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Shujiro Urata  
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Yoshiko Tonegawa *Editors*

# Sustainable Development Disciplines for Humanity

Breaking Down the 5Ps—People, Planet,  
Prosperity, Peace, and Partnerships

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Shujiro Urata • Kazuo Kuroda •  
Yoshiko Tonegawa  
Editors

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and Partnerships

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ISSN 2523-3084                      ISSN 2523-3092 (electronic)  
Sustainable Development Goals Series  
ISBN 978-981-19-4858-9              ISBN 978-981-19-4859-6 (eBook)  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4859-6>

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## Preface

The Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, and Science and Technology (MEXT) implemented the Top Global University Project (TGU) in 2014 to prioritize support to the universities actively promoting internationalization<sup>1</sup>. Waseda University was selected to be a part of this project.

The Global Asia Research Center (GARC) is one of the centers responsible for world-class education and research at Waseda University, under the framework of the TGU<sup>2</sup>. The purpose of the GARC is to study historical reconciliation and sustainable development from an interdisciplinary perspective, and to disseminate the outcomes globally. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015, are global development goals. One of the objectives of the TGU is to achieve the SDGs.

Reconciling history and promoting sustainable future development in East Asia present significant challenges. In pursuing reconciliation in East Asia, a critical re-examination of Japan's war responsibility and colonialism is necessary. In Europe, war and colonial responsibilities have been discussed separately. While advances have been made on the question of war responsibility, the debate over the legacy of colonialism has only recently begun. Promoting sustainable development and reaching a regional agreement on a common goal appears to be more challenging for the nations of East Asia, where there are greater differences in religion, culture, economic development, political systems, and other aspects when compared to Europe.

Studies to overcome these challenges should be conducted from an interdisciplinary perspective, incorporating multiple disciplines. The GARC brings together researchers from various specialized fields such as history, development studies, economics, sociology, international relations, international law, regional studies, peace studies, conflict resolution, political science, urban and rural planning, business administration, and management engineering. At the GARC, a diverse group of researchers is pursuing interdisciplinary research by building on their disciplines through innovative approaches.

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<sup>1</sup><https://tgu.mext.go.jp/en/index.html>.

<sup>2</sup><https://www.waseda.jp/global-asia/>.

This book and accompanying volume<sup>3</sup> report on GARC's research, to date, on sustainable development. Specifically, research focusing on evidence-based policymaking for realizing the SDGs is introduced in a simple manner. Though each study is based on different disciplines, the achievement of the SDGs is the common goal. I hope that readers will obtain the interdisciplinary knowledge necessary to understand the challenges and possible strategies for achieving SDGs in East Asia from these books. While the focus is East Asia, the issues addressed are globally relevant. Readers are recommended to refer to the introductory chapters of the books for a review of the content, significance, and relevance of each book.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Naoyuki Umemori, Director of the GARC, Waseda University, and Ms. Juno Kawakami and Ms. Saranya Devi Balasubramanian of Springer for their efforts toward the publication of this book. The editors also wish to acknowledge the extraordinary and dedicated support provided by Mr. Rui Asano, Research Associate of Waseda University, for editing this book. Additional thanks go to the anonymous reviewers for their supportive and intellectual guidance. Finally, the editors specially acknowledge the organizational support provided by the GARC and the Institute of Advanced Social Sciences of Waseda University and the funding support provided by the TGU Project of MEXT.

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<sup>3</sup>Sustainable Development Disciplines for Society: Breaking Down the 5Ps—People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnerships

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## Introduction

This multidisciplinary book provides 11 problem-solving lectures on the sustainable development of people, peace, and partnerships. These are three of the five keywords for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),<sup>4</sup> namely people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnerships (5Ps). According to the *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations* (2015, p. 2), the SDGs are intended to promote the following actions in these five areas:

- (1) For people: end poverty and hunger in all their forms and dimensions, as well as ensure that all human beings can fulfill their potential with dignity and equality and in a healthy environment.
- (2) For planet: protect it from degradation, including through sustainable consumption and production, by sustainably managing natural resources and taking urgent action on climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future generations.
- (3) For prosperity: ensure that all human beings enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives and that economic, social, and technological progress occurs in harmony with nature.
- (4) For peace: foster peaceful and inclusive societies that are free from fear and violence.
- (5) For partnerships: mobilize the means required to implement this agenda through a revitalized global partnership for sustainable development based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focusing, in particular, on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders, and all people.


Each of the lectures is classified as one or more keywords for the SDGs and based on history, health, education, sociology, development studies, and political science. Furthermore, each lecture delineates the essence of each discipline when it is practically applied to development studies. This book, along with its sister book on people, peace, planet, prosperity, and sustainable development disciplines for society, will be useful for development studies.

Interdisciplinary research is necessary to achieve the SDGs advocated by the United Nations. Hence, it is essential to learn the basics of individual

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<sup>4</sup>See Appendix 1 for an explanation of each of the 17 goals.





**Fig. 1** Relationships between chapters, disciplines, and the SDGs

disciplines as they offer ample knowledge to foster problem-solving through the accumulation of existing research. This and its sister book are the first comprehensive textbooks summarizing the essence of each necessary discipline to approach development studies from an interdisciplinary perspective. The 11 lectures enable readers to effectively learn the main aspects of each discipline necessary for research in development studies, and the careful interweaving of the aspects learned by the reader enables the implementation of interdisciplinary development research. Table 1 shows the relationships between keywords, disciplines, and the SDGs in all chapters. Figure 1 also illustrates the interrelationships between chapters, disciplines, and the SDGs in an intelligible manner. As each lecture corresponds to certain keywords, disciplines, and SDGs, readers can focus on topics that are relevant to them.

The first six chapters of this book are mainly related to “People” and help achieve mainly Goals 1 (no poverty), 3 (good health and well-being), 4 (quality education), 6 (clean water and sanitation), 11 (sustainable cities and communities), and 12 (responsible consumption and production). These chapters are based on the disciplines of history (Chap. 1), health (Chap. 2), education (Chaps. 3–5), and sociology (Chap. 6).

Chapter 1 applies the methods of the history of political thought to analyze the relationship between ideology and poverty. Specifically, it examines the history of Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It also analyzes the three ideologies of the government’s social policy: liberalism, exclusionism, and social democracy as a way of alleviating poverty and how support for the welfare state grew therefrom.

Chapter 2 approaches global health diplomacy in combating communicable diseases and promoting universal health coverage (UHC) as part of the efforts to achieve SDG 3. First, communicable diseases are now perceived as a threat to “human security,” and Japan has begun engaging in global health diplomacy to elevate the level of dialog. Second, international partnerships

**Table 1** Relationships between keywords, disciplines, and the SDGs in all chapters

	Chapter	Keywords	Discipline	Detailed discipline	SDGs	SDGs Targets	Related SDGs
For people	1	Poverty, ideology, welfare state, new liberalism	History	History of political thought	1	–	–
	2	Global health diplomacy, communicable diseases, universal health coverage, primary health care, human security	Health	Health policy, Human rights, Law for health	3	3.8, 3.b, 3d,	2.2, 6, 8.8
	3	History, international education development	Education	Education	4	4.7	1 to 17
	4	Inclusive education, quality education, equity, education for children with disabilities, Ethiopia	Education	Education	4	–	1 to 17
	5	Higher education, research, education, social contribution, industry–academia collaboration	Education	Education	4	4.3, 4.b	2, 3, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17
	6	Dam, displacement, resettlement, restoration of livelihood	Sociology	Sociology of development	2, 3, 6, 7	6.b	1, 4, 10, 11, 13, 15 16
For peace	7	Democracy, development, Peace, liberalism, human rights	Political science	International relations	16	–	–
	8	Corruption, political will, principal–agent model, institution	Political science	Political economy	16	16.5	1 to 17
	9	Human trafficking, mobility of people, vulnerability, and SDGs	Development studies	Human rights	5, 8, 10, 16, 17	5.2, 8.7, 16.2, 16.4	10, 17
For partnership	10	Multi-stakeholder partnership, private sector, co-creation, Japan,	Development studies	Development studies	17	–	–
	11	Global partnership, reconciliation, history problem, dialog, new historiography	History	History	17	–	–

Footnote: Contents of SDGs targets.

3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential healthcare services, access to safe, effective, quality, affordable essential medicines, and vaccines for all.

3.b Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use the full provisions in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all.

3.d Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction, and management of national and global health risks.

4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational, and tertiary education, including university.

4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development.

4.b By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular, least developed countries, small island developing states, and African countries, for enrollment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering, and scientific programs, in developed countries and other developing countries.

5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.

6.b Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management.

8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labor, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025, end child labor in all its forms.

16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and all forms of violence against and torture of children.

16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime.

16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms

*Source* United Nations (n.d.)

for global health have been strengthened to promote UHC. This chapter shows that global health has become an important agenda item for diplomacy to achieve SDG 3.

Chapter 3 describes the historical development of SDG 4 by tracing the history of three approaches to international education development: education for peace, education as a human right, and education for socioeconomic development. The approaches are then used to frame discussion of three perspectives: (1) the external and internal efficiency of education; (2) “education for development,” “educational development,” and “education and development”; and (3) dependency theory and modernization theory.

Chapter 4 examines the core of SDG 4, namely “inclusive and equitable quality education.” The quality of education is specifically examined from four perspectives: school environment, educational attainment, learning achievement, and non-cognitive skills. This chapter also provides a brief overview of international trends in educational cooperation from 1945 to 2015, and the relationship between education and all 17 SDGs. It also presents a case study of education for children with disabilities in Ethiopia.

Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between SDG 4 and higher education. It introduces various activities and initiatives at Japanese higher education institutions, such as the Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development (SATREPS), which promotes joint international research on global issues. This chapter also presents the expected roles and challenges of higher education in society through the indirect spillover effects on the other SDGs.

Chapter 6 provides a concrete picture of the sociological approach to this development. It presents arguments based not only on previous research in the English-speaking world, but also on research trends in Japan. Additionally, this chapter presents research perspectives that are considered unique to sociology in development issues: power relations among actors at development sites; the secondary, indirect, mid-, and long-term impacts of development projects; macro–micro linkages among international, national, and regional transformations; and values, culture, and discourse on development.

Chapters 7–9 mainly focus on peace and how to help achieve Goals 5 (gender equality), 8 (decent work and economic growth), 10 (reduced inequalities), and 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions). These chapters are written based on the disciplines of political sciences (Chaps. 7 and 8) and development studies (Chap. 9).

Chapter 7 focuses on three main aspects of a peaceful society: democratization, development, and peace. It cautions against authoritarianism, which threatens democratic systems. Regimes against human rights are increasing worldwide, including in Asia. This chapter underscores the promotion of peace for human rights based on international harmony and cooperation among various actors, such as governments, the United Nations, regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGO).

Chapter 8 discusses corruption, which has become an equilibrium of the interactions of various societal actors and is thus considered a social institution. Historically, all societies have been corrupted by today's standards, but some of them have successfully overcome the hardship of escaping the equilibrium of corruption, achieving a more transparent society. This chapter introduces examples of such societies, including Britain, the USA, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

Chapter 9 examines methods for reducing human trafficking using the SDGs. It mainly considers SDGs 5, 8, 10, 16, and 17 cited by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for addressing human trafficking. Additionally, this chapter addresses the following perspectives to propose possible solutions to the problems of human trafficking: first, the actions that the international society has taken to eradicate the crime; second, further understanding of human trafficking; third, how the SDGs can be adopted in the context of current human trafficking.

The last two chapters focus on partnership and how to help achieve Goal 17 (partnerships for the goals). These chapters are based on the disciplines of development studies (Chap. 10) and history (Chap. 11).

Chapter 10 examines how partnerships with the private sector have been formed, with a focus on Japan. First, it briefly discusses the international initiatives to understand the process by which previously separated entities—public and private sectors—have gradually moved closer to solving development problems. Thereafter, this chapter explores how the Government of Japan and the Japan International Cooperation Agency have created or supported projects in collaboration with companies.

Chapter 11 proposes methods for building a global partnership by seeking solutions to the “history problem” that extends outside the realm of “historiography.” Reviewing the “new historiography” advocated by Liang Qichao and creating a “neo-new historiography” that is compatible with the age of globalization can contribute to “reconciliation studies.” This chapter focuses on the building of a civil society partnership by focusing on multi-stakeholder partnerships.

Readers should refer to Table 1 and Fig. 1 to identify the relevant chapters to achieve a particular SDG and determine what wisdom each discipline in each chapter provides. It is also useful to refer to the sister book *Sustainable development disciplines for society: Breaking down the 5Ps—People, Planet,*

**Table 2** Contents of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Goal		
1	No Poverty	Economic growth must be inclusive to provide sustainable jobs and promote equality
2	Zero Hunger	The food and agriculture sector offers key solutions for development and is central for hunger and poverty eradication
3	Good Health and Well-Being	Ensuring healthy lives and promoting the well-being for all at all ages is essential to sustainable development
4	Quality Education	Obtaining a quality education is the foundation to improving people's lives and sustainable development
5	Gender Equality	Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable world
6	Clean Water and Sanitation	Clean, accessible water for all is an essential part of the world we want to live in
7	Affordable and Clean Energy	Energy is central to nearly every major challenge and opportunity
8	Decent Work and Economic Growth	Sustainable economic growth will require societies to create the conditions that allow people to have quality jobs
9	Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure	Investments in infrastructure are crucial to achieving sustainable development
10	Reduced Inequalities	To reduce inequalities, policies should be universal in principle, paying attention to the needs of disadvantaged and marginalized populations
11	Sustainable Cities and Communities	There needs to be a future in which cities provide opportunities for all, with access to basic services, energy, housing, transportation, and more
12	Responsible Consumption and Production	Responsible production and consumption
13	Climate Action	Climate change is a global challenge that affects everyone, everywhere
14	Life Below Water	Careful management of this essential global resource is a key feature of a sustainable future
15	Life on Land	Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss
16	Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions	Access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels
17	Partnerships	Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

Source United Nations (n.d.)

*Prosperity, Peace, and Partnerships* at the same time and find a roadmap for achieving a specific SDG by effectively combining the wisdom of several disciplines. In developing countries, these considerations will provide access to development research for readers aiming to develop their home countries further. Moreover, in developed countries, these considerations provide access to problem-solving research for readers seeking holistic solutions to complex social problems Table 2.

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**Part I**  
**For People**



# Poverty and Ideologies: How the Welfare State Gained Political Support in Britain

Hanno Terao

## Abstract

This chapter uses the method of the history of political thought to analyze the relationship between poverty and ideologies. Three major ideologies which have influenced government policies regarding poverty in modern welfare history will be analyzed: liberalism, exclusionism, and social democracy. This chapter uses the historical case of Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to examine what these ideologies said about government social policy as a way of alleviating poverty, and how support for (or antagonism against) the welfare state grew therefrom. It was found that in Britain, a new version of liberal ideology that incorporated some elements of social democracy appeared and contributed to the expansion of the welfare state in the early twentieth century. From the analysis in this chapter, three conclusions can be drawn for the first goal of the SDGs. First, in order to eliminate relative poverty in developed countries, it is necessary to recognize the variety of interpretation different ideologies have given to poverty as a social problem. Second, to increase the influence of a particular ideology, consideration should be

given to the path dependence of originally rooted cultural factors, for example, the strength of liberal ideology in the case of modern British politics. Third, a comprehensive discourse that spans science, philosophy, and policy is required in order to gain broad support for a particular ideology.

## Keywords

Poverty · Ideology · Welfare state · New liberalism

## 1.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the issue of poverty by using the method of the history of political thought. The history of political thought is the study of what has been said and written about politics in the past and the relationship between the political text and the social context of the same period, using the methods of history, philosophy, and political studies. Poverty is one of the most common political issues as it requires redistribution of resources through collective decision-making. Therefore, it is also one of the main themes in the history of political thought along with economics, sociology, social policy and other disciplines of social science.

The subject of this chapter is poverty in developed countries. How has the issue of

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domestic poverty been discussed in economically rich countries? What discourses encourage or hinder government response to poverty? These questions will be addressed in examining the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain as a case study, where society's perception of poverty underwent a major shift.

The nature of poverty in developed countries differs from that in developing countries because relative poverty is more central to the problem than absolute poverty. While absolute poverty refers to the inability to meet basic human needs such as food and shelter, relative poverty refers to a situation in which although people can obtain the basic requirements they have difficulty living at a level appropriate in light of the overall cultural and living standards of a specific society.

The common method used by international organizations (such as OECD) and many individual countries to measure relative poverty is to set the poverty line at 50% or 60% of a country's median income and consider any income status below this line to be in relative poverty. People in this income situation are placed in a state of what sociologist Peter Townsend once called "relative deprivation", which is defined as a situation in which individuals "lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities that are customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong." (Townsend 1979, 31). For instance, in contemporary Japanese society, this income situation makes it hard for a family with children to buy them new clothes and shoes every season, take a family trip every year, or let them join in local club activities, all of which are "customary" in contemporary Japan.

We should not consider absolute poverty as a more serious problem than relative poverty. Nor should we view these two as opposites. The two types of poverty are, in fact, often mutually interpenetrating in both theory and reality. For example, the concept of absolute poverty refers to the inability to meet basic human needs, but some researchers have pointed out that it should include not only physical but also social and psychological needs. (Lister 2004, 28)

Similarly, according to economist Amartya Sen, avoidance of shame or stigma should be considered one of the basic human needs, while it is often the result of a state of relative deprivation (Sen 1992). In Sen's view, relative poverty deprives individuals of *absolute* human needs such as self-esteem, participation in normal social life, and opportunities to develop their abilities. Therefore, relative poverty in developed countries should also be considered a major social challenge for the first goal of the SDGs, which is to "end poverty in all its forms everywhere".

Studies comparing relative poverty rates in developed countries and the factors contributing to their reduction have pointed to a correlation between relative poverty rates and the size of the welfare state (i.e., the size of the government's social spending and tax system) (Brady 2005). The general trend is that "countries with the largest welfare states typically have the lowest post-transfer poverty rates." (Moller et al. 2003, 28) The welfare state refers to the political system of modern industrialized societies that are equipped with social policies for ensuring citizens' minimum standard of living as well as for keeping wealth inequality within an ethically acceptable range. In the 1940s and the 1950s, after the Second World War, the welfare state was fully established in developed countries. However, the origins of the social policies established during that period date back to the turn of the century, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. In developed countries, the contradictions of the capitalist economy, such as poverty, economic inequality, and cyclical economic depression, deepened during this period, and calls for regulation of the market economy grew stronger. As a result, there was a common expansion of social policies, such as the introduction of old-age pensions, medical and unemployment insurances, and social assistances by governments (Pierson 1991).

Among various political, economic and social factors for the development of the welfare state, the history of political thought has often paid attention to the dimension of ideology. As a set

of certain ethical and political beliefs about human beings and society deeply rooted in the value of individuals, ideology is key cultural apparatus for mobilizing political actors such as political parties, bureaucrats and various associations in civil society for a certain direction of policy outcomes (Freeden 2003). When it comes to poverty, how it is interpreted by the dominant ideology within a particular society is an important factor that influences the welfare practices of that society.

In the process of the formation and restructuring of the welfare state from the nineteenth century to the present, three major ideologies have discussed poverty differently. The first is *liberal* ideology. It holds that self-helping individuals can overcome poverty and that government social security is usually counterproductive because it takes away the spirit of self-help. Second, there is *exclusionist* ideology. It prioritizes the defense of social order over the welfare of the individual, believing that since poverty is associated with crime and delinquency, what is needed is not support, but segregation of the poor.<sup>1</sup> Third, there is *social democratic* ideology. It holds that poverty is caused by structural factors beyond individual self-help efforts and that government social spending and wealth redistribution are important to eliminate poverty. Analyzing the shift in dominant ideology among these three will help us examine what is needed to encourage the expansion and redistribution of welfare in developed countries. As a typical historical case, this chapter will focus on British politics in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, after the Industrial Revolution, liberal ideology prevailed in Britain against the backdrop of the establishment of a free trade system. However, from the end of the century to the beginning of the

twentieth century, when poverty became a serious social problem, there was an increase in both exclusionist and social democratic ideologies. What is noteworthy in the history of British political thought afterwards is that against this backdrop, liberalism chose to embrace some elements of social democratic ideologies and managed to maintain its position as the dominant ideology. This led to the formation of the *liberal* welfare state in twentieth century Britain, resulting in a considerable reduction in the poverty rate. In the following sections, I will clarify how it was possible for British liberalism.

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## 1.2 Liberalism and Poverty in the Nineteenth Century

In the nineteenth century, liberalism became the dominant ideology in Britain. The early part of the Victorian era (1837–1901) saw working-class movements for political rights (Chartism), but they remained within the framework of constitutionalist liberalism and did not lead to a socialist movement. Liberalism developed in terms of economic liberalism endorsing a free-market economy, and ethical liberalism endorsing self-help value. Classical economist David Ricard, who was called the “high priest of the capitalist middle class” (Fraser 2017, 115), theoretically justified the significance of free trade and the futility of trade unionism.

At these times, political thought on poverty was also based on liberal ideology. The central tenet was that the government should refrain from providing the able-bodied poor with outdoor relief in order not to encourage idleness. This doctrine was reflected in the amendment to the Poor Law of 1834.<sup>2</sup> The amendment emphasized the importance of differentiating between the poor according to their ability to work. While those who were considered unable to work (such as the elderly, disabled, and children without relatives) were to be protected in

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<sup>1</sup> Some may wonder if it should be conservatism instead of exclusionism which should be analyzed here. Though significant as an ideology, I doubt if conservatism has given any unique and coherent thought towards the problem of poverty in the modern history of the welfare state. For very often its attitude towards poverty has significantly overlapped with that of the self-help type of liberalism discussed in the following section.

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<sup>2</sup> For the details of the New Poor Law of 1834, see Englander (1998) and Wood (1991).

specialized facilities, those capable of working were to be placed in workhouses and forced to work. Moreover, the principle of “less eligibility” was introduced for the latter type, which stated that the environment in the workhouse should be deliberately worse than that outside the facility. The purpose was to provide incentives for the able-bodied poor to refrain from resorting to the Poor Law and to overcome poverty through the spirit of self-help. Loss of suffrage was also a condition for entering the workhouse. In short, the revised Poor Law guaranteed the survival of the poor on the condition that they accepted the stigma of being second-class citizens.

Outside the workhouses, the 1850s and the 1860s were what historian Eric Hobsbawm called the “golden years of the mid-Victorians,” with “a large-scale transfer of labor from worse-to better-paid jobs,” “the general sense of improvement in living standards,” and “the lowering of social tension” (Hobsbawm 1968, 118). Poverty remained a minor problem, and working-class values were significantly affected by those of the middle class. The influence of liberal ideology can be seen in the fact that Samuel Smiles’ *Self-Help* (1859) became the best-seller. The beginning of the book is a good example of the spirit of self-help on which liberalism relied:

“Heaven helps those who help themselves” is a well-tryed maxim, embodying in a small compass the results of vast human experience. The spirit of self-help is the root of all genuine growth in the individual, and, exhibited in the lives of many, it constitutes the true source of national vigor and strength. Help from without is often enfeebling in its effects, but help from within invariably invigorates. (Smiles 1876, 1)

It was only in the 1890s that poverty became a social issue attracting the attention across class boundaries. The long depression of the 1870s and its political consequences in the 1880s were also significant. Amid Britain’s economic and political turbulence, liberal ideology faced a crisis during this period. Historian Stedman Jones summarizes the factors that contributed to the crisis of liberal ideology after the 1870s:

[T]he crisis was composed of four elements: a severe cyclical depression as the culmination of six or seven years of indifferent trade; the structural decline of certain of the older central industries; the chronic shortage of working-class housing in the inner industrial perimeter; and the emergence of socialism and various forms of ‘collectivism’ as a challenge to traditional liberal ideology. (Stedman-Jones 2013, p. 281)

With the development of heavy industry in Germany and the U.S., the share of British key industries such as coal and steel in world trade weakened from the 1870s, leading to periodic recessions. Combined with the lack of housing welfare, the recession hit the lower working class hard, reducing many to street-dwellers. The “visualization” of poverty was also backed up by statistics. Full-scale social surveys were conducted by Charles Booth in London and Seebohm Rountree in York to clarify the reality of poverty in the urban areas. Both showed that about 30% of the population of London and York lived in poverty (Booth 1889, 1891; Rowntree 1901). Finally, a more immediate threat to liberal ideology was the emergence of exclusionist and social democratic ideologies, which rejected the doctrine of economic liberalism.

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## 1.3 Poverty and Ideologies in Turn-of-Century Britain

### 1.3.1 Poverty and Exclusionist Ideology

The first nonliberal ideology of poverty at the turn of the century was exclusionism. Exclusionism here refers to the position that posits “deviant others” within society, attributes the causes of social problems to them, and advocates their social exclusion. As opposed to liberalism’s *laissez-faire* doctrine, it advocated collectivist interventions in impoverished areas. However, what was advocated was not social policies for the poor but segregation policies that targeted specific “deviant” groups among the poor.

One of the reasons for the growing influence of the “segregate the poor” discourse was the



growing interest in eugenics. Founded by Charles Darwin's cousin Francis Galton (1822–1911), eugenics was an emerging science that aimed to apply on humans the themes of evolution and heredity evolutionary biologists had studied in animals.<sup>3</sup> Based on the premise that all human traits, such as intelligence, physical ability, and stature, are largely inherited, Galton attempted to elucidate the mechanism of inheritance using statistical methods. He then coined the term “eugenics” as the “science which deals with all the influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race” (Galton 1904, 1) with the idea that social progress can be brought about when people with superior traits marry and reproduce.<sup>4</sup>

While Galton himself emphasized “positive eugenics,” that is, increasing the population of people with “superior qualities”, the next generation of eugenicists focused on “negative eugenics,” which aimed to prevent the transmission of “inferior qualities” to the next generation. In the case of Britain, the central target was the poor, especially the lowest rung of the working class, known as the “pauper class.” The exclusionist discourse recognized that the lives of the paupers were fraught with security and public health problems, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, crime, infectious diseases, and problems stemming from inherent moral defects.

The aforementioned Charles Booth, for example, also held a similar view of the poor. Booth divided the people of the East End into eight classes according to their employment status and income situation and found that half of them (four classes, or approximately 35% of the population) were living in poverty.

Class A: The lowest grade/occasional laborers, loafers, and semi-criminals. 1¼% of East Londoners (11,000 people).

Class B: Very poor/casual earnings. 11¼% (100,000).

Class C: Ordinary poverty/intermittent earnings. 8% (75,000).

Class D: Mixed with poverty/small regular earnings. 14½% (129,000).

Class E: Working-class comfort/standard regular earnings/above the Poverty Line. 42% (377,000).

Class F: Well to do/higher class labour. 13½% (121,000).

Class G: Wealthy/lower middle class. 4% (34,000).

Class H: Upper middle class. 5% (45,000). (Wise 2008, 151).

Booth then drew a line between upper two of the four poor classes (classes C and D), whose poverty could be eliminated by government social policies, and lower two classes (classes A and B) that should be subject to security and segregation policies. Of these, there was considerable overlap between the employment of classes B and C in terms of low wages and irregular employment (B had more day labor, while C had longer contracts but still more irregular employment). The key indicator that separates the two, according to Booth, is the presence or absence of moral character.

Booth saw Class C as having sufficient moral character for a citizen, but inferior in terms of ability. On the other hand, Booth leveled moral indictment against Class B. The majority of Class B was “shiftless, helpless, idle or drunkards” who “cannot stand the regularity and dullness of civilized existence, and find the excitement they need in the life of the streets”. (Wise 2008, 153) Booth thus considered environmental factors such as economy and employment to not affect poverty among Class B and Class A. Because “it is doubtful if many of them could, or would, work full time and for long together, if they had the opportunity. “Booth also saw that the employment situation of class C worsened due to the presence of class B, which accounted for more than 10% of the East Londoners, and this promoted poverty among class C. Considering the seriousness of poverty, especially in old age (he calculated that as much as 45% of the entire working class would be dependent on the Poor Law after the age of 65), Booth called for the introduction of a non-contributory old-age pension system for the

<sup>3</sup> For general introduction of eugenics, see Levine (2017).

<sup>4</sup> For Galton's life and research on eugenics, see Kelves (1985, Chap. 1).

working class. At the same time, he advocated that Class A be subject to security policies and Class B be subject to segregation and incarceration in local labor colonies. (Wise 2008, 161–162).

The turn of the century was also a time of widespread anxiety around the future of British society. The unexpectedly hard-fought imperialist war in South Africa (the Second Boer War, 1899–1902), and the apparent physical weakness of the volunteer labor force there, led to widespread fears that Britain was “degenerating” militarily and biologically as well. (Thane 1996, 55–56) Social unrest was also reinforced by class disparities in fertility rates. The fact that overall fertility rates in Britain were declining, especially among the middle class, compared to the working class, increased public interest in eugenics. Galton’s disciple Karl Pearson famously pointed out in 1897 that 50% of the next generation would be born from 20 to 25% of the married population (Soloway 1990, 12). Pearson believed that while the poor had a high birth rate, they were physically frail and much of the frailty was hereditary.<sup>5</sup> Many eugenicists of the time, including Pearson, thus strongly criticized social policies for giving rise to “reverse selection,” that is, the survival of the unfit. As long as the problem was biological and genetic, social policies aimed at improving the welfare of the poor were considered futile.

British eugenicists also noted that many of the poor seemed to have mild intellectual disabilities. (Mazumdar 1991, 257) Unlike those with moderate and severe intellectual disabilities, who had been housed in public and private institutions since the early years of the nineteenth century, milder intellectual disability, or “feeble-mindedness,” as was called then, became prevalent among school children and the unskilled working class at the end of the nineteenth century, when primary education became compulsory. In 1913, the Mental Deficiency Act was passed, which legalized forcible institutionalization of those “mentally deficient” among the poor

who did not have family or relatives. This law reinforced the stigma of the poor as a whole and entrenched the policy of segregating those with intellectual disabilities for more than half a century.

### 1.3.2 Poverty and Liberal Ideology 1: The Charity Organization Society

Eugenics, which constructed the exclusionist ideology of poverty at the turn of the century, expanded its influence among the intellectual elite in the early twentieth century, one consequence of which was the formation of the Eugenics Education Society in 1907. The Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 is said to be the greatest success story of British eugenics. However, unlike the United States and Germany, which legislated such eugenic policies as forced sterilization and restrictions on marriage and immigration, the influence of British eugenics was limited to segregation. As opposed to the US and Germany, where race was the focus of eugenics, British eugenicists placed the issue of poverty at the center of their discourse leading to a backlash from the working class people who were at a higher risk of falling into poverty. When eugenicists later campaigned for the enactment of a sterilization law targeting the feeble-minded among the poor, it was the Labour Party, with its supporters in the working class that firmly opposed this as a class discriminatory legislation. (Thomson 1998).

At the turn of the century, the British working class, especially the upper working class, continued to prefer to deal with the risk of poverty through the spirit of self-help. From the second half of the nineteenth century onward, they also formed friendly societies at work and in the community, along with organizing trade unions. Friendly societies were a system of mutual aid that uses the accumulation of contributions to provide a certain amount of income in the event of illness or injury. Maintaining and improving employment conditions through trade unions and shielding against poverty through the mutual

<sup>5</sup> Pearson estimated that environmental factors account for only 10–20% of genetic factors. (Soloway 1990, 173).

insurance scheme among friendly societies became the central methods of self-help practices in the working class. (Fraser 2017, 121–125).

Liberal ideology also maintained a certain influence on the practice of charity for the already impoverished. The Charity Organization Society (COS), founded in London in 1869, emphasized the practice of casework as the best way to find appropriate support for each individual's circumstances, based on the belief that the key to assisting the poor was to help them rebuild their capacities of self-help. Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923), a philosopher and one of the brains behind COS, expressed this as “help people to help themselves” (Bosanquet 1907, 1999, 218). COS's casework had a great influence on the subsequent charity practice of poverty alleviation. The number of COS' national branches and collaborating organizations grew from 12 in 1875 to 145 in 1914 (Humphreys 2001, 134). The core members of the London COS also influenced the government's welfare administration by serving the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded (1904–1908) and the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress (1905–1909).

The COS was organized in response to the realization that existing unprofessional charities that did not use the casework method contributed to dependency of the poor and exacerbated poverty. An example can be found in Bernard Bosanquet's criticism of William Booth, a minister who founded the Salvation Army in 1878 and provided free meals and lodges to the poor. Bosanquet was convinced that poverty could not be eradicated by simply focusing on the misery of the phenomenon and providing material support. To eradicate poverty, it is important to determine, through observation and interviews, the extent to which poor individuals have the will to help themselves and the knowledge and skills to effectively practice that will. Material support such as medical and financial assistance may be suitable only for people and families, with the appropriate will and skills, who may temporarily be in poverty due to illness or injury. On the other hand, for those who are willing to help

themselves but for the lack of knowledge and skills, social and psychological support such as lifestyle advice and referral to local mutual aid organizations may be more effective. Finally, for those who do not seem to have the will to help themselves at the moment, the best thing would be to suggest them to go to a workhouse, as giving them aid may encourage dependence. Based on COS' “Science of Charity” principle (Himmelfarb 1991, 185), Bosanquet concluded that William Booth's material aid would only increase the number of paupers and exacerbated the problem of poverty:

I ask you, as sensible men, *which* is hardship and *which* is the cruel course? To proceed in such a way that, as a rule, all workmen in fairly regular work will be members of good, sound clubs, so that this particular form of suffering from illness destroying a man's power to work, will be entirely checked, or to wait until a man is broken down by illness and starvation, and then induce him to enter a charitable refuge with workshops attached, and to become a workman half-living on charity, and in all probability a permanent semi-pauper, who will never feel his own man again so long as he lives? (Bosanquet 1891, 1999, 34)

Using the same logic, the COS also opposed the government's proposed pension system, which had been under consideration since the 1890s. Charles Booth and Fabian socialist Sidney Webb were its leading advocates. On the one hand, Booth and Webb advocated segregation for paupers who could be considered morally corrupt, but on the other hand, they were concerned that “respectable” workers would also be destitute in old age due to structural problems such as low wages and unemployment. The government pension system, they argued, would allow workers to maintain their livelihoods in old age without resorting to the stigmatizing Poor Law. (Webb 1891; Booth 1899).

Charles Loch (1849–1923), the secretary of the London COS, boldly opposed Booth and Webb's public pension plan. The introduction of pensions would reduce the fear of distress in old age and thus eliminate the incentive to prepare for the future. The customary practice by children of providing for elderly parents would also disappear. (Loch 1895, 157, 159) For COS, the

expansion of social policies by the state, as well as indiscriminate private charity, was a misguided measure that weakened the will to self-help. The government's relief measure should thus be limited to the Poor Law. For it would give an incentive for the able-bodied to regain the spirit of self-help through the workhouse principle of less eligibility. COS members shared the understanding that the division of roles between the Poor Law and organized charity would bring about a vibrant civil society of self-reliant individuals.

Thus, both eugenics-based exclusionism and the liberal ideology of the COS were negative towards the expansion of government social policies. The difference between them lies in their degree of faith in the potential of the individual. Contrary to Charles Booth and the eugenicists, who pointed out the hereditary problematic nature of the paupers and targeted them for segregation, the mainstream COS members saw every individual as having the potential for self-reliance. Thus, Bosanquet stated that it is important to hope for the possibility of recovery for individuals who do not currently have the will to be independent: 'All that can with truth be said is, that absence of any indication of self-help is a very serious element in judging of a man's position; it does not follow that the missing habit cannot be stimulated, and if it can, or if, in short, the man appears curable, then the attempt should be made to cure him.' (Bosanquet 1891, 1999, 34–35).

### 1.3.3 Poverty and Liberal Ideology 2: Formation of the New Liberalism

The core members of the COS, including Loch and Bosanquet, had faith in the potential morality of individuals, including the dependent needy. However, at the turn of the century, the COS' casework approach which involved intrusion into poor families' privacy and frequent dismissal of support came under fire from working class families and other social welfare practitioners (Humphreys 2001, 161–173). By that time the

most politically influential discourse on poverty had shifted from COS' "self-help" liberalism into "new liberalism," which highlighted the expansion of government social policies. By the time of World War I, new liberalism had succeeded in gaining broad political support from the political elite to the working class and laid the foundation for the British welfare state. How was this possible?

Of primary importance in understanding the background to the emergence of new liberalism is the expansion of social democratic ideology since the 1880s, or what contemporary historian Max Beer called the "Revival of Socialism" (Beer 1920). From the 1880s onward, with the economic depression and a growing interest in issues related to poverty, poor unskilled workers formed trade unions supported by newly organized socialist groups such as the Fabian Society and the Independent Labour Party. What these movements and organizations had in common were a *parliamentary democracy* line aimed at establishing a socialist society through the growth of a working-class party in parliament<sup>6</sup> and a *social policy* line that sought to protect worker's rights through labor and welfare legislation. These two lines gave the mainstream British socialist movements the characteristics of *social democracy* rather than of revolutionary socialism.

The growth of social democratic ideology posed a threat to liberals, and by the end of the century, the "crisis of liberalism" was being widely discussed (Freeden 1978). Among them, some younger liberal politicians and intellectuals started to argue that liberalism should become more reform-minded an ideology. They attempted to gain broad support for liberalism from the working class by partially embracing social democratic (or socialist, more broadly speaking) ideology. One typical strategy was to use the rhetoric that "the best elements of socialism had been already manifested in liberalism in the past".

<sup>6</sup> One of the factors that led the British socialists to take a democratic rather than a revolutionary line was the fact that the 1884 Reform Act gave the right to vote to about five-sevenths of all adult males, making the creation and expansion of a working-class political party a reality.

As an example, let us examine the discourse of L. T. Hobhouse (1864–1929), who was the editor-in-chief of the *Manchester Guardian* and Britain's first professor of sociology. Hobhouse argued that the primary aims of socialism were the correction of power inequalities between labor and management and the protection of the welfare of all citizens, and that such aims had already been present in the arguments of Richard Cobden, the leader of the Anti-Corn Law League (Hobhouse 1904: 212–214). Hobhouse also emphasized that the goal of socialism had not been state interference per se, but the realization of social justice and freedom, something which had been expressed in the “Socialist ideal” of J. S. Mill, the great liberal thinker of the nineteenth century (Hobhouse 1911, 115). This excavation of history and delimitation of the meaning of socialism led to the rejection of other socialist ideologies such as Marxism and Fabianism: Calling the former “mechanical socialism” and the latter “official socialism” and criticizing the unethical nature of both, Hobhouse proclaimed that “Liberal Socialism” be considered the “true socialism” (Hobhouse 1911, 167–174).

New liberalism also provided a discourse in social science and social philosophy to justify the expansion of taxes and social policies by the government. New liberal economist J. A. Hobson (1858–1943), for example, pointed out that the uneven distributional structure of the current capitalist economy resulted in excessive savings by the rich and under-consumption by the poor. This so-called underconsumption theory, which anticipated the Keynesian macroeconomic theory, argued that the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor through taxes and social policies would stimulate domestic demand and bring about economic recovery (Allett 1981). Hobson also criticized COS's social philosophy as based on “sheer monadism” which he thought would overemphasize the spirit of individual self-help. For Hobson, both COS, which emphasizes the character of the individual, and social democracy, which accentuates the

structure of society, are inadequate because they capture only the opposite side of the truth:

The Charity Organisation philosophy, crystallised for in the single phrase “in social reform, then, character is the condition of conditions,” represents a mischievous half-truth, the other half of which rests in the possession of the less thoughtful section of the Social Democrats and forms the basis of the cruder Socialism. Neither individual character nor environment is “the condition of conditions.” The true principle that should replace these half-falsehoods is the recognition of the interdependence and interaction of individual character and social character as expressed in the social environment. (Hobson 1909, 206–207).

Both Hobson and Hobhouse saw society as an organism with structural aspects that could not be reduced to individual personalities. While maintaining the core tenet of liberalism that individuals should lead independent lives by exercising their individuality and capabilities, they argued that economic justice must be actualized in order for individuals to fully realize themselves. Here, economic justice means that everyone, including the poor, should have equal opportunities for self-realization as a fundamental right. To ensure equality of opportunity, it is not enough to save the poor through private charity, which tends to be uneven and limited in their support. Instead, the role of the government is crucial in guaranteeing equality of opportunity as its citizens' social right by providing universal services through law and taxation. Thus, new liberalism used the traditional liberal discourse of individual rights to justify the expansion of government social policies and redistribution. (Freedon 1978; Terao 2016)

New liberalism, which combined the liberal discourse of individual rights with the social democratic discourse of increased government taxation and social welfare, succeeded in winning broad support among the working class and contributed to the Liberal Party's sweeping victory in the 1906 general election (Clarke 1971). Under the Liberal government, which lasted until 1915, a series of social welfare reform known as the “Liberal Reform,” were implemented,

including the introduction of free school meals (1906), a workers' compensation system (1906), free medical examinations for children (1907), old-age pensions (1908), creation of labor exchanges (1909), and the introduction of medical and unemployment insurances (1911). Furthermore, David Lloyd George, a new liberal politician and Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Liberal Reform, proposed a new tax system called the "People's Budget" to finance welfare reform. It targeted the upper classes who owned a large sum of wealth by increasing the progressivity of income, land, and inheritance taxes, while favoring middle-class taxpayers with incomes of up to 1000 pounds per year. (Clarke 1996, 87) Although the People's Budget was opposed by the House of Lords and the Conservative Party, it did gain broad support from the middle and working classes and was passed in 1910, along with a parliamentary reform bill which significantly reduced the power of the House of Lords.

Between the end of World War I and the end of World War II, one wing of the two-party system that opposed the Conservative Party shifted from the Liberal Party to the Labour Party. At first glance, it might seem that ideological conflict in British politics shifted from conservatism versus liberalism to conservatism versus social democracy. However, during the brief interwar period of the Labour government, forced as it was to respond to the Great Depression, few social democratic policies were implemented. When the Labour government came to power again in 1945 after World War II and the formation of the British welfare state began in earnest, it was not social democrats but two new liberals, J.M. Keynes and William Beveridge, who formed the theoretical backbone of postwar economic and social policies. In Britain, as in other countries, the expansion of social democratic ideology provided the impetus for the government to expand social welfare and redistribute wealth. However, as historian Chris Renwick points out, in Britain, above all, "liberalism was woven into the welfare state's identity" (Renwick 2017, 9).

## 1.4 Conclusion

After World War II, the discourse on new liberalism succeeded in becoming the dominant ideology of British politics on poverty. Based on the welfare restructuring plan of the new liberal thinker Beveridge, the postwar Labour government introduced free medical care, expansion of public housing, development of social insurance and public assistance systems, and free secondary education. By the 1950s, the problem of poverty had reduced its seriousness considerably compared to the pre-war period. Seebomh Rountree, who once conducted a poverty survey in York City in 1899 and concluded that 27.8% of the city's population was in poverty, conducted a follow-up survey in 1950. He concluded that the poverty rate had now been reduced to 1.66% thanks to the government's social policies, such as pensions and employment policies (Scott 1994).

However, the subsequent history of the British welfare state is far the end of poverty. In the 1970s, sociologist Peter Townsend criticized existing studies on poverty, which focused only on absolute poverty. He showed that poverty in British society was still serious from the perspective of relative deprivation, thus deepening academic awareness of poverty (Townsend 1979). The relative poverty rate in the UK, which is calculated to be 60% or less of the median income, has never fallen below 20% to date. On the other hand, since the 1970s, there has been a growing self-help inclined and/or exclusionist discourse that sees the persistence of poverty as a result of individual moral failings and the deviant culture of the poor rather than a problem of social structure. An influential speech from such an individualistic perspective was made in the early 1970s by Sir Keith Joseph, the Minister of Health in the Conservative government, on the "cycle of deprivation," which reduced poverty to a culture of moral failure reproduced by the individuals composing of the "problem families" (Welshman 2005). Margaret Thatcher, who would later become Prime Minister, also stated clearly in 1978 that "poverty is not material but behavioral." (Jones

2020, 64) This kind of self-help inclined and/or exclusionist discourse has continued since the 1980s, in line with the New Right's critique of the welfare state as promoting dependency culture. (Dean and Taylor-Goody 1992) Since the financial crisis of 2008, the demonization of the poor has continued among conservative politicians and the media in their emphasis of austerity over social welfare (Shildrick 2018).

This chapter examined the reasons why welfare-state-oriented discourse was able to exert political influence in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain by sketching several key political arguments about poverty at the turn of the century. Some points can be noted in the conclusion.

First, ideology matters. We saw that three different ideologies (liberalism, exclusionism, and social democracy) interpreted the same phenomenon of poverty very differently. Some emphasized the resilience of the poor themselves, some placed blame on them, still others explained poverty in terms of factors in the environment surrounding the poor. Different interpretations of poverty led to differences in treatment toward the poor, and so studying ideologies should be taken seriously as a way of finding out why one type of political and social practice rather than others becomes influential in a specific society at a specific time.

Second, it was not social democracy per se but liberalism with social democratic elements that encouraged the formation of the welfare state in Britain. Given the deep roots of liberalism throughout the nineteenth century, the importance of this point cannot be overemphasized. If liberal ideology had been confined to the COS-style emphasis on self-help while welfare-state ideology had been to socialist organizations, it is unlikely that the welfare state would have gained broad political support during the Liberal Reform period and afterwards. The extent to which a specific ideology can be associated with the dominant ideology already rooted in a society – that is, the extent to which an ideology can take into account cultural path dependence – largely determines the extent of political support it can gain.

Third, it is noteworthy that new liberalism was able to construct a diverse and systematic welfare state discourse that spanned social policy, science, philosophy, and journalism. The social policy proposals of new liberal politicians were given a scientific and philosophical credentials by new liberal intellectuals such as J. A. Hobson and L. T. Hobhouse. In addition, their ideas were communicated to a wide range of citizens by means of media outlets such as newspapers and pamphlets (Weiler 1982). Neither eugenics, COS, nor socialism at the turn of the century could as effectively develop complementary practices, theories, and philosophies to communicate with the public. The ability to be an inclusive political entity was what gave new liberal ideology its persuasiveness and popular appeal.

In conclusion, there are two factors that make an ideology powerful enough to drive a particular political practice, including poverty alleviation: (1) adaptation to cultural path dependence and (2) the creation of a comprehensive discourse. Creation of a strong ideology is one of the essential conditions in achieving not only one but all of the goals of the SDGs.

**Acknowledgement** This chapter is supported by JSPS KAKENHI (Grant Number: 18K12218).

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# Global Health Diplomacy to Combat Communicable Diseases and to Promote Universal Health Coverage in Achieving the Sustainable Development Goal 3

# 2

Yasushi Katsuma

## Abstract

The aspiration of the Goal 3 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” is derived from both the “right to health” norm in the field of international human rights and the “health for all (HFA)” goal in the field of international development. The principle of “Leave no one behind” in achieving the SDGs is logically endorsed both by the right to health and the HFA. First, communicable diseases have become perceived as a threat to “human security” in global health, and Japan started to use the concept in global health diplomacy to elevate the level of dialogues. Nevertheless, Ebola Virus Disease and COVID-19, not anticipated when the SDGs were adopted, now urge us to re-visit the needs to reform global health governance. Second, to promote universal health coverage (UHC), international partnership has been strengthened. In 2019, at the G20 Summit, Japan played an important role in promoting the UHC among the twenty members. This led to an expanded international commitment made at UN High-Level

Meeting on UHC in the same year. It shows that global health has become an important agenda for diplomacy.

## Keywords

Global health diplomacy · Communicable diseases · Universal health coverage · Primary health care · Human security

## 2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the Goal 3 (SDG 3) of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.” First, in the following section, the author discusses that the aspiration of the SDG 3 is derived from both the “right to health” norm in the field of international human rights and the “health for all (HFA)” goal in the field of international development.

The section three explains how communicable diseases have become perceived as a threat to security in global health diplomacy. First, it is reviewed how the concept of security started to be used to discuss not only the state sovereignty, but also various threats to people of international concern. Second, the author discusses how global health issues, particularly communicable diseases, have become perceived as a threat to “human security.” Lastly, it is reviewed how Japan started to use the concept of “human

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security” in global health diplomacy to elevate the level of dialogues.

In section four, the author analyzes two contemporary global health threats that were not anticipated when the United Nations (UN) member states adopted the SDGs: Ebola Virus Disease and COVID-19. It is argued that they have urged us to re-visit the needs to reform global health governance.

Lastly, section five discusses how international partnership has been strengthened to promote universal health coverage (UHC). As a case, the Group of 20 (G20) Summit in 2019 is analyzed to show the role of Japan in promoting the UHC among leading economies. At the end, UN High-Level Meeting (UN HLM) on UHC in 2019 will be presented as a political commitment made by the heads of State and government of UN members.

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## 2.2 “Health for All” as an Internationally Shared Vision

Some of the ideas expressed by the SDG 3 and its targets can be traced back to inter-governmental consensus reached among countries after the World War II. This section discusses that the aspiration of the SDG 3 to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” is derived from both the “right to health” norm in the discipline of international human rights and the “health for all (HFA)” goal in the discipline of international development. First, it is reviewed how the “right to health” has been internationally agreed as a legal norm at the World Health Organization (WHO) and at the United Nations (UN). Second, it is argued that, based on the legal norm of the right to health, the HFA vision has been promoted as a development goal. Finally, how the HFA vision became integrated into the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and then into the SDGs, will be reviewed.

### 2.2.1 The Right to Health

In this sub-section, it is reviewed how the “right to health” has been internationally agreed as a legal norm. The “Constitution of the World Health Organization,” an inter-governmental agreement to establish the WHO, was adopted at the International Health Conference held in New York from June to July in 1946. The WHO Constitution, signed by the representatives of 61 States on 22 July in 1946, entered into force on 7 April in 1948. The WHO was established in 1948, as an inter-governmental organization with its own Constitution, as well as its own member States.

At the same time, it is also designated as a specialized agency of the UN, within the terms of article 57 of the “Charter of the United Nations.” With the Agreement between the UN and the WHO, approved at the UN General Assembly in New York on 15 November in 1947 and then by the WHO in Geneva on 10 July in 1948, it is expected that the WHO coordinates their work with the UN.

Realization of the “right to health” is considered as one of the missions of the WHO. In the preamble of the WHO Constitution (1946), it is stated that “The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.” This norm was then brought to the UN. The “Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),” adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1948, states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services...” in its article 25.

As an outcome of the efforts to codify the UDHR into legally binding human rights treaties, the “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)” was adopted at the UN General Assembly in 1966. It entered

into force on 3 January in 1976, in accordance with its article 27. The article 12 of the ICESCR states that “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” As of January 2022, there are 171 States parties to the ICESCR. It shows that the right to health is explicitly accepted as a legally binding norm by many countries.

In April 2002, the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health was established by then Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/RES/2002/31). After the Human Rights Council was established in 2006, replacing the Commission, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur was extended in 2007, and most recently renewed in 2019 (A/HRC/RES/42/16).

The mandate of the Special Rapporteur was established to

1. Gather, request, receive and exchange information,
2. Foster dialogue on possible cooperation with relevant actors, including the WHO and the UN,
3. Report on the realization of the right to health throughout the world, and
4. Address specific cases of alleged violations of the right to health.

The Special Rapporteur on the right to physical and mental health have been engaging in dialogues with the WHO for the purpose of expressing their common understanding on the right to health (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and WHO 2008).

### 2.2.2 “Health for All” Through Primary Health Care

In this sub-section, it is argued that the HFA has been promoted as a development goal, based on the legal norm of the right to health. The right to health is integral part of the economic, social and cultural rights that need to be realized progressively (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

2008). The signatory States of the ICESCR have the obligation to take appropriate measures towards the full realization of the right to health to the maximum of their available resources in their countries. However, there is a recognition that the right to health can be hampered by a lack of domestic resources. This reference to “resource availability” leads to the needs of many low-income countries to seek development assistance from high-income countries.

At the 30th World Health Assembly (WHA) convened by the WHO Secretariat in 1977, the WHO member States agreed on a vision that all the people of the world should attain a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially and economically productive life by the year 2000. This international development goal is known as “health for all by the year 2000.” The WHO serves as an inter-governmental organization to promote multilateral cooperation for health development, providing technical assistance to low-income member States. At the same time, high-income countries are expected to provide bilateral development assistance for health, not only technical assistance but also grant aid, to low-income countries, for the purpose of achieving the HFA globally by 2000.

The right to health is a human rights norm, in which people are treated as the rights-holder and the States as the duty-bearer. The emphasis is put on the obligation of each State to take appropriate measures to realize the right to health for everyone in the country. On the other hand, the HFA is a development goal that encourages international cooperation for health, so that low-income countries suffering from resource scarcity can receive development assistance from inter-governmental organizations and high-income countries. In this context, this inter-disciplinary nexus of human rights and international development is significant, as health financing is indispensable for progressive realization of the right to health.

To achieve the HFA by 2000, particularly among low-income countries, a strategic focus was chosen within the health sector. In 1978, an international conference was held in Almaty, where the “Declaration of Alma-Ata on Primary

Health Care (PHC)” was unanimously adopted. In the wake of these events, at the 32nd WHA in 1979, the Global Strategy for Health for All was launched, in which the PHC was endorsed (WHO 1981).

The concept of the PHC has been redefined repeatedly since 1978, and there are several variants. One of the most recent international consensus reached by the major inter-governmental organizations is the following:

PHC is a whole-of-society approach to health that aims at ensuring the highest possible level of health and well-being and their equitable distribution by focusing on people’s needs and as early as possible along the continuum from health promotion and disease prevention to treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care, and as close as feasible to people’s everyday environment. (WHO and UNICEF 2018)

After the World War II, the UN and its specialized agencies started supporting many Asian and African countries that had become independent from their colonial rulers. Both in health and education, such support was extended to the tertiary level, either rehabilitating or establishing national hospitals and universities. Therefore, the “Declaration of Alma-Ata on PHC” in 1978 was a paradigm shift of focus from the tertiary to the primary level, ensuring all people to have access to essential health services in their community. Similarly, in education, the “World Declaration on Education for All” was adopted in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990, shifting the focus from tertiary to primary or basic level of education.

The concept of the PHC consists of three synergistic components (WHO 2021):

1. Comprehensive integrated health services that embrace primary care as well as public health goods and functions as central pieces,
2. Multi-sectoral policies and actions to address the upstream and wider determinants of health,
3. Engaging and empowering individuals, families, and communities for increased social participation and enhanced self-care and self-reliance in health.

The original concept of the PHC was challenged in the 1980s. The author of this chapter

believes that there were at least three reasons. The first criticism came from within the PHC circle. It was argued that the original PHC was too comprehensive to be achieved in low-income countries. There was a call for “selective PHC” with focus on specific diseases (Walsh and Warren 1979).

Second, high-income countries were more willing to support measurable interventions in low-income countries, such as immunizations. At the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the topic of evaluating official development assistance (ODA) started to be put on the agenda since the early 1970s. The high-income countries at the DAC became more interested in measurable health indicators, such as immunization coverages, as the demand for accountability increased in their own society.

Third, some communicable diseases have become threats to high-income countries, too. When the WHO declared global eradication of smallpox in May 1980, there was some sense of optimism. However, after HIV/AIDS was discovered in 1981, and transmitted among people in high-income countries, there was a growing interest in infection prevention and control (IPC), calling for health security.

### 2.2.3 From the MDGs to the SDGs

The HFA goal was incorporated into a multi-sectoral set of international development goals. This section explains how the HFA vision became integrated into the MDGs, and then into the SDGs.

The MDGs were not part of the “Millennium Declaration” adopted at Millennium Summit of the UN General Assembly in 2000. The MDGs framework was prepared later, as a program of action to carry out the Sect. 2.3 “Development and Poverty Eradication” of the Millennium Declaration. In this context, the MDGs framework was prepared as a composite of the international goals agreed earlier.

The HFA is not expressed explicitly in the Millennium Declaration. The HFA vision is

**Table 2.1** Health goals in the MDGs and the SDGs

MDGs by 2015	Goal 4 (MDG 4): reduce child mortality
	Goal 5 (MDG 5): improved maternal health
	Goal 6 (MDG 6): combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
SDGs by 2030	Goal 3 (SDG 3): ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

Source Author

fragmented in the MDGs, as there are three health-related goals, without an overarching vision (see Table 2.1). The MDG 4 can be traced back to the child survival goals committed in the “World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children” (A/45/625) adopted at the World Summit for Children held in New York in 1990. Similarly, the MDG 5 can be traced back to the “Programme of Action” (A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1) adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994.

The MDG 6 became an independent goal, due to an increasing interest in combating communicable diseases and the eventual establishment of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) in 2002. The Okinawa Infectious Disease Initiative, launched at the Group of 8 (G8) Summit in Kyushu and Okinawa in 2000, led to strengthened global efforts to combat not only HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, but also polio, parasitic and other neglected tropical diseases. The international dialogues at the 2000 G8 Summit prompted the establishment of the GFATM, as well as corresponding disease-specific programs, which are directly related to the MDG 6.

In the MDG 6, malaria was explicitly mentioned, in addition to HIV/AIDS, showing solidarity with Sub-Saharan African countries suffering from the disease. The Roll Back Malaria (RBM) initiative, launched by the WHO, UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Bank in 1998, has been helping strengthen public–private partnerships to reduce malaria episodes in the world, especially in Africa.

The goal of the RBM partnership is to reduce the burden of malaria by forming an alliance of a

wide range of partners, including malaria-endemic African countries, inter-governmental organizations, bilateral development agencies, NGOs, foundations and private businesses, organizations of affected communities, and research and academic institutions. In response, in 2000, African heads of State convened an RBM Summit in Abuja to express their personal commitments to kick malaria out of Africa.

At the third Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in September 2003, malaria was discussed not only as a threat to African children and women but also as an obstacle to economic development in Africa. It has become clear that the private sector plays an important role in reducing the malaria burden. For example, the Olyset bednet, the first long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) approved by the WHO, was identified as an effective tool to prevent mosquito bites while sleeping at night.

Although the health goals within the MDGs seemed fragmented, without an overarching vision of the HFA, there was an increasing interest in strengthening health systems in low-income countries around the year 2008. This renewed attention to health systems strengthening (HSS) may be explained by four factors.

First, it became clear that MDG 4 (child health) and MDG 5 (maternal health) were not on track to be achieved by 2015, while some tremendous progress was reported in relation to the MDG 6 (HIV/AIDS and malaria), thanks to the GFATM. Although annual deaths among children under five dipped below 10 million in 2006, child mortality rates remained unacceptably high (UN 2008). Similarly, the high risk of dying in pregnancy or childbirth continued unabated in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Therefore, it was increasingly

recognized that the MDG 4 and the MDG 5 could not be achieved without strengthening health systems.

Second, in 2008 when the 30th anniversary of the 1978 “Alma-Ata Declaration” was celebrated, the PHC concept was revisited and reinterpreted at the WHA hosted by the WHO, in which a document titled “Primary Health Care, including Health System Strengthening” was adopted (WHO 2009). The WHO proposed that countries should make health systems and health development decisions guided by four inter-linked policy directions: universal coverage, people-centered services, healthy public policies, and leadership (WHO 2008).

Third, eight years after the G8 Summit in Kyushu and Okinawa, in 2008, Japan again hosted the G8 Summit in Toyako, Hokkaido, in which global health was identified as a priority on the agenda. In his speech on global health and Japan’s foreign policy, then Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura stated that “human security is a concept that is very relevant to cooperation in the twenty-first century. That is to say, it is vitally important that we not only focus on the health of individuals and protect them, but also strive to empower individuals and communities through health system strengthening” (Koumura 2007). At the G8 Summit, there a shift of focus from communicable diseases to the HSS.

Fourth, in 2007, the International Health Partnership (IHP+) was launched. The IHP+ was a partnership of low-income countries, high-income countries and inter-governmental development organizations that signed an IHP+ Global Compact. The IHP+ partners were committed to improve coordination and harmonization within the health sector, by uniting around a single health strategy.

With an increasing interest in the HSS, on 12 December 2012, the UN resolution on global health and foreign policy (A/RES/67/81) made a recommendation to include the UHC in the discussions on the post-2015 development agenda, that is, the SDGs.

The health goal of the SDGs (SDG 3) “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” (see Table 2.1) is an overarching vision that

resembles the HFA, overcoming the fragmentation of health goals within the MDGs. In the framework of the SDG 3, there are several Targets (see Table 2.2). The Targets 3.3, 3.8, 3.b and 3.d will be mentioned in the following sections.

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## 2.3 Combating Communicable Diseases for Human Security

This section explains how communicable diseases have become perceived as a threat to “security” in global health diplomacy. First, it is reviewed how the concept of security started to be used to discuss not only the State sovereignty, but also various threats to people. Second, the author discusses how global health issues have become perceived as a threat to “human security.” Lastly, it is reviewed how Japan started to use the concept of “human security” in global health diplomacy to elevate the level of dialogues.

### 2.3.1 From State Security to Human Security

The scope of the security concept has been expanded in the last two decades. Moving beyond a traditional macro-level focus solely on the States, the concept of security now includes an attention to the micro-level insecurity of individuals and communities (Katsuma 2010). There has been a general agreement on the necessity for a new security paradigm, in which emerging threats to the security of individuals and communities are properly addressed.

It was in the 1990s when the concept of “human security” began to take clearer shape, being reappraised within the UN system. After the end of the Cold War, the UN started to shift its focus from inter-State wars and disputes to other types of intra-State and transnational threats that devastate the lives and livelihoods of people around the world. As part of such efforts, the UNDP published its “Human Development Report 1994,” which had a significant impact on the evolution of the concept of human security,

**Table 2.2** Targets within the SDG 3

Target 3.1	By 2030, reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births
Target 3.2	By 2030, end preventable deaths of newborns and children under 5 years of age, with all countries aiming to reduce neonatal mortality to at least as low as 12 per 1000 live births and under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 1000 live births
Target 3.3	By 2030, end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases
Target 3.4	By 2030, reduce by one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and promote mental health and well-being
Target 3.5	Strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol
Target 3.6	By 2020, halve the number of global deaths and injuries from road traffic accidents
Target 3.7	By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes
Target 3.8	Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all
Target 3.9	By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination
Target 3.a	Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as appropriate
Target 3.b	Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all
Target 3.c	Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small island developing States
Target 3.d	Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks

Source United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Accessed on 14 March 2022. <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3>

covering seven domains: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political (UNDP 1994). This report for the first time made the connection between the concept of human security, and the dual freedoms from fear and want that were originally outlined in the U.S. Secretary of State's report on the 1945 San Francisco Conference. To translate this concept into practice, the 1994 UNDP report also called for the establishment of a "global human security fund."

In the 1990s a series of tragedies caused by internal armed conflicts posed serious security

threats to vulnerable groups of people within the State. For example, the genocides in Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia in 1995 graphically illustrated to the world that the traditional concept of security as the protection of national borders was not sufficient for the UN to take responsibility to protect vulnerable people.

The 1997 financial crisis in East Asia provided another example, highlighting the vulnerability of some groups of individuals and communities to the transnational threat beyond their control. Even in some of Asia's more industrialized countries that had once been



praised for the “East Asian miracle” by the World Bank (1993), economic growth created the social exclusion of some fragile groups.

The above series of events in the 1990s provided justification for expanding the scope of security to include both internal and transnational threats to individuals and communities. Furthermore, in this decade, the terrorist attacks in the United States of America (U.S.A.) on 11 September 2001, are often seen as a turning point in how the concept of security is defined.

In addition, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 also shook the world, putting communicable diseases at the forefront of the human security agenda. Now, among others, avian, swine, pandemic influenza, and new corona virus diseases, as well as climate change, are identified as transnational threats.

A second influential report was published in 2003 by the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. This report, which was presented to the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 1 May 2003, laid out a definition for human security. The refined definition of human security in this report advocates protecting individuals’ and communities’ freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity (Commission on Human Security 2003).

To ensure human security for all, first, it is argued that no one should have to fear pervasive physical violence, whether it is violence by other States, violence by some groups within their own State, or violence carried out in their own communities or families.

At the same time, it is acknowledged that for many people, their most significant daily fears are not necessarily related to physical violence; instead, they worry about how to feed their families, how to keep their families healthy, and how to ensure that their children receive the education necessary to survive and flourish in today’s world. These are among the sources of insecurity that a human security framework also attempts to address.

Finally, the Commission’s report emphasizes the importance of allowing people to live in dignity. In other words, the causes of insecurity go

beyond physical needs to include psycho-social needs. Through the process of empowerment, individuals and communities are expected to enhance their own resilience to cope with current and future threats, rather than being dependent solely on external actors taking care of them.

### **2.3.2 Communicable Diseases as a Human Security Threat**

The 2003 Commission report identifies 10 immediate areas requiring concerted global action, including the provision of basic health services. In many low-income countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa, basic life-saving prevention and treatment are not readily available to large segments of the population, leading to unacceptable rates of preventable death, particularly among children under five and pregnant women.

Health has become a shared global challenge. First, the proliferation of information allows us to see the suffering of people in many African and other low-income countries. This has instilled in many of us a moral determination to respond to this challenge for humanity. Second, it has become increasingly clear that the health of one community now has serious implications for that of other communities around the world. For example, the outbreak of SARS in 2003 offers a vivid illustration of the way, in which communicable diseases can travel rapidly, ignoring national borders and socio-economic differences. As SARS traveled across Asia and across the Pacific Ocean to North America, we were reminded that health threats to people on the other side of the world are our business, not only for moral reasons but also because they have the potential to affect us physically.

Health threats can also have significant economic impacts, particularly the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other infectious diseases. The impact of HIV/AIDS on development is attributable to its ability to undermine three main determinants of economic growth, namely, physical, human, and social capital.

At the same time, the antiretroviral (ARV) treatment that can extend the lives of HIV-infected people is often prohibitively expensive, so that few developing countries are able to provide these life-saving drugs to this vulnerable group without external assistance. Once people living with HIV start taking ARV drugs, they must continue doing so for the rest of their lives. If they lose their access to these drugs, not only does it mean certain death for them, but it also means the emergence of drug-resistant strains of HIV, which in turn leads to a collective cost for the rest of the world in terms of research and development in search of new drugs.

In translating the concept of human security into practice, the health sector offers a very useful entry point for several reasons. First, low-income countries are more willing to accept health-related development assistance from high-income countries because it is less likely to be politicized. Second, diseases and severe malnutrition are such challenges that one can readily understand at an emotional level, making it easier to rally people in high-income countries to support health initiatives for humanity. Third, the inter-connectedness between health and many other human security challenges, such as education, are relatively clear. Finally, the SARS outbreak of 2003 and other emerging infectious diseases have provided stark illustrations of the fact that communicable diseases do not stop at national borders and have raised people's awareness that good health in one country depends on good health in other countries. In this context, in its World Health Report 2007, the WHO used the term "global public health security" to draw attention to emerging threats to the collective health of populations living across national boundaries (WHO 2007).

Beyond serving as an entry point, a strong international commitment to adopting a human security approach to dealing with global health has the potential to contribute to improved health for all.

First, as a human-centered approach, the focal point of human security is individuals and communities. It is important that people recognize

their right to health and then ask for health services that they deserve. People's proactive participation as the rights-holder will help strengthen the health systems that will respond more effectively to their health needs.

Second, the human security approach highlights people's vulnerability and tries to help them build resilience to current and future threats. Those who face violent conflicts or natural and/or man-made disasters find themselves even more vulnerable to health challenges, as their already limited access to basic social services further deteriorates. Therefore, it is important to look beyond the health sector and take a multi-sectoral, comprehensive approach, in which health is seen within the context of various threats affecting people's well-being.

Third, the human security approach allows us to strengthen the interface between "protection" and "empowerment." The "protection" strategy, through which basic social services are provided, is of course crucial. Nevertheless, at the same time, the "empowerment" strategy is equally critical so that people can take care of their own health and build their own resilience to cope with various threats. It is important to look at the interface between these two strategies.

It is imperative for those who have political and economic power not only to create a protective environment by providing vital services, but also to empower individuals and communities so that they can have more control over their own health, allowing them to live in dignity.

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## 2.4 Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases Challenging the SDGs

In this section, the author analyzed two contemporary global health threats that were not anticipated when the SDGs were adopted: Ebola Virus Disease and COVID-19. Reference will be made to the Targets 3.b and 3.d of the SDG 3 (see Table 2.2). It is argued that they have urged us to re-visit the needs to reform global health governance in achieving the SDG 3.

## 2.4.1 2014 Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak in West Africa

Ebola Virus Disease (also known as Ebola hemorrhagic fever) is an acute viral infection that was discovered in present-day South Sudan in 1976. It can only be contracted through blood and other bodily fluids, but it is extremely virulent and infectious. Although there have been 10 Ebola outbreaks in Africa, the first large-scale outbreak re-emerged in West Africa in 2014. Over 28,000 people were infected, and more than 11,000 people died by January 2016.

The author interviewed survivors, health workers and medical professionals, government officials, staff members of NGOs and UN agencies in Conakry, the capital city of Guinea, in addition to the staff members at the UN Secretariat as well as its funds and programmes in New York, the WHO and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Geneva and London, during the period of 2015–2016.

The author reviewed the disease's outbreak in Guinea and transmission to the neighboring countries in West Africa. The subsequent actions taken by local and international actors are analyzed. Then the author answers the following two research questions (Katsuma 2017):

1. Why didn't the WHO declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) sooner?
2. What forced UN Secretary-General to establish the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER)?

After answering these research questions, the author discusses policy implications for global health governance, not only for Africa but also for the rest of the world.

### 2.4.1.1 Background

In December 2013, a boy died of hemorrhagic fever in the southeastern forest region of Guinea, near the border with neighboring countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia. This boy is believed to be the first victim of the Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea. The Ebola virus was confirmed in March

2014, based on laboratory test results, and the Guinea's Ministry of Health declared an Ebola outbreak. In the same month, the MSF, an international NGO, issued a warning that the "geographical expansion was unprecedented (MSF 2015)," and then expanded its activities in Guinea and Liberia.

Yet, Guinea's Minister of Health and WHO's then Director-General, Dr. Margaret Chan, did not draw attention to the Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa at the WHA held in Geneva in May of that year. Consequently, international response was not mobilized.

In June, with a growing sense of crisis, the MSF stated that the Ebola outbreak was now "uncontrollable" (MSF 2015) and requested greater support. The steering committee of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) prompted a more effective guidance from the WHO. Accordingly, WHO Director-General declared a Grade 3 emergency in July, within the Emergency Response Framework (ERF), and gave increased priority to Ebola within the WHO. Then, in August, the WHO and the Governments of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone launched a joint response plan. It was later at this stage when WHO Director-General finally declared Ebola a PHEIC.

A few days later in Guinea, then President Alpha Condé announced a state of emergency, and formed the National Coordination for the Fight against Ebola. Under the leadership of the Ebola Response National Coordinator, Dr. Sakoba Keita, full-scale activities were started to be implemented in Guinea.

Nonetheless, the WHO-led international measures were considered inadequate, and the MSF made an emergency declaration in September that "the world is losing the battle to contain it. Leaders are failing to come to grips with this transnational threat" (MSF 2015). After that, UN Secretary-General established UNMEER, which was unconventional.

As a result of the expanded international response, together with efforts made by each country, the WHO said all known chains of transmission have been stopped in West Africa in January 2016.

### 2.4.1.2 Why Didn't WHO Director-General Declare a PHEIC Sooner?

WHO's International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005, agreed upon by member States, allow WHO Director-General to declare a PHEIC. Following the H1N1 flu (2009), wild poliovirus (2014), Ebola virus (2014), and Zika virus (2016), Ebola virus (2019) pandemic forced the WHO to declare the fifth PHEIC. Out of these, the action taken by the WHO for the Ebola outbreak has been criticized for its delay in making a PHEIC declaration (Garrett 2015; Gostin and Friedman 2014).

At first, opinions were split within Guinea between the government and the MSF. Although Guinea's Ministry of Health acknowledged an Ebola outbreak in March 2014, there was no perceived need for an international response. On the contrary, the MSF alerted the international community that the spread of the disease was unprecedented in the same month, and that it had become uncontrollable in June. Against this backdrop of conflicting views, it is possible to say that the WHO decided to respect the Guinean government's opinion. Still, only a few months later, the WHO was eventually forced to make a PHEIC declaration, and the President of Guinea announced a state of emergency, as the infection reached as far as Conakry, the capital city of Guinea.

Several reasons delayed the PHEIC declaration. First, because this was the first Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the Guinean government did not have sufficient experience in responding to the disease. Moreover, the government was optimistic, believing that even if an outbreak occurred in the southeastern forest region of Guinea, it would not affect Conakry. From the fear of a PHEIC declaration triggering economic damage, the government did not proactively disclose information. This caused a strain on the relationship with the MSF that had requested a rapid international response from the international community from the outset.

The second reason is related to the organizational structure of the WHO. It was originally anticipated that the WHO Regional Office for

Africa (AFRO) would take the lead for further support. However, due to its limited human resources and funding, AFRO was not able to fulfill its expected roles successfully. The WHO declared a Grade 3 emergency within the organization itself in July, but the PHEIC declaration was not made public until August, out of consideration for the governments' intent of the member States, such as Guinea.

### 2.4.1.3 Why Did UN Secretary-General Establish UNMEER?

Even though the WHO made the PHEIC declaration in August 2014, and then international response mobilized, the prospects of the Ebola outbreaks ending was bleak. In September, UN's then Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, established UNMEER, based on the resolutions made at the Security Council and then at the General Assembly. While political and peace missions led by UN Secretary-General are familiar to many, UNMEER was an unconventional UN health mission to fight a communicable disease. It operated until July 2015 when the activities were handed over to the WHO.

There were several reasons for establishing UNMEER. First, as limitations of the WHO's capability to lead and coordinate field activities became apparent, the UN needed to demonstrate its strong leadership. It was unprecedented for UN Secretary-General to take a lead in the fight against a communicable disease. Although temporarily, the WHO showed hesitance because it appeared that UNMEER would be structured above the WHO. This caused tension between UN Secretary-General and WHO Director-General, who would not generally be in a superior-subordinate relationship.

The second reason was that although a proposal for the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to take the initiative and then utilize the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) for Ebola being a humanitarian crisis was made, this did not come to fruition. Humanitarian crises due to natural disasters and armed conflicts were increasing, and it was decided that OCHA neither had the experience, framework, nor funding to undertake

this new type of humanitarian crisis caused by a communicable disease.

Finally, a large amount of funds needed to be mobilized immediately. The quickest way to do this was to have a new UN mission endorsed by the Security Council and the General Assembly, allowing the UN Secretariat to have access to its regular budgets.

However, UNMEER was heavily criticized within Guinea, as the value-added effects of its activities were considered questionable.

#### **2.4.1.4 Implications for Global Health Governance**

Based on the lessons learned from Guinea, a few policy implications for global health governance may be summarized as follows.

First, it is crucial that each country acquires the minimum core public health capacities required for crisis management according to the IHR, which should be supported by international development cooperation. In this context, achieving the Target 3.d of the SDG 3 is very important: “Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks” (see Table 2.2).

Second, even though WHO Director-General makes the final decision regarding a PHEIC declaration, the health risk evaluation that forms the basis for this decision should be performed scientifically by an independent, dedicated organization.

Third, at the country level, the UN country team (UNCT) should be prepared to coordinate country initiatives and international response to fight communicable diseases, utilizing existing coordination mechanisms, such as the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the thematic groups. The WHO will continue to retain its role as a lead agency in health, but the UNCT should coordinate cross-sectoral activities in the field.

The Ebola Virus Disease spread throughout Guinea, partially due to traditional healers praying over Ebola virus carriers, as well as friends and family members touching infected bodies to bid them farewell. This calls for multi-sectoral

approach to fight communicable diseases, including health education, contact tracing and safe burial.

Lastly, if a complex humanitarian crisis accompanied by a communicable disease outbreak occurs in the future, OCHA should become involved in the response, instead of establishing a new UN mission such as UNMEER. The OCHA must strengthen its capabilities to respond to humanitarian health crises by taking initiatives such as dispatching UN Humanitarian Coordinators with experience in infection prevention and control (IPC) and activating the cluster approach for humanitarian coordination (Katsuma et al. 2016).

### **2.4.2 COVID-19: A Global Pandemic**

At the end of 2019, there was an outbreak of an emerging infectious disease (EID) in Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei Province, China. Following that, the WHO announced the discovery of the novel coronavirus “SARS-CoV-2” on 12 January 2020. Human infection by this virus is called the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).

#### **2.4.2.1 Unique Features of COVID-19**

COVID-19 is a global pandemic, with an extremely high number of human infection cases in general, as well as relatively higher death rates among vulnerable groups, including elderly people and those who have underlying health problems. Since the first report in December 2019, COVID-19 has become a global pandemic all over the world, due to its unique features.

One reason for a high number of infection cases is that asymptomatic or undiagnosed infected people may be spreading the virus. Second, as it is difficult to identify, isolate and quarantine asymptomatic infected people, general mobility restriction measures, including lockdowns, are important to prevent the spread of COVID-19 cases (Katsuma 2021a). However, mobility restriction policy, banning mass gathering events and regulating hospitality and service businesses, would damage the economy and cannot be continued for months.

Much is still unknown about this virus, and there is no end in sight to the pandemic. Although the world now is much different than it was 100 years ago, the scale of its spread invites us compare with the 1918–20 Spanish flu (H1N1 type-A influenza virus). That virus is said to have infected 500 million and killed 50 million around the world (Jordan 2019).

However, SARS-CoV-2 is not an influenza virus but a coronavirus. SARS-CoV-2, causing COVID-19, is the seventh coronavirus known to infect humans. Of the seven, four have spread globally, but cause mild to moderate symptoms only now (HCoV-OC43, HCoV-HKU1, HCoV-229E and HCoV-NL63) (ICTV 2020). The first three cause common colds, as well as severe lower respiratory tract infections among the youngest and oldest age groups. The last one, HCoV-NL63, is an important cause of (pseudo) croup and bronchiolitis among children (ECDC 2022).

The other three, including COVID-19, can cause more severe and even fatal symptoms. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV), a coronavirus infection discovered in China's Guangdong Province in November 2002, and identified by the WHO in February 2003, is thought to have spilled over to humans from greater horseshoe bats. By July 2003, it had spread to over 30 countries and territories, with confirmation of around 8000 people infected and over 700 deaths (CDC 2004). The Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS-CoV), another coronavirus infection discovered in Saudi Arabia in 2012, is thought to have spilled over to humans from the Arabian camel (ECDC 2020). By the end of 2019, it had spread to 27 countries, with confirmation of about 2500 people infected and over 800 deaths.

WHO Director-General declares the sixth PHEIC on 30 January 2020, based on the 2005 IHR. This PHEIC declaration is supposed to allow the WHO to demonstrate global leadership in promoting international cooperation among the member States to combat COVID-19. However, with the “my country first” stance of many high-income countries, including temporary suspension of the payment of financial

contribution to the WHO by the U.S.A. in 2020, international cooperation to combat COVID-19 has been insufficient.

The advent of COVID-19 has made it difficult to achieve SDG 3. At the same time, structural challenges have arisen for global health governance, such as global equitable access to essential medical products and the global governance over disease outbreaks on international cruise ships (Katsuma 2021b).

#### 2.4.2.2 Global Equitable Access to Vaccines

In preventing infection and the spread of COVID-19, the focus was initially on non-pharmaceutical interventions such as changing personal hygiene behavior, improving the spaces where people gather, and restricting human interaction. Non-pharmaceutical measures remain essential, but pharmaceutical inventions such as vaccines and therapeutic drugs have become indispensable. It is anticipated that vaccines will prevent exacerbation of the disease.

But not all have fair access to vaccines. Attempts by high-income countries to secure as many vaccines as possible for their own citizens have been censured as “vaccine nationalism”. Meanwhile, a lack of funds has meant that low-income countries are unable to negotiate directly with pharmaceutical companies, making it difficult for them to secure vaccines independently. Nevertheless, top earners in low-income countries can partake in “vaccine tourism”, whereby they travel abroad (to the United Arab Emirates, for example) to be vaccinated. This gives rise to concerns that many people in low-income countries, including healthcare professionals, are being left behind.

The COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, one of three pillars of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, is an international framework for the co-purchase of vaccines. High- and middle-income countries can self-fund vaccines for 20% of their populations, while low-income countries are provided with vaccines for 30% of their populations free of charge. The Government of Japan held a Vaccine Summit on 2 June 2021 to raise the

funds required for this. However, one of the problems may be that pharmaceutical companies may prefer to negotiate with high-income countries bilaterally, as the willingness to pay of those countries are generally higher than that of multilateral framework such as the COVAX Facility. High-income countries are strongly encouraged to balance the country needs of their own citizens and the global equity in access to vaccines.

#### **2.4.2.3 Intellectual Property Rights and the Access to Medicine**

Access to medicines, including vaccines, is essential in the fight against COVID-19, but high prices and short supply have become issues in the oligopolistic market. 62 countries jointly proposed a temporary waiver from COVID-19-related intellectual property rights protection obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (WTO 2020). The proposal has been endorsed by more than 100 countries. Many high-income countries opposed it, but the U.S.A. and France are now in favor of the intellectual property waiver.

The Target 3.d of the SDG 3 states the following (see Table 2.2):

Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all.

The protection of intellectual property rights is an important mechanism for research and development (R&D) organizations to recover their investments. It is also an essential premise for publishing the results. On the other hand, public funding from governments and international organizations have been supporting the R&D and the purchase of pharmaceutical products.

However, in accordance with the Target 3.d, countries must consider temporarily waiving obligations to protect intellectual property rights, while encouraging technology transfer by pharmaceutical companies. Discussions on how public and private sectors should cooperate in the pandemic must also be deepened when a PHEIC is declared.

#### **2.4.2.4 Disease Outbreaks on International Cruise Ships**

In February 2020, the outbreak of COVID-19 on the Diamond Princess Cruise Ship attracted widespread attention not only in Japan but also internationally. The flag State of the Diamond Princess was the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the cruise ship operating company was based in the U.S.A. The ship was permitted to dock at the port of Yokohama in Japan.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Labour Organization's Maritime Labour Convention set out the responsibilities of flag States. WHO's IHR set out the responsibilities of the country in which the vessel is located. Further, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for the rights and obligations of coastal States vis-à-vis foreign vessels. Although the case involved several actors, the division of roles between the U.K., the U.S.A., and Japan was not clear.

Moreover, although Japan permitted the Diamond Princess to dock, it refused the same permission to the Westerdam (its flag State was the Netherlands, while the operating company was in the U.S.A.). After being turned away by various countries, the Westerdam ended up docking in Cambodia.

With a lack of clarity regarding the roles of the various actors involved, the burden on the coastal States in which such international ships dock is increasing, and it is no wonder why many countries are reluctant to extend support to both passengers and seafarers on such international ships. It is necessary to envision a global health governance mechanism for such event.

Both Ebola Virus Disease and COVID-19 have challenged the SDGs, particularly the SDG

3. They have reminded us that the global health governance needs to be reformed so that international cooperation to achieve the SDG 3 will be facilitated better.

## 2.5 Promoting Universal Health Coverage for Leaving no One Behind

This section discusses how international partnership has been strengthened to promote universal health coverage (UHC). As a case, the 2019 G20 Summit is analyzed to show the role of Japan in promoting the UHC. At the end, UN High-Level Meeting (UN HLM) on UHC in 2019 will be presented as an expanded political commitment made by the heads of State and government of UN members.

### 2.5.1 UHC and Primary Health Care

In this sub-section, the author discusses how international partnership has been strengthened to promote universal health coverage (UHC). It is also reviewed how the concept of primary health care (PHC) was re-defined in the current movement towards the UHC.

The Target 3.8 of the SDG 3 has two indicators (see Table 2.3). The indicator 3.8.1 is the coverage of essential health services, while the indicator 3.8.2 is the proportion of population with large household expenditures on health as a share of total household expenditure or income.

There has been coordinated efforts to monitor the progress toward the UHC in each country, collecting data on the indicators (WHO and World Bank 2021).

The International Health Partnership (IHP+) responded to the transition from the MDGs to the SDGs by discussing how best the partnership can contribute to the SDG 3. In early 2016, the IHP + Steering Committee and signatory partners agreed to expand the scope of IHP+ to include health system strengthening (HSS) towards the achievement of the UHC.

It was also agreed to broaden the base of the partnership as the SDGs are relevant for all countries, while the MDGs were for low-income countries only. It was envisaged that the new partnership would broaden the scope to focus on the HSS and domestic spending in all countries.

In September 2016, the Director-General of the WHO formally announced the establishment of the ‘International Health Partnership for UHC 2030’ at a High-Level Meeting to End AIDS during the UN General Assembly in New York. This transformed the IHP+ into the UHC2030. Its mission is to create a movement for accelerating equitable and sustainable progress towards the UHC.

After UHC was included in the SDGs as the Target 3.8 in 2015, Japan hosted the first UHC Forum with the World Bank, the WHO and UNICEF among others in Tokyo on 13–14 December 2017, for the purpose of further mainstreaming the UHC on the global agenda. The co-organizers adopted the “Tokyo Declaration on UHC” (2017), calling for greater

**Table 2.3** SDG Target 3.8 and its indicators

Target 3.8	Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all	
<i>Indicator 3.8.1</i>		Coverage of essential health services (defined as the average coverage of essential services based on tracer interventions that include reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health, infectious diseases, non-communicable diseases and service capacity and access, among the general and the most disadvantaged population)
<i>Indicator 3.8.2</i>		Proportion of population with large household expenditures on health as a share of total household expenditure or income

Source United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Accessed on 14 March 2022. <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3>



commitment to strengthen global momentum towards the UHC, to accelerate country-led processes towards the UHC, and to nurture innovation for the UHC.

Interestingly, the PHC is not explicitly mentioned among the Targets within the SDG 3, probably due to the lack of consensus on its definition at that time, in the wake of the debate between the “comprehensive” and “selective” PHC. However, in 2018, after 40 years since the “Declaration of Alma-Ata,” the Global Conference on Primary Health Care was held in Astana, Kazakhstan. The “Declaration of Astana” (2018) states that the PHC is a cornerstone of a sustainable health system for the UHC and health-related SDGs.

### 2.5.2 2019 G20 Summit and UN High-Level Meeting on UHC

The author demonstrates how international organizations and conferences, such as the WHO, the UN, and the Summit, have been providing their members with arenas for global health diplomacy to promote the UHC. In this sub-section, the G20 Summit in 2019 is analyzed as a case to show the role of Japan in promoting the UHC. At the end, UN High-Level Meeting (UN HLM) on UHC in 2019 will be presented as an expanded political commitment made by the heads of State and government.

The leaders of the G20 met in Osaka on 28–29 June in 2019, and then adopted the “G20 Osaka Leaders’ Declaration” (G20 2019a), in which global health is one of the major issues addressed. The paragraph 30 in the section “Global Health” of the Declaration summarizes the consensus reached among G20 leaders on the UHC. As an outcome of the 2019 G20 Osaka Summit, the consensus on the UHC is significant for the following three reasons (Katsuma 2019).

First, before the leaders met, G20 finance and health ministers were convened to organize a joint session for the first time on 6 June 2019, and then endorsed the “G20 Shared Understanding on the Importance of UHC Financing in Developing Countries” (G20 2019b). The

finance ministers of powerful economies have agreed that investing in health at an early stage of development is important for sustainable and inclusive growth. For supporting this argument, the World Bank provided evidence (World Bank 2019). Then, G20 finance and health ministers encouraged low-income countries to mobilize their domestic resources for the UHC. G20 Health Ministers’ Meeting, held in Okayama in October 2019, followed up on the agreement.

Second, Japan, as the host of the 2019 G20 Osaka Summit, took a whole-of-society approach in strengthening partnerships, and engaged in policy dialogues with various G20 Engagement Groups. Although the G20 Summit is an inter-governmental process, many non-governmental organizations, particularly G20 Engagement Groups, were given opportunities to provide the host government with policy recommendations.

For example, the Civil 20 (C20) published “C20 Policy Pack 2019” (C20 2019), containing a policy paper on global health prepared jointly by many civil society organizations, in April 2019. The Think 20 (T20) is a research and policy advice network for the G20, consisting of several Task Forces. The Task Force 1 focused on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and then published 11 policy briefs. The T20 Working Group on UHC produced one of the policy briefs in March 2019. The policy brief consists of four proposals: (1) leaving no one behind; (2) prioritizing reliable domestic financing and cost-effective best buys; (3) harnessing innovation and access to technology judiciously; and (4) supporting common monitoring mechanisms, mutual learning platforms, and coordinated international cooperation for the UHC (Bloom et al. 2019).

In addition to the above official G20 Engagement Groups, two interesting private initiatives were taken to advocate for the UHC. One is the Health Professional Meeting (H20) organized by the World Medical Association (WMA) and the Japan Medical Association (JMA) in Tokyo on 13–14 June 2019, in which the “Memorandum of Tokyo on UHC and the Medical Profession” (WMA and JMA 2019) was adopted. The other is the Biopharmaceutical

CEOs Roundtable (BCR) organized by the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) in Tokyo on 3–4 June 2019. The IFPMA prepared a joint statement signed by pharmaceutical manufacturers in Japan, the U.S.A. and Europe (IFPMA 2019), and presented it to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in anticipation of Japan's leadership in accelerating progress towards the UHC, in resolving unmet medical needs, and in transforming to a new healthcare system utilizing various medical data.

Third, G20 leaders recall the commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs made by all member states of the UN in 2015, and then identified the urgent need to formulate a global health action plan so that the SDG 3 and its Target 3.8 (UHC) can be achieved by all stakeholders in a harmonized manner.

A few months after the leaders of the G20 adopted the “G20 Osaka Leaders’ Declaration” in June 2019, the UN HLM on UHC was held in New York in September. The theme of the HLM-UHC was “Universal Health Coverage: Moving together to build a healthier world.” As the outcome, “Political Declaration of the High-Level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage” (A/RES/74/2) was adopted.

In response to the need of global action plan, expressed by the G20 leaders at the Osaka G20 Summit, the WHO presented a global health action plan (WHO 2019). It was a milestone event to mobilize the highest political support to package the entire health agenda under the umbrella of the UHC.

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## 2.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has approached global health diplomacy in combating communicable diseases and in promoting the UHC, as part of the efforts to achieve the SDG 3 by 2030. The principle of “Leave no one behind” is logically endorsed both by the right to health and the HFA.

First, communicable diseases have become perceived as a threat to “human security” in

global health, and Japan started to use the concept of human security in global health diplomacy to elevate the level of dialogues. Nevertheless, Ebola Virus Disease and COVID-19, not anticipated when the SDGs were adopted, now urge us to re-visit the needs to reform global health governance.

Second, to promote universal health coverage (UHC), international partnership has been strengthened, particularly UHC2030. In 2019, hosting the G20 Summit, Japan played an important role in promoting the UHC. This led to an expanded international commitment made at UN High-Level Meeting on UHC. It shows that global health has become an important agenda for diplomacy.

Lastly, the SDG 3 is inter-linked with other SDGs. For example, to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being” for all workers, the SDG 8 (decent work), particularly its Target 8.8 (Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers), is relevant. It is important to improve occupational safety and health (OSH) by setting international standards through consultation both at the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the WHO, and then implementing them domestically in each country. Therefore, inter-sectoral collaboration, enhancing the synergy, is important when we approach vulnerable populations, with the principle of “Leave no one behind.”

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# The Historical Development of SDG4: Evolution of the Global Governance of Education

# 3

Kazuo Kuroda and Lauren Nakasato

## Abstract

Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG4) aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”. This chapter describes the historical development of SDG4 by tracing the history of three fundamental approaches to international education development underlying the goal: education for peace, education as a human right and education for socioeconomic development. The approaches are then used to frame discussion of three prominent academic debates and perspectives in research in educational development: (1) the external and internal efficiency of education; (2) “education for development”, “educational development” and “education and development” and (3) dependency theory and modernization theory. SDG4 is then considered within the framework of these approaches and perspectives. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the challenges and possible solutions for the realization of SDG4.

## Keywords

SDG4 · History · International education development

## 3.1 Introduction

Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG4) aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all” (United Nations, 2015b, p. 21). This chapter contributes to SDG4 by tracing its historical and theoretical foundations, facilitating a deeper understanding of the challenges faced in achieving SDG4. By understanding these challenges within the context of the historical development of SDG4, implications can be drawn for ways forward.

With the explosion of cross-border migration, rapid advancement of the global and knowledge economies and the rise of information technology, the international community has recognized the necessity for the further development of the educational global governance system which has been evolving over the past few decades. Between 2000 and 2015, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aimed to alleviate world poverty and improve life in developing countries by setting a development agenda for national governments of developing countries and aid agencies of developed countries. The

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S. Urata et al. (eds.), *Sustainable Development Disciplines for Humanity*, Sustainable Development Goals Series, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4859-6\\_3](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4859-6_3)

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MDGs consisted of eight goals including one aiming to achieve universal primary education based on the Education for All initiative, first launched in 1990 to ensure access to quality education for every citizen in every society. The existence of an education-specific goal within the MDG agenda attests to the rising prominence of education within the international development agenda at the time. By the conclusion of the MDGs in 2015, the number of out-of-school children at the primary level had fallen by nearly 50% to 57 million in 2015 compared to 100 million in 2000 when the MDGs began (United Nations, 2015a). With the net enrollment rate in developing regions and the youth literacy rate both reaching 91% in 2015, the goal was considered met and the push for universal primary education successful.

Yet despite these gains, there remained vast inequalities in access to education, for example based on disability or socioeconomic status (United Nations, 2015a). Further, subsequent to the MDGs, studies examining student learning outcomes in developing countries found that although more students were attending school, many were not completing school and/or had shown little to no significant gains in their learning (e.g. UNESCO 2014; Filmer and Fox 2014). Thus, these remaining challenges became a springboard for the 2015–2030 development agenda, coined the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG4, the “education goal”, aims explicitly to improve quality and equality in education, reflecting the shortcomings of the MDGs. Yet both Goal 2 of the MDGs and Goal 4 of the SDGs are products of rich theoretical debates within the field of international education development. In the context of globalization, international education development has grown in importance both at the policy and research levels, highlighting the importance of gaining a deeper understanding of the history of the field. Thus, this chapter aims to introduce the theoretical approaches, debates and perspectives that have shaped the field of international education development, then discuss the current SDG4 agenda within this framework.

The chapter is organized as follows. In 2., three fundamental approaches to international education development are introduced. The peace approach, the human rights approach and the development approach are pillars of international education development theory which underly SDG4. In 3., shifting trends in policy usage of the three approaches are discussed. In 4., the approaches are used to frame discussion of three prominent academic perspectives in international education development: the external and internal efficiency of education; “education for development”, “educational development” and “education and development” and dependency theory and modernization theory. Together, these approaches and perspectives form the theoretical foundation of SDG4, which is explained in detail in 5. In 6., challenges facing the achievement of SDG4 and possible ways forward are discussed in the context of the approaches and debates introduced in 2. and 4.

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## 3.2 Three Approaches to International Education Development

Three fundamental approaches to international education development have been conceptualized and promoted by global governance organizations since the end of the second World War: the peace approach, the human rights approach and the development approach. These approaches form the foundation of SDG4 and are discussed in detail below.

### 3.2.1 The Peace Approach

The peace approach is considered the founding philosophy of international education and has long been a central to international cooperation efforts in the field of education. Born in the aftermath of World War I and popularized in the wake of World War II, the peace approach is based on the belief that international education can promote international understanding for

peace. Indeed, the peace approach is the underlying philosophy of the 1945 Preamble of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Constitution:

That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed; That ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war; (...) *That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern* [emphasis added]; That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

(UNESCO 1945)

The UNESCO Constitution preamble explicates the necessity of education for the realization of peace in the statement “peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind”, emphasizing the role of education not only in building mutual understanding but also in building a common moral standard.

While UNESCO laid the groundwork for the peace approach in international education, the approach first began to take shape in the realm of international higher education cooperation, particularly in international student mobility and exchange. In 1946 the Fulbright Program, a scholarship program offering grants for international exchange to and from the United States, was proposed and launched by then-US senator J. William Fulbright. The program was founded on Fulbright's strong conviction that “educational exchange can turn nations into people, contributing as no other form of communication can to the humanizing of international relations” (Fulbright 1983), becoming a model for the international education policies of other countries receiving international students. In Japan, the peace approach was a founding philosophy for

international exchange and cooperation in higher education. During the Nakasone Cabinet in 1983, a highly influential report, “Proposals for International Student Policies for the 21st Century” was published by the Advisory Committee on International Student Policy for the 21st Century. This report heavily influenced future higher education internationalization policies in Japan, and was clearly rooted in the peace approach, stating: “international exchange in education, especially at the higher education level, contributes to fostering and promoting a spirit of international understanding and international cooperation, and serves as an important bridge for developing and strengthening friendly relations between Japan and their respective home countries” (Ministry of Education of Japan 1984). Thus, the peace approach for mutual understanding is one of the foundational approaches to international cooperation and internationalization in higher education, as evidenced in subsequent literature (e.g. Knight 2008).

The peace approach has not only been limited to the field of higher education. At the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit in Canada, Japan introduced the Basic Education for Growth Initiative (BEGIN). The initiative reflects the peace approach, stating: “as globalization tends to bring about uniformity in the economy and lifestyles, it is of great significance to foster interest, understanding and acceptance of different cultures from an early age. Basic education gives people the ability to think and to understand other people and other cultures through dialogue, and therefore, when providing support, full attention should be paid to the role of basic education” (MOFA 2002).

International educational cooperation for peace and mutual understanding originated from the discussions of the International Commission for Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations and the Bureau of International Education in the interwar period and was further conceptualized in UNESCO discussions in the post-war period (Jones and Coleman 2005). As a result of such discussions, the peace approach was written into policy at the 18th Session of the

General Conference of UNESCO in 1974 with the Recommendation concerning Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Recommendation). The Recommendation, based on the UN Charter, the UNESCO Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, comprehensively lists major issues facing international society and outlines the indispensable role education, particularly through the peace approach, should play in the resolution of these issues. The Recommendation had a significant impact on educational practice as it succeeded in reshaping policy directions in UN member countries toward the internationalization of education, including education for international understanding and international educational cooperation. While the Recommendation was not taken up for revision at the 44th International Education Conference in 1994, it has lasting relevance today as evidenced by Target 4.7 of SDG4, which aims to “ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development” (United Nations, 2015b, p. 21).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001 and subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were wake-up calls for the international community, refocusing efforts on refining the peace approach and education for mutual understanding. This triggered a wave of new research on various aspects of education’s role in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, including research on education in post-conflict situations. A striking trend that emerges from this body of literature, however, is the development of research and practice on curriculum and textbook reform focusing on peace and mutual understanding. This literature identified mainstream education itself as a potential driving cause of conflict, making it difficult to rebuild post-conflict education systems

that take all stakeholder needs into consideration, stalling attempts to rebuild society and prevent future conflicts. Yet this is precisely the reason why the international community has taken on the role as mediator in this area. From the 1990s, UNESCO began advocating a “culture of peace”, engaging in various reconciliation projects in conflict and post-conflict countries and regions (Nelles 2003; World Bank 2005; Davies 2004; Tawil and Harley 2004).

Thus, the peace approach can be considered the founding rationale behind efforts in international cooperation in education. However, as educational aid to developing countries increased and the international community became acutely aware of the lack of access to quality education in developing regions, two new approaches emerged as the dominant policy principles. These approaches, the human rights approach and development approach, are explained in detail below.

### 3.2.2 The Human Rights Approach

A fundamental assumption underlying the international community’s involvement in educational development in developing countries is that education is a basic human right. This assumption is based on the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26:

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(United Nations 1948)



There are three points of interest in Article 26. Firstly, the “education” in 1. Refers to school education, not including education that is carried out informally at home or in the community. This equation of education as a human right to school education as a human right has been echoed and reinforced in subsequent declarations and treaties. Secondly, even prior to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there was a push to make basic education free and compulsory. Over 70 years later, these goals have yet to be accomplished, reflecting the idealistic nature of the goals. Thirdly, the expected role of education is stipulated in 2., which states that education “shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups,” reflecting the peace approach. Further, education should be aimed at “the full development of the personality”, “strengthening respect for fundamental freedoms” and “maintaining peace”. Thus, while Article 26 is a founding text of the human rights approach, it is also an important basis for the peace approach. Importantly, there is no mention of education’s expected contribution to socioeconomic development, which will be discussed in 2.3.

In 1959 the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child was adopted at the UN General Assembly. Principle 7 pertains to education, stating that “the child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages,” reflecting Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Further, the Declaration states that a child “shall be given an education which will promote his general culture and enable him, on a basis of equal opportunity, to develop his abilities, his individual judgement, and his sense of moral and social responsibility, and to become a useful member of society,” reflecting neither the peace approach nor the development approach.

Further, the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of all forms

of Discrimination Against Women reaffirmed the ideals of eliminating discrimination in education and securing the right to education for all (UNICEF 1998).

In 1989 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the UN General Assembly and was entered into force in 1990, providing a legal basis for the human rights approach in education. The Convention stipulates the child’s right to education in Article 28 and the aims of education in Article 29. While essentially in line with the philosophy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), these articles go beyond the UDHR to elaborate upon what constitutes a “right” and an “aim”. While the UDHR made no mention of higher education, for example, the Convention explicitly stipulates the child’s right to access to higher education. Further, in Article 29, the Convention states development of respect for the environment as an additional aim of education beyond what was previously outlined in the UDHR. This indicates that global governance through such documents has adapted to changing needs and circumstances while adhering to the founding philosophy of the UDHR.

While Articles 28 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provide the legal basis for the human rights approach, the fundamental concepts supporting the approach can also be found in other articles of the Convention, as outlined in UNICEF’s 1999 State of the World’s Children report: “Articles 28 and 29 of the Convention are buttressed by four other articles that assert overarching principles of law. All have far-reaching ramifications, particularly in terms of what is needed to mould an education system—or an individual school. These are article 2, on non-discrimination; article 3, on the best interests of the child; article 6, on the child’s right to life, survival and development; and article 12, on the views of the child” (UNICEF 1998, p. 11).

Regarding the aims of education, above and beyond the aims specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 29 of the

Convention on the Rights of the Child states that education should foster “the development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential” and “the development of respect for the natural environment” (United Nations 1989), widening the scope of the aims of education beyond international understanding and peace.

Further, UNICEF has advocated for educational quality, access and learning environment to be conceived from a human rights perspective and reflected in educational policy. Similarly, UNESCO has advocated for the peace approach in international education development in various conferences and statements. For example, at the 44<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Education in 1994, the Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy was adopted. While the Declaration reinforces the peace approach and education as a basic human right, it also calls for international consensus on education’s contribution to the promotion of human rights.

Yet why is education a human right? In the foundational documents described above, education is considered integral to human development, reflecting a fundamental belief in the field of education. Further, the definition of education as a human right reflects the international community’s expectations for the role of education in achieving peace through mutual understanding. The human rights approach has been embraced by NGOs and international organizations alike, with UNICEF and UNESCO leading the ideological push toward the human rights approach through numerous declarations and resolutions. As a result, it has become one of the main principles underpinning international educational cooperation by bilateral aid agencies and international organizations. However, the declarations, resolutions and treaties detailed above had yet to recognize another aspect of the human rights approach—that of the role of education as a tool to achieve the socio-economic conditions that support human rights. This approach, or the development approach, is examined in detail below.

### 3.2.3 The Development Approach

As former colonies gained independence, educational development became the center of larger modernization efforts. Using scarce budgets, these newly independent countries sought to develop their educational systems by sending students abroad to developed countries to acquire knowledge and technological skill. Japan’s modernization effort during the Meiji Era is but one of countless examples of developing countries positioning education policy as modernization policy, aiming to expand education through continuous policy and financial efforts.

Developed countries have supported such efforts with educational aid and scholarships reflecting their prototypical aid agendas. The United States Institute of International Education (IIE) cited promotion of international understanding and preparation of foreign students to benefit their home countries by acquiring new knowledge and skills (IIE 1955) as the purposes of international education exchange. Japan’s “Proposals for International Student Policies for the 21st Century” also cites cooperation in the development of human resources in developing countries as one of its key aims along with mutual understanding. Further, the Basic Education for Growth Initiative (BEGIN) embodies Japan’s fundamental aid philosophy that investment in education is effective in reducing poverty and promoting economic growth in developing countries based on the principle of self-help (MOFA 2002).

At the international level, the focus shifted to education’s role in economic development. First raised at the OECD Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education in Washington, DC in 1961, the importance of education in economic development was subsequently asserted in the 1962 United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for Action, which made a case for increased investment in education. In response to these trends, the international community steadily increased investment in the education sector with the World Bank at the helm. In its 1995 publication

Priorities and Strategies for Education: A World Bank Review, the Bank clearly delineates the connection between educational investment and economic outcomes. The review examined research in the economics of education, ultimately recommending the prioritization of education as a policy issue, an in-depth examination of the labor market outcomes of education and an increase in public investment in education, particularly basic education.

This direction in educational development, however, met with intense debate and sharp criticism from some scholars and academic communities such as the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES) of North America. At the CIES annual conference in 1996, education for economic development was contentiously debated and these viewpoints were summarized in the 1996 special issue of the *International Journal of Educational Development*. Among them were voices critical of the input-output approach to education in which the processes of education are oversimplified, ignoring the richness and complexity inherent in education.

A key proponent of this view was Joel Samoff of Stanford University, who feared that the use or overuse of economic theory in policy recommendations for developing countries was quickly reaching the level of dogma (Samoff 1996). Rather, Samoff argues, aid providers should recognize the complexity of education and learning processes and embrace the local wisdom of developing countries when seeking solutions to issues in education.

Yet such critical views triggered a series of rebuttals, for example Burnett et al. (1996) claiming that the use of economic theory in educational development has been misunderstood. Further, the World Bank itself responded to these criticisms by revising key wording in its 1999 Education Sector Strategy, adding “the most important actors and decision makers are the key education stakeholders and government staff in client countries. Progress in education is in their hands and depends in large part on local traditions and culture. The role of the Bank is to support and help strengthen their hands, where

values and priorities converge” (World Bank 1999, p. 12). At the same time, however, then-World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn is quoted as saying “All agree that the single most important key to development and to poverty alleviation is education” (World Bank 1999, p. 4), reinforcing the development approach as the basic philosophy behind World Bank efforts in education.

Thus, while education for economic development has been mainstreamed as a major approach to international education development, the aims of education for social development, basic human needs, poverty reduction and human development have yet to be fully conceptualized although some studies have emerged. In an analysis of demographic data of several developing countries, Le Vine (1982) found that maternal education was associated with lower fertility and reduction of family mortality. Further, it was found that educated mothers show greater concern for the education of their preschool-aged children. Such effects of education on social development and poverty reduction through the development approach have been instrumental not only in bringing focus but also resources to educational development. These outcomes have become a core rationale for investment in educational aid as put forth in major international policy documents not only from the World Bank, but also the UNICEF White Paper on the State of the World’s Children and the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Report.

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### 3.3 Shifting Trends and Issues Amongst the Three Approaches in International Education Development

In the years since their establishment, the three approaches introduced above have undergone various levels of fusion at the global governance level. The first is the trend toward fusion of the human rights and development approaches in educational development policy. As we have seen, UNICEF and UNESCO have led the

human rights approach while the World Bank has relied on the development approach as the basis for its aid activities. Yet with the increase in educational cooperation and international collaboration, these lines have become blurred. UNICEF and UNESCO now reference education's effect on social development and poverty reduction in major policy documents and statements, while the World Bank bases its practice on education as a human right. The 1991 World Conference on Education for All and subsequent World Declaration on Education for All, co-hosted by UNICEF, UNESCO, the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme is widely considered the impetus for such fusion, as the diversity of organizations in attendance led to a diversity of ideas and approaches present at the conference. Through the joint coordination of the EFA and MDG initiatives, international organizations integrated the human rights and development approaches into educational development policy and they soon became the core policy principles of the international community.

However, the *de facto* fusion and mainstreaming of the two approaches without proper examination of the relationship between the two creates risk for future international efforts to address issues in education. In the case of EFA, the lack of provision of basic education to disadvantaged children, known as the "last 5–10%", is a major policy issue from the human rights approach. However, from the perspective of the development approach, it is difficult to justify the high unit cost of investing in disadvantaged groups from a policy perspective as the returns on education are low (see Kuroda 2007 for a discussion of the conflicts between the two approaches to education for children with disabilities in developing countries). From the human rights perspective, however, "all means all" and the cost benefit calculation can be viewed as inhumane.

Further, while much attention was paid to completion of primary education and reduction of gender disparities in education in the MDGs, many have pointed out a relative lack of focus on three other target areas outlined in the 2000 Dakar Framework for Action: early childhood

education, literacy and non-formal education. This is due in part to a lack of empirical evidence supporting investment in these areas, and a tendency of the development approach to prefer investment in primary and girl's education, for which high externalities have been explained by cost-benefit and growth accounting analysis. The rise of the knowledge-based economy has also widened the gap between the development and human rights approaches. The knowledge economy has brought greater attention to the higher education sector, leading to its reevaluation from the standpoint of the development approach. Because the social rate of return on higher education tends to grow with time whereas the human rights approach aims for universal primary education, this new interest in higher education puts further tension between the development and human rights approaches.

The peace approach, on the other hand, while paid lip-service in international conferences and statements as a major policy principle, had little influence over international cooperation in education in the 1990s. It wasn't until the terrorist attacks in 2001 that the peace approach was revived and concepts such as peacebuilding, social cohesion and human security found their way into international education development discourse. Further, the peace approach gained traction with the realization that conflicts over ethnicity, religion and culture had been emerging since the end of the Cold War in the 1980's. Despite this, however, little effort was made by the international community to link the peace approach to the realization of the MDGs or Dakar Framework for Action, both of which concluded in 2015.

These struggles highlight the lack of a common framework to conceptualize the relationship between the peace, human right and development approaches in international education development. As previously mentioned, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that education is a human right and the content of education must be oriented toward peace. The relationship between the peace and development approaches have also been long debated, with the concept of "human security" as a concrete

manifestation of this relationship. Human security conceptualizes peace as an essential element of the social environment that enables human development. In the postwar era, intercultural understanding, a spirit of tolerance and orientation toward peace have been recognized as essential traits. This recognition should be taken seriously within the field of international education development and consideration should be given to how these traits can be systematized into a policy framework.

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### 3.4 Debates and Perspectives from Research on International Education Development

With the mainstreaming of education into the international development landscape, research in the field advanced, producing a body of analytical frameworks, research methods and empirical evidence that has guided the global governance of international education development. This section illuminates three major areas of academic debate and perspectives within the field.

#### 3.4.1 The Internal and External Efficiency of Education

One of the earliest conceptual distinctions to emerge in international education development is the external versus internal efficiency of education. Tied to the development approach, focus on the external efficiency of education recognized that education is an important input factor in socioeconomic development, rather than simply a product to be consumed. While the founders of modern economics such as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill had recognized education's importance in the development of the national economy, Solow (1957) and Svernilson (1964) extended this analysis and identified capital, labor, technological innovation and education as inputs of economic growth. Solow and Svernilson's studies defined education's contribution as the difference between economic growth and the sum of capital and labor growth, leading to

subsequent attempts to calculate education's contribution to economic growth in the literature. Such studies have consistently resulted in calculations as large as 10–40% (e.g. Denison 1962; Kendrick 1977).

Human capital theory has become a core theory impacting educational policies of the World Bank and individual governments and is based on the idea of the external efficiency of education. The theory, which gained popularity in the 1960s, provided an empirical basis for the idea that education increases the human capital needed for economic growth, examining both the impact of education on individuals (private income) and society (economic growth) (Schultz 1961 and 1963; Becker 1965). Schultz (1961 and 1963) developed the concept of the social costs of education, including opportunity costs, as well as the basic framework of human capital theory. Based on Schultz's framework, Becker (1965) established a method for analyzing the rate of return on education, which has had a significant impact on educational development discussions and policies for developing countries, particularly those published by the World Bank. George Psacharopoulos' highly influential empirical work confirmed a high social rate of return on primary education and became a major impetus behind the Education for All (EFA) initiative to promote investment in primary education (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1985; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002). Psacharopoulos aggregated the results of rate of return analyses from various parts of the world, conducting a birds-eye view analysis. He found that the social rate of return on education is lower than the private rate of return in general but higher in developing countries than developed countries. Further, he found that the social rate of return on investment in education is higher than that on investment in material capital in developing countries. Thus, these findings provided the empirical basis for increasing investment in basic education in developing countries.

Since the Psacharopoulos studies, the mechanisms connecting educational investment and economic development have been clarified through improvements in data and analysis. In

the 1990s, analysis of macroeconomic data on education (Barro 1991, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992), the formation of micro-development econometrics for the empirical study of social sector issues such as poverty, education and health care (Deaton 1997; Kurosaki 2001), deeper analysis on the returns to education (Thomas et al. 1991, Rosenzweig 1995) and the analysis of the relationship between education and the labor market (Fasih 2008) have all helped to clarify such mechanisms (see Sawada 2003 for details).

Economic growth has not been the only focus of studies using the concept of the external efficiency of education. Other studies have examined education's efficacy in reducing inequalities (Carnoy 1992; Campos and Root 1996), reducing infant mortality (Lockheed and Verspoor 1991), population control (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992), reducing gender discrimination (Tembon and Fort 2008), facilitating mutual understanding and reconciliation between conflicting social groups (Davies 2004; Tawil and Harley 2004) and political democratization (Kendall 2007; Kubow 2007) among others. This body of literature has formed the basis for research on the external efficiency of education, becoming a mainstream philosophy in international education development research. Further, such research provided an empirical basis for the development approach described in 2.3.

The other major research inquiry pursued by researchers in international education development relates to the internal efficiency of education. This body of work takes the external efficiency of education as a given and instead focuses on comparing educational outcomes within an education system, such as student achievement or enrollment growth, with the inputs and methods used to achieve them. While quantitative analyses such as cost-benefit analysis using the education production function (comprehensively reviewed by Harbison and Hanushek 1992) and student flow analysis readily come to mind, qualitative approaches to the analysis of internal efficiency have also been

taken (notably Levin and Lockheed 1993, Crossley and Vulliamy 1997). Further, a considerable body of research has been built around a pedagogical perspective (e.g. Caillods et al. 1996; Abandzi 2006, etc.).

These studies have led to a variety of educational policy recommendations for developing countries (namely Lockheed and Verspoor 1991, Nielsen and Cummings 1997, Bruns et al. 2003, Cummings and Williams 2008, etc.). Further, the policy process itself has been the subject of much examination in an effort to realize the goals of Education for All and the Millennium Development Goals, prompting an influx of research linked to specific policy recommendations (King 1991, Little, Hoppers and Gardner 1994, King and Buchert 1999, King and McGrath 2004, Williams and Cummings 2005, Jones and Coleman 2005, Cohen, Bloom and Malin 2006, Yamada 2007, Baker and Wiseman 2007, Hiramoto and Kitamura 2009).

Thus, research on the internal and external efficiency of education has developed analytical frameworks, research methods and provided empirical evidence to guide the global governance of educational development. In the context of the peace, human rights and development approaches, research on the external efficiency of education has largely contributed to the development approach. However, as such research supports the larger aims of education policy and international education development to improve the quality of education and expand access to it, external efficiency research is also based on the human rights approach. Yet very few studies have addressed the questions of why education should be a fundamental human right in the first place and what specifically is necessary for education to be a human right in the context of international education development research, particularly in developing countries. Further, research based on the peace approach or examining the process by which education builds peace has been limited in both quantity and quality with the exception of research on peacebuilding and educational reconstruction assistance.

### 3.4.2 “Education for Development”, “Educational Development” and “Education and Development”

The cross-sections of the concepts of “education” and “development” can be classified into three perspectives based on the literature: “education for development”, “educational development” and “education and development” (Kuroda and Yokozeki 2005). “Education for development” recognizes education as a means to achieve socioeconomic development, for example education that contributes to the accumulation of human capital for economic growth, welfare or the strengthening of democracy. Indeed, international educational cooperation policy based on the development and peace approaches have considered education as “for development”, whether development means achieving peace or achieving socioeconomic outcomes. Thus, both the peace approach and the development approach mentioned above can be considered as belonging to the “education for development” perspective. Further, research on the external efficiency of education is precisely in line with “education for development” view as the focus is on educational inputs affect socioeconomic outputs.

“Educational development”, on the other hand, views education as having universal value in and of itself, with development as a tool to achieve the best educational quality and opportunities. Thus, it takes the opposite view of the “education for development” perspective as it places education as the goal with development as the process needed to reach it. By placing value on education itself as a human right, rather than viewing it in terms of superficial and utilitarian functions such as contribution to socioeconomic development, this perspective is in line with the human rights approach, which views education itself as essential to human development and human dignity. In other words, this perspective implies that education itself is development. This perspective is often engaged in research on the internal efficiency of education, although

research in international education development has yet to clearly conceptualize the meaning of human development central to the “educational development” approach.

The third perspective, “education and development”, takes an objective approach to education and development, with no assumption of their correlation, positive or negative. This perspective is often critical of the mainstream aid agenda, questioning whether a positive correlation between education and development is indeed positive in a normative sense.

Each of these three views is utilized in research in the field of international education development, either independently or blended with one of the other three. While the “education for development” and “educational development” perspectives both affirm education’s importance, the nature of and approach to this importance differs vastly, with the “education and development” perspective arising as a counter-perspective critiquing the discrepancies between the two. On the other hand, these discrepancies may also be attributed to the difference in the disciplines and analytical methods of the researchers and practitioners of educational development. The “education for development” perspective approaches educational development from a social science, particularly an economic angle, while the “educational development” perspective takes a pedagogical approach. Looking at the geographical breakdown of research in international education development, the social science view is common in the United Kingdom and United States, which form the core of the international academic mainstream. Such research has tended to analyze educational development using methods from the four major social sciences: economics, political science, sociology and social anthropology. In continental Europe and East Asia, a latecomer to international education and development studies, the prevailing approach to educational development studies is pedagogical, focusing on the study of human development and emphasizing contribution to socioeconomic development.

### 3.4.3 Modernization Theory and Dependency Theory

The third perspective, “education and development” as described above is based on two opposing theories: modernization theory and dependency theory. Modernization theory, proposed by Rostow (1959), is based on structural functionalism and assumes that development is linear and all societies will follow the same trajectory toward modernization. In this conceptualization of development, developing countries simply need to “catch up” with developed countries, for example through promoting study abroad and building modern school systems. Human capital theory was built on these values, using analytical methods to show that education increases the human capital necessary for economic growth. This provided both theoretical and empirical justification for the provision of educational aid and had a major impact on the educational cooperation policies of international organizations.

Dependency theory as proposed by Galtung (1971) and Frank (1972) frames development within the historical exploitation and unequal power balance between the former colonial powers (the “center”) and their former colonies (the “periphery”). This expansion of educational models from the hegemonic center to the periphery can serve to maintain the subordination of developing countries in a form of neocolonialism (Carnoy 1980, Mazrui 1976 and Arnov 1980). Even prior to the development of dependency theory, Freire (1979) and Illich (1971) observed that developing countries had little autonomy or control over the educational development unfolding within their own jurisdictions. This prompted the advocacy of concepts such as “consciousness-raising” and “deschooling” to break the cycle of dependence and had a significant impact on educational movements in developing countries. These ideas are still actively discussed in the theory of endogenous development in the context of fostering and utilizing “local knowledge” in education.

The discord between modernization theory and dependency theory over the evaluation of

educational development prompted critical studies on the impact of structural adjustment policies for education in the 1980s and polarization and academic dispute over the World Bank’s education policy in the 1990s. The 2000s saw an influx in critical research examining the relationship between education and globalization and was heavily influenced by the existing rift between the modernization and dependency theory camps. Yet policy research on international education development has evaded such debates, instead simplifying the focus on educational development to quantity (access) and quality. As the core point of disagreement between modernization and dependency theories is over the content of education rather than its quality or quantity, policy research has been free to focus on the technological and functional aspects of educational development from an internal efficiency perspective.

The arguments of Freire and Illich have not lost their persuasive power even after 40 years. When reflecting on the power of their message, one cannot help but conclude that the conviction and sincerity of their arguments and commitment to improving the content of education has helped their message to endure. This has important implications for the current state of international education development research, which tends to uncritically accept the reigning international trends.

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### 3.5 SDG 4 in the Context of Perspectives and Debates in International Education Development

Thus far we have examined three major debates/perspectives in the field of international education development using the three approaches outlined in 2. In this section, we examine SDG4 within the historical and conceptual contexts presented in the earlier sections of the chapter, revealing that SDG4 is an attempt to bridge the various theoretical traditions that are the foundations of the field of international education development.



### 3.5.1 Sustainable Development Goal 4: The Education Goal

As mentioned in the introduction, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are global goals aimed at tackling the world's most pressing challenges. Based in part on the successes and failures of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDGs put forth an ambitious new development agenda for 2015–2030. One major departure from the MDGs is the focus on both developed and developing countries, recognizing that all countries are both affected by and responsible for solving the global issues we face. Resultingly, all 193 member states of the United Nations have adopted the SDGs and agreed to reach the goals by 2030. With a focus on monitoring and progress as the key to achieving the goals, each of the 17 goals are defined by a number of targets (169 in all), which are further defined by measurable indicators (232 in all).

Of the 17 goals, SDG4 focuses on education, aiming to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all” (United Nations, 2015b, p. 21). As mentioned, the focus on educational quality and equality are direct extensions of the shortcomings of the MDGs. However, SDG4 can also be considered as a product of the diverse theoretical traditions that are the foundation of the field of international education development. SDG4 consists of ten targets and 11 indicators, which will be considered below in the context of the perspectives, debates and approaches previously discussed.

### 3.5.2 The External and Internal Efficiency of Education and SDG4

The legacy of studies on both the external and internal efficiency of education in the international education development literature is readily apparent in the targets of SDG4. Targets 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.6 all take an internal efficiency approach to educational development, with focus on the individual outcomes of each student based on a

specific input. The indicators for these targets are also straightforward and easily measurable, as they represent a clear education production function model. Target 4.4, on the other hand, aims to “substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship” (United Nations, 2015b, p. 21). This target clearly links education to socioeconomic development, embracing both the external efficiency of education and the development approach. It should be noted, however, that the indicator for Target 4.4. is much more vague and loosely defined.

A further argument can be made by taking an external efficiency approach to education in the context of the entire SDG initiative. If education is considered an essential input for socioeconomic development, it can be argued that SDG4 is the foundation for all or most of the other SDGs. Though not explicitly stated, the same argument could be extended to the targets of SDG4, even those attributed to the internal efficiency of education, by making explicit connections between learning outcomes and socioeconomic outcomes.

### 3.5.3 “Education for Development”, “Educational Development” and “Education and Development” in SDG4

The targets of SDG4 also reflect the perspectives of “Education for development” and “educational development”, as well as “education and development” to a certain extent. For example, Target 4.5 aims to “eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations” (United Nations 2015b, p. 21), which is in line with the perspective of “educational development” and the human rights approach. The target clearly approaches education as having value in and of itself, implying that educational development is necessary for all people to realize the right to human development and

dignity. At the same time, however, “education for development” is also represented with the inclusion of the term “vocational training”, implying that education should be tied to socioeconomic development.

While there is no explicit reference to the viewpoint of “education and development”, a closer look at Target 4.7 finds that critical thinking and an ability to question the status quo are contained within the concepts of sustainable development and global citizenship. Thus, while SDG4 generally assumes a positive link between education and development, Target 4.7 encourages moving beyond blind acceptance of the established ways of thinking to imagine new possibilities for educational development. This is in line with the arguments of Freire and Illich, who stressed the necessity for local actors to spearhead educational development efforts in their own countries.

Thus, SDG4 represent an attempt at the harmonization of the various perspectives, debates and approaches that have defined the international education development field since its inception. While a noble goal, however, the task is not without its challenges.

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## 3.6 Discussion

While the diverse theoretical underpinnings of SDG4 reflect an attempt to embrace the needs of various stakeholders and represent the various theoretical traditions, this diversity has also presented issues for the achievement of SDG4. Three key challenges and proposed solutions are outlined below.

### 3.6.1 Clear Goals and Monitoring

The SDGs are designed for monitoring. As mentioned above, each of the 17 goals have associated targets and each target has at least one measurable indicator, totaling 169 targets and 232 indicators. Efforts for tracking progress on the SDGs continue to be made by both global governance organizations and independent think tanks and agencies. Yet SDG4 has faced issues with

monitoring due to the complexity of measuring certain targets. For example, Target 4.7 aims to “ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development” (United Nations 2015b p. 21) yet only one indicator has been agreed upon by the relevant stakeholders: “Extent to which (i) global citizenship education and (ii) education for sustainable development, including gender equality and human rights, are mainstreamed at all levels in: (a) national education policies, (b) curricula, (c) teacher education and (d) student assessment” (United Nations, n.d.). This reflects the difficulty in both measuring abstract outcomes such as sustainable development and in building consensus around the values that education should aim to teach. While meaningful measurements and frameworks for these concepts are a must for monitoring SDG Target 4.7 and other targets, global governance organizations and other stakeholders should also clarify the theories and principles underlying the goals to generate discussion about the significance and institutional limitations of such principles.

### 3.6.2 Need for More Empirical and Theoretical Research in the Field

For clear goals and monitoring to be achieved, more empirical and theoretical research in the field should be conducted. It is clear from the text of Target 4.7 and lack of concrete indicators that key conceptual differences between terms have yet to be agreed upon. Theoretical research should be conducted to spark discussion and reach consensus on what these terms mean. Such theoretical research should be supported by empirical studies reexamining the interrelationships between peace, human rights and educational development. In particular, research on the

external efficiency of education should expand the definition of development to include peace and human rights as potential social outcomes of educational investment to examine these relationships. Further, research on the internal efficiency of education should also expand beyond the focus on quantity and quality of education to include such outcomes as cultural transformation and human development.

### 3.6.3 Focus on the Content and Aims of Education

From both a policy and research perspective, the field of international education development should boldly engage in discussions, research and practices concerning the aims and content of education. While historical factors and concerns over cultural relativism and state sovereignty over education have relegated the field to systemic considerations and quantity-quality debates, it is now more imperative than ever to tackle discussions such as Freire's and Illich's that approach educational development from the standpoint of developing countries. Target 4.7 as mentioned above is a step in the right direction. Based on the four pillars of learning (learning to know, do, be and live together) as introduced in the Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century (the Delors Report) and subsequent concepts of sustainable development and global citizenship, Target 4.7 is an early attempt to build consensus around the aims and content of education. Though many challenges exist as is inevitable with normative discussions, these are questions that must be tackled in our rapidly globalizing society.

## 3.7 Concluding Remarks

This chapter examined the historical development of SDG4 within the framework of fundamental approaches (education for peace, education as a human right and education for socio-economic development) and perspectives (the external and internal efficiency of education; "education for

development", "educational development" and "education and development" and dependency theory and modernization theory) in the field of international education development. The chapter has shown that these approaches and perspectives have been brought together within SDG4 in an attempt to harmonize the diverse theoretical traditions that define the field. SDG4 reflects all of the five P's: people, prosperity, planet, peace and partnerships, and this chapter has traced the theoretical background behind this holistic emphasis. While the SDGs are necessarily interconnected due to the complexity and multifaceted nature of the issues themselves, SDG4 lays the foundation for the realization of all 17 SDGs. From the perspective of the external efficiency of education, education is an important factor in supporting development in many realms beyond just the educational realm. Further, Target 4.7 aims to cultivate the understanding, dynamism, sincerity and ability necessary for the current and future generations to achieve the SDGs and future global initiatives and challenges. Thus, SDG4, which clearly integrates the three approaches and three perspectives introduced in this chapter, is indispensable not only to the realization of all 17 SDGs but to the future of life on this planet. The theoretical underpinnings of SDG4 presented in this chapter thus provide the basis for understanding the essence of SDG initiative as a whole and the future direction of international development.

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# Education in SDGs: What is Inclusive and Equitable Quality Education?

# 4

Yoshiko Tonegawa

## Abstract

Education was positioned as Goal 4 (i.e., SDG4) in SDGs. SDG4 aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.” The lack of education and the inability to read and write often limit access to information and disadvantage the livelihoods of people. From the perspective of acquiring knowledge and skills, along with developing human resources, it is clear that the elements of education are present across all 17 SDGs. In other words, education is a cross-cutting discipline that influences a variety of areas (Kitamura et al. 2014) and, as such, plays an important role in achieving all SDGs. The main objective of this chapter is to examine “inclusive and equitable quality education.” First, this chapter provides a brief overview of international trends in educational cooperation from 1945 to 2015, covering the Education for All (EFA), Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and SDGs. It then discusses “inclusive and equitable quality education,” the core of SDG4. It specifically addresses discussions on equity, inclusion, and the quality of education. Furthermore, the quality of educa-

tion is examined from four perspectives: school environment, educational attainment, learning achievement, and non-cognitive skills. This chapter also presents the case of education for children with disabilities in Ethiopia.

[This chapter was written by modifying the following chapter: Tonegawa Y (2018) “Kokusai kyouiku kyouryoku (International cooperation in education)” in Yamada M (ed) Atarashii kokusai kyouryoku ron (New international cooperation theory), Revised edition, Akashi Shoten, Tokyo]

## Keywords

Inclusive education • Quality education • Equity • Education for children with disabilities • Ethiopia

## 4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines SDG4, which focuses on education. Today, approximately 258 million children and youths are not enrolled in school (UIS 2021b), and around 773 million adults are illiterate (UIS 2021a). Being unable to receive adequate education and thus having poor literacy levels (i.e., an inadequate ability to read and write), often mean that individuals are limited in their channels of obtaining information. This causes general disadvantages in daily life. If these individuals can gain education, it is possible to enrich and enhance their livelihoods.

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Nobel laureate Amartya Sen also states that “widening the coverage and effectiveness of basic education can have a powerful preventive role in reducing human insecurity of nearly every kind” (Sen 2003). Therefore, all 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) involve elements of education, including knowledge, skills attainment, and human resource development, as discussed later.

In this chapter, Sect. 4.2 provides an overview of international trends in educational cooperation. Section 4.3 discusses “inclusive and equitable quality education,” which forms the core of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG4)—the primary SDG related to education. This chapter also briefly introduces the case of education for children with disabilities in Ethiopia, based on the discussion of equity, inclusion, and quality of education.

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## 4.2 International Trends in Educational Cooperation

### 4.2.1 Educational Cooperation in the Postwar Era

This section provides an overview of international trends in educational cooperation after World War II. The right to education was articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. Specifically, Article 26 states “[e]veryone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory” (UN n.d.). This declaration has led to an international consensus that education should be seen as a fundamental human right (Yoshikawa 2010).

In the early 1960s, after most colonized nations gained their independence, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) held its first International Conference on Education. At this conference, education ministers from each region gathered to formulate an action plan for education (Kuroda 2016a, b). Among the goals

established at this conference were (1) the eradication of illiteracy, (2) free compulsory education, and (3) Universal Primary Education (UPE).

Similarly, the World Bank also focused on investment efficiency in education and, as a result, expanded education financing in the 1960s. Notably, since the 1980s, when the World Bank highlighted the high rate of return on primary education for society as a whole through its analysis of the rate of return on education,<sup>1</sup> aid for primary education by developed countries and international organizations accelerated rapidly (Kitamura 2016). Demonstrating the impact of education on economic growth has proved a major push to education support provision in low-income countries across the international community that aim for economic development.

### 4.2.2 From the 1990s Onward: Education for All (EFA)

#### 4.2.2.1 World Declaration on Education for All

In 1990, the World Conference on Education for All was held in Jomtien, Thailand, as a global conference limited to the field of education. The Conference was led by UNESCO, the World Bank, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and culminated in a resolution for the World Declaration on Education for All (the Jomtien Declaration). Following this conference, universal access to basic education was recognized as a goal to be shared by all nations (Kuroda 2016a). Education for All (EFA) then spread internationally as a slogan related to educational cooperation, and both governments of developed countries and international organizations began to focus on support for EFA. Such focus greatly impacted the education policies in low-income countries.

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<sup>1</sup> The rate of return to schooling equates the value of lifetime earnings of the individual to the net present value of costs of education (Psacharopoulos and Patorinos 2018, p. 3).

It should be noted that the Jomtien Declaration differs significantly from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in that it sets specific numerical targets and target years for the purpose of meeting the goals set therein. For instance, UPE was set to be achieved by 2000, with the aim of halving the illiteracy rate recorded in 1990 (UNESCO 1990). By providing such targets, “global governance,” which functions as a framework for the international community to address issues as well as to share awareness of and understand the direction of issues, has been in operation within the education sector since 1990 (Kuroda 2016b).

#### 4.2.2.2 The Dakar Framework for Action

In 2000, the World Education Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal. At this Forum, the Dakar Framework for Action was adopted in response to nations’ failure to achieve the aforementioned EFA targets. As part of this action plan, six goals were set; the deadline of 2015 was set specifically for Goals 2, 4, and 5 (see Table 4.1). The Forum was attended by more than 1100 participants representing governments, international organizations, and civil society organizations (e.g., NGOs.) from 164 countries (Sifuna and Sawamura 2010).

Of particular note is that civil society (e.g., NGOs) began influencing educational cooperation from the 1990s onward (Sifuna and Sawamura 2010). For instance, the Global Campaign for Education, whose formation was prompted

by the Forum, is a coalition of global organizations of teachers’ unions and NGOs working in the field of education (Miyake 2016). This campaign has now grown into a fully-fledged organization comprising membership organizations from over 100 countries. Specifically, the campaign works to ensure that all children have the right to quality education (Nishimura and Sasaoka 2016; Global Campaign for Education 2018).

Similarly, at the behest of the World Bank, the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) was established in 2002 (renamed the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) in 2011) as a means of promoting financial cooperation aimed at supporting UPE up to 2015. While the FTI initially only provided concentrated support by limiting the number of recipient nations (Kobayashi and Kitamura 2008), the GPE emphasizes international partnerships by incorporating all the least developed countries as recipients.

Furthermore, the GPE aims to ensure that different actors (e.g., developed countries, international organizations, civil society organizations, and private companies) contribute to the GPE Fund; they must also coordinate and effectively and efficiently use aid resources among one another (including the governments of low-income countries) (Kitamura 2016). In 2002, the focus was on securing funds. However, as time progressed, the goal was to achieve high-quality UPE, and from 2015 onward, they have been aiming to realize SDG4 (Kobayashi and Kitamura 2008).

**Table 4.1** The Dakar framework for action

Goal 1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education
<i>Goal 2. Ensuring that all children have access to and completely free and compulsory primary education of good quality</i>
Goal 3. Ensuring the learning needs of all young people and adults
<i>Goal 4. Achieving a 50% improvement in the level of adult literacy (especially for women)</i>
<i>Goal 5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education</i>
Goal 6. Improving every aspect of the quality of education

Source UNESCO (2000, pp. 15–17), italicized by the author

Note The deadline of 2015 was set for the three italicized targets (Goal 2, 4, and 5)



Aid coordination through such international partnerships has progressed rapidly since the early 2000s. It is now seen as an approach in which external donors collaboratively work with low-income countries' governments and provide necessary and consistent support to the country in question (Kitamura 2016). Such support is based on consistent education policies and is provided with an awareness of the division of roles. The implementation of balanced aid coordination among different actors is challenging, particularly due to the power relationships that exist between donors and low-income countries, and the ownership and capacity of low-income countries.

#### 4.2.2.3 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

Among the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were agreed upon at the United Nations (UN) Millennium Summit in 2000, the goals that are related to education are Goal 2, "Achieve Universal Primary Education (UPE)," and Goal 3, "Promote gender equality and empower women" (UN 2008). Therefore, both UPE and gender equality in education are further promoted across the globe. While the aforementioned Dakar Framework for Action also focuses on the quality of education, the MDGs place more emphasis on quantity (e.g., school enrollment and access) than quality.<sup>2</sup> Some criticisms and issues surrounding the MDGs include their lack of perspectives that cannot be measured quantitatively, and the levels of reliability of the data gained from low-income countries. However, both governments of developed countries and aid agencies have focused their efforts on educational cooperation in a bid to achieve the MDGs.

<sup>2</sup> In terms of the quality of education, Goal 2 indicators include "the proportion of students enrolled in Grade 1 who reach the final year of primary education" (UN 2008).

#### 4.2.2.4 Progress and Evaluation of International Cooperation in Education up to 2015

The achievement deadline of the Dakar Framework for Action and MDGs was set for 2015, at which time these initiatives' achievements were evaluated. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 gave relatively high marks to education (UN 2015). For instance, enrollment rates in low-income countries were found to have increased for both boys and girls, and the reduction of gender disparities in enrollment at the level of primary and secondary education was also mentioned (UN 2015). Notably, in sub-Saharan Africa, the net enrollment rate in primary education increased significantly from 52% in 1990 to 80% in 2015 (UN 2015). In addition, many low-income countries implemented compulsory and free primary education as a policy aimed at achieving UPE. According to UNESCO (2015, p. 20), in sub-Saharan Africa, 15 countries were found to have made primary education free, after 2000.<sup>3</sup> Free education was also observed to have reduced the general cost of education for parents/guardians, thereby further contributing to the increase in enrollment rates in primary education.

However, the report also indicated that the increase in the overall completion rate of the final year of primary education was miniscule and varied significantly across countries (UNESCO 2015, p. 20; Sifuna and Sawamura 2010). In addition, although the school enrollment rate in general has increased since the implementation of the Dakar Framework and MDGs, many children are still left out of the schooling system.

According to later findings by UNESCO, in 2018, there were approximately 59 million primary school-aged children not attending school (UIS 2021b). It was also found that many

<sup>3</sup> The adoption of a free primary education system was widely used in election pledges, as it was easy for voters to understand and for parties to gain support. This system was thus adopted in many countries as a result of domestic political motives (UNESCO 2015; Sifuna and Sawamura 2010).

children still do not possess basic learning skills, even though they are enrolled in school. An earlier study by Ogawa and Nishimura (2015), who conducted a survey in four African nations, found that many local residents and parents who had been actively involved in schools before primary education became compulsory and free, began leaving matters related to schooling to government administration, and their attitudes toward schooling became more passive. As shown here, while some progress has been made toward achieving the MDGs, new issues have simultaneously been identified.

### 4.2.3 From 2015 Onward: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

In September 2015, when the deadline for achieving the MDGs arrived, the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit was held, and the SDGs were adopted. UNESCO (n.d., 2016) states that the elements of education are present across all 17 SDGs from the perspective of acquiring knowledge and skills, along with developing human resources, as shown in Table 4.2. In other words, education is a cross-cutting discipline that influences a variety of areas (Kitamura et al. 2014) and, as such, plays an important role in achieving any given SDG.

Education was positioned as Goal 4 (i.e., SDG4) in SDGs. SDG4 reflects the concept of inclusive education, which not only reflects access to education, but also outlines the quality, equity, and diversity related thereto (see Table 4.3). In addition, the 10 targets underpinning SDG4 are divided across various educational fields, from pre-primary education to higher education, vocational training, adult education, gender, and peace education. Although indicators are provided for each target, these differ significantly from the MDGs, in that they include perspectives on the content and quality of education that cannot only be measured quantitatively. However, criticism has been leveled at the SDGs with respect to how, despite having incorporated diverse opinions, these goals are

incredibly complex and have included targets that are difficult to monitor as a whole.

## 4.3 What is “Inclusive and Equitable Quality Education?”

Thus far, this chapter has reviewed international cooperation in education toward the adoption of SDGs. This section shifts focus to examine “inclusive and equitable quality education,” which forms the core of SDG4. This examination is presented by dividing the section into three main points: equity, inclusion, and quality of education. This section also briefly introduces the case of education for children with disabilities in Ethiopia, based on the discussion of equity, inclusion, and quality of education.

### 4.3.1 Equity

Prior to the adoption of SDGs, the focus had been on correcting gender disparities in school enrollment, and achieving equality in terms of quantity had been emphasized rather than the promotion of equity (Kuroda 2014; Nishimura and Sasaoka 2016). Nishimura and Sasaoka (2016) describe the equality and equity of education as follows: equality refers to a state in which all people are equal, while equity refers to the different educational treatment of people in different environments to achieve equality (Nishimura and Sasaoka 2016). From the viewpoint of equity, it is justifiable to offer more support to groups who are in a position of disadvantage (Miwa 2005). UNESCO (2017) thus analyzed the equity of education based on items such as gender equality, geographical conditions, income status, language, and disability.

In addition, Schleicher (2014, p. 19) argued that equity in education can be interpreted from two perspectives, namely, fairness/equity and inclusion/inclusiveness. The perspective of fairness refers to education not being restricted by gender, ethnic group, family environment, or other personal or socioeconomic conditions. In

**Table 4.2** Relationship between SDGs and education

Goal 1 No poverty	Access to education contributes to poverty reduction. An educated population can make informed decisions contributing to equal rights and to granting basic services. This includes ownership and control over land and property, inheritance, and financial services
Goal 2 Zero hunger	Education is key to acquiring the necessary knowledge to increase agricultural production and the income of small farmers. Correct and up-to-date knowledge also helps to prevent problems potentially causing famines, such as drought, floods, and other disasters
Goal 3 Good health and wellbeing	Education provides relevant knowledge and information about health issues including reproductive health, spread of disease, healthy lifestyles, and well-being
Goal 5 Gender equality	Gender-sensitive education encourages the participation of women and girls in all political, economic, and social spheres by making sure they are heard and have real opportunities to fully participate. Furthermore, it contributes to putting an end to practices and traditions that impair the physical, mental, and sexual health of women and girls
Goal 6 Clear water and sanitation	Comprehensive water education provides the necessary tools to monitor water quality in order to reduce contamination. It also helps to improve water use by developing greater resources for its reuse. Moreover, it contributes to raising community awareness to ensure that they play an active part in improving water management and sanitation
Goal 7 Affordable and clean energy	Energy education promotes energy efficiency, teaching us to develop new technologies, and encouraging us to work together to research and develop renewable and clean energy resources
Goal 8 Decent work and economic growth	Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) aims to reduce the number of unemployed youth by increasing access to training opportunities. Quality education also raises awareness about forced and child labor and helps prevent and eradicate them in all their existing forms
Goal 9 Industry, innovation and infrastructure	Education is necessary to develop the skills required to build more resilient infrastructure and more sustainable industrialization. Allocating resources for research is key to addressing each country's specific needs in the field of industry and infrastructure, and in order to improve its technologies
Goal 10 Reduced inequalities	Education contributes to raising awareness about existing inequalities and contributes to ensuring that laws and social programs primarily protect disadvantaged and vulnerable people. It helps to empower and promote the social, economic, and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, economic, or other status
Goal 11 Sustainable cities and communities	Education contributes to providing the appropriate tools to ensure the monitoring of waste management and air quality. It prepares communities to manage their resources properly and tackle climate change. Through participatory approaches, communities are engaged in discussions and in planning activities for the improvement of their own cities
Goal 12 Responsible consumption and production	Education contributes to reducing the generation of waste through the introduction and practice of the four 'Rs'—Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, and Recover. By keeping the public informed and educated, the necessary tools to live in harmony with nature for sustainable lifestyles are provided
Goal 13 Climate action	Improved Climate Change Education (CCE) raises awareness about human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and impact reduction, as well as on early warning systems
Goal 14 Life below water	Education contributes to developing awareness of the marine environment and building proactive consensus regarding wise and sustainable use

(continued)

**Table 4.2** (continued)

Goal 15 Life on land	Biodiversity education contributes to integrating protective ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts
Goal 16 Peace, justice and strong institutions	An educated society ensures that its citizens are consulted and that its government makes decisions with the interest of children and adults at heart
Goal 17 Partnerships for the goals	Education allows engagement with organizations and individuals working on various topics that relate to the global goals. With international support, effective and targeted capacity-building activities can be implemented in low-income countries allowing them to support national plans to implement all the SDGs

Source Prepared by the author, based on UNESCO (n.d., 2016, p. 8)

**Table 4.3** SDG4 and targets

Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
Target 4.1. By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes
Target 4.2. By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary education
Target 4.3. By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university
Target 4.4. By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship
Target 4.5. By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations
Target 4.6. By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy
Target 4.7. By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development
Target 4.a. Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all
Target 4.b. By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programs, in developed countries and other developing countries
Target 4.c. By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing states

Source UNESCO (2016, pp. 36–37)

turn, equity from an inclusion perspective relates to how all students should acquire at least basic academic skills (Schleicher 2014). In other words, equitable education is concerned with helping students develop their potential learning

abilities without experiencing any barriers. The interpretation of equity based on these two perspectives is also consistent with the concept of inclusive education, which is discussed in more detail later.

Furthermore, Nishimura and Sasaoka (2016) compared the definitions of equity established by the four international organizations (i.e., the World Bank, OECD, FTI, and UNESCO) and highlighted that equity has generally been understood at different levels and has, therefore, not been agreed upon internationally. In the future, it would be necessary to pay close attention to how the international community might reach an agreement on the best approach to achieve equity. Currently, however, it is clear that equity is closely related to both the quality and inclusive nature of education. It is therefore important to consider these perspectives comprehensively when considering specific approaches to education.

### 4.3.2 Inclusion

#### 4.3.2.1 Inclusive Education

As noted previously, SDG4 includes an inclusion perspective. Inclusion can be defined in a variety of ways. For instance, UNESCO (2003, p. 7) defines inclusion in education as “a process of addressing and responding to the diversity of needs of all learners through increasing participation in learning, cultures and communities, and reducing exclusion within and from education.” In this sense, inclusive education is understood as an educational approach that realizes the concept of inclusive education, which values its process and response to diverse needs.

Inclusive education was internationally proposed in the Salamanca Statement, which was adopted by the World Congress on Special Needs Education (WCSNE) in 1994. Article 2 of this statement presents the basic concept of inclusive education, which can be summarized as “...every child has a fundamental right to education, and regular schools must provide opportunities for education that takes into account the special educational needs that each child has” (UNESCO and Ministry of Education and Science in Spain 1994, p. viii). The concept of integrated education, which had been the mainstream approach to schooling until the adoption of inclusive education, required that the children with special needs

adapt themselves to regular classes. Inclusive education differs from this concept of integrated education in that it supports the notion that teachers and schools should respond to children’s needs (Kawaguchi and Kuroda 2013).

Even in the approach to education, up to 2015, which was the aim for UPE by focusing on access to education, there still existed vulnerable children who had difficulties accessing schooling (Kawaguchi and Kuroda 2013; Hayashi 2016). For instance, children with disabilities, children in minority groups from the perspective of race, ethnicity, and language, children in low-income families, and other children from various backgrounds were found to have different educational needs. Education methods that meet diverse educational needs and address equity are thus an important approach that should be employed to improve the quality of education.

#### 4.3.3 Quality of Education

The importance of quality learning in the classroom is confirmed by the Dakar Framework for Action, with Goals 2 and 6, including a quality of education perspective (see Table 4.1). However, due in part to the impact of the MDGs, the international focus has tended to be predominantly on the quantity of education. Following the MDGs, since there has been some progress with respect to the quantity of education, SDG4 now emphasizes the quality of education. However, the interpretation of what the quality of education entails is diverse. As a more comprehensive interpretation, according to the “EFA Global Monitoring Report 2005,” quality education is based on educational objectives defined in a social context (UNESCO 2004). This perspective of addressing the social context is also consistent with the previously presented concepts of equity and inclusive education.

Nishimura (2018, p. 2) further indicated that previous educational cooperation had been centered on the “theory of defects,” which focused on the shortcomings and weaknesses of low-income countries, based on their comparison with developed countries. Rather, Nishimura

(2018, p. 2) described the importance of the “theory of context,” which presupposes education in accordance with the context of each individual country and unique society. With respect to such noted differences in theory and approach, the quality of education has characteristics that make it difficult to set indicators and measure growth. This section specifically considers the quality of education from four perspectives: school environment, educational attainment, learning achievement, and non-cognitive skills.

#### 4.3.3.1 School Environment

The school environment primarily includes the implementation of educational resources, including teachers, textbooks, and school buildings. Within the school environment, the issue of teacher quality has always been of particular importance, and is often discussed with respect to how the quality of teachers greatly affects education (Saito 2008). With the noted expansion of access to education and rise in enrollment rates, the number of students in one class has increased, along with the ratio of students to teachers. This increase and subsequent imbalance are due to various factors, including a shortage of teachers, a restricted education budget, and low teacher salaries. In terms of the ability of the teacher, the ratio of qualified teachers is sometimes used as an index. For instance, data regarding teachers with minimum qualifications in primary education indicate significant differences: 61.5% in Ghana (2019), 63.6% in Sierra Leone (2019), and 15.3% in Madagascar (2019) (World Bank 2021). Such data highlight that there are countries with insufficient numbers of teachers with minimum qualifications in primary education.

In addition, in many low-income countries, there are issues related to the abilities of teachers. Such issues are often the result of the potentially poor contents of pre-service teacher education at teacher training schools, and/or the absence of in-service training. Teacher training schools in many low-income countries have also been found to contain biases in their taught content and often lack practical training, such as preparing teaching manuals and/or conducting

classes (Hamano 2005). There are also many cases where in-service training is not institutionalized (Hamano 2005).

The physical school environment has also been found to influence the quality of education. There are many instances in low-income countries where teaching materials are scarce and a single textbook has to be shared by several students. Other issues such as scarce school equipment (e.g., desks and chairs), as well as a lack of properly installed toilets and drinking water facilities, have been noted. There is often no electricity available in schools. Various efforts have been made in low-income countries to improve the quality of education based on the school environment.

#### 4.3.3.2 Educational Attainment

Until the 1980s, the quality of education was mainly measured from a quantitative perspective that considered the degree of educational attainment, along with the school environment. A typical indicator included the completion rate. For instance, in the EFA Development Index, developed by UNESCO to measure the progress of the Dakar Framework for Action, the survival rate from entering primary school to reaching the fifth grade is adopted as an index to measure education quality (UNESCO 2010). Indicators related to Goal 2 of the MDGs similarly include “the proportion of students enrolled in Grade 1 who reach the final year of primary education,” and have been used extensively to measure education quality.

In 2019, the global average completion rate of primary education rose to 89.5% (World Bank 2021). However, there are many low-income countries where it is common for children to leave primary school for a variety of reasons, including helping with household chores, working to support their families, and/or early marriage. For instance, in 2019, the completion rate of primary education was only 55% in Mozambique, 64% in Benin, and 65% in Burkina Faso (World Bank 2021). Such findings indicate that many children are still unable to complete primary school, even if they have been enrolled for primary education.

As noted previously, the completion rate, which is easy to measure as a numerical value, has often been used to measure the quality of education. However, the completion rate is affected by various factors, depending on the country. Such factors include the presence/absence of automatic promotion, as well as the voluntary repetition of a year to obtain higher scores in the final year exam. For instance, in Kenya, students need to score high on their final exam to secure a place in a good secondary school (Sawamura 2006). In addition, it has become increasingly clear that some children are not learning, even when they attend school. The limitations of understanding the quality of education based on educational attainment alone have also come to the fore. Against such realities, learning achievement has started to receive more attention.

#### 4.3.3.3 Learning Achievement

Learning achievement (i.e., academic abilities) began to gain attention from the late 1990s (Miwa 2005). A national learning assessment was conducted at each nation's level to measure learning achievement. Internationally, there also now exist the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), participated in by the majority of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations.

As noted previously, while the MDGs brought attention to access to education, they also revealed that many students did not acquire basic academic skills, despite attending school. This result was to seek a more comprehensive measurement of learning achievement. A 2017/8 UNESCO report, for instance, found that one-third or less of students met the minimum proficiency levels in mathematics at the end of primary education in Chad, Kuwait, and Nicaragua; less than half of students met the minimum proficiency levels in reading at the end of primary education in Cameroon, Congo, and Togo

(UNESCO 2017, p. 35) In Central and South Asia, 79% of children in their final years of primary school were found to lack the necessary reading comprehension skills (UIS 2017).

Similarly, according to a 2017/8 UNESCO report, national learning assessments of reading comprehension and mathematics are being conducted at the end of primary and/or lower secondary education in approximately half of the countries in the world (UNESCO 2017, p. 34). Furthermore, while international learning assessments, such as the TIMSS and PISA, can be compared among participating countries, some have noted that local and national educational cultures and traditions are often overlooked. Therefore, some learning assessments are currently being conducted at the local level to reflect the regional characteristics. One example of such assessments is the "Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ)," which is presently being conducted in Eastern and Southern Africa to better measure education quality in these countries. The OECD also developed a "PISA for Development (PISA-D)" for implementation, aimed at low- and middle-income countries (OECD 2020).

In addition to measuring learning achievement levels, learning assessments conducted by civil society organizations are being implemented in an attempt to provide feedback to local residents and make recommendations to relevant governments. An NGO located in India, called Pratham, has further formed a partnership with the central government in order to annually assess and publish the educational situation of children living in rural areas (World Bank 2018, p. 5; Pratham Mumbai Education Initiative 2018). Similarly, in Kenya, an NGO called UWEZO conducts a learning assessment based on a household survey (Nishimura 2016). Such household survey-based assessments by civil society organizations are also being conducted in other countries. As shown here, learning achievement assessments are conducted not only to ascertain a country's academic ability state, but also to make concrete improvement measures based on the results while reflecting public opinion.

#### 4.3.3.4 Non-cognitive Skills

The quality of education that this chapter has detailed thus far has primarily focused on the cognitive skills associated with academic abilities. SDG4 also includes references to non-cognitive skills. Non-cognitive skills relate to skills such as communication, critical thinking, ethics, and citizenship. The OECD (2015, p. 34) calls non-cognitive skills “social and emotional skills,” and presents three skills related to “achieving goals,” “working with others,” and “managing emotions.” Skills for achieving goals comprise perseverance, self-control, and passion for goals; skills for working with others comprise sociability, respect, and caring; skills for managing emotions comprise self-esteem, optimism, and confidence (OECD 2015, p. 34). Improving non-cognitive skills is an important perspective not only in low-income countries, but also in developed countries.

Furthermore, the global citizenship education and Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) included in SDG4 also correspond to improvements in non-cognitive skills. There has been insufficient agreement on specific educational content pertaining to global citizenship education and ESD. For instance, according to UNESCO (2013, p. 3), global citizenship education aims to “empower learners to engage and assume active roles both locally and globally to face and resolve global challenges and ultimately to become proactive contributors to a more just, peaceful, tolerant, inclusive, secure and sustainable world.” ESD aims to empower “learners to take informed decisions and responsible actions for environmental integrity, economic viability and a just society, for present and future generations, while respecting cultural diversity” (UNESCO 2014, p. 12).

ESD is further defined as relating to any type of learning or activity that aims to create a sustainable society by perceiving various issues. These include the environment, poverty, human rights, peace, and development as one’s own issues, thereby creating new values and actions that could lead to the resolution of such issues (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan 2013). In particular,

Japan actively promoted ESD in cooperation with NGOs and advocated for the “United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD)” at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Summit) in 2002. In the final year of the “UN Decade of ESD” (i.e., from 2005 to 2014), the UNESCO World Conference on ESD was held in Nagoya City in the Aichi Prefecture, and Okayama City in the Okayama Prefecture of Japan.

ESD includes not only environmental studies but also education for disaster preparedness<sup>4</sup> (Motoyoshi 2013, p. 153). Japan experienced many disasters, including the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. Based on these experiences, education for disaster preparedness has been provided in the schools in Japan. As an advanced country in disaster prevention, Japan aims to build a sustainable and resilient society against disasters by sharing its relevant knowledge and technology with the world.

Since the realization of a sustainable society and providing education that reflects the social context are increasingly being sought, many countries now need to improve education for both the cognitive and non-cognitive skills of their citizens. The quality of education is expected to improve through the implementation of education aimed at acquiring and improving non-cognitive skills. However, there are many challenges associated with implementing education related to non-cognitive skills, especially since cognitive skills have been prioritized for so long. For instance, since international learning assessments have emphasized cognitive skills, many countries consider cognitive skills as indicators of a nation’s international competitiveness; education concerning non-cognitive skills has not been adequately provided<sup>5</sup> (Kitamura et al. 2014; Sudo 2010).

<sup>4</sup> Education for disaster preparedness refers to education that focuses on learning how to protect yourself from disasters and other risks present in society (Motoyoshi 2013, p. 153).

<sup>5</sup> PISA pursues PISA-type academic abilities that focus on problem-solving and that include the degree to which knowledge and skills can be used in various situations in real life (Sudo 2010).



Additionally, with regard to educational systems where entrance examinations are emphasized, cognitive skills have consequently been emphasized, while education pertaining to developing non-cognitive skills has been neglected (World Bank 2018, p. 5). Determining how and how much education related to non-cognitive skills should be included in a curriculum has been met with various challenges, since such determinations are closely linked to the education policy and system of the country in question.

#### 4.3.4 Case Study: Education for Children with Disabilities in Ethiopia

Inclusive education is practiced in many low-income countries, often focusing on children with disabilities. Based on the discussion of equity, inclusion, and quality of education discussed thus far, this section introduces the case of education for children with disabilities in Ethiopia.

##### 4.3.4.1 Overview of Education for Children with Disabilities in Ethiopia

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, located in East Africa, implements inclusive education mainly for children with disabilities. The “Special Needs Education Program Strategy” was formed in 2006 and revised in 2012 as the “Special Needs/Inclusive Education Strategy.” Based on this policy, the purpose of special needs/inclusive education in Ethiopia is “[t]o build an inclusive education system which will provide quality, relevant and equitable education and training for all children, youth and adults with special educational needs (SEN) and ultimately enable them to fully participate in the socio-economic development of the country” (Ministry of Education [MoE] in Ethiopia 2012, p. 12). Therefore, the establishment of an inclusive society is one of the goals of inclusive education in Ethiopia.

The gross enrolment ratio<sup>6</sup> for primary education (grades 1–8) in Ethiopia is 119.4% (male: 125.1%; female: 113.5%) (UIS 2021c). The number of children with disabilities enrolled at the primary education level in 2018/19 was 316,271, with a gross enrolment ratio of 11.0% (male: 12.3%; female: 9.7%)<sup>7</sup> (MoE in Ethiopia 2019). Therefore, the enrollment rates for children with disabilities are significantly lower than those for primary education enrollment in Ethiopia as a whole.

##### 4.3.4.2 Ethiopia’s Response to the International Approach

In developing inclusive education with respect to the education of children with disabilities, many countries have accommodated children with disabilities in regular schools, as well as closed special schools<sup>8</sup> (Gedfie and Neggasa 2019; NESSE Network of Experts 2012; Takahashi et al. 2013). Such an approach has been influenced by the adoption of the understanding that “every child has a fundamental right to education, and regular schools must provide opportunities for education that takes into account the special educational needs that each child has,” as set out in Article 2 of the Salamanca Declaration, where the term “regular school” is included within the basic concept of inclusive education (UNESCO and Ministry of Education and Science in Spain 1994, p. viii). This view of including all children in the same environment also overlaps with the perspective of equality.

<sup>6</sup> Gross enrollment ratio is defined as the “number of students enrolled in a given level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education” (UIS n.d.). The net enrollment ratio for primary education in Ethiopia was 87.2% (male: 91.2%; female: 83.2%) in 2020 (UIS 2021c).

<sup>7</sup> The Ministry of Education in Ethiopia calculates the number of people with disabilities as 15% of the population based on WHO standards.

<sup>8</sup> For instance, Norway (Takahashi et al. 2013), Greece (NESSE Network of Experts 2012), Italy (NESSE Network of Experts 2012), and South Africa (Gedfie and Neggasa 2019).

Influenced by this international approach, in Ethiopia, special schools/classes are currently transitioning toward regular schools/classes, while regular schools are simultaneously beginning to accept children with disabilities. Specifically, special schools/classes for children with hearing impairments are shifting toward regular schools/classes. In addition to the two schools studied by the author in Addis Ababa, namely, School A and School B, according to interviews with an official from the Ministry of Education,<sup>9</sup> three special schools for children with hearing impairments in other regions have also shifted in recent years to “regular schools” that accept children without disabilities. This shift suggests that unification between special and regular schools takes place throughout Ethiopia.

School A, which was a special school for children with intellectual disabilities and children with hearing impairments, has become a regular school, and a special class for children with hearing impairments present in this school now also accepts children without disabilities.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, School B accepts children without disabilities in special classes for children with hearing impairments, thereby turning these classes into “regular classes”. However, sign language is maintained as the medium of instruction in these “regular classes” at both schools. Many of the students who are enrolled in both schools have disabilities; children without disabilities are in the minority in these classes.

#### 4.3.4.3 Perceptions of “Regular Classes”

This research revealed that some parents of children without disabilities enrolled in these “regular classes,” have placed importance on the educational environment. For instance, in these “regular classes,” which are former special classes, the number of students in a class is small

<sup>9</sup>Online interview with a Special Needs Education Official of Ethiopia’s Ministry of Education, August, 2020.

<sup>10</sup>Special classes for children with severe intellectual disabilities as well as children with autism are continued in School A.

and, in many cases, an environment is fostered in which teachers can provide adequate consideration to each student. It can further be inferred that for children from economically disadvantaged families who are unable to attend private schools, these “regular classes” provide a place where they can enjoy quality education that better meets their needs.

Conversely, the unification of special schools/classes into regular schools/classes has been criticized. For instance, teachers with hearing impairments have noted that in the current environment, where children with hearing impairments learn alongside hearing children, children with hearing impairments are often unable to sufficiently learn sign language, which is their first language.

This indicates that there are educational needs that cannot be met by unifying special schools/classes into regular schools/classes; there is a demand for special schools/classes in Ethiopia. UNESCO (2003, p. 7) defines inclusive education as “a process of addressing and responding to the diversity of needs of all learners.” To achieve quality education that meets the needs of individual students, it is necessary to continue to explore ways of realizing both an equitable and inclusive education system in its true form, where teachers and schools effectively respond to the needs of students.

## 4.4 Concluding Remarks

The first half of this chapter provides an overview of the international trends in educational cooperation. The second half examined “inclusive and equitable quality education,” as included in SDG4.

From the perspective of acquiring knowledge and skills, along with developing human resources, it is clear that the elements of education are present across all 17 SDGs, as shown in Table 4.3. In other words, education is a cross-cutting discipline that influences a variety of areas (Kitamura et al. 2014) and, as such, plays an important role in achieving all SDGs.

The closely related concepts of equity, inclusion, and quality of education reexamine the ways in which education should be conducted for vulnerable children whose education has previously been hindered. This chapter noted that despite inclusive education based on the concept of equity, holding within it many issues related to interpretation and implementation, it is still believed to be able to improve the quality of education and contribute to the development of the full potential of all children. Of further note was that while “inclusive, equitable, and quality education” is unlikely to be uniform, it still needs to be implemented in alignment with the social context of each country. Such an implementation should also take into account the needs of each country’s diverse situations.

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# The Role of Higher Education in Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals

# 5

Akemi Ashida

## Abstract

This chapter focuses on the relationship between Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 and higher education. Higher education has traditionally been expected to play three significant roles: education, research, and social contribution. However, due to globalization, these societal roles and expectations are gradually evolving. There are two targets under SDG 4 that are directly related to higher education. Target 4.3 aims to “ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational, and tertiary education, including university.” It is noteworthy that the target mentions not only accessibility to higher education, but also quality. Additionally, the Times Higher Education released the Impact Ranking and visualized a university’s global performance, which assesses universities according to the framework of SDGs. Japan was the most represented nation in 2019, highlighting Japanese universities’ active efforts to work on global issues. While various efforts have been made to achieve the indicators of SDG targets, the global impact of COVID-19 has provided a significant opportunity for the role

of higher education to be reconsidered. Considering this background, this chapter introduces various activities and initiatives at Japanese higher education institutions, such as the Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development (SATREPS), which promotes international joint research on global issues. Finally, this chapter presents the further expected roles and challenges for higher education in society through the indirect spillover effects on the other goals of the SDGs.

## Keywords

Higher education • Research • Education • Social contribution • Industry-academia collaboration

## 5.1 Introduction

In 1990, the international trend of emphasizing basic education, especially at the primary level, became clear at the World Conference on Education for All (EFA). During this time, the global expansion of basic education progressed dramatically. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a new set of global goals for the year 2030. It explicitly expands the scope of education, from pre-school to higher education, shifting the emphasis from merely increasing

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accessibility, to offering more opportunities for higher quality education.

Higher education institutions are expected to play a more active role in developing human resources that can contribute to the achievement of the SDGs (Sustainable Development Solutions Network-Australia/Pacific 2017). Under SDG 4, two targets, namely 4.3 and 4.b, pertain directly to higher education. Goal 4.3 specifically states, “by 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university.” Previously, under the development theory that economic growth is essential for reducing poverty and benefitting the poor, education was seen as a necessary investment<sup>1</sup> to improve future products and achieve economic growth. In particular, higher education has been emphasized as a means to achieve economic development, along with vocational and technical training. However, in the wake of serious poverty problems and massive unemployment in the 1970s, it became apparent that economic growth alone would not solve poverty. As education itself has come to be perceived as an investment objective, primary education, which aims to replace higher education with the acquisition of basic knowledge and life skills, has attracted the attention of the United Nations (UN) and other donors. Since the 1990s, the perspective that education is a basic human right has flourished, emphasizing the importance of basic education in guaranteeing equal access to learning opportunities. In this context, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with an achievement deadline of 2015, set goals related to primary and secondary education. While higher education was only indirectly mentioned under the MDG regarding elimination of the gender gap, it is considered an actual goal under the SDGs. This shows that higher education has once again attracted

attention after the expansion of basic education in recent years.

Another target aimed at higher education, target 4.b, states that “By 2020, substantially expand the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular, least developed countries globally, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries” (United Nations 2015). This target was established as a necessary measure for the implementation of target 4.3, which aims to increase the number of scholarships to expand accessibility to higher education for students from developing countries. Considering the costs and resources involved in providing higher education and the introduction of appropriate curricula that incorporate the latest technology, opportunities for higher education in developing countries are still limited. Consequently, it is essential for students to study in middle and developed countries, where higher education is more accessible. However, it is difficult for an individual from a developing country to study abroad, owing to the considerable cost burden it entails. Support for study abroad programs is a meaningful initiative that develops human resources, who will play a leading role in education and industry in their respective countries. To achieve target 4.3 on higher education, it is therefore recommended to substantially increase the number of scholarships provided by governments, donors, and the private sector, and establish new scholarship systems and programs.

The SDGs address a wide range of issues relevant to businesses, including poverty, health, education, climate change, and environmental deterioration. Therefore, governments and companies are encouraged to consider the SDGs as a strategic issue. An increasing number of companies are attempting to formulate management strategies that incorporate the SDGs. With this trend, there will be an increasing demand for graduates who have a broad and deep understanding of the issues related to the SDGs and

<sup>1</sup> This idea, known as human capital theory, is one of the theories in modernization theory, which was the mainstream of development theory in the 1950s and 1960s. Human beings were considered a means to achieve economic growth, and education was considered a means to produce a certain quality of labor force and an investment.

can work to solve global issues. As educational institutions that respond to social changes, universities are expected to adopt teaching and learning content related to the SDGs at an early stage and develop human resources that can contribute to the achievement of the goals.

This chapter<sup>2</sup> focuses on the relationship between SDG 4 and higher education. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 summarizes activities aimed at internationalizing universities in line with recent globalization and its characteristics, focusing mainly on the Asian region. The author also considers the new roles and issues expected to be addressed to achieve the goals of the SDGs. In Sect. 5.3, the relationship between other SDG goals and higher education will be examined from the perspectives of education, research, and social contribution, with reference to the previous literature. Section 5.4 discusses Japan's guiding principles for SDG implementation and clarifies how higher education is mentioned therein and recognized as an important stakeholder. In addition, the Times Higher Education (THE) Impact Ranking, which visualizes the social contribution efforts of universities, will be discussed, and an overview of how Japanese universities are reported will be given. Section 5.5 will focus on COVID-19, which has been significantly impacting the world since 2020, and summarize its impact on higher education from the latest reports. Based on these discussions, the conclusions will examine the roles and challenges expected in higher education in light of post-COVID-19 and the achievement of the SDGs by 2030, while also addressing indirect spillover effects on the other goals of the SDGs.

## 5.2 The Changing Role of Higher Education

Traditionally, higher education has played three roles: teaching, research, and social contributions. Comparing the three, education and social contribution have pertained to activities open to society, while research has developed in a separate area, as an independent activity carried out a group of researchers. However, as globalization progressed in the 1990s, and people, goods, capital (money), and information traveled freely across national borders, the nature of higher education also required change. On one hand, the demand for higher education has grown and expanded in countries that have achieved economic development and wealth. On the other hand, in countries where domestic higher education is underdeveloped and the supply does not meet demand, students who can afford to do so choose to study at institutions overseas.

Coupled with these developments, higher education institutions are moving toward internationalization. Middle and developed countries with well-developed higher education systems try to meet demand by aligning their indicators for the transfer of university credits with international standards, as well as promoting overseas study. In addition, agreements with domestic and international higher education institutions should also be established. Taking the Asian region as an example, the structure of the educational networks and programs in recent years has tended to become more multi-layered, with collaborations not only between two universities, but also between three or more institutions and intra- and inter-regional collaborations that transcend national frameworks (Sugimura 2012).

The internationalization of higher education has led to an increase in transnational higher education,<sup>3</sup> which is not only a traditional form

<sup>2</sup>This chapter is prepared based on the previous work written in Japanese by the author (Ashida 2019). It is translated and revised with some new augmentations and major modifications.

<sup>3</sup>For example, twinning programs allow students to receive a single degree from a university in their home country after a certain period of education in both their home country and the destination country. In addition, overseas universities set up campuses in other countries, including developing countries and dispatch faculty members and programs to these campuses, allowing



of study abroad where students move across national borders, but also a broader form where institutions and programs are delivered across national borders. Additionally, there is a new type of learning that is not limited to existing academic disciplines, but involves dialogue with different ones, understanding each other's differences, integrating with one's own specialized field, and creating a new research field. In recent years, the expansion of opportunities for learning, the use of information and communications technology, and the introduction of active learning to encourage learners to participate proactively in class rather than passively have been often observed.

As globalization accelerates, the degree of interaction and dependence between countries is becoming increasingly stronger. It has become clear that the issues that need to be addressed are in cooperation with the international community as a whole, not just the problems of one country. The Asian region, in particular, has many issues that cannot be solved by a single country alone, and requires the collaboration of multiple countries. In response to this trend, a variety of higher education reforms targeting research and education on global issues are underway in today's higher education institutions. The human resources and research results produced by the aforementioned multi-layered program structure and cooperative system in the Asian region can become an international public good. In the context of the SDGs, researchers who specialize in research activities are called upon to address these issues beyond their own disciplines and fields to solve global issues in the real world. Furthermore, it is necessary to collaborate on an equal footing with stakeholders outside of higher education institutions, such as public agencies, industry, and civil society. For example, more innovative forms of collaboration are expected beyond the framework of industry-academia collaboration; private companies and universities can collaborate on research, product

development, and other projects, such as public-private partnerships.

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### 5.3 Other SDG Goals and Higher Education

The SDGs were adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015. They consist of 17 goals and 169 targets that cover a wide range of social, economic, and environmental issues. To solve this global challenge, academic expertise and cooperation among parties across various fields are essential. Among institutions of higher education, universities, in particular, can provide cutting-edge academic knowledge in both research and teaching. Moreover, they can stand as neutral and reliable stakeholders in society. Universities have the ability to take the lead in addressing local, national, and international SDGs through cross-sectoral dialogues and partnerships, as well as play a key role in advocating the importance of the SDGs and providing educational programs on SDGs in sectors other than education. In other words, higher education is a sub-sector within the education sector that can contribute to goals beyond SDG 4.

For example, the guidebook "Getting Started with the SDGs in Universities," which attempts to explain how higher education institutions can engage with and contribute to the SDGs (Sustainable Development Solutions Network-Australia/Pacific 2017), shows that universities can contribute to relevant goals beyond Goal 4 in two dimensions, namely teaching and research. With reference to this guidebook, this section presents specific examples of how education and research can contribute to each SDG.

#### 5.3.1 Contributions from Education and Research

Quality education, which is explicitly mentioned in Goal 4, not only develops the qualities, abilities, and potentials of individuals, but also leads to the development and advancement of communities and nations through individuals. For

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students to avail educational programs from overseas universities in their home countries.

example, if individuals have the opportunity to obtain education and advance to higher educational levels, they can acquire the qualifications and skills necessary for future employment and broaden their career choices. As a result, they are more likely to find jobs with better conditions. In the future, this will lead to the realization of Goal 8 of the SDGs: “Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.” Education can also contribute to the realization of other goals through the implementation of educational programs in non-educational sectors, such as knowledge on improving nutritional status, proper disease prevention and treatment, reproductive health care and services, and disaster preparedness. Specifically, education can help achieve Goal 2: end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture; Goal 3: ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; and Goal 11: make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient, and sustainable.

A wide range of research-related activities is essential for addressing the challenges of the SDGs, which at the same time is seen as a means for the implementation of the goals. Under the SDGs, universities are expected to play an important role in providing knowledge, evidence-based solutions, and innovations needed to identify and solve the challenges that hinder the realization of the SDGs. By creating knowledge through research activities and disseminating it to society through educational activities, universities are able to promote economic development, social well-being, and innovation in the world. For example, among the eight targets set in Goal 9 (“Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation”), two targets, 9.5 and 9.b, are directly related to research, such as promoting scientific research, improving technical capacity, and supporting technology development, research, and innovation (Table 5.1). The direct contribution of the research is essential for realizing each goal.

However, this is done not merely through a single field of research, but a variety of academic standpoints from different fields, such as the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Thus, education is set as one of the targets of Goal 4, but it is also closely related to the other SDGs in terms of promoting research and development (R&D), human resource development, and capacity building in various fields.

To achieve the SDGs, education can play an important role in underpinning all goals. The aforementioned guidebook “Getting Started with the SDGs in Universities,” prepared by Sustainable Development Solutions Network-Australia/Pacific (2017), has so far been widely referenced by many higher education institutions around the world. The guidebook has also been translated and provided in different languages. In September 2020, based on the information provided in the previous work, the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), published a new guidebook with expanded, updated, and improved information, titled “Accelerating Education for the SDGs in Universities: A guide for universities, colleges, and tertiary and higher education institutions” (SDSN 2020a). In the process of developing this new guidebook, universities around the world were invited to submit case studies on how they are implementing and supporting education for the SDGs. Some of the most innovative and inspiring case studies were presented. Other examples of activities not yet included in the guidebook are also provided through the website (SDSN 2020b).

In addition, in 2020, the United Nations University (UNU), a UN agency based in Japan, created the UNU SDG–Universities Platform. This platform was developed with the intention of strengthening and promoting partnerships between the UNU and the universities in Japan in order to initiate research and educational activities to contribute to the achievement of the SDGs (United Nations University 2020). It must be noted that individual universities actively embrace opportunities to collaborate and discuss various issues with one another.

**Table 5.1** Goals and targets relevant to research

Goals	Targets	Relevant to research
9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation	9.5 Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 million people and public and private research and development spending 9.b Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries, including by ensuring a conducive policy environment for, inter alia, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities	The need for training R&D workers Promotion of scientific research Improving technical capacity Support for research and innovation
2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture	2.a Increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in order to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, in particular least developed countries	Sustainable agriculture Vaccine development Need for scientific research and input on sustainable consumption and production
3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	3.b Support the research and development of vaccines and medicines for the communicable and non-communicable diseases that primarily affect developing countries, provide access to affordable essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which affirms the right of developing countries to use to the full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibilities to protect public health, and, in particular, provide access to medicines for all	
7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all	7.a By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology	
12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns	12.a Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological capacity to move towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production	

(continued)

**Table 5.1** (continued)

Goals	Targets	Relevant to research
14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development	<p>14.3 Minimize and address the impacts of ocean acidification, including through enhanced scientific cooperation at all levels</p> <p>14.4 By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics</p> <p>14.5 By 2020, conserve at least 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, consistent with national and international law and based on the best available scientific information</p> <p>14.a Increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and transfer marine technology, taking into account the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of Marine Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the contribution of marine biodiversity to the development of developing countries, in particular small island developing States and least developed countries</p>	The need for scientific input in addressing marine and fisheries management
17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development	<p>17.6 Enhance North–South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism</p> <p>17.8 Fully operationalize the technology bank and science, technology and innovation capacity-building mechanism for least developed countries by 2017 and enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular information and communications technology</p>	<p>Triangular cooperation and knowledge sharing</p> <p>Technology bank and full operation of the science and technology innovation capacity building mechanism</p> <p>Strengthen the use of enabling technologies</p>

Source Prepared by the author based on SDSN Australia/Pacific (2017, Table 2), and United Nations (2015)

### 5.3.2 Contributions from Collaborations with Society

While this chapter has so far outlined the contributions of universities in terms of education and research, examples of collaboration with international organizations, corporations, and other societies are also essential. One example is the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI), an initiative for higher education to collaborate with international organizations (UNAI 2021). With the aim of supporting and contributing to the realization of the goals and missions of the UN, such as the promotion and protection of human rights, access to education, sustainability, and conflict resolution, the UNAI has encouraged cooperation between the UN and higher education institutions. It has established a network of more than 1400 member institutions currently across 147 countries. The UNAI provides an essential link to these stakeholders so that the international community can harness the energy and innovation of young people and researchers for the benefit of humanity.

Another example of collaboration with companies is the so-called industry-academia collaboration, which refers to joint research, product development, and other projects between private companies and universities. It is emphasized as one of the channels through which the results of university research are provided to society and industry, and the returns are channeled back. In recent years, Japanese universities have been mainly contributing to the SDGs through research, but there are also many examples of industry-government-academia collaborations that include companies and government agencies. Compared to the past, a more proactive approach is now being taken to achieve the SDGs with companies being considered as important partners. For example, the SDG Compass, a set of guidelines for corporate action, was provided by three international organizations: the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (Global Reporting Initiative, UN Global Compact, and World Business Council

for Sustainable Development 2015). Taking Japan as an example, the Japan SDGs Award was established at the Third SDGs Promotion Headquarters meeting in June 2017 to recognize companies, local governments, and NGOs/NPOs that make outstanding efforts to achieve the SDGs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA] 2020). Receiving such an award can be an incentive for companies and organizations to promote their social contribution activities that lead to the SDGs. Since the SDGs cover a wide range of issues that are relevant to businesses, such as poverty, health, education, climate change, and environmental degradation, they can help connect corporate strategies to global priorities. Therefore, all companies are expected to use their creativity and innovation to contribute to solving issues concerning sustainable development, while universities and research institutions are expected to provide academic support for these corporate action guidelines based on scientific evidence.

## 5.4 Japan's SDGs Implementation Guiding Principles and Higher Education

Japan has been actively advocating for the inclusion of the concept of human security in the SDGs since its formulation phase (MOFA 2020). Based on this idea, its own guidelines for implementing the SDGs were formulated by the SDG Promotion Headquarters in December 2016 (MOFA 2017). Based on the analysis of the current situation, the guidelines set out individual policies for priority issues.<sup>4</sup> In December 2019, three years after the decision on the implementation guiding principles

<sup>4</sup>

The eight priority areas and policies formulated by the SDG Promotion Headquarters are as follows: (1) empowerment of all people; (2) achievement of good health and longevity; (3) creating growth markets, revitalization of rural areas and promoting science technology and innovation; (4) sustainable and resilient land use, promoting quality infrastructure; (5) energy conservation, renewable energy, climate change countermeasures and sound material-cycle society; (6) conservation of environment, including biodiversity, forests and the oceans; (7) achieving peaceful, safe and secure societies; and

was made, this guideline was reviewed and assessed in light of changes in the social context surrounding the SDGs and revised to reflect the latest developments (MOFA 2019). This section examines how higher education is viewed in the guidelines, taking as an example, Japan's guidelines for implementing the SDGs. In addition, human resource development and R&D efforts related to the SDGs have been promoted at various universities. There are a variety of factors that have led to the further promotion of these activities, and we observe the THE Impact Ranking, which may be one of the opportunities.

#### 5.4.1 Positioning and Expected Role of Higher Education in Japan

Edward and Ashida (2020) review how higher education is mentioned in the implementation principles and point out that higher education is listed as a relevant SDG target in the three priorities. Specifically, in the priority areas and policies of "Promoting the Advancement of All People," higher education is listed as a domestic measure, with the explicit goal of increasing the percentage of students enrolled in higher education including adults, part-time students, and students with disabilities. In addition, under the priority areas and policies "creating growth markets, revitalization of rural areas and promoting science technology and innovation," higher education is addressed in both domestic and overseas measures. In terms of domestic measures, the following are cited: formulation of R&D and industrialization strategies denouncing industry, academia, and government; reform of universities and strengthening the functions of R&D corporations; realization of world-class industry-academia collaboration; and development of young researchers, in particular, increase in the number of female and foreign researchers, and improvement of the environment as a means of securing diverse human resources, who will be

responsible for science and technology innovation. In addition, from the perspective of "science and technology diplomacy," international joint research through international science and technology cooperation projects, such as the Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development (SATREPS) (to be discussed later), is also listed as a foreign policy.

Furthermore, under the priority areas and policies of "Strengthening the means and frameworks for the implementation of the SDGs," the report states that as a measure aimed at countries outside Japan, official development assistance (ODA) should be implemented through public-private partnerships and effective cooperation should be provided in developing countries to advance human resources, infrastructure systems, and other environments that will contribute to the achievement of the SDGs. In December 2019, this guiding principle was partially revised, but the role for educational institutions was confirmed to continue to be the development of human resources, who will be responsible for solving global issues. Furthermore, research institutions are expected to recognize the role of research and science and technology innovation in achieving the SDGs and to promote their efforts based on scientific evidence.

Thus, we can see that higher education plays an important role in Japan's SDGs implementation policy. For this reason, an increasing number of Japanese universities have established courses and programs<sup>5</sup> to develop human resources who will be responsible for solving global issues, including the SDGs. Moreover, as the international community promotes collaboration to solve global-scale issues under the SDGs, more innovative forms of collaboration, beyond the conventional framework of industry-academia collaboration, are being sought and implemented. One example of this collaboration is SATREPS. The Japan Science and Technology

(8) strengthening the means and frameworks for the implementation of the SDGs.

<sup>5</sup> It can be confirmed that programs and courses related to SDGs by various universities are currently being established. Among them, Edwards and Ashida (2020) introduce the case of Kyoto University based on literature review and individual interviews. For details, please refer to the paper.

Agency (JST), the Agency for Medical and Scientific Research, Japan (AMED), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) are collaborating to combine competitive research funding in science and technology with ODA to address global issues based on the needs of developing countries. They promote international collaborative research to solve global issues based on the needs of developing countries and for future social implementation; SATREPS promotes international joint research facilitating the partnership of universities and research institutions in Japan and developing countries for the development and application of new technology and the acquisition of new knowledge (SATREPS 2020).

Researchers from Japan and each of the partner countries stand in equal positions and aim to contribute to solving problems by developing knowledge through research activities. By working in developing countries where the issues are present, researchers can properly understand the events firsthand and conduct cutting-edge R&D in the field. Some projects require the involvement of the private sector, such as companies in Japan and partner countries, to improve technological capabilities and transfer the new technologies developed. As of September 2020, 157 global research projects have been carried out in 52 countries, and it is expected that this new form of collaboration will continue to contribute to R&D and human resource development in many developing countries.

#### **5.4.2 Visualization of Social Contribution Efforts by Universities: The Emergence of THE Impact Ranking**

Universities in the international community work to contribute to the SDGs from a variety of perspectives. The release of the “Times Higher Education Impact Ranking” by THE, a UK-based higher education magazine, in 2019, was one of the opportunities to encourage universities to contribute to the achievement of the SDGs. This

ranking is the first time that universities’ social contribution efforts have been visualized using the framework of the SDGs. It is unique in that it presents not only an overall evaluation, but also a ranking for each of the 17 goals of the SDGs. Of the 17 SDGs, 11 that are closely related to universities were identified as indicators.<sup>6</sup> In this 2019 ranking, 462 universities from 76 countries were included. Japanese universities received particular attention having occupied the greatest number of high ranks in the list for proactively addressing global issues (Times Higher Education 2019).

In the latest edition of the THE University Impact Rankings 2021, a record number of 1420 universities were included, intensifying the competition. Nevertheless, the median score of all Japanese universities included in the rankings has improved from the previous year, indicating that the efforts of Japanese universities are making progress (Times Higher Education 2021). The Japanese universities that were ranked, posted their achievements on their websites and it is apparent that they are using this as a form of publicity, such as appealing to the public as a contribution to society. These world rankings, which have a variety of implications for universities worldwide, encourage active commitment from higher education institutions to contribute to the SDGs.

### **5.5 The Impact of COVID-19 on Higher Education**

The COVID-19 pandemic, which began in early 2020, has caused serious social and human health problems. By July 2021, 190 million infections

<sup>6</sup> The 11 goals include SDG 3 (Good health and well-being), SDG 4 (Quality education), SDG 5 (Gender equality), SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth), SDG 9 (Industry innovation and infrastructure), SDG 10 (Reduced inequalities), SDG 11 (Sustainable cities and communities), SDG 12 (Responsible consumption and production), SDG 13 (Climate action), SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions), and SDG 17 (Partnership for the goals). The latest 2021 ranking includes SDG 1 (No poverty), SDG 2 (Zero hunger), SDG 6 (Clean water and sanitation), SDG 7 (Affordable and clean energy), SDG 14 (Life below water), and SDG 15 (Life on land), all of which are also included.

had been confirmed worldwide, with more than 40 million reported in the Asia–Pacific region (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] Institute for Statistics and UNESCO Bangkok (2021)). Many countries have closed their borders to prevent the spread of the disease, disrupting the international movement of people, which had increased due to globalization. This pandemic not only stopped cross-border movement but also led to restrictions on inter-regional movement within countries. As many countries took steps to avoid denseness and ensure social distancing, university campuses also took steps to on-campus classes, resulting in learning disruptions (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD] 2021). According to UNESCO (2021), more than 220 million higher education level students were affected by the closure of universities in 2020.

In light of this situation, international organizations such as UNESCO, OECD, and the World Bank have compiled surveys on the impact and current status of the COVID-19 pandemic on higher education institutions around the world. For example, UNESCO surveyed the responses of higher education institutions to COVID-19 in terms of access to education, equity and quality of teaching and learning, university operations, national challenges, emerging issues, and strategic response. The report summarizes 10 key findings regarding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on higher education. Those that are particularly relevant to the discussion so far include the non-implementation of traditional on-site teaching and learning, cessation of international physical movement of international students, and suspension, postponement, or termination of international education and research activities. Thus, traditional educational and research activities were restricted, resulting in a decline in productivity. Apart from the above-mentioned, research on other topics, such as medicine and vaccine development related to COVID-19, increased.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, higher education institutions in many countries shifted their teaching and learning methods from on-site to online, hybrid methods, offering virtual

mobility as an alternative for international students who cannot travel, ensuring health and safety during teaching and learning activities, and implementing online seminars, conferences, and academic programs using digital communication. For example, many Japanese universities, which receive government subsidies to promote internationalization, have attempted to continue international exchange in a virtual form by using information and communications technology. Virtual mobility programs are offered both for short periods, primarily for the purpose of learning a foreign language, and for longer periods, lasting one or two semesters, for the purpose of acquiring credits. Some universities are collaborating with overseas partner universities to develop an online platform system to continue study abroad programs (Shimmi et al. 2021).

Based on the above, UNESCO's report mentions that financial support from the government and external funding is essential to address the growing inequity in higher education opportunities caused by COVID-19 (UNESCO 2021). The World Bank (2020) also identified several short- and long-term challenges facing higher education systems and institutions, including decreasing institutional resources, personal and academic challenges for institutions and students, demand for improved infrastructure to support continued distance and blended learning models, and reduced mobility-placing pressures to improve regional and local higher education (Table 5.2). Thus, it can be said that today's higher education institutions are facing a tough time, as they need to continue to address issues related to achieving the SDGs, while also dealing with the challenges of COVID-19.

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## 5.6 Concluding Remarks

Since the 1990s, there has been a need to change the nature of higher education to meet the increasing demand brought about by the rapid development of globalization. As a result, the internationalization of higher education, including the provision of educational programs across national borders, has been strengthened.



**Table 5.2** Immediate and long-term challenges to confront for higher education institutions

Immediate challenges	Long-term challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Broadscale institutional disruption</li> <li>• Staff and student illnesses—provision of adequate support</li> <li>• Mass student displacements and/or loss of vital campus services and support</li> <li>• Technical “debt”—even advanced, wealthy countries find themselves hampered by the use of outdated technology platforms</li> <li>• Maintaining instructional operations, including coursework, exams, and awarding of degrees—modification of assessment modalities</li> <li>• Maintaining or closing research operations, including on-campus laboratories and facilities, fieldwork, conferences, and external research collaborations</li> <li>• Curtailing of international mobility, including logistical implications for repatriation or locally housing international students and staff</li> <li>• Staff and faculty furloughs</li> <li>• Student loan maintenance (including deferrals/repayment freezes)</li> <li>• Equity implications—academic, social, financial, physical—for low-income/at-risk students (potentially those with covid-19 health vulnerabilities)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased inequity/inequality in access and retention, as at-risk students return at lower levels due to increased financial and situational constraints (family obligations, changes in personal circumstances, support networks diminished or dismantled by campus closures, etc.)</li> <li>• Reduced public funding for higher education</li> <li>• Reduced private funding for higher education in terms of household, firms, and other third-party funding</li> <li>• Permanent closures of programs and institutions—resulting in permanent loss of skills and human capital in academic and administrative positions</li> <li>• Permanent movement of more programs to online/remote platforms—requiring support for doing this effectively</li> <li>• Reduced internal mobility, leading to increased local demand for higher education, but also increased quality issues</li> <li>• Reduced global mobility (and related reduced income generation)</li> <li>• Socio-emotional impacts of remote teaching and learning on students (and academic staff)—attention must be paid to both student welfare and the development of interpersonal skills in contexts lacking direct interpersonal experiences</li> <li>• Loss of higher education’s contributions to the local and national civic communities and culture, including the provision of continuing education, community meeting spaces, centers for performance, and visual arts</li> <li>• Loss of research, including research collaborations across institutions, borders, and disciplines</li> </ul>

Source Prepared by the author based on World Bank (2020)

Globalization was accelerating even after the establishment of universal development goals, however, the spread of COVID-19 has caused restrictions that prevented people from moving across borders. As of 2021, the pandemic is far from over.

One of the key ideas of the SDGs is to form an inclusive society. Researchers and other experts, as well as various stakeholders responsible for solving the issues, have been actively involved in the formulation stage of the SDGs. The SDGs are transnational development goals, aimed at addressing global challenges. For them to be implemented and realized, researchers must go beyond their own disciplines and areas of expertise and collaborate with a global

framework of actors composed of governments, companies, and civil society, on an equal and new basis in both research and education. To do this, it is necessary to be able to observe from a broader perspective without getting too caught up in the common sense and conventions of one’s own field of expertise. Moreover, researchers must be able to understand the opinions of actors who are well versed in the field where the problem is occurring and empathize and collaborate with them. Beyond collaboration, they must build a holistic approach that brings together the respective fields of expertise and tackles issues on an equal footing in a transdisciplinary manner that aims to integrate academia and society. The SATREPS described

in this chapter is an initiative that will lead to such an ideal form and will contribute to the achievement of target 17.6.<sup>7</sup>

As mentioned in this chapter, higher education is one of the goals in Goal 4, but it is closely and indirectly related to the other goals in the SDGs (Goals 2, 3, 7, 9, 12, 14, and 17) in terms of promoting R&D, human resource development, and capacity building in the various fields covered by the SDGs. In other words, we need to continue to educate researchers and experts who understand these issues and can contribute to the realization of the SDGs (this will lead to the achievement of target 9.5<sup>8</sup>), while taking into consideration the post-COVID-19 era and the period after 2030. This requires the concept of Education for Sustainable Development, an approach to education that fosters the ability to view diverse issues such as poverty, human rights, development, and the environment as one's own problems and to take independent action in solving them. In addition, considering how necessary it is to disseminate scientific findings to society in an easy-to-understand manner and promote measures to enable dialogue between academia and society, it is recommended to emphasize science communication and develop human resources who can contribute to problem solving based on an understanding of both social issues and scientific findings. In fact, Japanese universities have established and are operating programs and courses related to the SDGs with the aim of developing such human resources. This will lead to further enhancement of higher education institutions in line with target

4.3. Such proactive human resource development is also expected to lead to an increase in the number of young and female researchers who can engage in future R&D (target 9.5). It is also necessary to set up spaces, such as companies and research institutions, where human resources developed in this way can play an active role. In the future, there will be an even greater need to support the career development of human resources who contribute to the realization of the SDGs, so that they do not only remain within universities and research institutions, but can actively move back and forth between government, industry, civil society, and academic institutions. There is a need for a form of collaboration that transcends the boundaries of international organizations, universities, and corporations and a place for such collaboration.

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<sup>7</sup> Enhance North–South, South–South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism.

<sup>8</sup> Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 million people and public and private research and development spending.

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# Social Impacts of Infrastructure Construction: Sociological Approaches to Development

# 6

Atsushi Hamamoto

## Abstract

This chapter helps readers unfamiliar with sociology to obtain a concrete picture of what a sociological approach to development is. It presents arguments based not only on previous research in the English-speaking world, but also on research trends in Japan. Sociological studies of development can be divided into two fields based on their disciplinary origins and research orientation: ‘Sociology of Development’ and ‘Development Sociology’. First, this chapter explains the difference between these research areas. Furthermore, as a case study, the issue of displacement and resettlement induced by dam construction is presented to examine what kind of sociological analysis has been conducted in these research areas. Accordingly, the author presents research perspectives that are considered unique to sociology in development issues: power relations among actors at development sites; secondary, indirect, mid-, and long-term impacts of development projects; macro–micro linkages among international, national, and regional transformations; and values, culture, and discourse on development. Finally, a discussion is presented on the role

of sociological research in the debate on sustainability and how it can play a significant part.

## Keywords

Dam · Displacement · Resettlement · Restoration of livelihood · Sociology

## 6.1 Introduction: Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement in the SDGs

This chapter considers the issue of development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR). It shows how the discipline of sociology approaches development, assuming that readers are unfamiliar with sociology. We begin by reviewing the relationship between DIDR and SDGs, which is the central issue of this book.

Among the goals set out in the SDGs are the eradication of hunger (*Goal 2*<sup>1</sup>), the provision of safe drinking water (*Goal 3*<sup>2</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> ‘Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture’.

<sup>2</sup> ‘Goal 3; Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’. In particular, *Target 3.9* is as follows; ‘By 2030, substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination’.

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*Goal 6*<sup>3</sup>), and energy security (*Goal 7*<sup>4</sup>). Achieving these may to some extent involve expectations of dam construction for irrigation, water resources, electricity generation, and flood control functions. However, the problem of infrastructure construction is not simple. As is well known, dam construction has often resulted in the destruction of nature and negatively impacted the ecology in many parts of the world. Further, social conflicts have arisen over the rights of indigenous peoples to land ownership and habitation, and over the restoration of the livelihoods of residents whose homes are submerged following dam operation<sup>5</sup>.

The central concern of DIDR research is not the positive effects of infrastructure construction itself, but the negative effects as a side-effect of the project. In particular, this is an issue-oriented research area that seeks to understand how to reduce the sacrifices made by those who are evicted, and to examine the necessary procedures to improve this scenario, while comprehending the actual status of compensation and livelihood restoration support. The perspective of DIDR, which considers measures to avoid imposing development-related sacrifices and pain on some people, is deeply related to the basic SDG principle of ‘no one will be left behind’.

However, issues related to DIDR are not explicitly included in the SDGs’ goals, targets, and indicators. One might suggest that in the SDGs, issues related to means and procedures for

migration and livelihood restoration, such as *Goal 1, 10, 11, and 16*, could be considered relevant<sup>6</sup>, but this is only an interpretation and does not imply that the issues addressed by DIDR are directly incorporated into the SDGs. Even if one tries to apply the SDG framework to DIDR, it is difficult to comprehend the essence of DIDR.

In fact, sociological and anthropological research is central to this DIDR research. In particular, the discipline of sociology emphasises capturing the ‘other side’ of events and looking at the gap between ideology and reality. The first half of this chapter will therefore first review the basic perspective of such sociological research. Sociological debates on development have been raised in Europe, such as in the UK and the Netherlands, as well as in India and Latin America, and, although not well known, there is also sufficient accumulation of such debates in Japan. Therefore, in this chapter, I will discuss the debate based partly based on Hamamoto and Sato (2012), Hamamoto (2013), and Hamamoto (2019), as well as on the accumulation of discussions not only in the English-speaking world but also by Japanese researchers.

<sup>3</sup> ‘*Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all*’. Puthucherril and Peters, while acknowledging the significance of SDG *Goal 6* on safe water supply in this regard, argued ‘if their human and environmental costs are not adequately factored-in, it raises the specter of social injustice and inequity. These can hamper the fulfillment of the SDG goals’ (Puthucherril and Peters 2021, p. 10).

<sup>4</sup> ‘*Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all*’.

<sup>5</sup> Conflicts between upstream and downstream areas are also common. The construction of a dam in Yunnan Province, China, in the upper Mekong River basin is of great concern to Laos and Thailand, which are in the middle and lower reaches of the river. Similarly, the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the upper Nile has caused friction downstream with Egypt and Sudan.

<sup>6</sup> For example, it is also relevant to ‘*Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere*’, as resettlers are often impoverished. In particular, it also relates to *Target 1.4* in terms of guaranteeing land rights. Additionally, regarding support for restoration of livelihood, *Target 10.7* in ‘*Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries*’ overlaps in terms of the resettlement action plan, but this is primarily concerned with economic migration, refugees, and internally displaced persons and does not directly include DIDR. Further, in terms of human settlements, ‘*Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable*’ is also considered relevant (e.g., *Target 11.1, 11.2, 11.5, 11.a*). Regarding procedures in development programme, ‘*Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels*’ is comprehensive and will be relevant under many sections of development goals. As mentioned in *Target 16.5*, dam construction is associated with corruption because of the interests of the contractors involved. The fairness and transparency of the resettlement process is important (e.g., *Target 16.6, 16.7, 16.10, 16.b*).

## 6.2 The Discipline of Sociology

### 6.2.1 Sociological Perspective

The discipline of sociology can be described from many different points of view, as diverse texts have been published in this field. Along with Western societies in the first half of the nineteenth century, when sociology was born, the classical work of sociological masters such as Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Marx is probably the orthodox entry point for sociology. Alternatively, there is a style in which sociology considers each of the thematic areas of study, such as urban/rural, family, gender, and environment.

However, such an explanation is not provided here. Rather, we would like to simply confirm sociology's basic perspective and way of considering social phenomena/problems. Put simply, sociologists do not speak in terms of 'something should be done'. Before thinking about 'what should be done', we must carefully look at 'what is happening now'. Further, we assign importance to unravelling the complex social situation. That is, sociology suspends value judgments such as 'good or bad', rejects prejudice, and concentrates all of its efforts on understanding the contemporary society<sup>7</sup>.

Speaking of 'analysis without prejudice', one might think that this is a basic scientific attitude, the same as in other disciplines. However, it is important to note that many traditional sociologies do not from the outset have principles or goals such as 'we should move towards XX' or 'XX is desirable'. This is a very different stance from disciplines that work towards principles and goals such as 'how to eliminate bullying in schools', 'how to create an easily accessible environment for special needs individuals', or 'how the technology of renewable energy can be developed for practical use'. For these researchers, bullying is something that 'should be eliminated', accessibility is something that 'should be created', and renewable energy is something that 'should be made practical'. They believe that

they can contribute to society through such 'shoulds' and 'good things' and, in fact, these studies are important research fields. However, traditional sociology approaches these issues from a different perspective. It is not concerned with ideals, but rather with the social mechanisms themselves and their changes and transformations, such as which functions of society work and how they work.

Therefore, sociology tries to look at aspects of what is considered 'good' that may be 'not good'. The reverse is also true. Sociological research with this stance tries to view contemporary society from multiple perspectives, without being preoccupied with what is 'good', but rather from the perspective of 'do they really all work well?' and 'even if they do work well, are there other problems occurring?' This positionality of sociology has the advantage of presenting arguments that other disciplines cannot highlight when considering policy.

### 6.2.2 Sociological Approach to Development

If one bears in mind this positionality of not talking in terms of 'shoulds', one will soon realise how the debate on development is full of 'shoulds' and 'musts'. For example, slogans such as 'Raise per capita income and become rich' and 'Promote import-substitution industrialisation and achieve economic growth' express a growthist ideology based on the assumption that these are 'good' and 'great' things. Although these ideologies are pervasive and commonplace values for the members of the society in question, sociology often considers such perspectives with scepticism.

This sociological stance can be seen in the trend from modernisation theory to dependency theory, known as the fundamental theory of development studies. Modernisation theory, which adopts the optimistic scenario that post-independence developing countries will achieve economic growth according to the logic of capitalism, is related to the functionalism of the sociologist Parsons, but above all, it is strongly based on the assumptions of modern economics.

<sup>7</sup> See Max Weber's discussion of value freedom/ neutrality.

In contrast, dependency theory attracted attention in the late 1960s and 1970s as a critique of modernisation theory. This argument, based on Marxism, argued that ‘developing countries will still remain underdeveloped’ not because of insufficient capacity or infrastructure in developing countries, but because of the consequences of the structural exploitation relationship between developed and developing countries. This argument incorporated considerable sociological knowledge and addressed aspects that had been overlooked by modern economics<sup>8</sup>. In addition, the world-system theory by the sociologist Wallerstein, which succeeded and developed dependency theory, was a dominant paradigm in development theory, as it explained the functioning of the capitalist system historically, rather than using the state as the unit of analysis.

The above is, according to sociology’s classification, a macro theory of social change, but even in micro analyses addressing individual concrete issues, sociology remains ascetic regarding talking about ‘should’. As social power takes many forms such as economic, cultural, sexual, and sociological, development analysis can help us understand how and why development has occurred and how and why it has not (Barnett 1988). However, the above explanation does not apply to all sociological research. In applied sociological research, there are positions that adopt a normative approach towards a ‘desirable’ society and an orientation towards policy science contributions, which also apply to development research. Let us consider this in more detail next.

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### 6.3 ‘Sociology of Development’ and ‘Development Sociology’

Development is a central issue because sociology, since its inception, has been concerned with what is social evolution and progress.

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<sup>8</sup> Another important point is that dependency theory was discussed by scholars from or based in developing countries, such as A. G. Frank in Chile and Brazil, and S. Amin in Egypt. In this respect, dependency theory was also meant to be a civilisational objection to the dominant values prevalent in the already developed Western world.

However, setting aside early sociological works and focusing on the social changes that have taken place especially since World War II, two main types of sociology can be distinguished in the field of development. As shown in Table 6.1, these are ‘Sociology of Development’ and ‘Development Sociology’. Although these are not always clearly differentiated by sociologists, the following section considers the subject areas, issues, and orientations of the two, partly referring to research trends in Japan.

#### 6.3.1 ‘Sociology of Development’

The sociological approach to development discussed above basically corresponds to the first ‘Sociology of Development’. It is a sub-discipline within traditional sociology<sup>9</sup>. Alongside, for example, sociology of religion, sociology of law, sociology of education, sociology of medicine, and social psychology, the field of sociology of development can be located here.

As mentioned above, the trend from modernisation theory to dependency theory and world-system theory is positioned as the basic genealogy of the ‘Sociology of Development’ (Kiely 1995; Singh 2010; Viterna and Robertson 2015; Webster 1990). In contrast, since the 1990s, there have been theoretical developments that directly and indirectly discuss modernisation and development, such as Giddens and Beck’s reflexive modernisation and risk society theory, but these are regarded as macroscopic contemporary social theories that discuss social change and the characteristics of modern society. Touraine’s social movements and the urbanisation debates of Castel, Sassen, and others are not generally included in the ‘Sociology of

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<sup>9</sup> Of course, concerns with development issues did not only occur in sociology. Development became a new and central sub-field across most social science disciplines, as well as an integral part of many schools of public policy (Viterna and Robertson 2015, p. 242).

**Table 6.1** Dichotomy of sociologies in the field of development

	Sociology of development	Development sociology
Disciplinary distinction	A branch of sociology	A branch of development studies
Research orientation	Relatively academic and theoretical	Relatively practical and applied
Research objects	Both developed and developing countries	Mainly developing countries and relations with donor agencies

Development’, but they are relevant when addressing issues related to globalisation and development<sup>10</sup>.

Despite the above developments in macro-social theory, there has been little commitment from traditional sociology to the development phenomena in developing countries or to the cross-border phenomenon of development assistance. Hence, the field of ‘the Sociology of Development’ is far from being established within sociology, in contrast to family sociology, urban sociology, and so forth, which have been institutionalised academically in many countries.

However, this does not mean that research on development does not exist. For example, in Japan, there is a vast and wide range of empirical research on development in the domestic context. At the same time, in sociology, where modernisation, industrialisation, and urbanisation have been the main subjects of research, ‘development’ has been quite commonly considered as a social phenomenon and issue (Machimura 2011, p. 8). For example, questions such as how the introduction of modern-style machinery in rural communities has transformed feudal human relationships have been discussed in rural sociology. The social changes in post-war Japan have also been depicted alongside the history of development and its effects, such as the impact of construction of hydropower facilities in mountainous areas and industrial development in coastal areas, housing development and the emerging new communities in the suburbs of large cities, residents’ movements against

regional development, and the urban renewal of inner-city areas (Machimura, *ibid.*). Since many of these development-related phenomena have already been addressed in extant sub-disciplines of sociology, there is no need to establish a new field of ‘Sociology of Development’. The common stance of these researches was to critically observe the nature and reality of development, rather than to conduct research that would be useful for development.

Research trends in such traditional sociology vary from country to country and region to region, but often deal with development phenomena within the researcher’s own country or culture. Such studies also generally have in common a research focus of Sociology of Development that is not necessarily limited to developing countries (Barnett 1988; Hooks 2016; Webster 1990). The Indian sociologist Singh, while applying the sociological theories of development to Indian society, argued that Sociology of Development examines the interface between socio-cultural circumstances and the processes of development (Singh 2010, p. 3) and that its aim is to trace the non-economic factors underlying economic development (*ibid.*, p. 5). Singh’s definition seems to indicate a strong preference for the use of sociological research in the analysis of economic development, but such characteristics will vary depending on the context in which each country is situated.

### 6.3.2 ‘Development Sociology’

The second approach, namely Development Sociology, is a sub-category of interdisciplinary applied sciences of Development Studies,

<sup>10</sup> Debates on post-development and degrowth are also closely related to sociological research, both theoretically and empirically.



together with related disciplines, such as Development Economics and Development Politics. Development Sociology can be described as a 'sociological approach to development studies'. The roots of development studies may be traced to the cultural understanding of underdeveloped and colonial societies as objects to be conquered, but were directly triggered by the Truman speech of 1949, which made the advancement of developing countries a common goal of the international community (Esteva 1992). Initially, when development was mentioned, it was almost synonymous with economic growth, but later emphasis was placed on understanding socio-cultural aspects as a prerequisite for economic development. Currently, social development itself has become a goal of development, and sociology has become an indispensable discipline, alongside anthropology, for this purpose.

As Development Sociology adopts the above concerns as its starting point, the discipline has a stronger practical orientation than traditional sociology. While there are arguments and suggestions based on sociological theory, such as those of Long (2001) discussed below, there is a need for practitioners, such as aid agencies and NGOs, to mobilise social knowledge in their specific activities, such as rural development and community development. These social development practitioners are often not only sociological researchers, but also administrative staff, consultants, or NGO specialists, and the boundary between researchers and practitioners is unclear. In addition, in some countries, applied Development Sociology often takes precedence while the accumulated findings of traditional sociology in academia remain immature, or sociology and anthropology are recognised as almost the same discipline.

It is important here to carefully consider that discussion in Development Sociology often involves 'shoulds' and 'musts'. While it is rather natural that applied sociological research should aim to contribute to policy, it is important to note that 'shoulds' here include both conscious and unconscious value judgments and the positionality of the researcher. In Japan, for example, the sociologist Tsurumi advocated 'endogenous

development' from the late 1970s, arguing for proactive change at the local level as opposed to 'exogenous development' at the national level (Tsurumi and Kawata 1989). This was a manoeuvre in which she articulated her value judgments in an extremely conscious manner. In contrast, there are pitfalls when social development centred on local people is not questioned as an ideal. This was clearly expressed in the debate on participatory development.

The concept of 'participatory development' is a bottom-up, grassroots type of development method that overcomes the problems of traditional top-down development. It conceives the local population not as a passive entity, but rather as the subject of development at all stages of its planning, implementation, and evaluation (Chambers 1983). Since the 1990s, 'participatory development' has quickly become mainstream and 'desirable' in development assistance. Persons involved here have included not only development specialists such as Chambers, a leading development expert, but also advocates of development sociology. However, as Cooke and Kothari (2001) critically argue, 'participation' has become authoritative in development settings and has been invoked as 'tyranny', affecting social relations within communities<sup>11</sup>. The ideal of 'community participation' held by donors does not always match the actual image of the local community, and there are also cases of tokenistic 'participation'. In response to such a situation in Japan, Sato expressed concern that 'participatory' as a tool is polysemic and ambiguous, noting that there is confusion as to whether participation is a means or a target (Sato 2003, 2005).

Nevertheless, sociology in the development domain has the potential to become a testing ground for policy practice, which has been considered a weakness of traditional sociology. In this respect, Michael Cernea's work at the World Bank is instructive in terms of the applied

<sup>11</sup> In response to this controversy, Hickey and Mohan (2004) discussed the need to focus on the agency of each actor in the transformation of local communities associated with participatory development.

practice implemented on the foundations of traditional sociology<sup>12</sup>. Let us now examine further, through Cernea's work, what sociological research on development looks like.

## 6.4 Displacement and Resettlement Induced by Infrastructure Construction

### 6.4.1 Michael Cernea's IRR Model

Michael Cernea was first employed as a sociologist in 1974 at the World Bank, the world's largest development assistance organisation and a conglomerate of economists. In his subsequent work with the World Bank, Cernea focused on the resettlement problems that arise in infrastructure financing projects. He proposed a check on the organisation's internal financing decision-making process and has led the institutionalisation of this within the Bank<sup>13</sup>.

Cernea advocated the basic principle of 'Putting people first' in development assistance projects. He presented the adverse impacts of infrastructure projects, such as dams, on the relocated and proposed sites as an 'Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction' (IRR) model. The eight risks are as follows: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property and services, and social disarticulation (Cernea 1991; Cernea and McDowell 2000).

Before the recognition of these issues and subsequent discussions by Cernea and colleagues of the social development division at the Bank,

the residents to be relocated were often 'just kicked out' when infrastructure construction proceeded. It would have been better if they were 'moved first and dealt with later'. That is, they were perceived as nothing more than obstacles in the way of the construction engineer. In this context, the concept clearly showed that the negative social impacts of infrastructure construction are multifaceted and extremely significant: the IRR model specifically highlights the risks that are likely to occur if no measures are taken in the event of displacement and resettlement; thus, the model can be used as a frame of reference to avoid risks. Accordingly, the model has been practically referenced and applied by many international organisations as a tool or checklist.

What is important here is that Cernea, who is trained in traditional sociology, not only understood the reality of project sites and extracted their essence from field research based on a sociological perspective, but also constructed a model that is compatible with the screening, monitoring, and evaluation systems of international financial institutions.

In his later work based on this model, Cernea criticised the cost-benefit analysis used in development projects for overlooking the social aspects of livelihood restoration, and further argued that compensation alone is not enough. He has published practical and concrete recommendations, such as advocating 'compensation with development' (Cernea and McDowell 2000; Cernea and Mathur 2008; Cernea and Maldonado 2018). Cernea was a pioneer and applied practitioner of Development Sociology.

### 6.4.2 Experiences of Japan

Let us now also look at the Japanese debate on DIDR. Cernea's argument is based on the reality of developing countries; thus, the IRR model cannot be applied directly to countries such as Japan. In the past, such as in the pre-war period, there were cases in Japan where people became impoverished after displacement, but in contemporary Japanese society there are

<sup>12</sup> For more on Cernea's work at the World Bank, see Koch-Weser and Guggenheim (2021).

<sup>13</sup> Not to go into the details here, but the guidelines for resettlement were first laid down as an internal regulation in February 1980 in the form of an Operational Manual (OM 2.33, Operational Manual Statement 2.33) and, after the Narmada experience, were published externally in 1986 as 'Operational Policy' (Operations Policy Issues in the Treatment of Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects). Various institutional designs and revisions have been made since then, including OP 4.30 (Involuntary Resettlement) in June 1990.

few cases where people cannot restore their livelihood. In addition, the system of ‘compensation with development’, as Cernea advocated, was already institutionalised as a law in the 1970s.

So, is IRR not an issue at all in Japan? In fact, the issue of dam construction has long been one of the most significant sites of social conflict in Japan, and the distress associated with development has been more severe than that associated with the restoration of economic livelihood. Based on the theory of social structure of victimisation, an analytical model in Japanese environmental sociology, Hamamoto clarified the long-term damage experienced by the residents who were supposed to be relocated from the Tokuyama Dam. The model created by Iijima (1984) analyses the multi-layered nature and derivation of the social damage experienced by victims<sup>14</sup>, and considers cases of pollution, harmful effects of medicines, and industrial accidents that occurred during the period of rapid economic growth in Japan.

Applying the model, Hamamoto found that the suffering of the residents who were relocated as a consequence of the Tokuyama Dam project varied depending on the phase of construction; for example, deterioration and conflicts in interpersonal relationships within communities as well as anxiety about the future occurred in the site planning and negotiation phase, and seeking reemployment and adapting to a new community were present in the life reconstruction phase. More importantly, the project was re-examined 10 years after the resettlement, when the validity of the construction purpose was questioned; it was re-examined regarding whether it should continue or not. If it were cancelled, re-settlers would experience a sense of alienation, as if their whole life had been denied,

with them wondering why they had spent so much time being forced to adapt to the project. This revealed that the former villagers had lost the meaning of their own existence, suffered an identity crisis and, in general, suffered extremely strong psychological pain (Hamamoto 2001, 2013, 2015). No major problems in terms of economic livelihood restoration have been identified regarding resettlers from the Tokuyama Dam project. However, Hamamoto noted that dam-induced social impacts are not only limited to livelihood restoration, but also include psychological harm.

Significantly, the social impact of constructing dams cannot be simply explained by the number people relocated or the amount of compensation payments that they received. When one focuses on the timing of the disputes from dam problems, it becomes apparent that Japan’s problems with constructing dams differ from those of developing countries (Hamamoto 2009, 2013). In the projects in developing countries, the process of getting the consensus of citizens living on the planned site is often simple, and the relocation procedure is fast. This is possibly because of the fragility of the land ownership system and protection of private ownership or possibly because of the asymmetrical power dynamics between the business people involved in the project and the residents living on the planned site. However, the relocation of citizens involves difficulties caused by citizens not wanting to live in a new area, and people demand the fulfilment of promises made regarding the relocation conditions and support with respect to their life reconstruction. Occasionally, these matters can turn into intense disputes. In many cases, these disputes occur after the citizens have relocated; these types of disputes could be called the ‘post-project problem model’. In contrast, in Japan it is not rare to observe complications between the business people involved in the project and the residents living on the planned site during the period before construction work begins. This is the ‘pre-project problem model’. Further, this can prolong a project and lead to the disruption of lives.

<sup>14</sup> The model has been well applied in recent years in studies with victims and evacuees of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident. Another analytical framework by Harutoshi Funabashi, which is not detailed here, includes the twin concepts of the benefit and victimized zones, which captures the composition of social conflicts over infrastructure construction (Hamamoto 2013).

## 6.5 Sociological Approaches to Development; What Kind of Sociological Research Do We Aim to Conduct?

The above has examined the specific example of DIDR, but there are many other areas of development phenomena that require a sociological approach, including the domains of urban, rural, labour, poverty, public health, primary health-care, and gender. In the following sections, we will examine research perspectives specific to sociology when targeting these diverse areas and tentatively organise them into the following four analytical perspectives<sup>15</sup>. These are the accumulated research findings of sociology in the field of development, as well as the sociological viewpoints that bridge the Sociology of Development and Development Sociology.

### 6.5.1 Power Relations Among Actors at Development Sites

Sociology excels at understanding social relations and is sensitive to the various relationships in the development field. In particular, it is important to note that development assistance is often characterised by the intervention by outsiders. Power relations are embedded in the act of ‘assistance’, reflecting the agendas and interests of international organisations, governments, and

NGOs. The recipients of development are also diverse. It is not uncommon for the acquisition of resources from the outside to strengthen the extant leaders’ power within the community. Leaders in the recipient society also make use of aid. This focus on relationships shares interests with political science and anthropology of development, of which Long’s actor-oriented approach (2001) is perhaps the most representative. Using this framework, Long explored how social actors are locked into a series of intertwined battles over resources, meanings, and institutional legitimacy and control<sup>16</sup>.

In Japan, Hiroshi Sato (1996) used the concepts of spoilage and jealousy to describe the relational changes in local communities where development programmes were implemented. Here, ‘spoilage’ refers to ‘an increase in dependency among people and marginalisation of their efforts towards self-reliance’ (Sato 1996, p. 118) as a result of assistance, and ‘jealousy’ refers to ‘people who feel that the benefits are concentrated in someone else’s place and wish to change that situation’ (ibid, p. 132). Such phenomena are a dynamic of social relations that often occurs in development aid settings, but are easily overlooked because they are outside the direct target. While this can be seen as the social relations of development settings, it can also be seen as an ‘unanticipated consequence’ of development projects. This is considered in the next section.

<sup>15</sup> Hamamoto and Sato (2012) listed five of these, but ‘a gaze towards the logic of local communities and residents’ is common to all of them; thus, it is not included here and has been reorganised into four points in this paper. Viterna and Robertson (2015) discussed research trends in development in economics and political science, particularly in microeconomics, in which randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have become the gold standard. In comparison with these trends and outcomes, they identified five sociological areas where Development Sociology can offer better insights. These are institutions, social mobilisations, culture, inequality, and evaluation. The analytical objects in these five areas are also close to the four analytical perspectives mentioned in this paper.

<sup>16</sup> Long argued that the outcomes of development programmes should not be myopically evaluated according to the intentions of the interveners but should rather focus on the historical processes of the recipient area, the accumulated experience of various stakeholders, and the interaction of actors in terms of negotiations, confrontations, and conflicts (Long 2001). The anthropologist Mosse’s point also fits here. In a participatory rural development project in India undertaken by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), he describes the authoritative nature of assistance, the diversity of recipients, and the complex social relations of local communities (Mosse 2005).

### 6.5.2 Unanticipated Consequences: Secondary, Indirect, Medium-, and Long-Term Impacts of Development Projects

‘Unanticipated consequences’ is one of the most important propositions in sociology, as proposed by R. K. Merton. When an event has a certain impact and produces some positive consequence, it is called an ‘eufunction’. Oppositely, when a certain influence has a rather negative result, it is called a ‘dysfunction’. For example, if the bureaucracy of a modern state can carry out its duties efficiently because the roles of its staff and chain of instructions are clear, this is called the ‘eufunction’ of the system. In contrast, if it is bound by roles and cannot flexibly respond to what is not in the precedent or in the manual, this is the ‘dysfunction’ of the bureaucracy. Similarly, regarding the economic assistance of international organisations, it is an ‘eufunction’ if the economic growth of developing countries is promoted, rather than a ‘dysfunction’ if the independence of developing countries is undermined and their economic growth is hindered. The aforementioned ‘spoilage’ concept of Hiroshi Sato captured exactly the ‘dysfunction’ in the development field, but engineers and administrative workers rarely pay attention to these ‘dysfunctions’.

Such ‘dysfunctions’ are often observed in society, but in many cases, they are the result of the accumulation of individual behaviour and are not expected by the actor. Therefore, for the actor, the situation in which ‘dysfunction’ occurs is indeed an ‘unanticipated consequence’, and it can be said that the secondary and indirect impacts of development are precisely these unintended consequences. The DIDR studies discussed above considered various aspects of resettlement as ‘unanticipated consequences’ of infrastructure construction, and followed up the process of livelihood restoration from a medium- to long-term perspective. However, this does not necessarily denote only the undesirable, but also the unexpected desirable consequences.

A study by Hamamoto (2008), (2011), Hamamoto et al. (2005), (2011) on resettlers in

Beijing’s urban renewal identified those kinds of experiences. The locals relocated from the inner city to the urban suburbs initially were disappointed with the decrease in living standard, but their dissatisfaction decreased as the property values of their new homes increased over time and living circumstances improved with the extension of subways and opening of commercial facilities due to the expansion of the suburbs. These are also examples of ‘unanticipated consequences’ that can be captured by following the impact over the medium to long term.

In this way, sociology, while critically examining the one-sidedness of economic development, focuses on the relationships between actors in social development and, furthermore, examines keenly whether there are any deviations from the original aims and what the unintended positive and negative consequences are (Hamamoto and Sato 2012)<sup>17</sup>.

### 6.5.3 Macro–Micro Linkages Among International, National, and Regional Transformations

Empirical sociological research in the development field seeks to understand daily life practices from the perspective of local communities and residents. However, trends in local communities are not closed and complete within local communities but are often associated with policies and measures at the national level. In addition, the impact of globalisation cannot be ignored. International market prices for certain agricultural products may rise or fall depending on events in seemingly unrelated distant countries,

<sup>17</sup> The proposition of ‘unintended consequences’ has been identified by sociologists, but even without using it, some studies have critically explained it as a paradoxical phenomenon. For example, the anthropologist Ferguson (1990) found that the World Bank and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) rural development programmes in Lesotho did not work as the donors had intended, as they overlooked the social significance of livestock ownership for farmers and various poverty reduction programmes created conflicts of interest among local government organisations.

which may in turn increase or decrease migrant jobs. That is, it is not possible to understand a local community simply by looking at it intrinsically. This perspective of analysing macro trends and micro social transformations, linking this hidden relationship, is one of the strengths of sociology.

In this respect, Viterna and Robertson (2015) suggested that development is best explained by analysing how a few key factors evolve across variable national and subnational contexts<sup>18</sup>. Barnett argued that Sociology of Development asks how social change occurs, what we mean by social change, how it affects individuals, how it affects whole societies, and most recently, how it affects the whole world taken as one 'social system' (Barnett 1988, p. 11). Webster also indicated that the present state of poorer countries in the world can only be understood by examining their place in the socio-economic relations of the global system (Webster 1990, p. 4). Thus, sociology has a dynamic perspective that links macro and micro trends. It tries to capture both macro and micro aspects of 'bottom-up' as well as 'top-down' development, and the element of 'endogenous development' that is partly contained within 'exogenous development' (Hamamoto and Sato 2012).

#### 6.5.4 Values, Culture, and Discourse on Development

Sociology does not only study concrete infrastructure construction and development programmes; the meaning of development is highly polysemic, varying according to the local and historical context. The shape of development is multifaceted.

People's attitudes change in the context of macro-social change. Values such as 'what kind of society do we want' and 'what kind of state can we call development', with respect to improved material living standards, political

democratisation, and a sense of social justice, differ from society to society and even within the same society at different times. They are related not only to political and economic systems, but also to local history, religion, and culture. In this regard, Webster stated the following.

What, for example, do the 'ordinary' members of society think 'development' is? Their version of an improved world may be very different from that of the economist oriented towards the expansion of industrial production. Sociologically it is important to examine people's own conception of their life-style, life-chances, and motivations in order to see how they respond to apparent 'development opportunities'. If people themselves do not think that an opportunity exists, whatever promoting the economist may give, they are unlikely to want to make a move (Webster 1990, p.10).

In Japan, developmentalism and developmental states have been examined in-depth by Southeast Asian studies scholars, economists, political scientists, and sociologists. The important point here is that people did not blindly follow the authoritarian top-down development policies put forward by these political leaders, but rather positively supported developmentalism through the medium of a shared growthist ideology (Institute of Social Science 1998; Suehiro 2000). Accordingly, the question then must be asked as to how the values of a growthist ideology, in which people aspire for a prosperous life, are generated and shared.

Following these discussions, the sociologist Machimura (2011) explored the discourse of development surrounding the Sakuma Dam (completed in 1956), one of the leading power generation dams in post-war Japan. This civil engineering project became a symbol of post-war development not only because of its massive size and economic benefits, but also because a documentary film on the construction of this dam project was widely shown in theatres throughout Japan. People witnessed the Sakuma Dam construction through the documentary and shared the development experience. It is too early to say that the documentary acted as some sort of device that engendered the growthist ideology that development is a wonderful dream, but there is no doubt that a shared value, which Machimura

<sup>18</sup> These key factors here are institutions, social divisions, and questions of human growth (Viterna and Robertson 2015, p. 259).

calls the ‘developmentalist mentality’, was formed during Japan’s period of rapid growth.

Dam construction in Japan was a symbol of development in the 1950s and 1960s, but since the late 1990s, it has become a primary target of criticism as ‘meaningless public works’. How these changes in perception developed needs to be analysed at a meta-level, and sociology is responsible for capturing these changes.

## 6.6 Concluding Remarks

The above has confirmed the basic stance of sociology in the field of development, considering the issue of DIDR. If DIDR is viewed in the broad sense of the SDGs goals and targets, vocational training to support re-settlers’ employment is closely related to *Goal 4*<sup>19</sup>, and in terms of participatory development and consensus-building, *Target 6.b*<sup>20</sup> may also be relevant. DIDR can often be discussed together with climate change related displacement and resettlement, which is also closely related to *Goal 13*<sup>21</sup>. Furthermore, although we have considered the negative impacts on human society, it also has a point of contact with *Goal 15*<sup>22</sup> in terms of the impacts of dam construction on the natural environment. However, what is more important than listing the relevant items in this way is to develop understanding case by case and context by context from the perspective of the Sociology of Development/Development Sociology, as explained above.

Developed countries have already shifted towards post development or degrowth, and growthist ideologies may seem somewhat old-

fashioned. However, the goal of development that has driven the world enthusiastically since World War II still exists, albeit with qualitative changes. Goals such as ‘reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by X% compared to the level of the year XXXX’ and ‘step towards decarbonised society’ are ‘desirable’, and the international community’s commitments to these goals are quite similar to the pursuit of conventional developmentalism.

The dominant values are the ideology of sustainability, which has become a world of normative ‘shoulds’. Sustainable development is considered as a matter of course, as well as discussing how to achieve the SDGs. Given the situation, sociology’s most significant role is neither simply to act as a flag-bearer for the SDGs, nor to criticise the ambiguity and inadequacy of the numerical indicators<sup>23</sup>.

Just as development used to be a beautiful-sounding word that caused many problems, the push towards the beautiful goals of the SDGs does not always bear only great fruit. Alternative energies such as wind and solar are also causing health hazards for residents and landscape destruction at the community level. Nuclear power is also touted by pro-nuclear advocates as a ‘clean energy’ that does not emit CO<sub>2</sub>, but the issue of final disposal of spent nuclear fuel indicates that it is not sustainable. Environmental NGOs have criticised the phenomenon of enterprises pretending to take environmental action as ‘greenwash’, and similar concerns about ‘SDG-washing’ are now being raised. The common goals of the international community may

<sup>19</sup> ‘Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’.

<sup>20</sup> ‘Target 6.b: Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management’.

<sup>21</sup> ‘Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts’.

<sup>22</sup> ‘Goal 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss’.

<sup>23</sup> While environmental sociologist Lockie criticises sceptical sociologists who regard the sustainability debate as a meaningless rhetorical device (Lockie 2012), he argues that there is significant scope for sociology’s contribution, as follows: ‘Sustainability is bigger than the SDGs or any other UN-led agenda. We can do more than monitor progress towards the ‘social’ targets agreed through multilateral negotiations. We can engage more directly with questions of *what* ought to be sustained alongside questions of *who* decides, *who* acts and *who* benefits. In doing so, we are presented with additional theoretical and methodological questions about how best to apprehend and influence social relationships that do not yet exist—questions we should be encouraging all sociologists to consider’ (Lockie 2016, p. 3).

be dysfunctional and have ‘unanticipated consequences’.

Portes once argued, while pointing to the failure of structural adjustment policies based on neoliberalism, that without sociological work in development and its diffusion within policy-making circles, it is probable that the fulfillment of the developmental goals of sustained growth and social equity will become anything but certain (Portes 1997, p. 254). The development phenomenon is more complex than it appears on the surface. The perspectives discussed in this chapter provide clues regarding how to identify and understand this complex composition. Putting aside once and for all the value norms of ‘good or bad’, sociology attempts to view society objectively and from multiple perspectives. From this standpoint, sociological perspectives will be of great help when trying to gain a deeper understanding of the phenomena surrounding the SDGs.

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**Part II**  
**For Peace**



# The Trilogy for Peacebuilding: Beyond Obstacles of Democratization, Development and Peace

Mitsuru Yamada

## Abstract

As Peace Studies is interdisciplinary subject, this chapter especially focuses on three main aspects: democratization, development, and peace. These are very important factors for keeping on a peaceful society. Therefore, we must cooperate for solving such challenges because we are facing with serious issues resulted from three areas. In concrete, democratic system is confronted by authoritarianism. The regime against human rights is increasing worldwide as well as in Asia. We get the news on election operation without a free and fair guarantee. It generally means there were irregularities at the polls. In the case of development, we are facing with the income disparity inside a country, as well as among states. Finally, the policy seeking the interests of own country like ‘America First’ sweep across worldwide. Therefore, we must promote the peace on human rights based on international harmony and cooperation. This chapter discusses to remove various obstacles as mentioned above. And then, the actors such as government, the UN, regional organization, and non-governmental organization (NGO)

must take charge of the role of promoting peaceful world because they need to cooperate for realization of SDGs Goal 16, based on peace, justice, and strong institutions.

## Keywords

Democracy · Development · Peace · Liberalism · Human rights

## 7.1 Introduction

This chapter aims at achievement of the optimum condition for societal growth. Therefore, we have to cooperate to solve difficult challenges with the government, the UN, regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because they have the power to realize SDG Goal 16, based on peace, justice, and strong institutions.

In recent times, democracy is on a shaky ground. However, it remains a central concept of any political system in protecting basic human rights. Therefore, why do we still hear that democracy is regressing or even going backward? The intentional or inevitable interpretation of democracy differs from country to country. In modern society, the interpretation of democracy is invisible to one’s own country. This is reminiscent of a swaying ship loaded with “Democracy,” which has the same concept on board but sways even though it is supposed to be anchored.

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The concept of democracy is indeed fluctuating in recent times.

I have been thinking about development in developing countries for many years, ever since I traveled around Southeast Asia as a backpacker at the age of 20. The reality that I have always faced in developing countries, especially since the late 1990s, is the “contemporaneity of development.” For example, since the referendum in August 1999, I have closely observed peace building and subsequent state building in Timor-Leste after the conflict.

For example, in restoring and reconstructing telecommunication systems that had been destroyed in the conflict, the spread of fixed-line telephones quickly surpassed, and now almost all young people have cell phones, even smartphones, and are connected to the rest of the world through social media networks, such as Facebook. However, a certain amount of poverty still exists in the rural areas in Timor-Leste; in those areas, certain instances of underdevelopment exist that are different from the standard of living in urban areas. In short, an “uneven development” exists in the society with income disparity as the backdrop.

Furthermore, the confrontation between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, which has become more conspicuous with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, is similar to the Cold War structure of the former U.S.–Soviet era; however, it is not an ideological confrontation of the past. While President Xi Jinping himself has stressed the importance of free trade, the former U.S. President, Donald Trump, had adopted a more protectionist approach with his “country first” policy. Although the current U.S. president, Joe Biden, has called for a shift to a more cooperative international policy, the conflict between the U.S. and China, over economic relations, is expected to continue.

Alternatively, in areas of politics and security, China has drawn a forceful territorial sea line, as seen in the nine-dashed line in the South China Sea, and frictions over territory with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian countries exist. The U.S., which is supposed to

be the leader of liberal democracy, has become increasingly protectionist, while China, which has an authoritarian regime under a one-party communist dictatorship, is appealing for free trade and international cooperation within a state-centric structure.

In this chapter, I would like to consider the current state of contemporary society, based on my own experiences in the field, with three key words: “fluctuating democracy,” “uneven development,” and “peace without a center of human.” Thereafter, I would like to reconsider the nature of “democracy,” “development,” and “peace,” as human beings are born with the basic human rights of freedom and equality. I would also like to ask whether SDG Goal 16, “Peace and justice for all,” is being provided.

Finally, “peacebuilding” in this chapter refers to conflict prevention. The term “conflict” here, includes not only physical violence but also structural and cultural violence, such as discrimination, oppression, and poverty, as presented by Galtung (1969). I have analyzed and discussed these conflicts as three types of pathologies, namely “The Trilogy of Peacebuilding,” in the hopes of creating new international peace, as these are important factors for maintaining a peaceful society.

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## 7.2 What is Liberal Democracy?

Hiroshi Tanaka states that even if the origin of liberal democracy is unclear, the meaning of this term is a combination of modern economic liberalism, such as “market economy,” “laissez-faire,” and “harmony between private and public interests,” as used in economics, and the idea of political democracy, which ensures “equality” and “peaceful society” through “the participation of the whole people in politics.” (Tanaka 2013, p. 12).

Liberalism has two aspects: political liberalism, which focuses on the political institutions of the state, and economic liberalism, which focuses on the market. While the former is based on institutional liberalism and democratic peace theory, which addresses international issues

through international organizations and various international treaties; the latter is based on interdependence through trade and investment due to the expansion of the international economy.

I am especially concerned about the recent global retreat of “liberal democracy”; and this concern is adeptly reflected in book titled *The People versus Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*, written by Yascha Mounk. He suggests that liberal democracy is the transformation of popular ideas into public policies, whilst protecting individual rights. However, in the modern state, the liberal democracy function is receding; while various democracies can be illiberal, conversely, liberal institutions can also be undemocratic, even when there are regular and competitive elections (Mounk 2019, p. 30).

According to Monk’s categorization, I have classified the composition of democracy in Asia, where I have been working on democratization; this is shown in Table 7.1. Including Timor-Leste, which is not yet a member, the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and East Asian countries can be classified as follows.

Other Asian countries such as Vietnam, Laos, China, and North Korea are the one-party rule system and Brunei Darussalam is only an absolute monarch. However, Myanmar is not at a stable place at present because of military coup in 2020.

### 7.2.1 The Fluctuating Democracy at Present

The trend in international politics seemed to shift from the realism of the Cold War era to idealism and liberalism. However, as Welsh points out, “The return of history” awaited the international

community. In other words, how optimistic was the notion that “Western liberal democracy has been universalized as the final form of human governance” was also expressed in Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* published in 1992.

As Fukuyama pointed out, after the Cold War, the international community accepted the UN-centered multilateralism of international cooperation against the backdrop of an increase in liberal democracies, as well as in the role and expectations of the UN. However, after 2010, the UN faced a fundamental threat to the Western-led liberal democracy model. “The end of history” predicted by Fukuyama, although international community expected idealism or liberalism after realism during Cold War, prophesied that the path to peace will collapse (Fukuyama 1992).

What is the “counterattack of history” that Welsh developed? First, it is a “return to barbarism” that goes against international humanitarian law, such as the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS). Secondly, it is the “return to mass refugees,” the unprecedented refugee and immigration problem that is hitting Europe. Thirdly, Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical return to power, and finally, a “return to social inequality” based on growing economic inequality within Western liberal democracies (Welsh 2017, pp. 40–41).

Another point must be added to Welsh’s four turning points, which is, the rise of China. Xi Jinping first became the general secretary of the Communist Party of China in 2012 and then became the president in 2013. He is aiming for the great revival of the Chinese nation. China has modernized its military force from a revolutionary army to a national defense force, and now has a navy and air force, second only to the U.S. While China is politically strengthening the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party

**Table 7.1** Forms of democracy in East and Southeast Asia

Liberal democracy	Illiberal democracy
Timor-Leste, Indonesia, The Philippines, Japan, South Korea	Singapore, Malaysia
Undemocratic liberalism	Authoritarianism
Thailand, Myanmar**	Cambodia

economically, it is aggressively introducing a market economy similar to that of Western countries, known as a socialist market economy.

China, being the second largest economy, with the presence of aid policies based on the “One Belt, One Road Initiative” (BRI) policy in the country, and a massive economic zone initiative, have caused the degree of freedom in the nation—that used to be a liberal democracy—to recede; contrarily, the number of democratic nations that hold skeleton elections has increased. In other words, an increasing number of states are either flying on one side of the democratic fence or moving toward authoritarian political systems (Kan 2018, pp. 160–169).

However, during the latter half of 2017, critical expressions against China, such as the “Chinese debt trap” and “neo-colonialism,” emerged from the littoral countries of the “One Belt, One Road Initiative.” According to the Center for Global Development (CGD), a U.S.-based research organization, China has invested \$8 trillion in transportation, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure in its massive network of 68 countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia; however, 23 of the 68 countries are in a debt crisis. (CGD Policy Paper 2018, p. 121).

Contrarily, the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, has published an interesting survey report. In it, 58 questions were asked to 1308 respondents, working in five professional areas: research institutions, business and finance, public sector, civil society, and media, drawn from 10 ASEAN countries, between November 12 and December 1, 2019.<sup>1</sup> According to an analysis of the ISEAS-ASC report, for ASEAN countries, China has two aspects: China’s expectations based on the backdrop of massive economic aid, and China’s threat based on its assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea and other areas.

Therefore, China has two contradictory faces: “expectations and threats.” It can be said, that, Southeast Asian countries’ political systems fluctuate between a free political system (liberal democracy) and an unfree political system (illiberal democracy). When the balance between

liberal democracy and illiberal democracy is upset, countries are towed, either visibly or invisibly, toward authoritarian regimes, using China as a cover.

Conversely, intellectuals may expect the United States, Japan, and the European Union to tow the ASEAN region back to a free political system or liberal democracy. This expectation is an analysis that can be interpreted from the data indicators in the ISEAS-ASC report.

### 7.2.2 New Movement Against Democracy

I would like to consider two examples of democracy. One of these considerations is the restoration of geopolitics and the political system of “sovereign democracy,” as advocated by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (Welsh 2017, p.41). When Putin assumed presidency in 2000, in his Millennium thesis, he advocated the revival of a stronger Russia based on the country’s real economy, which has declined to one-tenth that of the U.S., and one-fifth that of China. If we consider the characteristics of the Russian economy, which relies on energy resource states—“geo-economics”—then in terms of “geopolitics,” Russia is located in the center of Eurasia, exerting influence over the Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, and the Middle East. Thus, Russia remains a superpower in geopolitical terms (Shimotomai 2016, p. 296).

Rather than ties based on the ideology of communism, as in the former Soviet Union, Russia emphasized soft power that connects it with its neighbors through ties, such as energy exports, language, religion, and civilization. However, Putin’s soft power has often been described as “soft coercion,” and he is pursuing foreign policy based on national interests and pragmatism. Shimotomai points out that from a geo-economic perspective, Putin is seeking to develop energy and logistics routes through the Arctic Ocean and is adopting a strategy of shifting Russia eastward that he refers to as “De-Europe and In-Asia” (Ibid., pp. 297–298).

Moreover, it is known that the Soviet Union eventually disintegrated due to the *Perestroika policy* that was welcomed by the Western countries. However, for many Russians, the disintegration of the state was not a pleasant event, as their livelihood depended on the state that controlled the administration and economy. The inflation rate reached 2600%, immediately after the collapse, affecting the middle class of government employees, teachers, military personnel, students, and pensioners. The democratization and market economy suddenly introduced by Boris Yeltsin deprived them of their livelihoods. Furthermore, the existence of a series of political merchants who flocked to the privatization of Yeltsin's regime, widened the gap in the Russian society.

Putin launched a patriotic campaign and won the presidency through his support base—the United Russia. After assuming office, he restructured his political party and decisively rebuilt the nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union by articulating a strong state and sovereign democracy, backed by the idea of vertical control. Shimotomai states that Putin's achievement in his first term was bringing order to the relationship between the state and the market by avoiding corrupt oligarch tax evasion and making taxation simple and flat. Moreover, Putin's soft authoritarianism, what he calls "vertical control," "management democracy, or sovereign democracy," was accepted by the Russian population (Ibid., pp. 197–200).

Russia belongs to the category in Monk's Table 7.1. The country is in a situation where its axis is shifting from an illiberal democracy to an authoritarian political system. Poland and Hungary, which used to be part of the Soviet bloc and ruled by a single communist party, the Polish United Workers' Party, and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, have undergone a regime change with the democratization of Eastern Europe and joined the EU in 2004. However, the recent political systems of both countries are leaning towards what Monk classifies as a non-liberal democratic system. In this instance too, a fluctuating democracy can be identified.

Another movement against democracy is the "Sharp Power," which has been discussed mainly in the U.S. as a new type of power, in the context of today's fluctuating democracy. It goes without saying that the existence of power in international politics is an important source of exercising power. The power that existed in the Cold War era resulted in that specific period being named as the era of hard power, backed by the military and economic power of the major powers. However, the influence of hard power was diminished by the end of the Cold War. Rather, it encouraged the emergence of soft power in its following eras. Joseph Nye opined that peace and prosperity could not be brought about, merely by the exercise of America's mighty military and economic power. The U.S. president needs to make the ideals of democracy and capitalism more attractive. Thus, soft power is embodied in a country's culture, values, and policies at the national level (Nye 2009).

In contrast to these three concepts of power, one can wonder, what is "sharp power?" In 2017, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) published a 150-page book, *Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence*. The NED is a private, non-governmental organization created under the Reagan administration in 1983 that works with the Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI) on democracy, democratization, and international affairs, worldwide, to provide funding and support for the growth and strengthening of democratic research institutes (Walker and Ludwig 2017, pp. 2–3). Although it is a non-governmental organization, it has a close relationship with the U.S. government, as most of its funding comes from the U.S. national budget.

Considering the current state of modern society, the authoritarian states of China and Russia are spending billions of dollars on methods that are neither hard power nor necessarily soft power, such as people-to-people exchanges, extensive cultural activities, educational programs, development of media companies, and global information operations. In short, it can be noted, "rather than engaging or persuading, it instead looks to disruption and manipulation," to

systematically stifle political pluralism and domestic freedom of expression to secure its interests.

In the official journal of the NED, published by Johns Hopkins University (*Journal of Democracy* 2018), Walker analyzes why authoritarian states, such as China and Russia, have made a comeback.

First, he states the stagnation of democracy. This is because the countries that have led democracy today are deprived of confidence and are perplexed in the face of authoritarian states challenging them on the level of ideas, principles, and standards.

Second, he noted that dictatorships focus on the openness of democratic systems. If it is news or information on politically important subjects, China and Russia will control them. This is because the two countries leading authoritarianism today, find ways to protect themselves from the political and cultural influences of democracies, and exercise control in the realm of ideas.

Third, the eclectic state-capitalist regimes in China and Russia allowed autocrats to deftly penetrate the commerce and economy of democracy-led states through state-linked business activities in ways that were almost impossible during the Cold War. For example, Walker says that businesses in China rely not on the success or failure of their performance, but on meeting the demands of the government (Walker 2018, pp. 10–11).

Beyond the political sphere, the harmful effects of sharp power are now clearly increasing in the cultural, academic, media, and publishing spheres, which is important for citizens of democracies to perceive and understand the world. This is because the culture, academia, media, publishing (CAMP) field is open, accessible, and vulnerable in democracies, while China and Russia, with their sharp power, are prime targets in these areas. As a striking example, China has more than 500 Confucius Institutes around the world, including 100 in the U.S. university campuses, to teach Chinese

language and culture across the cultural and academic worlds. They are funded by the Chinese government as part of the country's strategy which influences socio-political areas in the democratic countries (Ibid, pp. 12–13).

Sharp power also permeates CAMP media, especially in the modern digital realm. Dictatorial regimes, such as in China, Russia, are censoring their citizens' free access to media using online equipment and technologies that preclude their use by international standards. Thereafter, Walker goes on to state that China is currently putting pressure on foreign technology and printing companies, such as Google and Facebook, to increase global freedom or the other way around (Ibid, pp.15–16).

The clear difference between soft power and sharp power is that, in a liberal democratic system, it is based on non-military, non-coercive power, and only on free values and appeal to influence other countries. However, as Nye pointed out, soft power is still an effective diplomatic tool, and Western democracies must first promote the appeal and value of free and open political systems to fragile democracies through aid and support (Nye 2009). Consequently, the "fluctuating democracies" that are being towed by "sharp power," can be brought back to liberal democracy through soft power.

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### 7.3 Inequitable Development

Welsh considers the "return to an unequal society" at the end of the "Return of History" phenomenon. Specifically, when we rethink the vulnerability of liberal democracy, while we have been seeking human rights that guarantee various freedoms, there are many individuals whose right to life is threatened. This is the reason behind the choice of authoritarian regimes with strong leadership. In the following section, I focus on the disparity between wealth and income spreading throughout the international community. Thereafter I will close with a consideration of the reality of "uneven development."



### 7.3.1 Inequitable Development in the World

Ahead of the World Economic Forum, held annually in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss the promotion of liberal trade, the international NGO, Oxfam, issued a report on the current state of global poverty inequality. The report, published on January 20, 2020, stated that the assets of the world's top 2153 richest people now exceed those of the world's poorest 4.6 billion people. According to the UN's 2019 population statistics, the world's population is 7713 million, which means that the assets of the world's poorest people, or about 60% of the world's population, are equivalent to those of the top 2153 richest people.

In this regard, the 2020 report provided interesting interpretations. The 22 richest people in the world are richer than all African women. There are 12.5 billion unpaid women and girls in the world's workforce every day, contributing at least \$10.8 billion to the global economy each year, and the world's manufacturing sector records more than triple this statistic. It also states that if the richest 1% of the world's population paid an additional 0.5% estate tax for 10 years, it would provide enough money to create 117 million jobs for the care for the aged, childcare, education, and health industries (OXFAM International 2020).

As demonstrated by Oxfam, the gap between the rich and poor in the world widened in the 1990s. After the Cold War, the international community focused on human security (HS) rather than national security. The concept of HS ensures the safety of people and communities in which they live their daily lives. The method of perceiving security began to transition to a bottom-up approach from a top-down approach.

Regarding the difference between the two security concepts, the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, considers the following four points in its report: First, HS is people-centered, that is, it focuses on protecting people from a variety of threats rather than on attacks by external forces. Second, it incorporates threats that include

environmental pollution, international terrorism, large-scale population movements, infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS, and long-term oppression and impoverishment. Third, the era of the state, alone as the bearer of security, is over and many people, including international and regional organizations, NGOs, and civil society, play a crucial role. Finally, ensuring security and strengthening the capacity of people and societies are inextricably linked. People find their own solutions and solve their own problems. The commission appeals that capacity building is necessary for this purpose (Commission on Human Security 2003, pp. 12–13).

*The 1994 Human Development Report (HDR)* published by the United Nations Development Programme was a catalyst for the spread of HS in the international community. The HDR was developed with the aim of representing basic human rights and presents the Human Development Index (HDI) with basic human needs (BHNs) in mind. The HDI, specifically, is calculated using three indices: an education index based on adult literacy and gross enrollment rates, a health index based on life expectancy at birth, and gross national income (GNI) per capita, based on purchasing power parity.

The purpose of *The 1994 HDR* was to present a new way of thinking about human security, from the perspective of human development. In this report, seven areas are recognized as crucial to human security: economy, food, health, environment, individual, community, and politics.<sup>2</sup> These can be grouped together into two categories, freedom from chronic threats, such as hunger, disease, and oppression, which falls under “freedom from wants,” and protection from the sudden disruption of daily routines, such as home, work, and community, which corresponds to “freedom from fear” (HDR 1994, pp. 23–33).

Freedom from wants, as the Oxfam report mentioned above, shows, is the result of the growing disparity between the rich and the poor, which has narrowed the traditional middle class and divided it into a few upper and many lower classes, resulting in an extreme increase in the number of people suffering from scarcity. Contrarily, the scope of “freedom from fear”

continues to increase with the rise of conflicts, terrorism, natural disasters, and the fear of new infectious diseases, such as the new influenza and the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). Currently, increasingly complex problems of scarcity and fear, such as environmental problems, are rising in the society. Thus, the HDI index is important for visualizing the reality of scarcity and fear that the international community is currently facing. The existence of the HDI presented by the HDR is also noteworthy in arousing international public opinion by showing the situation of human rights violations (Yamada 2016, 2019).

While the right to liberty and social rights were called first- and second-generation human rights, Karel Vasak, Director of the UNESCO Division for Human Rights and Peace, identified the right to solidarity as a third-generation human right in his 1977 article. It specifically includes “the right to development,” “the right to the environment,” “the right to peace,” and “the right to ownership of the common heritage of mankind.” In short, it states that these rights reflect the visionary power of the community and can only be achieved through the collective efforts of individuals, states, and other organizations, including public and private institutions (Vasak 1977, p. 29).

The UN adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development in its 41st session on December 4, 1986. Here, “the right to development as a human right” is clarified in Article 1. However, the meaning of development is quite comprehensive as it includes not only basic living standards, but education, health, food, housing, employment, and fair income distribution. In other words, it provides a guarantee for human life.

To commemorate the 20th anniversary of the conference, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, where both, the rights of the environment and development were discussed simultaneously. However, the first time that the environment and development were discussed together was at the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development, which provided an opportunity for “Sustainable

Development” to spread globally. It was also called the Brundtland commission as it was chaired by Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. In its report, “Our Common Future,” the Commission stated that the environment and development are compatible.

However, “sustainable development” is a vague phrase that is easier said than done, meaning that it is difficult to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of future generations. The Rio Declaration, which aimed to build a global partnership, was adopted as an outcome of the UNCED. Furthermore, to enhance the effectiveness of the Rio Declaration, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Convention on Biological Diversity, Statement of Forest Principles, and Agenda 21 have been adopted and signed. The Kyoto Protocol flows from the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which led to the Paris Agreement, later known as the post-Kyoto Protocol. “Rio+10” was held in Johannesburg in 2002 to confirm the progress of the Rio Declaration, and “Rio+20” was held, again in Rio de Janeiro, in 2012.

Thus, the concept of human rights has expanded from freedom rights to social rights, development rights, and environmental rights. In this context, one might wonder, are these concepts of human rights applicable only to liberal democracies originating in Western Europe? In conclusion, there are “human rights” that can be applied to undemocratic liberal states, non-liberal democratic states, and even authoritarian states. Alternatively, it can be said that the proliferation of the concept of human rights has led to the existence of human rights that can be selected for each political system.

### 7.3.2 Inequitable Development Inside Countries

Before the globalization of the 1990s, which began in earnest after the Cold War, the stereotypical categorization of rich northern countries and poor southern countries existed as an

extension of the north–south problem in the contrast between advanced industrialized countries and developing countries. However, this dichotomous composition of wealth and poverty is dissolving as globalization, which has been underway since the 1990s, is causing disparities between the rich and the poor within developed countries, which were supposed to become even more prosperous. Similarly, inequalities also occur in developing countries, especially in emerging countries. This is the background to the second pathology that I consider, “uneven development.”

To understand “uneven development,” the analysis of Branko Milanovic, a World Bank economist, is noteworthy. Milanovic coined a term called “Elephant curve” analysis, where he put the growth rate of per capita household income from 1988 to 2008 on the vertical axis, and the income distribution strata from poor to high income on the horizontal axis. The chart portrays the income imbalance associated with globalization, that is, the winners and losers of globalization. Milanovic analyzed the winners and the losers in the 20 years of globalization from the end of the Cold War to the 2008 financial crisis.


As the winners, he cites the richest people who have gained a lot of wealth from globalization, followed by the new middle class, especially in China, India, and the emerging market economies of Indonesia and Brazil. These new middle classes will make up more than one-third of the world’s population. The richest 1% of the world’s population have seen their incomes increase by more than 60% over the past 20 years. Contrarily, as shown in Fig. 7.1, the 200 million Chinese, 90 million Indians, and about 30 million Indonesians, Brazilian, and Egyptians, who make up the new middle class, are at or near 80th and 70th percentile in terms of per capita income growth. These are the richest people in the world. Thus, these two groups, the wealthiest and the new middle class, have been positioned as the winners of the globalization era over the past two decades (Milanovic 2013, pp. 202–204).

Indeed, the income distribution of many people in the new middle class belongs to the 40–70th percentile, excluding the poorest five percent (the World Bank changed less than \$1 a day to less than \$1.25 in 2015), whose income level has not changed. However, according to the World Bank, the percentage of the poorest population has decreased from 44 to 23% over the past 20 years. Conversely, the largest losers during this period, the losers in the age of globalization, are the middle class in developed countries, who are in the 75–90th percentiles of the income distribution as shown in Fig. 7.1, and whose income growth rate is around zero (Ibid.).

It is noteworthy that this situation occurs in the top 25% of the wealthy, with the top 1% and those within 5% gaining substantial wealth, while the next 20% have no or stagnant income growth. This means that there is a rift in the distribution of income among the wealthy, specifically the privileged 60 million people in the world and the miniscule section of three million people in the U.S., who belong to the richest 1% of the world’s population. In other words, the wealthiest people are 12% of Americans and certain numbers of the British, Germans, French, and Japanese. The remaining 1%, including Europeans, Brazilians, Russians, and South Africans, compete with each other to join the same class (Ibid.).

Finally, I wish to highlight the new middle class of emerging economies, such as China and India, which belong to the winning group. In 1988, the median income bracket in China was only slightly more than 10% of the world’s population; however, a similar income distribution in China 20 years later shows that Chinese people are now richer than more than half of the world’s population. India’s median income, although more modest, has risen from 10 to 27th globally, and Indonesia too saw a similar increase from 25 to 39th position, while Brazil rose from 40th to the 66th position in the hierarchical distribution (Ibid.). The existence of a new middle class in these countries seems to have increased the average income of the concerned countries.

**Fig. 7.1** Milanovic’s “Elephant Curve”: Change in real income between 1988 and 2008 at various percentiles of global income distribution (calculated in 2005 international dollars). Source Branko Milanovic (2013), “Global Income Inequality in Numbers: in History and Now,” *Global Policy*, Vol.4. Issue2, p.202



On reading the background of Milanović’s elephant curve, we can observe that due to economic globalization, consumers in industrialized countries are purchasing inexpensive export products from emerging countries, while companies in industrialized countries are shifting their production bases to emerging and developing countries to produce these inexpensive products. Alternatively, as phrases, such as “industrial hollowing out,” permeate industrialized countries along with structurally depressed industries, the employment of the middle class in industrialized countries is gradually being lost.

As a result, while income growth stagnates due to unemployment, employment in emerging countries increases in the opposite direction. Globalization has increased the size of the world economy; however, in the end, it has created a middle class in emerging countries in exchange for a decline in the income of the middle class in developed countries. Simultaneously, however, the world’s poorest people remain unchanged.

The worsening living conditions of the middle class in developed countries and their dissatisfaction with the government are said to be the reasons behind President Trump’s election in the U.S. and Britain’s exit from the European Union (Brexit). The frustration and anger of the middle

class, who were laid off due to the structural recession in the manufacturing industry, known as the Rust Belt region in the U.S. and the U.K., led to the birth of the Trump administration in January 2017, which called for an “America First” policy. In addition, the decline of the two major political parties in the UK—the Conservative Party and the Labour Party—was marked by the existence of people left behind (Mizushima 2016, pp. 173–176).

Globalization has promoted the transfer of manufacturing industries from developed countries to developing countries, while developed countries are required to change their industrial structure to a higher level. One of these changes is the digital revolution. As a result of the digital revolution, workers in traditional manufacturing industries face job losses and lower wages, and immigrants are recruited to compensate for these lower wages. This is also the main reason for the breakthrough of right-wing and right-wing political parties in Europe and the U.S., calling for the exclusion of immigrants and refugees. This is not to mention that Trump in the U.S. has explicitly called for the exclusion of immigrants adhering to the “home country first” policy.

Finally, this section is summarized as follows: This means that developed countries are no

longer developed countries of the past. Developed countries face internal fragmentation. As social rights and the right to life in liberal democracy are threatened, the right to liberty, the most important human right in the Western world, is losing its importance. The evidence for this is the anti-immigrant and anti-refugee movement, across many parts of the world, which has led to a high level of support and rapid growth of right-wing and right-wing political parties that call for such a movement.

As shown in the background of the Elephant curve, the middle class in developed countries that cannot catch up with changes in the industrial structure, such as the advanced digital revolution, which is not staying put but rather is further widening the wealth gap with the rich. In short, the gap between the upper and lower classes has widened significantly, and a relationship between the wealthy, who are immensely rich, and low-wage workers, whose employment is unstable, has been established in many countries. This is the background of the “uneven development” discussed in this chapter.

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## 7.4 Tackling Each Actor for a Peaceful Society

In Asia, many countries have enforced authoritarian policies on their citizens while ensuring economic growth. However, the consciousness of the middle class, which had been conservative toward an authoritarian regime, is clearly changing and is now welcoming it. It has been observed that the Arab Spring prompted Myanmar’s military regime toward democracy in 2011.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, Asian countries have already opened-up their markets and made great progress in liberalizing their economies. Contrarily, the progress of political and social liberalization varies greatly depending on the political system. Civil society aims to ensure the progress of political and social liberalization by manifesting its role.

### 7.4.1 Good Governance for Conflict Prevention

Asia has a variety of political systems. In many state-dominated countries, civil society, including NGOs, have been assiduously developing their activities. Civil society is trying to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Specifically, it is the realization of a society in which justice is guaranteed.

In the 2002 edition of the Human Development Report, the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, “Good governance is perhaps the most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting *development*” (HDR 2002, p. 58). In a special section on “Governance and Human Development,” good governance from a human development perspective is defined as follows (Ibid.):

- (1) The human rights and fundamental freedom of people are respected, and people can live with dignity.
- (2) People have the right to make decisions that affect their lives
- (3) People can demand accountability from decision-makers.
- (4) Social interaction is based on inclusive and equitable rules, institutions, and practices.
- (5) Women are equal partners to men in the private as well as public spheres of life and decision-making.
- (6) People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, or any other attributes.
- (7) Current policies reflect the needs of future generations.
- (8) Economic and social policies respond to people’s needs and aspirations.
- (9) Economic and social policies aim to eradicate poverty and expand the choices in the lives of all people.

In the 1990s, the UNDP published the HDR, which placed human development at the center of development scheme. Instead of measuring

human wealth in terms of the size of the economy, such as gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP), the report attempted to measure the wealth of a country by incorporating indicators such as education level, healthcare level, and income level, all of which are necessary for people to lead a basic social life.

However, the human development strategies for the twenty-first century further emphasize not only individual participation through good governance but also participation with an emphasis on collective activities. Specifically, social and political movements, such as those for environmental protection, promotion of gender equality, and protection of human rights, were recognized as the driving forces to advance the central issues of human development. Political freedom also empowered people to claim their economic and social rights, while education enhanced their ability to demand economic and social policies that responded to priority issues that needed to be resolved (Ibid. p. 61).

In the UNDP report, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines governance more broadly than the World Bank, including participation, involvement of civil society in policymaking, protection of human rights, prevention of corruption, democratic institutions, rule of law, and reduction of excessive military expenditure. It refers to “good governance” by assessing the governance of the country. Inada states that the UNDP’s concept of governance is an intermediate category between the World Bank and the DAC (Inada 2006, pp. 9–12).

He introduces three types of criticisms of the governance indicators introduced by the World Bank and IMF. The first criticism is that the governance indicators of Western-led international development institutions are a uniform imposition of Western values, which are incompatible with the values of developing countries with diverse histories, societies, and cultures. This is based on criticism of the World Bank and IMF’s conditionality-based structural adjustment

policies (SAPs), for loans to developing countries.

The second criticism is that the conditionality associated with World Bank and IMF lending, violates the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, which is the norm of the international community. This is a criticism that in the past, the World Bank and IMF provided economic aid based on the premise of the separation of politics and economics and non-interference in domestic affairs. The third criticism is that the World Bank and IMF are U.S.-led, and that economic interests and political interests for the U.S. are their priority as well as the driving force behind them. This is referred to as the “Washington Consensus” criticism. In the end, the World Bank and the IMF are “exporting democracy” to serve the global strategy of the U.S. (Ibid., pp. 18–19).

#### 7.4.2 Alternative Approach for Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding means “building peace and is closely related to peace studies. In Sakio Takayanagi’s book, *Introduction to Peace Studies for Understanding War*, he states that research on the causes of war has been conducted with the aim of solving various problems that threaten peace and helping to solve them in any nation by applying the scientifically accumulated knowledge of peace studies (Takayanagi 2000, p. 7).

He defines peace studies as the study of the causes of war and the search for conditions for peace through the application of many disciplines. He highlights the interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and applied research methods, of peace studies and its various research subjects. They specifically include environmental issues, gender issues, human rights oppression, marginalization and exclusion, development issues, and migration issues. He further states that it is a discipline that studies these issues using law, economics, political science, and other disciplines (Ibid., pp. 12–14).

Peace research was the origin of peace studies, and there are two lineages. One started in the U.S., with the publication of *the Journal of Conflict Resolution*, based at the University of Michigan. With the aim of avoiding World War III using nuclear weapons during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the researchers of this journal used mathematics and statistics, including game theory, to objectively and scientifically disseminate the results of their conflict-resolution research.

Another trend of peace research originated in Europe. The most significant influence was that of Johan Galtung, who founded the International Peace Research Institute in 1959 at the University of Oslo, Norway (Ibid., pp. 17–18). Galtung identified the structural violence. This theory is based on the “peacelessness” proposed by Sugata Dasgupta of India (Taga 1984, p. 158). He stresses that the opposite of peace is not war, but a state of non-peace, “peacelessness” because of his experiences in India, which Indians suffer from poor, traditional socio-economic framework.

In addition, Western societies believed that without war, which is physical violence, it would be possible to develop science and industry to ensure social and economic benefits and that war and peace are incompatible to each other. Galtung’s structural violence includes cultural competence that arises in social structures. Alternately, the absence of physical violence, that is, war and organized violence between groups, was distinguished as negative peace.

The NGOs working in the fields of human rights, development, and the environment, have been highly regarded for their expertise as consultative bodies in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), since the founding of the UN. However, the UN Security Council, which deals with peace, is led by sovereign states, and the role of NGOs has been limited because weapons are the exclusive domain of governments involved in national security. However, the high number of Nobel Peace Prize laureates, especially since the end of the Cold War, from the civil society and NGOs, is evidence that governments are no longer the only major actors in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

The 1997 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) may have provided an impetus for NGOs to make significant contributions to the field of peace internationally. In 2005, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), concluded a treaty to abolish nuclear weapons. These Nobel-Prize winning organizations may be attributed to the fact that civil society and NGOs have a presence that cannot be ignored as actors promoting international peace.

In December 2008, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) led the Convention on Cluster Munitions with a strategy similar to that of the ICBL, which resulted in the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, which aimed at providing justice to individuals deprived of their dignity in terms of human rights violations, and tried to conduct the Convention through the Ottawa Process, which involved the Canadian government, civil society, and NGOs, including the U.S. Veterans Affairs. A similar strategy led to the Oslo Process in Norway, where a coalition of some 200 NGOs responded to a call for a ban on the use, manufacture, possession, and transfer of cluster munitions.

This NGO-led strategy for the enactment of the Convention was also reflected in ICAN’s “World without Nuclear Weapons” campaign (Nuclear Weapons Convention) mentioned above. It aroused international public opinion not from the perspective of international politics or security, but from the humanitarian perspective that nuclear weapons destroy human health and cause enormous damage to society and the environment. The treaty was adopted by 122 UN member states and territories in July 2017. With the ratification of the treaty by Central America and Honduras in October 2020, the number of countries required for the treaty to enter into force reached 50 and the treaty came into force on January 22, 2021.

An ongoing debate on how to support post-conflict peacebuilding by blending the values of local society and Western-style liberal democracy led to Roland Paris’s suggestion that peacebuilding assistance must first be

“institutionalized before liberalization” (Paris 2005, p. 7). He opines that the imposition of the Western model of liberal democracies destroyed the values and cultural resources of the countries concerned and led to political and social turmoil. As a result, it is believed that the post-conflict government foresaw that it would provoke a major backlash and pose a new threat to the country.

Richmond argues that post-conflict peacebuilding, state-building, modernization, and development environments have become more responsive to local communities. He argues that peacebuilding in local societies should consider local communities with local customs and pay attention to the effects of modernization on local societies, while simultaneously discussing long-term changes, including hierarchies, inequalities, new hereditary systems, gender, and socioeconomic issues that shape the local soil for peacebuilding (Richmond 2011, p. 3).

As a post-liberal peace, Richmond urges the emergence of a “local-liberal hybrid” concept of peacebuilding. Rather than imposing liberal norms on local societies, Richmond argues that we should aim for a fusion between local societies and liberalism, in the broadest sense, and encourage a new blend of the two in each context. Particularly, what is interesting about the post-liberal peace proposal is that it encourages mutual aid and reunification of liberalism and local society rather than mutual rejection of both. He argues that “hybrid mix of local and liberal” peacebuilding will be the result of clashes and exchanges between fundamentally different political organizations and societies (Ibid., pp. 18–19).

Finally, I confirm that the subject of this section is the question of achieving “peace for whom.” My answer is clear because of peace for the innocent beyond “pacifism without a center of human.” I have discussed an alternative method for a peacebuilding approach with several topics. However, I have also stressed that the center of peace is human security.

## 7.5 Conclusion: Role of SDGs for International Harmony and Cooperation

In conclusion, I considered 17 goals of the SDGs. This chapter focuses on Goal 16, which is the realization of a “peaceful and just” society. From the given context, the realization of SDGs suggests that it will be impossible to achieve them by 2030 without cooperation among various stakeholders that transcend national borders. In this respect, it is difficult to realize a society where “no one left behind” with the “home-country-first” approach that is currently prioritized in the international community.

As discussed in this chapter, it is necessary to build an international society in which, the right to freedom, social rights, environmental rights, and development rights are balanced. To achieve this, we must first break away from the “home-country-first” principle and rebuild an international society that allows for international harmony and pluralistic cooperation.

Even after mid-December 2021, the global number of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) infections continues to grow in developing countries, where medical care is weak, as well as in developed countries. The international community’s attention is shifting from infection prevention, such as the use of masks, to vaccine development and vaccination. It is common knowledge that the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the virus a pandemic, this sentence can be framed as follows: However, the spread of the novel coronavirus pandemic has provided has new insights in the context of peacebuilding.

In this chapter, I emphasized the three issues of “fluctuating democracy,” “uneven development,” and “peace without center of human.” These three issues have become more apparent with the spread of novel coronavirus infections that we are now facing. Therefore, I will briefly highlight the challenges faced by the international community based on the prospects for solutions.



First, the problem of income disparity, which has increased due to globalization, has become increasingly apparent. With the spread of the novel coronavirus infection, the “losers” based on the concept of “the Elephant curve” are facing a crisis that is greater than income disparity under normal circumstances. The inability to access national social insurance services, especially for low-wage workers, has prompted the further spread of infection. As a result, many workers died from infection to avoid expensive medical care owing to limited finances. In short, the pursuit of efficiency and cost reduction in a globalized economy has impoverished the middle class.

In this sense, the lesson learned is that rebuilding the impoverished middle class is a pre-requisite for basic economic and political stability of the society. Simultaneously, the spread of the disease to vulnerable groups must be seen as a human rights issue that the international community must address. In the U.S., where the disease is spreading explosively, a high mortality rate among Africans, Hispanics, and other minorities has been reported (Matsuoka 2020, *Newsweek Japan*, June 19). Preventing the spread of the disease to the poor is the most recent challenge that must be addressed by the international community, which is committed to human security.

Second, the COVID-19 epidemic started in China, and under the strong political authority of the Communist Party dictatorship, China took uncompromising measures to prevent infection, including the purchase of masks, the emergency construction of simple hospitals, and implementing a curfew with penalties. Consequently, the early spread of the disease was controlled. However, the infection continued to spread to Europe and the U.S., but the Chinese government saw the spread of the infection in Western Europe as a perfect opportunity to point out the vulnerability of Western-style liberal democracy and began to counterattack the criticism of China by international public opinion. China’s Sharp Power strategy, discussed in this chapter, has sharply cut into the vulnerabilities of the liberal democratic system, leading to a “democracy

without liberalism” and a shift to an authoritarian political system.

In other words, the spread of the novel coronavirus revealed the vulnerability of Western-style liberal democracies. While the Asian approach, which emphasizes social order, was able to halt the spread of the disease to a certain extent, the Western approach, which emphasizes the right to freedom, took measures against the infection based on the premise that individuals are responsible for their own actions. The extent to which the aggressive curfew policy in the media can be balanced by human rights, remains to be seen.

Third, globalization has promoted an international society in which goods, money, and information can travel freely across borders based on the premise of people’s international movement. Thus, one of the reasons for the spread of the novel coronavirus can be attributed to the international movement of people who freely cross borders. After the outbreak, we can expect a strong backlash and further rejection of immigration and refugee exclusion. Consequently, populist politics seems to be gaining more power in Europe.

However, it is also clear that the lessons learned from this incident underscore the need to rebuild international cooperation, which populist political leaders and parties have neglected. Rather than seeing the spread of the virus as a problem caused by the international movement of people in the wake of globalization, it may be that it is the regression of international cooperation, which is the source of this threat. As an international public good, the WHO is based on the principle of international cooperation and assumes multilateral collaboration. In fact, the WHO-led COVAX Facility aims to ensure an equitable supply of vaccines to developing countries.

Fourth, even if there are conflicts of national interest among governments, the need for a global network of civil society and NGOs that transcends national borders and emphasizes human interest has been strengthened as an actor in promoting the human community. Simultaneously, there exists a threat to information

manipulation. In addition to the large amount of existing information, it is difficult to select necessary and reliable information from social media. We are the target of not only physical terrorism but also cyber terrorism, which are a threat to human security. Now we need to conduct serious discussions based on liberal democracy to combat such threats. More proactive development of global networks will open up newer prospects for human interest.

The final appeal of this chapter is to ensure everydayness in our lives. We should build various networks daily that emphasize international coordination and cooperation in building a peaceful society. Although the novel coronavirus belongs to a typical event of extraordinary nature, liberalism and democracy are the basis for creating peace in our daily lives and guaranteeing “freedom from fear.” “Freedom from poverty” is also a longstanding goal of humanity, as is the realization of a world where the SDGs aims at the slogan, “Leave no one behind.”

## Notes

1. A breakdown of the 1308 respondents by country shows that 224 (18.6%) were from Myanmar, 222 (17%) from Singapore, 163 (12.5%) from Malaysia, and (11.6%) from Vietnam, and Indonesia. 11.3%; Philippines, 10.5%; Brunei, 7.4%; Thailand, 7.3%; Cambodia, 2 Cambodia 2.5%, and Laos, 1.8%. By occupation, 40% of the respondents were engaged in government, regional, and international organizations; 36.2% in researchers, think tanks, and research institutes; 6.6% in business and finance; and 6.5% in civil society and NGOs.
2. According to *the 1994 HDR*, HS comprehends various securities, especially 7 areas, that are necessary for our daily lives except traditional security, such as territory and military.
3. In an interview with Benedict Rogers, a British human rights activist who supported the democracy movement in Myanmar, Than Shwe, a former longtime military ruler—

including others—said, based on multiple sources, that “they probably saw what happened to the Arab dictators and decided it was safer to tolerate the reform path” (The *Asahishimbun*, April 5, 2012, morning edition article). However, in response to the overwhelming victory of the National League of Democracy (NLD) after the second general election in 2020, following the transfer of civilian rule, the armed forces claimed that an illegal election was held, causing a coup d’ état in February 2021. At the end of December 2012, Myanmar’s political and social situations remained uncertain.

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# Stuck in an Equilibrium of High Corruption: The Strait Gate to a Fair and Transparent Society

# 8

Atsushi Kato

## Abstract

Target 16.5 of SDGs aims to “Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.” It is widely accepted in economics that corruption aggravates the overall economic performance of a society. However, previous studies have also shown that firms providing bribes to public officials are likely to record higher sales growth, while public officials undoubtedly enjoy extra income or entertainment. Domestic and international actors have fought against corruption for long, but most of these efforts have failed, mainly due to the reluctance of public officials who benefit from the entangled networks of corruption. Corruption has become an equilibrium of the interactions of a variety of societal actors, which is thus considered a social institution. Historically, all societies were corrupt by today’s standards, but some of them have successfully overcome the hardship of escaping the equilibrium of corruption, achieving a more transparent society. The examples of such societies include Britain, the United States, Hong Kong and Singapore. These cases indicate that the strong political will of

powerful elites is necessary for successful transitions. Many developing countries do not meet such conditions, which is a strait gate for a fair and transparent society.

## Keywords

Corruption · Political will · Principal-agent model · Institution

## 8.1 Introduction

The targets of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 are “access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels.” Specifically, Target 16.5 is to “substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.” Corruption in the public sector typically involves bribery by a private actor, inducing a public official to change the implementation of a public policy or enact, amend, or repeal a law in favor of the bribe giver. The practice of corruption distorts public policy in such a way that it benefits only a subset of citizens at the cost of others, diverting government expenditure from its optimal use. All SDGs require substantial government involvement. If a government policy is distorted to benefit only those who offer bribes, we cannot expect the government to support the achievement of SDGs. In this sense, I believe

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that the alleviation of corruption is at the crux of the achievement of SDGs.

Corruption is more widespread in developing countries, where economic growth and poverty reduction are urgently needed (e.g., Olken and Pande 2012). Ugur and Dasgupta (2011), through a meta-analysis of the literature on corruption's effects on economic growth, find a 0.59% and 0.86% decline in the growth rate of per capita GDP in a sample of low-income countries and all countries, respectively, for a one-unit increase in the perceived corruption index. Corruption has been shown to aggravate the prospects for poverty alleviation. For instance, Gupta et al. (2002) show that a one-standard-deviation increase in the growth rate of corruption leads to a 4.7% decrease in the growth rate of the income of the lowest 20% of the population. Furthermore, corruption exacerbates the inequality of income distribution, as well as access to public services. Those who give substantial bribes to public officials are more likely to become richer, while those who cannot afford to pay bribes remain poor (e.g., Gupta et al. 2002; Gyimah-Brempong 2002). In a corrupt society, poor people are sometimes excluded from public services, such as basic education and primary health care, which they are entitled to, and thus, are left behind.

Section 8.2 introduces the issues on the concept of corruption, and the consequences of corruption, which have been examined in previous studies. Section 8.3 discusses two views on the causes of corruption: the principal-agent model and the institutional view on corruption, and explains why it is difficult to escape from the equilibrium of prevalent corruption. Nevertheless, a number of countries, all of which were corrupt in the past, succeeded in transitioning from a corrupt society to a fair and transparent society. Section 8.4 discusses four success stories, of Britain, the United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore. However, the analysis of these success stories simply shows that it is indeed through the strait gate that a society can transform itself from a corrupt one to a non-corrupt one. Finally, Sect. 8.5 presents the conclusions.

## 8.2 The Concept and Consequences of Corruption

### 8.2.1 Concept of Corruption

Corruption is defined in many ways, as is usually the case in any social science concept. Transparency International adopts the definition of corruption as “abuse of entrusted power for private gains.” This definition presumes that there is somebody who is entrusted with power for the purpose of realizing a collective or public goal. However, the one entrusted with power exerts power to pursue private gains, and in such situations, corruption occurs. This definition of corruption applies to both private and public domains. An example is when the procurement section chief of a private company chooses the company's supplier of materials or components in exchange for bribes, not based on enhancing the company's profits. However, many scholars and practitioners have restricted their attention only to the public domain. The most broadly used concept of corruption along this line is “the misuse of public offices for private gain” (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman 2008). In line with many previous studies, the present chapter focuses on corruption only in the public sector. Furthermore, Kurer (2005) clarifies the meaning of “misuse” in the definition above by adding a normative criterion, and defines corruption as “violations of non-discrimination norms governing the behavior of holders of public office that are motivated by private gain.” This definition is based on the ethical principle that public officials must not discriminate in favor of those who are close to them or pay them bribes. We follow this definition throughout this chapter, implying that corruption induces the distortion of public choices.

Corruption can occur in different spheres of the public domain. For instance, a large company provides huge bribes to a political leader or the members of a legislative assembly to enact a new law or amend or repeal an existing law in a way that benefits the company. Another type of corruption works at the front line of public policy

implementation.<sup>1</sup> For instance, a citizen who applies for water connection may expedite the date of connection if bribes are paid. Another example is when a person gets a driver's license without taking the driving skills test by paying bribes. Corruption can also occur in the judiciary domain. If a convict bribes the judges, they can receive a more lenient sentence than duly warranted in similar cases. This chapter focuses on the first two cases, namely, corruption in policymaking and policy implementation, although corruption in the judiciary often entails similar causes and consequences.

## 8.2.2 Consequences of Corruption

Next, we examine the effects of corruption in policymaking and policy implementation on a society, first at the macro level, and then at the micro level.

### 8.2.2.1 Consequences at the Macro Level

Here, the effects of corruption at the macro level refer to the aggregate effects of corruption on the whole society, not on an individual actor of a society. We discuss the effects that have been shown to be important in previous studies, starting with the economic consequences, followed by other social consequences.

Many previous studies have provided evidence that corruption leads to a reduction of physical investment (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995, 1997; Campos et al. 1999). This negative effect is likely because physical investment often necessitates various licenses or permissions, which gives corrupt public officials opportunities to demand bribes, resulting in a decline in the marginal returns from investment in a corrupt society. The negative effect of corruption on investment is considered to be even worse when corrupt actions are disorganized because private firms cannot predict how much they need to pay as bribes at each stage of the

administrative process; thus, they are concerned with the possibility that costs eventually exceed revenues (e.g., Campos et al. 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). The negative effects of corruption also work against foreign direct investments through similar channels (e.g., Wei 2000; Wei and Wu 2001; Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Mathur and Singh 2013), but the uncertainty faced by foreign enterprises is even larger because they may not be familiar with the (corrupt) business customs of the host country, or they may not have useful connections with powerful political actors. Accordingly, some foreign enterprises refrain from investing or make joint ventures with local firms to rely on their local partners to manage corrupt deals with public officials (Smarzynska and Wei 2000). Interestingly, according to Habib and Zurawicki (2002), foreign enterprises whose countries of origin are regarded as more corrupt are less likely to be deterred from entering corrupt host countries.

Although less clearly, some previous studies have shown negative consequences of corruption on aggregate economic performance in terms of GDP per capita (e.g., Kaufmann et al. 1999; Wyatt 2002; Kato and Sato 2014) or economic growth rate (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi 2001; Gyimah-Brempong 2002; Meon and Sakkat 2005), while others have found insignificant effects (e.g., Li et al. 2000; Abed and Davoodi 2002). Aggregated economic performance is realized through a variety of factors, including the accumulation of physical and human capital, as well as productivity enhancement; thus, the effect of corruption on aggregate economic performance may not be as clear as that on the investment in physical capital. Subsequent studies have attempted to trace the channels through which corruption exerts negative effects on aggregate economic performance in terms of GDP per capita or economic growth rates, finding a variety of important mediating factors such as physical investment, human capital, and political stability, through which corruption affects aggregate economic performance (e.g., Mo 2001; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004).

In some studies (e.g., Olson et al. 2000; Lamsdorff 2003; Salinas Jimenez and Salinas

<sup>1</sup> This type of corruption is called petty corruption (Jain 2001).

Jimenez 2007), corruption has also been shown to affect productivity negatively. The rise of productivity is considered to be mainly achieved through technological progress, and it is difficult for corrupt public officials to target technological progress, compared with physical capital; thus, productivity is considered to be less susceptible to corruption. However, the expected returns from investment in technological progress, such as R&D expenditures, tend to be lower if public officials capture a part of enterprises' revenues, thus causing stagnation of productivity, as empirically shown in some studies.

Some scholars have shown so-called "greasing-the-wheel effects," which means that corruption expedites administrative procedures that would have been very slow without bribery, and could have positive effects on the economic performance of a society (e.g., Klapper et al. 2006; Méon and Weill 2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2013; Kato and Sato 2015).<sup>2</sup> Except for these few studies, previous studies have generally shown the negative effects of corruption on economic performance at the macro level. A recent study by Ang (2020) indicates that certain types of corruption can facilitate economic growth. She classifies corruption into four categories: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, and access money, and claims that access money could stimulate economic growth. In this type of corruption, powerful public officials offer lucrative profit opportunities, such as exclusive public works commission or preferential license provision, to private enterprises, in exchange for large bribes. Access money generates misallocation of resources, risks, and inequality, but can realize high economic growth in the short run by motivating business people to make investments.

Aggregate economic performance may be aggravated by the effects of corruption on public expenditure, which may take various forms. First, corruption reduces the total amount of tax revenues because corrupt tax collectors receive bribes from taxpayers and collect less tax than

the amounts due (e.g., Alm et al. 2016). Second, the allocation of public expenditures becomes distorted in a corrupt society because public officials prefer large infrastructure projects or military procurement, where they can more easily receive bribes (e.g., Mauro 1998; Gupta et al. 2001; de la Croix and Delavallade 2009; D'Agostino et al. 2016). This is because the order for such projects is voluminous and infrequent, such that private enterprises are willing to pay higher bribes to win the order, and it is less likely to be detected because of the low frequency. Because of this distortion toward large infrastructure projects and military expenditures, expenditures on education and primary health care are likely to be curtailed (e.g., Gupta et al. 2001), which in turn harms the development of human capital. Third, the efficiency of public expenditures worsens because corrupt public officials tend to commission public works to private firms that pay the highest bribes instead of the most efficient firms. Moreover, firms that pay the highest bribes obtain the money to pay bribes by reducing the quantity or quality of the commissioned public works (Wade 1982), resulting in the degradation of infrastructure.

Less expenditure on education and health care, as mentioned above, tends to aggravate the development of human capital in society, leading to further deterioration of the aggregate economic performance of a corrupt society. The awareness of citizens that corruption is harmful to themselves in the long run may change their political behavior, which, in turn, may allow the transformation of a corrupt society into a less corrupt one (see, also, Melgar et al. 2010). However, if insufficient education is provided in a corrupt society, such ideas may not be widely shared among citizens.

Corruption also induces private enterprises to go underground because they want to evade bribery payments to corrupt public officials (e.g., Johnson et al. 2000).<sup>3</sup> According to Schneider's (2005) estimation, 46.1% of Russia's GDP was

<sup>2</sup> The idea that corruption has negative effects on economic performance is called "sanding the wheels effect" hypothesis (see, e.g., Méon and Sekkat 2005).

<sup>3</sup> See Dreher and Schneider (2010) for a more nuanced discussion of the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy.

produced by the underground economy in 1999/2000, while the figure was 52.2% in Ukraine and 60.6% in Azerbaijan. Enterprises in the underground economy cannot rely on public conflict resolution systems such as public courts or police. Thus, they have to design measures to avoid the opportunistic behavior of their economic partners, which is costlier, leading to a less efficient performance of economic activities.

Corruption may cause further inefficiency in terms of the allocation of human resources. The economic abundance of a society can be realized through the enhancement of the productivity of economic activities such as production and trade. For this purpose, as many people as possible should be engaged in value-creating activities (e.g., research and development activities, total quality control, or creation of a new business model) to enhance the productivity of economic activities. However, in a corrupt society, competent young students prefer to become public officials because they are more likely to enrich themselves by receiving bribes than by conducting business, thereby worsening the prospects for society's economic development.

Corruption may also harm economic performance by hampering fair market competition, which ensures that firms providing the highest value to transaction partners make the deal, thereby inducing each economic actor to provide higher benefits to others. In a corrupt society, enterprises that pay bribes may obtain protection through regulations designed by bribe-taking public officials in such a way as to benefit them, or through discretionary implementation in their favor. Therefore, market competition does not work efficiently, resulting in the stagnation of firms' productivity.

In a corrupt society, the inequality of income or wealth distribution tends to be more obvious than in non-corrupt societies, because those who pay higher bribes get treated preferentially by public officials, even though they are already rich people or large enterprises in the first place. Hence, the rich tends to become richer, while the poor tends to remain poor, aggravating the income or wealth inequality in a corrupt society (e.g., Li et al. 2000; Gupta et al. 2002).

The effects of corruption do not remain in the economic domain but extend to other facets of society. If the inequality of income or access to public services is salient across races, ethnic groups, or religious groups, the social divisions between them may get intensified by the grievances of the discriminated groups. This type of inequality is likely to occur in any society, because political leaders need support coalitions and often rely on specific socioeconomic groups. Political leaders provide more benefits to their support coalition members, while they impose more costs on other groups, igniting the anger of groups placed in the inferior position. Thus, social divisions tend to become more serious in a corrupt society, which does not guarantee the provision of public services based on the anonymity principle.

Corruption also tends to reduce trust among people. In a corrupt society, people try to obtain more benefits than others by bribing public officials. In other words, people tend to forestall others for their own private benefits. In such a society, people cannot trust each other, but rely only on close kin and friends, whom they can trust. As Putnam (1993) claims, a society with lower trust tends to incur additional costs in conducting economic activities, thus leading to lower efficiency (see also, Knack and Keefer 1997; Whiteley 2000). Corruption naturally reduces citizens' trust in the government. According to Anderson and Tverdova (2003), citizens in corrupt countries tend to hold more negative views regarding the political legitimacy of their political system. This may, in turn, negatively affect citizens' willingness to pay taxes.

Corruption even harms the environment. Corrupt public officials may impose environmental regulations less strictly on economic actors in exchange for bribes, leading to higher pollution in a corrupt society. Through a cross-country empirical analysis of the effect of corruption on six types of pollution indicators (e.g., urban sulfur dioxide concentration, SO<sub>2</sub>, and nitrogen dioxide concentration, NO<sub>2</sub>), Welsch (2004) find that the total effect of corruption on pollution is positive for all types of pollution.



The size of the effect is considerable; for instance, a one standard deviation increase in the corruption index raises the SO<sub>2</sub> pollution indicator by a 0.2–0.4 standard deviation.

### 8.2.2.2 Consequences at the Micro Level

Although corruption generally harms the aggregate economic outcomes of a society, corruption may or may not be beneficial to actors involved in corrupt deals. Corruption may be harmful to a bribe payer if the act by public officials is considered as purely stealing money from a citizen for ordinary public service that these officials are required to provide without bribes. Meanwhile, corruption can be beneficial for both parties if a bribe-taking public official implements a certain policy in favor of a bribe-paying actor. An example is when a public inspector of certain regulations overlooks the negligence of a private company after receiving bribes, whereby the private enterprise does not need to pay fines or incur additional costs to conform to the regulation. Another example is a situation wherein a public official commissions public works to a private enterprise that offers bribes. In both instances, private enterprises can increase their profits, while public officials can keep bribes for themselves. These corrupt arrangements, beneficial to both parties involved, occur at the cost of general taxpayers.

Some previous empirical studies have shown that enterprises that pay more bribes can achieve good performance such as higher sales growth (e.g., Wang and You 2012; Ayaydn and Hayaloglu 2014; Mendoza et al. 2015; Williams and Martinez-Perez 2016), while other studies show negative performance (e.g., Hanousek and Kochanova 2016; Bai et al. 2019).

### 8.2.3 SDGs and Corruption

As we have seen in Sect. 8.2, corruption generates a wide range of adverse consequences on economies and societies, which curtails the achievement of other SDGs. For instance, corruption may slow down the pace of poverty

reduction (SDG1) or stifle the efficiency of efforts for hunger eradication (SDG2). It is evident that governments play a critical role, through public policies, in achieving other SDGs, such as SDG3 (good health and well-being), 4 (quality education), 5 (gender equality), 6 (clean water and sanitation), 7 (affordable and clean energy), 9 (infrastructure), 10 (reduced inequalities), 13 (climate action), and 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions). Corruption distorts the incentives faced by public officials in such a way that these officials are motivated to seek private benefits through corruption rather than provide public goods, such as those reflected in the SDGs. In this sense, curbing corruption is a prerequisite for the success of SDGs.

## 8.3 Causes of Corruption

Understanding the causes of corruption is necessary to conceive of measures to alleviate corruption. In this section, two different views on the causes of corruption are introduced. The first view looks at corruption from the perspective of a principal–agent model, while the second view considers corruption as a kind of social institution.

### 8.3.1 Traditional View on the Causes of Corruption

Scholars and practitioners have widely analyzed the causes of corruption in the context of the principal–agent model, where a principal, regardless of whether it is a citizen, a member of the legislative assembly, a minister, or a bureaucrat, is regarded as an incorruptible actor, while an agent is a corrupt actor who does not act up to the expectation of the principal. Based on this assumption, scholars have analyzed the causes of corrupt behaviors of an agent under specific conditions, such as asymmetric information and weak law enforcement.

First, the low salaries of government employees are considered to induce corruption, simply because government employees are

forced to take bribes to survive (e.g., Van Rijcheghem and Weder 2001; Azfar and Nelson 2007).

Second, the weakness of institutions that are supposed to prevent corrupt behaviors encourages corruption because public officials do not worry much about the detection of and conviction for corrupt behaviors when institutions are weak. Political leaders often overlook or permit the corrupt behaviors of bureaucrats because they want to maintain the loyalty of bureaucrats; thus, they do not strictly apply to them such anti-regulation measures. Some countries do not have strict anti-corruption laws, and even though strict anti-corruption laws exist in other countries, such laws are not strictly enforced. According to Darden (2008), in Ukraine, political leaders can secure the loyalty and obedience of officials by allowing them to engage in corruption, within the state's administrative hierarchies, which will not function otherwise.

Third, a larger discretionary space for public officials makes it easier for them to demand bribes. Public officials take advantage of their wide discretion in demanding bribes. For instance, if a specific regulation is not clearly defined, it will be up to an inspector whether a private firm is considered as violating the regulation. This room for discretion creates opportunities for corrupt deals between public officials and private actors. Previous studies have shown that wide discretion tends to worsen corruption (e.g., Decarolis et al. 2020).

Fourth, the concentration of decision-making authority in a handful of public officials induces private actors to provide bribes to these officials, because they have critical decision-making power and thus, can easily demand bribes. It is also more efficient if private actors need to exert influence on a few powerful public officials than in the case where authority is spread over many actors. For instance, if the legislative assembly takes the system of committees,<sup>4</sup> the

members of each policy committee hold strong policy-making power; thus, private actors are more tempted to offer bribes to them or find it difficult to refuse their request for bribe payments.

Fifth, the ethics or values of people may affect their behavior. In a corrupt society, people, including public officials, typically do not hold strong ethical values against corruption. People may even believe that they should take advantage of corrupt opportunities to obtain private benefits as much as possible. In such a society, public officials do not face strong social sanctions from other people, leading to less hesitation regarding corruption. For instance, previous studies claim that familism, whereby people tend to remain loyal to their own family members, is positively correlated with corruption (e.g., Lipset and Lenz 2000). In addition, Gerring and Thacker (2005) have shown that socialist legal traditions are positively associated with corruption.

Based on a principal-agent model, a variety of anti-corruption measures have been proposed to curb the incentives faced by public officials. Such anti-corruption measures include reducing public officials' discretion through deregulation and privatization, increasing accountability by supporting democratization and increasing public awareness, increasing the salaries of public officials, and encouraging greater transparency of government decision-making (Persson et al. 2013).

However, these measures have been unsuccessful in eradicating corruption (e.g., Meagher, 2005; Lawson, 2009). Scholars have inquired into the reasons for such failures, claiming that the principal-agent model of corruption may not capture the real interactions of actors in a corrupt society. For instance, even if public education makes people more aware of the adverse effects of corruption on the whole society, one would not take anti-corruption action unless the action brings more benefits than costs to the self. Even if the salaries of public officials are raised, as long as there remain opportunities for them to enrich themselves without much worry about punishment, they would continue to take bribes. Even with deregulation, there usually remains

<sup>4</sup> Under the standing committee system, important decision-making matters are conducted through a standing committee in charge of a specific policy field. This system is adopted in countries such as the United States and Japan.

room for discretion in policymaking and policy implementation and thus, room for corruption.

### 8.3.2 Corruption as a Social Institution

The presumption, behind the traditional anti-corruption measures, that a principal is incorruptible and that an agent is corrupt may not hold in reality. It is the case that most actors, who are considered the principal in a situation, do not attempt to remedy the behavior of corrupt agents, but they also participate in such corrupt deals in many cases. For instance, private enterprises are willing to provide bribes to obtain preferential treatment from public officials. Citizens, perhaps not willingly, pay bribes to frontline bureaucrats to conduct administrative procedures smoothly. Citizens are sometimes willing to pay bribes to public officials (through middlemen) to obtain benefits, such as getting a driver's license without skills testing (Bertrand et al. 2007) or evading high tax payments (Alm et al. 2016). If a firm is competing against private firms in a market and needs to obtain a license from the government to become competitive, that firm will be forced to pay bribes to obtain a license. Otherwise, the firm will exit the market.

People rarely report corrupt cases to the anti-corruption authority, because reporting usually has repercussions. The anti-corruption authority itself is often corrupt, powerless, or inefficient; hence, it does not remedy the reported case. Sometimes, the reported public officials take revenge against the actors who reported corruption cases. The former Minister of Finance of Nigeria, Okonjo-Iweala, who fought against corruption during her term, faced several threats of assault to her family and herself, including her mother's actual kidnapping (Okonjo-Iweala 2018).

People close to public officials who have the opportunity to take bribes from others expect such officials to take advantage of the opportunity. Public officials would even be despised by other people if they do not take advantage of such situations and enrich themselves. They are also

expected to provide benefits to people close to them, who would criticize them for not doing so, and these officials could even be stigmatized (see, e.g., Persson et al. 2013).

As such, people engage in corrupt behavior, willingly or unwillingly, because corrupt behavior is expected to incur fewer costs or greater benefits. Persson et al. (2013) states:

..., we cannot assume the existence of 'principled principals,' willing to hold corrupt officials accountable, such as suggested by the principal-agent framework. Rather, the rewards of corruption – and hence the existence of actors willing to enforce reform – should be expected to depend critically on how many other individuals in the same society that are expected to be corrupt. To the extent that corruption is the expected behavior, at least the short-term benefits of corruption are likely to outweigh the costs.

Even if one is opposed to corruption, the fight against corruption is a futile endeavor, resulting in no remedy from public authorities, possible revenge from reported public officials, and ridicule from other people.

Corruption is induced by incentives formed by the structure of the interactions between actors in a society. In this sense, corruption is an outcome of social institutions (Teorell 2007; Persson et al. 2013). North (1990) defines an institution as "... the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)." Corrupt behaviors are a natural outcome of the incentives faced by actors in a certain social institutional setting. The choice of corrupt actions by actors represents an equilibrium in which unilateral deviation of action by an actor will lower net benefits accruing to the actor, given the choices of actions by the other actors in the equilibrium. Hence, no actor has an incentive to deviate from corrupt actions.

It is very difficult to escape from this equilibrium because no actor has an incentive to deviate from it (Blackburn et al. 2006, 2010). For a corrupt society to transform itself into a non-corrupt society, a strong force that would drive the sweeping transformation of the whole society

is needed. Since a state, to a certain extent, monopolizes enforcement power in the present time, the will of the political elites of the state is expected to play a crucial role in social transformation (Brinkerhoff 2000; Quah 2018).

## 8.4 Successful Cases of Anti-Corruption Reforms

Although corruption is produced by social institutions, which cannot be transformed easily, some societies have successfully undertaken this transformation. Indeed, all societies were corrupt in the past based on current standards. However, some societies are presently regarded as non-corrupt. From their cases, we learn that there existed a strong political will to curb corruption, which enabled escaping from being trapped in the equilibrium of corruption.

### 8.4.1 Britain

There was abundant corruption in Britain by the end of the eighteenth century, when a group of economic-cum-political elites embarked on anti-corruption reform in the British parliament.<sup>5</sup> The extent of corruption had considerably declined by the 1820s through “an intraelite process that came about because of the parliamentary and executive decisions that transformed the administrative system and the nature of public office” (Popa 2015). The members of the British parliament at that time can be roughly classified into three categories: first, government officials, including military officers; second, economic agents who critically depended on the policy of the British government, including India bourgeoisie, West Indies bourgeoisie, and bankers of the Bank of England; and third, economic agents who are more independent from the government policy, including bankers (not associated with the Bank of England), merchants, manufacturers, and physicians. The members of parliament in the

first category enjoyed the benefits obtained through corruption, while those in the second category depended on government officials. These two categories were opposed to the anti-corruption reforms. By contrast, the independent economic agents (the third category) did not benefit from corruption and belonged to the class who bore the burden of tax payment. These independent economic agents neither obtained salaries from the government budget nor relied on the government’s preferential treatment for their occupation. According to Popa’s (2015) argument, as government expenditure rose drastically toward the late eighteenth century because of the wars against the American colonies and the French, these independent economic agents found it intolerable to overlook the inefficiency in the British government and parliament resulting from corruption. Popa (2015) argues that these independent economic agents determined to initiate anti-corruption reform in the parliament in the late 1770s because they evaluated that the cost of a reform would be smaller than the benefits that can be obtained from such a reform. During this period, these independent economic agents comprised around 65% to 70% of the House of Commons, and they controlled the government and bureaucracy to a significant extent. A series of anti-corruption reforms were carried out over four decades until 1820, and a number of public office holders, including the most powerful figures, were impeached for corrupt actions. The success of the anti-corruption reform in Britain was achieved because there was a majority group composed of independent economic elites in the British parliament who had the incentive to fight against corruption.

### 8.4.2 The United States

In the United States, clientelism, which is a form of corruption, was conspicuous, as machine politics, especially in urban areas in the latter part of the nineteenth century, where a group of citizens (clients) offered votes for a patron, and the patron provided benefits to the clients upon winning the

<sup>5</sup>This subsection is based on Popa (2015).

election.<sup>6</sup> Patron–client relationships were most visible among immigrants, who came massively from Southern and Eastern Europe to the United States in the nineteenth century and were a generally poor and less educated electorate.

The economic development of the United States in the latter part of nineteenth century generated the demand for civil service reform from new economic elites, including business communities and middle-class professionals. These reformers were furious about clientelism, whereby less educated politicians held political power by mobilizing uneducated, poor immigrants. They partly fought for their own material interests and partly for the recognition of their status and their dignity. Many of the reformers may have perceived clientelism to be ethically wrong and staged a fierce attack on such practices. This movement led to a large-scale political campaign against machine politics, eventually resulting in the enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883, which established a requirement for civil service examinations and the principle of merit, making political appointments more difficult. The act was followed by subsequent reform efforts to eliminate clientelism until the 1920s.

In this case, it was not the political elites but the economic elites who held a genuine commitment to combating corruption. These elites faced the deprivation of benefits through clientelistic politics, which transferred benefits from them to relatively poor immigrants. They could mobilize social and political campaigns against clientelism using their financial resources. There existed actors who could exert strong political influence and were committed to the fight against corruption. This group's influence affected the decision-making of political leadership.

### 8.4.3 Hong Kong

In Hong Kong, corruption was rampant until the early 1970s.<sup>7</sup> The bribery scandal involving the

high-ranking commander of the Hong Kong Police Force aroused the anger of the public and induced the British government to strengthen anti-corruption measures in Hong Kong. The government established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974. The ICAC has three departments. The Operations Department investigates corruption and the Corruption Prevention Department makes recommendations to remedy public sector systems to prevent corrupt behaviors. Meanwhile, the Community Relations Department educates the public and mobilizes their support for the fight against corruption. This three-pronged approach was considered to be an essential factor in the success of the anti-corruption fight in Hong Kong, and was imitated by other countries such as South Korea and Thailand, which ended up in failure (Hsieh 2017).

One of the reasons for the success of Hong Kong's anti-corruption efforts was the will of the political leader, the Governor, who was appointed by the British government and was not entangled in the corrupt network, and did not benefit from corruption inside Hong Kong. The governor had strong control over the executive branch and the legislative council and could immediately fire civil servants (Mao et al. 2013). The British government expected the governor to cope with the prevalence of corruption in Hong Kong. This peculiar situation provided the governor with incentives to be earnestly committed to the fight against corruption.

With the support of the British government, the governor was determined to combat corruption in the early 1970s after the corruption scandal and gave the ICAC full strength. The ICAC was endowed with great autonomy, preventing political intervention, and sufficient financial and human resources. The ICAC comprised a large number of staff, which was 1358 in 2014, and the expenditure on ICAC relative to the total population was US\$ 16.59 per capita, which is much larger than that in India (US\$ 0.05) and the Philippines (US\$ 0.39) (Quah 2018). Furthermore, ICAC staffs were required to respond promptly to all inquiries from the public regarding corruption, which in turn encouraged the participation of the public, as well as their

<sup>6</sup> This subsection is based on Fukuyama (2015).

<sup>7</sup> This subsection is based on Hsieh (2017) and Mao et al. (2013).

support. All these effective implementation of the anti-corruption measures were possible because of the strong political will of the political leader of Hong Kong.

#### 8.4.4 Singapore

Singapore suffered from the prevalence of corruption from the colonial period to the early 1970s.<sup>8</sup> The ruling People's Action Party (PAP) revamped the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) so that it could more effectively investigate corrupt behaviors and provide evidence for prosecution. The PAP government gave the CPIB significant autonomy as well as sufficient financial and human resources to combat corruption.

As in Hong Kong, there was a strong political will to eradicate corruption in Singapore (Quah 1989, 2004, 2018). One of the reasons for such a political will is that the political leaders of the PAP, after expulsion from Malaysia in 1965, were committed to the future economic development of Singapore, because they faced severe economic conditions at that time, such as a high unemployment rate and a lack of natural resources, and the risk of re-merger into Malaysia under unfavorable conditions (Beng-Huat 1985). The legitimacy of the PAP would depend on the success of economic development, and had it failed in economic development, people would not have supported the PAP. To survive politically, the eradication of corruption was an urgent need for the PAP leaders, and they could not tolerate the corrupt behaviors of public officials. The threat to political survival forced the political elites of Singapore to be committed to the fight against corruption.

#### 8.4.5 Strait Gate to a Fair and Transparent Society

As explained in Sect. 8.3, corruption can be understood as a kind of social institution that is

not easy to escape from because it is an equilibrium from which nobody wants to deviate unilaterally. In the four cases wherein society successfully escaped from the equilibrium, there existed politically powerful actors who did not economically depend on the respective governments, and who were earnestly committed to fighting corruption. In the case of Britain and the United States, economic elites were furious about the corrupt behaviors taken by corrupt political elites. In Singapore, the fate of the political elites depended on the success or failure of economic development. The political elites of Singapore could not tolerate corruption among public officials and were committed to curbing corruption. In Hong Kong, the most powerful political figure, the governor, was appointed in the United Kingdom and was accountable to the British government, which was consistent with the anti-corruption orientation. The mere existence of anticorruption-oriented actors is not sufficient if they are not politically powerful enough. Powerful political leaders must be committed to the fight against corruption.

Unfortunately, these conditions are rarely encountered in developing countries. Most political elites make earnings from their government position; some of them embezzle huge amounts of public funds through corruption, and many of them are entangled in the nexus of corrupt networks. In many developing countries, there are very few powerful political elites who are earnestly willing to fight corruption. By contrast, in many cases, the most powerful political elite are the greatest beneficiaries of corruption.

Most political leaders face incentives to engage in corruption for their political survival. Political leaders need the support of political coalitions to keep their position. To maintain the loyalty of their supporters, political leaders must provide sufficient benefits to these supporters to prevent them from switching to the opposite camp. Here, the incentives to engage in corruption, such as favoritism, patronage, and cronyism, often emerge. Hence, many developing countries are not in a situation that induces political elites to take serious anti-corruption

<sup>8</sup>This subsection is based on Quah (1989, 2004, 2018).

efforts, and we cannot expect powerful political actors to have a strong motivation to eradicate corruption.

## 8.5 Concluding Remarks

First, this chapter explained the consequences that corruption may have on the economy and society, in relation to other SDGs. It is emphasized that the alleviation of corruption is a fundamental prerequisite to achieving other SDGs, because governments play a critical role in achieving most SDGs. Second, the chapter discussed the traditional view on the causes of corruption and explained that the traditional view should be complemented by an institutional view. The institutional view of corruption suggests that it is extremely difficult for a corrupt society to transition to a non-corrupt society, because every actor has no incentive to stop their corrupt behaviors. By demonstrating four cases of a successful escape from the equilibrium of corruption, namely, of Britain, the United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore, we have shown that the strong political will of powerful elites is necessary for successful transitions. However, the analysis of these successful cases suggests that many developing countries do not meet such conditions, which is a strait gate for a fair and transparent society.

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# Considering the Effectiveness and Achievement of SDGs Towards Combating Human Trafficking

# 9

Yuko Shimazaki

## Abstract

Human trafficking needs to be addressed globally. It is designated as an important part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Human trafficking can be defined as a by-product of a negative circle caused by several social and economic problems that reciprocally affect each other in a complex manner. Global systematic exploitation, widening inequality, domestic or international social problems, and human rights issues lead to it. Considering the features of human trafficking, this chapter attempts to examine methods to reduce it using SDGs. This study mainly considers SDGs 5, 8, 10, 16, and 17 by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This paper also tries to discuss it considering the goals and the following perspectives to propose possible solutions to the problems: First, the actions the international society has taken to eradicate the crime. Second, further understanding human trafficking. Finally, how SDGs can be adopted in the context of current human trafficking.

## Keywords

Human trafficking · Mobility of people · Vulnerability and SDGs

## 9.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to discuss how the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have addressed human trafficking and the problems that are yet to be worked on. Generally, human trafficking is regarded as a form of modern slavery and a global issue. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), it has been detected in 148 countries (UNODC 2021, p25). People are trafficked regardless of age, gender, and domestically and globally. As it causes harmful damage to physical and psychological aspects, it is considered one of the most serious violations of human rights. In the Seventy-Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Agenda Item 29, ‘Trafficking in Women and Girls’,<sup>1</sup> addressed human trafficking as one of the most important issues to be included in the SDGs: ‘recognising the importance of a revitalised global partnership to ensure the implementation of the 2030 agenda’.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 2018, A/RES/73/146.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. See details in the document of A/RES/73/146.

Currently, the people's movement has expanded into a wider scope, and human trafficking has become more complicated. Thus, the international society must work together. Hence, this paper aims to discuss how human trafficking is defined today, how the international society has addressed it until now, and the ways SDGs can improve its work. Today, UNODC is responsible for addressing human trafficking in the United Nations (UN), citing Goal 5, 'Gender Equality'; Goal 8, 'Good Jobs and Economics'; Goal 10, 'Reduced Inequalities'; Goal 16, 'Peace and Justice'; and Goal 17, 'Partnerships for the Goals' of SDGs regarding human trafficking. To examine how the UN has combatted it, this paper examines several cases related to the goals: gender and violence, mobility of people and vulnerability, and implementation and partnership.

## 9.2 Definition of Human Trafficking

### 9.2.1 Perspectives for Understanding Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is considered one of the most serious violations of human rights as it is a crime to exploit other human beings. In 2000, the UN adopted the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime<sup>3</sup> and the protocols, specifically, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children.<sup>4</sup> In this protocol, human trafficking earned its definition, and the international community agreed on a common recognition for this crime. The protocol defines human trafficking as 'the recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud or deception for the purpose of exploitation'.<sup>5</sup>

The aforementioned protocol offers several important features. For example, the application of legal action extends to domestic cases of human trafficking along with those detected transnationally (OHCHR 2014, p. 3). Human trafficking was discussed mainly from the perspective of an international crime because in most cases it involved crossing national borders. However, the number of domestic cases, such as cases where victims are taken from rural areas to urban areas, and minor victims, has increased recently. Hence, it is difficult for international society to understand the situation. Nonetheless, the protocol extended legal application to home and abroad. This enables the international community to intervene legally and closely observe the situation.

Although human trafficking and migrant smuggling are different, they are often considered the same due to several similarities such as transfer process and transportation type. Moreover, both crimes treat human beings as commodities. However, the definition of human trafficking in the protocol contributed to clarifying the difference between the two (OHCHR 2014, p. 3). First, 'migrant smuggling involves the illegal, facilitated movement across an international border for profit. While it may involve deception and/or abusive treatment, the purpose is to profit from the movement, not the eventual exploitation as in the case of trafficking' (OHCHR 2014, p. 3). As aforementioned, human trafficking is described as a crime with the intention of exploiting persons. In other words, whether a trafficked person is a migrant, and may be smuggling a migrant, human trafficking principally involves the exploitation of victimised persons. In summary, migrant smuggling can be defined as an activity that focuses on the movement of crossing an international border rather than the exploitation of persons.

Therefore, the core elements of human trafficking are composed of acts, means, and purpose. First, the acts are the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of a person. Second, the means include the threat or use of force, deception, coercion, abuse of power, or position of vulnerability. Finally, the purpose

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, No.39574.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. See detail in the document of United Nations, vol. 2237, No. 39574 and A/RES/55/25.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. See detail in the document of United Nations, vol. 2237, No. 39574 and A/RES/55/25.

is to exploit. As the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) explained the terms used in the definition as: ‘terms such as ‘receipt’ and ‘harbouring’ mean that trafficking does not just refer to the process whereby someone is moved into situations of exploitation. It also extends to the maintenance of that person in a situation of exploitation’ (OHCHR 2014, p. 3).

### 9.2.2 Victims of Human Trafficking

This section attempts to describe the victims of human trafficking and how they can be visualised. In today’s world, anyone can be a target, regardless of age or gender. According to the data in 2018, the detailed victimisation rate is as follows: sexual exploitation accounted for 50%, followed by labour exploitation with 38%, and other forms of exploitation with 12% (UNODC 2021, p. 11, 16). In the survey, criminal activity, begging, forced marriages, baby selling, and removal of organs are considered other forms of exploitation. Regarding the economic sectors that trafficked victims engage in, domestic work, construction, fishing, agriculture, catering, street trading, garment, mining and so on are reported. Among them, in domestic work, the majority of victims are women, and they are entailed in sexual exploitation, violence by their employers, and physical and psychological exploitation. Notably, in many cases, victims suffer several forms of exploitation with one combined with others.

Regarding the detected worldwide victims of trafficking by gender, men account for 20%, women 46%, boys 15%, and girls 19% (UNODC 2021, p. 31). Regarding victimisation of women, 77% were sexually exploited, 14% were victims of labour exploitation, and others accounted for 9%. The details regarding men were: 17% were sexually exploited, 67% were victims of labour exploitation, 1% were trafficked for organ removal, and others accounted for 15% (UNODC 2021, p.33). Among the trafficked children under 18 years of age, 72% of the girls were sexually exploited, followed by labour exploitation with 21%, and others with 7%,

whereas 23% of the boys were sexually exploited, 66% were victims of forced labour, and others accounted for 11% (UNODC 2021, p. 33). In summary, sexual exploitation is a major purpose for trafficking among women and girls.

Surveying the breakdown by region of detection shows that the percentage of women is generally higher. For example, the regions where the number of female victims is conspicuously higher are: South Asia (3340 women and 857 men); East Asia and the Pacific (2871 women and 1253 men), North America (5735 women and 1196 men), South America (2358 women and 850 men), and Sub-Saharan Africa (1307 women and 659 men) (UNODC 2021, p. 31).

However, each region constitutes features that distinguish it from the others. South Asia presents a characteristic feature of a higher percentage of female victims of trafficking. By comparing it with that of children under 18 years of age, the number of detected trafficked boys was higher: 1874 boys and 1573 girls (UNODC 2021, p. 31). These boys were engaged in forced labour. In other words, they were victims of child labour. Outside of South Asia, the regions in which the number of boys is higher are Western and Southern Europe (2465 boys and 1073 girls), and North Africa and the Middle East (223 boys and 181 girls). In these, it has been reported that boys are involved in other forms of exploitation, such as criminal activity and begging (UNODC 2021, p. 17, 31).

Regarding the age of detected victims, the gross national income (GNI) of the countries the victims reside in is lower, and the victimisation of children under 18 years of age tends to be a higher percentage. For instance, in high-income countries, 86% were adult victims and 14% were children under the age of 18 (UNODC 2021, p. 10). However, in the lower-middle-income countries, 63% were adult victims and 37% were children under 18 years of age, which is higher than that of high-income countries. Finally, in low-income countries, 50% were adults and minors, equally (UNODC 2021, p. 10). Notably, there is a tendency for trafficked persons to be sold from countries with lower economic standards to those with higher economic standards.

### 9.2.3 Trafficker and Transportation

Among the offenders of human trafficking who underwent any judicial process such as enquiry, arrest, prosecution, or conviction, men accounted for 60% (UNODC 2021, p. 37). To cite the details by gender, 67% were men and 33% were women of 9429 persons who were questioned. Among the 7,368 prosecuted persons, 64% were men and 36% were women (UNODC 2021, pp. 36–37). Among the 3553 convicted persons, 62% were men and 38% were women (UNODC 2021, p. 36–37). Furthermore, among the 104 surveyed nationalities of convicted people: 74% were locals, 18% were foreign nationals within the region of conviction, and 8% were foreign nationals of other regions.

According to reports across the world and the research results by the author, there is a variety of traffickers at different social levels: brokers visiting villages, people involved in the brokers' network, parents including foster parents and step-parents, relatives, and friends, criminal organisations such as gangs, and multinational recruitment agencies.

There are two types of organisational structures at different levels, according to the travel distance. One, the opportunistic association of traffickers. This is trading on relatively a smaller scale between individuals. Two, organised criminal groups, a part of an international criminal organisation. For instance, in the opportunistic association of traffickers in Cambodia, where the author conducted research on human trafficking, many cases were committed by individual traffickers. Sometimes, a single trafficker is responsible for transferring a victim from the village they live in to the destination. There are cases wherein two or more traffickers are involved in selling and buying victims. Specifically, traffickers stay in contact with each other and work out a plan: the first one takes a victim to meet the second trafficker, and the second one accompanies the victim to another trafficker or destination. This is common when crossing a national border. UNODC describes it as an opportunistic association of traffickers (UNODC 2021, p. 13, 41). Organised criminal

groups are subdivided into two types: governance and business-enterprise<sup>6</sup> (UNODC 2021, p. 13, 41). A criminal organisation is involved in many cases of human trafficking when crossing a national border. Human trafficking is known as an international crime, with cases detected in many countries.

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## 9.3 Human Trafficking and Literature Review

In the past, women and girls accounted for 80% of the total victims of human trafficking. For instance, in 2004, 74% of all adult victims were women and 10% were girls, totalling 84%, whereas adult men and boys accounted for 13% and 3%, respectively, totalling 16% (UNODC 2021, p. 16, 32). Hence, as the majority of victims are women and are, generally, forced into sexual exploitation, research on human trafficking is conducted from 'violence against women' perspective.

Earlier studies have dealt with the human trafficking of women regarding sexual exploitation from a feminist perspective. Leading researchers include: Barry (1979), who examined the nature of human trafficking of women in the sex industry from the gender perspective, and Truong (1990) offered an analysis of the relationship between labour migration and the sex industry. Barry made a significant contribution to the study of forced prostitution among women and defined 'sexual slavery' as any situation in which women are unable to escape against their will, including international human trafficking, forced prostitution, forced marriage as a custom, and sexual exploitation inflicted by a husband on a wife (Barry 1979).

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<sup>6</sup> According to UNODC, 'the governance-type' means organised criminal groups, which apply security governance in a community or territory through fear and violence, and may be involved in multiple illicit markets. The 'the business-enterprise-type' refers to organised criminal groups, involving three or more traffickers systematically working together to traffic persons which is the core component of their criminal activities. (UNODC 2021, p. 41).

With the rise of the feminist movement, the UN framed the concept of violence against women. Consequently, this led to the evaluation of human trafficking-related to violence against women. Following an international stream, in 1993, the UN adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. In the Declaration, ‘violence against women’ is defined as ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private’ (The Elimination of Violence against Women 1993). In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China, adopted the Beijing Platform for Action. The platform declared human trafficking as a form of violence against women and a serious violation of human rights.

After the late 1990s, Parallel to the increase in child trafficking to exploit them for sexual purposes, the number of detected younger girls increased. Consequently, the situation admitted an argument regarding whether it was necessary to separate sexual exploitation of women from child sexual exploitation. For example, Truong, studying the human trafficking of women from the perspective of the migrant population, argues that sexual exploitation of women should be discussed regarding gender rather than age because sexual exploitation of women is derived from gender-based roles in the international system (Truong 1990).

Discussions on this issue from the feminist perspective was followed by another from the perspective of children’s rights. O’Grady (1992) and Lim (1998) base their arguments on the necessity of separating the sexual exploitation of adults from that of children. They argue that adults exercise their right to self-determination so that the matter can be discussed by separating free will from forced prostitution. However, when children are exploited for sexual purposes, it is a crime, regardless of the right to self-decision. Ennew (1986) explains that if sexual exploitation, or prostitution of women and children is addressed without considering the

significance of age, it is likely to fail in perceiving the power dynamic based on age and the parent–child relationships.

Considering the mechanism of human trafficking, several points are common between the sexual exploitation of women and children. Nonetheless, as the human trafficking system has become more subtle and complicated, there are various difficulties in detecting and identifying the situation. The sexual exploitation of women and children needs further consideration with discussions are based on only sex as the main point. However, Brush (2004) opened a way for further discussion.

Following the diversity in forms of victimisation in human trafficking, the focus has broadened from sexual to labour exploitation. From this period the UN started using ‘forced migration’ in their reports. Moreover, the International Labour Organization (ILO) also applied the term ‘modern slavery’ to human trafficking in the reports, featuring labour exploitation as a central subject. In the forms of human trafficking victimisation, sexual exploitation accounted for an overwhelming majority (79%), while forced labour comprised 18% in 2006<sup>7</sup> (UNODC 2021, p. 16). Detected trafficking victims of sexual exploitation decreased to 56%, whereas labour exploitation increased from 18 to 38%, and other forms accounted for 6% in 2012 (UNODC 2021, p. 16). According to the latest statistics in 2018, sexual exploitation accounts for 50% of the total detected victims, while labour exploitation was 38%, and other forms accounted for 12% (UNODC 2021, p. 16).

As the patterns of exploitation of human trafficking are diversifying, the percentage of detected male victims is increasing. For example, in 2004, it was 16% (Men 13% and Boys 3%). However, the data from 2018 show that trafficked men increased to 35%, including boys.

There are several reasons for active discussion concerning the situation of migration regarding human trafficking. First, detected victimisation exhibited a wide variation. Second, due to

<sup>7</sup>Trafficking for other forms of exploitation is 3%. (UNODC 2021, p. 16).

smuggling, there is an increase in the entry of undocumented immigrants, including asylum seekers, from developing to developed countries. Finally, the circumstances which unauthorised immigrants face in the country they reside in have several similarities with those displayed in human trafficking, such as working conditions and forms of exploitation. In other words, the situation of unauthorised immigration has many common points with the core elements of human trafficking. Thus, it is difficult to decide the legal status and qualifications that should be granted to undocumented workers. Currently, trafficking victimisation is conspicuously mixed in migration flows and hence, careful consideration is required to distinguish trafficked victims from other forms of migration.

Common examples from 2013 include many people attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea in a boat from Africa and the Middle East heading towards EU countries. The journey was made in inhumane conditions at the risk of their lives. Due to situations like these, international organisations such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) have worked closely to protect victims of human trafficking. This cooperation is consolidated by the finding that in recent years trafficked victims were detected among refugees. Generally, the risk of being targeted by human trafficking increases when people have difficulty asking for support from their communities and suffer due to cultural and social isolation.

As the number of refugees increased, mixed cases were identified in which the conditions of human trafficking, smuggling, undocumented immigrants, and refugees overlap. Thus, this makes it difficult to produce legal certification for the status of the concerned persons. Hence, UNHCR launched a '10 points Plan in Action' in 2016 updated to promote certification and protection of trafficked victims as part of a mixed migration movement (UNHCR 2016). Furthermore, in 2020, the UNHCR updated the Framework on Developing Standard Operating

Procedures for the Identification Protection of Victims of Human Trafficking, with a remark on its cooperation with IOM in encouraging the certification and protection of trafficked victims (UNHCR and IOM 2020).

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## 9.4 Treaties and Other Instruments for Human Rights

In this section, a general survey of current international treaties concerning human trafficking is discussed. It is considered one of the worst forms of human rights violations because victims' rights are deprived, and human beings are objectified as commodities and put into a state of servitude. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) takes human rights violations due to human trafficking into serious consideration, and defines the situation as human deprivation with a lack of the 13 rights that are fundamentally necessary. The rights declared by OHCHR include: the right to liberty and security; the right not to be submitted to slavery, servitude, forced labour, or bonded labour; the right not to be subjected to torture and/or cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment; the right to be free from gendered violence; the right to freedom of association; the right to freedom of movement; the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the right to just and favourable conditions of work; the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to social security; and the right of children to special protection (OHCHR 2014). As the lack of these rights is described as human deprivation by OHCHR, it can be stated that human trafficking can deprive victims of almost all fundamental rights for life. As human trafficking makes undue profits at the cost of the exploitation of victims' human rights, it is human rights violation.

In international human rights law, debt servitude is prohibited. Moreover, Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour of the ILO stipulates for the ban on debt

servitude, explaining it with the terms such as ‘slavery, child sexual exploitation, forced marriage, enforced prostitution’ (OHCHR 2014, p5). However, many trafficked victims are forced into debt bondage because they are required to bear the travelling cost and pay for commissions and fees of false accounts. Due to this, they have no alternative but to be exploited as debt slaves. Human trafficking is detected in many parts of the world. Hence, international treaties are not sufficient for victims to gain due protection.

Before the Trafficking Protocol in 2000 several international treaties and laws concerning human trafficking were established. These include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers, and Members of their Families (1990). Regarding the circumstances of trafficked victims and their rights, other treaties related to human trafficking are International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966). Among the aforementioned treaties, two treaties that the international society has referred to in addressing this issue is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art.35). This is partly because these international treaties have the power to protect victims’ human rights comprehensively.

Although the international community relies on treaties concerning human trafficking, it is difficult to highlight the conditions and carefully examine trafficked victims with limited treaties. Over the past decade, when problems of human trafficking became more severe, the international community considered it seriously. To improve the situation, it acted together and launched treaties and instruments.

The treaties and instruments are: the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution

and Child Pornography (2000), the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union (2000), and the treaties in place when the Trafficking Protocol was signed in 2000. Along with international agreements, regional treaties were also included: Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for prostitution (2002) by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; Article 5, and Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and Council on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims (2011).

Nonetheless, these international agreements and instruments cannot be expected to exercise a full binding force. To complete the treaties, guidelines were set forth to produce concrete measures against human trafficking on an international scale. Although they are non-treaty, they serve as a supplement to treaties. Important principles include Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, the UNICEF Guidelines on the Protection of Child Victims of Trafficking, Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons, ASEAN Practitioner guidelines, and the UNHCR Guidelines on international protection: Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Trafficking. Hence, the international community promoted the prevention of human trafficking by signing treaties to protect human rights. However, it cannot be positively stated that the protection of human rights is respected in all circumstances regarding human trafficking. It is essential to consider how legal protection can be reached at the grassroots level, and what plans can be made on a realistic basis.



## 9.5 Human Trafficking and SDGs

In the global indicator framework for the SDGs and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,<sup>8</sup> UNODC, the central organisation responsible for human trafficking, included five goals of the SDGs, specifically, those related to trafficking in person: goals 5, 8, 10, 16, and 17.<sup>9</sup> All the 17 goals of SDGs have their ‘goals and targets’ which accurately explain the actions taken to fulfil the aims of each goal. The ‘goals and targets’ are further subdivided into ‘indicators’. They serve as a way to show the degree of achievement of each goal to understand how the situation is developed and the facts concerning the goal are found. In Table of the Appendix, this paper describes the details of the goals and targets, which UNODC has considered as relevant to human trafficking.

### 9.5.1 Gender and Violence

Human trafficking is an important global issue. Many SDGs, those relevant to gender and violence, address it. It is an urgent issue as mentioned in the ‘UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women in the thematic’ (A/HRC/14/22).

Goal 5 of the SDGs defines human trafficking as ‘violence against women’. As aforementioned, 65% of all victims are women and girls and sexual exploitation accounts for 77% of the forms of victimisation among women (UNODC 2021, p. 31, 33).<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the Global Act, a special project of human trafficking by the UN as part of SDGs, explains that ‘recognising victims of sexual violence among smuggled migrants and victims of trafficking (at the hands of organised criminals or others), is a key criminal justice

response to this form of violence’ (GLO.ACT 2021, p. 13).

Regarding human trafficking as part of violence against women, [Target 5.2] of Goal 5 of Gender Equality states: ‘Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual, and other types of exploitation’. Moreover, Goal 16 of Peace and Justice states: ‘End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children’ [Target 16. 2]. The target designates human trafficking connected with violence as an issue that should be immediately and fairly addressed, which is essential for achieving human security and peace.

It is necessary to carefully observe the victimisation of human trafficking created by a combination of gender-based discrimination and violence. As seen in cases identified in a community or a rural village, gender-based discrimination worsens the vulnerability of a person in an economic and social plight. It is rooted in gender codes embraced by society. Gender-based discrimination affects various conditions in which trafficked victims are involved: ‘Prevention, Protection and Prosecution’, known as the 3Ps of human trafficking; ‘Partnership’, which is added to the former three, making up the 4Ps; the situation that trafficked victims are faced with in their communities; and revictimisation. A study by the author showed that gender codes aid in discriminating against trafficked victims (Shimazaki 2021). OHCHR also states that there is a close relationship between gender-oriented discrimination and human trafficking victimisation regarding the international human rights law, emphasising the necessity of taking action from the gender perspective.<sup>11</sup>

Human trafficking is identified at various levels, from a country to a region, a community, and a rural village. Generally, some people are unaware that they practise gender-based

<sup>8</sup> Global indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/71/313, E/CN.3/2018/2 and E/CN.3/2019/2, E/CN.3/2020/2.

<sup>9</sup> See the documentation of A/RES/71/313, E/CN.3/2018/2, E/CN.3/2019/2 and E/CN.3/2020/2 on UN.

<sup>10</sup> Shares of detected victims of women is 46% and girl is 19%.

<sup>11</sup> OHCHR states that ‘Under international human rights law, an anti-trafficking measure will violate the prohibition on sex-based discrimination if the measure can be shown to: (a) negatively affect the rights of the individual involved; and (b) be overwhelmingly directed to and affect women and girls’ (OHCHR 2014, p. 51).

discrimination against trafficked victims. They may be described as those who judge a person arbitrarily by gender-oriented stereotypes, prejudice, and cultural norms. To take radical action against human trafficking regarding violence against women, it is necessary to develop an awareness of gender-based discrimination. Therefore, measures against human trafficking must inevitably include those against gender-based discrimination and prejudice from various perspectives.

### 9.5.2 Mobility of People and Vulnerability

Human trafficking is closely connected to migrant labour. Generally, when a person is in a socially and economically vulnerable position, it increases the risk of being trafficked. Before being trafficked, people in need turn to migration as a means of earning a livelihood, aiming for cash income. However, from the beginning, they lack money, so they have no alternative other than taking less reliable transportation. Hence, they are forced to choose a means of mobility entailing a more serious risk of being targeted by human trafficking. Eventually, the circumstances are likely to force them into the exploitation trap (Shimazaki 2021). As it is necessary to address this situation by considering the relationship between poverty and social inequality, the action proposed in Target 8.7 of SDG's Goal 8 can be applied: 'Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking, and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour'.

Regarding migrant labour, women are generally exposed to a higher risk of being trafficked than men. This suggests that women are more vulnerable to social and economic vulnerability, which is a condition that places a majority of them in a marginalised position. Thus, the situation should be examined regarding the improvement of this economic system. Hence, this can be considered, specifically, in association with Target 10.7 saying 'Facilitate orderly, safe, regular,

and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies' of Goal 10 of 'Reduced inequalities'.

However, freedom of mobility should be secured. When people who are vulnerable to social and economic disadvantages travel, various systems to prevent human trafficking need to be built and provided by the concerned governments: the registration system of immigration, the issuance of work visas, and the disclosure of employment information. Today, human trafficking is detected in many parts of the world. Therefore, it is an international society that holds the responsibility for creating a prevention system against crime on a global scale. As Goal 17 proposes to 'strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development', an international partnership for solving human trafficking is important.

### 9.5.3 Implementation and Partnership

Among the goals of SDGs related to human trafficking, Target 17.9 from Goal 17 proposes to 'enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation'. By considering the target of Goal 17, the international community must establish a system to protect the rights of trafficked victims as part of prevention measures. A human rights-based approach is essential for the smooth operation of the system. In other words, the human rights system will function effectively to protect the rights of trafficked victims. Several factors underlie human trafficking: poverty, gender, personal educational background, labour, migration, discrimination, prejudice, a lack of legal protection, violence, exploitation, and international crimes. The mechanism of human trafficking is complicated in structure because several factors are combined and affect each other reciprocally.

When the prevention of human trafficking is considered from the human rights perspective, the international society needs to supervise if the fundamental rights are respected in any circumstance at different levels, such as in a community, a region, and a country. Thus, all the concerned institutions, from the governments to international organisations and NGOs need to work together to maintain constant supervision over the protection of human rights. It is also necessary to add the human rights-based approach into the legal framework regarding the international human rights law to consolidate legal protection for trafficked victims. At present, human trafficking cases are detectable in various parts of the world, home, and abroad. Specifically, trafficking of persons crossing a national border is on the rise, which increases the difficulty of addressing the situation by a single nation. Hence, if domestic and international laws are combined, it will help to produce effective legal protection for victims and legal action applicable to the crime.

OHCHR emphasises that a human rights-based approach should be framed into measures against human trafficking according to the international human rights laws in the national, regional, and international responses. It explains: ‘A human rights-based approach identifies right holders,<sup>12</sup> their entitlements, and the corresponding duty bearers<sup>13</sup> and their obligations. This approach works towards strengthening the capacities of rights holders to secure their rights and of duty-bearers to meet their obligations; and core principles and standards derived from international human rights law should guide all aspects of the response at all stages’ (OHCHR 2014, p. 8).

In 2020, the UN established the Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons and the United Nations Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking, as part of international cooperation in human trafficking and the creation of the human rights system in the international

community. In association with SDGs, this was followed by the establishment of The Global Action against Trafficking Persons and the Smuggling of Migrants<sup>14</sup>: Asia and the Middle East (GLO.ACT Asia and the Middle East).

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## 9.6 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, human trafficking was primarily discussed by referring to the relevant goals and targets of SDGs to clarify how they worked on the problem from viewpoints they had adopted. Human trafficking is considered modern slavery as victims are caught in a state of exploitation and deprived of their rights. Trafficking in person has several immediate and effective causes, such as poverty, gender, individual educational background, health problems, mobility of people, labour environment, economic inequality between regions and countries, and violence. This crime is a result of these factors combined in a complicated manner.

The trafficked victim analysed in this chapter is a person in the most vulnerable position in society. Overall, the incidence of human trafficking is concentrated in developing countries. Specifically, it demonstrates a tendency to traffic people from a developing country. In many cases, the person is sent to an industrialised or a more developed country compared to the one in which the person is targeted for trafficking. Regarding finding and implementing them, the main points are as follows: educating the public on the mechanism of human trafficking, empowering those who are in a socially and economically vulnerable position, increasing public awareness about gender-based discrimination, and maintaining the system of providing legal protection for trafficked victims. Finally, cooperative activity among members of the international community is crucial for preventing trafficking.

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<sup>12</sup> Rights holders are trafficked persons, individuals at risk of being trafficked, accused, or convicted of trafficking-related offences (OHCHR 2014, p. 8).

<sup>13</sup> It means generally it would be the United States.

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<sup>14</sup> The project was built on a global community of practices from 2015 to 2019 (first period), and it is now the second period from 2018 to 2022.

It would be meaningful to state that every goal and target of SDGs is relevant to human trafficking because they aim to create a better environment through the improvement of a deprived one by giving importance to human rights entitled to everyone. It will be more effective in putting an end to the human trafficking if all the goals and targets of SDGs are incorporated into preventive action against the crime.

Human trafficking needs to be addressed on a global scale and from various viewpoints related to a wide range of social problems. Therefore, measures framed based on various perspectives will increase the effectiveness of prevention. In other words, it is instructive to consider human trafficking from a cultural, social, and economic perspective when working on a solution and implementing it.

Today, victimisation of human trafficking is detectable in almost all parts of the world, and anyone can be a trafficked victim regardless of age or gender. From this perspective, human trafficking is not an issue that can be ignored. It should be discussed in the context of human rights and the significance to the community, which the other chapters study closely. To conclude, it can be interpreted that considering individual well-being leads to a decrease in the incidence of trafficking in person because addressing human trafficking is addressing the problem of human rights.

**Appendix: This Appendix Shows in Section [5. Human trafficking and SDGs]**

See Table 9.1.

**Table 9.1** SDGs and targets related to Human Trafficking<sup>15</sup>

Goal	Goals and targets	Indicators
Goal 5. Gender and Equality “Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls”	5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation	5.2.1 Proportion of ever-partnered women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to physical, sexual or psychological violence by a current or former intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by form of violence and by age
		5.2.2 Proportion of women and girls aged 15 years and older subjected to sexual violence by persons other than an intimate partner in the previous 12 months, by age and place of occurrence
Goal 8. Good Jobs and Economic Growth “Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all”	8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms	8.7.1 Proportion and number of children aged 5–17 years engaged in child labour, by sex and age

(continued)

<sup>15</sup> See the documentation of A/RES/71/313, E/CN.3/2018/2, E/CN.3/2019/2, E/CN.3/2020/2 on UN.

**Table 9.1** (continued)

Goal	Goals and targets	Indicators
Goal 10. Reduced Inequalities “Reduce inequality within and among countries”	10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies	10.7.1 Recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of monthly income earned in country of destination
		10.7.2 Number of countries with migration policies that facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people
		10.7.3 Number of people who died or disappeared in the process of migration towards an international destination
		10.7.4 Proportion of the population who are refugees, by country of origin
Goal 16. Peace of Justice “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”	16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children	16.2.1 Proportion of children aged 1–17 years who experienced any physical punishment and/or psychological aggression by caregivers in the past month
		16.2.2 Number of victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation
		16.2.3 Proportion of young women and men aged 18–29 years who experienced sexual violence by age 18
	16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime	16.4.1 Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current United States dollars)
		16.4.2 Proportion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instrument
Goal 17. Partnerships for the Goals “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development”	[Capacity-building] 17.9 Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the Sustainable Development Goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation	17.9.1 Dollar value of financial and technical assistance (including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation) committed to developing countries

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**Part III**  
**For Partnership**



# Towards the Creation of Effective Partnerships with the Private Sector for Sustainable Development

# 10

Yukimi Shimoda

## Abstract

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were launched to promote partnerships to enhance developmental effectiveness. This is especially apparent in Goal 17. The private sector is one of the prospective partners for the realisation of a sustainable society. Collaboration with it has accelerated internationally to challenge various development issues through businesses. This trend is impelled by both the public and private sectors, whose activities have different aims and purposes. Both multilateral and bilateral donors, including Japan, have planned and implemented various development projects in collaboration with untraditional partners, such as corporations. This chapter examines how partnerships with the private sector have been formed, focusing on Japan. First, it briefly studies international initiatives to understand the process by which previously separated entities—public and private sectors—gradually move closer to solve development problems. It then explores the way the Government of Japan and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, who are responsible for the public sector, have come to create or support projects in collaboration with

companies. Their shift in the direction of international development responds to international calls for sustainable development. The chapter concludes by discussing the prospect of partnership with the private sector to realise the sustainable future that the SDGs aim to create.

## Keywords

Multi-stakeholder partnership • Private sector • Co-creation • Japan • Goal 17

## 10.1 Introduction

Partnerships are the key to the realisation of a sustainable society achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which cover a wide range of development issues currently faced worldwide. Partnerships are one of the declarations in the United Nations' document *Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (2030 Agenda) and Goal 17 of the SDGs. In its preamble, the 2030 Agenda declares to the intention to 'mobilize the means required to implement this Agenda through a revitalized Global Partnership for Sustainable Development [...] with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people' (UN 2015, p. 2). Goal 17 aims to '[s]trengthen the means of implementation and

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revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development’ (UN 2015, p. 14). Ground-breaking approaches are required to challenge problems that are increasing their interconnectiveness and complexity. The UN and its member countries consider partnership as one of the approaches to realise the 17 goals and build a sustainable society.

The partnerships referred to by the UN have shifted their meaning and features from authoritative to co-creative in the last few decades. Harrington (2015) indicates that at the time of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), partnerships meant a relatively one-way action from those who had to those who did not, while the SDGs consider that partnerships are ‘forged on mutual terms and on a more equal footing’ for ‘co-creating new knowledge’. The UN Millennium Declaration aims ‘to give greater opportunities to the private sector, non-governmental organizations and civil society, in general, to contribute to the realization of the Organization’s goals and programmes’ (UN 2000, p. 9, italicised by the author). In turn, SDG Goal 17 resolves to ‘[e]nhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that *mobilize and share* knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries’ and to ‘[e]ncourage and promote effective public, public–private and civil society partnerships’ (UN 2015, p. 27, italicised by the author). The shifting of the verbs from ‘give’ to ‘mobilize and share’ and ‘encourage and promote’ clearly demonstrate the changing stance to prospective partners. The 2030 Agenda also acknowledges that ambitious goals and targets would not be achieved ‘without a revitalized and enhanced Global Partnership and comparably ambitious means of implementation’ (UN 2015, p. 28). It clearly expects the multi-stakeholder partnerships to collaboratively create knowledge to invent the ‘means of implementation’ required to realise its ambitions.

The 2030 Agenda expects that partnerships will create entrepreneurial innovations by combining diverse knowledge and skills which were

fostered and accumulated among previously separated entities. Referring to Lange’s (1943) work, Schumpeter (1947, p. 151) defines the characteristics of the entrepreneur, whose activities individually and collectively respond to changes, as ‘simply the doing of new things or the doing of things that are already being done in a new way (innovation)’. For Schumpeter, innovation is a new way of combining existing things. The private sector, which ranges ‘from micro-enterprises to cooperatives to multinationals’, is one of the ‘major drivers of productivity, inclusive economic growth and job creation’ (UN 2015, p. 29). By partnering with diverse stakeholders, including the private sector, the 2030 Agenda aims to foster innovation as a new way of combining and integrating existing knowledge and skills.

This chapter examines the partnership between the public and private sectors to consider their roles in the era of the SDGs. First, it looks at international initiatives to understand the process by which previously separated entities—public and private sectors—gradually became close to each other and started to embark on collaboratively addressing development problems. It then explores the way in which the public sector, such as the Government of Japan and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), collaborated with the private sector. The chapter concludes by discussing the prospect of partnerships with the private sector for a sustainable future.

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## 10.2 From Separated Entities to Global Partnerships

The relationship between the private sector and international development has been discussed. According to Black and O’Bright (2016, p. 145), there are two different views on the relationship: first, the private sector and markets are indispensable for development (e.g. foreign direct investment); and second, international development, considered as the arena of the public sector, remediates the disorder caused by profit-making business activities. However, intricately

interconnected issues, such as poverty, inequality, and the environment, have been pulling the public and private sectors together.

The United Nations (UN), whose members consist of governments and who lead international development, has changed its relationship with the private sector. In the last decades, with the growing influence of businesses and multinational corporations on countries, the UN has tried to involve the business sector in its activities (Fortin and Jolly 2015). This trend is supported by various initiatives to enhance or restructure the engagement between the two entities.

There has been a longstanding endeavour to control the power of multinationals. Reinert et al. (2016) hold that such an effort can be traced to the late 1960s. A UN panel in 1969 adopted a statement that agreed on the necessity of multinationals' recognition of host countries' development direction and ownership. In the late 1970s, the trend of requiring multinationals to consider their behaviour shifted to overseeing the influence of their activities on host countries' development processes. A UN report based on the findings of a 1972 panel to understand the influence of multinationals on host countries' policies led to the establishment of the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations and the United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations to discuss a code of conduct to control multinational corporations' activities (Reinert et al. 2016, p. 817). However, despite the UN's recognition of the necessity of an international action to restrict business practices, especially international businesses, it did not adopt a code of conduct until 1980 (Dell 1990, Ch. 1).

Under these circumstances, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were adopted in 1976. The OECD Guidelines are a non-binding, voluntary framework designed to oversee multinational corporations' behaviour and have been repeatedly revised. In 2000, the Guidelines were significantly revised to 'reinforce the economic, social and environmental elements of the sustainable development agenda', by not only adding and expanding

issues but also improving the implementation procedures (OECD 2003, pp. 5–6). The latest 2011 revision was based upon consultation with various stakeholders, including non-OECD countries, workers' organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) worldwide (OECD 2011, pp. 3–4). The Guidelines cover a wide range of issues (e.g. human rights, employment and industrial relations, environment, consumer interests, science and technology, and taxation) and provide a comprehensive code of conduct and implementation instructions to oversee multinational corporations' behaviour. According to Reinert et al. (2016, p. 819), the Guidelines are still insufficient because of their lack of 'real authority' to implement principles and standards. However, the agreed implementation mechanism through National Contact Points nominated by adhering governments highlights the necessity for 'a binding commitment' (OECD 2011, p. 13) among stakeholders from governments to NGOs.

The United Nations has a long history of engagement with non-governmental actors. It can be traced back to 1946 when NGOs, trade unions, and business groups (e.g. the International Chamber of Commerce) received consultative status at the Economic and Social Council (Dodds 2015, p. 5; Fortin and Jolly 2015, p. 45). However, individual corporations were not entitled to be involved in UN consultation processes before the 1990s (Dodds 2015, p. 5; Fortin and Jolly 2015, p. 45). The first conference, which highlighted the roles and responsibilities of nine 'social groups', including business and industry, was the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, which adopted Agenda 21, a non-binding comprehensive action plan to accelerate sustainable development, in 1992 (Dodds 2015, p. 6; UNCED 1992).

The challenge of the UN Global Compact (UNGC) was proposed to world business leaders in the private sector by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 1999. The UNGC was his 'inspiration' (Sethi and Schepers 2014, p. 198) and was proposed '[s]uddenly' (Williams 2014, p. 243). It is a 'historic experiment in learning and action on

corporate citizenship’ (McIntosh et al. 2004, p. 13). The UNGC consists of ten principles in the four areas of human rights, labour, environment, and anti-corruption.<sup>1</sup> These principles were created in response to the need to deal with problems brought about by business activities, especially of multinational corporations in less developed countries, and a call for business ethics from both citizens/NGOs and the business circle (Williams 2014, pp. 241–243). The proposal of ‘a genuine compact’ suggested embodying the principles into individual companies’ employees and subcontractors and giving a human face to the global market formed by policy choices after the World War (Annan 1999). It called for correct choices among governments, corporations, NGOs, and international organisations and offered the support of UN agencies to facilitate their dialogues. Accordingly, companies were expected to incorporate the ten principles into their business operations, publicly communicate with their stakeholders about the progress of their operations annually, and provide financial contributions (UNGC n.d. a; Williams 2014, p. 244). If they failed to report progress or meet other criteria, they may be delisted from the initiative (UNGC n.d.a).<sup>2</sup> As of November 2021, 14,670 companies and 162 countries supported the initiative, and more than 85,000 reports were submitted (UNGC n.d.b). In addition, the UN Guiding Principle for Business and Human Rights was launched in 2011.

Investors who have the power to influence businesses are also regulated. In 2006, the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), which consists of the six principles for responsible investment,<sup>3</sup> was launched to lead investors to take actions concerning environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues as part of their investment practices. The PRI was developed by

the largest institutional investors invited by Kofi Annan and supported by a group of investment experts, international organisations, and civil society (PRI n.d.). The number of signatories increased from 63 in 2006 to nearly 4000 in 2021.

The MDGs were ‘a historic and effective method of global mobilisation to achieve a set of important social priorities worldwide’, which were presented in the form of eight goals (Sachs 2012, p. 2206). The UN Millennium Declaration and the MDGs compiled development agendas among UN specialised agencies and other development agencies (Kumar et al. 2016, p. 1). The Declaration stated its decision to ‘develop strong partnerships with the private sector and with civil society organizations’ for development and poverty reduction (UN 2000, p. 5) and set Goal 8 ‘Develop a global partnership for development’. The MDGs were expected to achieve their goals with the leadership of corporations (including multinational, medium, and small), who had wider networks, technologies, and the capacity to scale-up solutions (Sachs 2012, p. 2211).

In the era of the MDGs, the UN, its funds and programmes, and specialised agencies reinforced activities involving multiple stakeholders, especially the private sector, as their partners to address development issues. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) acknowledged the importance of the private sector for economic growth in various ways (e.g. job creation, tax revenues, and the provision of goods and services for people in need) and created the Growing Sustainable Business (GSB) initiative in 2004 (UNDP 2008b; UNDP and UNGC n.d.). The GSB initiative provided a platform through which the private sector contributed to creating sustainable business models with local partners for vulnerable people (UNDP and UNGC 2008). In 2006, the UNDP also introduced the Growing Inclusive Markets (GIM) initiative to increase awareness of the potential for partnerships among the private sector, government, and civil society. The GIM promoted ‘inclusive business models’, which ‘include the poor on the demand side as

<sup>1</sup> The principle of anti-corruption was added in 2004.

<sup>2</sup> As of 2014, over 4,000 companies were delisted because of failure to report progress (Williams 2014, p. 244).

<sup>3</sup> For instance, Principle 1 states that investors incorporate ESG issues into their analysis and decision-making, while Principle 2 requires that they actively incorporate the issues into their policies and practices. For more details, please see: <https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri>.

clients and customers, and on the supply side as employees, producers and business owners at various points in the value chain’, connecting businesses with people in need of mutual benefit (UNDP 2008a, p. 14). Both initiatives aimed to accelerate the progress of the MDGs (UNDP 2008b). In 2008, together with bilateral donor governments and agencies from the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, the UNDP as the secretariate launched the Business Call to Action (BCtA) to encourage companies to develop inclusive business models that include people at ‘the base of the economic pyramid (BOP)’ (UNDP n.d.). More than 280 companies have become BCtA members and have implemented inclusive businesses worldwide (UNDP n.d.). Their activities in diverse areas, from agriculture and health to energy, service, and media, are showcased on the BCtA platform, together with tools and resources (BCtA n.d.). Thus, along with partners, the UNDP has actively brokered inclusive businesses to pursue win–win solutions for both business and development issues.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has encouraged inclusive businesses. Since 2005, the IFC has been promoting and supporting inclusive businesses through their investment and advisory activities across various sectors, in which ‘[b]y integrating the “base of the economic pyramid” into value chains as suppliers, employees, distributors, retailers, and customers using commercially-viable methods, the private sector can foster opportunity, expand access, and improve lives through solutions that are sustainable, replicable, and scalable’ (IFC n.d.b). Moreover, in 2015, the IFC led to the formation of the G20 Inclusive Business Framework and urged leaders of the public and private sectors, international organisations, and civil society to enhance businesses’ abilities and include low-income populations into global value chains (IFC 2021; see also IFC n.d.a).

In 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs by involving both developed and developing countries and expanding the scope more holistically than the MDGs. The 2030 Agenda states that multi-

stakeholder partnerships complement a revitalised Global Partnership for Sustainable Development by sharing ‘knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries’ and promoting ‘effective public, public–private and civil society partnerships’ which bring their experiences and resourcing strategies (UN 2015, p. 27). Multi-stakeholder partnerships are ‘an important *means of implementation*’ in the realisation of the SDGs (Beisheim and Simon 2016, p. 9), and the private sector is considered ‘a development actor’ (Scheyvens et al. 2016). Thus, the UN and its related organisations in the public sector have been advancing their engagement with the private sector, as well as other stakeholders.<sup>4</sup>

Business models that include vulnerable populations have gained the attention of both international donors and business communities. Since the late 1990s, Prahalad and Hart (2002)<sup>5</sup> and their colleagues (Prahalad 2004; Prahalad and Hammond 2002) have identified the potency and opportunity of the markets of the BOP, the largest and poorest socio-economic group in the world economy. The concept of the BOP markets has evolved: BOP 1.0 focuses on selling products to the BOP population; BOP 2.0 views the BOP population as business partners for co-creating markets through dialogue and mutual learning; and BOP 3.0 creates a social, economic, and environmental ecosystem for all (Cañeque and Hart 2015; Simanis et al. 2008). On another business front, the idea of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been developed to incorporate social issues in core business activities. CSR, which comprises the voluntary, philanthropic concerns of firms regarding the socio-economic impact of their activities, was practiced even a century ago, and was revived in the 1960s and 1970s (Vogel 2006, p. 6). CSR has become well recognised in business circles and society.

<sup>4</sup> Dodds (2015, pp. 6–8) and Beisheim and Simon (2016, pp. 7–8) introduce various partnerships towards sustainable development in relation to the UN.

<sup>5</sup> Prahalad and Hart (2002, p. 14) mention that their first articulation of the BOP concept was in 1998.

In India, CSR became a mandate for companies in 2013. The concept of ‘Creating Shared Value’ has furthered the notion and reinforced companies to shift their voluntary behaviours as risk management to a more mandatory one as the utilisation of business opportunities to jointly create values with a community (Porter and Kramer 2011). Therefore, the business circle increasingly sees the lower segment of the economic pyramid as business partners or stakeholders.

Simultaneously, fair trade movements with various labelling initiatives have gradually promoted alternative business models to include vulnerable people, especially those from less developed countries, into global markets. Many initiatives, including Fairtrade International, have been introduced to certify commodities from agricultural products to handicrafts. The fair trade movement and related networks are expanding and creating partnerships among stakeholders, including consumers. In the global capitalist market, ‘the fairtrade moral economy attempts to assert the principle of peoples’ basic right to live a decent life free from hunger and poverty’ (Fridell 2006, p. 90).

Other initiatives also try to control business influence by introducing practical guidelines and standards. For instance, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) exhorts companies and organisations to make their activities transparent. The GRI was formed in 1997 in protest against the environmental damage caused by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (GRI n.d.). In 2000, the GRI provided guidelines to produce sustainability reports covering the environmental, economic, and social aspects of their activities. The GRI Guidelines are linked to other guidelines and principles (e.g. the OECD Guidelines, UNGC). The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) published ISO26000 in 2010 after negotiating with various stakeholders, such as governments, NGOs, industry, consumer groups, and labour organisations globally for five years (ISO n.d.). ISO 26000 guides companies and organisations to take appropriate actions concerning their social responsibilities. In addition, the recent growing popularity of ESG

investing and others (e.g. socially responsible investing and impact investing) increasingly influence investors’ behaviours.

Thus, the circumstances surrounding international development and businesses have changed over the last few decades. The number of stakeholders is increasing, which contributes to addressing development issues in unconventional, innovative ways to gather their knowledge and resources.

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### 10.3 Partnerships with the Private Sector in Japan

In Japan, the relationship between development challenges and businesses has been keeping pace with international trends. This section examines how Japan has incorporated business approaches into its international cooperation to address development issues. It explores JICA’s activities after considering how the Government of Japan and related organisations have promoted business approaches for development.

#### 10.3.1 The Government of Japan, International Development, and the Private Sector

Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) policy was stated in the 2015 Official Development Assistance Charter (ODA Charter).<sup>6</sup> Believing in Japan’s past development experience and cooperation for the development of Asia and other areas through economic growth, the ODA Charter (GOJ 2015, p. 1) highlights the importance of partnerships with various actors as follows:

In the international community today, a huge amount of private funding flows to the developing countries, and various actors including the private sector, local governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in global activities. These actors play important roles in

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<sup>6</sup>The ODA Charter was decided by the Cabinet in 1992 and revised in 2003 and 2015.

dealing with development challenges and promoting sustainable growth in developing countries. Under these circumstances, Japan needs to address such development challenges not only through ODA but also by mobilizing various other resources.

It also emphasises the role of the government as a ‘catalyst’ to enhance partnerships with various actors (GOJ 2015, p. 12).

In 2016, the SDGs Implementation Guiding Principles were approved by the SDGs Promotion Headquarters, which had been established to promote comprehensive and effective implementation of the SDGs through close coordination with relevant government agencies. The Guiding Principles set five principles, one of which is ‘participatory approach’ for all stakeholders to play a role in building a sustainable society (SDGs Promotion Headquarters 2019, Sec. 4, [3]). Its 2019 revision stated that the role of business was first among the other actors, and the words ‘conventional corporate social responsibility (CSR)’ disappeared. In turn, the Guiding Principles exhort ‘each company to strive for sustainable corporate growth by installing the SDGs within its corporate strategy and applying them to individual business strategies’ (SDGs Promotion Headquarters 2019, Sec. 5, [3], A). This statement indicates the expectation that development agendas, rather than charitable activities, will be embodied into corporations’ core businesses. The Government of Japan organises the annual Japan SDGs Awards to acknowledge companies and organisations based in Japan that contribute to the SDGs within and beyond the country (MOFA n.d.).

There was active discussion about the BOP business for development through business approaches in the late 2000s. Ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and organisations, such as JICA and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), started discussing or taking initiatives to promote the BOP business in 2009, called ‘the first year of BOP business in Japan’ (Hiramoto and Watanabe 2015, p. 194; Sugawara et al. 2011). They

conducted a number of research and feasibility studies, dispatched missions, provided matching support with stakeholders in developing countries, and established the Japan Inclusive Business Support Center, thus aiming to address poverty reduction through businesses and industrial policies (Sugawara et al. 2011). For instance, METI supported ten surveys in 2009, JICA implemented 19 survey projects in 2010, and JETRO supported 19 projects in 2011 (Hiramoto and Watanabe 2015, p. 194). The Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of International Affairs and Communications, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation also implemented related projects (Hiramoto and Watanabe 2015, p. 194).

In the 2011 Tohoku Pacific Ocean earthquake, the products and technologies that some Japanese companies (e.g. Panasonic, Nissin Foods, and Nippon Ply-Glu) had been innovatively created through their BOP businesses supported disaster victims and restored the affected areas (Hiramoto and Watanabe 2015). This experience raised people’s awareness and that of the Government of Japan about the potency of such technologies and products, which are adaptable in addressing various social issues (Hiramoto and Watanabe 2015, p. 195).

This movement started a decade later in Japan than in other major bilateral donor countries. According to Sugawara et al. (2011), the UK, Germany, and the US began collaborating with the private sector around 2000. For instance, in the US, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) launched the Global Development Alliance, a partnership with the private sector to foster market-based approaches to challenge development issues, and the Development Innovation Ventures, an open innovation grant fund for innovators, entrepreneurs, and researchers to explore new ideas to solve development challenges, in 2001 and 2010, respectively (USAID 2021). USAID has expanded its cooperation with the private sector and currently provides eight partnership opportunities for corporations (USAID 2021). In the UK, the Department for International Development

(DIFID)<sup>7</sup> has launched several ‘challenge funds’ to assist development projects in collaboration with the private sector since 1999 (Sugawara et al. 2011, pp. 45–47). In 2010, DFID also implemented the Business Innovation Facility, a three-year pilot project to help develop inclusive business models with companies in Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia. According to Sugawara et al. (2011, pp. 50–54), in contrast with these bilateral donor countries where each organisation has individually implemented its funds or programmes, a unique characteristic of Japan’s BOP business support is the close cooperation between ministries and implementing agencies, such as METI and JETRO, and MOFA and JICA.

In Japan, the number of support systems that help businesses address development issues has increased. As of 2019, a report identified about 50 support systems provided by ministries and other public organisations (JICA 2019b, pp. 5–6). Some systems directly support (including finance) business activities in different stages, such as information gathering, business plan formulation, feasibility studies, and specific business development, while others provide business-related information. For instance, since 2015, METI has organised the *Tobidase* Japan Program<sup>8</sup> annually and invited business ideas from mid-ranking enterprises and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Through the programme, METI subsidises selected enterprises with part of the expenses to develop, test, and/or evaluate their products and services in collaboration with local universities, research institutes, NGOs, and companies, among others, in emerging countries, especially India and African countries (METI 2021).

In addition to these support systems, the Government of Japan has created opportunities to enhance dialogue among diverse development partners, including the private sector. For instance, since 1993, it has organised a

multilateral forum, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), which is co-hosted by the UN, the UNDP, the World Bank, and the African Union Commission. Its participants vary from African countries to various stakeholders, such as international organisations, partner countries, corporations, and civil society organisations for development in Africa. With respect to African countries’ ownership, the TICAD promotes international partnerships and discussions on development issues in Africa by ‘bringing together a broad range of global knowhow and efforts of the international community’ (MOFA 2016). The Yokohama Declaration 2013 adopted in the TICAD V set ‘Promoting Private Sector-led Growth’ as a strategic approach for African development (MOFA 2013, Sec. 3.1). In the TICAD VII in 2019, there were more than 10,000 participants, including leaders from African countries, development partner countries, international and regional organisations, NGOs, and the private sector. The TICAD VII strongly highlighted business promotion for the development of African countries. Through the TICAD and related opportunities, the Government of Japan has also sought to improve circumstances that encourage companies to start businesses in Africa by, for instance, launching the Japan-Africa Public–Private Economic Forum in the TICAD VI, establishing the Japan Business Council for Africa, and launching the Bilateral Committee on Improvement of Business Environment with seven African countries in the TICAD VII (MOFA 2021). These movements have contributed to improving business environments in Africa for Japanese companies and enhancing African development through businesses by mobilising the resources of various actors, including the private sector.

### 10.3.2 JICA and the Private Sector

JICA has been strengthening its relationship with the private sector since the late 2000s. It established the Office for Private Sector Partnership to promote collaboration with the private sector in

<sup>7</sup> DIFID was replaced by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office in 2020.

<sup>8</sup> The IC Net Limited operates the program as a subsidized entity.

2008, which was later upgraded to the Private Sector Partnership and Finance Department to strengthen partnerships with the private sector through consultation and understanding its needs.

JICA currently provides various support schemes. For instance, the Private-Sector Investment Finance (PSIF) scheme provides loans and equity mainly for infrastructure development, poverty reduction, and measures against climate change, and its preparatory survey helps to identify and formulate PSIF projects. The SDGs Business Support Surveys consist of three schemes to support private corporations in the different stages of creating and developing their business models: the SME Partnership Promotion Survey helps SMEs explore a business model through basic data collection and analysis; the SDGs Business Model Formulation Survey with the Private Sector supports companies to examine the feasibility of their business ideas (e.g. technologies, products, and know-how); and the SDGs Business Verification Survey with the Private Sector assists companies in validating their business ideas and models to develop business proposals (JICA 2020a). The Surveys support both less developed countries, who want to address development issues they face, and companies, who desire to develop their business models incorporated in partner countries' challenges and assess the adaptability of the latter's models as ODA projects. JICA acts as a catalyst to connect them and create mutually beneficial relationships by mobilising its established networks and relationships with the governments of less developed countries, and the expertise accumulated from past ODA projects (JICA 2020a). The provision of these schemes was driven by both international and domestic circumstances—the further involvement of companies to deal with increasingly intricate issues due to globalisation with the limited ODA and the political decision to revitalise Japan's regional economy by promoting SMEs (JICA 2019a, pp. 141–142).

The JICA website presents many examples of the SDGs Business Support Surveys (JICA n.d. b). For instance, in Uganda, JICA assisted in the

promotion of handwashing led by Saraya Co., Ltd. (Saraya), which manufactures and sells health and hygiene products and services. Saraya has been working with the United Nations Children's Fund since 2010 to solve hygiene issues in Uganda since 2010. JICA supported Saraya to expand its activities to medical institutions and workers. JICA also supported Ajinomoto Co., Inc. (Ajinomoto), a Japanese food and biotechnology corporation, to improve nutrition for infants in Ghana. Ajinomoto, which started the Ghana Nutrition Improvement Project as their 100th anniversary project, has developed, locally produced, disseminated, and sold 'KOKO Plus', a baby food supplement, in collaboration with the Government of Ghana, universities, international aid agencies, JICA, and NGOs, among others. JICA's collaboration with Kaiho Industry Co., Ltd (Kaiho Sangyo), a Japanese automobile recycling company, is multifarious (JICA n.d.c). Kaiho Sangyo collaborated with JICA and provided a technical training course for automobile recycling for trainers from South American countries in 2010. They also conducted a preparatory survey of the feasibility of an automobile recycling business in Nigeria and implemented a pilot survey to disseminate an environmentally conscious automobile recycling system by establishing a pilot plant and recycling education centre with a partnership with the Federal Center of Technological Education of Minas Gerais, Brazil (JICA and Kaiho Sangyo 2019). From 2010 to 2020, JICA's programme of the SDGs Business Support Surveys approved more than 1340 business proposals (JICA 2021a, p. 53).

JICA is expanding its assistance by promoting entrepreneurship, particularly in Africa. Several projects have been launched to accelerate the emergence of social entrepreneurs. In Rwanda, which aims to attain socio-economic development using ICT, JICA launched the ICT Innovation Ecosystem Enhancement Project in 2017 to support the creation of innovative solutions for addressing social problems by collaborating with companies, entrepreneurs, financial and research institutions, universities, and the government. Under this project, the '250 Startups'



programme, whose objective is to incubate ICT companies that are market competitive, was implemented together with the Rwanda ICT Chamber. It orients prospective entrepreneurs to develop their businesses (e.g. in customer acquisition, setting up business models, product development, finance, and legal issues) (JICA 2020b). In Kenya, JICA introduced a startup support project, the Next Innovation with Japan (NINJA) in 2020 (JICA n.d.f). Project NINJA aims to accelerate innovation, which meets local needs and creates novel businesses for socio-economic development. Its implementation is supported by private sector partners, such as the Double Feather Partners (an international venture capital firm), Deloitte Tohmatsu Financial Advisory LLC, Deloitte Tohmatsu Venture Support Co., Ltd., and GrowthAfrica (a leading African accelerator and advisory firm). Project activities vary from the provision of acceleration and incubation programmes to identify and foster ventures and the organisation of business contests, to policy recommendations. In the NINJA Business Plan Competition in Response to COVID-19 held in February 2021, more than 2,700 ventures from 19 countries participated, of which 69 ventures from wide-ranging industries, including medical care, agriculture, logistics, education, and finance, were recognised for the excellence of their businesses, and the top ten participated in the final pitch as finalists (JICA 2021b). For the three selected finalists, JICA provided business matching opportunities with companies in Japan. Various partners in Japan, including Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), support these programmes and projects to foster startups in Africa.<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, business approaches to address development issues are not a novel concept for JICA. JICA previously provided support for industrial development, such as the improvement of the investment environment, industrial human resources development, SME support,

technology development, research cooperation, and financial support to develop the private sector in recipient countries (Sugawara et al. 2011, pp. 53–54). The 2015 ODA Charter (GOJ 2015) explains that the emphasis on industrial development reflects Japan's post-war development experience. JICA has been transferring knowledge and skills accumulated in Japan through various technical cooperation schemes, such as dispatching experts, providing technical training (The Knowledge Co-Creation Program: KCCP), technical cooperation projects and programmes, and technical cooperation for development planning (JICA 2020a, pp. 68–69). JICA has dispatched experts from Japan and other countries to transfer best-suited knowledge and skills in various areas to meet the needs of recipient countries. The KCCP, which started in 1954, covers diverse subjects from agricultural techniques to local government systems. JICA implements hundreds of training courses annually, in which approximately 10,000 trainees participate. The KCCP is supported by various partners, such as the central and local governments, public organisations, universities, research institutes, companies, and NGOs in Japan. In 2020, 256 courses (group and region focus), including online courses, were implemented, of which 23 courses covered private sector development (JICA n.d.d). In 2021, approximately 30 courses related to private sector development were planned. Since its launch, the KCCP has hosted approximately 370,000 participants. Moreover, since 1975, JICA has been promoting South-South and Triangular Cooperation by assisting less developed countries in dispatching experts and implementing training programmes in many subjects, including private sector development (JICA 2018). South-South cooperation is expected to enhance ties by sharing knowledge and skills among less developed countries. In triangular cooperation, external actors, such as international and bilateral donors, assist their mutual support relationships. To enhance science, technology, and innovation and support capacity building through partnerships, SDG Goal 17 highlights South-South and Triangular Cooperation. In addition to these

<sup>9</sup> JICA and Keidanren published the 'Co-creating Digital Development to Achieve Society 5.0 for SDGs' in 2020, which aims to foster innovative solutions for less developed countries by using digital technologies developed by Japanese companies (Keidanren and JICA 2020).

technical cooperation schemes, JICA has established ten Japan Centers in transitional economies in East and Central Asia and Southeast Asia since 2000, to provide business training and foster human networks between them and Japan (JICA n.d.a).

JICA has also helped develop the private sector through various technical cooperation projects and programmes, which combine expert dispatching, technical training, and equipment provision to address various development issues faced by recipient countries. For example, JICA supports strengthening the competitiveness of companies by improving management capabilities, knowledge, and skills (JICA n.d.e). It has promoted *kaizen*, which is defined as '[a] Japanese business philosophy of continuous improvement in working practices, personal efficiency, etc.' in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. According to Sonobe (2018, p. 4), '*Kaizen* is the management philosophy and know-how that brings about continuous, participatory, incremental, and low-budget improvements in quality, productivity, cost, delivery, safety, morale, and environment', and it is 'human-friendly'. *Kaizen* was rooted in the US and developed in Japan. It has been applied in manufacturing and other areas, such as health, education, public administration, and other services (Sonobe 2018, p. 4). *Kaizen* consists of various tools, systems, methods, and principles, such as total quality management as a system and 5S (*seiri* [sort], *seiton* [set in order], *seiso* [shine], *seiketsu* [standardize], and *shitsuke* [sustain]) as a method among others (Sonobe 2018). In JICA, *kaizen* was first introduced in the Productivity Development Project in Singapore in 1983 and Thailand in 1994 (Jin 2018, p. 33). Malaysia adopted *kaizen* without assistance from JICA. Since then, JICA has transferred *kaizen* knowledge and tools to other countries and regions, such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, which has made *kaizen* 'a symbolic know-how' to lead their industrial development (Jin 2018, pp. 33 and 43–45). *Kaizen* in the private sector was transferred to less developed countries through technical cooperation in the public sector (Jin 2018, p. 43, Table 2.2).

Since around 2000, JICA has also promoted the creation and fostering of local industries to address issues of poverty and socio-economic disparity within a country, for instance, using the concept of the One Village and One Product (OVOP) movement. The OVOP movement, which originated from a local development activity in Oita Prefecture, Japan, in 1979, encourages the mobilisation of local community members, materials, and cultural resources to create value-added products and services for domestic and external markets. The OVOP concept has been adopted by many countries through the local diplomacy of Oita Prefecture since the mid-1980 (International OVOP Exchange Committee n.d.; Matsui 2006, p. 145). Simultaneously, the Government of Japan has promoted the OVOP movement approach for development, and JICA has applied it to projects and programmes. For example, in 2003, the Government of Malawi adopted the OVOP concept in its official development plan, aimed at the economic development of rural communities and the realisation of the MDGs (Kurokawa et al. 2010, p. 20). Prior to the adoption, however, Japan and JICA had supported Malawi for about ten years: they had introduced the OVOP movement to invited foreign missions and trainees, including those from Malawi (Yoshida 2006, pp. 180–183). Yoshida (2006, p. 180) indicates that the TICAD, especially the TICAD I, provided opportunities for Malawi to learn about the OVOP movement. In 1993, the Ambassador of Malawi to Japan was keenly interested in the OVOP movement when he visited Oita immediately after the TICAD I. Subsequently, the Malawi Embassy started to research it, and several ministers of Malawi also learned it in Oita on the occasions of the TICAD and others. The prefecture government of Oita was passionate about promoting the movement in Malawi and dispatched missions independently and together with a JICA mission. JICA training programs, which continuously introduced cases of the OCOP movement, also provided a learning opportunity for trainees from Malawi. For instance, in 1999, 14 government administrators from Malawi participated in the regional

development training program implemented in Oita (Yoshida 2006, p. 181). JICA also dispatched experts and implanted a pilot project in Malawi before its government started the OVOP program as a national program in 2003. Japan and JICA's long promotion and dissemination of the OVOP concept extended it to Malawi and other countries for industrial and community development by mobilising local resources and adding value to them. The Government of Japan declared its commitment to support OVOP programs for African development in the TICAD IV and meetings of the G8 countries in 2008 (Kurokawa et al. 2010, p. 3). As of 2010, 12 African countries adopted the OVOP approach (Kurokawa et al. 2010, p. 3). Moreover, JICA projects that incorporated the OVOP approach collaborated with companies. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan, a JICA project aimed at community development through the OVOP approach has collaborated with Ryohin Keikaku Co., Ltd. (MUJI) since 2010. MUJI has supported the development of Kyrgyz felt products and expanded sales channels by providing knowledge and skills derived from its global business experience.

The OVOP approach has also been adopted by other organisations. For instance, JETRO utilises the OVOP movement to address development issues. In collaboration with METI, JETRO started the 'One Village, One Product' campaign to support less developed countries to enhance their capacity to export by identifying and adding values to local products after the Government of Japan had announced the campaign as part of Japan's 'Development Initiative for Trade' at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005 (JETRO n.d.; METI 2015). JETRO set up two 'One Village, One Product Markets' at the Narita and Kansai International Airports to promote products from Asian and African countries, among others, including those that JETRO had helped develop and improve for the Japanese market (JETRO n.d.).

These activities indicate that JICA has promoted business approaches for development in collaboration with diverse partners, aligning with Japan's ODA Charter and the SDGs

Implementation Guiding Principles. Previously, JICA's business approach for development applied the knowledge and skills developed by other entities, such as *kaizen* in the industrial sector and the OVOP movement led by the local government, to different countries, which faced similar problems in the industrial sector and local development. JICA rarely supported specific companies directly. However, in the last decade, JICA's collaboration with the private sector has become more systematic, such as the introduction and promotion of the BOP business and the SDGs Business Support Surveys, through which JICA began supporting companies to address development issues. Consequently, the types and quantity of collaboration with the private sector are increasing, involving individual companies and other partners. The 2030 Agenda and its promotion of partnerships with multiple actors, including the private sector, seem to have become a driving force to hasten this trend.

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#### 10.4 The Roles of the Public and Private Sectors

Partnerships with the private sector are firmly incorporated in the current development agenda, and the promotion of business approaches for development is an international trend, including in Japan. The Government of Japan and related organisations have promoted businesses to address development issues. The growing expectation of the private sector as a development partner is a response to increasingly intricate issues in the connected world. The limitations of individual institutions or countries in addressing complex development issues are widely recognised. Simultaneously, corporations are compelled to respond to socio-economic pressures to deal with problems caused by their business activities. Multi-stakeholder partnerships, including the private sector, are indispensable in realising a sustainable society. The 2030 Agenda states that '[w]e will foster a dynamic and well-functioning business sector, while protecting labour rights and environmental and health standards in accordance with relevant

international standards and agreements and other ongoing initiatives in this regard' (UN 2015, p. 29). However, the question remains whether it is possible to harness the private sector, particularly large international corporations, whose value chain spreads across national boundaries to develop the best-profitable business models.

Studies reveal that the relationship between development and the private sector is ambivalent and uncertain. Reviewing conditions, which have fostered their complementary relationship, Black and O'Bright (2016, p. 146) acknowledge that the partnership with the private sector for development has become 'the new landscape of development'. On the other hand, they identified the risks that business approaches might introduce, and the ambiguity of such a relationship, as, for instance, microcredit has become a poverty trap due to the accumulation of small debt despite its original intention of supporting people to start small enterprises to improve their lives (Black and O'Bright 2016). Rai et al. (2019) claim that SDG Goal 5 (gender equality and empowerment of women and girls) contains frictions with Goal 8 (sustainable economic growth and decent work for all), whose focus on economic growth dismisses women's social productive work. Currently, it is unclear and ambiguous regarding the extent to which diverse partners could balance their different interests and primary motivations—for instance, socio-economic development of public sector entities and market-oriented benefits of private sector entities—by challenging internal tensions within the goals, or development agendas more generally.

The existing literature also raises the issue of 'washing', which is seen in corporate behaviours as a management strategy for increasing reputation. Such behaviours are described as greenwashing, bluewashing, and rainbow-washing/SDG-washing in association with environmental concern, UN's blue flag, and the SDGs' colourful logos, respectively. For instance, bluewashing is an issue related to the UNGC (Fortin and Jolly 2015, p. 52). A statistical analysis of 3000 U.S. firms by Berliner and Prakash (2015) reveals that the firms' human

rights and environmental performance, with which the UNGC is concerned, tend to be only superficial management of the impression of considering these issues for bluewashing, avoiding substantial and costly actions. Haras-Saizarbitoria et al. (2021) conduct empirical research on how organisations worldwide engage with the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda by exploring more than 1300 sustainability reports. They find that '[m]ost of the companies analyzed were very evasive or silent about their approach to tackling the SDGs in their reports. And when an explicit reference was made, a rather simple functionalistic and deterministic discourse, without references to any meaningful reflection, was presented' (Heras-Saizarbitoria et al. 2021, p. 10). The companies do not go beyond their CSR and lack substantial operation in relation to the SDGs, which consequently appears as 'SDG-washing' and indicates the weakness of self-regulatory initiatives (Heras-Saizarbitoria et al. 2021). These studies suggest that the extent to which non-binding initiatives, such as the UNGC and the SDGs, could balance the public and private sectors' interests is uncertain.

Nevertheless, the current global trend of highlighting partnerships to address development issues should not be devalued. International organisations have introduced many initiatives, such as the OECD Guidelines, the UNGC, the GRI, the ISO26000, the UN Millennium Declaration, the MDGs, the 2030 Agenda, and the SDGs, among others, and created the circumstances in which corporations feel persuaded to improve their accountability and transparency. These initiatives supported by countries, including Japan, have provided grounds to include the private sector in development practices, thereby fostering the morality of corporate behaviours. For instance, the UNGC offers a forum where various partners 'can come together to discuss the changing role of business and the moral norms needed for a more just global economy' (Williams 2014, p. 250). The 2030 agenda and the SDGs offer similar forums. Beisheim and Simon (2016, p. 7) state:

All in all, there needs to be a balance between nurturing and oversight, enabling and ensuring measures. Engaging potential partners as well into emerging and existing MSPs [multi-stakeholder partnerships] is critical to increase awareness of the 2030 Agenda and SDGs. Enabling MSPs to align their goals with the SDGs and to actually achieve impact may require support at various levels. Ensuring measures may encompass principles and guidelines, reporting duties and reviews.

The creation of effective multi-stakeholder partnerships seems to be a long process. However, while individuals are connected through globalisation and technological development, it is unlikely that the current trend may waver.

Innovative business models to address development issues are emerging and increasing in number. The UN and its related institutions are promoting inclusive businesses to challenge diverse issues in collaboration with companies and other partners. Their reports and platforms, such as the BCtA, present these business models, which help both members and non-members learn from each other and create networks. The Government of Japan and JICA have assisted the development of countries in need, utilising the knowledge and skills fostered in the private and other sectors. The Government of Japan reinforces its position to help create an enabling environment by promoting partnerships among stakeholders, revising the ODA Charter, and organising international conferences. Since around 2010, JICA has directly collaborated with companies to address development issues and support the creation and incubation of novel business models in less developed countries. Non-profit organisations and foundations also aid prospective and existing social entrepreneurs by organising business contests and workshops to promote domestic/international development through business approaches.

Additionally, the private sector continues to search for a better balance between business activities and social benefits. A growing number of companies, from large international corporations to SMEs, declare their commitments to increase the sustainability of society. The members of a company and their ideas are diverse, which makes the outcomes and continuity of its

commitments uncertain. Social enterprises might not sustain their primary social missions. However, a shifting international environment towards creating a sustainable society makes us believe in its persistence to some extent. *The Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Japan Economics Newspaper) (Nikkei 2021) reports that the number of its articles containing the term ‘ESG’ have sharply increased since 2015, which indicates the growing concern about non-economic aspects of business activities among its buyers, most of whom are white-collar workers and managers. These movements suggest that companies gradually feel obliged to shift the management of their core businesses to consider social benefits by balancing economic benefits.

The private sector is an indispensable partner in challenging complex issues in the current interdependent and interconnected world. Blowfield and Dolan (2014, pp. 23–24) investigate if a business could be a ‘development agent’, who ‘consciously seeks to deliver outcomes that contribute to international development goals’, rather than an irresponsible ‘development tool’ for outcomes despite actively conducting business in developing countries. Finding the mixed features of companies’ performance, they indicate the necessity of institutional environments (e.g. alternative forms of finance, incubation) required to make business a conscious and accountable agent of development (Blowfield and Dolan 2014). Under appropriately developed institutional environments surrounding businesses, the private sector would address needs in less developed countries with the understanding of influential shareholders.

The public sector could support creating an enabling environment as a catalyst to encourage the private sector to act as a ‘development agent’, and not as a ‘development tool’ by promoting continuous dialogues among stakeholders with respect to existing non-binding initiatives. It would foster alternative socio-economic mechanisms to nurture and develop novel business models with economic and social benefits. Moreover, the public sector, such as international organisations and individual governments, is

expected to oversee partnerships with the private sector to ensure its positive influence on society.

## 10.5 Conclusion: Partnerships as an Approach for the Co-creation of Innovation

The development circle has been expanding its membership and including the private sector, to improve the effectiveness of addressing development issues. In the process, partnerships with the private sector have become highlighted in international initiatives, such as the MDGs and SDGs. The UN and its related institutions have provided platforms to accelerate it. Individual countries and their organisations, such as the Government of Japan and JICA, have also promoted this trend by offering various programmes and projects. These efforts have supported corporations to step forward with or without other partners to create new business models, which are often innovatively formed by the existing knowledge and skills among stakeholders to challenge the issues faced by people living in less developed countries.

As the 2030 Agenda states, partnerships with multiple stakeholders, including the private sector, are an approach to solve problems through sharing resources. Partnerships could make all stakeholders responsible, work collaboratively, and increase the efficiency of challenging development issues to realise a sustainable society. Consumers who purchase goods and services are also responsible as partners for their global goals. These multi-stakeholder partnerships might not be a perfect approach for achieving the SDG goals, but without them, the 2030 Agenda would not be realised. The partnerships with the private sector and other stakeholders promote the combination of existing things and stimulate innovations (Schumpeter 1947) to find solutions for development issues brought about by existing socio-economic systems. The co-creation of innovative and novel ways through the effective ‘participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people’ (UN 2015, p. 2) would contribute to transforming our world to become more sustainable.

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# Toward a Partnership Based on Historical Reconciliation and Mutual Trust

Jie Liu

## Abstract

In the age of globalization when people around the world must work together to deal with common challenges, global histories with the intention to create “global citizens” are essential. Therefore, reviewing the “new historiography” advocated by Liang Qichao and creating a “neo-new historiography” that is compatible with the age of globalization and can contribute to “reconciliation studies” and the sustainable global partnership should not be a task for China alone. The goal of no. SDGs17 is to “activate the global partnership toward sustainable development.” However, in East Asia, to establish such a partnership and make it work, it is necessary to build trust as a precondition. To build trust in this region, “history” must be overcome. However, the history of perpetration and victimization has been politicized, casting a shadow on the trust between nations and their peoples. This chapter aims to propose methods to build the global partnership by seeking solutions to the

“history problem” that extends outside the realm of “historiography.”

## Keywords

Global partnership · Reconciliation · History problem · Dialogue · New historiography

## 11.1 Introduction

The goal of no. SDGs17 is to “activate the global partnership toward sustainable development.” However, in East Asia, to establish such a partnership and make it work, it is necessary to build trust as a precondition. To build trust in this region, “history” must be overcome. However, the history of perpetration and victimization has been politicized, casting a shadow on the trust between nations and their peoples. This chapter aims to propose methods to build the global partnership by seeking solutions to the “history problem” that extends outside the realm of “historiography.” In this sense, rather than discussing economic issues such as direct investment, technology, and trade, this chapter, by focusing on multi-stakeholder partnership, pays attention to the building of a civil society partnership.

For a long time, historians from different countries have been repeatedly engaged in solid joint studies and historical dialogue. In the dialogue, historians have shared the belief that we

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This paper is based on Jie Liu’s article in *Series for Developing Reconciliation Studies: Principles and Methods*, 2021. Akashi Shoten

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must start from the sharing of relevant historical documents and facts about “aggression,” “colonial rule,” and so on. This chapter points out the effectiveness of “reconciliation studies”—as a field to deal with the issue of historical perception that has become a bottleneck for public sentiments—in putting an end to the phenomenon of “history” being linked to “politics.” It also examines the situation of the community of historians, as a practical case of the global partnership. The purposes of the partnership desired by historians are: (1) To find how to reduce the confrontation made in history and how to put the relations between nations on the track to peace, stability, and cooperation. (2) To provide a pathway to ensure that commitments are met and the state of reconciliation is sustained between nations and between nations and individuals. (3) To propose the methods of avoiding new conflicts, so that the “history problem” does not cause new tension. (4) The state and society provide an environment that reflects on the past of victimization and perpetration at the individual level and achieve the “peace of mind.”

In addition, this chapter points out the lack of an “intellectual reconciliation” that mediates the reconciliations between governments and between peoples. To achieve the “intellectual reconciliation,” it proposes the creation of world citizens’ history that is indispensable for the global partnership, fusing people’s history and academic history and combining empirical and macroscopic history.

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## 11.2 “Reconciliation” and the Global Partnership

### 11.2.1 Advocating “Reconciliation Studies”

In 2000, scholars gathered and launched a joint research program on “history and reconciliation.” In their view, the academic research that would resolve the conflicts between the public sentiments of Japan and China over the issue of historical perception and bring about true reconciliation in East Asia must start. The joint

research, named “Japan–China Young Scholars Conference on History,” received full support from private organizations and continued for 15 years.<sup>1</sup>

20 years ago, the government-led channel for historical dialogue had yet to be established, and non-official historians made small attempts. The historians’ dialogue, based on the belief that “the key that brings reconciliation lies in ‘history’ itself,” (Kurosawa and Nish 2011) revolved around the confirmation of the facts of “aggression” and “colonial rule” in the modern history. This dialogue aimed to share “historical materials” and “historical facts.” Historians from different countries argued that “there can be no true conciliation unless it is based on the understanding of facts.” (Ibid.) It was the consensus among the historians that the cross-border joint research provides the basic condition for achieving reconciliation that allowed the persistence of the long-term, solid joint research.

However, despite historians’ efforts, the issues such as history textbooks and visits to Yasukuni Shrine cast a shadow on the political and diplomatic relations between Japan, China, and South Korea, and threatened the framework of political reconciliation achieved by the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965 and the Japan–China Joint Communiqué of 1972. The conflicts triggered by history did not stop at the political level, but also caused the deterioration of the public sentiments. The three governments recognized the significance of the problems. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, backed up by the governments, the Japan-Korea joint research started in 2002, and Japan–China joint research was launched in 2006. This was the beginning of the so-called government-led joint historical research. The

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<sup>1</sup> This joint research received support from the Sasakawa Japan–China Friendship Fund and the University of Tokyo Press, and has been published as *Contending Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations: toward a History Beyond Borders* (2006), *Reinterpreting Early Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations: a Dialogue in History* (2009), and *Between Conflict and Co-Existence Historical Understanding: Sino-Japanese Relations over 150 Years* (2013).

governments supported scholars' joint research to avoid the escalation of the history problem in diplomacy. By intervening in the history problem, the governments took measures to keep the history problem within the realm of "history," and prevent it from becoming a factor influencing politics and diplomacy.

However, the overflow of the history problem outside the realm of "history" could not be stopped. The following reasons should be considered.

Firstly, the times and social environment have changed. As Onuma Yasuaki pointed out, after entering the twenty-first century, the views of war, colonial rule, and human rights issues have dramatically changed in the international community. According to the Korea-Japan Treaty and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué, the issues of war and colonial rule, which should have been legally settled, have been called for reconsideration since the 1980s. Additionally, while the Japanese people have been reflecting on the problems of war and colonial rule, the feeling of "unfairness" imposed by the Tokyo Trial cannot be eliminated. On the other hand, the Chinese who got some space of expression and the Koreans who gained democracy have become more readily to direct their victim mentality to the perpetrator, Japan (Onuma 2015, pp. v-vi). Their free opinions are delivered in the world through diverse media, represented by the internet. Everyone has the freedom to imagine and talk about "history." The "popularization of history," accompanying with the changing times and social environment, is one of the reasons for the overflow of the history problem.

Secondly, "history" is easily used as a diplomatic card. As Kurosawa Fumitaka said, the phenomenon of the "politicization" of "history" dramatically changed in the 1980s (Kurosawa and Nish 2011, p. 3). Prior to the 1980s, the conflicts over the interpretation of history mainly appeared in Japanese domestic politics. Since the 1980s, history has been used in Chinese and Korean domestic politics and has functioned as the diplomatic card. For example, when the

diplomatic conflicts over the nuclear test, Taiwan issue, territorial issue, and trade frictions happened between Japan and China, "history" was often used as a method to deal with these issues. The historical memory of the past "economic aggression" and "territorial aggression" were evoked, and "history" was expected to be an effective card to gain significant results in diplomatic negotiations.

Third, the environment in which historians live varies among countries and regions, and in some countries, historians do not obtain sufficient conditions to deal with the "history problem." In China, the Marxist historical view is regarded as the orthodox historical view. The interpretation of the modern history, as an issue related to the regime legitimacy, is placed under government management. Historiography is closely tied with politics. Since the 1980s, positivist historiography has enjoyed unprecedented prosperity in universities and research institutes, and many historical studies based on the modernization historical view and the civilization historical view have emerged. However, in recent years, the free space of historical studies has been narrowed. The interpretation of the modern history is now strongly required to be consistent with the Communist Party's historical view.

Therefore, it is extremely difficult to achieve historical reconciliation based solely on traditional joint history research by historians from different countries and the research outcomes based on it. In other words, to deal with the issue of historical perception that runs counter to historical reconciliation between nations and peoples and becomes a bottleneck for interstate relations and public sentiments, the search for new knowledge is indispensable. It is this new knowledge that can be "reconciliation studies." Furthermore, since "enmity" was born in "history," "reconciliation studies" and historiography are certainly inseparable. One of the goals of SDGs is "to revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development." It is crucial to build trust that transcends history to achieve this goal.

### 11.2.2 Reconciliation and the Creation of “Reconciliation Studies”

Here I want to first confirm that achieving “reconciliation” between nations and peoples and creating “reconciliation studies” to overcome the history problem have the same direction, but different points of arrival.

If we, invoking the legal meaning, understand “reconciliation” as “a contract in which disputing parties make concessions to each other and promise to stop disputing,” (*Kojien*) historical reconciliation, in summary, can be defined as a state of sustained compromise and peace achieved based on treaties between adversaries.

55 years have passed since the signing of the Japan-Korea Treaty and 48 years since the announcement of the Japan–China Joint Communiqué, but the fact that the issue of reconciliation still lies before the three East Asian countries indicates the difficulty of historical reconciliation. Japan and Korea have intensified their confrontations over the issues of comfort women and forced workers, and the public sentiments in both countries are violently clashing. The top-level diplomacy between Japan and China was suspended due to prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the textbook issue, and the distance between the hearts of the peoples continued to grow. The reconciliation in East Asia once achieved through the treaty and the joint communiqué has been broken with the change of the times.

From a historian’s standpoint, Kurosawa Fumitaka listed the following five conditions for reconciliation. First, the related parties are willing to reconcile with each other. Second, they continually make efforts to maintain the reconciliation after it is reached. Third, reconciliation is a two-way issue between the parties, rather than a one-sided thing. Therefore, the spirit of modesty and tolerance is needed. Fourth, do not be absolute in one’s own thinking. Fifth, sincerely confront the past history, and truly pass on historical facts to the next generation (*Ibid.* pp. 12–13). Kurosawa did not rush to ask for

“universal values,” but emphasized “the spirit of modesty and tolerance” and “the sincere confrontation with the past history.”

And then what kind of study is “reconciliation studies”? “Reconciliation studies” is not only to elucidate the mechanism how the history problem becomes a fetter and impedes historical reconciliation. In addition to investigating the historical reasons for the failure to achieve reconciliation, we must also present the methodologies of future-oriented reconciliation.

Here, the “reconciliation studies” that is not limited to the history problem is considered to be the broadly defined “reconciliation studies”. The “reconciliation studies” that focuses on conflicts caused by the issue of historical perception is the narrowly defined “reconciliation studies.” The contribution of historiography and historians to the narrowly defined “reconciliation studies” is to induce the overflowed history problem into the area of “historiography.”

I want to explain a little more about the broadly defined “reconciliation studies” and the narrowly defined reconciliation. Mori Kazuko argued that when people become free in concept and if possible, in substance from the three boundaries—the boundaries of nation, ethnicity, and gender—the hypothesis that “true reconciliation” exists can be formulated, and the study built on this hypothesis is “reconciliation studies.”<sup>2</sup>

The creation of a “true reconciliation,” eliminating the three boundaries, is the widely defined “reconciliation studies.” However, when looking back the history that mankind has walked through and the issues that are happening on the earth, there is a long way to go before achieving this “true reconciliation.” In East Asia, we still need to continue our effort to foster the environment that transcends the three boundaries. Therefore, pursuing a gradual “reconciliation” is more realistic. If we see Mori’s “true reconciliation” as a “future reconciliation” and an idealistic goal, as the step before its realization, we must first aim to “reconcile from the past.”

<sup>2</sup>Comments by Mori Kazuko at the joint research meeting.

In East Asia, since many historical and cultural assets are shared, it is difficult to notice nuanced differences and easy to have misunderstanding and conflicts. Conflicting values based on different political systems and differences in social structure are also the obstacles. In addition, there is a competitive structure in this region that prioritizes each nation's historical view.

The above indicates that "reconciliation studies" is a field with strong "timely" and "regional" characters.

The so-called "timely" character is that "times" are different between the moment when a hostile relationship was formed and the current moment when we are trying to overcome that relationship and reconcile. We can neither recreate the time environment where the hostile relationship appeared nor pursue reconciliation in the same time environment. We must start from the recognition of the current time environment. The consequence of the progress of globalization with the movement of people, things, and information is that the world has transformed from the time centered on "national consciousness" into the time centered on ethnic consciousness, civil society consciousness, and "human rights" consciousness. There are reversals against this flow in some countries and regions, but the trend of the times has already reached a point where it cannot be turned back. Therefore, we cannot pursue the "reconciliation studies" built on "national consciousness." The "international reconciliation" in East Asia was achieved during the Cold War because of the historical background centered on "national consciousness." Today, the prominence of the issue of reconciliation among the people is related to the rising "human rights consciousness." Future "reconciliation studies" should be built with "civil society" and "human rights" consciousness.

Meanwhile, the so-called "regional character" means that different countries and regions face different challenges in their own historical contexts when working toward reconciliation. The process of pursuing reconciliation is also a process of psychologically evolving oneself. What are the barriers that Japan, China, and Korea

must overcome respectively? For the Japanese, the questions of how to protect the goal of "independence and self-respect" made since the modern age and how to build a "beautiful country" are vital when considering reconciliation with other countries. On the other hand, for the Chinese and Korean, the issue is how to face the "victim mentality" and "national justice and dignity." Especially for China, it is impossible to "reconcile" with foreign countries without examining the relationship between "law" and "justice," between ethnic diversity and the "unified state." In conclusion, "reconciliation studies" must be based on knowledge accumulated in area studies.

"Reconciliation studies" discussed in this article refers to the "narrowly defined reconciliation studies." Here I would like to limit the target region of the "narrowly defined reconciliation studies" to East Asia. In East Asia (Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Mainland China, and Taiwan), affected by diverse political systems and values and unstable interpretations of history, unfortunate historical events that were thought to have been resolved are sometimes unearthed as "unresolved historical issues" and impact on political and diplomatic relations in this region. When regaining our calmness after the impacts, we find that we cannot even reach agreements on the perceptions of many historical facts themselves. Especially since the 1980s, the disputes over historical interpretations have constantly occurred among Japan, China, and South Korea. The characteristic of the disputes in this region is that diplomatic problems are often structurally connected with "history," frequently provoking conflicts in public sentiments. Based on the above facts, when constructing "reconciliation studies," we need to first explore the academic knowledge that contributes to historical reconciliation in East Asia. And if we need to give a tentative definition of such "reconciliation studies," it should be a "policy science" that seeks to end "historical conflicts," sustain peace among nations and within domestic societies, prevent further conflicts, and find the "peace of mind."

Now I want to summarize the purposes of such “reconciliation studies” as the following four points. First, to find how to reduce the confrontation made in history and how to put the relations between nations on the track to peace, stability, and cooperation. Second, to provide a pathway to ensure that commitments are met and the state of reconciliation is sustained between nations and between nations and individuals. Third, to propose the methods of avoiding new conflicts, so that the “history problem” does not cause new tension. And fourth, the state and society provide an environment that reflects on the past of victimization and perpetration at the individual level and achieve the “peace of mind.”

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### 11.3 “Doing History” and the Contribution to SDGs

For the humanities and social sciences contributing to SDGs, a variety of traditional disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, history, political science, sociology, and economics must be mobilized in an interdisciplinary manner. Since the incentive for conflicts between nations and peoples is “history” itself, the role of historiography is important. The contribution of historiography to SDGs not only includes historical studies based on historical methods, but also means to bring “history” back from politics to the realm of historiography and “manage” (research) it, which is essential. This work cannot be accomplished in one country, but requires dialogue and collaboration among historians from different countries. Through dialogue and collaboration, if a common space of knowledge can be created, it will function as a platform for reconciliation. The method of building this knowledge platform shaped by historians will also contribute to SDGs. In other words, the three methodologies—historical methods, separating history and politics, and building historians’ communities—are the issues of historiography that can contribute to SDGs. The process of exploring the three methodologies itself is the process by which historiography, along with other disciplines, makes contributions to SDGs.

This article will describe this process as “doing history.” (Osawa 2019).<sup>3</sup>

#### 11.3.1 Exploring the Methods of the New Historiography

An overview of the process of exploring the three methodologies will be as follows. The first is the search for new methods of historiography.

Originally historiography is the study of exploring the past facts. However, as soon as the orthodox historiography crosses national borders and begins dialogue with historiography in foreign countries, it has to face two difficulties. The first is the difference in how to capture the past “facts.” Each country in East Asia has developed its self-centered sense of history through its own “national history” research and history education. In the case of Japan and China, what caused the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as the starting point of the Sino-Japanese War? What is the number of victims in the Nanjing Massacre? The facts of these incidents are still unsettled since there are no definitive historical records. However, China’s official view is that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was made by the Japanese army, and the number of victims in the Nanjing Massacre is 300,000. For Chinese historians, even if they may not agree with this official view, it is important for them to have the “basic recognition” that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was a key step in Japan’s aggression of China and that many Chinese were killed in the Nanjing Incident. For Japanese historians, objective and scientific historical records themselves are of decisive significance, and it is the finding of more accurate facts about the past that is considered to be true historiography. In addition, “in Japanese society, China’s pressure for approving

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<sup>3</sup> The expression “doing history” has been used in many places. Here it refers to an attempt to exclude political factors that interfere with historiography as a discipline and think about historical problems within the framework of historiography. At the same time, it also means to search for methodologies to think about the present through history.

the official historical view is seen as an act of power to suppress the scientific attitude aiming to search for truth.” (Kobayashi and Nakanishi 2010, p. 298).

That is to say, what China requests from Japan is the sharing of “recognition.” In contrast, what Japan demands is the empirical, “scientific” stance. In the current uncompromising situation, a direction showed by some Japanese historians is to “to go beyond the traditional rigid framework of ‘shared recognition’ and ‘positive science’ and to create a history combining both positivism and large interpretive frameworks as a joint academic act shared by Japan and China.”<sup>4</sup> However, the problem is that to what extent such a compromise plan can be achieved. The legitimacy of the Communist Party’s one-party dictatorship is demanded by history. In such a situation, as the Japanese side clearly recognizes, China “needs to modify its traditional culture that seeks historical justification of political legitimacy and create an open culture.”<sup>5</sup> In this sense, the process of creating “reconciliation,” as the precondition of SDGs, is also a process of creating the “open culture.”

We need solid efforts. The first step is to share historical materials. Many facts cannot be clarified with historical materials of one country alone, so the active use of historical materials in other countries is essential. One of the reasons for the historical disputes between Japan and China is that historical truth is not sharable. The sharing of historical truth must be based on the sharing of historical materials. However, hindered by the policies of historical materials (archives) management, sharing historical materials is difficult. Based on the limited conditions, seeking the sharing of historical materials and truth is the first condition for “doing history.”

The second difficulty that historical dialogue faces is the problem of “emotional memory.” “Historical perception” in each country can be divided into a “people’s history” intruded by “emotional memory” and an “academic history” based on objective, scientific historical records.

Of course, as I said before, in the “academic history,” there is a difference between the emphasis on “positivism” (Japan) and the prioritization of “large interpretive frameworks” (China), and the compromise between them itself is a big issue. This issue can only be resolved through dialogue and joint research by historians. Needless to say, the “people’s history” that contains much “emotional memory” has a more complex structure than the “intellectual history.”

The constituting elements of each country’s “people’s history” do not need to be the same. Using China’s case, they can be classified as follows: the “family historical narrative” told in family since childhood, the “societal historical heritage” widely conveyed among people in general, the “people’s historical memory” widely penetrated in school education and other situations, and the “national historical view” that secures the regime legitimacy.

The first layer of China’s “national history” is the “family historical narrative.” Many people have been taught “family history” by grandparents and parents since childhood. For example, for the “postwar generation” who were born during the 1950s and 1960s, the starting point of the education of the “War of Resistance history” they received was the family history told by their grandparents and parents. The family historical narrative is connected with the historical narrative inherited in society and the historical memory that unifies the people, shaping the form of historical perception.

The ruling power of the dominant “national historical view” varies in strength as times change. On the one hand, when its ruling power is weak, other constituting elements of the “people’s history” are in a state of “a hundred flowers blossoming,” and the distance between “academic historical studies” and politics is maintained, showing a flourishing phenomenon of “a hundred schools contending.” On the other hand, when the dominance of the “national historical view” becomes strong, other components of the “people’s history” decline, and “academic historical studies” fall silent.

Although we understand that there must be a line between “academic historical studies” and

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 299.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.



“people’s history” that is intruded by “emotional memory,” in recent years, “understanding people’s emotion in the historical past” has been entering the scope of historical studies (Frevert 2018, p. 213). Until quite recently, Ute Frevert pointed out that Japanese scholars did not give attention to the topic of historicizing emotion (Ibid., p. 7) However, we should not forget that 20 years ago, Japanese and Chinese scholars had a heated discussion on emotional memory. In the discussion on the “knowledge community” held by Japanese and Chinese scholars, Sun Ge, a Chinese scholar, raised the issue of “emotional memory” related to the Sino-Japanese War. The issue posed by Sun Ge is the meaning of sticking to historical documents regarding the situation of damage including the number of victims of the Nanjing Massacre, for which accurate statistics are almost impossible to obtain. Sun Ge asked, when historical studies is satisfied with the investigation of historical documents but completely ignores, or eventually turns hostile to people’s emotional memory, where does its “absolute legitimacy” come from? (Sun 2000, p. 167). The problem here is about “historical materials” and “memory” in historiography. According to Sun Ge, the posture that sticks to the number of victims in the Nanjing Massacre is the basic academic principle that emphasizes so-called “objective truthfulness.” The opposite side of this principle is the “emotion of live human beings.” However, in the pursuit of “objective truthfulness,” we have lost emotional memory. As a result, it takes the tension and complexity out of history and turns historiography into a dead knowledge that can be replaced by statistics.

Regarding the danger of the “dead knowledge” argued by Sun Ge, Mizoguchi Yuzu from Japan discussed in the following way. “In dead historiography, only historical materials that are preserved in some forms are counted as historical materials. The reality that is moving in tandem with the facts in historical materials—let alone emotional memory—is excluded from historical materials. One’s own ‘conscientious’ attitude in science that is overly concerned with 300,000 as a number not only erases emotional memory from

history, but also becomes an act of complicity in the de-historicization of the incident.” (Mizoguchi 2000, p. 128) The “act of complicity” mentioned here is an expression adopted with the intention of using the ambiguity of the complex political figure of “300,000,” “fictionalizing” the Nanjing Massacre, and further fabricating the “aggression” of China. Mizoguchi Yuzu emphasized the method of historicizing the Nanjing Massacre and the importance of “live historiography.” That is to say,

“In live historiography, the presence of emotional memory is accepted as the present tense of history. We realize that the complexity of the Nanjing Massacre lies not only in the historical facts about the past, but also in the multilayered nature of the structure where emotional memory exists ‘to the present day.’ We realize how to historicize the duet of emotional memory and historical facts, and how to historicize the Nanjing Massacre.” (Mizoguchi 2000).

Sun Ge also pointed out the problem of Chinese intellectuals regarding emotional memory. Emotional memory must be transformed into thought resources for the Chinese people, rather than “victims’ anger.” By doing so, for the first time, the unfortunate history of Japan and China will be emancipated from being “China’s thing” and “Japan’s thing,” and will become “the world history shared of us and other nations.” (Sun 2000, p. 170).

This dialogue between Japan and China was the first attempt by Chinese intellectuals to confront the weakness of their historical perception with the keyword “emotional memory.” What we should not forget here is that “emotional memory” is often disseminated in society mixed with ex-post “emotions” and established in the form of collective memory without verification by historiography. The “ambiguity” of memory should not be incorporated into historiography. When historians “historicize” these “emotional memories” based on the procedures of historiography, “doing history” and contributing to “reconciliation studies” make them function as tools for reconciliation, rather than creating new sources of conflict.

### 11.3.2 Excluding “Politics” that Invades the Realm of “History”

The second methodology that should be explored by historiography to contribute to SDGs is how to exclude “politics” that invades the realm of “history.” It is a recurring phenomenon that political and diplomatic issues are connected with “history,” and “history” is used as a catalyst to amplify conflicts. Needless to say, the present is an extension of the past. However, each political and diplomatic issue has its direct causes and historical and social background. It is the work of bureaucrats and politicians to investigate the direct causes and find out the ways to compromise and resolve the issues. It is scholars’ responsibility to provide academic interpretations of the historical and social background. Scholars’ interpretations can provide references for bureaucrats and politicians to make value judgments and policy decisions. However, when bureaucrats and politicians take away the right of interpretation from scholars to strengthen their own positions, it not only violates academic independence, but also complicates the issues and leads to the amplification of conflict and hate. Protecting “history” as an academic discipline from politics/diplomacy and bringing back “history” from politics/diplomacy is a way of “doing history.” In other words, historians, depending on situations, must draw a clear boundary line between “history” and politics/diplomacy. In the environment where these boundary lines are protected, historians may engage in dialogue between the present and the past, and through “historicizing” not only the “past” but also “emotion” and “memory,” create the wisdom necessary for “reconciliation studies.”

However, it is not easy to draw such a boundary line between “politics” and “history.” Especially in China where the political system and cultural traditions are different from those of Japan, it is extremely difficult for historians to gain academic independence. The state-dominant historical view, determined by politics, is extremely unstable. Therefore, a crucial step in drawing the boundary line is to seek and

establish an academic historical view that is independent from the national historical view, while maintaining the strained relations with politics and public opinion.

Since 1949, historical interpretations have been frequently revised based on the Party-state’s political judgements. The right of historical interpretation is controlled by the regime, rather than intellectuals (historians) who lead the academic community.

Since the 1980s, China’s “national historical view” has been repainted many times. At the beginning of the shift from the politics centered on class struggle to the modernization routine, the previously dominant “revolutionary historical view” was relativized, and the “modernization historical view” was introduced into the field of education. The assessment of the Self-Strengthening Movement and the “Westernization Group” was significantly changed. The “reform and opening up” in the modern history, called “Western affairs,” was reevaluated as a phenomenon that contributed to China’s modernization. In the 1980s, sending students to study overseas also became regularized. The Chinese young people who studied in Japan all expressed strong interest in Japan’s modernization since the Meiji Restoration. In the previous world history education, modern Japanese history was narrated as a history of “militarization,” but since the 1980s, the policies that led to Japan’s modernization had gained increased attention.

However, the change in the national historical view is limited. Since abandoning the revolutionary historical view means denying the regime legitimacy, no decisive change takes place in the national historical view, the “revolutionary historical view.”

In contrast, the “civilization historical view” and the “Republican historical review” were on the rise among historians. The Boxer Rebellion, previously regarded as an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement, was interpreted as an anti-civilization and anti-humanity riot. The “Republican era,” from 1912 to 1949, was separated from the revolutionary history and portrayed as the main axis of modern Chinese

history. Consequentially, the “Republican fever” emerged, and the legitimacy of the Communist Party that overthrew the Republic of China (ROC) was questioned. The diversification of historical views significantly influenced the Chinese people’s perception of the present situation. If the Communist Party-centered history is transformed into the ROC-centered history, the narratives of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1949 will also be changed. The Chinese leadership that places top priority on regime stability cannot afford to overlook this situation. The revival of the revolution-centered historical view is unavoidable. However, the complete return to the historical view of the Maoist era is outdated. Therefore, the officialdom must seek the possibility of historical interpretations according to China’s traditional views of the state, the world, and values.

In this way, 40 years after the modernization historical view started to be used to understand history, today’s China is once again dominated by the “revolutionary historical view” mixed with “traditional historical view.” During the 40 years, although Chinese historians have tried to rebuild historical views to engage in global dialogue, the return of the revolutionary historical view shows the instability of China’s historical interpretations. It also indicates the difficulty of clarifying the boundary line between history and politics. However, with the expansion of intellectuals’ influence and the popularization of the internet, the “free air” fostered mainly by intellectuals has begun to permeate Chinese society. There is a growing desire among the people to interpret history according to the real picture of the past. We should pay attention to how the national historical view and academic historical view, which maintain a strained relationship, will be affected.

In any case, to establish “reconciliation studies,” we must first aim to build the academic history. As can be seen from what I said earlier, it is difficult to build such a historical view within one country, and the construction the knowledge community in East Asia is much needed. The prerequisite for historical reconciliation in East Asia is the independence of academic studies and

the stability of historical views. To create such a situation, it is extremely meaningful for intellectuals to have conversations and construct knowledge networks and knowledge platforms.

### 11.3.3 The Construction of the Historians’ Community

The third methodology that historiography can contribute to SDGs is the method of constructing a historians’ community. To construct this community, the four processes—dialogue, understanding, compromise, and construction—are required. The difficult process among them is perhaps the first, “dialogue”. This is an age in which historians are expected to become conversational researchers.

For more than two decades, the dialogue on the “issue of historical perception” between the three East Asian countries produced various outcomes. Among the historical dialogue between Japan and China, the most notable one was the joint research conducted from 2006 to 2008. When Prime Minister Abe visited China in October 2006, the Japanese and Chinese leaders agreed to launch the joint history research program by experts from both countries within the year. From December 2006 to December 2008, a total of four plenary sessions were held. In January 2010, the papers in their original languages were presented by the committee members from both countries. And in September 2010, the translated papers were presented. This was the first attempt in the history of Sino-Japanese relations, and its meaning was significant.

The “dialogue” between academicians from different countries can be understood at two levels. The first is that scholars directly exchange opinions and conduct joint research by using venues such as workshops and conferences. The second is to use research outcomes as media to continuously engage in indirect dialogue with other parties. Although the number of times of the Japan–China joint research is small, the direct dialogue between historical researchers made great progress. In recent years, such dialogue has

taken various forms, deepened mutual understanding, and increased the possibility of compromise.

However, as can be seen from the research report on the modern history part of the joint research, on the one hand, the Japanese side completed the research with little reference to the research outcomes and historical materials of the Chinese side. On the other hand, China's research report used a great number of historical materials and research outcomes provided by the Japanese side. In other words, although various differences exist in the historical interpretations of the two countries, the study of the modern history of Sino-Japanese relations heavily relies on Japan's historical materials and existing literature. In such a situation, it is not easy to let Japanese scholars recognize the necessity of having dialogue with China's research outcomes. The Chinese side uses Japan's historical materials when necessary, but the dialogue with historical materials does not always make sufficient progress.

One of the missions of historiography to contribute to reconciliation, which is essential for the SDGs, is to build the "knowledge community" among scholars across national borders. To build such a community, in the "joint research," it is important to increase the communication among researchers who work on national histories and so far have little dialogue with each other, and to train researchers who can have dialogue on each other's historical materials and research outcomes.

In the 1990s, Japanese universities changed the name of the "national history" discipline to "Japanese history," in response to the internationalization of universities. The following passage from the introduction article of the Japanese history major at Kyoto University indicates the changes in Japan's "national history" education.

Japanese history is an academic field that seeks to clarify the society and culture as a whole that was born in the Japanese archipelago and has changed over time... Of course, the Japanese history major has accepted many international students, and Japanese history is a foreign history for them, so we do not only study 'Japanese history for the Japanese people.' In addition, Japanese society

and culture do not exist in isolation. Its relationship with the Eastern and Western regions is also an important research topic. Considering such things, we would like you to rethink the meaning of studying Japanese history at Japanese universities.

However, at about the same time when "national history" was changed to "Japanese history" in Japan, China established the Institute of Contemporary China Studies in 1990 and began to compile *The History of the People's Republic of China* and publish historical materials. In line with it, the concept of "national history" became more often used. This move was in contrast to Japan which stopped using "national history." Certainly, in China, "national history" is sometimes used to emphasize its difference from "the Party's history." On the other hand, "history" textbooks were made by integrating "Chinese history" and "world history" and used in education. It is necessary to examine the possibility of writing a common "history" for East Asia while searching for the knowledge community.

In recent years, with the internationalization of universities, the dialogue between "national history" and "world history" in our own countries seems to have made great progress. This is also the result of accepting a large number of international students and preparing an education guidance system for them. Recently we have frequently heard the expressions such as "Japan in the world" and "China in the world". However, Japanese studies in China is still developing, and few Chinese scholars who study "national history" can conduct dialogue with Japanese "national history." "National history" scholars on both sides are in dialogue through translated historical materials and research outcomes. The dialogue is extremely insufficient to construct the community.

To make the dialogue on "national history" more substantial, it is important to promote exchanges among current researchers and, in the meantime, to prepare an environment in which a full-fledged dialogue on national history can take place in 10 or 20 years. As the number of international students is increasing, researchers on both sides should create a cooperative

environment, and train Chinese history scholars who are familiar with Japanese language and culture and Japanese history scholars who know the languages and social cultures of China and other Asian countries well. Meanwhile, we must strengthen the cooperative environment for the development of Japanese studies in China.

One of the legacies left by the dialogue of the “knowledge community” held 20 years ago is that the Chinese participants demonstrated their position of “public intellectuals” independent from politics and the state to the Japanese side. In recent years, China’s “public intellectuals” (usually abbreviated to “*gongzhi*”) have become a well-established concept with the nuances of being intellectuals “outside the system.” For more than two decades now, they have been known as a force that strongly advocates China’s institutional change and cultural reconstruction. 20 years ago, Mizoguchi Yuzu captured this trend and explained as follows:

“Through the movement of the knowledge community, we got to know the existence of China’s critical intellectuals. However, unfortunately many Japanese scholars who study China are too fragmented in their specialties and lack the conditions to understand such intellectuals’ activities. Rather, especially since Tiananmen, many people have limited their vision of China based on stereotypical perception frameworks to make sweeping generalizations, such as institutional oppression and a lack of democracy and freedom. As learned from the movement of the knowledge community, the reality is that in today’s China, and within the system, they are creating their own democratic space while collaborating with the system, resisting it, and sometimes slipping through cracks (Mizoguchi et al. 2005, p. 562).

Mizoguchi’s explanation implied the possibility of the East Asian intellectual (historians’) community. Furthermore, he came to the assessment that the basic conditions for this community were being created. In the dialogue on the “knowledge community,” China’s critical intellectuals (public intellectuals) communicated

with intellectuals from Japan and South Korea where academic and speech freedom is institutionally guaranteed. It was successful enough to inspire participants to embrace the dream of the knowledge community. In the dialogue, the discussion over the issue of war responsibility unfolded. As the Chinese side reflected, “Chinese intellectuals have remained largely unaware of Japanese intellectuals’ reflection on the historical responsibility of the war and the price paid for assuming the responsibility for no more war. The capacity to notice it was lacking.” (Sun 2000, p. 159) Once again, the Chinese side became aware of the responsibility for the “fully hostile” image of Japan existing among the Chinese people. Both sides treated the progress of thinking about the issue as a measuring stick for whether or not real dialogue between Chinese and Japanese intellectuals could be held.

However, after 20 years, we are still searching for the historians’ community in East Asia. The political and academic environment for Chinese intellectuals has become much less free compared to 20 years ago. The psychological distance and differences in research perspectives between Japanese and Chinese historians, which was once close, seem to have widened again. The participants in the dialogue 20 years ago optimistically underestimated the impact of the differences in political systems and social conditions on the formation of the knowledge community. It is not easy for nations with different systems to construct the knowledge community. Reconciliation between peoples without the knowledge community is hard. If “reconciliation studies” is a field that also covers the methods of reconciliation between nations with different systems, it must begin with how to build a common space of knowledge and historians’ community under the conditions of different systems. Therefore, historical dialogue and building historians’ community between nations with significant differences is the process of “doing history” and constructing “reconciliation studies.”

## **11.4 The Three Stages and Research Topics of Historical Reconciliation**

### **11.4.1 The Stagnation of “Intellectual Reconciliation” as the Catalyst**

When looking back the postwar Sino-Japanese reconciliation, it is worth noting that there were three stages. The first stage was inter-governmental reconciliation. After the war, while considering the balance with domestic politics, the Japanese government sought a path of national reconciliation to break away from the shackles of the history of war and colonial rule. In 1952, Japan and the ROC government in Taiwan signed the Treaty of Peace. It pointed out “any problem arising between the Republic of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled,” but did not mention the issue of war responsibility and only announced the end of the state of war. The Korea-Japan Treaty signed in 1965 also did not express remorse for the colonial rule.

Regarding Sino-Japanese relations, initially, one of the reasons that Japan made peace and established diplomatic relations with the ROC in Taiwan, rather than the PRC on the mainland, was its wariness and dislike of the socialist political system. However, when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited China in 1972, he claimed that socialism is not a monolith, and “the Japanese people have gradually learned that the Chinese Communist Party is socialist, but it does not invade.” (Takeuchi 1993, p. 227) And he decided to normalize Japan’s relations with the PRC. For the Japanese people at that time, China was regarded as a neighboring country that was deeply connected to Japan historically and culturally, rather than a “socialist” country. In addition, the presence of the Soviet Union, a powerful communist state, also diluted China’s communist image. Above all, since China and the Soviet Union were fiercely hostile to each other back then, for Japan which had the Northern Territories issue with the Soviet Union,

China was a partner having the common enemy. The historical ties played a role in the diplomatic normalization between Japan and China, but strategic thinking on both sides also worked. Certainly, it cannot be denied that the rapid proximity between the US and China, symbolized by President Nixon’s visit to China, backed the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.

In the sense, the Japan–China Joint Communique released in September 1972 included the following expression: “Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.” China also declared that “in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.” Therefore, the two countries did not stop at the legal reconciliation, but had the intention to reach the psychological and emotional reconciliation between the peoples. For a time, there was a widespread sense of relief that the Sino-Japanese historical reconciliation was achieved with the Joint Communique and the diplomatic normalization. However, as the history until today shows, the Joint Communique was only the beginning of a reconciliation process with no end in sight.

The second stage was the reconciliation at the people’s level. In the era when people were forced to worship and obey the first generation of the revolution, such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the intention of the government-led strategic reconciliation spread to the people’s level in a top-down fashion. During the 1970s and 1980s, Japan and China entered an unprecedented honeymoon period. At that time, even the first history textbook issue in 1982 and Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 could not stop the warm current of Sino-Japanese reconciliation that permeated the societies. According to the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy released by the Prime Minister’s Office on March 15, 1987, when asked which of the four countries—the US, the Soviet Union, China, and South Korea—they felt

closest to, most Japanese respondents chose China (68.6%). It was followed by the US (67.5%), South Korea (39.7%), and the Soviet Union (8.9%). What many Japanese who felt close to China had in common was the sense of historical and cultural closeness and the sense of redemption as the perpetrator of the war. In addition, the Japanese who agreed to support China's modernization policy had the expectation that if China became modernized, the gap of values between these two countries would be narrowed.

However, the problems that existed between Japan and China would not go away because of the diplomatic normalization and the subsequent tentative people's reconciliation. Although the difference between the two countries in the interpretations of the modern and contemporary history came to the surface, the perception gap was concealed by the sophisticated political decision of Mao and Zhou. In particular, the Senkaku Islands issue, which could set back the negotiations on the diplomatic normalization, was shelved. In the negotiation process, there was almost no space for "intellectuals" (researchers) to intervene. The leaders of both countries showed no interest in shaping a consensus supported by academic knowledge.

Nevertheless, the three East Asian countries pushed forward with the process of historical reconciliation. In October 1998, President Kim Dae-jung officially visited Japan as a State Guest. As a result of the meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, the two leaders agreed "to raise to a higher dimension the close, friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea which have been built since the normalization of their relations in 1965 so as to build a new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership towards the twenty-first century." In the Joint Declaration, Prime Minister Obuchi "regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact." In response to it, President Kim "accepted with sincerity this

statement of Prime Minister Obuchi's recognition of history and expressed his appreciation for it. He also expressed his view that the present calls upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation."<sup>6</sup>

In November of the same year, President Jiang Zemin visited Japan as a State Guest. Japan and China released the Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, and tried to settle the history problem in accordance with the Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration. The Japan-China Joint Declaration stated, "Japan and China share a history of friendly exchanges spanning more than 2000 years, as well as a common cultural background, and that it is the common desire of the peoples of the two countries to continue this tradition of friendship and to further develop mutually beneficial cooperation." (Kazankai 2008, p. 457).

Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro also tried to put an end to the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations with his own logic. Koizumi, who called himself an "advocate for Japan-China friendship," visited Yasukuni Shrine six times in total, every year during his tenure. After the first, in October 2001, Koizumi made a one-day trip to China and visited the Museum of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression near the Marco Polo Bridge in the suburb of Beijing. Koizumi expressed his "heartfelt apology and condolences" to Chinese victims and told the Chinese side that his visit to Yasukuni Shrine was not intended to glorify the history of the war of aggression. He attempted to create a new pattern of Sino-Japanese relations that separated diplomacy and history. However, the Chinese side suspended the summit diplomacy and opposed Koizumi. Sino-Japanese relations continued to be in a period of "cold politics and hot economy."

What can be seen from the process of the establishment and upheaval of the intergovernmental reconciliation and the people-to-people

<sup>6</sup> Database "The World and Japan". <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPKR/19981008.D1J.html>.

reconciliation is that, without the functioning of the medium of “intellectual reconciliation,” the air of reconciliation diffused vaguely against the backdrop of China’s fast modernization. The prerequisite for sustaining the people-to-people reconciliation is to provide objective research and clear interpretations of history, but without sharing such research outcomes, the two countries put much effort into producing a friendly mood. Now we realize that the problem between Japan and China has been covered by short-term strategic requests and the prevailing atmosphere of Sino-Japanese friendship among the people, but the “shared knowledge” that is essential for stabilizing the relationship has yet to be established. The government-led joint history research mentioned before was one attempt to pursue the “shared knowledge”. The joint research has been promoted and the results have been made public between Japan and Korea since 2002, and between Japan and China since 2006. Although the two joint research programs were significant events for historical reconciliation of East Asia, it is regrettable that their impacts have not reached the people’s level of reconciliation.

In other words, the third stage of Sino-Japanese reconciliation, “intellectual reconciliation,” has yet to really begin.

#### **11.4.2 The Specific Content of the Third Stage**

If the third stage of historical reconciliation is “intellectual reconciliation,” the establishment of “reconciliation studies” is essential. The three methodologies of historiography contributing to “reconciliation studies” were discussed as before. Now it is necessary to sort out the “history problem” that should be researched based on the three methodologies.

Here we can divide the so-called “history problem” into three groups. The first group is the issues left by the war that are waiting to be resolved. In China, they are called “unresolved historical issues.” Specifically, it includes the

abandoned chemical weapons issue, the comfort women issue, the former civilian workers issue, the forced immigration issue, and the issue of Japanese left behind in China.

To deal with the abandoned chemical weapons issue, the Prime Minister’s Office (now the Cabinet Office) established the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office in April 1999. China also established the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense as a cooperative organization. However, due to the limitation of historical materials and political-diplomatic reasons, there has not been enough research on this issue from a historical perspective.

The second group is the problems that arise from the difference between historical facts and historical interpretations. The representative ones include the issue of Japan’s colonial rule in Korea and Taiwan, the authenticity of the Tanaka Memorial, the Fifteen-Year War theory, the causes of the Sino-Japanese War, the number of victims of the Nanjing Massacre, and the reality and historical assessment of the regimes of occupation. There is a wide gap between Japanese and Chinese historians over the interpretations of these facts of the past. Sometimes the issues of historical interpretations are turned into political issues, directly affecting the relationship between the two countries.

For example, many issues have yet to be elucidated regarding the regimes of occupation. In the 1930s, many regimes of occupations, backed by Japan’s military power, were established in China. While China calls these regimes as “false regimes,” Japanese historians strongly maintain that historical studies should exclude subjective value judgements and elucidate the complex multifaceted nature of the regimes of occupation, and this is the mission of historiography. We should be prepared for a long road ahead in the dialogue in East Asia on historical interpretations.

The third problem is the integration of history and political/diplomatic issues, such as the issues of the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima, the issue



of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and the textbook issue. Although these issues have both historical and political/diplomatic sides, it is the responsibility for academic history to exclude political forces and study these issues in an academic way. It is expected that research outcomes will be used to provide an academic basis for reconciliation.

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### **11.5 “Reconciliation Studies” and “Neo-new Historiography” that Contribute to SDGs**

As discussed in this article, historiography must provide the three methodologies for “reconciliation studies” seeking reconciliation between nations and peoples and the formation of global partnership. The methodologies are new historical methods, the method of separating history and politics, and the method of constructing the historians’ community. These methodologies required for historiography are also responsive to the changing time environment surrounding historiography.

In recent years, the popularization of historiography, accompanying the digitalization of historical documents and the expansion of material opening via the internet, has attracted much attention. Besides historical researchers and experts, former “consumers” historiography have become “producers,” who use readily available documents and promote them on the internet to influence historians and public opinion. The scope of historiography and the perspective from which history is perceived have broadened, contributing greatly to the development of our studies. Meanwhile, discourses that do not follow source criticism as the procedures of historiography spread widely, making the work of verifying the truth about the past more difficult.

In addition, the diversification of historical materials is developing rapidly. With the addition of subjective emotional memory to historiography, for which objective materials should have

decisive meaning, the way history is written is beginning to change. History, which has been portrayed using the state and society as the starting point, like the “history of emotion,” started from a concern for the “individual” and set up themes such as how human emotions cast their shadows on the times. In recent years, an enormous amount of oral history has been accumulated. The “history” told by individuals, which cannot be found in so-called “objective materials,” is uncovering the multiple aspects and depth of the facts about the past. Especially in countries where academic freedom is restricted, it is not uncommon for oral history to be even closer to the truth than “objective materials.”

In addition, the effectiveness of global history has been recognized by many people. Akira Iriye emphasizes that the pursuit of memories and identities across national borders, shared memories, shared pasts, and shared transnational identities is an issue related to the way of life of modern people living in the age of globalization, which means “a culturally interrelated world.” According to him, the shared identity of the three East Asian countries must be based on the shared understanding of the past, including “Japanese imperialism and its aggression, as well as the resistance against (or the cooperation with) Japan in China and Korea.” (Hosoya et al. 2004, pp. 424–425).

However, the formation of a regionally shared memory and identity is a difficult process. Therefore, “specific domestic groups share their memories with similar groups in other countries, forming transnational collective memories. Even though such transnational collective memories compete with each other, a global public memory is likely to be shaped.” (Ibid., p. 409).

In other words, today’s historiography is encountering drastic changes in the age of “popularization,” “diversification,” and “globalization.” Historiography that cannot respond to such changes obviously cannot contribute to “reconciliation studies,” and the vitality of historiography itself will decline.

## 11.6 Concluding Remarks

120 years ago, in 1902, Liang Qichao, a Chinese thinker, called for a revolution against the 2000 years of dynasty-centered way of historical writings and advocated a “new historiography.” (Liang 2008).

According to Liang Qichao, among the various disciplines commonly used in the West today, China’s only unique thing is historiography. Historiography is the greatest and most important of all studies. It is the model for the people and the source of patriotism. Historiography brought about the development of nationalism and the continuous progress of civilization in European countries.

However, what were the reasons that the merits of historiography failed to disseminate to the people? Liang Qichao pointed out four pathogens, such as “knowing dynasties but not nations,” “knowing individuals but not groups.” To eliminate these pathogens, Liang Qichao called for the “historiographical revolution.”

Since then, the Xinhai Revolution, the Republican era, and the PRC era have been recorded by the “new historiography,” which treats China’s “nation” and “groups” (society) as the subjects. “Patriotism” has become the central topic of historiography. In the nation-centered historical writings, the differences and conflicts with other nations are emphasized. In the society-centered historical writings, the emotions and experiences of unnamed individuals are eliminated. The highlight of “patriotism” has made reconciliation with enemy states difficult. Using Liang Qichao’s style, historiography tainted by patriotism is “knowing the nation but not the world,” “knowing groups but not individuals.” In the age of globalization when people around the world must work together to deal with common challenges, global histories with the intention to create “global citizens” are essential. Therefore, reviewing the “new historiography” advocated by Liang Qichao and creating a “neo-new historiography” that is compatible with the age of

globalization and can contribute to “reconciliation studies” and the sustainable global partnership should not be a task for China alone.

The attempt to construct a global history in dialogue is an effort to break the feeling of entrapment of historiography. Meanwhile, the “neo-new historiography” contributing to “reconciliation studies” and SDGs is a future-oriented historiography that fuses people’s history and academic history, balances positivist historiography and macroscopic historiography, mutually confirms emotional memory and objective historical materials, and excludes political forces from intervening in academic studies. Obviously, such a historiography will be co-created by historians around the world.

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