to the Anglo-French partnership as a "special relationship" that should

continue to be deepened. Given that both nations have now referenced each other in their respective national defence strategies, this is a positive sign that cooperation has become somewhat institutionalised between them.

Conclusions

From a theoretical perspective Libya is a useful case study of how to use alliance theory to analyse military operations, particularly Anglo-French ones. In Libya it is possible to see both Fedder's (1968) and Ghez' (2010) alliance typologies at work. This study of Anglo-French relations benefits from applying alliance theory to the operational dimension of the relationship as it provides clear conceptual tools with which to analyse how both sides operated throughout the conflict. Britain and France did augment each other throughout operations in Libya, even if they lacked the necessary capabilities to fulfil this role perfectly. As such it was clear that Britain and France provided augmentative support to each other, providing capabilities that collectively allowed them to play a major role in the campaign. This is a sure sign of Fedder's (1968) typology at work. However, it should also be noted that this augmentation was not equal, with France clearly providing more assets than Britain. Thus in Libya whilst the Entente was an augmentative alliance, it was an unbalanced one. Furthermore, whilst they may have relied upon the US for logistical support, they were also natural allies in taking charge of combat operations, thus demonstrating Ghez' (2010) typology. Despite their reliance on American logistical support, they were the only other NATO allies that could have taken the lead in combat operations. Without Anglo-French direction the coalition would have lacked the offensive capability necessary to succeed. Alliance theory thus provides the theoretical tools necessary to identify these operational

approaches which enhances our understanding of Anglo-French defence relations from a conceptual point of view.

Clearly however, Libya is not a blueprint for Anglo-French leadership of future interventions. While it certainly offers an interesting case in the practicalities of such an operation, it is not a usable framework for the future. As elaborated throughout this chapter, Anglo-French leadership on the military front was only possible because of American support on the logistics front. Without American support it is doubtful that Anglo-French efforts would have succeeded. This highlights the importance of the lessons outlined within this chapter. Firstly, Britain and France lacked, and in some cases still lack key assets for facilitating coalition warfare. This chapter has discussed at length the importance of ISTAR and in air refuelling assets to success in 2011. Such assets would be equally important in another campaign. Unfortunately, questions remain over whether either nation has the necessary resources to maintain these assets. While Britain has increased its ISTAR capabilities significantly, with plans to procure further aircraft, France has decreased its ISTAR capabilities. Combined they may well be able to provide sufficient aircraft for a successful campaign, but it is disappointing to see that France has not invested in this area, despite claims that it would. France has however invested in more in-air refuelling craft. Unfortunately, the opposite is true for Britain which has reduced its own stocks.

On the naval front the French procurement of the MdCN missile and the upgrade of Britain's submarine fleet are both positive signs that steps have been taken to improve capacity in this vital area. While it would be preferable that both nations had improved in all three areas, their collective improvements do indicate progress and contribute towards the viability of a purely Anglo-French intervention in the future. The issue of C2 is also of primary importance.

As has been discussed the Libyan campaign exposed the shortcomings of ineffective C2 capabilities. Since then however, CJEF has been tested and declared operational, thus offering a readymade format for future interventions which would avoid these problems. The creation of E12 also offers a forum for multilateral cooperation outside of existing institutional structures, thus providing more options for future Anglo-French action. The UK has also taken steps to improve its expeditionary capabilities. The construction of *HMS Queen Elizabeth* offers numerous possibilities for future interventions, while the 2015 SDSR adopted an expeditionary posture more in line with France. Both governments have also mentioned each other in their respective defence strategies as partners of choice.

These steps all point to lessons being learned from Libya. Ultimately, while Libya is not a blueprint for future multilateral operations, it offers the lessons and experience necessary for one to be created.

7. Brexit – Unravelling the European Entente

Introduction

Brexit adds an additional layer of complexity to the Entente, strengthening its peculiar nature. It also poses a challenge to the use of alliance theory in understanding Anglo-French defence cooperation. As has been stated repeatedly the Entente most closely resembles Ghez' (2010) natural and historic alliances, as well as Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance. These fundamental tenants are not altered by Brexit. However, the results of Brexit have mostly been contrary to these typologies. As this chapter outlines Anglo-French cooperation has been damaged by Britain's decision to leave, a trajectory which looks set to continue. Despite this the rationale for Anglo-French defence cooperation remains the same. Britain and France remain historic allies and Europe's premier military powers. Yet Brexit has made the augmentative nature of the Entente increasingly difficult to maintain. Whilst evolutions within the Entente are not new, as explained already the Entente has evolved rapidly during its existence embodying multiple different alliance types, these recent changes have fundamentally weakened the foundations of the relationship. The need for continued defence cooperation coupled with Brexit hostilities over trade has created a dynamic reminiscent of the 1920s. Cooperation is needed in one area but rivalry in another has renewed a damaging contradiction within the Entente. This further highlights the peculiar nature of the relationship. This does not mean that alliance theory has no utility when considering Brexit. Indeed, alliance theory provides a useful prism through which to view how the relationship has changed since 2016. By applying alliance theory to Brexit it is possible to chart how Anglo-French defence relations have evolved since the referendum and identify how this differs from the preceding years.

The UK's decision to withdraw from the EU in June 2016 was a seismic change to British foreign policy. Membership of the EU had underpinned British foreign policy for over forty years. Most of the Brexit process focused on economic matters such as free trade and immigration, with relatively little attention paid to the impact that Brexit would have on the UK's defence policy (Billon-Galland 2019). However, no area of cooperation between the UK and EU has been untouched by Brexit, defence included. Given the scope of EU institutions it stands to reason that the British withdrawal from the EU will have had an impact upon Anglo-French defence cooperation. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the state of Anglo-French defence cooperation in the wake of Brexit. As the UK embarks upon a new relationship with the EU, it is imperative to understand how this will impact the Entente Cordiale. Given the Ententes strategic importance to both France and the UK, failure to do so would be detrimental to both nations' national interests.

This chapter commences with a brief historical overview of modern Anglo-French defence cooperation in Europe. It then considers the impact of Brexit through three lenses. Firstly, it analyses EU defence infrastructure and considers how these structures will influence Anglo-French defence cooperation post-Brexit. Secondly, it considers how Brexit has impacted Anglo-French defence cooperation through European structures outside of the EU. Thirdly, it evaluates bilateral defence cooperation between the UK and France and considers how this has been influenced by Brexit. Finally, it draws together these various conclusions to assess the overall impact of Brexit on Anglo-French defence cooperation.

Contemporary Continental Cooperation

Anglo-French defence cooperation in Europe reflects a theme common at the heart of the peculiar relationship: cooperation despite divergent priorities in the hope of achieving

different outcomes. Britain and France cooperate in Europe through an array of organisations and institutions. As outlined extensively in this thesis their core interests are often aligned. A threat to one is a threat to the other. The security of Europe and its near abroad is of vital interest to both. Despite these aligned interests, their motivations and objectives are often contradictory. Both governments often see defence cooperation as a means through which they can achieve their national objectives, even when those objectives are contradictory. This dynamic has been seen before, such as in the creation of the Lancaster House Treaty and the intervention in Libya. As outlined below Britain and France cooperate in Europe in the hope that it will result in two very different outcomes.

Anglo-French cooperation in Europe has until recently taken place within three spheres: bilaterally, through multilateral organisations and the EU. Historically the UK has preferred to operate through multilateral arrangements or bilaterally, rather than under the auspices of the EU. This has of course caused tensions with the French, who have long sought to enhance the EU's defence capabilities. Both nations have cooperated in Europe through channels other than the EU. As discussed further below, they are both members of a variety of multilateral defence and security organisations that fall outside the EU umbrella. Equally, they have explored various avenues that have built upon their bilateral cooperation. However, the tensions caused by their divergences over the EU have remained and continue to plague the relationship.

This is not to say that British reticence towards the EU has always been uniform, far from it. The EU's CSDP was born out of an Anglo-French initiative at Saint Malo in 1998. Saint Malo was itself a response to Europe's ineptitude during the Yugoslav Wars. When fighting broke out in the former Yugoslavia the chair of the EU Council of Ministers declared that it was "the

hour of Europe, not of America” (Howorth 2007). Despite this bold claim the EU quickly found itself unable to prevent the violence engulfing Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia. Whilst EU member states did have some experience working together militarily, this was within NATO. As such military action outside NATO required significant work that individual governments were unwilling to do (Dover 2005). The EU therefore quickly discovered that its ability to act relied upon political and military support from the US. The US did not provide this, believing it had little interest in Yugoslavia (Dover 2006). The Bosnian War is an interesting example, as when the US finally did resolve to intervene it was France that pushed for greater involvement (Howorth 2007). The UK meanwhile already had troops in Bosnia under a UN mandate and was looking for a face-saving way to withdraw them whilst opposing any NATO involvement (Wright 2019). In the end though it was American airpower and the American sponsored Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia.

Three years later war returned to Yugoslavia, this time in Kosovo. It was the total failure of the EU to act independently of the United States, that finally forced both Britain and France to recognise that some form of autonomous EU defence capability was necessary. Despite calling for something to be done the nations of Europe were incapable of intervening to stop the conflict. Unlike in Bosnia the UK pushed forcefully for NATO intervention. France was also a strong proponent of intervention and would eventually contribute the most of any EU state to operations in Kosovo (Howorth 2007). However, it was not until the US overcame its initial reluctance and agreed to participate that Western intervention was possible. This humiliated the governments of Europe. They had called for action, then stood by as ethnic cleansing ravaged the former Yugoslavia. European reliance upon the US was laid bare for the world to see. This forced the UK and France to recognise that if another conflict was to breakout in Europe’s neighbourhood, the EU needed to be ready and able to respond. Even though they

had both supported intervention they had been beholden to America's generosity in order to act. American reluctance to intervene, particularly a reluctance to commit ground forces, had made it clear they could not always be relied upon to act on Europe's behalf.

Anglo-French impetus was therefore the driving force behind the development of EU defence integration (Howorth 2000). As Europe's two primary military powers they were natural allies in this endeavour. France has made it quite clear that the Franco-British impetus was essential in driving the EU forward (National Assembly 2011). The Franco-British solution was the ESDP. At Saint Malo Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac agreed to support the development of the EU's "capability for autonomous action" (Saint Malo Declaration 1998: 1) and to ensure that this capability was supported by sufficient military forces. A year later in Helsinki the 2003 Headline Goal was agreed, which committed the EU to being able to deploy a force of up to 60,000 troops for a period of one year (European Parliament 2006). This was a lofty goal but one which the EU would fail to achieve with member states happy to ignore it (Biscop 2020).

The UK and France were also the main drivers behind the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA), with the UK providing its first director (Howorth 2017). The EDA is intended to "support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future" (Council of Ministers 2004: 1). The EDA was a forum through which British and French personnel could cooperate and promote greater defence collaboration.

While the UK contributed towards instigating these measures, subsequently it failed to support them with the same enthusiasm. Furthermore, it quickly reverted to its traditional

posture of opposing greater defence cooperation within the EU because of its scepticism that the Union lacked the cohesion and the strength to act decisively in defence. The UK chose instead to focus on ensuring that NATO had the right of first refusal to lead any military operation. In part, this can be attributed to the divergent priorities of the UK and the EU in subsequent years. This was an unfortunate result of the ironic tension at the heart of Anglo-French motivations for the Saint Malo declaration. For Britain Saint Malo was a way to enhance European capabilities to strengthen NATO, while for France it was a way to increase European autonomy and reduce dependence on NATO (Howorth 2017). This peculiar convergence fostered disagreements as the UK and France both sought to shape the same institutions to meet their differing expectations.

Many of the disagreements between the UK and France over EU defence projects originated from their diverging views on what the purpose of these initiatives should be. The British preference was always for EU initiatives to be intergovernmental in nature, with a clear focus on promoting greater European capabilities (Whitman 2016). NATO was, and is, the bedrock of British security as successive governments have been keen to stress, due to the British belief in the importance of including the US in European defence. As such the UK held that any EU defence initiatives should be complementary and supportive of NATO (Juergenliemk et al 2012). Perennial concerns over sovereignty also influenced British thinking. While Britain was happy to influence EU initiatives and participate in them as long as they remained intergovernmental and limited in nature, the UK has always opposed any moves which suggested greater integration of member states militaries as opposed to collaboration.

To that end the UK pushed for the EDA to focus on defence sector liberalisation and intergovernmental cooperation (Calcara 2017). The UK was also keen to support CSDP civilian

missions, with a particular focus on the Security aspect of CSDP (Howorth 2017). Promoting greater cooperation between member states with an aim to increase capabilities across Europe was viewed as a means to enhance NATO, given the strong overlap between NATO and EU membership. If EU states collaborated to increase their capabilities, then NATO would have a greater range of assets at its disposal. The same logic led the UK to strongly support CSDP civilian missions, such as policing and training, as these fulfilled a niche that NATO did not. This is also why the UK opposed the creation of a standing operational headquarters (OHQ) for the EU or the creation of standing forces as these would have been a duplication of NATO rather than a complement (Howorth 2017). This often led to tension with France. For instance, in 2010 the French Sénat Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces committee bemoaned the fact that the UK wanted to keep the EDA limited to a discussion forum, as opposed to the nucleus of an EU defence capability that France preferred (Sénat 2010).

France has long supported European attempts to foster greater military cooperation in an attempt to lessen the continent's reliance on NATO (Howorth 2017). As such France has sought a more institutionalised form of cooperation within the EU. France had wanted the EDA to possess its own staff and budget, akin to other EU institutions, in order to imbue it with the momentum needed to develop autonomous European capabilities (Calcara 2017). France was thus frustrated when the UK successfully pushed for the EDA to be subordinate to member state defence ministries, rather than fully autonomous. France had wanted an organisation akin to the European Commission but had got one more like the European Council. France has consistently pushed for an increase to the EDA's budget to allow it to expand into the form that France prefers, but this was repeatedly vetoed by the UK during its time as an EU member (Calcara 2017). France also supported the creation of a permanent EU military HQ, despite British opposition, and was a founding member of Eurocorps. For France

this was a chance to improve European capacity for autonomous action. For the UK however it was a duplication of NATO and a waste of resources. The UK was successful in convincing the rest of the EU that such a body would be a wasted effort and compete with NATO. It was therefore agreed that EU deployments could operate through NATO structures, much to France's chagrin (Biscop 2012). France has also pushed for greater EU autonomy through the creation of Eurocorps. Emerging out of the previously discussed Franco-German brigade, Eurocorps offered a means through which the EU could deploy its own battlegroups. Whilst not overtly hostile to the idea, indeed Britain did at one point deploy a liaison officer to its headquarters, the UK never embraced the concept. Furthermore, as discussed in previous chapters, the different strategic cultures of France and Germany prevented the Franco-German Brigade from operating effectively (Krotz and Wolf 2018), which served to handicap Eurocorps from birth.

The UK also failed to properly support EU initiatives because of its ongoing commitment to Afghanistan, combined with the invasion of Iraq which drew the UK away from any major contributions to EU initiatives (Howorth 2017). France lacked similar commitments and as already mentioned structures its forces with the intention of launching multiple interventions simultaneously (White Paper on Defence 2008). The schism between the US and France over Iraq, and Britain's involvement in the invasion, further hampered British involvement as the UK once again prioritised its special relationship with America, rather than its relationships with the EU and France (Kramer 2003). This was the modern low point for the Entente as President Chirac was an outspoken critic of Anglo-American intervention. Sir Stuart Atha also argues that this created a certain level of animosity towards France within the British military which persisted long after the invasion itself (Atha 2021).

In contrast to its opposition towards greater EU integration in defence, the UK has supported a range of ad hoc initiatives within Europe aimed at fostering greater defence cooperation. For instance, in 1995 the UK and France established the Franco-British Air Group. The purpose of this was to improve cooperation and interoperability between the RAF and *Armée de l'Air* (EAG 2021). In 1998 it was expanded into the European Air Group (EAG) with Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy becoming members. The EAG continues to look for methods of improving interoperability between its seven member states and has a permanent headquarters at RAF High Wycombe (EAG 2021). The UK and France were also active participants in the creation of the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR). OCCAR was established in 1996 with the purpose of coordinating collaborative defence procurement programmes (OCCAR 2021). One of the most high-profile programmes managed by OCCAR was the A400M Atlas troop transport. This next generation transport aircraft is now operated by both the UK and France, assisting in improving interoperability between their armed forces. The UK has also supported efforts by the European Army Interoperability Centre (Finabel) and the Movement Coordination Centre Europe to bolster cooperation. France is also a member of each of these organisations, thus providing an array of organisations outside of the EU through which Britain and France can cooperate.

Britain has also been keen to foster bilateral links as an alternative to EU institutions. Bilateral cooperation remains the purview of governments and there is no risk of the UK being integrated into defence structures against its will. Bolstering cooperation through bilateralism also serves to enhance NATO capabilities, another key British objective. One of the organisations that CJEF is envisaged to support is NATO, thus for the UK bilateral cooperation with France enhances the Atlantic Alliance by aligning France closer with NATO thinking. This was the motivation outlined by former Defence Secretary Liam Fox (2021). As discussed at

length in this thesis already, the Lancaster House Treaty established several new modes of cooperation between the UK and France. The highest profile of these was CJEF, providing France and Britain with the option to deploy forces jointly without resorting to any other institutions. However, the other bilateral initiatives launched by the Lancaster House Treaty, such as industrial cooperation and ministerial cooperation, have also offered alternatives to greater cooperation through the EU. While France has also been supportive of these initiatives, these have never been its first choice. French support for bilateral or multilateral programmes has traditionally come after the EU has failed to deliver its own methods of cooperation. France privileges bilateral cooperation over NATO however, as demonstrated by French attempts to intervene in Libya bilaterally through CJEF rather than NATO. For France bilateralism with the UK is a means of promoting greater European autonomy and weakening American influence. Here again we can see the peculiarity of the Anglo-French relationship, whilst they often have divergent objectives, they cooperate on the same projects believing that these can achieve their differing objectives.

It should be noted that whilst these are separate spheres of cooperation, they are still interlinked. For most of the states involved, including the UK and France, one of the fundamental tenants underpinning their cooperation is that they are all members of the EU. Therefore, while defence cooperation at the EU level has been tepid, EU membership offered a common framework within which they all operated. Having left the EU, the UK is now operating in a radically different context from France. The common political context which has formed the foundation of bilateral relations for over forty years has been removed. The institutions which previously served to foster better relations are now potential focal points of discord. Being bound by similar rules and regulations allowed Britain and France to cooperate through other organisations without fear of impediment. This is no longer the case

as cooperation through other organisations will no doubt be impacted by Brexit, even if they are not a formal part of the EU.

EU initiatives and Brexit

The impact of Brexit upon the Entente Cordiale has most readily been felt at an EU level. Anglo-French membership of the EU could be classed as an entente as defined by David Singer and Melvin Small (1966). EU membership created a series of norms and procedures that have formed the basis of Anglo-French interaction for several decades. Brexit has removed these norms and undermined the common ground they created. Whilst individually this is not fatal to the Entente, they did serve to improve relations and their loss has created new impediments to cooperation that did not previously exist. Naturally the UK's withdrawal from the EU has removed it from EU defence architecture. This has necessitated several changes to British defence posture with a consequential impact on Franco-British defence cooperation. Most noticeably the UK has been forced to withdraw all its personnel from EU decision making bodies, such as the EDA. This has removed regular institutional contact between British and French officials, cutting off a forum for regular communication and cooperation. Equally, the UK has also withdrawn all its forces from EU military missions. In October 2020 the UK formally notified the EU of its intention to withdraw all forces from these missions (Reuters 2020), bringing to an end British involvement in various EU operations. Most notably, the UK is no longer participating in *Operation Atalanta*, a counterpiracy operation operating around the Horn of Africa. *Operation Atalanta* was previously headquartered in London under British command but has subsequently been transferred to Spain following Brexit. The Royal Navy and Marine Nationale had previously been deployed there together (Ministère de la Défense 2008) and so this avenue of cooperation is no longer

available. *Operation Atalanta* could have offered a method for enhanced naval cooperation between the UK and France, building on the progress that has been made since 2010. Counter-piracy operations are a relatively low risk, high reward scenario, and the EU was one of the organisations that CJEF was envisaged as supporting. This would therefore have been the ideal situation to test the naval component of CJEF. While *Atalanta* has been scaled back in recent years it is still ongoing, thus it represents a missed opportunity to put Anglo-French naval cooperation into action.

Brexit has also ejected the UK from collaboration on the EU's Galileo programme. Galileo is a satellite navigation system built by the EU. It is intended to rival the Global Positioning System (GPS), which is controlled by the American military. Galileo has numerous military applications and so the UK was keen to invest in the programme as it would grant it a level of influence over Galileo that was never possible with GPS. Prior to Brexit the UK invested £1.2 billion in Galileo (Sabbagh 2018). While this is a significant sum by itself, the overall budget for Galileo was £9 billion meaning the UK contributed approximately 13% of the final amount. The potential of Galileo for Franco-British cooperation is self-evident. Had British participation continued then both nations weapon systems would have been operating using the same satellite data. This would have had follow on advantages for the development of weapons systems, such as through oneMBDA, and for operational deployments as troops would be able to operate using the same data, thus enhancing interoperability. According to Francois Heisbourg the loss of Galileo was the first time the UK was forced to confront what being outside the EU would mean for defence cooperation (Heisbourg 2021). In losing access to Galileo, Britain has not only lost £1.2 billion, it has also seriously handicapped its ability to operate alongside French forces in the future. The loss of British access to Galileo was singled out by the French National Assemblies Defence Committee as an area that would particularly

affect Anglo-French cooperation in the future. This is as EU restrictions on third parties accessing Galileo data were highlighted as a major obstacle to intelligence sharing in the future (Defence Committee 2020).

The UK was predicably frustrated at losing access to Galileo, especially given the contributions it had already made. Had there been a willingness on both sides to compromise and be more flexible, continued British involvement could have been negotiated. However, with Brexit souring relations this was not possible. This resulted in an ill-fated attempt to create a UK Global Positioning Satellite Service (UK GPSS). While UK GPSS was originally envisaged as a competitor to Galileo, it was intended to be compatible with GPS (Titcomb 2020). This is notable as despite being involved in the design process of Galileo and therefore familiar with its design, the UK chose to make its own GPSS compatible with Galileo's main rival the American GPS. This was clearly a sign that the UK was again preferencing its special relationship with America over its relationship with France or the EU. Despite initial government enthusiasm however, UK GPSS failed to launch. A study into its viability was not positive and the government replaced UK GPSS with the Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing Programme (SBPP). SBPP was more focused on research, with the purpose of looking into various options for how the UK could achieve a similar result without building an entirely new satellite system (UK Space Agency 2020). The failure of UK GPSS keeps the UK outside of Galileo and reliant upon GPS for the foreseeable future, leaving the UK at a disadvantage to France and the US both of whom have access to their own satellite system. Francois Heisbourg notes that UK GPSS was a doomed project from the beginning as the UK lacked the national capabilities to undertake such a task (Heisbourg 2021). Furthermore, he argues that the project demonstrated a lack of seriousness on the UK's part and illustrates the wider chaos within the UK body politic created by Brexit.

Galileo would have embodied a perfect example of Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance. By collaborating with partner nations, the UK could have had access to a strategic capability that it cannot develop individually. Britain's ejection from Galileo represents an example of the theoretical contradictions posed by Brexit. An alliance that serves to augment the capabilities of its members has been undermined by a decision that actively prevents it from serving an augmentative function.

Notably, Brexit has had a serious diplomatic impact which has resulted in repercussions for Anglo-French defence cooperation. A sizeable amount of ill will has been created by the Brexit process (Taylor 2019). In particular the UK governments attempts to rewrite the Northern Ireland Protocol has seriously damaged relations. The governments brazen admission that it was planning to break international law was a shock to their French counterparts. This has created the impression in Paris that the current British government cannot be trusted to adhere to agreements it signs. This lack of trust has had a spill over effect and made cooperation in other areas even more difficult. President Macron presenting himself as the champion of Europe, combined with Prime Minister Boris Johnson's embrace of British nationalism have both strained relations further (France 24 2021). While these disagreements have primarily been over economic matters, they have real implications for defence cooperation. Effective cooperation is dependent upon the existence of the political will to sustain in. While officials in both militaries can continue to cooperate at the tactical level, without support at the political level cooperation will flounder. The 2021 Jersey fishing dispute encapsulates these problems. On the 6th May 2021 vessels from the Royal Navy and Marine Nationale were deployed to shadow each other as French fishermen blockaded the Jersey port of Saint Helier in a dispute over fishing rights. With headlines like "Boris sends gunboats to defend Jersey" (Standard 2021), the sentiment in the British press at the time

seemed more appropriate to 1821 than 2021. One of the British ships *HMS Severn* had previously been deployed to monitor Russian vessels moving through the English Channel (Royal Navy 2020). Obviously, this is a relatively minor incident but the image of British and French warships squaring off is detrimental to the wider Entente. If both militaries are going to be used for scoring political points it damages the relationships built up across the channel. If similar incidents were to occur in the future then it is likely that the fabric of Anglo-French defence cooperation could be severely damaged.

Whilst these changes are of significance they need to be viewed within the correct context. Britain's contribution to EU military missions was chronically small. Despite jointly pioneering the ESDP and its successor the CSDP with France, the UK has always been reluctant to make a major commitment to CSDP military operations. In 2017 for instance the UK had contributed less than 100 troops to CSDP missions, ranking well below many smaller EU nations (Giegerich and Mölling 2018). The Institute for Government noted in a 2019 report, that Britain contributed a mere 2.3% of personnel to European defence projects. When the UK formally announced its intention to withdraw from all EU military missions, the shortfall was compensated by additional troops from Italy and Spain, demonstrating that Britain's contribution was minor (Institute for Government 2021). Furthermore, unlike other organisations such as NATO there were no specifically UK-France deployments or commands operating as part of the EU. Consequently, while the opportunity for cooperation at the tactical level has been removed, at a strategic level Britain's withdrawal from these operations has only had a minor impact upon Anglo-French cooperation. Thus, while British withdrawal from the various EU missions discussed above has symbolic value, in practical terms it means very little. It should be noted therefore that the most significant military loss

of Brexit for Anglo-French cooperation so far has been its access to Galileo, not participation in EU deployments.

It is also important to remember that, to the UK, cooperation with France via the EU was always an optional extra, rather than an essential tool of British strategy. The British preference has always been for cooperation through other mechanisms (Tardy 2018). While this has often angered the French, for whom Europe is often its preference, it has created an expectation in Paris that if they wish to cooperate with the UK, it will need to be done through non-EU means (Pannier 2018). Thierry Tardy (2018) argues that the British decision to withdraw from the EU has not overly influenced Anglo-European defence cooperation. Indeed, cooperation may even improve as France will no longer face constant British opposition to enhanced European defence projects. Sven Biscop (2018) also makes this point by arguing that in the short term at least, Brexit is likely to increase Europe's propensity for operating through ad-hoc coalitions which will be to the benefit of Anglo-French cooperation as any such groupings must naturally turn to London and Paris for leadership.

However, despite these changes, arguably the main effects of Brexit on Anglo-French cooperation are still to come. The most significant consequences of Brexit relate to developments within the EU and how they will impact the UK as a non-member. Since Brexit the EU has launched several new defence initiatives. British antipathy towards them has strained relations and damaged some of the trust that was created by Lancaster House (Adamson 2021). It is these new initiatives that have the greatest potential to impact upon Anglo-French defence cooperation, even if their full influence has yet to be realised. Most notable amongst these new initiatives are the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)

(Franke 2020). These three initiatives are all interlinked and have the potential to significantly alter the dynamic of Anglo-French defence cooperation. As a third-party state the UK can no longer automatically participate in EU initiatives or shape their development (Whitman 2020). This eliminates an institutionalised form of cooperation that has assisted in developing defence relations between the UK and France. This loss of institutional contact will damage the fabric of the Anglo-French relationship and make defence cooperation harder in the future (Martill and Sus 2018). Sir Stuart Atha argues that the failure of the 2021 Integrated Review to grapple with these issues is detrimental to Franco-British relations, but the wounds caused by Brexit are still too raw to allow anything meaningful to happen in this area (Atha 2021). By detaching itself from Europe Britain has cut itself off from its closest neighbours (Heisbourg 2018). Britain is at risk of leaving itself strategically isolated and compelled to depend upon the unequal special relationship with the United States, rather than its equal partnership with France. This is especially disappointing as these initiatives could have benefited Anglo-French defence cooperation greatly. PESCO, CARD and the EDF all have the potential to improve member states capabilities and increase cooperation which would have reinforced the augmentative nature of the Entente in line with Fedder's (1968) typology.

CARD was first proposed in November 2016 and became fully active in 2019. It is intended to provide an overview of existing EU defence capabilities and identify new areas of cooperation for member states (EDA 2021). The EDF was also proposed in 2016 in response to Brexit. The purpose of the EDF is to increase the cooperation of defence industry research and development between EU members (EDA 2021). While PESCO was included in the Lisbon Treaty it was only activated in September 2017 in response to Brexit. PESCO aims to build upon the military capacity of EU members to achieve a full spectrum of military capabilities (PESCO 2021). Collectively these three initiatives are intended to harmonise member state

militaries and promote greater structural cooperation. As a third-party state the UK will not be able to participate in these structures (Martill and Sus 2018), meaning that new barriers to cooperation between the UK and France are a by-product of this enhanced cooperation.

The EDF for instance will potentially create new protectionist barriers that will negatively affect cooperation in defence procurement. One of the primary goals of the EDF is to promote inter-union industrial procurement by incentivising and supporting cooperation between EU members in defence procurement. Naturally, this erects barriers between non-EU states and the EU defence market. In the words of Francois Heisbourg creating barriers for non-EU members is a feature not a bug and should be accommodated rather than remedied. However, in the case of the UK this is a rather big bug. Large aspects of the Anglo-French defence industries, and the wider UK-EU defence industries, are heavily integrated (Heisbourg 2021). Given this level of integration, particularly in regard to MBDA, there is a real risk that Anglo-French defence production will be seriously affected by the EDF. These new initiatives have the potential to shut Britain out of the European defence arena completely (Ricketts 2018). The EDFs potential protectionist barriers could prevent the UK from participating in European procurement programmes (Ricketts 2018), dealing a fatal blow to an area of the Anglo-French defence relationship that is already failing to meet expectations (Ricketts 2018). Equally PESCO seeks to enhance structural cooperation between EU members, to the detriment of non-EU states. This could result in a scenario where France is forced to choose between Britain and Europe. Prior to Brexit France could cooperate bilaterally with Britain without hinderance as both states were members of the European Union. While there was some disquiet within the EU when France chose to act with the UK instead of the EU (Kempin and Mawdsley 2013), there were no institutional mechanisms through which these objections

could have any meaningful impact on Anglo-French cooperation. However, now that Britain's withdrawal from the EU is complete France will have to make a strategic choice on who will be its partner of choice (RAND 2018). As a result, in the future France may be prevented from cooperating with the UK, as it is committed to EU initiatives which the UK is unable to participate in.

Additionally, CARD will place new pressures on the Entente by identifying new areas in which EU states can cooperate. Where previously individual members would identify areas of cooperation, there will now be an institutional pressure for member states to enhance their cooperation. This could well restrict the possibility of Anglo-French dialogue and limit the number of avenues open to new cooperation in the future. As a third-party state, British approaches to defence and security issues will inevitably diverge from the EU, given that the UK no longer possesses any influence over the formulation of EU policy (Martill and Sus 2018). This will again place France in the unenviable position of being unable to satisfy both sides. France will be forced to choose between fellow members of the EU and its British allies. In such a situation it is likely that France will side with its continental partners rather than with Britain (RAND 2018), greatly diminishing the importance of Anglo-French defence cooperation. This is of course disappointing given that Britain and France are natural military allies as outlined by Ghez (2010). Their long history of cooperation and their combined abilities far outweigh the rest of the EU. Even if the EU is successful at implementing all of these new initiatives, the of military credibility of the other EU member states will remain minimal. As such being tied to institutional structures that prevent cooperation with a natural ally like Britain would be detrimental to France, just as being locked out of EU defence structures will be detrimental to Britain.

Multilateral Institutions and EU Initiatives

As outlined above, the UK and France also cooperate through a range of organisations that lie outside the EU (Robertson and Cazeneuve 2018). As the UK has been keen to stress the EU is not Europe (Cross 2021). Both the UK and France now have greater incentives to bolster cooperation through avenues such as these since the EU is no longer an option. Theoretically, cooperation here should continue unhindered by Brexit. However, this is not necessarily true as the implications of Brexit have been felt across the full spectrum of Anglo-French cooperation. The institution where Brexit's impact will be most keenly felt is OCCAR. While OCCAR is separate from the EU, five of its six permanent members and six of its seven partner nations are also EU members. Consequently, changes in EU policy will have a major impact upon OCCAR. As such the fate of the EDF will have a sizeable influence on OCCAR. Should the EDF be fully implemented it will erect barriers between the defence industries of EU and non-EU members. As such this could prevent non-EU members from cooperating with EU members, therefore transforming OCCAR into a de facto part of the EU. This would have a detrimental impact on future Anglo-French defence procurement. For example, the current MMCM programme is being conducted under the auspices of OCCAR (OCCAR 2020). The development of the EDF may well mean that similar programmes will be hampered, especially if the EDF does produce protectionist barriers (Ricketts 2018). This would be damaging to the progress made since the signing of the Lancaster House Treaty in 2010. This also highlights how the theoretical foundations of the Entente are being challenged by Brexit. The inability to collaborate on defence procurement will damage the augmentative nature of the Entente as Britain and France will be unable to take advantage of cross-channel industrial expertise.

Two areas in which Anglo-French defence cooperation should continue with minimal interference from Brexit are the EAG and Finabel. These institutions bring together personnel from the British and French armies and air forces and possess their own identities outside of the EU (Finabel 2021). Therefore, they should continue to offer avenues of Anglo-French cooperation despite the problems created by Brexit. This should ensure that there continues to be some level of cooperation between the UK and France at the European level. Cooperation through the EAG in particular should ensure that some of the augmentative nature of the relationship is maintained. Therefore at least some of the theoretical underpinnings of the relationship have been untouched by Brexit. Unfortunately, while this cooperation at the staff level is positive, it is insufficient to compensate for the damage done at the political level. This lower order military cooperation can only go so far in maintaining the relationship in the face of Brexit's disruptions.

The recently created E12 offers a new forum through which Britain and France can cooperate in Europe. E12 brings together both EU and non-EU states with the intention of complimenting both NATO and the EU (Ministère des Armées 2020). E12 is intended to maintain a light footprint, being coordinated via a small secretariat in the Ministère des Armées. It is thus outside of existing institutional structures and offers an opportunity for the UK and France to continue defence cooperation in Europe post-Brexit (Clingendael 2019). Its flexible nature could allow for the UK and France to deploy bilaterally or in conjunction with other European allies. E12 could therefore form the basis of future military operations, offering the kind of structure through which CJEF could be deployed. Andre Adamson notes that E12 is an attempt to put rhetoric into action and builds upon the CJEF process (Adamson 2021). Consequently, E12 offers a forum through which the augmentative nature of the Entente could be preserved by allowing likeminded allies to cooperate outside of the EU. This also shows that Ghez' (2010)

natural alliance typology continues to be of relevance as despite the tensions caused by Brexit E12 is an attempt to find a workable solution.

However, the potential of E12 should be viewed with scepticism. While beneficial in theory, there is still limited detail on how E12 will actually function. A small secretariat in Paris attended by allied military attaches may be able to improve cooperation on a small scale through regular communication and exchanges, however it's potential to coordinate large scale military deployments would be limited. Former Major General Tim Cross dismisses E12 as lacking any serious warfighting capability (Cross 2021). Additionally, while E12 is intended to promote a shared strategic culture, this is no small task. NATO and the EU have both attempted to do this in the past, with limited success. Therefore, coordinating operations between European allies with differing perspectives to the UK and France may be hamstrung by similar issues that operations in Libya experienced, when much of NATO was unwilling to actively participate in the campaign. In such a situation E12 could quickly be reduced to a forum for discussion, rather than a vehicle through which to deploy military force. Whilst this would of course be beneficial to Anglo-French defence cooperation, any forum which builds dialogue will improve cooperation to some degree, it would not be a radically new addition to Anglo-French defence cooperation. Francois Heisbourg maintains that E12 will not instigate any new avenues of cooperation that would not have happened without it. Whilst E12 will not damage relations, it will not contribute much to joint cooperation either (Heisbourg 2021). There are also questions over E12's future, namely its relationship with the EU. While France has stated that E12 will be complimentary, but separate, from EU structures (Ministère des Armées 2020), Germany has stated a clear desire for E12 to become integrated into EU-led initiatives (House of Commons 2020). As such there is a further risk that E12 could either be handicapped by divisions or drawn into the EU's orbit thus preventing significant British

involvement. Consequently, while E12 does have the potential to become a new avenue of Anglo-French defence cooperation, it is currently too underdeveloped to compensate for the disruption caused by Brexit and remains a paper tiger.

Bilateral cooperation

Bilateral Anglo-French defence cooperation within Europe is primarily focused on joint procurement. Unfortunately, the future of this procurement is tied to Brexit. In an ironic twist of fate on the 22nd June 2016 the French Defence and Armed Forces Committee submitted a report to the National Assembly in which it claimed that even if Brexit did happen, thought it doubted that it would, cooperation in arms procurement would continue unaffected (Defense Committee 2016). Alas this has proven to be undue optimism. In another example of poetic irony the UK ambassador to France, Sir Julian King, appeared before that same committee in May 2016 and spoke of the many benefits that the Lancaster House Treaty had brought for Anglo-French cooperation (King 2016). Sir Julian spoke of the progress that had been made on joint procurement projects and commended their value in strengthening the relationship (King 2016). As already discussed at length the Lancaster House Treaty established numerous joint initiatives that aimed to foster greater bilateral defence procurement. This thesis has considered the fate of FCAS already, with the debacle surrounding it being result of Brexit. As Andre Adamson rightly points out industrial cooperation is the hardest aspect of the relationship to manage post-Brexit. Stradling military, government and economic activity industrial cooperation is likely to be hit the hardest by new Brexit barriers (Adamson 2021). This is especially worrying as Britain and France have become increasingly interdependent in recent years. In 2011 Antoine Bouvier commended both governments for recognising their interdependence and structuring it effectively through Lancaster House (Bouvier 2011). With

Brexit erecting new obstacles to industrial cooperation there is a real risk that both sides' industrial bases could be fatally undermined by losing access to the other.

It is also notable that no new procurement projects have been announced since Brexit. For Sir Stuart Atha the industrial elements of Lancaster House where the hardest to achieve and so losing them is a real blow (Atha 2021). While the UK and France are continuing to work on MMCM and Sea Venom, they have not conducted any feasibility studies into new areas of cooperation or indicated any plans to build upon existing cooperation (Ricketts 2020). This again is disappointing, as joint procurement has delivered real benefits in terms of both cost and operational cooperation. Failure to continue this momentum is detrimental to both British and French interests as both sides risk reverting back to costly and self-defeating competition. This further damages the nature of the Entente as an augmentative alliance. Harnessing shared industrial experience is a tangible way that the Entente augments Britain and France. Supply chains are another, underappreciated, component of the defence industry and Brexit represents a challenge to maintaining the free flow of components within the defence industry (Atha 2021). Opting to pursue competing projects is self-defeating as it will cost more, reduce the potential for exports and likely leave both sides with less assets to show for their efforts.

As already discussed, the Lancaster House Treaty is an example of Ghez' (2010) natural alliance type resulting in an augmentative alliance in the vein of Edwin Fedder (1968). As Europe's strongest military powers with an array of shared interests it is natural for Britain and France to cooperate bilaterally. Thus, the damage done to bilateral cooperation by Brexit amounts to the unravelling of many of the theoretical underpinnings of the relationship. These foundations have changed before, such is the nature of the peculiar relationship,

however in the past such changes have not been entirely detrimental to the relationship. The consequences of Brexit have seriously undermined both bilateral cooperation and the Entente as an augmentative alliance. This is made even more frustrating by the fact that Britain and France remain natural allies. Brexit does not change the military realities of the Continent. Neither side can afford the kind of strategic divergence that has been instigated by Brexit.

Given the grand strategic objectives set out in the UK's 2021 IR it would be logical for the UK to seek greater collaboration with France in arms procurement, given they are natural allies. The potential savings that such cooperation offers would assist in making British strategic goals more viable. Equally, France's 2021 strategic update stresses the need to seek out international cooperation in defence procurement to deliver long term programmes (Ministres des armées 2021). Both of these documents coinciding just one year after the Lancaster House Treaties decennial anniversary, presented France and the UK with a perfect opportunity to pursue new avenues of collaboration, an opportunity that both sides have so far failed to appreciate. The tensions caused by Brexit are the main reason for this failure. While the military relationship remains strong the politics of the relationship have become the problem (Adamson 2021). Neither government is willing to consider major joint initiatives at this current time. There is a distinct lack of trust in both London and Paris, a problem which will only worsen as tensions over the implementation of the NI Protocol continue to rise.

The future of bilateral procurement is also tied to the development of EU structures. The EDF presents the same risks to bilateral cooperation as it does to multilateral cooperation. There remains a distinct possibility that the UK will find itself cut off from the French defence sector and unable to collaborate on major projects. If this does occur then both sides will suffer as

they will lose access to the expertise and industrial capacity that the other possesses. According to Antoine Bouvier the main threat to industrial cooperation is not poor diplomatic relations or new tariff barriers, but the lack of British access to EU structures (Tran 2017). In Antoine Bouvier's view political relations between both governments will improve in time while tariff barriers can be overcome by MBDA. The real problem is therefore Britain's inability to access EU funds. If the UK cannot participate in EDF programmes, there is a risk that the British elements of MBDA will not be able to fully participate in programmes with their French counterparts (Bouvier 2018). This would endanger both sides, given their mutual interdependence, and also risks undermining MBDA's dominant position in the complex weapons sector.

Another issue that bilateral cooperation faces is PESCO and the impact it will have on CJEF. As mentioned above PESCO aims to enhance operational cooperation between EU members. Should this programme succeed then it may hamper the ability of the UK and France to deploy CJEF. If PESCO continues to develop and France becomes increasingly committed to EU deployments this will limit the resources available to deploy with CJEF. Furthermore, it is likely that France may find itself in a position where it must choose between deploying bilaterally with the UK or multilaterally with the EU. In such a situation, and given current diplomatic trends, France will likely choose EU solidarity over cooperation with the UK. In 2011 the French Foreign Affairs Committee spoke of the revival of a "Paris-London Axis" (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011). The Lancaster House Treaty was symbolic of the rejuvenation of bilateral defence cooperation (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011). Whilst Brexit may not have killed bilateral cooperation, it has certainly halted its advance.

Post-Brexit reorientation?

Another aspect of Brexit that has already damaged the Entente is the prospect of a British reorientation away from the EU and Europe more generally. This has already caused concern in Paris with the French military worrying that Global Britain could result in a dilution of the Franco-British relationship through the diversification Britain's military partnerships (Defence Committee 2020). Having removed itself from the EU, the UK has begun to refocus its energies on other relationships, such as its role within NATO and its "Special Relationship" with the United States. Without EU membership the UK needs to exploit other means of exerting influence in the world. In the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum numerous academics argued that the UK would revert back to its Atlanticist tendencies and prioritise its alliance with the US. British policy in recent years has proven this prediction correct. With the launch of Global Britain and its attempts to put as much legal and regulatory distance between itself and the EU as possible, the UK has already embarked upon this path. Global Britain's contradiction with French desires for European autonomy have strained the relationship and make it increasingly difficult to align Anglo-French objectives (Adamson 2021). There is an irony here as Tim Cross points out, namely that the UK and France have similar aspiration for leadership in the world but have different ways of achieving those goals (Cross 2021). There are two examples which encapsulate this post-Brexit reorientation. The first is the publishing of the IR in March 2021 which laid out the UK's plans for its foreign and defence policy over the next decade.

Three things are clear from the IR. First, the US remains the UK's primary ally. This is not surprising, but it does inform the other two lessons from the IR. Secondly, the UK is now embarking upon a tilt to the Indo-Pacific. With the rise of China and the increasing geo-

strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific the UK is now seeking to become increasingly engaged in the region. The IR even states that the UK will be the Indo-Pacific's European partner of choice, a bold claim given that France retains sizeable overseas territories in the region. Given the UK's limited resources and extensive interests in the Euro-Atlantic and Middle East it remains to be seen how effective British engagement in the Indo-Pacific will be. Engagement with a region of such strategic importance is not a bad thing, indeed a more globally engaged Britain should be welcomed. However, this tilt to the Indo-Pacific appears to be more an exercise in appeasement of the US, rather than a fully developed British strategy. Thirdly and intrinsically linked with the previous points, there is a glaring omission in the IR regarding the EU.

The IR has precious little detail on how the UK will cooperate with the EU on defence or foreign policy. While it states that the UK will seek cooperation with the EU when it is in its interest to do so it says little else. Given the numerous problems Brexit presents for Anglo-French cooperation, and by extension Anglo-EU cooperation, outlined within this chapter this is a major flaw. The IR has therefore failed to think strategically about the EU, or Europe in general, and speaks to a wider inability within the British government at present to think critically about how this impacts British interests and relations with member states. The IR fails to consider the impact that the EDF and PESCO could have on the UK. Francois Heisbourg argues that the disorder caused by Brexit has prevented the UK from considering how developments within the EU will affect it resulting in serious damage to British interests (Heisbourg 2021). The IR reduces relations with France to a single paragraph, a paragraph of comparable length to British policy on the Antarctic. This is hardly appropriate for such an important ally. As Sir Stuart Atha rightly points out the French are too big and too capable to ignore (Atha 2021). This is further compounded by the IR claiming that Europe remains the

theatre of greatest interest to the UK, despite focusing most of its detail on other regions. It is contradictory to claim that the Euro-Atlantic remains the UK's main priority while failing to explain how the UK will operate there. Vague statements on an intention to cooperate do not substitute for actual detail. Without such detail the IR makes it clear that the UK is embarking upon a reorientation away from Europe and is prioritising allies in other regions. This has already damaged the fabric of the Entente Cordiale and is likely to continue do so.

The second example is the so called AUKUS agreement. Announced on the 15th September 2021 AUKUS is a trilateral defence agreement between the US, UK and Australia. Its headline goal is to assist Australia in constructing its own fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, becoming the seventh nation in the world to do so. It also proposes to enhance trilateral cooperation on “cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities” (UK Government 2021). By all accounts this is an ambitious project that strengthens relations with a key UK ally in the Indo-Pacific. However, it has also greatly angered France and damaged Franco-British relations further still. France had previously signed an agreement with Australia in 2016 to build a new fleet of submarines for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). These *Attack*-class vessels would have been conventionally powered and built by the French company Naval Group, for a contract valued at £27 billion. The formation of AUKUS and the announcement of a new nuclear powered submarine programme has necessitated the cancellation of the *Attack*-class. France was of course greatly angered by this decision, with the French foreign minister describing it as a “stab in the back” (Giordano and Woodcock 2021) while it also recalled its ambassadors to both the US and Australia. While its ambassador to the UK was not recalled, it was indicated that this was a deliberate insult. By not recalling its ambassador from London and describing the British Prime Minister as the “third wheel” and noting that France was used to “British opportunism”

France was indicating that it did not consider Britain a relevant actor in this dispute (Giordano and Woodcock 2021). Rather it viewed Britain as an opportunistic bystander. France did however cancel a meeting of the Franco-British Defence Council scheduled for 20th September 2021. French anger was such that it even intimated that there would be repercussions for its commitment to NATO (Conley 2021). Regardless of the merits of the AUKUS deal for the UK, undercutting another key ally to achieve it was definitely a strategic blunder. Aligning with the US and Australia in a diplomatic row with France is a clear indicator of the UK's changing strategic priorities post-Brexit. This kind of cross-channel antagonism will only strain the Entente further at a time when both governments should be at pains to reinforce it. Given the developments within the EU discussed already and the plans outlined in the IR, it is clear that the UK and France are beginning to diverge on defence affairs after a decade of increasing convergence, and without remedial action such divergence is likely to continue. Greater divergence will make it harder to take full advantage of each other's capabilities. If priorities diverge significantly then the augmentative operations we have seen in recent years, such as Britain's contributions to Mali, will become less likely. This will limit the scope of operations available to both sides and restrict their respective abilities to project power across the globe. This is likely to have an industrial impact as different priorities will necessitate different industrial strategies. Consequently, the scope for industrial cooperation and its associated economies of scale will be reduced and the likelihood of damaging industrial cooperation increased.

French anger is of course understandable, but it should be viewed within its proper context. The *Attack*-class had already run over budget and was behind schedule. Australian requirements had also changed. Given its unique operating environment and the shifting strategic situation in the Indo-Pacific conventionally powered submarines were no longer

sufficient to meet Australia's needs. It appears that France was taken by surprise by the AUKUS announcement, clearly a failure of US, UK and Australian diplomacy. However, it should be remembered that France withdrew from the Eurofighter project in 1985 and attempted to take Spain with in, seemingly undermining the projects viability at the time. Therefore, while there is understandable anger in Paris, this should not be allowed to fester. The Franco-British Defence Council would have been the perfect forum for France to raise its grievances with the UK in a mature manner, rather than resorting to megaphone diplomacy. Unfortunately given the tensions already created by Brexit this has not been possible. There is now a lack of trust that has further exacerbated tensions over AUKUS. The UK's decision has reinforced old French perceptions of the perfidious Albion and *les Anglo-Saxons* conspiring against French interests (McTague 2021). These attitudes are damaging to the Entente and only serve to drive Britain and France further apart when their interests are best served by greater cooperation. Bolstering alliances in other parts of the world should not come at the cost of damaging cross-channel relations. While the UK does need to strengthen its other partnerships as a consequence of Brexit, it should not neglect its European ties and it is disappointing that the UK has embarked upon such a path.

The IR and AUKUS both indicate that the UK and France are on course for a situation similar to the Cold War when they are formal allies but not in alignment. Whilst they will remain NATO allies their national priorities are becoming increasingly mismatched. With the UK realigning its priorities to be more in line with the US and France refocusing its efforts on the EU, there is an increasing schism within the Entente. Should this continue then it is likely that the Anglo-French relationship will become increasingly strained.

La diplomatie par twitter

The dire state of cross channel relations is perhaps best encapsulated in a case study from late 2021. On the 25th November Boris Johnson sent a letter to Emmanuel Macron proposing a number of new measures to deal with the ongoing migrant crisis in the English Channel. Johnson also tweeted this letter and attached a thread expanding upon his proposals. This French reception to this was immediately hostile and British Home Secretary Priti Patel was disinclined to an upcoming summit in France aimed at finding a solution to the crisis. Whilst the Prime Minister's twitter thread was rather tactless, the French response was unnecessarily hyperbolic. This is a clear symptom of Brexit where every minor slight is taken as a provocation. It also flew in the face of reality as official French twitter had been remarkably hostile towards the UK in the weeks prior to the incident. At a press conference on the 21st November French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves le Drian called Boris Johnson a populist who blamed others for all of his internal difficulties (Economist 2021). This was then tweeted out by the official Twitter account of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regardless of le Drian's personal views towards Johnson this is hardly the kind of diplomatic language expected from a foreign minister. It is also hard to imagine that such comments could have been promoted by government social media without the Elysée's approval. Following this Clement Beaune, the French Minister of State for European Affairs, accused the UK of running an economy based on "quasi-modern slavery" (Beaune 2021), claims which were retweeted by Beaune himself and other French government accounts. Interestingly whilst this was going on both the UKDefenceinFrance and FranceDefenceinUK twitter accounts were tweeting about then CDS Sir Nick Carter and his replacement Admiral Anthony Radakin visiting Paris to meet with French officials. Since then military accounts in both countries have tweeted about the strength of their ongoing defence relationship despite the

worsening political situation. This is emblematic of the frayed relations at caused by Brexit. Whilst defence cooperation has continued at a military level, politically the relationship has decayed. There is only so much that can be done at the military level to compensate for the damage done at the political level. French ministers launching ad hominin attacks on their British counterparts on Twitter gains far more traction that accounts run by defence attaches. Consequently, the diplomatic impact of Brexit continues to corrode the relationship.

Conclusion

When applying alliance theory it clear that Anglo-French defence cooperation has changed markedly since 2016, and not for the better. Ghez' (2010) typology still holds true as Britain and France remain both historic and natural allies. When they cooperate effectively they can form an augmentative alliance, as outlined by Fedder (1968), to their mutual benefit. However, this has been made significantly more difficult by Brexit. It is clear that the functioning of their augmentative alliance has been impaired by Britain's withdrawal from the EU. This is a marked change from before 2016 when the Entente formed a relatively successful augmentative alliance. Furthermore, the destruction of common norms has also undermined the relationship. EU membership contributed towards making the alliance an entente as outlined by Singer and Small (1966). The destruction of these common norms has therefore created new barriers to working together on a daily basis. It is both ironic and in character for the relationship that the applicability of Ghez' (2010) typologies has remained constant, whilst the political realities of the day have undermined the applicability of Fedder's (1968) augmentative typology. This is despite the fact that geopolitical realities make the success of the relationship as an augmentative alliance ever more important.

It is clear that Britain and France are now experiencing cooler relations than before. It should be noted that these problems have developed relatively recently and have mostly originated from the UK. During the tenure of Theresa May, while negotiations may have been intense, there was still a level of trust and good faith. This can be seen in the creation of new initiatives such as E12 and the Defence Ministerial Council. These were both created after the Brexit vote and served to improve Anglo-French defence cooperation. It is only since 2019 that there has been a noticeable rift in the relationship. This began with the FCAS split and then became more pervasive as time went on. The UK has now withdrawn from all EU defence initiatives, preventing daily institutional contact between the British and French militaries. It is also no longer participating in EU deployments which closes another avenue of potential cooperation with France. This also limits the utility of the CJEF, as the EU was one of the organisations that it was envisaged a CJEF deployment would support.

It is also clear that Brexit has the potential to impact Anglo-French cooperation across the European spectrum, not just within the EU. Developments within the EU over the next few years will have a major influence on the future of the Entente Cordiale. If these EU initiatives fail, or fail to develop as anticipated, which would not be unusual for EU defence policies, then the impact upon the Anglo-French cooperation will be marginal. However, if these institutions are successful then the UK may find itself isolated from the European mainland, while France forms the nucleus of an enhanced EU defence structure.

The diplomatic impact of Brexit has been profound. Gone are the days of political congeniality on display at the signing of Lancaster House. Military to military relations remain strong but Brexit has ruined relations at the top. Political leadership makes all the difference in a relationship such as this (Adamson 2021). This is even more important now that the UK and

France no longer have institutional contact at the EU level. The public disagreements and falling out on display in 2021 have seriously weakened the relationship. Military contacts can only do so much. If the political will to sustain cooperation does not exist then the military relationship will flounder. Prior to Brexit political disagreements could be solved through a number of forums. Now every Anglo-French spat gets wrapped up in the wider UK-EU relationship making it harder to achieve a meaningful solution.

Brexit also poses a serious challenge to the theoretical basis of the Entente. Britain and France remain both historic and natural allies. When they cooperate effectively they can augment each other's capabilities to their mutual benefit. However, this has been made significantly more difficult by Brexit. The destruction of common norms has also undermined the relationship. It is both ironic and in character for the relationship that the theoretical aspects of the relationship should remain constant, but the political realities of the day have made it increasingly difficult for them to be achieved in reality.

Whilst Brexit has created several new obstacles to cooperation, the incentives for the UK and France to cooperate will persist regardless of whether the UK remains a member of the EU. The strategic challenges that drove greater cooperation after 2010 still exist and will continue to make Anglo-French defence cooperation relevant, even as cooperation suffers post-Brexit. Political ideology needs to be balanced with pragmatism (Adamson 2021). Brexit does not change the fact that Britain will remain Europe's only other credible military force besides France (Hardy 2018). Therefore, it is inevitable that cooperation will, and must, continue as no other European state can compete in terms of capabilities or experience. The UK and France must find ways to work together (Atha 2021). While Brexit has damaged the institutional fabric of the relationship, the underlying strategic imperative to cooperate

remains (Heisbourg 2016). The UK should be involved and needs to be involved in discussions on to defend Europe (Cross 2021). Therefore while Brexit has damaged existing Anglo-French defence cooperation it is vital that steps are taken to repair relations.

8. The Future of Anglo-French Defence Cooperation

Introduction

This thesis has evaluated the current state of the Entente Cordiale. Previous chapters have analysed the state of the relationship through three case studies that illustrate how Anglo-French defence cooperation operates in practice. When cooperation has been strong, this thesis has commended it. Equally, this thesis has not shied away from offering critiques when cooperation has stalled, or one party has failed. This has provided a comprehensive overview of the contemporary Entente Cordiale. The purpose of this chapter is to put forward a variety of proposals to improve Anglo-French defence cooperation. These proposals are wide ranging and include both methods to remedy existing flaws within the relationship, and ways to build upon the relationship's strengths. These proposals broadly correspond to three categories: operational, industrial and diplomatic.

There are numerous examples of areas in which cooperation has succeeded. These have been outlined throughout this thesis. This chapter looks to the future and identifies how the Entente can be improved. These proposals have been included here as they are often interlinked and cannot be easily divided into the case study chapters discussed previously. For instance improving operational cooperation is relevant to bilateral cooperation as well as cooperation in NATO and in Europe. Therefore, these proposals have been collated here so that they can be presented in a holistic way. This way they cover the entire defence relationship and are not considered in isolation.

Operational

There are a number of ways in which operational cooperation between the UK and France can be improved. Firstly, both governments should set out a new timetable for joint exercises to sustain the progress that has been made bringing CJEF online. Having declared CJEF operational it is vital that this momentum is not squandered. Both governments should agree to a ten-year timetable to hold annual exercises, with a review at the five-year mark. This formula bore fruit in implementing CJEF and can do the same in maintaining it. Both governments should also work towards a large-scale exercise including a full complement of 10,000 personnel. Previous CJEF exercises have included 5,000 troops but this is only half of CJEF's intended operating capacity (MoD 2020). As such the new timetable for CJEF exercises should include a target to hold a full 10,000 personnel exercise at the half way point. This will allow both governments to prepare for the exercise and then amend their plans for future exercises accordingly in response to how this exercise proceeds. Given the strained nature of Anglo-French relations, agreeing such a timetable could prove difficult. With the UK government having previously indicated that relations may not improve until after the 2022 French Presidential election (Mallet and Parker 2021), there has been little scope for greater cooperation. This dire state of affairs is exactly why a new exercise timetable should be agreed expeditiously. If relations are currently struggling then reinforcing existing cooperation is a practical way of ensuring that defence cooperation does not become a casualty of current political disagreements. The re-election of Emmanuel Macron also offers an opportunity to reset the relationship, and a new exercise timetable could be a part of that reset.

It would be beneficial if the current ambiguity surrounding possible CJEF operations is removed. An understanding should therefore be reached that sets out the type of scenarios

in which CJEF will be deployed. While both the Lancaster House Treaty and subsequent communiqués explain that CJEF can be deployed bilaterally or to support organisations such as NATO, the EU or UN (Joint Declaration 2010), the criterion for deployment was never specified. Whilst this is in part intended to ensure that CJEF remains a flexible tool, it can also lead to confusion. This was best illustrated by the prelude to operations in Libya as considered previously. By clearly setting out when CJEF will be deployed a similar situation can be avoided in the future. Both governments should therefore outline the kind of scenario in which they envision deploying CJEF, be it a humanitarian relief mission, first entry force or full-scale intervention. It should also be clarified how CJEF would operate within multilateral frameworks. Exercise Rochambeau in 2014 simulated partner nations operating within a CJEF deployment. This was good but there has been little detail on how CJEF would operate to support international organisations. For instance, if CJEF was deployed to support a NATO operation would it use NATO C2 structures or would it be purely under Anglo-French command? Similar questions exist for both the EU and UN. The British and French governments should agree on how CJEF would operate within these environments as this will both smooth the process of deploying CJEF and improve its effectiveness once deployed.

Work should also continue on the creation of a joint Anglo-French carrier group. As outlined previously there were originally plans for a UK-France integrated carrier group (Joint Declaration 2010). However, these plans have subsequently been changed in favour of a joint carrier group, an important distinction. An integrated carrier group would have entailed reciprocal basing of aircraft on each other's carriers, personnel exchanges and close cooperation throughout deployments. A joint carrier group will merely feature vessels from both navies operating together. While this carrier group will no longer be fully integrated it will still be a useful asset to both nations and should be realised. To that end, the progress

that has already been made towards this goal should be continued and enhanced. The Royal Navy should continue to deploy as an escort for the *Charles de Gaulle*. This will continue to build on the relationships that have been created over the last decade. France should in turn reciprocate and deploy Marine Nationale vessels to escort *HMS Queen Elizabeth*. Other allied nations, such as the US and Netherlands, have already deployed naval assets as part of the UK's Carrier Strike Group (MoD 2021), and it is time that France did the same. France should also investigate operating its Caiman helicopters from *HMS Queen Elizabeth* just as the UK has previously operated Wild Cat helicopters from the *Charles de Gaulle*. In June 2021 British and French carriers conducted Exercise Gallic Strike together in the Mediterranean. As the first time that British and French carriers had come together in over a decade this was significant. It also represents a strong step towards the development of a joint carrier group. Now that *HMS Queen Elizabeth* is operational plans should be made for the deployment of a truly joint carrier group. Previous deployments have usually been lopsided with one nation providing the bulk of the naval assets. Plans should therefore be drawn up to deploy a carrier group comprising of similar assets from both nations to demonstrate the feasibility of this concept. This deployment could even be integrated into the CJEF timetable proposed above. This would therefore both maintain CJEF and contribute towards achieving one of the headline goals set out in 2010.

Both governments must also continue to invest in key military capabilities to ensure that they are able to deploy the full range of assets necessary in modern warfare. As outlined extensively when discussing Libya, both the UK and France suffered during that campaign from a lack of key capabilities, particularly ISTAR and in air refuelling aircraft. Since 2011 some progress has been made in dealing with these deficits. The deployment of British ISTAR assets to Mali to support French operations (MoD 2013) and the French use of MdcN in Syria in 2018

(Navy Recognition 2018) are both good examples of this. However, it is imperative that they both continue to develop these assets for future conflicts. Both governments should also work to formalise their cooperation in these areas. Rather than providing assets on an ad-hoc basis they should work to standardise when they would make such assets available to each other. This could be done through the Defence Ministerial Council. An agreement should be reached identifying a list of assets and support that each government would make available to the other upon request, provided of course that said assets are not required for their own use. For instance, given France's lack of strategic lift capability, such an agreement would allow France access to British transport aircraft should they be needed in the future.

Both France and the UK should also continue to support each other militarily within their respective areas of interest. As already discussed, the UK has been active in Mali since 2013 to support French operations there. Equally, France has contributed to NATO's EFP in Estonia under British command. Both countries share an interest in ensuring these two regions are secure. It is in British interests that Islamic extremism is contained within the Sahel and prevented from becoming a threat to Europe. Equally, stability on NATO's eastern flank is of interest to France as it ensures peace and stability within Europe. Supporting each other within these regions is therefore not only within their own interests but it builds upon Anglo-French defence cooperation and fosters greater collaboration between them. To that end the UK should continue to provide strategic lift aircraft to France in the Sahel. The British commitment to MINUSMA should also be maintained. While not an official part of *Operation Barkhane*, it is still supportive of operations in the Sahel. The UK should also look into supporting Task Force Takuba, with the deployment of additional special forces to the region to assist the French in their counter insurgency operations. As France now aims to draw *Barkhane* to a close in 2022 the UK should assist France as its forces transition to other states

in the region. It would be beneficial for both governments to identify how the UK can best support France in the region and reach an agreement for it to do so. France should also continue to deploy troops to the Baltics to support EFP there. This will demonstrate French commitment to NATO and reassure the UK that they can continue to cooperate with France within NATO.

More work should also be done to foster a convergence of British and French strategic postures. One of the biggest problems to blight the Entente has long been differing strategic outlooks. Since 2010 this has been clearly evident in the UK's designation of Afghanistan as the "main effort" with the 2010 SDSR (MoD 2010) and to a less extent the 2015 SDSR (MoD 2015). Both were built upon the assumption that the UK would only be involved in one large scale operation at a time. This contrasted with the French approach towards maintaining prepositioned forces across the globe with an emphasis on conducting multiple expeditionary operations simultaneously. This partially explained the British reticence to become involved in Libya, while France was willing and able to commit forces much earlier. The Entente would be greatly improved by a convergence of strategic thinking on both sides. There are already signs that this is currently underway, albeit haphazardly. The UK's 2021 Integrated Review established the doctrine of "persistent presence" (MoD 2021). This postulates that more British forces will be stationed abroad on a permanent basis. This is supported by the creation of so-called Littoral Response Groups (LRGs), naval formations intended to rapidly deploy marine and special forces assets to conflict zones abroad. These formations are similar to French prepositioned forces and indicate a shift in British thinking towards a more flexible defence posture, capable of responding to multiple threats, rather than one solely focused on a single conflict. This is a positive development as it will assist in deploying forces jointly in the future. The French 2021 Strategic Update (Ministère des Armées 2021) stresses the need

for cooperation with allies. In particular it highlights the necessity of improving doctrinal cooperation with partner militaries. There is thus an opportunity here for greater convergence of British and French military doctrines. The UK should therefore continue in its efforts to adopt a new military posture, which should be welcomed by France because of the new opportunities for joint operations that this presents. This would not only benefit Anglo-French relations but would also enhance the trilateral US-UK-France relationship. This relationship is discussed at greater length below, but it would be greatly improved by a convergence of Anglo-French military postures. A UK that is more engaged internationally, with greater cooperation between the UK and France would be in American interests and would allow for greater cooperation between all three allies.

In a similar vein both governments should coordinate their approach to the Indo-Pacific. The 2021 Integrated Review (MoD 2021) makes it clear that the UK wishes to establish itself as a player in the Indo-Pacific, even going as far as to declare an intention to be the region's European partner of choice (MoD 2021). The region was the target of *HMS Queen Elizabeth's* maiden voyage, and the UK plans to increase its military presence there in the near future. Meanwhile France already possesses a sizeable military presence in the region and significantly increased its naval presence in 2021 (CSIS 2021). There is a clear logic for greater cooperation in the region. For France, none of its regional partners have the same capabilities as the UK. The logic for cooperation there is thus similar to cooperation in Europe. France and Britain can gain far more through cooperation than they can through competition. Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific would provide France with a partner that can provide a similar spectrum of capabilities. With its own network of existing defence agreements and historic ties the UK can fill the gaps that France cannot. Equally, the UK may be based in the Indo-Pacific, but France *lives* in the Indo-Pacific. The vast majority of overseas France is located

there. Approximately 1.6 million French citizens live in French territories there accompanied by around 7,000 permanently based troops (Ministère des Armées 2019). France is arguably an Indo-Pacific nation as much as it is a European one. The UK simply cannot compete with that level of reach or military force. Consequently, the UK should seek to collaborate with France on joint military deployments in the region. Aircraft Carriers are one good example of potential cooperation. With *HMS Queen Elizabeth* deploying to the region with allied escorts, France could have fulfilled this role. Equally, in the past France has asked Australia to provide escorts for the *Charles de Gaulle* when it has been deployed to the Indo-Pacific. In the future the UK and France should coordinate their naval forces in the region to support each other. Just as they have offered reciprocal support in Mali and Estonia, the same should be done in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, France's network of military facilities in the region, combined with Britain's expanding alliance network, offer both nations an opportunity to exert real influence that they will not possess individually. In essence France can provide hard power while Britain can provide soft power. Collectively they can both be major players in the region, while individually they would remain relatively minor. Greater cooperation operationally, such as through freedom of navigation drills, as well as through defence diplomacy is in both nations interest and will bolster their influence in a critical region. This is of increasing importance given that the region is likely to shape the geopolitical landscape of the world for decades to come.

Industrial

There are numerous steps that can be taken to improve cooperation in the industrial realm. The Lancaster House Treaty launched several collaborative projects. Many of these, and their fates, have been explored at length already. It was noticeable that the tenth anniversary of

the Treaty did not result in a similar undertaking. While collaboration has not always been successful it has still provided numerous benefits. As such Britain and France should immediately investigate new areas of cooperation to explore (Magill 2021). The meeting of the Defence Ministerial Council in April 2021 was a missed opportunity to do exactly this. As such both governments should task their respective defence ministries with investigating potential avenues of cooperation prior to the next major bilateral summit in 2022. Given the UK's ambitions to play a global role, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and France's desire to be a stabilising actor in the world (MoD 2021 and Ministère des Armées 2021), the savings offered through collaboration are in both nations' interests. It is also vital not to let the momentum built up over the last decade go to waste. As such new industrial initiatives must be identified and commenced.

One area that would be worth exploring further would be aircraft development. The Lancaster House Treaty envisaged collaboration on a system of systems, which eventually evolved into FCAS. While FCAS itself is discussed below there are other areas that could still be explored. For instance, the development of a joint UCAS programme should be revisited. With the emphasis placed on new technology in both the UK's 2021 IR and the French 2021 Strategic Update this is an area worth re-examining (MoD 2021). Even if a joint aircraft is not produced it would be worthwhile to exchange technical expertise and investigate if potential savings could be achieved through joint development.

The two governments should also work towards a convergence of FCAS and Tempest. While collaboration on a joint aircraft may have ceased, there is still scope for cooperation in other areas. France has repeatedly stressed its desire to cooperate here, while the UK has also indicated that it is willing to collaborate on aircraft technology (Defense News 2018). To that

end both governments should immediately resume cooperation on next generation technology to ensure that their new aircraft are as compatible as possible. There are several benefits to this. Firstly, it preserves the possibility of savings and economies of scale. Collaboration here can take advantage of existing Anglo-French industrial expertise and reduce costs by eliminating unnecessary duplication. Secondly, it will increase interoperability in the future. Operational cooperation would be greatly enhanced if the UK and France were operating similar systems. Thus, even though their aircraft might differ, if the technology they utilise is the same, greater cooperation will be possible. Given that both FCAS and Tempest are intended to be a “system of systems” greater integration here will significantly improve cooperation long term. As both programmes originated from the same foundation, this is not only feasible but common sense. Additionally, cooperation on technology areas leaves open the door for a possible reconvergence, however slim, into a single aircraft programme. If both aircraft operate similar systems and components, then it will still be possible for a joint UK-France programme in the future. While this appears to be a remote possibility at present, there are still serious doubts over the viability of both programmes. There have already been disagreements between France and Germany over the nature of FCAS. Given their divergent strategic cultures it remains to be seen if they will be able to deliver a joint programme. Differences over what the function of FCAS should be, in addition to different export laws have already caused discord between France and Germany (Loss 2021). Equally, while the UK has since partnered with Italy and Sweden, they are not comparable to France. While they both offer industrial support Tempest will now be a primarily British programme, with limited allied assistance. Given the significant costs of aircraft development it is also unclear if the UK will be willing, or indeed able, to bear the cost of such a programme. These factors could thus drive Britain and France back together out of necessity if not desire. Consequently, securing

the maximum amount of compatibility between FCAS and Tempest will ensure that the two programmes can still be integrated should such an outcome occur.

Both governments should also ensure that the Sea Venom anti-ship missile is brought into full operational capacity as soon as possible. As a jointly developed weapon, Sea Venom represents the benefits of the oneMBDA process launched by Lancaster House. By bringing Sea Venom into operation interoperability between both navies will be improved, enhancing the ability of both navies to deploy together. This would further support the development of a joint UK-France carrier group and complement future CJEF deployments and exercise. Additionally, this would also support cross channel procurement chains and open up the possibility of greater industrial cooperation.

It is also imperative that FC/ASW is brought into the production phase as soon as possible. This Lancaster House project has remained in limbo for far too long. The failure to bring it forward in 2020 and 2021 were both disappointing and represent an unacceptable pattern of delay. Whilst it is positive that both governments have made the right decision to continue with the project, it is essential that it actually moves towards production. This is a vital capability that both militaries need and has already seen heavy investment. Failure to produce FC/ASW would be a major waste of taxpayer's money and deprive the UK and France of a next generation asset. Commencing production would not only be a prudent use of resources, it would also enhance future interoperability benefiting both CJEF and the possibility of a joint carrier group. It would also be a vote of confidence in bilateral defence procurement and indicate that both governments are willing to honour their existing agreements despite the complications of Brexit.

The UK should also assist France with the development of its next generation aircraft carrier. Given that the UK has completed construction of both the *HMS Queen Elizabeth* and *HMS Prince of Wales* it has a wealth of experience in next generation carrier design. It should therefore leverage this experience to assist France in the development of PANG. For the past decade France has allowed the UK to make use of the *Charles de Gaulle*, enabling the Royal Navy to maintain some experience of carrier operations and preventing a skills shortage when *HMS Queen Elizabeth* was launched. Consequently, the UK owes France a debt of gratitude. As a close ally the UK should therefore show its gratitude by assisting France in any way it can. This is also in Britain's self-interest as collaboration on PANG will ensure that it is as compatible with British systems as possible. This will assist with future deployments and further support the development of a joint carrier group. It would also open up the possibility of designing certain components through joint procurement chains and firms such as MBDA, further enhancing industrial cooperation and building upon the relationship built by the Lancaster House Treaty.

The oft overlooked Teutates Treaty established nuclear cooperation, a historic first for the UK and France. The joint nuclear testing centre at Valduc will reach completion in 2022 which is an excellent milestone in Anglo-French cooperation (Ricketts 2020). Going forwards the UK and France should investigate methods of enhancing their cooperation in this area. Teutates will remain in force for another forty years and both governments should aim to make the most out of it (Ricketts 2020). They should investigate expanding their existing facilities, ideally by expanding the joint presence and AWE Aldermaston to make it comparable to the site at Valduc.

Diplomatic

On the diplomatic front it is in the interests of both Britain and France that the UK establishes a structured relationship with the EU in terms of defence. Simply cooperating on an ad-hoc basis will not be sustainable in the long term. This thesis has already analysed the various impediments to Anglo-French defence cooperation that new EU defence initiatives may create. This would be detrimental to Britain, France and the EU. As the primary engines of European defence, anything that damages cooperation between the UK and France will damage the defence of Europe as a whole. Equally, while it is no longer an EU member, it is unreasonable to expect the UK to adopt the same defence relationship with the EU as other third-party states such as Norway. To that end bespoke solutions must be found to accommodate this new reality. Three possible solutions that could eliminate these problems are outlined below.

The first option, and the most ideal, is for the UK to pursue full membership of the EU's defence architecture. Richard Whitman has proposed something similar to this, which he refers to as the 'reverse Denmark' option (Whitman 2018). This would include membership of PESCO, CARD, the EDA and EDF. This is not an option that has been widely considered within the current discourse. Current discussion has limited British involvement in EU structures to third party status. This is the proposal put forward by Jolyon Howorth (2017), Benjamin Martill and Monika Sus (2018) and Simon Sweeney & Neil Winn (2020). These scholars have all suggested that the UK participate in EU initiatives as a third party, either on an ad-hoc basis or more regularly. However, they all recognise that this is unlikely to work as the UK will not accept a reduction to the same status as Norway. That is why this chapter

proposes an alternative approach in which the UK would resume full membership of the EU's defence architecture.

As a full member of these organisations the UK would be able to continue its cooperation with France without EU interference. The UK would be able to participate in EU initiatives as it saw fit and continue to shape their development. Obviously, there are several obstacles to this option. For the UK this would require it to re-join several EU institutions. British involvement in the EDA and EDF would also likely involve contributions to their budget. For the current British government this would likely be politically unpalatable. Equally, the EU would have to amend its existing rules to allow a non-member to join certain EU institutions. Given the EU's previous insistence that the UK could not have an *a la carte* approach to EU membership (Barnier 2018), that it was all or nothing, making such an accommodation for the UK would also be a difficult decision for Brussels to swallow. However, this approach is not only beneficial but practical. With an appropriate degree of pragmatism and flexibility both sides can make this option work.

As it stands the European Council allows non-EU members to participate in PESCO initiatives on a case-by-case basis provided those nations share the EU's values (European Council 2020). Anger over Brexit aside, the UK clearly meets that criterion. Currently, the US, Canada and Norway are all participating in PESCO's military mobility programme (European Council 2021), indicating that the Council's offer is a real one and not merely theoretical. Additionally, PESCO is overseen by the European Council rather than the Commission. It is therefore far more intergovernmental than institutional. British admittance would require a political agreement rather than a new treaty. Furthermore, participation in PESCO is voluntary for EU members (PESCO 2021). Member states may opt out of PESCO entirely, or they may join and only

participate in specific programmes. The UK could therefore join as a full member and only participate in programmes of its choice. This would allow Britain and France to continue cooperating unhindered, while also eliminating British fears of being tied to EU institutions and EU concerns that the UK might seek to hinder EU defence integration.

A similar approach could be taken with CARD. As another initiative driven by the Council rather than Commission, British participation could again be managed by political agreement. Given its consultative nature, the UK could participate in CARD without being bound by any of its conclusions. Equally, the EU would be able to coordinate with the UK without the risk of a non-member unduly influencing EU policy. British membership of the EDA and EDF would be more difficult but still achievable. The EU has already signed several administrative agreements with non-members allowing them to participate in EDA programmes, albeit without voting rights. While membership without voting rights would be unacceptable to the UK, the precedent for third party participation is set. In exchange for full membership and voting rights the UK could contribute towards the EDA's budget. These would be miniscule in comparison to the UK's previous EU contributions but would be welcomed by the EDA, given the loss of British funding that occurred after Brexit. A similar arrangement could also be reached over British involvement in the EDF. In exchange for a budgetary contribution the UK should be allowed to participate in programmes supported by the EDF and be exempt to any barriers placed around the EU defence market. This option is in both British and French interests and should be advocated by both governments. For the UK it would eliminate barriers to cooperation with a key European ally and assist in normalising relations with the EU. For France it would ensure that the UK is still involved in European defence and keep its sizable capabilities within the EU's orbit.

If full membership of EU institutions is not viable then the UK should seek a form of “associate membership”. This would be a more bespoke arrangement in which the UK would remain formally outside of EU structures but associate itself with them. The concept of “associate membership” for the UK has been raised before, however it has often been ill defined. It is inconceivable that the UK would agree to implement EU policy without having a say in its creation. This would be akin to third party status with a different title. Ben Tonra (2019) has outlined a scenario in which the UK is represented in EU institutions which would allow for a British “voice” in decision making but would stop short of allowing actual British decision making power. This would be a positive step but would still limit British options and would be unlikely to satisfy the UK, as whilst this would be better than third party membership, it would still prevent a British role in decision making. Joseph Dobbs (2016) has also raised the possibility of “associated membership” of the EU’s defence union, however he does not provide much detail as to how this would operate, and crucially how it would differentiate from third party status.

As envisaged here this associate membership would essentially amount to full membership under a different name. The UK would remain a non-member but with the unique status of “associate member” it would participate in EU defence structures as though it was a full member. In terms of both PESCO and CARD this would be straight forward. As an associate member the UK would attend meetings of the European Council, when they related to PESCO or CARD, and participate in their programmes when it sees fit. Associate membership would entitle the UK to decide on PESCO participation by itself, rather than require admittance by the Council on a case-by-case basis. Equally, with the EDA and EDF while the UK would not be a full member, as an associate member it would be entitled to participate in their programmes and have a vote on their governing bodies.

This would of course most likely be accompanied by financial contributions towards their budgets. While associate membership is intended to function as full membership under a different name, it is proposed here as a solution to the political obstacles that would stand in the way of full British membership. While pragmatism on both sides would make British membership completely feasible, the political considerations of both the UK and the EU may render this option unviable. Re-joining EU institutions so soon after Brexit may prove to be a non-starter for many in the current UK government, especially given its preference for placing UK sovereignty over all else, even when it is clearly in British interests to reach such an accord with the EU. The EU may also be opposed given its insistence that the UK cannot cherry pick what aspects of EU membership it wants. While it would also be in French interests to push for British membership of EU defence institutions, President Macron has previously taken a hard line on future UK-EU relations and so may struggle to backtrack now. Consequently, associate membership offers a face-saving compromise. The UK would not simply be re-joining, but rather a new arrangement that reflects its unique situation within Europe would be established. This would allow both sides to claim that they have defended their principles while still achieving a desired result.

A third possibility would be to establish an EU-UK Defence Council that would oversee defence cooperation between the two and minimise barriers to cooperation. A similar concept to this, a European Security Council (ESC) has been discussed by several scholars. It has even been mooted by France and Germany as a means for greater cooperation going forward. Luigi Scazzieri (2019) has outlined the proposal extensively for the Centre of European Reform. Such a body would bring together the UK, France, Germany as well as other European states to coordinate their defence and security policies. This would ensure that the UK remains engaged with European defence post-Brexit. Ulrike Franke (2020) has also raised

this as a possibility for future UK-EU defence cooperation. Anand Menon (2021) has also proposed such a body. Menon (2021) proposes that this council would consist of the E3 and possibly some other states and would allow for greater coordination between the three. Whilst this is an interesting proposal the creation of an ESC raises some significant questions. Who would be its members? If it is just the UK, France and Germany then it is little more than the institutionalisation of the E3. Whilst this isn't necessarily a bad idea, it is hardly a European body. If it includes other states then how would they be selected? Would other states outside of the EU be granted membership? Furthermore, how would the EU be represented? Would its representatives attend alongside member states? These questions raise serious doubts over the viability of an ESC. That is why this thesis proposes a purely EU-UK body.

An EU-UK Defence Council would contain a governing body consisting of the British Prime Minister, the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission. Given their status France and Germany could also attend, akin to how the EU attends G7 meetings. This council would ensure permanent UK representation at EU defence bodies such as the EDA. It would also deal with requests by the UK to participate in PESCO initiatives. Agreements on British participation could be reached within this council, thereby expediting the process of British involvement. Equally, should the UK wish to participate in particular programmes supported by the EDA or EDF, British involvement could be agreed within the council. This defence council would also be a standing body that would meet regularly. This way it can seek harmonisation between UK and EU policies and attempt to mitigate or eliminate any obstacles that may be created by the development of EU defence institutions. This is however the least desirable of the three options presented here. While the creation of a UK-EU Defence Council would go some way towards harmonising cooperation between the UK and the EU, it would not offer the same benefits as full membership. This council would allow for

regular contact between UK and EU defence officials and would be helpful in minimising the barriers that the UK could face, for example needing unanimous approval to participate in PESCO. However it would still keep the UK at arm's length. For France whilst this would ensure that there is formalised communication between the UK and EU, keeping the UK semi-detached in this way would be detrimental as it places the burden of EU defence on them and would still not remove all barriers to cooperation. As such whilst this council would be an option to pursue if full or associate membership is not available to the UK, it should not be considered a first choice. Rather this is a backup solution should attempts to secure a more beneficial option not succeed.

Outside of formalising the UK's defence relationship with the EU, it would also be in both Britain and France's interest to push for greater cooperation between the EU and NATO. Given the importance of NATO to the UK and the EU to France, improving cooperation between the two would benefit both nations greatly. EU-NATO relations are currently governed under the Berlin Plus Agreement that grants the EU the right to use NATO C2 structures and assets to conduct its own operations, subject to NATO consent and having had a right of first refusal. It would be in both Britain and France's interest to push for a similar agreement in regard to the EU. An agreement that stated that NATO members can participate in EU operations that use NATO structures would benefit both the EU and the UK. The EU would be able to integrate partner nations into its operations while the UK would be able to participate in EU operations if it considers them to be in its interest.

On the military level both governments should continue to build upon the military-to-military contacts that have been ongoing since 2010. Importantly the UK should resume sending a liaison officer to the *Charles de Gaulle*. This strengthened relationships between the Royal

Navy and Marine Nationale and should be resumed. The UK should also invite France to send liaison officers to both *HMS Queen Elizabeth* and *HMS Prince of Wales*. This would further enhance inter-navy relations and give France the chance to experience next generation carrier operations, further improving the ability to deploy a joint carrier group and repaying France for helping the UK to retain experience of carrier operations. This programme should also be expanded to other vessels within both navies to ensure that both sides have gained a range of experience across the full spectrum of their deployable assets. The exchanges that have taken place between both armies should also continue. Embedding British officers in the French army and vice versa builds interpersonal links and will assist with future joint deployments. These should continue and be expanded to further bolster inter-army cooperation. It would also be beneficial to expand meetings of the Defence Ministerial Council. As it stands the Defence Ministerial Council is intended to meet three times a year (Joint Declaration 2018). Meetings should be expanded to include junior British ministers and their French equivalents. This will build on relationships between both defence ministries and enhance relationships that already exist.

Both governments should also invest in improving E12 to ensure that it becomes an effective vehicle for cooperation. As already mentioned, E12 has the potential to offer a new avenue of cooperation outside of existing structures. Consequently, it could allow the UK and France to cooperate both bilaterally and with select allies. However, the Initiative still lacks significant detail and there are several questions over it will function that need to be answered. To that end both governments should establish a working group to build upon E12's founding principles and make it truly fit for purpose. Firstly, it should be clarified that E12 will remain outside of existing organisations. While this has already been stated it is important that the UK and France present a united front and affirm that they will oppose any German attempts

to merge E12 with EU structures. This will ensure that E12 remains a purely intergovernmental grouping that allows EU and non-EU members to cooperate militarily on a flexible basis. The UK should also offer to support the E12 Secretariat in Paris. E12 is currently being coordinated by a small secretariat based in the French Ministère des Armées in Paris. Whilst this reflects the flexible nature of E12, it also presents concerns about how an E12 deployment would operate effectively with such a limited structure behind it. As such the UK should offer to send a delegation to Paris to assist with the planning and operation of E12. This would not only strengthen the credibility of E12, but it would also build upon existing Anglo-French cooperation and offer a source of regular contact between both militaries, thus somewhat compensating for the loss of regular contact through EU channels. It would also signal to France that the UK remains a reliable partner that is willing to contribute to European defence.

It is also important to develop the trilateral relationship between the UK, France and United States. Building greater trilateral cooperation with the US will in turn benefit bilateral cooperation between the UK and France. The Libyan case proved that the UK and France can take the lead in multilateral operations. However, it also proved that this leadership requires some level of support from the United States. Operations in Mali further demonstrate this, as while France has been firmly in the lead, the UK and US have supplied ISTAR, strategic lift and air-to-air refuelling assets (Delaporte 2020). As global threats increasingly multiply, greater military cooperation between the West's three main military actors is in all of their interests. Anglo-French leadership is more necessary than ever, but it does not operate in a vacuum. Equally, America's foremost place amongst Western nations is undisputed but its resources are not unlimited. All three nations share numerous interests for which a division of responsibilities would be in each of their interests. There has already been some evidence of

this so far, with Britain and France taking the lead in the Baltic states and Sahel respectively as they have a common interest in stability there. America also shares this interest and supports the UK through NATO and France through the provision of the assets mentioned above. Greater trilateral coordination between these three nations could allow for increased burden sharing to their mutual benefit. The 2018 airstrikes on Syria launched by the US, UK and France demonstrate the potential for these three allies to act in conjunction. Greater cooperation would be particularly beneficial as all three nations increase their focus on the Indo-Pacific. The benefits of greater Anglo-French cooperation in that region has already been discussed but expanding that cooperation to include an American dimension would be of even greater benefit. As an already established power in the region cooperation with the US is logical for both Britain and France. Greater British and French involvement there also opens up new possibilities for the US, as it can rely on its allies to fulfil roles that it has previously undertaken, freeing up US forces to be deployed elsewhere.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined a number of proposals to improve the Entente Cordiale. It has covered the breadth of the relationship offering solutions to the various problems outlined earlier in this thesis. By far the greatest amount of work needs to be done in the diplomatic sphere, particularly in regard to the EU. This chapter has set out several proposals which the UK and France could adopt to mitigate the problems created by Brexit. Both governments should push for British membership of EU defence institutions. This is in both their interests and the wider EU's. While such an arrangement may seem politically difficult at present, in practice it is eminently feasible. Given the UK's unique position within Europe a bespoke response is needed. The EU cannot expect the UK to accept the same arrangements as other

European states. That is why a display of pragmatism is needed from both sides. France should push for the UK to be admitted into the EDA, EDF, PESCO and CARD and the UK should accept. Failure to do so would be damaging to both sides and sacrifice real strategic interest for political point scoring. The UK and France should also embark on a number of other diplomatic initiatives including a reform of EU-NATO coordination and greater collaboration between themselves and the US. Militarily they should continue to build on the progress that has been made since 2010. A new timetable must be drawn up to hold new bilateral exercises to ensure that CJEF remains a credible military force. This would also compliment continuing efforts to establish a joint carrier group which should be a priority area for both governments. A renewed focus should also be placed on industrial cooperation. Sea Venom must be brought into general operation and FC/ASW must be taken forward into the production phase. These will benefit Franco-British industry and improve interoperability. Both governments should also seek harmonisation of their respective next generation fighter programmes, with the aim to make them as interoperable as possible. This will maintain industrial cooperation and keep alive the possibility of convergence in the future. New areas of cooperation should also be sought out and invested in as soon as possible. Taken collectively the proposals contained within this chapter offer a range of solutions to existing problems and identify numerous ways to improve the Entente Cordiale, ensuring that it remains fit for purpose in the twenty first century.

9. Conclusion

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis has been to ascertain the current state of Anglo-French defence cooperation. It has done this by assessing how Britain and France cooperate across a range of areas. This chapter is dedicated to drawing together the conclusions made throughout this thesis. It begins by considering the theoretical aspects of the Entente and reviews its complex nature. It then considers the historical background of the Entente that has underpinned the relationship. The chapter then outlines several themes identified at the start of the thesis that have been present throughout the relationship, which are analysed within the context of the case studies considered previously. Finally, the chapter considers new areas of research that would improve our understanding of the Entente further.

A complex theoretical framework

While traditional international relations theories fail to properly capture the complexity of the Entente, alliance theory offers some useful tools for understanding the relationship. Through the application of alliance typologies, it is possible to gain a more nuanced understanding of the relationship. This is a true strength of alliance theory as it provides the framework through which to study the Entente in much greater detail than traditional theories. Alliance typologies provide more granular explanations than traditional theories as to why states form alliances. These are more applicable to the cases of individual nations as opposed to the sweeping claims of more traditional theories. The typologies of Singer and Small (1966), Fedder (1968) and Ghez (2010) all provide more practical explanations of alliance formation which are applicable to the Anglo-French case, which contrasts with Waltz' (1979) and Walt's (1987) more abstract focuses on balances of power or threat. This also

allows for comparisons with other alliances to be made, thus further enhancing the academic utility of alliance theory.

Similarly, alliance theory provides a more nuanced view of Anglo-French defence cooperation. By applying multiple alliance typologies it is possible to analyse the various layers of reasoning that influence Anglo-French defence cooperation. Given the complexities of their relationship outlined in this thesis it is clear that no single theory can encapsulate the entire rationale for the UK and France's continuing defence partnership. This is why alliance typologies are so useful as they more accurately reflect the reasons why Britain and France collaborate on defence matters. As such it is only through the application of alliance theory that it is possible to achieve this level of academic rigour.

Alliance theory also makes it possible to chart the evolution of the Entente over time. As has been stressed repeatedly the Entente has changed constantly throughout its history. It is part of the relationship's peculiarity that it is regularly in flux. By employing multiple alliance typologies it is possible to identify how the Entente has changed and make comparisons with today. This is useful when analysing the current state of defence cooperation, particularly when analysing if defence cooperation is currently stronger or weaker than in the past. Equally, it is possible to identify if the underlying reasons for the alliance have changed which would thus necessitate a re-evaluation of our understanding of the Entente.

However this can also be a weakness of applying alliance theory to the Entente, as even here the peculiarity of the relationship is present. The evolving nature of the Entente necessitates continuous re-evaluation to ensure that the typologies ascribed to it remain relevant. As discussed at length the Entente can often be ascribed several different typologies during any period in its history. At present it best fits the description of Jeremy Ghez' (2010) natural and

historical alliance and Edwin Fedder's (1968) augmentative alliance. Given that the Entente corresponds to two of Ghez' (2010) three alliance types as well as Fedder's (1968), the complex nature of the alliance is clear. These are of course only the current typologies the Entente corresponds to. As discussed already it previously corresponded to Fedder's (1968) pre-emptive and strategic alliance types. As such in order for alliance theory to remain relevant it is essential to maintain a flexible approach to its application when studying the Entente. This contrasts with traditional theories which aim to provide a simpler catch all explanation of the global system. This makes using alliance theory more difficult than traditional theories. However, the added conceptual rigour that alliance theory offers makes it worth the additional work necessary to ensure it remains accurate.

Its peculiarity is further evidenced when considering the concept of alignment. As discussed already alignment is the concept that two states can agree to support one another and cooperate even if they are not part of a formal alliance. For much of the Entente's existence it has more accurately been a form of alignment rather than a full alliance. From 1904 until 1947 Britain and France were only official allies for ten years, from 1914-1918 and again from 1939 – 1945 (Stone 2000). However for much of this period they remained in alignment, as this thesis has shown. It can also be argued that the Peculiar Relationship has been evident during periods when Britain and France were formally allies but were clearly not in alignment. Numerous examples of the post-1945 world illustrate this point, such as Britain and France arming and financing different sides in the Nigerian Civil War despite being formal NATO allies, or their radically different stances on NATO during the Cold War.

From a theoretical perspective the Entente Cordiale is indeed peculiar. Continuous evolution makes it difficult to accurately define it with any one theory. As has been highlighted

throughout this thesis, different theoretical perspectives can be seen at work throughout the relationship. While the relationship is currently most accurately described by the typologies of Fedder (1968) and Ghez (2010), given the relationships history this is likely to change in the future.

The shadows of the past

As this thesis has made clear the Entente has a long and complex history. This history has contributed towards it becoming such a peculiar relationship. Even in the origins of the Entente it is possible to see the issues that would become ingrained components of the relationship. The confusion over what the Entente Cordiale meant, with both governments reading into the agreement what they wanted, would become a hallmark of Anglo-French relations. This kind of peculiarity has occurred time and again, as shown throughout this thesis. Britain and France regularly have significantly different interpretations of the same event. Whether it was the peace conference at Versailles, the lessons of Suez or their approach to Libya both sides have consistently misinterpreted the other. On each of these occasions Britain and France drew radically different interpretations from their shared experiences. This has been a hallmark of the peculiarity of their alliance since its foundation. It is further compounded by the fact that they often have differing perceptions of where their interests lie, which has often led them to view each other as antagonistic, even when this has not been the case.

Also present in 1904 was the Anglo-French tendency to agree on a policy for radically different reasons. Britain approached the original entente with the intention of smoothing over some outstanding colonial differences and using France as a means to improve their relations with Russia. France saw the Entente as the foundation of a new alliance that brought Britain into

a system designed to oppose Imperial Germany. Approaching cooperation with conflicting goals has been a recurring theme of the Peculiar Relationship. At the turn of the century Britain and France collaborated to establish a military capability for the EU. Yet their reasons for doing so could not have been more different. Britain wanted EU members to improve their capabilities to make them more effective NATO members. France meanwhile wanted an autonomous EU capability that could stand independent of NATO. In 2010, while they shared some motivations for signing the Lancaster House Treaty, for France the Treaty was a means to bring Britain closer to Europe and away from its traditional Atlanticist mindset, while for Britain the Treaty bound France closer to NATO and the Atlantic alliance. This contradictory element at the heart of their relationship has been one of the main factors throughout the history of the Peculiar Relationship.

It is also clear that cooperation between Britain and France has been strongest when they face a shared threat to force them together. This can be seen throughout the history of the Entente. In 1904 the actions of Germany compelled Britain to abandon its long-standing isolationism and to adopt a Francophile foreign policy. The same was true in the 1930s when German aggression rejuvenated the Entente. It could even be argued that the financial crash of 2008 posed a threat to their respective places in the world and forced them to seek out new avenues of cooperation to preserve their global positions. In all these instances Britain and France were faced with an external threat that forced them to put aside their differences and focus on their shared interests. Conversely of course this has meant that when an external threat has been lacking, both sides have often reverted to competition rather than cooperation. The almost immediate return to imperial rivalry after the First World War, their divergences after the Second World War and the Suez Crisis and arguably their more recent disputes as the financial crash has receded all stand testament to fact that Britain and France

have often required a threat to force them to collaborate. These returns to competition have occurred even though they continued to share numerous interests that would have been better served by cooperation.

As well as these contradictory aspects existing within the Entente from its inception, the peculiarity of the relationship has been evident time and again throughout its history. At many pivotal moments of their relationship, Britain and France have sought to simultaneously cooperate and undermine each other. Following the First World War they competed for influence in the Middle East, setting their proxies against one another and fomenting unrest in each other's territories. At the same time they were negotiating arms reduction treaties in Washington DC. After the Second World War Britain transported French troops back to Indochina to reassert French control there, whilst also sending its own troops into the Levant to force a French withdrawal. In recent times France has pushed for a hard-line during the Brexit negotiations whilst also setting up E12 as a way to maintain defence cooperation with the UK. Equally, the UK undermined France with the announcement of AUKUS despite pushing for Western solidarity on issues like China and climate change. Time and again Britain and France have demonstrated that they are capable of viewing one another as both friends and rivals.

The history of the Peculiar Relationship continues to influence it today. Their shared history of conflict has ingrained certain perceptions of each other that are hard to unlearn. Within the UK there are still suspicions of the French as unreliable and only interested in themselves. When the two countries experience tensions or disagreements comparisons with historical conflicts are often quick to materialise (Mayne et al 2004). In France concerns about *Les Anglo-Saxon's* across the Channel are often reawakened. Governments on both sides often

find that playing to their respective national audiences by blaming the other can have political benefits. This further demonstrates why this is a Peculiar Relationship, in no other alliance are two allies so closely aligned in their values and interests yet able to sustain such high levels of division.

Continuing peculiarity today

There are a number of themes that have been evident within the contemporary Entente that have been outlined throughout this thesis. These themes are what gives the Entente its peculiar nature. These themes are outlined below along with how they relate to the cases considered within this thesis.

Atlantic instincts and continental ambitions

A theme that is still evident within the Entente is the constant tension between the UK's instinctive Atlanticism and the French desire for strategic autonomy. As discussed previously this tension characterised the Entente throughout the twentieth century. Since the Suez Crisis the UK has sought to align itself as closely with the US as it can (Self 2010). Suez convinced British policy makers that Britain could not rely on its own strength and so the best way to maintain influence in the world was to cultivate a close relationship with the US (Peden 2012). To that end it has firmly cemented NATO as the basis of its defence policy and rarely acted independently. Throughout the Cold War the bulk of Britain's military might was committed to NATO to defend Western Europe from the USSR (Duval 1989). The Falklands War and the 1999 intervention in Sierra Leone are rare instances where the UK has intervened abroad by itself. Instead coalition has been the default of British operations abroad. France in contrast has gone to great lengths to maintain its strategic autonomy (Vaisse 1989). It maintained extensive forces throughout the world and regularly intervened abroad when it has

considered its interests to be at risk (Duval 1989). After withdrawing from NATO's integrated military command, it repeatedly sought to develop a European alternative, often clashing with the UK over the influence of America on European defence (Tardy 2003). It is also another aspect of the relationships enduring peculiarity that Britain dedicated the bulk of its forces to the defence of Europe, despite its suspicion of continental entanglements, whilst France, the champion of European solidarity, undermined collective defence efforts by withdrawing from NATO's joint command and committing so many resources to interventions abroad. Where Britain has accepted its role as the junior partner to an American hegemon, France has always been uneasy with the preponderance of American power. This dichotomy has influenced the relationship for decades. As shown throughout this thesis it also remains a potent force today. The last decade of Anglo-French relations has been influenced by this dynamic. What is particularly interesting is that prior to Brexit both governments seemed to have learned how to compromise effectively. Since 2016 this period of understanding has seemingly come to an end.

The Lancaster House Treaty was in many ways a break from these traditional ways of thinking (Ostermann 2015). For the UK it marked a recognition that more needed to be done to develop its ability to cooperate with allies outside of traditional NATO structures (Antil et al 2013). This challenged decades of British thinking that it would not operate outside of a coalition led by the US. For France it indicated that pure strategic autonomy was not a viable option (Ostermann 2015). Greater cooperation with its allies was necessary if France was to maintain its world role. In particular, the agreement that CJEF could be deployed as part of a NATO mission indicated a show of support for NATO, and a change in French attitudes towards a more Atlanticist mode of thinking. In many ways Lancaster House was a compromise between these two positions. The creation of CJEF and a joint carrier group

allowed for the possibility of bilateral operations that would promote greater autonomy for Britain and France, a key French objective (Ostermann 2015). Equally, agreeing that CJEF could be deployed as part of a NATO operation assuaged British sensibilities about undermining the centrality of the Alliance. Furthermore, by accepting that CJEF could be deployed in support of CSDP missions, the UK demonstrated a commitment to EU defence, satisfying France without having to agree to greater defence integration at the EU level. This remarkable achievement of having satisfied both British and French objectives is why Lancaster House is such a seminal event in the development of the Entente. It established the framework through which they have cooperated for the last decade (Pannier 2020). By compromising on their long-standing positions an accord was reached, the likes of which had not been achieved in decades. It could almost be argued that agreeing on such a convergence of issues was itself peculiar, given the previous decades of disagreement.

The Libyan campaign also displayed this dynamic at work illustrating how it can still cause friction. As has been explored the initial campaign was marred by controversy as Britain and France could not agree how to coordinate their operations (Grand 2015). This unfortunate chain of events embodied their traditional divide. The British preference for coordination with the United States and for an eventual NATO operation was consistent with their Atlanticist inclinations. This adhered with established British doctrine that coalition warfare was the primary domain of NATO. Conversely, the French proposal for a Franco-British operation that would eventually morph into a coalition of the willing was aligned with their desire to maintain strategic autonomy. This was consistent with French doctrine of independent operations outside of formal structures. This dispute brought Anglo-French divisions to the fore and made it clear that despite the rapprochement of Lancaster House, old differences

still lingered. Crucially in this case however, after the initial controversy Britain and France were able to develop the means to overcome it.

After these difficulties were overcome, it was noticeable that the campaign operated as a hybrid of the two approaches. Officially within NATO, *Operation Unified Protector* adhered to British preferences that coalitions should be conducted through NATO with heavy US involvement (Goulter 2015). Whilst this was the case initially, as discussed previously the involvement of several non-NATO members meant that *Unified Protector* rapidly took on the appearance of a coalition of the willing, rather than a traditional NATO operation (Grand 2015). This allowed France to promote their vision for an Anglo-French-led campaign that went beyond a purely NATO construct (Heisbourg 2021). Additionally, the American decision to withdraw from frontline operations and provide logistical support, allowed Anglo-French leadership to develop. This had the dual function of supporting both the British requirement for operations to take place within NATO and French desires to take a leading role. Thus, in Libya it is possible to see that once again a compromise was found between British Atlanticism and French autonomy.

Two other instances exemplify this brief period of understanding. The first is British support for the French in Mali. *Operation Barkhane* is an ad-hoc coalition under French leadership intended to stabilise Mali, a former French colony, and protect Western, particularly French, interests. This is consistent with traditional French policy in Africa. According to the Ministère des Armées, France intervened in Africa twenty four times between 1964 and 2014 (Vallin 2014). The majority of these interventions have been unilateral operations, with a minority conducted through various international organisations but still under French leadership (Recchia and Tardy 2020). These have almost all been within former French colonies in which

France sees itself as having a sphere of interest (Gegout 2018). The UK in contrast has been remarkably circumspect when it comes to Africa, even its former colonies. The UK has not sought to intervene in the continent, maintaining only a minor military presence. British bases in Kenya are the only major permanent military installations it maintains there. Unlike France the UK does not consider itself to have a sphere of influence in Africa or major economic interests (Gegout 2018). *Operation Pallister* in Sierra Leone is a notable exception to this but General David Richards unilateral decision to expand his military mandate is beyond the scope of this thesis.

This is why the British decision to support France in Mali is so interesting. For France this was a routine operation, but for the UK it was a substantial shift in policy. The British decision to support a coalition outside of NATO, especially one that was led by France and not the US, was contrary to established British practice. Even in Libya, in a campaign that went beyond the scope of NATO, the UK had still insisted that operations be conducted under the NATO banner (Goulter 2015). In agreeing to support *Operation Barkhane* the UK was signalling to France that it was willing to support a more autonomous approach to defence. Whilst the British contribution has been relatively small in numerical terms; the strategic value has been significant. The deployment of RAF C-17 Globemaster's has provided France with a strategic lift capability that it previously lacked (Heisbourg 2021). Crucially, whilst the US also provided France with a similar capability at the onset of the operation, this support was temporary unlike that offered by the UK. Equally the deployment of Chinook helicopters has supported the French army in its day-to-day operations, complimenting the deployment of French medium helicopters in the region. The UK has also provided ISTAR support by deploying an RAF Sentinel R1 and troops from the Royal Corps of Signals (MoD 2019). Whilst the number of assets deployed has been kept small, their impact has been significant as they have

compensated for French capability caps. This is a clear example of the UK supporting France's autonomous approach to defence whilst demonstrating that it is willing to be more flexible when it comes to deploying military force abroad.

Equally, French involvement in NATO's EFP in the Baltics signalled that they were willing to support a more Atlanticist approach to defence. NATO's Estonian battlegroup has been led by the UK since 2017, with Britain and France making the only meaningful contributions. In 2017 it consisted of 800 British and 300 French soldiers (NATO 2017), whilst in 2022 it consisted of 828 British and 300 French soldiers with 2 Danes and 1 Icelander (NATO 2021). Crucially, France has provided 12 Leclerc tanks, 8 IFV's and a complement of logistical vehicles to support both them and their British counterparts (NATO 2021). This has been particularly beneficial for two reasons. Firstly, the UK has also deployed armoured vehicles so additional logistical support is beneficial and supports British leadership of the battlegroup. Secondly, as the main purpose of EFP is to deter Russian aggression, armoured vehicles are the kind of assets necessary to fulfil this role. France is therefore providing a crucial asset that complements their British allies, just as the UK has done in Mali. Without French support this battlegroup would essentially amount to a British deployment as other allied contributions have been tokenistic at best. In 2018 Denmark did deploy a single infantry company, but this is not comparable to a French armoured detachment. Therefore, the French contribution has been vital in ensuring that the Estonian battlegroup is a truly multinational force and not simply a British operation. Furthermore, by committing their forces almost continually since 2017 France has demonstrated its willingness to support NATO, a key British objective.

Unfortunately, this newfound spirit of accommodation does not appear to have lasted. The turning point has clearly been Brexit. This is to be expected since Brexit represents the biggest

shift in British foreign policy since the Suez Crisis. Whilst following Lancaster House Britain and France had found ways to accommodate their respective defence preferences, Brexit has brought this to an end. In leaving the EU it appeared to France that Britain had turned its back on the Continent. In the French mind the British had finally made a choice and chosen Atlanticism. Whilst Paris has always remained open to cooperation with Washington, this has always been grounded in its belief that an autonomous EU is a necessity. Consequently, French Ministers have accused the UK of accepting a form of vassalisation to the US (Beaune 2021) and of being the “fifth wheel” of American foreign policy (Le Drain 2021). Brexit has therefore forced both sides to revert to their traditional ways of thinking breaking the pattern of compromise and cooperation started by Lancaster House. It is in keeping with the history of the peculiar relationship that a period of mutually beneficial cooperation has been overturned by a new era of division with little tangible benefit.

Brexit has driven France to forcefully push for greater EU defence cooperation. As this policy continues France is being drawn further away from a UK which finds itself unable to influence the process. Having sat on the side-lines while the EEC was created the UK is now repeating history. The EU is embarking on a range of new initiatives aimed at deepening defence cooperation between members in which the UK cannot participate. As France becomes more involved in EU programmes that exclude non-members, this will naturally reduce its cooperation with the UK. It is also likely that France will face a difficult choice in the future, having to decide whether to cooperate with the UK or the EU. This would be an unenviable position as while Britain is obviously a more credible military partner, France may well feel compelled to choose EU solidarity instead. The existence of E12 does leave open the possibility of continued cooperation in Europe, but as mentioned the lack of detail surrounding it raises more questions than answers.

Brexit has also forced the UK to strengthen its relationship with the US as a means to compensate for its loss of influence in the EU. Consequently, Britain has already begun to reorient its defence policy in ways that would ensure it remains relevant to the United States. This is somewhat ironic as Britain now finds itself more dependent upon the US despite being a less useful ally outside of the EU. The British tilt to the Pacific is to a certain extent an attempt to demonstrate to the US that the UK is capable of operating alongside it across the globe (Policy Exchange 2021). In a post-Brexit world it is important for the British government to demonstrate that it remains a global player (Whitman 2021). The decision to deploy *HMS Queen Elizabeth* to the Indo-Pacific on her maiden voyage to conduct freedom of navigation drills in the South China Sea was intended to be evidence of the UK's commitment to region (Patalano 2021). The creation of AUKUS is another consequence of this. The Anglo-American decision to sell nuclear powered submarines to Australia, despite Australia already having a contract with France, is a clear signal to the world that the UK is putting its alliance with America first (Niblett 2021). Whilst the French reaction was in part overblown Britain's willingness to undermine France's contract with Australia without consultation is a clear indication that there has already been a reorientation away from the cooperative spirit created by Lancaster House. This division is likely to continue to grow as EU defence integration deepens.

Unless remedial action is taken the UK and France are likely to fall victim to a strategic drift that will pull them further apart. This is particularly unfortunate as the rationale for greater cooperation is arguably stronger now than it was a decade ago. As the poles of global power shift both sides would be better served through cooperation with an equal, rather than wasteful competition. Both sides have far more to gain from cooperation than from competition (Chabal 2021). The UK cannot thrive if it is cut off from the defence of Europe.

Being shut out of EU defence initiatives is not in Britain's interest. A rupture between the UK and France threatens the foundations of the Atlantic alliance. If Europe's two major military powers descend into acrimony it damages all of NATO. Equally, there can be no autonomous Europe without British involvement. The rest of the EU simply do not have the resources or the will to make such an outcome possible. If France desires greater strategic autonomy then it must work with its allies, particularly the UK. Their 2021 Strategic Update recognises that autonomy does not mean isolation (Ministère des Armées 2021). Equally the UK's IR accepts that it must cooperate with allies (MoD 2021). Once more we can see the peculiarity of the relationship at work here. Despite both sides recognising that they need to work with allies to maintain their global positions, they have so far refused to acknowledge that this means each other. Both nations defence reviews are noticeable for just how little they mention each other. It is classic Anglo-French peculiarity at work to identify the same solution to their problems but to be prevented from cooperating because self-made barriers and foolish disagreements. This is a situation that needs to be remedied. Therefore, they must work to restore the spirit of compromise that existed before Brexit. Recognising each other's strategic preferences and then accommodating them for their mutual benefit produced dividends prior to 2016 and can do so again. The alternative is to allow their old debate between Atlanticism and autonomy to divide them further, causing damage to both.

Unity around a common foe

Just as in the past, the contemporary Entente has often been at its strongest when Britain and France have been rallying against a common threat. The Entente was transformed from a simple agreement to full alliance precisely because of the common enemy of Imperial Germany. This dynamic has also influenced relations in recent years. Many of the

improvements in defence cooperation seen over the past two decades have been in response to a shared threat.

The creation of the CSDP was driven by a recognition that Britain and France faced a common threat, namely military irrelevance on their own continent. The realisation that they had been unable to intervene in Yugoslavia to stop the violence taking place there had been a national embarrassment for both sides (Howorth 2007). The UK was forced to accept that despite dedicating its forces to the defence of Europe it had been unable to prevent a war from actually occurring, whilst France had to grapple with the reality that it could topple dictators in Africa but could not stop genocide in Europe. Meanwhile both governments recognised that the US could not always be relied upon to act in Europe's interests (Dover 2006). This forced the UK to accept that there had been a divergence of transatlantic interests in which Britain and America would not always be on the same side. Where previously the UK could rely upon the US to always intervene in conflicts that threatened British interests, it was clear that the post-Cold War world no longer conformed to this paradigm. As a result, they moved to ensure that Europe, specifically the EU, would not find itself impotent in the face of a similar crisis. This led to the creation of the CSDP with its associated objectives of creating EU battlegroups that could intervene abroad. Granted these measures have not achieved everything they set out to, and Anglo-French perspectives on EU defence cooperation have diverged over the years (Howorth 2007). However, they were only possible because Britain and France saw military irrelevance in Europe as a threat to their position as global powers and sought to counter this threat. Once again here peculiarity emerged, as Britain and France differed over how these EU initiatives should be structured and what role they should play. This is discussed more below but it should be noted that even when they agree, peculiarity still influences Anglo-French defence cooperation.

As mentioned one of the driving factors behind the creation of the Lancaster House Treaty was the fiscal restraints imposed on both governments by the 2008 Financial Crash (Strategic comments 2011). This crisis posed a serious threat to both nations' global aspirations. With economies shrinking and the cost of military development ever increasing, the Financial Crash posed a real risk to both sides position in the world. As such they were compelled to work together to overcome these challenges. Sustaining their respective world roles could not be achieved unilaterally. In order to remain relevant and overcome the financial costs of the Crash cooperation was essential. That is why they signed the Lancaster House Treaty and embarked upon a new era of cooperation (Antil et al 2013). As a result, they have achieved impressive levels of cooperation, politically, militarily and industrially. Indeed, the very nature of Lancaster House is important. As a Treaty it sets out a binding agreement to improve cooperation. When considering the contents of Lancaster House, rarely are such measures elevated to treaty status. Joint industrial programmes can be undertaken by simple agreement between governments. The creation of the Eurofighter or AUKUS are two prime examples. These were complex projects but did not rely on a Treaty for their implementation. Even agreements governing the deployment of troops can be handled through political agreements. The decision to elevate something to treaty status bestows a certain level of importance and symbolism which regular agreements do not have. Lancaster House must be considered a key moment in the development of the modern Entente Cordiale. Prior to Lancaster House, the most recent bilateral defence treaty signed by the UK and France was the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 (Pannier 2020). Its status as a treaty has helped to preserve Lancaster House when lesser agreements would have withered. It is arguable that without the impending threat of economic catastrophe they would not have come too such a wide-ranging accord. Therefore, just as the German threat helped transform the Entente from

agreement to alliance, the financial crash was pivotal in rejuvenating contemporary cooperation.

The decision to intervene in Libya was also driven by the perception of a joint threat. As with Yugoslavia, Britain and France considered it to be within their interest to intervene in Libya. Also like Yugoslavia, there was initially some scepticism as to whether the US would get involved (Grand 2015). Consequently, they resolved to intervene in order to protect their interests. That is why they took the diplomatic lead in pushing for a no-fly zone and for international intervention (Chivvis 2015). Whilst they differed over how the intervention should be managed, there was never any disagreement that the intervention should take place. The intervention in Libya was an important moment for the Entente. It established that Britain and France could take the lead in military interventions. As this thesis has shown they conducted the bulk of combat operations, and it was their diplomatic leadership that drove the UN and NATO towards intervention. Whilst they may have still been dependent upon the US for logistical support Libya proved that when Britain and France are confronted with a joint threat they are capable of working decisively together to combat it.

The intervention in Mali is also an example of Britain and France responding to a shared threat. As mentioned above the British decision to support France in Mali indicated a willingness to embrace a more autonomous approach to defence policy. However, intervening in the Sahel was also in Britain's wider strategic interest. The initial French invasion was launched to prevent the disintegration of Mali and to ensure that Islamic extremists were not able to establish a base of operations to strike western targets. This instability also threatened to spill over into neighbouring countries, potentially triggering similar state disintegration. Having the Sahel transformed into an ungovernable space and a

home for terrorists was not in either Britain or France's interests. Such a scenario would present an obvious threat to European security. Furthermore, France was the only major nation willing to commit the resources necessary to stabilise the region and thus represented an opportunity to eliminate the threat at a low cost to the UK. As such the intervention in Mali can be viewed both as Britain supporting French aspirations for a more autonomous defence policy and as an Anglo-French response to a shared threat on the doorstep of Europe.

The COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to be another external threat that pushes Britain and France into closer cooperation. Whilst relations have been strained by Brexit, COVID offers a chance for a diplomatic reset. The threat posed by the pandemic is arguably greater than the Financial Crash in 2008. Not only is it a health crisis but a financial one as well. The economic impact of the pandemic will be felt by both nations for years to come. If they wish to preserve their ambitious military objectives then they will need to work together. Collaboration bore fruit when faced with financial hardship in 2010 and it can do so again now. The pandemic has also come at a time when both nations are striving to be more engaged with the Indo-Pacific. Both governments announced ambitious, and expensive, plans to increase their military and diplomatic presence in the region (Ministère des Armées 2021, MoD 2021). With the increasing rise of Chinese influence in the region both governments are becoming more aware of the threat China poses to their interests there (Morcos 2022). Cooperation is essential if either nation is to play a major role in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the wake of the pandemic. Projecting power half a world away would have been difficult enough before COVID, now with increased financial constraints it will be even more challenging. That is why greater cooperation is necessary. In order to face the twin threats of financial peril and a rising China Britain and France must restore their relationship to pre-Brexit levels.

Confusion, competition and miscommunication

Another feature of the Peculiar Relationship has been constant miscommunication and misinterpretation. This thesis has already outlined in great detail how Britain and France have wildly different interpretations of the original Entente (Keiger 2006). This problem has resurfaced in the modern relationship as well. A perfect example is in Libya. The confusion over how the Libyan campaign should be coordinated is emblematic of Anglo-French miscommunication and speaks to the wider Peculiar Relationship. This also links to a broader issue around what the Lancaster House Treaty actually meant to both sides. For the British Lancaster house was a sign of intent to build up bilateral cooperation and readjust both of their defence postures to a more cooperative disposition. Whilst it signalled a significant departure from established thinking it was not intended to be an instantaneous shift. For the French Lancaster House was the beginning of a realignment that would begin immediately (Heisbourg 2021). This in part explains why there was debate over whether Libya should be a NATO or independent operation. Whilst the UK was willing to develop bilateral structures that could be utilised outside of NATO, it wanted to do so gradually. In contrast France believed that these structures should be deployed immediately. This illustrates that there was ambiguity over how these structures should be implemented. Whilst Lancaster House survived this initial stress test, uncertainty still lingers over how CJEF would be deployed. This needs to be resolved so that a similar controversy can be avoided in the future. This kind of ambiguity has been a continuous feature of the Peculiar Relationship. From its initial conception, the staff talks both before and after the Great War, and the formation of ESDP, Britain and France have regularly allowed ambiguity in their intentions to hinder defence cooperation. Quite often both sides are willing to read into an agreement what they want without truly appreciating the views of the other side. This is as frustrating as it is common.

This repeated confusion and miscommunication has often created a sense that Britain and France are simultaneously competitors and allies. The Brexit process offers a clear example of this, standing as the modern example of peculiarity made manifest. France has been widely perceived as taking a hardline on the UK throughout the Brexit process (Reuters 2018). This is to be expected given the importance France places on the EU, combined with President Macron's ambitions for French leadership within the Union. However, whilst taking a hardline approach in the trade negotiations, France has also extended an olive branch in the form of E12 with the intention of keeping the UK engaged in European defence. Equally, the UK has stressed that it is keen to maintain bilateral cooperation whilst seemingly remaining wilfully ignorant of how Brexit has made that much more difficult. British claims that the UK wants to continue cooperation with France whilst simultaneously agreeing to AUKUS is another example of this. This kind of peculiarity is reminiscent of the contradictions seen in the past when France sought to build the Channel Tunnel whilst also funding rebels in British colonies or when Britain forced the French out of Syria whilst helping them retake Indochina. In 2010 it could have been hoped that this kind of situation had been relegated to the past. Brexit has proved that it remains a fact of life for the peculiar relationship. A reality of their geopolitical situation is that France needs Britain if there is to be any meaningful European defence capability. This point has been made repeatedly throughout this thesis. France and Britain are equals in ways that no other nation can match. Thus even though France may want the EU to adopt a hard stance on the implementation of the Brexit agreement it knows that it still needs the UK. This is a dilemma seen in the peculiar relationship time and again, Britain and France may be rivals in one area, but they need each other in others. This is a reality that Brexit has not changed even though it has made cooperation more difficult.

The same means to different ends

Another recurring aspect of the Peculiar Relationship is that Britain and France often approach the same means in the hope of achieving different ends. This is true today as it was when the Entente was first created. The signing of the Lancaster House Treaty is an excellent example of this. Whilst both sides understood the financial imperative for greater cooperation and accepted that their traditional approaches to defence had not always succeeded, they also saw the Treaty as a means to influence the other towards their way of thinking. France saw Lancaster House as a tool with which to convince the UK to embrace greater strategic autonomy and move away from its over reliance on the US (Heisbourg 2021). By building up their bilateral capacity France was able to increase the likelihood that the UK would be willing to support it independently of the US. Equally, the UK used Lancaster House as a means to move France in a more Atlanticist direction (Fox 2021). Through the integration of their defence industries and by putting CJEF at the disposal of NATO, Britain was binding France closer to NATO and thus making it more Atlanticist by stealth. Signing a Treaty with the intention of achieving two fundamentally different aims is a quintessential example of the Peculiar Relationship. The success of Lancaster House lies in the fact that it has managed to reconcile these conflicting aims. Britain has become more flexible in its military deployments, as evidenced by its commitment to Mali, whilst France has become increasingly committed to NATO with its ongoing deployment to Estonia.

The same can be said for the creation of CSDP. Britain and France agreed that the EU needed to develop its own military capability, but they differed as to why (Howorth 2007). For Britain the EU needed to be able to act independently so that it could better support NATO (Whitman 2016). EU assistance in developing individual members capabilities was a means to make

NATO stronger. France however wished to build up EU military capacity to act as an alternative option to NATO (Howorth 2017). France saw NATO as being too dependent upon the US and so sought an EU alternative in case the US refused to act again. This again highlights how Britain and France have approached similar means with differing intentions. Whilst they may both have wanted to develop EU military capacity, their reasons for doing so, to strengthen NATO but also offer an alternative could not have been more different. Unlike with Lancaster House, Britain and France could not reconcile their conflicting aims here which caused EU defence architecture to stagnate until 2016. It is an ironic consequence of the Peculiar Relationship that Brexit has caused a rejuvenation of EU defence initiatives, the groundwork for which was laid by the UK and France, which may well be detrimental to Anglo-French defence cooperation in the long run.

Libya offers a third example of this dynamic at work. Once it was agreed that the campaign should be overseen by NATO they again differed over how NATO should be used. For the UK it was important that NATO should retain the right of first refusal for any intervention (Goulter 2015). British policy makers were happy for the US to step back from combat operations and provide logistical support because it was still being done within NATO. Equally, the integration of non-NATO allies was achieved using NATO architecture and so preserved the primacy of NATO. For France, whilst it may have begrudgingly accepted the necessity of NATO it did so in a way that fundamentally differed from the UK. Libya proved that NATO could be transformed into a non-American tool (Heisbourg 2021). Whilst the campaign remained under the NATO umbrella, the withdrawal of American combat forces and the inclusion of non-NATO allies transformed it into a much wider coalition. This allowed France to take the military lead within NATO, thus transforming it into an operation that went beyond NATO. This again is an example of contrasting objectives being pursued through common means. In

Libya both sides again achieved their objective, the UK was able to retain the primacy of NATO within Western defence policy whilst France was able to guide the operation into becoming a de facto coalition beyond the realm of NATO.

Areas of future research

Having identified the current state of the Anglo-French relationship, the question that must now be asked is what other areas of research should be considered in the future? This thesis has outlined how the relationship functions and explained its peculiar nature. It has also outlined numerous ways in which the relationship can be improved. Consequently, it is important to consider what research would further our understanding of the Entente Cordiale.

One area that should be researched further is the cultural relationship between the British and French militaries. Whilst outside the scope of this thesis, this is a topic that was touched upon during the research process. This thesis has mentioned the concept of the perfidious Albion and ancestral French mistrust of the UK. Equally it has also discussed how this history colours British perceptions of France. However, there is little scholarship that pays particular attention to how this cultural context influences the relationship between their respective militaries. How do historic stereotypes impact contemporary thinking? How insulated are military personnel from the cut and thrust of diplomacy? How do British and French officers view each other on a personal basis? These are intriguing questions that should be answered in future research. Whilst researching this thesis it was suggested to the author that there still exists a level of prejudice on both sides towards the other. The term “cheese eating surrender monkeys” (Anonymous 2021) was bandied about as a way that some British officers view the French. Equally it was suggested that certain French officers still view their British

counterparts through the lens of the *perfidie Albion* who cannot be trusted. This is made more complicated by the complex nature of British national identity. It was intimated during the interview process that these Francophobic sentiments were predominantly held by English officers, whilst their Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish colleagues were more positive towards the French. Equally the more Anglophobic views of the French tended to be aimed at the English specifically with French officers more positively inclined towards those from the rest of the UK. This is an interesting dynamic that is worth exploring further. Interpersonal relationships are essential for a military alliance to function effectively. Of course, this may not be a representative sample, and is so far based on anecdotal evidence. These sentiments could simply be amongst a small minority and not representative of wider feeling. Certainly, on an operational level both militaries work well together, despite what tensions may or may not exist. However, the possibility that they do exist is worth exploring. If such sentiments continue to linger then it is important that scholars identify them, and to see how widespread such sentiments are, so that our understanding of the Entente can be expanded, and defence cooperation improved.

Another area worthy of further study is intelligence cooperation. As mentioned at the outset of this thesis intelligence cooperation was largely outside its parameters. However, it remains a relevant field of study that should be developed further. The relationship between Anglo-French intelligence agencies has not been particularly well studied in the UK. In large part this is because there is limited intelligence sharing between the UK and France. At each of the summits discussed in this thesis, the main focus was defence and security. Intelligence was granted a tertiary mention at best, if it was even mentioned at all. This is thus an area where academia should focus its attention. Why has Anglo-French intelligence cooperation been understudied? Why do the UK and France lack a formal framework for sharing intelligence? If

the nuclear taboo can be broken with the Teutates Treaty then surely there can be agreement on some form of intelligence cooperation. These are questions which could not be answered by this thesis but are undoubtedly relevant. Defence and intelligence are related, even if they are separate fields. Chapter 6 discussed the lack of ISTAR capabilities held by the UK and France during operations in Libya which demonstrated the difficulties in the defence and intelligence relationship. Whilst this thesis has developed a comprehensive look at the defence relationship between the UK and France, this would be complemented by further research into intelligence cooperation between the two.

Further research should also be conducted into the strategic culture of both sides and how they relate to each other. There is already a thriving body of work (Gray 1999) that considers strategic culture and this would be improved by considering things from an Anglo-French angle. This thesis has discussed strategic culture in brief and mentioned how Britain and France have often differed from each other. However, there is room to study this in greater depth. As strategic culture is a subfield in its own right, it was only discussed in this thesis when relevant and so could be developed further. There is room to consider how Britain and France have developed such differing strategic cultures. This history was outlined in brief by this thesis but it could be expanded upon with additional research. Questions surrounding how Britain and France have influenced each other's strategic culture, as well as how they have influenced wider European strategic culture should all be answered as these would provide a deeper understanding of the Entente Cordiale.

The Entente in a changing World

So what is the current state of Anglo-French defence cooperation? It is clear that the Entente has experienced a period of growth unseen in recent times. The Lancaster House Treaty

heralded a spirit of cooperation that had not been seen in decades. Despite its flaws Lancaster House will be known to history as a seminal moment in the Entente Cordiale. Anglo-French defence cooperation is definitely in a better place now than it was at the start of the century. Both operationally and industrially there has been tangible proof of the benefits of greater cooperation. The institutions created and experience gained have formed a solid foundation upon which the Entente now rests.

That is not to say the relationship is without its problems. Peculiarity is never far away and the past decade has seen many failures as well as successes. It is also imperilled by the current negativity surrounding Anglo-French relations as a whole. Despite its foundations being strong, Brexit poses a clear risk to the Entente. It is the greatest challenge to defence cooperation in decades. Without a renewed focus there is a real risk of cooperative backsliding. The traditional modus operandi of Anglo-French defence cooperation has been periods of cooperation followed by periods of antagonism. This is at the heart of the peculiar nature of the relationship. The Entente clearly finds itself in a period of antagonism. Whilst this cycle has played out for over a century there is no need to prolong the current state of division. It is time for the UK and France to make peace and set the Peculiar Relationship to rights.

This should be hastened by the fact that the rationale for defence cooperation is stronger than ever. The Lancaster House rapprochement was undertaken by two states striving to maintain great power status in the midst of an economic collapse and uncertain world. In 2022 the covid-19 pandemic has sparked an economic crisis that both states are still recovering from. Meanwhile Russia is upending peace and stability in Europe (Wallace 2022). Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 changed the dynamic of European defence. If

revisionist states posed a threat in 2010, then an imperialist one is an even greater threat today. In response to Russia's invasion the UK has sent weapons shipments to Ukraine and significantly increased its troops deployed in NATO countries (NATO 2022). Equally France has also increased its commitment to NATO, deploying additional warships and aircraft to defend NATO partners (NATO 2022). However there has seemingly been little coordination between the two. As Europe's two main military powers it would have been beneficial for the continent if they had aligned their responses. They could have jointly supplied weapons to Ukraine or coordinated their troop increases, they are already deployed to Estonia together so it would have been logical for them to coordinate there. Concentrating their forces in one area, particularly the region of NATO most likely to be subjected to a Russian attack, would have been a more efficient use of their respective resources. They could also, for example, have offered to put CJEF at NATO disposal to reinforce the eastern flank. The Ukrainian Crisis has shown that NATO solidarity remains strong and the Alliance is capable of adapting to face new challenges. It remains to be seen if the Peculiar Relationship will demonstrate similar resilience.

Russian aggression, whilst threatening to both nations' security, should not distract from the fact that China is seeking hegemony in the Far East (Heydarian 2020). The United States is undergoing a major strategic reorientation away from Europe and towards Asia (Sverdrup-Thygeson 2016). All this indicates that great power competition has returned to the World stage (Wright 2018). In this increasingly uncertain world Britain and France are striving to carve out a place for themselves. They remain great powers, but their place in that ranking is increasingly ambiguous. China has risen to be a clear competitor to the US for global leadership. The Russian economy may be half the size of Britain or France (IMF 2022), but it retains a formidable military might. Meanwhile India has now overtaken France as the sixth

largest economy in the world (IMF 2022). As the balance of world power shifts to the Indo-Pacific it is Asian powers like India, Japan and China that will have an ever increasing say over the global agenda (Rachman 2016). Alone Britain and France can attempt to adapt to these changes. The British tilt to the Pacific has been discussed already, and France still maintains territorial holdings in the region. Individually they can play a role in this new Indo-Pacific centric world, but it will be a small one. They have both recognised the need to mobilise allies to augment their global influence, Britain in the IR (MoD 2021) and France in its 2021 Strategic Update (Ministère des Armées 2021). Yet they have failed to appreciate that they should be trying to mobilise each other. Their relationship may be peculiar, but it is also essential. The tensions created by Brexit cannot be allowed to distract from this fundamental principle. They need to work together to maintain their positions in this new world. Neither state has allies that can match the resources of the other. Wasting time and energy on petty feuds over fishing or diplomatic etiquette damages them both as they risk being left behind in new era of great power competition.

Britain and France have the resources to play an outsized role if they work together. They now have the experience necessary to deploy forces together for prolonged periods of time. In a world where the ability to undertake force projection is becoming ever more essential their combined resources can make a real difference. The burden of sustaining forces in a theatre two continents away is a heavy one. Deploying forces together, like the proposed joint carrier group, would allow them to project strength for longer periods and in greater numbers. Ships flying the Union Jack or Tricolour individually may be impressive, but a taskforce flying both would send a clear message of intent. *HMS Queen Elizabeth* is an impressive platform and her maiden voyage to the Indo-Pacific was a useful display of British naval power, but it was her multinational taskforce that signalled a British willingness to lead

in the region. Britain and France should learn from this and replicate its success. Given the age of the *Charles de Gaulle* a joint carrier group around *HMS Queen Elizabeth* would demonstrate the seriousness of their commitment to the region. More military exercises are needed so let them be conducted in the Indo-Pacific. Britain and France should be leveraging their respective networks in the region to bolster each other's influence. It is in both of their interests to cooperate to the fullest extent possible.

If new industrial programmes can be agreed then they could further improve their influence in the region by arming their regional allies. Greater cooperation could eliminate competition and boost profits for both. Whilst Britain may no longer be in the EU, France cannot rely upon it to project strength in the Indo-Pacific. Most EU members have little strategic interest in the region, or indeed any other region beyond their own. They are the only two European nations capable of playing a global role, but they must work together to achieve their full potential. Tilting to the Indo-Pacific whilst keeping one eye across the Channel out of paranoia is not only counterproductive but actively damaging. They must utilise the lessons learned in Libya, Mali and beyond to play a role in this new multipolar world.

With the tensions caused by Brexit and the British tilt away from Europe, it is increasingly likely that defence cooperation will decrease in importance for France and the UK. This would be a mistake as defence cooperation with France is clearly of vital relevance to the UK. This thesis has outlined numerous ways to avoid such a damaging scenario. Periods of enhanced cooperation have often been driven by an external threat that needed to be confronted, whether that be Germany, Nasser's Egypt or the Great Recession. The Covid-19 pandemic should be seen as such a crisis. Brexit may have damaged relations but as the world begins to

recover Britain and France should take this opportunity to reset their relations and reinvigorate the spirit of the Entente Cordiale.

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