

Standard Theories of Emotion and the Concept of Intentionality

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ABSTRACT

In traditional Western philosophy, it was widely accepted that emotions could be an obstacle to human rationality when it comes to attempting to gain objective knowledge and truth. One way of understanding emotions is that they may accidentally happen to us; they are a purely non-volitional form of a mental phenomenon. There is the question of whether the study of emotions needs to rely on scientific methods at all. Can emotions be investigated merely through conceptual analysis and introspection? Are emotions only accessed, felt, and even understood from the first-person perspective? If the answer is positive, it indicates that we should have to refute pieces of subpersonal empirical evidence regarding the neurophysiological activities of emotions. This paper concerns the philosophical debate on emotion. I argue that in the history of the philosophy of emotion, the competing theories place themselves either on "cognitive" or "bodily" grounds; both are responsible for the mind-body dichotomy and have their difficulties. The former is what I call the "Orthodox Feeling Theory," which cannot account for the structure of intentionality or the evaluative property of emotions; the latter is the "Strong Cognitive Theory," which ignores the role of the bodily and experiential aspects. Such standard theories are out of date.

Keywords: *Orthodox Feeling Theory; Strong Cognitive Theory; Cartesian split; intentionality.*

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the study of any area, we cannot properly understand and investigate an emotion from any point of view without initially engaging with what theorists of emotion are usually referring to. Before going to the essential parts of the present work, we should initially explore these standard competing theories, and point out their problems. The formulation of the theory of emotion could be done in several ways. Given that emotions are mental phenomena, we cannot understand them without taking into consideration the problem of mind. One way to categorise these theories is to divide them into the dichotomy which could be seen as the well-known Cartesian split. The Cartesian split raises the mind-body separation, which finally becomes the major competing camps in philosophy; materialism and dualism. Briefly, materialism is best understood in terms of bodily and physiological grounds reducing all mental states to brain activities—which are material and observable. On the other hand, dualism speculates that the mind or consciousness cannot be scientifically observed; the mind is not exhausted by natural law. Accordingly, the mind seems to have its own place and be merely accessed by the subject that possesses it. Yet this is not what I would discuss in detail here. For present purposes, it is just implying that the division of mind and body influences more or less the way theories of emotion could be formulated. It is extremely important to state that even though most theorists of mind today endorse materialism, the Cartesian split is still relevant as the brain-body dichotomy (Solymosi, 2011).

There are two competing theories of emotion. Both primarily depend on the Cartesian split: the feeling theory and the cognitive theory of emotion. Broadly speaking, feeling theory postulates that emotions are merely our feeling of bodily responses. They automatically happen to us as physiological and biological responses. Thus, emotions are seen as a purely non-volitional form of consciousness. An Orthodox Feeling Theory of emotion—which I posit as equally important as James’s theory of emotion—argues that emotions accidentally happen to us, primarily involve bodily changes or arousals, and are therefore to be understood as non-intentional (Kret, et al., 2020). In that case, what is the Orthodox Feeling Theory of emotion construed as? How does such a theory fail in fully grasping emotion by way of ignoring intentionality?

On the other hand, cognitive theory contends that emotions are the act of conscious states; they are necessarily reducible to cognitive judgements or beliefs. Cognitive theorists posit bodily changes as more or less contingent to emotions. No doubt, they accept the fact that emotions are intentional states and involve cognitive appraisal like belief, intention, desire, and other folk psychological attitudes. Thus, cognitive theory, as opposed to feeling theory, is much more compatible with the structure of intentionality. It conceives that emotions are intentional cognitive states (mostly with representational contents). Nonetheless, one may ask whether a pure or strong cognitively grounded theory of emotion can even ignore important experiential and bodily aspects of emotion.

ORTHODOX FEELING THEORY AND STRONG COGNITIVE THEORY

In this section, I will explore the standard competing theories of emotion and point to their problems. To be more precise, in this context, I would call Orthodox Feeling Theory as OFT and Strong Cognitive Theory as SCT. As far as using the modifier “orthodox” and “strong”, I mainly focus on the standard competing theories which contain crucial problems. Therefore, I might just call both theories as “standard theories”. Although there are researchers today applying such standard theories for reconciling the tension between the account of intentionality and physiological conditions, I should leave those applied theories aside, or at least, I might discuss them briefly.

Before investigating the OFT and SCT, I shall briefly point to the constructive approach of such an evolutionary theory of emotion, which is worth surveying. Evolutionary theory of emotion could be understood in part by referring to Charles Darwin. It generally holds that emotions are biologically inherent and universal, and are hard-wired to our body and brain. Creatures evolve a set of basic emotions for the purpose of survival through natural selection. Roughly speaking, the basic emotions are quite unconscious and even non-volitional. Although a human being is the highest form of an evolved organism, there would be many similar kinds of emotions shared among the related species. Some emotions could be functional in the same way for both human beings and other creatures. For instance, human beings and chimpanzees respond to danger with certain emotions, like fear for example—that is manifest in other creatures as well, e.g. rats, dogs, lions, and so on. The function of fear is the survival of their lineage and reproduction. Based on this, they behave by either fighting or flying.

The prominent pioneer of the evolutionary theory of emotion other than Charles Darwin is Paul Ekman, a psychologist and anthropologist who proposed that basic emotions can be universally identified by considering facial expressions (Ekman, 1992). Facial expressions of basic emotions are universal, across cultures. Ekman formulated his idea through many experiments, starting in the 1960s. Many of his early famous cross-cultural experiments were very substantive. In one of his crucial experiments, he combined the portraits of facial expressions of westerners with the story telling of related emotions to show

them to tribes who had never been exposed to western stories and culture; the tribes could mostly identify and match basic emotions with those photographs and stories at the high agreement. Therefore, Ekman concluded that people in all cultures around the world share six basic emotions. However, the theorists after him came up with different lists. According to Ekman, basic emotions are joy, sadness, surprise, disgust, anger and fear, which are known as “affect program emotions”. The affect program theory has been accepted and modified by other evolutionary theorists. One of them is Griffiths. According to Griffiths, affect programs are “short-term, stereotypical responses involving facial expression, autonomic nervous system arousal, and other elements” (Thrift, 2016). This passage points to the essential attributes which indicate a non-volitional aspect of basic emotions; moreover, they are an automatic system for a short duration. The processes of basic emotions cannot be affected by thought or cognitive ability. This feature of basic emotions is known as modularity.

The evolutionary view I have briefly drawn is the very foundation of a science of emotion. The adherents of the scientific enterprise always update their theorisation to new scientific evidence related to the brain and bodily performances. This approach seems to be much more related to feeling theory since it focuses on the bodily realm. However, the endorsement of the evolutionary theory of emotion does not prevent one from being a cognitive theorist. The science of emotions explains the functions of the brain and the body that have evolved from time immemorial. Importantly, cognitive judgment is an essential ability of the evolved human brain that has developed since the primitive era, and its function is to help human beings survive. For Griffiths, it is true that some emotions are non-cognitive: basic emotions or affect programs (Starkey, 2017). However, he also recognises that, besides affect program emotions, other emotions are cognitive. For him, there are higher cognitive emotions that have evolved.

We have looked at an evolutionary view whose approach widely inspires the later theorists of emotion. Many researchers of emotion strictly follow the evolutionary theory since it is the great enterprise of the modern age and represents a rich repertoire in the framework of naturalism.

ORTHODOX FEELING THEORY (OFT)

The feeling theory of emotion in general is largely motivated by the evolutionary approach. Yet we cannot approach it without referring to William James—the nineteenth century American philosopher and psychologist. James published an ground-breaking article titled “What is an emotion?” (1884) to formulate the theory that came to be known afterwards as the feeling theory of emotion, therefore being recognised as the pioneer of the theory (Dalglish, 2004). For the purposes of this study, one should bear in mind that I refer to James’s theory of emotion alone as OFT, for the feeling theory is a huge, and most feeling theories today have shifted from OFT. In what follows, I shall directly examine the article “What is an emotion?” to investigate the conceptualisation of OFT.

At the beginning of “What is an emotion?”, James noticed that physiologists of his time overly emphasised on studying the cognitive activity of the brain. Also, they ignored what James called “the aesthetic sphere of mind”, the domain including pleasures, pains, emotions, and so on, which is usually reckoned as being noncognitive. All emotional performances in his opinion are only those which have distinctive bodily expressions; they are what he calls “standard emotions”. Other performances which are likely to engage mental operations such as pleasure and displeasure but eventually do not witness any obvious bodily changes are excluded from his formulation. Notice that James narrowed his work on

“standard emotions”. It seems that, in this article, he dismissed what later theorists call cognitive emotions, such as guilt, shame, embarrassment, love, and so forth.

According to James, “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.” What he meant is simple and literal. The bodily changes are the cause of emotions (Dalglish, 2004). In fact, the *feelings* or *perceptions* of those bodily changes *are* emotions. To put it in today’s anatomical and physiological terms, emotions are proprioceptive perceptions. Put in another way, “emotion = proprioceptive phenomenology”. Accordingly, perceptions/feelings of bodily events imply the phenomenology of emotion in the sense that they simply have an experiential aspect.

James admitted that his argument might be contrary to common sense. We, commonsensically, tend to think that emotional states primarily appear in our mind based on our thinking processes, then bodily reactions follow consequently. Instead, for James, whatever we perceive or feel toward our bodily changes, such as the increasing of our heart rate or the blood pumping in our face *are* emotions by themselves. Again, the *feeling of bodily change* is the defining characteristic of emotion, as it *is* emotion. James points out that “[t]he bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (de Silva, 2020, p. 55). We may consider the feelings of emotions in relation to experiences as well. The feelings by themselves are an experience. The emotional experiences are the experiences of our bodily changes, as Kind argues while discussing James’s theory. For her, “emotions are to be *identified* with the experiences of physiological changes.”¹⁶ So, they are nothing other than the experiences or the feelings of bodily changes that automatically precede thoughts and all cognitive activity.

James anticipated that there would likely be many readers who would immediately reject his proposal. Thus, he raised the crucial point by persuading the readers to do the experiment of introspection. It is to imagine some distinctive emotions and abstract them from all possible feelings of bodily changes. He asserted that we would find nothing remaining. The main point here proposes that bodily changes are essential to all standard emotions, and we cannot feel any standard emotion outside the corporeal realm. It is impossible to imagine any state of anger without the feeling of the increase of heart rate; when I am angry, what I primarily experience is the increase of heart rate. This feeling of such bodily change is my anger.

The word “feel” in common usage means “to experience something physical or emotional.” Nevertheless, this is inadequate to understand the word. The word should be considered in more detail in regard to James’s theory. There might be three characteristics related to the word “feeling” which corresponds with James’s theory: bodily, momentary, and automatic.

The feeling is bodily

Feelings are bodily activities rather than performances of pure cognitive mind. In general, the word “feel” is also used for non-emotional states of the body, such as pain, hunger, and so on, which are sensations (Ortony, 1987). For instance, we say, “I feel pain,” or “I feel hungry.” Thus, the feeling is not exhausted by emotion. In everyday language, to indicate the nature of emotions we often say: “I feel things with my heart rather than my head.” To talk about a certain emotion, we say: “I was so terrified by the dog in the street that I felt my heart beating and blood pumping in my body.” For an emotional state, when I feel something it seems that I feel it through my body. On the other hand, the pure cognitive activities in our head do not require the bodily feeling in their processes in this sense. Even

when the nerve cells are firing in our brain in the process of thinking, we cannot feel them for they are pure cognitive thinking. For James, since the feelings of bodily changes are emotions, there cannot be emotions in the domain of pure cognition, given that a purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity (Goldie, 2020). This is the so-called “feeling theory” of emotion which James formulated.

The feeling is momentary

The “feeling” indicates the momentariness of its occurrence. James connected the word “feel” to the momentariness of its occurrence. He argued that “every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs” (Goldie, 2020, p. 43). In addition to the body aspect, the characteristic of the feeling includes a momentary occurrence of emotion; one can feel something only at the moment that feeling is occurring. As James contended, we might think the bear is dangerous, then, decide to run, but we would not *actually* feel fear. Since this instance is a pure cognitive performance rather than an emotional feeling, we cannot feel it. The moment we think and decide to run is not the moment we feel, or experience, fear. Furthermore, it is important to see James’s idea that *every one* (every case) of the bodily changes can be *felt* by the subject. It is to say, for James, that all bodily changes are exhausted by the *feelings* of their changes. In other words, it is unlikely that there can be bodily change without feeling it.

The feeling is automatic

Finally, according to James’s theory, the bodily changes are a mere automatic system; our bodies have a reflexive mode. Therefore, we cannot pretend to feel anything which is not actually elicited. We might try to reproduce a fake emotion with facial expressions or tensing our muscles, but what we fail is to control our organs: heart beating, secretion of glands, and so on. These internal organs are an automatic mechanism. They are the same set of organs that usually play the other usual roles of our bodily functions other than emotions. Accordingly, James believed that [emotions] correspond to processes occurring in the motor and sensory centres, already assigned, or in others like them, not yet mapped out (Robinson, 1998). This presumes that human emotional processes do not require any special unique organs. They perform through the ordinary sensory and motor centres that are already assigned in the evolved body.

It is worth noting that even though James focused on the feelings of bodily changes, his theory of emotion also contributes to the phenomenology of emotion. The “what it is like to feel such emotion” must be gained only by the subject that feels its emotion—as conscious experience—at the moment it occurs. As Colombetti & Torrance (2009) states regarding James’s theory, “[we] could not imagine experiencing an emotion without experiencing bodily feelings.” However, the chief difference between James’s theory (or OFT) and the traditional phenomenology of emotion is that the former seems to lack the account of intentionality while the latter associates the structure of intentionality essentially with affective phenomena.

The OFT came out in the heyday of early modern science; physiologists and scientists thoroughly emphasised and observed the physical worlds such as the animal and the human bodies. Lyons remarked that “from the seventeenth century to roughly the end of the nineteenth century . . . feeling theory was the orthodox theory” (Marsden, 2003). The reason could be that James’s theory was consistent with scientific enterprise at the time. Cognitive science and neuroscience had not yet emerged and developed like today. The feeling theory has been finally dubbed as orthodox. Nonetheless, James’s theory has been afterward

criticised by many contemporary philosophers and researchers of emotion. As de Sousa points out, the criticism mostly rejects feeling theory due to two problems.

The OFT fails to accommodate the intentionality.

The first problem, for de Sousa, as one might have noticed so far, is that the OFT fails to accommodate the rationality, intentionality, and significance of emotion. It disconnects emotions from the capacities of human thought and judgment. The criticism contends that human beings—as the highest form of creatures—are much more rational than other biological beings. They are capable of understanding language and cognitive judgment; they understand logic and mathematics as well as control their emotions. Furthermore, the OFT considers emotions non-intentional, which means emotions do not signify anything. This also assumes that an emotion does not have significance: it cannot refer to the external world, it does not inform us about something.

The OFT is not capable of distinguishing different emotions.

The second problem is that the OFT is not capable of distinguishing different emotions. This criticism is largely shared by disapproving theorists. Without the process of thought, it is impossible to distinguish between anger and fear. For instance, the feeling of an increasing heart rate can *identically* occur for both kinds of emotions. It is natural to think that we cannot distinguish between different emotions without the process of thinking. The adherents of cognitivism criticise the OFT for these reasons. In the next section, I will examine the SCT, which is opposed to the OFT.

Strong Cognitive Theory (SCT)

A theory of emotion grounded on cognition is not a novel theory; one can find it in ancient philosophy. Aristotle held that types of cognition, such as beliefs and judgments, are *central* and *essential* to emotion (Carr, 2005). For instance, let us say that I walked through the street. There was a man who strangely gazed at me, and kept his hand in his pocket. It looked like he was pulling something from it. It turned out to be a bar of chocolate and handed it to me. I judged that he was kind, and then, I was happy. On the other hand, another person in the same situation might judge that this man looked down upon him by giving him chocolate. Hence, instead of being happy, he could have been angry. In fact, the Stoics taught us to be indifferent to emotions, this being the practical way to understand and manage our emotions for a good living. The ancient philosophers articulated their views on emotion through conceptual analysis, which was the only way of philosophising at the time.

Even though there are many researchers of emotion these days endorsing evolutionary biology, scientific methodology, and philosophical naturalism, there are also traditional philosophers who primarily focus on human rationality alone and do not need empirical evidence for philosophising and theorising. According to the traditional philosophical view, that is conceptual analysis, they mostly sympathise with the SCT rather than the OFT (The latter is mainly proposed by modern psychologists, scientists, biologists along with empirical explanations). I, however, quite disagree with the traditional philosophical view, for I think that it leads to a form of “strong” cognitive theory. It does not follow that I totally reject a cognitive theory of emotion; what I reject is a “strong” theory. This perspective holds that conceptual analysis alone is sufficient for understanding things. Those traditional philosophers tend to investigate the question of “what is emotion?” by seeking the conceptual meaning and definition of emotion. This tendency indicates the way philosophers, especially traditional ones, have dealt with OFT and SCT, emphasising mostly on the latter. Likewise, by saying that I disagree with using conceptual analysis *alone* for

philosophising the problem, I do not mean that I reject conceptual analysis by itself. What I mean is that a conceptual analysis of philosophical methodology must not limit itself to its own domain. Rather, it ought to pay attention to other disciplines and scientific evidence.

The word “cognitive” could be understood in many ways. It ranges from involving “intentionality”, “belief”, “desire”, “intention”, “judgment”, “thought”, “evaluative judgment”, “representation”, “construals”, “appraisal”, “consciousness”, and so on. Broadly speaking, the SCT argues that emotions involve thoughts, beliefs, judgments, and other instances mentioned earlier; the human mind cognitively rationalises emotions. The adherents of the SCT reject the OFT—the view that emotions are brute and may accidentally happen to us in a purely non-volitional form of consciousness. Rather, the SCT’s theorists would ignore the role of the body in emotions, or posit it as contingent. Anthony Kenny, a philosopher whose book *Action, Emotion and Will* inspired the SCT’s theorists that came after him, tries to relatively ignore the role of the body—including sensations—from emotions, as he states that:

[t]he most important difference between a sensation and an emotion is that emotions, unlike sensations, are essentially directed to objects. It is possible to be hungry without being hungry for anything in particular, as it is not possible to be ashamed without being ashamed of anything in particular. It is possible to be in pain without knowing what is hurting one, as it is not possible to be delighted without knowing what is delighting one (Kenny, 2003, p. 41).

He insists that “bodily changes may be the vehicle of an emotion, but they are not themselves emotion” (Kenny, 2003, p. 41). Therefore, thoughts, such as beliefs and judgments, are what we call cognition, which, for the SCT, is essential to emotions, and we can distinguish different emotions with cognition. As Lyons states,

In general, a cognitive theory of emotions is one that makes some aspect of thought, usually a belief, central to the concept of emotion and, at least in some cognitive theories, essential to distinguishing the different emotions from one another (Matravers, 2014, p. 106).

Emotions have a more significant feature as a result of the capacity of cognition; many emotions, if not all, are rational. For example, guilt, pride, love, embarrassment, envy, and so on. It is unlikely to imagine having guilt without judging that we have done something wrong, or feeling love for someone/something without thinking about the particular intentional object of our love. These emotions are what Griffiths calls “higher cognitive emotions”, which require a much higher cognitive ability than basic emotions or affect program emotions. No doubt, Griffiths is not a cognitive theorist *per se*. Rather, his theory essentially adopts the evolutionary approach. As a naturalistic-minded philosopher, he distinguishes higher cognitive emotions from affect program responses.

In what follows, let us set aside those standard theories of emotion. I will explore the concept of intentionality as understood in two traditions of philosophy: analytic philosophy of mind and existential phenomenology. To do so, I have to first admit that the concept of intentionality is huge, complex, and contentious, for it is one of the central debates in philosophy of consciousness and mind. One should bear in mind that exploring the different concepts of intentionality is related to the debate about embodied emotion as shown afterwards in the present study.

EXPLORING INTENTIONALITY AND CLARIFYING THE METHOD OF RESEARCH

It is true that there has been a division between the analytic and phenomenological traditions in the history of philosophy. The division has been held firmly among some scholars and researchers, causing to extend the gap between the two sides. This gap suppresses the possibility of full-blown understanding of human mind and experiences. The gap should be narrowed, particularly the debate about the problem of consciousness, a field which has boomed in the science of mind and philosophy. There are scientific-reductionist philosophers believe that they do not need to rely on phenomenology in regard to the study of the first-person perspective of experiences since they assert that the subjective experiences as such are illusions, or even mysterious. Thus, the attempt to bridge the gap between analytic and phenomenological philosophies is not aimed at those who hold a strong scientific-reductionist view—the view that every mental state can be reduced to material brain activities. However, those who are concerned with phenomenal consciousness and holding that the problem of consciousness is a really hard one should get some benefit from the endeavour to merge these traditions—or, to be precise, combine these methodologies. If they could not be fully bridged, at least, they should have a dialogue between each other; retaining some distinctions and sharing possible common grounds.

In exploring the notion of intentionality, I shall start with the word's etymology. The word "intentionality" is a technical term for a philosophical concept, and to give a certain conception of intentionality is quite complicated and contentious. The word "intentionality" derives from the Latin word "*intentio*", which means directing toward things (Myles, 1994). It is obvious that intentionality is the very essence of human life and permeates all over our activities, both mentally and physically, toward reliable truth, satisfaction, goal, and purpose (Myles, 1994). The structure of intentionality requires intentional objects, which are essential to mental activities—thinking, perceiving, experiencing, desiring, imagining, and so on—and they can also expand to action or behaviour in a certain environment.

The different methodological approaches to intentionality impact the way we attempt to understand and construe any mental phenomenon. Broadly speaking, an analytic philosophy of mind takes intentionality or intentional states to be mental contents, or mental representations (representative theory) which typically involve an emphasis on logic and language. It started with the linguistic turn in philosophy, especially semantics, in the nineteenth century. Philosophy is a conceptual analysis; to analyse concepts is to analyse language. For example, what we perceive, believe, intend, desire, and so on, can be reduced to intentional contents, and the structure of intentionality always bears such contents. This way of articulation accounts for the third-person perspective, which means that such contents can be conveyed to the public domain as objective knowledge or the view from nowhere. On the other hand, a phenomenological methodology takes intentionality to be the object-directed intentionality of conscious experiences, which typically involves an emphasis on experiential subjectivity. More specifically, an existential turn in phenomenology shifts the focus from the epistemological conception of object-directed intentionality to the ontological conception of world-directed intentionality as Being-in-the-world (conceiving human reality as existential coping with, engaging with, or being embedded within the world). The human existence encounters the world from a subjective point of view as the experiential aspect of phenomenal consciousness. Thus, a view from nowhere is impossible. For instance, experiencing the aroma of coffee has its phenomenal character. Such a phenomenal character, which forms the subjective experience of the first-person perspective, cannot be reduced to mental content from an objective point of view, as per analytic philosophical understanding.

Although the both side of philosophical aspects are called tradition or camp, I am convinced to see them as the difference in methodology as well. This section will explore

the concept of intentionality in analytic philosophical methodology and phenomenological methodology. Then, I will clarify what I mean by “existential phenomenological understanding” which I apply in the present research.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY (AMI)

Although we can trace back the origin of “intentionality” to ancient philosophy and medieval scholastic works, the investigation of the concept of intentionality should start with Franz Brentano, who took the word “intentionality” and introduced it to the discourse of philosophy through the famous slogan of intentionality being the mark of the mental. The concept of intentionality as such is developed by later phenomenologists. However, the phenomenological approach does not exhaust the concept of intentionality. It is quite not right to say that phenomenology is the only one approach to study the structure of intentionality.

The formulation of analytic philosophy—which initiated the philosophical movement of the linguistic turn in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—is mostly concerned with the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action. It focuses on mental states, mental content, or mental representations that refer to, represent, or stand for things, properties, and state of affairs. Beliefs, desires, intentions, and other folk psychological attitudes are mental states within the structure of intentionality. Our mind bears certain mental contents when we perform mental activities. In other words, the mind has intentional contents or intentional states that involve the rationality of judgments, beliefs, and actions. Intentionality is considered an account of the agency of human beings. It commits them to an action in some way and makes moral responsibility for an intentional action possible. It is the study of subjectivity, the core theme of philosophy. Thus, in analytic methodology, the focus is the analysis of logical and linguistic concerns rather than conscious experiential aspects of subjectivity (Lutz & Thompson, 2003).

Broadly speaking, the theory of intentionality for analytic philosophy is the theory of mental representation. An analytic tradition concerns logic, linguistic, semantics to the extent that it formulates forms of mental contents. Also, an analytic philosophy aims at the third-person perspective. In contrast, the existential phenomenological tradition is concerned with the first-person perspective, which is a conscious experience through which the subject can make sense of the world from a certain viewpoint. Even if there might be more or less some engagements among both circles, it would be safe to say that both traditions at their early stage could remain independent of each other. Each of them had developed their own line of thought with its particular jargon. There was no need to communicate with each other since their approaches to the mind seemed to be very different from the outset.

Around the late twentieth century, there was a mentalistic turn in analytic philosophy of mind that influenced the way of doing philosophy. It was a return to consciousness. In 1994, David Chalmers, an Australian philosopher, echoed the question “what is it like to be . . . ?” of Thomas Nagel’s paper “What is it like to be a Bat?” (1974), indicating the hard problem of consciousness (Nagel, 1974). Chalmers argued that there are two levels to the problem of consciousness: the easy problem and the hard problem.

The easy problem of consciousness is the problems of brain mechanisms, which is mostly in the hands of a neuroscientist, psychologist, biologist, and so forth. For instance, the task to discover the particular parts or regions in the brain which are related to certain mental and physiological activities. Such problems will be solved as long as high technology is developed. Thus, it is a matter of time, this being not different from other scientific projects which are about accumulating data and information, just as human genome mapping for

example. In other words, the easy problem is to explore the consciousness or mental phenomena in the physical domain.

The hard problem of consciousness is the view that the real problem of consciousness is a very hard one. It is about the following questions: How and why do we have subjective feelings or conscious experiences at all? How can the conscious experience emerge from the physical world as brain activity? So what is that conscious experience? When I sip coffee from a cup, I feel some exclusive conscious experience of “what it is like to feel the aroma of the coffee”, which is difficult to explain. Consciousness is essentially an inner life, a phenomenal character that is understood as “what it is like to be such and such”. Some philosophers believe that the hard problem of consciousness is true and return to consciousness studies; others hold that the hard problem is an illusion and totally dismiss it.

Around the 1990s, the turn to the study of consciousness coincided with the partial weakening of behaviourism and standard computer science. The former neglected the existence of mind and consciousness, holding that the study of humans and animals is to observe their behaviour. The latter believed that the mind is nothing other than computational processes (information processing). Both dismissed consciousness. The study of consciousness pays attention partly to the phenomenological approach as the study of conscious experience. However, there is the question of whether there can be a science of consciousness. Indeed, science is unlikely to wholly capture consciousness, for consciousness does not fit the reduction framework of science. For this reason, philosophers try to solve the problem by using the concept of intentionality to account for consciousness or the phenomenal character. And in some cases the intentionality should be adopted from all possible traditions, e.g. the phenomenological tradition, for some mental and affective phenomena could be non-conceptual and/or non-representational experiences.

Phenomenological Methodology of Intentionality (PMI)

Cerbone remarks that the phenomenological methodology considers intentionality as “the defining, and even an exclusive feature of experience, and so phenomenology can be characterized as the study of intentionality (Cerbone, 2014). Again, one should keep in mind that the study of intentionality is not exhausted by the phenomenological approach. The concept of intentionality from different approaches has different characters. The study of the concept of intentionality through the phenomenological method began with Husserl at the same period of the linguistic turn in the analytic tradition around the end of nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Husserl attempts to characterise the mental experiences as falling under either *directedness* or *aboutness*, the essence of consciousness. The crucial concern of this method is the structure of consciousness from the point of view of experiential subjectivity where the act of consciousness is always consciousness of something; the experience is always directed to the object of act, whether the object actually exists or not.

Moran points out that phenomenology is a methodology which claimed to have overcome the impasse reached in the treatment of many traditional philosophical problems (Moran, 2002). To a certain extent, phenomenology arguably started from Brentano, who considered his way of philosophising as a new science of descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology and considered it as a foundation that would “provide clear, evident truth about mental acts employed in these sciences.” Husserl was a student of Brentano, and was strongly inspired by him. Husserl formulates the idea of phenomenological reduction (*epoché*) for bracketing the world, or to be precise, to suspend a natural attitude. Philosophy, for him, is a rigorous science. It aims at the description of things themselves; it lets them show themselves *as they are* in the human experience from a subjective point of view, not through a causal explanation as per the presupposition of

naturalism. Husserl's phenomenology is concerned with the content of act rather than the content of the object of the act and the object itself. For Husserl, 'intentionality' is the way to presuppositionless of both natural attitudes and psychology. The idea that a natural attitude reduces everything to an object outside consciousness and that psychology reduces everything to the individual mind is rejected by Husserl. He argues that natural attitudes and psychology have the limitation since they are not being able to gain the real essence of the things. In other words, they cannot grasp the things as they are.

The purpose of Husserl is to do science in a new way through grasping the essence or meaning of things. Things manifest themselves to us as they are through intentionality which suspends the world, or natural attitude (scientific presupposition). Husserl's philosophy becomes a pure phenomenology or transcendental phenomenology that tries to make sense of the world, of the object by connecting it to the content of the act of consciousness. Thus, his aspiration is to "achiev[e] epistemological certainty." As Moran (2002) stresses, "for Husserl, as for Brentano, philosophy is the description of what is given in direct 'selfevidence.'"⁵¹ Husserl tries to construct an indubitable foundation along the lines of Descartes's philosophy. At the same time, his purpose is to beat Cartesianism, though what he actually does is "a radical rethinking of the Cartesian project itself." He tries to posit intentionality as the foundation of doing philosophy. Consequently, it is 'pure consciousness' or 'transcendental phenomenology' that indicates the role of the phenomenological reduction, but it differs from the notion of Descartes in that the *cogito* is not always directed to an object.

Here we see that, roughly, the phenomenology of Husserl can be understood as epistemological foundationalism. It is nonetheless more accurate to consider it as the thought of early Husserl (around 1887-1929), the works before he was concerned with the notion of 'life-world' (*Lebenswelt*), or his second reduction method that distanced him from Cartesianism. The later Husserl, responding to Heidegger's notion of Being-in-the-world, is more concerned about the lived-body, the embedded historical context of the world we live through.

After Husserl's formulation of intentionality, the concept was adapted from within the phenomenological tradition; such an adaptation took place following the existential turn in phenomenology. The so-called "existential phenomenologists", such as Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, theorised that the root of intentionality is the structure of Being-in-the-world as well as its temporality. This means that human reality is engaged with the world and materiality. However, it is debatable whether the existential turn in phenomenology excludes Husserl's phenomenology, for Husserl also offers the notion of life-world and intersubjectivity, which require the contextdependence in understating our self and the world.

Clarifying "Existential Phenomenological Understanding"

I shall clarify the approach of the present research, which is an "existential phenomenological understanding". The research is an attempt to understand emotions through three dimensions: 1) existential phenomenology as *the first-person perspective*; 2) existential phenomenological understanding as *the methodology of intentionality, which is an embodied engagement with the world*; 3) existential phenomenology as *the phenomenological tradition*. Let me elucidate this.

Existential phenomenology as the first-person perspective

The words "phenomenology", "phenomenological", and "phenomenologically" are commonly in use in academic research today. One might come across such statements as,

“*Phenomenologically* speaking, we need to describe how such experiences seem to us rather than explaining them from nowhere.” The word “phenomenology” in this broad sense probably refers to conscious experiences, subjective feelings, inner life, or the mental phenomenon known as describing “what it is like to be such and such”. In some cases, it is perhaps referred to as “qualia”. The paradigm cases of the phenomenology of mental states are pain, bodily feelings, perceived colours, affective feelings, and so forth. In philosophy of mind’s jargon, these characters is known as a “phenomenality” or “phenomenal consciousness” (Price, et al., 2022). The term “phenomenology” is widely used in analytic philosophy of mind’s literature today, but the same literature sometimes does not refer to the phenomenological tradition and classical phenomenologists. Besides, using the word “phenomenology” in any case might dismiss the whole idea of embodiment, lived-body, lived-experience, and Being-in-the-world. For example, it could be used in referring to the perception of the bodily feelings or something similar to the introspection method as used in the nineteenth century which is not exactly the same as the one recognised by the phenomenological tradition.

However, this use of the word “phenomenology” reflects the way philosophy of mind is related more or less to the phenomenological tradition. At some level, this implies that, in the study of mind, we cannot neglect consciousness. One should note that in the present study when I use the word “phenomenology”, I am simply referring to the sense adopted by most analytic philosophers of mind. I might employ the words “phenomenality” and “phenomenology” interchangeably. In this regard, however, one should bear in mind that, at the same time, the word “phenomenology” could be used to include lived-body and lived-experience as it is the case in the phenomenological tradition.

In fact, the need to distinguish the “existential phenomenology” from “phenomenology” is debatable. So, it is worth mentioning that what I am most concerned about in the phrase “existential phenomenological understanding” is that it essentially involves the notion of the embodied subjectivity, lived-body, livedexperience, Being-in-the-world understood as *the first-person experience*. This could be also referred to as the investigation of “what it is like to be something”. The subject being embodied and existential (engaging with the world and concerned with what matters to it) is to deal with the question of “what it is likeness” as well.

EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING AS THE METHODOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY WHICH IS AN EMBODIED ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORLD

This is a phenomenological understanding in an existential aspect. By the word “existential”, I mean that the human reality *exists* and understands itself in the world or environment. The subject is concerned with what matters and does not matter to it. In other words, it is an attempt to understand emotions from a subjective point of view, emphasising on the embodied subjectivity or lived-body aspect; the embodied subjectivity *exists* as Being-in-the-world. Such a formulation is known as existential phenomenology. Although the word “phenomenology” alone can be understood today to include the notion of embodied subjectivity, I prefer to use “existential phenomenology” to stress the importance of the idea of existential and/or embodied subjectivity in the phenomenological tradition.

Moreover, I put the modifier “existential” before “phenomenology” for two reasons. First, I intend to oppose any methodology based on the formulation of Cartesian mind, on the one hand, and a “transcendental” phenomenology as posited in Husserl’s phenomenology, on the other. So, to be “existential” is to be “Being-in-the-world”. This can include Husserl’s phenomenology only to the extent that he brings the consciousness back

to the world as the life-world. Consequently, to use the term “existential phenomenology” is not to exclude the whole of Husserl’s phenomenology. In this respect, “existential phenomenology” concerns a methodology undertaken by the classical phenomenologists, such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and so forth. These philosophers are taken up as long as their works posit human reality as Being-in-the-world, and formulate the notion of embodiment and lived-body.

The concepts of embodiment, lived-body, lived-experiences, Being-in-the-world, and so on, come from the phenomenological tradition. It could be said that the concepts have been formulated to be understood in terms of phenomenological philosophy. The present study will refer to prominent works of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, as far as the methodology is concerned, I will also engage with the recent formulations involving the blend of phenomenology with other approaches, for example, an embodied cognitive science and an enactive approach formulated by philosophers like Evan Thompson, Giovanna Colombetti, and so on. The current researchers adopting the phenomenological approach mostly absorb themselves into other disciplines. Gallagher suggests that, “More recently phenomenologists following [the phenomenological] tradition have been drawn into theoretical and empirical research in the cognitive sciences, and especially into discussions of enactive and embodied conceptions of the mind” (Shapiro, 2014, p. 6).

So, to be fair, to apply the phenomenological methodology cannot be the exclusive task of classical phenomenologists. Rather, applying the phenomenological methodology should also include the works of contemporary theorists who rely on the phenomenological tradition. Thus, I shall include the recent approaches like the enactive approach in the present work. The reason is that I regard such an approach as a more developed formulation of phenomenological methodology. I shall argue that it can contribute to an integration of both the OFT and the SCT in showing that emotions are intentional, bodily felt, and have a rich phenomenological dimension.

CONCLUSION

In the history of the philosophy of emotion, the competing theories place themselves either on “cognitive” or “bodily” grounds; both are responsible for the mind-body dichotomy and have their difficulties. The former is what I call the Orthodox Feeling Theory (OFT), which cannot account for the structure of intentionality and the evaluative property of emotions; the latter is the Strong Cognitive Theory (SCT), which ignores the role of the bodily and experiential aspect. Such standard theories are out of date. As Slaby points out, “it is fortunate that the old dispute between cognitivist theories and feeling theories of emotion is no longer in the centre of the philosophical debate”. Thus, I shall carry out the present research according to the facts about emotion that are undeniable; emotions structurally comprise of bodily, intentional, and phenomenological features. The quest here is to properly articulate them.

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