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Beyond Partisanship: Outperforming the Party Label with Local Roots in Congressional Elections

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Abstract

While factors like partisanship are increasingly decisive in congressional elections, they do not fully explain variation in constituency support between similarly-situated incumbents. I argue that legislators' reelection success is also influenced by the depth of their local, pre-Congress roots in the district they represent. I theorize that this local connection offers incumbents practical advantages, such as built-in grassroots political infrastructure in their districts. Shared local identity also allows legislators to relate to their voters on dimensions that is uniquely suited to cross-cut partisanship and qualify them to represent their particular constituents. Therefore, I argue that local roots positively influence incumbents' electoral performance in the district from that of their party - and more specifically, their party's presidential nominees. Using an original dataset of nearly 3,000 House incumbents from 2002-2018 and novel measures of their pre-existing local roots in their districts, I find that deeply-rooted incumbents outperform their party's presidential nominees in their districts by an average of about 5 additional points, even after controlling for partisanship and other crucial factors. I also find that this impact grows as the depth of local roots among a district's voters increases. These results indicate that even in an era of congressional politics largely defined by partisanship and presidential loyalty, dyadic district connections like local ties can break through and affect legislators' standing among their constituents.

Keywords: Congress; congressional elections; political geography; local identity; partisanship

> *We're about to find out whether partisanship is so deeply entrenched that federal races might as well be censuses of Democrats and Republicans rather than contests between individual candidates with unique strengths and weaknesses.*
>
> - Dave Wasserman (*Cook Political Report* and *FiveThirtyEight* Analyst)

The above quotation reflects a central puzzle in modern congressional representation that this paper takes up. Uttered before one of the many special elections that took place prior to the 2018 midterms, it gives voice to the modern consensus that nationalized partisanship stands nearly alone as the key determinant of vote choice at the federal level. The public, the media, and scholars of American politics seem to agree that the partisan balance of a congressional district and the national partisan mood together tell us almost everything we need to know about electoral competition in Congress, and how a legislator is assessed and viewed by their constituents. The quotation poses the same question I aim to answer in this paper: can factors other than a legislator's party label matter in the eyes of their voters? More specifically, can local ties that many legislators share with their particular communities break through in a time when national partisan issues, attachments, and identities so heavily define congressional elections?

There's no doubt that in an era of nationalized and party-competitive congressional politics, it is tempting to view congressional districts as simply "red" or "blue." In particular, analysts most often base considerations of district competitiveness on the performance of previous party nominees for president there. But stopping at such figures ignores considerable variation that still exists in congressional elections. This variation goes beyond partisanship and is crucial for understanding congressional representation. Both Republican and Democratic incumbents in the House run far ahead – and in some cases, far behind –other co-partisan candidates on the ballot, such as their party's presidential nominee. Even if both candidates come away with a win, this difference in margins has significant implications for how members of Congress campaign for and subsequently represent their districts. An incumbent who outstrips their presidential nominee in their district, for example, likely enjoys more political independence at home and in Washington than they would otherwise. These legislators likely allocate staff differently, campaign

differently, and relate to their constituents differently by not having to rely quite so much on explicitly partisan connections between them. As I will demonstrate, the party label alone does not explain these differences; but what does?

In this paper, I offer one understudied answer to this question: that even today, distinctly local, place-based representational connections can cause constituents to assess their representatives more positively than they would a standard-issue "generic" partisan. I examine the size and substance of the effect a legislator's biographical roots in their district have on how positively their constituents assess them at the ballot box compared to national partisan figures like presidential nominees. I argue that this local connection, when shared as a common identifying value with constituents, represents a key way in which members can break through the power of partisanship in modern congressional politics.

I first demonstrate that while nationalized partisanship explains a significant portion of constituents' actual vote choices, it falls short in fully explaining electoral performance in the district that continues to deviate from partisan expectations. I argue that the local ties manifest in a legislator's biographical roots in their districts play a large part in differentiating them from other partisan figures in the eyes of their constituents. I offer several potential mechanisms by which local roots might have this effect, and argue broadly that local roots are a signal of shared local identity that operates outside the bounds of nationalized partisanship. As a result, I argue, locally-rooted representatives significantly outperform partisan expectations in their reelection efforts. I demonstrate this overperformance empirically using multivariate analysis on incumbent House legislators from 2002-2018. Holding other relevant electoral factors equal, I find that legislators with deep local roots run over 5 additional percentage points farther ahead of their party's presidential nominee in their districts compared to their more carpetbagging counterparts. I also show that this effect size is even more significant in districts where voters' own local roots are deepest. These results suggest that having authentic roots in the communities they represent provides legislators with a local, dyadic connection that helps them advance their electoral support in the district beyond that of national partisan figures like Presidents who can achieve no such connection.

The Puzzle of Partisan Differentiation

At both the district and national levels, the influence of parties and partisanship has been the central focus of the literature on congressional elections and representation for much of the last twenty years, and for good reason. Scholars have compellingly argued that competition in congressional elections is now structured largely by partisan politics (Bartels 2000; Herrnson 2015; Jacobson 2015; Jacobson and Carson 2015). Members have become more reliably partisan in their legislative activity on Capitol Hill (Layman and Carsey 2002; Lee 2009; Theriault 2008), and their constituencies have become more homogeneous in their partisanship due to natural demographic, ideological, and geographic sorting (Bishop 2009; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 2015; Levendusky 2009), an effect thought by many to be augmented by partisan gerrymandering (McDonald 2006; McDonald and Samples 2007). As a result, electoral dynamics in the district seem to be increasingly dependent on both the partisan balance among a district's voters, and the favorability of their representative's party at the national level leading up to an election. Moreover, the literature has asserted that because politics has become more nationalized, voters do not meaningfully separate their assessments of their home-district representative and their representative's party (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Hopkins 2018; Jacobson 2015). Under this assumption, the only truly meaningful characteristic of an incumbent legislator is their party label; and therefore, the only meaningful connection and identification with their constituents is a partisan one.

The data, however, do not fully bear out this trend in terms of observed vote choices at the district level. In practice, many districts continue to "split tickets" in the aggregate at varying rates, demonstrating that partisanship is not the only metric voters use when assessing their congressional representatives. Figure 1 displays this variation by plotting the differences in the district-level victory margins between incumbent House members and their own party's presidential nominee in the 2002-2018 elections.[1] This distribution illustrates *Partisan Overperformance*, a valuable measure for understanding differences between legislators based on connections to constituents that go beyond party attachment, and the primary dependent variable in this paper. These differences notably persist in both presidential and midterm years.

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[1] The sample only includes incumbents with a major-party challenger; if included, unopposed incumbents would all appear in the far right end of the distribution. For midterm years, this difference was calculated using presidential results from two years prior.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

Previous literature tells us that presidential nominees are crucial figures for understanding deviation from nationalized partisanship. They are highly salient national figures whom voters can name and identify, oftentimes more easily than with their legislators. They are also the overt leaders of the national party whose incentives lie in emphasizing broad national issues that trigger national party attachments in the electorate (Lee 2009; Skowronek 1993; Whittington and Carpenter 2003). Voters' presidential vote choices have also become increasingly consistent over time, and are tightly aligned with voters' party identification and registrations. As a result, a voter's choice in a presidential election is a reliable proxy for an individual's partisan attachment. Importantly for this paper, this attachment also plays out the district level; in most electoral forecasters' ratings (and in most reliable scholarly models) prior presidential vote is commonly used either on its own or as part of larger indexes, to measure district-wide propensity to support one party or the other for Congress. More broadly, strong between-office electoral alignment within a jurisdiction indicates that constituents perceive and assess their legislator and their presidential nominees through a similar, partisan lens. In such scenarios, the ostensible motivation behind the vote choice at both levels is party attachment. Therefore, if nationalized partisanship were the only criteria by which constituents evaluated their representatives, then we would expect most incumbents to perform similarly to their party's presidential candidate.

However, only about a quarter of incumbent House members run within five percent of their party's nominee, while over half of all incumbents since 2002 were elected with a difference of more than ten percent in either direction. Legislators who ran either well ahead or (in fewer cases) well behind their party's presidential nominee continue to make up a huge proportion of the House membership. This indicates that for reasons not fully explained in the literature, a party's House and presidential candidates are assessed differently by their constituents in the district for reasons other than partisanship. I argue that one primary reason is that an incumbent possesses either an abundance or deficit of *local roots* in the district, which are authentic place-based lived experience within the boundaries of the district the incumbent represents. I theorize that these roots are indicative of a unique local connection that legislators can share with their constituents that by definition exists outside of nationalized partisan affiliations and identities, and thus increases local support for the legislator such that they overperform partisan expectations.

Defining and Valuing Local Roots

I argue not only that local roots have the potential to break through nationalized partisanship, but that they are uniquely suited to do so in several important ways. First, local roots are specific ties to a district that predate a legislator's time in Congress, and can provide *practical* advantages based on name recognition, local political and economic networks, and campaign communication opportunities unavailable to legislators with less familiarity in the district. The second broad benefit is more abstract: I argue that local roots offer legislators significantly more opportunities to personally relate to constituents of all partisan persuasions based on a shared, distinctly local identity that cross-cuts partisanship and thus helps incumbents outperform partisan expectations in their districts.

Previous literature demonstrates the many ways in which legislators relate to constituents in "personal" ways that go beyond partisanship and help them perform better in their elections than they otherwise would (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987, p. 77; see also Mayhew 1974, Parker and Davidson 1979, Mann and Wolfinger 1980, and Friedman 2007). Other scholarship tells us that voters place high value in incumbent-specific attributes such as race, religion, geography, and gender when deciding whether to reelect their representative (Fenno 2003; Gay 2001; Green and Guth 1991; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Childs and Cowley 2011).

One particular subliterature, however, has touted the importance of local, place-based identity and geographic closeness as a uniquely beneficial trait that legislators can share with their constituents, initially coined by V.O. Key as the "friends and neighbors" effect (1949). This phenomenon is essentially the advantage candidates enjoy in the town, county, state, or other geographic area that the candidate currently calls home, compared to other areas in their electorate. Subsequent work has found general support for the friends-and-neighbors voting effect at different levels of government (Johnston et al. 2016; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983; Tatalovich 1975). These works have found, for example, that constituents both recognize and value "local" candidates (Bowler, Donovan, and Snipp 1993; Jacobs and Munis 2018; Johnson and Rosenblatt 2006; Rice and Macht 1987; Shugart and Valdini 2005; Stevens et al. 2018). On the institutional side, parties in the comparative context have been shown to actively seek out candidates with local ties, or limit their searches to within the constituency's geographic area, even absent a residency requirement (Gallagher 1980; Parker 1986; Parker 1982; Weeks 2008). Recent works have corroborated the representational

importance of local connections (Jacobs and Munis 2018; Meredith 2013; Panagopoulos, Leighley, and Hamel 2017). This collection of findings indicates that political actors in many contexts recognize and leverage place-based identity as an electorally valuable connection between voters and their elected representatives.

The *Local Roots* concept I introduce in this paper builds considerably on these early insights about the importance of geographic connections between candidates and voters. It widens the scope and potential power of local candidate effects by examining legislators who represent smaller-scale local constituencies - in this case, congressional districts - and the electoral benefits they garner by being locally-connected in an authentic way to their entire district as a whole. In this paper, I use the logic of local identity that "friends-and-neighbors" scholars pioneered to theorize and empirically demonstrate the electoral value that local connections provide to deeply-rooted legislators compared against their "carpetbagging" counterparts in other districts. I also offer new potential mechanisms by which this electoral value accrues. While these mechanisms are founded both in theoretical reasoning and (in many cases) previous literature, they are *not* mechanisms I am specifically measuring in this paper. The findings I present later, while striking and likely indicative of the operation of one or more of these mechanisms, are purely observational in nature. The likely reality is that legislators' local roots follow a multi-causal pathway in helping them achieve electoral success and partisan overperformance, and that mechanisms differ in their impact across different types of districts. At any rate, I leverage previous scholarship to argue that this pathway likely includes both practical and symbolic advantages that strengthen the electoral relationship between legislator and constituent in ways that help incumbents overperform partisan expectations.[2]

First, I argue that local roots offer a legislator tangible, practical benefits in helping to build a deep and lasting coalition of voter support in the district. These benefits stem directly from connections, coalitions and experience that are by definition developed well before a legislator ever takes office; as such, deep roots can offer legislators a "head start" in terms of political infrastructure in the district and broadening their base of support. For instance, legislator traits like prior local political experience or long-term residential backgrounds in the district provide opportunities to achieve a naturally higher baseline of name recognition and grassroots support. But local roots may also offer a deeper and ultimately more meaningful and advantageous brand of name recognition that is not borne out of broadly-known celebrity status (Hosein 2004; Street 2004), nor out of incumbency itself, but that is organically grown at the grassroots. Previous work has theorized, for example, that local name recognition and local political connections are one key mechanism fueling the "friends-and-neighbors" effect (Bowler, Donovan, and Snipp 1993; Gimpel et al. 2008; Johnston et al. 2016). A legislator with an extensive personal history in the district has by definition more time and opportunity to establish a more expansive baseline of direct personal connections with important social, economic, and political institutions, including local media outlets, political influencers and operatives, and local businesses. This can happen organically before the legislator ever takes office, or in a recurring fashion over the course of their career.[3]

These relationships can pay dividends particularly in the campaign context, where locally-rooted incumbents have a great deal more representational flexibility than their less-rooted counterparts in other districts. Specifically, these legislators' reelection campaigns can feature extensive campaign communications that don't have to rely merely on partisan talking points, but can fall back on their local backgrounds and the perceived qualifications if necessary. Therefore, even if voters do *not* pick up on a legislator's local roots directly, they are exposed to them in the campaign process through direct candidate appeals. This potential mechanism becomes particularly important when a legislator's party is suffering politically at the national level: as a practical matter, legislators with local roots simply have a more diverse set of representational connections they can call upon in the campaign context if other connections (like partisanship) are weaker or less reliable in a given year than they normally would be.

This mitigation of partisan risk speaks not just to the bonus that local roots provide for legislators who possess them, but also to the significant challenges they present when they are missing from a legislator's resume. Incumbents who lack local roots also lack the opportunity to make authentic place-based appeals to voters, which then forces them to fall back on other (notably more polarizing) constituent connections like ideology or partisanship. With fewer resources and less representational flexibility, these more "carpetbagging" candidates then must rely more on their party or outside groups to support their candidacies, and often go on to underperform on Election Day even if they end up winning. One such example is Alex Mooney (R). A representative for West Virginia's 2nd District, Mooney was born in Washington, DC, educated in Maryland, and ran for state legislative seats in both Maryland and New

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[2]

[3] In fact, Table A7 in the online appendix demonstrates that the effects of local roots are largely consistent regardless of how long a legislator has served.

Hampshire before finally moving to West Virginia less than a year before his first successful congressional run in 2014. Mooney was barely reelected in 2016 and 2018 by margins 22 and 27 points lower than that of his party's candidate for President, Donald Trump.

The practical potential advantages local roots provide are obviously desirable for any reelection-seeking legislator, and are sorely missed when local roots are absent from their profile. However, a number of more abstract (but equally meaningful) representational advantages may also be at work that could be attributed to local roots. First, many kinds of shared nonpartisan characteristics between representative and constituent have been shown to have a broadly positive valence with voters and increase an elected leader's favorability. Voters prefer candidates with whom they share common identities and characteristics, particularly for salient identities like race, gender, and partisanship (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Fraga 2016; Grose 2011; Matson and Fine 2006; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Mason and Wronski 2018; Theodoridis 2017), largely because shared identity is a valuable cue for voters as to who they trust to represent them (Fenno 1978, Mansbridge 1999). Consequently, while politics is undoubtedly nationalizing to some extent (Hopkins 2018), localness has been demonstrated to be a key identity for many, and one for which they reward their legislators for sharing with them: robust experimental scholarship has replicated "local candidate" effects at the voter level by leveraging local identity cues (Panagopoulos, Leighley, and Hamel 2017; Sajuria and Collignon 2018).

I argue that this happens not just for the practical reasons addressed earlier, but also because close local connections reflect an underpinning of trust stemming from mutual interests, backgrounds, and identities that are unique to the particular district (Fenno 1978). Local roots represent a valuable connective tissue that creates a sense of trust among constituents that a legislator has their best interests at heart and truly are "one of them" on dimensions that have little if anything to do with their partisan label. For example, in Fenno's qualitative masterpiece *Home Style*, he interviewed (among many others) a member of Congress who attributed his electoral success as being rooted in trust and distinctly local identity because of his background before he came to Congress. He went to high school and college in the district, was a star athlete, and held local office shortly after graduating. Asked why voters seem to trust him so much, the member replied that it was mainly "because they've known me over a period of years. They know my father and my family's reputation. I'm a known quantity… people know your general reputation, your family name, your kids. They know you in athletics. People can put their finger on you." (Fenno 1978, 79) If a representative grew up in their district, went to a local high school, or owns a business that's a local institution, their voters might recognize these as credentials that qualify them to represent their interests in the House. Therefore, when both constituents and their representative both have a meaningful personal history in and around the district, it creates an overlapping identity that informs how well-represented constituents feel.

Fenno's classic observations illuminate another potential mechanism for why local ties might help incumbents differentiate from their presidential counterparts even amidst this more nationalized partisan era. Because parties - and partisan voting patterns themselves - used to be much more local and decentralized, the kind of partisan alignment at the district level captured by Figure 1 was likely much less predictable, or at least more heterogeneous based on other factors like race or geographic region (Hopkins 2018). Presidential voting patterns at multiple levels - in individuals, districts, and states - were far less consistent from year to year, in part because of high levels of split-ticket voting based on conceptions and expectations of the "personal president" that induces voters to cross party lines and vote for them (Campbell and Miller 1957). In the years since, parties have become significantly less decentralized, a process that is embodied by the accentuated role of presidential nominees as the nationwide leaders of their respective parties (Rogers 2016; Zingher and Richman 2019). Voters' nationalized partisan attachments are highly predictive of their presidential vote choices in particular. As a result, voters' assessments of presidents and presidential nominees has leapfrogged congressional vote choice as the truer signal of party attachment. Meanwhile, voters continue to value personal ties, but are finding them in a more natural venue: their local representatives in the House. Therefore, the consistent impact of personal ties such as local roots today may be due not just to constituents' perceptions of their representatives in the House as primarily local figures, but also their increasingly rigid perceptions of presidents as primarily national, partisan figures.

Regardless of whether the mechanism is primarily practical, symbolic, or both, I argue that a shared local background translates into votes that diverge positively from expected partisan support. At the voter level, local roots might accomplish this at the ballot box in any or all of three ways: by inducing unaffiliated or even out-party voters to support them based on shared local identity; imbuing co-partisan voters with a sense of personal loyalty that makes them more

likely to turn out in the general election; or motivating supportive constituents to vote all the way down the ballot.[4] Local roots therefore may have effects that go beyond ticket-splitting. However this increased electoral support manifests in practice, I argue that the result is a consistent overperformance relative to partisan fundamentals:

> **Hypothesis 1**: *The deeper an incumbent legislator's local roots in their district, the better they will perform electorally compared to their party's presidential nominee.*

As previously discussed, much of the theorized effects of candidate traits and identities are partly conditional upon whether these traits are shared and valued by voters. Foundational works on descriptive representation tell us that voters appreciate when candidates for various offices are more "like them" based on any number of descriptive traits, and that the more descriptive symbiosis exists between representative and constituency, the stronger their bond is likely to be, and the better incumbents perform in elections (Mansbridge 1999; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Banducci et al. 2004). The literature also tells us that place-based identity is no exception to these contextual effects. Previous work indicates that candidate traits like local birthplace is more highly valued as a candidate credential in jurisdictions where localism and "place" are particularly relevant and important parts of constituents' identity (Childs and Cowley 2011; Panagopoulos et al. 2017; Sajuria and Collignon 2018).

Therefore, I also argue that while local roots are an incumbent trait that voters of all stripes can appreciate, the extent of this appreciation as measured by vote choice will be greater among constituencies who themselves have deeper local ties to the district. To proxy these local ties at the district level, I utilize a measure of long-term geographic mobility in the district – specifically, an American Community Survey measure of the percentage of a district's voting-age constituents who were born in their current home state.[5] I argue that when long-term district mobility is low (that is, when more voters have lasting local ties), the homespun quality of the district's culture becomes a more salient part of its unique identity, much like the prevalence of a certain racial or ethnic population would increase the salience of that identity. A district with low levels of long-term geographic mobility, in which local background and attachment is a defining characteristic of the community, should be expected to place a higher value in representation with deep local roots, particularly as they contrast with nationalized presidential partisanship. More practically, voters are more likely to have had actual experience observing or perhaps crossing paths with their legislator in some capacity, including less direct experience like reading about them in local media outlets, if they grew up in the same place, thus amplifying the aforementioned advantages of name recognition and local trust. Therefore, I argue that the extent to which a constituency views local roots as a desirable quality in their representative depends on how locally-rooted the constituency itself is.

> **Hypothesis 2**: *The effects of Hypothesis 1 will be substantively larger for district constituencies who have more extensive local ties themselves.*

Data and Methodology

For the dependent variable (Partisan Overperformance), I subtracted the two-party margin of victory for the presidential nominee from the legislator's party in their district from that of the actual legislator using merged district-level election return data from *Congressional Quarterly Elections* (for House vote shares) and *DailyKos Elections* (for presidential vote shares). Capturing the primary independent variable -- legislators' local roots in their districts – required a more substantial undertaking. The goal was to establish legislators' meaningful geographic presence in their district at multiple points in their personal history preceding their service in Congress. The seven component measures I have captured do so, and serve as important landmarks of legislators' local roots in the district. All measures were collected originally by the author for every incumbent running in the nine elections spanning 2002-2018 using

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[4] This paper uses observational data at the district level, and therefore does *not* measure the specific mechanisms proposed here; however, it is the author's hope that future work might identify which of these mechanisms is most operative at the voter level.

[5] This measure varies considerably across districts, and a distribution can be found in Figure A3 in the Appendix. While a slightly more precise measure of, for example, percentage of voting-age constituents born in their congressional district would have been preferable, no such measure exists.

the *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress,* the U.S. Census Bureau, and *Congressional Quarterly*'s *Member Profiles.*[6] Below I will briefly describe the coding process for each type of local roots[7], and distributions of these measures across the nine election cycles in the data can be found in Figure 2.

- **Local Political Dynasty** - First, to capture early political roots in the district, I employ a little-used measure of whether or not an MC is part of a local political dynasty - that is, whether or not their family has held a previous elected office that overlaps with, and thus has appeared on the ballot in, the district. The *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress* systematically captures this data point for federal offices, which I extracted from the text using regular expressions. For non-federal offices, I used *CQ*'s Member Biographical Profiles which and a variety of other biographical sources that include these legacies.

- **Local Birth and Educational Attainment** –These include four binary indicators of whether a legislator was born, went to high school, college, or graduate school in their district. I code these measures based on whether the city or town of an MC's birth or educational institution is either fully or partially located in their current district.[8]

- **Local Political Experience** - This type of experience means service in local office that overlaps with the district such as mayor, city/town council, county-level office, or local boards (Board of Supervisors, Zoning Board, School Board, etc).[9]

- **Local Business Ownership** - The final component measure is whether an MC owns a business in the district. Using *CQ's* Member Biographical Profiles, which provide extensive narrative descriptions of an MC's pre-Congress career and political journey, I manually coded which members of Congress had begun businesses of their own or inherited a local family business in cities and towns that intersect with their districts.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

These previously underutilized variables will be tested primarily as part of an original *Local Roots Index* that adds together the component variables to create a scale from 0-7.[10] While these components all measure the underlying concept of a legislator's local roots, they also capture differing mechanisms by which local roots can be impactful.[11] Adding these components together into the Local Roots Index ensures that there is no bias towards or against any one of these mechanisms, and that legislators get proper credit when they possess more than one of these background attributes.[12]

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[6] While detailed and reliable, one limitation of this data is that it only covers candidates who have actually served in Congress. Most of the local roots indicators come from official Congressional biographies. This is a notable limitation primarily because of potential selection bias that exists by restricting the analysis to incumbent members of Congress (Gelman and King 1990). As such, the Local Roots Index I use in this paper is not precisely a measure of "local roots" as it applies to any congressional candidate, since most such data is unavailable for lesser-known challengers and open-seat candidates for whom reliably-coded biographies do not exist. As such, I make no claims that the effects I find in this paper are precisely those of all candidates for the House, but rather for incumbents only. However, as demonstrated in Figure A1.4 in the Appendix, the depth of local roots varies extensively across incumbent MCs, making the measurement of its impact possible in a cross-sectional context – this is also the only acceptable theoretical route, since local roots by definition do not change over a legislator's career absent a substantial redistricting. Secondly, on a substantive level, the motivations, contexts, and levels of political interest on the part of voters, donors, activists, and parties for incumbent MCs are so fundamentally different from those of generic congressional candidates, that including both sets in the same analysis would not only be problematic methodologically, but would ignore the fact that as actual members of Congress with lawmaking power, incumbents are a much more substantively impactful unit of analysis than challengers or open-seat candidates.

[7] Tables A2-5 in the Appendix display observational examples of each in the data.

[8] The U.S. Census Bureau's Place Relationship File indicates which congressional districts intersect with each American city's geographic boundaries within a particular Congress. It is possible that the exact geographic location of their birth is not technically located within the boundaries of the district; but city/town overlap is the metric most likely to be perceived and valued by voters. This is the same distinction made for the High School, Undergraduate and Postgraduate In-District measures.

[9] Although it is theoretically possible that an MC gained their local political experience or political dynasty in a geographic area that does not overlap with their congressional district, manual checks of MCs with this designation corrected any observations in which this might have been the case (very few existed).

[10] No MC over this period scores positively for all 7 component measures, making the scale 0-6 in practice.

[11] Alternate specifications of the Local Roots Index – including one utilizing factor analysis, and another that breaks out individual effects of the seven component indicators – can be found in Figures A1.1 and A1.2 in the Appendix.

[12] In all models and robustness checks, I control for whether the incumbent had any postgraduate degree; generic business experience; or prior elected experience regardless of location, all to ensure that these three components of the Local Roots Index are capturing only the place-based dimension of this qualification.

Beyond this primary independent variable concept, I include two crucial controls for partisanship. First, I measure the extent to which an incumbent has a strong partisan advantage in their district compared to their major-party opponent. This is operationalized by capturing how partisan a district is compared to the rest of the country as a whole using a modified version of two-party presidential vote in the district in prior elections. I argue that the steepness of the partisan balance of a district affects the extent to which an incumbent legislator can rely on co-partisan voters for reelection. That is, the more heavily partisan a district tends to vote, the more likely elections are to be decided on those terms at all federal levels, much as a majority-minority district will more heavily feature race as an issue or deciding factor for voters. Therefore, the more one-sided a district's voters are in terms of partisanship, the greater alignment in vote share we should expect between incumbent legislators and presidential candidates. To capture partisan balance, I use the Cook Political Report's *Partisan Voting Index* (PVI). The PVI has two distinct advantages as a measure of nationalized partisanship in the district: first, it compares the partisan voting behavior of the district to the national average, thus putting all districts on a consistent plane of measurement; it also averages behavior from the previous two presidential elections, thus avoiding selection bias on a particular election or candidate. Both advantages also help to avoid entanglement with the dependent variable in this particular model.

National political conditions also affect voter behavior in the district for a number of reasons, including attention to national issues, affecting the opinions of independent constituents, and mobilizing (or de-mobilizing) partisan ones (Herrnson 2015). For example, when national political conditions favor the party opposite the president, then co-partisan incumbents may be incentivized to distance themselves from their party's leader in their campaigns. To capture contemporary national partisan mood, I use the RealClearPolitics average of the two-party share of the "Generic Congressional Vote" ballot question at the national level in a given election. The generic ballot question has been shown to be a reliable indicator of national political conditions, and as such is a significant predictor of electoral dynamics in the district. It also is specifically tied to Congress, making it more appropriate to predict congressional election outcomes.

Additionally, there are a number of factors that fall outside of a partisan framework that have been found to affect district electoral dynamics. The most significant of these is the quality of the challenger in the congressional election. High-quality challengers have been found to significantly affect how well incumbents perform electorally by raising and spending money, running ads that challenge them publicly, and forcing them to respond to public issues (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985; Krasno and Green 1988; Squire 1992). Since presidential contests in the district always feature two well-known (and usually highly-qualified) candidates, an incumbent's race more closely mirrors their presidential counterpart's when they face a quality challenger. Therefore, the presence of a quality challenger should have a negative effect on the ability of a legislator to outperform a presidential nominee regardless of a legislator's local roots. I operationalize this using the commonly-used indicator of whether a challenger has prior elected political experience at any level of government.

Another important control included is that of a legislator's length of service in Congress. This is an important factor not just in congressional elections generally, but is particularly relevant as a potential differentiator between legislators and their party's presidential nominee. Most legislators have appeared on the ballot in their district several times, while presidential nominees are appearing for only the first or second time. Longer-serving legislators have also had extensive opportunity to build their relationship with voters and leaders in the district regardless of their pre-established roots, whereas most voters have little to no opportunity to "get to know" presidential nominees outside of national media. As a result, tenure length is a potential driver of outsized vote share in the district for legislators compared to presidential nominees.

I also address race as a key potential difference in the way constituents view their congressional representative as opposed to a presidential candidate. We know, for example, that descriptive representation that is not necessarily partisan can be deeply advantageous for incumbents who match their districts, and help them electorally by increasing participation among attribute-sharing constituents (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990). More specifically for this study, race differences between an incumbent legislator and their party's presidential nominee may create meaningful differences in constituent appraisal of the two. I therefore include a binary indicator for whether the incumbent and their presidential counterpart are the same race. Other control variables include whether the legislator faced a primary opponent and whether they held a leadership position in Congress. Primary opposition may weaken incumbent House members or force them to spend more resources, thus deflating their general election margins and bringing them closer to their party's presidential nominees, who also tend to face contentious, resource-

draining primaries. The directional effect of chamber party leadership is less clear, but likely produces a different kind of relationship with their home constituents that may more closely resemble that of a presidential candidate, as opposed to the relationship established by a back-bencher member of Congress.

I have also included whether the state in which the election is occurring allows single-mark straight-ticket voting. This condition should naturally deflate the marginal differences in electoral performance between presidential candidates and their co-partisan neighbors on the ballot, since voters in these states can choose all same-party candidates with one vote. Finally, I include a linear "time" variable, since partisan alignment between congressional and presidential candidates has descriptively increased over the course of the time period tested (2002-2018).[13] To estimate the effects for both Hypotheses, I employ mixed-effects multilevel regression with random intercepts by legislator, to account for repeat observations of incumbents across time.

Results

The results of these tests, as shown in Table 1, demonstrate clearly that legislators' local roots in their districts positively shape their electoral standing among their constituents. These results demonstrate that the depth of an incumbent legislator's local roots have extensive and statistically significant positive impacts on their voters' assessments at the ballot box compared to their party. The Local Roots Index is statistically significant well below the .01 level in predicting overperformance relative to their party's presidential nominee. Other control variables of interest, including terms of service in Congress, challenger quality, and straight-ticket voting also have their expected effects.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

To get a sense for the more precise effect of an incumbent's local roots on partisan overperformance, I generated predicted partisan overperformance based on different values of the *Local Roots Index*, which range from 0 to 6 as observed. The result of these predictions can be found in Figure 3, which displays the linear effect of a legislator's local roots bounded by 95% confidence intervals. We see from this Figure 3 that an incumbent legislator with no local roots (a zero on the local roots Index) runs, on average, about 6 points ahead of their party's presidential nominee in the district. This six-point advantage reflects the well-documented benefits of the incumbency advantage, including the "personal vote" and legislator tenure length, available to all congressional incumbents. However, this difference is outshined by the predicted difference gained by incumbents with deep local roots (6 on the Local Roots Index). These legislators, by comparison, enjoy a positive partisan differentiation in their districts of a little over 14 points. This marginal effect of around 8 total points demonstrates that deep shared roots induce voters to support legislators by margins that go beyond those predicted by simple partisanship, and which do so on top of the traditional advantages that legislators have in their districts over national figures. They also do with high levels of statistical confidence.

[Insert Figure 3 about here]

The substantive effect of deep local roots for incumbents is even clearer when compared directly to that of a lengthy tenure in Congress (defined here as nine terms).[14] As discussed earlier, a long-serving legislator has had the opportunity to cultivate a reputation in the district during their time in Congress using the power and privilege of the office, and other advantages that come with incumbency. These are advantages that even nationally-known partisan figures like presidential candidates do not possess. But, as Figure 4 indicates, the effect of deep local roots (5-6 additional points) is the same or larger than the effect of serving in Congress for a significant period of time. The fact that a legislator's pre-existing local roots meets or exceeds these effects indicates that *who they were before* they arrived in Congress may matter just as much – if not more – to their voters than the time they actually spend holding office.

This could be the case because of how time spent in Congress is defined primarily by partisanship in recent years. Much of Washington activity is determined by party leaders in the chamber or policy choices by the president, significantly constraining the amount of time and activity legislators can expend differentiating themselves. In this way, legislator's service in Congress is tinged with partisanship almost no matter what they do. Having served in the

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[13] Descriptive statistics for all observations in this paper can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
[14] The total effects of both the Tenure Length and Local Roots in Figure 4 are captured by generating predictions of Partisan Overperformance at the 10th and 90th values of the independent variables to avoid outliers.

chamber for a long time, while beneficial in other ways, may therefore not be as useful in helping a legislator establish a reputation that could transcend partisanship and be personally attributable to them. Local roots in the district, on the other hand, have no such baggage in part because they are in place long before a legislator's service in Congress and thus exogenous to any activity that occurs after they are first elected. Their association is with distinctly nonpartisan qualities that constituents of any political persuasion can find appealing. It is perhaps not so surprising, then, that local roots help differentiate voters' assessments of their legislator from their party label at least as much as their seniority in the chamber.

[Insert Figure 4 about here]

Given a number of systematic differences between presidential and midterm election years, it was also important to test the effects of local roots separately for each type. One might expect, for example, that during midterm elections, incumbents (and congressional campaigns generally) occupy more space in the average voting constituent's mind than in presidential years. This is what I find, though the effects of local roots hold both substantively and statistically when limited either to either election type. Regardless of the sampling, the effect of local roots on Partisan Overperformance meets or overtakes those of tenure length, challenger quality, racial alignment, and other variables thought to create recognizable differences between House members and their party's presidential nominees.

Hypothesis 2 engages with the question of whether these vary in the extent to which a district embodies or values local roots as a characteristic of their elected representatives. Previous work has shown that the type and extent of voters' place-based identity has impacts on their likelihood of voting for approving of local candidates (Sajuria and Collignon 2018) or of responding to place-based candidate appeals (Jacobs and Munis 2018), primarily using experimental methods or survey data. With Hypothesis 2, I extend these findings into the observational sphere. I argue that local legislator roots make a bigger substantive impact on vote choice when that their constituents themselves also have deep roots in their communities.

This is precisely the effect I find when splitting the sample based on the depth of district constituency roots in their geographic area. Figure 5 demonstrates incumbents' predicted levels of overperformance in their districts relative to their party's presidential nominee separately for districts with low, medium, and high levels of local constituency roots. Notably, increases in the depth of incumbents' local roots helps them overperform their party's presidential nominee in all three district subgroups at statistically significant levels. Local roots therefore seem to be a desirable characteristic for any incumbent. But we also see that as constituency roots increase, so too does the effect of incumbents' own local roots in their district. These differences are statistically significant at the .03 level.[15] These findings demonstrate a clear and meaningful descriptive connection between representatives and constituents that cross-cuts presidential partisanship and has significant and lasting effects on congressional elections.

[Insert Figure 5 about here]

Discussion

Much of the literature on congressional elections and representation of the last twenty years has focused on the effects of partisanship on the actions of members of the House, the voting behavior of their constituents, and the electoral relationship that binds both groups together every two years. Both scholarship and popular media posit nationalized partisanship, particularly as it relates to support for the president and presidential nominees, as the foundation on which the representative relationship in Congress currently rests, with the corollary that almost nothing can break through it.

These results show that the literature has prematurely dismissed local connections as a binding identity in many of the relationships that members of Congress share with their constituents. The local roots a legislator develops in the district prior to their time in Congress, particularly when shared with constituents who also possess them, have a clear and substantive effect on the nature of this relationship as enforced through elections. The variation in how voters evaluate their representative versus their party label has likely decreased as partisanship has become more salient, well-sorted, and well-defined; but member and district-specific factors like local identity continue to have an impact on the positive

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[15] One typical way to ascertain statistical significance of differences is by comparing the unstandardized betas using the following z-score formula: $z = (B1_{high\ constituent\ roots} - B2_{low\ constituent\ roots}) / \sqrt{(SE_{B1}^2 + SE_{B2}^2)}$. This was the method used here, which produced a z-score of 1.87, which indicates statistical significance at the 0.03 level.

assessments legislators try to maintain among their constituents in order to win reelection. The results in this paper indicate that the representative-constituent relationship is foundationally stronger relative to partisan leanings when legislators can identify with their constituents based on pre-existing local ties in the district.

That these elements of the member-constituent relationship can have such a tremendous impact in this particular era makes these results all the more striking. The recent emphasis on the overwhelming power of parties and partisanship in congressional elections can leave campaigns (or even potential campaigns) feeling deterministic, and that nothing about candidates other than the party label next to their name truly matters. Scholars, political analysts and commentators have pointed out the increasing correlation between partisan vote choice in congressional and presidential elections in this century; for example, many journalistic outlets like *FiveThirtyEight* and the *Cook Political Report* use prior presidential vote in a district as the foundation for their race ratings. But in recent elections, and in particular the 2018 midterms, the parties have also fielded uniquely compelling local candidates with biographies that helped them significantly outperform their party's presidential nominees in districts they had no business being competitive in, at least from a partisan perspective. The empirical analysis in this paper - which controls for partisan balance - demonstrates that this local advantage is not isolated, but rather a wide-ranging effect that is robust across all parties, election types, and geographic areas.

In addition, because party majorities in Congress are more volatile than they have been in nearly a century (Lee 2016), for incumbents their party label itself can be a blessing in one election, and a curse in the next. Local roots in the district have the opposite effect: while they indeed do not pack quite as powerful a punch as partisanship does, they are an unfettered benefit for legislators aiming for a positive reputation among their constituents. When legislators have deep local roots in the district, they have more stable constituent relationships, with stronger and more meaningful foundations that should help them withstand partisan competition and change at the national and district levels. Presumably, without deep local roots, more legislators would be more vulnerable to the increasingly volatile partisan winds in any given election. And notably, local roots are a connection that does not require sacrificing one subconstituency for another, since local attachments are in theory not limited by the extent of a voter's partisanship or ideological tendencies. As Hopkins (2018) elegantly put it in his recent work on electoral nationalization around the two parties, "One doesn't have to espouse certain political views to be a proud Rhode Islander or South Dakotan." (11)

Finally, this analysis should induce scholars to reexamine what representation in Congress means amidst the nationalized partisan lens through which most analysts tend to view congressional elections and representation. These results on the whole suggest that while both voters and candidates are participating in elections dictated more and more by partisanship, the candidates themselves continue to matter beyond partisanship. This is particularly the case in the American context, in which candidate-centric elections and "personal votes" (Cain et al. 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; Grofman 2005) are conducive to the use of local roots and other differentiating candidate qualities. But more specifically, the results from Hypothesis 2 indicate not just that legislators' local ties matter, but that – like other discrete candidate qualities – they matter more when shared with *their particular constituents*. The persistent impact of local roots in House elections show not just that candidate traits still matter, but that they matter more when they are dyadically shared with their district's voters.

This persistent candidate-centrism, particularly in the area of local qualifications, is largely possible because Americans still choose their elected leaders in the House based on geographic representation. The framers of the Constitution understood that the unifying nature of a shared community made it important to base our political representation in geography: members of the House of Representatives were originally intended not to represent simply one of two national factions, but rather the unique, decentralized, and vastly differing interests of their local communities to prevent any one (or, in today's case, two) factions from wielding too much influence (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1788). As a result of the natural commonality that geography provides, local roots in the district may be uniquely suited to stand against the detrimental effects of partisan polarization and nationalized tribalism that the founders warned against. Perhaps leveraging local roots and other nonpartisan tools to restore a shared sense of pride in American community life can ensure that the "People's House" does not simply become the "Party's House."

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Main Text Tables and Figures

Table 1

Effects on Partisan Overperformance, 2002-2018

Dependent Variable	Partisan Overperformance
Local Roots Index	1.37***
	(0.23)
Postgraduate Degree	-0.30
	(0.59)
Non-Local Political Experience	-0.32
	(0.57)
Business Background	-0.30
	(0.67)
Co-Racial Pres. Nominee	2.40***
	(0.47)
District Partisan Advantage (Cook PVI)	-0.34***
	(0.03)
Generic Congressional Ballot Advantage	1.42***
	(0.05)
Primary Opposition	-0.89**
	(0.41)
Chamber Leadership	-1.96
	(2.40)
Terms Served in Congress	0.62***
	(0.07)
Quality Challenger	-3.55***
	(0.50)
Straight-Ticket Voting Allowed	-0.34
	(0.70)
Time	-1.53***
	(0.10)
Constant	14.07***
	(1.01)
Wald(ch-2)	1846.67
N	2947

Note: Results found using mixed-effects multilevel regression with random intercepts by incumbent; standard errors in parentheses.

$*p < .1$, $**p < .05$, $***p < .01$

Fig. 1: Distributions incumbent partisan overperformance, 2002-2018. The variable is calculated by subtracting a presidential nominee's margin in the district from that of their co-partisan incumbent House member. Only includes incumbents who faced major-party challengers.


Fig. 2: Distribution of incumbent members of the U.S. House running for reelection on seven component measures of Local Roots, 2002-2018 elections.

Fig. 3: Predicted partisan overperformance in the district based on the incumbent's local roots in the district as measured by the Local Roots Index. Upper and lower bounds around the linear prediction represent 95% confidence intervals for predicted values. Effects found using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.

Fig. 4: Predicted effects of selected independent variables on incumbent partisan overperformance in the district. Effects bounded by 95% confidence intervals and found using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.

Fig. 5: Predicted effects of local roots on incumbent partisan overperformance in the district with split samples based on the long-term mobility of voting-age constituents in tertiles. Predicted effects bounded by 95% confidence intervals, found using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.

Appendix

Table A1
Descriptive Statistics - Contested Non-Open House Races (2002-2018)

N=2947	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Partisan Overperformance (Presidential)	9.0	14.84	-46	97
Local Roots Index	2.0	1.38	0	6
% Constituents Born In-State	0.5	0.17	0.07	0.88
Co-Racial Pres. Nominee	0.7	0.46	0	1
District Partisan Advantage	9.3	9.97	-22.3	44
National Partisan Advantage	-0.3	3.74	-6.2	6.2
Primary Opposition	0.4	0.48	0	1
Chamber/Party Leader	0.0	0.10	0	1
Terms Served	5.4	4.33	0	29
Challenger Quality	0.2	0.38	0	1
Straight-Ticket Voting Allowed	0.3	0.45	0	1

Alternate Specifications for Local Roots Index

While the raw Local Roots Index used this paper provides consistent results, there could exist concerns that some components of the Index matter more than others; or, that the district-level is the wrong jurisdiction in which to measure roots. In order to alleviate these concerns, I have reproduced findings for Hypothesis 1 using two alternate measures. The first uses factor analysis to produce a factor score version of the Local Roots Index. This score was

calculated using factor analysis on the 7 component local roots indicators and constraining to a single factor. The second swaps "district roots" for "state roots", using the same coding process as described on pages 15-17, but widening the parameters of local roots to the state level (i.e., was a legislator born in their home state?).


Fig. A1: Predicted total effects of local roots on incumbent partisan overperformance in the district using alternative specifications of the Local Roots Index. Predicted effects bounded by 95% confidence intervals, found using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.

Figure A1 above is a visual representation of the total additive effect that each alternate Local Roots specification has on Partisan Overperformance. While there is some slight variation in the total effects, all specifications have both substantively and statistically significant effects in the expected direction. Effects are similarly consistent for subsequent models in other chapters. Given the robustness of all specifications, I chose to continue to use the raw Local Roots index because it created greater fidelity to the original data values, and produced more intuitive descriptive scores and marginal effect predictions for each of the models.

While factor analysis allows for more flexibility in the influence of individual components of an index like this, it could alternately be useful to see how much individual influence each factor has separately from the others. Figure A2 below reproduces seven separate coefficients for Hypothesis 1, swapping the Local Roots Index for each component in turn. While all of them have consistently positive coefficients (and all but three are statistically significant), this is not a particularly useful method of assessing individual impacts, since excluding all six other factors assumes that they do not exist in the eyes of either the voters or the MC and have no impact, when in reality all seven measures are components of a unified concept - local roots - and are taken together as a singular local credential. Additionally, including all seven factors as separate independent variables in the same model would also not suffice. This model would by definition assume that all seven factors are completely independent of and unrelated to each other, which they are not, both in observation and underneath the single concept of local roots.

Fig. A2: Predicted total effects of alternate local roots components separately on incumbent partisan overperformance in the district. Predicted effects bounded by 95% confidence intervals, found using mixed-effects modeling with random intercepts by incumbent.

The raw regression results for each of these relevant specifications can be found below in Table A2.

Table A2 - Alternative Local Roots Specifications
Effects on Partisan Overperformance, 2002-2018

| Dependent Variable	Partisan Overperformance
Alternate LRI Specifications	
Local Roots Index (Original)	1.37***
	(0.23)
Local Roots Index (Factor Score)	2.01***
	(0.41)
Local Roots Index (State Roots)	1.11***
	(0.22)
Component Measures Tested Individually	
Local Political Dynasty	5.72***
	(1.26)
Born In District	2.39***
	(0.65)
High School in District	3.25***
	(0.64)
Undergrad in District	0.65
	(0.67)
Postgrad in District	0.47
	(0.00)
Local Political Experience	0.76
	(0.73)
Local Business Owner	3.70***
	(0.99)

Fig. A3: Distribution of District-level percentages of voting-age constituents who were born in their current home state. Measure obtained from American Community Survey estimates.


Fig. A4: Distribution of Incumbent MCs' scores on the *Local Roots Index* from 2002-2018.

Table A3: Observational Examples of Local Roots (Local Political Dynasty)

Name	District	Family Relation	Family Member Name	Former Overlapping Office
Doris Matsui (D)	CA-5	Spouse	Robert Matsui (D)	House Rep. (CA-5)
Bill Shuster (R)	PA-9	Father	Bud Shuster (R)	House Rep. (PA-9)
Tulsi Gabbard (D)	HI-2	Father	Mike Gabbard (D)	HI State Senate
Mario Diaz-Balart (R)	FL-25	Brother	Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R)	House Rep. (FL-21)
Jim Matheson (D)	UT-4	Father	Scott M. Matheson (D)	Governor (UT)

Table A4: Observational Examples of Local Roots (Birthplace and Education)

Name	District	Years Served	Local Roots Measure	Institution	Overlapping City
Rosa DeLauro (D)	CT-3	1991-present	Local Birth	N/A	New Haven, CT
John Rutherford (R)	FL-4	2017-present	Local High School	Nathan Bedford Forrest HS	Jacksonville, FL
Lane Evans (D)	IL-17	1983-2007	Local Undergrad	Augustana College	Rock Island, IL
Steven Palazzo (R)	MS-4	2006-present	Local Postgrad	University of S. Mississippi	Hattiesburg, MS

Table A5: Observational Examples of Local Roots (Local Political Experience)

Name	District	Years Served	Local Political Office	Jurisdiction
Zoe Lofgren (D)	CA-16	1995-present	Board of Supervisors	Santa Clara County, CA
Donald Young (R)	AK-0	1967-present	Mayor	Fort Yukon, AK
Mike Ross (D)	AR-4	2001-2013	Quorum Court	Nevada County, AR
Cheri Bustos (D)	IL-17	2013-present	City Council	East Moline, IL

Table A6: Observational Examples of Local Roots (Local Business Ownership)

Name	District	Years Served	Business Type	Overlapping City/County
Mike Thompson (D)	CA-1	1999-present	Vineyard	Middletown, CA (Napa Valley)
Gus Bilirakis (R)	FL-9	2007-present	Law Practice	Palm Harbor, FL
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R)	FL-27	1989-2019	Private School	Hialeah, FL
Jim Marshall (D)	GA-8	2003-2011	Law/Business Consulting	Macon, GA

Table A7 - Effects on Partisan Overperformance, 2002-2018

Dependent Variable	Partisan Overperformance	N
All Legislators	1.37***	2947
	(0.23)	
Served 1-3 terms	1.68***	918
	(0.33)	
Served 4-6 terms	1.40***	877
	(0.32)	
Served 7-9 terms	1.41***	557
	(0.45)	
Served 10 terms or more	1.22**	595
	(0.49)	

Table A7 - Effects on Partisan Overperformance, 2002-2018