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# Common defence – the past or the future?

## Introduction

Is common defence a thing of the past or future? Just a few months ago, this question would have been considered anachronic by some military theorists. They would explain it by saying the fact that in the era of war with precise means of destruction, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), fights for carefully chosen military targets, there is no place for clashes of mass armies or general involvement of society in the fight, and the very notion of “common war” should go into oblivion.

Doctrinal solutions at the operational and tactical level concentrate on the ways of using troops and cooperation between various armed forces and various of troops (also in the international environment). The element of using the “social potential” in documents has been marginalised or even ignored.

In Poland, three types of the armed forces are planned for use in the land environment. These are: land forces, territorial defence forces, and special forces. Of these mentioned above, land forces and territorial defence forces, whose total number in Poland oscillates around 120,000–150,000 soldiers, will have a major impact on shaping operations in the zone of deep, direct, and rear operations. From the point of view of the state’s defence needs, this number seems too low; nevertheless, in countries with a similar economic and social potential, the number of soldiers is at a comparable level. In view of the above, the way in which these armies are used in a state’s specific socio-economic environment begins to gain fundamental importance in theoretical

considerations. Reflections should be based on conclusions from completed and ongoing armed conflicts, taking into account the situation and limitations existing in Poland. The question to be addressed is whether the components of various types of the armed forces are able to “defend” the state by themselves, or whether their success depends on the society’s attitude.

Analysing conflicts, we can see that, on the one hand, we have the second Iraqi war (2003), on the other, the current war in Ukraine, and somewhere between them the conflicts in Afghanistan, Georgia, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. What makes these conflicts different? What determines achieving the final success by forces which had no qualitative or quantitative advantage? What makes success possible?

The aim of the article is to present information and conclusions, which would ultimately generate knowledge on the contemporary conditions for conducting operations in an armed conflict.

The above contents constitute the origin of the problem, the solution of which may be the answer to the question of what the influence of society’s popular involvement on the final outcome of an armed clash is. In order to answer this question and reach conclusions, it is necessary to address the specific problems summed up in the following questions:

1. How should “common defence” be defined today?
2. Has “common defence” been a determinant of the settlement of selected armed conflicts in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and if so, to what extent?
3. How should a country’s population be used during an armed conflict, taking into account the multifaceted nature of the impact on the adversary?

Answering the above questions will provide a broad perspective on the issue of defence and state security, without limitation to the use of the armed forces in this regard.

The presented content is based on the results of both theoretical and empirical research and conclusions reached by the author during the development of tactical-operational background for command-and-control exercises and solving tactical problems in various types of operations. One of the limitations of the presented publication is the author’s focus on warfare with the omission of activities carried out during a crisis.

## Common defence – contemporary relevance

The general duty to defend the Republic of Poland stems directly from the provisions of the Constitution and the Act on General Duty to Defend (*ustawa o powszechnym obowiązku obrony*), in particular from the provisions contained in:

- Article. 1: “The defence of the Fatherland is the concern and duty of all citizens of the Republic of Poland.”

- Article 2: “Strengthening the defence of the Republic of Poland, preparing the population and national property in case of war, and performing other tasks under the general duty to defend belongs to all authorities, government administration, and other state bodies and institutions, bodies of local self-government, entrepreneurs, and other organisational units, social organisations, as well as to every citizen within the scope defined in the acts.”<sup>1</sup>

*Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego* [The Dictionary of National Security Terms] defines the “common defence of the state,” which it describes as a “type of defense of the state, in which all human and material resources are prepared and used in military and non-military defensive actions in a manner ensuring effective repulse of the enemy’s aggression.”<sup>2</sup> According to the definition provided by this dictionary, common defence of the state is a part of the military system of the state, which includes the territorial defence.<sup>3</sup>

Taking into account the above considerations, it should be stated that common defence is the involvement of the state’s forces and all resources, in undertaking activities in the scope of defending the country against threats. This includes activities of military and non-military character, and both offensive and defensive actions in various, also non-military, areas of influence. The subjects of its activity are both specialised state bodies, including the armed forces, and the civilian population.

The definition of common defence presented above is consistent with basic legal documents. The common defence engages and obliges the whole society to take action. Importantly, these actions are not limited exclusively to military actions, which would have to take into account legal and international issues, including the fulfilment of the conditions for a given person (or persons) to be qualified for the group of veterans and to receive legal protection.

The multifaceted nature of is in the character of contemporary armed conflicts, which are not only conducted between the enemy’s force and own troops, but also take place in the information sphere, cyberspace, and in the economic sphere. They have a significant impact on the final outcome of military operations.

## Common defence and lessons learnt from armed conflicts

The 21<sup>st</sup> century has seen several full-scale and asymmetric armed conflicts. Their final outcome did not always depend on the quantitative and qualitative superiority

<sup>1</sup> Ustawa z dnia 21 listopada 1967 r. o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, tj. Dz.U. [Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland] 2021, item 372.

<sup>2</sup> Obrona powszechna państwa [headword], [in:] *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, eds. J. Kaczmarek, W. Łepkowski, B. Zdrodowski, 6<sup>th</sup> edition, Warszawa: AON, 2008, p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *ibidem*.

of one of the parties. By analysing various conflicts, it is possible to assess the degree of achievement of objectives at different levels, ranging from the strategic-political to the tactical. It is also possible to identify the variables that influence achieving these objectives.

The first conflicts to be compared are the wars in Iraq (2003) and Ukraine (2022).<sup>4</sup> Comparing the potentials of the parties in both conflicts, many similarities can be found.<sup>5</sup> However, the outcome of each clash was different.

The plan for subjugating Ukraine to the Russian Federation initially envisaged selective strikes against military facilities, the entry operations by combat groups in various areas of the country, and the seizure of most towns. The attitude of the population was assessed as favourable to Russia (in areas east of the Dnieper) or neutral. In the following period, it was predicted that the central authorities, friendly towards Russia, would be constitutionalised, and that political and economic control over the whole territory of Ukraine would be taken over. However, this plan was not implemented. This was due to the strong and indivisible defence of the Ukrainian army and the widespread population's support for the central authorities. The full support of world opinion (with a few exceptions) was not without significance.

From a military point of view, the Russian forces had an overall advantage of the number of troops and a significant advantage of the amount of essential armaments, especially aircraft, helicopters, tanks, combat vehicles, artillery, and missiles. Russia also had the initiative in choosing the objects and directions of attack and where to focus the main effort. After the first month of fighting, it could be assessed that the first operational thrust did not accomplish the task set for it. The Ukrainian army was not destroyed, nor did it lose its potential to undertake active combat operations. The Ukrainian grouping was not divided, and the main cities of the country in the border areas (including the capital Kiev) were not occupied.<sup>6</sup>

Military operations of a similar nature took place during the Second Iraqi War (USA–Iraq) in 2003. There, however, after three weeks of fighting, the main Iraqi forces were smashed and the capital city was occupied by Americans practically without fight. After four weeks, all of Iraq's major cities were captured and the Iraqi army's active resistance was broken. Iraq had a force of between 360,000 and 470,000 soldiers and fighters, while the coalition had about 250,000 troops. The Americans had considerable technological superiority and control of the air.

From the analyses made, several determinants affecting the course and outcome of the war can be identified (table 1). These include:

<sup>4</sup> For the period February–March 2022.

<sup>5</sup> Of course, these are not fully identical conflicts. The similarities concern mainly the general nature of the actions (the so-called full-scale actions) and the potential involved.

<sup>6</sup> As of 23 March 2022.

- the attitude of international opinion towards the conflict (favourable/unfavourable to the party concerned);
- isolation of the conflicting parties (yes/no);
- attitude of the civilian population – support for the central authorities in matters of military operations and the aggressor's country (yes/no);
- involvement of the population (public) in broad defence undertakings (yes/no).

Table 1. Comparison of the ratio of selected environment elements between the parties to armed conflicts in Iraq and Ukraine

	Iraq 2003		Ukraine 2022	
	Defensive action Iraq	Offensive actions USA	Defensive action Ukraine	Offensive actions Russia
Attitude of international opinion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• lack of general support</li> <li>• lack of active support from world powers</li> <li>• a negative assessment of the Iraqi government's actions in internal and external policies in the years prior to the conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the active support of certain countries, including the United Kingdom</li> <li>• favourable or neutral position</li> <li>• no active denial of US actions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• positive, supporting the defence efforts taken</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• negative (in some cases neutral outside Europe)</li> </ul>
Isolation of conflicting parties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• almost complete isolation from neighbouring countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support of certain bordering countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• active and passive support</li> <li>• supply of defensive arms and cash (western border)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• isolation with few exceptions (Belarus) or neutral attitude (China)</li> <li>• isolation in Europe, economic sanctions</li> </ul>
Attitude of the civilian population (support of the central government)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• lack of strong support</li> <li>• more support only for a selected religious group (Sunni – less)</li> <li>• conflict between religious groups (Sunnis and Shiites) and on national grounds (Kurds)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support of the American public</li> <li>• no visible anti-war movement in the USA</li> <li>• lack of popular protests by the Iraqi population against the US; in some areas, active support for the actions of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the unification of society, unity, preservation, and support of a single decision-making centre</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• society in Russia isolated in terms of access to information and the actual course of action; in official communications, support for the Special Military Operation</li> <li>• no civilian support in the occupied areas except for the declared Russian minority</li> </ul>
Public involvement in defence projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• limited to Fedayeen units</li> <li>• lack of grassroots activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• military support to the Kurds (Northern Iraq)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• creation of voluntary military formations</li> <li>• direct attacks on Russians</li> <li>• defence work</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• very limited support from the Russian minority mainly in the immediate neighbourhood of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk republics</li> </ul>

Source: Author's own compilation.

As can be seen from the above analyses, two basic determinants – lying outside the organisational armed forces – affecting the achievement of objectives in a defence operation can be delineated. They include:

- a) international assistance – no isolation of the country, ability to provide arms and other means of warfare, protection and assistance to the population;
- b) full and active support of its people in the struggle.

The actual focus on defensive operations, with maximum use of the terrain characteristics (built-up areas, forests), and emphasis on combating the logistical elements of the advancing troops made it possible to slow down and stop the actions of the Russian strike groupings in Ukraine (2022). Extremely positive in this respect was the receipt before the outbreak of the war and the maintenance during the war of supplies of weapons in the form of hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft launchers. This strengthened the Ukrainian potential by saturating it with means of combat, the operation of which could be quickly mastered by soldiers and civilians.

Influencing the rear area – supply lines, tying up with fighting based in towns not captured by the Russians – made it possible to tie up Russian forces in a relatively deep area of operations. Over the long term, such operations would have been impossible to carry out without maintaining international support and combat supply lines crossing the borders of Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. In fact, Ukrainian troops (operational and territorial defence) would not be able to carry out this operations do on their own because, just like Russian troops, there would not be enough of them.<sup>7</sup> The Ukrainian situation, especially in urban centres, was improved by the mass involvement of civilians in the fight (by grassroots joining of territorial defence forces and volunteer units).

In a way, these conclusions are confirmed by an analogical comparison of the actions conducted during Poland's defensive war in 1939. There is no doubt that one of the main reasons for Poland's defeat was its direct isolation from its neighbours, and basically the necessity to engage in a two-front war (with Germany and the USSR).

The influence of society's involvement on the outcome of operations can also be seen at the lowest level of the art of war – the tactical level. Here, we can compare the course of combat operations in Georgia (2008) with the contemporary ones in Ukraine. The way in which the offensive actions of the Russian groups were conducted

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<sup>7</sup> The number of troops planned for effective defence of a city constitutes 5 to 10% of the inhabitants (the author's assumption based on the results of episodic exercises carried out in War Studies University and the analysis of selected actions in urban areas). In the case of a city with e.g. 300,000 inhabitants – it would constitute 15,000 to 30,000 soldiers. In fact, the role of defenders was played by separated forces of operational forces, reinforced by the efforts of territorial defence troops and "civilians" joining them en masse during the war. Thus, part of the forces of operational armies and territorial defence were able to carry out extremely important extra-urban activities, concentrating on attacks from the outside on Russian rings of isolation and encirclement of towns and on their supply lines.

was similar. The assault was conducted by mixed reinforced battalion tactical groups capturing one object after another. While maneuvering, they cut across the enemy's defensive groupings, reaching their wings and rear. In the area of the separatist republics in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), the Russians achieved successes in this way, just as they did in the area administered by Georgia. In Ukraine, such actions fell through. The conquest of larger cities failed, and Russians sought to isolate them by triggering movement to the next object (usually a town). This time, this course of action did not bring tangible results, as the lines of communication were broken by relatively small Ukrainian groups. In this case, the prevalence of armed resistance was crucial to stopping the effective advance of the Russian forces. In the Georgian conflict, the failure of the Georgian troops can be explained by the fact that combat operations were conducted with full-time military forces, without real support from the civilian population.

An analogy can be found in the course of the first war in Chechnya (1994–1996) and in Afghanistan. After the occupation of Grozny and of nearly the entire country by the Russians, it seemed that the war was basically over. However, in 1996, the Chechens mobilised the population from rural and mountainous areas to fight, isolated Russian bases, and broke the links between them. Within days, they regained the capital, Grozny, and vast areas of their country within weeks, forcing the Russian Federation into a humiliating truce.<sup>8</sup>

The course of action in Afghanistan in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is well known. The US-led coalition captured major population centres. Using several hundred thousand military and security forces from the coalition and the Afghan government, the US sought to hold the lines of communication and non-urban areas. However, it failed to destroy Afghan fundamentalists – mainly the Taliban – and to cut off the insurgents from neighbouring Pakistan's support. Consequently, after the withdrawal of the main forces of the United States and the Western coalition, the Taliban overran Kabul within a dozen days, and the government forces, which were several thousands strong, practically ceased to exist without a fight.

Both conflicts clearly shows that an attacking force without the support or neutral attitude of the local population is not capable of permanently controlling the country's territory. In the above cases, this could indeed be done but only by isolating the country in question and using widespread terror. However, it would then be necessary to commit substantial forces (in relation to the area and population), which is problematic in the long term.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that the achievement of objectives in the conducted defensive operation, in addition to the general condition of the armed forces, is significantly influenced by the involvement of society in pro-defence activities and the support it provides to the central authorities. Disruption and

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<sup>8</sup> See: Z. Czarnotta, Z. Moszumański, *Czeczenia 94–95*, Warszawa: Altair, [cop. 1995].

disorganisation of this support is one of the basic determinants of the success with an offensive operation.

It would seem that this is a relatively banal conclusion which the state authorities should always bear in mind (the policy of security and state defence), however, practice shows that in the majority of states it is not the case. The use of simple solutions, such as “arming the masses,” is not an antidote to the needs of the so-called “common defence” either because even if a significant part of society was merely equipped with weapons and directed to the fight, it would not prove the successful implementation of the “common defence” approach.

## Common defence – current and future needs

In accordance with the conclusions presented above, it must be emphasised that the condition for the success of a defence operation, in addition to having well-trained armed forces, is the involvement a vast majority of society in defence activities. In the case of Poland, as well as other countries bordering the Russian Federation, this is of key importance because our country, for economic and demographic reasons, is not able to maintain in peacetime several hundred thousand professional troops or conscripts, or to ensure the training to a similar number of reservists. To a certain extent, this necessity is alleviated by membership in the North Atlantic Alliance, but this must not obscure the country’s need for self-sufficiency in defence.

Indeed, the primary role of armed forces is to maintain a deterrent capability against a potential, defined adversary. For years, the prevailing view has been that deterrence is to be achieved by armed forces – in terms of numbers and quality. In the context of the historical examples given earlier, this statement appears to be unjustified. The role of deterrence is to be performed by the entire state, both in subject and object terms, i.e. the armed forces, the security apparatus, society, the authorities, as well as the international aid system, which is kept operational, etc.

So the important question seems to be: how to ensure the “fulfilment” of common defence? Being a “Western society”, living a peaceful existence for several generations, should we have in mind only the population’s participation in universal military actions? In the light of current events, and especially in times of rapid development and changes in the environment, is this the only way to use common defence?

In the first place, it seems important to define the possible and widest areas of influence on the opponent in a defence operation. The condition for successful defence of a country at the tactical level is to beat the opponent’s forces. At higher levels, in addition to the military factor, it is still necessary to influence the political will of the opponent. Achieving objectives at various levels of the art of war does not take place today only at their “respective” levels. These levels depend on each other and often intermingle. Sometimes a small tactical success can be the cause of a big operational or



even strategic success. The multidimensionality of the impact gives rise to a wide spectrum of combat areas (kinetic and non-kinetic). This, in turn, leads to the need to find an impact factor.

Common defence, as defined at the beginning of the article, generates certain determinants of its use. A national defence operation should involve the entire society which should participate in the full spectrum of influencing the enemy. It must be stressed at all times that such involvement should not only be based on military action. A general, social military effort may to a small extent compensate for the weakness of the army (mainly its size and the lack of offensive weapons), but even so, with a generally weak army, this effort will be insufficient.

In this respect, one has to wonder if we are able, already at peacetime, to prepare the “human masses” (different professions, skills, social constraints) “to shoot.” Or is it better to use these “human masses” in different areas (spaces) of influence, in which they normally function and act professionally (cyberspace activities, information, disinformation, etc.)? If we consider the adversary’s actions against our country, then, in a nutshell, his actors will be military (armed forces) and non-military (information, cyber, economic, etc.). These actors will be based in the political authorities of their country, and in its society, which will exert a certain influence on these authorities, both in democratic and authoritarian states.<sup>9</sup>

Consequently, the impact on the adversary is exerted on two aspects: kinetic (on the adversary’s armed forces) and non-kinetic (on the adversary’s society). Common defence must interact on both aspects, using the maximum range of its capabilities.

First (direct) – it must strengthen the capabilities of the armed forces by strengthening their potential (accession to the military), as well as through their direct and indirect support (information about the enemy’s movements, the effects on him, and hampering his maneuvers – destruction of road infrastructure, etc.).

Second (informational) – it should carry out activities of an informational nature, aimed at the opponent’s armed forces and its society, and also at countries supporting the opponent and countries supporting “us.” Contrary to appearances, this is crucial for achieving the strategic goals of the state, especially in terms of breaking the political will to wage war by the adversary. Here, too, there should be full documentation of the adversary’s actions, the crimes committed and their dissemination, striving to rid the adversary of the feeling of impunity.

Third (protection-defence) – a scope of activities and actions aimed at protection of the population and public and private property, also for mutual assistance and self-assistance. These actions have crucial importance at the local level, in areas of direct action and in an area occupied by the enemy.

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<sup>9</sup> In fact, the difference in social pressure in democratic and authoritarian countries will be manifested by the “speed” of social influence on the authorities to force change and the way the authorities counteract this pressure (information isolation, further terror, etc.).

Fourth (in cyberspace) – offensive cyber operations. It is relatively easy to organise, especially by IT professional groups. Involves attacks on the adversary's information systems, especially in his country, disrupts its economy and, most importantly, indirectly transfers the "war" to the aggressor's country, hence its population's sense of security is reduced.

Only a few (four) areas of influence have been presented above.<sup>10</sup> Each can be made more specific with additional details, and new areas can be specified, not forgetting large diasporas in exile, which can put pressure on governments in other countries, and which can also influence the adversary indirectly.

The real effect is to increase the overall ability to influence the adversary, but with maximum effectiveness of taking social action. This is also underlined by the experience of armed conflicts in which an actively and widely opposing society was the cause of the aggressor's final defeat.

It seems that the implementation of common defence will not have a fundamental impact on making changes in the theory of the art of war and in tactics themselves. The existing types of tactical operations, aims, and ways of fighting will remain unchanged. However, the influence of society, both in the military and non-military aspect, should be taken into account.

## Conclusions

The experience of ended armed conflicts and the current operations of the Russian army in Ukraine highlight the fact that the lack of widespread involvement of society in defence activities significantly facilitates achieving political-military goals by the adversary.

An increase in common defence undertakings is directly proportional to an increase in the opponent's forces involved in the conflict, an increase in his losses, and the duration of the war. At the same time, terror used against the civilian population will increase. In fact, this leads to an information advantage in influencing the adversary and his society.

Common defence is not a new concept. Nevertheless, it is overlooked in existing doctrines and publications. Most often, the armed forces remain the subject of considerations. It is absolutely necessary to raise public awareness in this respect. Even in peacetime, it is necessary to prepare a system of functioning and including management of general defence. Organisationally, this system must be centrally directed, but the execution of tasks must be decentralised.

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<sup>10</sup> Due to the editorial requirements of the article.

Common defence cannot be equated with civil defence. They are two different categories existing side by side; they can sometimes intermingle, but have different objectives.<sup>11</sup>

Common defence cannot be seen as an antidote to the general weakness of the army and the state, nor is it a substitute for armies. It is a kind of broadly understood actor whose presence, capabilities, and limitations must be taken into account during the preparation and conduct of warfare.

The essential function of the armed forces is to deter an adversary from launching aggression against a country. The state with all its entities has the same function. In this aspect, the preparation in peacetime of an efficiently and effectively functioning common defence is an important factor in deterring an adversary. The armed forces must be able to accept reinforcement with “common defence.”

The current conflict in Ukraine has clearly illustrated the Russians’ mistakes in assessing the attitude of Ukrainian society. It cannot be expected that countries (especially the Russian Federation) will not learn from this, and that in the future a potential adversary will make this same mistake. However, it should be expected that in the future a potential armed confrontation will be preceded by extensive measures aimed at a society’s unity and the general will to fight, centred around the political leader of the state. In this respect, one should anticipate taking counter-measures, which may already occur in peacetime, as part of hybrid actions taken by the adversary and aimed at disrupting the factors conditioning good functioning of common defence.

Common defence cannot be attributed solely to military action as an element of personnel reinforcement of armies (the so-called voluntary enlistment). The diversity of the population’s skills should be used to the greatest possible extent. In the reinforcement of troops itself, the focus should be not only on direct action (combat), but also on deep action (e.g., information gathering) as well as rear area action (e.g., protection and defence).

Answering the problem question contained in the introductory part of the article, it should be emphasised that the involvement of the general public in the defence effort of the state and the armed forces has a real impact on the final outcome of an armed clash. Nowadays, the question is not whether to use the forces contained in society, but how to use and exploit them to ensure the security of the state.

The author realizes that in this article he has not presented all aspects concerning the so-called “common defence.” This is due to the limitations of publishing and the fact that the important results of research into a broader problem concerning transformations in the modern art of war are outlined here briefly.

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<sup>11</sup> The fundamental objective of “civil defence” is to minimise by passive means, the effects of hostile actions against the functioning of civilian life, cf. *AAP-6. Słownik terminów i definicji NATO zawierający wojskowe terminy i ich definicje stosowane w NATO*, 2014, p. 88.

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*AAP-6. Słownik terminów i definicji NATO zawierający wojskowe terminy i ich definicje stosowane w NATO*, 2014.

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Ustawa z dnia 21 listopada 1967 r. o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, tj. Dz.U. 2021, item. 372.

## Common defence – the past or the future?

### Abstract

The contents of the doctrines at the operational and tactical levels focus primarily on the ways in which the components of the types of armed forces are used and the for cooperation between them. Documents of a higher level (e.g. strategies) indicate a number of threats, including non-military ones, affecting the state directly or indirectly. The issue of using social potential in these documents is marginalised. Lessons from the Russian-Ukrainian war emphasise how important the role of common defence is for the defence of the country against aggression. Nowadays, however, common defence cannot be “limited” to military action alone. A potential opponent is not only its army, but also its society, economy, culture, etc. The research conducted and its results point to opportunities to increase the defence impact of the state through effective and full use of its actors, including the military.

Key words: war, art of war, common defence, security, governance