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Prediction of Remaining Useful Life for Components in SSC of RSG-GAS Based on Reliability Analysis

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A B S T R A C T

In the maintenance system, efforts are needed to improve the effectiveness of the maintenance system and organization. For effective maintenance planning, it is necessary to have a good understanding of component availability and the reliability of the system. For this reason, it is crucial to determine the remaining component life using Remaining Useful Life (RUL), so that maintenance tasks can be planned effectively. The purpose of this study is to determine the remaining life of the safety category A component from SSC RSG-GAS based on reliability analysis. The method used in this paper is a statistical approach to estimate the RUL. The Weibull hazard model was selected for modeling the hazard function to be integrated into reliability analysis. The model was verified using data from components with safety category A on SSC from RSG-GAS. The results obtained from the analysis are beneficial for estimating the remaining useful lives of these components which can then be used to plan for effective maintenance and help control unplanned outages. The results obtained can be used for maintenance development and preventive repair planning.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The process of operating a nuclear reactor is determined by the SSC conditions to carry out its functions. In this case, the maintenance process plays a vital role in ensuring the availability of SSC. Therefore, an operation management system requires good SSC reliability. Its management is expected to be able to plan appropriate treatment for all SSCs, to support the operation and aging management system of RSG-GAS[1]. It is necessary to develop a Computerized Maintenance

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Email: <u>entin@batan.go.id</u> DOI: 10.17146/tdm.2022.24.1.6400 Management System (CMMS) or a computer-based maintenance management system used to store and retrieve maintenance data. CMMS can handle data related to the frequency and duration of maintenance breakdowns and component costs[2]. Reliability management is an activity to ensure that there are no SSC failures while the reactor is operating. Furthermore, it can optimize costs and minimize or eliminate failures and their causes[3].

Maintenance components are needed to improve the maintenance support system along with replacing traditional strategies with new ones such as RUL (Remaining Useful Life), which can estimate failure times for one or more existing components and failure modes in the future. Prediction of component/system life is aimed to predict RUL before failure, by looking at the current system conditions. Therefore, estimation of component reliability and RUL are needed and crucial in maintenance optimization[4].

In recent years, the prediction of RUL has received more attention. It is vital to assess the RUL of an asset when it is used as it impacts the operational performance and profitability of an asset. Once an indication of failure has been detected, it is necessary to estimate the accuracy of the RUL to make timely maintenance decisions to avoid failure. Likewise, its reliability and estimation accuracy tends to result in accurate determination of the optimal inspection interval, thereby minimizing the overall cost of the system[5, 6].

RUL, which is the service life (remaining life) of a component or system at a certain time in the life cycle, is incredibly important for management integrity at a particular time[7-9]. Therefore, the ability to estimate the RUL of components and systems is beneficial for being able to employ different maintenance management strategies to optimize the life cycle phases of a component or system. In absolute terms, proactive management of the system that can be improved depends on the optimal estimation of the RUL and the reliability at various stages of degradation in the life cycle phases of components and systems[10, 11]. For this reason, many reliability estimation techniques, ranging from empirical stochastic to methodologies, have been proposed by researchers in the literature. To date, risk-based and reliabilitycentered maintenance techniques that incorporate predictive and condition-based maintenance strategies have been incorporated into the integrity of industrial asset management frameworks to maintain operating efficiency and enhance integrity [12].

Currently, Mean Residual Life (MRL) or RUL is recognized as a key feature in maintenance strategy, while true prognostic systems are rarely found in the industry. However, in estimating useful life, variations are found depending on the actual operating conditions and environmental characteristics, such as temperature and pressure, humidity conditions, and corrosion rates. Therefore, it is obvious that there exist many uncertainties that may lead to inaccuracy of the RUL estimation with its ability to predict and predict equipment degradation[13].

Evaluating an efficient component/system depends on classical limitations that limit, for example, the knowledge of available data, dynamics, and implementation requirements (precision, computation time, etc.).Therefore, implementing the RUL estimation method needs to be done on the safety component data A for RSG-GAS SSC to predict its remaining component life. These results can be used to optimize the maintenance system.

This research aims to estimate the expected value of the remaining life (RUL) of a component or system before failure from any time t based on the analysis of the reliability and the level of risk to optimize the life cycle phase of the component or system.

In this paper, the reliability method is used to estimate the RUL at a certain time *t*. First, several theoretical points are explained, then followed by a case study and the use of the reliability method in determining the RUL. It is necessary to consider the following assumptions: (a) The most suitable distribution for the failure time of a mechanical component is the Weibull distribution. The Assumptions of Independence and Identical Distribution (iid) of the data must be ensured so that a process model such as Weibull can be used; (b) in reliability analysis, hazard level function is needed to estimate RUL of components with safety category A on SSC from RSG-GAS.

2. THEORY

Analysis of Reliability, Risk Level and Estimation of The Remaining Useful Life Of Components using Statistics

The Weibull distribution is the most widely used empirical distribution and appears in almost all products of failure characteristics because it includes all three phases of damage that may occur in the damage distribution. The Weibull distribution is used in special cases, assuming the baseline hazard has a two-parameter Weibull form. The parameters used in this Weibull distribution are θ which is called the scale parameter and β which is called the shape parameter. The parameter β is useful for determining the level of damage from the formed data pattern and the scale parameter (θ) affects the mean value of the data pattern. The probability density function of the Weibull distribution model is provided in Eq. 1[14].

$$f(t) = \frac{\beta}{\theta} t^{\beta \cdot 1} e^{\frac{t}{\theta}} \quad t > 0 \tag{1}$$

In the parameter estimation stage, the distribution parameter values will be determined, which is by the time data between component damage (TTF) with the least square method and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Furthermore, the parameter values were substituted

into the formula for the level of risk, component reliability, and RUL.

Different types of failures were considered in the reliability analysis. Failure is defined as the inability of a component to timely perform the expected activities. In the reliability analysis, this data is collected in the form of time between failures (TTF), the time between maintenance (TBM), and for the topic of reparability in the form of repair time (TTR), time for corrective maintenance (TCM), time to perform preventive maintenance (TPM) and procurement and management downtime (TTD).

Four different functions are statistically defined to describe failures as follows: (1) the failure distribution is known as the probability density function (PDF) with the symbol f(t), (2) the cumulative distribution function (CDF) with the symbol F(t), (3) the joint function of F(t) is called the reliability function with the symbol R(t), and (4) the failure rate function or the hazard function with the h(t) symbol. The hazard level is considered as the rate at which failure occurs over a certain time (t_1,t_2) . This level is defined as the probability of occurrence of failure per unit time interval (t_1,t_2) so that failure has not occurred before t_1 (initial interval)[6].

The risk level is calculated to determine the intensity of the probability that the product will fail at a certain time with the hazard function model. The level of risk for the Weibull distribution is provided in Eq. 2[7].

$h(t) = \frac{\beta}{\theta} \left(\frac{t}{\theta}\right)^{\beta - 1}$	
h(t) = -(-)	
$\theta(\theta)$	(2)

System reliability is defined as the ability of a component or system to perform and maintain the required functions under certain conditions without failure for a specified time[9]. Equation (1) is applied to determine mathematically the reliability of the system (R(x)), where R(x) shows the reliability of the system (%) at time t. Weibull reliability is expressed as

$$R(t) = e^{-\left(\frac{t}{g}\right)^{\mu}}$$
(3)

Remaining Useful Life (RUL)

Remaining Useful Life (RUL) or Mean Residual Life (MRL) is the time left for components to carry out their functional abilities before failure occurs. RUL can also be defined as the duration from the current time to the end of its useful life for a component (Figure 1)




Fig 1. Component Health Index

Classification of RUL Prediction Techniques

There are several prognostic prediction methods used to determine the RUL of a subsystem or component. For Model-Based Prediction Methodology, RUL prediction can be applied to the Statistics and Computational Intelligence (CI) model approach. This is derived from configuration, usage, and historical failure data and applies to maintenance decision-making. Modelbased methodologies are often used to estimate RUL thereby informing maintenance decisions based on failure thresholds, where the timefrequency feature allows more precise results than using only the time feature. Similarly, failurederived methods and historical data can be used to predict the RUL of a component's assets[8].

Estimated RUL

RUL is widely used in reliability-based research [3]. The RUL is a component/system that is considered as the correct operating time remaining before the failure. RUL estimation is recognized as an important factor for conditionbased maintenance (CBM) [3]. The remaining component life is the length of time that the component remains functional after a certain time. The mean residual life (L) is the meantime expected for failure to occur. RUL = MRL = m (t) expressed as

$$m(t) = \frac{\int_{t}^{\infty} t f(t)dt}{R(t)} - t$$
(4)

3. METHODOLOGY

After entering the data, the relevant software is selected in the first step of the appropriate statistical approach, followed by the selection of an appropriate function or model of one of the main functions, for example, f(t) with the Weibull function. Furthermore, the cumulative distribution function F(t), reliability function R(t), the level of risk h(t), and then the remaining life of the component m(t) can be calculated using the available functions[6].

Data Processing Diagram on reliability analysis is shown in Figure 2[6]. Calculation of reliability and RUL were performed using Matlab code.




Fig 2. Data Processing Diagram on reliability analysis[6]

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The evaluated data is component damage with Safety A category on SSC of RSG-GAS reactor for core configuration number (CCN) from 72 to 94 between the years 2010 to 2018. Damage data for the SSC component is presented in Appendix A.

Determination of the distribution of component damage data and estimated data distribution parameters (Weibull distribution). Furthermore, the Goodness of Fit Test for the TTF distribution for the selected distribution, namely Normal, Exponential, Log-Normal, and Weibull, The Anderson Darling test was used. From the parameter value estimation, the shape and scale parameter values are obtained.

The plot of the probability function to determine the goodness of fit test of the exponential, normal, lognormal, and Weibull distribution functions for the BRV10 component is shown in Figure 3.




Fig. 3. Results of Component Distribution Conformity Test Electrical power supply (BRV10)

The value of the scale, shape, level of failure risk/damage rate h(t), and the reliability value of the component R(t) are presented in Table 1.

 Table 1. Level of Risk and Reliability for Components of Safety Category A on SSC from RSG-GAS

of Safety	/ Categor	y A on S	SC from	RSG-GA	S
Component	Scale	Shape	Т	h(t)	R(t)
_	(θ)	(β)	(day)		
Electrical	305.61	0.643	100	0.0031	0.8100
power supply,			250	0.0023	0.5906
B (BRV 10)			500	0.0018	0.3488
Component:			750	0.0015	0.2060
Emergency			1000	0.0014	0.1216
diesel					
aggregates					
			1250	0.0013	0.0718
Electrical	432.63	1.547	50	0.0011	0.8362
power supply,			100	0.0016	0.6993
BRV 20			200	0.0023	0.4889
Component			400	0.0034	0.2391
Emergency			600	0.0043	0.1169
diesel					
aggregates			800	0.0050	0.0572
Reactor	390.42	0.979	100	0.0026	0.7781
system, JA			200	0.0025	0.6054
Reactor pool			400	0.0025	0.3666
(Al-Lining)			600	0.0025	0.2219
JAA01			800	0.0025	0.1344
			1000	0.0025	0.0814
Measuring	139.08	0.694	50	0.0068	0.7790
point of the			250	0.0042	0.2868
process			500	0.0034	0.0823
systems:			750	0.0030	0.0236
Reactor pool			1000	0.0027	0.0068
purification					
KBE01			1250	0.0026	0.0019
Experimentati	309.36	1.250	50	0.0026	0.8170
on system			150	0.0034	0.5452
reactor pool,			300	0.0040	0.2973
Rabbit			450	0.0044	0.1621
systems			600	0.0048	0.0884
(inside the					
reactor pool)				0.0071	0.0402
(JBB)			750	0.0051	0.0482

Experimentati on system reactor pool, JB Control rods drive and suspension (JDA	61.292	0.774	20 100 150 200 250	0.0163 0.0113 0.0103 0.0097 0.0092	0.7766 0.2826 0.1502 0.0799 0.0424
Cranes and hoist, SM Crane, Reactor Building	494.54	1.135	300 100 250 500 750 1000 1250	0.0088 0.0018 0.0021 0.0023 0.0024 0.0025 0.0026	0.002256 0.79486 0.56327 0.31728 0.17871 0.10067 0.05670
Measuring point of the process systems: Pool cooling system JNA	475.55	1.507	50 100 250 500 750	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0020\\ 0.0010\\ 0.0014\\ 0.0023\\ 0.0033\\ 0.0040\\ \end{array}$	0.85343 0.72835 0.45274 0.20498 0.09280
20 Out of core temperature and neutron flux measurement JKT 02	209.41	0.669	1000 25 50 200 400 600 800	0.0046 0.0645 0.0051 0.0032 0.0026 0.0022 0.0021	0.04201 0.92316 0.85222 0.52749 0.27824 0.14677 0.07742
Out of core temperature and neutron flux measurement JKT 03	57.164	0.606	10 100 150 200 250 300	0.0211 0.0085 0.0073 0.0065 0.0059 0.0055	0.89931 0.34600 0.20352 0.11972 0.07042 0.04142

From Table 1, the remaining useful life is calculated for components with safety category A on SSC from RSG-GAS can be observed. The calculation results of the RUL values are shown in Table 2 and Figure 4.

Table 2. Remaining Use Life (RUL)

Component	RUL (day)
Electrical power supply, B (BRV 10) Component Emergency diesel aggregates	422.0292957
Electrical power supply, B (BRV 20) Component Emergency diesel aggregates	389.1657201
Reactor system, JA Reactor pool (Al-Lining)	
JAA01 Measuring point of the process systems:	393.9410755
Reactor pool purification KBE01	177.3360699
Experimentation system reactor pool, Rabbit systems (inside the reactor pool) (JBB)	288.0915321
Experimentation system reactor pool, JB Control rods drive and suspension (JDA)	71.12416625
Cranes and hoist, SM Crane, Reactor Building	472.4362112
Measuring point of the process systems: Pool cooling system JNA 20	429.0521178
Out of core temperature and neutron flux measurement JKT02	77.951269
Out of core temperature and neutron flux measurement JKT03	77.951269




Fig 4. Remaining Component Life

The remaining component life (RUL) was calculated from the year 2010 (t_1) , namely the time of the last year's component failure data, until the year 2018. The remaining component life for the electrical power supply component, B (BRV10) Component emergency diesel aggregates, electrical power supply, B (BRV20) Component emergency diesel aggregates, reactor system, JA reactor pool (Al-Lining) JAA01, measuring point of the following process systems: reactor pool purification KBE01, experimentation system reactor pool, rabbit systems inside the reactor pool (JBB), experimentation system reactor pool, JB control rods drive and suspension (JDA), cranes and hoist, SM crane, reactor building, measuring point of the process systems: pool cooling system JNA 20, outof-core temperature and neutron flux measurement JKT 02 and JKT 03, are consecutive: 422.029, 389.165, 393.941, 177.336, 288.091, 71.124, 472.436, 429.052, 77.951, and 77.951 days.

RUL estimation can provide information and data input for maintenance management to determine the appropriate and efficient treatment strategy. Strategy determination is the process of selecting components from the system with the lowest RUL value, so that replacement can be carried out before more serious damage occurs.

As seen in calculation results in Table 2, the estimation of RUL of RSG-GAS components is derived by projecting out the failure prediction during operation. This prediction assists to improve the operating conditions and protective measures, and hence avoid serious failures. Consequently, data in Table 2 should be compared with adequate litera for course ectnessture of the methodology used in the present study. As in the cases studies inspected herein, the failure model of RUL was simulated using Fortran code-based on the estimation method of Ref.[14] and by applying Weibull distribution predicated on Ref.[6]. The results of the comparison for the RUL simulations are plotted in Fig. 5. It can be noticed in Figure 5 that the present study has the RUL estimation

similar to the Fortran code and the Weibull distribution.




Fig 5. Comparison of RUL estimation (in days)

CONCLUSION

The effective prediction of RUL encourages fast maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) decision making and increases the availability of reliable SSC RSG-GAS components for use. The results presented can be used for preventive maintenance planning based on failure probability or RUL. This can reduce regular maintenance costs and increase operational efficiency, as well as a guide for care management to make fast maintenance and better decisions. In the future, there will be more focus on estimating RUL based on the context of which parameters are more influential to be considered to achieve a more realistic approach and outcome. Prediction techniques by mapping techniques against data types can enable the selection of relevant modeling methodologies.

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTION

All authors contribute together as the main contributors to this paper. All authors read and approved the final version of the paper.

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Reactor system,

JA Reactor pool

(Al-Lining)

JAA01

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APPENDIX

		or Componen on SSC from l				77	17/01/2012	126	811/821/831 points <12.41 The JAA01 CL811
Component		Date of		Type of					reading level
r r	CCN	Damage	TTF	Damage					is below the
Electrical power supply, B (BRV 10) Component: Emergency	73	24/11/2010	0	Diesel BRV 10 CW heater fault cannot be reset		85	06/01/2014	720	minimum limit The temperature
diesel aggregates	78	08/05/2012	531	Day tank BRV10 over scale danosilasi		91	22/08/2016	959	indication on the JAA01 CT001 meter is zero
	85	07/02/2014	640	Fuse BRV10 break					JAA01 CL811 pmeter is not
		0.000/001/	10	BRV10 cannot be	Measuring point	94	20/09/2017	394	accurate A noise is
		26/02/2014	19	operated BRV10 fault mechanic at	of the process systems: Reactor pool purification	71	01/04/2010	0	heard on KBE 01 AP 001 KBE01
		15/05/2014	78	RKU in local is not faul BRV10	KBE01	83	08/08/2013	1225	AP002 is rough The KBE01
		20/05/2014	5	electrical fault occurs repeatedly			16/01/2014	161	AP001 pump is inoperable The KBE01
Electrical power	86	16/06/2017	1123	BRV10 electrical fault Day tank fuel					pump designation CP001 at
supply, B (BRV 20) Component: Emergency	75	21/05/2011	0	level too low "fault" cannot be reset,			28/01/2014	12	RKU shows the maximum KBE01
diesel aggregates	83	28/06/2013	769	The accuracy is broken					AP001 blink/fault
				BRV20 water pump water		85	06/02/2014	9	(off) KBE01
	86	03/12/2014	523	line is leaking The flexible radiator hose for diesel					AA068 every time the process closes, a blink
	87	26/03/2015	636	generator no.2 (BRV20) is leaking			24/02/2014	18	fault occurs KBE01 AA068 cannot
	07	20/03/2013	050	<i>Charger</i> BRV20 tidak			01/04/2014	36	be opened / closed
	88	01/06/2015	67	berfungsi/rusa k			25/04/2014	24	The KBE01 AP001 pump

BRV20

100

343

343

294

0

146

17

29/09/2015

09/05/2016

09/05/2016

27/02/2017

03/04/2011

27/08/2011

13/09/2011

89

91

74

76

charger does

BRV20 fault

BRV20 fault

not work/is

damaged

BRV 20

Operates without

anyone

knowing The JAA 01

floating

is slightly

The JAA01 CL001

points to 0 m

indicator

JAA 01 CL811 /

821/831

designation

JAA 01 CL 811/821/831

<12.41 m

curved

bulkhead door

				is operating, but there is no flow Fault system, in the CXB02 Marshalling	system reactor pool, JB Control rods drive and suspension (JDA)				inoperable / JDA 03 at start-up crashes itself JDA 03 at start-up falls
				Kiosk the system is dead, there is			17/06/2011	8	off on its own The JDA 01 spindle is
				no power supply		77	02/03/2012	259	broken Many of the
		13/05/2014	18	The KBE01		78	11/04/2012		JDA indicator
				AP001 pump			11/04/2012		lights on the panel do not
	86	21/07/2014	69	sounds rough There is a water leak				40	light up JDA07 + 14 has a slow
				dripping in the pump seal of the reactor purification			25/04/2012	14	response and frequent shutdown faults.
				system (KBE01				14	Reg rod JDA07 at
	87	03/02/2015	197	AP001) KBE01 AP001 sounds			30/04/2012		position 353 mm, a repeated fault
	90	01/04/2016	423	harsh KBE01				5	occurs Position
				AP001 Pump On Blink indicator		79	12/06/2012	43	indicator display is off JDA is
	92	22/03/2017	355	cannot be reset			18/06/2012	6	broken (JDA 02)
	,2	22,03,2017	555	The indicator is below the			10,00,2012	0	JDA06 + 11 response is
	93	14/05/2017	53	limit/drop KBE01AA01 0 valve cannot		81	26/01/2013	222	slow (lagging behind the others)
				be opened/closed		01	20/01/2013	222	JDA06 11 response is
Experimentation system reactor	94	22/10/2017	161	from RKU 1 broken Hot Cell lighting			08/02/2013	13	slow (lagging behind the others)
pool, JBB	71	30/03/2010	0	lamp (JBB01) The water supply tank from the JBB 01 to JBB 04			00/02/2013	15	JDA04 armature dropped indicator cannot be
				system rabbit has no known			24/02/2013	16	reset JDA06 faults
	72	26/07/2010	118	water level JBB 01 rabbit system facility is not		82	30/04/2013	65	frequently The JDA06 power supply module
	75	14/05/2011	292	operating optimally The radiation timer counter		85	05/02/2014	281	cannot be closed JDA01 control rod
	82	07/05/2013	724	is abnormal (sometimes runs doesn't) on RS-5					overload insert indicator light cannot turn on
				MCB 4A on bit system			19/03/2014	42	(off) JDA07
	84	25/06/2013	49	JBB03 line 3 is broken <i>The solenoid</i>			20/03/2014	1	Armatur Drop JDA02 Blink, cannot be
				valve cannot be turned on when the capsule			28/04/2014	39	reset JDA06 when rod drop test, not
				returns to the drum, Manipulator		86	19/06/2014	52	responding to indicator
Experimentation	85 75	04/03/2014 09/06/2011	252 0	problem JDA 07					

			JDA07 + 14 (Regard) cannot be					JDA07 + 12 down position stuck when
	15/07/2014	26	downgraded manually					pressed manually
			JDA07 + 14 (Reg. Rod)	Cranes and hoist, SM Crane,				Crane SMK 10 (13 m
			cannot be lowered and	Reactor Building				floor) electric power does
	10/00/0011	•	triggered a			00/10/2011	0	not reach the
	12/08/2014	28	blink fault JDA03 - 05 if		76	08/10/2011	0	hanging panel The SMJ 10
			compensated rise/fall a fault					crane descends on
	09/09/2014	28	occurs During the		77	10/01/2012	94	its own (out of control)
			rod-drop time test, the					Close the operation
07	05/01/2015	110	counter does					button on the
87	05/01/2015	118	not stop JDA03 +					13th-floor crane partially
			10/12 oscillation		81	12/03/2013	427	off Crane SMJ10
89	27/08/2015	234	analog indicator					cannot be operated to
			The control rod fell off on					the left (left) at a slow
	28/09/2015	32	its own JDA03		91	10/05/2016	1155	speed The trolley
	05/10/2015	7	control rod					cannot be
	05/10/2015	7	Self-falling The control		95	02/01/2018	602	operated left or right
	08/10/2015	3	rod fell off on its own					Crane SMJ10 console panel
			The control rod falls by		95	26/03/2018	83	can not be lowered down
	27/10/2015	19	itself The regulating	Measuring point of the process				The pressure on the JNA20
			rod (JDA07) control rod	systems: Pool cooling system				CP001 / 002 pipe always
	30/10/2015	3	does not move automatically	JNA 20	78	14/05/2012	0	drops The JNA20
	20,10,2010	5	JDA07 does not respond		80	26/09/2012	135	blower is off JNA20
			down when					AN001
			compensation is done, the		85	19/05/2014	600	Frequently Faults
			control rod does not					The JNA20 CT001
	02/11/2015	3	respond Control rod					temperature control
	05/11/2015	3	not responding					indicator on the RKD
90	07/01/2016	94	jda 08 + 12 is damaged		86	05/11/2014	170	stand-up panel does not point
			After a scram event, the					JNA20 AN001 rough
			adjustment control rod		93	13/05/2017	920	bearing sound JNA20 rough
			(JDA07)		95	15/03/2018	306	motor sound
	05/02/2016	29	cannot be automatic	temperature and neutron flux	79	06/07/2012	0	JKT 02 CX 811, there is
			JDA04 at start-up	measurement JKT 02	81	16/01/2013	194	no response JKT02 CX811
91	25/07/2016	171	crashed The		61	10/01/2015	194	oscillation At the time of
			designation JDA05 + 11 is					the scram reactor at a
			defective, does not turn		85	24/04/2014	463	power of 1.84 MW, the JKT
92	08/03/2017	226	on JDA03 cannot	Out of core				02 max The
93	21/05/2017	74	go up / down	temperature and	00	10/10/2015	(01	appointment
94	01/12/2017	194	JDA07 is not a couple	neutron flux measurement	89	16/12/2015	601	of the JKT02 CX821
95	07/03/2018	96	Control rod	JKT 03				neutron

				0	-	
			detector did not respond The JKT02			too fa causin unbala
			CX821			alarm
			neutron detector			
	18/12/2015	2	showed no			
	10/12/2015	-	response			
			when the			
			reactor started			
			up JKT02 CX821			
	10/01/001 5		cannot			
90	18/01/2016	31	respond while			
			operating			
81	18/01/2013	0	JKT03 CX841 HV fault			
			JKT03 CX831			
	26/01/2013	8	response is			
			unstable			
			The meter			
			does not show the true value,			
	09/02/2013	14	even though			
	07,02/2013	17	the detector			
			position is			
			upper			
02	15/07/2012	150	JKT03 CX841			
83	15/07/2013	156	oscillation occurs			
			JKT03 CX821			
85	07/05/2014	296	cannot			
			measure			
			JKT03 CX811			
86	25/08/2014	110	up, Unbalanced			
			load alarm			
			JKT03 CX811			
	13/10/2014	49	with JKT03			
	13/10/2011	12	CX821 is			
			different Oscillation			
00	10/00/0015	202	system			
88	12/08/2015	303	(JKT03			
			CX811)			
			JKT03 CX811			
	13/08/2015	1	oscillation meter			
			designation			
			JKT03 CX821			
00	00/00/2015	4	oscillating			
89	28/09/2015	46	neutron detector			
			designation			
			The JKT03			
			CX821			
			neutron			
			detector designation			
	08/10/2015	10	oscillates			
			momentarily			
			causing an			
			unbalanced			
			load alarm JKT03 CX821			
			slow response			
			neutron			
	10/10/2015	2	detector			
	10/10/2013	2	indicates that			
			it raises an unbalanced			
			load alarm			
			The response			
	12/10/2015	2	of the JKT03			
		-	CX 821			
			Detector was			