

# Celebritization of Political Corruption in Pakistan: A Bourdieusian Perspective

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**Abstract**

In this thesis, I explore how political corruption gets celebrated by the action/in-action of the state of Pakistan. Although the state has long been claiming to have stringent controls against political corruption, however, over the years, the country has become a vessel for more political corruption instead. By promoting a national interest-based narrative, the state runs two parallel political systems (one seemingly run by the politicians while the other controlled by the establishment) hence doubling political corruption and making the accounting and accountability systems doubly vulnerable to misappropriations. I theorise the relations between political corruption and the state using Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical concepts, focusing on two political corruption cases, the Asghar Khan case and the Mehran Bank scandal. I make three contributions in this regard. First, I contribute to the literature on political corruption and accounting by contending that political corruption in developing countries takes the form of an institution in itself (a field) that continuously extends its boundaries over time. Second, I develop a theoretical framework that shows how political corruption (field) develops and how it violates accounting controls and accountability systems (causing sufferings). Moreover, when it comes to public attention (through hysteresis), how the state response (using social magic) turns this corruption into no-corruption causing no harm to corruption (partial revolutions) and hence its perpetuation (conatus) in the system becomes inevitable. Finally, I contribute to the literature on political corruption and accounting by proposing that such actions of the state, especially with its art of calling for positive emotional responses (national interest) from the public, not only prolong political corruption but also celebrate it in Pakistan. Thus while promising to end political corruption, the state does precisely the opposite.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Although political corruption is a global phenomenon (Werner, 2002), its modalities differ from one political system to another (Philp,1997). For instance, if corruption in South Korea emerges due to its increasing economic development, the falling economic conditions give rise to corruption in the Indian subcontinent (Khan,1998). Similarly, according to Evans (2008), if we study the political system of Pakistan, it appears to be the political culture of patronage that is there to take benefit from the state institutions. Although the political class in Pakistan comes from different backgrounds, it knows how to secure the interests of its dominant military in politics (Cohen, 2005).

This connection between the political elite and the powerful military in Pakistan gave rise to the two political corruption scandals. It shook the reputation of the country's political, judicial, bureaucratic, and military institutions. The money these scandals involved cost the entire nation so dearly that it engulfed a private bank (i.e. Mehran Bank, which was later merged with a nationalised bank to cover its losses). At the same time, the losses of the other state-owned bank (i.e. Habib Bank) were borne by the nation already. These political corruption cases that violated the banking system's accounting and internal controls will be analysed in this dissertation. In particular, this study investigates how the state of Pakistan tried to dispel the notion of corruption in this regard, delayed the decision of these cases, and never implemented the Supreme Court's order in this context, hence making political corruption a case of no-corruption. In addition, it also explores how the state generated a narrative of national interest to get a positive emotional response from the public to save their corruption.

This dissertation is structured as follows. A brief description of the literature on political corruption will be discussed next in the background section (1.1). The cases at the heart of this thesis and the theoretical framework and methodology will be discussed in section (1.2). In the end, an outline of this thesis (1.3) is provided, which concludes this chapter.

## **1.1 Background**

The phenomenon of corruption has changed its form in so many ways from what it was centuries ago that it is difficult to compare the corruption of those times with the corruption of current times. For example, buying expensive presents for state officials or even making payments to acquire state offices were never construed as corrupt and felonious acts in Britain and France, especially for their aristocracy (Genaux, 2002). Nations' political, legal, and cultural evolutions brought so many changes to this conception that it became necessary to have one broad definition of corruption. This burgeoning call for the definition of corruption brought three more expansive classifications of corruption using public interest, market, and public office interests at the forefront (Heidenheimer,1970).

The definitions which stressed the public interest emphasised more what public interest was and how it was endangered by corruption (Friedrich,1966). On the other hand, market centric definitions termed the public office-bearers as businessmen who turned their offices into businesses or investments and strived to maximise their return on investments (Klaveren,1957; Heidenheimer,1970). However, the public office centric definition of corruption described corruption as where the public office-holder required money to do something he was not authorised to do; or sought money for something he had a moral obligation to do anyway (McMullan,1961).



Apart from the definitional debates, various *types* of corruption are also discussed in the literature on corruption, for example, political and bureaucratic corruption, petty and grand corruption, and individual vs systemic corruption. According to Transparency International, political corruption involves the manipulation of policies and rules by politicians when it comes to distributing state resources, where preference is always given to personal interest (Transparency.org, n.d.). However, it is also essential to know that the modes of political corruption would not be the same in democracies and other systems such as communism or dictatorships (Philp,1997). Democracies need more money to unify like-minded people and build a majority in the political system (McMullan,1961).

In this way, systemic corruption comes from the corrupt systems of the country and becomes part of the entire system in such a way that corrupt behaviour becomes a common practice (Laver, 2014). This form of corruption is preserved behind the institutional veil in such a way that sometimes it becomes difficult to draw lines between normal and non-normal, corrupt and non-corrupt behaviour (Thompson, 2013). For politicians, in systemic corruption, the ultimate objective remains the finances they get hold of and utilise at their discretion to benefit them financially. Even if they damage the public interest and institutions concurrently (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2002).

Besides these types of corruption, corruption has also been identified as a noble cause corruption, which arises due to one's extreme loyalty to one's institution (Crank and Caldero, 2018). It is mainly connected to security personnel who, in protecting their country or in the love of their job, go to another extreme where the corrupt behaviour becomes blurred compared to the non-corrupt behaviour.

Moreover, corruption in Asian countries has been attributed by scholars as rooted in their political conditions, and a patron-client relationship (Schmidt et al., 1977) is one example of this. According to Wade (1984), although South Asian states declare themselves distinct and non-identical from their neighbouring countries, however, they all have this patron-client relationship at the very roots of their political setup. For example, in the case of Bangladesh, it has been a common feature to give undeserved political favours to one's political affiliates, which started right from its independence in 1971 (Khan,1997). Similarly, Indian democratic institutions have also been explained by Tummala (2002) as systems where rules are only followed in 'letter' while the 'spirit' is missing from the system. Politicians' criminal activities and seeking refuge in their political parties have changed the norms of democracy and political corruption in India (Vaishnav, 2017).

In addition, political corruption and its mainspring have also been studied in Pakistan. A striking feature in this respect appears to be the military's interference in the political system (Niaz, 2010), which has given rise to the political dynasties in Pakistan (Zain, 2010). All this led to a system where political corruption was impossible without collaborating with the military (Niaz, 2010). In the end, this handshake of politicians with the military was a win-win for both (Rizvi, 2000). For instance, the military took the position of a 'patron' and had its more significant say in the political system, while the politicians being their 'clients', enjoyed the benefits of ruling the country (in name only) until they locked horns in the future. The military intervention in the system also opened routes for other forms of corruption, such as grand, systematic, bureaucratic, and political corruption in Pakistan.

Besides seeing the literature on corruption in sociology and political science, it is also essential to know the link between accounting and political corruption. For instance, accounting literature on political corruption mainly concentrates on the corruption of politicians who intend to give government procurement contracts to only those contractors who agree to repatriate a specific portion of the contract amount to those politicians (Søreide, 2002; Grossi and Pianezzi, 2018).

Similarly, accounting has been studied as the primary facilitator in creating corrupt political networks, especially in Western developed economies (Neu et al., 2013). Such networks skillfully use accounting and embezzle public funds for the personal interests of politicians. For Gabbioneta et al. (2013), the corporate illegalities or the corrupt activities of the firms increase manifold when such firms are associated with the 'national pride of the country. Their corruption remains uncovered for many years due to the celebrated status (Rindova et al., 2006) enjoyed by such firms.

Regarding Pakistan's political system and its implications on accounting controls, Ashraf et al. (2018) assert that a power struggle between the military and politicians in Pakistan has developed a conviction among the masses that their political system largely depends on a powerful military to deal with corrupt politicians. This hegemonic power of the military and its tussle with the civilian bureaucracy results in the state-owned enterprises' weak accounting and internal control systems (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). However, we know little about the relationship between celebrityization and illegal practices in the context of the state (Gabbioneta et al., 2013), i.e. how the state uses its power to violate accounting controls in the name of national interest and, in turn, affect the accountability system of the state.

In the backdrop of this under-investigated area, where the state's action/inaction increase political corruption, and violations of the accounting controls remain unaccountable for decades in the name of national interest, I aim to explore the following research questions.

Firstly, I engage with the link of political corruption, democracy, and the state while unfolding their seventy-plus years' relationship, i.e. how the political corruption got perpetuated in the political system of Pakistan? How the changes in the state ideology (Ezzamel, 2007) promoted certain narratives over others to generate positive public emotions (Gabbioneta et al., 2013) to pursue the state's own agenda in Pakistan. I explain the process through the case studies of how state politics keeps the nation divided about democracy, i.e. how bad it is and how dictatorships have developed the country in better ways.

This question then leads to my second query. I investigate the features of state-induced corruption techniques and the troubles they create, i.e. how the two political corruption scandals cause suffering in Pakistan's accounting and accountability systems. Hitherto, the accounting literature has focused on the power struggle within the state, i.e. between military and civilian politicians in Pakistan (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015; Ashraf et al., 2018). What remains underexplored in the literature is how this power struggle puts the accounting and internal control systems of the state-owned and private organisations in a very precarious situation, besides adversely affecting the accountability system in Pakistan.

For example, at one end of the spectrum, these systems remain vulnerable to violations by the powerful state actors; on the other hand, these are deliberately kept at that level where they are always ready to lose their checks and balances (hence a paradox).

Therefore, these control systems find no option but to become an accomplice in this process. Consequently, the power of this political corruption feels more pronounced and worth studying for when no one gets punished by the state besides their corruption is proved in a court. My emphasis on state politics and its impact on accounting (Ezzamel, 2015) and the accountability system reflects how the state benefits from a culture of political corruption in Pakistan.

My third line of enquiry concerns the state response to the political corruption scandals investigated for this thesis, i.e. how did the state's response celebritize political corruption and help in its perpetuation? How political corruption remains hidden for a long period due to the celebritization effect, and how these political briberies that the state should denounce become a service to the state. It also shifts the emphasis on examining the accountability system of Pakistan, which has been legitimising and celebritizing such corruption. Such legitimisation of the accountability system could not be possible without the jurists' motivations for a role in state politics. The closeness of such shared interests is so closely guarded that it is unlikely to work against the dominant forces of the system.

This study focuses on understanding the context that births political corruption in Pakistan. For example, how the military achieved its domineering role in politics, political corruption proliferated financial institutions, and the judiciary was overpowered, a process with much history attached to it. History tells how the homeland security narrative received primacy compared to all other governance perspectives in Pakistan (Siddiqi, 1996). The two political corruption scandals - the Asghar Khan case and the Mehran Bank scandal - at the heart of this study reflect how these cases helped conserve a particular political

and judicial system in Pakistan. How they promoted a particular definition of the 'state' which constantly oscillated between military's direct and indirect control in politics.

As a result, positive emotional responses were invoked from the public and consecrated (Webb, Schirato, Danaher, 2002) the state's corrupt acts. However, this situation proved precarious for the accounting and internal control systems of the state-owned and private businesses, especially the banking organisations, which remained at the forefront of this corruption. The games of "fictitious accounts, fake companies, missing deposits, shady transfers, dubious loans to political and favourites, bankrolling of election candidates, and misappropriation of public money ... made these scandals as the biggest financial scams in the history of Pakistan" (Bakhtiar, 1994: 25). However, the celebritization effect in the end, by invoking national interest filled emotions, made it challenging for the state institutions to counter the sinister activities of the key figures involved in this corruption. The following section briefly describes these empirical cases, the theoretical lens, and the research methodology adopted in this research.

## **1.2 Cases, Theory, and Methodology of the Study**

After having disputes with the powerful establishment of Pakistan, the Nawaz Sharif-led government had to go home in 1993, and a fresh election was conducted in the same year in October (Kamran, 2017). The results of this election were not a surprise for many because they showed the military's anger, whose brunt Nawaz Sharif had to bear now. He lost that election to Benazir Bhutto and managed to form a government in a small North-Western province of Pakistan known as NWFP (North-West Frontier Province), now known as KP (Hussain, 2021). However, within a few months of the election, i.e. in

February 1994, his provincial government was toppled, i.e. it could not survive a vote of confidence, and his Chief Minister had to go home.

It was December 01, 1994, when former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claimed that his provincial government in the NWFP province had been illegally dismissed by drawing around \$8.5 million from a private bank called Mehran Bank (UPI, 1994). He alleged that the loyalties of his MPs in the NWFP province were bought to succeed a vote of no confidence against him. According to him, such actions would not serve democracy in the country that had recently taken its roots after General Zia's eleven-year-long martial law (ibid).

Due to its good relations with the military, Benazir's government won the general election of 1993 (Kamran, 2017). Seemingly having been bothered by this corruption scandal (although her party was the beneficiary and formed her government upon Nawaz's ouster) her government formed an inquiry commission to investigate the allegations of Nawaz Sharif and the wrongdoings of the Mehran Bank. However, all the relevant documents regarding the payment of bribes to the NWFP politicians were cunningly removed from the Mehran Bank, leaving no traces of these malicious transactions behind. And the findings of the inquiry commission were never made public by any government until this date (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012). These details only came to public attention later through leaked audio tapes of the banking officials and politicians from the NWFP province (Bakhtiar, 1994).

Subsequently, after having disputes with the military establishment in 1996 (Ziring, 2003), Benazir's government brought to light another corruption scandal on June 11, 1996. This scandal implicated Nawaz Sharif in forming an alliance against her called IJI by accepting

bribes from the military in the elections of 1990, which ultimately led Benazir Bhutto to lose the election. Now a corruption scandal was brought in response to another corruption scandal. Those who were lecturing about the violations of the democratic norms were violating the democratic norms themselves. Interestingly, the banker who had sponsored the vote of no confidence in 1994 from the Mehran Bank to dismiss Nawaz Shari's government was the same person who had financed the IJI in 1990 from the Habib Bank, on the instructions of the former army chief (Abbas,1994).

A petition was filed in 1996 by Asghar Khan (former Pakistan Air Force Chief turned politician) regarding the formation of IJI and rigging the election in 1990. However, the fate of this corruption scandal did not turn out to be very different from the earlier corruption scandal. The politicians involved in this scandal denied that they received any payments in this regard. Although one politician acknowledged receiving the money, they denounced it later (Dawn, 2018b). The inquiry report of this state-owned bank was also never made public (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012).

It took the accountability system of the country sixteen years to decide on the petition of Asghar Khan in 2012. However, the judicial and political systems failed even to this date to punish those politicians, military high-ups, and bankers whom the top court had convicted in this regard. It also draws attention to the judicial system of Pakistan, which showed its slightest interest in taking up the biggest financial scams of Pakistan which implicated its powerful establishment.

This thesis draws from Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice (Bourdieu,1977) to theoretically explain these corruption cases. Bourdieu's philosophy revolves around reading the structures of society and understanding those living within those structures,



raising the question of, for instance, how one influences the other (Bourdieu and Wacquant,1992). It explains the relationship between the objective structures (referred to as fields) as well as the subjective understandings (referred to as habitus) of the social agents in their social actions (referred to as practice) (Grenfell, 2014).

For Bourdieu, a field provides the ground where discourses are authenticated and hence causes tension between the agents; for example, which features carry more weight and should be given more importance than the other (Bourdieu and Wacquant,1992). However, these tensions are considered sacrileges if made public and remain a well-kept secret in the field. The dominant agents of the field get ample opportunities to impose their version of the narrative upon the field. In contrast, the dominated agents continue their struggles to endure the games played by powerful forces and respond to the pressures brought into play by the field. Such attributes make the field a percept - an object of perception - (Bourdieu,1991). Understanding the concept of political corruption, for example, how the state makes corrupt fields and strives hard for their preservation by using particular official narratives, can uniquely explain the phenomenon of political corruption.

Bourdieu uses the field analogy like an electromagnetic field where forces are applied from everywhere within the field (Thomson, 2014). As the so-called field effect changes the characteristics of the particles in contact with the electromagnetic field, the corrupt fields also impact their agents. You cannot escape the field effect as long as you are part of the field. However, as an electromagnetic field works on a particular type of particle, such as iron or nickel (Martin, 2003), the corrupt fields also require particular

characteristics of the agents at the time of their induction into a field for a field effect to work successfully.

Similarly, Bourdieu has also analogised the field with a football field (Web et al., 2002), where games are played under the rules understood by the players in advance. However, it is also not uncommon for field agents to play games within the game (ibid). For example, in order to win the game, players can go to any extent to keep the game in their favour, however, without sabotaging the game completely. The game concentrates on achieving 'that valuable resource', represented by the agents' various forms of capital whose value grants the holder a hegemonic power within the field.

For this thesis, a Bourdieusian lens is applied to understand the concept of political corruption in Pakistan. For example, how (corrupt) fields and their boundaries are created and how the agents' entry requirements are determined (Bourdieu,1993). Secondly, how these fields perpetuate themselves within society and achieve the status of conatus (Bourdieu,1998), the field's perpetuation tendency, in turn, brings more corruption opportunities (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and more violations (causing sufferings) (Bourdieu et al., 1999) of the accounting control systems. Although such fields maintain confidentiality and it is not easy to reveal the details of their corruption, a hysteresis (Bourdieu,1977) in the field brings such corruption to the public's attention. Nevertheless, the state's use of social magic (Bourdieu,1991) turns the efforts of changing the field into mere partial revolutions (Bourdieu,1993) in the field and the field continues to enjoy its conatus again.

It is imperative to know the mechanics of the state's social magic and partial revolutions to prolong political corruption in Pakistan. For example, according to Bourdieu (1991),

there would be a 'double game going on within the political field. The narrative produced by this field would ensure that the real and the foremost important class's interests remain protected. However, at the same time, it would convince the masses that it was working for their benefit, prolonging the elite class's domination while making the dominated more dwarfed and overshadowed. The power of this social magic puts the state in such an authoritative position that it can create things ex nihilo - out of nothing (ibid).

Similarly, Bourdieu (1993) draws attention to the 'partial revolutions' in the fields, which result from antagonisms in the field; however, they never challenge the principles at the very base of the field. Thus total revolutions are always avoided to continue benefiting from the field. The same concept can be found at the foundation of the celebritization process, where the quest for profit generation leads the agents of the corruption field to partial revolutions. For example, they would all resort to breaking out these scandals, filing petitions in the courts, and the courts asking the investigation agencies to investigate the matter. However, the results of all these efforts would only prove partial revolutions in the field of corruption, probably because the total revolutions would not be in the interests of any field agent. The agents remain faithful to their commitment that they would never challenge the fundamentals of the field, i.e. the entry fee of the field (Bourdieu, 1977).

The primary data for this study was collected from the participants who belonged to the ruling elite of Pakistan. For example, the politicians who had been part of the cabinets in the former governments, the former chief of Pakistan's intelligence agency, ISI; former military generals, former financial bureaucrats who were the presidents of the state-owned banks, as well as the chairman of the Pakistan Banking Council. In addition, former judges of the high court, as well as the lawyers who had been representing defendants,

petitioner, State Bank of Pakistan, and the state of Pakistan (former Attorney General of Pakistan). I managed to interview forty-five participants, including the political journalists who had written extensively about the corruption cases, which are at the heart of this thesis. Almost all participants belonged to Lahore; a face-to-face interview was conducted with them, except for six, which were conducted online.

Because of the topic's sensitivity and the participants' higher positions, access to the participants proved very difficult. Although I managed to interview forty-five participants, the number of people I contacted and got refusals surpassed this number. The participants who agreed to the interviews were informed that their data would strictly be used for my dissertation alone. The interview procedure which had been observed during the interviews is provided below.

All interviews were semi-structured and recorded except for six interviews, where five participants objected to the idea of recording. However, the sixth participant was a former Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan who had moved to the USA and preferred to answer my queries via email. I transcribed all interviews immediately after they were conducted so that the critical contexts discussed during those interviews do not fade away from my memory. Moreover, the participants did not allow me to use their names in the dissertation, so I assured them of complete anonymity in this regard. By committing to these requirements, I followed the guidelines of the Ethics Committee at the University of Essex.

Besides the primary data, secondary data had also been used for this thesis, including books, political magazines, newspapers, and political talk shows. The judgment of the Asghar Khan case, minutes of those parliament sessions where these cases were

discussed, and election commission reports about the elections, the IMF reports on Pakistan's banking sector also formed a significant part of this thesis's secondary data. The combination of this primary and secondary data is used for data analysis. The data analysis details are provided in this thesis's methodology section.

In the above backdrop, it is important to reiterate that there are three objectives of this study. Firstly, it aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the context of the two corruption scandals which have not been discussed widely in Pakistan on the pretext of national security issues. Secondly, it aims to provide a theoretical explanation of the two corruption scandals - the Asghar Khan case and the Mehran Bank scandal – which remain consequential in preserving a particular political and accountability system in Pakistan. And lastly, it aims to amplify the concerns regarding corruption-related policies and procedures in Pakistan, i.e. how they encourage rather than discourage political corruption in the country.

### **1.3 Thesis Outline**

This thesis uses Bourdieusian theoretical concepts in understanding the celebrityization of political corruption in Pakistan. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study where political corruption is studied as part of a celebrityization process of the state. The second chapter discusses the literature review of corruption. It starts from the conceptions of corruption in antiquity. It then gradually moves on to the corruption definitions of the twentieth century, reflecting a slow and gradual process of its understanding among scholars. It also highlights various *types* of corruption discussed in the literature and political corruption practices in various countries of the world. In the end, this chapter

reviews the accounting literature, i.e. how political corruption is dealt with in the accounting literature.

The third chapter discusses the theoretical framework of this thesis in detail which is the work of Pierre Bourdieu. It also shows how his work has been used in various accounting studies. It includes various critiques that Bourdieu's work has received from other scholars. The end of the chapter will focus on a triad, i.e. field theory, state, and corruption, which is then enriched with social magic and partial revolutions tropes of Bourdieu.

Chapter four describes the methodology adopted in this thesis. For example, it describes the philosophical assumptions and details about the data collection and field sites. It also specifies the data analysis and the steps taken to ensure reliability in such analysis. It then ends by describing the operationalisation process of Bourdieu used in this thesis.

The fifth chapter analyses the context of this thesis. It has been written using the Bourdieusian lens of field, i.e. how various stages of a field formation are achieved. What are the boundaries of the field, how are entry requirements set, and what barriers are put in place? All important historical events have been collected to determine Pakistan's state institutions' political, bureaucratic, and judicial histories. The sixth chapter deals with the issue of the perpetuation of the corrupt field in Pakistan, i.e. how the field achieves conatus.

The seventh chapter deals with the case analysis. It shows how corruption affects the accounting systems of the banking organisations and the overall accountability systems in Pakistan and how corruption comes out of the field into public knowledge, i.e. through

hysteresis. The eighth chapter discusses the state's response regarding the corruption scandals and connects it with the celebritization of corruption. The ninth chapter leads toward the conclusion and contributions of this study.

## **2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON POLITICAL CORRUPTION**

This chapter aims to understand the research on political corruption and identify the gap concerning political corruption and accounting. The structure for this chapter is as follows. I begin by understanding corruption in antiquity (2.1) and then see how it developed in the twentieth century, especially in sociology and political science literature (2.2). Similarly, how various definitions of corruption evolved (2.3) resulted in discerning the different types of corruption (2.4). I then work through a comparison of political corruption between the Western countries (2.5) and the Asian countries (South Asia, in particular, since the case studies of this thesis involve a South Asian country) (2.6) and contextualise the political corruption phenomenon for Pakistan, the home of the case studies of this thesis (2.7). Lastly, I explore the accounting literature for what has already been known in this regard (2.8). I conclude this chapter by identifying the gap in the political corruption and accounting literature (2.9) that this study aims to fill.

### **2.1 Corruption in Antiquity**

The concept of 'corruption' has seen many connotations and meanings attached over the last centuries (Heidenheimer, 1970). In the days of yore, corruption was understood to have two main discourses; degenerative corruption and the other with which we are familiar even these days too, public office corruption. The former involved a concept focused more on the principle of morality, i.e. '*moralists approach*' and argued that corruption caused the decomposition or degeneration of moral dispositions or characters of humans. In contrast, the latter involved abuse of public office for private gain (Buchan and Hill, 2014). Aristotle explained degenerative corruption as corruption coming from the moral corruption of the individuals who, if they were the rulers of a state, permeate into



their citizens (*polis*). Secondly, he contended, the pervasion of greed/avarice among the public officeholders made them have personal profits at the cost of the general public (ibid).

Moreover, what was corrupt and what was not also kept on changing from time to time. It would not be incorrect to state that actions called corrupt today, centuries ago, may not have been thought of as corrupt. For example, giving gifts to someone having a public office, patronising, or even buying a public office was not corrupt in aristocratic Britain and France (Genaux, 2002). These aristocrats might complain that giving preferential treatment to one public officeholder over the other was permeating the state functionaries with more incompetent men. However, still, that was not their main issue. Their real objection was that these recruits were taking control of the practice of 'patronage' in their own hands and proving dangerous for their [aristocrats'] 'clientele networks' (ibid).

Similarly, in feudal Europe, public offices were considered favourable properties to keep or buy rather than paying attention to the duties these offices intended to offer (Leys, 2002). According to Weber, "traces of an objectively defined official duty disappear[ed] altogether, with the treatment of the public office as benefice or property" (Weber cited in Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002: 78).

However, in order to dig deeper into the concept of public office corruption, as understood to be against the public interest, we must first decide what is 'public' and the public interest. Genaux (2002) explained it by arguing that until the eighteenth century, the term 'public interest' masked the term 'king's interest'. 'Public' during that time did not have any political significance; it was thought that the public, no doubt, had the power from God to control the process of public good, but it had passed on that power to the king. Upon

taking that power from the public, he was only accountable to God. So the agents appointed by the king were there to care for the public good, but they also had to ensure that they gave primacy to the king's interests. The expressions such as 'honour', 'morality', and 'duty' involved in the public office were all used in relation to the patron (king) who was holding on to the authority (ibid) without giving priority to the public.

Consequently, these offices were started to be perceived as places of extortion; the bureaucratic abuses created positions that required little or no work but gave the office-bearer financial benefit (Swart, 2002). The sale proceeds of these public offices would go straight to the king's treasury and be utilised to meet the expenses of the king's military expeditions. It, according to Leys (2002), was in our modern times equivalent to the election campaign contributions, which are utilised to meet the expenses of elections and then allow the governments to make decisions regarding whatever is at their disposal; both scenarios have claimed to be done in the public's best interest.

Similarly, purchasing public offices from the monarchs, particularly paying them to buy parliamentary boroughs or political interests by the wealthy gentry during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, had started raising objections but was still not illegal until the nineteenth century (Scott, 1972). The first British Prime Minister (1721 – 1742), Robert Walpole, obtained his parliamentary majority through bribery and patronage (Friedrich, 2002). His government had such a skilfully crafted system in place that "would hand over each of its partisans in the Parliament from five hundred to eight hundred pounds at the end of a session, the amount varied according to the services rendered" (ibid: 20), even many of his contemporaries called it a system of moral corruption. However, the payments were considered so legal that these were not omitted from the

treasury records. Hence it gave the idea of the researchers of this age how political favours used to be obtained by paying the members of parliament during the early days of the British parliamentary system (ibid).

The point here is how the corruption of antiquity can then be compared with the corruption of current times. Much has changed regarding the nations' legal, cultural, and political exposure. Any simple comparison between the two times would be very challenging. For example, the use of bribery to get a bureaucratic position in traditional England would not have been frowned upon during old times but would make a big case of corruption in modern England now. According to Scott (2002), this was the most critical aspect of the study of corruption. He argued that much of the talk of the corruption that we have today was the result of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We started having these conversations when nation-states came into being, people's representatives were elected by them, and we had a more detailed civil services code for government officials, which gave birth to the discussions around public responsibility and private interest. He termed those practices that were not considered corrupt before the nineteenth century but got recognised as corrupt in the nineteenth century as '*proto corruption*'.

He argued that the same behaviour could be analysed at different times, explaining its causes and effects without calling it corrupt in ancient times because the norms were only set later (ibid), for instance, centuries later!

## **2.2 Corruption in Twentieth Century**

Corruption in 1900 was one of the most used terminologies in the political lexicon of the USA (Heidenheimer, 1970). However, one thing common in its all variants was terming it

as something against the logic of the reforms of the state institutions and irrational acts of those who committed it (ibid). Also, the sale of public offices, a common practice of antiquity, ended at the turn of the century. The new political, administrative, and social systems of the world rendered all those corruption-related ideas of antiquity, for example, the degradation of moral values to be the cause of corruption, obsolete. Scott (2002) argued that the corruption practised in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England started to look less damaging than the corruption in modern liberal democracies, which were based on more egalitarian assumptions. The change in time and system required a different perspective on corruption. Social scientists wanted more clarity and a specific definition of corruption, and thus this was when the *'revisionists approach'* was born (Caiden and Caiden,1977).

The revisionists challenged the moralists' approach (corruption being the result of moral degeneration) and explained corruption in the light of social customs or conventions. They brought this phenomenon out from the domain of righteousness or wickedness to something factual or empirical. They were interested to know why corruption in certain countries, especially in developing countries, was more than in others. Besides its academic interest, the phenomenon was also crucial for the international aid agencies and Western governments who wanted to work with developing countries but detested the prevailing corruption in those societies (ibid). So the question was, what *is* the definition of corruption?

### **2.3 Definitions of Corruption**

Although revisionists widely believed, as mentioned above, that corruption was not explained well with the notion of morality alone. And there was more to it: hiding or taking

refuge in the systems of politics or administration. However, a big challenge was bringing out a comprehensive or more lucid definition of corruption. This encouraged contemporary social scientists to provide various definitions to learn more about the concept of corruption. These definitions have been combined into various groups; the three that are most commonly cited are called: public interest centred, market centred, and public office centred definitions of corruption (Heidenheimer,1970). The details in this regard are provided as follows:

### **2.3.1 Public Interest Centred**

The definitions of corruption, which revolve around the public interest conception (Friedrich, 1966; Rogow and Lasswell,1970), tend to emphasise that keeping in view the public interest is prime for studying corruption. The public is, of course, the key element around which the political and administrative systems are designed in democratic societies. So according to these definitions, the criteria of what is and what is not corrupt should also be decided by keeping in view the public's interest first. According to Friedrich (1966: 74), "the pattern of corruption may therefore be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain things, that is a responsible functionary or officeholder, by monetary or other rewards such as the expectation of a job in the future, is induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the reward and thereby damages to the public and its interests". Similarly, another version in this regard termed the public and its interest as supreme, and anything contradictory to it was called corruption. According to Rogow and Lasswell (1970), "A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one, system of public or civic order and is, in fact, incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. A system of public or civic order exalts common interest

over special interest; violations of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt”  
(54)

These definitions keep the public interest at the helm of everything and propose that any action done to serve the public interest cannot be termed corrupt. Gardiner (2002), for example, compares it with an example: that in Nazi Germany, it was unlawful for the Jews to relocate themselves out of Germany, where they were heavily persecuted. In that situation, if a passport inspector was asked to take the money and let a family go out of Germany. Would that act be considered corrupt if he had accepted the payment in this regard? The difference of opinions which will arise in this situation is quite evident (ibid). It is challenging to understand corruption without determining whose public interest is served.

In the abovementioned case of Jews migration, if this situation is analysed keeping in view the public interest of proponents of the Nazi movement. A different perspective would emerge regarding the conduct of the passport inspector, e.g. he had committed a corrupt action. If it were viewed from the public interest of the Jews, where it was believed that Jewish families were subject to extreme harm, then it would have been evil for the passport inspector not to let them escape. In this way, the action of taking illicit money would not have been termed corrupt (Gardiner 2002). For this reason, the notion of public interest, which is subject to different connotations and interpretations, prevents the acknowledgement of corruption until public interest can be defined or refined. It is primarily rejected by many revisionists (Caiden and Caiden,1977). On this account, we move to another group called market centred definitions.

### 2.3.2 Market Centred

As the name suggests, market-centred definitions (Klaveren,1970; Leff, 1964; Tilman, 1970) involve market-enabled economics-based models (demand, supply, & market forces) to study corruption. These sets of definitions, according to Philp (2002), tend to remain neutral, for example, keep a balance between objective, universalistic elements (as witnessed in public-office-centred definitions) and local standards (which are provided in the public interest definitions). The definition states:

"A corrupt civil servant regards public office as a business, the income he will seek to maximise. The office then becomes a "maximising unit". The size of his income depends ... upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public's demand curve" (Klaveren,1970: 39)

Similarly, according to Tilman (1970), "Corruption ... involves a shift from a mandatory pricing model to a free-market model. The centralised mechanism, the ideal of modern bureaucracy, may break down in the face of serious disequilibrium between supply and demand. Clients may decide that it is worthwhile to risk the known sanctions and pay the higher costs in order to be assured of receiving the desired benefits" (62).

Additionally, Leff (1964) termed corruption as an additional practice in any country which makes things possible for those who would not otherwise get a chance to have them in their favour. He contends: "Corruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As such, the existence of corruption per se indicates, only that these groups participate in the decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case"(8).

The main problem with the market centred definitions is that they may help explain the phenomenon of corruption, but they lack sufficient definition (Philp, 2002). For example, Philp further argues that the mere act of 'income maximisation' does not define what is corrupt; in fact, it is the background behind the formation of public office and the conception of behaviour in this regard which defines what is corrupt (2002). One possible reason for not being able to define public office corruption properly was that such theories had been presented by those theorists who had studied early Western or non-Western civilisations. The rules to run public offices had either not been expressed clearly or did not exist there (Heidenheimer, 2002). The criticism of this group of definitions leads us to the next set of definitions called public office centred definitions.

### **2.3.3 Public Office Centred**

Besides having seen the definitions of corruption from different angles, for example, public interest and market, many social scientists associated their definitions of corruption with the public office centred definitions (McMullan, 1961; Bayley, 1970; Nye, 1967), which according to Caiden and Caiden (1977) looked more promising. Since the idea of taking public office as something to yield personal benefits or to treat them as private property, as it used to be done in antiquity, the abuse of power for personal gain represented an essential part of this group. According to McMullan (1961), "A public official is corrupt if he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that he is under the duty to do anyway, that he is under the duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for improper reasons" (183-184). Similarly, for Bayley (1970), "corruption, while being tied particularly to the act of bribery, is a general term covering misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary" (522).



Apart from that, political scientist Joseph S Nye gave the most often-used definition of public official's corruption. According to Nye: ... "behavior [sic] which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private- regarding influence.' This includes such behavior [sic] as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses)" (1967: 419).

Although Nye does not mention the impact of abuse of public office on the public interest, however, he does address that aspect implicitly when he states that any digression from the office of a public job for private gain crosses the line drawn between public and private interests and falls into the realm of corruption (Philp, 2002). Nonetheless, public office centred definitions also met with the same criticism as public interest centred definitions. For example, which perspective would be used to resolve the issue that 'deviation' from the 'formal duties' took place? The dilemma of a passport inspector in Nazi Germany provided above in public interest centred definitions also exist in public office centred definitions. The acceptance of money from the Jewish family for their emigration falls into the ambit of corrupt behaviour following the definition of Nye because it does involve a deviation from his formal duties set by the Nazi government. However, the question is, are the laws about formal duties established by the governments always right? According to Scott (1972), this is not the case; he contends, everything allowed by the law is not necessarily ethical too.

Furthermore, another limitation of Nye's definition appears when the rule-making process of public officials' duties is observed worldwide. For instance, as Gardiner (2002) argues, some governments are very particular about public officials' rules and take even a tiny deviation very seriously. For example, many Western countries have established stringent rules against bribery (Philp, 2002). On the contrary, some governments may not have formal rules to stop state officials from accepting gifts and making decisions involving conflict of interest. For example, for a long period, the Greeks did not have separate words for bribery and gifts (ibid). This makes the international implementation of Nye's definition very difficult. The same act could be subject to different treatments because of different rules in different countries (Gardiner, 2002). The growing criticism of all groups of corruption definitions has turned the discussion of corruption towards its definitional disputes.

The growing *definitional disputes* among various social scientists have made it very difficult to define corruption clearly and concisely. Although, there are multiple issues involved in this regard, for example, different approaches concerning matters involving public interest in different countries and inconsistent legislation in various countries (Gardiner, 2002). In other words, if the definition of corruption is focused more on the public interest than the statutory laws, for instance, terming everything damaging to the public interest as corrupt, then uncertainty arises regarding how the public interest is chosen, the points of view of which classes are included and excluded in this regard.

Similarly, if in the corruption definition, prominence is given to the legalistic definitions, how would these definitions be ensured of being ethical too, and not violating human rights? Hence, it is better to think of corruption in terms of the conceptual structure of

governments/laws and public interest. Thinking of a definition in terms of a concise one-liner would delude the purpose as it would be tantamount to ignoring the fact that things are rooted in the common understanding of the people (Philp, 2002).

Besides looking at the *definitional disputes*, which dominated the literature on corruption from the beginning to the late twentieth century, it is also essential to review those debates which discussed various *types* of corruption. For example, what is political corruption (grand corruption), and how different is it from bureaucratic corruption (petty corruption)? Likewise, what is individual corruption, and how does it make way for systemic corruption (institutional corruption)? All these conceptions are discussed in the *types* of corruption below.

## **2.4 Types of Corruption**

Scholars on corruption have made a distinction among various forms of corruption; for example, there is bureaucratic corruption where government officials use their government offices for their personal gains (Leff, 1964; Hope, 1985), and political corruption where politicians use their power of office to draw benefits in their own favour (Heywood, 1997; Philp, 1997). Their corruption can be further subdivided into small-scale corruption, i.e. petty corruption (Scott, 1972) and large-scale corruption, i.e. grand (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). Similarly, Caden and Caiden argue that revisionists' definitions of corruption see them from an individual's point of view but ignore their systemic position. For them, systemic corruption is where public officeholders' malpractice becomes a norm, and everyone in the system is expected to behave similarly (1977). These various forms of corruption are explained in this chapter, starting with bureaucratic corruption.

### **2.4.1 Bureaucratic Corruption**

Max Weber, in his writings, pointed out two ideal systems in which public administration could be grouped, i.e. patrimonial and bureaucratic. In the former, the system did not require the official to distinguish between what was 'public' and what was 'private'. The public offices were widely bought and sold and considered to be the private properties of those who bought them, i.e. administrators (as mentioned in the 'corruption in antiquity' part above). On the contrary, the bureaucratic system required the officials to take charge of the public offices as employees rather than owners and demanded complete adherence to the laws of the state rather than allegiance to the ruler (Dahlström et al., 2011). Bureaucratic corruption in such systems was "the utilisation of bureaucratic official position for private gain" (Hope, 1985: 02).

In this way, all those definitions that fall in the public office centred (as discussed earlier) can also fall under bureaucratic corruption. Such corruption may involve a public office holder's transaction(s) with private businesses or individuals, entailing squandering of public money or losing people's faith in the state institutions but, first and foremost, benefitting the incumbent bureaucrat. It can be explained in terms of two dimensions: the demand side of bureaucratic corruption and the supply side of bureaucratic corruption.

A demand-induced corruption is when government officials demand illicit money (Neu et al., 2015) from private individuals to provide legal or illegal services, as the case may be. On the other hand, there is a supply side of corruption where private parties or businesses offer bribes to government officials to get government contracts or favours (Sikka and Lehman, 2015). Much work has been done on the demand side of corruption (Moody-Stuart, 1993; Mauro, 1995). However, the same has not been done on its supply side

(Grossi and Pianezzi, 2018). Another critical categorisation within demand-induced bureaucratic corruption is between *grand* and *petty* bureaucratic corruption.

*According to Scott (1972), Petty* bureaucratic corruption is mostly customary among lower-level public servants. However, its combined total impact can be substantial for the lower-ranked officer, and the volume of individual transactions of petty bureaucratic corruption can be relatively trivial. It is from where the term 'petty' takes its name. Scott provides its further classifications and examples as follows: a situation where one has to give gifts to a clerk so that they speed up the processing of their cases, for instance, a driving license (speed payments); money can also be extracted by an official (extortion) in response to waive someone's charges off involving minor wrongdoings, for instance, a traffic ticket; similarly, the money offered to an official to get services which one is not entitled to, for instance, issuance of a driving license to a minor (distortion); it is also pertinent to mention that where speed payments are more common at low-level bureaucracies, the extortion and distortion payments are widely used at grand bureaucratic corruption level (1972).

*Grand* bureaucratic corruption is more significant than petty bureaucratic corruption in magnitude and scale. For example, according to Rose-Ackerman (2016:11), "[it] involves a small number of powerful players and large sums of money". Also, according to Lodge (2002), these are "the dishonest practices of senior officials resulting in large scale misappropriation" (408). As the high-level bureaucracy enforces more stringent rules and regulations or red tape, the more it generates bribe-soliciting top officials. For example, the complicated laws or crafty top-level bureaucratic system may slow down the award of licenses or permits to businesses unless inducements are paid (Mauro,1995).

Similarly, a lot more damage this high-level bribery brings to the national exchequer when the decision-making procedures of the top officials are perverted. The cost and quality, which should be the prime factors in deciding any contract take a back seat when money to the bureaucrat becomes a deciding factor in awarding such a contract. And in a last-ditch effort, if the preferred party of the top bureaucrat does not succeed in getting the contract, the whole bidding process is terminated, citing improvements or remodelling in the contract or changing the terms of reference etc., and hence starting the whole activity afresh (Moody-Stuart, 1993).

Such unfair preferential treatment to the party/business can be called *demand*-induced bureaucratic corruption if initiated at the insistence of the bureaucrat. However, if it is committed at the desire of the party or business, which was ready to dole out funds to the bureaucrats, it is called the supply side of bureaucratic corruption.

*Supply*-induced bureaucratic corruption, which can take any form between petty or grand corruption, involves a situation where private groups or businesses approach public officials and offer them payoffs to make their profits. According to Sikka (2015), in their cut-throat competition, businesses and their officials pay no heed to the country's rules, regulations, and legislation, when the subject matter involved is obtaining government contracts for their enterprises.

However, the supply side of corruption is not restricted to the local businesses' corrupt offers. Many large companies from foreign countries have also been accused of harnessing it. For example, George Soros, a global investor, stated that "international business is generally the main source of corruption" (George Soros cited in Sikka, 2015: 2). If we term bureaucratic corruption as the output stage corruption (Scott, 2002)

because it takes place at the time of implementation of the legislation; there could also be its counterpart, an input stage corruption (ibid) which transpires before or at the time of passing of such legislation. This corruption of legislature or politicians is called political corruption.

### **2.4.2 Political Corruption**

Political corruption, as mentioned above, is different from bureaucratic corruption. It involves politicians who use their office, armed with power, to gain personal advantages. Transparency International defines it as the "[m]anipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision-makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth" (Transparency.org, n.d.). The notion of political corruption does not remain the same in all societies. Instead, it changes with the change in the political systems.

For example, the modalities of political corruption would be different in democracies than those in communist or monolithic systems; this means we should be ready to accept a wide-ranging definition of political corruption (Philp, 1997) based on different systems. Democracies have a philosophy of merging different political voices and factions into one political group, thus boasting a majority and justifying the right to rule.

However, this comes with a price (literally), i.e. money. The inducements paid in this regard act "as a cement, a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens" (Leys, 2002: 62) or, as McMullan argues, "the greater the corruption the greater the harmony..." among political circles (1961: 196). It makes corruption a natural or rather unceremonious part of the political system. Political corruption seeps into the political setup in such a way that it

becomes a fundamental part of the system. For instance, as explained by Scott, "if the study of corruption teaches us anything at all, it teaches us not to take a political system or a particular regime at its face value... party manifestos, general legislation, and policy declarations are the formal facade of the political structure [whereas] corruption stands in sharp contrast to these features as an informal political system" (2002: 123).

Political corruption is *grand* if it involves the corruption of high-level politicians. It has various subsets, for instance, bribery, fraud, and electoral fraud (Philp, 2002). For Amundsen (1999), grand corruption relates to the corruption of those politicians who are in charge of law-making in the country (legislatures), and they do it corruptly. In some countries, the magnitude of political corruption rises as the ranks of those in politics grows, i.e. *grand* corruption. Namely, the "cabinet ministers are the most corrupt; and the president or top leader the most corrupt of all among them. In such societies, the top leader may make off with tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars" (Huntington, 1968: 67).

On the other hand, this pattern is quite the opposite in the countries where national-level cabinets or heads of state may not relatively indulge in corruption; however, political representations at town councils or local bodies are extensively involved in corruption, i.e. *petty* corruption. Such *petty* political officeholders see the corruptly earned economic gains as their compensation for having no or less political power as compared to their national-level leaders. In contrast, high-level political leaders perceive their political power as a replacement for economic gains (ibid).

The abovementioned explanation by Huntington is quite essential in respect of the explanation of political corruption, which, according to him, is all about power. If a top-



level politician is not corrupt, it may mean that he is probably satisfied with his political power; since he can achieve what he wants through his power so he may not be inclined to *grand* corruption. However, those political authorities operating at lower levels may not have the same power wielded by high-level politicians. Hence in their struggle to reach out for that power or at least fill out that power gap, they – the lower-level politicians - resort to this money-making business, i.e. *petty* corruption.

Besides the classification of *petty* and *grand* corruption in bureaucratic corruption, political corruption can also be *demand* and *supply* induced. The definitions of political corruption mostly revolve around state and politics and are known as '*corrupted*' because of the avarice or demand-induced tactics of the political officeholders. However, there are '*corrupters*' too, who can be ordinary citizens or non-state actors who provide incentives or money to instigate supply-induced corruption (Amundsen,1999).

There can be different motivations for corruption for *corruptor* and *corrupted*. For example, corruption may become an option for the *corrupted* if they believe they are poorly rewarded. They want to achieve more in less time, e.g., over-ambitious or it is plain greed or avarice. On the other hand, a *corrupter* may not comprehend the system/rule/or law to which they are subjected. They think it is absurd or wrong to follow it, or they may notice that something crucial to their interest is at risk and can only be reversed with a change or amendment in law; (Friedrich,1966). Large businesses and multinational corporations are not behind in gaining government influence by bribing or paying off inducements to high-level politicians.

The result of such bribes sometimes emerges in designing and redesigning laws to increase the flow of payments to the legislators and bring big profits for the businesses

(Rose-Ackerman, 1996). In fact, corruption throws "a bridge between those who hold political power and those who control wealth, enabling the two classes, markedly apart ... to assimilate each other" (McMullan, 1961: 196).

These types of corruption that have been explained so far, such as bureaucratic corruption and political corruption, can be thought of in terms of individual corruption, for example, anyone working at the top or lower level, either in bureaucracy or holding a political office, can digress from the norm, i.e. thinking of private benefit first than the public office is something which they may be doing individually (in their personal capacity) or with the connivance of a small cluster. However, what happens when most people in any society (a large proportion of the population) start engaging in malpractice? Corruption becomes so deep-rooted in society that it becomes a norm. The question is whether corruption vanishes when it is widely accepted because it does not bother people anymore. The answer is no. Corruption does not dissipate once it gets well-established in society. It only takes another form, i.e. from individual to systemic (Caiden and Caiden, 1977).

### **2.4.3 Systemic Corruption**

Systemic corruption, as the name states, is the form of corruption spread in the system. In some countries, corruption does not exist in alienation or seclusion from the rest of its society. For example, it gets institutionalised so that it is not restricted to a selected few of the society; rather, it proliferates the entire society (Laver, 2014), i.e. it becomes more generalised. Although, as defined earlier in the definitions of corruption, corrupt behaviour is the exception and not the rule or norm itself. However, this situation gets completely reversed in systemic corruption, where malpractices or misfeasance take the form of the

norms, whereas already recognised and approved conducts to achieve institutional objectives seem anomalous or exceptional (Caiden and Caiden,1977). The corrupt behaviour gets so normalised or institutionalised that institutions encourage misconduct and punish those who adhere to the old accepted standards (ibid).

As corrupt actions tend to corrupt others, for example, a *corruptor* (individual) corrupts the *corrupted* (another individual); similarly, institutional corruption has a tendency to corrupt its institutional system and members without getting recognised easily (Thompson, 2013). For instance, in case of any wrongdoing, when corruption charges are put forward against members of an institution, then such accused persons are declared rotten apples (De Graaf, 2007) of the institution. Thus, the emphasis goes more on their 'individual corruption' while institutional tendency, which may be responsible for inculcating such behaviour, gets completely ignored. On the other hand, institutionalised malpractices lessen their severity in the eyes of the institutional members. They excuse themselves with the arguments that such is/was the practice of the time and 'everyone is/was doing it, again citing the examples of other individuals but exonerating the institution (ibid). According to Moroff and Blechinger (2002), it is imperative to analyse individual corruption cases deeply so that the fundamental attributes that make such conduct systemic or institutionalised can be identified.

Similarly, corruption becomes institutionalised or systemic when it becomes rampant and recurring at almost every level of the state institutions. For instance, in bureaucracy and politics, overt practices of *petty* corruption, which become routine and covert modus operandi pervasive *grand* corruption, become structurally imbibed in the system (Lodge, 2002). For instance, while studying institutional corruption in the political system of the

United States of America, Lessig (2013) terms US Congress as an institution which is the offspring of institutional corruption. He explains the US electoral system as dependent on a tiny section of its society, called 'Funders', who fund the political leaders. Without their bankrolling, the success of any political leader remains impossible. It is not the citizens of the USA who choose their leaders, but these 'Funders' select these leaders for them. He terms this dependence on the funders as 'dependency corruption' (ibid).

Also, this pervasive nature of institutional corruption does not make it easy to discern the institution's day-to-day activities, especially when they become completely acceptable in any society. For example, in the case of campaign financing, US politicians are allowed to collect such contributions by law. They are also allowed to aid their voters if they encounter difficulty dealing with the government. However, it is very easy to blur those lines drawn between what is allowed or what is disallowed, which political gain is legitimate and which service is illegitimate (Thompson, 2013).

Even those charged with the responsibility of revamping the system confuse it between the systemic vs individual phenomenon. For example, Thompson quotes a former Senator of Congress, Charles "Buddy" Roemer, who once said, "It's the system that's corrupt. It's the system! And members are a slave to it .... People within the system cannot imagine the system functioning any other way" (2013: 17). However, Thompson states further; this is stretched a bit too far. He argues that this contention of the Senator concludes that the issue lies with the system alone, and either people cannot be held responsible for their misfeasance, or they are all to be blamed for it because they are all corrupt in the system (ibid).

On the other hand, Philp (1997) argues that the notion of institutional corruption is highly debatable. It is imperative to know from where institutional impropriety ideas come. For instance, from local culture, the institution's practice, statute, or public opinion. That is why, he continues, reflecting upon corruption for private gain alone would be very constraining for studying deep, systematically entrenched corruption.

Moreover, the issue of systemic corruption becomes more grave when it starts utilising the entire system in its favour (for the benefit of only a few) instead of working for the people (the general public). It starts building networks or associations of like-minded functionaries to achieve particular goals, for instance, the development of a few privileged individuals, which otherwise would not be possible without such collusion.

Similarly, according to Lodge (1992), systemic corruption also discourages public development. It redirects public funds to those states of affairs in the private interest of the few and for which such colluding network or systemic corruption is aimed. Della Porta and Vannucci (2002) argue that in systemic political corruption, the utilisation of public funds happens to be a goal or target. For example, those in power attempt to win over substantial funds for those areas where they can wield more power, i.e. use their discretion; and public money is spent where the benefits of the misappropriation are grand. Hence public interest, which remains subservient to the greed of systemic corruption, may remain unfulfilled if the politicians or the bureaucrats do not find it sufficient in their own institutionalised interest.

Apart from this, it is a boon for systemic corruption to grow faster where selective implementation of state laws occurs. For example, laws to curb systemic corruption may exist in a country. However, they are not applied to the powerful apparatus of the country.

Even the powerful state actors violate their offices' rules but remain fearless or audacious in their corruption. Furtherance of the institutions or individuals' private interests remains unstoppable compared to the public interests. State departments of accountability can be found, but their existence is more figurative than real; above all, in these situations, the use of security forces is made to protect the corrupt activities (Laver, 2014). The problem of systemic corruption does not arise due to the non-existence of formal rules, laws, and regulations but due to the matching and parallel informal rules or practices which start replacing formal ones. Although it is possible to eradicate individual corruption by applying various punishments to the offender, for example, they may be thrown out of their positions, fined, or even imprisoned. However, it is not easy to deal with systemic corruption where it can never be assured that having dealt with all corrupt officials simultaneously would not let corruption grow again. Past practices, in fact, in institutionalised corruption, would be carried on by new actors (Caiden and Caiden, 1977).

Although the topic of corruption that has been discussed so far involves more economic corruption, for example, giving or receiving bribes for personal interests (wealth), buying or selling public offices (status), and corruption of politicians to serve private regarding (power). However, another type of corruption comes to the fore due to extensive commitment to one's institution. The digressive decisions are made to eliminate whatever is perceived to be a threat to one's institution, and questionable steps are persuaded to achieve institutional objectives considered to be for the betterment of one's institution; this is termed as noble cause corruption and discussed next.

#### 2.4.4 Noble Cause Corruption

As the definition of Nye (1967) explains, that corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain; however, Miller (2007) disagrees with this definition. He argues that there can be another dimension in the study of corruption, which is missing in Nye's definition. For example, corruption can be committed in the name of goodness or for doing something good for one's institution. However, the actions used to attain goodness can sometimes be inappropriate or even ethically wrong. Such corruption, he argues, may not be for personal gain. Although the person thinks that it is just and equitable to go ahead with what is fair in their *thinking*, there is a problem, i.e. their *thinking* can be wrong and even lead them to the noble cause corruption (ibid).

This form of corruption is associated with those state institutions which have been tasked with the security of the country, for example, law enforcement agencies. The motive for their corruption arises out of exceeding commitment to their institution. Imagine, as an illustration, a police officer who, on his *hunch*, plans an illegal house search, makes a fake phone call to the department to substantiate his claim, barges into the house, and the accused, while safeguarding himself and his property, gets killed. Later, it is determined that the deceased is not involved in any wrongdoing. It is a classic example of the noble cause corruption, where the security official, highly motivated to work for the betterment of his society, does not fear to take immoral steps. However, there are chances that the belief he is carrying may be completely wrong (Caldero, Dailey and Withrow, 2018). This term, noble cause corruption, was initially conceived by Delattre in 1989, which according to him, was an infringement of the country's basic laws by its own security forces (van Halderen and Kolthoff, 2016).

Subsequently, Van Halderen and Kolthoff (2016) modified the idea of noble cause corruption by excluding the 'noble determination' as its important consideration and naming it "*task-related rule breaking*" behaviour instead. For them, following unethical practices for task fulfilment was not limited to the security officials alone but could be found in any other institution and corporation. The overt or covert demand from the leaders or other senior members of an organisation may also require the subordinates not to make this rule-breaking habit a big deal.

Similarly, for Umphress and Bingham (2011), "*Unethical pro-organisational*" behaviour also falls into the ambit of corruption and takes its inspiration from the noble cause corruption. According to their definition, the successful operation of an organisation may require the breach of values set by the society and encourages "*Unethical pro-organisational*" behaviour among organisational members. It is imbibed among the organisation's officials through the social exchange, organisational identification, and neutralisation. These are briefly explained below:

Firstly, as according to the social exchange theory, institutional members do not carry out their official assignments to meet their job related requirements only but to return polite or thoughtful treatment of their superiors or leaders; although, this reciprocity is non-compulsive in many cases but failure to act in this regard may attract difficulties for the incumbent employees which may involve scepticism towards their work, low prestige, and negation of future profits; secondly, organisational identity, for example, a recognition or having a belief of being a member of an organisation may make the employee a conscientious worker who staunchly believes the "*Unethical pro-organisational*" behaviour as the best service to the institution; they ascribe the winnings and losings of



their institution as something happening to them personally and strive to work the way they are expected to work by their institution; and finally, neutralisation is a technique which hides or covers up the unethicity of any action which is performed for the one's institution; once an employee stops thinking about the ethical implications of the unscrupulous decisions, his day to day decisions become more of business decisions which are done of course in the best interest of the institution (Umphress and Bingham, 2011).

The abovementioned literature on corruption, whether economic or non-economic, helps us understand the principles or practices that cause corrupt behaviour in different societies. However, another dimension in corruption literature involves knowing the impact of *culture* in formulating such principles or practices. According to Medard (2002), culture is essential in our dealings with our families and friends. Many practices can be understood to a greater degree by understanding the relevant *culture* of the society. Corrupt behaviour, for instance, is not sometimes followed across society only because it has become part of the system and people have stopped bothering about it, but because it turns out to be so ingrained in the *culture* that it takes the form of a necessary evil, it cannot be avoided. Hence, it requires the citizens to fine-tune their ethical or moral standards per the *cultural* demands of society.

*The cultural* demands of societies vary from one society to another. For example, what is allowed in one society may be disallowed in other. Heidenheimer (2002) presented the idea of different *cultural* understandings of corruption. For example, white corruption, where corruption is tolerated by both elite and masses of the society, and no one wants to punish it. And grey corruption, where the majority remains unsure about corruption.

Lastly, black corruption, where the elite and masses both denounce corruption vehemently and require strict punishment. For him, different societies, such as conventional (traditional) or contemporary (Western/modern), have different sets of *cultures*. For instance, collectivist culture (prioritising certain groups) to civic culture (fair treatment to all). He further argued that as societies change their status from conventional to contemporary and from collectivist culture to civic culture, corrupt actions also change their forms from white to black. For example, the same corrupt actions that had more acceptance earlier (white corruption) now required more strict actions (black corruption). This perception of corruption that depends upon the communities' *cultural* norms and societal values is called parochial corruption. This form of corruption is explained next in the thesis.

#### **2.4.5 Parochial Corruption**

"Parochial corruption represents a situation where only ties of kinship, affection, caste, and so forth determine access to the favours of power-holders" (Scott,1969: 330). The basic idea of this phenomenon takes its roots in patrimonial corruption, which has been discussed earlier. Here, no sound clarity exists about public vs private. Cultural values such as giving gifts to the officials and unabated cooperation among friends, families, and ethnicities continue as were part of the aristocratic and feudal societies (Sardan,1999). Parochial corruption has also been termed "non-market corruption" (Scott,1969). As "market corruption" (an impersonal process) allows access to favours only to those who competitively pay the highest bribes, non-market corruption, on the other hand, allows such favours to those who are connected based on kinship or other cultural attributes (ibid).

For Tanzi (1994), close-knit familial and friendship ties expect public officials to adhere to the cultural norms first. It becomes challenging for the incumbent officers not to help their friends and family and think of their public office first. The customs and traditions which evolve over generations in their native societies take precedence over the demands of the public office, which requires them to employ arm's length principles in their dealings with friends and family. Although any failure to apply such principles may label such actions as corrupt, which might be true in a legalistic way, however, it fails to incorporate the importance of different cultural and social norms from such actions (ibid).

Similarly, according to Caiden and Caiden (1977), a person who accepts a job at a public office feels ripped apart between two different social powers. Firstly, because of the Western borrowed ideals of the Weberian bureaucracy, he has to realise that public office is not something he can use to benefit his friends and families or even extended families. Secondly, he also has to consider his reverence for his relations, especially where some of them might have helped him get his education. So, in that case, the thought of applying Weberian rules to public office may remain only a thought (bid).

On the contrary, does this cultural relation among communities or groups always remain altruistic or are there other motives that also play their role surreptitiously? Kingston has explored it and argues that it becomes easy for a corrupt official to look for bribes in his close circle and network, with fewer chances to report his prospective crime (2007). Similarly, working for the interests of their kinship relieves the corrupt official from the worries of deception in the transaction. For example, one benefit of parochial corruption, according to Kingston (2007), is that it resolves the trouble of 'enforcement' involved in any transaction of bribery; for example, how can the bribee ensure that upon giving the

service, the briber would pay the full amount (the bribe) and vice-versa; so in parochial corruption, besides having the elements of altruism and friendship, and besides knowing the party whom the favour is being bestowed, it is easier for the officer to recognise a probable bribe paying person within the community who might not deceive in the end; secondly, the connection within the communities makes their transaction 'self-enforcing', for instance, in case the person who has been paid the bribe, if he does not work in accordance with the instructions provided he can be penalised or made an example by the community, i.e. can be thrown out of the group.

Besides using cultural norms in one's favour, it is also important to know how the definition of corruption evolves in any society. For instance, if the definition of corruption, as defined in state statutes, does not conform with the definition understood by its citizens based on their cultural norms, enforcing such laws would be very hard for the government (Heidenheimer, 2002). People would be more convinced to follow the culture's lead than the rules established by the state.

Similarly, Kingston says it would not be easy for the state to preclude people from parochial corruption when society is widely classified as 'collectivist' (2007). He uses the definition of Greif (1994) while explaining collectivist societies, mostly developing nations, where individuals build strong ties with others based on religion, ethnicity or relations. They are ready to do anything for such groups but may not be willing to cooperate with anyone outside their collectivity. Hence, considering an act corrupt or not so corrupt largely depends upon its local culture and varies from country to country (Amundsen, 1999). It is still possible that an act that can be declared corrupt by the courts of a country has its full acceptance in the local culture of its society (ibid). For this reason,

many Western ideas of corruption reforms do not work in many developing countries. Failure to discourage personal contacts of the public office holders and well-built social relations among the communities transpire people to enter into parochial corruption very easily (Tanzi, 1994), a phenomenon not very common in the 'individualist' societies of the West (Kingston, 2007).

Besides knowing about all these various types of corruption, it is also important to know its complexity and variety in the broader spectrum of countries. For example, according to Clarke (1983: x), "different political economies permit or even require different kinds and extents of corruption ... [which] change over time". Similarly, other issues in corruption include what types of corruption are present in different countries, what sorts of perceptions exist about corruption there, and how corruption prevalent in many developing countries is different from corruption in Western countries. Most importantly, if corruption is present in many developing countries because of their less development and non-democratic values, then why is it present in developed countries, which are more developed and democratic; the next section highlights all these issues.

### **2.5 Corruption in Western Countries**

The revisionists challenged the moralists' approach (as mentioned earlier in 'Corruption in the Twentieth Century) and understood corruption as a phenomenon that largely contributed to the developing nations because of their political and institutional backwardness. However, in the 1970s and later, it was indicated that corruption was a global phenomenon present in many advanced nations of the west as well, in a form known as grey corruption (Werner, 2002). Grey corruption, for instance, where a public

official authorises a corrupt action knowing that the people of his country are not aware of it, but they would have denounced it if they had been informed about it.

Scoble argues that this is an example of systemic corruption. He connects this systemic corruption with American politics and argues that when the Watergate scandal is seen beyond the failing of a few politicians (individual corruption), it sheds light on the base or the origin of this scandal, i.e. the political system (Harry Scoble, cited in Peters and Welsch, 2002). This view elucidated a new dimension of corruption where it was observed that wrongdoings were not only done to gain personal benefits. For instance, Watergate was a corruption scandal unlike many other corruption scandals where bribery, embezzlement of funds, favouritism or nepotism were not used for personal advantage; which was unusual from other corruption scandals (Heidenheimer, 2002). Its perpetrators wanted a big win for their party in the elections of 1972, which is why a cover-up for all that wiretapping of the Democrat's headquarters had conspired for the benefit of the entire political party, i.e. Republicans (Gardiner, 2002).

However, Johnston argues that a particular type of corruption does not need to be important for everyone in society. For instance, a particular corrupt act may be considered corrupt by some but may be considered 'part of the politics' by others or even recklessness or irresponsibility to others. Probably, for this reason, various people during the unravelling of the Watergate scandal were more concerned with Richard Nixon's refurbishment of a private house from public money and his tax-dodging than the corruption of the entire political system that was taking place simultaneously (2002).

Although the post-Watergate period initiated a lot of political science research in the area of corruption, later another corruption scandal in the USA called Keating Five Scandal

caused a stir in the political and bureaucratic circles of the country and compelled the research scholars to question the legality of payoffs in the name of political campaign contributions.

Another prominent example of the political corruption scandal in the US political science literature is Keating Five. It includes five US Congress senators accused of influencing an inquiry against one of their constituency residents, Charles Keating (Philp, 2002). Keating was being inquired of misconduct in the affairs of a loan company which collapsed when he was the company chairman. Although everyone in the group of five senators took political advantage of Keating's money in the form of election campaign contributions and also fought for his benefit, for example, inappropriately intervening in the regulatory investigations until the investigations backed off; there appeared a problem in dealing with this issue, for instance, how such behaviour of the senators could be classified; because the senators contended that they had not done anything which no other senator had never done before them; which according to them was in accordance with the norms of the American politics where political donations that were given out during election campaigns were returned as a favour when the donors were in problem (Moroff, 2002).

It was a grave issue for the Senate Ethics Committee because criticising this form of political benefit was equivalent to jeopardising the entire political process of the election funding on which the US politics was based (Philp, 2002). Payoffs considered to be made in connection with election contributions are more lawful than other payoffs. For example, in the USA, a one thousand dollar donation to a politician, when it relates to their election campaigning, is completely fine. However, the same payment to any other public official as a present or donation would attract legal consequences (Peters and Welch, 2002).

That is why it is considered the right course of action for many world leaders to pay money to the US Congress to negotiate its supportive backing, although a process where political development is causing political corruption (ibid).

On the other hand, political corruption in the United Kingdom can be attributed to more individual corruption than systemic. According to Fennell (1983), corrupt practices in the UK are lone acts of the individuals due to their deceptive and malicious ambitions, whereas systemic structures are strong enough in the country not to let corruption seep into them. Similarly, Pujas and Rhodes (2002) argue that the bureaucracy in Great Britain is famous for its uprightness. The credit goes to the British political system, which was strengthened before the systematisation or institutionalisation of bureaucracy. It closed the doors for the bureaucracy to penetrate the development of political parties in the country.

Chibnall and Saunders (1977), while elaborating on individual corruption, contended that corruption is a social construction devised differently by the upper and lower classes in Great Britain. The acts of secrecy, or gift-giving, are seen differently by ordinary people and elites when the issues at hand revolve around political morality (ibid). For example, ordinary citizens would criticise the involvement of secret dealings between citizens and political and public officials for discouraging the concealment of facts or benefits. However, for the upper class, secrecy is a necessary part of their decision-making; similarly, gift-giving or offering favours to the officials is considered corrupt by the middle classes, but that is a way of making allies in the public sphere for the upper classes. It is customary for the elites to seek and offer favours to achieve their beneficial objectives (private interests) even when it is proscribed in public life (Johnston, 2002).



In addition, a prominent political corruption scandal in the 1990s in the UK was known as the Cash-for-questions affair. It involved some of the Members of the Parliament (MPs) whom the lobbyists bribed to access the ruling party's politicians and the House of Commons (Philp, 2002). Such non-declaration of payments by the MPs was a big blow for John Major's Conservative government. However, no one was allowed to take refuge behind the system, and the culprits had to resign from politics. Since then, any MP who fails to report a declaration is punished strictly by the system, including the tabloids (ibid).

In Italy, on the contrary, the political state of affairs has taken a different turn. The connection of politicians with criminals and mafias of the south has given birth to transactive and extortive corruption (Pujas and Rhodes, 2002). The former is a reciprocal process where a donation to a politician is considered a transaction between donor and politician. Both understand that benefits would be reciprocated to the donor in this regard. Conversely, extortive corruption is where money is extracted from the donor compulsorily through blackmail or coercion (Alatas cited in Heywood, 1997).

Such transactive and extortive corruption brought a more severe issue to the Italian political system. The invasion of politicians into state departments (Heidenheimer, 2002) and collusion with private businesses have transformed the country's political system into a protection system. For example, Mr A would not join a political party to participate in the country's political affairs but mainly to seek protection for his vested interests, which may involve protection from accountability or help in finding public and private contracts. It, in turn, increases pressure on the politicians because in order to be a superior politician, one needs to offer superior protection services; so the donations paid to such politicians become insurance cover for the donor (Pizzorno cited in Della Porta and Vannucci, 2002).

However, this system paves the way for politics, where the political class constantly looks out for those who could arrange illegal financing for the politicians. Business politicians become the first choice for every political party, ready to influence the public and political quarters through bribes and kickbacks (Pujas and Rhodes, 2002). The more the risk of losing a political seat is involved, the more bribes and kickbacks are sought, and the more bribes and kickback money flows in, the more manipulation in the electoral process kicks in (ibid). Bettino Craxi, former Prime Minister and socialist leader of Italy, once said that a significant portion of the funds that political parties generate is illegal and unofficial; which makes the entire political system illegal and criminal (Bettino Craxi cited in Della Porta and Vannucci, 2002).

On the other hand, Spain was the first country in Europe to implement a public financing system for its political parties; it resulted from bringing the political parties near the state and detached them from the public (Pujas and Rhodes, 2002). It also gave birth to the idea of cartel parties which, according to Katz and Mair (1995), are the parties that use state resources, act as state-agent, and become absorbed by the state with time. All political parties rely on state resources, form a cartel for their survival, which in the end, is for the benefit of all.

However, this phenomenon of public funding did not stop political parties from attaining secret financing. Bielsa scandal unearthed at the beginning of the 1990s revealed how one of the biggest political parties in Spain, PSOE, which was getting 100% funds from the state, formed illegal companies and showed fake consulting services in order to divert funds into the party's account (Heywood,1997). Besides that, it also used state power to receive payoffs from Portuguese and German companies (ibid).

However, unlike Italy and Spain, France was the country where public funding and the acceptance of donations were both disallowed until the late 1980s, which, in turn, had increased the politicians' reliance on unlawful practices; and they circumvented the system in many different ways (Pujas and Rhodes, 2002). For example, various organisations funded by the government had established strong ties with different political factions. Hence, they paid political parties' day-to-day running expenses and wages of their staff and even sponsored their political campaigns (Meny cited in Della Porta and Vannucci, 2002). Secondly, some political parties got secret funds established specifically for the party favoured by the government; the details in this regard would never be made public on account of "raison d'etat" (i.e. national interest)(ibid).

Similarly, in Germany, another European country, political parties were getting public subsidies regarding their electoral expenses. However, such funding could not prevent its politicians from accumulating illegal financing; the volume of this ill-gotten money was initially equivalent to government funding provided to these parties. Subsequently, it became much more than this (BardiMorlino cited in Heidenheimer, 2002). Flick affair, revealed in the early 1980s, indicated how donations came from a company, Flick conglomerate, to various political parties and enabled the company to bag various tax concessions; the ultimate beneficiaries of such donations, as revealed later on, were the political parties rather than politicians (Heidenheimer, 2002).

In another political corruption case, Helmut Kohl, the German Chancellor and chief of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was implicated in the 1990s when he refused to name his secret donors. He admitted that he had concealed the donations worth DM 2 million by violating the party rules of Germany (ibid).

Although government funding has been available to all of the abovementioned European countries (Italy, Spain, France, and Germany), the notion of political corruption could not be eradicated as one of their prime funding sources. Besides a lack of corruption controls, the importance of opportunity structure (e.g. supply side of corruption), whose ominous presence always entices politicians to political corruption, cannot be ignored (Pujas and Rhodes, 2002).

Besides seeing the modalities of political corruption in Western countries, it is also essential to see the perspective of research scholars regarding political corruption in Asia. It is discussed next.

## **2.6 Asiatic Perspective on Political Corruption**

Economists have attributed the varying levels of corruption in Asian countries as something brought about by their economic development. For example, corruption in South Korea is believed to have arisen from its soaring economic development. At the same time, in the Indian subcontinent, the tumbling economic conditions have been considered responsible for it (Khan, 1998).

However, there is politics, where corruption networks operate under certain political conditions besides economic conditions. For instance, patron-client networks – where the members of different standing and qualities within the network (Schmidt et al., 1977) commonly retain the position of patron - show an essential factor in generating corrupt transactions in Asian countries (Khan, 1996a, 1996b). State institutions involved in these networks generate demand/supply of corruption by receiving/giving bribes to/from state officials (Mueller, 1989).

Hence, the members' political power establishes the nature of these transactions within the network. For instance, if clients lack political strength, the patron will require more in monetary terms (i.e. bribes) in return for the benefits they are going to offer (Khan, 1996a, 1996b). In contrast, if clients are politically strong, political support is also demanded per deal along with bribes (ibid). South Asian countries, even though they claim to be different from one another, have their political systems excessively marred by this patron-client corruption (Wade 1984).

Another important consideration that contributes to the understanding of political corruption in Asia is grasping the difference between the authority – an original function of a public-office holder - and the power - following self-interest goals - (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1979). For instance, Scott (1972a), in his study on Southeast Asia, concluded that political and bureaucratic institutions of the twentieth century had been severely imbued by their patron-client networks, which weakened their authority. He contended that the more authority state institutions maintained in comparison with the power of patron-client networks, the rare instances of corruption occurred in that country.

On the other hand, this strong interaction of the official's authority and the network's power created more possibilities for corruption; for example, higher convergence between the two led to a more predictable form of corruption and even institutionalised corruption after its long practice (ibid). With vast knowledge and experience in official capacities, the Thai bureaucracy colluded with corrupt business people to give them favours, who would know how to use such state officials (Sindzingre, 2002).

Apart from this, the corruption of government officials was sometimes not mainly for their personal gain alone. However, it provided money for the entire or the part of the field,

sector, or department to which they belonged (Anderson cited by Hutchcroft, 1996). For example, Colonel Suharto (who later became the President of Indonesia), in 1950, was shifted from his office in Java on charges of 'smuggling', whose proceeds he was using for the support of his military unit (Crouch, 1988). The lack of state funds to fulfil the needs of the soldiers brought this idea to the patrons (military) to generate money from the corrupt activities using clients (civil officials) of the state (ibid).

However, going furthest from this phenomenon of only supporting one's unit or field gives birth to the conditions of transforming military officials into roving bandits (Olson, 2000) and hence transforms the political culture of the country entirely. Myanmar, for example, had military officials who had been involved in plundering money, holding private properties against the law, and opium smuggling; this kleptocratic distribution of resources was a manifestation of the violence and socio-political chaos in their country (Siddiqa, 2017).

Besides the military's corrupt practices in Asian countries, the political set-ups in many of these countries have also been studied for having political corruption at the foundations of their political systems, irrespective of democratic or non-democratic systems. For instance, Khan (1997) termed the Bangladeshi political system ruined by excessive undue favours to one's political affiliates. When one is in power, giving benefits to one's friends and families had been a common attribute to almost all of the rulers and began right after its independence from Pakistan in 1971. For example, the first democratic government of Sheikh Mujib (1972-1975) became known for allocating state resources and granting favours to Sheikh's political accomplices. This trend continued even after that, i.e. during the political set-up of General Zia ur Rehman (1978 – 1981) and the

military rule of General Ershad (1983- 1990). General Zia's patronage and partiality towards the distribution of the state resources among his loyalists in a bid to consolidate his political party institutionalised political corruption in the country, whereas, during President Ershad's martial law, he was famous for seeking his commission on signing off every large contract by his government (ibid).

Although Bangladesh and Pakistan in South Asia have seen military interventions in their respective political set-ups, India has found its democratic norms stronger and unchallenged than its these two neighbouring countries. The democratically elected governments had never been derailed in India since it got independence from the British in 1947. However, political corruption among its political parties cut out the system for those who used democracy for their benefit instead working for the betterment of people. Tummala (2002), for instance, stated that political corruption in India had turned its democracy into "a shell of an institution while [its] spirit is lacking" (65). He contended that the coalition partners of the ruling political governments ensured that they kept their pressure on the governments. Since political governments' survival in office was because of them hence in order to stay in power, "unscrupulous leaders resort[ed] to all sorts of illegal, immoral, and even unconstitutional means" (64).

Similarly, for Vaishnav (2017), the concept of criminality and politics has gone so deep in the Indian democracy that political parties now prefer candidates with a criminal record. He cited the examples of some BJP politicians where one MP confessed that "our party does informal surveys of every constituency ... there can be a payoff to fielding a candidate, who may be a criminal, but a local folk hero to his community" (203). The

qualities which should have been viewed as liabilities for the politicians have become their assets in Indian democracy (ibid).

After having seen corruption from various angles and in different countries, it can be stated that its presence cannot be denied in any system. Where there is politics and power, there is corruption. In his interview with *Washington Post*, Berezovsky, a Russian business tycoon, once said, "If we rank all the fields of man's activity by profitability, politics will be the most lucrative business" (1998).

However, analysing the Asiatic perspective of corruption enables us to know the various explanations of political corruption in Asia. As the patron-client phenomenon, on the one hand, remains the dominant form of corruption here, the interplay of authority and power in institutionalising political corruption, on the other hand, wreaks havoc on the political structures. In addition to these countries, it is also essential to view the political corruption phenomenon in Pakistan, the second most populated country in South Asia (after India), whose political corruption cases are at the heart of this thesis.

## **2.7 Political Corruption in Pakistan**

Several years of Pakistan's independence since 1947 have seen lots of political upheavals in the country, which involved 'political instability, extra-constitutional systems, and a high level of arbitrariness in state apparatus (Niaz, 2010). It is the persistent disruption of the political system in the country which hampered its political parties from evolving into a well-structured political system (Zain, 2010). The long and continuous discouragement of political leadership at the hands of the military establishment gave



birth to dynastic political structures rather than enabling political parties to encourage genuine political leadership within the parties (ibid).

Similarly, the leaders of the two biggest political parties, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (both former Prime Ministers whose governments were toppled by the military) always looked to the military for its assistance to reach the corridors of power (Aziz, 2016). An important point that emerges here is why politicians submit to the will of the military and do not garner the support of the public. The answer is that just like a structure of clientelism, politicians support the dominant player, i.e. military, to take personal benefits from them rather than doing their politics fairly (Siddiqa, 2017).

Similarly, Cohen argued that an elite from various subgroups essentially regulates Pakistan, yet it knows how to protect the stakes of its dominant player, the military (2005). For Niaz political corruption in Pakistan has become a “social activity... [which] is not possible for politicians ... without the collaboration of civil servants, subordinate officials and the military/intelligence personnel” (2010: 245). The intelligence agencies, especially the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) in Pakistan, became strong during the tenure of former President General Zia (1978-1988), whom he frequently used to take political benefits by pulling the strings of his political opponents (Haqqani, 2005). Such intelligence agents would invest money in military-sympathiser politicians and make them win the elections (ibid). Upon winning the elections, such politicians, in return, would exalt the military's political and institutional status and term it an ultimate saviour of the nation (Arif, 1995).

Although the politicians not supported by the military in the elections would largely depend on the donations of wealthy individuals who, in exchange, would demand favours (Zain, 2010), however, taking money from such individuals would not guarantee a win in the

elections. On the other hand, a handshake with the military (in accepting their money) would guarantee a political win. A former Chief of the army once told the Supreme Court that "it was a practice within the ISI to support certain [political] candidates during the elections ... and ISI did make funds available for them ... the winners and losers [in the elections] did not know about the 'angels' [intelligence officers] who had played the trick [made the intelligence-backed candidates win] and disappeared" (Rizvi, 2000: 280). It emphasised the importance of having personal contacts with the military, and the intelligence high-ups where patronage was becoming increasingly essential tool to achieving power to rule.

In the context of Pakistan, Evans termed *sifarish* (an Urdu word for patronage) as an essential manifestation of corruption in the country where personal contacts were used to get benefits from the state institutions (2008). Despite having abhorrent opinions about political corruption, Pakistan's military and civilian counterparts strongly desire to use state employees as personal employees who, in response, create a network that increases their power, wealth, and honour (Niaz, 2010). This accession and accumulation of wealth and power denote the strength of such a group or institution, that is why they buy the support of other actors (Siddiqi, 2017).

All the top positions in the bureaucracy are awarded to the loyalists as their rewards (Wheatland, 2015). Hence, "corruption of all magnitudes such as mega, moderate, and petty permeates all tiers of governance and all segments of the society, public, private, political, judicial, commercial, ... and acts as the balancing market mechanism ... there exists surreal economic rationale for this give and take at the individual level, but [its] economic cost to the society is stupendous" (Javaid, 2010: 123).

Although numerous efforts have been made to deal with political corruption in Pakistan, in fact, in the presence of various anti-corruption laws, a separate institution was established in 1999, called the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), to tackle the problem of political corruption in Pakistan. "However, a lack of political will, coupled with the perceived co-option of the judiciary and the arbitrariness of many anti-corruption proceedings, [were] the major obstacles in the fight against corruption" in Pakistan (Chêne, 2008: 1). However, Ali (2019), while analysing the failure of the NAB in more detail, concurred that all governments in Pakistan had done their best to control the accountability process of the NAB. They achieved this objective by either appointing their yes-men to the chairman position or cutting down the bureau's budget to clip its wings. One common feature for all the governments was to use the NAB to victimise the opposition and "force them to switch party loyalties" (ibid: 94). Politically corrupt mafias knew very well that the accountability system would undoubtedly protect them.

To conclude, when we state the phenomenon of political corruption concerning Pakistan, the main characters who seem very obvious in this regard are the functionaries of the military and politics. The frequent involvement of the military in politics has opened many avenues of petty, grand, bureaucratic, and political corruption. In such a political system where patronage had been deeply entrenched among all state departments, the mere presence of accountability laws and bureaus has not yielded any results. Besides seeing corruption from different angles, it is essential to read the accounting literature to see what aspects of corruption have been discussed. The review of accounting and political corruption literature is provided next in this chapter.

## 2.8 Accounting and Political Corruption

The phenomenon of corruption and fraud has been used interchangeably in the accounting literature. For example, Cooper et al. (2013) contend that various accounting scandals, which include "fraud and corruption in government" (440) as well as deceptive conventions in politics, not only undermine the efficacy of accounting and internal control systems but also adversely affect the quality of such institutions to remain legitimate. Furthermore, they argue that although the 'fraud triangle' has been extensively used by fraud examiners as a most important accounting fraud technique, such fraud examiners forget that concentrating only on the individuals involved in fraudulent practices would distract focus from the context. The context nurtures 'corruption and fraud' and remains hidden in the social, legal, political, and economic environment.

For instance, fraud in accounting literature has also been studied in the context of celebritization. For example, according to Gabbioneta et al. (2013), a firm gets the status of celebrity when it faces heightened public expectations, especially due to its association with the 'national pride' of the country. However, knowing that it can always touch "the nerve of national pride" (500). This tendency of celebrity gives the firm many opportunities to do corporate illegalities (frauds) and remain undetected for a longer period due to the fear of social ridicule felt by independent analysts and regulatory bodies.

Similarly, to Rindova et al. (2006), "to attract large-scale public attention and to stimulate positive emotional responses provides celebrity firms with access to critical resources" (51) such as financial and human capital as well as strategic opportunities to make networks and alliances which might not be possible otherwise. The status of celebrity, in fact, becomes an intangible asset for the firm, they assert.

Besides that, the accounting literature on corruption has mainly focused on corruption in public procurement (Neu et al., 2013; Johnston, 2015). These studies explain the corrupt practices of government officials, i.e. demand side of corruption (Grossi and Pianezzi, 2018), as well as the corrupt practices of businesses, i.e. supply side of corruption (Sikka and Lehman, 2015) while highlighting various other issues involved in this regard.

For example, because of their volume, government procurements remain the most desirable contracts for businesses to acquire and remain a site of significant corruption (Sargiacomo, 2015). The corrupt officials have classified the procurement process into various stages. For instance, how to deal with a contract at the pre-bidding and post-bidding stages. According to Søreide (2002), corrupt politicians in a country ensure that the procurement contract is awarded to businesses ready to return some portion of the contract money to the politicians. In order to achieve their purpose, they try their best to manipulate the whole bidding process. For example, adding such conditions in the bidding documents that the bidder, favoured by the politicians, appears to be the only one who is eligible bidder; also by leaking the confidential details to the selected few bidder(s) so that they successfully complete the bidding process. It makes the process of repatriation easier for politicians (ibid).

Moreover, when a contract is awarded to a preferred bidder, the doors of corruption are not locked here. In the name of modifications, the contract is changed multiple times, regarding which no independent bids are called. Negotiations between the parties remain the only option to proceed further, opening more avenues for corruption (ibid). Similarly, procurement contracts whose market values are not readily determinable, for instance, defence equipment, such contracts make a lucrative site for corruption (Roberts, 2015).

However, in this regard, the safeguard is proper auditing and adherence to accounting controls (ibid). Although it is widely believed that the accounting-based barriers (Neu et al., 2013) and assemblages (Sargiacomo et al., 2015) can help curtail corruption. However, the political and bureaucratic forces which have their vested interests attached to the procurement contracts undermine the effectiveness of such accounting-based assemblages, both at the law-making stage (through politicians) and implementation stage (through bureaucrats) (ibid).

Subsequently, the skilful use of accounting is made to gain illicit financial benefits, such as repatriating money from inflated invoices, entices the formation of a corrupt network around accounting transactions to bypass the corruption barriers established by the accounting practices (Neu et al., 2013). For Grossi and Pianezzi (2018), the involvement of multiple actors in the public procurement process makes the whole process more obscure regarding accountability and opens doors for more corruption.

For instance, politicians represent their voters (a component of their constituency) while making contracts on their behalf. The bureaucrats represent politicians in dealing with businesses or other private parties. In contrast, such private businesses represent their private profits. However, in the end, in this long chain of representations, no one represents the interests of the general public, and the only interest is that they all serve self-interest. This interdependence of politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen in the government procurement contracts yields money for the politicians to pay for their electoral campaigns, fulfils the dream of promotions and career success for the bureaucrats as well as bags profit for the businessman; it becomes a win-win for the entire network (Neu et al., 2015).

Besides the demand-side corruption of procurement contracts, there is also supply-side corruption, which has been the subject of discussion in the accounting literature. For example, according to Sikka and Lehman (2015), the research of Neu et al. (2013) asserts having stronger accounting and internal control systems. However, they forget that private businesses under market capitalism are always hungry for more profits. In their quest for higher profits, they can go to any extent, even bribing the bureaucrats or politicians so they can award them a contract.

So for Sikka and Lehman (2015), it is not always the demand side of corruption (where the public official seeks a bribe) which is a problem it is the supply side (where the private businesses offer money) as well, which is a problem. It is possible to consider all precautions in designing the best procurement internal controls. However, when the keepers of such controls are under constant pressure from private businesses, it becomes difficult for them to combat this systemic corruption from capitalism and show their faithfulness to the system of accounting and internal controls instead.

For Phiri and Uslu (2018), such directions within the capitalist system should not be astonishing for many of us who know how capitalism encourages private businesses and the state machinery to increase the flow of economic resources for themselves, even at the cost of the state institutions. The wealth accumulated in this respect is used to gain more political power so that more favourable laws could be passed, and more wealth could be generated in return, even though it has severe repercussions for the political process, they argue. After all, a single person cannot misappropriate government funds and indulge in grand corruption alone. The network of powerful characters gives political favours to each other and survives in the capitalistic environment (ibid).

Apart from capitalism, the accounting systems in emerging markets have also been studied for having arrived from Western countries and failing to meet the local information needs of the emerging markets (Lodhia and Burritt, 2004). For instance, political and social realities are different in the Western world. So when accounting systems are imported from western countries, there comes a clash of underlying assumptions. It gives birth to unintended consequences, i.e. unable to take into account the local informational needs (ibid) and paving the way for more corrupt practices in emerging markets.

The same is also argued by Uddin and Hopper (2001) that international organisations such as IMF and World Bank, while projecting their neoliberalism agenda in the emerging markets, completely ignore the critical aspect of local practices. Such international institutions advise developing countries to follow Western countries' management and accounting practices (based on their Western economies). Hence, they remain short of achieving their desired result from such economies.

Similarly, for Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2008), unlike in Western countries where the role of accounting is more constitutive, i.e. more empowering, accounting in developing countries, on the other hand, is not that powerful. The labour controls in developing countries are bound by the socio-political conditions in which they operate. They merely reproduce the political hegemony of the state by showing "it as a calculated 'truth' or a 'nature'" (293). Sometimes the state in developing countries is run by the political elite, which always keeps its eyes on the state-owned enterprises and other state assets to be grabbed for their private consumption (Ahmad Khair et al., 2015). This continuous desire to benefit themselves and their cronies for the authoritarian political elite increases corruption in developing countries and affects judiciary and investigating



authorities, whose check and balance capacity gets severely weakened in this process (ibid).

Furthermore, although the state, according to Ashraf and Uddin (2015), is believed to be a uniform or homogenous body which works to generate structures for the betterment of its society in a magnanimous way, especially when it involves devising the accounting control systems in the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). However, in the backdrop of Pakistan's state-owned entity, they contended that such is not always the case. The power struggles between different state factions, especially where the military plays a dominant role in the power clique, resulted in the accounting controls in the SOE being more reflective of the interests of the state's more powerful bloc than those of its weaker groups. However, this hegemonic struggle within the state remained to fail to give a stable accounting control framework to the SOE in the end.

Similarly, Ashraf et al. (2018) argue that this conviction has been inculcated among the masses of Pakistan that military governments are the way forward for the country to get rid of corrupt politicians whose civilian governments have only destabilised the country. "They [have] created a discourse that they would make Pakistan secure by forming a corruption-free government to foster economic growth" (39). However, in their resolve to eliminate corruption, what they ignore is how corruption can become a coincidental by-product of [their] strategic ignorance [while] serving 'public' benefit" (Pianezzi and Ashraf, 2020: 20).

In addition, the literature on corruption and accounting also defines the celebrity status of some firms, enabling them to hide and prolong their corporate frauds while enjoying their celebrity status. For instance, Gabbioneta et al. (2013) acknowledge that little is known

about how celebrity status develops within firms and how it facilitates corruption within them. However, in their study, which revolves around the Italian firm 'Parmalat', they contend that it was the status of 'national pride' that the firms had achieved over the years, which led to many corrupt instances. Many analysts' suspicions about its wrongdoings were covered up with the publicity the firm had achieved. The media hype and the public's positive response provided ample opportunities for the firm to hide its adverse outcomes until it collapsed for hiding its actual positions and reporting corrupt transactions to the public. For Rindova et al. (2006), a significant characteristic of celebrity status is the generation of positive emotional responses from people. These responses develop a connection between the public and the actor (celebrity) that celebrity status becomes "a property of the actor's relationship with an audience, rather than a characteristic of the actor him/her/itself" (51).

## **2.9 Opportunity for research investigation on political corruption and accounting**

As stated by Gabbioneta et al. (2013), we know little about the relationship between celebritization and illegal practices in the context of the state. In particular, more research is needed to understand how the state promotes and celebritizes certain narratives over others to generate positive public emotions to pursue its own agenda in a country, for instance, in Pakistan.

Although the power struggle within the state, i.e. between military and civilian politicians in Pakistan, has already been documented in the accounting literature (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015; Ashraf et al., 2018). How this power struggle makes its way to distinct political corruption, and related accounting mechanisms has not been discussed in the corruption

and accounting literature. The attribution of national pride characterises this distinctive form of political corruption to the military to include the military's duty to eliminate corrupt civilian politicians from the country – by forming and deforming political governments - even using corrupt practices, for instance, political briberies. Such political corruption remains hidden for an extended period due to the celebritization effect of the narrative of justified 'military's politics interference'. It results in a paradox that political briberies the state should denounce are treated as service to the state.

Similarly, this celebritization of political corruption directly affects Pakistan's accounting and accountability system. It puts the accounting and internal control systems of state-owned and private organisations in a very precarious situation. At one end of the spectrum, they remain vulnerable to violations by powerful state actors. On the other hand, such controls are deliberately kept at that level where they remain ready to lose control (another paradox, where accounting controls have to be strong enough, are made weak to lose control at the top level). Therefore, control systems also become an accomplice in this celebritization process. In the end, the power of the celebritization phenomenon feels more pronounced and worth studying when no one involved in this corruption gets punished by the state's accountability system.

Although to Ashraf et al. (2018), the judicial system of Pakistan has shown its tendency to make decisions based on popular discourses built by the media. However, they also call for further work in accounting research where emotions are used to influence the judgments of the accountability system of Pakistan's courts (ibid). Hence, this study focuses on state politics and its impact on accounting and accountability in Pakistan. For example, how political parties are bribed and facilitate state ideology of political

corruption; how the celebritization phenomenon affects the accountability institutions and investigatory bodies to spare in their investigations and critical assessments. In the backdrop of this research gap; this study aims to explore the following research questions:

1. How does political corruption get perpetuated in the political system of Pakistan?
2. How do the political corruption scandals cause sufferings for the accounting (of the banking industry) and accountability systems of Pakistan?
3. How does the state's response in political corruption cases celebritize political corruption and help its perpetuation?

The next chapter explains the theoretical lens to find answers to these research questions.

### 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter deals with the discussion of the theoretical framework used in this study. It is structured in the following manner. First, a discussion about structure *or* agency - a continuing debate in social sciences about social practice - is carried out by identifying different theoretical perspectives (3.1). Then a case is built for the Bourdieusian theoretical concepts, a framework adopted for this study, specifying it as structure *and* agency (3.2) as against the contention of structure *or* agency mentioned earlier. Then Bourdieusian concepts used in the literature on accounting and corruption are discussed (3.3), followed by critiques of his concepts (3.4). A further discussion is carried out regarding the Bourdieusian concept, that is, the 'field theory', for example, how it has been used in sociology and political science literature with respect to the state and bureaucratic corruption (3.5). Lastly, the field conditions and the mechanism are discussed (3.6), whose combination with the field theory forms the basis of the theoretical framework for this study.

#### 3.1 Structure *or* Agency?

In social science, the discussion about structure or agency has remained very popular for many years. The result, which is the practice, i.e. why people do certain things in a certain way, or even why they do certain things anyway, has been understood using structure or agency. The structuralist perspective (Durkheim and Althusser) states that the structure, for example, social class or ethnic background, compels us to do things. On the other hand, the agential perspective (Webber and Popper's work) contends that our own free will or agency makes us do things. In sociology, we deal with situations where structure or agency or even an interplay of both are studied as prime motivations for people's

actions. A brief review of structure, agency and the interplay of both in practice is provided below.

For structuralists, we are what our structures make us, and these structures do not only exist in the outside environment but also reside inside us, for example, language. According to Saussure (1960), language can be considered a structure that generates our speech and even limits our speech. We probably cannot think beyond the vocabulary stored in our minds. Similarly, these structures, once formed, can change in many ways. For example, one factor that changes them can be referred to as the 'demonstration effect' (Cerny, 1990). The agents of a structure can copy the characteristics of other structure(s) and try to change their structure.

On the other hand, the agential perspective speaks more about humans' independence in generating different options and then choosing between those for their decisions. Every decision of the agent involves analysis which may include, for example, cost-benefit analysis or rational choice analysis to increase its utility (ibid). However, continuing practices of agents in a certain way also breed structuralism and motivate the agents to control those structures. Giddens meaningfully explains these dynamics of structure and group agency in his structuration theory.

According to Giddens (1984), the critical aspect of social science is not to explain the issues relating to structure or agency. However, the practice is imperative, i.e. how we do things in space and time. He emphasises that subjects such as structure and agency and society and individual are more of a matter of duality instead of dualism, which implies that they should not be construed as two extremes on the spectrum; instead, they are the different aspects of the same situation.

In practice, it is easy to witness the agency or agents being at one end while the structure is at its other end. It has been termed Giddens's theory of structuration. In this theory, duality has given a new meaning to the structure. For example, earlier, it was understood that structure had the power of 'determinism' which dictated what to do and what not to do. The structuration theory identified it to have the property of 'allowing' things in one's practice.

However, although Giddens's (1976; 1984) structuration theory gave a new direction to the age-old discussion revolving around structure and agency, it was also subject to severe criticism. Sewell (1992), for instance, argued that Giddens's (1984) definition of 'virtual structure' includes rules and resources which exist in actors' thoughts. Although rules and regulations could be called virtual, resources also had their place in the physical world and cannot be termed virtual. It, in his opinion, needed a revision in structuration theory. Similarly, Archer (1995) stated that many rules today are not those that just existed in actors' thoughts; instead, these have been inscribed in the books of law and have a material reality. Their knowledge and application should not be part of a structure; instead, it should be considered an agential matter.

After structuralism, postmodernism emerged and criticised the way social science was understood in earlier times. Two of the leading theorists of the postmodern era, Michael Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, interpreted the social world using critique, scepticism, and reflexivity to discover the reasons behind social practices (Groat, 2015). Foucault's theories described how the state and other institutions achieved social control using power and knowledge. Power, according to Foucault, existed at three levels: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower (Lynch, 2011). He explained that sovereign

power was the force which compels people to obey what the authority says them to do; disciplinary power, on the other hand, exercises power to control the conduct or behaviour of the people, for example, the use of surveillance in schools, hospitals, and military barracks. In contrast, biopower involves how technology is used to control birth rates, death rates, and other contagious illnesses.

Historically, it was understood that power was only exerted at the top, but Foucault's theory of power articulated it as something which existed in every social connection or relationship; it was omnipresent. He argues how with time, the old practices of physically punishing the guilty - to demonstrate sovereign power - had been changed to the practices of continuous observation and monitoring to signify disciplinary power (ibid). While keeping the same old purpose intact, that is, taking control of peoples' lives, making them submissive (ibid).

### **3.2 Structure *and* Agency – Bourdieusian Perspective**

Another important contemporary of Michael Foucault, whose outstanding work has made many contributions to social science, is Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu has been known to liberate sociology from using the traditional impediments of structure and agency as separate concepts, by incorporating both as his fundamental principles of practice (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

The focal point of his research had been to study the changing structures of society and their understandings by the individuals living within those structures, giving rise to the notion that is how one affects the other. It requires comprehending the process of structure generation as well as reading the underlying principles generated along with



those structures. However, such principles are meant to create misrecognition (Grenfell, 2014) because if such misrecognition is not entailed, the success of the structure is not effective. "The whole of Bourdieu's conceptual universe – his theory of practice and the terms in which it is expressed, i.e. habitus, field and capital – is predicated on this epistemological stance" (ibid: 214). It is these concepts that help in understanding the relation between objective structures (fields) and subjective understandings (habitus) of social actions (practice). We begin to know more about these concepts starting from the habitus.

Habitus happens to be the most widely used Bourdieusian concept "in sociology, anthropology, education, cultural studies and literary criticism, yet habitus is also one of the most misunderstood, misused and hotly contested of Bourdieu's ideas" (Maton, 2014: 62). The more it has been researched, the more its various dimensions have been brought to light (emotional habitus, family habitus, institutional habitus). However, according to Atkinson (2011), giving various descriptions of habitus lowers its explanatory power. For example, naming habitus may reflect a particular background (institutional) or a type of individual (emotional). However, it remains unable to dig out the fundamental generative principles of habitus, making the entire process redundant. Habitus, for Bourdieu, consists of values and dispositions one learns and gains from being part of a particular heritage, i.e. involving a series of past events. However, such dispositions bring out different practices from time to time (due to the spontaneous actions of the agents). Nevertheless, the approach, in many instances, remains mostly synchronised with the culture from which it originated (1977).

Although from the above discussion, it can be seen that habitus has three interrelated connections; for example, it is formed in certain conditions (structured structure), generates current practices, and tends to affect future practices (structuring structure). However, according to Brubaker (1985), this is the perfect example of over-determinism in a theoretical concept. That can be termed as versatile and vague at the same time. For him, the connection between structures of habitus and practice lacks reality. It directs more towards "*deus ex machina*" [God out of machine], where a problem which seems to be inexplicable, surprisingly, gets sorted out, out of the blue (ibid: 760).

However, Everett (2002) explains that it is not that everything gets sorted for the agents automatically. They make efforts to resolve their problems; they make strategies; they calculate which strategies serve their interests better, although habitus makes particular strategies forced upon them while remaining obscure from their eyes during this process. However, practice cannot emerge with the study of habitus alone. We need to take into account the field which generates habitus. For Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), practice comes into effect due to the unintentional relation of habitus and field.

Field, for Bourdieu, can be termed as "institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, designations, and appointments, which constitute an objective hierarchy, and which produce and authorise certain discourses and activities" (Webb, Schirato, Danaher, 2002: x). In addition, the field can also be formed when disputation is involved. For example, a war of words or disagreements emerges between groups or individuals regarding which attributes are to be awarded more value than others and how their distribution would take place within the field (ibid). It makes every field unique and capable of having its own

narrative of what is allowed and what is not within the parameters of a field, e.g. what can be thought of and what cannot.

For instance, how in the field of natural science, the abstractions of philosophies are not given any consideration and vice versa. However, this feature of the field also makes it vulnerable to those powerful position holders (dominant) who would continually compete to force their own point of view on the official narrative of the field, thus making it a site of struggle. So viewing the field with reference to power struggle presents an entirely different picture from what its powerful actors want us to see.

However, misrecognition regarding what is happening inside the field and what the outsiders perceive is deliberately kept from people. Bourdieu (1983) terms any attempt to speak about this power struggle in public as an unforgivable sin which all forces in the field will prevent. For example, regarding the higher education field, Everett (2002) contends that academia creates its own misrecognition of the higher education field by not debating about its funding or even who is funding but rather keeps itself immersed "on field-specific topics, such as what constitutes knowledge, what the newest research methods are, what the most prestigious conference is, or what qualifies as a top journal" (61).

It, in turn, takes the discussion about the field to game analogy developed by Bourdieu (1977). He equates the social world to a football field where games are played. For Bourdieu, when "players are taken in by the game", they agree to confront their counterparts only because they know the game and the field are worth fighting for (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 98). Their game revolves around the acquisition of "trump

cards, whose force varies depending on the game" in the fields (ibid). Bourdieu uses this analogy of cards to represent the species of capital required in the fields.

For Bourdieu, the amount and configuration of the capital enable social actors to vie for their places in the field. For example, subject to the nature of a field, capital can take three basic forms, i.e. economic, social, and cultural. The economic capital is the monetary wealth which can be used to buy any other form of capital. At the same time, the social capital is about knowing the right people and having the right connections to excel in the field. The cultural capital, however, is about assigning the 'worth' to certain actions, characteristics, and skills, the acquisition of which would be termed cultural capital (Webb, Schirato, Danaher, 2002). This form of capital can exist in objectified, embodied, and institutionalised forms.

For example, the objectified form of cultural capital shows the tangible depiction of a particular capital into material things or objects "such as, artworks, galleries, museums, laboratories, scientific instruments, books, and so on – artefacts of various kinds" (Moore, 2014: 102). On the other hand, the embodied cultural capital absorbs the fundamentals of the field as the underlying concepts of one's predispositions which reflect in one's attributes "such as body language, stances, intonation and lifestyle choices" (ibid). The institutionalised cultural capital insinuates the official recognition of an institution regarding a person's objectified or embodied cultural capital, such as "the academic qualification, a certificate of cultural competence that separates the last successful candidate from the first unsuccessful one" (Everette, 2002).

The value of all the abovementioned forms of capital depends upon how the people in a society perceive them, i.e. social recognition. A particular cultural capital, for instance,

hailing from a well-known political family, becomes a valued symbolic capital in society if its people give it great significance. It brings double value (Crossley, 2014) to the capital, i.e., ease in forming social capital and ample opportunities to earn economic capital. It also sets the stone for establishing other power hubs and dictating one's narrative as "the legitimate vision of the world" (Everette, 2002: 63), causing symbolic violence. Next, we see how this symbolic violence and other Bourdieusian tools have been used to study accounting and corruption in various studies.

### **3.3 Bourdieu in Accounting and Corruption Literature**

Accounting research has been known as interdisciplinary for appropriating theoretical frameworks from other subject areas, including sociology, psychology, anthropology, and political science (Chua, 1988; Roselender and Dillard, 2003). It has also extensively used the work of famous French intellectual Pierre Bourdieu, whose work had been known to use critique and scepticism in unmasking the secret structures of domination in accounting (Rahaman et al., 2007; Alawattage, 2011; Neu et al., 2013; Killian and O' Regan, 2016; Fukofuka and Jacobs, 2018). This domination is also (re)produced by the cultural agents by becoming part of the accounting process. The following research reflects how the work of Bourdieu has been interpreted in the accounting field.

Rahaman et al. (2007) explain how the restricted field (water services of Ghana) was influenced by the widespread field (Western governments and supranational organisations) through the power of their economic capital. They criticise the role played by accounting in the seemingly benevolent privatisation of Ghanaian water services, which paved the way for the brutal debt-entrapment of the IMF and the World Bank; and caused more damage than good to the Ghanaian public in general. The accounting-led

terms such as "inefficiency, a lack of profitability, and poor performance" (665) showed the accounting-backed solution, i.e. privatisation, as the only way to redemption to the state. However, for Rahaman et al. (2007), this created an opportunity for the vested interest elements in and out of the state to wield their power over the process and engender the role of international organisations in the politics of LDCs "more complex and subtle than it is often portrayed" by them (ibid).

Similarly, using the Bourdieusian constructs, the impact of social accounting on having more authority and legitimacy over the community has been studied by Killian and O' Regan (2016). They contend that whenever an organisation donates money for any community projects, in fact, it buys narratives and images provided by the community in return. It helps the organisation gain symbolic capital and "permits it, to conceal certain kinds of actions" (4), for example, its tactic of converting economic capital into social capital and gaining a position in the eyes of the public which it might not enjoy otherwise. The social reports prepared and circulated become a 'structuring structure' for constructing the objective world that the organisation desires; the community involved in producing such symbolic capital appraises the company as an 'altruistic patron'. This whole process of donating money and then reflecting it in the books of accounts "alters the status of the company, demonstrating how accounting can shift power in a way that transcends traditional boundaries." (ibid: 11)

On the other hand, accounting is studied for playing its role in the resistance of the subaltern groups (the case of indigenous people of the Kingdom of Tonga) against the power wielded by the dominating agents (such as the western financial institutions). Fukofuka and Jacobs (2018) explain it in terms of doxa and symbolic capital (Neu et al.,

2013) and describe the role of accounting in the context of culture. For example, how "society tacitly accepts notions, such as profitability, revenue and expenses" (Fukofuka and Jacobs, 2018: 609), which can even dare challenge the powerful global institutions. It, in some way, signifies the importance of local context (structures) in forming conceptions of accounting and shaping the cognitive processes of its people. Although they divulge that "[t]his is not to suggest that [international] accounting does not bring change [in local societies] but that ultimately being Tongan [local] sometimes is more important than the accounting requirements of the World Bank" (ibid: 622).

Similarly, the perpetuation of poverty in a small village in Sri Lanka was studied in light of an International Development Bank-led study using the Bourdieusian lens (Jayasinghea and Wickramasinghe, 2011). The newly established system introduced accounting-based principles in the village and aimed for the poor to have equal and better opportunities for credit facilities and fishing instruments. "In Bourdieu's terms, this was a process of restructuring of the village, which had been structured with traditional ways of earning and living" (406). However, when its effectiveness audit was conducted, it was revealed that the entire project was hijacked by the symbolic power of the local politicians and other powerful actors around this new system who handicapped the entire process of equal distribution of resources in the village. The local patron-client domination system wrecked the IDB's performance measurement, controls, and accountability practices, thus rendering the poor more powerless and poorer (ibid).

Besides that, accounting has also been studied for having unique and field-specific practices which, while originating from the field, take the form of dispositions "(through habitus, doxa, and bodily hexis)" in the minds and bodies of the agents and become a

structure in generating power relations (Alawattage, 2011: 16). Such structures compel the social agents to view the world in a particular way, for example, having a particular form of accounting rather than the other, which of course brings more symbolic capital and more domination in the field. Alawattage terms accounting-based calculative templates and procedures as the symbolic systems which become "structuring structures (in cognition), structured structures (in communication) and instruments of domination (in social differentiation)" within the gem mining industry of Sri Lanka (2011: 16).

Similarly, the rise of the Chinese state's control over its banking field during the early twentieth century was also studied using Bourdieu's triad, habitus, capital, and field (Xu and Xu, 2008). They unravelled the connection between China's foreign, modern, and native banks. They showed how the modern Chinese banks, having more cultural capital and social legitimacy, were in a better position to lobby for the standardisation of the banking field in China. The game in the field played by the modern banks worked, and the native banks lost their cultural capital and legitimacy and came under the domination of the modern banks. However, this field's domination did not last too long for the modern banks, who also came under the domination of the Chinese state shortly. The ultimate victor was the Chinese state which got the native banks controlled through modern banks and then "exercised more systematic supervision and control over modern banks" (ibid: 98) by keeping the ultimate domination of the field in its own hand.

However, according to Malsch et al. (2011), the concept of state domination given by Xu and Xu (2008) appeared to be descriptive instead of exploring broader social and political impacts of such state intervention. The primary purpose of using Bourdieu's conceptions of field, capital and habitus are to identify the political and social implications of dominating



structures which, if identified by remaining "less politically engaged" (Malsch et al., 2011: 208), the identification of such domination structure remains less effective.

Furthermore, their review article on the Bourdieusian studies in accounting contends that it is not Xu and Xu, around half of the studies which use Bourdieusian theoretical concepts in accounting (10 out of 18) do not recognise their research's broader political and social implications. Nor do they holistically bring into play the connection among the triad, i.e. habitus, capital, and field. They argue that "the type of symbolic capital which currently prevails in the discipline of accounting research is characterised with a sense of collective fascination towards performance" (ibid: 221), i.e. to publish in a highly ranked journal in a short period in order to continue researcher's good standing, financial rewards, and tenure track. It is because giving more time to decrypting and grasping the Bourdieusian concepts in full is considered perilous and excessive by its authors in accounting.

In addition to having only a few studies in accounting which identify political and social aspects of domination in accounting literature, there is also a dearth of research in accounting which investigates political corruption using the Bourdieusian triad in accounting. A prominent study in this regard is the one carried out by Neu et al. (2013), which elaborates on how corrupt networks are formed by politicians, bureaucrats, and private businessmen in the western democratic world, Canada, for instance, and how accounting is used in this process as a facilitator of the network. The corrupt field constituted by the powerful state actors devises the field habitus. It is inculcated in the personal habitus of the field members, the fundamental purpose of which is to inculcate among its members to benefit the Canadian Liberal Party illegally. Accounting allows this purpose to be fulfilled by "the construction of a space for the exercise of discretion, the

lengthening of the accounting transaction chain to inflate the proceeds, and the fabrication of invoices that make unusual accounting transactions appear normal" (ibid: 520). It made accounting a symbolic capital in the field.

Although it did not involve any complex or incomprehensible transactions like those involved in complex financial instruments, its skilful use in creating simple tasks looks valorised and taken for granted, making it perceived beyond suspicion. Similarly, according to Neu et al. (2013), accounting controls devised by the states in the Western world to curb political corruption have become part of the 'game' to strategise against, or ways are discovered to overcome such barriers. "So the accounting simultaneously limits and facilitates corruption within influence-market settings" (ibid: 521). They also emphasise that such accounting strategies in corrupt networks become reproductive (by becoming part of their habitus) and regenerative (which they can create several times in many ways), thus making way for the corruption in the Western world.

Besides Neu et al. (2013), there has been no study in accounting which uses the Bourdieusian triad to study political corruption. However, Bourdieu's other theoretical concept, social capital, has also studied corruption. According to Phiri and Uslu (2019), the political and bureaucratic elite failed Zambia's accountability system in pursuit of its corrupt aims. The social capital formed by the dominating politicians and top-level government officials made "it difficult for the institutions of accountability to detect and untangle such activity" (526). Knowing the influence of corruption on the system and their inability to transform, the accountability actors start abetting the corrupt system and get "involved in the facilitation and perpetuation of corrupt practices" (527).

Similarly, Das et al. (2021), in their recent article about the healthcare facilities in India, contend that setting unrealistic performance targets along with severe disciplinary actions upon non-conformance lead to corruption in the public health sector. They further explain how the practice of meeting the expectations of the bosses becomes so entrenched in the habitus of the medical professionals that they do not hesitate to "expending extensive effort on managing data and creating documentation to show the achievement of targets, even when these were not actually met" (29), leading to the below standard service to the people for a prolonged period.

In the same manner, Vaidya (2019), in his study on the corruption among the state bureaucrats in India, especially regarding agriculture marketing, contends that bureaucrats mimic the habitus of their dominating, high-power superiors. A corrupt bureaucrat pretends to be an honest one when he sees his boss be an upright man. "It is related to the ability of the officers to alternate their habitus between corruption and honesty ... [they] choose to hibernate from corruption" (617) until they build up their position in the field. Once they have strengthened their position, they resort to corruption (re-corruption) again. However, in the absence of such an opportunity, the corrupt bureaucrat contemplates transferring to another posting.

After analysing Bourdieu's conception of accounting and corruption, it is crucial to study the critique which Bourdieusian theoretical concepts have attracted in literature. I move on to this part next.

### 3.4 Critique on Bourdieu

Although Bourdieu's oeuvre has been used extensively in various disciplinary fields as wide as medicine (Das et al., 2021), agriculture (Vaidya, 2019), higher education (Naidoo, 2004) and art (Grenfell & Hardy, 2007). However, the effect of his theoretical constructs has not remained free from criticism. Although Bourdieu claims to surpass the great divide between objectivism and subjectivism by introducing his theoretical triad, his theory remains "essentially deterministic and circular" (Jenkins, 1982: 270). Especially when he states how practice comes into being as a result of habitus learned by the social agents from their objective environment, but the base (habitus) and the result of such practice both point towards structures which are present to play their roles in such practice. It does not take Bourdieu far from structuralist sociologists. The details of such critiques are provided below.

A tenacious critique of Bourdieu has always been that his theoretical framework is too 'deterministic'. The field and its logic behind every move involved in the practice take his work more towards idealism than logic. For example, according to Jenkins, Bourdieu's "analytical emphasis falls upon causes rather than reasons. Structures produce the habitus, which generates practice, which reproduces the structures and so on" (ibid: 273). This talks more about the productive and reproductive features of the field than discussing the change, for example, how, in the process of continuous dialectic between field and habitus, a change can occur in practice.

It is answered by Grenfell (2014), who states that change is possible in the field by creating a 'disjunction' or disconnect between the habitus and conditions of the field. For example, it is possible to change field conditions with the change of law which govern the

field and change in any technological advancement on which the field is dependent. It can break the field-habitus determinism for which Bourdieu's work is critiqued most. For Bourdieu (1988a), social agents are not 'automatons'; instead, they are equipped with 'practical sense' for having 'schemes of actions' which allows them to have 'interests' in the field. This interest is at the forefront of Bourdieu's field theory. For Grenfell (2014) the interest "allows for instinctive and semi-conscious acts of behaviour in terms of maximisation of profit ... in a way similar to economic interest" (154). This means our 'interests' in the fields create ulterior motives of benefits in the field. However, these are not overtly disclosed. So the social agents are not as 'determined' by and as 'caught up' in the field-habitus duality as the critics of the field theory paint them; they have 'interests' and 'games' to play in the field.

Bourdieu is also critiqued on the 'borders' of the fields, which have often been termed blurry and challenged for their continuously shifting characteristics (Thomson, 2014). It becomes taxing for the researcher to know where to draw the line, for example, where the influence of the phenomenon being studied has the most potent effect and where it starts to diminish. He argues that many courses of action can be followed in the field of education, especially in "life-long learning" (ibid: 77). For instance, one may utilise the company-provided staff training, online resources, state-facilitated programmes, and private sector-enabled education schemes. So how does one ensure where the boundaries of the field of education end?

Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) explain this criticism by asserting that the matter of boundary can only be decided with an empirical investigation. There are points beyond which the effects of the field fade away. However, it is up to the researchers to discern

how and where such effects get more robust and weaker during empirical investigations. For instance, Bourdieu contends, "I seriously doubt that the ensemble of cultural associations (choirs, theatre groups, reading clubs, etc.) of a given American state or a French region form a field" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 100). Only because they are a group of people working together does not make them a field. Hence, a need to ponder over boundaries does not arise. On the contrary, the major American universities such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, he quotes the study of Karabel (1984), had formed a link with certain external forces (objective relation), which was proving to be a structure for the practice of such elite universities. Karabel 's study discerned how during the 1940s, the elite American universities were under tremendous pressure from their dominant Protestant upper-class donors to restrict the admissions of Jews students to these institutions.

So the practices of these universities were not boundaried around the field of education alone. However, its limits were extended to the socio-economic backgrounds of stakeholders with conflicting demands from the field. For Bourdieu, we have to study each cosmos (field) to find out how they are combined to form a whole, "where they stop, who gets in and who does not, and whether at all they form a field" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 101)

Furthermore, Jenkins (2002) critiqued the Bourdieusian relationship between field and habitus. He termed such a relationship full of contradictions. For example, he contends that at one place, Bourdieu states that the field produces its own habitus. In another place, he argues that social agents bring their pre-existing and historically constituted habitus to the field. He asks, how about those fields which social agents join after they become

mature "[a]nd how, if at all, is it possible for a field to have its own habitus, if the habitus is a property of embodied, individual agents?" (Jenkins, 2002: 90)

However, Bourdieu explains this criticism in 'An Introduction to Reflexive Sociology', that the association between field and habitus functions in two ways: First, it acts as "a relation of *conditioning*: the field *structures* the habitus" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127). For example, the structuration of habitus takes place in the field, which transforms the habitus in accordance with the field's inherent 'sine qua non' prerequisites (i.e. essential conditions).

Secondly, it is "a relation of *cognitive construction*" (ibid). For instance, it makes the social agent believe that the field is an important world worth investing one's energies. So when habitus comes across a field of which the former is the product, it is like a "fish in water"(ibid). So it is very much possible for the field to structure the habitus of its agent while habitus remains the property of the embodied, individual agents. "Just as the "right opinion" "falls right," in a sense, without knowing how or why, likewise the coincidence between dispositions [habitus] and position [field], between the "sense of the game" [habitus] and the game [field], explains that the agent does what he or she has to do" (128) without feeling confused.

Lastly, Lane (2000) critiqued Bourdieu for not elaborating on the relations between national fields (fields of power) and subfields. Similarly, for Thomson (2014), the involvement of too many fields makes their relations so baffling and complex that how the process of domination fundamentally gets put into practice remains opaque. For example, he quotes the instance of education where for field analysis, the field of higher education is taken as a field of power, then comes the field in question, which can be an institution,

and then the departments involved with that field which become subfields, and so on. It, in fact, makes fields relatively abundant.

However, for Bourdieu, a field cannot be broken down into parts or pieces. A field can have subfields where every subfield entails its rationalities and practices. For example, if we move from higher to lower in the literary field, i.e. "to the subfield of novel or theatre" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104), we see that such subfields have their own logic of games and struggles as these are going on in these subfields. However, to see the whole picture, it is necessary to see the fields with respect to the field of power and the empirical case they both generated (ibid). Bourdieu has explained the relationship between the state (field of power) and housing (field) in detail while explicating the aims of the state, which through the imposition of policies and procedures, aspired home financing, accomplished the development of land, provided social security benefits, and in the end changed the entire form of housing field in France; in accordance with the wishes, it had. Nevertheless, despite these concerns, many scholars in various subjects, including corruption and accounting, use Bourdieu's theoretical concepts to dig out more about the dominating structures in the disciplines in which they operate. We move on to the field theory, which will be used as the theoretical framework of this study.

### **3.5 Field Theory, State, and Corruption**

Field theory has been a meaningful conceptualisation in understanding the regularity of the actions of social agents. It emphasises the 'positions' occupied by the social agents, which explains how such position-holders respond to the 'forces' exerted upon them from within the field. The origin of the field theory made its headway in the social sciences from



the physical sciences. Newton's gravitational theory had many commonalities with it; however, it was "Einstein's theory of general relativity [which] technically gave it a field-theoretic form" (Martin 2003: 4).

Likewise, psychology took up Gestalt theories first and studied the quality of 'perception' using field theories. They were eliciting a field theory called 'electromagnetism' (to be explained shortly) in explaining the phenomenon of perception. Gestalt theorists contended that it was not easy to comprehend how a 'being' perceived their environment unless attention was paid to the 'field' itself, i.e. 'field of perception'. They argued that every perception was relative and impacted other perceptions. Secondly, the field which encircled the perception was also attaching specific properties to the perceptions it was generating, thus making perceptions unique and impactful (Mey, 1972).

The study of electromagnetism field theory, as shown by Martin (2003), asserts that it has the following attributes:

- (1) It attempts to illustrate the metamorphosis (changing of characteristics) taking place in 'some elements' of the electromagnetism field compared to other elements. For example, its analogy to social life can be drawn by observing that a particular type of upward mobility available in a particular career path would only happen to certain people on the condition that nothing abnormal happens outside the field.
- (2) This transformation of elements takes place due to their interaction (reciprocal action) with the field.
- (3) Besides their interaction, the innate characteristics of these elements make them prone to the 'field effect'. For instance, as in the magnetic field, we can tell how the

field would respond to rubber and iron (the latter would be attracted to the magnetic field, and the former would have no effect). Similarly, certain people would be more attracted to the field effect than others. However, having no effect (just like rubber) does not deny the presence of the field.

- (4) If elements are not present in the field, they cannot exert their force but only retains the potential to exert their force. For instance, a magnet does not pull iron if iron is not present within its reach. Also, we can infer that it is not the magnet pulling the iron. In fact, it is the magnetic field doing its work in the background.
- (5) The field is described as organised and differential. For example, it is an arrangement of parts or elements which can be extended or used to form bigger fields. In terms of social sciences, the field can be expressed as representing those general and overarching practices that can be witnessed in systems and structures.

It logically follows from the above characteristics that although it is impossible to quantify the field or its effects, its presence can be sensed with the help of its effects. It "allows us to account for the conviction Durkheim had ... that there was something "more" out there – some social whole that penetrated us - without our being forced to recapitulate in specifying exactly what this thing was" (Martin, 2003: 14).

Field theory was although evolved in Germany; however, it got more prominence when Pierre Bourdieu advocated it. For Bourdieu, who had studied various fields such as education, politics, bureaucracy, and art, multiple comparisons had been drawn for the '*champ*' (a French word used by Bourdieu for 'field'). For example, he analogised a field with a 'football-playing field' in one place. In the other instance, he termed it a 'field of

science fiction', while on the third occasion, he termed it a 'field of forces' as one would encounter in physics (Thomson, 2014). Bourdieu's these analogies of the field, as described by Thomson, are briefly described below.

For Bourdieu, the likeness of a social field with a football field brings the idea of a social field being boundaried and where games are played. The players have their positions marked in accordance with the internal divisions and are also bound by the game's rules. The condition of the football field, for example, being wet, dry, or having filled with holes due to massive wear and tear, would dictate the players how the game would be played in such conditions; the way, he contends, the social fields are controlled by their conditions. The other analogy of field, for instance, the science-fiction field, is used by Bourdieu to express the building of barriers to protect insiders from outsiders. Not all the participants in the field have equal status. The power to make decisions rests with a select few. In the example of an economic field, he terms this field as a disparate milieu controlled by its rules and regulations.

Correspondingly, the field of forces analogy is more like an electromagnetic field mentioned earlier in this chapter. Bourdieu talks about the powerful forces of cultural and economic capital exerted in the social fields. For instance, the activities in the cultural fields have the dominance of the economic field (Thomson, 2014).

Similarly, further elaborating upon the properties of certain fields, such as the bureaucratic field, Bourdieu (1991) explains that the bureaucratic field demands absolute compliance with the rules and norms of the field. So when a novice joins bureaucracy with whatever perceptions or intentions they have in their minds, it is the mind of the system (the

bureaucratic field) that prevails. After some time, bureaucrats start thinking like what the field tells them.

Although according to Webb et al. (2002), the bureaucrats would always claim that they work for the national good without getting themselves politically influenced; however, for Bourdieu, they are the protectors of their personal interests. It becomes challenging for government employees to stay independent at the time when their influential bosses, the ruling political elite, entice them to "think about their own careers and the status of their own ministries than with the public good" (98). And this is how veritable structural corruption begins.

Bourdieu (2004) terms the phenomenon of corruption as an act of spillage or leaking while the state actors strive for their power, dominance, and symbolic capital. As power is split, he contends, among various government departments, however, the quest for domination leads government employees to "serve themselves directly", for instance, distributing the state resources according to their own wishes "instead of waiting for redistribution" (26) based on social equality.

Based on their personal interests at the foundation, they fabricate the view of the state, which maximises their own stakes and positions in the state. So as Bourdieu puts it, "they create the state which creates them, or that they make themselves by making the state" (29). In this light, it becomes easier to understand the importance of the 'state' for bureaucrats and political forces. These ruling elites emphasise the state's narrative, the state's supremacy, or the state's security to cream off state resources. Hence, the "bureaucratic field ... becomes the site of a struggle for power over statist capital and over the material profits and symbolic profits it provides" (34).

The statist capital, as mentioned by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), shows the accumulation of the various types of capital which permits the state to exert its power over other fields. For example, it includes the cultural capital of those powerful fields which are the central part of any state, such as the military, bureaucracy, judiciary, and politics.

Thus, the state becomes a forum of struggle among powerful fields to achieve dominance over state power. In their quest for statist capital, state institutions delegate political capital (Bourdieu, 1991) to those they deem fit to work for their interests. For example, in the case of Western democracies, such delegation comes from well-established political institutions such as political parties, where the prevailing democratic political system consecrates candidates. However, in other cases, such political delegation may arise from non-democratic institutions that use such politicians as a conduit to work for their interests, helping them achieve their statist capital. "The acquisition of a delegated capital obeys a very specific logic ... institution invests in those who have invested in the institution: investment consists not only in services rendered [but] in obedience to orders or in conformity to the demands of the institution" (ibid: 195).

For Bourdieu, the political field provides a programme of thought and action to the politicians so "when they open their mouths, they speak with all the power invested in them by the group" (Grenfell, 2014: 256). The political field, for Bourdieu, qualifies to be accepted as a field where "political products, issues, programmes, analyses, commentaries, concepts, and events are created" (Bourdieu, 1991: 172). He contends this requires special training, for instance, attaining political rhetoric by gathering specific knowledge in a particular political field context.

However, what remains at the forefront is the 'double game' played by such a narrative. The vision influenced by the interests of those whom such political agents truly represent (their sponsors) would assure them the protection of the existing system - prolonging their domination – on the one hand, while pretending to be working against it. For Bourdieu, this “duplicity is not in the least intentional since it results from the duality of fields of reference and from the necessity of serving at the same time, [between] the esoteric aims of internal struggles and the exoteric aims of external struggles” (183).

### 3.6 Field Conditions and Mechanisms

Besides 'field theory and state', it is also essential to know the field conditions, i.e. the circumstances surrounding the field and how their effect is felt, without being very obvious to the field agents. For Bourdieu, *illusio* and *conatus* are the field conditions that make their way to the social agents through field interests and become so ingrained that their permanency seems to be the only option for their adherents (Grenfell, 2014).

On the other hand, Bourdieu also describes field mechanisms, i.e. how a field operates its process using *doxa* and *hysteresis*. *Doxa*, which works to prevent the values and practices of the field, for example, works for their preservation; *hysteresis*, however, shows how the change in the field is attempted or achieved and what consequences it brings for the field agents (ibid). The detail of these mechanisms and conditions is provided as follows and the first one to be explained is *illusio*.

*Illusio*, according to Bourdieu, involves being caught up in the field. It shows, for example, why someone is interested or motivated in the field. Bourdieu uses the game analogy in explaining *illusio* and terms it as an interest in the game. For example, he narrates that

those games which are more important to us get our attention and get “imposed and introduced in our mind in a form called the feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 1998: 77). *Illusio* also gives the principle of perception to the field members. This experience is linked to one's belief in the stakes of the game, which translates into a refusal to question the field's underlying principles.

Hence, the actors perceive the field as obvious and normal, though it appears to be an illusion to those outside the field. Also, *Illusio*, as an “investment in the game” (Bourdieu, 1990: 66), persuades the field agents that stakes in the field are worth dying for. For example, it brings such a blinding impact on the actors that they do not question the underlying principles of their actions anymore; they keep on following the rules of the games (Bourdieu, 1998a) without perhaps thinking about the outcomes of their actions. Once the agents understand these rules properly or internalise them, they play the game ferociously (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). So *illusio* is, at the same time, interest, investment, and principle of perception.

Similarly, *conatus* is another field condition showing how social phenomena shape within fields. For Bourdieu, it is a “combination of dispositions and interests associated with a particular class of social position which inclines agents to strive to reproduce at a constant or an increasing rate the properties constituting their social identity, without even needing to do this deliberately or consciously” (Bourdieu, 1988: 176).

From the definition given by Bourdieu, it can be seen that *conatus* seems to be a combination of both *habitus* and *illusio*, whose job is to strive for the reproduction of the *doxa*, which is at the heart of the field. However, all of this is achieved by the field agents without being conscious of their actions. On the one hand, the *habitus* of the field provides

'dispositions,' i.e. how to survive in the field; *conatus*, on the other hand, shows how this existence can be enhanced or prolonged.

For Bourdieu, in the context of perpetuating the family influence and keeping the family property intact in Béarn (Bourdieu's hometown in southwest France), "the unconscious desire of the family or the household to perpetuate itself by perpetuating its unity against divisive factors, and especially against those inherent in competition for the property" (1998: 107) has nothing but *conatus* at its base.

Furthermore, *conatus* has also been explained by Bourdieu in comparing two main classes of society, i.e. the *noblesse oblige* (the rich and powerful) as well as the *ignoble birth* (underprivileged, less powerful); where both learn through their own ways how to perpetuate and justify their actions (Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu, 1999). The powerful and the dominated attribute their power and powerlessness unintentionally to their respective classes, the process Bourdieu named "*amor fati*" (2000: 146), which Bourdieu terms as the hallmark of the *conatus*, e.g. the subjective expectations get automatically adjusted to the objective chances that one foresees.

"In short, Bourdieu provides insight into how people are "bought" into the social system ... [how] the social system ... retains its stability through complementary illusions .... It is here that *conatus* can be most easily confused with liberty and freedom ..." (Fuller, 2014: 177). People assume that they are free in their social system. However, it is the *conatus* whose perpetuation in the system has brought different narratives among different classes (through various illusions) which tells them to adjust according to their class. That is how equilibrium is achieved in a social system.



Apart from field conditions, field mechanisms such as *doxa* play a crucial role in Bourdieu's logic of practice (1990). "*Doxa* is a particular point of view, the point of view of the dominant, which presents and imposes itself as a universal point of view - the point of view of those who dominate by dominating the state ..." (Bourdieu, 1998: 57). The state, according to Matheron, as quoted by Bourdieu (1980) fashions its citizens according to its own wishes which could help it in achieving its objectives later. All this is not possible without giving them a particular *doxa*. Creating conviction or confidence in the affairs of the field is a significant challenge for the dominating forces to maintain their fields. And the process starts from the time of inducting new members to the field, who have to assure their "undisputed, pre-reflexive, naïve, native compliance with the fundamental presuppositions of the field which is the very definition of *doxa*" (ibid: 68).

Such compliance with *doxa* is the main feature of any field. According to Bourdieu, it is probably for these reasons that it is just not that easy to join in any field; you have to be ready to follow the commands of the *doxa* (1980). Similarly, *doxa* requires that its legitimacy and those who impose it should not be questioned. Hence the "socially arbitrary nature of power relations that have produced the *doxa* continues to be misrecognised, thereby reproducing this same *doxa* in a self-reinforcing manner" (Deer, 2014).

On the other hand, hysteresis is a field mechanism that shows the importance of the relationship between a field and the habitus of the field members. This relationship can be the best fit, "at ease, like a "fish in water" [where] your habitus matches the logic of the field, you are attuned to the *doxa*, the unwritten "rules of the game" [the] underlying

practices within that field" (Maton, 2014: 56). However, opposite is true when this relationship goes "out of synch", and *hysteresis* starts to take its effect.

For example, the habitus, formed under certain field conditions, feels an unfamiliar and alien environment when confronted with a different field. Bourdieu (1977) explains this phenomenon in 'Outline of a Theory of Practice' in the following words: "as a result of the hysteresis effect ... practices are always liable to incur negative sanctions when the environment with which they are actually confronted is too distant from that to which they are objectively fitted" (78).

Although from the above discussion, it might be inferred that fields and the field members do not like change in the field, this is not the case. For instance, Bourdieu (2000) does mention in this scenario that change does impact fields. He claims that during social stability, field agents lay down a carefully guided path to the change so that every member is comfortable with the change, i.e. a fish in water.' However, during a social crisis, when a field is tried to be changed forcefully, the habitus responds to the new developments, but it does not happen in a predictable way. The success and failure attached to *hysteresis* make it more risky and uncertain, and its outcome may bring loss of power for some, whereas more power for others.

Although the rich and powerful, who have more and easy access to cultural, social, and economic capital, would instantly make new strategies and occupy new positions. The dominated agents would lag behind the powerful groups due to social distance. According to Hardy (2014), "It is the "hysteresis effect", or inertia in the habitus, which provides opportunities for the already successful to succeed further, while the less successful continue to misrecognise the strengths and weaknesses of relative field positions" (130).

The social crisis, the hysteresis, where conventions and traditions are challenged, brings opportunities for the dominated classes. However, sometimes such changes only make their position worse by giving more power to the dominant.

The symbolic power of state institutions in relation to the political field is termed by Bourdieu a *social magic*, which according to him, gives the state institutions the authority to bring things to life and give credence to those beliefs which support the state's own vision and division.

For instance, Bourdieu states in the 'Language and Symbolic Power': "the act of institution is an act of social magic that can create difference *ex nihilo*, or else (as is more often the case) by exploiting as it were pre-existing differences, like the biological differences between the sexes ..." (Bourdieu, 1991: 120). Such power structures operating within the state oblige the ruling elite more favourably than the commoners when both find themselves caught up in a scandal, for instance, a corruption scandal. The state makes concessions for some, while others are marked as culprits. However, all this is done using the illusions of social magic.

How this social magic works is explained by Bourdieu (1990). He gives an example of the first-born son in ancient times, i.e. how he (from an individual) would become the lord of the inherited property and how such inheritance would make an institution in itself for him to institute its rules and regulations into the lord. Thus his practice would be generated. It is the social magic, for Bourdieu, that "institutes an individual as the eldest son ... with all the corresponding privileges and obligations, and which is prolonged, strengthened, and confirmed by social treatments that tend to transform instituted difference into natural distinction"... (ibid: 58). The power of the powerful is created, granted, and observed by


many, and the whole process gets naturalised through social magic. The sleight of hand turns an individual into a lord by creating illusions of socialisation, and the privilege gets legitimised. The cultural arbitrary is disguised, i.e. no other family member can deny this privilege. However, the things shown in this regard conceal more than what they reveal. "Social magic is the means of obscuring the conditions in which value is constructed so that fit comes to be seen as 'natural' ..." (Ingram and Allen, 2019: 729).

And finally, partial revolutions in the fields prevent total revolutions. "The partial revolutions which constantly occur in the fields do not call into question the very foundations of the game, its fundamental axioms, the bedrock of ultimate beliefs on which the whole game is based" (Bourdieu, 1993: 74). They resort instead to the partial revolutions. One of the most important factors for bringing partial revolutions and avoiding total revolutions in the games is the "size of investment in time, effort, and so on" (ibid), which the participants presuppose at the time of joining the field. This investment renders it unthinkable for the field agents to topple the game, i.e. bring total revolutions and destroy the domination of the dominants.

Building on these Bourdieusian field conditions and mechanisms, I combine Bourdieu's theoretical concepts such as field, conatus, hysteresis, social magic, and partial revolutions, especially with reference to my study of political corruption in the context of Pakistan. A combination of these concepts allows me to probe their direct and indirect connections in interpreting the political corruption occurring in Pakistan. My theoretical framework shows how a 'field' of 'the military's political involvement has been created in Pakistan since its creation. How it takes the form of a 'conatus' and perpetuates itself to all spheres of the state. This status of 'conatus' provides ample opportunities for the 'field'

to form groups/networks and indulge in acts of political corruption. However, the power of the field does not let this corruption come to public attention unless there is 'hysteresis' in the field. Political corruption is highlighted in the case of such 'hysteresis effect'; however, the state attempts to mute this cacophony by bringing in its 'social magic' and exonerating all those involved in the corruption scandals. The 'social magic' wins, and everything proves to be a 'partial revolution' in the field. And hence, 'conatus' is achieved again. A diagram explaining these relationships is presented below.

Fig 1



The aims of using this theoretical framework are two-fold. Firstly, it has theoretical aims to interpret political corruption in Pakistan using Bourdieusian concepts. Secondly, it aims to highlight the empirical concerns regarding accounting of the banking organisation in Pakistan, i.e. how both private and state-owned banks use accounting to facilitate state politics. Keeping in view these aims, the over-arching objective of this study is to

understand the role of the banking industry's accounting and internal control systems in contributing or political corruption, as well as the part played by the accountability system in the prevention and correction of such corruption in Pakistan.

## **4. METHODOLOGY**

The previous chapters of this study have described the literature written about corruption giving its historical as well as geographic perspectives. Also a detailed theoretical account of Bourdieusian theoretical concepts has also been described to answer the research questions of this study. However, this chapter elaborates on the research methodology, i.e. explaining the methodological assumptions and methods adopted for this study. Although research 'methodology' is sometimes confused with research 'methods', they are not synonymous (Bryman, 2008). The methodology deals with the philosophical considerations involving the inherent features of reality and how they can be accessed. On the other hand, research methods guide us to recognise our data and in which form it can be accepted and analysed (ibid).

So, this chapter is structured in the following manner. I explain my quest for the data, that is, where my 'data' is and how I can access it in the following two sections explaining ontology (4.1) and epistemology (4.2) of this study. A detailed explication regarding data collection is provided (4.3) by distinguishing between primary and secondary data. And lastly, the techniques used for data analysis (4.4) of this study are explained in detail.

### **4.1 Ontology – What is Reality?**

Ontology is a term derived from the Greek terms 'on', which means 'being', and logos, which means 'theory' (ibid: 25). This means that ontology is associated with the theory of being or theory of reality, i.e. how by making certain presuppositions, we attempt to know what reality is and how it comes into being. The classic study of Burrell and Morgan (1979) guides us to these presuppositions and classifies them into objectivist and subjectivist

assumptions. If the reality that we are going to research exists for us as external, 'out there', then we are termed for having an objectivist ontology. On the other hand, if reality for us is made real by what people do and how others attach 'meanings' to such doings, i.e. how they construct the meanings of others' actions, then we are the ones who hold the subjectivist ontology.

Strictly speaking, whatever social phenomenon we study will depend upon the methodology we choose from these two forms of assumptions. The objectivist assumption would emphasise finding out those structures, regularities, and lawlike generalisations which affect human behaviour in an 'objective' and 'real' way. However, subjectivists or constructivists think another way around. For them, the social phenomenon is a product of time and space, which changes from time to time and varies geographically (Potter, 1996). The interaction of people constructs a phenomenon, and contrary to objectivists, reality comes from the human mind. Hence the researcher attempts to understand the phenomenon by closely looking into people's understandings and experiences relating to the phenomenon, which of course, tend to be subjective.

On the contrary, to some authors, this mandatory divide between objectivism and subjectivism for research is unnecessary. For example, Giddens's (1984) structuration theory argues that both structure (objectivism) and agency (subjectivism) relate to different paradigms. However, at the same time, they are intertwined in such a way that they create conditions for the existence of each other. Their presence is felt in the practice of social actors. It does not prefer one over the other, i.e. structure over agency and vice versa, but it negotiates a rapprochement between the two, thus making the extreme case of divisions between them more or less meaningless. Similarly, for Bourdieu, such division



and favouring one at the cost of the other is not worth it. In 'An Introduction to Reflexive Sociology', Bourdieu states that "objectivism and subjectivism ... structural necessity and individual agency are false antinomies. Each term of these paired opposites reinforces the other; all collude in obfuscating the anthropological truth of human practice. [T]ranscend these dualities [and] ... the resulting social praxeology weaves together a "structuralist" and a "constructivist" approach" ... "structuralist constructivism" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 10-11). It gives birth to intersubjectivity in qualitative research, where objectivism and subjectivism are both considered congruent in understanding the social phenomenon.

Thus, for Cunliffe (2011), objectivism or subjectivism as the only paradigmatic choice no longer holds. He emphasises revising such typology and introducing intersubjectivity into the ontological mix. I also follow the same approach of intersubjectivity. For me, the mediation of structure and agency in intersubjectivity explains reality much better than thinking of it as the construction of consciousness alone or posting it as a self-contained, independent-of-consciousness event. Although it is the ontology of any research which guides one on how to carry out one's research; however, in order to grasp this process in full, i.e. how it happens, it is crucial to understand the second aspect of philosophy in research called epistemology. It is explained next in this section.

#### **4.2 Epistemology - How Can We Know Reality?**

The expression epistemology is also obtained from the ancient Greek language, where 'episteme' means 'knowledge' and logos elucidate 'theory' (Bell, Bryman, and Harley, 2019: 29). In other words, epistemology can be termed as the 'theory of knowledge, i.e. how we know what we know. At its foundation is ontology; for example, whatever

epistemology we intend to have would come from what ontological position we have. It works in this way: if I intend to use objectivism as my ontology, then it automatically means that I believe as a researcher that I can be unbiased and separate from how I do my research. For example, I can stay objective and neutral when applying scientific methods to know nature's intrinsic and hidden structures and laws. These features of epistemology are called positivism (Bell, Bryman, and Harley, 2019).

On the other hand, if I believe that, as a human, I cannot stop myself from having particular likes or dislikes during the research process and if I believe that the nature of natural science is different from social science. In that case, positivistic assumptions are unsuitable for me, and my ontological position is unquestionably subjectivist, whereas my epistemological position is interpretivism (ibid). Unlike positivism, in interpretivism, social actors and researcher share their respective perceptions and interpretations of a 'context', and both strive to understand reality. Again, it is the ontology that enforces epistemology.

As I mentioned earlier, the ontological position of this research is intersubjectivity, which accepts the interplay of objectivism and subjectivism in reality generation; however, the question then arises of what would be my epistemology which could take into account my intersubjective ontology. Alfred Schutz, as quoted in Cunliffe (2011), has done a great deal "to bridge the gap between subjectivism and intersubjectivism" (657). According to Cunliffe, the world is yet another spectacular example of socially constructed intersubjective facts (2011).

Such intersubjectivity becomes part of the cognitive process of the social agents. They, upon interaction with other agents, socially construct it and make it possible for the researcher to theorise the phenomenon at the level of a person, a social agent or

collectively, at the level of a community. He further elaborates on the epistemology of intersubjectivists by stating that "Intersubjective researchers draw on hermeneutic phenomenology, relationally responsive social constructionism,...that is, living utterances and the two-way movement of dialogue between people in particular moments and particular settings, in which meaning emerges in the interaction and struggle of back-and-forth conversation .... They focus on micro-level conversations, relationships, and insights about specific issues, and their research accounts are transitory understandings shaped dialectically between all research participants, particular to a moment but which may offer interpretive insights for others" (Cunliffe, 2011: 658).

In light of this, I have the epistemology of 'hermeneutic phenomenology' (or interpretivism), where a social phenomenon is seen and interpreted from the social actor's point of view (Bell, Bryman, and Harley, 2019). For example, examining the meaning-making process of the social agents, how they sense their environment, and how they interpret it. In other words, this requires the researcher to see, interpret, and explain things from their subject's point of view, also known as double interpretation (ibid). For instance, the researcher interprets the participants' interpretation following an already established theoretical framework or creates a theory out of this interpretation.

That said, after having the epistemology of hermeneutic phenomenology (or interpretivism), my next task was to select particular research methods which could complement my epistemological assumption. Any negligence in this respect, for example, any incongruence between my epistemological assumption and the chosen research method, could weaken the quality of my research findings. And, as a result, undermine the validity of the knowledge I produced. Next, I will explain my journey to collect data

(both primary and secondary), which was interconnected with the guidelines of my epistemological assumptions.

### **4.3 Data Collection**

Coming from the epistemology of hermeneutic phenomenology, I wanted to reach out to the social agents who had been involved in the meaning-making process of political corruption. I was planning semi-structured interviews with my prospective participants who had been involved in the corruption scandals. Who, not to forget, happened to be the ruling elite of the country. Initially, when preparing the list of these prospective participants, I did not know how problematic this data collection phase could become for me. It reminded me of the assertion of Neu et al. (2013: 521) that "corruption by [its] very nature, [is] difficult to study ... the unwillingness of some participants to speak truthfully and completely about their activities" renders the researcher's accomplishment of this task very arduous.

However, they also contended that researchers should still not avoid investigating this parlous topic, as it influences many people's lives in any country. Keeping these golden words in mind, I had to bear all the hurdles I faced during my primary and secondary data collection. I begin with my primary data collection process.

#### **4.3.1 Primary Data**

As mentioned above, the prospective participants of this study I was to interview were going to come from the country's ruling elite, for example, the former army chief, the former head of the intelligence agency, the former prime minister, and other politicians. Apart from those, former judges of the supreme court who had decided the corruption

cases, the lawyers who represented their clients in this regard and political journalists who wrote extensively about the corruption scandals, which were part of this study. Except for the latter, it was challenging to approach all in the first place. I had to go through a lot to chase them to give me one hour from their busy schedules. While a few accepted my request, many declined it after a month-long chase.

I remember one eminent politician who had been considered very close to the former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto and who had been named in one of the corruption scandals for wiping out the corruption evidence from state institutions. His political secretary interviewed me on the phone at least ten times a month, why I wanted to interview his boss. Finally, after 45 days, he said his boss was ready to talk. We exchanged the zoom codes. I joined the zoom room, and the secretary told me to prepare my questions because in 15 minutes, after finishing an interview with Al-Jazeera TV, his boss would be ready to speak with me. For the 11<sup>th</sup> time, he asked me why I was interviewing him so he could inform his boss. I told him the purpose of my study, and after a minute, he got back to me and said that his boss did not want to speak about that, and the zoom invitation was revoked. The boss had cancelled it!

It is only one example. Many other politicians, generals, judges, lawyers, and bureaucrats turned down my requests after keeping me in the loop for several weeks. However, I still managed to interview 45 participants (Annexure A). The difficulties I mentioned at the beginning of this section enabled me not to give in to the pressure of such non-cooperation and led me to think of other ways of knowing about these corruption scandals from the perspective of the relevant people. I started with 15 interviews which enabled me to understand the context of the case more precisely. The knowledge that these

participants had, who saw the power corridors of the country up close and had a close watch on these corruption cases, helped me understand the political and economic context that prevailed during the 80s and 90s in Pakistan. They also recommended that I go through the relevant secondary data sources to strengthen my grip on the case study context.

Since these interviewees were: seasoned financial bureaucrats, judges of the accountability courts and high courts who had decided financial and political corruption cases, military generals, and practising lawyers (handling political corruption for at least 25-30 years), my initial discussions with them proved very fruitful. During these meetings, a participant abruptly demanded that I emphasise the political corruption of one political party (the Asghar Khan case) and ignore the other political party's corruption (which was also committed by the same banker and called the Mehran Bank scandal). Why was that so? It led me to reconsider my case study, which only encompassed the Asghar Khan case earlier, but then I decided to include the Mehran Bank scandal. Although these preliminary interviews were vital for broadening my perspective of the case, I managed to secure 11 interviewees who were either directly involved or had close ties with those directly involved.

Furthermore, 12 interviews were conducted with political journalists who had written extensively about these corruption scandals in national newspapers (this will be discussed later in the secondary data section). Upon the continuous refusal of various key characters in these cases, I carried out the second stage of the fieldwork. I turned to some other politicians, judges, and bureaucrats who were, although not directly involved with the case but had been the contemporaries of these real characters and had

accumulated lots of insights in this regard. Such interviews were seven and corroborated the data I had collected during the first stage of the fieldwork. I would now begin to discuss how I accessed the research participants, what procedure had been followed throughout the interviews and what was my fieldwork site.

#### **4.3.1.1 Fieldwork Site**

Almost all participants I interviewed resided in Lahore, the second-largest city in Pakistan. The city was chosen because of my convenience i.e. I also hailed from the same city. Two participants belonged to Karachi, the largest city in the country and 750 miles away from Lahore; they were interviewed via Zoom and WhatsApp. Similarly, three participants hailed from Islamabad (the capital city and 250 miles away from Lahore), so Skype video calls helped me for those interviews. Similarly, a former governor of the state bank of Pakistan was interviewed via email because he had moved to the USA permanently.

Apart from that, all interviews were conducted face-to-face. One round of interviews was carried out from October 2019 to March 2020 (thirty eight interviews were conducted during pre-covid days), while the other round was done in December 2020, which involved seven interviews. However, the question persists, how I managed to have access to such people who had been part of the ruling elite of Pakistan? And the answer is that it is the excellent help of my colleagues at the university in Lahore where I teach. They arranged such meetings for me and gave my prospective participants a reference which led them to rely on me and share their experiences with me. In many cases, the snowballing led me to the new participants. However, when the prospective participant refused to give time, I reverted to the old participants. I requested them to arrange a new meeting with

another participant whose name would be suggested by them, or my research would require their interview.

#### **4.3.1.2 Access to the Participants**

As already mentioned, the prime source of my contact with the prospective participants was my colleagues at the university in Lahore, where I teach. However, the communication medium was either WhatsApp chat or text messages (in case they did not have WhatsApp). I would inform the prospective participant that 'I was contacting them with reference to Mr/Miss ["contact's name"] and I intended to interview them for the purpose of my PhD thesis. For some replies, I had to wait for days and remind them again and again from time to time. For some, there would be instant refusal. However, in some cases, positive responses also came. As the nature of the topic was quite sensitive, I could understand the nature of such responses.

However, the more refusals and fewer acceptances kept me on my toes to access more and more of these top-notch people who had either been directly involved with the cases or were the contemporaries of those directly involved and had great insights about these scandals. This alternate strategy worked. Those former high-ups who had worked with the real characters of the cases knew the political corruption cases well and were less reluctant to share their feelings regarding the power games played in the country. They provided information that was not usually covered in the press in Pakistan.

The politician participants in this study included Pakistan's former ambassador to the USA and former defence, foreign, information, and finance ministers who had been associated with the political parties at the forefront of these corruption scandals. One of these



politicians was directly involved in the bribe-taking scandal and had openly talked about the process of political corruption and bribe-taking practices of the politicians. However, when I turned the table and asked them about the specifics of the Asghar Khan case, their discomfort became quite prominent, and they concluded the interview within the next ten minutes. However, the other politicians were quite open to discussing political corruption, how bribe-taking from the military was a norm in Pakistan, and how they could not survive without it. For some, it was the endorsement of the international establishment which facilitated such corruption in the developing world to facilitate their international agendas.

I also tried to approach the former judges of the supreme court who had decided on one of the corruption cases in 2012 (Asghar Khan case). Upon my initial contact, one of the three judges was kind enough to call me to his office for the interview. However, after hearing the full context of my thesis, which involved discussing the case he decided on, he refused to give the interview. So I had to come back without his interview. I also approached the other two judges by phone; one was in Karachi, and the other was in Islamabad. However, they both refused to speak on the pretext that judges do not speak about their judgments. So I turned to those retired judges of the high court and the accountability courts who had decided the political corruption cases in the country, knew how this political corruption system worked, and how the judiciary had been pressurised in the country to make favourable decisions. The purpose of moving on to these other judges was to know the interpretations and social constructions of these state officials who had seen the system of political corruption closely in the country and knew how its mechanics operated on the state officials.

Similarly, the respondents, the petitioner's lawyers, and the former attorney general of Pakistan were also contacted. Some of them, as usual, refused to speak on the ground that the information belonged to their clients and would not like to share it with me. For some, the matter was still sub judice, so they declined to comment. However, the former attorney general of Pakistan, who had represented the state in this case, became willing to speak and was very kind to give me his time for the interview. Similarly, a former lawyer of one of the respondents also spoke via Skype and shared his thoughts about the case. Another lawyer, who had represented his client in this case, got so angry during the interview that he refused to speak and asked me to leave his office. He insisted why I was interested in this corruption case and I must have a hidden agenda. So I had to turn to the other lawyers who knew about this corruption case and who had dealt with corruption cases in Pakistan.

Likewise, the retired financial bureaucrats were open to discussing their experiences and cases of political corruption with which this thesis dealt. Some of them had personally met with the fraudster former bureaucrat Yunus Habib, whose corrupt banking practices were infamous in banking circles. A former state bank governor, a participant in this study, was interviewed via email and pointed me to the material, which was extremely helpful for this study.

Similarly, a former president of the state-owned commercial bank, another participant of this study, revealed he was approached by the former head of the intelligence agency to help him get back their deposit from the defunct Mehran Bank. As he had personal contact with the bank's Chief Operating Officer, Yunus Habib, he planned to recover that amount from his bank.

Also, another retired bureaucrat who had served as the chairman of the Pakistan Banking Council (a body to oversee banking operations) shared his views about the corruption committed by Yunus Habib. He explained that he had seen the reports of the inquiry commission, which investigated the Mehran Bank and whose report was never made public, citing danger to the grave national interest.

Furthermore, I contacted some retired military chiefs, who never replied to my WhatsApp messages or politely refused to speak on the issue. I then contacted some three-star retired generals (Senior Commanders) to have a discussion; however, their acceptance proved very informative for my study. They had also represented the state in their political and diplomatic offices besides serving in the military. One of the generals I spoke with via skype had been indicted by the supreme court and had been directly involved with the Asghar Khan case. He discussed the details of the case and his disappointment with the country's judicial system, which prevented him from filing a review petition against this decision. The other retired generals also explained their views on the country's political setup and how the political bribery culture had wreaked havoc on state institutions.

Lastly, political journalists were the only participants who were very open in their discussions. These journalists were carefully chosen based on their writings on these corruption cases. One of the political journalists named in this case for accepting bribery was also contacted, who graciously accepted my request for the interview. Although he denied accepting money from the banker, he admitted that he was friends with Yunus Habib and once complained to him about why he took his name to the supreme court. He also expressed his candid views about these corruption scandals. One of the renowned journalists, and a participant in this study, claimed that a former prime minister of Pakistan

and an accused of bribe-taking in the Asghar Khan case admitted to him during an informal dinner that he had taken money from the military. However, the same politician had denied this allegation publicly.

Although, as discussed earlier, accessing participants of this study had been very challenging for this study. The topic's sensitivity, the higher positions of those involved, and the status of one corruption scandal being sub judice while the proclamation of the other as a national secret made the primary data collection a herculean task. However, I tried my best to bring these long-time buried scandals to light through my interview with the participants of this study. I also need to discuss the interview procedure followed during the data collection stage, which is provided next in this section.

#### **4.3.1.3 Interview Procedure**

Once a participant showed their willingness to be part of this study, I asked them about the venue of their choice. For example, was it convenient for them to meet in their house or office (before covid), or which online medium suited them the most (during covid)? Their choice was given preference, and most of the participants invited me to their house for the interview. It saved them from the worries of being overheard, and they felt more confident about what they were saying.

So after obtaining their willingness, I provided them with the participation information sheet and participant consent form (attached as appendices B and C). In case of face-to-face interviews, these were brought to the venue and duly discussed before the meeting, and in case of online interviews were emailed to them. The consent form (Annexure B) was signed by the participants after the interviews and retained by me as proof for the

interviews. These documents were approved by the University of Essex ethics committee and informed the prospective participants of their rights. For example, the participant information sheet (Annexure C) stated that if they were not satisfied or had any concerns about any aspect of the process, including how they were treated during the interview, they could inform my supervisor or contact the university staff in the emails provided at the end. I had communicated to them in advance that interview would last approximately one hour, and they could ask me any questions that may arise in their mind at any time during our interview.

All interviews were recorded, and participants were informed about these recordings in advance. Almost all participants consented to record these interviews, except four participants who felt uncomfortable with this idea and preferred me to take notes during our conversations. I transcribed my discussions with them right after the interviews, so I did not skip any details in this regard. The recorded interviews were mainly conducted in the local language, i.e. Urdu and were subsequently transcribed by me in English. I transcribed these interviews personally because I did not want to risk using someone else who might have their own biases in the process of translation. Also, I knew the context and environment of the interview better, so I felt more comfortable transcribing these interviews from Urdu to English. This transcription of all the semi-structured interviews made a full-fledged document of the primary data, which was compared for its correspondence with the secondary data, which will be discussed shortly after the ethical considerations have been explained.

#### 4.3.1.4 Ethical Considerations

Ethical concerns relating to this research arose on various occasions mainly due to the topic of this thesis which involved criticising the political system of the country as well as its judicial system. It was not easy for many of the participants to quell their reservations and speak candidly about the topic. For some participants, it was suspected that I could be a ploy for them, a secret agent, getting to know their thoughts about the military's political interferences. However, my referees came to rescue me in this regard. They assured them that I was a genuine PhD student at the University of Essex and affiliated with a prestigious university in Lahore as its faculty member; and that the purpose of this study was academic, nothing more than nothing less. It seemed to have worked for them, and they happily engaged with this study.

However, many prospective participants still were not convinced to talk about the corruption allegations against them or their political leaders. For some, it could fetch legal repercussions even if I had assured them anonymity. Probably trusting a stranger was becoming a precarious issue here, and even my referees could not convince them. However, I had to respect their privacy and right to make choices, which is why I had to change the course of my study. For example, in addition to meeting with some of the actual characters, I had to look out for their contemporaries to understand more about these political and financial corruption scandals.

All participants of this study wanted to ensure that their names would never appear in the dissertation or anywhere else relating to what they had contributed to this study. And I assured them that their names would be anonymised. The information collected from them would be kept securely while any of the identifying details if found, would not be

used in the thesis. All this was done in accordance with the ethical approval requirements of the Ethics Committee at the University of Essex.

#### **4.3.2 Secondary Data**

Secondary data, no doubt, had been very significant in understanding the context of this study. Some of the secondary data were recommended by the participants of this study; however, I also managed to collect certain books, political magazines, newspapers, and a compilation of political talk shows where discussions had taken place regarding these two corruption scandals.

Besides that, I obtained a copy of the discussion in the parliament, where these scandals were discussed in June 1996. The election commission's commentary on the conduct of the 1990 election, which had been massively rigged. The political funding rules established by the election commission of Pakistan. The judgment of the Asghar Khan case; Mehran Bank Scandal report prepared by the State Bank of Pakistan; a leaked FIA report on the Mehran Bank Scandal published in a political magazine, The Herald, April 1994 issue. The IMF report on Pakistan's banking sector regarding the 90's political era, Habib Bank's financial statements of 1990 when the ruling elite plundered the bank, and how it was covered up in those financial statements. Below is a brief description of the process of acquiring the secondary data.

In the judgement of the Asghar Khan case, it is mentioned that it was 11<sup>th</sup> June 1996 when the then interior minister broke the news on the floor of the parliament that he had a piece of confirmed news regarding the rigging of 1990 elections as well as bribing of the politicians by the military establishment. The news appeared in the newspapers on

12<sup>th</sup> June 1996. Getting hold of these old newspapers was challenging; even the web portals did not carry such old archives. Luckily, I found in my university's library in Pakistan the archives of two newspapers, Dawn, and Business Recorder, preserved from 1990. I took photos of all the relevant editorials and news items reported between June 1996 and June 1997, after which the reporting of this scandal started to die.

Similarly, the newspaper reports regarding the Mehran Bank scandal also started to emerge on 21<sup>st</sup> April 1994 and continued until December 1994, from which I took pictures of the relevant news items. During this archival research, I also found an advertisement for a political magazine, The Herald, which was doing a cover story of the leaked investigation report of the FIA regarding the Mehran Bank scandal, this could have been very crucial for me, but it was relating to April 1994. I contacted the magazine's office at the given contact numbers, but I found that that magazine had been closed down, and it was impossible to get its older issues in 2021. I called the parent organisation of The Herald magazine, i.e. Dawn newspaper and requested its resident editor in Lahore to arrange that particular copy for my thesis. He was kind enough to consider my request and arranged a copy from the Karachi office of the disbanded magazine. This investigation report of the FIA proved very useful for my understanding of the gory details of the corrupt transactions used by the country's corrupt elite.

Besides this, the Asghar Khan case of political corruption started to appear in the news again when in 2012, the supreme court announced to hear it. I followed the web archives of two widely read newspapers, Dawn, and The News, from March 2012 by using the search term "Asghar Khan Case". These papers provided me with results about case hearings, its decision in October 2012, and the non-implementation of the case until 2019,



after which it started to disappear from the news coverage. I saved all the copies of these online articles.

Similarly, on the recommendation of the former governor of the state bank of Pakistan, I contacted the librarian of the state bank of Pakistan. I got hold of the history of the state bank of Pakistan's volume relating to the political era of 1988 to 2003. It covered all the prominent banking scandals of the country with a detailed discussion of the political involvement in the banking industry. It also cited the IMF report of 1990 relating to the banking sector of the country (I also got that report from the website of the IMF), which discussed the political influence on the banks and siphoning off of the state's money into private pockets. I also got the financial statements of Habib Bank from the archives of the state bank of Pakistan. However, when I requested the librarian to send me the financial statements of the Mehran Bank, the second case study of this thesis, he refused to do so, citing his inability to find such an old record of a defunct bank.

Besides these, I also searched in the University of Essex's library online ProQuest database to get international coverage of such scandals. The search terms involved the Asghar Khan case and Mehran Bank scandal, and the news articles reported in the Guardian, the Observer, and the Washington Post were downloaded from ProQuest. All these extensive resources of primary and secondary data were then analysed, and that procedure is discussed in the next section.

#### **4.4 Data Analysis**

According to Corbin and Strauss (2008), a researcher cannot carry on with the data collection forever, and eventually, *something* is needed to make the data consequential

and distinctive. This *something* for them is called data analysis. "Data analysis involves examining a substance [data] and its components in order to determine their properties and functions, then using the acquired knowledge to make inferences about the whole" (ibid: 45). In this part, those analytical tools are discussed, which facilitated the data analysis of this thesis.

#### **4.4.1 It Started with the First Interview**

The data analysis for this thesis started immediately after recording my interview with this study's first participant. I listened to the audiotapes of the interviews before their transcription. I made observational notes regarding those critical points that needed to be stressed later. And later, the transcription of the data by myself made me know it better and keep abreast of its nuances. The initial analysis (reading, listening, and taking observational notes) continued until all interviews were transcribed verbatim. However, I stopped when I wrote memos about what I heard and read in my data. These memos (Miles and Huberman, 1994) helped me view the data in provisional/exploratory relationships, codes, and themes, stimulating my analytic insights.

As qualitative data analysis is a continuous backwards and forward movement between theoretical framework and data (ibid), these memos helped immensely in my data analysis especially as my understanding of the Bourdieusian theoretical concepts matured over time. For instance, initially, I analysed all my data based on the three Bourdieusian concepts, such as field, habitus, and capital. However, with time, as I read more about Bourdieu's other concepts, for example, conatus, sufferings, and hysteresis, I started to incorporate those concepts into my data analysis as well. Hence, new memos were written about my revised understanding of the theory and the data.

At this point, I had memos written based on various Bourdieusian theoretical constructs, comparing the views of various participants from different fields. For instance, an instance has been quoted in the discussion chapter as well, how the military dictatorship period of General Ayub Khan has been viewed differently by a retired military general and a civilian bureaucrat participant in this study. In these memos, I was using different codes and themes, depending upon the maturity of my understanding of the Bourdieusian concepts, as already mentioned. The coding and thematic analysis processes are described below, distinguished as first-cycle and second-cycle coding (Miles, Huberman, Saldana, 2020).

#### **4.4.2 First Cycle Coding**

Codes are the labels attached to the chunks of the data obtained/compiled during a study, assigning meaning to that chunk (Maxwell, 2005). Hence, the coding aims to analyse the data based on the researcher's own contention/perception about the data. It transforms the data from its original condition to the one how its analyst views it. Similarly, "the portion of data coded during the first cycle coding process can range in magnitude from a single word to a full paragraph ..." (Miles, Huberman, Saldana, 2020: 63).

For this thesis, I used the Bourdieusian constructs as a priori codes, and all the relevant paragraphs/partial paragraphs were clustered into them as 'codes'. For instance, in the case of the Bourdieusian construct, 'sufferings,' I looked for passages in my data that best described the state of suffering of the baking organisations' accounting and internal control systems. Then to those passages, I assigned my codes (shown in Table 4.1).

Table 4.1

A priori Codes	Data Extracts	My Codes
Sufferings		
	"Because banks are not independent on their own, they [military] have controls over the banks [too]. Actually, where the power lies? Ultimately, it lies with them [military] ...(Lawyer 3)	Subjugation
	"Look, whenever [external] pressure comes, it comes at a higher level, at the board of directors level. It is where the policy decisions are tweaked then ..." (Bureaucrat 6)	Policies squeezed
	"Controls are only for low levels, but if you receive a command from a high level that lets this thing happen, then controls do nothing there ..." (Judge 5)	Accounting controls are helpless here.

#### 4.4.3 Second Cycle Coding

First cycle coding, as shown above, reflects how data is summarised into various smaller segments. All relevant portions of the data are clustered in their relevant a priori codes, and then codes are assigned to them to shorten the data. This compressed/coded data is then analysed in the form of the second cycle of coding, and themes are extracted. Although the data for the second cycle coding comes only from the first cycle coding, it helps to figure out the bigger picture perpetrated by the first cycle coding. For example, for this study, the cluster of codes formed in the above table is then given a theme which unifies them. This theme is reflected in table 4.2.

Table 4.2

<b>My Codes</b>	<b>Theme</b>
Subjugation	Controls are Meaningless at the Top
Policies squeezed	
Accounting controls are helpless here.	

It is essential to mention that the results of the first and second cycle coding reflect the "interpretive act" (Miles, Huberman, Saldana, 2020: 83) of a particular person's analytical approach. If another person sees this data, they might have arrived at different codes and themes altogether (ibid). It is in line with the interpretivist epistemology of this thesis. Accordingly, we know about the social world through interpretations and understandings of social actors' meanings of their actions.

#### **4.4.4 Steps for Quality**

Although connotations of validity and reliability are essential parameters for considering quality in any research, many qualitative researchers do not agree to use such terms (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; Bell, Bryman, and Harley, 2019). For instance, Corbin and Strauss (2008) "[they] do not feel comfortable using the terms "validity" and "reliability" when discussing qualitative research. These terms [according to them] carry with them too many quantitative implications" (301).

Despite this criticism, specific reliability measures have been deemed appropriate and emphasise the questions of accuracy in qualitative studies, although in a different way (Mason, 1996). A critical aspect in this regard is that the data generation should be careful and honest, and it must satisfy you and others that it has not been invented (ibid). In order

to meet this quality criterion, I audio-recorded all the interview conversations. As soon as I finished the transcription of the interviews, I sent a copy to my supervisors so that later when I use these chunks for my data analysis, they can authenticate such analysis from those files.

Similarly, according to Bell, Bryman, and Harley (2019) authenticity of the data requires the qualitative researchers to represent different viewpoints in their data. The same has been practised in this study. I have considered it my responsibility to include the viewpoints of those dissenting voices in my data required for the credibility of the phenomenon. Furthermore, I have provided examples of my data analysis in this thesis, i.e. what bases are used and how the data is analysed to bring more evidence to the readers and why they should consider my work reliable and accurate.

Lastly, although it is believed that triangulation reduces many biases in the research methods, it is not accurate to state that it automatically increases validity (Maxwell, 2005). However, what is recommended is the identification of the fallibility in certain research methods or data, for example, what unique bias or chance of an error is present which needs to be rectified (*ibid*). For this thesis, I also encountered a situation when I doubted the response of one of the participants. For example, a participant's contention regarding political corruption in Pakistan's banking systems and the writing off of loans percentage when found doubtful, I double-checked it with the IMF's country report regarding Pakistan. So information was included in the data analysis after due verification from the IMF report was attained.

#### **4.4.5 Operationalising Bourdieu**

Bourdieu's methodology, he argued, involved the pre-eminence of relations. At the same time, other alternatives, such as structure or agency, indicated a common-sense worldview of the social reality that must be avoided ( Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). He advises the researchers to use critical thinking and bring novice ideas of social practices to light. "The power of a mode of thinking never manifests itself more clearly than its capacity to ... approach a major socially significant object from an unexpected angle" (ibid: 221).

It required connecting the research object (the empirical) with a framework (the theoretical), for instance, connecting the abstract issues of the society with the thinking tools of the philosophers and turning them into scientific problems, hence, turning "theory of practice" into "theory of research practice" (Grenfell, 2014: 213). The methodology that Bourdieu prescribed included the construction of the research object and field analysis (ibid), and both were also applied to this study.

##### **4.4.5.1 The Construction of the Research Object**

In order to construct a research object, Bourdieu (1992) advises the researchers to use 'words' to describe their research object very cautiously. For example, he signifies the importance of the formation of words, which he argues, although it seems value-neutral, might be subject to some biases, cultural differences, and time-bound perceptions that have remained part of that word since its inception. In this way, a mere repetition of that 'word' in the research object can also continue using that historicisation as part of the

research process. It makes constructing the research object a very challenging aspect of the research methodology.

For this study, the construction of the research object took place during my PhD. It started with my aim to study the military's involvement in the politics of Pakistan and its overarching role in influencing the state-owned institutions' accounting and internal control systems. However, with time, after reading Bourdieu thoroughly and collecting data, my study's focus changed from my earlier aim to a broader focus involving the word 'corruption' itself. For example, what was corruption, and how, in the context that I was going to study, was it different from corruption occurrences in the rest of the world? What happens when corruption is studied as a 'field' (a Bourdieusian term)?

The case studies (Asghar Khan case and Mehran Bank scandal) used in this thesis led to the breaking out of Pakistan's most prominent political corruption scandals (Bakhtiar, 1994). The aftermath of these cases reflected that, as in the past (details in chapter 5), the wider the net was cast, the better these corruption scandals remained undetected and unpunished in Pakistan. For example, a Milito-judicio-politico nexus would ensure monetary benefits and pave the way for lenient investigations and judicial comforts. However, the state institutions' inability to bring the ruling elite to justice continues to corrode the accounting control systems of the banking companies as well as the accountability system of Pakistan.

Similarly, my meetings with the participants of this study and those who were reluctant to become part of this study opened different avenues for me to view these case studies from various angles. For instance, the non-cooperation of many of the real characters of these case studies changed my approach from an in-depth analysis of these corruption



cases to a more context-based study. I studied the context in detail to determine why it produced corruption cases.

Although a casual gaze at such case studies and the secondary data would have shown that political corruption was a severe offence in Pakistan, a deep Bourdieusian analysis revealed that political corruption had started to be celebratized in the country. Any attempt to undermine its influence was made a partial revolution in the field, preventing it from total revolution because it served the establishment's vested interests. The social magic of the field of corruption does its magic in the respective fields of the agents, i.e. politics, bureaucracy, and state institutions. This approach helped me in examining political corruption as a field itself. The case studies were to discover the field's boundaries. However, after constructing the research object, I conducted a field analysis.

#### **4.4.5.2 Field Analysis**

In 'An introduction to reflexive sociology', Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) explained the three-level field analysis where the field's relationship with the field of power is assessed at the first level. At level two, the field's topography is looked into, i.e. positions of the dominant and the dominated, which reflects the ownership of capital of the agents. The third level assesses the habitus of the individuals, i.e. how it connects them with the field. According to Grenfell (2014), Bourdieu begins his field analysis with the first level mentioned above and then moves down to levels two and three in the same sequence mentioned above. However, for some researchers in social science, this analysis could also be carried out in reverse order, i.e. from level three to one. However, Grenfell contends, "this often overlooks both the "mapping" of any given field and its constitution

in terms of relations to the field of power; mapping, that is, in the form of actual structural positioning" (ibid: 227).

Similarly, political corruption, as already mentioned, for this study had been studied as a 'field' whose boundaries were assessed, and a full-scale field analysis was performed. This field analysis followed Bourdieu's footsteps and began with the relationship of the field (of corruption) with the field of power (the establishment of the country), how one created the other and then how the other, in turn, impacted the field agents. It became evident from the responses of many participants that the country's ruling elite had used political corruption as its tool to run the country's state of affairs. The field was created right after Pakistan's independence and provided a particular narrative to the masses, i.e. how political corruption of the politicians needed to be countered by the military. However, success to this narrative could not have succeeded if it had not acquired the support of the other power fields, such as the fields of politics, bureaucracy, and the judiciary.

In the second level, the analysis shifts to the field agents, i.e. the relation between the field and its agents. It reflects the acquisition of capital, positions in the field, and competition for domination based on capital value. Data collected during my fieldwork was utilised to identify the relations between participants of the 'corruption field'. These participants explained the lack of value of political and cultural capital and the increased value of the military's cultural capital, which was exchanged in the field and facilitated the military into political affairs and increased the stature of those politicians whose reputation was already dwindling in the people's eyes. Hence, the field of corruption became a place for mediation and exchange of capital for state actors to shape the state in a form distinct from many other states.

At the third level, Bourdieu emphasised investigating the habitus of the social agents occupying the field (1977), how they developed their dispositions, how they understood their positions in the field and how the field members internalised the whole mechanism of the field. It was vital to look into their background and trajectory.

For this purpose, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the participants of this study who belonged to the field of power at some point in their career trajectory. These interviews aimed to assess the habitus of those who had been part of the field of power. And how they viewed the phenomenon of corruption surrounding the places where they had operated. The questions to the participants revolved around their knowledge of the famous Asghar Khan case and the Mehran Bank scandal. What role did they play in these scandals (in case of their direct involvement), and what did they know about them (which involved their peers in the establishment)? What role was played by the military's dominant habitus and the money-grubbing habitus of the politicians, as well as how the promotions-and-benefits-hungry bureaucrats mediated this link. The next chapter answers these questions.

## **5 CONTEXT ANALYSIS**

This chapter describes the context in which the case studies of this thesis were developed. For instance, how during the initial days of its independence, the failure of its political class turned the entire Pakistani political system to look toward its powerful military and changed its political dynamics forever. This context is viewed through the Bourdieusian lens, especially with reference to his theoretical construct 'field' (Bourdieu, 1977). This chapter discusses how a field of military's political interference was established (5.1) right after Pakistan's independence in 1947 and how the entry requirements (5.2) were set up for the participants, using a particular capital and habitus to gain dominance in the field. And in order to prolong its duration and widen its influence, how the boundaries of the field (5.3) were extended. All this is discussed next.

### **5.1 Emergence of a Field**

This chapter digs up the process of Pakistan's military's ascension into politics, a field that was created during the early days of Pakistan's independence in 1947. As Bourdieu states, it is the field in which field agents evolve, and it is the field which gives them a particular vision of the world (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Similarly, regarding the field of military's political interference/intervention (MPI), a precedent was set during those early days of independence which became an uphill task for all the subsequent civilian governments to reverse. However, the process of MPI field creation also included an important role of the political, bureaucratic, and judicial officials whose role cannot be omitted in this regard. All this is discussed in this chapter.

It was difficult for the newly independent Pakistan to look towards a reliable political setup in the country because the founder of Pakistan, who led the entire movement of independence from the front and became the first Governor-General, died within thirteen months of the independence (Mahmood, 2000). It caused a tremendous political vacuum in the early days of Pakistan. The occupant of the Governor-General office was appointed by the British Monarch, whose authority could not be challenged in Pakistani courts. This highest office after the death of the first Governor-General was later filled by military generals and top civilian bureaucrats (ibid). However, the office became highly controversial with time. Two Governors-General [Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza] from 1953 to 1958 sent six prime ministers home within five years (Waseem, 2006). Hence, the first constitution of Pakistan in 1956 had tacitly imbibed the role of a Prime Minister as a weak officeholder in Pakistan's parliamentary system – a system which Pakistan's powerful establishment never valued. "In the establishment's view, parliamentarianism was a curse on the country's destiny, which held back its development and security. Therefore, it had to go" (ibid: 108).

The main reason for this coming and going of prime ministers had been a tug of war between East and West Pakistan's politicians. Those hailing from East Pakistan demanded more resources from the national exchequer for being the majority population. In contrast, the political elite of West Pakistan was not ready to lose its tight grip on the system – a system mainly controlled by the military. Hence, the struggle between the dominant and the dominated had turned the entire political system so tyrannical and demeaning for the politicians that every political action taken by the military was evidence of the power imbalance and the site of power games (Bourdieu, 2005).

For instance, in 1954, Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly citing rising political corruption among the politicians. For McGrath (1996), "it was necessary for Ghulam Muhammad to convince the public that the politicians of the Assembly had failed in their task. ... To Ghulam Muhammad, demeaning politicians was an easy game to play" (218). Thus a new Constituent Assembly came into being in 1955 with two unique features.

Firstly, the majority of East Pakistan's population (slightly above 40 million) was equalised with the minority of West Pakistan's population (slightly above 30 million), i.e. both were given the status of one unit each so that equal members could be elected from each unit. It was claimed to have achieved parity, but in reality, it was an attempt to usurp East Pakistan's majority.

Secondly, the cabinet of the Prime Minister included serving military chief General Ayub Khan as the defence minister, whereas General (R) Iskandar Mirza was the interior minister. However, for many, the dissolution of the first assembly and the formation of a new assembly with military generals forming part thereof was nothing but a deliberate act of the military to become part of the cabinet and begin its political journey more openly. For example, Feldman (1967) asserted, "from all accounts available, it seems clear that Ghulam Muhammad's plan to dismiss the Constituent Assembly once and for all and to start again was worked out with General Ayub's prior knowledge ... The presence of General Ayub in the cabinet was intimation enough" (41).

The dominion of Pakistan was transformed into a republic in 1956. The position of Governor-General was abolished, and General (R) Iskandar Mirza ( who was appointed interior minister in 1955) became the first president of the country (Callard,1957).

Upon becoming the first President, Iskandar Mirza gave the idea of 'controlled democracy' for Pakistan because the country, according to him, was not ready for a full-fledged democratic system. He went on to say that "masses of this country are overwhelmingly illiterate. They are not interested in politics. They are bound to act foolishly sometimes ... it was thus necessary, in fact essential, that there should be somebody to rectify their blunder. ... people of this country need controlled democracy for some time to come" (ibid: 142). The general was establishing the doxa (Bourdieu, 1977) of the MPI field.

However, the protests of the politicians and the general public started in East Pakistan regarding the constituents of the second Constituent Assembly<sup>1</sup>, especially the military generals. They protested against parity and demanded more political representation in the central government, causing more tensions in the state. On 7<sup>th</sup> October 1958, it was announced by President Iskandar Mirza that the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan had been revoked, no political activities were allowed, and the military would run the country under martial law. General Ayub Khan, the defence minister, became the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Upon giving his first speech, General Ayub said that the state of affairs of the country regarding security was not adequately addressed by the legislature, which is why the military had to intervene. For him, the deteriorating situation of the law and order where people were protesting to get their political and legal rights was all because of a lenient political system called 'democracy'. He vowed that he would give this country "democracy of a type that people could understand" (Aziz, 2008: 63). The doxa set by a retired military general was now reproduced by a serving military general.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: <https://na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=75>

The martial law of General Ayub continued for ten years, and it was this time that the military made its presence felt in every nook and corner of the state. General Ayub even founded his political party and elected himself the country's President. He gave the country his own formulated constitution in 1962, the second constitution, which was all about strengthening the President's office in Pakistan. This constitution had peculiarities, especially regarding strengthening the military's political role.

“Unfortunately, there was no way to enter the Ayub’s system available to politicians belonging to the major political parties, especially for those from East Pakistan and smaller provinces of West Pakistan” (Waseem, 2006: 110). This era of dictatorship has been explained by the two participants of this study in a very contradictory manner. For Bourdieu, players in the field confront one another intensely insofar as they believe in the doxa and stakes of the game (Bourdieu, 1990). For example, a retired military general stated:

“General Ayub Khan’s time is still being referred to as the golden period of Pakistan. People generally think that the economic progress, national stability, and much better standards of governance were achieved in that time” (General 1).

Whereas a retired civil bureaucrat criticised that political era:

“ ...that golden era of General Ayub Khan had poor public service governance model. Therefore, the majority in East Pakistan, later on, found that this ten-year period widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few ... giving land and permit to do businesses to a select few. Everything was highly controlled even exports were controlled and only allowed through permits [which were granted to those who supported him]” (Bureaucrat 3).



For Bourdieu, the dominant always uses the field to their advantage, but they also have to face resistance from the dominated (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1998). Although General Ayub was also using the political system in his favour, a full-blown war that started with India in 1965 over the issue of Kashmir burdened the economy manifold and increased poverty so much that it led to protests against General Ayub Khan to resign. Especially in East Pakistan, where the civil unrest seemed unable to control by the general. It was 1969 when Ayub Khan wrote a letter to the then Chief of Army Staff, General Yahya Khan, to take over the country as the situation was going out of control for his government to handle.

In 1969, General Yahya Khan imposed second martial law in the country. He abrogated the second constitution given by General Ayub Khan in 1962, and once again, a General dissolved the parliament in the country. However, by the time General Yahya Khan took control of the country, the gulf between East and West Pakistan had gone so vast, and the resistance from the dominated had become so strong that it was impossible to keep them united. A veteran politician and lawyer participant in this study revealed:

“After General Ayub, the elections took place in 1970, which were fair, but no one was ready to accept their outcome in West Pakistan. The power transfer should have been done according to the people's verdict, but then conditions started to pop up from the military. For example, 'I' should be made the President, and if 'we' [military] make you the prime minister, then you will do the things which 'we' tell you. But then these conditions did not go down well with the politicians of East Pakistan, and they said you had already not given us our rights; you kept us politically backward. You did not give us our constitutional rights, so what you want us to do will not happen. You cannot play with us anymore, so transfer the power to us. We are not going to accept any sharing of power formula with you ...

... but our military did not let it happen, and in the end, broke up the country ... it was the most shocking moment of our lives when they [East Pakistan] broke their alliance with Pakistan and declared their independence. We had seen East and West Pakistan since our childhood. Our military establishment broke it apart but never transferred the power" (Lawyer 3).

East Pakistan gave itself a new name, Bangladesh, and a full-scale liberation movement started there with India's cooperation, which later turned into India Pakistan's third war of 1971. This war resulted in the formation of Bangladesh as an independent country. A considerable number of people lost their lives, ninety thousand West Pakistan's military soldiers and civilians, were made prisoners of war, and India captured several thousand square kilometres of West Pakistan (Gohar, 1993). The military gave away half of the country but not the slightest of its political ambitions were taken away by anyone during this time. The objective relations in the field, the power games, and the power imbalances had turned the field of MPI into a place of violence and suffering (Bourdieu 2005: 140).

The field of MPI has constantly been working to appropriate the political dominance in the politics of Pakistan. However, as earlier stated, it also had to encounter the unwillingness of those it dominated (Bourdieu, 1998). The setback military received in 1971 tarnished its reputation massively. It was high time for the country's political elite to reinforce parliamentary supremacy in Pakistan. The field, a place of constant struggles, was now allowing the agents to appropriate the "specific products at stake in the game" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97).

So, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the founder of the Pakistan People's Party, whose party in the 1970 elections took the highest seats in West Pakistan, got this opportunity and took control of the country. "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was temporarily successful in asserting the

primacy of civilian government. He enjoyed popular support in the early stages of his government while the military's reputation had declined dramatically owing to the East Pakistan debacle. He retired 43 senior military officers in the first four months of his rule, brought about several changes in the military's command structure, and introduced specific clauses in the 1973 Constitution [the third constitution of Pakistan] to restrict the military to its conventional role" (Rizvi, 1991: 110). For Bourdieu, struggle within the fields, especially within fields of power, requires players to increase their capital's value. For instance, they make strategies to discredit the capital on which their opponent's strength depends while ascribing value to the capital owned by them (Bourdieu, 1986).

In short, if General Ayub and General Yahya's rule signified presidentialism, the rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was nothing short of parliamentarianism, where all political decisions were now being made by the chief executive, a powerful Prime Minister. Bhutto, although a democrat, started to induct his loyalists into the key government positions and turned the state structure into an individualised one where his recruits would strengthen his personalised chain of command rather than consolidate the writ of the state institutions (Zahoor, 2017). He even formed a specialised federal security force which would bypass all existing security agencies and work under the Prime Minister's direct control, take his agenda forward, and even inculcate fear among his opponents (ibid). At this time, Pakistan's premier intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was also formed. Its prime job was to manipulate politics in the country for the benefit of the Prime Minister. However, the continuing supremacy of the politicians over the military was certainly not going down very well with those institutions who earlier had been the movers and shakers of the political system of Pakistan. All they were doing was waiting for the right time and

the right mistake, which, if committed by Bhutto, would give them a chance to take over the country again. Moreover, Bhutto did not take long to provide them with this opportunity.

The continuing downward spiral of the economy started creating resentment among the public. However, the historic success of Bhutto in the elections of 1977 caused a stir among the opposition-led Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which declared the results of those elections as rigged. The protests started all over Pakistan, and the PNA members publicly stated that they would not challenge the validity of martial law if it were imposed at that very moment in time (RIZVI, 1991).

In other words, politicians were openly calling for the military to come and intervene in the political process. However, for some, the PNA was sponsored by the military, which only made way for the military takeover (Zahoor, 2017). MPI field, which had been inactive for some time, got rejuvenated again. On 5<sup>th</sup> July 1977, the then Chief of Army Staff, General Zia ul Haq, imposed the third martial law in the country, suspended the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, banned all political activities, and hanged Bhutto in 1978 on [fake] charges of murdering his political opponent.

The MPI field, this time, had become more ruthless and tyrannical. For Bourdieu, "a field may start to function as an apparatus ... when the dominant manage to crush and annul the resistance and the reactions of the dominated ... the effects of domination are such that the struggle that is constitutive of the field, ceases" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 102).

Moreover, the eleven years (1977 – 1988) long martial law of General Zia brought Islamization of state institutions in the country. The key posts were offered to those Islamists who could endorse his policies and hence help him prolong his authoritarian rule using Islam (Shuja 2007). He even quoted once, "Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state, take out Judaism from Israel, and it will collapse like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse. ..." (Burki, 1986: 78). This love for religion for General Zia was a deterrent for its critics not to question his rule. Otherwise, they would be punished or silenced forever.

According to Sheikh and Ahmed (2020), authoritarianism becomes unchallengeable when rulers play the 'religious card'. It was also true for General Zia's regime, where the politicians and journalists were indiscriminately incarcerated for criticising the government policies by terming them against the spirit of Islam. Besides that, he jacked up his support for the top echelon of the military by offering them lucrative positions in the civilian bureaucracy, e.g. his loyalists got 10 % seats in all top civilian institutions (Rizvi, 1991).

Similarly, the military in Pakistan was becoming more money-minded than ever before. "Several other material benefits were offered to the senior officers. These included, inter alia, assignments in the Gulf states, allotment of plots of land in urban areas to construct houses at below-market rates and loan facilities. A number of these cheap plots of land were then sold to civilians at exorbitant prices. The higher echelons of the military thus emerged as the most privileged caste in Pakistan" (ibid: 32). All this had turned the military into a corporate military where money and profit seeped into its decision-making and just like any other successful corporate entity (Siddiqa, 2017), it had more reasons now to influence politics, not for power alone, but profits.

It was a mammoth task to turn the economy around, which was in tatters, until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. It became a windfall for both Pakistan's military and General Zia when billions of dollars of aid poured in for military aid to help the US fight against the Soviet Union. It saved General Zia's dictatorship from American criticism and encouraged him to continue his longest-tenured military rule in Pakistan.

However, General Zia needed a democratic cover to prolong his military rule despite all these autocratic tactics. Probably on the suggestions of his Western friends, he conducted non-party-based elections in 1985. He brought a hand-picked Prime Minister to become his subservient and civilianise his covert military rule (Mahmood, 2000). However, it was stated that martial law had been lifted from the country and a political government was in place. However, this claim was made to appease the western democratic forces; the real catch was that the general had included a clause in the constitution that the President could dissolve the government any time he deemed fit. Thus converting a prime ministerial-dominated constitution of 1973 into a presidential-dominated constitution again, a precondition had been set by General Zia before lifting martial law (Zaidi, 2017).

Soon after the establishment of the political government in 1985, political differences started to arise between the military dictator and his selected Prime Minister over issues ranging from the Afghan war to the country's internal politics, as well as the lifting of martial law. However, in April 1988, General Zia dissolved the assembly and sent the Prime Minister home instead of resolving these issues. He termed the political government corrupt and inept enough to run the country. The doxa of the field (Bourdieu,

1990), i.e. democracy cannot work here because the politicians are corrupt, was revived once again.

However, in a series of events, all the glories of grant money flowing in, the provision of American arms to Pakistan's army, and international credence to the dictator's regime started to end as the Western countries withdrew from Afghanistan. The cold war was over, and so was the American interest in supporting a military dictatorship in Pakistan. General Zia suddenly died in a plane crash in 1988, which ended his eleven-year dictatorship. After his death, there was a question, who would rule the country now? How would the field of MPI work now?

Shortly, the news of the death of General Zia spread like wildfire in the country. A moment of truth had come for those in the military's highest ranks; they had to decide whom to succeed General Zia. Would there be another general to take over as General Zia's successor, or would the power be transferred to the political leadership that the military had always deplored; the decision had to be made now ((Khan,2000). Keeping in view the signals of no foreign support to the military-based government in Pakistan anymore, the top brass of the military decided to hand over power to the civilian politicians. So, according to the constitution of Pakistan, the Chairman of the Senate (Ghulam Ishaq Khan) was invited to become the country's acting President. The vice-chief of the army staff (General Aslam Beg) had to take over as the Chief of Army Staff (General Zia was the President of the country and the Chief of Army Staff, so his death vacated two offices) (ibid).

On 16<sup>th</sup> November 1988, general elections took place while the military seemingly opted to stay on the sidelines. Benazir Bhutto, whose father had been hanged by General Zia

in 1978, her socialist party won the general elections. She defeated the opposition-led right-wing alliance called Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) or Islamic Democratic Alliance and became Pakistan's first female Prime Minister (Mahmood, 2000) . Although after ruling Pakistan for so long, it was unbelievable to many how the military could vanish from the political scene and let politicians take full charge of the political affairs so easily. For instance, according to Rizvi (1991), "the military's current withdrawal from politics should [have] be seen as tactical, rather than as an admission that they [would] not play a dominant role" (29). It only came to public knowledge after around twenty years, when "during an interview on Dawn News, the former chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) General (Retd) Hamid Gul ... admitted responsibility for creating the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), a political alliance that was created to prevent Benazir Bhutto's PPP from winning. He said that he is not afraid of any case levelled against him, nor is he afraid of being hanged .... The former ISI chief said that politicians are crooks and that if they continue the path they are on, then the army will continue to intervene in the state's affairs" (Dawn, 2012). The illuso, "investment in the game and [its] outcome, interest in the game" (Bourdieu, 1990: 66) was showing its impact. However, this time it had changed its form; rather than directly controlling the political process, the MPI field started pulling the strings from the back.

Similarly, the MPI field had started to successfully orientate its recruit, the new Prime Minister, about the doxa of the field, i.e. how, as a politician or a democratic person, she would not be allowed to change the hegemony of the military from the system. According to Shafqat (1996), Benazir Bhutto had been told by the military to agree to the following conditions beforehand if she had to become the country's next Prime Minister. These



included: she would have to agree that the chief of the army staff would remain the one chosen by late General Zia, i.e. General Aslam Beg; she would make late General Zia's chosen acting President full President of the country; she would not interfere with the late General Zia's foreign policy, especially with regards to Afghanistan and hence would not change General Zia's appointed foreign minister Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan; and lastly, she would not attempt to interfere in the military's internal affairs and would not cut military's large budget.

Hence, power was posed as transferred to the civilian politician. It was more of a power-sharing with the military than a transfer. The Prime Minister had to perform under these limitations and restrictions or go home. Initially, everything seemed to be working very well, and the Benazir government started to work under the auspice of a strong military. The habitus of the Prime Minister had matched with the habitus of the MPI field, i.e. to accept the military's dominance in politics, and as Bourdieu puts it, the field agents feel like a "fish in water" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 127) when their habitus match with the field habitus.

However, with time, things started to take a different turn. As mentioned earlier, in Bourdieusian terms, the field agents try to change the relative value of those tokens on which they think their competitor's strength lies (Bourdieu, 1986). Similarly, upon being extremely unhappy with the political manoeuvrings of the ISI chief, Benazir replaced the powerful general with a retired general. However, for the military, this decision constituted intrusion (Durrani, 2018). Later, another conflict arose with the military when Benazir Bhutto wanted to have the right to appoint services chiefs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, vacancies previously filled by the President due to the amendments in the

constitution by General Zia. Although Benazir Bhutto retreated this time, this certainly raised the military's top brass's eyebrows about her aims. Did she want to bring the military under the control of the Prime Minister? (ibid).

"Thus, at the corps commanders' meeting in July 1990, the generals decided they could no longer accept the supremacy of the government, and the COAS conveyed the decision to the President. The President had his own list of grievances and dissatisfactions with the PPP government and was supported and encouraged by the military. He dismissed the Bhutto government in August 1990 on charges of corruption, inefficiency, and misconduct of power" (Shafqat, 1996). Another military conspiracy had sent another civilian Prime Minister home. The characters were new, but the story was old, going back to when the country was broken apart in 1971 and even earlier than that since it got its independence in 1947.

As discussed above, the MPI field has been established over a long period. However, it is also essential to know how the military successfully retains this field intact for this long period, for example, since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. How do people join this field? What sort of capital is required in forming this field, and then how do the new field agents have to subscribe to this particular capital and the doxa of the MPI field? It is discussed next in the following section.

## **5.2 Entry Requirements – Capital and Habitus**

In order to know the logic of the field, for Bourdieu (1990), it is imperative to know the capital that operates within it. He asserts that how people found the fields and how they legitimise their entry into those fields is a matter which should be a goal of every social

science research. In the case of the MPI field, a particular cultural capital has always been used by the dominating agent (military), which is called the security narrative. Being the guardians of the borders gives the military so much prominence in Pakistan that it becomes easier to use that cultural capital in other spheres of the state. However, before delving into it any further, it is essential to know the background, i.e. how the military achieved this cultural capital since the independence of Pakistan.

When the British left the sub-continent in 1947, and the two countries, India and Pakistan, got their independence, this was not the end of hostility between them. However, it essentially took a new dimension, i.e. 'Islamic Pakistan' was trying to prove itself against 'Hindu India' (Haqqani, 2005). The first war between the two countries erupted within just eight months of their independence over the region of Kashmir, which is still an unresolved issue between the two countries and challenges the peace in the region from time to time. Having a war at this early stage of independence made Pakistan realise the importance of its military. A perception was built since then that the enemy is not far away. It is sitting right in the neighbourhood, so keep yourself ready all the time and keep your army efficient and well-equipped. This thought of '*thy neighbour thy enemy*' defined the country's national interest and prioritised the military and its budget against other things in the country. Quoting the first defence budget of Pakistan, Siddiqi writes that 70 per cent of Pakistan's first budget was allocated to its defence (1996).

On the other hand, Pakistan was not less than a spoiler for India, who had always blamed Pakistan for meddling in its internal affairs and working towards undermining its regional supremacy. A split started with the disputed territory between the two countries at the

partition. It took so many twists and turns (primarily negative) that it made the politics of these countries more hostile and vengeful towards each other.

However, it was not India alone. The diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have also always remained a cause of concern for both these states. Afghanistan had been the only country that objected to Pakistan's UN membership when the newly independent Pakistan applied for it, citing border disputes (Khan, 2011). Afghanistan claims certain areas of Pakistan's provinces (Baluchistan and KP) as its territories. Similarly, Russia, which shares a long border with Afghanistan on its north and is a close ally of India, haunted Pakistan for using Afghanistan as a gateway to Pakistan and causing problems for its disputed territories with Afghanistan (ibid).

So the security narrative that got inculcated in the nation always seemed logical and crucial in its politics. It emphasised that any compromise on security meant you would lose your country; hence, those who had taken responsibility for its security and defence needed to be strengthened. Any attempt to undermine this narrative was dealt with, with iron hands and sometimes required full-scale military control over the country's governance (as mentioned in the last section). When I say governance of the country, it means the political process which became so crucial for the military to significantly influence or take complete control of if they had to deal with those territorial disputes with their neighbours on their terms. The cultural capital of the military, in this way, had got so solid and efficacious that it "allow[ed] its possessors to wield a power" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98) even in other fields as well such as the field of politics.

To Cohen (2012), the US support of Pakistan's army during the 50s and 60s to counter Russian communism made Pakistan's army so strong that it was not difficult to challenge

a larger number of Indian army in conventional warfare. Although he continues, Pakistan's army brands its politicians as corrupt and seeking furtherance of their interests. However, remaining in control of national politics for so long has also brought corruption in the military's upper ranks. The army knows it is difficult to rule Pakistan for a prolonged period, but they would not let civilians do it either (ibid).

Bourdieu explains this process further and contends that most of the struggles within the field of power involve the seizure of state power. It is the acquisition of economic and political power that makes a state wield its power over other games (Bourdieu, 2004); hence, strategies are devised in this respect. For instance, as mentioned earlier, the capital on which the opponent's strength is based is discredited, while the ownership of own capital is valorised in the field. The same can be found in the MPI field where the military, knowing having no place in a democratic system, discredits the cultural capital of the politicians (branding them as incapable of ruling) while valorising its capital. A retired military General and participant in this study contended:

[...] “for flood relief work army is called, in fire breakouts army is called, accidents on railway lines army is called, in general elections army is called for protection, so when civil institutions are failed everywhere, and the army is needed everywhere, then military thinks why not take over.” (General 3)

Similarly, another retired military General stated:

“So even today, in our society, businessmen are sick of our political governments, they want authoritarianism. Because they need stability to prosper and for their businesses and all. There is a considerable segment of society which wants at least an indirect,

if not direct, the role of the military, to maintain discipline in the society” (General 2)

Here, the question also arises, how do the politicians enter this MPI field? For instance, the military has considerable cultural capital in the area of defence of the borders. However, in the field of politics, especially with reference to the MPI field, their cultural capital does not have any value, i.e. in a democratic system, for instance. For Bourdieu, "social agents are not "particles" that are mechanically pushed and pulled by external forces. They are, rather, bearers of capital and, depending on their trajectory and the position they occupy in the field, by virtue of their endowment (volume and structure) in the capital; they have a propensity to orient themselves actively either toward the preservation of the distribution of capital or toward the subversion of this distribution" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 108-109). In order to legitimise its power holding in the MPI field, the military has to recruit politicians of a certain calibre who could withstand the military's political interventions in the system. For instance, those who show conformism to the MPI field.

“They (military) also know that they are holding this power illegally, so in order to justify this illegal power holding, they use illegal means to justify it. They [military] rely on corrupt politicians, recruit them, and then it's their [provided] umbrella under which corruption sprouts” (Lawyer 3, former politician)

[...] "it is the weakness of a military leader that he has to do a lot of things for his legitimacy. In order to get him legitimised, he keeps his eyes closed on some things and persons, and just lets them do the things the way they are doing" (General 4).

Although for military officials, this democratic system is so infested with corruption that politicians have no choice but to become corrupt in order to remain part of this system.

For instance:

“When you go for an election here you need to take care of a large constituency, you need to distribute the money amongst the voters, you need money for canvassing, etc. Elections have attached so many social evils, that you can’t think of running elections without them”(General 4)

However, for some, the label of corruption on politicians is nothing but propaganda to keep politicians docile and fit for the field.

“He [General Ayub Khan] inculcated in us that military is our ultimate saviour. Then he told that all politicians are corrupt. It is one thing that politicians are corrupt, but to paint them corrupt for vested interests is a different thing. This all started in General Ayub’s time.” (Political Journalist 3)

Finally, this MPI field has also generated particular thinking among the politicians, which runs through the entire political institution that the military is essential the politics, and they have to work for the preservation of the field; otherwise, they cannot survive.

“ ... there is also this perception [in the military] that politicians don’t quite understand defence-related issues i.e. what they are and how to pursue them .... Military has its own perspective about the national security, not like that of any political government, but they don’t want those politicians to come into power who have a different point of view on the national security” (General 2).

“This generative capacity” is carved in the system of dispositions and “makes possible the production of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the particular conditions of its production” (Bourdieu, 1990: 55). It is called habitus of the field. So when

you have this thinking in a field, it also generates a specific habitus among the field agents. For example, suppose the politicians violate the constitution and work for the military's supremacy in the field. In that case, they can also do other corrupt acts that would remain camouflaged in the MPI field.

As Bourdieu puts it, the relation between habitus and field has two essential characteristics. Firstly, the field structures the individual's habitus in accordance with the field habitus. Secondly, habitus shows the field as a meaningful world where field agents believe the energies are worth investing in (Bourdieu, 1985). The same can be deduced from the views of the following participants of this study.

[...] “politicians think certain things are off-limits to them, but these limits vanish if they make an alliance with them [military].” (Political Journalist 11)

So if this is true that you have good relations with the country's main power centre, what happens if someone does not take that route or decides to take a new path instead?

“I tell you that if I come into politics then I’ll need their [military’s] help to stay into that position, otherwise they start creating roadblocks in my way.” (Political Journalist 5)

“Those who had not been favoured by them [ the military] they had suffered a lot.” (Lawyer 3)

The field agents have understood via habitus that the MPI field can generate many benefits for them if the game in the field is played according to the wishes of the dominant agent, i.e. by not challenging the military's dominance in politics. Although this type of habitus seems favourable for the politicians, this cultural capital of their docility and conformity increases the *illusio* of the dominant field members. It encourages them to



increase the boundaries of the field. For instance, to continue the MPI field successively and after influencing the political system heavily, the MPI field also requires a particular judicial and bureaucratic system in Pakistan, which is discussed next in the boundaries of the field.

### **5.3 Boundaries of the Field**

According to Bourdieu, the continuing struggles within the field make the field's boundaries continuously changing, i.e. more dynamic, which "can only be determined by an empirical investigation" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 100).

Similarly, in the case of the MPI field, it was necessary for the military and its like-minded politicians that in order to keep their hegemonic powers continue the judiciary's support had to be achieved at any cost, which they did pretty successfully later on. This is why the top judiciary of Pakistan has been criticised for siding with the powerful military-politicians alliance and undermining the natural democratic system in the country. The list of instances where the judiciary encouraged the military to continue with their coup d'état directly or indirectly is getting longer.

As mentioned in the last section, in every such attempt, whenever the highest court of Pakistan was turned to, it facilitated supra-parliamentary forces over the parliamentary ones. This process started with the Tamiz Uddin Case (when the Governor-General dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 1954, as mentioned earlier). The interpretation of the constitution through courts never stopped afterwards. It paved the way for the judiciary to be seen as the ultimate source of legitimacy (Waseem, 2006).

In his illustration of the Tamiz Uddin Case, Aziz states that in order to pressurise Tamiz Uddin (Constituent Assembly's speaker) to withdraw his petition, the serving chief of army staff met with Tamiz Uddin's counsel personally to dissuade him from the petition against the government. However, upon his refusal, the military chief himself obtained a decision from the top court in the government's favour (2008). The court applied the doctrine of necessity and validated the dismissal of the constituent assembly by stating that although such action is not lawful, it has become lawful in the time of extraordinary circumstances (necessity) (ibid). The impact of the MPI field could now be felt in Pakistan's top judiciary too.

Similarly, the first coup of Pakistan's military in 1958 by General Ayub Khan (as mentioned in the last section) was also challenged in the Supreme Court. The court could have discouraged this practice of abrogation of the constitution and stopped future coups in the country. However, in the deliberations made during the Dosso Case (Waseem, 2006), the top court termed the martial law of 1958 a successful revolution which was legitimate enough to change/replace the constitution. The message was loud and clear from the judiciary that they had given credence to those with dominating positions in the country.

And their actions would always be legitimised by terming them 'successful revolutions' or the 'doctrine of necessity'. The Supreme Court of Pakistan had not only protected the MPI field for the second time but, as Bourdieu states, the field was provided with institutionalised "entry barriers" (Bourdieu, 1993: 72) now. For instance, the MPI field could not be unsettled or overthrown. It was decided. These two cases played a considerable role in further developing the military's political interference field and widening its boundaries.

With time, the military's covert and overt attempts to influence the political setup continued. In 1977, General Zia dismissed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's political government (as mentioned in the last section) and imposed martial law in the country. Once again, the law and order situation in the country was thought to have invoked the military takeover. And again, the door of the top court was knocked. The wife of the deposed Prime Minister Nusrat Bhutto went to the Supreme Court and asked to invalidate this coup.

However, the top court ruled that in a time of great political mess, where the politicians were not sorting out political instability in the system, the doctrine of necessity required that the military's takeover was rightful (Waseem, 2006). For Bourdieu, "each field calls forth and gives life to a specific form of interest, a specific *illusio*, as tacit recognition of the value of the stakes of the game and as practical mastery of its rules" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 117). The judiciary had also learnt that under martial law, their monetary rewards and perquisites were all dependent upon their allegiance to the MPI field. They had recognised the value of the game.

Moreover, besides expanding the MPI field to the political and judicial fields, it was also crucial for the MPI field to stretch its boundaries towards financial institutions. Especially the state-owned banks where the financial bureaucracy's relations with the MPI field would not disappoint the field. After all, for Bourdieu, it is only the relations in the social world which exist and "conceal structural conflicts of interest" (Bourdieu, 1990: 16).

So when Pakistan became independent in 1947, things started to change over time, and there came the point when it was felt that the services of the banks had started to concentrate in a few influential hands, and it was challenging for the masses to take loans from the banks (Siddiqui, 2015).

In 1974, after three years of the cessation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh (as mentioned earlier), Pakistan's socialist political party's leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto nationalised the banking system of the country and "consolidated the eleven Pakistani banks into just five: Habib Bank, Allied Bank, Muslim Commercial Bank, United Bank and National Bank of Pakistan; these five banks were officially designated as Nationalized Commercial Banks" (Khan, 2017: 249). As provided in the Banks Nationalization Act 1974, nationalisation emphasised achieving the national socio-economic objectives by reaching out to those people whom the private banks were unwilling to issue credit (Banks Nationalisation Act 1974: 9). The powers to appoint the top executives of the nationalised banks such as Chairman, President and Board Members were provided to the Federal Government (Ministry of Finance, and senior bureaucrats (ibid).

For Rammal (2008), the involvement of politicians and bureaucrats in the appointments of the top-notch positions of the nationalised banks started favouritism and nepotism in such offices. The bankers in the top positions knew they were there for a short period initially - the position was available for three years; however, it could have been extended for another three years if Federal Government had wished (Banks Nationalisation Act 1974: 12).

So the financial bureaucrats knew that if they had maintained 'good' relationships with the politicians and military personnel, they could have prolonged their stay in those positions. For Bourdieu, "... [t]he civil servants closely associated with bureaucratic organisations oriented towards one or other of the great state functions (ministries, directorates,

services, etc.) tend to assert and defend their existence by defending the existence of those bodies” (Bourdieu, 2005: 93).

On the other hand, those granting favours to the bankers were also expecting something in return. This nexus gave birth to a never-ending process of political involvement in lending, non-performing loans (which are not paid within 90 days of their due date), and then the writing-off of the loans (Baig, 2000). Professional honesty was starting to diminish, and corruption was creeping into the banking system of Pakistan (ibid). "The limits of the field" (Bourdieu, 1993: 73), i.e. the MPI field had successfully been extended to the financial bureaucratic field.

Soon this nationalised banking system was turned into a "get rich quick" scheme by the ruling elite of the country (Khan, 2012: 250). Khan explains this process in his article 'The Banking and Financial Sector of Pakistan' as "the mechanics of the scheme were very straightforward: set up an "industrial unit," i.e. a textile or sugar mill with a small down-payment of your own money but with massive government loans at subsidised rates ... then default on them ... [this] turned the financial system into their personal ATM and turned loan defaults without fear of penalty or prosecution into a fine art". The maxim 'fine art' used by Khan (2012) regarding the characteristic of the MPI field seems not different from what Bourdieu called certain maxims awarded by certain fields.

For instance, “the artistic field rejects the law of material profit ... [and in] economic field we commonly say business is business” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98). In the same manner, the moto of the MPI field was not different from the axiom of their field.

As a result, it had severe consequences for the entire nationalised banking sector. In 1999, a list of bank defaulters was prepared by the State Bank of Pakistan, highlighting the politicians, bureaucrats, and military and judicial office holders among the top defaulters of the bank. They used their political influence to waive those loans from the banks. A high-ranked state bank official (Deputy Governor) once declared that only 325 highly influential defaulters from all over Pakistan had to pay Rs 72 billion to the state-owned banks, each of which owed at least Rs 100 million (Aslam, 1999).

Similarly, in their report on Pakistan's non-performing loans, the International Monetary Fund revealed that it stood between 15 to 35 % of the nationalised banks' total loan exposure. However, it was only 0.4% of the foreign banks operating in Pakistan (IMF 2004: 10). The more boundaries the MPI field had acquired, the more complicated it was making for the state-owned financial institutions. . The MPI field, having the status of the state was now using its "*legitimate symbolic violence*" (Bourdieu, 1985: 732).

Similarly, constant political interference from the MPI field led the nationalised banks to report dubious figures in their financial statements. The Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan once, during his speech on 'dealing with non-performing loans of banks', stated that nationalised banks had been dealing with their non-performing loans wrongly in their books of accounts by underreporting their non-performing portfolio. For example, according to him, the non-performing portfolio of the public sector specialised banks could be as high as 29% of the banking sector's total loan portfolio, which was reported as 24% (Hussain 2002).

Hence, by the time it was 1991, almost all "Pakistani banks were technically bankrupt because their non-performing loans had exceeded 40-50 percent of their total lending. In 1996, non-performing loans totalled approx. 6% of the GDP" (Khan, 2007: 237).

This whole quest for power and stretching of boundaries by the MPI field is summed up in the following words of Bourdieu. The concentration of these different species of capital - economic, military, cultural, juridical and, more generally, symbolic - goes hand in hand with the rise and consolidation of the various corresponding fields. "The result of this process is the emergence of a specific capital, properly statist capital born of their cumulation, which allows the state to wield a power over the different fields and over the various forms of capital that circulate in them" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 114). The next chapter deals with conatus, i.e. how the MPI field uses its doxa and illusio to perpetuate the field.

## 6 CONATUS

This chapter employs the interviews conducted with various politicians, retired bureaucrats, and military officials in Pakistan and explores the process of making the doxa of an MPI field a success. How the MPI field promotes its doxa, i.e. military's political interference, is crucial by making it a part of people's habitus and then achieving a state of conatus, i.e. perpetuation. For Bourdieu, it is the habitus and *illusio*, a combination of both, which forms conatus and induces the field "agents to strive to reproduce at a constant or an increasing rate the properties constituting their social identity" (1988a: 176).

Similarly, my discussion with many interviewees also found this innate desire to perpetuate the MPI field, i.e. to exist and enhance its stature. It was essential to see conatus developing through their views, i.e. how somehow such views had successfully reproduced the worldview of the MPI field and conserved it. Furthermore, for Bourdieu (1989), in order "to change the worldview, one has to first change the ways of 'world-making', that is, the vision of the world" (23) and then it is the "practical operations" (*ibid*) that need attention. In this chapter, the first aspect of Bourdieu's statement is dealt with under the theme 'power to impose vision' while the other is dealt with in the second theme, i.e. 'how authority is gained'.

In the first theme, the participants' narratives are evaluated, that is, how political access is achieved and sustained by the MPI field using 'power to impose vision', even though the Constitution of Pakistan provides no authority in this regard. It also reflects how international politics influences the MPI field in Pakistan to adopt a particular political



posture. Voices of research participants favouring the MPI field have been included, along with those criticising such actions of the establishment. In the second theme, field relations are viewed in terms of physical and symbolic violence tendencies of the dominant forces of the field, i.e. military. It shows how dominant forces, such as in the MPI field, not only apply tacit or invisible forms of violence, but physical violence is also part of the game. All this is discussed in this chapter.

### **6.1 Power to Impose Vision**

"For Bourdieu, "reality is nothing other than a set of relationships, obscured by the realities of ordinary sense-experience" (Grenfell, 2014: 217). Similarly, the primary purpose of this section is to find out those realities of the sense-making experiences that promote the doxa of the MPI field and help the MPI field achieve conatus. In order for the military to remain in a forceful position in the MPI field, it has to give a new vision of the world to the people, i.e. how it has unique capabilities to run the state; and protect the national interest of the country than those who are corrupt and incompetent, i.e. the politicians. It helps the military present itself as an institution that does not rely on the government of the day, formed by the politicians but has developed its own rules to govern as an institution. A vision which probably makes it a unique state institution in Pakistan. A participant in this study put it in the following words:

“[...] there is a difference between army-thinking and non-army-thinking. And that difference is that although the constitution says that the command and control lie with the federal government. The army thinking is, at the highest level, for example, at the chief level and the corps commanders' level, that their basic loyalty is not to the government of the day but to the state of Pakistan. And if at any point of time 'they' think that the state or the interests of the state are different from the interests of the government then they will go with

the interest of the state: 'their' perception of what are the interests of the state, not the perception of the elected government. So when you have that sort of thinking, every now and then, there will be differences between the armed forces and the government" (Lawyer 2, Former Defence Minister).

Such vision from the powerful institution of the state has tremendous power to transform the 'objective principles' of the politics in the country. All the state institutions know where the special aura and distinction lie. This consecration power (Webb et al., 2002) of the MPI field has been understood by the politicians so well that even if the military is not ruling directly, it has become a norm for the politicians to have military support at their back if they have to thrive in politics. As stated by a participant in this study:

"This fight between the two [Benazir and Nawaz Sharif] gave military very importance, and it was perceived whoever will be supported by the military, will rule the country and whom they will not support, will perish" (Political Journalist 8).

A critical aspect is the role of international politics in this power to impose a vision that resurfaced in my discussion with various participants of this study. It is discussed next.

### **6.1.1 International Politics Has an Important Role**

As discussed in the 'context' chapter of this thesis, the military has actively participated in Pakistan's political activities throughout its history. For the military, the creation of this narrative that the security situation in the country and the region had been so hostile that to counter it, military-dominated thinking had always been essential for the country's political system.

"... but remember, establishment in Pakistan is a reality. Why is it a reality? Because of the threat from India. Because of chaos in Afghanistan ... in Pakistan, for some time to come the political powers and the establishment will have to work in synchronisation... we are not a first-world society and I think anyone who negates it will run into problems" (General 1).

As mentioned in the last chapter, this security narrative in Pakistan for the military is "quite comparable with the dubbing of a knight". It conceals its social function' that is, the consecration of the statutory bearers of social competence' of their right to rule" (Bourdieu,1998: 22). It is the state for Bourdieu et al. (1994) that has the ultimate contribution to constructing social realities even about the state itself. Although seemingly, this is done in the garb of disinterestedness, the biggest beneficiary of this is the state itself. The same had been happening in the context of Pakistan; after having been under the influence of military governments for an extended period, it had never been easier for Pakistan's state to think of a political system without the military's interference. It has become part of most people's habitus now. Many of the military generals interviewed during this research termed the examples of the non-democratic countries as the best systems running in the world.

"... look, many people in Pakistan say that we should not have democracy here, they talk about the authoritarian examples of China, South Korea, Malaysia ... we, at the periphery of the subcontinent, have influences from Afghanistan, Iran, and all ..." (General 2).

The logic of citing the example of those countries who made their developments without resorting to the democratic systems portrays the establishment's self-interest. Although

this had been perceived or made to be perceived as disinterestedness; however, taking the influence of only non-democratic countries, of course, suits the non-democratic forces and "contributes to the reproduction of the social order in which [Pakistan's political system is] ... embedded" (Brubaker, 1985: 755).

It is the state that "imposes and inculcates a dominant culture constituted as the legitimate national culture" (Bourdieu et al., 1994: 8) in any country. The same can be understood regarding Pakistan's military. After gaining dominance in the establishment, its organisational structure was extensively used to form the citizens' durable dispositions that the military-controlled system had always been the best. It built new, deep, and "fundamental presuppositions of the national self-image" (ibid). The military has been termed more loyal and nationalist than the politicians who had been notorious for stashing their wealth in foreign countries, thus making the military more local and helpful.

“... the army needs a country, a state, a boundary, to place itself somewhere. Nawaz [former Prime Minister] is an international personality, he has his money outside Pakistan, and his properties are outside, but the army needs its geographical area as well. They have some interest in the country but the bourgeoisie of the country or the civilian ruling class has no concern with the nation or the country” (Political Journalist 2).

Again, the state provides this common-sense experience that politicians indulging in money-making business have all their loyalties lying outside Pakistan. Hence they need to be condemned and shunted for their behaviour. On the other hand, the military is shown as one institution that defers the borders and knows how to protect the country. Hence, it will always be in a better position than the politicians whenever a comparison occurs between the two. Although this comparison is so wrong because the job of one is security

and the other is governance of the country, both get muddled up in the "common-sense" experience given by the state. The people know that the military's influence has never been eliminated from politics because the politicians in this country are very corrupt, so the military must keep a check on them. It is what Bourdieu called "amor fati" (Bourdieu, 1998: 216), the hallmark of conatus, i.e. people adjust their subjective expectations to align them with their objective chances.

Similarly, for Bourdieu et al. (1994), the state can fix beliefs or ideas about 'vision and division'. It encourages a particular idea or a political strategy to be imposed on its people than the other. The enforcement happens due to a vision that the state is superior, or appears superior to those at the helm of state affairs. It involves the argument of the geography of Pakistan and the impact of international politics on it. The scenario where the military exalts its power to 'vision and division' is witnessed in a general's wordings who participated in this study.

“Americans wanted some kind of influence in this country which could be through only one way, that support the dictatorship. Deal only with one man! So when this cold war was going on, they badly needed Pakistan. Geography has placed this country in such a manner that even if we want to live in peace that’s not possible” (General 3).

Hence, a conformism or rather a 'logical conformism' (Bourdieu et al., 1994) in the name of security had to be won by the establishment from its political forces, which, in turn, had to become an essential cultural capital of the MPI field.

In order to give it a common-sense experience, the acts of submission are inculcated into cognitive structures using the strategies of vision and division. Moreover, self-interest

always remains in hiding from all the social structures of the system. For Brubaker (1985), "Self-interest ... is not reducible to material interest [alone]. Calculations of self-interest ... extend to ... powers or pleasures ..." (755). So for a state, self-interest might not be about monetary or material goods alone. It is about power as well, which is also reflected in the following interview excerpt of a bureaucrat:

"... suppose if a politician is interested in good neighbourly relations with India - our forever enemy - the military won't view that kind of alliance, friendship, or efforts, favourably. Because then, in the long run, the military's own role in the geopolitical set up of the subcontinent will be minimal" (Bureaucrat 1).

The above theme shows how the MPI field makes a case for its relevance in the political setup of Pakistan. Furthermore, *conatus*, i.e. the perpetuity of the field, provides field agents and citizens with certain dispositions that they find the MPI field more logical than a democratic system led by civilian politicians. Similarly, taking inspiration from the non-democratic forces of the world paves the way for a political system in Pakistan that keeps the military's domination in the politics intact, making it a common-sense and natural phenomenon, helping '*amor fati*' (Bourdieu, 1988) to take over. The next theme discusses the logic presented by the participants of this study, i.e. why the military is so active and essential in Pakistan's political setup.

### **6.1.2 Behind Every System, There is a Force; we Have Military**

After gaining inspiration from international politics and gaining their support, the military has to enforce its rules on the fields it creates, the political groups it plants, and the alliances it makes in this respect. Much like many of the Western democracies where big

corporates have become notorious for meddling in political affairs and carving a portion of political support for their companies' benefits (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). For many participants of this study, it was not very difficult to draw parallels between the two. Although Siddiqua (2007) has termed Pakistan's military as a rich state within a state that has constantly been increasing its reliance on its resources and stashing wealth by building its corporate empires, this does not stop it from acquiring political power. Instead, it exacerbates the process. As Brubaker holds, "... purely economic power is powerless and must be converted into symbolic power ... in order to make itself fully effective" (Brubaker, 1985: 756). Similarly, a participant in this study drew a parallel between the Western corporations and their influence on democracy with the MPI field in Pakistan in the following words:

"... I think it is all about the problem created by the democratic system. This Asghar Khan case is not new. If Obama does not have \$6.2 billion, he cannot run for the presidential elections. If Sarkozy does not have 4.3 billion euros, he cannot win elections either. When we use the word 'will of the people speaks in the parliament, it is something ridiculous ... I am telling you the essence of democracy is that whoever will have power, like in the West, the corporate structure is in power - there are 17 to 18 banks in power who hold world treasury and are its managers. There are 45 thousand corporations, out of which 500 are core corporations and 22 banks - these are the real controllers of the USA and the world. Here, in Pakistan, we have a military! Behind every system, all over the world, there is a force which wants to implement its policies (Bureaucrat 2).

What is true for these corporations also seems true for the military when protecting self-interest and manipulating the political process is involved. However, the military in Pakistan, of course, cannot afford resources to employ in politics as the corporations in

the Western world do. So it resorts to other means. It becomes the 'status group' (as mentioned by Bourdieu in his book 'Distinction') and "relies increasingly on the transmission of power and privilege in other forms - especially in the form of cultural capital" (Brubaker, 1985: 756). The cultural capital the military has earned in the form of saving the borders and guarding the national interest. The security paradigm conceals the power relations, which only get stronger when the political interference of the military increases. For some participants, using military 'might' in the political process is a way for the military to protect the country's internal political setup from foreign influences.

“Look, for that, you need to hear the military’s side of the story, which I can tell you because of my observation while staying in their government. They say that if we don’t use our ‘might’ in this money game then the governments that will come into being would be made with the money given by our enemies because the only governing factor that would remain here would be the money. One group in Pakistan would be funded by Modi the other would be funded by someone else. One group will be funded by Iran, the other by Saudi Arabia. We don’t have any monitoring system here” (Politician 2, Former Information Minister).

Similarly, the military's political interventions, such as controlling the country through direct martial law or funding a particular political party, have been construed by many as a service to the country. For them, the violations of the constitution and the military oath, which requires them not to take part in the country's politics, did not matter. These had been projected as a service to the country against the corruption of the politicians. Whenever there was a comparison of politicians vs military government during this study's interviews, those politicians who sided with the military government praised it for its corruption-free rule. The political institution had formally recognised and "institutionalised



cultural capital" of the military (Bourdieu 1986: 21). For a former foreign minister, every martial law in the country was, in fact, a blessing for this country.

"Pakistan army is like an anchor when everything goes wrong [they save us]. A former Indian ambassador in Islamabad once said that this country is very different from other countries. Because when everything seems to be going to the dog here, suddenly the army steps in; so people have it in their minds that no worries, in the end, the army will take care of us" (Politician 3, Former Foreign Minister).

So now we know that the military has earned itself as a cultural capital institutionalised by politics, and many politicians acknowledge military rule as the best option. However, this allowance to the military by the politicians had not been without politicians' self-interest hidden behind their legitimated transgression.

Bourdieu (2005: 133) explains legitimated transgression as " the agents ... always have available to them a range of possible 'choices' lying between two limits ... at one end of the scale is the strict, complete application of the regulations, or, by contrast, a legitimated transgression, an official or semi-official's dispensation, in the sense of an exception to the rule made within the rules. In fact, the ... exception granted becomes a service rendered, and hence a specific resource, capable of being exchanged and of entering into the circuit of symbolic exchange forms the basis of the social and symbolic capital of the notable". Hence, politicians also demand something in return upon exercising their legitimate transgression. The same echoed in the voice of the following participant:

"The politicians know that in Pakistan if you have to politically survive, you have to make money, you have to have rent-seeking, then you must be with GHQ [ General Headquarter, a term used in Pakistan to refer to military]" (Bureaucrat 3).

After having seen the different narratives used by various participants regarding their own common sense experiences, it is not difficult to imagine how easy it becomes for the state, the establishment in Pakistan, to propagate the doxa of the MPI field for its benefit. How easily the 'vision of division' among the citizens gets imposed by having a particular doxa of the field which misrecognise the logic of practice at work in the field" (Thomson, 2014: 68). The same power of doxa and 'vision of division' was felt in the following excerpt.

“Democracy works under lobbying, if lobbies of a country want to get a particular mindset brought forward, then what can you do in this respect? ... The whole of Europe was fearing that the right-wing is coming to power, in India Modi came, which means lobbies control [democracies]...democracy is at its lowest ever in the West these days. America is no more a republic it's becoming an empire [of Trump]. Where is democracy? In our region if we believe that prosperity comes through democracy alone, then how did China become rich? How did Singapore and Korea develop? They didn't follow democracy” (Political Journalist 7).

This power of the MPI field to impose a particular vision provides insights into how people are made to believe certain things and how they are bought into the political system of Pakistan. How the ruling elite justifies the political interference of the military is compared with the weaknesses of the democratic systems. Moreover, how its acceptance by politicians helps prolong the rule of the MPI field. Hence, an equilibrium is achieved without seeing lots of turmoil in the MPI field. It is how conatus, i.e. the perpetuation of the field, "can be most easily confused with liberty and freedom" (Fuller, 2014: 177). For example, the choices people think they are freely making are the illusions created by the perpetuation of the fields, i.e. conatus.

After evaluating the military's power to impose vision and its inspirations, it is also essential to see the execution process in this regard. In the next theme, I explore 'practical operations' (Bourdieu, 1989: 23) that are needed by the MPI field, which can be termed as the ways to provide political patronage in order to get authority to run the state. All this will be discussed next.

## **6.2 How Authority is Gained**

This part reflects on the forces wielded by the MPI field in other fields. For example, the formation of the MPI field needed to be saved from the judiciary and investigatory agencies (bureaucracy). It required a tight grip on these two pillars of the establishment. It takes us back to what Bourdieu stated: "what happens in the field of power shapes what can happen in a social field; at the same time what happens in a social field shapes the field of power ... " (Grenfell, 2014: 69). In addition, the symbolic and physical power used by the military in this regard is also what is going to be discussed in this section.

The military's lack of authority to rule is the one reason that forces it to secure its ascension to power by forming different political factions in Pakistan. For Bourdieu, when a "political party ... is invested with the state authority", the phenomenon is nothing short of "social fiction" (Bourdieu, 1989: 24). There are many who get life in this political process of party formation. Political births and party formations also give power to those who form them. For example, the political birth of Pakistan's former Prime Minister is explained by a participant in this study as follows:

“... well Nawaz Sharif was brought forward into politics by General Jilani [former Director General ISI, and Governor Punjab]. He made him sports minister, then finance minister, and then after the election of 1985, chief minister of the Punjab province. Now you can think that

if an important person of the military is giving you such big offices, then they would also require something from you in return” (Political Journalist 8).

No doubt, the military remains in need of authority to run the country, and for this purpose, it has to depend on the politicians. However, the question arises, which type of politicians can bail the military out in this process of the military's illegal ascendancy to power? For Bourdieu (1989), it is the "objective affinities" (24) between the agents which bring them together in a group, that is, the degree to which they tend to combine; otherwise, they could have been 'merely juxtaposed individuals' (ibid). Thus, to make space in the country's political setup, the military has to get together all the corrupt politicians in the country to give itself the right to be a significant political player.

“They (military) also know that they are holding this power illegally, so in order to justify this illegal power holding, they use illegal means to justify it. They [military] rely on corrupt politicians, recruit them, and then it's their [provided] umbrella under which corruption sprouts.” (Lawyer 3, former politician)

In their quest to gain more power, the military leaders claim to deal with corruption with iron hands. In this regard, they assign themselves this "monopoly of legitimate violence" (Bourdieu, 1998: 19). However, in the end, to save their own "arbitrary empire" (20), they resort to those corrupt politicians whom they vowed to deal with iron hands. A participant expressed almost the same views in this study:

“... the military dictators General Zia and General Musharraf, although they both had completely different personalities, yet when they came into power, they vehemently announced that we will do this we will do that for the country, but later on we saw that they themselves needed the support of the politicians for the longevity of their rule. They sought the support of which politicians then; the corrupt politicians; created new power-centres; rigged the general elections; that I believe was political corruption at the fundamental level” (Political Journalist 3).

One crucial aspect in this regard involves a tight grip on the state institutions so that any action against the MPI field could be timely quashed. It is explained next.

### **6.2.1 Controlling Judicial and Investigation Systems**

Bourdieu observes that "there are always, in any society, conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at imposing the vision of legitimate divisions, that is, at constructing groups" (1989: 22). Many participants in this study disagreed with the notion that the military's political inference benefits the country. They stressed the superiority of the democratic system and termed this field creation process of the military as not without its side effects. For example, they termed the rising corruption in investigatory agencies and the judicial system as the effects of the direct control exerted by the MPI field to dominate the system.

“After all, the judiciary does not have weapons in its hands, it only has to give decisions which give it high moral ground, it does not have its own physical force, physical force is with the armed forces, by using which they have been intimidating judges and taking decisions in their favour. Those who did not give decisions in their favour had been removed from their offices .... This thing has been built up in the last seventy years that our military establishment has lowered the stature of all other institutions, including the judiciary. Even today, whatever is

going on now, if there is an independent judge, his life is made difficult” (Lawyer 3).

“... but yes, to some extent in the past they [courts] have been subjected to the influences. The most famous example of that of Bhutto’s case where one of the judges who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan said yes, in delivering the guilty verdict we were influenced by the then martial law commander. So this has happened, and the judiciary has not been saints” (Lawyer 2, Former Defence Minister).

In addition, the MPI field requires the control of state institutions to make politicians compliant with the field mechanism, working for the benefit of the field but pretending to be working in the best interests of the people at large. "Just as within language, there is a distinction between the signifier (symbol) and the signified (substantive content), so in political discourse, there is a distinction between representatives (agents' action) and representation (substantive interests). A kind of "double game" is then undertaken" (Grenfell, 2014: 255) where the military uses political corruption as a bargaining chip to make politicians docile and the ones accepting its supremacy in the political field. A vision that exalts and gives permanence to the military at the cost of political institutions.

“I myself have seen that the accountability process was being used against the political opponents. There’s no doubt about that. The cases of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were pended and were not to be touched, and in 2007 when the elections were going to happen, these cases were used against them, so that manipulation [bargaining] could be done. So this is the reality ...” (General 2).

“NAB instead of becoming an accountability institution actually became a national washing machine. Whoever they [military] wanted to wash they washed and made them their supporter” (Politician 2).

The "double game" analogy just mentioned above also becomes true once again when politicians also start manipulating the system when they see corruption has been used as a tool to control them. They also start influencing the judicial system to escape the long arm of the law. The MPI field, formed by the military by controlling the state institutions, influenced other field members and how things work here in Pakistan.

“In Nawaz Sharif’s time, he also started investing in bureaucrats and judiciary. He brought his own judges. He obliged bureaucrats. He has been exploiting them. So they also gave him huge favours because they were under obligations. Long tenures, lucrative appointments were offered so that they could work for him ...” (General 3).

### **6.2.2 Physical Violence or Symbolic Violence**

The field members' relations remain one-sided; for example, the dominating member always dictates the rest of the field members. Bourdieu (2014) states that the state or "the field of power... is defined by the possession of the monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence" (4). In the context of Pakistani politics, the military needs to get hold of "that 'statist capital' which for Bourdieu is the 'culmination of the different species of capital' and which enables the state to exercise power [or violence] over other fields" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 114). Such state violence, which was quite visible in the interview excerpts of some of the study participants, is mentioned here.

[...] “well, obviously the people who have gun power it is very difficult to say ‘no’ to them. You need to have the character of a prophet to not bend before the cannon-bearers. If a person dissents, what happens to that person? He’s picked up and taken to an unknown place where no one has any knowledge about them until they decide to release them. So if you have opted for the politics, for example, if I opt for the politics, then I’ll have to remember, that this [military] is one big force, against which I’ll have to put up a very strong stance otherwise I’ll have to do what they say” (Bureaucrat 1)

[...] “when high profile people, like those involved in this case [army], give anyone a task, then it’s not that you have a choice to refuse. Even if at one side your real father is sitting and on the other side these big wigs are sitting, you would never look at your father.” (Political Journalist 1)

For 'symbolic violence' to work, the agents must be 'subjected to the forms of violence; for example, treated as inferior' (Webb et al., 2002: 25). The same could be observed from the following remarks of a retired military general who justified military takeovers by stating civilian governments were incompetent.

[...] “for flood relief work army is called, in fire breakouts army is called, accident on railway lines army is called, in general elections army is called for protection, so when civil institutions are failed everywhere, and the army is needed everywhere, then why not take over.” (General 3)

However, the same cannot be possible; for example, symbolic violence cannot work on one class unless that class (mis)construes it as a natural thing or something inevitable. Consequently, it becomes an accomplice in such domination. It can be seen in the following comment of a lawyer participant of this study, who remained adamant during



the interview that military dictatorships in the country and even funding to the politicians by the military could not be termed as corrupt actions:

"I have seen Asghar Khan case in detail... let's say it [military] had any involvement in it. It was only in the context of government, like the coming and going of any government. But it was not established that they [military] did it for corruption .... Dictators in this country have always strengthened accountability. It's our history .... any intervention by the military has been for the betterment of this country but we perceive it wrongly" (Lawyer 1).

While analysing the reproduction strategies of the MPI field, it can be seen that at the basis of all of these strategies is a desire to perpetuate the field, i.e. *conatus*. The MPI field had to exert power to impose its vision of division, and secondly, it had to use violence to gain authority. However, applying this power and using authority could not be possible had the MPI field not aligned itself with the state "to create itself as holder of a legitimate monopoly on state power" (Bourdieu, 1998: 22). Similarly, it had to invent ways to impose its vision so that its vested interests could hide behind the "superior degree of universalisation" (ibid: 24 ) to appear normal or natural. (As seen in the interview excerpt of Lawyer 1 just above). For Bourdieu, "when it comes to the state, one never doubts enough" (Bourdieu et al.,1994:1).

The state's facilitation of political corruption and its effect on the accounting controls of the banking institutions is discussed in the next chapter.

## **7 CORRUPTION, SUFFERING, AND HYSTERESIS**

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how the MPI field, which has been in existence for so many years (seventy-plus years, as mentioned in the 'field' chapter) and which has achieved the status of 'conatus' (as explained in the last chapter) and has extended its boundaries to all other essential state institutions (such as judiciary and investigation agencies), how would it bring any corruption happening within the field in public attention, and how it will be dealt with in accordance with the law of the land. It is interesting to see how all these questions can be explained using another Bourdieusian concept known as hysteresis (Bourdieu, 1977). It will help to understand Pakistan's political corruption theory and practice.

This first part of this chapter includes the case study, which is at the heart of this thesis and explains the real cause of political corruption in the MPI field. It elicits the main characters involved, their influential status, power struggles, and strategies to conserve the MPI field. The second part shows how the ruling elite has manipulated the state-owned banks' accounting and internal control systems. For example, how such controls are breached and what their efficacy is in the context of Pakistan's political setup. All this is seen through the eyes of the participants of this study.

Lastly, the case study is explained in the light of hysteresis. For example, it would not have been possible for the corruption in the MPI field to become known had there been no conflict between the military and politicians, i.e. hysteresis one. Similarly, this political corruption case could not have been decided had there been no conflict between the judiciary and military, a second hysteresis. Moreover, these hystereses provided ample

opportunities to change the MPI field and lower the influence of the dominant field members, i.e. the military, but what happens, in reality, is all spelt out in this section. However, first, the case study is explained.

### **7.1 The Corruption Case**

As discussed earlier in the 'field' chapter, Benazir Bhutto, during her first government (1988 – 1990), developed serious differences with the military. Soon, it was decided by the high command that she needed to be thrown out of her office. A Military Intelligence Chief of Sind province told the court that two critical reasons for Benazir's government to go home were: First, she candidly discussed in the media that the Pakistan army had enriched uranium to much higher levels which would not be acceptable to the big powers, i.e. the Western countries (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012).

Secondly, in another interview, she stated that her government had vehemently supported India in suppressing the Sikh independence movement [which was a brainchild of the Pakistan army] (Durrani, 2018). All this was deemed her interference in the military's internal affairs and led to great divides between the two. As a result, her government got dismissed on 06<sup>th</sup> August 1990, and the President of the country announced new elections within 90 days.

Although these elections were conducted within the time frame on 24<sup>th</sup> October 1990, there was a unique feature attached to these elections. The military and the President got

together different politicians in one political alliance. They formed a political party, the so-called Islami Jamhoori Ittihad or IJI<sup>2</sup>.

This time, IJI was not only supported morally but financially as well. The banker contacted in this regard gave his affidavit in the supreme court that he was working as a senior executive vice president, a member of the Board, and the provincial chief of the state-owned bank Habib Bank Limited (HBL). The then Chief of Army Staff (CoAS), General Beg, called him and told him that the President of Pakistan wanted to meet him. When he went to meet him along with the CoAS, he said, "President inquired of me for the arrangement of 35 to 40 crores for the 'Great National Interest' to which I told the President that the arrangement for such a huge amount was not possible through legal means and manipulation shall be needed for this purpose. The President directed that whatever is required should be done for the National Cause. The loans worth Rs.140 million were sanctioned by the provincial committee and executive committee of Habib Bank Ltd in the name of my friends and business acquaintances. This money was deposited into fake accounts opened for that purpose" (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012: 40).

Further, to ensure the swift transfer, Mir (2012) claims that the President sent his message to the top officials of the HBL through the Ministry of Finance that Yunus Habib was doing an important task, so he must be facilitated in this regard. The HBL president later confirmed that Yunus Habib "had generated the funds through parking finance to create credit balances in different accounts and illegally allowed withdrawal of Rs 140 million"

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<sup>2</sup> an altered version of the IJI introduced in the 1988 elections. General Hamid Gul openly admitted that he was behind this political group formation (details in the 'context' chapter).

(Dawn, 2012a). He stated that 15 fake accounts were opened for an intelligence agency by giving further details. The cash was withdrawn by Yunus Habib using cash payment cheques, and the money was transported then by the bank's messenger in the bank's official car for deposit in six other banks (ibid). The then Director-General of the intelligence agency ISI confessed in his book that he had received instructions from the then CoAS General Beg to facilitate the election campaign of the IJI (Durrani, 2018).

According to his affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court, the money deposited by Yunus Habib in different branches of Karachi was then transferred to the cover accounts he opened in Quetta and Rawalpindi. A sum of "Rs 60 million" was then distributed among the politicians, as directed by the CoAS, he revealed, and the remaining "Rs80 million" were then transferred to the military's special fund (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012: 61).

Besides that, an election cell was formed in the President's house, which was responsible for providing the results of the winning candidates to the media, a claim uncovered by the white paper issued by Benazir Bhutto's party later (Haider, 1991). However, the white paper claimed that the election results were managed so that Benazir's party had to be stopped from coming to power again at any cost. A brief election result of these two political parties relating to the national assembly seats is presented in table 7.1. When the 1990 election results are compared with the 1988 results, it can be seen how IJI helped to achieve the desired majority by following the tactics just mentioned above.

Table 7.1

	<b>1988</b>	<b>1990</b>
PPP/PDA	93	44
IJI	54	106

Source: Online reports on the General Elections 1988, 1990 issued by the Election Commission of Pakistan

The IJI's success led Nawaz Sharif to become Prime Minister in November 1990. As mentioned above, the support he had received from Pakistan's establishment made it evident that he would go a long way with the military, unlike his predecessor Benazir Bhutto.

However, he also fell prey to the traps laid by the establishment. A major blow for him was a difference of opinion with the CoAS General Beg over the Gulf War, who publicly criticised the Prime Minister for siding with the Western countries. In his biography, General Beg described the Gulf War as a Western conspiracy, and that is why, as opposed to the Prime Minister, he admitted that he sided with Saddam Hussein (Hussain, 2021).

Similarly, another bone of contention with the military was Nawaz Sharif's privatisation policy, which upset the military. The businesses that the military had established over long periods of dictatorships were [now] required to face private-sector competition on a more level playing field" (Cohen, 2005: 251). The conflicts with the military were accumulating and waiting for the right time to erupt. For instance, Nawaz Sharif's "independent policies on Kashmir and Afghanistan soured the relations [with army]"

(Kamran, 2017: 152). He even criticised the President of Pakistan, who he claimed remained busy conspiring against his government. His differences with the military and the President had ultimately reached a level where the President could not find another option but to dismiss Nawaz Sharif's government in April 1993 on the charges of corruption and nepotism (ibid). Nawaz Sharif challenged his dismissal in the Supreme Court, and the top court reinstated his government by declaring the Presidential order unconstitutional.

However, taking back the government was not resolving his issues with the President and the powerful army. Eventually, the then-military chief Abdul Waheed Kakar had to intervene, and in July 1993, he commanded both the Prime Minister and the President to resign from their offices. According to Talbot (2012), "ultimately, however, it was to be the army rather than democracy which emerged triumphant from this crisis" (152). Once again, the military had shown dominance in the political field, and a new election was proposed.

After the elections in October 1993, the tables had successively been turned. The PPP, Benazir's party, had emerged as the single largest party in the national assembly which formed the government. In contrast, Nawaz Sharif had to bear the brunt of the establishment's wrath by managing to form his government in only one of the smallest provinces of Pakistan, i.e. NWFP (now known as the KP).

However, his provincial government was soon toppled by the forces who had never wanted him to remain in power in 1993. Nawaz Sharif alleged that in February 1994 (within four months of its formation), his provincial government was toppled by the state

by arranging \$8.5 million worth of illegitimate financing from Mehran Bank<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, he provided tape recordings of the conversations between the top government officials and the provincial chief of the Mehran Bank in the NWFP province (UPI, 1994). To pacify the opposition, the Benazir government committed to inquiring about the wrongdoings of Mehran Bank. However, the inquiry report of that commission was later declared to be a confidential document, and it remains so even to date. It was the second time public money was being used to change a political regime in the country, with no inquiries.

Apart from that, although it was Benazir Bhutto's second term in office, her acceptance in the top military circles was still dwindling. A group in the military was constantly annoyed because of her lenient policy over the disputed region of Kashmir. It was for this reason that another coup by the military was in the making against her government. It was reported in The Washington Post that a group having fundamentalist views was thinking in the army "that the army chief and Prime Minister Bhutto had compromised the Kashmir cause, and it was in the supreme interest of Islam to remove them from the scene," (Khan, 1995).

According to Ziring (2003), this made Benazir furious, and she blamed the former head of the ISI for conspiring against her government. She ordered to arrest of forty army officers and forced the army chief General Abdul Waheed Kakar, to retire. It "opened

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<sup>3</sup> After he retired from Habib Bank, Yunus Habib founded a private bank called Mehran Bank in 1991. The bank started operations in 1992, and Yunus Habib became its Chief Operating Officer (COO). It has been involved in various dubious transactions since its inception, mainly involving political disbursements. According to a news report, "Intelligence funds were deposited in Mehran Bank in 1992 - an insolvent bank - as a favour to its owner's help in loaning money to the ISI in 1990.

The money was used in the creation of the right-wing alliance Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJ) and bankrolling the campaigns of many opponents of the PPP" (The News, 2012d).



fissures within the army", and many "saw the change in command as Benazir's attempt to bring the military establishment under her control" (ibid: 239). After being in power for almost two years and seeing the military's constant disapproval of her, Benazir decided to inquire about the matter of her first electoral defeat by the military in 1990. She got a confessional affidavit from the former ISI chief General (R) Asad Durrani, acknowledging that he had distributed the funds among IJI politicians to make her lose the election. On 11th June 1996, her interior minister read that affidavit in the Parliament to foil the plot hatched against her in 1990.

Moreover, five days later, on 16<sup>th</sup> June 1996, Air Martial (R) Asghar Khan, a former Chief of Pakistan Air Force turned politician, who was also a political ally of Benazir in the 1990 elections, wrote to the then Chief Justice of Pakistan. He filed a petition to take legal action against those military officials and politicians who were involved in the rigging of the 1990 election and who plundered the state-owned bank. However, within five months of filing this petition, when the Supreme Court had not decided this case, Benazir Bhutto's government was dismissed by the President again in November 1996 on corruption charges (Kamran, 2017).

Although the Supreme Court of Pakistan received Asghar Khan's letter in 1996 and converted it into a petition (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012), unfortunately, it did not decide on this case until 2012, sixteen years from the date of filing of this petition. It is also interesting to see how this verdict came into being from a court that has long been blamed for supporting the military and the country's ruling elite. As concurred by The New York Times, "[Pakistani] courts would find rationales for superseding constitutions, rigged elections, and referendums; judges would actively collude with military officials against

the political parties ... to vindicate and facilitate military interventions into democratic politics" (Traub, 2008).

So the question arises that, after neglecting the case for almost two decades, how the top court of the country decided to go against the country's powerful establishment and decided on a case which could annoy its long-term institutional friend, i.e. the military. It also has a background involving a scuffle between the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, who decided the Asghar Khan Case and the then military dictator General Pervez Musharraf who ruled the country after attempting a successful coup against the Nawaz Sharif-led government in 1999.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, had developed serious differences in 2007 with President General Pervez Musharraf. The chief's famous decision against the privatisation of Pakistan Steel Mill irked the general big time (Ashraf et al., 2018). Also, 2007 was the year which had inflamed the confrontation between the Musharraf regime and the judiciary of Pakistan. The bone of contention in this regard was General Musharraf's re-election bid for the post of President. General Musharraf held two key posts simultaneously, i.e. Chief of Army Staff and the President of Pakistan. The constitution of Pakistan does not allow a serving military man to remain President of the country. However, Musharraf managed to do it by amending the constitution (Shafqat, 2018).

However, this leverage was only given to him for five years, expiring in 2007, and Musharraf had this inclination that the present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would not allow him this extension (ibid). Soon the Chief Justice announced that the decision on

the appeals filed against General Musharraf's holding of two offices would be decided on 03rd November 2007.

In order to avoid another adverse decision, General Musharraf imposed a state of emergency in the country (Ghias, 2010), i.e. another martial law! The constitution was held in abeyance, and the military had removed the entire judiciary unless they agreed to take a fresh oath under the PCO (Provisional Constitutional Order). The existing Chief Justice refused to take a new oath under the PCO, so the Chief of Army Staff sent him home. Anyone who objected to this was put behind bars, including the senior judges of the Supreme Court (Dawn, 2008).

This action of the military dictator brought an unprecedented reaction from Pakistan's judiciary. A judiciary famous for taking sides with the powerful military, through thick and thin, was now thinking of taking another course of action, i.e., defiance. It turned against the military dictator and started a movement to restore the Chief Justice and the rest of the judiciary, which was later called the lawyers' movement (Shafqat, 2018).

Finally, a commitment to their resolve brought its fruit in March 2009 when the lawyers' movement successfully reinstated the Chief Justice and other deposed judges of the higher judiciary and brought down the Presidency of General Musharraf (Ashraf et al., 2018). A new president took over the President's office. This time, the President was from a political party against which the military formed a political alliance in 1990 to make them lose the election, i.e. Benazir Bhutto's husband. The latter had become chairman of her party due to her assassination in a suicide attack in December 2007. The judiciary and the President's office were in no mood to give any concessions to the powerful officials of the military to get away with their political excesses. This background made it easier for

the Chief Justice to bring the Asghar Khan case back from the back burner that had been waiting for as long as sixteen years. The Supreme Court gave its verdict within eight months and decided that:

The general election held in 1990 was subjected to corruption, and the President, General (R) Aslam Beg and General (R) Asad Durrani were found to be violating the Constitution of Pakistan by favouring a group of politicians. The court further directed that even though these men have retired from the service, the Federal Government should take necessary action against them, and legal proceedings should start against those politicians who had received money from the ISI in the general election of 1990. According to the law, an investigation in this regard should be initiated by the Federal Investigating Agency (FIA). The court, in the end, concluded that Rs 80 million that had been deposited by Yunus Habib in the military's account in 1990 should be transferred to the HBL with profit "if the liability of HBL has not been adjusted so far, otherwise, the same may be deposited in the treasury account of the Government of Pakistan" (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012: 140).

Although I will discuss the implementation of the Supreme Court's order in the next chapter, this case proves that it has been difficult for a democracy to find its roots in Pakistan's political setup. The conspiracies of politicians against each other and their use by the establishment make Pakistan's democracy dream yet to come true. No doubt, such actions were causing severe harm to the democratic political system of Pakistan. On the other hand, they were causing suffering to the accounting and internal control systems of the state-owned as well as the private banking system of the country. Such sufferings are mentioned next in the following section.

## **7.2 Suffering of the Accounting controls in the Banking Sector**

Although regarding accounting and internal control systems of the LDCs, it is well known in the accounting literature that the operations of such controls differ from their counterparts in the Western world due to their different cultural, economic, and political context (Hopper et al., 2009). Colonisations played a significant role in devising such control systems in the LDCs. However, after colonisation, local hegemonic powers tend to fill that gap (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). In terms of Pakistan, its weak political institutions enabled other powerful groups, such as the military, to become a dominant power institution, shaping the management controls of its state-owned institutions (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). The military's dominance in the political setup (the MPI field) led its boundaries to extend to other state-owned institutions in such a way that it caused enormous suffering for the banking institutions' accounting and internal control systems. So they had no other option but to surrender before the inevitable power centre of the country.

### **7.2.1 Controls Are Meaningless at the Top**

A senior lawyer and a former politician contended in the context of the banking sector of Pakistan:

“Because banks are not independent on their own, they [military] have controls over the banks [too]. Actually, where the power lies? Ultimately, it lies with them [military]. So any bank or any industry cannot be run unless it has the approval of the power centres. If power centres refuse them, then ultimately, they will not be able to continue their work. In this country, no one can do big business without the consent of the military establishment. Patronage comes from there [military]” (Lawyer 3, former politician).

For Connolly and Healy (2004), symbolic violence is usually not perceived by those upon whom it is exerted and hence becomes an efficient and effective way of dominating the dominated. For example, whenever the dominant needs to exercise its dominance, they term it 'let the system take its due course' without making it evident that they will achieve what they intend. For the banker of a state-owned bank and a participant in this study, symbolic violence of the powerful establishment in Pakistan is exerted at the top level of the banking executives:

[...] "look, whenever [external] pressure comes, it comes at a bigger level, at the Board of directors level. This is where the policy decisions are tweaked then, and either people are accommodated or refused."  
(Bureaucrat 6)

In this way, the sufferings of the accounting and internal control systems are "internalised by the members of society" (Schubert, 2014: 180); something, when applied at the top, can achieve desired domination. The cacophony of the soundness of the controls in the banking industry seems nothing but a hoax.

"Controls are only for low levels, but if you receive a command from a high level that let this thing happen, then controls do nothing there. When someone at the top says that this loan has to be sanctioned then that is done even without formalities, because everything gets controlled from up. So controls do nothing there." (Judge 5)

This constant interference of the MPI field, i.e. carving a space for itself where it does not have a legal ground, changes the habitus of the banking field as well, and the banking field incarnates itself to the MPI field. The banking field mirrored all the inappropriateness committed at the MPI field level and kept hidden tactically. A banker participant in this

study revealed that accounting records of corrupt transactions are kept more up-to-date than other transactions as a tactic to avoid investigations. However, a detailed examination always reveals the actual position of these accounting records:

“Whenever, a scam has to take place, remember one thing the documents required for the fake transactions or illegitimate transactions would always be complete, although they will be either faked or unverified. The forgery will be done in such a way that from its onset it will seem to be a proper transaction for which all necessary documentation has been provided, but once you start going deep down into those documents, you’ll find that these documents are worthless and can’t be verified for their authenticity. Basically, they were an eyewash to the regulators and the auditors.” (Bureaucrat 7)

### **7.2.2 Bankers Have Learned Survival**

Similarly, the acceptance of this violence in the banks' accounting and internal control systems for Bourdieu (1989) is not a phenomenon that has been imposed by the powerful elite or propagated by them. It is the result that "agents apply to the objective structures of the social world, structures of their perception and appreciation which are issued out of these very structures, and which tend to picture the world as evident" (21).

“99 percent decisions can’t be made within rules. If I want to bring a deposit to my bank from an A-class customer (a very clean business record) and if the market doesn’t consist of such people, then how will I bring the deposit to my bank? ... It is always the top management that decides what levels of controls are required.... Remember one thing that law is like a pipe, big/powerful men can’t pass through it, they would choke it! This pipe is only for the commoners” (Bureaucrat 6).

Further, "Bourdieu focuses on the domination which forces the colonised to adopt the law of the coloniser" ... denying the dominated society the power of selection" (Schubert,

2014: 182). After conquering the political field, and dominating the banking field, as Bourdieu argues, it is the dominator who needs to install his people in the dominated field so that obedience can be achieved from them. A banker participant in this study, who had been the chairman of the Pakistan Banking Council, stated regarding the case study that General Beg had installed his best friend at the top slot of the HBL so that he could be used in future:

“And when Benazir became Prime Minister, General Beg told her that I have a friend in the HBL whose promotion is long due, please promote him. So Benazir promoted him (Yunus Habib) to the provincial chief. Provincial Chief had the authority to give loan up to Rs 2 crores (20 million) to one party” (Bureaucrat 5).

Lastly, it is pertinent to mention that those subjected to symbolic violence are the same and are more interested in those systems (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). It is because they understand the system of domination (for instance, the MPI field) from the dispositions generated by the same system. For a participant in this study, it was not intolerable for the banking controls of the state-owned banks to not conform to the requirements of the MPI field and not to fund the politicians. It was a norm!

“Also let me tell you another important thing here that, at that time, all national banks used to give money to those politicians who were contesting elections, it was a common practice, especially to the ruling class so that they could win elections, come back to power and given promotions or benefits to us” (ibid).

Although the violence that the MPI field was exerting was symbolic, the suffering it generated in the accounting and internal control system was very real. In conclusion, it can be said that in Pakistan's democracy, the MPI field has connected itself in such a



manner that it is not only the people who decide their rulers, but the MPI field has a more significant say in this regard. The MPI field's influence and tactics render the general public useless in this entire process of election and democracy; however, it also has implications for the accounting and internal control systems of the state-owned and private banks. This constant interference of the MPI field in various state institutions creates symbolic violence and makes such systems suffer the violence of state nobility. However, how the state covers such corruption using social magic and turns any attempt to revolutionise the field into partial revolution is discussed next in this thesis.

### **7.3 Hysteresis**

The case studies of this thesis can be seen in the light of the Bourdieusian concept of hysteresis, which reflects how hysteresis in the MPI field attempted to change the field on several occasions whenever there were disputes among the politicians and the military. Similarly, another hysteresis occurred when the judiciary and military had a dispute. However, corruption had been brought to light because of the hysteresis in the field. For example, this corruption was brought to people's attention whenever there was a fight between the two. The Supreme Court also decided this corruption case when there was another hysteresis, i.e. between the military and the top court. However, despite all these opportunities, the dominance of the powerful forces could not be challenged in the MPI field. All this is explored in the following discussion.

#### **7.3.1 When conformism becomes non-conformism**

The MPI field, whose very existence is plagued with corruption and, as mentioned in earlier chapters, requires a particular habitus and capital from its members. However, at

times there also appears a "hysteresis [in the field, i.e.] ... a social crisis" (Hardy, 2014: 126) that emerges between politicians and the military, and which brings ample opportunities for corruption for the dominant agents to save their dominant position in the field.

The link between the individual habitus and the field structures starts loosening up. Field agents feel out of place instead, "fish out of water" (Maton, 2014: 56). For this study, a political journalist expressed his views on how the MPI field agents are made to feel like a fish out of water, causing hysteresis in the field:

"when establishment thinks that he/she is not working in accordance with their strategic thinking; or they think that they [politicians] don't share their [establishment's] security paradigm. They [establishment] want to dictate how things should be done. So when Benazir came into power in 1988, she didn't know the mindsets of the generals who were carrying the legacy of General Zia ... later on, after forming her government, roadblocks were set for her government, and differences started to appear in decision-making processes between establishment and political government and that is when establishment thought they would have to distance themselves from her". (Political Journalist 11).

Besides that, with time, politicians in the MPI field also start changing their docility. They establish international connections and attempt to break free from the military's dominance and challenge the habitus of the MPI field, i.e. acceptance of the military's interference in politics. For Bourdieu, this change of habitus is common in response to new experiences of the field agents (Bourdieu 2000). This whole experience of politicians joining the MPI field and then establishing foreign connections and disputing with its dominating agent is described by research participants as follows:

“... our political elite firstly uses lobby as a tool to reach out to the military so that they could come into power, they take their share from the cake, then one day, they fight with them for any reason. That reason can be anything like ... something happening on the civil-military front etc. They come to the voter then and say democracy is in danger... Secondly ... in order to come into power, they look at the USA. The general public is not involved in anything” (Political Journalist 2).

American involvement in Pakistan's politics has also been considered a significant cause of hysteresis in the MPI field. A retired General also considered it a specific reason for the social crisis between the military and Benazir in the following words:

“Even when once we thought that we give her an exclusive briefing over Kashmir and nuclear programme and we invited her, she brought American ambassador with her without informing us .... So these types of things made people [in the military] worried” (General 5, Former ISI Chief).

### **7.3.2 Status quo Has to be Maintained**

On the other hand, due to this hysteresis in the field where politicians publicly reported the military's misgivings and political excesses, a form of disconnect between field and habitus, there were also opportunities for the field agents to improve their field positions (Bourdieu, 1999). For example, according to the former ISI chief, this case was an attempt to change political dynamics in the country so that the military could be taken to task.

“... this case [Asghar Khan] ... has become a political case now. Whoever would want to close this case, there would be a hue and cry that why are you closing it? The military men have come under our teeth, so punish them, people say... [and] then come judges like Iftikhar Chaudhry, and Saqib Nisar, who bring this case back on track to show that they won't spare anybody. So this case is no more a legal case, it's more of a political case now. It's because that two high profile soldiers [generals] are involved in it” (ibid).

Although many hystereses between the politicians and the military brought many opportunities to change the course of the MPI field, it remains challenging for politicians to break the cultural arbitrary established by the military. A participant in this study explained more about the cultural arbitrary:

“So their [military’s] interest was status quo as well as make sure that political class remains subservient to military. And whosoever made any kind of dissident movement or opposed them would be made a horrible example like Benazir and Nawaz” (Bureaucrat 3).

Even though the dominated agents make strategies against the cultural arbitrary, as Bourdieu (1999) writes in 'The Weight of the World', they cannot win against the dominant forces in the field and remain in the culturally disadvantaged position. Similarly, the two major political parties led by Benazir and Nawaz Sharif made their strategies. They forged an alliance to not fight with each other, the so-called charter of democracy. However, for the military, this was an alliance against its domination. So it brought another player in the MPI field to counter the strategy of the politicians. The politicians' strategies could not affect the military's dominance by resorting to more corruption and forming new alliances.

A politician participant in this study explains it:

"Earlier, it was a common practice that if one party used to do corruption then the other would go to the military and say that look what they are doing, and they [military] having this balancing factor in their hand would replace things. But that ended with the charter of democracy. In that situation, the establishment had to bring another third player into the field, who would build his politics around 'corruption elimination', for that purpose, Imran Khan got the backing. So basically charter of democracy was about not questioning each other's corruption as well as weakening the army, which they thought, was used to question their corruption. They tried to corner the army. So in retaliation, the army brought a new third player in the field" (Politician 2)

To Bourdieu (1996), those rich in cultural or social capital tend to benefit from their dominance in various ways. For instance, whenever hysteresis brings forth crises, the habitus and field position of the dominant agents guide them to acquire another dominant position in the freshly created situation. A retired judge participant in this study explained how, firstly, the dominance of the military remains unchallenged because of the constitutional cover it has been provided:

“to go against the military is a difficult thing. Our constitution protects the army. No writ can be issued against the army, according to our constitution. So if the constitution gives you protection, it is an independent institution, and you can't interfere with its functioning” (Judge 2).

And secondly, they know different measures to continue their dominance in new positions, which again involve various schemes of corruption, for example:

"They [military] have adopted, you know, different measures for political legitimacy, and transforming their system to a political system. And for that, they used different methods; political win over is one of the strategies, and co-option is another strategy; when you co-opt, you exclude some people and introduce constitutional changes. You try to implement your view of politics and then manage elections carefully (Politician 6, Former Chief Minister).

In addition to the conflicts between the military and the politicians, other state institutions also bring hysteresis to the MPI field. For instance, "state intervention changes what is legitimate" (Hardy, 2014: 138) by assigning different values to the cultural capital valued in any field, causing a dislocation between habitus and field structures (a hysteresis). The same could be seen for the MPI field when the top state institution, the Supreme Court, decided the case against the military. Traditional ways and cultural dispositions of the

MPI field were going to be challenged now. (Grenfell, 2006). However, for many participants of this study, the top court's decision was not free from its own biases. A hysteresis had taken place at the judiciary-military alliance (a fight between the Chief Justice and the military dictator had led the Chief Justice to open this case after 12 years, as mentioned in the 'case' above).

“Here, the court dragged itself into politics. It caught centre stage. It became all-powerful. The court which had always been an under-link of the military was now trying to make the military its under-link. So even military regimes were criticised in this case [for the first time]” (Lawyer 6, Former Attorney General of Pakistan).

However, as already mentioned, hysteresis in the field brings opportunities to change, where successes and failures can be experienced in terms of changing or not changing the field. As the field agents move in an unknown direction while having hysteresis, they do not know the exact outcomes of their hystereses. The same was experienced in the MPI field. For example, the politicians reported their social crises in the field, i.e. the excesses of the military. The top court also contributed and broke free the past assertions of the judiciary being the subordinate institution of the military. However, these field struggles also landed the field into an unknown future. The decision of the Supreme Court did not prove powerful enough to stop the desirable dominance of the military in the MPI field.

### **7.3.3 Accounting and Accountability: A Pious Hypocrisy**

Although by taking up this corruption case, the supreme court had given the impression that it would decide on the corruption of the MPI field, which was going to be another hysteresis for the MPI field after the politicians started to speak against the MPI field.

However, the ruling on the case could not live up to the expectations of many in the juridical field. For example, according to the lawyer of one of the defendants and a participant in this study:

"If Supreme Court was saying that your this action (General's action) is wrong, then why did they have to say this to the FIA that you do the investigations. If Supreme Court determines that the chief of the army has done something wrong, and it records a finding to that fact, why then it will refer the case to FIA to determine [it further]? It is not the case where the court decided against the establishment. There is no determinative finding against General Beg or General Durrani. The court only said that you do further investigations. Supreme Court says this in hundreds of cases, that do further investigation. This does not mean that Supreme Court takes on the establishment" (Lawyer 7).

Similarly, for a former Attorney General of Pakistan, the verdict of this case did not prove more than an academic exercise of the judiciary:

"As far as the judgment is concerned it did not lay any law which could be termed as good law. It was not a judicial precedent to be followed for the days to come. There was nothing before the court, the persons who were responsible nothing was done against them. it was more of a cosmetic and academic exercise than any real exercise" (Lawyer 6, Former Attorney General of Pakistan).

Fields, according to Bourdieu, were not closed entities but always remained in a state of expansion with other fields (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The legal field in Pakistan had also not been an exception and continued to strengthen its ties with the field of state power, i.e. the MPI field. The law and jurisprudence, i.e. the overall accountability system in Pakistan, could be seen as having solid reflections of the interests of the dominant state groups, for example, using law as a potent instrument of domination (Dezalay and Madsen, 2012). For this reason, although the judiciary in Pakistan had always claimed to

be independent of other state institutions' pressures and even saw its scuffle with the military, the means and ends of its accountability system could never escape those power relations. A participant from the legal fraternity expressed the accountability system in the country in the following words:

“Accountability system here has become an instrument in their [military] hands. They are not catching people for their corruption but because military establishment is angry with them ... [they] opened NAB [National Accountability Bureau] cases against all of them. However, when a particular politician said, sir, I’m in your party, his NAB cases were closed” (Lawyer 3).

Similarly, when I asked the petitioner's lawyer about the accountability system and the judgment of the top court concerning the case study of this thesis, his reply comprised:

“... it [Asghar Khan case] just shows that the establishment is powerful, and the courts drag their feet in cases that involve the army and the establishment. We know that, and yes, this reflects the unevenness of the system” (Lawyer 5).

For a former judge of the accountability court, all these power relations were becoming detrimental to the financial institutions whose accounting and accountability controls were weakened to strengthen the political corruption in Pakistan.

“It is in my personal knowledge while I was performing my duty in the NAB [National Accountability Bureau] that the collateral securities for the grant of loans were of the bed of the river. And if bed of the river is kept as a security in case someone defaults in making payments of that loan then how the amount of that loan can be recovered from the defaulted person. Every bank has a committee which ensures that the collaterals are sufficient or not for the recovery of the loan, but that department was bypassed and even the revenue department was bribed and provided fake documents regarding the ownership of properties, and without verification those documents were kept as security. In this way, loans were disbursed and were not recovered and



if the loans were recovered at a later stage the time value of money would have affected the whole financial institution badly” (Judge 4).

Bourdieu (1987), in 'Forces of Law', explains the juridical field as "the site of a competition" (817) involving the dominant field members having their monopoly in explaining the law. "Juridical productions, like other forms of cultural productions ... are tied to the assumptions which are written into the very structure of the game ... for example, the relationship between the juridical field and the field of power" (ibid: 852).

For this study, it was not difficult to see the conflicting claims of the military officials and the politicians to explain the accountability system of Pakistan. If a retired military general, for instance, was defending the work of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) for prosecuting the influential politicians in Pakistan. On the other hand, a politician denounced this accountability system as a persecution of politicians in Pakistan. However, in the end, an accountability court judge contradicted what the retired general said and connected the accountability system with the structure of the political games.

For a retired military General:

“When the accountability drive is launched, and it starts hurting the people then you also find people reacting against it. It is to their [NAB's] credit, I think, in this region you have more examples where ex-prime ministers, ex-chief ministers, ex-bureaucrats have been brought in the [inaudible] of accountability” (General 1).

But for a politician:

“NAB’s ability to affect corruption is very limited. NAB has been a tool for political persecution, it’s nothing to do with political corruption. They would always go after political opponents of the government ... NAB has been given draconian powers to arrest anyone they feel like. If you speak against the government and government doesn’t like it, they will make NAB run after you. It has lost its credibility in the

present government if it had any. It is a fish which is completely rot” (Politician 5).

However, a retired accountability judge conferred:

“It [military] has remained involved in the IJI formation, political set up formations, purchasing loyalties etc., even General Musharraf formed Q league during his dictatorship. They unduly influence people either using NAB or other. I can give you an example that there was a politician in Sheikhpura, fake case of drugs was registered against him, which was punishable by death, but later on when he agreed to join the Q league in General Musharraf’s time, he was released. This is one tactic, the other they have is to offer bribe straight away, the way they [military] gave out money in forming IJI, as it is stated in Asghar Khan case, these are all tactics” (Judge 5).

Hence, the jurists, i.e. the accountability system, had their interest in legitimising and being legitimised in Pakistan. They were legitimising the MPI field in the political system and carving a particular role for themselves in the system. A role motivated by their political inclinations, social affinities, and financial interests (Bourdieu, 1987). The closeness of such shared interests is so closely guarded that it is unlikely to work against the dominant forces of the system. A former accountability court judge put it in the following words:

“... in fact, it [accountability] is a source of corruption here and not something to control corruption. The officers who are sitting there would perhaps also be doing corruption. Do you think they are surviving on their salaries alone? No, It [accountability] is actually a matter of giving employment to their own people, that such and such people will go and work for the accountability bureau. Hence, their livings are made to be dependent on it. They do not work there to end corruption; they go only for their job or other benefits they are getting in addition to their salary ... ” (Judge 1).

"The jurists, the berobed, were people with a connection to the state, and in order to make their interests prevail, they had to make the state prevail ... And in this way, by this kind of pious hypocrisy ... they contribute to developing a discourse that is the very negation of what they legitimise"(Bourdieu, 2014).

For example, although the accountability system claims to eradicate political corruption from the system, however, it becomes an integral part of promoting corruption. For Bourdieu, "judicial ratification is the canonical form of all this social magic" (Bourdieu, 1987: 840). It renders those in the dominated positions have their subversive efforts becoming least successful in abolishing the power relations of the dominant forces, thereby perpetuating the structure of the MPI field.

Besides that, how the state's response in dealing with these corruption cases worked as a social magic and brought partial revolution in the field of corruption is important to consider and discussed in the next chapter.

## **8 SOCIAL MAGIC, PARTIAL REVOLUTIONS, AND CELEBRITIZATION OF CORRUPTION**

### **8.1 Social Magic**

In the last few chapters, it has been discussed in detail how the MPI field developed and sustained its motivations to influence the political process in Pakistan. For example, how it used various ways of controlling the political process directly (through martial law) and indirectly (by creating an alliance with politicians). Although such alliances with one group of politicians in case of disputes with the other group (hysteresis in the field, as discussed in the last chapter) bring more opportunities for political corruption in the MPI field; however, in this chapter, I discuss the state's response to this corruption. For example, how the state responded after the Supreme Court decided the Asghar Khan case in 2012. How did it deal with the accountability of those involved in this corruption?

The state in Pakistan speaks a lot about eradicating political corruption; however, in the case of two corruption scandals, which have just been mentioned in the last chapter, state action and in-action show a completely different picture of the accountability process. It tends to make those involved in it realise that political corruption has no big issue as long as it is done in connivance with the field of power, i.e. the MPI field. However, the strategy that the state uses in this regard, i.e. by reacting to this corruption as if no corruption took place, is nothing less than magic, which Bourdieu (1991) terms "social magic" (111). The themes discussed in this section show how 'ambiguity' is created and promoted by state institutions to discourage progress in these cases. Secondly, how the 'national interest' card is played to give all corrupt actions a new direction, hence making way for no-corruption in the acts of corruption. All this magic is discussed next.

### **8.1.1 Ambiguity is Magical**

From the outset, it appeared that when the Asghar Khan political corruption case was filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1996, it would set a new precedent in the country. For example, the court's acceptance of the case was a big message for the ruling elite, especially the MPI field, that such matters would not escape the rule of law. However, with time, things seemingly started to die down. Social magic started to get at it. It permeated into all those state departments that were required to interrogate, investigate, and prosecute these cases. The MPI field remained dominant, wielded its power, and brought that version of the corruption that suited it the most. The corruption declared by the Supreme Court was going to become no-corruption (I use the term no-corruption because the complete indifference of the state towards these cases reflects if this is a no-corruption or a minor corruption).

For Bourdieu (1991), the success of social magic depends on the 'interdependent conditions' or actions used in the 'social rituals' (111). For example, in this study, the state departments performed their tasks as rituals to facilitate the state in achieving what it wished. For example, the state initially remained indifferent to this matter in helping the Supreme Court decide this case. That is why it took the Supreme Court of Pakistan sixteen years to decide this case since the petition was filed in 1996. However, when the decision came out in 2012, the directions relating to accountability that the top court gave were still not implemented until 2022. For a participant in this study (a retired judge from the Lahore High Court and former Attorney General Punjab), the verdict of the Asghar Khan case was nothing more than judicial magic, and the court never intended to enforce its judgment.

“This issue [of Asghar Khan Case] has not been taken up with seriousness .... If Supreme Court, at the time of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in office, for some reasons, had decided the case then it could also have this case implemented as well if it had wanted; because whatever it had wanted to implement it got that implemented within hours; but this case it left [hanging] like this deliberately. Neither this case was important for the judges before him nor for him. He [Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry] only gave his observation or direction in this regard which, again, was not very important for those who were going to implement it.” (Judge 1).

The Supreme Court's order directed the politicians whose names were identified during the court proceedings to return that amount with interest in the national exchequer they obtained from the intelligence agency in 1990. The judgment quoted:

“... it is noteworthy that in the course of the proceedings, it was alleged that one of the recipients, namely, [name deleted] as per reports published in the newspapers, had acknowledged receipt of the money (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012: 123).

The matter was also reported in the media:

“Talking to Arif Nizami in SAMAA program, [name deleted], a former National Assembly member from [deleted], noted [pronoun deleted] is willing to return the money along with the interest.” (SAMAA, 2012).

In 2018, however, six years after the admission, the same politician filed a written statement in the Supreme Court that now they deny such receipt:

... [name deleted] also denied on Monday that [pronoun deleted] had ever received funds from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in 1990 for creating the Islami Jamhoori Ittihad [IJI]... In a two-page statement submitted to the Supreme Court, [name deleted] stated that the allegations contained in the affidavit of the former ISI chief were incorrect” (Dawn, 2018b).

And the Supreme Court accepted that statement as it is. The state institution, without interrogation, declared the money which was earlier acknowledged as having been received as not being received. The state used its authority and gave credence to that

belief suited the state's vision and division, demonstrating its social magic (Bourdieu, 1991).

Similarly, in another incident, the banker Yunus Habib said to the Supreme Court that he had given the money to Nawaz Sharif as a bribe.

“According to Younis Habib, he had himself handed over Rs 3.5 million to Nawaz Sharif at his Lahore residence while Rs 2.5 million were later sent to Shahbaz Sharif [Nawaz Sharif’s brother] through Telegraphic Transfer” (The News, 2015).

However, after two years, in 2014, Yunus Habib changed his statement regarding Nawaz Sharif because Nawaz had then become the Prime Minister of the country:

"In a surprising development in the Asghar Khan case eighteen years later, the PML-N leadership has received an all-clear, after Younis Habib, a key witness in the case, retracted his statement of having paid the prime minister and [his brother] Punjab’s chief minister sums of money to run campaigns in the 1990 general elections. Habib says he did not pay any amount to either politician, according to a source” (Rana, 2014).

The politicians had spread the ambiguity successfully that the corruption scandal the Supreme Court had decided had been nothing but a frivolous charge against the politicians. They played their role in bringing out the political magic in the game, and the Supreme Court's ultimate authority in this regard was giving life to these statements. Such is the power of state institutions in bringing social magic and creating "differences ex-nihilo ... like the biological differences between sexes ..." (Bourdieu, 1991: 120).

Similarly, the bureaucracy also played its role in furthering the confusion. It was evident from the verdict of the Asghar Khan case that when the Supreme Court asked the Ministry of Justice Department to submit the inquiry commission's reports of the two banking

scandals, the reply that the Supreme Court got in this regard had been quoted in the verdict in the following words:

"... the Commission did not complete its report, as is evident from the report dated 17.05.2012 submitted on behalf of the Ministry of Law and Justice vide CMA No.2096/12 wherein it is stated that report of Commission in the affairs of Mehran Bank Ltd, is not available. As regards the report on Habib Bank Limited [HBL] Scam, it was submitted that Chairman HBL Inquiry Commission vide letter dated 22.04.1997 sent only an interim report and did not send the final report to the Ministry. (Asghar Khan vs Aslam Beg, 2012: 32).

The state's Ministry of Justice responded casually to the country's two most prominent banking and political corruption scandals. The state had not been interested in completing the inquiries of these banking scandals, which occurred in 1990 and 1994, respectively, even until 2012, when the Supreme Court demanded them during the hearing. The state departments were conferring the MPI field "with all the corresponding privileges" through their "social treatments ... to transform [its] instituted difference into natural distinction" (Bourdieu, 1990: 58).

The same privileged treatment of the social magic towards the MPI field could also be observed in the FIA reports submitted to the Supreme Court, where it requested the top court to close this case for want of evidence. One example of Bureaucratic magic appeared when the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) appealed to the Supreme Court that after investigating for around six years, they could not complete their investigations, so the case should be closed. It was reported:



“In its report submitted before the Supreme Court on Saturday, the FIA stated that due to lack of sufficient and solid evidence, the investigation in the matter could not continue. Similarly, it also contended that there are contradictions in the statements recorded by the witnesses. The FIA further submitted that as the matter is 25-year old hence no record of bank transactions could be found, adding that politicians who were accused of taking money have also denied the allegations.” (Iqbal, 2018).

The social magic of all the state institutions worked, and the Supreme Court delisted the Asghar Khan case from further hearings on March 19, 2019 (The News, 2019). Moreover, since then, no hearing has taken place, even until 2022. The corruption case that the court had decided on became a no-corruption case when it came to implementing the verdict.

The conversion process of social magic is shown in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1

<b>Actions</b>	<b>Outcomes</b>	<b>Social Magic</b>
Petition filed of Asghar Khan Case in 1996	No decision until 2012	Judicial Magic
The decision came in 2012	No implementation until 2022	Judicial Magic
Inquiry Commissions for both cases were formed in the 1990s	No final reports were submitted to the court in 2012	Bureaucratic Magic
Investigations initiated by the FIA in 2012	Request for closure of the case in 2018	Bureaucratic Magic

One politician accepts taking bribe	Later changes statement	Political Magic
A banker accuses a politician and his brother of taking money from him	Later changed his statement when that politician became PM	Political Magic

### 8.1.2 National Interest is Magical Too

Social magic, according to Ingram and Allen (2019), involves the process where the modes of discrimination are “first obscured and then transformed” (729) according to the wishes of those who want to “disguise cultural arbitrariness” (737). It takes the discussion of social magic towards a phenomenon called 'national interest', used by the states and their heads in their interest. Throughout the interview sessions of this study, I heard this term from the participants who had served the government of Pakistan in various capacities, such as ministers, senior bureaucrats, military generals, and justices. The following section discusses how this term has been used in obscuring things and transforming them into social magic, especially concerning political corruption.

For some, the actions involved in the Asghar Khan case were nothing but honourable acts of national interest. A bureaucrat stated that:

“In the Asghar khan case, General Hameed Gul, former DG ISI, has elaborated in detail that it had never involved corruption. It was actually about national interest ... So they worked for their own interests. I don't think that it was based on corruption. That was a strategical move as well as a political one ... So the word corrupt should not be used in this regard” (Bureaucrat 2).

Similarly, for a lawyer and participant in this study, it was unacceptable that the MPI field committed any corruption in bribing politicians. It was a sheer national interest which was making them do it.

“... but what was their [military’s] personal benefit in it [bribing politicians]? I’m not actually ready to buy this ... I have seen a lot of things very closely. Maybe they [military] would have done something in the national interest but they would never do something like to bring corrupt people forward” (Lawyer 1).

For another participant, a politician, the military in Pakistan is in charge of taking care of its national interest, and why should we trust the military’s vision of the national interest is because they do everything on merit.

“... the institution [army] which is doing all this, its everything is based on the merit, like entry and promotions in this institution are all on merit” (Politician 2).

Thus, the cultural arbitrary, for example, the dominance of the MPI field in the political setup of Pakistan, is successfully disguised by terming the military's political aspirations as acts of national interest. Bourdieu terms this an effect of social magic when "a socially approved non-entity ... accedes to a recognised scientific existence" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 232). For example, the military is a non-entity in the political setup, but having its social approval has achieved the status of a recognised political institution through social magic, for instance, using national interest terms in this regard.

Similarly, the terms such as national interest and 'the guardians of national interest' give so much power to the already powerful institution of the military that these help them

justify those actions, which would not have been possible if these overarching terms were taken away. Some participants in this study elucidated a more candid explanation of the national interest in the context of Pakistan's political setup.

“So, basically, it is something which is created, as a hoax, to do certain things which are not legally permitted” (Bureaucrat 1).

“People in power try to align their personal interest of remaining in power with the national interest and they sell it as a national interest to perpetuate themselves in power ...” (General 2).

“... there had been national leaders who think that they had been part of the national interest. They are obviously stretched too far... they give their own personal interest the colour of national interest, which is true of military leaders most of all .... The leaders who have served for fifteen or twenty years have this idea that they embody the nation ... [like] the famous king Louis the Fourteenth said, 'I'm the state' (Lawyer 2, Former Defence Minister).

Even the banker who stole money from the HBL and was found guilty by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the Asghar Khan case termed his siphoning off of the money from the state-owned bank in the “supreme national interest” of the country (Asghar Khan v Aslam Beg, 2012: 42).

Although it can be seen from the above discussion that bribing the politicians and creating political groups in the country by the military had been reckoned as acts of the country's national interest, Bakhtiar (1994) later spilt the beans and showed a different picture of this political group formation. He stated:

"... a total of Rs 140 million was deposited in these accounts between September 16 and October 26, 1990. This money was withdrawn almost immediately after it was deposited and is said to have gone towards bankrolling the 1990 election campaigns of certain politicians. It was not done out of generosity, only to allegedly further the career designs of "General Beg, who wanted an extension in his tenure as army chief. General Beg apparently felt that Bhutto government would do no such thing" (Bakhtiar, 1994: 28). It is this reason that he sponsored a political alliance as "General Beg believed that the IJI would form the government and that Mr Jatoi, who was sure to grant him an extension in service, would become the prime minister" (ibid: 31).

The whole act of political funding was designed to bring those politicians in power who could give extension to the then chief of army was being given the name of the national interest. The "sleight of hand" had worked in the form of social magic to "transforms subjective value judgements into seemingly objective assessments without anyone recognising the illusion" (Ingram and Allen, 2019: 737).

## **8.2 Partial Revolutions**

According to Bourdieu (1993), partial revolutions are the actions of field agents who do not question the fundamentals of the field to avoid total revolution. And what they concentrate more on is how to play the game differently or in the best possible way to improve their own field positions, causing only partial revolutions within the field. Since all the agents have a staunch belief in the field, they never intend to subvert it completely. The same can also be stated regarding the MPI field, that is, how its dominant members, i.e. military, attempt to save the field from total revolutions. The MPI field has to use such strategies, which turn every attempt of the dominated agents to bring total revolution into partial revolutions. The main reason remains to strengthen the cultural arbitrary of the

field, i.e. domination of the military's political role. The dominated field members also understand that due to the heavy investment of the dominant and the time and other commitments required from the dominated (ibid), a total revolution is not possible. So they also resort to becoming part of the MPI field, believing that all of them can only survive if the field survives. All this is going to be discussed under the following themes.

### **8.2.1 Fundamental Interest (Illusio) in the Game**

The field members need to have an interest in the game for which the field is designed. Having their faith in the field prevents the field from undermining the power and authority of the dominant. Similarly, their interest in the field improves their position within the field. "It guides their practice and allows them to act in a particular way within the context in which they find themselves, in order to define and improve their position" (Grenfell, 2014: 152). Such interest is found within Pakistan's establishment, which guides their practice of continuous interference in the political setup.

“Nowhere in the world, you will see that the state itself is coming and institutionalising rent-seeking. They make laws against rent-seeking and other political corruption. What we have seen here is a perpetual effort by the military establishment as well as the political elite of the time to give more and more in the form of political bribes ...” (Bureaucrat 3).

The same goes for the politicians, who do not join the hands of the military without having their own interests in this process. Their motives keep their faith firm in the MPI field.

[...] “politicians think certain things are off-limits to them, but these limits vanish if they make an alliance with them [military].” (Political Journalist 11)

It is also important to mention that politicians in Pakistan have always been complaining about the military's excesses, i.e. they feel that the MPI field uses and abuses them. However, according to Bourdieu, it is not the agents who live in any field; it is the field that lives in the agents (Grenfell, 2014). For example, one cannot join a field unless one has certain affinities/inclinations towards the field. It is more like "the "good school chooses the pupil as much as the pupil chooses the school" (ibid: 163). The same was reported by a political journalist who blamed both military and politicians for forming their alliances and then making it a fight of democracy vs authoritarianism. He contended:

“...but what is happening here, our political elite firstly uses lobby as a tool to reach out to the military so that they could come into power, they [politicians] take their share from the cake, then one day, they fight with them [military] for any reason; that reason can be anything, for example, resulting from a business contract, or something happening on civil-military front etc. They come to the voter then and say democracy is in danger” (Political Journalist 2).

Similarly, this interest and investment in the game also help us understand the military's motivations to join the civil bureaucracy to gain a state of complete control over the system. They are caught with the field in such a way that they become the 'game' of the field (Bourdieu, 1990).

“Look at the services they [military officers] go into [after serving some time in the military], they go into Pakistan's administrative services, foreign services, and police services. These are the only three groups in which military people are inducted. Now, what is the justification for that? Does it make any sense? The only sense that comes out of it is that they send their well-trained personnel into these essential services to keep a total control” (Bureaucrat 1).

Similarly, in the context of political corruption, which is at the heart of this study, it has been found that it had not only been the matter of the chief of the army's job extension (as mentioned in the social magic section) behind all the games of financing the political groups. However, it had also been the money motivations (the fundamental interest of the General) triggering the money heist from the state-owned bank.

Although General Beg showed his complete disinterest in the Supreme Court (for example, he referred to the matter as something that was happening between the President and ISI Chief), however, the involvement of money in this regard showed how interested he was in getting the money out of the bank. It was mentioned in the Supreme Court's verdict that out of Rs 140 million drawn illegally from the HBL, some money was transferred into General Beg's foundation, called 'Friends'. According to Bourdieu, there is also an interest when one appears disinterested (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). The Court judgment referred to the money claim in the following words:

"Rs. 3 Crores [30 million] approximately were drawn and given to "FRIENDS" [sic] under the instruction of Gen. Beg during his last days as Army Chief" (Asghar Khan v Aslam Beg, 2012: 133).

For a journalist participant, corruption of those who work in the MPI field gets easily brushed under the carpet:

"... if there's a man who's corrupt, and he is with them [military], then you'll not hear anything bad about him. They will not let anything out against him. I personally know that my colleague was going to do a story on a corrupt politician, but the military stopped him from working on that story" (Political Journalist 5)



By the same token, the financial bureaucrat Yunus Habib who had siphoned money off from the public in 1990 and then in 1994, also had such a deep-rooted interest in the MPI field that he could not think of bringing a total revolution in the field. Although he had plundered billions of rupees from the state and private banks throughout 80 and 90, he only had to return Rs 1.6 billion in the end after the passing of 15-20 years.

“The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has recovered Rs1.6 billion in the famous Mehran Bank scandal case by selling Benami property of defunct bank’s chief Younus Habib in Islamabad, a spokesman for the NAB said on Wednesday... Mr Habib had siphoned off a staggering Rs 5 billion and doled out millions of rupees to politicians in order to cover up his crime” (Dawn, 2006).

Bourdieu quite aptly said for such circumstances that, bureaucrats "legitimise their position as servants of the state while their interest is in having the state at their service" (Grenfell, 2014:165).

### **8.2.2 Investment in the Game**

One of the reasons that the social games played by the agents within the field remain unharmed is the ‘size of investment in time and effort’ (Bourdieu, 1993) which gets inculcated in the minds of the field agents so well that any subversion of the game becomes “unthinkable” (74) for the agents. Regarding the case study of this thesis, the same can be felt regarding the military's power structure, which remains 'unthinkable' for politicians to subvert. The military's might in the arms, its intelligence services, its links with international spy agencies, and its hegemony in the national interest (as mentioned in the last section) have made it invincible for the politicians to compete with it. Such

increased military investment in its institution also requires increased investment in the political field to continue its mighty presence in the country's establishment. For a participant of this study, the military had never allowed politicians to control them; such is the power of their investment:

“The actual power was never transferred to the voters. When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power, he brought back the prisoners of war from Bangladesh, even though he was not able to prosecute military men for war crimes. In other countries, if there had been war crimes there would have been commissions, but here even Bhutto did not have the power to exercise over the military. He was also cut to his size. He had remained under tremendous pressure from the military and the real power remained with them, and ultimately, he was hanged because he had some tendencies of non-conformism which they (military) didn't like at all” (Bureaucrat 3).

This investment in the game adjusts the field agents' dispositions so that it assures them of success in the field's stakes and satisfies them regarding their "ability to play the game" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 118). The politicians have understood the same in Pakistan that after remaining part of the MPI field for so long, the political rule in Pakistan had never been a success of the democratic system per se. Instead, it was always something which had been bestowed upon them from the military to work under their tutelage. A lawyer and former politician participant in this study revealed that:

“General Zia famously said in 1985 when formed the government of Junejo, "do not think that we are transferring you the power; we are not taking anything from you but giving". This meant that the power belongs to us (military) we're only giving some portion of it to you, and we are not taking anything in return because it is already ours. So it was not a transfer of power but sharing of power" (Lawyer 3).

The military's investment in the political field has made politicians, judiciary, and bureaucrats realise that any sort of subversion is 'unthinkable' here. Looking into this background, it becomes easier to understand how necessary it was for the financial bureaucrat, Yunus Habib, to keep generals pleased and fulfil their requests for money. He was thinking of investing in the MPI field by investing in the generals so that he could yield benefits later. For a banker bureaucrat participant in this study, it was not difficult, to sum up Yunus Habib and his actions in the following words:

"Yunus Habib, to describe him was like that someone is carrying a tray full of cash, offering everyone [influential]. That's how he wooed General Nasir. In that time period, he plundered but he also shared it with others as well" (Bureaucrat 4).

"Younis Habib was an illiterate but crooked person who had developed skills to manipulate the financial system by cultivating the army generals and top brass of political leadership, and by sharing with them the national wealth plundered by him" (Bureaucrat 8, Former Governor State Bank of Pakistan).

The above discussion shows the basic premise of Bourdieu's theory that one cannot exist in a field without having an interest in the field. If one has an interest in the field, one invests more in the field to gain more improved positions than the rest in the field. This investment in the field brings dominance and deterrence against the total revolution in the field. Although this process brings cultural arbitrary domination of the powerful, however, for Bourdieu, "those who talk of equality of opportunity [in the fields] forget that social games . . . are not "fair games" (Webb et al., 2002: 24).

### 8.2.3 Save the Field and Save Yourself

After investing so heavily in the field, it makes every sense for the agent to conserve the cultural production of the field because doing so would enable them to conserve themselves (Bourdieu, 1993). The same can be discussed regarding the case studies of this thesis. Once the MPI field is established, it becomes mandatory for the field members to save it from total collapse because the field's collapse would declare the field of power's own collapse. Furthermore, its survival would continue its benefits for the entire field of power. In this way, this dependence of the politicians on the military and vice versa makes political corruption a need of the MPI field to save itself from total revolution. For a participant in this study, it was summed up in the following words:

“That’s why I call them [the political parties] non-democratic parties. If they had been democratic, they could have given a shut-up call to the non-democratic forces [military]. They could have told them that we are the representatives of the people, why are you interfering? And similarly, if these so-called democratic people are approached by a military institution and require that you leave one political party and go to another one then [at that time] they could also give them a shut-up call. But they [politicians] say that they [military] made us do that, I ask them, are you really babies or small children that they [military] can easily get things done from you? The fact is that you also wanted to do that, all you wanted was a push or an excuse” (Judge 1).

For Bourdieu (1977), it was not enough for a field to merely get together individuals and form a field unless they all have shared interests to make a social collectivity. The strategies are then devised to strengthen the field by adjusting everyone to this social collectivity. Similarly, the MPI field casts the net wider. It brings the judiciary into its ambit to gain more power by having judicial agents in the field and saving itself from collapse.

The judicial system, which is required to work independently, is thus lured into saving the MPI field. For participant judges in this study, the judges do not say 'no' to the powerful military and politicians.

"... judiciary is also part of this society. Their kids, siblings, and families need to do jobs, and it is these political forces they go to for such employment. So, how will they get a job if they will anger them [politicians + military]? It is a matter of give and take. I'm saying from my experience that sometimes judges make decisions with the intention that they are going to retire sometime so if they give a favourable decision to someone, they can get a job quickly after their retirement and in this way enjoy power and money for 4-5 more years (Judge 2).

Similarly, considering the background of Bourdieu's partial revolutions and 'saving the field is saving oneself', the following statement of Yunus Habib in 2012 feels quite apt. He contended that many bigwigs would be in trouble if he opened his mouth. "Younis Habib said he could create a lot of complications by involving many people who were part of the dirty game in 1990, but he was not doing that" (Mir, 2012). He was making every effort to preserve the field; after all, this field enabled him to plunder billions of rupees from the banks. Prevented him from the severe punishments of the law and, in the end, allowed him to return a meagre amount of money out of the fortune of billions he fleeced from the public.

Besides using its social magic and turning the revolutions in the MPI field into merely partial revolutions, the Pakistani state promotes the politics of the MPI field by celebrating its activities. It undermines any other political system that it thinks can be challenging for the MPI field. All this is discussed next in the celebration of corruption section.

### 8.3 Celebritization Of Corruption

From the above discussion, it can be seen that the political corruption of Pakistan's ruling elite, for example, the military and its selected politicians through the MPI field, has been brought to people's attention and decided by the Supreme Court (due to hysteresis). However, it is not punished by the state; rather, frivolous justifications are granted by the state institutions (using social magic). In this section, another important dimension of the MPI field is discussed, which involves its generation of positive emotional responses from the people, i.e. how patriotic and noble this field is. This power of the state and invoking positive emotional responses regarding the MPI field gives the corruption of the MPI field a status of celebritization. It is discussed next.

According to Rindova et al. (2006), a critical feature of a celebrity is that a social actor evokes a lot of public attention. For example, the more people know and admire the celebrity, the more value it generates for the celebrity. The same can be observed for Pakistan's military, which has achieved celebrity status for many since the country's independence (as mentioned in the context chapter). The way military keeps discipline and manages a strict accountability system in its organisation has been praised by many participants of this study, and their comments were not far from giving the military a celebrity status. For example, according to a some participants:

“In the military, you recruit a sepoy but then you take him to the ranks of a General, it’s because of a system, there are checks and balances in the system for eradication of corruption, no other department in Pakistan works like theirs. This is why ultimately when we don’t see any hope from anywhere [from the system or the politicians] we resort to them [military] because they have such norms” (Judge 5).

“one thing they [people] know is that this [going against the merit] does not apply in Pakistan’s army. I have been in politics for so long, that not a single person has ever come to me that I give them a favour and get their son promoted in the army, they never even asked me to get their children recruited in the army [by using my influence]” (Politician 4).

“The army is very disciplined, their accountability is very tough, corrupt people are taken to task there, I have seen high-rank officers being compulsorily retired and asked to deposit the money” (General 3).

However, these heightened expectations from the military strengthen the public's association with this institution, and it achieves the status of national pride for the nation. Hence, seeking their positive emotional responses in this regard (Rindova et al., 2006). For example, they start identifying themselves with a mightier and tougher institution. Further, the stance of a corruption-free and merit-based military institution adds prestige or status to the institution in the eyes of the public. All of this asks for a sense of attachment to the institution.

However, the problem arises when people's positive emotions for the institution also get transferred to the MPI field. A prevalence of general perception that the military controls politicians (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015) in the country (through the MPI field), as well as long durations of martial laws (as mentioned in the Conatus chapter), have all facilitated the extension of this celebratization status for the corruption of the MPI field. A discussion of how the MPI field is considered a field of noble cause is provided below.

### 8.3.1 MPI Field is for Noble Cause

To McKernan (2011), celebrities in the entertainment industry have commonalities with their counterparts in politics, for example, where celebrities "appeal to consumers' greatest dreams and desires" (192). On the other hand, the country's ruling elites "appeal to voters' sense of patriotism, fear, and anger" (ibid). Both are termed as having their own audiences regarding which they come up with their own different strategies.

“This sponsoring of the politicians, I seriously think that it happens out of goodness of their heart. Those ISI personnel who are dealing with this situation sincerely feel that they are bringing forward more honest and patriotic people [politicians]. They think that people don't think why they are voting for the dynastic politicians and they [intelligence agencies] are actually serving the country. So they kind of work in a way we can say that ends justify the means. They think that since our intentions are noble and our ends are good so our means would be justified as well. So for them then it's okay to justify the payments to the politicians, it's okay to pressurise the politicians, it's okay to even rig[inaudible] the election” (Politician 5)

The reality for Bourdieu is nothing but a manifestation of illusion, making the beholder ignore the interests or illuso underlying it (Grenfell, 2014). The abovementioned participant completely ignores those aspects of the MPI field which strive for its unconstitutional political domination in the country, use briberies, and even rig the elections in this process, but still manages to get positive emotions generated for the field. It takes the discussion of political corruption toward noble cause corruption. Miller (2007) asserted that corruption was also sometimes done by the social agents for their institution because, in their perception, it was suitable for their institution, even though it was inappropriate or ethically wrong for society. The same echoed in discussion with another



participant in this study who stressed that military rulers do not indulge in corruption like the politicians :

“... in the case of military government you don't find any evidence of material gains through illegal means by those who are controlling power, that's the basic difference. For example, the kinds of charges you have against Nawaz Sharif, and Zardari, about making money, you don't have these kinds of charges against military rulers ... Military people want to protect their interests and for that, they use state resources but not for building their empire, that's the basic difference”. (Politician 6)

Similarly, this task-related rule-breaking behaviour (Van Halderen and Kolthoff, 2016) is fostered in the MPI field as a service to the country. And its association with the national interest or national pride (Gabbioneta et al., 2013) brings “salience and positive emotional valence for their audiences and celebrity arises from the audience's attention and positive emotional responses” (Rindova et al., 2006: 51). Another participant expressed that:

“With respect to the Asghar Khan case, I would say that those involved thought they were doing it for a great national cause. They were not driven by revenge or trying to contain an enemy, which was also there, and which was their right purpose, but they did it under the cover of national interest. They somehow believed the perception that these [politicians against whom the alliance was being created] were the enemies of Pakistan” (Political Journalist 3).

Furthermore, the MPI field's doxa (Bourdieu, 1990) also plays a vital role in bringing out positive emotions from the public for the field. For example, what narrative the MPI field gives to the world for its existence, how it likes to be viewed by the people plays a significant role in strengthening the relation of celebritization between the public and the

MPI field. And a critical narrative in this regard is that the military has never been interested in ruling the country. However, it is always compelled the politicians to do so.

“... military I think doesn’t intervene by design or agenda, we create such circumstances in the country when they (politicians) don’t have deliverance capacity, I mean of political governments, he or she whoever is running the country, if they won’t deliver then on the public sentiment that pulse is checked [by the military]” (Political Journalist 1)

“politicians should also see that army is not dying to take over every time, but if there will be an absence of governance then the army will definitely take over. They have some generals who are overambitious with Napoleonic streak undoubtedly ...” (Politician 4)

According to Bourdieu (1998), the state gives its people a particular doxa, a certain point of view which then help the state in achieving its objectives. However, this particular doxa becomes a bedrock for the ideals formed in the minds of the citizens. For example, politicians are branded as corrupt in Pakistan( it happens in many democratic systems); however, the MPI field is considered a panacea in this regard (in contrast to many democratic systems). This doxa also comes from the state:

“... when politics became the ‘game of money’, establishment [military] realised that within the political parties there should be a democracy, there should be a meritocracy, political process should be transparent, political funding should have been made through legal ways. Otherwise, you only left the field open for rich people who would use their money; in that situation, if the establishment had to bring in people into politics who did not have [foreign funded] money, then what should they have done? This is the Asghar Khan case” (Politician 2).

Hence, the state sped up the celebritization process by assigning particular characteristics of the military to the MPI field, i.e. its competence, merit-based

functionality, and patriotism. Upon adoption of this doxa, the MPI field establishes a relationship and induces the citizens to be more sympathetic towards the military's political interferences.

In this way, it creates a celebrity which, according to Rindova et al. (2006: 51), is "a property of the actor's relationship with an audience, rather than a characteristic of the actor him/her/itself". Besides portraying itself as a noble cause field, the MPI field also aims to undermine the democratic system in Pakistan, against which it finds itself to be in direct competition. The more a democratic system is demeaned in Pakistan, the more the importance of the MPI field emerges. It is discussed next.

### **8.3.2 Democracy is Not for Us**

It is essential to see the cultural norms in Pakistan concerning the development of its political environment. The customs based on traditions and social norms (Tanzi, 1994), especially concerning Islamic traditions, are still cited for taking precedence over other systems. For example, democracy was quickly and widely accepted (during this study) as a Western concept whose implementation in Pakistan was not required to be of paramount importance. On the other hand, the narrative of authoritarianism was promoted on the pretext of having close affinities with Pakistan's local culture and religion.

"We talk much about Western democracy, but we are Eastern. Our history is full of kings; when the Mughals were defeated, and the English came, they were also like kings" .... We Muslims never saw democracy since its inception. Our four caliphs were appointed by different methods/systems. There was no general election in this regard. After that, there were the Abbasids and Ottoman empires. Later, when you come to the Sub-continent, there were kings and emperors. All Muslim rulers in the sub-continent were kings, emperors or nawabs. We do not have a history of democracy to teach our children (Judge 1)

Any criticism of democracy works best for the interests of the MPI field. It strengthens the field doxa (Bourdieu, 1980) that politicians use democracy for their corruption and black money; hence it is necessary to control them through the MPI field. And any resistance by the politicians in this regard should be deemed as their yearning for corruption. It is a doxa so carefully crafted by the MPI field that it appeals emotionally and rationally to the masses. Hence paves the way for the military's intercession in its political and accountability systems. It can also be observed in the following excerpts.

“... look, the democracy, which is tainted with black money is not a democracy at all. It has been given a wrong name, until and unless you eliminate money from the democracy you can't have the real democracy. If 65% of donations to the politicians are coming from the big corporations then that is not a democracy, no law can be passed there without their consent. So until you remove black money it's all farce” (Political Journalist 2).

“How come the BJP came to power in India? Is this perfect democracy there today? What is its result? The country is on the brink of breaking up. Even though democracy is not perfect, democracy can never be perfect. Even in America, there is no perfect democracy. I have lived there; I've seen that only the rich can run for the elections there. Either you should be rich enough or you should have sponsors, only then you can run in the elections” (General 4).

Lastly, another criticism which targets Pakistan's democracy is the presence of political dynasties in its political system. It, in turn, creates more political space for the MPI field, which projects itself as non-dynastic and more institutionalised than the dynastic political parties - which consolidate their familial positions by promoting parochial corruption (Tanzi, 1994). For a participant in this study, the military will continue to pitch itself as a

political force until we have these dynastic political parties in the country. In other words, the MPI field would also not want to eliminate dynastic political parties if it has to remain a political option in the country.

“... but here in political parties you will see that a dynastic system has been flourished. Political parties are becoming family parties” (Judge 2).

“... You [politicians] want dynastic rules, the army wants martial laws. So whenever there is a competition between dynastic rule and martial law, martial law would win. But whenever there will be a competition between democracy and the martial law, democracy would win” (Politician 2).

Hence, the field narratives (doxa) of the military working for a noble cause and democracy being the money-making business of the politicians attract large-scale public attention and stimulate their positive emotional responses in providing the corruption of the MPI field a celebrity status. The system not only valorises the military's institutional achievements but also brings it parallel to democracy, making it easier for the MPI field to rule and co-opt with democracy.

“... If you want to say that establishment should be restrained through democratic forces, then we have also seen democratic forces going over the board. So a healthy check and balance between institutions are lacking here; and how to achieve that, is a catch 22 question. It's not easy to do that. Look theory is one thing, like when you say that there should be a democracy, and such and such are the democratic principles, but when you try to implement the theory, it doesn't get applied” (General 2).

This chapter explained the sources and consequences of the excessive attention and positive emotions that the MPI field attracted from the general public. It showed how this

attention and emotions celebritize the actions of the MPI field, which along with the social magic power of the state, changed the dynamics of corruption in Pakistan. It is probably the only country in the world where corruption could easily become a no-corruption due to the presence of celebritization and the state's use of social magic. The next chapter concludes this thesis.

## 9 CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I explored the phenomenon of political corruption, its impact on accounting controls and the accountability system of Pakistan. The analysis of the two political corruption scandals, which involved political regime change and siphoning off of funds from the state-owned and private banks, showed how state politics (Ezzamel et al., 2007) violated the control systems of its institutions and suppressed its accountability process in the name of national interest. I had three research questions asking: (1) How does political corruption get perpetuated in the political system of Pakistan? (2) How do the two political corruption scandals cause sufferings for the accounting (of the banking industry) and accountability systems of Pakistan? And (3) How does the state's response to the two political corruption cases celebrate political corruption and help its perpetuation?

I used Bourdesian theoretical concepts to address these questions and inquired about the state's role in political corruption. It explained how the state was having a power struggle between its dominant forces (politicians vs military) and maintained its dominance not only by manipulating the political system but also by manipulating Pakistan's accounting and accountability systems. Although for the dominant actors within the state, such as the military, it brings multiple benefits, this also encourages other dominated actors, such as politicians and bureaucrats, to indulge in political corruption when they find no or lukewarm state response against corruption. I argue that accounting controls find themselves in a weaker state of control (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008), when they have to guard themselves against influential state actors. On the other

hand, this state of weakness has to be assured and maintained to continue the domination of the dominant forces.

Furthermore, the powerful state actors (Xu and Xu, 2008) also know they must manage their dominance and violate these controls. However, they have to build a particular narrative that could justify their actions. Hence, a national interest-based narrative is promoted, a narrative which, on the one hand, would not stop the embezzlement of public funds but, on the other hand, help those involved escape the accountability system of Pakistan. In this thesis, I explored the role of state politics (Ezzamel et al., 2007) in increasing political corruption rather than decreasing it. I made three contributions to the political corruption and accounting literature.

The first contribution explains how political corruption was perpetuated in Pakistan as a 'field' (in Bourdieusian terms) and how the quest for domination enabled the powerful forces of the state to declare a unique cultural capital for the field (such as remaining docile to the military's political interferences). Its acquisition would make the field agents superior beings in the field while opening various avenues of political corruption. Similarly, a particular field habitus was generated in this regard where the military's political interferences were deemed legitimate in a democratic environment. However, over time, the field's boundaries were extended to other fields. Such as the judiciary and the banking institutions, which increased the field of corruption's influence over the other fields. Besides having its implications for political immaturity, the field had severe repercussions for the accounting control systems of state-owned and private banking organisations. They all have to resort to dubious accounting practices to facilitate this field.



The second contribution of this study is the presentation of a theoretical framework on political corruption in Pakistan, which has been designed keeping in view the occurrences of political corruption based on the case studies of this thesis. It starts with creating a corruption field, as mentioned in the first contribution above, and then attaining perpetuation, i.e. conatus. This conatus has many corruption opportunities, bringing suffering to Pakistan's accounting and accountability systems. A hysteresis within the field unveils corruption to the public. Then the state response in the form of social magic brings a partial revolution in the field, and the field keeps enjoying the conatus again.

The third contribution is built on the previous two contributions. For example, the study explains how the doxa of a corrupt field, i.e. corruption in the national interest, invokes social magic and celebrates political corruption in Pakistan. It renders the accounting and accountability systems suffer from symbolic violence and protect the field from public scrutiny and the law's long arms. All of these contributions are discussed in more detail below (9.1). Then I set out the limitations of this study (9.2) while its practical implications are explained (9.3). I also propose possible future avenues for this study (9.4) at the end.

## **9.1 Contributions**

The three main contributions of this thesis are theoretical, and these are explained in detail below.

### **9.1.1 Political Corruption is a 'Field'**

The first contribution of this study concerns the literature on political corruption and accounting. Previous studies have shown how the skilful use of accounting is used in the formation of corrupt fields (Neu et al., 2013), especially in the Western world. On the other

hand, I claim this relationship is completely reversed in the developing world. Put differently, I contend that political corruption in developing countries becomes a strong institution in itself (or rather a field) because of the inabilities of the states (instead due to their vested interests). It enables the field to extend its boundaries to other fields, including the judiciary, financial institutions, and accounting. The MPI field, i.e. 'Military's Political Interference' and its quest to control the political process provides certain dispositions to the field members, through habitus and doxa, that it becomes a structure in itself and creates cultural arbitrary (Alawattage, 2011) for the field.

The analysis explains how this field emerged, what cultural capital is valued in it, how the military's dominance is achieved, and how the boundaries are expanded to the accounting and accountability institutions. For Bourdieu, it is the field that makes its participants progress and has their world vision (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). The power struggle between the democratic and non-democratic forces started in Pakistan right after its independence in 1947. When Pakistan made its first constitution in 1956, its powerful establishment understood that 'parliamentarianism was a curse' that needed to get rid of (Waseem, 2006: 108). The political setup had already become a site of power games (Bourdieu, 2005) which was only becoming more authoritative for the military and more demeaning for the politicians with time. The first President of Pakistan, a retired military general, contended that his countrymen were foolish and always needed someone to correct their blunders. That is why a 'controlled democracy' was a better option for them (Callard, 1957). It is pretty in line with what Bourdieu contended: the struggles within the field of power involve the seizure of state power, and the field's doxa gets shaped/reshaped accordingly (Bourdieu, 2014).

Soon the MPI field became an 'apparatus' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) where it was ready to crush and annul the struggles of the dominated, i.e. the politicians. For example, Pakistan had to witness three martial laws, i.e. from 1958 to 1969 by General Ayub Khan, from 1969 to 1971 by General Yahya Khan, and from 1977 to 1988 by General Zia ul Haq. These military dictators' dominating positions ascribed validity to the MPI field and stigmatised the politicians as corrupt who did not favour the military's political interference. The dominant knew how to crush the dominated.

Besides that, during those martial law periods, the military high-ups also started to get profit-making positions in the civilian bureaucracy to consolidate their position in the field. According to Rizvi (1991), military officials started to go on well-paid assignments in the Gulf region. They were allotted several plots below the market rates, which, when sold to civilians at sky-high prices, turned military officials into the most privileged class in Pakistan. The economic resources and their ancillary political dominance was becoming so lucrative that the MPI field was ready to devise other strategies to grasp the products at stake in the game (Bourdieu,1990). It involved valorising the capital that was the strength of the MPI field whereas discrediting the capital on which the strength of their opponents, i.e. politicians, depended.

So the security narrative, for example, that military was not only the protector from external threats but had also the responsibility to keep the country's political house in order too, became so supreme and pronounced that any attempt to weaken it was denounced ferociously. The dominant agent, i.e. military, had devised a strategy (Bourdieu, 1993). According to Cohen (2012), the military started to term the politicians in Pakistan as corrupt because it knew it could not rule the country for a long duration

(due to the pressures of its Western allies). So it made a strategy that would make it difficult for the politicians too to rule this country.

While the military's security narrative had given its cultural capital tremendous success in Pakistan, its political intervention also raised questions within and abroad in a democratic world. And this is why the military had to look out for the cultural capital of the politicians (whose cultural capital is more significant in democracies than the military) to back it up in the so-called democratic system in Pakistan. Thus as Bourdieu contends, social agents in a field are not pieces or particles which could be pulled or pushed in the field; they are the owners of the capital who work towards the preservation or subversion of the field (Bourdieu,1993). Thus to give its power-holding legitimacy, the MPI field had to induct those politicians who could show their conformism and give the MPI field approval to continue its dominance. For example, adhering to the field doxa regarding which field habitus was enough to give them dispositions.

The politicians in the MPI field understood the field via field habitus and knew that if they played the game following the desires of the military, they could reap many benefits in this regard. It got into the dispositions of the politicians that if they were violating the country's constitution by making a non-democratic force (military) relevant in the democratic system. Then they could also do several other corrupt acts (for instance, financial corruption), which would remain hidden in the MPI field. Bourdieu explained this process as the field structures the individual habitus in relation to the field, and then the individual's habitus shows them the field as a meaningful world (Bourdieu, 1990).

Although the joining of the politicians made the MPI field more potent, it also required the field to expand its boundaries to other fields so its influence could be advanced. It involved

but was not restricted to, expanding the MPI field's boundaries to the financial fields (such as banks), the accounting practices of such fields and the accountability system. It all started when the politicians and military high-ups started favouritism and nepotism in the top-notch appointments of the state-owned banks (Rammal, 2008). The financial bureaucrats had also realised that if they had to remain in those lucrative positions, they had to keep these politicians and military officials happy. For Bourdieu, the bureaucracy had always known how to perpetuate itself (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

However, those offering favours and lucrative positions to bankers (by inducting them into the field) were also expecting some favours in return. According to Baig (2000), the entire banking system of Pakistan's nationalised banks became a deep dark system of political and banking corruption. The non-performing loans of the state-owned banks started to skyrocket, and pressures began to mount on the financial bureaucrats to write such loans off to protect the interests of the MPI field. A Deputy Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan once claimed that slightly more than three hundred defaulters from the ruling elite of Pakistan owed Rs 72 billion worth of loans to the state-owned banks (Aslam, 1999). The MPI field had successfully made it to the bureaucratic field and was using its legitimate symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1985) to protect the interests of the field.

Finally, these constant interferences of the MPI field into the state-owned banks of Pakistan (as the case study of this thesis explains better) were not only causing public money to be swindled. However, they were also causing the state-owned banks to follow dubious accounting practices. A former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan once said that the state-owned banks were underreporting their non-performing loans in their books of accounts (Hussain 2002). The MPI field had taken the entire system towards more

corruption in its quest to achieve dominance and the "Statist Capital" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 114).

### **9.1.2 Perpetuation (Conatus) of Political Corruption (Field) and Sufferings of the Accounting Control Systems: A New Theoretical Framework**

My second contribution to this thesis is developing a new theoretical framework to explain political corruption in developing countries like Pakistan. This framework explains how a corrupt field establishes, achieves perpetuation, the conatus gets lots of corruption opportunities and brings suffering to the banking organisations' accounting and internal control systems.

The process of conatus, i.e. bringing perpetuation for the MPI field, also requires the subjugation of the other state institutions, such as the judiciary and the investigative agencies in Pakistan. It lessens the chance of the MPI field's political corruption coming into public knowledge. However, still, such corruption comes to the surface whenever there is hysteresis in the field, i.e. a social crisis causing a mismatch between individuals' habitus and the field. This hysteresis, which occurs twice regarding the case studies of this thesis, results initially between military and politicians and later between military and judiciary. However, over time, the efforts to bring change to the MPI field die down when the state response uses its social magic and turns the attempted revolution in the MPI field into a mere partial revolution. Hence the conatus of the MPI field sustains.

For Bourdieu (1988), it is a combination of the habitus and the *illusio* used by the fields to achieve conatus - a field's innate desire to amplify its standing. And this makes it mandatory for the fields to give a particular "vision of the world" and "practical operations"

in this regard (Bourdieu, 1989: 23). The analysis in this thesis showed how the military used its power to impose a distinct vision and then adopted a particular political posture in Pakistan. For example, it had to insist on its own unique capabilities to run the state by having the status of the 'protector of the national interest' in the country and safeguarding the country from the politicians who were corrupt and whose interests were lying outside Pakistan.

However, the process of conatus also required the MPI field to be protected from other fields, such as the judiciary and the investigating agencies, so these high-powered social fields could not stop the functioning of the MPI field. It connected all these strong state institutions with the MPI field in such a way that a particular field of power got perpetuated in Pakistan. As Bourdieu contends, the field of power dictates the other social fields and what can happen there (Grenfell, 2014). In addition, the whole process of conatus made the politicians docile and compliant with the vision of the MPI field. The political class knew they would have to forego their corruption opportunities and fight back heavily to undo the corrupt image created by the MPI field. So they have no option but to remain subservient to the military and exalt its political interference in Pakistan; a "double game" (Grenfell, 2014: 255) had been instituted by the dominant agents of the MPI field.

This power imbalance in the system resulted in many opportunities for violations of the accounting and internal control systems of Pakistan's state-owned and private banking institutions. For instance, according to Uddin and Hopper (2001), just as the local hegemonic powers make their way to fill the gap left by the foreign colonisations. In the case of Pakistan, its military successfully shaped the accounting and internal control

systems of the state-owned institutions due to the country's weak political system (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015).

The case studies also revealed how due to their differences with the politicians, the former military chiefs changed the political regimes in Pakistan. They violated the accounting and internal controls of the state-owned bank named HBL and financed the whole pursuit with public money, unbeknown to the public. Similarly, the same incident was repeated when the MPI field brought forward its favoured group of politicians. However, upon having differences with them too, it had to resort to another control violation of a private bank, i.e. Mehran Bank and change the provincial government of its dissident politicians.

Hence sufferings of the accounting systems had become a norm in Pakistan's banking organisations, and they made it a part of their habitus that they could not run their businesses until they had the approvals of the power hub, i.e. the MPI field. The symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1985) of the MPI field that had been in existence for several decades had become an efficient way to dominate the banking institutions of Pakistan without making it very obvious.

It made the sufferings of the accounting systems 'internalised' "(Schubert, 2014: 180) by the top echelon of the banking organisations, and they had started having their profound beliefs that the accounting controls in Pakistan only existed at the lower levels of the organisations. The powerful ruling elite could get its things done from the top level without facing any barriers imposed by such controls. This change of habitus is also reflected in the accounting practices of the financial institutions where accounting records, manipulated and breached, had been falsely shown in a way as they were compliant with the rules and regulations of the country.



In light of the above discussion, a question arises: How, in the presence of a highly influential field, is the political corruption of these dominant forces decided by the courts? The answer to this question also lies in hysteresis, which according to Bourdieu (1977), attempts to change the field, i.e. weaken the domination of the dominant agent.

The resonance of such a social crisis (hysteresis) was first heard when political and military conflicts arose in the MPI field. Consequently, political corruption came to public knowledge. The politicians who had joined the MPI field upon showing the cultural capital of their docility had developed new experiences (Bourdieu 2000) with time and started to feel a weakened connection between their habitus and the field. It, in turn, made them feel like a "fish out of water" (Maton, 2014: 56) within the field. Hysteresis in the field resulted in spitting out their political corruption in public.

Similarly, another hysteresis was found in the MPI field when the judiciary also decided on this corruption case, confirming that the MPI field had massively violated the banking controls. The generals, politicians, and bureaucrats involved were ordered to be brought under the ambit of the law. This top court decision was also the result of a conflict between the then-Chief Justice of the top court and the then-President, General Musharraf.

The General's animosity with the judiciary chief had gone to such a length that the military dictator got the Chief Justice arrested. The same chief brought the Asghar Khan case back from the back burner (after sixteen years of filing the petition) upon his reinstatement and decided it within eight months. Hence political corruption in Pakistan always needed a social crisis, a hysteresis, to come to the public knowledge and then be decided by the courts.

For Bourdieu (1999), although hysteresis brings many possibilities of change in the fields, i.e. improving field agents' positions in the fields to break the dominance of the dominant, the cultural arbitrary established by them is not easy an easy task. The dominant's cultural and social capital helps them acquire another dominant position whenever a change in the field is planned (Bourdieu, 1996).

The same could be observed in the theoretical framework given by this thesis that although hysteresis in the field brought political corruption to the public attention and helped the court to decide. However, it failed to eliminate the military's domination from the political system primarily because of the state response. For example, the use of social magic in turning corruption into no corruption proved to be only partial revolutions within the MPI field. The state's continued inability to implicate those who had been part of these corruption cases proved encouraging for the perpetrators. It brought the status of conatus again for the MPI field. In addition, the state's generation of positive emotions for the MPI field not only refused to demoralise political corruption but took it towards its celebritization.

### **9.1.3 Celebritization of Political Corruption: The Art of State**

The third and last contribution of this thesis is about the art of the state, which converts corruption of the MPI field into no-corruption. For example, by not taking any actions to implement the Supreme Court's order of punishing those who had committed this corruption in Pakistan. And justifying corruption by invoking positive emotional responses from the public, hence celebritizing the political corruption.

According to Bourdieu, the state uses its magical powers to construct social realities (Bourdieu et al.,1994). In the context of Pakistan, although the state had expressed its intention to eliminate political corruption from the system. However, it did not prove more than talking the talk. By imposing its "legitimate national culture" (ibid: 8), the state became more tolerant of political corruption. The strategy used in this respect showed the state's power of social magic (Bourdieu,1991).

All the public announcements made by the politicians that the MPI field had been using and abusing them and the admission of the case in the Supreme Court of Pakistan for hearing gave the signals that the state would not tolerate the violation of the state controls anymore. Furthermore, strict actions would be taken by the state against those involved. However, these state actions turned out to be mere "social rituals" (Bourdieu, 1991: 111) performed by the state in this regard.

For instance, the financial bureaucrat of a state-owned bank once admitted in the Supreme Court that he had paid bribes to a politician (and provided an affidavit in this regard). Later retracted that he paid such bribes and submitted a revised affidavit to the Supreme Court. Similarly, in another incident, a politician accepted that they had received money from the ISI, the intelligence agency; however, later, they submitted a revised statement to the Supreme Court that no such money was received. And the Supreme Court of Pakistan accepted all these revised statements without much ado. The politicians used their social magic (Bourdieu, 1991) to increase the ambiguity and term those bribery charges as frivolous. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pakistan validated such claims unquestioningly.

Likewise, the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) also reflected the power of social magic and requested the Supreme Court of Pakistan to withdraw from its stance of implementing the Asghar Khan case, as the agency was finding it hard to investigate the matter any further. The Supreme Court accepted their pleas and delisted the case from further hearings. Such has been the state response regarding those scandals, which had been the most prominent political corruption scandals in the history of Pakistan (Bakhtiar, 1994), where public funds were embezzled from public and private banks. However, the state institutions were not ready to investigate the matter. The state facilitated those who had established this cultural arbitrary, the dominance of the MPI field, and later obscured this discrimination (Ingram and Allen, 2019) and saved them on the pretext of non-availability of evidence; social magic was at its peak indeed.

The state successfully saved the field and the dominant and turned the revolution into a mere partial revolution (Bourdieu, 1993). The state ensured that the MPI field focused on the games being played and improved its positions within the field (ibid). Similarly, the politicians who earlier complained about the military's excesses in politics were now protecting the MPI field. For Bourdieu, someone cannot stay in a field unless that field is not present in them (Grenfell, 2014). So the politicians, as already mentioned, who had approved of the military's corrupt political ambitions themselves had their corrupt ambitions to fulfil. That is why they had never intended to bring a total revolution in the MPI field.

Similarly, the same was reiterated by many participants in this study that politicians first lobby to reach out to the MPI field, and the field accepts them in its quest for legitimacy. In this way, both come into power using their connections. However, in future, when they

both fight for any reason, one starts bickering about the politicians being corrupt. In contrast, the other starts to squabble about the system domination of the MPI field. They both have invested heavily in the MPI field, and they know a complete subversion of the field remains out of the question for them. Hence the conservation of the field (Bourdieu, 1993) suits them the most.

In this way, the tactical treatment of the state makes the political corruption in Pakistan trivialised. Those involved knew their actions would never be reprimanded; instead, they would be encouraged to act in the country's national interest. This generation of positive emotional responses takes the political corruption of the MPI field one step closer to the celebratization of political corruption.

It again takes the discussion towards 'national interest' and the 'guardians of the national interest', which the state uses in its interest. These powerful elements of the MPI field's doxa (Bourdieu, 1977) would not only glorify the military as an institution but also help it justify many of its political excesses. The status of 'national pride' attaches lots of positive emotional responses from the public (Rindova et al., 2006) even in places where it does not deserve such a response. For instance, the military's bribing politicians, rigging general elections and blaming the entire political class as corrupt and incompetent. For some participants, such actions in the MPI field were done out of the 'goodness of their heart'. Because, in their view, the military always wanted to bring patriotic people ahead. And in this process, the election riggings, control violations, and political briberies denote ends justify their means, i.e. everything is for the betterment of this country! So the celebratization of corruption had taken deep roots in the system. The illusion that the MPI

field had created in society stopped them from seeing the illusion in the field (Grenfell, 2014).

Another critical dimension that some participants contended included that the military had never been interested in schooling the politicians or even taking over the country; however, the politicians had compelled the military to form a field and indulge in Pakistan's politics. After all, their institution was the custodian of the national interest of this nation. The same notion of the participants was taking the MPI field's corruption to the stature of noble cause corruption, where Miller (2007) argued that social agents dubbed the corruption in certain institutions as good, and they defended it even if it was ethically wrong for the society. The state had successfully sold a particular doxa to the nation, which again was in the state's best interests. It was a foundation for many people's ideals that politicians can never stop corruption in Pakistan (a phenomenon common to many democratic countries). At the same time, the MPI field was a magic bullet that could cure all political evils (a belief made to succeed specifically in Pakistan).

Lastly, these state narratives (of politicians being corrupt and the military being there to keep a check on them) had developed such cultural norms in Pakistan that democracy had always been viewed as a Western concept. And the crimes against democracy gained the least importance on the pretext of having traditions and cultural norms of Eastern origin (Tanzi, 1994) in Pakistan. The more democracy was criticised, the more room was created for the validity of the MPI field in Pakistan. A doxa so meticulously crafted that it not only evoked public sentiment but also celebrated any corruption that arose in this regard.

## 9.2 Limitations

This study, like many studies, is not free from limitations. The purpose of this section is to highlight these limitations that mainly pertain to the methodology used for this study.

This research could have been more insightful had the real characters of the political corruption scandals been convinced to talk with me. Considering the high profile status of those involved and the connotation of being associated with a corruption case barred many of them from speaking about these cases openly. However, it did not stop me from investigating these cases further. I resorted to interviewing their contemporaries who were knowledgeable about these cases. For example, bureaucrats, politicians, generals, and political journalists, doing their jobs during the period to which the cases of this study relate. However, I felt during the interviews that some of the participants lacked the depth I was looking for. Moreover, their stances were different due to being away from the field. Similarly, they were apprehensive in their conversations, so it was probably the nature of this study that a built-in reservation was typical in many of these participants.

Another limitation was the lack of access to the inquiry commission reports. Both the inquiry commissions set up to investigate Mehran Bank and Habib Bank, the so-called Mehran Bank Commission report and the Habib Bank Inquiry report had been declared national secrets and were beyond the public's reach. I had accessed the State Bank of Pakistan's officials in this regard, but I was told I could not get hold of these sensitive reports. Similarly, a lawyer participant in this study forbade me to look for those reports any further because citation of that report in my thesis could land me into trouble for violating the state secrecy act. Had those reports been accessed, the analysis of this thesis could have been strengthened.

Similarly, sometimes I felt that selection of the participants was also somehow slipping out of my hands. The constant refusals of those more crucial for this study led me to their contemporaries whom the research participants recommended. It meant that I would have listened to similar views from the participants with a particular mindset. However, due to my detailed conversation, the diversity of views helped me minimise this limitation. Furthermore, because of the sensitive nature of this study, some of the participants constrained their views by not stating the facts they could have uttered. Despite my assurances that our conversations would remain secure, some participants were not that open and preferred not to go to a deeper level to discuss things based on their personal experiences.

Lastly, it is also possible that some of the participants exaggerated some things they knew about the case or their role with respect to handling these cases. They might have anticipated that I would be more interested in a particular incident or a piece of information. As I mentioned earlier, one participant asked me why I was more interested in one particular political party's corruption (Habib Bank scandal) than the other party's corruption (Mehran Bank scandal). That participant insisted that he would discuss the other political party's corruption with me, which gave me the idea to include the second case study for this thesis, i.e. the Mehran Bank scandal.

### **9.3 Practical Implications**

"... The state forced me, like everyone else, into myself, and made me compliant towards it; and turned me into a state person, regulated and registered and trained and finished and perverted and dejected, like everyone else. When we see people, we only see state people, the state servants, as we quite rightly say, who serve the state all their



lives and thus serve un-nature [sic] all their lives" (Thomas Bernhard cited in Bourdieu, 1994: 01).

In this part of the chapter, I discuss the practical implications of this thesis and how the phenomenon of political corruption can be explained beyond the political corruption rhetoric adopted by the states, both internationally and locally. This thesis will shape and inform the opinions of laypeople and people from the far-off academic world to figure out the games (Bourdieu, 1977) played out and their impact on the accounting and internal control systems of banking organisations.

For several decades, political interruptions of Pakistan's powerful military have turned its entire state apparatus more reliant on military officials than civilian politicians (Niaz, 2010). It successfully replaced the gap left by colonisation with the military (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). However, it is vital to see the role of the international states (Western powers), whose financial aid has been crucial for sustaining Pakistan's civil and military economy (Ashraf et al., 2018). The international establishment encouraged such military interventions and their political bribes in forming political governments because such interventions had served the interests of the international forces. The question of political corruption and the violation of democratic principles never arise when the Western forces have their interests aligned with the MPI field. However, the moment such interests change their course, the military's political interference would also be viewed differently. The military also knows non-compliance in this situation can be dangerous for the free flow of Western financial assistance.

So what happens when the Western standards on political corruption change, but the financial aid is not to be compromised, and the control over the political system is not let

loose by the military in Pakistan? The strategy of the military changes from direct intervention to indirect. The military would resort to launching its own sponsored politicians in the so-called democratic system of Pakistan. The military's presence in substance does not vanish from the system; it merely changes its form. Hence it is crucial to see the narrative of political corruption in Pakistan in the backdrop of its socioeconomic (aid dependence) and geopolitical (working for the Western interests in South Asia) environment. The international states' tolerance or no tolerance of real democracy and political corruption played a significant role in the strengthening and weakening this phenomenon in Pakistan. For many participants of this study, democracy could not flourish in Pakistan because of the changing ideals of the West. An actual model of Western democracy would have hindered the Western force's way of getting their tasks done using military dictators. The military rule suited them the most.

Besides having this international view on political corruption, consistent military interventions also gave birth to a particular mindset, i.e. disposition (cf Bourdieu, 1983) within Pakistan. The political corruption definition has been changed here. For instance, the military's political ambitions and their competition with the politicians in a democratic system were not to be frowned upon but viewed in the context of its national interest. It was evident in the two corruption cases of this thesis where the state conducted no inquiries into the political excesses of the military. The state had given its verdict with its no-action that Western models of democracy and accountability do not fit in Pakistan's political system. The national interest-based politics had roped the military into the political system. The state had forced and made most people compliant with it (Bourdieu, 1994).

However, this gave birth to two different political narratives (doxa, as referred to by Bourdieu, 1977) in Pakistan's political system. Those who subscribed to the idea of the 'military's political interference in the national interest' of the country deemed a system without the military's political involvement a corruption hub and denounced it as a Western ploy to be imposed on the Eastern countries (as many participants of this study quoted that). On the other hand, some criticised the military's political interferences and termed such actions as blatant acts of corruption (such voices are also included in the discussion chapter of this thesis).

However, this one state and the advocacy of two political systems had implications for Pakistan's judicial, bureaucratic, and banking systems, turning the entire accounting and accountability system confused and complicated. For instance, the acts of political corruption (bribing the politicians) which could have been penalised in any democratic system would now go unpunished in Pakistan on the pretext of the national interest-based system of governance (and not punishing military officials for bribing politicians). So political bribery, which was corruption in democracy ( accepting bribes from the non-democratic forces), had been a no-corruption in a national-interest-based system. The Pakistani political system had to incorporate both these narratives now.

As a result, the system has to experience political corruption twice the size it could have experienced had democracy been in place. For example, democracies are plagued by capitalism and those capitalists who give huge donations that select the leaders for their nations rather than the ordinary people (Lessig, 2013). However, in Pakistan's political system, the common person's say comes after the capitalists and military generals have both exercised their say in the system. The state-owned and private organisations'

accounting and internal control systems, especially banks, must incorporate these facts into their design. The political funding in Pakistan would make them vulnerable twice; for example, such controls could not only be violated by the capitalists for their business interests alone, but the adherents of the national interest could violate them too.

#### **9.4 Future Research**

Further research in this area can include the search for other narratives (as national interest is used in this study), which the states can use in celebritizing political corruption in developing countries to promote their hegemonic powers. Similarly, how much hegemonic narratives co-opt capitalism and impact the accounting and accountability institutions within the particular background of society.

Lastly, the theoretical framework developed in this thesis may also help investigate political corruption in other contexts. It can enrich Bourdieusian studies in accounting that have mainly drawn on the fundamental concepts of Bourdieu, i.e. capital, habitus, and field but developed little analysis around others such as conatus, hysteresis, suffering, social magic, and partial revolutions.

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## Annexure A

## List of Interviews

	Date	Status	Profession	Face to face Interview	Recording Time in Mins
Interview 1	07/10/2019	Bureaucrat 1	Civil Services	✓	50
Interview 2	08/10/2019	Bureaucrat 2	Civil Services	✓	72
Interview 3	16/10/2019	Political Journalist 1		✓	68
Interview 4	17/10/2019	Political Journalist 2		✓	28
Interview 5	23/10/2019	Lawyer 1	Political, Corruption cases expert	✓	61
Interview 6	07/11/2019	Bureaucrat 3	Civil Services	✓	66
Interview 7	12/11/2019	Lawyer 2, Former Politician	Former Defence Minister	✓	62
Interview 8	16/11/2019	Lawyer 3	Former Politician	✓	37
Interview 9	19/11/2019	Political Journalist 3	Journalist	✓	62
Interview 10	20/11/2019	Judge 1	Former Judge Lahore High Court	✓	68
Interview 11	26/11/2019	Judge 2	Former Judge Lahore High Court	✓	51
Interview 12	28/11/2019	Lawyer 4, Former Politician	Lawyer of State Bank in Asghar Khan case; Former Politician	✓	39
Interview 13	29/11/2019	General 1	Ex-Chairman NAB	✓	39

Interview 14	2/12/2019	Political Journalist 4	Journalist at Human Rights Commission of Pakistan	✓	39
Interview 15	3/12/2019	Judge 3	Former Judge of Lahore High Court	✓	69
Interview 16	4/12/2019	Politician 6	Former Chief Minister Punjab	✓	48
Interview 17	5/12/2019	Politician 1	Former Foreign Minister	✓	59
Interview 18	31/12/2019	Political Journalist 5	Journalist	Skype	68
Interview 19	01/01/2020	General 2	Ex-DG NAB	✓	49
Interview 20	09/01/2020	General 3	Worked for ISI	✓	93
Interview 21	16/01/2020	Politician 2	Ex-Information Minister	✓	58
Interview 22	21/01/2020	Politician 3	Former Ambassador to USA	✓	14
Interview 23	21/01/2020	Politician 4	Former Foreign Minister	✓	52
Interview 24	/01/2020	Bureaucrat 7	Former Bureaucrat, Current CEO of a bank	✓	No Recording
Interview 25	24/01/2020	Judge 4	Former Judge of NAB Court	✓	48
Interview 26	24/01/2020	Lawyer 5	Lawyer of petitioner	✓	08
Interview 27	25/01/2020	Political Journalist 6	Journalist	✓	27
Interview 28	26/01/2020	Political Journalist 7	Journalist	✓	62
Interview 29	28/01/2020	General 4	Ex-deputy Military secretary to Prime Minister	✓	71

Interview 30	29/01/2020	Judge 5	Former NAB Judge	✓	28
Interview 31	03/02/2020	Political Journalist 8	Journalist	✓	66
Interview 32	06/02/2020	Judge 6	Former NAB Judge	✓	53
Interview 33	07/02/2020	Political Journalist 9	Journalist	✓	22
Interview 34	12/02/2020	Political Journalist 10	Journalist	✓	44
Interview 35	Multiple dates	Bureaucrat 8	Former Governor State Bank	Email	No Recording
Interview 36	12/02/2020	Bureaucrat 6	Head of Compliance in State-owned Bank	✓	No Recording
Interview 37	14/02/2020	Political Journalist 11	Journalist	✓	No Recording
Interview 38	18/02/2020	Private Banker	Head of Commercial Credit Risk in Government Bank	✓	No Recording
Interview 39	18/02/2020	Politician 5	Former Finance Minister	WhatsApp	35
Interview 40	08/12/2020	Lawyer 7	Lawyer of Defendant	Skype	50
Interview 41	8/12/2020	Lawyer 6	Former Attorney General	✓	80
Interview 42	10/12/2020	Bureaucrat 4	Former President Nationalized Bank	✓	69
Interview 43	12/12/2020	Bureaucrat 5	Former Chairman Pakistan	✓	100

			Banking Council		
Interview 44	20/12/2020	General 5	Former Intelligence Chief	Skype	34
Interview 45	25/12/2020	Political Journalist 12	Journalist	Zoom	50

## Annexure B

### Participant Consent form for Research Project: "Accounting and Political Corruption in Pakistan"

Dear participant,

This research is being carried out by Syed Zain ul Abidin under the supervision of Dr Daniela Pianezzi

If you agree to participate in this study, you will be interviewed by the researcher.

The answers which you provide will be recorded through notes taken by the interviewer/audio recording.

Please see the attached Participant Information Sheet for details about the study and your rights as a participant.

Yours,

Syed Zain ul Abidin

<u>Statement of Consent</u>	<u>Please initial each box</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I agree to participate in the research project, "Accounting and Political Corruption in Pakistan", being carried out by Syed Zain ul Abidin.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This agreement has been given voluntarily and without coercion.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I have been given contact details of the researcher(s).</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I have read and understood the information provided in the Participant Information Sheet</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research and my participation in it.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>I agree for this interview to be audio recorded/recorded via notes taken by the researcher.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/>

\_\_\_\_\_  
Researcher's signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Participant's signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

**Participant Information Sheet for Research Project: “Accounting and Political Corruption in Pakistan”**

Dear participant,

I, Syed Zain ul Abidin, am currently carrying out a piece of research entitled, “Accounting and Political Corruption in Pakistan” under the supervision of Dr Daniela Pianezzi.

This research contributes towards the knowledge that how the officials belonging to various fields use their position, and devise rules of the game which can then change the accounting and internal control systems of the organizations. And what role is played by their background in devising such motivations?

This information sheet provides you with information about the study and your rights as a participant.

**What does taking part in the research involve?**

The data will be collected through semi-structured interview. The interview will be audio-recorded/notes taken by the interviewer and will last approximately 1 hour. You will be asked to talk about your professional experience in this regard and the content of the interview will be used only for my research purposes.

**Do I have to take part?**

Naturally, there is no obligation to take part in the study. It’s entirely up to you. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to give consent to take part. If publications or reports have already been disseminated, these cannot be withdrawn, however, these will only contain anonymised or aggregated data. If you wish to withdraw from the study at any time, please contact the researcher on the details below.

**Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?**

All information collected will be kept securely and will only be accessible by Syed Zain ul Abidin and Dr Daniela Pianezzi. However, this research forms part of the studies at the University of Essex and therefore may be subject to scrutiny by other University staff in determining the outcome of the degree. If you are mentioned individually in any publications or reports, then a participant number or pseudonym will be used and identifying details will be removed. A list may be kept linking participant numbers or pseudonyms to names, but this will be kept securely and will only be accessible by those listed above.

**What happens if something goes wrong?**

If you are harmed by taking part in this research project, there are no special compensation arrangements. Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been treated during the course of this study then you should immediately inform the student and/or their supervisor (details below). If you are not satisfied with the response, you may contact the Essex Business School Research Ethics Officer, Dr Maria Hudson ([mhudson@essex.ac.uk](mailto:mhudson@essex.ac.uk)), or the University of Essex

Research Governance and Planning Manager, Sarah Manning-Press ([sarahm@essex.ac.uk](mailto:sarahm@essex.ac.uk)) who will advise you further.

We would be very grateful for your participation in this study. If you need to contact us in future, please contact me ([sz18521@essex.ac.uk](mailto:sz18521@essex.ac.uk)) or Dr Daniela Pianezzi [daniela.pianezzi@essex.ac.uk](mailto:daniela.pianezzi@essex.ac.uk) You can also contact us in writing at: EBS, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ.

You are welcome to ask questions at any point.

Yours,

Syed Zain ul Abidin