

**Norm glocalization:
United Nations' climate change norms and India**

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Abstract

In the negotiations on a new international agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), states had also been negotiating normative expectations for climate mitigation efforts by developing countries since 2005. These norms, expecting mitigation efforts in general and in forestry in particular, had then been operationalized in voluntary governance concepts, such as 'Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions' (NAMAs) and 'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation' (REDD+) from 2007 onwards. Subsequently, developing countries have increasingly adopted mitigation efforts, without being legally obligated to do so. But *why and how have nation-states (in the Global South) engaged with these international norms (on climate change) both internationally and domestically?* In order to explain such dynamics, I propose a new theoretical framework: *norm glocalization*. This approach allows to analyze the interaction of proactive external (e.g., foreign governments) and domestic actors (i.e., Indian government), for explaining outcomes. It enables explanations of changing glocalized norm interpretations by the domestic government, which are influenced by both external and domestic actors. The concept includes several norm glocalization phases that explain the interactions of domestic with external actors at the international and domestic level, ranging from contestation over international norm reshaping to domestic action formulation and implementation. Lastly, the framework incorporates scientific realist insights, enabling comprehensive explanations of outcomes based on multiple interacting mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions.

I apply this framework to the *case of India* from 2005 through 2019. India has been the third largest greenhouse gas emitter since 2006, and had rejected domestically financed mitigation efforts until 2007 when this began to change. This raises the research question of *why and how India has changed its engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm*. I answer this question by applying process tracing and qualitative content analysis of primary and secondary sources, including 70 expert interviews conducted in India. This contains explanations of India's shift from contestation towards the international reshaping of norms, ensuring that international funding would be provided. I subsequently explain further shifts at the domestic level towards a glocalized norm interpretation: In the 2008 'National Action Plan on Climate Change', the Indian government adopted domestically financed actions that promote economic development and have co-benefits for climate mitigation, while not aiming to reduce emission-intensive activities. This glocalized norm interpretation subsequently informed India's mitigation target in 2009, and its 'Nationally Determined Contributions' under the Paris Agreement in 2015. It also guided the Indian governments formulation and implementation of climate-related forestry actions. Overall, I find that India's climate policy-making has been strongly linked to developments in international climate negotiations. The main factors shaping India's mitigation approach were international pressure, lesson drawing from external and domestic sources, as well as domestic actors' aspirations for achieving international recognition, strategic foreign policy interests, and sufficient carbon space.

Zusammenfassung

In den Verhandlungen über ein neues internationales Abkommen unter der Klimarahmenkonvention der Vereinten Nationen (UNFCCC) haben die Staaten seit 2005 auch Verhandlungen über die normativen Erwartungen geführt, dass Entwicklungsländer Klimaschutzanstrengungen unternehmen sollen. Die entsprechenden Normen wurden in freiwilligen internationalen Instrumenten wie ‚National Angemessene Klimaschutzmaßnahmen‘ (NAMAs) und ‚Reduktion der Emissionen von Entwaldung und Walddegradierung‘ (REDD+) ab 2007 operationalisiert. In den folgenden Jahren haben dann Entwicklungsländer zunehmend nationale Klimaschutzanstrengungen beschlossen, ohne rechtlich dazu verpflichtet zu sein. Deshalb stellt sich die Frage, *warum und wie sich Staaten (im Globalen Süden) mit internationalen Normen (zum Klimawandel) sowohl auf internationaler als auch auf nationaler Ebene auseinandergesetzt haben*. Um diese Dynamiken zu erklären, schlage ich ein neues theoretisches Konzept vor: die *Normglokalisierung*. Dieser Ansatz erlaubt es, die Interaktion zwischen proaktiven externen (z.B. ausländischen Regierungen) und inländischen Akteuren (z.B. der indischen Regierung) zu analysieren, um die Ereignisse zu erklären. Es ermöglicht dabei Erklärungen der sich ändernden globalisierten Norminterpretationen der inländischen Regierung, die sowohl von externen als auch von inländischen Akteuren beeinflusst werden. Das Konzept umfasst mehrere Phasen der Normglokalisierung, die die Interaktion der inländischen Akteure mit den externen Akteuren auf internationaler und nationaler Ebene erklären, von der Normanfechtung über die internationale Umgestaltung von Normen bis hin zur Formulierung und Umsetzung inländischer Maßnahmen. Schließlich berücksichtigt das Konzept auch Erkenntnisse des wissenschaftlichen Realismus, die eine umfassende Erklärung der Ereignisse auf der Grundlage mehrerer interagierender Mechanismen unter förderlichen oder hinderlichen Bedingungen ermöglichen.

Ich wende diesen Ansatz auf den *Fall Indien* von 2005 bis 2019 an. Indien ist seit 2006 der drittgrößte Emittent von Treibhausgasen und hatte bis 2007 inländisch finanzierte Klimaschutzbemühungen abgelehnt, was sich fortan änderte. Dies wirft die spezifische Forschungsfrage auf: *Warum und wie veränderte Indien die eigenen Interpretationen und die Auseinandersetzung mit den Normen ‘Klimaschutz durch Entwicklungsländer’ und ‘Klimaschutz im Waldsektor’?* Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage verwende ich eine Prozessanalyse und eine qualitative Inhaltsanalyse von Primär- und Sekundärquellen sowie von 70 in Indien durchgeführten Interviews. Ich erkläre Indiens Wandel von der Anfechtung hin zur internationalen Umgestaltung der Normen, womit Indien sicherstellte, dass internationale Finanzmittel bereitgestellt werden. Anschließend erkläre ich weiteren Wandel hin zu einer globalisierten Norminterpretation auf der nationalen Ebene: Im ‚Nationalen Aktionsplan zum Klimawandel‘ von 2008 beschloss die indische Regierung inländisch finanzierte Maßnahmen, die die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung fördern und einen Zusatznutzen für den Klimaschutz haben, wogegen emissionsintensive Aktivitäten nicht reduziert werden sollten. Diese globalisierte Norminterpretation bildete dann die Grundlage für Indiens Klimaschutzziel in 2009 und Indiens ‚National Festgelegte Beiträge‘ im Rahmen des Pariser Abkommens in 2015. Sie diente der indischen Regierung auch als Richtschnur für die Formulierung und Umsetzung von klimarelevanten forstwirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen. Insgesamt lässt sich feststellen, dass die indische Klimapolitik eng mit den Entwicklungen in den internationalen Klimaverhandlungen verknüpft ist. Die wichtigsten Faktoren, die dabei Indiens Klimaschutzpolitik prägten, waren internationaler Druck, Lehren ziehen aus externen und internen Quellen sowie das Streben nationaler Akteure nach internationaler Anerkennung, der Realisierung strategischer außenpolitischer Interessen sowie der Sicherstellung ausreichenden zukünftigen CO₂-Budgets.

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List of abbreviations

APP	Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CAMPA	Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority
CBDR+RC	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
COP	Conference of the Parties
CSE	Centre for Science and Environment
D-N model	Deductive-Nomological Model
eq	Equivalent
ETS	Emission Trading Scheme
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
Forest-PLUS	Partnership for Land Use Science Program
FR(E)L	Forest Reference (Emission) Level
FSI	Forest Survey of India
G20	Group of 20
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GIM	Green India Mission
Gt	Gigaton
GW	Gigawatt
ha	Hectare
ICFRE	Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INDCs	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IR	International Relations
JFM	Joint Forest Management
JFMC	Joint Forest Management Committees
kWh	Kilowatt-hour
LMDC	Like-Minded Developing Countries
MOEF	Ministry of Environment and Forest
MOEFCC	Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change
Mt	Megaton

NAMAs	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
NAPCC	National Action Plan on Climate Change
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
NICCSA	National Institute on Climate Change Studies and Action
PES	Payments for Ecosystem Services
PM	Prime Minister
PM Council	Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change
RED	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries; and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SIS	Safeguard Information Systems
t	Ton
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	United States Dollar
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction: International climate change norms and glocalization

“The science is clear. We know what to do. First, we must keep the goal of 1.5 degrees Celsius alive. This requires greater ambition on mitigation and immediate concrete action to reduce global emissions by 45 per cent by 2030. G20 countries have a particular responsibility as they represent around 80 per cent of emissions. According to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in light of national circumstances, developed countries must lead the effort. But emerging economies, too, must go the extra mile, as their contribution is essential for the effective reduction of emissions. We need maximum ambition – from all countries on all fronts – to make Glasgow a success.” (1 November 2021, Glasgow COP 26 speech by United Nations’ Secretary-General António Guterres)

1.1 Relevance: Global climate politics and the Global South

In his speech at the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Glasgow on 1 November 2021, United Nations’ (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres underlined the clarity of the science on climate change and emphasized global targets that need to be reached to prevent dangerous climate change (Guterres 2021). Moreover, he urged all countries to take actions to mitigate climate change, while underlining the particular responsibility of the Group of 20 (G20) that include major industrialized countries and emerging economies, such as India. In its 2022 report, even the World Economic Forum acknowledged “climate action failure” (WEF 2022: 14) as the number one severe global risk. Scientists have pointed out the problem of human-made climate change for a long time, with subsequent reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1990 highlighting the growing knowledge on the impacts and necessary actions to limit climate change (IPCC 2022). While developed countries have historically been responsible for causing the growing concentration of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere, their current GHG emissions were overtaken by developing countries’ GHG emissions as noted by the fifth IPCC assessment report of 2013/14 (IPCC 2014b: 113). From 1990 until 2016, the Global South has emitted as many GHG emissions as the Global North, and, if trends since 1990 were to continue, it would overtake the cumulative historical emissions of the Global North in the early 2040s (Fuhr 2021: 8). However, global action on climate change has been insufficient to change the GHG emission trajectory toward reducing global GHG emissions (Climate Watch 2022), and developing countries need to do their bit alongside the developed countries that need to take the lead. Otherwise, the current global warming of 1.2 degree Celsius will increase to 1.5 degree Celsius by 2033 and to 2 degree Celsius by 2060 at current GHG emission trajectory (Berkeley Earth 2022).

In 1992, 154 parties signed the UNFCCC (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 20). This established a framework for subsequent international negotiations on the further development and operationalization of *norms*, which are *collective expectations for appropriate behavior by a community of actors* (based on Finnemore 1996: 22; Katzenstein 1996: 5). UNFCCC’s central objective is to prevent dangerous climate change, which is the macro norm of the intergovernmental

institution (i.e., defining what ought to be achieved by its parties) (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 2). The Convention text from 1992 lists several meso norms that specify how to achieve the macro norm. This includes climate change mitigation (in short 'mitigation') based on *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR+RC)* and that developed parties should *take the lead* in combatting climate change (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.1). Moreover, micro norms, which specify how to achieve the macro norm for a particular group of subjects or regarding a particular object, were also formulated and were further changed in the subsequent negotiations. The micro norm of *developed country climate mitigation actions* (i.e., collectively shared expectation of climate change mitigation actions by developed countries) was expanded to *developed country climate mitigation commitments* in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which obligated developed countries to legally binding and quantifiable GHG emission reductions in the period from 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 3.1 and Annex B).

Only since the Montreal COP in 2005, negotiations on micro norms targeting developing countries have started as part of the post-Kyoto negotiations (i.e., the negotiations about a new international agreement succeeding the Kyoto Protocol): the *developing country climate mitigation norm* (i.e., collectively shared expectation of climate change mitigation actions by developing countries) and the *carbon forestry norm* (i.e., collectively shared expectation of climate change mitigation actions in the forestry sector by developing countries). The Convention had previously requested developing countries' action on climate change as well (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1(b)), but put them in relationship to meso norms of CBDR+RC, their need of economic development and their specific needs of international support (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1), and made the extent of the implementation dependent on both developed countries' implementation of their obligation to provide international support to developing countries and developing countries' overriding priorities of economic and social development (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.7). In practice, developing countries refrained from taking own mitigation actions prior to 2005 (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 19, 22; Dingwerth and Green 2015: 159; Jinnah 2017: 294). Developing countries' domestic mitigation actions were limited to (private) mitigation projects completely financed by developed countries under the Clean Development Mechanism and used by the latter for realizing their own Kyoto Protocol targets. But even this occurred very unevenly between different sectors, as for example only a tiny portion was implemented in the forestry sector (Lederer 2011: 1900). However, the negotiations on the two micro norms targeting developing countries, which started in Montreal in 2005, resulted in two voluntary and loosely-defined governance concepts that first emerged at the Bali COP in 2007 and were further developed in the following years: First, the concept of 'Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions' (NAMAs) was initially mentioned in the context of international support to developing countries for their mitigation actions in 2007 and its scope was subsequently expanded to cover mitigation targets in 2009. Second, the approach of 'Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries; and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks' (REDD+) was

introduced as an international funding instrument for carbon forestry measures in the Global South in 2007 (UNFCCC 2008b: 3) (see also Chapter 4). In the following years, from 2007 until 2012, climate strategies proliferated in the Global South (Dubash et al. 2013a), several developing countries communicated their first quantitative mitigation targets in the form of National Level NAMAs around the Copenhagen COP in 2009 (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 504), and more than 350 REDD+ projects and initiatives were launched in over 50 countries up to 2015 (Duchelle et al. 2018: 2, 5). NAMAs were subsequently succeeded by 'Nationally Determined Contributions' (NDCs), which became the key governance concept to communicate mid-term climate (actions and) targets by all parties under the Paris Agreement of 2015 (Pauw and Klein 2020: 406). These developments resulted in a more bottom-up post-Kyoto climate architecture since the Copenhagen COP of 2009, manifesting itself in the Paris Agreement that added a top-down global mitigation goal of well below 2 degree Celsius to 1.5 degree Celsius (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 2) and an international pledge-and-review system (Falkner 2016: 1121).

These international developments and first signs of domestic actions in the Global South since 2005 raise the question of *why and how nation-states (in the Global South) have engaged with international (micro) norms (on climate change) both internationally and domestically*. Explaining climate actions by developing countries requires to study both international and domestic developments as part of global-domestic norm and governance dynamics. The norm literature has already developed various norm models that improved our understanding of global-domestic norm dynamics, while shortcomings remain. In order to close some of those gaps and to enable more inclusive, comprehensive and open-ended analyses of global-domestic norm dynamics, I develop the *norm glocalization framework*. It builds upon previous insights from norm research, comparative politics, public policy and sociology.

1.2 Theoretical contributions: Norm glocalization

I identified four gaps in the existing norm literature that I address in this work: *First*, the norm literature does not explain global-domestic norm dynamics through the interaction of both proactive domestic and external actors, and thereby overaccentuates either domestic actors'¹ or external actors' norm engagement. Early scholarship exclusively explained norm diffusion based on mechanisms induced by external actors, such as shaming. Domestic non-state actors only played a supportive and secondary role to external actors, while reactive domestic governmental actors were the ones being socialized into international norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Ropp 2013). Subsequent norm scholarship solely emphasized the role of domestic governmental actors

¹ The focus of this study is to explain the behavior and understanding of (main representatives of) the domestic government (of India). The term 'domestic actors', therefore, usually refers to domestic governmental actors, unless I refer specifically to non-state domestic actors. External actors can be (representatives of) foreign governments, international organizations or international NGOs, among others (see Chapter 2 for further details).

in reconstructing international norms through processes of norm localization, while not including mechanisms of norm engagement by both proactive domestic and external actors (Acharya 2004). Comparative Politics, instead, largely explained policy diffusion based on mechanisms induced by proactive domestic governmental actors, such as lesson drawing (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). In their introduction to a Special Issue, Börzel and Risse (2012a) list mechanisms induced by both proactive domestic and external actors as potential pathways of norm diffusion, while the case studies of their Special Issue actually applied *either* domestic actors' *or* external actors' mechanisms.

Second, the norm literature does not *explain* particular and changing *interpretations* of norms, especially when they are shaped by global-domestic norm dynamics of both domestic and external actors. Those *new emerging glocalized* norm interpretations are to be located between a full adoption of stable international meanings of norms (Finnemore 1996; Risse and Ropp 1999), and the sole prevalence of local normative understandings that hardly incorporate external normative understandings in local norms (Acharya 2004). Scholarship on the contestation and translation of norms already emphasized the varying meaning attributions to fluid norms by different agents in processes of discursive disapprovals or translations of norms (Berger 2017; Wiener 2004, 2014). Yet, this strand does not explain norm interpretations emerging from norm diffusion dynamics based on mechanisms induced by both domestic and external actors.

Third, the norm literature does not explain the reshaping of international norms in international negotiations by domestic actors prior to or during the diffusion to their nation-state. Instead, scholars have explained the diffusion from the international level to the domestic level without accounting for a prior re-shaping of international norms by domestic actors at the international level (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999: 243-244). Only recently have researchers started to acknowledge potential discursive feedbacks to the global level after the implementation of a norm (Acharya 2013; Prantl and Nakano 2011; Zimmermann 2019: 41). Alternatively, scholars theorized how a group of weaker actors create subsidiary norms that either challenge existing norms advocated by major powers or support alternative international norms (Acharya 2011), or they emphasized the role of developing countries as norm shapers at the international level without considering the dynamics between international negotiations and domestic norm engagement (Jinnah 2017; Job and Shesterinina 2014). In contrast, norm cycle models do not even indicate that norms can be re-negotiated at the international level by target states, but explain international norm change as emerging from argumentation over violation of norms that are too general (Sandholtz 2008: 103), or claim that international norm change emerges from persuasion by norm entrepreneurs of target states and subsequent norm cascading to other states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896-897, 901-904).

Fourth, the norm literature could benefit from explanatory research in the tradition of *scientific realism*, which embraces the social world's complexity by drawing on multiple causes under several domestic conditions to provide more accurate explanations of global-domestic norm dynamics.

Existing norm scholarship either leans toward neo-positivist's mono-causal explanations (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005) or toward interpretivist understandings that do not provide mechanism-based explanations (see, e.g., Berger 2017). Some insights from scientific realism have already been incorporated in norm research (e.g., Wendt 1999), and some norm researchers have already started to provide more "complex, multi-causal, contextualized explanations" (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 14). Yet, too often explanatory research prefers mono-causal explanations, while the social world is characterized by a much higher level of complexity. We, hence, need explanatory frameworks that embrace this complexity in our explanations of social events and behavior.

I develop the *norm glocalization framework* to address those four gaps. *First*, the norm glocalization framework integrates mechanisms induced by *both* proactive domestic governmental actors (e.g., lesson drawing, competition, strategic mimicry) and external actors (e.g., shaming, persuasion) and scrutinizes *interaction patterns* (i.e., how do external and domestic actors' mechanisms interact in one period and over time). This includes one *new mechanism* (strategic mimicry) and several *adapted mechanisms* (e.g., competition), which are facilitated or hampered by various *adapted domestic conditions* (e.g., material resonance). *Second*, the framework allows to illuminate different preexisting norm interpretations by external and domestic actors and to *explain the resulting glocalized norm interpretation* at both the international level and at the domestic level as an outcome of their interactions. The *glocalized norm interpretation*, thereby, represents the fusion of external and domestic actors' preexisting norm interpretations, which is explained through the workings of different mechanisms under several domestic conditions. *Third*, the *norm glocalization framework* introduces a concept, which includes several stages that consider the norm glocalization dynamics between the international and the domestic level and that incorporates an international reshaping of norms in this process. This includes the following stages: international contestation of external actors' norm interpretations by domestic actors (stage I), domestic actors' domestic agenda-setting (II), international reshaping of norms (III), formulation of domestic actions (IV), international target setting (V, VII), sectorial changes (VI, VIII) and implementation (IX). *Fourth*, the framework continues further down the scientific realist pathway by developing *explanations of outcomes* (i.e., discursive, policy and implementation changes based on glocalized norm interpretations and supportive organizational changes) *based on causal complexes*, which are combinations of multiple mechanisms that are facilitated or hampered by particular conditions (based on, e.g., Kurki 2006; Sayer 2000), and that can inform other case studies as well. In consequence, norm glocalization is defined as *the process of proactive domestic and external actors engaging with an international norm based on their particular interpretations of it, which leads to efforts of international reshaping of collective interpretations of norms and/or to varieties of domestic outcomes that reflect both the fusion of norm interpretations by both external and domestic actors, depending on the activated mechanisms of social behavior of actors under particular domestic conditions* (see also Chapter 2).

1.3 Empirical focus: Climate change norms and India

In order to show the utility of the *norm glocalization framework* for analyzing global-domestic norm dynamics in general and particularly for the global-domestic dynamics around global climate politics, I apply it to India's engagement with the two micro norms targeting developing countries: the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm. Climate change is a particularly interesting policy field for investigating global-domestic norm dynamics, as it is shaped by international negotiations in the UNFCCC and is based upon international promises and domestic actions, which allows to study norm diffusion mechanisms, their facilitating or hampering domestic conditions, and domestic outcomes based on particular glocalized norm interpretations.

Nonetheless, International Relations' norm research on climate change is rather scarce, particularly regarding a focus on developing countries (e.g., Höhne 2018; Jinnah 2017; Stevenson 2011), as scholars have mostly analyzed norm engagements by countries from the Global North in the context of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., Bernstein 2002b; Cass 2006; Hoffmann 2005). Large parts of the global climate politics literature, instead, are influenced by neoliberal institutionalism when studying international climate politics (O'Neill 2017: 16), leading to concepts, such as fragmentation (Biermann et al. 2009) and regime complex (Keohane and Victor 2011). Alternatively, scholars have studied climate initiatives from a governance lens – often with a focus on non-state and subnational actors (Dingwerth and Green 2015; Lederer 2015), leading to approaches, such as polycentricity (Jordan et al. 2015), multi-level climate governance (Betsill and Bulkeley 2006), governance experiments (Hoffmann 2011), and transnational climate governance initiatives (Bulkeley et al. 2014) (e.g., municipal networks, business self-regulation and private certification, see Hickmann 2017).

I, instead, concur with calls to focus on the state as the most important regulator of GHG emissions (Purdon 2015; Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012), especially as it is the central actor in a more hybrid international UNFCCC architecture with bottom-up pledges and international goals and reviews (Falkner 2016: 1120-1121). I do so neither from an exclusive domestic politics focus (e.g., Jordan and Huitema 2014) nor from an exclusive international politics perspective (e.g., Eckersley 2020; Keohane and Victor 2016). Instead, I share with some researchers the interest in the connections between international agreements and domestic politics (Andonova 2008; Kasa 2013). Scholars have noted that much more research on these global-domestic dynamics is needed in the realm of climate change (e.g., Jordan et al. 2015; Lederer 2015; Purdon 2015; Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012). Quantitative research descriptively noting a proliferation of climate strategies in the Global South around major international climate conferences has already suspected that international processes are stimulating or enabling national climate actions, while noting that the “exact dynamic between these two levels is a subject for further study and may well vary by country” (Iacobuta et al. 2018: 1131). I provide an approach to study those global-domestic norm dynamics in the form of the norm glocalization framework and apply it in order to explain outcomes based on the underlying mechanisms and conditions. This fits very well with a focus on global-domestic political dynamics

between the intergovernmental developments in the UNFCCC and the Indian government's engagement with climate change norms at both the international and domestic level. Moreover, this allows me to investigate and explain the changing and different interpretations of climate change norms in a fine-grained way, while previous discourse analyses have described more coarse-grained and general differences in environmental discourses on climate change and forestry (e.g., Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Di Gregorio et al. 2015).

India is a particularly interesting and *puzzling* case: Since 2006, it has been the third highest absolute GHG emitter in the world (Climate Watch 2021a), is rapidly industrializing and among the 20 richest countries of the world, while having contested any own domestically financed mitigation efforts due to its low per-capita GHG emissions and its development status. Yet, this surprisingly began to change in 2007. The observation period starts in 2005, as since then, India had participated in the international UNFCCC negotiation on two micro norms targeting developing countries: the developing country climate mitigation norm, manifesting itself in UNFCCC's governance concepts of NAMAs and (since 2015) NDCs, and the carbon forestry norm, mostly manifesting itself in the UNFCCC's governance concept of REDD+ (for an overview of previous research findings on those governance concepts, see Chapter 4). In interaction with external actors, it has reshaped these norms and governance concepts internationally, and subsequently has further adjusted them domestically. This has led to domestic action formulation in the form of India's national action plan in 2008, international target setting in the form of quantitative GDP-based climate mitigation targets in 2009 and 2015, to subsequent sectorial changes in the forestry sector by formulating the Green India Mission in 2010 and by advancing India's REDD+ framework in 2013 and 2018, and eventually to implementation in the forestry sector since 2014. The observation period concludes at the end of 2019, as in 2020, a new epoch marked by the COVID-19 pandemic started (see also Chapters 5 to 7).

The forestry sector is a particularly interesting sector in the Indian case, as the Indian government has presented its forestry sector as a carbon sink over the last years in order to shine on its achievements in international climate meetings, while independent research indicates that forestry is a carbon emitter due to forest degradation through fuel wood collection and even deforestation for economic development purposes (Kohli and Menon 2011: 15; Sharma 2017). The Indian government has a history of promoting afforestation programs, whose success is very questionable (Coleman et al. 2021; Jones 2021), and has successfully renegotiated the international funding instrument REDD+ to include afforestation as another internationally adopted interpretation of the carbon forestry norm (alongside reducing deforestation and degradation). Yet, it has only slowly and non-conclusively advanced the REDD+ preparations at the domestic level, while instead advancing domestically financed actions in the forestry sector in a way that interpreted both the carbon forestry norm and the developing country climate mitigation norm in a different way than international agreements on them in the form of the REDD+ and NAMA governance concepts at the Bali COP in 2007 suggested.

The Indian government's advancement of domestically financed mitigation actions is *surprising* given that India was previously particularly known for contesting any demands internationally to undertake domestic climate mitigation actions that were not completely financially compensated by developed countries and has actively fought for the incorporation of this perspective in the negotiations on the two micro norms and governance concepts. Hence, the research *question* arises *why and how India has changed its interpretation of and its (domestic and international) engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm from 2005 until 2019*. As the two micro norms both address the forestry sector, I chose to analyze how the Indian government has advanced their version of these norms in the forestry sector.

Existing norm frameworks are insufficient to explain these *puzzles*, as India had faced shaming since 1992 without leading to any changes and had always demanded compensation for mitigation actions, while it started to advance domestically financed climate actions since 2008 without sufficiently preparing for being able to acquire international funding from NAMAs or REDD+ (i.e., no pure norm socialization). Also, an exclusive focus on how domestic actors adapt the norms to the domestic context is insufficient in order to explain the global-domestic norm dynamics between external *and* domestic actors that caused the changing norm engagement by India, as external actors and their interpretations of both norms remained important over the course of the case study (i.e., no pure norm localization). Furthermore, India even reshaped the collective interpretation of the norm internationally before further glocalizing it domestically, which cannot be captured by any norm framework to date. Lastly, preexisting norm frameworks prefer single causes explaining particular periods of a norm model, while not considering that multiple mechanisms can interact at a certain point of time.

While this book advances empirical claims regarding India, the qualitatively explained dynamics may also be found in other developing countries in similar ways, as quantitative descriptive research found a proliferation of climate strategies in the Global South from 2007 until 2012 (Dubash et al. 2013a), long before the introduction of NDCs under the 2015 Paris Agreement that required developing countries' actions. However, in the spirit of scientific realism, the activated mechanisms and conditions revealed in this study will only be useful as initial starting points for analyzing other cases, as their specific empirical contexts may reveal other mechanisms and conditions at other points of time. The literature on the Global South has so far analyzed negotiation behavior by emerging economies (Jinnah 2017), and has already provided empirical analyses of countries like India regarding particular aspects and different periods of time (e.g., Atteridge 2013; Dubash et al. 2018a; Stevenson 2012; Vijge and Gupta 2014), while not explaining India's climate policy evolution between the international and domestic level and its international and domestic REDD+ engagement from 2005 until 2019 in a theory-guided way. Climate politics in the Global South still merits further systematic, theory-guided analyses (Lederer 2015; Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012), especially from a norm perspective, as GHG emissions in the Global South have been rising, which necessitates

more and better explanations of the varieties of climate change engagements by governments. This can be achieved by applying the *norm glocalization framework*.

1.4 Research design: Scientific realism and methods of analysis

The research design of this study strongly relies on insights from one particular philosophy of science: scientific realism. Scientific realists emphasize the deviation from a neopositivist understanding of causality based on regularities between two events, and propose “uncovering the underlying [...] mechanisms that causally connect [them]” (Wight 2002: 43). Causes are thereby defined as “all those things that bring about, produce, direct or contribute to states of affairs or changes in the world” (Kurki 2006: 202). Social processes and events are conceptualized as the result of multiple causes which interact, complement and/or counteract each other (Bhaskar 2008: 43; Kurki 2006: 202, 209). Explanations are therefore based on spatio-temporal causal complexes that are *characterized by the workings of multiple causal mechanisms, which in combination generate processes and outcomes under certain facilitating or hampering conditions* (Bhaskar 2008: 37, 43; Kurki 2006: 202; Patomäki 2008: 21; Sayer 2000: 14-15). Mechanisms are ‘*all those entities that, as part of causal complexes in open systems, generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world*’ (based on Bhaskar 2008: 37, 39, 46; Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 421) (for a more comprehensive definition see Chapter 3). Depending on the conditions and their facilitating or hampering effects, the same causal mechanism can result in different outcomes (Sayer 1992: 107; 2000: 14-15).² The procedure of reasoning of retroduction (also known as abduction) thereby allows to plausibly connect observable effects to underlying causal mechanisms (Jackson 2011: 76, 83; Sayer 1992: 107; Wynn and Williams 2012: 799). For scientific realists, the production of knowledge about reality is socially influenced, but they try to come as close as possible in their account of reality, which exists independently from the researcher’s mind (Bhaskar 2008: 12, 15, 56; Kurki 2006: 203; Patomäki and Wight 2000: 224; Wendt 1999: 75). This also means that from a scientific realist perspective, “we can, and do, make rational choices between competing knowledge claims” (Wight 2007: 386) as they do have different abilities to account for evidence and to provide explanations for processes (Kurki 2006: 210; 2007: 372).

I apply a *case study* approach, which is defined by scientific realists as investigation of “one or a small number of social entities or situations” (Easton 2010: 199). Cases are not selected with the goal to generalize empirical results and to predict other cases (as by neopositivists) (Wynn and Williams 2012: 804). Instead, scientific realist research produces context-dependent, situational and holistic explanations based on mechanisms and conditions that *may be general and applicable to other cases* (Jackson 2011: 110, 199). Cases are *chosen selectively* based on the belief that they

² Conditions are caused by other causal mechanisms than the ones under investigation.

exhibit the workings of conceptual framework's mechanisms and that they provide the chance to illuminate under-theorized factors. This can result in a *reformulation of the theoretical framework*, which then can work for other not yet studied cases as an initial ordering framework (Bergene 2007: 22-23; Jackson 2011: 200). Scientific realists thereby pose questions that integrate both *how* and *why* questions (Wynn and Williams 2012: 795, 804). I present the case of India's climate change engagement between 2005 and 2019 in order to apply the norm glocalization framework that may inform other case studies as well.

A case study can be conducted through in-depth *process tracing* to illuminate which complex of causal mechanisms is responsible for an outcome of interest. Most process tracing approaches (e.g., George and Bennett 2005) rest upon a semi-positivist understanding of mechanisms as observable intervening variables which fill in the gaps between the independent and dependent variable in a model based on a covering law causality that produces singular causalities (Guzzini 2012c: 258-259; Jackson 2011: 109). For example, George and Bennett (2005: 6) argue that process tracing is being done by examining "sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case". Instead of applying a semi-positivist method that prefers mono-causal explanations, I introduce *causal complex process tracing*, which is rooted in scientific realism. Causal complex process tracing allows for complex explanations of events, actions and particular meaning attributions through illuminating the workings of multiple *interacting causal mechanisms and their facilitating or hampering conditions* based on abduction. I explain the Indian government's engagement with the two micro norms from 2005 until 2019 based on twelve succeeding causal complexes that cover nine stages of the norm glocalization process and are each based on the workings of up to four mechanisms and up to seven conditions explaining the evolving outcomes.

Expert interviews help scientific realists to reveal the role of mechanisms, conditions and their outcomes, as experts know about the reasons of actions and the overall processes to the outcomes. Interviewees also provide information about their own particular perspectives, though as scientific realists aim to capture reality, they do not want to stop at understanding how individuals perceive their world (in contrast to interpretivists). However, interviewees can never be aware of all the relevant causes and conditions, leading only to a partial picture. The validity of interview outputs must therefore be critically evaluated on its own terms and be triangulated with other interview data and sources. Interviews must be conducted from a theoretically oriented perspective, while following an abductive approach (Smith and Elger 2012: 4, 12, 16). I incorporated 70 expert interviews with government officials, donors, consultants, NGO representatives, project managers, advocates, and researchers that were participants or observers of the processes analyzed in the case study. I conducted them during two field trips to India in 2016 and 2018. In addition, I incorporated two e-mail communications with two experts in my analysis. *Qualitative content analysis* was used to scrutinize both interview transcripts as well as secondary and primary documents (e.g., media articles, government documents) based on the categories of the norm glocalization framework.

Based on this comprehensive data material, it is possible to evaluate divergent claims by different interviewees. This helped to reveal the actual mechanisms and conditions of the process, the collectively shared interpretations of the international norm and the resulting outcomes.

1.5 Main findings of the Indian case study

The book demonstrates how *the Indian government shifted its engagement* with the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm from international contestation (I) over domestic agenda setting (II), international norm reshaping (III), domestic action formulation (IV), international target setting (V), sectorial changes (VI), and renewed target setting (VII) to renewed sectorial changes (VIII) and implementation (IX) in the period from 2005 until 2019. This is explained by twelve causal complexes.

Responding to UNFCCC negotiations on both micro norms, in 2007, the Indian government shifted *from international contestation to international reshaping* of the two norms in focus. This can be explained by India's competition engagement (i.e., maximizing material benefits), which was facilitated by cultural resonance (i.e., alignment with preexisting norms and sectorial priorities), material resonance (i.e., alignment with the domestic material necessities), and material reception (i.e., high prospects for financial or political benefits). This occurred as a response to external actors' shaming (i.e., negative comments that jeopardize the social status) or persuasion (i.e., convincing others) efforts. From 2008 until 2019, these internationally reshaped collective norm interpretations were subsequently *further reshaped at the domestic level* through interactions between external actors (such as United States) and domestic governmental actors (such as India's Prime Minister or Environmental Minister).

The continuous international negotiations in the UNFCCC and other international fora (such as the G8+5/G20), since 2007/08, resulted in social dynamics that motivated the Indian government to *engage more constructively on the developing country climate mitigation norm both internationally and domestically*, as India's previous naysayer image threatened to negatively affect other foreign policy goals (such as on the US-Indian nuclear deal). The Indian government mostly reacted to external actors' shaming by engaging in strategic mimicry (i.e., mimicking of a norm engagement for other strategic reasons). Strategic mimicry, lesson drawing (i.e., incorporating elements from external approaches and past experiences) and competition shaped most of the Indian governments' subsequent norm interpretations and policy outputs (e.g., adoption of National Action Plan on Climate Change) from 2007/08 onwards, indicating interesting interaction patterns between external and domestic actors' mechanisms.

The domestic *engagement with the carbon forestry norm* was closely related to the Indian government's engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm in the forestry sector. Competition, complex learning (i.e., incorporating new patterns of reasoning), lesson drawing,

strategic mimicry, and to a lesser extent external actors' persuasion in different combinations shaped the Indian government's subsequent norm interpretations, discursive outputs (e.g., REDD+ Strategy) and policy changes (e.g., Green India Mission) from 2008 onwards, and the implementation in the forestry sector since 2014 (i.e., afforestation under the Green India Mission).

1.5.1 Explaining changing glocalized norm interpretations in different stages

I demonstrate how and explain why the Indian government *shifted its interpretations* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* from voluntary and fully compensated mitigation actions (in stage I) over internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions (in stage III) to domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation³ efforts and targets (in stage VII) and eventually to domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets (in stage IX). These *glocalized norm interpretations* are fusions of preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors (i.e., promotion of high economic growth, sectoral development goals, rejection of mitigation commitments, international funding) and of norm interpretations advocated by external actors (i.e., non-compensated mitigation commitments and implementation by developing countries). The *domestic actors'* norm interpretations have mostly been incorporated through the mechanisms of strategic mimicry, competition, and lesson drawing under the conditions of cultural resonance and material resonance. The *external actors'* norm interpretations have largely been included through the mechanisms of strategic mimicry, lesson drawing, and shaming under the condition of social reception (i.e., quest for international social recognition) and material reception. At the same time, the Indian government continuously rejected taking legally-binding quantitative mitigation commitments (due to competition, cultural resonance, material resonance). Fearing competitiveness and economic development to be jeopardized by undertaking climate mitigation efforts, the Indian governments under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (up to 2014) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi (since 2014) followed a reversed co-benefit approach in which development was the main priority, leading to sectoral developmental actions that had climate co-benefits (i.e., win-win actions) and to non-ambitious GDP-based climate mitigation targets hardly higher than sectoral business as usual developments, while not addressing trade-offs with emission-intensive developmental activities (such as deforestation or coal usage).

Regarding the *carbon forestry norm*, similarly, *changing glocalized norm interpretations* can be found and explained through causal complexes: The Indian government shifted from financially compensated conservation (in stage I) over compensation of all carbon-forestry activities (in stage III) to domestically and internationally financed interventions on afforestation, forest quality improvement and non-carbon benefits (in stage VI), which was limited to domestically financed

³ 'Developmental climate mitigation' means that development is the main target and mitigation is only a co-benefit of an intervention. The Indian government thereby turned external conceptualizations on its head, such as from the IPCC, which had indicated that mitigation as the main target of interventions can result in co-benefits for development (see Chapter 6.1).

interventions in the form of implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations in the implementation stage (IX). These *glocalized norm interpretations* are fusions of preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors (i.e., afforestation, compensated conservation, economic crop and private tree plantations, non-carbon benefits) and of norm interpretations advocated by external actors (i.e., mitigation in forestry by developing countries, compensated reduction of deforestation and degradation). The *domestic actors'* norm interpretations have mostly been incorporated by the mechanisms of competition, lesson drawing, strategic mimicry under the conditions of cultural resonance, material resonance, and material reception. The *external actors'* norm interpretations have largely been included by the mechanisms of persuasion, complex learning, lesson drawing and strategic mimicry under the condition of material reception, social reception, and knowledge (i.e., sufficient preexisting understanding). However, in the implementation, the new focus on forest quality improvement was lost (due to competition, strategic mimicry, material resonance, cultural resonance, material reception, social reception) and addressing deforestation was continuously rejected (due to competition, cultural resonance, material resonance). Instead, the Indian government relied on a norm interpretation that was materially beneficial for India, even when international funding from REDD+ would not be flowing, as it included benefits for local livelihoods as well as for economic crop and private plantations.

The changing glocalized interpretations of both micro norms thereby reflect compromises and prioritizations between climate mitigation and other (colliding or fusing) norms, such as unlimited economic growth and achievement of sectorial development goals in the case of the developing country climate mitigation norm, and afforestation, privatization, biodiversity conservation and community empowerment in the case of the carbon forestry norm.

1.5.2 Causal complexes explaining outcomes

Domestic actors' strategic mimicry triggered most *policy changes* as a response to or in prevention of future external actors' shaming. Strategic mimicry in combination with lesson drawing and competition shaped the content of most policy changes (e.g., National Action Plan on Climate Change, emission intensity targets of GDP), which were mostly facilitated by cultural resonance, material resonance, social reception, and material reception. Shaming and strategic mimicry were the most important mechanisms triggering most *organizational changes* (e.g., set-up of Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change and Special Envoy's Office on Climate Change). *Implementation* (e.g., planting of seedlings) was triggered by strategic mimicry and largely shaped by competition. However, no transformational policy change (i.e., change of the hierarchy of goals) occurred (due to competition, cultural resonance, material resonance). Moreover, no large-scale organizational changes (e.g., constitution of strong ministerial departments) were enacted to push policy change and implementation. Implementation of the climate mitigation-oriented afforestation program – the Green India Mission – (enacted by strategic mimicry and competition) has remained

inadequate (belated start, insufficient funding, inadequate planting compared to the targets) due to several conditions (political-administrative set-up, cultural resonance, material resonance, material reception). This will prevent India to reach its NDC carbon forestry and Green India Mission targets.

Development cooperation hardly played any role in this case study, as the Indian government had not strived to complete the necessary preparation activities for receiving some of the little international funding available. The few instances of donor engagement based on potential material incentives and persuasion efforts were not effective or had little domestic impact due to several conditions (material reception, political-administrative set-up, social reception, cultural resonance, material resonance). However, internationally, India continued to demand international funding as part of its negotiation position, among others to ward off external demands to increase India's own mitigation efforts.

1.6 Implications for scholars and policy experts

What can we learn from this study? This research demonstrates the necessity to study *multiple causes and the conditions* at the same time, but also indicates that some are more important than others. It shows the possibility that *domestic actors reshape international norms* in international negotiations before further reshaping them domestically in interactions with external actors. This leads to *changing glocalised norm interpretations* that are fusions of external and domestic actors' norm interpretations. Global-domestic climate politics are *shaped by both international and domestic developments* (here between the UNFCCC negotiations and the domestic level in India) and *by both external and domestic actors*, while development cooperation hardly played a role in the Indian case. For scrutinizing those global-domestic interactions *several norm glocalization stages* are suggested that help to explain governmental actions from international contestation to implementation. This framework thereby proposes *several most important mechanisms* (strategic mimicry, shaming, competition, lesson drawing) and *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, social reception, material reception) that may be particularly relevant for explaining state actions in the face of *horizontal* (UNFCCC and G8+5/20) and *vertical institutional interlinkages* (international and domestic level) of the global regime complexes on climate change and other policy fields.

Regarding the prospects for mitigating climate change, the *dynamics around international social expectations of increasing climate action and goals* may lead to more ambitious pledges by national governments over time, especially in the context of the Paris Agreement's pledge and review mechanisms and the shaming and strategic mimicry around it. But a ratcheting up to higher ambitions does not necessarily mean that they will directly and quickly translate into adequate implementation or even that the pledges will be sufficiently ambitious for preventing dangerous climate change. In the Indian case, norm glocalization increased the legitimacy of the Indian government's climate actions, but led to results that raise serious questions about their effectiveness. However, its legitimacy may also be questioned in the short-to-medium-term, as the increasing

demands for more ambitious climate targets and actions by the Indian government from various international actors, such as UN Secretary-General Guterres, and domestic non-state actors, such as Fridays for Future India, already indicate (Climate Action Tracker 2021; Fridays for Future India 2021; Harvey 2020; PTI 2020). Yet, my analysis suggests that the Indian government will only increase its actual climate actions if low carbon solutions are available that solve development problems and serve economic goals at the same time.

1.7 Outline of the book

Following this introduction, the first part of the book on 'Norm globalization, scientific realism and climate change' starts with Chapter 2 that provides a more detailed state of the art of the norm literature regarding the identified gaps. Subsequently, I present the norm globalization framework. After introducing norms and their hierarchies, I define norm globalization and glocalized norm interpretations and conceptualize the norm globalization process, its different stages at the international and domestic level, and the varying outcomes (such as policy change and implementation) based on glocalized norm interpretations. This is explained by mechanisms initiated by external and domestic actors under several domestic conditions. Chapter 3 introduces the research design in much more detail. It shortly discusses different philosophy of science approaches and explains why I strongly rely on scientific realists' insights in studying causality and world politics. It provides an overview on the philosophy of science preferences of norm research, of scholarship on causal mechanisms, and on method suggestions regarding process tracing, case study design, expert interviews and data analysis, and justifies the positions and approaches I take in this study. Part I ends with Chapter 4, in which I set the international scene by providing a short overview of the history of the UNFCCC negotiations, introducing UNFCCC's norm hierarchy and the increasing role of the Global South in addressing climate change. I describe the UNFCCC negotiations on the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm and how they have been taken up in UNFCCC's most important international governance concepts addressing developing countries: NAMAs, NDCs, and REDD+. Moreover, I briefly introduce the forestry sector, which is under scrutiny in the Indian case.

The second part of the book on 'Glocalization of climate change norms in India (2005-2019)' starts with setting the domestic scene by introducing India's political history, GHG emissions, forest politics and global climate politics pre-2005 in the first section of Chapter 5. The remaining sections of Chapter 5 cover the first three stages of the norm globalization process: international contestation, domestic agenda setting and international reshaping of norms in the period from 2005 until 2007. Chapter 6 continues with the three subsequent stages: domestic action formulation, international target setting and sectorial changes in the period from 2007 until 2014. The three final stages of renewed international target setting, further sectorial changes and implementation in the period from 2014 until 2019 are explained in Chapter 7. The book ends with a comprehensive discussion and

conclusion of the dynamics of norm glocalization in Chapter 8. I contextualize the central findings on norm glocalization stages, mechanisms, conditions, glocalized norm interpretations, multi-level global governance, domestic change, and international development cooperation. Moreover, I reflect on the theoretical and methodological approach and suggest ways of moving forward. This includes both suggestions on future research as well as policy implication and recommendations.

Part I: Norm glocalization, scientific realism and climate change

2. Norm glocalization framework

In this chapter, I present the norm glocalization framework. I first introduce my perspective on the state of the art of the norm literature (2.1) in order to lay the ground for the development of the norm glocalization framework. I then provide my conceptualization of norms (2.2). This is followed by a definition of norm glocalization and its outcomes and an explanation of the heuristic of the norm glocalization framework (2.3). Subsequently, I introduce the norm glocalization stages (2.4). Finally, I present the mechanisms initiated by external and domestic actors and the domestic conditions that hamper or facilitate them (2.5), before I end with a short summary (2.6).

2.1 State of the art of norm dynamics: Agents, processes, and outcomes

In the introduction, I already shortly presented four gaps of the norm scholarship. In this sub-chapter, I will further discuss three of those four gaps – agents (2.1.1), outcomes (2.1.2), and processes (2.1.3) – while shortcoming number four – the philosophy of science approach to causality – is treated in Chapter 3.

2.1.1 Agents: Proactive external or domestic actors

The first gap is that the existing norm literature does not explain global-domestic norm dynamics through the interaction of both proactive domestic and external actors, and thereby overaccentuates either domestic actors' or external actors' norm engagement. Early norm scholarship has investigated how international norms diffuse to nation-states through processes of socialization driven by external actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999, 2013; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). They explained these diffusion processes based on mechanisms induced by external actors, which they integrated from rationalist institutionalism (e.g., coercion/control, material incentives/changing incentives) and constructivism (e.g., persuasion/normative suasion) (Magen and McFaul 2009; Risse and Ropp 2013). This literature tried to identify factors that condition successful norm socialization, such as high vulnerability of domestic actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 29), high domestic resonance of the external norm with domestic culture, norms and institutions (Checkel 1999: 87), or no opposition by domestic veto-players (Börzel and Risse 2009), among others.

Domestic non-state actors only played a supportive and secondary role to external actors who were responsible for domestic norm change, while reactive domestic governmental actors were the ones being socialized into international norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Ropp 2013). In the 'boomerang model', for example, external actors put pressure on the domestic government after being contacted by the target country's domestic NGOs that have to ask for external actors involvement for socializing the domestic government (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13). Similarly, the 'spiral model' starts with the domestic civil society being unable to convince or

pressure its domestic government to institutionalize and internalize human rights norms, leading them to look for the support and engagement of international actors to put pressure on the domestic government. One central conclusion of the 'spiral model' was that continuing pressure from the top and from below was needed to reach the internalization of human rights norms by the target domestic government, but the presented mechanisms that explain the outcomes are all initiated by external actors, such as shaming (Risse and Ropp 1999; Risse and Sikkink 1999, 2013; Risse and Ropp 2013). These norm socialization models did not include social mechanisms of domestic state or non-state actors to engage on an international norm proactively and to successfully introduce the norm in the domestic context themselves. Especially domestic governments of the target countries were only seen as reactive and as barriers to norm change; hence, they were subject to teaching, socialization or pressure by external actors (Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999, 2013).

The norm socialization scholarship's reliance on external actors' mechanisms to explain norm change in domestic target states was criticized for downplaying the agency of domestic actors (Acharya 2004: 242). Norm localization research, instead, solely emphasized the role of local actors in domestic engagements with international norms, leading to the reconstruction of international norms through processes of norm localization. However, this research has theoretically left external actors without any meaningful agency for influencing domestic norm change. Norm localization research also does not provide mechanisms of proactive norm engagement by domestic actors, but only defines factors under which localization as an outcome (i.e., the local reconstruction) is more likely, as this approach is not interested in the diffusion processes as such (Acharya 2004: 247-249).

The policy diffusion literature and the world polity approach provide such potential mechanisms of domestic actors' engagement with international norms and external policies. The world polity concept introduced isomorphism and normative mimicry to explain domestic actors' adoption of international norms based on standardized ways of appropriately setting up organizations or formulating policies in line with global cultural norms (Meyer et al. 1997). Their model is much more based on a structural account of norm diffusion than norm socialization models, as states are only "enactors" of the world cultural norms (see, e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998: 33 for a critique). In contrast to the structural world polity approach, the policy diffusion literature applies an agency-oriented perspective in which domestic actors copy foreign policies or organizational models in their own state through learning, lesson drawing or competition (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000). Yet, both approaches predominantly focus on the mechanisms induced by domestic actors. While the policy transfer literature also recognizes coercive policy transfer initiated by external actors (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 347-348), most of the transfer and diffusion literature is emphasizing the proactive actions of domestic actors (e.g., Holzinger et al. 2008).

Some scholars have started to list both external actors' and domestic actors' mechanisms in the same study; yet, without applying them in an integrated way to provide a comprehensive explanation,

but in order to test them against each other. For example, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) test their rationalist incentive model induced by external actors against two alternative models: a constructivist model of social learning induced by external actors' persuasion and a rationalist policy diffusion model of lesson drawing that is induced by domestic governmental actors. They thereby treat external actors' mechanisms as a separate model from the domestic actors' mechanism and cannot account for comprehensive explanations based on mechanisms induced by both types of actors and their interaction patterns.

For the first time, Börzel and Risse (2012a) integrate both external actors' mechanisms from the norm socialization literature (i.e., coercion, manipulating utility calculations, socialization, and persuasion) and domestic actors' mechanisms from the policy diffusion literature (i.e., competition, lesson-drawing, and normative emulation) in one theoretical framework of a Special Issue on the direct and indirect diffusion of the European Union's institutions to other states. However, their empirical case studies applied *either* domestic actors' *or* external actors' mechanisms, and did not provide comprehensive explanations of the empirics based on mechanisms induced by both types of actors and their interaction patterns.⁴

Even scholarship that introduced interactive processes between external and domestic actors in the norm engagement processes at the domestic level, rests on a reactive agency of domestic actors. Zimmermann (2017b) develops a two-phase model in which international actors start with norm socialization mechanisms in the target state, such as material incentives and naming and shaming. Following contestation by the reactive domestic agents, the external actors shift to persuasion efforts as the dominant mode of engagement after the domestic resistance. However, domestic actors do not possess any proactive agency in this model to pull at an international norm itself, such as by imitation, competition or learning as suggested by the policy diffusion literature. Only in the context of the dialogue-based persuasion attempts by external actors, domestic actors receive more agency in Zimmermann's interactive norm translation model and are able to reshape the international norm domestically themselves, without being assigned any domestic actors' mechanisms to induce domestic change themselves.

Previous norm approaches have not sufficiently integrated the proactive agency of both external and domestic actors. Norm contestation scholarship acknowledges the agency of all kinds of affected stakeholders of international norm, but is interested in the disputes over the meanings of norms and the changing meanings of norms over time, without explaining norm diffusion based on mechanisms induced by different types of actors (Wiener 2004: 190; 2018: 13, 30).

⁴ Only recently have policy diffusion and legal scholars started to apply frameworks that combine mechanisms driven by either external or domestic actors, while both hardly found the workings of external actors' mechanisms and strongly rely on domestic actors' mechanisms to explain their case studies (Jodoin 2017b: 206; Torney 2015b: 118).

The norm glocalization framework integrates abductively developed mechanisms induced by both external and domestic actors to address this gap and to provide more comprehensive explanations of global-domestic norm dynamics that also reveal interaction patterns between both types of actors. Moreover, it builds upon abductively identified conditions that hamper or facilitate the workings of different mechanisms in order to explain social outcomes and processes.

2.1.2 Outcomes: Full adoption, localization, contestation or translation

The second gap is that the norm literature does not *explain* particular and changing *interpretations* of norms, especially when they are shaped by global-domestic norm dynamics of both domestic and external actors. Early norm socialization scholarships conceptualized the norm diffusion outcome in terms of full adoption or rejection of a stable international (meaning of a) norm, without allowing for varieties of interpretations of norms. For example, Finnemore (1996: 22, 25) explicitly aims to show that there is no variation in state behavior regarding international norms, but that similar actions occur despite different conditions in order to prove that norms matter. Risse and Ropp (1999: 239, 259-260) only account for a temporary variation of state behavior during the movement along the trajectory of the spiral model, eventually leading to a world-wide homogenization of human rights norms. Successful norm change has been characterized by “internalization” (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 12), “institutionalization” (Klotz 1995: 25) or through the “displacement of local norms by transnational norms” (Farrell 2001: 81). Norm socialization scholars found the workings of these rather stable norm in “patterns of behavior in accordance with their prescriptions” (Finnemore 1996: 23), as justifications of actions or noncompliance (Cortell and Davis 2000: 71; Katzenstein 1996: 22), and as persuasions, praises and disapprovals in discourses (Finnemore 1996: 24; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 892). However, confronted with empirical observations in between the dichotomy of adoption and rejection, norm socialization research has also acknowledged selective adoption of norms (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 10, 16) or different degrees of compliance with new global norms (for this critique, see, e.g., Hofferberth and Weber 2015). Yet, this scholarship has not accounted for different or changing interpretations of norms, and instead scrutinizes the internalization of norms (Börzel and Risse 2012b: 193). Interestingly, early on, some norm socialization scholars have already pointed toward the different framing and interpretation activities by external actors promoting a norm to better resonate with the local context, but have not conceptually or empirically looked at the influence of varying and changing norm interpretations by different actors on the domestic norm advancement (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 17, 31, 204). The norm socialization literature was therefore criticized for not acknowledging the vague and elusive character of norms (Krook and True 2012; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007; Wiener 2004).

Likewise, world polity approaches and policy diffusion scholars mostly foresee full adoption of norms and policies, leading to global homogenization based on global cultural norms and to cross-national convergence of policies (Knill 2005: 764; Meyer 2000: 244). Similar to the norm socialization

literature, both approaches also acknowledge the partial adoption of norms and policies. The world polity approach recognizes the problems of “eclectic adoption of conflicting principles” (Meyer et al. 1997: 154) and of decoupling between formal adoption of norms and the unchanged realities in practice due to a lack of implementation. However, its proponents perceive these issues as only temporary as “over time both systems [(i.e., institutions and practices)] are penetrated by wider models” (Meyer 2000: 244). The policy diffusion literature also acknowledges the possibility of incomplete transfer of policies (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 19). Scholarship on ‘varieties of capitalism’ has even argued that we observe continuing cross-national divergence of formal and informal institutions despite the influence of globalization forces (Hall and Soskice 2001: vi, 9, 54, 60). However, representatives of the policy diffusion literature have noted that most of the scholarship in their field focuses on complete diffusion and not on the ways local actors adjusted a policy to the domestic context (Biesenbender and Tosun 2014: 424-425).

The norm localization approach does not assume a full adoption of international norms, but in contrast, presumes that local actors only pick and choose certain elements of an international norm, leading to the introduction of new policy instrument without changing the policy paradigm (i.e., they do not change the domestic hierarchy of norms of the policy by placing the external norm above the preexisting domestic norm). This indicates a strong predominance of local normative understandings that hardly incorporate external normative understandings in domestic norms. Yet, according to Acharya (2004: 253-254), even a full norm displacement can occur over time, which indicates an understanding of a stable international meaning of a norm, even though it can be adjusted domestically. Similarly, Zimmermann’s interactive norm translation envisages local adjustments of international norms through omission, modification, and addition in the law and implementation (Zimmermann 2017b: 55). Yet, for that purpose, she also has to assume a stable international meaning of parts of an international norm in order to be able to show how domestic actors changed some of them at the local level. Overall, all these five approaches – norm socialization, world polity, policy diffusion, norm localization, interactive norm translation – do not account for the variety of norm advancements in different countries based on varying norm interpretations and largely remain committed to a stable meaning of an international norm, which is, at best, adjusted at the domestic level.

Scholarship on the contestation and cultural translation of norms already emphasized the varying meaning attributions to fluid norms by different agents in processes of discursive disapprovals or cultural translations of norms (Berger 2017; Wiener 2004, 2014). For example, the cultural norm translation approach by Berger (2017: 24) emphasizes the “transformation in the content of norms” when they travel to other places, as they always encounter preexisting social worlds (Berger 2017: 25). This perspective is derived from the literature on postcolonial cultural translation that emphasizes the emergence of cultural hybridity when international norms get translated based on preexisting domestic social concepts (Bhabha 2004 [1994]: 5, 313; Chakrabarty 2000: xii). Particularly, Wiener’s norm contestation approach is interested in the varying and changing meaning

attributions to international norms. She recommends to concentrate on the “role of discursive interventions as social practices that entail and re/construct the meaning of norms” (Wiener 2004: 190) and is interested in norm contestation that “involves the range of social practices, which discursively express disapproval of norms” (Wiener 2014: 1). She emphasizes the flexibility of norms and that they are located in the practice (Wiener 2004: 191; 2008: 38), as discursive interventions of agents specify the meaning of norms (Wiener 2004: 200-201; 2018: 19). Yet, she also underlines that norms can become stable when not contested anymore (Wiener 2007: 57). Even though both approaches – cultural norm translation and norm contestation – point to the changing and varying meaning attribution of different agents, they *do not explain* (varieties of) norm interpretations emerging from norm diffusion dynamics based on mechanisms induced by both domestic and external actors.

The norm glocalization framework therefore allows to reveal varying preexisting norm interpretations by external and domestic actors and can explain the *resulting glocalized norm interpretation* at both the international level and at the domestic level as an outcome of their interactions. The *glocalized norm interpretation*, thereby, represents the fusion of external and domestic actors’ preexisting norm interpretations, which is explained through the workings of different mechanisms under several domestic conditions. This allows to explain changing collective norm interpretations at the international level and can explain varieties of different domestic norm advancements based on varying glocalized norm interpretations.

2.1.3 Processes: Global diffusion, norm shaping or discursive feedbacks

The third gap is that the norm literature does not explain the reshaping of international norms in international negotiations by domestic actors prior to or during the diffusion to their nation-state. Norm socialization scholarship has largely explained the diffusion from the international level to the domestic level without accounting for a re-shaping of international norms by domestic actors at the international level. For example, the spiral model presents five stages that include repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status and rule-consistent behavior by the domestic target state (Risse and Sikkink 1999). The model does not envisage any international reshaping of international norms before they travel to the domestic governmental scene (Risse and Ropp 1999: 243-244). Also, the norm cascade model does not foresee any international reshaping of an international norm before or during the diffusion to the domestic level in all states of the world, but theorizes a worldwide norm diffusion that starts with the persuasion by norm entrepreneurs of target states and is followed by subsequent norm cascading to other states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 896-897, 901-904). Similarly, the cycle of normative change proposed by Sandholtz (2008: 103-104) does not capture reshaping of norms in international negotiations, but explains norm change as an outcome of disputes and argumentation that emerges from conflicts among norms and their violation as they are too unspecific in their prescriptions. In contrast, other approaches, such as policy diffusion, world

polity, norm localization and interactive norm translation do not address international norm change, but emphasize how external policies and norms are introduced (fully, partially or strongly adjusted) in the domestic target state without including the possibility for a reshaping of the norm at the international level before or during the diffusion process (Acharya 2004: 245; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 9; Meyer et al. 1997: 151; Zimmermann 2017b: 5-6).

Other scholars were particularly interested in the agency of non-Western actors to become norm makers or shapers at the international level without reflecting upon the dynamics between the international norm shaping and the prior and subsequent domestic norm advancement and implementation in those countries. Non-Western actors promote their own conceived norm at the international level through rephrasing them to fit better in the international context (Bettiza and Dionigi 2015: 637), propose their alternative version to the dominant Western version at the international level (Xiaoyu 2012: 359), and assume both norm taking and norm making roles in the same international negotiations (Jinnah 2017: 299). Similarly, concepts like norm subsidiarity emphasize the strategies of weaker and peripheral actors to preserve their autonomy by challenging norms advocated by major powers or by supporting alternative norms at the international level or even by promoting local norms at the international level (Acharya 2011: 97-99). As a combination of norm subsidiarity and norm localization, Acharya started to develop the idea of norm circulation, in which localized variants of international norms can be repatriated at the international level or that even locally-defined norms can be universalized internationally (Acharya 2013: 471), while his empirical case study only showed the non-Western sources of the international norm and subsequent discursive feedbacks by one non-Western state who was discontent with the actual application of the international by other states (Acharya 2013: 474-478). Similarly, others have also noted discursive feedbacks to the global level after the implementation of a norm (Zimmermann 2019: 41), and have even argued that this led to the international reshaping of the norm at the international level (Prantl and Nakano 2011: 205). However, they have not scrutinized the subsequent norm engagement at the domestic level.

As none of these approaches provide a comprehensive framework to study norm dynamics at the international and at the domestic level, the norm glocalization framework includes several stages that consider these norm dynamics at both levels. It incorporates international norm reshaping shortly after the domestic agenda setting and prior to the domestic norm diffusion process, which includes further domestic reshaping of the norm interpretations and continuous up to the domestic implementation. The following parts of this chapter develop the norm glocalization framework that address the conceptual gaps of the norm literature.

2.2 Conceptualization of norms


The norm globalization framework relies upon a definition of *norms* as ‘*collective expectations for appropriate behavior by a community of actors*’ (based on Finnemore 1996: 22; Katzenstein 1996: 5). Norms have intersubjective validity (Kratochwil 1989: 97; see also Zimmermann 2017b: 7) and a prescriptive quality (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). But it is worth noting that norm-following “does not involve blind habit (except in limiting cases), but argumentation” (Kratochwil 1989: 97), which points toward reasoning in the norm engagement process (Sending 2002). Norms are thereby subject to various interpretations by actors that engage with them as actors “are cultural beings endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance” (Weber 1949: 81). They interpret international norms based upon their already existing background “against which understanding becomes possible and actions meaningful” (Berger 2017: 25). But there is a difference between the international codified norm and its various interpretations and implementations, as singular interpretations of norms, such as particular applications or contestations, do not directly change the collective expectation for appropriate behavior of the whole community of actors at the international level (Finnemore 1996: 23; Katzenstein 1996: 20; Kratochwil 1989: 63; Sandholtz 2008: 109), which would require the support of large parts of the community of actors. The point of origin of the norm globalization framework are international norms that were agreed upon in negotiations between all member nation-states of an intergovernmental institution, such as the UN, leading to further reshaping in subsequent international negotiations. In such international negotiations, non-Western states are also active norm makers and shapers (Bettiza and Dionigi 2015; Jinnah 2017).⁵ In those negotiations, collective expectations for appropriate behavior of the community of actors can change over time at the international level, as “actors and social structures are mutually constitutive” (Sandholtz 2008: 102). In international negotiations, norms are often formulated imprecisely and vaguely in order to reach international consensus, leading to varieties of norm interpretations (Krook and True 2012: 109; Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007: 221). Subsequently, international norms can be further reshaped at the domestic level based on particular interpretations of international norms.

Intergovernmental institutions (e.g., UNFCCC) contain a hierarchy of several types of norms that can be found in its international treaties (e.g., Convention text), agreements (e.g., Paris Agreement) and decision (e.g., Bali Action Plan), which I develop based on an adapted and expanded version of the norm typology introduced by Wiener (2018: 58-62). The *macro norm* defines *what* ought to be achieved by the parties to the intergovernmental institution (e.g., prevent dangerous climate change). It is situated below the more fundamental norms, which are meta norms existing beyond the intergovernmental institution with wide moral reach (e.g., sovereignty), which in the case of the

⁵ The dynamics related to the norms of intergovernmental institutions with exclusive membership, such as the European Union (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 18-19), with which candidate states must comply in order to be able to join, and which I would call non-negotiated norms from the perspective of the candidate state, may lead to different dynamics than the dynamics presented here regarding internationally negotiated norms by all states.

sovereignty norm constitutes the parties to the intergovernmental institution in the first place. *Meso norms* specify *how* the macro norm ought to be achieved (e.g., climate mitigation based on common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities – CBDR+RC), which subordinates them to the macro norm. *Micro norms* go one step further by *specifying how* the macro norm ought to be achieved for a *particular group of subjects* (e.g., developing countries) or regarding a *particular object* (e.g., a particular policy field or aspect). Meso norms (e.g., CBDR+RC) are further specified by the introduced micro norms (e.g., developing country climate mitigation norm). From fundamental norms over macro norms, meso norms and micro norms down to standardized procedures and regulations (e.g., decision rules or reporting rules), the moral reach decreases and the specificity increases (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Norm hierarchy of the intergovernmental institution



2.3 Glocalization of norms

The norm glocalization framework borrows the term *glocalization* from sociology, where it has informed a debate on the outcome of globalization, influenced by global and local forces (e.g., Ritzer 2003: 193-194; Robertson 1995: 40-41), leading to glocalization that reflects a “blend of the local and the global” (Roudometof 2016: 403). This blend is reflected upon in the definition of norm glocalization, which is *the process of proactive domestic and external actors engaging with an international norm based on their particular interpretations of it, which leads to efforts of international reshaping of collective interpretations of norms and/or to varieties of domestic outcomes that reflect both the fusion of norm interpretations by both external and domestic actors, depending on the activated mechanisms of social behavior of actors under particular domestic conditions.*

The norm glocalization framework provides four contributions to the existing norm literature. *First*, it *integrates mechanisms* by proactive domestic actors (e.g., lesson drawing, competition, strategic mimicry) and by external actors (e.g., shaming, persuasion) in the form of *interaction patterns* (i.e., how do external and domestic actors’ mechanisms interact in one period and over time). This includes one *new mechanism* (strategic mimicry) and several *adapted mechanisms* (e.g.,

competition), which are facilitated or hampered by various *adapted domestic conditions* (e.g., material resonance).

Second, the framework allows to illuminate different preexisting norm interpretations by external and domestic actors and to *explain the resulting glocalized norm interpretation* at both the international level and at the domestic level (by domestic governmental actors in this case) as an outcome of their interactions. The *glocalized norm interpretation*, thereby, represents the fusion of external and domestic actors' preexisting norm interpretations, which is explained through the workings of different mechanisms under several domestic conditions that either facilitate the incorporation of the domestic actors' norm interpretation or of the external actors' meaning attribution.


Third, the *norm glocalization framework* introduces a concept, which includes several stages that consider the norm glocalization dynamics between the international and the domestic level and that incorporates an international reshaping in this process: international contestation (I), domestic agenda-setting (II), international norm reshaping (III), formulation of domestic actions (IV), international target setting (V, VII), sectorial changes (VI, VIII) and implementation (IX).

Fourth, the framework continues further down the scientific realist pathway by enabling case-specific *explanations based on causal complexes*, which are combinations of multiple mechanisms (e.g., strategic mimicry, lesson drawing and competition together) that are facilitated or hampered by several conditions, and that can inform other case studies as well. Such an approach takes the complexity of the social world more serious by providing comprehensive and empirically more adequate explanations (see also Chapter 3).

2.3.1 Outcomes

The domestic results of the workings of causal complexes (i.e., multiple mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions) reflect *glocalized norm interpretations*, which are fusions of norm interpretations that are advanced by domestic and external actors and that represent something new (figure 2).

Figure 2: Glocalized norm interpretation



This can neither be captured and explained by homogenizing norm socialization models in which the external norm (interpretation) prevails after diffusion (Finnemore 1996; Risse and Ropp 1999), nor by norm localization in which the domestic norm (interpretation) prevails (Acharya 2004) (see table

1 for a typology). Varying meaning attributions of norms by different actors are also mentioned by the norm contestation and the norm translation literature (Berger 2017; Wiener 2004, 2014). Yet, they do not try to explain norm interpretations based on mechanisms and conditions and do not refer to fusions of both external and domestic actors' norm interpretations. The emergence of glocalized norm interpretations is not limited to the domestic level, but can also occur in international negotiations as a collectively shared norm interpretation (at least in written form among all parties) of an intergovernmental institution.

Table 1: Typology of norm approaches in terms of the norm (interpretation) outcome

Norm approach	Socialization	Localization	Glocalization
Outcome	External norm (interpretation) prevails	Domestic norm (interpretation) prevails	Fusion of both domestic and external actors' norm interpretations

Glocalized norm interpretations can change over time and can especially be observed in domestic discursive, policy and implementation changes. A domestic *discursive change* may occur prior to or after policy changes (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2007), and is characterized by a change of the discourse in relation to previous statements. This can include strategies or information documents that specify (new) ideas about potential future interventions without defining concrete actions to be taken and therefore do not have direct consequences for policies.

Following Hall (1993: 278-279), I differentiate between first-, second-, or third-order *policy changes*, but I partially adapt his categorization. A first-order change of a policy encompasses a change of the level of the instrument, which can also include the increase of a quantitative target. This can also comprise additional legal measures to support the implementation of an already existing instrument. Second-order policy change is characterized by the replacement of an instrument or the adoption of a new one (incl. new additional logics of action), which can also include new adopted quantitative targets. I add that this can also comprise the adoption of action plans with concrete implementation ideas on new actions. Only when the policy's paradigm changes (i.e., the hierarchy of domestic policy goals), can we find a third-order policy change. *Implementation* usually starts with an implementation order or guidelines, continues with the provision of resources, and finalizes with the enforcement of the implementation order. It may even result in further policy and organizational changes.


Organizational changes are enacted in order to prepare or to further advance discursive and policy changes or to implement them. Organizational changes create bureaucratic actors, tasks and routines, which assure the engagement with a norm (Cortell and Davis 2000: 80). Organizational change can occur within or between organizations at one governmental level. A large-scale

organizational change comprises of the constitution of strong ministerial departments and the establishment of a powerful inter-ministerial body with an own secretariat. A medium-scale organizational change can be identified when new agencies or councils, or new ministerial units or offices are established that lack implementation power or staff. Small-scale organizational changes are characterized by a small increase in personnel of an already existing ministerial unit or by the constitution of temporary working groups (Höhne 2018: 130). Yet, discursive, policy and organizational changes can also be reversed or further changed over time.

2.3.2 Heuristic

I provide a *heuristic* that captures how and why domestic *governmental* actors engage in discursive, policy and implementation changes based on glocalized norm interpretations and supporting organizational changes (see figure 3). The *agents* of the framework are both external actors, such as foreign governments, international organizations, and international NGOs, as well as domestic actors, such as domestic governmental actors (incl. non-state actors that are hired or tasked by the domestic government), who engage with the international norm through various mechanisms (e.g., shaming or competition). In addition, domestic non-state actors (e.g., business groups, domestic NGOs, consultancies) can facilitate or hamper the activities of the domestic government as part of domestic conditions (e.g., opposition). Mechanisms and conditions either facilitate the incorporation of external actors' or domestic actors' norm interpretations in the resulting glocalized norm interpretations by domestic *governmental* actors at the domestic level or by a collective of states (at least in written form of international agreements) at the international level (see 2.5). Domestic and external actors engage with the norm based on their preexisting norm interpretations. Through various mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions, external actors and domestic governmental actors both shape the evolving collective interpretation of the international norm in international negotiations and diffuse their conception of it to the domestic level through particular activated mechanisms (e.g., shaming, competition) that are facilitated or hampered by domestic conditions (e.g., cultural resonance, material reception). The results are (evolving) discursive, policy and implementation changes in the nation-state based on (evolving) glocalized norm interpretations that reflect aspects advocated by both external and domestic actors as well as (evolving) supportive organizational changes.

Figure 3: Heuristic of norm glocalization




2.4 Norm glocalization stages

The norm glocalization process involves several stages, which are abductively developed: Two of these stages are recurring in this particular study (which may be different when applied to other cases) (see figure 4). The norm glocalization process specifies how domestic and external actors (inter)act over several stages leading to a glocalized norm interpretation at the international level and subsequent (evolving) glocalized norm interpretations at the domestic level that inform discursive changes (e.g., in agenda setting) and policy changes (e.g., in the domestic action formulation and the sectorial changes), and their subsequent implementation. This occurs in relation to micro norms in order to specify how to achieve the macro norm of the intergovernmental institution by further specifying the meso norm regarding a particular group of subjects (i.e., actors) or a particular object (i.e., policy field).

- Stage I: In international negotiations, domestic actors contest external actors' norm interpretations of micro norms.
- Stage II: At the domestic level, domestic actors start agenda setting regarding the micro norms based upon their first glocalized norm interpretations.
- Stage III: In the international negotiations, domestic actors reshape the collective interpretation of the micro norms by all parties, leading to collective glocalized norm interpretations in the international negotiations at least in a written form, such as an international decision or agreement.

- Stage IV: At the domestic level, domestic actors engage in the formulation of domestic actions as an operationalization of the micro norm based upon glocalized norm interpretations.
- Stage V: At the international level, domestic actors engage in target setting as an operationalization of the micro norm based upon glocalized norm interpretations.
- Stage VI: At the domestic level, domestic actors adopt sectorial changes based upon glocalized norm interpretations of the micro norm.
- Stage VII: At the international level, domestic actors, again, formulate new targets based upon their glocalized norm interpretations of the micro norm.
- Stage VIII: At the domestic level, domestic actors, again, adopt sectorial changes.
- Stage IX: At the domestic level, domestic actors implement the previous sectorial changes and advance further sectorial changes based upon their glocalized micro norm interpretation.

Figure 4: Norm glocalization stages



These stages can partly overlap in time in the empirics. In the future, implementation may restart the process either from the stage of international reshaping of this particular micro norm (stage III) or from the stage of renewed domestic action formulation or international target setting (stage IV or V). Obviously, new proposal regarding new micro norms may restart the whole norm glocalization cycle from contestation onwards (stage I). The reasons for shifting from one stage to another are case-specific (see Chapters 5 to 7), and can be developed based on the heuristic of the norm glocalization framework (i.e., its mechanisms, conditions, outcomes).⁶

⁶ However, depending on the empirical context, other cases than the one analyzed in this study may be explained by additional or partly different mechanisms and conditions than the ones presented in the norm glocalization framework. Similarly, in the spirit of scientific realism (see Chapter 3), the identified norm glocalization stages can only be a starting point for other researchers, as the empirical context of their cases may be different: For example, one could imagine cases in which international reshaping occurs several times, or in which international reshaping follows on a previous domestic reshaping.

2.5 Mechanisms and conditions

In the following part, mechanisms and conditions of the heuristic are abductively developed and subsequently operationalized (for the philosophy of science foundations and definitions see Chapter 3). I also indicate my expectations about whether a particular mechanism or a particular condition contributes to a globalized norm interpretation that either incorporates interpretations advocated by external actors or of preexisting interpretation emphasized by domestic actors.⁷

2.5.1 Mechanisms

In Chapter 3, I provide a genesis of my definition of mechanisms of which I include a short version here in order to introduce the external actors' and domestic actors' mechanisms. Mechanisms are *'all those entities that, as part of causal complexes in open systems, generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world'* (based on Bhaskar 2008: 37, 39, 46; Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 421). Mechanisms are hence the causes of norm engagements and resulting outcomes. I distinguish the mechanisms initiated by external actors and those induced by domestic actors (see table 2).

Table 2: Mechanisms and social logic of action

Social logic of action	External actors' mechanisms	Domestic actors' mechanisms
Logic of consequences	Material incentives	Lesson drawing
		Competition
Logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness	Shaming	Strategic mimicry
Logic of appropriateness	Persuasion	Complex learning
		Normative mimicry

When *external actors* promote the engagement with international norms regarding other states they can act based on three different mechanisms.⁸ The exact relationship between any of the following mechanisms is not pre-defined, but is case-specific in nature. The mechanism of *material incentives* follows the logic of consequences⁹ and stipulates that external actors provide material benefits to

⁷ However, this expected direction of influence is not meant to be deterministic.

⁸ I do not list coercion (Risse and Ropp 2013: 13) as an external actors' mechanism, as I have not expected or observed the use of force by external actors as a mechanism in the policy field of climate change.

⁹ The logic of consequences means that "human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise" (March and Olsen 1998: 949). According to the logic of consequences, domestic actors are self-interested actors that try to accomplish more resources and power (Sprinz and Vaahoranta 1994: 78). Therefore they are adopting maximizing strategies (Ostrom and Ostrom 1971: 205) of their fixed set of preferences in a highly strategic way (Hall and Taylor 1996: 944-945).

domestic actors to influence their cost-benefit calculations, who will start to act when the expected benefits exceed the expected costs of action (Magen and McFaul 2009: 12-13; Risse and Ropp 2013: 14; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 31-32). After being offered material benefits (e.g., grants) from external actors, I expect to find statements and actions by domestic governmental actors that indicate a norm engagement that is more strongly based on the norm interpretation advocated by external actors.

Persuasion follows the logic of appropriateness¹⁰ and comprises two strategies: deliberation and teaching. First, *deliberation* concerns the arguing between external and domestic actors in a speech situation in which both parties are respected with their opinions and where external actors try to convince domestic actors by providing the “better argument” (Risse and Ropp 2013: 14). Domestic governmental actors are then able to change their preferences (Risse 2004: 300). I assume to find statements and actions indicating changing domestic norm engagement by domestic governmental actors based on dialogue-oriented interactions in specific forums (e.g., intergovernmental meetings) in which external actors provide arguments to convince domestic actors. I expect persuasion to lead to the incorporation of external actors’ norm interpretations by domestic governmental actors. Second, *teaching* refers to a more uni-directional approach of persuasion that is based on the provision of knowledge and expertise from a ‘teacher’ aspiring to convince the ‘student’ (Zimmermann 2017b: 60; 2017a: 776). Either those domestic governmental actors are convinced by the external actors or they may even not know what they actually want, which makes them “receptive to teaching of useful actions (Finnemore 1996: 11). Professional training, in this context, “actively socializes people to value certain things above others” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 905). Teaching also includes capacity building, which has been defined as “a highly institutionalized process of social interaction aiming toward education, training and the building up of administrative capacities” (Risse and Ropp 2013: 16). After teaching activities by external actors to domestic governmental actors in meetings, such as workshops, I anticipate statements and actions by domestic actors that indicate a norm engagement that is more strongly based on the norm interpretation advocated by external actors.

Shaming is a mechanism that aims at “jeopardiz[ing] [states’...] credits enough to motivate a change in policy or behavior [...] or] to expose the distance between discourse and practice” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 24). It both applies to circumstances where states look for international “legitimation, conformity, and esteem” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 903) based on the logic of appropriateness or were their strategic calculations are impacted based on the logic of consequences (Zimmermann 2017b: 60). I thereby agree with Schimmelfennig (2001: 65), who regards shaming as fitting both logics. Following negative comments by external actors on statements, actions or plans by domestic

¹⁰ The logic of appropriateness means that “actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations” (March and Olsen 1998: 951). It implies that actors engage in reasoning processes about which norms apply in a situation by asking “What kind of situation is this?” and “What am I supposed to do now?” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 914).

governmental actors in the public (e.g., press statements), semi-public (e.g., workshops) or non-public forums (e.g., intergovernmental meetings), I expect to find statements and actions by domestic actors that indicate a norm engagement that is more strongly based on the norm interpretation advocated by external actors.

When *domestic actors* engage proactively on an international norm they can act based on five mechanisms. *Lesson drawing* follows the logic of consequences as actors take actions out of functional necessity, domestic policy failure, or in order to provide new impetus to previous programs. They engage in (selective) copying based on the opinion that an external approach (on an international norm) or “a particular program elsewhere provides the best standard for designing legislation at home” (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 351). Lesson drawing follows a form of simple rationalist learning with new information mostly leading to a change of means, but not in ends, as foreign approaches or policies (based on an international norm) are imported to serve preexisting domestic preferences more effectively. This can include varying forms of import ranging from a very comprehensive form to only an inspiration in which the final outcome does not draw on the original (Checkel 1998: 344; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 21). Especially in the latter case, domestic governmental actors will also draw lessons from their past domestic policy engagement, when voluntarily transferring parts of foreign approaches based on international norms to their state. I expect to find statements and actions indicating that domestic actors independently and actively look for approaches and policies based on international norms to solve a domestic functional problem or to provide a new impetus to preexisting domestic approaches. As such selective copying based on simple learning always occurs in relationship to preexisting domestic norms and goals, I assume to find statements by domestic actors that indicate a norm engagement that incorporates both external and domestic actors’ norm interpretations.

Competition also follows the logic of consequences, as actors unilaterally adjust their behavior to realize and increase material benefits and to improve the performance (e.g., on economic growth) and standing of their jurisdiction compared to important competitors or with regard to their own material goals. This both includes reactions to and anticipatory measures with regard to the decisions of important competitors (e.g., selective copying of foreign policies or of external approaches on how best to achieve the material goals of the country) (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 9; Busch et al. 2005: 152; Drezner 2001: 57-58), as well as the unilateral engagement with international norms by domestic governmental actors who maximize their material benefits when advancing it internationally or domestically. I anticipate statements and actions indicating changing domestic norm engagement based on domestic actors’ aim for achieving higher material benefits, better market circumstances and to gain advantage compared to other competitors. As such aiming for increasing material benefits occurs in relationship to preexisting domestic norms and goals, I assume to find a norm engagement that is more strongly based on the norm interpretation previously advocated by domestic actors.

Complex learning is different from simple learning as it includes a change of belief systems and underlying goals and interests (Checkel 1998: 344; 1999: 88; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). Learning by domestic actors occurs when they search for new information and knowledge on their own, thereby “learn[ing] new patterns of reasoning” (Haas 1992: 2). Based on scientific insights learning can lead to an understanding of the increasing appropriateness and need to change policy goals in relation to an international norm. As such a learning would result in new patterns of reasoning, I assume that domestic actors’ norm engagement would be less strongly based on the norm interpretation previously advocated by domestic actors. I expect to find statements and actions indicating this, following domestic actors’ comprehensive engagement with new knowledge by studying research results and by participating in knowledge transfer.

Normative mimicry is based upon the logic of appropriateness. Scholars argue that domestic actors mimic the norm engagement of other states, as they take the appropriateness of that norm for granted. As good members of the international community they perceive it as “the right thing to do” (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 11; Checkel 2005: 804; also Meyer et al. 1997). I assume to see domestic actors independently, voluntarily, and actively striving to fit a global model by mimicking the norm engagement of other states, while mentioning that this is the right thing to do. I, therefore, expect domestic actors to engage in norm interpretation that is based on the norm interpretation advocated by external actors of the international community.

The new mechanism of *strategic mimicry* is characterized by a mixture of the logic of appropriateness and consequences. Domestic actors proactively *mimic an engagement with an international norm for strategic reasons*. They want to shine internationally and to receive international legitimacy in order to foster other interests beyond that international norm (e.g., in other policy fields). They hence do not necessarily take the appropriateness of that international norm for granted, but act for strategic reasons. It is different from rhetorical action that engages in the “instrumental use of arguments to persuade others of the validity of one’s selfish claims” (Schimmelfennig 2000: 129). In contrast, strategic mimicry is the instrumental use of arguments and actions by domestic actors that mimics an engagement with an international norm to persuade others of the validity of one’s own engagement with that international norm in order to prevent negative consequences for other strategic targets, while they continue to pursue their preexisting goals based on the dominant domestic norms. It is different from domestic reactions to external shaming, as strategic mimicry is proactive. I expect proactive domestic actors to refer either to the necessity of receiving international legitimacy for strategic reasons or to other strategic interests when justifying their decision to engage with an international norm. I, therefore, assume domestic actors to engage in a norm interpretation that includes both preexisting norm interpretations by domestic and external actors, as domestic actors want to pursue their preexisting strategic goals, while at the same time convince external actors to be in line with their norm interpretation (see table 3).

Table 3: Mechanisms and expected influence on norm interpretation

Expected influence on norm interpretation	External actors' mechanisms	Domestic actors' mechanisms
Incorporating <i>external</i> actors' interpretation	Material incentives	Complex learning
	Shaming	Normative mimicry
	Persuasion	
Incorporating preexisting interpretations by <i>domestic</i> actors	-	Competition
Incorporating preexisting interpretations by <i>domestic and external</i> actors	-	Lesson drawing
		Strategic mimicry

Domestic actors are not limited to pulling at an international norm to the domestic scene, but can also engage in efforts to reshape the collective interpretation of international norms by the community of actors at the international level. This can occur based on motivations that are captured in domestic actors' mechanisms, such as for gaining material benefits through competition, for gaining international legitimacy for strategic reasons through strategic mimicry, or for solving domestic functional problems through lesson drawing. However, this only explains why domestic actors *try* to reshape the collective interpretations of international norms internationally, while not explaining why they are (*un*)*successful*. Normative mimicry and complex learning are not regarded as mechanisms that enable domestic actors to reshape collective international norm interpretations, as they, instead, reshape individual domestic norm interpretations (in this case of the domestic government). At the same time, external actors try to reshape the collective international norm interpretation by engaging in the same mechanisms that can also be activated for norm diffusion to the domestic scene: material incentives, shaming, and persuasion (see table 4).

Table 4: Mechanisms and the reshaping of collective international or individual domestic norm interpretations

Mechanisms	Trying to reshape <i>collective international</i> norm interpretations	Reshaping of <i>individual domestic</i> norm interpretations	
External actors' mechanisms	Material incentives	Material incentives	
	Shaming	Shaming	
	Persuasion	Persuasion	
Domestic actors' mechanisms	Lesson drawing	Lesson drawing	
	Competition	Competition	
	Strategic mimicry		Strategic mimicry
			Complex learning
			Normative mimicry

2.5.2 Conditions

The norm engagements by domestic governmental actors and resulting outcomes are caused by mechanisms. Domestic conditions hamper or facilitate particular mechanisms and influence how the norm is interpreted and advanced. I distinguish seven domestic conditions (see table 5). Generally, all conditions can hamper or facilitate all mechanisms, but I formulate some expectations regarding the more likely combinations. Hence, the relationship is not pre-defined, but is case-specific in nature.

Table 5: Domestic conditions

Conditions	Elements	Logics
Cultural resonance	Perceived cultural match with domestic norms	Logic of appropriateness
Material resonance	Perceived match with material necessities	Logic of consequences
Social reception	Identity sensitive to international pressure/recognition	Mostly logic of appropriateness
Material reception	Perceived material vulnerability and prospects	Logic of consequences
Knowledge	Preexisting knowledge	Precondition mostly for logic of appropriateness
Opposition	Opponents resisting or working against norm engagement	Logic of appropriateness and consequences
Political-administrative set-up	Capacity and horizontal coordination/centralization	Precondition for logic of appropriateness or consequences

Cultural resonance reflects upon the extent to which prescriptions of an international norm are perceived to be in line with preexisting prescriptions of domestic norms embedded in the domestic discourse, outputs of the legal system (e.g., laws, policies, programs), and in organizational ethos and procedures (Checkel 1999: 87). However, cultural resonance is not static, but can change over time (Cortell and Davis 2000: 75), and is subject to interpretation. Cultural resonance can be identified, when an international norm is perceived to be in line or can be aligned with (parts of) previous domestic discourses, political decisions and organizational orientations, which are referred to by domestic actors. Cultural resonance would then facilitate a domestic norm engagement that incorporates preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors. Moreover, it is likely that cultural resonance facilitates strategic mimicry and hampers shaming.

Material resonance captures the idea that an international norm has also to resonate materially. This means that international norms need to match to the perceived domestic material necessities (e.g., energy security), and need to be perceived to be in line with preexisting material decisions (e.g.,

energy subsidization) and material goals (e.g., high economic growth). The literature has already indicated the role of material foundations of a state (e.g., standard of living) (Stevenson 2012: 56), the positive or negative impact on the domestic political economy (Alger and Dauvergne 2017), and material developments in technology and economy (Bloomfield 2016: 17-18) as factors influencing the norm engagement. This (perceived) material resonance can change over time. Material resonance can be identified, when an international norm is perceived to be in line or can be aligned with (parts) of the perceived domestic material necessities and goals, which is indicated in statements by domestic actors. Material resonance would then facilitate a domestic norm engagement that incorporates preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors. In addition, it is likely that material resonance facilitates competition and hampers shaming.

Social reception refers to the identity of domestic agents, which can be both characterized by social vulnerability to pressure (i.e., negative social reception) and/or the aim for social recognition (i.e., positive social reception) (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 208; Risse and Ropp 2013: 20-21). It therefore requires that domestic actors have a certain form of identification with the international community (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 19; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 60), “care about their international image” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 208) and desire “to be members of [the...] international community ‘in good standing’” (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 10). Social reception can be identified, when domestic actors underline their aim to be part of the global community in good standing. Social reception then facilitates a domestic norm engagement that incorporates norm interpretations advocated by external actors. However, domestic actors may also try to reduce their social vulnerability to pressure (i.e., reversed social reception), which may prevent an incorporation of external actors’ norm interpretations. Moreover, it is likely that social reception facilitates shaming and strategic or normative mimicry.

Material reception includes both expected material vulnerability (e.g., trade sanctions) and material prospects (e.g., grants, political benefits) in relation to the domestic norm advancement and the actions of external actors. For example, states with strong dependence on international aid or preferential trade relations will be more vulnerable to their termination and may engage in norm advancement as required by external actors when threatened to lose these benefits (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 29, 207-208; Risse and Sikkink 1999: 24; Risse and Ropp 2013). In contrast, material prospects by external actors need to be sufficiently high and credible in order to provide a positive cost-benefit calculation outcome for domestic decision-makers to engage in norm advancement as expected by external actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 208; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 12, 58). This can include the prospect of receiving international funding or gaining political powers, such as voting rights in international organizations. Material reception can be identified, when domestic actors refer to the possibility of perceived strong potential negative or positive material consequences through the actions by external actors (incl. sanctions and receiving funding). Material reception then supports a domestic norm engagement that incorporates norm interpretations advocated by external actors. In addition, it is likely that material reception facilitates strategic mimicry.

Knowledge captures the idea that preexisting understanding of the overall content and context of an international norm helps domestic actors to engage with it. Knowledge is defined as “the sum of technical information and of theories about that information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal“ (Haas 1980: 367-368). Preexisting knowledge can be identified, when domestic actors can rely upon preexisting necessary information about the content and context of the issue the international norm addresses and perceive this information as satisfactory to take further actions, which is indicated by their statements. Preexisting knowledge can then be expected to support a domestic norm engagement that either relies upon preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors or that incorporates norm interpretations advocated by external actors, depending on the mechanism that is either facilitated or hampered. Moreover, it is likely that sufficient preexisting knowledge facilitates complex learning and lesson drawing.

Opposition includes veto-players (Keck and Sikkink 1998), which are “individual or collective decisionmakers whose agreement is required for the change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 2000: 442). Antipreneurs’, whose consent is not needed, can also undertake opposition by shaping the public opinion or the perception of decision-makers, and can thereby “defend the normative status quo” (Bloomfield 2016: 2). Opposition can be identified, when domestic (non-state) actors influence the discourse in a way that prevents decision-makers to take further changes relating to the international norm or opposing powerful actors within the government prevent these changes on their own. Opposition against the change of the status quo can then be assumed to hamper the incorporation of norm interpretations advocated by external actors, as opponents defend the preexisting domestic norm interpretations of the status quo. Opposition is therefore likely to hamper shaming and normative mimicry.

The *political-administrative set-up* of a nation-state comprises state capacity and horizontal centralization or coordination at the national level. First, capacity implies “efficient and effective administrative structures” (Risse and Ropp 2013: 18) of domestic governments in order to be able to formulate policies and rules based on international norms (Levy et al. 1992: 30; Risse-Kappen 1995: 294; Stehle et al. 2019; VanDeveer and Dabelko 2001), and to ensure implementation and enforcement of them subsequently (Meyer et al. 1997: 155; Risse and Ropp 2013: 18-19). Second, central government centralization or coordination can be expected to prevent institutional turf wars and fragmentation among governmental organizations (on intergovernmental fragmentation, see Höhne 2018: 139; von Lüpke and Well 2020: 10). Sufficient capacities and government coordination can be identified, when governmental organizations have sufficient resources and qualified personal to deal with an international norm and when the leadership of the central government ensures a coordinated approach in which several governmental organizations (incl. several departments of an organization) work together based on a shared goal and understanding. The political-administrative set-up can then either result in a domestic norm engagement that incorporates preexisting norm

interpretations by domestic actors or the ones advocated by external actors. This largely depends upon which particular mechanism is facilitated or hampered by this condition (see table 6).

Table 6: Conditions and expected influence on norm interpretation

Expected influence on norm interpretation	Condition
Incorporating preexisting interpretations by <i>domestic</i> actors	Cultural resonance
	Material resonance
	Opposition
Incorporating <i>external</i> actors' interpretations	Social reception
	Material reception
Incorporating either <i>external</i> actors' or preexisting <i>domestic</i> actors' interpretations	Knowledge
	Political-administrative set-up

2.6 Summary: Norm glocalization

In response to the identified gaps in the norm literature regarding agents, processes and outcomes, I develop the norm glocalization framework. Based on external actors' and domestic actors' mechanisms, I explain the norm engagement by domestic governmental actors based on (evolving) glocalized norm interpretations, which represent the fusions of preexisting norm interpretations by external actors and domestic actors. Domestic conditions facilitate or hamper particular mechanisms and either contribute to the incorporation of domestic actors' or of external actors' norm interpretations. The norm glocalization framework can capture both the international reshaping of collective interpretations of norms and the domestic reshaping by domestic governmental actors. I therefore introduce various stages of the norm glocalization process, which starts with international contestation, but includes international reshaping before domestic governmental actors engage in further domestic reshaping of norms in domestic action formulation and sectorial changes (incl. discursive and policy changes, supported by organizational changes), which eventually are implemented. How this conceptual framework is applied methodologically, is defined by the research design, which is elaborated in the next chapter.

3. Research design: A scientific realist perspective

In this chapter, I present the research design. I first introduce my perspective on the philosophy of science and explain why and how I strongly borrow from scientific realism (3.1). I then explain how norm research has already benefited from scientific realism and how it could be further advanced in this regard, which relates to the fourth gap of the norm literature identified in the introduction (3.2). Based on scientific realism, I introduce the concept of causal mechanisms and explain my approach to it (3.3.). I then provide an overview on the different methods I use (3.4-3.7). Based on insights from scientific realism, I develop causal complex process tracing as a new variant of process tracing (3.4), explain case selection (3.5), and describe my approach to expert interviews (3.6) and data analysis (3.7) before I end with a summary (3.8).

3.1 Philosophy of science, scientific realism and the study of world politics

International Relations' (IR) scholars' worldviews, conceptual approaches, scientific procedures and empirical inferences are shaped by insights from the philosophy of science. How we can produce what kind of knowledge is a major point of discussion in the field. Yet, the philosophy of science is not providing simple consensus answers to this question. Jackson distinguishes four ideal-types of philosophy of science approaches based on the "[r]elationship between the knower and the known" (mind-world dualism or monism) and the "[r]elationship between knowledge and observation" (phenomenalism or transfactualism): neopositivism is characterized by phenomenalism and mind-world dualism, scientific realism by transfactualism and mind-world dualism, analyticism by phenomenalism and mind-world monism, and reflexivity by transfactualism and mind-world monism (Jackson 2011: 37).

The introduction of concepts from the philosophy of science in IR resulted in misinterpretations as they were stripped off their disciplinary meaning (Jackson 2011: 15-16; Wight 2002: 26). Scholars have often not reflected upon the methodology (i.e., procedure and logical structure of scientific enquiry) on which their methods (i.e., gathering and analysis techniques for data) are based on or formulated 'neutral' method tenets without acknowledging that those are not only derived but also do only make sense from the dominant neopositivist stance (Jackson 2011: 18, 25). While there are many influential books on how to apply neopositivism (for such a neopositivist textbook, see, e.g., King et al. 1994), method suggestions on scientific realism or interpretivism are much rarer. Regarding my "hook up to the world" (Jackson 2011: 36), I strongly rely upon insights from scientific realism and IR's treatments of it (e.g., Jackson 2011; Patomäki 1996; Wight 2002).

3.1.1 Questioning of Humean causality and neopositivism

Qualitative researchers from different theoretical schools have over the last decades increasingly leaned toward neopositivist's methodology and methods. Scholars had become under pressure to

use neopositivists' evaluative criteria as neopositivists such as King et al. (1994) had claimed that there exist "a 'single logic of inference'" (Levy 2008: 15) for both qualitative and quantitative research that is based on the neopositivist' statistical research design (McKeown 1999: 175). From such a perspective, all non-positivist approaches have been judged as engaging in non-causal understanding. Even Hermeneutics accepted this positivist perspective by rejecting any form of causal analysis as "invalid in the 'interpretive understanding' of subject" (Kurki 2006: 194). This supported the "sharp dichotomization of reasons and causes, [and] understanding and explaining" (Kurki 2006: 194). In practice, both explanation (causal inquiry) and understanding (constitutive inquiry) are overlapping (Klotz and Lynch 2006: 357; 2007: 15; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 13), as those "who say they explain behavior also interpret meaning, and those who focus on understanding language also explain action to some degree" (Klotz and Lynch 2006: 357). Moreover, explanation and understanding both rely on the systematic inquiry for the production of factual knowledge. For both approaches, conclusions need to follow from the provided logical argumentation and evidence (i.e., internal validity) (Jackson 2011: 21-22, 24).

Distinguishing explanation from understanding is derived from one particular philosophy of science: logical positivism, as developed by David Hume and further elaborated by Carl Gustav Hempel (deductive-nomological model (D-N model)). It defines causality based on the deterministic covariation between the independent and the dependent variable (if A, then B) (Kurki 2006: 192-194). It relies upon the "human observations of 'constant conjunctions of events'" (Kurki 2006: 192) in the form of covering law models. Yet, this approach faced the problem that "law-like claims are not verifiable" (Jackson 2011: 12). It cannot distinguish between "causal and spurious regularities" (George and Bennett 2005: 132) and does not explain laws themselves.¹¹ Popper reversed the logic and argued that law-like claims should be falsified based on prior defined criteria.¹² In scientific practice, however, scholars have often preserved theoretical claims in the face of contradicting evidence by adjusting background assumptions (Jackson 2011: 12-14) with the result that "very few theories (if any at all) have been discarded in the face of discrepant evidence" (Pouliot 2007: 378). Observers even noted that "there is an embarrassing scarcity of covering laws [...and] there are hardly any observable empirical regularities that could be considered explanatory" (Hedström and

¹¹ Scholars have tried to modify the D-N model by replacing its determinism through probabilistic statements ('inductive statistical' model), but did not define how probabilistic an outcome needs to be to be accepted as law-like (George and Bennett 2005: 133).

¹² (Neo-)positivist approaches share some general features: phenomenalism (i.e., study observations instead of realities), mind-world dualism (i.e., there exists a world independent from the researcher), nominalism (i.e., words we use are only conventional symbols), cognitivism (i.e., no cognitive value of normative judgements), and naturalism (i.e., same procedures in social science than in natural science). This leads to the following scientific practices: hypothesis testing of explanations based on constant conjunctions in which usually only one cause can explain and predict an outcome based on observations scholars make about regularities among an independent and a dependent variable. This explanation covers all cases of the explained phenomenon (Jackson 2011: 38; Wight 2002: 41-42). Data selection and analysis procedures are to provide validity, objectivity, reliability, and replicability (see, e.g., King et al. 1994; for a critic, see, e.g., Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 92) and are meant to reduce the disturbances between explanatory and dependent variable in an open system in the absence of controlled experimental environments (Kurki 2006: 196).

Ylikoski 2010: 55; for IR, see also Ruggie 1998: 880). Neopositivists have not provided “depth explanations’ of the patterns of observables identified” (Kurki 2006: 197). Therefore, it is important to question this exclusive Humean understanding of causality dominant in the IR discipline and to look for alternative views of causality (Kurki 2006: 190, 194-195).

3.1.2 A scientific realist understanding of causality

Scientific realists share with neopositivists the belief in mind-world dualism (i.e., a world exists independent from the researcher), but disagree that knowledge can only be produced in relation to observables (i.e., phenomenalism), as they believe in the possibility to generate knowledge about realities that are unobservable (i.e., transfactualism) (Jackson 2011: 36-37).¹³ In contrast to the neopositivist conception of causality based on regularities of two observable events, scientific realists propose to “uncove[r] the underlying [...] mechanisms that causally connect [them]” (Wight 2002: 43). Scientific realists define causes as “all those things that bring about, produce, direct or contribute to states of affairs or changes in the world” (Kurki 2006: 202), including material and social forces (Kurki 2007: 366). In contrast to neopositivists’ presumption of closed systems, scientific realists acknowledge that social processes and events are occurring in open systems, which are characterized by complexity (Bhaskar 2008: 43; Mader et al. 2017: 13; Patomäki 1996: 112).¹⁴ Explaining processes and events shaped by complexity requires explanations based on a complex of several causes, which can be interacting, complementing or counteracting (Bhaskar 2008: 43; Kurki 2006: 202, 209). Scientific realists therefore reject the neopositivist prioritization of parsimony as an oversimplification of social processes and events (Kurki 2007: 372).

Processes and outcomes are explained by scientific realists based on *spatio-temporal causal complexes*, which are characterized by *multiple causal mechanisms that are facilitated or hampered by different conditions* (Bhaskar 2008: 37, 43; Kurki 2006: 202; Patomäki 2008: 21; Sayer 2000: 14-15). Different outcomes can be produced by the same mechanisms, depending on the facilitating or hampering effects of the condition under which they are operating (Sayer 1992: 107; 2000: 14-15).¹⁵ This is an empirical question and “cannot be specified at the level of ontology, for it depends on the nature of the processes of interest” (Sayer 2000: 16). Conditions are not delineating the scope of the

¹³ Wight (2002: 43) defines scientific realism as “the belief that the objects posited in scientific theories should be considered to be real and their ontological status subject to test”. Theories are then conceived as “attempts to grasp the nature of real entities and processes that are independent of our theories about them – even non-observable ones” (Wight 2002: 43). Scientific realism thereby “does not deny that theories are dependent on minds [...and] [i]t accepts that we construct theoretical accounts of the world, but it denies that these theoretical accounts exhaust the world” (Wight 2002: 43). While scientific realism acknowledges that “all knowledge claims are socially constructed [, ...] some claims may be better than others” (Wight 2002: 43).

¹⁴ Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis method aims to capture complexity by accounting for multi-causality (Ragin 1987). However, it ultimately rests upon a covariational approach (Jackson 2011: 68), and still sticks to “a systematic cross-case association between variables” (Jackson 2011: 222).

¹⁵ Conditions are caused by other causal mechanisms than the ones under investigation (Sayer 1992: 107).

applicability of a general law as in neopositivist research (Jackson 2011: 152), but instead facilitate or hamper the workings of causal mechanisms.

3.1.3 Studying causality from a scientific realist perspective

Scientific realists' try to cross the gap between the researcher and the world by producing an "accurate correspondence between empirical and theoretical propositions on the one hand and the actual character of a mind independent world on the other" (Jackson 2011: 35) in a way that represents the "best approximation to the world" (Jackson 2011: 198). In contrast, mind-world monist approaches presume that "the researcher is a part of the world in such a way that speaking of 'the world' as divorced from the activities of making sense of the world is literally nonsensical" (Jackson 2011: 35-36).¹⁶ Scientific realists acknowledge that knowledge production about reality is socially influenced, but they underline that it is not imagined by the scholar, as it exists independently from their mind (Bhaskar 2008: 12, 15, 56; Kurki 2006: 203; Patomäki and Wight 2000: 224; Wendt 1999: 75). They do not regard the world as constructed by theorizing, as they postulate an existing reality beyond theories (Godfrey-Smith 2003: 181-182). This makes it possible to "make rational choices between competing knowledge claims" (Wight 2007: 386), as they have different abilities to take account of evidence and to explain processes of reality (Kurki 2006: 210; 2007: 372).

Due to their transfactual perspective (i.e., revealing knowledge about unobservable reality) (Bhaskar 2008: 37; Jackson 2011: 36-37), scientific realists aim to reveal the underlying mechanisms that shape the course of events. They are therefore interested in the "underlying structures, powers, and tendencies that exist, whether or not detected or known through experience and/or discourse" (Patomäki and Wight 2000: 223). Hence, the goal is to theorize about unobservable mechanisms and conditions that produce effects that are perceivable (Jackson 2011: 77-78). Retrodution (also called abduction) as the procedure of inferential reasoning allows scientific realists to plausibly connect observable data to underlying causal mechanisms that are able and plausible to produce them, although mechanisms are not directly observable (Jackson 2011: 76, 83; Sayer 1992: 107; Wynn and Williams 2012: 799). Retrodution is an alternative to the deductive (i.e., testing hypotheses based on theories against a set of observations) and to the inductive logic of inquiry (i.e., developing general laws from observations of particular instances) and is used by both scientific realists and non-realists (Easton 2010: 123; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 714; Jackson 2011: 82-83; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 26-27). It is based on "reasoning at an intermediate level" (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009: 715). It has an iterative character (Easton 2010: 124; Wynn and Williams 2012: 800), whose iterations occur "between what is puzzling and possible explanations for

¹⁶ For reflectivists, researcher's knowledge is inseparable from their social situation when producing the knowledge, while for analyticists' knowledge derives from the ordering of empirical observations according to pragmatic ideal-typifications (Jackson 2011: 38-39, 114-115).

it" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 27), and result in new forms of conceptualizing and revised explanations (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 29, 33-34).

To sum up, I heavily rely on scientific realism in my research design. Instead of following the dominant neopositivist approach to causality, I base my analysis in a scientific realist understanding of causality. For that purpose, I reveal the underlying mechanisms that are facilitated or hampered by different conditions to explain social events and processes. The knowledge I produce through retrodution is socially constructed, but not imagined and tries to provide the best approximation to reality.

3.2 Norm research from a philosophy of science perspective

Scholars have studied norms from very different positions on the philosophy of science and have done so by leaning toward neopositivism, scientific realism (often discussed together as positivist approaches) and reflectivism (often discussed as post-positivist research) (e.g., Klotz and Lynch 2006; Klotz and Lynch 2007). These categorizations conflate scientific realist with "soft-positivist" (Agnew et al. 2017: 411) research (such as Checkel 2005), and fail to recognize the postpositivist character of scientific realism (e.g., Klotz and Lynch 2007: 33, 113).

With the emergence of interest in norms, many researchers have included the study of norms and meaning "with minimum disruption to the field's prevailing epistemological stance" (Ruggie 1998: 884), which has been neopositivism (Wight 2002: 39). These neopositivists study "reality in terms of stable meanings [...] and believe that neither prevalent ideologies nor the researcher's own judgments have a significant impact on the reliability of the resulting analysis" (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 12-13). This facilitated a conceptualization of stable norms (e.g., Risse et al. 1999) and of stable local understandings of international norms (e.g., Acharya 2004; Zimmermann 2017b). However, those norm researchers usually do not follow neopositivist standards by the book, as, for example, they do not strive to illuminate laws of behavior, while also aspiring to explain phenomena in more general terms across a broad empirical spectrum (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 14). While some apply neopositivist standards of case selection, others rarely explicitly substantiate their case selection and often argue to contribute to theory-development (e.g., Zimmermann 2017b). They sometimes explicitly note the independent and dependent variable and even list scope conditions (e.g., Risse et al. 1999, 2013), as well as test hypotheses (e.g., Checkel 2001), while others only specify the variables under scrutiny (e.g., Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Scientific realism has already been applied on the study of norms and on constructivist perspectives on world politics (Jackson 2011: 206; Kurki 2007: 368; Wendt 1987, 1999; Wight 2002: 35). Early on, Wendt (1987: 370), for example, acknowledged that "[s]cientific realism, then, offers an alternative to the standard positions in the Positivismstreit, one which enjoins social scientists to think 'abductively' about 'causal mechanisms' to build their theories, instead of trying to find law-like

generalizations about observable regularities”. However, scholars often brought such an approach under a neopositivist umbrella by trying to explain outcomes based on a singular mechanism operating under particular scope conditions or in different time sequences through hypothesis testing (e.g., Checkel 2001; Checkel 2005: 819; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005). Norm researchers have also strived to capture the underlying processual pathways leading to an outcome (e.g., Finnemore 1996; Zimmermann 2017b), and have already brought several mechanisms in one framework together to explain outcomes (e.g., Börzel and Risse 2012a) and some have already provided more “complex, multi-causal, contextualized explanations” (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 14). Other norm researchers have criticized mono-causal theorizing, but still rely upon a reflectivist perspective by emphasizing the non-causal constitutive role of norms (Kurki 2006: 200, 212). Many of those norm researchers are skeptical of strong generalization and prefer context-specific analysis (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 20).

Mind-world-monist norm researcher (often called post-positivists, while only including post-structuralists, post-modernists or interpretivists) challenge neopositivists and scientific realists mind-world dualism (Jackson 2011: 31), as they argue that they “work in a hermeneutical circle without any objective standpoint for analysis” (Klotz and Lynch 2006: 357). They “do not attribute essential properties to social facts” (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 13) and “favor terminology that captures the instability of meaning” (Klotz and Lynch 2006: 357). In their view, norms are constantly “works-in-progress” (Krook and True 2012: 104) and inherently unstable due to their contestedness (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 13). They, hence, strive to capture and understand the variety of (changing) meanings. They eschew the aim of causal explanation and refuse variable-oriented research designs, as they prefer to study “historical conjunctures” (Klotz and Lynch 2006: 357). However, some also incorporate neopositivist and scientific realist positions by aiming at contingent generalizable claims (Pouliot 2007: 379), which are context-dependent and based on hypotheses, social mechanisms and scope conditions (Guzzini 2012a: 4-5). Pouliot (2007: 367) even embraces causality by developing “[n]arrative causality [that] traces the historical evolution of meanings (both subjective and intersubjective) in order to explain how they brought about, or made possible, a given social context”.

In consequence, observers noted that many norm researchers take positions that include elements of different philosophies of science (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 11-12). They emphasize that norm scholars must instead “treat the (in-)stability of intersubjective understandings as an empirical question” (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 13). Those meanings can be treated as relatively stable at some moments or for some actors, such as in the case of codifications of norms at international conferences (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 13-14), which imply a collectively shared meaning attribution, while the subsequent international advancement or domestic implementation may be subject to many different meaning attributions. However, this presupposes a philosophical ontology that accepts mind-world dualism so that we can empirically evaluate those claims about the stability of

norms (in Jackson's words the 'scientific ontologies') and scrutinize whether reality matches proposed scientific ontologies (Jackson 2011: 30-31).¹⁷

For the study of norms, I heavily rely on scientific realism (mind-world dualism and transfactualism). This means that I can capture collective interpretations of internationally negotiated norms, such as by the domestic government at a certain moment of time as well as different individual interpretations by external and domestic actors. This can also include different interpretations by different ministries. Those meaning attributions are stable for a certain amount of time, can change over time and influence outcomes and social processes. This can be captured through triangulation of interviews and the analysis of primary and secondary sources (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 17-19). I accept the critical realist perspective that there is a reality independent from my own perspective, which I can capture from an external position.

To sum up, I contribute to the norm literature by further including scientific realists' positions to the study of norms in world politics.

3.3 Causal mechanisms

The study's causal explanations rely upon scientific realist's multiple and interacting causal mechanisms that are facilitated or hampered by different condition. But what is a mechanism? Bhaskar (2008: 37), the most important representative of critical realism (a subset of scientific realism), famously wrote that the "world consists of mechanisms not events". He argued that these mechanisms "combine to generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world" (Bhaskar 2008: 37). Mechanisms are independent of the observer that "may be said to be real, though it is rarely that they are actually manifest and rarer still that they are empirically identified (Bhaskar 2008: 37). They are not artificial constructs (Bhaskar 2008: 37), but they are "real and distinct from the patterns of events that they generate" (Bhaskar 2008: 46). In open systems, mechanisms also function "in their normal way irrespective of our perceptions" (Bhaskar 2008: 39), where they are affected by other mechanisms, which prevents the identification of a one-to-one relationship between variables (Bhaskar 2008: 43). As part of 'spatio-temporal causal complexes' (at a moment of time, in a particular space),¹⁸ mechanisms produce outcomes in interaction with other mechanisms and under specific (facilitating or hampering) conditions in open system (Bhaskar 2008: 43; Patomäki 2008: 21). The mechanisms that will be activated in what ways are unknown *ex ante*, making outcomes and events unpredictable (Bhaskar 2008: 109).

¹⁷ Jackson (2011: 28) defines 'philosophical ontology' as the "conceptual and philosophical basis on which claims about the world are formulated", while he distinguishes it from 'scientific ontology', which is the "catalog of objects, processes, and factors that a given line of scientific research expects to exist or has evidence for the existence of" (usually referred to as ontology).

¹⁸ For a similar non-realist perspective, see Hedström and Ylikoski (2010: 53).

Social sciences have seen a recent turn toward mechanism-based explanation, but this turn has not been very sharp as “many neo-mechanists are still half-positivist” (Gorski 2015: 27). For example, George and Bennett (2005: 128), propose mechanism-based explanations as an alternative to the neopositivist D-N model: “If we are able to measure changes in the entity being acted upon after the intervention of the causal mechanisms and in temporal or spatial isolation from other mechanisms, then the causal mechanism may be said to have generated the observed change in this entity” (George and Bennett 2005: 137). However, they rely upon a neopositivist understanding of cause and effect and capture mechanisms as intervening variables that provide a more fine-grained chain between the independent and dependent variable (Gorski 2015: 28; Jackson 2011: 109). Yet, such an approach explains one correlation by another correlation (Guzzini 2011: 322; Mahoney 2001: 578), thereby “link[ing] causal mechanisms to the very law-like generalizations” (Jackson 2011: 109) they were criticizing.

Scholars have also come up with different ways of defining causal mechanisms. Patomäki (1996: 118) relies on structure-based mechanisms as he defines mechanisms as “only those generative structures which do not include intentional agency”. Others have only relied on agency-based mechanisms (Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 11-12). In contrast, Bhaskar (2005 [1979]: 37-38) underlines the duality of structure.¹⁹ Sil and Katzenstein (2010: 421) provide a comprehensive and open-ended definition by conceptualizing mechanisms as “all entities – whether individual actions or choices, social relations or networks, environmental or institutional characteristics, specific events or contextual factors, individual cognitive dispositions or collectively shared ideas and worldviews – that generate immediate effects through processes that may or may not recur across contexts and that may be, but often are not, directly observable”. However, mechanisms need to be distinguished from contextual factors (i.e., based on conditions) and single events are to be explained but not to be conceptualized as mechanisms. Moreover, a definition should be open to the combination of several mechanisms. Other definitions emphasize that “[m]echanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences” (Elster 1998: 45). However, scientific realism underlines that mechanisms are often not observable and not necessarily frequently occurring.

In reliance on the definitions by Bhaskar (2008: 37, 39, 46) and Sil and Katzenstein (2010: 421) I define *mechanisms* as ‘*all those entities that, as part of causal complexes in open systems, generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world through processes that may or may not recur across contexts, that may be, but often are not, directly observable, and that are independent of the conditions that allow humans to access them*’. In line with scientific realism, such a perspective on causal complexes prefers a holistic causal story, as only combinations of mechanisms produce outcomes in open systems (Jackson 2011: 110). *Causal complexes are therefore characterized by the workings of multiple causal mechanisms* (Bhaskar

¹⁹ For a discussion of Bhaskar’s and Giddens’ perspectives on the duality of structure see Wendt (1987: 356).

2008: 37; Kurki 2007: 364), *which in combination generate processes and outcomes under certain facilitating or hampering conditions* (Sayer 1992: 107; 2000: 14-15). Interacting mechanisms can be complementing or counteracting each other (Bhaskar 2008: 43; George and Bennett 2005: 145; Hedström and Swedberg 1998: 21; Kurki 2006: 202, 209). The same mechanism can result in different effects depending on the facilitating or hampering conditions, while different mechanisms can produce similar effects (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 52, 56; Sayer 1992: 107; 2000: 14-15). This is ultimately an empirical question and can be illuminated in retrospect (Guzzini 2012c: 252; Sayer 2000: 16).

In line with analytical eclecticism and scientific realism, I draw upon a wide variety of causal mechanisms and conditions which transcend theoretical boundaries permitting me to deal with a greater form of complexity (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 412, 418, 421). By relying on some causal mechanisms and conditions that are rather structural (normative mimicry, political-administrative set-up), and on others that are rather agent-based (persuasion, opposition), mechanism-condition-based explanations help to deal with the mutual constitution of structure and agency in a processual approach. Such an approach neither privileges methodological individualism nor holism and is based on an open-ended scientific ontology (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 412, 417-418, 421). Different (types of) causal mechanisms can operate during different periods of time of a social process (Checkel 2006: 366; Klotz and Lynch 2007: 92; Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1053).

To sum up, I heavily rely upon scientific realism in my understanding and application of causal mechanisms. For providing explanations of events and social processes, I reveal spatio-temporal causal complexes in the form of multiple causal mechanisms that are facilitated or hampered by different conditions. How I illuminate them is explained in the next sub-chapters.

3.4 Process tracing

Process tracing is fruitful and logical method for studying causal mechanisms in action (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 13; Checkel 2006: 363; George and Bennett 2005: 214). However, process-tracing has been used as a buzzword for analyzing historical developments without explicating of how it functions. Scholars have therefore presented criteria for good process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 4), but have done so mostly from a semi-positivist philosophy of science position.

3.4.1 Semi-positivist process tracing

The most prominent process tracing approaches are built upon the semi-positivist understanding of causality and mechanisms mentioned above. For example, the process tracing approach by George and Bennett (2005: 137, 177) rests upon an understanding of mechanisms as observable intervening variables in a causal chain, which fill in the gaps between the independent and dependent variable (Guzzini 2012c: 258-259; Jackson 2011: 109). Such an approach explains a correlation by another

correlation (Guzzini 2011: 322; Mahoney 2001: 578), as it proposes to examine “sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (George and Bennett 2005: 6). These intermediate steps must be completely predicted and undergird by the hypothesis under scrutiny prior to the analysis or else the hypothesis will be subject to amendment (Checkel 2006: 363; George and Bennett 2005: 147, 207). While they strive for parsimony by “eliminat[ing] all potential rival explanations but one” (George and Bennett 2005: 207), they also acknowledge that this may be difficult in the social world. One particular approach of deductive hypothesis testing, called ‘efficient process tracing’, directly eliminates hypotheses when they are not able to explain the first sequence of the process and continues to do so until only one hypothesis is left (Schimmelfennig 2015: 107). Such an approach fails to account for explaining the complexity of reality by revealing multiple causal mechanisms.

A subsequent variant of semi-positivist process tracing by Bennett and Checkel (2015: 6-7) departs from the previous covariational approach and defines process tracing as the purpose of hypothesis development or testing of causal mechanisms that explain the collected evidence of intermediate steps of a process. Alongside their neo-positivist focus on hypothesis testing, comes a preference for parsimony to be able to isolate single mechanisms’ causal impacts for the purpose of theory development (Checkel and Bennett 2015: 270). For achieving this, they even recommend to “carefully choos[e] cases for process tracing that allow the isolation of particular theorized mechanisms” (Checkel and Bennett 2015: 270). They prefer deductive hypothesis testing as part of a staged research design following inductive process tracing (i.e., hypothesis development), which implies their privileging of deduction (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 8, 268) and call for the application of Bayesian logic to deductive process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 16, 18). Their deductive hypothesis testing is conducted by first predicting data of the process based on the hypothesis to be tested and then by scrutinizing whether the observations match those predictions. Based on Bayesian logic, a priori, they assign a probability that the hypothesis is true. In addition, they assign a likelihood that if the hypothesis is true, they will find evidence on it as well as express a probability that they will find the same evidence even though the hypothesis is false. They subsequently lower the probability that the hypothesis is true when important evidence is unavailable or contradicting the predictions (see, e.g., Bennett 2015: 278, 281-282; Bennett and Checkel 2015: 19, 30), which suggests an exactness that does not exist.²⁰ They use different tests, such as hoop test, smoking gun test, doubly decisive test, or the straw-in-the-wind test to decide which hypothesis wins the contest in providing a comprehensive explanation. Such an approach based on Bayesian logic has been criticized to be “difficult to square with scientific realism” (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 8).

²⁰ However, there exist “no full-fledged examples where scholars have done process tracing with explicit priors and numerical Bayesian updating” (Bennett 2015: 298).

3.4.2 Alternative variants of process tracing

Unsatisfied with the semi-positivist process tracing approach out there (Guzzini 2011: 333), Guzzini (2012a: 4) proposes an alternative approach called “interpretivist process tracing” that aims to capture meaning attributions of national actors regarding international events, which are “no constant and equal input for all country cases” (Guzzini 2012a: 4). It is puzzle- and case-oriented, embraces historical scrutiny, and aims to contribute to finetuning the underlying framework, whose mechanisms can be applied in other cases as well (Guzzini 2012b: 74; 2012c: 255, 262). However, this reflectivist analysis remains limited to the discursive level when studying how events relate to the dynamics of ideational structures (Guzzini 2012b: 48), while leaving out non-discursive and non-ideational factors.

Another interpretivist approach takes an explicit anti-realist and analyticist standpoint that “mechanisms are not ‘real’” but are “mental constructs devised to make sense of our interpretations” (Pouliot 2007: 374). His variant of the method is called “practice tracing” (Pouliot 2015: 237), acknowledging that “practices have causal power in the sense that they make other things happen” (Pouliot 2015: 241), while he remains committed to the positivist distinction between constitutive and causal mechanisms (Pouliot 2007: 373). He wants to provide insights into the “singularity of causal accounts” (Pouliot 2015: 237). However, he does not aspire to match theory with reality, but to abstract away from reality in the form of ideal-types, whose analytical generality “cannot be validated through empirical testing” (Pouliot 2015: 239). In contrast, I aim to capture the best approximation to the complex nature of reality. For this reason, I propose ‘causal complex process tracing’.

3.4.3 Causal complex process tracing

As an alternative variant of this method, I introduce causal complex process tracing, which strongly relies on insights derived from scientific realism. It is based upon a scientific realist conception of causality: As reality is complex (as it occurs in an open system), the causes of outcomes are complex themselves, which means that multiple interactive mechanisms generate outcomes instead of a single ultimate cause (Bhaskar 2008: 43; Kurki 2006: 202; 2008: 286; Mader et al. 2017: 13; Patomäki 1996: 112). Causal complex process tracing enables researchers to handle the complex causes of outcomes (e.g., events, actions, social processes, collective interpretations) by providing holistic explanations based on causal complexes that are characterized by multiple interacting causal mechanisms under their hampering or facilitating conditions. Mechanisms are either directly observable or are unobservable, but have exercised effects on the processes and outcomes we can perceive (Jackson 2011: 77; Wynn and Williams 2012: 794). The triangulation of interview data, documents, media reports, and secondary literature helps to uncover mechanisms and conditions. For that purpose, the observation period should start sufficiently before any outcomes to be explained in order to reveal the causal mechanisms and conditions that led to them. Causal complexes are revealed based on abduction, which reaches beyond the observations made by the

researcher in order to postulate something that explains what the researcher has observed (Jackson 2011: 83). Even though all explanations are always socially constructed, this approach aims to provide the best approximation to reality. While the explanation will be context-dependent and situational, the mechanisms and conditions may be of a general character and can be applied in other cases (Jackson 2011: 110, 199). This helps to fine-tune the underlying framework. Comparisons do not serve the purpose of generalization, but allow to illuminate the different ways that causal complexes manifest themselves and produce effects, which can help to understand their contrasting character and capacities (Jackson 2011: 200).

The same mechanism can generate different effects under different (facilitating or hampering) conditions, while different mechanisms can have the same effects. Moreover, the activation of the same condition does not necessarily result in the workings of the same mechanism (Guzzini 2012c: 264; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010: 52, 56; Sayer 1992: 107; 2000: 14-16). The effects of singular mechanisms and conditions can only be revealed in closed (laboratory) systems (Jackson 2011: 110; Kurki 2006: 202), which can only be approximated in open systems, while the focus of causal complex process tracing is on revealing the entire causal complex that explains the outcome. Causal complex process tracing can both capture more structural and more agential causal mechanisms (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 421), and can both account for material and ideational mechanisms (Kurki 2006: 204, 211, 213; 2007: 366). Moreover, it can capture different causal complexes at different moments of time explaining a particular outcome as part of a larger social process. For each norm globalization stage, I provide one or two causal complexes to explain the evolving events and outcomes. Each causal complex is based on the workings of one to four activated mechanisms and up to seven conditions.

3.5 Case study

Ragin (1992: 8). has famously argued that “[w]hat is a case’ [is answered] in remarkably different ways”. However, most method suggestions are written from a neopositivist philosophy of science perspective.

3.5.1 Non-realist perspectives on case studies

Neopositivists define a case study as “an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena” (Gerring 2004: 341). Their aim is to select cases that allow to provide generalizations for a larger class of cases based on neopositivist covariational causality and the same covariational evidence utilized in quantitative research (Gerring 2004: 341; Seawright and Gerring 2008: 296). Facing representativeness problems, they prefer cases that represent a larger population of cases. Moreover, they also prefer studying several cases that feature some variation regarding the

theoretical interests in order to test hypotheses about the covariation of causal factors (Jackson 2011: 152; Seawright and Gerring 2008: 294, 296). However, such an approach needs to avoid case selection on the dependent variable, but which is possible for within-case studies based on process tracing (Levy 2008: 8). Assuming a closed (laboratory) system setting, they, instead, prefer Mill's methods of difference and agreement that permits them "to eliminate independent variables that do not covary with the dependent variable" (Levy 2008: 10). However, even Mill has refuted the possibility to use his methods of case selection for the social science (Jackson 2011: 69-70, 108), as it does not function in open systems, potentially leading to the omission of important causal factors and resulting into spurious inferences and faulty generalizations (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 19-20; Levy 2008: 11; Ragin 1992: 13). Even though neopositivists acknowledge those problems, they still demand that "this standard should be approximated as closely as possible" (Lijphart 1971: 688). This led to the utilization of Mill's method of most similar case selection (i.e., selecting cases similar on all independent variables but one) and of most different case selection (i.e., selecting cases of which only one independent and dependent variable covary) (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 304, 306). Moreover, neopositivists provided different case study typologies, such as distinguishing ideographic (i.e., inductive understanding of a case), from theory-guided (i.e., generate hypothesis that can be subsequently tested), and hypothesis testing case studies (i.e., based on theory-guided case selection) (Levy 2008: 4-5, 8). Others further differentiate between cases that are extreme (i.e., selecting a case based on the extreme value of dependent or independent variables), deviant (i.e., displaying surprising value), typical (i.e., demonstrating stable cross-case relationships), or diverse (i.e., demonstrating maximum variance along theoretical dimensions), which cannot be utilized for all purposes (e.g., deviant cases cannot be utilized to test hypotheses) (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 299-301, 303).

Semi-positivists' also define "a case as an instance of a class of events" (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 8), but try to reduce the problem of comparability of cases by combining it with within-case methods such as process tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 19-20; George and Bennett 2005: 18). For that purpose, they recommend to analyze most-likely (i.e., theory is most likely to be true for that case but fails), least-likely (i.e., theory is least likely to be true for that case but succeeds) or crucial cases (i.e., cases that would strongly support or challenge a theory) to provide strong inference on a theory (George and Bennett 2005: 9, 24, 31-32). They argue that such an approach would result in a contingent generalization that applies to a subclass of cases that share similarities with the case in some key characteristics (George and Bennett 2005: 25, 32).

For interpretivists (i.e., mind-world monists such as reflectivists) the purpose of a case study is not in producing generalization or revealing causality, but "understanding meaning making in particular sites" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 70). For that purpose, the possibility of the access to the site is intertwined with the choice of the case. Otherwise, researchers are free to choose any case and comparisons only serve the purpose to illuminate different forms of meaning attribution (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 70).

3.5.2 Scientific realist perspectives on case studies

Scientific realists define the case study approach as the investigation of “one or a small number of social entities or situations or situations about which data are collected using multiple sources of data” (Easton 2010: 199). Scientific realists generate situational, holistic, and context-dependent explanations of cases (Jackson 2011: 199). They do not select cases to provide generalization and prediction of other cases (Wynn and Williams 2012: 804). Mill’s logic of case selection and comparison cannot be applied from a scientific realist standpoint, as “it is only the presence, not the absence, of a causal complex that produces an outcome” (Jackson 2011: 110). They instead aspire to provide “generalization to theory” (Wynn and Williams 2012: 805) based on mechanisms and conditions that may be general and applicable to other cases, in which, however, they may be operating differently or in combination with new mechanisms and conditions due to the different empirical context. Scientific realists can therefore draw upon mechanisms and conditions illuminated by other studies, but need to consider the new empirical context in which they are applied to explain an outcome (Bergene 2007: 14, 22; Jackson 2011: 110-111, 199). The case study method is considered to be the ideal method to illuminate how causal complexes operate in a particular case, which they scrutinize by posing research questions that integrate how and why questions (Wynn and Williams 2012: 795, 804) in a way that provides answers to the question of “[w]hat caused the events associated with the phenomenon to occur” (Easton 2010: 123). Scientific realists select cases based on the belief that they demonstrate the operation of the mechanisms and conditions delineated by the conceptual framework and in order to reveal and further conceptually develop previously unclear or undertheorized aspects.²¹ This can lead to a reformulation of the conceptual framework that can be used as an initial ordering framework for other not yet scrutinized cases (Bergene 2007: 22-23; Jackson 2011: 200). It can also contribute to answering the question of “how and why a similar mechanism could lead to different, or perhaps similar, outcomes in a different setting” (Wynn and Williams 2012: 804). Comparing cases, scientific realists select cases that feature some similarities and differences with implications for theory (Kessler and Bach 2014: 169), and illuminate how mechanisms and conditions play out differently in different contexts (Bergene 2007: 24-25). This can help to understand the contrasting character of causal complexes leading to outcomes (Jackson 2011: 200), and can “help to clarify the extent of their real-world potential” (Jackson 2011: 111), leading to a refinement of the framework (Jackson 2011: 153).

3.5.3 The book’s case selection

I heavily rely on scientific realism in my *case study* approach, which analyzes and explains India’s climate change engagement between 2005 and 2019. India is a particularly interesting and *puzzling* case as it is among the highest absolute GHG emitters in the world, is rapidly industrializing and

²¹ Even some non-realists have realized the merits of such an approach by proposing to focus on “‘telling’ cases” instead of typical cases in order to “clarify[y] previously obscure theoretical relationships” (McKeown 1999: 174).

among the 20 richest countries of the world, while having contested any own mitigation efforts due to its low per-capita GHG emissions and its continuous development status, which surprisingly began to change in 2007 (see Chapter 5). The observation period starts in 2005, as since then, India had participated in the international UNFCCC negotiation of two micro norms: the developing country climate mitigation norm, manifesting itself in UNFCCC's governance concepts of NAMAs and (since 2015) (I)NDCs, and the carbon forestry norm, manifesting itself in the UNFCCC's governance concept of REDD+ (see Chapter 4). In interaction with external actors, it has reshaped these norms and governance concepts internationally, and subsequently has further adjusted them domestically, leading to domestic action formulation in 2008, international target setting in 2009 and 2015, and to subsequent sectorial changes in the forestry sector (despite small deforestation rates) such as in 2010. The implementation in the forestry has continued until the end of the observation period (see Chapters 5 to 7), which concludes at the end of 2019, as afterwards the COVID-19 pandemic has started a new epoch, impacting all aspects of politics, economy and society. As the two micro norms both address the forestry sector, I chose to analyze how the Indian government has advanced their version of these norms in the forestry sector.

India's climate change engagement has been shaped by the workings of mechanisms enacted by both external and domestic actors that have been facilitated or hampered by domestic conditions. This Indian case, hence, is not a non-case, as actions have occurred (e.g., National Action Plan on Climate Change, Green India Mission, REDD+ strategy, NDC), even though they have not been conclusive, such as regarding the preparation of the national REDD+ framework. I could expect the workings of previously theorized mechanisms and conditions, which I refined according to the empirical context and included new or adapted ones in order to be able to explain the Indian case (see Chapter 2). For that purpose, I used abduction by oscillating between theory and empirics. I applied the resulting norm glocalization framework that explains changing glocalized norm interpretations, policy and organizational changes and their implementation over time by the activated mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions. This framework will be useful for scholars as an initial ordering framework for analyzing other cases as well.

3.6 Expert interviews

Conducting expert interviews are implicitly or explicitly influenced by the researcher's take on the philosophy of science. In method textbooks, the method is roughly defined as the questioning of individuals with exclusive knowledge for the purpose of theory-guided data collection (Kaiser 2014: 6). I introduce the neopositivist, interpretivist and scientific realist perspectives on expert interviews, before I present my own approach that relies on scientific realist insights and is in line with some more general advice by textbooks on conducting interviews.

3.6.1 Non-realist approaches to conducting interviews

Neopositivists conduct interviews to reveal one objective truth based on observations (Littig 2009: 102; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 41). Neopositivists take a neutral position in the interview situation, tightly control them, prevent dialogical interaction and use deductively derived standardized questions “to elicit unbiased and replicable responses” (Smith and Elger 2012: 6). The goal is to extract information in the form of “passive recording” (Smith and Elger 2012: 7) from interviewees that are considered to be carriers of facts and experiences, whose information can subsequently be aggregated and quantitatively analyzed to provide generalizable insights (Smith and Elger 2012: 6-7). They, therefore, care a lot about inter-expert reliability (Dorussen et al. 2005: 317).

Interpretivists (or mind-world monists), in contrast, presume that “we live in a world of potentially multiple, intersubjective social realities” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 41). As interpretivists reject mind-world dualism, they do not aspire to capture reality (Smith and Elger 2012: 6, 8). They posit it as normal that different interviewees provide different versions of events and processes and aim to understand their different interpretations and experiences regarding them (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 41). For that purpose, they aim to be exposed to the whole range of different understandings and aspire to achieve thickness and intertextuality of empirical data by including different sources of evidence (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 51, 85-86). But this is not conducted to reach convergence across multiple sources, but to check whether interviewees are “purposely ‘performing’ for the investigator” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 89). Interpretivists reject rigid interview questionnaires, but still advice to ask well-developed questions. However, they recommend to react flexible to the interviewee and to respond in ways that reflect upon their statements and even to confront them with particular opinions or perspectives (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 75-76; Smith and Elger 2012: 8). Interpretivists emphasize that the interviewer’s personal background, demographic characteristics, and knowledge about language, people and culture may affect the type and degree of access in the field. Moreover, this may also affect the researcher’s understanding of the interviews, as the meaning is jointly constructed between the interviewer and the interviewee, which makes it necessary to reflect upon these aspects (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 60, 67-68; Smith and Elger 2012: 6).

3.6.2 Scientific realist approach to conducting interviews

Scientific realists utilize interviews to reveal both the interpretations of their interviewees and to gain access to in-depth information and accounts of processes and outcomes. This helps scientific realists to capture facets of the complex reality and to reveal the workings of causal mechanisms and their facilitating and hampering conditions (Smith and Elger 2012: 6, 9, 11, 14). Interviews must therefore be conducted from a theoretical oriented perspective and must follow a retroductive (meaning abductive) approach. Interviews may not directly reveal mechanisms and may only present

an incomplete picture, as interviewees are embedded in particular contexts, can never be aware of all relevant causes and conditions, and may have a limited evaluative and information horizon (Smith and Elger 2012: 4, 12, 16). However, interviewees are still needed as a direct access, as they can provide “insights into the actual and empirical representations of action” (Smith and Elger 2012: 4). They can help to reveal the causal mechanisms and conditions, as they know about the motivations and reasons of actions, the processes, conditions and outcomes. Interviewers can directly ask for plausible mechanisms and conditions and can probe the plausibility of different perspectives by other interviewees, but they must retain flexibility and follow up on interviewees’ responses. Interview outputs must be critically evaluated on its own and be triangulated with other interviews and other sources, which helps to reveal potential biases (Smith and Elger 2012: 10-13, 15-16, 20). Yet, the result of such an analysis still “remains corrigible in the face of a combination of fresh evidence and new theorising” (Smith and Elger 2012: 11).

3.6.3 The book’s approach to conducting interviews

For conducting expert interviews, I strongly relied on scientific realist insights. Interviews were conducted to reveal causal mechanisms and conditions and the changing interpretations by collective domestic and external actors. This occurred in a theory-guided way and the theoretical framework was abductively adjusted over the course of the research. All interviews were critically scrutinized on their own terms and were triangulated where possible with other interview outputs and evidence from other sources (Smith and Elger 2012).

Moreover, my approach is also in line with some of the practical non-positivist textbook advices, with whom I agree that experts are either people who are responsible for elements of the processes of interests or who have particular knowledge on them (Kaiser 2014: 41). In this analysis, I incorporated 70 expert interviews that I conducted with government officials, donors, consultants, NGO representatives, project managers, advocates, and researchers that were participants or observers of the processes analyzed in the case study (see Chapter 9.1). I conducted them during two field trips in 2016 and 2018. In addition, I incorporated two e-mail communications with two experts in my analysis.

Interviews were conducted with government officials and stakeholders (e.g., consultants), who were involved in the decision-making processes to reveal knowledge about the changing collective interpretations of norms, the reasons of decisions, their outcomes and their implementation, and the hampering or facilitating conditions, which would not have been possible to reveal otherwise (Kaiser 2014: 42). Alongside this process knowledge, context knowledge about the processes and outcomes can be derived from interviewing stakeholders (e.g., NGO representatives or researchers) not directly involved in the decision-making process. This can help to better understand the motivations and facilitating or hampering conditions, even though they are based on a particular perspective (see

Kaiser 2014: 39-40, 43-45). This can be particularly helpful for instances on which no or only few published empirical description and public documents are available.

Before conducting interviews, I reviewed the state of the art regarding the case study in order to become a quasi-expert before talking to actual experts (see Kaiser 2014: 40). An explorative field trip was conducted in India in New Delhi in November and December 2016, from which I included 23 expert interviews in this study. The focus of this first trip was on interviewing stakeholders and some bureaucrats in a more explorative and less semi-structured way to reveal both contexts, but also some insights on the processes and outcomes, potential mechanisms and conditions and collective interpretations (Kaiser 2014: 29-30, 35). For the first trip, interviewees were selected based on the snowball method (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 87), as I contacted researchers and practitioners who had published on similar empirical topics of interests and asked them for contacts or even interviewed them. Moreover, I contacted some experts that I identified by an online search of relevant organizations. The contacted experts were further asked for additional expert contacts, which I subsequently interviewed as well. During this first trip, one researcher joined me for conducting eight out of 23 of the incorporated interviews, which is unproblematic from a scientific realist perspective (Smith and Elger 2012: 17).

The second trip to India occurred from February until April 2018, from which I incorporated 47 interviews in this study that I conducted in the New Delhi area, Gandhinagar (Gujarat), Dehradun (Uttarakhand), Bengaluru (Karnataka), Aizawl (Mizoram), and Shimla (Himachal Pradesh). These interviews were both explorative and much more semi-structured based on a questionnaire (Kaiser 2014: 30-31, 35). In these interviews, I tried to reveal mechanisms, conditions, outcomes and interpretations based on the initial theoretical framework, while remaining open for new ones or adaptations, leading to further refinement of the framework based on an abductive approach. For that reason, I mostly interviewed government officials, donors and stakeholders directly involved in the processes of interest. However, I also switched to asking for context knowledge, when no further information on process knowledge could be acquired from such an interview. I again relied on the snowball method in selecting interviewees. I asked all the interviewees from the first trip for expert contacts and identified additional experts through an online search of further relevant organizations by checking conference participation lists, press media statements, and organization websites and organigrams. All of these contacted experts were again requested to recommend further expert contacts. During the second trip, I conducted all interviews alone.

In most cases, experts were contacted by e-mail and less often by phone calls or SMS. In many cases, each expert had to be contacted three up to ten times until responses were received and a meeting spot and time could be agreed upon. Experts were selected based on their knowledge on the issue of interest and their availability. Even though I did not interview every single existing expert on the matter (Kaiser 2014: 71-72), I talked to almost all of the most important ones that I have become aware of. For that matter, I tried to interview as many experts from different organizations

as possible. Interviews were conducted from Monday until Friday and often went on for about an hour, but in many cases even longer up to one-and-a-half or two hours.

Interviews were usually being done with one interviewee. In some cases, two people were interviewed at the same time, as they were with the same organization. 70 interviews were conducted in person, mostly at the office of the interviewee and sometimes in a café, restaurant, private home or hotel lobby. Two additional interviews were conducted by telephone as the interviewees were located in another location or were traveling. All interviews were conducted in English.

Interviews were recorded in writing by myself. They were written down as they were spoken by the interviewee and potential citations were marked by quotation signs, but fill words or fill sentences were kept out as no discourse analysis was planned. This format was chosen so that interviewees can feel more secure about revealing actual knowledge about issues of interest and to prevent that interviewees only present the official position of their organization, which sometimes occurred anyhow (see Kaiser 2014: 83-85). This approach is advantageous when the interviewer has a good empirical knowledge, has some initial theoretical categories in mind, conducts a high number of expert interviews, investigates politically sensible issues, and does not plan to conduct discourse analysis.

Some interviewees asked for anonymity and to prevent that interviewees are negatively affected from revealing their actual knowledge and opinion (see also Kaiser 2014: 86), I decided only to reveal the type of organizational background they are representing (e.g., government, NGO). Even listing the names of the organizations could result in their identification, as in some cases only one or few people of an organization work on the matters of interest.

The questionnaire (see Annex I) I used for the semi-structured interviews included background question which I prepared before the first research trips and adjusted before the second field trips. They were formulated to reveal important empirical details that help me to explain the processes and outcomes of the case. However, I tried to keep the conversation ongoing by posing questions which were well connected to what the interviewees had just talked about (see Sayer 1992: 245), while guiding them smoothly from one subject complex to the next of my questionnaire to cover the whole ground, while not posing every question of the questionnaire to every interviewee. Background questions thus served as a loose reservoir to which I could come back in a flexible manner, which revealed more of interviewees' actual knowledge and opinions (see Kaiser 2014: 83). I always posed questions to reveal empirical details and to uncover the underlying mechanisms, conditions, and interpretations and the resulting outcomes, but adjusted the way I was asking about them in the different interviews and did not ask all questions of the questionnaire in each interview.²² Moreover, I also asked much more specific questions on particular moments of time or particular aspects of a

²² Expert interviews are not a standardized way of data collection. Hence, no identical replication of the interview data can be expected by another interviewer (Kaiser 2014: 6, 83).

process in which the interviewee was involved, which are not part of the questionnaire. I used the results of previous interviews to partially refocus the questions posed to subsequent interviews (see Checkel 2006: 367). This required a good feeling for the interview dynamic and for the interview partner. The interview started with an open question about the current situation in the policy field or the process under scrutiny to give interviewees the initial chance to present their knowledge and to feel more comfortable. Left out questions were asked toward the end of the interview (see Kaiser 2014: 63, 80-81). During the interview, I largely took a neutral and open-minded position (Kaiser 2014: 9), but occasionally, I confronted the interviewees with opinions from other experts and sometimes took a side to give them the chance to provide an argumentation of their own perspective and to reveal some insights which would have stayed hidden otherwise (see Kaiser 2014: 80; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012; Smith and Elger 2012). To sum up, the questionnaire functioned as an inspiration for conducting the interview, but was not systematically posed to all interviewees due to their different backgrounds and in order to reveal their particular knowledge by adjusting the questions to the interview situation.

3.7 Data analysis

For data analysis, several text book approaches exist. Mayring (2014: 7-8, 43) combines different philosophy of science traditions in one concrete procedural approach to qualitative content analysis of interview transcripts, primary documents and secondary sources. However, as Mayring's approach has been hardly applied due to its complexity and time-consuming procedures, Kaiser (2014: 90-91) adapted it to analyzing expert interviews. Mayring (2014: 63-64) distinguishes three procedures of qualitative content data analyzes: summary (i.e., material reduction to the essential contents), explication (i.e., only inclusion of additional material for understanding doubtful passages), and structuring (i.e.; assessment of material according to criteria). Kaiser (2014: 91-92, 111-112) simplifies and adapts them, while following Mayring's implicit sequence of procedure of first summarizing, second explicating and finally structuring of data. Kaiser (2014: 100-102) starts the procedure by indexing the entire text corpus based on the deductive categories of the theoretical framework and potential omitted categories to be subsequently included in an abductive approach. This is followed by summarizing statements, identifying divergent opinions, and paraphrasing of core statements, while categories are to be further abstracted to cover more statements (Kaiser 2014: 105-110). Kaiser's explication then includes additional sources of evidence for all text passages as part of triangulation (Kaiser 2014: 111). Finally, Kaiser (2014: 114-117) recommends to link core statements to theoretical sub-categories.

3.7.1 The book's approach to data analysis

I utilize an even more simplified version to data analysis than recommended by Mayring and Kaiser, which is in line with a more scientific realist approach. In contrast to their approaches, I directly coded

and regrouped all interview data according to the conceptual framework's categories (mechanism, condition, outcomes, interpretation) in a separate document, as this direct structuration is more efficient. This already reduced the text material as only theoretically important parts were transferred to the separate document, while simple reductions of texts had already been done in the interview situation, as fill words or embellishing words were not recorded. Further categories were inductively identified in the structuration process, resulting in the abductive adjustment of the conceptual framework (see also Kaiser 2014: 91, 101). Subsequently, further summarizing, including reduction and integration, was undertaken, resulting in a clearer overview of convergent or divergent facts and perspectives. Preferences was given to those statements by interviewees in analysis that were closer to the process of interest and that were not engaging in exaggerations or in solely reproducing the organization's official statements, as each distinct narrative should not be treated equally. This could be achieved through checking all statements for plausibility on their own terms and by triangulating them with statements of other interviews and evidence from other sources (Smith and Elger 2012: 15). Data from other sources, such as primary documents, media articles and secondary sources was added to the interview data in order to provide a comprehensive and adequate explanation of the whole process (see Kaiser 2014: 111) (see Annex II for the coding scheme). This approach allowed to evaluate divergent claims by different interviewees and helped to reveal changing collective interpretation as well as mechanisms and conditions explaining the outcomes. In the spirit of scientific realism, the results of this approach led to an explanation of India's climate policy approach that is still socially constructed, but aims to provide the best approximation to reality.

3.8 Summary: An approach inspired by scientific realism

The research design applied in this book strongly relies on insights from scientific realism, such as on their perspective on causality. Norm research has already included some aspects of this philosophy of science, but could benefit from a more rigorous application of its perspectives. Causal mechanisms were defined in an open-minded and scientific realist fashion. A process tracing approach was developed that helps to reveal causal complexes (multiple causal mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions) that explain outcomes. The book also strongly relies on a scientific realist perspective on the case study approach, scrutinizing India's climate policy approach regarding two UNFCCC micro norms from 2005 until 2019 with a particular focus on the consequences in the forestry sector. Expert interviews were conducted in a scientific realist inspired fashion in India in 2016 and 2018. Data analysis also relies on an own approach that includes scientific realist perspectives and incorporates additional sources of data in order to reveal the causal complexes that explain the outcomes in the Indian case. The next chapter introduces the two UNFCCC micro norms.

4. Setting the international scene: Norms on climate change and the Global South

In this chapter, I set the international scene by introducing norms on climate change and mitigation actions by the Global South. In 4.1, I provide a short history of the UNFCCC negotiations and present UNFCCC's norm hierarchy. Subsequently, I shortly reflect upon the growing role of the Global South for preventing dangerous climate change. In 4.2, I introduce the first micro norm under investigation: the developing country climate mitigation norm. I give a short overview of the negotiation process on this micro norm and highlight previous research findings on the two most important governance concepts that apply this norm: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). In 4.3, I present the second micro norm under scrutiny: the carbon forestry norm. I provide a short summary of the negotiation process on this micro norm and introduce previous research findings on its most important governance concept that applies this norm in the framework of the UNFCCC: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries (REDD+). I end this chapter with a short summary (4.4).

4.1 UNFCCC's norm hierarchy and the Global South

In this sub-chapter, I first provide a short overview of the history of the UNFCCC negotiations (4.1.1) and then introduce UNFCCC's norm hierarchy and the increasing role of the Global South for preventing dangerous climate change (4.1.2).

4.1.1 A short overview of the history of UNFCCC negotiations

In response to the growing realization that climate change has been caused by human GHG emissions, as indicated by the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990, from 1991 until 1992, negotiations took place among nation-states on a global response to climate change. At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, 154 parties eventually signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 20; Ramakrishna 2000: 50-51). This established a framework in which international negotiations on norms and their operationalizations could take place at annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs). As a result of the Berlin Process from 1995 until 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the COP in Kyoto in 1997, which obligated developed countries to legally binding and quantifiable GHG emission reductions in the period from 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 3.1 and Annex B).²³ However, the US declared not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, as it had not obligated

²³ The overall emission reduction target for developed country parties (listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol) was set to be at least five percent below 1990 levels (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 3.1). The average of all commitments added up to 5.2 per cent (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 22). However, at the COP in Bonn in 2001, the rule book for implementing the Kyoto Protocol was adopted and introduced carbon absorption options for

emerging economies to quantitative mitigation commitments, so the protocol only entered into force in 2005, when sufficient parties ratified it (Betsill 2015: 243; Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 23, 30). Any proposal to negotiate a future agreement that includes commitments by all major emitters was rejected by developing countries and the US at subsequent COPs (Jacob 2003: 104; Ott et al. 2005: 85). Those negotiations only re-emerged at the COP in Montreal in 2005 with the scheduled formal start of negotiations on the successor of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol post-2012 according to Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 3.9; Wittneben et al. 2006: 91-92). At the COP in Copenhagen in 2009, developed and developing countries presented differentiated voluntary mitigation target pledges, representing a shift away from Kyoto-style top-down mitigation commitments (Bodansky 2010: 236). At the COP in Doha in 2012, parties agreed upon a second commitment period (from 2013 until 2020) under the Kyoto Protocol in the Doha Amendment, which would only cover 15 per cent of global GHG emissions (Betsill 2015: 245).²⁴ For the Paris COP in 2015, each party was requested to formulate in a bottom-up fashion its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) post-2020, which became the NDCs under the Paris Agreement, institutionalizing the bottom-up pledging approach, while adding top-down elements, such as the global goal of limiting global warming to well below 2 degree or even 1.5 degree Celsius (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 2-3).

4.1.2 UNFCCC's norm hierarchy and the increasing role of the Global South

The UNFCCC is an intergovernmental convention under the United Nations. One of the *fundamental norms* of not only the UNFCCC but also of the entire UN system is the *sovereignty of nation-states*, which are the parties to the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC's convention text specifies the central objective of the UNFCCC as the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (UNFCCC 1992: Article 2). In a norm hierarchy of an intergovernmental institution, such as the UNFCCC, the objective to *prevent dangerous climate change* can be conceptualized as the *macro norm* of the regime, which defines *what* ought to be achieved by its sovereign parties.

Meso norms then specify *how* the macro norm ought to be achieved. The Convention text lists nine principles of the UNFCCC. However, they can be conceptualized as meso norms (on the following categorization of meso norms, see also Höhne et al. 2021), as they define *collective expectations for appropriate behavior by a community of actors* by which UNFCCC's parties "shall be guided" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3). The first meso norm is *equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR+RC)*, as "Parties should protect the climate system [...] on the

meeting the Kyoto GHG emission target which reduced the overall GHG emission reduction ambition to 2.5 per cent (Ott 2001: 470).

²⁴ However, the Doha Amendment only entered into force on 31 December 2020, after more than 144 parties had "deposited their instrument of acceptance" (UNFCCC 2022), while, compared to the first commitment period, Canada, Russia and Japan are not among them (UN 2022a).

basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.1). An additional burden is put on the developed countries in the form of the meso norm of *take the lead*, which specifies that "the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.1). The third meso norm emphasizes the *specific needs* and special circumstances of developing countries: "The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and [...] those [...] that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.2). The fourth meso norm is called *precautionary actions*, as it notes that "Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.3). *Cost-effectiveness* is the fifth meso norm, as the Convention emphasizes that "policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.3). In addition, and closely related to the previous statement, the Convention specifically mentions that global cooperation on addressing climate change is possible (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.3). Adaptation actions is the sixth meso norm, as the Convention notes that "policies and measures should [...] cover [...] adaptation" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.3). The seventh meso norm requests mitigation actions in all *mitigation sectors*: "To achieve this, such policies and measures should [...] be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases [...], and comprise all economic sectors" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.3). *Economic development* is the eight meso norm, as the Convention notes that "Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development" and further postulates that "economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.4). The last meso norm is *free trade*, as the Convention emphasizes that "Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system" (UNFCCC 1992: Art. 3.5).

These nine meso norms have different qualities, being composed as parties' rights (economic development), concrete expectations (mitigation sectors) and unspecified broader expectations (mitigation responsibilities). Some of those norms (e.g., economic development, free trade) can be easily linked to what Bernstein calls the compromise of liberal environmentalism, as they "predicate international environmental protection on the promotion and maintenance of a liberal economic order" (Bernstein 2002a: 1). Similarly, others have similarly noted that the dominant discourse of the climate regime is ecological modernization, which claims the "compatibility of economic growth and environmental protection" (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006: 52). Advocates who embrace those perspectives perceive the relationship among those meso norms as synergistic (e.g., between mitigation sectors and economic development), while others emphasized the conflictive nature of the relations between mitigation and economic development (Harris and Symons 2013; see also Höhne et al. 2021 for a similar categorization and discussion of those norms). In the end, it depends

on the domestic decision-makers of how they perceive the relationships between particular meso norms, as we will see in the case study on India (Chapters 5 to 7).

Micro norms further specify how the macro norm ought to be achieved for a particular group of subjects or regarding a particular object. As a specification of the meso norms of take the lead and CBDR+RC, the Convention formulated the micro norm of *developed country climate mitigation actions*, as developed countries (as Annex I countries) had to “adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change” (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.2(a)). This micro norm was expanded by the Kyoto Protocol toward a micro norm of *developed country climate mitigation commitments*, as it demanded from them to implement and achieve quantitative mitigation commitments: “The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions [...] do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments” (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 3.1). Moreover, the meso norms of take the lead by developed countries and specific needs of developing countries were further specified in the micro norm of *developed countries’ support to developing countries*, as the Convention requires developed countries to financially support developing countries to meet their reporting obligations and to empower them further in taking mitigation actions through financial and technological transfers (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.3). In practice, this funding has remained inadequate since then (Betsill 2015: 242).

In the following sub-chapters 4.2 and 4.3, I introduce two further *micro norms* that target developing countries (*developing country climate mitigation norm, carbon forestry norm*), which either address all sectors or particularly forestry. They also have predecessors. The Convention already stipulated a micro norm of developing countries’ mitigation actions, as it requested all parties to “[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigation climate change” (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1(b)). However, the Convention emphasized that this micro norm shall be implemented in a way that takes into account the meso norms of CBDR+RC, specific needs and economic development (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1). It further specified that the *extent of the implementation* by developing countries was dependent on developed countries’ international support to developing countries and developing countries’ overriding priorities of economic and social development (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.7). Hence, in practice, for a long time, developing countries largely refrained from taking actions with the specific purpose of mitigating climate change. Also, they resisted any international mitigation obligation. They emphasized the meso norm of CBDR+RC and demanded that developed countries shall take the lead according to their historical responsibility, while they prioritized the promotion of economic development (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 19, 22; Dingwerth and Green 2015: 159; Jinnah 2017: 294).

Even for the carbon forestry norm a loose predecessor can be found, as the Convention demanded all parties to “[p]romote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation

and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans” (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1(d)). This micro norm can be seen as a specification of the meso norms of CBDR+RC, mitigation in all sectors, and implicitly of cost-effectiveness due to the mentioning of cooperation. However, in the following years, this did not play any particular role in developing countries. Yet, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 acknowledged the role of carbon forestry for achieving the quantitative emission targets by developed countries and introduced the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a mechanism to achieve them (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 3.3, 12). The CDM represents an operationalization of the meso norms of CBDR+RC, cost-effectiveness, economic development and specific needs. It was the first international policy instrument that financed climate mitigation projects in the Global South as a low-cost option for developed countries to meet their quantitative mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (i.e., as an offset), which was the maximum developing countries accepted as an operationalization of the developing country climate mitigation norm. This was also linked to the carbon forestry norm, as the CDM already included afforestation and reforestation projects as eligible activities. However, CDM projects in forestry were rather unsuccessful, as only one percent of all CDM projects occurred in this sector due to administrative difficulties and high costs (Lederer 2011: 1900).

Lastly, *standardized procedures and regulations* provide concrete rules of how micro norms are to be applied or how their application is to be reported on. This can include elements that need to be established to receive international recognition of one’s appropriate engagement with the micro norm (such as the formulation of a safeguard-information system or the communication of biannual update reports). For example, the Convention already required developed countries to report their mitigation policies (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.2(b)) and all parties to report data on GHG emissions and sinks (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1(a), 12.1(a)). Yet, legally binding and concrete rule-based obligations for UNFCCC parties to reduce GHG emissions have been missing in the framework convention text (von Stein 2008: 247).

Climate engagements by countries from the Global North in the context of the Kyoto Protocol have already been in the focus of norm scholars (Bernstein 2002b; Cass 2006; Hoffmann 2005). Such research on countries from the Global South is more scarce (but see Stevenson 2011). Yet, GHG emissions by developing countries have overtaken the GHG emissions by developed countries in the period from the fourth IPCC assessment report (2007) until the fifth IPCC assessment report (2013/14) (IPCC 2014b: 113). From 1990 until 2016, the Global South has even emitted as much GHG emissions as the Global North, and, if trends since 1990 were to continue, it would overtake the cumulative historical emissions of the Global North in the early 2040s (Fuhr 2021: 8). Without contributions by developing countries on climate change mitigation, preventing dangerous climate change cannot be achieved anymore. Several emerging economies in the Global South have become high GHG emitters since the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992. Looking at figures from 2014 (i.e., GHG emissions including land-use; EU not as a block), among the top ten GHG emitters are

China (1st place), India (3rd), Indonesia (4th), Brazil (6th), and Iran (10th). From 1990 until 2014, GHG emissions rose from 2.83 to 11.6 Gigaton (Gt) carbon dioxide (CO₂) equivalents (eq) in China, from 5.55 to 6.3 Gt CO₂eq in the US, from 1.14 to 3.2 Gt CO₂eq in India, and from 1.34 to 2.47 Gt CO₂eq in Indonesia, while the 28 EU countries reduced their GHG emissions from 4.95 to 3.62 Gt CO₂eq (Climate Watch 2019d). Even in terms of per capita GHG emissions in 2014, Indonesia (9.69 t CO₂eq per capita), and China (8.5 t CO₂eq per capita) emitted more than the EU (7.13 t CO₂eq per capita) (Climate Watch 2019e, 2019c, 2019b). However, the US still trumps them in terms of this figure (19.84 t CO₂eq per capita), while India instantly becomes a low emitting country (2.48 t CO₂eq per capita) (Climate Watch 2019f, 2019a). Similarly, natural scientists have underlined that the “shift [from OECD to Non-OECD countries] in the sources of greenhouse gas emissions has been dramatic” (Steffen et al. 2015: 91). While, they indicate that “most of the human imprint on the Earth System is coming from the OECD world” (Steffen et al. 2015: 91), they emphasize that this has started to change through the increasing middle classes in emerging economies.²⁵ Emerging economies have become important actors for mitigating climate change. This is also reflected upon in the two micro norms that target developing countries and which I introduce in the following sub-chapters: the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm.

4.2 Developing country climate mitigation norm: From NAMAs to NDCs

In this sub-chapter, I first provide an overview of the negotiations concerning the developing country climate mitigation norm and how it has been taken up in two governance concepts post-2005: NAMAs and NDCs (4.2.1). I then shortly introduce the previous research findings on NAMAs and NDCs (4.2.2).

4.2.1 UNFCCC negotiations on the developing country climate mitigation norm

The *Convention* had only requested developing countries to take mitigation actions in a way that takes into account the meso norms of CBDR+RC, specific needs and economic development (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1). Those actions were furthermore contextualized, as the extent of the implementation of mitigation actions by developing countries was made dependent on developed countries’ international support to developing countries and developing countries’ overriding priorities of economic and social development (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.7). The *Kyoto Protocol* did not foresee any additional commitments by developing countries (UNFCCC 1998a; 1998b: 4), but

²⁵ An example from the energy sector indicates these rapid changes: While in 2004, Non-OECD countries equaled OECD countries in energy demand, projections forecast that energy demand by Non-OECD countries will be double as high as that of OECD countries by 2035 (Downie 2015: 801). During the decade from 2000 until 2009, 90 per cent of the growth in total global energy demand was coming from developing countries, particularly with countries in Non-OECD Asia relying strongly on coal (Bradshaw 2010: 279). Developing countries face three major issues: providing energy security, increasing energy access to the population, and environmental sustainability (Dubash and Florini 2011; Van de Graaf and Zelli 2016: 63).

allowed developed countries to finance mitigation projects in developing countries for fulfilling their own quantitative mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 12). Those interventions by developing countries were only project-based and were fully compensated by funding from developed countries. This was also the only interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm that developing countries would accept at the time.

A first international recognition of domestic mitigation actions in developing countries in the UNFCCC occurred at the Delhi COP in 2002, whose declaration acknowledged that “mitigation actions are now taking place both in Annex I and non-Annex I countries” (UNFCCC 2003: 3), while not specifying any further actions. This only changed with the start of the formal post-2012 negotiations on a successor of the Kyoto Protocol commitment period (2008 until 2012) at the *Montreal COP in 2005*, where the COP initiated a “[d]ialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention” (UNFCCC 2006b: 3). It was agreed upon that the “dialogue should identify approaches which would support, and provide the enabling conditions for, actions put forward voluntarily by developing countries that promote local sustainable development and mitigate climate change in a manner appropriate to national circumstances” (UNFCCC 2006b: 4). This opened up a potential pathway on negotiations on voluntary mitigation actions by developing countries that are international supported but not necessarily fully compensated from offset funding by developed countries.

At the *Bali COP in 2007*, the Bali Action Plan then recognized “that deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention” (UNFCCC 2008b: 3). It introduced a new negotiation process in order to reach an agreed outcome for the post-2012 period at the COP in 2009 (UNFCCC 2008b: 3). As part of the “[e]nhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change” (UNFCCC 2008b: 3), the Bali Action Plan envisaged “[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” (UNFCCC 2008b: 3). Voluntary mitigation actions by developing countries in the form of NAMAs were interpreted to be financially supported by developed countries (Coetzee and Winkler 2014; Tyler et al. 2013). This was a perspective which the Indian delegation shared back then, as they had ensured the inclusion of the wording of ‘supported and enabled’ in the decision (see Chapter 5), which already represented a shift away from the previous demands of full compensation by developed countries of any action taken by developing countries. However, the South African delegation convinced the US to support the NAMA wording at the Bali COP, as it did not make the explicit link between mitigation actions by developing countries and financial support by developed countries in stating the following: “Developing countries are saying voluntarily that we are willing to commit ourselves to measurable, reportable and verifiable mitigation actions. It has never happened before. A year ago, it was totally unthinkable” (cited in Müller 2008: 5). This led observers to note that “such support could be from national, bilateral, multilateral or other sources” (Rajamani 2013: 156), reducing the previous differential treatment between developed and

developing countries (Rajamani 2013: 156; Vogler 2018: 21). It was therefore perceived as a “major shift in the discourse surrounding responsibility to act that reflected the US position seeking emission reductions from all countries” (Jinnah 2017: 294). Similarly, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized that “there is an emerging consensus on the building blocks of climate agreement, including [...] mitigation [...] which] must also be comprehensive and involve all nations, developed and developing” (UNFCCC 2008b: 28). However, differential treatment continued, as developed countries were requested to formulate “[m]easurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives” (UNFCCC 2008b: 3). Moreover, they were called for enhanced action on financial and technology transfer to support mitigation actions by developing countries (UNFCCC 2008b: 4-5), which indicates the important role that international funding should play to facilitate nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing countries. At least in the written form, NAMAs by developing countries were strongly linked to international funding by developed countries at the time.

While the Bali Action Plan still mentioned NAMAs as supported and enabled by financial and technological transfer, this changed subsequently: The Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Cancun Agreements of 2010 differentiate between domestically and internationally supported NAMAs (UNFCCC 2010: 6, 9; 2011: 10-11). The *Copenhagen Accord* notes that “Non-Annex I Parties will implement mitigation actions” (UNFCCC 2010: 6) and will submit them for compilation to the UNFCCC Secretariat. It was reaffirmed that this occurs in the context of sustainable development and in accordance with Article 4.1 of the Convention (all parties take mitigation actions) and Article 4.7 of the Convention (developed countries’ implementation of financial and technological transfers; developing countries’ overriding priorities are economic and social development) (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.7) (UNFCCC 2010: 6). Domestically financed NAMAs were made subject to domestic MRV and to international consultation and analysis that respects national sovereignty. Internationally financed NAMAs were made subject to international MRV. NAMAs receiving international funding or seeking it were announced to be listed in an international NAMA Registry (UNFCCC 2010: 6). For enhanced action on climate change, the developed countries committed to increasing public and private financial support to developing countries. They promised 30 billion United States dollar (USD) from 2010 until 2012 and 100 billion USD annually by 2020. A significant amount of it was meant to be channeled through the Green Climate Fund (UNFCCC 2010: 6-7). Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020 by developed countries had to be compiled in Appendix I, while developing countries’ nationally appropriate mitigation actions were to be listed in Appendix II (UNFCCC 2010: 8-9). Moreover, a global warming target of 2 degrees Celsius was mentioned for the first time in the context of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2010: 5). Observers noted that CBDR+RC “was no longer interpreted as placing primary responsibility on the global North[,as...] all Parties, except the Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States [...] were encouraged to play a role in shouldering the burden of implementing actions to mitigate climate change” (Cipler and Roberts 2017: 152).

While the Copenhagen Accord “required developing countries to submit and implement mitigation actions, it did not prescribe a cumulative quantitative mitigation goal” (Rajamani 2013: 162) with regard to their actions. Yet, a “tentative step” (Rajamani 2013: 162) toward this was added at the following *Cancun COP in 2010*, when developing countries were requested to taking NAMAs that are “aimed at achieving a deviation in emissions relative to ‘business as usual’ emissions in 2020” (UNFCCC 2011: 10). At the Cancun COP, several of the provisions of the informal Copenhagen Accord were formally adopted in the Cancun Agreements. It noted the submitted NAMAs by developing countries, including quantitative mitigation targets by some of them (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 504), and submitted mitigation commitments by developed countries to the UNFCCC Secretariat as stipulated by Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2011: 8, 10). Those have become known as bottom-up ‘Cancun Pledges’, which “demonstrate an acceptance of broader participation in climate change mitigation efforts” (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 504). The Cancun Agreements did not put domestically financed NAMAs in relation to Article 4.7 (international support; economic and social development priorities) anymore (UNFCCC 2011: 10-11). However, developed countries were still requested to provide enhanced international support for NAMAs to developing countries (UNFCCC 2011: 10). Internationally financed NAMAs were made subject to international MRV, while domestically financed NAMAs were only made subject to domestic MRV and to non-intrusive, non-punitive and sovereignty-respectful international consultations and analysis based on biennial update reports that do not discuss their appropriateness. For that purpose, regular reporting obligations for developing countries were introduced (i.e., national communications every four years and biennial update reports) (Coetzee and Winkler 2014: 9; UNFCCC 2011: 11). Moreover, the UNFCCC Secretariat was commissioned to establish the NAMA registry, which was intended to list NAMAs seeking international finance or international recognition (UNFCCC 2011: 10). Furthermore, the Cancun Agreements recognized that climate change “requires to be urgently addressed by all parties” (UNFCCC 2011: 2) and acknowledged that “developing country Parties are already contributing and will continue to contribute to a global mitigation effort [...] and could enhance their mitigation actions” (UNFCCC 2011: 9) depending on international support by developed countries. Developing countries were also encouraged “to develop low-carbon development strategies or plans” (UNFCCC 2011: 11). Lastly, a work program was called for to develop modalities and guidelines for the NAMA registry, MRV, biennial update reports and international consultations and analysis (UNFCCC 2011: 11). Several observers underlined that NAMAs have remained only vaguely defined and conceptualized in the UNFCCC negotiations (Coetzee and Winkler 2014: 7; Fridahl and Johansson 2017: 36; Jung et al. 2010: 3-4; Sterk 2010: 3; Upadhyaya 2017: 7). Based on the above mentioned Cancun decision, the UNFCCC Secretariat, on its website, provided a double-sided definition of NAMAs as being a National Level NAMA (i.e., being a formal communication to the UNFCCC by developing countries about the planned overall mitigation ambition with regard to business as usual emissions) or of being an Individual NAMA as a supported or unilateral project, program or policy under the national

government to meet national mitigation targets (UNFCCC Secretariat 2019). Observers noted that the trend “to delink support from actions” (Rajamani 2013: 163), which had been started in the Copenhagen Accord, “has been taken forward in the Cancun Agreements” (Rajamani 2013: 163). This was evaluated as “a leveling-down of developed countries’ stringent obligations [...] and a leveling-up of developing countries’ responsible actions” (Oh and Matsuoka 2017: 155).

The subsequent *Durban COP* in 2011 adopted rules for several of the items introduced at the Cancun COP. First, it provided guidelines for the preparation of biennial update reports (first due by 2014), such as to include the national GHG inventory as well as information on mitigation actions, their effects and domestic MRV modalities (UNFCCC 2012a: 10, 39, 41). Second, it adopted guidelines and modalities for international consultation and analysis to be applied to biennial update reports within six months of their submission (UNFCCC 2012a: 13-14). It was decided that this analysis had to be conducted by “technical experts in consultation with the parties concerned” (UNFCCC 2012a: 43) without discussing the appropriateness of their mitigation actions. Third, it further provided guidelines on the information to be provided in the NAMA registry, including the description of the mitigation action, the costs, the amount and type of support required, the estimated emissions reductions, and the co-benefits for sustainable development (UNFCCC 2012a: 11-12). It also invited developing countries to submit their domestically funded Individual NAMAs to the NAMA registry “for their recognition” (UNFCCC 2012a: 12). Fourth, the Durban COP set up the modalities of the GCF to support mitigation projects and programs in developing countries (UNFCCC 2012a: 63). Lastly, the Durban COP requested the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to provide guidelines for domestic MRV of domestically supported NAMAs (UNFCCC 2012a: 9).

At the *Doha COP* in 2012, final elements of the NAMA registry were decided upon (UNFCCC 2012b: 15), which was finally established in 2013 (Coetzee and Winkler 2014: 7). However, no final agreement could be reached on the rules on international consultations and analysis (UNFCCC 2013a: 30-38). A work program (from 2013 until 2014) was established under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to understand the diversity of NAMAs (UNFCCC 2013a: 6).²⁶ Under the new Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which had the task to develop by 2015 “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” (UNFCCC 2013a: 19), work started to identify “options [...] to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties” (UNFCCC 2012a: 3).

The *Warsaw COP* laid the ground for the emergence of a new governance concept for the period post-2020: INDCs, while the pre-2020 period was covered by the Cancun Pledges, including National Level NAMAs by developing countries. The COP decision invited all parties to prepare their INDCs as part of the new international agreement and to communicate them by 2015, while

²⁶ In 2013, the SBI took note of information provided by experts, invited developed countries to scale up financial support for NAMAs, and requested the UNFCCC Secretariat to organize workshops on methodological issues, on external support needed and on the amount of international finance provided under the NAMA Registry (UNFCCC 2013b: 12).

developed countries were asked to provide support for it (UNFCCC 2014: 4). The Warsaw COP decision also asked developing countries to communicate their NAMAs in case they had not yet submitted them (UNFCCC 2014: 4). It also urged developing countries to implement their communicated NAMAs and to consider further action (UNFCCC 2014: 5). Eventually, modalities were concluded on international consultation and analysis of biennial update reports, while remaining non-intrusive, non-punitive and sovereignty-respecting without discussing the appropriateness of mitigation actions (UNFCCC 2014: 12). Moreover, general guidelines for domestic MRV of domestically supported NAMAs were agreed upon, which are “voluntary, pragmatic, non-prescriptive and non-intrusive, [...] build on existing domestic systems [...], recognize existing [MRV...] and promote a cost-effective approach” (UNFCCC 2014: 16). This basically allowed every party to just follow preexisting domestic processes (UNFCCC 2014: 17). The guidelines on international consultation and analysis and on domestic MRV are hence both very weak in terms of raising accountability of mitigation actions by developing countries.

At the subsequent COPs, the INDC governance concept took over the previous discussions on NAMAs. The *Lima COP* decision in 2014 provided some guidelines on how to formulate INDCs, which are to be applied by all parties, without highlighting different mitigation responsibilities by developed and developing countries. First, it stipulated that the INDCs “will represent a progression beyond the current undertaking of that Party” (UNFCCC 2015: 3) toward achieving the objective of the Convention. Second, it was decided that INDCs may include “quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches” (UNFCCC 2015: 3). Third, an INDC should include reflections on how it “is fair and ambitious, in light of [...] national circumstances” (UNFCCC 2015: 3) and contributes to preventing dangerous climate change. Fourth, parties were also invited to communicate adaptation measures, indicating that the governance concept of INDCs moved beyond the previous mitigation focus of NAMAs to include adaptation as well. Fifth, LDCs and SIDS had the opportunity to reflect their special circumstances, when communicating low carbon development plans and actions (UNFCCC 2015: 3). (I)NDCs became automatically NDCs after the ratification of the Paris Agreement, except the respective government chose to submit a new NDC (UNFCCC 2016b: 4-5). Only very few countries revised their INDCs before submitting them as NDCs (Pauw and Klein 2020: 407).

The *Paris Agreement* concluded the shift from the pre-2012 Kyoto Protocol’s top-down GHG emission target commitments by developed countries to the bottom-up (I)NDCs by all parties for the post-2020 period, which had been bridged by the pre-2020 bottom-up NAMA pledges by developing countries and the pre-2020 mitigation commitments by developed countries. The Paris Agreement includes the top-down goal to reduce the increase of the global average temperature to below 2 degree Celsius to 1.5 degree Celsius above pre-industrial levels. For achieving this goal, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are required to be undertaken by all parties and are announced to progress over time in a five year-rhythm (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 2, 3, 4.9). In this context, the

Paris Agreement also notes “the need to support developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this agreement” (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 2). Observers characterized the NDCs as “near-universal, medium-term, country-driven climate action plans” (Pauw and Klein 2020: 406). For reaching the 1.5 to 2 degree Celsius goal, all parties have furthermore been requested to “formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies” (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 4.19) for the period up to 2050. The Paris Agreement further declares the aim of global peaking of GHG emissions, but accentuates that “peaking will take longer for developing country Parties” (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 4.1), introducing some differentiation. Moreover, it targets to achieve carbon neutrality in the second half the 21st century, while also noting equity, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 4.1). Developed countries are still requested to “continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets”, while developing countries are “encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets” (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 4.4). International support by developed countries to developing countries is mentioned as “allow[ing] for higher ambition in their actions” (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 4.5), which represents a shift away from Kyoto Protocol’s compensatory offset funding and Bali Action Plan’s enabled and supported NAMAs. The accompanying Paris COP decision still urged all parties “to make and implement a mitigation pledge under the Cancun Agreements” (UNFCCC 2016a: 15), which indicates the continuous importance of National Level NAMA pledges up to 2020.

Pre-2020 implementation of climate mitigation actions, and therefore implicit references to NAMAs, continued to be important issues at the *Marrakech COP* in 2016 (UNFCCC 2017: 4), at the *Fiji COP in Bonn* in 2017 (UNFCCC 2018: 3-4), and at the *Katowice COP* in 2018 (UNFCCC 2019a: 5-6). However, the Katowice COP also marks the turning point for transparency issues. Its decision stipulates that the previous MRV system on pre-2020 actions, including international consultation and analysis of biennial update reports, will be superseded by new modalities and guidelines as decided at this conference (UNFCCC 2019a: 7). This includes for example that “[e]ach Party shall provide information on actions, policies and measures that support the implementation and achievement of its NDC under Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, focusing on those that have the most significant impact on GHG emissions or removals and those impacting key categories in the national GHG inventory” (UNFCCC 2019b: 31). The Katowice COP produced the Katowice rule book on the Paris Agreement, while many issues, such as NDC time frames, remained unresolved – also at the subsequent COP in Madrid in 2019 (Pauw and Klein 2020: 408).

To sum up, the collective interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm by UNFCCC parties changed over time. In the context of the Kyoto Protocol, it was strongly related to CDM projects funded for offset purposes by developed countries. With the emergence of the NAMA governance concept, the micro norm both involved national level ambitions, such as first mitigation targets compared to BAU, and individual projects funded by donors. In the context of the Paris Agreement, the micro norm is now related to bottom up mitigation actions and quantitative targets

as contributions to limiting global warming to 1.5 to 2 degrees Celsius. The differentiation between developing countries' and developed countries' mitigation responsibilities has been reduced over this period.

4.2.2 From NAMAs to NDCs

Before the term NAMAs emerged, developing countries had “resisted any legal mention of mitigation actions in their countries because they saw such statements as a slippery slope to binding targets” (Jinnah 2017: 294). For many developing countries, their first domestic mitigation experiences had been in the form of the CDM, while they were limited to project-level intervention often by non-state actors. CDM projects created carbon credits that could be used as offsets by developed countries, but most CDM projects were low-cost and low-effort options. Participating in the CDM required some national rules to be set by the national government. The CDM engagement of the national government thereby increased state capacities on carbon markets and climate awareness among involved stakeholders to some extent (Fuhr and Lederer 2009; Lederer 2011). Yet, the CDM engagement of developing countries did not result in the formulation of national climate change strategies, policies or targets. This changed in the context of the emergence of NAMAs since 2007.²⁷ Investigating all kinds of NAMA submissions and proposals, observers have found that domestic NAMA activities are characterized by a large variety of approaches, ranging from programmatic actions (i.e., several activities loosely coupled), over projects, policies, plans/strategies to mitigation targets (De Vit et al. 2012: 9-10; Fridahl and Johansson 2017: 36; Jung et al. 2010: 4).

In the context of the Copenhagen Accord, 46 developing countries formally submitted national level NAMAs as part of the Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord. In 2015, in a compilation of all National Level NAMAs, the UNFCCC Secretariat noted submissions of 57 country NAMAs and one NAMA by the African Group (ECN and ECOFYS 2016: 36; UNFCCC Secretariat 2019). Those national level NAMAs comprise a range of different approaches from GHG emission (intensity) targets to specific programs and projects, including Individual NAMAs (UNFCCC Secretariat 2015a). At least 16 of those National Level NAMAs had a quantified mitigation goal or a national mitigation commitment. At least eight of them were formulated as mitigation targets, which were unconditional of international financial support (Hof et al. 2013: 310; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 504). In these submissions “NAMAs appear to be generally understood to include any action that reduces emissions” (Sterk 2010: 4).

Since the first reference to NAMAs in the Bali Action Plan in 2007, national climate strategies have proliferated in the Global South, which can also be perceived as NAMAs (for such a perspective,

²⁷ Credited NAMAs to be financed by the carbon markets as proposed by the EU had not been able to materialize due to their similarity to the CDM and similar technical problems, such as proving additionality (Jung et al. 2010: 13-14; Linnér and Pahuja 2012: 60; Okubo et al. 2011; Sterk 2010: 7, 18). Moreover, the international CDM demand collapsed alongside the obligatory carbon market (Fridahl et al. 2015: 253).

see, e.g., Wang-Helmreich et al. 2011: 15).²⁸ While only four developing countries (Peru, Argentina, Mongolia and Uruguay) had a climate strategy in place in 2006, this number rose to 40 countries in 2012 (Dubash et al. 2013a). Subsequently, from 2013 until 2017, the number of countries with climate strategies only showed a small increase, underlining the strong changes in the first period (Iacobuta et al. 2018). Observers have claimed that states may have presented such documents to indicate their future contributions to the international climate efforts in the context of international conferences (Iacobuta et al. 2018: 1114-1115). At the domestic level, scholars noted that climate policy integration between climate strategies and sectoral actions has remained a central problem, with scholars noting capacity problems, lack of funding, lack of coordination (e.g., Fukuda and Tamura 2012; Garibaldi et al. 2014: 60; Kojwang and Larwanou 2015: 110; Mdivani and Hoppe 2016), and more political issues like opposition by vested interests (Ravikumar et al. 2018: 1439).

NAMAs also include Individual NAMAs, which can be projects or programs, leading to a great variety of different interventions (Garibaldi et al. 2014; Winkler 2014: 2-3). NAMAs can address all kinds of sectors, including forestry (De Oliveira Silva et al. 2018; Duguma et al. 2014; Kojwang and Larwanou 2015). NAMAs are either domestically or (partly) internationally supported with financial resources (Fridahl et al. 2015: 242; Jung et al. 2010: 5; Linnér and Pahuja 2012: 59). UNFCCC's NAMA registry lists voluntary submitted NAMAs seeking international funding or recognition, while many developing countries have been hesitant to submit their initiatives to the NAMA registry (Fridahl et al. 2015: 240, 243). International support seeking NAMAs submitted to the NAMA registry (140 entries) were mostly of a project type, while NAMAs listed in UNEP's NAMA Database (259 entries) were rather of a policy or plan type (Bucquet 2017: 11-13; Fridahl et al. 2015: 247).

Developed countries had promised international funding for climate actions of 30 billion USD from 2010 until 2012 and 100 billion USD annually by 2020. However, there have been only few donors that have explicitly financed NAMAs. The most directly linked donor institution is the NAMA Facility, established in 2013 by Germany and the UK, who were joined by Denmark and the EU Commission in 2015. It finances NAMA projects and, by 2020, had committed 486 million Euro for which it selected different country projects in seven competitive calls (NAMA Facility 2020a). While the UNFCCC did not provide any guidance on NAMA development to developing countries (ECN and ECOFYS 2016: 36), donors came up with their own requirements (Fridahl et al. 2015; Fridahl and Johansson 2017). The NAMA Facility, for example, puts a focus on financing projects with the potential for transformational change of "national or sectoral development towards a less carbon intensive development path" (NAMA Facility 2013: 8).²⁹ Other indicators are whether the Individual

²⁸ In addition, the UNFCCC invited developing countries to prepare low-carbon development strategies (LCDS) at the Cancun COP in 2010 and the Doha COP in 2012 (UNFCCC 2011: 11; 2013a: 5), but no submissions have been made under this term to the UNFCCC. LCDS, therefore, were described as "catch all' term" (Tyler et al. 2013: 5) without any agreed definition.

²⁹ Scholars have defined transformational change as "the large-scale and radical change of shifting from an old to a new development path" (Fridahl and Johansson 2017: 37). However, the NAMA Facility only foresees project duration of 3-5 years (NAMA Facility 2013: 7), while transformational change usually requires longer time frames (Fridahl et al. 2015: 241; Fridahl and Johansson 2017: 37).

NAMA “helps to overcome systemic barriers to the reduction of emissions” (NAMA Facility 2013: 8) and the potential to realize additional development co-benefits. Finally, it requests the leveraging of additional funding resources and the achievement of direct and indirect GHG emission reductions (NAMA Facility 2013: 8-9). Despite some funding for NAMA implementation by other donors like the Global Environmental Facility (NAMA Registry 2019), the majority of funding has come from the NAMA Facility (64 percent of projects by end of 2017) (Bucquet 2017: 17). Yet, the NAMA Facility only accounted for three percent of international mitigation funding in 2014 (ECN and ECOFYS 2016: 38), indicating mitigation action funding by other donors. For example, the Green Climate Fund, whose establishment was decided at the Cancun COP in 2010 and that was tasked to finance NAMAs at the Durban COP in 2011 (UNFCCC 2011: 17; 2012a: 63), has funded mitigation projects in developing countries without explicitly using the term NAMAs (Green Climate Fund 2018a: 2), while having greatly learned and benefited from the experience of the NAMA Facility (Bucquet 2017: 17; Gardiner et al. 2015: 26; NAMA Facility 2014). Project developers have therefore stopped to use the term NAMAs (Halstead 2017: 21), while the GCF rather interprets it as developing countries’ climate targets. The GCF both finances the preparation and strengthening of such climate targets and the implementation of projects that help to achieve it (Green Climate Fund 2018b: 5; 2018a: 2). In addition, donors, such as UNDP, the Inter-American Development Bank and GEF, provided funding for developing NAMAs (NAMA Registry 2019). Other donors (e.g., GIZ) and international organizations (IRENA, UNDP, UNEP, UNFCCC Secretariat) provided capacity building or information tools for preparing NAMAs (GIZ 2016, 2017; IRENA 2014; Lütken et al. 2013; Lütken et al. 2016), and established international partnerships on exchanging knowledge on NAMAs (e.g., NAMA Partnership, International Partnership on Mitigation and MRV) (GIZ 2019a, 2019b; Lütken et al. 2013: 13).

Only 22 of 259 listed NAMAs in the NAMA Database were under implementation by end of 2017 (Bucquet 2017: 11-13). Multiple hurdles for NAMA implementation continue to exist. For example, in the case of South Africa, both domestically funded NAMAs and NAMAs seeking international funding faced problems due to vested interests and a lack of available funding (Tyler et al. 2014; Upadhyaya 2016). NAMAs seeking international funding have problems securing such international support (Eisbrenner et al. 2017: 8), while also struggling with leveraging additional private funding (Gardiner et al. 2015: 27; Halstead 2017: 21-22). NAMA projects attempting to secure NAMA Facility funding often do not have (convincing) plans to initiate transformational change (Lütken 2015: 41-42).

NAMAs as mitigation targets, action plans and compilations of projects with national level ambition pre-2020 have been succeeded by (I)NDCs for the period post-2020. 104 developing countries submitted an INDC before the 2015 Paris COP (Fridahl et al. 2015: 258; Fridahl and Johansson 2017: 41; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 504). Even in their (I)NDCs, 46 countries referred to NAMAs (ECN and ECOFYS 2016: 36). Research has found a strong link between Individual NAMAs and NDCs (Halstead 2017: 19, 21). Investigating 38 INDCs referring to NAMAs, scholars found that

46 percent aim to use NAMAs to implement INDCs and 31 per cent refer to an already ongoing NAMA implementation or to finished NAMA readiness activities (Fridahl and Johansson 2017: 40, 45).

As the new governance concept that represents efforts to apply the developing country climate mitigation norm post-2020, guidance on NDC development by the UNFCCC had been limited (Jernnäs and Linnér 2019: 82; Pauw and Klein 2020: 406). Yet, several organizations provided guidelines for (I)NDC drafting to developing countries (e.g., Höhne et al. 2014; Holdaway et al. 2015; Levin et al. 2015), and some developing countries even received financial support to hire external consultants for this task (Jernnäs et al. 2019: 1242; Tobin et al. 2018: 12). (I)NDCs vary strongly in terms of content (including targets, scopes and time frames), length, and style (Mills-Novoa and Liverman 2019: 5; Pauw and Klein 2020: 406), which collectively will only result in a limiting of global warming to 2.6 degree Celsius to 3.2 degree Celsius by 2100 (Rogelj et al. 2016; UNEP 2019; UNFCCC Secretariat 2015b: 11). The strongest differences can be found between developed countries' and developing countries' NDCs. Developed countries focused on decarbonization issues and natural resource management, while developing countries also featured other aspects like adaptation, vulnerability, economic development, and the need for international support (Jernnäs and Linnér 2019: 78; Leinaweaver and Thomson 2021; Mills-Novoa and Liverman 2019: 6-7, 9-11; Pauw et al. 2019). While developed countries mentioned functions of the state as regulator and market facilitator, developing countries referred to more roles, including information provider, among others (Jernnäs et al. 2019: 1244, 1247). Developed countries rather submitted absolute emission targets, while most developing countries communicated relative emission targets (Pauw et al. 2019; Tobin et al. 2018: 15). Many developing countries even distinguished between unconditional and conditional mitigation targets (Pauw and Klein 2020: 473). Funding requirements communicated amounted to more than 4.4 trillion USD by 2030 (Weischer et al. 2016: 5-6), which far exceeds general funding pledges by developed countries (Pauw and Klein 2020: 469).

To sum up, in practice, NAMAs as the overarching term for climate targets, climate action plans and projects by developing countries as well as NDCs are very broad governance concepts to apply the developing country climate mitigation norm. This resulted in a great variety of different approaches. It is noteworthy that developing countries have also applied the micro norm in different ways at the domestic level without necessarily using these governance concept terms.

4.3 Carbon forestry norm: REDD+

In this sub-chapter, I first provide an overview on the distinct features of the targeted sector: forestry (4.3.1). I then describe the negotiations concerning the carbon forestry norm and how it has been taken up in one governance concepts post-2005: REDD+ (4.3.2). Lastly, I shortly introduce the previous research findings on REDD+ (4.3.3).

4.3.1 Short introduction to the forestry sector

During colonial rule, forests in the Global South were nationalized and brought under colonial administrative control. This resulted in immediate conflicts with local and indigenous communities that had managed these forests informally for centuries (Arts 2014: 18). After decolonialization, forests, usually, continued to be owned by central governments (Andersson et al. 2006: 576, 578). However, national governments have often been criticized as bad managers of forests and have been accused of exploiting natural resources, allowing corruption and failing in enforcing forest management rules. As a response to those failures, since the 1980s, new approaches to forest management have been introduced by central governments, such as market approaches, community-based forest management and decentralization of ownership or management (Agrawal 2012: 314; Arts 2014: 18). However, deforestation has remained a major issue in most rainforest nations of the Global South, while the international community has increasingly recognized the role of forest losses as GHG emitting sources (Pistorius 2012: 638). For example, the IPCC report of 2007 noted that 17 percent of global GHG emissions were coming from forests (IPCC 2007a: 36).³⁰ How the issue of forests has been taken up in the UNFCCC negotiations is introduced in the next section.

4.3.2 UNFCCC negotiations on the carbon forestry norm

The *Convention* already required all parties to promote and cooperate forest conservation and enhancement (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.1(d)), which, however, did not raise to prominence in the following years. Increasing attention on forests in the UNFCCC only emerged in the context of the *Kyoto Protocol*, as carbon forestry interventions were recognized as measures to achieve the quantitative mitigation commitments by developed countries. For achieving these commitments, the CDM was introduced to allow developed countries to meet their targets by financing mitigation projects in developing countries (i.e., as an offset) (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 3.3, 12). This linked carbon forestry to fully compensated mitigation interventions in the Global South, as subsequent UNFCCC's rules made afforestation and reforestation activities eligible under the CDM (but not reducing deforestation or degradation) (Lederer 2011: 1900; Pistorius 2012: 639).

The carbon forestry norm more strongly emerged in the UNFCCC negotiations from 2005 onwards. Already at a side-event of the *Milan COP* in 2003, Brazilian scientists had presented ideas on an operationalization of this micro norm. Building upon these ideas, at the *COP in Montreal in 2005*, Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, as representatives of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, proposed a compensation mechanism for climate change mitigation in developing countries' forests, which they called "Reducing Emissions from Deforestation" (RED) (Lederer 2012b; Pistorius 2012:

³⁰ The IPCC Report of 2014 then found that 24 percent of global GHG emissions were coming from agriculture, forests, and other land uses (IPCC 2014a: 47), while forests and other land uses were responsible for half of it in the period from 2000 until 2009 (IPCC 2014b: 822, 825).

640). This linked the carbon forestry norm to interpretations of the developing country climate mitigation norm, such as that mitigation actions by developing countries are to be compensated by developed countries. However, in the UNFCCC, these micro norms were negotiated in different negotiation tracks. Yet, RED was perceived as a potential door-opener for an international post-2012 agreement, because it had a voluntary nature and included material benefits for developing countries. The initial idea was that developed countries provide international finance to developing countries, when they reduce their GHG emissions coming from forest loss as measured against a national baseline (Turnhout et al. 2017: 2). This idea had been based on earlier debates and projects on payments for ecosystem services (PES), even though PES had not successfully reduced large-scale deforestation (Pistorius 2012: 638). Yet, proponents perceived large-scale payments as potential game-changer compared to PES (Lederer 2011: 1900), standing “in a long line of efforts to tap global economic markets for conservation finance” (Fletcher et al. 2016: 673-674). Subsequent UNFCCC workshops in 2006 and 2007 broadened the concept to include forest degradation. India, supported by China and some other afforesting countries, proposed compensated conservation as a mechanism benefiting afforesting countries (Pistorius 2012: 640). The 2006 Stern Review’s claim that reducing deforestation is a cost-effective and quick way to reduce GHG emissions,³¹ and the IPCC’s 2007 report that indicated that 17 percent of GHG had been emitted from forests further convinced parties to advance the governance concept related to the carbon forestry norm (IPCC 2007a: 36; Jodoin and Mason-Case 2016: 266; Stern 2006: ix).

The *Bali COP decision of 2007* then acknowledged that addressing forest-related GHG emissions can contribute to preventing dangerous climate change (UNFCCC 1992, Article 2; 2008b: 8, Decision 2). Parties agreed upon a mechanism that includes all previously demanded components relating to the carbon forestry norm: “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation”, while “the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries” (UNFCCC 2008b: 3, Article 1 b (iii)) (the plus part) was still divided from REDD through a semicolon. In addition, the COP decision was more specific on deforestation and degradation than on conservation. It calls for starting demonstration activities (to be in line with sustainable forest management) as well as for addressing the drivers of deforestation and the needs of indigenous and local communities. In addition, it requests capacity-building support by developed countries and asks for the development of national approaches (UNFCCC 2008b: 8-10). Moreover, it recommends the usage of reporting guidelines and IPCC reporting methodologies adopted at previous COP’s in 2002 and 2003 (UNFCCC 2004: 31-32; 2008b: 10). The shift from looking at changing forest cover to considering carbon changes made much more sophisticated MRV methods necessary. Subsequently, stakeholders, such as scientists and NGOs often paved the way for addressing technical problems and safeguards (i.e., to avoid negative impacts of REDD+), which were later taken up in the UNFCCC negotiations. This included discussions on the Forest Reference

³¹ The influential Eliasch Review of 2008 subsequently supported the idea that financing the reduction of deforestation would contribute to reducing global mitigation costs (Eliasch 2008: xii).

(Emission) Level (FR(E)L), which establish the baseline for measuring reduced emissions (Pistorius 2012: 640-641).

At the *Copenhagen COP of 2009*, the plus activities (conservation and afforestation) were equally accepted, as the semicolon separating REDD from the 'plus' was replaced by a comma (Pistorius 2012: 640; UNFCCC 2010: 11, Decision 4). The Copenhagen Accord promised international funding for REDD+ as part of the pledge by developed countries to provide 30 billion USD to developing countries in the period from 2010 until 2012 and even 100 billion USD/year by 2020 (UNFCCC 2010: 6-7). The Copenhagen COP decision, additionally, provided methodological guidance on REDD+. This included, for example, the establishment of national forest monitoring systems, which apply remote sensing and are based on a forest carbon inventory. Interested recipients were requested to develop forest reference (emission) levels (UNFCCC 2010: 11-12). Moreover, concerns were raised on the plus components by stakeholders, fearing that plantations could replace pristine forests. Furthermore, discussions emerged whether REDD+ should be eligible for carbon offsets, as proposed by the US, which was opposed, among others, by Brazil. Negotiations on safeguards continued, in which stakeholders promoted biodiversity safeguards and raised concerns regarding dangers of land-grabbing, lack of forest governance, and insufficient compliance with the rights of indigenous people and local communities (Pistorius 2012: 640-641).

The *Cancun COP of 2010* parties adopted the *Cancun REDD+ framework* (Lederer 2012b: 108). It reaffirms the aim to prevent dangerous climate change through REDD+ interventions (UNFCCC 2011: 12, 26). It requires REDD+ participating countries to develop a national REDD+ strategy or action plan, a national forest reference (emission) level, a national forest monitoring system, and a safeguard information system (UNFCCC 2011: 12-13). The national REDD+ strategy was intended to address the following issues: drivers of deforestation and degradation, land tenure, gender, forest governance, and safeguards. It requests a full and effective stakeholder participation, including indigenous peoples and local communities (UNFCCC 2011: 13). The Cancun REDD+ framework further specified that REDD+ activities should be implemented in phases: the development of national actions, strategies, and capacity building (phase one), the implementation of national strategies, actions and results-based demonstration activities (phase two), and the MRV of results-based actions (phase three). It requested developed countries to provide bilateral or multilateral funding (UNFCCC 2011: 13). The REDD+ guidance adopted in Cancun further specified that REDD+ activities should be country-driven and in line with the goal of environmental integrity, with national development priorities, and adaptation requirements. They should also reduce poverty, promote sustainable forest management, and be implemented in the context of sustainable development (UNFCCC 2011: 26). Moreover, specific safeguards were listed that should be promoted, such as transparent and effective forest governance, conservation of natural forests and biological diversity, actions to address reversal and displacement of emissions, respect for indigenous people and local communities, full and effective stakeholder participation as well as consistency with national forest programs (UNFCCC 2011: 26-27). This put the carbon forestry norm in the context of several other

norms, enabling a variety of different approaches on how to interpret the relationships between those different norms. The *Durban COP in 2011* then specified that the obligatory FR(E)L had to be consistent with the country's GHG inventory, and provided further guidance on safeguard information systems (SIS) (UNFCCC 2012a: 16-17).

The *Warsaw COP in 2013* reaffirmed previous decisions and added new ones in the Warsaw Framework on REDD+. This included the decision to make both market-based- and non-market-based approaches eligible for results-based payments. The Warsaw framework further specified that REDD+'s MRV activities had to be in line with UNFCCC's guidance on MRV of NAMAs, be consistent with the established FR(E)Ls, and should be built upon preexisting systems (UNFCCC 2014: 24-26, 28, 31, 34, 39, 43). The technical assessment of the FR(E)Ls was decided to be based on a "facilitative, non-intrusive, technical exchange of information" (UNFCCC 2014: 36) in order to enable future improvements. Finally, in the *Paris Agreement of 2015*, all previous REDD+ decisions were recognized. Parties were encouraged to conserve and enhance GHG emissions in forests and to achieve results-based payments through REDD+ (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 5). The COP decision, moreover, requested the GCF to provide REDD+ funding (UNFCCC 2016b: 8-9), and further guidelines on the safeguard information system were agreed upon (UNFCCC Secretariat 2016: 42-45). Lastly, the Paris Agreement also encouraged to engage in a new approach in forests: "joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and sustainable management of forests" (UNFCCC 2016a: Article 5.2), without further specifying it.

To sum up, the collective interpretation of the carbon forestry norm changed over time from reducing deforestation, over additional reduction of degradation to a comprehensive compensated carbon forestry approach that includes conservation and afforestation. This approach was further operationalized by defining specific rules at subsequent COPs. In addition, safeguards and guidelines on REDD+ put climate mitigation in forests in the context of several other norms. It can therefore be expected that the carbon forestry norm is implemented in a great variety of ways in different nation-states.

4.3.3 REDD+

Previous to the emergence of REDD+ and NAMAs in the forestry sector, CDM projects had been implemented in developing countries. Due to problems with monitoring and accounting, leakage, additionality, and permanence of the GHG emission cuts, only afforestation and reforestation activities had been eligible and have not created much interest by CDM developers. In consequence, only very few CDM projects (one percent of all CDM projects) have been implemented in the forestry sector (Lederer 2011: 1900; Pistorius 2012: 639). Moreover, since 2007, carbon forestry actions could also be taken in the framework of NAMAs, which could potentially overlap with REDD+ (Kojwang and Larwanou 2015: 110; Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen 2009). However, REDD+ has

been the most prominent UNFCCC governance concept for addressing emissions in the forestry sector in developing countries.

Even before UNFCCC parties agreed upon REDD+ framework rules, a plethora of projects emerged at the subnational and national level engaging in REDD+ preparation or demonstration activities (Lederer 2012b; Pistorius 2012; Turnhout et al. 2017). Many of them build upon previous conservation projects and aimed at selling carbon credits in the voluntary carbon market (Pistorius 2012: 642). As of 25 March 2019, the voluntary REDD+ database noted 2,119 REDD+ arrangements in the Global South (FAO 2019). However, the database also included pure conservation projects and not implemented projects. In contrast, scholars only counted 350 projects in over 50 countries by 2015 (Duchelle et al. 2018: 2, 5), which seems more realistic. Scholars noted that domestic REDD+ activities have led to a “patchwork of different initiatives driven by distinct conceptualizations and associated objectives, with a focus on carbon, co-benefits or landscapes” (Turnhout et al. 2017: 9).

As of 2015, 8.7 billion USD had been pledged for REDD+ interventions, but only a smaller amount has also been disbursed. 90 per cent of this funding has come from public sources and has been pledged or allocated to national governments (Lee and Pistorius 2015; Norman and Nakhooda 2014; Turnhout et al. 2017: 3). 75 percent of the funding has been provided by Norway, Germany, the US, the UK and Japan, while 40 percent has been pledged to Brazil and Indonesia alone (Norman and Nakhooda 2014: 2), having received commitments by Norway to provide up to 1 billion USD to each country (Höhne et al. 2018). Established in 2008 and 2009, three multilateral programs have also supported REDD+ countries mostly in their readiness activities: World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), World Bank’s Forest Investment Program, and UN-REDD (Climate Funds Update 2019; Pistorius 2012: 641). For example, UN-REDD had allocated 87 million USD to 23 countries by December 2015 (UN-REDD 2016: 1-2, 19), and FCPF had provided 148 million USD to 39 countries by 2016 (FCPF 2016: 16, 33). Since 2017, the GCF has started to finance REDD+ activities. GCF’s model is non-market- and non-offset-based for which it has made 500 million USD available for the period up to 2022, including for results-based payments (Angelsen et al. 2017: 718; Green Climate Fund 2017, 2022). In 2019, Brazil has been the first beneficiary of results-based payments of 96.5 million USD for achievements in 2014-15 (Green Climate Fund 2019). In addition, domestic actors have provided co-funding to international REDD+ funding (Lee and Pistorius 2015: 36).

While donors relied on their own interpretations of UNFCCC’s REDD+ rules, such as on safeguards (Visseren-Hamakers et al. 2012: 1-2), and added further rules on REDD+, domestic actors have also been able to influence them in negotiations on REDD+ partnerships, such as in the case of Norway and Indonesia (Höhne et al. 2018; Lederer and Höhne 2021). Moreover, public actors have increasingly called for more private funding (Jodoin and Mason-Case 2016: 277-279). Private funding has mostly been provided through the voluntary carbon market, as an obligatory global

compliance carbon market has not been established, while regional ones, such as EU's Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) have not accepted REDD+ forest credits for offsets (Angelsen et al. 2017: 718; Turnhout et al. 2017: 3). REDD+ followed a different trajectory than the CDM, which had initially been planned to be set-up as a fund, but quickly developed into a carbon market, when the EU included CDM credits in the EU's ETS (Lederer 2012a: 648). Moreover, donors, recipients and stakeholders have engaged in debates and knowledge sharing in collaborative initiatives, such as the REDD+ Partnership established in 2010 and now defunct, and in transnational conferences, such as the Oslo REDD Exchange established in 2013 and renamed to Oslo Tropical Forest Forum in 2018 (Climate Initiatives Platform 2019; Gupta et al. 2016; NORAD 2019a, 2019b).

The above-mentioned levels of REDD+ have, however, been evaluated as inadequate for providing sufficient incentives for changing market practices (Fletcher et al. 2016: 674; Sunderlin et al. 2015). Financial pledges have outweighed the actual costs of reducing emissions from forests (Streck 2013: 106-107). Most of the donor funding has been provided to state actors for readiness activities or demonstration activities, as they had not been ready for REDD+. Yet, many countries had already considered these funds to be insufficient, while very little funding has been actually disbursed for results-based payments (Lee and Pistorius 2015: 4; Pistorius 2012: 642). Only 20 percent of projects have been found to engage in any carbon transaction (Turnhout et al. 2017: 5). In contrast to the above amounts, costs of 17 to 33 billion USD per year had been calculated for halving global deforestation if forests are incorporated into carbon markets (Eliasch 2008: 69). The enormous financial gap becomes even more obvious when considering the opportunity costs of agricultural production, which is the largest factor driving deforestation (Di Gregorio et al. 2015: 65). Scholars found that the net present value of palm oil plantations over a period of 30 years is 3,835 USD to 9,630 USD per hectare, and increases to 9,860 USD to 12,750 USD per hectare when one incorporates the price of timber, while REDD+ credits in voluntary markets would be only 614 USD to 994 USD per hectare and could increase to 1,571 USD to 6,605 USD if included in compliance carbon markets for the same period (Butler et al. 2009: 70; Fisher et al. 2011: 332). Moreover, subsidies for palm oil and timber in Indonesia as well as beef and soy in Brazil amount to 40 billion USD per year (Angelsen 2015: 414). REDD+ thereby has faced similar problems as previous (ineffective) conservation approaches, leaving disappointed local communities as their funding hopes have not been fulfilled (Angelsen et al. 2017: 718; Fletcher et al. 2016: 674). This has led scholars to criticize REDD+ as yet another fad, alongside PES or eco-certification, which is now abandoned or even dead (Fletcher et al. 2016: 673; Redford et al. 2013: 437). However, many forest-rich national governments have since then continued their REDD+ engagement (Korhonen-Kurki et al. 2019), and REDD+ has continued to function as a "light form of results-based aid" (Angelsen et al. 2017: 718).

REDD+ related funding has resulted in many different interventions ranging from trainings, outreach, pilot projects, policy and organizational changes to stricter enforcement (Angelsen 2015; Angelsen et al. 2017; Sunderlin et al. 2014; Sunderlin et al. 2015). Some governmental organizations have

used it to finance forest governance reforms (Lederer and Höhne 2021), to strengthen the MRV approaches (Romijn et al. 2015: 119-120), to focus on local community needs (Jodoin 2017a: 1428-1429), to promote integrated development and conservation programs, or to use them for their broader efforts to achieve their NDC pledges (Angelsen 2015; Angelsen et al. 2017: 718). Indigenous people were even able to use REDD+ as an opportunity to achieve a strengthening of their rights in Indonesia (Jodoin 2017b: 189). Positive REDD+ outputs have been found in countries when they already had effective forest governance in place, had already embarked on a pathway toward domestic changes and were facing high pressures on scarce forest resources (Korhonen-Kurki et al. 2014). Moreover, scholars emphasized that promised results-based payments and positive involvement of donors were supporting factors, even when domestic ownership has been low (Brockhaus et al. 2017).

Comparative research has shown for a number of countries that REDD+ readiness efforts have been slower than expected and mitigation or co-benefit outcomes have not yet become measurable at large scale (Brockhaus et al. 2017; Korhonen-Kurki et al. 2019). While predictable and sustainable funding was lacking and REDD+ has often not been implemented to the extent needed, it has also been opposed by powerful economic and political actors (Angelsen et al. 2017: 718-719; Fletcher et al. 2016: 674). Vested interests in combination with a lack of strong forest governance has been particularly challenging for advancing REDD+ (Karsenty and Ongolo 2012). REDD+ intervention hardly address major drivers of deforestation, such as agricultural expansion and instead concentrate on minor drivers of forest loss generated by local communities (Jodoin and Mason-Case 2016: 280-281), indicating the conflicting norms in REDD+ implementation. While not triggering large-scale recentralization of forestry as previously feared by some scholars (Phelps et al. 2010), the REDD+ involvement of central governments has resulted in horizontal turf wars on responsibilities between more progressive and more reluctant governmental entities (Hickmann et al. 2017; Höhne et al. 2018; Lederer and Höhne 2021).

To sum up, in practice, the application of the carbon forestry norm in the form of REDD+ interventions has ranged from local projects to national jurisdictional approaches that have hardly achieved results-based payments or carbon transactions. They followed a great variety of different approaches, leading to varying co-benefits in some cases, such as the strengthening of forest governance or of livelihoods of local communities.

4.4 Summary: Micro norms on developing country climate mitigation and carbon forestry

The developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm have seen similar trajectories in the UNFCCC negotiations since 2005. This resulted in the developments of the NAMA and REDD+ governance concepts in the UNFCCC, while the negotiations provided more concrete guidelines on REDD+ than on NAMAs. Both bilateral and multilateral donors promoted actions by

developing countries on those norms and governance concepts. Domestic actors – most prominently central governments – engaged on them in cooperation with donors or on their own, leading to a variety of different approaches. For actions post-2020, NAMAs have been succeeded by NDCs. NAMAs, as Cancun Pledges, have been influential until 2020 and continue to be important as Individual NAMAs (e.g., projects or action plans) beyond 2020. While NAMAs and NDCs can concern all sectors, REDD+ addresses the forestry sector. REDD+ actions can even be linked to the voluntary carbon market, while most of NAMA and REDD+ interventions are funded by external or domestic public sources. NAMAs, NDCs and REDD+ apply the developing country climate mitigation norm and carbon forestry norm in relationship to other important norms, such as economic development, poverty eradication or environmental integrity. This enables a great variety of different interpretations of those micro norms that are shaped by the perceived synergies and conflicts with other norms. How and why one prominent nation-state – India – has engaged with those norms and governance concepts over time (2005-2019) is subject of the Chapters 5 to 7.

Part II: Glocalization of climate change norms in India (2005-2019)

5. Contestation, domestic agenda setting and international reshaping (2005-2007)

In the second part of the book, I apply the norm glocalization framework to the case of India and its engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm from 2005 until 2019, which evolved over nine stages that I capture in Chapter 5, 6, and 7. Chapter 5, introduces India and then lays out the stages I (5.2), II (5.3) and III (5.4) of the norm glocalization framework that include contestation, domestic agenda setting and international reshaping of the two micro norms. The chapter ends with a short summary on the three stages (5.5).

5.1 Setting the domestic scene: Introducing India

I introduce India in this sub-chapter. I first provide a short political history of India since its independence in 1947 (5.1.1). Then, I give a short overview on India's GHG emissions and its previous forest politics (5.1.2). Finally, in 5.1.3, I introduce India's engagement in global climate politics before 2005 and lay the empirical ground for the subsequent empirical analysis of India from 2005 onwards.

5.1.1 A short political history of India

Following British colonial rule, in 1947, India was founded as an independent state on a vast territory comprising multiple religious and cultural communities (including multiple Hindu casts and outcasts, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains and tribes),³² a hierarchical social order³³ at odds with the introduced political equality and an impoverished population (Khilnani 2004: 16, 151). The Constituent Assembly gave birth to a constitutional democracy that rests upon a parliamentary political system and universal suffrage. It defined a federal system, whose union is irresolvable, assigning strong political and fiscal powers to the central state, but also responsibilities to regional states in several policy fields on which the center is dependent upon in implementation (Dutt 1998: 420; Khilnani 2004: 34-36; Swenden and Saxena 2017: 44; Wagner 2006: 87-89). Besides introducing universal rights to all citizens, the constitution also enabled selective positive discrimination for previously excluded particular communities, such as backward classes and Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. Those positive discriminations were reshaped and politicized over the following decades, leading to growing social distance and also to the re-organization of regional states (Dutt 1998: 414, 420, 426; Khilnani 2004: 36-37; Kinnvall and Svensson 2010: 280).

³² The 1961 census identified 1652 languages in India of which 18 are officially recognized by the Constitution (Dutt 1998: 426).

³³ The caste system is based on four major castes, but estimates indicate that about 3000 sub-castes exist in India, with boundaries based on geography and language. Members of higher castes are considered to have higher status, leading to social segregation (Dutt 1998: 423).

India's first Prime Minister (PM), Jawaharlal Nehru from the politically dominant Congress party (tenure between 1947-1964), aimed to modernize India and to establish the state in the Indian society. He relied on ideas from national integration and democracy and followed a policy-approach based on state-led economic developmentalism, international sovereignty based on non-alignment as well as religious tolerance and cultural pluralism (Dutt 2002: 241-242; Khilnani 2004: 8, 12-13, 30, 39, 41). After independence, India's economy included both heavy industries and a large agrarian economy, but the government neither promoted international trade nor agricultural production. Instead, India's economic approach incorporated mixed and uneven characteristics that emerged from competing visions, including from big industrialists, Nehruvian state-led developmentalists, and Gandhian local self-producers. Economic policy was steered by the development plans of the Planning Commission, leading to state-directed industrialization and moderate growth, while foreign capital did not play any role. Both the inequalities of land ownership and the low productivity of the agricultural sector led to food crises in the 1950s and 1960s and the dependence on foreign aid in those crises, whose accompanying conditionalities increased the suspicion against foreign influences (Khilnani 2004: 11, 62-69, 76-79, 85-90).

Nehru's daughter and main successor as Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi (tenure between 1966-77 and 1980-1984) loosened India's non-alignment by signing a treaty with the Soviet Union, centralized decision making in the PM Office and at the federal level, nationalized banks as well as coal and problematic companies, shifted power from the Planning Commission to the Finance Ministry, intervened in regional state politics, and increasingly relied upon populism and patronage politics (Dutt 1998: 431-432; Khilnani 2004: 40, 46, 48-49, 51, 89, 91). This contributed to growing government spending, secessionism, corruption, and increasing conflicts among particular social groups that were mobilized on identity issues for political ends (Khilnani 2004: 50, 53-54, 94).

After her tenure, the Congress party increasingly relied on appeals to particular regional and caste sentiments as a counter-measure to its declining popularity, leading to further politicization of identities. In the 1980s and 1990s, as a counter-vision to Nehru's pluralist vision, Hindu nationalists from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) promoted a vision based on a constructed homogenous and exclusive Hindu nation to make electoral gains (the Hindutva ideology), even though Hinduism is not monolithic and unitary (Dutt 1998: 413-414; 2002: 243; Khilnani 2004: 83, 151, 166; Kinnvall and Svensson 2010: 283). At the same time, particular social groups formed their own exclusive local communities, leading to a proliferation of regional parties. BJP and regional parties were increasingly gaining seats in national elections to the Lok Sabha (lower house), leading to minority governments dependent on regional parties in the 1991 and 1996 national elections (Dutt 1998: 414; Khilnani 2004: 56-57, 151, 166).

India's insulated and state-led domestic economy was only increasingly liberalized and opened up to international competition from the early 1990s onwards under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (tenure between 1991-1996) and his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh following a fiscal crisis and

due to bailout conditionalities by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Khilnani 2004: 11, 64, 95). For the liberalization process, Rao assigned regional governments larger powers to implement economic reforms, and otherwise chose a gradual reform process focused on industry and trade (Khilnani 2004: 57, 98). But at the end of the 1990s, urban incomes were three times higher than rural ones and 400 million Indians were still living under the poverty line, having hardly benefited from the economic reform process (Khilnani 2004: 101).

Based on Hindu nationalism and economic nationalism, BJP expanded its electorate from the upper caste to the middle and lower classes, leading to a BJP-led coalition government after the 1998 elections (Dutt 1998: 428-431; 2002: 243; Khilnani 2004: 185-186; Palshikar and Suri 2014: 43). BJP's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (tenure between 1998-2004), however, followed a more moderate approach to Hindu nationalism and rather focused on privatization and further global market integration. Vajpayee also strived to establish India as a global player by both making it a nuclear weapons state and by improving the relationship to the US. However, at the end of his tenure, people from rural areas were unsatisfied, having the perception to benefited less from economic development.

By appealing to the poor, by forming a coalition with regional parties and by being tolerated by communist parties, the Congress party was able to replace BJP from power in 2004 (Nayar 2005: 72-75). The new government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh from the Congress party (tenure between 2004-2014) and Congress party Leader Sonia Gandhi shifted to combining economic development with social justice by promoting agriculture and employment opportunities, alongside industry and services. At the same time, the Singh government continued the pathway in foreign affairs by fostering good relations with the US (Nayar 2005: 76-81). But at the end of Congress-led tenure, the party faced an adverse public opinion, resulting from economic slowdown and the lack of political leadership and vision, among others (Palshikar and Suri 2014: 41).

For the first time since 1984, the 2014 elections brought a majority for one party – the BJP – which had been able to convince lower to upper classes with its pro-business developmental promises based on liberalization as a counter-project to Congress'-led welfare policies and with the presentation of Narendra Modi as strong leader with positive development records from his time as Chief Minister of Gujarat. BJP campaigned on infrastructure development, making India attractive to private capital and developing India as a manufacturing hub, while Modi refrained from speaking about cultural issues (Palshikar and Suri 2014: 39, 44-46). During his first tenure, Modi centralized power in the PM Office, and concentrated his efforts on social and economic affairs (Aiyar and Tillin 2020: 130; Jaffrelot and Verniers 2020a: 143). Following two defeats in state elections, the Modi government shifted from an exclusive pro-business stance to a policy approach that includes centrally-sponsored welfare schemes that were enhanced and re-named from the previous Congress-led government (Aiyar and Tillin 2020: 129).

In the 2019 elections, BJP won a majority again. Facing an economic slowdown and high unemployment rates, Modi had campaigned on issues relating to nationalism, security, and welfare schemes and presented himself as the country's protector (Jaffrelot and Verniers 2020b: 157-158; 2020a: 143). Observers already note an ideological consolidation of the electorate that favors BJP's social and economic conservatism and Hindu majoritarianism that refrains from special treatment of minorities, while others question this due to BJP's poor performance in many state elections (Jaffrelot and Verniers 2020a: 141-142, 146). After elections, the Modi government adopted several decisions based on ethnicity or religion, such as the exclusion of Muslims from the accelerated path to citizenship for refugees (Jaffrelot and Verniers 2020a: 143), which led to growing concerns about Hindu majoritarianism (Baloch and Vaishnav 2020: 114-115).

5.1.2 India's GHG emissions and forest politics in context

Policy-making is strongly driven by the Executive. This makes the Prime Minister the decisive political figure. Bills are formulated by the government and passed by parliamentarians of the coalition parties, as parliamentary voting against the party line may be disqualified. Both the independent Judiciary and the 'Indian Administrative Service' are considered to be stabilizing forces in the Indian political system. The Judiciary has taken on an important role in policy-making through court decisions, especially concerning environment and forests (Aamodt and Stensdal 2017: 117; Prabhu 2012: 230-231). Environmental and forest issues fall both under the concurrent list of the Constitution, meaning both central government and states can operate in those policy fields (Aamodt and Stensdal 2017: 117; Das 2020: 94). Until the 1970s, the central government solely perceived forests as a resource for economic growth. In the 1970s and 1980s both conservation efforts increased and forest-based industries were expanded. Deforestation continued mainly for development, yet, in a smaller amount than during the previous decades. Attempts at stronger participation of local communities and initiatives of social forestry increased since the late 1980s. In 2006, the Forest Rights Act even defined forest rights for previously unrecorded forest dwellers. But those initiatives largely failed or were limited in implementation, as state governments preferred continuous control of decision-making and resources (Das 2020: 92-96, 99-100).

From 1990 to 2005, India rose from being the eight to the fourth highest absolute GHG emitting country. Its emissions increased from 1.01 to 1.98 Gt CO₂eq (Climate Watch 2021a), reflecting India's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth from 0.321 to 0.820 trillion USD (World Bank 2021a) and growing usage of fossil fuels (from 73 to 81 percent of electricity) (World Bank 2021b). However, India still had one of the lowest per-capita GHG emissions in the world, which rose in this period from 1.16 to 1.72 Gt CO₂eq (Climate Watch 2021i), while the population increased from 0.873 to 1.148 billion (World Bank 2021a). After India became the third highest absolute GHG emitting country in 2006, those above-mentioned trends continued further up to the end of the available data line: absolute GHG emissions of 3.35 Gt CO₂eq (2018), per capita GHG emissions of 2.47 t CO₂eq

(2018), GDP of 2.869 trillion USD (2019), population of 1.366 billion (2019), and usage of fossil fuels of 82 percent of electricity (2015) (Climate Watch 2021a, 2021i; World Bank 2021b, 2021a). A central factor of India's rising GHG emissions was the high amount of emissions from the energy sector that increased from 0.609 Gt CO₂eq (1990) over 1.181 Gt CO₂eq (2005) to 2.425 Gt CO₂eq (2018) (Climate Watch 2021e). Hence, India, represents a rapidly growing economy and population, which results in its high-level emitting position as a country, while its per capita emissions are relatively low.

According to official data, India's forest and land use sector was not responsible for the strong rise in India's GHG emissions. It even served as a carbon sink from 1990 (-0.217 Gt CO₂eq) to 2000 (-0.219 Gt CO₂eq) and from 2011 (-0.061 Gt CO₂eq) to 2018 (-0.028 Gt CO₂eq). It only was a very small carbon emitter from 2001 (0.006 Gt CO₂eq) to 2010 (0.013) according to a cross-national database (Climate Watch 2021g). In its own communications, the Indian government reported the 'land use, land use change and forests' sector as a carbon emitter in 1994 (GOI 2004: iv) and claimed it to be a carbon sink ever since (FSI 2014: 40, 51, 54-55; GOI 2012: 84, 86; INCCA 2010: vi; Kishwan et al. 2009: 10; Lahiri 2015; MOEFCC 2018b: 76). Yet, independent scientific research emphasized the carbon emitting role of forests in the years 1985 to 1996 (Chhabra and Dadhwal 2004: 354; Haripriya 2003), from 2003 until 2007 (Sheikh et al. 2011: 1), from 2005 until 2013 (Reddy et al. 2016), and in 2015 (Sharma 2018: 3). Critics emphasized that the government excluded fuelwood from the forest sector's GHG accounting (Sharma 2018: 3), equated carbon stocks of forest plantation with natural forests (Puyravaud et al. 2010), and included croplands and trees outside forests (Saxena et al. 2018: 11, 17). In this context, it also remains unclear from government reports how the reported carbon stock can increase (from 6,663 Mt CO₂ to 6,941 Mt CO₂), while the growing stock actually declines (from 6,218.282 million cum to 5,658.046 million cum) between 2004/05 and 2013 (FSI 2014: 40, 51, 54-55; Lahiri 2015). Based on its own reporting, India perceived forestry as a potential sector that could neutralize GHG emissions in sectors like energy whose emissions were growing due to India's economic growth trajectory.

In 2005 and in 2020, India was ranked worldwide as the country with the tenth largest reported forest cover³⁴ of 68 million hectare (ha) and 72 million ha, respectively, which represents 23 to 24 percent of the entire land area (FAO 2006: xiii; 2020: 15). On annual average, it officially gained forest cover of 304,000 ha from 2000 to 2010 and of 266,000 ha from 2010 to 2020 (third among top ten countries for both periods) (FAO 2010: 21; 2020: 18). However, in 2005 and 2018, it was also ranked as the country with the second highest amount of wood removal (307 million m³ in 2005 and circa 357

³⁴ Forest Survey of India (FSI) defines forest cover as "all lands more than one hectare in area with a tree canopy of more than 10 %, irrespective of land use, ownership and legal status" (FSI 2018: 5). FSI specifies that it "may include even orchards, bamboo, palm etc and is assessed through remote sensing" (FSI 2018: 5). In contrast, forest area "refers to all the geographic areas recorded as Forests in government records" (FSI 2018: 5). This mainly includes Reserved Forests and Protected Forests, but also areas that are recorded as forests, such as in revenue records (FSI 2018: 5). In 2019, the forest area amounted to 76,741,900 ha (compared to 76,962,600 ha in 2004) (FSI 2007: 26; 2019: 4).

million m³ in 2018) (FAO 2010: 101-102; 2020: 112) and, in 2011, it was even world-leading on this matter (434 million m³) (FAO 2016: 34). India is, thus, a country that both reports increasing forest cover, and large volumes of wood removal, indicating a degradation of forests. At the same time, India's natural forests are deforested for infrastructure projects, leading to the replacement of natural forests with planted forests (Sheikh et al. 2011: 6-7).³⁵ Those patterns have been consistent for decades: Despite an accumulated afforestation of 34 million ha from 1980 until 2005 (with most afforestation from 1987 until 2003), forest cover (i.e., area of one hectare with tree crown density greater than ten percent) only increased from 64.08 million ha in 1987 to 67.83 million ha in 2003 (Ravindranath et al. 2008: 217), indicating both low survival rates of planted trees and ongoing deforestation in natural forests, while not even revealing the ongoing degradation.

5.1.3 India in global climate politics pre-2005

India was strongly involved in the negotiation of the Convention text from 1991 to 1992 (Raghunandan 2019: 191). In those negotiations, India emphasized the historical responsibility of the Global North of causing climate change and demanded mitigation actions by developed countries due to their high per capita emissions (Dasgupta 2019: 143-144; Dubash et al. 2018a: 397). Moreover, India unsuccessfully demanded a convergence of historical per capita GHG emissions. However, the mentioning of common but differentiated responsibilities in the Convention reflected India's perspective (Stevenson 2011: 1012-1013; Vihma 2011: 79). India ratified the Convention in 1993 and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol in 2002 (commitment period from 2008 to 2012) (Jung et al. 2005: 21).

In the UNFCCC negotiations on the post-2012/post-Kyoto framework that started in 2005 (i.e., on a new international agreement succeeding the Kyoto Protocol), negotiations focused on how to achieve the macro norm of preventing dangerous climate change in a post-2012 commitment period based on specifications of several meso norms (such as CBDR+RC, developed countries take the lead) in the form of negotiations on two micro norms: the developed country climate mitigation norm and the developing country climate mitigation norm. The Kyoto Protocol had already resulted in an expansion of the micro norm targeting developed countries to be based on achieving quantitative mitigation target commitments (subsequently 'mitigation commitments') (UNFCCC 1998a: Article 3.1, Annex B). In contrast, the micro norm targeting developing countries had been put in checks and balances with other norms in the Convention, such as their right to economic development and the implementation of developed countries duties regarding their commitments on international support provision to developing countries (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.7) (see Chapter 4). In consequence, it had not resulted in domestic implementation by developing countries (Dingwerth and Green 2015; Jinnah 2017), except for internationally compensated mitigation projects under the

³⁵ Yet, deforestation decreased from 4 to 5 million ha of forest area in 1950 to 1980 down to 1.29 million ha in the period from 1980 until 2015 (Bhushan and Saxena 2016: 10).

CDM. Since 1992, some developed countries, such as the US, had also pressured developing countries to commit to quantitative climate mitigation targets (subsequently 'mitigation commitments') (Raghunandan 2019: 192), which further increased in the post-Kyoto negotiations from 2005 onwards. They tried to change the collective interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm to include domestically financed mitigation actions and quantitative mitigation target commitments by developing countries.

India had always contested demands of international commitments or even of domestically financed climate mitigation actions (subsequently 'non-compensated mitigation actions') as hampering India's economic development. India had only accepted domestic carbon market projects, such as CDM projects, which were financed by the Global North (subsequently 'compensated mitigation actions') (Dubash 2013: 192-193; Sengupta 2019: 119-120, 132). Compensated mitigation actions are a collectively shared interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm during the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, which specifies several meso norms (such as CBDR+RC, cost-effectiveness, economic development, specific needs) (UNFCCC 1992: Article 3.1, 3.3, 3.4). Otherwise, India emphasized the historical responsibility of the Global North to mitigate climate change (Vihma 2011: 79), as an interpretation of the CBDR+RC meso norm. Despite India's high vulnerability to climate change, in the period from 1997 to 2005, the Indian government even coquetted with positions that diminished efforts to ensure sufficient mitigation efforts by developed countries. India was also an advocate of embracing an international focus on adaptation, which contributed to a reduced attention to necessary emission reduction efforts in the UNFCCC pre-2005 (Raghunandan 2019: 192-195).

In India's first national communication to the UNFCCC in 2004, the government listed no adopted or planned mitigation actions (GOI 2004). In the forestry sector, scheduled afforestation activities for the tenth five-year-plan were planned to achieve sectoral and developmental targets, but not concrete mitigation targets (Planning Commission 2003: 1060-1064, 1067). After the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, India began to participate in the CDM process and became the second largest CDM market (Fuhr and Lederer 2009: 333). However, those projects were conducted by non-state actors, while governmental actors were only active in terms of accrediting the projects (Benecke 2009: 353; Phillips et al. 2013: 1597). Only very few projects were developed in the forestry sector (Benecke 2009: 351-352), and had a bias to implementing eucalyptus plantations (Basu 2009: 3). The CDM process had no impact on any sectoral policies (Benecke 2009: 366-367). In 2005, India, hence, had not yet developed any national or sectoral approach to mitigating climate change (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 46).

In 2005, hence, Indian actors' *preexisting interpretations of meso norms*, such as CBDR+RC, lead-taking by developed countries and promoting economic development, and *of the micro norms* of developed country climate mitigation and developing country climate mitigation, can be described as focusing on high economic growth and sectorial development goals by India, while mitigation

commitments and non-compensated mitigation actions are the responsibility of the Global North. In addition, India accepted compensated mitigation actions in the form of CDM projects and demanded financial compensation of the full incremental costs by developed countries for any future mitigation action (Sengupta 2019: 117). In contrast, external actors from developed countries that engaged with the Indian government followed different interpretations of these norms, as they emphasized both mitigation commitments and non-compensated mitigation actions by the Global North and the Global South.

In 2005, two UNFCCC negotiation tracks emerged that started to negotiate the meaning of the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm, both addressing developing countries. First, in the negotiation track on the post-2012 commitment period, negotiations started on the collective interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm alongside negotiations on the collective interpretation of the developed country climate mitigation norm. Second, in a parallel track, negotiations started on the development of an international instrument for the carbon forestry norm.

In the following chapters, nine norm glocalization stages illuminate India's climate change norm glocalization from 2005 until 2019. Each stage is explained by one or two causal complexes of several mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions that either incorporate domestic actors' or external actors' norm interpretations in the emerging glocalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm or the carbon forestry norm, leading to discursive, policy, organizational and implementation changes over this period.

The following sections of this chapter capture the stages I to III of the norm glocalization process. *Stage I* explains India's contestation of external actors' norm interpretations of the above-mentioned micro norms through two causal complexes (see 5.2). Through one causal complex, *stage II* explains why India started domestic agenda-setting regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm based upon a first glocalized norm interpretation (see 5.3). *Stage III* then captures why and how India successfully contributed to reshaping the collective interpretations of both the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm at UNFCCC negotiations through two causal complexes. Glocalized norm interpretations were thereby collectively accepted (at least in written form) by all parties in the international negotiations (see 5.4).

Each causal complex starts with the norm engagement by domestic and external actors based on the activated mechanisms. It subsequently moves toward analyzing the domestic conditions that facilitated or hampered those mechanisms. The focus of the analysis is on those actors that were influential in the respective time period. In each sub-section (such as on a particular mechanism or a particular condition), it is explained whether a particular mechanism or condition either incorporated domestic actors' norm interpretations or external actors' norm interpretation in the resulting glocalized norm interpretations and what kind of discursive, policy, and organizational changes occurred from this causal complex. For that purpose, I note which mechanism(s) under which

facilitating or hampering condition(s) shaped the particular outcomes initiated by India's governmental actors of a specific causal complex.

5.2 Stage I: International contestation (2005 until 2007)

The norm glocalization process in the Indian case study starts with contestations by Indian negotiators of the interpretations of the two micro norms – the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm – by other parties to the Convention. Instead, the Indian delegation presented its own alternative interpretations of both norms. Causal complex 1 captures this contestation with regard to the developing country climate mitigation norm (see 5.2.1), and causal complex 2 explains this contestation for the carbon forestry norm (see 5.2.2). While external actors either enacted shaming or persuasion, India, instead, relied on competition to develop its alternative approaches. This stage did not result in glocalized norm interpretations, but only in the acceptance of further negotiations on both micro norms.

5.2.1 Contestation of non-compensated mitigation efforts from 2005 until 2006 (causal complex 1)

Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries that had ratified the protocol were only obligated to reduce GHG emissions until the end of the first commitment period in 2012, while no such obligations were defined for developing countries such as India. At the COP in Montreal in 2005, negotiations about post-2012 commitments by parties to the Kyoto Protocol started, as it was foreseen in the Kyoto Protocol (Wittneben et al. 2006: 90-91). Causal complex 1 captures the unsuccessful *shaming* efforts by developed countries on India and other developing countries to adopt non-compensated mitigation efforts. India, instead, contested this interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm and, based on its *competition* engagement, demanded sufficient carbon space for its development. However, shaming and competition contributed to India's acceptance of discussions of internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions as part of a post-Kyoto agreement. Most conditions facilitated competition and hampered shaming.

Mechanism: *Shaming* by developed countries at COPs

At the Montreal COP in 2005, developed countries used the opportunity of scheduled post-2012 negotiations to increase the pressure on developing countries by pointing to developing countries' rising GHG emissions in order to push them into accepting mitigation commitments as part of the Kyoto Protocol's second commitment period. However, this shaming was contested and rejected by developing countries. The US and the Canadian COP presidency then successfully pushed for the opening of the Convention Dialogue, alongside the Kyoto negotiation track (Wittneben et al. 2006: 92), that started a "process for discussions on long-term cooperative action to address climate

change” (UNFCCC 2005a: 1). This dialogue would also cover mitigation actions (but not necessary mitigation commitments) by non-Kyoto Protocol parties, such as the US and developing countries like India. Pressure contributed to India accepting such a dialogue, which, among others, would aim to “identify approaches which would support, and provide the enabling conditions for, actions put forward voluntarily by developing countries that promote local sustainable development and mitigate climate change” (UNFCCC 2006b: 4). This already represented a change from previous COPs where largely adaptation issues were discussed, as the US and developing countries like India had prevented any discussion on post-2012 mitigation efforts (Ott et al. 2005: 84-85; Raghunandan 2019: 195; UNFCCC 2005b, Decision 1/CP.10). In putting internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions by developing countries on the agenda, developed countries had reached a small success through their shaming efforts. In this dialogue, Annex I parties like the EU again shamed developing countries for their rising emissions and argued that the EU's own mitigation efforts would thereby be neutralized, hoping to successfully pressure them into accepting non-compensated mitigation actions. However, developing countries were reluctant to discuss any future obligatory actions under the Convention Dialogue (Kulovesi et al. 2007: 256; Sengupta 2019: 118-121; Wittneben et al. 2006: 90-93). The pressure continued at the 2006 COP in Nairobi, where Russia proposed that developing countries should adopt voluntary mitigation commitments under the Convention for the period after 2012, which was also rejected by developing countries (Kulovesi et al. 2007: 259).

The increasing bilateral and multilateral engagement in the context of the 2005 COP already led to a first small-scale organizational change in the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEF). The MOEF's climate change unit was strengthened through an increase of staff in order to cope with the increasing number of international meetings on climate change (GI-28022018). Approaching climate negotiations from a foreign policy perspective, Indian negotiators warded off developed countries' pressures by pointing to the Convention's meso norm of CBDR+RC and to the historical responsibility of the Global North in causing climate change, which, in their view, would necessitate the implementation of mitigation commitments and actions by developed countries (Dubash et al. 2018a: 396; Vihma 2011: 79; GI-19042018). They thereby perceived themselves as the defenders of the existing UNFCCC norms and saw developed countries' demands as norm contestations (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 469). Moreover, India contested this shaming by emphasizing their low per-capita GHG emissions and by demanding climate justice and equity based on per capita GHG emissions in a post-Kyoto agreement (Ghosh 2012: 165; Vihma 2011: 79). However, India did not use the equity perspective to push developed countries to more mitigation efforts, but rather utilized it to ward off their pressure. It was hence used as a “shield ... but not as a sword” (Raghunandan 2020: 205; citing Rajamani 2011).

Overall, developed countries' shaming was mostly unsuccessful in shaping the collective understanding of the developing country climate mitigation norm toward mitigation commitments by developing countries. Shaming was only successful to start negotiations in the Convention Dialogue on internationally supported and enabled voluntary mitigation actions by developing countries, which

indicated a small shift away from internationally compensated mitigation actions (such as in the form of the CDM). Indian negotiators accepted such a dialogue, but still warded off any demands of own immediate non-compensated mitigation actions. India still interpreted the meso norm of CBDR+RC in a way that required exclusive developed country climate mitigation efforts and only accepted an interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm that was based on full international financial compensation of mitigation projects in developing countries.

Mechanism: *Competition* about carbon space in negotiations

India warded off developed countries' pressure by engaging in carbon space competition. Indian diplomats perceived climate negotiations as bargains about future economic development prospects. Their central goal was to secure sufficient "carbon space" (Sengupta 2019: 132), as India pursued a coal-dependent development path with growth being the first priority (Isaksen and Stokke 2014: 113; Stevenson 2011: 1018). India, therefore, perceived any demands by developed countries for mitigation efforts by developing countries as potentially hampering those growth prospects (Sengupta 2019: 132). The problem of climate change was perceived to be "generated by excessive consumption patterns in the North" and was seen "as a reflection of globally inequitable patterns of development" (Stevenson 2011: 1018). One Indian negotiator, therefore, underlined that India would not accept "a treaty which puts a ceiling on our per capita emissions and so on energy units [...] as it would manifest a distinction between poor and rich countries" (GI-19042018). Instead, Indian negotiators demanded developed countries' mitigation commitments in line with the CBDR+RC meso norm and their historical responsibility (Stevenson 2011: 1018), as the Global North had already exceeded its fair share of carbon space. In contrast, Indian negotiators perceived their country far away from curbing their own emission and wanted to catch up economically to the Global North. For this reason, they did not try to leverage stronger emission cuts by developed countries through engaging in own mitigation efforts. They refused domestic mitigation financing as providing dispersed global benefits, while only accepting domestic financing of adaptation measures as benefitting India domestically (Rajamani 2009: 353, 356; GI-19042018). Indian representatives argued that they wanted to use their own limited resources for development needs (Joshi 2013: 137) and highlighted India's low per capita emissions as an excuse for abstaining from mitigation efforts. However, they did not reflect upon the huge differences between the rich and the poor in India, as India's increasing middle class of 80 million people already adopted Northern lifestyles, which was noted by Indian intellectuals, who criticized the government for "protect[ing] the interests of this consumerist elite" (Bidwai 2005) by refusing mitigation commitments. Instead, the Indian government argued that mitigation commitments would reduce economic growth and eventually curb resources for climate change adaptation (Rajamani 2009: 356). The government, therefore, planned to gain climate resilience through coal-based economic development (NI-15122016).

Indian negotiators feared protectionist actions by developed countries, which increasingly considered emerging economies as competitors. Developed countries, such as France in 2006, talked about introducing carbon tariffs on industrial exports for countries that would not implement mitigation actions under a post-Kyoto agreement. France justified this proposal with the competitive advantage that countries would gain who did not adopt mitigation actions. Indian negotiators perceived this as an attempt to put the costs of mitigation efforts on all countries, which was seen as a dilution of the CBDR+RC norm and as an indication that developed countries were not acting according to their responsibilities as historical polluters (Songenberg 2006; GI-19042018). Moreover, they, assumed those considerations to be economically motivated to sell patent-protected low carbon technologies to the Global South (Joshi 2013: 137).

The Indian government was, however, open to business opportunities. In 2005, it, therefore, joined the exclusive Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) that promotes cooperation on clean technologies. The Indian government even accepted that APP does not differentiate between emission responsibilities of its members and rejects mitigation commitments in order to gain access to technology (Stevenson 2011: 1017-1018). The Indian government was also keen to receive foreign investments and technology transfer under the Convention, as in the case of CDM, which it perceived as a form of voluntary internationally compensated mitigation action (Dubash 2013: 192-193). Indian negotiators, therefore, actively pushed for the continuation of carbon markets post-2012 and demanded from developed countries an increasing usage of the CDM in order to increase India's financial benefits (Sengupta 2019: 119-120; Stevenson 2011: 1017-1018; 2012: 144). India's acceptance of the Convention Dialogue must be seen in this light, as the dialogue aims to identify approaches to support and enable developing countries in taking actions that promote mitigation and development (UNFCCC 2006b: 4), which was in line with India's demand for compensated mitigation actions (Sengupta 2019: 117) and its rejection of non-compensated mitigation efforts based on a carbon space interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm.

Overall, India's competition approach led to the contestation of any non-compensated mitigation efforts. But it permitted an engagement by India in the Convention Dialogue over internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions. The Indian government interpreted the developing country climate mitigation norm from a 'carbon space' and 'resilience through coal-based development' perspective that would only accept internationally financed mitigation actions.

Condition: No *cultural resonance* with external actor's norm interpretations due to enduring perspectives on per capita equity

External actor interpreted the developing country climate mitigation norm in a way that demanded developing countries' non-compensated mitigation efforts, which did not resonate culturally with India's long-lasting normative beliefs about the climate regime. India perceived such demands as

unfair, as it regarded the problem of climate change being historically caused by developed countries (Isaksen and Stokke 2014: 113). India, instead, demanded equity between member-states based on historical per capita GHG emissions (Atteridge 2013: 57; Raghunandan 2019: 200; Sengupta 2019: 116). In India's perspective, developed countries had already overused their fair share of the atmosphere based on per-capita allowance (Dubash et al. 2018a: 397). In 1992, Indian negotiators had successfully incorporated the reference to the low per-capita emissions of developing countries in the Convention preamble (Stevenson 2012: 133-134), but failed to achieve any recognition of particular Convention rights on the basis of per-capita emissions (Stevenson 2011: 1013). However, they contributed to designing the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' meso norm as a compromise between the 'common responsibilities' statement of the IPCC report of 1990 and developing countries' demand of developed countries' 'main responsibility'. Since then, India has always interpreted the CBDR+RC meso norm alongside the Annex I/Non-Annex divide, and had supported its operationalization in the form of the micro norm of developed countries' mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (Raghunandan 2019: 191; Sengupta 2019: 115-116; Vihma 2011: 77-78). Over the years, India dismissed all calls to take on mitigation commitments (Plagemann and Prys-Hansen 2018: 3) and took a defensive, reactive stance. Its negotiators resisted pressure by developed countries, and even shifted the focus away from enhanced global climate action toward adaptation issues.

In the negotiations, India did not actively project its own vulnerability and did not try to leverage stronger international mitigation efforts by emphasizing own domestic mitigation efforts (Raghunandan 2019: 188-190, 192-195; Rajamani 2009: 353). Already ongoing sectoral activities could have been used in this way by India: Since the oil crisis in the 1970s, India had continuously invested in energy efficiency (Harrison and Kostka 2014: 466) and had promoted renewable energy. It had also started to conserve and replant forests in the 1980s. The central government did not link these sectoral activities to the question of climate mitigation (Dubash et al. 2018a: 404). While the 2006 Environment Policy recognizes climate change impacts as a new threat, it only emphasizes the responsibility of developed countries to act and considers any domestic mitigation actions as limiting factors to India's future economic growth. In consequence, it does not foresee any future climate mitigation actions in India (MoEF 2006: 41-43).

India only accepted those external actors' norm interpretations that resonated culturally with its own perspectives. India already engaged in CDM projects, which it perceived as morally acceptable as a form of compensated mitigation actions (Dubash 2013: 192-193). India, hence, accepted an emphasis on voluntary mitigation actions supported and enabled through financial and technology support as part of the Convention Dialogue (Dubash 2013: 192-193; Sengupta 2019: 115).

Overall, cultural resonance hampered shaming and facilitated competition. Due to cultural resonance, India continued to embrace its preexisting norm interpretations, accepted compensated mitigation actions and rejected any further normative changes advocated by external actors.

Condition: No *material resonance* with external actors' norm interpretation due to coal-based and economic-growth oriented development

The Indian government's political economy pathway did not resonate materially with the norm interpretations by external actors that demanded non-compensated mitigation efforts by developing countries. The Indian government perceived it as necessary that India's emissions continue to grow in order to industrialize the economy, to achieve high economic growth and to catch up with the Global North through coal-based development (Sengupta 2019: 115-116; GI-19042018; Stevenson 2011: 1017-1018). India, therefore, perceived any limitation of its GHG emissions as a constraint to its economic development and growth rates (Dubash 2013: 192; Isaksen and Stokke 2014: 113; Sengupta 2019: 132). In the 2000s, this development pathway also led to increasing large-scale deforestation for infrastructure or mining projects. From 2003 until 2007, around 311,220 ha of forest land were deforested, while in the total period from 1980 until 2007, around 1,140,177 ha of forests were cleared (Lahiri 2015). The Indian government thereby continued the process of industrialization and liberalization that started in the 1990s and that aimed at increasing economic growth through investments in non-agricultural sectors (Stevenson 2012: 120-123). Even under Prime Minister Nehru, industrialization was promoted in contrast to Mahatma Gandhi's idea of a village-based agricultural development pathway for India (Stevenson 2012: 116-118). Moreover, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had also emphasized an economic growth development pathway based on the belief that "[t]he environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty" (cited in Stevenson 2012: 123), which she stated at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1972.

The Indian government's perspective had only resonated materially with an interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm that was based on compensated mitigation actions, such as in the form of the CDM, which led to incoming foreign investments and buying of low carbon technologies for energy efficiency and renewable energy (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012: 578; Never 2012b: 144; Sengupta 2019: 119-120). The Indian government, therefore, could accept the Convention Dialogue that aimed at discussing further internationally financed and enabled mitigation actions by developing countries but rejected any norm interpretations that demanded non-compensated mitigation efforts by India, as this was regarded to be deleterious for economic growth. This facilitated competition and hampered shaming.

Condition: *Material reception* in the Convention Dialogue

India perceived itself materially vulnerable in the climate negotiations. Indian negotiators refrained from acknowledging their current low carbon sectorial activities (such as energy efficiency or afforestation) as climate mitigation actions, as they perceived it as harmful for India's negotiation position. They feared that "it could be interpreted as evidence that India could and should undertake climate mitigation using its own resources, and also that India could develop with a lower allotment of carbon space" (Dubash 2013: 197). While India would have been able to accept own mitigation

efforts based on already ongoing sectoral activities (Betz 2012: 21-22), its negotiators contested any demands by developed countries in order to ensure sufficient carbon space for India's coal-based development path, which hampered shaming. At the same time, India also feared carbon border taxes by developed countries on its exports (Hall 2016: 276; GI-19042018), which facilitated shaming and contributed to accepting a Convention Dialogue based on internationally financed and enabled mitigation actions by developing countries. The latter was also facilitated by positive material reception regarding compensated mitigation actions in the form of the CDM that lead to financial and technology transfer, as Indian businesses had been economically benefiting from it (Dubash 2013: 192-193; Sengupta 2019: 115, 119-120). This facilitated India's competition engagement and contributed to accepting the discussions on internationally funded and enabled mitigation actions under the Convention Dialogue (Never 2012b: 164). Overall, material reception both facilitated and hampered shaming, while also facilitating competition. This did not result in a globalized norm interpretation, as Indian actors continued to rely on their preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions), and only accepted discussions on internationally financed and enabled mitigation actions as a concession to external actors' norm interpretation calling for increased contributions by developing countries to address climate change.

Condition: No negative *social reception* due to the Indian identity

India did not show any negative social reception toward the increasing pressure by developed countries from 2005 to 2006. Indian negotiators did not move away from their negotiation position (Raghuandan 2019: 188-189; Vihma 2011: 80), leading to India increasingly being seen as a nay-sayer in climate negotiations. An image that it also achieved in other international negotiations, such as in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Indian negotiators were famous for insisting on their opinion and for not accepting any compromises (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012: 576; Narlikar 2017: 93-94, 98).

Looking at Indian negotiation behavior through the lens of the Mahabharata (an important collection of ancient Hindu stories), scholars argue that Indian negotiators are culturally less oriented to accept compromises, negotiate from a moral high ground, and perceive negotiations as a zero-sum game. They argue that Indian negotiators are not easily socialized by external actors and prefer balancing of major powers through coalition building. Occasionally, Indian negotiators accept voluntary actions, while they are often reluctant to make major concession (Narlikar and Narlikar 2014: 7-8, 216-219). Indeed, those elements could be found in the climate negotiations: Indian negotiators perceived themselves as the defenders of the Convention norms (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 469). As part of the G77/China coalition, they balanced against the developed countries (Wittneben et al. 2006: 92-93). From a moral high ground, they did not accept accusations of being among the largest GHG emitters, but pointed to India's low per-capita GHG emissions (Stevenson 2011: 1006). Carbon space competition was, furthermore, seen as a zero-sum game to which Indian negotiators did not

make compromises (Sengupta 2019: 132). Eventually, they only accepted a Convention Dialogue that discusses voluntary internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions (UNFCCC 2006b: 4).

Overall, India's lack of social vulnerability hampered shaming by developed countries and the acceptance of external actors' norm interpretations. Instead, it facilitated competition and the persistence of India's preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions).

Condition: Perception of available *knowledge* on climate change

Knowledge on climate science was sufficiently available among experts and diplomats engaged in the climate negotiations (Never 2012b: 157). At the time, scientific studies already indicated that the temperature will increase by 3 degree Celsius to 4 degree Celsius in India, which will negatively affect crop yields and will lead to droughts and flooding (Bidwai 2005). Yet, Prime Minister Singh (Congress party) still perceived climate science to be insufficient (Rajamani 2009: 344). While, in the early 1990s, Indian scientists were able to show the inaccuracy of claims by the Global North that methane emissions from agriculture (i.e., rice paddies, cattle, pigs) were the most important causes for global climate change, the Indian government had not subsequently invested in strengthening the climate science capacity of the country. Climate science insights on India's vulnerability did also not affect India's negotiation position (Raghunandan 2019: 190-192; Sengupta 2019: 133-134). The perception of insufficient knowledge hampered the acceptance of own mitigation efforts. It thereby also hampered shaming efforts by developed countries.

Condition: No *opposition* to the Indian government's negotiation position

Indian negotiators did not face any opposition, as there was a broad societal consensus about India's negotiation position (Atteridge 2013: 54; Sengupta 2019: 133; Vihma 2011: 82). Core features, such as the per-capita approach, had been influenced by the NGO 'Centre for Science and Environment' (CSE) in the early 1990s (Raghunandan 2019: 191; Sengupta 2019: 133). Since then, CSE had continued to provide advice and to work closely together with the government (Fisher 2012: 111; Stevenson 2012: 140). Even environmental NGOs perceived climate change as a distraction from more pressing local environmental problems and approached it from an equity perspective (Lele 2012: 208). They have, hence, agreed with the government interpretation that climate mitigation was the responsibility of developed countries and even feared that domestic mitigation actions could lead to problematic actions, such as the expansion of monoculture forest plantations or nuclear power plants (Dubash 2013: 193, 195). Overall, there, hence, was no opposition to the government position. This hampered shaming and prevented the acceptance of own mitigation efforts, while India's competition engagement was domestically uncontested and therefore facilitated.

Condition: *Political-administrative set-up* during the Convention Dialogue

India's political-administrative set-up was characterized by a small group of bureaucrats from MOEF and the Ministry of External Affairs steering India's negotiations from a foreign policy perspective since many years, leading to intellectual continuity in India's approach. There was little involvement of the PM's Office or sectoral ministries. The latter only provided technical input on particular issues, but overall coordination was hardly done, leading to horizontal fragmentation (Atteridge 2013: 58; Dubash and Joseph 2016: 46; Sengupta 2019: 133; Stevenson 2012: 124; GI-25042018). Small governmental capacities in MOEF and the small delegation, furthermore, prevented any normative changes in India's position (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012: 585; Mohan 2017: 54; Sengupta 2019: 133-134; GI-28022018). Hence, limited capacity, continuity of responsible officials and horizontal fragmentation facilitated the endurance of India's competition approach and of its preexisting norm interpretations. The political-administrative set-up, thereby, hampered any shaming efforts and the acceptance of own mitigation efforts.

Sum-up of causal complex 1

From 2005 to 2006, India contested any demands by developed countries to accept own mitigation efforts due to competition. *Shaming*, hence, was mostly unsuccessfully, but in combination with *competition*, contributed to India's acceptance of discussions on voluntary internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions as part of the Convention Dialogue, while not resulting in new globalized norm interpretations by India. Most conditions, thereby, facilitated competition (except for knowledge) and all conditions hampered shaming (except for material reception). The increasing number of meetings in the run-up to Montreal COP in which India already faced increasing shaming contributed to the increase of climate change staff in the MOEF – a small-scale organizational change. India, hence, stuck to its *preexisting norm interpretations* that required climate mitigation commitments by developed countries and only accepted negotiations on internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions by developing countries, while developed countries were unsuccessful in shifting the collective interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm toward non-compensated mitigation efforts by developing countries.

5.2.2 Contestation of compensated reduction from 2005 until 2007 (causal complex 2)

At the Montreal COP in 2005, in a parallel negotiation track to the Convention Dialogue, parties to the Convention started to negotiate a new international financial instrument for compensated mitigation actions in developing countries' forests. The Coalition of Rainforest Nations tried to *persuade* India and other parties to accept their interpretation of the carbon forestry norm in the form of compensated reduction (of deforestation). Indian negotiators contested this and based upon their

competition engagement proposed an alternative interpretation in the form of compensated conservation. While all conditions facilitated competition, most conditions hampered persuasion.

Mechanism: *Persuasion* efforts by Coalition for Rainforest Nations on compensated reduction

Negotiations on compensated mitigation actions in the forestry sector started in 2005. In 2003, Brazilian scientists had suggested to compensate the reduction of deforestation in developing countries by carbon trading with private companies or developed countries (Pistorius 2012: 640; Santilli et al. 2005: 269-270). At the 2005 COP in Montreal, Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, as representatives of the 2003 formed Coalition for Rainforest Nations, formally proposed financial payments for reducing emissions from deforestation (RED) (Lederer 2012b; Pistorius 2012: 640). They criticized that the Kyoto Protocol did not provide any incentives for reducing deforestation, but only allowed for crediting of afforestation and reforestation (UNFCCC 2005c: 3, 8). They, hence, highlighted that their “emphasis is carbon emissions – not ‘sinks’” (UNFCCC 2005c: 8) and proposed to change the Kyoto regulations in this regard with accounting to be done based on a deforestation baseline or to come up with an additional protocol covering RED (UNFCCC 2005c: 8-9). RED advocates then tried to persuade other parties to the Convention to accept this proposal. Subsequent discussions continued in UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) in 2006, during which Brazil refused the incorporation of RED in any carbon trading under the Kyoto Protocol and demanded that the RED instrument should be limited to voluntary actions and financed by developed countries’ grants (UNFCCC 2006a: 60-61). Furthermore, parties to the Convention, such as Bolivia, the Congo Basin countries and Indonesia, started to call for expanding the instrument to include the reduction of degradation (UNFCCC 2006a: 19-21, 72, 88-89).

Indian negotiators were also not persuaded by this approach. In their perspective, the “[p]roposed concept of ‘Compensated Reduction’ favours the countries with high deforestation rates” (UNFCCC 2007c: 61). This was not in India’s interest as according to its own official data and definition of forest and tree cover, it presented itself to the international community as a country that had been able to stabilize and even to increase its forest cover (UNFCCC 2007c: 60). However, the Coalition of Rainforest Nations was able to persuade the community of states to accept negotiations on international instrument based on the carbon forestry norm. Yet, what it would include particularly, was still open to contestation and negotiations. India, nevertheless, was persuaded to engage in negotiation on an international instrument based on this micro norm and subsequently tried to reshape it based on its own interests, as India did not want only high density and high deforestation countries like Indonesia and Brazil to benefit from such an approach (Kohli and Menon 2011: 27; Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 479; GI-05122016). Indian negotiators thereby started to increasingly perceive forestry actions from a carbon value perspective (GI-1-13032018).

Overall, external actors were not successful in persuading India to accept compensated reduction as an interpretation of the carbon forestry norm. India contested this approach and aimed to reshape

the micro norm subsequently. Other parties, too, engaged in widening it to include degradation issues. Yet, India was convinced to accept continuous negotiations on this new international instrument operationalizing the carbon forestry norm.

Mechanism: For *competition* reasons introducing compensated conservation

As the Indian government realized that it would not receive the same high financial benefits from RED as large-scale deforestation countries like Indonesia (GI-1-13032018, NI-27022018), it hoped to reshape the international financial instrument operationalizing the carbon forestry norm so that India could receive higher financial returns (Kohli and Menon 2011: 27; Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 479; GI-05122016). India perceived it “as an opportunity to get money” (GI-15122016) for its own long-existing afforestation programs, which resulted in the expansion of planted forests, while natural forests were decreasing due to development projects and fuel wood collection (Kohli and Menon 2011: 27-28; UNFCCC 2007c: 60). The Indian government’s perception was that India had been doing sustainable forest management for decades (GI-2-13032018), which is why the Indian government was not accepting an international instrument that addresses degradation and deforestation, despite India’s continuous problems with degradation through fuelwood collection and deforestation through infrastructure development or mining. This resulted into dissatisfaction regarding the RED proposal, as indicated by one negotiator, who emphasizes the important role of competition: “We are losing despite we are conserving forests. [...We] could also extract resources. REDD is putting us at disadvantage. [...That’s why] we demanded compensated conservation” (GI-05122016). India had also not benefited from the eligibility of afforestation under the CDM as the procedures and rules were so complex that forest projects did not take up in the worldwide CDM market (Singh et al. 2013: 66-67).³⁶

For that reason, MOEF mandated India’s negotiators to “upload our forest conservation to the global level” (GI-1-13032018) at the 2006 Nairobi COP. MOEF believed that there should also be financial support for those countries that are stabilizing and increasing their forest cover (GI-151202016). MOEF planned to “use the negotiations to contribute to the 33 per cent goal” (GI-1-13032018), which is the longstanding forest policy objective of increasing India’s forest and tree cover from 23 to 33 per cent (an area is already counted as forest when only ten percent of it is covered by trees according to the Indian definition) (GOI 1952; GI-1-13032018). Both at the 2006 Nairobi COP and at a series of subsequent UNFCCC workshops in 2006 and 2007, mandated by the Montreal COP decision, Indian negotiators advocated for financial rewards for forest conservation, sustainable forest management and afforestation (Kishwan 2007: 13). They complained that compensated reduction would reward countries with high deforestation rates and would not benefit nation-states that had previously stabilized or increasing its forest cover (Kishwan 2007: 4, 10, 14). They, therefore, proposed the approach of ‘compensated conservation’ as an alternative approach to

³⁶ The first forestry CDM project only started in India in 2008 (Shailesh 2011).

compensated reduction, which would only provide financial incentives to countries that maintain and increase carbon stocks, resulting from conservation and increasing or improving forest cover (Kishwan 2007: 2, 15, 38). India's proposal included both future activities until 2030 and past activities since 1990 (UNFCCC 2007c: 61). Indian negotiators proposed an approach in which the accounting would take place for the whole country and material benefits would be distributed by the central government (Kishwan 2007: 23, 25). In order to push their argument, Indian negotiators even claimed that their previous domestic conservation activities had been sustained at huge economic costs (UNFCCC 2007c: 61), indicating their predominant competition engagement.

Indian negotiators substantiated this approach for the Indian case by presenting figures that indicate a stabilizing and increasing forest cover from 1987 until 2003, a growing afforestation area until 1998, a growing stock of forests and trees outside forests from 1980 until 2003 and projections that indicated the continuation of those trajectories until 2031 (Kishwan 2007: 31-35). Based on a commissioned report by MOEF, Indian negotiators argued that India's carbon stock in forests will increase from 8.79 Gt of carbon to 9.75 Gt of carbon from 2005 until 2030 (Kishwan 2007: 36), without making it transparent that the calculations of the respective study did not include any carbon emissions from deforestation or degradation from fuelwood collection (Ravindranath et al. 2008: 216, 221),³⁷ which indicates that they solely aimed to make an argument for the financing of afforestation programs. Despite, India's efforts, only ten developing countries initially supported the proposal, as they had also stabilized their forest cover, such as China (GI-1-13032018).

Overall, India engaged in competition by proposing an alternative interpretation of the carbon forestry norm that emphasizes compensated conservation. This was also in line with India's preexisting acceptance of compensated mitigation actions as an interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm.

Condition: *Cultural resonance* with preexisting forest policies

Compensated reduction as a norm interpretation by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations did not resonate well with India's existing forest policies and norms, as it planned to reward the reduction of deforestation rates. But since the 1980s, India did not face the problem of large-scale deforestation as countries like Indonesia. Previously, large-scale deforestation was also a problem in India: Under colonial rule, the British administration solely aimed for timber extraction (Gopalkrishnan 2012: 344). After decolonialization, forest departments continued to view forests as economic resource only and aimed for maximum revenue. Timber extraction as well as forest diversion for industrial development, agricultural expansion and commercial plantations occurred during this period under the guidance of the 1952 Forest Policy (Das 2020: 89, 92-93; ForEcoIndia n.d.: 2). Under the pressure from local movements and introduced under Indira Gandhi's government, the 1980 Forest Conservation Act

³⁷ The report was presented to MOEF in 2006 (see Kishwan 2007: 36). In 2008, a part of this report was subsequently published as a research article by Ravindranath et al. (2008).

made large-scale deforestation more complicated as it shifted the final decision over the approval of forest conversion from the state governments to the central government (Bhushan and Saxena 2016: 8, GI-05122016, RI-12122016, NI-14122016; Das 2020: 94). Since then, state governments had to ask for permission from the central government when land users wanted to divert reserved forest-land to non-reserved land, to use it for non-forest purpose (incl. agricultural purposes) or to clear naturally grown trees for afforestation purposes (GOI 1980, Article 2; Kohli and Menon 2011: 15). Subsequently, the National Forest Policy of 1988 then also provided a more conservation oriented policy focus alongside other goals such as livelihood provision and provision of wood (GOI 1980: Article 2; 1988: Article 1 and 2). This has been hailed as a shift from commercial forest exploitation to forest conservation (CI-2-26022018; for a critical perspective, see Kohli and Menon 2011).

The Forest Conservation Act and following guidelines, however, did not end deforestation per se, but introduced a domestic compensation and offsetting system for non-climate change reasons based on the polluter-pays principle (Kohli and Menon 2011: 13, 16, 21). The guidelines of the Forest Conservation Act made it mandatory to conduct compensatory afforestation over an equivalent area of non-forest land or over twice the area diverted on degraded forest land (MOEF 2004: 37-38). Initially, approved forest-land diverters had only to pay for the diverted forest land for compensatory afforestation. Later, it was added that monetary compensation based on the net value of forest had to be paid alongside any expenses for compensatory afforestation (Aggarwal et al. 2009a: 6; Kohli and Menon 2011: 16). After a Supreme Court decision of 1996, this was not only applicable in recorded forest land, but even for forests in the dictionary meaning outside of those areas (Das 2020: 96; Kohli and Menon 2011: 7). This domestic “commodification of forests” (Kohli and Menon 2011: 13) predated the international one and provided a certain cultural resonance for the discussions on the international financial instrument for carbon forestry, even though the approach of compensated reduction favored a polluter-*gets-paid* principle – at least for developing countries – and was therefore not in line with India’s polluter-*pays* principle (Kohli and Menon 2011: 16). India chose not to perceive itself as a deforesting country, which limited India’s cultural resonance with the RED proposal, even though India deforested approximately 1 million ha from 1980 until 2007 (Lahiri 2015; Ramesh 2015a: 391).

Besides conservation, afforestation had already been part of the cultural perspective and training of Indian foresters for decades (Fleischman 2014: 63). The Forest Policy of 1952 already mentioned the target to increase the forest and tree cover to one third of the land area and thereby to extend forests beyond the official forest area (GOI 1952; Sudha and Ravindranath 2004: 2, DI-GI-02122016). This figure became a cultural norm that is not questioned anymore (AI-10022018).

Afforestation programs had been ongoing since the 1980s as part of social forestry programs. From 1980 until 2005, the reported accumulated afforested area amounts to 34 million ha, including agro-forestry, farm forestry, community woodlots and avenue plantations (Ravindranath et al. 2008: 217). The Forest Policy of 1988 and the Joint Forest Management (JFM) Guidelines in 1990, for the first

time, included joint forest management between communities and state forest departments, including regeneration and afforestation activities. This was initiated to reduce the ongoing degradation that the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 could not stop and to supply forest products to local communities, covering an area of over 15 million ha (Das 2020: 95; Ravindranath et al. 2008: 220). Furthermore, in 1992, the National Afforestation and Eco-Development Board was founded to implement afforestation programs by state departments (NAEB 2019; AI-10022018), and, in 2001, a new Greening India afforestation program was proposed by the Planning Commission (Planning Commission 2001: v-vi). Afforestation is also among the most important Indian forestry strategies for wood production (Fleischman 2014: 62). These afforestation activities did not resonate well with the compensated reduction approach, as it did not foresee any afforestation activities. The goal of India's government, hence, was to increase the resonance with India's forest policies by uploading the conservation and afforestation approach to the international level (GI-1-13032018).

Overall, the compensated reduction approach did not resonate with India's forest policy norms and was therefore contested, which hampered persuasion by the Coalition for Rainforest Nations. It, at the same time, facilitated competition and India's alternative norm interpretation in the form of compensated conservation, leading to the acceptance of further negotiation on the new international instrument.

Condition: *Material resonance* with political economy of afforestation and development

The approach of compensated reduction did not resonate well with India's political economy of forests. Deforestation was not as large-scale as in Indonesia or Brazil (Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 479), as the 1980 Forest Conservation Act brought deforestation down to roughly 1 million ha between 1980 and 2007, compared to 4 to 5 million ha between 1950 and 1980 (Bhushan and Saxena 2016: 10; Lahiri 2015; Ramesh 2015a: 391). Yet, reports mention that mining, agriculture and infrastructure development still led to deforestation of circa 50,000 to 60,000 ha per year according to some observers (DI-GI-02122016, GI-12022018, Saxena et al. 2018: 11).³⁸ Official information even revealed a fluctuation of diverted forestland between 36,000 ha in 2005 and 109,000 ha in 2006 (Kohli and Menon 2011: 15), while Indian negotiators downplayed deforestation to be only 30,000 ha per year (UNFCCC 2007c: 60). These deforestation activities, however, were regarded as materially necessary for India's continuous development pathway and were only contested by environmental activists. MOEF, instead, confirmed 99 percent of all the proposals for environmental clearances (Ramesh 2015a: 79). This resulted into an image of the ministry as a "rubber stamp[,...or] as an 'ATM' ministry" (Ramesh 2015a: 3), with the "general impression [...] that it could be 'managed'" (Ramesh 2015a: 3), indicating the prioritization of development over conservation concerns. Compensated reduction, hence, did not resonate well materially, as the

³⁸ In North East India mostly shifting cultivation with slash and burn practices contributed to deforestation (NI-05122016).

Indian government had no interest in reducing India's deforestation rates for political-economy reasons.

India's forests also faced large-scale degradation, as 275 to 300 million forest-dependent people relied on forests for fuelwood collection or grazing (RI-16122016, AI-10022018, Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 478; Saxena et al. 2018: 11, 13, 17). Since colonial rule, local communities had been denied any rights to forests, being regarded as illegal encroachers by the forest bureaucracy (Kohli and Menon 2011: 8). Observers note that more than 40 per cent of India's forests are degraded (Aggarwal et al. 2009b: 92) – at a time when Indian negotiators hailed India's stabilizing and increasing forest cover (Kishwan 2007; UNFCCC 2007c: 60). In 2004, India's first National Communication still classified the forestry sector as a carbon emitter of 14.29 Mt CO₂eq emissions, as it still accounted for degradation through fuelwood collection, which subsequent government reports communicated in the energy sector section (GOI 2004: iv). While countries such as Bolivia already proposed to broaden the compensated reduction approach to include degradation, this did not resonate well with the Indian political economy of forest-dependent people. For decades, these local communities had been fighting for their traditional forest rights and had been dependent for their livelihoods on forest products (NI-14022018). At the time of the negotiations, the Indian minority government was tolerated by two communist parties, who lobbied for welfare programs for poor people (Basu 2009: 12-13).

India's own response to livelihood problems and degradation had traditionally been the promotion of large-scale community-based afforestation and reforestation. From 1980 until 2005, roughly 30 million ha out of 34 million ha of afforested area had been undertaken under social forestry programs (Ravindranath et al. 2008: 217, 219-220). Those programs were designed to increase livelihood options for local communities and to reduce degradation pressure (Das 2020: 95). Since the 1970s, the Indian government has also supported tree crops planting by farmers to increase the supply of wood, which also contributed to increasing forest and tree cover (Ravindranath et al. 1997: 311). India's annual increase in afforested area was among the highest in the world, ranging from annual planting of 1 million ha to even 1.78 million ha from 1980 to 1990s (Singh et al. 2013: 64, 74). Despite tree planting of 34 million ha from 1980 until 2005, India's forest cover only increased from 64.08 million ha in 1987 to 67.83 million ha in 2003 (Ravindranath et al. 2008: 217; UNFCCC 2007c: 60), indicating continuing deforestation and/or short lifetime of seedlings. The result is a loss in native forest, which is replaced by increasing tree cover through tree planting, including eucalyptus and pongamia that are not even mentioned in the working plans of the forest bureaucracies (Fleischman 2014: 67). Also agro-forestry activities under government programs largely introduced monoculture plantations, e.g., for eucalyptus or teak (Ravindranath and Murthy 2010: 447-448). In 2002, the Indian government even planned the adoption of the 'Greening India Programme' that would cover an area of 43 million ha for afforestation activities (i.e., JFM, commercial agroforestry, subsistence agroforestry) (Planning Commission 2003: 1063-1064) in order to contribute to reaching a forest and tree cover of one-third of India's land area as well as to "ensure meeting the basic needs of people,

environmental protection, food accessibility and productive employment generation to 10 crore³⁹ people” (Planning Commission 2003: 1064). A compensated conservation and afforestation approach, hence, resonated much better with India’s political economy.

Overall, India’s political economy of forests did not resonate well with the compensated reduction approach. It, therefore, hampered persuasion. However, Indian negotiators could make the new international instrument and its micro norm resonate with India’s political economy by proposing an alternative approach of compensated conservation (i.e., meaning afforestation), which facilitated India’s competition engagement.

Condition: *Material reception of India’s forest administration*

An approach of compensated reduction did not translate in sufficient material prospects in the perspective of MOEF and its negotiators, despite ongoing deforestation for infrastructure development and degradation for fuelwood. MOEF, instead, proposed compensated conservation, as an approach of the international instrument, which it perceived to provide sufficient and credible material benefits, and expected to receive those financial benefits for its conservation and afforestation activities (Kohli and Menon 2011: 27-28; GI-05122016). MOEF had always had a very small budget compared to other line ministries. It only received around 1.5 per cent of the total government budget and was looking for additional financial sources (NI-05122016, AI-10022018, GI-15122016). MOEF, thereby, hoped to receive financial compensation for past and future conservation and afforestation activities (UNFCCC 2007c: 61). Those material benefits were perceived so attractive that the Indian government even painted a rosy picture of its forestry sector to convince other UNFCCC parties to agree on a compensated conservation approach. Based on India’s past and planned afforestation programs, MOEF’s sponsored study claimed that “India is one of the few countries in the world, particularly among the tropical countries, where carbon stock in forests has stabilized or is projected to increase” (Ravindranath et al. 2008: 220), while the study did not include emissions from deforestation or degradation that are still occurring as mentioned above (Ravindranath et al. 2008: 216, 221).

Already in 2002, the government planned the adoption of the ‘Greening India Programme’ for sectorial development reasons that would cover an area of 43 million ha for afforestation activities in order to increase India’s forest and tree cover (Planning Commission 2003: 1063-1064), which would allow India to realize financial benefits under compensated conservation.

Overall, potential positive material prospects from the new international instrument were perceived sufficiently large to motivate the Indian government to lobby for an alternative approach of compensated conservation and to contest compensated reduction. Positive material reception, therefore, facilitated competition and hampered persuasion.

³⁹ One crore denotes 10 million.

Condition: *Political-administrative set-up* characterized by strong capacity on forest and carbon monitoring

Indian negotiators were able to lobby for their alternative approach of compensated conservation, as India's forest bureaucracies and research institutes had sufficient capacity to come up with a methodological approach to monitor and evaluate conservation and afforestation activities. India already had in place good remote sensing capacities in the governmental FSI (Kishwan 2007: 22; CI-GI-13022018). Brazil's and India's forest monitoring system served as models for other developing countries and were therefore highlighted in the RED discussions (e.g., UNFCCC Secretariat 2006: 7). India's remote-sensing system changed to digital in 2001 and FSI started to include climate change parameters in the forest inventory in 2002 with first carbon estimations of India's forests in 2002. Those changes were implemented, as part of India's preparations of its First National Communication to the UNFCCC of 2004, while forest policy approaches and programs did not yet incorporate climate mitigation concerns (GI-2-13032018).

Due to their capacities, Indian negotiators were able to make the argument for India's alternative approach of compensated conservation (Kishwan 2007: 22). Indian negotiators proposed an assessment of baseline and incremental stocks through remote sensing of forest cover and ground verification as well as subsequent modeling of carbon stocks (Kishwan 2007: 20). Without those capacities, India would have had a harder time to make a convincing argument about developing an alternative approach of compensated conservation, as the initial proposal by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica only suggested using the "national deforestation baseline rate" (UNFCCC 2005c: 9), which is considered to be much easier for implementation (Pistorius 2012: 640-641).

Overall, India's strong monitoring capacities facilitated its competition engagement and the alternative proposal of compensated conservation.

Sum-up of causal complex 2

From 2005 to 2007, the Coalition of Rainforest Nations unsuccessfully tried to *persuade* India and other parties to the Convention to accept compensated reduction as an interpretation of the carbon forestry norm. India's government was persuaded to engage in international negotiations on a new international instrument on the carbon forestry norm, but proposed an alternative approach of compensated conservation instead of compensated reduction due to its *competition* engagement, which was in line with India's preexisting forestry norms on promoting afforestation. This causal complex, hence, did not result in glocalised norm interpretations. Most conditions hampered persuasion and the compensated reduction interpretation (except for political-administrative set-up) and all condition facilitated competition and the compensated conservation interpretation of the carbon forestry norm. The proposed international instrument for the carbon forestry norm was in line with India's perspective of compensated mitigation actions as an interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm.

5.3 Stage II: Domestic agenda setting

In stage I (5.2), Indian negotiators contested interpretations of micro norms by other parties to the Convention and presented their own alternative interpretations. While external actors either relied on shaming or persuasion, India, instead, relied on competition to develop its alternative approaches. In stage II, Indian decision-makers started to set the agenda domestically for an engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm.

5.3.1 Domestic agenda-setting on own future mitigation efforts and first discursive changes in 2007 (causal complex 3)

In the Convention Dialogue, Indian negotiators had contested any demands by developed countries to engage in non-compensated mitigation efforts, but accepted discussions on internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions as part of the post-Kyoto UNFCCC agreement (see stage I). In the run-up to the 2007 Bali COP, negotiations intensified, while Indian decision-maker started to engage with the developing country climate mitigation norm domestically. Continuous *shaming* by developed countries (demanding non-compensated mitigation efforts by developing countries) and the persistent *competition* engagement by Indian decision-makers (prioritizing high economic growth, sectorial development goals, and per-capita convergence) shaped the domestic agenda setting, while *complex learning* did not play any important role. Most conditions facilitated *competition* as well as hampered *shaming* and *learning*. This resulted in a shift toward a glocalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm that considers *future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions* based on *international per-capita equity*.

Mechanism: Shaming around the G8+5 Heiligendamm meeting

Due to the growing international pressure by developed countries on India to commit to mitigation efforts in the run-up to the Heiligendamm G8+5 meeting in June 2007 and the Bali COP in December 2007 (GI-2-09022018, GI-25042018; Atteridge 2013: 61; Dubash et al. 2018a: 409-410), the Indian government also increasingly felt the need to prepare its position (Deshpande and Sethi 2007), which motivated Singh to take over the steering of climate negotiations from bureaucrats (Vihma 2011: 82). Pressure came particularly from the US, which refused any new international agreement not covering mitigation targets by developing countries (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 46; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016: 1354; Rajamani 2009: 360). This led to US-Indian-bilateral talks on climate change shortly before the Heiligendamm meeting in May 2007, where Singh “conveyed India’s commitment to work with other countries to deal with the problems of climate change” (PMO 2007b). Shortly after, in May 2007, he announced the constitution of the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change (PM Council) in order to “be better prepared to react to global pressures to address climate change” (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47), indicating the importance of shaming for India’s domestic agenda-setting. The 26-member PM Council represented a medium-scale organizational change, as it was permanently set-

up, but did not have an own secretariat (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47). Only in this context, a review of the IPCC findings occurred at a high-level meeting, in which Prime Minister Singh emphasized that he considers to take a “pro-active approach based on national interests and developmental goals to address problems of global warming” (Jain 2007).

The international pressure continued during the Heiligendamm meeting in June 2007 (GI-25042018), during which Singh re-emphasized preexisting domestic norm understandings, such as the rejection of quantitative mitigation targets as counter-productive to development (MoEA 2007a). Yet, as a reaction to international shaming, he brought up an alternative target that was in line with India’s longstanding insistence of per-capita convergence (GI-25042018; Stevenson 2012: 149). He promised that his government is “determined that India’s per-capita GHG emissions are not going to exceed those of developed countries” (MoEA 2007b), which represents an international discursive change based on international per-capita equity (in short, the per-capita target). He, thereby, set a voluntary loose ceiling on India’s GHG emissions in the far future (Rajamani 2009: 346; Sengupta 2019: 121-122), representing a first discursive change toward non-compensated mitigation efforts. But most developed countries refused this proposal as insufficient, as not leading to immediate emission reductions (GI-19042018). In contrast, Indian negotiators perceived this as “a huge concession by Singh [and...] the maximum he could go” (GI-19042018). This per-capita proposal was not well prepared, as “there was no mechanism in place to credibly devise an approach towards this end” (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47), and was not even reemphasized in Singh’s statement at the first official PM Council meeting in July 2007. There, Singh emphasized that “most importantly we need to document the work we have done in following a less-energy intensive path to develop” (PMO 2007d), while also exploring greener developmental actions for the future, which indicates his attempt to cope with the increasing pressure (see also 6.1.1). This represents a domestic discursive shift toward considering developmental climate mitigation actions in the future.

Overall, shaming facilitated the incorporation of elements of external actors’ norm interpretation (i.e., non-compensated mitigation efforts by developing countries) in India’s new glocalised norm interpretation that considers future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions based on international per-capita equity. Shaming facilitated the establishment of the PM Council and the international offer of a per-capita target, which was rejected by developed countries.

Mechanism: No actual *complex learning* from the IPCC

What role did learning play in this process? Traditionally, India’s high climate change vulnerability had not influenced its negotiation stance (Raghunandan 2019: 188-189). In January 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh still remarked that “the science of climate change is still nascent and somewhat uncertain” (PM Office 2007; Rajamani 2009: 344), despite the findings by IPCC’s 2001 report that emphasized with stronger evidence the human-induced character of climate change (IPCC 2001: 4-5). In February 2007, the new report of the IPCC highlighted this with even more

confidence and indicated India's high vulnerability and high absolute GHG emissions. Yet, only in May 2007, Singh convened a high-level panel to review the IPCC Report and its indications for India (GI-25042018; Deshpande and Sethi 2007; Stevenson 2012: 149-150). The meeting involved stocktaking of the science and resulted in the commissioning of a study on India's energy consumption and on potential sectoral actions like in the industry sector (Jain 2007). Yet, the subsequently constituted PM Council, which was given the mandate of coordination and policy guidance on climate change, did not include any minister on energy, but other ministers like on foreign affairs, alongside some non-state representatives (PMO 2007c), indicating a limited focus on mitigation efforts and a strong international focus, as several (retired) high-ranking Indian diplomats were members as well.

Before departing to the Heiligendamm G8+5 meeting in June, Singh even stated that "more and not less development is the best way for [...] protecting the climate" (MoEA 2007a), which in India's case would mean more coal-burning. In Heiligendamm, he raised scientific uncertainties to justify his rejection of a joint global warming target, which is also in contrast to UNFCCC's precautionary principle (UNFCCC 1992: Article 3.3). Singh reemphasized preexisting domestic norm understandings, such as Global North responsibility and his rejection of mitigation commitments as counter-productive to development. However, he did not highlight the urgency to act on climate change despite India's high vulnerability (MoEA 2007b), indicating no learning from the IPCC report that raised this challenge. In light of the shaming efforts by developed countries and Singh's statements on climate science, his per-capita target cannot be regarded as being influenced by learning, as it would not have resulted in early mitigation actions that the IPCC perceived necessary (IPCC 2007b: 748). It was not until the first meeting of the PM Council in July, i.e., after the rejection of the per-capita target and further international shaming at the G8+5 meeting in Heiligendamm, that Singh finally recognized the "unequivocal findings [...] that global warming is a validated fact" (PMO 2007d). However, as he intended to prove to the world that India had already taken a less-energy intensive development pathway in the path, no indication of complex learning could be found, even though he also acknowledged that India must explore greener ways of development in the future (PMO 2007d). But this is more related to his attempt of strategic mimicry to shine internationally for other strategic goals and to prevent future shaming (see 6.1.1). Complex learning, hence, did not contribute to the globalized norm interpretation that considers future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions based on international per-capita equity.

Mechanism: *Competition* for per-capita convergence and high economic growth

Singh interpreted the developing country climate mitigation norm from a carbon space competition perspective by rejecting a quantitative mitigation commitment target as counter-productive to development (MoEA 2007b), and by emphasizing that "development is the best way for [...] protecting the climate" (MoEA 2007a). He also highlighted that he will "not allow growth and

development prospects in the developing world to be undermined or constrained” (MoEA 2007a). Even the per-capita target did not really mean any limitation for India’s coal-dependent and high-emission development pathway as India’s per-capita GHG emissions only stood at one-tenth of developed countries’ ones (Rajamani 2009: 346), permitting further rising emissions for decades. In Indian negotiators’ perception at the time, even a four-fold increase in per-capita GHG emissions would be needed to catch up economically with the Global North on which the “world should not intervene” (GI-25042018). It was in line with India’s long-held negotiation position to enable international convergence in per-capita emissions in order to be able to catch up economically with the Global North (Sengupta 2019: 121-122). As this still was a long way to go, the new per-capita target was “not taken up by the bureaucracy” (RI-08022018). In order to benefit materially from climate mitigation targets of developed countries, Singh requested them to enhance their GHG commitments as this “would significantly stimulate CDM projects” (MoEA 2007b) in India. Even when reflecting upon potential measures on addressing climate change, Singh planned to do so based on national development goals indicating the priority of development over climate mitigation, which would benefit the country materially (Jain 2007; PMO 2007d).

Competition facilitated the incorporation of elements of domestic actors’ norm interpretation (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals, and per-capita convergence) in the new globalized norm interpretation that considers future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions based on international per-capita equity, alongside the renewed affirmation of internationally compensated CDM actions.

Condition: Matching *cultural resonance* in the globalized norm interpretation

India’s long-held negotiation position was based on the predominance of economic development and international per-capita convergence between luxury emissions in the Global North and survival emissions in the Global South (Sengupta 2019: 116, 121-122; Stevenson 2011: 1012-1013, 1018; Vihma 2011: 78). Singh’s interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm (i.e., consideration of future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions based on international per-capita equity) resonated culturally with this traditional position. While Indian negotiators had not been able to incorporate per-capita rights in the Convention text in 1992, they continued to interpret the CBDR+RC meso norm in this way (Stevenson 2011: 1013). However, developed countries interpreted it differently and demanded immediate GHG emission cuts from developing countries as an interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm (GI-19042018). Singh’s competition engagement was facilitated through this matched cultural resonance, while it hampered shaming and learning. The matched cultural resonance facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors’ norm interpretations (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals, and per-capita convergence) in the globalized norm interpretation.

Condition: Per-capita target and development prioritization based on *material resonance* matching

India's political economy approach has been based on a coal-dependent development path (Stevenson 2011: 1012). Indian negotiators continued to interpret any mitigation actions as limiting India's ability to realize 9 percent growth (Betz 2012: 6, 21-22; MoEA 2007a, 2007b). The perception of India's material resonance, thereby, followed a priority for industrialization. Even though the agricultural sector was responsible for one-quarter of GDP and will be negatively affected by climate change, it did not picture prominently in Singh's perception of India's development pathway (Rajamani 2009: 359; Sengupta 2019: 134-135). India's perceived material necessities therefore prevented an acceptance of immediate emission limitations. It hampered shaming and learning and fueled the competition engagement. Only the per-capita target and prioritizing development in any future mitigation actions provided the material resonance that was acceptable to the Indian government. This facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors' norm interpretation (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals, and per-capita convergence) in the glocalized norm interpretation.

Condition: Positive *material reception* of US-Indian alliance

During the 1990s, India's foreign and economic policy approach shifted to an increasing global market integration and pragmatic coalition-building. India's ambition was to become a major power (Mohan 2017: 48-49; Stevenson 2011: 999, 1011). India began to cooperate more closely with the US and signed a nuclear agreement in 2005 that resulted in further US-Indian nuclear negotiations (Hall 2016: 273-274; Raghunandan 2019: 195-196). The US thereby sought to influence India on economic issues, including climate change. As Singh's priority was on the nuclear deal, he saw advantages in occasionally following these US calls, as potential material political and economic prospects were perceived high (Atteridge 2013: 61-62; Raghunandan 2019: 195-196; 2020: 207). India's larger strategic interests thus provided an opportunity for international shaming (Sengupta 2019: 136-137), but did not result in the acceptance of quantitative mitigation commitment targets (MoEA 2007b). In addition, CDM was perceived as highly beneficial for India's economy (MoEA 2007b). The material prospects facilitated shaming and India's competition engagement. This facilitated the incorporation of external actors' norm interpretation (i.e., mitigation efforts by developing countries) in the glocalized norm interpretation, alongside the renewed affirmation of internationally compensated CDM actions.

Condition: Positive *social reception* in the context of India's foreign policy ambitions

The Indian government had ambitions to become a major power. It joined several international forums and had a strong desire for international social recognition (Hall 2016: 277). Singh was pleased that developed countries increasingly viewed India as a partner (Rastogi 2011: 139), but they thereby also put high pressure on India to take climate actions (Michaelowa and Michaelowa

2012: 577; Raghunandan 2019: 188-189). This motivated Singh to constitute the PM Council due to his strong desire for positive social reception (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47; Vihma 2011: 82). While Singh rejected quantitative mitigation targets, he presented the per-capita target in a way that implied responsibility sharing (Sengupta 2019: 121), as Indian decision-makers are generally more open to voluntary concessions than to binding commitments (Narlikar and Narlikar 2014: 216, 219, 223). Positive social reception facilitated competition and shaming. This facilitated the incorporation of external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., non-compensated mitigation efforts by developing countries) in the glocalized norm interpretation.

Condition: Lack of pre-existing *knowledge* on climate change

The IPCC report traveled to a landscape that was not conducive to learning, as most of Indian elites were hardly aware of climate change consequences (Never 2012b: 157; Vihma 2011: 81-82). While scientific knowledge regarding India was already existent in studies, Indian decision-makers chose not to perceive it in this way (Bidwai 2005; PM Office 2007; Raghunandan 2019: 190; Sengupta 2019: 133-134). The Indian government had not invested in strengthening domestic climate science prior to the IPCC report (Raghunandan 2019: 191-192), and afterwards felt the need to develop an own assessment of climate change impacts on India (PMO 2007c, 2007d). The priorities remained unchanged on fostering economic development, despite India's high climate change vulnerability. India's preexisting knowledge hampered learning, shaming and an acceptance of immediate emission reductions. It facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors' norm interpretation (i.e., high economic growth and per-capita convergence) in the glocalized norm interpretation.

Condition: Non-conducive preexisting *political-administrative set-up* on climate change

The preexisting political-administrative set-up was not conducive for the government's engagement on climate change. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) had limited capacity, which contributed to the adherence to long-held negotiation positions despite new scientific evidences (Sengupta 2019: 133-134; Stevenson 2012: 124). This hampered learning and shaming, and resulted in a predominant focus on fostering economic development, despite India's high climate change vulnerability. This facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals) in the glocalized norm interpretation and prevented immediate emission limitations. MOEF's weak role facilitated the establishment of the PM Council that provided a better form of coordination and horizontal centralization and resulted in a buy-in from the whole government (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47), which MOEF would not have been able to achieve by its own (GI-19042018; RI-19042018). Yet, priorities remained unaffected by this organizational change.

Condition: *Opposition against change*

Historically, Indian state and non-state actors shared a consensus on India's negotiation position, as both prioritized economic development and rejected quantitative mitigation targets (Sengupta 2019: 133; Vihma 2011: 82). Singh even included non-state stakeholders in the PM Council that were close to the government's position (e.g., CSE, TATA, TERI) alongside sectoral ministries in order to ensure an overarching buy-in (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47). There were only some criticism of Singh's per-capita target among those fractions that did not want to see any ceilings on GHG emissions (Atteridge 2013: 60). The opposition against too far-reaching changes of the status quo hampered shaming and learning and facilitated competition. This facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals, and per-capita convergence) in the glocalized norm interpretation.

Sum-up of causal complex 3

This phase is explained by the workings of two mechanisms as causal complex: *shaming* and *competition*. *Shaming* resulted in the discursive shifts to announce the per-capita target and to consider future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions, whose content was largely defined by India's *competition* engagement. *Complex learning* did not affect the domestic agenda setting. Due to *shaming* and several *conditions* (social reception, material reception), *external actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., non-compensated mitigation efforts by developing countries) were included in the *glocalized norm interpretation* that considers *future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions* based on *international per-capita equity*. In addition, *competition* and several *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, opposition, knowledge, political-administrative set-up) ensured that *preexisting domestic actors' interpretation* (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals, per-capita convergence) were included as well. Moreover, shaming contributed to the constitution of the PM Council (i.e., medium-scale organizational change). Otherwise, India continued to emphasize preexisting domestic norm understandings, such as Global North responsibility and rejection of quantitative mitigation commitments, while embracing compensated CDM actions. Most conditions facilitated competition (except for political-administrative set-up and knowledge), and hampered shaming (except for social and material reception) and complex learning (except for social and material reception).

5.4 Stage III: International reshaping

In stage I (5.2), Indian negotiators contested interpretations of the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm by other parties to the Convention and presented their own alternative interpretations in the form of compensated mitigation actions and compensated conservation. Yet, in stage II (5.3), Prime Minister Singh started to set the domestic agenda for a domestic engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm based on future non-

compensated developmental climate mitigation actions. In stage III, Indian negotiators reshape the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm in the UNFCCC negotiations.

5.4.1 Reshaping of the developing country climate mitigation norm at the Bali COP in 2007 (causal complex 4)

In the Convention Dialogue, Indian negotiators had contested any demands by developed countries to engage in non-compensated mitigation efforts, but accepted *discussions* on internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions (see stage I in 5.2.1). Domestically, Indian decision-makers started to engage on a glocalized norm interpretation that considers future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions based on international per-capita equity (see stage II in 5.3.1). At the 2007 Bali COP, *shaming* by developed countries (demanding non-compensated mitigation actions or commitments by developing countries) and *competition* by India (only accepting compensated mitigation actions) resulted in a *collective glocalized norm interpretation* in the form of *internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions*. Most conditions hampered shaming and facilitated competition. India thereby reshaped the developing country climate mitigation norm at the international level.

Mechanism: *Shaming* and the reshaping toward enabled mitigation actions at 2007 Bali COP

In the run up to 2007 Bali COP, international pressure by developed countries on India and other large emitters to accept non-compensated mitigation commitments was increasing (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 46; GI-19042018). In addition, shortly before the COP, Greenpeace International orchestrated a shaming campaign by Greenpeace India that attacked the Indian government for hiding behind the low emissions of poor Indians, while 150 million Indians of higher income classes were emitting above the sustainable limit for staying within 2 degree Celsius global warming (Dubash et al. 2018a: 399; India 2007; Subramanian 2015). In consequence, Greenpeace demanded the application of the CBDR+RC norm both internationally and domestically by emission limitations of richer Indians and by non-compensated mitigation actions of the Indian government (Ananthapadmanabhan et al. 2007: 14). Yet, this shaming was not directly successful in shaping India's climate politics (Dubash 2013: 196; Stevenson 2012: 152).

The international pressure by developed countries on major developing country emitters culminated at the Bali COP, as it represented the end of the Convention Dialogue on a post-Kyoto agreement (Dubash 2013: 196; Spence et al. 2008: 145). Especially the US pushed for an interpretation of the CBDR+RC meso norm that was based on parity between major emitters (i.e., including emerging economies) (Rajamani 2009: 350; GI-25042018). Indian negotiators perceived those proposals as attempts to shift away from the meso norm of Annex I countries taking the lead through mitigation commitments toward a voluntary pledge-and-review system that includes all major emitters (Vihma

2011: 78; GI-2-09022018). Indian negotiators contested those demands and preferred the Annex I differentiation in order to prevent any mitigation commitments, as they perceived Kyoto-style targets as limitations for India's economic growth (Rajamani 2009: 350; GI-28022018). India responded to US shaming efforts through objections based on the low historical stock and low per capita emissions of India (GI-25042018) and continued to argue for the sharing of atmospheric space based on equal historical international per-capita entitlements (Ghosh 2012: 165). Indian negotiators even refused non-enabled mitigation actions (DI-24042018), despite their beginning domestic efforts to consider future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions (PMO 2007d). However, the US did not accept any new negotiation track toward an international agreement that would not cover all major emitters (GI-2-01032018, GI-19042018).

The Convention Dialogue ended with the establishment of a second negotiation track on long-term cooperative action alongside the Kyoto protocol's track in order to negotiate an international 'agreed outcome' until the 2009 COP. The US and Canada had continued to demand strong language based on non-compensated mitigation actions or commitments by major emitters, which was opposed by India and the G77/China (Spence et al. 2008: 148-152). The 2007 COP decision adopted that the international 'agreed outcome' will address "[e]nhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change, including, inter alia, consideration of [...] nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner" (UNFCCC 2008b: 3). For Indian negotiators, the expression 'nationally appropriate' saved it, as, in their view, this meant that India can prepare a plan "without external dictat[e]" (Ghosh 2012: 166), while they successfully lobbied that those actions are to be 'supported and enabled' (see Competition). Yet India, continued to reject any mitigation commitments (Müller 2008: 6; GI-19042018). This came very close to India's preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions), even though, this time, internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions were not linked to the mitigation commitments of developed countries through carbon markets. Developed countries had only accepted 'nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions' which were not completely reflecting the Kyoto-type of binding mitigation commitments anymore (Spence et al. 2008: 149; UNFCCC 2008b: 3).

Overall, shaming by developed countries contributed to Indian negotiators' international discursive shift from demanding compensated mitigation actions toward accepting internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions as a globalized norm interpretation. This came very close to India's preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions), even though, this time, mitigation actions by developing countries were additional to the mitigation efforts by developed countries and were not linked anymore among each other through carbon markets. Shaming, thereby, facilitated the incorporation of external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., mitigation efforts by developing countries) in the globalized norm interpretation. As the following part on India's competition engagement will show, it also included preexisting norm interpretations by India (i.e.,

compensated mitigation actions) due to competition. Yet, they still contested any mitigation commitments or non-compensated mitigation actions internationally, although the Indian governments had started a domestic engagement on future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions (see 5.3.1).

Mechanism: *Competition* securing enabling of mitigation actions at 2007 Bali COP

Shaming pushed India and other developing countries to accept mitigation actions under the post-Kyoto agreement (GI-19042018). While Indian negotiators were reluctant to agree to it, the expression of 'nationally appropriate' saved it, as, in their view, this would prevent the "diversion of scarce resources for development needs" (GI-19042018), indicating their continuous competition engagement. The Indian government aimed to ensure their future economic growth, which they feared to be jeopardized, as they perceived mandatory non-compensated mitigation actions to "lead to major diversion of [...] resources away from development" (Ghosh 2012: 165). India's negotiators, therefore, had consistently demanded that mitigation actions "are adequately compensated, and the necessary technology is provided at low cost" (Ghosh 2012: 165). This was also the motivation by Indian negotiators in the Convention Dialogue. While India's negotiators did not take the lead on the NAMA concept, they, alongside others, insisted and successfully lobbied for that those NAMAs are not only supported, but also enabled through technology, financing and capacity building. For India's negotiators, 'enabled' made clear that the support had to come as a precondition for any mitigation action (GI-19042018; GI-25042018). India also made sure that the 'measurable, reportable and verifiable manner' (MRV) moved from the beginning to the ending of the phrase capturing NAMAs (Müller 2008: 3). US negotiators, firstly, objected to this change as they feared that MRV would then only apply to international support. But South Africa as G77 chair ensured that MRV would be with regard to mitigation actions by developing countries (Müller 2008: 5; Spence et al. 2008: 149). India, however, interpreted it in a way that would make both mitigation actions and the international support accountable to MRV (Ghosh 2012: 166; Rajamani 2009: 351). From India's perspective, financial resources had to be new and additional to already existing development aid and low-carbon technologies had to be provided on non-commercial terms (Ghosh 2012: 166-167).

Indian negotiators also made sure that MRV would not apply to non-enabled mitigation actions by developing countries (Sengupta 2019: 122). That permitted India to keep the leeway not to implement any non-enabled mitigation action domestically as this could divert limited resources from development priorities (Ghosh 2012: 165; Joshi 2013: 136). Indian negotiators also prevented that large emitting developing countries would be subject to mitigation commitments as proposed by Bangladesh (Müller 2008: 6). For competition reasons, Indian negotiators also prevented that the Kyoto Protocol review would reflect upon the achievement of the overall Convention objective of preventing dangerous climate change as this could have resulted in statements that find developing countries' actions necessary as articulated by the IPCC report of 2007 (Vihma 2011: 80).

Overall, Indian negotiators, hence, reshaped the developing country climate mitigation norm through their competition engagement. This resulted in a collective glocalized norm interpretation in the form of internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions that included India's preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions). Yet, it also indicates an international discursive shift from compensated to internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions only – that was achieved due to international shaming. Internationally, India even rejected mandatory non-compensated mitigation actions, despite its already ongoing efforts to envisage future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions at the domestic level. This occurred due to India's competition engagement to keep sufficient leeway for economic growth.

Condition: No change in the *cultural resonance* with previous negotiation positions

India accepted the collective glocalized norm interpretation (i.e., internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions) as it culturally resonated with its preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions) and previous negotiation positions. India's cultural resonance was, hence, persistent over the duration of the Convention Dialogue. India continued to see Annex I countries as responsible for taking the lead in mitigation actions and for providing international support to developing countries, as they were perceived to be responsible for causing climate change (Sengupta 2019: 122; GI-19042018). Indian negotiators even perceived themselves to be the “defenders of the status quo and of established international norms” (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 469). They also continued to regard the issue of climate change from a foreign policy logic (Aamodt 2018: 369), and remained committed to international equity and the right to development (Never 2012b: 149). Based on those domestic norms and previous negotiation positions, India warded off any pressure by other parties to accept mitigation commitments or obligatory non-compensated mitigation actions. This hampered shaming by other parties and an acceptance of mitigation commitments or mandatory non-compensated mitigation actions. Instead, it facilitated the competition engagement, resulting into a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions that incorporated India's preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions).

Condition: No change in the *material resonance* with regard to India's political economy

In the perception of Indian negotiators, external actors' norm interpretation in the form of mitigation commitments by developing countries still did not resonate materially with India's political economy. Domestically, Prime Minister Singh continued to emphasize India's “urgent imperative for sustaining high economic growth rates” (Ramesh 2015a: 2), which was based on a coal-dependent energy system (Stevenson 2011: 1017-1018). Indian decision-makers rejected any obligatory non-compensated mitigation actions or commitments. For them, this would reduce their carbon space and would mean a diversion of limited resources (Ghosh 2012: 165). Only, a glocalized norm

interpretation in the form of internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions resonated materially with India's perceived material necessities, as it would not mean a diversion of scarce resources from development objectives (GI-19042018). In their perspective, economic development was even the best form of climate adaptation (UNFCCC 2007b: 10). Only, compensated mitigation actions were perceived as not harmful to India's political economy (Ghosh 2012: 165). This perception of India's perceived material necessities hampered any shaming efforts by developed countries and an acceptance of non-compensated mitigation actions or commitments. Instead, it facilitated the competition engagement and a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions that incorporated India's preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions).

Condition: Positive *material reception* due to bureaucratic prospects for international funding

The collective glocalized norm interpretation in the form of internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions was facilitated by the positive material prospects that Indian negotiators hoped to receive under a post-Kyoto agreement. Indian negotiators demanded international funding and technologies for mitigation actions, as they felt that they had own constraints in terms of available public resources in the face of many development priorities (GI-2-09022018). In their view, those resources had to be new and additional to already existing development aid (Ghosh 2012: 166-167). India had already experienced large international investments in the CDM and hoped to receive even more under a second Kyoto commitment period (MoEA 2007b), which contributed to the expectance of further international funding for enabled mitigation actions. This facilitated both competition and partly shaming and resulted in the incorporation of domestic actors' norm interpretation (i.e., compensated mitigation actions) and external actors' norm interpretation (i.e., mitigation efforts by developing countries) in the glocalized norm interpretation.

Condition: Reversed *social reception* due to sovereignty concerns

External actors' norm interpretations in the form of mitigation commitments by developing countries and MRV of mitigation actions were hampered by India's reversed social reception (i.e., efforts to reduce social vulnerability), as it perceived them as impinging on India's sovereignty (Mohan 2017: 44). Autonomy and independence were deeply entrenched in the identity of Indians foreign policy representatives, who always tried to block any supervision of domestic actions or any connection between domestic actions and international negotiations in order to protect national sovereignty and to reduce social vulnerability (Atteridge 2013: 56-57; Mohan 2017: 47). India wanted to avert being embarrassed internationally for not being able to implement promised actions (Rajamani 2009: 364). Accepting MRV of enabled mitigation actions was already perceived as a compromise that was at unease with India's sovereignty concerns (Joshi 2013: 140). Yet, Indian negotiators have also been found to be open to accept voluntary actions occasionally in international negotiations due to their

identity (Narlikar and Narlikar 2014: 216). Nevertheless, at the intersessional meeting in Bonn in 2008, Indian negotiators again defended their interpretation of the Convention as not foreseeing any review requirements for developing countries (Vihma 2011: 81). Overall, reversed social reception hampered shaming efforts by developed countries and their norm interpretations. Yet, it still allowed for the acceptance of MRV of enabled mitigation actions, thereby partly including external actors' norm interpretations.

Condition: *Political-administrative set-up* not conducive for change

Despite India's domestic efforts to envisage future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions, Indian negotiators rejected any international mandate for non-compensated mitigation actions and only accepted compensated or at least enabled mitigation actions. Indian negotiators and PM Council members, who preferred to stick to the traditional climate negotiation positions of India, were very powerful and successful in preventing any change to India's international position. This prevented any linkage between domestically started brainstorming on potential future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions and the international negotiations (Never 2012b: 149; Sengupta 2019: 133). This hampered the shaming efforts by developed countries and an acceptance of non-compensated mitigation actions or commitments and facilitated India's competition engagement alongside its emphasis on compensated mitigation actions, which were included in the glocalized norm interpretation (i.e., internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions).

Sum-up of causal complex 4

At the Bali COP in 2007, a *collective glocalized norm interpretation* in the form of *internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions by developing countries* was agreed upon as part of a future post-Kyoto international agreement. *Shaming* and several *conditions* (material reception and social reception) facilitated the incorporation of *external actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., mitigation efforts by developing countries). *Competition* and several *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, material reception, political-administrative set-up), however, contributed to the incorporation of *preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors* (i.e., compensated mitigation actions) in the glocalized norm interpretation. Most conditions hampered shaming (except for material reception) and facilitated competition (except for social reception). Due to competition, India reshaped the developing country climate mitigation norm to be more strongly based on not only internationally supported but also on enabled mitigation actions (at least in the written form of the Bali Action Plan).

5.4.2 Reshaping of the carbon forestry norm toward a comprehensive compensated carbon forestry approach in 2007 (and up to 2009) (causal complex 5)

In the parallel negotiation track to the Convention Dialogue on a new international financial instrument for compensated mitigation actions in the forestry sector of developing countries, India contested an interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on compensated reduction and proposed as an alternative the approach of compensated conservation (see stage I in 5.2.2). At the domestic level, discussions had already started that shifted the glocalized norm interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm toward the consideration of future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions (see stage II in 5.3.1). In the Convention Dialogue, India was successful in reshaping the collective glocalized norm interpretation of the same norm toward internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions as part of a post-Kyoto agreement (see stage III in 5.4.1). At the Bali COP in 2007 and in subsequent international negotiations until 2009, the Indian delegation engaged in *competition* (facilitated by all mentioned conditions) and successfully reshaped the *carbon forestry norm* toward a *collective glocalized norm interpretation* in the form of a *comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach* that includes conservation and afforestation.

Mechanism: For *competition* reasons promoting a comprehensive compensated carbon forestry approach

The Indian government invited the ten developing countries that had supported the idea of compensated conservation to New Delhi to prepare a joint advocacy of an approach that values conservation/afforestation as well (GI-1-13032018). Among parties to the Convention, reducing degradation was increasingly being accepted alongside reducing deforestation for compensation (Sanz 2007: 25), while this had not yet been the case for conservation and afforestation. Indian negotiators changed their tactic toward advocating for an equal recognition of each ton of carbon saved from deforestation and conservation in order to become eligible under the new international instrument. Otherwise, the international financial instrument would be more directed toward large deforesting countries, such as Brazil (Kohli and Menon 2011: 27-28; GI-1-13032018). At the Bali COP, India, therefore emphasized that “[n]ations with continued deforestation and now committing to reduce deforestation rates, and those having already taken up strong conservation measures and thereby stabilizing and increasing the forest cover against a pre-determined baseline, present a fit case to be rewarded under REDD” (UNFCCC 2007a: 3). Indian negotiators proposed to establish three different funds outside of the CDM, which were to be sponsored by additional resources from developed countries, to finance reducing deforestation, stabilizing forest cover, and forest carbon conservation (UNFCCC 2007a: 3-4). In order to make their own plantation forests eligible to such an international instrument they proposed to keep the definition of forests broad by including both natural forests as well as “industrial/short rotation plantations” (UNFCCC 2007a: 4).

At the 2007 Bali COP, India had to lobby intensively on the inclusion of conservation and afforestation, as other large emerging economies such as Brazil were against it and favored an exclusive compensated deforestation approach (GI-05122016). Indian negotiators were not satisfied as they felt that “[all the] money goes to Brazil” (GI-05122016) as Brazil was promised funding by Norway in Bali (Abranches 2014: 12, 14-15). Nevertheless, at the Bali COP, India successfully reshaped the carbon forestry instrument to include conservation and afforestation as part of a post-Kyoto agreement. The Bali COP decision described the international instrument as including “[p]olicy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries” (UNFCCC 2008b: 3). Indian negotiators were, however, still unsatisfied, as they perceived this outcome to be lacking equal recognition of the different approaches, as conservation, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (referred to as ‘plus’ in the REDD+ acronym), which were derived from India’s compensated conservation approach, were still divided by a semicolon from deforestation and degradation (GI-1-13032018). The accompanying COP decision on the international forest instrument also made more references to deforestation and degradation (UNFCCC 2008b: 8-10). Indian negotiators, hence, perceived that “afforestation was not taking off” and that funders were “more worried about the REDD, not [the] plus” (GI-25042018).

In the run-up to the 2008 Poznan COP, Indian negotiators continued to lobby for an equal recognition of the plus components of conservation and afforestation (UNFCCC 2008a: 27). They even proposed a common methodology for all interventions to save or enhance forest carbon that was largely based on remote sensing (UNFCCC 2008a: 27-28). But they suggested different funding sources and thereby shifted away from an exclusive funds-based financial approach: They advocated using carbon markets for financing measures on limiting the decrease in carbon stock and for actions on increasing the carbon stock, while they proposed using international funds raised from a REDD carbon market levy for financing the maintenance of the carbon stock (Dooley 2008: 17-18). Indian negotiators, thereby, wished to receive “carbon credits for plantations” (GI-15122016) in order to finance afforestation programs, while hoping to avoid the complex set-up of the CDM (GI-1-13032018). However, the proposal of the financial approach was not successful, as the 2009 Copenhagen Accord promised additional funding by developed countries for REDD+ activities, without any mentioning of carbon markets (UNFCCC 2010: 6-7).

As developed countries’ funding priorities were on reducing deforestation (GI-05122016; GI-2-09022018), Indian negotiators, in 2009, again demanded “‘positive incentives’ for all three categories of actions related to forestry” (MOEF 2009: 20). They underlined this by emphasizing that “several developing countries, including China and India have both strong regulatory regimes to prevent diversion of forests to non-forest use [...] as well as large, nationally funded programs for afforestation” (MOEF 2009: 20). India even asked for receiving compensation for not only the costs of protection, enforcement and monitoring of forests but also for the opportunity costs of the non-

economic use of forests (Kohli and Menon 2011: 26-27; MOEF 2009: 20), and claimed that “the major benefits of these actions lie in global climate protection, and are not specific to the countries concerned” (MOEF 2009: 20). This shows that Indian negotiators were trying to make an argument in order to receive large international funds for financing activities that the Indian government had been doing for sectoral reasons since the 1980s and were planning to continue to do so in the future (MOEF 2009: 20). India substantiated those claims by arguing that India’s forests are net carbon sinks and neutralize around 9 per cent of India’s total emissions of 2000 (Dubash et al. 2018a: 406), while there was no consensus on such a claim domestically as India faced large-scale degradation (Khan 2019; Kishwan et al. 2009: 1).⁴⁰ Conservation and afforestation activities finally received equal recognition in both the Copenhagen Accord as well as in the 2009 COP decision on the international REDD+ instrument (Pistorius 2012: 640; UNFCCC 2010: 6-7, 11-12). This increased equal footing could also be seen when looking at the methodology of the new instrument. While Brazil proposed that countries provide forest *reference emission* levels, Indian negotiators insisted on the wording of forest *reference* levels, as in their view, India had no emissions from the forestry sector (GI-05122016). At the end, the COP decision referred to both formulations (UNFCCC 2010: 12).

Overall, based on its competition engagement to receive financial benefits, India was able to internationally reshape the international instrument on the carbon forestry norm to be based on a *collective glocalized norm interpretation* in the form of a *comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach*, including conservation and afforestation alongside the reduction of deforestation and degradation (at least in the written form of COP decisions). Competition, thereby, contributed to incorporating India’s preexisting norm interpretation consisting of conservation and afforestation. This approach was consistent with India’s acceptance of compensated or supported/enabled mitigation actions as interpretations of the developing country climate mitigation norm.

Condition: Generating continuous *cultural resonance* with India’s forest policies and programs

India continued to interpret the carbon forestry norm in a way that resonated with the country’s longstanding conservation and afforestation policies and programs and made sure that this was reflected in the REDD+ instrument (see also 5.2.2). The resulting plus components resonated with India’s own domestic forest area categorizations and policies. Conservation is in line with India’s forest area categorization of wildlife protected areas and conserved forest areas, while sustainable

⁴⁰ Indian negotiators even started to reframe their own official data. India’s first National Communication to the UNFCCC of 2004 acknowledged that India’s forests and grasslands were small carbon emitters of 14.29 million CO₂eq in 1994 (GOI 2004: iv). However, a subsequent study by the governmental research institute Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education (ICFRE), which is also involved in the REDD+ negotiations on behalf of MOEF, reframed those results. They pointed out that “changes in forest and other woody biomass stock’ account for a net removal of 14.25 mt of CO₂” (Kishwan et al. 2009: 4). This study presented the forest as a carbon sink despite contrary evidence in the National Communication (GHG emissions of 17.99 MtCO₂eq from forest and grassland conversion and of 19.69 MtCO₂eq from soil) (GOI 2004: iv).

forest management resonates with India's treatment of forest areas that are managed according to forest management plans (Planning Commission 2014: 95). The third plus component of enhancement of forest carbon stocks also resonates with India's long-existing afforestation and plantation programs. Indian negotiators asked for funding of activities they had been doing for decades and would have continued doing anyhow, as the 2007 Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) had already set the planting target to 16 million ha (i.e., 3.2 million ha per year) (Planning Commission 2008: 194). Furthermore, India had made positive experiences with the CDM (Fuhr and Lederer 2009: 333), despite CDM's problems in the forestry sector (Aggarwal 2014: 75; Singh et al. 2013: 66). This facilitated the shift from a funds-based proposal by Indian representatives to a carbon market-based approach outside of the CDM in order to avoid the same strict rules for REDD+ activities (GI-1-13032018).

Overall, Indian negotiators ensured a cultural resonance of the carbon forestry norm to India's conservation and afforestation policies. Cultural resonance, thereby, facilitated an incorporation of preexisting norm interpretations (i.e., conservation and afforestation) in the collective glocalised norm interpretation (i.e., a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach) at the UNFCCC. This facilitated the competition engagement.

Condition: Generating continuous *material resonance* with India's political economy

Indian negotiators also continued to interpret the carbon forestry norm in a way that resonated materially with the perceived material necessities of India's economy. In their submission, Indian negotiators proposed a broad definition of forests that includes industrial, short rotation plantations (UNFCCC 2007a: 4). Carbon credits for such plantation would benefit the private sector that grew wood on private land (Das 2020: 95-96; GI-15122016). India also did not want to change its economic development trajectory and therefore refrained from addressing deforestation or degradation (Kohli and Menon 2011: 30). The government continued to prefer addressing degradation by local communities through the promotion of community-based afforestation programs, which can be controlled by the bureaucracy, instead of granting them any forest rights under the new Forest Rights Act of 2006 (Das 2020: 95-96, 100, 102). Indian negotiators made sure that those afforestation programs would be eligible under REDD+.

Overall, Indian representatives ensured that the internationally agreed glocalised norm interpretation of the carbon forestry norm was based on a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach that materially resonates with India's political economy. Material resonance thereby facilitated an incorporation of preexisting norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation and conservation). This facilitated the competition engagement.

Condition: Generating preconditions for positive *material reception*

Indian negotiators activities toward ensuring a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach of the international instrument were based on their belief in large financial flows that could be derived for India's afforestation programs. In their view, India's strong regulatory framework and large-scale afforestation programs create economic and financial costs that they would like to see covered by the new international forest instrument (Kohli and Menon 2011: 26-27; MOEF 2009: 20). As they were already seeing money being provided for reducing deforestation by Norway to Brazil, they perceived material prospects to be large and credible and wanted to create the precondition for receiving them as well (Kohli and Menon 2011: 27; GI-05122016). Even though developed countries prioritized the reduction of deforestation in their funding decisions, Indian negotiators still kept the belief that India could also receive a share of those funds for its afforestation activities (GI-25042018; GI-1-13032018).

Overall, Indian negotiators ensured the carbon forestry norm to be based on a collective glocalised interpretation (i.e., a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach) in order to match their expectations of large material prospects for India's afforestation programs. Material reception facilitated the incorporation of preexisting norm interpretations (i.e., conservation and afforestation), and the competition engagement.

Condition: *Political-administrative set-up* with strong capacity conducive for including conservation and afforestation

The expansion of the international forest instrument to include degradation already made the monitoring, reporting and verification much more complex (Pistorius 2012: 640). In order to convince the other parties to accept further components of conservation and afforestation, India could resort to its already strong forest monitoring capacities. Internationally, they had to show how their approach could be included methodologically through the "assessment of forest carbon stocks" (UNFCCC Secretariat 2008: 8), instead of only tracking the change in forest cover as originally proposed for RED (UNFCCC 2005c: 9). Internationally, India was recognized as being "among the pioneers in forest-cover monitoring" (UNFCCC Secretariat 2008: 8), which helped Indian negotiators to convince other parties to include conservation and afforestation as well. India's forest institutions had already undertaken forest carbon estimations since 2002 (GI-2-13032018), even though it was still considered inadequate as it lacked for example the inclusion of litter (CI-GI-13022018). While they argued internationally that they could produce a 'National Level Forest Carbon Account' that included below ground biomass (UNFCCC 2007a: 5), they did not have the capacity for this domestically (GI-2-13032018). Indian negotiators used India's good reputation and already good capacities to promise accurate measurements internationally so that parties would accept an incorporation of conservation and afforestation in the new international forest instrument.

Overall, the political-administrative set-up successfully allowed India to advocate for a collective glocalized norm interpretation in the form of a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach. It facilitated the competition engagement and the incorporation of domestic actors' preexisting norm interpretation (i.e., conservation and afforestation) in the new international forest instrument.

Sum up of causal complex 5 in stage III

At the Bali COP in 2007 and in subsequent negotiations until 2009, India successfully reshaped the carbon forestry norm toward a *collective glocalized norm interpretation* in the form of a *comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach* (at least in the written form of COP decisions). Based on its *competition* engagement and facilitated by all mentioned *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, material reception, political-administrative set-up) this facilitated an incorporation of *India's preexisting norm interpretation* (i.e., conservation and afforestation) in the internationally agreed carbon forestry norm and the international forest instrument.

5.5 Summary: Contestation, domestic agenda setting and international reshaping (2005-2007)

In the first three stages, India engaged in contestation of norm interpretations by external actors, started domestic agenda-setting based on a first discursive glocalized norm interpretation and subsequently reshaped the collective glocalized norm interpretations at the international level.

In stage I, Indian negotiators contested interpretations of micro norms by other parties to the Convention and presented their own alternative interpretations. Causal complex 1 captures this contestation with regard to the developing country climate mitigation norm and causal complex 2 explains this contestation for the carbon forestry norm. While external actors either enacted shaming or persuasion to lobby for non-compensated mitigation efforts and compensated reductions, respectively, India, instead, relied on competition to embrace its alternative approaches of compensated mitigation actions and compensated conservation. Most conditions hampered mechanisms induced by external actors and facilitated competition by India. In the context of increasing shaming on the developing country climate mitigation norm, India increased its staff in the MOEF, representing a small-scale organizational change.

In stage II, Indian decision-makers started to set the agenda domestically for an engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm due to the combination of shaming and competition. This shaped the domestic discursive change toward considering *future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions* based on *international per-capita equity* as a *glocalized norm interpretation*. Shaming resulted in the discursive shift to announce the per-capita target and to envisage future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions, whose content was

largely defined by India's competition engagement. Most conditions hampered the mechanism induced by external actors: shaming. The picture is mixed regarding domestic actors' mechanisms: most conditions hampered learning and facilitated competition. Shaming also resulted in the constitution of the PM Council, representing a medium-scale organizational change.

In stage III, Indian negotiators reshaped the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm in the UNFCCC negotiations due to competition, while external actors engaged in shaming regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm. Shaming and competition resulted in a *collective glocalized norm interpretation* in the form of *internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions* at the UNFCCC. Competition by India led to a *collective glocalized norm interpretation* in the form of a *comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach* in the UNFCCC negotiations. Most conditions hampered the external actors' mechanism of shaming and facilitated the domestic actors' mechanism of competition.

Glocalized norm interpretations at the domestic level (stage II) and at the international level (stage III) included preexisting norm interpretations by external and domestic actors. *Competition* and *several conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, material reception, opposition, knowledge, political-administrative set-up) facilitated the incorporation of preexisting domestic norm interpretations, while *shaming* and *several conditions* (social reception, material reception) facilitated the incorporation of preexisting external actors' norm interpretations.

In most cases of all stages, conditions hampered external actors' mechanisms (shaming, persuasion) and facilitated domestic actors' mechanisms (competition, but not learning). Shaming was only activated regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm, while persuasion was undertaken regarding the carbon forestry norm. Competition was enacted in all causal complexes. As the international forest instrument promised international funding on implementing the carbon forestry norm, India offensively reshaped the approach and the norm internationally (at least in written form) in order to increase material benefits, while it more defensively reshaped the developing country climate mitigation norm to prevent negative economic consequences through receiving international enabling funding for mitigation actions.

One small-scale and one medium-scale organizational change but no policy change occurred in those three stages, while first discursive shifts were undertaken (considering future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions, per-capita target). Moreover, India reshaped the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm in UNFCCC negotiations toward internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions and a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach, which represented India's discursive international alignment with them. This also indicates differences in the Indian government's behavior. While it already considered non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions domestically, it demanded internationally enabled mitigation actions in UNFCCC negotiations in order to benefit from

international funding. How this was further taken up domestically and internationally is shown in the next chapter on domestic action formulation, first international target-setting and sectorial changes.

6. Domestic action formulation, international target setting and sectorial changes (2007-2014)

Chapter 6 presents the stages IV (6.1), V (6.2) and VI (6.3) of the norm glocalization process that include domestic action formulation, international target setting as well as domestic sectorial changes. It ends with a short summary of the three stages (6.4).

6.1 Stage IV: Domestic action formulation

In stage I (5.2), Indian negotiators contested interpretations of the developing country climate mitigation norm by other parties to the Convention and presented their own alternative interpretation based on compensated mitigation actions. In stage II (5.3), Prime Minister Singh started to set the domestic agenda for an engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm. In stage III (5.4), Indian negotiators reshaped the developing country climate mitigation norm toward internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions at the Bali COP. This was perceived to be a major shift by developing countries, as they “had long resisted any legal mention of mitigation actions in their countries” (Jinnah 2017: 294). In stage IV, the Indian government formulates domestically financed actions regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm.

6.1.1 Proactive engagement through the NAPCC development from 2007 until 2008 (causal complex 6)

In stage IV, causal complex 6 captures India’s domestic engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm mostly after the Bali COP. India shifted domestically away from a norm interpretation based on compensated or internationally enabled mitigation actions toward the glocalized norm interpretation in the form of *adopting non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions* (i.e., without enabling international finance for domestic actions, while also being open to international financial support) as part of the *National Action Plan on Climate Change* (representing a second-order policy change). This is explained by the workings of *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing* and *competition*. Most conditions facilitated *strategic mimicry*, *competition*, and *lesson drawing*, and hampered *complex learning*.

Mechanism: Strategic mimicry through NAPCC presentation

At the G8+5 Heiligendamm meeting in June 2007, Singh had realized that China had been able to avoid international pressure from developed countries by presenting a national climate strategy. For the same purpose (GI-25042018; NI-15122016; RI-08022018; GI-2-01032018; Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47), Singh, at the first PM Council meeting in July 2007 (PMO 2007d), asked the PM Council to document India’s previous domestic actions and to prepare an action plan on climate change in order to present India as “responsible ‘global citizen” (Sethi 2007b). He wanted a plan “that protects

India's developmental goals and interests while [...] addressing concerns, both at home and abroad, with respect to global warming" (PMO 2007a). Singh believed in the need to present an action plan to prove his seriousness about the per-capita target at the upcoming 2007 Bali COP and at the G8+5 Tokyo meeting in July 2008 (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47; Raghunandan 2020: 216; RI-08022018). He planned to use it "as a measure to avoid a Kyoto type reduction target" (GI-28022018), indicating his strategic mimicry. As the initial draft from November 2007 solely mentioned previous sectoral activities, Singh could not present it at the Bali COP and asked the PM Council to revise it to include future climate action so he could showcase it at the 2008 G8+5 meeting in Tokyo (Sethi 2007b).

Climate change had become such a foreign policy priority that India had to avoid negative outcomes on issues such as the US-Indian nuclear deal. Singh, therefore, convinced India's Special Envoy on Nuclear Issues, Shyam Saran, to become his Special Envoy on Climate Change in January 2008. Saran's new responsibilities included to be lead negotiator and to coordinate and finalize the action plan. The Special Envoy's office qualifies as a medium-scale organizational change as it had high political standing and could draw on the PM's personnel (GI-2-09022018; Bagchi and Sethi 2007; Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016: 1354).

On 30 June 2008, Singh released the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), shortly before the Tokyo meeting (Bidwai 2012: 387). High officials acknowledged, "it is because of the international process, that the national action plan was brought into place" (Ghosh 2009b) and that it "was given to the international community to show that India was doing something serious on climate change" (GI-14022018). The NAPCC permitted Singh to showcase India's seriousness and engagement and to present India as responsible global citizen and member of the international community (GI-28022018; RI-2-01122016; GI-14022018; GI-25042018; PMO 2008; Rajamani 2009: 356; Vihma 2011: 91).

The NAPCC included "measures that promote [...] development objectives while also yielding co-benefits for addressing climate change" (PM Council 2008: 2). This had emerged from a PM Council debate about how "to find convergence between development and climate change" (GI-28022018). The PM Council decided to "turn the argument on its head compared to the international debate" as they wanted "development as main benefit not as co-benefit" (GI-28022018).⁴¹ They had realized that "old policies such as Energy Conservation Act and Forest Conservation Act [...] are not only needed for development, but also for climate change" (GI-28022018). The NAPCC composes of eight missions, focusing on solar energy, energy efficiency and afforestation, among others, alongside adaptation (PM Council 2008), "where both development and climate change go hand in hand" (GI-19042018). The NAPCC did not indicate any immediate changes to India's high-emission pathway and no mitigation commitment target (Bidwai 2012: 387-388; Kohli and Menon 2011: 8),

⁴¹ The NAPCC, therefore, states that "India's development path is based on [...] the overriding priority of economic and social development and poverty eradication" (PM Council 2008: 1) and that "[m]aintaining a high growth rate is essential for increasing living standards of the vast majority of our people and reducing their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change" (PM Council 2008: 2).

and only re-emphasized Singh's per-capita target. However, the NAPCC shifted from demanding international enabling support toward only mentioning that it would permit enhanced efforts (PM Council 2008: 1-2), underlining the new glocalized norm interpretation in the form of non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions (i.e., without enabling international finance for domestic actions). However, Indian representatives also continued to emphasize preexisting domestic norm understandings, such as per-capita equity (PMO 2008).⁴² The NAPCC was criticized for the low ambition of its co-benefit approach (Betz 2012: 5; Dubash 2012: 200), and for the lack of criteria for operationalizing co-benefits (CI-02032018), which was perceived to run the risk of "being used in an ad hoc manner to [...] justify business as usual development policies" (Dubash et al. 2013b: 47).

Overall, the NAPCC represents a second-order policy change, as it is an action plan that defines concrete actions and institutionalizes the per-capita target, while not implying a paradigm change. Due to strategic mimicry, both preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals) and external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., developing countries' non-compensated mitigation efforts) were incorporated in the glocalized norm interpretation consisting of non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions. International support was not perceived anymore to be required as enabling funding or compensation, but as means to additionally enhance even further actions. Otherwise, India continued to emphasize preexisting domestic norm understandings, such as per-capita equity, and rejection of commitments. Strategic mimicry also resulted in the establishment of the Special Envoy's Office – a medium-scale organizational change.

Mechanism: No *complex learning*, but *lesson drawing* in the NAPCC

Even though Singh, for the first time, acknowledged the "unequivocal findings [...] that global warming is a validated fact" (PMO 2007d), and recognized India's vulnerability at the PM Council meeting in July 2007, no actual complex learning occurred subsequently among the drafters of the NAPCC. First, the initial draft plan presented before the Bali COP did not incorporate future climate mitigation actions (Sethi 2007b). Second, the NAPCC argues that "[n]o firm link between [weather] changes [...] and] anthropogenic climate change has yet been established" (PM Council 2008: 15), despite the IPCC report's evidence (Raghunandan 2019: 190-192). It mentions large uncertainties concerning climate impacts and concludes that "it is not desirable to design strategies exclusively for responding to climate change" (PM Council 2008: 13). Third, there is no evidence that climate science informed India's decision to adopt the NAPCC and the respective mitigation actions. High officials even indicated that "when the NAPCC was done, no one thought it is worth spending time" (GI-28022018). Fourth, it continuously refers to traditional emphasizes, such as Indira Gandhi's

⁴² Internationally, Special Envoy Saran also stressed both traditional understandings and that developing countries' "emission reductions will be the result of sustainable development, not the other way around" (MoEA 2008). India's negotiation position also remained largely unaltered (Sengupta 2019: 122).

“poverty is the worst polluter” (PM Council 2008: 14), while not acknowledging IPCC findings that developing countries need to start reducing their emissions growth. Instead, the NAPCC emphasizes that climate change is solely caused by developed countries and that India will continue its rapid economic growth (PM Council 2008: 1-2). The NAPCC does not specify any immediate emission reductions, but relabels sectoral activities as mitigation actions, while not addressing trade-offs with emission-intensive activities (CI-02032018; Bidwai 2012: 387; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016: 1356).

Lesson drawing from China’s national strategy played a strong role for India’s strategic mimicry to present the NAPCC (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47; NI-15122016; RI-08022018), which is also evident in the similar structure of both plans (NDRC 2007; PM Council 2008). India also drew lessons from the IPCC report that some mitigation actions can contribute to development goals (IPCC 2007b: 47; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016: 1354), and reversed it to developmental actions that produce climate co-benefits (PM Council 2008: 2). The PM Council could also draw some lessons from a report commissioned in 2007 on potential sectorial measures in the context of climate change and from certain contributions by line ministries, while lacking detailed analytical input (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47; Never 2012a: 371; GI-19042018). In the NAPCC, the Indian government engages in some form of lesson drawing by aligning foreign ideas on the developing country climate mitigation norm with previous existing sectoral activities.

One of NAPCC’s relabeled sectoral actions is afforestation, while the NAPCC does not reflect upon emissions from deforestation or degradation. Previously, the 2002 ‘Greening India Programme’ was already planned to afforest 43 million ha over ten years (Planning Commission 2003: 1063-1064). However, annual planting only amounted to 1.6 million ha between 2001/02 and 2005/06 (PM Council 2008: 34). The 2007 Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) increased the planting target to 16 million ha (i.e., 3.2 million ha per year) (Planning Commission 2008: 194). The NAPCC refers to afforestation of 6 million ha as part of its new Green India Mission, without specifying its additionality, in order to contribute to the 1952 target of increasing forest and tree cover to one-third of land area (PM Council 2008: 5, 34). It appears that the NAPCC wanted to provide new impetus on previously partly unsuccessful afforestation activities, which had resulted in large planting but not in an equivalent increase of forest cover (Ravindranath et al. 2008: 217). There is no evidence that the NAPCC triggered any changed emphasis regarding forest activities, except for the recognition that “forests [...] constitute one of the most effective carbon-sinks” (PM Council 2008: 5).

The NAPCC also introduced relabeled sectoral actions in other policy fields, such as energy, which helps to understand the overall approach of the NAPCC. It presented a small target of establishing solar power of 1 gigawatt (GW) (PM Council 2008: 22). The 2006 Integrated Energy Policy report by an expert committee had already perceived India’s high dependence on fossil fuel imports and rising prices as a threat to economic growth and advocated the promotion of solar alongside the maximum exploitation of domestic fossil fuel sources (Planning Commission 2006: xiii, xxiii-xxiv). Adjusted to climate change concerns, the NAPCC then emphasized that “development of clean energy

technologies, though primarily designed to promote energy security, can also generate large benefits in terms of reducing carbon emissions” (PM Council 2008: 13). There emerged a belief that promoting energy security and climate change could move in the same direction (Betz 2012: 18; GI-2-09022018, GI-24042018; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016: 1354-1355), which was previously contested. This indicates a normative shift toward perceiving win-win opportunities without questioning the expansion of fossil fuel based energy capacities (Atteridge 2013: 58).

Overall, no complex learning occurred, while lessons were drawn from external sources (e.g., China, IPCC’s co-benefits), which were brought together with previous sectoral activities and goals, thereby shifting to a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions. Lesson drawing contributed to incorporating preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors (i.e., sectorial development goals and high economic growth) and by external actors (i.e., developing countries’ non-compensated mitigation efforts).

Mechanism: Persistent *competition* engagement in the NAPCC

Regarding the content of the NAPCC, India continued to rely on its competition engagement by emphasizing international per-capita equity (PM Council 2008: 1-2, 46), while not referring to equity concerns between rich and poor Indians (Bidwai 2012: 387). The NAPCC did not question the prevailing logic of continuous and accelerated economic growth for development. Own rapid growth remained the chosen trajectory for further development (Joshi 2014: 685; PM Council 2008: 1-2). Moreover mitigation was not even the priority regarding climate change actions, as NAPCC’s stated purpose was “firstly, to adapt to climate change and secondly, to further enhance the ecological sustainability of India’s development path” (PM Council 2008: 5). Actions that are directly responsible for India’s emissions were not addressed (Bidwai 2012: 387; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016: 1356). For example, the NAPCC did not question the ongoing deforestation through (economic) development projects. The domestic funding for afforestation was planned to come from the levy on deforestation, which resulted in emissions in the first place. Similarly, in the energy sector, the NAPCC does not reflect upon the planned increase of the fossil fuel capacities (PM Council 2008: 3, 5, 20, 34). Even though the NAPCC mentions several planned domestic actions without any reference to international compensation or support, the NAPCC also specifically articulated the hope for receiving funding from global climate instruments and from the CDM (PM Council 2008: 2, 22-23). High officials hoped that they can do more with such international support (GI-25042018; GI-2-09022018).

Overall, India refused any intervention on emission-intensive activities and still embraced the growth focus, international per-capita equity, and compensated CDM actions, while also emphasizing non-enabled domestic developmental climate mitigation actions as glocalized norm interpretation. Competition thereby facilitated the incorporation of preexisting domestic norm interpretations (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals).

Condition: Matching *cultural resonance* in the NAPCC based on preexisting policies

In the NAPCC, PM Council members culturally matched their interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm to preexisting sectoral activities. For defining mitigation actions, the NAPCC resorted to previous policies and programs, such as the Forest Conservation Act (or the Energy Conservation Act of 2001) and afforestation programs (Atteridge 2013: 59; Harrison and Kostka 2014: 466; Kohli and Menon 2011: 15; RI-09022018). In governmental statements, Indira Gandhi's 1972 mantra of poverty as the greatest pollution is continuously used as an excuse for rapid growth and for neglecting environmental damages (Vihma 2011: 74), and the NAPCC also relied on her statement to justify an economic development focus for adaptation, without reflecting the implications for increasing GHG emissions (PM Council 2008: 14). While Indian representatives often claim that environmental protection is part of their culture, in fact, environmental regulations often exempt large parts of the economy or are not enforced (Betz 2012: 13-14; Stevenson 2012: 115). Observers also noted that the "linking of development priorities with socio-environmental considerations has not been the norm in India" (Dubash et al. 2018a: 404). Even the 2006 Environmental Policy defends the primacy of growth and did not foresee any domestic mitigation actions (MoEF 2006: 41-43). This matched cultural resonance facilitated a glocalised norm interpretation in the form of non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions that included preexisting domestic norm interpretations (i.e., sectorial development goals and high economic growth). It hampered learning and mitigation commitments and facilitated lesson drawing, competition and a strategic mimicry based on relabeled sectoral activities.

Condition: Matching *material resonance* in the NAPCC based on perceived material necessities

The NAPCC was formulated in a way that it matched India's perceived material necessities of "[m]aintaining a high growth rate" (PM Council 2008: 2). Previously, mitigation actions were considered as potential constraints for economic growth (Atteridge 2013: 58; Betz 2012: 6; Dubash 2015). The NAPCC provided a new narrative of developmental actions that yield climate change co-benefits. For example, the NAPCC shifted its argument toward emphasizing that investments in solar energy will increase energy security (GI-2-09022018; GI-25042018; GI-24042018; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016: 1355; PM Council 2008: 13).⁴³ But the NAPCC did not address coal usage or deforestation (PM Council 2008: 3-5, 34-35), did not target the agricultural sector due to its importance to large parts of the population (Atteridge 2013: 58), and was unambitious compared to China's plan (Betz 2012: 14). Instead, the NAPCC only selected measures based on sectoral development goals and in the belief that they may also address climate change. Material resonance facilitated strategic mimicry, competition, and lesson drawing, while it hampered learning and

⁴³ The NAPCC did not include a mission on wind energy, as the government perceived this industry to be sufficiently mature (Schmitz 2017: 529-530). Also, the government planned to promote manufacturing capacities for solar energy and to continuously rely on fossil-fuel based development (PM Council 2008: 3, 21). Those aspects indicate the predominance of industrial and economic policy and not of climate mitigation.

mitigation commitments. It resulted in a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of non-enabled domestic developmental climate mitigation actions that included preexisting domestic norm interpretations (i.e., high economic growth, sectorial development goals).

Condition: Hoping for positive *material reception* through the NAPCC

The Indian government continued to perceive material prospects as sufficiently high and credible and asked for them, as evident in the NAPCC's call for international support to enhance own activities, including CDM funding (GI-2-09022018; GI-25042018; PM Council 2008: 2, 22). Positive political and economic prospects from positive relations with the US were also perceived as high and credible. The Indian government hoped to benefit in other issue areas from positive relations with the US, such as trade and nuclear cooperation (Hall 2016: 273-274; GI-14022018; Raghunandan 2019: 195-196). This is evident in the Special Envoy's joint responsibility for climate change and the US-Indian nuclear deal (Bagchi and Sethi 2007), which made the Indian government more open-minded toward the norm interpretation by external actors. Positive material reception facilitated strategic mimicry and competition and contributed to a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions that included external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., non-compensated mitigation actions by developing countries).

Condition: Positive *social reception*

Traditionally, Indian negotiators had feared that international acknowledgements of domestic mitigation actions would harm India's negotiation position (Dubash 2013: 197). But in his desire for international social recognition as part of his foreign policy agenda (Hall 2016: 277), Singh viewed India's nay-saying image as harmful and wished to change India's image to a "problem solver instead of a problem maker" (GI-14022018). Therefore, NAPCC's "audience was global" (GI-14022018) in order to show India's seriousness on the per-capita target (Raghunandan 2020: 216), to avoid further international pressure on taking commitments (GI-28022018), and to shine internationally as "responsible global citizen" (Sethi 2007b). This behavior was in line with Indian negotiators' general openness to occasional voluntary actions (Narlikar and Narlikar 2014: 216, 219, 223). Social reception facilitated strategic mimicry and a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions that incorporated external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., non-compensated mitigation efforts by developing countries).

Condition: Lack of preexisting *knowledge* on climate change

The NAPCC formulation still occurred under low preexisting knowledge as India had previously missed out to strengthen its climate science (Raghunandan 2019: 190-192). Stakeholders still emphasized data insecurities and a lack of Indian studies on climate impacts (Never 2012b: 158).

Detailed studies were missing when PM Council members formulated the NAPCC, even though they could access prior work of their organizations on sectoral activities (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47). The lack of preexisting knowledge prevented learning and commitments. However, knowledge on preexisting sectoral actions facilitated lesson drawing and contributed to a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of developmental climate mitigation actions that incorporated preexisting domestic norm interpretations (i.e., sectorial development goals).

Condition: Centralized *political-administrative set-up* for the NAPCC formulation

The PM Council worked in a centralized way with only three members (out of 26 members) and the Special Envoy formulating the document. In this process, the MOEF did not play any crucial role (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47; Rattani et al. 2018; GI-2-09022018; GI-19042018). Consultations with line ministries hardly took place (RI-1-01122016, GI-28022018). The parliament did not even debate about it (RI-2-01122016), and the NAPCC was adopted as an executive plan, immediately entering into force (Kashwan 2017: 194). Criticism emerged regarding the quick process and the PM Council's capacity deficits on strategic planning (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 48-49; NI-15122016; Rattani et al. 2018). This political-administrative set-up prevented learning, but facilitated lesson drawing and competition as ministers could resort to previous ministerial work (GI-19042018), which were in line with India's growth focus. It facilitated strategic mimicry as it permitted the rapid presentation of the NAPCC and contributed to a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of developmental climate mitigation actions that incorporated preexisting domestic norm interpretations (i.e., sectorial development goals and high economic growth).

Condition: *Opposition* against far-reaching changes

The opposition against far-reaching changes continued, while they did not affect the development of the NAPCC. As part of the PM Council, Singh had already included few stakeholders and powerful ministers, which have helped to achieve an overall societal buy-in. Despite no comprehensive stakeholder consultations (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 47; Fisher 2012: 119; Rajamani 2009: 356), which resulted into procedural criticism by the civil society (The Hindu 2008), societal opposition against the NAPCC did not emerge. Initially, opposition against the NAPCC rather came from within the government, as some representatives of the previous Indian negotiation position argued that India would not have to take any climate actions (Aamodt and Stensdal 2017: 121; NI-15122016). As the NAPCC did not aim to limit any usage of high emission activities, it did not create opposition by businesses (Aamodt and Stensdal 2017: 121). For example, the coal industry did not perceive the NAPCC as any threat to their business prospects (Atteridge 2013: 58-59). The opposition against far-reaching changes and the lack of it against the NAPCC facilitated strategic mimicry, competition and lesson drawing. It contributed to a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of developmental

climate mitigation actions that incorporated preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors (i.e., high economic growth and sectorial development goals).

Sum-up of causal complex 6

Strategic mimicry, *lesson drawing* and *competition* worked together in producing the NAPCC. India engaged in *strategic mimicry* by formulating the NAPCC in order to avoid international pressure and to shine internationally for strategic reasons, resulting in the establishment of the Special Envoy's Office – a medium-scale organizational change. Due to *strategic mimicry*, India shifted its glocalized norm interpretation toward *adopting non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions* (while also being open to international financial support), which was informed by *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing* and *competition*. The NAPCC is a new action plan that adopted several actions and Singh's per-capita target, and therefore represents a second-order policy change. The glocalized norm interpretations incorporated *preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors* (i.e., sectorial development goals and high economic growth) due to *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing*, *competition* and several *conditions* (i.e., cultural resonance, material resonance, knowledge, opposition, political-administrative set-up). It also included *external actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., developing countries' non-compensated mitigation efforts) due to *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing* and several *conditions* (i.e., social reception, material reception). Most conditions facilitated strategic mimicry (except for knowledge), competition (except for social reception and knowledge), and lesson drawing (except for material and social reception), and hampered learning (except for material and social reception and opposition).

6.2 Stage V: International target setting

In stage I (5.2.1), Indian negotiators contested interpretations of the developing country climate mitigation norm by other parties to the Convention and presented their own alternative interpretation in the form of compensated mitigation actions. However, Prime Minister Singh started to set the domestic agenda for an engagement with the norm based on future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions in stage II (5.3). In stage III (5.4.1), Indian negotiators reshaped the micro norm toward internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions in the UNFCCC negotiations. However, in stage IV (6.1), at the domestic level, India shifted toward a glocalized norm interpretation based on non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions, as mentioned in the NAPCC. In stage V, the Indian government also changes its position at the international level and communicates a GDP-based climate mitigation target in the UNFCCC negotiations.

6.2.1 The Copenhagen COP and India's mitigation target announcement in 2009/10 (causal complex 7)

In stage V, causal complex 7 explains India's behavior at the international level. In the run-up to the 2009 Copenhagen COP, expectations were high to achieve a post-Kyoto agreement. India shifted toward a *glocalized interpretation* of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on accepting and announcing a *GDP-based climate mitigation target* (representing a second-order policy change) in addition to domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions as contributions to reaching the global warming goal of 2 degree Celsius. This is explained by the workings of *shaming*, *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing* and *competition*. Most conditions *facilitated* strategic mimicry, lesson drawing, and competition, while some conditions *hindered* complex learning and shaming.

Mechanism: Increasing *shaming* on India in the run-up to the 2009 Copenhagen COP

India had tried to ward off international pressure by producing the NAPCC (see 6.1.1). However, developed countries, such as the US, continued to demand quantitative mitigation commitments in the form of GHG emission reduction targets from developing countries. India's NAPCC was only seen as a qualitative approach by developed countries. Yet, the Indian government continued to refuse mitigation commitments (Bhasin 2009: 344). In the run-up to the Copenhagen COP and as part of one single post-Kyoto agreement, developed countries, such as the US, pressured India and other major emitters to adopt mitigation target commitments subject to similar international scrutiny as the ones by developed countries (Dubash 2013: 198; Joshi 2013: 135; Raghunandan 2020: 207; Ramesh 2015a: 29; GI-25042018; GI-14022018; Sengupta 2019: 124). This was perceived by Indian representatives as an attempt to "renegotiate the convention" (Vihma 2011: 78). While the Indian government thought that the per-capita target would be sufficient (GI-25042018), it continued to refuse any own mitigation commitment or peak year (Sengupta 2019: 124-125; GI-25042018). In preparation for the Major Economies Forum in July 2009, developed countries, such as the US and the UK pressured Indian representatives to accept a common statement that global warming should be limited to 2 degree Celsius (Sethi 2009a), which Indian diplomats rejected by claiming scientific uncertainties. Achieving such a goal would have meant cuts from India by 15 to 30 percent below business as usual emissions (IPCC 2007b: 748; Sethi 2009a; Sterk et al. 2010: 6). Due to the strong pressure, Singh finally accepted the global warming goal, while insisting that this did not have any repercussions in terms of mitigation commitments for India (Deccan Herald 2009; Sethi 2009a). However, the US continued to demand quantitative mitigation commitments by developing countries (Raghunandan 2020: 207-208; The Economic Times 2009). Different from previous COPs, also vulnerable developing countries increasingly put pressure on all major emitters "to come together to tackle emissions" (Raghunandan 2012: 174). India was mostly targeted by this pressure, as China, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil had already declared mitigation targets (Raghunandan 2020: 207-208). Among Indian representatives, this resulted in a fear of growing isolation (Atteridge 2013:

62-63). At the 2009 pre-COP, US negotiators openly pressured Indian representatives to accept a single legal agreement, consisting of non-enabled mitigation commitments by all countries, which was rejected by India (Sethi 2009b).

Overall, shaming by developed countries resulted in the acceptance of the 2 degree Celsius goal. While this may be perceived as an implicit acceptance of mitigation commitments, Indian representatives, officially did not see it this way and continued to reject an own quantitative mitigation commitment. Yet, as reaching the 2 degree Celsius goal would require fulfilling quantitative mitigation targets by developing countries according to the IPCC, it can be argued that successful shaming on the 2 degree Celsius goal resulted in the implicit incorporation of external actors' norm interpretations in the form of non-compensated mitigation targets by developing countries, even though this was initially not publicly acknowledged by Indian actors (for the full picture see the following sections).

Mechanism: *Strategic mimicry* through emission intensity target announcement at Copenhagen COP

For warding off international pressure in the run-up to the Copenhagen COP, Singh, in May 2009, told the new Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh to “positio[n] India in a different light” (GI-14022018) on climate change. Ramesh task was to create a positive and constructive image of a problem solver in climate negotiations, as Singh was concerned about India's naysayer image. In Singh's view, “India should be part of the solution even though [...India] had not created the problem” (Ramesh 2015a: 2) of climate change. But he also reminded Ramesh to “not forget the urgent imperative for sustaining high economic growth rates” (Ramesh 2015a: 2), indicating that a change in rhetoric and less in substance was aspired. Ramesh agreed and planned “to reposition India – in terms of both style and substance – in international negotiations” (Ramesh 2015a: 450), while “be[ing] guided by [...] the need to protect our economic growth [...and by] us[ing] climate change negotiations as part of the arsenal to meet our foreign policy objectives” (Ramesh 2015a: 28-29).

Indian representatives subsequently started to soften their language (Vihma 2011: 75). At the Major Economies Forum in July 2009, Singh emphasized “India's ambitious National Action Plan” (Bhasin 2010: 439) and announced India's willingness “to diverge from business as usual and [to] move to a climate friendly path of development” (Bhasin 2010: 440). This re-emphasis of India's qualitative approach, however, was perceived insufficient by developed countries who continued to demand quantitative mitigation commitments, which were still rejected by India in following meetings. India's representatives, instead, emphasized the per-capita target and the NAPCC and demanded IPCC conforming mitigation commitments by developed countries and Annex I differentiation (Bhasin 2010: 454, 522; Ramesh 2015a: 462-463; Sethi 2009b). This indicates the continuous importance of traditional norm understandings, despite strategic mimicry efforts.

In mid-October 2009, Ramesh proposed to Singh a nuancing of India's climate approach to “counter the growing pressure on emerging economies like India” (Ramesh 2015a: 451) and to reach a

Copenhagen outcome that safeguards India's developmental space and foreign policy agenda (Ramesh 2015a: 29). Ramesh understood that "India was seen as the bad guy by developed and developing countries" (GI-14022018), as India was perceived as a large emitter. He wanted to avoid a continuous negative image that could harm India's global power standing and prospects for a permanent Security Council seat (Ramesh 2015a: 476). Ramesh realized that the demand for per-capita convergence was "not a sustainable basis for negotiations" (Ramesh 2015a: 474), and that India could not continue rejecting quantitative mitigation targets (Betz 2012: 16; GI-14022018; Raghunandan 2019: 196). Ramesh thought that "[c]hanging the global perception would require us to consistently remind the world of how, despite our many constraints, there was a serious domestic engagement" (Ramesh 2015a: 451), which would allow India to "speak internationally from an authority of strength" (GI-14022018). As a "per capita plus' approach" (Ramesh 2015a: 474), he proposed the launching of "aggressive domestic actions" and the development of a "domestic law on climate change management that incorporates performance targets for efficiency and intensity, and non-fossil-based energy supply by 2020 or 2030", which he called "nationally appropriate mitigation outcomes" (Ramesh 2015a: 474). He underlined that those performance targets "would not be new obligations but things we have already committed to domestically" (Ramesh 2015a: 474), indicating a more rhetorical than substantial change through strategic mimicry. He was even willing to accept one single legal agreement listing *commitments* by all parties as long as Annex I differentiation was maintained (Ramesh 2015a: 476) and advocated for shifting away from demanding the provision of technology and finance as a prerequisite for an international mitigation pledge (Ramesh 2015a: 476). Indicating his strategic mimicry, he argued in favor of vociferous "support [of] the 'early start fund' on adaptation finance [...] for small-island nations and least developed countries [...as India] could consider leveraging the goodwill this would generate to prevent the move to impose mitigation and finance commitments" (Ramesh 2015a: 475) on India. He also proposed "a mechanism through which the international community could be kept informed of our efforts at tackling climate change" (Ramesh 2015a: 451) that was based on biennial national communications on climate change and accompanying annual dialogues.

At pre-COP and bilateral meetings in November 2009, Indian representatives lobbied for their position. Ramesh highlighted that India already had in place several domestically financed NAMAs in the form of NAPCC missions that the government considers converting into nationally appropriate mitigation outcomes, which could be reported upon in biennial national communications (Ramesh 2015a: 478), indicating India's international alignment with domestically financed mitigation actions. At a pre-COP meeting, Ramesh even announced that India is "taking on commitments to reduce energy to GDP intensity and corresponding emission reduction outcomes for the year 2020" (Ramesh 2015a: 478) as part of the Twelfth Five Year Plan. However, those announcements were still perceived to be insufficient by many developed and developing countries. At the end of November 2009, India was one of the few major emitters that had not yet announced any quantitative mitigation target (Raghunandan 2019: 199; CI-12022018). As even China, Brazil and Indonesia had

already presented own targets (GI-14022018), Ramesh thought that India “should also come up with a target” (CI-12022018). In his view “India could not afford to be seen as lagging behind in other nations in offering to act” (Ramesh 2009). For safeguarding its international recognition as a responsible member of the international community, India, hence, needed to provide an international target (Sengupta 2019: 136; GI-14022018).

Four days before the Copenhagen COP, Ramesh announced India’s voluntary quantitative GDP-based climate mitigation target pledge (in short: GDP-based climate mitigation target) in the Indian parliament: The target consisted of reducing the emission intensity of India’s GDP by 20 to 25 per cent from 2005 levels by 2020 (Pulla 2015: 1024; Vihma 2011: 76). He justified this target by emphasizing that India’s global aspirations come along with assuming global responsibilities (Ramesh 2015a: 493). But he also underlined that the GDP-based climate mitigation target “is not an internationally legally binding commitment [...but] [t]his is a unilateral domestic obligation” (Ramesh 2015a: 503), and that if the international community preferred a higher target, they would need to provide additional finance and technology. At the same time, India’s per capita target remained existent as well as India’s goal of long-term per capita convergence and India’s rejection of mitigation commitments (Ramesh 2015a: 503; 506), indicating an additional persistence of traditional norm understandings, alongside a new glocalized norm interpretation based on accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target. For the first time, India pledged a concrete mitigation target, moving beyond its qualitative approach, even though it was only with regard to GDP’s emission intensity and did not promise absolute GHG emission reductions (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 471; Raghunandan 2019: 188; Sengupta 2019: 124; GI-14022018). Ramesh perceived this new target as a way “to get out of the trap of per capita emissions” (GI-14022018). As one PM Council member mentioned, this target was announced “to show that we are part of the global community” (GI-28022018).

The Indian government perceived their GDP-based climate mitigation target as “a reasonable target [... that was derived from the] realistic pathway based on energy efficiency” (GI-14022018), which had already been declining for the last three decades due to the modernization of its economy (RI-09022018). For the calculation of the GDP-based climate mitigation target, they looked upon the reductions achieved over the last ten years and included the already planned NAPCC missions (GI-14022018). The 20 to 25 percent target represented a small increase compared to sectoral business as usual developments, as the Planning Commission had projected a decrease of 17.3 percent of GDP’s emission intensity from 2005 until 2020 based on the previous pathway since 1990 (Planning Commission 2011: 388; Ramesh 2015a: 507). Presenting the mitigation target to the parliament, Ramesh assured that the implementation of the NAPCC will guarantee the achievement of the emission intensity target, which indicates its business as usual character based on the already planned actions of the NAPCC (Ramesh 2015a: 496). Unsurprisingly then, Ramesh guaranteed the parliament that this target could be reached “without jeopardizing our economic growth [...] and electricity supply target”, and asserted that if the target “merges as a constraint we would be the first

to re-look at it" (Ramesh 2015a: 507). Climate mitigation, hence, was still considered to be a co-benefit to economic development (GI-28022018). Observers criticized that the target was "pretty modest" (CI-12022018), based on conservative assumptions (RI-09022018), and not difficult to achieve as the Indian government was already on track with existing policies (Jørgensen 2017: 275; CI-12022018). It, therefore, was described as "symbolic politics" (Betz 2012: 5) that would still result in doubling emission by 2020 and tripling by 2035, while a more ambitious target of 35 to 37 percent would have been possible (Betz 2012: 5, 17; Ramesh 2009). From 1994 until 2007, India had already reduced GDP's emission intensity by 30 percent, and, from 2005 until 2010, by 12 percent (GOI 2018a: 6; Ramesh 2015a: 269). The envisaged change through the GDP-based climate mitigation target, hence, was less in substance and more in rhetoric and was enacted to avoid international pressure through strategic mimicry. It still represents a second-order policy change, as it introduces a new policy instrument to the domestic scene: a quantitative GDP-based climate mitigation target.

In parliament, before the Copenhagen COP, Ramesh also formulated three non-negotiables in order to convince critics of his approach: no legally-binding mitigation commitments, no peaking year and no international scrutiny of domestically financed actions (Ramesh 2015a: 503; Sengupta 2019: 123-124). At the COP, Singh justified India's GDP-based climate mitigation target with being a "responsible citizens of the globe" (Bhasin 2010: 622). He, furthermore, added that India "will deliver on this goal regardless of the outcome of this Conference [...and that India] can do even more if a supportive global climate change regime is put in place" (Bhasin 2010: 622). But India's GDP-based climate mitigation target was not used to elicit stronger mitigation commitments by developed countries (Raghunandan 2019: 188). At Copenhagen, Indian negotiators accepted the broadening of the NAMA governance concept to actions that are either internationally supported/enabled or domestically financed and also accepted their submission to the UNFCCC secretariat by 30 January 2010 (UNFCCC 2010: 6). They even helped to strike a balance between contrasting positions by China and the US on international scrutiny by proposing biennial communications and international consultations and analysis of domestically financed mitigation actions (Isaksen and Stokke 2014: 115-116), while internationally supported NAMAs had to be subject to international MRV (UNFCCC 2010: 6). This was perceived as a departure from one of India's non-negotiables, which Ramesh justified by mentioning the decision of the BASIC countries "not [to] be held responsible for the failure of Copenhagen" (Prabhu 2012: 244). India was acknowledged as being flexible in the negotiations (Mohan 2017: 51), while observers did not find India to be successful in increasing its prestige by announcing the GDP-based climate mitigation target (Raghunandan 2019: 197). After Copenhagen, this strategic mimicry led to the resignation of two long-serving Indian negotiators due to their dissatisfaction (Stevenson 2011: 1019; Thaker and Leiserowitz 2014: 2), and to the closure of the Special Envoy's office due to tensions over the appropriate negotiation approach between Saran and Ramesh (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 49), resulting in the reversal of a previous organizational change.

In response to the request by the Copenhagen Accord to submit India's NAMA for public listing (UNFCCC 2010: 9; GI-25042018), in January 2010, India formally communicated its voluntary and non-legally binding emission intensity target as "information on India's domestic mitigation actions" (Rashmi 2010). Both Ramesh and PM Council members perceived both the NAPCC and the emission intensity target as domestically financed NAMAs (GI-25042018; GI-14022018). At the Cancun COP, India accepted that the informal agreements of the Copenhagen Accord were formalized in the 2010 Cancun Agreements, which also defined NAMAs to be either internationally or domestically funded (UNFCCC 2011: 9-11). While India had already accepted domestically financed mitigation actions as part of the NAPCC, it now also formally accepted it internationally.

In Cancun, India also moved away from the traditional norm understanding of carbon space competition toward an emphasis of "equitable access to sustainable development" (UNFCCC 2011: 3), as Ramesh perceived vulnerable developing countries to be very wary of India (Ramesh 2015a: 189). Ramesh still justified India's repositioning by underlining that "[a]s responsible global citizens [...] we need to act" and that "[a]n increase in our international role comes with certain responsibilities" (Ramesh 2015a: 180). In Cancun, he, then, implied that India's target could be legally-binding as part of the post-Kyoto agreement by stating that "all countries must take on legally binding commitments in an appropriate legal form" (Rastogi 2011: 136). After domestic criticism, he explained his behavior to Singh as "walk[ing] the thin line between safeguarding our position while showing a level of sensitivity to the view shared by the majority of countries" (Rastogi 2011: 136), indicating the predominance of strategic mimicry. At the domestic stage, he then rowed back and argued that he wanted to express that every country had to provide "commitments in an 'appropriate legal form'" (Ramesh 2015a: 563), indicating a less strong legal nature. As Singh also underlined that observers should not interpret too much into Ramesh's Cancun statement (Rastogi 2011: 136), the Indian government's strategic mimicry becomes obvious: Making international statements that resonate with the norm interpretations by a majority of states at the international level, while the government domestically was still not ready to accept legally-binding mitigation commitments.

Overall, India engaged in strategic mimicry by announcing a GDP-based climate mitigation target internationally and by indicating that it might even be legally-binding. India also accepted domestically financed mitigation actions as part of the post-Kyoto agreement. The globalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation targets included external actors' norm interpretations consisting of quantitative mitigation targets by developing countries (but not absolute GHG emission reductions) and domestic actors' preexisting norm interpretations based on ensuring unlimited economic growth and sectorial development priorities and of preventing any form of commitments (but not being solely based on a qualitative approach).

Mechanism: Lesson drawing from China's emission intensity target, but no impact of learning

Complex learning did not contribute to India's changing climate position and the announcement of the GDP-based climate mitigation target. In 2007, Ramesh was already aware of India's climate change vulnerability. He, personally, already believed in the need of an Indian contribution in limiting global warming (Atteridge 2013: 63; Ramesh 2015a: 456). As Environment minister, from 2009 to 2011, he indeed conveyed the message that India is the most vulnerable country to climate change and that it is in India's own interest to mitigate and adapt. He even acknowledged that India is an increasing contributor to new emissions (Pulla 2015: 1024; Ramesh 2015a: 484, 486-487). Ramesh created the Indian Network for Climate Change to increase and improve climate science and awareness in India. Ramesh also helped to raise awareness on climate change in the public domain (Isaksen and Stokke 2014: 114; Thaker and Leiserowitz 2014: 7-8).

Ramesh often used those references to India's vulnerability to convince the Indian public of the changes he initiated or planned to introduce on India's negotiation position, which, however, did not indicate complex learning. For example, in a letter to parliament, he justified his proposal to introduce performance targets by referring to India's climate change vulnerability (Ramesh 2015a: 472), while, at the same time, he assured Singh they "would not be new obligations but things we have already committed to domestically" (Ramesh 2015a: 474). Ramesh's knowledge of India's vulnerability contributed to his belief in the necessity to reach an international agreement. However, Ramesh still did not accept mitigation commitments, as economic development remained India's over-riding priority and he also defended per-capita equity publicly (Ramesh 2015a: 458; 463). India's ultimate objective in the climate negotiation remained for him "to protect its developmental space and foreign policy agenda" (Ramesh 2015a: 29). At the Major Economies Forum, India, initially, even rejected the 2 degree Celsius goal by raising scientific uncertainties around this target, without making an alternative proposal (Sethi 2009a). India also blocked the adoption any concrete peaking targets at the Copenhagen COP (Ramesh 2015a: 524).

There are no indications that the acceptance of India's vulnerability by Ramesh contributed to announcing the GDP-based climate mitigation target. India still did not accept IPCC's mitigation recommendations for developing countries of 15 to 30 percent reduction compared to business as usual by 2020 (Sterk et al. 2010: 6). India did not even choose such a relative emission reduction target, but only proposed the reduction of the GDP's emission intensity. Its target was slightly higher (20 to 25 percent) as the projected reduction that would result from business as usual sectoral activities (17 percent) and included already promised NAPCC activities (Planning Commission 2011: 338; Ramesh 2015a: 496), while India would have been able to propose a much larger target of 35 to 37 percent (Betz 2012: 17; Ramesh 2009). Indian observers, hence, criticized that the Indian government "had not fully grasped the science, which in fact called for much greater emission reductions" (Raghunandan 2012: 170). They complained that India had not taken stronger targets and had not formed a stronger coalition with vulnerable countries that would have made the

leveraging of higher targets by developed countries more likely (Bidwai 2012: 389; Raghunandan 2012: 170).

India's changed international climate position, however, was informed by lesson drawing. For changing India's international image, Singh and Ramesh saw China and the US as role models of countries that were "adjusting the negotiation position to reflect the changed circumstances without abdicating national interest" (Ramesh 2015a: 29). As part of the BASIC negotiation group, India was exposed to other emerging economies' climate policy debates (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 46; Ramesh 2015a: 452; CI-12022018). When other emerging economies had already formulated their mitigation targets (Betz 2012: 10; Ramesh 2015a: 506), Ramesh drew lessons from China's GDP emission intensity target of 40 to 45 percent, and announced the same type of GDP-based target: a GDP emission intensity target of 20 to 25 percent (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 46-47; GI-14022018).⁴⁴

For setting the target, the Indian government engaged in domestic lesson drawing by consulting the Planning Commission. As part of the mid-term appraisal of the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-2012) the Planning Commission had conducted a study and consulted with think tanks. It had found that India's GDP emission intensity had already dropped by 17.6 percent from 1990 until 2005 and projected a further decline by 17.3 per cent from 2005 until 2020 (Planning Commission 2011: 338; Ramesh 2015a: 452, 507). In addition, the Indian government drew domestic lessons from its already existing NAPCC missions and decided upon India's GDP-based climate mitigation target.

Overall, complex learning did not influence India's changing international position. Instead, the Indian government drew lessons from China on the GDP-based climate mitigation target. The government concretized it by receiving domestic input from the Planning Commission on the already existing sectoral development pathway and from preexisting NAPCC activities. This contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target that incorporated preexisting domestic norm interpretations (i.e., economic development based on a projected sectoral development pathway and preexisting NAPCC missions) and external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., quantitative mitigation targets by developing countries).

Mechanism: *Competition* preventing stronger emission cuts

Up to mid-2009, Indian representatives still followed a strong competition engagement at the international level based on a norm interpretation in the form of compensated or internationally enabled mitigation actions. They still emphasized that domestically financed mitigation actions do not fall in the category of NAMAs, which in their view are internationally financed (MOEF 2009: 17-18; Rajamani 2009: 352). Indian representatives also perceived a post-Kyoto agreement with "uncompensated reductions" as a deal-breaker" (Rajamani 2009: 352). They still demanded that the

⁴⁴ In addition, Ramesh's proposal of international consultation and analysis with annual dialogues on biennial communicated domestically financed mitigation actions was inspired from WTO's Trade Policy Review and IMF's Article IV consultations (Ramesh 2015a: 451).

full incremental costs of developing countries' mitigation actions are being met by Annex I countries, despite already having adopted the domestically financed NAPCC, indicating differences in norm interpretations at the international and domestic level (Bhasin 2010: 460; Rajamani 2009: 352-353). Singh also ensured the parliament that the acceptance of the 2 degree Celsius goal at the Major Economies Forum does not compel India to accept mitigation commitments, and that India insisted on the forum's declaration referring to developing countries' overriding priority of economic growth (Bhasin 2010: 459-460). Carbon space competition, hence, remained an important motivator for India's international stance (Kohli and Menon 2011: 26).

With the Copenhagen COP approaching, India changed its negotiation position toward accepting domestically financed mitigation actions and a GDP-based mitigation target. However, to attract international funding, India still emphasized that it can do more with international support (Bhasin 2010: 550; Singh 2009). The GDP emission intensity target was also quite unambitious (20 to 25 percent reduction) compared to what could have been possible (35 to 37 percent), indicating the predominance of economic development considerations (Betz 2012: 17; Ramesh 2009). Ramesh also ensured his critics that this target is feasible "without jeopardizing our economic growth" (Ramesh 2015a: 507), indicating India's predominant competition engagement. Ramesh still wanted "to ensure that [...] development goals, which would mean a rise in emissions, would not be compromised" (Ramesh 2015a: 453). Protecting economic growth and safeguarding development space remained the priorities at the Copenhagen COP (Ramesh 2015a: 28, 31). Indian negotiators ensured that the economic development priority for developing countries was mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord. Otherwise, they prevented the adoption of any peaking year or any global quantitative mitigation goal for 2050 in Copenhagen and Cancun (Ramesh 2015a: 515, 524, 561; UNFCCC 2010: 5-6).

While India had even explicitly mentioned in the context of the Copenhagen COP that its GDP-based climate mitigation target is unconditional on international finance (Ghosh and Mathew 2009; Rashmi 2010; GI-25042018), India's NAMA submission after the Copenhagen COP emphasized that the target will be implemented in accordance with Convention article 4.7 (Rashmi 2010). This article specifies that the extent of developing country actions depends on the provision of finances and technology by developed countries and that economic and social development is their overriding priority (UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.7), which raises questions of the target's unconditionality, even though PM Council members underlined that the target remained unconditional (GI-25042018).

Overall, competition shaped the type, content and quality of India's GDP-based climate mitigation target. It contributed to a globalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target that incorporated preexisting domestic norm interpretations based on high economic growth, sectoral development goals and a persistent demand of international funding. This ensured that the target was unambitious and ensured the uncompromised further economic development of India's economy.

Condition: Matching *cultural resonance* to preexisting but changing domestic norms in Copenhagen

The Indian government culturally matched its interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm to the preexisting but also changing domestic norms regarding foreign policy, climate negotiations, and sectoral energy policies. While India's foreign policy norms historically included leading the non-alignment movement and defending of developing countries' perspectives, in Copenhagen, India, instead, was primarily interested in defending its own national interests, such as safeguarding development space and ensuring India's chances for a permanent Security Council Seat, as part of a more strategic and pragmatic foreign policy approach (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012: 584; Ramesh 2015a: 452, 476). Demands by US or EU or vulnerable countries like Bangladesh of mitigation commitments by India did not resonate with its domestic norms of economic development. While India also persistently referred to its traditional norm understandings, such as Global North responsibility, it nuanced this position. The new glocalized norm interpretation in the form of a GDP-based climate mitigation target resonated culturally with India's new strategic and pragmatist foreign policy norms (Isaksen and Stokke 2014: 117; Mohan 2017: 48; Ramesh 2015a: 29; Stevenson 2011: 1009-1011; Thaker and Leiserowitz 2014: 2). Such a norm interpretation would be both acceptable to vulnerable developing countries and developed countries and be in line with its domestic norms of economic development and domestic developmental climate mitigation actions.

India's GDP-based climate mitigation target was also chosen in a way that it reflected the preexisting domestic norms of energy efficiency, which are institutionalized in the Energy Conservation Act of 2001 and the 2002 established Bureau of Energy Efficiency and that were already included in the NAPCC's mission on energy efficiency (Harrison and Kostka 2014: 466; PM Council 2008: 3). This resulted in a target that reflected the projected pathway of business as usual developments plus NAPCC activities (Betz 2012: 5, 17; Planning Commission 2011: 338). This relabeling of sectoral developments as a mitigation target was also in line with the domestic norms of economic growth being the overriding priority, with its domestic climate policy approach of developmental climate mitigation actions and with India's preexisting negotiation positions of Annex I differentiation. Internationally, India could also accept the wording of domestically financed mitigation actions as part of the post-Kyoto agreement, as it had already adopted such actions in the NAPCC (PM Council 2008).

Overall, India created a cultural resonance with its preexisting domestic norms that resulted in a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target and domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions. This facilitated strategic mimicry, lesson drawing, competition, and hampered learning and further shaming by external actors, while incorporating preexisting domestic norm interpretations based on economic growth and sectoral development priorities.

Condition: Matching *material resonance* to perceived material necessities of India's economy in Copenhagen

The Indian government also materially matched its interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm to the perceived material necessities of India's economy. Indian representatives continued to perceive high economic growth as a necessity that would require a tremendous increase in energy consumption (Joshi 2014: 685; Ramesh 2015a: 2, 6-7, 414) and wanted to "ensure that the country's growth is not constrained by scarcity of natural resources" (PMO 2009). They rejected mitigation commitments and any peaking year as limiting economic growth (Dubash 2013: 194; Ramesh 2015a: 507, 561). The Indian government chose a GDP-based climate mitigation target based on business as usual developments of energy efficiency and NAPCC activities (Planning Commission 2011: 338; Ramesh 2015a: 496). Ramesh ensured that the target could be achieved "without jeopardizing our economic growth [...] and without jeopardizing our electricity supply target" (Ramesh 2015a: 507). He even guaranteed that if the target "emerges as a constraint we would be the first to re-look at it" (Ramesh 2015a: 507), which indicates the necessity of material resonance. The target was not ambitious (Betz 2012: 5, 17), but resonated materially with already ongoing energy sector developments (Vihma 2011: 76). India, thus, created a material resonance with its perceived material necessities that resulted in a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target that was based on sectoral business as usual developments. This facilitated strategic mimicry, competition, lesson drawing and hampered learning and shaming, while incorporating preexisting domestic norm interpretations based on economic growth and sectorial development priorities.

Condition: Persisting hopes for positive *material reception* for India's mitigation target

In the context of the Copenhagen COP, Indian representatives held the perception of high and credible positive political and economic material prospects from delivering a voluntary mitigation target, and still hoped for at least some international funding. They did not make their target conditional upon receiving financial compensations (Bhasin 2010: 550), but argued to be able to do more if international support would be provided (Ramesh 2015a: 506; GI-2-09022018). Yet, Indian representatives did not have high hopes on receiving international funding (Dubash 2009: 9-10), despite the Copenhagen promises of international climate finance (UNFCCC 2010: 7), as developed countries informally indicated to them that India should not expect benefiting strongly due to its own domestic financial resources (GI-2-09022018). In a speech to parliament, Ramesh even argued that India "does not need any international aid" (Prabhu 2012: 245). Nonetheless, when submitting formally the target, Indian representatives put it in the context of Article 4.7 of the Convention, which makes the extent of the implementation of mitigation actions by developing countries dependent on the provision of international support by developed countries and on developing countries' overriding priority of economic and social development (Rashmi 2010; UNFCCC 1992: Article 4.7).

For India's acceptance of a voluntary mitigation target, high and credible political prospects were especially decisive, as India had aspirations for a "permanent membership to the Security Council" (Ramesh 2015a: 476) for which it needed a constructive and positive image internationally. Positive material prospects were also perceived high from bilateral cooperation with the US, such as on issue like nuclear energy, which motivated Singh to highlight to Obama "India's own ambitious national action plan on climate change" (Obama 2009) at bilateral foreign policy meetings. In addition, for Ramesh, economic material prospects were perceived high for Indian businesses through the development of green technologies (Prabhu 2012: 245). Positive material reception, less on international climate funding, but more on economic and political prospects, thus, facilitated strategic mimicry, competition, lesson drawing and even made shaming by developed countries easier. This contributed to a globalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target that incorporated external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., mitigation targets by developing countries).

Condition: Aiming for positive *social reception* by nuancing India's climate position

India strived for international recognition (Raghunandan 2019: 199; Ramesh 2015a: 476), but developed countries and even vulnerable developing countries like Bangladesh viewed India as part of the problem (GI-14022018). For that reason, Singh asked Ramesh to "give India a positive and constructive image" (Ramesh 2015a: 2) as a problem solver (GI-14022018). When the other emerging economies presented their targets, the "peer pressure" [...] made it politically impossible for India not to follow suit [...due to] the desire to be viewed as a 'responsible member' of the international community" (Sengupta 2019: 136). Hence, there was a fear of isolation that India wanted to avoid (Atteridge 2013: 62). This was confirmed by one former high government official who acknowledged that "it was more about the international recognition of India in international forums" (GI-14022018) that India promised its mitigation target.

Traditionally, Indian representatives rejected legally binding targets and international scrutiny of domestically financed actions in order to prevent a negative social reception (Rajamani 2009: 364; RI-1-01122016; GI-28022018). Ramesh, however, perceived international scrutiny based on annual climate dialogues and biennial communications as an instrument to increase India's international recognition: "Changing the global perception would require us to consistently remind the world of how, despite our many constraints, there was a serious domestic engagement" (Ramesh 2015a: 451). Ramesh even indicated that all parties needed to take binding commitments at the Cancun COP, as he felt the need to demonstrate that India "was not completely oblivious and insensitive to the views and opinions of a large section of the global community" (cited in Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 475). Yet, this aim for social recognition only resulted in a nuancing of India's position, while traditional understandings like rejection of commitments continued, as Indian negotiators are not easily socialized (Narlikar and Narlikar 2014: 218-219). This social reception facilitated strategic

mimicry, shaming and lesson drawing. It resulted in a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target that incorporated external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., mitigation targets by developing countries).

Condition: Preexisting *knowledge* in the run-up to the Copenhagen COP

Despite limited climate science capacities and knowledge by the Indian government (Never 2012b: 157), Ramesh already had preexisting knowledge on climate science. Two years before assuming office, in a letter to the Indian government's Principal Scientific Advisor in 2007, he already underlined that India "should take climate change more seriously" (Ramesh 2015a: 456). While this motivated him push for increasing public awareness on climate change as minister, there were no indications that it motivated him to announce the mitigation target. Ramesh, instead, even underlined that he was "fashioning an approach to ensure that [...India's] development goals, which would mean a rise in emissions, would not be compromised" (Ramesh 2015a: 453). India's GDP-based climate mitigation target reflected business as usual developments (Planning Commission 2011: 338; Ramesh 2015a: 496), did not come close to the IPCC recommendations (Sterk et al. 2010: 6), and did not reflect the urgency of climate change impacts. Ramesh even prevented the incorporation of global quantitative mitigation goals in the Copenhagen Accord (Ramesh 2015a: 515). However, knowledge on activities by other countries or of sectoral development in India's energy sector were taken up during the development of the mitigation target (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 46-47; GI-14022018; Ramesh 2015a: 507). Preexisting knowledge facilitated lesson drawing and strategic mimicry, but did not facilitate learning. It contributed to a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target. Knowledge therefore mostly facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors' previous norm interpretations (i.e., sectoral business as usual developments based on economic growth).

Condition: Domestic *opposition* to the nuancing of India's climate policy approach

The nuancing of India's climate policy approach mostly received criticism by both long-standing senior negotiators and some opposition parties such as BJP (Atteridge 2013: 65; Jørgensen 2017: 275; Thaker and Leiserowitz 2014: 2). After Singh accepted the 2 degree Celsius target at the Major Economies Forum, critics emphasized that this will compromise India's development objectives through implicit emission caps (Rastogi 2011: 135; Sethi 2009a; Vihma 2011: 83). This only truncated when Saran ensured that India's support "doesn't amount to an agreement on emission cuts" (Deccan Herald 2009). When Ramesh proposed the 'per capita plus' approach (Hindustan Times 2009; Ramesh 2015a: 479; Vihma 2011: 83-84), his opponents did not support any linking of domestic actions to the international climate process (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 48), and Ramesh's own political party – the Congress – even refused to back him (Rastogi 2011: 135; The Times of India 2009a). In response, Ramesh had to define three non-negotiables, such as no commitment,

no emissions' peaking and no international scrutiny of domestically financed actions (Ramesh 2015a: 493-494). While Ramesh had far-reaching goals such as the adoption of a domestic law or the definition of performance targets, none of those were advanced domestically "as it was seen as a deviation from India's long-held negotiation position" (Ramesh 2015a: 453).

When Ramesh announced India's GDP-based climate mitigation target before the Copenhagen COP, his opponents criticized him for shifting away from a per-capita convergence and carbon space norm interpretation and for indicating domestic funding of those activities (Isaksen and Stokke 2014: 116; Pulla 2015: 1024; Ramesh 2015a: 497-498; The Times of India 2009b). While the NGO CSE and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry joined the opposition, the more progressive Confederation of Indian Industry did not criticize the target as it had realized that it was easily achievable (Das 2012: 252; Dubash 2013: 195; The Times of India 2009b).

After the Copenhagen COP, BJP criticized Ramesh for accepting international scrutiny of domestic climate actions (Mohan 2017: 43; Prabhu 2012: 241). Moreover, three high senior negotiators, among them Special Envoy Shyam Saran, resigned from their positions in protest to the Indian negotiation behavior under Ramesh (Stevenson 2011: 1019). After the Cancun COP, opposition parties and senior negotiators fiercely criticized Ramesh for selling out India, after he indicated that every country would need to accept commitments (Isaksen and Stokke 2014: 116; Mohan 2017: 44). Having to deal with the traditional norm understandings of his opponents, Ramesh himself pointed out that the "home front proved to be a major challenge, where even the slightest attempt to abandon the shibboleths of the past were viewed with suspicion" (Ramesh 2015a: 450). Several months afterwards, in July 2011, Ramesh was assigned a new position as Minister for Rural Development in a cabinet reshuffle. He was replaced by the environmentally less progressive Jayanthi Natarajan (Betz 2012: 10-11; Subramanian 2011), indicating that Ramesh was too progressive in Singh's view.

Even though Ramesh only nuanced India's climate policy approach in substance and only proposed a business as usual mitigation target, he faced intense opposition that prevented him to advance his ideas of domestic legislation and the adoption of performance targets. Opposition hampered strategic mimicry, lesson drawing, learning and shaming and facilitated competition. Opposition contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target that incorporated preexisting domestic norm interpretations based on economic growth and traditional understandings.

Condition: Break-up of the traditional *political-administrative set-up* during the run-up to the Copenhagen COP

Climate negotiations by Indian delegations had traditionally been shaped by few long-serving senior bureaucrats, while MOEF was characterized by weak capacities. Singh already took over international climate policy steering in 2007, and additionally established the Special Envoy's Office in 2008, as the then-Minister of Environment was "less articulate" (Varadarajan 2010). The political-

administrative set-up changed with Jairam Ramesh becoming Minister of Environment in May 2009. He aspired to play a stronger role in climate policy-making and Singh gave him the mandate to reposition India internationally (Ramesh 2015a: 2; GI-14022018). Ramesh brought with him several progressive advisors, which increased capacities within MOEF, while they had contrasting perspectives than the long-serving negotiators and the Special Envoy (Never 2012b: 143). While the latter criticized any shift away from traditional positions, Ramesh's team was still able to advance some of his ideas. As Ramesh was increasingly gaining power of climate policy-making leading to a re-centralization toward MOEF, Saran stepped down over tensions about authority and different opinions on India's climate position in March 2010 (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 48; Varadarajan 2010). As one former high government official mentioned, after Ramesh became Minister, the role of the Special Envoy "became rather marginal" (GI-14022018). Singh closed down the Special Envoy's office and Ramesh became India's formal central authority on climate change under the Prime Minister (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 49).

During the run-up to the Copenhagen COP, the changes in the political-administrative set-up toward higher centralization toward MOEF and the increase in capacity in MOEF facilitated strategic mimicry, lesson drawing and competition. This contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation in the form of accepting a GDP-based climate mitigation target that incorporated external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., mitigation targets by developing countries).

Sum-up of causal complex 7

Causal complex 7 explains India's changing international climate policy engagement. *Shaming* resulted in the acceptance of the 2 degree Celsius goal. India engaged in *strategic mimicry* by announcing the GDP-based climate mitigation target as a reaction to prior *shaming*, representing a second-order policy change whose content and style was shaped by *strategic mimicry, lesson drawing* and *competition*. This increasing strategic mimicry culminated in the closure of the Special Envoy's office, representing a reversal of the previous medium-scale organizational change. No indication could be found that *complex learning* contributed to the formulation of the target. Causal complex 7 resulted in the *glocalized norm interpretation* in the form of accepting a *GDP-based climate mitigation target* in addition to domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions as contributions to achieving the global warming goal. This second-order policy change neither represented an absolute GHG emission reduction target as demanded by developed countries, nor was it limited to a qualitative approach as preferred by domestic actors. *Shaming, strategic mimicry, lesson drawing* and several *conditions* (material reception, social reception, political-administrative set-up) contributed to the incorporation of *external actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., mitigation targets by developing countries). Preexisting *domestic actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., economic growth, sectoral business as usual developments and rejection of commitments) were included due to *strategic mimicry, competition, lesson drawing* and several

conditions (cultural resonance, material resonance, knowledge, opposition). Most conditions facilitated strategic mimicry and lesson drawing, while opposition hampered them. Most conditions facilitated competition (except social reception and knowledge). Some conditions hampered complex learning and shaming (cultural and material resonance and opposition, respectively), while others facilitated shaming (social and material reception).

6.3 Stage VI: Sectorial changes

In stage III (see 5.4), Indian negotiators reshaped the developing country climate mitigation norm toward internationally financed and enabled mitigation actions and the carbon forestry norm toward a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach in the UNFCCC negotiations. In stage IV (6.1) and V (6.2), India shifted toward globalized interpretations of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions (such as in the NAPCC) and a GDP-based climate mitigation target. In response to the developments in the previous stages, the Indian government introduces sectorial changes in the forestry sector in stage VI.

6.3.1 The formulation of the Green India Mission from 2008 until 2010 (causal complex 8)

In stage VI, causal complex 8 explains India's sectorial changes in the forestry sector after the adoption of the NAPCC in stage IV (see 6.1) and the announcement of India's international mitigation target in stage V (6.2). As requested by the NAPCC, MOEF developed the Green India Mission (GIM). This continued to be based on a globalized norm interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm in the form of *domestically financed* and internationally supported *developmental climate mitigation actions* as stipulated in the NAPCC. Yet, India shifted toward a *globalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *afforestation, forest quality improvement, and non-carbon benefits*, and introduced first-order policy changes (increase of afforestation) and second-order policy changes (new logics of action based on improvement of forest quality and carbon sequestration). This is explained by the workings of *complex learning, lesson drawing* and *competition*. Most conditions facilitated lesson drawing and competition. Complex learning was only facilitated by the political-administrative set-up and knowledge and hampered by material resonance.

Mechanism: *Complex learning* contributing to an emphasis on forest quality alongside afforestation

Building upon the NAPCC, GIM was developed as a program to be domestically financed by Planning Commission's additional resources (MOEF 2010c: 22), which Ramesh used to announce in Cancun that India is "pursuing aggressive strategies on forestry" (Ramesh 2015a: 556). MOEF's

first GIM draft of May 2010 expanded the targeted area to 10 million ha from the previously announced six million ha of the NAPCC (MOEF 2010c: 9). In contrast to the NAPCC (PM Council 2008: 5), this did not only include afforestation on degraded forest areas, but also eco-restoration in both dense and degraded open forests (i.e., forest quality improvement as an intervention to reduce forest degradation) (MOEF 2010c: Executive summary). MOEF claimed that this would mean a doubling of already ongoing and planned forestry activities over a period of ten years (MOEF 2010c: Executive summary), and former high bureaucrats assured that the target represented more than business as usual (GI-12022018, GI-17022018). Among the responsible bureaucrats, there was a new “realization that much mitigation can be done in forestry” (GI-12022018), indicating a learning process. GIM’s implementation was calculated to amount to annual carbon sequestration of 43 Mt CO₂eq, supposedly removing 6.35 per cent of India’s annual GHG emissions by 2020, which was claimed to represent an increase in offsetting of India’s GHG emissions by 1.5 per cent (MOEF 2010c: Executive summary).

Bureaucrats claimed that this number was derived from a “scientific exercise” (GI-12022018). The document provides a detailed accounting of the carbon sequestration potential of each intervention based on IPCC values (MOEF 2010c: 25). A previous governmental study by the Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education (ICFRE), to which the GIM draft refers to as a source for its carbon calculations, had calculated an annual increase of 8.8 Mt CO₂eq by afforesting six million ha by 2020 (Kishwan et al. 2009: 10). It, therefore, remains unclear how the additional four million ha, mostly targeting increasing forest quality, would result in such a sharp increase in carbon sequestration, especially as activities addressing degradation have a smaller carbon sequestration potential as afforestation (MOEF 2010c: 7-14), indicating limited learning from those sources. Yet, the GIM draft is the first domestic forestry program that incorporates the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm (CI-GI-13022018).

Ramesh perceived the decade long goal of reaching one third of India’s land area to be covered with forest and trees as a “theology of forest planning” (Ramesh 2015a: 191). For Ramesh, it was an “unrealistic goal” (GI-14022018), which had “became biblical” (GI-14022018). With 40 per cent of India’s forests being open and degraded forests, he perceived it as important to improve the quality of existing forests alongside increasing the area of forest cover (Ramesh 2015a: 191). He therefore underlined that GIM “take[s] a *holistic* view of forestry, not merely focus[ing] on plantations” (MOEF 2010c: Foreword). He perceived GIM to represent a “fundamental shift in mindset from our traditional focus of increasing the *quantity* of forest cover, to increasing the *quality* of our forest cover” (MOEF 2010c: Foreword), indicating a complex learning process (due to the new patterns of reasoning). This represents second-order policy changes, as GIM introduced new logics of action (and thereby new instruments) to the forestry sector of improving forest quality and increasing carbon sequestration. Reflecting on previous afforestation programs, a former high bureaucrat also emphasized that “in previous targets we did not think about improving degraded forest” (CI-GI-13022018). He added that addressing forests’ quality was “motivated by the new climate change

discourse as follow-up on the NAPCC” (CI-GI-13022018). For example, the 2002 ‘Greening India Programme’ had not addressed degradation (Kohli and Menon 2011: 37-38; DI-GI-02122016; Singh et al. 2013: 63-64).

As interventions to improve forest quality (in total covering five million ha), the GIM draft planned the increasing forest density of two million ha of moderately dense forests through better protection and regulated grazing and the restoration of two million ha of scrub and grasslands through conservation and rotational grazing. Moreover, it envisages the restoration of 0.2 million ha of mangroves and wetlands and the improvement of 0.8 million ha of agro-forestry land. In addition, GIM planned to reduce degradation through fuelwood collection by providing improved cook stoves to 10 million households. As afforestation activities (in total covering roughly five million ha), the draft envisaged the regeneration and afforestation of 4 million ha of open forests, the implementation of agro-forestry on 0.7 million ha, and the enhancement of carbon stocks in (peri-)urban areas of 0.2 million ha (incl. single tree planting) (MOEF 2010c: 7-13). Learning, however, was also limited as GIM did not plan to reduce deforestation for development projects (Kohli and Menon 2011: 38). Also, the ambition of afforesting roughly five million hectares was small compared to the target of 43 million ha by the Planning Commission in 2001 (Planning Commission 2001: 152; 2003: 1063-1064), which would have meant higher mitigation potential. Former high bureaucrats, therefore, criticized that the “Green India Mission was nothing huge” (GI-15122016).

Overall, MOEF engaged in learning that contributed to a globalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on afforestation, improving forest quality and non-carbon benefits and to two second-order policy changes (new logics of action of carbon sequestration and improving forest quality). Learning incorporated external actors’ norm interpretations based on addressing degradation and measured carbon forestry outcomes, while not being sufficient to include addressing deforestation as well.

Mechanism: *Lesson drawing* from international mitigation discussions and previous forestry programs

GIM drafters drew lessons from the international climate change discussions leading to the NAPCC (incl. its afforestation target) and from previous forestry programs on the governance structure and the provision of livelihood opportunities. One former PM Council member underlined the lesson drawing from the NAPCC: “thanks to the missions, climate change had been mainstreamed in thinking of ministries” (GI-28022018). MOEF’s Joint Secretary confirmed that they tried to link climate mitigation with India’s current forest policies and historical forestry experiences (Kohli and Menon 2011: 33-34). Observers noted that the bureaucrats looked at the problems of previous forestry programs and tried to find better solutions in GIM (CI-24042018) and thereby “connected what was possible in forest policy with the climate change agenda” (GI-15122016). Compared to already existing programs, GIM increased the overall afforestation area (MOEF 2010c: 3-4), representing a

first-order policy change. Yet, observers complained that GIM was “old wine in a new bottle” (AI-10022018), as it “merely present[ed] existing afforestation and mainstream forest conservation practices as actions to tackle climate change” (Kohli and Menon n.d.: 6), indicating limited lesson drawing.

Lesson drawing also occurred from the previous governance structure, indicating the continuous afforestation focus, as GIM placed the mission directorate in the National Afforestation and Eco-Development Board (MOEF 2010c: 21), which had been created for promoting afforestation in 1992 (Kohli and Menon n.d.: 5). GIM also aimed at utilizing and strengthening already existing institutions, such as Joint Forest Management Committees (JFMC) (MOEF 2010c: 14-15), which had been strongly controlled by State Forest Departments at the expense of local communities (Das 2020: 95; Kohli and Menon n.d.: 6). While the GIM draft also recognized the 2006 Forest Rights Act and gave implementation responsibilities to local village assemblies (i.e., the Gram Sabhas) guidance and steering of the mission was still assigned to national and state forest departments (MOEF 2010c: 14-15, 20-21). The governance structure, hence, was inspired by past practices, without any strong lesson drawing on their problems.

Lesson drawing also occurred from domestic programs regarding improving local livelihoods. The 2002 Greening India Program’s second major objective was providing livelihood benefits, which was supported by the convergence with the ‘food for work’ scheme leading to the provision of employment and food for afforestation activities (Down to Earth 2001; NAEB 2002: 2; Planning Commission 2003: 1063-1064). GIM aimed to increase livelihoods by promoting agro-forestry and harvesting of non-timber forest products (MOEF 2010c: 13-14), and by converging with the 2005 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme (MOEF 2010c: 17), which entitles every rural household to 100 days of work at minimum wage (Ong and De 2016: 1), indicating lesson drawing from previous converging programs. Yet, existing trade-offs between afforestation and local livelihood needs were still insufficiently reflected, indicating a limited lesson drawing from previous experiences (Kohli and Menon 2011: 29; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 22).

After the issuance of the GIM draft in May 2010, MOEF held public consultations (MOEF 2010b: C). Shortly after, in September 2010, the ministry issued the revised GIM document to the PM Council (MOEF 2010b: C), after having drawn lessons from the consultations (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 22, 24). MOEF shifted toward a more integrated approach that includes multiple objectives, as stakeholders criticized that “enhancement of forest carbon stocks should not be the main objective of the Mission but a ‘by-product’” (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 22), indicating a similar co-benefit thinking as the NAPCC. The final GIM document, therefore, added as central criteria for project area selection the significance of the area for ecosystem services (MOEF 2010b: G). In addition, it added an extra target of improving livelihoods of three million people, while the provision of more efficient cook stoves to 10 million people was dropped (MOEF 2010b: F). In line with a stronger focus on livelihood, the agro-forestry and afforestation targets were increased (from 1.5 million ha to 3 million ha plus an

increase of forest cover by another 1.8 million ha through restoration), while the forest quality targets were decreased (from 2 million ha to 1.5 million ha in moderately dense forests and from 2 million ha to 1.2 million ha on grasslands) (MOEF 2010b: 8-19; 2010c: 7-12). Based on calculations of two consultants, the carbon sequestration target was increased from 43 Mt CO₂eq to 55 Mt CO₂eq (MOEF 2010b: 9; 2010c: 3). MOEF also drew lessons from stakeholders by increasing the role of local institutions like community institutions, by stipulating institutional reforms to revamp forest institutions like JFMCs and State Forest Development Agencies, by demanding compliance with the Forest Rights Act on intervention areas and by placing the mission directorate in an autonomous society with strong stakeholder participation (and not in MOEF's National Afforestation Eco-Board) (MOEF 2010b: H, 5, 41; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24). Stakeholder complaints' that deforestation was not addressed, was rhetorically accepted, as, in GIM's foreword, Ramesh underlined that "replacing forests with plantations is not the panacea" (MOEF 2010b: C). While he "acknowledge[d] the forces of de-greening" (MOEF 2010b: 6), the final GIM document did not define any interventions on deforestation. GIM was finally approved by the PM Council in 2011 (MOEFCC undated: 2). Implementation was envisaged to start in 2012, while during a preliminary phase from 2011 to 2012, funding and institutional arrangements at the national and state level were planned to be established (Kohli and Menon 2011: 32).

Overall, lesson drawing from international climate change discussions (leading to the NAPCC) and from domestic programs (forest programs, stakeholders) contributed to a glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm in the form of afforestation, improvement of forest quality, and non-carbon benefits. Lesson drawing incorporated preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations consisting of afforestation, eco-system services, livelihoods and strengthened local governance. This contributed to one first-order policy change in the form of an increased afforestation target. It did not result in addressing deforestation.

Mechanism: *Competition* contributing to economic growth perspective and outlook for funding

Both the NAPCC and GIM were formulated in a way that fostered India's competition engagement through enabling high economic growth of 8 to 9 percent, whose GHG emissions GIM aimed to offset. In the face of those high economic growth goals, MOEF reduced the envisaged offsetting from 10 percent achieved during the 1990s to 6.35 percent in the GIM draft (MOEF 2010c: Executive summary; Ramesh 2015a: 185, 192). In the past, this high economic growth pathway had led to deforestation through development projects (Ramesh 2015a: 185). Projects requiring environmental clearances had received it in 99 percent of all request. When Ramesh refused clearance in several cases that would have resulted in environmental damage and/or deforestation, this resulted in strong public criticism, even though the clearance rate only dropped to 95 percent for environmental projects and to 85 percent for forest projects during his tenure (Ramesh 2015a: 79). But GIM only paid lip services to the problem of deforestation without addressing them with interventions (MOEF 2010b: C, 6), as it was accepted for the purpose of continuous economic growth (Kohli and Menon

2011: 38). Ongoing infrastructure and industry projects were not only perceived to lead to deforestation but also to limit the available areas for additional afforestation (Ramesh 2015a: 185).

GIM's purpose was also to increase wood supply on fallow land through agro-forestry, private tree farming and certification to contribute to solving India's problem of low wood supply (MOEF 2010b: 18, 34-35), indicating India's competition engagement. Agro-forestry interventions were initially planned in 1.5 million ha and increased to 3 million ha after public consultations (MOEF 2010b: 18; 2010c: 12). The development of a national forest certification system was even imagined to permit India to realize its "huge untapped potential for exports of its processed wood and non-wood products" (MOEF 2010b: 35). The Planning Commission's Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth perceived those interventions as contributing twice to India's emission intensity target: by increasing growth and reducing emissions (Planning Commission 2014: 94).

The GIM document outlined that GIM's costs of 46,000 crore Indian rupee (equivalent to 7.64 billion Euro on 16 September 2010 according to OANDA 2020) shall be provided by additional funding from the Planning Commission (MOEF 2010b: 43). This led an observer to characterize the "Green India Mission [as...] an endogenous REDD+" (RI-12122016) program. Initially MOEF planned to use funding by the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA), managing a fund composed of levies from previous deforestation activities, as already indicated in the NAPCC (PM Council 2008: 5), but this funding was not available at the time (The Hindu 2010b; GI-17022018). Yet, GIM also foresaw the convergence with the CAMPA Fund (MOEF 2010c: 17).

MOEF, building upon international NAMA and REDD+ developments, which India had reshaped in negotiations (see stage III in 5.4), additionally indicated that any missing funding would be acquired from international development agencies (MOEF 2010b: 43; 2010c: 22) and that a "majority of interventions under the Mission have potential to qualify under REDD / REDD Plus" (MOEF 2010b: 36). GIM's interventions were in line with the loose NAMA requirements, as they were nationally appropriate, were developed for both climate change and sustainable development considerations and were measured in their outcomes, allowing biennial national communication reporting (UNFCCC 2010: 6).

GIM's interventions were also in line with the REDD+ pillars of afforestation and degradation. Observers noted that "GIM is implicitly seen as the mechanism that can mobilize future international financing for the Indian forestry sector through REDD+, which is expected to cover a "substantial part' of the Mission's budget" (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 21). It was planned to align GIM and REDD+ actions (MOEF 2010c: 5). GIM was already in line with REDD+ decisions by the Bali and Copenhagen COPs, as it foresaw addressing the needs of local communities, enabling local communities' participation in monitoring, promoting sustainable forest management and biodiversity, addressing drivers of degradation, engaging in activities to increase removals and reduce emissions, applying IPCC guidelines to calculate carbon sequestration potential and defining a mission monitoring system based on remote sensing of forest cover and ground-based carbon monitoring

(MOEF 2010c: 19-20, 25; UNFCCC 2008b: 8-9; 2010: 11), while not reflecting upon and addressing drivers of deforestation and not providing a nation-wide monitoring system or a forest reference level (UNFCCC 2010: 11-12). For increasing India's REDD+ readiness, GIM, moreover, declared the establishment of a REDD+ cell "under the overall guidance of MOEF to link to REDD Plus activities in the country" (MOEF 2010b: G). The REDD+ cell received the tasks to develop the REDD+ strategy, a fair benefit-sharing mechanism and REDD+ projects "as consistent with the objectives of this Mission" (MOEF 2010b: 36). This was even supposed to be used to inform other relevant (forestry) programs by "providing services for improved monitoring at the outcome level to avail benefits under REDD Plus" (MOEF 2010b: 32). MOEF, thus, tried to tap into international REDD+ funding for its forestry activities as, at the time, MOEF "believed that the country stands to gain a lot from a global REDD+ mechanism" (Kohli and Menon 2011: 28).

Overall, MOEF's competition engagement contributed to a glocalised interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on afforestation, forest quality improvement and non-carbon benefits. Competition incorporated preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations consisting of economic growth, international funding support, and increasing wood supply. It resulted in the rejection of reducing deforestation and mainly contributed to the first-order policy change of an increased afforestation target.

Condition: Matching *cultural resonance* with previous forestry programs and policies

MOEF formulated GIM in a way that it resonated culturally with previous forest programs and policies that stipulate both afforestation and livelihood provision. India advanced afforestation to contribute to the 1952 Forest Policy goal of one-third of land under forest and tree cover, which had become a "biblical" (GI-14022018) norm. Its scientific basis was unclear and it was considered unrealistic (Ramesh 2015a: 191; GI-14022018, SGI-1-09042018, AI-10022018). Since the 1970s, the Indian government had supported afforestation programs in combination with livelihood provision to increase forest cover and forest products. This started with social forestry alongside other afforestation projects in the late 1970s, and continued with the National Afforestation Program in the 1990s and the Greening India Program in the 2000s, leading to planting on fallow land of up to 1.78 million ha/year in the 1980s and up to 1.6 million ha/year in the 1990s (Das 2020: 94; Planning Commission 2001: v-vi; Singh et al. 2013: 64; CI-27022018; RI-02042018). Since the 1990s, Joint Forest Management (JFM) aimed to achieve the same goals in a more participatory way through collaborations between the State Forest Departments and local communities (Das 2020: 94), which was in line with the 1988 National Forest Policy that had recognized the multiple objectives of forests, including conservation, livelihood provision and timber supply (GOI 1980: Article 2; 1988: Article 1-2; Singh et al. 2013: 63; RI-16122016; RI-12122016).

In line with those previous programs and policies, GIM also combined afforestation with local livelihood provision (Kohli and Menon 2011: 36). GIM's envisaged convergence with the Mahatma

Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme also culturally resonated with previous efforts to converge rural employment schemes with afforestation schemes, such as in the case of the 2001/02 'Greening India Programme' and the 'food for works' scheme (Planning Commission 2001: v-vi) or the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme with other afforestation programs prior to GIM (Singh and Sethi 2007). India's afforestation programs also had several flaws: Low survival rates of planted trees, insufficient sharing of decision-making and revenues with local communities, and funding and implementation shortages to which GIM tried to respond (CAG 2010; Das 2020: 95; Fleischman 2014: 63; CI-2-26022018; DI-12122016; CI-27022018; CI-24042018).

Even though deforestation continued for development purposes (Das 2020: 95-96, 106), the implementation of the 1980 Forest Conservation Act and subsequent rulings by the Supreme Court made large-scale deforestation more complicated (Bhushan and Saxena 2016: 8, GI-05122016, RI-12122016, NI-14122016; Das 2020: 94), and ensured that deforesters had to provide levies in the form of net present forest value⁴⁵ that were collected in the CAMPA Fund for financing compensatory afforestation (Kohli and Menon 2011: 21; DI-2-30112016; GI-05122016). The NAPCC and MOEF originally planned to use CAMPA funding for GIM (PM Council 2008: 5; The Hindu 2010b; GI-17022018), indicating their cultural resonance with compensatory afforestation. The CAMPA Fund had accumulated to over 6 billion USD (Ministry of Law and Justice 2016; NI-05122016; GI-151202016) and was mostly unutilized due to lacking legislation (Gopalakrishnan et al. 2014: 42), but was eventually unavailable to GIM (MOEF 2010b: 43; GI-17022018).

GIM also showed a cultural resonance with preexisting forest governance norms that reflected the decade-long struggle over the authority on forests between forest administrations and local communities (Das 2020: 98; Ramesh 2015a: 22, 195; NI-14122016; SGI-03042018; SGI-1-16042018). MOEF and states had shared authority over forests since 1975 (Kohli and Menon 2011: 6; Ramakrishna 1985: 910), and implementation by State Forest Departments have been characterized as top-down oriented (NI-14122016, AI-10022018). In line with this, GIM outlined MOEF's responsibility for guidance and steering at the national level and State Forest Departments' same tasks at the state level (MOEF 2010b: 39-40), while preexisting local forest institutions like JFMCs were responsible for implementation (Das 2020: 89-90). But as state forest bureaucracies had been reluctant to share powers and revenues with local communities in JFMCs in the past (Das 2020: 97; CI-24042018; NI-14122016; RI-12122016; Gopalkrishnan 2012: 346; Kashwan 2017: 204; Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 484; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24), stakeholders successfully achieved that GIM required the revamping of JFMCs and the strengthening of village assemblies (MOEF 2010b: 41; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24).

GIM also demanded compliance with the 2006 Forest Rights Act (Kohli and Menon 2011: 37; MOEF 2010b: 41). The Forest Rights Act was developed by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs to provide more

⁴⁵ Net present value includes "the loss of tangible as well as intangible benefits flowing from the forest lands due to its diversion to non-forest use" (Kohli and Menon 2011: 21).

tenure security by recognizing the disrespected historical rights of forest-dependent communities to the management of forest (Das 2020: 92, 99; RI-12122016; DI-12122016; DI-GI-02122016; Gopalkrishnan 2012: 345; Kashwan 2017: 204). For decades, non-state actors had lobbied for this (Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 479; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24; NI-14022018; NI-05122016), which had to be considered in any new forest program in order to avoid social resistance (Kohli and Menon 2011: 13). But observers criticized that GIM preferred the collaboration with JFMCs that are largely controlled by State Forest Departments (NI-05122016), while the Forest Rights Act would have put the management rights completely in the hands of individuals and communities. Most forest bureaucrats had rejected this, leading to low implementation rates of the Forest Rights Act. Bureaucrats did not want to lose forest control and, therefore, claimed that local communities would subsequently destroy the forest, even though the Forest Rights Act only assigned management and no ownership rights and despite studies indicating the opposite in the form of increasing conservation (Das 2020: 101-102; Gopalkrishnan 2012: 346; Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 484; NI-14122016; RI-12122016; DI-12122016; DI-GI-02122016; CI-27022018; GI-12022018; CI-24042018; RI-05122016; NI-05122016; AI-10022018; Ramesh 2015a: 196). GIM, therefore, incorporated elements of the struggle over forests by recognizing the Forest Rights Act, but also by assigning most authority to government (controlled) institutions.

MOEF formulated GIM in a way that culturally resonated with India's preexisting forest programs, policies and governance structures. This contributed to the globalized norm interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on afforestation, forest quality improvement, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic norm interpretations consisting of afforestation, livelihood and state-dominated forest governance with local community recognition. This facilitated lesson drawing.

Condition: Matching *material resonance* with local livelihood needs and development priorities

GIM was formulated in a way that it resonated with India's perceived material necessities. The main priority was a high economic growth rate of eight to nine percent (Ramesh 2015a: 192). Deforestation for mining, agriculture or infrastructure was not questioned or addressed by GIM, as this was perceived to represent material necessities for India's economic development (Das 2020: 106; ForEcolIndia n.d.: 4; Kohli and Menon 2011: 38; Singh et al. 2013: 64; DI-GI-02122016). GIM's afforestation activities were developed in a way that they matched the material necessities of both increasing wood supply and local livelihoods through promoting agro-forestry in partnership with communities and private companies as well as advancing forest certification (MOEF 2010b: 18-19, 34-35; Singh et al. 2013: 74).

Poor forest-dependent people were supposed to benefit from agro-forestry, non-forest timber products, and wage and employment opportunities (MOEF 2010b: 10, 18, 22), as one measure to balance the strong pressure by 200 to 300 million forest-dependent people on forests for fuelwood, grazing, and fodder, which is a major reason for Indian forests' high-scale degradation (Lele and

Krishnaswamy 2019: 478; Saxena et al. 2018: 11, 13, 17; Singh et al. 2013: 64, 73; RI-16122016; AI-10022018; NI-14122016; DI-2-30112016; CI-27022018; CI-2-26022018; DI-GI-02122016). India is characterized by a very low forest area per capita and faces enormous pressure for forest products (Ramesh 2015a: 182; Singh et al. 2013: 73). In the view of forest bureaucrats, it is impossible to keep local people out of the forests (SGI-2-16042018). For example, in Karnataka, illegal cutting, fuelwood collection, encroachment and forest fires has led to degradation (SGI-03042018). Himachal Pradesh has had problems with fires that were started to clear forests for grazing or encroachment (SGI-1-16042018). In the North-Eastern states, such as Mizoram, the expansion of shifting cultivation has led to deforestation (SGI-06042018; SGI-1-09042018). In the past, afforested areas had been cut down or been burnt down by local people, when they occurred in areas of local economic usage (Kohli and Menon 2011: 34; SGI-1-09042018; DI-12122016). This could also happen to GIM's activities, which target wastelands that are usually under multiple local usage (Kohli and Menon 2011: 33, 38). By improving the livelihood of three million people, GIM tried to consider the material necessities of those communities (MOEF 2010b: F). The convergence with the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme is also supposed to help in that regard by providing employment opportunities to rural people (MOEF 2010b: 32).

MOEF formulated GIM in a way that it resonated with India's material necessities. This contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, improvement of forest quality, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic norm interpretations consisting of afforestation, economic growth priority and provision of local livelihood and wood products. This facilitated lesson drawing and competition, but hampered learning toward addressing deforestation.

Condition: Perceived positive *material reception* from REDD+

MOEF still perceived international REDD+ funding credible and sufficiently high to foresee the establishment of the REDD+ cell and the development of REDD+ strategy and projects, as it believed to gain substantially from REDD+ (Kohli and Menon 2011: 28, 43; MOEF 2010b: 36; GI-15122016). Previously, the Indian government had seen that large sums of funding went to Brazil and Indonesia and hoped to receive substantial funding as well (Kohli and Menon 2011: 27-28; GI-05122016). GIM, therefore, outlines that “[a] majority of interventions under the Mission have potential to qualify under REDD / REDD Plus” (MOEF 2010b: 36) and the government anticipated REDD+ funding so high and credible that they expected a “substantial part” (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 21) of GIM to be financed by REDD+. MOEF only had a very small budget (NI-05122016, AI-10022018), and CAMPA funding was not available (The Hindu 2010b; GI-17022018), contributing to the hope for additional external funding from REDD+.

MOEF had a positive material reception toward REDD+. This facilitated the competition engagement. It contributed to the glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on afforestation, improvement of forest quality, and non-carbon benefits by including external actors’

norm interpretations consisting of measured carbon forestry outcomes and domestic actors' norm interpretations based on receiving international support. Yet, it was insufficient to address deforestation.

Condition: Preexisting carbon forestry *knowledge*

Preexisting knowledge on climate change and forestry was sufficiently available prior to the GIM formulation (GI-12022018). NAPCC had already acknowledged forests as carbon sinks and a study by the governmental research institution ICFRE had provided carbon calculations for afforesting six million ha (Kishwan et al. 2009: 1; PM Council 2008: 4-5). The state of forests was also known to MOEF and Ramesh due to biannual State of Forest Reports by the Forest Survey of India, indicating a degradation of 40 percent of India's forests in 2009 (Ramesh 2015a: 200). Evaluations of preexisting forestry programs existed as well and could be used for GIM formulation (CI-24042018). Preexisting knowledge facilitated lesson drawing and complex learning. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, forest quality improvement and non-carbon benefits by incorporating both external actors' norm interpretation (i.e., addressing degradation, measured carbon forestry outcomes) and domestic actors' norm interpretation (i.e., afforestation).

Condition: *Opposition* to exclusive carbon focus, state control on forests and reducing deforestation

In the national consultations, opposition emerged against the strong carbon focus, the lack of biodiversity concerns and the reliance on state-dominated JFMC (Dubash 2013: 195; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 18, 22, 24; RI-05122016), which was partly considered in the final draft (MOEF 2010b: G, 41). An incorporation of deforestation issues in the GIM was not successful, as Ramesh already faced strong opposition by his attempt to define no-go areas for coal mining in high density forests and due to his rejections of some proposals for environmental clearances. Ramesh had to accept a compromise as Singh perceived economic growth and energy security as more important (Ghosh 2009a; Ramesh 2015a: 376-378; Sinha 2011; NI-14122016). In 2011, Ramesh was even replaced as Environment minister and observers speculated that businesses strongly lobbied Singh for fast clearances (Gupta et al. 2015: 597; Padma 2011).

Opposition facilitated lesson drawing from the national consultation process and competition engagement by prioritizing economic growth instead of reduction of deforestation. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, forest quality improvement, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic norm interpretations consisting of high economic growth and considerations of non-carbon benefits.

Condition: *Political-administrative set-up of sufficient capacities and vertical fragmentation*

Despite limited capacity on climate change on general (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 48), MOEF had sufficient capacities to develop GIM on its own (Dubash and Joseph 2016: 48; GI-14022018). But it took MOEF two years to formulate GIM, which was submitted to the PM Council in September 2010 (MOEFCC undated: 2). Vertical fragmentation in forestry between the central government and states prevented the usage of CAMPA funding and resulted in the request of additional funding by the Planning Commission and of external funding (MOEF 2010b: 43; GI-17022018). In 2008, MOEF's draft bill for the establishment of a permanent CAMPA Fund foresaw a centralized control of the funds, which would have been disbursed to states for implementation. While the Lok Sabha passed it, the state-controlled Rajya Sabha did not accept it. The draft bill was criticized for centralizing forest management in India (Gopalakrishnan et al. 2014: 41-42), which is a concurrent subject of the Constitution (Kohli and Menon 2011: 6; Ramakrishna 1985: 910). Subsequently, in 2009, MOEF established the Ad hoc CAMPA by an executive order. The Supreme Court decided that financial resources of maximum 100 crore Indian rupee (eq. to 14.82 million Euro on 1 June 2009, see OANDA 2020) were allowed to be released on an annual basis to each state based on operational plans (Gopalakrishnan et al. 2014: 42), which made it unavailable for a centralized scheme like GIM. The political-administrative set-up of sufficient forestry capacities facilitated learning and lesson drawing, while the vertical fragmentation facilitated the competition engagement, as MOEF had to look for external funding. This contributed to the glocalised norm interpretation based on afforestation, improvement of forest quality, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating external actors' norm interpretation (i.e., measured carbon forestry outcomes) and domestic actors' norm interpretation (i.e., afforestation and international funding).

Sum-up of causal complex 8

Causal complex 8 explains the formulation of GIM. *Complex learning* contributed to the second-order policy changes of introducing carbon sequestration and improvement of forest quality as new logics of action in the forestry sector. *Lesson drawing* and *competition* resulted in the first-order policy change of increasing afforestation. Competition also prevented any interventions to reduce deforestation. Most conditions facilitated lesson drawing (except for material reception) and facilitated competition (except for cultural resonance and knowledge). Complex learning was facilitated by the political-administrative set-up and knowledge and hampered by material resonance. This resulted in the *glocalised interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *afforestation, forest quality improvement, and non-carbon benefits*. *Learning* and several *conditions* (material reception, knowledge, political-administrative set-up) contributed to an incorporation of *external actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., addressing degradation, measured carbon forestry outcomes). Preexisting *domestic actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., afforestation, high economic growth, international support and non-carbon benefits) were included due to *lesson drawing, competition*

and several *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, material reception, knowledge, opposition, political-administrative set-up). MOEF, moreover, continued to interpret the developing country climate mitigation norm in the form of *domestically financed* and internationally supported *developmental climate mitigation actions* as stipulated in the NAPCC.

6.3.2 Domestic engagement with REDD+ from 2010 until 2014 (causal complex 9)

In stage III, India reshaped REDD+ and the carbon forestry norm toward a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach in UNFCCC negotiations (see 5.4.2). However, in stage IV, India formulated the NAPCC with domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions such as afforestation (see 6.1). In stage VI (causal complex 8), MOEF already developed the Green India Mission as one of the announced missions of the NAPCC and foresaw the development of India's REDD+ framework (see 6.3.1). Causal complex 9, which is also part of stage VI, explains India's subsequent domestic engagement with REDD+. India shifted toward a *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *afforestation, reducing degradation* and *non-carbon benefits* and adopted the REDD+ Reference Document as a discursive change. This is explained by the workings of *competition, lesson drawing* and *persuasion*. Most conditions hampered stronger forms of lesson drawing and persuasion, while competition was facilitated and hampered by an equal number of domestic conditions. MOEF, thereby, continued to interpret the developing country climate mitigation norm in the form of *domestically financed* and *internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions* as stipulated in the NAPCC.

Mechanism: For *competition* reasons trying to attract REDD+ funding for implementing the Green India Mission

Domestic funding was missing for the implementation of GIM. Even though Ramesh “was not keen on REDD+” (GI-14022018) as in his view the mission was “not dependent on external finance” (GI-14022018), shortly after the presentation of the GIM draft, on 27 May 2010, MOEF's Secretary requested international REDD+ funding for GIM at the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference by stating: “Now we seek REDD plus funds for our Green India Mission in the interest of global climate protection” (Sharma 2010: 2). He criticized the more than fifty countries meeting to launch the REDD+ Partnership for focusing exclusively on providing funding for reducing deforestation in their partnership agreement, arguing this would exclude India as potential beneficiary: “Is the partnership document putting REDD in the foreground at the cost of the plus part” (Sharma 2010: 1)? Instead, he demanded an “all-embracing and inclusive” approach based on the “operationalization of the entire REDD plus” (Sharma 2010: 1), indicating his competition engagement. As the Secretary did not want India to be disadvantaged, he insisted that “[f]airness requires that a unit of carbon saved be treated the same as a unit of carbon added” (Sharma 2010: 3). He wanted to realize material benefits for developing countries “like India [that, in his view,] are

preventing diversion of forests to non-forestry uses and are also ensuring large scale afforestation” (Sharma 2010: 2). For convincing other countries, he claimed that India sequestered 177 Mt CO₂ in 2007 (Sharma 2010: 2), even though India’s forests emitted 87.84 Mt CO₂ that was only balanced through sequestrations by croplands of 207.52 Mt CO₂ (INCCA 2010: vi). This indicates MOEF’s competition engagement to tap into international funding.

After Oslo, MOEF even presented GIM as part of India’s domestic REDD+ engagement (MOEF 2010a: 5), while previously REDD+ was rather presented as a part of GIM (MOEF 2010c: 17), or was not even mentioned regarding GIM (PM Council 2008: 4-5, 34-35). Moreover, MOEF claimed the establishment of a National REDD+ Coordinating Agency, a ‘National Forest Carbon Accounting Programme’ and a technical group that is responsible to develop REDD+ methodologies and procedures (Kishwan and Pande 2011: 9; MOEF 2010a: 5). But no indications of their existence has ever surfaced, indicating MOEF’s attempt to attract international funding by asserting an already ongoing REDD+ readiness engagement. For the same purpose, MOEF claimed that, in India, REDD+ can “provide more than 3 billion USD as carbon service incentives” (Kishwan and Pande 2011: 6).

In a 2011 UNFCCC submission, the Indian government reemphasized that a substantial part of GIM is expected to be covered by REDD+ and argued that it needed 2 billion USD/year for GIM implementation (MOEF 2011: 2), indicating India’s competition engagement. Carbon sequestration is only perceived as a co-benefit alongside other eco-system services like timber and non-timber products (MOEF 2011: 2), indicating India’s attempt to materialize all possible economic benefits. In this submission, India proposed internationally a carbon market-based approach for all REDD+ interventions, except for conservation (MOEF 2011: 8). India also claimed the establishment of the REDD+ cell in MOEF (MOEF 2011: 2), which, indeed was formally established in MOEF. However, only one bureaucrat was given the additional task to engage on REDD+, indicating only a small-scale organizational change (GI-05122016; GI-12022018). According to the submission, the cell was tasked to coordinate and guide REDD+ actions, to provide assistance for the development and implementation of REDD+ policies and to collaborate with State Forest Departments (MOEF 2011: 2).

Developed countries and multilateral funders like ‘UN-REDD Programme’ and World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), however, did not finance afforestation and only provided non-market-based funding for reducing deforestation to large-scale deforestation countries like Brazil and Indonesia (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 20; GI-2-09022018; GI-1-13032018). This was upsetting for Indian bureaucrats (GI-05122016; GI-15122016), who increasingly realized that “funders are more worried about the REDD, not the plus” (GI-25042018). In their view, donors supported reducing deforestation, as they wanted to see immediate and high impact, disadvantaging efforts to reduce degradation and to increase afforestation as they take longer and have smaller impacts (GI-15122016; GI-1-13032018). India even tried to collaborate with FCPF. But, according to the

responsible bureaucrat, it “could not materialize” (GI-16122016) as FCPF only supported REDD, but not the plus-components. Nonetheless, even in 2012, expectations among bureaucrats and stakeholders continued to be that “India stands to gain a lot from a global REDD+ mechanism [...such as] compensation for its pro-conservation approach and sustainable management of forests” (Pinjarkar 2012).

From 2008 until 2013, Norway even funded a REDD+ research and awareness project by TERI that included some research pilots on reducing degradation (TERI 2014: xi-xiii; DI-GI-02122016; RI-16122016; RI-12122016). The Indian government, however, was not interested in a collaboration with Norway on reducing degradation, leading to the end of Norway’s REDD+ engagement in India (RI-16122016; RI-12122016). The Indian government rather preferred receiving afforestation finance, which is evident in its announcement to intend to develop pilot projects on the plus-components (MOEF 2011: 7).

At the time, donors financed REDD+ preparation and implementation (REDD+ phase 1 and 2) for countries to become ready for results-based payments (REDD+ phase 3). Yet, MOEF already perceived India to be ready for results-based payments and did not sufficiently invest in REDD+ readiness (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 20; GI-15122016). The UNFCCC had defined four core elements of REDD+ readiness at the 2010 Cancun COP, including a REDD+ strategy or action plan,⁴⁶ a monitoring and reporting system, a forest reference (emission) level, and a safeguard information system⁴⁷ (UNFCCC 2011: 12-13). But MOEF’s bureaucrats initially did not think “they would need to go through UNFCCC documents and to have [to prepare the] 4 documents” (GI-15122016). For example, high bureaucrats argued that India already had sufficient safeguards in place (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 23). In India, the only internationally financed REDD+ implementation projects were two preexisting natural resource community management projects in North East India. Their managers included a carbon dimension in their existing projects in order to receive voluntary carbon market funding, without any involvement of the Indian government (Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 480; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 21-22; DI-GI-02122016; CI-2-26022018; GI-05122016).

The Indian government increased its REDD+ engagement, when international funding was becoming more visible with the establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2012, to which 7.3 billion USD of climate funding had already been pledged (UNFCCC Secretariat 2012: 4, 6; GI-05122016). MOEF talked to the GCF secretariat for receiving REDD+ (GI-15122016), and, in February 2013, it established a REDD+ Expert Committee to develop a guidance document for developing and implementing REDD+ in India (GI-05122016), which eventually started the domestic REDD+ readiness engagement. The committee was composed of (former) senior government experts from MOEF, Forest Survey of India, ICFRE, and scientists from TERI or the Indian Institute

⁴⁶ A REDD+ strategy may reflect on drivers and locations of forest-related GHG emissions, prioritize mitigation actions, ensure safeguards and define governance responsibilities (Ravindranath et al. 2012: 1118, 1124).

⁴⁷ A safeguard information system may include a set of indicators on forest governance, indigenous rights and on stakeholder participation and a system for their monitoring (Ravindranath et al. 2012: 1124).

of Science (MOEF 2013: 4, 8), representing a small-scale organizational change due to its temporary character. It produced the REDD+ Reference Document in 2013, which is largely written in the spirit of technical lesson drawing from UNFCCC's requirements in the context of Indian circumstances. It provides a roadmap of necessary steps by the Indian government to become eligible for international REDD+ funding (see below).

Overall, the Indian government engaged in competition to receive international funding for implementing GIM and for other forestry interventions compatible with the plus-components of REDD+, while it did not aspire to address deforestation or degradation in partnership with donors. This contributed to a glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on afforestation, reducing degradation, and non-carbon benefits, which incorporated preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations in the form of afforestation, crop planting, and international funding. It resulted in two small-scale organizational changes: the REDD+ cell and the REDD+ Expert Committee.

Mechanism: *Lesson drawing* from the UNFCCC for India's REDD+ documents

In 2011, the Indian government submitted to the UNFCCC the country's "framework of approach to [...] REDD-plus" (MOEF 2011: 1), in which it drew lessons from the 2010 Cancun COP decisions. It acknowledged the essential REDD+ framework elements (MOEF 2011: 2), which the COP decision defined to be a REDD+ strategy or action plan, a forest reference (emission) level, a safeguard information system and a monitoring and reporting system (UNFCCC 2011: 12-13). As national focal point on REDD+, the Indian government established the REDD+ Cell within MOEF, representing a small-scale organizational change (see above) (MOEF 2011: 2).

Yet, the UNFCCC submissions only drew limited lessons from the essential Cancun elements. It did not announce the development of a national strategy. While it foresaw the subsequent development of a safeguard information system after the UNFCCC would have agreed on the modalities (MOEF 2011: 7), it only aimed to ensure safeguards for local communities under existing forest laws like the Forest Rights Act and approaches like JFM (MOEF 2011: 4), as MOEF considered existing policies as sufficient despite civil society criticisms (Kashwan 2017: 189). Similar, the Indian government awaited further modalities on the forest reference level development, while not expressing any plans to develop a REDD+ monitoring system (MOEF 2011: 5-6). Otherwise, the Indian government already perceived itself ready for results-based payments (MOEF 2011: 5). For the development of the Second National Communication to the UNFCCC, Forest Survey of India had already drawn lessons on carbon stock accounting from IPCC's 'Good Practices Guidance' (FSI 2018: 9; n.d.: 4; GI-2-13032018), resulting in a 2011 report that "for the first time, provide[d] [a] comprehensive account of carbon stock in forests of India" (FSI n.d.: 4). Yet, gaps remained regarding GHG inventory, permanent forest monitoring plots, state level monitoring, remote sensing technologies, non-carbon benefit monitoring and below ground biomass carbon assessment (Ravindranath et al. 2012: 1124; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 20-21; GI-2-13032018).

While the Indian government did not mention any actions planned on reducing deforestation and degradation in the UNFCCC submission, it referred to the plus-components on which it planned to undertake three pilot projects if funding would be available (MOEF 2011: 7), indicating a norm interpretation based on the plus-components. The Indian government announced the channeling of REDD+ incentives to local communities (MOEF 2011: 7), and foresaw an approach that perceives carbon sequestration only as a co-benefit alongside non-carbon benefits (MOEF 2011: 4-5). Observers were skeptical if bureaucrats would be motivated implementing REDD+, when all the benefits would be channeled to local communities (Khan 2019) or noted that previous financial benefits for community-empowerment programs like JFM were captured by state institutions. No benefit sharing approach was developed at the time, and GIM also did not specify the compensation approach (Acharya 2010; Kashwan 2017: 189; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24).

In February 2013, MOEF decided to establish a REDD+ Expert Committee to develop a guidance document to “channelize the actions of all relevant stakeholders for an effective implementation of REDD+” (MOEF 2013: 4, 8). As a temporary working group, the committee represents a small-scale organizational change. In August 2013, independently from any external readiness support like UN-REDD, as MOEF considered its own resources as sufficient, the REDD+ committee produced the REDD+ Reference Document by drawing lessons from both the UNFCCC Cancun COP requirements and the domestic context (MOEF 2013; GI-15122016, GI-1-09022018, GI-1-13032018). It included many elements and issues that showed similarities to the domestic strategies of other countries (Vijge 2016: 125-126), reflecting the committee’s lesson drawing.

The core features of the REDD+ Reference Document were similar to the ones mentioned by India in the 2011 UNFCCC submission. Carbon sequestration was perceived as only one of many ecosystem services. REDD+ benefits were envisaged to completely flow to involved local communities (MOEF 2013: 9-10), alongside other livelihood incentives (MOEF 2013: 30). The Reference Document acknowledged the need to develop the necessary Cancun elements, such as a National Strategy, a forest reference level, a forest monitoring system and a safeguard information system (MOEF 2013: 9, 17), while hardly elaborating on the latter.

On the development of the forest monitoring system (incl. MRV), the Reference Document noted that UNFCCC modalities were still lacking (MOEF 2013: 8). Yet, it already specified that FSI will develop MRV procedures on the forest carbon stock according to REDD+ requirements and the IPCC Good Practice Guidance (MOEF 2013: 74). It also planned further improvement of carbon accounting by measuring below ground biomass, increasing sample points and establishing a forest inventory program (MOEF 2013: 17, 57, 78). FSI also partly followed UNFCCC’s definition of forests by defining it as an area of at least one hectare with at least ten percent tree crown cover (MOEF 2013: 36-38). But it did not incorporate the additional UNFCCC criteria of having “trees with the potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 meters at maturity in situ” (MOEF 2013: 36) (see also FSI 2018: 5). The Reference Document, moreover, proposed the development of a national forest

reference level “that would lead to incentivization of increase in removals” (MOEF 2013: 13), indicating the preference for the plus-components.

In contrast to the 2011 UNFCCC submission, the Reference Document addressed the need to reduce degradation alongside the plus components, while noting that the UNFCCC had not yet defined those interventions (MOEF 2013: 11, 19). For this reason, the Committee drew lessons from the domestic context, by defining degradation as “[t]ransition from higher to lower tree crown density and/or [...] reduction in forest carbon stocks” (MOEF 2013: 39) and by defining the plus-components. It specified conservation as a “maintenance of area under existing forests” (MOEF 2013: 40) that may occur in Protected Areas like National Parks (MOEF 2013: 40). Sustainable forest management was clarified as the “[m]anagement of forests to sustain the biomass productivity” (MOEF 2013: 40), which may occur in all degraded forest areas that are managed by forest working plans, such as Reserve Forests and plantations (MOEF 2013: 41). Enhancement of carbon stocks was defined as a “[c]onversion of non-forest or degraded forests to forests through afforestation” (MOEF 2013: 41) that may occur in degraded forest areas under forest working plans (MOEF 2013: 44). It did not foresee any interventions on planned drivers of reducing deforestation, such as mining or economic development (MOEF 2013: 70), despite recognizing new research indicating annual deforestation of 100,000 ha from 2007 until 2009 (MOEF 2013: 38; Ravindranath et al. 2012: 1121).

The Committee drew the lesson from other countries that seeking assistance for REDD+ preparation from multilateral funds like UN-REDD and FCPC or from bilateral donors like GIZ or Norway would be beneficial for the development of India’s REDD+ framework (MOEF 2013: 13-15). For developing benefits for participants in the implementation, it drew lessons from previous domestic programs like the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MOEF 2013: 33) and from interventions that improve livelihood opportunities of local communities (e.g., access to non-timber products, more fuelwood efficient cookstove) (MOEF 2013: 32). Regarding MOEF’s own capacities, the Reference Document proposed to increase funding and staffing of the REDD+ Cell (MOEF 2013: 31-32). The Reference Document foresaw the following tasks for the REDD+ Cell: policy guidance, implementation assistance, co-development of fundable projects, collaboration with states, organization of carbon stock accounting, and disbursement of REDD+ benefits (MOEF 2013: 65). The Reference Document stipulated that overall guidance should be provided by the National Steering Committee chaired by MOEF and composed of governmental stakeholders (MOEF 2013: 9). The Reference Document did not stipulate any major changes to the forest management system (MOEF 2013: 11) and drew lessons from the existing institutional structures by noting that JFMCs could channel REDD+ funding (MOEF 2013: 15), despite their poor track record of benefit sharing with local communities (Kashwan 2017: 191). Drawing lessons from GIM, the Reference Document also foresaw the “[s]trengthening [of] decentralized governance through Gram Sabhas” (MOEF 2013: 18). In line with this, the Reference Document allowed for subnational REDD+ projects to be implemented by JFMCs and to be organized and overseen by State REDD+ Cells (MOEF 2013: 10, 65-66).

The invitation for stakeholder input on the Reference Document from April until May 2014 did not result in any changes (MOEF 2014a, 2014c; Mohan 2014; GI-16122016). The Reference Document foresaw a timely implementation of the required necessary steps for becoming REDD+ ready, such as the development of the national forest reference level within six months and the establishment of a Monitoring Committee (MOEF 2013: 21), but none of this happened as proposed. Only in December 2014, the Reference Document was approved under the new Indian government (Kishwan 2017: 107). Even though it was quickly outdated to a certain amount as it was written before the COP adoption of the Warsaw Framework on REDD+ in November 2013 that provided further REDD+ guidance such as on MRV (DI-GI-02122016), MOEF did not perceive a revision as necessary. Such a REDD+ Reference document, however, is not required by the UNFCCC and does not represent a national REDD+ strategy, as it was meant as an intermediate step through the compilation of all information to sensitize stakeholders and to identify the necessary steps to become REDD+ eligible (UNFCCC 2011: 12; GI-15122016). The chairman of the REDD+ Expert Committee, hence, noted that “many additional measures need to be put in place in order to operationalize REDD+ [and...] [t]he first step will be to draft and finalize the four key elements of REDD+ required by the UNFCCC” (Kishwan 2017: 107), as laid down in the 2010 Cancun decisions. As Indian experts showed a lesson drawing from the UNFCCC requirements in the REDD+ Reference Document and in statements, it was rather limited when it came to adopting the necessary actions to become REDD+ eligible.

After the submission of the Reference Document to MOEF in August 2013, one bureaucrat in MOEF started working on the National REDD+ Policy and Strategy (GI-16122016; DI-GI-02122016; GI-15122016). In April 2014, MOEF issued the zero draft of “National REDD+ Policy & Strategy” and shortly after the final draft of “National REDD+ Policy” that included some small changes (MOEF 2014b; MOEFCC 2014a; Mohan 2014). The National REDD+ Policy was meant to be included in the National Forest Policy and the national REDD+ strategy was intended to pave the way for REDD+ implementation (GI-16122016). Both observers and former REDD+ Expert Committee members criticized it for not being well connected to the REDD+ Reference document (DI-GI-02122016, GI-15122016).

Both National REDD+ Policy drafts, indeed, focused completely on reducing degradation, while the Reference Document had both targeted degradation and the plus-components (MOEF 2014b: 2, 6; MOEFCC 2014a: 8). One of it even foresaw arresting deforestation (MOEFCC 2014a: 3), drawing more lessons from the UNFCCC in this regard than the Reference Document. In contrast to the latter, the National REDD+ Policy drafts, however, hardly referred to the Cancun elements, while assuming that they already qualified as a REDD+ strategy, indicating limited lesson drawing (MOEF 2014b: 4; MOEFCC 2014a: 5-6). They did not specify any steps of how to implement monitoring, REDD+ activities, benefit sharing and safeguards. Yet, both National REDD+ Policy drafts acknowledged the development of the national inventory and national reference levels by the REDD+ Cell (MOEF 2014b: 5; MOEFCC 2014a: 6-7). Safeguards were already perceived to be

adequately ensured through existing domestic legislation such as the 1980 Forest Conservation Act or the 2006 Forest Rights Act (MOEF 2014b: 2, 4, 6; MOEFCC 2014a: 2-3, 4-5, 8). While the National REDD+ Policy drafts foresaw the sharing of REDD+ benefits with local communities (MOEF 2014b: 1, 3; MOEFCC 2014a: 1, 4), they both intended to work through JFMCs, which they praised successful despite JFMCs poor track record (MOEF 2014b: 2, 6; MOEFCC 2014a: 2, 7), leading to criticism by civil society (Ghosh 2015). Some similarities to the Reference Document existed as well, such as the development of State REDD+ cells nested in the national approach, similar tasks for the REDD+ Cell, the intention to use international and domestic funding, and the view that carbon sequestration is only one of many forest ecosystem services (MOEF 2014b: 3-6; MOEFCC 2014a: 4-5, 7-8).

None of the National REDD+ Policy drafts has ever been adopted (GI-15122016). Instead, the UNFCCC requires a REDD+ strategy and action plan (GI-15122016). Governmental REDD+ experts denied these National REDD+ Policy drafts the status of a REDD+ strategy, as they did not cover the necessary information (GI-05122016). They were criticized as not being well thought through and sound (GI-1-09022018, DI-GI-02122016, GI-05122016), as they would “requir[e] an entirely different set of activities” (Murthy et al. 2017: 54). Subsequently, even high bureaucrats in MOEF acknowledged that they were “not reflecting the realities” (GI-1-09022018).

Overall, lesson drawing occurred from both the UNFCCC’s Cancun decisions and the domestic context. This contributed to a glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on afforestation, reducing degradation, and non-carbon benefits. Lesson drawing incorporated preexisting domestic norm interpretations consisting of the plus-components and non-carbon benefits as well as external actors’ norm interpretations in the form of reducing degradation and strengthened forest carbon measurement. It contributed to two small-scale organizational changes: the REDD+ Cell and the REDD+ Expert Committee. The REDD+ Reference Document indicated a discursive change, while not a policy change, as it was only an information document for subsequent policy changes.

Mechanism: *Persuasion* through USAID’s Forest-PLUS program

FCPF and Norway had not been able to persuade India to engage on reducing deforestation or degradation in a joint partnership (RI-16122016; GI-1-13032018). USAID engaged in persuasion efforts by collaborating with India in a bilateral project: In September 2010, the Indian government and USAID signed a partnership agreement “to promote scientific and technical collaboration [...] in the forestry sector” (Tetra Tech ARD 2013: 3) as part of their broader bilateral strategic cooperation. This resulted in the implementation of the ‘Partnership for Land Use Science (Forest-PLUS) program’ from 2012 until 2017, which was supposed to “strengthen capacity for REDD+ implementation” (Tetra Tech ARD 2013: 5). USAID as the “only big actor on REDD+ in India” (DI-2-30112016) provided over 14 million USD to its contractor, the consultancy firm Tetra Tech, for implementing

Forest-PLUS (Mitchell et al. 2018: v), as the first large scale initiative on REDD+ in India (CI-2-26022018).

Forest-PLUS tasks included the development, deployment and teaching of tools for carbon sequestration, ecosystem management and forest carbon inventory, the design of programs to incentivize local communities to adopt REDD+ activities and the enhancement of capacities (Tetra Tech ARD 2013: 5). As international REDD+ results-based funding was not available and as trust in carbon market finance by many (subnational) Indian bureaucrats was lacking due to the CDM experience in forestry, USAID changed the narrative and project focus. After deliberations with subnational governments such as from Himachal Pradesh, USAID shifted to the promotion of integrated forest management and livelihood provision, which provide direct non-carbon benefits while also reducing pressure on forests (DI-28042018). USAID's approach at the subnational level was in many ways similar to India's previous ideas on GIM and REDD+, such as providing and teaching tools for achieving multiple ecosystem services and promoting non-carbon incentives for local communities (e.g., non-timber products) (Kumar 2017: 166; Mitchell et al. 2018: vi; Tetra Tech ARD 2014: iv). Yet, in general, USAID more strongly worked on reducing degradation and suggested "shifting the [forestry] focus from 'quantity' (forest area) to 'quality' (growing stock, species richness, etc.)" (Tetra Tech ARD 2016b: 2).

USAID's norm interpretation in the form of reducing degradation was not directly introduced in India's national REDD+ policy process, as USAID was not formally involved in the development of the REDD+ Reference Document or the National REDD+ Policy drafts (DI-28042018). While (former) bureaucrats noted the disconnection of USAID from the national REDD+ process (GI-15122016; DI-GI-02122016), donors, instead, claimed that USAID provided informal input (DI-28042018). Yet, in 2014, Tetra Tech itself acknowledged that Forest-PLUS had no access to MOEF's senior officers for supporting policy development on climate change, as originally foreseen in the project plan, and, instead, decided to collaborate with the Forest Survey of India on REDD+ related MRV issues (Tetra Tech ARD 2014: 26, 31), indicating the lack of openness of MOEF toward persuasion by USAID's contractor.

USAID's contractor Tetra Tech concentrated on persuasion activities regarding improving MRV capabilities and forest management capacities (Mitchell et al. 2018: v; MoEA 2013; USAID n.d.; DI-2-30112016). This included technologies and approaches to strengthen the GHG inventory data management system, forest carbon stock estimations, and community participation in carbon estimations (Tetra Tech ARD 2013: 6; 2016c: 2). Tetra Tech, however, was not always successful in persuading the government and local communities to apply these tools and practices in their routine use (Mitchell et al. 2018: v-vi; DI-GI-02122016). Yet, Forest-PLUS support contributed to the improvement of India's forest inventory by FSI through increasing the sample plots from 20,000 to 32,000 in 2016 and by improving the use of satellite data (GI-2-13032018).

Forest-PLUS indirectly channeled its norm interpretations in India's national REDD+ process. USAID's contractors tried to engage in teaching by providing training programs and workshops (Tetra Tech ARD 2016a: 7; DI-2-30112016; NI-DI-16022018), such as on climate change and GHG inventories (Tetra Tech ARD 2014: v). Also, Forest-PLUS facilitated the development of training material, such as on the ecosystem approach to forest management (Tetra Tech ARD 2017b: x). For Indian forest bureaucrats, they organized study tours to the US, including on MRV and on ecosystem management to increase REDD+ readiness by exposing them "to the US' most advanced practices in these fields as possible models for applying to REDD+ and forest management in India" (Tetra Tech ARD 2014: iv; similarly GI-05122016; DI-12122016). Both the project evaluation and other observers argued that many of the trainings were successful in persuading and teaching Indian bureaucrats and stakeholders to respond better to forest-related climate change (Mitchell et al. 2018: vi-vii; DI-08022018), while others doubted this success (RI-16122016).

USAID's contractor, furthermore, collaborated with four states on demonstration activities, which were chosen by the Indian government based on their different regional conditions: Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Sikkim (Tetra Tech ARD 2014: iv; NI-DI-16022018). The goal was to incorporate some of the results and experiences from the pilots in the national REDD+ process (NI-DI-16022018), while no national guidance had previously been provided by MOEF for subnational REDD+ activities (CI-2-26022018). Forest-PLUS engaged in several trainings of state forest officers (SGI-12042018; SGI-03042018). Based on deliberations with state governments, forest reference levels were developed and different REDD+ approaches were applied in three states (DI-28042018), including the development of a carbon project design document for voluntary carbon market REDD+ funding in a local area of Karnataka, a jurisdictional REDD+ approach in Sikkim (Tetra Tech ARD 2014: v-vi, 29), and a carbon finance proposal for a jurisdictional REDD+ approach at district level in Madhya Pradesh (NI-DI-16022018; CI-2-26022018). Yet, none of those approaches resulted in results-based payments or in the development of State REDD+ Action Plans (NI-DI-16022018). As Himachal Pradesh refused any REDD+ project development due to doubts about carbon trading (NI-DI-16022018, CI-2-26022018, SGI-12042018), USAID's contractor and the State Forest Department, instead, collaborated on addressing drivers of degradation and supporting local communities in alternative livelihoods alongside improvement of state-level forest inventory (Tetra Tech ARD 2017a: 5; DI-28042018; NI-DI-16022018; SGI-12042018; SGI-1-16042018).

USAID had the impression that REDD+ "has not really picked up in India" (DI-2-30112016). They waited for the final national REDD+ guidelines by the central government (DI-2-30112016), which did not complete REDD+ readiness steps (NI-DI-16022018). But some observers criticized that USAID could have been doing more on supporting India's REDD+ readiness (DI-GI-02122016). However, MOEF representatives were satisfied and even open to a follow up project (GI-1-01032018).

Overall, persuasion was limited to technical forest management and carbon estimation aspects by USAID's contractors, while not directly influencing India's national REDD+ or forest policy approach. Yet, persuasion contributed to a globalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits by indirectly incorporating external actors' norm interpretations consisting of reducing degradation and strengthened forest carbon measurement. At the subnational level, USAID's contractors were additionally open to include domestic actors' preexisting norm interpretations based on non-carbon benefits, which however, did not impact the national level. Persuasion, also, did not result in any national policy changes.

Condition: Perceived *cultural resonance* with donors' norm interpretations and UNFCCC's requirements

India's domestic norms of self-reliance and its carbon forestry norm interpretation based on afforestation and conservation were not matching donors' norm interpretations consisting of reducing deforestation, which prevented further development cooperation on REDD+. In the view of high MOEF representatives, India does forestry on its own based on the belief of "whatever we do, it is not dependent on external finance" (GI-14022018), continuously reflecting India's self-reliance of the past in which foreign capital had been restricted and external forces had not been permitted to influence development decisions (Stevenson 2011: 1009). Indian bureaucrats thought, "we are good enough to develop it [(i.e., REDD+)] on our own" (GI-1-13032018) and told FCPF that India would not join the multilateral funding scheme as long as they don't include plus-components (GI-1-13032018). India's self-reliance was also visible in the collaboration with USAID, as it was largely limited to MRV issues and to piloting at the state level, while national forestry bureaucrats were not open to direct inputs on India's national REDD+ framework. Instead, the central government thought that the Indian forest bureaucracy had sufficient capacities and resources to develop it on its own (GI-1-13032018; GI-1-09022018; GI-16122016), while being more open to indirect influences through Forest-PLUS trainings and workshops.

At the same time, Indian bureaucrats perceived the Cancun requirements to be well aligned with India's already existing policies (GI-1-13032018), leading to a lack of collaboration with donors and to gaps regarding India's REDD+ framework. Already in 2011, the government perceived India to be ready for results-based REDD+ payments, without having developed the essential elements of the Cancun REDD+ framework (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 20). For that reason, MOEF did not want to collaborate on REDD+ readiness with FCPF or UN-REDD when REDD+ experts recommended it in 2013, as they were perceived as only small capacity-building donors (GI-15122016). Indian forest bureaucrats had the opinion that India already had good forest monitoring capacities in place to measure forest carbon (CI-GI-13022018, GI-151202016). They even believed that India was "ahead of others with regard to safeguards" (GI-15122016) and did "not have to do any separate thing for the carbon service investment" (cited from Vijge and Gupta 2014: 23). The Forest Conservation Act and the environmental impact assessment were perceived to be sufficient as environmental

safeguards (GI-05122016; RI-12122016; GI-15122016). Similarly, the Forest Rights Act and Joint Forest Management were regarded as sufficient social safeguards for the rights of local communities (GI-15122016; RI-12122016; DI-GI-02122016; GI-05122016), despite huge implementation problems of both of them (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24; NI-05122016; NI-14122016; DI-GI-02122016). Still, the REDD+ Reference Document did not see any necessity to change India's forest management governance (Kashwan 2017: 195).

The lack of cultural resonance with donors' carbon forestry norm interpretations and the perceived already existing high resonance with UNFCCC's Cancun requirements prevented further collaboration with donors and resulted in gaps in the national REDD+ framework. This fueled the competition engagement, hampered lesson drawing by Indian bureaucrats and hampered persuasion by USAID. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation in the form of afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations consisting of afforestation and self-reliant implementation based on preexisting domestic forest policies.

Condition: Perceived *material resonance* with community livelihoods, afforestation programs and deforestation for development purposes

The Indian government chose a REDD+ approach that matched its perceived material necessities. The 2013 Reference Document planned to channel REDD+ incentives to and enhance livelihood benefits for involved local communities, as they were regarded as the main drivers of degradation (MOEF 2013: 11-12). By providing alternative options to fuelwood, such as solar heaters, or by providing alternative income such as agricultural products, both the Indian government and USAID assumed that pressure can be taken away from forests (Kumar 2017: 150-151; Mitchell et al. 2018: vi; MOEF 2013: 12). According to one MOEF official, India's goal was to find a way so that "local people [can] be supported through the plus who are already doing the plus" (GI-16122016). In the face of lacking REDD+ funding, USAID shifted to promoting immediate local livelihood benefits from, e.g., agricultural activities.⁴⁸

India, moreover, focused on promoting afforestation, which could also improve livelihood of rural planters and increase wood supply. India even highlighted croplands as eligible for REDD+ in its UNFCCC submission. Previously, GIM had already mentioned the promotion of private agro-forestry plantations as potential activity (see 6.3.1). In addition, neither India's 2011 UNFCCC submission nor its REDD+ Reference Document addressed the problems of deforestation, which had still amounted to almost 100,000 ha from 2007 until 2009 (MOEF 2013: 38; Ravindranath et al. 2012:

⁴⁸ Even under favorable carbon market conditions (i.e., 50 US Dollar/ton CO₂eq resulting in 2000 Indian rupee/ha/year for the growing period of 50 years), grazing and firewood collection in forests would have still been financially more beneficial for local communities (i.e., ranging from 2,000 to 12,000 Indian rupee/ha/year in terms of forest-based income) (Lele 2011: 9-10), making it even more important to provide additional livelihood options.

1121), as this would have been in contradiction to the perceived material necessities, such as coal mining or infrastructure development (NI-14122016; GI-12022018; ForEcolIndia n.d.: 4).

India formulated its REDD+ approach in a way that it matched the perceived material necessities. This facilitated the competition engagement, prevented persuasion by Norway and FCPF and led to an adjustment of USAID's persuasion approach. It also hampered lesson drawing regarding reducing deforestation. This contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations in the form of afforestation, non-carbon economic benefits and rejection of reducing deforestation.

Condition: Reversed *social reception* hampering collaboration with donors

India's reversed social reception in the form of potential social vulnerability toward donors hampered India's collaboration with them. Indian bureaucrats feared potential conditionalities and domestic scrutiny by donors like FCPF or UN-REDD, such as regarding safeguards, in exchange for the little available REDD+ readiness funding (DI-GI-02122016; GI-15122016; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 21). They, instead, preferred to use own domestic resources to prevent those conditionalities (GI-1-09022018; NI-14122016). Cooperation with external donors was a very sensitive issue for the Indian government (DI-02122016), as they did not want to follow any one's external dictate when it came to their own domestic forest policies (GI-15122016; NI-05122016), which prevented USAID from having a larger impact on India's REDD+ framework (RI-12122016, NI-05122016). Instead, the collaboration with USAID was limited to technical MRV issues and indirect influences through trainings and workshops.

Reversed social reception hampered the persuasion activities by USAID, hampered India's lesson drawing that was much slower on its own and hampered competition as stronger collaborations with donors could have opened the door for results-based payments. This contributed to a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of afforestation, reducing deforestation and non-carbon benefits, which incorporated preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation, self-reliant implementation based on preexisting domestic forest policies and rejection of reducing deforestation).

Condition: Perceived positive *material reception* for afforestation in India

During this period, India perceived REDD+ funding to be insufficient, especially for afforestation activities. This slowed down the development of the national REDD+ framework (GI-1-13032018). For implementing afforestation programs, Indian representatives emphasized the need of 2 billion USD/year internationally and hoped for large-scale REDD+ funding (MOEF 2011: 2). Yet, only 340 million USD were available for REDD+ as of 2012 and donors were prioritizing the financing of

reducing deforestation (Vijge and Gupta 2014: 20; GI-15122016; DI-2-30112016; GI-25042018), while the Indian government was not interested in addressing deforestation (GI-05122016). Even after FCPF opened up to plus-components in 2011, support did not materialize (GI-15122016; GI-16122016). India's perception was that there was "no funding" (GI-1-09022018) available internationally for results-based payments on afforestation. This slowed down the REDD+ readiness efforts as a high MOEF official asked a REDD+ donor: "When we do all what is required for REDD+, but where is the funding?" (NI-DI-16022018). This lack of international REDD+ funding became problematic for the development of USAID's state pilot projects, which is why they shifted to pilot activities that directly benefit local communities, irrespective of REDD+ funding (DI-28042018). When the GCF became operational, the Indian government had renewed hopes for financial REDD+ benefits.

The lack of high and credible REDD+ funding resulted in a low positive material reception that only increased when the GCF became operational. This slowed down India's domestic REDD+ efforts. It hampered persuasion by USAID and FCPF, lesson drawing by India, and competition. In addition, it also facilitated competition, as it resulted in India requesting international funding more vehemently. It contributed to a globalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation and non-carbon benefits).

Condition: Preexisting *knowledge* being taken up in REDD+ Reference Document and collaboration with USAID

Members of the REDD+ Expert Committee had already previously served as India's REDD+ negotiators and could draw upon their preexisting knowledge, such as on compensated conservation, forest carbon stocks and reference levels (Kishwan 2007: 2, 23, 25, 37; MOEF 2013: 4). Yet, this preexisting knowledge was more limited for MOEF's forestry bureaucrats, as mostly environmental bureaucrats and forest scientists from ICFRE had participated in negotiations (GI-1-13032018).

Similarly, Indian forest scientists had already preexisting knowledge on forest carbon stock measurement on which they could build upon during the collaboration with USAID. This knowledge was derived from India's "long history of national forest inventories" (Romijn et al. 2015: 110), which provided first incomplete forest carbon estimations for India's First National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2004. This forest carbon estimation was improved in 2010, which resulted in a carbon stock assessment report in 2011 as a contribution to the Second National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2012 (FSI 2018: 9; CI-GI-13022018; GI-2-13032018). The collaboration with USAID then resulted in a further improvement of India's forest carbon inventory by increasing the sample plots, which was implemented in 2016 (GI-2-13032018).

Preexisting knowledge facilitated lesson drawing by the REDD+ Expert Committee and persuasion activities by USAID. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation) and external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., strengthened forest carbon measurements).

Condition: Horizontal and vertical fragmentation and lack of capacity in the *political-administrative set-up* of the domestic forestry sector

MOEF was characterized by a horizontal fragmentation between the environment wing and the forest wing. The ministry sent bureaucrats from the environment wing and forest scientists from ICFRE to negotiate REDD+ internationally, which contributed to less capacity and buy-in by the forestry wing. But the forestry wing was responsible for domestic REDD+ advancement and assigned senior forest bureaucrats to the REDD+ Expert Committee (MOEF 2013: 4; GI-05122016; RI-16122016; DI-GI-02122016). There was a lack of cooperation and interaction between the two wings, which slowed down the advancement of REDD+ (GI-12022018). Observers even noted turf wars and struggles between both wings, which were not resolved by MOEF's minister or secretary (GI-12022018; DI-GI-02122016).

The REDD+ Cell was established in the forestry wing and was only staffed with one bureaucrat who also had other responsibilities (GI-12022018; DI-GI-02122016). This lack of capacity resulted in the low degree of lesson drawing in the draft REDD+ policy that was written by one forestry bureaucrat (GI-15122016). Moreover, capacity was lost as bureaucrats involved in the REDD+ process retired or were shifted to other positions (GI-1-13032018; NI-14022018; GI-12022018; GI-05122016; RI-02042018). This was also a problem at the state level for USAID's training program; frequent changes in staff prevented an increase in capacity (Mitchell et al. 2018: viii; DI-28042018; RI-02042018).

The vertical fragmentation between the center providing policy guidance and the states implementing forest policies did not result in any pro-active REDD+ engagement by states or in any involvement of states in the national REDD+ process (DI-GI-02122016; GI-15122016). State government also did not strongly engage in USAID's Forest-PLUS project due to the lack of personnel that would have been needed to continue the work after the USAID project ended and to successfully tap into funding for the developed carbon project proposals (SGI-03042018), which had been a general problem at state level (RI-02042018).

The horizontal and vertical fragmentation and the lack of capacities slowed down the REDD+ process and hampered lesson drawing and persuasion. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., implementation based on preexisting domestic forest policies on afforestation).

Condition: *Opposition to REDD+ by social movements on people's forest rights*

REDD+ was not popular among civil society groups (GI-05122016), with some of them opposing it, while observers noted no strong overall opposition (GI-16122016; RI-05122016). Civil society organizations already had fundamentally questioned REDD+ when India negotiated it internationally (CSD and NFFPFW 2009), while not influencing India's negotiation behavior. NGOs like Campaign for Survival and Dignity had been engaged in the struggle for the recognition of people's rights for long time (Kohli and Menon 2011: 29), and criticized that "REDD is in conflict with the Forest Rights Act" (Chauhan 2010). They feared land-grabbing for carbon credits by companies (Chauhan 2010). Their observation was that afforestation activities are often implemented on lands used by communities (Gopalkrishnan 2012: 347-348) and "have often been a cover for massive land grabbing" (CSD and NFFPFW 2009: 3). MOEF responded to this criticism by underlining that "REDD is not intended to take away rights of indigenous people but to provide them money to protect forests" (Chauhan 2010). But even forest bureaucrats acknowledged that in most cases State Forest Departments had not properly shared benefits with communities in the past (SGI-12042018), and would hardly be motivated to advance REDD+ when it would only reward communities (Khan 2019). REDD+ was not taken well by those who fought for the assignment of forest rights to forest-dependent people, as from their perspective, they would not get real rights through REDD+. They, instead, preferred the proper implementation of the Forest Rights Act as the "better regime with regard to rights and conservation" (NI-05122016).

The All India Forum of Forest Movements criticized the Draft National REDD+ Policy and the REDD+ Reference Document for focusing on plantations of fake forests while continuing deforestation for development purposes, for choosing JFMCs as implementation institutions that undermine the Forest Rights Act, and for portraying communities as drivers of deforestation and degradation (Ghosh 2015). Greenpeace, moreover, criticized the Draft National REDD+ Policy for not addressing deforestation by mining and infrastructure projects (Bhalla 2014). While some NGOs categorically opposed carbon sequestration by communities, others rather stressed that this decision should be made by communities (Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 438). However, more critical civil society groups were not consulted over the Draft National REDD+ Policy, which was perceived as a very exclusive process (Kashwan 2017: 195; NI-05122016; RI-05122016). The Ministry of Tribal Affairs (drafting ministry of the Forest Rights Act) and the Ministry of Rural Development were also not being involved by MOEF (Kashwan 2017: 195), while none of them objected the Draft National REDD+ Policy or the REDD+ Reference Document openly (The Hindu 2010a).

Opposition hampered India's competition engagement, as the government had to promise the channeling of financial benefits to local communities instead of to bureaucracies. This contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits by incorporating preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., financial and livelihood benefits for local communities).

Sum-up of causal complex 9

Causal complex 9 explains India's first domestic REDD+ engagement. The Indian government's *competition* engagement triggered its domestic REDD+ preparation process. Together with *lesson drawing* from UNFCCC's requirements and India's domestic context, this resulted in two small-scale organizational changes – the establishment of the REDD+ Cell and of the REDD+ Expert Committee – as well as the development of the REDD+ Reference Document and the National REDD+ Policy drafts. The adopted REDD+ Reference Document qualifies as a discursive change, but not as a policy change, as it was only an information document for preparations of subsequent policy changes. *Persuasion* by USAID's contractors was limited to technical forest carbon aspects and only indirectly influenced India's REDD+ process through trainings and workshops, while not resulting in any national policy change. Most conditions hampered stronger forms of lesson drawing and persuasion (except for knowledge and opposition), while competition was facilitated (by cultural and material resonance and positive material reception) and hampered (by reversed social reception, positive material reception, and opposition) by an equal number of conditions. This resulted in the *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* in the form of *afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits*. *Competition, lesson drawing and all conditions* contributed to an incorporation of *preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., afforestation incl. crop planting, non-carbon benefits, rejection of reducing deforestation, self-reliant implementation based on domestic forest policies). *Persuasion, lesson drawing and knowledge* facilitated the incorporation of *external actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., reducing degradation, strengthened forest carbon measurement). MOEF, moreover, continued to interpret the developing country climate mitigation norm in the form of *domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions* as stipulated in the NAPCC.

6.4 Summary: Domestic action formulation, international target setting and sectorial changes (2007-2014)

After contestations (stage I), domestic agenda-setting (stage II) and international norm reshaping (stage III), in stage IV, the Indian government formulated domestic mitigation actions, in stage V communicated a GDP-based climate mitigation target at the international level, and in stage VI introduced sectorial changes. In stage IV (causal complex 6), the Indian government produced the NAPCC (incl. adopted developmental climate mitigation actions, institutionalized per-capita target) as second-order policy change, established the Special Envoy's Office as medium-scale organizational change, and shifted toward a *glocalized interpretation* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* based on *non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions (incl. openness to additional international financial support)*. This was triggered by strategy mimicry and shaped by strategic mimicry, lesson drawing and competition. Most conditions facilitated those domestic actors' mechanisms, while they hampered learning. External actors' mechanisms did not directly contribute to this causal complex.

In stage V (causal complex 7), the Indian government set its GDP-based climate mitigation target at the international level. India's quantitative mitigation target was triggered by strategic mimicry as a follow up to prior shaming and was shaped by strategic mimicry, lesson drawing and competition, representing a second-order policy change. It also resulted in the closure of the Special Envoy's Office. Moreover, shaming resulted in the acceptance of the 2 degree Celsius goal. The Indian government shifted to a *glocalized interpretation* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* based on accepting a *GDP-based climate mitigation target* in addition to domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions. Most conditions facilitated domestic actors' mechanisms (except learning), while they also mostly hampered the external actors' mechanism.

In stage VI, the Indian government introduced sectorial changes in the forestry sector. In response to the NAPCC (stage IV), MOEF formulated the Green India Mission (causal complex 8). Complex learning contributed to the second-order policy changes of carbon sequestration and improvement of forest quality as new logics of action in the forestry sector, while lesson drawing and competition resulted in the first-order policy change of increasing afforestation. Most conditions facilitated the domestic actors' mechanisms, while external actors' mechanisms were not influential. GIM represented a *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *afforestation, forest quality improvement, and non-carbon benefits*. Furthermore, MOEF continued to interpret the *developing country climate mitigation norm* as *domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions*, while also being interested in *receiving international support*, similar to the Indian government's norm interpretation in the NAPCC.

In the second part of stage VI, the Indian government started the domestic REDD+ engagement (causal complex 9), which was triggered by competition and jointly shaped with lesson drawing. USAID's persuasion efforts were less connected to India's REDD+ readiness efforts. This contributed to two small-scale organizational changes – the establishment of the REDD+ Cell and the REDD+ Expert Committee – and to discursive changes through the adoption of the REDD+ Reference Document. Most conditions hampered the external actors' mechanism, but also the domestic actors' mechanism of lesson drawing, while more conditions facilitated the domestic actors' mechanism of competition. India's domestic REDD+ engagement represented a *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits*. MOEF, moreover, continued to interpret the *developing country climate mitigation norm* as both *domestically financed* and *internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions*. The norm interpretations of both norms hardly changed in stage VI of sectorial changes (causal complex 8 and 9), while during the REDD+ development sub-phase (causal complex 9) more emphasis was put on internationally supported actions than during the GIM formulation process (causal complex 8).

Glocalized norm interpretations in domestic action formulation (stage IV), international target setting (stage V) and sectorial changes (stage VI) included preexisting norm interpretations by external and

domestic actors. *Competition, lesson drawing, strategic mimicry*, and several *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, knowledge, opposition, and partly political-administrative set-up) facilitated the incorporation of preexisting domestic actors' interpretations. In contrast, *shaming, learning, persuasion, strategic mimicry, lesson drawing* and several *conditions* (material reception, knowledge, political-administrative set-up) contributed to the incorporation of external actors' norm interpretations.

In those stages, most conditions facilitated domestic actors' mechanisms (except for learning) and hampered external actors' mechanisms (shaming, persuasion). Shaming was only activated regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm in the context of international target setting of stage V. Persuasion was only undertaken regarding the carbon forestry norm during India's first domestic REDD+ engagement. Competition and lesson drawing were enacted in all causal complexes. Strategic mimicry played a role in domestic action formulation and in international target setting of stage IV and V. Learning only occurred in stage VI of sectorial changes when MOEF formulated GIM. Domestic actors' mechanisms played a much more prominent role in those stages, appearing eleven times, than external actors' mechanisms that occurred only twice.

Four second-order policy changes (NAPCC, GDP-based climate mitigation target, GIM's carbon sequestration and improvement of forest quality as new logics of action in the forestry sector), one first-order policy change (afforestation target), and one discursive change (REDD+ Reference Document) occurred in those three stages. In addition, one medium-scale organizational change was introduced and later reversed (Special Envoy's Office) and two further small-scale organizational changes were enacted (REDD+ Cell, REDD+ Expert Committee). Regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm, India in those three phases consistently accepted the adoption of non-compensated domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions, but still hoped for international funding (e.g., REDD+). The previous differences in announcements between the international and domestic level regarding the prerequisites of enabling international funding disappeared. While the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm were handled separately from each other in stages I to III, the Indian government engaged on both of them in a more integrated way in stage VI of sectorial changes. In its interpretation of the carbon forestry norm, the Indian government consistently preferred afforestation, while also being open to addressing degradation and to realizing non-carbon benefits. While the Indian government had reshaped the carbon forestry norm internationally in stage III, it could not benefit from it domestically, as donors still preferred to support the original version of compensated reduction. On the international reshaping of the developing country climate mitigation norm toward internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions in stage III followed a further domestic norm reshaping by the Indian government in stages IV and VI. This shifted India's glocalised norm interpretation toward domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions, which were also internationally acknowledged in stage V. How those aspects changed or continued in the next round of international

target setting, domestic sectorial changes, and eventually the implementation is shown in the next chapter.

7. Renewed target setting, further sectorial changes and implementation (2014-2019)

Chapter 7 presents the stages VII (7.1), VIII (7.2), and IX (7.3) of the norm glocalization process that include renewed international target setting, domestic sectorial changes as well as implementation. It ends with a short summary of the three stages (7.4).

7.1 Stage VII: Renewed international target setting

In the stages IV and V, India presented non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions as part of the NAPCC (see 6.1) and a GDP-based climate mitigation target (6.2), which both represent glocalized interpretations of the developing country climate mitigation norm. In stage VI (see 6.3), India introduced sectorial changes in the forestry sector. However, implementation of those sectorial changes did not subsequently start. In stage VII, the Indian government presents renewed international targets in the context of a new international agreement.

7.1.1 India's INDC formulation and behavior around the Paris COP from 2014 until 2016 (causal complex 10)

International negotiations on a new international post-Kyoto agreement continued and led to the Paris Agreement in 2015. In this context, in stage VII, India presents renewed international targets. Causal complex 10 explains the formulation of India's INDC and India's behavior around the Paris COP. The Indian government followed a *glocalized interpretation* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* based on *domestically financed* and *internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets*, which was in line with its previous glocalized norm interpretations in the stages IV to VI (see chapter 6). Moreover, it introduced a first-order policy change (emission intensity target of GDP) and two second-order policy changes (forest carbon sequestration target and non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity target). This is explained by the workings of *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing*, *competition*, and *shaming*, while complex learning and material incentives were not successful. Most conditions facilitated competition, lesson drawing, and strategic mimicry as well as hampered material incentives and complex learning. Moreover, shaming was hampered more than facilitated. In this stage, the Indian government continued its *glocalized norm interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* as stipulated in the GIM that consisted of *afforestation*, *forest quality improvement* and *non-carbon benefits*.

Mechanism: Shaming in the run-up to the Paris COP

During the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action negotiations (since 2012) on a post-Kyoto framework, developed countries continued to pressure developing countries to commit to legally binding emission reductions, to which India and its allies from the Like-Minded Developing Countries

(LMDC) group responded with contestations and demands of commitments by developed countries only (Eckersley 2020: 12-13). While the EU urged countries with the largest responsibilities and capabilities to communicate (absolute) quantitative emission reduction commitments (EU 2013: 3, 5), the US preferred a more flexible approach of “nationally determined commitments” (United States 2013: 2), in which parties would also be able to present policies alongside varying emission target types. Indian negotiators, instead, emphasized equity and historical responsibilities. They re-used the wording of the Bali Action Plan by declaring that “non-Annex I Parties will take nationally appropriate mitigation actions enabled by finance and technology transfer”, while Annex I countries “must continue to take quantified emission limitation” (GOI 2013: 2). They thereby interpreted the developing country climate mitigation norm as enabled mitigation actions, despite India’s already ongoing domestically financed mitigation actions and targets. As India and the LMDC had to accept that the post-Kyoto agreement will cover all parties, at the 2013 Warsaw COP, they ensured that domestic actions under such an agreement will only be termed contributions instead of commitments (ENB 2013: 13, 14, 29; Tollefson 2011). Yet, India was not able to reshape those contributions to be binding for developed countries and voluntary for developing countries (Rajamani 2014: 739).

In September 2014, UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon organized the UN Climate Summit in New York and invited heads of governments to “raise political momentum for a meaningful universal climate agreement in Paris in 2015” (Ki-Moon 2014). However, India’s new Prime Minister Narendra Modi (BJP), who won the May 2014 national elections, did not participate, even though he had a visit scheduled for New York three days later (Gupta 2014b), leading to strong criticism by several island nations (Chauhan 2014). High pressure by developed countries (e.g., the US) on India to take legally binding mitigation pledges continued in 2014 (Gupta 2014c). At the Major Economies Forum shortly before the UN Climate Summit, the new Environment minister Prakash Javadekar contested those demands strongly and instead emphasized that developed countries should reduce emissions themselves (Gupta 2014a). At the UN Climate Summit, he then raised traditional norm understandings, such as historical responsibilities, poverty as major polluter, and development prioritization, but also mentioned India’s GDP-based climate mitigation target and domestic mitigation actions. While those actions were domestically financed, he still asked for financial support in order to do more, indicating a norm interpretation based on both non-compensated and internationally supported mitigation actions (Javadekar 2014). In 2015, Prime Minister Modi responded to high pressure on India by claiming Indian’s harmonious co-existence with nature: “Those who have destroyed climate are asking questions to us. If anybody has served the nature, it is Indians” (The Hindu 2015).

Overall, India responded to the shaming by developed countries to take mitigation commitments or binding quantitative pledges with contestation. Yet, India accepted nationally determined contributions by all parties under the new agreement. This contributed to the globalized norm interpretation in the form of domestically financed and internationally supported developmental

climate mitigation efforts and targets by incorporating external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., non-compensated mitigation contributions and quantitative mitigation targets by all parties).

Mechanism: *Strategic mimicry* around the Paris COP

Shortly before the 2014 UN Climate Summit, Modi told Indian school children that “climate has not changed, we have changed” (Gupta et al. 2015: 596), which resulted in concerns that Modi is a climate sceptic. Indeed, in 2014, he did not show concerns for the environment, as he dismantled environmental regulations and blocked foreign funds to environmental NGOs (Goldenberg 2014). When he did not show up at the UN Climate Summit, he was even criticized by developing island nations (Chauhan 2014; Gupta 2014c), leading to his dissatisfaction about the picture that was drawn of him internationally. As Chief Minister of Gujarat, he had already tried to improve his (inter)national image, which had been negative due to his controversial role in the massacre of Muslims by Hindu nationalists in 2002 (Gowen 2016). He had subsequently portrayed himself as ‘development man’, as a reconciler among religious groups (Gupta et al. 2019: 13-14), and lastly as climate change addressing politician. In 2011, he published the book “Convenient Actions” (Modi 2011), presenting Modi’s previous developmental actions in Gujarat as mitigation and adaptation measures. While he usually prefers using Hindi (Mehra 2014), this book is written in English with a foreword by the UK-based Climate Group (Modi 2011), indicating the intended international audience.

After the criticism of his environmental and climate stances in 2014, Modi started to engage in strategic mimicry in order to improve his international image. Shortly before the 2014 G20 meeting and the 2014 Lima COP, Modi reconstituted the PM Council on Climate Change, which had not met for three years. He removed several members that were known for their traditional positions (e.g., Sunita Narain, Prodipto Ghosh), and kept those that accepted a more flexible approach (Hindustan Times 2014). He also renamed the responsible line ministry to the Ministry of Environment, Forests, and Climate Change (MOEFCC), while not changing the internal organizational structure and not increasing the staff working on climate change. Subsequently, his goal was to present India as a progressive and flexible actor on climate change (NI-15122016; GI-15022018; GI-14022018; NI-27022018; DI-02122016; Upadhyaya 2017: 80).

Environment minister Javadekar softened India’s language at the 2014 Lima COP, arguing that India is “ready to play its part in the global fight against climate change” (Javadeka 2014: 5). As evidence, he claimed the advancement of “action-oriented policies to bring rapid development to our people while purposefully addressing climate change” (Javadeka 2014: 1), indicating a continuous norm interpretation based on non-compensated developmental climate mitigation efforts. Examples included the increase of the solar target from 20 GW to 100 GW by 2022, the release of 6 billion US Dollar for afforestation and the 100 Smart Cities initiative (Javadeka 2014: 2), which were sectoral actions that were internationally labelled as mitigation actions to prove India’s seriousness. The solar target served Modi’s goal to fulfill his election promise of increasing energy access and security

(Shah and Wilkes 2014; CI-06122016), following dropping prices due to favorable market conditions (from 0.356 USD/kWh in 2010 to 0.071 USD/kWh in November 2015) (Buckley 2016; Dubash et al. 2018a: 403), allowing Modi to shine internationally at the 2014 G20 meeting (The Economic Times 2014). Moreover, the utilization of the six billion US Dollar of the CAMPA funding for afforestation had already been declared by the Singh government. At the PM Council meeting in January 2015, Modi also emphasized that “instead of focusing on emissions and cuts alone, focus should shift on what we have done for clean energy generation, energy conservation [...] and what more can be done in these areas” (The Siasat Daily 2015). This indicates Modi’s attempt to shine internationally on preexisting and future sectoral activities – an approach that was already enacted under Prime Minister Singh (see 5.3 and 6.1).

In the 2015 run-up to the Paris COP, the Modi government intensified its strategic mimicry to show that Indians are part of the international community as conscious, constructive, responsible and proactive members (RI-1-01122016; DI-1-30112016; Plagemann and Prys-Hansen 2018: 12; Sengupta 2019: 136). Modi aspired a growing international role as a global player alongside developed countries (NI-15122016; DI-1-30112016; CI-1-26022018; DI-02122016; NI-27022018; Modi 2015b; Raghunandan 2019: 200). Modi, therefore, started to change the narrative by emphasizing that “protecting the environment is part of India’s cultural heritage, and therefore, India must take the lead in countering this challenge” (Modi 2015b). He, therefore, claimed that “the solutions to the [climate] ‘crisis’ are in India’s traditions and customs” (The Hindu 2015). He was disappointed that “the country is occasionally perceived to be a barrier in the global fight against climate change” (Modi 2015a), and demanded to change this image to counter international criticism (Modi 2015a; Plagemann and Prys-Hansen 2018: 13). He asked the Ministry of Culture to gather “material on how India has contributed to environment protection through the ages” (PM Office 2015) to be presented at the 2015 Paris COP as “India must show the world how it has been at the forefront of environment protection” (PM Office 2015), indicating his aim for strategic mimicry. Modi also started to claim that “development and environment protection can go hand in hand” (Modi 2015a; see also Narlikar 2017: 102-103), despite his government’s deregulation of environmental rules to achieve an “ease of doing business” (Modi 2015a).

Modi’s motivation derived from his general global politics motivations, such as good partnership with the US, achieving a permanent UN Security Council seat for India, being equal leader to developed countries and to China (CI-16022018; CI-1-26022018; DI-02122016; NI-27022018; GI-28042018; Raghunandan 2020: 220; Saryal 2018: 15). For example, when talking with US President Obama on the upcoming Paris climate COP in September 2015, Modi raised the issue of seeking a permanent UN Security Council seat (BBC 2015). Similar, Modi’s joint establishment of the International Solar Alliance with French President François Hollande at the Paris COP not only served Modi’s goal of promoting India’s solar industry, but also his aim of positioning himself as an international leader (RI-2-01122016; RI-24042018; GI-28042018; GI-28022018; NI-27022018; Hakala 2019: 5; Narlikar 2017: 104-105; Plagemann and Prys-Hansen 2018: 11). He was motivated

by his goal “to build up his international credibility as the good guy” (GI-14022018), as he “only cares about what works best for himself” (RI-1-01122016). He, therefore, focused on big international events, where he could show international leadership (CI-16022018; NI-14122016). Modi understood how to make big announcement, how to present a vision and how to engage in ambitious grand staging (NI-15122016; CI-1-26022018; RI-09022018; RI-2-01122016).

India presented its INDC at Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday in October 2015 to project India as a moral voice having always followed a sustainable lifestyle inspired by Gandhi, while concealing India’s pollution and coal-dependence (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 10-11; GOI 2015: 1, 3; Saryal 2018: 13-14; DI-02122016). At the INDC presentation, Javadekar emphasized that “[t]hrough India is not part of the problem, it wants to be part of the solution” (Vaughan 2015), repeating Singh’s mantra before the 2009 Copenhagen COP (see 6.2), indicating both governments’ strategic mimicry at important international junctures. The Indian government presented its INDC as fair and ambitious (Jaitley 2015; Modi 2015d; Mohan 2017: 45; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276), and emphasized the need to “craft a genuinely collective partnership” (Modi 2015d), indicating India’s aim to be part of the international community in good standing. Yet, India’s INDC only showed a low ambition compared to business as usual sectoral developments in India, indicating Modi’s strategic mimicry.

India’s target of reducing emission intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35 percent by 2030 compared to 2005 levels represented a first-order policy change, as it only increased the previous GDP-based climate mitigation target. The target was much more modest than claimed by the Indian government. The Indian government had commissioned three different external organizations for conducting modeling exercises (GI-28022018; CI-01032018; CI-29112016), but then chose a target from the “lower half of the middle range” (RI-CI-26042018) of one of the models. This model was mostly based on the implementation of the energy targets (CI-29112016), which was the achievement of non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity of 40 percent by 2030. Yet, all models suggested that India could be more ambitious (CI-01032018). Internationally, Javadekar argued that it represented a “75% jump in ambition over [the] 2020 targets” (Gupta 2015b), which had been the reduction of the emission intensity of India’s GDP by 20 to 25 percent by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. However, India already achieved a reduction by 28 percent in 2016 (Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276), indicating only a 25 percent increase to business as usual developments.

The INDC target was even described as being lower than the 2014 domestic energy targets of reaching 100 GW of solar capacity by 2022 (NI-15122016; CI-06122016),⁴⁹ and was forecasted as likely to be overachieved (CI-16022018). Others also indicated that the emission intensity target is conservative and corresponded to sectoral business as usual developments for the purpose of increasing energy provision (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 11-12; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276-278; NI-15122016; DI-13122016; NI-14022018; RI-09022018). International analysts, instead,

⁴⁹ The solar energy target was already adopted in 2014 and was not listed as an INDC target but as one of the already on-going domestic sectoral mitigation actions (GOI 2015: 9; CI-1-26022018).

recommended a higher emission intensity target of 35 to 50 percent (Gupta 2015b), and, in 2016, NITI Aayog (the successor organization of the Planning Commission) estimated that emission intensity will even decrease by 45 to 53 percent by 2030 (Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 279). This overselling of low ambitions is also evident in Javadekar's emphasis that "India will save carbon emissions to the tune of 3.95 million tons" (Gupta 2015b), representing a very small emission reduction (to be achieved over a period of 15 years) as India's annual GHG emissions amounted to 3,002 million tons CO₂eq in 2015 (Climate Watch 2021f). Moreover, Javadekar asserted that the INDC target of reaching non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity of 40 percent by 2030 equals an increase by 50 percent (Gupta 2015b), while India had already reached a share of 30 percent in 2015 (Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276), indicating only a 33 percent increase. It qualifies as a second-order policy change, as it introduced a new kind of energy target. Yet, this target was also unambitious, as the Central Electricity Authority even predicted in 2016 an increase of the non-fossil fuel based energy capacity to 57 percent by 2027 (i.e., renewable energy capacity of 275 GW) (Central Electricity Authority 2016: 193; Kuramochi et al. 2017: 41; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 279-280).

While the Indian government internationally claimed to reconcile development and environmental protection (GOI 2015: 1; Modi 2015a; Narlikar 2017: 102-103), it, instead, domestically prioritized development at the cost of the environment, as evident in the INDC's low ambition that could have been higher (Höhne et al. 2017: 22; Kuramochi et al. 2017: 41; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276-279; Raghunandan 2019: 202; CI-01032018). Even a doubling of India's energy-related emissions from 2012 levels until 2030 would be in line with India's emission intensity target (Dubash et al. 2018b: 1). Unlike China, India did not indicate a peak year for its total GHG emissions (Bajpae 2016: 206). India's emission intensity target did also not include the agriculture and forestry sector, which also were not part of the modeling exercises (RI-CI-26042018; CI-29112016). The Indian government presented an additional forestry target to "create an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of CO₂eq through additional forest and tree cover by 2030" (GOI 2015: 29),⁵⁰ which further lowers the ambition of the emission intensity target (RI-CI-26042018).

The forestry target of 2.5 to 3 Gt CO₂eq represented a second-order policy change, as, for the first time, it introduced a guiding quantitative carbon sequestration goal to forestry, while GIM had already introduced carbon sequestration as a new logic of action in the forestry sector in 2010 (but without defining a guiding carbon sequestration target) (see 6.3.1). Several observers called the 2.5 to 3 Gt CO₂eq target a "magic number" (NI-14122016; DI-08022018; GI-12022018). Others agreed that it is not a scientific position, but a political one, which engages in grand standing internationally (RI-16122016; NI-27022018). Experts involved in the process noted that calculations were being done by both the FSI and the MOEFCC, but that the target was "not ambitious, as it is business as usual plus something" (GI-2-13032018). In contrast, earlier National Afforestation Programs were more

⁵⁰ One billion tons are equivalent to one gigaton (Gt).

ambitious. While FSI recommended higher targets, MOEFCC decided to choose a smaller target. This target both comprised afforestation in forests and of trees outside forests. The latter was not yet covered by UNFCCC methodologies, and FSI had still to develop methodologies (GI-2-13032018), but it made target achievement easier, as the Indian government could additionally finance it with tree planting programs, such as the National Highway Program, the River Basin Program, the National Agroforestry Program and the Rural Employment Scheme (GOI 2015: 21, 30), indicating the continuous interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on afforestation and non-carbon benefits. Observers indicated that it was feasible and supposed that it represented the double amount of GIM (i.e., 11 million ha afforestation and 10 million ha forest improvement). While reaching the INDC forestry target would necessitate annual carbon sequestration of 167 to 200 Mt CO₂eq, the INDC indicated that the GIM implementation would already result in 100 Mt CO₂eq annually (GOI 2015: 17), despite the original GIM version stating 50 to 60 Mt CO₂eq (MOEF 2010b: F), indicating strategic mimicry. Yet, GIM implementation had not yet started due to the lack of sufficient funding disbursement to states (GI-12022018; GI-15122016). According to government data, India's forest was already sequestering 200 Mt CO₂eq/year through other forestry interventions, making the forestry target achievable at the same sequestration rates over the next 15 years (Dubash et al. 2018a: 407), indicating its business as usual character (at least according to official government data). In its INDC, the Indian government furthermore engaged in international shining by claiming that India's forests are a net carbon sink, even though observers noted the contradictions with declining growing stocks and methodological errors (Dubash et al. 2018a: 407; Raghunandan 2020: 214). It also engaged in shining by declaring the increase of the carbon sink due to the REDD-Plus Policy and available CAMPA funding of 6 billion US Dollar, while both had actually been defunct (GOI 2015: 17).

By submitting an INDC with a long list of domestic actions, the Indian government could signal its support internationally toward a more bottom-up international agreement (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 13). Even though India was perceived to be more proactive and constructive at the Paris COP (Saryal 2018: 13-14; Worland 2015; CI-1-26022018), observers criticized that the Indian government did not push developed countries toward stronger emission cuts (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 13), but "used its new position only as a hedge against further developed country pressure" (Raghunandan 2020: 220), indicating strategic mimicry. Instead, it was sufficient for India's international shining to refrain from staying a nay-sayer in the negotiations. The Modi government quickly ratified the Paris Agreement (BBC 2016), making India's INDC to its NDC, which was commented with praise by the United Nations top officials, uncritically conveying Modi's claim of India's pathway of development without destruction (UN News 2016), despite the Indian INDC's norm interpretation based on developmental climate mitigation efforts and its omission of addressing high-emission intensive developmental actions. When the new US President Donald Trump indicated that the United States will pull out of the Paris Agreement, Modi could again shine internationally by underlining India's

implementation of its INDC pledges (Vishnoi and Chaudhury 2017), which largely served domestic development purposes anyhow (RI-2-01122016).

Overall, the Indian government engaged in strategic mimicry by presenting an INDC that included one first-order and two second-order policy changes and that followed a globalized norm interpretation in the form of domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets. It incorporated both external actors' norm interpretation (i.e., non-compensated mitigation contributions and quantitative mitigation targets) and domestic actors' norm interpretation (i.e., development-first perspective).

Mechanism: No complex learning, but *lesson drawing* in the INDC

No indications for actual complex learning could be found among Modi, Javadekar and the drafters of the INDC. In 2014, Modi even questioned climate science when he argued that people are changing and not the climate (Goldenberg 2014; Gupta et al. 2015: 596; Venkatesh 2018). There are no indications that Indian officials learned from the Fifth IPCC Assessment Report whose results were presented in 2013 and 2014 (IPCC 2014a; Pachauri 2013). Only for strategic mimicry, Modi stopped questioning climate science and let his government officials recognize India's vulnerability at the 2014 and 2015 COPs and in the INDC (GOI 2015: 2, 4; Javadeka 2014; Modi 2015d).

In India's INDC, the government even claimed to engage in "[d]evelopment without [d]estruction" (GOI 2015: 7), and that "economic growth and development have to be guided by the key concerns of sustainability" (GOI 2015: 6), which seems like a belief change toward low-emission development. Yet, India's INDC relabeled preexisting sectoral developmental actions as climate actions (e.g., Smart Cities Mission, National Rural Employment Scheme) (GOI 2015: 13, 25, 33), recalled already existing mitigation actions from the Singh government (e.g., GIM) (GOI 2015: 16-17, 30), or presented unambitious targets (e.g., emission intensity, forest carbon sequestration and non-fossil fuel based energy capacity). The INDC drafters even had to request line ministries to increase the ambition of their proposed actions, as they only presented sectoral business as usual activities actions as contributions to the INDC (GI-15022018). The most ambitious actions listed in the INDC are non-mitigation motivated energy targets, such as the 2014 solar target of 100 GW by 2022, which was not a core INDC target (see above). Modi's government preferred sectoral output-oriented actions instead of emission cuts (Modi 2015c), rejected stronger INDC targets and also did not list efforts to reduce emission-intensive deforestation and degradation (except for the forest quality improvement target as part of the already existing GIM) and even announced that "coal will continue to dominate power generation in [the] future" (GOI 2015: 10). At the same time, the Modi government engaged in the dilution of environmental regulations and prioritized high economic growth, indicating the lack of complex learning (Goldenberg 2014).

The Indian government, however, engaged in lesson drawing. It copied the type of China's Cancun NAMA targets and INDC targets, which were targets on emission intensity, non-fossil fuel-based

energy capacity and afforestation (China 2010; 2015: 5; Gaoli 2014). India's INDC drafters included exactly the same kind of targets, which represented a first-order policy change (emission intensity target) and two second order policy changes (non-fossil fuel and afforestation targets), while not copying China's carbon emission peak year (see above). Both countries had engaged in a bilateral cooperation on climate change since 2009 (MoEA 2015), and India realized how China prevented international pressure by presenting those targets (Narlikar 2017: 103; Plagemann and Prys-Hansen 2018: 23; Tata Center 2015).

For defining the level of India's INDC targets, the Modi government drew lessons from three models by consultancies, without fully copying any of the proposals. Instead, Modi chose a target that falls in the "lower half of the middle range" (RI-CI-26042018) of one of the models that was only a little bit above business as usual developments. On the forestry target, the Modi government also drew lessons from calculations by FSI, and again chose a lower target that was only a little bit more ambitious than business as usual developments (RI-CI-26042018; GI-2-13032018). This is in contrast to India's high vulnerability and its international claims to act out of conviction on climate change, which indicates the lack of complex learning (Pulla 2015: 1024). The government brought those lesson drawings together with already existing activities by line ministries (GI-15022018).

Overall, no complex learning happened, but lesson drawing occurred from China and consultancies. This contributed to one first-order and two second-order policy changes and contributed to the globalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets. Lesson drawing contributed to incorporating preexisting norm interpretation by domestic actors (i.e., sectorial goals and development-first perspective) and by external actors (i.e., non-compensated mitigation contributions and quantitative mitigation targets by all parties), while not including absolute quantitative commitments and not addressing emission-intensive actions.

Mechanism: Continuous *competition* engagement preventing higher INDC ambition

In the context of the Paris COP, the Indian government demanded developed countries to make room in terms of available carbon space so that India can continue to grow (Modi 2015d; Pulla 2015: 1025), for which it requested "equitable carbon and development space" (GOI 2015: 4). It criticized the emissions from an extravagant lifestyle in the Global North and emphasized that poverty is a big polluter (GOI 2015: 3-4; Gupta and Gupta 2016: 111), while not reflecting upon climate injustices domestically (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 13). The government underlined India's right to growth and development and demanded strong mitigation actions by developed countries without introducing carbon border tariffs that would hurt the Indian economy (GOI 2015: 1-2; Gupta 2015a; Javadeka 2014; Modi 2015d).

The Indian government did not offer absolute immediate GHG emission reductions or any emission peaking year, as it perceived them as restraining India's development and growth (Bajpaee 2016:

206; Pulla 2015: 1025), while Brazil, China and South Africa communicated at least one of them (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 11). Based on the annual GDP growth goal of 8.6 percent that informed India's INDC, India's total emissions would rise to 7.8 Gt CO₂eq in 2030, and its per capita emissions to 6.5 tons CO₂eq (based on 2014 population level of 1.2 billion) (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 11; GOI 2015: 6), passing United States' absolute emissions (of 5.59 Gt CO₂eq in 2015) (Climate Watch 2021h), and almost reaching EU's per capita emissions (of 6.85 tons CO₂eq in 2015) (Climate Watch 2021c).

The Indian government communicated that its coal-based energy consumption, electricity demand and GDP will increase four times in order to reach the Human Development Index level of developed countries (GOI 2015: 5-6, 10; Gupta et al. 2015: 596-597; Javadekar 2014). Despite India's substantial renewable energy targets (such as 100 GW solar energy capacity by 2022),⁵¹ India planned to continue to rely on coal energy for its economic growth, which will provide about 79 percent of energy generation in 2030 (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 12). In addition, a significant expansion of coal generation capacities has been planned for the 2030s (Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 5) and India asked for "global collaborative research [...on] clean coal and fossil fuel" (GOI 2015: 32), indicating India's economic growth prioritization. For the same reason, Modi preferred focusing on policy outputs and technology development instead of emission reductions (Modi 2015c; Pulla 2015: 1024; Saryal 2018: 12; CI-29112016), on which India also collaborated with China (MoEA 2015).

India's competition engagement manifested itself in the INDC targets (i.e., emission intensity target, carbon forestry target, non-fossil fuel target), which were unambitious compared to business as usual developments (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 11-12; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 2-4). While Modi and his government internationally claimed to reconcile development and environmental protection (GOI 2015: 1, 6; Narlikar 2017: 103; Plagemann and Prys-Hansen 2018: 13), domestically they followed an "aggressive industrial growth strategy" (Jørgensen 2017: 281), and a "development-first" perspective" (Raghunandan 2020: 218). They diluted environmental regulations to ease doing business (Raghunandan 2020: 214, 218-219; NI-27022018; CI-24042018). Developmental climate mitigation efforts were only taken "when it is good for jobs and growth" (RI-30112016) or when there were any economic benefits attached (Aamodt 2018: 371), indicating India's competition engagement. This developmental focus made it easy for Modi to stick to the NDC implementation, even when US President Donald Trump pulled out of the Paris Agreement (Vishnoi and Chaudhury

⁵¹ The 2014 solar target is not an INDC target. The Modi government hoped to attract foreign investments in low-carbon technologies to boost their development (GOI 2015: 3). Solar energy prices had already been falling in India from 17.91 Indian rupee/kWh (0.356 USD/kWh) in 2010 to 4.63 Indian rupee/kWh (0.071 USD/kWh) in November 2015 (Buckley 2016; Dubash et al. 2018a: 403), and India had already increased its solar energy capacity to 4.3 GW (as of 30 September 2015). In addition, the Modi government initiated the International Solar Alliance to support the economic development of India's solar sector by promoting technologies, creating manufacturing markets, mobilizing investments, creating economies of scale and bringing down the costs through aggregation of demand and risk mitigation (Hakala 2019: 4; GI-28042018; RI-24042018).

2017). The Modi government even indicated that it will undertake domestically financed efforts to implement its INDC, but that “is not obliged to actually fulfil them unless support is forthcoming” (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 13).

Besides acknowledging own domestic funding for implementing the INDC, the Indian government also requested international funding (Gupta 2014c; 2015a; CI-1-26022018). Before the Paris COP, India mentioned that it can do more when international funding would be provided and even requested payments for intellectual property rights of low-carbon technologies (Gupta 2015a; Javadekar 2014; Modi 2015d). The Indian government calculated that INDC implementation would cost 2.5 trillion USD from which it requested 206 billion USD for adaptation and 834 billion USD for mitigation from external sources (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 13; GOI 2015: 31). The Indian government even made the INDC implementation dependent on an ambitious international agreement and resource provision by developed countries (GOI 2015: 30). After the Paris Agreement, the Indian government was “aspired to get their share” (DI-02122016) of international climate funding, as the awareness increased that international funding is available. For example, the government submitted two proposals to the GCF (CI-01032018).

Overall, the Indian government engaged in competition when developing its INDC by following an economic growth/development-first perspective, by struggling for carbon space internationally and by requesting international financial support. This contributed to the low ambition of the first- and second-order policy changes and to the glocalised interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets that incorporated domestic actors’ norm interpretation (i.e., carbon space competition, economic growth/development-first and international funding requests).

Mechanism: Failed attempt to influence India’s INDC through *material incentives*

In 2013, Germany and the United Kingdom started the NAMA Facility in order to financially support NAMA projects in developing countries that aim for transformative change (BMU and DECC 2012: 1; DI-24042018). In September 2013, GIZ started a project in India to support the preparation of NAMA project proposals that could be submitted to the NAMA Facility (Upadhyaya 2017: 58, 61; CI-01032018). By providing climate funding to India, the German government hoped to leverage an ambitious mitigation commitment by India in the upcoming international agreement in Paris. While the available international funding by the NAMA Facility was small (i.e., less than 20 million Euro per project), the plan was to use it for experimentation, which could be scaled-up by domestic resources (CI-01032018). However, during the first 2 years not much happened, as GIZ was waiting for a response from MOEF on potential NAMA project actions and on the signing of an implementation agreement (CI-01032018; DI-02122016), preventing any leveraging of India’s INDC ambition.

After German officials promised that any NAMA project proposal would be financed by the NAMA Facility and after a new Additional Secretary in MOEF took over who was open to bilateral aid, NAMA

project proposal development started (CI-01032018; DI-02122016). The Indian government determined its objectives and priorities and asked GIZ India to support them, leading to the development of two NAMA project proposals within six months. One proposal was on the waste sector in several cities and the other one on forestry in Assam, which were submitted to the NAMA Facility in 2016 (CI-1-26022018; DI-02122016; CI-01032018; DI-24042018; Upadhyaya 2017: 61). However, both proposals were rejected, which resulted in resentments by the Indian government, as GIZ India had assured them the funding of their proposals, leading to the cancelation of the Indo-German Climate change group meeting in 2017 (CI-01032018).

As the NAMA Facility only finances projects that are contributing to transformational change, which is defined as “catalytic change in systems and behaviours resulting from disruptive climate actions that enable actors to shift to carbon-neutral pathways” (NAMA Facility 2020b), GIZ India rather followed the Indian government’s approach of developmental climate mitigation efforts (Upadhyaya 2017: 60). This would lead to incremental change, which the NAMA Facility criticizes as insufficient to cope with the climate crisis (NAMA Facility 2020b). Moreover, in contrast to the perspective of the Indian government, for the NAMA Facility, sustainable development may only be a co-benefit (NAMA Facility 2020c). While the NAMA Facility is not providing any statements on the reasons of their rejection (DE-15102020), it may well be the case that the diverging norm interpretations contributed to the rejection.

Overall, material incentives failed to influence India’s INDC. It did not influence India’s glocalized norm interpretation based on domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets by failing to incorporate external actors’ norm interpretation based on transformational change.

Condition: Matching *cultural resonance* with religious and sectoral norms in the INDC

As part of Modi’s strategic and pragmatist foreign policy (Hall 2016: 272), Modi referred to Hindu wisdoms when speaking about climate change (Gupta et al. 2019: 12). He claimed the harmonious co-existence of Indians with nature due to their traditions and customs and invoked Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas of pursuing needs instead of greed (GOI 2015: 1-2; Hall 2017: 128-129; Modi 2015b). Modi used Hindu arguments to defend India’s traditional norm understandings like equity (GOI 2015: 1-4; Plagemann and Prys-Hansen 2018: 13), and to market India’s sectoral developmental actions as instances of “development without destruction” (Narlikar 2017: 103), while not addressing emission-intensive actions, such as deforestation or coal-based energy generation. He also used sectoral targets that were adopted for non-climate reasons, such as the 175 GW renewable energy capacity target (i.e., for increasing energy access) (Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276-278; The Economic Times 2014), as examples of the deep connection between faith and nature in India (Modi 2015c). India’s INDC forestry target was also matched to India’s preexisting forestry norms of increasing forest and tree cover to achieve the 1952 forestry goal of covering one-third of India’s

land. It was even based on already existing plantation and tree planting programs (FSI 2018: 85-86; GOI 2015: 16-17, 29-30; Kohli and Menon 2015), while natural forests continued to be depleted (Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 481-482).

Overall, Modi matched the developing country climate mitigation norm to preexisting religious norms, foreign policy norms and sectoral developmental targets. This contributed to the globalized norm interpretation in the form of domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretation (i.e., sectoral targets and development-first prioritizations). This facilitated competition, strategic mimicry, lesson drawing, and hampered shaming, material incentives and learning.

Condition: Matching *material resonance* with the perceived material necessities in the INDC

The Modi government matched the developing country climate mitigation norm to India's perceived material necessities. BJP had won the elections by promising a rapid increase of the low growth rates (Gupta et al. 2019: 4; Hall 2019: 515). Modi's primary goals were the promotion of economic growth, industrialization, and job creation, following a growth-first pathway (Bajpae 2016: 198; Narlikar 2017: 99; Raghunandan 2020: 220; RI-02042018). In 2014, the Modi government directly started with diluting environmental regulations to ease doing business (Goldenberg 2014; Raghunandan 2020: 218-219; Venkatesh 2018), announced the industrialization strategy 'Make in India', and lobbied for foreign investments internationally (Bajpae 2016: 198, 201-202; Gupta et al. 2019: 5; Sidhu and Godbole 2015).

The Modi government's goal was to increase energy security and energy provision. For this purpose, dependence on energy imports should be reduced, coal-based power generation should be quadrupled, and a solar energy capacity of 100 GW should be achieved by 2022 (Dubash 2017: 2; Dubash et al. 2018a: 402; GOI 2015: 5, 10; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 280; CI-06122016; GI-25042018; DI-24042018; GI-24042018; GI-28042018; NI-27022018).⁵² The Modi government used the falling solar prices to increase the targets for and deployment of solar energy and tried to further promote it through the establishment of the International Solar Alliance (i.e., with the goal of reducing the cost of finance), while Modi labelled it as a mitigation action internationally (DI-13122016; RI-09022018; CI-12022018; CI-06122016; GI-28042018; CI-16022018). In its INDC, the government claimed to promote more energy efficient coal usage, but did not plan to reduce its utilization or growth (GOI 2015: 10). Moreover, in its INDC, the Indian government proposed unambitious targets on emission intensity and non-fossil fuel-based energy generation that are in line with its economic growth targets (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 11-12; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276).

⁵² For the same reasons, Modi had already promoted solar energy as Chief Minister in Gujarat (SGI-05032018; GI-28042018; CI-16022018; Modi 2011).

For supporting its growth pathway, the Modi government facilitated the diversion of forests by diluting regulations (Fernandes et al. 2020: 165; Kaushik 2019; Pulla 2015: 1025; Raghunandan 2020: 218-219; GI-12022018; CI-24042018). It even reframed deforestation as reforestation, as deforesters were legally required to pay a levy for afforestation purposes (piling up in CAMPA) (Lahiri 2015; Mazoomdaar 2015), which had not yet been used as the CAMPA Fund was not operational (Ghosh 2016). In its INDC, however, the government promised to provide carbon sequestration of 2.5 to 3 Gt CO₂eq by 2030. They planned to achieve it with policies and programs that promote agro-forestry, job creating and economic growth (e.g., National Agroforestry Policy, National Rural Employment Scheme), alongside already existing afforestation programs (i.e., GIM) (GOI 2015: 16-17, 21, 29-30). This was also perceived to help with the problem of land availability (Kohli and Menon 2018; RI-16122016; RI-12122016; DI-GI-02122016; CI-GI-07122016; NI-14122016; RI-02042018). However, forest plantation programs had rather been unsuccessful in the past, and even the Environment minister complained about the low tree survival rate of 10 to 20 percent (Kohli and Menon 2015; Lahiri 2015). Experts also noted that the forestry target was unambitious (GI-2-13032018). In addition, the government did not address high-emission intensive problems like deforestation and degradation (except for the forest quality improvement target as part of the already existing GIM) (Kashwan 2017: 202; Kaushik 2019; Pulla 2015: 1025; NI-14122016; GI-12022018; RI-05122016; DI-GI-02122016; RI-02042018; CI-24042018). It was only able to report growing forest and tree cover by including crop plantation and by accounting forest degradation through fuelwood logging under the energy sector, while the growing stock of trees was decreasing due to degradation and deforestation (Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 481-482; Pulla 2015: 1025; Sharma 2017: 3; 2018: 3; NI-14022018; DI-GI-02122016; NI-14122016; RI-16122016).

Overall, the Modi government matched the developing country climate mitigation norm to the government's perceived material necessities, leading to a glocalized norm interpretation in the form of domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., growth-first and sectoral actions). It facilitated competition, lesson drawing, strategic mimicry and hampered shaming, learning, and material incentives. It also prevented measures that address emission-intensive activities.

Condition: Positive and reversed *social reception* around the Paris COP

The Modi government aimed for increasing its social recognition (i.e., positive social reception) and tried to reduce its social vulnerability (i.e., reversed social reception). Modi tried to improve his international image that had suffered due to his controversial role in Hindu riots on Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 (Gowen 2016). The desire for positive social reception was evident in Modi's attempt to present India as a global player and leader through starting initiatives like the International Solar Alliance and by relabeling sectoral actions as mitigation efforts (Hall 2016: 281; GI-15022018; GI-28042018; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276-280; Venkatesh 2018). For receiving international praise,

the Indian government also labelled its forestry sector as carbon sink through accounting fuelwood logging under the energy sector (GOI 2015: 16; Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 481-482; Sharma 2017: 3; RI-16122016).

At the same time, the Modi government was cautious regarding its social vulnerability. In the negotiations, it had insisted on the nationally determined character of the INDCs and had rejected an international stocktaking of individual INDCs as part of the Paris Agreement (Saryal 2018: 11-12; Vidal 2015; RI-1-01122016). Moreover, the Modi government presented unambitious targets as part of its NDC in order to avoid international blaming when not being able to achieve them (Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 278; CI-01032018; NI-14022018; CI-1-26022018; NI-15122016; GI-28022018).

This reversed social reception also hampered a more comprehensive engagement with international support. The Indian government was very cautious about any international funding and foreign influences on domestic politics. Donors were only allowed to provide technical support for the achievement of domestically-set priorities and had to refrain from attempts to influence domestic policies (DI-02122016; RI-2-01122016; DI-15022018; DI-1-30112016; DI-24042018; CI-1-26022018). Cooperation was otherwise rejected (Torney 2015a: 169). The “deep-rooted suspicion about the motives of support providers” (Upadhyaya 2017: 57), and the caution regarding MRV requirements and potential foreign influences contributed to India’s cautious engagement on NAMA project development (RI-30112016; DI-02122016; DI-13122016). When their NAMA project proposals were rejected by the NAMA Facility, despite previous promises of funding by GIZ, the Indian government was strongly hurt and disappointed, and canceled Indo-German climate change discussions in 2017 (CI-01032018). The Indian government also refrained from labeling domestically financed mitigation actions as unilateral NAMAs in the international NAMA registry, as their implementation would then have become obligatory in their perspective (RI-2-01122016; DI-24042018), indicating the fear of increasing social vulnerability. It also did not accept MRV of unilateral actions for social vulnerability reasons (NI-15122016). In addition, for sometime, the Indian government refrained from project proposal submissions for GCF funding, as it did not want to be perceived as taking away climate funding from less developed countries (DI-15022018).

Overall, positive and reversed social reception contributed to the globalized norm interpretation in the form of domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets by incorporating external actors’ interpretations (i.e., non-compensated mitigation contributions) due to positive social reception and domestic actors’ interpretation (i.e., domestically financed sectoral developmental actions) due to reversed social reception. It therefore facilitated competition, strategic mimicry, shaming and lesson drawing, and hampered learning and material incentives. It did not result in accepting commitments or transformational policy changes.

Condition: Positive *material reception* in the context of the Paris COP

In the context of the Paris COP, political material prospects were perceived to be sufficiently high by the Modi government. Modi's foreign policy largely followed the pathway of the Singh government in aiming for economic growth and an increasing international leadership of India (Hall 2016: 272, 280-281). This included an aspiration for a permanent UN Security Council seat for which Modi lobbied the US at bilateral talks on climate change (BBC 2015; The Economic Times 2015a). Grand staging on climate change was perceived to help to realize those political prospects (Saryal 2018: 15; NI-27022018).

The Modi government, however, did not perceive available financial prospects to be sufficiently high. Nonetheless, it continued to demand (and hope for) international funding and even considered submitting one of two INDC parts as contingent on international support (Gupta 2015a), and eventually declared the INDC implementation success dependent upon financial support (GOI 2015: 31). But the Indian government did not perceive international climate funding, such as through the NAMA Facility (i.e., less than 20 million Euro per project), to be sufficient (DI-1-30112016; DI-13122016; NI-15122016; CI-12022018; CI-01032018; DI-02122016; Upadhyaya 2017: 57). In consequence, line ministries were not looking into it, as it was more lucrative and much easier to receive domestic funding (RI-29112016; DI-13122016). The MOEF also regarded the transaction costs of applying for NAMA funding as high, which hampered stronger engagement (RI-2-01122016). The perceived potential financial prospects increased after the Paris COP when available international climate funding became more visible, leading line ministries to become more interested in GCF and NAMA funding (DI-13122016; NI-15122016; DI-02122016). However, the government only submitted two project proposals to the GCF (CI-01032018), and it also applied for two NAMA support projects in 2016, which were not selected by the NAMA Facility (RI-2-01122016; DI-02122016).

Overall, the Indian government had a positive political material reception and an insufficient financial material reception that slightly increased after the Paris COP. This contributed to the globalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets by incorporating external actors' interpretations (i.e., non-compensated mitigation contributions and quantitative mitigation targets) and preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., international funding requests). Yet, it was insufficient to incorporate transformational change or commitments. It facilitated strategic mimicry, competition, shaming, lesson drawing, and hampered material incentives.

Condition: Lack of climate change *knowledge* around the Paris COP

When Modi became Prime Minister, he had already published his book "Convenient Action", which included his developmental actions in Gujarat that Modi claimed to be on climate change (Modi

2011). It was therefore surprising that he stated in 2014 that “climate has not changed, we have changed” (Gupta et al. 2015: 596), despite his supposedly existing previous climate knowledge. He changed his narrative when the Paris COP approached, and connected climate action to the traditional practices of Indians that he claimed to live in harmonious co-existence with nature (The Hindu 2015). But the Indian government had missed the opportunity to increase the governmental capacity to process climate knowledge. Previous Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh (2009 until 2011) had initiated the process of establishing a National Institute on Climate Change Studies and Action (NICCSA) in order to increase capacities and knowledge on climate change. But this process was not advanced after his tenure and was not supported anymore under the Modi government (DI-02122016; CE-14102020), while it could have helped to achieve higher ambition (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 13). For the preparation of India’s INDC, line ministries only submitted sectoral developmental actions and targets to the coordinating MOEFCC without reflecting on any additional measures on climate change, indicating their low climate knowledge (GI-15022018). Based on that, India eventually presented sectoral developmental climate mitigation actions and unambitious targets in its INDC, despite India’s high vulnerability to climate change (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 11-12; CI-12022018; Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 276-280).

Overall, knowledge was not sufficiently high to lead to actions and targets that substantially move beyond sectoral business as usual plans. This contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation in the form of domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets by incorporating domestic actors’ norm interpretations (i.e., sectoral developmental actions). This hampered learning, material incentives, and shaming, and facilitated lesson drawing, and competition.

Condition: Strong centralization and low capacities in the *political-administrative set-up* around the Paris COP

Modi reconstituted the PM Council, which had not met for the previous three years and removed members that relied on traditional positions and kept those with a more flexible understanding (Hindustan Times 2014). It only met once or twice during the INDC preparation in 2015 (The Siasat Daily 2015; GI-2-01032018; GI-15022018). The INDC formulation was coordinated by MOEFCC (DI-02122016), which asked line ministries for submissions of their respective climate change plans (GI-15022018). The INDC draft was not discussed in a PM Council meeting, and Modi decided upon the actual INDC ambition himself (GI-28022018), indicating the strong coordination and horizontal centralization. States, even though being needed for implementation, were not consulted in the process (CI-02122016). For the ratification of the Paris Agreement, only inter-ministerial consultations were needed, but no parliamentary approval (Sethi 2016). Strong centralization, thus, characterized the process around the Paris COP.

Internationally, the Indian government demanded international funding, but it lacked the institutional capacity to prepare own project proposals due to the lack of skilled personnel and dedicated institutions, leading to a reliance on consultants (CI-1-26022018; DI-15022018; DI-24042018; RI-09022018). Singh's Environment minister Ramesh (2009 until 2011) tried to change this with the establishment of NICCSA, which was intended to increase climate change knowledge and capacities. A GIZ project even supported the process, but the institution was not established due to insufficient support by the Modi government (DI-02122016; CE-14102020). MOEFCC's bureaucrats' specialization was on negotiations and not on implementation, leading to MOEFCC's openness to GIZ support on NAMA project proposal development (DI-24042018), while the Indian government took the decisions about sectors, locations and priorities (Upadhyaya 2017: 80; DI-1-30112016). The decision to develop NAMA project proposals was dependent on individual bureaucrats, such as MOEFCC's new Additional Secretary, who was in favor of bilateral aid (Upadhyaya 2017: 58; Upadhyaya et al. 2018: 18). The sectoral partners were the Ministry of Urban Development for the waste NAMA and the Environment wing of the MOEFCC for the forestry NAMA (DI-02122016; DI-24042018). Yet, the process also suffered from a lack of coordination (DI-02122016; Upadhyaya et al. 2018: 14).

Overall, the Indian government followed an approach of strong centralization of the INDC formulation process, while it lacked capacities on the preparation of internationally supported NAMA project proposals. This contributed to the glocalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets that incorporated domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., sectoral developmental actions) and prevented the incorporation of transformational change (i.e., external actors' norm interpretation). This facilitated lesson drawing and strategic mimicry, and hampered material incentives, learning and shaming. It facilitated the competition engagement based on sectoral targets, but hampered the competition engagement to acquire international funding.

Condition: No *opposition* to care about around the Paris COP

The Indian government's formulation of the INDC did not result in any opposition. In 2014, Modi had already removed traditionalists from the reconstituted PM Council (Sunita Narain, Prodipto Ghosh) (Hindustan Times 2014). India's INDC did not raise opposition, with the exception of former Environment Minister Ramesh (2009 until 2011), who demanded non-compensated mitigation actions by the Indian government due to India's high vulnerability to climate change (Ramesh 2015b). Some traditionalists, such as Narain (CSE) criticized the Paris Agreement for "cement[ing] climate apartheid" (Narain 2015), arguing that the mitigation burden is increasingly being put on developing countries. However, she welcomed India's INDC alongside other NGOs, while only the

Climate Action Network demanded higher ambitions (The Economic Times 2015b).⁵³ The forestry INDC target was also criticized as “a veil to hide India’s continuing deforestation” (Lahiri 2015), but this did not result in any further opposition. The developmental focus of the INDC, otherwise, resulted in a broad acceptance by the Indian public (Raghunandan 2020: 211).

Overall, no meaningful opposition emerged against India’s INDC. This eased the Indian government’s course of action and facilitated strategic mimicry, competition, lesson drawing, and prevented shaming and learning. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation of domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets by incorporating domestic actors’ norm interpretations (i.e., growth-first and sectoral targets).

Sum-up of causal complex 10

Causal complex 10 explains the INDC formulation and the Indian government’s behavior around the Paris COP. *Shaming* contributed to the acceptance of non-compensated (quantitative) mitigation contributions. *Strategic mimicry* motivated the INDC formulation. *Strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing* and *competition* shaped the content of the INDC, and resulted in one first-order policy change (emission intensity target of GDP) and two second-order policy changes (forest carbon sequestration and non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity targets). *Complex learning* and *material incentives* were not successful in shaping India’s behavior around the Paris COP. All conditions facilitated competition (while political-administrative set-up also hampered it) and lesson drawing. Most conditions facilitated strategic mimicry (except for knowledge), and hampered material incentives (except for opposition) as well as complex learning (except for material reception). Shaming was hampered more than facilitated (except for social and material reception). This resulted in the *glocalized interpretation* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets*. *Shaming*, *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing* and several *conditions* (positive social reception, material reception) contributed to an incorporation of *external actors’ norm interpretations* (i.e., non-compensated mitigation contributions and quantitative mitigation targets). Preexisting *domestic actors’ norm interpretations* (i.e., growth-/development-first, sectorial developmental targets and actions, carbon space competition and international funding requests) were included due to *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing*, *competition*, and *all conditions*. Norm interpretations consisting of quantitative commitments, transformational change and mitigation of emission-intensive activities were rejected. In addition, the Indian government continued its *glocalized norm interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* as stipulated in the GIM that consisted of *afforestation*, *forest quality improvement and non-carbon benefits*.

⁵³ During the INDC drafting process, moderate NGOs were consulted without much impact, while more critical NGOs were not involved (DI-02122016; RI-2-01122016; RI-1-01122016; NI-15122016; NI-14122016).

7.2 Stage VIII: Renewed sectorial changes

In stage III (see 5.4.2), Indian negotiators reshaped REDD+ and the carbon forestry norm in the UNFCCC negotiations. In stage IV (see 6.1), the Indian government formulated domestic actions as part of the NAPCC and in stage V (see 6.2) set an international target regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm. In stage VI (see 6.3), in response to the developments in the previous stages, the Indian government introduced sectorial changes in the forestry sector. This included the Green India Mission as one of the announced missions of the NAPCC and first steps toward the development of India's REDD+ framework. Yet, the REDD+ framework was not concluded and implementation of GIM did not start afterwards. In stage VII (see 7.1), the Indian government then set a new forestry target as part of its (I)NDC to the Paris Agreement. In stage VIII, the Indian government introduces new sectorial changes to achieve the previous climate-related forestry targets and to advance the engagement with the carbon forestry norm.

7.2.1 Development of domestic REDD+ framework from 2015 until 2019 (causal complex 11)

Renewed sectorial changes occurred as stage VIII of the norm globalization framework. Causal complex 11 explains the Indian government's further domestic advancement of the REDD+ framework from 2015 until 2019. India shifted toward a *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits* and adopted the REDD+ Strategy as a discursive change. This is explained by the workings of *strategic mimicry, lesson drawing* and *competition*. Most conditions facilitated competition, strategic mimicry, and lesson drawing. The Indian government, thereby, continued to interpret the *developing country climate mitigation norm* as both *domestically financed* and *internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions*.

Mechanism: Strategic mimicry through advancing REDD+ after the Paris COP

The Modi administration continued the domestic REDD+ engagement that had been started by the Singh government (see 6.3.2). One important motivation was to shine in the international climate discussions based on the claimed success in forestry (GI-1-09022018). In December 2014, MOEFCC adopted the REDD+ Reference Document that was prepared under the Singh government without any further changes (MOEFCC 2014b). In January 2015, MOEFCC commissioned FSI to develop India's forest reference level that was required under the UNFCCC (GOI 2018b: 3; GI-2-13032018). Yet, the National REDD+ Policy draft, which was developed under the Singh government, was still awaiting approval. Subsequently, the process stalled, which only changed after the Paris COP when a new team in MOEFCC, responsible for the INDC implementation, "looked at the [forestry] target and woke up" (GI-15122016). In their view, this target was ambitious and they realized that they had to initiate steps in order to achieve this target. This was backed by the PM

Council on Climate Change's sub-committee, which requested a renewed focus on REDD+ as part of the NDC implementation process (GI-15122016). With the help of REDD+, the goal was to shine internationally by delivering on the NDC forestry target and by communicating to the world how well India is conserving and increasing forests, as MOEFCC's responsible bureaucrat emphasized: "REDD+ is a tool for us, as we are part of the international climate process [and] REDD+ will help us [so that...] we can show we are in the right way" (GI-1-09022018).

In October 2016, MOEFCC asked the chairman of the previous REDD+ Expert Committee to lead a renewed REDD+ Expert Committee (with experts from e.g., FSI, ICFRE), representing a small-scale organizational change. After realizing that a REDD+ Policy was not required by the UNFCCC, MOEFCC requested the REDD+ Expert Committee to prepare India's REDD+ Strategy as stipulated by UNFCCC decisions (GI-15122016). In late 2016, MOEFCC also joined UN-REDD – an international capacity building program on REDD+ – in order to indicate its involvement in the international REDD+ community, while not working with them domestically (DI-08022018; GI-12022018; GI-1-09022018). Despite the recommendations by the REDD+ Reference Document "to seek technical and financial assistance for REDD+ preparation" (MOEFCC 2014b: 10), MOEFCC continued to perceive own capacities as sufficient, as indicated by one bureaucrat: "We did not tap [into] the [UN-REDD] preparation fund as we have our own resources" (GI-1-09022018). The new REDD+ Expert Committee developed the REDD+ strategy on its own. Yet, MOEFCC did not show a strong buy-in, as it did not meet with the committee to discuss the almost completed REDD+ Strategy in 2017 (GI-12022018). Instead, in September 2017, MOEFCC even partly reorganized the REDD+ Expert Committee under the new leadership by ICFRE (MOEFCC 2018e: 40; GI-1-13032018).

The approved REDD+ Strategy was eventually released in August 2018 (MOEFCC 2018e: iv; PIB 2018), which introduced a national jurisdictional approach as recommended by the UNFCCC (see 4.3.2). The issuance of the REDD+ Strategy was used by the Indian government as an attempt to engage in international shining: Environment minister Harsh Vardhan emphasized that the "National REDD+ strategy is one of the tools to achieve India's commitment to [the] Paris Agreement" (PIB 2018). His deputy underlined that "India [is] joining hands with [the] global community" and claimed that the "progressive conservation-oriented forest policies and afforestation programmes in India is contributing to reduction in carbon emissions, stabilization and improvement of carbon stocks in forests" (MOEFCC 2018e: vii). Moreover, MOEFCC's high bureaucrats asserted that "India is one of the few countries where forest and tree cover have increased in recent years" (MOEFCC 2018e: xi) and that "India, even though not a part of the problem, has been an active and constructive participant in the search for solutions" (MOEFCC 2018e: ix). This attempt at international shining was also taken up in the REDD+ Strategy itself: Modi's mantra of "development without destruction" (MOEFCC 2018e: 1) was mentioned as the basic forestry approach and several remarks emphasized how successful India has been sequestering forest carbon (MOEFCC 2018e: 1-2). In contrast, researchers noted that India was actually a forest carbon emitter due to fuelwood logging

that the government accounted for under the energy sector (Sharma 2017, 2018) and several environmental activists as well as former Environment minister Jairam Ramesh complained about the Modi government's deforestation for development (Kaushik 2019; Koshy 2019; PTI 2018).

In January 2018, FSI submitted India's national forest reference level to the UNFCCC for technical assessment. UNFCCC's experts criticized that India was overestimating its carbon forest sequestration in its forest reference level (UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 3, 8), which it had claimed to be 49.7 Mt CO₂eq per year from 2000 until 2008 (GOI 2018b: 22), indicating India's aim to shine internationally as forest conserving country, despite ongoing deforestation and degradation. Moreover, UNFCCC experts noted that the forest reference level excluded forest fires and non-CO₂ GHG emissions, leading to further overestimations of carbon sequestration (UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 9). It even included crop plantations, such as bamboo, orchards, and palm that increased India's forest cover, while being agricultural areas outside of recorded forest areas (GOI 2018b: 7). Comparing 34 forest reference (emission) levels, only Vanuatu also incorporated agroforestry areas in its forest definition (Rosenstock et al. 2018: 3). A study found that up to 12 percent of India's reported forest cover could be economic crop plantations, which was criticized for "masking deforestation" (Nandi 2019b), as it concealed the loss of actual biodiversity-rich forests in the statistics.

Overall, India engaged in strategic mimicry, leading to the domestic REDD+ advancement. This resulted in one small-scale organizational change – the REDD+ Expert Committee – and one further discursive change – the REDD+ Strategy, laying the ground for the usage of a new international instrument in India, while not introducing any actual policy changes. This contributed to the glocalized carbon forestry norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation and economic crop plantations) and external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., quantitative emission baselines and a jurisdictional REDD+ approach based on UNFCCC requirements). Moreover, India refrained from additional interventions on deforestation or degradation.

Mechanism: *Competition* engagement in the domestic REDD+ preparation under Modi

The second factor that motivated MOEFCC to continue working on REDD+ was the realization of economic and financial benefits (GI-05122016; GI-15122016; GI-12022018). MOEFCC wanted to become eligible for REDD+ funding from GCF in order to close the funding deficits for the NDC implementation. This contributed to the reconstitution of the REDD+ Expert Committee – a small-scale organizational change (MOEFCC 2018e: 26; GI-05122016; GI-1-01032018). MOEFCC aspired to receive result-based payments for REDD+, and the REDD+ Strategy even requested funding support for all REDD+ phases (MOEFCC 2018e: ix, xiii, 17, 19). For maximizing REDD+ income, the REDD+ Strategy even included economic crop plantations, and hoped to be able to include single trees outside forests as well as grasslands and coastal sea grasses in the future

(MOEFCC 2018e: 16-17). MOEFCC also wished to realize economic benefits by advancing REDD+: This included the creation of additional jobs, the increase of production of raw material for the wood-based industry, and the provision of livelihood benefits for forest-dependent communities (MOEFCC 2018e: xiii, v, 5). The REDD+ Strategy, therefore, hailed India's National Agroforestry Policy for "perfectly synergiz[ing] with objectives of REDD+ implementation [...] by explicitly supporting the coverage of trees outside forest" (MOEFCC 2018e: 13), while also fostering economic development. Due to India's plans of achieving high economic growth, the REDD+ Strategy did not address deforestation for development projects. It even claimed that forest-dependent communities were responsible for deforestation and degradation (Bhasme and Rai n.d.; MOEFCC 2018e: 22-23), which it aspired to reduce only through the provision of "improved fuel efficient cooking stoves" (MOEFCC 2018e: 23), while not adding any further forestry interventions to address these problems. Otherwise, plantations by the private sector and crop plantations were perceived as being REDD+ interventions with high potential and feasibility and as significant parts of India's REDD+ engagement (MOEFCC 2018e: 7, 41).

India's REDD+ focus on agroforestry is also evident in India's national forest reference level, which included economic crop plantations under its forest definition. This contributed to the positive net increase of the forest cover, outweighing deforestation and degradation according to government data (UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 9). India's national forest reference level acknowledged the average annual deforestation of 35,560 ha (GOI 2018b: 4), but instead of focusing on reducing deforestation or degradation, the Indian government chose the activities of "Sustainable Management of Forest" (GOI 2018b: 6) under REDD+ (i.e., the plus part of REDD+). This permitted a focus on economic crop plantations, such as palm, orchards, tea and coffee estates, coconut, mango, apple and bamboo plantations (GOI 2018b: 7, 11), which also provide economic benefits to farmers. Such an economic and agricultural approach to REDD+ was very rare among REDD+ countries (Rosenstock et al. 2018: 3).

Overall, India's competition engagement resulted in a focus on realizing financial and economic benefits from advancing REDD+. This contributed to one small-scale organizational change (i.e., the REDD+ Expert Committee) and one discursive change (i.e., the REDD+ Strategy). It also contributed to the glocalized carbon forestry norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretation (i.e., high economic growth, afforestation, livelihood provision for local communities and economic crop plantations). It did not lead to additional direct forestry interventions addressing deforestation and degradation (only indirectly through the provision of more fuel efficient cooking stoves).

Mechanism: (Incomplete) *lesson drawing* from UNFCCC's requirements after the Paris COP

In October 2016, MOEFCC's officers started to draw more lessons from the UNFCCC frameworks. After having realized that a REDD+ policy was not required, they reconstituted the REDD+ Expert

Committee and assigned them the responsibility to draft a REDD+ Strategy that is in line with UNFCCC requirements (GI-15122016; GI-1-09022018). They had realized that Brazil had become eligible for REDD+ funding after having completed all necessary elements, including a REDD+ Strategy, a reference emission level, a safeguard information system and a national monitoring system (GI-05122016; GI-12022018). The REDD+ Expert Committee developed the REDD+ Strategy on its own, without any bilateral or multilateral assistance (GI-12022018; GI-1-09022018; GI-15122016; DI-28042018). While the committee developed a national jurisdictional REDD+ approach as required by UNFCCC, some MOEFCC bureaucrats still continued to perceive REDD+ as yet another form of a local forest project (GI-12022018; Secretariat 2016: 9). The committee both worked on the REDD+ Strategy and the safeguard information system, while FSI was responsible for the development of India's forest reference level (GI-1-13032018; GI-12022018; GI-2-13032018).

For developing the forest reference level, Indian experts claimed that they followed UNFCCC decisions and the IPCC Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (GI-1-09022018; GI-15122016; GI-2-13032018; GOI 2018b: 6, 8, 22; UNFCCC Secretariat 2016: 19; 2018: 4-5). UNFCCC requirements on the forest definition encouraged countries to apply the most recent IPCC's guidelines (UNFCCC Secretariat 2016: 4). India submitted the same forest definition that it used domestically, which included plantations outside forest areas, such as orchards. In contrast, IPCC guidelines distinguished forest land from croplands like orchards and agroforestry (IPCC 2003: 3.69), indicating India's limited lesson drawing. Also, UNFCCC's forest definition distinguished forests from cropland management (UNFCCC 2001: 58), and, in contrast to India's definition, required trees to have the potential to reach a minimum height of 2 to 5 meters (GOI 2018b: 7; UNFCCC 2001: 58). This indicates that India followed its own particular norm interpretation of the carbon forestry norm that was based on expanding economic crop plantations alongside afforestation. Yet, UNFCCC's technical assessment team did not criticize India's forest definition (UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 10), as the UNFCCC COP decisions on REDD+ only requested the "consistent representation of land" (UNFCCC Secretariat 2016: 7). By defining croplands as forests, India was able to report increasing forest cover and to justify the selection of the REDD+ intervention of "Sustainable Management of Forest" (GOI 2018b: 6-7). While at least one REDD+ Expert Committee member even preferred the incorporation of single trees outside forests (GI-12022018), FSI experts did not include it in the forest reference level, as they drew the lesson from the COP decisions that the UNFCCC would not accept this for REDD+ implementation (GI-2-13032018). While FSI experts did not perceive the UNFCCC and IPCC guidelines to be strict at all (GI-2-13032018), UNFCCC's technical assessment noted that "the data and information used by India in constructing its FRL [(i.e., forest reference level)] are [...] not fully in accordance with the guidelines contained in the annex to decision 12/CP.17" (UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 1) and requested several improvements in the future (UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 11), indicating limited lesson drawing.

For constructing the national forest reference level, FSI also drew lessons from their own sources, as indicated by one expert: "We were connecting all the data we have like the GHG inventory in

forestry” (GI-2-13032018). Forest cover data came from the forest monitoring by FSI, which, from 2008 until 2010, had also conducted an additional study to further develop emission factors (UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 4). FSI believed its own expertise in measuring growing stock to be sufficient (FSI 2018: 93). While the cooperation on forest monitoring with USAID helped to increase the sample plots from 21,000 to 32,000 in 2016 (GI-2-13032018), this did not affect India’s national forest reference level in 2018, as its baseline was based on the previous existing 21,000 sample plots from 2002 until 2008 (GOI 2018b: 15).

MOEFCC’s representatives argued that the approved National REDD+ Strategy, which was released in August 2018, was in accordance with UNFCCC’s COP decisions (MOEFCC 2018e: v, xiii). Indeed, the REDD+ Strategy referred several times to the Cancun decisions on REDD+ (MOEFCC 2018e: 3). It perceived all five REDD+ interventions (i.e., addressing deforestation and degradation as well as the three plus-components) to be in line with its National Forest Policy (MOEFCC 2018e: 5). It also referred to the essential REDD+ framework elements and thereby drew lessons from the UNFCCC and from India’s preexisting forest policy framework. It noted the submission of India’s forest reference level, the requirement of having a national forest monitoring system and the existence of India’s national forest inventory and forest cover assessment (MOEFCC 2018e: 4). Yet, in September 2018, one of the REDD+ Expert Committee members noted that the National Forest Monitoring System was still not finalized by FSI (Das and Rawat 2018: 3, 12). The REDD+ Strategy even extensively discussed UNFCCC’s safeguard requirements, but did not emphasize how India’s REDD+ approach ensures the compliance with them, except by referring to already existing forest policies (MOEFCC 2018e: 5, 7, 9, 14). However, it also noted that the development of a safeguard information system and of a benefit sharing system will still be required (MOEFCC 2018e: 29, 35; GI-1-01032018). India’s approach to safeguards continued to be based on combining all existing policies within one structure, such as the Forest Conservation Act or the Forest Rights Act (GI-1-13032018; GI-15122016). The organization responsible for its development – ICFRE – still conducted brainstorming sessions with REDD+ experts in December 2018 (Das and Rawat 2018: 3, 12; Garhwal Post 2018), indicating the slow progress on this matter.

The REDD+ Strategy drafters also drew the lesson from the UNFCCC that subnational REDD+ implementation was possible and therefore envisaged the development of State REDD+ Action Plans (MOEFCC 2018e: 17-18). Some of the REDD+ Expert Committee members were involved in the development of one small-scale REDD+ pilot project to provide alternative income sources to forest-dependent people in Mizoram in 2017/18 and the formulation of Mizoram’s State REDD+ Action Plan (GI-1-13032018; SGI-06042018), leading ICFRE experts to claim to have drawn lessons from it for the national REDD+ Strategy (Garhwal Post 2018), while no such indications could be found.⁵⁴ Yet, it may have helped them to clarify the role state governments have to play in the national

⁵⁴ Those activities were financed as part of a transboundary Himalayan REDD+ preparation project that was implemented by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development and was funded by Germany, mostly focusing on interventions in Nepal (GIZ 2020; GI-17022018).

REDD+ governance structure, which received major responsibilities on REDD+ implementation in the REDD+ strategy (MOEFCC 2018e: 33; GI-1-01032018; GI-1-09022018).

For the content of the REDD+ Strategy, the Indian government also drew lessons from India's preexisting forestry policies and targets. It emphasized its plan to use REDD+ for achieving the 1952 goal of one-third of all land being under forest and tree cover and the NDC forestry target (MOEFCC 2018e: 6-7). It already perceived itself on track due to preexisting forestry programs (e.g., GIM, National Afforestation Program) (MOEFCC 2018e: 6). The REDD+ Strategy also utilized India's preexisting forest policy definition and even planned to include single trees outside forests in the future, being consistent with India's domestic focus on forest and tree cover (MOEFCC 2018e: 16-17). It also introduced definitions of UNFCCC's five REDD+ interventions, based on its own domestic understanding. The strategy defined the preferred option of sustainable forest management as activities "to sustain the biomass productivity [...] for prevention of long-term loss of carbon stocks" (MOEFCC 2018e: 20). It also defined its other preferred option, the enhancement of carbon stocks, as the "conversion of nonforest or degraded forests to forests [...] leading to enhancement of carbon stocks" (MOEFCC 2018e: 20), and emphasized that this would be in accordance with India's National Agroforestry Policy (MOEFCC 2018e: 21).

Lesson drawing from domestic sources also occurred regarding the governance structure that was built upon preexisting forestry institutions. The REDD+ Strategy's governance structure included a National Governing Council, largely composed of MOEFCC members, that is responsible for steering, coordinating and overseeing REDD+ implementation and for developing guidelines on benefit sharing (MOEFCC 2018e: 30-31). It incorporated a supporting Thematic Advisory Group (led by FSI), that is responsible for MRV, the national forest monitoring system and the forest reference level and a REDD+ Technical Working Group (led by ICFRE) that is responsible for safeguards, capacity building and finance (MOEFCC 2018e: 31). It further claimed the establishment of a National Designated Entity for REDD+ that was responsible for the day-to-day activities of the REDD+ implementation and the collaboration with states (MOEFCC 2018e: 32-33). As no indications could be found that those institutions have actually been set-up, they do not qualify as instances of organizational changes. One high government official also acknowledged that the MOEFCC has "no dedicated REDD+ staff" (GI-1-09022018), while one person functioned as focal point on REDD+ alongside other responsibilities (GI-1-01032018).

Similarly, the REDD+ Strategy drew lessons from preexisting governance responsibilities. It also planned to assign the responsibility and adequate resources for forest management to Joint Forest Management Committees (MOEFCC 2018e: 35), even though, for decades, JFMCs had been criticized by non-state actors for being under state control, failing to share benefits with communities. At the same time, the REDD+ strategy neglected Gram Sabhas, which were empowered by the Forest Rights Act (Bhasme and Rai n.d.). For the domestic financing of the Indian REDD+ actions, the REDD+ Strategy planned to utilize the funding for GIM and the 500 billion Indian rupee from the

CAMPA Fund (equivalent to 6.346 billion Euro on 7 June 2018 according to OANDA 2020), alongside external GCF funding (MOEFCC 2018e: 26), indicating a renewed focus on domestically financed afforestation activities alongside international REDD+ funding.

Overall, the Indian government drew partly lessons from the UNFCCC and IPCC and combined this with lessons drawn from its domestic context. This contributed to one small-scale organizational change (i.e., the REDD+ Expert Committee) and one discursive change (i.e., the REDD+ Strategy). This also contributed to the glocalized carbon forestry norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation, economic crop plantations and preexisting domestic forestry goals and governance structures) and external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., quantitative emission baselines and a jurisdictional REDD+ approach based on UNFCCC's requirements).

Condition: *Cultural resonance* matching between UNFCCC's requirements and domestic norms

The Indian government matched its interpretation of the carbon forestry norm and REDD+ requirements to its preexisting forestry norms. MOEFCC's REDD+ strategy built upon the National Forest Policy and the Forest Conservation Act for defining the potential REDD+ interventions (MOEFCC 2018e: 5, 10). It also resorted to GIM and the National Agroforestry Policy by following a norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits (MOEFCC 2018e: 13, 26). The planned safeguard information system was also intended to rely on the existing policy framework (GI-1-13032018; GI-15122016). Funding was not only supposed to come from international sources, but also from preexisting domestic sources like the CAMPA Fund (MOEFCC 2018e: 26). India's governance structure was matched to the preexisting forestry governance with national steering and subnational implementation by state forest departments and Joint Forest Management Committees, while neglecting the more recent unfavored Forest Rights Act and Gram Sabhas in order to keep state control, despite non-state actors' criticisms of those JFMCs (Bhasme and Rai n.d.; Kashwan 2017: 189, 204; Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 479, 484; MOEFCC 2018e: 35; Vijge and Gupta 2014: 24; CI-27022018; SGI-12042018; CI-24042018; AI-10022018). For defining India's forest reference level, the Indian REDD+ experts relied upon India's definition of forests, including tree areas outside forests and croplands, while not going as far as including single trees, as this would have not been in line with UNFCCC requirements (GOI 2018b: 7; MOEFCC 2018e: 17). They also resorted to FSI's preexisting forest monitoring procedures and carbon stock assessment rules for the development of the reference level (GI-2-13032018; FSI 2018: 7, 9, 94, 125; GOI 2018b: 15; UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 4).

Yet, Indian bureaucrats also remained committed to their domestic norm of self-reliance, refusing additional external REDD+ preparation support (GI-1-09022018). Modi even preferred the usage of domestic funding for private forestry projects instead of the usage of international private funding from the voluntary carbon market, as he asked the coordinator of an externally financed private

REDD+ project in Meghalaya: “Why do we depend on foreign funding? I have funds for green and clean India” (PI-02032018). Previous negative experiences with the CDM in the forestry sector had not created a positive image of international carbon instruments (GI-1-09022018; DI-28042018; CI-2-26022018). However, the REDD+ Strategy also acknowledged that REDD+ projects would be needed to test the carbon accounting system and that international REDD+ funding would be required to meet the domestic funding deficit for realizing the forestry NDC target (MOEFCC 2018e: 19, 26), indicating differences between Modi and the MOEFCC about the usage of international funds and contributing to a reliance on both domestically financed and internationally financed actions.

Overall, India matched its interpretation of the carbon forestry norm to its preexisting domestic forestry norms and its norm of self-reliance. This facilitated lesson drawing and strategic mimicry. It also facilitated (i.e., maximize economic benefits) and hampered competition (i.e., regarding international funding requests). It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating domestic actors’ norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation, economic crop plantations and preexisting domestic forestry goals and governance structures).

Condition: *Material resonance* matching between UNFCCC’s requirements and India’s perceived material necessities

The Indian government formulated the REDD+ Strategy and the forest reference level in a way so that they matched perceived material necessities. Both did not address planned drivers of deforestation or degradation, while the Modi government even diluted environmental regulations to facilitate deforestation for development and economic growth (Kashwan 2017: 202; Kaushik 2019; Raghunandan 2020: 218-219). The REDD+ Strategy, instead, mentioned the problems of unplanned drivers, such as fuelwood logging by local communities, and claimed the provision of LPG to local communities as one solution to this problem (Bhasme and Rai n.d.; MOEFCC 2018e: 22-23). Otherwise, the REDD+ strategy promoted afforestation and agroforestry, which were perceived as beneficial for India’s political economy that required wood, farming and jobs for the local population and economy (MOEFCC 2018e: v, 5, 7, 13, 41). Similarly, the preferred REDD+ option of sustainable forest management permitted the promotion of economic crop plantations, such as palm, orchards, and coconut (GOI 2018b: 6-7, 11).

This matched REDD+ approach to India’s perceived material resonance facilitated competition and strategic mimicry, but hampered further lesson drawing from UNFCCC and IPCC. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating domestic actors’ norm interpretations (i.e., high economic growth, afforestation, economic crop plantations, non-carbon benefits). It prevented the reduction of deforestation and hampered more direct approaches to reducing degradation.

Condition: Positive *social reception* after the Paris COP

The Modi government had an aspiration for a high international social recognition. Advancing REDD+ was intended to show internationally that India is on the right track concerning climate change and forestry and regarding the achievement of its NDC forestry target (GI-15122016; GI-1-09022018; NI-14022018). In the context of India's approval of the REDD+ Strategy, MOEFCC's representatives, therefore, emphasized that India was "joining hands with [the] global community" (MOEFCC 2018e: vii), and acted as "an active and constructive participant in the search for solutions" (MOEFCC 2018e: ix). MOEFCC, therefore, had to respond to UNFCCC requirements on forest reference levels and the development of a national jurisdictional approach, among others, as indicated in India's forest reference level document and REDD+ Strategy. MOEFCC even overemphasized India's forest carbon sequestration and increasing forest cover, and, celebrated India for being one of few countries that have increased forest cover and carbon sequestration (MOEFCC 2018e: vii, xi; Padma 2018; Sharma 2017, 2018; UNFCCC Secretariat 2018: 9).

Positive social recognition facilitated strategic mimicry, lesson drawing and competition. It contributed to the globalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., quantitative emission baselines and a national jurisdictional REDD+ approach based on UNFCCC's requirements).

Condition: Mixed positive *material reception* concerning the REDD+ engagement

Positive political prospects from a continuous constructive climate change engagement were perceived to be sufficiently high by Indian decision-makers, as the Indian government hoped to achieve international leadership in foreign affairs and to acquire a permanent UN Security Council seat (Saryal 2018: 15; NI-27022018). This motivated India's REDD+ advancement, as it was perceived as a key instrument to achieve the NDC forestry target, signaling India's commitment to multilateralism and global partnership (GI-15122016; GI-1-09022018).

In contrast, financial material prospects were not perceived to be sufficiently high and credible. MOEFCC's bureaucrats complained that "there is no money for REDD+" (RI-16122016), even though developed countries have "promise[d] internationally so much things" (GI-1-09022018). Even donors acknowledged that the lack of results-based payments hampered the advancement of REDD+ in India (DI-2-30112016). In 2018, MOEFCC looked at REDD+ without much hope for financial prospects, as indicated by this statement from the responsible bureaucrat: "Let's wait and see if future like CDM" (GI-1-09022018). This was further impaired by bureaucrats' perspective that different donors had different procedures that they changed after a couple of years, further complicating the process for receiving international funding (GI-1-09022018). As voluntary global carbon market prices were at a very low level (Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 484), only GCF funding was internationally available for REDD+ in the perspective of MOEFCC's bureaucrats (GI-

05122016), which they tried to tap into in order to close the domestic financial gaps for financing the NDC forestry target (GI-15122016; MOEFCC 2018e: 26). The REDD+ Expert Committee, therefore, prepared several of the necessary elements for becoming eligible for REDD+ funding in order to receive international funding (GI-05122016; GI-15122016; GI-12022018).

The positive political prospects and the low financial prospects resulted in a REDD+ preparation that advanced slower than in other countries. While it facilitated strategic mimicry and lesson drawing, it rather hampered competition due to the low financial prospects. It contributed to the glocalized carbon forestry norm based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., quantitative emission baselines and a national jurisdictional REDD+ approach based on UNFCCC's requirements).

Condition: Preexisting REDD+ and carbon *knowledge* supporting domestic REDD+ advancement

The preexisting knowledge on forestry by the members of the REDD+ Expert Committee (i.e., FSI, ICFRE, former Indian REDD+ negotiators) enabled them to develop the REDD+ strategy and the forest reference level without external support. FSI could build upon previous experiences and assessments of forest carbon stock (GI-12022018), which it started in 2002 for the formulation of India's First National Communication to the UNFCCC and which it improved over the years (GI-2-13032018; CI-GI-13022018). REDD+ Expert Committee members that had served as India's REDD+ negotiators benefited from their very strong understanding of UNFCCC requirements (GI-15122016; GI-05122016). Preexisting knowledge facilitated lesson drawing, competition and strategic mimicry. It contributed to the glocalized carbon forestry norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., quantitative emission baselines and a national jurisdictional REDD+ approach based on UNFCCC's requirements) and domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation and economic crop plantations).

Condition: Lack of governmental REDD+ capacity in the *political-administrative set-up*

The REDD+ Expert Committee included several non-ministry REDD+ experts with sufficient knowledge on REDD+. In contrast, MOEFCC lacked capacity on REDD+, having no separate personnel for REDD+ and only a low understanding of REDD+ (GI-05122016; GI-1-13032018; DI-GI-02122016; DI-2-30112016; GI-1-09022018). MOEFCC outsourced the preparations of REDD+ documents to the REDD+ Expert Committee and FSI (GI-05122016; GI-1-09022018; GI-12022018), leading MOEFCC's bureaucrats to acknowledge that they "don't deal with REDD+ directly in MOEFCC" (GI-1-01032018). The REDD+ Expert Committee even did not hear anything back on the first National REDD+ Policy draft for several months in 2015/16 or on the National REDD+ Strategy draft in 2017 (GI-12022018), as MOEFCC lacked capacities and buy-in in the process. MOEFCC's

bureaucrats even continued to perceive REDD+ as individual projects, even though the UNFCCC required a national jurisdictional approach (GI-12022018).

This lack of bureaucratic capacity slowed down India's REDD+ advancement. It hampered lesson drawing, competition, and strategic mimicry. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., preexisting domestic forestry policies).

Condition: Lack of *opposition* against domestic REDD+ advancement

Opposition against India's REDD+ approach did not play any role. MOEFCC's bureaucrats were only cautious about the expected success of REDD+, but not opposed to it (GI-1-09022018). As the Indian government had not even finalized its REDD+ framework (i.e., no monitoring system, no safeguard information system) and did not plan to target any emission-intensive activities like deforestation or degradation, it did not result in any opposition by other ministries or non-state actors. Solely one research-oriented NGO – ATREE – criticized the REDD+ strategy for not addressing planned drivers of deforestation such as development projects. It perceived India's REDD+ approach as “centralis[ing] state control of the forest [...] mak[ing] forests legible and investable” (Bhasme and Rai n.d.). Particularly, ATREE criticized that the REDD+ Strategy aimed to work through the state-controlled Joint Forest Management Committees, undermining forest decentralization to Gram Sabha and violating the Forest Rights Act (Bhasme and Rai n.d.). Yet, this opposition did not undermine India's REDD+ engagement. Instead, most NGOs were occupied with lobbying for the implementation of the Forest Rights Act and by fighting against planned deforestation (Gupta and Paul 2018).

Opposition did not have any effect on India's REDD+ advancement. The lack of opposition facilitated the Indian government's course of action, including competition, lesson drawing and strategic mimicry. It contributed to the glocalized norm interpretation based on afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., afforestation, economic crop plantations and preexisting domestic forestry goals and governance structures), while not addressing deforestation.

Sum-up of causal complex 11

Causal complex 11 explains India's development of its REDD+ framework from 2015 until 2019. The Indian government's *strategic mimicry* for foreign policy goals, its *competition* engagement to realize economic and financial benefits, and its *lesson drawing* from UNFCCC's requirements and the domestic context resulted in the reconstitution of the REDD+ Expert Committee – a small-scale organizational change – and the formulation and adoption of the REDD+ Strategy – a discursive change (laying the ground for the usage of a new international instrument in India, while not

introducing any actual policy changes). Most conditions facilitated competition (except for material reception and partly cultural resonance), strategic mimicry, and lesson drawing (except for material resonance), while the political-administrative set-up hampered all mechanisms. This resulted in the *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits*. *Strategic mimicry, competition, lesson drawing, and several conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, knowledge, political-administrative set-up, opposition) contributed to an incorporation of *preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., afforestation, economic crop plantations, preexisting domestic forestry goals and governance structures, and high economic growth). *Strategic mimicry, lesson drawing, and several conditions* (social reception, material reception, knowledge) facilitated the incorporation of *external actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., quantitative emission baselines and a national jurisdictional REDD+ approach based on UNFCCC's requirements). Indian representatives, however, did not address planned drivers of deforestation and did not incorporate additional measures against degradation. The REDD+ framework still lacked a national forest monitoring system and a safeguard information system and also did not include a benefit-sharing mechanism. The Indian government, thereby, continued to interpret the *developing country climate mitigation norm* as both *domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions*.

7.3 Stage IX: Implementation and further sectorial changes

In stage IV (6.1), the Indian government formulated domestic actions in the NAPCC, including the announcement of GIM. The Indian government then introduced sectorial changes in the forestry sector by formulating GIM in stage VI (6.3.1), but its implementation did not start afterwards. In stage VII (7.1), it set a new carbon forestry target in the context of the Paris Agreement. In stage IX, the Indian government eventually starts implementation of GIM and introduces further sectorial changes to achieve the NDC forestry target.

7.3.1 Implementation of the Green India Mission and further sectorial changes for achieving the NDC forestry target from 2014 until 2019 (causal complex 12)

Causal complex 12 explains the Indian government's implementation of GIM and its enacted sectorial changes for achieving the NDC forestry target, which represents stage IX of the norm glocalization framework. The Indian government shifted toward a *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations* and a *glocalized interpretation* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* based on *domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets*. This resulted into two first-order policy changes (CAMPA Fund Act, Indian Forest Act Amendment), and the start of implementation in the form of tree planting (i.e., after the issuance of implementation guidelines and the disbursement of financial resources). This is

explained by the workings of *strategic mimicry* and *competition*. Most conditions facilitated strategic mimicry and competition.

Mechanism: Implementation in the forestry sector due to *strategic mimicry*

The Modi government utilized all sectoral activities that relate to climate change for flagging them as mitigation actions internationally in order to shine at the international level (NI-14122016). This also included the Green India Mission that had been formulated under the Singh government in 2010. Under the Singh government, GIM implementation had not started and CAMPA funds had remained largely unused (Rattani et al. 2018). From 2012 until 2014, only very small amounts of funds had been allocated to some states to finance preparation activities for GIM implementation (Committee on Estimates 2018: 59). GIM only received approval by the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs and the Expenditure Finance Committee in February 2014 (GOI 2014: 2, 6). The Singh government had not been keen on implementing mitigation actions quickly and had not given GIM serious attention, which delayed the process (GI-14022018; GI-25042018; SGI-12042018; GI-12022018; GI-17022018; GI-15122016; Committee on Estimates 2018: 131; Rajya Sabha 2018: 22; Rattani et al. 2018). Yet, an Executive Committee on Climate Change, including Secretaries from different ministries and PM's office, was established as part of the PM Council to monitor, coordinate and improve implementation of NAPCC's missions (PMO 2013; GI-15022018), representing a small-scale organizational change. Yet, this did not have any effect on GIM's implementation under the Singh government.

The Modi government continued the engagement with GIM, as it was one of the climate change initiatives it could use in order "to show internationally what they are doing" (NI-14122016). The Modi government issued GIM's implementation guidelines in November 2014, shortly before the Lima COP in December 2014, where Environment minister Javadekar announced the release of six billion USD CAMPA funding for large-scale afforestation in order to underline India's commitment to climate mitigation (Javadeka 2014: 2, 5; GI-05122016). Both the 2010 GIM document and the 2014 GIM implementation guidelines interpreted the carbon forestry norm in the form of afforestation and forest quality improvement (GOI 2014: 4-5). Moreover, the 2015/16 (I)NDC forestry target to sequester carbon of 2.5 to 3 Gt CO₂eq by 2030 brought new prominence to the forestry sector and opened a window of opportunity for afforestation activities (MOEFCC 2018a: 11; GI-15122016). Modi supported the NDC implementation in order to be able to present himself and India in a positive light internationally (DI-13122016). This contributed to the establishment of a general NDC Implementation Committee, headed by MOEFCC (GI-15022018), and a particular Forest NDC Implementation Committee, headed by MOEFCC's forestry wing (GI-05122016; GI-2-13032018), representing two small-scale organizational changes due to their temporary character. No further organizational changes occurred in the MOEFCC, as the number of its staff working on climate change remained the same from 2011 until 2018, including four to five bureaucrats and some

temporary consultants (GI-15022018). The Forest NDC Committee became pressure from the PM Council's Executive Committee to "do [their] homework to achieve [the] ambitious target" (GI-05122016), as the "government fe[el]t the need to deliver what they ha[d] promised internationally in the INDC" (NI-14022018). The Forest NDC Implementation Committee took this seriously, as "nobody want[ed] to be the own who is not sticking to it" (GI-15122016).

The Forest NDC Committee and MOEFCC planned to rely on several preexisting programs for afforestation, such as the National Afforestation Program, the Green India Mission, and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme (Nandi 2018; GI-1-01032018). However, previous and current records do not indicate that this would result in the delivery of the required carbon sequestration results. Survival rates of the previous National Afforestation Program had only been at 10 to 20 percent, which was also lamented by the Environment minister Javadekar shortly after announcing the NDC target (Kohli and Menon 2015). According to a Lok Sabha Report from 2014, forest cover had even declined until 2011, despite the National Afforestation Program being implemented since 2002 (Kohli and Menon 2015). The National Afforestation Program only resulted in afforestation of 36,000 hectares in 2015/16, being highly insufficient for achieving the NDC forestry target (Kukreti 2019b).

GIM implementation was intended to be the main instrument for achieving the NDC forestry target (GOI 2015: 30), with India's INDC claiming that this alone would "enhance carbon sequestration by about 100 million tonnes CO₂ equivalent annually" (GOI 2015: 16-17), even though the 2010 GIM document envisaged annual carbon sequestration of "50 to 60 million tonnes in the year 2020" (MOEF 2010b: F), indicating the Indian government's intent to shine internationally by doubling GIM's carbon sequestration potential (while not increasing the planned forestry interventions). GIM's National Governing Council was constituted in March 2015 as the steering committee, representing a small-scale organizational change due to its temporary character. GIM eventually got operational in the budget year 2015/16. As envisaged in the 2010 GIM document, domestic funding for GIM from other programs and funds was facilitated through the adoption of convergence guidelines with the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme (i.e., providing days of employment to rural people for planting trees) and the CAMPA Fund (i.e., financial resources from the levy on legal deforestation) in March and May 2015 (Committee on Estimates 2018: 59-60), as well as the passing of the CAMPA Fund Act in August 2016 and the CAMPA Fund Rules in August 2018 (Agarwal 2018; Ministry of Law and Justice 2016: 1; Rajya Sabha 2019). The CAMPA Fund Act represented a first-order policy change, creating the legal preconditions for financing GIM's afforestation activities, which produced hopes for a more rapid GIM implementation (Kishwan 2017: 98). Large parts of the GIM funding were supposed to come from the CAMPA Fund and the Rural Employment Scheme and not from MOEFCC's budget (GOI 2014: 6), which had a shortage of funds (SGI-2-09042018).

In August 2019, 474 billion Indian rupee (i.e., 5.96 billion Euro in August 2019, see OANDA 2020) out of 540 billion Indian rupee (i.e., 6.78 billion Euro in August 2019, see OANDA 2020) were

allocated to 27 state governments from the CAMPA Fund, which were allowed to be used for afforestation, wildlife management, catchment area treatment, or for GIM implementation (and up to 20 percent for infrastructure and personnel) (MOEFCC 2018c: 28; The Hindu 2019; The Pioneer 2019). Environment Minister Javadekar announced publicly that “[i]t is expected that all States will utilise this fund towards forestry activities to achieve the objectives of the Nationally-Determined Contributions” (cited in The Pioneer 2019), indicating the government’s attempt to use CAMPA funding for delivering on the NDCs, such as through the implementation of GIM.

Bureaucrats, REDD+ experts, and observers, however, criticized the lack of progress in GIM implementation (Khan 2019; Rattani 2018: 20; GI-14022018; GI-12022018; GI-28022018; GI-25042018; GI-1-01032018; CI-02032018; SGI-1-09042018; SGI-12042018). GIM implementation was only sanctioned between one to four percent of the envisaged funding in the following years (e.g., 480 million Indian rupee for 2017/18 and 2.01 billion Indian rupee in 2019) (Kukreti 2019a; MOEFCC 2019b: 1; GI-12022018). For reaching GIM’s targets, instead, the annual allocation would have needed to be 46 billion Indian rupee over ten years as envisaged by the 2010 GIM document (MOEF 2010b: F).⁵⁵ Several observers as well as bureaucrats responsible for the GIM implementation criticized that the Modi government allocated less domestic funding for GIM implementation as originally planned (DI-GI-02122016; RI-16122016; SGI-2-09042018). This extremely low disbursement of funds indicates that the government was shining more on their goals than delivering their implementation. Accordingly, in 2015/16, the release of 720 million Indian rupee for GIM implementation resulted in the increase of green cover by 45,000 ha in 2015/16 (Kukreti 2019a; Rattani et al. 2018). Considering the low survival rates of India’s afforestation programs of 10 to 20 percent (Kohli and Menon 2015), 45,000 ha per year was not only insufficient to reach GIM’s afforestation target of 5 million ha over ten years, but also India’s NDC forestry target. Moreover, in the GIM implementation, bureaucrats focused exclusively on increasing the green cover through plantations (Committee on Estimates 2018: 131; Rattani 2018: 20), and no evidence could be found that they also implemented actions to improve the forest quality (having also a target of 5 million ha), even though the GIM document had foreseen an equal implementation of improving forest quantity and quality. This indicates that Indian bureaucrats’ carbon forestry norm interpretation was solely based on afforestation in implementation.

Despite this low implementation performance on the GIM, Environment minister Javadekar frequently claimed that “India is walking the talk on NDCs” (Goswami 2019) and attempted international shining by declaring that India’s forest and tree cover is increasing rapidly (Goswami 2019). This occurred only weeks before the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit in New York that was organized by UN General Secretary Guterres to foster the implementation of climate actions and the increase of climate mitigation ambition (UN 2022b). Similar, as part of India’s pre-2020 mitigation

⁵⁵ In 2012, the envisaged annual funding had been determined to come from MOEF (10 billion Indian rupee) and from other preexisting programs, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme (15 billion Indian rupee), and the CAMPA Fund (8 billion Indian rupee), among others (MOEF 2012: 2).

actions that were announced as a COP submission, the Indian government also tried to shine internationally by not only describing the implementation activities of the GIM and by noting the passing of the CAMPA Fund Act, but also by asserting the reduction of forest diversion as examples of India's efforts (GOI 2018a: 6, 12-13). However, the Modi government's overwhelming domestic priority of promoting economic growth and easing business activities (RI-05122016; CI-24042018; GI-12022018; RI-02042018), instead, resulted in further forest destruction through deregulations and coal mining in high dense forests (Fernandes et al. 2020: 165; Kaushik 2019; NI-27022018).

Indian forestry experts were very concerned how to reach the NDC forestry target in the context of the slow and insufficient GIM implementation and believed that large parts of the target (up to 70 percent) had to be realized outside state forest areas through forest and agricultural plantations (including agroforestry), which faced several regulatory hurdles (Kishwan 2017: 100; GI-12022018; GI-28022018; GI-17022018; CI-2-26022018; RI-02042018). In consequence, MOEFCC aimed "to provide incentives to farmers to plant as much trees as possible by removing all the laws which are restricting farmers" (NI-14022018) in order to contribute to reaching the NDC forestry target. The government amended the Indian Forest Act in 2017 by excluding bamboo from the definition of trees, permitting bamboo cultivation and harvesting outside state forest areas, which forest officials perceived to contribute to reaching the NDC target by increasing the green cover (Business Standard 2017; Mohan 2020; GI-1-01032018; RI-02042018; GI-12022018). This represented a first-order policy change, as it increased the level of potential growth and harvest of bamboo outside forests.

MOEFCC's bureaucrats even tried to amend the National Forest Policy and claimed to do so for reaching the NDC forestry target through increasing "locked carbon" (Kaushik 2019). The National Forest Policy Draft of 2016, prepared by the Indian Institute of Forest Management, included climate change considerations in forest management and enabled private plantations and public-private afforestation models in state forest areas (IIFM 2016: 2, 3-4, 19; Rajya Sabha 2019: 43). The MOEFCC's subsequent National Forest Policy Draft of 2018 even explicitly aimed at promoting trees outside forests and urban greens in order to contribute to reaching the NDC target (MOEFCC 2018d: 3). The National Forest Policy Draft of 2018, however, was not adopted due to opposition by civil society organizations and by the Indian government's Tribal Ministry (Mohan 2018; Shrivastava 2018b). Yet, the Indian government still advanced the plantation of trees outside forests alongside highways and in urban areas in order to reach India's forestry NDC target that included carbon sequestration from both forests and trees outside forests, even though singular trees were not even considered acceptable according to UNFCCC standards (GI-1-13032018; GI-2-13032018).

In 2018, MOEFCC believed that India could reach a carbon sequestration of 1.9 Gt CO₂eq by 2030 based on the business as usual annual sequestrations in forests and was looking for closing the gap to the 2.5 Gt CO₂eq target (GI-1-01032018). While research had showed that the forestry sector is not a carbon sink when including forest degradation from fuelwood logging (Sharma 2017; 2018; RI-16122016), the government continued to present the forestry sector as a carbon sink internationally

in order to shine on its presented performance. But in 2019, it became publicly known that India's annual carbon sequestration would be insufficient to reach the NDC forestry target due to a lack of funding for the implementation of GIM and the National Afforestation Program, having led to decreasing afforestation rates in the previous years (Kukreti 2019b; Rajya Sabha 2019: 42-43). In 2019, Modi continued to claim internationally that India will achieve its NDC by 2020/21, while environmental experts criticized that the "government makes plans but lacks in implementation" and termed Modi's statement as unrealistic, as "[i]t will take a long time before India achieves its Paris climate conference goals" (Times of India 2019). Observers also criticized that the "government would like to project that it is [...] serious about climate change, but there is little real evidence for the claim" (Venkatesh 2018), indicating Modi's strategic mimicry.

In 2017, the Modi government had still emphasized internationally that "India is a responsible nation with regard to climate change" (Vishnoi and Chaudhury 2017), but it fell short in implementing GIM and other measures to achieve the forestry NDC target due to the Modi government's more important priorities of promoting economic growth. When Environment Minister Javadekar announced in 2019 that India had reached its 2009 quantitative emission target of reducing emission intensity of its GDP by more than 20 percent compared to the 2005 level, he also praised India as "one of the few countries which had increased tree cover in and outside the forest", while GIM implementation had hardly contributed to reaching this economy-wide emission target (The Economic Times 2019b).

At the Madrid COP in 2019, Environment minister Javadekar also claimed that India is "walking the talk" (MOEFCC 2019a) by increasing green cover by 1.5 million ha over the previous five years through projects such as urban forests and presented them as India's climate actions toward fulfilling the NDC forestry target. Yet, GIM alone was supposed to lead to afforestation of five million ha and to forest quality improvement of additional five million ha over ten years. The Global Forest Watch even reported decreasing forest cover of India by four percent from 2010 until 2018 (Arasu 2020), while Javadekar engaged in strategic mimicry internationally by arguing that "[o]nly 6 countries are on track to meet their NDCs [...] and] [w]e are leading the pack" (MOEFCC 2019a). The government thereby tried to portray India as a responsible global player, which was motivated by Modi's more general global politics ambitions, such as the quest for an UN Security Council Seat and high seats in multilateral economic forums. So far the Modi government was already partly successful by becoming elected as non-permanent UN Security Council member in 2020 and by gathering support from several permanent members for a permanent seat in the council (Financial Express 2020; The Hindu 2020a).

Overall, strategic mimicry (i.e., for reaching foreign policy goals) triggered the advancement of GIM implementation and other measures toward achieving the NDC forestry target. This contributed to four small-scale organizational changes (Executive Committee on Climate Change, NDC Implementation Committee, Forest NDC Implementation Committee, GIM's National Governing Council), two first-order policy changes (CAMPA Fund Act, Indian Forest Act Amendment), and the

start of implementation in the form of tree planting. Yet, implementation remained inadequate compared to India's own carbon forestry targets, which did not prevent Indian representatives to indicate differently at the international level. Strategic mimicry contributed to the glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm in the form of implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations by incorporating domestic actors' interpretations (i.e., afforestation, economic crop and private tree plantations and non-carbon benefits) and external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., implementing carbon forestry actions). Moreover, it also resulted in a glocalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm in the form of domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., development- and growth-first perspectives) and external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., implementing domestically financed mitigation actions and targets).

Mechanism: *Competition* shaping the implementation approach in the forestry sector

GIM's implementation guidelines of 2014 followed an ease of doing business approach for afforestation on private land outside state forests through deregulating harvesting and transit regulations, indicating India's competition engagement. GIM was also supposed to provide employment to rural people (GOI 2014: 6, 22), among others through the convergence with the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme (Committee on Estimates 2018: 59-60). Similar, for reaching the NDC forestry target, an expert committee perceived "actions on forest and non-forest lands [as...] equally important" and recommended to "create viable business models for farmers to get more income from tree cropping" (MOEFCC 2018a: 11). It was argued that this would also reduce the trade deficit in wood and improve farmers' income through promoting "short rotation crops" for private farmers and "long duration wood production" for states' Forest Development Corporations (MOEFCC 2018a: 16), indicating India's competition engagement. Moreover, MOEFCC amended the Indian Forest Act in 2017 to allow for the growing and harvesting of bamboo outside forests (a first-order policy change), which it perceived as beneficial for reaching the NDC forestry target (GI-1-01032018). In line with India's competition engagement, this amendment was perceived to reduce the trade deficit in timber and bamboo with China, to increase farmers' income, and to create jobs (Business Standard 2017; Debroy 2018). A high forest official from the MOEFCC acknowledged that growing bamboo as agricultural crop "will help in growing carbon stock and livelihood" and acknowledged in this context that the "government is committed to easing business" (GI-1-01032018), indicating the competition engagement in implementing the NDC (GI-12022018). For the same purposes of reaching India's NDC and reducing India's trade deficit, MOEFCC also planned to promote agro-forestry (Rajya Sabha 2019: 43) and to "provide incentives to farmers to plant as much trees as possible by removing all the laws which are restricting farmers" (NI-14022018). In addition, MOEFCC also tried to adopt a new Forest Policy in 2016 and 2018 that facilitates private plantations and public-private partnership models for afforestation in state forests

(IIFM 2016; MOEFCC 2018d: 3-4; Shrivastava 2018a), which was also justified with reaching the NDC forestry target and reducing the trade deficit in wood products (Kaushik 2019; Rajya Sabha 2019: 43). In addition, the 2018 version aimed to promote tree and agro-forestry plantations outside state forests and an integration of REDD+ in forest management (MOEFCC 2018d: 3, 6). Yet, it was not adopted due to opposition (Das 2020: 103).

In 2018, observers noted that the GIM implementation rather resembled a plantation scheme (Rattani 2018: 20), e.g., for eucalyptus, which was even criticized by the Indian Parliament (Committee on Estimates 2018: 131). No indications could be found that GIM implementation included the improvement of forest quality as well and the Indian Parliament even complained that “a holistic approach to increasing green cover and protecting existing trees is needed” (Committee on Estimates 2018: 131). Large scale GIM funding was supposed to come from the CAMPA Fund (Committee on Estimates 2018: 59-60). International REDD+ funding, which was aspired by GIM in 2010, could not be accessed for GIM implementation, as the domestic REDD+ framework was not yet ready (e.g., lack of safeguard information system and national forest monitoring system), even though the government continued to be open to future international funding (MOEFCC 2018e: 26). At the same time, the Modi government’s overwhelming domestic priority of promoting economic growth and easing business activities (RI-05122016; CI-24042018; GI-12022018; RI-02042018), instead, resulted in further forest destruction (Fernandes et al. 2020: 165; Kaushik 2019; NI-27022018).

Overall, the Indian government approached GIM’s implementation and the achievement of the NDC forestry target in a way that was in line with its competition engagement. Competition contributed to the glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm in the form of implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations by incorporating domestic actors’ preexisting interpretation (i.e., afforestation, economic crop and private tree plantations and non-carbon benefits). This also resulted in a glocalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation action by incorporating domestic actors’ norm interpretations (i.e., development- and growth-first perspectives). It also contributed to one first-order policy change: the amendment of the Indian Forest Act.

Condition: *Cultural resonance* matching in the implementation in the forestry sector

For the implementation of GIM and the NDC forestry target, the Indian government matched its interpretation of the carbon forestry norm to its preexisting domestic forestry norms and programs. GIM’s implementation resembled a pure plantation scheme of largely eucalyptus trees (Committee on Estimates 2018: 131; Rattani 2018: 20), which were similar to previous forestry programs, such as the 2002 National Afforestation Program, largely ignoring the additional emphasis of forest quality

improvement of GIM in 2010 (CI-24042018; Committee on Estimates 2018: 131; Rattani 2018: 20). Such an approach was also in line with the 1952 Forest Policy's afforestation goal (GOI 1952).

For GIM implementation, the Indian government also matched its interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm to its preexisting domestic programs and norms. GIM implementation thereby financially benefited from the convergence with previous non-forestry programs, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme, and the preexisting policy prescription, such as the collection of levies from deforestation that accumulated in the CAMPA Fund for afforestation activities (Committee on Estimates 2018: 59-60; CI-01032018; GI-1-13032018). When the CAMPA Fund Act was adopted, the Indian government took the chance to acknowledge GIM as one of its funding purposes (GI-15122016; NI-05122016; Ministry of Law and Justice 2016: 1).⁵⁶

For the implementation of the NDC forestry target, the Indian government could also resort to preexisting forestry programs that aimed at expanding forest cover, such as GIM, the National Afforestation Program, and the CAMPA Fund, or at expanding tree cover, such as the 2014 Agroforestry Policy, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme or the 1988 National Forest Policy that stipulated tree planting along railways and streets (GI-1-01032018; GI-2-13032018; GOI 1988: 4; Kukreti 2019b). For decades, the forestry approach of the Indian bureaucracy had been to further expand the forest and tree cover, which is also evident in the NDC implementation approach of the government. For increasing green cover, in 2017, MOEFCC amended the Indian Forest Act to exclude bamboo from the definition of trees in order to facilitate the growing and harvesting of bamboo outside forests (GI-1-01032018). Yet, MOEFCC's attempt to allow private plantations inside state forest areas for reforestation reasons failed due to its lack of cultural resonance with two other dominant preexisting norms – the rejection of privatization of forests and the demand for community empowerment by civil society organizations (Das 2020: 103; Lahiri 2015; Lele 2018; Rajya Sabha 2019: 36, 38, 41).

Overall, India matched its interpretation of the carbon forestry norm and of the developing country climate mitigation norm to its preexisting domestic (forestry) norms and programs. This facilitated competition, as it enabled new business models on growing bamboo, and strategic mimicry, as the government could shine internationally on preexisting afforestation activities. It resulted in a glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations by incorporating domestic actors' preexisting interpretations (i.e., afforestation, crop planting and non-carbon benefits). It also resulted in a glocalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on

⁵⁶ Previously to the CAMPA Fund Act of 2016, since 2009, the Ad hoc CAMPA Fund had existed and had only disbursed very few financial resources to states. In 2002, the Supreme Court had decided the collection of levies from legal deforestation in a special fund based on the 1980 Forest Conservation Act so that they could be used for future afforestation activities (Kohli and Menon n.d.: 2; AI-10022018; Ramesh 2015a: 20, 92-93).

domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation action by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., implementation of preexisting programs).

Condition: *Material resonance* matching in the implementation in the forestry sector

The Indian government's perceived material necessities and goals shaped their interpretation of the carbon forestry norm and of the developing country climate mitigation norm in the implementation of GIM and of the NDC forestry target. Those actions had to be in line with the Indian government's priority for economic growth and development (GI-12022018). For GIM implementation, the government did not advance activities that lower degradation or improve forest quality, which may interfere with local livelihood needs, but instead chose the economically more beneficial path of increasing the green cover on farmers land, such as through agroforestry, and the planting of economically valuable monocultural plants like eucalyptus (Committee on Estimates 2018: 131; GOI 2014: 22). In addition, through the convergence with the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme, jobs could be created for rural people to plant trees as part of GIM's implementation, which was in line with the perceived material goals of the Indian government (Committee on Estimates 2018: 59-60; GOI 2014: 6). Yet, due to the Indian government's priority for economic growth, funding allocation for GIM implementation was not the top priority (GI-12022018).

At the same time, the Modi government deregulated environmental regulations in forests to facilitate economic development, which resulted in further deforestation of native forests (Fernandes et al. 2020: 165; Kaushik 2019; NI-27022018). According to the Global Forest Watch, and in contrast to the Indian government's official statistics, India's forest cover decreased by four percent from 2010 until 2018 (Arasu 2020). Due to the lack of available land, the total deforested area was larger than the total area received for afforestation in 2019 (Sharma 2019). Instead of improving the quality of degraded forests, the Modi government rather preferred to open up more forests for coal mining (NI-14122016; Fernandes et al. 2020: 165), as demanded by the strong coal mining lobby (RI-09022018; DI-GI-02122016), even though some of those areas had previously been marked as no go areas for coal mining due to their forest richness (Kohli and Menon 2015; Nandi 2019a; Raghunandan 2020: 214; NI-27022018). Hence, observers criticized the Modi government for being "more interested in mining than in forests" (DI-GI-02122016).

For the implementation of the NDC forestry target, the Modi government also chose actions that were in line with the government's perceived material necessities of boosting economic growth and of reducing wood trade deficits. The Indian government tried to allow plantations by public-private partnerships in state forest areas (IIFM 2016: 19; MOEFCC 2018d: 3-4; Shrivastava 2015, 2018a), which companies had demanded for several years (Gopalkrishnan 2012: 348), and claimed that this would contribute to reaching the NDC forestry target (Kaushik 2019; Rajya Sabha 2019: 43). In addition, the reform of the Indian Forest Act, which permitted the harvesting and transiting of bamboo outside state forests, was enacted to spur increasing income for farmers and economic growth and

was claimed to contribute to reaching the NDC forestry target (GI-1-01032018; The Hindu 2017). For reaching the NDC forestry target, the responsible NDC committee planned “to provide incentives to farmers to plant as much tree as possible” (NI-14022018). All other potential interventions, such as stopping deforestation or improving the quality of forests were not pursued by the government (NI-14122016), even though 71,000 ha of forests were diverted for industrial purposes in state forest areas from 2013/14 until 2017/18. Moreover, 16,000 ha were diverted annually for infrastructure projects from 2003 until 2018 (Rajya Sabha 2019: 21), and overall growing stock decreased during this period (Sharma 2018: 3; CI-27022018). Several observers noted that the Modi government’s priority has not been forestry, but economic growth, industrialization, easing businesses, and the economic utilization of resources (RI-02042018; DI-12122016; DI-GI-02122016; RI-05122016; GI-12022018; NI-14122016; NI-27022018; CI-24042018; CI-27022018; Kashwan 2017: 202; Kaushik 2019; Lahiri 2015).

Overall, the Indian government matched its interpretation of the carbon forestry norm to its perceived material necessities. This facilitated competition, as it permitted the promotion of economic growth, and facilitated strategic mimicry, as the government could shine internationally based on private actors’ efforts, while also hampering strategic mimicry, as more success could have been reached and shown if the government would have implemented GIM more thoroughly. This resulted in a glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations by incorporating domestic actors’ preexisting interpretation (i.e., afforestation, private and economic crop plantations and non-carbon benefits). It also contributed to the glocalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets by incorporating domestic actors’ interpretation (i.e., implementing economic growth-first activities).

Condition: Positive *social reception* in the context of the implementation in the forestry sector

The Modi government had a strong desire for international social recognition and cared about its international image, which facilitated GIM’s implementation and the search for solutions for achieving the NDC forestry target. One MOEFCC bureaucrat noted that there was a “big push from highest authority to showcase internationally what we have been doing” (GI-15022018). Therefore, the Modi government resorted to the different climate change missions like GIM (NI-14122016). The government claimed that “India is committed and ready to play its part in the global fight against climate change” (Javadeka 2014: 5) and that “India is a responsible nation with regard to climate change” (Vishnoi and Chaudhury 2017). Implementation had to start in order to show India’s seriousness, as the government felt “the need to deliver what they have promised internationally in the INDC” (NI-14022018). Environment minister Javadekar frequently emphasized that “India is walking the talk on NDCs” (Goswami 2019) or is even “leading the pack” and that “India has and will

continue to do its bit” (MOEFCC 2019a). In the forestry sector, this was proven internationally through the communication of an increasing green cover (Goswami 2019; MOEFCC 2019a; The Economic Times 2019b), as other programs than GIM could contribute to this, thereby balancing the patchy track record of GIM’s implementation (Kukreti 2019a, 2019b). The Indian government did not communicate actual carbon sequestration or forest cover, as deforestation of carbon rich natural forests has continued (Arasu 2020). Nevertheless, the strong desire for high international social recognition also contributed to the start of GIM’s implementation and to the search for solutions to implement the NDC forestry target.

Overall, positive social reception facilitated strategic mimicry, as the government had a strong desire to shine internationally based on the green cover data. It thereby contributed to a glocalised interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations by incorporating external actors’ norm interpretations (i.e., implementing carbon forestry actions). It also contributed to a glocalised interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets by incorporating external actors’ interpretations (i.e., implementing domestically financed mitigation actions and targets).

Condition: Lack of positive financial *material reception*, but hopes for financial and political prospects in the implementation in the forestry sector

The lack of positive material reception hampered the implementation in the forestry sector. At the international level, the Indian government continued to demand international funding and criticized the lack of funding over the last years (GOI 2018a). The Indian government had hoped for receiving international REDD+ funding for the implementation of GIM and of the NDC forestry target, but had neither received such funding nor sufficiently prepared for it. Instead, it started GIM’s implementation with the little domestic funding available to the MOEFCC (Kukreti 2019a). At the same time, the Indian government continued to hope to receive REDD+ funding for the implementation period (GI-12022018; GI-1-01032018), which was even mentioned in the National Forest Policy draft of 2018 (MOEFCC 2018d: 2). For the implementation of the NDC target, the MOEFCC planned to incorporate funding from different donors, such as GIZ or JICA (GI-1-01032018). The provision of international funding would have certainly helped to close the financial gap for GIM’s implementation (or for advancing the NDC forestry target implementation).

At the same time, by advancing the implementation of the NDC, the Modi government hoped to shine internationally and to benefit from it politically. Already prior to the Paris COP, Modi raised both climate change issues and India’s ambition for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council in a meeting with then-US President Obama (BBC 2015). As Modi perceived grand staging on climate change at the international level as beneficial for India’s political material prospects (NI-27022018; Saryal 2018: 15), such as an increasing international political role for India (Hall 2016: 272, 280-

281), it resulted in Indian government representatives' claims that "India is walking the talk on NDCs" (Goswami 2019). For that purpose, the "government felt the need to deliver what they have promised internationally in the INDC" (NI-14022018). This already paid off, as the Modi government ensured support for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council by all Asia-Pacific countries in 2019 and was elected for two years by the General Assembly in 2020 (Financial Express 2020; The Economic Times 2019a; The Hindu 2020a). This increasing international role for India under Modi has also paid off domestically, as it contributed to the BJP's electoral success in the 2019 elections, counterbalancing its patchy track record on economic development (Hall 2019: 515).

Overall, the lack of positive financial material prospects facilitated the competition engagement, as an economic growth focus in implementation could outweigh the lack of international funding. The hope for positive material political prospects facilitated strategic mimicry by the Modi government, as they motivated the implementation. This facilitated a glocalised interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations by incorporating external actors' norm interpretations (i.e., implementing carbon forestry actions). It also contributed to a glocalised interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets by incorporating external actors' interpretations (i.e., implementing domestically financed mitigation actions and targets).

Condition: Fragmentation of the *political-administrative set-up* during the implementation in the forestry sector

The political-administrative set-up hampered GIM's implementation. The biggest problem from the beginning was the lack of domestic funding due to the horizontal fragmentation, as the Ministry of Finance was not sanctioning sufficient funding for GIM, even though the Planning Commission was favorable toward allocating the required funding (GI-19042018; GI-15122016). Financially, the MOEFCC is one of the ministries receiving the lowest share of budget in general (i.e., 1 to 1.5 percent) (Sharma 2017: 5; AI-10022018; RI-12122016), and this did not change in the context of the Green India Mission, leading to a very low financial allocation of one to four percent of the envisaged budget for GIM's implementation (Kukreti 2019a; MOEFCC 2019b: 1; GI-12022018). Other afforestation programs, such as the 'National Afforestation Programme' faced the same problem (Kukreti 2019b; Rajya Sabha 2019: 20). This hampered the implementation of the NDC forestry target and was even used as an argument to speak up in favor of private sector plantations inside state forests (Lahiri 2015; MOEFCC 2018a: 13-14). While GIM's document from 2010 also planned to rely on funding from other sources, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Scheme, convergence guidelines had to be agreed upon with the responsible Ministry of Rural Development. Initially, this had rather been difficult as both ministries wanted to control the funds (CI-01032018), but was successfully achieved in May 2015 (Committee on Estimates 2018: 59-60). Hence, inter-ministerial coordination and the lack of domestic funding hampered and slowed down

GIM's implementation. Even intra-ministerial coordination problems in MOEFCC slowed down the implementation. While the environment wing of the ministry was formally responsible for the NAPCC and GIM (GI-15022018; DI-24042018), the forestry wing of the ministry would have been needed to advance the implementation of the mission due to its working relationship with the state governments. But there was not much interaction, hampering the implementation (GI-12022018). This is also evident in the statement by the ministry's responsible focal point for REDD+ (sitting in the forestry wing of the ministry), who emphasized that he does not even know anyone responsible for GIM (sitting in the environment wing of the ministry) (GI-1-09022018), even though REDD+ was supposed to be one central feature of the mission.

Moreover, the vertical fragmentation was also hampering GIM's implementation. Forestry is a concurrent subject in India: While the central government is responsible for policy formulation, the state governments have the responsibility to implement forest programs and policies (Rajya Sabha 2019: 18), such as GIM (GOI 2014: 36; DI-2-30112016). As the central government delayed the allocation of funding for GIM's implementation and only provided a very small amount for the development of prospective plans to state governments (e.g., for the identification of landscapes), the implementation only started slowly and belated at the state level (CI-2-26022018; SGI-12042018; DI-08022018; RI-12122016; GI-15122016; GI-12022018; GI-1-13032018). In addition, for the utilization of CAMPA funding, states had to wait until 2019, when the central government finally allocated the funds to states, which can be used for GIM's implementation (Ministry of Law and Justice 2016: 1), as the central government needed to pass a law and operational rules first (Rautray 2019). From 2009 until 2018/19, only very small amounts had been disbursed from the Ad-hoc CAMPA Fund to the state governments, which were used haphazardly (Bhushan and Saxena 2016: 8; Ghosh 2016; Kohli and Menon 2018; Rautray 2019; RI-16122016), including for classical plantation schemes (Lele and Krishnaswamy 2019: 485). This delay further slowed down GIM's implementation.

Overall, fragmentation hampered GIM's implementation and thereby also the achievement of the NDC forestry target. This hampered strategic mimicry by the Indian government, as it became harder to shine internationally due to the slow progress. It also facilitated the competition engagement, as the lack of funding for forestry contributed to the goal to open up the state forest areas for private plantations. This contributed to a glocalised interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., private plantations).

Condition: *Opposition* hampering the implementation in the forestry sector

Opposition hampered GIM's implementation and the achievement of the NDC forestry target. The Ministry of Finance did not share the same priority for implementing the mission as the Environment ministry and the Planning Commission, providing only a tiny share of the envisaged funding to the

mission (GI-15122016; CI-24042018). Further policy changes that were meant to contribute to achieving the NDC forestry target, such as the promotion of private plantations in the National Forest Policy draft also faced opposition (Das 2020: 103; Rajya Sabha 2019: 43; Shrivastava 2018a). The Ministry of Tribal Affairs successfully argued that the MOEFCC would have needed to prepare the draft jointly with the Ministry of Tribal Affairs according to the Allocation of Business Rules of 1961 (Rajya Sabha 2019: 38, 40-41; Shrivastava 2018b). Civil society organizations also criticized the privatization of state forest areas and the lack of community empowerment of the National Forest Policy draft (Mohan 2018). This discursive opposition contributed to preventing the adoption of the policy.

Overall, opposition by veto-players (i.e., Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Ministry of Finance) and antipreneurs (i.e., civil society organizations) hampered GIM's implementation and the achievement of the NDC forestry target. This hampered strategic mimicry, as the Indian government had a harder time to shine internationally. It also hampered competition, as the Indian government could not advance the commercialization of state forest areas as initially planned. This contributed to a glocalized interpretation of the carbon forestry norm based on implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations by incorporating domestic actors' norm interpretations (i.e., public afforestation and non-carbon benefits).

Sum-up of causal complex 12

In stage IX, the Indian government enacted sectorial changes for achieving the NDC forestry target and started implementation of GIM, as explained by causal complex 12. *Strategic mimicry* motivated the implementation process and *competition* and *strategic mimicry* shaped the manner of implementation. This resulted in four small-scale organizational changes (Executive Committee on Climate Change, NDC Implementation Committee, Forest NDC Implementation Committee, GIM's National Governing Council), two first-order policy changes (CAMPA Fund Act, Indian Forest Act Amendment) and led to the implementation in the form of tree planting (i.e., after the issuance of implementation guidelines and the disbursement of financial resources). Most conditions facilitated strategic mimicry (except for the political-administrative set-up and opposition that hampered it), and facilitated competition (except for social reception and opposition).

This resulted in the *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* in the form of *implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits* and *facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations*. *Strategic mimicry*, *competition*, and several *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, political-administrative set-up, opposition) facilitated the incorporation of preexisting *domestic actors' interpretations* (i.e., afforestation, economic crop and private tree plantations and non-carbon benefits). *External actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., implementing carbon forestry actions) were included due to *strategic mimicry* and several *conditions* (social reception, material reception). Indian

representatives did not address planned drivers of deforestation and did not incorporate measures against degradation or for the improvement of forest quality.

Moreover, causal complex 12 resulted in the *glocalized interpretation* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* based on *domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets: Strategic mimicry, competition* and several *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance) facilitated the incorporation of *domestic actors' preexisting interpretations* (i.e., development- and growth-first perspectives and implementing preexisting programs). *External actors' norm interpretations* (i.e., implementing domestically financed mitigation actions and targets) were included due to *strategic mimicry* and several *conditions* (social reception, material reception). Internationally financed actions did not play any role in the implementation.

7.4 Summary: Renewed international target setting, further sectorial changes and implementation (2014-2019)

After contestations (stage I), domestic agenda-setting (stage II), international norm reshaping (stage III), domestic mitigation action formulation (stage IV), international communication of a GDP-based climate mitigation target (stage V), and domestic sectorial changes in forestry (stage VI), the Indian government engaged in renewed international target setting (stage VII), further sectorial changes (VIII), and eventually in implementation (alongside additional sectorial changes) (IX).

In stage VII (causal complex 10), the Indian government produced renewed international targets as part of the (I)NDC, which included one first-order policy change (increased emission intensity target of GDP) and two second-order policy changes (forest carbon sequestration and non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity targets). The Indian government shifted toward a *glocalized interpretation* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* based on *domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets*. *Shaming* contributed to the acceptance of non-compensated (quantitative) mitigation contributions, while *strategic mimicry* motivated the formulation of the INDC and *strategic mimicry, lesson drawing* and *competition* shaped its content. Most conditions facilitated those domestic actors' mechanisms, while they mostly hampered learning and the external actors' shaming and material incentives. In addition, the Indian government continued its *glocalized norm interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* as stipulated in the GIM that consisted of *afforestation, forest quality improvement and non-carbon benefits*.

In stage VIII (causal complex 11), the Indian government introduced further sectorial changes by developing India's REDD+ framework. This resulted in a small-scale organizational change (the reconstitution of the REDD+ Expert Committee) and a discursive change (the formulation and adoption of the REDD+ Strategy). The Indian government shifted toward the *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits*. This can be explained by the workings of *strategic mimicry, competition* and *lesson drawing*. Most conditions facilitated competition, strategic mimicry, and lesson drawing. Yet, the REDD+

framework was not sufficiently completed. The Indian government, moreover, continued to interpret the *developing country climate mitigation norm* as both *domestically financed* and *internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions*.

In stage IX (causal complex 12), the Indian government enacted sectorial changes for achieving the NDC forestry target and started implementation of GIM. This resulted in four small-scale organizational changes (Executive Committee on Climate Change, NDC Implementation Committee, Forest NDC Implementation Committee, GIM's National Governing Council), two first-order policy changes (CAMPAs Fund Act, Indian Forest Act Amendment) and led to the implementation in the form of tree planting (i.e., after the issuance of implementation guidelines and the disbursement of financial resources). The Indian government shifted toward a *glocalized interpretation* of the *carbon forestry norm* based on *implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits* and *facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations* and a *glocalized interpretation* of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* based on *domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions*. *Strategic mimicry* motivated the implementation process and *competition* and *strategic mimicry* shaped the manner of implementation. Most conditions facilitated strategic mimicry and competition.

Glocalized norm interpretations in the stages of renewed international target setting (stage VII), further sectorial changes (VIII), and implementation (IX) included preexisting norm interpretations by external and domestic actors. *Strategic mimicry*, *shaming*, *lesson drawing* and several *conditions* (social reception, material reception, knowledge) facilitated the incorporation of *external actors' norm interpretations*. *Preexisting domestic actors' norm interpretations* were included by *strategic mimicry*, *lesson drawing*, *competition*, and several *conditions* (cultural resonance, material resonance, social reception, knowledge, political-administrative set-up, opposition).

In those stages, most conditions facilitated domestic actors' mechanisms (except for learning) and hampered external actors' mechanisms (shaming, material incentives). Shaming was only activated regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm in the context of renewed international target setting of stage VII. Material incentives did not successfully shape the Indian government's renewed international target setting. Strategic mimicry and competition were enacted in all causal complexes. Lesson drawing played a role in the renewed international target setting and the sectorial changes of stage VII and VIII. Domestic actors' mechanisms played a much more prominent role in those stages, appearing eight times than external actors' mechanisms that occurred only twice (of which one was unsuccessful).

Two second-order policy changes (forest carbon sequestration and non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity targets), three first-order policy change (emission intensity target of GDP, CAMPAs Fund Act, Indian Forest Act Amendment), and one discursive change (the formulation and adoption of the REDD+ Strategy) occurred in those three stages. In addition, five small-scale organizational changes (reconstitution of the REDD+ Expert Committee, Executive Committee on Climate Change, NDC

Implementation Committee, Forest NDC Implementation Committee, GIM's National Governing Council) were enacted.

In stage VII and VIII, the Indian government interpreted the developing country climate mitigation norm in a way that was based on developmental climate mitigation actions and targets that are largely domestically financed, while it hoped for some additional international funding. Yet, in the implementation of stage IX, the Indian government solely interpreted the norm as *domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets* – despite the Indian government's lack of domestic funding that resulted in an implementation that could only utilize one to four percent of the envisaged funding. The Indian government had only reluctantly, slowly and ineffectively engaged in the preparations for receiving international funding, while external actors preferred other forms of domestic actions like transformational change (in the case of the NAMA Facility) or reducing degradation and deforestation (in the case of REDD+). In those three stages, the Indian government also shifted its carbon forestry norm interpretation toward *implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations*. The improvement of forest quality did not play any role anymore.

In the next chapter, I contextualize the central findings of the case study, reflect on the theoretical and methodological approach and formulate steps for moving forward in terms of future research. I also indicate policy implications and provide policy recommendations.

8. Discussion and conclusion: Dynamics of norm glocalization

Chapter 2 introduces the norm glocalization framework. Its premise is the proactive engagement of domestic and external actors in global-domestic norm dynamics. This is captured by causal mechanisms that are initiated by both domestic and external actors, while being facilitated or hampered by domestic conditions. The evolving events are explained through causal complexes that include several interacting mechanisms under several domestic conditions. This is rooted in a scientific realist perspective (see Chapter 3). The results are glocalized norm interpretations that are fusions of domestic and external actors' norm interpretations. They manifest themselves in discursive, policy and implementation changes and are accompanied by organizational changes. The norm glocalization process includes several stages at the international and domestic level, which allow to capture the global-domestic norm dynamics. I apply the norm glocalization framework to the case of India's climate policy engagement from 2005 until 2019 and explain how and why India changed its interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm during this period (Chapter 5, 6, and 7). In the following sub-chapters, I present the central findings of the presented study and discuss them in relation to the preexisting scholarship (8.1), reflect upon my theoretical and methodological approach (8.2), and provide future research recommendations as well as highlight policy implications and recommendations (8.3).

8.1 Contextualizing the central findings

The research question of this study was the following: *Why and how has the Indian government changed its interpretation of and its (domestic and international) engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm and the carbon forestry norm from 2005 until 2019?* The answer is the following: The Indian government changed its interpretation of the two aforementioned norms over the period of the case study several times (see 8.1.4). This is explained by the workings of causal complexes, including multiple interacting mechanisms (see 8.1.2) under facilitating or hampering conditions (see 8.1.3). This evolution can be captured through norm glocalization stages (see 8.1.1) in a multi-level global governance setting (see 8.1.5). The results are not only glocalized norm interpretations but also domestic changes of policies, organizations, discourses and implementation (see 8.1.6). International development cooperation hardly played a role in this process (see 8.1.7). The findings are discussed in relation to the preexisting scholarship. In terms of contributing answers to the broader question of *why and how nation-states (in the Global South) have engaged with international (micro) norms (on climate change) both internationally and domestically*, it can be concluded that the norm glocalization framework provided the means to formulate the specific answers for the Indian case and represents a useful starting point for analyzing other cases as well.

8.1.1 Norm glocalization stages

The *norm glocalization framework* is beneficial for illuminating the *dynamics between the international negotiations and domestic politics* in the form of *norm glocalization stages*. The case study showed how the Indian government shifted from international contestation over domestic agenda setting, international norm reshaping, domestic action formulation, international target setting, sectorial changes, and renewed international target setting to renewed sectorial changes and implementation (see tables 7, 8, 9). Those stages occurred cyclical to some extent, as international target setting and sectorial changes were revisited before implementation eventually started, leading to a new GDP-based climate mitigation target, a forest carbon sequestration target and the advancement of the REDD+ framework. Particularly the forest carbon sequestration target influenced the subsequent implementation process by strengthening a focus on afforestation and by initiating further sectorial changes (Indian Forest Act Amendment). This cyclical character of norm glocalization stages is different from the linear global-domestic spiral model (Risse and Sikink 1999; Risse and Ropp 2013), or the linear model of the “life cycle of norms” (Finnemore and Sikink 1998: 895). This return to previous stages could also happen again, starting at other stages, such as the contestation stage, the international norm reshaping stage, or the domestic action formulation stage. Global-domestic norm dynamics and norm diffusion processes are not linear.

In contrast to preexisting norm frameworks, *domestic actors can reshape a micro norm internationally before advancing it domestically*, when they have the perception that it does not match to their domestic context. Hence, international norm contestation does not need to be a status that is either persistent or abolished in favor of external actors’ demands and interpretations (as indicated by Risse and Ropp 1999: 243-244) or completely reconstructed at the local level of one particular country only (as indicated by Acharya 2004).⁵⁷ Others have only theorized the challenging/resisting or supporting of international norms through local agents (Acharya 2011: 99), have shown domestic reshaping after initial domestic contestation of external actors’ norm promotion (Zimmermann 2017b), or have pointed to potential discursive feedbacks to the global level after domestic reshaping (without international rule-setting or domestic application in another state) (Zimmermann 2019: 41). The Indian government achieved the international reshaping through its competition engagement (as a response to external actors’ shaming), leading to the glocalized interpretation of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on *internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions* (stage III). The same occurred regarding the carbon forestry norm, which was reshaped by the Indian delegation toward a collective glocalized interpretation in the form of a *comprehensive compensated*

⁵⁷ The ‘spiral model’ started with repression and then denial that was subsequently followed by tactical concession of domestic governments as a response to pressure by transnational advocacy networks (Risse and Ropp 1999: 243-244). In contrast, the norm glocalization framework points to an alternative beginning in which international contestation (after some initial domestic agenda setting) is followed by international reshaping of norms in the international negotiations. While the localization approach emphasized the active role of domestic governments in reconstructing international norms domestically (Acharya 2004), the norm glocalization framework, instead, indicates the international reshaping of international norms at the international level, before further reshaping occurs domestically.

carbon-forestry approach at the Bali COP (stage III) (as a response to external actors' persuasion in stage I) (see table 10). This international reshaping was domestically facilitated by cultural resonance, material resonance, and material reception. The illumination of particular mechanisms and facilitative conditions that initiate international reshaping of norms is a further contribution to the literature, which had not yet specified mechanisms and conditions of international feedbacks or international reshaping.⁵⁸

Table 7: Results on the relationship between conditions and mechanisms I

Stage/Complex		Mechanism	Condition	Globalized norm interpretation	Domestic change
I Internat. contes- tation (2005-07)	1	Shaming (+)	Cul. resonance (-, +)	<i>None</i> , but acceptance of international discussions on <i>voluntary internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions</i>	Small-scale organizational change: small increase of <i>climate change staff</i>
		Competition (+)	Mat. resonance (-, +)		
			Mat. reception (0, +)		
			Soc. reception (-, +)		
		Knowledge (-, 0)			
		Opposition (-, +)			
		Pol.-ad. set-up (-, +)			
	2	Persuasion (+)	Cul. resonance (-, +)	<i>None</i> , but acceptance of international discussions on <i>compensated carbon forestry</i>	-
		Competition (+)	Mat. resonance (-, +)		
			Mat. reception (-, +)		
			Pol.-ad. set-up (0, +)		
II Domestic agenda setting (2007)	3	Com. learning (0)	Cul. resonance (-, -, +)	Consideration of <i>future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions</i> based on <i>international per-capita equity</i>	Medium-scale organizational change: <i>PM Council</i> Discursive change: <i>per-capita target & future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions</i>
		Shaming (+)	Mat. resonance (-, -, +)		
		Competition (+)	Mat. reception (0, +, +)		
			Soc. reception (0, +, +)		
			Knowledge (-, -, 0)		
			Opposition (-, -, +)		
		Pol.-ad. set-up (-, -, 0)			
III Internat. resha- ping (2007)	4	Shaming (+)	Cul. resonance (-, +)	<i>Internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions</i> in the negotiations	-
		Competition (+)	Mat. resonance (-, +)		
			Mat. reception (+, +)		
			Soc. reception (-, 0)		
			Pol.-ad. set-up (-, +)		
	5	Competition (+)	Cul. resonance (+)	<i>Comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach</i> in the negotiations	-
Mat. resonance (+)					
Mat. reception (+)					
Pol.-ad. set-up (+)					

First column: + influence, 0 no influence. Second column: + facilitating, - hampering, = facilitating and hampering, 0 no influence; signs arranged according to descending order of mechanisms in the first column.

⁵⁸ Zimmermann (2019: 42) only hypothesized that increasing international attention toward the domestic model will make feedback loops to the international level more likely. Moreover, Acharya (2011: 101) argued that system-dissatisfied states are more prone to challenging international norms.

Other norm cycle models do not indicate that (micro) norms have to or can be re-negotiated at the international level by target states. Instead, Sandholtz (2008: 103) argues that international norm change emerges from argumentation over norm violation, as existing norms are too general. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 896-897, 901-904) claim that activists promote a new international norm that convinces an increasing number of governments to adopt it, which is followed by a cascading of the norm to other governments and to the norm internalization. The international reshaping of (micro) norms through negotiations in international institutions that leads to international norm compromises as captured by the norm glocalization framework does not play a role in their models. Hence, the norm glocalization framework's stages may be particularly suitable for cases that involve international norms that are under negotiations in international institutions.

In subsequent stages, the *Indian government further changed its glocalized norm interpretation of both norms* (on glocalized norm interpretations, see also 8.1.4). It more strongly balanced domestic and external actors' norm interpretations in the case of the developing country climate mitigation norm. In addition, it more strongly incorporated domestic actors' preexisting norm interpretations in the case of the carbon forestry norm. In consequence, the internationally reshaped norm interpretation of stage III subsequently did not endure at the domestic level. This continuous domestic change culminated in the glocalized norm interpretations based on *domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets* as well as *implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations* in the implementation stage. The norm glocalization framework thereby goes beyond recent studies on "norm makers" (Bettiza and Dionigi 2015: 623) and "norm shaper[s]" (Jinnah 2017: 299; see also Xiaoyu 2012: 357) that have investigated how norms are promoted or shaped by countries from the Global South at the international level, as the norm glocalization framework includes the further domestic reshaping of those international norms at the domestic level. This finding is in contrast to post-colonialists claims of the marginalization of powerless countries from the Global South, as the Indian government was strong enough to contest micro norms and to reshape them internationally and domestically. While the internationally and domestically reshaped norms guided India's domestically financed actions at the domestic level (such as in the NAPCC, GIM or NDCs), they, at the same time, prevented India from benefiting from international funding flows, as external actors – Western states and multilateral agencies – subsequently further refined those norms according to their own priorities in international funding facilities (NAMA Facility, FCPF), indicating the enduring influence of Western actors in global climate finance. While the Indian government could not benefit from those financial resources, it, however, was not dependent on the very small amount of international funding and could advance its glocalized norm interpretations in policy changes and implementation based on its own domestic funding resources (even though it chose to disburse only very few financial resources for the implementation) (on domestic change, see 8.1.6, and on development cooperation, see 8.1.7).

To sum up, the norm glocalization stages show that international developments (but not necessarily external actor) have influenced India's domestic climate policy-making. It also demonstrates that the Indian government has reshaped collective norm interpretations in international negotiations. Those norm interpretations are subsequently further changed at the domestic level, while retaining mismatches with norm interpretations by important external actors (such as funders). The norm glocalization stages can be cyclical and lead to evolving norm interpretations and domestic changes over time. Applying this framework, hence, enables the provision of better explanations of both international and domestic politics than was previously possible.

8.1.2 Mechanisms

The norm glocalization framework allows to *provide causal complexes as explanations of events and outcomes* based on process tracing that identifies *several interacting causal mechanisms* induced by both external and domestic actors under facilitating or hampering domestic conditions (see tables 7, 8, 9; on domestic conditions, see 8.1.3).

The results show that *external actors* played an active role in the stages I through III on international contestation, domestic agenda setting, and international norm reshaping and again in stage V and VII on international target setting by *shaming* the Indian government regarding the developing country climate mitigation norm. Shaming was mostly enacted by developed countries, but also several instances of shaming by vulnerable developing countries could be found, indicating an increasing divergence among developing country interests. *Persuasion* only occurred in stage I on contestation (by forest-rich developing countries) and in stage VI on sectorial changes (by the US) regarding the carbon forestry norm, and remained limited in its impact on domestic actors. Thus, shaming was more important for India's engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm and persuasion was more important for India's engagement with the carbon forestry norm. The mechanism of *material incentives* was only initiated in stage VIII (by Germany), but remained ineffective and did not shape India's norm glocalization. The absence of the mechanism of material incentives is surprising as the Indian government had always demanded international funding and industrialized countries had increased their climate funding since the Copenhagen COP. Particularly, rationalist International Relations' scholars would have expected a stronger role of material incentives by industrialized countries to promote climate action by reluctant developing countries (e.g., Keohane and Victor 2011: 14), but this did not drive India's climate policy evolution (for an explanation, see 8.1.7). Yet, the Indian government tried to realize own material benefits through its competition engagement. Moreover, no instance of coercion was found in the case study.

Only seven influential instances of external actors' mechanisms could be revealed. From time to time, shaming at the international level was an important driving force for subsequent norm engagement by domestic actors. However, even the preparation of India's REDD+ framework occurred without external actors' engagement, except for the limited persuasion efforts by USAID in

stage VI, which is surprising as in many other countries external donors played an important role in the development of REDD+ frameworks (see 4.3.3). In contrast, mechanisms were induced by domestic actors in 24 instances in the Indian case study (see table 7, 8, 9). Only in combination with domestic actors' mechanisms, external actors' mechanisms contributed to domestic change. Yet, the continuous role of external actors in the norm engagement process – even though only in interaction with domestic actors' mechanisms – is not acknowledged by norm localization research, which studies how domestic actors reconstruct international norms on their own (Acharya 2004). At the same time, the rather limited independent role of external actors' mechanisms is also in contrast to previous other norm models that perceive them as sole driving forces of domestic norm change (Risse and Ropp 2013: 13-16; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 7; Zimmermann 2017b), which may only be accompanied by pressure from the domestic opposition (Risse and Sikink 1999: 22-35). For example, the spiral model particularly focused on shaming efforts and social pressure by transnational advocacy networks (incl. domestic societal actors), while ignoring the possibility of domestic governmental actors' proactive engagement in complex learning, lesson drawing, competition or strategic mimicry. Different to the spiral model, the Indian case study of the norm glocalization framework shows that domestic governmental actors are proactively involved in the norm glocalization processes from the very beginning, while social pressure from non-state actors did not play any role. Hence, both norm socialization and norm localization are not able to uncover the *proactive* engagement by *both* domestic and external actors over the whole process of global-domestic norm dynamics. This framework therefore allows for more comprehensive and fine-grained explanations of domestic change that go beyond solely emphasizing either external actors' or domestic actors' mechanisms.

The most important mechanisms initiated by *domestic actors* were competition (appearing in all causal complexes), lesson drawing (appearing in six causal complexes, hence, six times)⁵⁹, strategic mimicry (five times), and complex learning (once). Yet, norm interpretations by external actors were also incorporated due to some domestic actors' mechanisms such as strategic mimicry and lesson drawing. Obviously, *strategic mimicry* occurred in order to avoid any future shaming and to shine internationally for other foreign policy reasons. This even contributed to the largest shift in interpretation from internationally financed actions to domestically financed actions, while no instance of normative mimicry was observable. Strategic mimicry played a slightly more important role for India's engagement with the developing country climate mitigation norm than with the carbon forestry norm. It was found to be an important mechanism in triggering new domestic and foreign policy developments, which is in contrast to other scholarship that argued that social (dis)incentives are not an effective instrument (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 9).

Throughout the whole case study, other proactive domestic norm engagements occurred as well, which were based on *lesson-drawing* and some *complex learning* alongside continuous *competition*.

⁵⁹ When stating six times, I mean it occurred in six of the twelve causal complexes presented in this study.

Particularly, complex learning played a role in the sectorial changes' of stage VI, but it is surprising that it did not shape the agenda setting, the NAPCC, the 2009 mitigation target or the (I)NDC development. In contrast, lesson drawing (such as from China) consistently occurred through all stages that concerned domestic action formulation, international target setting and sectorial changes (stages IV to VIII). The continuous competition engagement ensured that India's perceived preexisting interests (such as international funding, economic growth) were being incorporated. Norm localization researchers had not yet conceptualized this pulling at an international norm through the workings of causal mechanisms initiated by domestic actors (Acharya 2004). Yet, policy diffusion scholars have already shown that lesson drawing can play a role in bilateral climate policy cooperation (Torney 2015b: 113, 118). They also indicated that cost-benefit adoption (similar to competition) are important for the adoption of indigenous rights in REDD+ projects (Jodoin 2017b: 192). The norm glocalization framework allows to conceptualize the important role of domestic governmental actors and makes it applicable to norm research.

The framework also permits to scrutinize *interaction patterns*: External actors' *shaming* was followed by domestic actors' *strategic mimicry* (in stage IV and IX alongside *competition* and less so *lesson drawing*). Thus, domestic action formulation and implementation, which were strongly initiated through strategic mimicry, can (at least partly) be seen as direct responses to shaming during earlier stages, when India either engaged in international norm reshaping or in renewed international target setting. *Strategic mimicry* was also performed in immediate response to *shaming* during the same stages V and VII (alongside *lesson drawing* and *competition*), which both concern international target setting at important international conferences. Shaming solely occurred at the international level, such as in international meetings of the G8+5/G20, Major Economies Forum or COP, while strategic mimicry was also enacted domestically to prepare for upcoming international meetings (e.g., stage IV on domestic action formulation) or to follow up on previous international meetings (e.g., stage IX on implementation). Yet, *strategic mimicry* (IV) was also followed by *complex learning* and *lesson drawing* by the Indian government (VI), when it developed the GIM as a sectoral policy response to the NAPCC. This provides a more complex story of global-domestic norm dynamics than previous norm models indicated, as for example the spiral model solely explained domestic change by the pressure of international actors and the domestic opposition that are even the driving forces when argumentative rationality by domestic governmental actors starts to kick in toward the end of the model (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 22-35).

Competition occurred persistently in all stages, irrespective of domestic or international level, indicating the importance of economic growth to (and the hope for international funding by) Indian representatives. Internationally, India's *competition* engagement led to the international reshaping of both micro norms, thereby balancing the *shaming* efforts from developed countries and the previous persuasion efforts by developing countries (stage III). Domestically, competition shaped the policy responses by the Indian government, leading to the reversal of co-benefit thinking in the form of developmental climate mitigation actions and to the focus on economically beneficial actions and/or

international funding in forestry. *Lesson drawing* occurred together with *competition* both at the international level regarding target setting (V, VII) and at the domestic level concerning domestic action formulation (IV) and sectorial changes (VI, VIII). Lesson drawing brought together insights from other jurisdictions (like China's approach to climate policy) and from the own preexisting domestic sectorial policies and goals like on economic growth or afforestation. *Complex learning* accompanied *competition* only domestically – in the context of sectorial changes (VI). This shows the (surprising) minor role of complex learning and the dominant roles of competition and strategic mimicry, indicating India's very strategic approach, while lesson drawing contributed to shaping the content of domestic actions and international targets.

Generally, actors' mechanisms based on the *logic of consequences* (competition, lesson drawing) or the *logic of consequences and appropriateness* (shaming, strategic mimicry) mostly shaped the case study, while actors' mechanisms based on the *logic of appropriateness* rarely played a role (persuasion, complex learning). It is therefore important to engage in eclecticism and synthesis in order to provide comprehensive and better explanations not only of world politics (Sil and Katzenstein 2010), but also of global-domestic norm dynamics. Neo-positivist studies that aim to test hypotheses against each other could not capture those causal complexes and interaction patterns of different causal powers (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). They would, instead, present the most compelling mechanisms per sub-phase (for such a process tracing approach, see Schimmelfennig 2015: 107), which would represent a strong distortion of reality and would leave out many important dynamics between external and domestic actors. The norm glocalization approach, instead, provides much *more detailed, comprehensive and accurate explanations* of social processes and events. Similarly, norm socialization and norm localization with their one-sided focus on actions by transnational advocacy networks (incl. domestic societal opposition) or domestic governmental actors could not have found the interaction patterns at the same stage or across stages between external actors' and domestic actors' mechanisms. Scientific realist approaches based on causal complexes are, hence, helpful to reveal complex explanations and interaction patterns. Such an approach, therefore, answers the call to *integrate interaction of mechanisms at the expense of parsimony* (Marsh and Sharman 2009: 272-274).

Overall, in this case study, I find a prominent role of most *domestic actors' mechanisms* (especially strategic mimicry, competition and lesson drawing) and of one *external actors' mechanism* (shaming), alongside interesting *interaction patterns at one moment of time* (e.g., strategic mimicry combined with lesson drawing and competition) and *in subsequent periods* (e.g., strategic mimicry following upon shaming, alongside other mechanisms). Consequently, the norm glocalization framework and the application of causal complex process tracing allow us to *gain better case-specific explanations of particular events and processes*.

Table 8: Results on the relationship between conditions and mechanisms II

Stage/ Complex		Mechanism	Condition	Glocalized norm interpretation	Domestic change
IV Domestic action formu- lation (2007-08)	6	Strat. mimicry (+)	Cul. resonance (+, +, +, -)	<i>Adopted non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions</i> (plus openness to additional international financial support)	Medium-scale organizational change: <i>Special Envoy's Office</i> Second-order policy change: <i>NAPCC with developmental climate mitigation actions and per-capita target</i>
		Less. drawing (+)	Mat. resonance (+, +, +, -)		
		Competition (+)	Mat. reception (+, 0, +, 0)		
		Com. learning (0)	Soc. reception (+, 0, 0, 0)		
			Knowledge (0, +, 0, -)		
			Opposition (+, +, +, 0)		
	Pol.-ad. set-up (+, +, +, -)				
V Internat. target setting (2009-10)	7	Shaming (+)	Cul. resonance (-, +, +, +, -)	Accepting a <i>GDP-based climate mitigation target</i> (in addition to domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions)	Second-order policy change: <i>emission intensity target of GDP</i> Organizational change: <i>Closure of Special Envoy's Office</i>
		Strat. mimicry (+)	Mat. resonance (-, +, +, +, -)		
		Less. drawing (+)	Mat. reception (+, +, +, +, 0)		
		Competition (+)	Soc. reception (+, +, +, 0, 0)		
		Com. learning (0)	Knowledge (0, +, +, 0, 0)		
			Opposition (-, -, -, +, -)		
	Pol.-ad. set-up (0, +, +, +, 0)				
VI Sectorial changes (2008-14)	8	Less. drawing (+)	Cul. resonance (+, 0, 0)	<i>Afforestation, forest quality improvement, and non-carbon benefits</i> <i>Domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions</i>	First-order policy change: <i>afforestation target</i> Second-order policy changes: <i>carbon sequestration, improvement of forest quality</i>
		Competition (+)	Mat. resonance (+, +, -)		
		Com. learning (+)	Mat. reception (0, +, 0)		
			Knowledge (+, 0, +)		
			Opposition (+, +, 0)		
			Pol.-ad. set-up (+, +, +)		
	9	Less. drawing (+)	Cul. resonance (-, +, -)	<i>Afforestation, reducing degradation, and non-carbon benefits</i> <i>Domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions</i>	Small-scale organizational changes: <i>REDD+ Cell, REDD+ Expert Committee</i> Discursive change: <i>REDD+ Reference Document</i>
		Competition (+)	Mat. resonance (-, +, -)		
		Persuasion (+)	Mat. reception (-, =, -)		
			Soc. reception (-, -, -)		
			Knowledge (+, 0, +)		
			Opposition (0, -, 0)		
	Pol.-ad. set-up (-, 0, -)				

First column: + influence, 0 no influence. Second column: + facilitating, - hampering, = facilitating and hampering, 0 no influence; signs arranged according to descending order of mechanisms in the first column.

8.1.3 Conditions

The norm glocalization framework allows to reveal under what *facilitating or hampering domestic conditions*, domestic or external actors' mechanisms are enacted. This not only helps to explain the events and outcomes of the case study, but it also provides hints to the particular relationships between individual mechanisms and conditions. All seven theorized conditions played a role in the case study. Cultural resonance, material resonance, material reception and the political-administrative set-up conditioned mechanisms in all causal complexes of the study. Some of the

activated mechanisms are strongly dependent on particular conditions: strategic mimicry for example depends on social and material reception.

Table 9: Results on the relationship between conditions and mechanisms III

Stage/Complex		Mechanism	Condition	Globalized norm interpretation	Domestic change
VII Renewed target setting (2014-16)	10	Shaming (+)	Cu. resonance (-, +, +, +, -, -)	<i>Domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets</i> <i>Afforestation, forest quality improvement, and non-carbon benefits</i>	First-order policy change: <i>emission intensity target of GDP</i> Second-order policy change: <i>forest carbon sequestration target</i> , non-fossil fuel-based <i>energy capacity target</i>
		Strat. mimicry (+)	Ma. resonance (-, +, +, +, -, -)		
		Less. drawing (+)	Ma. reception (+, +, +, +, 0, -)		
		Competition (+)	So. reception (+, +, +, +, -, -)		
		Com. learning (0)	Knowledge (-, 0, +, +, -, -)		
		Ma. incentives (0)	Opposition (-, +, +, +, -, 0) Pol.-ad. set-up (-, +, +, =, -, -)		
VIII Renewed sectorial changes (2015-19)	11	Strat. mimicry (+)	Cul. resonance (+, +, 0)	<i>Afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits</i> <i>Domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions</i>	Small-scale organizational change: <i>REDD+ Expert Committee</i> reconstituted Discursive change: <i>REDD+ Strategy</i>
		Less. drawing (+)	Mat. resonance (+, -, +)		
		Competition (+)	Mat. reception (+, +, -) Soc. reception (+, +, +) Knowledge (+, +, +) Opposition (+, +, +) Pol.-adm. set-up (-, -, -)		
IX Sectorial changes & implementation (2014-19)	12	Strat. mimicry (+)	Cul. resonance (+, +)	<i>Implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations</i> <i>Domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets</i>	Small-scale organ. change: <i>Executive Committee</i> on Climate Change, <i>Forest NDC Implementation Committee</i> , <i>NDC Implementation Committee</i> , <i>GIM's National Governing Council</i> First-order policy change: <i>CAMPA Fund Act</i> , <i>Forest Act Amendment</i> Implementation: <i>tree planting</i>
		Competition (+)	Mat. resonance (+, +) Mat. reception (+, +) Soc. reception (+, 0) Opposition (-, -) Pol.-adm. set-up (-, +)		

First column: + influence, 0 no influence. Second column: + facilitating, - hampering, = facilitating and hampering, 0 no influence; signs arranged according to descending order of mechanisms in the first column.

Regarding the *relationship between mechanisms and conditions*, several patterns become observable, which I first present *from the perspective of the different activated mechanisms*: *Shaming was mostly hampered by domestic conditions*. This can usually be attributed to cultural and material resonance. In contrast, material reception and social reception were the only conditions that facilitated shaming, indicating their importance for the functioning of the mechanism. External actors

can, hence, increase the effects of their shaming efforts when the domestic actors are interested in material prospects or in receiving social recognition. Otherwise, it is very unlikely that shaming would have any effect at all.

Competition was mostly facilitated by domestic conditions. The most important condition for facilitating competition was material resonance, followed by material reception and cultural resonance. This indicates the important entanglement of the competition mechanism with the preexisting political economy (i.e., material resonance), the dominant domestic norms focusing on economic growth and development (i.e., cultural resonance) as well as the hope for receiving material prospects by a certain form of engagement with an international norm (i.e., material reception). In contrast, conditions like social reception and knowledge often had no impact on competition. Opposition even hampered competition twice. This largely emerged from the civil society, which was motivated to prevent a privatization of forests and a community-disempowerment by the Indian government. Yet, opposition did not prevent the overall competition engagement by the Indian government with the international norms.

The few instances of *persuasion* by external actors were *largely hampered by domestic conditions*. This can mostly be attributed to cultural resonance, material resonance, reversed social reception and material reception: The domestic norms and the political economy of India were not in line with the proposed interpretations and actions by external actors. Contrary to shaming, external actors trying to persuade domestic actors could not benefit from domestic actors' quest for social recognition or their hopes for material benefits. Persuasion may be more successful when external actors relate to domestic norms, political economy issues, potential material benefits and do not face issues with social vulnerabilities. Or they can benefit in cases when preexisting knowledge is available, which had facilitating effects on persuasion in the stage of sectorial changes.

Domestic conditions *mostly hampered complex learning* by domestic actors. This can mostly be attributed to the low level of preexisting knowledge, the political-administrative set-up, and the dominant cultural and material resonance. In stage VI, complex learning occurred when sufficient knowledge and capacities were available. Learning, hence, faced quite high hurdles in the Indian case, but could increase in the future if capacities are expanded and if Indian actors are not only able but also willing to process knowledge.

The mechanism *material incentive* was *hampered by almost all domestic conditions*. This indicates that external actors need to tailor their funding proposals to the domestic norms (cultural resonance) and the political economy of the target country (material resonance) in order to be more successful. Similarly, material prospects need to be sufficiently high (material reception) and social vulnerabilities sufficiently low in order to allow for facilitating effects on material incentives (social reception). Interestingly, domestic opposition was not the reason for material incentives to be unsuccessful in the Indian case. Yet, low capacities and coordination in the political-administrative set-up were also

hampering material incentives (for further implications on international development cooperation see 8.1.7).

Strategic mimicry was mostly facilitated by domestic conditions. Particularly, social reception and material reception were important domestic conditions in this regard, strongly facilitating this mechanism in order to increase international social recognition and to foster other foreign policy goals internationally. In addition, cultural resonance and material resonance always facilitated strategic mimicry. Those conditions were particularly important for shaping the content of the proposed actions by India. The only conditions that hampered strategic mimicry were the domestic opposition and the political-administrative set-up in one causal complex, respectively, while knowledge had no impact in two causal complexes. Those conditions are not the most important ones, when it comes to strategic mimicry, but can still have further supporting or impeding effects.

Lastly, *lesson drawing was mostly facilitated by domestic conditions.* Yet, all conditions, except for knowledge, at least in one causal complex also hampered lesson drawing, while only knowledge always facilitated it. All other conditions did not have a very consistent effect on lesson drawing. However, in several occasions, lesson drawing was facilitated by cultural resonance, material resonance, social reception and material reception, indicating the importance of both domestic (cultural and material) entanglement and international (social and material) prospects for successful lesson drawing. Moreover, in the stages VI and VIII, higher capacities and bureaucratic coordination would have been more facilitative.

More general patterns become visible when looking at the condition-mechanism relationship *from the perspective of conditions.* Both *cultural resonance* and *material resonance* mostly facilitated strategic mimicry, lesson drawing and competition and mostly hampered shaming, persuasion and complex learning. This contested external actors' norm interpretations and facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors' norm interpretations, while preventing stronger forms of policy change. Similarly, *knowledge*, *opposition* and the *political-administrative set-up* mostly hampered shaming and complex learning, and more often facilitated strategic mimicry, lesson drawing and competition. This led to more mixed results, but domestic actors's interpretations were more often incorporated than external actors' interpretations. In contrast, both *social reception* and *material reception* mostly facilitated strategic mimicry, lesson drawing, shaming, competition, and rather hampered persuasion and material incentives. This contributed to the incorporation of external actors' norm interpretations, while also including domestic actors' interpretations. While this condition-mechanism relationship revealed some more general patterns, not each condition had the same facilitating or hampering effect to the same mechanism in each causal complex. Instead, this sometimes varied due to the change of setting (domestic or international level), focus (climate change in general or forestry in particular), actors and context over time. This also led to altering perceptions regarding cultural resonance, material resonance, social reception and material reception by domestic governmental actors. Scholarship often does not include changing conditions

over time and solely discusses the effects of conditions for an entire period (but see Stevenson 2012 for changing domestic norms and material conditions). The norm globalization framework allows for scrutinizing the effects of changing conditions as well.

Overall, particularly *cultural* and *material resonance* as well as *social* and *material reception* played crucial roles for several of the more important mechanisms. This is in line with the norm socialization literature that indicated the relevance of *cultural resonance* (Bernstein 2002b: 224; Cass 2006: 226-227; Checkel 1999; Cortell and Davis 2000; Torney 2015b), while domestic norms and their perceived match to an international norm may change over time (Stevenson 2011; 2012: 200-201). The Indian case study showed that a constant matching of cultural resonance between the interpretation of international norms and their fit to changing domestic norms is enacted by domestic governmental actors.

Similarly, the norm socialization literature already indicated the importance of material prospects and vulnerabilities (i.e., *material reception*) (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Ropp 2013; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006). Yet, the present study shows that this is not limited to financial and economic aspects, but also includes political prospects like an acceptance as a nuclear and global power. It also indicates that material reception can be exclusively based on hopes of material prospects, while actual benefits did not directly materialize.

Moreover, the norm literature already pointed to the relevance of international social recognition and vulnerabilities (i.e., *social reception*) (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 2013), which could be found several times (i.e., in several causal complexes) – particularly in respect to the developing country climate mitigation norm. Yet, it is interesting to note that this also played a role for India, as scholars and practitioners have emphasized that the Indian government is a notorious naysayer in climate (and other) negotiations, who is not interested in its international image (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2012; Narlikar and Narlikar 2014; Narlikar 2017). This naysayer attitude could only be observed during the early observation period in the contestation stage, while the Indian government subsequently cared a lot about its international image and its place within the international community. Others had already shown such a dynamic for the case of Canada's (international) climate policy-making (Bernstein 2002b: 224).

In the Indian case study, the lack of capacities was less decisive than previous research suggested (Risse and Ropp 2013: 17), and the *political-administrative set-up* (incl. public coordination) had a more balanced impact of both facilitating (16 times; i.e., regarding 16 mechanisms in the entire observation period) and hampering (14 times) mechanisms. Similar to other studies (Bernstein 2002b: 224), this case study also showed that horizontal fragmentation may be reduced by the establishment of a national coordinating body.

In addition, *opposition* to the government's course of action was hardly found (but this still facilitated and hampered mechanisms), as there was a strong consensus among powerful domestic actors during most of the observation period. The previous literature indicated an important hampering role

of veto-players in norm dynamics (Börzel and Risse 2009; Cass 2006: 224-225; Frank 2011; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005), but the evolving climate discourse was at most times so consensually shared that domestic veto-players barely became visible and were hardly successful.

Whereas *knowledge* was sufficiently available on the carbon forestry norm, it was mostly missing in respect to the developing country climate mitigation norm among domestic decision-makers, while being accessible in the Indian science system, as indicated by the previous literature (Bidwai 2005; Raghunandan 2019: 190; Romijn et al. 2015: 110; Sengupta 2019: 133-134), leading to different effects on the activated mechanisms. Yet, preexisting knowledge by decision makers seems not to be the most crucial condition, as previous research showed the extensive knowledge on climate change and the lack of mitigation efforts in the case of the United States (Hoffmann 2005: 140, 147-148).

Material resonance was found to be an important condition for several mechanisms in the Indian case study, and previous literature also already indicated that economic cost reflections and the political economy impact the norm engagement (Bernstein 2002b; Cass 2006; Hoffmann 2005: 140; Torney 2015b: 229-230), while domestic economic paradigms and their perceived fit to an international norm can change over time (Stevenson 2011; 2012: 200-201). The Indian case study shows the necessity of a continuous matching between the (interpretation of) international norms and the (changing) perceived material necessities. Interestingly, while some studies emphasized the important role of changing governments for an increasing or decreasing norm contestation or engagement (Cass 2008; Hoffmann 2005; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Stevenson 2012: 201), the Indian case study did not provide evidence for such a condition, as there was much continuation from the Singh government to the Modi government.

Overall, the findings of the Indian case study, hence, extend the previous knowledge on relationships between mechanisms and conditions by indicating the more prominent role of some conditions (cultural resonance, material resonance, social reception and material reception) in this particular case study which may inform future studies as well.

8.1.4 Glocalized norm interpretations

The norm glocalization framework enables us to *explain (changing) glocalized norm interpretations*. Based on the respective causal complexes, I showed how and explained why the Indian government shifted from interpretations of the *developing country climate mitigation norm* based on voluntary and fully compensated mitigation actions (I) over internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions (III), to domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets (VII), and eventually to domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets (IX). These *glocalized norm interpretations* are fusions of preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors (i.e., promotion of high economic growth, sectoral development goals, rejection of mitigation commitments, international funding) and of norm

interpretations advocated by external actors (i.e., non-compensated mitigation commitments and implementations) (see table 10, 11, 12).

India thereby followed a *reversed co-benefit approach*, which remained in place despite the governmental change from Singh to Modi, in which development is the main priority and climate mitigation only a co-benefit, leading to sectoral developmental mitigation actions and to non-ambitious GDP-based climate mitigation targets hardly higher than sectoral business as usual developments. In contrast, not only the IPCC had proposed a co-benefit approach in which climate mitigation is the main benefit and development is the co-benefit (IPCC 2007b: 47; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016: 1354), but also the UNFCCC had provided guidelines on the NAMA registry at the Durban COP in 2011 that followed the same logic for recognizing domestic actions by developing countries (UNFCCC 2012a: 11-12). As the Indian governments under Singh and Modi feared competitiveness and economic growth to be jeopardized by climate mitigation, only a win-win perspective that is mainly based on economic development measures and has climate co-benefits was acceptable to them. In consequence, both Indian governments did not address trade-offs with emission-intensive developmental activities, such as deforestation or coal-based power generation.

Strategic mimicry played an important role (i.e., due to other strategic foreign policy goals) in shifting the Indian government's norm interpretation toward *domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions and targets*. This was supported by lesson drawing from other jurisdictions (like from China) and by the Indian government's competition engagement that prioritized economic development. In addition, occasionally, shaming around important international climate conferences held the pressure high to engage in change. Particularly, *cultural resonance* (alignment with preexisting sectorial priorities), *material resonance* (alignment with the political economy) and *social reception* (quest for international social recognition) facilitated this shift.

At the same time, the Indian government continuously *rejected taking legally-binding quantitative absolute mitigation commitments*, and emphasized per-capita equity and historical responsibilities of the Global North, which can mostly be attributed to its competition engagement and the conditions of cultural resonance and material resonance. Thus, the interaction of both external and domestic actors' mechanisms shaped the evolving glocalised norm interpretations. This has not been captured by preexisting norm approaches, which either found full norm adoption as envisaged by external actors (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 32), or the predominance of domestic norms that indicate a full adoption of preexisting interpretations by domestic actors (Acharya 2004).

Table 10: Results on glocalized norm interpretation I

Stage/Complex		Incl. <i>external</i> actors' interpretation	Incl. <i>domestic</i> actors' interpretation	Glocalized norm interpretation	Domestic change
I Internat. contes- tation (2005-07)	1	Shaming	Competition	<i>None</i> , but acceptance of international discussions on <i>voluntary internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions</i>	Small-scale organizational change: small increase of <i>climate change staff</i>
		Mat. reception	Cul. resonance		
		Mat. resonance			
		Mat. reception			
		Soc. reception	Knowledge		
		Opposition	Pol.-adm. set-up		
	2	Persuasion	Competition	<i>None</i> , but acceptance of international discussions on <i>compensated carbon forestry</i>	-
		-	Cul. resonance		
			Mat. resonance		
			Mat. reception		
			Pol.-adm. set-up		
II Domestic agenda setting (2007)	3	Shaming	Competition	Consideration of <i>future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions</i> based on <i>international per-capita equity</i>	Medium-scale organizational change: <i>PM Council</i> Discursive change: <i>per-capita target & future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions</i>
		Mat. reception	Cul. resonance		
		Soc. reception	Mat. resonance		
			Knowledge		
			Opposition		
			Pol.-adm. set-up		
III Internat. reshaping (2007)	4	Shaming	Competition	<i>Internationally supported and enabled mitigation actions</i> in the negotiations	-
		Mat. reception	Cul. resonance		
		Mat. resonance			
		Mat. reception			
		Soc. reception	Pol.-adm. set-up		
	5	-	Competition	<i>Comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach</i> in the negotiations	-
		-	Cul. resonance		
			Mat. resonance		
			Mat. reception		
			Pol.-adm. set-up		

Regarding the *carbon forestry norm*, similarly to the developing country climate mitigation norm, changing glocalized norm interpretations can be found and explained through causal complexes: The Indian government shifted its interpretation from compensated conservation (as a compensated climate mitigation approach) (I) over a comprehensive compensated carbon-forestry approach (III) to afforestation, forest quality improvement and non-carbon benefits (VI), which was limited to implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations in the implementation stage (IX). These *glocalized norm interpretations* are fusions of preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors (i.e., afforestation, compensated conservation,

economic crop and private tree plantations, non-carbon benefits) and of norm interpretations advocated by external actors (i.e., climate mitigation in forestry, compensated reduction).

The focus on *afforestation* was shaped by the Indian competition engagement (maximizing material benefits), lesson drawing from previous forestry programs and from international climate discussions, and its strategic mimicry to shine internationally. This was facilitated by cultural resonance (preexisting afforestation norms), material resonance (more in line with political economy than addressing degradation and deforestation), material reception (hoping for international funding), and social reception (the aim for international social recognition). In stage VI (causal complex 8), the improvement of forest quality was additionally incorporated, which can be attributed to complex learning that was facilitated by sufficient knowledge. In the first REDD+ advancement period (causal complex 9 of stage VI), lesson drawing (from UNFCCC's REDD+ framework) and persuasion (by USAID) facilitated by knowledge still included the reduction of forest degradation. This indicates differences to a pure localization approach that would expect an exclusive afforestation focus, and not the expansion of the forestry approach by including new elements such as forest quality improvement.

Yet, the new focus on *forest quality improvement* was *lost in implementation*, as the Indian government returned to its initial position of promoting afforestation. This mostly occurred due to the workings of competition (maximizing economic benefits for economic growth and jobs) and strategic mimicry (international shining based on increasing green cover). Several domestic conditions played a role for this shift, such as material resonance (conflicts with local political economy), cultural resonance (already existing afforestation focus), material reception (lack of international funding), and social reception (desire for international social recognition based on increasing green cover). Complex learning and lesson drawing did not play any role anymore and funding had to come entirely from domestic sources. The question remains whether forest quality improvement would have been part of the implementation if complex learning had been continued and sufficient domestic funding had been disbursed shortly after the GIM formulation or if international funding had been provided for addressing forest degradation.

At the same time, the Indian government *rejected a norm interpretation based on reducing deforestation*, which can mostly be attributed to the workings of the mechanism of competition and the conditions of cultural resonance and material resonance. The Indian government, thereby, relied on a norm interpretation that was beneficial for India, even when international funding would not be flowing, as it included *non-carbon benefits* for local livelihoods, agroforestry, and plantations. This was mostly enabled by competition and facilitated by cultural resonance (respecting preexisting policies and programs), material resonance (in line with the political economy) and opposition (to an exclusive carbon focus).

Table 11: Results on glocalized norm interpretation II

Stage/Complex		Incl. <i>external</i> actors' interpretation	Incl. <i>domestic</i> actors' interpretation	Glocalized norm interpretation	Domestic change
IV Domestic action formulation (2007-08)	6	Strat. mimicry Lesson drawing	Strat. mimicry Competition Lesson drawing	<i>Adopted non-enabled developmental climate mitigation actions</i> (plus openness to additional international financial support)	Medium-scale organizational change: <i>Special Envoy's Office</i> Second-order policy change: <i>NAPCC with developmental climate mitigation actions and per-capita target</i>
		Mat. reception Soc. reception	Cul. resonance Mat. resonance Knowledge Opposition Pol.-adm. set-up		
V Internat. target setting (2009-10)	7	Strat. mimicry Shaming Lesson drawing	Strat. mimicry Competition Lesson drawing	Accepting a <i>GDP-based climate mitigation target</i> (in addition to domestically financed developmental climate mitigation actions)	Second-order policy change: <i>emission intensity target of GDP</i> Reversal of organizational change: Closure of <i>Special Envoy's Office</i>
		Mat. reception Soc. reception Pol.-adm. set-up	Cul. resonance Mat. resonance Knowledge Opposition		
VI Sectorial changes (2008-14)	8	Com. learning	Competition Lesson drawing	<i>Afforestation, forest quality improvement, and non-carbon benefits</i> <i>Domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions</i>	First-order policy change: increase of <i>afforestation target</i> Second-order policy changes: <i>carbon sequestration, improvement of forest quality</i>
		Mat. reception Knowledge Pol.-adm. set-up	Cul. resonance Mat. resonance Mat. reception Knowledge Opposition Pol.-adm. set-up		
	9	Persuasion Lesson drawing	Competition Lesson drawing	<i>Afforestation, reducing degradation and non-carbon benefits</i> <i>Domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions</i>	Small-scale organizational changes: <i>REDD+ Cell, REDD+ Expert Committee</i> Discursive change: <i>REDD+ Reference Document</i>
		Knowledge	Cul. resonance Mat. resonance Mat. reception Soc. reception Knowledge Opposition Pol.-adm. set-up		

India's *glocalized interpretation* of the developing country climate mitigation norm based on domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets and of the carbon forestry norm in the form of implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations reflect particular interpretations that emerged since 2005. While they are particular for India, they are, at the same time, *in line with broader discourses* that have been described before in the realm of climate change and environment.

Bernstein (2002a: 1) emphasized the predominance of liberal environmentalism that “predicate[s] international environmental protection on the promotion and maintenance of a liberal economic order”. This includes the support of economic growth and development (see also Najam 2005: 311-312), free trade, market mechanisms, values of efficiency, and privatization, among others, in the context of environmental and climate change policy-making (Bernstein 2002b, 2002a). Similarly, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) revealed the predominance of the ecological modernization discourse, which accentuates that environmental and climate protection are compatible with economic growth.⁶⁰ In addition, those authors noted a second dominant discourse of green governmentality, which emphasizes a “stewardship of nature and an all-encompassing management of its resources” (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006: 54). Those aspects can also be found in India’s climate policy and climate-related forest approaches (e.g., growth priority, CDM, REDD+, win-win actions, emission intensity target of GDP, carbon sequestration target, economic crop and private tree plantations), while elements of the third discourse – civic environmentalism (i.e., stronger stakeholder engagement or fundamental transformations) – can hardly be discovered.⁶¹ Analyses of all NDCs also found that ecological modernization and green governmentality are the most dominant discourses (Jernnäs and Linnér 2019). Similarly, a study on REDD+ discourses in six countries revealed the predominance of ecological modernization, but emphasized the importance of civic environmentalism as well (Di Gregorio et al. 2015: 80), indicating a difference to the Indian case study. Others found varieties of REDD+ storylines; yet with most of them indicating national market-based approaches that aspire co-benefits, showing similarities to the Indian approach (Vijge 2016: 126; Vijge et al. 2016: 65). Yet, those macro discourses are still too broad and too coarse-grained to capture the subtle differences in norm interpretations between actors and their changes over time.⁶² In contrast to those broader discourses, the norm glocalization approach allows to reveal and explain more fine-grained interpretations, such as the emphasis on developmental climate mitigation actions

⁶⁰ Interestingly, research found that non-state climate experiments similarly share a “common liberal environmental ethos that stresses the compatibility of economic growth and environmental protection” (Hoffmann 2011: 25).

⁶¹ The Indian government organized some minor forms of stakeholder participation in the development of GIM, but not in its implementation. Also, very few NGO representatives were involved in the PM Council under Singh. The Indian government only embraced fundamental changes to consumption patterns in international negotiations, when it criticized luxury emissions in the Global North as well as demanded per-capita equity in GHG emissions and carbon space for growth. Yet, such a critique of consumption patterns did not occur with regard to India’s own population, whereas its upper and middle-class members emitted much more GHG emissions per-capita than the rural populations. Also, the international demand for carbon space reflects elements of the ecological modernization and liberal environmentalism discourse by highlighting the need of economic growth. While initially the Indian government refused any domestically financed mitigation actions as threatening economic growth, since the NAPCC, the Indian government had reconciled it in a way that accepts developmental actions that foster economic growth and provide climate co-benefits.

⁶² For example, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2019: 528) find discourse shifts toward low-carbon development and green growth from Copenhagen to Paris, but they are subsumed under the prevailing discourse of ecological modernization, leading to the disappearance of their differences behind the broader and coarse-grained discourse label. Moreover, such an approach cannot capture the subtle differences in interpretations of those concepts by different actors. How, for example, developing countries and developed countries interpreted the concept of sustainable development differently in the context of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development had been indicated by Najam (2005: 315).

and targets or the focus on both afforestation as well as economic crop and private tree plantations alongside non-carbon benefits. Shifting or differing interpretations of international norms have already been captured by some norm scholars working on climate governance (Cass 2005; Hoffmann 2005; Stevenson 2012), but they have neither explained them based on the fusion of external and domestic actors' norm interpretations nor through particular causal complexes of (interacting) mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions.

The Indian case study reveals four further findings concerning *mechanisms and conditions shaping glocalised norm interpretations*. First, as theoretically expected, the mechanisms of shaming, persuasion, complex learning, lesson drawing and strategic mimicry and the conditions of knowledge and political-administrative set-up *facilitated the incorporation of external actors' norm interpretation*. The mechanisms of competition, strategic mimicry, and lesson drawing as well as the conditions of cultural resonance, material resonance, opposition, knowledge and political-administrative set-up *facilitated the incorporation of preexisting norm interpretations by domestic actors* in the different norm glocalization stages (see table 10, 11, 12). This proves the usefulness of the assumed relationships.

Second, I find *few exceptions of the assumed relationships*. The conditions of social reception and material reception, as theoretically expected, mostly facilitated the incorporation of external actors' norm interpretations (examples can be found in all stages). Yet, in the stages I, III, VI, and VII either one of them or both conditions (also) facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors' norm interpretations. The theoretical expectation was formulated regarding the *actual perceived* material reception at the moment, but not the *hope for potential* material reception in the form of *future* material prospects. Particularly the latter facilitated the preexisting norm interpretation by Indian actors of internationally compensated or internationally funded mitigation and afforestation actions (stage I, III, VI, VII). In addition, the theoretical expectation for social reception was formulated regarding its *positive and negative forms* (i.e., the quest for social recognition and the social vulnerability to international pressure), which was supposed to lead to the inclusion of external actors' norm interpretation. This happened as envisaged (stages II-V, VII-IX). Yet, in three stages, either the *lack of negative* social reception (I) or even *reversed social reception* (i.e., efforts to prevent social vulnerability) facilitated the incorporation of domestic actors' norm interpretations (VI, VII). This is, hence, an important specification of the role of social reception. Overall, this does not question the usefulness of the assumed relationships.

Third, the *conditions and mechanisms on which no theoretical expectation could be formulated* on whether they facilitate the incorporation of domestic or of external actors' norm interpretation (i.e., strategic mimicry, lesson drawing, knowledge, political-administrative set-up) showed trends toward one or the other or even both. The conditions of knowledge and of the political-administrative set-up incorporated domestic actors' norm interpretations (in eight causal complexes and in eleven causal complexes, respectively) more often than external ones (in three causal complexes and in two causal

complexes, respectively). In contrast, the results for lesson drawing (incorporating external actors' interpretation in five causal complexes and domestic actors' interpretation in six causal complexes) and strategic mimicry (including domestic and external actors' norm interpretation in five causal complexes each) are more balanced. This specifies the relationship between these conditions or mechanisms and the expected influence on glocalized norm interpretations, but also shows that it is reasonable to assume that their relationships are more complicated than of other conditions and mechanisms.

Finally, the case study allowed to reveal the *most dominant conditions and mechanisms for the incorporation of external or domestic actors' norm interpretations*. For external actors' interpretations, these were material reception, social reception, shaming, strategic mimicry, and lesson drawing and, for domestic actors' interpretation, these were cultural resonance, material resonance, competition, strategic mimicry and lesson drawing. Therefore, they are likely to be good starting points for analyzing other cases as well.

The norm glocalization framework therefore *permits new pathways* that go beyond analyzing domestic change based on full or selective adoption of stable international norms as envisaged by external actors in norm socialization models (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 32), and moves beyond solely studying meaning attributions in contestation or translation processes without explaining domestic changes based on mechanisms and conditions (Berger 2017; Wiener 2014). International contestation is not necessarily a persistent status and moving away from it does not mean that states accept the norm interpretation by external actors. Instead, the results are glocalized norm interpretations, influenced by both external and domestic actors. In contrast to norm localization's predominance of local norms (Acharya 2004), the norm glocalization framework enables to study and explain the fusions of domestic and external norm interpretations based on the activated mechanisms under facilitating or hampering conditions.

The norm glocalization framework opens up a *new empirical pathway for global-domestic norm analyses to study the varieties of norm glocalizations*. Those norm interpretations reflect *compromises and prioritizations between conflicting or complementary norms* and their particular interpretations, such as the pursuit of unlimited economic growth and the pursuit of maximum climate mitigation. This is also evident in the carbon forestry norm as interpretations of it based on public afforestation, privatization, community empowerment, maximum carbon sequestration and maximum biodiversity conservation are colliding and/or fusing with each other. The decisive question for the norm literature, hence, is not anymore whether governments are internalizing or habitualizing a particular international norm (on internalization and habitualization, see, e.g., Risse and Sikkink 1999: 32), but rather which conflicts and prioritizations among different norms best reflect particular norm interpretations by an actor at a specific point in time. The norm glocalization framework permits to study those changing glocalized norm interpretations.

Table 12: Results on glocalized norm interpretation III

Stage/Complex		Incl. <i>external</i> actors' interpretation	Incl. <i>domestic</i> actors' interpretation	Glocalized norm interpretation	Domestic change
VII Renewed target setting (2014-16)	10	Strat. mimicry Shaming Lesson drawing	Strat. mimicry Competition Lesson drawing	<i>Domestically financed</i> and internationally supported <i>developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets</i> <i>Afforestation, forest quality improvement and non-carbon benefits</i>	First-order policy change: <i>emission intensity target of GDP</i> Second-order policy changes: <i>forest carbon sequestration target, non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity target</i>
		Mat. reception Soc. reception	Cul. resonance Mat. resonance Mat. reception Soc. reception Knowledge Opposition Pol.-adm. set-up		
VIII Renewed sectorial changes (2015-19)	11	Strat. mimicry Lesson drawing	Strat. mimicry Competition Lesson drawing	<i>Afforestation, economic crop plantations, and non-carbon benefits</i> <i>Domestically financed and internationally supported developmental climate mitigation actions</i>	Small-scale organizational change: <i>REDD+ Expert Committee</i> reconstituted Discursive change: <i>REDD+ Strategy</i>
		Mat. reception Soc. reception Knowledge	Cul. resonance Mat. resonance Knowledge Opposition Pol.-adm. set-up		
IX Implementation & sectorial changes (2014-19)	12	Strat. mimicry	Strat. mimicry Competition	<i>Implementing afforestation with non-carbon benefits and facilitating economic crop and private tree plantations</i> <i>Domestically financed implementation of developmental climate mitigation actions and targets</i>	Small-scale organizational changes: <i>Executive Committee on Climate Change, Forest NDC Implementation Committee, NDC Implementation Committee, GIM's National Governing Council</i> First-order policy changes: <i>CAMPA Fund Act, Indian Forest Act Amendment</i> Implementation: <i>tree planting</i>
		Mat. reception Soc. reception	Cul. resonance Mat. resonance Opposition Pol.-adm. set-up		

8.1.5 Multi-level global governance in an international regime complex

The norm glocalization framework allows to study the many *global* and *domestic locations* of norm engagement and *their interrelations*. In this case, the UNFCCC provided the overall context of changing international normative perspectives on the developing country climate mitigation norm from the 2005 Montreal COP and 2007 Bali COP over the 2009 Copenhagen COP to the 2015 Paris COP, which were actively reshaped by different states like the Indian government. However, it was important to look beyond the UNFCCC, as responsibilities to take climate action are also negotiated in other high-level forums (alongside other foreign policy issues), such as the G8+5/G20, UN Summits and the Major Economies Forum meetings prior to upcoming UNFCCC COPs. My finding

of the *complementary character of these international institutions* in the Indian case study contributes empirically to the literature on the fragmented climate regime complex (Biermann et al. 2009; Keohane and Victor 2011), which is still divided on the positive or negative impacts of fragmentation (Biermann et al. 2020: 168). At the same time, it was important not to lose sight of the *domestic level*, as international actions are both prepared and followed up there, including the norm interpretations and organizational, policy, and implementation changes.⁶³ Therefore, global-domestic norm dynamics are best studied from the perspective of *multi-level global governance* that bring together analysis of external and domestic actors at the global and domestic level together (Höhne 2018), as captured in the norm glocalization framework. This reveals not only international interactions but also how and why states engage with international propositions, norms and rules at both the international and domestic level and how and why they relate them to preexisting domestic norms and rules. This supports previous arguments proposing to conceptualize global and domestic climate governance from a multi-level perspective (see, e.g., Jänicke 2017), and further theorizes them by proposing mechanisms (e.g., strategic mimicry, shaming) and conditions (e.g., social reception, material resonance) for analyzing those multi-level dynamics.

As part of the climate regime complex, existing *mini-lateral clubs* (i.e., organizations with exclusive membership) such as G8+5/20 (as opposed to international organizations with inclusive membership like the UN) have been criticized for providing insufficient economic benefits to participating countries compared to what would be needed to stimulate climate actions (Victor 2011: xxxi). Other scholars have theoretically argued that they may facilitate the advancement of international climate negotiations in the UNFCCC (Falkner et al. 2021: 4). The Indian case study shows that countries like India strive for international social recognition in those mini-lateral fora and showed more flexibility there at several occasions (e.g., in 2007 and 2009) than in the universal negotiations of the UNFCCC. India's aspiration for social recognition was motivated by various reasons, such as India's goal to reach broader foreign policy goals like achieving a permanent seat at the UN Security Council or fostering bilateral partnerships with major powers like the US. In the shadow of upcoming COPs, mini-lateral clubs can help to raise individual country's climate ambitions, as they represent social theatres in which political leaders need to save face and want to increase their social reputation, which often result in announcing new pledges. They also contribute to policy signaling, as emerging economies indicated their planned targets to each other, which further motivated India to declare a mitigation target prior to the Copenhagen COP. Moreover, they result in policy coordination, as participating states agreed upon the 2° C global warming target at the 2009 Major Economies Forum. Yet, those agreements and announcements are required to be transferred to the actual UNFCCC negotiations in order to receive multilateral recognition and legitimacy (on legitimacy, see Eckersley

⁶³ Similarly, interpretations and operationalizations of the carbon forestry norm were discussed and advanced in multilateral forums like the Oslo Climate and Forest Conference and in bilateral negotiations with external actors like the US, which were subsequently advanced and adapted by the Indian government. Yet, they did not play the same important role as in the case of the developing country climate mitigation norm.

2012: 33), which, in the case of the 2 degree Celsius goal, subsequently occurred at the Copenhagen and Cancun COPs.

Similar dynamics can be found at or prior to UNFCCC negotiations. While UNFCCC's decisions and accords, such as the Bali Action Plan or the Copenhagen Accord, did not result in steep emission reductions as criticized by some scholars (Victor 2011: 26), they have resulted in *social dynamics* in which demands are formulated to states to increase ambition and actions, subsequently leading to the formulation of domestic actions (such as the NAPCC after the Bali COP) and international targets (such as the GDP-based climate mitigation target shortly before the Copenhagen COP or the Paris COP) by the Indian government, even though they are not ambitious enough to prevent dangerous climate change. In comparison with other countries, similar dynamics become visible in both mini-lateral and multilateral fora. For example, the Indonesian President announced Indonesia's GHG emission target on his way to the Pittsburgh's G20 meeting shortly before the 2009 Copenhagen COP in order to be able shine internationally (Höhne 2018). The surprising announcement by China's President Xi Jinping to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 at the 2020 UN General Assembly has also been interpreted by NGOs as motivated by geopolitical reasons in the face of the then-US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (McGrath 2020). Yet, whether they only represent "symbolic politics" (Cass 2008: 468) needs to be scrutinized in policy formulation and implementation at the domestic level. Too few studies cover this part, giving an impression of wide-scale engagement on climate change by governments or non-state actors through adopting plans and setting targets, while we learn very little about whether they are more than business as usual efforts and are followed up in policy-making and implementation.

Strategic mimicry was an important mechanism and *social reception* and *material (political) reception* were decisive conditions in the Indian case, and may be important for other cases as well, as they facilitated the *dynamics between international institutions, different (foreign) policy fields, and domestic politics*. Action on climate change had become such an international pressing issue from the perspective of the international community and of powerful states like the US that India's naysaying image threatened to affect its security foreign policy goals like the nuclear cooperation with the US or the quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat. Proactive strategic mimicry was the answer to it, which contributed to the formulation of India's NAPCC, its Copenhagen pledge and its NDC, while the content of those plans and targets was largely shaped by competition (economic growth) and lesson drawing (from China, IPCC, UNFCCC and preexisting sectoral developments).⁶⁴ This worked, as we can see in the example of UN General Secretary António Guterres who, in 2018,

⁶⁴ Different dynamics occurred regarding the carbon forestry norm and the advancement of the REDD+ framework. Competition (to receive international funding), and not strategic mimicry, largely triggered the engagement with this norm. Subsequently, competition, lesson drawing, and strategic mimicry (and less so persuasion) also shaped the evolution and content of respective actions toward advancing the REDD+ framework, even though international funding was hardly visible for India. Yet, the REDD+ framework was never finalized and not implemented, while the carbon forestry norm in later stages was advanced in combination with the developing country climate mitigation norm.

applauded India's government and offered the UN Champions of the Earth Award to India's Prime Minister Modi for his "bold environmental leadership that the world needs" (Guterres 2018). Two years later, he criticized the Indian government's plans of continuous coal expansion in the context of its Covid-19 recovery plan (Harvey 2020; PTI 2020). Yet, similar plans were already highlighted in the National Energy Policy draft of 2016 (Mohan and Wehnert 2019: 279), which he apparently did not know when applauding Modi in 2018. Therefore, international shaming can follow upon strategic mimicry, when external actors realize that the performance by domestic actors is different from what they have expected based on domestic actors' announcements. International demands for increased targets during the run-up to the Glasgow COP of 2021 motivated Modi to announce an even higher non-fossil energy capacity target (500 GW by 2030), a new emission intensity target of India's GDP of 45 percent by 2030 and a carbon neutrality goal (by 2070) at the 2021 Glasgow COP (Modi 2021), while he refrained from any statements on the forestry sector due to India's lack of progress in this regard. This seems again like an act of strategic mimicry engagement as a response to international shaming.

Thus, the *dynamics around international social expectations* of increasing climate actions and goals may lead to more ambitious pledges over time, especially when supported through the Paris Agreement's pledge and review mechanisms and shaming and strategic mimicry around it. This was already observable in the run-up to Paris, when India formulated its (I)NDC in the context of international shaming, lesson drawing from peers like China and an aspiration for international recognition for multiple political reasons. Those "accountability politics" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 16) may increase the pressure on all states to incorporate norm interpretations by external actors (incl. from more ambitious states, IPCC, social movements) much more in the future to achieve the promised objective of the Convention to prevent dangerous climate change. This was also observable in the context of the Glasgow COP, as India only reluctantly and last-minutely (i.e., after the official deadline) started to consider updating its NDC and Modi had to announce new targets at the conference itself (Goswami 2021; Modi 2021). This supports arguments that the broader political dynamics around the pledge and review architecture of the Paris Agreement may result in a positive spiral toward higher ambitions (Falkner 2016: 1121), while the actual technical procedures of the transparency framework may be insufficient in holding states accountable in terms of the implementation, ambition and fairness of their NDCs (Gupta and van Asselt 2019: 30-31).

A ratcheting up to higher ambitions does not necessarily mean that they will directly and quickly translate into adequate implementation or even that the pledges will be sufficiently ambitious for preventing dangerous climate change. In the Indian case, no transformational change was enacted and implementation remained inadequate, which can mostly be attributed to the mechanism of competition, and the conditions of cultural resonance and material resonance. Unfortunately, this result is not limited to the Indian case, but 'talking the talk' is still more common than 'walking the walk', as shown for the Indonesian case (Höhne 2018), and also claimed more generally (Falkner 2016: 1108). Since the developing country climate mitigation norm has been treated internationally

as a form of a bottom-up contribution to the UNFCCC's objective of preventing dangerous climate change, India could easily engage in norm glocalization that benefits its economic growth agenda. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Indian government did not pull out of the Paris Agreement after the then-withdrawal of the US under Donald Trump, as the NDC approach could be aligned with its norm interpretation based on developmental climate mitigation efforts and targets.

The norm glocalization framework may therefore be helpful in further analyzing the behavior of states in circumstances that are characterized by *horizontal* (UNFCCC and G8+5/20) and *vertical institutional interlinkages* (international and domestic level) of the climate regime complex (Hickmann et al. 2020; Morin et al. 2013: 570-571). It proposes several mechanisms (strategic mimicry, shaming, competition, lesson drawing) and conditions (cultural resonance, material resonance, social reception, material reception) that may be particularly relevant for explaining state actions of other cases in the face of those interlinkages, which connects the institutional interlinkage scholarship with the global-domestic norm dynamics literature. Some climate governance scholars were very critical of the UNFCCC process (Victor 2011) and of the Post-Kyoto negotiations and proposed to shift attention to the importance of non-state climate actions (Bernstein et al. 2010: 164, 166; Hoffmann 2011: 5-7). Yet, states remain the most important GHG regulators to date (Purdon 2015; Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012), and even many non-state transnational climate initiatives are dependent upon a functioning UNFCCC process (Hickmann 2016). Moreover, I can show for the Indian case that domestic climate actions and targets have been developed in response to the evolution of the UNFCCC negotiations since 2005, indicating that the UNFCCC process has remained at the center of both international and national mitigation efforts by state governments like India. This indicates stronger interconnections by climate initiatives at multiple scales than the popular term 'polycentric governance' indicates (Jordan et al. 2018: 6; Ostrom 2014: 119).⁶⁵ While Hickmann (2016) had shown this dependence for some transnational climate initiatives toward the UNFCCC, I argue that the Indian government has strongly been influenced by international developments within the UNFCCC (but not necessarily by external actors) and minilateral fora such as the G8+5/20 that followed the UNFCCC agenda and that it, at the same time, reshaped those international developments. Yet, this only led to slightly higher ambition than business as usual developments and inadequate implementation in the Indian case, still raising questions of effectiveness of those multi-level global governance dynamics around the UNFCCC.

Quantitative research already descriptively noted a proliferation of climate strategies in the Global South from 2007 until 2012 (Dubash et al. 2013a), and of GHG emission targets from 2007 until

⁶⁵ Elinor Ostrom cites Vincent Ostrom's definition of polycentric order in which "each element acts with independence of other elements" (Ostrom 2014: 119). Yet, it is an empirical question if climate initiatives are independent from each other or whether a certain dependence toward a center or among each other exists. Obviously, the degree of dependence varies enormously depending on the climate initiative under scrutiny. In another article, she solely argues that "[e]ach unit within a polycentric system exercises considerable independence to make norms and rules within a specific domain" (Ostrom 2010: 552), which would be more open to empirical findings of dependence or connections. Yet, there is no common and jointly shared definition of polycentric governance among scholars, as the term is often used casually (Jordan et al. 2018: 10).

2017 (Iacobuta et al. 2018: 1123-1124), and I explained one particular case of this qualitatively. Therefore, the changing architecture toward bottom-up pledges under the Paris Agreement already began long before. The Bali COP represents the essential turning point in this regard with the adoption of the Bali Action Plan. By studying norm engagement in both international and domestic institutions, we gain better explanations of global-domestic norm dynamics and domestic policy evolutions. This is an important research path for broadening the global climate and environmental governance literature, which has strongly been shaped by research embedded in the tradition of neoliberal institutionalism (O'Neill 2017: 16).

8.1.6 Domestic change

The norm glocalization framework allows to reveal different forms of domestic change, including norm interpretations (see 8.1.4), *discursive* change, *policy* change, *organizational* change, and *implementation* change. In the first three stages of the Indian case study, which concerned international negotiations and domestic agenda setting (I-III), domestic change was limited to one small-scale (increase of staff) and one medium-scale (PM Council) *organizational change* as well as to first *discursive changes* (per-capita target & consideration of future non-compensated developmental climate mitigation actions). When the Indian government started to formulate domestic actions, international targets and sectorial changes (stages IV-VI), *policy changes* followed alongside fewer *organizational* and *discursive changes*. This included one first-order policy change (increasing afforestation area), four second-order policy changes (NAPCC, emission intensity target of GDP, carbon sequestration, forest quality improvement), one discursive change (REDD+ Reference Document), alongside one medium-organizational change that was subsequently reversed (Special Envoy's Office), and two small-scale organizational changes (REDD+ Cell, REDD+ Expert Committee). The last three stages of renewed international target setting, renewed sectorial changes and implementation (VII-IX) led to several *policy* and *organizational changes*, alongside *implementation*. This included three first-order policy changes (modified emission intensity target of GDP, CAMPA Fund Act, Indian Forest Act Amendment), two second-order policy changes (forest carbon sequestration target, non-fossil fuel-based energy capacity target), one discursive change (REDD+ Strategy), and five small-scale organizational changes (reconstituted REDD+ Expert Committee, Executive Committee on Climate Change, NDC Implementation Committee, Forest NDC Implementation Committee, GIM's National Governing Council). In addition, implementation included the planting of seedlings for afforestation purposes (i.e., after the issuance of implementation guidelines and the allocation of funding to states by the central government). To sum up, in the Indian case study, domestic changes hardly occurred during phases of initial negotiations and domestic agenda-setting and were limited to organizational changes and discursive changes. In the three phases of domestic actions, international target setting and sectorial changes, policy changes took centerstage. In the final stages of renewed international targets and sectorial

changes as well as implementation, organizational changes caught up again with the policy changes in order to facilitate implementation. Future studies will be needed to investigate whether similar patterns can be found in other cases as well.

In the Indian case study, strategic mimicry triggered most *policy changes* as a response to shaming or as a prevention of future shaming. Strategic mimicry in combination with lesson drawing and competition mostly shaped the content of those policy changes. Only in one case (i.e., GIM), the interaction of lesson drawing, competition and complex learning shaped the policy change. Interestingly, both the domestic action formulation (NAPCC), which occurred mostly to satisfy the international audience, and the international target settings (Copenhagen target and Paris targets) showed similarities regarding the causal complexes that shaped their formulation: Strategic mimicry, lesson drawing and competition in the context of previous or ongoing shaming, which were mostly facilitated by cultural resonance, material resonance, social reception, material reception, and less so by knowledge. Moreover, policy changes in forestry both resulted from previous climate change strategies (GIM following NAPCC) and from previous international targets (Indian Forest Act Amendment following NDC). Yet, the advancement of the REDD+ framework only resulted in discursive changes, but not in policy changes and mostly represented the status quo of India's forest policy. This indicates a fusion of governance arrangements (REDD+) and government policies (India's forest policy) without changing the latter (see also 8.1.7).

Comparing the mechanisms of the norm glocalization framework leading to policy changes in the Indian case study with the mechanisms of decarbonization pathways leading to entrenchment in the form of policy changes as theorized by other scholars (i.e., normalization, capacity building, coalition building) (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018: 198-200), similarities and differences appear. Similarities with the Indian case study only appear with regard to an emphasis on capacity building (i.e., altering capacities to act based on information, teaching, co-governance, demonstration activities, among others, according to Bernstein and Hoffmann), which seems partly comparable to the norm glocalization framework's mechanisms of lesson drawing or teaching. Otherwise, normalization processes (i.e., policy entrepreneurs' persuasion efforts and actors' build-up of appropriate practices), which partly resemble persuasion and normative mimicry, hardly appeared in the Indian case study. Moreover, coalition building in their sense (i.e., linking winners and empowering actors that have an interest in climate change) did not show up in the Indian case study, but it displays similarities with competition, as the mechanism tries to capture the idea of maximizing material benefits for concerned agents. What is missing in their framework is an account of shaming and strategic mimicry that could also be important mechanisms for scaling up or entrenching decarbonization initiatives in policy changes – at least in the short term.

None of the policy changes of this case study introduced any form of *paradigm change*. Cultural resonance and material resonance were decisive domestic conditions that prevented a paradigm change by largely facilitating mechanisms that either fostered business as usual engagements

(competition) or only minor changes (strategic mimicry, lesson drawing). Yet, even ratcheting up from business as usual actions could still be limited to business as usual developments: For example, technological advancements in industries can reduce GDP's emission intensity without any mitigation-oriented policy changes. These would still be counted against a GDP-based emission intensity target of a country, as it had occurred in the Indian case. In addition, carbon sequestration targets could be achieved through changing accounting methodologies, so that single trees outside forests and crop plantations are counted as well to mask the slow afforestation progress and continuous deforestation and forest degradation, which the Indian government chose as its approach for the NDC. Climate politics, in the Indian case, includes relabeled sectorial actions, business as usual developments and incremental change, while not engaging in transformational change. Climate actions were only advanced in policy-making when they were in line with the economic growth and sectoral development goals of the government. Apart from the NDC, which lists many sectorial actions previously initiated for non-climate reasons, Indian governments have not developed a strategic document on climate change to guide future sectorial developments since the 2008 NAPCC (see also Pillai and Dubash 2021). Moreover, the GDP-based climate mitigation targets were not even adopted as regulations or as part of a law. Scholars have found similar forms of repackaging of sectorial actions and policies, such as in the case of China's 2007 National Climate Change Program (Torney 2015b: 112). This dynamic can be observed in many countries around the world, resulting in calls by social movements like Fridays for Future for fundamental policy changes (Taylor et al. 2019), which the Indian branch now demands as well by emphasizing that "only a change in the system can sustain [...] individual changes" (Fridays for Future India 2021). This requires transformational changes, as captured by third-order policy changes in the norm globalization framework, which is so far seldomly found in climate policies around the world. An active role of the state in decarbonization processes will be needed not only in the Global North (Hildingsson et al. 2019), but also for low-carbon transformations in the Global South (Lederer et al. 2019). For a more strategic approach toward transformational change and decarbonization (incl. their implementation), norm interpretations have to change as well. The norm globalization framework can reveal important driving forces for transformational change in the form of mechanisms and facilitating conditions, while also pointing toward the decisive hurdles in this regard (also mechanisms and conditions).

Comparing India's policy changes on climate change (i.e., developmental climate mitigation actions and targets) and on climate-related forestry (i.e., afforestation with non-carbon benefits) to other states, *varieties* of policy changes become visible. On climate-related forestry, other states like Indonesia engaged substantially in REDD+ and did not focus on afforestation but initiated (limited) policy changes to reduce deforestation (Lederer et al. 2020; Lederer and Höhne 2021). On climate mitigation targets more generally, policy changes in some countries from the Global North are including absolute emission reduction targets that are more ambitious than business as usual developments (e.g., in the EU) (Höhne et al. 2021). Even in the Global South, countries such as

Indonesia have presented relative emission reduction targets (i.e., GHG reductions relative to business as usual GHG emission developments) (Höhne 2018), while India and China only presented emission intensity of GDP targets. The focus on materializing co-benefits and advancing win-win actions exists more widely in the Global South, but even then differences are observable, such as Vietnam's prioritization of wind energy and hydro (Urban et al. 2018: 559, 578), in contrast to India's promotion of solar energy. The empirical results, hence, do not indicate a homogenization of climate governance. This is in line with research that emphasized varieties in REDD+ and CDM governance and in NDC discourses (Fuhr and Lederer 2009; Jernnäs and Linnér 2019; Vijge 2016: 118-119) and that presumed that "climate action will vary enormously from country to country" (Fuhr 2021: 17). The norm glocalization framework allows to reveal the varieties of policy changes that emerge from the heterogeneity of glocalised norm interpretations and explains them based on their differing causal complexes.

Shaming contributed to triggering some initial *organizational changes* (increase of climate change staff, PM Council), while strategic mimicry was decisive to prompt most of the subsequent organizational changes (Special Envoy's Office and its subsequent closure, reconstitution of REDD+ Expert Committee, GIM's National Governing Council, Executive Committee on Climate Change, NDC Implementation Committee, Forest NDC Implementation Committee). Only in one instance, lesson drawing and competition contributed to triggering another organizational change (REDD+ Cell). Yet, organizational changes remained limited to the establishment of additional bodies outside ministry structures and without their own secretariat, while the line ministries had only seen a small increase of staff. No large-scale organizational changes could be found. While organizational change was reversed in one case (Special Envoy's Office), this initially did not result in any particular climate governance void due to the strong presence of the Minister of Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, at the time. Yet, due to the inactive status of the PM Council after the development of NAPCC's missions, a coordinating institution was lacking to further advance policy formulation and implementation. The Ministry of Environment and Forests was not able to fulfill this function, especially after the departure of Ramesh (see also Pillai and Dubash 2021). This indicates the important role of national coordinating organizations and of strong line ministerial capacities for advancing climate action, especially as climate change was solely advanced by the executive in India.

Comparing India's medium-scale organizational changes (PM Council, Special Envoy's Office) to the ones initiated by other states in the Global South, such as Indonesia, some similarities become noticeable. Indonesia also heavily relied on executive politics on climate change and established a coordinating National Council on Climate Change and even a National REDD+ Agency outside the ministry structure. Those organizations were able to initiate reform processes in the beginning. Yet, they depended on the cooperation of line ministries for advancing policy changes and implementation, which hampered further policy changes in Indonesia, and eventually led to their reversal under a new government that prevented the advancement of further policy changes and

implementation (Höhne 2018; Lederer and Höhne 2021). In India, GIM was developed by the line ministry as a response to PM Council's NAPCC, but it was not sufficiently implemented subsequently. Yet, this cannot be attributed to the relationship between the PM Council and the line ministry, but rather to a classical conflict among line ministries, as the Ministry of Finance did not allocate funding for the implementation. The PM Council did not support the Ministry of Environment and Forests in this conflict with the Ministry of Finance, as it was not active during this time and did not have its own secretariat that could have facilitated such coordination. This supports the argument that large-scale organizational changes in line ministries and supportive permanent inter-ministerial climate change bodies (with own secretariats) may both be needed to advance policy changes and implementation. Previous research has also pointed toward the necessity of establishing coordinating inter-ministerial organizations that are even able to intervene in sectorial politics to improve policy integration and implementation (von Lüpke and Well 2020: 842-843). Yet, scholars recently argued that purpose-built climate organizations have only been set-up permanently under conditions of low polarization (as in India) and mitigation-centrism (as not the case in India) (Dubash et al. 2021). This supports my argument that norm interpretations have to change as well. However, this does not preclude that powerful co-benefit-oriented inter-ministerial organizations are permanently established in order to facilitate the implementation of actions that foster both climate mitigation and other sectorial targets, such as afforestation programs like GIM. Otherwise, those win-win actions face a hard time to get implemented if the responsible line ministry has to deal with the Ministry of Finance on its own, leading to missed opportunities for the achievement of sectoral goals as well. This is also important for shifting government policies toward decarbonization, as successful implementation of co-benefit policies may support changes in norm interpretations toward stronger mitigation-centrism over time. Yet, organizational problems are not the sole reason for missed policy changes, a low climate mitigation focus or insufficient implementation.

Implementation was triggered by strategic mimicry and largely shaped by competition. Yet, implementation remained hugely inadequate, starting after years of inaction with funding allocation being restricted to one to four percent of the envisaged funding, covering only a tiny portion of the envisaged target area and neglecting the improvement of forest quality. Globalized norm interpretations, hence, do not ensure that implementation is quick and comprehensive. These results show some similarities to the implementation gaps identified by world polity researchers under the term decoupling, which they explain with low state capacities (Meyer et al. 1997: 154-155). As they understood capacities in a more general way by claiming that it was easier to change education policies than to set up schools, the results of this study also indicate the problems of the political-administrative set-up (vertical and horizontal fragmentation). Norm researchers have pointed to the importance of capacity building to overcome decoupling (Risse and Ropp 2013: 17-18). Yet, the presented Indian case study shows that other factors have to be considered as well: A political economy that prioritizes deforestation for development purposes and economic growth will not lead to the disbursement of sufficient funding and to quick advancement of afforestation activities

(material resonance). In addition, international funding has not been provided to close the domestic financing gap (material reception). Moreover, preexisting domestic norms of afforestation were taken up at the expense of improving forest quality, leading to an exclusive plantation focus (cultural resonance). Therefore, the reasons for the lack of implementation are more complex than world polity scholars previously suspected and are more related to the prioritization of conflicting goals and norms under resource constraints.⁶⁶ Climate governance scholars should focus on those content-driven reasons for lack of policy changes and implementation and should not over-emphasize the role of particular organizations. The inadequate form of implementation in the Indian case raises questions of the effectiveness of global-domestic norm dynamics, especially regarding outcomes and impacts. The norm glocalization framework can both reveal those effectiveness problems and can explain them at the domestic level, while previous research on international regimes often focused on issues at the international level (see, e.g., Young 2011). The results of the Indian case study indicate a lack of effectiveness, and research on other countries like Indonesia indicates similar problems of implementation and effectiveness (Höhne et al. 2018; Lederer et al. 2020). Yet, these may only be two cases of the varieties of different implementation pathways. While one may expect norm glocalization to lead to better policy integration and even implementation, as it integrates domestic norm interpretations based on domestic conditions, future studies need to investigate whether norm glocalization rather improves or lowers effectiveness of international norms.

8.1.7 International development cooperation

The norm glocalization framework allows to reveal both the external mechanisms and domestic conditions that hamper or facilitate *successful international development cooperation*. In the Indian case study, *material incentives* by external actors did not work out, as domestic actors perceived their amount to be too low (low material reception). The available funding for NAMA or REDD+ projects was in the millions, while the Indian government had billions sitting in the CAMPA Fund.⁶⁷ This hints at the other side of the same coin – the lack of sufficient international funding for which not even accounting rules had been agreed upon by 2021 (Timperley 2021; Weikmans and Roberts 2019: 100): The developed countries had promised climate finance of 100 billion USD per year by 2020 at the 2009 Copenhagen COP; yet, a report by Oxfam found that reported climate finance by developed countries to the Global South only amounted to 59.5 billion USD of which solely 19 billion to 22.5 billion USD were estimated to be climate-specific net assistance (i.e., grants and grant equivalents for climate-specific actions) in 2017-18 (Oxfam 2020: 8-9). Moreover, domestic actors considered the procedures for obtaining international funding, e.g., from the NAMA Facility, to be too

⁶⁶ Decoupling scholars recently introduced normative decoupling as the non-willingness to implement externally imposed norms as additional reason besides the lack of capacity (Gizelis and Joseph 2016: 543). Yet, this is not the case in India, as the norms were not externally imposed and afforestation had already been implemented for decades.

⁶⁷ Yet, for a long time these funds were not accessible and the MOEFCC had only low financial resources, still leading to an interest in receiving international funding in general.

complicated (low capacities) compared to the domestic procedures for accessing national schemes, like the National Afforestation Program. This confirms similar findings on hampering conditions for acquiring adaptation finance in India (Doshi and Garschagen 2020: 13, 15), but I reveal other important conditions that move beyond capacity issues. For example, domestic actors feared too much external scrutiny and influence in the context of development cooperation projects and did not want to be dependent on foreign aid (reversed social reception). In addition, Indian actors had a proud self-image of being able to implement plans on their own and had negative memories of failed development projects of the past (cultural resonance).

Even more importantly, the normative priorities about the cooperation focus between external funders and domestic actors were too far apart (low cultural and material resonance): Development cooperation projects would have needed to aspire transformational change toward climate mitigation for receiving NAMA funding or the reduction of deforestation (or at least of forest degradation) for obtaining REDD+ payments according to donors' priorities, while India preferred a focus on achieving economic development and an increase of afforestation. This also points to the enduring differences between external actors' and domestic actors' norm interpretations. Moreover, it also provides an idea of how donors reshape international concepts like NAMAs and REDD+ in their funding facilities (such as NAMA Facility or FCPF) by refining NAMAs to be oriented toward transformational change or by limiting REDD+ to be primarily about reducing deforestation. These are the subtler ways of how donors keep influence on climate politics in the Global South, and at the same time define the pathway and fate of internationally negotiated instruments. Yet, for emerging economies, this funding is so little that the overall impact on domestic policies is in many cases very small, unless external actors' priorities overlap with those of the domestic government, which did not occur in the Indian case.⁶⁸ But even then, domestic policy change can be hampered by important opposing forces such as powerful line ministries acting as veto-players or the lack of sufficient international payments, which, for example, is observable in the forestry sector in Indonesia (Lederer et al. 2020; Lederer and Höhne 2021). Hence, the domestic conditions, which enormously complicate any prospects of *material incentives*, at the same time, also partly reflect non-conducive international circumstances, as they indicate the mismatch between external and domestic actors' views (different norm interpretations) and performances (lack of international funding by external actors and lack of capacities by domestic actors).

Interestingly, the Indian government has consistently called for international climate funding at the international level, although it has not made sufficient efforts to acquire the little international funding available by preparing projects (in the case of NAMAs) or creating the necessary governance architecture (in the case of REDD+) at the national level. Both NAMA project development and REDD+ preparation activities stalled for years. By the end of the observation period, India had not

⁶⁸ The only priorities by the Indian government that overlapped with USAID's were to promote technical issues related to forest carbon estimation.

finalized its national REDD+ framework, although it had reshaped the concept internationally. Only in 2020, a NAMA project in the waste sector of 17 million Euro was selected as the first Indian NAMA project by the NAMA Facility (NAMA Facility 2021). Apart from the insufficient available international funding and the divergent funding priorities by donors compared to India's priorities, India's continuous demand of international funding implies that India used it as a central feature of its negotiation position: India demanded international funding to point toward the moral responsibility of the Global North to tackle climate change, to ward off external demands to increase India's own mitigation efforts, and to increase the amount of financial benefits available to all developing countries. Yet, the Indian government's interest in receiving international climate finance as an additional source of funding alongside domestic resources also seems to persist, as indicated by statements at the international and domestic level. At the Glasgow COP, Modi called for climate finance of one trillion USD by developed countries, and emphasized that pressure should be on those developed countries that do not deliver the promised funding (Modi 2021). At the domestic level, the Indian government's 2020 'Report of the Sub-Committee for the Assessment of the Financial Requirements for Implementing India's Nationally Determined Contribution', for example, perceives both international REDD+ as well as domestic CAMPA and GIM funding as viable instruments for achieving the target in the forestry sector (MOF 2020: 26).⁶⁹ This could foster the competition engagement by the Indian line ministries in the future in order to tap into international climate funding for achieving the NDC targets.

Persuasion by external actors at the domestic level as part of development cooperation hardly played a role in the Indian case study. Norway and FCPF failed in their persuasion efforts. USAID successfully cooperated with India on technical REDD+ issues, but was not able to influence the political developments around REDD+, as the Indian government was not open to such foreign influence on its policies (reversed social reception). The Indian government only accepted trainings and advice on technical aspects, such as monitoring techniques, and was interested in the advancement of sub-national pilot projects. The external donors on REDD+ like Norway, FCPF and USAID had other priorities, such as addressing degradation or deforestation. In contrast, the Indian government preferred afforestation (cultural resonance), which was also perceived to be in line with the material necessities for securing wood supply, sufficient farmers' incomes and livelihood options for rural people (material resonance). This supports previous arguments highlighting the need for donors to reduce their supply-side approach and better understand the country context of their (potential) domestic partners (Booth 2011: S18). In addition, India perceived itself as already ready for results-based finance (cultural resonance), which prevented development cooperation (incl. persuasion) on political issues related to REDD+ preparation.

⁶⁹ Yet, it also notes that the usage of REDD+ funding still requires the identification of beneficiaries and clarifications on benefit-sharing with communities. On CAMPA funding, it emphasizes that a constant flow of these resources would be contradictory to achieving the NDC forestry target as it requires further deforestation (MOF 2020: 26).

Interestingly, the lack of high and credible material prospects for REDD+ in general and for afforestation in particular (low material reception) even motivated USAID to reframe and adjust its cooperation approach in India toward generating some material benefits for the local population by promoting local livelihoods in the absence of results-based payments for REDD+. Bilateral REDD+ approaches, thereby, resulted in spill-overs that were not initially considered as the main objective of the interventions, such as the strengthening of community-based agriculture in Himachal Pradesh or, in other cases such as Indonesia, the increasing bureaucratization of forestry (Lederer and Höhne 2021). This supports previous findings that external actors can be receptive to normative priorities of domestic actors, leading to adjustments of external actors' strategies (Zimmermann 2017b). It also underpins previous arguments on conditions of successful governance by external actors in domestic target states (such as development cooperation or state-building), which emphasized the importance of external governors' legitimacy among local populations, their consideration of vested domestic interests, and the appropriate resourcing by external governors, among others (Krasner and Risse 2014: 547; Krasner and Weinstein 2014: 126; Lederer 2018: 200-202). Interestingly, the EU did not engage in a reframing and reorientation toward domestic actors' interests when trying to cooperate with the Indian government on climate and energy governance, leading to the failure of bilateral cooperation (Torney 2015b: 119). This indicates that for analyzing international development cooperation, it may be beneficial to scrutinize both domestic and external conditions that facilitate or hamper mechanisms of cooperation. On the side of external actors, this would also include a consistent and long-time commitment by donors to a particular policy instrument they promote. Too often, donors "move quickly from one instrument [...] to the next" (Bernstein and Cashore 2012: 602) based on changing fads like CDM, REDD+ (Redford et al. 2013), or the new market instrument under the Paris Agreement. Yet, this leads to recurrent processes of domestic preparations for new instruments by domestic governments and their external partners, leading to decreasing effectiveness and legitimacy of development cooperation initiatives.

Other domestic conditions also influenced the impact of persuasion in the context of development cooperation. The preexisting knowledge on forest carbon estimations clearly facilitated the development cooperation with USAID. In contrast, the lack of capacity (partly due to high rotation of bureaucrats) at state level rather prevented an uptake of those concepts (political-administrative set-up). This confirms previous findings arguing that the high rotation in bureaucracies hampers the effectiveness of trainings and eventual implementation (Rahman et al. 2020: 16). Thus, development cooperation with USAID (from 2012 until 2017) contributed to improving technical capacities on forest monitoring at the national level and resulted in some local demonstration activities that improve local livelihoods, but did not result in any policy changes and did not shape India's national REDD+ framework. Instead, the Indian government subsequently developed its REDD+ strategy on its own (from 2015 until 2019), largely repacking and reordering preexisting legislation under the umbrella of REDD+, while not concluding the preparation efforts during this period. In the absence of international REDD+ funding, the Indian government chose a REDD+ approach that will contribute

to India's domestic goals, even when future results-based payments would not flow, for example by promoting agroforestry. While it is notable that the Indian government formulated its REDD+ strategy independently, other countries such as Indonesia that had received external support, have advanced much faster on REDD+. The Indonesian government initiated policy changes in forestry and, in 2019, even reached an agreement with Norway upon first results-based payments based on reduced deforestation rates in 2017 (Lederer et al. 2020; Lederer and Höhne 2021). To be fair, countries like Indonesia also had much better material prospects, as their bilateral agreements already promised credible amounts of results-based payments. Research has shown that this is an important precondition to outweigh the perceived costs of reforms by domestic actors (Freyburg and Richter 2015). India has never had an agreement that promised results-based payment, but instead rejected offers by Norway or FCPF that could have moved in this direction. Hence, it also needs the openness of domestic actors toward external actors' persuasion efforts and their material incentives. Yet, development cooperation that goes beyond technical assistance needs to ensure sufficient and reliable international funding so that material reception is perceived as high and credible. For example, Indonesia stopped the REDD+ development cooperation with Norway, despite years of preparation efforts, arguing that the results-based payments agreed upon with Norway were not yet disbursed (MOFA 2021). This provides insights into the importance of several domestic (e.g., cultural and material resonance, material reception) and international conditions (e.g., sufficient and long-term funding) for the successful advancement of new forms of negotiated and results-based development cooperation partnerships (Dornan 2017; Molenaers et al. 2015). While we currently do not know whether climate aid generally influences climate policies due to quantitative data constraints (Kono and Montinola 2019), the Indian case study qualitatively explained that policy changes did not appear from development cooperation due to several domestic conditions (e.g., social reception, material reception, cultural resonance, material resonance) that also partly reflect upon international conditions (like lack of international funding).

Other mechanisms did not play any role for India's limited development cooperation. Some scholars emphasize forms of material or social coercion in the context of development cooperation by Western actors on Non-Western states more generally; yet, there was no instance of *coercion* and not even of *shaming* at the domestic level in the Indian case study.⁷⁰ If there was any power asymmetry between external and domestic actors in India's development cooperation, it would be at the expense of external actors. This power asymmetry in favor of domestic actors even increased under the Modi government, which terminated the cooperation with several smaller international development partners and reduced access of several international NGOs like Greenpeace and Ford Foundation (Nair and MacAskill 2015; DI-1-30112016). At least for India, and very likely for other emerging economies in the Global South, those claims are hence not convincing. Yet, in instances of weaker capacities of the central government and higher power asymmetries, such as between the

⁷⁰ In the Indian case, external actors were more successful in partly influencing domestic actors in international negotiations, but did not even try shaming at the domestic level.

US and Bangladesh, stronger influences by donors on domestic policies have been found (Rahman et al. 2016: 50-51; Rahman et al. 2018: 257). But even in aid-dependent countries, domestic actors have already rejected the implementation of policies in the context of dialogue-based conditional aid, when there was sufficient opposition and no support by domestic agents (e.g., based on cultural and material resonance) (Dornan 2017: O60). Similarly, research on negotiations for development cooperation partnerships has found instances in which weaker developing countries have successfully defended their normative position against stronger donor states (Poppe et al. 2019: 766). Research has also shown that even under conditions of power asymmetry, external actors have to aim for domestic legitimacy when promoting external norms in the target nation-state (Krasner and Risse 2014: 555-556). In the Indian case, donors had to carefully align their approach with the interests of the domestic government in order to be able to start and implement development cooperation projects. This supports the argument of this book that domestic actors have more proactive agency than often assumed – not only in norm dynamics more generally but also in development cooperation more specifically. Yet, at the same time, due to the adherence to their own priorities, domestic actors of states like India could not benefit from the little available international funding, as external actors – Western donors or multi-lateral agencies – had further reshaped internationally negotiated concepts like REDD+ and NAMAs according to their own priorities in the international facilities (NAMA Facility, FCPF) that allocate this funding. At least where funding is involved, this also indicates the enduring influence of Western external actors in global climate politics. Nevertheless, the Indian government was not dependent on the very small amount of international funding and advanced policy changes and implementation based on its glocalised norm interpretations and financed by domestic resources (even though it chose not to allocate sufficient domestic funding for implementation).

To sum up, the norm glocalization framework helps to illuminate and explain mechanisms and domestic conditions for (un)successful development cooperation and thereby contributes valuable empirical in-depth analysis and conceptual categories to the research topic of the influence of domestic factors on (climate aid) development cooperation (see, Klöck et al. 2018: 909 regarding this call for research contributions).

8.2 Reflection

By applying the norm glocalization framework, I explained India's changing norm interpretations during different stages and the resulting domestic changes. I then presented the central findings relating to important theoretical elements of the framework, such as norm glocalization stages, mechanisms, conditions, glocalised norm interpretations, multi-level global governance, domestic change and international development cooperation (see 8.1). In this sub-chapter, I reflect upon the theoretical (8.2.1) and methodological approach (8.2.2) I have taken in this study.

8.2.1 Theoretical approach

Developing and applying the *norm glocalization framework* permitted me to account for almost all empirical details I found during my research, thereby providing very comprehensive and accurate explanations of the Indian case study. It allowed me to integrate actions by external and domestic actors, to cover developments at both the international and the domestic level and to span different stages from contestation to implementation. The mechanisms that explained actions by states both comprise more structural (e.g., normative mimicry) and more agential elements (e.g., persuasion). Some of those mechanisms are guided by the logic of appropriateness (persuasion) or by the logic of consequences (e.g., competition), while others are steered by both (e.g., strategic mimicry). They include both mechanisms induced by external (e.g., persuasion) or by domestic actors (e.g., complex learning). The domestic conditions that hampered or facilitated the workings of mechanisms similarly comprised both more structural (e.g., political-administrative set-up) and more agential elements (e.g., opposition). Some of those conditions even included characteristics of both, such as material or cultural resonance, which imply more structural features that, however, can be very different depending on the standpoint of the beholder. This short summary of categorizations already indicates that the norm glocalization framework bridges several schools of thoughts and sub-disciplines in an effort of eclecticism. The center of the norm glocalization framework is the central government, whose actions are explained. This framework allowed me to cover different kinds of policy events and processes like international negotiations, donor project implementation, domestic policy formulation and policy implementation.

The case study findings are specific to the Indian case. Nonetheless, this framework can be used to analyze other *developing country cases in the climate regime* and it is likely that similar patterns will be observable, such as the strong shaming by developed countries and the strategic mimicry by (some) developing countries around important conferences like the 2007 Bali COP, the 2009 Copenhagen COP or the 2015 Paris COP. This framework can be used to qualitatively explain for single cases the upspring of national action plans from 2007 until 2012 (Dubash et al. 2013a), and of GHG emission targets from 2007 until 2017 (Iacobuta et al. 2018: 1123-1124) that has been quantitatively noted in the Global South. In other country cases, material incentives may have played a stronger role, but this is not certain, as international climate funding was very small and industrialized countries hardly provided sufficient material incentives to change domestic policies in developing countries. Competition can be expected to have played a role in many developing countries, as most of them strive for economic growth and international funding. Persuasion can be expected to be higher for other developing countries, as the Indian government is a particularly hard case for this due to its domestic conditions of cultural resonance and social reception. Even in the Indian case, there may have been instances of persuasion behind closed doors of bilateral gatherings that I could not account for, as I did not find any indications of it. Yet, coercion is very unlikely to have played any role in this policy field (see also Jodoin 2017b: 206), and no empirical evidence hinted toward its activation. Similarly, normative mimicry is unlikely to be observable, as it

is a mechanism that has usually been proven by quantitative research, while qualitative research often found other reasons.

Regarding domestic conditions, *similar conditions are likely to play a role in other developing countries* as well, yet in different forms. Mitigation actions and goals are more likely to be adopted if they are closely related to sectoral developments and plans (cultural resonance) and if they are in line with perceived material necessities and developments (material resonance). Similarly, material prospects are also likely to be rather low, while expectations may be rather high. Other developing countries, and particularly the emerging economies, will also strive to be recognized internationally. Lack of capacities or governmental fragmentation may also hamper developments in other cases. Given that the Indian government's relatively decent administrative capacity was not able to produce a higher level of preexisting knowledge, it is unlikely that other developing countries will have a higher level in this regard. Yet, opposition may be stronger in other cases that are characterized by higher polarization. This indicates that the mechanisms and conditions developed in this framework will also be beneficial for analyzing other cases of developing countries in the climate regime. Some of the empirical results may even show many similarities with India, but I do not claim, as positivists would do, that all developing countries will display the same patterns in their climate policy evolution.

What about *other explanatory factors*? I distinguish between two alternatives here: the domestic politics story and structural factors. One might suspect that the development of India's national action plan and GDP-based climate mitigation targets may be exclusively a *domestic politics story*. As the norm glocalization framework already includes the possibility of the central government to engage in complex learning, lesson drawing, competition, normative and strategic mimicry itself, the drivers of change would need to come from outside the government. Similar to developments in 2019 or in 2021, one would expect street demonstrations by citizens demanding climate action by their government. Or one would guess that civil society organizations, parliamentarians or domestic scientists lobbied the central government for domestic change. Alternatively, demands for domestic change or, more indirectly, inspiration may arise from actions by subnational governments like states or cities. Or elections could bring another political party to power, which would then enact policy changes. Lastly, business associations might be expected to lobby for a domestic change toward clean technologies or to oppose such a domestic change when it threatens their business models. Yet, none of these different domestic factors has shaped the Indian case study in a comprehensive form. Only one instance could be found, when Rajendra Pachauri, IPCC's and TERI's then-chairman, in February 2007, urged the government to establish a climate change task force, while, in addition, parliamentarians raised concerns over the IPCC report in a debate in May 2007 (Sethi 2007a; Stevenson 2012: 149-150). Yet, no clear causal chain could be found that links these events to Prime Minister Singh's actions, such as the establishment of the PM Council, which have mostly been driven by external shaming at the time. Otherwise, the parliament, scientists or civil society organizations were no drivers of change in the Indian case study, as climate change was not widely discussed or of strong concern at the time. In addition, Indian NGOs shared many of the

government's positions on climate change (Sengupta 2019: 133; Vihma 2011: 82). The critique of the Indian government by Greenpeace India in 2007, which was orchestrated by Greenpeace International, was even widely criticized in the Indian public sphere, among other reasons for undermining India's negotiation stance (Aamodt 2018: 369; Dubash 2013: 196). Similarly, when a non-state initiative called 'Campaign for Progressive Climate Policy in India' submitted demands to Prime Minister Singh shortly before the 2009 Copenhagen COP (Dubash 2013: 195; Raghunandan 2019: 196-197), these were not backed by other NGOs, who continued to support the government's stance. In the end, their demands were not included in the government position (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 478).

Only *more recently*, new civil society movements like 'Fridays for Future India' have also started to protest on the street (Fridays for Future India 2021). This growing societal interest in climate change may even lead to a greater role for the judiciary in the future, as a case filed by a child against the Indian government for failing to take sufficient climate action is pending in the Supreme court (Varagur 2020). States and cities have not been frontrunners in India and in most cases reacted to demands by the central government (Hickmann et al. 2017: 338; Stehle et al. 2020: 8; NI-15122016, CI-27042018, CI-02122016); yet, this may change in the future, as cities and states are already facing more climate impacts and are increasingly confronted with potential climate actions. As climate change policy making increasingly affects sectorial developments and policies, it will gradually produce winners and losers, which will also have a greater impact on party politics. Thus, the domestic politics story may increase in the future, but these factors can easily be included in the norm glocalization framework by adding mechanisms such as *domestic mobilization* and *lobbying by non-state actors* (Jodoin 2017b: 21) or even *coercion by the judiciary*. At the same time, many domestic factors are already included in the norm glocalization framework, especially in the form of domestic conditions. Particularly the more agential aspects of domestic politics can already be captured in the domestic conditions of opposition (e.g., from non-state actors or parliamentarians) and of political-administrative set-up (e.g., horizontal or vertical coordination, including the role of other ministries, states and cities if there had been any).

What about *structural factors*? These could include discourses that set social limits of what is thinkable in the first place. Alternatively, they could comprise material structures like the existence of the capital system that produces material necessities that are immanent to the system. These would also cover rapid technological changes that impact agents structurally (e.g., digitalization). Or they could comprise uneven relationships and power hierarchies between the hegemon (i.e., the US) or a broader number of nation-states that are at the core (e.g., the Global North) and those that are at the periphery, shaping world politics (for an overview, see Paterson and P-Laberge 2018). Yet, the norm glocalization framework already incorporates aspects of those structural factors in the framework. Normative mimicry represents a structural account of the diffusion of ideas and organizational templates that represent specifications of broader discourses, but I could not find any evidence of this in the Indian case study. Instead, agential capacities were decisive as well, as the

Indian government engaged in strategic mimicry for other foreign policy purposes. Dominant domestic norms and discourses are reflected upon in cultural resonance. Yet, it is important how agents perceive those discourses and norms. Similar, the pursuit of material necessities and goals within the capitalist and uneven world system, whether conscious or not, can also be found in the mechanism of competition, while the material resonance reflects the perceived material necessities that need to be accommodated at the domestic level. Technological changes can then shape the material resonance and the competition engagement in the norm glocalization framework. The case study showed that the Indian government continuously brought its mitigation approach in line with its economic growth imperative, which hints toward the important role of material structural factors. Nevertheless, too much of the entire story would be lost if scholars focused only on this aspect, as other factors also played a role. Pressure by a hegemon, the US, was incorporated in the form of shaming. Yet, India did not adopt the kind of approaches that the US demanded, as it rejected quantitative commitments. As soon as structural factors changed, such as domestic discourses or material necessities, this could be incorporated in the cultural and material resonance of the norm glocalization framework, as those conditions are not understood as static, but as evolving. The norm glocalization framework, thus, integrates both structural and agential explanations. In my view, pure structural explanations would fall short by overemphasizing only one aspect of the story.

What else could have added to the understanding of the case? I identify two additional pillars: the subnational state level and international conditions. The case study was situated at the national level. As the *subnational state level* did not play any prominent role in India's climate policy evolution, I refrained from including it in the norm glocalization. Yet, in India, the implementation occurs at the state level. I focused on the national aspects of the implementation process, such as the allocation of funding and the provision of implementation guidelines, alongside accompanying policy and organizational changes. As I did not examine the specific planting steps at the state level, I limited the analysis to reports about the overall output and outcome of the national implementation, which indicated that it has been inadequate. In addition, I conducted expert interviews in three different Indian states that covered the GIM implementation part in order to reveal the current status in some states and the facilitating and hampering conditions in this process. A more comprehensive study could include the state level in the norm glocalization framework. Yet, the chosen approach for the Indian case study permitted to sufficiently capture both mechanisms and conditions of the implementation stage. Cases that empirically include more vertical dynamics between the national and subnational levels over the entire norm glocalization process and that are interested in subnational government's actions could start from the perspective of the state level and could assign external actor mechanisms (persuasion, coercion, material incentives, shaming) to the central government (vertical level) and to foreign actors like donors (horizontal level), while assigning state level governments the mechanisms of domestic actors (lesson drawing, complex learning, normative mimicry, strategic mimicry).

Other aspects that could have expanded the norm glocalization approach would have been the integration of *international conditions* alongside domestic conditions. These could have included, for example, the amount of funding provided by external actors or the quality of the arguments used by external actors in persuasion. However, those international conditions are already partly incorporated in domestic conditions and external actors' mechanisms of the norm glocalization framework. For example, the amount of international funding is reflected both in the material incentives offered to the Indian government and in the domestic condition that the material support is perceived to be credible and sufficient (material reception). In contrast, the quality of the arguments used in persuasion attempts could have indicated shortcomings on the part of international donors, while this framework only revealed domestic hampering and facilitating conditions. Yet, as additional international conditions would have made the framework even more complex and as they are partly reflected upon in domestic conditions or mechanisms, I refrained from including them. In other cases, it may be more beneficial to include international conditions alongside domestic conditions.

To sum up, the norm glocalization framework integrates mechanisms and conditions that emerged from different schools of thoughts and sub-disciplines. The relevance and added value of the categories of the norm glocalization framework is demonstrated in the case study. Elements of domestic politics and of structural factors were even partly incorporated in the framework, while it is very unlikely that a focus on either one of those alternatives in isolation would provide better explanations of the case. Future studies could expand the norm glocalization framework further to include subnational levels and international conditions, which was not necessary for explaining the Indian case study.

8.2.2 Methodological approach

The *norm glocalization framework permits to embrace the complexity of the social world*. In order to explain the social world, it allows to combine several explanatory causal mechanisms that are facilitated or hampered by domestic conditions. This increasing comprehensibility and explanatory power with respect to a particular case comes at two costs. First, it does not allow for *parsimony*. Neo-positivists aspire to reduce social complexity to the point where they can identify one or two causal factors that explain the case. Yet, this is at odds with a scientific realist perspective that attempts to capture the complexity of the social world through comprehensive explanatory frameworks. Thus, the norm glocalization approach makes it possible not only to explain a portion of the empirical events, but to provide much more detailed, comprehensive and accurate explanations of social processes. Causal complex process tracing was helpful for illuminating the complex and changing relationships among various mechanisms and conditions, which would not have been possible with semi-positivist process tracing approaches that seek to illuminate only one or very few causal factors.

Yet, to keep complexity in check, based on my abductive research process, I limited the explanatory mechanisms driving Indian norm engagement to three mechanisms initiated by external actors and to five mechanisms initiated by domestic actors, as well as to seven domestic conditions that could facilitate or hamper them. As mentioned above, I did not further include international conditions or more domestic politics' mechanisms (e.g., mobilization), as I attempted to maximize causal explanatory power at a level that simultaneously minimizes complexity given the empirical evidence. This complexity reduction could have been further improved by eliminating the mechanisms of normative mimicry and of material incentives, as they did not shape the case study. However, I wanted to show the difference between the mechanisms of normative mimicry and strategic mimicry and therefore kept an open mind for potential instances of normative mimicry. Similarly, as I found evidence of an attempt to provide material incentive, I did not rule out this mechanism either. However, there was no reason to include the mechanism of coercion because it was very unlikely to play a role in this policy field, so I excluded it from the analytical framework. However, scholars who wish to apply the framework to another policy field, such as human rights or security, may add this mechanism to the external actors' mechanisms. Thus, parsimony is not achievable with such a methodological approach. Parsimony helps neo-positivists to make generalizable statements for a universe of cases, but it also implies stronger relationships between few variables (e.g., two to three) than a more comprehensive account of the complexity of the social world would support. This brings us to the second consequence of scientific realists' complexity.

Second, the case study findings are not empirically *generalizable* to a universe of cases. Neo-positivists provide a case selection to be able to make empirically generalizable statements for the whole universe of cases. However, one must wonder whether this is convincing for the social world, since one can never be sure whether the empirical findings of one case really explain another case of the same universe, since cases are never completely alike. Scientific realists, in contrast, only aim for context-dependent and situational explanations. This provides very detailed and convincing explanations of social events, much better than the neo-positivists could provide, and thus increases our understanding of how politics actually works. Scientific realists do not aspire empirical generalizability, but instead strive to generate insights about mechanisms and conditions that can be used to provide generalizations about particular elements of the framework, such as mechanisms and conditions that are applicable to other cases (Jackson 2011: 199). The goal is to illuminate new mechanisms, new conditions, or new relationships between them, and to further develop the general framework to serve as a starting point for investigating other cases, allowing better explanations of them. It is then the task of other researchers to apply the conceptualized relationships regarding norm glocalization of this study to other cases and to refine them based on their empirical evidence. Moreover, scientific realist research can raise new research questions by revealing new gaps to be filled by future research.

In this study, I revealed findings that are at odds with the preexisting norm literature, such as the emergence of glocalized norm interpretations through mechanisms induced by both external and

domestic actors. I uncovered a new mechanism (i.e., strategic mimicry), refined existing conditions, theorized the ways in which mechanisms and conditions influence glocalized norm interpretations, and highlighted interesting causal complexes that could also serve as a starting point for other case studies, leading to further development and refinement of the norm glocalization framework. Moreover, it is also possible to make some broader considerations about what could be empirically expected without claiming that this would occur in this regard in every other case. I already noted which mechanisms and which conditions will be more likely in the cases of developing countries in the climate regime (see 8.2.1). When analyzing other cases with another background, it is unlikely that the same causal complexes shape the same norm glocalization stages. Yet, broader patterns could be highlighted that transcend the policy field. For example, it is more likely that shaming and strategic mimicry play a more important role in the international context or that lesson drawing increases in relevance in the stages of domestic action formulation and sectorial changes. Similarly, it is possible to point out some more general relationships that are very likely to be found across several cases. For example, it is very likely that strategic mimicry will be facilitated by social reception and/or material reception, as those are the most important conditions for this mechanism. Similarly, shaming is very likely to be facilitated by social reception. In general, most of the mechanisms and conditions will be useful for analyzing even completely different policy fields because they are so generic and span several social logics of action and structural and agential capacities, which allows for their broad applicability.

Even though scientific realists strive to provide the best available explanation of the social world, they are well aware that this will remain an *interpretation* in itself. Nevertheless, they try to get as close to reality as possible by triangulating different sources. For this reason, I conducted two field trips to India and interviewed experts at the national and state level from various backgrounds including ministries, consultancies, donors, scientists and NGOs involved in the processes under investigation. I triangulated this data with an extensive amount of primary and secondary documents. Yet, it still remains my particular analysis of the Indian case study, which is also more or less consciously shaped by my background as an academic from Germany. Yet, the analysis is intersubjectively understandable and transparent. Moreover, I am confident that based on my extensive reading of available primary and secondary documents and my extensive interviews with experts from diverse background, I reduced any potential conscious or unconscious bias as much as possible to get as close as possible to the reality of Indian climate policy evolution, even though this itself will always remain an interpretation.

The case of India permitted to explain the changes from norm contestation to implementation by a rising power. Similar patterns may also be found for other emerging economies in the climate regime, especially in the context of major conferences, while implementation could look quite different. What would one expect in the case of smaller powers or autocratic regimes? First, I argue that not only emerging economies have sufficient resources and power to glocalize norms rather than adopting the interpretations by external actors. Research had shown the success of *small powers* (i.e., less

powerful and less affluent developing countries than emerging economies) in negotiations with donors at the domestic level, indicating that power asymmetries do not necessarily need to translate into negotiation asymmetries (Poppe et al. 2019: 766). This may also be the case in negotiations at the international level, especially when the consensus principle applies. Particularly in the climate regime, some influential ideas were lobbied for by smaller powers, such as reducing deforestation by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea. Similarly, most developing countries have presented conditional relative emission targets in their first NDCs, while developed countries communicated absolute targets (Tobin et al. 2018), indicating that developing countries continue to prioritize their own economic development. While it may be theoretically expectable that small powers incorporate more interpretations by external actors into their own approaches, they still need to align the international norm with their own domestic context and goals, leaving sufficient leeway for norm glocalization. As coercion is not being used by external actors in the climate regime, and material incentives are too few to trigger major shifts in domestic politics, it is likely that small powers also glocalize norms. Even when large powers from the Global North (i.e., more powerful and affluent industrialized countries) exert social pressure, it often vanishes at the domestic level, where domestic actors have sufficient leeway to reshape the norm interpretation. Given that the international climate regime lacks sufficient monitoring and enforcement rules, the varieties of norm engagement at the domestic level can hardly be held accountable at the international level. Thus, there is little reason to limit the expectation of norm glocalization to emerging economies only. India also faced power asymmetries vis-à-vis the US and other industrialized countries, especially when it came to recognition of its nuclear status, support for a permanent or non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, or its reliance on open trade arrangements (without carbon-border adjustments). Future research, however, needs to examine in what ways norm glocalization in small powers differs from that in rising powers.

Second, I do not expect to find fundamentally different theoretical and even empirical patterns for *autocratic states*. China as an autocratic regime showed similar patterns to India in the context of the COPs in 2007, 2009 and 2015 by presenting national action plans or mitigation targets to signal their contribution to the global response to climate change. International social pressure seems to influence them, at least to some extent and depending on the policy field. This points to the workings of shaming and strategic mimicry in the Chinese case. Similarly, lesson drawing and competition can be expected as well. Chinese scientists even recently argued that the Chinese nation-state derives its domestic legitimacy not only from economic growth but increasingly from its engagement in environmental protection (Teng and Wang 2021). Moreover, the democratic constitution of the Indian nation-state did not have much influence on the case study, as changing governments or opposition hardly played a role. Horizontal and vertical coordination problems can also arise in autocratic regimes, and Chinese scholars particularly emphasized the problem of insufficient implementation of central government's environmental plans by subnational governments (Teng and Wang 2021). Moreover, the domestic conditions of the norm glocalization framework are general enough to be

relevant to both democratic and autocratic regimes. Nor can autocratic regimes be assumed to be more or less prone to norm glocalization. Thus, one can expect that the norm glocalization framework is beneficial for analyzing all nation-states, irrespective of their regime type.

Finally, as far as the boundaries of the case are concerned, the *time period* is also important. I chose a timeline that began with the post-Kyoto negotiations in 2005, as the period before was characterized by the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol and its rules, which targeted industrialized countries (with the exception of the CDM), and its subsequent implementation. Developing countries such as India were not adopting or implementing any climate actions at the time, and domestic actions were limited to mostly private projects under the CDM (even though this also required some national rules). In 2005, both discussions on mitigation actions by developing countries, which resulted in the NAMA concept in 2007 and the NDC concept in 2014/15, as well as negotiations on the REDD+ arrangement began. Studying these concepts together was beneficial, as I scrutinized how India started to address climate mitigation in the forestry sector, which concerns all three concepts, even leading to their increasing integration at the domestic level in later norm glocalization stages. The case study ends with the end of 2019. My two field trips took place in November and December 2016 and from February to the end of April 2018. It was possible to follow the further developments of the case study until the end of 2019, but I decided to end the timeline then due to the emergence of a new epoch shaped by the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020 onwards. Obviously, the further the observation period would be extended, the more implementation outputs would be likely to be observed. However, GIM was already adopted in 2010, giving the Indian government more than nine years to implement it. The relative success of the implementation will not increase much with more implementation years, while the absolute output might grow. Nor are the particular hindering or facilitating conditions of the implementation process likely to change fundamentally. The period from 2020 onwards has been marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, raising new and different problems. Moreover, the Glasgow COP, originally scheduled for November 2020 but held a year later, led to a new cycle of international demands for updated NDCs, prompting Prime Minister Modi to announce new climate targets in November 2021. Therefore, although the developments since 2020 could also be analyzed using the existing tools of the norm glocalization framework, I argue that I chose an appropriate end point of my observation period.

How could this *methodological approach be expanded*? For example, it would be useful to make comparisons between different cases. Because the application of the scientific realist methodology, especially over longer observation periods, is a space- and time-consuming endeavor, I refrained from including a second case country in this study. However, doing so may provide an avenue to uncover similar theoretical relationships (e.g., strategic mimicry facilitated by social and material reception) and empirical patterns (e.g., strategic mimicry in the context of large international conferences). This may also show that there is greater variation in the preparation and implementation of international pledges due to differences in domestic circumstances. However, if similarities appear, this will reinforce the expectations of similar patterns. Such a comparison could

ideally also include different sectors. Particularly the solar sector would be an interesting sector for comparison in the case of India, because of its enormous importance for India's GHG emissions and economic development, which I could not consider due to space- and time-constraints. In the solar sector, the implementation record is much better than in the forestry sector. I chose the forestry sector instead because it allowed me to study how India engaged with both international developments on NAMAs/NDCs and REDD+, further supporting my findings of norm glocalization when occurring in those two contexts. Cross-country and cross-sectoral comparisons could therefore be useful for finetuning or expanding the boundaries of the norm glocalization framework.

8.3 Moving forward

After contextualizing the central findings and reflecting on the theoretical and methodological approach, in this sub-chapter, I provide an outlook on potential future research directions (8.3.1). Based on the results of this study, I then present some policy implications and end with several policy recommendations (8.3.2).

8.3.1 Future research

Future research would greatly benefit from *using the norm glocalization framework to analyze other cases, norms and policy fields*. This would increase our knowledge about the similarities and differences regarding norm glocalization stages, causal complexes, dominant mechanisms and conditions and their effects on norm glocalization, as well as varieties of glocalized norm interpretations and domestic changes. It would also enable insights into the interaction patterns between external and domestic actors as well as between international institutions, mini-lateral forums and domestic politics. Moreover, we could learn about important mechanisms and conditions for successful development cooperation. Promising policy fields could be human rights or trade. This framework may be particularly useful for those issue areas that do not involve international enforcement mechanisms, such as the Sustainable Development Goals. The further application of the norm glocalization framework and its future advancement will increase our understanding about global-domestic norm dynamics.

Further applying the norm glocalization framework will be particularly useful *in the policy field of climate change*, which is characterized by bottom-up pledges in the international pledge-and-review system of the Paris Agreement. Such application would increase our knowledge on the decisive drivers and their facilitating and hampering conditions as well as the varying glocalized norm interpretations and domestic changes. This would sharpen our understanding of vertical and horizontal institutional interlinkages and of multi-level global governance dynamics in the climate regime. The norm glocalization framework can then be used to explain transformational change or the persistence of business as usual actions. Future research should investigate if similar patterns

can be found around international conferences as in the Indian case with strategic mimicry following upon shaming. Announcements of new climate action plans and carbon neutrality by China shortly before international conferences point toward the possibility of similar patterns and explanations in other cases as well. This framework can qualitatively explain the upspring of national action plans and mitigation targets around the world and could illuminate the causal complexes that facilitated those developments.

Future research that applies the norm glocalization framework could include *comparisons* in order to scrutinize similarities and differences. This could include a second case country, allowing for a comparison between states with similar status as emerging economies or among states with smaller powers and states with larger powers. Moreover, democracies could be compared with autocracies in order to scrutinize the usefulness of this framework for explaining actions by autocratic governments. In addition, different sectors could be compared, such as the forestry sector with the energy sector in order to reveal different workings of mechanisms and conditions. Even within one particular country, different subnational entities could also be compared in order to reveal different pathways of policy development and implementation.

Future research could *further expand the norm glocalization framework*. Mechanisms of domestic politics, such as mobilization (e.g., street protests) and non-state lobbying as well as judicial coercion (e.g., by the Supreme Court) could be added to include domestic politics more comprehensively. This could be helpful to analyze climate policies shaped by more recent empirical developments around Fridays for Future demonstrations and climate litigation cases. Moreover, the framework could be expanded to include norm glocalization dynamics at the subnational level by shifting the focus to explain state government actions or city actions, which could incorporate vertical coercion by the upper governmental level as a further vertical mechanism for change. In the spirit of multi-level governance, this could still include horizontal mechanisms initiated by external actors like donors (e.g., material incentives or persuasion). Cases with a prominent focus on development cooperation could incorporate international conditions (e.g., amount of funding provided, quality of the argument) alongside domestic conditions to capture both sides more comprehensively. Lastly, this framework could be applied to explain the behavior of companies, which may require other domestic conditions. In the climate change policy field, a combination with transition research as well as a stronger focus on business-state relationships could therefore be productive.

Apart from explaining global-domestic norm dynamics through applying the norm glocalization framework, *three further research questions are worth considering in future research*. First, does norm glocalization improve or lower the effectiveness of internationally negotiated norms? A better fit to the domestic context may increase the likelihood of smooth implementation, yet it may also reduce the transformational character of implementation. Second, what are the unintended consequences or spill-overs of norm glocalization? For example, from the perspective of the initial proposals and negotiations on REDD+, the bureaucratization of forestry (Lederer and Höhne 2021)

or the strengthening of indigenous rights (Jodoin 2017b: 189) could be perceived as unintended consequences or spill-overs. In the Indian case, this would include the promotion of agroforestry. Under what conditions do we observe those spill-overs? Third, what are the normative implications of norm glocalization? Such a line of research could incorporate theories of political thought and social justice and could position itself in relation to question of effectiveness and of climate justice.

What are related aspects that concern the broader *climate governance literature*? First, climate governance research too often describes or explains the emergence of policy outputs, but falls short in scrutinizing their implementation or effectiveness. This produces the overall positive perception that multiple actors are engaging on climate change, such as governmental or non-state actors, while too few scholars ask to what extent this leads to changing policies, implementation, long-time endurance and eventually to the reduction of GHG emissions. Future research should investigate these issues of effectiveness and should therefore focus on how climate change considerations travel into sectoral policies, goals and actions. Second, global climate governance scholarship too often solely focuses on interactions at the international level. Scholars note fragmentation and institutional interlinkages, but too seldom include domestic politics as well. The norm glocalization framework showed the benefit of analyzing the interactions between the UNFCCC, mini-lateral forums and domestic politics and future research should continue down this pathway. Third, the climate and environmental governance literature should critically question the impulse of different kinds of actors to create ever new fads (Redford et al. 2013). Moving from CDM to REDD+ to the new market mechanism of the Paris Agreement, donors establish new preparation funds and capacity programs in which developing countries participate for several years to prepare for their effective implementation. However, results-based implementation and payments hardly happen in the end, while yet another new fad is already around the corner and the preparation activities start all over again. Such research should also critically investigate the effectiveness of climate aid and the conditions of successful development cooperation. Lastly, future research should investigate whether climate change coordinating institutions outside of sectoral line ministries or within them are best suited to advance climate actions, and which policy instruments are most successful in getting sectorial ministries to advance climate mitigation and adaptation alongside their sectorial goals.

Finally, what are related aspects that concern the *broader global governance literature*? First, the question remains as to what impact the increasing rise of emerging economies is having on global governance. How will burdens and responsibilities be shared between the old and new major powers in the face of global crises and challenges? In this case study, the Indian government felt the international expectations to take responsibility in the face of global climate change and responded in its own way without neither fully matching developed countries' expectations nor fully sticking to its prior positions that only perceived a Global North responsibility. What kind of effects can we find for other emerging economies and in other policy fields? Second, questions of conflicts between different norms and prioritizations are of imminent importance, as they shape norm interpretations. Those norm conflicts exist in many policy fields and are often institutionalized in international regimes

and international organizations, as nation-states with different priorities ensured their incorporation in the negotiations leading to their foundations. Lastly, multi-level (global) governance is too often used as a descriptive heuristic. Future research should continue down the pathway laid out in the norm globalization framework to specify mechanisms and conditions of vertical and horizontal dynamics within multi-level global governance. This will further increase our understanding of global-domestic norm dynamics.

8.3.2 Policy implications and recommendations

Practically, the question remains if India's climate targets and actions are sufficient to prevent dangerous climate change. India proposed rather unambitious targets and win-win actions that it would have taken to some extent anyhow, while shying away from measures that involved costly trade-offs, such as on deforestation and degradation or coal usage. Yet, we know from political debates in other countries, including from the Global North, that addressing trade-offs is the hardest part of climate policy-making, which is too often avoided. Moreover, this opens up questions of what would be India's appropriate contribution to the global response to climate change. Yet even when India's fair share of the remaining carbon budget is taken into account, climate targets and actions are rated as highly insufficient for reaching the 1.5 degree Celsius target, according to the Climate Action Tracker (2021). In the Indian case, but also in many other instances around the world, sectorial development and economic growth goals frequently trump mitigation goals. Instead of turning this hierarchy of norms around by changing the policy paradigm, governments at best formulate win-win actions in the spirit of green growth that result in slightly higher mitigation achievements than business as usual actions, but fall way short of triggering the transformational changes needed to prevent dangerous climate change. I therefore concur with Bernstein's assessment twenty years ago: "Liberal environmentalism risks justifying inaction if tough regulatory choices, which imply trade-offs with market values, are necessary to get the desired ecological effects" (Bernstein 2002a: 14).

Similarly, India's organizational changes are insufficient to steer the various sectorial ministries toward mitigating climate change. India's largest organizational changes were medium-scale and were enacted outside ministries, such as the establishment of the PM Council. This makes them easily reversible, as it could be observed in the case of the Special Envoy's Office. Other small-scale organizational changes were largely temporary, such as the establishment of committees, while no major changes occurred in line ministries. This was masked by renaming MOEF to MOEFCC, without any accompanying organizational changes within the ministry. India, instead, needs a strong coordinating organization with an own secretariat that has the political backing to coordinate, steer, monitor and check line ministries in issues concerning climate change mitigation and adaptation. However, this requires the political commitment that is still lacking from the Indian government.

India has made very little progress in implementing its climate-related forestry programs and targets through the observation period, and continues to face deforestation and degradation. It took India eleven years from the initial announcement of the idea to utilize CAMPA funding for climate-mitigation oriented afforestation activities to its actual disbursement (2008 to 2019) and five years from GIM formulation to the start of the implementation of its first afforestation activities (2010 to 2015). However, only one to four percent of the initially envisaged annual GIM funding was disbursed for its implementation. This only led to nine percent of the planned annual interventions on afforestation in 2015/16 (45,000 ha instead of planned annual interventions on 500,000 ha for reaching the envisaged target of five million ha afforestation over the ten years of the program), while not implementing any hectare toward the target of improving forest quality of additional five million ha. As survival rates of seedlings had been low in the past, ranging from ten to twenty percent, probably only one to two percent of the envisaged afforestation area (instead of the nine percent) was afforested and survived. These numbers indicate the insufficient volumes and timeframes to effectively prevent dangerous climate change. According to the Indian State of Forest report of 2019, the Indian government reports expanding forest and tree cover outside of recorded forest areas, which by Indian definition include fruit gardens and agricultural plantations, while recorded forest areas have declined, indicating continuous deforestation and degradation (Carboncopy 2020; Choudhary 2020). Moreover, recent research even showed that previous afforestation programs in North India have failed to accomplish an expansion of forest cover (Coleman et al. 2021; Jones 2021), raising the question whether realizing the NDC forestry target is feasible. For achieving the NDC forestry target, the Indian government even relies on tree planting outside forests, which is not in line with UNFCCC's understanding of forests (GI-2-13032018). Current official forest carbon sequestration numbers indicate that India will fall very short on reaching the NDC forestry target by 2030, as the annual carbon sequestration was reported to be only 78 Mt CO₂eq in 2017 and 2018, respectively, according to the Indian State of Forest Report of 2019 (PIB 2019). Over a 15-year period, this would result in official carbon sequestration of only 1.173 Gt CO₂eq instead of the promised 2.5 to 3 Gt CO₂eq. This may also be why Prime Minister Modi did not report progress on afforestation or forest carbon sequestration at the COP in Glasgow in November 2021 and instead sought to highlight achievements in other sectors (Modi 2021).

For economic and political reasons, progress is much higher on solar energy, while India still continues to rely on coal for achieving its high economic growth goals. As part of its Covid-19 response package, the Indian government announced the further expansion of coal mining, even in biodiversity-rich natural forests, despite higher potential for job creation in the solar industry and lower prices for solar energy. In addition, the envisaged increasing coal usage seems not needed as energy demand has been lower than predicted (Ellis-Petersen 2020; UNEP 2020: 45), and the Indian government also pursues a renewable energy target of 450 to 500 GW by 2030, which Modi announced in 2018 (Jaffrelot and Ganesh RS 2020). According to the economic growth rate targets of 8.6 percent that are the basis for India's INDC calculations, India's absolute GHG emissions will

rise to 7.8 Gt CO₂eq by 2030 (Dubash and Khosla 2015: 11), and its per capita emissions will increase to 6.5 tons CO₂eq/per capita based on 2014 population levels (i.e., 1.2 billion according to GOI 2015: 6), overrunning US's current absolute GHG emissions (5.79 Gt CO₂eq in 2018) (Climate Watch 2021b) and almost reaching EU (27)'s current per capita GHG emissions (7.46 Gt CO₂eq/per capita in 2018) (Climate Watch 2021d). Prime Minister Modi (2015a) and his government like to speak about how Indians are "living in harmony with [nature]" (Abraham 2020), but the Modi government, actually, prioritizes economic self-reliance through promoting coal mining and usage, increasing wood supply, and growing palm oil development in order to reduce sensitive imports in the energy, forest and agricultural sector (Jaffrelot and Ganesh RS 2020; NPR 2018; The Hindu 2020b; Vishandaas and Thakwani 2020). At the same time, in 2019, the Modi government set the target to reach a GDP level of 5 trillion USD by 2024, which would necessitate an economic growth rate of nine percent per year (The Economic Times 2020). Not surprisingly, the Climate Action Tracker recently re-evaluated its categorization of India's climate policy performance and now lists India's actions and targets as highly insufficient for limiting global warming to 1.5 degree Celsius (Climate Action Tracker 2021). At the moment, it seems that the Indian government will only increase its climate actions if low carbon technologies are available that solve development problems and serve economic goals. However, the example of solar energy shows that even this may not be enough for Indian decision-makers to limit future expansion or reduction of fossil-intensive activities.

At the same time, international funding did not play any role for India's climate mitigation efforts. The Indian government barely tried to acquire international funding for its domestic actions, despite having frequently demanded it in international negotiations. At the same time, donors were not sufficiently adjusting to the priorities and concerns of the Indian government, as they provided funding for reducing deforestation, but not for afforestation. Moreover, when developing countries like India reached the point where they had (almost) completed preparations for a global governance arrangement (such as REDD+), donors did not provide sufficient funding for its result-based implementation. Instead, they started talking about yet another new fad (e.g., climate-smart agriculture or the new market mechanism under the Paris Agreement). But this means that developing countries like India must once again prepare for new global approaches, wasting years of preparation for the previous approaches.

The empirical results indicate the need of evolving glocalised norm interpretations based on continuous and evolving norm engagements by both domestic and external actors in order to move toward preventing dangerous climate change. Current forms of norm glocalization, at least in the Indian case, seem to increase both international and domestic legitimacy in the short-term, but their international and domestic effectiveness is highly questionable, which will put their legitimacy in question in the medium-term. This could be already observed in the increasing pressure by UN General Secretary Guterres on the Indian government to stop coal expansion in 2020. Whether or not the pledge and review mechanism of the 2015 Paris Agreement will support an evolution toward preventing dangerous climate change remains to be seen in the future. The analysis of this study

suggests that it may well lead to a ratcheting up of ambition, as we could observe at the Glasgow COP 2021 where Prime Minister Modi announced higher mitigation targets (Modi 2021). However, it is very likely that this ratcheting up of ambition will still fall short in terms of emission pledges and implementations that are needed to keep global warming to 1.5 degree Celsius, as, so far in the Indian case, they have been limited to slightly higher business as usual targets and insufficient implementation.

In light of these policy implications, I provide the following *policy recommendations*. Governments around the world need to start initiating transformational policy changes and large-scale organizational change to support climate mitigation actions in various policy sectors in order to prevent dangerous climate change. For countries in the Global South, such as India, this is an opportunity for leap-frogging, as we can currently observe in the case of solar energy. When low carbon technologies are already cheaper than their fossil-fuel predecessors (e.g., solar energy compared to coal energy), countries should massively shift toward the low carbon technology. Afforestation cannot be the solution for the forestry sector. Plantation projects have failed in the past in India, and the Indian government should start to reduce forest degradation by providing livelihood alternatives to local communities and to reduce deforestation by ending unsustainable practices like coal mining. In this process, biodiversity needs to be safeguarded and sustainable solutions for local communities need to be achieved, ideally in direct dialogue with them, so that long-term protection of forests is achieved.

For initiating transformational changes in various sectors, the Indian government needs a strong coordination unit with an own secretariat and permanent institutionalization. The Apex Committee for Implementation of the Paris Agreement, institutionalized in 2020 (MOEFCC 2020), seems insufficient for this task, as it is under the chairmanship of the MOEFCC, who historically had problems in coordinating other line ministries due to the informal hierarchy within government (Pillai and Dubash 2021: 10). Therefore, MOEFCC should be given a higher standing in the government hierarchy and in budget considerations. Moreover, transformational policy changes need a better climate governance architecture, but also more extensive climate change knowledge and capacities in all line ministries. In addition, India's climate policy approach will be more comprehensive, when the central government begins to involve state governments in the planning of climate actions and improves collaboration with them in the implementation. Similarly, state governments should work closely together with cities on climate action planning and implementation.

The Indian government should not plan to rely on potential funding that it cannot immediately access, as it was in the case of CAMPA funds or still is in the case of REDD+. If external finance is envisaged, then the necessary conditions for acquiring this funding should be created as quickly as possible, such as by concluding the REDD+ framework preparations or by preparing climate funding projects (e.g., for GCF). India could benefit from being more open to international collaborations with donors in these preparation processes. At the same time, external actors should be more sensitive and open

to India's priorities and needs. But large-scale funding should not be expected from REDD+ or other international funding sources. Funding should be provided from the regular budget. Many co-benefits come along with domestic climate actions, which additionally legitimize domestic funding. Moreover, in the medium term, funding for afforestation activities should no longer be provided from the CAMPA Fund, as it is filled with levies that arise from deforestation activities that cause the problems in the first place.

Finally, as India is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change, it will be beneficial for India itself if dangerous climate change can be prevented. For that reason, India should increase its climate mitigation targets so that they are getting in line with its fair share for limiting global warming to less than 1.5 degree Celsius. The Indian government should also follow a comprehensive climate justice approach that includes more equitable per capita carbon rights within India. Moreover, the Indian government should update its NDC and start implementing it. In addition, it would be advisable to the Indian government to announce a carbon neutrality target to be reached much earlier than the current target of 2070 (i.e., probably around 2050). For achieving its climate targets by 2050, India should formulate a long-term mitigation strategy as requested under the Paris Agreement. Any new climate mitigation target should be immediately followed by sectorial policy changes, concrete climate actions and implementation in the respective sectors. This should be backed by a climate law defining sectorial targets and timelines for their achievement. Last but not least, implementation should be sufficiently funded and be set in motion in a fast-track fashion as India's contribution to preventing dangerous climate change.

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Annex

Annex I: Questionnaire

Introduction

- Brief introduction of the research and the professional background
- How long have you been engaged on climate change issues? What is your own role in this particular policy process?
- What are or have been your main activities with regard to climate change?

Main part

1. How do you assess the current state of India's climate policy-making and the underlying organizational setting?

- How would you describe the national formulation and implementation process of climate policies? Has there been a change in national policies? Why?
- How far-reaching has been climate policy in India?
- What are the constraints/barriers when it comes to advancing and implementing climate actions in India?
- Which actors have been the most active in terms of putting climate change on the agenda and in terms of triggering and advancing climate policies and actions?
- What kind of role has the Prime Minister played for advancing India's climate policy and related organizational changes? Why?
- To what extent have climate change mitigation actions been integrated in the country's development plans (with regard to forestry)?
- How do you perceive the situation in 2005 in comparison to 2016/2018?
- How do you assess the country's INDC/NDC process and outputs?

2. How do you perceive the general opportunities for external actors or the international developments in the UNFCCC to contribute to policy change / organizational reform in India? Which role do external factors play in domestic climate policy-making?

External and UNFCCC

- Which external actors have influenced Indian policy-makers the most and why? What strategies did they use? How did they influence domestic actors?
- What kind of role has the involvement of the country in the UNFCCC had on advancing domestic climate policies and related organizations? How?
- What kind of role has the involvement of the country in REDD+, NAMAs and NDC had on advancing domestic climate policies and infrastructures? How? What kind of changes have been initiated in the forestry sector due to the involvement in REDD+, NAMAs and NDC?
- Which role did external factors (e.g., international negotiation processes and agreements, policies and organizations in other countries, etc.) play for domestic climate policy making and related organizations?
- Who has been involved in the NAMA and in the INDC process, who has been driving the process and what consequences can we see?
- Why did India advance climate policy-making under Prime Minister Singh and under Prime Minister Modi?

Carbon forestry norm: REDD+

- How do you assess the current state of India's REDD+ policy and the related organizational set-up?
- How influential are external actors with regard to REDD+ and who are they?
- Which actors are very powerful when it comes to REDD+ participation and development?
- To what extent are the different levels of government implementing changes in policies and organizational set-up to participate in REDD+?
- What role of donors, such as Norway, UN-REDD, UNDP, FCPF, FIS, UK, USAID or GIZ?
- Why and how did India advance different REDD+ issues domestically?
- How did external actors interpret the norms and rules of REDD+?
- How did domestic actors interpret the norms and rules of REDD+? Did they question the morality/appropriateness of climate change mitigation in forests? If yes, why?

Developing country climate mitigation norm: NAMA / NDC

- How do you assess the current state of NAMAs in India: sectors, projects, actors, readiness and implementation?
- What kind of role had the NAMA / INDC process for climate policy-making in India? Why?
- To what extent has the NAMA National Level Communication Process contributed to the establishment of a domestic climate governance framework?
- To what extent have external actors successfully advanced NAMA support project and their accompanying sectoral policy changes?
- To what extent led the UNFCCC/NAMA process to the set-up of the National Council on Climate Change?
- What role of external actors, such as GIZ?
- Are NAMA projects still attractive for donors and recipients or rather outdated? Is there still a momentum for NAMA projects?
- How did external actors interpret the norms and rules of NAMAs?
- How did domestic actors interpret the norms and rules of NAMAs?

3. How do you perceive the role of politicians and administrations in your country in the field of climate policy? Why have they advanced climate policy-making in general and in particular in the forestry sector? What role of NGOs, scientists, and business actors?

- Do you see signs of a strong engagement?
- Why do Indian politicians and administrations advance climate policy making or participate in global events and global climate governance arrangements?
- Do domestic actors question the morality or appropriateness of climate change norms (in the forestry sector)? If yes, how do they approach and address climate change?
- How do they understand and see actions on climate change?
- Why and how did the Indian government advance climate mitigation approaches in the forestry sector, such as the Green India Mission?
- Why and how did the Indian government prepare the NAPCC?
- Why and how did the Indian government prepare the INDC?
- Do you see an institutional turf war going on among ministries on one governmental level or among administrations of different governmental tiers?
- How would you describe the capacities of the administrations to prepare for and implement of climate activities?

- Do the different governmental tiers possess enough powers and resources to cope with climate change?
- Which actors are opposing climate policy making and for what reasons?
- How well do climate change mitigation actions fit in the current developments of the economy and the activities by politicians and business actors with regard to the future economic development?
- How open are administrations and politicians to inputs by NGOs, scientists, and business actors?
- To what extent has the number of people, the financial resources, the number of administrative units, and the competences increased for climate policy making in your administration?
- How do you perceive the resonance of climate change actions in Indian administrations?
- Which actors benefit from increased climate actions in the Indian political system and why?
- To what extent have bureaucrats and politicians been influenced in UNFCCC meetings and side-events for their climate policy making?
- What kind of other domestic barriers do you see which hamper the advancement of climate change in the forestry sector through REDD+/NAMAs/NDC.

4. How do you perceive the collaboration between the national and the sub-national level?

- How strong does the central level of government influence political decisions made at the subnational level when it comes to REDD+/NAMAs pilot and readiness activities and NDC implementation?
- To what extent do subnational actors depend on or are restricted by actors and political directives at the central level for policy-making and implementation of climate mitigation approaches (in forestry)?
- To what extent do national actors depend on policy making and/ or implementation by subnational actors?

5. What kind of consequences do you see emerging out of the engagement of the country in climate change mitigation in general and in climate change mitigation in forestry? What are the consequences of India's engagement with REDD+, NAMAs, and NDCs for the national climate policy and the role of the country in international negotiations? To what extent has implementation occurred?

Carbon forestry norm / REDD+

- To what extent is a fundamental change of policy in the forestry sector or even a spill over to other sectors like agriculture due to the country's REDD+ participation or the advancement of mitigation actions in forestry happening?
- To what extent do we see organizational and policy changes emerging out of the REDD+ participation or the advancement of mitigation actions in forestry? Which actions are prioritized and is climate change accepted as a reason to provide larger changes in the forestry sector?
- To what extent has the Indian government implemented its climate change related plans in the forestry sector, such as the Green India Mission or the NDC forestry target? What were the constraints or enabling factors?

Developing country climate mitigation norm / NAMA / NDC

- To what extent has the involvement of the country in UNFCCC's NAMA/NDC process contributed to organizational and policy changes? Which actions are prioritized and is climate change accepted as a reason to provide larger changes in the forestry sector?
- To what extent has the NAMA/NDC participation led to transformational change by advancing NAMA projects or by implementing the national action plan or the NDC?
- To what extent has the NAMA process influenced the INDC/NDC process?

International

- To what extent has the changing climate policy had any impact on the country's position in the UNFCCC negotiations?

Concluding Questions

6. What do you think about the future of climate policy-making in India?

7. Do you know about relevant policy documents I might not have read until now?

8. Can you recommend further contact persons for interviews?

Annex II: Coding schemes for interviews and primary and secondary sources

Table 13: Coding scheme for mechanisms

Coding category: mechanism	Characteristics	Examples
Material incentives	Promising of international funding (e.g., grants)	- Attempt at material incentives: “We were guaranteed that NAMA Facility will give support on anything what will be sent [...] Germany wanted India to come up big in terms of commitment for Paris especially on mitigation” (GI-1-01032018)
Persuasion	<p>Arguing based on exchanging opinions and arguments in an ideal speech situation in dialogue-based formats based on mutual respect (e.g., in international meetings, policy dialogues, domestic intergovernmental meetings) in which external actors try to provide the better argument to convince domestic actors.</p> <p>More uni-directional approach of providing knowledge and expertise from a ‘teacher’ to a ‘student’ (e.g., in workshops, seminars, webinars, training sessions, and conferences or through consultants).</p>	<p>“India [...] wishes to participate actively in the international efforts to reduce deforestation at global level. India recognizes immense importance of the forest resources including land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities in contributing towards changes in emissions related to climate change.” (UNFCCC 2007c: 59)</p> <p>“USAID helped to raise capacities. They built capacities of forest officers” (DI-08022018)</p>
Shaming	Negative comments and criticizing of domestic actors (through press statements, conferences, interviews, guest editorials, statements in workshops, seminars, official letters, statements in meetings)	“At Heiligendamm: G8+5 called in ...we were in the pressure, in the news everywhere people saying we are third biggest consumer [...] almost we had to explain per capita emission [...] if we were 4 countries, then we would be below radar [...] that’s why Prime Minister Singh made this pledge [(i.e., India’s per capita GHG emissions will never exceed the one’s from the Global North)] [...] Merkel found it good [...] but was killed by EU” (GI-24042018)
Lesson drawing	Studying and (selectively) transferring (parts of) external approaches to norms in order to address a policy failure/ functional problem (participate in study tours, study best practices, hire consultants, study foreign models and international requirements)	“With the Warsaw Framework, it became clear what you need as a prerequisite (even in Cancun already) ... what you need for implementation ... it is now mandatory requirements for the INDC process with REDD activities” (GI-15122016)
Competition	Unilateral adjustment of behavior to realize and increase material benefits and to improve the performance (e.g., on economic growth) and standing of the jurisdiction compared to important competitors and regarding own material goals (study foreign models and	“Every money goes to Brazil, Indonesia [...] we are losing despite [...] we are conserving forest, we could also extract resources [...] REDD is putting us at disadvantage [...] We demanded compensated conservation in addition to

Coding category: mechanism	Characteristics	Examples
	international requirements and developments in relation to own material goals)	compensated deforestation at 2006 Nairobi COP” (GI-05122016)
Complex learning	Domestic actors search for and incorporate new knowledge with regard to an external norm on their own (e.g., through studying research results and stakeholder inputs, collaboration with scientists and stakeholders, participation in knowledge-sharing meetings).	<p>“GIM targets were new. In previous targets we did not think about improving degraded forest. [This was] motivated by the new climate change discourse as [a] follow up on [the] NAPCC (CI-GI-13022018)</p> <p>“GIM in 2008: realization that much mitigation can be done in forestry” (GI-12022018)</p>
Normative mimicry	Mimicking of the norm engagement of external actors by domestic actors, as they take the appropriateness of that norm for granted (e.g., justification as the 'right thing to do').	-
Strategic mimicry	Proactive mimicking of a norm engagement for strategic reason in order to ensure their standing as a legitimate member of the international community. Domestic actors do not take the appropriateness of that external norm for granted, but engage on that norm strategically to foster other interests beyond that external norm (e.g., justification through other strategic interests).	<p>“NAPCC was a bit of eyewash [...] It was given to the international community to show that India was doing something serious on climate change [...] The audience was global ... The challenge was to show the international community that we were serious actor [...] by positioning India in a different light [...] [There was] concern [regarding...] India’s image on WTO negotiations [as we] were seem to be stubborn on agriculture [...In] May 2009, Singh said: make sure that India’s image is problem solver instead of problem maker [...] It was more about the international recognition of India in international forums” (GI-14022018)</p> <p>Ramesh planned “to reposition India – in terms of both style and substance – in international negotiations” (Ramesh 2015a: 450), while “be[ing] guided by [...] the need to protect our economic growth [...and by] us[ing] climate change negotiations as part of the arsenal to meet our foreign policy objectives” (Ramesh 2015a: 28-29).</p>

Table 14: Coding scheme for conditions

General coding category: conditions	Characteristics	Examples
Cultural resonance	Prescriptions of an international norm are perceived to be in line or can be aligned with domestic norms which can be found in discourse, policies, laws, and practices as well as in organizational ethos and administrative procedures. Cultural resonance can change over time.	“Now we study 7 Cancun safeguards [...] quite easy, but you have to put it in structure [...] like Forest Conservation Act, Forest Policy 1988, Forest Rights Act, Nat. Green Tribunal, Nat. Working Plan, NAPCC [...] We have a] strong policy framework, but we need structure for [satisfying] UNFCCC requirements [...] Cancun requirements are well [in line] with our existing policies” (GI-1-13032018)
Material resonance	Approaches based on international norms are perceived to be in line or can be aligned with (parts) of the perceived domestic material necessities (e.g., energy security) and material goals (e.g., high economic growth). Material resonance can change over time.	“India is faced with the challenge of sustaining its rapid economic growth while dealing with the global threat of climate change.” (PM Council 2008: 1).
Social reception	<p>The identity of domestic actors is characterized by their aim for international social recognition (positive social reception) and their vulnerability to social pressure (negative social reception), as they want to be members of the international community in good standing.</p> <p>When domestic actors, instead, try to reduce their social vulnerability to pressure, I speak of reversed social reception.</p>	<p>“I assumed office barely six months ahead of the UNFCCC conference at Copenhagen [...] I was on a virtual time clock to effectively affect an image change to reposition India. [...] The aim was for the world to recognize that India was playing a proactive role. Given our naysayer image, any change that seemed positive would be welcomed by the global community” (Ramesh 2015a: 450)</p> <p>“India did not approach UN-REDD and FCPF due to conditionalities of World Bank for 4 million USD as they should first do some work and first with regard to safeguards, and tenure and governance [...] are you ready to allow external agencies to scrutinize these issues?” (GI-05122016)</p>
Material reception	<p>Material reception includes expected material vulnerability and material prospects in relation to the domestic norm advancement and the actions of external actors.</p> <p>Material prospects (e.g., international funding) need to be sufficiently high and credible in order to provide cost-benefit calculation for domestic actors to act.</p> <p>States can be materially vulnerable to the actions by external actors (e.g., when they are dependent on their international funding or their preferential trade arrangements).</p>	<p>“When we do all what is required for REDD, but where is the funding” (NI-DI-16022018)</p> <p>“[I] needs financial support also for those countries which are stabilizing their forest cover, that’s why the plus in REDD+ [...] but developed countries wanted to see immediate impact, so focused on addressing deforestation [..., while] reversed degradation and plantation takes longer” (GI-15122016)</p> <p>“[T]here was a perceived risk among policy circles that promoting clean energy and energy efficiency could be strategically harmful, as it could be interpreted [by external actors] as evidence that India could and should undertake climate mitigation using its own resources, and</p>

General coding category: conditions	Characteristics	Examples
		also that India could develop with a lower allotment of carbon space.” (Dubash 2013: 197)
Knowledge	Preexisting understanding of the overall content and context of an international norm based on preexisting information and theories about this information.	“We are keenly aware of the looming effects of climate change. But, the science of climate change is still nascent and somewhat uncertain. This is why Indian scientists must engage in exploring the links between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.” (PM Office 2007)
Opposition	Opposition occurs, when domestic actors influence the discourse in a way that prevents (or makes it harder for) decision-makers to take further changes relating to the international norm. Alternatively, powerful actors within the government prevent these changes on their own or are responsible for a strong adjustment of the original plans.	“I assumed office barely six months ahead of the UNFCCC conference at Copenhagen [...] I was on a virtual time clock to effectively affect an image change to reposition India. [...] The aim was for the world to recognize that India was playing a proactive role. Given our naysayer image, any change that seemed positive would be welcomed by the global community. The home front proved to be a major challenge, where even the slightest attempt to abandon the shibboleths of the past were viewed with suspicion” (Ramesh 2015a: 450).
Political-administrative set-up	<p>Political-administrative set-up includes capacity and horizontal centralization or coordination.</p> <p>Capacity means sufficient resources and qualified personal to deal with an international norm in policy formulation and implementation.</p> <p>Horizontal centralization or coordination means that the leadership of the central government ensures a coordinated approach in which several governmental organizations (incl. different departments of an organization) work together based on a shared goal and understanding.</p>	<p>“[G]iven limited governmental capacity, the natural tendency of the Indian state and its bureaucracy has been to stick to existing orthodoxy, rather than venture out into new uncertain territory.” (Sengupta 2019: 134)</p> <p>“Some conflict about REDD in MOEFCC between forest and climate change department, but no one bothers about it ... GIM is with climate change department as part of the Action plan [...] who are the owners and to whom does it belong?” (DI-GI-02122016)</p> <p>“MOEF alone would not be able to push alone [in the government]” (GI-19042018)</p>

Table 15: Coding scheme for outcome

General coding category: outcome	Specific coding category: order of change	Characteristics	Examples
Discursive change	-	<p>Change of the discourse in relation to previous statements</p> <p>This can include strategies or information documents that specify the (new) ideas of potential future interventions without defining concrete actions to be taken.</p>	<p>"We are determined that India's per-capita GHG emissions are not going to exceed those of developed countries even while pursuing policies of development and economic growth" (MoEA 2007b)</p> <p>The main aim of the "REDD Reference Document [was to] bring all information together[: ...] compile information and national circumstances and make people aware [...as it was] for internal consumption". (GI-05122016)</p>
Policy change	<i>1st order change</i>	<p>Change of level of an instrument, including the increase of a preexisting quantitative target</p> <p>This can also comprise additional legal measures to support the implementation of an already existing instrument.</p>	<p>"The objectives of the Mission are: a) Increased forest/tree cover on 5 m ha of forest/non-forest lands" (MOEF 2010c: 9)</p> <p>"An Act to provide for the establishment of funds [...] received from the user agencies [...] for administration of the funds and to utilise the monies so collected for undertaking artificial regeneration (plantations), assisted natural regeneration, protection of forests, forest related infrastructure development, Green India Programme, wildlife protection and other related activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto" (Ministry of Law and Justice 2016: 1)</p>
	<i>2nd order change</i>	<p>Change of an instrument or adoption of a new one, which can also include new adopted quantitative targets.</p> <p>This can also comprise the adoption of new action plans with concrete implementation ideas on new actions.</p>	<p>"20-25 per cent target before Copenhagen: for intensity, not for emissions. For the first time we took a target. It was not for absolute emission, but relative emission." (GI-14022018)</p> <p>The NAPCC included "measures that promote [...] development objectives while also yielding co-benefits for addressing climate change" (PM Council 2008: 2).</p>

General coding category: outcome	Specific coding category: order of change	Characteristics	Examples
	3 rd order change	Change of the hierarchy of goals	-
Organizational change	Small-scale change	Temporary working group constituted; small increase in staff	"Since COP 15/16 you need 4 documents... After Cancun, government constitutes a committee and hired experts to develop a document in 2013 before Warsaw [...] We started working in 2013 ... but no substantial progress [...] Many retired persons in committee and no timeline with only 1-2 meetings a year [...] No substantial progress [...]" (GI-1-13032018)
	Medium-scale change	New agencies or councils, or new ministerial units that lack implementation powers or staff	"The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, has set up a High Level advisory group on climate change issues. [...] The Council will coordinate national action plans for assessment, adaptation and mitigation of climate change. It will advise government on pro-active measures that can be taken by India to deal with the challenge of climate change. It will also facilitate inter-ministerial coordination and guide policy in relevant areas" (PMO 2007c)
	Large-scale change	Strong and large ministerial departments, powerful inter-ministerial body with own secretariat	-
Implementation	-	Implementation order or guidelines, provision of resources, enforcement of the implementation order	"GIM: not much implementation. [They] identified landscape in each state and carried out studies. Reason: resources lacking. You need additional resources [but they are] not willing to give more than 1 % of budget" (RI-12122016)
Norm interpretation	External actors' norm interpretation	Norm interpretation as articulated by external actors	"Compensation or incentive is needed in order to encourage developing countries to reduce emission from deforestation beyond their national capacity." (UNFCCC 2006a: 89).
	Domestic actors' norm interpretation	Preexisting norm interpretation as articulated by domestic actors	"We are losing despite we are conserving forests. [...] We] could also extract resources. REDD is putting us at disadvantage. [That's why] we demanded compensated conservation" (GI-05122016).
	Glocalized norm interpretation	Interpretation by domestic actors that represents a fusion of external and domestic actors' norm interpretations	"India favours a comprehensive REDD mechanism that encompasses all policy approaches that enhance forest carbon or save it." (UNFCCC 2008a: 27)