A PRAGMATIC STRATEGY FOR BUILDING ACCORDANCE IN DISCORDANT SITUATIONS: A CASE STUDY ON NEGATIVE QUESTIONS

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Synopsis:

"Discordance" between what we expect and what actually happens is one of the biggest conflicts we experience in our daily lives. This paper will argue that conveying to others that there is such discordance is one of the main reasons interlocutors use negative questions in uttering a request.

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1.   Introduction

In making a request, we often use politeness strategies in order to be polite as much as possible, for making a request may end up threatening the other's "face" (a la Goffman) by directing the person to do something to perform our expectation.   In Japanese, one of such strategies is to use Negative Questions. (henceforth Neg-Q's) This paper conducts a case study on Neg-Q's in English and Japanese and argues that conveying to others that there is such a discrepancy between what we expect and what is actually happening, in other words, trying to overcome the discordance and build accordance between the interlocutors, is one of the main reasons interlocutors use Neg-Q's in uttering a request.

Neg-Q's show the following two interesting characteristics:

First of all, it seems that English Neg-Q's do not prompt the "conversational implicature" of being polite, but Japanese ones do.[1, 2]   The following (1)-(4) are a few random examples showing this difference: in English, a Neg-Q (1b, 3b) seems to be less polite than a non-Neg-Q (1a, 3a) (a Neg-Q < a non-Neg-Q) ($a < b$ means b is more polite), but in Japanese, a Neg-Q (2b, 4b) seems to be more polite than a non-Neg-Q (2a, 4a). (a Neg-Q > a non-Neg-Q)

(1) a. [?] Will you lend me your book?	***Will > Won't***
b. [#] Won't you lend your book?	**non-Neg-Q > Neg-Q**
(2) a. [?] Anata-no hon - wo kasite-kure ru - ka.	
you Pos book Acc lend-give Q	
'Will you lend me your book?' (literal translation, henceforth)	
b. Anata-no hon - wo kasite-kure -n - ka.	
you Pos book Acc lend-give-**Neg** Q	***kureru < kurer-n***
'Won't you lend me your book?'	**non-Neg-Q < Neg-Q**

[1] It is clear that, both in Japanese and in English, to make an utterance in the form of question makes a sentence polite.   Examples show this fact: (ii), question, is more polite than (i), and (iv), question, is more polite than (iii).
   ?# (i) I want to know how to get there.   (Ide 1986: 118)
      (ii) ***Do you know*** how to get there?   (ibid.: 118)   (emphasis hers)   (i) < (ii)
   # (iii) Senaka-ga itai.   Monde   kure.
      'I have a backache.'   massage   give   ' Give me a massage.'   (iii)<(iv)
   ? (iv) Senaka-ga itai.   Monde   kureru   **ka.**
      'I have a backache.'   massage   give   **Q**   ' Will you give me a massage?'
However, Wierzbicka points out that in Polish, politeness is not linked with an avoidance of imperative, nor with the use of interrogative devices.
         (v) ? Mamo, czy podasz mi chustecke?   ' Mom, will you give me a Kleenex? '
She says that she will correct the children to use the imperative instead (Wierzbicka 1991: 33-34).   This fact requires explanation, but since the difference will not be noticed in English and Japanese, I will not deal with these differences in this paper.
[2] Making an utterance in the past tense also makes a sentence polite both in English and in Japanese.
   ?# (i) Can you help me?   (Ide 1986: 122)
      (ii) ***Could*** you help me?   (ibid.: 122) (emphasis hers)   (i) < (ii)
   ?# (iii) O   rei-wo   mousiagetaku   omotte ori   masu.
      HON   thank-Acc   say-HON-up-want   think   be-HON   Hon   ' I want to say thank you to you. '   (iii) < (iv)
   (iv) O   rei-wo   mousiagetaku   omotte ori   masi   ta.
      HON   thank-Acc   say-HON-up-want   think   be-HON   Hon   ***Past***
         'I have wanted to say thank you to you." (ibid. : 122) (emphasis hers)(gross, translation mine)
(ii) and (iv) are politer than their counter present-tense sentences, i.e., (i) and (iii).   Taylor gives an explanation to this phenomenon.   He says that the pragmatic softening effect of the past tense has evolved from the prototypical usage of the past tense, i.e., past time, by metaphorization.   (See Taylor 1995: 152-153.) However, this too is over the scope of this thesis.   I will treat only present-tense Neg-Q's in this paper.

(3) a. Can you pass me the salt?
     b. Can't you pass me the salt?   **Can   >   Can't**
(4) a. Shio-wo totte kure-masu- ka.   **non-Neg-Q > Neg-Q**
        salt Acc   pass   give Hon Q
           'Can you pass me the salt?'
     b.Shio-wo totte kure-mase- **n** ka.   **masu   < mase-n**
        salt Acc pass give Hon   **Neg** Q   **non-Neg-Q < Neg-Q**
           'Can't you pass me the salt?'

("#" indicates that the sentence is not polite, and "?" indicates that the sentence is rather polite.   The degree of politeness is shown as   no mark > ? > ?# > #,   "#" being the most impolite.   However, there is no objective way of deciding the degree of politeness. All the degrees are decided in a minimal pair.)

Admitting that English Neg-Q's are more likely to be impolite and the Japanese ones polite, the situation is not so straightforward.   As we will see later on, there are polite Neg-Q's in English, and there are impolite Neg-Q's in Japanese, too.

Another interesting phenomenon in Neg-Q's is that, in the literature, Neg-Q's are generally considered as implying a positive and a negative proposition (*Aren't you tired* involves *you are tired* and *you are not tired*), but we cannot posit the two to every Neg-Q's. (5) is an example; it is simply impossible to argue that A implies the negative proposition of *you don't have the book now*.

(5) A, a professor, is talking to B in A's office.

A: Did you read the book that I was talking about?

B: Yes.   I finished reading it 3 days ago.   Actually, I had some questions regarding the argument.

(B takes out the book)(After the talk, B puts the book in her bag.)

(Some time later, C comes into the office.)

C: I couldn't find the book at the bookstore.

A: Really? (to B) (pointing at the bag) *Don't you have the book now?*

B: (0.5) Oh yeah.   It's in my bag.   Hold on.

This case study investigates why Neg-Q's sometimes seem to have a "conversational implicature" of being polite (this happens more in Japanese), but not in others (this happens more in English). And through considering the politeness phenomenon, we will see what the two propositions expressed in Neg-Q's are.   As a consequence, this paper will argue that the two propositions expressed in a Neg-Q are (a)what is expected and (b) what is actually happening, and that the Neg-Q's become impolite both in English and Japanese when the speaker refers to the action not being carried out but non-impolite when the speaker refers to the state of not being carried out, hence referring to the state rather than action is a pragmatic strategy for building "accordance" in a discordant situation. In other words, we will see the following results;[3]

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[3] There is another interesting difference in English and Japanese Neg-Q's shown in (i)-(ii).   When Addressee (henceforth Ae) is asked a Neg-Q, the answer *yes* to it seems to indicate the opposite meaning in English and Japanese:
(i) A: Aren't you coming to the party? /   B: Yeah, I am.   (which means B is coming)
(ii) A: Pati-   ni- wa   ko-   nai- desu-   ka?   'Aren't you coming to the party?
   B: Hai, iki- mase- n.   'Yes, I am not going.'   (which means B is not coming)
However, this case study focuses on the functions and the interpretation of a sentential unit of Neg-Q, and studying the phenomena of answering to these Neg-Q's is over the scope of this paper.   Therefore, I will deal only with the above two phenomena.

(i)   Relying solely on the form, or on the lexical item, or solely on the pragmatics will not give an explanation as to why Neg-Q's sometime become polite.   Rather, we must see the phenomena from an Addressee (henceforth Ae)-oriented as well as practice-based view following Bourdieu (1977 [1972]).

(ii)   Seen from the practice-point of view, the central Function of Neg-Q is to articulate two opposing "feelings", i.e., "observation" and "counter expectative".

(iii)   In principle, the kind of "counter expectative" plays a great role in politeness: those Neg-Q's whose "counter expectatives" refer to Ae's action usually becomes impolite, and those that refer to situation, usually non-impolite.

(iv)   The politeness of the Neg-Q's are related to the kind of "counter expectative", but sometimes the politeness is "over-ridden" by the dynamic interpretation by the Ae, and the habitus.

(v)   English and Japanese have different habitus regarding the interpretations of the Neg-Q's; in English Neg-Q's are often regarded as expectations about Ae's actions, while in Japanese they are often regarded as expectations about situation, hence in general English Neg-Q's are regarded as impolite, while Japanese counterparts non-impolite.

2. Previous Studies

Neg-Q's have attracted some attention in the literature (eg. Leech 1983, Brown and Levinson 1987), but none of the previous studies have sufficiently provided answers to the following two aspects of Neg-Q's, i.e., (1) being a Question, a Neg-Q expresses a discrepancy between two propositions.   What are the two propositions expressed in a Neg-Q; (2) why is it that English Neg-Q's are more likely to become impolite compared to a simple question (*Won't you open the window? < Will you open the window?*   ("A<B" indicates that B is more polite), while Japanese counterparts seem to show the opposite effect (*Mado-wo akete-kure-mase-N-ka*   'Won't you open the window?' > *Mado-wo akete-kure-masu-ka 'Will you open the window'*.)

The previous studies on Neg-Q's can be categorized into 3 lines of thought, which is subdivided into 5 categories; attempts to attribute politeness to 1) the language structure,   2) lexical items, 3a) a pragmatic reason dealing with the phenomenon universally, 3b) a pragmatic reason dealing with the phenomenon culture-specifically, and 3c) a pragmatic reason which involves the more prominent expectation.   We will review each line in the following sections.

2.1. Attempts to Attribute Politeness to the Language Structure

There were, in the history of linguistics, attempts to attribute politeness to the language structure without referring to the contextual / pragmatic aspects. Transformational syntacticians have tried to account for the matter, first, by grammatical accounts.   For example, Prideaux (1970) says it is the feature assigned to each noun, and Makino (1970) says it is an agreement rule, that makes an utterance polite.

However, just a mere look at data proves that this way of thinking is untenable.

(6) (The Ae seems tired, and the Ar offers a seat.)
    (a) Won't you sit down?   Won't > Will
    (b) #? Will you sit down?

(7) (The Ae is blocking the Ar's view, and Ar says irritated.)

      (a) # Won't you sit down?   Won't < Will

      (b) Will you sit down?

      Whatever rules or features we may assign to them, it is just impossible to explain the fact that the degrees of politeness of the same Neg-Q differ depending on the situation solely from those rules or features without referring to the context. In other words, as Harada (1976) points out, we cannot say that those and others treating the matter of politeness by grammatical accounts are successful, and ". . . failure of these works seems . . . to stem from the fact that . . . [they] try to incorporate the evaluation of politeness into grammatical accounts" (Harada 1976: 561).

      Admitting the shortcomings, Transformational syntacticians change their directions and build the "performative hypothesis". (See, for example, Ross (1970) and Sadock (1974).) Performative Hypothesis assumes that ".. all sentences ... have underlying structures in which the highest clauses is a statement by the speaker of what he does in the speech act he is performing" (Allwood et al. 1995 [1971]: 170). In other words, they say sentences which orders someone to do something have the underlying structure of (8):

(8) I order you S   (ibid.: 170)

      However, this hypothesis is also shown untenable. Lyons (1977) lists two weak points that this performative analysis has. The first one is that "the conditions which determine the selection of a subject expression and an indirect-object expression in the text-sentence (S) containing the performative verb of saying in an explicitly performative utterance are quite complex; and they will vary according to the nature and occasion of the illocutionary act that is being performed." (ibid.: 779) The second one is that "it seems perverse to assimilate the performative function of verbs of saying to their descriptive function, rather than to assume that we come to know the sense and denotation of verbs of saying by virtue of our prior understanding of what is involved in the performance of illocutionary acts" (ibid.: 780). Also, *The Dictionary of English Grammar* says the failure of the "performative hypothesis" is due to the truth value of the sentence, how to account for reflexive pronouns and adverb, ambiguity of underlying structure and derivational procedure, and so on. (See Yasui et al. 1992: 1032-1033) And with these observations, as Wierzbicka says, ". . . the attempts to explain the interaction between syntax and illocutionary force on the basis of the performative hypothesis were unsuccessful" (Wierzbicka 1991: 209).

2.2. Attributing Politeness to Lexical Items

      There were also attempts to ascribe politeness to the information that lexical items have[4], i.e., another attempt to attribute politeness to the nature of language itself, not to the dynamic interpretation by the Ae.

      Looking at (9)-(12), it seems possible to attribute the impoliteness to *won't*.

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[4] There are many definitions for "Lexical" level. The Lexical Level approach that I will deny here is the approach which is based on the autonomous view of language and which claims that it is useful to study the meaning of the words separated from the context in which they are used. In other words, an approach which emphasizes the words more than the context, and claims that we can tell the meaning of a sentence by the total of the meaning of the words in the sentence without referring to the context in which they are uttered. In this view, it follows that the words change the meaning of the sentence. (For this kind of approach to linguistics, see Fries (1952) for example.) I will not deny the lexical approach which focuses on the influence of context on the meaning, for what I will deny here is an approach purely lexical: admitting much influence of context on the meaning is not an approach purely lexical but is an approach close to a Pragmatic one

(9)　Wouldn't you like a drink?[5]
(10)Isn't it wonderful?
(11)# ***Won't*** you close the window?[6]
(12)#***Won't*** you do this?

In such argument, Fraser (1973), for one, suggests there is a "hierarchy of politeness, " in which sentences starting with "*Won't*" is the lowest in the hierarchy.[7]　Fraser's "hierarchy of politeness" is as follows:

(13)Won't / Can't < Will < Can < Would < Could　　　　(Fraser 1973: 303)
　　　(*a < b* means *b* is more polite)

However, this idea is easily proved untenable by English Neg-Q's which contain *Won't* but are polite. Examples of these are:

(14)***Won't*** you join in the dance?[8]
(15)***Won't*** you have something to eat?　　　　(Leech 1983: 169)

Moreover, it might be possible to object more strongly to the idea which argues that the Neg-Q phenomena can be explained focusing on word, not on context, with the following (16) and (17): it is impossible to account for the difference between them without placing great emphasis on the context where the sentence is uttered.

(16)(The Ae seems tired, and the Ar offers a seat.)
　　　　(a) Won't you sit down?　　　　　　　　　　Won't > Will

　　　　(b) #? Will you sit down?
(17)(The Ae is blocking the Ar's view, and Ar says irritated.)
　　　　(a) # Won't you sit down?　　　　　　　　　　Won't < Will

　　　　(b) Will you sit down?

From these sentences above, we must conclude that the politeness of Neg-Q's is not fully controlled by a certain lexical item, such as *Won't*: relying on words, which are separated from the context where they are used, for explaining this linguistic situation involving Neg-Q's does not seem to be a promising explanation.　There must be other reasons which can account for this phenomenon.

　　　Summarizing, we have shown so far that studying the phenomena at the purely word level or syntactical level is unsound, and have suggested that studying the phenomena without referring to the context is inadequate.

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[5]　I am, in this case study, dealing only with the present-tense Neg-Q's.　However, although (5) has a past-tense word "*Would*" instead of "*Will*", this is not a Neg-Q that asks an action in the past, therefore, I will include this sentence in my data.
[6]　(10) and (11) are impolite compared to (i) and (ii) respectively.
　　　# (10) Won't you close the window?　　　/　　　(i) Will you close the window?
　　　# (11) Won't you do this?　　　/　　　(ii) Will you do this?
[7]　The lowest words in Fraser's hierarchy of politeness is not only "*Won't*" but also "*Can't*":　He says that the sentences starting with "*Won't*" and "*Can't*" are the impolite sentences.　Just as the argument of "*Won't*", it is easy to show that this idea, i.e., which says sentences starting with "*Can't*" are impolite, is inadequate by citing counter-examples which start with "*Can't*" but are polite:
　　　(i) ***Can't*** you put the meat on first?　　　　(Green 1975: 137) (emphasis mine)
　　　(ii) ***Can't*** I get you a drink?
[8]　This Neg-Q can be judged polite if we compare this within the set of minimal pair. The same applies to the rest of the data as well.
　　　(14) Won't you join in the dance? / ?# (i) Join in the dance? / ?# (ii) Will you join in the dance? / ? (iii) Would you join in the dance?

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2.3. Explaining Politeness from a Pragmatic Point of View

Among the Pragmatic accounts for politeness, little attention has been given to the study of politeness of Neg-Q's, and a small number of the former works treating the Neg-Q's in the field of politeness can be divided into two big streams: the first stream includes works which argue that Neg-Q's are universally polite, and the other stream consists of works which treat them as a culture-specific phenomenon.

2.3.1. Neg-Q's as Universally Polite

Included in this line of thought are Searle (1964), Leech (1983), and Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]). Let us review Leech (1983) as a representative of this line of thought.

Leech (1983) says, a Neg-Q is universally polite in that it implicates "a negative assumption and a . . . canceled positive belief" (Leech 1983: 170). He continues to say that because of these implications, the addressee understands that the addresser is using negation to give him or her "a chance to withdraw or suppress a positive refusal" (ibid.: 170).

Let me explain with an example he gives.

(18) Won't you have something to eat? [9]   (ibid.: 169)
(19) # Have something to eat.

He argues that (18) is more polite than (19) because of a three-step reason:

1. (18) implicates the Ae's negative assumption, i.e., Ae does not want anything to eat,

2. This assumption cancels Ar's positive belief, i.e., it cancels Ar's thought that Ae wants something to eat, Therefore,

3. It gives Ae a chance to withdraw,

and from the above three-steps, according to him, Neg-Q's are polite.[10]

In such examples, the Neg-Q's seem to be universally polite. As we have seen so far, when we consider Japanese examples, this argument considering Neg-Q as universally polite seems to be sound.

Also, this argument leaves out many aspects of the phenomena: Neg-Q's which are not polite can be easily found in English. For example, (20), a Neg-Q, is less polite than (21), the paired simple question.

(20) # Can't you drive straight?   (Leech and Starvik 1995: 113)
(21) Can you drive straight?

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[9] It is possible to say that the sentence (18) is polite because it uses the word "*something*," instead of "*anything*." However, Leech says, not only (ii) but also (i) is polite, (ii) being more polite :
        (i) Won't you have **anything** to eat?
        (ii) Won't you have **something** to eat?   (Leech 1983: 169) (Bold mine)
[10] I must note here that Leech is aware of the existence of Neg-Q's which are impolite. He cites Neg-Q which has "overtone of impatience." (Leech 1983: 108)
        (i) Can't you sit down?
And he comments that "different indirect illocutions have different emotive or attitudinal implications which are not reducible to the simple matter of politeness." (ibid.: 108) However, this line is the only space he cites for explaining the impolite Neg-Q's in this book. Mainly, he treats Neg-Q as universally polite in this book.

Also, there are Neg-Q's which are not so polite in Japanese, too.   The following (22) serve as an example: The Neg-Qs, (22), is less polite than (23).

    (22)# (The H is standing in front of the S and blocking the S's view. S says irritated.)
        Suwatte   kudasai   mase-**n**   ka. [19, 20]
        sit   please-HON   HON **Neg** Q
          'Won't you please sit down? '   **Neg-Q < non-Neg-Q**
    (23)Suwatte   kudasai   masu-   ka.
        sit   please-HON   HON   Q
          'Will you please sit down? '

Neither my informants (both English and Japanese) nor I would say that (20) and (22) are polite.   Rather, these sentences would be classified under "insults" as Kuno says (1977: 321).

From these counterexamples, we must conclude that to consider the Neg-Q's as universally polite is inadequate.

2.3.2. Neg-Q as a Culture-Specific Phenomenon of Politeness

Recent scholars, being aware of the fact that seeing Neg-Q as universally polite is unsatisfactory, are lead to study the phenomena in the opposite direction: instead of treating the Neg-Q's as a universal phenomenon, they treat them as culture-specific occurrence of politeness.

Probably due to the fact that unless more than one language is compared, the difference of politeness in Neg-Q's will not be obvious, this topic of dealing with Neg-Q's in the field of politeness is somehow left unanswered after seeing the phenomenon universally, and, surprisingly, only a few attempts have been made, so far, at giving an explanation to this phenomenon as Kageyama and Tamori say: " ... there is no systematic analysis of such expression in the literature so far" (Kageyama and Tamori 1976: 14).   Among the few scholars who have dealt with this issue, let us review Mills (1992) in the following.   (cf. Koike (1994))

Mills (1992) says "that … negative [questions] must be considered culture-specific" (Mills 1992: 67).   She provides many Neg-Q's both in English and in Russian, and shows that the Neg-Q's are polite in Russian, however, on the other hand, not in English.   She says Russian sentences such as (24), with both the "negative and interrogative particle" is "extremely polite" (ibid.: 70) .

    (24)□e □ampy□□um □□u □ac   nepe□am□   □e□□□u?   (ibid. : 70)
        Neg   trouble   if   you   change   money
          'Won't it trouble you if you change money?'

And she concludes the paper by saying that it is the way of conventionalizing how to express politeness that differs between the two languages as the title of the paper, i.e., "Conventionalized Politeness in Russian Requests", shows.

It must be true that Neg-Q is not universally polite as Searle, Leech, and Brown and Levinson consider it to be, for counterexamples such as (20) and (22) are easily found.   However, rushing from one extreme to the other,

i.e., rushing from saying that it is universal to saying that it is the culture that makes the difference, seems counter-productive: attributing everything to culture may be good for description but it is not adequate in that it cannot explain why it is so.   Onoe (1997) strongly argues this point.   He says describing a phenomenon shown in a language and concluding that this is culture-specific is not interesting.   What is needed, he says, is the explanation for the phenomenon.

Also, saying that a Neg-Q is a culture-specific phenomenon of politeness will not explain the difference within one language / culture.   In Japanese, for example, there are both polite and impolite Neg-Q's as the following sentences show:

(25) Sato-wo   totte-kure- mase-   n-   ka.
     sugar-Acc   take-give   HON   Neg   Q
          ' Won't you pass the sugar? '   (with "*masen*")
(26) #Sato-wo   totte-kure- nai-   nodesu-   ka.
     sugar-Acc   take-give   Neg   *NO*-HON   Q
          ' Won't you pass the sugar? '   (with "*nainodesu*")
(27) ? Sato-wo   totte-kure- n-   ka
     sugar-Acc   take-give   Neg   Q
          'Won't you pass the sugar?'   (without "*masu*")
(28) # (The H is standing in front of the S and blocking the S's view.   The S says irritated.)
     Suwatte-kure- mase-   n-   ka.
     sit-give   HON   Neg   Q
          'Won't you sit down?'   (with "*masu*")
(29) ?Sato-wo   totte-kure-   nai-   desu-   ka.
     sugar-Acc   take-give   Neg   HON   Q
          'Won't you pass the sugar?'   (without "*no*")
(30) n Ame- wa   fura-   nai-   nodesu-   ka.
     rain-Top   rain   Neg   *NO*-HON   Q
          'Isn't it going to rain?'   (with "*no*")
(The mark "n" indicates that this is neutral in politeness, it is neither polite nor impolite.)

(25) and (26) show the fact that there are both polite and non-polite Neg-Q's in Japanese, and (27) -(30) deny the possible argument which may say that there are not any polite / impolite Neg-Q's in Japnese but the matter of politeness can be reduced to a certain word.   (27) and (28) deny the possible argument which might say that (25) is polite only because of the existence of "*masu*"; (27) shows that the Neg-Q's without "*masu*" are still polite, although it is less polite than the ones with "*masu*", and (28) shows that there are sentences with "*masu*" which are not so polite as (25).   ((25) is impolite in the situation where Ar is accusing the Ae. It is suggested here that the context in which the sentence is uttered plays a great role in the matter of politeness.)   Also, (29)-(30) deny another possible argument which says that (26) is impolite not because it is a Neg-Q but only because of the existence of "*no*"; (29) shows that Neg-Q without "*no*" is still less polite than (25), and (30) shows that there are Neg-Q's which contains "*nainodesu*" but still not impolite.   With the six examples above, we can say that there are polite Neg-Q's and impolite Neg-Q's in Japanese.   (For detailed argument for "*noda*", see Hanazaki (1999).)

Therefore, with two points above, i.e., saying it is culture-specific is 1. counter-productive and 2. it does not explain the differences within one language, we must say that treating Neg-Q's as a culture-specific strategy of politeness, also, has weak points in itself.

2.3.3. The Third Alternative – Attributing the Politeness to its More-Prominent Expectation

The recent general treatment of Neg-Q is to argue that they imply a positive and a negative expectation and represent a "bias" to either of them, and when studies go further enough to explain the politeness phenomena of Neg-Q's, they attribute the politeness to the "negative expectation". Included in this line of thought are Lyons (1977), Oota (1980), Ikegami (1981), Nitta (1986), Hanazaki (1997, 1998), Adachi (1999), among others.

Regarding the "expectations", Leech says, "'*Can't you drive a car?*' differs from. . .'*Can you drive a car?*' in conveying the . . . dual assumption on the S's part: 'I thought you could drive a car, but now it appears that you can't.' There is a[n]. . . expectation [of] '*You can drive a car.*' and . . .'*You can't drive a car.*' " (Leech 1970: 318-320) (emphasis his, brackets mine) And Leech calls these two expectations "cancelled expectation" and "actual expectation" (ibid.: 319).

Also, when we closely look at any Neg-Q, we can see that it has "a bias" (Oota 1980: 624) to one of the two expectations. (See also, Lyons 1977, Nitta 1986, Tei 1994, and Adachi 1999.) For example, Adachi (1999) writes,

> (A) Kimi   tsukarete i   mase   n   ka?
>   You   tired   be   HON   Neg   Q
>   'Aren't you tired?'
> The situation in which (A) is used is different from that in which a typical question is used. This sentence (A) is used when the speaker has the expectation that *you are tired*. In other words, speakers utter this sentence when the **positive proposition** (*you are tired*) and the **negative proposition** (*you are not tired*) are not equal in value. (Adachi 1999: 47-48) (translation, square bracket and bold mine)

And regarding the politeness, Ikegami (1981) says *Kite-kudasai-mase-n-ka? (Won't you come?)* implies propositions of *you will come* and *you will not come*, and as a polite strategy, the Ar conveys, maybe superficially, that he/she is expecting the negative one more.

However, these notions of assuming something positive and something negative or non-positive should be revised from a more practice-based notion. Blindly assuming that two "feelings" are positive and negative (non-negative) and that the speaker will always have a "bias" to one of these two will always be haunted by the following two defects; firstly, for some Neg-Q's positing something positive and something negative is simply counter-intuitive as we have seen in (5); and secondly, it is always uncertain which of the two is the more "biased" one.

Let us see which of the "propositions" is more expected by the interlocutors in the next two Neg-Q's.

(31) Can't you drive straight?

(32) Mado-   wo   akete- kure- mase- n-   ka?
    Window Acc   open   give   HON   Neg   Q
               'Won't you open the window?'

It is easy to find which proposition is expected more in (31): the positive one, i.e., *you can drive straight*. However, it is hard to decide which proposition is the "biased" one in (32). As Ikegami (1981) as well as many other studies have been arguing, the utterer of (32) shows, at least on the surface, that he/she is expecting *you will not open the window* as a polite strategy to make a request in Japanese: the Ar shows that he/she is expecting *you will not open the window*, so that it would put less burden on Ae in declining the request if Ae does not want to grant the request. (This is a "negative politeness" according to Brown and Levinson (1987)[11].) (We will come back to Brown and Levinson's theory shortly.) In this respect, we can say that the Ar shows a "bias" to the "negative proposition". However, it is obvious that the Ar expects, i.e., desires, that *you will open the window*. In this respect, the "positive proposition" is the "biased" one. With this mere observation, we can see, if we regard the two opposing "feelings" as "positive proposition" and "negative proposition", we cannot have a stable decision as to which is the "biased" proposition.[12]

With the advantages and shortcomings of these observations in mind, the next chapter tries to develop a better explanation to the politeness of Neg-Q's.

3. The Alternative Explanation from a Practice-Based View --- The two contradicting propositions expressed in Neg-Q's

In this chapter, we will propose an alternative explanation as to why Neg-Q's sometimes seem to have a "conversational implicature" of being polite (this happens more in Japanese), but not in others (this happens more in English).

Neg-Q's express two contradicting "feelings". There should be no objection to this idea: whatever name they may have given to them, all the previous studies we have seen in Chapter2, including Leech, Searle, and Brown and Levinson, are unanimously in accordance on this point, and nor am I in the position to stand against it. We, in this section, will review the two "feelings" expressed and interpreted in a Neg-Q, and argue that those "feelings" are not quite what most previous studies call "positive proposition" and "negative proposition". Rather, by undergoing a "Copernican" change through reviewing the two "feelings" from a practice-based point of view, we will argue that those two "feelings" expressed in Neg-Q's are the "observation" the interlocutors make about the world around him/her, i.e., the remark on what is present at the time of utterance, and the "counter expectative" that is at variance with the "observation", i.e., the expectation that the Ae thinks Ar has had and which contradicted the actual "observation". In other words, a Neg-Q is uttered when Ar's find a gap between the "observation" and the "counter expectative", and to tell the Ae what they have been expecting, i.e., trying to build "accordance".

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[11] Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]: 129) define "negative politeness" as follows: a redressive action addressed to the addressee's negative face: his want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded.

[12] Of course, the other way around is to say that, as Adachi (1999) seems to argue, it is always the "positive proposition" that is "biased." This idea works for most of the Neg-Q's; *Ashita ame furanaika*? ('*Won't it rain tomorrow?*') is biased toward the "positive proposition", i.e., *it is going to rain tomorrow*. However, this kind of analysis, too, will be unable to explain (73); it is impossible to describe the difference between *Mado-wo akete-kure-mase-n-ka?* (*Won't you open the window?*) and *Mado-wo akete-kure-masu-ka?* ('*Will you open the window?*') The Neg-Q is more polite and it is the usual way to make a request in Japanese, and the non-Neg-Q sounds awkward as a request. This is because, as I have written in the main body part, Neg-Q shows that, at least on the surface, the *Ar is not expecting the Ae to open the window*, hence becomes a polite request. If we say that, as Adachi (1999) seems to say, Neg-Q's articulate the Ar's belief that "positive proposition" is correct and "negative proposition" incorrect, there is no room for explanation for this seeming expectation or the "bias" on the "negative proposition".

Let us see this with an example (5), this time quoted as (33).   We have seen that positing the "non-positive" expectation seems counter-intuitive in this example.

(33)A, a professor, is talking to B, a graduate student, in A's office.
   A: Did you read the book that I was talking about?
   B: Yes.   I finished reading it 3 days ago.   Actually, I had some questions regarding the argument.
      (B takes out the book) (Some time later, C comes into the office.)
   C: I couldn't find the book at the bookstore.
   A: Really? (to B) (pointing at the bag) Don't you have the book now?
   B: Oh yeah.   It's in my bag.   Hold on.

The positive and negative expectation or the "p" and "~p" of the Neg-Q in (33) would be as follow: [p]: *you have the book now*, and [~p]: *you do not / may not have the book now*.   However, this seems quite counter-intuitive. To say one of the expectations is *you have the book now* comes without much problem.   On the other hand, it is incorrect to say that B "expects" that *you do not/may not have the book now* when B knows that C has the book, and especially if he is pointing at the bag where the book is.   Rather, if we are to posit some "feeling" that is opposite to *you have the book now*, the followings appear to be good candidates; *ostensibly, or at the surface, you **seem** not to have the book* or, *you **seem** to act as if you do not have the book by hiding it in your bag*.   Or to say it plainly, it should be something like *I don't see your book.*   In other words, one of the "feelings" expressed through a Neg-Q must be the "observation" of the present situation.   As for the other expectation, *you have the book now*, we can say that this is the expectation the Ar has had and is opposite to the "observation", or, to put it in other words, what Ar has expected instead of the present situation, hence it is called "counter expectative".[13]

There are advantages in adopting this practice-based view to Neg-Q's and argue that Neg-Q's express "observation" and "counter expectatives", which supports the validity of the claim.

The argument which sees two opposing "feelings" as "observation" and "counter expectative" is free from the problem of wondering which expectation is the more prominent one because it is always the "counter expectative" that the interlocutors have the "bias" to.   When you posit positive and negative / non-positive proposition to all of the Neg-Q's, you always have to wonder which of these propositions does the Neg-Q have the "bias" to, or in other words, which proposition does the interlocutors believe more likely to be the case, i.e., the problem pointed out in 2.3.3.

(34) and (35) are the examples quoted earlier to see that it is hard to decide which expectation is the "biased" one.

(34)Can't you drive straight?   (=(31))
(35)Mado-   wo   akete- kure- mase-   n-   ka?   (=(32))
    Window Acc   open   give   HON   Neg   Q
         'Won't you open the window?'

The "Copernican"-changed notion to the two opposing "feelings", which regards the two feelings as "observation" and "counter expectative", do not face this problem, for, by definition, it is the "counter expectative" that the Ar expects more; in (34), the Ar expects the Ae to drive straight, while the Ar in (35) expects that the Ae opens the

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[13] This point owes much to personal communication with Hanks.

window.

Secondly, this practice-based notion can successfully explain (35) as well, hence the validity of this claim; With the positive / negative expectation, we had to say that (35) is polite because the Ar expects, at least superficially, the negative expectation more, which is hard to quickly understand.   However, this practice-based concept explains that (35) is polite, for the Ar shows politeness towards the Ae through conveying that he/she is "observing" the situation as *Ae is not going to do the favor of him / her*, hence showing "negative politeness".   In other words, this practice-based notion of Neg-Q is favorable in demonstrating the politeness of (35) because this view does not have to argue that either one of the opposing "feelings" is "less biased" or "incorrect", but rather posit two different level notions of " observation" and "expectative" which does not have to be "negated" or cancelled.   This theory being able to provide a better explanation to a phenomenon unable to be described by the other theories, we can claim the soundness of this Copernican-changed view to Neg-Q's. (For the politeness of Neg-Q's, we will come back in more detail in 4.4.)

Hanks (1996, p.c.) is in support with this view.   According to him, there, also, is a specific word in Yucatec Maya, the language he studies, which shows the two "feelings" similar to this Neg-Q phenomenon.   One of the two "feelings" articulated in that expression shows that something is right in front of your eyes although you expected something else, and the other shows that something is not there although you expected that to happen. And he calls the two "feelings" "observation" and "counter expectative", where I took the names.[14]

From the practice- and discourse- based point of view, as well as the phenomenological point of view, this argument of regarding the two opposing "feelings" articulated and interpreted in Neg-Q's as "observation" and "counter expectative" seems rational.   Standing on the Ar's point of view, the time when we articulate a Neg-Q should be the time when we find that our observation of the world around us is not consistent with what we have expected, not when we have two opposing "propositions" or "expectations": when you are asking which of the two expectations is the case, you would utter a non-Neg-Q instead of a Neg-Q.   And we, the Ar, communicate what we have expected instead of the immediate state of affairs, through referring to the condition that is present in front of our eyes.   That is to say, to express the incompatibility we find with our expectation that we have had, we, the Ar's, refer to what Langacker (1991) calls a "reference point", i.e., a point used as a starting point to understand something else, and this is what we name "observation" here.

Thus, all of the foregoing considerations amounts to saying that the argument which considers the two opposing "feelings" expressed and interpreted in Neg-Q's as "observation" and "counter expectative" have much justice.

The argument by Leech, which we saw earlier in 2.3.1., in a sense, supports the argument regarding the "observation".   Let me repeat his arguments.   He says;

> "'*Can't you drive a car?*' differs from . . .'*Can you drive a car?*' in conveying the . . . dual assumption
> on the S's part: 'I thought you could drive a car, but now it appears that you can't.'   There is a[n]. . .
> expectation [of] '*You can drive a car.*' and . . .'*You can't drive a car.*'   That is, there is a "cancelled
> expectation" ('*You can drive a car*') and an "actual expectation" ('*You can't drive a car*')." (Leech

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[14] Hanks (p.c.) also pointed out to me that the word "expectation" does imply some futurity, hence not a good name for the "observation" feeling.

1974: 320) (italic, brackets mine)

As we saw in 2.3.1., his arguments are not tenable for several reasons. Also, his arguments give a distorted account to this phenomenon in that, first and foremost, he is also a follower of positive/ negative approach who believes one of the "feelings" is "cancelled".[15]   What is worth noting is that we can see in the above quote that Leech actually mentions that the "observation" of the present situation plays a great role in Neg-Q's; "***now* it *appears*** *that you can't*."

    To determine what the "observation" and the "counter expectative" of each Neg-Q are, by its nature of being practice- and discourse- based, we must consult not only the Neg-Q itself but also the context including the previous and subsequent utterances.   Subtracting the interrogative part from the Neg-Q might appear as a good candidate for figuring out what the "observation" is.   (The "observation" of *Won't you open the door?* seems to be *You won't open the door*.)   Yet, the real explanation lies a little deeper as we have seen in (33); the "observation" of *Don't you have the book now* is not *you don't have the book now*.   Only the "thick description" (Geertz 1973) of the contextual information makes available the "observation" and the "counter expectative" of a Neg-Q.

    As for the "counter expectative", by definition, it is the expectation that is contradictory with the "observation".   Some of them are about the Ae's action: (36)-(38) are the cases in point.[16]

> (36) A mother is talking to his son
>   Can't you tidy up your room?
> (37) Can't he say something about it?
> (38) Mado-   wo   akete- kure- mase- n-   ka?
>   Window Acc   open   give   HON   Neg   Q
>   'Won't you open the window?'

    In such Neg-Q's, it is easy to see what the "counter expectatives" are: in (36), *the mother expects that the son clean his room*, in (37) *the Ar expects that he say something*, and in (38), *the Ar expects that you will open the window.*

    On the other hand, in some Neg-Q's, the "counter expectative" refers only to the static situation.   Look at (39)-(40);

> (39) Isn't he defeated in the election?
> (40) Kono   kotae   Chiga-tte nai-   ka?
>   This   answer wrong-be Neg   Q
>   'Isn't it wrong?'

    The Ar "counter expects" in (39) that *he is defeated*, although the observation tells the Ar that he is not defeated. (Maybe his supports are treating him as a hero.) In (40), Ar expects that *it is wrong*. In such Neg-Q's, the "counter expectative" are an expectation about the situation, and they are presumably represented by stative verbs, in English, most likely be-verbs.

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[15] The term "actual expectation" seems to imply some futurity when it involves only the present situation; you know when you utter this Neg-Q you do not expect the situation *you can't drive a car* lasts long.

[16] We can say the same thing to the "observation", too; some "observation" is about Ae's action and some not.   However, since, by definition, it is the "counter expectative" that the Ar wants to convey to the Ae, we will only look at the "counter expectatives" here.

Just as the action verbs and the stative verbs form a gradation (See, for example, Quirk et al. 1985: 21), this "counter expectative" also forms a range; one edge being action, and the other end being situation. Of course because of the nature of being gradual, there are "counter expectatives" that are about either "action" as well as "situation". (41) illustrates this fact;

(41) Doesn't he live here?

The "counter expectative" of (41), *he lives here*, can be about action as well as about situation.

To summarize the foregoing discussion, we have been reanalyzing the two opposing "feelings" expressed and interpreted in a Neg-Q from an Ae-oriented as well as practice-based point of views. Consequently, we have seen the following among the 5 arguments to be made in this chapter;

(ii)   Seen from the practice- point of view, the central function of Neg-Q is to articulate two opposing "feelings", i.e., "observation" and "counter expectatives", and the "counter expectatives" of Neg-Q's are in the gradual scale from those about actions, to those about situation.

4. The Politeness and the Difference between English and Japanese

Having made clear the nature of Neg-Q's, we will analyze the politeness and difference between English and Japanese Neg-Q's. Analyzing the Neg-Q's in both languages, this section, as a consequence, will see the followings;

(iii)   In principle, the kind of "counter expectative" plays a great role in politeness: those Neg-Q's whose "counter expectatives" refer to Ae's action usually becomes impolite, and those that refer to situation, usually non-impolite.

(iv)   The politeness of the Neg-Q's are related to the kind of "counter expectative", but sometimes the politeness is "over-ridden" by the dynamic interpretation by the Ae, and the habitus.

(v)   English and Japanese have different habitus regarding the interpretations of the Neg-Q's; in English Neg-Q's are often regarded as expectations about Ae's actions, while in Japanese they are often regarded as expectations about situation, hence in general English Neg-Q's are regarded as impolite, while Japanese counterparts non-impolite.

Let us start from looking at the relation between politeness and "counter expectatives". The relationship between them becomes pertinent from a three-fold argument; if (42) and (48), then (49).

Closer look at the "counter expectatives" in relation with the Ar's desire will lead us to find (42); "counter expectative" which refers to action coincides with the desire that Ar has, and those about situation does not correspond to the desires of Ar.

(42) The Relationship between the Kind of "Counter Expectatives" and Desires
Neg-Q's whose "counter expectative" refers to Ae's action
counter expectative   =   Ar's desire
Neg-Q's whose "counter expectative" refers to situation
counter expectative   =/=   Ar's desire

When we look at (43)-(45), the Neg-Q's whose "counter expectatives" are about action, it is quite obvious that the desire corresponds to Ar's "counter expectative":

(43) A mother is talking to his son   (=(36))
     Can't you tidy up your room?
(44) Can't he say something about it?   (=(37))
(45) Mado-   wo   akete-   kure-   mase-   n-   ka?   (=(38))
     Window   Acc   open   give   HON   Neg   Q
         'Won't you open the window?'

In (43), the mother "counter expects" that *the son clean his room*, and she also desires that *her son clean the room*; in (44) the Ar expects that *the Ae say something*, and the Ar also wants *the Ae to say something*; and in (45), the Ar "counter expects" that *the Ae is going to open the window*, and the Ar certainly longs for *the Ae to open the window*.

However, this does not hold for those that are about situation: the "counter expectative" which refers to situation does not necessarily coincide with Ar's desires. The examples we have previously seen, repeated here as (46)-(47), are sufficient to demonstrate this observation.

(46) Isn't he defeated in the election?   (=(39))
(47) Kono   Kotae   Chiga - tte-   nai-   ka?   (=(40))
     This   answer   wriong- be   Neg   Q   'Isn't it wonrg?'

In (46), the "counter expectative, i.e., Ar thinks *he is defeated*, does not have anything to do with the Ar's desires; it is perfectly acceptable to fancy a situation in which the Ar knows that *he is defeated* yet wanted *him to be elected in the election*. Ar might have voted for him. The same argument can be applied to (47); Ar "counter expects" *that it is wrong*, but we do not know if the Ar desires *it to be wrong*. To sum up, in such Neg-Q's whose "counter expectatives" are about situation, the "counter expectative" and what Ar desires do not coincide.

Furthermore, Hanazaki (1997, 1998) made it clear that Neg-Q's in which the Ar's desires are conveyed are likely to become impolite.

(48)   The relation between Expressing the desire and the politeness
When   the desire is expressed
then   impolite
otherwise   non-impolite

This should be naturally understood. Expressing the desire straightforwardly is what Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]) calls "Without redressive action, baldly", which is the least polite strategy. (We will come back to Brown and Levinson (1987) shortly.)

If we logically combine (42) with (48), we can infer (49); if the "counter expectative" of Neg-Q's refers to action, it corresponds with the Ar's desire, then, the Neg-Q is considered to be an impolite one, while if Ar utters a Neg-Q with expressions referring to the situation, then, the counter expectative does not correspond with Ar's desire, hence the Neg-Q is non-impolite, i.e., (49) and (iii).

(49) The Relationship between the Kind of "Counter Expectatives" with Politeness
    Neg-Q's whose "counter expectative" is about action   =   usually impolite
    Neg-Q's whose "counter expectative" is about situation =   usually non-impolite
            (I added "usually" intentionally, which we will come back shortly.)

(iii) The Relationship between politeness and "counter expectatives"
        In principle, the kind of "counter expectative" plays a great role in politeness: those Neg-Q's whose "counter expectatives" refer to Ae's action usually becomes impolite, and those that refer to situation, usually non-impolite.

The following pair of Neg-Q's is a good illustration of (iii);

(50) The Ar wants ice cream and asks the friend who said was going to the grocery store named Andronico's.
        (a) ?Aren't you going to Andronico's?
        (b) # Won't you go to Andronico's?

When we compare the two Neg-Q's, it should be unanimously agreed that (b) is more impolite. The reason why (b) is more impolite is that (b) utters a strong desire about Ae's action, which makes (b) sound too intruding; on the other hand, uttering an expectation using a *be*-verb, (a) does not sound as obtrusive as (b).

Let us see another example (51) to support (iii).

(51) Aren't you the president?

When Ae interprets (51) suspecting that Ar has a counter expectative about the Ae's action (ex. *You should do X if you are the president*), then it is regarded as an impolite Neg-Q. On the other hand, if the Ae interprets (51) as asking the situation if Ae is the president or not, (51) becomes a non-impolite Neg-Q.

Also, another support for (iii) comes from Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]). According to their theory, expressing a strong desire about the other's action violates what they call "negative politeness", hence impolite. Also, commenting on situation does not violate any of their politeness, rather becomes "off record" in some cases, hence non-impolite, sometimes polite.

Brown and Levinson, standing on two big assumptions that 1. Men are rational and 2. Men do not want to do the FTA (Face Threatening Act), classify politeness into five classes and put them in order according to their level of politeness: 1.Without redressive action, baldly, 2. Positive politeness, 3.Negative politeness, 4. Off record, 5. Don't do the FTA. (5 being the most polite) Also, according to them, three factors (distance, power, and the degree to which the utterance is rated an imposition in that culture) determine which of the five will be chosen at a certain situation. Their definitions of the 3 politeness are (among the 4 polite strategies quoted above, the last is a strategy to be polite by not saying anything) ;

(52) Politeness according to Brown and Levinson (1987 [1978]):
        Positive politeness: redress directed to the addressee's positive face, his personal desire that his wants (or the actions / acquisitions / values resulting from them) should be thought of as desirable (ibid.: 101)
        Negative politeness: redressive action addressed to the addressee's negative face, his want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his attention unimpeded (ibid.: 129)

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> Off record: a communicative act is done off record if it is done in such a way that it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act. … Such off-record utterances are essentially indirect uses of language (ibid.: 211)

To put it differently, "negative politeness" is a strategy to show politeness by trying not to intrude in the other's action, and "off record" is to say things in an indirect manner.

Opinions vary as to whether there are only three ways to express politeness[17], or whether these four types of politeness are universal. There is, however, no disagreement on the point that "negative politeness" is a way to show politeness, and if violated, the utterance becomes impolite. Telling someone that you expect him/her to *do* something although he/she has not carried out the action is definitely an intrusion of the other's freedom of action, hence violating "negative politeness". On the other hand, talking about situation does not intrude the other's territory, hence non-impolite.

We can also support (iii) from our natural sense. Action is something people do with their own intention, hence accusing of not carrying out the action is to nag the person of not doing something although he or she can carry it out. On the other hand, referring to the situation does not have anything to do with the Ae's intention, for situation is not something the Ae can control. Hence, telling the Ae that his/her *action* does not correspond with the Ar's expectation means to nag the person for not doing the action, hence impolite, while the Ae cannot do anything about it although the situation does not correspond with the Ar's expectation, hence non-impolite.

Let me summarize the foregoing discussion. In this section so far, we have revisited relationship between the "counter expectative" and the politeness. As a consequence, we have found (iii);

> (iii)   In principle, the kind of "counter expectative" plays a great role in politeness: those Neg-Q's whose "counter expectatives" refer to Ae's action usually becomes impolite, and those that refer to situation, usually non-impolite.

However, the arguments are not so straightforward: the above correspondence only applies *in principle*, and it is only *usually* that "counter expectatives" and politeness correlate; the Ae sometimes "over-ride" the interpretation while dynamically interpreting the Neg-Q's, .i.e., (iv);

> (iv)   The politeness of the Neg-Q's are related to the kind of "counter expectative", but sometimes the politeness is "over-ridden" by the dynamic interpretation by the Ae, and the habitus.

The following two phenomena are the cases that fall under this "over-riding" interpretation.

Firstly, when the Ae thinks that the Neg-Q is uttered for positive politeness, Ae interprets the Neg-Q as polite. (53) is an example.

(53) Won't you come to the party?

In (53), the Ae understands that the "counter expectative" of the Ar is reffering to the Ae's action, hence impolite according to (iii). However, the Ae "over-rides" this impolite interpretation understanding that Ar uttered (53)

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with the intention of positive politeness; Ae understands that Ar is telling Ae what to do, but that for Ae's benefit. In other words, by "observing", i.e., practice (a la Bourdieu), that the Ar is pushing what the Ar thinks Ae wants, Ae feels that his/her "positive face" was saved, hence Ae "over-rides" the impolite <accusation> interpretation to get the polite <offer> or <invitation> reading.

Secondly, the Ae "over-rides" the interpretation when certain words are used in Neg-Q's. This idea applies to Japanese Neg-Q's of <request>: although their "counter expectatives" are about Ae's action, hence should be impolite according to (iii), the lexical information of the words used in Japanese <requests>, i.e., *kureru*, *kudasaru*, *morau*, or *itadaku*, make available the polite reading of the Neg-Q's.

Consider the following Neg-Q's

(54) Won't you open the window?
(55) Mado-wo   akete **kure-** mase- n-   ka?   <request>
       Window-Dat   open   **give**   Hon   Neg   Q
          'Won't open the window?'   with *kureru*
(56) Mado-wo   ake   mase- n-   ka?   <invitation>
       Window-Dat   open   Hon   neg   Q
          'Won't open the window?'   without *kureru*
(57) Mado- wo   akete- **kure-** n-   ka?[18]   <request>
       Window-Dat   open   **give**   Neg   Q
          'Won't open the window?'   with *kureru*

To make a request in Japanese with a Neg-Q, the sentence must contain a special kind of complementary verb, *kureru* (give), *kudasaru* (give Hon), *morau* (receive) or *itadaku* (receive Hon), as in (55) and (57): a Neg-Q without such words, for example (56), is not a <request>, rather an <invitation>.[19] These words of *kureru*, *kudasaru*, *morau*, and *itadaku* are best translated as different focatlization of the word *bestow* in English, where some kind of a granting is done from the superior to the inferior. This "bestowing" frame is excerpted by the "inner-horizon" of these words, and being interpreted in this frame, this kind of Neg-Q becomes polite, hence (iv), i.e., The politeness of the Neg-Q's are related to the kind of "counter expectative", but sometimes the politeness is "over-ridden" by the dynamic interpretation by the Ae, and the habitus.[20]

Lastly, when we closely look at the data, we can observe a major difference in English and Japanese Neg-Q's: English ones are mostly those whose "counter expectatives" are about Ae's action, while most of the Japanese ones have the "counter expectative" of the situation, i.e., (v)

(v) English and Japanese have different habitus regarding the interpretations of the Neg-Q's; in English Neg-Q's are often regarded as expectations about Ae's actions, while in Japanese they are often regarded as expectations about situation, hence in general English Neg-Q's are regarded as impolite, while Japanese counterparts non-impolite.

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[18] (57) cancels the possible counter arguments that *masu*, a honorific form, makes the Neg-Q polite: even without *masu*, (57) is still polite
[19] The fact that (56) is an <invitation> rather than a <request> is supported by how it is answered. Ae is most likely to answer to (56) as *Ee, soshimasho* (*Yes, let's*.). This seems to be related to the fact that (56) does not particularly express the grammatical subject. This being so huge a topic for this thesis to investigate, I leave it for future study.
[20] Also, by adding the word *Kureru*, the speaker is taking the action of *you opening the window* as one event and asking if this event can be "given" by the Ar,: Ar, at least on the surface, considers *you opening the window* as one event, i.e., situation. In this way, Japanese are making a request not through directly asking the Ae to do something, but through referring to the action as "situation", hence polite according to (iii)

The followings are random examples;

(58) Can't you drive straight?
(59) A stage director being not satisfied with the actress (in her 50's) says:
Wakai- no-   wa   i- nai-   no- ka?[21]
Young-people-Top   is   Neg   *NO*- Q
   'Isn't there someone who is younger?'
(60) The Ae arrives at the station when the train has just left.
Densha itte-   shimatta- jya- nai?
Train   went   Pef   be   Neg
   'Isn't it the situation where the train has left already?'

(58)-(60) are random examples of English and Japanese Neg-Q's which has the illocutionary force of <accusation>.   The English <accusation> Neg-Q's such as (58) directly express the Ar's expectation about Ae's action, while Japanese counterparts do not express the expectation about action but about situation as we can see in (59) and (60).   Although it is obvious that the Ar's desires in those Japanese Neg-Q's are about Ae's action, *you should find another actress* in (59) and *you should come earlier* in (60), the Ar's do not straightforwardly express the desires, but refer only to the situation using *be*-verbs or words such as *No* whose functions are similar to the *be*-verb.   If we artificially make Neg-Q's out of (59) and (60) as (59') and (60') respectively, i.e., directly referring to the Ae's action, they would not be interpreted as <accusation> but as <confirmation> or maybe as <request>:

(59') Wakai- no-   wo   sagase   nai-   ka?
      young   person Dat   find   Neg   Q
         'Can't you find younger one?'
(60') Motto   hayaku   kore- nai- ka?
      a little earlier   come Neg   Q
         'Can't you come a little earlier?'

This sheer observation shows that English and Japanese Neg-Q's of <accusation> are different.

Of course it is possible to literally translate (58) into Japanese with the "counter expectative" of action as in (61).   However, in a situation where the Ae is not driving straight and Ar wants to accuse the Ae for that, Ar is most likely to utter (62) instead of (61).

(58) Can't you drive straight?
(61) Massugu   unten   deki- nai-   ka ?   With Action
     straight   drive   can   Neg   Q
        'Can't you drive straight'
(62) Massugu   unten   deki- nai-   **n-**   ka?
     straight   drive   can   Neg   *NO*   Q
        'Can't you drive straight?'   With *No*

(61) does not sound natural and, if it is uttered, the Ae is likely to interpret it as <confirmation> asking if there is anything that is bothering the Ae to drive straight.   This is obvious from the fact that the Ae is likely to answer (61) with *Yes* or *No*: specially if it is answered negatively, it would be *Iie, daijyobu-desu* (literally 'no, everything is alright').

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[21] In short, *No* is a word whose function is to take the preceding clause as a shared information. (See Tanomura (1990) and Hanazaki (1999).)   There being no equivalent word in English, I will here gross it as *NO*.

As for the *NO* in (62), there has been much discussion, but all of those arguments come to an agreement in saying that its function is to take the preceding clause as shared information. (See Tanomura (1990), Hanazaki (1999).)   In other words, in (62), *massugu unten-deki-nai* (*you cannot drive straight*) is understood as *one* piece of information already shared, and the Neg-Q can be paraphrased as *Isn't it the case that you cannot drive straight*. In other words, the Neg-Q does not refer to Ae's action of just *you drive straight*, but to a piece of shared information of *you cannot drive straight*, hence situational reading. Thus, Japanese Neg-Q's of <accusation> are not straightforwardly impolite, but, referring to the situation mitigates the rudeness, and they are only relatively impolite.

The routinized Japanese way of referring to the situation when speakers want to accuse the Ae for not carrying out the action invites no other explanation but to argue that it is a result of the habitus of the people of the language.   The Japanese can of course refer to the action of the Ae by saying *Can't you drive straight* but this is not interpreted as an accusation as we have seen with (61).   People, through practice, acquired a way to accuse people through referring to the situation rather than the action, and this has become a routinized way for the speakers of Japanese, through practice, habitus.

With all of the above arguments, we have succeeded in explaining why Japanese Neg-Q's do not sound as impolite as the English counterparts to the extent that the general impression of Japanese Neg-Q's are polite.   In sum, we have argued for (iii) through (v), namely,

(iii)   In principle, the kind of "counter expectative" plays a great role in politeness: those Neg-Q's whose "counter expectatives" refer to Ae's action usually becomes impolite, and those that refer to situation, usually non-impolite.

(iv)   The politeness of the Neg-Q's are related to the kind of "counter expectative", but sometimes the politeness is "over-ridden" by the dynamic interpretation by the Ae, and the habitus.

(v)   English and Japanese have different habitus regarding the interpretations of the Neg-Q's; in English Neg-Q's are often regarded as expectations about Ae's actions, while in Japanese they are often regarded as expectations about situation, hence in general English Neg-Q's are regarded as impolite, while Japanese counterparts non-impolite.

5. Summary

This paper has analyzed Neg-Q's from a practice-based as well as Ae-oriented point of view, and through those viewpoints, we have suggested a Copernicus-change analysis to the two "feelings" expressed in Neg-Q's and with those concept in mind, we have re-analyzed the functions as well as the politeness of Neg-Q's.   In sum, we have argued the following points;

(i)   Relying solely on the form, or on the lexical item, or solely on the pragmatics will not give an explanation as to why Neg-Q's sometime become polite.   Rather, we must see the phenomena from an Addressee (henceforth Ae)-oriented as well as practice-based view following Bourdieu (1977 [1972]).

(ii)   Seen from the practice-point of view, the central Function of Neg-Q is to articulate two opposing "feelings", i.e., "observation" and "counter expectative".

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(iii)   In principle, the kind of "counter expectative" plays a great role in politeness: those Neg-Q's whose "counter expectatives" refer to Ae's action usually becomes impolite, and those that refer to situation, usually non-impolite.

(iv)   The politeness of the Neg-Q's are related to the kind of "counter expectative", but sometimes the politeness is "over-ridden" by the dynamic interpretation by the Ae, and the habitus.

(v)   English and Japanese have different habitus regarding the interpretations of the Neg-Q's; in English Neg-Q's are often regarded as expectations about Ae's actions, while in Japanese they are often regarded as expectations about situation, hence in general English Neg-Q's are regarded as impolite, while Japanese counterparts non-impolite.

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